

The London School of Economics and Political Science

Pakistani Worldmaking in International Politics  
Empire, Decolonization and Cold War struggles 1950-1989

Asad Zaidi

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

London, March 2022

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 90,537 words.

This thesis is dedicated to my family, without whom this project would not have been possible, and to my late grandfathers, Dr Zavar Hussain Zaidi and Akbar Karamally.

“This is the season of passion, yet also of the yoke and the noose  
This is the season of repression, yet also of agency and resistance  
The cage may be in your control, but you have no power over  
The Season when the fiery rose blossoms in the garden  
So what if we do not live to see it? There will be others who witness  
The season of the glowering garden, of the nightingale’s song”

Faiz Ahmed Faiz

## Table of contents

Introduction: Pakistan and World Politics	8
1. Theorizing the struggles over the Pakistani Cold War Imaginary	51
2. Anatomies of power in Pakistan	87
3. Cold War Pakistan, Decolonization and the Left: From the 1950s Culture wars to the 1968-9 Uprising	126
4. Pakistani encounters in the Middle East Cold War: The Baghdad Pact, Suez & the global politics of Anti-Imperialism	166
5. When Complexity defeats strength: Afterlives of the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier in the Afghan-Soviet War	205
6. Pakistani entanglements in world order struggles: Anti-Communist Jihad, the Cold War and Decolonization	252
Conclusion	299
Bibliography	310

## Abstract

Conflict in Pakistan became crucial to late Cold War struggles when Pakistanis helped to defeat the Soviet Union during the Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989). This thesis offers an account of Pakistani society and state's significance in shaping the post World War II world order, from the height of decolonization in the 1950s to the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the collapse of the USSR in 1989. It charts how a society that emerged from an imperial frontier, produced anti-colonial and socialist mass politics, before a merger of the religious right and the military state transformed society, enabling a transnational assault on Soviet and Afghan communist forces, through a US led counter-insurgency that spawned the anti-Communist jihad, with on-going legacies for our contemporary era. Understanding how this was possible requires engaging beyond conventional scholarship's preoccupation with state elites, bi-lateral interstate relations and terrorism, to uncover a complex, uneven and shifting social terrain in Pakistan, where colonial inequalities created potent sources of mobilization and conflict in the postcolonial era. It means to examine Pakistani Cold War factions, their transboundary imaginaries and international encounters. Struggles for Pakistan comprised of a vigorous field of socio-political imaginings for a new society, but also for world order. These were projects of worldmaking that connected Pakistanis with the global transformations of the twentieth century. They included nationalists, socialists, Islamists and ethno-separatists, who fought for the structure of power in Pakistan, but also for deciding Pakistan's identity and alignment during the Cold War. Conflictual Pakistani factions engaged in struggles amid world historical transformations of empire, decolonization and Muslim world politics, and within the geopolitics of the Cold War. In viewing world politics as a matter of national elite interactions defined by great powers, orthodox historiographies of Global South states and societies misrepresent postcolonial histories of struggle as the symptoms of weak, failing, third world states. By going beyond dominant IR and political science approaches, this thesis extends scholarship on the legacies of empire in international politics, whilst also intervening in debates about Pakistan's role in geopolitics and the relationship between the Cold War and decolonization. Although Pakistanis suffered greatly through conflict, repression and social upheavals, they also absorbed and adapted the Cold War to their own needs, constraining empires and enabling unruly clients. Pakistanis galvanized the politics of anti-imperialism, anti-communism, Islamism and socialism, in complex and conflicted ways that can tell us a great deal about the modern world.

## Acknowledgements

I owe a great deal of gratitude to my supervisor Tarak Barkawi for his guidance, wisdom and warm mentorship. I would also like to thank Majed Akhter, James Caron, Lisa Tilley, George Lawson, and Martin Bayly, for their generous feedback on chapters. A huge thanks to George Bodie, Mia Certo, Joe Leigh, William Rooke, Mattin Biglari, Zenab Ahmed, Brendan Harvey, Kia Golsorkhi-Ainslie, Nicola Degli Esposti and Kelly-Jo Bluen for their support and for taking the time to read chapters and provide comments. Thanks also to Sanaa Alimia, Aasim Saajad Akhter and Ayesha Siddiqi for their recommendations and encouragement. Thanks also to my friends from the Critical Pakistan project, Azzah Ahmed, Khuzema Gauhar Siddiqui and Ghulam Ali Murtaza for their knowledge, humour and passion to see a better Pakistan. I also owe a great deal to Adiva Lawrence, Olimpia Burchiellaro, Khalfan Al Badwawi, Gabriel Popham, Beatrice Tura, as well as Shahid Padhani, Abbas Asaria, Ned Dukes, Kabir Joshi, Flora Cartright, Sinead Macinnes, Daniel Turi, Christian Turek, Jordan Brown, Rob Peas, Yasameen Hussein, Delilah Dumont, Mollie Hanley, Alexa Goodman, Josh Middleton, Chloe Evans, Pete Yelding, Rob Shipster, Luke Mills Pettigrew, Ally Rooms, Beni Evans, Milaad Rajai, Niall Brown, Frobisher Solomon, Austin Cooper, Rohan Rawat, Ashwani Rajawat, Bareesan Potharatnam, as well as Fred Molin, Owen Roys, Mehmet Kurdi, Tom Wragg, Jaskaran Sarkaria, Emily Behan, Carmen Castrillon, Michael Slevin, Nick Collis, Andy Booth and Lawrence Crompton for their friendship and support during this project. There are many others, teachers and friends, particularly at the LSE IR department, at SOAS and at Birmingham University, whom this thesis is also indebted to. I thank them all. Lastly for all their love and support I thank my family for all they have done to help me on this journey.

## **Introduction**

### **Pakistan and World Politics**

Conflict in Pakistan became crucial to late Cold War struggles when Pakistanis helped to defeat the Soviet Union during the Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989). This thesis offers an account of Pakistani society and state's significance in shaping the post World War II world order, from the height of decolonization in the 1950s to the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the collapse of the USSR in 1989. It charts how a society that emerged from an imperial frontier, produced anti-colonial and socialist mass politics, before a merger of the religious right and the military state transformed society, enabling a transnational assault on Soviet and Afghan communist forces, through a US led counter-insurgency that spawned the anti-Communist jihad, with on-going legacies for our contemporary era.

Understanding how this was possible requires engaging beyond conventional scholarship's preoccupation with state elites, bi-lateral interstate relations and terrorism, to uncover a complex, uneven and shifting social terrain in Pakistan, where colonial inequalities created potent sources of mobilization and conflict in the postcolonial era. It means to examine Pakistani Cold War factions, their transboundary imaginaries and international encounters. Struggles for Pakistan comprised of a vigorous field of socio-political imaginings for a new society, but also for world order. These were projects of worldmaking that connected Pakistanis with the global transformations of the twentieth century. They included nationalists,

socialists, Islamists and ethno-separatists, who fought for the structure of power in Pakistan, but also for deciding Pakistan's identity and alignment during the Cold War. Conflictual Pakistani factions engaged in struggles amid world historical transformations of empire, decolonization and Muslim world politics, and within the geopolitics of the Cold War.

In viewing world politics as a matter of national elite interactions defined by great powers, orthodox historiographies of Global South states and societies misrepresent postcolonial histories of struggle as the symptoms of weak, failing, third world states. By going beyond dominant IR and political science approaches, this thesis extends scholarship on the legacies of empire in international politics, whilst also intervening in debates about Pakistan's role in geopolitics and the relationship between the Cold War and decolonization. Although Pakistani society suffered greatly during conflict, repression and social upheavals, they also absorbed and adapted the Cold War to their own needs, constraining empires and enabling unruly clients. Pakistanis galvanized the politics of anti-imperialism, anti-communism, Islamism and socialism, in complex and conflicted ways that can tell us a great deal about the modern world.

Complexity often overwhelms might in world politics. Imperial forms of divide and rule created conflict-ridden social terrains during the transition from colonial to the postcolonial world (Cooper & Stoler: 1997, Wolf: 1982, Bhambra: 2013, Mugabane: 2005). Past empires set up the new postcolonial states and on looking superpowers with further fractured societies in the Global South. Encounters between Global North and Global South are mutually co-constitutive, transforming the world in the process. Yet whilst International Relations (IR) and social theory routinely underplay and under theorize southern agency and encounters, Postcolonial theory largely fails to offer transnational accounts of security, hierarchy and geopolitics, despite rare and

important exceptions (Go: 2016, Barkawi: & Laffey: 2006). How then do we go about studying the Pakistani encounter with the International?

As the frontline of the Great Game, the Cold War and later the War on Terror, the idea that the territories of modern day North West Pakistan encompassed a frontier defence for Western interests against hostile forces in and beyond Afghanistan, has long held a place in the imperial imagination (Hopkirk: 1990, Jalal: 2014, Bayly: 2016, Manchanda: 2020). Pakistan has a long-standing relationship with the US emerging between 1950-1955 culminating in military alliances, including the Central Treaty organization, signed during the Baghdad Pact in 1955, which tasked Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and Turkey with preparing the first line of defence against possible Soviet incursion into the Middle East (Jasse: 1991, Hashmi: 2011). Pakistan-US relations have since grown to include deep diplomatic, military and intelligence links with the US, as well also commercial, technological and cultural ties. Nevertheless these ties have been subject to, alienation and distrust, despite mutual-security concerns.

Adopting the British imperial approach of using Indian Muslim troops in its colonial armies to safeguard interests in the Middle East, the US strategized and encouraged Pakistan into regional security roles in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, both to guard oil interests as well as help regional countries fight counter-insurgencies. This set of connections, across political, bureaucratic and security relationships, was institutionalized and intensified during the Afghan-Soviet war and again, following 9/11 during the War on Terror (Bajwa: 1996, Hilali: 2005, Tahir: 2021, Khan: 2020). Pakistani Cold War society included both pro-imperial and anti-imperial forces, the former including the military officers, industrialists, politicians and landlords that would become the fulcrum of the new postcolonial Pakistani state, and the latter being the assortment of counter-hegemonic factions that challenged the state

narrative on world order, and the state's alliance with the US during the Cold War. In the early years after independence no single political faction exercised mastery over the machinery of the state. Yet things would change within the first decade of independence with the development of the military-beauracritic complex and later, eras of martial rule and the growing militarization of Pakistani society, closely tied to the desire to offset insecurity with India through defence contracts and establishing security ties with Cold War ideologues in Washington (Alavi: 1972, Jalal: 1990, Akhtar: 2018).

Pakistanis also had a complicated relationship with the Muslim and anti-colonial world. On one hand, they occupied a position where Pakistan's first state managers proudly identified themselves as the first Islamic state, and sought to identify themselves with potential allies in the Middle East, particularly during periods in which the country fought wars with India, during 1947, 1965 and 1971. Likewise, the Pakistani street was animated by calls for pan-Muslim and anti-colonial solidarity during the height of decolonization, often in direct opposition to Pakistani leaders. On the other hand, Pakistani state officials were viewed with suspicion in some quarters of the Arab world, particularly as Pakistan's induction into the US Cold War alliance coincided with Arab Nationalism, the Bandung Conference and the broader global struggles for an anti-colonial world politics.

Partition created an uneven social terrain. Social factionalism engendered a liberal nationalist elite and anti-imperial leftist opposition at the beginning of the Cold War that gave way to unison between the religious right wing and the military (Toor: 2011: 3). These struggles were connected with wider conflicts in Muslim world politics: between anti-imperial nationalist and Marxist forces, pro-western anti-communists and Islamists. But they also reflected contingent histories of inter-societal conflict and

transnational mobilizations in Pakistan, where the state was vested with both reconstituted imperial era institutions, as well as being divinely sanctioned by state approved clergy, as an Islamic state. The ambivalences of Pakistani identity would to come to a head with the world-historic implications of the Soviet Afghan war, the triumph of the West, and the deployment of Jihadism in the service of empire.

These imperial, Cold War and postcolonial histories explain something missing in the conventional 'small wars' studies, and counterinsurgency literatures, which tend to focus on why 'big' nations loose small wars, or how 'the weak' win asymmetric conflicts, through a narrow focus on tactics and strategy, divorced from the sociologies of the Global South (Mack: 1975, Toft: 2005). Could it be that Pakistan's ambiguous formation lent itself to the entwinement of three strange bedfellows: globalized political Islam, socialist anti-imperialism and anti-communist national security politics? (Piscatori: 2006, Roy: 2002). And what happens when these worldmaking projects begin to seep into one another, further complicating Pakistani decolonization? Underestimating the imaginaries of those who oppose empire has long been a problem for Western scholarship, media and foreign policy. Yet history shows us how inter-societal conflict, histories of empire and South-South connection, constrain great powers and postcolonial states alike.

Scholars of security studies and foreign policymakers have failed to diagnose the issue correctly, often reinforcing a Eurocentric and often orientalist perspective of Pakistan and its inhabitants (Fair: 2006, Paul: 2014, Murphy: 2012). Eurocentric International Relations treats non-European processes as derivative, a fact not lost on those seeking to explore how alternative imaginings of community have played into the emergence of modern postcolonial states and societies (Chatterjee: 1990, Chakrabarty: 1992). One way to address the puzzle of Pakistan of how Pakistanis punch above their weight in world politics, is look beyond the India-centric understanding of Pakistan in terms of engaging in

the Cold War from a South Asian regional dynamic (Sayyid: 2017). This well versed line and important form of inquiry has provided us with much in the way of diplomatic and military relations in South Asia, and of course the ways that Pakistan's leaders sought to offset insecurity with India will be discussed in the thesis as a core fundamental feature in Pakistani politics. However India-centres South Asian studies have inadvertently positioned Pakistan on the periphery of an already supposedly peripheral regional system (McMahon: 1994, McGarr: 2013). This reifies the Anglo-American imagining of South Asia in regards to Western strategic interests and imprisons our understanding of Pakistani international politics in South Asia. Furthermore the regionalization of international politics through the institutionalization of distinct knowable regions and thus areas of study, Area Studies, has roots in Cold War modernization theory, and neglects the transboundary dynamism of international social relations (Hoffmann: 1977).

Orthodox IR and the social sciences have consistently been unable to broadly how we analyse societies in the Global South that absorb the politics of superpowers and global security networks. If we begin our theorizing from the notion that the state is an important component of a wider set of social relations, we can integrate other metrics of the social. Provincializing the state maintains its usage in our analysis, but centres social relations and the struggles for power among social forces, where the state intercedes in relations with global forces, but neither in determining nor in uni-directional ways (Go: 2016: 101). Instead we study what relations between postcolonial societies, transnational movements and states can tell us about security and hierarchy in world politics, particularly when we examine the *longue durée* of historical processes, alongside both inter-state politics, and transnational encounters between societies and movements across borders.

However, history and theory provide tools to uncover critical genealogies of power and creative resistance in Pakistan. From this vantage point, we can reckon with an entire

architecture of representation marshalled in the depiction of Global south societies, and trouble its foundations in Eurocentric and Orientalist understandings of the world (Adib-Moghaddam: 2007). I will discuss in detail below the methods this projects deploys to combat Eurocentrism, however in this section I want to consider particular features of postcolonial international relations, and the ways in which current scholarship depicts Pakistan's international politics.

In order to account for how complex social terrains in Pakistan constrained empires, we need to understand how imperial legacies animated societal contestation in Pakistan during the Cold War, how national elites shared the stage with rival articulators of Pakistan, and how socialist, Islamist, anti-colonial and ethno-nationalist forces were able to destabilize a singular foreign policy identity. This means investigating how Pakistani Cold War factions wrought distinct internationalisms, and when and how their forms of 'worldmaking' shaped the hierarchies and character of world politics.

Rather than seal off the temporalities and geographies of processes of imperialism, decolonization, Muslim world transformation and Cold War power struggles, we need to think beyond the unit of the state, and its normative association with failure in the postcolonial context. Rather, we need to think deeper about how we can create a historical, transnational and sociological account of a moving matrix of power, involving a vibrant social field involving societies across borders, postcolonial states and world powers (Burbank & Cooper: 2010, Westad: 2005).

Consequently this thesis challenges perspectives that condense Pakistan's international relations in terms of dualities. The foremost of these relies on an 'externalist' approach that reduces Pakistan to a durable or duplicitous regional client of the US on the periphery of South Asia, or invokes an 'internalist' perspective that understands the total

historical significance of Pakistan's Cold War contributions purely through its state's foreign policy and international relations, seeing them as deriving solely from the interests of a narrow state-class (McGarr: 2013, McMahon: 1994, Nawaz: 2008, Haqqani: 2005).

Whilst the former, side-lines Global South states and societies as either deficient or resulting from generalizable patron-client relations, and imprisons Pakistan's importance in the study of the Subcontinent, the latter is imprisoned within the confines of the domestic-international divide in the social sciences, which privileges an elite centric analysis of a narrowly demarcated political arena. The second binary relates to normative assessments of Pakistani security relations. Here security studies academics either portray Pakistani Cold War politics as an unruly, dangerous example of disruptive Western clients, or as a case of durable, frontline client, not given enough credit in their efforts in the fight against Communism, and Jihadism (Fair: 2006, Rashid: 2008, Lieven: 2011). Third, there is the duality presented between those who study Pakistan through its political-military relations, and those who tend to focus on cultural politics, national identity struggles, and the origins and development of Pakistani nationalism (Abbas: 2004, Jalal: 2014, Shaikh: 2009).

In attempting to supplant these dualities, the thesis develops a global historical sociology and international postcolonial theory of Pakistani Cold War encounters. Its two main conceptual pillars relates to Pakistani Cold War factions who fought for power in Pakistan, but also the right to define Pakistani global identity and action. They relate to how these factions maintained 1) 'Pakistani Cold War imaginaries' which impacted their 2) 'transboundary encounters (i.e. international) and relations', together forming the contested multiplicity of the 'transboundary Pakistani Cold War imaginary' and its worldmaking potential. This theorization enables me to analyse a complex and changing multiplicity, at once examined as contested and fragmented and at the same time treated

as analytical whole, allowing for a focus on particular trajectories between Pakistani state, society forces, during given international events and encounters, and within geopolitical theatres of interaction, involving historically and socially complex entanglements of the politics of empire, the Cold War and decolonization.

To build this panorama, I am working within historical IR, postcolonial theory and global historical sociology. I embrace Robert Cox's urge to study states, social forces and world order together in a single analytical frame (Cox: 1981). This also means being aware of Julian Go's and Gurminder Bhambra's distinction between agency and agency-in effect, a sub-division of agency that works well in thinking about the forms of direct and indirect agency of postcolonial societies, for example how pyrrhic victories transform both imperial 'metropolises' and 'peripheries', or how to think about societies that withstand and absorb epochs of great power confrontation and regional proxy wars (Go: 2016: 140, Bhambra: 2014: 42).

Temporally, the project develops a *longue durée* account, nesting Pakistan's Cold War relations within a wider historical arc starting with the late 19<sup>th</sup> century height of European colonialism and the fracture of European and Ottoman empires in Asia in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. It also inculcates insights from the contemporary period, in particular the context of Pakistan's efforts to quell insurgencies in the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands, and two decades of the War in Terror ending in NATO's retreat from Kabul in 2021.

I am paying close attention to the effect of social multiplicity in the generating of world historical events, and the spatial dynamics of these events. I am using the idea of historical events as socially encompassed, as in William Sewell's notion of "eventful temporality (which) recognizes the power of events in history...actions are constrained and enabled by

the constitutive structures of their societies” (Sewell: 2005: 100). This helps me draw attention to particular historical and sociological dynamics during periods of war, alliance building, and rupture. It allows me to think about Pakistani imaginaries as underpinning state and society forces and institutions, whilst also thinking about distinct transboundary arenas, fields or theatres of interaction that cut across borders and continents. For example if we think of the social encompassment to the Afghan-Soviet war, we are able to better understand how the struggle for Pakistan impacted world order struggles beyond its borders, and beyond the confines of categories such as South Asia and the Middle East. Instead, we move towards new categories such as West Asia and South West Asia, as well as thinking about the overlapping and distinct historical processes connecting the Cold War and decolonization, which can aid innovative work at the cutting edge of history, theory<sup>1</sup> and the study of international politics (Leslie & James: 2015).

In the final two chapters, the thesis examines the role of war as a transformative and productive power that is generative of changing socio-political arrangements, transforming societies whilst destabilizing accompanying ideas regarding hierarchy and social order (Foucault: 2004: 47). Second, it works within a recent trend in scholarship that seeks to critique Eurocentric understandings of war, through reflecting on wars of decolonization in the former colonies, in order to outline how different experiences, geographies and histories of conflict shape experiences of war, society and order. As such, this thesis also operates within a move towards a postcolonial war studies, particularly regarding the analysis of the Afghan-Soviet war (Barkawi: 2016: 1).

---

<sup>1</sup> Theory is understood as the systemic, generalizable inquiry into social life, which offers causal, constitutive, and normative avenues for investigation. History is understood, here as revealing the relationships between power and knowledge, both as a means of explaining socio-historical processes, as well as simultaneously being our epistemological knowledge of these processes. We are both makers and narrators of history, where the dominance of certain narratives at the expense of others, tells us about what becomes acceptable as history and what does not. It is in the silences, disjunctures, and ruptures in historical production, where we can examine how power, “precedes the narrative proper, contributes to its creation and to its interpretation” (Trouillot: 1995: 28). It is in, “the range of narratives that specific collectivities must put to their own tests of historical credibility because of the stakes involved in these narratives” (Trouillot: 1995: 14).

Concentrating on three main socio-political forces, first pro-Western conservative and liberal national elites, second the Islamist movement and third, anti-colonial and socialist factions, the thesis analyses how social forces shaped the struggles over Pakistan and if and how they effected the wider processes involving decolonization and the Cold War. In term of world political events, I primarily focus on the Baghdad Pact and the Suez crisis in the ‘early Cold War’ and the Afghan-Soviet War in the ‘late Cold War’ period, and their legacies for the post-Cold War world. Nevertheless the thesis also refers to many other key international events during this period, including the 1955 Bandung conference, the 1960 Sino-Soviet split, the 1968 Havana Cultural Congress, the 1969 Pakistan overthrow of the Ayub regime, the 1973-4 oil crisis, the 1979 Iranian revolution, the rise of Zia’s military junta and the US led global counter-insurgencies of the 1980s. More broadly, the project discusses differing conceptions of decolonization and the Cold War in Pakistan, as well as the rise and decline of political alliances, initiatives and military campaigns, within the wider context of the legacies of the British empire in South Asia, the lacuna left in West Asia following the decline of the Ottoman Caliphate, and the trajectory of global power politics during the Cold War.

To analyse processes of historic change, we must think through 1) the resonance of universal claims made by competing Pakistani factions 2) the ability of Pakistani faction’s to attract support within the structure of power in Pakistan, principally through popular momentum and institutions, and 3) the influence of Pakistani encounters within wider transboundary theatres of geopolitics, and 4) where agency was enabled or constrained during critical junctures. This framework enables the thesis to craft a critical genealogy and alternative theory of Pakistan’s world historical significance in shaping Cold War international politics as being the result of a dynamic interplay of conflictual social and political forces within a complex and changing social field, centred on their understanding

of what Pakistan ought to represent on the world stage; their transboundary relations and their international encounters in given theatres of international politics. In doing so, the thesis makes an original contribution to the fields of critical IR, global historical sociology, Cold War historiography, postcolonial studies, the study of decolonization, as well as Pakistan and West Asian studies.

Consequently this study works as an argument against three major ways of thinking about Pakistan and world politics. First it stands in opposition to orthodox analyses of Pakistan in political science and dominant accounts in Pakistani historiography, that foreground teleological, official histories of the diplomatic politics of the nation-state, to the detriment of studying the inter-societal multiplicity of international politics. It does so in part by introducing a whole cast of non-state elite forces into the conversation, by taking Pakistani anti-imperial, socialist and Islamist forces seriously, in the context of world events, and by considering Pakistani Cold War events outside of the dominant rubrics which focus solely on Pakistan-India conflict, the Pakistan-US alliance, terrorism, and the quest for nuclear weapons (Fair: 2006, Paul: 2014, Murphy: 2012). Second, the thesis argues against dominant analyses of postcolonial states in social sciences scholarship, that present the deficiencies of 'Third World' states as solely deriving from the result of domestic failures to modernize in line with Western requirements, rather than resulting from the imperial, and postcolonial dimensions of geopolitics (Ayooob: 1995, Jackson: 1990). Third, the project works in contrast with dominant accounts of the global Cold War as a 'long peace', and compliments the work of historians such as Westad, Kwon and Chamberlin, who excavate the violent and bloody conflicts of the Cold War in the Global South, and how they intersected with histories of empire and decolonization (Westad: 2005, Kwon: 2010: Chamberlin: 2019).

Across orthodox accounts of world order, the historical process of decolonization forced through by anti-colonial struggles for liberation, are viewed as of secondary importance to the changing characteristics of superpower conflict, from the Second World War to the Cold War. Rather, we should also pay attention to the detailed accounts in Cold War history, that that examine how the processes of decolonization interconnected with the Cold War in the Global South, and the implications for planetary social relations (James & Leake: 2015, Barkawi: 2019, Getachew: 2019). Accordingly this study works to shift the primary focus away from great powers and their role in Cold War struggle, and the preoccupation with the 'long peace' in Europe (Gaddis: 1989), to thinking through the role of war and struggle in postcolonial societies and states like Pakistan, whilst reflecting on the colonial afterlives in the Cold War and the repercussions of global anti-communism in fracturing not only socialist but anticolonial momentum, particularly during late Cold War counterinsurgencies, the rise of the 'New Right' in Washington and London, and the ascent of Jihadism in the furnace of neoliberal globalization.

Hence this thesis advances current scholarship at four levels; 1) as a contribution to discussions of transnational change and hierarchy in IR; 2) as an intervention in debates about the dialogic character of security and global power politics in which political-military relations and socio-cultural factors intercede; 3) as a piece of work advancing understandings of Pakistan's Cold War encounters 4) and as a study which seeks to uncover the interconnections between decolonization and Cold War international politics (Mattern & Zarakol: 2016, Goddard & Nexon: 2016, James and Leake: 2017). What I propose here is a historical, relational study of multi-scaled encounters of social forces, states and planetary powers. Rather than attempting to offer a totalizing history of Pakistan as linear state-society history, I want to offer a critical analysis of world politics through the Pakistani position in global networks.

## **Empire, anticolonialism and the co-constitution of imaginaries and worldmaking**

In the mid twentieth century decolonization struggles endured despite the onset of Cold War superpower struggle. Notwithstanding the deep imperial legacies on the Pakistani state, the political geographies of South Asia and the wider international system, anti-colonial internationalism and ideas of Muslim South Asian selfhood and place within the global Ummah, provided potent universalisms that laid the ground for expressions of postcolonial nationalism, Islamism and socialism in Cold War Pakistan.

Diverse Pakistani social forces contended with the collective trauma from two Partitions, the first in 1947 splitting British India into Pakistan and India, and the second in 1971, the result of massacres and bloody conflict with East Pakistani separatists supported by India, ending in the independence of Bangladesh. When one takes into consideration the traumas of successive dismemberments, costly wars with India in 1947, 1965 and 1971, and conflicts in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North West Frontier Province) and Baluchistan, alongside Pakistan's manifold socioeconomic problems, and international relations, the complexity of Pakistani Cold War divisions becomes all too apparent.

This has led some to argue that Pakistan's political failures reside in the inability to force a singular national identity. From this perspective, Pakistan has been argued to be 'insufficiently imagined' (Rushdie in Oldenberg: 1985: 71). By contrast this thesis turns attention to a host of actors who reside in multiple sites, who don't just survive and traverse international terrains, but actively contest, reimagine and remake its possibilities. They include anti-colonial and socialist movements and internationalism, often left out of conventional histories. Goswami is instructive here. She argues that, although the

“triumph of the nation-state as the normative unit of the interstate system has been taken as methodologically conclusive, entrenching the sense that internationalism was either a minor key of anticolonialism or a ‘futile holding operation’ against the inevitable consolidation of the nation form...this historicist conflation of a contingent outcome as a methodological premise obscures the fact that the course of interwar struggles was neither knowable in advance nor determined” (Goswami: 2002: 1462). As such, “the flattening of anti-imperial politics to nationalism and the depiction of decolonization as a linear transition from empire to nation has acquired the fixity of common sense. It orients political and intellectual histories of colonial societies and underwrites postcolonial theories” and means, “we know very little about a political imaginary that galvanized collective identification and an intensity of lived attachment on a scale comparable only to nationalism. And we know even less about its concrete workings in colonial worlds, where competing conceptions of a non-imperial future animated a heady mix of utopian aspiration and pragmatic reckoning, collective action and conceptual improvisation” (Goswami: 2002: 1462).

This problem is heightened by the lack of internationalist archival material in comparison to nationalist work on Pakistan. As such the critical scholar must engage in detective work to discover internationalist perspectives and experiences outside of the orthodox cannon, and to look into the blind spots of national and international historiographies in order to uncover in what ways the colonial division of the world came to be intersected with Cold War global politics, and how divisions in colonial societies became both sites of Cold War global and regional confrontation, as well as sites of also becoming sites of anti-colonial, socialist as well as radical nationalist, ethno-separatist and religious politics.

The rise of the nation-state and inter-state system, and the adjacent rise of global capitalism, signified the immense influence of European colonialism on the very structures

of world politics. The construction of the postcolonial nation-state has come to be argued particularly within the postcolonial turn, as a form of imported statecraft in the formerly colonized world, a machination of transnational elite politics unable to forge forms of self-governing, radical redistribution and anti-colonial awakening that millions of people across the world had strived for. Adom Getachew's work is instructive. She argues, "decolonization, was a project of reordering the world that sought to create a domination-free and egalitarian world order" and recasts "anti-colonial nationalism as worldmaking" (Getochew: 2019: 2) to shift away from a view of decolonization purely as postcolonial state formation. Instead, global decolonizing movements viewed formal decolonization as one step in a wider struggle for a world system based on institutional transformation in order to remove imperial hierarchy and racial supremacy from world politics.

My own mapping of 'worldmaking' also foregrounds anti-colonial nationalism, exploring its hydra headed changes after independence, in order to account for how anti-colonial movements mutated in the face of state repression and global proxy wars. This means studying how the structure of power in Pakistan changes, and how Cold War factions created movements that sought to reshape Pakistani politics. It requires tying Pakistani struggles to their international encounters, and with struggles for world order. In this sense, I am making the case for the co-constitution of Pakistani Cold War factions with their imaginaries. Pakistani Cold War movements had varied success at worldmaking. Hence the thesis charts how their efforts at solidarity, alliance building and conflict nested within broader struggles for power including colonial, anti colonial, communist, anti-communist, and Islamist politics, and how struggles for power overlapped with the struggle to define the meaning of Pakistan in world politics.

Pakistanis expressed and fought for visions of 'worldmaking' that escape the conceptual divisions and historical assumptions of Eurocentric scholarship, and imply the resonances

of colonial, Muslim world and decolonization trajectories. Thus Pakistani factions articulated popular worldmaking projects- be it the capitalist nation-state and the Western geopolitical and territorial model, the international Muslim Ummah, differing conceptions of pan-Islam and Islamism, socialist and anti-colonial world orders. It is these universalist, cultural, and trans-regional dynamics that provided Pakistani social forces and their imaginaries with powerful symbolic and material resources useful for identification, recruitment and alliance-building, and played into the geopolitical struggles that Pakistanis came to be absorbed in during the Cold War, particularly in terms of the deep social ties binding the Middle East with Pakistani society (Devji: 2011: 41).

### **Pakistanis, empires and superpowers**

The claim that Pakistan frustrated both superpowers needs substantiation. Societies inhabiting contemporary Pakistan and Afghanistan at once provided empires with military personnel, as well being the sites of resistance that constrained empires during the Great Game, Cold War and War on Terror. The magnitude of the response to imperial violence flummoxed the British Imperial State during the Anglo-Afghan wars (1839-1919), the Soviet Union during the Cold War and later the US post 9/11.

The geopolitical theatre of Pakistan-Afghanistan has thus been historically permeated with imperial and anti-imperial struggles. Indeed, the British Raj, the jewel of the British Empire, “possessed the world’s largest Muslim population, which provided Britain with a substantial portion of the army with which she controlled large parts of Asia, Africa and the Middle East” (Devji: 2013: 21). Indian Muslim officers, who would become Pakistan’s early political and military leaders, fought on behalf of the British in Asia and the Middle East. The experience sharpened their sense of their place in world politics, as the bridge between the Anglo-American and Muslim worlds, and informed their dissatisfaction with

Partition, and the sense they had lost of the centre-ground of the Subcontinent which the Muslim Mughals had ruled for centuries prior to British rule. It created a sense that the West owed them, a recurring theme in Indian Muslim and later Pakistani elite's relations with empire.

The Pakistani state ultimately endured a pyrrhic victory during the Afghan-Soviet war, as on-going conflict, destitution, underdevelopment continue to plague the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Given the cost of Cold War military dictatorships supported by the US, the flows of arms and narcotics into Pakistan resulting from Pakistan's support for the Mujahedeen, and the resulting fraying of social and political life in the country, one could be forgiven for thinking that the Pakistanis lacked agency in world politics, or that agency only resided within a powerful elite.

Yet Pakistanis constrained the policies of both superpowers during the Cold War, albeit in markedly different ways. The United States frequently found itself in tense relations with the Pakistani defence establishment and Pakistani society over Pakistan's relations with India, quest for nuclear weapons and in disputes over military and financial sponsorship, whilst Pakistani leaders navigated the societal desire for anticolonial and Muslim solidarity in foreign policy, whilst eyeing up lucrative military contracts from the US, to aid fellow US Cold War allies in the Middle East, particularly during the early decades of the Cold War. Here the Pakistani role was limited, partly because the dreaded Soviet incursion into the Middle East never materialised, and partly because other region's Cold War theatres were at the time central to world order struggles. Yet we see the entrenchment of imperial patron-client relations into the Cold War period.

Pakistani encounters were far more decisive to global politics during the late Cold War, particularly when the Soviet Union became increasingly mired in the unforgiving terrains of Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989). Pakistanis found themselves on the front-line of the last major 'hot' Cold War, a decisive confrontation that would bring the Soviet Union to its knees and usher in a new era of world history characterized by globalisation and a decade of much celebrated US unipolarity, as the hubris of US empire reached its zenith (Fukuyama: 1992, Huntington: 1996). But it would also nurture the rise of religious, ethnic and nationalist militancy, and the wars in the Middle East that would spill over across the world, and shatter the myth of American invincibility (Devji: 2013, Aydin: 2017). This was the result of a transfer of Pakistani geopolitical agency outside the confines of the state, to include the militants who fought the Soviet Union. Thus Pakistanis showed greater agency beyond what is recognised by Cold War historiography and post 1945 histories of world order. It is in the conflagration of the Afghan-Soviet war that they became decisive to not only superpower confrontation, but also as a crucible for broader anti-colonial, nationalist, socialist and Islamist trajectories in South West Asia.

### **Conceptual definitions**

In the following chapter I refine my explanations of how imaginaries, social forces and their transboundary relations are different from national and inter-state analysis of international relations, and how the two come together in this project. Here I am concerned with clarifying the definitions of 1) the Pakistani Cold War imaginary, its multiple, contesting factions, and 2) their transboundary relations, in order to later assess their importance in given geopolitical encounters.

I define the Pakistani Cold War imaginary as 1) a social phenomenon with insights for Pakistani impacts on the Afghan Soviet war, and 2) as a vantage point from which to tackle the question of postcolonial polities and their impact in North-South security encounters. What the Pakistani Cold War imaginary can explain is how Pakistani inter-societal struggles constrained great powers and postcolonial states alike, and how Pakistanis came to play contested, wide-ranging and world-historic roles during the Afghan-Soviet Cold War. Imaginaries in this conception are deeply tied to particular Pakistani Cold War factions and inform their international encounters.

Imaginaries help us think about societies as co-creative, and points to the importance of collective self-narratives, ideas, symbols, institutions and practices for understanding our social whole. This thesis reconceptualises the concept of the imaginary in light of the colonial encounter in order to readdresses the imbalance between understandings of the imaginary as constantly collaborative, in favour of an imperial and anti-imperial dynamism, which considers the conflictual and hierarchical dimensions of modernity.

Pakistani Cold War factions and the contested Pakistani Cold War imaginary, itself a multitude of clashing formations, are transboundary in the sense that they operate outside the confines of the state and connect through multi-scaled forms of interaction, to societies, states and movements elsewhere. I derive my conception of transboundary relations from the notion that they include, “histories that interconnect people across borders, whether these borders are represented by groups, states, regions, empires, or other entities” (Barkawi & Lawson: 2017:3). This conception allows me to better describe particular geopolitical arenas, fields or theatres, which operate as trans-national social terrains involving multi-scaled interactions across and beyond the nation-state.

Henceforth this analysis allows me to diversify the array of political actors that are consequential for world politics, to think more closely about their sociologies, institutions

and imaginaries and acknowledges the multi-dimensionality of social relations in international politics.

### **Combatting Eurocentrism**

Classic theories of late modernity and globalization have generated internalised notions of the rise of capitalist modernity as primarily a European phenomena, an issue we see time and again, be it in theories of the imaginary, globalization or modernity (Taylor: 2004, Castels: 1996, Appadurai: 1996). What ahistoric and presentist visions of world order do is to not only neglect histories beyond Europe, but also remove struggle and contestation from histories of Europe. To repel this we need to uncover the global histories of co-constitution, in which Europe developed with international others (Barkawi: 2015, Chakrabarty: 2007, Wolf: 1992). It also means foregrounding the role of dialectical relations of the colonial encounter in forging the processes of modernity, and the divergent experiences of the International, as a result of rather than as a by-product of modernity, thereby repelling the analytical bifurcation of world politics as the separation of Europe from the rest (Adams et al: 2005: 60).

Avoiding the pitfalls of Eurocentrism and methodological nationalism<sup>2</sup> means attending to how we internationalize modern self-understandings to include worldmaking, whilst inculcating diverse and particular forms of modern self-understandings into our theorizing. Bhabra argues persuasively that the fact that colonialism is consistently written out of the origins story of capitalism and modernity, even by accounts which actively take part in the project of writing pluralistic accounts of modern politics, is exemplar of the, “methodological assumption that rests on the believed ‘undesirability’ of

---

<sup>2</sup> I understand the purposes of provincializing Eurocentrism through Dipesh Chakrabarty’s notion of ‘provincializing Europe’ (Chakrabarty: 2000: 6). I define methodological nationalism as the presumption of the methodological conclusiveness of the modern state.

particular processes- such that even if it is accepted that ‘Eurocentrism’ is inappropriate as a methodological assumption, it cannot be denied as ‘fact’” (Bhambra: 2011: 679).

In order to tackle the scourge of Eurocentrism, we need robust defences. These include a strong focus of interconnections along notions of ‘connected sociologies’ and introducing the standpoint of non-European others, within mutually –co-constituted processes of international relations and world history (Bhambra: 2014, Go: 2016: 143, Barkawi& Laffey: 2006). This thesis acknowledges advances made by postcolonial approaches in IR, history and sociology, which have focused on unravelling global power politics and hierarchy, whilst extending contemporary approaches in relational theory, through ideas of connected sociologies and provincialization (Doty: 1996, Bhambra: 2014, Chakrabarty: 2000).

Overcoming Eurocentrism requires conceptual innovation in order to move beyond the uncritical conceptions of ‘western’ and ‘non-western’, as these categories imply a denial of shared world histories. Fortunately studies at the intersections of IR and international history have shown the way towards offering a non-Eurocentric history of modern world politics, refuting the myths of separate civilizations (Hobson: 2004, Goody: 2006).

Eurocentrism, civilizational theories and methodological nationalism as well as Orientalism, historicism, cultural relativism constitute some of the major pitfalls when we study international politics. One needs to be particularly aware of how these errors can go unchallenged especially when the aim is to recalibrate encounters and experiences of non-European histories that fail to sit neatly into frameworks used to explain the national imaginaries of the European-nation state.

Scholarship on social and global imaginaries largely reinforces Eurocentric approaches that emphasize the development of a singular trajectory of the modern, from the national

to the global. This is mirrored in International Relations (IR) where categories of ‘non-western’ difference and ‘global’ assimilation are upheld, despite their roots in knowledge production born in uneven conditions of empire (as critiqued by Getachew & Mantena: 2021, Anderl & Witt: 2020). The problem is with totalising Eurocentric claims to universalism, the removal of histories of co-constitution and conflict with the rest of the world, and the uncritical transfer of imaginaries to contexts described as ‘non-western’, and ‘global’ without sufficient historical context or conceptual innovation.

Non-western, post-western and Global IR theory all tend to reinforce difference in ways that untrouble colonial knowledge production by either essentializing or assimilating non-European epistemologies. Admittedly these approaches have gone beyond calls for diversity for underrepresented voices in IR to fully acknowledge the power structures underling representational and knowledge production, and even explicit aim to deconstruct the discipline’s historical foundations in colonialism (Anderl & Witt: 2020: 34). Yet whilst non-western IR makes problematic assertions over concrete differences between the west and the non-west, Global IR promotes the notion of a singular universal repertoire of body of knowledge.

By contrast, this thesis works with contemporary critiques of the aforementioned approaches, and towards the calls for a non-Eurocentric IR theory, by introducing a non-Eurocentric or decolonized concept of the imaginary (Getachew & Mantena: 2021, Anderl & Witt: 2020, Murray: 2019). I make the case for how transboundary, postcolonial phenomena are not simply only ‘social’ or ‘political’ in a narrowly defined form, but rather by thinking of imaginaries as social, political and transboundary, we arrive at a deeper notion of the self-understandings of societies and how they are stable for periods but undergo a process of change, in institutional dynamics resulting from changing political geographies, international events, and reinterpretations of society during critical

junctures, involving processes of antagonism and dependence, collaboration and contestation, and their cumulative production (Wagner: 2010: 55). This is different to classical analysis of ideology and state power in international politics, deriving from the notion that ideas mystify power relations, and moves towards a notion of imaginaries as self-understandings and practices, and including notions of dialectical encounter, as well as rupture (cf Grant: 2014: 410). Thus shifting the focus from nation state to societal contestation can contribute to a trend in IR scholarship, which interrogates the imperial dimensions of world order (Barkawi & Laffey: 2006). This approach considers the conflictual, relational and hierarchical dimensions of modern imaginaries as informing nation states and superpowers, transnational populations and conflictual collectives alike.

Henceforth the thesis moves beyond recent interventions in overcoming Eurocentrism, in ways that can best be explained through a discussion of the contested Pakistani Cold War imaginary. The development of the concept of the transboundary Pakistani Cold War imaginary is aided by Edward Said's geographical imagination, which has influenced approaches in critical geopolitics and postcolonial modifications of historical sociology, particularly the notion of 'overlapping territories and intertwined histories (cf Mugabane: 2005, Gregory 1995, Ó Tuathail & Agnew: 1992, Kothari & Wilkinson: 2010).

Consequently unpacking Pakistani Cold War imaginaries aids the scholarship in anti-Eurocentric IR away from a focus on the supposed inherent differences between the 'western' and 'non-western' world, and the scholarly move to an assumed centre ground of 'the global', towards an entangled imperialized domain. Imperial and anti-imperial dialectics destabilize our understanding of a linear, collaborative and frictionless rise of the 'national' to the global'. Examining Pakistani Cold War imaginaries compliments and extends approaches to postcolonial and anti-Eurocentric IR, as well as the scholarship on

imaginaries, modernity and world order, as we can gain a better understanding of how all imaginaries in world politics are contested within conditions of empire.

By contrast, this thesis moves beyond Eurocentrism, and not merely by decentring Europe and Eurocentric analyses. After all, Area studies research already tackles this issue (whilst still being underpinned by Eurocentric metrics of analyses, developed during the advent of modernization theory in the context of the Cold War). Rather, this project reworks Eurocentric understandings and categories, such as the relationship between nation-states and societies and world orders, supplanting a study of geopolitics via nations to societal contestation, through the introduction of postcolonial geopolitical terrains including, social forces, states and their transboundary relations.

One could question why I enlist a theory developed in and for 'the West' if the point is to mobilize sources of anti-imperial impacts on world politics. There is precedence for existing concepts being deployed in new contexts, where the researcher aims to develop better universally applicable tools (Sartori: 1970: 1038). My purpose is to update the concept of the imaginary in the context of decolonization and the Cold War, both in the particular case of anti-imperial politics, and as a way to shed light on conflict in world politics more generally (Getachew & Mantena: 2021: 372).

The aim is to bring to light the violence of uncritically taking concepts to the colonies, without throwing conceptual development out altogether. Here the researcher remains interested in concepts that are taken to be universal, but critiques their Eurocentrism, and reflects on the consequences of encounters of non-European world histories (Bhabra: 2014, Chakrabarty: 2007). Rethinking all imaginaries as contested, and reflecting on the imperial and anti-imperial contour of conflict in world politics, has systematic benefits for IR theorization. Thus a Pakistani Cold War imaginary conception opens up non-

European moral orders for their importance to understanding Cold War encounters- by taking their often conflicted imaginaries seriously in the making of world political-military and socio-cultural relations.

### **Overcoming Methodological Nationalism**

Pakistan is routinely depicted as a tumultuous client of American strategic designs (Pande: 2011, Hilali: 2005). Policymakers and academics have advanced representations of Pakistan as weak, dangerous and unstable (Fair: 2006, Paul: 2014, Murphy: 2012). Contestations within Pakistan are described as being due to the weakness of the state, rather than due to the complexity of the context, struggles and effects of Pakistani political encounters. The problem is not one between qualitative and quantitative work. There is of course space for both. The problem is in the over determining of our frameworks and categories without rigorous historical and sociological reflection, and crucially, the deployment of the state as an ontologically permanent and conclusive category.

Scholarship in history and sociology has progressed the study of Pakistan and Pakistani social relations. On one hand materialist scholars have highlighted the relationship between the legacies of the modern imperial system in shaping the economy (Gilmartin: 1988, Akhtar: 2018). Here the emphasis is on Pakistan's state modernization project, structural limitations in political economy and its' peripheral position from the commanding heights of global capital, and the effect on class composition and capitalist-labour relations in Pakistan (Alavi: 1971, Akhtar: 2018). Relatedly, these scholars focus on the labour and communist movements in Pakistan, and connect postcolonial histories with the decades leading up to independence (Ali: 2015, Azhar: 2019). On the other hand, the ambiguities of Pakistani identity and its founding traumas in partition and post-colonial formation have been comprehensively examined, its cultural politics, keenly observed (Jalal: 2014, Shaikh: 2009, Toor: 2011). Meanwhile militarism and the role of

Pakistan's military institutions in the country's political economy have been subject to academic scrutiny (Siddiq: 2007). However one area of inquiry remains almost completely absent; a historical, theoretical and sociological analysis of political-military and socio-cultural trajectories arising from Pakistani transboundary encounters. How can we do this, without falling prey to the pitfalls of methodological nationalism?

Methodological nationalism has been defined as the dual assumption that, “the boundaries of social relations map directly onto the boundaries of the nation-state; and second that nation-states form the natural unit of social scientific analysis” (Go & Lawson: 2017). It “connotes the tendency of sociological theorists to explain domestic institutions and social practices in isolation from international forces” (Hobden & Hobson: 2002:268). As a result, “discontinuous ruptures and differences between historical epochs and state systems are smoothed over and consequently obscured” (Hobden & Hobson: 2002: 9). Methodological nationalism appears across disciplines in IR, Historical Sociology and International History, effecting international theories of world order, sociological accounts of modernity and international histories. It is hard overemphasize how important and resonant the ontology of the nation-state as an ontological force is in the social sciences and the humanities (Barkawi: 2015: 30). This dynamic is only intensified, when we think about how the development and intensification of nationalism, nation-building and the spread of the nation-state geopolitical form, emerged adjacent to the rise of the social sciences, within a wider episteme of modern enlightenment thought, and how modes of power that brought about nationalism were born in the context of racialized world orders that structured the development of European colonialism into a world structuring system during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Registering the implications for conceptualizing difference across space and time, means acknowledging that multiple visions of Pakistan have emerged and coexisted over time. It requires us to think deeper about international politics as inter-societal multiplicity and how methodological nationalism prevents this analysis.

Henceforth, the thesis will first discuss methodological nationalism, before explaining how my conception of Pakistani Cold War struggles consciously works to avoid methodological nationalism and state-centrism, instead focusing on the historical sociology of imperial and Cold War relations amid transboundary dynamic encounters.

Here it is important to address the intellectual sources of the problem of methodological nationalism and clarify the weaknesses and strengths of existing solutions within IR scholarship. In particular I want to point to how the problems of methodological nationalism and the domestic-international divide have been such a persistent issue for mainstream IR, but also how attempts to overcome these issues in historical IR, historical sociology, world history, as well as advances in anti-Eurocentric political thought, opens the way towards a complimentary overlap between Global Historical Sociology and Postcolonial social theory. This will aid the project's theorizing of the International, and hence the exploration of co-constitution of Pakistani Cold War encounters.

The thesis's deployment of categories of analysis suited for analysing transboundary encounters, and works in the aim to draw attention to particular sociological, historical and global dynamics, underpinned by colonial modernity. It works with insights gained from IR and recent moves towards transnational, postcolonial world histories. The latter also acknowledge how imperial and anti-imperial politics are co-constitutive of world historical international relations, particularly in how inter-imperial fields have left not only legacies, but have structured the very power differentials, institutional structures and cultures of international politics (Doyle: 2014: 5).

This means to excavate insights from multiple disciplines, in order to elucidate operations of power, hierarchy and interaction, and how they relate to wider historical processes, as well as how this evolving sociology of social relations relates to eventful temporalities, and

operates within particular configurations of spatiality and scale. The problems of analytical bifurcation in IR theory derive from the discipline's origins as inseparable from operations of imperial and superpower statecraft and strategy. This has led leading IR scholars to argue for the discipline's imperial and American origins and through its development from political Science (Vitalis: 2015, Hoffman: 1977, Rosenberg: 2016). Despite these beginnings, mainstream IR has developed a successful ability to remove its imperial history from its theoretical edifice, through a promotion of a nation-state and inter-state ontology, under the rubric of anarchy in the International (Waltz: 1979).

Whilst the international events of 1989-91, the end of the Afghan-Soviet War, the dissolving of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, reshaped modern international relations, they also helped to create a growing realization in IR departments around the world of the failure of neo-liberal institutionalist and neo-realists to predict 1989 (Waeber: 1996). Mainstream IR theories were charged with being unable to offer a sociological theory of change in international relations, having been unable to contend with processes of territorialisation in world politics, in favour of a rubric based on supposedly timeless qualities to war, civilization, nations and geopolitical rivalry (Ruggie: 1993). IR theorists then began thinking deeper about the importance of breaking down boundaries between History and International Relations, history and theory (Lawson: 2012, Barkawi & Lawson: 2017).

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a steadily growing appreciation in communities of scholars of international, global and transnational history, for the need to overcome methodological nationalism. This included a desire to remove the idea of the nation-state as an organic analytical unit, towards multi-scaled analysis of international fields, networks and theatres, in order to explain characteristics of modern international world history (Iriye: 1989, Osterhammel: 2014: Doyle: 2014). These advances have

benefitted from an acknowledgement of how territorialisation itself emerged from the complex sovereignties of empires, emerged as a consequence of colonial conquest, and bequeathed an uneven international terrain.

Histories of the theory and practice of imperialism and anti-imperialism offer a commanding response to the nation-state matrix dominating the study of international politics. The global dimensions of the colonial encounter lend themselves to a relational approach, particularly as violence and war present the most extreme and arguably most potent form of transboundary encounter. The role of war as a generative force in society is revealed through the role of armed forces such as the British Indian army and other imperial militaries, through their encounters beyond borders and recognized sovereignties (Barkawi: 2015: 2017). How then can we go about incorporating these insights into our theorizing of the International in ways that seek to overcome methodological nationalism?

Luckily the historical turn in IR and its rendezvous with historical sociology has provided key tools for exploring the sociological dynamics of the International, by bringing interactive multiplicity much more explicitly into theorizing. The historical sociological intervention in IR has unleashed a profound critique of the neo-realist-neo-liberal institutionalist approach. In particular as Hobson have illustrated, the notion of an International arena defined only by what it is not, a theatre of order, and a field in which nation-states, for all their leviathan primacy in the domestic realm, are powerless to the determining military structures underpinning security, threat and survival, a series of assumptions only viable by the removal of history from its place as underpinning IR theorizing, to its site as a variable in ahistoric analyses reifying causal mechanisms in which social life becomes a site of game theoretical models. This has lead to persuasive charges of ahistorism and presentism in IR leading to chronofetishism and temporocentrism, a theoretical malaise in which the conditions of the contemporary era

are reproduced in ways that omit the temporalities and spatial dynamics in which historical phenomena arose, and how these assumptions are transmuted in the study of the past (Hobson: 2002: 7).

The most systematic and persuasive attempt at overcoming methodological nationalism in IR and Historical Sociology appears in the work of Justin Rosenberg. Developing on Trotsky's theory of world development as uneven and combined development (UCD), Rosenberg marshals a critique against classical sociology and the political realism underpinning much of IR and the social sciences, by arguing that the core unassailable fact of the international scheme is that it is marked by multiplicity. Inter-societal multiplicity is marked by unevenness, as well as its interactive and combined qualities. Its core consequences include "co-existence, difference, interaction, combination, (and) dialectics" (Rosenberg: 2016:139). This has the immediate effect of revealing the co-constitution of sociological difference and geopolitical co-existence in world politics (Rosenberg: 2016: 141). Here we have an ambitious project, which embraces pluralism into theorizing historical development, and offers a systematic critique of the inability of classical social thought to offer a pluralistic analysis of history and society.

The theorization of uneven and combined development has enabled Historical Sociology in IR to recalibrate the International in favour of a deeper notion of multiplicity, which involves reintegrating difference and multiplicity into a revitalised, and much needed sociological theory of the International, enabling a grounding for arguments about multiplicity in the rise of capitalist development, or the global emergence of modernity (Rosenberg: 2006, Matin: 2013). Furthermore UCD offers IR theory its big idea that can finally be used in other disciplines in order to free its 'imprisonment' from political science (Rosenberg: 2016:127). Instead of always being the repository for insights from other disciplines, Rosenberg contends that UCD helps benefit the notion of IR as not merely

based on an anarchy problematic, mapped out on the premises of a very particular history of modern North-Western Europe, but also as a discipline capable of analysing social processes and encounters.

We are invited to view not a world merely of national states where the International is only understood as the absence of overarching political authority, but as a domain of social life with its own qualities, arising from its multiplicity, unevenness and interactive and generative qualities. Here, the International is, “neither at a level above, nor in a space between, societies, but rather in a dimension of their being which cuts across both of these ‘places’ and reaches simultaneously into the ‘domestic’ constitution of those societies themselves” (Rosenberg: 2006: 327). Rosenberg and other advocates of UCD approaches in IR and historical sociology such as Kamran Matin in his pioneering work on Iranian modernity, offer new ways of thinking about integrating into theories of international politics, history as always on the go, open to rupture, defined by continuities and discontinuities, and always generated through fields of densely formed co-constituted and multi-scaled interactions (Rosenberg: 2016, Matin: 2013, Matin: 2011).

Whilst IR has tended to fail at developing a theorization of historical change in favour of presentist and ahistoric perspectives, recent studies of historical transformations over the *longue durée* of the long 19<sup>th</sup> century, have created new avenues of inquiry (Buzan & Lawson: 2015). Transformations to modes of power, social mobility, the travelling of ideas and technologies, goods and cultures created previously unfathomable changes to the circulations, scales and intensities of modern power relations. These great transformations augmented the interdependencies at the core of international politics, but also increased the pace of events as time was compressed by technologies of navigation, telegram and flight, whilst accompanying processes transformed the complexity of social orders, and the manifold complexity of social relations (Buzan & Lawson: 2015:6).

Historically attuned scholarship on historical change has highlighted how the era of late development characterising modern international relations, forged complex and wide-ranging changes characterized by seemingly incongruous hybridity. Different social entities at differing points in their historical development were involved in complex networks of relations in given temporalities (Rosenberg: 2006, Rosenberg: 2016). Hybrid social encounters developed from these relations creating uneven terrains of struggle characterising political fields of relations shaped by the sequence of events, the particular catalysts of encounters, and the variations of cultural forms, and the determining modes of power that social forces encountered (Go: 2016: 211).

Historical Sociology in International Relations have major implications for the study of empire and imperialism in world politics, particularly when we think about how to go beyond nation-state ontology, and towards the re-shaping of social relations across and beyond the domestic-international divide, involving processes of rescaling. When we turn to popular accounts of modernity and globalization, we see how notions of the diffusion of cultural and civilization entities encapsulated by the ‘multiple modernities’ theses (Eisenstadt: 2007) or the post-Marxist arguments that reduce empire-state relations to the postmodern condition whereby imperialism no longer exhibits its structural role (Hart & Negri: 2003), both end up underplaying how Westphalian state politics had imperial roots, in ‘thick’ relations across the International, and prevent the escape from methodological nationalism, by failing to escape the ‘territorial trap’ of a nation-state ontology to IR and world politics (Barkawi & Laffey: 2002).

This idea holds implications for the way we think about everything from how we historicize global security regimes to how re-theorize stages of modernity. These solutions offer antidotes to the bane of analytical bifurcation, Eurocentrism and methodological

nationalism, through its historicization of key theoretical models deployed in political science IR such as the state, society and civil society. This enables renewed reflection on how and through what histories, methodological nationalist studies reinforces statist histories of the International and conversely how studies combatting methodological nationalism, can provide fresh insight into how this mode of inquiry in the study of world politics.

Yet historical IR and historical sociology both suffer from particular issues, which threaten bring back Eurocentrism and methodological nationalism through the back door. While Weberian analyses emphasized a particular European experience of modernity, Marxist historical sociologists also develop a European origin story, where its most distinct modes of production have allowed for development both of a combined and uneven nature, yet still deriving from a European experience of capital. As Bhambra argues, both of these accounts view colonialism and imperialism as by-products of, rather than constituent elements of capitalist modernity (Bhambra: 2011:667).

This follows from a deeper problem that runs through IR theorizing that relational social theory deriving from sociology can rectify. That is of its focus on units rather than relations. But any pre-mediated political or social unit, be it the state or the individual, should never be, “the starting points of sociological analysis” (Emirbayer: 1997:287). The idea is avoid the separation of social relations, their analytical bifurcation, into the production of constants and then to demarcate their split in ways that work for disciplinary purposes, but that may have never have been disconnected as social relations (Go: 2013, Go: 2016).

The classic examples of analytical bifurcation include the territorialisation of space along national and international lines, and the ontological separation of Europe from the rest of

the world, and these twin issues of Eurocentrism and methodological nationalism apply to historical IR as well as historical sociology. Indeed as Matin and others have argued, historical sociology and the cultural turn in historical sociology actively reproduced forms of state-centrism and Eurocentrism into their theorizing, exemplified by Skocpol's work on world revolutions, as well as Tilly's work on war and society and Michael Mann's theorizing of historical development (Matin: 2013: 4, Rosenberg: 2006).

In order to think through the possibilities afforded to us by Rosenberg's notion of interactive multiplicity as a way to theorize world history beyond analytical bifurcation, Eurocentrism and methodological nationalism, a further step is needed. This arises from the argument that UCD, despite its strengths, lets in methodological nationalism and forms of Eurocentrism in through the back door. Anievas and Nişancıoğlu offer a compelling account of the rise of the West, that offers a historical sociological account of the global dimensions of modernity, a welcome addition to a growing inter-disciplinary conversation that seeks to offer a non-Eurocentric account of modernity (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015, Hobson: 2004, Goody: 2006, Magubane: 2005). They argue that UCD reaffirms the notion of bounded, singular societies in its theorization inter-societal interaction as being made up of the self-contained unit of 'society'. Hence without a thorough historicization of societal forms, even the notion of inter-societal multiplicity itself, can entrench the appearance of the state as an ontological given without sufficient scrutiny (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015:45).

One promising new approach that thesis works closely with, is the recent move towards Global Historical Sociology (GHS). This contribution makes space for a more thorough appreciation for multiplicity in terms of relations and encounters, within fields of co-constitution that enable a deeper appreciation for 'transboundary' interaction between social units of various forms, and the forms of interaction they are involved in. Units are

thus not prescribed as constant and unchanging characteristics, but rather studied as they emerge and develop through time and through social relations. In this recalibration of the benefits of detailing GHS and its intersections with field theory, Go argues social relations are not merely connections between individuals and groups. Instead they form “terrains of struggle....a social field” (Go: 2016: 211 thereby revealing a perspective of social relations grounded in a deeper account of the relational entanglement of social life, which can compliment both Rosenberg’s contribution of multiplicity and the imperial turn in postcolonial inquiry.

GHS as an approach is informed by both a deeper appreciation of history and theory’s co-constitution, as well as postcolonial thought’s recent rendezvous with social theory (Go & Lawson: 2017, Barkawi & Lawson: 20017, Go: 2016). Julian Go curates a postcolonial criticism of classical social thought, used to revive the latter in terms of its enduring occlusion of imperialism, just as Rosenberg had critiqued it for its occlusion of the international sphere. The removal of the colonial encounter is argued to have persisted in contemporary social thought (and by extension, political science and IR given their mutual implication) emerging from its colonial standpoint and an un-provincialized positionality (Go: 2016:15).

Consequently, a ‘postcolonial relationism’ can compliment GHS in its theoretical reconstruction of the role of imperialism and colonialism into our theoretical models, such that the relational dynamics mentioned above, are deployed to “help us see the ‘overlapping territories’ and intertwined histories (to return to Said’s phrasing) while showing how relations from afar were not external to the formation of European modernity” (Go: 2016:140). In this schema, despite the need to ‘decolonize’ sociology and social theory, the very edifice of postcolonial thought and its immanent critique and

reconstruction of social thought, derives from and depends upon the very sociological forms of thought that postcolonial theory emerges from.

Ultimately global historical sociology and postcolonial social theory offer a powerful respite from IR's role in obfuscating empire, Eurocentrism, promotion of nation-state ontology and its naturalization of the inter-state system. The aim is to offer a mapping of "the transnational and global dynamics that enable the emergence, reproduction and breakdown of social orders...and second, the historical emergence, reproduction, and breakdown of transnational and global social forms" (Go & Lawson: 2017:2). By integrating the turn towards GHS with the recent rendezvous between postcolonial thought and social theory, we can integrate implications of social multiplicity in the International, with a properly realized turn towards the study of the relational dynamics of colonial modernity in world politics.

Interrogating latitudinal terrain of social interaction and the vertical networks of global hierarchies, can give rise to richer analysis of global security relations, in ways that offer an alternative to the 'states under anarchy' systemized hypothesis, whilst also registering that processes of change are constituent of longer historical phenomenon in the international system (Mattern & Zarakol: 2016:6). By conferring primacy to the interactions rather than units of analysis, postcolonial relationism helps us to re-situate the state in wider social relations, uncover overarching and undergirding historical processes, and theorize forms of postcolonial agency, both direct and as effects, in relation to global power politics (Go: 2016).

Now that close attention has been given to approaches combatting methodological nationalism, here I clarify how my analysis compliments and extends these approaches. First, this thesis acknowledges the need for a postcolonial relationism, and an uneven and

combined notion of the International. My concept of the ‘Pakistani Cold War imaginary’, its potent universalisms, divided social factions, and transboundary encounters, offers a framework that can compliment these recent approaches. Together these theoretical devices can offer a route towards fleshing out the theorisation of global and international processes involving a multitude of sites and actors, existing within moving transboundary social relations.

Broadly speaking, international, global and transboundary imaginaries hold much promise for dissecting international operations of power as auxiliary concepts. They help us analyse the emergence, development and performative power of hierarchy and authority, and the relationship between institutions of power and the notions of social groups as being informed by shifting, societal-self understandings. This can provide a lens on the historical background of social forms, and offer abstractions, which can group diverse units, such as Pakistani Cold War factions, together. These abstractions can fuse together power and meaning, ideas and practice, and are embedded within power-knowledge frameworks that can be analysed historically.

Deploying the notion of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary, its conflictual factions and transboundary relations, offers an account of societies and states in the Global South, and the mutual implication of their sociological and geopolitical dynamics, outside of Eurocentrism and ontological statism, by crafting a dynamic picture of historic change, whilst combatting internalist approaches to Pakistan that fail to develop any sociological theorizing of the International, and without a historic theorizing of the imperial and colonial origins of the international state and capitalist system.

Second, this study adopts a perspective of the International from the standpoint of Pakistanis; in ways that avoids the drawbacks of both ‘Subaltern’ explanations as well

narrow elite theories. In this way, the project analyses the major players within Pakistani Cold War factions, their relationship to an evolving structure of power in Pakistan involving, the ability to define and implement visions of Pakistan in the International, and the impact of their imaginaries in transboundary global encounters.

Third, in order to explain the world historic changes that included Pakistani's emergence and rise to prominence during the Cold War, we need to think about the longer term processes as well as the more immediate trajectories in Pakistan and beyond, in order to trace particular developments that straddle borders and sovereignties. This means to take seriously the notion of Pakistanis and their co-constitutive relations with the International.

This leads me to some core conclusions. Imperial legacies shape the structure of the International, particularly the global Cold War environment that Pakistani nationalist, socialist and Islamist (as well as ethno-nationalist and separatist) forces encountered. The International reshaped the dynamics of socio-political struggle and development in Pakistan, just as it was reshaped itself, by developments in the Global South, involving at particular critical junctures, the role of the Pakistanis and their forms of allegiance and resistance to global projects of anti-communism, Islamism and socialism and anti-colonialism. Lastly, Pakistani Cold War social forces in society, state and world politics, offer potent avenues for propelling GHS and postcolonial sociological thinking forward, in terms of deepening our appreciation for the postcolonial co-constitution of the International, marked by multiplicities, unevenness, and complex forms of agency, particularly in the domains of security, statecraft and solidarity-building, as resulting from integrations of collaborative and coercive historic relations, that together, build up a far richer picture of world politics.

## **Methodology**

Here I sketch out a discussion of the methodological choices made in the thesis and why they were chosen. Beyond orthodox studies of weak states in IR, or teleological accounts of the diplomatic and political-military relations of the Pakistani state, I am engaging in Leftist scholarship on class, power and internationalism in Pakistan, as well as in the study of Islamism in Pakistan and beyond, and the politics of empire and decolonization. In so doing I am working beyond official histories of Pakistan, which centre the state and the role of great statesmen, as well as accounts which focus on Pakistan as passive client to the US, or to the interests of a narrow state-class. Moreover I am working within a burgeoning tradition of critical Pakistan studies scholarship, which has sought to diversify which Pakistanis are consequential, and has tackled questions of militarism, political economy, gender and class struggle.

My account works to compliment these authors, by paying attention to the role of historical and theoretical innovation in rethinking Pakistani Cold War relations beyond methodological nationalism and Eurocentrism in IR and security studies. Whilst the first half of the thesis is concerned with history, theory, conceptual development and the analysis of empirical cases of the early Cold War era, it focuses on secondary source material. By contrast in the second half of the thesis, I deploy a combination of US, Pakistani, Soviet, Chinese, British archives. I have also collated primary sources from Pakistani and British Cold War newspapers and publications, as well as accounts from Cold War alliances and conferences. The focus on history and theory supported by archival analysis is partly due to the forms of inquiry this project has taken. It is also in part due to the Covid pandemic cancelling my funded research trip to Pakistan, and to

the restrictions the pandemic placed in accessing UK archives at the time. Luckily there has been a wealth of useful online material to draw from, including declassified policy documents as well as from the collections of socialist and anti-colonial resistance movements and archivists, including the Cold War History Project and the South Asia Research and Resource Centre, a collection of left documents in Islamabad that has been carefully compiled, and has recently been partly digitized. In relation to secondary sources, I draw from a vast assemblage, and a rich repertoire of material on Pakistan, Afghanistan the Cold War, colonialism, decolonization and the international politics of South and West Asia.

In forging a new reading of transnational historical dynamics through theoretical innovation, I arrive at an innovative set of arguments about Pakistanis and their entanglement within planetary politics of solidarity and hope, but also conflict and hierarchy. This alternative theory and history of Pakistani Cold War encounters works first by fresh theorizing Pakistani Cold War sociologies. Second it creates a new disciplinary approach for thinking about Pakistani international politics. Third it uses inflected readings of pre-existing as well as declassified archival material, when making arguments in the final two chapters relating to the Afghan-Soviet war. The chapters work through readings of official conservative and liberal nationalist as well as left, Islamist and separatist counter-histories, through an inflected reading of these literatures, and in connection to political-military histories of the Cold War and social histories of decolonization. They situate Pakistani struggles during the Cold War within underlying historical processes of decolonization and imperial fracture, and in connection to the shifting Cold War geopolitical, diplomatic and military histories of the Baghdad Pact and Afghan war eras, in order to examine historical changes in world politics between these historical periods, and the consequences for our contemporary age.

