

The London School of Economics and Political Science.

One Step Forward, One Step Backwards: African Regimes' Changing Relations with Artisanal Miners.

Isaac Haruna Ziaba.

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Development of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, May 2022.

Declaration.

I certify that this thesis I have presented for the examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 98,698 words.

Abstract.

This thesis explores and explains differences in how resource-rich African countries respond to artisanal and small-scale mining operatives. There is mounting evidence that these countries repress artisanal miners to protect large-scale mining companies' mineral concessions, not least because of the revenue streams from these companies. However, recent scholarship shifts the analytical focus from states to regimes (i.e., governments) and suggests that regimes tolerate or raid artisanal miners over time. Nevertheless, why some regimes prefer raids to tolerance and whether all artisanal miners get tolerated or raided are unclear. The thesis unravels this puzzle by drawing on Ghana and Tanzania as case studies with data from ten months of fieldwork involving in-depth interviews and observations in mining conferences, supplemented by official mining and media reports, relevant published articles, electoral data, and survey data. It argues that African regimes' relations with artisanal miners are complex and multi-layered, inextricably intertwined with regimes' power consolidation efforts. While some regimes tolerate artisanal miners, others introduce varying layers of military raids targeting different groups of artisanal miners. The thesis finds that CCM regimes in Tanzania generally raid artisanal miners to protect mining companies' interests when the political opposition is weak but otherwise tolerate artisanal miners to buy votes. However, the presence of a strong political opposition does not invariably result in the tolerance of all artisanal miners, as artisanal miners linked to the political opposition do suffer repression. In Ghana, indigenous artisanal miners are politically connected to the NDC, while illegal Chinese miners have links with the NPP. Thus, NDC regimes use raids to vilify illegal Chinese miners. By contrast, NPP regimes raid the sector in ways that penalise most indigenous artisanal miners but protect mining companies' and illegal Chinese miners' interests. These findings provide novel insights into how politics underpins regimes' responses to artisanal miners in Africa. Notably, they highlight how, under certain circumstances, some informal workers do not need to overcome collective action problems to influence outcomes and why big businesses' collective action prowess does not always drive outcomes.

Acknowledgements.

A Wiseman once said, “you can only do your best work if you are doing what you want to do and doing it the way you think it should be done.” I am grateful to my Supervisor, Dr Elliott D. Green, for supporting me in pursuing a topic I found fascinating. I owe Elliott much of my academic and professional development as he offered me the opportunity to work with him as a Graduate Teaching Assistant at the 2018 LSE-UCT July School in Cape Town (South Africa), when I had no prior teaching experience. The intellectual and social support I received from Elliott and his family gave me a sense of belonging, worth and confidence.

I am grateful to my second Supervisor, Professor James Putzel. James’ initial feedback and continual support shaped my thinking and writing process. I am indebted to Professor Teddy Brett for acting as an unofficial Supervisor throughout my time at the LSE. I am also grateful to several other scholars for their insightful and critical feedback during my time at the LSE, especially Catherine Boone, Kate Meagher, Laura Mann, Omar McDoom, Kai Spiekermann, Steffen Hertog, Joachim Wehner, Ben Radley, Nicolai Schulz (a student mentor), Portia Roelof, Eyobb Gabremariam, Max Gallien, Michael Mbate, and McDonald Lewanika.

I thank Professor Ken Shadlen for offering me my first job as an Occasional Research Assistant and Professor Stephan Haggard for discussing my research idea while visiting the LSE in 2019. I am grateful to Professor Chris Alden for the early morning rides and conversations during the 2018 LSE-UCT July School. It was a pleasure to begin this PhD journey with Hosna, Yuezhou, Alice, Costanza, and Musa and learn from Nicolai, Max, Kara, Carolin, Liz, Sophie, Richard, Harshita, Aisha, Jorich, Michael Mbate and Michael Mugisha in other cohorts. I am grateful to Susan Hoult, Nina Craven and Ginny Pavey for their diverse support as ID PhD programme managers. Peter Campbell, ID Department Manager, and Professor Jean-Paul Faguet also deserve a special mention for facilitating the payment of funds for fieldwork and international conferences.

Several scholars across the LSE shaped my professional development. I thank Dr Babken Babajanian for trusting me to moderate two PP4J4 assignments and Dr Eleanor Power for bringing me on board the MY410 marking team. I also thank Dr Aliya Hamid Rao for trusting me to teach and mark the MY421 module. I thank the MY421 teaching and admin team for their diverse support. I am deeply grateful to the Conveners of the LSE APEG seminar, Dr Sarah Brierley and Dr George Ofosu, and the participants for their insightful feedback. Particularly, I appreciate Dr Omar McDoom and Dr Sarah Brierley for their written feedback on my research design. I am also deeply indebted to the LSE Financial Support Office and the PhD Academy for the financial and academic support I received throughout my stay at the LSE.

Outside of the LSE, I thank Professor Deborah Bryceson and Professor Gavin Hilson for their comments. I am also grateful to the organisers of the 2019 EX4DEV conference at Surrey University. I thank Dr Alesia Ofori Dedaa for the discussions on artisanal mining and Daniel Adebayo for the numerous conversations on my project. I am grateful to Professor Richard Aidoo for discussing my thesis and career plans. The comments of the discussants and participants of the DSA, MPSA, WPSA, EX4DEV and Life Beyond PhD conferences I attended shaped my thought and writing process further. I am also grateful to Dr Viani Djeundje Biatat and his wife, Janine, for hosting my family in Edinburgh in the Summer of 2021 and for their mentorship role. I thank William Kombian Somtuaka, a high school friend, for the Chicago tour and his encouraging words.

I am very grateful to those who supported me during my fieldwork in Ghana and Tanzania. In Ghana, I am indebted to Dr Emmanuel Akwetey for hosting me at his institute, IDEG. I also thank the staff at IDEG, especially Professor Woode, Mr Jonah, Professor Ayee, Pearl, Walter, Nadège and Foster. I thank Dr Yao Graham of Third World Network, for the several conversations on my proposal during my fieldwork. I am grateful to Richard Ellimah, Dr Tony Aubyn and his staff at the AIEI, Professor Akilagpa Sawyerr, Chris Nyarko, Dr Thomas Akabzaa, Bismark Adongo, Mr Atebiya, Prince Newman, and the research participants for their support. In Tanzania, I am thankful to Dr Ronald Ndesanjo for acting as my key local contact person, Professor Lokina, Mtundi Segere, Hadijah Hassan Mlaula, Judith Karangi, Levi, Silvia, HakiRasilimali, LEAT, HakiMadini, the staff of Leni Hotel, and the fathers and fellow residents at the Passionist's Fathers Guest House.

I thank Rev. Stephen and Monica Wengam and the Church Board of Cedar Mountain Chapel, Ghana, for their prayers and support. I am grateful to Tehilla Cedars for the encouragement and MD Pascal for visiting me at the LSE in 2018. I thank my parents, my brother-in-law, Lawyer Caliis Badoo, my mother-in-law, and Rev Albert Adjekumhene (and his wife) for their tremendous support. I also thank the pastoral, worship, and small-group teams at the Birmingham Vineyard Church for welcoming my family and giving us a sense of community. My greatest appreciation goes to my wife, Mrs Carlister Naa Sanku Ziaba, who tolerated my odd working hours, listened to boring academic conversations, supported my inter-continental travels, and made me a proud father by giving us a pretty daughter (Nivea Yintet Ziaba). I weathered this storm because of her love and support.

Finally, I dedicate this thesis to the honour and glory of Father God, whose power, loving-kindness, mercy, favour, and grace allowed me to conceive and birth this thesis. Thank you, Father, for not leaving me in a lurch.

Table of Contents.

Introduction.....	13
Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework, Research Design and Methods.....	20
1. Introduction.....	20
2. Main theoretical framework.....	21
2.1. Political settlement.....	21
2.2. Party-society linkages and elite behaviour.....	24
2.3. Political marketplace.....	26
2.4. Hypotheses.....	28
3. Alternative theories.....	29
3.1. Ideas and resource governance.....	29
3.2. Social movements and elite behaviour.....	35
4. Research design and methods.....	37
4.1. Case selection justification.....	37
4.2. Data collection.....	39
4.3. Thematic data analysis.....	43
5. Conclusion.....	48
Chapter 2. Literature Review. Informal Economies and ASM.....	49
1. Introduction.....	49
2. Conceptualising informality.....	50
3. States and informal economies.....	51
4. Conceptualising ASM.....	52
5. ASM categories.....	54
5.1. The licensed/unlicensed alluvial ASM.....	54
5.2. The licensed/unlicensed hard-rock ASM.....	55
5.3. Varying ASM categories in Ghana and Tanzania.....	56
6. Developing countries and the informal ASM sector.....	59
6.1. Why ASM proliferates.....	59
6.2. The LSM-bias thesis.....	61
7. Conclusion.....	64
Chapter 3. Governing the Mining Industry. An Overview.....	65
1. Introduction.....	65
2. Colonial era mining regulations (1870 – 1950s).....	66
2.1. Mineral resource ownership and participation structure in the Gold Coast.....	66
2.2. Colonial mining fiscal regimes in the Gold Coast.....	67
2.3. Mineral resource ownership and participation structure in Tanganyika.....	68
3. Post-colonial era mining regulations (1950s – 1980).....	71
3.1. Nationalisation. An outcome of the decline in the mining industry.....	71
3.2. Nationalisation. An outcome of a rise in gold prices.....	73

3.3.	Declining gold industry and the rise of ASM.	74
4.	Neoliberal world order and mining (1980s – present).	75
4.1.	Neoliberalism and a change in mineral ownership structure in Ghana and Tanzania.	75
4.2.	Artisanal miners’ positionality in a neoliberal world order.	79
5.	Conclusion	81
Chapter 4. The CCM’s Changing Relations with ASM.		83
1.	Introduction.	83
2.	Containing the opposition	84
2.1.	Mwinyi’s tolerance of the artisanal miners in Bulyanhulu (1990 -1995).	84
2.2.	Touch not the ‘downtrodden’. Magufuli’s approach to artisanal miners (2015-2020).....	89
3.	Favouring LSM over ASM.	110
3.1.	Mkapa’s eviction of the artisanal miners in Bulyanhulu (1995-2005).....	110
3.2.	Kikwete and artisanal miners. A marriage of convenience (2005-2015)?.....	113
4.	Conclusion	120
Chapter 5. Different Responses to Galamsey in Ghana.		121
1.	Introduction.	121
2.	The NDC’s benignity towards indigenous galamsey	122
2.1.	Rawlings’ changing relations with indigenous galamsey (1983-2000).	122
2.2.	Mills. Ignoring the GCM’s lobby against galamsey (2009-2012).	127
2.3.	Mahama. Repressing illegal Chinese miners but not indigenous galamseyers (2012-2016).....	132
3.	The NPP’s malignity towards indigenous galamsey.	140
3.1.	Kufour’s repression of indigenous galamseyers (2001-2008).	140
3.2.	Akufo-Addo. Repressing indigenous miners but not illegal Chinese miners (2017-present).....	146
4.	Conclusion	153
Chapter 6. Why Regime-ASM Relations Vary in Ghana.		155
1.	Introduction.	155
2.	Tracing the NDC’s political connectedness to indigenous galamsey	156
2.1.	The presence of ‘northerners’ in southern mines.	157
2.2.	The NDC’s identification with rural voters.....	165
3.	Exclusive extraction of rent from the mining industry	177
3.1.	Securing rents from LSM companies.	178
3.2.	The NPP’s connection to illegal Chinese miners.	179
3.3.	The NDC disrupts the opposition’s access to ASM rents.	184
3.4.	The NPP exclusively extracts ASM rents.	186
4.	Conclusion	192
Chapter 7. Interrogating Alternative Analytical Approaches.		193
1.	Introduction.	193
2.	Do ideas matter?	194
2.1.	Ideas and regime-ASM relations in Ghana.	194

2.2. Ideas and regime-ASM relations in Tanzania.....	203
3. Social movements and regime-ASM relations.....	214
4. Conclusion.....	219
<i>Chapter 8. Conclusion.</i>	221
1. Theoretical implications of the findings.....	222
2. Academic contributions.....	225
3. Beyond Ghana and Tanzania.....	226
4. Policy recommendations.....	228
5. Limitations.....	229
6. Areas for future research.	232
<i>Bibliography.</i>	233
<i>Appendices.</i>.....	258
Appendix A. Ghana’s mining fiscal regimes in 1975 vs 1986.	258
Appendix B. Major minerals production in Ghana pre- and post-liberalisation (1983-2020).	258
Appendix C. 13 Mines that came on stream in Ghana post-1986.	259
Appendix D. The 14 large-scale mining companies and 19 mines in Ghana by 2000.	260
Appendix E. Mineral production in Tanzania from 1977 to 1995.	261
Appendix F. Tanzania’s mineral exports from 1989 to 1992 (US\$’000).....	261
Appendix G. Mining sector growth rate as a percentage of Tanzania’s GDP from 1979 to 1996.....	262
Appendix H. Ghana’s macroeconomic indicators: 1974-1983.....	262
Appendix I. Ghana’s macroeconomic indicators: 1983-1992.	263
Appendix J. Composition of Ghana’s primary merchandise exports (2008-2019) in US\$ million.	264
Appendix K. Face-to-face interviews conducted in Greater Accra Region and Ashanti Region (Kumasi and Obuasi), Ghana. April to July 2019.	264
Appendix L. Remote interviews conducted in Talensi, Upper East Region, Ghana. September – October 2021.....	267

Appendix M. Face-to-face interviews conducted in Tanzania. December 2019- February 2020.....	268
Appendix N. Remote interviews conducted in Tanzania.	269

List of Tables.

Table 1. Types of economic activities and their interrelationships.....	51
Table 2. Simplification of ASM categories.....	55
Table 3. Results of Tanzania’s 1994 local elections.	88
Table 4. Results of Tanzania’s 1995 presidential elections.	89
Table 5. The distribution of active mines in Tanzania.....	93
Table 6. The CCM’s and the oppositions’ (CHADEMA and CUF) zonal and regional vote shares in mainland Tanzania in the 2005 presidential elections (%).	94
Table 7. The CCM’s and CHADEMA’s zonal and regional vote shares in mainland Tanzania in the 2015 presidential elections (%).	95
Table 8. Combined results of Tanzania’s 1995 parliamentary and presidential elections.....	112
Table 9. Investment by mining companies (including loans and equity) from 1985 to 1990.....	123
Table 10. The NDC’s and NPP’s electoral performance in the three northern regions from 1992 to 2020 (%).	162
Table 11. Rawlings’ share of votes by region and major urban constituencies in the 1992 elections.	169
Table 12. Distribution of district types in battleground regions.	171
Table 13. The NDC’s presidential vote percentage in battleground regions and key urban constituencies. 1992-2020.....	171
Table 14. The NDC’s presidential votes percentage in the Greater Accra region and the region’s key rural areas. 1992-2020.....	172

List of Figures.

Figure 1. Thematic network analysis of the Ghanaian case.	46
Figure 2. Thematic network analysis of the Tanzanian case.....	47
Figure 3. Geological map and mineral deposits in Ghana.	57
Figure 4. Geological map and mineral deposits in Tanzania.	58
Figure 5. Graphical presentation of Tanzania’s dominant settlement.....	84
Figure 6. Parties’ share of Tanzania’s presidential election results from 1995 to 2020.	91
Figure 7. Major minerals production in Ghana (1983-2020).....	123
Figure 8. Overtime change in global gold price.....	127
Figure 9. Graphical presentation of Ghana’s competitive political settlement.	156
Figure 10. Which party’s presidential candidate did you vote for in the recent 2016 presidential elections?.....	174
Figure 11. If presidential elections were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for?	174
Figure 12. Which party do you feel close to?	175
Figure 13. Investment trends in Ghana’s mining industry. 2000-2010.....	197

List of Abbreviations.

AGA	Anglogold Ashanti.
AGC	Ashanti Goldfields Corporation
ANC	African National Congress
APC	All Progressives Congress
ASM	Artisanal and Small-scale Mining
BAE	British Aerospace
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BIAs	Bilateral Investment Agreements
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CESIS	Centre for Social Impact Studies
CHADEMA	Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
CPP	Convention People's Party
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CUF	Civic United Front
CV	Certificate of Validation
DA	Democratic Alliance
DEFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment.
GCM	Ghana Chamber of Mines
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFGL	Gold Fields Ghana Limited
GGM	Geita Gold Mine
GNASSM	Ghana National Association Small-Scale Miners.
GPRS	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
GPRS	Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
IMCIM	Inter-Ministerial Committee Against Illegal Mining
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LSM	Large-scale Mining
MAREMA	Manyera Regional Miners' Association
MCAG	Media Coalition Against Galamsey
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change

MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
NCCR	National Convention for the Construction and Reform
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NGGL	Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd
NPP	New Patriotic Party
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party
PF	Patriotic Front
PMMC	Precious Minerals and Marketing Corporation
PMI	Performance of the Mining Industry
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PNDCL	Provisional National Defence Council Law
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes.
SGMC	State Gold Mining Corporation
STAMICO	State Mining Company
TIN	Tax Identification Number
UDC	Umbrella for Democratic Change
UDP	United Democratic Party
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
WACAM	Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

Introduction.

During Kufour's regime¹, there were about 300 *galamseyers*² in one of AGA's shafts in Obuasi (Ghana). The government's security operatives put tyres on the pit entrance and set them ablaze to deliberately suffocate the miners so that the miners would come out of the pit. They picked miners like snails and arrested almost all of them. This incident happened in a community called Anyinam in Obuasi.³

Under Presidents Mkapa and Kikwete, large-scale mining companies enjoyed the freedom to carry out their work in Tanzania without interruption in their licensed areas. Small-scale miners found on companies' premises were either killed or shot and maimed. Human rights abuses by large-scale mining companies were rampant. The security guards of the respective companies and the police collaborated to harass the small-scale miners found on the large-scale licensed concessions.⁴

In the last three decades, artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), conceptualised as a low-tech, poverty-driven, and labour-intensive mineral extraction and processing (Hilson & McQuilken, 2014), has caught policy and scholarly attention. Notably, there is an increasing focus on the marginality ASM operatives suffer in the developing world (Gamu et al., 2015; Hilson & Potter, 2003; Hilson & Yakovleva, 2007; Teschner, 2013; World Bank, 2009), which marginality dates back to the 1980s and 1990s. Over this period, the Bretton Woods Institutions initiated the neoliberal development paradigm to, among other things, boost foreign direct investment (FDI) in the natural resource sectors of developing countries through tax incentives (Banchirigah, 2006; Hilson & Potter, 2005). As resource-endowed developing countries exhibited poor economic outcomes over time (Auty, 1995; Sachs & Warner, 2001; Wheeler, 1984), the neoliberal agenda sought to reverse this resource curse syndrome.

¹ I use the term 'regime' to refer to a government in power rather than a type of government (i.e., democratic, or autocratic).

²The word *galamseyer* is a title for a person who does *galamsey*. *Galamsey* is the local term for artisanal and small-scale mining. This word is an adulterated form of the English phrase "gather them and sell", a phrase that depicts how, during the colonial and pre-colonial eras, mining community dwellers could easily chance on gold nuggets following heavy downpours and "gather and sell" these nuggets. Over time, as the locals could not pronounce "gather them and sell" correctly, the phrase became corrupted as "galamsey." Interview with the Centre for Social Impact Studies (CESIS) in Obuasi on 4th July 2019. An interview with a local government official in Obuasi on 11th July 2019 confirmed this.

NB: I use the terms *galamseyer(s)* and *artisanal miner(s)* interchangeably throughout the thesis. I also use the terms "indigenous *galamsey* operatives", "indigenous artisanal miners" and "indigenous miners" interchangeably to distinguish this group of artisanal miners from their foreign counterparts (mainly illegal Chinese miners).

³ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village A on 1st July 2019.

⁴ Zoom interview with an official of HakiMadini on 26th May 2021.

At the heart of neoliberalism lies the urge to promote individual entrepreneurial drive within a free market and private property rights framework (Blomgren, 1997; Harvey, 2007; Thorsen & Lie, 2006). However, whereas the idea of a free market frowns on states' active participation in an economy, it requires states to protect individual property rights, even if this means applying force (Harvey, 2007). Accordingly, as foreign mining capital flows into the developing world and surges the prospects of high revenues, resource-rich developing states disproportionately allocate mineralised lands to predominantly foreign large-scale mining (LSM) companies to the neglect of artisanal miners (Cuellar, 2005; Hatcher, 2016; Lydersen & Cardona-Maguigad, 2015; Rochlin, 2018; Siwale & Siwale, 2017; Spiegel, 2016; Verbrugge, 2015). However, along with such unequal mineralised land distribution comes the urge for states to protect LSM concessions against ASM encroachments, invariably resulting in the repression of artisanal miners (Hilson, 2020; Hilson & Maconachie, 2020; Katsaura, 2010; Kemp & Owen, 2019; Luning, 2014; Mawowa, 2013; Musisi, 2021).

For instance, Hilson and Maconachie (2020) use the concept of large-scale mining bias (henceforth, LSM-bias) to describe the military raids artisanal miners suffer in the developing world. The authors argue that “over the last two decades...large-scale mechanised extraction has often been associated with progress and ‘modernisation’, while artisanal operators have been ostracised and subjected to military ‘sweeps’” (p. 7). Similarly, Kemp and Owen (2019) describe how public and private security in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) fatally evicted nickel and cobalt artisanal miners that operated close to a copper mining company's site. Likewise, while the Burkinabe government collaborated with exploration companies to raid artisanal miners (Luning, 2014), the Zambian military evicted artisanal miners in five gold rush districts (Hilson, 2020). Similar incidents have been reported in Uganda (Musisi, 2021) and Zimbabwe (Katsaura, 2010; Mawowa, 2013).

Despite these military sweeps, ASM supports about a hundred million livelihoods and directly employs 44.7 million people globally (World Bank, 2013, 2020) relative to the seven million people the LSM sector employs (World Bank, 2013). In Africa, 10 million people work as artisanal miners (UNECA, 2011), while the sector spawns backwards and forward economic linkages (Ziaba, 2020). Thus, resource-rich countries' marginalisation of ASM is surprising but reflects broader debates that big business' capital and organisational wherewithal are crucial in influencing economic policymaking in the developing world (Haggard et al., 2019; Haggard & Maxfield, 1996; Hirschman, 1978; Olson, 1965). Generally, resource-rich developing countries depend on capital from foreign LSM companies that tend to be organised via chambers of mines, contextualising the raid of artisanal miners.

These debates underscore how informal artisanal miners are at the receiving end of states' repressive measures. However, states' interests are not monolithic and may change depending on the regime in power. Therefore, while artisanal miners may suffer military sweeps, regimes sometimes quickly

terminate these exercises because artisanal miners constitute a vast electoral constituency and are, therefore, politically salient to regimes (Abdulai, 2017c, 2017a, 2017b; Aubynn, 2009). Thus, two primary assumptions emerge from these counter debates: regimes either raid artisanal miners to protect mining companies' property rights or tolerate artisanal miners' excesses – including encroachment upon LSM concessions – for votes.

In line with these assumptions, O'Faircheallaigh and Corbett (2016, p. 962) argue that regimes' responses to artisanal miners in the developing world could be based on “incentives or inducements offered to miners, or on application of coercion” against the miners. The authors substantiate their claim with the Peruvian case where the Toledo and Garcia regimes (2000-2011) abstained from military crackdowns in sharp contrast with the Humala regime's (2011-2016) crackdown on artisanal miners in primary ASM regions (Emery, 2014; Gonzalez, 2016; O'Faircheallaigh & Corbett, 2016). Besides Peru, O'Faircheallaigh and Corbett (2016) highlight incentive regulatory responses in Bougainville.

These authors shift the analytical focus from states to regimes and demonstrate the non-linear nature of regime-ASM relations. However, they do not explain the temporal variation in regime-ASM relations. Moreover, the authors necessarily reduce these relations into a binary world of ‘inducement’ and ‘coercion’; or ‘tolerance’ and ‘raid’, obscuring potential complexities and nuances in regimes' responses to artisanal miners. Thus, the present studies beg more questions than answers, such as: Do regimes offer inducements to all artisanal miners? Do all artisanal miners suffer repression or raid? Why do some regimes prefer inducements to coercion and vice versa?

These questions, while apposite, remain unresolved in the ASM literature and raise the following overarching puzzle: *How do regimes in resource-rich developing countries relate to artisanal miners, and why do such relations emerge?* The thesis will address this primary research question, drawing on Ghana and Tanzania as case studies. Although Africa has several resource-rich countries, Ghana and Tanzania have the largest artisanal mining population on the continent. Latest estimates show that artisanal mining directly employs about one million people in Ghana and 1.5 million in Tanzania (UNECA, 2011). Nonetheless, Ghana's ASM sector has, since 2010, markedly witnessed an influx of illegal Chinese miners operating alongside indigenous artisanal miners (Aidoo, 2016; Hilson et al., 2014), reflecting the growing Chinese presence in Africa's formal and informal economic spaces (Carmody, 2009; Mohan & Lampert, 2013; Park et al., 2010).

Situated within a rapidly democratising continent – where strongmen in such places as Cameroon and Uganda even embrace elections – Ghana and Tanzania have similar and distinct political configurations. The national constitutions of both countries impose term limits on political leaders so that presidents in Ghana cannot do more than two-four-year terms akin to their counterparts in Tanzania limited to two

five-year terms. Hence, political leadership changes over time at regular intervals across the two countries. However, Tanzania has a dominant political system in which all the different political leaders have, since the introduction of multiparty elections in 1995, emerged from the same political party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). In contrast, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) have equally alternated political power since Ghana returned to multiparty democracy in 1992. Nonetheless, Ghana and Tanzania are low-middle-income countries and, thus, have economic features similar to Africa's low and high-middle-income countries. Accordingly, studying regime-ASM relations in Ghana and Tanzania could produce findings with implications for other African contexts.

The thesis draws upon ten months of in-depth interviews conducted at national and sub-national levels across the two countries. National-level interviews were mainly elite semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders such as mining ministries, former ministers of mines, former CEOs of mineral management bodies, mining-related Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), mining companies, mineral dealers, and academics. Sub-national interviews comprised semi-structured interviews with key informants and focus-group interviews with artisanal miners. Seventy-two semi-structured interviews and three focus groups constitute this study's field data corpus. In addition, I supplemented this field data with observations in mining conferences – mainly organised in Ghana – as well as relevant published articles, grey data (i.e., official mining reports and media reports), electoral data and survey (Afrobarometer) data.

I argue that regime-ASM relations in Africa are complex and multi-layered, inextricably intertwined with regimes' power consolidation efforts. While some regimes tolerate artisanal miners and abstain from military raids, others introduce different layers of military raids targeting different groups of artisanal miners. In Tanzania, CCM regimes generally raid artisanal miners to protect LSM companies' interests when the political opposition is weak but otherwise tolerate artisanal miners to buy votes. However, the presence of a strong political opposition does not invariably result in the tolerance of all artisanal miners, as artisanal miners linked to the political opposition do suffer state-sponsored repression.

Like Tanzania, Ghanaian regimes' relations with artisanal miners change over time. However, unlike Tanzania, regime-ASM relations in Ghana are more intricate, with NDC regimes being more benign towards indigenous *galamsey* operatives but vicious towards illegal Chinese miners. In contrast, NPP regimes vilify indigenous *galamsey* operatives but protect illegal Chinese miners. I attribute this outcome to the varying political networks between different groups of miners (i.e., indigenous *galamseyers* and illegal Chinese miners) and the contending Ghanaian regimes. I show that indigenous *galamseyers* resonate more with the NDC's political base, while illegal Chinese miners are linked to

the NPP. Hence, NDC regimes abstain from raiding indigenous galamseyers even if these miners, typically subsisting on mining companies' concessions, become active threats to mining companies. On the contrary, NPP regimes generally find it politically feasible to raid the ASM sector in ways that penalise most indigenous artisanal miners deemed NDC supporters, protect large-scale mining interests, and create avenues for illegal Chinese miners to mine.

To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to explore and explain differences in regime-ASM relations in Africa and perhaps the developing world. The study's argument extends the frontiers of knowledge by challenging several assumptions in the relevant literature. First, it clarifies how artisanal miners are not invariably under 'military sweeps' because of LSM interests (Hilson, 2020; Hilson & Maconachie, 2020) and explicates the conditions under which some regimes may overlook artisanal miners' encroachment upon LSM concessions. Second, contrary to current thinking (Abdulai, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; Aubynn, 2009), it suggests that while the artisanal mining population may be huge, artisanal miners' votes may not be crucial to all regimes. Relatedly, the argument flies in the face of debates that a regime's belligerence or tolerance of an informal sector is conditional on the sector's population size (Holland, 2016; Weitz-Shapiro, 2014). Finally, the study shows that regimes in both dominant and competitive political settlements/systems can be similarly vulnerable to social groups, contrary to the present theorisation of more regime vulnerability in competitive political settlements and less in dominant political settlements (Di John & Putzel, 2009; Kelsall, 2018; Khan, 2010).

The thesis proceeds as follows:

Chapter one has two sections: Section one specifies the leading theoretical framework by discussing three related bodies of political economy literature (i.e., political settlements, party-society linkages, and political marketplace). The section also discusses two main alternative theories on party-political and resource nationalism ideas on the one hand and social movements on the other. Section two discusses the research design and outlines the data collection and analytical methods.

Chapter two introduces the reader to the concepts of informal economy and ASM and examines the relevant informal economy studies that have approached questions similar to this thesis's puzzle. These studies argue that regimes fail to enforce regulations against informal actors (including artisanal miners) where the informal population is large and vice versa. However, it is unclear how huge the informal population should be to produce this outcome. Moreover, these studies dichotomise the social world into an arena of tolerance or repression and, by so doing, conceal the complex ways in which regimes may respond to informal actors temporarily and spatially. The chapter also shows how most scholars attribute the repression of artisanal miners to external factors (i.e., the need to protect LSM interests),

overlooking differences in regime-ASM relations. However, those few scholars highlighting such variations do so in a binary way (raid or tolerance) and stop short of elucidations.

Chapter three offers relevant background discussion on the governance of Ghana's and Tanzania's mining sectors, beginning from the colonial period to the neoliberal period. The chapter demonstrates how the governance of the mining sector marks change and continuity over time. For example, it shows that the colonial powers criminalised and nearly collapsed ASM while ASM proliferated under the post-colonial authorities who left these miners off the regulatory hook. It also highlights how the neoliberal era mimics the colonial era wherein artisanal miners seem to have, once again, come under suppression. However, the chapter concludes with several questions on how 'democratic' regimes within the neoliberal state may respond to artisanal miners and why any variations in such responses might exist.

Thus, chapters four, five and six explore and explain differences in regime-ASM relations drawing on Tanzania and Ghana as case studies. Chapter four argues that Tanzania's opposition's relative threats to different CCM regimes create varying constraints that shape temporal variation in regime-ASM relations. Chapter five explores differences in regime-ASM relations in Ghana. It demonstrates that NDC regimes generally abstain from military raids but occasionally and briefly use them to vilify external elements (mainly illegal Chinese miners) in galamsey. In contrast, NPP regimes commonly employ military raids to victimise indigenous galamsey operatives but spare foreign elements in the sector.

Chapter six builds on chapter five by explaining the differences in regime-ASM relations in Ghana. It contends that indigenous galamsey operatives generally constitute the NDC's political base while illegal Chinese miners are connected to the NPP, explaining why raids are uncommon under NDC regimes compared to the NPP and why both parties target different groups of miners when they raid the sector. It also argues that raids generate mineral rents to regimes but block rents to the opposition, further explaining why regimes target different groups of miners. Chapter seven discusses two alternative explanations. The first alternative explanation emphasises how differences in resource governance ideas could explain variations in regime-ASM relations in Ghana and Tanzania. It posits that rightist regimes are likely to be oriented towards neoliberal ideas of resource governance and, thus, repress indigenous artisanal miners to protect foreign mining capitalists.

In contrast, leftist regimes may be resource-nationalist and, therefore, prioritise the participation of indigenous artisanal miners in the mining sector, even if these miners are largely unlicensed. The second alternative explanation underscores how variation in anti-ASM social movement advocacies could drive different regimes' responses to artisanal miners over time. Although these alternative interpretations

are interesting, I show how they do not convincingly explain the temporal differences in regime-ASM relations within Ghana and Tanzania.

Chapter eight concludes the thesis by discussing its theoretical implications and empirical contributions. It also discusses the thesis's implication for other contexts, proposing that regime-ASM relations in Zambia and Nigeria may reflect Ghana's case since these countries have competitive clientelist political settlements. It contrasts Zambia and Nigeria with South Africa and Botswana, whose dominant settlement patterns are akin to Tanzania's, suggesting that the outcomes in Tanzania may play out in South Africa and Botswana.

However, miners may come under constant attacks in dominant settlements where strongmen rule over time (such as Uganda and Zimbabwe). These strongmen may not require miners' votes to survive and could afford to raid them. Similarly, in places like the DRC, where rebels and regimes compete over resource extraction, artisanal miners may suffer constant raids by rebels who need mineral rents and the state whose budget depends on mining companies' mineral rents. The rest of the chapter then discusses the policy implications, limitations, and areas for future research.

Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework, Research Design and Methods.

1. Introduction.

This chapter discusses the relevant theories, research design and methods. It draws on three pieces of political economy literature to construct the study's main theoretical framework, including studies on political settlements, party-society linkages, and political marketplace. The foregoing political economy literature suggests that the nature of power dynamics and corresponding constraints shape how regimes respond to different social groups over time. In competitive political settlements, where social cleavages matter in party politics, contending regimes will respond differently to the same group of economic actors depending on the group's political salience to these elites. Similarly, in dominant political settlements, different regimes of a dominant governing coalition will respond differently to the same group of economic actors due to the varying political constraints triggered by the temporal variation in oppositional politics.

Nonetheless, a regime's political survival across competitive and dominant political settlements may also depend on the rents accruing to their political budget. Hence, different governing coalitions in competitive and dominant political settlements will engage in rent-seeking activities that affect their political budget with implications for how they relate to social groups. Besides this leading theoretical framework, the chapter presents two alternative theories. The first revolves around questions of varying resource governance ideas over time (i.e., resource nationalism, neoliberalism, and party-political ideology), suggesting that a regime's idea of resource governance affects how it responds to relevant social groups. The second alternative theory draws on the literature on social movements and asks if the ebb and flow of social movement activities could shape how a regime responds to social groups.

Methodologically, this study follows the typical case design as Ghana and Tanzania have features that make them illustrative of resource-rich African countries in Africa. The thesis assembles data from multiple sources, including interviews, observations, academic and grey literature, and electoral and survey data. Although the thesis is theory-guided, prior theory only partially shaped data collection because field data revealed surprising findings inconsistent with the prior theory culminating in a review of initial theoretical positions. Thus, an inductive and reflexive approach also shaped data collection. The data analysis followed the thematic analytical technique, producing different layers of themes that displayed patterns in the data relevant to the research question.

2. Main theoretical framework.

2.1. Political settlement.

In the last three decades, the concept of political settlement has emerged in the field of Development Studies as an analytical tool for understanding variation in development outcomes (Behuria et al., 2017; Di John & Putzel, 2009; Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2013; Kelsall, 2018a; Kelsall et al., 2016; Khan, 2010, 2017, 2018; Lavers, 2018; Weis, 2014). Di John and Putzel (2009, p. 4) define political settlement as the “balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes, on which any state is based”, while Khan (2010, p. 1) sees power distribution as “...the relative holding power of different groups and organisations contesting the distribution of resources.” Thus, this conceptualisation of political settlement provides a counterweight to debates that institutional differences and quality and their constraining effects shape variation in development outcomes (North, 1991; Rodrik, 2008).

Particularly, North’s (1991) conception of institutions focused on how democratic institutions minimise political transactional costs and promote efficiency in society. However, if democratic institutions determine “incentives then all democracies would be similarly wealthy” (Di John & Putzel, 2009, p. 9). Nonetheless, like North, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) regard institutions as the principal drivers of cross-national variation in growth and development. However, they also appreciate that the institutions/development nexus is not mechanistic because the nature of a society’s power distribution and political institutional configuration shape its economic institutions.

Thus, inherent in their thinking is how political settlement – power balance or distribution – can facilitate or constrain outcomes. These institutional critiques do not, however, render the institutional debate inapt. Instead, they show that institutions could shape and be shaped by power distribution with implications for policy outcomes (Khan, 2010). This debate is useful as it indicates the constraints that power distribution – which may be the outcome of specific institutional configurations – could have on the optimal functioning of institutions. While echoing the above understanding of political settlement, Kelsall (2018) simplifies this concept by distinguishing between two main components of a political settlement.

First, the *social foundation* component comprises the range of social groups within the settlement, including “politicians, party members, businesses, ethnic networks, [and] trade unions” (p. 7). In contrast, the *power configuration* component refers to the head of government where political power concentrates (p. 7). While different social groups within the settlement’s social foundation could exert

varying pressure on elites to act in patterned ways, elites' responses may depend on the polity's power configuration.

Regarding a polity's power configurations, Khan (2010, p. 48) argued that modern developing countries are characterised by clientelist political settlements where "formal institutions do not operate in impersonal and rule-following ways and their operation is constrained by the exercise of personalised power." Nevertheless, he distinguished between four types of clientelist political settlements based on the ruling coalition's configuration. Three of these typologies – weak dominant party, potential developmental coalition and competitive clientelism – are relevant to this study.

2.1.1. Weak dominant party and potential developmental coalition settlement patterns.

Within weak dominant party and potential developmental coalition settlement patterns, regimes enjoy relative stability over time, given their political dominance. However, regimes in weak dominant party settlements tend to experience considerable constraints despite their hegemonic powers because weak internal cohesion characterises these regimes, fragmenting the governing coalition and resulting in excluded factions breaking away along with disgruntled supporters. Consequently, the governing coalition also tends to have weak enforcement capabilities mediated by the potential political threat that excluded factions pose. Khan cites West Bengal under the Communist Party of India in 1977, Thailand under Thaksin in the 2000s, India under Congress in the 1950s and Tanzania under the CCM in the early 1990s as examples of weak dominant party settlements.

In contrast, regimes in a potential developmental coalition settlement pattern experience more robust political stability and have a "long time horizon [due to] low opposition from excluded factions". Hence, the "limited power of lower level factional supporters ensures high enforcement capability, [making] the construction of a developmental state possible" (Khan, 2010, p. 65). Khan highlights South Korea as an example of this settlement pattern. Nonetheless, South Korea's development is the product of many factors, including the country's geo-political relevance to the US and Japan, which conditioned investments from these countries into South Korea over time (Park, 2012). Hence, just because a regime experiences low opposition and has high enforcement capacity does not mean it may also be developmental.

However, Khan's ideas are intriguing in that they reveal the varying constraints that dominant regimes can face and how these constraints can shape elite behaviours. Moreover, Khan's ideas echo Kelsall's conceptualisation of political settlement. Kelsall (2018, p. 9) uses the concept of *concentrated* settlement to describe a dominant governing coalition that has sway over groups and "can bestow or withdraw benefits at will". He contends further that since leaders in concentrated or dominant

settlements “can dictate terms to other groups in society”, they also tend to have long time horizons as there is no credible threat to their political power (p. 10).

Nevertheless, like Khan, Kelsall (2018) acknowledges that a dominant regime may face emerging opposition. However, while Khan sees such regimes as lacking enforcement capacity, they may “deliver inclusive development” to tame the growing opposition (Kelsall, 2018, p. 14). Nonetheless, what is common across Khan’s and Kelsall’s conceptualisations is their argument that dominant or hegemonic regimes face political competition, which might shape their actions in patterned ways. For heuristic purposes, I will use the concept of weak dominant settlement to represent a dominant regime that faces growing opposition and a strong dominant settlement to represent a dominant regime that confronts limited or insignificant political opposition. Theoretically, regimes operating in distinct dominant settlement patterns will confront different constraints and act differently towards social groups.

2.1.2. Competitive clientelist settlement patterns.

To Khan, competitive clientelism is “characterised by competition between multiple strong factions [wherein] stability can be achieved only with credible mechanisms for cycling of actions in power” (p. 65). Khan’s concept of competitive clientelism resonates with Kelsall’s (2018, p. 10) concept of *dispersed* political settlement, where the governing coalition “knows it is challenged by powerful groups and does not therefore expect to be in power for a long time.” Thus, common to these conceptions is the idea of frequent power alternation across different power coalitions, either by democratic or undemocratic means.

Within these settlements, regimes have limited enforcement capacities because the political opposition can capitalise on regimes’ enforcement decisions. Hence, regimes also appear more vulnerable to varying social groups who may leverage the competitive feature of the settlement to advance their interests. Thus, regimes “can only get [their] way after an extensive process of negotiation, bargaining and deal-making, often relying heavily on material incentives” (Kelsall, 2018, p. 10). Khan cites Thailand in the 1980s and 1990s and India and Bangladesh after the 1980s as examples of this settlement pattern.

In some respect, the competitive clientelist settlement pattern overlaps the weak dominant party settlement pattern. Across these distinct settlement patterns, regimes face political opposition, although the opposition is more credible in a competitive clientelist settlement. However, despite the variation in oppositional politics, regimes in a weak dominant party settlement may be as concerned about the opposition's threat as regimes in a competitive clientelist settlement. Therefore, regimes in either settlement pattern may fail to take enforcement actions against social groups for political

expediency. However, this outcome could be more prevalent in a competitive clientelist political settlement.

These theoretical discussions predict within-country variation in governance outcomes. Nonetheless, the assumption that social groups in a competitive clientelist settlement can hold regimes to ransom is simplistic as it overlooks the impact that a society's cleavage structure can have on the political saliency of social groups for regimes. Here, a regime's vulnerability to a social group would depend on whether this social group is part of a cleavage core that appeals to the regime. Therefore, understanding the nature of party-society linkages in a competitive clientelist settlement could clarify the conditions under which some contending regimes may or may not be vulnerable to social groups.

2.2. Party-society linkages and elite behaviour.

To reiterate, within a competitive clientelist settlement, distinct regimes preoccupied with power consolidation may be vulnerable to the disruptive potential of varying social groups. However, since group interests are non-monolithic, a regime must concede to some group interests while ignoring others. The nature of party-society linkages is crucial to understanding how regimes in a competitive clientelist political settlement would respond to a given social group. Unlike Western democracies, where political parties are offshoots of society (Osei, 2012) and serve as the "central intermediate...between society and governments" (Sartori, 2005, p. ix), van de Walle (2003) theorises that African parties animate the aspirations of politicians.

In Africa, party campaigns are rarely policy-based (Van de Walle, 2003), while party structures commonly revolve around the leader (Erdmann, 1999). Thus, there is scholarly consensus that African parties have weak linkages with civil society (Erdmann, 1999; Randall, 2007; Widner, 1997), partly due to the weaknesses of civil society in delivering votes for parties (Widner, 1997). However, Burnell (2005) contends that the Western conceptualisation of party-society linkages differs from their African variants. Hence, it is unsurprising that 51% of respondents trusted political parties "a lot" or "somewhat" in Africa (Bratton et al., 2005, p. 257), compared to a paltry 17% in the European Union (Osei, 2012).

Consequently, since all political parties exist to link the governed to the ruler (Lawson, 1980), parties naturally require "a certain degree of social anchorage" to garner votes (Osei, 2012, p. 15). Therefore, African political parties are likely to be anchored in society as Erdmann (2004) underscores the potential application of Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) theory of cleavage structures to appreciate party-society relations in Africa. This theory highlights the schisms in citizens' interests along rural/urban, capital/labour, centre/periphery, and church/state divisions.

However, while admitting that the above social cleavages may be present in Africa, Erdmann (2004) argued that such cleavages have little implications for African party formation and politics. Indeed, processes of industrial and historical revolutions did not precede political mobilisation in Africa to engender the cleavage structures Lipset and Rokkan conceive (Randall, 2001). Therefore, because African ethnic identities evolved independently of any industrial revolution, many analysts underscore the intersection between ethnic cleavage and party formation and mobilisation in Africa (Erdmann, 2004; Fearon, 2006; Posner, 2005; Randall & Svåsand, 2002).

Nevertheless, the emphasis on ethnicity as the pivot around which party-society linkages in Africa revolve obfuscates any efforts at conceptualising party-society linkages beyond ethnicity. Nonetheless, Boone and Wahman's (2015) study of eight anglophone countries in sub-Saharan Africa highlights the relevance of rural/urban cleavages in driving political mobilisation. The authors find that ahead of the first multi-party elections in the early 1990s, regimes across six of these countries reconfigured their rural electoral constituencies to increase their chances of winning more rural seats as a countermeasure to opposition parties' popularity in urban areas.

For instance, before Zambia's 1991 election, the electoral commission created 25 new constituencies and allocated them in rural areas, disadvantaging the urban district of Lusaka (Boone & Wahman, 2015). Similarly, Kenya's electoral commission created 22 new rural constituencies, enabling President Daniel Arap Moi's party to secure a narrow victory during the 1997 parliamentary elections (Boone & Wahman, 2015). Likewise, before Ghana's 1992 election, the electoral commission created 60 new constituencies in the rural Upper East and Upper West regions (*ibid*). Moreover, Boone and Wahman (2015) further contend that this rural bias malapportionment persisted despite electoral turnover.

Thus, these early gerrymandering practices laid some foundation for the evolution of a sense of party-society linkage along the rural-urban divide in anglophone sub-Saharan Africa. Boone and Wahman's (2015) work accentuates the pertinence of Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) rural/urban cleavage structure as an analytical tool for understanding African political dynamics. Hence, in competitive clientelist societies where parties mobilise support along rural/urban cleavages, regimes will respond differently to a social group depending on the group's rurality or urbanity.

2.3. Political marketplace.

A marketplace is an arena of interaction between sellers and buyers. The concept of a political marketplace represents the mutually beneficial interactions between buyers (politicians) and sellers (the electorate) in the political arena. There are two possible variants of this concept. One variant is the ‘market for votes’ wherein politicians attempt to buy as many votes as possible through distributive politics or direct cash hand-outs/transfers. The other is the ‘market for money’, where contending regimes compete over the mobilisation of resources necessary for vote-buying.

2.3.1. The market for votes.

The ‘market for votes’ variant has perhaps received much wider scholarly attention, beginning with Anthony Downs’ (1957) seminal work – *An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy* – which contended that “political parties in a democracy formulate policy strictly as a means to gaining votes” (p. 137). As rational agents, political parties would pursue preconceived policies to serve preconceived interest groups only if such preconceived policies could enhance their re-election chances. Therefore, political parties’ campaign promises, which are conceivably preconceived policies, may differ from actual policy formulation and implementation depending on their electoral implications. Essentially, the social functions of political parties to make and implement policies as governments are fundamentally driven by their “private motive...to attain the income, power, and prestige of being in office” (Downs, 1957, p. 137).

In the context of ‘democratic’ Africa, political needs render African parties and politicians clientelist in their relationship with segments of the voter population (Van de Walle, 2003). Thus, on top of the campaign list of African politicians is the promise of social services such as better roads, which, in turn, shapes the voting pattern of citizens. Therefore, African parties “do not really serve to aggregate interests – rather they serve a representation function in a context of clientelistic politics” (Van de Walle, 2003, p. 314). Hence, African governments’ political survival considerations drive their articulation of specific policies.

Like Van de Walle, Hart (1982) examined relations between governments and farmers in rural West Africa, asking why governments continually allocate scarce funds for capital-intensive agricultural projects despite their persistent failures. Hart (1982, p. 89) found that such projects keep “a loyal cadre of followers employed” and generally strengthen the rule of the political elite in the countryside. Hart’s findings contextualise the representative functions of African parties in a clientelist political context. A fundamental assumption of the ‘market for vote’ debate is that African political parties care more about their political survival than the interest of social groups and may respond differently to the same social

group over time for political reasons. However, in a competitive democratic system where social cleavages matter in political mobilisation and party politics, a regime may consistently favour a social group that constitutes its cleavage core, as articulated in section 2.2.

2.3.2. The market for money.

Beyond the market for votes, politicians also seek to maintain their power through the ‘market for money’. The market for money helps politicians raise necessary campaign funds to influence the electorates. Alex De Waal (2018) contends that the means to maintaining or winning power is the political budget which “...refers to the funds available to the ruler for discretionary spending on ensuring the loyalty of members of the political elite” (p. 2). However, while disgruntled elites can foment ruptures within a party and must be bought via the political budget, the political budget also plausibly targets broad party members and neutrals whose loyalties could boost an incumbent’s survival.

Thus, the source and amount of rent that accrue to the political budget shape the likelihood of regime survival. Hence, De Waal (2018, p. 2) argues that “management of the political budget is the single most important political business management skill for a political entrepreneur...” (p. 2). This argument implies that “the role of personal agency and political skill [cannot be] considered as an extraneous factor...” but rather as actual politics (p. 2). De Waal’s (2018) conception of the ‘market for money’ echoes Bates’ (2014) question of why government monopsonies (marketing boards) exploit farmers, a problem Hart (1982) and Brett (1986) also observed.

These marketing monopsonies had the original intent of stabilising farmers’ income by keeping part of the surplus emerging from world market price booms and drawing on the surplus to support prices during a bust in world market prices (Hart, 1982). Nonetheless, that intent got compromised because governments set agricultural products at levels far lower than the lowest international price ever plummeted, depressing agricultural production (ibid). Consequently, Brett (1986) contended that farmers would increase their yield if conditions (pricing policies) were right. However, by extracting surplus from farmers through price distortions, African governments could fiscally buy off urban dwellers, including the bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie, capable of regime destabilisation (Bates, 2014). Thus, surplus extraction from farmers accrued funds to African governments’ political budgets vital for political survival.

2.4. Hypotheses.

The question of whether qualitative researchers test hypotheses is quite contentious. Some scholars argue that hypothesis testing occurs only in quantitative social science and that qualitative research's epistemological approach and 'inductiveness' do not allow for hypothesis testing (Bluhm et al., 2011; Ulichny, 1991). Others believe that hypotheses have a place in qualitative research but remain ambivalent about their testability (Malterud, 2001; Malterud & Hollnagel, 1999). Still, others assert the applicability and testability of hypothesis in qualitative research (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Sullivan & Sargeant, 2011).

Mainly, qualitative researchers with positivist epistemological orientations frequently test hypotheses primarily derived from theory (Chigbu, 2019). Therefore, drawing on the political settlement, party-society linkage, and political marketplace (i.e., market for votes) literature, I hypothesise that:

H1: The nature of a society's political power configuration and social cleavage structure generates incentives and constraints that drive how regimes relate to social groups.

From the above hypothesis, 'political power configuration' and 'social cleavage structure' constitute independent variables (IVs) that may together or individually shape a regime's response to social groups such as artisanal miners (dependent variable) through the incentives and constraints (mechanisms) the IVs generate. I unpack this overarching hypothesis into two sub-hypotheses.

H1A: Ghana's competitive clientelist political configuration and social cleavage structure generate incentives and constraints affecting how regimes relate to artisanal miners.

H1B: Tanzania's weak and strong dominant political configurations shape the incentives and constraints regimes encounter with implications for how regimes respond to artisanal miners.

Given the discussion of the literature on political marketplace (i.e., market for money), I postulate further that:

H2: Regimes will target different groups of artisanal miners to facilitate exclusive access to mineral rent.

This thesis will test these hypotheses by examining both primary and secondary evidence. However, to increase the internal validity of my overarching theoretical approach, hypotheses, and corresponding

arguments, I present two alternative theoretical lenses and show their relevance or otherwise to this thesis.

3. Alternative theories.

3.1. Ideas and resource governance.

Global and domestic ideas may play crucial roles in shaping resource governance outcomes. Global ideas on natural resource governance revolve around neoliberalism and resource nationalism. Different political leaders might temporarily respond to such ideas quite differently, with ramifications for natural resource governance. Domestically, political party ideas, bifurcated along the left-right spectrum, may prove potent in driving variation in resource governance. These multiple layers of ideologies, discussed below, could offer alternative ways of exploring and explaining differences in regime-ASM relations.

3.1.1. From resource nationalism to neoliberalism and back to resource nationalism.

Since the 1950s, two primary resource extraction orthodoxies have emerged to shape resource governance. The first of these orthodoxies, resource nationalism, emerged following political independence in developing countries and broadly describes host countries' effort to generate rents from resource extraction at the expense of foreign private investors (Arbatli, 2018; Chua, 1995; Haslam & Heidrich, 2016; Stevens, 2008). Arbatli (2018) defines resource nationalism as strategies resource-rich countries deploy to exercise control over their natural resources vis-à-vis foreign participation. This definition echoes Haslam and Heidrich's (2016) understanding of resource nationalism as an attempt by a host nation to increase its control and influence over the extraction of its natural resources through a range of policies and actions.

Thus, at the heart of resource nationalism are the varying policies, actions, and strategies nations use to maximise benefits from resource extraction. Regulatory approaches to resource nationalism, including changes in resource laws, contract renegotiations and changes in taxes, constitute attempts at resource nationalism (Arbatli, 2018; Haslam & Heidrich, 2016; Klapp, 1987) and have been used by developed nations such as Canada (Fossum, 1997) and Australia (Hay, 2009), with insignificant effects on the operations of private investors. However, resource nationalism could threaten foreign investors when host states attempt to restructure resource ownership, underpinned by the ideology that the predominance of foreign capital in the resource sector is inimical to the public's well-being (Arbatli, 2018). Such resource ownership restructuring tends to be more nationalist than statist or socialist. In other words, as Hartshorn (1993, p. 140) observes, the nationalisation of assets occurred "not because

they were privately owned, but because they were foreign.” Thus, resource nationalism represents “a battle between national interests and foreign [rather than private] influences” (Stevens, 2008, p. 8).

This ideologically and nationalistically driven opposition to foreign private capital extraction of natural resources was ubiquitous in the 1960s and 1970s (Chua, 1995), wherein resource-rich developing countries sought to maximise their endowment through the nationalisation of foreign assets (Ross, 1999; Stevens, 2008). Whereas resource ownership restructuring might have accrued rents to these states, the transformation of such rents into economic development remained unclear (Haslam & Heidrich, 2016). Instead, nationalisation became a politico-economic curse in most cases (Ross, 1999). Economically, nationalisation surged countries’ dependence on resource extraction, culminating in currency overvaluation and disruptions of the domestic manufacturing base (aka Dutch Disease) (Auty, 1995; Sachs & Warner, 2001).

Politically, nationalisation undermined the prospects for democratisation as states eventually failed to tax their population due to the rents accruing from the resource sector, preventing civil society from demanding accountability, participation, or representation (Karl, 2007). Thus, resource nationalism spawned an inverse relationship between resource endowment and growth and development (Auty, 1995; Karl, 2007; Sachs & Warner, 2001). Unsurprisingly, by the 1980s and 1990s, resource nationalism receded to the background as a new paradigm of market-led resource governance emerged. Haslam and Heidrick (2016, p. 7) describe the 1990s as a “liberalising phase” in which the dominance of states in resource ownership and governance dwindled while foreign private capital investment and participation surged (Luo, 2001). This period is broadly referred to as the neoliberal period.

Nonetheless, the neoliberal paradigm predates the 1990s, emerging in the late 1970s in response to the global economic recession largely blamed on undue state intervention in the economy. Thus, neoliberalism emphasises market mechanisms, rather than governments’ economic interventions, as efficient in resource allocation (Munk, 2004; Thorsen & Lie, 2006). Thorsen and Lie (2006) regard neoliberalism as an offshoot of economic liberalism which retires the state in the back seat and instead allows individuals to compete within a framework of free and self-adjusting markets (Polanyi, 1957). David Harvey (2007, p. 2) sheds detailed light on this concept.

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence,

police and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force, if need be, the proper functioning of market.

Like Harvey, Blomgren (1997, p. 224) understands neoliberalism as a “political philosophy giving priority to individual freedom and the right to private property.” Similarly, Thorsen and Lie (2006) interpret individual freedom economically, positing that neoliberalism constitutes “political beliefs which most prominently and prototypically include the conviction that the only legitimate purpose of the state is to safeguard individual liberty, understood as a sort of mercantile liberty for individuals and corporations” (p. 203). Therefore, neoliberalism typically allocates a minimal role to the state. Nevertheless, this role is significant as it guarantees macroeconomic stability and protects the private property rights of individuals and corporations.

In Africa and much of the developing world, the 1980s and 1990s constituted the neoliberal eras. In the early 1980s, the Bretton Woods institutions attributed the economic malaise of developing countries to the absence of the minimal but vital state role of securing and protecting private property rights. Factors such as complex regulatory processes, unstable macroeconomic environments, exploitative taxation regimes, tight government controls and restrictions on imports and exports disincentivised investment in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 1989). These illiberal economic regimes meant that the economies of sub-Saharan Africa could not leverage the rising metal prices propelled by the global economic crisis in the previous decade (the 1970s) (World Bank, 1989)

Given the critical nature of mining to these economies, the World Bank saw the creation of an ‘enabling environment’ for investors as a precondition to boost the mining industry and prevent the 1990s from becoming another “lost decade” for the region (World Bank, 1989, p. 122). Consequently, the Bank mediated a new partnership between foreign mining capitalists and African governments by advising African countries to “take a minority interest in new [mining] ventures...” and rethink the policy, legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks of their mining sectors (World Bank, 1989, p. 122).

Thus, with the proliferation of neoliberal mining codes in the developing world that commonly offered tax holidays to foreign investors and drastically reduced the stakes of host countries from between 50% and 100% to between 0% and 10%, resource nationalism had become obsolete in the 1990s. However, by the turn of the new millennium, the neoliberal development paradigm had proven elusive in transforming the wealth of natural resources in the developing world into substantial growth and development.

Hence, a return to the past became inevitable. Haslam and Heidrick (2016, p. 8) characterise the late 1990s and mid-2000s as the “regulating phase” of resource nationalism, which sought to correct “some

of the excesses and lacunae” of neoliberalism. However, beyond the mid-2000s, the “re-nationalising phase” emerged, with states reasserting their ownership and participation in the natural resource sector, a direct challenge to the neoliberal orthodoxy (Haslam & Heidrich, 2016). The inferential logic underpinning these debates is that regimes that operate under neoliberal periods may also be more inclined to favour foreign mining capitalists to the detriment of indigenous artisanal miners. In contrast, regimes that operate under resource nationalism periods may prioritise the interests of indigenous artisanal miners over foreign mining capitalists.

Nonetheless, these debates overlook how domestic factors could shape a regime’s approach to resource governance. As several scholars observe, a regime’s political goal shapes the likelihood of resource nationalism (Domjan & Stone, 2010; Wilson, 2015). Thus, it is conceivable that, given the nature of domestic politics, a regime may be resource-nationalist in a neoliberal era and ‘neoliberalist’ in a resource-nationalist era. Therefore, while a regime’s resource governance ideas may coincide with its treatment of artisanal miners, such a coincidence may have no causal relevance. Nevertheless, beyond resource governance ideas, regimes may also be influenced by their political ideological orientations to govern their resource sectors.

3.1.2. Party ideology and resource governance.

The literature on the nexus between political orientation and policymaking mainly focuses on Western societies. Here, scholars generally regard parties’ policies as products of their ideologies. Conventionally, parties either lean to the left or right. Left-wing or social democratic governments differ from their right-wing or conservative counterparts based on the distinct policies they pursue to appeal to their differing constituencies. Whereas social democrats appeal to the working class, as in Northern Europe, rightist parties enjoy a monopoly of support from a society’s middle and upper-middle classes.

Hibbs (1977) found that left and right parties in 12 industrialised countries pursue macroeconomic policies in line with their ideological leanings, positing that leftist and rightist governments respectively prefer low and high unemployment policies. Thus, inflation tends to be high under leftist governments and low when right-wing governments are in power. For example, in the US and UK, leftist parties (the Democratic Party and the Labour Party) tend to pursue low unemployment/high inflation macroeconomic policies. In contrast, rightist parties (the Republican Party and the Conservative Party) do the opposite. These varying macroeconomic policy choices help parties appeal to their respective support bases consistent with their ideological leanings. Hibbs’ study confirms Kirschen’s (1964) finding that class cleavage is associated with political parties’ preferences for unemployment and inflation policies.

Nevertheless, assumptions that ideologies shape public policies even in advanced democracies are crude because the desire to win power in a competitive political system makes political parties take a more central position to appeal to different constituencies or classes of people (Esping-Andersen, 2017; Przeworski, 1980). Nonetheless, while there is evidence to suggest that ideology mediates policies in advanced democracies, scholars contend that party politics in the developing world, including Africa, centres on identities (mainly ethnic and religious identities) rather than ideologies (Basedau, 2007; Horowitz, 2000; Randall, 2007)

Hence, as nonethnic-based political parties are rare in ethnically polarised societies (Horowitz, 2000), it is impossible to conduct any significant test on ideological variation in Africa, given its multi-ethnic diversity (Basedau, 2007). The above debates arguably attribute Africa's political-ideological poverty to its multi-ethnic diversity. However, according to Manning (2005, pp. 715–716), Africa's ideological deficit partly arises from how “all political contenders are constrained by the same economic model and policy parameters” associated with “the advent of structural adjustment and high aid dependency.” Perhaps, the dominant explanations point to the absence of industrial revolution in Africa, weak party institutionalisation and fragile party-civil society (i.e., trade union) nexus (Basedau & Stroh, 2012; Erdmann, 2004; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Salih, 2003; Widner, 1997).

Nevertheless, while scholars concur on the lack of ideological evolution in Africa, early writers on African politics, partly influenced by the socialist rhetoric of post-independent African leaders, held that radical socialism would become the primary ideology (McCain, 1975). Although this prediction proved elusive, other Africanists that discussed the ideological question in passing found a blend of social democracy and political liberalism as Africa's political ideology (Bartolini & Mair, 2007; Carothers, 2006; Erdmann, 2004; Hodgkin, 1961; Van de Walle, 2003). Nevertheless, a few studies have attempted to empirically analyse the role of ideology in African politics (Cheeseman & Hinfelaar, 2010; Dickovick, 2008; Elischer, 2012; LeBas, 2006).