## **Structure**

The introduction has familiarized the reader with the scope of the study. In the first chapter, the Pakistani Cold War imaginary is theorized as a concept capturing complex social phenomenon, with implications for Pakistani impacts on world politics and simultaneously, as a vantage point from which to explore the historical trajectories by which Global South societies constrain superpowers. Chapter Two investigates the origins of the structure of power in early Cold War Pakistani politics. The worldmaking projects of Islamists, nationalists, separatists and socialists, and their struggles for power are illustrated in connection to the afterlives of empire in the early stages of Decolonization and the Cold War. Chapter Three chronicles how Pakistani Cold War struggles encompassed a series of conflicting responses to the state but also offered divergent responses to questions of culture, nationalism and world order. This section assesses Pakistani cultural, class conflicts and struggles over Pakistani internationalism. It does so in connection to the high point of Pakistani anti-imperial left movements, and in the context of the development of the US led Cold War in Asia. In chapter four I argue that Pakistani anti-imperial worldmaking was visible in the societal uproar at the government's ceding to US Cold War strategy following the Baghdad Pact and the Suez crises, amid anti-colonial activism in Pakistan and across the Middle East. It reflects on the societal reaction to Pakistan becoming a garrison for US Cold War interests, and develops a mapping of the significance of the links between Pakistani social struggles and developments in Middle East Cold War struggles. Chapter Five examines the afterlives of the frontier in the global covert operations to arm the Afghan Mujahedeen to defeat the Soviets. The chapter claims the war's trajectory emerged due to entangled local, regional

and global conflicts, which together created a social terrain which constrained the Soviet Union, and creating the conditions for the US's own quagmire in Afghanistan two decades later. It argues that the onslaught on left and ethno-separatist forces in the context of Pakistan's Islamization and militarization during the 1970s, shaped the course of the Afghan-Soviet War and reminds us of how empires become ensnared when complexity defeats strength. The final chapter explains the world historic significance of Pakistani encounters in the Afghan Jihad through examining both CIA-ISI covert politics and the preceding era of anti-imperial struggle along the Durand Line. It then examines how the Afghan war rewrites our histories of the Cold War and Decolonization before exploring the legacies of Pakistani Cold War worldmaking projects, the changes to global security from the Cold War to the War on Terror, and explores the planetary blowback that has shaken the foundations of world politics. Finally, in the conclusion I briefly summarize the thesis, and bring the core thematic reflections together.

## **Chapter One: Theorizing the struggles over the Pakistani Cold War Imaginary**

*“This is not that Dawn for which, ravished with freedom, we had set out in sheer longing, so sure that somewhere I n its desert the sky harboured a final haven for the stars, and we would find it.”*  
Faiz Ahmed Faiz

*“Sometimes before the sun sets I put some dreams in its platter. Maybe next morning that language will be found in which I can define my dreams.”*  
Kishwar Naheed

*“With his relinquishment of utopias, man would lose his will to shape history and therewith his ability to understand it”*  
Karl Mannheim

### **Introduction**

The foremost architect of neorealist IR theory, Kenneth Waltz, suggests a “general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers” (Waltz: 1979:14). Thus “it would be as ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica” (Ibid: 72). Yet assuming global politics is grounded solely in great power encounters ignores the relational dimensions of world order, and the thick connections between ‘North’ and ‘South’, ‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ (Barkawi & Laffey: 2006). Consider how former CIA officer Donald Gregg, lamented on the colossal 1954 French defeat to the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu, “we should have seen it as the end of the colonial era in South East Asia...but instead we saw it ... as a defeat for the free world...and it was a total misreading of a pivotal event that cost us very dearly” (Gregg: 2017: 1). Here we see an admission of the fundamental role of the colonial and anticolonial relationship in structuring the major fault-line of world order, and an acceptance that the colonial

encounter, rather than Cold War superpower rivalry, still dominated Global South societies during the early Cold War, inspiring collective mobilization and resistance. The Vietnamese defeated the French colonial empire and the behemoth of US superpower strength, albeit at a massive cost. If we are to appreciate the dialogical nature of conflict between the 'strong' and their discontents, it follows that the universalist claims and mobilizations of the 'weak' must be understood.<sup>3</sup> What we must reckon with, is how societies regularly deemed as peripheral, are in actuality, central to the trajectory of modern forms of international power politics, both as the social terrain of North-South conflict, and as the sites of political action and South-South connections that shape the trajectory of world order, at particular historic moments.

Eurocentric limitations on intellectual inquiry remain hegemonic to our notions of world politics and hinder us from rethinking history, politics and international social relations in fundamental ways. In IR, security studies and foreign policy analysis, the struggles of the Global South are largely characterized as struggles as civil wars, insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, or as forms of terrorism. Within the study of international politics, postcolonial polities are assumed as reacting to, rather than creating history. They are viewed as deficient and passive. Their interactions are the effect rather than the locus of history; their states are 'Third world' (Ayoob: 1995), 'Weak' (Handel: 1990), or 'Quasi' (Jackson: 1990). Subsequently these approaches have failed in appreciating the resonance of transboundary struggles in postcolonial societies, the strength of complex, divided social terrains in the South, and the constraining of global superpowers in the post-colonial era.

This image of a flat international politics often reflects the realist notion in IR of an anarchic world system where the moves of great powers and nation-states are paramount,

---

<sup>3</sup> Examples of universalist, transnational claims from the Global South, whether Islamic, Third world solidarity or Black internationalism, can be found in the work of Neil Sheehan (1989) on Vietnam, Greg Grandin (1989) on Latin America and Robbie Shilliam (2015) on the African diaspora.

and demonstrate timeless rules of balances of power, amid core anarchical structures in the international realm (Waltz: 1979: 102). Second, this belies an on-going attitude in the study of IR that ‘peripheral’ societies in the Global South are to be understood primarily through their ability to meet liberal democratic conventions enshrined in Eurocentric theory and law. This is detrimental for our understandings of social relations, and skews studies of the actions, connections and self-understandings of the postcolonial societies. In Pakistan this works to fuse understanding of history, politics and culture, and has been called *Pakistaniat*, the nationalist ideology of Pakistan, which is reinscribed through academia and foreign policy literature (cf Bajwa: 2016).

The Pakistani state is regularly portrayed in security discourse as the tumultuous client of American strategic designs (Pande: 2011, Hilali: 2005). Policymakers and academics have constructed representations of the Pakistani state as weak, dangerous and unstable (Fair: 2006, Paul: 2014). Contestations within Pakistan are routinely described as being due to the weakness of the state, rather than due to the complexity of the context, struggles and effects of Pakistani political encounters. Current frameworks are ill adept at addressing transboundary encounters<sup>4</sup>, and fail to assess Pakistani practices and meanings outside of the dominant notions of the Pakistani state (Bajwa: 1996, Sayyid: 2017, Waheed: 2017). They are ill equipped to understand how transboundary processes shape world politics. In this schema Pakistan’s importance to international politics becomes an elite centred research agenda concerning foreign policy elites, state officials and diplomats. Wider society’s history, complexity and relationship to transnational societies and events, is left to the margins of the conversation.

---

<sup>4</sup> For an analysis of the international origins of political and social theory and as the interconnections between people across polities, states, regions and empires as transboundary encounters, see Barkawi & Lawson (2017).

Pakistan has been at the epicentre of global struggles over the past forty years. Conflict and contestation over the basic presuppositions of what Pakistan was meant to represent at home and in world politics, would become decisive for the late Cold War and after, during the War on Terror. Yet we still do not have a scholarly grasp of this process.

By failing to understand the magnitude of Pakistani social histories, interconnections and embeddedness in global networks, we risk repeating the same scholarly mistakes of the past: contributing to rather than combatting modes of representation that either silence the other through Eurocentric categorization, or risk over-determining historical ideal-types of statehood and sovereignty. Consequently a major inquiry is still to be advanced, how we study the non-European's global encounters world, "from a critical, or non-deterministic and non-manipulative perspective" (Adib-Moghaddam: 2007:82). Yet when we reflect on modern international relations from the position of the Global South, the state itself becomes a symptom of relations of empire, capitalism and war.

By contrast, in this chapter I discuss to the concept of the contested, multiple and transboundary Pakistani Cold War imaginary as 1) a social phenomenon with insights for Pakistani power struggles in world politics and 2) as a vantage point from which to tackle the question of how Global South polities create complex social terrains of struggle that have ensnared empires. What the Pakistani imaginary can explain is how Pakistani meanings, practices, factions and institutions, played a historic role in the Cold War. It unravels the transnational linkages and societal contentions missing in analyses of national interests, small wars or foreign policy cultures. A reframed imaginary opens up non-European moral orders for their importance to understanding Cold War encounters- by taking their imaginaries seriously.

Refiguring the imaginary in the Pakistani context can enhance our understanding of Cold War world politics. The evolving historical social field, this matrix of power that I call the

Pakistani imaginary, has explanatory power because it helps us explain the ideas and practices animating social forces. Conflicting factions form part of a relational and changing, transboundary arena of power where hegemonic and counter hegemonic forces operate and co-constitutively shape social relations. The imaginary enables and constrains different political synergies at given critical junctures. The Pakistani imaginary is transformed in the context leading up to the Afghan-Soviet War and reshapes the social terrain of struggle during the war. Thus this chapter develops a theoretical apparatus from which the rest of the thesis derives. It is built upon the following claims.

Conflict and contestation over the principles of what Pakistan was to stand for, became activated by Cold War dynamics informed by earlier histories of empire and resistance. The Pakistani imaginary is a concept that offers a way of exploring the significance of contestation over the meaning of Pakistan. I propose a treatment of transboundary dynamics in and through time and across political geographies in, to uncover Pakistani state and society's imaginaries and their effect on a changing structure of power in Pakistani, and how this shaped global encounters. This argument takes conflict and contestation over the idea of Pakistan seriously, arguing that this was decisive for the late Cold War and War on Terror, and that astute analysis should have seen this coming. To that end the weakness of the state, the porous nature of transnational dynamics and the profoundly evocative struggles contained within the struggle for Pakistan need to be traced.

I argue for the need to provincialize European imaginaries, by retrieving transnational histories of conflict that are ignored in national historiographies in 'the West'. The Pakistani Cold War imaginary, has particular features, including its 1) violently conflicted rather than consistently consensual, 2) over spilling over the territorial boundaries of the state, 3) multiple rather than singular and transboundary rather than global, and 4)

enabling rather than constraining of social change during critical junctures. I argue for the benefits of decolonizing the imaginary for IR and social theory, in ways that illuminate the diversely experienced yet entangled realm of the International (Go: 2016, Buzan & Lawson: 2015). Subsequently this chapter makes the argument for decolonizing the concept of the imaginary in order to make it usable for the study of conflictual, multi-scaled and transboundary encounters. It then develops the concept of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary before offering some key claims about Pakistanis and their role within international relations.

## **1 Decolonizing the Imaginary & introducing the Pakistani Cold War**

### **Imaginary**

Examining imaginaries can clarify the socio-cultural, creative, human condition and inter-cultural and dialogic aspects of social relations. When we bring in empire and Cold War politics into the picture, imaginaries become useful for describing the enabling and constraining features arising from the encounter between great powers and peripheral polities. Decolonizing the Taylorian conception of the social imaginary for IR, introduces the notion of the Pakistani imaginary as a complex field or social terrain, of competing socio-political factions, with insights for power struggles within Pakistan, and geopolitics in the wider international sphere. I argue for the need both to provincialize European imaginaries and also to create mechanisms for thinking through Pakistani imaginaries as 1) contested 2) over spilling the territorial boundaries of the state 3) multiple rather than singular and transboundary rather than global, and 4) enabling rather than always constraining of social change, during critical junctures. Thus my provincializing of Taylor's notion of the social imaginary allows for conceptual development, to incorporate conflict and competition in colonial and postcolonial contexts.

I am chiefly interested in examining the concept's promise for studying global dynamics, such as the constitution and performative power of authority and hierarchy. The reconceptualization of the imaginary in the context of Cold War Pakistan has benefits for contemporary international theory: first, imaginaries as abstractions can group varied social phenomena together, creating a singularity out of a plurality. Such abstractions are fused with power and linked to questions of social interaction, co-production and change. Second, imaginaries are cultivated within distinct knowledge producing processes and practices. They are embedded in particular knowledge structures that ground social movements, institutions and transnational alliances, and can be studied historically, so that divided imaginings of 'Pakistan in world politics' takes its place alongside the imaginings of 'the state', 'the subject' or 'the market', within imaginaries scholarship.

On one hand, International Relations (IR) theory and the imaginaries scholarship contain a potentially rich area for cross-pollination in illuminating international encounters, and highlighting inter-cultural varieties shaping modernity. On the other, the imaginary literature mirrors the foundational spatial optics of orthodox IR Theory, the notion of nations as methodologically conclusive, held together through an anarchic international system. Moreover IR's persistent marginalization of the study of empire, class and racialized struggles hinders its ability to be to properly reckon with the world (Barkawi & Laffey: 2006). IR's emergence within inter-imperial conflict and Cold War expansion, shaped power-knowledge dynamics, in ways that have omitted empire from the discipline's core focus (Vitalis: 2015). Nevertheless within International Relations (IR) theory, these issues are now receiving careful reflection (Goddard & Nexon: 2015, Zarakol & Mattern: 2017). IR provides a fertile ground for the recalibration of imaginaries due to the serious considerations given to theorizing the International.

Developing concepts, themes and examples of global interconnection is a powerful antidote for IR and social theory's spatial and territorial silences (Barkawi: 2004,

Bhambra: 2014, Mugabane: 2005, Cooper & Stoler: 1997). Recent interventions have opened the door towards examining social relations shaped by imperial relations, complicating Eurocentric analyses of modernity (Barkawi and Laffey: 2006, Lawson: 2006, Rosenberg: 2006). Thus IR theory and the imaginaries scholarship contain a rich area for cross-pollination in illuminating the ideas and practices of international encounters, but this still requires internationalizing social relations whilst historicizing international relations (Matin: 2013: 355).

Numerous theorists have invoked the idea of the imaginary as a counterpoint to abstract structural visions of social life (Castoriadis: 1988, Appadurai: 1996). Similarly, several scholars of nationalism have invested in the idea that nations are constructed realities, inventions of culture, identity and community. In terms of theorizing the imaginary, Castoriadis (1987), Anderson (1983) and Taylor (2004) have developed the most thoroughly developed the concept as the narratives and practices that underpin social life. The ‘social imaginary’ (Taylor: 2004), at its best is useful for gaging how societies are creative, changing and contentious forms (Gaonkar: 2002).\_Notions of imaginaries underscore “the multidimensionality of social formation” (Blokker: 2015: 41) enhancing the underlying picture of the normative visions that underpin modernity. Social imaginary theorizing demonstrates how overreliance on culture-neutral theories inhibits the exploration of how people navigated modernity’s treacherous terrains (Taylor: 1995). Moreover, theorisation of the imaginary has increasingly been deployed in the conceptualisation of international and international processes within an array of empirical sites and theoretical approaches, including imaginaries of colonialism, modernity and globalization (Kothari: 2010, McKeil 2018, Steger: 2009). They can enable a fruitful dialogue with the emergent moves to furnish a deeper understanding of modernity in International Relations through the study of its core modalities (Buzan & Lawson: 2015).

Charles Taylor develops a theory of the ‘social imaginary’, which describes the rise of collective self-understandings underpinning the emergence of modern Western European societies (Taylor: 2004: 22). He defines it as “the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, and how things go on between them and their fellows and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (Taylor 2004, 23). For Taylor, 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century social transformations in Europe wrought a distinct, modern social imaginary (Taylor: 2004:4). The arrival of modernity shaped a renewed perception of moral order, a set of presuppositions that enabled collective values and practices, facilitating the emergence of civil society, the market and the notion of free will, which coalesced as collaborative, social institutions, grounded in the modern territorial state. Gone were the divinely ordered hierarchies of the medieval age, Taylor claims. At the dawn of a new order, humans entered a reality framed by rational, sociable agents collaborating for mutual benefit (Taylor: 2004: 7). The idea of the social imaginary is a compelling one. It affirms that we experience the world not merely from an individual, perspective, but also through a collective, creative lens; through the co-production of ideas, ideologies, moral orders and practices.

But Taylor’s conception falls short with regard to its Eurocentric vision of modernity, although he does readily argue for the limits of his theorization’s scope (Taylor: 2004: 22). Taylorian imaginaries are grounded in the positionality of Western European bourgeois culture. They overlook racial hierarchies, war, and empire, enabling a collaborative vision of the origins of modernity in an internal Western European sphere, that omits the relational history of struggle characterising the modern world. By under-theorizing conflict, Taylor ignores the entanglement of modern ‘Western’ imaginaries with the former colonies, and underplays how struggle, hierarchies and violence condition imaginaries. In so doing he presents a vision of capitalist democracies and their interiority, not their constitutive connections in the International. Not only does the Taylorian

account overlook non-Europeans, it silences struggles over identity within ‘the West’. Thus Taylor fails to think about the co-constitution of world politics, a glaring omission. Yet imaginaries are not just harmonious constants and consistently collaborative. Imaginaries are also uneven, violent and transformative, subject to change and always include contentious forms. The effects of social transformations in relations of conflict lead to subjectivities of power and resistance where resistance reopens space for reimagining (Tripp: 2003: 14).

This requires removing Europe from being the sovereign theoretical subject of all histories to highlight the co-constitution of European and non-European worlds (Chakrabarty: 1992). Chakrabarty highlights a grave error, the relegating of violence in the forming of modernity to an external process outside of the modern western imaginary. He writes, “histories that aims to displace a ‘hyperreal’ Europe from the center toward which all historical imagination currently gravitates will have to seek out relentlessly this connection between violence and idealism” (Chatterjee: 1992: 22). Taylor’s model upholds the reproduction of a society of citizens, a moral order grounded in mutual benefit, but a society of subjects was created in the colonies (Taylor: 2002: 112, Chakrabarty, 1990). Hence Taylor obscures imperial violence’s role in shaping the European public sphere. The modern imaginary then, is not just an image of an imagined future. It orders who is included within the imaginary, where they are positioned and what consequences there may be, and it is fragmented along lines of power.

Subsequent ‘public sphere’ and ‘global imaginary’ theorists, who are influenced by Taylor, yet reject his Eurocentrism have developed alternative sites of social imaginaries, to include non-European imaginaries. These theorists cite the emergence of cosmopolitan networks of deliberation through media, communications, religious and cultural networks (Appadurai: 1996, Gaonkar: 2002). Meanwhile global imaginary theorists have refined

detailed accounts of globalization, grounded in the argument that globalized practices and structures are evidence of the rise of a global imaginary (Steger: 2009). These explanations have undoubtedly pluralized our notions of social worlds.

However social, public sphere and global imaginary theorists have largely underestimated the conflictual dimensions of modernity. Despite contributing to our understandings of the ideas, practices and institutions grounding modern relations, the imaginary intervention is diminished because dominant power-knowledge assumptions grounded in Western experiences are universalized without sufficient reconstruction. For example collective understandings of the modern Muslim and Communist worlds, gained planetary scope in ways that don't fit the linear, national to global transition, advocated by theorists of social imaginaries. Rather they emerged through complex ways that problematize universalizing Eurocentric frameworks (Aydin: 2017, Westad: 2007). Hence investigating the context, content and consequences of postcolonial imaginaries, their connections to imaginaries elsewhere and the accumulative planetary connection of imaginaries, can benefit scholarship, and inform current debates on global power politics in anti-Eurocentric world histories (Goody: 2006, Hobson: 2004, Steinmetz: 2016).

Non-Eurocentric imaginaries offer rich possibilities for enhancing discussions around interactive histories<sup>5</sup>, global modernity's and the promise of non-European imaginaries. These conversations have focused on the inter-cultural, civilizational and the cultural impact of global modernities (Warner: 2003 Appadurai: 1996, Anderson: 1983). Piscatori frames the imaginary as how we understand shared horizons as a setting for the struggles of power. He explores the contemporary meaning of the Ummah (Muslim Community)

---

<sup>5</sup> On the historical inaccuracy of the binary there are a number of works that challenge the self-conception of a linear European history, Hobson, (2004) Goody (2012) and Adib-Moghaddam (2012) offer laudable attempts to challenge Eurocentric accounts of modernity via studying the social world of contention and struggle. Geopolitical and geographic assumptions have also been unpacked for what they reveal about Eurocentric conceptions of space and power (Lewis & Wigen: 1997, Gregory: 2004).

as a social imaginary<sup>6</sup>. The Ummah is a site of competing ideas and hybridity where the violence of its categories threatens to stretch the Ummah to its limits, indeed, “to the extent that the Ummah is being imagined...it may also be a fractured imagination” (Piscatori: 2006: 14). Speaking for the Ummah is a powerful tool; it evokes political action for those speaking on behalf of it. Many political actors invoke the trans-local Ummah (Ibid). But its usage is variable and meaning unclear. Modernity helps increase the instrumentality of the notion of the Ummah where it forms part of an evolving politics. There is a sense of the transformative nature of imaginaries to articulate the struggles of social life. In this way there is ample space for the imaginary to be extended to other non-European settings. Connected, Gaonkar highlights how it is not mimicry but adaption of alternative historical contingencies that underpin the same forms of collective agency. These cultural forms are “refigured both in meaning and function when placed within a social imaginary calibrated by an image of a moral order different from that of the West” (Gaonkar: 2002: 12).

Reconfiguring the term requires an appreciation that people beyond ‘the West’ have other experiences of modernity which impacts on the planetary ‘whole’, and to recognize transboundary relations included histories of conflict that shaped societies. Introducing a modern imperial episteme to the formation and development of modern postcolonial imaginaries encourages us to engage with the context, content and consequences of non-European imaginaries, and the scales of local, regional and transnational manifestations of imaginary development. We can then decolonize the imaginary and make it useful for the Pakistani context by integrating the conflictual and not merely consensual, aspects of imaginaries.

---

<sup>6</sup> For literature on trans-local Islamic identities, see Adib-Moghaddam (2012) Piscatori (2006) and Roy (2002).

One could question why I enlist a theory developed in and for the West if the point is to mobilize sources of Southern impacts on world politics. There is precedence for existing concepts being deployed in new contexts, where, the researcher 'takes concepts to new contexts' in the aim of developing better universally applicable tools (Sartori: 2008). But my purpose is instead to reformulate the concept based on a different mapping of experiences amid relational encounters. This is where the researcher remains interested in concepts that are taken to be universal, but examines the consequences of their encounters with other modern histories (Bhambra: 2014, Chakrabarty: 2007).

By 'decolonizing' I mean the process of critiquing and reconstructing power-knowledge frameworks grounded in the assumptions of European exceptionalism, both by acknowledging their simultaneous insufficiency and indispensability, and by integrating colonial and postcolonial histories into our theorizing (Chakrabarty: 2007: 6, Shilliam: 2021, Barkawi: 2017). Subsequently, decolonizing the imaginary requires conceiving imaginaries as in co-constitutive relations with other imaginaries and their planetary dimensions; and to think about imaginaries as in tension and contradiction with one another, in and beyond borders. Taking the imaginary to the post-colonies carries with it the need to 'decolonize' the concept to account for planetary dimensions of empire and capitalism. In light of imperial and post-imperial histories I argue modern postcolonial imaginaries are contested rather than consistently collaborative. Imaginaries of course also include deep ties of solidarity and collaboration the world over. The point is to rebalance the concept to include contestation, and thus to include the hierarchies that underpin world politics.

The Pakistani Cold War imaginary is a way of getting at the contestation over the meaning of Pakistan, by competing social forces within society, and on an interconnected international level, in relation to geopolitical conflicts over power during the Cold War.

Imaginarities are divided internally and externally, and are conditioned by hierarchies across local, national, regional and international scales. Their combustibility can illuminate the historical, social and cultural encompassment to power relations (Sewell: 2005). It then becomes possible to acknowledge how ‘Western’ imaginaries are engaged in relations with others who they historically have been in conflict with through colonization and that we must attend to the characteristics of those other imaginaries, conceived as diverse and divergent but connected to other non-European and European societies and their imaginaries. There are alternative experiences of modernity but they are in co-constitutive relations with others (Bhabra: 2014, Lowe: 2016). This analysis is ‘decolonized’ in the sense that it deploys anti-imperial social forces in the Global South to rework the concept, and we are now also working Southern perspectives into our analysis of world

## **2 Imagining Pakistan differently**

Dawn Newspaper heralded, the birth of “Pakistan as an event in history”, a world historical formation, and a novel form of national identity, based around an idea of the first Islamic state to use religion as its ideological fulcrum (Devji: 2013). In August 1947, Lord Mountbatten, the last governor General and Viceroy of the British Empire wished farewell to Pakistan, praising how, by “achieving your independence by agreement” Pakistanis had, “set an example for all freedom-loving people throughout the world” and thus had allowed for a “parting among friends<sup>7</sup>”. Despite their striking achievement, Pakistani leaders also faced seemingly insurmountable geostrategic and political challenges. Pakistani first generation leaders after Jinnah dreamt big, but unlike the Quaid, their geostrategic ambitions would be not reach world historic proportions, until

---

<sup>7</sup> The Manchester Guardian, Friday August 15<sup>th</sup> 1947

Zia's junta supercharged the Afghan Jihad. Consider how Ayub Khan, the first military dictator of Pakistan's autobiography is titled, 'Friends Not Masters' in order to justifying his rule by defining the relationship with empire for both international and domestic audiences. Not quite friends yet neither foes, Pakistanis have long had a complex set of relations with former colonial powers and imperial patrons.

But this is only part of the story. From feminist- socialist activist poets like Kishwar Naheed and Fahmeeda Riaz, to anti-colonial and progressive activists such as Asma Jahangir and Eqbal Ahmed, Pakistanis have contended the narrative of world order and reimagined society. Anti-imperial Pakistani forces have had an influence out of proportion to their power. Despite their hardships, they continue to invoke the hope for a better future. In so doing, they have articulated alternative visions of Pakistan and crafted alternative Pakistani worldmaking projects.

Empire, Islam and a shifting internal and international political geography forced myriad challenges for leaders from the onset, conditioning the projection of an establishment trifecta between imperial patronage, Islamic universalism anti-Indian nationalism, at the heart of Pakistani national identity and its foreign policy architecture (Ahmed: 2006, Haqqani: 2005). Yet without understanding the complex sociologies and imaginaries of Pakistani imaginary factions, we cannot investigate the effects of their worldmaking projects in transnational events. As Pakistanis were inculcated into a world order marked by two world wars, new forms of non-territorial internationalism and anti-colonial movement spread across the world. At the dawning of what seemed like a new age, intra-imperial conflict, regional powers and postcolonial states and societies would engage in transboundary, multi-scaled struggles for power. The race for shaping the meaning of Pakistan, and the makeup of world order, had begun.

The retention of colonial path dependencies in terms of institutional culture, geopolitical alignment and the notions of threat, security and power-knowledge, propelled close political-military relations with Anglo-American strategists in the first decade of independence (Bajwa: 1996, Ahmed: 2013). In particular, the relations of the military and bureaucratic nexus had lasting effects on the structure of power in Pakistan (Alavi: 1972, Akhtar: 2018). This class was dominant within the state during the country's first two decades. Crucially they had undergone training and service within the British colonial state and would consolidate power over Pakistan's disparate communities, cementing a pro-Western Cold War stance (Ahmed: 2006, Haqqani: 2005). The tension between these always-precarious yet simultaneously powerful political elites, and counter-hegemonic political and social forces in Pakistani society would sharpen over time and lead to national tragedies, wars and brutal counter-insurgencies, as well as changes to the sociology of Pakistan's national security elites (Siddiqi: 2007, Ali & Patman: 2019, Ahmed: 1996).

In the mind-set of Pakistan's early Cold War leaders, they were the contemporary inheritors and innovators of the strategic, martial and geopolitical practices of the old empire. In the early years following independence, liberal, Mujahir elites, as well as a small section of Punjabi middle classes dominated the military-bureaucratic complex. These political classes shared a Westernized worldview and sensibility (Alavi: 1972). Not only did military and civilian officers carry themselves as Anglicized 'Sahibs', they also imagined their political power outside of the territorial boundaries of Partition, and towards a combination within British imperial, Mughal Civilizational and Pan-Islamic, trans-regional links (Sayyid & Tyrer: 2002, Toor: 2005, Ahmed: 2013). This class only gave way to a military dominated political class, also involving political parties and industrialists. Later they shifted towards a conservative, South Punjabi, lower middle class imagining of Pakistan, as an Islamic state foregrounded by an Islamist worldview with

British imperial strategic inheritances, during Zia's martial rule (Ahmed: 2006, Akhtar: 2018). However, less well recognized was how this longstanding process, beginning in the 1960s, affected the Afghan war. Part of what makes Pakistan distinct is its particular combination of social geography, Islamic universalism, and the state's ideological rather than territorial nationalism. Thus Devji argues that Jinnah and his contemporaries had imagined Pakistan as modern Muslim selfhood, a world historical phenomenon, grounded in both Islam and the Enlightenment conception of the nation-state, in the sense of being grounded in universalisms, as opposed to blood and soil (Devji: 2013:48).

Under successive military regimes and military-bureaucratic dominated civilian governments, comprising the Ayub, Bhutto and Zia regimes, an anti-Indian, pro-Western and pro-Islamic identity reinforced a militarized and conservative Islamic ideology (Haqqani: 2005). This would have significant effects on Pakistan's geopolitical outlook. Right from the offset, the logics of Cold War superpower rivalry sat uneasily with the complex social forces encountering one another in Pakistan, often sharing anti-colonial sensibilities. Thus Pakistani imperial inheritance, uneven development, geostrategic position, and particular brand of pan-Islamic, Islamic ideological over territorial nationalism, and the disparity between the national security state and aligned establishment classes and the masses, made for a very particular social terrain in which Cold War bi-polarity was complicated by local, provincial, national and regional contests for power (Yousuf & Adkin: 2007, Westad: 2005). If we now return to theorizing, we need to clarify what are the limitations in theorizing Global South encounters, before I unpack how the Pakistani Cold War imaginary theorization works to alleviate these issues.

### **3 Approaches to Global South Polities in the study of world politics and their limitations**

I have argued previously that Security Studies, influenced by earlier modernizing theories, has traditionally constructed bounded, statist, representations of the world from a Eurocentric perspective. But how have IR theorists approached the specific question of the agency and transboundary constitution of Southern polities within North-South political-military-cultural encounters? Here I briefly sketch out problems in asymmetric conflict, third world security and constructivist approaches to southern polities and their global encounters.

Asymmetric conflict approaches engage with the question of hierarchy by arguing strong powers lose wars due to the causal variables of strong state's preferences through concepts of strategy and authority (Arreguin-Toft: 2006, Lake: 2011, Ikenberry: 2000, Cooley: 2008). Andrew Mack asks 'why big nations lose Small Wars' (Mack: 1975). Mack was influenced by Western losses in Algeria and Vietnam, and their impact on Western liberal democracies. He claims, "in every asymmetric conflict where the external power has been forced to withdraw, it has been as a consequence of internal dissent" (Mack: 1975:200). His work addressed how the became disenfranchised by the Vietnam War, forcing the US establishment to terminate the conflict. But at no point does he address 'small ' powers, or rather how societies in the Global South are willing to endure great burdens in order to outlast occupations. Similarly, Arreguin- Toft (2001) asks how the weak win against the strong. He argues "strong actors lose asymmetric conflicts when they adopt the wrong strategy vis-à-vis their weaker adversaries" (2001:121). Here conflict is determined by interest and resolve. There is no attention granted to categorizing how the 'weak' win. These approaches are interested in timeless distinctions between strong and weak dating back to Thucydides, and the ways that strategy and conviction explain great power

defeats. Both models assume 'strong' and 'weak' as sociological categories, and underplay the agency of Southern polities beyond tactics on the battlefield.

Third world security analysis highlights a sociological categorization of third world security through regional insecurities (Ayoob: 1993). 'Weaker' States' security potential is argued to be attainable through a western styled regional trajectory (Buzan: 1983:99). Jackson's theory of Quasi states (1980) claims states the Third World states are quasi states, which lack the innate features of sovereignty. Hence they are deficient of universal logics of true nation states. 'Quasi' states extract resources from 'strong' states to survive in the international system by bargaining, yet they exist only by being supported by the international community (Jackson: 1990). He asserts, "they are still far from complete, so to speak, and empirical statehood in large measure still remains to be built" (1990:21). Jackson is interested in contrasting quasi states with an ahistorical model "based upon strictly European values, customs, practices, organisation and structures" (Hill: 2005:146). The assumption remains that there exists strong or real states, centred in the European world and failed, or weak states in the international system in the non-European world. In so doing Jackson indulges in Eurocentric valorisation of the Western state as the pinnacle of full state-hood and removes the violent encounter of colonial violence, in shaping both 'real' and 'quasi' states. More recently, the presence and persistence of the weak state thesis in international and regional politics has been redeployed in the Pakistani context, to explain notions of the longevity of weak states and their impact on interstate security norms (Paul: 2010).

Both asymmetric and third world or quasi state approaches neglect to highlight the mutual constitution of social horizons in the connection between strong and weak, north and south. Moreover the deployment of ahistoric categories fails to investigate the historical and international trajectories of these states. This enables them to position the

‘other’ outside the realms of the ‘true’ international system. In so doing it reaffirms the notion of a clash between the European and non-European world<sup>8</sup>. Underpinning the weak state thesis is an assumption that southern polities contain an innate sociological weakness, when really this only reproduces a, “cultural understanding of regional weakness and victimization” (Niva, 1996:151). So-called ‘weaker’ states are assumed *less* sovereign for their failings, existing at the foot of a stratified international order. This understanding of societies in the Global south is shared in the ‘Small Wars’ literature. Here imperial relations in the South are taken seriously, but the approach expanded from the desire to aid colonial counter-insurgencies and continues to embed culturalist modes of understanding the other (Cohen: 1984, Calwell: 1996, Scheipers: 2014). But the imperial was not some top down, inevitable and undiminishing power relation. Rather it involved “a dense field of co-constitution (where) the international becomes a “thick” social space, traversed by multiple relations” (Barkawi: 2004: 28). The boundaries of states do not correspond with historic or even existing imagined political communities, nor do the temporalities of states neatly coincide with the histories and sociologies of modern sociologies in the Global South. Connected, the assumption that colonization created coterminous, liberally informed, analytic units in Europe obscures the imperial past (Doty: 1996). It mystifies the emergence of Western states and ignores enduring imperial practices that underpin North-South entanglements (Barkawi and Laffey: 2006, Weldes: 2006).

Additionally, theories of great –small power conflict in conventional constructivist accounts are similarly hindered by the view of insular and self-contained identities, one of many variables that explain states’, limiting analyses to explaining *why* decisions were made actions (Katzenstein: 1993, Johnston: 1995, Keohane: 1988). This perspective

---

<sup>8</sup> Drawing on the structural transformation of the social is crucial to this reinterpretation of events as interactive processes (Sewell: 2005, Lawson: 2006, Wolf, 1982).

focuses on the replication of norms that govern world politics, including the ontological assumption that states simply exist, as do their interests. This approach modifies rather than radically challenges the rationalist perspective that separates identities and interests as opposing variables (cf Laffey & Weldes: 1997). Such a framework fails to question *how* interests are reproduced through multiple social relations. By contrast, viewing ideas not as objects but, “inter-subjective systems and representation-producing practices” (Laffey & Weldes: 1997: 209) enables the study of the practices that shape subjectivities. Interests then, “are the most transient of things. Ideas invariably exceed them and are the great survivors of history, living beyond the political conjunctures within which they were produced to shape new futures” (Devji, 2013: 8).

In contrast critical-constructivist approaches have made advances to the study of North-South relations in IR through attending to the relationship between world politics, power and culture (Weldes: 1996). This literature studies the temporally and spatially defined discourses underpinning transnational relations. Scholars have examined US relations with ‘weaker’ states, particularly through valuable work on US relations with Cuba, Philippines, Guatemala and Iran (Weldes 1996, Doty: 1996, Adib-Moghaddam: 2007). These scholars have highlighted the dialogic making of foreign policy identities, adopting a view of identity as a social process where transnational security is a reproductive enterprise. They have unpacked how the social construction of security practices brings profound insights into the encounter of Global South politics. Subsequently drawing upon critical scholarship on the social production of imperial encounters (Doty: 1996), national interests (Weldes: 1996) and state action (Hopf: 2005, Laffey: 2000) elucidates how power and resistance operate in asymmetric relations, and how foreign policies legitimize identities.

Yet critical-constructivist accounts of world politics, for all their utility, have often remained at the elite level, and have been unable to theorize a convincing conceptual

apparatus, even amongst those who have deployed the concept of the imaginary (Weldes: 1996, Adib-Moghaddam: 2006). How then have theorists sought to deploy the imaginary across security studies? The uses of imaginary in security turn it into a process of interpretation and an elite transmission of intersubjective ideas studies. For Muppidi Indian security imaginaries and their interactions with US and Soviet security imaginaries are driven by an elite political culture (Muppidi: 1996). Here, foreign policy is interpolated through foreign policy cultures, where identities work as ideational modes transmitted from national interest architects onto populaces. This runs into the problem of agency as the security imaginary scholar searches for agential pulls from elites (Pretorius: 2008). It also suggests a top down dispersion of ideas to material consequences, rather than viewing their co-constitution.

Thus critical constructivists are right to source the socio-cultural locus of ideas underpinning policy, but the sole focus on foreign policy cultures reifies an elite centric position on the relationships of meaning and practice, and isolates ideas and identities from the histories and sociologies of the Global South. Instead, I want to suggest socio-cultural encounter are open, contingent processes, which produces trans-local contestation and are subject to historical processes. Consequently critical-constructivist IR does not develop a sustained treatment of culture as agentic, dynamic and open, as has been developed by historical and cultural sociologists (cf Go: 2016, Lawson: 2006, Sewell: 2005). Yet cultural relations constrain and sometimes enables action that can reproduce or fundamentally alter structures It is this more thorough, understanding of culture, history and encounter from historical sociology that I draw upon in theorizing the Pakistani imaginary.

What asymmetric wars, Third world security and constructivist approaches to Global South relations in global relations of security collectively fail to satisfactorily explain is

how *transboundary* encounters shape world politics, together with how systems of meaning and practice, influence international politics. In contrast, I am concerned with how my use of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary works to unite meaning and practice in transboundary relations. In this way a stronger theory of the imaginary reinvigorates the possibility of theorizing connectivity, meaning and change in socially grounded relations.

#### **4 The Pakistani Cold War Imaginary**

The Pakistani Cold War imaginary works as the opposite of an imaginary in Taylorian social thought, where it provides a national, insular and underlying unity, a set of presuppositions that enable society to function. In contrast I identify the Pakistani Cold War imaginary as an evolving, changing social phenomena, subject to dynamics of conflict as well as transboundary connection to global others. In this sense this study argues that the concept of the imaginary can be re-fashioned from a theory of consensus to a theory of conflict. The Pakistani imaginary is singular in the sense that it is an analytical device to study a self-contained set of Pakistani societal relations, yet it is also plural in the sense that it contains multiple conflictual factions, involved in transboundary encounters with multiple generative outcomes.

It included key movements, institutions, people and ideas, whose struggles had significant repercussions for which forms of Pakistani internationalism shaped geopolitics. These social histories and the terrains of struggle they created, were crucial to the late Cold War, and the Afghan-Soviet War. Astute analysis has failed to understand these transnational, and historical dimensions to Pakistani social transformations. The confluence of social histories of conflict, worldwide struggles over imperial legacies in the colonies and Cold War conflict, complicate national and Eurocentric accounts. Thinking about the effects of

Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan and reframing this story in global histories of anti-imperialism and anti-communism, is I argue, a new way of thinking of the relationship between social histories and the transboundary dimensions of modern power politics.

Modern 'postcolonial' imaginaries can be relatively stable but then enable transformations depending on power hierarchies, structural contexts and the generative interplay of social forces. Rather than singular national imaginaries, fields of relations are underpinned by contesting imaginaries that evade the distinctions between state and society, national and international realms. Imaginaries are not only about the 'we' but also the 'other' and what their relation is to us, and often, what power 'we' have over 'them'. Recalibrating the imaginary enables further investigation into how violent encounter with external others shape contested Pakistani imaginary, and how imaginaries, in turn, shapes international encounters.

Hence conflicted Pakistani Cold War imaginaries are 1) violently conflicted rather than consistently consensual, 2) imaginatively unbounded from the state, 3) multiple rather than singular, 4) transboundary rather than global, 5) enabling and not simply constraining of new events, and 6) furnished with cultural memories older than empires that animate encounters. In investigating the importance of non-European imaginings for international politics, IR scholarship is advanced.

The Pakistani imaginary is best thought of as a socio-cultural terrain that partly constrained Pakistan-US early elite designs (during the 1955 Baghdad Pact and 1956 Suez Crisis era), yet despite exhibiting resistance to elite's Cold War allegiances, it reproduced dominant security relations. In contrast after 1979 Pakistani state and non-state encounters had a transformative effect on the trajectory of the Afghan Soviet War with the state's unison with the religious right in the plan to transform Pakistan, and fight

the Soviets in Afghanistan. Political and cultural developments in the Muslim world constrained regional and global Cold War security elites. In the process Pakistan became an important site where pan-Islamic mobilizations and Cold War security processes intertwined. Thus the Pakistani imaginary is useful for what it can tell us about shifting meaning-practice contentions beyond Pakistani borders, to understand Pakistan as vehicle and incubator for transboundary North-South encounters.

I am self-consciously theorizing the imaginary as the site of intersecting and multi-scaled, trans-local struggles and contentions for systems of meaning of Pakistan in the International, within Pakistani society. Imaginary projects are understood here as contingent processes that map trends of popular Pakistani positions on Cold War encounters. The imaginary contains three major intellectual, political and cultural ‘projects’ including 1) *elite national culture* 2) *Islamism* and 3) *Socialist anti-imperialism*. It is important to note that these imaginary projects were not mutually exclusive, nor did they contain internally homogenous movements. Rather they work as abstractions that help us examine multiple, fragmented and contested Cold War imaginaries. These projects reveal clashing systems of meaning within struggles for Pakistani world visions. They change over time and clash with each other, becoming generative of broader transnational relations during the Afghan-Soviet War. What interests me here is how these projects are tied to transnational mobilizations; Pan-Islamism, Anti-Imperialism and US Cold War security narratives. Investigating the social imaginaries of weak powers enables the reappraisal of Cold War encounters. I have sketched out how such a theorization can reposition ‘Pakistan’ away from its traditional representation— ‘Allah, Army and America’ (Abbas: 2004) and prior to that to view Pakistani politics only within the legacies of the British imperial state in the subcontinent, but instead as, “part of a series of intellectual, political and cultural developments within the Islamosphere” (Sayyid: 2017).

Through the imaginary we can study how “all societies showed that they could both transcend and reframe ordinary social life by recourse to mythologies of various kinds in which social life was imaginatively deformed” (Appadurai: 1996: 5). However what the imaginary does not explain, are the transboundary socio-cultural forms beyond the nationally and socially bounded locales of Taylor’s modern social imaginary (2004). In this way an imperial British imagination (Bayly: 2016, Manchanda: 2017) has in part informed the Pakistani Cold War Imaginary, constraining it in many ways but also opening trans-local and regional sites of resistance, as evidenced during the Afghan Jihad. Thus thinking about transition and change can be useful tools for broadening the horizons of conversations in interdisciplinary fields regarding collaborative but also factitious accounts of global imaginaries, within contemporary accounts of international relations.

The chapter has developed a notion of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary as a contentious, trans-local process. Decentring Eurocentric imaginaries unlocks the practices of the Pakistanis, and the reproduction of a Pakistani imaginary in Cold War encounters. Here we introduce the possibility that different systems of meaning and practice produce historic trajectories, and that the imaginary has different foundations in different contexts. That the story was very different in the colonies offers a rewarding avenue for provincializing our conceptions of the imaginary (Chatterjee: 1990:120, Chakrabarty: 1992, Goswami: 2002). Non-European identities have underpinned alternative geographies, connections and experiences of political mobilization (Connolly: 1991, Ho: 2004). Interactive connections forge world trajectories, problematizing the notion of an internal European experience.

The violent colonial encounter is a fundamental component of the Pakistani imaginary. In postcolonial polities, as in Pakistan, the imaginary is more openly contentious.

Collaborative social imaginaries emerge from external and internal violence. In Pakistan's experience, the varied *reactions* to the Cold War encounter are visible in the reproduction of the Pakistani imaginary. Imperial power partly shaped the imaginings of Pakistan the *state*. Retracing Pakistani social identities *as social historical interactions* with external encounters reveals the practices emerging from the imaginary, introducing other relationships that inform Pakistani impacts, beyond borders. I develop the Pakistani imaginary as projects of contested transnational narratives of Pakistanis' sense of their place in the world. The development of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary benefits from the assessment of socio-political worlds as a vehicle for studying transnational security relations in their historic, yet contingent interactions. Reframing via the imaginary addresses the possibilities for transnational historical, "thus unraveling the potential for larger socio-political changes to be understood through connected social worlds." (Blokker: 2015:42). This reformed notion conveys modern imaginaries are multifaceted, dynamic and violent in their exclusion of actors, practices and narratives.

The Pakistani Cold War imaginary features the different ways Pakistanis acclimatized to their international conditions. Pakistan's international meaning is contentious, its foreign policy choices hotly debated, reflecting the underlying difference between a pro-west elite and the rest of society (Ali: 2015, Toor: 2005, Ahmed: 2013). Transnational and societal narratives animate Pakistani international identities. The Pakistani imaginary is very much impacted by international contention in the Cold War era, and the formation of postcolonial nation-states in Asia, confounding the national paradigm of the Taylorian imaginary. Indeed transboundary identities included pan-Islamic mobilizations that wanted to collapse the national imaginary altogether in South Asia (Devji: 2008).

Patron-client relations with Britain and then the US have dominated Pakistani national *elite's* geopolitics. Studying hierarchical Pakistan state relations, by themselves cannot

satisfactorily explain the contentions involved in shaping Pakistan's international relations. Or why the country has been the site for global contentions. Yet 'Pakistan' as a signifier for trans-local societal struggles about Pakistan's international meaning, illuminates transboundary encounters outside of the power of the state. The potency of these value laden narratives derives from their historical resonance and ability to capture the imagination of Pakistani and external actors. 'Pakistan' disrupts statist categorizations that reinforce security as a realm of knowledge separate from socio-historic considerations. They explain the cultural resources that frustrated empire and militant alike, and offer a complex dynamic picture of Cold War relations from the Pakistani lens.

Hence it is useful here to engage in an imaginaries intervention into international theory by scrutinising Pakistani imaginaries as contested moral orders of Pakistan. Analysing the interfacing between clashing Pakistani Cold War political mobilizations, and particular transnational processes; anticommunism, anti-imperial internationalism and the religious right, can establish how dynamic encounters in the Cold War played out in Pakistan, but also how Pakistan became the site of contingent and contradictory dynamics, that over spilled into global politics during the US led proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan (McMahon: 1994, Toor: 2005, Akhtar: 2018). The imaginary in this schema is de-provincialized from the European public sphere. Instead it is resituated as a move to establish how imaginaries constrain and enable political projects, and in order to understand shifting centrifugal elements of Pakistani society and its coterminous development alongside Cold War developments in the Muslim world.

In addition, the contention for the meaning of 'Pakistan'<sup>9</sup> in the international by various actors clarifies the ways in which the Pakistani imaginary became variously appropriated

---

<sup>9</sup> I deploy 'Pakistan' primarily as a distinct geography, history and meaning in world politics, over spilling from the territorial limits of the nation-state. Moreover I use the term 'elite(s)' in at least two ways: a) as an analytical

for security practices, inculcated within Anglo-American, national, anti-imperial and Islamic imaginings. Social factions constrain the terrain of transnational actors, impact the outcome of the violent external encounter with great powers, and feature trans-local struggles emanating from the different imaginary projects, or meaning systems, operating in Pakistan and within transboundary dimensions.

This clarifies how Pakistani publics and their international solidarities become important to the contentions for Cold War security hierarchies. I have discussed these transversal qualities relating to anti-imperial internationalisms in the previous chapter but here I also want to appreciate the trans-locality of Islam (Piscatori: 2006) and how its political deployments across borders, brings attention to transcultural connections and change. Piscatori writes, “pan-Islamic identity reaches beyond the elite level. This consciousness may be deeper and broader now, and to the extent that fault lines exist, they are certainly not civilizational, nor even dynastic, and not even national or starkly ethnic as in the past” (Ibid: 2006:15). In other words, it is the trans-local Pakistani identities and practices in Afghanistan- that produce culturally ‘thick’ sets of cultural connections (Geertz: 1973) between developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet War. Thus the connection between Pakistani social imaginary and Cold War encounter illustrates the global contestations within Pakistani societal narratives, and their potential to impact Cold War security encounters.

Taking the social imaginary to the former colonies doesn’t just inform us of the need for new theorizations to describe the weak. It widens our understandings of the concept imaginary and its applicability to the study of world politics as a whole. The effects of the

---

category centred on their role (e.g. as in ‘foreign policy elite’) and b) as a sociological category to define their background and/or source of power (e.g. ‘military-bureaucratic elite’).

imaginary can clarify southern convergence or resistance to global political-military strategies during the Cold War. It largely constrains Cold War relations, but enabled certain political mobilizations to gain global traction, particularly during the Afghan war.

This theorization takes seriously the notion of hierarchies all the way down from the meta-narratives of empire to the everyday politics of local experience. The imaginary involves 1) the social weight of peripheral postcolonial polities that have constituted messy and constraining cultural connections and social contestations that have constrained the elite machinations of global elites 2) the lateral social mobilizations of Southern actors, both elite and non-elite can begin to be considered systematically, for their importance to global relations 3) an analysis of the cultural contentions that influence transnational change. This helps to illustrate how global Cold War security encounters are subject to transformation by the deep sociologies of peripheral polities, and that 4) although social imaginaries are relatively sticky and stable, owing to the glacial changes in the deep structures of political orders, the imaginary illustrates how these deep structures of Pakistani state-society relations and international politics are most likely to be contested and subject to change during tempestuous geopolitical and historical changes.

When adapted to the Pakistani imaginary there are some key insights which can potentially be extended to other non-Eurocentric notions of the imaginary: 1) political violence as key to the social imaginary in a postcolonial Pakistani setting 2) that Anglo-American power in South Asia and the Middle East has been structured by a global principle of racialized hierarchies in ordering geopolitics that, as with decolonization and the Sino-Soviet split, complicates the narrative of the bipolar Cold War, and that 3) different forms of acquiescing or resisting Anglo-American Cold War security projects in the region, and earlier responses to modernity, generated new South-South connections that IR and security studies have yet to systematically understand.

Although the Pakistani state is 'weak', Pakistani society's universalisms and wider global connections are potent in activating political trajectories, as the events of the Afghan war illustrate. Global South polities are involved in hierarchies, in contending practices and contentious relations with great powers. These polities invoke their own narratives through the imaginary that makes superpowers take notice. Superpowers signal their power to universalize moral orders and propel their own imaginations. Thus the 'strong' dictate their universalisms to the 'weak', but the 'weak' maintain their own universalisms and challenge world order (Aung-Thwin: 2001). History shows us just how far IR is behind the times. The Vietnamese national liberation struggle transformed the politics of the US (Sheehan: 1989, Moyar: 2006, Lentz: 2019). Similarly Algerian resistance to French colonialism spurred enduring connections between France and North Africans, and inspired Algerian decolonization (Shepard: 2006).

Recent scholarship has given new impetus to challenge Waltz's assertion towards a fuller embrace of the mutually constitutive connections of southern, smaller or weaker powers, which influence contemporary global politics. Lateral mobilizations and encounters propelled alternative global experiences. Anti-colonial Oceanic people (Shilliam: 2015), Atlantic sailors (Linebaugh & Rediker, 2002) Indian Ocean traders (Ho: 2004), or anti-colonial intellectuals reimagining West Asia post-empire (Mishra: 2013, Devji: 2013) also transformed the global. These studies have focused on the socio-economic mobilizations and their ability to challenge Eurocentric notions of insular notions of development. New social worlds emerge from transcultural encounters that constrain great powers and regional polities, creating clashes but also solidarities that are at times violently antithetical to the project of nation-statehood. Sometimes these encounters enable the weak to influence and transform global trajectories.

Subsequently the Pakistani Cold War Imaginary can enhance understandings of the constraining and enabling roles of contestation in the International and offer an alternative vantage from which to develop a sustained analysis of Cold War political-military encounters. If International Relations (IR) and Security Studies took seriously the imaginaries of the South, it could deepen investigations into world historic connections. Identifying the salient, complex and entangled dynamics of enduring global has never been more vital to recalibrating our notions of geopolitics, international order and world history.

## **5 Pakistanis and the International**

At its heart the ambiguities of empire and Islam played into Pakistani extra-territorial politics. It shaped the attempt by various state establishments to use colonial borders and frontier politics in ways to subdue ethnic peripheries on the borderlands with Afghanistan, by transforming left and ethno-separatist politics through a counter-insurgency practice uniting the state with the religious right, which I explore deeper in chapter 5. In addition, their policies alongside the borderlands, and their connection to cross-border politics and commitment to irregular counter-insurgency, would become key features of the Pakistani postcolonial state project (Nunan: 2015: 124). Moreover, the violent, authoritarian and centralizing impulses of the state, promoted a system of patronage politics, which, especially after the first two decades of postcolonial optimism, hollowed out state institutions in ways that have remarkable shared trajectories in other Muslim Cold War states in the Middle East (Tripp: 2012). Alongside the colonial encounter, Pakistanis found themselves engulfed into the unfolding logics of Cold War superpower rivalry. Natural proclivity and interconnection with British imperial power smoothed the transition towards US Cold War alliance, and the beginnings of eras of military, strategic,

economic, political and cultural interfacing with the US Cold War project and its twin wings of security and development (Jalal: 1990, Bajwa: 1996). Across the global south, Pro-Western Capitalist model states vied with Soviet socialist economies, as the structure of the world economy entered a new phase after 1945.

Pakistanis entered into a new era characterized by the world historic advent of decolonization. In this historic moment era, anti-colonial forces wrought into being new postcolonial states and movements, whilst global mobilization of anti-colonial forces had to contend with both the old European powers reluctant to relinquish power, and the might of the new superpowers. Whilst national liberation struggles, had forced wars of independence that brought a militant path of anti-colonial resistance, despite centuries of anti-colonial struggle, the handover of formal power to the Muslim League and Congress as marked by the close connections between empire and the anti-colonial nationalist class. In the case of Pakistani early Cold War architects like General Mirza, Liaquat Ali Khan and Ayub Khan, Pakistan needed a modernizing developmental nationalism, as I discuss in chapter 3. These forms of statecraft sat uneasily with Pakistan's potentially volatile Pan-Islamic identity, and sat uneasily with the direction of its foreign policy in the Middle East in the first decade of independence, as I shall highlight in chapter four. Despite links with the Kemalist and Shah regime in Turkey and Iran, as well as deep strategic connections with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, the responses to Pakistan's Islamic doctrine were markedly unfriendly from Levantine states.

Pakistanis engaged with a world political climate marked by historic changes in the Muslim world characterized by schisms between security regimes and their dissidents, and challenges to traditional religious authority from modernists of different political persuasions. A longer historical dure of Islamic encounter with modernity and its effects in both the adoption of superpower politico-economic doctrines, as well as the decisive

rejection of the Cold War binaries, would spur an Islamist political trajectory across borders. Inspired by Al-Afghani, Sayyid Qutb and Khomeini, these forces engaged with nationalist and socialist strategy, propaganda, tactics and organising in an increasingly vibrant set of political spheres by the second half of the twentieth century (Rahmena: 1994, Fowkes & Gokay: 2009).

Pakistan's inculcation into the US led Baghdad Pact, cemented close ties to the other 'Southern rim', or 'Northern Tier' states straddling the frontier with the Soviet Union. Pakistan's adoption of US treaties of cooperation and global anti-communist alliance both sanctified repression of left, anti-imperial and ethno-separatist forces domestically, whilst providing the Pakistani military with much needed hardware. As we shall see in chapter 4, in the context of the Suez crises, these loosely Pan-Islamic, strongly pro-US stance, would greatly anger large swathes of Pakistan, radicalize East Pakistani Maoists, and set the stage for a lively national debate over the 1950s over Pakistan's role in the anti-communist Cold War order (Bajwa: 1996). As such, Pakistani political elites from Jinnah to Ayub Khan, were anxious to make the right balance between pro-Western, pan-Islamic and Third World solidarity in foreign policy making. Pakistani leaders were anxious to attach themselves to the worldwide euphoria of decolonization, if not the militant struggle of postcolonial factions, nor the Non-Aligned Movements, of which India under Nehru was prominent.

Pakistan's British and American relations were key to the establishing of the new state, its military and bureaucratic instruments, and its development within the first decade, into a national security state geopolitically aligned with the West (Ahmed: 2013). It was on the Durand Line that the frontier had seen the British Indian army guard against the Tsarist threat, and later the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Haroon: 2007, Marsden & Hopkins: 2012). The old imperial sociology of the 'Martial Races', a mixture of Punjabis,

Muhajirs and Pathans, would act as the Praetorian Guard for the British Empire, and then, the Soviet threat during the Cold War (Rand & Wagner: 2012, Roy: 2011). Transnational operations of the British Indian army in the Middle East, South and South East Asia, imagined anew through imagined role of the Pakistani army in geopolitics. Pakistani military personnel could operationalize two key strategies for US Cold War strategy. They were imagined by Western and Pakistani strategists alike, to be able to bolster the forces in the protection of the Persian Gulf from Soviet threat (Devji: 2005). There they could play the role of regional henchmen, arms dealer and military trainer, particularly in relation to US friendly Arab anti-communist states (Tharoor: 2015). Whilst British Indian subjects manned the machinery of the oil industry even after 1945, the Pakistani army continued the colonial army's defence of the Gulf monarchies (Devji: 2005). Pakistani garrisons have been during stationed in key states housing large oil fields, and the training and operational oversight of Pakistani forces in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman, and their role in organizing Jordanian and Saudi airpower against the PLO in 1970 and South Yemeni Marxists in 1968, during the Cold War (Siddiqi: 2017, Prashad: 2013).

Structural inheritances and institutional outlooks deriving from an imperial world system, direct colonial rule and the uneven inheritances of state and capital, mapped uneasily onto the new social terrain of the postcolonial state (Chatterjee: 1991). This phenomenon exacerbated social hierarchies and imbalanced between a narrow Anglicized imperialized professional class and the rest (Akhtar: 2018). Military and bureaucratic elite classes deployed the geostrategic optics of the colonial state, imagining themselves as technocratic managers and Islamic warriors. They viewed themselves as both the rational agents of Pakistani history, as well as the natural heirs to the new state, an assumption shared by subsequent conservative lower middle class professionals working in the military and bureaucracy, who would rise to prominence from the 1970s onwards (Nasr: 1994). This

overdeveloped military-bureaucratic nexus (Alavi: 1972, Siddiq: 2007) would be the major architects of power, and their distrust for political parties, non-Punjabi-Muhajir communities and the left, would ferment an exclusive hierarchy at the core of the state project.

## Chapter Two: Anatomies of power in Pakistan

*“The hours of the workers are very bitter in your world”  
‘Lenin in God’s presence’,  
Allama Iqbal*

*“But perhaps he doesn’t know this  
That upon this contract of suicide  
He has consciously put his signature  
He is actually the fuel of this furnace!”  
‘Steel Mills Worker’  
Parveen Shakir,*

### Introduction

When Pakistani socialist activist Abdullah Malik walked into the centre holding the Cultural Congress of Havana in January 1968, he was confronted with a sight to behold. Artists, intellectuals and activists had arrived in Cuba from across the world to take part in a transnational project of anti-colonial worldmaking. At its core they sought to explore decolonization, not merely as a political or geopolitical phenomenon, but one, which forced activists to rethink the very nature of mankind. Rearticulating human subjectivity after empire required transnational engagements in the cultural sphere. Like fellow Pakistani activists including the poets Fahmida Riaz and Parveen Shakir, Malik sought to engage in transnational solidarity through a conversation of ideas, involving political debate and the arts. Central to this project was the reimagining of Pakistan. Consider Malik’s position in Havana. How different it must have felt to be welcomed into the tropical, welcoming climes of socialist Cuba, when he was painfully aware that state surveillance and imprisonment awaited him at home. Still, for the course of a week, he would engage with the global anti-colonial imaginings, and with a collective of Asian, African and Latin American scientists, filmmakers, musicians, economists and journalists, who together, reimagined the world anew (Ali: 2019: 225).

One of the questions that both activists and political-military strategists wrestled with regarded what was Pakistan meant to represent in world politics. Was Pakistan to become a garrison for imperial interests, a renewal of the Caliphate, or become a site of anticolonial, socialist revolution? How could Pakistan best prosper given the many fragments of the its imagining? The ambivalence over Pakistan's cultural identity, geostrategic location, uneven development and the role of Islam in the state, meant that despite not being at the epicentre of Cold War politics, the struggle for 'Pakistan' increasingly came to be tied to wider Cold War encounters.

The chapter makes the case for the historical mapping of the imaginary onto Pakistani Cold War encounters in order to think offer reflections on how we consider world history if Cold War history were to be punctuated by non-European people's socio-political imaginings. The chapter builds on the previous edition's theoretical construction of the Pakistani imaginary by unpacking the first two of its factions, the nationalists and the Islamists (the next chapter studies the Left), its utility in critiquing current historiographies, and value to the wider story arc of the study of Pakistani Cold War encounters. Mapping the change in power configurations in Pakistani Cold War encounters means taking seriously how the growing importance of the clashing conceptions of the meaning of 'Pakistan', took place within overarching and connected Cold War and post-imperial historic processes.

The structure is as follows. First I develop a detailed historic account of the international origins of Pakistani Cold War imaginaries. Second, I consider Cold War historiographies on the Cold War and Pakistan and sketch out the limitations and strengths of current approaches. Third I clarify the different Pakistani Cold War factions. Fourth I chart a historical mapping of Pakistani Cold War encounters. I clarify how the imaginary can help explain how social contestation and transnational developments proved intersecting

processes which, when activated by particular Cold War encounters, and how it contributed to Pakistan's spectacular rise in geopolitical prominence, from decolonization to the Afghan-Soviet war. I sketch out important transboundary political-military and socio-cultural dynamics that arise from Cold War Pakistani encounters. This allows me to examine particular intensities of geopolitical and socio-cultural interaction that connected the international politics of Middle East to the politics of Pakistan and the Subcontinent, and to go beyond the historiographies of the state, to include imperial, anti-imperial and Muslim world histories. The focus is the intersections of the domestic, regional and international dimensions of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary and their connections to the international constitution of the changing structure of power in Pakistan.

### **1 The international origins of Pakistani Cold War Imaginaries**

Here I develop an account of the origins of Pakistani imaginaries in histories of imperial and anti-imperial struggles that shaped Pakistan's Cold War international encounters. This has a threefold benefit. First it gives weight to the claim that Pakistani Cold War factions contributed to world historic changes during the final decade of the Cold War, whilst strengthening the claim that imperial encounters underpinned the politics of the Cold War and decolonization. Second, we are paying particular focus on the formation and transformation of imaginaries from British colonial to Pakistani national eras, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of methodological nationalism. Third, it gives the thesis a panoramic backdrop, fortifying the claims regarding Pakistani imperial and Muslim world inheritances, and the importance of its diverse internationalisms.

Much of the thesis is dedicated on how Pakistani Cold War encounters with international players, shapes the world order. Here I am also able to explore the other side of the dialectic, how earlier stages of world politics and international relations shaped socio-political dynamics in the Subcontinent, and then in Pakistan, and how they contributed to varied expressions of Pakistani Cold War identity. This requires deploying cases from periods that are beyond my major area of inquiry, yet are nevertheless important in establishing the various social mobilizations that animated struggles over culture, politics and international relations. By doing so we are more concretely able to analyse the hydra headed responses to colonial and anti-colonial relations, in forms of nationalist, socialist, anti-imperial and forms of Pan-Islamic or Pan-Muslim solidarity, and the changes from the colonial to the postcolonial era.

Forms of Muslim solidarity, political egalitarianism and anti-imperialism united classes, professions and ethnicities at particular critical moments when interests aligned (Ahmed: 1996: 635). But the self-understandings of Pakistani factions also inspired division, contestation and violence. The literature on ethnic conflict and communal violence is of course expansive and the ethnic composition of the elite will be dissected elsewhere in the thesis (Ahmed: 1996, Alavi: 1991, Haqqani: 2005). Here however, we are particularly focusing on the forms of inter-societal connectivity and conflict that emerged in the colonial encounter, and directly affected Pakistani Cold War internationalism, and conflict.

In this section, I make three core points. First, that examining Pakistani Cold War factionalism need to be anchored within the contexts of the transboundary forms of connectivity binding colonial and anti-colonial politics in the societies that constitute modern day Pakistan. Second, I make explicit how social terrains of struggle

connected movements and societies across South Asia the Middle East, and how transboundary connectivity, involved imperial, pan-Islamic and socialist communist politics, often in ways that blurred the boundaries between these groupings in particular and contingent ways. Third, I briefly sketch out how imperial, Muslim and socialist afterlives endured after the colonial period, and explore how they shaped an emergent anatomy of power in Cold War period in Pakistan.

#### 1) Colonial and Anti-colonial struggles amid international historical transformations:

Anti-colonial struggles — across global and local, imperial, national and interstate contexts — wrought earth-shattering changes to the dimensions of world politics. As the old imperial system disintegrated, hundreds of millions of people brought about an end to the era of colonial authority, refashioning their ideas of themselves in the process. Yet the colonial encounter produced varied forms of political identification, structural inequalities and uneven development. Anti-colonial movements and internationalisms were borne into this social context; and it is in these historical social terrains in the Global South which would go on to shape the contours of postcolonial relations in dynamic ways.

Indian Muslims in the late colonial period consisted of a disparate kaleidoscope of ethnic, sectarian, class and linguistic backgrounds scattered across the Subcontinent. Under the British, they became part and parcel of the colonial system of rule. Particular elite factions within ethnic groups such as the Punjabis and the Pathans would become the fabled ‘martial races’, the soldiers that would make up the British Indian army (Rand: 2006). The racialization of the martial races theory brought

Northern Indian, Punjabi and Pashtun recruits into key posts of colonial military and bureaucratic institutions (Rand & Wagner: 2012).

Inclusions into the military, bureaucracy and other elements of the colonial state, demarcated future grounds of friend and foe in the colonial and then the postcolonial state. The colonial state became increasingly intrusive into social life, inspiring new forms of subjectivities in response to colonial rule. This is crucial for example, to understanding the counter-challenge of Islamism in South Asia, particularly in response to the violent and ordering politics of the colonial state, which created a distinct politics of ordering and knowledge production. In this context Islamism, “originated in a period that was particularly thick with debate and alternatives, cannot escape engaging with the state, but inverts the substantive elements of colonial secularism by attributing universalism to Islam and claiming its compatibility with modernity” (Iqtidar: 2011:539). Thus the Indian Muslim social milieu would include Muslim members of the Indian Communist Party, all the way to the Deobandis, a grouping of conservative Muslim hardliners from the seminaries of Northern India. These divisions would be exacerbated following independence, with historic consequences.

More broadly, the 19<sup>th</sup> century saw the globalization of ‘print capitalism’, the integration of modern societies through the homogenizing and standardization of forms of language, technology and communication, amid the growth of capitalism (Anderson: 1983). The printing press, the telegraphic cable system and the railways were world transformative engineers of change. These technologies wrought a new secular homogenized notion of time into a matrix of globalized military, commerce, communications, travel, shipping and logistics. The advent of globalized technologies made communication across continents quicker whilst making the world feel smaller

and more integrated through ever more rapid forms of movement of people, goods, resources and ideas. In so doing, they inaugurated a “qualitatively different degree of interaction capacity’ from previous centuries, generating ‘a nineteenth-century discourse about the annihilation of space and time” (Buzan and Lawson 2015: 69–70).

This entwinement between print-industries and cultures, capital, technology and standardization remains a striking assemblage that truly transformed the world. And yet these social transformations were neither coterminous in their arrival, intensity or distribution, particularly in the Global South. Thus new political subjectivities were irreducible to a contemporary understanding of nations and nationalism (Younis: 2017: 485). The very “organizing principles of socio-political life were in flux as the nineteenth century drew to a close” (Bell: 2020: 15). Yet technological advancement was uneven and the riches from empire were bestowed to the colonizers and their allies in the feudal classes whilst the effect of global colonial violence and extraction was needless to say staggering.

The British Raj was the jewel in the crown of the British Empire, which extracted trillions of pounds from South Asia and left its mark on the social terrain of groups in terms of the devastation it bequeathed onto postcolonial societies. New techniques of policing, surveillance and militarization were practiced in the colonies long before the mechanized slaughter in the killing fields of Europe during the World Wars (Hevia: 2012, Roy & Rand: 2017). In the aftermath of the multi-racial and cross-religious Indian Mutiny against the British Raj in 1857, and the context of intense insurgencies from Afghanistan to Bengal, British power was on the wane in South Asia (Chatterjee: 1991). In both large-scale rebellion and everyday resistance, the refusal of imperial domination took many forms (Guha: 1983, Scott: 1990).

The British and French empires faced a problem. On one hand they had won the First World War and had even expanded by taking over some of the territories of the vanquished Central powers. Yet on the other, exhausted from total war, they were unable to crush the global rebellions against colonial rule. Under British rule, anti-imperial conflict rose up in Ireland, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan (Gallagher: 1981: 355 Bayly: 2016, Manchanda: 2020, Johnson: 2011). Following the end of the Second World War, anti-colonial movements would be strengthened further, as movements for anti-colonial liberation gathered pace, receiving growing international support, including from the superpowers (Parker: 2006). Not only was decolonization a denouncement of the previously most powerful forces in human history. It was also a refutation of the exclusivist notions of man, humanity and planetary possession. The 'darker nations' of the world were articulating new imaginings of the past and future, and centred justice and equality (Prashad: 2007).

Across Asia, Africa and Latin America, anti-imperial cultures were developing decades before formal decolonization, due to the integration of colonial and colonized worlds. At its heart and despite the variety of forms that emerged, anti-colonial thought and praxis was a deeply humanist notion of empowerment and equality in the face of the deployment of cultural, civilizational and racial difference (Getochev: 2019).

Anti-colonial resistance produced new ideas regarding post-imperial, non-national futures as well as the very forms of anti-colonial nationalism that created the architecture of the postcolonial state. Anti-colonial activists invoked new notions of federations, reparative justice, abolition, multi-racial and class solidarity as well as new ideas about international politics, geopolitics and world order (Devji: 2013). During the first half of the twentieth century, the momentum of independence in Africa and

Asia saw new forms of solidarity across borders and new conceptions of international order along notions of the 'Third World', decolonization and non-alignment (Mahler: 2019, Prakash & Adelman: 2022). Despite anti-colonial solidarity and resistance, postcolonial societies found themselves conditioned by the wealth, power and overwhelming military superiority of the former colonial powers, the superpowers and their allies.

Yet nonetheless the effects of anti-imperial victories and colonial overreach set the agenda for new forms of politics and society in the post 1945 world. Across the world, new postcolonial nations would emerge and engage in economic, political and social reconstructions. Paradoxically, in other regions, the radical optimism of anti-colonial internationalism for a utopian, emancipatory politics gave way to the more reactionary forces of state, capital and empire.

Internationalisms of the first quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, particularly during the interwar period, galvanized anti-imperial projects that did not always fall into the easy categorization of being for or against nationalism. Internationalisms captured the imagination of countless people across the world that were inspired in part by ancestral histories of tragedy and stoic struggle against colonization. And they collaborated to make the world anew through utopian world-making projects (Getochev: 2019).

Anti-colonial imaginaries are often framed in normative rather than sociological ways - to highlight a particular perspective on history, as the failed experiments prior to the establishment of nationalism's hegemony (Goswami: 2012: 1461). This is in spite of the fact that anticolonial internationalisms were a core component of anti-colonial struggles. These internationalisms were explicitly utopia focused in the sense of projecting a politics of post-imperial futurity, part of the reason they are sidelined in

national historiographies. They were neither like for like imitations of European nationalisms, nor were they characterized by a nativist rejectionist politics. Thus, “conceptions of a non-imperial future animated a heady mix of utopian aspiration and pragmatic reckoning, collective action and conceptual improvisation.” (Goswami: 2002:1463). Creative dynamic experiments with anticolonial internationalisms challenged notions of geopolitical hierarchy and the divide between national and international public spheres.

As I argued in the introduction, Methodological Nationalism dominates our understandings of internationalism and undergirds popular imaginings of society and world politics. It contributes to a particular projection of history by the victors that continues to omit histories of struggle and violence that have made the modern world. Spatially flattened to a world of borders and linear secular-time, dominant historical lenses for thinking about anti-colonial internationalisms has fallen short.

The result is that world histories of post-1945 world order are dominated by Western histories of modernity as planetary history. In this way the history of the twentieth century is marked by the two World Wars and the global superpower rivalry of the Cold War. Decolonization, a historical process that marked the formal end of colonial sovereign control, is argued to be secondary to great power struggle. Yet the revolutions of decolonization reordered societies and transformed the subjectivities of the world whilst simultaneously entrenching imperial legacies in uneven global terrains (Barkawi: 2016). Indeed emerging postcolonial elites negotiated decolonization from a position of former subordination (Westad: 2006: 561).

The unifying moment of anti-colonial struggle would be short lived as animated intensified as the struggle for power in postcolonial countries absorbed postcolonial

and superpower elites alike. This also inspired opportunism by many postcolonial elites to extract wealth and capitalize on the Cold War, in ways that did much to delegitimize early postcolonial leaderships and dampen optimism in decolonization (Westad: 2006: 562).

The US as an ascendant world superpower tentatively welcomed anticolonial nationalism and self-determination in public, with the 1955 Bandung conference causing much confusion in policy circles behind closed doors (Parker: 2006). What made anti-colonial internationalists a perceived threat to US interests was the demand for racial justice tied to the demand for former colonized people to be neutral during superpower struggle (Parker: 2006: 871). Even as Wilsonian rhetoric failed to transpire in the actions of the US in their own colonial exploits in the Philippines and racialized repression of African-Americans at home, a mass outpouring of global jubilation and socio-cultural awakening emerged at the end of formal colonization, borne out of centuries of struggle against global imperial and racialized hierarchies. (Go: 2011). Western imperial empires faced a crisis of legitimacy as the Wilsonian principle of self-rule gained global traction and institutionalisation and the US sought to change its image in the Global South.

In a time of world disorder amid the restructuring of global power hierarchies, the US played a delicate balancing act, appealing for clients in the Global South and popularising the image of itself as a supporter of 'Wilsonian' self-determination, whilst also taking over informal forms of influence and domination in areas formally under European colonialism. Parker reveals the surprise, disagreements and trepidation of US officials in the Eisenhower administration following from the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Parker: 2006:871). For the first time in history, the non-White global majority were coming together to uphold non-alignment, anti-racism and anti-

colonialism, an image that shattered the bi-polar worldview favoured by Washington and Moscow. It is of course important not to romanticize this solidarity, particularly given the harsh realities of economic and geopolitical hardship faced by formerly colonized peoples in local contexts, as well as the sheer variety and many forms of division of global anti-colonial movements, including factions that did not aspire to cosmopolitan secular forms of internationalism. Nevertheless the collaborative-emancipatory ethos of anti-imperial internationalisms stood apart from the politics of individualism in the US and the managed collectivism of the Soviet Union.

Sadly the Global South became the battleground for Cold War conflagration as the egalitarian promise of decolonization disintegrated, and was subsumed by the broader struggle between communists and US backed capitalist regimes (Westad: 2005, Chamberlin: 2019). But this was only part of the story as anticolonial demands were themselves historic. They had established the norm of self-rule and independence in the International. It included the international acknowledgement of self-determination, itself a denouncement of bi-polarity, in recognition of the North-South divide, along what Dubois famously called 'the Global Colour Line'. It was this racial-political-geopolitical divide that remained the defining fault line in the construction of an uneven modern world system, despite the onset of superpower confrontation and Cold War geopolitics (Leslie & James: 2015:6).

2) Social terrains of struggle and transboundary connectivity: Global Muslim solidarity, internationalism, and anti-colonial resistance in the Subcontinent

Consequently modern international self-understandings emerged in the Muslim world that denounced colonialism. They were varied in hue, including nativist-revivalist,

religious, socialist and cosmopolitan global outlooks. Indian Muslims engaged in an abundance of varied political dreams in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, facilitated by the capacity to reimagine the world in the context of anti-colonial politics in South Asia, amid global pan-Asian and Pan-Muslim, anti-colonial mobilizations (Alavi: 2021, Mishra: 2012, Aydin: 2019). Muslim Indians such as Syed Ahmed Khan and even Jinnah had previously advocated Muslim political federations straddling South Asia and the Indian Ocean in the decades preceding Partition (Devji: 2013: 72). Moreover, South Asian communists called for greater ties to the Soviet Union and China in the late 1940s. Meanwhile Pan-Islamists from 1919-1924 had launched the Khilafat Movement, a last ditched attempt by Muslim South Pan-Islamists to help resuscitate the Caliphate, following its collapse after the First World War. And yet this would not be the last time in which the Muslims of South Asia would look to the Islamic World, particularly West Asia in what is called the 'Middle East'. This was not only due to religious universalism, cultural affinity or anti-colonial solidarity, but also in order to escape the geopolitical trappings of international politics that the end of empire had afforded them; the regional confines of an Indian dominated South Asia.

Inter-West Asian Muslim connectivity brought about connections amidst the rubble of the British and Ottoman Empires. Pan Islamic revival movements; the growth of political modernism; the decline of Muslim-Hindu unity into communalism, the end of the Ottoman Empire; and the geopolitical crises of the Great Depression and Interwar era together opened up a space for these new modern movements to develop. These networks were crucibles of modern fusions of ideas, technology and intuitional infrastructure. Modern Muslim mobilizations were constructed in the political, economic and social matrix of global modernity, in conjunction with

modern forms of rationalization, capital accumulation and knowledge production, at in intimate proximity to the colonial state.

In this context, nationalist, socialist and communist forces as well as pan-Islamic and Islamist movements, all draw from the legacies of anti-imperial mobilization, political action and internationalism. Together they informed a plural terrain of differing visions for Muslim selfhood, with remarkable transnational weight, encapsulated by the transboundary anti-colonial connectivity binding the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt with the Subcontinent's Jamat-i-Islami (Gani: 2022: 1). Despite the manifold disagreements among anti-colonial forces, and within the Indian Muslim community, there was a collective acknowledgement, that the "international dimension was a crucial bulwark against the old rivalries which were there before colonialism" as well as the "old inter-racial hatred" of white supremacy (Gani: 2019: 129). Here I want to draw attention to the forms of anti-colonial struggle Indian Muslims engaged in, as well as the networks of connectivity they were part of.

Artists, writers, students and workers formed new imaginaries by bringing together ideas establishing a collective 'we' through dialogue on moral order, justice and everyday struggle, as well as meditations on culture and society. Through journalism, novels, the newspaper, art, theatre, and satire, these cultures grew. Modern technologies such as the railway system, the cable system, the typewriter and most significantly the print-industries of 19<sup>th</sup> century South Asia, turbo-charged the advancement of political modernisms through literature and art, creating an era of professional classes, students, workers and activists, a transcultural terrain, the "Muslim Cosmopolis" that in the previous generations had been "knitted together by merchants, warriors, scholars, and Sufi saints" (Alavi: 2015: 7).

However the new social terrain at the turn of the twentieth century was fuelled by the spread of print cultures has been described as the ‘Urdu Cosmopolis’, the print-culture that brought together Urdu-speaking people from across the Subcontinent (Dubrow: 2018). In coffee houses, public meetings or *mushairas*, in the towns and cities, these new print-cultures allowed for new notions of subjectivity alongside wider social commentary on the future of political and social order (Malik: 2013:531). Dubrow writes, “in the decades leading to the Independence of India and Pakistan, progressive writings also interrogated the idea of the nation, casting it as a ‘terrain of struggle,’ an imaginary to be explored and constructed rather than a political given” (Dubrow: 2018: 111). They would have a fundamental role in the emergence of national culture in Pakistan following Partition. Hence it is easy to forget how Urdu culture upheld internationalist and socialist articulations of what a new polity could look like through the founding of the Indian and later, Pakistani Progressive Writers Associations (Toor: 2011: 52). The rise in literacy and the development of Urdu print cultures, writers associations, legal societies, activist networks, and recitals by writers, artists, playwrights, novelists and poets – would help Indian Muslims reimagine their subjectivity through anti-colonial lenses.

Moreover, militant forms of anti-imperial resistance to colonial rule also intensified as a result of transforming social relations. They included a nationwide strike that culminated in the mutiny of British Indian navy personnel in 1946, which spread from HMS *Talwar* through to Bombay and ports across the empire, from Calcutta to Karachi (Mitra: 2022). The 1946 rebellion of revolutionary sailors is sidelined in orthodox South Asian historiography. Nonetheless it was a pivotal moment in the capitulation of revolutionary politics and the ascent of liberal-communal hybrid politics by national elites on the eve of independence. It illustrates how class and revolutionary struggle animated the British Indian army and navy. Angered by their

subjugation, experience of racism fighting for Britain and armed with revolutionary thought, the sailors of the Indian Ocean resurrected the trend of maritime anti-imperial resistance (Linebaugh & Rediker: 2000). Crucially they expressed an explicit rejection of religious-ethnic divides instilled by the nationalist leaders and the colonial state, and enunciated a challenge to empire which explicitly rejected colonial markers of division.

Naval and maritime logistics workers strikes were matched by labour strikes in the cities. One of the major sites of labour activism and internationalism was in Lahore where the Mughalpura railway workers, emerged as one of the most politically active railway unions in South Asia during the 1920s. Ahmed Azhar argues that whilst these workers built solidarity networks with anti-colonial militants and communists, they were never beholden to them, but in fact maintained varied and internally complex disagreements and politics that never fell neatly into the boxes of nationalism, communism or anti-imperialism (Azhar: 2019:23). Instead these workers and maintained a level of autonomy over their collective action, which was an altogether different politics to the communitarianism that later swept India in the 1940s.

These workers held organic links not only to the Communist party cadres, but also with everyday people, precisely because of this ability to express and uphold varied political identities through collective action and solidarity (Azhar: 2019:116). In addition, Anushay Malik reminds us that, “the divide between Islam and communism was in no way as clearly defined in actual practice as it was in the public statement made by officials and politicians” (Malik: 2013:525). This is not to downplay divisions in society, but rather to point to politics and factionalism as opposed to sharp distinctions in ideology. Thus, as Kamran Asdar Ali writes, sectarian and ethnic struggles in contemporary Pakistan need to be rethought in the context of the varied

forms responses to Muslim nationalism, as “differences based on political affiliation, region, language and ethnicity were dividing the working class” even as “class-based solidarities and alliances are created in specific moments of the struggle” (Ali: 2015-195-196).

Anti-colonial strikes and mutinies suffered from a lack of coordination, and a lack of support from the major political parties. Muslim League, Congress and even Communist Party elites were primarily concerned with their own articulations of independence and were fearful of the spread of revolutionary struggle that could alter the character and composition of their networks. Unsanctioned revolutionary politics was seen as a threat to their power and a threat to the future constitution of post-colonial militaries. None were prepared to escalate tensions with the British so close to agreeing the terms of independence.

The challenge of anti-colonial resistance was violently repressed by British colonial forces, yet the damage to the confidence of the Raj implied their rule was untenable and they began negotiations over their departure. The fact that historic uprisings on the eve of Partition are marginalized from the neat nationalist historiographies of resistance ignores the transnational and imperial dimensions of the struggle for liberation. But it also serves to maintain the powerful narrative that homogenizes the liberation struggle, removing histories of conflict involving class conflict and violent anti-imperial struggle from nationalist accounts of independence in South Asia.

Armageddon ensued in the last hours of British rule in the collective traumas of Partition in which millions died in the communal violence and migration of people across new borders. Anti-colonial connectivity in the postcolonial era would be much harder in the new world of states, borders and national binaries of ‘us’ versus ‘them’.

It would require new strategies, as well as tactical and knowledge sharing (Sajed & Seidel: 2019:1). Internationalism was inseparable from local anti-imperial struggles (Salem: 2020: 19). In Fanon's schema, national consciousness was a liminal space on the way towards a futuristic age involving anti-colonial horizons of new possibilities (Fanon: 1961). New subjectivities would need to fit both the terrain of national liberation, as well as the wider international realm of anticolonial connectivity and solidarity (Sajed & Seidel: 2019: 5). However anti-colonial dreams would often turn to postcolonial melancholy, precisely because of the imperial legacies that were imparted by the colonial encounter.

### 3) Colonial and anti-colonial afterlives in early Pakistani Cold War politics

The fears and hopes of Pakistanis unfolded as a new world began to take shape in the aftermath of the Second World War, decolonization and the onset of the Cold War. Whilst nationalists tied to Anglo-American power would emerge at the fulcrum of the postcolonial Pakistani state, Islamists and anti-colonial socialists of varying factions would take the role of counter-hegemonic forces. Their universalisms and historic transnational connectivity ensured these factions and their imaginaries would continue to transform and contest the structure of power in Pakistan, and connect to changing geopolitical events, networks and processes.

Incomplete forms of decolonization contributed to divergent Pakistani Cold War worldmaking projects in the 1950s and 1960s, with regard to the uneven struggle for the structure of power in Pakistan, and the imperial origins of Pakistani militarism. Varied Pakistani Cold War factions inculcated imperial statecraft, Muslim

universalism, and socialist ideals into their politics. These imperial, postcolonial and transboundary relations were crucial in the making of an emerging structure of power in Pakistan that was characterised by inter-societal conflict and early Cold War encounters.

Conceptions of Muslim futurity on the Subcontinent had initially brought together secular, post-imperial and democratic mobilizations for a post-Partition future, spearheaded by the charismatic Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Yet as I will argue in greater detail in the next chapter, following his death in 1948, his successors were faced with a whole host of geopolitical, economic and social problems. A nation had to be created from a diverse array of communities, including indigenous and migrating communities along different ethnic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds- and they had been held together, early architects thought, by a singular national identity in Muslim nationalism, and a single language in Urdu. The particular promise of Muslim nationalism inspired both passion and ambivalence; it was the idea that in the Subcontinent, amid evidence of majoritarian Hindu violence, and the global movement for decolonization, Muslims of India should have their own sovereignty. This idea was vague so as to win support from the freedom movement, but post-Partition this ambivalence only cemented social divisions in the new country but was also used as a strategy by the early Muslim League party leaders, in order to win support for the idea of Pakistan (Devji: 2013, Toor: 2011).

Colonial forms of hierarchy would be entrenched in a nexus of military officers and bureaucrats forming a new political nexus temporarily uniting Muhajir and Punjabi professional political, military and bureaucratic classes (Alavi: 1972, Gilmartin: 1992). The result would lead to the reification of colonial hierarchies, arrangements and

political frameworks, and in the violent maintenance of peripheral zones, particularly in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province, where Baluchis and Pathans composed the majority.. Imperial inheritances would lead to the dominance of an over determined ‘garrison’ state, which replicated the frontier role played by North West Indian Muslims during the Anglo-Afghan wars and during the Great Game geopolitical rivalry over Central Asia that ensnared both the British Raj and the Soviet Union during the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Ahmed: 2011, Leake: 2016).

From a world of dying empires in the interwar period to the resurrection and reordering of global hierarchies following the Second World War, the imaginaries of Indian Muslims and Pakistanis emerged in rapidly changing worlds. New conceptions of society sat alongside old forms of tradition, solidarity amid enduring social hierarchies. The implications for the changing terrain of struggle included the shift from diverse experiences of anti-imperial politics to a new nationalized, social terrain characterised by uneven development and the rubble of Partition. This terrain became, “utilized in legitimating and delegitimizing structures of international politics and competing visions of world order.” (Aydin: 2007: 73). It would birth multiple, contested imaginaries articulating alternative visions of moral order. These terrains of struggle were fought over by nationalists, the religious right and the left, alongside various local, provincial, ethnic factions and within the realm of global power politics. Anti-colonial thought and its descendant forms of postcolonial nationalism, anti-imperial socialism and Islamism- all grew out of the colonial modern encounter. In this way they all share in the forms of connectivity of imperial and anti-imperial networks.

Meanwhile the colonial shadow would only grow in Pakistan through military Cold War alliances, militarism, espionage, diplomacy, surveillance and in culture wars in society, laying the groundwork for later anti-communist counter-insurgencies in East Pakistan and Afghanistan. This exemplified particularly intense moments of Pakistani Cold War history as its architects sought to strengthen the image of the nation as an imperial frontline, both in the coming superpower rivalry in Asia with the Soviet Union, but also as an outpost to combat the potentially transformative potential of anti-colonialism and decolonization. Security-centric national security architecture would grow in Pakistan in the first decade after independence, cementing an obsession with national sovereignty and territorial integrity; India abroad and communist, anti-colonial or ethno-separatist elements at home. It would see the institutionalization of the military-bureaucratic complex on top of political party factionalism, as well as a strategic focus on offsetting insecurity with India through militarising society and attempting to win powerful patrons abroad, with the US at the top of the list (Alavi: 1972, Ali & Patman: 2019: 301).

By connecting the historical terrain of anti-imperial internationalism, to the postcolonial terrain of Pakistan, I have offered a historical snapshot of how Pakistani, Muslim Indian and South Asian relations were constituted in international relations structured by the colonial encounter. The story of anti-colonial connectivity and its legacies, illustrates how the differentiated ideas of Pakistan- between nationalists, leftists and Islamists and others- emerged as the progeny of anti-colonial connections that created uneven legacies of anti-colonial afterlives, just as the colonial state left deep unevenness in terms of the social hierarchies it bequeathed. These earlier antagonisms shaped the power differentials of Cold War factions, as well as the repertoires of resistance and registers of imagining, of competing Pakistani social forces, at the onset of postcolonial nationhood. With the international origins of

Pakistani Cold War imaginaries now covered, the chapter now charts Cold War and Pakistani historiography, in order to uncover the strengths and limitations of scholarly approaches.

## **2 Recalibrating Cold War Histories**

During the 1950s, North-South conflicts in Algeria, Vietnam and Cuba developed alongside the grand narrative of American-Soviet Cold War rivalry (Robinson: 1996, Kolko: 1988, Barkawi: 2004, Prashad: 2007). The Cold War looked very different in Algiers, Hanoi and Havana than it did from Washington or Moscow. The role of Global South societies in the Cold War complicates conceptions of the Cold War. Southern polities activated their own self-understandings and universalisms in engagements with the emerging international order. Where the Global South is concerned, Cold War studies have tended to focus on third world elite agency, avoiding explaining the meanings, mobilizations and contentions of Global South polities in their transnational context (Gowan: 1999, Ikenberry: 2001). These approaches routinely focus predominantly on focusing on third world elite actors, often elites, without comprehensively investigating Cold War practices and relations amid transboundary contexts. But the Global Cold War entailed both ideological struggle and political-military engagements involving broader social mobilizations and polities interacting beyond the straightjacket of the nation-state. They included the enduring case of Pashtun tribes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and their long history of resistance to foreign intervention (Siddique: 2014, Leake & James: 2015).

The tidal wave of postcolonial nationalism during the 1950s problematizes not only a superpower, but also statist analyses of the Cold War, opening up dynamic transnational

analyses of Cold War encounters to inspection. In IR and in conventional Area Studies scholarship, postcolonial nationalism is often viewed within another self-contained logic that of third world Nationalism, which is anti-colonial, where Algeria and Vietnam become the dominant representations of North-South encounters. This reading fails to see that everywhere in the Global South, the Cold War was fought on deeply fractured transnational social terrain shaped by immediately preceding histories of empire. (Leake: 2017, Go: 2011). This imperial landscape informed Cold War relations, but also came to be defined by both transnational connections between societies beyond state borders, as well as coming to be characterized by conflict and social contestation within. So, even in societies where there was no outright war that defeated a colonial power, the fractured social terrain of empire shaped the course and conduct of the Cold War and after. What this set of claims does is to help me identify in the paper the entanglement of local contestation, Cold War dynamics and deep imperial inheritances that Pakistan and other postcolonial societies were dealing with.

Coextensively this chapter also engages in a debate about how we should rewrite the history of the Cold War. Eurocentric accounts have been prevalent, epitomised by Gaddis's notion of the Cold War as a long in Europe, focusing on relations between the superpowers. Similarly Russian and Cold War historian Robert Service focuses his study of the end of the Cold War through a depiction of Gorbachev and Reagan's relationship as being crucial to negotiating the end of the Cold War, whilst also examining the role of other key figures in the US, USSR, as well as Europe (Service: 2015). Both accounts depict the Cold War from a distinctly Eurocentric gaze that silences the role of the global South in the trajectory of the Cold War.

Luckily there has been a turn in Cold War history that take seriously the rest of the world and its conflicts and imperial histories. Impressive advances in Cold War scholarship have

interrogated the intersection between Cold War and North-South conflicts in the Global South (Chamberlin: 2018). Odd Arne Westad has highlighted how the downplaying of the Third World experience as being crucial to the trajectory of the Cold War, yet has simultaneously been omitted from global histories of the Cold War (Westad: 2005: 2017). Similarly, Leake and James (2015) have sought to understand the processes of decolonization as they encountered specific sites of Cold War struggle. Thus building on Cold War and postcolonial political-military histories of South Asia by analysing Pakistani Cold War factions, imaginaries and encounters, can contribute to reframing Cold war dynamics, and deepen the literature on South Asian imperial politics (Leake: 2013, Rand: 2006, Haines: 2017, Hevia: 2012).

Other critical Cold War histories have further complicated Gaddis's notion of the 'Long Peace' (1992). Bell and Isaac (2012) rightly look to complicate this notion, problematizing the periodization of the Cold War, arguing whether the idea of a monolithic Cold War was an invention of the US in its quest for expansion. Consequently there has been a rise scholarship focusing on Cold War dynamics incorporating a 'de-centred' interpretation of Cold War events in Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Algeria, Cuba, and the Pakistan-Afghan borderlands (Kwon: 2010, Parker: 2006, Byrne: 2016, Bayly: 2007, Cumings: 2002, Dower, 2000, Luthi: 2016, Weldes: 1996, Grandin: 2006, Leake: 2016). These writers have overcome the "great challenge facing any effort to write an international history of the Cold War.... discerning the precise, subtle and intricate connections between the Cold War...and the course of Third World decolonization" (Parker: 2006: 867).

Recent interventions in Cold War histories had further destabilized Eurocentric dominant frameworks in which the Cold War is studied. Friedman's 'Shadow Cold War' (2015) analyses the Sino-Soviet struggles for the Global South, contributing to a wider scholarly move, which pays attention to the entanglements between the Cold War and

decolonization following the establishment of a Tripolar world order (Leake & James: 2015). Stretching across multiple geopolitical terrains, these ‘other’ Cold Wars are what anthropologist Kwon identifies as being vital to integrating colonial and regional histories into the histories of the Korea and Vietnam Wars (Kwon: 2010). Southern societies have encounters, which actively reshape the contours of the international order. This necessitates us to take part in the intellectual project to go beyond Eurocentric assumptions on relevant actors, processes, temporalities and connections in Cold War politics by reintroducing the importance of southern polities, specifically when their North-South and South-South interactions generated new histories of political-military and socio-cultural contestation. This can help build on recent developments in Cold War and postcolonial historiography by acknowledging the co-constitutive dimensions of imperial relations, and by acknowledging the meta-narrative of the Cold War as a series of historical processes involving social, economic and political changes (Wolf: 1982, Mazower: 2013, Barkawi: 2017, Robinson: 96, Grandin: 2004, Kolko: 1988).

Pakistan studies specialists and intellectual historians have pushed the frontiers on temporality, eschewing linear histories of Pakistan in favour of searching for the enduring effects of British Imperial rule (Gilmartin: 1988, Devji: 2013). Historians have attended to Pakistan’s formation: contributing interventions into Partition, the failures of the national project and Pakistan’s ambiguous relationship to Islam (Shaikh: 2009, Jalal: 1990, Ali: 2015, Sayyid & Tyrer: 2002). They have argued Pakistan’s lack of institutional foundations and popular support following independence, contributed to a weak base from which elites sought to forge their place in the world (Ahmed: 2013). Thus scholars have investigated power and resistance, relational identities and connected histories, in explaining the use of colonial laws, political violence and language in Pakistani state consolidation. In so doing they have sought to analyse, “the imperatives of differentiating

between the creative bigotry of power and the critical power that vests in creative imaginings” (Jalal: 1995: 1).

Recent interventions in Pakistan studies have developed the literature significantly, by problematizing dominant interpretations, pluralizing the different stories in which Pakistani history can be told (Bajwa: 1996, Toor, 2011). It is enough here to highlight the encouraging emergence of Critical Pakistani studies literature working on disturbing the taken for granted assumptions of Cold War national historiographies and interpretations through appreciating cultural conflict and the importance of the local, national, regional and global scales (Toor: 2011, Ali: 2015, Sayyid: 2017). Re-contextualizing Pakistani Cold War developments, repositions the contentions for the meaning of ‘Pakistan’, beyond the geopolitics of Anglo-American power or patron relations, to place Western Cold War security logics into conversation with the geopolitical, military, cultural and intellectual changes within the Muslim World, variously described as the Islamosphere (Sayyid: 2017) in ‘West Asia’ (Halliday: 2005, Adib-Moghaddam: 2012).

However there is also inadequate attention given between the multi-scaled connections between the evolving Cold War sociology of Pakistani society and its relation to transboundary political processes. The thinking here is not to replace international history with national history, or a Eurocentric story with a Pakistan-state centric perspective of the Cold War. Rather it is to identify how the struggle for ‘Pakistan’ included sites of overlapping historical encounters. It is the result of these multi-dimensional Pakistani encounters that I argue came to generate profound global trajectories. It requires examining what ‘Pakistan’ represents in international politics, how we can reconceive its encounters, and extend analyses beyond the nation state and towards constitutive and dynamics accounts of Pakistan. With the last point in mind, the chapter now turns attention to the factions of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary.

### **3 Factions of the Pakistani Cold War Imaginary**

Pakistani Cold War contestations in the 1950s included competition between liberal elite, pro western nationalism, the Islamist right and Leftist anti-imperialists (Toor: 2011, Ali: 2015, Akhtar: 2017). Whereas recent interventions in the emergent critical Pakistan literature have focused on the sociology of culture and society in Pakistan, the thick sets of relations involving Pakistani inter-societal multiplicities in the international, is yet to be theorized. Here I identify these factions and their imaginaries as representing the major ways in which contestations for Pakistani identity were articulated in society.

The clashes between the nationalists, Islamist right and the Left constitute the Pakistani imaginary's core forms of factionalism. They are contesting political projects that form the major space of deliberation, argument and violence within the Pakistani Cold War imaginary. These factions were invested in the conceptual and material struggles for 'Pakistan' as distinct intellectual projects engaged in both local contestations for ascendancy in Pakistani society, and encounters within Cold War. The Pakistani imaginary, includes participants who politicians, intellectuals, businessmen, activists, officers, bureaucrats, professionals, as well as artists, workers, intellectuals, unionists, clerics and public sector workers. These struggles were very much material power struggles, as well as forming contrasting discourses over key issues on Pakistani identity, culture, political economy and ideas of world order.

Pakistani imaginary articulators clashed over how to respond to Anglo-American empire, the question of socialism, and threats from an insecure geopolitical environment. They also faced the mammoth task of governing a society and building a cohesive national culture. Cold War political parties and movements of ethnic Pashtuns and Baluchis constitute another branch of Pakistani Cold War imaginaries. These included a disperse

set of political movements which nevertheless tied not only to the politics of state power, economic development and political autonomy, but also to the Cold War, Communism, global Islam and anti-imperialism. Their intersectional politics between ethnicity, ideology and world politics is analysed in greater detail in the penultimate chapter. Whilst Pashtun groups regard the Durand Line as preventing the connections to Afghan Pashtuns, Baluchi movements regard both the Pakistani and Iranian state as oppressive powers that obstruct liberation. In contrast, the selected 'Pakistani' imaginary projects in this schema include a sequence of connections to wider Cold War global histories that cut across ethnicities and structured ideological responses to Pakistan's postcolonial geopolitics and political geography. Thus the three imaginary projects are not just distinct visions for Pakistani society, but abstractions which imply particular visions for what 'Pakistan' should mean in the emerging Cold War order that very much influenced each other, were subject to change and conditioned by international processes and trajectories.

Contention for the national culture of Pakistan takes place within the imaginary, and those outside it, be it separatists or regional powers. However the contention for the 'meaning of Pakistan' plays out in relations in the international by various actors. This clarifies the ways in which the Pakistani imaginary became variously appropriated for security practices, inculcated within Anglo-American, national, anti-imperial and Islamic imaginings. It points to the specific way in which the partial nature of Pakistani decolonization conditioned global encounters.

The struggles to define Pakistani cultural identity contributed to the development of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary as a fragmented, contentious, creative and changing system of thought and practice that grew out of Cold War developments. The struggles for Pakistan also took place within on-going trajectories of anti-colonial nationalist and

Islamic resistance to Cold War bipolarity (Sayyid: 2017, Devji: 2013, Parker: 2006, Luthi: 2016).

Competing visions for the meaning of Pakistan between Pakistan as Islamic revival, Socialist Utopia and anti-Communist garrison created a fertile site for Cold War clashes. Pakistani religious, cultural and historical struggles functioned as both jingoistic affirmations of the new nation but also as repertoires of resistance that challenged orthodox hierarchical relations in favour of societal and transnational loyalties.. The stunning possibilities of Pakistan in world politics captivated campaigners for Pakistan. Muslim political mobilization in Pakistan provided an alternative in 1955, to national secular projects in the Muslim world (Sayyid: 2017), especially given its leaders showed a healthy disregard for territoriality in favour of a vague, yet potent transnational Muslim identity (Devji: 2013).

The social mobilizations of Pakistani state elites, social forces, and their transboundary relations to Cold War actors in the Global North and South, have a causal significance on Cold War security. Pakistani Cold War trajectories directly influenced the synthesis of US and Islamist anti-communist international projects. Contestations for Pakistani cultural and international identity took place within an explicitly transnational arena. The growth of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary's importance offers an "alternative narrative, one, which explains Pakistan's present reality not as an inexorable unfolding of a teleology, but as a result of a complex and contingent historical process, with both domestic and international dimensions" (Toor: 2011:5). Left activists like Faiz and religious intellectuals such as Maududi, and groups such as the Pakistani Communist Party and the Islamist Jamat-e-Islami contributed to Pakistani international politics in very different ways and intensities, as the following chapter will detail. These actors

articulated their projects within wider struggles in the Islamosphere and the third world where anti-Imperial and Pan-Islamic mobilizations contested the post war international order.

Central to Pakistan's Cold War importance is the "chronic ambiguity and confusion over the meaning of Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims" (Shaikh: 2009: 60). Pakistanis imagined worlds stemmed from ambiguity over to what extent 'Pakistan' was to be a national or post national project, and how Pakistani national identity and foreign policy could communicate the extraordinary power of Islamic universalism. Pakistan's Cold War emergence transformed its early transnational projections of Indian Muslim futures in its embodiment by forcing it to compromise with a more normalised form of world politics- the retrenchment of hierarchy through nationalism and territorially bound national interests (Devji: 2013). Consequently a key ambiguity stems from the problems with consolidating a statist vision that drew explicitly from transnational visions of Islamic universalism. The contention between the spheres of the Cold War imaginary illustrates how these forms of contention endured and were exacerbated during the Cold War of the 1950s, as national elites mediated societal struggles through an increasingly centralizing yet still weak, national culture and national elite (Toor: 2005). Pakistani solidarities provided ample conceptual space for contentions in the public sphere, for what Pakistan should represent on the international stage. Was it to be a US client or site of Islamic revival? What then would it mean to reposition 'Pakistan' in a different context outside of its territorial limits and as part of transnational visions of the future?

The struggle for the meaning of Pakistan was not merely a forgone conclusion with the rise of national elites. Despite Pakistan's early leaders' embrace of a modernizing nation-state vision, Pakistan maintained host of socio-economic, security, logistical and diplomatic problems. National elites worked to cement state consolidation in society

through a conservative nationalist ethos couched in Islamic notions of loyalty, technocracy and uniformity. State consolidation was ruthlessly enforced through a paranoid national myth where diversity became seen to be treacherous and where Islam and nationalism came to be seen as the foundations of the national myth. Under the successors to Jinnah, the leading leader of the Muslim League, figures like Ghulam Muhammad and Iskandar Ali Mirza, faced political instability, constitutional malaise and social unrest. Henceforth anyone seeking further transformations in the country's economy or geopolitics was branded a troublemaker, a dissident, or worse still, a Communist (Malik: 2013:528). Thus whilst in 1955 Pakistani relations are contentious *but not in and of itself* the cause of broader relations, whereas post 1979 the Pakistani Cold War imaginary I shall argue, transformed the last act of the global Cold War.

In the final section, this chapter now fleshes out the two Cold War historical episodes of the thesis. By charting the evolving set of relations in Cold War encounters, my aim is to highlight some of the core features of this change, in order to account for the transboundary changes in the Pakistani Cold War imaginary. I attempt to provide a brief overview of the two historical eras the project analyses, in order to later dig deeper the dynamics of interaction and change in later chapters during particular political events.

#### **4 From the Decolonization era to the Afghan- Soviet War**

During the early to mid-1950s, rapid intensifications in the Cold War in Asia, meant the US was no longer willing to allow Anglo-American regional interests to be dominated by British concerns for their former imperial possessions (Bajwa: 1996, Ahmed: 2006). The US viewed restricting Soviet access to seaports as essential to defending the oil wells in the Gulf. This mandated the creation of the Baghdad Pact as the US sponsored regional

alliance of anti-communist states in Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey. As I will explore in chapter 4, the alliance proved weak and temporary, its US backers losing interest in the project when the Soviet regional threat subsided, as world historic changes of decolonization threatened to disrupt the bi-polar world order narrative.

By 1979, pan-Arabism, and anti-colonial nationalisms were on the decline. The transnational context of the Pakistani imaginary developed alongside changes in the Muslim World that spurred the rise of Islamic visions for Pakistani society. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and already underway changes in the structure of power in Pakistan during the 1970s, signalled radical changes in the Muslim World (Rahmena: 1994, Akhtar: 2018). These intersecting processes effected the transformation of Pakistani state-society relations, propelling the acceleration in importance of the Pakistani Cold War effort internationally, consolidated around the language of Islam and the security state (Toor: 2011).

The 1978 coup by another military general, Zia, propelled a decade of martial rule as he sought to rapidly Islamize the nation and cement the military's role in society. Zia and his ruling clique greatly benefited from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which propelled US leaders to firmly back and arm the Pakistani military junta. By 1979 the weak but brutal military theocracy under General Zia was given a new lease of life via the Afghan-Soviet war. Its rise had led to the downfall of the leftist government prior, partly resulting from the national calamity of the Indo-Pakistan 1971 war, succession of East Pakistan and the wider socio-economic crises afflicting society. All of which had brutal legacies for the ascent of military rule and subsequent struggles in Pakistan leading up to and during the Afghan-Soviet War, which I will discuss in Chapter five.

Just how anticolonial nationalism gave way to the unison between Pakistani elite, global anti-Communist strategy and the religious right is a remarkable historical change that has consequences not just for understanding Pakistani society, but also for global politics. Key trajectories emerge by the time of the Afghan war; the rise of the religious right, Islam as anti-Communist strategy, the change in character of regional conflict in the Middle East and the world historic effects that the war provoked. Anti-imperialism would give way to transnational and indigenous Islamist mobilizations during the Afghan War. But why did this take place?

Anti-communist Cold War activity in the Muslim World was driven by US Cold War alliances. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan offered US Cold War planners the ability to propel a staunchly Islamic and anti-Communist offensive in Afghanistan (Coll: 2004). This was aimed at the USSR and the Iranian Islamic Republic, the latter presenting an existential threat to the Sunni nationalist regimes in the region. Other Cold War schemes played out across the Islamosphere but what made the Pakistani case unique was the Afghan Jihad. It was during this war “that violence in the name of Islam became legitimized, the means which to inflict it became freely available, and the networks through which it was to be operationalized were created” (Toor: 2011: 3). In this shifting geopolitical terrain the Mujahedeen, the Pakistani state and non-state militias, engaged with the CIA, ISI, Gulf nations and various international partners in efforts to counter the Soviet- Afghan intervention.

In correspondence with ISI chiefs Hamid Gul and Asad Durrani, two primary Pakistani architects of the Afghan Mujahedeen strategy, Eqbal Ahmed writes that US strategy regarding Pakistan became “known as the Reagan Doctrine- a global package of widely publicized aid for anti-Communist guerrillas...and an ideological statement of a global war against communism, and its aim was to establish the United States as a player in the global game of guerrilla politics” (Ahmed: 2006: 462). Consequently asymmetric warfare

became a means and an end in the Cold War, where Superpower and 'Third World' trajectories would overlap in often-bloody ways. This would have the effect of spurring further US sponsoring of anti-Communist fighters worldwide (Robinson: 1996). For US strategists, Pakistani security actors were viewed as a success story. Anti-imperialism and anti-colonial nationalism had given way by the time of the Soviet invasion to a synthesis of radical Sunni Islamism and US strategic designs, which aided the US proxy war against the Soviet Union. Thus Pakistani actor's role as client, interlocutor in Afghanistan was essential for the US led proxy war's success (Lodhi: 2011, Jalal: 2014).

Pakistan was transformed in this decade as leftists, women and minorities faced the brunt of state violence, yet also formed the heart of the challenge to military rule (Ali: 2015, Talbot: 1998). This period undeniably changed the contours of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary. The militarization and Islamization of state and society by the junta, was legitimized by the US and backed Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi ideology (Siddiqa: 2017, Rashid: 2013, Sattar: 2006). The militarization of Pakistani society, the growth of the ISI, the extension of a shadow economy along the Afghan border, and the growing religious character of the military, were some of the key trajectories that came to redefine the relationship between Islam, the state and the military whilst simultaneously entrenching renewed and intensified links between the Pakistani defence establishment and the US (Ahmed: 2006, Toor: 2011: 157).

Pakistani state elites had a vested interest in combatting the Soviet threat. The powerful invocation of Islamic identity provided the Pakistanis with an opportunity for power and influence both within and outside of US security hierarchies in the region. Particularly relevant are the transboundary connections among Pashtun tribes. The links between Pashtuns across the border and the prevailing mood to help their brethren across the border cannot be underestimated, nor understood through the vehicle of Pakistani

national identity or metrics of tribe (Siddique: 2014, Manchanda: 2018), but rather through a synthesis of Islamic, regional, local and ethno-national Pashtun centred mobilizations, emanating from fractured, transboundary, Pashtun polities. Hence the Afghan war took place alongside a wider multi-sided proxy war, which included Pakistan, the US, the USSR, Iran, China, India, Egypt and Saudi Arabia as players in Afghanistan. Heightened transnational interconnections meant Pakistan became an active cultural theatre in the Cold War, where “ethnic, religious, and political networks intersected, creating a site both moulded by events in faraway metropolises and capable of impacting decisions making across the globe” (Leake: 2017:3).

Another transnational *effect* during the war was the exported forms of Islamist militant culture that travelled beyond Pakistan and Afghanistan to the Middle East and beyond (Devji: 2008:100). The Afghan war emboldened a Pakistani martial identity internally and abroad. More importantly it enabled ‘Pakistan’ to be deployed both as the site of anti-Soviet military operations, as well as where Jihad is first sanctioned in contemporary international politics (Sattar: 2006, Rashid: 2013). The social contentions of Pakistan were by then directly tied up to an immediate Cold War site in Afghanistan. Key factors signalling this effect included; of the fading left, the ascendancy of political Islam as the premier counter-narrative in Pakistan, the tying of the Pakistani narrative to conceptual entanglement with the US Cold War designs, and an evolving regional proxy war.

1979 saw the Pakistani military dictatorship transform. The US gave Pakistani military and financial aid, which propped up the junta whilst simultaneously appealing to notion of Pakistan and Muslim social power along the frontier (Marsden & Hopkins: 2012, Leake: 2013). But Pakistani strategic managers were busy with their own development of non-state clients in Afghanistan, useful as ‘*strategic depth*’ against India, as well as “fulfilling the Pakistani military’s fantasy of regional dominance” in West Asia (Toor: 2013:154).

These dynamics weren’t just about international actors contesting for power but included

non-elite actors and transboundary formations that enabled and constrained international security projects.

Through charting the transformation of Pakistani Cold War imaginary, I have sketched its influence on the growing synchronization of US security imperatives, the military state and the religious right. I will now investigate how transboundary Islamicized, militarized politics came to synthesize with US security plans, to assess the key logics that arise from charting the development of Pakistani Cold War imaginary perspective in addressing transnational relations.

Theorizing Cold War change through Pakistani encounters helps to get at the relations between actors within Anglo-American and Islamic networks. Spatializing power relations through the Cold War imaginary attends to the complexities of dynamics of political, cultural and social changes in a way that current state-centric approaches are ill equipped to explore. Theorizing the imaginary *in relation to* a multi-scalar set of social relations existing at local, national and transnational can identify Pakistani interactions. This intervention suggests ways towards a compelling synthesis where Pakistani, Cold War, Muslim world and anti-colonial histories intertwine. I have developed a set of categories and mapped the trajectory of Pakistani imaginary encounters that help understand the change of the Pakistani imaginary and its effect on Cold War dynamics. In so doing I have outlined key dynamics that illustrate how trans-cultural societal contention interacts with political-military strategy, whilst outlining observations arising from studying the generative effects of Pakistani transnational relations.

Contentious within Pakistani imaginary wrought a distinctly Islamic Pakistan to develop in by 1979 at the expense of anti-imperial and national-secular mobilizations

Islamised, martial identities are important in two ways. First, Pakistani Islamic imaginings are central to the US-Saudi led deployment of Sunni Jihadi political Islam. This is broadly speaking a Cold War effect of Pakistan's engagement in Cold War meta-narratives.

Second, US and Pakistani plans in West and South Asia mark a period of convergence between Pakistan's elites and US strategists. Both US and Pakistani elites had a shared interest in limiting decolonization, paving the way for Cold War securitization in the Global South.

This historic change derives from transformations in the Islamosphere and from the culture wars within Pakistan where the Zia military regime repressed anti-imperial and leftist mobilizations, whilst being constructing an international narrative of an Islamic Jihad against the Soviets. This served to bolster the regime, and played on notions of Islamic solidarity as well as the notion that the Afghan Jihad was also an anti-imperial conflict against godless communists who posed a threat to the nation. Anti-colonial struggles and pan-Islamic currents intersected in unexpected ways. Political Islam as a modus operandi of global security in Afghanistan was not a US strategy, but a transboundary effect influenced by a variety of actors- that created both synthesis and later fracture with empire. Both superpowers would find themselves constrained in Afghanistan at different moments, as I will explore in following chapters.

Pakistani society became the site of violent external encounter with Cold War western security hierarchies. These forms of "colonialism which survives the demise of empires" coalesce as a set of postcolonial relations that bind the encounters of cultures between Pakistani and global polities (Nandy: 1983: Xi). Recalibrating Pakistani interactions through the imaginary highlights the dialogic making of global security. This brings the Pakistani lens into view, whilst reframing Cold War encounters for their co-constitutive character. Pakistani Cold War imaginary sphere's contentions and the wider struggle for

Pakistani Cold War identity took on an explicitly global context during the Afghan-Soviet war. Violent encounter and the encounter with powerful others shapes the imaginary but in 1979 the meaning and contention of Pakistan give 'Pakistan' and Pakistani authorized state and non-state actions, a transboundary influence irreducible to its state elite actions. The struggle for the meaning of Pakistan inspires trajectories that unsettle the picture of Pakistan as only an unruly client of Western superpowers. Rather it illustrates how societal factionalism interconnected with changing geopolitical trajectories, and offers an alternative lens beyond only state elites, to consider the dynamic interactions themselves, to reorient our perspectives on the Global Cold War.

US, Pakistani and Saudi national elites and strategic architects propelled the shift from originally more anti-imperial, secular and pan-Islamic hybridity within the Mujahedeen, into a hard-line Sunni Islamist movement which had repercussion of local, national and international dimensions. Sunni Jihadism in Afghanistan was viewed in Washington as the perfect antidote to Shia Iran's revolutionary overtures to Third Worldism and pan-Muslim anti-imperialism. Thus the forms of Islamic inspired resistance that propelled the Mujahedeen to defeat the Soviets was also exacerbated by inter-Muslim divisions, that the US deployed to further its own interests, both in the case of Saudi-Iranian rivalries, and between Iraq and Iran during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988).

The Pakistani imaginary had become productive of transboundary effects when Pakistani soldiers, militants, writers, workers, unionists, doctors and aid workers became engulfed in the Afghan War. Militancy was one effect of the war but so too was the refugee crises, expansion of the development and aid sector, the development of weapons and drug economies as well as the rise of religious welfare organizations and madrassas not to mention the very flows of peoples between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Siddiqa: 2007, Begum: 2018).

Seemingly peripheral polities in the global south threaten our given historical categories. The blowback of USSR and US Afghanistan interventions cannot be understood only through the lens of the superpowers, given the connections and cultural empire was confronted by in the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands (Leake: 2017). Anglo-American patronage certainly helped shape the Pakistani state and its security relations, but was also aware of the geopolitical insecurities that Pakistani security managers faced. But “this link between minority seeking to overcome its weakness and an external power went well beyond state interest, to form a distinctive way of thinking about international relations” (Devji: 2013: 37).

This chapter has illustrated how Cold War encounters were altered by the contentions of actors like the Pakistanis, and how Pakistan itself became a site of conceptual struggle between different narratives. It has sketched the parameters a historical analysis of the imperial and anti-imperial origins of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary before charting Cold War historiography, Pakistani factions including involving the state and the religious right, and sketched the broad changes from decolonization to Afghan war that the final two chapters will explore in greater detail. In the following chapter I develop an expansive, empirically focused analysis of Pakistani Cold War factionalism in the 1950s and 1960s with a primary focus on nationalists, state elites and the Left.

### **Chapter Three: Cold War Pakistan, Decolonization and the Left: From the 1950s Culture wars to the 1968-9 Uprising**

*“On the molested bodies of cities  
Mansions and plazas have begun to erupt  
...Declaring the decisive victory of the black market...  
We are grinding humans to produce dwarves  
Alms! O brother!  
I swear by your hallowed petrodollar  
Fehmieda Riaz, Pakistani feminist anti-imperialist poet*

*“There is smoke of tear gas in the air  
and the bullets are raining all around  
How can I praise thee  
the night of the period of shortsightedness”  
Habib Jalib*

#### **Introduction**

So how did Pakistani Cold War struggles manifest in the 1950s and 1960s? And what role did socialist and anti-imperial forces have in mobilizing alternative responses to the Cold War and decolonization? In this chapter I first chart the nationalist imaginary, outlining the discourses, social sites, mobilizations and sociology of the Pakistani nationalist project. Next I chart the development of forces I collectively describe as the anti-imperial Left, from the Rawalpindi case and Pakistan’s inculcation into the US Cold War alliance to the 1968-9 popular revolt that brought an end to a decade of Ayub Khan’s military government. I argue for the dynamism of interaction between Pakistani factions of the Cold War imaginary and their relationship to the International, before assessing the ability of Left forces to transform the state, and to challenge Pakistan’s US Cold War alliance. I argue that despite the popular revolt against the Ayub regime, the military-bureaucratic state and its Cold War alliance survived the wave of socialism, trade unionism and anti-imperialism. In the following years the military state would return under Zia, through an alliance with the religious right, who together repressed left and

ethno-separatist forces in Pakistan. This trajectory of the rise and fall of anti-imperial and socialist power in Pakistan is mirrored in world politics in ways I shall discuss. The Left, itself a divided and disparate assortment of groups, lacked the institutional might to transform Pakistan's international politics, but nevertheless theirs was a powerful legacy and collective memory that would inform future movements in Pakistan who would resist the military-Islamist union of the 1980s. Lastly I offer implications for this argument as a contribution towards integrating global histories of the Cold War with an analysis of the struggles for decolonization and power in Pakistan.

Provincializing Eurocentric and superpower centric studies of the Cold War to include sites of Cold War struggle from the Global South, allows for deeper historic accounts of global Cold War politics. Traditionally this process has been understood from the perspective of the 'west' – obscuring non-European intellectuals, movements, and ideas, and their global connections. Cummings writes in the context of studies of the US's Cold War relations with Japan and the Far East, that we should begin to, “rethink boundaries (of area and discipline) and reengage our minds with the task of understanding the world outside American boundaries” (Cummings: 2002: 179). Postcolonial polities constrained and resisted empire and postcolonial elites alike during the Cold War, but they also became active sites for superpower clientelism, and technocratic and socio-cultural experiments including propaganda, commercial ties and development (Kwon: 2010, Dower: 2000, Chakrabarty: 1989, Mitchell: 1988, Scott: 2004).

Cold War histories of the Global South frequently focus on 'third world' elite agency, and largely avoid explaining transboundary practices and relations, in Southern contexts, between elites and non-elites, in local and transnational contexts (Weaver: 2010, Jones: 2003, Paul: 2004, Fair: 2014). In the debates on South Asian experiences of the Cold War, the Cold War is depicted as if the only important participants were homogenous

national units existing within an internal regional system within overarching bipolar Cold War clashes (McMahon: 1994, McGarr: 2014). Studies of Pakistan's Cold War politics have thus far been unable to elucidate the transnational dynamics that emerged from the connection between social factions articulating what Pakistan stood for in the Cold War; the geopolitics of the state, with the changing global political context informing Cold War relations - namely imperial political-economic hierarchies (Lodhi: 2011, Haqqani: 2005, Eamon: 2013, Cohen: 2011, Pande: 2011).

How one makes sense of Pakistani societal struggles during the onset of the Cold War encounter is conditioned by how we conceive of how local and international dimensions of politics interact. This narrative is usually presented in social science in terms of the development of the Pakistani political-military establishment and Pakistan's Cold War relations with the US. Whilst these factors are important, the interrelationships between these two trajectories have not yet been theorized through a historical analysis of empire, regional politics and the contested transboundary imaginings of Pakistanis.

This is remarkable given the need for scholarship on how postcolonial polities came to complicate and unsettle global politics. Let us begin by assessing the panorama of Pakistani Cold War society.

In the mid 1950s, the feeling amongst some anti-imperial Leftists in Pakistan was that the Cold War was a distraction from the fundamentally imperial fault line of global politics. They sought to imagine Pakistan anew and succeeded in toppling a military regime. Yet the state and the right's unison with US anti-communist strategy in the 1970s saw the suppression of the anti-imperial and anti-capitalist Left, and the limiting of their idea of Pakistan (Ali: 2015, Malik: 2013, Malik: 2016, Raza: 2019). In order to trace this history we have to examine the role of the Pakistani Cold War Left, its anti-imperial politics, and

how it's toppling the Ayub regime in 1968 failed to transform the hierarchies that underpinned Pakistani society.

Reflecting on the contested, transboundary imaginaries of post-colonial Pakistan, illuminates the creative responses of ordinary Pakistanis to the Cold War. The dislocation of Cold War grand narratives is observable when we scale down to view the overlaps and hybridizations in Pakistani society, where the Cold War was not replacing but refiguring, older imperial histories, as well as infusing geopolitics with on-going local struggles between the religious right, conservative post-colonial elites and the anti-imperial Left.

The task ahead is to flesh out the ways in which the Pakistani Cold War imaginary became operationalized through different factions of Pakistan, and how these factions generated overlapping dynamics between anti-communism, anti-imperialism and Islamism, that counter the dominant narrative of Pakistanis as compliant US clients during the early Cold War. Bringing the socio-cultural aspects of these interventions into dialogue with the political-military features of Pakistani state relations enables a re-theorizing of Pakistani Cold War factionalism. Carving out a co-constitutive account of the struggles for 'Pakistan' in domestic and international politics is possible when we take seriously the potential that Pakistani societal encounters were dynamic, clashing, constrained by empire and social patronage, and that these contingencies were productive of broader Cold War politics. Going beyond the assumed solidity of the state and towards contentions in society, offers a valuable vantage from which to point to broader transnational effects of contestation. Subsequently I want to chart the development of leftist, anti-imperial politics in this period, and juxtapose this process with the arrival of the Cold War encounter in Pakistan.

## **1 Pakistani Cold War Left politics and the Pakistani Cold War social terrain during the 1950s**

As the Cold War spread to Asia in 1950 during the Korean War, discussions on Pakistan's entry into the Cold War, sat alongside nationwide debate on national identity, culture and constitutional politics, which proliferated in the sphere of worker's union centres, publishing houses, university campuses, poetry seminars, and mosques and across public spaces (Yaqin: 2009: 3). Defining Pakistani culture became a nationwide obsession during the 1950s. Debates centred on contrasting liberal elite, leftist and religious right factions, and their positions on the nature of national culture, identity and national interests. Public debate over national culture gained prominence in Pakistan during the early 1950s, initially through communist party cadres and writer's associations, setting in wheels the mass party and worker-student nexus of the 1960s (Ali: 2015: 9). Hence, "the mutation of Pakistani nationalism under the pressure of global forces ought not to suggest that its course is in any sense uni-linear. There are powerful countervailing influences at work" (Nazir: 1986: 607). Pakistani elites agreed to US Cold War alliance in 1954 followed by Pakistan joining the Western backed Baghdad Pact anti-Communist alliance in 1955. This is when the Pakistani imaginary begins to develop as a site where 1) the meaning of Pakistan is fought over in local and national contexts as well as 2) when the struggle for Pakistan's international identity becomes contested by global powers and inculcated into the Cold War. The everyday reality of Pakistanis now became tied to whether Pakistani strategists could galvanize citizens in the service of bi-polar confrontation, or face challenges from other political hierarchies.

The Pakistani Cold War imaginary- as three contested imaginings - represented a relatively small section of society in terms of who actively imagined 'Pakistan' as a vehicle for socio-political projects. Imaginaries are relatively stable and constraining but become

increasingly contested in turbulent periods, enabling change. The development of social imaginaries may have unintended consequences. These, “social forces penetrated the state-system and so blurred the boundaries between them in practice” (Ansari: 2011: 161), subsequently reviewing Pakistani societal relations helps to, “throw light on the workings of a trans-local institution” (Ansari: 2011: 161) in the state and its global relations. The Pakistani imaginary contains trans-local struggles emanating from the different faction, including lateral solidarities between Muslim and Global South publics facing imperial and Cold War politics in the 1950s. Different forms of acquiescing or resisting to the US Cold War produced differentiated responses in Pakistan and across the Muslim world. Thus the relationship of a former colony to a rising global power, and its connection to postcolonial developments within the Muslim world, can clarify where and to what extent pan-Islamic and anti-imperial movements threatened the dominant bipolar Cold War narrative.

Pakistani Cold War factions overlapped and borrowed from one another’s strategic and symbolic toolkit, their ideas always sitting alongside older forms of community in what was still a largely rural society that was in the process of modernizing. The religious right was weak in the 1950s, as it was in the wider Muslim world. The Left represented the major challenge to the emergent national elite, and this challenge was more in terms of ideology and imagining as opposed to manpower and militarism. During the 1950s the establishment’s US deal, the Baghdad Pact regional alliance, and its response to the Suez crises, were actively challenged in anti-imperial mobilizations. Imperial, local, and regional relations made Pakistani politics a complex political field. This prompted a brutal reaction from the establishment, conveying the fear of elites to resistance, and the lack of acceptance of plurality within the elite national project for Pakistan. Yet despite its relative weakness, the Left presented an alternative vision for Pakistan in the International

that was anti-imperial and internationalist in scope, and was far more popular than the state's Cold War foreign policy architecture (Ali: 2015).

Debates on national culture were imbued by a set of contrasting commitments to Islam, Muslim world politics and empire. Imaginings of Pakistan were stretched to the conceptual limits of what a Muslim homeland in South Asia could look represent (Devji: 2013:72), but this diversity reflected a complete lack of a unified social identity. The idea of Pakistan was inefficient to unify the population who had different politics, languages, and who were separated into two ethnically separate wings. West Pakistani elite's socially conservative and militaristic tendencies were almost certain to develop in the absence of a pluralistic vision for society. Whether the elite could unify the nation of diverse sects, ethno-national and political groups under the narrative of Pakistani nationalism, was doubtful given the colonial structure of state institutions.

The Pakistani Cold War Left in this period this included the early CPP and PWA leaders Faiz, Zaheer<sup>10</sup> and later included activists and global public intellectuals like Tariq Ali who would go onto become a globally renowned public intellectual. These actors shared the space to define the imaginary, with Islamist right-wingers like Maududi and Hijazi as well as liberals who had been prominent in the Pakistan Movement. They included figures like Askari, Iftikharuddin and Daultana, and civil servants, intellectuals and judges such as S. A. Rahman and M.D. Taseer. (Toor: 2005:325, 331, Ali: 2015: 50-56).

Instrumental here, is the, "role played by prominent members of the liberal intelligentsia in obstructing and undermining democratic politics from the very beginning of the country's history: (Toor: 2013:1). However it is crucial to note the contribution of elements of society that weren't politicians, public intellectuals or generals in the national

---

<sup>10</sup> Both Faiz Ahmed Faiz and Sajjad Zaheer were socialist revolutionary Urdu writers active in both the Communist Party and the Progressive Writer's Movement.

conversation on Pakistan's national identity and foreign policy. These sections of society may not have been part of the classes shaping foreign policy preferences. Nevertheless, they were very much active participants in shaping the Pakistani Cold War imaginary at particular junctures.

The politics of Pakistani Cold War factionalism was innately tied to contrasting internationalisms, amid world historic changes in global politics. Less than four months after taking office as Congo's first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba was assassinated during a US-Belgium backed coup in January 1961. A committed anti-imperialist and pan-Africanist, Lumumba was a towering figure in the independence movement to end Belgium's brutal era of colonial extraction and genocide. In the weeks following his assassination, protests erupted across the Global South. In Lahore, hundreds of students of the Government College and members of the Youth Speakers Union gathered in defiance at the murder of one of global anti-imperialism's shining lights.

*Dawn* newspaper, a pro-US, pro-Ayub dictatorship paper during his rule, was amongst the major establishment newspapers, committed to upholding the official line on the Cold War. This necessitated a strong anti-communist message, a pan-Islamic camaraderie and loose 'Third World' solidarity. The latter of these core forms of imagining security, a state sanctioned third world pillar in foreign policy, was severely compromised because the Ayub regime lacked credibility as an anti-imperial power. In contrast to *Dawn*, the left leaning *Gazette* paper reported how the Lahore protestors had committed to a resolution that, "all the peace loving nations of the world will unite to punish the murderers, namely Tshombe, Kasavubu and Mobutu...this plea...was particularly directed to the Afro-Asian countries which themselves have only attained freedom and thus were best qualified to

understand the horrors of colonialism”<sup>11</sup>. Similar protests led by thousands of students and workers continued across Pakistan, as domestic and foreign policy decisions entwined, and were hotly debated in university campuses, bazaars and union centres.

Even in the early 1960s, when Ayub Khan’s regime was at its strongest, Pakistanis contested the imagining of the nation through anti-imperial internationalist politics, rejecting the anti-communist narrative. Contestation manifested through debates, protests, Mushairas, teahouses, speaker’s corners and university campuses, as well as through propaganda, street battles and factional feuds. It emerged not only in the major cities either but also across the provinces, particularly in East Pakistan, Balochistan and NWFP. It is true that the history of internationalism in the South Asian Left has been under-researched, and archives are sparse. But in works like Ajmal Khattak's *Pahsto* memoir, ‘*Qissa Zma da Adabi Zhwand*’ (Khattak: 2005), there is an extraordinary level of detail regarding National Awami Party and Jamaat-i Islami struggles for influence in village mushairas<sup>12</sup> or poetry seminars, among other forums, in the 1950s and 1960s. He writes his poems on simultaneous local and transnational themes. You'd expect the writings about local and regional politics, given the immediate political terrain, but Khattak invites us to explore a global imagination at work, and how thinking about Cold War geopolitics wasn't limited to Pakistan's urban middle classes, but reached deep into the periphery. This includes an ode to Lumumba, which conveys the transboundary levels of political imagining at work. Anti-imperial and economically redistributive factions in Pakistan may not have enjoyed the size of mass membership of worker led movements

---

<sup>11</sup> ‘Student’s Protest against Lumumba’s Murder’. The Civil and Military Gazette. Lahore. February 1961

<sup>12</sup> Mushairas refer to poetic symposiums in which poetry is recited, ideas are debated and many cups of tea drunk. Mushairas take the form of competition. These were crucial sites of Pakistani Cold War imaginaries and are still popular in Pakistan and across the Indo-Persian world. Mushairas are often evening social gatherings in which poetry, often in Urdu and also Pashto in which the everyday and the transcendental are accompanied by musings on life and struggle. Ghazals, or poetry forms, come in different styles, which imbue the humorous, the melancholic and the ecstatic. They are political and carry friction of delivery, rhythm and movement.

elsewhere in the Global South, yet nonetheless, Cold War and imperial politics made its way into everyday Pakistani life.

The radical, founding of Pakistan as a Muslim state in South Asia, and its ambivalent, multiple and contested understandings in the new assemblage of communities brought together after Partition, made the future of Pakistan a matter of global interest. But the state's geopolitical and ideational problems were not merely due to the ability of Pakistani nationalism to unify society, but also due to its uneven imperial legacies. These contradictions "did not arise from Pakistan being insufficiently imagined, but rather it being insufficiently decolonized" (Sayyid & Taylor: 2002: 72). Here we see the problem with addressing the dynamism of post-colonial societies from a Eurocentric focus on the nation-state. Of course all nations are imagined and contested (Anderson: 1983). There is no nation imagined singularly not free of contestation. But Pakistani imaginings of the future polity were constructed beyond the confines of nationalism and the Cold War in powerful ways that national elites looked to either suppress or co-opt.

The contested political field in societies like Pakistan developed was dominated by emergent, "bourgeois hegemonic projects everywhere, but with the all-important difference that it had to choose its site of autonomy from a position of subordination to a colonial regime" (Chatterjee: 1991:524). Pakistan could at the same time as 'meaning' an Islamic state on one hand, could also be understood as the site of imperial and Cold War political-military interests on the other (Devji: 2013: 72). What this argument gets at is the consent and coercion underpinning hegemony, and how horizontal lines of connection are intersect with hierarchy, when elites acknowledge non-elite presences, yet also how non-elite cooperation and adaptation to the political domain was conditioned by older constraints. The trouble was that moral-intellectual leadership of the post-colonial elite operated in a field constituted by a separate contingency, in which legacies enabled a

closely tied postcolonial elite, with deep ties and interests with the Anglo-American bloc following Partition.

Thus Pakistan represented a double-edged sword for international actors interested in deploying its assets in a changing world in the 1950s, when Anglo-American strategic calculations in the Middle East began to differ. On one hand, British military strategists continued to view Pakistan as a frontline state and asset as an ally in its dwindling empire (Bajwa: 1996, Jalal: 1990). On the other, visions for Pakistan in a future world order attracted the interests of transnational Islamists and Leftist movements as well as regional states and Cold War architects in Moscow and Washington. Money and contracts bought influence, in a society undergoing transformation, beset with economic hardships and social dislocation, and defined by local patronage networks that provided their own forms of power outside the institutions of the state (Ali: 2015, Akhtar: 2018). The imaginary emerged from two mutually conditioning global processes: the continuity of the historical relationship of Imperial North-Global South relations in the region, but also the development of anti-imperialism as a growing set of connected international movements involving nationalist, nativist, socialist and communist varieties, which were gaining power through both violent liberation struggles as in Algeria and Vietnam, as well as in staged, yet turbulent transitions for power, as in Pakistan.

The Pakistani national project worked through an Anglicized social hierarchy, where elites played off class, ethnic and linguistic inequalities creating new post-colonial dynamics of competition, which raises broader questions for us over postcolonial state's and their ability to decolonize given hierarchies in world order. Amina Yaqin argues Pakistani imaginings of the nation did not originate, "through a common language and the rise of a homogenizing print capitalism" as they have been imagined to do in theories of European modernity (Yaqin: 2009:115). Similarly, Chatterjee claims we give too much

weight to nationalism as a political movement and underplay its socio-cultural power, whereby anti-imperial struggle had already established “sovereignty within colonial society” (Chatterjee: 1991: 521). These insights highlight the acceptance in post-colonial society of the material intrusion of the West, in terms of the benefits of technocratic and modernizing technologies, yet this is contrasted with the defence of the spiritual, internal sovereignty of society (Nandy: 1983:4). Thus differentiated imaginings of Pakistan were not just based on access to capital exchange and imperial legacies, but also on sentiment, collective memory and creative reciprocity.

Islam played a colossal role as a signifier of unity and simultaneously as an instrumental strategy of power, both as a transnational ethos as well as a disciplinary code in society. In this way religious nationalism became increasingly operationalized within the national project during the shift from the emancipatory dreams of the Pakistan movement, to the institutionalization of the military-bureaucratic state in the years leading up to Ayub Khan’s seizure of power in 1958 (Alavi: 1972, Toor: 2005). Theorizing societal dynamics in this way illuminates, “elements and tendencies which are in agreement but also of those which clash and contrast. Altogether, it stands for a generality in which ideas, mentalities, notions, beliefs, attitudes of many different kinds come together to constitute a whole” (Guha: 1999: 334).

Social struggles functioned as both jingoistic affirmations of the new nation but also through repertoires of resistance. Westernized Pakistani elites sought to preserve the culture, forms and values of the colonial state, yet Muslim forms of patronage, as well as local and regional politics constrained Pakistani nationalism. Here we can, “understand the ways that the tension between multiple constructions of identity and the search for moral community itself defined Pakistan’s ideational becoming” (Gilmartin: 1998:1070). The government’s response to collective organising was surveillance, propaganda and

repression, which “institutionalized and habituated into imagining the Left as a seditious movement that was a proxy of the Soviet Union” (Ali: 2013: 507). So given the historic processes of empire and the complex sociologies of Pakistani Cold War society, what arguments can be marshalled to explain the effects of global and local constraints on the Pakistani imaginary?

Ideas of the nation evolved within shifting global trajectories, and were an expression of the entwinement of society and statecraft. Here the post-colonial state no longer keeps a distance from the internal, spiritual domain of society, as in the colonial era. Instead the state actively begins to deploy Islam as a regulating social code, whilst also dominating the debates on national culture and national interests. Islam as signifier of unity in reality becomes deployed as an instrumental political strategy of power. An example of the fundamental contradiction of Pakistani imaginings is that Islam also becomes a facet of internationalist solidarity with the Muslim World, which simultaneously acts as a driver for anti-regime politics and which gave Pakistani anti-imperial politics its potency in the 1950s. Consequently we can observe that the imperial encounter and the highly complex and uneven social terrain in Pakistan created differentiated responses to empire, the nation-state and the Cold War, the contradictions between them becoming generative of geopolitical trajectories, as we I shall unpack below and in the following chapter.

Second, alongside imperial hierarchies and the contradictions born from state formation, local hierarchies conditioned by patronage networks, constrained Cold War imaginings of Pakistan. A different historical experience labour, class and capital in the post-colonies led to a more complex relationship between social classes and the state. Cold War factions cut across class and other divides, and competed for the public imagination. Both nationalists and the Left wanted to, “harness the intuition and enthusiasm of the people...the immediacy in their politics and the spontaneity of their actions” (Ali:

2015:195). Meanwhile, Pakistani trade unions fell prey to politicization and state infiltration, whilst “differences based on political affiliation, region, language and ethnicity were dividing the working class” (Ali: 2015:195). The difficulty of forming a nationwide movement enhances our appreciation of the persistent effects of the colonial state into the practices of state and society, but also the efforts on the postcolonial state to consolidate a national project, and dismantle socialist and communist counter-hegemonic threats (Reza: 2013: 503). Hence the contested project of Pakistani nationalism needs to be understood in relation to fragmented repertoires of resistance, and the imbalance in capabilities underpinning the structure of power.

Third, the uneven nature of Pakistani state formation, and the disperse nature of ethnically and linguistically separate provinces and regions, was not conducive to the sort of coherent consciousness required for revolutionary struggle. As the new nation entered the new techno-politics of the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century, struggles for Pakistan followed the trajectory of class confrontation, but provincial and regional social identities complicated and pluralized forms of political belonging. The construction of the nation sat alongside imperial and local practices, including “cultural competition and patronage that had long ordered local public arenas” (Gilmartin: 1998:1075).