Dickovick (2008, p. 1122) argues that at the third wave of democracy in Africa, “the lack of a dominant ethno-patrimonial coalition opened political space for more programmatic contestation” in Benin, Ghana, and Mali. Leftist regimes headed by minority presidents in these countries initially “attempted ideological incorporation in ways that attenuated the political salience of ethnic identity” (p. 1122). Hence, the political opposition became nonethnic and occupied the other end of the ideological spectrum. Similarly, Elischer (2013) contends that the presence of dominant ethnic groups inhibits the evolution of nonethnic-based (i.e., ideology-based) parties as these dominant ethnic groups lack the incentive to unify. Nonetheless, Bratton (2014) rejects this structural explanation because its emphasis on time-invariant factors (i.e., the demographic distribution of ethnic groups) makes it challenging to appreciate the evolution of African parties and party systems.

However, Dickovick (2008) and Elischer (2013) suggest that it is the nature of ethnic polarisation, rather than ethnic polarisation per se (Horowitz, 2000), that matters in understanding the evolution of ideologically-driven parties in Africa. Thus, despite ethnic polarisation in Africa, a few scholars regard ideology as relevant in Africa's party politics. For example, Cheeseman and Hinfelaar (2010) found that during Zambia's 2008 election, the Patriotic Front (PF) and Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) campaigned on different issues that appealed to their primary supporters. LeBas (2006) reported similar findings in Zimbabwe regarding the campaign strategies of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). These electoral campaigns on varying issues appealing to core supporters underline the relevance of ideology in Africa's party politics, even if the different campaign issues do not readily reflect the left-right ideological continuum.

Nevertheless, it is one thing for ideology to influence electoral campaigns and quite another for ideology to impact actual policies. Even at the campaign level, Elischer (2012, p. 651) found contrasting evidence, concluding that "African parties...have neither a particular strong right-wing, nor a particular strong left-wing tendency." Indeed, in some cases, the programmatic contents of some parties have ethnic undercurrents. For instance, while Kenya's Democratic Party (DP) had rightist tendencies, this rightism was a charade the DP used to promote the economic interests of its ethnic clientele, the Kikuyu ethnic group, that dominates Kenya's business sector (Elischer, 2012). Similarly, the NPP's rightist ideology may well reflect how its ethnic core (i.e., the Asantes, Akyems and Kwahus) is also the most business-oriented in Ghana.

Nevertheless, granted that party ideology matters in party politics in Africa (Cheeseman & Hinfelaar, 2010; Dickovick, 2008), the theoretical expectation is that parties' ideologies may shape how they relate to different social groups, including indigenous artisanal miners and foreign mining capitalists. Typically, resource-nationalist ideas also tend to be socialist in outlook to the extent that they seek to extract resources to enhance social wellbeing. Thus, even in a neoliberal ideational world or era, leftist parties would be more inclined to engage in resource nationalism that may incorporate some degree of tolerance of domestic actors such as indigenous artisanal miners. In contrast, given the liberal tendencies of rightist parties, such parties may embrace the neoliberal paradigm even in a resource-nationalist ideational world and prioritise the interest of foreign mining capitalists as against domestic artisanal miners.

3.2. Social movements and elite behaviour.

Across the globe, the role of social movements in shaping elite behaviour has been well documented. Charles Tilly (1998, p. 467) understands a social movement as “a kind of campaign...that demands righting of a wrong, most often a wrong suffered by a well-specified population [which] can range from a single individual to all humans, or even all living creatures”. Tilly (1998, p. 469) further defines a social movement as consisting “of a sustained challenge to powerholders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those powerholders by means of repeated public displays of that population’s numbers, commitment, unity and worthiness”. Two fundamental assumptions emerge from Tilly’s conceptualisation.

First, as social movements essentially embark on campaigns, they must necessarily draw upon some resources to kick-start and sustain these campaigns. This assumption ties in with the resource mobilisation theory of social movement, which contends that a movement’s access to material and non-material resources from domestic and external sources shapes the likelihood of transforming grievances into collective action (McAdam et al., 1988; van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). Tilly (1998) demonstrates how such variegated resources drove the campaigns of the Catholic Association in Ireland and Great Britain and eventually contributed to the King’s concession of fundamental political rights to Catholics in 1829. Similarly, Ellis and Kessel (2009) highlight how African social movements, such as the Nasrul-Lahi-I-Fatih Society or NASFAT movement in Nigeria, depend on foreign donors for their campaigns.

Second, since social movements aim to engage with “powerholders” to change the status quo, it follows that the nature of the political structure and how movements construct or frame social reality can shape the likelihood of protests. Thus, the political structure theory underlines how differences in the politico-institutional environments present opportunities for and constraints against protests (Walsh, 1981). Nevertheless, just because the political structure might favour protests does not mean protests would occur. Instead, as the theory of social constructivism posits, movements must construct meaning or interpret social reality to facilitate public identification with their goals, values and aspirations and, thus, foster public participation in movements’ activities (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Snow et al., 1986).

For instance, Snow et al. (1986, p. 464) use the concept of frame alignment to refer to the congruence between individual values, beliefs, goals, and ideologies with those of social movements, arguing that social movements’ “various interactive and communicative processes” shape frame alignment. Thus, without individual values and goals aligning with those of social movements (Snow et al., 1986), through the meaningful construction of the social world (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Snow et al., 1986),

identification with movements may not occur, inhibiting participation in protests (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991).

These distinct theories of social movements offer valuable insights into the likelihood of protests. Nevertheless, while the nature of the political structure may facilitate or prevent protests, research on African social movements shows how a hostile political structure does not necessarily stop protests from occurring as much as it may undermine protests. For instance, De Waal and Ibreck (2013) demonstrate that the harsh political environments in Zimbabwe, Uganda and Malawi did not stop social movements from protesting but did result in their repression. They argue that protests are ubiquitous in Africa, but “broad-based popular movements are weak and especially vulnerable to co-option or collapse” (p. 305).

Thus, contrary to the political structure theory, De Waal and Ibreck’s study implies that the nature of the political structure in Africa could shape regimes’ responses to social movements rather than inhibit the occurrence of protests. For instance, Maccatory et al. (2010) analyse how regimes in Burkina Faso and Niger responded quite differently to similar scales of cost-of-living protests or “hunger riots” in the mid-2000s. Unlike Burkina Faso, food insecurity is a historically sensitive political question in Niger because the Nigerien ruling party came to power in the 1970s in a famine-induced coup d’état, making food security a pivotal anchor that held the regime’s legitimacy together. Therefore, when the ‘hunger riots’ erupted, they posed a more significant threat of regime destabilisation in Niger than in Burkina Faso. Thus, the different political structures meant that Burkinabe authorities could crack down on the protesters while the Nigerien regime empathised with the protesters.

These theoretical and empirical literature suggest that while social movements aim to get powerholders to right some wrong, powerholders’ responses will change over time and across space depending on some interaction between the political structure and a movement’s resource base and construction of social reality. Therefore, given the nature of the political structure, a social movement with a credible resource base and the ability to unambiguously frame issues to elicit social support may implicitly threaten a regime’s survival by either withdrawing support from the regime or providing “sustenance to a regime’s enemies” (Tilly, 1998, p. 467).

Such threats to regimes become imminent with the emergence of new social movements, such as environmental movements that tend to get broader public support (ZEUS & Reif, 1990) given the consensual and nonpartisan nature of questions on environmental protection (Downs, 1972; Mertig & Dunlap, 2009). Hence, compared to other movements, environmental movements can also pose the most significant threats to regimes as these movements’ ideologies, values, goals, and aspirations may resonate with those of the broader population they purport to represent. Under such circumstances, the

political structure may fail to prevent the occurrence of protests, compelling regimes to capitulate to the demands of these movements.

Thus, theoretically, how a regime relates to artisanal miners may depend on a given anti-ASM social movement's resource base; its construction of social reality (i.e., ASM) to elicit widespread public identification with the movement's ideologies; and whether the nature of the political structure makes the movement politically salient. Since artisanal mining, particularly alluvial ASM, causes environmental degradation, the presence of an anti-ASM social movement could compel a regime to raid the artisanal miners to placate this movement. Nonetheless, the explanatory power of this theory would vaporise if a regime became tolerant of artisanal miners in the face of an anti-ASM social movement or if a regime repressed artisanal miners in the absence of an anti-ASM social movement.

4. Research design and methods.

4.1. Case selection justification.

This thesis draws on the case study method since its primary purpose is to explore and explain variation in regime-ASM relations in Ghana and Tanzania. A few conceptual definitions of a 'case' and a 'case study' will clarify the study's design, including the justification for the two cases and the data collection methods and analysis. Lund (2014, p. 224) understands a case as "an edited chunk of empirical reality where certain features are marked out, emphasised, and privileged while others recede into the background." Thus, a case represents a specific concrete and observable phenomenon or event discernible to investigators and participants (Lund, 2014).

Granted this definition, scholars regard a case study as the detailed investigation of a specific empirical phenomenon to draw broader conclusions. For instance, Gerring (2006) considers a case study as the in-depth study of one or a few cases to shed light on a broader set of cases. Similarly, Yin (2009, p. 18) and Yin and Davies (2007) conceptualise a case study as the intensive investigation of a contemporary empirical event "within its real-life context." However, case studies are not necessarily restricted to real-life events and may also involve the examination of historical incidences towards the generation or testing of generalisable explanations (George & Bennett, 2005)

Nevertheless, while acknowledging an overlap between case studies and histories, Yin (2009, p. 18) posits that case studies are unique for their use of a range of evidence and reliance on "prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis." Nonetheless, not all case studies are theory-guided (Levy, 2008). Be that as it may, a distinctive trait of the case study method is its use of evidence from a single or few cases to illuminate a larger group of cases (Gerring, 2006).

Thus, the case study method has conventionally been associated with qualitative methods to the extent that the number of cases studied is few (Gerring, 2006), and data for such studies emerge from multiple sources (Yin, 2009).

Given qualitative case studies' primary goal of intensive investigation of a single or few cases, such studies also tend to ask 'how' and 'why' questions necessary for describing and explicating aspects of the empirical world (Yin, 2009). These exploratory and explanatory questions underscore how the case study method prioritises within-case variation in the phenomenon of interest to confirm or disconfirm some hypotheses (Gerring, 2006). This thesis's theory-guided approach and its focus on exploring and explaining variation in regime-ASM relations in a few cases (i.e., Ghana and Tanzania) make it a qualitative case study.

I selected Ghana and Tanzania as they are typical cases and broadly represent resource-rich developing countries in Africa. Since qualitative case studies are, by definition, not cross-case or large-N studies, researchers somehow need to select one or two cases representative of a larger sample of cases for in-depth analysis (Gerring, 2006). Thus, typical cases tend to represent a larger class of cases in a probabilistic sense and "provide insight into a broader phenomenon" beyond the immediate cases under interrogation (Gerring, 2006, p. 86). Lund (2014) echoed a similar worldview when he suggested that a case is not fascinating unless it resonates with a broader set of cases. Such resonance "may help us to generalise, abstract and theorise" (Lund, 2014, p. 226).

While Africa has many resource-rich countries with ASM and LSM sectors, the United Nations Environment Commission for Africa (UNECA) estimates that about 1.1 million and 1.5 artisanal miners directly operate in Ghana and Tanzania, the highest on the continent (UNECA, 2011). Moreover, Ghana and Tanzania are among the four-leading gold-producing countries in Africa and host some of the world's renowned large-scale gold mining companies, including AngloGold Ashanti, which operates in both countries. However, not only do artisanal miners mainly mine gold in these countries, but they also commonly extract tanzanite in Tanzania and diamonds in Ghana.

Also, whereas Africa is fast democratising, Ghana and Tanzania represent quintessential African democracies to the extent that their national constitutions impose term limits on leaders. Thus, although Tanzania's CCM has invariably won national elections, political leadership within the CCM changes as frequently as power changes across Ghana's NDC and NPP. Furthermore, Ghana and Tanzania are low-middle-income countries whose economies are not remarkably different from low-income economies such as Uganda, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Neither do their economies strikingly differ from the high-middle income economies of Nigeria, Botswana, and South Africa. Understanding how regimes respond to artisanal miners and why they do so in Ghana and Tanzania could irradiate regime-

ASM relations in other African contexts. With this case selection in mind, I now describe and justify the data collection processes.

4.2. Data collection.

Since the case study method relies on different sources of evidence to draw conclusions, process tracing is central to data collection. Process tracing's uniqueness stems from the examination of multiple and non-comparable evidential sources, including qualitative and quantitative evidence, towards formulating an incontrovertible causal narrative that renders rival explanations less persuasive (Dunning, 2008; Gerring, 2006). Thus, process tracing underlines the collection, ordering, categorisation, and narrativisation of "bits and pieces of evidence" to present some causal relations within a plausible universe (Gerring, 2006, pp. 173).

Given this thesis's overarching goal of exploring and explaining differences in how regimes respond to artisanal miners, I garnered evidence from varying non-comparable sources. Data for this study include in-depth interviews, online data, electoral and survey data, and academic and grey literature. Between 2019 and 2021, I conducted ten months of fieldwork in Ghana and Tanzania and garnered qualitative data via in-depth interviews. Across the two countries, I divided the fieldwork into two broad phases. The first phase facilitated critical reflections on the data and provided new directions for data collection in the second phase.

During the first phase, I spent four months in Ghana and two months in Tanzania. However, the second phase of the fieldwork got obstructed and delayed due to the COVID-19-related travel bans on Tanzania and bureaucratic and quarantine procedures in Ghana. Thus, it became necessary to conduct remote and virtual fieldwork.⁵ Whereas this adaptation can be a limitation, virtual interviews have emerged as distinct interview methods that supplement conventional interview methods and have merits and demerits like other interview methods (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004).

For instance, virtual interviews are convenient for both the researcher and the participants (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004). In this research, I could quickly agree and reschedule the date and time of the virtual engagements as they fit the participants' schedules. This might have been impossible with onsite interviews as onsite researchers work within tight timelines and lack the flexibility to adjust their schedules to meet the participants' availability. Nonetheless, as a drawback, participants' access to mobile or computer devices and the internet could hinder their ability to participate in virtual interviews. Moreover, participants' reading and writing skills could invariably affect their ability to respond to

⁵ The virtual fieldwork in Ghana and Tanzania spanned two months each.

email interviews (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Again, in the event of email interviews, the researcher has limited control over the interview process, while the participant could temper the naturality of the data by editing their responses (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

To limit these effects, I reduced the virtual interviews to zoom and WhatsApp conversations and only used email interviews where a participant was not directly accessible due to internet challenges.⁶ However, besides the virtual interviews with elite participants, I collaborated with third-party researchers, who, having received two weeks' training and orientation, conducted interviews with non-elite participants. The latter group of participants either did not have access to the internet or mobile devices or could not speak English.

Across the two cases and the different phases of the fieldwork, I sampled participants purposively, ensuring that these participants' worldviews were crucial to the study's aim and overarching research question. I then conducted 72 elite and non-elite semi-structured interviews at the national and sub-national levels and three focus group interviews across the two countries (two in Ghana and one in Tanzania). Concerning the elite interviews, participants included officials of government institutions and agencies, local government units, CSOs⁷ and academics, former managers of mining companies, mining companies, chambers of mines, gold dealers and ASM associations at the national and sub-national levels. For the non-elite interviews, the participants comprised artisanal miners, former underground workers of mining companies, and the elderly in mining communities at the sub-national level.⁸

In Ghana, I held 46 national and sub-national interviews. The national interviews occurred in Accra, Ghana's capital. However, the sub-national interviews mainly occurred in two separate but typical mining districts (i.e., Obuasi and Talensi).⁹ The Obuasi municipal district¹⁰ hosts the Obuasi gold mine, Ghana's premier mine operated by AGA, while the Talensi district¹¹ hosts the Gbane gold mine, one of northern Ghana's largest and oldest mines. I conducted in-person national and sub-national interviews in Accra and Obuasi during the first phase of the fieldwork. The remaining sub-national interviews in Talensi were held virtually and remotely with the assistance of a third-party researcher.

⁶ Only one participant in Tanzania elected to respond to my interview guide via email. This was when an initial Zoom interview got disrupted after about 30 minutes into the discussion. Thus, the responses via email provided supplementary data to the data collected via Zoom.

⁷ The CSOs in Ghana included CESIS and Third World Network. In Tanzania, they included the Lawyers Environment Action Team (LEAT), HakiMadini and HakiRasilimali.

⁸ See Appendices K, L, M, and N for a list of the interviews conducted.

⁹ Nonetheless, I held two interviews in Kumasi, which I consider sub-national interviews.

¹⁰ The Obuasi municipal district is located in Ghana's Ashanti Region.

¹¹ The Talensi district is located in Ghana's Upper East Region.

In Tanzania, I held 26 national and sub-national interviews. Dar es Salaam and Dodoma constituted national interview sites, while Geita and Mererani comprised sub-national interview sites. Being Tanzania's most prominent and commercial city, Dar es Salaam hosts most of the country's vibrant mining-related civil society organisations. However, the leading mining-related government agencies are in Dodoma, the country's political capital. Geita is a typical gold mining community in Tanzania that hosts AGA, like Obuasi in Ghana. Moreover, Geita and Obuasi host approximately equal numbers of artisanal miners (i.e., 5000 miners), making them directly comparable. Therefore, understanding the varying relations between regimes, AGA, and artisanal miners in Geita and Obuasi can offer considerable insights into the study's theoretical lens.

While Mererani is not a gold mining community, it is the world's only site for tanzanite, the globe's rarest gemstone. Though tanzanite is much less valuable relative to gold, the uniqueness of this mineral lies in its rarity, which gives it a non-monetary value. Until recently, the tanzanite mining site was mined by artisanal miners and Tanzanite One, a foreign mining company. The changing relations between different CCM regimes and different strands of miners in Mererani (i.e., artisanal miners and Tanzanite One) made this mining site a relevant sub-national case for consideration.

All the interviews in Geita were face-to-face during the first phase of the fieldwork. Some of the in-person interviews in Dar es Salaam occurred during the first phase of the fieldwork. All the interviews with government agencies in Dodoma were held virtually via Zoom, while a third-party researcher engaged with sub-national elite and non-elite participants in Mererani. Across Ghana and Tanzania, elite interviews at the national and sub-national levels were semi-structured. However, non-elite sub-national interviews included semi-structured and focus group interviews. I conducted two focus group interviews in two mining communities in Obuasi and one focus group in a community in Geita. Each focus group comprised between six and ten participants.

Adopting a semi-structured interview approach to collect data was vital because of the flexibility in asking questions outside the interview guide but in line with the study's aim to probe further into a given subject (Bryman, 2012). However, there is the danger of going off on a tangent if the researcher does not carefully guide the participants. Hence, while I asked follow-up questions not written down, these questions aligned with the study's overarching objective. Like semi-structured interviews, focus group interviews have strengths and drawbacks. Focus group interviews can be relatively cost-effective by enabling the researcher to quickly garner lots of data (Marshall & Rossman, 2014; Matthews & Ross, 2010; Merton, 1987). Moreover, with focus groups, participants' perspectives on a given subject – in this case, the artisanal miners' experiences with different regimes over time – may become revealing through discussions, debates, and counter-debates among participants under the interviewer's moderation (Bryman, 2012; Cyr, 2019).

However, the primary drawback of semi-structured interviews is group dynamics, which could distort the reliability and validity of the data generated for analysis (Bryman, 2012). For instance, some participants may be naturally “reticent” while others “hog the stage” so that the interviewer may get a less balanced contribution from the group (Bryman, 2012, p. 518). Therefore, following Krueger’s (1988) advice, I communicated the need for participants to respect one another’s opinions and avoid undue interruptions as far as practicable. Also, I frequently asked for divergent opinions, ensuring that the data represented the groups’ opinions.

Across the two cases, I posed standardised questions which, according to George and Bennet (2005), generate cross-case comparable data for cumulative and systematic analysis. However, the interview guide for different groups of participants varied but broadly addressed similar issues on regime-ASM relations. The semi-structured and focus group interviews were in-depth, with the former lasting between an hour and 1.5 hours. The latter lasted between 1.5 and two hours. There is a seeming convergence around in-depth interviews being crucial in studying the processes through which decisions are reached (Levy, 2008). For instance, Dennis Chong’s (1993, p. 868) study of how decisions on civil liberties [are made] emphasised that in-depth interviews have the advantage of comprehensively documenting “how subjects arrive at their opinions.”

Chong argued that “the way subjects ramble, hesitate, stumble, and meander as they formulate their answers tips us off to how they are thinking and reasoning through political issues” (p. 868). Thus, a researcher can “witness many of [the] outward manifestations” undergirding the “mental processes” that shape the responses of subjects (p. 868). Nevertheless, it is possible, if not usual, for qualitative research participants to exhibit biases and self-interest in their responses. However, such biases and self-interest are evidential sources since their juxtaposition could lead us to appreciate how roles evolve and wane (Evans, 2012).

For ethical reasons, I have anonymised all interview and focus group participants except where participants consented to their names being used in the thesis. I have also anonymised mining communities where I held focus group discussions. In the Tanzanian case, in particular, I have concealed the location of some third-party interviews to protect the identity of participants whose titles might compromise their identity. In such instances, I referred to the region of the interview instead of the town.

In addition to these interviews, I critically reviewed the annual reports of mining companies, official mining-specific documents of governments, reports of critical online media outlets, reports of the Ghana Chamber of Mines (GCM) and CSO reports. Moreover, my fieldwork coincided with an ASM conference held in Ghana on the 14th and 15th of May 2019 by Third World Network. This organisation

works on development issues such as mining and environment. My participation and observation of miners in this conference and random conversation with miners – sampled across ASM constituencies in the country – culminated in a pool of qualitative data salient to the study’s research question.

Finally, I collected presidential and parliamentary electoral data in Tanzania and presidential electoral data in Ghana at the regional and constituency levels. Quantitative data also came from Afrobarometer surveys in Ghana gauging rural and urban dwellers’ connectedness to the NDC and NPP. Tanzania’s presidential and parliamentary electoral data contextualised the study’s emphasis on how regimes’ political constraints shape their varying relations with artisanal miners over time.

Similarly, the presidential and parliamentary electoral data and Afrobarometer surveys in Ghana gave insights into how indigenous artisanal miners are differently linked to Ghana’s two parties and how this motivates the regimes’ varying responses to these miners. These quantitative data and the qualitative and secondary data clarified the study’s overarching research question. The data triangulation process was crucial considering that process tracing involves the examination of “bits and pieces of evidence” (Gerring, 2006, p. 173) or “diagnostic pieces of evidence” for drawing inferences (Collier, 2011, p. 824).

4.3. Thematic data analysis.

Thematic data analysis constituted the primary technique for analysing the garnered data. In their paper – *Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology* – Braun and Clarke (2006) defined four key terms concerning qualitative data analysis relevant to this study. These terms are data corpus, data set, data item, and data extract. Data corpus includes all the data a researcher garners for a research project, whereas data set “refers to all the data from the corpus” a researcher plans to analyse (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79). Thus, correctly identifying the data set in qualitative research is vital since the data set provides scope for a researcher’s analysis.

A data item refers “to each individual piece of data collected, which together make up the data set or corpus” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79) and may include individual interviews conducted by a researcher. Finally, a data extract describes a piece of data extracted from a data item or across a set of data items within one’s data set. Qualitative analysis involves intense examination and classification of texts, with similar meanings, into different categories or themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). To identify the relevant themes or patterns in the data set (described in section 4.2), I followed Braun and Clarke’s (2006) proposed phases of thematic analysis. First, I transcribed all the recorded interviews and proofread the transcription at least twice while taking relevant notes emerging from the proofread.

This early phase of the analysis allowed for data familiarisation (Riessman, 1993) and considerably limited any possibility of data miscoding. I then generated initial codes from the transcribed data. According to Tuckett (2005), coding involves organising data into meaningful categories. Essentially, a code is the most fundamental or basic theme developed from one's data set (Attride-Stirling, 2001; Boyatzis, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Accordingly, across the two cases, I developed 26 codes or basic themes (18 on Ghana and eight on Tanzania) showing patterns within and across the data set. Also, I gave each data item in the data set complete and similar attention during the coding process, ensuring that context was not lost (Bryman, 2012).

The next phase of the analysis involved categorising the 26 basic themes into organising themes. According to Attride-Stirling (2001, p. 389), an organising theme "is a middle-order theme" that groups the basic themes into classes of analogous issues. Organising themes summarise the main ideas of a cluster of basic themes and abstractly reveal the texts' patterns (Attride-Stirling, 2001). These organising themes aid a researcher in presenting a global theme, a claim or an argument about a phenomenon under investigation that constitutes a researcher's data interpretation (ibid).

I initially developed eight organising themes from the list of basic themes generated. Four of these organising themes focused on Ghana as follows: a) "The NDC's benignity towards indigenous artisanal miners", b) "The NPP's malignity towards indigenous artisanal miners", c) "Indigenous artisanal miners' ethnic and rural connection to the NDC", d) "Exclusive extraction of rents from the mining industry." The other four organising themes focused on Tanzania. They comprised the following: a) "state-cum-company violent evictions of artisanal miners", b) "discriminating in favour of mining companies and against artisanal miners", c) "containing the political opposition", d) "limiting the political opposition's access to ASM rents."

However, I refined these organising themes following Patton's (1990) dual criteria for theme development and evaluation. Patton distinguished between *internal homogeneity*, in which coherence must meaningfully exist between data within themes and *external heterogeneity*, wherein themes must not necessarily overlap. Nonetheless, while it is essential to ensure that themes have unambiguous distinctions (i.e., external heterogeneity), some similarities across different themes may occur. The object is to ensure that, despite any apparent similarities, the themes are identifiably different from each other and reflect the entire data set from which they emerged.

As Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 90) argued, during theme evaluation, "some initial codes may go on to form main themes, whereas others may form sub-themes, and others still may be discarded." Thus, what a researcher may initially regard as an organising theme may be a basic theme that better supports another organising theme. After carefully reviewing the eight organising themes, I observed significant


overlaps between some of the organising themes in the Tanzanian case. For instance, organising themes (a) and (b) overlapped as did (c) and (d). Thus, I merged (a) and (b) as one organising theme: “favouring LSM over ASM”. I also combined (c) and (d) as one organising theme: “containing the political opposition.” Therefore, the total number of organising themes reduced to six: four on Ghana and two on Tanzania.

Figures one and two present a network of themes (basic, organising, and global) and their interconnections displaying the data analysis. For visualisation and clarity, I have colour-coded the three layers of themes, with sea-blue representing basic themes, yellow representing organising themes and blue representing the global themes. Throughout the empirical chapters (chapters four, five and six), I draw on data extracts reflecting these thematic layers, which outline and explain differences in regime-ASM relations within Ghana and Tanzania.

Figure 1. Thematic network analysis of the Ghanaian case.



Figure 2. Thematic network analysis of the Tanzanian case.



Although the study's design is deductive in approach (Boyatzis, 1998; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005), it benefited from inductive reasoning. The initial proposal of this research drew on existing theory to guide data collection. However, I soon realised upon the first phase of this research in Ghana and Tanzania that the prior theory could not explain much of the relevant empirical data. Initially, I limited this study's scope to 2005-2020. I then set up the project to maximise cross-national variation in regime-ASM relations, conceiving Ghana and Tanzania as similar cases with different outcomes in regime-ASM relations. My desktop review of relevant primary and secondary material revealed that the Kikwete and Magufuli regimes increasingly tolerated artisanal miners while their counterparts in Ghana (Kufour, Mahama and Akufo-Addo) raided them.

Thus, the initial goal was to explain this cross-national variation in regime-ASM relations. However, following the first phase of fieldwork, I discovered that regime-ASM relations were more complex than I had initially conceptualised. For instance, participants highlighted how different regimes in Ghana and Tanzania have, since 1990, altered their relations with artisanal miners. These field insights challenged the study's initial scope, theory (political settlements) and research design (cross-national most-similar systems design).

Therefore, I incorporated more analytical literature (i.e., party-society and political marketplace literature) to cater for the emerging empirical data while reconceptualising the cases as typical rather than most similar cases. This reflexivity further drew my attention to crucial aspects of the field data, such as the indigenous artisanal miners in Ghana being more connected to the NDC, which, together with relevant secondary and electoral data, clarifies the research question. Therefore, despite using theory to frame the analysis, the reflexive and inductive approaches to data collection make this study

avoid the problem of researcher bias, which arises when prior theory leads to the discovery of confirmatory rather than nonconfirmatory evidence (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

5. Conclusion.

This chapter provided a theoretical foundation and methodological justification for this study. The main theoretical framework came from three related bodies of political economy literature, including political settlement, party-society linkages, and political marketplace. I contrasted these with two alternative theoretical discussions, emphasising the influence of ideas and social movements on elite behaviour regarding resource governance. Concerning the leading theoretical framework, the chapter showed that the nature of power distribution and party-society linkages could generate incentives and constraints and produce varying outcomes.

In competitive clientelist settlements, where party-society linkages are active, contending governing coalitions will theoretically govern critical sectors of the economy differently. Such variation in economic governance is necessary for political survival. Similarly, in dominant political settlements, dominant elites' governance of vital economic sectors will change in response to temporal variation in oppositional politics. Consequently, periods of relatively weak and strong oppositional politics may present varying constraints and result in different responses to social groups. However, across competitive clientelist and dominant settlement patterns, the rents accruing to a regime's political budget are necessary for political campaigns. Hence, varying governing coalitions across either type of settlement will engage in rent-seeking with implications for how they relate to social groups.

Beyond these leading theoretical lenses, the chapter also discussed two main alternative theoretical explanations. The first showed how ideas, be they global or domestic, could influence regimes' responses to social groups such as artisanal miners. The second emphasised how variation in social movement activities could cause regimes to act differently. The rest of the chapter discussed the study's qualitative case study strategy, emphasising the selection of typical cases that could shed light on a broader set of cases. Given its aim to explore and explain variation in regime-ASM relations, the study relied on data from different sources, including interviews, grey literature, academic literature, and electoral and survey data. Finally, the study employed a thematic analytical technique in analysing the triangulated data by coding the data and identifying patterns within and across the data set.

Chapter 2. Literature Review. Informal Economies and ASM.

1. Introduction.

This chapter has six sections. Granted that ASM is an informal activity, the second section of the chapter situates the study within the literature on informal economies. It introduces the reader to the concept of informality and particularly distinguishes between informal and illegal activities. The third section reviews the literature on the governance of informal actors and further contextualises the study's research question. It critiques this literature's conclusion that where the informal population is vast, politicians are likely to abstain from enforcing regulations against informal actors.

With these discussions on informality, the fourth section narrowly focuses on the ASM literature. It conceptualises artisanal mining as an informal activity because while most artisanal miners mine without licenses, their products, including gold, diamond, tanzanite, or cobalt, get traded via legal and illegal (i.e., smuggling) marketing channels. The fifth section distinguishes between two main ASM categories. These include licensed/unlicensed hard-rock ASM and licensed/unlicensed alluvial ASM. The extant ASM literature generally does not capture this distinction and treats ASM as a monolith. However, this distinction would be helpful for analytical purposes in subsequent chapters of this thesis.

The sixth and final section addresses two broad issues. First, it outlines debates and counter-debates on why artisanal mining proliferates. Second, it discusses how states relate to their artisanal miners relative to large-scale mining companies. Thus, this section aims to highlight the gaps in the relevant literature and question some of the fundamental assumptions underlying these studies to motivate this thesis further.

2. Conceptualising informality.

The informal economy is a distinctive trait of developing countries. The concept of informal economy emerged in the Third World following Keith Hart's study of urban labour dynamics in Accra, Ghana's capital. Hart (1973, p. 61) posited that "the unthinking transfer of [W]estern categories to the economic and social structures of African cities" hindered proper "government planning and...application of economic theory" in the informal economic sphere. Hart's argument essentially attributes the rise and growth in developing countries' informal sectors to the neoliberal development paradigm,¹² which, in Africa, took the form of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) aimed at adjusting the structure of African economies by rolling back the inefficient and ineffective state and paving the way for market-oriented competition among private actors.¹³

However, instead of formalising African economies, these neoliberal reforms served as springboards upon which the informal economy surged (Bayart et al., 1999; Fatton, 1995; Ikelegbe, 2001; Meagher, 2014). On this point, Hart (1990, p. 158) emphasised the disconnection between "[W]estern discourse on economic development" and widespread entrepreneurship in African cities. To Hart (1973), the informal economy represented burgeoning entrepreneurialism in contexts where official economic rules and regulations are incompatible with workers' lived experiences. Contrary to this entrepreneurial conception of informality, the ILO (1972) understood informality as characterised by low productivity and accumulative capacity and, thus, shaped by poverty.

Consequently, terms such as "underemployment" and the "excluded" sector became synonymous with the informal economy (Gerry, 1978; PREALC, 1985; Sethuraman, 1981; Tokman, 1979), interpretations that hold a particularly negative view of the informal economy (Centeno & Portes, 2006). Nonetheless, a third group of scholars neither associates informality with poverty nor entrepreneurialism. Instead, for these scholars, the informal economy represents "all income generating activities that are not regulated by the state in social environments where similar activities are regulated" (Castells & Portes, 1989, p. 12). In other words, the informal economy comprises "those actions of economic agents that fail to adhere to the established institutional rules or are denied their protection" (Feige, 1990, p. 990).

However, while informal activities flout rules and regulations, informal activities are not necessarily illegal or criminal. Castells and Portes (1989) clarified how informal and criminal or illegal economic activities are similar but distinct. In one way, the "processes of production and distribution" in informal

¹² See sub-section 3.1 of chapter one for an elaborate discussion of neoliberalism.

¹³ See section four of chapter three for detailed discussion of SAPs in Ghana and Tanzania.

and criminal economies are illicit, occurring outside the formal-legal architecture. In another, the “final product” of the informal economy is licit, whereas that of the criminal economy is illicit.

Therefore, just as the informal economy shares some characteristics with the criminal economy, the informal economy also overlaps with the formal economy since formal and informal economies’ final products are considered licit. *Table one* below summarises these similarities and distinctions.

Table 1. Types of economic activities and their interrelationships.

Processes of Production and distribution	Final product	Economic type
Licit	licit	formal
Illicit	licit	informal
Illicit	illicit	criminal

Source: Castells and Portes (1989, p. 14).

These distinctions would be relevant in the conceptualisation of artisanal mining in section four of this chapter.

3. States and informal economies.

The licit and illicit characteristics of informal economies raise fundamental questions about how states respond to their informal actors. Indeed, the primary functions of the state as “the regulator, the policeman, and the tax collector” (Centeno & Portes, 2006, p. 29) threaten informal enterprises, whose preoccupation is to avoid any contact with the state (Cross, 1998; Lomnitz, 1988). However, under what circumstances do states enforce or fail to enforce regulations against the informal economy?

Generally, states formulate regulations to safeguard the larger public or some sections of the public (Stigler, 1971). However, “‘politics’...is a constantly and unpredictably shifting mixture of forces of the most diverse nature” (Stigler, 1971, p. 3). Therefore, states may enforce or relax regulations that may or may not benefit informal economic actors depending on the envisioned political outcomes of regulatory enforcement or relaxation. Thus, the relative threat of the informal economy to regimes becomes a critical factor that shapes the enforcement or relaxation of informal economy regulations.

Holland (2016, p. 232) employs the concept of *forbearance* – “the intentional and revocable nonenforcement of law” – to contend that politicians in urban Latin America “often withhold sanctions

to maximise votes as well as rents.” Thus, forbearance may be *clientelistic* or *contingent* as a mechanism to buy the poor’s fundamental political asset, which is their votes. However, Holland acknowledges that the composition of the poor in each geographical space influences the probability of clientelism or contingent forbearance. For instance, Chilean officials tolerate street vending in Santiago districts, where the population is predominantly poor, while enforcing the same laws in districts with a much less poor population.

Similarly, Weitz-Shapiro (2014) argues that clientelism becomes a good strategy for mobilising the poor’s votes where there is a competitive political system and the poor’s population is high. Therefore, while the poor’s fundamental political assets may be their votes (Holland, 2016), these assets may not always work in their favour if the poor’s population is low. However, neither scholar specifies how large the poor population should be to motivate regime forbearance. Nonetheless, these Latin American examples emphasise the intricate role politics plays in shaping regime behaviour in the developing world.

For instance, several Africanists have observed how African regimes’ dysfunctional economic policies and decisions take clientelistic forms to keep them in power (Bates, 2014; Boone, 2009; Hart, 1982; van de Walle, 2003). Nevertheless, politicians in the developing world cannot eschew clientelism, as Holland and Weitz-Shapiro argue. If politicians decide to enforce regulations against the poor population (i.e., informal actors) because the nonpoor population is high, politicians are not necessarily eschewing clientelism. Instead, such political action is clientelistic since it seeks to win the votes of the sizeable nonpoor population. This study will extend the frontiers of knowledge regarding the politics of informal sector governance by demonstrating how politics shapes regimes’ variegated responses to informal artisanal miners.

4. Conceptualising ASM.

Hilson (2011, p. 1032) defines artisanal and small-scale mining as “a labour-intensive, low-tech mineral exploration and processing” economic activity. Artisanal mining caught international policy limelight in the late 1980s with a World Bank report highlighting ASM as an enterprise that “frequently employ(s) large numbers of workers in rural mining districts, where job opportunities are scarce” (Noetstaller, 1987, p. 13). Thus, the Bank linked rising ASM to people’s entrepreneurial drive in the developing world. However, many scholars attribute the rise in ASM to the conditionalities associated with the Bretton Woods Institutions’ SAPs (Banchirigah, 2006; Hilson & Potter, 2003, 2005). For instance, cuts in agricultural subsidies accelerated farmers’ impoverishment, making ASM a viable livelihood option (Banchirigah, 2006; Hilson & Potter, 2003, 2005). Moreover, privatising state-owned mining

enterprises as part of SAPs led to redundancy and compelled former public sector (mine) workers into ASM (ibid).

Nevertheless, these inadvertent surges in artisanal mining mean approximately 80% of all ASM operatives work without licenses (Hilson & McQuilken, 2014), raising concern about whether ASM operatives are illegal/criminal or informal actors. Based on Castells and Portes' (1989) distinction between informality and criminality, ASM is an informal rather than an illegal activity.¹⁴ Granted that an estimated 80% of ASM operatives are unlicensed, the mode of ASM production is largely illicit. Nonetheless, the final product (gold, diamond, tanzanite, or cobalt) is licit and sometimes traded via formal marketing outlets. For example, in places like Ghana, licensed private and parastatal mineral dealers patronise ASM products without regard to the illicit mode of production (Hilson & Potter, 2003; Teschner, 2012). This market dynamic underscores how the informal sector subsidises the formal economy (Portes, 1996) or provides public goods and services to communities (Boege et al., 2008). Unsurprisingly, ASM has contributed uniquely to national and sub-national development for over three decades.

At the sub-national level, ASM fosters economic diversification in rural economies, with farmers generating revenues from ASM for agricultural reinvestment, while some miners invest in housing projects in sub-Saharan Africa (Dondeyne & Ndunguru, 2014; Hilson & Garforth, 2013; Maponga & Ngorima, 2003; Okoh & Hilson, 2011; Werthmann, 2017). At the national level, governments raise substantial revenues from the ASM sector (Barreto et al., 2018; Hilson, 2017). For example, artisanal gold mining in the Migori District of Kenya generates some US\$225 million annually, while artisanal miners in clay and bricks in Uganda raise approximately US\$500 million annually (Barreto et al., 2018). In Ghana, artisanal gold miners produced an average of 1,311,261.2 oz of gold between 2012 and 2016 compared with 2,744,259 oz of gold produced in the large-scale gold mining sector in the same period (Hilson, 2017). Likewise, over 75% of national mining output in the DRC and Sierra Leone comes from artisanal gold and diamond mining (World Bank, 2009).

Nonetheless, artisanal mining engenders environmental degradation with negative repercussions for farming. For instance, Poku (2016) identifies three mechanisms through which ASM affects agriculture in parts of Ghana. First, ASM contributes to arable land shortage and limits crop production. Second, ASM pollutes water bodies and plummets the quality and quantity of water required for irrigation in rural areas. Finally, the get-rich-quick mentality of some farmers often persuades them to either abandon farming for mining or convert their farmlands into mines.

¹⁴ While I concede that ASM is an informal activity, I do sometimes use the term 'illegal' to describe artisanal miners.

Poku's work shows that ASM can undermine agriculture, contrary to the positive links between ASM and agriculture highlighted above. However, like much ASM literature, Poku's work pays no attention to the different categories of ASM and the varying negative externalities associated with each category, which I highlight below.

5. ASM categories.

ASM comes in two types and forms, intersecting to produce two main categories. The ASM type is either licensed or unlicensed, while the form is hard-rock or alluvial. Whereas the competing interests of differing actors shape the ASM type, the ASM form is geologically determined. Put differently, miners may decide to work with or without licenses depending on the institutional configuration and power distribution across varying actors. However, the geological formation of minerals means that the form of mining in each country is the outcome of nature.

Thus, although miners in some countries may mine hard-rock deposits only, miners in others may have access to both hard-rock and alluvial deposits. Hence, ASM operatives may differ across space and time. Thus, it is possible to arrive at two different categories of ASM, drawing upon the different ASM types and forms. These categories may be licensed/unlicensed-alluvial ASM and licensed/unlicensed hard-rock ASM.

5.1. The licensed/unlicensed alluvial ASM.

This ASM category is complex regarding the nature of investors involved, the methods used and the outcome in terms of returns to capital and negative externalities. Typically, the investors in this category tend to be foreign entrepreneurs whose investment in mining is business-driven rather than poverty-driven. Nonetheless, employees in this category tend to be poverty-driven local individuals seeking to eke a living from mining. Investors operate with or without licenses and may not directly engage in daily production. Given the nature of investors and the geological makeup of this category (i.e., alluvial), the use of complex technology, such as excavators, in dredging sub-surface soil is commonplace.¹⁵

Mineral exploitation tends to be less laborious because of the alluvial nature of the mineral deposits and the extractive technology involved. Depending on the size of one's concession, exploitation typically takes two to three weeks. Accordingly, returns to capital are as high as the negative environmental

¹⁵ Illegal Chinese miners commonly constitute the foreigners involved in alluvial mining. Many of these foreigners have local partners who assist them in illegally applying for mining licenses or accessing mineralised lands via chiefs. Interview with an official of the EPA in Accra on 17th June 2019.

externalities. Riverbed dredging constitutes unlicensed alluvial mining. However, dredging riverbeds for gold in most jurisdictions, including Ghana, is an offence. Hence, licensed alluvial miners must leave a buffer zone of 100 meters between the nearest river body and their concessions in Ghana.¹⁶

5.2. The licensed/unlicensed hard-rock ASM.

In contrast, the licensed/unlicensed hard-rock ASM category is dominated by indigenous poverty-driven individuals, although it can involve some entrepreneurs.¹⁷ Usually, these miners tend to co-exist with LSM companies that only exploit hard-rock mineral deposits. However, hard-rock artisanal miners may operate with or without licenses like their alluvial counterparts. Nevertheless, miners here employ simple implements such as pick-axes, chisels, torchlights, and shovels in constructing a pit relative to the complex technology used in the previous category.

Since hard-rock mining is underground in nature, miners spend extended periods exploiting the underground veins, sometimes digging as deep as 200 metres to reach an ore. Compared to alluvial mining, the negative environmental externalities of hard-rock mining are trivial. Indeed, in some instances, hard-rock ASM can co-exist with farming, unlike alluvial ASM. Licensed hard-rock miners tend to be formal miners, whereas their unlicensed counterparts are unquestionably informal miners. The table below simplifies the differing ASM categories.¹⁸

Table 2. Simplification of ASM categories.

ASM TYPE/Form	Alluvial ASM	Hardrock ASM
Licensed ASM	Capital-intensive Grave externalities Formal	Labour-intensive Trivial externalities Formal
	Example	Example
	Amansie West – Ghana Dunkwa – Ghana	Talensi – Ghana Geita – Tanzania Mererani – Tanzania

¹⁶ Interview with an official of the Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st June 2019.

¹⁷ Interview with an official of the Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st June 2019.

¹⁸ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village B on 2nd July 2019.

Unlicensed ASM	Capital-intensive Grave externalities Informal	Labour-intensive Trivial externalities Informal
	Example	Example
	Amansie West – Ghana Dunkwa – Ghana	Obuasi – Ghana Talensi – Ghana Geita – Tanzania

Source: Author's.


5.3. Varying ASM categories in Ghana and Tanzania.

The distinct ASM categories can be observed across Ghana and Tanzania. However, Ghana has both hard-rock and alluvial ASM, while artisanal mining in Tanzania is predominantly hard-rock. Furthermore, the distinct ASM forms are distributed differently across Ghana, with hard-rock ASM forms typical in the north, while hard-rock and alluvial ASM forms are common in the south. As a result, whereas artisanal miners in Ghana mainly extract gold, southern Ghana has more gold deposits than northern Ghana (*figure three*).¹⁹ In Tanzania, artisanal miners mainly extract gold deposits disproportionately concentrated in the country's northern regions (*figure four*).

The different ASM categories discussed above imply that varying forms of ASM produce different externalities. For instance, ASM-induced externalities are likely graver in Ghana than in Tanzania since Ghana has alluvial ASM deposits. If regimes' responses to artisanal miners are driven by the extent of ASM-induced environmental degradation, then Ghanaian regimes may more frequently raid artisanal miners than their Tanzanian counterparts. Even within Ghana, regimes are likely to raid alluvial artisanal miners and spare hard-rock artisanal miners. However, as explored in the empirical chapters, this environment-based assumption about regime-ASM relations overlooks the politico-economic reasons that motivate particular patterns of regime-ASM relations over time and across space.


¹⁹ Figure three presents the distribution of gold deposits in Ghana. It shows that southern Ghana is more mineralised than northern Ghana, as the south has both alluvial and hard-rock mineral deposits relative to hard-rock mineral deposits in the north.

Figure 3. Geological map and mineral deposits in Ghana.



Source. Eshun (2005).

Figure 4. Geological map and mineral deposits in Tanzania.



Source: The URT (2016).

6. Developing countries and the informal ASM sector.

6.1. Why ASM proliferates.

One of the fundamental development problems in Africa today is how to regulate the ASM sector to harness its development potential while attenuating its negative externalities. The ASM sector has seen exponential growth in the last three decades. For instance, in 1996, the sector employed six million people globally (United Nations, 1996) and 13 million people globally by 1999 (Jennings, 1999). The sector currently directly employs 44.7 million people (World Bank, 2020), dwarfing the approximately seven million people working in LSM (World Bank, 2013). However, while these numbers mean artisanal miners are stimulating backwards and forward linkages (Ziaba, 2020) and facilitating rural economic diversification (Maponga & Ngorima, 2003; Okoh & Hilson, 2011; Werthmann, 2017), artisanal mining comes at grave environmental costs (Conteh & Maconachie, 2021; Hilson et al., 2007; Veiga & Hinton, 2002).

Thus, the last three decades have witnessed the evolution of two strands of scholarships attempting to explain the proliferation of ASM. First, some scholars point to states' preoccupation with LSM capital as one of the fundamental drivers of the surge in informal mining. For example, Hilson and Potter (2003) lamented the disproportionate allocation of mineralised lands to LSM companies, which leaves informal miners with little land and compels them to encroach on mining companies' concessions. Similarly, Banchirigah (2006) contended that African states pay more attention to LSM capital and little or no attention to building capacity to regulate the ASM sector, hence the rise in ASM. Likewise, Jennings (1999) argued that there are enormous ASM regulations but few supervisors to enforce these regulations.

Moreover, Hilson and Potter (2003, pp. 250–251) contextualised the Ghanaian case and argued that “insufficient institutional support [and] complications with the existing licensing scheme” explain the growth in ASM. They pointed to the “inefficient” support service scheme that the state introduced with the establishment “of seven small-scale mining district support centres” as typifying a scarcity of institutional support for informal miners (p. 252). Thus, the state's preference for LSM capital and its incapacity to regulate informal miners become two fundamental explanatory variables for informal mining proliferation.

Nevertheless, institutional support for artisanal miners and a more balanced distribution of mineralised lands across LSM and ASM sectors may not necessarily mitigate the ASM informality as long as existing customary practices support informality. For instance, Siegel and Veiga (2009) draw upon

Desoto's theory of "extralegality" to highlight the persistence of informal ASM in Uganda. While Uganda had attempted to formalise its ASM sector, the formalisation process was out of sync with the "existing customary practices – developed informally by miners" (p. 51). Thus, the authors recommended a formalisation process that absorbs artisanal miners' customary practices (ibid).

Seigel and Veiga's argument assumes that the state can formalise the ASM sector but fails to appreciate the nuanced drivers of informal mining. However, the state's inability to appreciate miners' norms and everyday praxes in ways that could support formalisation efforts may reflect its capacity problems (Jennings, 1999). This emphasis on the state's incapacitation as an explanation for the increase in informal mining shows how resource-endowed African countries substantially lack the infrastructural power required to tame growing informal ASM. As Michael Mann (1984, p. 189) argued, "infrastructural power" is a fundamental feature of the modern state, which allows the state "to actually penetrate civil society, and...implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm."

Hence, African states' inability to control growing ASM, which occurs in the remotest parts of Africa, suggests that these states also lack the infrastructural power Mann conceptualised. However, these explanations take a more technical perspective and overlook the role of politics in shaping ASM proliferation. Indeed, just because a state cannot regulate every economic actor within its territory does not necessarily mean it lacks the 'infrastructural power' to enforce regulations and understand and incorporate the customary practices of informal miners in the formalisation process. Instead, the state's regulatory incapacities sometimes reflect political constraints brought to bear on the state by different social groups. Hence, it is helpful to probe why the state does not seem to have the capacity to curb rising informal mining.

Against this backdrop, a new scholarship has emerged that underlines the clientelist and vested political and social interests as explanations for the proliferation of ASM. For example, Teschner (2012, p. 308) suggests "that political leniency and law enforcement corruption have resulted in a booming small-scale gold system..." in Ghana. Similarly, Aubynn (2009) and Abdulai (2017a) point to Ghana's competitive political system as an explanation for the laxity in enforcing regulations against informal miners. These scholars reason that Ghanaian regimes abstain from enforcing regulations that could stop informal mining or galamsey because the informal mining population is large and politically salient. For instance, Abdulai (2017a, p. 36) contends that since more than a million livelihoods depend on informal mining in Ghana and given that "presidential elections are sometimes won by less than 50,000 votes, it is easy to understand the political relevance of galamsey operators to ruling political elites" (p. 36).

This analysis is insightful and underlines the role of politics in fuelling the rise in informal mining. Nonetheless, the authors focused only on Ghana, where the party system is competitive. Therefore, it

is unclear how their findings speak to uncompetitive democratic countries, such as the DRC, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Mali, and South Africa, where informal mining proliferates. Moreover, the assumption implicit in these debates is that ASM votes are relevant to all politicians across the political divide. Therefore, competing political parties would also tolerate these miners for their votes across time and space. Such an assumption contradicts some of the most established scholarly arguments in the ASM literature on how resource-rich developing countries marginalise and repress artisanal miners, despite their votes. I discuss these next.

6.2. The LSM-bias thesis.

Whereas the large number of people involved in artisanal mining shows the sector's politico-economic relevance to political leaders, scholars bemoan the neglect, marginalisation, and repression of this sector. For example, Hilson and Maconachie (2020, p. 7) have recently proposed the LSM-bias concept to explain states' marginalisation and repression of informal miners due to LSM capital investment. Specifically, they argue that:

Over the last two decades, governments in resource-rich sub-Saharan Africa have consistently prioritised large-scale mining in their development strategies. Large-scale mechanised extraction has often been associated with progress and 'modernisation', whilst artisanal operators have been ostracised and subjected to military 'sweeps.'

Although artisanal mining generates more employment, albeit indecent, than does the LSM sector (World Bank, 2013), the LSM sector constitutes a crucial source of revenue for African states. Thus, Hilson et al. (2020) contend that the LSM-bias phenomenon is a direct function of host governments' penchant to generate 'easy money' from LSM companies through taxation, exploration licenses and permit fees. This argument appears plausible given that informal miners commonly encroach upon LSM companies' concessions, which encroachment directly threatens the property rights of companies and indirectly threatens governments' revenue from mining companies.

The LSM-bias concept finds expression within and beyond resource-rich African countries. Generally, resource-endowed developing countries marginalise informal miners in two ways. First, these countries enact mining codes that prioritise large-scale miners and neglect informal miners (Cuellar, 2005; Hatcher, 2016; Lydersen & Cardona-Maguigad, 2015; Rochlin, 2018; Siwale & Siwale, 2017; Spiegel, 2016; Verbrugge, 2015). For example, Verbrugge (2015) finds that the Philippino Government introduced Executive Order 79 to suppress informal mining to attract foreign LSM capital. This suppression was despite informal miners' contribution to state consolidation through mineral rent accrual to the local state.

Similarly, Spiegel (2016, p. 570) demonstrates that the LSM sector “has been much more prominent and influential in guiding political priorities”, influencing the Cambodian government to allocate considerable mineral concessions to LSM companies as an instrument to curb ASM-induced environmental degradation. Like Cambodia, mining investment promotion prioritises LSM capital but overlooks informal mining in Mongolia (Hatcher, 2016). Likewise, Zambia’s mining policy framework is copper-centric, neglecting informal miners in the country’s emerald sector (Siwale & Siwale, 2017). Among other variables, Rochlin (2018) relates the marginalisation of informal miners in Colombia to Canada’s role in shaping the country’s pro-LSM mining law between 1997 and 2001, which allocated half of the country’s new mining contracts to Canadian firms. Although this law constituted the country’s attempt to formalise its mining sector, it delivered mineral titles to transnational mining companies but sidelined informal miners (Cuellar, 2005; Lydersen & Cardona-Maguigad, 2015).

Second, resource-endowed developing countries take actions that result in fatal evictions of informal miners through military raids, culminating in deaths and obliteration of livelihoods and property (Hilson, 2020; Hilson & Maconachie, 2020; Kemp & Owen, 2019; Luning, 2014). For instance, while ASM/LSM clashes are common, Luning (2014) revealed that the Burkinabe government invariably sides with exploration companies in such clashes. Similarly, public and private security in the DRC fatally evicted nickel and cobalt artisanal miners from a copper mining company’s site (Kemp & Owen, 2019). Likewise, Hilson (2020) found that the Zambian government rapidly deployed the military to evict informal miners in five gold rush districts after initially attempting to formalise the artisanal miners. The change in plan was due to the government’s award of prospecting licenses to mining companies in these sites.

Thus, these ASM-specific studies resonate with studies on business-state relations, which posit that the power of foreign capital and the collective action prowess of big businesses can influence economic policymaking in the developing world. As developing countries tend to depend heavily on foreign capital investments, the possibility of capital flight – within the context of global financial integration – can pressure governments to favour big businesses (Haggard & Maxfield, 1996; Hirschman, 1978). Moreover, unlike small businesses that are often large in numbers and dispersed, big businesses tend to be small in numbers and highly concentrated. Hence, firm concentration promotes organisation, allowing big businesses to overcome collective action problems since they can monitor and sanction free-riders (Haggard et al., 2019; Olson, 1965). Thus, while different social groups may have similar economic interests, those with the propensity to collectively shape policy outcomes are also few in numbers but operate on a larger scale.

Therefore, unlike informal artisanal miners who operate on a small scale and are dispersed, LSM companies operate on a large scale and are highly concentrated and organised via chambers of mines.

Hence, LSM companies also have collective action prowess as free-rider problems may be non-existing. Moreover, given the paucity of African domestic capital, most LSM companies are also foreign in origin, making these countries dependent on foreign mining capital. Hence, developing countries' fear of LSM capital flight and the organisational wherewithal of mining companies suggest that governments would invariably favour LSM companies.

The LSM-bias literature and the literature on business-state relations shed invaluable insights into why African states suppress and raid their informal miners. Such raids are necessary to protect foreign mining companies' legitimate investments and private property rights and tame the possibility of capital flight. Nonetheless, artisanal miners do not always suffer military sweeps. For instance, O'Faircheallaigh and Corbett (2016, p. 962) argue that regimes' responses to artisanal miners in the developing world could be based on "incentives or inducements offered to miners, or on application of coercion" against the miners.

Drawing on the Peruvian case, the authors describe the shifts between coercive and incentive regulatory responses over time. For example, in the early 2000s, the Toledo regime abstained from military crackdowns. Instead, it sought to "produce a development plan for ASM operations and for assisting miners to establish land rights" (O'Faircheallaigh & Corbett, 2016, p. 963). However, while the Garcia regime (2006-2011) ignored these plans, the subsequent Humala regime (2011-2016) deployed about 1500 police and military personnel to crack down on artisanal miners in primary ASM regions (Emery, 2014; Gonzalez, 2016; O'Faircheallaigh & Corbett, 2016). Moreover, despite artisanal mining proliferating in Bougainville with associated fatalities and social conflict over land, the Autonomous Government of Bougainville abstains from coercive measures due to the ASM-induced economic benefits (O'Faircheallaigh & Corbett, 2016).

O'Faircheallaigh and Corbett's analysis suggests that while mining companies' capital and organisational wherewithal may be vital, regime-ASM relations could change in ways that favour or disfavour mining companies. By shifting the analytical focus from states to regimes, the authors show how states' mining interests vary depending on the regime in power. Thus, the authors de-emphasise the linear conceptualisation of state-ASM relations wherein ASM operatives suffer marginality and repression at the hands of the state. However, although O'Faircheallaigh and Corbett demonstrate temporal variations in regime-ASM relations, they do not explain these differences. Moreover, their reduction of regime-ASM relations into binary categories of inducements/tolerance or coercion/raids conceals the complex and multi-layered ways such relations could take.

Thus, several questions remain unresolved, including whether regimes offer inducements to all artisanal miners, whether regimes raid all artisanal miners, and why some regimes prefer inducements to

coercion. These concerns raise the following overarching puzzle that drives this thesis: *How do regimes in resource-rich developing countries relate to artisanal miners, and why do such relations emerge?* By addressing this question, the thesis contributes to knowledge by showing the conditions under which varying patterns in regime-ASM relations emerge. In doing so, it will highlight how regimes in developing countries respond to the economic interests of big and informal small businesses operating in the same economic sectors.

7. Conclusion.

This chapter reviewed relevant literature to contextualise the study. Given that ASM is an informal economic activity, the chapter introduced the reader to the concept of informality, which describes economic activities with illicit modes of production and distribution but licit outputs. The chapter then discussed how politics underpins the governance of informal actors so that politicians fail to enforce regulations against informal actors when the informal population is large and vice versa. However, it revealed that the literature is silent on how large the informal population should be to tame regulatory enforcement.

Nonetheless, the chapter also discussed the ASM literature and conceptualised ASM as an informal activity due to the illicit and licit features characterising this sector. It further distinguished between two main ASM categories, showing how different categories generate varying environmental degradations with different implications for how regimes may respond to artisanal miners. Beyond the conceptualisation of ASM, the chapter critically reviewed studies on why ASM proliferates, drawing the reader's attention to technical and political explanations.

The technical explanation emphasises the state's incapacity to regulate its informal miners. In contrast, the political explanation acknowledges the state's regulatory capacity. However, it argues that politicians court artisanal miners' votes and, therefore, abstain from taking drastic measures that could disrupt the livelihoods of artisanal miners. Nevertheless, while the chapter engaged with the LSM-bias thesis, which produces evidence on state-sponsored raids of artisanal miners, it further highlighted variation in regime-ASM relations to suggest how regimes may respond to artisanal miners differently across space and time. Overall, this chapter showed that the extant literature does not adequately discuss questions about whether political actors raid or tolerate all informal actors and why some political actors prefer raids to tolerance, motivating this thesis.

Chapter 3. Governing the Mining Industry. An Overview.

1. Introduction.

This chapter constitutes the thesis's background. It traces, compares, and contrasts the governance of Ghana's and Tanzania's mining sectors in the colonial, post-colonial, and neoliberal eras. It shows that the governance of the mining industry marked change and continuity across these three critical periods. For example, during colonialism, mineral ownership was mainly under the colonial government that prioritised LSM interests over ASM, leading to the criminalisation and near collapse of ASM.

Nevertheless, the post-colonial state took over mineral ownership and nationalised mining projects. However, while the socialist orientations of the post-independent governing elites seem to have driven mine nationalisations, these elites inherited weakening mining sectors attributable to years of the colonial regimes' underinvestment in the mining sector resulting from the diversion of resources from mining into the war economy. Hence, the nationalisation of the mines reflected economic pragmatism. However, while mine nationalisation occurred, post-independent elites did not criminalise ASM. The arduous task of nation-building meant that criminalising artisanal mining in already crippling mining economies was the least of the priorities of these elites. Hence, artisanal mining, which had nearly gone defunct under the colonial elites, blossomed under the post-colonial elites.

However, mine nationalisation proved counterproductive due to a paucity of endogenous managerial skills and limited capital injection into these nationalised mining projects. Moreover, the poor mining sector outcomes and other external variables, such as Tanzania's war with Uganda and coups and countercoups in Ghana, contributed to economic decline. Thus, Ghana and Tanzania sought a bailout from the Bretton Woods institutions, ushering in the new and contemporary neoliberal era. Neoliberalism retired both the Ghanaian and Tanzanian states from direct participation in the economy, leading to the privatisation of state assets, including mining assets.

Therefore, as neoliberalism attempts to protect foreign investors' property rights, most scholars conclude that neoliberalism compels these states to repress artisanal miners to protect mining companies' mineralised lands against ASM-induced intrusions. This chapter provides a necessary context for the thesis's analytical core, which critiques the assumption that artisanal miners invariably suffer marginalisation and repression by states preoccupied with LSM-induced rents.

2. Colonial era mining regulations (1870 – 1950s).

2.1. Mineral resource ownership and participation structure in the Gold Coast.

In the Gold Coast, present-day Ghana, the colonial project began in July 1874 when the British declared the Gold Coast a crown colony, extending their influence beyond the coastal regions to the middle belts and Northern Territories by 1902. Throughout West Africa, the British relied on a system of indirect rule, enabling them to govern the colonies through traditional authorities or chiefs. Concerning the mining sector, a flagship agenda was to streamline the titling of mineralised lands since many prospective investors had to bargain with several chiefs to acquire mineral titles.