Yet although anti-imperialism and collectivized socialism were not the only demands of Pakistanis in the 1950s, (and of course food, security, housing and jobs took priority) nevertheless they were concerns of a section of society, in particular who were literate, and concerned with on-going transformations in global politics. The Left in one sense still emerged from the same class groups as the liberal nationalists, and were constrained by the same conditions as all imaginary factions. Ansari traces sources from Pakistani citizens through letters in national and local newspapers. He reports of accounts in this period of “tangible frustration that the authorities repeatedly sought to defuse through appeals to

people's patriotic sentiment" (Ansari: 2011: 163). Nonetheless, it is also important to note that the state's attempt to secure military and extractive power under the guise of US Cold War alliance were never linear, were always shaky and characterised by mutual – suspicion. This undoubtedly had a debilitating effect on the ideology of Pakistani nationalism. Ultimately, the penetration of the Cold War into Pakistan, and the state's institutionalizing of colonial legacies, enabled early administrations to counter the Left and wield the evocative politics of anti-communism in Pakistan, rallying around bourgeois capital, at home and globally (Jalal: 1990, Alavi: 1972). With the Left imaginary outlined and the social terrain of 1950s Cold War Pakistan outlined, I now develop a deeper discussion of the nationalist imaginary.

## **2 Nationalists, Nation-building & World Politics**

Following the military coup in 1958, the shaky and contingent power of successive weak political governments was replaced by Ayub Khan's military regime. However throughout his time in power, "conscious efforts were made toward the visible formation of national culture" (Yaqin: 2009:121) as well as in the spheres of political economy and international politics. In the decade after independence, "bureaucrats and ex-army officers... moved into banking and insurance which supplied them with the funds for further expansion. Pakistan's growth was heralded by economists from the US as a model for the rest of the Third World" (Ali: 2015:172).

Yet Pakistani politics was deeply divided in the years following partition, not only along class but also ethnic and regional lines (Ahmed: 1996, Alavi: 1991). This was a North Indian, Muhajir, Urdu speaking elite who dominated the Muslim League and political apparatus, however even in this early period they lacked coherence politically, and they

were already having to organize with a steadily growing Punjabi influence in the “bureaucratic-military oligarchy” (Alavi: 1972: 76). Hence Pakistan’s creation was, “a partial resolution of the contradiction between the particularisms of Muslim identity linked to locality and place, and the larger construction of Muslim moral community connected to a territorially bounded nation-state” (Ali: 2011: 502). Consequently Pakistani elites emerged from a Punjabi and North Indian political nexus, the former emerging from the most populous region as well as being the fertile breadbasket of the country, and thus the most economically prosperous province, and the latter, and the latter home of the old Muslim gentry prior to partition, and site of the intellectual and religious hub in which liberal modernist, constitutionalist national movements emerged in the colonial period (Roy: 2015, Jalal: 1990). Thus it is certainly true that the consolidation of the state was not undertaken by one particular class but rather “should be understood as an evolving assemblage of forces exercising power at different levels of social formation” (Akhtar: 2018: 11). Here it is useful to reflect here on some of the key dynamics the liberal Pakistani imaginary developed from.

Elite patronage networks emerged post-independence, entrenching links to the West (Alavi: 1972). Elites kept tight control of the economy through direct patronage networks deriving from twenty families who controlled two thirds of Pakistani industry by the 1960s. Maintaining and generating capital for this emergent class was part of the official national project (Siddiqa: 2007: 3) but it also induced, “complex and uneven development” in Pakistan (Nazir: 1986: 497). These entrenched relations with British and then American interests, and the fear of public anger in the face of global colonial violence, was a constant source of anxiety for Pakistani establishment figures.

The politicization of identities in tandem with the deepening logic of capital, urbanization and the evolving military and bureaucratic nexus were processes that emerged and were

inherited in the formation of the former colonial state during the development of the capitalist global system in the 19th century (Siddiqa: 2007: 61). This had a lasting effect on Pakistani international politics by limiting who could speak for the national interest. The key strategy for the secular, westernized, nationalist classes, were to tie themselves to US security designs and more broadly, a Western vision of international order (Jalal: 1990, Shah: 2014). The economic role of the military-bureaucracy oligarchy enabled it to deploy significant economic surplus to strengthen their position and to balance the budget in favour of military and security needs. Deploying the legal power of the state, they were also able to wield former imperial legal acts of emergency and safety bills to implement direct control of the provinces. Meanwhile the national myth marshalled civilizational pride through an imagined national uniformity focused on order, technocratic development, and notions of collective sacrifices for the greater good, which collectively gave meaning to officially sanctioned imaginings of Pakistan (Jalal: 1995).

The tension of high Pakistani politics derives from a core binary between the military – bureaucracy ‘oligarchy’ and the landed political families. The oligarchy had been in command of the state since the state’s inception, and has used politicians as a buffer, when the deep state has been threatened, as in 1958 when the military-bureaucracy formally took power under Ayub Khan, and in 1968-69 when the ruling clique lost power. In particular, the former received accommodation for their plans, autonomy and a degree of legitimacy from having the political class confer a degree of hegemony over Pakistani elite spaces. Political party factions certainly held sway in this period and accumulated political power which was backed by their already existing privileges, wealth and connections, as landed elites. However they would be second in order of power, in relation to the military-bureaucratic officials within state institutions. This union between the state and the major political parties has been useful historically for Pakistani establishments, as a process that absorbs public anger and grievances. A core facet, it

would seem of the Pakistani post-colonial state therefore, is the inhibited, divided, comprador class of westernized and pro-western elites, both military and political, that navigated Pakistan's limited decolonization after national independence. Together they controlled the state in the first twenty years, competing with each other yet maintaining the common goal of preserving the social order based on property, control of social hierarchies and access to 'the International'.

Thus we can understand the rise of the military-bureaucracy under the Ayub Khan military junta (1958-1969) by 1958 as a contingent process that developed from independence but with colonial path dependencies. This process had a global dimension, due to entrenched links with Anglo-American politico-economic and geostrategic interests. Thus the "military's rise to dominate as early as the 1950s can be understood only in their regional and global challenges of the Cold War" (Jalal: 2014: 60) as a way to help protect Anglo-American oil routes to Iraq, as well as ward of Soviet expansion into the region.

Crucially, the Pakistan- US alliance allowed for successful foreign penetration into public life through modernization policies. This economic collaboration with US politicians, economists, financiers and businessmen, can partly explain American patronage in Pakistan. The Ford Foundation financed these groups, who were "entrusted with the task of drawing up Pakistan's first five-year plan for economic development" (Ahmed: 1974: 17). All the while, "foreign advisors aligned themselves with the technocrats who in turn pushed the private enterprise line. The bureaucrats defended their vested interests under the ideological cover of the public sector." (Ahmed: 1974: 17).

These Cold War relationships formed pillars of the new social engineered modernization projects of Ayub's regime. Techniques of economic and social planning were projected as

rational sciences that were propagandized as the desired route towards a much-heralded 'decade of development'. Economists from the Harvard Advisory Group instructed Ayub Khan's developmentalist agenda. New institutions were established, including the Pakistani Council on National Integration, the Pakistani Committee of the Congress of Cultural Freedom and the Bureau of National Reconstruction. Moreover, the British Information Service and the United States Information Service "outlined a plan to influence Pakistan's educated youth, journalists and professional writers about the misunderstanding concerning world ideologies" (Ali: 2015:124).

The co-constitution of Pakistani social forms in local and transnational contexts offers a better lens at Pakistani subjectivities, which in turn helps understand the manifold forms that the Cold War and decolonization intersected, particularly in regard to the power of superpower experiments to remake countries in the non-European world. Hence, in Japan following World War Two, the US, "set about doing what no other occupation force had done before; remaking the political, social, cultural, and economic fabric of a defeated nation, and in the process changing the very way of thinking of its populace" (Dower: 2000: 78). In contrast Pakistan's Cold War cultural onslaught was never totalising in the same way. Nevertheless, the Cold War ties with the US ensnared the states and all major Pakistani factions, transforming modes of power as well as influencing people's collective identities.

Reviewing Pakistani state formation necessitates us to study the development of nationalist discourse, amid wider historic changes and developments in Pakistan. This new political sphere involved print capitalism, cultural competition, selective patronage of public spaces, and the proliferation of religious lexicon in the public arena allowed for the continuation of the Islamic moral order in Pakistan. But, "the old 'moral city' of mosques, courts, schools, and markets...had been displaced by the realm of print and public

meetings...for the representation of the Muslim ‘moral community’ (Devji: 1991:149). Capital intensification also helped develop the space and technology for counter-hegemonic politics. In this way theorizing “how various political actors were attempting to mould the post-colonial state in their own image in the immediate aftermath of decolonization” (Ali: 2013:504) becomes tied into how these actors navigated Cold War developments.

Pakistani identities became deployed through state censored history, in school textbooks, and in leaflets, radio broadcasts and public signs, and was reproduced in different formats across society, in local assemblies, mosques, barracks and public institutions (Saigol: 2006). On-going imperial and Cold War dynamics shaped everyday Pakistani social relations in economic, political, cultural, gender and ethnic hierarchies that were galvanized for political order. In an analysis of Pakistani school textbooks, Saigol shows how these projects were characterized by a “futuristic and modernist “nationalism that depended on a developmentalist image of the hardworking, industrious, upright and patriotic citizen, unbridled by narrow ethnic loyalties and parochialism” (Saigol: 2006: 184). Similarly Jalal argues “the ways in which the history of Pakistan has been conjured and disseminated by the state controlled education system highlight the failure, “of a coherent, much less, shared imagining of a ‘national’ community” (Jalal: 1995:2). Henceforth Pakistani nationalism deployed of the notion of Pakistani exceptionalism, the nation’s mighty historical roots and glorious future (Nazir: 1986, Jalal: 1995, Bajwa: 2016). But how did the military-bureaucracy and its landed scions and captains of industry, as well as the wider classes that composed the liberal nationalist and its propertied classes, cement power?

The military, bureaucracy, financiers, industrialists, aristocracy and politicians rallied behind the national project. Successive governments of the 1950s were dominated by a

technocratic professional class that was itself, “underpinned by a form of secular politics that saw a division between the public and private domains of social life” (Ahmed: 2008: 127). This was central to consolidating the Punjabi military-bureaucratic oligarchy and the proprietor classes that supported them and mirrors third world military relationships in civil-military relations elsewhere in the Global South (Siddiq: 2007, Mitchell: 2002). This hierarchy excluded ethno-national groups as well as the Left, and systematically crushed their movements for autonomy and independence. The key to consolidation was the retrenchment of capital and power in a small elite who manned the Colonial State’s military and bureaucracy, and who also swiftly deposed the hegemony of the Indian Muslim aristocrats who had dominated the Muslim League and Indian Muslim politics in the 1940s. Despite the state’s shift towards an Islamic model, the work of an active conservative religious lobby, by the time of the 1956 constitution, the core axis of elite power had already been cemented.

Moreover West Pakistan’s cementation as the dominant wing of the new state, and the prominence of Punjab were other core trajectories of the period. The Eastern wing was severely underdeveloped, and faced harsh reprisals for unrest. Even in West Pakistan, national elites repressed Pathan, Kashmiri, Baloch and Sindhi local communities through state violence but also by enforcing Urdu as the national language in the denial of subnational and local identities (Nazir, 1986:505). Contra realism’s affirmation of two distinct national and international realms, Pakistan’s unequal structure suggests a different historic formation that can go some way to explaining the postcolonial security problematic. Whereas Western state formation was predicated on a settled bourgeoisie and public sphere, a very different experience of social formation arose in Pakistan, post Empire, one characterized by international capital penetration, uneven development and a stratified, complex social order (Nasir, 1986).

The national elite expressed an Islamic solidarity through the discourse of Muslim Nationalism, which led to two key contradictions. First, major questions arose as to who was a Pakistani and to what extent Pakistan was an egalitarian enterprise given the disparity between the Muslim League elite and the masses, and the majoritarian politics of Muslim nationalism, and its repression of non-Sunni and non-Muslim identities in an overwhelmingly Muslim country. Second, contradictions in the Pakistani imaginary stemmed from the tension between its transnational claims and statist reality. A dilemma for Pakistani strategic architects was how to create strategic objectives for national unity for a nation not yet culturally configured as a cohesive society.

Forging a national community and international identity required mobilizing broad social acceptance of the Pakistan project at a time where nationalism masked on-going imperial relations, reforming under new auspices in Anglo-American power in Asia. A narrative of national order was argued to be necessary to create loyalty to the state as the embodiment of the nation. Yet the instrumental use of Muslim nationalist discourse meant little to people in the peripheries once the utopian promise of Pakistan had been marginalized. Muslim nationalism, once derived from Islamic universalism in the years before independence, became narrowed in its scope, honed in by the rubric of the territorial Pakistani state and successive Pakistani government's of Islam as a punitive code (Nazir, 1986: 501, Devji, 2013). And yet they were unable to quell internationalism and transboundary connection and even relied upon it in order to project power. This contradiction would have world historic repercussions, as I will discuss in the final two chapters.

Pakistani politicians endorsed Westphalian norms, and relied upon imperial methods to integrate frontier regions, which mirrored Pakistan's own integration into imperial hierarchies (Leake: 2016: 3). At home a mix of patron-client politics sat together with

modernization plans, via transnational developmental strategy (Akhtar: 2018: 21). But despite the thick relations that reproduced Pakistan's subordinate position in relation to the US, Pakistani elites constructed themselves as an independent power fighting their own conflicts. Despite colonial institutional inheritance, Pakistani state institutions were nascent in the 1950s, they're potential to extend a coherent imagining of Pakistan was only ever partial. An overdeveloped military and bureaucracy could rapidly develop the coercive state but not spaces and forms of collective collaboration required winning hearts and minds, which the state was less successful at encouraging

Non-elite politics sought to articulate a counter narrative to global imperialism, but became subverted and often drawn into an evolving national arena of contestation. Yet the dynamism of Pakistani social clashes was explicitly international. They tied to conflict with India, regional connections with the Middle East, and the Western Cold War bloc. Despite repression, forms of anti-imperial, anti-feudal politics endured in the 1960s amid a worldwide challenge from the Global South, which sought to contest the narrative of the bipolar world order imagined in Moscow and Washington.

The Ayub regime were predominantly concerned with transnational forms of internationalist solidarity that the Pakistani Left were engaged with, which had both a connection to Soviet Communism as well as ties to the anti-colonial movements that were decolonizing large parts of the world. The strategic preferences of the state became entwined with US Cold War strategy. Shared beliefs, connected transnational class interests and aversion to anti-imperial movements, made anti-communist politics a compelling political strategy for Pakistani elites. This meant downplaying the US as an imperial actor, portraying the Soviet Union as an atheist empire, and promoting anti-communism as strategy to downgrade the potency of anti-imperial, internationalist and leftist solidarities in Pakistan. The Left had a significant challenge on its hands, namely

the state and feudalism, but also global relations of capitalism, superpower rivalry and empire. How then did Left factions respond to the onrush of the Cold War in Pakistan?

### **3 The fortunes of the Pakistani Left: Pakistani Left struggles and the Rawalpindi Case**

Consolidation of the nation-state took place through concerted strategies of regulating the popular imaginings of Pakistanis (Jalal: 1995, Bajwa: 2016). For states like Pakistan, constraining the access to the International was an important political strategy. However they could not control debate and connections in world politics, particularly in regard to Islam, the perceived challenge of Communism, as well as anti-imperialism, empire, the US and capitalism. But it also revolved around the varied power of responses to the state's allegiance to the US Cold War. This counter movement was not a cohesive political bloc in the 1950s but rather a disparate group of socialists, intellectuals, activists, union members, or disaffected political and military figures.

The Pakistani establishment had thrown out any chance at an independent postcolonial state in their acquiescence to Western interests. Nevertheless, the Left articulated a counter-vision of what Pakistanis advocated for in world politics. Neither dominated by a mass anti-imperial party, nor a Soviet satellite, the Left in the early 1950s was a small, divided collection of various coalitions. The most prominent political organization within the wider leftist, progressive and anticolonial mobilizations was the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP), which challenged the emerging nexus between the military and the bureaucracy. Additionally, the Democratic Student Federation DSF, the Progressive Writer's Association (PWA) and the Pakistan Trade Union Federation represented

students, the writer's movement and the major independent unions. The Pakistani Left was quick to realize that their imagining of a progressive Pakistan, could gather pace through an alternative national project.

Cultural debates on society, Islam, democracy and foreign policy, were the nodes from which Leftist intellectuals, politicians, artists and activists could attract support.

The PWA were anti-colonial and communist inspired, with a mission statement that documenting everyday struggles of ordinary citizens was essential for a critique of social injustice. Key figures of the period renowned poet-activists like Faiz and Jalib. These groups included "a range of free thinkers, modernist poets and independent-minded intellectuals along with those who sought to link the question of Pakistan with Islamic morals and values" (Ali: 2013:1). Moreover the PWA's primary motive was "to link the cultural project overtly to the question of political transformations that would benefit the mass of ordinary people" (Ahmed: 2008: 121).

The promise of a nationwide anti-imperial left remained weak, the movement was divided, lacking leadership and mass support. This constrained the potential for more decisive social opposition in the 1950s, due to the weakness of Left penetration of society, but also due to the success of the Ayub Regime in crushing opposition through building regimes of legitimation, co-option and consent in institutional frameworks. Indeed, "four years later, one of the first directives of the Ayub government was the removal and destruction of all socialist literature from public libraries" (Ahmed: 2008: 48). Nowhere was this better seen than when Ayub Khan set up a state sponsored writer's guild. It showcased the requirement for "advocating governmental policy rather than nourishing genuine creative talent...Ayub had succeeded in his challenge to curb the freedom of intellectual thought in Pakistan" (Yaqin: 2009:120).

Moreover the Left's relationship with Pakistani nationalism was fraught with difficulty, particularly over what Islam's role was to be, and to what extent Pakistan looked for identification and legitimation from the Muslim world. It is important to remember that although Pakistan was created as a homeland for the Muslims of India, it has been largely ruled by an elite, "whose allegiances to Islam has tended to be either nominal or purely instrumental" (Sayyid & Taylor: 2002: 72). Nazir (1968) makes this point by warning against conflating ideology as institutional practice and social understanding. In contrast, the Left's also recognised the influence of Islam in the popular imagination, and also the influence of the religious right. Islamic Socialism, as a political doctrine, was developed in different guises by both the Communist Party in the mid 1950s, and then more extensively by the PPP in the 1960s. They are critical examples of how socialist Pakistani Cold War experiments understood the need to deploy a notion of Islam in a religious country, and to deploy Islam as understood as combatting social justice. Pakistani intellectuals of differing allegiances tried to balance Islamic culture with modernity. Those on the Left were aware for the need for syncretic, dialogic understandings of culture and community, state and society, Pakistani identification and Muslim Solidarity. The fragmented coalition making up the Left were aiming to construct an alternative Islamic model of economic development and national culture, whilst being wary of the wrath of the state.

In response to the religious undertones of the nationalist project, the Left's launched its own brand of 'Islamic Socialism', praising the historical achievements of past Muslim powers, and the "achievement of creating the largest Muslim state and creating it out of virtually nothing" (Sayyid: 2013: 72). Yet this did not stop the state's sustained suppression. Henceforth the CPP was outlawed, following a failed attempted coup lead by communist activists and anti-colonial nationalist officers in 1951 during what has been called the Rawalpindi case. However, Communist party members and other socialist and

anti-imperial inspired factions would continue to fight for an alternative image of Pakistani Cold War international politics. In this section I will discuss the Rawalpindi case and its effects, by first beginning with a closer inspection of the politics of anti-imperialism and anti-communism in Pakistan.

The Left was directly antagonistic to foreign domination of the nation, which manifested in protests in support of anti-imperial conflicts across the world. Up until they were disbanded by the regime in 1954, the PWA maintained a consistent anti-imperial line in their politics. The CPP “emphasized its anti-British stance, demanding that the Pakistan government leave the Commonwealth and create better relations with the Soviet Union... there was also a manifesto that emphasized that people of all walks of life...should unite and form a joint front to protest against Anglo-American interests, the big industrialists and the large landlords to eventually form a workers’ democracy aligned with the Soviet Union and China” (Ali: 2015:129). These calls for anti-colonial and communist worldmaking connected with worldwide struggles during the 1950s, and intensified with the militant student-labour struggles of the 1960s.

Pakistani activists articulated their demands against the regime in tandem with these broader anti-imperial sentiments, as US Cold War strategies intensified across the Global South. This was in contrast with the elite, “class whose ideological instincts developed under a colonial structure, whose overriding consideration was the necessity to govern a modern bourgeois nation-state” (Ahmed: 2008: 128). The politics of anti-imperialism crossed classes and even among nation elites; there were elements within the elite who were not in favour of US alliance. However this position came at a high cost. Pakistan’s former Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated in 1951, most likely by elements of the security services, for considering advocating a neutral or non-aligned stance in the Cold War. As Alavi writes, “Pakistan’s ‘non-aligned’ policy under Liaquat

Ali Khan is little recognised today...nor... a 'policy' in the sense of a deliberate and calculated choice, its 'non-alignment' was merely a description of its isolation on the global stage and its lack of trust in Western regimes" (Alavi: 1998:1552).

The Left's pursuit of a non-Western foreign policy closer to the Communist powers is striking given Pakistan's lack of revolutionary antagonism with empire that visible elsewhere in the Global South. Although the Left had not been a key part of the Pakistan Movement, which had been dominated by Northern Indian secular liberal modernists, the limits of accepted political debate proved the Left were seen as the key internal threat. The rhetorical cementing Communists as seditious were buttressed by the utilization of Islam as legitimizer for the state and as a weapon against the anti-imperial, left.

Henceforth Leftist meetings were smashed and newspapers shut down. As such, the lines of deliberation were far more inclusive of conservative, liberal and religious factions than anti-imperial left groups (Iqtidar: 2011).

The rules of the game had been written to remove the Left from influence and power, in a way that had begun under the colonial State, but had transformed in the post-colonial era as Pakistani and US elites could work together to repress socialist and anti-imperial counter-hegemonic mobilizations. The Left, were consistently seen as the nation's fourth column of saboteurs, beyond the realm of the Pakistani moral community. In this hostile climate they could achieve only limited political success in the political sphere, and many thus tuned towards community organizing across the country (Toor: 2005: 330).

Nonetheless, the Left were in successful in shedding light on the oppressive tendencies of the state, the continuations of colonial legacies in the new national project, and their connection to anti-imperial struggles worldwide. Despite their lack of tangible mass appeal, the legacy of the Left in the 1950s was able to shift public debate on what was considered legitimate politics (Ali: 2013:515). Furthermore, the Left were committed to a

national solidarity movement but also believed strongly in regionalism, and worked closely in this period with Pushto and Baluch national movements, but did not have the tools to prevent state repression of the peripheries (Ahmed: 2008: 127). Thus enduring colonial methods of governing, the rhetorical use of Islam in society, local and regional contestations, and the growing unison with Anglo-American anti-communist meta-narratives, worked to limit the Left in the 1950s. US and the Pakistani fears regarding anti-imperial politics was massively out of proportion to the actual capacity of the left. Henceforth the left in Pakistan would go on to provide a source of socialist and anti-establishment during the 1960s that would overthrow the Ayub Regime. Yet despite their potency, and the multiple responses to Pakistani Cold War alliance articulated in society, and the brief cooling of relations during the mid-1960s, the military and political establishment's links to the US led Cold War alliance was largely consistent. Here I briefly sketch out the events of the 1951 Rawalpindi Case, and the relevance for my argument.

Months before his assassination, Liaquat Ali Khan went on radio to unmask a conspiracy plot by anti-British, pro Soviet officers, and members of the Communist Party. The anti-British sentiment and pro anticolonial stance of a section of the Pakistani officer class derived from the maintenance of high rank British military officers in the Pakistani army, a source of resentment from the Pakistani officer class, some of whom now advocated an anti-Western, pro-Soviet stance. This was in stark contrast to established generals like Ayub Khan, whose conservative and pro-Western politics satisfied Anglo-American interests (Ali: 2015:131). Alongside the military officers, the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case included Communist Party (CPP) leaders and allies, including the CPP General Secretary Sajjad Zaheer and Faiz Ahmed Faiz.

The consequences of the discovered plot were the wholesale assault on the Left as seditious, anti-Pakistan, and pro-Soviet. The right in the state and society were

emboldened, whilst state repression on the Left intensified. Pakistani anti-communism in the 1950s dovetailed well with Western Cold War strategy both in terms of repelling Communists, and in terms of dismantling anti-imperial momentum. At once a plot to seize power and a dispute within the elite over the reins of power, the managed handling of the Conspiracy by Ayub Khan has been argued to have been paramount to Ayub Khan's rise to power (Malik: 2008:145). The Rawalpindi Case was an early example that Pakistan's managers were committed to promoting free movement of capital, private sector penetration of the industrial and agricultural sectors, through a willingness to invest in the US military-industry complex and particularly, through the meta-narrative of global anti-communism.

Despite the crushing of the Communist Party and the Writers' Association as well as other Left wing parties, publications and unions, a strong theme of anti-imperial resistance continued throughout the 1950s. In fact the Rawalpindi Case conveys how, despite lacking in mass support and political power, disenfranchised Pakistani army officers and Communist Party members had a shared interest in changing the foreign policy narrative, the international identity of Pakistan. Thus Pakistani society in 1951 and by the time the state formally allied to the US in 1954 was not just an empty vessel of US power, an aberration from the anti-colonialism sweeping other parts of the Global South and Muslim World. The struggles during the Rawalpindi Case, illustrate how Anti-British, pan-Arab solidarity was rife in a section of the officer class following Partition. Plotting Pakistani officers weren't only searching for the end of British strategic influence; they also desired a closer connection to the Muslim Middle East, and to the Communist bloc. Here I have briefly outlined the consequences of the Rawalpindi case. In the following section I examine the rise of the 1968-9 movement and reflect on how it was able to overthrow the Ayub regime, but not the military-bureaucratic state.

#### **4 The politics of resistance: Ayub Khan's Modernization politics, the rise of the Left and the pyrrhic 'victory' of 1968**

By the 1960s, Ayub Khan's government faced multiple problems arising from uneven development, and the consequences of deeper capital penetration in migration and urbanization took root in Pakistani cities. Despite widespread repression, the Left was "to remerge in various shapes and forms in response to the almost consistently acrimonious relationship that the Left had with the State" (Ali: 2013: 513). The Students and workers movements expanded in number, dwarfing the literary and communist movements of the early 1950s. Students and labour movements, began to, "popularize a radical idiom of politics across a wide cross-section of society" which, despite leading to limited material wins in the short term, helped to popularise a new conception and practice of politics" (Akhtar: 2018: 12).

This coalition provoked amongst the establishment, "an acute fear of the leftist upsurge given the obvious potential of this constellation of progressive forces to overturn the status quo" (Akhtar: 2018: 13). As a result, "the Ministry of the Interior formed a secret subcommittee to combat communism in government services, reflecting anxieties that the lower ranks of the civil service and the army officer corps had developed irreligious or left-wing views" (Ali: 2015: 123). This anxiety propelled the perceived and imagined fear of the encirclement of the state by Soviet communism.

What had begun as the strikes in protest at socioeconomic conditions and the killing of students at a protest had spread to organized Karachi dock labours and Lahore industrial workers by 1968 (Ali: 2005). Growing interconnection between student and worker movements, armed with Islamic socialism, Communism and the politics of Third World

liberation, now span across a cross-section of Pakistani society. Pakistanis now contended their nation's politics, in ways that threatened to overwhelm the category of 'Pakistan' itself. Nonetheless it is important here to recognize how the previous repertoires of resistance informed the class and anti-imperial forms of social consciousness during the 1968 protests. By the 1960s, the development of both the National Awami Party and the Pakistan People's Party signified the rise of left leaning mass parties, which together with the active mobilizations underpinning student-worker alliances, collectively developed into a force that led to a groundswell resistance to the regime, and the downfall of the Ayub government.

Given the state and the religious right's assault on the Left, striking workers, ethnic groups and religious minorities, it is remarkable how anti-regime and anti-imperial leftist gained momentum during the latter half of the Ayub Khan's regime. Alongside student and worker militancy, anti-imperial politics gained inspiration from global events. Farzana Shaikh claims, "the anti-Vietnam war movement had caught the imagination of young peace campaigners... but the police were unable to stop the students' actions particularly as they gained inspiration from radical protests taking place in other countries" (Shaikh: 2012: 78). This group of political forces, fragmented and divided as they were, managed to create, "a space in the new country to speak about social reform, labour rights, land distribution, free education, economic and social justice and women's rights.... these discussions and debates developed in scope and energy over the years and have remained within the public sphere as an ideological force" (Ali: 2013:15).

The consequences of a growing socialist, anti-imperial and student-worker led movement shaped a counter-narrative of Pakistani internationalism. Here anti-imperial politics interacted with a wider counter-hegemonic politics, intensifying over the course of Ayub

Khan's military dictatorship, leading to the popular revolt in 1969, overthrowing the regime, but not the political, social and military machinery of the state.

And yet this movement was unable to transform the state, and would eventually be picked apart. Halliday, thus claims the Pakistani, "state was threatened by a prolonged, yet spontaneous, outburst of revolutionary class forces; these were unable to prevail, lacking as they did an organized expression" (Halliday: 1971:1). Connected, Reza Ali emphasizes, "the social and political limits of radicalism and the resultant choices and compromises it had to make in order for it to remain a viable socio-political alternative" (Ali: 2013:503). Both old and newer waves of the Left were marked out within the Pakistani Cold War imaginary for their opposition to the US Pakistan alliance, and both faced the combined threat of Pakistani, US and British intelligence services who worked closely together to repress the threat from the Left. Both waves were ultimately constrained by the anti-communist international climate in South Asia, as well as by the entanglement of ethnic, linguistic and class divides in society ties (Ali: 2015: 3, Akhtar: 2018: 6). Here see here the manifold problems the Left had in forging class based resistance to the Ayub Regime (1958-1968).

The 1968 movement demanded socio-economic change as well as a break with the old political system. It included protests, occupations and strikes in factories nationwide, and involved over ten million people (Ali: 2008:4). And yet Pakistani National historiography has largely ignored this history (Jalal: 1995). It has preferred to focus on the malleable legacy of the country's founding fathers (Sayyid & Taylor: 2002:72) than a serious reflection over the Ayub period, the loss of Bangladesh defeat to India, nor early Middle East Cold War relations. Nevertheless 1969 represented, what Tariq Ali has described as 'the lost 1968', a historic yet overlooked moment in the cacophony of global anti-imperial

voices in 1968; when a US backed junta were removed, propelling both East Pakistani succession and further instability in the remaining provinces (Ali: 2018: 2).

For a brief moment, both the elites of the PPP and the more radical, revolutionary NAP epitomised the momentary ascendancy of the Left in Pakistan. Whilst the PPP would eventually slip into authoritarianism, right wing Islamic discourse and the retrenchment of the landed classes, it is important to note how the movements that propelled them, “were extremely active in organising popular fronts of students, industrial workers, intellectuals and artists, and women” (Akhtar: 2010: 119). 1968 was also the result of the dissatisfaction with the Ayubian ‘decade of development’, socio-economic collapse and national humiliation following the 1965 India-Pakistan war.

The rise of the Left from the Rawalpindi Case in 1951, to the rise of the 1968 mass opposition movement that toppled Ayub Khan amid an anti-imperial narrative, is an astonishing process in Pakistani history. But it is also important, as a vehicle for revealing the global dimensions of intersecting bi-polar, imperial and regional dynamics.

Additionally, the 1960 Sino-Soviet split divided the Left in West Pakistan, and solidified differences between West and East Pakistan. In the Western wing it had a direct bearing not only over the future leadership of global communism between pro-Moscow and Pro-Peking factions but also the trajectory of the Pakistani Left (Toor: 2011: Ali: 2015).

Overlapping battles were afoot in society and with the rehabilitation of the global right after 1968, the hopes of a united; anti-imperial Left in world politics, and in Pakistan, subsided. Consequently, the crushing of the Left took place in the early 1970s as the Bhutto regimes sided with the old elite classes, paving the way for the reintegration of the military. This in turn would facilitate the 1977 coup, the installation of the Zia military regime, and a renewed marriage between Pakistani military-bureaucratic-oligarchs and

US Cold War strategists, culminating in Bhutto's hanging and the beginning of Zia's decade of martial rule. The generals were back.

In charting the evolving Pakistani Cold War imaginary from the 50s to the 60s, I have sought to explain the characteristics and contingencies on Pakistanis imaginings of international politics. In the final section I offer some reflections on the limits of decolonization in Pakistan.

## **5 The limits of decolonization**

I have argued that mobilizations for socialism and anti-imperialism were a core facet of societal contention in Cold War Pakistan, and a key mobilizer for the Left. However rather than a united front, the Left was a contested, fragmented set of movements that gained traction at particular critical junctures. Despite their inability to transform the state, the toppling of the Ayub regime was a historic watershed moment. It challenged the view of Pakistanis as Cold War US clients. Here was a cosmopolitan movement for liberation that tied to a global tide of student-worker led revolts and anti-colonial revolutions around the world.

Anti- British and anti-American sentiment fused old enmities from empire, and newer concerns regarding the expansion of US power across Asia under the narrative of anti-Communism. The Cold War cultural infiltration of society contained "not only the peasants, workers, lower-middle classes and urban intellectuals...but also people of other classes, such as the national bourgeoisie who were against foreign imperialism" (Ali:

2015:125). Here I want to focus on some key arguments and address particular potential counter-arguments by drawing attention to salient trajectories.

The Soviet threat that the Ayub regime and its predecessors had identified was not the real source of social conflict in Pakistan. Rather anti regime and anti-Anglo-American Cold War politics sat alongside fury at the privileging of certain ethnic, class and linguistic groups over others. This configuration constrained all Pakistani Cold War factions, however, as much as it did the state elite. Mobilization in Pakistani society of the national and internationalist form were limited by local and provincial unrest, as well as socio-economic problems and the politics of provincial and local hierarchies.

Additionally, the role of anti-imperialism and the Left should not be overplayed as a continuously present reality, despite its integral role in counter-hegemonic politics in Pakistan at given conjectures. I have demonstrated that Pakistani Left played a role in influencing society out of proportion to its actual strength. And as Communist and Socialist politics gained particular forms, they contended with a system out of their choosing, and with religious and nationalist imaginings managed by the reconstructed institutions of the old imperial state. Furthermore, Pakistani Anti-Imperialism was not necessarily just connected to the Communist Party or other Leftist factions. Rather anti-imperialism permeated Pakistani culture. This was particularly focused on anti-British and anti-American hegemony but also included desires for better relations with Muslim and Third World countries.

The organized left in Pakistan was only one part of broader coalitions calling for political-economic change, and global Muslim solidarity. The role of Muslim solidarity, Islamic universalism as an idea and the intercultural ties between Pakistanis and the Muslim

world, was a countervailing pressure on Pakistan-US relations (Jabeen & Mazhar: 2011: 128). Consequently Pakistani society underwent several vast transformations in the 60s including the trauma of defeat, a second partition, and the struggles of socio-economic justice in a divided and stratified society. All of which, alongside the Left's inability to transform popular unrest into long-term structural change, helped to rehabilitate the old establishment.

Global, regional geopolitical forces shaped the trajectory of the changing structure of Pakistan in various ways. In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union and China began actively challenging US power in South Asia, investing in post-colonial sites of Cold War contention. By the mid-1960s, the Kennedy administration's warming relations with India came to bear on the increasingly unpopular Ayub Regime. Pakistan-US relations deteriorated in this period, causing a decrease in military and economic ties, helping facilitate the fall of the regime in 1968. The then charismatic foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, lead diplomacy which helped the state navigate the succession East Pakistan and post-war negotiations with India, whilst strengthening ties with the Soviet Union, China and the Arab states. Despite his elite background and disinterest in changing the structures of society, Bhutto's articulated a kind of anti-imperialism abroad and liberalism at home. When he became prime minister, Bhutto would turn on the Left, appease the religious right, and enable the political rehabilitation of the military brass, eventually leading to his own demise.

Moreover, the decline of Arab-Nationalism and socialist nationalism followed from Nasser's death in 1970 and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Concurrently, anti-colonial movements would face further problems following the 1973 oil embargo, which allowed for the financing of new between Gulf Arab states and militant Islamist politics. These dynamics involved the emergence of new social reforms in the form of mercantile,

religiously conservative and well-connected, transboundary Islamist movements. These connections would animate the rise of Islamism in Pakistan during the 1970s (Akhtar: 2018: 21-22).

This chapter has demonstrated the development of the early Pakistani Cold War imaginary in conjunction with the history of the state's Cold War enlistment. It has outlined the lines of connection and conflict between Pakistani imaginary factions from the early 1950s to the late 1960s. What Pakistani early Cold War history offers us is an example of the contingent and contradictory development of an evolving assemblage of factitious responses to the global Cold War, within growing regional and international changes in geopolitics. It has captured a sense of what it meant for Pakistanis to reconfigure their ideas of Pakistan through its relationship to Cold War conflagration. It has illustrated the intrinsically global imagination that many Pakistanis held. Their notions of themselves transcended the geographies of the nation-state and escaped the machinations of its security architects.

Yet the continuity of colonial levers of power, amid Cold War ruptures calls into question, “what ‘decolonization’...really meant in the South Asian context...the freedom that many had struggled and yearned for merely brought about a change in ‘masters’ who willingly inherited the colonial state instead of displacing it” (Ali: 2013:515).

Simultaneously we see how the Cold War was also not the only marker of politics, but importantly, offered routes to mobilize both pro and anti-imperial politics.

Mobilizations challenging the establishment and imperial consolidation were imagined together, in various manifestations by socialists, workers, clerics, officers and students.

Pakistani counter-narratives encapsulated the ways in which anti-imperial politics conveyed not only the reactions to the end of the Raj and the onset of the Cold War, but

also the latest manifestation of Muslim responses to modernity. These tensions have fuelled the ambiguity of Pakistani identity, culture and praxis in world politics.

By resituating Pakistani Cold War politics outside of South Asia, and in relation to global politics, we can view how the repertoires of Pakistani statecraft were inherited from the colonial state, into forms of modern nation state making (Akhtar: 2018: 21-22), but also how new political, economic, cultural and social divisions emerged in national and trans-regional contexts. It is thus important to note the weight of Muslim world socio-cultural connections to Pakistanis during the Pakistani state's Cold War Cold War. Cummings argues, "it is amazing to see how even the experts on late-nineteenth century East Asia take the Western theory as the norm and cannot get it through their heads that there *was* an international system ... in East Asia, that it has lasted for centuries, and that China, Japan, and Korea knew each other, cross-fertilized each other, and traded with each other" (Cummings: 2002: 7). Similarly, Muslim world connections connecting Pakistan to the Middle East, was a historic transboundary socio-cultural force that shaped Cold War politics.

It has been important to highlight the imperial context of Cold War relations that inform Pakistani society. I actively deploy this notion in a way that contends the notion of foreign policy as only the remit of elites. Rather, "foreign policy is about imagining the place of a country among the community of nations. The international affairs of a country are about claiming a status, questions of dignity, identity, reputation, emotions, and words.... (and) has always also been about imagining global grandeur" (Adib-Moghaddam: 2014: 43). We get a sense of how Pakistanis challenged the nation and the foreign policy of the nation simultaneously, how they imbued local struggles with transnational struggles, and how they constrained national and global strategic projects, whilst at certain conjunctures

enabling political reckoning, such as in 1968, despite counter-hegemonic groups being too weak and divided to prevent the institutionalization of the US-Pakistan alliance.

Contemplate the similarities and differences with this analysis, and with Dower's analysis of the US occupation of Japan. Dower writes, "what matters is what the Japanese themselves made of their experience of defeat, then and thereafter" (Dower: 2000: 30). He argues Japan's economic rise following US occupation after the war "is incomprehensible without understanding how victor and vanquished embraced Japan's defeat together" (Dower: 2000: 558). Likewise given the spirited, complex and varied responses of Pakistanis to the onrush of superpower and regional politics, we need to study the victors and vanquished in Pakistan, their dialectical relations, and the changing structure of power, connecting factions to their transboundary connections and encounters.

Vibrant anti-imperial, anti-capitalist politics of the Pakistani Left grew, out of all expectation, following the 1951 Rawalpindi Case, the 1954 US Defence Pact, the 1955 Baghdad Pact, all the way to the 1968 protests that overthrew Ayub Khan. These mobilizations had an effect out of proportion to their actual size and strength. Yet so much of what was fundamental to Cold War Pakistani society- the envelopment in imperial hierarchies, divisions between pro and anti-capitalist sentiment in the country, and the contradictions between the plurality communities and the constructed Pakistani Muslim community- stems from the relationship between the victors and vanquished, the contrasting efforts towards forging as well as demolishing efforts at Pakistani decolonization, and the precise ways in which processes of decolonization and the Cold War interacted.

## **Chapter Four: Pakistani encounters in the Middle East Cold War: The Baghdad Pact, Suez & the global politics of Anti-Imperialism**

*“The contested nature of Pakistan did not arise from Pakistan being insufficiently imagined, but rather it being insufficiently decolonized.”*  
Salman Sayyid

*“The identification of the second half of the twentieth century as an exceptionally long period of international peace would be intelligible to most of the rest of the world”*  
Henrik Kwon

### **Introduction**

This chapter emphasises how the Baghdad Pact and the Suez Canal crisis were two events with direct consequences for the rise of global anti-imperial politics during the early Cold War, symbolized by the 1955 Bandung Conference. When the Pakistani government joined the US backed Baghdad Pact alliance in 1955, Pakistani society was deeply fractured over its foreign policy course as a US frontier ally. A year later, two world historic powers would force Britain, France and Israel to end its seizure of the Suez Canal. The first and most important was the role of the US in forcing its allies to retreat. The second was the role of global public outcry, particularly within the postcolonial and Muslim worlds. Consequently this chapter explores the effect of Pakistani Cold War factions, their imaginaries and transboundary encounters, which it argues is important for conceptualizing Cold War geopolitics and socio-historical processes in a way which conventional scholarship (largely focusing on Cold War inter-state analysis) cannot. The concept of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary is argued to be useful for how it helps us look beyond inter-state relations, to recover the relational co-creation of politics between the contestations over the meaning of Pakistan, and Cold War political-military encounters. It highlights the ways in which Pakistani anti-imperial movements sought to

contend with the Pakistan-US alliance, and its effects for international politics. In particular, connections between anti-imperial groups in Pakistan, and developments in the Middle East, forced Pakistani state managers to reconsider their position on Suez, provoking fierce backlash in society and across the international stage. Through detailing a developing arena of conflict and competition, I map the relationship between political encounters and their relationship to the contested imagining of Pakistani international politics. Thus charting transnational anti-imperialism alongside Cold War interstate relations offers a useful avenue for reinvigorating Cold War histories, in revealing the inter-societal multiplicity in international politics (Rosenberg: 2006).

Thus Pakistani anti-imperial worldmaking was observable in societal uproar at the government's ceding to the US position on the Suez crises following the attack on Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. I construct an analysis of Pakistani state and societal relations with global powers during the Baghdad Pact and Suez crises Cold War encounters. I trace the relationship between the Pakistani imaginary and its encounters where pro-imperial elites and anti-imperial opposition both became entangled in Cold War and decolonizing world politics. The argument reframes Pakistani encounters in the Middle East Cold War of the 1950s through using the analytic of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary and its overlapping projects, as a method to sketch a social architecture of international Cold War relations. It does so by countering the narrative of Pakistan as simply a Cold War client to the US. It reflects on the world-historic end of empire and the advent of post-colonial statehood through identifying the transnational effects of the power in Pakistan, through the standpoint of asking how Pakistani contested imaginings of international politics, came to co-constitute, Cold War developments.

In so doing, the chapter contributes to and expands the scholarship on the Cold War in the Middle East, histories of Pakistani internationalism and Left history, complimenting

scholarship on transnational security and socio-historical relations within the field of global historical sociology and Non-Eurocentric security studies (Go & Lawson: 2017, Barkawi & Laffey: 2006). It deploys an analysis combining diplomatic history, the history of transitional imperial politics, Cold War geopolitics in the Middle East, and draws from various Cold War archives. A global historical sociological analysis offers a different perspective in which to navigate geopolitical change: identifying the transnational effects of the encounter between Cold War struggles in the International, and societal struggles over what 'Pakistan' was to represent in world politics. The chapter fits in with the larger project, by extending the analyses of the effects of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary on both an evolving structure of power in Pakistan, and assessing how its conflictual, multiple and divergent factions were involved in co-constitutive relations with international forces during particular global events.

Within the discipline of South Asian history, the study of Pakistani history and Cold War international politics, there is insufficient consideration of transnational processes. Often regional Area studies analyses has straightjacketed the transboundary relations of societies. South Asia becomes the bracket for a self-enclosed regional system, echoing US Cold War theories of modernization. For example, Cold War historian McMahon (1994) writes largely about Pakistani, Indian, and American trilateral diplomatic relations as an internally coherent Subcontinent phenomenon. His central thesis is that Anglo-American strategy was ineffective unlike the strategies of Moscow and Beijing (McMahon: 1994:6). McMahon asks why did areas maintaining limited economic-military power become so intensely important to US strategy. Whilst his work undeniably advanced understandings of inter-state relations, the transboundary dynamics and constraining societal sociologies of these areas, had effects beyond their relation to Anglo-American power. Yet anti-imperial and pan-Islamic mobilizations against state foreign policy were indicative of wider contestations that can help reframe Pakistani Cold War relations outside of

diplomatic relations on the Subcontinent, to assessing their relations with anti-imperial social mobilizations in the Middle East, in relation to Pakistani connections to the politics of the region, Islam and the history of imperial and anti-imperial relations.

Recalibrating Pakistani international politics outside of a subcontinent focus offers avenues for new scholarship. Societies inhabiting the territories that make-up modern Pakistan have for centuries maintained deep connections to the Middle East and West Asia. The British Indian army was staffed with Muslim soldiers and officers, who oversaw a territory with the largest population of Muslims in the world, whose army were deployed across Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Indian Ocean (Hevia: 2012). The Western sponsored Arab monarchies that emerged in the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, “were initially created, governed and exploited by British imperialism in the form of the government of India. It was this government and its Indian subjects that founded, managed and manned the oil industries of these countries, including Iraq, till well after the end of British rule in 1947” (Devji: 2005:71).

On one hand, ordinary Pakistanis contributed to global change as part of global anti-imperial struggles worldwide, proving, “that the sun really did set on the British Empire” (Jalal: 1989:432). On the other, Pakistani strategic planners were active participants in the “oncoming American Century” (Jalal: 1989: 432). By the 1950s, empires were no longer an internationally accepted mode of politics, yet plural imaginings of post-colonial nations were actively repressed. We can look to interrogate this development through the lens of the Pakistanis. US expansion in the Middle East contributed to the beginning of informal imperial power, ushering in of a new era of relationships between the US and post-colonial military clients across the world (Robinson & Gallagher: 1953:5, Williams: 1988:3). The politics of anti-imperialism arrives at the global stage just as it begins to be co-opted by Southern states and their superpower allies. Post-colonial clashes within

societies like in Pakistan proved to be active theatres of Cold War politics (Toor: 2011: 3, Bajwa: 1996, Kux: 2001). The tensions within them activated global encounters that wrought cataclysmic and contradictory changes in world politics. How can we model change and continuity when imperial politics is constrained but survives, whilst anti-imperialism, having been established as a global norm, becomes engulfed in new hierarchies during the Cold War?

Pakistani leaders aligned with US Cold War strategists in the mid-1950s, ensnaring both sides into a series of connected responses to regional changes. This history is often characterized as a foreclosed trajectory as if Pakistan's Cold War enlistment was inevitable and conclusive (Rashid: 2013, Eamon: 2013, Fair: 2014). Thus, "while historians of American foreign relations have generally overlooked Pakistan's importance to the overall defence strategy of the United States, scholars of South Asian affairs have explored the alliance between Washington and Karachi" (McMahon: 1988: 813). Although "Cold War connections helped exacerbate local rivalries and conflicts" (Rowan & Littlefield: 2016: 68), this is still predominantly viewed through an interstate lens. Meanwhile struggles between socialists, Islamists and nationalist elites contested the US Pakistan alliance (Toor: 2005, Ali: 2015). Instead we can engage questions of Cold War history through global, imperial and post-colonial histories marked by co-constitutive relations.

Cold War relations were more plural than the literature on Pakistan's Cold War portrays. Reframing allows for a more attuned idea of how Pakistani ties to Muslim world and third world liberation movements. Documenting global contestation during the Baghdad Pact and the Suez Crises highlights fundamental moments of tension between Pakistani state managers and society, in their notions of global politics, and what 'Pakistan' was to represent in international politics.

The power of anti-imperial mass mobilizations in Pakistan and across the Global South, pressured US strategists to backtrack on the Baghdad Pact alliance and modify their responses to the Suez crises, adapting regional strategy, and benefiting from opposing the European power's intervention in Egypt. This moment was in a sense the high point of anti-colonial interventions in the Cold War after which anti-communism in the Global South intensified, as did the assault on the Left and anti-colonial nationalists, globally (Bevins: 2020). Nevertheless anti-imperialism as a political discourse was now a mode of international order, as well as a strategy to win support for political strategy (Mazower: 2009).

This chapter builds on historiography, which recognises the violence<sup>13</sup> that marked the Cold War on the periphery, particularly at the junctures of decolonisation and great power politics (Robinson: 1996, Grandin: 2004, Kolko: 1988). It finds its home in scholarship highlighting the interconnections between Cold War encounters, and social transformations in the Global South (Leake: 2013, Rand: 2017, Haines: 2017). Through this analysis I aim to contribute to reframing Cold war dynamics through unravelling postcolonial political-military histories and interconnected sociologies of South Asia and the Middle East (Leake: 2013, Jalal: 2014, Haines: 2017, Roy: 2017, Barkawi:2017, Hevia 2012). The structure is as follows. The chapter analyses Pakistani connections with global trajectories during the 1950s within the Middle East. Following on, it details Pakistani state and societal responses to the Baghdad Pact and the Suez crises, and interrogates how they engaged in global upheavals and changes to world order. Lastly I reflect on the dynamics that emerged from the expansion of the US Cold War networks, particularly in regard to US military, logistical and commercial expansion of the Gulf before offering

---

<sup>13</sup> Violence in the broader sense of epistemic violence viewed as part of the imperial organizing principle of global hierarchies through race that marked out decolonizing struggles against empire (Fanon: 1961:2).

concluding remarks. Before this I make some concrete arguments about the nature of Pakistani Cold War relations.

## **1 Pakistanis and Cold War conflicts**

Here I chart the key trajectories that developed from the earlier period in the 1950s when anti-imperial politics in Pakistan and beyond, countered the US Cold War in the Middle East. Contestations highlight a familiar contradiction in Pakistan international politics; the need for powerful patrons to offset insecurities with India, and on the other hand the desire to project solidarity with and social power on other Muslim countries. This ambiguity has been enlarged, “by a concern to anchor national claims in a supra-national agenda...in the case of Pakistan, the future of pan-Islamism. (Shaikh: 2015: 4). This strategic vision was ultimately very different from the anti-imperial politics of much of the populace. Citizens contested the national interest and foreign policy of the state. In turn this resistance fashioned an alternative view of the Cold War. And yet the state’s power over society could be seen in the sporadic and disunited movements for Pakistani anti-imperial movements, the lack of effective leadership, and the ability of the state to dismantle support for Pakistani progressive politics. Here I list the salient trajectories that arise from this schema.

It is only after the crises that US strategists were enabled to construct a more regionally attuned Cold War project in the Middle East. One could argue this was partly down to there being less of an impetus to do so previously, given the Truman administration’s willingness to follow the British lead in the Middle East and South Asia. However we see a marked change during the Eisenhower years when US strategy became far more focused

on the Middle East and Asia more generally, in the context of the Korean War (1950-1953) (Parker: 2006: 867).

Superpowers, regional states and anti-imperial mobilizations in Pakistan and in the Middle East form my schema. I have not attempted here to develop a comprehensive analysis of the Pakistani imaginary, which is the focus of the previous two chapters. Yet studying the forces at work emerging from the relationship between imaginary and encounter alerts us to the co-constitution of international hierarchies. Part of this is to recognize two connected dynamics. On one hand anti-imperial movements, overthrew empires and spearhead the emergence of post-colonial nation states, fuelled by the particular forms of agency engendered by anti-imperial leaders, thinkers, soldiers, activists and citizens. On the other it means appreciating that anti-imperial movements connecting Pakistan to the Middle East, galvanized a global backlash against European empires following Suez, which enabled American ascendancy in the region as US strategists were able to position themselves in opposition to Britain and France.

Second, Pakistani and regional anti-imperial forces, formed an irresistible tide as part of a wave of Muslim solidarity, forcing the US to recalibrate regional strategy. In this way, “foreign interventions in the region were beholden to potent political, ethnic, communal, religious and cultural forces” (McGarr: 2013:8). This form of Pakistani anti-imperialism, particularly on the Left, inspired and was inspired by, protests across the Muslim world after Suez, and after other anti-colonial events in Iran, Palestine, Algeria, Vietnam, where alternative worldmaking projects were being established. For establishment figures, Pakistani anti-imperial politics was now viewed as a clear threat to elite interests. It is also clear that the Western plan to deploy post-colonial militaries in the Muslim world as Cold War strategy clashed with these forms of anti-imperial contestation.

Although Pakistani post-colonial Cold War politics did not follow the trajectory of more violent encounters between Western powers and postcolonial polities, resistance to US designs in the Muslim world were actively challenged in Pakistan. Anti-imperial and Muslim solidarities politics represented a diversity of responses to the effects of the Pakistan's Cold War alliances. Pakistani foreign policy was decisively shaped towards a US Cold War sphere of influence during Ayub Khan's rule. But the popular position of Muslim solidarity and anti-imperialism exacerbated tensions, becoming a fundamental line of contention in Pakistani politics. Pakistan's emergent and exclusionary political nexus engaged in struggles with counter-hegemonic forces in the cities and the peripheries, where an evolving set of contestations about the nature of the state, Islam and the relationship of state to society played out (Ali: 2015, Toor: 2005).

Third, another effect of Pakistani early Cold War encounters was the strengthened position of the military. Its institutional make-up and norms were shaped by both British imperial and US Cold War encounter, in part down to the cultural Cold War in Pakistan. US relations strengthened the army and helped propel Ayub Khan to take over in 1958, a negotiation the Pakistani elite were willing to make despite the risk of losing public and regional Muslim support. Yet accepting the US line on global politics was counterproductive for Pakistan in terms of mounting resentment as well as permitting foreign leverage over foreign policy. However, it strengthened the military garrison and gave the state international prestige and legitimacy as well as substantial economic and military resources (Ahmed: 2013, Bajwa: 1996). This endowed US, British and Pakistani strategists with the opportunity to coordinate strategies of militarization and alliance building in the Middle East. (Bajwa: 1996, Jalal: 2014). By not taking Pakistan's US alliance as a forgone conclusion, we can see how the struggles over defining the national interest included multiple forces, some of whom wanted to imagine Pakistan in line with anti-imperial forces across the world. Understanding how these forces tried to shape the

new state becomes very important then, to understanding the effect of the Pakistani Cold War encounters.

Fourth, whilst the Baghdad Pact and Suez represent contrasting political events in terms of the Cold War and decolonizing processes, the tide of anti-colonialism and its effect on world politics was undeniable, as epitomised by the world historic 1955 Bandung conference. Anti-colonial nationalism at its zenith in the mid-1950s, evidenced from the global solidarity shown to Egypt and other societies resisting imperial violence. Alongside Suez, and 1957 Ghanaian Independence and the Afro-Asian Conference, also known as the Bandung Conference of 1955<sup>14</sup>, galvanized, “a stirring consciousness of changes in inter-and international relations” (Parker: 2006: 888). Indeed, the “meeting marked the first time that the decolonizing world had come together to attempt to find a shared voice, one capable of transcending race, religion and the Cold War dichotomy” (Parker: 2006:870). In many ways Suez, just months after Bandung, epitomises the end of formal European forms of imperial power, which after 1956 were untenable. Suez represents a rupture with the old forms of imperialism, and an opportunity to recalibrate Cold War periodization through punctuating it with the struggles of the Global South (Go: 2012:153). Crucially both Superpower architects and postcolonial elites realised the historic opportunity afforded by the end of European empire, which largely prevented further revolutionary transformations following the advent of postcolonial statehood.

Fifth, after Suez, anti-imperialism became a norm used by both superpowers and regional states to expand power and legitimacy. One of the effects of anti-imperial politics becoming accepted into the international order as a norm of self-determination, was that it allowed the superpowers to begin expanding patronage to both postcolonial regimes

---

<sup>14</sup> Pakistani officials were present and helped organize at Bandung whilst also becoming members of the Baghdad Pact. Numerous states were both attendees to the Bandung conference whilst also being aligned to either superpower (Parker: 2006: 870)

and social forces in the Middle East, under the meta-narrative of the Cold War. Thus, “for decades after that Islamists and their ideology of Islamism was used as a tool by the United States to achieve its hegemonic objectives” (Gardezi: 2011:1). Despite the historic moments of the 1950s and 1960s when anti-colonial national movements were at their peak, the wheels were in motion for US global expansion. In this way, while taking global anti-imperial momentum seriously, it is important to also assess US Cold War strategy and regional expansion. US leaders including Eisenhower were happy to denounce European imperialism, whilst adopting new, regionally attuned strategy, within the Cold War discourse of containment. By later tracing the co-option of Pakistani nationalism in the Cold War, we can assess how Pakistan became the laboratory for late US strategy covert war in Afghanistan.

US power politics was rebranded in the Middle East following Suez so as to both discipline postcolonial regimes and curb leftist internationalist forces through the cultivation of reactionary forces in the region (Luthi: 2016: 202). Charting the limits of transnational anti-imperialism in Pakistan and beyond helps attend to these relationally forged dynamics. Thus the notion that, “Cold War discourse in the Muslim world was framed by the idea that Islam would be an effective bulwark against communism” (Toor: 2011:85), was first experimented with in Pakistan. Deploying Islamists, as a way to destroy the anti-imperial Left was a strategy of the Pakistani government, but also a method of global US led anti-communism.

Despite this strategy being adopted across the Muslim Cold War world, it is in Pakistan’s where these plans find their origin. It is here where the tensions over Pakistani state-society encounters during the Baghdad Pact and Suez, provoked the state’s growing unison with the Pakistani religious right following the social unrest of the late 1960s and early 1970s. But prior to this during a period in which the state was staffed less by Islamist

nationalists and more by secular and liberal, Anglicized military and bureaucratic officials, anti-communism became indoctrinated into Pakistani politics very much during the 1950s. In this way “Pakistan became a cornerstone of the Eisenhower Doctrine, as part of its notion of collective security in fighting Communism”, (Jalal: 1989: 432).

Through evaluating regional anti-imperial momentum, strategists in both countries could consider the level of response to political-military encounters in the region, the strength of affinities of solidarity between societies, and the changes in strategy needed to win over factions in society. The US could add the Pakistanis to their budding list of allies in Asia. Pakistani leaders, desperate for aid and massively in economic and strategic aid, were more than happy to oblige (Leake: 2017: 157). With the core analytics outlined, I now focus on Pakistani social contention over US alliance, by charting the relationship between these dynamics and the dynamics of struggle within the international politics of the Middle East during the 1950s.

## **2 Pakistani social conflict and Global Cold War dynamics in the Middle East**

The Cold War in the Middle East represented the meeting of important trajectories beyond superpower rivalry. They included the transition from British to American regional hegemony in the Levant, as well as a set of political and social changes underpinning the rise of anti-colonial nationalism. The western bloc was in desperate need of postcolonial militaries for containment of the USSR to work. Where Anglo-American divisions became apparent was over the direction and nature of Middle East

alliance building, where US strategy of regional expansion clashed with long standing British imperial interests. Hence an overlooked theme in Cold War history is the leverage postcolonial societies wielded during this transition (Leake & James: 2015, Westad: 2007). Contentions within societies like Pakistan were more dynamic than they have been given credit. It was not only foreign policy elites who leverage, indeed contradictions between the establishment and the anti-imperial position of the populace became, in itself, a battleground for Cold War struggle.

Whilst the US went to war in Korea in 1951 in the name of containing Communism, the British wanted to maintain interests in Iran, Iraq and Egypt, amidst a rise in anti-colonial nationalism. Both wanted Pakistani soldiers and bases for their campaigns (Jalal: 2014: 81). Both agreed on the potential of Pakistan to further strategic interests. The US viewed Pakistan as a garrison for Cold War politics. In contrast, Pakistan's strategic architects saw the Cold War alliance as a way to strengthen the military capabilities of the state against India. Indeed, "the military's rise to dominate as early as the 1950s can be understood only in their regional and global challenges of the Cold War" (Jalal: 2014: 60). All around the world, "from the Cuban Revolution and Missile Crisis to the West and rising violence in Vietnam to the east further indicated that far from détente, the Cold War was heating up" (Leake: 2017: 197). It is striking that in a relatively brief period, Pakistan had gone from periphery to a, "key anchor in the United States-sponsored global network for the containment of the Soviet Union." (McMahon:1988: 838). Pakistan was to become central to US containment strategy. How did this happen?

Pakistan's proximity to both the Persian Gulf and the Soviet Union meant it offered valuable assets for Anglo-American strategy. These included a reputable military, colonial bureaucracy, air bases, Indian Ocean ports and an Anglophone trained elite. Alongside the build-up of superpower alliances, imperial conflicts, rumbled on. We normally think

of empire and the Cold War as two distinct historical periods in time. But British Indian troops had been deployed to quell, “uprisings in China, Malaya, Burma and Iran” (Leake: 2017: 93). Whilst they were intimately aware of the fighting prowess of Northern Indian Muslims during the Raj, Cold War Western strategists knew less about the complex sociologies and histories of the people that inhabited the newly established country of Pakistan after 1947. When in 1955 Pakistan joined the US alliance, the process of defining the meaning of Pakistan as a new nation was very early in the making (Ansari: 2011:159). The state was dominated by a westernized elite, whose power derived from its political, military and economic ties to British and American interests (Alavi: 1971, Nazir: 1986). Pakistani strategists were searching for economic and military parity with India. By 1947, Pakistan had, “inherited only nine per cent of the total industrial establishment of British India” (Leake: 2017 225). National leaders craved closer ties to the West and looked to ensure capital and imperial relations. But during the 1950s other groups began to share the capacity to shape the political vision of Pakistan (Ahmed:2006, Toor:2005).

Anti-imperialism was a source of growing concern for the Pakistani establishment in the 1950s. The Pakistani Left was antithetical to the imperial, nationalist and class basis of the state project. The development of radical politics had a relation to socialist, postcolonial nationalist and decolonizing movements globally. However it also emerged from, “major socio-economic and ideational changes taking place within Pakistan’s society” (Akhtar: 2018: 3). The new Pakistani military-bureaucracy oligarchy (Alavi: 1972) sought to consolidate the remnants of the British Raj, and entrench western backing via joining US led Cold War alliances. Ghulam Muhammad, Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan were the chief architects of Pakistani foreign policy, steering the country into the 1954 US alliance (Kux, 2001:55). In due course, “structural weakness in the nascent Pakistani state, and looming external threats in India and Afghanistan, fostered a national security culture in

Pakistan, within which leaders distrusted their own constituents, and the armed services assumed a central role in the maintenance of national cohesion” (McGarr: 2013: 20).

Pakistani strategists argued they were indispensable to the US due to Pakistan’s strategic location at the crossroads of West, Central and South Asian Cold War theatres. However contra the view of Pakistan as a mere vessel of US interests, leftist social factions resisted the Pakistan-US alliance.

Whilst US support was slow at first, the Pakistani leadership were successful in lobbying for the beginnings of a formal military alliance by 1954. Pakistani strategists had successfully articulated themselves as crucial for American interests. US planners, busy with Cold War events in Europe, were initially happy to take Britain’s direction on South Asia. However 1949 changed the game. In 1949 Mao declared the beginning of the Chinese Communist Republic, the Korean peninsula became the site of global confrontation, the allies created NATO, and the Soviets exploded nuclear devices for the first time.

For postcolonial states like Pakistan, Cuba, Iran, Turkey and the Philippines with deep imperial legacies, neutrality remained a risky proposition. Pakistani state elites and aligned classes were enabled by the new leverage they could wield in the Cold War, as opportunities for military-economic development increased. (Jalal: 1989: 414). The Korean war had demonstrated that the US needed Asian backers given the, “limits to the sacrifices most Americans were willing to make in order to extend Americanism abroad” (Westad: 2005:26). Pakistani elites were willing to create a bulwark of defence against the USSR, in return for arms, money and a defence alliance. US planners grew impatient over British policies regarding Kashmir, as they looked to free up Pakistan’s for a possible supporting role in Korea (Jalal: 2014: 82). That the US inquired into Pakistani forces being sent to Korea, (but were refused on this occasion) is indicative of the endurance of

British imperial visions in US strategic planning for the Pakistani army's role in Cold War strategy.

By the early 1950s, the US was no longer willing to allow British to take the lead in South Asia and Middle East. US Secretary of state, Dulles, and US ambassador to Pakistan, Hildreth, were central, along with the triumvirate governing Pakistan, in the plan to develop Pakistan as a frontline state against Communism. Indeed, "the State Development had decided that Pakistan and the Middle East now constituted an area of direct importance to the United States" (Bajwa: 1996:35). How exactly Pakistan and other allied states bordering the USSR would stem a Soviet thrust into the Middle East, remained vague.

What I want to suggest is that the Pakistani state narrative was not the only imagining of Pakistan's Cold War role domestically. Foreign policy reached a position central to the Pakistani political imagination, as struggles of the anti-imperial left, solidarity with their Muslim brethren, and the tensions between Pakistani elites and society endured. Pakistan's nationalism, derived from a form of religious nationalism, which was a challenge to the dominant forms of secular modernizing regimes in the Middle East during the 1950s when, pan-Arabism and Kemalist forms of statecraft were dominant (Sayyid: 2017). Within regional public opinion, "the twin grievances of imperialism and Zionism acquired new force in Arab politics" (Yaqub:2004: 38), which Western planners feared would empower Soviet expansion. Alongside the Soviets, the spectre of anti-colonial nationalists like Mossadeq in Iran and Nasser in Egypt was viewed as a threat to Western interests and the liberal international order.

In Pakistan, protests in Lahore and Karachi over the Indian military build-up in Kashmir were useful for national elites, enabling them to project themselves as the defenders of the nation. This contrasted with anti-imperial protests denouncing Pakistan's role in Western

imperialism. Two incidents in 1951 signalled heated contention over foreign policy. First, as I have argued in the previous chapter, the 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy' a failed coup of anti-British military officers and Communist Party members allowed state elites to crush the anti-British military faction and the Pakistani Communist Party. It was indicative of the consolidation of a conservative, US friendly power elite signalling their seriousness in supporting global anti-communism (Jaffrelot: 2004:240).

Second, after repeated attempts at soliciting US assistance against India in Kashmir, the then President Liaquat Ali Khan began exploring the notion of a Soviet alliance and also the possibility of Pakistan-Iran-Egypt alliance to create a foreign policy based on Muslim solidarities rather than imperial alliance (Jalal: 2014: 84). Pakistan's forays into a Muslim bloc were earlier refuted in the Arab world, leading to the intensification of relations between Pakistan and the US. What US strategists did not consider was the Soviets offering a better deal to Pakistan and the risk of Pakistan entering the Communist sphere of influence to access aid following Partition. Khan was assassinated soon after in October 1951, rumour had it by the intelligence agencies. What would Pakistani international politics have looked like if Khan had survived, and aligned himself with the anti-colonial nationalists like Nasser and Mossadeq? Pakistan's induction to US Cold War alliance was far from being a predictable result of Anglo-to-American patronage.

Khan's assassination reflects a wider trend in an increasingly cohesive global anti-communist strategy to not only limit Soviet expansion, but crush anti-imperial politics (Jabeen & Mazhar: 2011:114). Whilst 1953 saw the CIA help overthrow Mossadeq after he nationalized the Anglo-American oil company, in countries like Pakistan the US already had a willing political-military-bureaucratic elite who could suppress resistance to US expansion. Yet whilst Pakistani protests over Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination were muted (given immense repression and state obfuscation of the legal process), Pakistani

public protests in favour of Mossadeq and Nasser, and anger at US interventions in Congo and Vietnam, could not be stemmed (Toor: 2011:97).

Hence Pakistan's shifting security relations emerged during the transfer over to the US alliance. Pakistani elites preferred to solidify the US alliance over the British offer to help form a Commonwealth security organization (Haines:185: 2015). Pakistani elites still resented British handling of partition, especially in Kashmir, paving the way for US patronage (Jalal: 2014:79). In return Pakistani elites believed the US alliance would benefit them by building their capacity to influence Middle East developments and their defence capability against India.

Despite the 1954 'mutual defence agreement' with the US, Pakistani insecurities were accelerated at home with unrest in East Pakistan, no Kashmir resolution, heightened conflict on the Afghan border, and an ailing economy. In fact, the 1954 US defence agreement whilst strengthening the political-military elite, stirred up tensions with India, Afghanistan and the USSR, as well as straining relations with Arab states (Leake: 2013:784). Yet Pakistani elites pushed the US to decisions they would normally have made slower (Bajwa: 1996:233). This included dispatching \$25 million in military resources and beginning close military coordination between both militaries (Ashton: 1993: 126-7). US relations strengthened the army, helping to propel Ayub Khan's 1958 military coup but Pakistani state elites risked losing public and global Muslim support. Western security pacts were counterproductive for Pakistani state-society relations, and reinforced the international notion of the Pakistanis as the frontline against the Soviets, belying the true complexity within Pakistan over the country's Cold War allegiances.

### 3 The 1955 Baghdad Pact

Pakistani involvement in the Cold War was formalised in 1955 when state elites joined the Baghdad Pact. US politicians like Dulles had argued, “that Pakistan was in the position to advocate western policies and to moderate extreme nationalistic and anti- western feelings generally” (Jabeen & Mazhar: 2011 114). Whilst US strategy during the Baghdad Pact negotiations has been reviewed in scholarship as part of the global containment strategy, British strategic interests in the Pact have been argued to develop to retain imperial assets in the Middle East (Jasse: 1991: 141). British and US strategists agreed that Pakistani troops could overcome the issue of the lack of Western armies available in Asia (McMahon: 1988: 823). But they disagreed over the future of world order, making for an even more fractured terrain of transnational politics.

Originally the ‘Northern Tier’, the Baghdad Pact, was an Anglo-American sponsored agreement to develop a northern defence alliance against the Soviet Union, through aligning Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Britain. Of the different scholarly perspectives over the Baghdad Pact, Meyer argues British strategic calculations estranged the US through a last ditched attempt to maintain imperial power (Meyer: 1980:101). Another interpretation points to the pact as representing Anglo-American collaboration at its zenith (Stivers: 1987:200). Yet another view claims the defence alliance was a political strategy to strengthen US regional presence. Here the pact represented US rivalry, then dominance over British strategic interests in the Middle East (Jalal: 1989:433). Haines claims, “the United State-Pakistan military alliance in 1954 marked American ascendant in the West’s relationship with South Asia” (Haines in Leake & James: 2015: 196). US-Pakistani Cold War planning now enabled US use of Pakistani bases and listening stations, crucial to US intelligence gathering along the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands. Although Eisenhower was willing to cooperate closely with the British when countering

the Soviets, there was a reluctance to build on British 'assets' in the region through formal imperial intervention. This sentiment explained the US's decision to abandon the policy of the large Canal Zone Base which Britain maintained in Egypt. Instead US planners would focus on promoting an alliance with the countries bordering the Soviet Union, to protect Western assets in the Middle East (Ashton: 1993: 125).

In this context, Pakistan's "strategic stock soared" (McMahon: 1988: 827). By 1955, Pakistani elites had both the US alliance and the regional alliance that they had hoped would give them security deterrents, allies and prestige. Pakistani state managers had cautiously experimented with a more diverse foreign policy in the early years after independence including overtures to the Arab world and the wider Global South. However neither was as significant as membership of the Pact, not least because of the perceptions of Pakistan it created in the region. One particular outcome for Pakistani elites was that the alliance enabled them to act as interlocutors between the US and Muslim elites in the Middle East. In their direct relations with the US they did however bargain astutely into winning concessions, demonstrating how post-colonial clients could negotiate their rise to prominence. Pakistani state elites had signed up to the western anti-communist alliance, and had committed to tackling communism and anti-imperialism at home. Globally 1955 was a watershed for other reasons. Khrushchev embraced Third Worldism while non-aligned countries united under Nasser, Nehru, Tito and Sukarno (Westad: 2005:100). In Asia Muslim allies were an attractive prospect for power consolidation and resource extraction for the US, who sought to present themselves as distinct from the European powers (Westad: 2007: 26).

The Baghdad Pact alliance had little military impact following the lack of direct Soviet threat to the region and because of the lack of a direct coordination of strategy. Instead regional issues constrained the alliance's workings. Pakistani elites were in no position to

honour regional commitments given the state of relations with India and the country's finances. Moreover anti-imperial sentiment in Pakistan further constrained elite desires to broaden Cold War intervention. Pakistani society remained largely absent from the conversation, with surges of sporadic yet unorganized anti-imperial and pro-third Worldist and Pro-Muslim mobilizations. Anti-imperial resistance to the Baghdad Pact and the Pakistani state was at this stage limited. Leftist factions so important to the early Pakistani imaginary yet neglected in Pakistani historiography, were themselves weak, nascent and unable to transform Pakistan into an anti-imperial force (Ahmed: 2006). Resistance was dispersed and lacked organization. Postcolonial optimism gave way to the enduring realities of internal and external hierarchies, where the creative imaginings of power eventually upended the creative power of imaginings (Jalal, 1995: 87). The Baghdad Pact demonstrates how despite how Pakistani elites became constrained by local and regional developments; they were seen as valuable assets to strategists in Whitehall and the Pentagon.

British strategists were at first reluctant to engage in the Baghdad Pact plan, fearing it would upset India, undermine the Commonwealth, complicate its oil interests in Iraq and also its plans for the Suez Canal. But they began to see the alliance an opportunity for British re-involvement in the region, following their securing of the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement in 1955, which allowed its continual influence in Iraq (Ashton: 1993: 132). The reversal in enthusiasm within the Western block for the Baghdad Pact, formerly the 'Northern Tier', has been claimed by Ashton to be the defining feature of the plan's emergence and eventual lack of military effectiveness (Ashton: 1993:126). It is logical that eventual acceptance of the Pact signalled British leaders' acceptance that their regional decline could only be mitigated by taking the US lead. The integration of both regions as part of one US strategic theatre, and tacit British acknowledgment of US expansion, became a growing reality during the 1950s (Jalal: 1989: 411).

Awareness grew in US decision-making circles that British strategy was out-dated and had contributed to the upswing of anti-imperial tensions in Egypt and Iran. For US planners this was a potential moment for Soviet expansion (Ashton: 1993:131). But fears of Soviet invasion did not match up to reality, and were superseded with the ambition for US consolidation in the region, to supplant Britain as the region's chief patron. As a result while Dulles pushed for Pakistan to join the alliance, he also sought to find settlements for the Arab-Israeli conflict and smoothen ties with Nasser. Pakistani involvement was important as a component in the US Cold War defence of the Middle East plan in part because it was viewed as a welcome Muslim ally, and in part because the US sought to evade the politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict into its planning for a southern rim of anti-communist frontline states. US apprehension was also tied to popular opposition in Pakistan and other Baghdad Pact states.

Developments in Muslim societies, namely Pakistan and Egypt, Iraq and Iran, were determining new trajectories in the development of the Cold War in the Middle East. The lines of public solidarity across societies, and the reactive politics of international diplomacy at this moment, reveal a concentration of relations that had a direct bearing on Cold War trajectories. Pakistan was key to US Strategy for Middle East expansion, yet simultaneously, Pakistani public outlook, "generally favoured non-alignment" (Jalal: 1989: 426). In Pakistan, the agreement to join the alliance was widely disputed, with growing calls for a Non-Aligned, third world foreign policy focused on strong relations with Muslim states. Instead the alliance meant Pakistan had stronger relations with Non-Arab regional states, as well as states such as Britain which had conquered Muslim territories. This was counter-intuitive for those Pakistani Cold War activists who wanted an altogether different Pakistani international identity.

The Baghdad Pact was more of a political than military tool, allowing the US to expand influence in the region in the absence of large-scale Soviet presence. Its utility to member states was minimal, as seen by the reluctance of the US to join its own regional alliance. In part this was due to the desire to not upset US regional allies, but it is also a result of the downturn in British support in the region following Suez. Thus Anglo-American imperial transition in the Middle East, rather than superpower struggle, conditioned the nature of global power politics in the region. US geopolitical expansion would be ensured through negotiations with postcolonial state managers. Developments in the region were unfolding in ways that neither superpower could afford to ignore. Intra Arab regional rivalry, Arab-Israeli tensions as well as the tide of anti-imperial revolts, prevented the Baghdad Pact as a military tool for anti-Communist strategy. But as a political policy for US expansion, the alliance assisted the creation of US regional networks and facilitated the distribution of security networks in ways, which would have a special significance for the global Cold War politics of the Afghan-Soviet war. Here I have clarified the field between interstate Cold War politics, developments in the Middle East, and the role of anti-imperialism in Pakistan and the wider region. I will now examine conflicting Pakistani reactions over the Suez crises and their impact, before assessing the relationship between the early Pakistani Cold War encounters and anti-imperial mobilizations in the context of US military and logistical networks in the Middle East in the 1950s.

#### **4 Clashing Pakistani responses to the 1956 Suez Crises**

The Suez canal represented a vital logistical node for global capital, as the route connecting Europe and Asia (Mohan:1960: 185). The canal connected the Persian Gulf to Europe; hence the flow of trade and oil was of paramount importance to Cold War strategists from Pakistan to the US. Nasser's nationalization of the canal had garnered

wide scale support including in Pakistan and across the global south as a direct challenge to the old imperial order (Hashmi: 2011:529). However in 1956, British, France and Israel coordinated efforts to seize the canal. This was soon reversed following global outrage.

Worldwide condemnation at the intervention came from Muslim and Global South publics but also from US leaders who were furious at being kept in the dark. In response to the invasion, Pakistani English newspaper *Dawn* published an editorial which argued Britain and France had, “suddenly turned the clock hundreds of years, unwritten much of what has since been written in the book of human civilization...with the gun and the bomb, killing and conquering the weak like cowards” (quoted in Bishku: 1992: 40). This led to heated parliamentary debates in 1957. Debates in parliament demonstrated that the views of the government were not shared in the national assembly, where the Suez crisis was viewed as connected to a wider problem of US influence over Pakistani foreign policy, following the Baghdad Pact. The gulf between popular support for Nasser and the government’s deeply unpopular Western position was indicative of the ideological schisms in Pakistani society.

Pakistani political elites’ alienated their public and received a mixed response in the Middle East. Nasser saw it as treacherous that Pakistani Prime Minister Choudhury, who had pledged support for Egyptian sovereignty, then went on to co-sponsor the US backed bill for international deliberation over the Canal (Bishku: 1992:40). Popular resistance came from socio-economic inertia and widespread instability combined with nationwide outrage at the government’s Pro-Western stance (Bajwa: 1996, Bishku: 1992). The government condemned European and Israeli aggression, without affirming outright solidarity with Egypt or condemning the instigating powers (Hashmi: 2011, McMahon: 1988). Hence the importance of Muslim and Pakistani publics in the region and their

anger at Suez threatened US interests, leading to US planner's own hesitation, before outright condemnation of their allies during the crisis.

The Pakistani government faced resistance following an embarrassing U-turn. In the following weeks, the largest protests since independence demonstrated the pro-Muslim solidarity and anti-Imperial views of Pakistani society (Jalal: 2014:92). Consequently the state responded by repressive measures banning public meetings, and unleashing repression of dissidents (Bajwa: 1996: 220). Pakistan's western alignment exacerbated geopolitical and local tensions, whilst strengthening the repressive apparatus of the state and the expense of other political structures. The crises, "served as a watershed moment in U.S. relations with the Middle East and its decolonizing Western allies. After the canal incident, U.S. officials proved more willing to intervene in Third World nations (Leake: 2017:191). The myth of on-going European colonial power had been shattered. Suez was the ultimate test of Pakistani postcolonial elites. They now faced new pressures as at home and in the region.

Instead of building relations with Muslim states and global with anti-colonial nationalists, the government opted to side with US plans on the Suez crises, largely because the strategy to adopt patrons to defend against India had acquired the power of common sense in Pakistani strategic culture. This meant that the Pakistani delegation at the Suez conferences took the line of supporting a globally ratified association control over the canal, rather than the popular opinion to support Nasser's nationalisation. Thus the highly contentious nature of Pakistani involvement in the Baghdad Pact, and its policy regarding Suez, threatened the fragile power of the government, even as it committed itself to a pro-US alliance. The official Pakistani position during Suez was to abhor the use of force against Egypt. But the leadership maintained a guarded stance in the face of wide scale public pressure to take a harder position against the European powers in support of Egypt.

How did the politics of the Baghdad Pact play out during the Suez crisis? For Pakistani foreign policy elites, 1954-56 represented a shift from supporting Muslim causes within the narrative of Islamic universalism, to supporting Western Cold War positions. Political-military commitments with the US tied Pakistani interests to Western influence in the region (Mohan: 1960:185). Mohan argues "in Pakistan the intervention was described as "pure and naked aggression" and denounced as a "reversion to colonialism" (Mohan: 1960: 189). Public opinion against imperialism led to massive protests in favour of Nasser, and for cutting ties with the West. It is striking then, that the Pakistani leadership resorted to condemning the intervention, before working to strengthen the US led Baghdad Pact position following the global backlash to Suez.

The Pakistani political leadership were arguing in policy and via the media that Nasser's rejection of Pakistani offers of negotiation stemmed from his close ties with India. Public discourse was being shaped to counter anti-imperial politics that informed Pakistani nationalism, through an anti-Indian politics (Hashmi: 2011:525-6). Of all the Baghdad Pact members, Pakistan was the foremost advocate of the alliance. However, it became an example of, Pakistani elites' "history of making the wrong moves at the wrong time in their relations with the Arabs" (Hashmi: 2011:537). After all, Arab nationalism was at its zenith, in contrast to the Pan-Islamic politics that had informed Pakistani nationalism, but that was on the decline as a global political force following decolonization. Pakistani elite's regional claims as a leaders in the Muslim world, clashed with Egyptian claims. The ideas underpinning Pakistani state politics in this period were in flux and open for struggle and interpretation. Pakistani leaders were simultaneously disciplining anti-imperialism at home, whilst providing international support for the retention of the imperial politics through the Baghdad Pact. This included the rejection of other sponsored alliances, such

as the Non-Aligned Movement, which Pakistan avoided in part because of Nehru's key role in the alliance (Mohan: 1960:191).

The struggles between state and society, and the gap between national elite's Cold War alliances, and the transnationalism of pro-Muslim solidarity, was not merely an effect of Cold War military alliance. Neither was popular sentiment of a pro-Islamic variety always in tandem with anti-imperial politics. These protests challenged the state narrative, articulating solidarity with protests in Egypt and Iran following the coup in 1953, forming the contours of new lines of politicization and social mobilization. It is thus important to appreciate both the limits of the effect of anti-imperial mobilizations in changing the character of the Pakistani state, whilst acknowledging that, as part of a wider regional and global effect, Pakistanis contributed to the moment of decolonization that shook imperial strategy following the Suez crisis.

Henceforth the 1956 Suez Canal crisis instigated a series of problems for Baghdad Pact member states, which faced both domestic and regional pressures against the alliance. Member state elites were restrained by having to justify the crackdown on anti-imperial leftists and nationalists at home (in the case of Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq), whilst appearing to have sympathy for their foe's ideological equivalents abroad. In turn this created a greater incentive to postcolonial elites in societies like Pakistan to repress anti-imperial mobilizations. Anti-imperial, pro-Nasser politics were seen as active threats to the Pakistani state. In response, Pakistani state and media reactions galvanized anti-Egyptian protests from their support base, and used it as evidence of pro-alliance politics in society.

Meanwhile the British still believed the Suez crises could still be internationally engineered for maximum extractive value and for the continuation of British interests. In

contrast, American strategists, were by 1956, aware that British regional histories, specifically a history of British occupation in Egypt, and bitter legacy in the Levant, were the cause of much of the tension in the Arab world, preventing US strategic objectives (Ashton: 1993:124). That the US declined to join the Baghdad Pact indicated it was no longer viewed as the principal locomotive for US regional strategy, and with it, being tied to an Anglo-American joint foreign policy in the Middle East. On one hand Suez was a watershed moment for anti-colonial politics and the advent of postcolonial statehood. Both superpowers accepted the moment of decolonization as a standard of international diplomacy, even as they intervened in conflicts in the Global South. Suez conveys the futility of the Baghdad Pact as an actual defence alliance, and informs us of its use as temporary instrument of US regional expansion. Alliance member leaders were paralyzed to respond to the crises for fear of angering both US Cold War leaders and the tide of anti-colonialism in their societies. In Pakistani foreign policy elites risked losing global Muslim support after taking the US line during Suez. One can see how counterproductive Western security pacts were for state-society relations, but also how they reinforced the transnational logics of a martial, patronage politics in Pakistan and beyond.

On the other hand, the US in particular was emboldened following the crises. After Suez, the Eisenhower administration was able to intensify political-military operations across the region and wider Global South, including strategies to intervene in Lebanon, launch cover war in Sukarno's Indonesia, and coordinate covert plans to assassinate Lumumba in Congo (Leake: 2017:191, Parker: 2006). This was the beginning of the Eisenhower Doctrine that would soon supersede the Baghdad Pact as the primary method by which the US would assist clients in return for access to territory, resources and leverage and the possibility of the deployment of US ground troops in the region, a fundamental shift from the Baghdad Pact.

The international hierarchies of the Cold War Middle East had fundamentally altered, in part due to American regional power but also due to the advent of postcolonial nation-states amid global anti-colonial momentum. And yet US strategy in the region was decisively emboldened. Old imperial forms were replaced in the 1950s and 1960s across the Global South as both superpowers wrestled for the loyalties of postcolonial polities. Subsequently, “empires were increasingly seen as illegitimate, nation-states were becoming the ideal, and anti-colonial nationalism could now become a tool for mobilization” (Go: 2011:149).

The Suez crisis reveals how the British and French had the chance to occupy Egypt, they had an opportunity to reverse decades of decline and the reintroduction of the protectorate system. In the end however they were forced into an embarrassing retreat amid global anger. Suez had facilitated the fundamental rejection of imperial forms of intervention worldwide. It also demonstrated the weakness of the Arab states and the opportunity for Soviet aligned forces across South Asia and the Middle East, which bolstered the narrative of the need for a defence alliance. The problem for Ayub Khan was how to gain US membership of the Baghdad Pact alliance, and thus restore the prestige of the alliance.

Thus the US, although initially enthusiastic about the alliance, increasingly sought to distance itself from British strategy, during developments in the region-taking place in ways that increasingly made the alliance seem out-dated (Bishku: 1992: 30). This was in part due to not wanting to upset America’s allies in Israel and amongst the Gulf monarchies, but this hesitation also reflects how early US Cold War policy in West Asia (very much influenced by British strategic thought) was being reevaluated, particularly in response to the Suez crisis. Thus Suez signals, a significant moment of change, not just

because of the transition from Anglo to American regional power in the Middle East, but also due to the global disavowal of imperial forms of conquest.

## **5 Suez, cracks in the Baghdad Pact and US geopolitical and logistical networks**

Consequently the Suez Crises reveals the intersections between superpower struggle, European colonialism and regional geopolitics. The ascendancy of US forms of empire required new forms of convergence and alliance, as well as distancing from European colonial violence, at least in the Middle East, if not in South East Asia. Suez offered a moment for the US to sponsor Wilsonian ideas of sovereignty whilst also auditioning for the role of chosen modernizer for newly decolonized states (Nunan: 2015). A 1956 Chinese state reported on their Pakistani neighbours, detailing the Suez crises and the uproar in Pakistan over the Baghdad Pact Cold War alliance. Thus, “as member nations of the Baghdad Pact—touted as defensive in nature—Britain and France’s aggression against Egypt sparked intense opposition among the Asian member nations of the pact, especially the people of Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. Hence, “The Four Power Tehran meeting [of the Baghdad Pact Council] was held at the suggestion of Pakistan and Iran in order to convey that the pact is non-aggressive and that the Asian member countries have nothing to do with Britain’s aggression, and to give an explanation to the people so the pact does not collapse and they can continue to access American aid”<sup>15</sup>.

By the late 1950s, Pakistani state managers were dependent on US financial and military aid. Suez had provoked global outrage and demonstrated imperialism was far from over

---

<sup>15</sup> Chinese report on the impact of the Suez Canal Crisis on the Baghdad Pact and Pakistani foreign policy. September 1956. Cold War International History Project. Woodrow Wilson Archives.

during the onset of a new Cold War world order. Various Pakistani forces including, “Republican Party leftists, and various circles, expressed intense anger over the stance Mirza, Suhrawardy, and [Foreign Minister Feroz Khan] Noon ... criticized them of defending a pact of aggression, working for British and French interests, and lavishing praise on the United States, and demanded withdrawal from the British Commonwealth and the Baghdad Pact<sup>16</sup>”. Anti-colonial politics had seeped into Pakistan’s liberal constitutional politics. Moreover, we encounter in the report how, “Pakistan’s president and prime minister still reject the Indonesian prime minister’s advice to accept the five principles for withdrawing from the military pact and to actively support Egypt, and they are also preparing to pay visits, on the 17th, to Turkey, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia; the goals remain to persuade Iraq not to break with Britain, to persuade Saudi Arabia to join the Baghdad Pact, to isolate Egypt, to strengthen Pakistani-Turkish and Turkish-Iraqi relations, and to use Egypt’s plight to fight for leadership authority over Muslim nations.<sup>17</sup>” Another Chinese cable goes further. It claims, “the Pakistani ruling circle is doing things this way in order to mitigate the Pakistani people’s dissatisfaction with diplomatic policies, duping the people with “Muslim” nations as a pretence. On the other hand, they plan through the abovementioned activities to put Baghdad Pact activities on display and solve their economic problems by gaining a relatively large amount of American aid”<sup>18</sup>.

At the high point of decolonization, the Cold War brought about two strategic camps, in the Middle East. On one side Nasser and the non-aligned anti-colonial nationalists, and on the other the Baghdad Pact states along the Northern tier, pro-Western anti-Communists. Whilst the former was firmly opposed to European colonialism and its

---

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Cable from Chinese Embassy in Pakistan: the circumstances of Pakistan. September 1956. Cold War International History Project.

surrogates, the latter camp comprised of the imperial client regimes. The Chinese report reveals how anti-British sentiment had skyrocketed in Pakistan, and how the Americans were viewed as a welcome alternative to the British.

Central to the anger in Washington at the British, French and Israeli plot at Suez, was how intervention threatened US interests in securing strong relations with clients.

Consider here the anti-communist and interventionist politics of the US at home and abroad. US claims to support national liberation struggles emerged in the last throws of McCarthyism at home, whilst abroad the CIA supported the Guatemalan coup in 1954. Five years later a Soviet report for the Politburo, centred upon the analysis of US democracy promotion and cultural diplomacy as a form of propaganda. The report goes on to give a substantial account of the institutional strength, wealth and military presence of "American imperialism in the Orient". Consequently, the Soviets read, "the USA is preparing eight million copies of cheap booklets for publication for 24 countries of the Orient devoted mainly to extolling "the American way of life". The report locates American universities, as well as the role of radio broadcasting and film, in promoting the US abroad<sup>19</sup>.

The era of Bandung and Suez were watershed moments in the politics of the Cold War but also of the geopolitics of decolonization. Suez was a wake up call for the Americans, particularly; "in the way that its disposition had been foretold in the lessons the administration chose to learn after Bandung the year before. To learn, that is, but not fully to apply-until Nasser forced the issue" (Parker: 2006: 887). The Eisenhower administration had been left unaware at the planned seizure. Their allies' actions risked the painstaking work in building a massive logistical architecture around the extraction

---

<sup>19</sup> Soviet Report: "The ideological aggression of American Imperialism in the Orient". Cold War International History project. Woodrow Wilson Centre Archive.

and moving of oil. When British Petroleum and Shell drafted report on the Suez Canal's capacity prior to the crisis, a particular focus was given to whether the Canal could withstand the massive surge in oil production, much of it being run by Anglo-American companies. But the attempted seizure, and the response of Syria and Lebanon to ban French and British from docking their ships at their ports, meant oil containing ships had to go round South Africa and the Cape of Good Hope, severely disrupting the flow of oil around the global economy sending shockwaves around the world, including in Pakistan, whose economy was beholden to Western aid flowing via Suez (Khalili: 2020:243-6). British and French standing in the world had plummeted, as the old empires were made to look weak and deeply unpopular. Other events unfolded which would spur American expansion. Yemen expelled the British in Aden, and gave the USSR permission to dock their naval vessels at their ports. Additionally, despite US superiority in the Gulf, the al-Anad air base outside Aden had been secured by the Soviets, which was at that time the largest of its kind anywhere in the Arabian Peninsula (Ho: 2004: 235). These developments were viewed in Washington as an existential threat to US power in the Gulf and the wider Indian Ocean region. In response to these global events, the Americans now sought to ramp up the Cold War in the Middle East.

In the aftermath to Suez, the US recommitted itself to the region following the creation of new security architecture. Washington would develop the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, as a Cold War high command in the Middle East<sup>20</sup>. Pakistan's leaders under Ayub Khan were rewarded with the Eisenhower Doctrine, in January 1957, which declared Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran to be defended in the instance of Communist invasion<sup>21</sup>. Furthermore, post-war oil production had been supplemented by a transnational infrastructure project that connected the oil wells in Saudi Arabia to the Indian Ocean.

---

<sup>20</sup> Henrik Bliddel. Reforming military command arrangements: the case of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War college 2011. P.1

<sup>21</sup> Timeline of the Cold War. Cold War International History Project. Woodrow Wilson Centre Archives.

US Central Command now stretched between the Middle East and Central and West Asia, echoing the Muslim world connections binding the regions. US corps engineers embedded themselves from Riyadh to Helmand, whilst Aramco developed connections across the region, allowing for rail and road building as well as the contracts to establish routes binding “Dubai Ports world (as well as)...contracts to operate container terminals in Karachi” (Khalili: 2020:95). Thus, “this moment also marked the introduction of the US Army corps of engineers’ construction programmes in the Middle East...from Morocco to Libya, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and beyond, encompassed by highways, military bases, airfields and other strategic infrastructure projects, including both military and civilian telecommunications networks” (Khalili: 2020:127). A militarizing and modernizing client was a valuable ally for the Americans. Suez represented how whilst the US had propped the French in Vietnam, it would not blindly follow the old European colonial powers, as it set about forging a very different form of empire for the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Maintaining anti-communist allies therefore was not simply about espionage, manpower and military strategy, but also about extraction, innovation and transportation.

The Cold War was not simply being fought through clandestine operations or propaganda, but through contracts, ports, and infrastructure projects in which American modernization came to acquire hegemonic status within its expansive networks. Empire had changed and the old forms of conquest gave way to a combination of development utopias and covert war nightmares, the carrot and stick of neo-colonialism. Thus, “even at the height of the Cold War, incidents like the Suez crisis of 1956 demonstrated that it was the control of routes like the Suez Canal rather than countries like Egypt that had become crucial” (Devji: 2005:153). The entanglement of US influence in the Persian Gulf during the 1950s and 60s, the establishment of Western modernizing nation-states and the dominance of the West in the global economy, secured the founding of the post-war

system. Yet the era was also marked by the effect of anticolonial nationalism on world order politics. In the final section I construct some final arguments for thinking through Pakistani encounters during the Baghdad Pact and Suez crisis, and their legacies for world politics.

## **6 Pakistani Cold War encounters and the constraints on global anti-imperial politics**

This chapter has fleshed out the emergence of Pakistani statecraft and national interest formation as a result of elite consolidation of the narrative and machinery of the state, and the transition of Anglo Imperial to US Cold War dominance in changing geopolitical theatres. It has situated Pakistani interactions in Cold War, anti-imperial, regional and Anglo-American politics, before I discussed the practices and outcomes of Pakistani Cold War interaction. It is with this last point in mind that the final section turns.

Anti-imperialism was a key force in building counter-hegemonic solidarity in Pakistan, and in linking confrontation with the pro-Western stance of the state, to global North-South struggles worldwide (Ali: 2005). The development of the Pakistani Cold War imaginary during the 1950s can be understood as the ways in which Pakistanis have collectively imagined, and sought to reconfigure their social reality in relation to Cold War encounters. The concept of the Pakistani imaginary has been described through its global encounters, and has been argued to be valuable in comprehending how Pakistani Cold War encounters were locally conceived, appropriated or resisted. It can also give us tools from which to understand the variety of expressions of the moral community in Pakistani society, and how this impacted notions of what 'Pakistan' was to represent in world politics, and equally, how Pakistanis should react to developments in the global

Cold War. In an article for the *Pakistan Times*, writer Qalander Memon reflects that, “in this sense, Pakistan’s brown sahibs’ decision to join the Baghdad Pact in 1955, accept American tutelage and not follow a Third World path has cost us dearly” (Memon: 2014). This bore from the melancholic realization in the post-colonies that decolonization only went so far in new epochs of great power confrontation and transnational struggle. Pakistanis protested British actions in Suez, and they also protested US actions in Vietnam, Congo and Iran. These protests were part of simultaneous local and global concerns. By tracing the effects of Pakistani contributions to a wider groundswell of global anti-imperialism I have developed an alternative paradigm for capturing transactional relations. Colonized people and subordinate groups have, “experience or knowledge of other social systems, can conceive of the domination under which they live as anything other than completely inevitable. The historical fact is that they can and do” (Scott: 1985: 335). We can reconceptualise Cold War dynamics beyond and within inter-state politics, through Southern local and regional relations, and attune our theories, in the process.

This means on one hand appreciating the limited direct effects of Pakistani involvement in Suez crises, and maintaining that regarding the failure of tripartite invasion in Egypt, the role of the US was decisive. And yet on the other hand, I have constructed an argument that shows how changes in US policy regarding the Baghdad Pact and then Suez, were in part manifested in response to global anti-imperial mobilizations, of which Pakistanis played their part, albeit through an ‘agency-in effect’, one which “did not impute an essential identity, consciousness, or intentionality” (Go: 2016: 140) yet emerged as a form of global, “postcolonial relationism” which forced a world historic change in world order; the end of formal colonialism as a legitimate form of political action in world politics.

It is vital to understand the constraining of Cold War strategy by the complex sociologies and histories of interconnection between the societies of South Asia and the Middle East. But it is also important to recognize how US regional power was enabled, and its ascension over the British delivered, in the changeover of regional power, empowered by Pakistani political-military elites, and challenged by Pakistani socio-political forces on the Left. McMahon claims that, “given the imprecision in American strategic thinking, nations other than the Soviet Union could sometimes play a significant role in the growth of the American empire, a phenomenon that has not been sufficiently appreciated by historians of the Cold War” (McMahon: 1988: 815). But this is only half the story; a tacit acknowledgement of the role of non-US powers however is not enough to explain the multiple dynamics that emerged beyond the inter-state politics as South-South connectivity proliferated in the transnational terrains of decolonization. Several key dynamics continued after Suez. These include the ascent of American over Anglo regional power, regional patronage politics, Islamism as Cold War strategy and the development of Middle East and South Asia as US Cold War theatres. I shall expand on these trajectories in the final two substantive chapters of the thesis.

Identifying anti-imperial contentions within the Pakistani imaginary helps clarify the contingencies and continuities of South-South and North-South relations amid the regional Cold War. It helps us to historicize the global changes of the 1950s, and points to the opportunities for reframing international politics through the dialogical relationship between strong and weak. One can historicize these developments within a wider historical arc of imperial global power politics. Continuity is evident in the ways in which Anglo-American power, despite variations in strategy, maintain political and economic hierarchies that fuse with regional developments. US policy following Suez involved rejecting old imperial methods and pluralizing regional clients, a distinct change in policy

directly affected by regional anti-imperialism. Yet at the same time, empire is let in through the back door, albeit in distributed, privatized and rentier forms.

It is striking that the US arrives in the Middle East as a global hegemon after Suez just when anti-colonial resistance reaches its peak. Aligned powers like the Pakistani establishment could become increasingly involved in fulfilling their regional fantasies, if they aligned with US grand strategy (Bishku: 1992: 41). Pakistani elites began playing, “an unequivocally reactionary role-providing officers and men for the Sultan of Muscat’s army, helping the British in South Arabia and sending arms and men into royalist Yemen” (Halliday: 1971:1). US dominance in the Middle East as the sole Western imperial patron was affirmed after Suez, as leftist and anti-imperial forces were targeted across the region, under the narrative of the Communist threat. But the notion of the US’s ascent as a singular rise towards an American Century hides the fact that its rise to prominence in the Middle East was predicated on contingent developments. They include the collapse of European empire, the divides in postcolonial societies and regional geopolitics.

Tracing the co-constitution of international developments, rather than the history of inter-state politics, opens up Cold War moments to new inspection. The synergies of these encounters simultaneously brought Pakistani and Middle East developments together whilst bringing the contentions for the idea of Pakistan as a political geography, into contact with Cold War security strategies. Dialogic interaction propels struggles involving multiple powers and entangled relations between recently colonized and colonizer. It inspires the schematizing of arenas of conflict, where historic structural constraints are understood amidst radically changing global encounters. Recalibrating the under-researched role of post-colonial struggles in Pakistan during the Cold War helps us to appreciate the evolving rules of the game- in which bi-polar superpower conflict itself

became subject both to the effects of anti-imperial politics and regional inter-state politics. Both superpowers and their clients became entangled by the complexities of Cold War post-colonial societies undergoing both entry into the international system whilst still feeling the enduring effects of imperial modernity. Conflicting global dynamics stemming from the mid-1950s Middle East Cold War are prevalent in our contemporary world.

## **Chapter Five: When Complexity defeats strength: Afterlives of the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands in the Afghan-Soviet War**

*“My country has two Gods.  
One is Allah and the other is Martial Law”  
Ustad Daman*

*“How much do narratives of the end of the Cold War fit into a pre-packaged history of capitalism in knightly armour?”  
Michel-Rolph Trouillot*

### **Introduction**

Complex social histories of struggle overlap and overspill onto successive histories of conflict that hapless superpowers are unaware of when the tanks start rolling in. Glasses of champagne were handed out to Pentagon staff in Washington and at the CIA Headquarters in Langley in 1988, as America’s Cold War warriors celebrated the withdrawal of the Soviet Fourth Army from Afghanistan, following the largest and costliest Soviet conflict since the end of the Second World War (Coll: 2004:113). The Communist experiment in Afghanistan may not have been over, but it had lost superpower backing, and would soon lose international interest, in the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the USSR. In the US, self-congratulations were in order as academics lionized the American project (Fukuyama: 1992, Huntington: 1996). Speaking ten years after the Soviet withdrawal, Carter’s former national security Zbigniew Brzezinski, claimed the US had seized on the, “opportunity of giving to the U.S.S.R its Vietnam War.”<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski in *Le Nouvel Observateur* 15–21 Jan. 1998, p. 76.

Yet six thousand miles away, the bloody games in Afghanistan continued apace. The Mujahedeen plotted the final blow to the Communist government, now left with a rump state in Kabul, which finally fell in 1992<sup>23</sup>. The rebels, already prone to infighting, turned their guns on each other. Gorbachev and Reagan signed the Geneva Accords in 1988, before turning their attention to the ending of the Cold War. But in army citadels in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, refugee camps along the borderlands, logistical hubs in Peshawar, battered villages in the Khyber mountains, and in barracks straddling the Durand Line, war-making had become everyday politics, a profitable business, and a transnational operation of power. Thirty-three years later, the US withdrew in defeat in Afghanistan, ending a twenty-year exercise in development, privatization and intervention. A fundamental puzzle of world politics remains hidden. How did the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier and the societies across the borderlands of the Durand Line defeat three superpowers, and how did Pakistani social forces impact the trajectory of the war?

My central argument in this chapter is that there was a fractured transnational social and political terrain along the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier. This terrain absorbed the Soviet occupation, and helped defeat the Soviet Union whilst creating the conditions for the global Jihad and the War on Terror. Part of this fracturing is the historical legacy of empire in the form of the struggles over the Durand Line; part of it emanates from Afghan and Pakistani society, imaginaries and politics, and part of it emerges from the geopolitics of decolonization and the Cold War. The chapter's four major themes examine the imperial histories of the border, socio-political trajectories in Pakistan, the trans-regional developments especially in South West Asia, and the local, national and global politics of the Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989). It first demonstrates how Pakistani

---

<sup>23</sup> National Security Archive: Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last war. Afghanistan: The making of US policy 1973-1990. Steve Galster. October 9<sup>th</sup> 2001.

Islamization and militarization affected the course of the Afghan-Soviet War, in the context of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border struggles. It examines how the rise of Afghan irredentist claims on Pashtunistan incited a massive response from Pakistan, backed by the US, to support Afghan militants as far back as 1975. Second, it examines the struggles for Pakistan during the 1970s and 1980s in the context of revolutionary socialist politics across the borderlands in both Baluchistan and the NWFP. Growing Islamization of the military and the development of state sponsored Islamist warfare during the war in Bangladesh, intensified following US and Saudi Arabian backing, helping fuel the growth of the Mujahedeen (Devji: 2005). US intervention in the war secured its intended outcome in the short term, defeating the Soviets. Less well recognized is how the war itself was shaped by Pakistani military and intelligence actors, their connections to the Afghan rebels, and the Islamization and militarization of the state underway in Pakistan, which saw the military and the religious right embrace, together assaulting left and ethno-separatist forces in Pakistan and across the border (Akhter: 2018, Toor: 2011, Haqqani: 2005). Third, the chapter links Pakistani social transformations to the wider global events of 1979 before fourth, examining the confluence of these trajectories in fuelling the fractured social terrain of the Afghan-Soviet War.

In the longer arc of the thesis, this chapter hones in on the complexity defeating strength argument, in relation to the global politics of the border and the afterlives of empire. It compliments the following chapter, which examines how histories of decolonization and the Cold War are implicit in the Afghan-Soviet war, and compel us to rewrite our histories of world order. This argument advances the debate on the Afghan-Soviet War by incorporating a deeper understanding of the connected sociologies and histories of Pakistan and Afghanistan, integrating the border disputes and imperial history of the borderlands into the history of the war, and by expanding our political geographies to include theorizing the salient trajectories underway in the wider region. In doing so it

offers a new interpretive framework for thinking through the global politics of the war, in the context of the imperial afterlives of the border and from the perspective of the Pakistanis.

Imperial powers lose wars when complexity overwhelms strength (Kolko: 2009). British imperial, Soviet and US superpowers were ensnared in the local, national and regional politics of the Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre. (Roy: 1986, Dorronsoro: 2005). How global anti-communist forces defeat the Soviets, and how a national liberation movement transformed into a globalized jihad, is one of the most misunderstood processes in modern history (Devji: 2005:28). The answer lies in the histories of the border and the transboundary politics of the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier. The Afghan-Soviet war crystalized the meeting of on-going colonial and postcolonial processes in the geopolitics of the late Cold War. US intervention in the war secured its intended outcome in the short-term, defeating the Soviets. Yet US forces were similarly constrained, just like their British imperial and Soviet predecessors, by the social transformations along the borderlands and the wider Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre.

From the British to the Soviets and the Americans, past empires set up their descendants for even more fractured social terrains (Doyle:2014). The Durand Line sowed chaos for decades and created ever-more complex struggles involving changing Pakistani and Afghan structures of power, supercharged local struggles across the borderlands and entangled regional and global encounters (Haroon: 2007, Rubin: 1995). The borderlands along the Durand Line include communities who had fought for and against empires and the Pakistani and Afghan nation-states. The Pashtun dominated northern half in particular, “forever garrisoned on the borders of empires, [have] always been more

interesting to power as a problem rather than as an asset”<sup>24</sup>. In a sense, the ‘Great Game’ played out between the Victorians and the Tsars, imagined the frontier and the borderlands, as “at once and the same time, the centre of imperial strategic concerns and an afterthought in terms of its local complexity” (Marsden & Hopkins: 2011: 12). Across global borderlands, imperial relations are actively reinterpreted and contested in heterogeneous ways by communities, in ways that unsettle Westphalian notions of territoriality and sovereignty.

Four centuries of Western imperial strategies of divide and rule galvanised the creation and maintenance of colonial hierarchies, as well as the delineation of racialized ethnic categories in imperial dominions. Long before the Cold War, Western imperial powers were sanctioning the destruction of alternatives to European imaginings of world politics. In the Anglophone imagination, the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands represented a wild hinterland. US policy followed its British imperial predecessor, following its imagining of political geographies, martial races and tribal management (Bayly: 2016, Manchanda: 2020). Yet Pakistani and Afghan political forces contested and redefined global power struggles, reshaping the world through their encounters.

Contemplate Pakistani internationalism. Pakistan’s national identity was based on an extra-territorial escapism, seeking to look beyond the Indo-centric South Asian region. Pakistani managers looked West to Anglo-American empire and the Gulf for aid and allies. Its borders were the result of the imperial cartographic imagination. Its military-bureaucratic-intelligences networks developed during the British Raj were nourished by US projects of war and development. Replenished by Gulf finance and transnational recruits from the Muslim world, Zia’s regime seemed to have temporarily fulfilled the long held desire among Pakistan’s architects for leadership status in the Muslim world.

---

<sup>24</sup> James Caron (2015) *The Lives of Amir Hamza Shinwari*. Tanqeed. Winter 2015.

Forthwith, Pakistani establishments have attempted to devise new legislative amendments to bring FATA and the wider province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa into the fold, whilst maintaining the colonial differentiation between citizen and 'savage'. Indeed the state has relied on old colonial laws to enforce the extra-territorial and post-sovereignty notions of the borderlands, in the context of counter-insurgency and US-Pakistani aerial warfare along the border (Akhtar: 2018). Pakistan's role as garrison in the War on Terror redeployed Pakistan's rentier security project for US strategy, in effect deepening the 'distributed empire' in which, the US offloads, "war-making to collaborators and security assemblages that will help render empire difficult to track—a game that the United States has long played in Pakistan." (Tahir: 2021).

Whilst much of the scholarship on borderlands and borders reveals them as places of disjuncture between colonial and postcolonial worlds, this work follows a trend to view them as centre points. Pakistan-Afghanistan represents a global theatre of social relations, a heartland of global connectivity bringing social and political forces together, fusing them with trans-regional mobilizations and on-going historical changes (Marsden & Hopkins: 2011: 15). The struggles of societies on both sides of the Durand Line empowered diverse expressions of social power that challenged the delusions of grandeur underpinning imperial and postcolonial politics. Thus "across the global south, colonial demarcations of zones of control and influence left in their wake political units lacking correspondence between their territorial frame and the cohesion of culture and political identity" (Mahmud: 2010: 54). Schisms manifested in hotly contested reactions, adaptations and resistance to imperial cartographies, postcolonial nation building, and geopolitics. Yet despite conflict, intrinsic solidarities bind the borderlands in deep unassailable ties, which, though shifting in global encounters, have nonetheless ensnared national and imperial powers.

Borders and borderland histories provide a potent physical example of contention over time, highlighting orthodox IR theory's inability to think through patterns of continuity and change, due to its flat, static notions of conflict and encounter (Mahmud: 2010:21-22). National historiographies are unable to clarify the processes of successive eras of inter- imperial rivalry, and transnational interconnection. Neither are they able to explain the imperial afterlives in eras of decolonisation and the Cold War. Yet critical scholars have articulated detailed theorizations of international space involving divergent, multi-scaled operations of power (Cox: 1981, Connolly: 1991, Agnew: 1994). By paying attention to the synergies between Pakistanis and the International, we can explore numerous particularities of world politics taking place during the late cold war in Pakistan-Afghanistan and the wider South West Asian region, and sketch how their afterlives shaped the international politics of the Afghan war.

Pakistanis and Afghans inserted their own meanings on society and world order. In the context of the failure of the US led twenty-year war, and the renewed spectre of great power confrontation, rethinking dominant narratives over the Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre, the Cold War in South Asia and the implications of global encounters, is timely. In this chapter I deploy the categories: the 'borderlands', the wider 'Pakistan-Afghanistan Theatre', and 'South West Asia' as temporal, spatial and eventful categories, which can aid investigation into transboundary social encounters involving imperial and postcolonial histories of the Afghan-Soviet war. These categories fuse temporality, geopolitics and historical events with social relations. They are tools for explaining how conflict binds disparate social forces and produces transformed social fields, generating new social terrains. Retrieving an idea of Pakistan beyond the straightjacket of linear national histories, allows for an analysis of imperial and anti- imperial, as well as socialist and Islamist encounters. This requires thinking through the state's historical trajectory from the British Raj, and the contours of decolonization, in relation to internal societal

struggles for Pakistan, as well as Pakistani's connections to Anglo-American empire and the Islamosphere (Sayyid: 2017). These dynamics are significant if we are to gauge how Pakistanis constrained superpowers.

### **1 All along the watchtower**

The Durand line emerged from the cartographic rivalries of the Great Game (Hopkirk: 1990). Both Russian and the British empires engaged in espionage against each other in central Asia during the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, with Afghanistan becoming a buffer zone between Russia and the British Raj (Cullather: 2002, Bayly: 2014). It was in the borderlands that the British employed the logic of the 'Martial Races', which portrayed Punjabis and 'Pathans', as the warrior races (Rand & Wagner: 2012). Yet longer histories of co-constitution shaped the borderlands. Through centuries of colonization and resistance in British India and Afghanistan, the imperial era loomed large in postcolonial imaginings. Whilst Pakistanis inherited the frontier anxiety and military muscle of the old colonial state, Afghan society emerged from a different nexus of power after independence in 1919, one which connected inter-ethnic and tribal relations to a moving history of intra-imperial rivalry, structured by a disperse and localized set of powers which constrained national governments.

Observe both the forces of fusion and fission that the Durand Line activates. On one hand the border continues previous eras of militarization, bio-politics and surveillance, and a fixation on state sovereignty among Pakistani foreign policy elites. On the other hand, the border engenders transboundary practices and structures of power during wars, which are both shaped by the border, and by the politics of resistance to the border. These political projects

animate the societies in the borderlands (Hopkins & Marsden: 2012). While historians regularly describe Afghanistan now as the ‘graveyard of empires, before the advent of European colonial expansion, Afghanistan was the meeting place of empires and societies (Banerjee: 2000: 23). It is in the Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre where modern empires become overwhelmed, and it is along the Durand Line where conflict reshapes societies, and informing future forms of struggle and agency in successive eras of conflict.

The clash between rival superpower modernization projects infused with a global proxy war and trans-regional warfare in the Global South, “Afghanistan’s role not as the ‘graveyard of empires,’ but rather as the graveyard of the Third World nation-state” (Nunan: 2016: 5). Both Afghan and Pakistani nation-states were transformed in the context of war, privatization and fundamentalism. The Pakistan Afghanistan borderlands are a space of global encounter, paving the way for renewed bloody games in South West Asia following 9/11 (Khan: 2020). Within the borderland itself, empires and states alike have attempted to divert the, “history of dynamic interconnections, mobile populations and religious and ethnic heterogeneity and change” (Bashir & Crews: 2012: 5). As such, “there is no disappearance of the border, because its existence is still fundamental in the exchanges...there is an extension of the transnational space affected by it and a growing autonomy visa a vis the states” (Dorronsoro in Bashir & Crews: 2012:44).

Borders carry weight. They cast long shadows upon postcolonial nation-states. Emerging in reaction to “cartographic violence...the state and its violent constitution of territory have been sanctified through the project of the map” (Neocleous: 2003: 409). Durand’s border set up imperial path dependencies for both states’ Cold War insecurities (Fisk: 2006:46). In the colonial era, the British Imperial Raj sprung violent campaigns in what is now northern Pakistan and Afghanistan, most notably through three wars spanning eighty years. In Herman Melville’s *Moby Dick*, written in 1851, Ishmael bemoans how the cosmos conspires to

keep him on whaling seafaring expeditions, and away from ‘exciting’ adventures in Afghanistan (Khan: 2020). These wars inculcated the modern Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands into the great power rivalry over Central Asia. Cold War American strategists similarly viewed the borderlands as a frontier for imperial power (Hopkirk 2006, Westad: 2007, Barkawi: 2017).

For Pakistan’s leaders, securing the Radcliffe Line with India was unfinished if the politics of the Durand Line politics was not resolved. Although Pakistan had extra-territorial ambitions, it was inhibited by its capacity, and the many internal and external threats both real and imagined (Jalal: 1995). Conflicts with India over Kashmir in 1947, the annexation of the kingdom of Kalat in 1948 and the purchase of Gwadar in 1958 from Oman, were early examples of Pakistani attempts to expand in the periphery. This began a long-standing process involving arms, espionage, logistics, labour, commerce, charity and alliances with Arab Gulf states, as means to survey, control and subdue the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier. In return for Gulf sponsorship, Cold War Pakistani military officers would train and support allies, in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman as Arab states sought the military expertise of the old colonial officer class. Whilst Afghan Cold War regimes emphasized their Pashtun Durrani tribal credentials, Pakistani military and bureaucratic officers, imagined themselves in relation to a strong Islamic belt across Asia, whilst also thinking of themselves as inheritors of the old colonial empire.

During the War on Terror, Richard Holbrooke’s popularization of ‘Af-Pak’ as a political geography in Western security discourse mirrored the colonial vision of the societies along the Durand Line. Holbrooke, a distinguished US diplomat in Washington, famous for brokering peace between conflicting factions in the Balkans, deployed the term to encapsulate the US’s strategy in the wider Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre. Yet as a form of “geographical prejudice”, it “perpetuates the production of Afghanistan as a space of exception in an effort to (re) make

the region through continued military and epistemic violence” (Manchanda: 2020:68). It is no wonder that Holbrooke’s assertions were met across the border with derision. After all, in the imaginaries of tribesmen of Waziristan, workers in Peshawar, fighters in the Swat Valley or traders in Kandahar, the border was simultaneously an obstacle to a lived tradition of interconnection, as well as being a traversable geography of possibility.

What the term announced was not merely a new strategy to recognize Pakistan-Afghanistan as one geopolitical theatre, but the requirement of Pakistan as a US ally, to fight the War on Terror at home. Thus when the US began bombing FATA (the Federally Administered Tribal Areas), the Pakistani borderlands, in 2004, it was soon joined by Pakistan’s military. FATA represents the modern buffer zone; an area straddling the border on the outskirts of the old NWFP (North West Frontier Province) recently renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, an admission by Pakistan’s rulers, of the divisiveness of the old colonial system (Rais: 2021, Martin: 2014). General Musharraf ensured Pakistani allegiance to US strategic designs that his predecessors, Ayub Khan and Zia ul-Haq had begun. In the context of the 2009 US troop surge in Afghanistan and increasing US pressure on Islamabad to dismantle militant strongholds, Pakistan began a series of protracted counter-insurgency operations in FATA. Pakistan’s complex relations with different groups included clients from the Soviet war era, Kashmiris positioned against India, as well as anti-state Jihadists and separatists. Postcolonial states develop their own national interests, whilst working with superpower patrons. They are shaped by imperial legacies, which create deeply complex social terrains, particularly in unstable borderlands in which imperial politics is outsourced to client states who redefine the mechanics of imperial warfare (Tahir: 2021).

Due to the lack of Afghan state cohesion and the influence of the Pakistani military, Pakistani Cold War power struggles have had a disproportionate effect on the border, yet as with their British imperial and Afghan counterparts, this has always been partial. The Pakistani

perspective on imperial politics offers a striking comparison and compliment when studying Afghan trajectories. The imperial notion of, the “ ‘buffer state’ was reincarnated in the Pakistani army’s concept of ‘strategic depth’, an idea which like its colonial predecessor “ underlines the extent to which local actors consider the future of the region’s nation-states as having little of anything to do with the integrity of their national borders” (Haroon: 2011:3). Nevertheless, local forces continued to challenge the writ of the state through imagining the frontier in radically different ways, and through traversing the border, “the afterlife of which continued to shape the region” (Haroon: 2011:2).

Modern imperial interventions across the Durand Line are part of a more complex history of politics along the border, involving both Afghan and Pakistani postcolonial state schemes, and superpower modernization projects (Leake: 2016: 3). Transboundary conflict involving Global North and South participants, created terrains of struggle, characterized by successive eras of inter-imperial, North-South and South-South conflicts. Superpower’s have been entangled in social and historical terrains of struggle, whilst postcolonial societies on the borderlands, were transformed by successive eras of instability, division and war. In particular, the Pashtun region straddling Pakistan and Afghanistan has thus also been a space of territorial anxiety for landlocked Afghan leaders (Siddique: 2014). For Cold War regimes in Kabul, the Durand border was an expression of the traumas of colonial rule, severing Pashto communities, just as Partition had severed societies in Punjab and Bengal (Satia: 2021).

Marginalised by colonial bordering practices and the rivalries of Pakistani and Afghan governments, the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan, the FATA region along the border, and wider Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands, have proved to be a fertile ground for geostrategic dreams and traumas. The region acts as a meeting space for multi-ethnic, tribal social forces that display a vibrant set of interconnections as well as divergent cultural expressions from the Baluchis at the Southern end of the border, all the way up to Chiral in

the north (Marsden & Hopkins: 2011). During the last forty years, from the Afghan Saur Revolution and the Soviet invasion in 1978-9, Anglo-American defeat and withdrawal in 2021, the borderlands have been “transformed into a staging ground for a global conflict that has entangled some of the world’s most powerful regular and private armies” (Siddique: 2014:11).

Successive Pakistani governments intensified patron-client relations with Pashtun Islamist militants as early as the early 1970s in order to combat Left forces, whilst simultaneously providing a bulwark against Afghan irredentist claims breaking apart Pakistan and the establishment of a neighbouring ‘Pashtunistan’. In the context of losing its eastern wing, defeat to India backed by the Soviets, claims on its territory from Afghanistan, Pakistani leader’s decision to aid and arm the Afghan Mujahedeen as early as the mid-1970s, is hardly surprising (Hilali: 2005:12). Not only was the Soviet invasion an opportunity for the military to restore its image, but the transboundary potential of Islamist forces, backed by global powers, had the possibility to halt the expansion of the Soviet juggernaut if it ever rolled into Kabul and threatened Islamabad.

Pakistan’s nation-state projects emerged in the cauldron of imperial and Cold War clientelism. Elite professional forces in the military and bureaucracy were Anglicized, brought into the institutional bosom of British imperial rule, and yet retained hopes of Islamic leadership (Ahmed: 2006). They were imagined both by British and American planners as having the military acumen needed to govern the frontier. Imperialists, favoured Pakistan’s postcolonial elite, because they continued military and bureaucratic path dependencies, connected to Western strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. Here was the military-bureaucratic nexus at the pinnacle of the Cold Wars structure of power in Pakistan (Alavi: 1972, Akhtar: 2018). British imperial power was superseded by American might, but Pakistan continued to be viewed as a garrison state, guarded by a praetorian warrior class against a

savage frontier; the optics mirroring imperial fears of ‘the other’ (Bajwa: 1996, Ahmed: 2013). Far from a pliant handover of power, Decolonization in South Asia featured resistance to imperial power, not only in British Indian navy regiments along the Indian Ocean, but also along the borderlands with Afghanistan. Both violent and pacifist anti-colonial struggles contested the state along the Frontier during the Twentieth century. Thus Pakistani state and anti-state forces continue a Sisyphean encounter along the borderland, which stretches back over a century, intimately binding superpowers, postcolonial states and social forces. In this section I have sketched out the longer histories of the borderlands in relation to imperial and anti-imperial histories. This chapter will now evaluate the power struggles in Pakistan leading up to the Afghan War and explore their significance for the conflict.

## **2 Changes to the structure of power in Pakistan**

Here I offer a brief historical reading of the changes in power in Pakistan, and explain how the rise of the state’s union with the religious right impacted left, particularly the Jamat I Islami, and ethno-separatist forces. Pakistan became the “front-line ally” of US anti-Communist strategy in South West Asia, and developed into a militarized security state after joining the US regional security alliances via the 1955 Baghdad Pact (Siddique: 2014:40). Yet several trajectories emerged between the 1969 deposing of Ayub Khan’s regime and the 1978 return of the military and rise of Zia-al Haq, that are significant to understand Pakistan’s changing matrix of power and its effects on the Afghan war. In Pakistan, during 1968-9, hundreds of thousands of workers and students thronged the cities, factories and squares of the major cities, starting strikes and demonstrations. They

published newspapers, disseminated cassettes and pamphlets, and created spaces of convergence for resistance to the regime (Ali: 2018).

The uprising of 1968-9, proved only a pyrrhic victory for the Pakistani Left, which deposed the Ayub regime without being able to uproot the establishment. The alliance briefly threatened to unite the class antagonisms of Pakistan's underclasses and challenge the structure of power (Akhter: 2018). Populist Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then squandered a historic opportunity to unite left, anti-colonial, socialist forces (Ahmed: 2006). Despite coming to power criticizing Ayub Khan's handling of negotiations with India after the 1965 war, Bhutto gained support via the promise of 'bread, land and freedom', coupled with an anti-imperial, Pan-Muslim foreign policy which was pro-China and anti-American. But Bhutto was never a committed socialist or anti-imperialist. Rather, his feudal background shaped his politics and that of his party, the PPP (Pakistan People's Party). After being voted in behind a groundswell of revolutionary momentum, Bhutto actively consorted with a rehabilitated military, centralizing power before turning on his base. He brought about changes to the law to appease the religious right, isolating the Left through a nepotistic patronage system, which rotted out the PPP and state institutions (Nasr: 1994). Bhutto worked to consolidate his standing with the establishment classes, targeted left social forces through the smashing strike action and directed a brutal 1973 counter-insurgency against Balauchi separatists along the borderlands, before being deposed and hanged by Zia, his protégé (Ali: 2005, Haqqani: 2005).

Although Islamization and militarization intensified exponentially under Zia, it began earlier during the Yahya and Bhutto periods (Sayyid: 2017). Bhutto's rise and fall was preceded by the disaster of Yahya Khan's presidency, itself the result of the fight back of the political and military elite following socialist victory in the 1970 national elections. The dominant form of resistance to the state in Pakistan has been ethnic separatists'

movement, especially former East Pakistan, Baluchistan and the former Northwest Frontier Province. Following two decades of neo-colonial politics by West Pakistani rulers on the East, in East Pakistan, the idea, “of “Islamic socialism” gained ground within a “certain political and intellectual context enthused by the experience of socialism in China and East Asia” (Iqtidar: 2011: 56). West Pakistan came to dominate the East, as the postcolonial establishment sought to contain and coerce the Bengali population, leading to genocide, war with India and the calamity of loosing its Eastern wing in 1971. In the aftermath of loosing Bangladesh, successive Pakistani regimes refashioned an already authoritarian and centralizing state into an Islamic state, galvanized around a unitary national identity (Alavi: 1972, Toor: 2011, Bajwa: 2016). Whilst unleashing genocide on East Pakistan, aimed at decapitating the liberation movement, the military marshalled the Jamat al-Islami student movement, the ITJ, into two paramilitary organizations, to be unleashed on the separatists, foreshadowing its strategy in Afghanistan (Nasr: 1994, Haqqani: 2005).

Rather than emerging from traditional Deobandi seminaries and Madrassas, the Jamat grew in spaces with deep connection to urban and therefore labour politics. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Jamat Islamist cadres tried to rally lower middle class, anti-Communist conservatives. They fought back against the Left, in union headquarters, factory floors, city squares and university campuses. Hence, “by the mid- 1970s the IJT had already built a reputation of clashes and violence with the other student organizations. This was a radical departure from IJT’s initial years, when the IJT stayed away from active involvement in politics” (Iqtidar: 2011: 73). Moreover, changes to the ethnic, class and geopolitical dispositions of the West Pakistan elite-, broadly from an imperial officer and bureaucrat Mohajir class towards a military and lower middle class of Punjabis. This would have historic consequences. It was pivotal to the growing accommodation of the religious right into the mainstream of Pakistani nationalism and its

transformation from a secular, Kemalist style of modernization loosely affiliated to Pan-Muslim, into a militarized, religious-nationalist model (Akhtar: 2018, Sayyid: 2017).

Pakistani military leaders received strong diplomatic backing from the US amidst international condemnation following the 1971 East Pakistan War. The US Nixon administration needed the Pakistanis as intermediaries with the Chinese before Nixon's visit to China in 1972, which shifted the Sino-Soviet split into a wholesale transformation of the balance of world power. From 1960 onwards the fallout between Mao and Khrushchev caused a great schism in the Marxist movement, itself already divided by Trotskyist and Stalinist factions globally (Luthi: 2008). Soviet forces now looked to implement Socialism through promoting Soviet modernization, whilst Mao encouraged national revolutionary struggles. This had a substantial effect of creating divisions among both Pakistani and Afghan socialist movements (Ahmed: 2010).

During a period of late Cold War massacres, Pakistani generals harnessed imperial anxieties with the periphery, and racist representations of Bengalis, packaging their war against East Pakistan as part of a wider anti-communist struggle underway, as US backed paramilitaries fought leftists in Chile, Guatemala, Brazil and beyond (Chamberlin: 2019: 175, Bevins: 2020:3). In many ways the epicentre of the anti-communist crusade shifts from Jakarta to Jalalabad. In addition, the trauma of losing its Eastern wing, another legacy of imperial cartography, would have large repercussions as Zia's military establishment, which adopted a more aggressive agenda, fusing state authoritarianism with patronage of fascist and Islamist proxies. The cost was high. Pakistan could no longer claim to be a place of salvage against Hindu dominated India. The defeat precipitated the second partition in the space of a quarter of a century, enabled by structural racism against Bengalis and a refusal to accept them into the mainstream of Pakistani

nationalism, galvanizing the Bengali resistance movements, and galvanized diverse responses from movements along the Afghan border.

Socialist and Maoist forces began to attract support and develop influence during the 1960s, before brutal state crackdowns under Bhutto and then Zia crushed their momentum. Even as the military was at its weakest, and political forces seemed to have gained the upper hand, Bhutto's need to rehabilitate the army to ensure his own regime, signalled the ability of the military to stay at the crucible of Pakistani power politics. The old adage was that the military was the best institution in the country, maybe even the only one that functioned properly. But this hid the overdevelopment of military and bureaucratic institutions into expansive powers, supported by US backing (Siddiq: 2007, Alavi: 1972). Only a decade after popular revolt against Ayub Khan in 1969, Zia's regime installed martial law, inaugurated a raft of policies pivoting towards a militarized Islamic nationalism, and intensified support for the most radical of the Afghan rebel factions. In Pakistan, liberal-left parties like the PPP and the ethno-separatist-socialist factions of the National Awami Party faced a choice; accommodation with the state and the softening of calls for redistribution and geopolitical realignment, or the prospect of being violently dismantled by the expanding architecture of the security state.

Once the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistani strategic managers dreaded a Soviet invasion. They feared the Soviets were driven by the desire for a warm water port and access to the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, anxieties that Anglo-American strategists had passed to their Pakistani successors (Bajwa: 1996). Rivalry and resentment towards India continued to dominate the strategic thinking of Pakistani policy makers, who drew upon the loss of East Pakistan, the collective memory of galvanizing Pashtun tribesmen to fight India in Kashmir, and the experience of militarising the Jamat's student movement, during the course of the Afghan war. Pakistani state managers built their legitimacy in

part through the deployment of Islam as an engine for social transformation, in stark contrast to the Afghan communist party and the Shah's regime in Iran.

Rather than based around longstanding national cohesion, linguistic and ethnic unity, Pakistan's national identity emerged from a non-territorial strategic assessment of its founders, following tense negotiations with their British and Indian counterparts. Islamic identity formed the background to the Pakistani national imaginary. Pakistan's early security architects, Ayub Khan chief among them, aware of the potentially revolutionary message of having a national identity based on Islamic solidarity rather than territorial identity, sought to downplay an Islamic subjectivity, emphasizing secular, modernizing and nationalist projects for national cohesion and development (Sayyid: 2017, Devji: 2005). Later Pakistan's late Cold War planners marshalled an Islamization of society and the military. Hence, "the Islamization of the anti-Soviet struggle both drew inspiration from and reinforced the Islamization of the Pakistani state under Zia" (Mamdani: 2002:771). Islamic signifiers of the security state, the role of madrasahs, aid agencies, financial circuits, logistical networks, Islamic centres and social organisations, inducing a politicized Islamic subjectivity, expanded from Bhutto's rule onwards, but really intensified during Zia al Haq's martial rule (1978-1989). In the process Pakistani state and society were redefined.

Left, ethno-separatist, socialist and anti-imperialist social forces in Pakistan survived Zia's onslaught, and continued to articulate counter-visions of an alternative domestic and international society. With the vision of a Muslim state with secular, egalitarian and inclusive principles depleted and its social base divided, the way was open for counter-revolutionary forces. Founder of the Jamat-I-Islami, Maududi, advocated for an ideological state, arguing that there was no precedent of a modern Islamic state. A world historic figure in his own right, Maududi would rival Jinnah in terms of his effect on

ideology of the Pakistani state due to his strong relationship with Zia up until his death in 1979. His brand of political Islam stood in contrast to Khomeini's pan-Islamic third world internationalism, and emerged distinct from Muslim Brotherhood model, despite the forms of transboundary connectivity that bound the Jamat and the Brotherhood (Rahnema: 1994, Gani: 2022). This brand of Islamist politics, sat along comfortably with both Saudi funding and Wahhabi ideology, as well as with an increasingly socially conservative and religious army officer and aligned lower middle class commercial classes (Siddiqa: 2007, Akhtar: 2018). Maududi's close coordination with the new military junta, helped redefine a singular Pakistani national ideology, whilst his death allowed for more radical leadership to split. Part of it would work ever closer with the Afghan rebels, whilst a constitutional faction, sought to engage in mainstream party politics (Haqqani: 2004, Nasr: 1994).

The Jamat emerged from a context of urban politics, intimately connected to nationalist and socialist politics (Iqtidar: 2011). They adopted a modernist framework of religion that ran up against traditional religious authority. This goes some way to explaining their affiliation with other modernist groups, which included dense entanglement with militant Mujahedeen factions but also left anti-imperial groups as well as ethno-nationalists. Traditionally the Jamat preached a reformist conservative understanding of social change. Yet they changed course in the context of Left momentum and the popular uprising of 1968-9 when they started to articulate a more virulently anti-communist politics. Concurrently, despite the anti-Americanism of its student wing, Jamat leaders were careful to align behind Zia's US alliance, when the offer of patron-client relations and access to state power emerged (Nasr: 1994). They were useful clients for the Junta, precisely because they could be redirected away from pressuring for more autonomy, and also because they could be steered towards implementing Islamist state power in the peripheries, and across the border. The Jamat had a party structure, cadres of dedicated

activists, and spoke to a world influenced by socialist rhetoric, symbolism and organising. This does not apply to the full range of Islamist actors operating between Afghanistan and Pakistan though, many of which were traditionalist Deobandis. Rather it is more a broad framework that links the modern forms of transboundary contention in Muslim world politics between various socialist, nationalist and Islamist forces, which emerged in the context of global Cold War struggles.

Not only did the Jamat secure the politically unpopular dictator, their willingness to bypass traditional religious authority and coordinate with the regime over Islamicizing state ideology enabled Pakistani intervention in Afghanistan. Meanwhile the state was able to access a conservative lower middle class whose religiosity and anti-communism made them useful recruits for both the Jamat and the military (Akhtar: 2018, Haqqani: 2005). In turn, the Jamat could use its political cadres to fight the street and propaganda war with the Left, in Pakistani student unions and factories, but also through the cultural domain; through rival radio, newspaper and television programmes, and through poetry and plays (Toor: 2011, Yaqin: 2009).

Consequently the Jamat's alliance with Zia's Junta, helped smash socialist student-worker movements, and its radicalization in the context of the bloodbaths of Bengal and Baluchistan, paved the way for its role in supporting the Mujahedeen. Crucially they enabled more radical offshoots to emerge both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, facilitating the development of the Afghan Jihad through the militarization and Islamization of Pakistani society. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the rise of Islamism and later the defeat of the Soviet Union, would mortally weaken the left, then tied to the dwindling fortunes of the PDPA (Fowkes & Gokay: 2009). For many Pakistani and Afghans, the promise of decolonization remained elusive, whilst the ability of political-military leaders to wield Islam as an engine for social and military power, fit with the agendas of Islamist Gulf

monarchies and Western anti-communists. What emerges is the hollowing out of a social sphere of progressive politics. Rather than the postcolonial utopias imagined by Faiz, Riaz and other Pakistani socialist anti-imperialists, the alliance of Islamism and anti-communism, signified an ever-tighter embrace between empire and Jihad (Toor: 2011, Bayat: 2009, Mamdani: 2002). Thus the transformation from Islamism as a maligned social conservatism to state ideology and global Jihadism, occurred through the logistics networks funded by wealthy Gulf patrons, the late Cold War bloodbaths of the Afghan-Soviet war and in the decomposition of the global Cold War narrative, through the utopian promise of Islamist empire, as imagined by Zia's military junta. Here I have outlined an account of the various forces and changes in the balance of power in Pakistan in the years leading up to the Afghan war. This helps us to build a transnational social terrain involving both Pakistani and Afghan political geographies, in order for us to better examine how complex transboundary terrains constrain superpowers. In this next section I expand on the global terrains in which Pakistanis and Afghans found themselves in, on the eve of the Soviet invasion. How does the complex terrain of struggle become global?

### **3 1979, the Soviet Invasion and Muslim World transformations**

In the early 1970s it seemed as though anti-imperialists were making major inroads across the world. African anti-imperialists were at their strongest in Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Cape Verde. This was a time in which the myths of American invincibility were being shattered. In this global terrain, "the successes of the Vietnamese were largely responsible for breaking the ideological straightjacket of the Cold War" (Ali: 2018:103). Large-scale student-worker's movements emerged from Mexico to Pakistan (Ali: 2018: 6). But anti-colonial momentum was about to slow down as the upheavals of the mid 1970s

accompanied a growing alienation from the uneven effects of national development in postcolonial societies. Postcolonial regimes sought to implement coercive control, particularly on matters of state planning, economy and foreign policy. Yet they also sought to instil the international dimension with a collective agency of the nation, often through anti-imperial and third worldist registers, despite differing commitments to the principles of anti-imperial politics. In addition, the loss in legitimacy of anticolonial nationalist regimes, and the decline of Communist internationalism enabled the resurgence of the religious right, far right nationalists and global anti-communists (Anievas & Saull: 2020). The US global anti-communist offensive was about to intensify. Nasser's death, Arab defeats to Israel in 1967 and 1973, and Sadat's appeasement all had profound effects on the trajectory of resistance politics. The breakup of the Communist international, and the success of global anti-communist warfare opened up a space for new ideological alignments.