The Concession Ordinances of 1900 and 1903 streamlined the mining license application process, simplified it and boosted FDI, with some 4000 concessions granted between 1900 and 1901 (Maxwell, 1928). Nonetheless, while these ordinances culminated in Europeans' disproportionate wealth accumulation, they did not oust the indigenous right to grant mineral titles (Aryee, 2018). Instead, the colonial government introduced the Mining Rights Regulation (CAP 128) of 1905, which respected indigenous ownership over mineralised lands. The law defined mining concession as:

Any writing whereby any right, interest or property in or over land with respect to minerals or precious stones, or the option of acquiring any such right, interest or property, purports to be either directly or indirectly granted by a native (Aryee, 2018, p. 58).

However, the 1909 Gold Mining Products Protection Ordinance (CAP 149) criminalised unlicensed mining. Nonetheless, while recognising gold mining by native methods (i.e., ASM), CAP 149 prohibited persons from trading gold products without first writing for the approval of the Minister of Police (CAP 149. Gold Mining Products Protection, 1909). Similarly, the 1932 Mercury Ordinance (No. 2) criminalised the unlicensed possession, transfer, and receipt of mercury by natives. These measures were new to the pre-existing indigenous miners and impeded their access to mineralised lands. Consequently, artisanal mining – the only means of gold production in the pre-colonial era (Hymer, 1970) – witnessed stunted growth and nearly collapsed by the 1950s (Aryee, 2018).

Nevertheless, despite this apparent alienation of indigenous miners, the Mineral Rights Regulation (CAP 128) recognised native rights in granting mineral titles. Like CAP 128, the 1939 Concessions Ordinance defined a concession as:

Any instrument whereby any right, title or interest in or to land, or to minerals, timber, rubber, or other products of the soil in or growing on any land or the option of acquiring any such right, [is granted] by a native (Aryee, 2018, p. 59).

These mineral laws and regulations attest to how colonial structures of mineral governance co-existed with, rather than supplanted, indigenous ones. However, a mineral title granted by a native had to be validated in a Court within six months and covered by a Certificate of Validation (CV) (Maxwell, 1928). Thus, the colonial mining ordinances somehow sought to formalise any transaction between the concessionaire and the landowner (Boateng et al., 1958) while ensuring that appropriate rents from the transactions and use of mineralised lands accrue to the colonial state (Maxwell, 1928).

Unsurprisingly, these hybrid institutional arrangements and structures of mineral governance resulted in natives granting some of the earliest mineral concessions. For instance, the paramount chief of Wassa granted the Ankobra River Dredging concession (under the Concession Enquiry No. 144 Cape Coast and CV 154) to Marie-Joseph Bonnat, a French businessman, in June 1875 (Griffis et al., 2002; Quashie et al., 1981). This transaction preceded the first gold rush (aka the ‘Jungle Boom’), which occurred between 1898 and 1902 (Griffis et al., 2002; Quashie et al., 1981). In 1902, the colonial government received 3,613 mineral concessions applications, of which 400 came from Europe. Moreover, approximately 23000 ounces of gold were produced (Aryee, 2018).

The second gold rush (1925 – 1935) saw some 7000 applications for mineral concessions, out of which about 600 received mineral titles and CVs by 1935. Between 1880 and 1934, 45 mines operated in the Gold Coast. By 1935, 33 of the 452 mineral concessions listed on the London Stock Exchange operated in the Gold Coast. Overall, the colonial concession ordinances (introduced between 1900 and 1940) constituted the colonial government’s attempts to formalise the titling of mineral concessions. However, these ordinances acknowledged indigenous structures and, thus, did not replace them (Aryee, 2018).

2.2. Colonial mining fiscal regimes in the Gold Coast.

Given the nature of shared ownership of mineral resources in the colonial era, colonial and native mineral title grantors had the right to impose levies. However, the colonial government’s fiscal levies on the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti differed from those on the Northern Territories. Regarding the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti, the levies comprised a prospecting license (£1), a mining license (£30), and stamp duties (£1) (Aryee, 2018). For the Northern Territories, the levies covered a prospecting license (1s per square mile), prospecting option (8s per square mile), mining option (£4 per square mile) and mining license (£40 per square mile). Beyond these regional-specific levies, the colonial

government imposed standard levies – such as a gold dredging license (£5) and a 5% annual duty on profits – across regions (Aryee, 2018).

Concerning titles granted by natives, the following customary levies applied: consideration fee (a one-off upfront fee); land occupation rent; working or mining rent; and royalties. These taxation rights ultimately guaranteed the natives' fiscal stakes in mining (Aryee, 2018). However, a 1958 Concessions Commission found that customary taxes did not consider the land size, economic value, and environmental effects of mining (Boateng et al., 1958). Furthermore, the Commission found that the concessionaires were educationally, financially, and technically better positioned to negotiate mining contracts. Thus, the legal representatives of grantees often drafted mining contracts to advance their clients' interests (Boateng et al., 1958).

Moreover, some grantors could not immediately ascertain the commercial value of land, resulting in limited royalties and rents accruing to them (Boateng et al., 1958). These practical lapses in contract negotiation between the sophisticated legal representative of the grantee and the illiterate grantor had severe ramifications for native grantors. Such practices constituted the colonial government's incremental but subtle way of estranging natives' mineral rights. However, natives could award mineral rights and impose mining-related levies despite these unequal power relations in mining contract negotiations (Aryee, 2018). Hence, the colonial government's mining governance structure failed to alienate indigenous rights over mineral resources.

Still, the mineral ordinances between 1900 and 1940 resulted in mineral titles being disproportionately issued to foreign (mainly European) companies. However, many indigenous miners (ASM operatives) lacked the educational, financial, and technical wherewithal to compete for mineral titles, despite the Gold Mining Products Protection Ordinance (CAP 149) acknowledging mining by native methods. Consequently, mining by native methods (ASM) waned.

2.3. Mineral resource ownership and participation structure in Tanganyika.

In Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika), the creation of the German East Africa Company in 1885 marked the beginning of colonialism (Illife & Illife, 1969). This company aimed to secure Germany's geo-strategic and economic interest in Africa (ibid). By 1889, the Germans had militarily seized the administration of what was then Tanganyika, albeit with much resistance from the locals (Coulson, 2013). This takeover heralded the 1895 imperial land decree that granted unoccupied land to the colonial state (Illife & Illife, 1969). Furthermore, the land ordinance empowered the colonial administration to award mineral concessions (prospecting licences) to foreign private interests, leading to the demarcation of some 76 prospecting fields by 1910 (Emel et al., 2011).

Nevertheless, unlike the British colonial government in the Gold Coast, the German colonial government expressed much indifference to LSM in Tanganyika partly because of the capital-intensive nature of LSM (Lemelle, 1986) and partly because of the colonial government's particular focus on commercial agriculture (Elbra, 2016). Consequently, the government concentrated on small reef miners instead of LSM (Lemelle, 1986). However, these small reef miners were by no means natives (ibid).

Following German's defeat in World War I, Tanganyika fell under British colonial rule. The new colonial government introduced the 1920 Mining Ordinance, which was apathetic to LSM. Nevertheless, despite this apathy, the government launched the Tanganyika Order-in-Council in 1920, declaring that:

All mines and minerals being in, under, or on any lands in the occupation of any native tribe, or any members thereof or any person not possessed of the right to work such mines and minerals shall be vested in the Governor...in the like manner as the mines and minerals in, under or on any public lands (Lissu, 2002, n.p.n).

Nevertheless, the British colonial administration's indifference to LSM began to alter with the discovery of alluvial gold deposits in Lupa and Lake Victoria goldfields in 1921. Originally, small-scale miners of European origin discovered and extracted these deposits. In the early to mid-1920s, about 150 European small-scale miners operated in Lupa. However, this figure rose to 300 by 1931 and beyond 1000 by 1936 (Lissu, 2002). Two primary factors underpin the predominance of small-scale European miners in the first half of the 1920s.

One explanation is that the Lupa alluvial fields were not amenable to LSM, while the reefs, which were suitable for LSM, had no commercial viability. A second explanation is the lack of gold price variability (fixed at \$4.86), which made large-scale exploitation of an unproven depth of reefs unfeasible (Lissu, 2002). Hence, in Tanganyika, the colonial state prioritised peasant agriculture compared to the Gold Coast, where the colonial state encouraged both agriculture and mining.

Nevertheless, the second half of the 1920s saw a resurgence in corporate interest in mining in Tanganyika as the Lupa and Lake Victoria discoveries had inspired the colonial government to establish the Department of Geological Survey in Dodoma to undertake geological mapping and relevant reconnaissance and prospecting exercises (Lissu, 2002; The URT, 2001). The government also enacted the 1929 Mining Ordinance to replace the 1920 Mining Ordinance, an amendment purported to encourage LSM investments. However, the new law neglected small "penniless" miners (Lemelle, 1986, p. 93).

To pursue this goal, section 28 of the Ordinance capped the number of alluvial claims that individual prospective miners could hold (Lissu, 2002). Moreover, private firms that prospected for minerals could only do so in partnership with the colonial government, which retained the power to issue exclusive prospecting licenses and special prospecting licenses. The colonial government also had the power to withhold prospecting licenses (Lissu, 2002). In response to these legal changes, Serenge Concessions (a South African company) was the first LSM company to invest in the Lupa goldfields in 1927.

However, because of low mineral prices and the absence of investment incentives from the colonial state, Serenge folded up. Following this failure, a London-based syndicate of Indian miners invested in Lupa in 1928, but to no avail “because of communication problems and the difficult local conditions” (Lissu, 2002, n.p.n). After these investment disasters, another South African Company – the Central Mining and Investment Corporations – began exploration in the 1930s but was knocked off by the global financial recession and the fixed gold price (Lissu, 2002).

Consequently, European alluvial small-scale miners exploited the Lupa goldfield and contributed to a steady rise in gold production between 1929 and 1936. Many indigenes only participated in the industry as employees of European small-scale mine owners. Approximately 32,000 Africans worked in the different European-owned small-scale mines, with gold alone accounting for about 27,580 African labourers. However, in 1936, the increasing costs of alluvial production, the revival of interest in large-scale reef mining, and the more reliable income sources in other sectors waned the alluvial gold rush (Lissu, 2002).

Thereafter, a series of LSM investments in reef gold production between the late 1930s and early 1940s made gold the second most crucial export product next to sisal. Tanganyika produced an average of four tons of gold annually within this period. However, these investments raked in marginal revenues to the colonial government because the Bank of England’s low demand for gold, spawned by World War II, kept gold prices low (Lissu, 2002).²⁰ Moreover, the supply priorities of the World War II economy starved mining companies of inputs required for production (Roberts, 1986).

In Tanganyika’s case, this shortage of inputs led to the ban on gold prospecting (Roberts, 1986). Accordingly, by 1945, gold production fell to about two tons per year in Tanganyika (Lissu, 2002). Nonetheless, the emergence of new diamond mining fields in Mwadui (Shinyanga Region) in 1939 balanced the decline in gold production as diamonds became the single most significant component of exports (Lissu, 2002). Consequently, the colonial government proposed to nationalise diamond mines

²⁰ The Bank of England was the leading consumer of gold in this period. However, the emergence of the Second World War shifted Britain’s focus from gold to the consumption of materials necessary to prosecute the war. See Lissu (2002).

(Epstein, 1982). As a result, minerals' share of gross domestic product (GDP) by 1950 was 3%, the highest relative to other primary commodities (Epstein, 1982).

As both colonies (Gold Coast and Tanganyika) approached independence, investor confidence in the industrial mining sector plummeted. This was because of the years of underinvestment in the mining industry and the unprofitability of the industry, attributed to gold's relative irrelevance to the international monetary system pre-1970.²¹ By the 1940s, these events compelled the closure of many big mines, including Sekenke, in Tanganyika. Hence close to independence, only one big mine (Tanganyika Concessions in Geita) remained in Tanganyika. While the mines in the Gold Coast weathered these storms, many collapsed in the early days of independence. The LSM industry's decline coincided with the ASM sector's revival in the early days of independence.

3. Post-colonial era mining regulations (1950s – 1980).

3.1. Nationalisation. An outcome of the decline in the mining industry.

The Gold Coast and Tanganyika were among the first African states to have gained independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Gold Coast's independence came in 1957, with Dr Kwame Nkrumah as its founding father. Following independence, Nkrumah adopted the name 'Ghana' in place of the Gold Coast. In contrast, Tanganyika's independence came in 1961. In 1964, Tanganyika united with neighbouring Zanzibar to form a new state (i.e., Tanzania) with Julius Nyerere as its founder. Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) and Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) shared socialist ideologies, yet their mining policies were driven by economic pragmatism.

Both countries inherited struggling mining industries characterised by years of underinvestment, surging operational costs, inadequate exploration for ore reserves, low gold prices and production declines. Moreover, due to projected uncertainties in the post-independence business milieu, investor confidence in these colonies tumbled further (Acquah, 1995; Akabzaa & Darimani, 2001; Griffis et al., 2002; Quashie et al., 1981). Thus, the 35 mining companies in Ghana between 1935 and 1938 had reduced to 11 between 1945 and 1948 (Elbra, 2016). In Tanzania, four major mines, including Mukwamba, Geita, Kiabakari and Buhemba, closed down between 1960 and 1970 (Tesha, 2000). By the early 1960s, only one mine, the Tanganyika Concessions in Geita, operated (Lissu, 2002).

Following independence, the Ghanaian government inaugurated a five-member commission (known as the Concession Commission) led by Kwaku Boateng. This commission had the task of "examin[ing]

²¹ The price of gold was below US\$ 35 per ounce throughout the period preceding 1970. See Lissu (2002).

relevant agreements and documents...relating to the terms of concessions existing in the then Ghana in respect of mining...to determine the consistency of such agreements with equity and with the profitability of these industries” (Aryee, 2018, p. 75). The Concession Commission’s key recommendation was for “minerals [to be] vested in the Governor-General as representing the State” (Boateng et al., 1958, p. 13). This recommendation shaped the enactment of Ghana’s first post-independence mining legislation: i.e., the Minerals Act, 1962 (Act 126). A preamble of this Act read: “An Act to provide for the vesting of the ownership and control of minerals throughout Ghana in the President on behalf of the Republic of Ghana in trust for the people of Ghana” (Republic of Ghana, 1962, n.p.n).

While the Ghanaian state asserted its sovereign ownership over mineral resources, it failed to meet mining firms’ requests for financial support for mine reinvestment and rehabilitation. The mine owners then moved offshore (Acquah, 1995), leaving Nkrumah’s regime with the option of nationalising all but two mines in Obuasi and Konongo by 1961 (Quashie et al., 1981). Six of these nationalised mines, including the Tarkwa, Prestea and Dunkwa mines, became consolidated as the State Gold Mining Corporation (SGMC). In 1965, the Government’s SGMC took over the Konongo mine to save it from total collapse (Jackson, 1992). Consequently, economic pragmatism shaped Nkrumah’s nationalisation of mining assets.

Nevertheless, in 1964, Nkrumah introduced several anti-business economic measures typical of socialist economies. These included the introduction of a sales tax on gold sales; an import licensing system to control imports; exchange controls; and the direction for all mining companies “to pay a 12.5% of employee wages into an overdue national pension scheme” (Griffis et al., 2002, p. 56). Like Nkrumah’s nationalisation measure, Julius Nyerere’s mining policy responded to Tanzania’s already crippling mining. By 1966, the only surviving mine (i.e., the Tanganyika Concessions), which employed over 2000 people, closed. Consequently, commercial gold production dropped from three tons per year in the early 1960s to 10kg by the early 1970s and zero in 1972 (Lissu, 2002).

Thus, Tanzania’s first three-year development plan (1961 – 1964) linked economic transformation with agricultural development. However, Nyerere initially considered reviving the mining industry through tax concessions (World Bank, 1961) to no avail because trade sanctions on apartheid South Africa, Tanzania’s primary FDI source, prevented South African mining companies from investing in Tanzania (Lissu, 2002). Thus, before Tanzania embarked on its nationalisation programme at the Arusha Declaration in February 1967, the last mining company had folded up (Lissu, 2002). Therefore, across Ghana and Tanzania, the collapse of mining companies in the early days of independence spawned the subsequent mine nationalisation policies. Nonetheless, a second wave of nationalisation would occur in the 1970s in response to rising metal prices.

3.2. Nationalisation. An outcome of a rise in gold prices.

Following years of decline in the mining industry, a rise in global gold demand from 1969 made gold production a viable venture. With the US gold stock fast declining and its budget deficit rising, the dollar standard, which had replaced the gold standard post-World War II, began to suffer confidence crises. Hence, a return to the gold standard became inevitable, surging gold demand by 12% annually from 1969 onwards and triggering a rise in the gold price from 1971. Moreover, an increase in speculations on the free gold market contributed to a further surge in the gold price to US\$ 49.25 by 1972 (Green, 1987). The 1973 global economic crisis, connected to the US's rising budget deficit, damaged the dollar standard further and soared gold prices to US\$132 an ounce. The price had reached US\$ 507 by 1982 before declining marginally to US\$400 in the mid-1980s (Lissu, 2002).

These market dynamics were welcoming events to gold-producing countries, including Ghana and Tanzania. Ghana's General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong formalised the country's nationalisation strategy in 1972 to leverage the rising gold prices. After a six-month negotiation with mining companies, Acheampong's regime passed the Mining Operations (Government Participation) Decree (NRCD 132) in December 1972. This law reorganised Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (AGC) and CAST Ltd as Ghanaian companies, allowing the state to hold a 55% equity stake in these companies (Quashie et al., 1981).

Thus, the regime directed the mining companies to establish their headquarters in Ghana (Kesse, 1985). Also, in February 1974, the regime issued an Executive Instrument (EI 15), which imposed a 6% royalty rate on the two companies. Subsequently, the regime owned all mining companies but AGC, though it retained a 55% share in AGC (Quashie et al., 1981). Similarly, Nyerere's regime established the State Mining Corporation (STAMICO) in 1970 to benefit from the profitable gold industry. Through STAMICO, Nyerere took over the Geita Reef mine in 1971 and considered the exploitation of alluvial gold by large-scale methods (Lissu, 2002).

However, despite the mine nationalisation in response to rising gold prices, Ghana and Tanzania lacked the managerial, technical, and financial capacities to manage the mines (Elbra, 2016). Compounding these deficits were poor economic decisions and political crises in either country. In Ghana, budget deficits soared within the period, along with currency overvaluation and import restrictions (Addy, 1998). Moreover, two military coups occurred within the decade (1970 – 1979). Consequently, despite rising gold prices, gold production decreased from 915000 ounces in the 1960s to 282000 in the 1980s in Ghana (Addy, 1998). In contrast, Tanzania engaged in an eight-month bloody border dispute with Uganda, beginning in October 1978 and lasting until June 1979. Thus, STAMICO did not begin production in Geita until 1981. Between 1981 and 1989, STAMICO churned out a paltry 800kg of gold.

3.3. Declining gold industry and the rise of ASM.

Despite the colonial law prohibiting unlicensed mining and the post-colonial state's failure to legally recognise ASM, Ghana's last military regime – Jerry Rawlings' Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC [1981]) – completely turned a blind eye to these legal restrictions on ASM. Miners could easily access mineralised lands through chiefs and landowners (Hutchful, 2002). Indeed, chiefs and landowners had incentives to informally transact mineralised lands to artisanal miners because the post-colonial state prevented chiefs and landowners from officially transacting mineralised lands (Aryee, 2018). Hence, the post-independence mineral ownership structural change created a platform for informal mining to surge as miners could access mineralised lands through disgruntled chiefs and landowners.

Similarly, in 1979, as part of its attempt to attract investments from abroad, the Government of Tanzania passed the 1979 mining law, which made the government's stake in mining non-mandatory. However, while the 1979 Mining Law allowed ASM operatives to peg and work on claims legally, it is doubtful if such claims were always legally pegged. Nevertheless, ASM flourished – spawned by the retrenched LSM workers in the 1970s – leading to remarkable discoveries of mineral deposits in Bulyanhulu (in Shinyanga Region) and other parts of the country (Lissu, 2002). However, despite the increased activities of ASM in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the share of mining to GDP in Tanzania fell from about 4% in the 1960s to only 1% in 1981 (Lange, 2006).

By the close of the 1970s, mineral smuggling was commonplace in Ghana (Hutchful, 2002) and Tanzania (Cooksey & Kelsall, 2011). Food shortages were also routine in both countries, triggered by the early 1980s drought (Cooksey & Kelsall, 2011; Elbra, 2016). Given these economic and political developments, both countries entered the new decade (the 1980s) with ailing economies. In Ghana, the annual mean decline of GDP per capita stood at 1.6% between 1961 and 1983, with a significant tumble of 14.5% in 1975. Inflation galloped within the same period, reaching 116% in 1977 and 1981, with a peak of 123% in 1983 (Elbra, 2016).

A similar trend occurred in Tanzania, where the average decline of the gross national product (GNP) per capita was 0.1% annually between 1965 and 1990. Moreover, throughout the 1980s, Tanzania recorded a mean annual inflation rate of 30% (Due, 1993). By 1980, granted the challenges discussed above, the number of gold mining companies in Ghana had reduced to four from 11 in the 1940s.²² Therefore, Ghana and Tanzania struggled to resuscitate their economies, making it inescapable to resort to financial support from the Bretton Woods Institutions. The conditional loan packages, which these

²² These four gold mining companies included the Obuasi mine (AGC) and three SGMCs (Tarkwa, Prestea and Dunkwa mines).

institutions offered to many developing countries in Africa, including Ghana and Tanzania, marked the beginning of a new mining governance and regulatory regime.

4. Neoliberal world order and mining (1980s – present).

Confronted with dire economic situations, Ghana and Tanzania, while under socialism, embraced neoliberal economic principles. However, domestic commitment to liberal governance of the mining sector preceded the World Bank/IMF-induced liberalisation programmes across these countries. Nonetheless, it took the Bank's neoliberal reform programmes to revitalise the crumbling mining industries in either country's mining sector. I discuss these in turn.

4.1. Neoliberalism and a change in mineral ownership structure in Ghana and Tanzania.

In 1983, Ghana negotiated its Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The ERP was a type of SAPs that the IMF used to lend conditional loans to countries in return for executing neoliberal policies, including currency devaluation, job freezes, trade liberalisation and privatisations (Gyimah-Boadi, 1990). However, before the ERP, Ghana inaugurated the Quashi Committee in 1980 to investigate how to increase gold production. The Committee recommended a review of mining sector taxes that inhibited investment, including the introduction of a sliding royalty rate between 2% and 6%; reduction of the sliding company tax of 45%-50%; abolition of the minimum turnover tax for mining companies, among others (Aryee, 2018). Accordingly, the Quashi Committee's recommendations laid the foundation for Rawlings' PNDC's adoption of the ERP.

Among other objectives of liberalising trade and exchange regimes and controlling galloping inflation, Ghana's ERP had a short-term plan to end gold production declines (Aryee, 2018). It planned to achieve this goal "by assisting the existing mines to obtain international funding for the purposes of rehabilitating equipment and machinery, upgrading mine infrastructure and improving management practices in the state-owned mines" (Aryee, 2018, p. 89). However, in the long term, the ERP aimed to create a stable macroeconomic environment and introduce legal measures crucial to attracting investments into existing mines and boosting exploration for new mines (Aryee, 2018).

The objectives led to new laws, such as the Minerals and Mining Law in 1986 [PNDCL, 153]. Like the 1962 Minerals Act, the 1986 law vested all minerals in their "natural state in, under or upon any land in Ghana, rivers, streams, [and] water-courses" in the PNDC on behalf of Ghanaians (Republic of Ghana, 1986, Part I, Section 1). While this provision reiterated Ghana's ownership over its mineral

resources, the Government only had a 10% non-negotiable and carried interest in mineral operations. However, it could negotiate a further 25% interest in mining operations.

Moreover, this law and subsequent amendments provided considerable fiscal incentives for existing and prospective investors. It introduced a sliding royalty rate of 3% to 12% relative to a fixed rate of 6% in 1975. It also fixed corporate tax at 45% in place of the sliding 45% to 55% corporate tax in 1975. Moreover, it increased the initial capital allowance to 75% from 20% in 1975 and the subsequent annual capital allowance to 55% from between 5% and 15% in 1975. However, the law maintained the investment allowance at 5%. Apart from these incentives, the law scrapped other taxes such as import duty, foreign exchange tax, import license tax, minimum turnover tax, and gold export levy (Aryee, 2018).

Nonetheless, the law introduced a 25% additional profit tax and an annual ground rent of ₵5000²³ per km² per year.²⁴ However, it liberalised restrictions on the transferability of the profits of mining companies. This liberalisation allowed mining firms to retain up to 25% of their foreign exchange earnings in external accounts to purchase inputs for production. However, the 1986 Act was amended in 1994 (Act 475) and 2000 (Act 592). The 1994 amendment reduced corporate tax from 45% to 35%, while the 2000 amendment brought corporate tax down to 32.5% and increased initial capital allowance from 75% to 80% in 1986 (Aryee, 2018).

These fiscal incentives and the reduced government stake in mining represented a concession to mining companies. Thus, the fiscal changes boosted investment to the tune of US\$4 billion and increased gold production (Akabzaa & Darimani, 2001)²⁵ while redefining the mineral ownership structure. Following the liberalisation of the industry, which elevated mining companies' structural powers, 13 new mines opened.²⁶ By 2000, 14 LSM companies existed in Ghana, operating 19 mines.²⁷

The changes in Ghana's mining sector governance resembled those in Tanzania. In 1985, Julius Nyerere stepped down as President. He got replaced by President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, arguably paving the way for the enactment of economic reforms that would sweep the mining sector (Cooksey & Kelsall, 2011). Nevertheless, Tanzania's mining industry reform debatably preceded the broader economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, although a socialist President (Julius Nyerere) enacted the 1979

²³ The annual ground rent is a compensation payment by mineral companies to holders of surface land rights. In 1986, ₵5000 was worth US\$56.05. However, due to currency depreciation, by 2005, ₵5000 was less than US\$1. See Aryee (2018, pp. 87–90).

²⁴ See Appendix A for a table comparing the taxes in 1975 vs those granted by the 1986 Minerals and Mining Law.

²⁵ See Appendix B for a table on the pre-and-post-liberalisation mineral production trends.

²⁶ See Appendix C for the 13 mines that opened after mining reforms in 1986.

²⁷ See Appendix D for the 14 mining companies and 19 mines by 2000.

Mining Act, this Act had liberal features. The Act made state domination of mining ventures non-mandatory and highlighted negotiation as the mechanism by which the state could acquire any mining shares (Lissu, 2002). It also distinguished between two mineral rights: the long-term mining license, targeting foreign capital and the short-term mining license for ASM operatives.

The long-term license had a 15-year lifespan with renewal options and covered an area of 150 km². In contrast, the short-term license lasted for a year with renewal options and covered an area “of 400 ft by 400 ft for gold and 900 ft by 900 ft for gemstones” (Lissu, 2002, n.p.n). The Act also required holders of mineral rights to pay royalties, annual charges, and a 5% diamond levy on the gross value of diamonds. The unspecified percentages of royalties and annual charges meant that the sector minister could impose more or fewer charges on mineral rights holders. Nonetheless, the law offered two major fiscal concessions. First, royalties could be remitted partially or wholly (The Mining Act, 1979, 1979, p. Section 89-92). Second, royalty payment could be deferred for the period and conditions the sector minister may determine (Lissu, 2002).

In addition, the regime introduced the 1983 mining policy to encourage small-scale mining as an alternative livelihood economic activity (Lissu, 2002). These legal and policy instruments were further supplemented by an IMF-driven decision to liberalise internal and external trade and minerals trade in 1986. Thus, between 1987 and 1989, a mineral trade rationalisation policy privatised minerals trading (Lissu, 2002), resulting in 70% of mineral sales in 1991 (Lange, 2006). Debatably, the neoliberal stance of the 1979 Mining Act explains why this law governed mineral extraction for nearly two decades, during which time the country attracted relatively huge foreign directive investments.

For instance, by 1992, the regime had granted eight reconnaissance licenses, 75 prospecting licenses and 17 mining licenses. Moreover, 67 companies got licensed to drill minerals (Chachage, 1995). However, by 1996, 15 gold mining companies actively operated in the country with a total exploration budget of US\$25m (Gould, 1997). Despite these investments, Lissu (2002) associated increased mineral production, mineral exports, and growth rates in the mining sector between 1977 and 1996 with ASM output. For example, gold production increased from 8900 tons in 1979 to 24100 tons in 1983 and 46900 tons in 1986²⁸, while gold export surged from 1152 tons in 1989 to 40380 tons in 1992.²⁹ Also, the growth rate in the mining sector as a percentage of GDP moved from 2.5% in 1983 to 9.6% in 1996 (Lissu, 2002).³⁰

²⁸ See Appendix E for data on mineral production in Tanzania from 1977 to 1995.

²⁹ See Appendix F for data on Tanzania’s Mineral Exports from 1989 to 1992.

³⁰ See Appendix G for data on the mining sector growth rate as a percentage of Tanzania’s GDP from 1979 to 1996.

Nonetheless, mining's contribution to the national economy was relatively marginal, with the World Bank (2019) putting the average contribution of mining to GDP in Tanzania at 0.2% between 1990 and 1999. However, this figure contradicts official CCM figures of 1.25% between 1990 and 1996.³¹ Nevertheless, Tanzania's mining industry performed worse than Ghana's, which contributed 1.6% to GDP between 1990 and 1999 (Elbra, 2016). By the early 1990s, the abysmal performance of Tanzania's mining sector inspired a more significant commitment to neoliberalism aimed at spawning more FDIs. In 1994, negotiations between the Tanzanian state and the World Bank led to a US\$14.5 million Mineral Sector Technical Assistance Project.

Purported at liberalising the sector, the Bank regarded the project as a precursor of a "legal, regulatory and fiscal framework, which would provide an environment conducive to private investment in mining" (World Bank, 1994, p. 6). That "legal, regulatory and fiscal framework" eventually got implemented in the late 1990s. For instance, under the Bank's influence, Tanzania formulated a new mining policy in 1997 aimed at attracting and enabling "the private sector to take the lead in exploration, mining development, mineral beneficiation and marketing" (The URT, 1997, p. 8). To realise this goal, the policy reduced the regime's role to stimulating and guiding "private mining investment by administering, regulating, and promoting the growth of the sector" (The URT, 1997, pp. 27–28).

The policy shaped the 1998 Mining Act, which vested all minerals in the United Republic of Tanzania. However, the Act granted far greater fiscal incentives to mining companies than Ghana's 1986 World Bank-influenced mining law. For example, while the Tanzanian state raked in revenues from mining operations through royalties, the Ghanaian state made mining revenues via royalties, corporate tax, and additional profit tax. Moreover, unlike Ghana's sliding royalty rate of 3% – 12%, Tanzania's 1998 Mining Act fixed an annual royalty rate of 5% for diamonds and 3% for other minerals (The Mining Act, 1998, 1998, Section 86).³²

³¹ See Appendix G. The different figures might reflect the conflicting stakes of the Bank and the Government of Tanzania in the mining industry. The Bank – which together with the IMF spearheaded neoliberalism – might have produced lower figures to suggest that the mining sector experienced stunted growth in the absence of neoliberalism. Therefore, the 0.2% reported for Tanzania compared to 1.6% for Ghana between 1990 and 1999 meant that Ghana's mining sector contributed more to GDP than Tanzania's because of Ghana's neoliberal legal regime. In contrast, while the Tanzania government's figure may be inaccurate, it suggests how the country's 1979 Mining Act might have contributed to GDP growth, however marginal.

³²It is worth emphasising that mining companies prefer a sliding royalty rate relative to a fixed one. This is because where the royalty rate is on a sliding scale, mining companies may likely elect to make royalty payments that reflect the lower percentages on the sliding scale. So, in Ghana, it would have been legal for a mining company to pay a 3.1% royalty rate. In contrast, a royalty rate payment of 4.9% for diamonds and 2.9% for other minerals in Tanzania would have been illegal. Thus, fixed royalty rates likely rake in more revenues to states than sliding royalty rates. Therefore, Ghana arguably had a more liberalised royalty regime than Tanzania.

Tanzania's 1998 Mining Act also sanctioned the deferment of royalties in cases where "the cash operation margin of the authorised miner, in respect of mining operations in the mining area, falls below zero" (The Mining Act, 1998, 1998, Section 87). The Act defined the cash operation margin as "the amount derived by deducting operating costs from revenue..." (The Mining Act, 1998, 1998, Section 87). However, operating costs included only expenses incurred following "the commencement of production from the mining area" (The Mining Act, 1998, 1998, Section 87). Hence, this fiscal incentive elevated the interests of mining companies over those of the state since there was no mechanism to ensure that reported operational costs reflected only production-related expenditures rather than pre-production expenses.

Moreover, the provision on royalty deferment could result in fiscal abuses by mining companies because the law stated that deferred royalty payments should be payable in the "following royalty payment period or periods" provided the 'cash operating margin' becomes positive. Thus, mining companies could deliberately report negative cash operation margins for multiple royalty payment periods to evade royalty payments.³³ Furthermore, the Act reduced the regime's stake in mining to zero and provided for a development agreement between holders of special mining licenses and the state. Such an agreement guaranteed "the fiscal stability of a long-term mining project" and provided special conditions "for the payment of royalties, taxes, fees and other fiscal imposts" (The URT, 1997, p. 8).

This development agreement, absent in Ghana, meant that mining companies in Tanzania were better protected against future fiscal changes than their counterparts in Ghana. However, despite the significant fiscal concessions in Tanzania, mineral revenue as a percentage of GDP per capita stood at 1.5% by 2005 in Tanzania (Elbra, 2016). Moreover, between 1995 and 2005, the Tanzanian state earned a paltry US\$28 million from mineral extraction compared to US\$280 million earned by LSM companies within the same period (Curtis & Lissu, 2008).

4.2. Artisanal miners' positionality in a neoliberal world order.

Across Ghana and Tanzania, the neoliberal mining laws recognised artisanal mining and sought to promote it. For example, Ghana's 1986 Mineral and Mining Law defined small-scale mining as the "...mining of minerals in any area of land by methods not involving substantial expenditure or the use of specialised technology" (Republic of Ghana, 1986, Section 77[1]). In addition, the law allowed the Secretary of Minerals to designate an area for small-scale mining and issue a restricted mining lease to

³³ This debate assumes that Tanzania had no mechanism for tracing and enforcing the payment of deferred royalties in fiscal years when the cash operation margin became positive.

small-scale miners valid for 15 years, renewable for a period not exceeding 15 years (Republic of Ghana, 1986, Section 74[2]).

Along with the 1986 Minerals and Mining Law came the Small-Scale Gold Mining Law (PNDCL 218). This law limited the size of ASM concession to 25 acres and exempted ASM operatives from income tax and royalty payment for three years. The law also provided for the creation of district centres, supported by Small-Scale Mining Committees, to train ASM operatives on efficient mining (Hilson & Potter, 2003). These legal provisions directly responded to the economic importance of ASM as the sector remained the leading diamond producer and the fifth leading gold producer between 1989 and 1998 (*ibid*).

Like Ghana, Tanzania's neoliberal 1998 Mining Act reserved small-scale mining for only Tanzanian citizens while encouraging the designation of mineralised land for small-scale mining (The Mining Act, 1998, 1998). Nonetheless, for gemstone mining, the law acknowledged a partnership between Tanzanians and non-Tanzanians (The Mining Act, 1998, 1998). However, citizens wishing to engage in small-scale mining could apply for a primary prospecting license – for one year, renewable annually – and subsequently apply for a primary mining license (The Mining Act, 1998, 1998).

Thus, Ghana's and Tanzania's neoliberal mining regimes appeared inclusive because they acknowledged ASM operatives. Nevertheless, since artisanal miners previously worked without legal restrictions, the liberalisation of the mining sector hindered ASM because of the licensing cost and the red tape associated with the processing of licenses (Akabzaa & Darimani, 2001; Fisher, 2007; Hilson & Potter, 2003, 2005). To many scholars, the liberalisation of the mining sectors in Ghana, Tanzania and sub-Saharan Africa inadvertently pushed many artisanal miners who could not meet the legal barrier into the underground economy (Fisher, 2007; Hilson & Potter, 2003, 2005; Banchirigah, 2006).

One disturbing outcome of liberalisation has been the surging antagonism between ASM and LSM actors (Akabzaa & Darimani, 2001). Such disputes result from LSM companies' rate of mineral explorations, which limits mineralised lands for ASM operatives (Akabzaa & Darimani, 2001; Hilson & Potter, 2003, 2005). However, the neoliberal state may, where necessary, engage state security apparatus to protect private property rights (Harvey, 2007), which, in the case of the ASM-LSM contests over mineralised lands, culminate in the repression of artisanal miners. As discussed, some of the leading scholars in the ASM sector contend that the structural and discursive powers of LSM companies, occasioned by neoliberalism, invariably imply military repression of artisanal miners to protect the tax-paying and revenue-generating large-scale mining sector (Hilson, 2019; Hilson & Maconachie, 2020).

Contrary to this linear thinking about state-ASM relations, wherein artisanal miners are at the receiving end of repressive measures, other scholars shift the debate from state-ASM relations to regime-ASM relations and dichotomise these relations along the categories of repression and tolerance (O’Faircheallaigh & Corbett, 2016). Nonetheless, both the linear and binary descriptions of states’ and regimes’ relations with their artisanal miners vis-à-vis large-scale mining companies leave much to be desired because such relations could be more complex than presently theorised.

Against this background, this thesis explores and explains variations in regime-ASM relations. Shifting the debate from state-ASM relations to regime-ASM relations is helpful for analytical purposes because the state is not a monolith with homogenous interests. Instead, even where the same governing coalition governs over time, the state’s character and behaviour towards different societal elements may permute. Hence, the ensuing analytical chapters explore and explain differences in regime-ASM relations in Africa, using Ghana and Tanzania as case studies.

5. Conclusion.

This chapter contextualised the two cases by tracing the governance of Ghana’s and Tanzania’s mining sectors in the colonial, post-colonial, and neoliberal eras. It demonstrated change and continuity in the governance of the mining sectors. Under colonialism, artisanal miners faced marginality since the colonial government prioritised large-scale mining but criminalised and nearly collapsed the ASM sector. Nevertheless, artisanal mining revived under the post-colonial regimes that nationalised mining projects and overlooked the regulation of artisanal miners.

However, mine nationalisation proved counterproductive due to factors such as undercapitalisation and a paucity of managerial skills. These outcomes, together with other exogenous variables, including Tanzania’s war with Uganda and Ghana’s coups and countercoups, weakened the economies of these countries and culminated in their resort to the Bretton Woods institutions for external fiscal support. Nevertheless, the support came with a new development paradigm – i.e., neoliberalism – that compelled the state to take a back seat and instead create an enabling environment for private economic actors to compete in a free market. Like most African countries, neoliberalism hit Ghana’s and Tanzania’s mining sectors hardest, reflected in the divestiture of state-controlled mining assets to private but foreign mining companies.

For some scholars, these shifts in mineral ownership also beckoned the marginality of artisanal miners, given the requirement for the neoliberal state to, where necessary, apply force to protect foreign direct investments. Thus, since the early 1990s, scholars have pointed to events of military sweeps of artisanal

miners in Ghana and Tanzania and other parts of Africa as evidence of how the neoliberal state represses artisanal miners. However, unlike the colonial period, where the state was autocratic and regimes were unaccountable to the governed, the neoliberal states in Ghana and Tanzania, as elsewhere in Africa, have democratic features that could constrain their actions against artisanal miners. However, it is unclear whether the neoliberal state invariably represses artisanal miners, whether some miners evade repression and the motivation behind any variation in how regimes might respond to artisanal miners in democratic Africa. The rest of the thesis addresses these questions.

Chapter 4. The CCM's Changing Relations with ASM.

1. Introduction.

This chapter explores and explains variations in regime-ASM relations across four political leaders of Tanzania's CCM. It posits that the changing nature of Tanzania's dominant political settlement generates different constraints for political leaders and shapes differences in how these leaders respond to artisanal miners over time. Between 1990 and 2015, Tanzania's dominant settlement pattern oscillated between a weak dominant settlement and a strong dominant settlement, with the CCM having faced relatively fierce political competition from leading opposition parties such as the NCCR-Mageuzi (1995) and the CHADEMA (2010 and 2015) [*figure five*].

Therefore, regimes under weak dominant settlements feel threatened by the political opposition and do not repress artisanal miners. At best, such regimes call for diplomatic dispute resolution between LSM companies and artisanal miners. At worst, such regimes become hostile towards LSM companies deemed oppressive of artisanal miners while deploying discourse that encourages artisanal miners to encroach upon mining companies' concessions. These benign regime-ASM relations help regimes to win the hearts of artisanal miners more generally and, thus, contain the political opposition. However, amid such general benign regime-ASM relations, regimes also carefully identify and repress artisanal miners directly linked to the political opposition. Doing so stifles the opposition by disrupting its access to mineral rents.

In contrast, regimes that govern under a strong dominant settlement, characterised by fragmented and weak political opposition, repress artisanal miners to protect the property rights of mining companies. Such a political milieu makes artisanal miners' votes less salient to the governing regime since the opposition remains weak and offers no viable option to the voting populace, including artisanal miners. Thus, within the same governing coalition (i.e., CCM), different political leaders, confronting varying constraints, alter their relations with artisanal miners.

This chapter has two sections. The first section shows Presidents Mwinyi's and Magufuli's increasing needs to contain the political opposition and, thus, tolerance of artisanal miners. However, Magufuli also repressed opposition-aligned artisanal miners to hold back the political opposition. The second section demonstrates how Presidents Mkapa and Kikwete, whose regimes confronted weak political oppositions, could repress artisanal miners to protect mining companies' interests.

Figure 5. Graphical presentation of Tanzania's dominant settlement.



Source: Author's.

2. Containing the opposition.

2.1. Mwinyi's tolerance of the artisanal miners in Bulyanhulu (1990 -1995).

In the early 1990s, the Bulyanhulu mine in the Kahama District of Shinyanga Region constituted Tanzania's most controversial and highly contested mine. This controversy revolved around the contesting claims that artisanal miners and Sutton Resources Ltd (a Canadian mining company) made over the mine. Sutton Resources Ltd claimed it held a Mineral Development Agreement over the mine and sought to pressure the Mwinyi regime to evict the artisanal miners. In contrast, the artisanal miners referred to a 1979 Act, which reserved the Shinyanga Region for gold prospecting and mining activities that were not capital intensive (Lissu, 2002).

Nonetheless, Lissu (2002) provided three reasons to debunk Sutton's claim over Bulyanhulu. First, the company's 1994 prospecting license gave it a claim over Butobela Area in Geita District (now Geita Region), a different geographical location to Bulyanhulu in Kahama District. Second, the successive renewal of Sutton's prospecting license in 1997 and 1998 emphasised Butobela, Geita District, as the company's claim. Third, the Ministry of Energy and Mine's publication of 39 prospecting licenses, issued between 1993 and 1996 in the Kahama District, omitted Bulyanhulu.

These reasons, combined with a 1980 Government Notice designating Shinyanga Region for ASM, raised significant concerns about Sutton's claim over Bulyanhulu, possibly explaining why the company lost a lawsuit it filed against the miners. Hence, rather than evict the miners, Mwinyi's regime called for an agreement between Sutton and the miners. For instance, Prime Minister, Cleopa Msuya, having visited Bulyanhulu, argued that "the government [recognised] the importance of both the small-scale and large-scale miners". He then granted both parties a fortnight to address their stalemate to encourage the mutual exploitation of mineral resources (Cooksey, 2011, p. 28).

This call for diplomatic and inclusive dispute resolution meant that Mwinyi was unwilling to violently evict the miners to make way for Sutton Resources. However, Mwinyi's proposed resolution did not meet Sutton's expectations since Sutton and the Canadian High Commission in Tanzania took an uncompromising position (Cooksey, 2011). Instead, these external actors engaged in discourses portraying Tanzania as a poor investment destination for foreign mining capital with potential economic ramifications. For example, in March 1995, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) reported that the Tanzanian state allowed approximately 20,000 people, including artisanal miners, to live in Sutton's concession area. The DFAIT argued further that the:

laxness of the authorities in dealing with illegal mining has emboldened the artisanal miners and aggravated the situation [and that] if large-scale prospecting were to be undertaken and some of the illegal pits bulldozed, it is Sutton's view and that of the Canadian mission that there would be trouble (Cooksey, 2011, p. 27).

The DFAIT and Sutton's worldview on the regime's "laxness in dealing with illegal mining" ultimately aimed at getting the regime to evict the artisanal miners. Since Tanzania was in the early stages of liberalising its economy (see chapter three), it appeared that allowing the artisanal miners to mine at the expense of Sutton could signal to the investment community about a hostile mining investment climate in Tanzania. Despite these threats, Mwinyi put up with the supposedly marauding artisanal miners.

Mwinyi's reluctance to raid the miners represented a defeat for Sutton and the Canadian High Commission since the company could not start any extractive activities in the concession area without the regime's intervention to evict the miners. Meanwhile, the artisanal miners' contribution to total gold production was grossly insignificant, with no tangible effect on the country's economy (Lissu, 2002). Thus, while Mwinyi's behaviour contradicts the LSM-bias theory (Hilson, 2019; Hilson & Maconachie, 2020), it was embedded in the domestic political dynamics, which made artisanal miners' votes politically relevant.

The timing of Sutton's dispute with the artisanal miners overlapped the electioneering campaign in 1995 when the CCM faced incessant political opposition in the NCCR-Mageuzi. Before the October 1995 election, the CCM's popularity waned significantly, mainly due to President Mwinyi's failure to prosecute petty and grand corruption. Pepinsky (1992, p. 27) reported how Mwinyi's attempt to fight corruption in March 1990 was a lip service as he victimised citizens that presented him with evidence of corruption acts.

When President Ali Hassan Mwinyi declared war on corruption in March 1990, he was reliably reported privately to know that some of his ministers were embezzling state supplies, funds and labour in large quantities, and it was widely rumoured that some of the students he later expelled from the University offered him documentary proof in the case of two ministers. He knew of rampant petty employee pilferage. He knew people even paid to get severely ill or injured patients attended and medicated in supposedly free state hospitals.

Similarly, Heilman and Ndumbaro (2002) emphasised the widespread belief in corrupt practices among the Asian business community in Tanzania. The authors showed how Reverend Christopher Mtikila of the Democratic Party capitalised on these popular discontents with Asians. For instance, Mtikila claimed that "181 *magabacholi* (wealthy non-Tanganyikans)" controlled Tanzania and "transferred the wealth of Tanzania abroad while *walalahoi* (dispossessed Africans) lived in abject poverty" (p. 6). However, in addition to these widespread perceptions and petty acts of corruption, grand corruption scandals tainted the CCM's image and caused political wrangling within the CCM.

One such scandal involved the misapplication of US\$ 3.5 million by the Chavda brothers. In 1993, V.G. Chavda and his brother P.G. Chavda secured a \$3.5 million government loan under Tanzania's Debt Conversion Program, which directed foreign-acquired loans into investment projects. Thus, the Chavda brothers obtained their loan to revive sisal plantations in Tanga by "upgrading and building workers' houses and dispensaries, buying and repairing decorticator machines, and replanting neglected sisal farms" (Heilman & Ndumbaro, 2002, p. 4). Nevertheless, instead of rehabilitating the sisal farms with the funds, the brothers purchased spare parts abroad with the complicity of high-ranking government officials, such as the Permanent Secretary in the President's Office (Heilman & Ndumbaro, 2002).

Nonetheless, Augustine Mrema, the Minister for Home Affairs, who would later fall out with the CCM, resolved to prosecute the Chavda brothers. However, parastatal banks absorbed this financial loss caused by private businesspersons, exculpating the Chavdas from prosecution. Besides this scandal, Heilman and Ndumbaro (2002, p. 6) also cited another scandal involving Mohammed Enterprises, which allegedly distributed "food unfit for human consumption." Again, Mrema promised to bring this

highly politically connected enterprise to book. However, Mwinyi demoted Mrema from a Home Affairs Minister to a Youth and Culture Minister, disabling him from initiating any prosecutorial actions against Mohammed Enterprises (ibid).

Given these frustrations, Mrema condemned Mwinyi's regime for its connivance in high-level corruption, triggering Mrema's removal from Mwinyi's cabinet and later his (Mrema's) defection from the CCM to become the presidential candidate of the opposition NCCR-Mageuzi. Given these events, the CCM's electoral fortune hung in the balance heading into the 1995 elections. To retool the CCM's image, Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's most idolised President, led a campaign to distance the CCM from Mwinyi's regime by criticising the regime's failure to prosecute corruption (Heilman & Ndumbaro, 2002; Nyaluke & Connolly, 2013). Thus, when the CCM met in Dodoma to select its presidential candidate, the primary objective was to select a candidate untainted with corruption scandals. Hence, Benjamin Mkapa, a relatively unknown political figure with no traces of corruption scandals, won the bid to become the CCM's presidential candidate (TEMCO, 1997).

Nevertheless, although Mkapa's candidature was a political schema to portray the CCM as a reformist rather than a corrupt party (Heilman & Ndumbaro, 2002), this did not make the issue of corruption any less significant. Indeed, Mrema had joined the opposition NCCR-Mageuzi as a hero victimised by his previous party (the CCM) for attempting to fight corruption. Thus, Mrema's popularity soared with implications for the NCCR-Mageuzi's popularity, a party that had been relatively unpopular prior to these events. One observer described the impact of Mrema's defection on the opposition as follows:

In Dodoma, Mrema was carried shoulder high by excited crowds and some 3,000 people signed up for the NCCR-Mageuzi. When he reached his hometown, Moshi, police had to use tear gas to control the crowds and shops closed as thousands greeted him all the way from Kilimanjaro airport to the town. In Dar es Salaam, he addressed what was described as one of the biggest meetings ever held in the city. At the NCCR party headquarters, officials were selling membership cards until late in the night making nearby roads impassable. It is assumed that he will soon declare his bid for the presidency and there are indications that several other opposition parties might support him (Editor, 1995, n.p.n)

Similarly, Whitehead (2000, p. 7) argued that “[w]ithout a doubt, the most popular opposition figure today – Augustine Mrema – grudgingly defected from the incumbent regime into the NCCR-Mageuzi's Chairman position, subsequently propelling the party into the most prominent opposition status.” Likewise, Heilman and Ndumbaro (2002, p. 6) contended that Mrema's anti-corruption posture earned him “a considerable degree of personal popularity, making him the main electoral threat to CCM and its presidential candidate for the October 1995 elections.” Before Mrema's defection, the NCCR-

Mageuzi was one of the weakest opposition parties in Tanzania, as evident in the outcome of the 1994 local elections (see *table three*).

Table 3. Results of Tanzania’s 1994 local elections.

Party	Number of Seats	Seat Percentage
CCM	2,327	96.72%
CHADEMA	22	0.91%
CUF	21	0.87%
UDP	16	0.67%
NCCR-Mageuzi	15	0.62%
UMD	3	0.12%
TADEA	2	0.08%
Six others	0	0%

Source. Whitehead (2000).

According to *table three*, the NCCR-Mageuzi was not the leading opposition party, as it trailed behind three other opposition parties in the 1994 local elections. Moreover, the combined seats of the four leading opposition parties (74 seats) came nowhere near the CCM’s (2,327 seats). However, Mrema’s defection altered the political scene and created a platform for a competitive election. Thus, the opposition presented voters with a viable option, underscoring how the CCM could not underrate any electoral constituency, particularly the black African population (including ASM operatives) generally described as the “dispossessed Africans” (Heilman & Ndumbaro, 2002, p. 6).

Consequently, not only did the sitting President (Mwinyi) fail to raid the artisanal miners in Bulyanhulu, but also the CCM’s presidential candidate, Benjamin Mkapa, campaigned to support ASM. For instance, a week before the general elections, the CCM’s campaign team “issued a press release [on how] presidential candidate Mkapa would back small-scale miners at Bulyanhulu” (Cooksey, 2011, p. 28). In response to this campaign, the Canadian High Commissioner informed Ottawa that Mkapa, the would-be President, had a pro-ASM posture (Cooksey, 2011). Nonetheless, since the performance of a regime can shape voters’ choices (Downs, 1957), the best way to provide artisanal miners with some prior evidence of a future pro-ASM CCM administration was to tolerate them before the election. Thus, with the miners’ votes becoming a more politically sensitive question and a palpably disruptive potential, the CCM cadres tolerated the miners to avoid a possible political backlash.

As the balance of power tilted against Sutton Resources and the Canadian Mission in Tanzania, Mwinyi and the CCM tolerated ASM operatives for political expediency. Indeed, the 1995 presidential election results (*table four*) show how Mrema’s presence in the opposition NCCR-Mageuzi shot this party to prominence over other opposition parties, threatening the CCM.

Table 4. Results of Tanzania’s 1995 presidential elections.

Candidate	Number of votes	Percentage of votes
Benjamin Mkapa (CCM)	4,026,422	61.8
Augustine Mrema (NCCR-Mageuzi)	1,808,616	27.8
Ibrahim Lipumba (CUF)	418,973	6.4
John Cheyo (UDP)	258,734	4.0

Source. African Elections Database (2011).

The outcomes of the 1995 elections and the events preceding the elections, offer much insights into why Mwinyi and the CCM, including the presidential candidate (Benjamin Mkapa), became apprehensive of the opposition and took a pro-ASM posture that militated against the interests of Sutton Resources and the Canadian High Commission over the Bulyanhulu Mine.

2.2. Touch not the ‘downtrodden’. Magufuli’s approach to artisanal miners (2015-2020).

“The CCM does not go to sleep anymore because of the opposition.”³⁴

Like Mwinyi, President Magufuli confronted political constraints conditioned by the outcomes of the 2015 elections. The events preceding the 2015 elections marked striking similarities and differences to those that preceded the 1995 elections and, in many ways, contributed to making the opposition a threat to the CCM. Like Mrema’s defection to the opposition NCCR-Mageuzi ahead of the 1995 elections, Edward Lowassa also defected from the CCM to the opposition CHADEMA before the 2015 elections after losing the CCM’s presidential candidate race to Magufuli. While both defectors were popular, Lowassa even appeared more popular because of his previous role as the Prime Minister of Tanzania.

Nevertheless, the CHADEMA’s decision to settle on Lowassa as presidential candidate appeared counterintuitive due to a corruption scandal that entangled Lowassa and made him less appealing to CCM elites. For instance, Branson (2015) blames Lowassa’s loss of the CCM’s presidential candidate

³⁴ Interview with a professor at the University of Dar es Salaam on 16th December 2019.

race and his defection to the CHADEMA on his involvement in the Richmond Development Company energy corruption scandal. In 2006, following an electricity crisis in Tanzania, the Tanzanian government awarded a contract worth TSh 172 billion or US\$ 123.2 million to the US-based Richmond Development Company to construct an oil pipeline from Dar es Salaam to Mwanza and to supply generators to generate 120 megawatts of electricity. The pipeline did not come on stream while another company provided the generators, as it became apparent that Richmond was a shell company with no experience in power generation. A parliamentary select committee investigated this scandal and found Richmond did not merit the tender award, implicating senior government officials such as Prime Minister Edward Lowassa for their role in the tender award. Lowassa and the Minister for Energy and minerals, Nazir Karamagi, resigned as a result (Cooksey, 2017; Jacob, 2008).

While evading prosecution, the scandal earned Lowassa nicknames such as *Lo-Rushiwa* and *Fisadi-in-chief*, Swahili expressions for bribery and corruption (Branson, 2015). Thus, to the CCM elites, this scandal made Lowassa unfit to lead the party at a time public disenchantment with the CCM was growing, reflected in the drastic fall in the CCM's presidential vote share by almost 20% between the 2005 and 2010 presidential elections (*figure six*). Consequently, the CCM's Security and Ethics Committee excluded Lowassa from the presidential race, paving the way for Magufuli to win the bid to become the CCM's candidate (*ibid*).

Nonetheless, whereas the CCM preferred a candidate untainted with corruption scandals (Magufuli), the CHADEMA overlooked the scandal that had entangled Lowassa and selected him for at least three reasons. First, Lowassa's political popularity stood beyond that of Magufuli, which the opposition sought to exploit. This popularity also coincided with a period wherein Tanzanians seemed to be calling for regime change, making Lowassa a preferred candidate for the CHADEMA. One government official argued that: "Lowassa was more popular than Magufuli. Also, it reached a moment when people no longer had faith in the CCM. That is why Lowassa moved to the CHADEMA."³⁵ Second, Lowassa had a denser and more comprehensive network with Tanzania's business community, which might have shaped the party's access to campaign finance. As a CHADEMA cadre asserted: "We brought Lowassa to lead the CHADEMA because he was popular and well-connected to the business community."³⁶

Third, the CHADEMA had no reason to doubt that it would exercise considerable control over Lowassa should he become president. One prominent opposition member argued that:


³⁵ Zoom interview with an official of the Mining Ministry on 21st May 2021.

³⁶ Interview with a leading member of the CHADEMA in Dar es Salaam on 19th December 2019.

We had mechanisms to control him and ensure that he delivered in line with the party's ideology if he won the election. Lowassa had a high chance of winning the elections. We believe that he won, only that the CCM rigged the elections.³⁷

Although the CCM won the 2015 presidential elections, its share of 58.5% of the votes (*figure six*) marks the party's worst electoral performance since the return to multiparty elections in 1995. The outcomes of the elections, which the opposition disputed, highlight how the CHADEMA's institutionalisation³⁸ and the Lowassa factor mattered in this election. However, it also reflected people's disenchantment with the Kikwete regime, which was engulfed in corruption scandals. To one participant, "Kikwete had not governed the country popularly. There were many corruption scandals under Kikwete which affected Magufuli and the CCM's fortune in the 2015 presidential elections."³⁹ More importantly, the opposition's ability to capitalise on the CCM's internal political wranglings and governance shortcomings to increase their share of votes portended a future regime change and appeared to be a source of concern for the CCM.

Figure 6. Parties' share of Tanzania's presidential election results from 1995 to 2020.



Source: Author's.

³⁷ Interview with a leading member of the CHADEMA in Dar es Salaam on 19th December 2019.

³⁸ The CHADEMA has been Tanzania's most enduring opposition party, steadily increasing its share of the presidential electoral votes from 2005 to 2015 [See *figure six*].

³⁹ Zoom interview with an official of LEAT on 24th May 2021.

Essentially, the 2015 electoral outcomes underlined the emergence of a weak dominant political settlement, wherein the dominant governing coalition (the CCM) faced a political contender in the CHADEMA. Therefore, following the election, Magufuli and the CCM set out to contain the political opposition, with one academic arguing that CCM elites increasingly became wary of the opposition and acted to appeal to the consciences of the masses.

The CCM does not go to sleep anymore because of the opposition. The last election (in 2015) shows that the opposition could possibly beat the CCM in a future election. Due to this, the CCM is now doing more for the poor masses. In Dar es Salaam, poor neighbourhoods are now getting their roads asphalted, while wealthy neighbourhoods such as Mikocheni have bad roads.⁴⁰

Moreover, this academic described the CCM's decision to hold Tanzania's 2018 national Independence Day celebration in Mwanza – the most populous region in northern Tanzania – as an attempt to weaken the growing presence of the opposition in the north.

"For the first time in our history, the CCM decided to hold the 2018 national Independence Day celebration in Mwanza, the largest city in the north and the second largest in the country in terms of population. You see, the opposition had always boycotted such events in Dar es Salaam. But because Mwanza and the north are politically important to the opposition, they decided to participate in the event."⁴¹

However, along with these soft containment measures came hard ones, as a participant lamented the regime's ban on all political rallies following the 2015 elections.

With Magufuli coming to power, that is when political rallies were banned until election time. Magufuli's regime was more authoritative, which showed in the 2019 local government and the recent elections, where the ruling party won all but one seat in parliament.⁴²

Magufuli's response to this growing opposition threat had implications for his governance of the mining sector. Artisanal miners generally became part of the 'downtrodden' whose interests he represented (Paget, 2021). The result was an 'outrageous' tolerance of most of these miners that negatively impacted the operations of large-scale mining companies.

⁴⁰ Interview with a professor at the University of Dar es Salaam on 16th December 2019.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Zoom interview with an official of HakiRasilimali on 31st May 2021.

2.2.1. Implications of the 2015 elections for Magufuli’s relations with artisanal miners.

Dan Paget (2021) uses the concept of elitist plebeianism to describe how Magufuli trifurcated society between three different actors: the elite (CCM), the bureaucracy and business community (middle strata), and the ordinary people (the plebs). He argued that the CCM discursively imbued the middle strata of society (the bureaucracy and business community) with power and blamed them for the suffering of ordinary Tanzanians. Thus, Magufuli and the CCM aimed to rescue the plebs from the abusive middle strata. Paget conceives of Magufuli’s governance in purely ideological terms.

However, as I shall discuss in chapter seven, those who often attribute Magufuli’s governance to his ideas of how society ought to be governed implicitly and explicitly point to how oppositional politics underpinned Magufuli’s behaviour (Jacob & Pedersen, 2018; Paget, 2020, 2021; Poncian, 2019). Regarding the mining sector, however, the CCM sought to alter its economic relations with mining regions by implementing economic policies the opposition campaigned on, including promoting ASM as a livelihood option. Indeed, the opposition (CHADEMA) was more present in the northern territories (i.e., Lake Zone and Northern Zone) compared to other parts of Tanzania. Meanwhile, the northern territories host most artisanal miners since the country’s active mines are disproportionately located in the north (see *table five*).

Table 5. The distribution of active mines in Tanzania.

Mine	Region	Zone
Biharamulo Gold Mine	Kagera	Lake Zone
Bulyanhulu Gold Mine	Shinyanga	Lake Zone
Buzwagi Gold Mine	Shinyanga	Lake Zone
Geita Gold Mine	Geita	Lake Zone
Mererani Tanzanite Mine	Manyara	Northern Zone
New Luika Gold Mine	Mbeya, South-west	Southern Highlands Zone
Ngaka Coal Mine	Ruvuma, South-west	Southern Highlands Zone
North Mara Gold Mine	Mara	Lake Zone
Williamson Diamond Mine	Shinyanga	Lake Zone

Source: Author’s.