Pakistan's geopolitical importance to US Cold War aims had from the 1955 Baghdad Pact, been viewed in Washington as significant as part of the chain of anti-communist frontier states on the Soviet's southern border. Access to the frontiers allowed US planners to host listening posts, missile launching pads and proxies. There was also fear of a Soviet thrust into the Persian Gulf and the potential disruption to the oil fields of the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula, (Williams: 1962, Hilali: 2005). On the US side, the loss of a key ally in the Shah following the Iranian Revolution in 1978-9 meant the loss of one of the two pillars of Nixon and Kissinger's twin pillar policy, which sought to govern the Persian Gulf through Saudi Arabia and Iran (Westad: 2005: 197). The alliance between Saudi Arabia's economic muscle, and the Shah's sizeable military and intelligence institutions were viewed as key to combatting Communism. But with the collective memory of the CIA's 1953 coup against Mossadeq in mind, Iran's new regime was in no mood to make concessions to either Washington or Moscow. Following the Iranian Revolution, both superpowers displayed anxieties over the potential of trans regional Islamism in world politics (Adib-Moghaddam: 2007). Iranian

power would soon be converted into a more nationalist framing, in the context of the Iran-Iraq war. Nevertheless, the radical internationalism inherent Khomeini's message, threatened to expand the spread of Pan-Islamism and Islamist militancy through a refashioned anti-imperialism (Rahmena: 1994, Devji:2005). Pakistani warm water ports were prized strategic assets, particularly as they connected to the straits of Hormuz and the Suez Canal, the great highways of global capitalism. US strategists worried about a reversal of fortunes in Asia, following the Soviet invasion. These were largely unfounded as the US was dominant in the region. Report of Soviet movement at the border in the wake of growing unrest in Afghanistan in 1978 gave Islamabad and Washington pause for concern but also afforded opportunities. Political Islam and in particular Islamist militancy, would be channelled away from the US and its allies, and towards the Soviets (Ahmed:2013, Mamdani: 2002).

World historic events took place during 1979, outpacing both Washington and Moscow. In quick succession, a Wahhabi preacher led his followers in a bloody occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca leading to wide scale confusion and anger in the Muslim world, as conspiracies ensued blaming Western powers. Also in November, the US embassy hostage crisis in Tehran shook the Carter regime. Next the countryside rebellion in Afghanistan would soon catch fire across the whole country. The revolt against the Communist PDPA forced the Politburo into action in defence of its unruly clients in Kabul. The Soviet response transformed what had "began as a reaction to the domestic developments in Afghanistan ... into a geopolitical offensive" (Hilali: 2005: 3). Andropov, Soviet General Secretary and architect of the clampdown on the 1956 Hungary uprising, declared in a Politburo meeting in that year, "bearing in mind that we will be labelled as the aggressor, but in spite of that, under no circumstances can we loose Afghanistan"<sup>25</sup>.

---

<sup>25</sup> Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. March 17<sup>th</sup> 1979. Transcript of proceedings. National Security Archive Files.

On Christmas Eve 1979, Soviet Tanks crossed the Termez Bridge connecting Soviet Uzbekistan with Afghanistan. Brzezinski told Carter, “the Soviets are likely to act decisively...in world politics nothing succeeds like success, whatever the moral aspects”<sup>26</sup>. But the president moved cautiously, before finally supporting the upgrade from non-lethal aid to the transfer of small weaponry, albeit slowly. Brzezinski pressured Carter to act decisively, arguing, “both Iran and Afghanistan are in turmoil and Pakistan is both unstable internally and extremely apprehensive externally...collapse of the balance of power in South West Asia...could produce...Soviet presence right down to the edge of the Arabian and Oman Gulfs”<sup>27</sup>. A leaked 1978 cable prior to the invasion, between US and Pakistani officials, reveals how the two parties agreed on Pakistan’s fears over a Moscow-Kabul-Dehli axis seven months before the Soviet invasion.<sup>28</sup> The 1979 Soviet invasion caused alarm across Pakistani society. Pakistani security elites had long imagined themselves as the garrison state, but now their frontier bordered the Soviet empire (Haqqani: 2005). It is in this context that Pakistani military officers feared unrest in its Pashtun dominated North-West Frontier province, and potential KGB-KHAD clientelism of both Baloch and Pashtun national-liberation movements (Yousaf & Adkin: 2007).

Events would now transpire in ways that ruptured Cold War superpower strategies, bringing new alliances and antagonisms into play. On the 21<sup>st</sup> November 1979, an irate crowd, including many members of the Jamat, stormed and then burnt down the US embassy in Islamabad, following a report on local radio that the Grand Mosque attack in Mecca had been orchestrated by the US (Kux: 2001:242). An Islamabad daily newspaper, ‘The Muslim’, as with the radio report, claimed that the West had attacked the Kabba, unleashing, “hostile

---

<sup>26</sup> Memo from Brzezinski to Carter. Reflections on Soviet Interaction in Afghanistan. December 26<sup>th</sup> 1979. National Archive Files.

<sup>27</sup> Brzezinski to Carter. Reflections on Soviet Interaction in Afghanistan. December 26<sup>th</sup> 1979. National Archive Files.

<sup>28</sup> Public Library of US Diplomacy. Disclosed by Wikileaks: ‘Pakistan Anxieties growing out of Kabul. US Telegram. 1978

actions against the Muslim world...by the imperialists and their stooges”<sup>29</sup>. Enraged crowds, who, despite their differing religious and ideological convictions, shared an anti-American and anti-imperial disposition, attacked US embassies in both Iran and Pakistan. The US was not behind the Grand Mosque attack, but the rage directed at them had symbolic qualities. It manifested as a response to the longer US Cold War politics in the Middle East, the arming of military regimes, US extraction in the Gulf, and a belief among a younger generation of Muslims disillusioned by the Cold War and postcolonial era, that the Islamic world was a sleeping giant. This power was a superpower in its own right, and needed the development of a new vanguard of believers to right the world’s wrongs.

A formidable process was underway, which would fund young Islamist recruits across the world. Now came the unleashing of Gulf financial power, itself the by-product of the breakdown of Bretton Woods, the system of monetary management that the Western powers had developed after 1945 to regulate imbalances of payments between countries. Whilst oil process inflicted considerable damage to both Western and Soviet economies, oil producing Gulf States earned enormous profits. The causes of inflation weren’t simply to do with the Great Society programmes in the US, but also bore the long-term consequences of the Vietnam War on the US and the global economy (Bordo: 2020:195).

The forming of transboundary Islamist, charity and militant networks connecting Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the wider Gulf to Pakistan and Afghanistan made for a deeper complex social terrain in the Global South, with its links to both empire and Islamism (Bayat: 1996, Siddiqa: 2011, Haqqani: 2005). This would provide the Mujahedeen with an impressive array of allies, and making the Soviet occupation ever more complex. Gulf monarchies awash with Petrodollars following the 1973-4 oil embargo had been building charitable and modernization projects abroad since the 1960s, but it was in the context of the oil embargo, that their influence rapidly expanded. By the late 1970s, and particularly following the

---

<sup>29</sup> The Muslim, Islamabad. November 21<sup>st</sup>, 1979.

Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion, Gulf charities with large endowments, religious organizations and other financial conglomerates, began an intensified campaign across the Muslim world. From Morocco to Indonesia, Gulf leaders sponsored the production of Korans, Islamist literature, radio, publications, and propaganda, whilst funding the construction of mosques and madrassas. In this context, Saudi Arabia would rise to global prominence, but its role in Jihadist warfare was not new, but rather central to the monarchy's rise, emerging as it did from intra-tribal warfare, resistance to the Ottomans and through alliances with the British Empire. Thus, Saudi Arabia was, "the only modern nation created by jihad" (Coll: 2004:77). This trans regional logistical landscape, and its links to military, militant and technocratic actors in Pakistan and Afghanistan, was crucial to the Afghan resistance. It is no coincidence that Hekmatyar, Massoud and Bin Laden all had engineering backgrounds, which proved vital for rebel construction of bases, roads and bridges. The links between the Gulf and the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands formed an alternative humanitarian and development modernization, to the US and Soviet models (Nunan: 2105). Into this social terrain, the ISI spearheaded the construction of an enormous infrastructure project on the border, including "checkpoints, training camps and the newly built roads and caves and depots" (Coll: 2004:181).

Both superpowers had made inroads into modernization programmes from the 1950s to the 1970s in Afghanistan. Whilst the US engineer corps and US firm, Magnus Knudsen, constructed the Helmand Dam, the Salang Pass represented Soviet utopian projects of modernization, itself part of a wider infrastructure in Central Asia, developed to build up the logistical, industrial and extractive capabilities of the USSR and placate its Muslim populations in Central Asia. In particular, "considerable effort had been made to develop...natural resources...natural gas, oil and minerals...to explore, identify and map the natural resources of Afghanistan" (Yousuf & Adkin: 2007:190). Whilst Gulf sponsors poured money into Pakistan, the Chinese helped in the gargantuan task of creating the Karakorum

highway, connecting Pakistan and China. A new round of bloody games in the Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre were underway.

Socialism and Islamism intermingled in the ideological promiscuity of the 1970s. Student campuses had been sites of revolutionary spirit in Pakistan during the 1960s, and continued to be spaces for the clashing of Cold War Pakistani imaginaries. Similarly, as far back as the 1960s, Marxists and Islamists, confronted each other at Kabul University and the Kabul Polytechnic Institute, where Massoud and Hekmatyar had studied (Rubin: 1995: 81). It was during this period that a “university trained religious leadership began to develop a theologically driven position to counter the politics of the increasingly left-leaning Afghan intelligentsia” (Haroon: 2007: 197). Throughout this era, “Soviet influence had also grown among the urban Afghan political class unhappy with Afghanistan’s monarchy” (Haqqani: 2005: 167).

Under Zia’s martial law regime, Pakistan’s left leaning universities came under sustained assault. These sites of revolutionary politics had united with worker’s movements to topple the previous military regime in 1969. By 1979, they became sites of the alliance between the military regime and the Jamat. Funded by the Gulf religious-charity-development complex, and armed and empowered by the Pakistani military, the Jamat would act as the vanguard for a dual policy, the crushing of domestic opponents to the regime and the extra-territorial training, arming and financing of the Afghan Mujahedeen. The Jamat’s political cadres formed a unique link between militants in Kashmir and Afghanistan, whilst also providing ballast against socialist anti-imperialists at home. Across the border in Afghanistan, university campuses were similarly spaces for global ideological contest. Whilst Hekmatyar and Bin Laden connected their technocratic expertise to the Islamist doctrines of Sayyid Qutb, Rabbani and Abdullah Azaam, Massoud, despite his place within a broad Islamist coalition,

was known as a voracious reader of revolutionary thinkers on warfare, including Che Guevara and Mao Tse Tung (Coll: 2004:116).

But transboundary entanglements in the region weren't just evidenced in the interactions of the late Cold War. They stretched back to the age of empires. The ties between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamat emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman and British empires (Halliday: 2005:216). Saudi funding would strengthen the capabilities of the Jamat (Kepel: 2002:62). The connectivity between the Jamat and the Brotherhood dated back to the collective memories of Islamist politics connecting the Ottoman Empire with the Subcontinent, the history of the Khilafat movement (1919-1924), and trans-regional Pan-Islamist resistance to British colonialism. Shared histories of, and a tendency to follow the tradition of modern Islamist thinkers from Al-Afghani, Bana and Qutb through to Maududi, meant that the Jamat had more in common with the modern political and organizational models of the Muslim Brotherhood, than it did with the traditionalist Deobandi clergy in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India (Rahmena: 1994, Nasr: 1994, Haroon: 2007).

Both had their antecedents in the transnational political, commercial and cultural ties that bound the Middle East and South Asia in deep fields of co-constitution. Both acted as transnational religious, development and proselytizing networks, with militant offshoots and a fierce cadre of activists. The major difference was that the Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria were consistently and severely suppressed in this period. By contrast, the Jamat in Pakistan, having previously gone through periods earlier of opposition to the Ayub regime, which intensified when challenging Bhutto, were now embraced by the Zia regime, and accommodated into the structure of a reconstituted political bloc (Akhtar: 2018). During the 1980s this relationship was not always smooth, as the Jamat leaders faced pressure from both the military government, and more radical militant groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and connected to them, the charity front, the Jamat-ud-Dawa, particularly after the Soviet retreat,

during rising conflict with India in Kashmir (Iqtidar: 2011). Nevertheless, they enjoyed an extraordinary level of influence as junior partners in power, influencing the trajectories along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier by facilitating the Mujahedeen, its transnational benefactors and recruits. In this agreement, “the state would act as the senior party, but the Islamic forces would gain from state patronage” (Nasr: 1994:188).

The development of political Islam to Jihad from the interwar to the late Cold War era is not a linear or homogenous process of Pan-Islamism to Islamism and Jihadism<sup>30</sup>. Rather, transnational connectivity, anti-imperial politics and empire-state violence shaped the Afghan Jihad in the context of the colonial afterlives of the border. It is worthwhile to note how the Brotherhood, the Jamat and even Khomeini’s revolutionary cadres, all rejected territorial politics (Rahmena: 1994, Adib-Moghaddam: 2007). Instead, they advocated political projects foregrounded on the principle of Islamic universalism in ways that mirrored the doctrines of Pakistani military architects. Transnational Islamist organizing was being redeployed as way to break through the colonial imposition of modern borders as well as Cold War superpower binary civilizational standpoints.

Transboundary Islamist networks expanded in the context of the renewed alliance between Pakistan and the US. As Soviet tanks reached Kabul, “anti-Soviet fever swept Washington, arousing support for a new phase of close alliance” (Coll: 2004:51). A CIA report outlined how, “only one state, Pakistan, is directly affected by the Soviet invasion, but it tends to view the situation as both an opportunity and a long term threat<sup>31</sup>”. Reagan abandoned the repertoires of detente in favour of religious language of good versus evil, freedom and democracy, versus ‘the evil empire’, responding to social changes underway in West Asia. He

---

<sup>30</sup> Readers will find this differentiation between Pan-Islamism and Islamism useful. Sayyid and Tyler write, “Pan-Islamism is characterized by a colonial context and the desire to unify the Muslim world...Islamism’s condition of possibility is ‘postcoloniality’ and the ambition to re-Islamize Muslim societies. The differences between Pan-Islamism and Islamism are not simply temporal, but also political and conceptual” (Sayyid & Tyler: 2002:58).

<sup>31</sup> CIA Archive: National Foreign Assessment Center. Worldwide Reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. An intelligence memorandum. January 1980. Released in 2006.

maintained that the US, “must not break faith with those risking their lives-on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua-to defy Soviet sponsored aggression” (Reagan in Scott: 1996:75). Reagan’s strategy expanded upon that of Nixon’s, who had previously argued that US strategy was structured around containing the “expansion of the Soviet Union...the control of the Persian Gulf, the oil jugular of the West” (Nixon: 182: 115). Through Peshawar, Islamist networks, shaped by ISI led transnational intelligence agencies, enabled the interactions between “Afghan refugees, rebel fighters, smugglers, money changers, poets, proselytizers, prostitutes, and intrigues of every additional stripe” (Coll: 2004:53). In the context of the Soviet invasion, the rise of Reagan’s New Right and the strength of transnational Islamist networks, the world was remade. How did intra-imperial conflict, Pakistani power struggles and regional historical changes, impact the Afghan-Soviet war?

#### **4 The Afghan-Soviet war**

During the Afghan-Soviet war, militant groups fought with states and superpowers, over an increasingly divided social terrain, born out of a transnational assemblage of warfare involving border conflict, proxy war, ideological competition, local conflict, and regional struggles. The legacy of modern intra-imperial conflict, postcolonial regional struggle and geopolitical scramble, remade Afghanistan in the context of successive eras of conflict.

Afghans and Pakistanis experienced the Cold War across the borderlands, as a hot war, a conflagration, which reshaped planetary politics. Afghan-Pakistani entwinement is a history borne of empire, Muslim world connection and the tortured trajectory of the postcolonial state. It is in this context that we can reposition the Soviet war outside of a dominating focus on US-Soviet rivalry, to incorporate the role of neighbouring Pakistan. International players

including Saudi Arabia, India and Iran, as well as the US and the USSR, were at work in the proxy war in Afghanistan, but no regional power was as influential as Pakistan.

As far back as the British withdrawal from Afghanistan's borders in 1947, successive Afghan governments, "decided to press irredentist claims to Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province" (Isby: 1989: 15). During the 1973 coup d'état, Daud Khan, general and cousin of the Zing Zahir Shah, overthrew the monarchy in Afghanistan and installed himself as the country's first President. Remembered for his brand of authoritarian rule and strident Pashtun nationalism, Khan was determined not to allow Afghanistan to be dictated to by foreigners. Khan's foreign policy would anger both the Soviet Union and Pakistan. First, despite warnings during a meeting with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Khan angrily condemned Soviet relations with Afghan Communists, and rebuffed Soviet criticism of Khan's tentative overtures to the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It is notable that following Sadaat's growing ties with the US and Israel, both Egypt and Afghanistan downgraded relations with the Soviet Union, weakening the Soviet position in the Persian Gulf vis a vis the US, to much anger in the Kremlin. Meanwhile Daoud Khan's policy of demanding a review of the Durand Line was based on a longstanding Afghan claim to Pakistani territory. This was the dream for a Greater Pashtunistan, invoking Ahmed Shah Durrani, the Pashtun founder of the modern Afghan state. Henceforth under Khan, Afghan intelligence officials sent arms and funds to Pashtun and Baloch separatists in Pakistan, infuriating the Pakistani establishment who starting under Bhutto, worked to crush the Baloch insurgency before funding Afghan insurgents. The failed 1975 Afghan revolt enabled the government to decapitate the leadership of an earlier cohort of rebel commanders, but it also allowed the Pakistani military establishment to use the borderlands as a recruitment ground for Jihad (Roy: 1986:75).

Five years later during the 1978 Saur Revolution, Daud Khan was assassinated and his regime overthrown by a combination of military officers and activists from the People's

Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) (Rubin: 1995:105). Muhammad Taraki, founder of the PDPA and leading communist, writer and activist, emerged to power following two decades of active involvement in Kabul's socialist circles (Siddique: 2014). For all their revolutionary fervour, the PDPA lacked strategic acumen, incited anger from domestic and global actors, and failed to stop infighting, leading to a precarious national project, which received little support outside the cities. Divided into two political wings, the more moderate Parcham and the more radical Khalq, both halves of the PDPA had a proclivity towards violent repression, infighting and a tendency towards revolutionary romanticism. To the Kremlin's dismay they underestimated the social power of the Afghan countryside and attempted to change it by force, incurring the wrath of Afghans nationwide. The Khalq faction in power launched a "sweeping campaign of repression...the regime...moved against Islamists, Maoists and Parachamists...students, teachers, army officers and minorities" (Rubin: 1995: 115). Zia, like the rest of the Pakistani military establishment viewed supporting the Afghan rebel groups, and in particular the preferential treatment of Afghan Islamists, as paramount to the task of crushing Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan, securing a pliant neighbour and safeguarding the Durand Line and in so going, serving the long-term strategy of 'Strategic Depth, to prevent Indian led encirclement.

Following their seizure of power, PDPA political cadres attempted to transform Afghan society. Agrarian reform, women's rights, secular education and modernization projects, angered the conservative rural heartlands. A trifecta of local Mullah clerics, Jirga tribal elders and feudal lords had an intense pull on Afghan society (Martin: 2014). Together, they combined with Afghan rebel factions, and defecting military officers from the Afghan army, launching a dispersed set of nation-wide guerrilla warfare struggles against the PDPA (Dorrnsoro: 2005). This movement fused a liberation struggle with varying ideological currents including Afghan nationalism, Pashtun ethno-centrism, Islamism, and even socialist cadres, as well as a new brand of global Jihadism, exemplified by Bin Laden's infamous 'Arab

Afghans'. Nonetheless, Afghan Islamist rebel groups were among the major factions fighting the PDPA and the Soviets and they received the lion's share of military equipment from Pakistan. They included factions like Ahmed Shah Massoud's forces comprising of largely Tajik fighters fighting a liberation war in the North-East, all the way to Hekmatyar's Hize-i-Islam, hard-line Islamists, comprising largely of Pashtun fighters in the South, who formed close ties to the ISI. Thus, the Pakistani preference for Pashtun Islamism served as a counterweight to Afghan claims on Pakistani Pashtun dominated region. This would repeatedly effect the course of the war against the Soviets.

The revolt crystallized during the 1979 uprising in Herat, which killed hundreds of PDPA officials and Soviet military trainers, as local army garrisons joined the rebels<sup>32</sup>, before a bloody reprisal by government forces that led to up to 25,000 deaths (Dorransoro: 2005: 99). The PDPA's repression of religious authority and local tribal Jirga councils set the stage for a decisive shift in power and prestige toward religious clergy" (Gopal: 2013:7). By late 1979 the PDPA was suffering increasing attacks. After much debate in the Kremlin, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began. Soviet planners feared an Islamist rebellion in Afghanistan would usurp their unstable clients in Kabul, allowing for the expansion of US influence on the Soviet Union's southern rim, whilst stimulating support for unrest in the Soviet Muslim Central Asian republics. Added to this, the 1979 Iranian Revolution had brought Khomeini's form of Islamic revolution into power, startling both superpowers and Sunni Arab states. A region stretching from Lebanon to Afghanistan, including the Persian Gulf and the countries neighbouring the Southern Soviet Union, was now the foremost battleground of the late Cold War. Both Soviet and US Cold War strategists attempted to respond to rapidly changing social conditions. The confluence of anti-imperial left forces, authoritarian regimes, and a burgeoning Islamist politics of both Shia and Sunni forms, fought over the postcolonial battlegrounds of 'Third World' societies (Westad: 2005, Chamberlin: 2018).

---

<sup>32</sup> Soviet Invasion: A cryptic History. National Security Agency. Central Security Service. Special Series. Volume B. Declassified. 1993

Politburo hawks Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko, believed it was a necessity to protect Soviet territorial and geostrategic ambitions by strengthening the Afghan Communists. Unlike in Pakistan, the Afghan Left, despite the infighting of the PDPA, was a more consolidated group, with organic links to a secular military officer class at the time of the 1978 Saur Revolution (Coll: 2004). Furthermore, the PDPA enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union, as well as close connections with East Germany and Czechoslovakia. On the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Afghan Communist party in January 1980, the Kabul New Times reported congratulations from Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Hungary and Poland. While the USSR had expressed solidarity with the Afghan people, the GDR condemned US led foreign intervention<sup>33</sup>. Bolstered by international support, KGB and KHAD units launched a terror campaign on the borderlands, and into Pakistan, as reprisal for Pakistani sponsorship of the Mujahedeen<sup>34</sup>.

Part of the reason for the USSR occupation derived from the anxieties and opportunities that Afghanistan had long played in the Soviet imagination. During the 1950s, rival US and Soviet modernizing schemes built canals, irrigation systems and highways (Nunan: 2015). Both had envisioned a new utopia in the mountains and plains of Afghanistan. US strategists observed that while Islamist political fervour threatened their regional interests, it was a potentially far greater threat in the Soviet's southern belt. Moscow and Washington were keenly aware, if unable to fully reckon with Islamist political revolution. Nonetheless they were alert of its ability to spread from Iran and Afghanistan into the Central Asian Muslim Soviet republics. But Soviet generals still viewed intervention from the lens of European Cold War intervention, particularly the revolts in Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Meanwhile the US was engaged in a new set of covert wars as well as direct counter-insurgency ventures in the Middle East and Central America, in order to support religious, ethnic and right wing anti-communists (Robinson: 1996). Both Washington and Moscow, had

---

<sup>33</sup> Kabul New Times. Wednesday January 5<sup>th</sup> 1980.

<sup>34</sup> Bombing raids by Afghan aircraft inside Pakistan. Mobin Shorish Collections. 1984.

severely underestimated the social terrain of struggle in South West Asia. Yet it was Washington that was best placed to capitalize on the changing of the tides.

One of the most striking aspects of the Afghan Soviet war was how the conflict rearranged clichés about empire, the Left and world order. Undeniably the high point of anti-colonial nationalism had ended. A combination of intra- communist splits, the failure of Marxist groups to build national projects, the global anti-communist offensive, changes to global finance and ethnic-religious divides amplified by imperial legacies, all conspired to halt the progress of anti-imperialism and international socialism. The Soviet-South relationship was always ambivalent. As Westad reminds us, “the relationship between communism and anti-colonialism is a long and complex one: Marxism and other forms of radical socialism inspired both movements, and the Communist International ...played a key role in organizing anti-colonial resistance in the 1920s and the 1930s.” (Westad in Leslie & James: 2015: xii). But the rise of the USSR as an expansionist empire in its own right, led to the fraying of the alliance between the Kremlin and the forces of anti-imperialism. This is not to downplay the role of Soviet development projects rivalling the American model, as well as support for guerrilla movements. Thus, “Soviet help for liberation movements undoubtedly mattered, for the Viet Minh in Vietnam, the FLN in Algeria, the MPLA in Angola or the South African ANC. But, overall, it is hard to argue that the Soviet Union played a key role in the decolonization process, as inspiration or as provider of practical assistance.” (Ibid). Cold War internationalist doctrines, Washington and Moscow were always prioritising their own global strategic interests. The decline of Soviet power towards the end of the Cold War had consequences for postcolonial societies and Soviet republics alike. What's more, the Soviets became entangled in costly conflicts in Ethiopia and Angola whilst resistance in the Eastern bloc mounted. The Soviet-South relationship had broken down towards the end of the 1980s. Notwithstanding the presence of Marxist regimes in Cuba and Burkina Faso, Soviet interventions to save Mengistu and Najibullah's regimes in Ethiopia and Afghanistan, were the last significant

attempts to invest in Marxist-Leninism in the Global South. Both were spectacular failures, leading to conflict and instability. Here we see how complex terrains in the Global South proved in part to be the Soviet's undoing.

Meanwhile the appetite to bleed the Soviets and halt the advance of Communist fervour galvanized Islamabad, Riyadh and Washington. Zia's junta threw itself into the ISI-CIA-GID covert sponsorship of the Mujahedeen (Coll: 2004). In this context, the Soviet intervention was presented in Pakistani national discourse as a matter of survival, Zia's martial law ensuring strict control over the media the national conversation (Haqqani: 1994). Covert actions had to be proportionate to maintain plausible deniability and avoid inviting the Soviets to escalate their attacks in Pakistan, which had begun during the war as KHAD (the state's intelligence agency) and KGB agents launched sporadic bombings along the borderlands. This was a high stakes game for the Pakistanis, who risked provoking a superpower and incurring annihilation. Pakistani-Saudi-US alliance may have reignited earlier Cold War alliances between the superpower and its regional allies, but these synergies had devastating effects.

As with the contemporaneous Lebanon War and in contrast to the Iran-Iraq war, the Afghan civil war combined with a nationwide rebellion against occupation. Subsequently Zia's military junta reshaped FATA, and the wider geographies of the Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre. Peshawar became a vast hub of commerce, logistics, aid, migration and arms dealing. The city provided the staging ground for the 'Peshawar Seven', allowing Afghan rebel party leaders, to communicate both with their military commanders on the ground, as well as with international donors (Yusuf & Adkin: 2007, Hilali: 2005). A transnational flow of operations from Jeddah, Cairo, Dubai and Abu Dhabi, traversed the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and routed towards Karachi's port. Once there, the ISI orchestrated the

trucking of arms and goods to the rebel base in Peshawar, and then across the borderlands and into the battlefields of Afghanistan (Yousaf & Adkin: 2007, Coll: 2004).

Right wing forces in the West mythologized a new generation of global-anti-Communists as freedom fighters. Reagan's New Right lambasted and caricatured the Soviet Union as the 'Evil Empire'. From Nicaragua to the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands, anti-imperial, socialist and indigenous forces came under attack. Indeed, "U.S. Cold War policies helped to destroy the principal alternative to ethno sectarian politics in much of the postcolonial world" (Chamberlin: 2018: 557). It is in this planetary context, that US led alliances shaped anti-communist strategists, galvanizing an on-going Pakistani project of Jihad-as-strategy during the largest clandestine operation of its kind in modern history. US aid to the Mujahedeen amounted to 660 million dollars in 1987, more than the entire budget given to the Contras throughout the war in Nicaragua (Mamdani: 2002:771). Thus, "it was the American sponsored anti-communist crusade in Afghanistan that revitalized in the last quarter of the twentieth century the notion of jihad as the armed struggle of believers" (Ahmed: 2006:575).

During this process, transnational powers lead by Pakistan succeeded in converting the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands, once home to a vibrant political field informed by a long history of anti-imperial politics, into, "a platform from which to wage a global battle between communism and capitalism" (Abbas: 2014:54-55). Beyond Pakistan, Iran and the Gulf, China, Israel, India, Britain and France were all involved in Afghanistan, albeit in differing ways and with divergent choices of clients. Siddique contends, "it is not without irony that many of the jihad's original sponsors were not Muslims" (2014:40). Operation Cyclone aimed to turn Muslim attention to the Soviet Union, and steer the course of Islamist mobilization. By arming the Sunni dominated rebels, the US led alliance aimed to limit Shia Iranian influence, but it also helped animate a largely dormant Sunni-Shia split into a politicized, global struggle and coordinate of power. Seemingly strange bedfellows, Jihad and empire had

a longer history of entwinement going back beyond Roosevelt's charming of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, founder of the modern Saudi State in aboard USS Quincy on the Bitter Lake, Egypt in 1945, seven years after the discovery of petroleum in Saudi Arabia (Devji: 2005).

The borderlands became the epicentre for the testing of modern tactics of irregular warfare, as well as the deployment of hi-tech weapons such as the, US designed Stinger surface- to-air missiles. Stingers were introduced in 1985-6 into the Afghan battlefields, quickly transforming the Mujahedeen's war effort, allowing them to more accurately target Soviet aircraft and helicopters. They dented Soviet aerial prowess whilst damaging the morale of Soviet troops, many of them from Muslim Central Asian conscripts Soviet aircraft and infantry columns were ever more susceptible to ambush in Afghanistan's mountainous pathways and valleys. The Soviets and the PDPA struggled to maintain their armies, supply lines and control over the main transport routes, whereas the Mujahedeen dominated the countryside, establishing alliances with local clergy, tribal jirgas and community leaders, although these societal connections were tested by infighting and atrocities (Martin: 2014).

By 1987, Afghanistan's last Communist leader and former head of the KHAD, Najibullah, in conversation with Gorbachev, rued how "our country has become one of the main links of a policy of state terrorism being pursued by the US". Similarly Gorbachev himself expressed his frustration at the Afghan-Soviet campaign at the 1987 Soviet Party conference, decrying that the war had left an open, "bleeding wound"<sup>35</sup>. Guerrilla warfare lead to stalemate, with the Soviet military machine unable to penetrate the mountains and valleys of Helmand and the Panjshir valley, whilst the rebels launched a string of unsuccessful sieges of the major cities in the late 1980s. Afghan commanders, supported by ISI strategists, planned a siege of Jalalabad in March 1989, which was anticipated to bring a swift end to the PDPA regime. Instead, it ended in a stalemate after heavy losses were inflicted on the Mujahedeen.

---

<sup>35</sup> CIA Archive: Directorate of Intelligence: The Costs of Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan. CIA special collection. February 1987. Released in 2000.

For Pakistani activist and writer Eqbal Ahmed, this put the rebel tactics into sharp contrast with Vietnamese efforts at annihilating the French at Dien Bien Phu, thirty-five years earlier. Not only did the Mujahedeen lack a coordination coalition structure and centre of command, they lacked the tactical acumen displayed by the Viet Minh. Moreover the logistical support provided by the people to bring the Vietnamese artillery through the dense jungle and into the hills surrounding French fortifications, was not apparent in the Jalalabad onslaught in 1989. Despite the support of the ISI, seizing Jalalabad from the PDPA proved very difficult. Eqbal Ahmed writes, “beyond generalized promises of an Islamic state, the resistance organizations offered no positive or consistent vision that could motivate the population” (Ahmed: 2006:498). In a sense the Mujahedeen had ignored, “the lessons of Mao Tse Tung...wars of national liberation...distinguishing it from simple guerrilla warfare” (Ahmed: 2006:298). They had paid the price for their division and protracted struggle against the PDPA as well as their adherence to a transnational regime of militarization. Connected to Ahmed’s reflections, the global terrain had altogether transformed from, 1954 to 1989, as left and anti-imperial forces were gradually overcome through the alliance of the US led western alliance, postcolonial security states and sectarian, religious right forces.

Following the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, the conflict between Afghan Mujahedeen groups intensified. Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e-Islami were initially Pakistan’s favoured rebel group. The ISI viewed Hekmatyar as one the most effective warlords fighting the PDPA. Not only was he a formidable battle commander, but this hard-line Islamist politics seemed a strong barrier to royalist and nationalist advocates for Pashtun nationalism. However Hekmatyar’s irreverence towards Pakistani-US-Saudi backers and growing tendency to prioritise attacking rival factions over fighting the government, saw him lose favour in the early 1990s. Moreover, his war with Massoud and Dostum, inflicted massive damage on Kabul. A loose coalition of Mujahedeen party leaders set up a delicate interim government in 1992 following the taking of Kabul. Nevertheless, stability proved elusive. Effective justice was non-existent.

Afghanistan became a political vacuum, contested by scores of commanders backed by regional governments, fostering a political terrain dominated by *warlordism*, atrocity and conflict (Gopal: 2014:5-7). Additionally, the Afghan economy and society had all but collapsed, and was kept on life support by international donors (Rashid: 2000). Giustozzi suggests three major repercussions of the war. They included, “the creation of a military class with deep roots in society; the destabilization of social, political and economic life; and the accumulation of tactical and operational military knowledge” (2012:17).

Decimated by fratricide violence, plunder and massacres, self-interested Mujahedeen commanders lost the support of the clergy, jirgas and local power elite. By 1994-96 Pakistani ISI and military officers began supporting a new movement. Raised in the refugee camps of the borderlands and deeply connected to the Pashtun heartlands in Helmand, these religious students, or Talibs, would receive international backing, conquer Kabul by 1996 and install a theocratic regime situated within modern networks of social relations and power politics.

Within this social context, the Taliban emerged on the world stage. They sought both to revitalize a tainted Jihad, whilst implementing a judicial transformation based on the hardline interpretations of Shariah Islamic legal structures, to guarantee an element of social stability. The Wahhabi and Salafi politics that would dominate Al Qaida’s emergence was influential, and provided financial, educational and religious resources. However, it was the Subcontinent’s tradition of Deobandi Islam that grounded the Taliban, alongside its Pashtun heritage and borderland histories of conflict and interconnection with religious and development networks. Mujahedeen repertoires of resistance were redeployed and redefined by both the Taliban, and other militant groups in the region during the post-2001 era (Giustozzi: 2012:17). Despite the Taliban’s puritanical rule, their regional alignments and political-military force in Southern Afghanistan, brought about a modern transboundary

power structure, and with it a semblance of order, however brutal, to a generation attuned to the traumas of chaos, instability and violence (Gopal: 2014:10-11).

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the US redeployment to the Persian Gulf during the First Gulf War, Afghanistan seemed to have been forgotten by the great powers. The Thatcher-Reagan era of the 1980s ushered in a global, neoliberal political economy, which redefined the consensus on state development, now orientated towards free markets that came to conflate freedom of the market with freedom of the individual (Harvey: 2005:7). Neoliberal finance came to be inextricably tied up with the political economy of modern warfare, and the rise of international financial institutions, which aimed at disciplining global south societies and their economies (Klein: 2007, Gregory: 2004, Khalili: 2012). Within the context of an increasingly ‘globalized’ world, the emergence of international disciplinary regimes, led by the IMF and the World Bank, the rise of NGOs and the connected logics of liberal internationalism and humanitarian intervention, enabled a new set of ideas, practices and institutions, in the Global South. This context is central to understanding the War on Terror, specifically in the case of interventions in Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, Syria and also in the increasing privatization of war, coupled with the outsourcing of imperial violence to postcolonial armies. Yet the intended and unintended consequences of transnational interventions have spawned their own specters. The emergence and expansion of Al Qaida and its offshoots, is the foremost example of the modern entanglements between neoliberal globalized flows and militancy (Devji: 2005, Roy: 2002).

The late Cold War was the pinnacle of clandestine warfare at its most grandiose scale. US efforts saw the expansion of a “massive warning bureaucracy” (Coll: 2004:416) – that encompassed the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Pentagon. This led to the consolidation of a hegemonic culture surrounding strategic thought and security studies, including a whole swathe of social scientists, analysts and linguists, charged with mapping

geopolitical trends and monitoring security threats. The presence of a global surveillance project informed the reshaping of the international order, but not always in the ways expected by Washington strategists. In the context of US-Saudi-Pakistani patronage, the Afghan war effort was engaged in fighting the Soviet occupation and the Afghan Communist government. But unexpected consequences of patron-client relations and the mutation of the Mujahedeen spawned both the *territorialisation* of the Taliban, and conversely the *internationalization* of the global Jihad following the Soviet withdrawal, in the context of Bin Laden's war against the US in the Gulf. Contemporaneously the ISI became one of the largest and most powerful spy agencies in the world, during the 1980s.

The broader Pakistani military and security architecture expanded exponentially in the context of the war, amassing a sprawling property empire with ventures across Pakistan (Siddiq: 2007). The superpowers may have left, but the Afghan civil war and its position within global transboundary circuits of war, commerce and logistics, secured a pyrrhic victory for Pakistan's security managers. Whilst the covert war had been successful and billions of dollars had flowed in, the spread of violence, sectarianism, illicit money, opium and 'Kalashnikoff culture', poisoned Pakistan in the process (Begum: 2017).

Thus the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan in 1988 brought imperial blowback to roost in Moscow. 15000 Soldiers were killed and 50,000 injured, the highest number of Soviet military dead since the Second World War (Kalinovsky: 2011: 168). The war acted as a catalyst that connected to other key ruptures contributing to the Soviet Union's decline, including economic decay, political mismanagement and a rising critical public sphere following Glastnost. Nothing undermined the Soviet narrative more than the accounts from returning Soviet veterans (Alexievich: 2017). Gorbachev understood this acutely yet he was reacting to social and historical forces as the USSR disintegrated, devoured by combination of western financial 'shock doctrines'; oligarchs and KGB led nationalist forces. This widening

gulf between the Kremlin and the lived conditions of its citizens, occurred both in Russia and in the Soviet republics, where protest at the Afghan war contributed to growing nationalist movements. It was not only the Soviets and the Afghans who had paid a bitter price. In the US militarism came home to roost once more, this time coupled with a raging opioid crisis, in part shaped by the Afghan war. Here we see the planetary effects of blowback from imperial histories of conflict in the wars of the late Cold War. In the final section of the chapter I develop some core evaluations to the argument that Pakistani encounters in the Afghan war illustrate a transboundary terrain of conflict, which constrained empires.

## **5 Reflections on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Theatre and Pakistani global encounters**

The Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier and the wider Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre, was shaped by and helped shape successive histories of conflict. Its people defeated three superpowers during the Great Game, the Afghan-Soviet War and the War on Terror. Yet they were also subject to numerous tragedies in the process. A transboundary theatre of co-constitution fused the destinies of places and peoples, institutions and events. The Soviet invasion internationalized both the Afghan civil war and the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands dispute at the same time. In response the Pakistan-Saudi alliance shaped the diplomatic, political, military, financial and logistical backing for the international *Jihad* against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. As with other aspects of modern power politics, regimes of territoriality and the cartographic imagining of modern borders promote conclusiveness to ideas of people and place. They include the powerful geographic ability to enclose, demarcate and isolate. And they help to mobilize ideas of war, politics, and sovereignty that are conditioned by contingent strategic

and tactical factors within trans regional social terrains. But these are only ever partial, and in line with transboundary, trans-regional networks, they mutate in the furnace of war.

This chapter has sketched the complex puzzle of these conflicts, by thinking through critical geopolitical registers such as the borderlands, the frontier and South-West Asia, in part to complicate the national and regional mapping that dominates Eurocentric social science. It has charted how Pakistanis and Afghans supercharged the borderlands, ensnaring the fears and ambitions of outside powers. Traditionally, singular frames reify the spatial imaginings of power-knowledge dynamics, observing the fact and not the mutability of the border, and fail to explain the hybrid eras of Cold War and Decolonization. In contrast I have attempted to overcome these obstacles, through reading the Afghan-Soviet war within a longer historical arc and within a transboundary theatre of struggle. I have provided an analysis of the complex changing sociologies of South-South relations, and have sought to explain how they mapped onto North-South and East-West antagonisms in the context of the Afghan Soviet war. By doing so I hope to have explained something about the transnational, interconnected yet differentiated nature of the *longue dure* of global encounters along the frontier, across the borderlands and throughout the region.

The cost to Pakistani and Afghan society is immeasurable. The Afghan civil war, the Soviet occupation and the Pakistani-US led projects along the border, acted as incubator for Kashmiri militancy, global Jihadism and then the rise of Pakistani sectarian groups including the anti-state Pakistani PTT. In the context of the War on Terror, it would be latter's forces which sought revenge for Musharraf's counterinsurgency in the borderlands. Taking their war from the Tribal Areas into the cities, the PTT bombed schools and hospitals, slaughtered minorities, and allied them with Al Qaida. The war had come home and transformed Pakistan forever. The politics of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was not simply the result of a sole imperial legacy. Rather the border was re-inscribed by both

Pakistani and Afghan postcolonial nation building projects, their struggles with non-hegemonic forces, and their cross—border struggles. The Pakistani state's adoption and intensification of bordering and ordering practices in the Borderlands restructured FATA as a buffer zone, in a different way to how Afghanistan was viewed as a buffer state in Soviet and US modernizing plans (Nunan: 2015). The borderlands expand in the growing political significance, inflaming interconnected struggles in the region, creating multiple sites of conflagration after the Cold War.

A sharp divide exists between the heartlands of power, namely Punjab and the metropolitan centers and the regions along the borderlands, particularly FATA. This relationship exacerbated the old colonial relations between metropolises and periphery and expanded them in the context of the Cold War and the War on Terror. At the same time, despite the uneven development, what is striking is the mobility of communities across the borderlands (Hopkins & Marsden: 2012). By centering the Pakistanis and their ambivalent and tense relations with anticolonial, anticommunist and Islamist social forces, we get to a deeper understanding of world politics.

Histories of the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands demonstrate the contradictions of the spread of the modern nation-state. The border as a political category, and sovereignty as a political norm, were transformed by the Pakistani state, whose security architects had no qualms with exceeding territorial boundaries, in their quest to marry global anti-communist fervour, Islamic universalism and defence against India. Security architects viewed Pakistani ambiguity over its national identity, as a source of jeopardy but also as a strategic opportunity (Jalal: 1995:2). Yet histories of the border invite us to trace longer histories of imperial and anti-imperial politics that lived on in the late Cold War. Consequently, investigating Pakistani imaginaries, imperial path dependencies and uneven structures of power, provides a portal from which to re-examine the changing landscapes of struggle characterizing the borderlands.

Far from the isolated, 'savage frontier' descriptions of the region, the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands are conditioned by deeply modern historical, social and political processes, whose transboundary encounters, are only partially recovered in studies of international politics.

In June 1989, just months before his death in a plane crash, Zia claimed, in an interview that Pakistan's actions had been justified. He argued, "we have earned the right to have a very friendly regime there...we took risks as a front-line state, and we won't permit it to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claims on our territory. It will be a real Islamic state, part of a pan-Islamic revival"<sup>36</sup>. In the context of the 2021 Taliban victory, those words ring true. However, Pakistanis have not enjoyed the fruits of their leader's 'Strategic Depth' doctrine. The legacies of Pakistani involvement in the Afghan war includes US drone warfare, Pakistani counter-insurgency operations in FATA and the militarization and radicalization of society. Terrorist attacks on ethnic and religious minorities, as well as on-going separatist resistance, have ensured the Durand Line has remained a source of instability. Power shapes resistance in ways which both mimic the violent manifestations of power politics, while sowing the seeds for redefined logics of violence amidst renewed fields of struggle. War transforms societies, battles spur realignments, and experiences of war create ever more divided social terrains.

---

<sup>36</sup> Selig Harrison. Who will win the bloody battle for Kabul? Washington Post. January 29, 1989.

**Chapter Six: Pakistani entanglements in World Order struggles: Anti-Communist Jihad, the Cold War and Decolonization**

*“In military campaigns I have heard of awkward speed but have never seen any skill in lengthy campaigns.*

*No country has ever profited from protracted warfare.”*

*Sun Tzu*

*“The Jihad, accordingly, may be stated as a doctrine of a permanent state of war”*

*Majid Khadduri*

*“There was one consolation for General Akhter: the intelligence agency he ran was worthy of a superpower”*

*Muhammad Hanif*

**Introduction**

Two pairs of academics visited Pakistan and Afghanistan; the first during the Soviet occupation and the latter, during US led ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) intervention. Journeying through Pakistan together in 1988, Pakistani activist-writer Eqbal Ahmed and historian Richard Barnett, recount a scene from their research trip, when they came across a spectacle in the valleys outside Peshawar. Joined by Afghan friends, they witnessed a large crowd watching a game of *Buzkashi*, an ancient Central Asian game, in which horse-mounted teams of players compete for a calf or goat carcass, which they race to the opponent’s goal. A brutal sport played with no protective gear, and lacking in rules specifying team sizes, it remains a popular spectacle in Northern Pakistan. At the match, the scholars met Sayd Marjooh, an ex-professor at Kabul University. They

asked his thoughts on the game. Moorjah's sarcastic response struck a chord, "Afghanistan is the calf in this *Buzkashi* between Moscow and Washington...go see the game. We have brought it here to Pakistan. You will understand much about Afghanistan and about this war"<sup>37</sup>.

Eighteen years later in 2006, anthropologist Magnus Marsden and historian Benjamin Hopkins visited a wintery Kabul. There they met ISAF officers who were enthusiastic about the opportunity to "learn from the past success of the British in the region. A number of these officers commented that the Pakistani army which carried forward both the martial and intellectual traditions of the British Raj, knew how best to handle the Frontier's men" (Marsden & Hopkins: 2011: 5). What can we take away from these encounters? Pakistanis are entangled in long histories connecting them to Anglo-American imperial relations, as well as longer, deeper ties to the Muslim world.

The novelty of the creation of Pakistan arose from both the magnitude of the development of a modern Islamic state and its emergence with no preceding locus. The Pakistani state inherited the military-bureaucracy institutions, the borders, practices and ordering world-views of colonial power (Bajwa: 1996, Jalal: 2014). Imperial relations and their afterlives shaped changing structures of power in Pakistan through British colonial borders, military bureaucratic institutions and by path dependencies following colonial rule. In the context of the post Second World War order, imperial relations transformed through the dispersal of imperial violence to postcolonial rentier security politics, with devastating consequences for societies in the global south. The US Cold War had irrevocable effects on Pakistan's postcolonial politics in the creation of violent hierarchical orders aligned to US Cold War architects.

---

<sup>37</sup> 'Bloody Games'. Eqbal Ahmed and Barnett Rubin. The New Yorker: 11th April, 1988.

In this chapter I explain how Pakistani Cold War encounters reshaped world politics and rewrite our histories of world order. As the final substantive chapter, it continues the previous chapter's focus on Pakistani encounters in the Afghan-Soviet War, this time from a perspective combining theory, historiography and archival research. It culminates in an examination of Pakistani trajectories during the late Cold War and what they tell us about histories of post 1945 world order. Conflict and contestation over the basic presuppositions of what Pakistan means for domestic and world politics, had a decisive impact on the late Cold War. The uneven nature of postcolonial politics, the inability to create consent and so rely on coercion, and the ambivalence towards Islam, territory and empire, have all shaped Pakistani Cold War trajectories. Pakistan "never possessed a stable form even in its own imaginaries" (Devji: 2013: 22). Rather people and politicians wrestled with the idea of community, Islam's role in the state, and the economic and foreign policies of the nation. Pakistanis faced an uncertain postcolonial future, conditioned by an unfamiliar Cold War meta-narrative, and were faced with how, "the audacity of Pakistan as a political idea stood in direct proportion to its territorial logic" (Nunan: 2016: 121).

Part of the ambivalence of Pakistan as an entity, stemmed from the contradiction between its radical and swift success during a ten-year period from which it was imagined to its formation, and the fact that as an ex-nihilo order, Pakistan lacked a national culture that could bind Muslim nationalism (Sayyid: 2017). It is in this context that Pakistan's changing borders, lack of national identity and insecurities over its geopolitics, came to shape the practices, institutions and outlooks of its leaders (Devji: 2013: 6). Pakistan's US alliance and connections to the Gulf monarchies, enabled a renewed round of transnationalism along the Durand border. This argument has three major benefits for scholarship. First it deepens our understanding of the intersections between the historical, socio-cultural and geopolitical histories of the borderlands, and connects them to the

histories of the Afghan-Soviet War. Second, it extends our theoretical and analytical lenses on regional struggles, ties in Pakistani trajectories to South West Asia, and incorporates the use of new archival material on revolutionary borderlands politics. Finally it deepens the historiography of post 1945 world order histories, by compelling us to resituate the Afghan-Soviet war in the histories of the Cold War and decolonization, offering a novel interpretive framework, with insights for the post Cold War era.

Pakistan's roles in shaping the Afghan – Soviet war helped to transform a war of national liberation into a global Jihad, a strategy which provided a rulebook for the adoption of Jihad, state terror and covert proxy war, which now plays out in the ruins of societies following twenty years of the War on Terror. The US led war in 2001 turned the fury of Washington onto the Jihadis, but inadvertently spread their franchises globally, inciting the unintended consequences, with characteristics that entangle global anti-communist and counter-revolutionary histories of warfare. Concurrently, “the Afghan war became a window to a new Pakistan, one in which the security apparatus became virtually indistinguishable from the ‘non-state’ right wing” (Akhtar in Tahir: 21012:10). But the Pakistani state elite's ability to exercise hegemony, extend sovereignty and evade territoriality was constantly undermined by counter-hegemonic forces.

Pakistani establishment blocs have become active participants in project to reconstitute imperial hierarchies via the outsourcing of American empire in the post-colony (Getachew: 2019: 31). In reigniting a politics of military patronage and fluctuating sovereignty, Islamabad sought to counter an Indian, Soviet and Afghan axis along the borderlands (Leake: 2017). Postcolonial futures gave way to Jihadist nightmares, precisely because of the failure of local, secular, anti-imperial and progressive politics (Devji: 200:28). The power of imperial dependencies, feudal politics and uneven capitalist development constrained progressive

forces throughout the Cold War. Despite this, Pakistan Cold exhibited a vibrant socio-cultural politics of dissent, creativity and solidarity (Toor: 2011, Ali: 2015).

The chapter begins by exploring how cold war trajectories and the promise of decolonization became engulfed in the power struggles of the late cold war, in ways that intimately connected Pakistanis to transnational networks during the Afghan Jihad, and the repercussions for modern power politics. Next I sketch a history of struggle along the borderlands, prior to the Afghan war. Chiefly, this section examines how Maoist and Baloch liberation politics, informed the state backlash, and derived from an older history of anti-colonial politics. In the context of the state's alliance with transnational Islamists, these forces would lose ground. Following on, I outline the encounter of the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) in relation to the Afghan rebels and the CIA in forming a transnational assemblage of covert warfare, which proved crucial in defeating the Soviets and dismantling the Afghan Communist state. I then dissect the importance of the war as a historical event places within the rubrics of the Cold War and decolonization. Following on, the conclusion reflects on the wider trajectory of Pakistani global encounters during the Cold War.

The revolutionary message of Pan-Islamic power and third world revolution emanating from the Iranian Revolution, the world historic leadership of Khomeini and the rise of the Islamic Republic, stood in contrast to the secular nationalist and socialist regimes of the Arab world. But it also had the corresponding effect of incentivizing both the Pakistani state and the religious right into unison, bounded by a Sunni conservative nationalism, deriving from Maududi's modern Islamist doctrine which effectively modernized Deobandi politics whilst remaining receptive to Wahhabi funding. (Nasr:1994). The rise of Pakistani Sunni sectarian groups, who would fight in Afghanistan as well as in Kashmir, before launching a sectarian war in Pakistan during the 1990s, included groups such as Jaish-i-Mohammed and Sipah Sahaba Pakistan, both of which emerged from this tense set of social encounters binding Iran,

Afghanistan and Pakistan (Devji: 2005:54). Yet the histories of the Mazdoor Kissan Movement and the Baluchistan Liberation Front, complicate Eurocentric analyses of the borderland. By crafting a history of both the revolutionary precursor to the Afghan war, and the era of the alliance between anti-communism and Jihad, I seek to chart a historic period of international change, for what it tells us about transboundary encounters in the making of world order. In this way, the following and penultimate sections act as theoretic and historiographical examinations, whilst the study of the revolutionary politics and covert operations of the 1970s and 1980s acts as contrasting analytical and empirical material. Thus the chapter begins by giving an analysis of some of the core global and regional trajectories that took place before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It then charts an alternative history of the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands through examining the effects of Maoist and Ethno-Separatist liberation struggles along the Durand Line. Following on, I contrast this focus on counter-hegemonic movements, with a study of the covert relations between the ISI, the CIA and the Mujahedeen. Lastly I consider the Afghan-Soviet war as a historical event in the history of the Cold War and decolonization, before suggesting some concluding remarks. The conclusion of the thesis follows this chapter, and binds the core thematic points together.

## **1 The decomposition of the late Cold War and Decolonization in South West Asia**

In this section I historicize the Cold War's narratives by going beyond the dominant Eurocentric frames, in order to sketch out a global history of the late Cold War, and the events leading to the Afghan-Soviet War. In so doing, I argue the Cold War was understood and fought in different, often contradictory ways, and connected with local and regional processes, events and encounters. Second, by examining the afterlives of war and revolution

in South West Asia (Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan) I challenge the notion that the Cold War marked a decisive break in world history, by clarifying its afterlives in the planetary blowback that continues to shake world politics (Fukuyama: 1992, Devji: 2005). Cold War struggles are foregrounded in our accounts of post 1945 history, to the detriment of histories of decolonization (Leslie & Leake: 2015). Great power conflict takes precedence in IR, and Decolonization is relegated to a secondary position, even as it redefined the twentieth century and fused with longer histories of imperial relations involving South-South and North-South connectivity (Barkawi: 2019).

One of the consequences of world order struggles was the decomposition and fragmentation of the idea of Cold War bi-polarity and East-West conflict, in relation to North-South and South-South entanglements. The 'decomposition' of the Cold War order took place in many Southern theatres as local and regional processes involving everyday people, who altered the machinations of strategists in creative ways (Kwon: 2010). Whilst the superpowers expanded their conflict outside of Europe, during the Cold War, the study of the Cold War remains imprisoned by the architectures of representation used to describe it as a 'long Peace', which in reality only took place in Western Europe. Provincializing superpower division enables a supporting cast of states and movements to become active players in a global set of scaled and interlinked conflicts. (Kanet: 2006: 331) During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, these historical transformations overlapped in complex ways and were underpinned by longer histories of struggle supercharged by four centuries of colonial and anti-colonial encounters. Imperial entanglements refers to the networks and practices of empire that connect states and social forces, in ways which offer us rich tools from which to think through international hierarchies and forms of modern power politics (Cox: 1981, Mattern & Zarakol: 2017, Goddard & Nexon: 2015).

In addition, three events took place in the late Cold War, which overturn the hegemony of dominant assumptions on the Cold War, for our post 1945 histories. The Sino-Soviet split shatters the Communist International and engenders a splitting of allegiances amongst left forces and aligned postcolonial revolutionaries. Beginning under Deng Xiaoping's economic and political restructuring following Mao's death in 1976, China abandoned revolutionary Maoism in favour of market economy changes towards state capitalist planning and moved towards sponsoring postcolonial states, foremost of these new clients was the Pakistanis who the Chinese saw as both strategic assets, following their facilitation of Nixon and Kissinger's overtures to the Chinese during the 1970s. Second, Global anti-communist networks facilitated funding, arming, training, trading and logistics from Nicaragua to Indonesia, in ways which were refined in the Pakistan-Afghanistan context during the Soviet occupation. The 'Jakarta Method' of Anti-communist insurgency dated back to 1965, whilst left revolutionary forces continued to espouse Marxist revolution and pan-regional solidarity well into the 1980s, in places like Burkina Faso and Nicaragua (Bevins: 2020).

Shifts in dynamics of revolutionary warfare and counter-insurgency retribution energized new networks in the context of Reagan's New Right and the re-emergence of links between Washington's Cold War warriors, ethnic, sectarian and militant anti-communist forces. Hence, the "US-led liberal international order in "the West" after 1945 was constituted by a significant far-right ideological and sociopolitical presence" (Anievas & Saull: 2019: 390). Third, Economic transformations during the 1970s, awakened the financial power of the Gulf monarchies. US inflation, the global 1973-5 recession, and the reversal of post 1945 economic expansion lead to unemployment and inflation worldwide. Together they lead to the decline of industrial and manufacturing sectors in the West, the moving of capital to financial institutions, the growth of global financial regimes on postcolonial states, and the growing influence of financiers, investors and

financial institutions on state's economies. The 1973-4 oil embargo by Arab petroleum producing states conveyed the new financial muscle of Gulf monarchies and authoritarian regimes. OPEC member states in the Middle East were earning significantly more capital from oil exportation than state administrators could effectively deploy in domestic infrastructure. The result was the massive spending on religious, development and militarism, primarily for development projects and the sponsoring of Islamist and Jihadist groups. Subsequently, interconnections between oil producers, financial, strategic and logistic networks, were fundamental, alongside US and Pakistani patronage, to the Mujahedeen's ability to withstand and confront the Red army. Taken together, these historic processes complicate our established Cold War narratives. Thus the split in the Communist International, the rise of US anti-communist offensives, and the role of modern economic transformations, shook the foundations of world politics, and impacted the Pakistani global encounter during the Afghan-Soviet War.

In liberal theories of world politics, decolonization marks the end of empire and the unavoidable rise of sovereign nations under the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, rather than appearing as set of global worldmaking projects which redefined society and envisioned a "domination-free and egalitarian international order (Getachew: 2019: 2). Likewise in classic accounts of the Cold War, we are informed that peace between the superpowers, secured by mutually assured destruction between thermo- nuclear-armed states, created an uneasy equilibrium that prevented global war (Gaddis: 1992). But when we provincialize the experience of Europe from post 1945 world politics, we become aware that the era was marked by a series of bloody, interconnected conflicts, in effect creating a war system post 1945 (Ahmed: 2006). Historians like Westad and Chamberlain have urged us to be aware of the deeply violent world conflicts underway in South America, Africa and Asia. Chamberlin reminds us that, "the Cold War confrontation functioned as a central nervous system, linking disparate societies and distant battlefields

into a global network through which flows of arms, capital, tactical knowledge, soldiers, and political ideologies circulated” (Chamberlain: 2018:12). Indeed the southern rim of South West Asia, at the Soviet border with the Middle East, and the wider region stretching from Lebanon to Korea, were the heartlands of the Cold War. In Kabul, Islamabad and Tehran, Communists and Islamists, overthrew secular nationalist regimes between 1978 and 1979.

Anti-communism proved to be an especially fertile ground for Western backed postcolonial elites to reverse the radical potential of anti-imperial decolonization, through equating alternative imaginings as communist. And yet Cold War designs imagined in Washington or Moscow rarely squared up to the reality of postcolonial geographies in the Global South. Instead, imperial conflict was renewed and entwined with changing regional dynamics, while academics failed to capture world-changing events, casting conflicts as civil wars or proxy wars, and failing to anticipate the end of the Cold War. The US and its allies marshalled a strategy to destroy not only Soviet sympathizers but also the advocates of anti-imperial internationalism, developing into a world order project that militarized the Global South (Bevins: 2020). The egalitarian promise of decolonization as a global redistribution of economic and geopolitical power was countered by US (and in a different way Soviet) patronage over clients. From the killing fields of Indonesia in the 1950s to Latin America in the 1960s, a method was extrapolated to systematically engineer the red scare, and to exterminate those who opposed imperial retrenchment (Bevins: 2020, Grandin: 2006). From the late 1970s onwards however, a new set of dynamics emerged. It is during this period that the US led world order project fully inculcates non-state militants into the global anti-communist project (Robinson: 1996).

Across the Global South, the superpowers fought for clients, contacts and space to survey, test arms and assert dominance. An entire architecture of representation cemented these ideas into reality. In defiance, anti-imperial faction continued to think through planetary relations of empire and capitalism, rather than the Cold War binaries, as the fundamental fault line. This was not a new struggle, they argued, between East and West, but consistent with half a millennia of relations between the imperial North and the Global South. Contemplate how the Algerian war of liberation transformed the politics of metropolitan France. Or how transboundary relations binding Cold War China to its South East Asian neighbours created divergent state building projects in the borderlands connecting China with Thailand and Myanmar. Or how the historic battle between the Viet Minh and the French at Dien Bien Phu, infused North Vietnam with particular socio-cultural and historical sensibilities that have formed an important form of collective memory and social power (Han: 2019, Shepherd: 2007, Lentz: 2019). Thus we can learn more about global historical events, by investigating North-South and South-South entanglements in world politics, addressing a different standpoint into global dynamics, and by moving the traditional focus, from states and security, to transboundary encounters and effects.

Thinking through Pakistani-Afghan connections across the border and across historical time invites a deeper investigation into modern transboundary encounters implicit in the Afghan-Soviet War, conditioned by imperial, Cold War, as well as regional and postcolonial transformations. I chart how thinking about Cold War politics as transboundary wars and social upheavals, reveals how East-West superpower struggle was punctuated and outlasted by North-South imperial struggles, amid world historical changes to the character of anti-colonial politics and Muslim social transformation in the 'Islamosphere' of West Asia (Sayyid: 2017). Colossal World War style field operations were superseded by insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, as well as assassinations,

suppressions and massacres between 1945 and 1990. Yet imperial blowback from so-called 'small wars' had planetary consequences (Mack: 1975, Caverly: 2009, Hoffman: 2005). Rather than being examples of limited, confined or new conflicts, conflicts in the Global South traversed borders, unleashed universalisms and constrained empires.

The Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre emerged as the most consequential site of military struggle in the late Cold War, shifting power in favour of the US, contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union (Reuveny & Prakash: 1999). The legacy for the alliance between Western geopolitical powers and transnational Islamists was the War on Terror, a new era of entwined worldwide struggle orchestrated over several interlinked theatres, with no clear objective. This two-decade conflict has propelled imperial blowback of a previously unimaginable magnitude, refashioned the West and shattered the semblance of unity in its societies, amplifying division back into the metropolises.

Centuries of imperial violence and ordering crafted global hierarchies in ways that have promoted sectarian, ethnocentric and religious-militant alternatives to secular egalitarian projects of anti-colonialism. Subsequently rethinking the Afghan-Soviet war (1979-89) as a global historical event unsettles and revises theories and linear histories of world order in terms of Cold War and imperial history. In making the case that global conflicts compels us to rethink our histories of world order, I argue for thinking through 1) the transnational emergence of geopolitical postcolonial Pakistan as an active frontline power in the Cold War 2) the development of a planetary embrace of global anti-communism and Militant Islamism to stifle left forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan and 3) the effects of blowback on world politics.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, whilst both Superpowers fought for global supremacy, postcolonial projects and counter-hegemonic projects contested the role of

empire, state and capital. In Pakistan, the messy politics of the Cold War constrained the anti-imperial left, whilst allowing for the expansion of militarism through the rubrics of anti-communism and officially sanctioned jihad, with detrimental effects for long-term stability. These struggles had a vital role in effecting the Afghan war and by extension, the end of the Cold War. The Afghan war was shaped in the relations between superpowers; state and social forces during the US led proxy war, as Pakistani state managers were suddenly catapulted into directing the largest covert operation in the CIA's history. They played a vital role in connecting international donors and intelligence agencies, with Afghan and transnational militant forces (Yusuf & Adkin: 2007).

If the Afghan Soviet war shaped the ending of the Cold War, then it follows that Pakistani social forces were pivotal actors. The Cold War was won along the Pakistan-Afghan borderlands. Bi-polar superpower conflict and national-strategic optics are continuously used as the primary registers to understand the Afghan civil war and Afghan-Soviet war. The relations between the Pakistan-Afghan theatre and the Islamic world, the strange bedfellows of empire and Islamism, and the hydra headed contortions of decolonization and anti-imperialism- are less well-known drivers of the war. The Afghan-Soviet war coincides with a changing world order This has world historic effects, unleashing modern hybridizations of culture in the dense enmeshing of Islamist militarism, international finance, logistics, global anti-communism and international hierarchies (Devji: 2005). Conflicts between socialist revolutionaries, Islamist militants and ethno-separatists, meant that the Pakistan-Afghanistan region became a particular site of complex, interconnected conflict. The various battles for power for Afghan sovereignty, Pashtun power and Pakistani strategy together represented a complex, interconnected field. The various battles for power intersected with global, regional, national and local schisms.

Reflect here on Pakistan and Afghanistan's shared and divergent imperial trajectories. In Afghanistan, local contests for power, class conflict and intra-tribal and local struggles contributed to the fragmentation of old ideological blocs including the royalist, urban modernizing and professional classes. They had staffed both Daoud Khan's nationalist regime and later the PDPA communist government. In their place the power of foreign backed rebels was only possible due to strong links to the tribal Jirga's, Deobandi clergy as well and local strongmen (Dorransoro: 2005, Rubin: 1995, Roy: 1986). Meanwhile realignments between the religious right with the Pakistani state and the US challenged the sharp ideological demarcations popularized in earlier eras of the Cold War.

By contrast, Pakistan's independence emerged from the sharp distinction between the communal anguish of Partition, and the ordered elite transition of power. Its ruling classes adopted a strategy governed by a policy of close cooperation with Washington and Whitehall, particularly in the first decade of independence, when Pakistan was both part of the Commonwealth, and when British officers still served in the delicate handover of military power. This close link stemmed from the upper echelons of the old British Indian army (Barkawi: 2017). Part of the reason for the Pakistani military officer's self-identification came from the fact they had been part of the elite professionalized, Anglicized, military and bureaucratic classes. Despite the national project's power projection, it wasn't lost on officers that the heartland of Muslim civilization on the Subcontinent; the Mughal North Indian center, had been ceded. Nevertheless, Pakistani Cold War power projection animated imperial path dependencies in terms of institutional culture, operational practice and geopolitical outlook.

There are several implications from this analysis. First, the networks facilitating the conflicts along the border, prior to the Soviet occupation, have not received sufficient attention, despite the fact that these transnational networks spanned continents, and

bound South Asia to the Middle East and Central Asia. Instead of the homogenous milieus we observe in orthodox accounts, Pakistanis and Afghans shared histories of highly complex social terrains, characterized by clashing ideological, class and geopolitical projects. The Pakistan- Afghan borderlands and the colonial afterlives of the Frontier along the Durand Line, fashioned a unique set of evolving social ties which transformed successive histories of conflict across Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Second, the entangled, multi-scalar transboundary connections between local, provincial, national, regional and trans-continental, which are referenced but not detailed, in 'global' accounts of the Cold War (Westad: 2005). This is a friendly assessment and extension, rather than a critique of Cold War historians like Westad and Chamberlin, who have done much to attune us to the global, violent and connected terrains of the global Cold War. The 'sectarian' violence of the late Cold War is itself a consequence of earlier Cold War processes, in which the decline of an autonomous left and anti-colonial liberation forces in world politics foreshadowed the rise of US backed global anti-communism. One of the great consequences of this transformation was the transition from anti-colonial nationalisms to ethno-nationalisms, under changing geopolitical and economic conditions. Thus, the "decomposition of the Cold War" was a by-product of, "the crosscutting dimensions of colonial history and bipolar history" (Kwon: 2010: 55). It is only through the provincialization of Europe as a political category, that we view other, experiences of the Cold War, as other realities not simply imprisoned but enmeshed in the Enlightenment projects of capitalism and communism. This is crucial to better gaging the Cold War as a global process, involving changes and continuities, centrifugal and centripetal trajectories (Leake & James: 2015, Chakrabarty: 2000, Kwon: 2010).

Decolonization reaches the level of importance we usually reserve for great power rivalries and world wars (Barkawi: 2109). This perspective asserts that the Cold War was

an extension of imperial struggle involving histories of successive epochs of inter-imperial rivalry and North-South as well as South-South wars, insurgencies and repressions. It allows us to rethink the networks, encounters and generative outcomes of events involving Pakistanis in the Afghan-Soviet war, and their mutual-co-constitution in transnational networks of war, commerce, logistics and development. Moreover, it offers a route towards non- Eurocentric security studies analysis, having paid attention to the local, regional and trans regional struggles of the political geographies of the borderlands, the Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre and the wider South West Asia region, in ways that account for the generative, spatial, temporal and moral phenomena implicit in Pakistani Cold War encounters.

Recalibrating imperial and Cold War history necessitates understanding both the imaginaries of movements and states in the Global South, in relation to South-South connectivity, as well South-North relations. It means re-centring our analysis to focus our social and historical inquiry into the very thickness and intensity of transboundary encounters in the forging of networks of alliances, security, development, trade and war making. Additionally, the Afghan-Soviet war disrupts accounts of unipolarity and Western supremacy at the end of the Cold War. The war and planetary consequences and forces us to rewrite accounts of world order and modern power politics because it compels us to rethink how territorial sovereign states and their accompanying bordering and ordering practices, enmesh uneasily with transboundary connections between societies.

Moreover, a relational rather than a unitary state ontology helps to avoid the pitfalls of methodological nationalism and state-centrism in our optics (Rosenberg: 2006, Go: 2016). It focuses attention on the ontology of the evolving relationships between, and co-constitution of states, social forces and world orders (Cox: 1981). Pakistani agency is

multiple, differentiated, enabling of certain political practices whilst being constrained by conditions, international and domestic pressures. It is transnationally constituted in eras of international politics, foregrounded by circulatory networks of political, economic, cultural and moral forms of power. With the sociologies of Pakistani Cold War encounters outlined, the chapter moves onto answering how socialist and ethno-separatist anti-imperialism in the Pakistani borderlands, compels us to rewrite histories of the Pakistani borderlands (Rais: 2019, Crews & Bashir: 2012).