Because artisanal miners predominantly mine gold, tanzanite, and diamond, it is safe to conclude that, despite the lack of official statistics, Tanzania’s northern territories may host approximately 80% to 90% of all artisanal miners. Meanwhile, the CHADEMA had shown some consistent strength in the

Northern and Lake Zones compared to other zones over time. For example, while the CHADEMA was not the leading opposition party in the 2005 elections, its combined average votes in the Northern and Lake Zones exceeded those of the leading opposition party (i.e., CUF) by 5.8% (*table six*). Fast forward to 2015⁴³, the CHADEMA emerged as the main opposition party while retaining its relative strength in the Northern and Lake Zones, beating the CCM in the Northern Zone and significantly increasing its vote share in the Lake Zone by 25.8% (*table seven*).⁴⁴

Table 6. The CCM's and the oppositions' (CHADEMA and CUF) zonal and regional vote shares in mainland Tanzania in the 2005 presidential elections (%).

Zone	Region	CCM	CHADEMA	CUF
Northern Zone	Arusha	82.0	15.3	1.2
	Kilimanjaro	72.9	20.6	2.0
	Manyara	86.4	10.7	1.9
	Tanga	84.8	1.3	12.4
	Mean	81.5	12.0	4.4
Lake Zone	Mara	78.0	12.4	6.9
	Mwanza	79.4	6.6	11.9
	Geita	-	-	-
	Kagera	84.4	7.4	5.9
	Shinyanga	74.5	6.6	15.8
	Simiyu	-	-	-
	Mean	79.1	8.3	10.1
Coastal Zone	Dar es Salaam	70.6	5.6	22.8
	Lindi	74.0	1.6	22.3
	Morogoro	85.8	2.5	3.4
	Mtwara	79.1	2.1	16.6
	Pwani	72.9	1.6	24.4

⁴³ I could not find data for the 2010 regional distribution of presidential votes across the parties. However, any such data is likely to reflect the pattern of CHADEMA's consistent performance in the Northern and Lake Zones. This is because the CHADEMA performed much better in the 2010 presidential elections compared to the previous elections in 2005 (*see figure six*).

⁴⁴ See *tables six and seven* for the difference in the CHADEMA's vote share in the Lake Zone. While constituency-level results would have been preferable in presenting *tables six and seven*, I only found constituency-level results for 2015 from the OpenAFRICA dataset, which does not contain results for previous elections. Thus, I limited the analysis to the regional level, where I could access regional-level data for the 2005 and 2015 presidential elections. Despite its limitations, the presidential results at the regional level for the two elections demonstrate how political constraints shaped Magufuli's tolerance of the artisanal miners.

	Mean	76.5	2.7	17.9
Central Zone	Dodoma	87.5	5.9	11.7
	Singida	90.9	3.7	4.2
	Tabora	76.0	1.7	21.0
	Mean	84.8	3.8	12.3
Southern Highlands Zone	Iringa	94.2	3.5	1.0
	Mbeya	88.9	3.8	2.9
	Njombe	-	-	-
	Rukwa	89.8	4.5	2.5
	Ruvuma	84.6	3.9	10.1
	Songwe	-	-	-
	Mean	89.4	3.9	4.1
Western Zone	Katavi	-	-	
	Kigoma	79.6	3.5	7.9
	Mean	79.6	3.5	7.9

Source: Author's based on data from Kireey (n.d.).

Table 7. The CCM's and CHADEMA's zonal and regional vote shares in mainland Tanzania in the 2015 presidential elections (%).

Zone	Region	CCM	CHADEMA
Northern Zone	Arusha	28.7	70.6
	Kilimanjaro	37.9	60.5
	Manyara	54.7	36.5
	Tanga	64.9	33.2
	Mean	46.6	50.2
Lake Zone	Mara	59.2	39.2
	Mwanza	64.4	34.4
	Geita	69.6	29.1
	Kagera	61.7	37.3
	Shinyanga	70.2	28.4
	Simiyu	62.6	36.1
	Mean	64.6	34.1
Coastal Zone	Dar es Salaam	45.7	52.4
	Lindi	41.0	57.2
	Morogoro	61.2	37.3

	Mtwara	57.3	40.5
	Pwani	59.4	38.7
	Mean	52.9	45.2
Central Zone	Dodoma	75.4	23.0
	Singida	70.4	27.2
	Tabora	68.2	29.9
	Mean	71.3	26.7
Southern Highlands Zone	Iringa	64.3	34.4
	Mbeya	52.8	45.8
	Njombe	67.8	30.6
	Rukwa	57.0	41.6
	Ruvuma	67.9	32.3
	Songwe	–	–
	Mean	62.0	36.9
Western Zone	Katavi	72.7	26.0
	Kigoma	62.2	29.5
	Mean	67.5	27.8

Source: Author's based on data from openAFRICA (2018).⁴⁵

Consistent with the electoral data above, one participant suggested that artisanal miners had historically been CCM voters. Nonetheless, the opposition had been making in-roads in this voting constituency, which made the CCM more careful in handling artisanal mining issues:

For the ruling party (i.e., the CCM), the ASM operatives had always voted for them. But the opposition party had gained momentum in ASM areas before Magufuli came to power. So, the CCM had to be careful about how it governed the ASM sector.⁴⁶

Given this momentum the opposition had gained among the artisanal miners, these miners – who suffered repression under previous CCM presidents, as we shall see subsequently – became part of the ‘downtrodden’ Magufuli sought to protect. For instance, the President regarded artisanal miners as poor Tanzanians who should be allowed to mine even without licenses:

⁴⁵ The openAFRICA dataset records absolute valid votes and number of votes each of the eight candidates obtained in the 2015 elections. The CCM's and CHADEMA's candidates' performance stood above the rest of the candidates, explaining the focus on only these parties. I calculated the regional vote percentages of the CCM and CHADEMA by dividing each party's regional absolute vote by the corresponding absolute valid votes cast and multiplying the results by 100.

⁴⁶ Zoom interview with an official from the Mining Ministry on 21st May 2021.

The President calls the artisanal miners the poor Tanzanians who should benefit from ASM. It was in 2017 that the President said the artisanal miners should mine without being asked for a license. But the condition is that these miners should sell their gold to dealers in the government's market.⁴⁷

Magufuli's construction of the realities of artisanal miners as poor Tanzanians and his rhetoric that these miners were free to mine had some neutralising effect on the opposition's popularity among the artisanal miners, a popularity deeply embedded in the opposition's deliberate pro-ASM campaign message. One observer noted that: "the opposition always stood with the ASM people. During Magufuli's period, the opposition kept insisting on formalisation and the need to prioritise artisanal miners as they greatly impacted the rural economy."⁴⁸ Another participant put it this way:

The CHADEMA had campaigned to support small-scale miners. However, the CHADEMA did not have any agenda again to discuss when Magufuli came to power because he started to implement the core policies of the CHADEMA. The CHADEMA did not have anything to say again. They were just asking for Democracy and Freedom. But I do not know what freedom they were asking for.⁴⁹

Among other policy measures, Magufuli ended the previous practice of state-cum-company-induced evictions of marauding artisanal miners. Moreover, the regime took concrete steps that facilitated artisanal miners' access to mineralised lands by withdrawing licenses belonging to mining companies and releasing these lands to artisanal miners.

Magufuli freed artisanal miners to carry out their activities even in large, licensed areas that had not yet been mined and urged large companies to leave small-scale miners to mine areas that had not yet been used. It was during the time of Magufuli that the government also withdrew licenses belonging to the country's two biggest mining companies, Barrick Gold Corporation and Glencore Plc, to allow more than 5,000 small-scale miners to gain access to the gold-rich areas in the Lake Zone. Magufuli also directed the revocation of big investors' licenses in the Mwanza Region to pave the way for small-scale miners. During the Magufuli period, human rights violations of small-scale miners were significantly reduced compared to the Kikwete period."⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Interview with a mining official in Mwanza on 28th December 2019.

⁴⁸ Zoom interview with an official of HakiMadini on 26th May 2021. The Zoom interview was disrupted after about 30 minutes. Thus, the official completed the rest of the interview questions via email.

⁴⁹ Zoom interview with an official of HakiMadini on 26th May 2021.

⁵⁰ Zoom Interview with an official of HakiMadini on 26th May 2021.

While these arbitrary measures served political purposes, they might also have been the regime's strategy of coercing mining companies to end their alleged tax evasion and honour their tax obligations. Therefore, the regime could always relocate mineralised lands from artisanal miners to mining companies, provided any taxation-related disputes got resolved. In the words of a participant:

Kakola mine and Acacia mine were not paying taxes on their mines in North Mara. So, the government gave parts of their land to artisanal miners. This is a strategy for the big mining companies to pay all their taxes. Once they pay the tax, the land would be given back to them.⁵¹

Thus, although most of the artisanal miners had no security of tenure, the fact that the regime allowed them to temporarily occupy mineralised lands belonging to embattled mining companies represented some gains for these artisanal miners and positioned Magufuli as a friend of the 'downtrodden.' However, as we shall shortly see regarding regime-ASM relations in Geita, even companies with no business disputes with Magufuli, such as AGA, had part of their concessions seized by artisanal miners without the regime's protection.

Nonetheless, while granting artisanal miners access to mineralised lands without recourse to licenses, Magufuli also addressed some of the fundamental concerns of artisanal miners more generally. For instance, for the first time in Tanzania's history, a sitting president honoured an invitation to participate in a meeting organised by the Federation of Miners Association of Tanzania (FEMATA) to appreciate the dynamics of miners' plight and respond to them appropriately. This interaction with the artisanal miners culminated in Magufuli's directive for mineral markets to be built across mining regions to facilitate miners' easy access to dealers and fair prices.

According to a stakeholder in the mining industry, Tanzania's 2009 mineral policy had provided for the construction of mineral markets for artisanal miners. However, it was Magufuli who implemented this policy. For instance, one of the objectives of the 2009 mining policy was "to promote and develop a marketing system of minerals to ensure that miners get the right values of minerals traded in formal markets" (The URT, 2009, p. 9). Nevertheless, no such marketing systems got established until Magufuli came to power.

The mineral policy talks about creating markets for small-scale miners. But Magufuli was the one who picked it and implemented it. In January 2019, FEMATA organised their annual general meeting in Dar es Salaam. They wanted to meet with the Minister of

⁵¹ Interview with a former AGA Manager in Geita on 23rd January 2020.

Minerals. Then the Minister informed the President that the miners asked if they could have him in the meeting. He said, “yes! I am going to be in that meeting.” He said, “I have come here, and now I want to hear from the people.” He asked the miners, “what are your concerns?” They replied, “we don’t have markets.” He said, “Minister, you are here. I am giving you thirty days to establish markets across the country.” The miners now get near market price because the government uses the world market price to influence the local market.⁵²

Besides these measures, Magufuli constituted the Tanzania Mining Commission in 2017, whose members include the CEO of FEMATA, a nationwide artisanal mining organisation representing artisanal miners’ interests. As an official of the Mining Ministry argued, including a representative from artisanal miners in the Tanzania Mining Commission was necessary to facilitate the regime’s appreciation of the miners’ challenges.

One of the Commissioners [of the Tanzanian Mining Commission] is the FEMATA CEO. FEMATA comprises the regional small-scale miners’ association (REMA) and therefore represents the interests of all artisanal miners. We thought that if artisanal miners had representation in the Commission, it would be easy for the government to hear them.⁵³

While generally taking a pro-ASM stance, Magufuli also descended heavily on artisanal miners identified as having links with the political opposition. In the rest of this section, I show how the regime remained tolerant of artisanal miners in Geita and Mererani. However, I also how some miners in Mererani got repressed for their alleged network with the political opposition.

2.2.2. Magufuli’s relations with artisanal miners in Geita.

Geita Gold Mine (GGM) is one of the world’s most important gold mining sites. GGM opened in the late 1880s under German colonial rule (1884-1917), which gave foreign mining companies exclusive mining rights over vast tracts of land (Chachage, 1995). After World War I, the mine came under the British, who had taken over the colony (Tanganyika). However, as the British had more interest in commercial agriculture, the GGM and the colony’s mining sector experienced a decline (Lange, 2006). This decline worsened during World War II when the colonial government banned gold prospecting while the existing companies had no access to machinery due to a diversion of global capital into the war economy (Lange, 2006; Lissu, 2002).

⁵² Zoom Interview with an official of the Mining Ministry on 21st May 2021.

⁵³ Zoom interview with an official of the Mining Ministry on 21st May 2021.

Following independence, the mine closed in 1966 because of low gold prices, but when the prices rose in 1971, the post-colonial government expressed interest in the mine via STAMICO. Nonetheless, in 1996, the AGC of Ghana acquired mining rights in GGM but partnered with AngloGold of South Africa to raise the necessary capital for production. Thus, the new company that emerged, AGA, invested about US\$ 400 million in GGM. While the GGM officially reopened in 1999, full operations started in 2002 (Lange, 2006). Like most mining communities in Tanzania, Geita is located in the north (the Lake Zone). Here, most artisanal miners operate without licenses and frequently eke a living on parts of AGA's concessions.

As shown above, the opposition CHADEMA performed better in the Lake Zone than in most other zones during the 2015 elections. Given these dynamics, artisanal miners in Geita became part of the 'downtrodden' whose plight Magufuli identified with. Here, Magufuli improved his relations with the artisanal miners in ways that had noticeable effects on AGA. Before Magufuli's election, AGA could ward off marauding artisanal miners either with company security or through a joint company-state security force. However, all such evictions ceased upon Magufuli's election. Instead, the regime cautioned AGA and other mining companies to desist from any form of securitisation that might repress and abuse the human rights of the intruding artisanal miners. Instead, mining companies were encouraged to persuade the intruding artisanal miners to vacate companies' concessions. While lamenting the ubiquity of ASM-induced invasions of AGA's concession, an official of the Geita Resident Mining Office emphasised how Magufuli prioritised diplomatic approaches to getting artisanal miners off AGA's concession.

The government is against the use of force to fight artisanal miners. It directed us to find peaceful means to get intruders out of mining companies' concession. Just last two weeks, about 3000 artisanal miners invaded parts of GGM. We reached out to the leaders of the miners to help us educate the miners that the land belongs to GGM, so they should retreat. We usually get the District Commissioner to inform the leaders of the miners about why the miners should leave the site. For me, diplomacy works. The artisanal and small-scale miners are in their thousands. You cannot use force to evict all of them.⁵⁴

In line with Magufuli's directive against violent evictions of artisanal miners, his regime also obliged mining companies to persuade under-18 intruders off companies' concessions safely. A former Manager of AGA's GGM stressed that:

⁵⁴ Interview with an official of the Geita Resident Mining Office on 3rd January 2020.

The government said mining officials should accompany intruding artisanal miners home safely if these intruders are under 18 years. However, since GGM's concession is vast, sometimes mining officials hate this directive, especially when they are called upon to get some under-18 intruders out of the concession during rush hours (i.e., 5pm). This is extra work for the mining officials, so some ignore reports of under-18 invaders.⁵⁵

Because artisanal miners are commonly armed when encroaching upon a mining company's concession, the directive for unarmed managers to persuade 100s and thousands of artisanal miners off companies' concessions was arduous and risky. Moreover, since managers could not readily ascertain the ages of intruders, many artisanal miners would hide behind this directive to intrude. For those artisanal miners who were visibly beyond 18 years, their strategy was to resource under-18s to encroach upon GGM.

It is not easy to tell who is 18 years old and who is more than 18 years old. Also, some artisanal miners use under-18s to deliberately intrude on the company's land because they are aware of the government's directive about under-18 intruders.⁵⁶

Given the risk and challenge of persuading miners to leave a company's concession, it is unsurprising that managers would often ignore ASM-induced encroachments. Although managers sometimes collaborated with resident mining officers to persuade intruding miners away from the company's land, the outcome of this diplomatic approach was not always palatable for the company. In most instances, the company had to allow the miners to work on the invaded concession, a compromise deeply motivated by Magufuli's rhetoric that mining companies should allow artisanal miners to work on concessions the companies are not developing. For instance, one mining official suggested that:

If Special Mining License and Mining License holders [i.e., Mining Companies] are not developing the land and artisanal miners intrude, the regime always tells the companies to release the intruded land to the artisanal miners. Magufuli is firmly against the use of force to evict these miners.⁵⁷

Personal observations of mining sites corroborated these accounts. For instance, during a field visit in Geita, I observed how hundreds, if not thousands, of artisanal miners were mining in Magera. This area was previously within AGA's concession that the company had yet to develop. A participant narrated that while GGM stopped the Magera miners in 2015, Magufuli intervened on the miners'

⁵⁵ Interview with a former AGA manager on 23rd January 2020.

⁵⁶ Interview with a former AGA manager on 23rd January 2020.

⁵⁷ Interview with an official at the Mwanza Resident Mining Office on 28th December 2019.

behalf: “GGM stopped them (the miners) in 2015, but the government ordered GGM to let them (the miners) work.”⁵⁸ Likewise, a participant suggested that, prior to 2015, Magema was a restricted area until Magufuli released this land to the miners post-2015: “Before 2015, the situation was different, but now things have changed. Restricted places are now given to artisanal miners.”⁵⁹

Thus, the regime’s tolerance of the excesses of artisanal miners escalated the invasions of AGA’s land. As a former manager put it:

The rate of artisanal miners’ intrusions has increased. Before Magufuli came to power, we could record only about 100 intrusions at a time. Now, we are talking about thousands of artisanal miners of different age groups intruding very frequently. The company is helpless.⁶⁰

This exponential growth in the rate of ASM-induced intrusions of GGM might have resulted from existing artisanal miners escalating their intrusions. However, the growth may also partly reflect how – in the presence of a pro-ASM regime – some AGA underground workers quitted the company in pursuit of greener pastures in artisanal mining. Such was the case of one former underground miner who stopped working for AGA to start artisanal mining.

I used to work as an underground miner for AGA. However, since Magufuli came to power, I realised that artisanal miners now have more freedom to operate and are getting richer. So, I decided to stop working for AGA and go into artisanal mining. Many of my colleagues in AGA and other mining companies are also doing artisanal mining now⁶¹

Hence, in Geita, as elsewhere in Tanzania, Magufuli bolstered artisanal miners’ positionality and rendered LSM companies vulnerable to ASM-induced invasions. Like mining companies, other stakeholders such as mineral dealers and elution plant⁶² owners bore the brunt of Magufuli’s pro-ASM position. For instance, by creating mineral markets across the country and compelling gold dealers to trade within these markets, Magufuli guaranteed artisanal miners’ access to near market prices while disrupting prior practices wherein dealers could unilaterally set gold prices and swindle artisanal

⁵⁸ Focus group interview with miners in Mining Village A in Geita on 2nd February 2020.

⁵⁹ Focus group interview with miners in Mining Village A in Geita on 2nd February 2020

⁶⁰ Interview with a former AGA manager on 23rd January 2020.

⁶¹ Interview with a former AGA underground worker in Geita on 17th January 2020.

⁶² An elution plant is a gold processing technology with a high recovery rate. When artisanal miners use mercury to process mineral ore (sand), they are unable to recover all the gold. Thus, the processed ore (or tailings) becomes a raw material to be processed further by elution plants. Interview with an official of an elution company in Geita on 6th January 2020.

miners. One miner suggested that: “the government’s market is a relief. It has made life easier.”⁶³ In contrast, a mineral dealer in the Geita *madini* (mining) market lamented the market’s disruptive impacts:

Before these markets, we were operating from major cities like Mwanza and miners from all over the country were bringing their gold to us. We could also determine the price at which the miners would sell their gold, which meant we made more profit because the miners did not know the global prices. Magufuli forced us to operate from mining communities after he built these markets. Business is now not good for dealers because we all must compete for the gold of the Geita miners. But before, we could get gold from other miners from other parts of the country. Also, the government uses the world market price to set the local prices, which means we can no longer set prices far below the market prices to make more profit.⁶⁴

Other gold dealers interviewed in Geita expressed similar sentiments. Likewise, Magufuli compelled elution plant owners across Tanzania to move their plants to gold-producing communities to facilitate miners’ access to these plants. An official of an elution company narrated that:

Before, our plant was in Mwanza. The government asked all elution companies to relocate to gold areas. The elution companies organised to protest this directive in Parliament, but they were not successful. The relocation was not easy because we could process carbons from other countries in Mwanza. But in Geita, we only have carbons from the Geita miners.⁶⁵

Magufuli’s relations with the Geita artisanal miners suggest that the regime might have been benign towards all artisanal miners across the country. However, the story was slightly complex in Mererani because while the regime put up with many artisanal miners here, it also repressed some of these miners linked to the political opposition. I take this up next.

⁶³ Focus group interviews with miners in Mining Village A in Geita on 2nd February 2020.

⁶⁴ Interview with a gold dealer in the Geita *madini* market on 28th January 2020.

⁶⁵ Interview with an official of an elution company in Geita on 6th January 2020.

2.2.3. Magufuli's relations with artisanal miners in Mererani.

Mererani is the world's only tanzanite mining site in the Manyara Region of Tanzania. The discovery of tanzanite, the world's rarest gem, dates back to 1967 when Maasai herders found blue crystals in Mererani hills close to Arusha. The herders informed a prospector, Manuel d' Souza, who obtained mining rights from the state to exploit this mineral. In 1968, Tiffany & Co appreciated the potential of this gemstone to compete with more pricey stones such as sapphire and elected to distribute it. Tiffany renamed this blue gemstone tanzanite after Tanzania, emphasising its unique geographic origin.⁶⁶

In 1990, following Tanzania's incremental approach to liberalising its mining sector, the regime privatised tanzanite mining, switching ownership of the mine from Tanzania Gemstone Industries, a state-owned company, to four private companies. The mine was divided into four blocks: Blocks A, B, C, and D. Kilimanjaro Mines Ltd owned Block A; Building Utilities Ltd owned Block B; Graphan Ltd owned Block C, while artisanal miners operated in Block D via the Arusha Region Miners Association. However, ownership of Block C shifted to African Gem Resources in 1998 and then to Tanzanite One in 2004 (Lange, 2006). Block B later fell under artisanal miners as Building Utilities ceased operations.⁶⁷

By 2004, two main groups of tanzanite miners – artisanal miners and Tanzanite One – actively operated the Mererani Mine. While tanzanite extraction occurs in Mererani, a town in Manyara Region, much of the trade occurs in Arusha. Therefore, Manyara and Arusha co-constitute tanzanite regions within Tanzania's Northern Zone.⁶⁸ As shown in *table seven* above, in the 2015 elections, the political opposition performed better in the Northern Zone, where it beat the CCM in this zone, particularly in Arusha and Kilimanjaro regions. Consequently, as we shall see shortly, relations between the Mererani artisanal miners and the state improved considerably under Magufuli.

However, while seeking to win the hearts of artisanal miners in a region considered the opposition's stronghold, the regime also identified and repressed artisanal miners perceived to have links with the opposition. A local politician of the CHADEMA highlighted the harassment that some artisanal miners suffered because of their affiliation with the political opposition.

⁶⁶ Brief history of Tanzanite taken from American Gem Society. Retrieved April 13, 2021, from <https://www.americangemsociety.org/birthstones/december-birthstones/tanzanite-history/#:~:text=Tanzanite%20History,while%20tending%20livestock%20in%201967>

⁶⁷ Third-party interview with a mayor in Manyara Region on 28th May 2021.

⁶⁸ Until 2002, Manyara was part of the Arusha Region.

For the past five years, the opposition (CHADEMA) has been in ICU because of Magufuli. He did not allow political activities anywhere in the country. Even here in Mererani, he harassed ASM operatives connected to the opposition (CHADEMA), closing some of their mines/pits for no good reason. Since I entered politics, I have never experienced a politically difficult moment as I have in the past five years. Many ASM operatives appealing to CHADEMA had their property confiscated and bank accounts seized. Some were taken to court with false accusations to intimidate them. Last year, I lost my younger brother after being beaten by the soldiers. They caught him with tanzanite minerals; they took him to their camp and beat him. He died a few days later. We filed the case, but it ended in favour of the government, which claimed that our brother was a thief and attempted to kill a soldier, which is why they beat him, which was not really true. Therefore, most ASM operatives were forced to join the CCM under such an oppressive regime. However, in their hearts, they appeal to the opposition.⁶⁹

Artisanal mining is a money-making venture, and political parties thrive on funds. As Paget (2019) argues, Tanzania's political opposition parties have historically struggled to mobilise funds for political campaigns. However, the liberalisation of the country's financial system made it possible for some private commercial banks and individuals to contribute to the opposition's political budget. With artisanal tanzanite mining occurring in its supposed stronghold, it is entirely conceivable that the CHADEMA had elements in the mining sector that supported the party financially, as the excerpt from a government official implies.

Party members definitely contribute to their party's finances. The MPs in ASM provide much financial support to the party. I know the miners do so too. There are prominent figures in the mining that support their party. Sometimes they work straight from the party. We have politicians in the small-scale mining sector. Sometimes the ASM disputes with LSM are coming from politicians.⁷⁰

Given the intricate connections between the availability of campaign finance, political campaign, and a party's electoral fortunes, it is unsurprising that Magufuli became hostile to artisanal miners linked to the opposition in Mererani. Thus, the regime effectively disrupted the opposition's (CHADEMA's) political budget by repressing the opposition-aligned miners.

⁶⁹ Third-party interview with a local CHADEMA politician in Simanjiro District on 22nd May 2021.

⁷⁰ Zoom interview with an official in the Mining Ministry on 21st May 2021.

Nevertheless, for the most part, Magufuli's strategy was to represent the interests of most artisanal miners in Mererani against those of Tanzanite One, a company deemed to be artisanal miners' nemesis. Several participants described the antagonistic relations between Tanzanite One, a South African mining company, and artisanal miners over claims and counterclaims of intrusions. As explained above, Tanzanite One's concession (block C) laid between two opposite blocks (blocks B and D) belonging to artisanal miners. While both Tanzanite One and artisanal miners intruded on each other's block, Tanzanite One could previously unleash untold atrocities on artisanal miners to ward off intrusions.

Before Magufuli was elected, ASM operatives were brutally treated by Tanzanite One. The company was doing whatever it intended to do without any fear. It extended Block C's boundary inward to Block B and confiscated some artisanal miners' mining pits. But the government at the time never responded. ASM operatives got confused.⁷¹

Meanwhile, the political opposition never relented in its effort to portray Tanzanite One as a company exploiting the state and preventing ordinary Tanzanians from benefiting from tanzanite mining: "The opposition, particularly CHADEMA, has always been saying that Tanzanite One Company is exploiting the government. They said that should Block C be given to the ASM operatives, this could have a huge impact on many Tanzanians."⁷²

Given the clashes between the artisanal miners and Tanzanite One and the resultant helplessness of artisanal miners, the artisanal miners became aligned with the opposition's pro-ASM message and leaned more towards the opposition. A CCM politician described artisanal miners in Mererani as having previously supported the opposition.

In the past, most of the ASM workers in Mererani appealed to the opposition since there were a lot of unresolved claims, including the abuses artisanal miners suffered at the hands of Tanzanite One. Mererani was the 'heart' of CHADEMA in Simanjaru District [where Mererani is located]. Both the Mererani Ward Councillor and the Member of Parliament (MP) were from CHADEMA.⁷³

Beyond the artisanal miners, it is conceivable that most stakeholders directly and indirectly connected to tanzanite mining may have also fallen for the opposition's pro-ASM message. For example, apart from mineral brokers and dealers who directly transact tanzanite with artisanal miners and have direct stakes in this industry, the entire economy of Mererani heavily depends on tanzanite trade. Moreover,

⁷¹ Third-party interview with a ward councillor in Manyara Region on 30th May 2021.

⁷² Third-party interview with mineral dealers' association chairman in Arusha on 25th May 2021.

⁷³ Third-party interview with a mayor in Manyara Region on 28th May 2021.

the economy of Arusha, one of Tanzania's largest cities and the hub of tanzanite trade, might also be significantly driven by tanzanite.

Again, like mining activities in other parts of Tanzania and Africa and unlike other informal economic activities, artisanal mining attracts miners beyond the borders of host communities. In this case, not all the artisanal miners were indigenes of Mererani or even Manyara and Arusha Regions. Instead, interviews with different participants underscore how Tanzanians from other parts of the country directly participate in the tanzanite economy while the use of a national identification system prevents most foreigners from engaging in artisanal tanzanite mining. For example, a CHADEMA politician suggested that: "Mererani mining activities are being done by people from all over the country; all regions are represented in Mererani. The population is mixed with all tribes from the country. There are no foreigners who are working as miners."⁷⁴

Similarly, a mineral brokers' chairman asserted that:

Mererani has all Tanzanians from every region; there is no dominance of certain people from a particular region but rather a mixed-up of Tanzanians from all over the country. The law does not allow outsiders to operate in ASM activities in Tanzania, so no people from other countries work as artisanal tanzanite miners.⁷⁵

The dynamics of the population of artisanal miners in areas such as Mererani, and the oppositional politics in artisanal mining, suggest how the opposition's pro-ASM message might have resonated with artisanal miners and their dependants from different parts of the country. Consequently, Magufuli listened to the concerns of artisanal miners and acted upon them.

The government puts itself closer to ASM operatives. Whenever there are any issues, the minister responsible for minerals would arrive to solve them or else he calls for a meeting with ASM operatives to listen and give solution to their issues.⁷⁶

Beyond listening to artisanal miners, Magufuli took radical measures that antagonised Tanzanite One and contributed to the company's exit from the country. For instance, in 2018, the regime set up a committee to investigate Tanzanite One, which led to the arrest of the company's managers. The investigation also culminated in the confiscation of the company's tanzanite ore and its closure.

⁷⁴ Third-party field interview with a local CHADEMA politician in Simanjiro District on 22nd May 2021.

⁷⁵ Third-party field interview with mineral brokers' chairman in Manyara Region on 27th May 2021.

⁷⁶ Third-party interview with a mayor in Manyara Region on 28th May 2021.

Different participants gave similar but slightly distinct detailed accounts of the committee's work. According to the report of one civil society actor,

Magufuli set up a committee in 2018 to investigate Tanzanite One. The committee's report showed that Tanzanite One had been evading taxes and abusing artisanal miners' rights. So, Magufuli arrested three officials of Tanzanite One and also prevented them from exporting tanzanite ore.⁷⁷

A more detailed account came from an elected politician.

The Parliament formed an investigative committee to investigate Tanzanite One's operations in Mererani; they realised that the company was oppressing the ASM operatives, and the government was not getting enough returns from the company as a partner. Then the government decided to stop its partnership with Tanzanite One.⁷⁸ It took back its mining license and ordered Tanzanite One to close its operation. Block C now remains under the government with no mining activities going on. ASM operatives regarded Magufuli as their heaven-sent redeemer.⁷⁹

Similarly, a mineral dealers' chairman had the following to say.

The Parliament created a special investigative committee whose chairman was the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Minerals to investigate what was going on in Tanzanite One and STAMICO. One of the recommendations they gave is that the agreement between Tanzanite One and STAMICO should be terminated; and the mining license at Block C should be returned to the government because the mining activities under Tanzanite One are not profitable. So, in 2020, STAMICO informed the Tanzanite One Company to surrender the Mining License. Then mining activities at Block C stopped.⁸⁰

Common across these data extracts is how Magufuli antagonised Tanzanite One leading to the company's exit from the country. Artisanal miners were the direct beneficiaries of this state-business dispute in at least two ways. First, the regime had finally taken care of the miners' main business

⁷⁷ Zoom interview with HakiMadini on 26th May 2021.

⁷⁸ In 2012, Tanzanite One ceded 50% of its equity to STAMICO, a parastatal mining company. Thus, the Tanzanian state formed a joint venture with Tanzanite One until Magufuli terminated this partnership.

⁷⁹ Third-party interview with a major in Manyara Region on 28th May 2021.

⁸⁰ Third-party field interview with mineral dealers' association chairman in Arusha on 25th May 2021.

opposition, Tanzanite One, ending years of human rights abuses and the disruption of the artisanal miners' operations. Second, although all mining activities might have temporarily stopped in Block C, with a declaration of block C "as a government Tanzanite reserve",⁸¹ it is possible that artisanal miners could access this block. This is because artisanal miners could intrude into block C even under Tanzanite One's management.

Magufuli's containment strategy appeared to have worked out for Magufuli and the CCM, as many artisanal miners are perceived to have switched from the opposition to the CCM in response to the CCM's pro-ASM stance. To one participant, the "CHADEMA lost its strong presence in Mererani and Simanjiro at large because people decided to support the government and CCM as they were positively touched by their policies regarding mining activities in Mererani."⁸² Similarly, a CCM-elected politician argued that:

Since Magufuli came to power, the majority of ASM operatives have been appealing to the CCM because Magufuli seems to favour and solve some of their complaints, unlike Kikwete's regime, whereby the majority of them were appealing to the opposition CHADEMA. You know, these Mererani people are not predictable. They can change their political affiliation anytime, especially when their interests in mining have been adversely affected by the government's policies and interventions.⁸³

To a large extent, Magufuli's response to the artisanal miners, like Mwinyi's, reflects how regimes faced with rising opposition popularity, particularly among artisanal miners, also generally favour artisanal miners over LSM companies. Across the different periods examined (Mwinyi: 1990 -1995 and Magufuli: 2015-2020), mining companies such as Sutton resources, AGA and Tanzanite One suffered varying degrees of neglect and antagonism by these regimes because the artisanal miners' votes mattered to the regimes. However, unlike Mwinyi, Magufuli also repressed some artisanal miners aligned with the opposition and appeared to have supported the opposition's political budget. The two sub-cases suggest that regimes in weak dominant settlements can appear vulnerable to social groups and tolerate them. Nonetheless, Magufuli's case shows how regimes in weak dominant settlements can vilify social groups that generate some rent to the opposition's political budget.

⁸¹ Third-party field interview with an official of MAREMA in Babati on 28th May 2021.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Third-party field interview with a mayor in Manyara Region on 28th May 2021.

3. Favouring LSM over ASM.

Between 1995 and 2005, political power in Tanzania shifted from one president to another within the CCM. President Benjamin William Mkapa, who won the 1995 elections and succeeded President Mwinyi, would win an overwhelming majority of the votes [72%] in 2000 and complete his second term in 2005. Following Mkapa's regime, a new CCM flagbearer, candidate Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, won the 2005 elections [by 80.3%] and later the 2010 elections (by 63%), completing his tenure in 2015. However, unlike Mwinyi and Magufuli discussed above, Mkapa and Kikwete confronted much weaker and fragmented political opposition parties, which made artisanal miners' votes less relevant to these regimes. Thus, these regimes could marginalise and repress artisanal miners while protecting and promoting the interests of LSM companies.

3.1. Mkapa's eviction of the artisanal miners in Bulyanhulu (1995-2005).

As presented earlier, the impasse between the artisanal miners in Bulyanhulu and Sutton Resources remained thorny before the 1995 elections. To reiterate, Mkapa's predecessor (Mwinyi) resisted corporate pressure brought to bear on him to evict the artisanal miners to make way for Sutton's project. Similarly, candidate Mkapa campaigned to support the artisanal miners before the election, which caused uneasiness in the circles of the Canadians (i.e., Sutton Resources and the Canadian High Commission). Nonetheless, Mkapa's post-election stance on the impasse in Bulyanhulu varied markedly from his pre-election campaign. Surprisingly, he directed the Shinyanga Regional Commissioner and Police Command to evict approximately 300,000 artisanal miners in Bulyanhulu in August 1996. Even worse for the artisanal miners, Sutton claimed that the regime opposed the idea of compensating the evicted miners as that would authorise illegality (Cooksey, 2011).

This eviction underscores how political parties and candidates do not necessarily seek office to pursue preconceived policies (i.e., campaign promises) (Downs, 1957). In other words, Mkapa's eviction policy contradicted his preconceived mining policy of promoting and supporting ASM, evident in his pro-ASM campaign message. However, while this eviction contravened a prior court order restraining the state from evicting the miners, it paved the way for Kahama Mining Corporation Ltd, a subsidiary of Sutton, to begin work on the Bulyanhulu Mine. Lissu (2002) implicated Chief Justice Nyalali, the Attorney General and the Inspector General of Police, claiming that these high-level political appointees supported the Shinyanga Regional Police Command and the Regional Commissioner in carrying out the evictions. The evictions illuminated the vulnerability of the Tanzanian judiciary in enforcing or adjudicating land disputes in the face of a powerful coalition of executive interests (i.e., President Mkapa, the Inspector General of Police and the Attorney General).

Although Mwinyi and Mkapa confronted similar corporate pressure to evict the artisanal miners, the politico-economic constraints favoured evictions of miners under Mkapa relative to Mwinyi. Indeed, it is worth noting that not only had Mkapa campaigned to promote ASM, but he had also campaigned to improve tax collection, address economic inequality and end endemic corruption that had so entangled the Mwinyi regime (Nyaluke & Connolly, 2013). Meanwhile, the latter campaign message of improving tax collection and addressing economic inequality sat with a broader electoral constituency (Nyaluke & Connolly, 2013) beyond artisanal miners. Nevertheless, with mining being a critical source of tax revenues for African governments, a campaign to improve tax collection meant creating an enabling environment for FDI flows into the country's natural resource sector.

Thus, following the 1995 election, the prospects looked brighter for LSM companies than they did for ASM since the country's mineral endowment constituted the most promising natural resource that required FDIs. Moreover, such FDI requirements became more pertinent when the Canadian High Commission argued that the country's failure to resolve the impasse between Sutton and the artisanal miners annihilated investor confidence in Tanzania's mining industry and prevented other more promising mining companies from investing in the country (Cooksey, 2011).

Before the eviction in August 1996, the Canadian High Commissioner, who also doubled as the new Sutton Chairman, Roman Shklanka, met with President Mkapa in April 1996 on the increasing tensions between Sutton and the artisanal miners. The High Commissioner is said to have requested the President to protect Canadian citizens and commercial interests in Bulyanhulu (Cooksey, 2011).⁸⁴ Canada's general position was that a successful operation by Sutton would imply the destruction of the illegal pits, which could spark off serious tensions without the regime's intervention (ibid). Consequently, Mkapa's vision of reviving the economy could hardly materialise without necessarily dealing with obstacles (i.e., artisanal miners) to the implementation of large-scale mining projects.

Thus, the quest for tax revenues from LSM projects might have motivated Mkapa's raid of the artisanal miners. However, Mkapa's response to the artisanal miners had much to do with the evolution of a different pattern of dominant political settlement [i.e., a strong dominant settlement] after the 1995 elections. As presented above, the opposition NCCR-Mageuzi threatened the CCM's survival just before the 1995 election due to Augustine Mrema's popularity and public disenchantment with Mwinyi's regime (Cooksey, 2011; Nyaluke & Connolly, 2013). Thus, while the period immediately preceding the 1995 election could have been characterised by a weak dominant political settlement,

⁸⁴ Cooksey (2011) reported that there were only four Canadian citizens in Bulyanhulu at the time. While one of these was attacked by a local miner through an alleged punch, the Canadian High Commission's version of the story was that the miner drew a knife at the Canadian citizen.

wherein the CCM faced a popular opposition, as others have observed (Khan, 2010), the period after the election approximated a strong dominant settlement.

This strong dominant settlement emerged from the lack of opposition institutionalisation, evident in the outcomes of the 1995 parliamentary elections, underscoring how the pre-election opposition momentum and threat would become unsustainable post-election. Despite the NCCR-Mageuzi's impressive performance in the 1995 presidential elections, garnering 27.8% of the votes and placing second, the party's performance in the 1995 parliamentary elections was mediocre, securing only 6.9% of the seats. By comparison, the CUF, an opposition party that managed a paltry 6.4% of the presidential votes, won 10.3% of the parliamentary seats and beat the NCCR-Mageuzi at this level (*table eight*).

The variation in the NCCR-Mageuzi's performance in the presidential and parliamentary elections, together with the party's and all other opposition parties' abysmal performance in the 1994 local elections (*see table three*), suggests how the opposition was weakly organised at the grassroots level (Nyaluke & Connolly, 2013). Therefore, the NCCR-Mageuzi's sustenance over time could not simply hinge on the popularity of Mrema, who was not a core party member. All these factors, along with the next election being in the distant future (2000), meant that Mkapa had much political latitude to evict the very artisanal miners Mwinyi tolerated and whom Mkapa had campaigned to support.

Table 8. Combined results of Tanzania's 1995 parliamentary and presidential elections.

Party	Number of seats won	Percentage of parliamentary seats won	Percentage of presidential votes
CCM	186	80.2	61.8
CUF	24	10.3	6.4
NCCR-Mageuzi	16	6.9	27.8
CHADEMA	3	1.3	-
UDP	3	1.3	4.0
Total	232	100	100

Source: Author's based on data from African Elections database (2011).

The Sutton victory over the Bulyanhulu miners, in a context of a strong dominant political settlement, was closely followed by further liberalisation of Tanzania's mineral economy. The regime eventually introduced the donor-sponsored 1998 Mining Act to replace the 1979 Mining Act. Being the product of Julius Nyerere, the 1979 Mining Act sought to promote an inclusive mining regime wherein both LSM and ASM had access to mineralised lands. The 1998 Mining Act, by comparison, saw LSM as the

mainstay of mining and therefore aimed to attract foreign mining capital investments into Tanzania's mining economy.

Consequently, evictions of artisanal miners to make way for large-scale mining projects became ubiquitous under Mkapa. A participant lamented that Mkapa had granted vast mineralised lands, previously mined by artisanal miners, to mining companies and evicted these artisanal miners through police invasions: "Under Mkapa, there were many police invasions of ASM on LSM concessions. The LSM companies were granted large concessions in areas where ASM was already taking place, leading to displacement and marginalisation of ASM."⁸⁵

These state-sponsored raids of artisanal miners problematise debates that regimes tolerate informal sectors with considerably vast populations (Holland, 2016; Weitz-Shapiro, 2014). While the approximately 300,000 artisanal miners evicted in Bulyanhulu is a relatively large number, the miners' political relevance did not simply lie in their numbers. Instead, the varying political settlement patterns under which Mwinyi and Mkapa governed, characterised by different oppositional politics, made the Bulyanhulu miners politically relevant to Mwinyi but not Mkapa and shaped the regimes' different responses to these miners.

3.2. Kikwete and artisanal miners. A marriage of convenience (2005-2015)?

In 2005, Kikwete won a landslide victory, garnering approximately 80% of the valid votes cast. This outcome was surprising because of the rising disaffection with the CCM's performance under Mkapa's last term (2000-2005). For instance, Nyaluke and Connolly (2013) contended that Mkapa's economic measures did little to transform the lives of Tanzanians, while Kelsall (2003) described how an anti-government bloc, known as the G46, demonstrated against Mkapa's regime over economic difficulties. With an ostensible mission of fighting for the ordinary man, the bloc's rhetoric highlighted the convergence between Mkapa's economic policies and the hardships of Tanzanians.

It argued that austerity – colloquially known as *Ukapa*, a derivative from Mkapa – and foreign capital domination of Tanzania's natural resources had exacerbated the miseries of Tanzanians. A 2002 report of an additional one and a half-million people reeling under the poverty line relative to the prior decade supported the bloc's agitation (Kelsall, 2003). Moreover, Mkapa's second term witnessed corruption scandals, one of which involved the high cost of the regime's contract with Independent Power Transmission Limited to supply electricity (Cooksey, 2017). Another involved the inflation of the price of a radar the regime purchased from British Aerospace (BAE). An investigation by the U.K. anti-

⁸⁵ Zoom interview with an official of LEAT on 24th May 2021.

corruption agency found BAE culpable of corruption and directed it to compensate Tanzania an amount of £30 million (BBC, 2010).

However, these political problems did not hinder Kikwete's election for at least two reasons. First, as a former minister under Mkapa's administration, Kikwete demonstrated his anti-corruption stance by dismissing corrupt officials and introducing financial management in the Finance Ministry. In addition, as a Foreign Minister, he played a vital role in conflict mediation and resolution in the Great Lakes Region (Nyaluke & Connolly, 2013). This political record and his contest with Mkapa in the 1995 presidential primaries, in which he (Kikwete) nearly won, made him the leader of choice. Second, Kikwete staged a vigorous anti-corruption and economic development campaign ahead of the 2005 election, promising prosperity to all Tanzanians through employment creation and poverty eradication (Nyaluke & Connolly, 2013).

Nonetheless, Mkapa's poor economic governance opened the CCM to criticism from civil society when Kikwete assumed office. Regarding the minerals sector, several CSOs coalesced around Mkapa's undue favouritism of foreign mining companies compared to indigenous artisanal miners. One participant posited that "CSOs had always fought for mining communities and ASM operatives since 1995. LEAT was a pioneer in this regard, pushing for reforms. We engaged with the Parliament to reform the ASM sector in terms of licensing and formalisation."⁸⁶

These early CSO-led advocacies for reforms in the mining sector created a policy niche for the political opposition. The CHADEMA, which would become a significant force in Tanzania's subsequent elections, immediately made reform of the ASM sector a core campaign message. Although CHADEMA came third in the 2005 presidential elections, garnering a paltry 5.9% of the valid votes cast, the party remained vociferous in advocating reforms in the mining sector. A leading CHADEMA member stressed that:

CHADEMA and civil society persistently brought the CCM's attention to artisanal and small-scale mining. We argued that the country could benefit from ASM if we support ASM. One of our MPs, Tundu Lissu, a mining expert and an academic, was the leading voice on mining sector reform.⁸⁷

While Kikwete had a landslide victory in the 2005 election, he responded somewhat positively to the rising pro-ASM voices, as we shall see shortly. However, this response was surprising because Kikwete

⁸⁶ Zoom interview with an official of LEAT on 24th May 2021.

⁸⁷ Interview with a leading member of the CHADEMA in Dar es Salaam on 19th December 2019.

previously held an anti-ASM position. For example, in 1993, as a Minister of Water, Energy and Minerals, Kikwete ignored an application filed by the District Commissioner of Kahama District, Edson Halinga, to stop the Mwinyi regime from evicting some 300,000 people in Bulyanhulu whose livelihoods depended on artisanal mining⁸⁸ (Cooksey, 2011). Thus, the call for reforms in the mining sector and the opposition's capitalisation on these calls were crucial in swaying Kikwete to initiate some pro-ASM reforms soon after his electoral victory in 2005.

The Bomani Commission, set up in 2008, was the culmination of two other committees (the 2004 Kipokola Committee and the 2006 Masha Committee), which called for an overhaul of the existing Mining Act as the starting place for mining sector reforms (Cooksey, 2011). Notably, the Bomani Commission found the 1998 Mining Act disproportionately skewed in favour of LSM companies and suggested the enactment of a new mining law that prioritises artisanal mining. Expectedly, the Canadian High Commission allegedly engaged with the Tanzanian parliamentary affairs to reject the Bomani Commission's conclusions (Cooksey, 2011).

Despite this external lobby, the country introduced a new mining policy in 2009 to replace the 1997 neoliberal mining policy. The new mining policy shaped the enactment of new mining law in 2010 to "support and promote the development of small-scale mining so as to increase its contribution to the economy" (The URT, 2009, p. 9). Some notable changes these reforms occasioned include the decentralisation of artisanal mining licenses from the national to zonal levels to ease license application and the provision of loans to artisanal miners seeking to expand their activities (Barreto, 2011).

However, these fundamental mining policy and legislative changes did not immediately shift the balance of power in the artisanal miners' favour. Instead, in the words of one elite participant, the reforms remained on paper throughout Kikwete's tenure:

We underwent policy change in the mining sector in 2009. The policy suggested that the government should always enhance the artisanal miners' capacity. But in the whole ten years of Kikwete Administration, we did not see the need to enhance the capacity of ASM.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Despite blocking the District Commissioner's application to protect the artisanal miners against eviction, the regime under which Kikwete served as a minister – i.e., the Mwinyi regime – did not evict the miners for the reasons discussed above. In other words, Kikwete's anti-ASM stance in 1993 could not prevent his boss (President Mwinyi) from putting up with the miners in Bulyanhulu.

⁸⁹ Zoom interview with an official of HakiRasilimali on 31st May 2021.

Generally, state-sponsored clampdown on artisanal miners continued⁹⁰ while mining companies could unleash untold atrocities on artisanal miners under Kikwete. A participant asserted that:

Under Presidents Mkapa and Kikwete, large-scale mining companies enjoyed the freedom to carry out their work in Tanzania without interruption in their licensed areas. Small-scale miners found on companies' premises were either killed or shot and maimed. Human rights abuses by large-scale mining companies were rampant. The security guards of the respective companies and the police collaborated to harass the small-scale miners found on the large-scale licensed concessions.⁹¹

The GGM was one mining site where AGA could frequently attack artisanal miners found on the company's concession. However, Lange (2006) reported that when AGA began full operations in 2002, there were no conflicts between artisanal miners and AGA in Geita since the GGM had fenced its concession. Lange's report hinged on fieldwork conducted in May 2004, barely two years after the new company began operations. Thus, when Kikwete came to office in 2005, artisanal miners began to encroach upon AGA's concession.⁹² Kikwete's response to these encroachments was that of force. A former AGA employee suggested that AGA could always call on state security to get the invading artisanal miners off the company's concession. These evictions victimised artisanal miners but also attenuated intrusions.⁹³

AGA could always request the government's security to get any intruding artisanal miners from the company's concession. Intrusions were uncommon and involved about 100 artisanal miners at a time. However, the evictions were sometimes very brutal and led to human rights abuses. Kikwete's regime was there to protect AGA's interest against artisanal miners.⁹⁴

Moreover, Kikwete also tacitly approved mining companies' use of lethal force to ward-off artisanal miners. A former underground miner for AGA in Geita recounted the securitisation of the company's concession under Kikwete.

⁹⁰ Interview with mining officials in Mwanza and Geita in December 2019 and January 2020 and third-party interview with mining officials in Mererani in June 2021.

⁹¹ Zoom Interview with an official of HakiMadini on 26th May 2021.

⁹² Interview with a mining official in Mwanza on 28th December 2019. Interview with a mining official in Geita on 3rd January 2020. Interview with a former AGA Manager in Geita on 23rd January 2020.

⁹³ This intrusion by 100 artisanal miners is insignificant compared to intrusions by about 4000 artisanal miners witnessed under Magufuli, as discussed above. Interview with a former AGA Manager in Geita on 23rd January 2020.

⁹⁴ Interview with a former AGA Manager in Geita on 23rd January 2020.

Under Kikwete, it was common for company security to go after small-scale miners across Tanzania. When I worked as an underground miner for AGA, I saw how the AGA's security could collaborate with state security agencies to evict the small-scale miners forcefully.⁹⁵

These state-cum-company-induced evictions occurred in Geita and other mining communities, such as Mererani, the world's only tanzanite mining site. Given Tanzanite One's location between two blocks of artisanal miners, mining conflicts were inevitable. Moreover, like other minerals, tanzanite is mined horizontally, so surface demarcations could not prevent underground intrusions and counter-intrusions by both artisanal miners and Tanzanite One. Thus, accusations and counteraccusations of intrusions ensued. While Tanzanite One often complained about artisanal miners invading Block C, artisanal miners complained about Tanzanite One invading Block B.

To the artisanal miners, Tanzanite One invaded block B deliberately because of the rich mineral deposit in this block. An elected official in Mererani narrated that:

There have been quarrels about the boundary between Block B and Block C. Block B has rich deposits as it used to be the property of Building Utility Company. However, this company closed, so the government relocated the block to artisanal miners. During the relocation process, Tanzanite One, which owned block C, shifted its boundaries into parts of Block B. So, it seemed like ASM operatives were invading block C. Nevertheless, the company had been smart enough to withdraw the boundaries. The government formed an investigative committee. I was one of the committee members. We went through the documents, read the coordinates, and went down to the mining pits. From the original boundary, we realised that Tanzanite One had tempered with the boundaries of Block B. We recommended that the original boundary be reinstated, but Tanzanite One disagreed. The government did not pursue this matter because it did not care about the artisanal miners.⁹⁶

Reflecting on these boundary disputes, the chairman of a mineral dealers' association in Arusha similarly argued that Tanzanite One had shifted its boundaries into the artisanal miners' block. To him, government looked on unperturbed because of its stake in Tanzanite One.

⁹⁵ Interview with a former AGA underground worker in Geita on 17th January 2020.

⁹⁶ Third-party interview with a mayor in Manyara Region on 28th May 2021.

It is not that ASM operatives intruded on Tanzanite One's concession (Block C). Instead, Tanzanite One was the one that crossed its boundary to Block B, which belongs to the artisanal miners. If it were artisanal miners that crossed to Block C, then the government could have addressed this situation with immediate effect because the government had an interest in Block C through the partnership with Tanzanite One.⁹⁷

Not only did the Kikwete regime ignore reports of Tanzanite One's intrusion into Block B, but also the regime sanctioned Tanzanite One's use of naked force to protect this contested boundary. One miner stressed that:

During Kikwete's administration, all the complaints and issues raised by ASM operatives regarding the attacks by Tanzanite One Ltd were not considered. We (artisanal miners) fought with Tanzanite One because the company was killing artisanal miners. Sometimes, Tanzanite One would pour water into our pits to stop us from mining. However, Kikwete did nothing about this. We just wanted Tanzanite One to stop invading Block B, which belongs to artisanal miners, and stop killing our fellow artisanal miners.⁹⁸

While the regime failed to protect artisanal miners against Tanzanite One's abuses, it responded to Tanzanite One's complaints about ASM intrusions. A local politician of the CHADEMA posited that: "Kikwete's regime and Tanzanite One would often accuse ASM operatives as thieves or armed robbers. ASM operatives ended up paying fines or getting jailed. During Kikwete's administration, the artisanal miners operated in a challenging environment."⁹⁹

The regime's pro-LSM posture undermined an informal dispute resolution mechanism, which the Manyara Regional Miners Association (MAREMA) had mediated between artisanal miners and Tanzanite One. Both artisanal miners and Tanzanite One had agreed that MAREMA would resolve all disputes relating to accusations of intrusions. However, this dispute resolution mechanism became moribund since Tanzanite One invariably resorted to state and company security as the more effective mechanism to address its grievances.

The MAREMA was to resolve all disputes between ASM and Tanzanite One. But Tanzanite One never resolved their dispute with the artisanal miners through MAREMA. Instead, the company's security and government security would beat up suspected intruders with wire. Sometimes, miners suspected to be intruders disappeared and were

⁹⁷ Third-party interview with mineral dealers' association chairman in Arusha on 25th May 2021.

⁹⁸ Third-party interview with a leader of a mining association in Mererani on 7th June 2021.

⁹⁹ Third-party interview with a local CHADEMA politician in Simanjiro District on 22nd May 2021.

never found. Tanzanite One had a partnership with the government, so the government was reluctant to intervene and save the artisanal miners.¹⁰⁰

Kikwete's response to the artisanal miners in Geita and Mererani was surprising because the CCM began to face a more organised and increasingly popular opposition post-2010. With the CCM's votes having significantly reduced during the 2010 election (*see figure six*) and the emergence of a more organised and popular political opposition, Kikwete should have tolerated the artisanal miners to buy them off in the next election (i.e., the 2015 election). However, the opposite occurred, and two factors illuminate this paradox. First, Tanzanite one had ceded off 50% of its equity to the state in 2012, making the state a joint owner of the company. Moreover, while the regime did not contribute to the company's operation, it received 50% dividends.¹⁰¹

Second and more importantly, despite the CCM confronting an organised political opposition in Kikwete's last term, this opposition might have threatened the CCM rather than Kikwete. Thus, as Kikwete was completing his second and final term, he also personally had little incentive to tolerate artisanal miners as a vote-buying mechanism. Nevertheless, this analysis contradicts President Mwinyi's tolerance of the artisanal miners in 1994, though he similarly ended his last term in 1995. Moreover, just as Augustine Mrema defected from the CCM to lead the opposition NCCR-Mageuzi in the 1995 election, Edward Lowassa also defected from the CCM to lead the opposition CHADEMA in the 2015 elections. Hence, not only were both Mwinyi and Kikwete ending their last terms but also the political pressures that the 1995 and 2015 elections brought to bear on the CCM were similar. Hence, we would have expected Kikwete to tolerate the miners ahead of the 2015 election, just like Mwinyi did before the 1995 election.

Nevertheless, Mwinyi and Kikwete also faced different constraints that might have motivated Mwinyi rather than Kikwete to tolerate the miners. First, unlike the 2015 election, the 1995 election was a founding election, making it imperative for Mwinyi to be more interested in the CCM's victory. Second, before the 1995 election, Mwinyi's regime was tainted by more corruption scandals, causing prominent CCM figures like Julius Nyerere to distance themselves from the regime (Nyaluke & Connolly, 2013). Third, Mrema defected to the opposition following his dismissal from the CCM for critiquing Mwinyi's poor handling of corruption scandals. In some sense, Mrema joined the opposition as a hero. In contrast, the 2015 election was not a founding election, while the Richmond corruption scandal tainted Prime Minister Lowassa's image.¹⁰² Thus, due mainly to the Richmond saga, Lowassa defected to the opposition not as a hero but for failing to get the CCM's flagbearer position.

¹⁰⁰ Third-party interview with a local CHADEMA politician in Simanjiro District on 22nd May 2021.

¹⁰¹ Zoom interview with an official of HakiMadini on 26th May 2021.

¹⁰² See section 2.2 of this chapter.

Consequently, although the CCM faced a popular opposition party under Mwinyi's and Kikwete's second terms, the different constraints these presidents faced, as elaborated above, more probably explain Mwinyi's tolerance of the artisanal miners relative to Kikwete. Hence, while Kikwete's mining reforms initially suggested a glimmer of hope for artisanal miners, his use of state security to raid miners and his disregard of company-led abuses of artisanal miners meant these initial reforms constituted a marriage of convenience arranged as a countermeasure to the pro-ASM voices that emerged in the mid-2000s.

4. Conclusion.

This chapter has argued that the changing nature of Tanzania's dominant political settlement creates differential political survival imperatives that drive the temporal variation in regime-ASM relations. Between 1990 and 1995, Tanzania operated under a weak dominant settlement since the opposition NCCR-Mageuzi held real disruptive potential just before the 1995 presidential election, threatening the CCM's political survival. Hence, despite corporate pressure for Mwinyi's regime to raid artisanal miners, the regime tolerated the miners.

Nonetheless, following the 1995 election, the country transitioned into a strong dominant settlement, giving the Mkapa regime the latitude to respond positively to corporate mining pressure by raiding artisanal miners. Similarly, President Kikwete's first term was generally characterised by a weak opposition, though the opposition gained some ground after his second term. However, Kikwete was generally hostile to artisanal miners as he was ending his second and last term and had no political incentive to tolerate the artisanal miners. In contrast, the opposition became a force that threatened Magufuli's regime and shaped his radical tolerance of artisanal miners' excesses.

This chapter demonstrated that different dominant political settlements generate different constraints for regimes of the same governing coalition with varying implications for development outcomes. Thus, it illustrated how contrary to the predictions of the business-state relations and LSM-bias literature, states do not invariably favour big business actors over informal and small business actors.

Chapter 5. Different Responses to Galamsey in Ghana.

1. Introduction.

This chapter explores differences in regime-ASM relations in Ghana. Following the return to multiparty democracy and the inception of Ghana's fourth republic in 1992, two main political parties have governed Ghana – the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) – and produced five regimes or presidents in the process. Some have described these parties as two sides of the same coin, whose similar political strengths also mediate their presentation of similar policy issues across a spectrum of sectors to voters (Ayee, 2016). Nevertheless, I find significant differences in how the parties relate to different groups of artisanal miners.

Unlike NPP regimes, NDC regimes' relations with indigenous galamsey operatives are so characterised by benignity and less antagonism that any repressive measure introduced by the NDC leaves most indigenous galamsey operatives off the hook while targeting foreign elements (mainly Chinese) in galamsey. In contrast, NPP regimes frequently militarise the artisanal mining sector in ways that repress and marginalise most indigenous galamsey workers while sparing foreign elements (predominantly Chinese) in galamsey. These patterned differences in regime-ASM relations in Ghana are intriguing, which I explain in chapter six.

In the meantime, the rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section one explores the NDC's benignity towards indigenous galamsey, demonstrating how the NDC's Rawlings and Mills respectively abstained from raiding the ASM sector despite evidence of ASM-induced diseconomies and calls by powerful voices for the eradication of galamsey. However, the section shows that while the NDC's Mahama raided the sector in 2013, this exercise targeted illegal Chinese miners and their local partners, leaving the majority of indigenous galamsey operatives unscathed. Moreover, Mahama tolerated indigenous artisanal miners that had illegally encroached upon AGA's Obuasi Mine in 2016. By contrast, section two presents evidence highlighting NPP regimes' malignity towards indigenous galamsey operatives. Particularly, the section reveals how the NPP's Akufo-Addo spared illegal Chinese miners but vilified indigenous galamsey operatives.

2. The NDC's benignity towards indigenous galamsey.

Ghana's fourth republic has produced three NDC presidents, including Presidents Rawlings, Mills and Mahama. Across these regimes, Rawlings and Mills did not raid artisanal miners post-democratic rule despite evidence of ASM-induced externalities. Nonetheless, Rawlings had not always been tolerant of artisanal miners. Instead, before the return to multi-party democracy, he was virulent towards galamsey, an approach that changed radically from 1992 onwards. Under Rawlings and Mills, indigenes or Ghanaians dominated artisanal mining. However, this dynamic changed when Mahama took office in 2012 as many foreigners (mainly Chinese nationals), responding to the spikes in gold prices (*figure eight*), had infiltrated the country's artisanal mining landscape. Thus, unlike Rawlings and Mills, Mahama briefly cracked down on the ASM sector over two weeks, but this raid was more anti-Chinese than anti-ASM. Most indigenous artisanal miners remained untouched as the regime empathised with them amid the raid.