## **2 Once upon a time the mountains were red**

The ideological struggle over the idea of Pakistan and its connection to global Cold War politics, conditioned a structure of power in Pakistan, informed by a changing local, national, regional and global dynamics. Pakistanis contested the idea of Pakistan within an international environment characterized by superpower rivalry, intra-state regional competition and transnational political and social movements within broad and diverse expressions of left, ethno separatist and religious right wing politics. Pakistani state and society conditioned a contentious structure of power in Pakistan, underpinned by clashing imaginaries of society and world politics, (Jalal: 1995, Toor: 2011). They enlisted divergent of Islamic universalism and held differing experiences of imperial modernity, Pakistanis were neither immune to global Cold War struggles, nor simply the recipients of global politics, but rather readily engaged with and reshaped Cold War networks during international ruptures and realignments in world order.

Cold War modernization utopias offered a double-edged sword for postcolonial elites. On one hand, early 1950s Pakistani and 1950s-1970s Afghan political leaders played off competing Soviet and US projects for the chance to build the infrastructure of roads,

dams, railways, government infrastructure and provide the cement, weapons, data, expertise and arms to create new states in the image of a professionalised transnational class of modernizers. On the other hand, it allowed superpowers direct access to the levers of power in both societies. Timothy Nunan has described this process in Afghanistan as a social laboratory, conditioning the very futurity of the third world nation-state (Nunan: 2016). The same is true in Pakistan, where superpower clientelism and the *longue durée* of Anglo-American influence conditioned forms of modernization and development, in ways in which largely worked to entrench patronage politics and the intensity of uneven development (Akhter: 2018: 8). Post conflict hierarchies of power have emerged in Afghanistan and along the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands, not only war and development, but also by charity networks blurring the boundaries between public and private spheres. This was not new to Pakistan and in any case, the rise of the Jamat began partly through the extension of party political projects through charity networks, before post-Maududi conservative Islamists took over the Anti-Soviet resistance (Nasr: 1994). But other forms of left social organizing and struggles for the meaning of Pakistan in world politics, emerged in the borderlands during the Cold War.

Here it would be valuable to consider the longer historical arc of Pashtun, Socialist, Maoist and anti-imperial Balauchi Pakistani Cold War worldmaking. Orientalist framings of imperial discourse, sought to portray Pashtuns as the wild Pathan, savage tribes prone to division and violence (Bayly: 2016, Manchanda: 2020). From the end of empire through to the War on Terror era, Pashtun social struggles included secular, anti-imperial and non-violent groups such as the Khudai Khidmatgars (KK), the socialist and ethno-separatist party politics of the National Awami Party (NAP), as well the Maoist struggles for land rights, led by Mazdoor-e-Kissan Party (MKP). The KK were an anti-imperial, pacifist political and social organization that advocated anti-colonial struggle to end British Raj. Following Partition, the KK leader, Ghaffar Khan, known as the 'Frontier

Gandhi' opposed the centralization of power of the Muslim League and the Islamic nationalism of the state (Banerjee: 2000). Khan eventually swore an oath to Pakistan in the face of mounting state pressure, yet his movement maintained a non-violent activism in favour of Pashtun nationalism. They were increasingly repressed by the 1950s, viewed as seditious and pro-communist.

In terms of cross-sect politics, the NAP, (National Awami Party) founded in 1957, was a broad church of multiple factions and movements. Their power emerged from their ability to transcend Pakistan's divides. They included some of the foremost Sindhi, Bengali, Baloch and Pashtun intellectuals, politicians and community organizers. During the fallout of revolt and war in West and East Pakistan respectively, between 1968-1971, a split occurred in the NAP. The 1971 election brought the NAP to power in NWFP and Baluchistan, but they faced backlash by Bhutto's PPP and the military which called off the results, leading to unrest in both wings and the eventual break away of East Pakistan led by the East Pakistan wing of the NAP. In formerly West Pakistan, now the One Unit imagined by the generals of the 1950s, the NAP themselves were further split during the 1970s. Whilst Wali Khan's faction (son of Ghaffar Khan) lead a faction in NWFP (North West Frontier province now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KPK) and was pro Soviet, another faction lead by Afzal Bangash, left the NAP and formed a Maoist offshoot, the MKP, which straddled both Punjabi and Pashtun constituencies (Paracha: 2013).

The Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP) emerged as the result of the 1960 Sino Soviet split and the effect of the fragmentation on the Communist International, the international body controlled by the Soviet Union that promoted global communism. Inspired by the Cuban, Vietnamese, Chinese and African liberation movements, the MKP linked domestic militancy to anti-imperial Cold War politics (Ahmed: 2010). The organizing practices of the MKP were animated by older lineages of struggle, such as the Khudai Khitmagars along the Afghanistan-

Pakistan borderlands, and the Pakistani Communist Party with its heartlands in Punjab, and through connections between different generations of activists, intellectuals and workers to some degree (Ali: 2015). Their ideas, practices and institutions did not conform to the established rubrics of counter-hegemonic politics in Pakistan. Unlike the urban intellectuals of the Communist Party, the MKP were an explicitly grass roots movement that prioritised land reclamation, collective ownership and peasant militancy, in the face of state backed landlords and their militias (Paracha: 2013). The MKP focused on transboundary histories of resistance in the borderlands, while inking their Maoist politics with anti-imperial and communist internationalism.

From the late 1960s into the mid-1970s, the MKP garnered a sizeable level of popular support in NWFP, “out of proportion to its political strength in the overall balance of power” (Ahmed: 2010:251). This was partly sustained because of changes in Pakistani foreign policy from the 1960s onwards, as Pakistan-China relations warmed significantly, and Pakistan-China infrastructure projects blossomed. In this context, Maoist Pakistani parties in the NWFP were tolerated for a while, until their peasant militancy forced a crackdown lead by landlord militias and the state. The MKP contested Pakistani worldmaking amid a weakened historic bloc during a period in which the Pakistani establishment faced a period of reconstitution and realignment following war with India and loss of East Pakistan (Akhter: 2018).

Reflect here on the ‘MKP Circular’, the periodical that acted as the mouthpiece for the Dehaat Mazdoor Tanzeem (the Agriculture Worker’s Movement). Specialist MKP activist units were tasked with organizing landless peasants and workers. Not only did they equip peasants with knowledge of practical political economy, but these groups also sought to change wider perceptions in Pakistan about the control of land ownership, feudalism and foreign policy. Ayub Khan’s modernization had spurred its own agrarian transformation; the green revolution, which

had uneven affects for agriculture. The Circular recounts the internationalism of the peasant and worker's movement, "four thousand years is a very long time. Many a people have been born, and erased. The ages of tribalism, slavery, feudalism; the age of capitalism, i.e. of globalised production, and of socialism, which is the age of government by factory workers ...today, humanity is living in the age of 'modern tribalism...we, the historical owners of the land are living as immigrants on our own lands to this day<sup>38</sup>".

The MKP emphasised a four-thousand-year history of Indus civilization, and the long history of the castes and their displacement, a stark contrast from the Muslim nationalist doctrine at the heart of the state narrative regarding national identity. They provincialize capitalism through a wider history of the global political economy, invoking empire, modernity and capital-labour relations. Despite multiple splits and a decline of influence by the 1980s, the MKP's legacy lives on and reveals much about the scholarly amnesia towards peasant and workers led movements in Pakistan. This offers the chance to rethink how we scale histories and engage with intergenerational legacies of anti-colonialism. Charting anti-colonial histories provides a powerful antidote to the racist depictions of Pashtuns in the era of the War on Terror. Groups such as the MKP and their periodicals, offer a window into a period in history in which Maoist movements traversed the frontier, connecting people across colonial borders, involving activists, militants and their societies, their imaginaries and connections to global politics.

Similarly, the BPLF (Baluchistan People's Liberation Front) provides a valuable case study in the connections between the Pakistani state, its ethnic minorities in the periphery and global politics. Sandwiched between the Safavids and the Mughals, and later the

---

<sup>38</sup> November 13<sup>th</sup> 1974, the constitution of the Dehati Mazdoor Tanzeem. The Mazdoor Kissan Party Circular. Translated by Sara Kazmi. Revolutionary Papers.

Qajar Iranians and the British Raj, Baluchistan has long been a crucial site of imperial contact (Mendez: 2020). Founded in 1964, the BPLF were committed to the Baloch people's liberation. By 1973, they had launched an insurgency along the borderlands against the Pakistani state. They espoused a combination of Marxist Leninism and Baluch nationalism and advocated violent militant action. The widespread appeal of groups like the BPLF and Maoist labour militant groups such as the MKP (Mazdoor Kissan Party) along the Durand Line, helped to create a vibrant anti-colonial field in both Baluchistan and NWFP during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Borderland revolutionaries terrified the Bhutto and Zia regimes. Bhutto launched a concerted counter-insurgency against the BPLF in 1973, in a bid to clear the southern half of the border, in preparation for state penetration into the Pashtun dominated northern half (Haqqani: 2005). This conflict coincided with a counter insurgency launched by the Shah of Iran on Iranian Balauchis. Both Iran and Pakistan were members of CENTO, and during the Shah's era they were friendly neighbours who both worked as regional anchors for US Cold War influence. Both had a desire to keep the Balauchis and the Afghans in check and they coordinated the 1973 counter-insurgency, which was part of a much longer history of resistance to the British colonial and Pakistani postcolonial state. Here I examine the BPLF's periodical, *Jabal*, and what it reveals about Balochi internationalism and clashing Pakistani Cold War imaginaries.

'*Jabal*' (mountain) was born out of the resistance movement to state operations in Baluchistan, the largest, most sparse region of Pakistan, blessed with natural resources, yet remains the least economically developed and integrated province of Pakistan. *Jabal* emphasized the forced disappearances and imprisonments of citizens whilst celebrating Baluchi culture. Such was the popularity of the subversive material in *Jabal*, that its dissemination carried with it a death sentence for distributors and publishers.

Nevertheless, people put their lives on the line in order to spread information about counter-hegemonic struggles across Baluchistan and beyond. Although the counter-insurgency was successful in militarizing the conflict and crushing much of the resistance, the guerrilla tactics of the BPLF and their deep links within Baluch society ensured that they would continue to engage in subsequent eras of conflict.

One of the most vivid aspects of *Jabal* newspaper was its inculcation of a global anti-colonial internationalism. In two essays written in 1977, *Jabal*'s writers critiqued the overlaps between oil, empire-capitalism and the state, in which Baluchistan is noted as a site of extraction as well as the site for the trialling of new weapons and forms of torture<sup>39</sup>.

Here we receive an analysis of the links between the state and empire, so “without imperialism’s direct and indirect assistance it is difficult to imagine the continued existence of the essentially neo-colonial state of Pakistan in its present condition.

Imperialism and the oligarchy are united on the issue of maintaining the most backward and reactionary social structures, maintaining the centuries old rule of the landlords over the peasantry and oppressing the minority nationalities”<sup>40</sup>. Additionally, a keen awareness is displayed, both of internal changes and global struggles, so, “imperialism is the counter-revolutionary prop of all that is most backward and reactionary in our society and impedes its historical development by maintaining the structure of metropolitan dependence and internal exploitative class relations. Even capitalism in our country develops partially, lopsidedly, unevenly and as a dependent adjunct of the world capitalist economy<sup>41</sup>.”

Perhaps most striking is the call for internationalist aid, in line with what potential clients can muster, “We don’t want tanks, we don’t want aeroplanes, ... we are inspired by the

---

<sup>39</sup> *Jabal* July 1977. Vol. 1. No. 7.

<sup>40</sup> *Jabal*, February 1977 Vol. 1, No. 3.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*.

heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people that triumphed in the face of more stupendous odds. We are inspired by the great struggle of the Palestinians...we are fully aware that our friends have their own considerations and limitations ...that is why we say that our needs are simple ....we know how to make the best use of them without involving or implicating our friends.<sup>42</sup> In another article, the collaboration between Oman and Pakistan is criticized. The recruitment of Baluch men into the armies to fight a Marxist insurgency continued a long history of Pakistanis using mercenaries as well as official regiments, in service to Gulf monarchies (Prashad: 2013, Tharoor: 2015, Siddiq: 2017).

As with the MKP, the BPLF exerted influence out of proportion to their strength and size, and committed themselves to a societal contest with imperial networks. Jabal conveyed an internationalist yearning, which sought to reorient Pakistani worldmaking away from the Cold War narrative. Instead, the BPLF sought to usher in deep links to currents of international revolution, within an international climate in which revolutionary activism was both at its zenith, and simultaneously about to experience the backlash at the hands of state and imperial interests. Revolutionary left groups would be squeezed by Pakistan and Afghanistan's irredentist claims, repression of ethnic minorities, and commitment to state militarism married to irregular forces and political clients. The stage was also set for the conservative Islamist backlash to transnational left solidarity, in the context of Cold War revival and the rising economic power of the Gulf monarchies.

Power begets resistance. Just as the Baluch campaign came to a close, Pakistani generals turned their attention to dismantling Pashtun nationalism in the northern borderlands. Subsequently, the proliferation of the madrassas, operational centres and logistics hubs, reshaped the borderlands. Pakistani military officials provided the Afghan Mujahedeen

---

<sup>42</sup> Jabal. 1976. "The People's Armed Struggle in Baluchistan: A Short Review with a Special Emphasis on the Future."

with the resources, safety and physical space in KPK, FATA and Peshawar, from which to launch insurgency against the Soviet backed Afghan Communist government. Cultural critic Naeem Paracha writes that some of the earliest “Pakistani fighters that were inducted into the jihad were those peasants and tribal Pashtuns who were radicalised by the MKP in the early 1970s” (Paracha: 2013:1). Thus although, “bred on the sayings of Mao and Marx, these fighters were shown the glitter of the American dollar and the Saudi Riyal” (Ibid). The role of the Pakistani army and the ISI in these efforts was paramount. However the recruitment of ex-Maoists was a limited and early stage process within a longer historical arc of a recruitment of fighters that began in the borderlands, and later became international. This reaffirms our understanding of the close entanglements between Afghan fighters, refugees, Pakistan frontier communities, as well as the peasant groups and tribal members, Pashtun nationalists, leftist cadres and transnational Jihadi militants, and their relations with the Pakistani State (Haqqani: 2005, Nasr: 1994, Iqtidar: 2011).

This ties in with what we know about the theory and strategy of Global Jihadists. Ayman al-Zawahri, Al Qaida commander and Bin Laden’s deputy, summarised his reflections on the purity of the Afghan Mujahideen, in contrast to their foreign comrades. He claimed, “the Muslim youth in Afghanistan waged the war to liberate Muslim land under purely Islamic slogans, a very vital matter, for many of the liberation battles in our Muslim world had used composite slogans, that mixed Islam, and indeed, sometimes caused Islam to intermingle with leftist, communist slogans” (Zawahri in Devji: 2005:11-12). In this regard, Pakistani fighters were very much informed by the histories of the previous ten years, either as former Maoists with military and organizing experience, or as Jamat and other Islamic party cadres and charity workers, who waged holy war. All along the borderlands, ideological, strategic and tactical alignments, made for a rich social terrain of struggle, amplified by the Soviet invasion in 1979. By no means was this a decisive but

rather a countervailing trajectory that emerged during the militarization of the borderlands. The purpose here is rather to explore the sites of global encounters between social forces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre. In the following section, I extend this notion in the context of the transition from socialist and ethno-separatist-to Islamist politics that emerges from the violent contests for power along the borderlands.

### **3 The ISI, US led Anti-Communism and Global Jihad**

The Pakistani state was fundamental to transnational anti-communist strategy along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier. An alliance between Washington and Islamabad was secured following the Soviet invasion, when Zia reassured US officials that the Pakistanis shared their assessment of the threats and opportunities and, connectedly, the need to rebalance power in South West Asia, in the context of the Iranian Revolution. Indeed, “anti-communist hard-liners were Zia’s target audience in Washington” (Haqqani: 2013:241). Lieutenant Colonel Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi offers a “first account of events as seen by low-or middle officers” (Ghazi: 2013: 11). During his time in the ISI, spanning from 1984-1993, Ghazi first undertook specialist training along with other ISI officers in the US. Later he was in charge of training camps where rebels were taught clandestine warfare and the use of US made surface-to-air missiles. American made Stingers, were far more effective than the British made Blowpipe missiles the rebels had been previously been using. The Stingers were cutting edge of military technology yet very expensive. Their procurement, principally manufactured by the US defence company *Raytheon Missiles & Defence*, signalled the lengths to which US security architects were willing to go to oust the USSR from Afghanistan. These weapons had infrared heat seeking capabilities, and could be carried by one man over the shoulder. The Stinger was the perfect weapon for nullifying Soviet airpower and causing disarray to army battalions

traversing the mountains (Coll: 2004). Carter's administration was increasingly unpopular after what appeared to hawks in Washington as weakness, following strategic mistakes in Lebanon and then during Iranian hostage crisis (Haqqani: 2013:244). The Soviet invasion made matters worse. The stage was set for the Reagan administration to sweep to power in 1981, re-reigniting the US led global anti-communist offensive across the world.

Reagan's administration set their sights on Pakistan, and a potential alliance with Zia's military and the ISI. Ghazi offers a detailed account of the political interfacing, institutional cultures and contrasting suspicion but also at times the convivial relations between ISI and CIA officers coordinating the training of Afghan rebels. Both agencies housed officers who were deeply resentful to the political class, and who advocated a hawkish position on anti-communism. Ghazi outlines the relations between Zia, General Rahman, the formidable Pashtun ISI chief and close ally of the president. As a new officer in 1947 years earlier, Rahman had been tasked with assisting, "the tribal militias...to fight in Kashmir. Thus he as not new to managing religiously motivated fighters" (Haqqani: 2:005:262). Other key figures included Lieutenant Sultan Amir, a renowned military trainer, respected by Mujahedeen and CIA officers alike (Ibid: 26). Nicknamed the 'Colonel Imam', the CIA showed their appreciation for Amir by giving him a trophy encrusted with a part of the Berlin Wall. On the trophy it read, "with deepest respect to one who delivered the first blow" (Ghazi: 2013:88). Another Pakistani brigadier general, Muhammad Yousuf, was known informally among CIA colleagues as the ISI's "barbarian handler" (Yousuf & Adkin: 2007). Along the frontier with a warring Afghanistan, Pakistani military and intelligence officers were under no illusions as to what was at stake. Ghazi recounts how, "the ISI was positive that it was not just a fight got freedom of Afghanistan, but it was indeed a fight for the survival of Pakistan too...had the Soviets not been impeded in Afghanistan then probably by now Pakistan would have become a Soviet vassal state" (Ghazi: 2013: 92).

The ISI permitted US, Saudi Arabia and the wider Western-Gulf alliance to operate in Pakistan, under the condition that the ISI would have operational oversight of the covert war. A US Cable from the rebuilt US embassy read, “since the Soviet invasion...we have largely been content to follow Pakistan’s lead”<sup>43</sup>. In the final estimation, the ISI trained 1164 rebels in the Stinger training operation, which yielded 274 successful hits out of 342 fired, a hit percentage rating of 77%. The combination of the guerrilla warfare acumen of the Mujahedeen, ISI-CIA coordination, and the deployment of the Stingers, had a vital role in stalling Soviet operations, limiting them to a strategy of consolidating the major urban centres and transport routes by 1986.

For Zia, the imperial imagining of the frontier was paramount to the wider cause of defending the state, and launching an offensive war in Afghanistan. Coming from a British Indian army family background like Ayub Khan before him, Zia’s trauma at the legacies of Partition was evident in his future politics. Zia’s account of Partition is revealing. He describes how, “we were under constant fire. The country was burning until we reached Lahore. Life had become so cheap between Hindu and Muslim...Once in Pakistan...we were bathed in blood, but at least we were free citizens” (Weaver: 2010:61). This past history of conflict shaped the future general. Zia, “believed deeply in the colonial-era army’s values, traditions and geopolitical mission-a thoroughly British orientation” (Coll: 2004:61). The twin imperative between securing the borders against Indian-Afghan-Soviet intervention, and furthering the Pakistani military’s divinely ordained geopolitical mission, were at the crux of the regime’s war strategy.

---

<sup>43</sup> ‘The Secretary’s visit to Pakistan: Afghanistan’. Cable from the US embassy, Islamabad, to the secretary of state. June 1<sup>st</sup> 1983. Cold War International History Project.

During the early phase of the war, Zia famously turned down 400 million dollars from the Carter government, ridiculing the offer as ‘peanuts’, before holding out for a successful deal of over 3 billion dollars with the Reagan administration, which came with both stronger political backing, increased covert coordination and prized new F-16 fighter jet planes (Kux: 2001:256). US officials privately agreed that, “without Zia’s support, the Afghan resistance...is effectively dead<sup>44</sup>”. Afghanistan may not have become the Soviet Vietnam in terms of the scale of military deaths. Nevertheless the Soviets lost 15000 men with another 35000 wounded, with the final soldier killed by a sniper along the Soviet built Salang highway on the 15<sup>th</sup> February 1989 (Borovik: 1990:278).

Over the course of the Afghan-Soviet War, the ISI would develop into one of the largest and most powerful intelligence agencies in the world. The combined largesse of the Pakistani-intelligence-security nexus deepened its economic as well as political power in Pakistani society in the context of the Afghan war, with transformative effects on society (Siddiq: 2007: 170). In the process, the Afghan Soviet war generated a new field of social relations in Pakistan. While, land conflict, narcotics, arms, black markets proliferated, Pakistani society faced the world most severe refugee crisis, amid changing patterns of social movement, urbanization, border regimes and violence. In this context of shifting social patterns, social mobilizations based on the old structures of counter-hegemonic power, faced problems of engaging an ever more fragmented society, riddled with patronage politics, religious fundamentalism and political instability (Akhter: 2018). With the help of Saudi funding, Pakistan’s madrassas exploded. Rashid states “in 1971 there were only 900 madrassas in Pakistan, but by . . . 1988, there were 8000 madrassas and 25,000 unregistered ones, educating over half a million students” (Rashid: 2011:89). Meanwhile de-territorialised, geographically promiscuous social forces attached to the global directives of market deregulation, including conservative lower middle classes

---

<sup>44</sup> ‘Memo from Shultz to Reagan’. November 29<sup>th</sup> 1982. Cold War International History Project.

connected to Islamist parties, facilitated the trans-regional project of supporting the Mujahedeen, birthing the global Jihad movement.

Amongst Pakistan's strongest allies, Charlie Wilson's romanticized role in garnering support for funding the Mujahedeen in Congress has become the stuff of Hollywood legend. Yet another US Cold War warrior, William Casey, was a far more important ally to Pakistan and the Afghan rebels. Casey was director of the CIA, a World War II veteran of the CIA's precursor organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (Coll: 2004). He was known at CIA HQ in Langley as a fiery Cold War advocate, and his pursuit of covert war spanned from the borderlands to Nicaragua and the sponsoring of the anti-communist Contras.

During meetings between Zia and Casey, Zia is said to have found in Casey a kindred spirit, versed in the links between empire and the Cold War, and committed to the "moral duty" (Gates: 1996:252) to maintain the old British imperial frontier against the Soviets. Cogan writes, "Casey and Zia both emphasized that...Soviet strategy echoed the colonial era's scrambles among European powers for natural resources, shipping lanes and continental footholds" (Cogan: 1993:73). They both agreed on the necessity of an Islamist buffer zone that reimagined the British Indian army's deployment of martial races on the frontier, only this time in service to the anti-Communist Jihad. Nowhere was this transition more observable than in the Pakistani state's transfer of control of the border, from the old colonial regiment known as the Frontier Corps, over to the ISI. Henceforth the ISI would administer global funds to the rebels, select their chosen clients and downplay rebel factions with close ties to the royalist tribes and Pashtun nationalists. These factions were not only known as less committed to jihad, but were also the strongest advocates of Pashtunistan, and with that, challenges to Pakistani sovereignty.

Casey's endorsement of a robust covert strategy enabled a close working relationship between Zia, Rahman and Saudi Prince Turki Al-Faisal, who headed the Saudi intelligence agencies, of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID). It was part and parcel of a much larger global anti-communist project involving war, patrimonialism, privatization and development (Hilali: 2005: 83). In the changing landscapes of the late Cold War, the deployment of Islamism by states and proxies alike in Afghanistan would help to defeat the Soviet Union and the Afghan Communist party. But it would also help crush remaining left and anti-colonial movements, mimicking the 'Jakarta Method' the US policy of support for the Indonesian military junta in its war on its citizens under the guise of anti-communism, a policy so successful as a campaign of terror on the international Left that it would be repeated in Brazil, Guatemala and Chile (Bevins. 2020: 3). In the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands, we see the evolution of US led global anti-communist strategy, in widening the scope of clients, from right-wing military death squads in the Global South, to Islamist and Jihadi militants and terrorists, albeit through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as the middlemen.

It was the ISI, which organised the last battlefield of the Cold War, and oversaw the transformation of the third world peripheries along the borderlands from terrains of anti-imperial and ethno-separatism, to, "landscapes of the Jihad" (Devji: 2005). In perhaps the most spectacular yet overlooked feature of covert operations, ISI agents, approved by Casey and Zia, assisted Mujahedeen units tasked with the dissemination of CIA funded Korans in Uzbek, before shifting from propaganda to outright sabotage (Coll:2004: 90). During the late 1980s, ultra-clandestine operations were carried out by Afghan Mujahedeen Special Forces, and overseen by ISI officers. In 1987 they crossed the Amu Darya River, and launched commando raids into Soviet Central Asia, targeting Soviet industrial and logistical capacity (Yousuf & Adkin: 2007: 200). These operations were quickly downscaled after the Soviets threatened massive reprisals in Pakistan.

Nevertheless, in retrospect these raids have great symbolic importance. Not only did they amount to the first instance of CIA supported guerrilla warfare in the Soviet Union, they also marked the expansion of Pakistani war making into Soviet territory. No longer simply the praetorian guard of empire, Pakistan's military and intelligence services emerged in the context of the Afghan war, as amongst its most formidable vassals.

Adopting a military doctrine of strategic depth, Pakistani generals aimed to develop deterrence capability as well as offensive military capacity against India thereby circumventing encirclement. In military scholarship, the concept equates to the strategies in which commanders pursue a strategy to close the gap with the adversary's key areas of military and industrial production. By attempting to secure a friendly neighbour in Afghanistan, Pakistani generals such as Ashfaq Kayani and Assad Durrani<sup>45</sup> have in the past vocalised different notions of the border, the former arguing against a 'Talibanisation' of Pakistani Afghan policy, whilst the latter refuting its existence. The strategy has led to disagreements in more recent years within Pakistan's foreign policy community about the long-term repercussion for Pakistan of allying with militant groups across the border (Parkes: 2019). In the Pakistani context, strategic depth referred to the attempt to avoid encirclement by the Soviet Union, India and a hostile Afghanistan. The strategy was based on the idea that if India unleashed a sudden large-scale invasion of Pakistan's Punjabi heartlands, the military response would require a friendly neighbouring client installed in Afghanistan, in order to rally Pakistani forces, offering generals both extra manpower and geographic space from which to counter-strike. In this way Pakistani generals thought they could both control the Durand Line and Afghan claims to Pashtunistan across the border, while also preparing a counter-offensive to a potential Indian incursion.

---

<sup>45</sup> (Former chief of army staff general and ISI lieutenant general respectively.)

Strategic Depth reflects the state's anxieties about the Radcliffe Line stemming from tense histories with India. In this context, the Durand Line demarcating Pakistan and Afghanistan was viewed to be even more vital to secure. The Western border not only overlooked the plains and mountains of Afghanistan, but beyond that the Muslim Central Asian republics, which were viewed as a source of potential support through pan-Islamic mobilization (Rashid: 2008, Haqqani: 2005). Pakistani generals dreamed the socio-cultural links with Persian-Turkic belt could provide Pakistan with the influence it had so craven first in the Subcontinent at Partition, and then in the Middle East during the early Cold War years. This included the idea amongst Pakistani leaders of opening the door to economic, social and cultural exchange with their Muslim brethren in Central Asia, a policy that was ultimately unfeasible as long as a hostile government was in power in Kabul. Following the Soviet invasion and occupation, Pakistan now effectively boarded the Soviet Union.

Consider Pakistani Brigadier General S.K. Malik's book, "the Quranic Concept of War". Malik offers an interpretation of the Quran, in favour of Pakistani military doctrine and Jihadist warfare. Published in 1979 the year of the Soviet invasion, Malik's book reflected a huge shift in the sociology, political culture and strategy of the Pakistani military (Ahmed: 2006, Siddiq: 2007). Changes to the composition of military officer cadres, and military strategy, emerged after the disaster of the India-Pakistan War of 1971 and counter-insurgency during the 1973 Baluchistan War. This was a period in which the power structure in Pakistan, having withstood the popular left challenge of 1968, reconstituted itself in line with a conservative, lower middle class classes, and with the religious right, most notably the Jamat.

Thus the Anglicized military officer class, soldiers of the British Empire and Pakistan's early Cold War architects were gradually outnumbered during the 1960s, by a younger

generation of Pakistani military officers, with Punjabi lower middle class origins. A new group of military officers that had grown up in Pakistan rather than the British Raj had come to power. Much more explicitly "Islamic," these social forces were less likely to come from the established elite classes of Muhajirs and Northern Punjabis, and included Southern Punjabi and Pashtun (but very few Sindhi or Baloch) cadres. They had different cultural leanings, were more likely to have had training in Arab states rather than at the British Army's base at Sandhurst, and had a far greater propensity towards social conservatism, whilst remaining suspicious of the pro-Anglo-American bias of their Anglicized superiors (Ahmed: 2006: 431). Moreover, Zia's policies formalized the introduction of religious indoctrination in the military, expanded the construction of madrassas along the border, and deployed military personnel to oversee the development of militant training camps on the borderlands.

The military's reconstitution within wider social changes in Pakistan, were central to its future role in the Afghan War, Islamicizing the military in the context of the growing Soviet threat across the border. Islamization and militarization thus worked hand in hand. Having fought full-scale wars and counter-insurgencies during the 1970s, the Pakistani military would now throw itself into the transnational covert war. Under Ayub Khan's developmental state, Yahya Khan's brief and disastrous revanchist politics, and Bhutto's false promises implicit in his populist authoritarianism, changes to the sociology of the military were beginning. Yet they reached a crescendo after the intensification of state backlash against left and ethno-separatist forces, and reached a crescendo during the Zia period.

Enthusiastically approved by the Zia regime, Malik's doctrine received state backing, whilst its dissemination was promoted by the state, in military barracks and in religious, political and social life. Malik not only sets out an Islamic 'Just war' theorization for

conflict. He also provided a transnational vision of Pakistani geopolitical power, in connection to patrons, allies and proxies. Here is the notion of extra-territorial Jihad as a moral duty, and that practices of terror are not merely part tactical or strategic, but a justifiable goal in of itself, if it means spreading the Jihad and expanding power. He writes, “our main objective is the opponent’s heart or soul, our main weapon of offence against this objective is the strength of our own souls...we have to keep terror way from our hearts...terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent’s heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision on the enemy, it is the decision we wish to impose on him” (Malik: 1979: 59). Important to note here, is the exceptional nature of Malik’s text in the context of defeat, war and martial law, far removed from earlier or later periods of Pakistani military thought.

Insecurity with India would fuel the establishment of a National security architecture, where anti-Indian, Pakistani liberal and conservative nationalists positioned themselves as both pro Western and Pro Islamic. This is what Husain Haqqani calls Pakistan’s policy tripod. It can be thought of as Pakistani pro-Western foreign policy, anti Indian geopolitical strategy and the development of a ‘mosque-military alliance’ (Haqqani: 2005). Another formulation of this idea is Nawaz’s ‘Allah, Army and America’ as the trifecta ballast of Pakistani foreign policy making (Nawaz: 2008:xxxi). Empire and Islam were at the heart of Pakistani military doctrine going into the Afghan-Soviet War. What insights does the war hold when considered within wider global histories?

#### **4 The Afghan-Soviet War as an event**

The Afghan-Soviet war holds a peculiar place in histories of the Cold War and Decolonization. On one hand, the war is usually acknowledged as a significant milestone in the late Cold war and the shaping of the global Jihad movement, with direct relevance to the post 9/11 War on Terror. On the other hand, global histories of the Afghan war are often afforded lesser attention than other Cold War ruptures, in part due to Soviet decline, and Gorbachev's willingness to transform the Soviet Union. Crucially the Afghan war is yet to be appreciated for its significance, in what it reflects about changes to the character, composition and consequences of world order. The parallels with Algeria and Vietnam are stark, but also in the combination of regional proxy war, within internationalist struggles that disavowed territoriality, the growth of the Jihad shared something of the birth of revolutionary anarchism from the Spanish Civil war (Halliday: 2012: 100, Reuveny & Prakash: 1999: 702). In its combination of borderland conflict, superpower struggle, site of anti-imperial decline and rise of Islamist militancy, and as a core nodal point of capitalist geographies of war, logistics and trade, the Afghan-Soviet war heralded a new kind of conflict, informed by old alignments within transnational networks of power. When we think about the global Jihad, the Afghan-Soviet war remains the primary antecedent to the post 9/11 wars and the concurrent remaking of power in world politics. It is in the transnational state adoption of the War on Terror narrative- of state authority versus terrorism, that the fundamental binary of the first two decades of international order in the 21<sup>st</sup> century was established.

If we think of the Soviet Afghan war as socially encompassed, historical event, then we acknowledge that it took place “within broader political and cultural fields which broke existing configurations and reconstructed categories of meaning” (Lawson: 2012: 217). An appreciation of events as socio-cultural structures underpinned by historical processes

opens up path-dependent sequences of events, multiple intervening socio-cultural structures as well as differentiated causalities (Sewell: 2005: 102). Explaining the relationship between inter-societal conflicts in a Southern, postcolonial, space and its relationship to multi-sided global conflict, helps us overcome the limited causal logics surrounding inter-state studies of Pakistan, the Cold War or North-South relations. A notion of eventful temporality allows for the relations between Pakistani social forces, the Muslim world and Anglo-American empire, understood first as a particular historic social field that changes over time. Second, it equips us conceptually for thinking about how events like the Soviet-Afghan War effected global transformations. Understanding the war as an event, also allows us to bring in other political geographies, such as the borderlands, the wider Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre, and South West Asia, into play.

Thus the Soviet-Afghan war helps us intervene by 1) critiquing bi-polarity, 2) accounting for the variations, limitations and operational changes in global anti-communism and anti-imperialism and 3) helps us in thinking seriously about how pan-Islamic and Islamist collective mobilization, tied into Western imperial strategy. Furthermore 4) it can help us go beyond current scholarship on isolated third world struggles and romanticized notions of resistance to power, to offer a more nuanced account of power-resistance, hierarchy and strategy in relation to the differentiated experiences in the South. Additionally, 5) addressing South-South relations and Southern ontologies can help to perceive how Muslim politics intersected and challenged or changed the notions of imperial patronage and anti-imperialism in specific sites and involving specific strategic actors.

Subsequently our understanding of the scope, scale and nature of post 1945 warfare is so coloured by the Eurocentric notion of the 'Long Peace' that we fail to see the emergence of transboundary conflicts, binding different states and societies together (Gaddis: 1992). Rather than being 'small wars', in the sense of being isolated conflicts of low intensity, we find that the wars in the Global South Cold War were a series of interconnected conflicts,

which reshaped world order (Chamberlin: 2018). Connected to each other, the Lebanese civil war (1975-1978) to the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Afghan war (1979-1989), as well as the Iran-Iraq war (1989-1988), constituted an expanding theatre of violence and interconnection. How do we place the importance of the Afghan war within our vistas of the post-1945 Cold War in the era of Decolonization?

The Afghan Soviet war (1978-1989) takes its place among the pivotal moments of the Cold War. These include the onset of superpower nuclear tests (1945 & 1949 respectively), the Sino-soviet split (1954-1960), the Vietnam War (1955-1975), the Berlin airlift (1962), the Cuban missile crisis (1962) and the fall of the Berlin wall (1989). As a historical event, the war deserves renewed attention from international theorists and historians, in the context of US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, the war deserves its place in the chain of events, which straddle the Cold War-Decolonization conceptual frame, and which disrupts our post 1945 histories, dominated by a Eurocentric perspective of the Cold War era. What happens when we use a different referent, for example an anti-imperial lens on world order struggles? This might include the Bandung Conference (1955), the Suez crisis (1956), the Korean and Vietnamese wars, and the Iranian Revolution, as well as the memorial days of fallen anti-colonial leaders, from Lumumba to Mossadeq. Yet what is striking about the Afghan War is its direct correlation with the defeat and then disillusion, of a superpower. The Afghan war showcased the political decay, military overstretching and the crippling economic stagnation of the Soviet Union.

The Afghan war and Soviet withdrawal, severely affected the Soviet Union's prestige in the Global South, and sped up its decline and disintegration. The mood in policymaking circles on both sides of the Atlantic was jubilant. The hubris of politicians, journalists, and strategists was matched by the lofty claims of academics proclaiming the 'End of History'

and the transfer from a superpower ideological struggle, to a 'Clash of Civilizations' (Fukuyama: 1992, Huntington: 1996). Less well recognized is how the victory of the West, was established in Afghanistan, and assisted by Pakistan's establishment classes. The West's orientalist view of the rest of the world as well as its ability to project social, economic and cultural power was at its zenith, only to be shaken in the context of 9/11. Thus the Afghan Jihad is the most salient Cold War trajectories shaping the post 9/11 world.

The Afghan Soviet war triggered "Islam's geo-political fragmentation (Devji: 2005:63). Pakistan-Afghanistan reverses the centre-periphery logics imagined by Islamists in regard to being originally viewed as hinterlands vis a vis Arab Islamic heartlands. But in the romance of the Afghan war, Islamists attempted to forgo a previous era of Cold War modernization conditioned by nationalism, communism and capitalism (Roy: 2002). Henceforth the Afghan war was the incubator of the global, Jihadists being attracted to its otherness from western modernity, and the uncompromising nature of the social, geographic landscape. 'Peripheries' become centres for new spaces of resistance to Cold War superpowers, and become entangled in regional proxy wars. This goes some way to explaining the global significance of the Jihad out of proportion to the traditional spatial and political optics used to explain transnational power relations.

The Afghan War, like its Vietnamese and Algerian predecessors, unsettles our notions of wars straddling the divide between the Cold War and decolonization. Imperial blowback leads to historically generative events in the aftermath of encounters between superpowers and societies in the Global South. The impacts of Vietnam and the Afghanistan-Iraq era have shook the US to its core. In the context of the Vietnam War, it is not just Vietnamese history that becomes imperialized when we consider the successive histories of French, Japanese and American imperial power, but the boomerang effect that

Vietnam had on the US. The Algerian war and the Vietnam War were wars of Decolonization as well as being wars of the Cold War. Whereas the latter is seen (from a Western metropolitan view) as a core conflict in the Cold War, the latter is regularly regarded first as war of Decolonization. Yet the Vietnam War was simultaneously part of a wider history of Vietnamese and South-East Asian history of struggle, whilst the Algerian war was a significant event in the history of the Cold War. These conflicts were not isolated spectacles of French imperial and US Cold War defeat. Rather they were connected events in which anti-colonial national liberation struggles shook administrations in Moscow and Washington into action (Westad: 2005). Similarly, the Afghan-Soviet war represents a conflict straddling our conceptual divides.

Consequently, the Soviet-Afghan War had much wider effects on annihilating the Left than just in Pakistan or Afghanistan. The Pakistani ruling classes' victory in allying with China, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, to destroy the Afghan Communist Party's support structure and replace it with a new anti-communist, Jihadist politics, was the start of a kind of politics now visible elsewhere. Here we see the transformation of multiple, conflicted Pakistani Cold War imaginaries, in altering the structure of power in Pakistan, heavily towards a military-militant synthesis during the Afghan-Soviet war. This process of state sponsorship of Islamist militants helped to both crush anti-colonial leftist and ethno-separatists on the borderlands, whilst preparing the terrain for a global financing of Mujahedeen factions, and Pakistani and international recruits into the Afghan Jihad. Fiercely militarist, patriarchal, and based a strong desire to subvert colonial borders and innovate imperial techniques of control. Based on a strong patronage politics between Pakistani military and intelligence officers, and the militarized populations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands, these encounters forged an explicitly anti-communist and often pro-capitalist, Islamic sensibility.

The Pakistani ruling classes' victory in allying with China, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, to destroy the Afghan Communist Party's support structure and replace it with a new anti-communist response, was the start of a kind of politics now visible globally. This period marked a distinct unravelling of anti-imperial modernisms in the Muslim world; from the secular visions of earlier generations of anti-colonial nationalists and socialists as well as pan-Islamic advocates- to a tighter embrace of the neoliberal military state, nationalists and Islamist groups (Rahmena: 1994, Devji: 2005). The war defined a whole new form of religiously centred anti-communist politics that was very popular in the 1970s and 1980s, and formed connections with other forms of Islamism and Jihadism across the Middle East, Central Asia South East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Caucuses. The Afghan war facilitated new cycles of war and conflict in Pakistan that unleashed the Taliban and Al Qaida. In so doing it opened the Pandora's box of Islamist rage at modern inequalities in the domestic and international realms. It redefined a completely new form of religiously centred anti-communist politics that reshaped world order and forces us to rethink the dynamics of struggle shaping world order.

## **Conclusion**

Postcolonial Pakistani struggles — across local, imperial, national and interstate contexts — transformed the dimensions of world politics. Multipolar struggles punctuated world order struggles. The idea of a bi-polar Cold War governed by ideological conflict between East and West was over within the first decade of the Cold War (Luthi: 2008). Rather the Cold War shaped and was shaped by, regional wars, the decomposition of decolonization, and the afterlives of empire. Competition was largely geopolitical and power-political as opposed to

being rigidly ideological in a doctrinal form, so whilst ideological synchronicity enabled trans-regional alignment, the relationship between US led global forces backing Islamist war making, was an alliance forged in convenience and strategy. What other implications does thinking through Pakistani global encounters in the Afghan war, offer us for rewriting histories of world order?

The historic significance of the Afghan war emerges in four primary ways, which tie Pakistan to events in Afghanistan. First, they include the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan by societies on either side of the Durand Line, contributing the end of the Cold War, unrestricted of Western liberal elites in the 1990s, and the growth of divisions and backlash emanating from the over-extension of superpower projects. Second, is the rise of the global Jihad movement, the incubation of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaida. Third, the global encounters of war sealed a decisive victory of anti-communist state and social forces over internationalist left and anti-imperial forces in the region. Fourth, they contribute to the world historic consequences of the War on Terror and the blowback legacies of a war system redeployed to target Muslims rather than Communists; devastation in postcolonial societies, and the networks of militancy, arms, narcotics, commerce, trade, logistics, refugees, development and NGOs. In their quest for pliant clients Pakistani generals forged strategic ties to the Mujahedeen and the Taliban in the hope of negating Pashtun nationalism in the country's north-west. In the pursuit of willing clients, they have ceded to the Taliban as their chosen clients, who despite their Islamist outlook, are nonetheless largely Pashtun and Afghan nationalist in character (Rashid: 2000). Jihadi, sectarian and indigenous militant groups have created renewed eras of struggle, such as the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Taliban's war, first in the borderlands and then into the cities during Musharraf's War on Terror through counter-insurgencies such as the infamous Zarb-e Arb. The transnational social terrains have been separated from the history of the Cold War, and presented as 'limited wars', removed from

the wider processes of war making in world order. Nevertheless, south-south connectivity in South West Asia, amid planetary encounters, shaped the formation of modern power politics.

The limited container of the state acts as a straightjacket when describing trans-local struggles between anti-communism, leftist anti-imperialism and religious Islamism alongside inter-state conflict. Southern societies are involved in hierarchies, in contending practices and contentious relations with great powers. These polities invoke their own narratives that make superpowers take notice. Strong and weak are mutually constitutive and the connection culturally reconfigures not only the political-military theatres of conflict, but also the wider world. The 'power' of Southern societies was not just enclosed in the material power of the state. Nor are ideational forces, southern polities and global processes separate from one another. Thinking beyond the liberal-bourgeois subject opens up the possibility to investigate Southern agency beyond dominant representations of Southern societies (Johnson: 2003:114). Ongoing patterns of North-South conflict have spiralled into multi-dimensional conflicts today with mimetic cycles of violence making a folly of Western triumphalism after the Cold War. We need a more reflective position on the histories of struggle between different political factions within the South, their relations to global politics understood within contrasting experiences of political modernity (Magubane: 2005: 93).

The entwinement of colonial military expertise, imperial bureaucratic inheritance and the uneven distribution of power in Pakistani society fused the Pakistan borderlands with the power of the postcolonial security state. This exercise in power was both restricted by and actively propelled, a disregard for sovereignty. Resistance to state practices created spaces of autonomy and complex negotiations of power between local actors, entrenching power players in trans-regional networks of politics, religion, commerce, charity and militarism. Yet these forms of resistance play out within, and participate in national politics, and their actions bind them with the Pakistani government, whose sponsorship of Durand border militarism

means it has a dominant role in shaping frontier dynamics (Martin:2014: 6, Bashir & Crews:2012:33). It is in the context of counter-insurgency at home and abroad, the military's rehabilitation by politicians and the strategic and ideological realignment of the state with Islamists and Afghan rebels, that the left was undone in Pakistan. Anti-imperial alliances between urban student, worker and intelligentsia socialists and ethno-separatists in the provinces threatened to transform Pakistan through a transformative, progressive vision between 1968-1971. The military's decision to smash the left in the centre whilst unleashing violence in the periphery signalled a historic shift in society and in the wider arc of decolonization.

The presence of insurgents and ethno-separatists such as the BLP and Maoist groups such as the MKP created a diverse landscape of ethno-left social movements in the 1970s, whose militancy contested the power of Islamabad and state-aligned landowners, alongside an assortment of paramilitaries, Islamist clients and frontier corps units. Pakistani state managers were willing to operate the border as a transboundary space during the Afghan-Soviet war, in stark contrast to the border regimes and counter-insurgency campaigns in FATA during the War on Terror. Nonetheless left forces failed to transform the architecture of the state or in forging long-term alliances; over provincial, ethnic, linguistic and geographic divides.

Following on from the 1968 student and labour led revolt that upturned Ayub Khan, Bhutto and Yahya Khan's short reigns coincided with bloody counter-insurgencies in East Pakistan and Baluchistan. They paved the way for the frontier militarization and proxy war over the Durand Line. But in all their doings, the left, political establishment and the religious right were all superseded by the military rehabilitation and sociological reconstruction, which enabled the rise of Zia's martial law regime (1977-1988).

Whilst Zia Islamicized society, introduced a moral order based around strict adherence to state sponsored Sharia and implemented a centralized, puritanical vision of an Islamic state,

he cannot take all the credit for Pakistan's transformation. For one, transnational sponsorship of the military and religious networks bound Pakistan to the strategies and financial networks of the Gulf monarchies, principally Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the social transformations reshaping the military began in the 1960s as lower middle class Punjabis replaced the Anglicized Muhajir officers of the Raj. Other social changes were underway in this period. In addition the Jamat's path breaking emergence as a religio-political force that straddled the divide between social organizing, party politics and anti-communist violence, brought them into the nexus of state power, as they became both the foot soldiers at home and abroad. In its dress rehearsals in the universities and streets of labour and student politics, and then later through the militarization of the Jamat's student wing into fascist paramilitaries in the bloodbaths of Bangladesh, the Jamat proved its commitment to state sponsored Jihad. The Pakistani – US led covert operation to support the Mujahedeen was not the first time in history that a postcolonial Cold War state would be at the fulcrum of the superpower struggle. Nor was it the first time that Pakistanis, formerly Indian Muslims in the North-West of the old British empire, had provided the manpower and martial expertise to bolster the forces of empire, and later, the Pakistani postcolonial state and its Gulf Arab allies (Devji: 2005:71). Events along the borderlands during the Afghan-Soviet war transformed Pakistan in ways that have shaped the modern world. The connections between the rebels, Pakistani state and social forces, and transnational allies were nested within a trans-regional set of competing, multi-scaled struggles involving the Soviets, China, India, Iran and the European powers as well as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf monarchies. While the role of the Mujahedeen and the CIA led covert war are now well known, the role of the Pakistanis has still to be appreciated in global history.

I have chronicled an alternative history of Pakistani worldmaking. This has required charting the social, international and historical dynamics of Pakistani Cold War imaginaries through the dynamic encounters and struggles between Pakistan social forces, the state, and Cold War

world orders (Cox: 1981). The Pakistani borderlands would become the site of an elaborate logistical network spanning continents, connecting vast international commercial, military and development architectures involving connections between arm dealing states, private contractors, drug lords, tribal chiefs, NGOS, as well as military and intelligence officers (Coll: 2004). Hence in freeing, “our understanding of Cold War history from the centrality of Europe’s imaginary, that is, we need to think of the history as a genuinely global history” (Kwon: 2010:35) we begin to rethink the Cold War as a phase of long imperial politics; including imperial, intra-imperial and anti-imperial politics.

In the context of the War on Terror, the US-Pakistan drone and counter-insurgency programmes, and the extrajudicial killings of Pashtun activists by the Pakistani states, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) grew to prominence. Forming in 2014 in KPK, the PTM advocate Pashtun human rights in the borderlands. Shaped both by a longer heritage of secular, Pashtun-separatist, leftist and non-violent heritage, yet also conditioned by the rise of NGOS, the PTM have demanded a truth and reconciliation commission, accountability from the state forced disappearances and killings by security forces, as well as campaigns for economic and social programmes for Pashtun society (Haroon: 2007, Tahir et al: 2014). In their disavowal of Islamist politics, strident anti-imperial solidarity, and in their ethnic politics, they have sought to reorient the national debate on Pakistan’s involvement in the War on Terror. As with the MKP and BFLP before them, the PTM, offer yet another expression of the grassroots resistance to empire, and point the way both for a social theory foregrounded in anti-colonialism, as well as one expression of a diverse array of Pakistani social forces which advocate progressive politics and anti-colonial internationalism (Go: 2016, Khan: 2020).

Thus the afterlives of the social terrain of empire shaped the course and conduct of the Cold War and after. In the context of the Cold War, Pakistani society, ‘Pakistan’ was ‘remade’ through inter- imperial transition, constraints on postcolonial world order changes, and

struggles in the Muslim world. Pakistani social transformations during the Afghan war would engender the expansion of the national security state, and the strategic unison between Western backed anti-communism and Islamism, a world historic alignment, the effects of which still haunt planetary politics. A people's tragedy, the Afghan war simultaneously unleashed the leadership's extraterritorial ambitions, even as it galvanised defiance and solidarity against Zia's martial law. In the end, despite all the hardship they have been subjected to, Pakistanis, like Afghans, are a spirited people. Progressive histories of resistance inform on-going struggles for power even as the afterlives of the Cold War inform our fragile era. They show us how Pakistanis imagined, challenged and redefined power at home, and in world politics.

## Conclusion

In this thesis, I have offered an international, historical and sociological contribution to scholarship, by charting a counter-history of Pakistani Cold War struggles in relation to the effects of uneven legacies of empire in Pakistani postcolonial politics. I have charted the Pakistani Cold War role on the frontline by provincializing the Cold War, first as frontline state during the Baghdad Pact era, and then during the Afghan War. I have nested Pakistani power factions, their struggles and imaginaries within a longer historical narrative from the end of the Raj to the War on Terror. I have captured something of the political fractures, cultural debates, strikes, solidarity marches and conflicts over Pakistani Cold War politics, in relation to international events. The study has chronicled a panoramic vista exploring the spatial, historical, cultural and eventful nature of Pakistani social struggles and internationalisms, through charting transboundary landscapes of struggle and connectivity. By incorporating a conceptual apparatus involving Pakistan's clashing imaginaries, their ties to a changing structure of power, and their connections to global politics (in the borderlands, the Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre and wider South West Asia and Greater Middle East and Muslim world political geographies) I have attempted to spatialize Pakistani postcolonial politics in relation to an imperial world order.

Furthermore, I have examined the arenas of 'Cold War era' politics, including global imperial, anti-communist, Islamist, socialist and anti-imperial arenas of different scales. I have described their various trajectories in relation to a history of modern power politics, involving international encounters, ideological constructions, alliances and strategic maneuvers, (Bashir & Crews: 2012: 5). The national politics of the governments, tied to the wider problem of the uneven experience of the postcolonial state in Pakistan, and its inability to slide onto a shifting and heterogeneous set of social forces, divided by provincial, sectarian, ethnic, tribal, class and

internationalist lines, and shaped by imperialized elite class with political and military dominance, yet who exercised a weak and partial hegemony. I have theorized the call to decolonize the imaginary, outlined the dynamics of a changing and contentious Pakistan Cold War imaginary, and explained how it shaped both a moving architecture of power, as well as how it informed Pakistani state and social forces in their international encounters.

Historicizing and spatializing the struggles and transformations between state and society via studying their factional disputes and internationalist politics, offers insights on the trajectory of the Cold War. In this way, “the postcolonial state of Pakistan can best be characterized by the notion of “uneven state spaces” and thus illustrating that the state as a “site” is contested from both “external” and “internal” forces (Khan: 2021: 52). Superpower rivalries, regional powers and social movements shaped the trajectory of postcolonial Pakistan. In contrast to other postcolonial states in the region on the advent of decolonization, the decision to construct state identity around Islamic order and imperial clientelism, created a system of patronage and praetorian militarism. By the time of the Afghan war, it had “turned the military into its own mighty corporate empire worth over \$20 billion, with deep penetration into each pore of the state apparatus” (Mallick: 2021: 198-199). In the repetition and advancement of colonial practices, the state order ensured the alienation of Pakistan’s non-Punjabi provinces, ostracizing them from the national project. Thus, the state dominance over national development has been experienced as the continuation of colonial development in Pakistan, especially by the working classes and ethnic minorities (Akhter: 2015). This is especially true when we consider how war and development are framed as the carrot and stick of Pakistani postcolonial politics, in ways with obvious imperial lineage.

I have engaged in a discussion about the eroding of the possibility of decolonization in the retrenchment of imperial politics. Decolonization here refers to a project of reordering the

world that sought to create a domination-free and egalitarian international order” involving anti-imperialism as a project of ‘worldmaking’ because it sought to rearrange the hierarchies of an imperial world order (Getachew: 2019:2). Indeed, “the contested nature of Pakistan did not arise from Pakistan being insufficiently imagined, but rather it being insufficiently decolonized.” (Sayyid: 2017). To this end, the thesis has explored the trajectories of the nation state, its centralizing and extra-territorial logics, internal hierarchies and external alliances. From being on the brink of socialist revolution to becoming the centre of an Islamist and anti-communist union against the Soviets, the repercussions of Pakistan’s role in the Afghan war were transformative. It took place in ways that did little to guarantee Pakistan’s stability in the aftermath of the Cold War. Pakistan’s uneven development, rentier security state and the prevalence of violent hierarchical orders, shaped a fractured imaginary. Here is a social terrain in which Pakistani generals innovated imperial statecraft, whilst counter-hegemonic forces fought for power, in both promoting the Cold War, and dampening decolonization. On the surface, global south societies are usually thought about in terms of the capabilities and limitations of postcolonial states, rather than the intensities, encounters and repercussions of social forces within historical networks, involving global universalisms of religion, culture and internationalisms. Yet this second perspective offers significant benefit for the study of world order.

Moreover, I have charted the sociological roots of Pakistani militarism, in relation to changing phases of warfare in the post-colonies. The trauma across the Radcliffe Line with India, shaped the collective memory and institutional culture of Punjabi-Mohair dominance within the military-bureaucratic elite, whose institutional culture and international outlook were shaped in running the Colonial state (Akhtar: 2018, Devji: 2005). Thus, the Pakistani army’s “sociospatial recruitment trend is rooted in colonial history” (Khan: 2021:65) in terms of the imperial path-dependencies, martial traditions, Anglicised practices, codes of honour and the military’s imperialized worldview. Pakistanis engineered new mechanisms of imperial

governance in the context of the late Cold War. Pakistani military prowess was valorised by Anglo-American strategists, not just because of their experience of governing the borderlands, but also because of the *realpolitik* associated with the strategy of blending imperial security practices, Jihadist fervour and irregular warfare. This is not to downplay the US contribution to the experimentation with Jihad. After all, “it was the American sponsored anti-communist crusade in Afghanistan that revitalized in the last quarter of the twentieth century the notion of jihad as the armed struggle” (Ahmed: 2006:575). Rather, I mean here to focus attention on the transnational linkage between US anti-communism, Pakistani militarism and their joint sponsorship of militants, which redefined geopolitics, and transformed notions of Jihad, Islam and the Muslim world (Roy: 2002, Adib-Moghaddam: 2007).

This thesis has also contested the sanitized post -1945 world history underpinned by both a negation of imperial legacies during the Cold War, and a false universalization of the idea of a ‘Long Peace’ in world politics (Gaddis: 1992, Barkawi: 2019). Whilst ‘global’ Cold War historians have popularized the provincializing of a Eurocentric understanding of the Cold War, they have remained cautious of thinking through the processes involving sequences of inter-imperial, regional and local struggles of intersecting and multi-scaled levels of interaction, (Westad: 2005, Chamberlin: 2018). Hence we need, “some way to parse out exactly what kinds of impacts the Cold War had on Third World societies and to separate these from processes that were occurring quite independently of the Cold War” (Roxborough: 2007: 808). Observe how inter-imperiality structures modern power politics and the hierarchies, “as a long-standing world structure, an event-generating structure that has fostered combined and ever more uneven development and has provoked intensifying political resistance” (Doyle: 2014:4). I have also borrowed the idea of the ‘decomposition’ of the Cold War and tied it to the ‘decomposition’ of postcolonial momentum in Pakistan; in order to clarify how imperial path dependencies and Muslim world politics, in connection with the changing dimensions of international power struggles, have shaped Pakistani politics (Kwon: 2011).

Through charting a conceptual, theoretic, analytical and historical study I have crafted a panoramic view of Pakistani relations across state and society, in relation to global historical and political processes. In so doing I have called for the need to resituate mutual-encounters from the perspective of Global South connectivity in order to provincialize Eurocentric readings of world struggles that rely on forms of methodological nationalism, to inquire into the inter-societal multiplicity of the International. Following on, I made the case for the need to 'decolonize' our notions of the imaginary in Eurocentric social theory and integrate the international, conflictual, transboundary and generative elements of a vibrant socio-political field, with explanatory power, when the Pakistani imaginary, its multiple and conflicting internal and external logics, is understood as a struggle for power of the state as a set of transboundary conflicting projects beyond state power with analytical purchase for gaging how the ideas of religious nationalism and militarized Islam became inculcated into the wider global anti-communist struggle. The Pakistani Cold War imaginary engages in dynamic symbiosis with the Afghan War. To understand the co-constitution between Pakistani Cold War and an evolving struggle for power, necessitates a need for sketching the context of a changing international environment, a world political field governed by war, empire and world order involving power struggles, ideological determinants, strategic and tactical developments, lateral solidarities and geopolitical hierarchies.

In addition, I have given significant attention to Pakistan-US relations. Informed by the bloody massacres of Partition, the military-bureaucratic classes consolidated an only partial state project. Particular histories included the traumas of Partition, which informed their hostility towards India, anxiety over social difference and willingness to use military force on dissidents. The state's inability to garner consent, made for an ever more centralizing political unit, in which first the military-bureaucratic nexus and later an overdeveloped military- intelligence-paramilitary political economy, came to dominate Pakistan (Siddiq: 2007, Akhtar: 2018). At the state's origins, and within the geopolitical environment of the

end of the Second World War, Pakistani leaders looked to overcome asymmetry with India through British and then American patronage in economic and military aid. The formal handover of Anglo to American supremacy in the Middle East emerged in the context of the Suez crises, a fiasco for the old European powers, which proved an opportunity for the US to expand in the region. It's easy to forget, that at the dawn of the new state, Jinnah had valorised the US as an example of a former colony, comprised of multiple nations, whose social and technological development now outstripped the old empires. He wrote, "take America. When it threw off British rule and declared itself independent, how many nations were there?... they had many difficulties. But mind you, their nations were actually in existence and they were great nations; whereas you had nothing. You have got Pakistan only now" (Jinnah: 1948: 149). Such is the heightened contradiction between the melancholy of loss from Partition and the sundering from the heartlands of Muslim civilisation in the Subcontinent that the steely nation-building determination that Jinnah alone was able to temporarily steer, and even then, only within international, social and historical constraints which would ensnare his successors.

By mapping the development of Pakistan-US relations largely outside of the rubrics of patron-client relations, I have attempted to reflect on the broader international and historical dynamics, which explain how Pakistanis have had tense relations with Washington. Pakistan-US relations have been infamously tempestuous. Meanwhile Pakistani society has maintained a deep distrust of the US in the context of Pakistani histories of anti-imperialism and American histories of foreign intervention. Thanks to US support, Pakistan's establishment class, political elite and chiefly its Military's upper echelons, developed a strong martial apparatus during the Cold War, despite being unable to create an cohesive, inclusive, national unity. In this context, Pakistani Cold War architects became ever more paranoid about enemies inside and outside the gates by the time of increasing friction with afghan regimes in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the temporary synergies of Pakistani-US military

operations, reshaped world order. Subsequently, “what is happening with Afghanistan is less a withdrawal than a redistribution of imperial power. The United States is dispersing its war-making to collaborators and security assemblages that will help render empire difficult to track” (Tahir: 2021). Despite technological and military innovations, this is not a new phenomenon, but rather constituent of a long-standing structure of modern power politics. It has its roots in the colonial investment in Northern Indians as labourers for British colonial interests in the Middle East, and Indian Muslim military sociologies within the British Indian army (Haqqani: 2005: 165, Barkawi: 2017, Devji: 2005). Thus when Pakistan joined US sponsored CENTO and SEATO regional alliances in 1955, Pakistani chiefs hoped to exert geostrategic significance stretching from the Middle East to South East Asia, much as the British empire had enjoyed. But lacking the centre ground of the subcontinent, and forced into communal, imperial, patrimonial and praetorian path dependencies, they entered a new epoch. This was characterized by the constraints on foreign policy ambitions due to lived histories of resistance to the Cold War narrative, uneven state-society relations and emerged in the anxieties and perceived opportunities that shaped Pakistan’s strategic culture.

Pakistan’s inculcation into the Cold War during the Baghdad Pact, and enlistment into the frontline during the Afghan Soviet war, mirrors America’s own Cold War and ascent to global supremacy. Even when Pakistan remained a peripheral actor during the 1950s, Anglo-American planners valued the geographical possibilities, martial prowess and Islamic universalisms implied in the potent yet ambiguous struggles for Pakistan’s identity. The relationship between the US led world order and postcolonial states has globally enforced imperial era hierarchies, but in Pakistan and across the borderlands, we see the mutation of a set of global flows binding military, strategic, ideological, commercial and logistical ties.

I have traced the how superpowers become entangled in global conflicts in the Global South. For US strategic planners Afghanistan represented the opportunity to turn the tide of national

liberation struggles back onto the Soviets who had sporadically particular left and anti-imperial forces. In the Soviet Union, defeat in Afghanistan shook self-perceptions, military confidence, state legitimacy and participation of in the Soviet project (Reuveny & Prakash: 1999: 693). For the Soviets, returning soldiers of the Fourth army complained of a, graveyard full of memories in Afghanistan (Alexievich: 2017). Superpowers become ensnared in complex social terrains involving imperial and Cold War politics, and countervailing and realigning social and political forces including socialist, Islamist and ethno-separatist forces. For the US, the Afghan Jihad propelled the growing confidence, capability and ambition of the global Jihad to take on another superpower in the global spectacle of 9/11. The million deaths across continents that came as a response has reshaped the West, whilst transforming the politics of Asia, cementing further militarism, societal fracture and dislocation.

The thesis has also charted the role of Islamic Universalism and Muslim world connectivity as a trans-regional set of relations binding Pakistanis to global politics. Notions of a lost Islamic era have plagued Islamic modernisers across ideological and political divides since the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Rahmena: 1994). The sanctioning of Islamist warfare as legitimate Cold War violence, backed by the liberal world order, was part of a longer process of Anglo-American militarizing of Muslim counter-revolutionary states, militants and social forces dating back to the Raj, but refined in the US-led Cold War era (Mamdani: 2002). During this period, the US would lead Western states in supporting the Afghan Jihad, “both as a bulwark against communism and as a tactical resource for controlling Arab oil” (Mernissi: 2003: 58-9).

However, this is only half the story, and from the perspective of the Pakistanis, empire looks very different (Ho: 2004: 211). The Afghan war symbolized a moment in which Zia’s generals sought to lead the Islamic Ummah through geopolitical power. In the context of a lost Mughal centre in the Subcontinent, the tribulations of imperial rule, Pakistanis imagined sharply differing visions of world order; Islamic civilizational states, post-imperial federations and socialist nations all traversed their imaginaries.

Charting the relationship between Pakistani Cold War factions, their transboundary imaginaries and their international interlocutors, reveals world historic consequences to both changes in the structure of power in Pakistan, and transformations in world order struggles. This has been a partial endeavour, given the focus on war, empire and world politics, and has not had the space to chart in greater detail the student-worker movements, the women's movement and the different ethno-separatist movements in Pakistan. Others have done so within the emergent Critical Pakistan Studies (Bajwa: 2016). This study contributes to this growing set of studies on Pakistani Cold War and political-military relations, as well as scholarship on the Pakistani anti-imperial Left. It is a humble interjection into this vibrant field. In charting the relationship between vying social forces within the contested Pakistani Cold War imaginary, I have reserved specific attention on the anti-colonial Left. This has been in order to illustrate how they articulated a world politics that stood opposed to Cold War binaries, hierarchy and Islamism, but rather sought to promote an internationalist, egalitarian and progressive anti-colonial politics in the state. Groups as diverse as the Pakistani Communist Party, the 1968-9 student-workers movement, the Mazdoor Kissan Party, the Baluchistan Liberation Front, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, workers movements in Okara and Gwadar as well as the women's movement including the coalition behind the Aurat March, have challenged state violence and order during the Cold War and the War on Terror (Tahir et al: 2012). These vibrant counter-movements and histories are a source of inspiration in a troubled world, and constitute a welcome reminder that the struggle continues.

This inquiry paves the way for future scholarship. Decolonizing the imaginary and introducing the Pakistani Cold War imaginary, has significant benefits for IR theory. Introducing Pakistani Cold War politics outside of the usual metrics, offers substantial insights for the study of world order. Thus recasting the post 1945 era by charting how decolonization and the Cold War interacted has the potential to further redefine scholarship. On a broader

level, the transboundary analysis of Pakistani Cold War encounters, has implications for the fields of IR, Security and War Studies. I have continued and developed the call for a 'non-Eurocentric security studies' (Barkawi: Laffey: 2006: 351), which seeks to requisition scholarly tools for an emancipatory analysis in order to rethink global security analysis. This project also finds welcome companionship in recent scholarly work, which has focused on Islam's relationship to Communism and Cosmopolitanism in South East Asia, which similarly attempts to offer theoretic, analytical and historical analysis of transboundary politics in the Global South (Sidel: 2021).

Given the troubles of the world today, this thesis is but a humble contribution to the task of repositioning Pakistan, the Cold War and decolonization outside the awesome power of dominant representations, in order to invoke histories that were never confined to the European nation state, but instead evade traditional categorization at every turn, histories that point to both the struggles that underpin world order, and the need for a more humane and compassionate understanding of social relations. Across disciplines, the move to fully reckon with imperial legacies in our present has been a constant source of inspiration in writing the thesis. Finally, the project is dedicated in honour of those who have fought for an egalitarian world politics, and those who continue to fight for a better world today.

## Bibliography

### Archival Material

- ‘Birth of Pakistan an event in History’. Dawn Newspaper August 1947. ‘World greets Pakistan’s first Anniversary today’. Dawn Newspaper August 1948. Saturday August 14th 1948
- ‘Bombing Raids by Afghan Aircraft inside Pakistan’. Professor M. Mohbin Shorish Collections. 1984
- ‘Brzezinski to Carter. Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan. December 26th 1979. National Security Archive files
- ‘Chinese Report on the impact of the Suez Canal Crisis on the Baghdad Pact and Pakistan foreign policy’. Cold War International History Project. Woodrow Wilson Center Archives. November 16th 1956.
- ‘The Costs of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan’. CIA Special Collection. February 1987. Released in 2000.
- ‘The Muslim. Islamabad. November 21st 1979.
- ‘Afghanistan. Russia’s Vietnam?’. David Chaffetz. The Afghanistan Council of The Asia Society. 1979. ‘15th Anniversary of the PDPA’. Kabul New Times. Vol. XII No. 2. January 5th 1980.
- ‘CPSU Politburo Decision on Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, with report by Fidel Castro to mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and approved letter from L.I. Brezhnev to Fidel Castro’. Cold War International History Project. Woodrow Wilson Center Archives. March 10 1980.
- ‘Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan’. ‘The Circumstances of Pakistan’s Recent Diplomatic Activities. Cold War International History Project. Woodrow Wilson Center Archives. September 11th 1956.
- ‘Dossier of Political Parties intent on exporting an Islamic Revolution. A.A. Lyakhovisky’. Plamyā Afghana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran). Iskon. Moscow. Translated for Cold War International History project by Gary Goldberg.
- ‘Gorbachev and Reagan discuss the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan’. Cold War International History Project. Woodrow Wilson Center Archives. December 1987. Available at: <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117245>
- ‘Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski. : Nouvel Observateur. January 15th 1988. P. 76.
- ‘Jabal. The Voice of Balochistan’. Released by the SARRC. South Asian Research and Resource Center. 1973-74.
- ‘Lessons from the last war’. National Security Archive: Volume II. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 57 .Edited by John Prados and Svetlana Savranskaya October 9, 2001. Available at :<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/>
- ‘Lord Mountbatten’s farewell in Pakistan: A Parting among friends’. The Manchester Guardian. Friday. August 15th 1947.
- ‘Mazdoor Kissan Party Circular’. Released by the SARRC. South Asian Research and Resource Center. 1974.
- ‘Memo from Shultz to Reagan. Cold War International history project. Woodrow Wilson Archives. November 29th. 1982.
- ‘National Security Archive: Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the last war. Afghanistan: The making of US Policy, 1973-1990. Steve Galster. October 9th 2001.