2.1. Rawlings' changing relations with indigenous galamsey (1983-2000).

Being Ghana's first President under the fourth republic, governing from 1992 to 2000, Jerry John Rawlings' tenure overlapped Ghana's experimentation with neoliberalism or structural adjustment programmes. In 1983, as part of a broader attempt to resuscitate Ghana's ailing economy, Rawlings' military junta – the PNDC – turned to the Bretton Woods institutions for a bailout. Thus, Ghana was among the first African countries to adopt SAPs, which in Ghana's case, took the form of an Economic Recovery Programme. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank supported Ghana's ERP at a cost of approximately SDR 1.21 million, conditional on several policy requirements, including the privatisation of state assets and enterprises (Bawumia, 1998).


As discussed in section four of chapter three, the ERP prioritised reforms in strategic economic sectors such as the minerals sector, wherein foreign capital was a prerequisite to unlocking the sector's potential. The ensuing reforms, which granted fiscal concessions to foreign mining capital, resulted in the injection of about US\$4 billion worth of FDI into the gold mining sector. Moreover, between 1985 and 1990, some mining companies positively responded to these reforms by making new investments in the country's mining sector, with the gold sub-sector alone constituting 98.5% of these investments (*see table nine*). As a result, mineral production increased significantly between 1983 and 1995 (*figure seven*).

Table 9. Investment by mining companies (including loans and equity) from 1985 to 1990.

Company	\$ million	Share of Investment (%)
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (AGC)	253.0	54.62
State Gold Mining Corporation	55.0	11.87
Billiton Bogosu Gold	90.0	19.43
Other Gold Mining Companies	58.2	12.56
Ghana Bauxite Company	3.0	0.65
Ghana National Manganese Corporation.	4.0	0.86
Total	463.2	100

Source: Author's based on data from Aubynn (1997).

Figure 7. Major minerals production in Ghana (1983-2020).



Source: 1983 to 1989 figures from Aubynn (1997); 1990-2019 figures from Ghana Chamber of Mines (2021).

As *table nine* illustrates, investment from gold mining companies, as a response to the neoliberal reforms, dwarfed investments from other mineral companies. Moreover, private gold mining companies (AGC, Billiton, and others) accounted for 86.61% of these investments. Expectedly, the surge in gold investment also reflected exponential increases in gold production compared to other mineral productions (*figure five*).

Given these returns, the PNDC initially raided artisanal miners that encroached upon gold mining companies' concessions. Aubynn (2009, p. 66) described the situation as follows:

During the military regime of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government of the 1980s, it was common to witness police raids on galamsey operators in the Wassa West mining district, which occasionally culminated in arrests and prosecutions.... The brutal nature of some of the raids, commonly called 'scatter', occasionally led to fatalities and abuse of human rights.

Interviews with national and sub-national authorities and artisanal miners confirmed these raids. One sub-national participant reflected on his experience of Rawlings' brutality against artisanal miners under the PNDC: "When I was young in the 1980s, Rawlings' military regime used to attack illegal miners in Obuasi."¹⁰³ Similarly, according to one artisanal miner in a focus group discussion, "Rawlings was using the military to evict illegal miners all over Obuasi during the military rule."¹⁰⁴

Also, a sub-national elite participant commented that:

Rawlings' military regime clamped down heavily on ASM in the late 1980s, although the sector was no nuisance to the environment. Since Ghana had just liberalised its economy and the mining sector was seen as the engine of private sector development, it was a taboo for ASM to stand in the way of LSM companies.¹⁰⁵

Likewise, a former Minister of Lands and Natural resources observed the PNDC's abuse of illegal miners, blaming these attacks on the artisanal miners' contribution to the state's revenue losses.

Up until the 1990s, artisanal mining was a proscribed activity. The environment was not the main reason for which Rawlings attacked these miners. The main reason was the revenue losses to the state. Rawlings' crackdown was brutal because he could deploy a whole contingent of the military to flush out ASM.¹⁰⁶

Thus, the PNDC's apparent resolve to protect mining companies' interests resonates with the thinking that the neoliberal state may establish the "military, defence, police and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning

¹⁰³ Interview with a local government official at the Obuasi Municipal Assembly on 11th July 2019.

¹⁰⁴ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village B on 2nd July 2019.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with a former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources in Accra on 13th June 2019.

of market” (Harvey, 2007, p. 2). Some even observed that before Ghana’s ERP, regimes overlooked the illegal nature of galamsey as large-scale mining prospecting and operations were almost moribund (Hilson, 2002a). Therefore, it seems plausible that the ERP’s revival of the LSM industry and the need to protect LSM interests would invariably translate into incessant state-sponsored attacks on marauding artisanal miners over time.

Surprisingly, however, these raids ceased following the return to multiparty elections in 1992. Rawlings won the 1992 and, subsequently, the 1996 elections, ending his tenure in January 2001. Throughout his democratic tenure, crackdown measures almost disappeared, although artisanal miners encroached upon mining companies’ concessions. Major ASM-LSM clashes occurred across mining communities in Ghana in this period without the state intervening to protect mining companies. For instance, no sooner had Teberebie Goldfields in Tarkwa, Ghana’s Western Region, begun operations in 1991 than conflict ensued between the company and artisanal miners, with the artisanal miners adamantly refusing to vacate the concession (Agyapong, 1998; Aubynn, 2009; Hilson, 2002c). Aubynn (2009) particularly alleged that these violent clashes at Tarkwa left a Goldfields Ltd staff viciously battered.

Similarly, Ashanti Goldfields Company (AGC) Ltd – now AGA – experienced violent clashes with artisanal miners in 1996 at the Obuasi mine. While Hilson (2002b) estimated that the clashes cost AGC US\$ 1 million, Aubynn (2009), a former CEO of Ghana’s Chamber of Mines and Minerals Commission, put the cost at US\$ 10 million. Despite the variation in the cost estimation, what is evident is that the ASM-induced encroachments were costly. Nevertheless, AGC suffered another attack in December 2000 wherein artisanal miners burnt the company’s poultry farms and bolted away with its livestock (Hilson, 2002b). During a focus group interview with artisanal miners in one community in Obuasi, the miners reminisced about attacking the company’s farms and stealing its gold ore:

AGC had taken all the land and would not let us do galamsey. Even where they were not mining the land, they were growing maize and rearing livestock. So, we mobilised and attacked the farms. We killed several pigs, stole some gold ore, and made a feast out of pigs. We were surprised that Rawlings did not bring the military after us. Maybe he realised that the job opportunities in the country were few and so it was pointless for him to stop galamsey.¹⁰⁷

Hilson (2002b) describes how the state’s security failed to end these incessant encroachments on mining companies’ concession: “The management of Ghanaian large-scale mining operations is becoming increasingly frustrated with galamsey. Certain managers and mine engineers also feel that the efforts

¹⁰⁷ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village B on 2nd July 2019.

governmental policy-making bodies have made to resolve these land use conflicts have been marginal at best” (p. 152). Therefore, granted the regime’s indifference to the mining companies’ vulnerability to ASM-induced encroachments, several companies proactively engaged and accommodated the artisanal miners as a conflict prevention mechanism.

For example, when Gold Fields Ghana Ltd (GFGL) operationalised its Tarkwa mine in 1998, artisanal miners had long been mining this concession. Nonetheless, the management undertook geochemical prospection of its Tarkwa concession in the Western Region and allocated portions of the land that contained alluvial deposits to resident artisanal miners as alluvial deposits are not amenable to large-scale mining (Hilson, 2002b). Nevertheless, these miners, issued with identity cards, had agreed to sell their mineral products to GFGL at prevailing market prices. Similarly, Abosso Goldfields Ltd, also in the Western Region, encountered approximately 800 artisanal miners operating on its legally acquired concession in the early 1990s. Having failed to get the police to evict these miners, the management identified and registered about 700 miners to mine portions of the company’s concession on the condition that the miners would sell off their mined products to the company (Appiah, 1998).

These companies’ adaptations to Rawlings’ unwillingness to raid the miners were innovative. However, Rawlings’ apathy to the companies’ plight is baffling, granted his implementation of Ghana’s ERP, which spurred investments from these companies. In his bid to explain Rawlings’ tolerance of the artisanal miners’ provocative behaviours, Aubynn (2009, p. 66) argued that Rawlings lacked a political will to raid the miners:

The lack of political will to control illicit mining in the country has become even more evident since the inception of constitutional rule in 1993. The-then National Democratic Congress government did not possess the political will to control ASM operations: it was of the view that any attempt to stop galamsey operations without the provision of acceptable alternative livelihood sources risked putting more people out of a job, with suicidal political consequences.

Indeed, it is tempting to emphasise democratic transition and the political competition it spawns as an explanation for Rawlings’ tolerance of artisanal miners in the 1990s. However, while Rawlings might have tolerated these miners for votes, these miners came under regular attacks under subsequent NPP regimes, as we shall see. Therefore, the argument that Rawlings’ NDC tolerated artisanal miners for votes would imply that NPP regimes could not be bothered by artisanal miners’ votes. However, it is unclear why artisanal miners’ votes, in a competitive political system, would not similarly matter to contending regimes. Nevertheless, Rawlings’ benign relation with galamsey marks striking similarities with Mills’ and accentuates the NDC’s benignity towards indigenous artisanal miners.

2.2. Mills. Ignoring the GCM's lobby against galamsey (2009-2012).

Like Rawlings, President Mills avoided confrontations with artisanal miners. However, Mills' tenure immediately preceded the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, which surged demand for gold on the global market and led to exponential increases in gold prices (*figure eight*). Some consider this price surge fundamental in fuelling artisanal miners' encroachment on mining companies' concessions (Okoh, 2014). Thus, following his electoral victory in December 2008 and his January 2009 inauguration, Mills came under increasing pressure from the GCM, an association of LSM companies, to raid artisanal miners encroaching on mining companies' concessions.

Figure 8. Overtime change in global gold price.



Source: BullionByPost (2021).

Thus, through its annual Performance of the Mining Industry (PMI) reports, the GCM carried out anti-ASM advocacies during Mills' tenure, particularly highlighting the threat that illegal artisanal miners pose to the large-scale gold mining industry. For instance, the 2011 PMI report lamented how expanding illegal mining activities directly threatened the large-scale gold mining industry and compelled mining companies to spend extra resources to protect their concessions.

The increasing activities of illegal mining operators continue to be a threat to the good standing and image of the regulated mining industry. These activities of the illegal miners have escalated due to the relatively high price of gold in 2011. Due to this menace, gold

mining companies had to spend huge sums of money to protect their concessions with mixed success (GCM, 2011, p. 14).

The report further underscored the adverse effects of illegal mining on arable land and water resources, contending that ASM-induced water pollution adds to the country's water processing costs.

Illegal mining has taken on a disturbing trend as illegal miners expand their activities onto public lands and in water bodies, polluting and destroying these natural resources extensively. Besides the resulting higher cost of treating the polluted water, the Ghana Urban Water Company had been compelled to augment its processing plant with high cost clarifiers (GCM, 2011, p. 14).

Despite the claim that ASM destroys public lands and water bodies, hard-rock ASM operatives, who tend to invade LSM concessions, have little association with water pollution in Ghana compared to alluvial ASM workers. However, the Chamber may have emphasised the ASM-induced water pollution as a necessary mechanism to evoke public sentiments against all forms of ASM to elicit the appropriate political response. Given the positive association between property rights protection and the attraction of FDIs into democratic countries (Li et al., 2018), the argument that hard-rock miners encroached on mining companies' concessions could block FDI flows into Ghana's mining sector. Again, because gold mining companies pay taxes on their profits, surging operational costs emanating from a rise in ASM activities could translate into low LSM profit margins and therefore reduce LSM tax contributions.¹⁰⁸

Business-state relations theses predict that big businesses are better organised and can influence government policy. Moreover, because capital is mobile, big businesses can threaten governments with capital relocation to impact policy (Haggard et al., 2019; Hilson & Maconachie, 2020; Olson, 2012). Accordingly, the GCM sought to leverage its organisational wherewithal and the considerable capital base of its members to lobby President Mills' regime to evict ASM operatives. Nonetheless, Mills did not yield to this 'capitalist coercion.' Expectedly, subsequent PMI reports re-emphasised ASM's negative externalities while criticising the Mills regime for failing to deal with ASM.

As predicted and advocated by the Ghana Chamber of Mines a few years ago, illegal mining has become an environmental, health, safety, and security nightmare to Ghana. Its economic implications are dire for the country. Unfortunately, the Chamber of Mines' repeated advocacy for government to take a leadership role to deal decisively with the

¹⁰⁸ Interview with an official of the Ghana Chamber of Mines in Accra on 17th May 2019.

menace went unheeded. This was when the illicit activity occurred mainly on encroached concession of member companies. Whilst their focus has not shifted entirely from member companies' concessions, today, illegal miners mine every conceivable land or water body where they expect to find gold. Given the nomadic nature of their activities, illegal miners leave in their trail polluted water bodies, craters and general destructions of flora and fauna. Various experts including the Ghana Water Company have cautioned that the nation may face an imminent catastrophe, considering the rate at which its water bodies are being destroyed primarily through illegal mining activities. In the very near future, the already increased cost of treating water to make it potable will escalate due to extensive pollution of the water bodies. Ultimately, the volume of potable water that can be produced nationwide will be reduced sharply if the spate of water pollution continues (GCM, 2012, pp. 16–17).

However, President Mills refused to clamp down on ASM operatives despite these anti-ASM advocacies. A focus group discussion with artisanal miners in a community in Obuasi underlined Mills' tolerance of illegal miners: "When Atta Mills came to power, he realised that there is no work in Ghana, so he did not stop the galamseyers. He tolerated us until his death."¹⁰⁹ Similarly, miners in another community in Obuasi relived their experiences under Mills, praising him for not evicting them.

The government under whose tenure we enjoyed doing galamsey was President Mills of the NDC. He never sent the military to disturb us when he came to power. Although he appreciated that galamsey was destroying land, he also saw that he had not created any job opportunities for the youth and so he did not stop galamsey.¹¹⁰

According to one participant, Mills' tolerance of illegal mining in Obuasi emboldened some illegal miners to access AGA's core concessions. As a result, AGA adapted to these encroachments by ceding off portions of its abandoned concessions to the illegal miners to prevent them from invading the company's most sensitive underground shafts and tunnels. Given this corporate gesture, the illegal miners formed a taskforce to prevent miners from going beyond the boundaries of the ceded concessions. Unfortunately, while this 'live and let's live' approach initially kept the illegal miners at bay, the miners soon encroached upon the company's sensitive underground shafts without any corresponding action from the Mills regime.

¹⁰⁹ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village A on 1st July 2019.

¹¹⁰ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village A on 1st July 2019.

Between 2009 and 2011, illegal and small-scale mining shot up. Despite the public outcry against the proliferation of illegal mining in Ghana, the government adopted a *see no evil, hear no evil* response to such public outcry and allowed ASM operatives to mine. One of the dire effects of the government's inaction against the proliferation of illegal mining was that some illegal miners were emboldened to enter parts of the core concessions of AGA. Following a fruitless effort by the AGA to stop such invading ASM operatives, AGA released portions of their abandoned concessions to the illegal miners to get them out of the core concession. In return, the illegal miners also promised to form a taskforce to ensure that no illegal miner enters AGA's core concession. Therefore, the taskforce arrested its members who invaded AGA's main concession and handed them over to the company. This informal arrangement worked well for both the company and the illegal miners. However, over a year after this informal agreement between AGA and the ASM association, some illegal miners began invading the company's core concession again. The Taskforce could not stop such invasions because the invaders were in their thousands. There was also a failure on the part of the government to act decisively against the illegal miners.¹¹¹

Beyond putting up with these miners, Mills also compelled some mining companies to relinquish parts of their commercially viable concessions, which the regime intended to develop and allocate to artisanal miners.

We had previously been forcibly asked to cede off portions of our concessions in Nkasaemu around the Goaso area to the government between 2009 and 2011. The ceded concessions were to be given out for ASM purposes. These concessions were commercially viable. Therefore, the company may have ceded it back to the government reluctantly. However, the land belongs to the government, and they can always take it back even though it is leased out to us. If the government gave you land today and decided that they want it back tomorrow, how do you contest them? This land was given to small-scale miners, presumably the legal guys.¹¹²

Mills' pro-ASM stance was consistent with his pre-2008 election campaign. An official at the Minerals Commission recalled Mills' campaign on ASM that underscored artisanal miners' marginality under the previous regime (Kufour's regime) and the need to promote ASM as a livelihood option.

¹¹¹ Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019.

¹¹² Interview with the community relations manager of a mining company in Accra on 31st July 2019.

Mills and his NDC party campaigned vigorously in ASM constituencies (Such as Wassa Akropong) to make the sitting government unpopular because of the ASM policies. He said that the ASM policy implemented by the Kufour government was the source of their poverty. He argued that granted the power, his government would regularise ASM and ensure that they work and gain their livelihood from mining.¹¹³

A former NDC Minister of Lands and Natural Resources echoed a similar worldview when he suggested that the NDC's manifesto under Mills aimed at regularising ASM as an employment creation venture.

We are talking about up to one million people involved in small-scale mining, so there is a political question: how do you settle those people? No government can claim to have the power to create employment for one million people. So, if one million people are already working illegally, you must start to think about how to regulate them and bring them within the ambit of law and ensure that they continue to mine. This way, you will be providing the needed business environment for them while safeguarding the environment. When you look at the 2006 – 2008 Atta mills' manifesto, it spoke about regularising small-scale mining.¹¹⁴

Indeed, the NDC's 2008 manifesto was a harbinger of how the Mills regime would relate to ASM vis-à-vis LSM. The manifesto posited that:

Deregulated mining has sacrificed our mining communities. They face conflict, dislocation, environmental degradation, [and] unemployment. The sector must be reorganised to benefit communities and develop Ghana. A new NDC government will resolve the sector's difficulties [by] strengthen[ing] environmental regulation and enforcement in mining areas; abolish[ing] investment agreements that make mining operations exempt from legislative reforms and national emergencies; captur[ing] more income for the communities and for development;...improv[ing] capacity of small-scale operations and reduc[ing] illegal galamsey (NDC, 2008, p. 5).

A critical look at this manifesto shows how it blamed mining companies for the conflict mining communities faced, and the environmental degradation and dislocation meted out to mining communities. However, while the manifesto also talked about strengthening ASM operatives' capacities and reducing illegal galamsey, it remained silent on how it would reduce illegal galamsey.

¹¹³ Interview with an official of the Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st June 2019.

¹¹⁴ Interview with a former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources in Accra on 13th June 2019.

Nevertheless, it seemed an implicit pathway was to build the miners' capacities rather than evict them. Arguably, the consistency between Mills' campaign message on ASM and his noncombative approach to ASM challenges Downs' (1957, p. 137) argument that political parties are less concerned with the pursuit of 'preconceived policies...to serve [preconceived] interest groups.'

Thus, interesting parallels could be drawn between the NDC's Mills' and Rawlings' relations with artisanal miners under Ghana's Fourth Republic. Both regimes abstained from violent evictions of artisanal miners, which was strange because, on the one hand, Rawlings had supervised the implementation of Ghana's ERP, attracting FDI into the mining sector. Therefore, Rawlings should have expectedly acted against the marauding artisanal miners. On the other hand, it was surprising that Mills, being a professor of Economics and Law, ignored the GCM's advocacy against illegal mining and its impact on the environment and mining companies. Nonetheless, unlike Rawlings and Mills, President Mahama of the NDC briefly raided the artisanal mining sector. However, this exercise incriminated illegal Chinese miners, leaving most indigenous illegal miners off the hook. In essence, all three NDC regimes remained pro-ASM despite the subtle differences between Rawlings and Mills on the one hand and Mahama on the other.

2.3. Mahama. Repressing illegal Chinese miners but not indigenous galamseyers (2012-2016).

In July 2012, President Mills passed away. His Vice President, (John Dramani Mahama) who served as a 'caretaker' President, eventually won the December 2012 elections. Following his inauguration in January 2013, Mahama constituted the National Security Sub-committee on Lands and Natural Resources – christened *Operation Halt* – to eradicate illegal mining. The committee had an unambiguous mandate to, among other things, confiscate the equipment of locals and foreigners involved in illegal mining while arresting and prosecuting these miners.¹¹⁵

Nonetheless, this exercise discriminated against external elements in ASM while sparing most indigenous illegal artisanal miners. Notably, illegal Chinese miners that had flooded Ghana's artisanal mining landscape became targets of Operation Halt. For instance, justifying why Operation Halt targeted illegal Chinese miners, a former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources argued that most of the illegal miners were non-Ghanaians with Asian origins predominantly.

At the time that we entered to flush illegal small-scale miners out of the mining site, most of the persons involved in small-scale mining were non-Ghanaians. These were foreigners and we didn't need any evidence to show they were breaking the law. There were even

¹¹⁵ Interview with a former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources in Accra on 13th June 2019.

some Russian and west African nationals engaged in illegal ASM. However, because of the similar skin colours of the west African nationals, we needed to see their documentation to separate them from their Ghanaian counterparts. But you didn't need any other evidence to prove that a Chinese, a Russian, or a Korean working in small-scale mining was doing an illegal activity.¹¹⁶

The sector minister further described how China attempted to lobby the regime's intent to evict the illegal Chinese miners.

When we said foreigners must leave, they thought we were joking because there were perhaps more than 5000 foreign nationals in the illegal mining business. We set up a day in June 2013. We were in four regions on the same day: Eastern, Ashanti, Central and Western Regions. I was advised by Gbevlo Lartey, then national security coordinator, to keep the date of our intervention secret because it was in the form of warfare. When the Chinese heard that we were preparing to rid the ASM sector of illegalities, they brought emissaries from China and said that the Chinese were victims. But we said we are not talking about victims. They argued that the Chinese were lured into small-scale mining by Ghanaians, but we argued that the Chinese have always known that foreigners are not supposed to engage in small-scale mining. Our operation was like a dragnet in which the net was put across the ASM areas to ensure that no illegal miners escaped. The first groups of Chinese who ran into the net, we arrested them and brought them to immigration. We screened all of them to make sure that they were all engaged in small-scale mining. About 5000 Chinese were deported.¹¹⁷

Crawford and Botchwey (2017, p. 453) similarly observed this China-centric raid, arguing that “no Ghanaian miners were arrested or prosecuted.”¹¹⁸ This military exercise might have strained diplomatic relations between Ghana and China. Like many African countries in the sub-region, Ghana seeks Chinese loans for its development programmes (Hilson et al., 2014). Before the mass deportations, Ghana and China had finalised a US\$3 billion loan agreement. However, access to this facility delayed after the deportations. The Guardian's Afua Hirsch (2013) reported that Ghana blamed these delays on the deportations: “Ghana's government said claims that delays in Ghana being able to access a \$3bn loan facility agreed with China recently were related to the current events.” Moreover, Hirsch's (2013,

¹¹⁶ Interview with a former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources in Accra on 13th June 2019.

¹¹⁷ Interview with a former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources in Accra on 13th June 2019.

¹¹⁸ While no Ghanaian miner may have been arrested or prosecuted, Mahama certainly attacked Chinese-linked Ghanaian galamsey operatives. See sub-section 3.3 of chapter six for more discussion on this subject.

n.p.n) interview with Alhaji Inusah Fuseini, Ghana's former Minister of Lands, revealed how, following the deportations, Ghanaians struggled to access visas from the Chinese Embassy in Ghana.

Of late we have seen a tightening of the visa regime at the Chinese embassy for Ghanaians. We don't know whether this is a manifestation of our actions to deport illegal Chinese goldminers.... This is a matter for concern. Relations between China and Ghana go back a long way, and they had been on the rise until we started the expulsion of foreigners from our illegal mining sites. We didn't think China would take it to this extent.

Regarding why Mahama's regime deported over 5000 Chinese illegal miners rather than prosecuting them, an official at the Minerals Commission explained that the country's Minerals and Mining Law had no explicit provision for prosecuting foreigners engaged in illegal mining in Ghana.

The Minerals and Mining Act at the time did not specify that foreigners involved in galamsey should be prosecuted. This is why the Ghana Immigration Service used its law to deport them. This is also why immigration personnel were involved in Operation Halt alongside Minerals Commission officials, the Police, and the Military.¹¹⁹

While being brutal against illegal Chinese miners, perceived to be profit-oriented rather than poverty-driven (Hilson et al., 2014), Mahama sympathised with the indigenous galamsey workers, positing that these miners were "only doing it [i.e., galamsey] to earn a living" (Duodu, 2015, n.p.n). Indeed, the Ghana National Association of Small-Scale Miners (GNASSM), an umbrella body of supposedly licensed Ghanaian artisanal miners, played a crucial role in shaping the scope of Mahama's Operation Halt. A leading GNASSM official explained how Operation Halt became China-centric.

During Inusah Fuseini's time, we had no trouble engaging with the government. We had a series of meetings, and our input on issues was taken. In one of our meetings, we explained why the government's plan to raid the ASM sector needed to target only unlicensed miners. We argued that those responsible for the water pollution and land degradation are mainly Chinese and unlicensed Ghanaian miners and that we, the licensed ones, operated according to the mineral regulations.¹²⁰

A former NDC Minister of Lands, who regarded GNASSM as his ally in dealing with illegal mining, confirmed the convivial relationship between the NDC and GNASSM.

¹¹⁹ Interview with an official of the Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st June 2019.

¹²⁰ Interview with a GNASSM official in Kumasi on 19th July 2019.

I identified them [GNASSM] as my allies and always told them so. They used to give me information. One day I was lying on my bed when one of them called me and implicated an MP. I called the MP and said if he doesn't get the people to stop illegal mining, I am going to make it public.¹²¹

The GNASSM-NDC amicable relationship may stem from the fact that the NDC regime under Mills facilitated the organisation of GNASSM in 2011. However, while it seems like GNASSM represents the interests of only licensed miners, I observed in a two-day mining conference organised by Third World Network that the boundary between licensed and unlicensed mining is blurred and that GNASSM probably represents both licensed and unlicensed miners' interests. Actively participating in this conference as GNASSM members were Obuasi artisanal miners.¹²² Meanwhile, as of 2019, all artisanal miners in Obuasi were unlicensed miners since the Minerals Commission would not issue licenses in this mining area. This is because AGA owned the Obuasi concession, which spanned about five administrative districts. As a participant argued:

All small-scale miners in Obuasi are illegal miners. The entire Obuasi concession, which covers some five administrative districts, belongs to AngloGold Ashanti. So, the Minerals Commission does not issue ASM licenses to artisanal miners that want to operate in Obuasi.¹²³

Thus, unlicensed miners connected to the GNASSM may have escaped Operation Halt in 2013. For instance, illegal miners in one of the communities I visited in Obuasi admitted that they could still mine despite the 2013 raid, describing Mahama's raid as anti-Chinese rather than anti-indigenous miners.

Even when Mahama sent soldiers to drive out galamseyers in 2013, Obuasi was not really affected. The military did not frequently come here, so we could still do illegal mining. I think Mahama was more interested in the illegal Chinese miners who were into alluvial mining.¹²⁴

¹²¹ Interview with a former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources in Accra on 13th June 2019.

¹²² Personal observations in a Third World Network Conference on 14th and 15th May 2019.

¹²³ Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019. CESIS also revealed that mining companies in Ghana typically secure more mineralised lands than they need, often rendering community members (mainly farmers and existing artisanal miners) landless. These outcomes motivate community members to encroach upon mining companies' assets. As we saw under subsection 2.2 of this chapter, President Mills compelled one mining company to release portions of its mineralised lands for further development for small-scale miners.

¹²⁴ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village A on 1st July 2019.

Miners in another community in Obuasi expressed similar views. Here, they compared Mahama's raid in 2013 to a subsequent raid under the NPP (which I discuss below), regretting their decision to vote against Mahama in the 2016 election as they later regarded Mahama as pro-indigenous ASM President.

We wish we had not voted Mahama out. His clampdown measure was very short and did not affect us much. One of my brothers in galamsey was building a house during Mahama's era. I advised him not to vote for Akufo-Addo because Akufo-Addo does not like galamsey. He ignored me and voted for Akufo-Addo. Soon after the election, Akufo-Addo asked every miner to get their equipment off-site. My brother could not complete his house. Another friend wailed because he had not made enough savings from galamsey before Akufo-Addo's ban.¹²⁵

In line with the LSM-bias thesis, a regime interested in curtailing illegal mining would expectedly have targeted these indigenous artisanal miners who tend to threaten mining companies. However, the experiences of indigenous artisanal miners highlight the China-centric nature of Mahama's attacks and support Tschakert's (2016, p. 127) argument that Operation Halt vilified Chinese miners who were "easy-to-single-out culprit for environmental destruction, economic losses, mismanagement, and persistent informality in the ASM sector."¹²⁶

Moreover, following the deportation of thousands of Chinese miners, Mahama formulated Ghana's first minerals policy in 2014 to guide the extraction of mineral resources. Concerning ASM, the new policy had three objectives:

- i. Artisanal and Small-scale miners would be assisted to improve upon their operations.
- ii. Artisanal and Small-scale mining is reserved for Ghanaian citizens.
- iii. Government will continue to ensure the use of appropriate, safe and affordable technologies in small-scale mining (Republic of Ghana, 2014, pp. 41–43).

¹²⁵ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village B on 2nd July 2019.

¹²⁶ The assumption implicit in this argument is that the Ghanaian state would, over time, malign illegal Chinese miners. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in sub-section 3.2 of this chapter, the NPP-led Ghanaian state tolerated illegal Chinese miners and rather attacked indigenous galamsey operatives. This is a puzzle I unravel in chapter six.

Nonetheless, the policy differentiated between legal and illegal artisanal miners, noting that “nothing in this policy document should be construed to equate small-scale mining with illegal mining” (Republic of Ghana, 2014, p. 43). However, the policy underscored the mitigation of the adverse effects of ASM through the dissemination of “information to raise awareness of health, safety and environmental risks, and...revise and disseminate occupational health and safety guidelines for small-scale mining” (p. 43). Since illegal artisanal miners are responsible for more than 80% of all ASM-related degradations, it is apparent that this policy document did not exclude illegal artisanal miners.

Further to the mining policy, Mahama introduced an ASM framework and implementation plan to promote ASM. Among other strategies and expected outcomes, the plan aimed to educate illegal artisanal miners to regularise their activities. It also aimed to geologically investigate and demarcate 20 blocked-out areas for ASM and decentralise ASM license acquisition to the district level to ease license application (Minerals Commission, 2015). The emphasis on abating illegal mining through education/sensitisation highlights the regime’s pro-indigenous illegal mining position. Nevertheless, to demonstrate its aversion to illegal mining more generally, the regime amended the Minerals and Mining Act in 2015 [i.e., the Minerals and Mining (Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act 900)], which tightened punishment measures for illegal miners.

However, Act 900 distinguished between a person who engages in illegal mining [i.e., a Ghanaian] and a foreigner who does illegal mining and handed different imprisonment terms to these varying groups of illegal miners. For instance, the Act prescribed the following punishment for illegal Ghanaian miners:

A person who, without a license granted by the Minister, undertakes a small scale mining operation contrary to the provisions of this Act...commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than three thousand penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not more than five years or to both (Republic of Ghana, 2015, Section 99[2]).

This imprisonment term of five years had only marginally increased from three years under the previous law, the Minerals and Mining Act 2006 [Act 703] (Republic of Ghana, 2006). Nonetheless, while Act 703 had no punitive measures for foreigners in galamsey, Act 900 closed this legal lacuna.

A foreigner who undertakes small-scale mining operations contrary to the provisions of this Act commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less than thirty thousand penalty units and not more than three hundred thousand penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not more twenty years or to both (Republic of Ghana, 2015, p. Section 99[3]).

The 2014 Minerals and Mining Policy generally opposed illegal mining. However, a comparison of the imprisonment terms of five years for Ghanaians and 20 years for foreigners shows how Act 900 was more punitive towards foreigners engaged in illegal mining. This discrepancy in the imprisonment terms for locals and foreigners further reveals Mahama's pro-indigenous galamsey position and anti-foreign (Chinese) galamsey stance. Nonetheless, despite these seemingly stringent punitive measures, indigenous galamsey operatives (particularly the illegal hard-rock miners) increasingly threatened mining companies between 2015 and 2016. For example, the CEO of the Chamber of Mines suggested that:

The country stands to lose heavily if the activities of the illegal miners are allowed to fester ahead of the election in November 2016. There is a clear and present danger...to Ghana's economy as illegal miners fight large-scale mining companies for concessions the latter have obtained legally. This...breeds a sense of insecurity and fear among investors, which will cause a slowdown in investment in the country's mineral sectors¹²⁷

AngloGold Ashanti Ltd suffered these galamsey attacks. In early 2016, an estimated 6000 galamsey operatives seized the company's most commercially viable concessions (i.e., the *Adansi* Shaft). This invasion occurred when AGA was under care and maintenance, seeking foreign investors to redevelop the mine.¹²⁸ A former CEO of the Chamber of Mines argued that the 'care and maintenance' situation arose from AGA's failure to develop the mine ahead of its operations in 2004. Thus, by 2014, the mine had become unprofitable with surging production costs.

When AGA took over the operations of AGC in 2004, they did not spend time to develop the mine. In mining, you spend at least two years ahead of active operation to develop the mine. Because the mine was a living mine, AGA started mining as soon as it took over the operations of AGC. So, AGA's cost of production was going up while its profit margins were declining. At a point in time, the salaries of AGA staff in Obuasi were being paid from South Africa.¹²⁹

Given these existing operational difficulties, the ASM-induced encroachment held the potential of collapsing the company as the King of Asante, a significant stakeholder in the Obuasi Mine, lamented.

I received information that galamsey operatives had flooded the Adansi Shaft. I called the government of the day (i.e., Mahama's regime), requesting soldiers to be sent into the area

¹²⁷ A speech by Sulemanu Koney, CEO of the Ghana Chamber of Mines. See JoyOnline (2016).

¹²⁸ Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019.

¹²⁹ Interview with a former CEO of the Ghana Chamber of Mines in Accra on 21st May 2019.

(Obuasi Mine) to flush out the galamseymers. However, the government told me they could not grant my request and send soldiers to shoot people, as happened in South Africa. At a point, the company's management told me they would close and sell the mine to me for US\$ 1. I begged the management not to close the mine and told them that better days would come (Asuman-Frimpong, 2019, n.p.n).¹³⁰

Mahama's reference to the South Africa's state-sponsored massacre of miners in Marikana, a platinum mining site, to justify his decline of the King's request is intriguing. Unlike the artisanal miners in Obuasi that had illegally seized AGA's legitimate mine, the Marikana victims were Lonmin workers picketing for salary increments. Hence, whereas the attacks in South Africa were reprehensible, Ghana's legal and regulatory measures required Mahama to protect AGA against encumbrances. For instance, the 2014 Minerals and Mining Policy obliged the state to "protect bona fide mineral rights holders from interference in their operations by unlicensed persons" (Republic of Ghana, 2014, p. 43). Moreover, Act 900, mentioned above, sanctioned the arrest and prosecution of illegal miners.

Indeed, Mahama's tolerance of the illegal miners breached a 2013 Memorandum of Understanding requiring the use of state security apparatus to protect mining companies' concessions against ASM invasions.¹³¹ Be that as it may, this tolerance affected AGA's effort to redevelop the Obuasi mine. For instance, CEO Mark Bristol of Randgold Resources, a South African mining company, reportedly declined a proposed joint venture with AGA to resuscitate the mine partly because of the threat of galamsey (Jamasmie, 2016). However, in May 2016, having failed to get Mahama to evict the miners, AGA registered an arbitration case with the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ISDS, 2016). Nonetheless, this did not result in a violent eviction of the miners. Instead, around October 2016, as one participant revealed, AGA undertook feasibility studies of its concession and shed off 60% of the concession to the regime to be allocated to the illegal miners to get them out of the company's active underground shafts.¹³²

Thus, Mahama's relations with the illegal miners and AGA in Obuasi, coming on the back of a brutal eviction of thousands of Chinese, underscores his tolerance of indigenous galamsey workers whom he regarded as poverty-stricken folks "only trying to earn a living" (Duodu, 2015, n.p.n). Therefore, it is reasonable to contend that the three NDC regimes – Rawlings, Mills and Mahama – remained benign towards indigenous artisanal miners. However, before I explain this similar pattern in regime-ASM

¹³⁰ I extracted this data from a YouTube video in which the King delivered his speech in a local language (i.e., Asante Twi), which I translated into English. As a native speaker and writer of this language, my translation accurately reflects the King's speech.

¹³¹ Interview with the Ghana Chamber of Mines in Accra on 17th May 2019.

¹³² Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019.

relations under NDC regimes, I first explore how NPP regimes relate to indigenous artisanal miners quite to the contrary.

3. The NPP's malignity towards indigenous galamsey.

Two NPP presidents have governed Ghana since 1992, including the regimes under President John Agyekum Kufour (2001-2008) and President Nana Addo-Dankwa Akufo-Addo (2017-present). Unlike the NDC regimes, the NPP's Kufour and Akufo-Addo introduced some of the most rancorous attacks on indigenous artisanal miners, spanning between a year and four years and culminating in grave violations of human rights.

3.1. Kufour's repression of indigenous galamseyers (2001-2008).

When Ghana entered the new millennium, the euphoria that greeted neoliberalism concerning the expected economic benefits from mining almost became elusive. Investments in the mining sector in the 1990s could not save Ghana from adopting the IMF's Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative. With a change in government in December 2000, the newly elected NPP Government, under President Kufour, initiated two medium-term development plans, namely the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 1, 2003-2005) and the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 2, 2006-2009) (National Development Planning Commission, 2003, 2005). These development plans were part of the HIPC initiative.

Since the mining sector remained one of the most strategic sectors in Ghana, both development plans aimed at reforming this sector. For instance, GPRS 1 recognised the unequal access to mineralised lands and sought to address this through policies that promote small and medium-scale mining.

Current mining laws tend to disproportionately favour large-scale mining enterprises. To address this apparent imbalance, measures will be put in place to expand the scope and increase the support to the small and medium scale sub-sector with the view to making it predominant means of exploiting minerals in the long term (National Development Planning Commission, 2003, p. 91).

The measures to achieve this long-term goal included a geological survey of mining regions to classify "areas as suitable for either small, medium or large-scale mining operations" (ibid). The development strategy also sought to undertake a geological examination of mining companies' shed-off lands. Thus, GPRS 1 beckoned hope for ASM operatives. However, the succeeding development plan (GPRS 2)

made no commitments to small-scale mining. Instead, while highlighting the country's need to continue exploiting traditional minerals, it also attempted to control illegal mining.

In addition to the exploitation of traditional minerals such as gold and diamond, a policy to promote value addition to other mineral resources including bauxite and limestone, and also the exploitation of lesser known minerals such as salt will be promoted. In the process, efforts will be made to control illicit activities (National Development Planning Commission, 2005, p. 38).

Despite GPRS 1's commitment to ASM, Kufour's eight years in office were characterised by pockets of state-sponsored attacks on artisanal miners, underscoring GPRS 2's resolve to control illicit activities. These artisanal miners were hard-rock and mostly indigenous miners who illegally co-existed with LSM companies. For instance, artisanal miners in Obuasi admitted invading AGA's underground shafts under Kufour.

We used to invade the company's (AGA's) underground shafts. We sometimes had to arrest and tie the company's underground workers until we finished exploiting gold ores. If we did not tie them, they would go and report us to the company's security, and we would be attacked.¹³³

Unlike Rawlings' accommodation of these indigenous miners, Kufour's approach to these miners was combative. For instance, Bush (2009) reported how approximately 30,000 miners and community members were displaced in a Tarkwa community to make way for LSM projects. Similarly, Hilson and Yakovleva (2007) described Kufour's belligerence towards artisanal miners in Prestea. These artisanal miners operated on the peripheries of the concession of Bogoso Gold Ltd, owned by the Canadian-listed Golden Star Resources. However, the regime warned the miners to cease operations, granting them a vacation deadline of 31st March 2005.

To the regime, the artisanal miners' occupation of the company's concession had national security implications. For example, a former Western Regional Minister argued that "the exercise...is not intended to deprive [illegal] operators of their means of livelihood but to safeguard national security." The Minister stressed further that this ban against the miners in Prestea was part of the regime's bigger plan to eradicate illegal mining in the country (Hilson & Yakovleva, 2007, p. 106).

¹³³ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village A on 1st July 2019.

Accordingly, these pockets of attacks culminated in almost two years' mass raid of artisanal miners across southern Ghana under the so-called *Operation Flush-out*, a joint military-police taskforce set up in November 2006, which ran through 2008. An NDC former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources described Kufour's belligerence towards these indigenous artisanal miners as a mechanism to protect the property rights of large-scale mining companies.

Before the major 2006 clampdowns, Kufour had implemented some clampdown policies against ASM because what was happening was that the small-scale mining was growing in intensity. They were looking for more mineral-bearing areas, so they were trespassing onto concessions. The concession owners complained to the government, and the government sent military men to flush them out to protect the concession.¹³⁴

Lamenting Kufour's relations with artisanal miners, a participant suggested that Kufour was not as interested in the livelihoods of artisanal miners as he was in mining companies' operations.

In Kenyasi, when ASM operatives demonstrated against Newmont, Kufour instructed them to stop being a nuisance to the mining company. He was not interested in the other side of the coin, which is the livelihoods of communities. He was more interested in the company having the peace of mind to work. It was this mindset that drove his military intervention against galamsey.¹³⁵

In Obuasi, artisanal miners recounted their bitter experiences under the Kufour regime. One miner bewailed the loss of his livelihood.

My wife and I used to go to the AGA's site to select their abandoned rocks for crushing. We used to make about GHC 400 (i.e., US\$ 67) a week, with which we could afford to live a much more decent life. However, Kufour said we should be arrested. All the crushing machines belonging to our partners were confiscated.¹³⁶

Another miner narrated how approximately 300 artisanal miners fell victim to Operation Flush-out in Obuasi.

During Kufour's regime, there were about 300 galamseyers in one of AGA's shafts in Obuasi. The government's security operatives put tyres on the pit entrance and set them

¹³⁴ Interview with a former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources in Accra on 13th June 2019.

¹³⁵ Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019.

¹³⁶ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village B on 2nd July 2019.

ablaze to deliberately suffocate the miners so that the miners would come out of the pit. They picked miners like snails and arrested almost all of them. This incident happened in a community called Anyinam in Obuasi.¹³⁷

The word “snails” in this narrative metaphorically represents the enervating effects of the attack on the miners, preventing them from escaping. Operation Flush-out was so inimical to artisanal miners’ livelihood and human rights that it caught international attention. For instance, the FoodFirst Information & Action Network (FIAN), in cooperation with the Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining (WACAM), submitted a human rights report to the UN in 2008 concerning the outcomes of Operation Flush-out. An excerpt of the report reads:

FIAN and WACAM are very concerned about the increasing deployment of military and police personnel in the country’s mining districts, both in traditional mining areas and in areas where exploration or exploitation has started only recently. The deployment of the military personnel to mining areas has led to a number of human rights violations in these areas. Mining related human rights abuses involving the police and the military have been reported from the Wassa West District and the Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai District, both in the Western Region; from Obuasi and Amansie West District in Ashanti Region; from the Asutifi District in Brong Ahafo region as well as the Birim North District in the Eastern Region (FIAN, 2008, p. 3).

The report further stressed the complicity of multinational mining companies in perpetuating human rights abuses on mining sites.

Security contractors of mining companies assisted by the armed police and soldiers often conduct ‘operations’ ostensibly to arrest alleged illegal small scale mining operators (galamsey) in the concessions of large-scale mining companies. These ‘operations’ tend to be violent and bloody invasions of communities resulting in gross human rights violations. Since November 2006, the military and police in Ghana have been conducting a country-wide operation named ‘Operation Flush Out’, during which hundreds of galamsey were forcefully removed from the land they were working on. An unknown number of galamsey has been shot, beaten, and maimed by members of the private and state security forces, their equipment destroyed. Companies regularly use the media to threaten galamsey and community members that they will bring in the military. The latest of these threats was

¹³⁷ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village A on 1st July 2019.

made by the Managing Director of the Obuasi Mines of AngloGold-Ashanti (AGA) in early January 2008 (FIAN, 2008, p. 3).

With the backing of the state, the companies could violently block artisanal miners' access to their concession. The human rights abuses reported above are best exemplified by the experience of one artisanal miner in Obuasi who fell victim to state-induced attacks against galamsey in 2005. Awudu Mohammed lived in Obuasi until 2005, when he suffered an egregious attack by state-cum-company security operatives. Awudu was part of thousands of artisanal miners that had encroached upon AGA's concession but got busted by police and company security operatives, who shot indiscriminately at the galamseymen.

While several of the miners escaped, Awudu was among a dozen unlucky miners that suffered gun attacks that gushed out his intestines. The police eventually sent him to the Okomfo Anokye Teaching Hospital in Kumasi for emergency treatment. However, Awudu narrated how the company and police framed him as an armed robber who got hurt by spikes on the company's fence after attempting to jump over the fence and escape. This attempted distortion of the event aimed to exonerate the company and the state.

My father lost his farmland following AGA's decision to wall its concession covering almost all farmlands in Obuasi. So, being the first child in my family, I joined several galamseymen to collect mineral-bearing rocks from AGA's concession to process and sell. One day, the police and the company's security operatives raided us. They started shooting at us, and I got hit with a bullet and fell unconscious. They thought they had killed me, so they kicked me to see if I would respond. I responded and they put me in the back of their pick-up vehicle and sent me to the hospital. On our way to the hospital, they warned me that if the doctors asked about what happened to me, I should confess that I was an armed robber trying to flee and got pierced by the spikes on the company's fence. Although the police had chained me to the hospital bed and framed me as an armed robber hurt by spikes, the doctors did not believe the story since they regarded my wound as a gun wound. Eventually, I told the true story to the doctor in charge because I thought I would die anyway, and the truth had to be known. When one doctor confronted the police and the company officials about this issue, he was transferred from the hospital a few weeks later.¹³⁸

¹³⁸ Interview with Awudu Mohammed in Kumasi on 22nd July 2019.

Framed as an armed robber, a police officer was assigned to watch over Awudu while he was at the hospital and receiving treatment. However, following a leak of photos about Awudu's predicament into the media space,¹³⁹ a coalition of CSOs, including Third World Network, WACAM, and League of Environmental Journalists, held the first national mining conference in October 2005, highlighted Awudu's case, shamed AGA and demanded that AGA foot Awudu's hospital bills to not much avail.

In October 2005, the national coalition on mining organised the first national mining conference, which highlighted Awudu's case and further brought it under the limelight, forcing AGA to make some financial commitment towards Awudu's upkeep and hospital bills. However, the company reneged on its responsibilities to take care of Awudu, so Awudu resorted to self-medication (anti-biotics) for years.¹⁴⁰

However, beyond this national naming and shaming conference, WACAM used the platform of the *Public Eye Award* in Davos to further criticise AGA. The Public Eye Award was a Swiss-based international project convened in Davos between 2005 and 2015 as a counter-event to the World Economic Forum in Davos. Its preoccupation was to draw domestic and international media's attention to the worst incidences of environmental degradation and human rights abuses. One participant suggested that "the Public Eye Award is purportedly held in a hotel close to the venue of the World Economic Forum, and the rationale is to bring the world's attention to some of the irresponsible practices of multinational companies."¹⁴¹

In 2011, WACAM nominated AGA for the Public Eye Award by presenting Awudu's case to support this nomination. Unfortunately, AGA won this uncoveted award, bringing the company's international image into disrepute. For instance, a Norwegian Pension Fund, a key investor in AGA, subsequently threatened to pull out their investment in AGA.¹⁴² As one participant put it, following this event, AGA "ran to have talks with WACAM concerning Awudu's case. WACAM made Awudu's healthcare needs a prerequisite in any talks with AGA. Therefore, the company agreed to fly Awudu to Johannesburg, South Africa, to see a specialist."¹⁴³ As of 2019, Awudu was still visiting South Africa for medical review.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁹ During an interview with Awudu on 22nd July 2019, he suggested that the media got to know his condition because his brother took pictures of his wound and released them to the media while the policeman had stepped out to urinate.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019.

¹⁴¹ Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019.

¹⁴² Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019.

¹⁴³ Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with Awudu Mohammed in Kumasi on 22nd July 2019.

The untold atrocities indigenous artisanal miners suffered under Kufour's regime, particularly in Obuasi, attest to the regime's anti-indigenous mining stance. Thus, Kufour's regime bolstered the positionality of large-scale mining companies who, under Rawlings and Mills, were vulnerable to ASM attacks and, in some instances, adapted to such vulnerability by accommodating illegal miners on their concessions. Kufour's intolerance of these indigenous artisanal miners confounds debates that political parties are vulnerable to the votes of artisanal miners and tolerate them (Abdulai, 2017a, 2017c; Aubynn, 2009). Like Kufour's relation with artisanal miners, the NPP's Akufo-Addo unleashed, perhaps, the most extensive attack on indigenous artisanal miners in Ghana, as discussed below.

3.2. Akufo-Addo. Repressing indigenous miners but not illegal Chinese miners (2017-present).

Having won the December 2016 elections, the NPP's Akufo-Addo indefinitely banned all forms and types of ASM in southern Ghana in June 2017. This measure was part of the regime's broader Multilateral Mining Integrated Project (MMIP) that sought to sanitise the ASM sector through legislative, enforcement, and technological approaches (Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, 2017). Nonetheless, the MMIP arguably represented a suspension of the 2014 minerals policy and its associated ASM Framework and Implementation Plan discussed above.

While the 2014 minerals policy and the MMIP recognised ASM-induced degradation in Ghana, their proposed solutions differed remarkably. The 2014 minerals policy sought to mitigate the adverse effects of unlicensed mining through information dissemination on ASM-related health, safety, and environmental risks. Moreover, the policy aimed to formalise unlicensed mining through a panoply of measures, including license decentralisation and designation of geologically surveyed lands for artisanal miners.

In contrast, the MMIP aimed to address unlicensed mining in three phases. The first phase involved the enforcement of mineral legislation using state security operatives. The second phase sought to incorporate social interventions, such as alternative livelihood projects, and get stakeholder buy-in to fight unlicensed mining. Finally, the third phase would use technology to track and trace unlicensed miners and "improve mining and processing efficiencies" (Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, 2017, p. 19). The regime estimated the MMIP to cost US\$ 200 million. Funding partners (i.e., the World Bank) footed 50% (US\$ 100 million) of this cost. The other 50% came from the following sources: the Ghanaian state (20%), public-private partnerships (20%), and other sources (10%)¹⁴⁵ (Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, 2017).

¹⁴⁵ The other sources would come from corporate bodies and fund-raising activities. The project document does not mention World Bank as the funding partner. However, interviews with officials at the Ministry of Lands confirmed the World Bank as the funding partner.

Thus, while the 2014 minerals policy saw ASM (licensed and unlicensed) as a livelihood option for Ghanaians worthy of promotion, the MMIP deemed ASM, particularly unlicensed mining, a menace and planned to end it. Subsequently, Akufo-Addo launched two successive military operations – *Operation Vanguard* and *Galamstop* – to enforce an indefinite ban on licensed and unlicensed ASM operatives by raiding any artisanal miners found on mining sites. This raid, coordinated by an ad hoc committee (i.e., the Inter-ministerial Committee Against Illegal Mining [IMCIM]), took off in June 2017 and stupefied many ASM operatives since President Akufo-Addo had campaigned to support ASM operatives before the 2016 elections. For example, according to one elite participant:

Small-scale miners in Obuasi alleged that the sitting president told them that when he comes to power, he will give them the go ahead to do what they are doing. Yet the clampdown policy he implemented is perhaps the worse in Ghana’s history.¹⁴⁶

Indeed, as a presidential candidate for the NPP, Akufo-Addo discursively portrayed then Mahama’s regime as anti-ASM and promised to protect ASM interests.

I was here in Obuasi to say that galamsey, which I prefer to call small-scale mining, will be regularised to ensure that the youth all find work to do. Shortly afterwards, Mahama also came here to tell you that I was lying and that an Akufo-Addo government will rather sack everyone involved in galamsey.... When he [i.e., Mahama] won the [2012] election, he rather directed soldiers to come and drive out all persons involved in galamsey in Obuasi (Starfonline.com, 2016, n.p.n).

Although Mahama’s raid (i.e., Operation Halt) was brief, China-centric, and spared most indigenous galamseyers, Akufo-Addo’s campaign message performatively presented Mahama’s raid as inimical to the indigenous miners’ interests. Nonetheless, contrary to his campaign promise delivered in a local dialect, the NPP’s 2016 manifesto, which the miners most likely could not access, portended a future clampdown measure against the sector. According to the manifesto, the NPP planned to “reconstruct the small-scale mining industry so that its activities can take place within guidelines set up under the appropriate regulations” (NPP, 2016, p. 27).

Thus, despite his campaign promise to the miners, Akufo-Addo, upon assuming office, discussed galamsey as a menace with devastating implications for the country’s water bodies and forest landscape. In one of his initial speeches on this subject, the President suggested that it was inappropriate for young

¹⁴⁶ Interview with a former employee of the Minerals Commission and the Lands Ministry in Accra on 12th June 2019.

people to do galamsey simply because it supports their livelihood and that he would put his presidency on the line to fight galamsey.

Don't sit back and say, 'well, all these young men do not have anything to do and so let them go on' when you know that the activities they are involved in are jeopardising the very survival of our nation...I have said it in the Cabinet, and perhaps this is the first time I am making this public, that I am prepared to put my presidency on the line on this matter (Kwawukume, 2017, p. n.p.n).

Akufo-Addo's discursive portrayal of these indigenous galamseyers sharply differs from Mahama's sympathetic position on how these miners engage in galamsey to earn a living. Nevertheless, Akufo-Addo lifted the ban on licensed ASM in December 2018 while maintaining the ban against unlicensed miners (Oxford Business Group, n.d.).¹⁴⁷ However, the IMCIM introduced a complex vetting system to ascertain the authenticity of ASM licenses, which constrained many licensed indigenous miners.¹⁴⁸ First, the vetting process required miners to submit six primary documents, including a Mining License, Environmental Permit, Operating Permit, Certificate of Registration, Tax Identification Number (TIN), Birth Certificate, and a Passport or Voters ID (Lartey, 2018b). A miner would most likely fail the vetting process without one of these documents. Moreover, the regime introduced the TIN in 2018, which many Ghanaians struggled to acquire (Lartey, 2018a), creating a basis for some miners to fail the vetting process.

Second, the IMCIM only dedicated one week to vet an estimated 1335 licenses and ended up vetting only 500 licenses. However, it concluded that the remaining 835 licenses were ghost licenses and scrapped them.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the length of time set aside for the vetting was too inadequate for artisanal miners across the country to present their licenses for vetting.¹⁵⁰ Third, during the vetting process, the IMCIM charged artisanal miners an undisclosed amount of money to demarcate lands for the miners. The Minerals Commission, a bureaucratic body, disagreed with the IMCIM on this practice, leading to the Commission being sidelined and excluded from the vetting process.

In the initial stages, they [the IMCIM] involved us [the Minerals Commission] in their work, but they later sidelined us. They were doing some things that some of us think are completely illegal such as mapping areas to small-scale miners for money as part of vetting

¹⁴⁷ As of the writing of this thesis in 2020 and 2021, the ban against unlicensed miners was still in place.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with licensed artisanal miners during a Third World Network mining conference on 14th and 15th May 2019. Interview with an official of the Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st June 2019.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with an official of the Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st June 2019

¹⁵⁰ Interview with an official of the Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st June 2019.

the licensed small-scale miners. These miners had already paid for the demarcation of lands, so this extra payment was unnecessary. Some of us think this was completely illegal because the fees were not approved by parliament.¹⁵¹

Nevertheless, the land demarcation requirement might have disincentivised some miners from attending the vetting process as the Minerals Commission narrated the ordeal of one indigenous licensed miner who had returned from abroad upon hearing the lifting of the ban on licensed artisanal miners.

She returned from abroad to work because of the news that the ban had been lifted on licensed miners. She came to the Minerals Commission for a sticker because she had heard that the government was distributing stickers to licensed miners. I told her we are not the institution giving the stickers, so she should go to IMCIM. She went there and was told she had to pay some money before any land demarcation could be done for her. She was furious and reported the issue to the Commission. She complained that field demarcation had already been done for her by the Minerals Commission, so there was no need for another demarcation. But I explained that the IMCIM now has the responsibility of managing the ASM sector.¹⁵²

An official at the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources expressed much disquiet about how the IMCIM's management of the artisanal mining sector frustrated licensed indigenous artisanal miners.

Some of the licensed miners complain about the difficulties they face following the lifting of the ban. They cannot return to work because of certain new requirements introduced by the IMCIM. Perhaps, the IMCIM should realise that they have stabilised the situation a little bit and that it is time the ministry and the Minerals Commission are allowed to perform their statutory functions regarding mineral resource management.¹⁵³

However, while these licensed indigenous artisanal miners struggled to access their mineralised lands and Operation Vanguard and Galamstop chased unlicensed indigenous artisanal miners from mining sites, several media reports and field interviews converged on how illegal Chinese miners could mine under the state's protection. For instance, a reporter of *Adom* TV gave a vivid narrative about how a taskforce set up by the Environment Ministry to investigate galamsey sites found over 30 military personnel protecting illegal Chinese miners in a forest in Manso, Ashanti Region.

¹⁵¹ Interview with an official of the Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st June 2019.

¹⁵² Interview with an official of the Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st June 2019.

¹⁵³ Interview with a senior civil servant at the Lands and Natural Resources Ministry in Accra on 25th July 2019.

About three weeks ago, a taskforce set up by the Ministry for Environment and the Environmental Protection Agency to stop illegal mining invited me as a media person to report every happening on mining sites. We went to a forest in Manso to investigate illegal mining. We saw a lot of illegal Chinese miners who had cut down tons of trees and erected lots of makeshift onsite buildings. When the task force searched the buildings, we found military uniforms, bulletproof vests, and rifles. Suddenly, one military person appeared and called some of his commanders to report that some media and police personnel are on the site. Within 30 minutes, about 30 fully armed military men came to the site, surrounded the task force, and said they would not let anyone leave the forest. They assaulted our driver who tried to move our car. They also assaulted our cameraman recording the events and deleted most of the videos. They confiscated our cell phones and deleted every file on them (Adom TV, 2021, n.p.n).

Similarly, while on a campaign platform in a galamsey community, the presidential candidate of the NDC, John Mahama, criticised Akufo-Addo's regime for discriminating against Ghanaians and favouring the Chinese in the galamsey fight.

The government says it is fighting against galamsey. However, the government has arrested and arraigned Ghanaian citizens involved in illegal mining before court. Today, as I speak, some of our youths are in prison because they did galamsey. Meanwhile, the government arrested an illegal Chinese miner, a galamsey queen. They did not send her to a law court or imprison her. They said she should go back to her country. They let her go free, but our children are in prison. When we win power, we will give amnesty to all the Ghanaian citizens this government has imprisoned. I believe that whatever law they violated, they are now sorry. So, we will set them free and give them another chance (Tabi, 2020, n.p.n).¹⁵⁴

The galamsey queen Mahama refers to is En Huang, aka Aisha Huang, believed to be the head of a syndicate of Chinese entrepreneurs in Ghana's illegal ASM trade. In December 2018, a Ghanaian court charged Aisha with three counts, including undertaking small-scale mining in contravention of Section 99 [1] of the Minerals and Mining Act 2006 (Act 703); offering mine support services without a license from the Minerals Commission in breach of Sections 59 and 99 [2] of the Minerals and Mining Act; and illegally employing foreign nationals in contravention of Section 24 of the Immigration Act and regulation 18 of the Immigration Regulations (GhanaWeb, 2019). Moreover, four other accused Chinese nationals, including Gao Jing Cheng, Lu Qi Jun, Habin Gao, and Zang Pang, were charged

¹⁵⁴ This extract is Mahama's speech delivered in a local language. I am responsible for the translation of the speech into English.

with flouting the Immigration Act 2000 (Act 573) since they had no work permits in Ghana (Adogla-Bessa, 2018).

Nevertheless, on 19th December 2018, the state prosecuting attorney, Mercy Arthur, terminated the trial of these illegal Chinese miners by filing an application for *nolle prosequi*¹⁵⁵ to a High Court presided over by Charles Ekow Baiden (Adogla-Bessa, 2018). Before this application, the presiding Judge, Ekow Baiden, had expressed his displeasure over how the state was delaying the prosecution of the case (Allotey, 2018). Nonetheless, the *nolle prosequi* application allowed the state to deport Aisha and the other accused persons rather than jail them per the Minerals and Mining (Amendment) Act, 2015 [Act 900], which provided for an imprisonment term of at most 20 years for foreigners who undertake ASM in Ghana (Republic of Ghana, 2015).

How Akufo-Addo's NPP deported Aisha Huang in 2018, despite the existence of a sufficiently stiffer punishment regime, is an enigma that even bewildered some relevant state agencies. For instance, an official at the Minerals Commission expressed much disapproval of the regime's failure to prosecute Aisha.

In 2015 we amended Act 703 (now Act 900), which amendment clearly stated that if a foreigner is involved in illegal mining, the punishment includes prosecution and certain penalty units. Since we amended the law, the government should have prosecuted foreigners (Chinese) doing *galamsey* in Ghana. Chinese miners like Aisha Huang should not have been deported.¹⁵⁶

Nevertheless, justifying Aisha's supposed deportation, the regime's Senior Minister, Osafo-Mafo, argued that jailing or prosecuting Aisha Huang could strain Ghana's bilateral relations with China with dire economic consequences.

We have a very good relationship with China. The main company that is helping develop the infrastructure system in Ghana is Sinohydro, it is a Chinese Company. It is one that is going to help process our bauxite and provide about \$2 billion to us. So, when there are these kinds of arrangements there are other things behind the scenes. There are many other things beyond what we see in these matters and everybody is wide awake. The most important thing is that we established regulations and we are protecting our environment.

¹⁵⁵ *Nolle prosequi* is a Latin phrase and legal term meaning a prosecutor no longer wishes to prosecute a case.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with an official of the Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st June 2019.

That is far more important than one Chinese woman who has been deported back to her country (GhanaWeb, 2019, n.p.n).

The Senior Minister's argument may reveal Ghana's vulnerability and, thus, dependence on China's foreign aid. However, unlike the NPP regime and despite Ghana's time-honoured relations with China, the Mahama-led NDC regime deported thousands of Chinese to Beijing's displeasure. Nevertheless, while both Mahama's and Akufo-Addo's regimes deported rather than prosecuted the Chinese, the Ghanaian laws did not sanction the prosecution of foreigners in galamsey under Mahama as they did under Akufo-Addo. To reiterate, until the amendment of the Minerals and Mining Act in 2015, no explicit legal provision required the prosecution of foreigners engaged in galamsey, explaining Mahama's deportation of the 5000 illegal Chinese miners. In contrast, Akufo-Addo took office in 2017, two years after the requisite legal amendments allowed for the prosecution of foreigners that breached Ghana's Minerals and Mining Laws.

Thus, Mahama's deportation of the 5000 Chinese nationals constituted a punitive measure that even triggered diplomatic tensions as discussed. By contrast, Akufo-Addo's deportation of Aisha and her accomplices violated the country's laws, underlying the regime's tolerance or protection of Chinese interests in galamsey. Moreover, beyond the unique case of Aisha Huang and the four accomplices, there were no reports of mass deportation of Chinese galamsey operatives under Akufo-Addo. Instead, it is possible that many Chinese galamsey operatives evaded deportations. For instance, one sub-national police officer described how Akufo-Addo's regime initially fined rather than deported or prosecuted illegal Chinese miners while preventing sub-national police precincts from interrogating these miners.

In the initial stages, the government sent illegal Chinese miners to court and fined them. However, after paying the fine, the court never gives the deportation order. But recently, they don't even send them to court at all. They arrest you, and they bring you here. Even the police would not take a statement. Then they carry you to immigration at Accra for deportation. To me, this is wrong. But that is the order of the day. It is a cabinet decision. So, most of the illegal Chinese miners passing through this police station are sent to Accra. Whether they reach Accra or not, I don't know.¹⁵⁷

The above analysis clarifies how Akufo-Addo's fight against galamsey spared illegal Chinese miners and victimised indigenous galamsey operatives. This contrasts how the NDC's Mahama cracked down on illegal Chinese miners and instead put up with indigenous galamsey operatives. Also, the chapter

¹⁵⁷ Interview with a sub-national police officer in Obuasi on 12th July 2019.

demonstrates that NPP regimes are generally belligerent towards indigenous galamseyers in contrast with NDC regimes' benignity towards these miners. However, this analysis does not suggest that NDC officials have zero contact with illegal Chinese miners. Indeed, Crawford and Botchwey (2017) argued that Chinese miners bribed officials under the Mahama regime to access mineral resources.

Their debate stresses the neopatrimonial character of the African state, where informal rules rather than formal institutions condition exchanges and leaders care more about acquiring personal wealth than performing official duties (Blundo & De Sardan, 2006; Van de Walle, 2007). Nonetheless, Crawford and Botchwey (2017) did observe that Mahama's regime eventually repressed illegal Chinese miners but left indigenous galamsey operatives untouched. This is an observation Tschakert (2016) also made, underscoring this study's contention that NDC regimes, over time, put up with indigenous miners compared to illegal Chinese miners. Nevertheless, since Crawford and Botchwey (2017) and Tschakert (2016) focused on the Mahama regime, they missed the opportunity to explore and explain temporal variations in regime-ASM relations, a task I have taken up in this thesis. Therefore, chapter six explains the NDC's and NPP's varying responses to the different groups of miners.

4. Conclusion.

This chapter has explored temporal variation in regime-ASM relations in Ghana. The chapter found that NDC regimes tend to be more benign towards indigenous galamsey workers compared to their NPP counterparts. As a result, when an NDC regime introduces a military raid against the ASM sector, this tends to target foreign elements in galamsey while sparing indigenous galamsey operatives. The chapter showed that the NDC's Rawlings and Mills put up with the ASM sector despite Mills' regime coming under considerable pressure to raid the sector to protect the environment and mining companies' concessions. It also demonstrated that while the NDC's Mahama introduced a raid against the sector, this exercise was China-centric, leading to the arrest and deportation of thousands of Chinese in the galamsey business.

The chapter contrasted these NDC regimes' relative benignity towards indigenous galamsey operatives with the NPP's malignity towards this group of miners. It revealed that the NPP's Kufour and Akufo-Addo regimes launched relatively elongated forms of military raids against the ASM sector in ways that repressed indigenous galamsey operatives. Interestingly, while alluvial ASM had become established following Kufour's regime and attracted Chinese migrants, Akufo-Addo's raid of the galamsey sector spared illegal Chinese miners.

This longitudinal variation in regime-ASM relations is fascinating because it raises one's curiosity about whether indigenous artisanal miners' votes are necessarily relevant to both regimes in Ghana. From the evidence presented above, it seems NDC regimes are likely to care more about these miners'

votes than their NPP counterparts, yet it is unclear how and why this might be so. Moreover, how some regimes abstain from raiding the sector while others target different groups of miners demonstrates how artisanal miners are not invariably at the receiving end of regimes' repressive measures, as popularly argued in the literature. Chapter six explains these differences in regime-ASM relations.

Chapter 6. Why Regime-ASM Relations Vary in Ghana.


1. Introduction.

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the NDC and NPP regimes respond differently to different groups of miners. That chapter revealed that NDC regimes generally abstain from raiding the ASM sector and may only introduce a raid to repress foreign elements in galamsey rather than indigenous galamsey operatives. In contrast, I showed how NPP regimes commonly repress indigenous Ghanaian galamsey operatives but spare foreign elements in galamsey.

This chapter posits that different groups of miners have varying links with the contending Ghanaian regimes, explaining the variation in regime-ASM relations. I show that within Ghana's competitive clientelist political settlement (*figure nine*), where regime survival is paramount, indigenous artisanal miners generally constitute the NDC's geo-ethnic political base. In contrast, illegal Chinese miners have links with the NPP. Consequently, NDC regimes so detest raiding the artisanal mining sector that any raid introduced by the NDC also discriminates in favour of indigenous artisanal miners and against illegal Chinese miners and their local accomplices deemed to be accruing rents to the opposition. In contrast, NPP regimes crack down on the ASM sector in ways that vilify most indigenous artisanal miners, protect large-scale mining interests, and create mineral extractive avenues for illegal Chinese miners.

I begin this chapter by tracing the NDC's political connectedness to indigenous galamsey in two ways: First, I discuss how northerners, who constitute NDC voters, became predominant in the country's ASM hub. Second, I show that artisanal mining, being a rural economic activity, resonates with the NDC's rural political base, accentuating the indigenous miners' political saliency to the NDC and the parties' varying responses to these miners. I also demonstrate the NPP's connection to illegal Chinese miners and how that underpins the contending regimes' varying relations with these miners.

Figure 9. Graphical presentation of Ghana’s competitive political settlement.



Source: Author’s.

2. Tracing the NDC’s political connectedness to indigenous galamsey.

How do artisanal miners constitute the NDC’s geo-ethnic base with implications for varying regime-ASM relations in Ghana? Indeed, much of Ghana’s artisanal mining unfolds in southern regions, including Ashanti Region, Eastern Region, Western Region, Central Region, and Brong Ahafo Region. Two of these predominantly ethnic Akan Regions – Ashanti and Eastern Regions – constitute the NPP’s stronghold. However, the remaining regions swing across the two parties over time but more in the NPP’s favour (*see table 13*). Thus, contrary to the variation in regime-ASM relations explored above, one would theoretically expect NPP regimes to be more benign in their relations with indigenous galamsey operatives in line with the prediction of studies on ethnicity and public goods provision (Alesina et al., 1999; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Ejdemyr et al., 2018; Fernández & Levy, 2008; Green, 2006; Ireson & Ireson, 1991; Jackson, 2013; Kimenyi, 2006).

Nevertheless, as we shall see below, while artisanal mining occurs in predominantly Akan regions, miners in these regions tend to have northern ethnicities, which electorally appeal more to the NDC. Moreover, following Ghana’s implementation of structural adjustment programmes, the NDC lost its urban electoral constituency to the opposition and instead built a core electoral constituency among rural voters. Thus, the rurality of artisanal mining further makes artisanal miners more politically relevant to the NDC. Therefore, the geo-ethnic dynamics of artisanal mining make artisanal miners’

votes more salient to the NDC than the NPP and most likely shape the parties' varying relations with indigenous galamsey operatives.

I discuss how individuals from northern Ghana¹⁵⁸ emerged as a dominant group in southern Ghana's mining sector. I follow this up with an examination of how Ghana's adoption of SAPs created a rural constituency for the NDC and makes artisanal mining, a rural economic activity, resonate with the NDC's rural political base.

2.1. The presence of 'northerners' in southern mines.

While it is difficult to estimate or quantify the number of northerners that work as informal miners in southern Ghana, scholars generally agree on a pattern of north-south labour movements in Ghana (Beals & Menezes, 1970; Berg, 1965; Fortes, 1971; Nabila, 1972; Plange, 1979; Scully & Britwum, 2019). However, these scholars diverge on the causes of this migration pattern, with some emphasising natural causes (Beals & Menezes, 1970; Berg, 1965; Nabila, 1972) while others point to colonial and post-colonial policies (Fortes, 1971; Plange, 1979; Scully & Britwum, 2019).

The naturalists propose at least two explanations for this migration pattern. The first explanation is fundamentally neo-Malthusian in character, highlighting how migration becomes an adaptation mechanism in the context of population growth and lower agricultural productivity (Crenshaw & Oakey, 1998; Hawley, 1971; Kasarda & Crenshaw, 1991). Thus, both population explosion and limited land productivity in northern Ghana induced north-south migration. For instance, Nabila (1972, n.p.n) argued that:

...the overpopulation on a limited land resource base has been one of the major problems of the [north]. Consequently, there was a serious problem of soil erosion, periodic hunger, and the like. Faced with such a situation out-migration probably provided an escape-valve from the stringent survival system.

Nonetheless, contrary to the neo-Malthusian explanation of the north-south migration trends, Boserup (1981) argued that population density induces agricultural intensification through technological changes (such as ploughs or fertilizers), leading to rising food production. Similarly, Rene Dumont (1957) found agricultural intensification as a natural response to population density in the tropical

¹⁵⁸ I use the term 'northern Ghana' to refer to the three primary northern regions, including Upper East Region, Upper West Region, and Northern Region. In 2018, Ghana created six new regions out of ten existing regions. As a result, the Northern Region was split into three as follows (Northern Region, Northeast Region and Savannah Region). Therefore, I use the term 'Northern Region' to refer to the pre-regional demarcation state of this region.

Savannah of West Africa. However, since Dumont's work focused on French West Africa [excluding Ghana], his findings may not be direct evidence of population growth conditioning agricultural intensification in Northern Ghana.

Nonetheless, even if Dumont's findings were directly relevant to Northern Ghana, it is unclear how extensive this agricultural intensification would be to neutralise the migration effect of both population explosion and decreasing agricultural productivity. Hence, the neo-Malthusian theory debatably holds some explanatory power regarding Ghana's north-south migration. The other naturalist explanation for the north-south migration pattern emphasises regional climatic variations. For instance, Beals and Menezes (1970, p. 112) contended that "[R]egional variations in farming calendars provide the basis for seasonal labour migration." Berg (1965, p. 164) gave a detailed description of the causal effect of regional farming calendar differences on seasonal migration.

[C]limatic zones in West Africa are so ordered that the slack season in the savanna zones is the busy season along the southern coast. Thus, there is a seasonal dovetailing; the period of inactivity in the Savanna regions corresponds to the time of peak agricultural demands in the cocoa and coffee regions of the forest zone. Short-term movements from savanna to forest were thus a natural adaptation, particularly because the kinds of work required in the cocoa and coffee regions, harvest labour and the clearing of new plantations, lent themselves to seasonal or casual performance.

In other words, Berg contended that northerners temporarily migrated to find employment in the southern plantations due to the seasonality of southern crop production. While this might be the case, it is possible that northerners also migrated to work in southern mines. In comparing Ghana and South Africa, Scully and Britwum (2019) posit that colonial and apartheid policies deliberately undermined northern Ghana and Eastern Cape and transformed these areas into labour reserves for the mines in southern Ghana and Johannesburg. This pattern of capital accumulation continued after independence in Ghana, wherein the post-colonial state policies "maintain[ed] the flow of migrant labour to the growing urban and extractive industries" (p. 410).

Similarly, Plange (1979, p. 4) argued that the trend of north-south migration in Ghana was a direct function "of the requirements of the colonial economy for labour power for [southern] mines and cocoa plantations." These country-specific analyses on the impact of capital accumulation on migration echo the Marxist and Dependency theorisation that capital accumulation in Africa hinged on the supply of cheap rural labour for the extractive and industrial sectors in the urban centres (Amin, 1972; Burawoy, 1976; Wolpe, 1972). Samir Amin's (1972) work deserves special mention. Amin proposed the concept

of *labour reserve* to describe the movement of large African labour to the mines and agricultural plantations of the colonial powers in southern and eastern Africa.

To Amin (1972, p. 519), the colonial administrations compelled “the ‘traditional’ societies to be the supplier of temporary or permanent migrants on a vast scale, thus providing a cheap proletariat for the European mines and farms.” While categorising eastern and southern Africa as Africa of the labour reserve, Amin (1972) also observed that the idea of labour reserve existed in West Africa, a region he broadly categorised as the *Africa of the colonial trade economy*. He argued that the populations of the hinterland of West Africa became a labour reserve for the industries established in the wealthy coastal zones. Like Amin (1972), Cliffe (1976, p. 117) suggested that the category of “labour reserve” is “scattered throughout the continent” and, therefore, not peculiar to eastern and southern Africa.

Thus, as colonial and post-colonial administrations deliberately conditioned labour movement from northern Ghana to the mines and cash-crop plantations of the south, these economic sectors also became populated by northerners. Nonetheless, whereas the seasonal nature of cocoa production temporarily drove migration to the southern cocoa farms, migration to the southern mines may have been more permanent. For instance, Fortes (1971) observed that although land shortage previously triggered north-south migration on temporary bases, young men from the north later permanently settled as labourers in the southern mines.

Therefore, major southern mining towns such as Tarkwa and Obuasi became migrant towns, with northerners constituting a crucial segment of the miners in these towns. A local government official in the Obuasi Municipal Assembly revealed that most of the informal miners in Obuasi have northern origins, contending that while the Obuasi natives preferred farming to mining, northerners constituted the primary labour force for AGC. Nonetheless, the privatisation of the mines in the 1980s, as a function of SAPs, culminated in the retrenchment of these miners. Consequently, having honed considerable skills in mining, many of the retrenched miners turned to artisanal mining and became thorns in AGC’s flesh.

The natives of Obuasi did not value mining because they saw mining as a dirty, difficult, and risky job. Northerners were seen as people with much physical strength to do the type of hard job mining required. So, for the natives, farming was a far better option than mining. Hence, AGC’s labour force was predominantly northerners. When Ghana adopted structural adjustment programs in the 1980s, many of these miners were laid off, but because Obuasi had become their homes, they could not simply return to the north. Instead,

they put their skills to use in artisanal mining and have always been a source of threat to the company.¹⁵⁹

Several other participants corroborated the above narrative about the prevalence of northerners in southern mines. For instance, a former underground worker of AGA (a northerner) narrated how northerners constituted the company's underground mining staff, arguing that the southern indigenes (Akans) loathed underground mining for safety reasons. He explained further that the company's retrenchment policies in the 1990s culminated in many of the underground miners going into artisanal mining.

In the beginning, the Akans were afraid to go underground. People from the Upper East, Upper West and Northern Regions were the main underground workers for AGA. There was not much safety, so roof-fall was common. Many underground miners got buried by roof-falls. In the 1990s and 2000s, most mining companies, including AGA, retrenched their underground workers. These underground workers were primarily northerners. Most of them, especially the younger ones, went into galamsey. For the old ones who could not take care of their children after the retrenchment, their children had to do galamsey to survive.¹⁶⁰

Similarly, during a focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi, one miner recounted that his grandfather migrated from the north to work as an underground miner for AGC. He explained that he and his siblings had no formal education and did artisanal mining to support their families.

My grandfather came from the north to work for AGC. He went on pension and died in 1992 at 86 years. So, my parents were born here just as I was born here. Because my parents could not support our education, the galamsey is the only work my brothers and I do to support our wives and children.¹⁶¹

Thus, galamsey became an intergenerational trade amongst northerners in southern Ghana. Many of these northerners had made investments into galamsey, as observed by a community-based CSO:

¹⁵⁹ Interview with a local government official at the Obuasi Municipal Assembly on 11th July 2019.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with a former AGA underground miner in Obuasi on 5th July 2019.

¹⁶¹ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village A on 1st July 2019.

There are people who have invested heavily in ASM in Obuasi despite their knowledge of the fact that ASM cannot be done in Obuasi. A number of these groups of people are not indigenes of Obuasi but mostly from the northern part of the country.¹⁶²

Like the above narratives, a sub-national police officer described Obuasi as a company rather than a town, arguing that proper human settlement only evolved when the company started operating in this area, with northerners being its primary labour force.

Obuasi is not a town. Obuasi is a company. When the company started operating in the late 1890s, its workers started building structures, which is why we have Obuasi today. That is why Obuasi does not have a chief and why development is so low in Obuasi. Most of the mine workers were northerners, which is why we see many northerners here. Had Obuasi existed as a town before the company bought its concession, there would not have been many northerners in this town today.¹⁶³

These pieces of field evidence corroborate Okoh's (2014, p. 56) study, which described the galamsey labour force in Obuasi as consisting of people with northern ethnic origins.

One may argue that a sizeable number of migrants involved in ASM in the Obuasi area are descendants of people from the northern part of the country who worked in the Obuasi mines in the past, and for that matter, have 'automatically' become natives of the town. However, the Ashanti have an adage that, 'no matter how long a dead wood is kept in the stream, it cannot be described as a crocodile'. This literally implies that by Ashanti tradition, a so-called 'outsider' can become a native by birth but that does not entitle him/her ancestral inheritance of the land.

Okoh's (2014) argument is intriguing not just because of its emphasis on the northern origins of most of the miners in Obuasi but also its conclusion that individuals with northern origins in the Ashanti Region cannot have ancestral ties to the land. Nonetheless, Okoh's (2014) adage has a deeper meaning. The 'dead wood', as used in the adage, may represent the migrant (in this case, the miners with northern ethnicities). The 'stream' represents the territory of Obuasi or Ashanti Region more generally, while the 'crocodile' represents the Obuasi or Ashanti natives with ancestral ties to Ashanti land.

¹⁶² Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019.

¹⁶³ Interview with a sub-national police officer in Obuasi on 12th July 2019.

Just as a ‘dead wood’ cannot become a ‘crocodile’ by finding a new habitat (water), northern miners could also not become natives or Asantes by migrating to or being born in Ashanti, contrary to Okoh’s interpretation. Nonetheless, given the preponderance of northerners in southern mines (including the Obuasi Mine), the time-invariant nature of ethnic identity, and the possibility that ethnic identity switching cannot guarantee a tie to ancestral land, the northern miners in southern Ghana are also likely to gravitate towards their co-ethnic political party.

Across the two main political parties, the NDC appeals to northern voters as this party comfortably wins elections across the three northern regions over time (*see table ten*). Thus, the reverberation of the miners’ northern ethnicities with the NDC first underlines the NDC’s abhorrence towards military raids. Second, it explains why such raids under the NDC spare the indigenous miners. For instance, Mahama’s refusal to violently evict the indigenous galamsey operatives that had seized AGA’s concession for months in 2016 shows how these miners, predominantly northerners, were politically salient to the regime even as 2016 was an election year.

Table 10. The NDC’s and NPP’s electoral performance in the three northern regions from 1992 to 2020 (%).¹⁶⁴

Year	Region	NDC’s share	NPP’s share	Difference
1992	Northern	62.97	16.30	46.67
	Upper East	53.97	10.48	43.49
	Upper West	50.96	8.90	42.06
1996	Northern	61.13	33.01	28.12
	Upper East	68.99	17.35	51.64
	Upper West	74.61	11.19	63.42
2000	Northern	50.76	29.57	21.19
	Upper East	49.82	18.99	30.83
	Upper West	62.29	15.51	46.78
2004	Northern	57.83	34.72	23.11
	Upper East	53.26	31.69	21.57
	Upper West	56.65	32.22	24.43
2008	Northern	57.37	37.79	19.58
	Upper East	56.06	35.25	20.81
	Upper West	54.36	37.72	16.64
2012	Northern	58.59	38.78	19.81

¹⁶⁴ In 2018, the state created two new regions out of the Northern Region (i.e., Northeast and Savannah Regions). Thus, the 2020 figure for Northern Region is an amalgamation of the votes across the three regions.

	Upper East	66.43	29.29	37.14
	Upper West	65.54	29.26	36.28
2016	Northern	56.08	41.34	14.74
	Upper East	60.32	34.93	25.39
	Upper West	58.37	35.94	22.43
2020	Northern	52.93	46.08	6.85
	Upper East	63.29	34.44	28.85
	Upper West	67.42	29.89	37.53

Source: Author's based on several data from Peace FM Online.

Addressing Mahama's regime's response to the Obuasi artisanal miners in an interview, an NPP MP implicitly classified the miners as the regime's political base even in an opposition stronghold, underlining this tolerance.

Any step in 2016 was influenced by political fortunes. The NDC was not doing well in the Ashanti Region. So, the decision not to deploy the military in the Obuasi Municipality was politically driven as that would have further weakened the NDC's support base.¹⁶⁵

Similarly, speaking on this matter to Bloomberg, Kwesi Aning, the Director of Academic Affairs and Research at the Kofi Annan Centre, asked: "Why will an incumbent government displace about ten thousand of its potential supporters?" (Jamasmie, 2016, n.p. n). Likewise, miners in Obuasi appraised the connection between indigenous artisanal miners and the two parties, concluding that artisanal miners support the NDC.

Every galamseyer knows that if the NDC is in power, galamsey flourishes. However, if NPP comes to power, it is often harsh against galamseyers. When Rawlings was in power from 1992 to 2000, galamsey was going on uninterrupted. Nevertheless, when the NPP came to power in 2000, galamsey started coming under attack. So, everybody in Obuasi knows that galamseyers are NDC supporters.¹⁶⁶

In addition to these pieces of evidence, a 2021 galamsey report authored by the IMCIM Chair (an NPP member) clarifies how indigenous artisanal miners predominantly lean towards the NDC.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with an NPP MP at the premises of Ghana's Parliament on 26th April 2019. NB: Obuasi municipality is within the Ashanti Region, the NPP's stronghold.

¹⁶⁶ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village A on 1st July 2019.

It is well known in the small-scale mining circles that NDC members and sympathisers were well established in the small-scale mining, especially in the Western Region.... They had the money and other resources to not only sponsor NDC candidates but also support independent candidates in the supposed strongholds of the NPP. There are far more NDC people engaged in illegal mining than NPP members in the region (Frimpong-Boateng, 2021, n.p.n).

Thus, to the extent that indigenous artisanal miners essentially represent the NDC's ethnic voting constituency, NDC regimes find it politically undesirable to evict these miners violently. The analysis reflects debates on ethnicity and public goods provision (Alesina et al., 1999; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Ejdemyr et al., 2018; Fernández & Levy, 2008; Green, 2006; Ireson & Ireson, 1991; Jackson, 2013; Kimenyi, 2006).

Alesina et al. (1999) found that US cities with fragmented ethnicity tend to spend less on productive public goods. Similarly, Ejdemyr et al. (2018, p. 111) argued that Malawian political elites provide public goods for their co-ethnics "only when ethnic groups are sufficiently segregated." These debates support the idea that ethnic diversity encourages public goods under provision since ethnic heterogeneity surges polarity, which encumbers a common understanding of the kind of public goods to provide (Easterly & Levine, 1997). Similarly, Kimenyi (2006) contended that ethnic heterogeneity drives public goods under-provision and over-provision of patronage goods. Thus, since political elites in ethnically diverse settings cannot target co-ethnics with public goods, they would provide private goods (i.e., patronage) to different groups to win reelection (Fernández & Levy, 2008).

These discussions imply that, in competitive electoral systems, elites' electoral gains also incentivise their provision of public goods to their co-ethnics in ethnically homogenous settings and private goods in ethnically diverse settings. Nevertheless, even in uncompetitive electoral systems where elites can easily rig elections, like Uganda, politicians target their co-ethnics with public goods provision. For instance, Green (2006, p. 371) reported fears among the Baganda ethnic group that "President Museveni and fellow western Ugandans would take away their land." Hence, the Baganda people have increasingly advocated a system of federalism that would allow them a semblance of control over their land (Green, 2006).

Like Green's argument, Ireson and Ireson (1991) found that while the three main ethnic groups in Laos do not differ significantly in size, the Laotian government's policies favoured its co-ethnic lowland Lao group relative to midland and highland Lao groups. Thus, politicians enhance their electoral fortunes by strengthening their co-ethnic group's economic base through targeted public goods distribution. This is because the economically strengthened co-ethnic group could fund their co-ethnic political party. As the indigenous galamsey operatives' ethnicity primarily reflects the NDC's political base, NDC

regimes' benignity towards this group of miners may also constitute a mechanism for providing public goods – in this case, access to mineral resources and rents – to these miners with a relatively homogenous ethnicity. In contrast, by targeting indigenous galamsey operatives, NPP regimes also seek to withdraw these public goods (i.e., mineral resources and rents) from miners whose ethnicity points to political support for a political contender. I will return to this point in section three of this chapter.

2.2. The NDC's identification with rural voters.

To appreciate the NDC's connection with rural voters, which further makes artisanal miners salient to the party, an examination of the differential implications of Rawlings' PNDC's economic policies for urban and rural dwellers would suffice. While the PNDC military regime was initially biased towards urban areas, its adoption of SAPs compelled it to favour rural areas. Thus, when Ghana transitioned into democratic governance in the early 1990s, and the PNDC morphed into the NDC, rural voters became the NDC's core electoral constituency. The leading opposition at the time, the NPP, occupied the urban electoral spaces.

2.2.1. Pre-SAPs dysfunctional urban-bias economic policies in Ghana.

When Rawlings staged a second coup d'état in 1981, Ghana's economy was in shambles. Between 1972 and 1983, the economy had almost hit rock bottom primarily because of the interventionist policies that characterised this period. The state participated in the economy as a producer, prioritised import substitution policies, controlled prices, maintained an illiberal foreign exchange regime, and overvalued its currency (Bawumia, 1998). Thus, between 1970 and 1983, GDP per capita declined by 2% annually, industrial output by 4.2%, and agricultural output by 0.2% per annum. In addition, cocoa production, Ghana's economic lifeblood, and food production took a nosedive (Tabatabai, 1986) due partly to a period of drought in the early 1980s and partly to the exodus of more than two million Ghanaians to Nigeria as a response to Nigeria's oil boom that began in the mid-1970s (Bawumia, 1998). These factors deteriorated Ghana's revenue base from 21% of GDP in 1970 to 5% in 1983. In response, the finance of government expenditure relied heavily on the banking system, ballooning money supply and inflation from 697 million Cedis and 18.5% in 1974 to 11400 million Cedis and 116.5% by 1981 (Bawumia, 1998).¹⁶⁷

Although the dysfunctional economic policies bore adverse economic outcomes, they generated rents necessary for successive Ghanaian political leaders' political stability (ibid). These politico-economic dynamics were not unique to Ghana. Jeffrey Herbst (1990, p. 949) argued that state-owned enterprises,

¹⁶⁷ See Appendix H for a table on Ghana's macroeconomic indicators from 1974 to 1983.

import regimes, and agricultural producer price controls became critical tools that African leaders used to establish and maintain “webs of patron-client relations to garner the support necessary to remain in power.” For instance, public enterprises constituted 17.5% of GDP in African countries, twice the average (8.6%) of developing countries (Short, 1984). However, these enterprises employed many people and brought dominant elites under direct state control (Herbst, 1990; Rondinelli et al., 1983). Therefore, while these enterprises were unprofitable (Nellis, 1986), they constituted avenues for patronage and maintained regime stability.

Similarly, administrative rather than market-oriented import regimes meant that political leaders directly controlled imports and could reward clients with import licenses. However, administrative control of imports overvalued exchange rates and made exports, a significant proportion of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa, uncompetitive in the global market (World Bank, 1986). Apart from import controls, African leaders also manipulated agricultural producer prices. Through their monopsonist systems, they could set export crops, like cocoa and coffee, below world market price to extract surplus to buy off urban elites. Moreover, they set food prices below actual market prices to subsidise the living cost of the urban labour force (Bates, 2014; Herbst, 1990).

This urban-bias proclivity made political sense because urban dwellers were “better organised, better educated and informed, more politically aware, and hence more of a political threat to those in power” (Diamond, 1987, p. 587). Against this backdrop, Rawlings’ PNDC, which came to power through a coup d’état in 1981, initially continued these dysfunctional policies for regime survival. Like his predecessors, Rawlings’ economic policies favoured urban dwellers but neglected rural folks. Nonetheless, such politically motivated economic policies only secured short-term political survival because they led to poor economic outcomes in the medium to long term and provided a context for coups and countercoups of the kind witnessed in Ghana between 1966 and 1981.

Therefore, following a series of failed coup attempts, arguably in response to the PNDC’s poor economic performance,¹⁶⁸ Rawlings turned to the IMF and World Bank for an economic bailout, having failed to receive financial assistance from the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc of countries. Hence, Ghana was among the first African countries to adopt SAPs, which, in Ghana’s case, took the form of an Economic Recovery Programme adopted in 1983.

¹⁶⁸ Not only did Rawlings inherit an ailing economy, but he also continued those poor policies that underpinned the ailing economy. However, his regime met with severe drought in 1983 and sporadic bushfires, which destroyed farmlands. In addition, two key events compounded these challenges: first, capital flight due to the regime’s intolerance towards big businesses and second, the deportation of one million Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983. Hence, it became politically riskier to maintain those economic policies that his predecessors and other African leaders used to secure short-term political stability. See Bawumia (1998) for further discussion of these events.

2.2.2. Structural adjustment and rural-bias economic policies in Ghana.

Ghana's SAPs (the ERP) had an overarching goal of resuscitating the country's ailing economy at the cost of about SDR 1.21 million to be provided by the IMF and World Bank (Bawumia, 1998). Nevertheless, this financial assistance was conditional on the regime increasing cocoa producer price, removing price controls, liberalising the foreign exchange regime, withdrawing health and education subsidies, and cutting down on public expenditure (Mosley et al., 1995). Thus, the dysfunctional policies that guaranteed short-term regime stability in Africa (Bates, 2014; Diamond, 1987; Herbst, 1990) were what SAPs compelled Rawlings to abandon.

Therefore, while SAPs may have threatened short-term regime stability (Herbst, 1990), Rawlings needed SAPs to survive because SAPs eliminated those dysfunctional policies with poor growth outcomes¹⁶⁹ that make coups inevitable in the medium to long term. However, SAPs considerably changed the urban-rural structural power relations because the ensuing economic policies favoured rural dwellers but hurt urban folks. Bawumia (1998) suggested that while inflation plummeted from 122% in 1983 to 10% in 1992, urban prices increased more rapidly than rural prices. For instance, the urban/rural consumer price ratio surged from 0.83 in 1983 to 1.02 in 1992 (Bawumia, 1998).

Agricultural prices also rose sharply from 1980 to 1986, with the producer price of cocoa increasing about twenty times, while the nominal price for maize and millet was eight times higher in 1986 than in 1980. Similarly, the nominal price for cassava and plantain was ten times higher in 1986 compared to 1980 (Bawumia, 1998). These cash crop and food crop price increases imply that the regime could no longer extract much rent from cash crop under-pricing, nor could it subsidise food crops for urban consumers. In other words, better agricultural prices surged food prices, translating into a high urban cost of living (Diamond, 1987) and improved rural living standards.

Also, the regime embarked on massive road construction that opened the export crop-producing rural areas. However, non-export-producing rural areas benefited from these road projects to a small extent (Bawumia, 1998). Moreover, the regime undertook a significant electrification project, which enhanced many rural communities' access to electricity for the first time since independence. Again, a special self-help rural electrification project ensured that rural areas that could mobilise labour and funds for materials such as poles also received the regime's support (Bawumia, 1998). Similarly, rural areas' access to water increased exponentially compared to urban areas. For example, in 1983, 43.7% of the

¹⁶⁹ After implementing SAPs, Ghana's GDP averagely grew at 5% per year. See Appendices H and I for a comparison of the macroeconomic indicators before and after SAP's implementation.

rural population had access to water relative to 80% of urban dwellers. However, by 1989, water access among the rural population had increased by 15%, while that among the urban population saw a relatively marginal increase of 6% (Bawumia, 1998).

Again, whereas the regime's agricultural policies and infrastructural projects disproportionately benefited rural areas, its social programmes (health and education) worsened the plight of the urban population. For example, the regime introduced user fees for hospital services, including consultations and laboratory tests, leading to a 25% drop in hospital attendance in the nation's premier hospital, the Korle-Bu Hospital (Ephson, 1985). The regime also introduced new book user fees and increased existing book user fees in primary schools. Moreover, housing fees and feeding costs increased at the tertiary level (universities) (Kraus, 1991). As urban dwellers were more likely to access hospitals and higher education services, they also disproportionately bore the brunt of these policy changes with political ramifications.

2.2.3. The political outcomes of SAPs.

Given the relief that the ERP brought to rural households and the sufferings it meted out to urban dwellers, it was only natural that Rawlings would enjoy more and less support in rural and urban constituencies, respectively. Mikell (1989) argued that the PNDC's implementation of the ERP pitted the regime against urban workers and students that had previously supported the regime. Consequently, the PNDC turned to rural dwellers, mainly peasants, for political support. Thus, besides the ERP's bias towards rural inhabitants, the regime deliberately mobilised this constituency. For example, it introduced the idea of self-help farm labour (locally termed *nnoboa*) in 1984, which aimed to encourage a sense of cooperation among rural farm labour in the cultivation and management of farms (Mikell, 1989).

The intersection between the PNDC's SAPs and its deliberate effort to mobilise rural people created a core rural constituency for the regime. As Mikell (1989, p. 456) wrote:

[C]ertainly the farmers I met in Sunyani in 1986 were more enthusiastic about Rawlings and the PNDC than many of the bureaucrats and teachers in Accra and the Inland towns...they were responding positively to the restoration of their agrarian economy.

Mikell's claim finds corroboration in the 1988 local government electoral outcome. This non-partisan election reflected the regime's effort at political reforms. However, the varying participation of rural and urban dwellers in this election foreshadowed the pattern of rural-urban votes that would emerge

after the return to multiparty democracy in 1992. Having observed this local-level election, Naomi Chazan (1991, pp. 36–37) commented that:

For the first time in post-colonial Ghanaian history, a regime derived its support primarily from rural constituencies.... Indeed voter participation in the large cities was much below national and regional averages.... This distribution was indicative of the relative strength of the PNDC in the countryside and its waning credibility in the cities.

Similarly, Yao Graham, the Convener of Third World Network, argued in an interview that:

Rawlings lost friends in urban areas by introducing SAPs. People became unemployed. Those employed could hardly live off their meagre wages. The introduction of user fees on social services minimised peoples' disposable income, making life harder for urban dwellers particularly.¹⁷⁰

This pattern of urban discontentment with the PNDC created an opportunity for the emerging opposition, the NPP, to identify with urban voters ahead of the 1992 elections. Nonetheless, while the NPP – being an outgrowth of the Danquah-Busia political tradition¹⁷¹ – would have prioritised urban voters, the odds were even higher with the ramifications of SAPs. Therefore, when Ghana returned to democracy and held its first multiparty elections in 1992, the presidential results were consistent with Rawlings' rural support base (see *table 11*).

Table 11. Rawlings' share of votes by region and major urban constituencies in the 1992 elections.

Region	Rawlings' share in region (1)	Rawlings' share in major urban constituency (2)	Difference (1) – (2)
Western	60.7	33.5	27.2
Central	66.5	45.9	20.6
Eastern	56.7	41.5	15.2
Volta	96.2	94.1	2.1
Ashanti	32.8	16.8	16.0
Brong-Ahafo	61.5	40.3	21.2
Northern	62.5	41.2	21.3

¹⁷⁰ Interview with Yao Graham in Accra on 19th April 2019.

¹⁷¹ The Danquah-Busia political tradition had historically favoured urban, rich, and high-class people relative to Nkrumah's CPP, which enjoyed support among rural and ordinary people. See Apter (1964).

Upper East	50.8	39.8	11.0
Upper West	51.0	55.9	-4.9
Greater Accra	51.8	41.7	10.1

Source: Bawumia (1998, p. 48).

While Rawlings won more than 50% of the regional votes in all but the Ashanti Region, he obtained less than 50% of the votes in all major urban constituencies but the urban constituency in the Volta region. However, because the Ashanti and Volta Regions emerged in the early 1990s as the NPP's and NDC's stronghold, these regions' regional and urban constituency results are unsurprising. Instead, what is fascinating is the trend of the NDC's or Rawlings' poor performance in urban constituencies compared to the party's impressive performance in the regions.

Drawing on the outcomes of the 1992 elections, Bawumia (1998, p. 69) argued that the disproportionate impact of SAPs on urban dwellers explains the differences in rural and urban votes Rawlings' NDC secured: "the differences between rural and urban voting figures can be readily associated with the differential impact of the incumbent government's policies on voters. [Thus] other factors notwithstanding, the SAP was probably the decisive factor in Rawlings's victory." Therefore, as the SAP's implementation spanned the period of Rawlings' democratic reign (1992-2000), it is apparent that the SAP might have entrenched the variation in party-society linkages along the rural-urban lines.

Time-series data on the NDC's electoral performance in the regions relative to urban or rural constituencies may offer much insight into whether the NDC are relatively weak in urban constituencies. Following the 1992 elections, the two political parties have become stronger in certain regions while battling for votes in others. Notably, the Eastern and Ashanti regions have become the NPP's strongholds, while the Volta region and the three traditional Northern regions have emerged as the NDC's strongholds. Therefore, unlike battleground regions, the parties may likely win most of the presidential votes in urban and rural constituencies in their stronghold regions.

Hence, I only focus on battleground regions – including the Western, Brong Ahafo, Central, and Greater Accra Regions – to demonstrate the NDC's relative weakness in urban constituencies. I draw upon district categorisation in Ghana to select urban constituencies from these battleground regions. Ghana has three district categories separated from one another by population size. Ordinary districts have a minimum population of 75,000 people; municipal districts have a population of at least 95,000 people; and metropolitan districts have a minimum population of 250,000. Of the 216 districts, 154 are ordinary, 56 are municipal, and six are metropolitan. Generally, while all district types have rural constituencies, municipal and metropolitan districts tend to have fewer rural constituencies and more urban constituencies.

Among the four battleground regions mentioned above, the Greater Accra region is the most urbanised (*table 12*). Since Western, Central and Brong Ahafo regions have relatively few urban districts, I randomly select three urban constituencies (one each from the three regions) and compare the NDC's performance in these constituencies and their corresponding regions across eight elections (*table 13*). Given the Greater Accra Region's large number of urban districts, I randomly select two rural constituencies from two of the region's four ordinary districts and compare the NDC's performance in these rural constituencies and the region across eight elections (*table 14*).

Table 12. Distribution of district types in battleground regions.

Battleground region	Number of ordinary districts	Number of municipal districts	Number of metropolitan districts	Total
Greater Accra	4	23	2	29
Western	12	10	1	23
Central	14	7	1	22
Brong-Ahafo	18	10	0	28

Source: Author's.

Table 13. The NDC's presidential vote percentage in battleground regions and key urban constituencies. 1992-2020.¹⁷²

Year	Region*	NDC's share in region (%)	NDC's share in key urban constituencies (%)	Difference + -
1992	Western	60.74	33.48	27.26
	Brong Ahafo	61.95	40.35	21.60
	Central	66.49	45.86	20.63
1996	Western	57.30	29.74	27.56
	Brong Ahafo	61.73	39.81	21.92
	Central	55.22	45.64	9.58
2000	Western	44.83**	21.25	23.58
	Brong Ahafo	44.63**	26.71	17.92

¹⁷² In 2012, 2016 and 2020, Peace FM Online recorded presidential results for Bono, Bono East and Ahafo Regions. These three regions previously constituted the Brong Ahafo Region until 2018, when Ghana embarked on regional reorganisation. Thus, to calculate the regional figures for Brong Ahafo in 2012, 2016 and 2020, I took the average of the votes in the three newly created regions for each election year.

	Central	43.51**	31.68	11.83
2004	Western	39.96**	24.41	15.55
	Brong Ahafo	46.11**	33.28	12.83
	Central	38.94**	41.83	-2.89
2008	Western	45.52**	33.32	12.2
	Brong Ahafo	47.70**	37.23	10.47
	Central	50.58	53.06	-2.48
2012	Western	50.24	38.15	12.09
	Brong Ahafo	51.39	39.92	11.47
	Central	52.12	53.88	-1.76
2016	Western	41.55**	28.75	12.8
	Brong Ahafo	45.07**	31.82	13.25
	Central	43.43**	47.27	-3.84
2020	Western	46.24**	30.48	15.76
	Brong Ahafo	46.67**	34.01	12.66
	Central	45.87**	48.48	-2.61

*In the Western, Brong Ahafo and Central Regions, data for a key urban constituency respectively came from Takoradi, Sunyani East, and Cape Coast South. These are amongst the regions' few urbanest constituencies.

** NDC lost in the region.

Source: Author's based on several data from Peace FM Online.

Table 14. The NDC's presidential votes percentage in the Greater Accra region and the region's key rural areas. 1992-2020.

Year	NDC's share in Greater Accra Region	NDC's share in key rural constituencies	Difference
			+ -
1992	53.37	94.11	-40.74
		83.71	-30.34
1996	53.99	94.59	-40.60
		86.61	-32.62
2000	42.09*	75.58	-33.49
		68.67	-26.56
2004	46.64*	77.41	-30.77
		68.65	-22.01
2008	52.11	81.12	-29.01
		71.97	-19.86
2012	52.31	84.81	-32.50

		74.12	-21.81
2016	46.69*	79.34	-32.65
		69.81	-23.12
2020	51.04	82.53	-31.49
		72.14	-21.10

*NDC lost in the region. NB: In column three (i.e., NDC's share in key rural constituencies), the top and bottom figures in each cell for each year respectively represent Ada and Shai Osudoku constituencies.


Source: Author's based on several data from Peace FM Online.

In *Table 13*, the NDC lost elections in all major urban constituencies, even where it won the regional election. The only exceptions were the 2008 and 2012 elections, where the party managed a marginal victory in the Cape South constituency. These temporal electoral outcomes underline the NDC's weaker urban base and stronger rural base.

Table 14 further underlines the NDC's relative strength in rural constituencies. It shows that the NDC won all presidential elections in the Greater Accra Region's rural constituencies, even when it lost the regional election. Thus, the above tables support Bawumia's data and argument that the NDC is more rural than urban-based. They also contextualise the argument that the differential effects of SAPs might have evolved party-society linkages along rural-urban lines in Ghana.


In addition to the above evidence, Round Seven of the Afrobarometer survey, conducted in 2017, sheds valuable, even if not very compelling, insights on the NDC's and NPP's respective rural and urban support bases. The survey gauged urban and rural dwellers' association with different political parties in Ghana via three questions: a) Which party's presential candidate did you vote for in the recent 2016 presidential elections (*figure ten*)? b) If presidential elections were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for (*figure 11*)? c) Which party do you feel close to (*figure 12*)?

Figure 10. Which party's presidential candidate did you vote for in the recent 2016 presidential elections?




Source: Author's based on data from Afrobarometer (2017).

Figure 11. If presidential elections were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for?



Source: Author's based on data from Afrobarometer (2017).

Figure 12. Which party do you feel close to?



Source: Author's based on data from Afrobarometer (2017).

At first glance, the survey suggests that the NPP has a stronger base in urban and rural areas than the NDC. Nonetheless, the survey was conducted from 9th to 25th September 2017, barely a year after the NPP had secured a resounding electoral victory, garnering 53.7% of the presidential election votes compared to the NDC's 44.5%. Moreover, on 15th September 2017, the NPP regime introduced a free senior high school (SHS) programme, which received an enthusiastic response from the public (Forson, 2017). The survey's context could explain why the results disproportionately tilt in the NPP's favour in rural and urban areas. Unfortunately, previous surveys (rounds 6, 5, 4 and 3) do not provide disaggregated data along the rural-urban dimension.

Nevertheless, the survey reveals an interesting pattern regarding party-society linkages. In *figures ten and 11*, more urban than rural voters either voted or would vote for the NPP, while more rural than urban voters either voted or would vote for the NDC. Moreover, the urban votes in *figure ten* exceed the rural votes by 1% for the NPP, while the rural votes exceed the urban votes by 8% for the NDC. Similarly, in *figure 11*, the differences are 2% more urban votes for the NPP and 10% more rural votes for the NDC.

The results in *figure 12* are slightly different from the other figures, showing that more rural dwellers feel closer to the NPP and NDC than urban residents. Nevertheless, the difference between rural and urban affinity to the NPP is 3%, while that for the NDC is 10%. Thus, across the three questions, the NDC records significantly higher percentages from rural respondents than urban respondents, indicative

of the party's strength in rural areas compared to urban areas. Hence, despite the limitations of the survey, it shows a clear pattern of variation in party-society linkages, with the NPP and NDC being urban and rural-based, respectively.

The above analysis and evidence confirm studies that report findings on political mobilisation along rural-urban cleavages in Ghana and Africa. For instance, Whitfield (2009, p. 623) argues that the two parties in Ghana have varying links to society along "social cleavages such as ethnicity, region, rural/urban and social status", which may underpin their vote mobilisation strategies. These social cleavages "interact in complex ways, providing the two major parties in Ghana the opportunity to build distinct images" (Osei, 2013, p. 582). For example, Lindberg and Morrison (2008, p. 583) found that "rural belongingness, low levels of education, farming and working-class jobs, and low income" are associated with NDC voters, while the reverse is the case for the NPP.

In contrast, Fridy (2007) found socio-economic indicators (i.e., urban dwellers, highly educated, developed toilet facilities) as insignificant predictors of the NPP's votes, controlling for ethnicity (percentage of Akan speakers). While Fridy's findings contradict Lindberg and Morrison's, Fridy's conclusion must be taken cautiously because the Akan are not a homogenous ethnic group (Frempong, 2001). Only the Asante, Kwahu and the Akyem sub-groups of the Akan ethnic group consistently vote for the NPP. Most other Akan sub-groups swing their votes, including the Fante, Nzema, Ahanta, Bono, and Wassa sub-groups.

Thus, rather than control for the Akan ethnic group to test the significance of socio-economic indicators in predicting the NPP's votes, Fridy could have controlled for the Akyem, Asante and Kwahu sub-groups of the Akan ethnic group. Controlling for these sub-groups would probably have produced different results, underscoring the socio-economic indicators' significance in predicting the NPP's votes. This result could be expected because Fridy also found that socio-economic indicators significantly predict the NPP's votes when ethnicity (Akan) is not controlled.

Nonetheless, regarding the NDC, Fridy found one socio-economic indicator (less education) as a better predictor of the NDC's votes, controlling for the Ewe ethnic group, a reasonably homogenous ethnic group. However, the other socio-economic variables (rural dweller and lack of toilet facilities) are only significant when the Ewe ethnic group is not held constant. Fridy's findings challenge Lindberg and Morrison's debate (2008). However, rural dwellers tend to have lower levels of education than urbanites. Thus, if the low levels of education significantly predict the NDC's votes controlling for the Ewe ethnic group, then Lindberg and Morrison's emphasis on a link between rural belongingness and NDC voters may still hold.

Boone and Wahman's (2015) findings on political mobilisation along rural-urban cleavage in Africa further support the discussion in this section. Boone and Wahman studied eight anglophone African countries that oversaw multiparty democratic transitions in the 1990s and concluded that regimes in six of these countries increased the number of rural constituencies as a counterweight to opposition popularity and mobilisation in urban areas. The only exceptions were Botswana and Zimbabwe. Interestingly, the six cases that increased rural malapportionment (i.e., Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, the Gambia, and Zambia) also implemented SAPs, which might have worsened the plight of urbanites and compelled the regimes to look to rural voters.

Accordingly, Botswana's lack of rural malapportionment may reflect the absence of SAPs in this country. Also, although Zimbabwe implemented SAPs, the dearth of rural malapportionment here likely rests on two factors. First, the country's electoral system was historically designed to favour the white urban community. Second, Mugabe's regime merged urban and pro-government rural constituencies in response to rising anti-regime urban voices (Chigora & Nciizah, 2007). Boone and Wahman (2015) concluded that political mobilisation along rural-urban cleavages in the six-case countries, including Ghana, persisted despite political turnovers. Thus, in some sense, SAPs became Africa's economic revolution that evolved party-society linkage along rural-urban cleavages.

The above discussions, taken together, suggest that NDC's voters tend to be rural, low class and less-educated Ghanaians, while the reverse is valid for the NPP. Not only does artisanal mining occur in rural areas, but much of the ASM literature explicitly and implicitly regards ASM as poverty-driven (Bryceson & Geenen, 2016; Hilson & Potter, 2003; Banchirigah, 2006). These geo-social dynamics of artisanal mining and the preponderance of northerners in southern mines make artisanal miners assume a specific electoral constituency that strikes more resonance with the NDC than the NPP. Against this backdrop, one appreciates why the NDC is unlikely to raid the ASM sector and why it spares indigenous gamamsey operatives but vilifies illegal Chinese miners who are neither poverty-stricken rural dwellers nor citizens with voting power.

3. Exclusive extraction of rent from the mining industry.

Regimes care not only about the votes they can garner to remain in power but also the rent they can generate to prosecute their political campaigns. For the rest of this chapter, I demonstrate how the indigenous gamamsey operatives' saliency to the NDC and illegal Chinese miners' network with the NPP motivate raids and counterraiding of different groups of miners towards exclusive extraction of mineral rents. I argue that the NDC's disposition of sparing indigenous gamamsey operatives and raiding illegal Chinese miners reveals its attempt to redistribute public goods (i.e., mineral rents) to its co-ethnic political supporters with implications for the party's campaign finance. In contrast, because indigenous

artisanal miners do not mirror the NPP's electoral constituency, raiding these miners reconfigures the mining industry and allows for exclusive extraction of mineral rents through the protection of LSM and Chinese interests.

3.1. Securing rents from LSM companies.

As we saw in chapter five, while Rawlings tolerated the illegal hard-rock miners on mining companies' concessions, Kufour repressed these miners, describing them as nuisances to foreign investors. Since these indigenous artisanal miners are less politically crucial to the NPP, Kufour could raid these miners to protect mining companies' property rights and, thus, guarantee his regime's revenue streams from these companies. In contrast, a similar raid under Rawlings could have threatened the regimes' votes from a politically salient social group (i.e., the indigenous artisanal miners).

Like Kufour, Akufo-Addo's raid targeted indigenous hard-rock and alluvial artisanal miners (see chapter five).¹⁷³ The targeted nature of the raid was necessary to protect mining companies' concession against illegal hard-rock miners' incursions. Thus, hard-rock mining communities became the regional headquarters of Operation Vanguard. For example, Obuasi, AGA's host community, became the headquarters of Operation Vanguard in the Ashanti Region. So did Kenyasi, Abirem, and Tarkwa become the Brong Ahafo, Eastern and Western Regional headquarters of Operation Vanguard. Kenyasi and Abirem host Newmont in the Brong Ahafo and Eastern Regions, while Tarkwa hosts Goldfields Ltd in the Western Region.

Indeed, it is counterintuitive that a regime seeking to abate ASM-induced water pollution would station military personnel in hard-rock mining communities where there is hardly water pollution.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, while alluvial ASM was the crux of the environmental problem, the stationing of the military in hard-rock mining communities would strategically protect mining companies against marauding hard-rock artisanal miners and secure LSM rents. As one mining expert argued:

ASM invasions are the major challenges mining companies face. As a result, companies can underreport profit and attribute it to increased operational costs associated with ASM

¹⁷³ This section shows how Akufo-Addo's target of indigenous hard-rock miners secured rents from LSM. See sub-section 3.4 of this chapter for how his target of indigenous alluvial miners aided his exclusive rent access from ASM.

¹⁷⁴ All mining experts and artisanal miners interviewed made a distinction between hard-rock and alluvial ASM, positing that hard-rock ASM is environmentally friendlier.

invasions. This can reduce government revenue from gold mining. Hence, the government used Operation Vanguard to protect mining companies against galamsey invasions.¹⁷⁵

Also, artisanal miners in Obuasi reported that:

AGA is relieved because of Operation Vanguard. We operate in mountainous areas far away from water bodies. If the government is fighting galamsey because of water pollution, they should have spared us [i.e., hard-rock miners]. But they did not because they wanted to protect AGA against galamsey.¹⁷⁶

Moreover, a community relations officer of one mining company emphasised how military raids protect mining companies against ASM invasions: “We have our internal security measures against artisanal miners’ incursions. However, this is not enough because the miners are numerous and overwhelm company security. So, for us, military raids are very beneficial.”¹⁷⁷ Thus, mining companies face existential threats from indigenous artisanal miners across regimes. However, since these miners represent the NDC’s electoral constituency, it became more feasible for the NPP’s Akufo-Addo to repress this group of miners because doing so could also guarantee the regimes’ access to LSM-induced mineral rents.

Nonetheless, an alternative explanation for these varying responses to the indigenous artisanal miners could be the NDC’s and NPP’s differential ideological positions (which I discuss in chapter seven). However, I next demonstrate the NPP’s connection to illegal Chinese miners. I then show how this network probably generates rents for the NPP but provided an impetus for the NDC’s Mahama to raid these Chinese miners and an NPP financier linked to them. Finally, I conclude the chapter by discussing how Akufo-Addo’s raid of the mining sector targeted GNASSM members perceived to be NDC members and thus deemed financially crucial to the NDC.

3.2. The NPP’s connection to illegal Chinese miners.

Until 2008, when the global financial crisis increased gold prices and led to a gold rush in gold-producing countries such as Ghana, galamsey was predominantly hard-rock, occurring off the concessions of existing LSM companies. Nevertheless, not only did the financial crisis spur the exodus of foreigners, mainly Chinese migrants, into Ghana’s alluvial galamsey landscape (Crawford & Botchwey, 2017), but also deliberate government policy under the NPP’s Kufour regime in 2007

¹⁷⁵ Interview with the Ghana Chamber of Mines in Accra on 17th May 2019.

¹⁷⁶ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village A on 1st July 2019.

¹⁷⁷ Interview with a community relations officer of a mining company on 31st July 2019.

arguably remains the most fundamental cause of the preponderance of Chinese in Ghana's galamsey sector.

For instance, a former CEO of the Minerals Commission explained how President Kufour sponsored some Ghanaians to learn a more efficient and effective alluvial small-scale mining in China's Guangxi Province in 2006. Alluvial mining was purely artisanal at the time, involving simple implements such as pick-axes and shovels with insignificant imprints on the country's forest landscape and water bodies. However, many Ghanaian miners sponsored to China built networks with their Chinese counterparts. These Ghanaian miners then facilitated the Chinese participation in Ghana's ASM sector by fronting them to apply for mining licenses.

Galamsey was not a major issue until 2008, when the trend of ASM production started surging. Around 2006, some Ghanaian ASM operatives were sent to China to study how to particularly improve alluvial small-scale mining in Ghana. These guys came back with new technology, such as Chamfan, and introduced some Chinese miners into the ASM sector. This was the beginning of the mechanisation of small-scale mining in Ghana.¹⁷⁸

Thus, Kufour's role in indirectly facilitating networks between Chinese and Ghanaian miners suggests that most Chinese miners and their Ghanaian counterparts are likely to be connected to the NPP relative to the NDC. For instance, an informant described how the Kufour regime nearly evicted artisanal miners in Talensi for a Chinese mining company, fronted by an NPP member, to mine.

In 2003, we wanted to regularise our activities. You could apply for licenses together if you were nine miners and above. We were about 15 persons wanting to apply for the license. Three of us were leading the licensing process, including the regional minister's nephew. However, he went behind us and took the license for his company, *Yenyeya* Mining Group. He was also an NPP member in the Nabdam constituency. The regional minister lobbied for his nephew (Charley¹⁷⁹) to go to China to strike a deal with Shaanxi. Shaanxi said they were coming to help us, but we did not see this. Charley and Shaanxi considered us illegal miners and maltreated us. Between 2003 and 2009, Shaanxi was like an NPP company.¹⁸⁰

This dispute occurred in Gbane, a mining site in the Talensi District of Ghana's Upper East Region (northern Ghana). In the early 1990s, following a gold rush in Talensi, the NDC's Rawlings blocked

¹⁷⁸ Interview with a former CEO of Ghana's Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st May 2019.

¹⁷⁹ Charley is a pseudonym.

¹⁸⁰ WhatsApp interview with a representative of indigenous galamsey operatives in Talensi on 4th October 2021.

out a 72km² area of land for indigenous galamsey operatives to earn a living.¹⁸¹ These miners informally operated the mine until the question of regularising their activities came to the fore in 2003 just two years into the Kufour NPP regime. However, the regularisation took a partisan shape as the regional minister's nephew's company (Yenyeya Mining Group) and his Chinese partner, Shaanxi, pushed the rest of the indigenous galamsey workers to the periphery.

Crawford et al. (2017) suggested that Shaanxi officially entered Gbane in 2008, having legally acquired a license to provide mining services for two small-scale mining companies: Yenyeya and *Pubortaaba* Mining Groups.¹⁸² These small-scale mining companies held a combined concession of 0.25 km². Despite Shaanxi's official status as a mine support service company, it set up a complex large-scale mining equipment and engaged in large-scale mining in breach of its license. An informant in Talensi revealed that Yenyeya and Pubortaaba only fronted Shaanxi to mine illegally and that Shaanxi allocated 7% of the minerals produced to these small-scale mining companies.¹⁸³

Several scholars contend that Shaanxi illegally operated as a large-scale mining company under the guise of offering mine support services (Crawford et al., 2017; Hilson et al., 2014). For instance, Crawford et al. (2017) reported how state officials were complicit in Shaanxi's illegalities. However, the authors also observed that the Minerals Commission under the NDC regime intervened in mining disputes in Gbane to seemingly uphold the artisanal miners' interests vis-à-vis Shaanxi and its local partners. Consistent with this observation, an informant in Talensi contended that the NDC recognised the artisanal miners' right to mine in Gbane. For example, Benjamin Aryee, a former Minerals Commission CEO, supported the artisanal miners' cause against Shaanxi and Charley while the NDC was in office.

In August 2010, concerning the land that Charley took behind us, we sent a petition to Benjamin Aryee in Accra. Benjamin Aryee said Charley could not call the rest of us illegal miners. Aryee said the rest of the miners could mine on the same land until Charley and Shaanxi found a place for us. Immediately after we returned from Accra, Charley took us to court in Bolga for the court to sack us from the land. He argued that he had brought his investors and that the court should sack us from the land for his people to get some peace to work. We took a very powerful lawyer who humiliated them. They withdrew the case

¹⁸¹ WhatsApp interview with a representative of indigenous galamsey operatives in Talensi on 4th October 2021.

¹⁸² My WhatsApp interview with a representative of indigenous miners in Talensi revealed that Shaanxi's presence in Gbane dates back to 2003. Thus, Shaanxi may have operated without a mine support service license until it officially obtained one in 2008.

¹⁸³ WhatsApp interview with a representative of indigenous galamsey operatives in Talensi on 4th October 2021.

and made it out of court settlement. However, after 2016, the company became untouchable.¹⁸⁴

Thus, while Shaanxi and its local partner could exercise a monopoly over the mineralised land under Kufour's NPP, they had to at least co-exist with the artisanal miners between 2009 and 2016 when the NDC was in power. This point implies that the artisanal miners in Gbane fare better under the NDC than the NPP. However, Crawford et al. (2017) argued that the state under the NDC was hostile towards the artisanal miners but favoured Shaanxi. Nevertheless, rather than being cruel to the artisanal miners, the state intervened in Gbane to restore law and order after a local movement (comprising artisanal miners and community members) violently attacked Shaanxi and destroyed equipment, including a drilling machine, worth approximately US\$ 3.4 million (ibid).

Moreover, whereas the state made some arrests, critical members of the movement, such as a District Assembly member, were granted bail. Also, a court case brought against the movement dragged (Crawford et al., 2017). Indeed, the audacity with which the miners attacked Shaanxi, the dragging court case and the Minerals Commission's pro-ASM intervention in Gbane all show how the artisanal miners' positionality was bolstered under the NDC compared to the NPP's regime wherein Shaanxi is said to have become 'untouchable.' This untouchability is reflected in how the NPP protected Shaanxi's interests in Gbane and overlooked its excesses, including its abuse of artisanal miners' rights and encroachment on a concession operated by Cassius Mining Ltd, a large-scale mining company.

On the one hand, in 2019, the regime deployed the Ghana air force to close all artisanal mining pits in the Gbane area to prevent the artisanal miners from trespassing into the concession Shaanxi operated.¹⁸⁵ Also, as reported in local media (GH Headlines), seven illegal miners died in 2018 after inhaling poisonous gas emanating from a blasting exercise Shaanxi conducted (Akapule, 2018). This event came on the back of another blasting incident that killed one person in 2017 (Akapule, 2018). Similarly, another local media (Modern Ghana) reported the death of 17 people in Gbane caused by Shaanxi's blasting in 2019 (Owusu-Abedi, 2019). While the NPP regime fined Shaanxi and its local partners (Yenyeya and Pubortaaba) an amount of \$50,000, the deceased's relatives received no compensation of any kind (Owusu-Abedi, 2019).

On the other hand, in 2017, Shaanxi encroached upon a concession prospected by Cassius Mining Ltd, an Australian company that began exploration in Gbane in 2014¹⁸⁶ and signed a prospecting license agreement on 28th December 2016 (Cassius Mining Limited, 2020), covering an area of 13.791 km².

¹⁸⁴ WhatsApp interview with a representative of indigenous galamsey operatives in Talensi on 4th October 2021.