- ‘Notes from Politburo Meeting. Cold War International History Project. February 23rd 1987. Available at: <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117235>
- ‘Pakistan Government Anxieties growing out of Kabul’. Public Library of US Diplomacy. Wikileaks. May 3 1978. Available at: [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978ISLAMA04348\\_d.html?fbclid=IwAR3wtHDzxV8d0qjQxjD3AH8OamMk1P0kMu80gemjcvH7qhdFe1MohjKFKhs](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978ISLAMA04348_d.html?fbclid=IwAR3wtHDzxV8d0qjQxjD3AH8OamMk1P0kMu80gemjcvH7qhdFe1MohjKFKhs)
- ‘Reforming military command arrangements: The case of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Carlisle. PA; Strategic Studies Institute. US Army War College. P. 1
- ‘Soviet Invasion: A cryptic History’. National Security Agency. Central Security Service. Special Series. Volume B. Declassified. National Security Archive. 1993
- ‘Soviet Military Intelligence assesses the equipment provided to Afghan. Cold War International History Project. Woodrow Wilson Center Archives. September 1981.
- ‘Soviet Report’. ‘The Ideological Aggression of American Imperialism in the Orient’. Cold War International History Project. Woodrow Wilson Center Archives. January 1959.
- ‘Spies, Lies and the Distortion of History. Steve Coll. Cold War. International History Project. February 24 2002. Available at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/cwihp-afghanistan-collection-featured-washington-post>
- ‘Students protest against Patrice Lumumba’s Murder’. The Civil and Military Gazette. Lahore. February 1961.
- ‘The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Détente.’ Nobel Symposium 95. Lysebu. September 17-20, 1995. Transcribed by Svetlana Savranskaya. Edited by David A. Welch and Odd Arne Westad. The Norwegian Nobel Institute Oslo 1996. Available at: [https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/carterbrezhnev/docs\\_intervention\\_in\\_afghanistan\\_and\\_the\\_fall\\_of\\_detente/fall\\_of\\_detente\\_transcript.pdf](https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/carterbrezhnev/docs_intervention_in_afghanistan_and_the_fall_of_detente/fall_of_detente_transcript.pdf)
- ‘The KGB in Afghanistan: Mitrokhin Documents Disclosed’, press release from the Cold War International History Project. Woodrow Wilson Center Archives. February 25 2002.
- ‘The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Failure of Military Coercion in Afghanistan, 1979-89’ Journal of Conflict Studies. Vol. XIX No. 2, Fall 1999. Available at: <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4356/5011>
- ‘The Pervez Case, Pakistani Nuclear Procurement and Regan Administration Nonproliferation policy, 1987’. Available at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-pervez-case-pakistani-nuclear-procurement-and-reagan-administration-nonproliferation>
- ‘The Quranic Concept of War’. S.K. Malick. Lahore : Wajidalis. 1979. Available at: <https://wolfgangloss.files.wordpress.com/2008/02/malik-quranic-concept-of-war.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2sKb7ilXxzNFJ0fkCj6PNsYWvBAVqsEWL9eAV0GAN-34XXY0C5IzqA6J4>
- ‘The Secretary of State’s visit to Pakistan: Afghanistan Cable from the US embassy Islamabad, to the secretary of state. Cold War International history project. Woodrow Wilson Archives. July 1st 1983.
- ‘US Air Force Oral History Interview. Major General Robert W Burns.’ Office of Air Force History. USAF Headquarters. Unclassified. March 1979.
- ‘Worldwide Reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: An intelligence memorandum’. January 1980. CIA Archive: National Foreign Assessment Center. Released in 2006.
- ‘I have faith in my people’ says Quaid-I-Azam’. Dawn Newspaper. Volume VIII No. 224. August 15th 1948
- ‘Record of a conversation of M.S. Gorbachev with the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the people’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan’. Cold War

International History Project. Woodrow Wilsons Centre. July 20th 1987. Available at: <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117237>

- “Today two new self-governing Dominions India and Pakistan are added to the British Commonwealth of Nations. The empire of India ceases to exist”. The Daily Mail. August 15th 1947.

## Books

- Adams, J., Clemens, E.S., & Orloff, A.S. (eds.). (2005). “Introduction: Social theory, modernity, and the three waves of historical sociology,” in *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.
- Alex, Aand Nisancioglu, K. (2015) *How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Arshin, A. A. (2008). *Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . (2011). *A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations: Us and Them beyond Orientalism*. London: Hurst.
- Eqbal, A, Bengelsdorf, C., Cerullo, M., & Chandrani, Y. (2006). *The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ishtiaq, A. (2013). *Pakistan the Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2011*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Akhtar, A.S. (2017). *The Politics of ‘Common Sense’: State, Society and Culture in Pakistan*. Delhi: Cambridge University Press.
- Aleksievich, Svetlana, A., & Bromfield, A. (2017). *Boys in Zinc*. Penguin Books.
- Alexander, J.C., and Smith, P. (2001). The Strong Program in Cultural Sociology. In J. Turner (ed.) *The Handbook of Sociological*. New York: Kluwer.
- Ali, K.A. (2015). *Communism in Pakistan: Politics and Class Activism 1947-1972*. London: I.B.Tauris.
- Ali, T. (1970). *Pakistan: Military Rule or People’s Power?* London: Cape.
- . (2018). *Uprising in Pakistan: How to Bring down a Dictatorship*. London: Verso.
- Amin, Y. (2008). Variants of Cultural Nationalism in Pakistan: A Reading of Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Jamil Jalibi, and Fahmida Riaz. In K. Pemperton & M. Nijhawan (eds.). *Shared Idioms, Sacred Symbols, and the Articulation of Identities in South Asia* London: Routledge, 2008.

- Anievas, A. (2015). *How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Anwar, M. (1986). *Race and Politics: Ethnic Minorities and the British Political System*. New York: Tavistock.
- Appadurai, A. (1996). *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Archer, M.S. (1988). *Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Arreguín-Toft, I.M. (2005). *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Aydin, Cemil. 2017. *The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- . (2019). *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ayoob, M. (1995). *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. Boulder, Colorado: Rienner.
- Azhar, A. (2019) *Revolution in reform: Trade-unionism in Lahore, c. 1920-70*. Hyderabad, Telangana, India: Orient BlackSwan Private Limited
- Bajwa, F.N. (1996). *Pakistan and the West: The First Decade, 1947 - 1957*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Banerjee, M. (2000). *The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition & Memory in the North West Frontier*. Oxford: Currey..
- Barkawi, T. (2017). *Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bashir, S., & Crews, R.D. (eds.). (2012). *Under the Drones: Modern Lives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Baudrillard, J. (1995). *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- Bayly, M.J. (2016). *Taming the Imperial Imagination: Colonial Knowledge, International Relations, and the Anglo-Afghan Encounter, 1808-1878*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bayly, S. (2007). *Asian Voices in a Postcolonial Age: Vietnam, India and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Begum, I. (2017). *The Impact of the Afghan-Soviet War on Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Bell, D. (2020). *Dreamworlds of Race: Empire and the Utopian Destiny of Anglo-America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Bennett Jones, O. (2003). *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Berger, P.L., & Luckmann, T. (1991). *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: Penguin Books.
- Bevins, V. (2020). *The Jakarta Method: Washington's Anticommunist Crusade and the Mass Murder Program That Shaped Our World*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Bhambra, G.K. (2014). *Connected Sociologies*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Boot, M. (2014). *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. New York: Basic Books.
- Booth, K. (2007). *Theory of World Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Borradori, G., Habermas, J., & Derrida, J. (2009). *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Braithwaite, R. (2011). *Afgansty: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Buzan, B. (1983). *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.
- Buzan, B., & Lawson, G. (2015). *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Buzan, B., & Little, R. (2000). *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Byrne, J.J. (2019). *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Campbell, D. (2005). *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Caryl, C. (2014). *Strange Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century*. New York: Basic Books.
- Castells, M. (1996). *The rise of the network society: Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture*. New Jersey: Wiley- Blacwell.
- Castoriadis, C. (1987). *The Imaginary Institution of Society*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Chamberlin, P.T. (2019). *The Cold War's killing fields: Rethinking the long peace*. Harper Collins Publishers.
- Chakrabarty, D. (2000a). *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. New Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press.

- . (2000b). *Rethinking Working-Class History: Bengal, 1890-1940*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Chakrabarty, D., Majumdar, R., Sartori, A., & University of Chicago, (eds.). (2007). *From the Colonial to the Postcolonial: India and Pakistan in Transition*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chatterjee, P. (1993a). *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- . (1993b). *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . (2012). *The Black Hole of Empire: History of a Global Practice of Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Clark, I. (1989). *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Coll, S. (2005). *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Cooley, A. (2005). *Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States, and Military Occupations*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Cooper, F. (2005). *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
- Cooper, F., and Stoler, A.L. (eds). (1997). *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
- Cummings, B, (ed.). (2002). *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Dalby, S., & Toal, G. (eds.). (1998). *Rethinking Geopolitics*. New York: Routledge.
- Denemark, R.A., (ed.). (2010). *The International Studies Encyclopedia*. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Devji, F. (2008). (2008). *The Terrorist in Search of Humanity: Militant Islam and Global Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . (2013). *Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Gilles Dorronsoro. (2005). *Revolution Unending: 1979 to the Present*. Columbia University Press.
- Dower, J.W. (1999). *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
- Dubrow, J. (2018) *Cosmopolitan dreams: The making of modern Urdu literary culture in Colonial South Asia*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

- Ewans, M. (2002). *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Fair, C.. (2014). *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fanon, F., & Jean-Paul Sartre, J.P. (2001). *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Fisk, R. (2005). *The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Foucault, M, Bertani, M., Fontana, A., & Macey, D. (2004). *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-76*. London: Penguin Books.
- Fraser, T. G. (1984). *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine: Theory and Practice*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Friedman, J.S. (2015). *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World*. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.
- Fukuyama, F. (2012). *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Penguin Books.
- Gaddis, J.L. (1989). *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gates, R.M. (2006). *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Geertz, C. (1993). *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. London: Fontana Press.
- Getachew, A. (2019). *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Ghazi, M.A. (2013). *Afghan War & the Stinger Saga: How the Air Battle Was Fought and Won in Afghanistan*. Lahore: Ahmad Publications.
- Gilmartin, D. (1988). *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan*. London: Tauris.
- Gilroy, P. (1993). *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Go, J. (2011). *Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . (2016). *Postcolonial Thought and Social Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Go, J., & Lawson, G. (eds.). 2018. *Global Historical Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goldstein, J., Keohane, R.O., & Social Science Research Council (U.S.) (eds). (1993). *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

- Goody, J. (2006). *The Theft of History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gopal, A. (2014). *No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban and the War Through Afghan Eyes*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Grandin, G. (2006). *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*. 1st ed. The American Empire Project. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Gregory, D. (2004). *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publications.
- Grindstaff, L, Ming-cheng Miriam Lo, M.M., and Hall, J.R. (eds.). (2019). *Routledge Handbook of Cultural Sociology*. New York: Routledge.
- Guha, R. (1983). *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*. Delhi.
- Halperin, S. (2015). "Imperial city states, national states and post-national spatialities," in: Halperin, S. and Palan, R., *Legacies of empire: Imperial roots of the contemporary global order*. Cambridge University Press.
- Haines, D. (2013). *Building the Empire, Building the Nation: Development, Legitimacy and Hydro-Politics in Sind, 1919-1969*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Hall, S., & Du Gay, P. (eds.). (1996). *Questions of Cultural Identity*. London: Sage.
- Hall, S., Maharaj, S., Campbell, S., & Tawadros, G., (2001). *Modernity and Difference*. London: Institute of International Visual Arts.
- Halliday, F. (2005a). *The Middle East in International Relations Power, Politics and Ideology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . (2005b). *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Halperin, S., & Palan, R. (eds.). (2015). *Legacies of Empire: Imperial Roots of the Contemporary Global Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Han, E. (2019). *Asymmetrical Neighbors: Borderland State Building between China and Southeast Asia*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Handel, M.I. (1990). *Weak States in the International System*. London: F. Cass.
- Hanif, M. (2009). *A Case of Exploding Mangoes*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Ḥaqqānī, H. (2005). *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
- . (2013). *Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2003). *Empire*. Harvard University Press.

- Haroon, S. (2007). *Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland*. London: Hurst.
- Harvey, D. (2005). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hevia, J. (2012). *The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge and Empire-Building in Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hilali, A.Z. (2005). *US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*. US Foreign Policy and Conflict in the Islamic World. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Hiro, D. (2018). *Cold War in the Islamic World: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Struggle for Supremacy*. London: Hurst.
- Hobden, S., & Hobson, J.M. (eds.). (2002). *Historical Sociology of International Relations*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. J., & T. O. Ranger (eds.). (1983). *The Invention of Tradition*. Past and Present Publications. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobson, J.M. (2004). *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hopkirk, P. (1992). *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*. New York: Kodansha International.
- Huntington, S.P. (2002). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. London: Free Press.
- Ikenberry, G.J. (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton University Press.
- Iqtidar, H. (2011). *Secularizing Islamists? Jama'at-e-Islami and Jama'at-Ud-Da'wa in Urban Pakistan*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Isby, D.C. (1989). *War in a Distant Country, Afghanistan: Invasion and Resistance*. New York: Arms and Armour.
- Jackson, P.T. (2011). *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics*. New York: Routledge.
- Jackson, R.H. (1990). *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jaffrelot, C (ed.). (2009). *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins*. London: Anthem Press.
- Jalal, A. (1985). *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . (2008). *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*. Cambridge University Press.

- . (2014). *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- James, L., & Leake, E. (eds.). (2015). *Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Jinnah, M.A. (2000). 'Speech at a Public Meeting in Dacca: 21 March 1948'. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Juris, J.S., & Khasnabish, A. (eds.). (2013). *Insurgent Encounters: Transnational Activism, Ethnography, and the Political*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.
- Kaldor, M. (2010). *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Kalinovsky, A.M. (2011). *A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Kepel, G., and Gilles Kepel. (2002). *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Khadduri, M. (2010). *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*. Clark, New Jersey: Lawbook Exchange.
- Khalili, L. (2013). *Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Khan, I. (2012). *Pakistan's Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Making: A Study of Pakistan's Post 9/11 Afghan Policy Change*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
- Khattak, A. (2005). *Qissa Zama Da Abadi Ziwand*. Riaz Book Agency.
- Kolko, G. (1988). *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Krause, K., and Williams, M.C. (eds.). (1997). *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kuus, M. (2017). *Critical Geopolitics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kux, D. (2001). *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Kwon, H. (2010). *The Other Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lake, D.A. (2009). *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Lawson, S. (2015). *Theories of International Relations: Contending Approaches to World Politics*. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity.
- Leake, E. (2017). *The Defiant Border: The Afghan-Pakistan Borderlands in the Era of Decolonization, 1936-1965*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Lee, C.J. (2010). *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.
- Lentz, C.C. (2019). *Contested Territory: Dien Bien Phu and the Making of Northwest Vietnam*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Lewis, M.W., & Wigen, K. (1997). *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
- Lieven, A. (2011). *Pakistan: A Hard Country*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Linebaugh, P., and Rediker, M. (2000). *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Lodhi, M. (ed.). (2011). *Pakistan: Beyond the 'Crisis State'*. London: Hurst.
- Luthi, L.M. (2008). *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Magubane, Z. (2020). Overlapping Territories and Intertwined Histories: Historical Sociology's Global Imagination. In J. Adams, E.S. Clemens, A.S. Orloff, & G. Steinmetz (eds.), *Remaking Modernity* (pp.92–109). Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.
- Mahler, A.G. (2018) *From the Tricontinental to the Global South: Race, radicalism, and Transnational Solidarity*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Malik, A. (2013) "Alternative politics and dominant narratives: Communists and the Pakistani state in the early 1950s," *South Asian History and Culture*, 4(4), pp. 520–537. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19472498.2013.824681>.
- Manchanda, N. (2020). *Imagining Afghanistan: The History and Politics of Imperial Knowledge*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mannheim, Karl. (1985). *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Matin, Kamran. (2013) *Recasting Iranian Modernity: International Relations and Social Change*. London: Routledge.
- Marsden, M., & Hopkins, B.D. (2011). *Fragments of the Afghan Frontier*. London: Hurst.
- Martin, M. (2014). *An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978 - 2012*. London: Hurst.
- Mazower, M. (2013). *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Mbembe, A. (2001). *On the Postcolony*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
- McGarr, P. (2015). *The Cold War in South Asia Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945-1965*.

- McMahon, R.J. (ed.). (2013). *The Cold War in the Third World. Reinterpreting History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mills, C.W. (1956). *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mishra, P. (2013). *From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt against the West and the Remaking of Asia*. London: Penguin.
- Moyar, M. (2006). *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Murphy, E. (2013). *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism*. New York: Routledge.
- Nandy, A. (1983). *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Nasr, S.V.R. (1994). *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan* Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
- Nawaz, S. (2017). *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Nelson, M.J. (2011). *In the Shadow of Shari'ah: Islam, Islamic Law, and Democracy in Pakistan*. London: Hurst.
- Nunan, T. (2016). *Humanitarian Invasion: Global Development in Cold War Afghanistan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Osterhammel, J. (2014). *The transformation of the world*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Pande, A. (2011). *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India*. New York: Routledge.
- Paul, T. V. (2014). *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pham, Q.N., & Shilliam, R. (eds). (2016). *Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonial Visions*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield International.
- Phillpotts, E., & Bennett, A. (1975). *The Sinews of War: A Romance of London and the Sea*. Plainview, N.Y: Books for Libraries Press.
- Piscatori, J.P., and Saikal, A. (2019). *Islam beyond Borders: The Umma in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Prakash, G. and Adelman, J. (eds) (2023) *Inventing the third world: In Search of Freedom for the postwar Global South*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Prashad, V. (2007). *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*. New York: New Press.

- Rāhnamā, A. (ed.). (2005). *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*. New York : Zed Books.
- Rao, R. (2010). *Third World Protest: Between Home and the World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rashid, A. (2000). *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- . (2008). *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. New York: Viking.
- . (2012). *Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan*. New York: Viking.
- Raza, S, and Shapiro, M.J. (eds.). (2021). *Geopolitics of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Borderland*. New York: Routledge.
- Reus-Smit, C. (2002). *The Idea of History and History with Ideas in Historical Sociology of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Riedel, B.O. (2011). *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
- Rizvi, H.A. (2000). *The Military & Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1997*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications.
- Robinson, W.I. (1996). *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rodney, W. (1974). *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press.
- Roy, K. (2011). *War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740-1849*. London: Routledge.
- Roy, O. (1986). *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Roy, Olivier (2006). *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. London: Hurst.
- Rubin, B.R. (1995). *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Said, E.W. (1993). *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Knopf.
- . (2003). *Orientalism*. London: Penguin.
- Salem, S. (2020). *Anticolonial Afterlives in Egypt: The Politics of Hegemony*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868969>.
- Samad, Y. (2011). *The Pakistan-US Conundrum: Jihadists, the Military and the People: The Struggle for Control*. London: Hurst.

- Sattar, Abdul. (2013). *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2012: A Concise History*. Third edition. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Schaffer, H.B., & Schaffer, T.C. (2011). *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Shilliam, R. (2021). *Decolonizing politics: an introduction*. Oxford. Polity Press.
- Scott, D. (2004). *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.
- Scott, J.C. (1985). *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- . (1990). *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Service, R. (2015). *The End of the Cold War, 1985-1991*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Sewell, W.H. (2005). *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Shah, A. (2014). *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Shaikh, F. (2009). *Making Sense of Pakistan*. London: Hurst.
- Sheehan, N. (1989). *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*. London: Cape.
- Shepard, T. (2008). *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Shilliam, R. (2015). *The Black Pacific: Anti-Colonial Struggles and Oceanic Connections*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Siddiq-Agha, A. (2007). *Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*. London: Pluto Press.
- Siddique, A. (2014). *The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan*. London: Hurst.
- Sidel, J.T. (2021). *Republicanism, Communism, Islam: Cosmopolitan Origins of Revolution in Southeast Asia*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Steger, M.B. (2009). *The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the Global War on Terror*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tahir, M.R., Memon, Q.B., & Prashad, V. (eds.). (2014). *Dispatches from Pakistan*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Talbot, I. (2009). *Pakistan: A Modern History*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Taylor, C. (2004). *Modern Social Imaginaries*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

- Toal, G. (1996). *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*. London: Routledge.
- Todorov, T. (1984). *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Toor, S. (2011). *The State of Islam: Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan*. London: Pluto Press
- Tripp, C. (2013). *The Power and the People: Paths of Resistance in the Middle East*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Trouillot, M. (1995). *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press.
- Urban, M. (1990). *War in Afghanistan*. New York: St Martin's Press.
- Vitalis, R. (2017). *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Waeber, O. (1996). "The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate," in Smith, S., Booth, K., and Zalewski, M. (ed.) *International theory: positivism and beyond*, 149-86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walt, S.M. (1987). *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, K.N. (1979). *A Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
- Warner, M. (2010). *Publics and Counterpublics*. New York: Zone Books.
- Weaver, M.A. (2003). *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- . (2010). *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan The Battle for Afghanistan: The Soviets and the Mujahideen during the 1980s*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Weldes, J. (ed.). (1999). *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Westad, O.A. (2005). *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, W.A. (1978). *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. New York.
- Wolf, E.R. (1982). *Europe and the People without History*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
- Yousuf, M. & Adkin, M. (2007). *The Battle for Afghanistan: The Soviets and the Mujahideen during the 1980s*. Barnsley. Pen & Sword Books Ltd.
- Ziring, L. (1999). *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

## Academic Articles

- Acharya, A. (2011) Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the West. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 39(3), pp. 619–37. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829811406574>.
- . (2014). Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58(4), pp. 647–59. <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12171>.
- Acharya, A., & Buzan, B. (2007). Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 7(3), pp. 287–312. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcm012>.
- Agnew, J. (1994). The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory. *Review of International Political Economy*, 1(1), pp. 53–80.
- Ahmad, M., & Mehmood, R. (2017). Surveillance, Authoritarianism and “Imperial Effects” in Pakistan. *Surveillance & Society*, 15(3/4), pp. 506–13. <https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v15i3/4.6721>.
- Ahmed, I. (2010). The Rise and Fall of the Left and the Maoist Movements in Pakistan. *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs*, 66(3), pp. 251–65. <https://doi.org/10.1177/097492841006600302>.
- Ahmed, F. (1996) “Pakistan: Ethnic fragmentation or national integration?,” *The Pakistan Development Review*, 35(4II), pp. 631–645. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.30541/v35i4iipp.631-645>.
- Ahmed, T. (2008). Writers and Generals: Intellectuals and the First Pakistan Coup. *The Indian Economic & Social History Review*, 45(1), pp. 115–49. <https://doi.org/10.1177/001946460704500104>.
- Akhtar, A.S. (2010). Pakistan: Crisis of a Frontline State. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 40(1) , pp. 105–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472330903270742>.
- Akhtar, A.S., & Rashid, A. (2021). Dispossession and the Militarised Developer State: Financialisation and Class Power on the Agrarian–Urban Frontier of Islamabad, Pakistan. *Third World Quarterly*, 42(8), pp. 1866–84. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1939004>.
- Alavi, H.
- (1964). Imperialism Old and New. *Socialist Register*, 1, pp.104-126.

- (1972). The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh. *New Left Review*, 1(74).
- (1991). Nationhood and Communal Violence in Pakistan. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 21(2), pp. 152–78.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00472339180000131>.
- (1998). Pakistan-US Military Alliance. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 33(25), 1551–1557.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4406909>
- Ali, A. and Patman, R.G. (2019) “The evolution of the National Security State in Pakistan: 1947–1989,” *Democracy and Security*, 15(4), pp. 301–327. Available at:  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2019.1566063>.
- Ali, K.A. (2011). Communists in a Muslim Land: Cultural Debates in Pakistan’s Early Years. *Modern Asian Studies*, 45(3), pp. 501–34.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X11000175>.
- . (2005). The Strength of the Street Meets the Strength of the State: The 1972 Labour Struggles in Karachi. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37(1), pp. 83–107.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743805050063>.
- Ali, N.G. (2020). Agrarian Class Struggle and State Formation in Post-colonial Pakistan, 1959–1974: Contingencies of Mazdoor Kisan Raj. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 20(2), pp. 270–88.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12338>.
- Alimia, S. (2019). Performing the Afghanistan–Pakistan Border Through Refugee ID Cards. *Geopolitics*, 24(2), pp. 391–425.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2018.1465046>.
- Anderl, F., and Witt, A. (2020). Problematising the Global in Global IR. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 49(1), pp. 32–57.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829820971708>.
- Anglim, S. (2008) Callwell versus Graziani: How the British Army Applied “Small Wars” Techniques in Major Operations in Africa and the Middle East, 1940–41. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 19(4), pp. 588–608.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310802462455>.
- Anievas, A, & Saull, R. (2020) Reassessing the Cold War and the Far-Right: Fascist Legacies and the Making of the Liberal International Order after 1945’. *International Studies Review*, 22(3), pp. 370–95.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viz006>.
- Anjum, O. (2007) Islam as a Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 27(3), pp. 656–72.
- Ansari, S. (2011). Everyday Expectations of the State during Pakistan’s Early Years: Letters to the Editor, *Dawn* (Karachi), 1950–1953. *Modern Asian Studies*, 45(1), pp. 159–78.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X10000296>.

- Arreguín-Toft, I. (2001). How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. *International Security*, 26(1), pp. 93–128.  
<https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753212868>.
- Asad, T. (2009). The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam. *Qui Parle*, 17(2), pp.1–30.  
<https://doi.org/10.5250/quiparle.17.2.1>.
- Ashton, N.J. (1993). The Hijacking of a Pact: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955—1958. *Review of International Studies*, 19(2), pp. 123–37.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500118996>.
- Aziz, A. (1965). Cultural and Intellectual Trends in Pakistan. *Middle East Journal*, 19(1), pp. 35–44.
- Bahadur, K. (1975). The Jama'At-I-Islami of Pakistan: Ideology and Political Action. *International Studies* 14(1), pp. 69–84.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/002088177501400105>.
- Barkawi, T. (2004). On the Pedagogy of “Small Wars”. *International Affairs*, 80(1), pp. 19–37.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00363.x>.
- . (2004). Globalization, Culture, and War: On the Popular Mediation of “Small Wars”. *Cultural Critique*, 58, pp. 115–47.
- . (2009). “Small Wars” and Big Consequences: From Korea to Iraq. *Globalizations*, 6(1), pp. 127–31.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14747730802692724>.
- . (2016). Decolonising War. *European Journal of International Security*, 1(2), pp. 199–214.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2016.7>.
- . (2017). Empire and Order in International Relations and Security. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. Retrieved 5 Jan. 2023, from <https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-164>.
- . (2020). World War III. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 22(3), pp. 410–14.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2019.1660471>.
- Barkawi, T., & Laffey, M. (2002). Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International Relations. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 31(1), pp. 109–27.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298020310010601>.
- . (2006). The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies. *Review of International Studies*, 32(2), pp. 329–52.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210506007054>.
- . Barkawi, T. (2015). “Political military legacies of empires in world politics,” in: Halperin, S. and Palan, R., *Legacies of empire: Imperial roots of the contemporary global order*. Cambridge University Press.
- Barkawi, T., & Lawson, G. (2017). *International Origins of Social and Political Theory*. Vol. 32.

- Barthwal-Datta, M., & Basu, S. (2017). Reconceptualizing Regional Security in South Asia: A Critical Security Approach. *Security Dialogue*, 48(5), pp. 393–409.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010617717619>.
- Bayat, A. (2008). Islamism and Empire: The Incongruous Nature of Islamist Anti-Imperialism. *Global Flashpoints*, 44.
- Bayly, M. J. (2021). Review of *Frontiers: Real and Imagined: Ruling the Savage Periphery: Frontier Governance and the Making of the Modern State*, by Benjamin D. Hopkins. *Critical Asian Studies* 53(1), pp. 165–73.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2021.1878675>.
- . (2015). Imperial Ontological (in)Security: “Buffer States”, International Relations and the Case of Anglo-Afghan Relations, 1808–1878. *European Journal of International Relations*, 21(4), no. 4, pp. 816–40.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066114557569>.
- Berenskoetter, F. (2007). Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 35(3), pp. 647–76.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298070350031501>.
- Bhambra, G.K. (2010). Historical Sociology, International Relations and Connected Histories. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 23(1), pp. 127–43.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570903433639>.
- Blaney, D.L., & Tickner, A.B. (2017). International Relations in the Prison of Colonial Modernity. *International Relations*, 31(1), pp. 71–75.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117817691349>.
- Bordo, M.D. (n.d.) The Imbalances of the Bretton Woods System 1965-1973. *Open Economics Review* 31, pp. 195–211.
- Bose, N. (2017) Decolonization and South Asian Studies: Pakistan, “Failure,” and the Promise of Area Studies. *South Asian Review*, 38(3), pp. 43–49.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/02759527.2017.12023345>.
- Brown, C. (n.d.). History Ends, Worlds Collide. *Review of International Studies*, 25(5), pp. 41–57.
- Calhoun, C, Gaonkar, D., Lee, B., Taylor, C., Warner, M. (2015). Modern Social Imaginaries: A Conversation. *Social Imaginaries* 1(1), pp. 189–224.  
<https://doi.org/10.5840/si20151112>.
- Call, C.T. (2011). Beyond the “Failed State”: Toward Conceptual Alternatives. *European Journal of International Relations*, 17(2), pp. 303–26.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066109353137>.
- Capan, Z.G. (2017). Decolonising International Relations?. *Third World Quarterly*, 38(1), pp. 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1245100>.

- Caron, J. (2016). Borderland Historiography in Pakistan. *South Asian History and Culture*, 7(4), no. 4, pp. 327–45.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/19472498.2016.1223716>.
- Caron, J., & Ahmad, M. (2016). Activism, Knowledge and Publishing: Some Views from Pakistan and Afghanistan. *South Asian History and Culture*, 7(1), pp. 30–36.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/19472498.2015.1109305>.
- Caverley, J.D. (2009). The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam. *Quarterly Journal: International Security*, 34(3), pp. 119–57.
- Chakrabarty, D. (n.d.). History as Critique and Critique(s) of History. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 26(14), pp. 2162–66.
- . (1992) Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for “Indian” Pasts? *Representations*, 37, pp. 1–26.
- . (1993). The Difference - Deferral of (A) Colonial Modernity: Public Debates on Domesticity in British Bengal. *History Workshop Journal*, 36(1), pp. 1–34.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/hwj/36.1.1>.
- . (1991). Whose Imagined Community? *Millennium* 20(3), pp. 521–25.
- Chapman, J. (2020). The End of the World as We Know It: The Cold War’s Killing Fields and the Origins of Modern Conflict. *Journal of Genocide Research*. 22(3), pp. 415–18.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2019.1660474>.
- Cheong, S. (2019). A Subaltern Geopolitics? *Geopolitics*, 24(4), pp. 989–94.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2019.1588525>.
- Cogan, C. (1993). Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979. *World Policy Journal*, 2.
- Cohen, E.A. (1984). Constraints on America’s Conduct of Small Wars. *International Security*, 9(2), pp. 151.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2538671>.
- Connell, R. (2014). Using Southern Theory: Decolonizing Social Thought in Theory, Research and Application. *Planning Theory*, 13(2), pp. 210–23.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095213499216>.
- Connolly, W. (1991). Democracy and Territoriality. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 20(3), pp. 463–84.
- Cox, R.W. (1981). Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10(2), pp. 126–55.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298810100020501>.
- Craig, M.M. (2016) “Nuclear Sword of the Moslem World”?: The United States, Britain, Pakistan, and the “Islamic Bomb”, 1977–80. *The International History Review*, 38(5), pp. 857–79. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2016.1140670>.

- Crawford, N.C. (2018). Human Cost of the Post-9/11 Wars: Lethality and the Need for Transparency. *Costs of War*. *Watson Institute*.
- Cullather, N. (2002). Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State. *The Journal of American History* 89(2), pp. 512-537.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/3092171>.
- Daechsel, M. (1997). Military Islamisation in Pakistan and the Spectre of Colonial Perceptions. *Contemporary South Asia*, 6(2), pp. 141-60.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09584939708719810>.
- Gaonkar, D.P. (2002) Toward New Imaginaries: An Introduction. *Public Culture* 14(1), pp. 1-19.
- Donahue, A.K., & Kalyan, R. (2015). Introduction: On the Imperative, Challenges, and Prospects of Decolonizing Comparative Methodologies. *Comparative and Continental Philosophy*, 7(2), pp. 124-37. <https://doi.org/10.1179/1757063815Z.00000000058>.
- Doty, R.L. (1993). Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines. *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(3), pp. 297-320. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600810>.
- . (1993). The Bounds of “Race” in International Relations. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 22(3), pp. 443-61.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298930220031001>.
- Doyle, L. (2014). Inter-Imperiality: Dialectics in a Postcolonial World History. *Interventions*, 16(2), pp. 159-96.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2013.776244>.
- Duara, P. (2008). The Global and Regional Constitution of Nations: The View from East Asia. *Nations and Nationalism*, 14(2), pp. 323-45.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2008.00328.x>.
- Eisenstadt, S. N. (2007). Multiple Modernities. *ProtoSociology*, 24, 20-56.  
<https://doi.org/10.5840/protosociology2007242>
- Emirbayer, M. (1997). Manifesto for a Relational Sociology. *American Journal of Sociology*, 103(2), pp. 281-317.  
<https://doi.org/10.1086/231209>.
- Fair, Christine, C.& Jones, S.G. (2009). Pakistan’s War Within. *Survival*, 51(6), no. 6, pp. 161-88. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330903465204>.
- Fazal, T.M. (2014). Dead Wrong? Battle Deaths, Military Medicine, and Exaggerated Reports of War’s Demise. *Quarterly Journal: International Security*, 39(1), pp. 95-125.
- Feldman, A. (2004). Securocratic Wars of Public Safety: Globalized Policing as Scopic Regime. *Interventions*, 6(3), pp.330-50.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801042000280005>.

- Fonseca, M. (2019). Global IR and Western Dominance: Moving Forward or Eurocentric Entrapment? *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 48(1), pp. 45–59.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829819872817>.
- Fowkes, B, & Gökay, B. (2009) Unholy Alliance: Muslims and Communists – An Introduction. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 25(1), pp. 1–31.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13523270802655597>.
- Gallagher, J, and Robinson, R. (1953). The Imperialism of Free Trade. *The Economic History Review*, 6(1), pp. 1-15.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2591017>.
- Gani, J.K. (2019). Escaping the Nation in the Middle East: A Doomed Project? Fanonian Decolonisation and the Muslim Brotherhood. *Interventions*, 21(5), pp. 652–70.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2019.1585916>.
- Gani, J.K. (2022) “Anti-colonial connectivity between Islamicate movements in the Middle East and South Asia: The Muslim Brotherhood and Jamati Islam,” *Postcolonial Studies*, pp. 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2023.2127660>.
- Gardezi, H.N. (2010). Allah, Amry and America in Pakistan. *Critical Asian Studies*, 42(1), pp. 145–63. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672710903537571>.
- Getachew, Adom & Mantena, Karuna. 2022. Anticolonialism and the Decolonization of Political Theory. *Critical Times*. 4 (3): 359–388.
- Gilmartin, D. (1998). Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 57(4), pp. 1068–95.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2659304>.
- . (1979). Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab’. *Modern Asian Studies*, pp. 485–517.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X00007228>.
- Gilroy, P. (2010). Planetarity and Cosmopolitics: Planetarity and Cosmopolitics. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 61(3), pp. 620–26.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2010.01329.x>.
- Go, J. (2008). Global Fields and Imperial Forms: Field Theory and the British and American Empires. *Sociological Theory*, 26(3), pp. 201–29.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2008.00326.x>.
- . ———. (2009). The “New” Sociology of Empire and Colonialism: The “New” Sociology of Empire and Colonialism’. *Sociology Compass*, 3(5), pp. 775–88.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2009.00232.x>.
- . Go, J. (2013a). For a postcolonial sociology. *Theory and Society*, 42(1), 25-55.
- . Go, J. (2013b). “A global-historical sociology of power: on Mann’s concluding volumes to *The sources of social power*”. *International Affairs*, 89:6, 2013, 1469.1477.

- . Go, J. (2014). Occluding the Global: Analytic bifurcation, causal Scientism, and alternatives in historical sociology. *Journal of Globalization Studies*, 5(1).
- . (2018). Postcolonial Possibilities for the Sociology of Race. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity*, 4(4), pp. 439–51.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/2332649218793982>.
- Goddard, S.E, & Nexon, D.H. (2016). The Dynamics of Global Power Politics: A Framework for Analysis. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 1(1), pp. 4–18.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogv007>.
- Gole, N. (2002). Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries. *Public Culture* ,14(1), pp. 173–90.  
<https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-14-1-173>.
- Goswami, M. (2012). Imaginary Futures and Colonial Internationalisms. *The American Historical Review* 117(5), pp.1461–85.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/117.5.1461>.
- . (2002). Rethinking the Modular Nation Form: Toward a Sociohistorical Conception of Nationalism. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 44(4), pp.770-799.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S001041750200035X>.
- Grant, J. (2014). On the Critique of Political Imaginaries. *European Journal of Political Theory*, 13(4), pp. 408–26.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885113519259>.
- Grovogu Siba. (2011). A Revolution Nonetheless: The Global South in International Relations. *The Global South*, 5(1), pp. 175-190.  
<https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.5.1.175>.
- Gustafson, E.W. (1979). Pakistan 1978: At the Brink Again? *Asian Survey*, 1(19)
- Halliday, F. (1993) “Orientalism” and Its Critics. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 20(2), pp. 145–63.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13530199308705577>.
- Halliday, F., & Rosenberg, J. (1998) Interview with Ken Waltz. *Review of International Studies*, 24(3), pp. 371–86.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210598003714>.
- Halliday, F. (1987). ‘State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda’. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 16(2), pp. 215–29.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298870160022701>.
- Hashmi, S.H. (2011). “Zero Plus Zero Plus Zero”: Pakistan, the Baghdad Pact, and the Suez Crisis. *The International History Review*, 33(3), pp. 525–44.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2011.615184>.

- Hill, J. (2005). Beyond the Other? A Postcolonial Critique of the Failed State Thesis. *African Identities*, 3(2), pp. 139–54.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14725840500235381>.
- Ho, E. (2004). Empire through Diasporic Eyes: A View from the Other Boat. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 46(2), pp. 210-246.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S001041750400012X>.
- Hobson, J.M. (2002a). “What’s at stake in ‘bringing historical sociology back into international relations’? Transcending ‘chronofetishism’ and ‘tempocentrism’ in international relations,” in Hobden, S. and Hobson, J. (2002). *Historical sociology of international relations*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Hobson, J. M.(2002b). “Two waves of Weberian historical sociology in international relations,” in Hobden, S. and Hobson, J. (2002). *Historical sociology of international relations*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Hobson, J.M., & Sajed, A. (2017). Navigating Beyond the Eurofetishist Frontier of Critical IR Theory: Exploring the Complex Landscapes of Non-Western Agency. *International Studies Review*, 19(4), pp. 547–72.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix013>.
- Hoffman, F.G. (2005). Small Wars Revisited: The United States and Nontraditional Wars. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28(6), pp. 913–40.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390500441040>.
- Hoffman, S. (n.d.) An American Social Science: International Relations. *Daedalus*. 106(3), pp. 41–60.
- Hopf, T. (2005). Identity, Legitimacy, and the Use of Military Force: Russia’s Great Power Identities and Military Intervention in Abkhazia. *Review of International Studies*, 31(S1), pp. 225–43. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021050500687X>.
- . (1998). The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. *International Security*, 23(1), pp. 171–200.  
<https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.23.1.171>.
- Hörschelmann, K., Studemeyer, C.C., Hopkins, P. & Benwell, M. (2019). Special Section Introduction: “Peripheral Visions: Security By, and For, Whom?”, *Geopolitics*, 24(4), pp. 777–86. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2019.1593965>.
- Hutchings, K. (2011). Dialogue between Whom? The Role of the West/ Non-West Distinction in Promoting Global Dialogue in IR. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 39(3), pp. 639–47. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829811401941>.
- Inayatullah, S. (1998). Imagining an Alternative Politics of Knowledge: Subverting the Hegemony of International Relations Theory in Pakistan’. *Contemporary South Asia* 7(1), pp. 27–42. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09584939808719828>.
- Iqtidar, H. (2011) “Secularism beyond the state: The ‘state’ and the ‘market’ in Islamist imagination,” *Modern Asian Studies*, 45(3), pp. 535–564. Available at:  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x11000217>.

- Iriye, Akira. 1989. "The Internationalization of History." *American Historical Review* 94(1):1-10.
- Jalal, A. (1995). Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 27(1), pp. 73–89.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800061596>.
- Jasse, R.L. (1991). The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism? *Middle Eastern Studies*, 27(1), pp. 140–56.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00263209108700852>.
- Johnson, W. (2003). On Agency. *Journal of Social History*, 37(1), pp. 113–24.  
<https://doi.org/10.1353/jsh.2003.0143>.
- Jones, R.W. (1989). Pakistan and the United State: Partners After Afghanistan. *The Washington Quarterly* 12(3), pp. 65–87.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01636608909477517>.
- Kalb, D. (2005). From Flows to Violence: Politics and Knowledge in the Debates on Globalization and Empire. *Anthropological Theory*, 5(2), pp. 176–204.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499605053994>.
- Kalyvas, S.N. (2001). "New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?, *World Politics*, 54(1), pp. 99–118. <https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2001.0022>.
- Kanet, R.E. (2006). The Superpower Quest for Empire: The Cold War and Soviet Support for "Wars of National Liberation". *Cold War History*, 6(3), pp. 331–52.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740600795469>.
- Kantor, R. (2016) "My Heart, My Fellow Traveller": Fantasy, Futurity and the Itineraries of Faiz Ahmed Faiz. *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, 39(3), pp. 608–25.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2016.1189034>.
- Keohane, R.O. (1988). International Institutions: Two Approaches. *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(4), p.379.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2600589>.
- Khan, D. (2021). Political Economy of Uneven State Spatiality: Conflict, Class, and Institutions in the Postcolonial State of Pakistan. *Rethinking Marxism*, 33(1), pp. 52–70.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2020.1847016>.
- Kothari, U, & Wilkinson, R. (2010). Colonial Imaginaries and Postcolonial Transformations: Exiles, Bases, Beaches. *Third World Quarterly*, 31(8), pp. 1395–1412.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2010.538239>.
- Laffey, M. (2000). Locating Identity: Performativity, Foreign Policy and State Action. *Review of International Studies*, 26(3), pp. 429–44.
- Laffey, M., & Weldes, J. (1997). Beyond Belief:: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 3(2), pp. 193–237.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066197003002003>.

- Landolt, L.K. (2004). (Mis)Constructing the Third World? Constructivist Analysis of Norm Diffusion: Feature Review. *Third World Quarterly*, 25(3), pp. 579–91.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659042000191447>.
- Lawson, G. (2005). Negotiated Revolutions: The Prospects for Radical Change in Contemporary World Politics. *Review of International Studies*, 31(3), pp. 473–93.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210505006595>.
- . (2012). The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 18(2), pp. 203–26.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066110373561>.
- . (2016). Within and Beyond the “Fourth Generation” of Revolutionary Theory. *Sociological Theory*, 34(2), pp. 106–27.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0735275116649221>.
- . (2006). The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations. *International Studies Review*, 8(3), pp. 397–423. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2006.00600.x>.
- Leake, E. (2016). At the Nation-State’s Edge: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-1947 South Asia. *The Historical Journal*, 59(2), pp. 509–39.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X15000394>.
- . (2018). Spooks, Tribes, and Holy Men: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 53(1), pp. 240–62.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009416653459>.
- . (2013). The Great Game Anew: US Cold-War Policy and Pakistan’s North-West Frontier, 1947–65. *The International History Review*, 35(4), pp. 783–806.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.817463>.
- Lebow, R.N. (2008). Identity and International Relations. *International Relations*, 22(4), pp. 473–92. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117808097312>.
- Lüthi, L.M. (2016). Non-Alignment, 1946–1965: Its Establishment and Struggle against Afro-Asianism. *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development*, 7(2), pp. 201–23. <https://doi.org/10.1353/hum.2016.0015>.
- Mack, A. (1975). Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict. *World Politics*, 27(2), pp. 175–200.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2009880>.
- Mahmud, T. (2010). Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of International Law: The Unending Wars along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier. *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*, 36(1), pp. 1–74.
- Mahwash, S. (2011). “A Dictionary to Define My Dreams”: The Politics of Remembrance and Forgetting in Kishwar Naheed’s Poetry. *Women’s Studies Quarterly*, 29 (3/4), pp.153-170.
- Mamdani, M. (2002). Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism. *American Anthropologist*, 104(3), pp. 766–75.  
<https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.2002.104.3.766>.

- Manchanda, N. (2018). The Imperial Sociology of the “Tribe” in Afghanistan. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 46(2), pp.165–89.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829817741267>.
- Matin, K. (2013). Redeeming the Universal: Postcolonialism and the Inner Life of Eurocentrism. *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(2), pp. 353–77.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066111425263>.
- Mattern, J.B., & Zarakol, A. Hierarchies in World Politics. *International Organization* 70(3), pp. 623–54.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818316000126>.
- McKeil, A.C. (2017). Global Societies Are Social Things: A Conceptual Reassessment. *Global Society*, 31(4), pp. 551–66.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2017.1337629>.
- McMahon, R.J. (1988). United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954. *The Journal of American History*, 75(3), p.812.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/1901531>.
- Mernissi, F. (1996). Palace Fundamentalism and Liberal Democracy: Oil, Arms and Irrationality. *Development and Change*, 27(2), pp. 251–65.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.1996.tb00588.x>.
- Milliken, J., & Sylvan, D. (1996). Soft Bodies, Hard Targets, and Chic Theories: US Bombing Policy in Indochina. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 25(2), pp. 321–59.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298960250020501>.
- Mitchell, T. (1990). Everyday Metaphors of Power. *Theory and Society*, 19(5), pp. 545–77.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00147026>.
- Mohan, J. (1960). India, Pakistan, Suez and the Commonwealth. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, 15(3), pp. 185–99.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/002070206001500302>.
- Monsutti, A. (2013). Anthropologizing Afghanistan: Colonial and Postcolonial Encounters. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 42(1), pp. 269–85.  
<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-anthro-092412-155444>.
- Mulich, J. (2018). Transformation at the Margins: Imperial Expansion and Systemic Change in World Politics. *Review of International Studies*, 44(4), pp. 694–716.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210518000074>.
- Mussarat, J. & Mazhar, M.S. (2011). Security Game: SEATO and CENTO as Instrument of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan. *Pakistan Economic and Social Review*, 49(1)
- Murray, C. (2019). Imperial dialectics and epistemic mapping: From decolonisation to anti eurocentric IR. *European Journal of International Relations*, 26(2), 419–442.
- Nandy, A. (2005). The Idea of South Asia: A Personal Note on Post-Bandung Blues. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 6(4), pp. 541–45. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14649370500316828>.

- Nazir, P. (1986). Marxism and the National Question: Class and Ideology in the Making of Pakistan. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 16(4), pp. 491–507.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00472338685390231>.
- Neocleous, M. (2003). Off the Map: On Violence and Cartography. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 6(4), pp. 409–25.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/13684310030064003>.
- Newman, E. (2004). The “New Wars” Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed. *Security Dialogue*, 35(2), pp. 173–89.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010604044975>.
- Nexon, D.H., and Wright, T. (2007). What’s at Stake in the American Empire Debate. *American Political Science Review*, 101(2), pp. 253–71.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070220>.
- Oldenburg, P. (1985). “A Place Insufficiently Imagined”: Language, Belief, and the Pakistan Crisis of 1971. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 44(4), pp. 711–33.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2056443>.
- O’Tuathail, G., and Agnew, J. (1992). Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy. *Political Geography*, 11(2), pp. 190–204.
- Paris, R. (2001). Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? *International Security*, 26(2), pp. 87–102. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753191141>.
- Parker, J. (2006). Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era. *Diplomatic History*, 30(5), pp. 867–92.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2006.00582.x>.
- Parkes, A. (2019). Considered Chaos: Revisiting Pakistan’s “Strategic Depth” in Afghanistan. *Strategic Analysis*, 43(4), pp. 297–309.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2019.1625512>.
- Patomäki, H., & B. Steger, M.B. (2010). Social Imaginaries and Big History: Towards a New Planetary Consciousness? *Futures*, 42(10), pp. 1056–63.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2010.08.004>.
- Piscatori, J.P. (2006). Reinventing the Ummah? The Trans-Locality of Pan-Islam. Lecture to the Tenth Anniversary Conference: Translocality: An Approach to Globalising Phenomena. Zentrum Moderner Orient Berlin.. September 2006.  
[https://archiv.zmo.de/veranstaltungen/2006/Piscatori\\_Reinventing\\_the\\_Ummah.pdf](https://archiv.zmo.de/veranstaltungen/2006/Piscatori_Reinventing_the_Ummah.pdf)
- Porter, P. (2006). Review Essay: Shadow Wars: Asymmetric Warfare in the Past and Future. *Security Dialogue*, 37(4), pp. 551–61.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010606072498>.
- Price, R., & Christian Reus-Smit, C. (1998). Dangerous Liaisons?: Critical International Theory and Constructivism. *European Journal of International Relations*, 4(3), pp. 259–94.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066198004003001>.

- Raghavan, S. (2020). Review of The “Long Peace” in Asia: The Cold War’s Killing Fields Rethinking the Long Peace, by Paul Thomas Chamberlin. *Journal of Genocide Research* 22(3), pp. 426–29. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2019.1660478>.
- Rand, G. (2006). ‘Martial races’ and ‘imperial subjects’: Violence and governance in Colonial India, 1857–1914,” *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire*, 13(1), pp. 1–20. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13507480600586726>.
- Rand, G., & Wagner, K.A. (2012). Recruiting the “Martial Races”: Identities and Military Service in Colonial India. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 46(3-4,) pp. 232–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2012.701495>.
- Rao, R. (2017). Recovering Reparative Readings of Postcolonialism and Marxism. *Critical Sociology*, 43(4-5), pp. 587–98. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920516630798>.
- Raza, A. (2013). An Unfulfilled Dream: The Left in Pakistan ca. 1947–50. *South Asian History and Culture* 4(4), pp. 503–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19472498.2013.824680>.
- . (2019). Dispatches from Havana: The Cold War, Afro-Asian Solidarities, and Culture Wars in Pakistan. *Journal of World History*, 30(1-2), pp. 223–46. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jwh.2019.0018>.
- Reuveny, R., & Prakash, A. (1999). The Afghanistan War and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union. *Review of International Studies*, 25(4), pp. 693–708. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210599006932>.
- Rosenberg, J. (2016). International Relations in the Prison of Political Science. *International Relations*, 30(2), pp. 127–53. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117816644662>.
- . (2006). Why Is There No International Historical Sociology? *European Journal of International Relations*, 12(3), pp. 307–40. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066106067345>.
- Roxborough, I. (2007) Review: The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times by Odd Arne Westad. *The American Historical Review*, 112(3), pp. 806–8.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1983). Continuity and transformation in the world polity: Toward a neorealist synthesis. *World Politics*, 35(02), 261-285.
- Ruggie, J.G. (1993). Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations. *International Organization*, 47(1), pp. 139–74.
- Sabaratnam, M. (2011). IR in Dialogue ... but Can We Change the Subjects? A Typology of Decolonising Strategies for the Study of World Politics. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 39(3), pp. 781–803. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829811404270>.

- Sajed, A, & Seidel, T. (2022): Anticolonial connectivity and the politics of solidarity: between home and the world, *Postcolonial Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/13688790.2023.2127652
- Sartori, G. (1970). Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics. *American Political Science Review*, 64(4), pp. 1033–53.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/1958356>.
- Sayyid, S., & Tyrer, I.D. (2002). Ancestor Worship and the Irony of the “Islamic Republic” of Pakistan. *Contemporary South Asia*, 11(1), pp. 57–75.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0958493022000000369>.
- Scheipers, S. (2014). Counterinsurgency or Irregular Warfare? Historiography and the Study of “Small Wars”. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 25(5-6), pp. 879–99.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.945281>.
- Selbin, E. (2019). Resistance and Revolution in the Age of Authoritarian Revanchism: The Power of Revolutionary Imaginaries in the Austerity-Security State Era. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 47(3), pp. 483–96.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829819838321>.
- Seth, S. (2009). Historical Sociology and Postcolonial Theory: Two Strategies for Challenging Eurocentrism. *International Political Sociology*, 3(3), pp. 334–38.  
[https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2009.00079\\_4.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2009.00079_4.x).
- Sewell, William H. (1992). A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 98(1), pp. 1–29.  
<https://doi.org/10.1086/229967>.
- Shaikh, F. (2008). From Islamisation to Shariatation: Cultural Transnationalism in Pakistan. *Third World Quarterly*, 29(3)
- Shaikh, F. (2019). Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea. *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal*.
- Shaw, I., and Akhter, M. (2014). The Dronification of State Violence. *Critical Asian Studies*, 46(2), pp. 211–34.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2014.898452>.
- Shaw, M. (2020). Dilemmas in the Interpretation of Global Conflict in the “Cold War” Period. *Journal of Genocide Research*. 22(3), 422–25.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2019.1660510>.
- Shaw, M. (2002). Post-Imperial and Quasi-Imperial: State and Empire in the Global Era. *Millennium*, 31(2), pp. 327–36.
- Shilliam, R. (2017). Race and Revolution at Bwa Kayiman. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 45(3), pp. 269–92.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829817693692>.
- Siddiq, A. (2011). Pakistan’s Modernity: Between Military and Militancy. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 46(51), pp. 61–70.

- Siddique, Q. (2011). Pakistan's Future Policy towards Afghanistan. *Danish Institute for International Studies*,
- Smith, S. (2003). Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11. Presidential Address to the International Studies Association, February 27, 2003, Portland, OR. *International Studies Quarterly*, 48(3), pp. 499–515.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.t01-1-00312.x>.
- Staniland, P., Mir, A., & Lalwani, S. (2018). Politics and Threat Perception: Explaining Pakistani Military Strategy on the North West Frontier. *Security Studies*, 27(4), pp. 535–74.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1483160>.
- Steger, M. (1970). Political Ideologies and Social Imaginaries in the Global Age. *Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric*, 2, pp. 1-17  
<https://doi.org/10.21248/gjn.2.0.13>.
- Steinmetz, G. (2016). Social Fields, Subfields and Social Spaces at the Scale of Empires: Explaining the Colonial State and Colonial Sociology. *The Sociological Review*, 64(2), pp. 98–123. <https://doi.org/10.1111/2059-7932.12004>.
- . (2008). Logics of History as a Framework for an Integrated Social Science. *Social Science History*, 32(4)
- Strauss, C. (2006). The Imaginary. *Anthropological Theory*, 6(3), pp. 322–44.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499606066891>.
- Sullivan, P.L. (2007). War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(3), pp. 496–524.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002707300187>.
- Tahir, M. (2015). Bombing Pakistan: How Colonial Legacy Sustains American Drones. *The Costs of War. Watson Institute for International Affairs*
- Taylor, C. (1995). Two Theories of Modernity. *The Hastings Center Report*, 25(2), pp. 24-33.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/3562863>.
- Tickner, A.B. (2013). Core, Periphery and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(3), pp. 627–46.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113494323>.
- Toor, S. (2005). A National Culture for Pakistan: The Political Economy of a Debate. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 6(3), pp. 318–40.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14649370500169946>.
- . (2007). Moral Regulation in a Post-Colonial State: Gender and the Politics of Islamization in Pakistan. *Interventions*, 9(2), pp. 255–75.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13698010701409186>.
- Twomey, C.P. (2008). Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International Security. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 29(2), pp. 338–57.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260802284324>.

- Wagner, P. (2011). From Interpretation to Civilization — and Back: Analyzing the Trajectories of Non-European Modernities. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 14(1), pp. 89–106. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431010394511>.
- . (2010). Multiple Trajectories of Modernity: Why Social Theory Needs Historical Sociology. *Thesis Eleven*, 100(1), pp. 53–60. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513609353705>.
- Waheed, A.W. (2017). Pakistan's Dependence and US Patronage: The Politics of "Limited Influence". *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, 4(1), pp. 69–94. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797016689220>.
- . (2017). State Sovereignty and International Relations in Pakistan: Analysing the Realism Stranglehold. *South Asia Research*, 37(3), pp. 277–95. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0262728017725624>.
- Weldes, J. (1996). Constructing National Interests. *European Journal of International Relations*, 2(3), pp. 275–318. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066196002003001>.
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*, 46(2), pp. 391–425. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027764>.
- Westad, O. A. (2000). The New International History of the Cold War: Three (possible) paradigms. *Diplomatic History*, 24(4), 551–565. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00236>
- Wynter, S. (2003). Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation--An Argument. *CR: The New Centennial Review*, 3(3), pp. 257–337. <https://doi.org/10.1353/ncr.2004.0015>.
- Yaqin, A. (2013). Faiz Ahmed Faiz: The Worlding of a Lyric Poet. *Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies*, 5(1)
- Younis, M. (2017). "United by Blood": Race and Transnationalism during the Belle Époque: Race and Transnationalism during the Belle Époque. *Nations and Nationalism*, 23(3), pp. 484–504. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12265>.
- Zimmerman, A. (2006). Decolonizing Weber. *Postcolonial Studies*, 9(1), pp. 53–79. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13668250500488827>.

#### Online Articles and Newspaper Publications

- Ahmad, E., & Barnet, R.J. (1988) Bloody Games. *The New Yorker*.
- Akbari, H. (2019, June 7). Durand Line Border Dispute Remains Point Of Contention For Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations. *Global Security Review*. Retrieved from

- <https://globalsecurityreview.com/durand-line-border-dispute-contention-afghanistan-pakistan-relations/>
- Akhtar, A.S. (2021a., August 21). The New Cold War? *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1641757>
- . (2021b., August 20). The War Of Terror: It Was Never About “Saving Afghan Women”. *Friday Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.thefridaytimes.com/2021/08/20/the-war-of-terror/>
- Akhter, M. (2015, August). Infrastructures of Colonialism and Resistance. *Tanqeed*. Retrieved from <https://www.tanqeed.org/2015/08/infrastructures-of-colonialism-and-resistance/>
- Ali, N.G. (2017). The Mazdoor Kisan Party & the Hashtnagar Peasant Movement (1970-77). *Participedia*. Retrieved from <https://participedia.net/case/4971>
- Appadurai, A. (2021, March 9). The Future of Postcolonial Thought. *The Nation*. Retrieved from <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/achille-mbembe-walter-mignolo-catherine-walsh-decolonization/>
- Aqdas, H. (2019, May 22). The Durand Line Issue. *Modern Diplomacy*. Retrieved from <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/05/22/the-durand-line-issue/>
- Ataie, M., Lefevre, R., & Matthiesen, T. (2021, April 26). How Iran’s 1979 Revolution Affected Sunni Islamists in the Middle East. *Blogs.Lse.Ac.Uk*. Retrieved from <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2021/04/26/how-irans-1979-revolution-affected-sunni-islamists-in-the-middle-east/>
- Aziz, H. (2010, February 4). Af-Pak- What Is Strategic Depth? *Open Democracy*. Retrieved from <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opensecurity/af-pak-what-strategic-depth/>
- Bajoria, J. (2009, March 20). The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border. *Council of Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/troubled-afghan-pakistani-border>
- Bajwa, S. (2016, March). Reclaiming Pakistaniat. *Tanqeed*. Retrieved from <https://www.tanqeed.org/2016/03/reclaiming-pakistaniat/>
- Bearden, M. (2009, March/April). Curse of the Khyber Pass. *The National Interest*. pp.4-12
- Beinin, J. 2021. (2021, March 31). The Long Struggle Over the Suez. *Tribune*. Retrieved from <https://tribunemag.co.uk/2021/03/the-long-struggle-over-the-suez>
- Borger, J. (2021, August 21). After the Chaos in Kabul, Is the American Century Over?. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/aug/21/after-the-chaos-in-kabul-is-the-american-century-over>
- Caron, J. (2016, February). ‘The Lives of Amir Hamza Shinwari’. *Tanqeed*. Retrieved from <https://www.tanqeed.org/2016/02/personal-history-against-an-imperial-border-the-lives-of-amir-hamza-shinwari/>
- Crawford, N.C. (2018, November). Human Cost of the Post-9/11 Wars: Lethality and the Need for Transparency. *Watson Institute*. Retrieved from

- <https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2018/human-cost-post-911-wars-lethality-and-need-transparency>
- Çubukçu, A. (2021, October 1). A Continuum of Intervention. *Verso Books Blog*. Retrieved from <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/5166-a-continuum-of-intervention>
- Daud, B. (2018, February 13). The Pashtun Long March: Reviving the Nonviolent Creed of Bacha Khan. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/the-pashtun-long-march-reviving-the-nonviolent-creed-of-bacha-khan/>
- Daur, N. (2017, April 28). A Friendship Fit for a King. *The Friday Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.thefridaytimes.com/2017/04/28/a-friendship-fit-for-a-king/>
- Gott, R. (2021, August 19). The Blood Never Dries. *Red Pepper*. Retrieved from <https://www.redpepper.org.uk/the-blood-never-dries/>
- Goudsouzian, T. (2020, September 24). The Durand Line: The Elephant in the Room. *Le Monde Diplomatique*. Retrieved from <https://mondediplo.com/outsidein/durand-line>
- Gregg, D.P. (2017, September 23). The Vietnam War, Revisited. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/23/opinion/sunday/vietnam-war-ken-burns.html>
- Hainy-Khaleeli, A. (2021, August 25). Why We Need to Stop Calling Afghanistan “The Graveyard of Empires”. *Ajam Media Collective*. Retrieved from <https://ajammc.com/2021/08/24/stop-calling-afghanistan-graveyard-empires/>
- Hanif, M. (2021, August 24). In Pakistan We Cultivated the Taliban, Then Turned on Them. Now We Can Only Hope They Forgive Us. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/aug/24/pakistan-taliban-us-retreat>
- Harrison, S. (1989). Who Will Win the Bloody Battle for Kabul? *Washington Post*. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1989/01/29/who-will-win-the-bloody-battle-for-kabul/6ba0fd58-1e5f-4d91-874d-99e9d4e1ec0a/>
- Himal Southasian Editors. (2021b., August 31) Afghanistan: Graveyard of Development? *Himal Southasian*. Retrieved from <https://www.himalmag.com/afghanistan-graveyard-or-development-timothy-nunan-interview-2021/>
- Humayun, F. (2021, August 20). US-Pakistan Cooperation Is More Necessary Today than Ever Before. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/8/20/us-pak-cooperation-is-more-necessary-today-than-ever-before>
- Kanji, A. (2021, September 18). War of Terror: Legal Colonialism Reincarnated. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/9/18/war-of-terror-legal-colonialism>
- Khan, L. (2005, June 13). The 1946 Rebellion of the Sailors of the British Indian Navy. *In Defence of Marxism*. Retrieved from <https://www.marxist.com/1946-rebellion-indian-navy150903.htm>

- Khan, H.R. (2020, April 17). The Forever War. *Commune*. Retrieved from <https://communemag.com/the-forever-war/>
- Kolko, G. (2009, September 23). Escalation Is Futile in a War in Which Complexity Defies Might. *The Sydney Morning Herald*. Retrieved from <https://znetwork.org/zcommentary/escalation-is-futile-in-a-war-in-which-complexity-defies-might-by-gabriel-kolko/>
- Lachmann, R. (2018, December 26). Why the US Loses Wars. *Jacobin*. Retrieved from <https://jacobin.com/2018/12/united-states-military-defeat-afghanistan-iraq>
- Leake, E. (2021, August 19). Afghan Civil Wars and the Location of a Nation. *History Workshop*. Retrieved from <https://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/afghan-civil-wars/>
- Lieven, A. (2021a., September 28). Has Neo-Orientalism Killed Our Ability to Sense the Limits of Western Influence? *Responsible Statecraft*. Retrieved from <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/09/28/has-neo-orientalism-killed-our-ability-to-sense-the-limits-of-western-global-influence/>
- . (2021b., August 27). Nemesis: Why the West Was Doomed to Lose in Afghanistan. *Prospect Magazine*. Retrieved from <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/nemesis-why-the-west-was-doomed-to-lose-in-afghanistan-911-taliban>
- Maisey, R. (2021a., February 13). The Real Third World. *Tribune*. Retrieved from <https://tribunemag.co.uk/2021/02/the-real-third-world>
- . (2021b., April 5) The Long Legacy of Algeria's War. *Tribune*. Retrieved from <https://tribunemag.co.uk/2021/04/the-long-legacy-of-algerias-war>
- Meaney, T. (2021, September 9). Like Ordering Pizza. *London Review of Books*. 43(17). Retrieved from <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v43/n17/thomas-meaney/like-ordering-pizza>
- Memon, Q.B. (2021, April 14). Where Third-Worldism Meets Agonism: What Can We Learn from, and with, Each Other? *DisTerrMem*. Retrieved from <https://www.disterrmem.eu/blog/where-third-worldism-meets-agonism>
- . (2014, November 14). Fanon & the Decolonial Project. *The Friday Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.thefridaytimes.com/2014/11/14/fanon-and-the-decolonial-project-ii/>
- Mishra, A. (2007, August 12). Nations out of Fantasy. *Himal Southasian*. Retrieved from <https://www.himalmag.com/nations-out-of-fantasy/>
- Mitra, A. (2022) Freedom on the waves: The story of the 1946 Indian naval mutiny, *The Wire*. Retrieved from: <https://thewire.in/history/freedom-on-the-waves-the-indian-naval-mutiny-70-years-later>
- Naeem, R. (2020, April 22). Lenin in Urdu: His Every Word Became Poetry. *The Wire*. Retrieved from <https://thewire.in/culture/lenin-in-urdu-his-every-word-became-poetry>
- Naheed, K. (2021a, February 12). To the Masters of Countries with a Cold Climate. *Capire*. Retrieved from <https://capiremov.org/en/culture/to-the-masters-of-countries-with-a-cold-climate-by-kishwar-naheed/>

- Neale, J. (2018, May 15). Remembering the Saur Revolution. *Jacobin*. Retrieved from <https://jacobin.com/2018/05/afghanistan-saur-revolution-communists-soviet-intervention>
- Nunan, T. (2021, August 24). The End Of Nation-Building. *Noema*. Retrieved from <https://www.noemamag.com/the-end-of-nation-building/>
- Osborne, P. (2021, August 20). US Humiliation in Afghanistan Could Be a Turning Point in World History. *Middle East Eye*. Retrieved from <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/us-afghanistan-taliban-humiliation-turning-point-world-history>
- Paracha, N. (2013, August 1). When the Mountains Were Red. *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1033407>
- Pilger, J. (2021, August 26). Afghanistan, the Great Game of Smashing Countries. *Monthly Review*. Retrieved from <https://mronline.org/2021/08/26/john-pilger-afghanistan-the-great-game-of-smashing-countries/>
- Prashad, V. (2013, August 14). Pakistani Mercenaries Arrive in Bahrain. *Jadaliyya*. Retrieved from <https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/29308>
- Rafi Sheikh, S. (2021, August 4). Military Creep. *Himal Southasian*. Retrieved from <https://www.himalmag.com/military-creep-pakistan-2021/>
- Rana, A.M. (2016, July 24). Iran and Pakistan's Intertwined History. *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1272879>
- Rashid, A, and Rubin, B.R.. (2008, November/December). From Great Game to Grand Bargain. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2008-11-01/great-game-grand-bargain>
- Runciman, D. (2013, September 26). Counter- Counter Revolution. *London Review of Books*. 35(18). Retrieved from <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v35/n18/david-runciman/counter-counter-revolution>
- Satia, P. (2021, August 19). To Understand Afghanistan's Future, Reckon With the Region's Colonial Past. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/19/afghanistan-pakistan-india-south-asia-british-colonial-past-partition-durand-line/>
- Sayyid, S. (2017, August 14). The Meaning of Pakistan. *Critical Muslim Studies*. Retrieved from <https://criticalmuslimstudies.co.uk/project/the-meaning-of-pakistan/>
- Shahbaz, H. (2022, January 16). Pakistan's New Left. *The News On Sunday*. Retrieved from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/925200-pakistans-new-left>
- Stewart, T. (n.d.) Britain's Retreat from Kabul 1842. *Historic UK*. Retrieved from <https://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofBritain/Britains-Retreat-From-Kabul-1842/>

- Tahir, M. (2021, September 10). The Distributed Empire of the War on Terror. *Boston Review*. Retrieved from <https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/the-distributed-empire-of-the-war-on-terror/>
- Tharoor, I. (2015, March 27). Pakistan's Long History of Fighting Saudi Arabia's Wars. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/27/pakistans-long-history-of-fighting-saudi-arabias-wars/>
- Toor, S. (2013, May 17). Notes Towards a People's History of Pakistan. *Tanqeed*. Retrieved from <https://www.tanqeed.org/2013/05/notes-towards-a-peoples-history-of-pakistan/>
- Twiby, L. (2020, April 6). The League Against Imperialism: Interwar Anti-Colonial Internationalism. *Retrospect Journal*. Retrieved from <https://retrospectjournal.com/2020/04/06/the-league-against-imperialism-interwar-anti-colonial-internationalism/>
- Wearing, D. (2021, September 18). Western Elites Aren't Mourning the Loss of Afghan Life, but of Their Own Power. *Novara Media*. Retrieved from <https://novaramedia.com/2021/09/18/western-elites-arent-mourning-the-loss-of-afghan-life-but-of-their-own-power/>
- Winstanley, C. (2021, September 16). The Afghan War Was an Imperial Endeavour. *Tribune*. Retrieved from <https://tribunemag.co.uk/2021/09/the-afghan-war-was-an-imperial-endeavour>