¹⁸⁵ Third-party interview with small-scale miners' association in Talensi on 24th September 2021.

¹⁸⁶ On its website, Cassius claims it has been exploring gold in Gbane since 2014.

Cassius's concession dwarfed the 50 acres (or 0.25km²) area of land Shaanxi mined on Yenyeya and Pubortaaba's behalf. While the former Minister of Lands, John Peter Amewu, visited the Gbane mine and rebuked Shaanxi for its illegal modus operandi, the Minister counterintuitively acknowledged Shaanxi as a large-scale mining company that should co-exist with Cassius: "I do not see why two companies cannot work together even if you are both into large scale mining; you must learn to co-exist in this environment" (Amenuveve, 2017, n.p.n.).

Since Shaanxi was a mine support service provider that abused its license by illegally engaging in large-scale mining, one would expect Minister Amewu to initiate processes that would sanction Shaanxi for abusing its license and trespassing into Cassius' concession. Instead, Amewu encouraged Shaanxi to stop illegal mining and apply for a large-scale mining license (Akapule, 2017; Amenuveve, 2017). Eventually, Shaanxi obtained a large-scale mining license in September 2019, covering 16.02 km² area of land, which is almost 50 times the previous concessions it mined.¹⁸⁷ Much worse for Cassius, the regime rejected Cassius' application to renew its prospecting license in 2018, effectively undermining the company's investment in Gbane. Cassius claims the regime gave no valid reason for refusing to renew the prospecting license (Cassius Mining Limited, 2020).

Nevertheless, Cassius' plight may have resulted from the NPP regime's suspicion of the company's connection to the opposition NDC. Cassius obtained its prospecting license on 28th December 2016 after the NDC had lost the presidential election to the NPP. An informant in Talensi narrated how NPP elites became suspicious of Cassius' connection to the NDC.

In 2017, seven small-scale miners died in the mining area. The Regional Minister invited Cassius, Shaanxi, and small-scale miners to a security meeting. The Shaanxi PRO said Cassius's license was political because it was signed in December 2016 after the elections. That Cassius had some links with the NDC. Suddenly, everything changed. The Regional Minister started using some unpleasant words against Cassius.¹⁸⁸

The NPP's tolerance of Shaanxi's illegalities and protection of Shaanxi's interests in Gbane underlines how Chinese miners may have intricate networks with the NPP. Thus, Mahama's 2013 raid might have intended to block mineral rents from accruing to the opposition (the NPP) at the time. However, the raid spared Shaanxi but victimised a prominent opposition miner and NPP financier (Chairman Wontumi) linked to Chinese migrants in galamsey. As we shall see in section 3.3, like Shaanxi, Wontumi officially operated a mine support service but abused his license by engaging in illegal mining.

¹⁸⁷ WhatsApp interview with the Director of a local NGO in Talensi on 22nd September 2021.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

However, unlike Wontumi, who fronted a faceless Chinese entrepreneur, Shaanxi openly operated as a licensed service provider. Thus, it was probably easier for Mahama to target Wontumi, an opposition financier whose company (Hansol Mining Ltd) facilitated the participation of Chinese in Ghana's illegal mining sector.

3.3. The NDC disrupts the opposition's access to ASM rents.

Chairman Wontumi is popularly known as a galamsey kingpin that finances the NPP. Before Mahama raided the ASM sector in 2013, Wontumi claims Mahama queried him over the legality or otherwise of his mining business, Hansol Mining Ltd, and, at some point, sought to persuade him to finance the NDC.

I took one of airline, then I flew to Tamale and saw him [President Mahama]. The time I reached there, all my company documents and everything was there. That time Gbevlo Lartey was there, Peter Mahama was there, and Alfred Mahama was there and some few people were there. Then, he [President Mahama] asked me, 'young man, how did you get all this money'? He said, 'they brought you for me to stop you [from galamsey]. Tell me the truth!' And I said I have nothing to hide... I have a legitimate concession called Hansol and Akonta mining, so this is my document and I have expatriates that they also work for me. That time I was making about one million US dollars a day. He told me that 'young man, you are too intelligent. I want you to come to NDC and support me. I said to him that the place I come from, even if you have money and you don't belong to NPP, it's very dangerous (Adom-Otchere, 2020, p. n.p.n).

Following this correspondence between Wontumi and President Mahama, Wontumi alleged that the Bureau of National Investigation (aka National Security) invited him for further interrogation to coerce him into admitting to being an illegal miner.

Gbevlo Lartey has invited me to National Security about four times. He said, 'you should accept that you are galamsey', and I said no, 'I am not galamsey.' They said, 'how do you bring the Chinese people' and I said, 'I am not ambassador in China, you should ask the Ghana Ambassador to China. That time I had Chinese people working for me because that time I had service support mining. So, I showed all my documents to Gbevlo Lartey in the National Security and said, 'if you are saying I am a galamsey, then arrest me. I am not immigration officer, and I also don't give working permits. So, you want to harass me because I have money. Tell President Mahama that it won't work.' So, they tagged me so that they can steal. Not knowing that the workers working with me, the National Security

has sent some there. So, they know where exactly we are hiding the gold. They stole my gold. They killed some of my workers. They seized and burnt about 500 of my excavators. I can never forgive President Mahama. I will never forgive him (Adom-Otchere, 2020, n.p.n).

The Minister who supervised this event confirmed the burning of Wontumi's excavators:

Unfortunately, although we had given the military personnel instruction to only confiscate excavators, in the Western Region, they burnt the excavators of one Chairman Wontumi, who took us to court. For about three years, the matter was still in court until we left office in 2016.¹⁸⁹

Moreover, an official of the Precious Minerals and Marketing Company (PMMC), a parastatal marketing body that buys gold and diamond from licensed and unlicensed artisanal miners, corroborated Mahama's targeted attack.

The Mahama clampdown targeted some people. Even they didn't arrest any illegal miners. The target was NPP's chairman in Kumasi. They destroyed his excavators in the Western Region, and that was all. I was a principal witness for Chairman Wontumi. He was the only one affected. So, this clampdown did not affect our [i.e., the PMMC's] operations because a lot of illegal miners were mining.¹⁹⁰

Wontumi's experience shows how the NDC's perception of his links with Chinese miners likely led to this victimisation. However, Wontumi might have been fronting Chinese entrepreneurs. For instance, the President of Concerned Small-Scale Miners in Ghana, who claims to have worked with Wontumi, argued that Wontumi only fronted a Chinese entrepreneur.

When Wontumi came to Ghana, he owned a small Golf two vehicle. He used to go to Tema where he met a Chinese man called Lee. This Lee wanted to do mining. However, he had no network or contact in Ghana. So, Wontumi agreed to work with him. That is how Wontumi entered mining. So, those excavators Wontumi claimed were burnt by the Mahama administration were Lee's excavators. Wontumi could not provide a single document that the machines belonged to him" (OneLife Ghana Investrips, 2020, n.p.n)

¹⁸⁹ Interview with a former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources in Accra on 13th June 2019.

¹⁹⁰ Interview with a PMMC official in Accra on 26th June 2019.

Indeed, contrary to Wontumi's claims that his company had a mining license, Hilson et al. (2014, p. 301) found that Hansol Mining was a service company without a mining license but mined "illegally whilst simultaneously drawing upon China for labour and expertise". The authors argued that Ghanaian-fronted Chinese companies, such as Hansol, "facilitated Chinese migration" and participation in Ghana's illicit mining business (Hilson et al., 2014, p. 301). Indeed, in 2021, the IMCIM Chair (an NPP member) authored a damning galamsey report that substantiate the complex network between NPP elites and Chinese miners in the galamsey sector. For instance, the report suggested that a former NPP General Secretary, who later became the CEO of Ghana's Forestry Commission (popularly known as Sir John), "had Chinese gangs doing galamsey on his behalf" (Frimpong-Boateng, 2021, n.p.n). It further underscored how national and sub-national NPP officials, including those working at the Presidency (i.e., the Jubilee House), became entrenched in galamsey by engaging Chinese expertise.

I can state without any equivocation that many party officials from National to the unit committee level had their friends, PAs, agents, relatives, financiers or relatives engaged in illegal mining. Most of them engaged Chinese working for them. There are appointees in the Jubilee House that are doing or supporting illegal mining (Frimpong-Boateng, 2021, n.p.n).

This evidence contextualises Mahama's anti-Chinese raid in 2013. Furthermore, it shows how Mahama's attack on Wontumi's Hansol Mining in 2013 dealt with the mysterious Chinese behind this illicit mining company, blocking mineral rents from accruing to the opposition. Nonetheless, while Wontumi sued the NDC regime over these attacks, GhanaWeb (2017) reported that the state had awarded a judgement debt of US\$1 billion to Wontumi in January 2017 when Wontumi's party (the NPP) had just assumed office. Perhaps, the claim that the burnt excavators belonged to Wontumi's Chinese accomplices might explain why Wontumi failed to get an 'underserved' justice under Mahama's administration.

Nevertheless, while Wontumi suffered at the hands of Mahama for his perceived or actual connection with the illegal Chinese miners, the odds changed when the NPP came to power in 2017. This time, miners like Wontumi and illegal Chinese miners could mine even amid a ban on artisanal mining. In contrast, most indigenous artisanal miners suffered marginality and suppression because of their perceived or actual connection to the NDC. I discuss this below.

3.4. The NPP exclusively extracts ASM rents.

Despite President Akufo-Addo's rhetoric to put his presidency on the line to fight galamsey, this fight, as explored above, spared Chinese miners but scapegoated most indigenous artisanal miners, licensed

and unlicensed. Before deploying the military in June 2017, the IMCIM deeply suspected the GNASSM, an indigenous mining organisation, as an NDC ally for at least two reasons.

First, the NDC regime under Mills facilitated the organisation of the GNASSM in 2011¹⁹¹ and housed GNASSM in the Diamond House, a parastatal commercial building in Accra central. This building also hosts the PMMC. The location of GNASSM in the Diamond House was likely strategic, aimed at facilitating mineral trade between GNASSM members and the PMMC and, thus, accruing rents to the Mills NDC regime.

Second, while the GNASSM attempted to engage with Akufo-Addo's NPP regime or the IMCIM to implement a raid that spares licensed miners, relations between GNASSM and the IMCIM strained during these engagements. This is because a splinter group of the GNASSM, the Ashanti Chapter of Small-Scale Miners, threatened demonstrations against the regime for failing to lift a ban on licensed ASM.¹⁹² One GNASSM member lamented in an interview that:

After the splinter group's planned demonstration, they saw all of us as members of the opposition NDC party with no good intentions for the government. When we went for a meeting with them, we could read from their faces that they did not want to have us in the meeting.¹⁹³

Another GNASSM member shared similar sentiments at a Third-World Network mining conference.

We, the small-scale miners, were invited to the meetings of IMCIM but were not allowed to make any contribution to the policies or measures the IMCIM was going to implement in the sector. They only invited us sometimes to inform us what decisions they have taken without giving us any room to make even minor changes.¹⁹⁴

Thus, the GNASSM could not lobby the regime, through IMCIM, to target only unlicensed miners. Instead, having posited that licensed and unlicensed miners engage in illegalities, the regime clamped down on all types of miners, including licensed GNASSM members. While it would be strange to

¹⁹¹ Interview with a GNASSM official in Kumasi on 19th July 2019.

¹⁹² This demonstration arose after the regime failed to lift a temporary moratorium on ASM. The government agreed with the miners that the moratorium, which would enable the state to assess the situation, would not exceed two months. However, the moratorium was becoming permanent, which triggered the splinter group's demonstration, deepening the IMCIM's suspicion that most licensed indigenous miners are also NDC allies. Interview with a GNASSM official in Kumasi on 19th July 2019.

¹⁹³ Interview with a GNASSM official in Kumasi on 19th July 2019.

¹⁹⁴ Observation of the narrative of a miner during a Third World Network conference on the 14th and 15th of May 2019.

contend that all GNASSM members are NDC members, a sub-national elite participant indicated that GNASSM leans more towards the NDC than the NPP: “There are some within GNASSM who are more aligned and loyal to political parties than to GNASSM. However, GNASSM generally has a better relationship with the NDC than the NPP.”¹⁹⁵ This might explain why, despite lifting the ban on licensed miners in December 2018, the NPP regime introduced a stringent vetting process – discussed in chapter five– that alienated licensed miners.

In fact, before the vetting, the IMCIM declared all licenses issued to ASM operatives from 1st July 2016 null and void.¹⁹⁶ However, these were legal documents signed by a former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources and published in the District Assemblies and, thus, easily traceable. One official at the Minerals Commission argued that:

This decision [to invalidate all licenses issued from July 2016] was taken by the IMCIM without the approval of the President of the Republic of Ghana or the Parliament of Ghana. However, ASM licenses are agreements between the Government of Ghana and a small-scale miner. Therefore, the IMCIM’s decision to revoke the licenses of ASM operatives represented some form of contractual breach.¹⁹⁷

Nevertheless, this decision served a political purpose to the extent that it potentially alienated perceived NDC-aligned miners who might have received their licenses just before the NDC lost the December 2016 elections. Nonetheless, even those licensed GNASSM members who could return to work suffered further repression on-site. For example, in May 2021, JoyNews reported how military men had invaded a licensed mining site where miners appeared to have been mining responsibly.

One of the mining sites JoyNews visited with the Ghana National Association of Small-scale miners was the John Benedict Ventures in the Twifo Praso District. Here, the proximity of where the mining is done and where the Pra River is [located], is in the range of 50 and 100 meters. There are tubes that are linked to the Pra River where water is drawn to undertake their activities in what they call recycling. Some three excavators and other mining equipment they value at GHS 3 million have been burnt by the military in their operation. This has angered the Ghana National Association of Small-scale Miners, who are saying they have been betrayed by the government (JoyNewsPrime, 2021).

¹⁹⁵ Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with an official the Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st June 2019.

¹⁹⁷ Interview with an official the Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st June 2019.

However, elements deeply connected to Akufo-Addo's NPP regime escaped similar attacks. For instance, in Obuasi, participants in a focus group discussed how Wontumi had moved excavators into a nearby forest and had started mining: "The government says it is fighting galamsey, but Wontumi has just brought excavators into the forest nearby to mine. They have been mining for some months now."¹⁹⁸

Similarly, a senior police officer, who served as a member of the Operation Vanguard taskforce in Tarkwa, contended that:

When I was with Operation Vanguard in Tarkwa, we seized four excavators. However, we received a call from the headquarters to drop the case because the concession belonged to Kate Gyamfua, who happened to be the NPP's women's organiser. All the members of the Galamstop task force are party loyalists. The leader of the Galamstop in Obuasi is the NPP Vice Chairman for Cape Coast. If they (Galamstop) came to your site and found that you are an NPP person, they would make no arrest. Otherwise, they would crash you. If you are a party member and your excavators are seized, you can penetrate the system and get it back.¹⁹⁹

Nonetheless, while the military (Galamstop and Operation Vanguard) may have spared party members, illegal miners that could bribe the military could mine regardless of their political affiliation.

We had training in ASM in Tarkwa, and the participants that were also miners told us that if Operation Vanguard comes to your site and you give them something (money), they will allow you to mine. But if you prove stubborn, then you will be monitored very closely so that you can't mine.²⁰⁰

However, politics was central in determining who got to mine amid the raid. For instance, in 2020, several scandals on the partisan nature of the raid hit the IMCIM, the ad hoc body set up to fight illegal mining. These scandals implicated the IMCIM's chair (Frimpong Boateng) and other NPP party members regarding their role in facilitating their party's access to mineral rents. For example, under Frimpong Boateng's watch, approximately 500 excavators seized by Operation Vanguard disappeared in February 2020 (Petetsi, 2020), confirming the claim that party members could retrieve seized excavators and return to work.

¹⁹⁸ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village B on 2nd July 2019. An informal conversation with an old woman in Obuasi on 9th July 2019 confirmed Wontumi's operations.

¹⁹⁹ Interview with a police officer in Obuasi on 12th July 2019.

²⁰⁰ Interview with the Geological Survey Authority official in Accra on 27th May 2019.

Moreover, a leaked audio revealed an interaction between Frimpong Boateng and Ekow Ewusi – the Central Regional NPP organiser – in which the IMCIM was planning to exploit some mineralised lands to raise funds for the party.²⁰¹ These mineralised lands perhaps fell under a community mining project the regime had introduced to train artisanal miners towards responsible mining. However, this project soon took a partisan shape, alienating many existing miners and introducing new ones linked to the regime. For example, a sub-national police officer expressed concerns about how the community mining project would be politicised.

A few days ago, they said they want to do community mining, so interested people should come and register. But the party in power would penetrate this mining programme with its own people. Everything is now politicised in our country.²⁰²

Likewise, a miner lamented the politicisation of the community mining project and its implication for existing licensed miners: “they said they are bringing in community mining project. They said we should go to the District Chief Executives to register for community mining. They are taking land from licensed miners for those in community mining.”²⁰³ Similarly, many existing artisanal miners in Obuasi deeply suspected that individuals selected for the community mining projects were closely linked to the regime in power.

For those of us with no connection to the government, we cannot access the community mining project. So, the government should leave us to make a living from mining any land with gold. Otherwise, the government should extend the community mining to cover everybody in galamsey.²⁰⁴

The politicisation of the community mining project and the IMCIM’s persistence – despite the corruption scandals it faced – highlight how the NPP sought to penalise perceived NDC miners while exclusively accruing mineral rents under the guise of a military raid of artisanal miners. Several bureaucrats and mining stakeholders expressed concerns about how the persistence of the IMCIM unduly affected the effective functioning of mainstream mineral management organisations such as the Minerals Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). For example, Yao Graham of Third World Network suggested that the IMCIM had no legal basis and needed to be dismantled.

²⁰¹ Alleged conversation between Frimpong-Boateng & Ekow Ewusi on plans to finance NPP through Galamsey. Retrieved February 12, 2020, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URsRBLRWvns>

²⁰² Interview with a police officer in Obuasi on 12th July 2019.

²⁰³ WhatsApp interview with a representative of artisanal miners in Talensi on 4th October 2021.

²⁰⁴ Focus group interview with artisanal miners in Obuasi Village A on 1st July 2019. Similar sentiments emerged in a focus group interview in Obuasi Village B on 2nd July 2019.

What exactly is the legal basis of the IMCIM? What is the legal basis of the step that it is taking? We know that the refusal of the IMCIM to disappear has basically become a point of paralysis of the operation of the institutions in the sector. We need to demand a return to the role of the properly constituted institutions; and the dismantling of ad hoc institutions which were illegal to start with and are in danger of becoming permanently illegal.²⁰⁵

Responding to Yao Graham's query, a representative from the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources implied how the extension of the ban on galamsey beyond six months – and, thus, the IMCIM's persistence – was a function of the political elites' decision.

The MMIP itself envisaged six months ban on the sector. When the politicians took over, they had some ideas for extending it. As technocrats, we work with politicians and engage with them in policymaking. But every policy of national interest must be approved by politicians. Politicians have a 'public' mandate, and they are the ones to seek re-election. So as a technocrat, you serve your masters. To the best of your ability, you advise them, and when they don't take it, you would have done your duty.²⁰⁶

Moreover, an official at the Minerals Commission lamented the IMCIM's failure to hand over its duties to the relevant mineral management and regulatory bodies.

We were made to understand right from the beginning that after the ban is lifted, automatically, the IMCIM should be dissolved, and all the resources transferred to the regulatory bodies to continue from where the IMCIM ended. But now, after lifting the ban, they are still in existence.²⁰⁷

The initial plan to dissolve the IMCIM and transfer its resources to the regulatory bodies appeared impressive because these regulatory bodies (the Minerals Commission and the EPA) have national and sub-national experts with field appreciation of the intricate dynamics of the artisanal mining sector. Thus, they are better placed to manage this sector than the IMCIM. However, this plan became elusive because, unlike the regulatory bodies not under the direct control of the political state, the IMCIM was. Hence, despite the corruption scandals that hit the IMCIM, this organisation's persistence crucially

²⁰⁵ A speech by Yao Graham during a two-day Third World Network conference held in Accra on 14th and 15th May 2019.

²⁰⁶ A speech by an official of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources during a two-day Third World Network conference held in Accra on 14th and 15th May 2019.

²⁰⁷ Interview with an official of the Minerals Commission in Accra on 21st June 2019.

facilitated the manipulation of the artisanal mining sector to accrue mineral rents to the regime while blocking same to the political opposition.

4. Conclusion.

This chapter explained why the contending regimes in Ghana respond differently to different groups of ASM workers. It demonstrated a pattern of linkages between different regimes and varying groups of miners, arguing that NDC regimes have links with indigenous artisanal miners as these miners constitute the NDC's geo-ethnic political base. In contrast, NPP regimes are connected to illegal Chinese miners. Consequently, NDC regimes generally put up with the ASM sector but use military raids to scapegoat illegal Chinese miners and their local partners considered to be generating mineral rents for the political opposition.

By contrast, because indigenous artisanal miners do not constitute the NPP's political base, NPP regimes also have the political leeway to crack down on the sector in ways that penalise most indigenous artisanal miners and allow for a reconfiguration of the mining industry towards the exclusive extraction of mineral rent. The chapter's argument is relevant because it shows how intricate political dynamics in the natural resource sector could shape the fate of different groups of miners over time. Moreover, it reveals that while Ghana's competitive clientelist settlement is necessary to generate political constraints for incumbents, it does not sufficiently make contending regimes similarly vulnerable to social groups.

Instead, by showing how contending regimes in a competitive clientelist political settlement differently connect to different social groups in society, the chapter clarified the conditions under which constraints emerge and shape varying outcomes.

Chapter 7. Interrogating Alternative Analytical Approaches.

1. Introduction.

This chapter introduces alternative ways of making sense of the study's overarching research question. Ideational questions about resource governance and within-country variation in social movement activities present alternative ways to interpret the study's question. The chapter interrogates three main ideational questions: neoliberal ideas, resource-nationalist ideas, and party-political ideas. Regimes that subscribe to resource-nationalist ideas and appear oriented to the left may seek to maximise their nations' streams of benefits from resource extraction. Thus, such regimes may be hostile to foreign mining interests but resist attempts at repressing indigenous artisanal miners. In contrast, regimes that endorse neoliberalism and are right-oriented may prioritise foreign mining capital and repress indigenous artisanal miners.

These ideational approaches to resource governance may condition how regimes in Ghana and Tanzania respond to artisanal miners. In Ghana, the NDC and NPP respectively lean to the left and right. Thus, unlike the NPP regimes, NDC regimes may be resource-nationalist and favour indigenous artisanal miners while antagonising foreign mining interests. Nonetheless, the CCM, a leftist political party, has consistently won elections in Tanzania. However, as we saw in chapter four, different CCM regimes responded differently to artisanal miners, implying that the CCM's leftist ideology cannot explain such temporal variation in regime-ASM relations. Instead, focusing on the resource governance ideas of each president may alternatively clarify their varying relations with the artisanal miners.

Thus, sections one and two of this chapter discuss how ideas shape regime-ASM relations in Ghana and Tanzania. Section three offers a third alternative interpretation, focusing on how variation in social movements' activities may drive differences in regime-ASM relations. This section only focuses on the Ghanaian case, where media advocacy against galamsey varies over time and seems to influence how the various regimes respond to artisanal miners. However, I show that these alternative approaches do not adequately account for the study's question.

2. Do ideas matter?

2.1. Ideas and regime-ASM relations in Ghana.

How Ghanaian regimes respond to artisanal miners and why they do so might be a function of the regimes' competing ideas on governance more broadly and resource governance more narrowly. Ghana's NDC and NPP subscribe to varying party-political ideologies and, therefore, appeal to different resource governance ideas. As regards its philosophy, Article 5 of the NDC's 1992 constitution considers the party as a "Social Democratic Party that believes in the equality and the egalitarian treatment of each person irrespective of their social, cultural, educational, political, religious and economic relations in a multi-party environment" (NDC, 1992, p. 6). This political philosophy shapes the manifestos of the NDC, with its 2008 manifesto arguing that:

"We are certainly not against wealth accumulation by individuals and groups but as a Party that is anchored [in] the social democracy philosophy and espouses the tenets of our ideology unashamedly, all our efforts must be geared towards protecting and supporting the vulnerable, the disadvantaged, the marginalised and the have-nots in society.... We reaffirm our conviction that Social Democracy provides the best solution for the evils resulting from unregulated competition and the domination of vested interests" (NDC, 2008, p. 2).

Key phrases such as "social democracy", "domination of vested interests", and "the have-nots in society" underscore the NDC's commitment to protecting the economic interests of the poor masses, including most informal economic actors. Compared to the NDC's ideology, the opening paragraphs of the NPP's 1996 manifesto outline the party's philosophy as follows:

"[The NPP's] policy is to liberate the energies of the people for the growth of a property-owning democracy in [Ghana], with right to life, freedom and justice, as the principles to which the Government and laws of the land should be dedicated in order specifically to enrich life, property and liberty of each and every citizen" (NPP, 1996, p. 1).

As a rightist political party, creating an enabling environment for capitalism (businesses) to flourish is crucial for the NPP. However, at least in the extractive sector, capitalism has almost become synonymous with foreign capital since many oil and mining companies in Africa, including Ghana, are foreign owned. Thus, for the NPP, attracting FDI into Ghana's mining sector, which is also the country's most productive sector,²⁰⁸ is crucial. As foreign capital dominates Ghana's mining sector, the NPP aims

²⁰⁸ Since 2008, gold has become the single-most-important commodity in the country, generating far more foreign exchange than its closest counterpart, cocoa. See Appendix J for a comparison of the export values of gold and cocoa from 2008 to 2019.

to retain foreign investors and entice new investors by rolling out measures that reduce mining companies' operational costs. These measures include tax holidays and the protection of mining companies' property rights through military raids of marauding artisanal miners.

Thus, it appears that the quest to protect the property rights of mining companies motivates the NPP's raid of indigenous galamsey operatives, suggesting that rightism has a bearing on regime-ASM relations. Put differently, a regime that grants tax and other concessions to transnational mining companies as mechanisms to attract more foreign mining capital would find it more appropriate to take policy measures that ward-off ASM operatives from mining companies' concessions. Therefore, a critical analysis of the NPP's mining concessions to LSM companies relative to the NDC's could clarify any link between the parties' distinct resource governance ideas and their relations with indigenous galamsey operatives.

2.1.1. Regimes' concessions to mining companies. Rawlings, Kufour and Mills.

Before Ghana entered the new millennium, the Bretton Woods institutions expressed concerns about the country's uncompetitive Minerals and Mining Law of 1986 relative to other liberal codes in places like Guinea, Mali and Tanzania (Abdulai, 2017a). These institutions called on the NDC's Rawlings administration to adopt a more liberal mining code. While the existing law under Rawlings fixed a royalty rate between 3% and 12% of the total revenues of mining companies, it empowered the Minister of Mines (then Secretary of Mines) to determine the exact rate at which mining companies paid the royalty.

The Secretary shall on the advice of the Minerals Commission determine the rate of royalty, payable under this section by the holder of a mining lease provided that the rate of royalty payable shall not be more than 12 per cent or less than 3 per cent of the total revenue of minerals obtained by the holder (Republic of Ghana, 1986, p. Section 22[2]).

Thus, the Secretary of Mines could require companies to pay a rate of 10% or 11%, a considerable percentage of their revenues. Other fiscal measures included a 45% mining income tax, revised to 35% in 1994 and 32.5% in 2000 (Aryee, 2018). These fiscal measures remained unchanged until the NPP's Kufour came to power in January 2001. Being rightist in orientation, Kufour superintended over some of the generous fiscal concessions to mining companies. For instance, the regime revised Ghana's Minerals and Mining law in 2006, birthing the Minerals and Mining Act 2006 (Act 703), which granted more fiscal incentives to mining companies. Act 703 introduced a sliding royalty rate of 3% to 6%

compared to the previous sliding rate of 3% to 12% and reduced the corporate tax rate from 32.5% to 25%. However, for mining companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange, a corporate tax of 22% applied (Aryee, 2018). The Act also introduced the concepts of development and stability agreements. Thus, mining companies that invested more than US\$ 500 million qualified for a development agreement and stability terms. The stability terms then shield the leaseholder for 15 years against any adverse financial imposts triggered by the passage of any new legislative instrument or any other government action (Republic of Ghana, 2006).


It is worth noting that before the passage of the revised Act in 2006, the Kufour regime had already entered into two investment agreements with two major mining companies, which would shape the development and stability agreements later introduced in the revised Act. On 18th December 2003, the regime signed the first investment agreement with Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd (NGGL) after NGGL proposed to invest US\$700 million in the Ahafo and the Akyem Mines over a 15-year timeframe (Aryee, 2018). These proposed investments persuaded the regime to grant the company an investment agreement, which guaranteed the company a 15-year protection against any fiscal changes occasioned by the enactment of new legislation. To the regime, such a concession was necessary to bolster Ghana's economy and improve the economies of host communities (Aryee, 2018).

Second, the NGGL's investment agreement provoked a similar agreement between the regime and AGA. AGA was incorporated in Ghana in 2004, following a merger between Ashanti Goldfields Company (AGC) Ltd and AngloGold Limited of South Africa. This merger was necessary to enable AGC to leverage AngloGold's technical and fiscal wherewithal in deep-level mining to develop the "Obuasi-deep". Like NGGL, AGA's investment exceeded US\$ 500 million, culminating in bilateral negotiation for a stability agreement ratified by Parliament in February 2004 (Republic of Ghana, 2007). Thus, the stability and development agreements, granted in sections 48 and 49 of the Minerals and Mining Act 2006 (Act 703), were afterthoughts by the Kufour regime that had reckoned that formalising such agreements could attract new FDI and encourage re-investment by existing mining companies.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁹ Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019.

These considerable fiscal concessions may have partly contributed to a surge in LSM investments from US\$ 231.78 million as of 2000 to US\$ 797.52 million by 2005 (*figure 13*).

Figure 13. Investment trends in Ghana’s mining industry. 2000-2010.



Source: Ghana Chamber of Mines (2021).

In accounting for these fiscal changes, Abdulai (2017a, p. 15) contended that “the influence of transnational ideas and actors was very significant”, emphasising the World Bank’s aversion towards the uncompetitiveness of the 1986 mining law. However, he later argued that “the passage of the 2006 mining code was...straightforward...given the closeness of [the NPP’s) ‘property-owning democracy’ ideology to the World Bank’s pro-business ideological perspective...” (p. 16).

Abdulai’s (2017a) argument demonstrates how the NPP’s rightist ideology and neoliberal ideas of resource governance might have influenced Kufour to revise the country’s mineral laws to grant more concessions to mining companies. Indeed, Kufour’s concession to mining companies starkly contrasted with Rawlings’ deafening opposition to the World Bank’s call for the adoption of a more liberal mining regime. Hence, the NDC’s leftist philosophy and resource-nationalist ideas may have shaped Rawlings’ refusal to make significant concessions to mining companies. Thus, a comparison Rawlings’ and Kufour’s mining fiscal concessions demonstrates why the Kufour regime had more incentive to crack down on the indigenous galamsey operatives that co-existed with mining companies.

Nonetheless, contrary to Kufour’s benign relations with mining companies regarding mining fiscal policies, the NDC’s Mills replaced existing liberal fiscal measures with stringent ones between 2009 and 2012. For instance, in 2009, Mills introduced a National Fiscal Stabilisation Levy, imposing a 5% levy on companies’ gross profits in some industries, including mining (Abdulai, 2017a). Furthermore,

in 2010, Mills revised the 2006 Mining Act, introducing a fixed royalty rate of 5% to replace the erstwhile sliding royalty rate of between 3% to 6%. The previous sliding royalty rate meant mining companies could pay royalties at the lower thresholds of the scale (3%). Thus, by fixing the rate at 5%, Mills also addressed the legal lacuna that possibly allowed mining companies to pay lower royalties.

The regime also introduced a windfall tax of 10% and reviewed corporate tax upwards from 25% to 35% (Abdulai, 2017a). It further abolished the 5% investment allowance, introduced a ground rent of GHS 9, 109 (i.e., approximately US\$ 3,036.3) per km²²¹⁰, introduced a straight-line capital allowance of 20% to replace the previous initial capital allowance of 80%, and proposed an additional profit tax of 10% (Aryee, 2018). Nevertheless, Mills could not implement the 10% windfall tax before his demise in July 2012. However, the fiscal changes he effected sat with the NDC's leftist thinking, given the party's 2008 political campaign on generating more revenues from mining companies for development (NDC, 2008).

Nevertheless, it is also likely that commodity price booms and apparent shifts "in transnational support and ideas" may have shaped these tax reforms (Abdulai, 2017a, p. 17). For instance, given the commodity price booms, the IMF and World Bank, despite being the progenitors of the neoliberal mining regimes, called on Mills to increase mining taxes as part of the country's domestic resource mobilisation efforts (Abdulai, 2017a). Nonetheless, the NDC had expressed its intent to reform Ghana's tax regime even before the surge in global commodity prices, underlying a link between the party's leftist ideology and the fiscal reforms.

Be that as it may, the reforms, which constituted a strain on mining operations, represent a market-based or regulatory resource nationalism, wherein countries use taxation to extract resource rents during boom periods (Arbatli, 2018; Haslam & Heidrich, 2016; Klapp, 1987; Wilson, 2015). Thus, while the NDC's Rawlings refused to capitulate to the World Bank's concern over the need for a more liberal mining regime, the NDC's Mills reversed some of the vital fiscal concessions that the NPP's Kufour granted to mining companies. Thus, as Mills' mining fiscal measures reflected the NDC's leftist ideology, it is also likely that this leftist ideology shaped Mills' tolerance of the indigenous artisanal miners despite mining companies reeling under ASM-induced encroachments. Nevertheless, it is counterintuitive to think that a regime which increases taxes on mining companies would also shy away from protecting these heavily taxed companies from ASM-induced encroachments.

²¹⁰ Before these fiscal reforms, the ground rent was less than US\$1 per km² by 2005. The Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL), to whom this rent accrues, argued before parliament that the cost involved in collecting the ground rent outweighed the revenues from this rent. Thus, the amendment of Act 703 in 2012 introduced a new ground rent rate of GHS 9,109 per km². Nevertheless, Mills' regime could not implement this ground rent because of resistance from industry players. See Aryee (2018).

Nonetheless, one may also interpret Mills' tolerance of the artisanal miners as an attempt to facilitate the participation of Ghanaian nationals in the mining sector to support the local and national economy. Several scholars have observed that the predominance of foreign capital in the resource sector, rather than private capital, sometimes motivates resource nationalism (Arbatli, 2018; Hartshorn, 1993; Stevens, 2008). Stevens (2008) particularly contended that resource nationalism opposes foreign, rather than private, interest in the resource sector. Thus, Mills' tolerance of the artisanal miners might be a resource-nationalist measure that possibly aimed at boosting the participation of domestic private actors – i.e., indigenous artisanal miners – in the country's resource sector.

Nevertheless, this interpretation is controversial because while these artisanal miners might have been predominantly domestic private actors, most operated without licenses. It is, therefore, improbable that Mills would put up with these largely unlicensed indigenous artisanal miners simply because of the quest to boost the participation of domestic private actors in the country's mineral sector. Nonetheless, from Rawlings to Kufour to Mills, party-political ideas and ideas of resource governance do coincide with the regimes' relations with artisanal miners. Kufour's raid of the artisanal miners off mining companies' concession most probably sat with the NPP's rightist ideas and the neoliberal orthodoxy towards resource governance. However, it is unclear how the NDC's leftist ideas and, possibly, resource-nationalist thinking might have shaped Rawlings' and Mills' tolerances of the largely unlicensed artisanal miners.

2.1.2. Regimes' concessions to mining companies. Mahama vs Akufo-Addo.

Following Mills' demise in July 2012, his Vice, John Mahama, took over as a caretaker President and became the substantive President after winning the December 2012 elections. As presented above, Mills had proposed a 10% windfall tax that did not materialise before his death. Like Mills, when Mahama assumed office, a review of mining fiscal measures constituted one of his primary mechanisms for increasing revenue to reduce budget deficits. Accordingly, in presenting a budget statement for the 2014 fiscal year to Ghana's Parliament, the regime's Finance Minister described Mahama's resolve to implement the windfall tax and consider a further revision of fiscal incentives and stability agreements.

Mr. Speaker, in 2012 the windfall profit tax Bill was tabled in Parliament. The Bill sought to impose a windfall profit tax of 10 percent on mining companies. Unfortunately, the Bill could not be considered by Parliament. A committee is reviewing all stability agreements, incentives and the windfall profit tax that could not be passed in 2012.... In due course, Government will re-introduce the Bill in parliament after completion of the consultations with all stakeholders (Republic of Ghana, 2013, p. 195).

These acts of regulatory resource nationalism were consistent with the NDC's 2012 manifesto aimed at:

Increasing the Government's low revenues from the mining sector by reviewing the royalty regime in the mining sector and introducing measures that will enable the state and other stakeholders to fully benefit from the upside in the prices in the sector (NDC, 2012, p. 51).

Nonetheless, mining companies pushed back, stalling the implementation of this tax and, by implication, the regime's regulatory attempt at resource nationalism. Speaking at a 2014 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, President Mahama linked his regime's inability to implement the windfall tax to staff-retrenchment threats from mining companies.

They threatened to lay off workers if we implemented the windfall tax and because we needed the jobs, and you don't want workers laid off, you are coerced to go along. So, these are major issues we have.... They will not allow us to implement a windfall tax in our country (GhanaWeb, 2014, n.p.n).

While Mahama failed to implement the windfall tax, the existing tax reforms introduced by his co-party predecessor (i.e., Mills) remained intact, including the reforms on investment allowance and capital allowance (Aryee, 2018). Also, Mahama revised existing stability agreements between the state and several mining companies. For example, in 2015, the regime revised NGGL's stability period from 15 years to six years while revising GFGL's from 15 years to 11 years in 2016. However, AGA's 15-year stability agreement remained untouched (Aryee, 2018) probably because, by 2015, the company was under care and maintenance and not commercially operational.

Whereas these measures underscore the NDC's leftist and regulatory resource-nationalist thinking, it is notable that Mahama also granted some concessions to major mining companies such as NGGL and GFGL. For example, on 26th November 2015, Mahama revised NGGL's Investment Agreement and reduced corporate income tax from 35% to 32.5%. The regime also changed the royalty rate from a fixed rate of 5% to a sliding rate of 3%-5%. Likewise, the regime revised GFGL's Investment Agreement on 17th March 2016 and granted GFGL the same corporate income tax and royalty rates as it did NGGL (Aryee, 2018). These concessions perhaps made up for the regime's reduction in NGGL's and GFGL's stability periods. However, they raise questions about Mahama's commitment to the NDC's leftist ideology and resource nationalism.

Nevertheless, Mahama's tax concession to NGGL and GFGL came barely a year before the end of his term in office. Therefore, for most of his tenure, Mahama maintained the anti-LSM fiscal reforms his co-party predecessor had introduced (including 35% corporate income tax and a fixed royalty rate of 5%). Thus, to a large extent, the leftist and resource-nationalist ideational values of the NDC undergirded Mahama's attempt to rake in more revenue from the mining sector. Therefore, it is possible that the NDC's leftist thinking and resource-nationalist ideas motivated Mahama's tolerance of the invading indigenous miners in Obuasi in 2016 and his China-centric raid in 2013, which spared most indigenous galamsey operatives. This pro-indigenous mining stance guaranteed the participation of Ghanaians in the mining industry. It possibly ensured that the regime accrued revenues through the PMMC's purchases from these miners, making up for Mahama's inability to implement the windfall tax.

Nonetheless, just because Mahama may have been leftist and resource-nationalist in orientation does not necessarily mean he would condone illegalities. The majority of the indigenous galamsey operatives Mahama spared in 2013 were illegal miners, as were all the indigenous galamsey operatives that had besieged AGA's legitimate and commercially viable underground shafts in Obuasi in 2016. Thus, Mahama's targeted raid in 2013 and his tolerance of the Obuasi miners in 2016 better reflect the political saliency of the illegal indigenous artisanal miners to the NDC, as argued in chapter six.

Unlike Mahama's tense relations with AGA that prevented Randgold Resources from investing in AGA to revive the Obuasi mine, Akufo-Addo had, in 2016, campaigned to revamp AGA.²¹¹ Nonetheless, Akufo-Addo had also campaigned to promote ASM, condemning Mahama's 2013 raid of the ASM sector (see section 3.2 of chapter five). However, these two campaign promises seemed incompatible, given the clashes characterising ASM-LSM relations in Obuasi. Thus, it was only a matter of time before one of the promises would be forfeited. We have already seen how, contrary to the promise to promote ASM, the President invaded the sector by targeting indigenous artisanal miners who co-exist with LSM companies. By contrast, before his inauguration in January 2017, the President-elect began negotiations with Randgold to invest in AGA.

When on Friday Charlotte Osei [the Electoral Commissioner] announced my victory as the new President of Ghana, on the Sunday, Mark Bristol of Randgold called to tell me he is coming to partner with government to boost Anglogold once more. And I am hopeful it will work (Segbefia, 2017, n.p.n).

²¹¹ Interview with CESIS in Obuasi on 4th July 2019.

Randgold's Mark Bristol probably anticipated that Akufo-Addo and the NPP's rightist orientation made an investment in AGA worthwhile since this regime would also likely ward off the Obuasi artisanal miners. Following Akufo-Addo's inauguration in January 2017, further negotiations between the NPP regime and Randgold committed the latter to invest in AGA. In the President's words: "my assumption of office saw the holding of a series of negotiations and discussions and the provision of a number of fiscal incentives which led...to the establishment of the redevelopment project of the Obuasi Mine" (Nunoo, 2020, n.p.n).

The fiscal incentives Akufo-Addo granted AGA comprised a Tax Concession Agreement and a Development Agreement, which received parliamentary ratification in June 2018 (AnglogoldAshanti, 2019). The Tax Concession Agreement included a corporate income rate of 32.5% and a sliding royalty rate of 3%-5%. These fiscal incentives were consistent with the incentives Mahama granted NGGL and GFGL in 2015 and 2016 and therefore did not represent an extraordinary effort by Akufo-Addo to cushion AGA. Nevertheless, Akufo-Addo exempted AGA from customs duty and Value Added Tax on the "import of items on the specified Import List" over six years to enable the company to redevelop the Obuasi mine (AnglogoldAshanti, 2019; Aryee, 2018, p. 185). Also, unlike Mahama, who reduced NGGL's and GFGL's stability periods, Akufo-Addo granted a ten-year stability period to AGA with the possibility to extend it by five more years (AnglogoldAshanti, 2019; Aryee, 2018).

Given Akufo-Addo's apparent efforts to restore mining investor confidence in the country's large-scale mining industry, it seemed natural that he would also violently evict indigenous artisanal miners from LSM companies' concessions. Thus, in presenting the Obuasi redevelopment project to investors in May 2019, AGA argued that the regime, via the Defence Ministry, "provides reasonable assurance of security for Obuasi mine" (AnglogoldAshanti, 2019, p. 8). This "reasonable assurance of security" reflected Akufo-Addo's anti-ASM military operations stationed in major hard-rock mining communities hosting mining companies in southern Ghana.

Thus, while it sounds plausible that the NPP's rightist and neoliberal thinking may have driven Akufo-Addo's raid of the ASM sector, it is unclear how the party's resource governance ideas motivated Akufo-Addo to spare illegal Chinese miners while raiding indigenous galamsey operatives. Perhaps, the regime spared the Chinese because of its bilateral economic relations with China. In July 2017, the Vice President (Dr Bawumia) announced at a China-Ghana conference – organised by the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) – that Ghana had secured a US\$ 20 billion Chinese loan facility. Part of this facility (US\$2 billion) would develop the country's bauxite resources.²¹² Therefore, invading the

²¹² I worked for IDEG for two years (2015-2017) and played a crucial role in convening the maiden China-Ghana conference in July 2017. I also served as the rapporteur and, thus, keenly observed the event and transcribed the recorded speeches of the various speakers, including those of Vice President Bawumia.

illegal Chinese miners could have undermined this loan agreement. Nevertheless, Ghana-China bilateral relations predate Akufo-Addo's NPP, yet Mahama's NDC regime dealt with illegal Chinese miners. Hence, the question of party ideology and neoliberal ideas of resource governance does not adequately explain why Akufo-Addo targeted different groups of miners.

Moreover, ideology offers a weak interpretation of the study's question because the NDC and NPP cross ideological lines on several policy matters. Thus, despite its social democratic ideals, the NDC is not against market reforms, while the NPP's flagship policies appeal to social-democratic ideals (Osei, 2013). For instance, the NDC oversaw the adoption and implementation of Ghana's neoliberal reforms. In contrast, the NPP's Kufour and Akufo-Addo regimes implemented social intervention programs such as a national health insurance scheme and a free senior high school program. Moreover, scholars like Ayee (2016, p. 88) downplay these parties' ideological commitment because they campaign on similar "issues such as better education, modernised agriculture, good governance, [and] basic service delivery." Therefore, although the parties' responses to indigenous artisanal miners seemingly co-vary with their party-political and resource governance ideas, it is safe to conclude that such ideological interpretations do not convincingly account for the study's puzzle.

2.2. Ideas and regime-ASM relations in Tanzania.

Like Ghana's NDC, the CCM in Tanzania is a social-democratic party that regards socialism and self-reliance as the only means to guarantee the dignity of Tanzanians. With a hoe and hammer in its flag, symbolising workers and peasants, the CCM aims to govern Tanzania "with democratic and socialist principles" to utilise the country's wealth to develop its people towards poverty eradication (CCM, 2005, Part 1, Section 5). Thus, across Ghana and Tanzania, the NDC and CCM seek to create a social democratic society in which the state works to guarantee the socio-economic rights of the vulnerable, marginalised and have-nots. Since artisanal miners represent proletariats and given that social democrats seek to promote the economic interests of proletariats (CCM, 2005), the CCM should also tolerate artisanal miners.

However, chapter four of this thesis showed that CCM regimes' relations with artisanal miners are inconsistent with the party's ideology. That chapter revealed that Magufuli's and Mwinyi's governance of the sector reflected the CCM's ideology, while Mkapa's and Kiwkete's deflected from it. While I argued that varying political constraints shaped these patterned differences in regime-ASM relations, I present an alternative explanation of how the four presidents' differential ideas on resource governance may have shaped their different but patterned responses to the artisanal miners. Ideas of resource governance do not develop in a vacuum. Instead, they may result from a leader's idiosyncrasies and experiences embedded in some broader ideological framework on how society ought to be governed.

Therefore, I interrogate the individual Presidents' idiosyncrasies, reflecting on how these might have shaped their resource governance ideologies and, thus, varying relations with the artisanal miners. This section first discusses Mwinyi's and Magufuli's ideational approaches to resource governance which come close to resource nationalism, potentially explaining their tolerance of the small-scale miners. The section then discusses Mkapa's and Kikwete's neoliberal thinking on resource governance with some potential effects on these leaders' anti-ASM postures.

2.2.1. Ali H. Mwinyi vs John P. Magufuli. Radical resource-nationalists?

Despite governing in different periods, Presidents Mwinyi and Magufuli shared some similar idiosyncratic features, which could position them as resource-nationalists and condition their tolerance of the artisanal miners. Both Presidents had relatively modest upbringings and similar early career trajectories and life experiences that did not considerably expose them to the outside world. Born in May 1925 in Dar es Salaam, Mwinyi spent his formative years in Zanzibar, where he had his primary and secondary education and worked as a teacher and head teacher. He then acquired an Adult Education Diploma from the United Kingdom in 1956, became a professional teacher and taught at Mangapwani and Bumbwini Primary Schools in Zanzibar (The URT, n.d.).

Mwinyi joined the Afro Shiraz Party (ASP) in 1964 in Zanzibar, a year after becoming the Permanent Secretary in the Education Ministry of Zanzibar. Between 1977 and 1982, following the merger of ASP and TANU to form the CCM, Mwinyi became Tanzania's Ambassador to Egypt. He also held several ministerial portfolios, including Minister for Natural Resources, Minister for Health, and Minister for Home Affairs from 1982 to 1983. Before becoming President in 1985, Mwinyi was the President of Zanzibar and Vice President of the United Republic of Tanzania in 1984 (The URT, n.d.).

His modest rise to prominence has striking similarities with Magufuli's. Born and raised in Chato, a village in the Geita Region (Lake Zone), to farmers, Magufuli grew up grazing his father's cattle. Between 1967 and 1981, he attended several schools for his primary and secondary education, including Chato Primary School (1967-1974); Katoke seminary/secondary school (1975-1977); Lake secondary school (1977-1978); and Mkwawa High School (1979-81). Magufuli earned a Diploma in Education Science, specialising in Chemistry, Mathematics and Education at the Mkwawa College of Education from 1981 to 1982 and taught Chemistry and Mathematics at Sengerema Secondary School (1982-1983) (University of Dar es Salaam, 2019).

He obtained his bachelor's degree in education at the University of Dar es Salaam with a major in Chemistry and Mathematics from 1985 to 1988. He then worked for Nyanza Cooperative Union as an industrial chemist in Mwanza (1989-1995). In 1995, he ran for and won the parliamentary elections in the Chato constituency, retained the seat in the 2000 and 2005 elections and worked as a minister in

different ministries, including the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlement Development (2005-2008); Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries (2008-2010); and Ministry of Works (2010-2015) (University of Dar es Salaam, 2019).

These similar modest experiences of Mwinyi and Magufuli may have made them more nationalistic to the extent of possibly considering artisanal miners as crucial elements of the Tanzanian society whose interests should be protected rather than suppressed because of pressure from foreign mining capitalists. Before Mwinyi assumed office in 1985, the economic meltdown in Tanzania compelled the CCM to turn to the West for economic support. Speaking to Africa Report's Margaret Novicki, Mwinyi narrated how his predecessor and Tanzania's first President, Julius Nyerere, had been negotiating with the IMF for an economic bailout, which negotiations culminated into an agreement by 1986.

When I assumed the presidency of my country, we were faced with gigantic economic problems.... Of necessity, we had to do something. We were advised by many friends, including the Americans, the Nordic countries, Britain, and others that the only 'open sesame' was to enter into an agreement with the IMF. We had been negotiating with the IMF for the last six years. So when I entered office, we started an agreement (Novicki, 1988, p. 27).

While seeking Western economic assistance, Mwinyi's socialist rhetoric remained unwavering. Thus, amid an attempt to open Tanzania's economy to private (but mainly foreign) sector participation, President Mwinyi discursively reinstated and reified the CCM's socialist governance ideas. Emphasising that he had not deviated from Nyerere's approach to governing Tanzania, Mwinyi argued that:

Nobody can cite any example to prove that we have reversed this or that. We are just carrying on from where he (i.e., Julius Nyerere) left off, because after all, I don't think any government can reverse party policies. In our country, the party is supreme and the government is only an instrument which implements the party's positions. Mwalimu Nyerere before and now myself are only implementing the party's directives... I think I should make it clear that Tanzania is aiming at becoming a socialist country. It is not yet a socialist country. We are on the road toward socialism (Novicki, 1988, p. 27).

This direct emphasis on socialism as Tanzania's ultimate and utopian destination demonstrates how Mwinyi's agreement with the IMF for an economic bailout only contrasted rather than supplanted the CCM's leftist ideals. Mwinyi's reification of the CCM's socialist ideology – even amid economic distress – partly stemmed from the active role Nyerere continued to play as Chairman of the CCM. This role arguably subordinated Mwinyi's regime to Nyerere's dictates. For instance, Mwinyi defended

Nyerere's chairmanship and implicitly admitted that Nyerere influenced the country's day-to-day running.

I don't think for me it will be a great handicap for President Nyerere to continue his day-to-day affairs as chairman because after all, as I said earlier, in Tanzania the party is supreme, and it is the organ which lays down policies for the country. The government only executes the policies of the party. So whether the two functions are united in one person or in different persons, I don't think will make a great deal of difference (Novicki, 1988, p. 29).

Mwinyi's unwillingness to let go of socialism, possibly due to Nyerere's presence and his (Mwinyi's) early life experiences that brought him close to ordinary people, may underpin how he (Mwinyi) related to artisanal miners in Bulyanhulu relative to Sutton Resources. His refusal to evict the artisanal miners for Sutton Resources to operate was perhaps part of his plans to ensure that the country did not deviate from its journey towards the socialist destination. This logic suggests that the regime's tolerance of the Bulyanhulu miners was a matter of a resource-nationalist ideal shaped by the CCM's socialist ideal and Mwinyi's own experiences.

Interestingly, Mwinyi's unwillingness to abandon socialism and its bearing on his relations with the artisanal miners bear stark similarities with Magufuli's willingness to return to a nostalgic socialist idealistic past deemed necessary to bring about the desired but unattained development. Here, Paget's works deserve some mention. Paget (2020) uses the concept of "restorationist developmental nationalism" to describe how Magufuli and the CCM reflected on Tanzania's deviation from the past order, Nyerere's Tanzania, and how restoring this old order was necessary to reinstate Tanzania on the path of development and transformation.

These socialist, nationalist, and developmental discourses construct the current order (under Mkapa and Kikwete) as corrupt and responsible for the sufferings of 'the people' interpellated as the nation (Paget, 2020) or the plebs (Paget, 2021). Thus, to rescue the nation, the old order must replace the current order to attain a future idealistic order. However, a rupture with the current order necessarily requires the restorationist and developmental nationalist leader to confront those agents – foreign and domestic – responsible for the misery of the nation, the people, or the plebs. Paget (2020, 2021) contends that Magufuli's aggressive posture towards mining companies (i.e., the foreign agents) reflects these ideas of governance embedded in and inspired by the country's socialist past.

Like Paget, several other scholars contend that Magufuli took a resource-nationalist approach closely intertwined with Tanzania's socialist past to bring about some imagined transformation (Jacob & Pedersen, 2018; Kinyondo & Huggins, 2019; Poncian, 2019). For instance, not only did Magufuli seize

Acacia's mining company's mineral concentrates (Jacob & Pedersen, 2018; Kinyondo & Huggins, 2019) but also, he revoked Pangea's²¹³ prospecting license in Shinyanga. This license revocation culminated in the relocation of 5000 artisanal miners to the Shinyanga site, representing a resource-nationalist attempt (Poncian, 2019) to rescue the plebs (i.e., artisanal miners) from the more powerful foreign agent (i.e., Pangea).

Thus, Magufuli's radical resource-nationalist position, embedded in his early life experiences and his broader ideas of restoring and developing Tanzania, may explain his tolerance of the artisanal miners in Geita and Mererani. The regime's caution of AGA to desist from using force to evict artisanal miners in Geita, along with the regime's suppression of Tanzanite One in Mererani, reflect this resource-nationalist idea. One elite participant compared Magufuli's pro-ASM approach to resource governance with past regimes' approaches, contending that different presidents had different priorities:

The presidents belonged to the CCM, but each president governed differently because each president had their own priorities. Tanzanians compare Magufuli to Nyerere because he had the passion to ensure that natural resources benefit Tanzanians. Magufuli also commissioned two presidential commissions and put the question to the parliament that Parliament should ensure that the resources benefit the people.²¹⁴

Similarly, a mayor referred to Magufuli's ideas as crucial in shaping his relations with the artisanal miners.

The late President Magufuli came into power with his new policies and philosophy; he said that tanzanite must benefit the country and ASM operatives. He removed some taxes which have been hurting ASM operatives. Magufuli dedicated more on uplifting ASM operatives and even small businesspeople in other sectors, unlike Kikwete's era, where big businesspeople, including Tanzanite One, had power²¹⁵

This effort by the elite (Magufuli and the CCM) to protect the plebs (artisanal miners) against foreign agents (mining companies) is what Paget (2021) conceptualises as *elitist plebeianism* and argues as underpinning Magufuli's trifurcation of society. Thus, beyond the mining sector, the regime targeted big business operators in other economic sectors, discursively and performatively constructed as responsible for the sufferings of the *wananchi* or citizens. For instance, in the agricultural sector, Magufuli argued that conflicts between large-scale farmers and pastoralists are rooted in the former's hoarding of a vast swath of land. He then instructed officials to "confiscate all undeveloped farms and allocate them to wananchi (citizens) who will develop them" (The EastAfrican, 2017, n.p.n). Similarly,

²¹³ Pangea Minerals Limited is a subsidiary of Acacia Mining Plc.

²¹⁴ Zoom interview with an official of LEAT on 24th May 2021.

²¹⁵ Third-party interview with a mayor in Manyara Region on 28th May 2021.

he cracked down on sugar traders for hoarding sugar and creating artificial price hikes. He is quoted as saying the following about sugar traders: “I warn these traders against thinking that they can fool around with the government. They should know that they are only playing with their own survival. I advise them to immediately release the commodity to the market” (The Citizen, 2021, n.p.n).

Thus, the Mwinyi and Magufuli regimes arguably appropriated ideas of resource nationalism to defend artisanal miners against LSM companies. Nonetheless, interpreting Mwinyi’s and Magufuli’s tolerance of the artisanal miners idealistically somehow obscures the political threats that might have inspired these regimes to take pro-ASM positions. Interestingly, those who argue that ideas matter in understanding Magufuli’s governance of the mining sector (Paget, 2021; Poncian, 2019) also point to the rising political threat from the opposition CHADEMA as an explanation for Magufuli’s leverage of either resource-nationalist ideas (Poncian, 2019) or populist, elitist plebian and restorationist developmental nationalist ideas (Paget, 2020, 2021).

For instance, Paget (2020, 2021) admits that the rising opposition discourses on corruption amongst CCM elites and the opposition’s impressive electoral performance in 2010 and 2015 drove Magufuli’s war on corruption within the state bureaucracy and the business sector. Similarly, Poncian (2019) concedes that Magufuli’s resource-nationalist efforts served an instrumental purpose of delegitimising the political opposition [CHADEMA] for being the CCM’s closest political contender. Therefore, while these alternative interpretations of Magufuli’s relations with the artisanal miners might hold some sway, the inherent political constraint triggered by the opposition’s increasing threat to the CCM best illuminates Magufuli’s pro-ASM position.

However, unlike scholars that frame their interpretation of Magufuli’s pro-ASM and anti-LSM behaviour by pointing to the outcomes of the 2015 presidential election at the national level (Jacob & Pedersen, 2018; Paget, 2020, 2021; Poncian, 2019), this thesis presented disaggregated temporal and spatial electoral data at the zonal and regional levels to show how the opposition’s relative strength in the Lake and Northern Zones nuance our understanding of Magufuli’s radical tolerance of the artisanal miners. Similarly, I showed in chapter four that Mwinyi’s tolerance of the artisanal miners aimed to contain the overnight threat from the NCCR-Mageuzi due to the defection of a popular CCM cadre (Augustine Mrema) to the NCCR-Mageuzi ahead of the 1995 elections. Before I conclude on the ideology and regime-ASM relations question, I will show how Mkapa’s and Kikwete’s idiosyncrasies, neoliberal ideas, and rightist orientations do not adequately explain their anti-ASM positions.

2.2.2. Benjamin Mkapa and Jakaya Kikwete. Darlings of neoliberalism?

Unlike Mwinyi and Magufuli, Mkapa's and Kikwete's relatively affluent upbringings and early career experiences exposed them to the outside world and arguably made them embrace neoliberalism as crucial to unlocking Tanzania's development. Born in 1938 and obtaining his primary and secondary education in Tanzania, Mkapa graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in English (with honours) in 1962 at Makerere University College, Uganda. His early career began in 1962 when he worked as a District Officer in Dodoma's local administration. He later became a seasoned journalist – serving as the Managing Editor for newspapers such as *The Daily News*, *The Nationalist* and *Uhuru* – and returned to politics as the Press Secretary for Tanzania's first President, Julius Nyerere. Besides holding several ministerial positions between 1980 and 1992, Mkapa became one of Tanzania's longest-serving and prominent diplomats, working as the High Commissioner to Nigeria (1976-1977), Minister for Foreign Affairs (1977-1980), a High Commissioner to Canada (1982-1983) and Tanzania's Ambassador to the United States (1983-1984). Before becoming President in 1995, Mkapa served as a Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1984 and a Minister for Science, Technology and Higher Education in 1992.

Like Mkapa, Jakaya Kikwete, born in October 1950 in Msoga (Bagamoyo District), had his primary and secondary education in Tanzania. Being the son of a District Commissioner, a Regional Secretary, and an Ombudsman, Kikwete got exposed to leadership and politics very early in life. Thus, Kikwete was actively engaged in the TANU national youth movement at Kibaha Secondary School, where he had his 'O' level. Also, during his 'A' level at Tanga Technical Secondary, Kikwete became the head prefect and a football captain. Having completed his bachelor's degree in Agro-economics at the University of Dar es Salaam, Kikwete went directly into politics, working as the CCM's Regional Party Secretary in Singida. In 1977, he played a crucial role in setting up the CCM's administration in Zanzibar, returning to mainland Tanzania to work as the CCM's administrator in Dar es Salaam. Between 1981 and 1988, Kikwete worked in several regional CCM offices before being appointed as the Deputy Minister of Energy and Minerals from 1988 to 1990. From 1990 to 2005, he worked as the Minister for Water, Energy and Minerals; the Minister of Finance; and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Relations.

Common to Mkapa and Kikwete is their role as foreign ministers, a role that requires the position holder to build politico-economic diplomatic relations between their country and the outside world. Given these experiences, both regimes became more concerned with attracting foreign direct investment into critical sectors of Tanzania's economy in line with the prevailing neoliberal development paradigm. Mkapa's writing on development shows how he regarded FDI as necessary for Africa's and Tanzania's development. For example, in his chapter contribution to a book on leadership and growth, Mkapa argued that:

The debate on whether Africa needs FDI for its development has long ended among serious people. African leaders must now accept that attracting and retaining FDI must be an integral part of efforts and policies to engender economic growth, social development, and poverty reduction (Mkapa, 2010, p. 55).

Nonetheless, while recognising that Africa needs to build its indigenous capitalist class and attract FDI, Mkapa also conceded that Africa lacks the capital and technological base required for sustainable growth and poverty reduction.

The attraction of FDI must...go hand in hand with deliberate efforts to build domestic productive capacities and an indigenous middle class.... Africa simply does not have the capital and technology necessary to produce sustainable growth, and hence to make a decisive impact on poverty. Any discussion of African economic growth and poverty reduction must, therefore, include a discussion of the important role of private investment capital, mostly FDI.... The question is thus not whether, but how best, to do it.... Difficult choices have to be made (Mkapa, 2010, p. 55).

This apparent neoliberal ideological position, possibly embedded in his Western diplomatic experiences, may explain why Mkapa was quick to violently evict the artisanal miners in Bulyanhulu to secure the investment of the Canadian-based Sutton Resources. Addressing the stand-off between the artisanal miners in Bulyanhulu and Sutton Resources was a crucial statement to the international investment community that Tanzania was ready for business and that the country would protect foreign mining companies in the event of any ASM-LSM disputes. The eviction of the miners, which violated a court order prohibiting the miners' eviction and which led to the death of some 50 artisanal miners (Cooksey, 2011; Kamata, 2012), reflects Mkapa's argument about the need for difficult choices to be made to attract FDI (Mkapa, 2010).

According to Kamata (2012), Mkapa's eviction of the miners in Bulyanhulu portended the regime's readiness to do everything possible to attract foreign investors. That Mkapa warned the public to stop making things challenging for foreign investors since these investors would relocate their investments if they found the country unwelcoming (Kamata, 2012). This quest for FDI transcended the mining sector. For instance, the World Bank called on Mkapa to revise the land law on mortgages as the law granted peasants control over lands, prevented land collateralisation, and discouraged banks from lending (Kamata, 2012). Responding to the World Bank's call, Mkapa directed his Attorney-General to work with solicitors from a London firm to revise the said law.

These actors (i.e., the Attorney-General and the London-based solicitors) revised the land law without consulting the Lands Ministry. Meanwhile, the Ministry had a better appreciation of the country's law

on mortgages and saw nothing wrong with it to warrant a revision (Kamata, 2012). Nonetheless, the amended land law (i.e., the Land [Amendment] Act 2004), which sanctioned land collateralisation, increased the risks that Banks and lending institutions would dispossess peasants of their land for loan default (Kamata, 2012). Mkapa's commitment to neoliberal ideals of resource governance also finds expression in the number of Bilateral Investment Agreements (BIAs) he signed during his tenure. These agreements attract FDI by assuring investors that the country will protect their investments. Before Mkapa became President in 1995, Tanzania had signed only one BIA, which surged to 12 BIAs by the time he left office in 2005 (Kipole, 2010).

Also, Mkapa endeavoured to suppress popular dissenting voices over his neoliberal policies (Kamata, 2012) while taking pride in his neoliberal stance. For instance, he reminisced about his supervision of "deep and very far-reaching economic reforms in Tanzania between 1995 and 2005" (Mkapa, 2010, p. 23).²¹⁶ This neoliberal approach to resource governance persisted under Mkapa's successor, President Jakaya Kikwete (2005-2015). Kamata (2012) reports that between 1995 and 2010, a period overlapping Mkapa's and Kikwete's presidencies, Tanzania passed more than 100 market-based policies and laws.

Moreover, both Mkapa and Kikwete engaged in country-branding exercises by frequently travelling abroad to persuade investors to invest in Tanzania. However, such country-branding exercises were more frequent under Kikwete, who defended his regular travels abroad as a form of *diplomasia ya kiuchumi* (economic diplomacy) the country needed. For instance, according to Kamata (2012, p. 298), President Kikwete is reported in the Guardian (22 December 2006) to have argued about how local Tanzanian businesspersons could not reach out to their Western counterparts without the President's intervention.

Our local businessmen cannot reach other executive areas on their own without the President's presence. During my visit to the US, we had a luncheon with NASDAQ officials, who later held talks with Tanzanian businesspersons. Under normal circumstances, the NASDAQ president, whose stock exchange volume stands at USD7.1 trillion, cannot meet a person of the stature of TCCIA president, Elvis Musiba. But because I was there, the NASDAQ president personally attended that event.... When I visited Tiffany, a big jeweller's company turning out billions of dollars, its officials were in some other place and had to be summoned to meet Tanzanian tanzanite dealers... This is how they could meet; because I was there otherwise it would have been difficult for local tanzanite dealers to meet their US counterparts... People should not just simplify these things.

²¹⁶ See sub-section 4.1 of chapter three for a detailed discussion of the mining sector reforms Mkapa supervised.

These country branding projects involved more than international travels of the President and other relevant state actors to meet with potential investors. Instead, the branding also required buying airtime to advertise the country on leading international media outlets. For instance, the East African reported that between 2007 and 2009, the Tanzania National Parks Authority spent approximately US\$ 800,000 on a country-branding advertisement with CNN (Kamata, 2012). This scramble for foreign investors in a neoliberal world was not unique to Tanzania as many other African regimes in South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya similarly branded their nations to woo investors (Kamata, 2012).

Granted the pre-eminence of foreign large-scale mining companies in the mining sector, Kikwete suppressed critical voices questioning the regime's mining contracts with foreign mining companies. For example, Tanzania's CCM-dominated Parliament suspended Zitto Kabwe, an opposition MP for Kigoma North. Kabwe's crime was filing a motion for the Parliament to investigate the circumstances surrounding the country's mining contract with Barrick Gold Mining Company on the Buzwagi gold mining in Kahama District signed in February 2007. Kabwe's motion sought to unravel: why the parties signed the contract in London rather than Dar es Salaam; why Kikwete breached his December 2005 promise that new contracts would only be signed after existing ones had been examined; why a 15% required tax was deleted from the contract; why Barrick received their mining license prior to parliamentary approval of their Environmental Impact Assessment; and general issues about the contract being shrouded in secrecy (Kamata, 2012).

Responding to Kabwe's motion, the regime argued it would have missed a March 2007 deadline and lost Barrick's investment had it not signed the contract in London (Kamata, 2012). Kabwe's suspension was enough gesture that Tanzania would protect mining companies against opposition scrutiny. To a large extent, Kabwe's motion could undermine Kikwete's effort at branding Tanzania as a business-friendly country in the international arena. Interestingly, Tanzania's country-branding exercise ceased when Magufuli came to office in 2015. Just three days into office, Magufuli banned foreign travel by senior government officials and public servants, arguing that the country's high commissioners and ambassadors would undertake tasks that previously required state officials to travel abroad (Badmus, 2015).

For state officials within Tanzania, Magufuli directed them to travel to rural Tanzania instead to appreciate and address problems confronting Tanzanians (Badmus, 2015). Magufuli also led by example when he delegated his Foreign Affairs Minister to represent him at a 2018 UN General Assembly meeting, arguing that it was more expensive for the President to attend such events (Mumbere, 2018). The Citizen reported that, in less than a year, this singular act saved Tanzania Sh7 billion that would fund development projects (The Citizen, 2021b). This contrast between Kikwete and

Magufuli clarifies how these different Presidents' lived and early career experiences may have shaped their varying worldviews.

Whereas Kikwete looked outward for investors, Magufuli believed domestic resources could be mobilised through prudent public financial management to develop the country. Like Mkapa, Kikwete's neoliberal approach to governance, evident in his efforts to attract foreign investors to Tanzania, might explain his frequent raids of artisanal miners and neglect of abuses meted out to artisanal miners by large-scale mining companies such as Tanzanite One. The suspension of Kabwe from Parliament for simply raising questions about Barrick's mining contract foreshadowed how far Kikwete could go, as he did go, to sanction state-cum-company security raids of artisanal miners across mining communities.

Thus, Mkapa and Kikwete were darlings of neoliberalism who saw FDI as the answer to Tanzania's development malaise and therefore sought to crush any impediment, including artisanal miners, that stood in the way of foreign mining companies. This interpretation sits quite well with the LSM-bias thesis and the business-state relations debates on how big businesses, including LSM companies, hold considerable sway over African regimes that desperately require big capital to transform their economies (Haggard et al., 2019; Hilson & Maconachie, 2020). Nevertheless, interpreting Mkapa's and Kikwete's anti-ASM stance as a function of the regimes' neoliberal ideological leanings necessarily ignores how domestic political dynamics could incentivise some regimes to respond positively to foreign capital while constraining others from doing so.

As shown in chapter four, Mkapa and Kikwete did not face the kind of domestic political constraints Mwinyi and Magufuli confronted. Thus, Mkapa and Kikwete also had more political latitude to court foreign mining capital in ways that violated the interests of the artisanal miners. In chapter four, I showed that while running for the presidency in 1995, Mkapa campaigned to promote ASM, causing panic in the camp of the Canadians who reasoned that such a pro-ASM campaign promise would further undermine Sutton Resources' interests. This pro-ASM campaign was notwithstanding Mkapa's diplomatic experiences, including being a former High Commissioner to Canada.

The prevailing domestic political climate, marked by Augustine Mrema's defection to the NCCR-Mageuzi, temporarily increased the risks for the CCM, making both President Mwinyi and candidate Mkapa take a pro-ASM stance. However, after winning the 1995 election, Mkapa turned around to evict the very miners he had campaigned to support because Augustine Mrema's presence in the opposition NCCR-Mageuzi, a poorly organised party, was no longer an imminent threat to the CCM, even as the next election was in the distant future (the year 2000). Like Mkapa, I also showed that, while the CCM under Kikwete confronted a better-organised political opposition after the 2010 election, Kikwete could afford to sanction violent evictions of artisanal miners because he would not seek re-election.

3. Social movements and regime-ASM relations.

This section interrogates whether temporal variation in social movements' activities could shape regimes' responses to artisanal miners. Here, I focus only on the Ghanaian case for reasons stated above. Social movements organise campaigns to get elites to address some injustices a group of people suffers (Tilly, 1998). Thus, the resources at a movement's disposal (van Stekelenburg et al., 2009), the nature of the political structure within which the movement is embedded (Walsh, 1981), and a movement's construction of social reality (Snow et al., 1986) not only shape the likelihood of protests but also how elites respond to such protests.

Ghana's competitive political system presents a political structure favourable to protests. Hence, where movements can construct social reality and draw on sustained resources, Ghanaian elites will likely capitulate to movements' demands. This causal logic may, for instance, underpin the variation in how the NPP's Akufo-Addo and the NDC's Mahama responded to the ASM sector. In chapter five, we saw Akufo-Addo and Mahama clamped down on different groups of galamseyers. However, Mahama's raid of the sector barely spanned two weeks, while Akufo-Addo's lingered for more than three years.

Under Mahama (2012-2016), domestic reports on ASM-induced degradation abounded (Crawford & Botchwey, 2017; Tschakert, 2016). For example, Crawford and Botchwey (2017) found that three leading media outlets – Modern Ghana, Daily Graphic, and Expose Ghana – jointly reported 128 news items on the role of foreigners in fuelling galamsey and perpetrating violence in mining communities. The media framed Chinese miners as 'illegal, undesirable migrants' and 'deviants' and 'aliens' (Daily Graphic) hunting for 'easy riches' in Ghana (Modern Ghana). Words such as 'invasion' (Expose Ghana) and 'menace' (Daily Graphic) also described the presence and participation of Chinese in galamsey. (Crawford & Botchwey, 2017, pp. 452–453). Media coverage further highlighted conflict incidents, anti-Chinese protests in mining communities and deaths of illegal Ghanaian miners associated with the collapse of Chinese mining pits (Crawford & Botchwey, 2017; Tschakert, 2016).

Crawford and Botchwey (2017) and Tschakert (2016) contend that these xenophobic media reports compelled Mahama to crack down on illegal Chinese miners. The authors also argued Mahama spared illegal Ghanaian miners because new 'culprits' (illegal Chinese miners) had been found. Nevertheless, perhaps Mahama spared the illegal Ghanaian miners because the anti-galamsey media voices had yet to culminate in a vibrant social movement necessary to elicit public support for a full-blown raid of the sector. For instance, the Minister for Lands that supervised this raid explained how he tried to convince his colleagues in Parliament that public support was crucial to fighting galamsey: "I was just trying to

explain to them that the [galamsey] situation is such that I need the total support of not only the mines and energy committee but the entire people of Ghana to deal with the phenomenon.”²¹⁷

Moreover, the media and civil society did not welcome Mahama’s attempt to use drone technology to fight illegal mining. The Minister for Lands explained how Malaysia’s use of drones to monitor and fight illegal logging inspired him to replicate this system to control illegal mining in Ghana. Nonetheless, the media and civil society misunderstood this drone technology as military drones that were not needed to fight galamsey, stalling the implementation of this technology.

In Malaysia, drones are programmed to fly intermittently over forests where illegal logging was happening. These drones took pictures of logged areas and downloaded them to a central electronic storage facility that was regularly monitored. These are real-time delivery of pictures by the drones. So immediately you see a black hole in a picture, it means someone has fallen a tree. And they calculate the time it will take the person to process the tree and move it, which then allows the officials to go after them. Often the officials know that by the time they get to the logging area, the culprits would still be there processing the trees for transport. So, when they explained to me, I said this is good to monitor small-scale mining. When I proposed this to the public on TV, at a time America was fighting Al Qaeda, IMANI, a civil society organisation in Ghana, misunderstood my proposal and thought I was rather planning to introduce warfare/military drones as part of my government’s efforts to flush out illegal mining in Ghana. As one of the largest CSOs in Ghana, IMANI can influence public opinion. It was this fear of its ability to shape public opinion that made us drop the drone idea.²¹⁸

Similarly, a former CEO of the Minerals Commission under Mahama’s regime narrated how the press undermined his effort to garner public support against galamsey.

I invited the press and told them this fight is not just about the Minerals Commission but a holistic one. The next day, the press published ‘Minerals Commission admits failure.’ The environmental degradation was not as bad then as it was in 2017, but I could see it happening.²¹⁹

²¹⁷ Interview with a former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources in Accra on 13th June 2019.

²¹⁸ Interview with a former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources in Accra on 13th June 2019.

²¹⁹ Interview with a former CEO of the Minerals Commission in Accra on 3rd May 2019.

Thus, the relatively limited timeframe of Mahama’s 2013 raid and its China-centric character resulted from the absence of a vibrant media-inspired social movement required to galvanise public support to widen the scope of the raid to include illegal Ghanaian miners.

In contrast, no sooner had the NPP’s Akufo-Addo assumed office in 2017 than he met with an organised social movement, the so-called Media-Coalition Against Galamsey (MCAG). The movement emerged from a campaign Citi FM had initiated against galamsey on 3rd April 2017, *hashtagged* “#StopGalamseyNow.” This initial campaign made five unequivocal demands on the regime, including the placement of a moratorium on small and medium-scale mining for six months (Adogla-Bessa, 2017b).²²⁰ The station also galvanised public support by distributing leaflets across the principal streets of Accra and Takoradi (Adogla-Bessa, 2017a), arguing that citizens must support the fight against galamsey “a national cancer, [that] is devastating our water bodies, [and]...poisoning our future”(Adogla-Bessa, 2017b, n.p.n). Citi FM’s Director of News Programming, who led this initial campaign, argued that:

Essentially, we are saying that galamsey must get to the point where the public conscience must be pricked and people must get involved. We have done a lot of stuff on air, but we want people to see galamsey for itself as they drive through traffic (Adogla-Bessa, 2017b, n.p.n).

The MCAG, inspired by Citi FM’s advocacy, aimed to educate the public against galamsey and engage stakeholders to eradicate it. The MCAG drew membership from media institutions (including Graphic Communication Groups Limited, the News Times Corporation, Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, and the Ghanaian Times); media associations (including the Ghana Journalists Association, Private Newspapers Association of Ghana, Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association, and Ghana Community Radio Network); and religious associations such as the Christian Council (ibid). The MCAG also got the support of *OccupyGhana*. This pressure group declared the last Friday of every month as ‘Red Friday’ on which the MCAG and its affiliates would don red apparel to inform the public that ‘enough is enough’ (GCM, n.d.).

Moreover, the MCAG thrived on donor funds and the contributions of its members, making it financially independent of the regime. STAR-Ghana, a pool of independent donor organisations, including EU, USAID, UK Aid (DFID) and DANIDA, constituted a source of donor support for the

²²⁰ The other demands included the suspension of the issuance of new mining licenses for a year; re-categorisation of mining to make room for the use of larger equipment; remediation of polluted water bodies; and land reclamation and tree planting. See Adogla-Bessa (2017b).

MCAG (Frimpong, 2019). Besides this donor funding, the Ghana Chamber of Mines pledged its support to sustain the MCAG's advocacy (Frimpong, 2019), while Ghana Oil offered GHC10, 000 (the equivalent of US\$ 2,500) worth of fuel coupons to facilitate the MCAG's movement across mining sites (GNA, 2017a).

The diversity in the MCAG's members, disproportionately drawn from urban private bodies, the active construction of galamsey as a menace, and the depth of resources at the MCAG's disposal all meant the movement was powerful and held disruptive potential. Thus, it proactively engaged with relevant government ministries on the need to crack down on galamsey. These ministries included the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources and the Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology, and Innovation. These and other ministries, such as the Information Ministry and Water and Sanitation Ministry, pledged to support the MCAG's goals (GNA, 2017b).

The media also actively suppressed ASM voices seeking to present alternative discourses on galamsey. For instance, a leading GNASSM member lamented that:

Sometimes when we were being interviewed on air, and they (the radio station) realised that we were making much sense about licensed small-scale mining, they would usually find a way to stop the interview. There were times the media stations didn't even want to call or listen to us because there was a broad consensus that galamsey was a national security threat and that no one should negotiate with galamsey operatives.²²¹

In response to this urban pressure, the President promised to put his presidency on the line to fight galamsey. 'True' to his words, he set up an ad hoc agency – the IMCIM – to coordinate a ban on ASM and enforce this through a joint military-police task force known as Operation Vanguard. As one research participant suggested, the MCAG's pressure on the regime prevented the regime from proactively engaging with the licensed small-scale miners' association on how to deal with illegal mining.

The government should have had a dialogue with the small-scale miners' association. The association even offered to help fight illegal mining at their own expense, but the government ignored them. I think the approach was for the NPP to have a stakeholder conference with the association to deal with galamsey. However, the government took a different approach because of pressure from the press for something radical to be done.²²²

²²¹ Interview with a GNASSM official in Kumasi on 19th July 2019.

²²² Interview with a licensed gold dealer in Accra on 10th May 2019.

Thus, it is reasonable to contend that the presence of a more vibrant media-driven social movement under the NPP's Akufo-Addo explains this regime's elongated crackdown on ASM relative to the NDC's Mahama. However, an argument that social movements' actions explain variation in regime-ASM relations necessarily admits that a regime under a social movement's pressure would also drive out all artisanal miners to please powerful societal voices, in this case, the MCAG and its members. Nevertheless, as explored in chapter five, Ghanaian regimes target different groups of artisanal miners when cracking down on the sector. We saw how Mahama's short-lived attack on the sector targeted illegal Chinese miners and spared most indigenous galamsey. In contrast, Akufo-Addo targeted indigenous galamsey and spared illegal Chinese miners. The absence or presence of social movements cannot explain this complex outcome.

Moreover, the NPP's Kufour brutally evicted hard-rock artisanal miners between 2006 and 2008 at a time social media and a media-based anti-ASM social movement had yet to emerge. Nonetheless, Kufour's action against these miners may have responded to social pressure from the Ghana Chamber of Mines, a social group that invariably advocates against hard-rock artisanal miners' encroachment upon LSM companies' concessions. For example, a former NDC minister linked Kufour's raid of the artisanal miners in 2006 to the complaints of LSM companies.

Before the major 2006 clampdowns, Kufour had implemented pockets of clampdown policies against ASM because what was happening was that the small-scale mining was growing in intensity, and they were looking for more mineral-bearing areas, and so they were trespassing onto concessions. The concession owners complained to the government, and the government sent military men to flush the illegal miners out to protect the concessions.²²³

These concession owners (i.e., the LSM companies) work through the Ghana Chamber of Mines, one of the influential voices in the Ghanaian business community. Although the Chamber does not organise protests, it proactively lobbies regimes by publishing reports and granting media interviews on how galamsey threatens large-scale mining companies. A former Chief Director of the Lands and Natural Resource Ministry said the following concerning the Chamber.

The Chamber of Mines is an overbearing organisation in relation to the small-scale miners' association. We have only one ASM association. They have no voice, and that is why their activities are suspended. In many cases, the Chamber of Mines manipulates several policy

²²³ Interview with a former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources in Accra on 13th June 2019.

prescriptions towards small-scale miners behind the scenes. The Chamber is often behind governments' policies of clamping down on small-scale miners.²²⁴

Thus, it may seem right to interpret Kufour's raid of the hard-rock and predominantly indigenous galamsey operatives as a response to the Chamber's advocacies. Nevertheless, Mills did not crack down on the sector despite the Chamber's incessant demands for the regime to do so. Thus, while the foregoing alternative interpretations appear plausible, the complex relations between Ghanaian regimes and different groups of artisanal miners cannot be due to the absence or presence of a social movement.

4. Conclusion.

This chapter interrogated two alternative lenses via which the study's research question on regime-ASM variation could be viewed. It demonstrated that how regimes respond to artisanal miners and why they do so may be due to regimes' ideas about resource governance and whether a regime confronts some social movement advocating a crackdown on artisanal miners. Regarding ideational questions, the chapter showed that the distinct party-political ideologies that Ghana's NDC and NPP subscribe to make them appeal to varying resource governance ideologies and, thus, respond to artisanal miners differently over time. However, these parties have crossed the party-ideological lines on several policy issues on health, education and even the economy more broadly. Thus, it is problematic to interpret their relations with artisanal miners in terms of their party-political or resource governance ideological leanings. Moreover, even if ideology could explain the presence or absence of a raid, it may not explain why raids victimise some miners and spare others.

Regarding Tanzania, where different CCM presidents have responded differently to artisanal miners, the chapter interrogated how the four Presidents' idiosyncrasies may have shaped their resource governance ideas and, thus, their responses to artisanal miners. The findings showed that Mwinyi and Magufuli had similar modest upbringings and lived experiences that made them less exposed to the outside world and more resource-nationalist in their thinking. Hence, their tolerance of the artisanal miners. In contrast, Mkapa's and Kikwete's relatively flamboyant lived experiences regarding their professional diplomatic roles exposed them to the outside world and made them more appreciative of foreign mining capital in developing Tanzania's mineral resources. Hence, their violent eviction of artisanal miners and support of mining companies' abuses of artisanal miners.

²²⁴ Interview with a former Chief Director of the Lands and Natural Resources Ministry in Accra on 13th May 2019.

Nonetheless, I showed that debates about resource-nationalist ideas shaping Magufuli's resource governance point to the political constraints brought to bear on Magufuli by the opposition CHADEMA following the 2015 elections. Hence, rational choice rather than resource-nationalist ideological inclination better explains Magufuli's relations with the artisanal miners, as the thesis's central argument demonstrates. Similarly, just before the 1995 elections, President Mwinyi and the CCM faced a threat from the opposition NCCR-Mageuzi shaped by the defection of a popular CCM elite to the opposition. Hence, the CCM campaigned to support ASM but later suppressed these miners after winning the election as the political threat had disappeared. Therefore, the different resource governance ideas of the Tanzanian leaders do not offer a convincing account for the temporal variation in regime-ASM relations.

Finally, the chapter argued that the relative differences in anti-ASM social movement advocacies could explain differences in regime-ASM relations in Ghana. Notably, the emergence of a media-driven-anti-ASM social movement under the NPP's Akufo-Addo regime may have inspired the regime's virulence against the ASM sector. However, it does not explain why the regime largely spared illegal Chinese miners but victimised indigenous galamsey operatives. Moreover, although the Chamber of Mines engaged with the NPP's Kufour and NDC's Mills to deal with artisanal miners, Kufour responded in the affirmative, but Mills in the negative. Thus, this chapter showed that the alternative analytical approaches do not convincingly account for how regimes respond to artisanal miners and why they do so.

Chapter 8. Conclusion.

This thesis explored and explained differences in regime-ASM relations in Africa. Much of the existing scholarship on artisanal mining in the developing world treats the state as a monolith with a singular purpose of marginalising and repressing ASM as a mechanism to protect LSM companies' interests. However, the state's character changes over time depending on the nature of the regime in power. Thus, the extant linear conceptualisation of artisanal miners being perpetually marginalised and repressed by the state has come under some scrutiny, with cross-country evidence demonstrating how, but not why, different regimes either tolerate or raid artisanal miners. This thesis built on these works by carefully selecting Ghana and Tanzania to understand how regimes in these countries relate to artisanal miners and why they do so.

Studying Ghana and Tanzania, cases that typically represent resource-rich African countries, could allow for some generalisations across a larger set of cases in Africa and the developing world more broadly. A combination of political economy literature constituted the thesis's theoretical lens. I initially set out with the political settlements' theory on how countries with different political configurations generate different outcomes. Thus, before the fieldwork and with the limited information about the two cases at hand, I set up Ghana and Tanzania as a most-similar systems design, wherein Ghanaian regimes repressed artisanal miners while Tanzanian regimes tolerated them. Hence, the pre-fieldwork tentative hunch was that Ghana's competitive political settlement vis-à-vis Tanzania's dominant settlement should explain the varying outcomes.

However, the fieldwork produced data that baffled this theory. It showed that regime-ASM relations within Ghana and Tanzania varied over time, provoking a rethink of the theory and the design. While I reckoned that the political settlement or configuration within which regimes operate matters for regimes' behaviour, I conceded that further elaboration of this theoretical debate and the inclusion of additional analytical literature could clarify the empirical material. Rather than regard dominant settlements as characterised by regimes whose disproportionate holding power insulates them against societal forces, I conceptualised two dominant settlement variants (i.e., a weak dominant and a strong dominant settlement). Thus, regimes that operate in these distinct dominant settlement patterns should also respond to social groups differently over time. This theoretical framework clarified the Tanzania data, which showed CCM regimes' varying relations with artisanal miners over time.

Regarding Ghana, the field data revealed a pattern in which some regimes stayed away from raiding the sector. In contrast, others targeted different groups of artisanal miners when raiding the sector, confounding the initial theory that regimes in competitive political settlements are vulnerable and concede to social groups. Thus, I refined this theory by adding the literature on party-society relations

and political marketplace. These theories illustrate how regimes in competitive political settlements will respond to social groups differently depending on the regimes' connection to these groups and how a raid could support a regime's political budget.

Given these theoretical revisions, the design similarly changed, with Ghana and Tanzania qualifying more as typical cases than comparative cases. This shift was necessary as the field data revealed within-country rather than cross-national variations in regime-ASM relations. Thus, granted that both cases are developing and democratising middle-income countries with significant ASM populations and hosting some of the world's renowned LSM companies, they fairly exhibited features of many resource-rich developing countries in Africa and beyond. These revisions in theory and design, shaped by the field data, demonstrate how theory incorporation in this study did not imply a reductionist approach to data collection and analysis.

Field in-depth semi-structured and focus group interviews conducted at the national and sub-national levels, mining and government reports and observations constituted the study's primary data. The primary data further motivated the collection of supplementary media, electoral, Afrobarometer and relevant secondary data with evidential value. Finally, I adopted a thematic analytical approach, identifying multiple layers of themes across the study's data set to answer the research question. For the rest of this conclusion, I first discuss the relevant theoretical implications of the study's findings. Second, I present the study's academic contributions. Third, I discuss what we can learn beyond the two cases. Fourth, I outline the study's policy implications. Fifth, I discuss the study's limitations and conclude the thesis by highlighting potential research agendas for future researchers.

1. Theoretical implications of the findings.

The study found that regime-ASM relations are not uniform in Ghana and Tanzania. Instead, in Tanzania, artisanal miners either come under attack or are allowed to mine, depending on the regime in power. While the Mwinyi and Magufuli regimes took a pro-ASM stance, putting up with the artisanal miners, Magufuli also repressed artisanal miners deemed to be connected to the opposition. In contrast, the Mkapa and Kikwete regimes were intolerant of the artisanal miners and violently evicted artisanal miners from mining companies' concessions. The study further found that the changing nature of opposition politics in Tanzania surges and wanes the political threats different CCM regimes faced, conditioning their varying responses to the artisanal miners. Unlike Mwinyi's and Magufuli's pro-ASM positions, Mkapa and Kikwete confronted relatively weak political opposition and could afford to take anti-ASM positions.

More complex findings emerged in Ghana, showing how NDC regimes generally abhorred cracking down on the galamsey sector but used crackdown measures to penalise illegal Chinese miners while sparing indigenous galamsey operatives. In contrast, crackdown measures were ubiquitous and elongated under NPP regimes. Moreover, these regimes targeted indigenous galamsey workers but spared illegal Chinese miners in galamsey. The study attributed this variation in regime-ASM relations to the differential linkages between different groups of miners (i.e., indigenous galamsayers and illegal Chinese miners) and the contending Ghanaian regimes. I demonstrated that indigenous galamsayers generally constitute the NDC's political base, while illegal Chinese miners have intricate links with the NPP. Accordingly, NDC regimes put with indigenous miners disregarding these miners' threat to large-scale mining companies. In contrast, NPP regimes raid the ASM sector in ways that penalise most indigenous artisanal miners but protect large-scale mining interests and the interests of illegal Chinese miners.

These findings show that, while big businesses can leverage their organisational prowess and wealth to influence a regime's policy (Haggard et al., 2019; Haggard & Maxfield, 1996; Hirschman, 1978; Olson, 1965), regimes' variegated political needs could sway their policies against big businesses. For example, LSM companies faced operational difficulties whenever regimes put up with artisanal miners and refused to crack down on marauding artisanal miners, as observed under Mwinyi and Magufuli in Tanzania and Rawlings, Mills and Mahama in Ghana. Thus, rather than assume that African regimes' quests for 'easy money' from LSM companies lead these regimes to raid artisanal miners (Hilson, 2020; Hilson & Maconachie, 2020; Kemp & Owen, 2019; Luning, 2014), it would be more analytically useful to pay attention to the conditions under which some regimes raid the sector while others do not.

The findings also show that a country's overarching political settlement in and of itself may offer limited insights into complex social phenomena. In the last three decades, scholars have been converging on how countries with different political settlement patterns produce different outcomes. This reasoning is often presented as an alternative to institutional accounts for development outcomes (Di John & Putzel, 2009). Here, the theoretical logic is that regimes operating in dominant political configurations tend to be less vulnerable to social groups and could dictate terms to these groups. In contrast, regimes operating in competitive settlements are vulnerable to social groups as they have to garner votes across social groups to maintain power (Abdulai, 2017a, 2017b; Di John & Putzel, 2009; Kelsall, 2018; Khan, 2010). Nevertheless, despite Tanzania's dominant political configuration, CCM leaders sometimes appeared vulnerable to artisanal miners' votes and took policy stances that furthered the artisanal miners' interests to the disgruntlement of mining companies.

In Ghana, the NDC's and NPP's varying relations with indigenous groups of artisanal miners and the rationale behind this variation demonstrate how Ghana's competitive political settlement does not

necessarily render the contending regimes equally vulnerable to indigenous artisanal miners' votes, as others have argued (Abdulai, 2017c, 2017b; Aubynn, 2009). Instead, the evidence presented in this thesis underscores how the country's competitive political settlement, along with the nature of party-society linkages, makes the NDC more vulnerable to indigenous artisanal miners' votes and shapes our appreciation of why the NDC and NPP respond to these differently. Thus, the study's findings question debates that African political parties are loosely linked to society (Erdmann, 1999; Van de Walle, 2003). Instead, it draws attention to how existing patterns of party-society linkages (Boone & Wahman, 2015; Bratton et al., 2005; Erdmann, 2004; Lawson, 1980; Osei, 2012) in Africa's competitive political configurations could have varying policy implications.

Moreover, the study's evidence is consistent with Anthony Downs' (1957) seminal work on how political parties are not preoccupied with pursuing preconceived policies to satiate the interest of certain preconceived interest groups. For instance, Mkapa's campaign to promote and support artisanal miners in Tanzania differed from his actual policy of evicting these miners. Similarly, in Ghana, while the NPP's Akufo-Addo campaigned in 2016 to encourage artisanal mining, the party heavily raided indigenous galamseyers after winning the election.

The study also confirmed the political marketplace literature on how political parties seek to fund their political budget for political campaigns (De Waal, 2018). For instance, regarding the Ghanaian case, clampdown measures facilitated regimes' exclusive access to mineral rents since these measures targeted perceived and actual opposition elements in ASM while bolstering the position of pro-regime miners. Moreover, clampdown measures sometimes protected LSM companies' concessions and preserved regimes' tax revenues from this sector.

Similarly, while generally tolerating artisanal miners, Tanzania's Magfuli attacked artisanal miners linked to the opposition to prevent mineral rents from accruing to the political opposition. This point is crucial as analysts of Magfuli's governance tend to overemphasise the regime's protection of the interests of the downtrodden or plebs, including artisanal miners' interests (Paget, 2020, 2021; Poncian, 2019), underemphasising how the regime also cracked down on 'plebs' connected to the opposition.

2. Academic contributions.

The thesis makes four primary contributions to literature.

First, it problematises the periodisation of differing perspectives characterising the informal economy. For example, the criminalisation perspective suggests that governments criminalised the informal economy in the 1990s (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Meagher, 2014; Reno, 2000). In contrast, the hybrid governance perspective posits that governments tacitly tolerated the informal economy in the 2000s to leverage the sector's economic benefits (Boege et al., 2008; Meagher, 2014; Portes, 1996). Nonetheless, this thesis showed how some Ghanaian regimes tolerated informal miners in a *criminalisation period* while other regimes attacked different groups of informal miners in a *hybrid governance period*.

Second, the study's argument extends and refines the informal economy literature on how regimes respond to their informal sectors. Current debates suggest that governments tolerate informal economies where the informal population is enormous relative to the non-informal population (Amengual, 2016; Aubynn, 2009; Holland, 2016; Weitz-Shapiro, 2014). At first glance, this literature may illuminate why NDC regimes tolerate the over one million indigenous artisanal miners in Ghana. Yet, the literature fumbles in the face of the NPP's intolerance of these miners. Similarly, this literature cannot explain why different political leaders of Tanzania's CCM tolerate and raid artisanal miners over time despite artisanal miners numbering over 1.5 million. Thus, this thesis's argument deepens our understanding of the conditions under which some regimes can afford to crack down on the informal population regardless of the numbers involved.

Third, by emphasising how politics mediates variations in regime-ASM relations, the thesis joins a few studies that examine the political dynamics of ASM governance (Abdulai, 2017a, 2017b; Aubynn, 2009; Teschner, 2012). Nevertheless, this emerging literature assumes that regimes in competitive political settlements lack the political will to sustain military raids against artisanal miners due to the need for the miners' votes. However, Ghana's NPP's raid of the indigenous artisanal miners throughout the 2020 election challenges the validity of this assumption. As demonstrated in this thesis, the NPP sustained the raid because of the subtle political benefits associated with this policy decision.

Finally, the study's emphasis on the different ramifications of different ASM forms (i.e., hard-rock vs alluvial) underscores the weakness in the debate that ASM supports agriculture (Hilson & Garforth, 2013; Maponga & Ngorima, 2003; Okoh & Hilson, 2011). Hard-rock ASM much less devastates arable lands than alluvial ASM since hard-rock ASM is underground mining, which leaves vast swaths of arable land somewhat undisturbed. Hence, hard-rock miners in places like Tanzania and Burkina Faso can also raise funds to support agriculture without necessarily disturbing agricultural lands. In contrast,

alluvial ASM, being open cast in nature, destroys large portions of agricultural land and remains a significant setback to agriculture. Moreover, unlike hard-rock ASM operatives, the actors in alluvial ASM tend to be foreigners and profit-driven with no interest in investing in agriculture.

3. Beyond Ghana and Tanzania.

The thesis's argument and findings have implications for resource-rich developing countries in Africa. Artisanal mining is a fundamental livelihood activity across several sub-Saharan African countries, including Zambia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Uganda, South Africa, and Botswana. Like all sub-Saharan African countries, these countries have clientelist settlement patterns (Khan, 2010). However, the nature of power configurations and party-society linkages across these clientelist settlements could shape how regimes here respond to artisanal miners. For instance, Zambia's and Nigeria's clientelist settlements are more competitive as political power has shifted from the incumbent to the opposition.

Like Ghana, Zambia's PF and the MMD draw support from urban and rural areas. Hilson (2020) reported a state-sponsored raid of artisanal miners between 2018 and 2020 in Zambia when the PF was in power. However, because artisanal gold mining in Zambia occurs in rural districts, the PF might have found little or no political risk in raiding these miners, who are more likely to be MMD supporters. Thus, within Zambia's competitive clientelist settlement, the nature of party-society (ASM) linkages could lead the key political parties to oscillate between raiding and tolerating indigenous artisanal miners.

Similarly, artisanal mining is increasingly becoming a livelihood activity in Nigeria, where a competitive clientelist settlement is burgeoning with the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the People's Democratic Power (PDP) having alternated power. Since artisanal mining mainly occurs in northern Nigeria – the APC's stronghold – and the miners are likely to have ethnic and religious identities (northerners and Muslims) that resonate with the APC, the APC may find it more challenging than the PDP to raid these miners.

Unlike Zambia and Nigeria, South Africa has a dominant settlement as the same governing coalition – the African National Congress (ANC) – has ruled the country since 1994. However, like Tanzania, different ANC political leaders, including Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, and Cyril Ramaphosa, have governed South Africa. Because artisanal mining in South Africa mainly occurs outside the formal-legal structure, the relative threat that the opposition – Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – poses to the ANC could drive how the ANC relates to

artisanal miners. When the opposition becomes a threat, the ANC may seek to contain this by putting up with several informal actors, including artisanal miners, for votes.

The leading opposition DA is a predominantly white and urban-based political party that has consistently won over 20% of provincial elections in Gauteng and the Western Cape (South Africa's most urbanised provinces). In the Western Cape, the DA beat the ANC in the last three elections in 2009, 2014, and 2019 (Giraut & Vacchiani-Marcuzzo, 2013). In contrast, the ANC draws more support from rural and black folks, although the EFF, a black-dominated political party, is likely to make inroads into this electoral constituency. The EFF's pan-Africanist and Marxist-Leninist orientation and its rhetoric of land expropriation without compensation may appeal to artisanal miners who are mainly black and rural voters (Ledwaba, 2017). These dynamics imply that the ruling ANC may tolerate artisanal miners over time as the DA's and EFF's vote shares increase.

Similarly, like Tanzania and South Africa, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) is a dominant party that has ruled Botswana under different political leaders. Nonetheless, in the last two elections, the opposition coalition – the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) – became a viable force, garnering 30% of the votes against the BDP's 46.45% in the 2014 elections and 35.88% against the BDP's 52.65% in the 2019 elections. Thus, since the BDP has a rural political base, it may tolerate artisanal miners who are also rural economic actors to prevent this constituency from falling to the UDC if the UDC begins to identify with the miners' plight.

Unlike Tanzania, South Africa, and Botswana, strongmen rule in Uganda and Zimbabwe over time. For example, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni has been in power since 1986, while Mugabe ruled Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2017. In Uganda and Zimbabwe, electoral processes are often shrouded in opacity and outcomes are frequently disputed domestically and internationally. Moreover, the governing elites regularly adopt undemocratic means to stay in power. Therefore, regimes here can continually raid artisanal miners as the miners' votes may mean nothing to these regimes. For instance, existing research shows that the Mugabe-led ZANU-PF frequently raided artisanal miners to protect the regime's stake in mineral rents (Katsaura, 2010; Mawowa, 2013). Similarly, in August 2017, Museveni's National Resistance Movement raided about 50,000 artisanal gold miners for 15 months in Mubende District to protect the concession of AUC Mining Ltd. (Musisi, 2021).

In contrast to the above cases, the DRC is highly unstable, with rebel movements contesting the legitimacy of ruling elites and controlling resource extraction through violence. The DRC fits Khan's (2010, p. 59) category of "Political Settlements in Crisis", which describes countries where formal institutions have collapsed and "political stability declines below the minimum sustainable level." The near absence of formal institutions in these countries makes informal political power relevant (Khan,

2010). Thus, artisanal miners in the DRC may come under constant attacks from rebel movements whose survival hinges on mineral rents and the state whose budgets hugely depend on rents accruing from mining companies. Future researchers may subject this thesis's argument and scope conditions to further tests by examining one or two hypothetical cases highlighted in this section.

4. Policy recommendations.

This study has policy implications for the donor community and mining companies. For example, the World Bank's communities and small-scale mining project, which ended in 2013, sought to improve ASM in seven countries, including Tanzania and Ghana, by increasing productivity and securing social protection and fair standards of labour (World Bank, 2013). However, as this study has demonstrated, different regimes confront different constraints and incentives, which those seeking to influence ASM policy in developing countries must consider.

Where a regime regards indigenous artisanal miners as political foes, the Bank's attempt to support the regime to revamp the ASM sector may only create an opportunity for that regime to penalise miners for political reasons. For instance, Ghana's NPP received US\$ 100 million in World Bank funding to supposedly sanitise the ASM sector, which enabled the regime to tighten its raid of most indigenous artisanal miners while allowing party loyalists and illegal Chinese miners to mine clandestinely. Thus, the regime lacked the incentive to manage the ASM sector genuinely. Hence, despite spending much on the ASM sector, the environmental degradation, superficially motivating the clampdown measure, persists.

By comparison, international development organisations may find it helpful to partner regimes in promoting the ASM sector where a regime values artisanal miners' votes. For instance, in Tanzania, Magufuli operated in a weak dominant political settlement and, therefore, felt politically threatened by the opposition. Hence, he introduced pro-ASM interventions, which sought to contain the opposition in mining regions by improving the lots of artisanal miners. Hence, the political settlement pattern in which Magufuli operated made it feasible for any international organisation to collaborate with this regime in promoting ASM.

Similarly, Ghana's NDC may direct multilateral funds into programmes and policies that could harness the ASM sector's economic potential. This is because indigenous artisanal miners generally constitute the NDC's political base. As discussed in chapter five, the NDC's 2014 mining policy was pro-ASM, which informed an ASM framework seeking to implement this policy. Therefore, with multilateral

funds, the NDC may raid foreign elements in artisanal mining while capacitating indigenous artisanal miners.

However, because pro-ASM regimes also tend to put up with artisanal miners' encroachments upon mining companies' concessions, it is vital that any multilateral funds for these regimes be conditional on the regimes' readiness to protect mining companies' property rights against ASM-induced invasions. Nevertheless, we saw that mining companies acquired more land than they needed, dispossessing community members and artisanal miners and motivating artisanal miners' encroachments. Thus, donor organisations must proactively engage with pro-ASM regimes and mining companies to ensure that mining companies release commercially unviable lands for artisanal miners in ways that can tame encroachments.

Nonetheless, such accommodative measures may not always prevent encroachments, and there is no guarantee that a pro-ASM regime will forcibly evict artisanal miners once encroachments occur. Thus, as a buffer, prospective and existing mining companies must invest in building robust company-community relations by supporting primary community projects. Companies also need to communicate their visions for and to host communities frequently. These strategies could build a sense of community shield against illegal artisanal mining by accentuating mining companies' genuine commitment to community development relative to artisanal miners who make little or no contribution to community projects. Moreover, where an encroachment occurs, a mining company's robust relations with communities could become a critical bargaining chip required to evict miners diplomatically. This approach could save companies operational challenges that may otherwise arise where a pro-ASM regime deliberately fails to deploy state security to evict marauding artisanal miners.

5. Limitations.

This research had three fundamental limitations worth discussing. First, like most qualitative works, primary data – such as semi-structured and focus group interviews – comprised the core of the study's evidence. To some extent, the quality of such data depends on one's ability to conduct face-to-face interviews with participants because interviewees' gestures, cues, and mumbles could provide grounds for follow-up questions. I planned to conduct six months of fieldwork in Ghana and four months in Tanzania. To make the most of the time and for purposes of reflexivity during the research process, I divided the fieldwork into two main phases. The first phase comprised four months in Ghana and two months in Tanzania. The second phase was two months in either country.

Between April 2019 and February 2020, I successfully conducted face-to-face interviews during the first phase of the fieldwork. However, the second phase – planned to take off from June to December 2020 – coincided with the global pandemic (COVID-19). With national lockdowns in the UK and Ghana and the UK's travel ban on Tanzania, it became impossible to conduct face-to-face interviews during this fieldwork phase. Thus, I adapted by applying for remote fieldwork, which the LSE's Ethics Committee and PhD Academy approved. I drew upon two main mechanisms for remote data collection, including third-party research assistance and virtual data collection.

I collaborated with two local third-party research assistants in Ghana and Tanzania. Following several meetings with my Supervisor, I gave the research assistants a two-week orientation on my research and commissioned them to collect data from non-elite research participants who were neither conversant with virtual platforms nor familiar with English language in most instances. The research assistants could also arrange for me to conduct virtual interviews (i.e., via zoom and WhatsApp) with elite participants.

However, the virtual interviews were primarily audio rather than video conversations because of unstable internet connectivity. Therefore, not much latent data (cues, mumbles, and gestures) emerged to facilitate probes. Moreover, it was also unclear how the third-party research assistants used latent data (cues, mumbles, and gestures) to ask probing and follow-up questions. Nonetheless, remote fieldwork was the best alternative under the circumstances (i.e., COVID-19). Counterintuitively, however, the third-party research assistants were native speakers of the dialect in the research sites and could clearly communicate the interview guide with the research participants. This eliminated the language barrier I could have encountered in the field and primarily made up for the potential loss of latent data.

Secondly, the empirical chapters on Ghana and Tanzania are vastly unequal in length. The practical challenges I encountered in Tanzania relative to Ghana explain this difference. Unlike Ghana, researchers must apply for a research permit in Tanzania. Since it was impossible to apply for this permit outside Tanzania, I had to spend part of the first phase of my fieldwork in Tanzania applying for a research permit. Nonetheless, while in Dar es Salaam for this application, I could informally interview academics and opposition politicians.

Moreover, I could also engage with regional mining offices in Mwanza and Geita Regions. However, because Geita was one of my primary sub-national cases, I spent close to three weeks informally interviewing artisanal miners, an official at the Geita regional mining office, gold dealers, a former official of AGA, and former and current underground workers of AGA. Whereas I had planned to interview local politicians and current AGA officials, my plans got truncated by the Geita regional

immigration office, accusing me of conducting interviews without a research permit. Although I showed them my research permit application documentation, they insisted I end the fieldwork until the permit was granted.

Given these practical ethical considerations, I ended the fieldwork a week earlier and could not access sub-national politicians and current AGA officials as planned. However, these challenges were non-existing in Ghana, where I spent four months interviewing relevant stakeholders in Accra and Obuasi. Consequently, I ended up with more interview data in Ghana. Moreover, accessing online news items was easier in Ghana (my home country) than in Tanzania since much of Tanzania's news items are in Kiswahili, a language I am unfamiliar with.

Third and finally, participants in the LSM sector were reluctant to grant me interviews. The perspectives of these participants would have been helpful for the analysis because regimes' responses to artisanal miners affect mining companies positively or negatively. However, since the mining industry is very secretive, this participant attrition is quite understandable. Nevertheless, participant attrition was more of a problem in Tanzania than in Ghana. While the Ghana Chamber of Mines participated in this research, their counterparts in Tanzania declined. Moreover, one major foreign mining company participated in the research in Ghana. In contrast, apart from my challenge in Geita, officials of Tanzanite One in Mererani turned down interview requests.

Nonetheless, as stated above, during my face-to-face interviews in Geita, I could interview previous employees of AGA while informally holding discussions with the company's current underground workers off the company's premises. Thus, although the data from these participants may not represent the official position of AGA, they provided a basis for understanding mining companies' relations with regimes and ASM operatives. Moreover, I could interview mineral management bodies in Ghana and Tanzania that frequently interface with mining companies and could comment on questions relating to mining companies' influence on regimes' responses to artisanal miners. Finally, official reports of mining companies and chambers of mines, particularly in Ghana, provided further insights into the thought processes of mining companies concerning ASM governance. This adaptation to the above challenges means that the study's limitations do not undermine its internal and external validity.

6. Areas for future research.

This thesis provides three avenues for future research.

First, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to examine the political dynamics of the governance of ASM within two African countries. To further test the theories employed in this research, additional research is required on how governing coalitions in the Global South govern their ASM sectors. I have indicated how political dynamics in other resource-endowed developing countries, such as Zambia, Nigeria, Botswana, South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the DRC, could create different ASM governance approaches. Future research could test the scope conditions of this thesis's theoretical lens by examining one of these cases.

Second, whereas this study sought to explore and explain variation in regime-ASM relations, it would be interesting for future research to estimate the causal effect of a mining policy intervention on different stakeholders in the mining sector. For example, Tanzania established ASM markets across its 26 mining regions in 2018. All mineral dealers and artisanal miners must transact minerals in these markets. Since a similar market intervention is absent in Ghana, quantitative researchers could use a differences-in-differences identification strategy to estimate the impact of this market intervention on the profit margins of different stakeholders in Tanzania, using Ghana as a counterfactual.

A third and final future research agenda revolves around the effect of raids on artisanal miners' voting patterns. It is presently ambiguous whether artisanal miners significantly vote against a regime that introduces a clampdown measure. However, our theoretical priors could lead us to expect miners to vote for the opposition if an incumbent introduced a clampdown measure. Again, through survey data, quantitative researchers could test the effects of military raids on miners' voting behaviour.

Bibliography.

- Abdulai, A.-G. (2017a). *Competitive clientelism and the political economy of mining in Ghana*. (No. 78). www.effective-states.org
- Abdulai, A.-G. (2017b). *FINDINGS: Competitive politics and the challenge of combating illegal mining in Ghana*. Effective States and Inclusive Development. <https://www.effective-states.org/beyond-the-resource-curse-the-political-economy-of-mining-and-inclusive-development-in-ghana/>
- Abdulai, A.-G. (2017c). *The Galamsey Menace in Ghana: A Political Problem Requiring Political Solutions?* (pp. 1–5). University of Ghana Business School. <chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%253A%252F%252Fu%252Fgbs.ug.edu.gh%252Fsites%252Fdefault%252Ffiles%252Fpublic%252Fdocuments%252FThe%252520Galamsey%252520Menace%252520in%252520Ghana-%252520A%252520Political%252520Problem%252520Requiring%252520Political%252520Solutions%252520in%252520Ghana.pdf>
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2008). *The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development*. (No. 10). <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28045>
- Acquah, P. C. (1995). *Natural resources management and sustainable development: The case of the gold sector in Ghana*.
- Addy, S. N. (1998). Ghana: revival of the mineral sector. *Resources Policy*, 24(4), 229–239. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0301-4207\(98\)00035-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0301-4207(98)00035-X)
- Adogla-Bessa, D. (2017a). #StopGalamseyNow campaign moves to Western Region [Photos]. Citifmonline.Com. <https://citifmonline.com/2017/04/stopgalamseynow-campaign-moves-to-western-region-photos/>
- Adogla-Bessa, D. (2017b). *Citi FM launches #StopGalamseyNow Campaign*. Citifmonline.Com. <https://citifmonline.com/2017/04/citifm-launches-stopgalamseynow-campaign/#:~:text=Citi FM will take its,water bodies and the environment.>
- Adogla-Bessa, D. (2018). *State discontinues case against Chinese “galamsey queen” Aisha Huang*. CITI NEWSROOM.
- Adom-Otchere, P. (2020). *Topic: Exclusive Interview with Chairman Wontumi (NPP Ashanti chair)*. GoodEveningGhana. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwRgp3C6b84>
- Adom TV. (2021). *Over 30 fully-armed battalion guard miners degrading Manso Forest*. Adom TV.
- African Elections Database. (2011). *Elections in Tanzania*. African Elections Database.
- Afrobarometer. (2017). *Summary of Results. Afrobarometer Round 7*. CDD-Ghana.
- Agyapong, E. (1998). *Streamlining Artisanal Gold Mining Activities and the Promotion of Cleaner Production in the Mining Sector in Sub Saharan Africa: Ghana as a Case Study*. Lund University, Sweden.
- Aidoo, R. (2016). *The political economy of galamsey and anti-Chinese sentiment in Ghana*. *African*

- Studies Quarterly*, 16(3/4)(55).
- Akabzaa, T., & Darimani, A. (2001). Impact of mining sector investment in Ghana: A study of the Tarkwa mining region. In *Third world Network* (Vol. 11, Issue 2).
- Akapule, S. (2017). *Shanxi Mines aksed to register as large scale mining company*. Modern Ghana. <https://www.modernghana.com/news/795114/shanxi-mines-asked-to-register-as-large-scale-mining-company.html>
- Akapule, S. (2018). *Deadly Gas Kills Galamsey, Others Collapse At Gbane*. GH HEADLINES.
- Alesina, A., Baqir, R., & Easterly, W. (1999). Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(4), 1243–1284. <https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556269>
- Allotey, G. A. (2018). *Judge unhappy with handling of Aisha Huang case*. CITI NEWSROOM.
- Amengual, M. (2016). *Politicized Enforcement in Argentina: Labor and Environmental Regulation*. Cambridge University Press.
- Amenuveve, V. (2017). *Stop the galamsey and come for proper license - Amewu tells Shaanxi*. Graphic Online. <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/stop-the-galamsey-and-come-for-proper-license-amewu-tells-shaanxi.html>
- Amin, S. (1972). Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa — Origins and Contemporary Forms. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10(4), 503–524. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00022801>
- AnglogoldAshanti. (2019). *Obuasi Redevelopment Project. Investor Presentation - May 2019*. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://thevault.exchange/?get_group_doc=143/1558972797-ObuasiInvestorPresentation2019.pdf
- Appiah, H. (1998). Organization of small scale mining activities in Ghana. *Journal of Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy*, 98(7), 307–310.
- Apter, D. (1964). Ghana. In J. S. Coleman & C. G. Rosberg (Eds.), *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (pp. 259–317). University of California Press.
- Arbatli, E. (2018). Resource nationalism revisited: A new conceptualization in light of changing actors and strategies in the oil industry. *Energy Research and Social Science*, 40(December 2017), 101–108. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.11.030>
- Aryee, B. N. A. (2018). *A Historical Overview of Ghana's Mining Sector Fiscal Regimes* (First). Reach Publishers.
- Asuman-Frimpong, N. K. (2019). *Otumfour's Emotional Speech at Obuasi Mines Reopening*. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwRgp3C6b84>
- Attride-Stirling, J. (2001). Thematic networks: an analytic tool for qualitative research. *Qualitative Research*, 1(3), 385–405. <https://doi.org/10.1177/146879410100100307>
- Aubynn, A. (2009). Sustainable solution or a marriage of inconvenience? The coexistence of large-scale mining and artisanal and small-scale mining on the Abosso Goldfields concession in

- Western Ghana. *Resources Policy*, 34(1–2), 64–70.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2008.04.002>
- Aubynn, A. K. (1997). Land Based Resource Alienation and Local Responses Under Structural Adjustment-Reflections from Western Ghana. *Helsinki: Institute of Development Studies*.
- Auty, R. M. (1995). Industrial policy, sectoral maturation, and postwar economic growth in Brazil: the resource curse thesis. *Economic Geography*, 71(3), 257–272.
- Ayee, J. R. A. (2016). Manifestos and Agenda Setting in Ghanaian Elections. In K. A. Ninsin (Ed.), *Issues in Ghana's Electoral Politics* (pp. 81–111). CODESRIA.
- Badmus, D. (2015). *President Magufuli bans foreign trips for Senior government officials*. CGTN AFRICA.
- Banchirigah, S. M. (2006). How have reforms fuelled the expansion of artisanal mining? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa. *Resources Policy*, 31(3), 165–171.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2006.12.001>
- Barreto, L. (2011). *Analysis for stakeholders on formalization in the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector based on experiences in Latin America, Africa, and Asia*.
- Barreto, M. L., Schein, P., Hinton, J., & Hruschka, F. (2018). The Impact of small-scale mining operations on economies and livelihoods in Low-to-Middle-Income Countries. *UK Department for International Development, London*.
- Bartolini, S., & Mair, P. (2007). *Identity, competition and electoral availability: the stabilisation of European electorates, 1885-1985*. ECPR Press.
- Basedau, M. (2007). Do Party Systems Matter for Democracy? A Comparative Study of 28 Sub-Saharan Countries. In *Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*. (pp. 105–144). Elanders Gotab.
- Basedau, M., & Stroh, A. (2012). How ethnic are African parties really? Evidence from four Francophone countries. *International Political Science Review*, 33(1), 5–24.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512110391770>
- Bates, R. H. (2014). *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*. University of California Press.
- Bawumia, M. (1998). Understanding the rural-urban voting patterns in the 1992 Ghanaian presidential election. A closer look at the distributional impact of Ghana's Structural Adjustment Programme. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36(1), 47–70.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X97002632>
- Bayart, J.-F., Eliis, S., & Hibou, B. (1999). *The criminalization of the state in Africa*. Currey, Indiana University Press.
- BBC. (2010). *BAE Systems fined for Tanzania accounting offence*. BBC News.
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12049723>
- Beals, R. E., & Menezes, C. F. (1970). Migrant labour and agricultural output in Ghana. *Oxford*

- Economic Papers*, 22(1), 109–127. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041148>
- Behuria, P., Buur, L., & Gray, H. (2017). Studying political settlements in Africa. *African Affairs*, 116(464), 508–525. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adx019>
- Berg, E. J. (1965). The Economics of the Migrant Labor System. In H. Kuper (Ed.), *Urbanization and migration in West Africa* (p. 227). University of California Press.
- Blomgren, A. M. (1997). *Nyliberal Politisk Filosofi En Kritisk Analys Av Milton Friedman, Robert Nozick Och FA Hayek*. Bokförlaget Nya Doxa.
- Bluhm, D. J., Harman, W., Lee, T. W., & Mitchell, T. R. (2011). Qualitative Research in Management: A Decade of Progress. *Journal of Management Studies*, 48(8), 1866–1891. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00972.x>
- Blundo, G., & De Sardan, O. J.-P. (2006). Everyday Corruption in West Africa. In *Everyday Corruption and the State: Citizens and Public Officials in Africa* (pp. 69–109).
- Boateng, K., Pogucki, R. J. ., Botchay, B., Blay, D. ., & Ocansey, C. (1958). *Report of Concessions Commission submitted to the Hon. Minister of Trade and Industry, 31 December 1958*.
- Boege, V., Brown, A., Clements, K., & Nolan, A. (2008). On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of “Fragility.” *Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management*.
- Boone, C. (2009). Electoral Populism Where Property Rights Are Weak: Land Politics in Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa. *Comparative Politics*, 41(2), 183–201. <https://doi.org/10.5129/001041509X12911362971990>
- Boone, C., & Wahman, M. (2015). Rural bias in African electoral systems: Legacies of unequal representation in African democracies. *Electoral Studies*, 40, 335–346. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.10.004>
- Boserup, E. (1981). *Population and Technological Change*. University of Chicago Press.
- Boyatzis, R. E. (1998). *Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and code development*. Sage Publications.
- Branson, N. (2015). What’s in it for me? Personalities, Enticements and Party Loyalties in Tanzania’s 2015 Elections. In *Africaportal* (p. 4).
- Bratton, M. (2014). Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation by Sebastian Elischer. *Political Science Quarterly*, 129(4), 746–748. chrome-extension://efaidnbmninnibpcapjpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2Fpdf%2F43828501.pdf%3Fcasa_token%3DsvnzUBjZrFgAAAAA%3AynZD6bnOOKCkA3FKN5mfuacTvU6QwYrHEJ92vHuCVNVPmwY8XJY1AHmvXvhMMXI8dMu72rbE_3afhVoTXEteZQtzhK1y
- Bratton, M., Mattes, R., & Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2005). *Public opinion, democracy, and market reform in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.
- Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in*

- Psychology*, 3(2), 77–101.
- Brett, E. A. (1986a). State Power and Economic Inefficiency : Explaining Political Failure in Africa. *IDS Bulletin*, 17(1), 22–29. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.1986.mp17001005.x>
- Brett, E. A. (1986b). State Power and Economic Inefficiency : Explaining Political Failure in Africa. *IDS Bulletin*, 17(1), 22–29. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.1986.mp17001005.x>
- Bryceson, D. F., & Geenen, S. (2016). Artisanal frontier mining of gold in Africa: Labour transformation in Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo. *African Affairs*, 115(459), 296–317. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adv073>
- Bryman, A. (2003). *Quantity and quality in social research*. Routledge.
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social research methods* (4th Editio). Oxford University Press.
- BullionByPost. (2021). *20 Year Gold Price History in Pound Sterling per Ounce*.
- Burawoy, M. (1976). The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor: Comparative Material from Southern Africa and the United States. *American Journal of Sociology*, 81(5), 1050–1087. <https://doi.org/10.1086/226185>
- Burnell, P. (2005). Political Parties in Africa: Different, Functinoal and Dynamic? In A. Mehler (Ed.), *Elections and Political Parties in Contemporary sub-Saharan Africa*. Nordic Africa Institute.
- Bush, R. (2009). ‘Soon there will be no-one left to take the corpses to the morgue’: Accumulation and abjection in Ghana’s mining communities. *Resources Policy*, 34(1–2), 57–63. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2008.02.002>
- Carmody, P. (2009). An Asian-Driven Economic Recovery in Africa? The Zambian Case. *World Development*, 37(7), 1197–1207. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.12.002>
- Carothers, T. (2006). *Confronting the Weakest Link. Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Cassius Mining Limited. (2020). *ASX Announcement: Cassius serves notice of intent to take Ghana to International Arbitration over the Gbane Gold Project* (p. 4).
- Castells, M., & Portes, A. (1989). World underneath: The origins, dynamics, and effects of hte informal economy. In A. Portes, M. Castells, & L. Benton (Eds.), *The informal economy: Studies in advanced and less developed countries* (p. 336). Johns Hopkins University Press.
- CCM. (2005). *The Constitution of Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (pp. 1–150).
- Centeno, M. A., & Portes, A. (2006). The informal economy in the shadow of the state. In J. Shefner & P. Fernández-Kelly (Eds.), *Out of the Shadows. Political Action and the Informal Economy in Latin America the Inf*. Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Chachage, C. S. L. (1995). The meek shall inherit the earth but not the mining rights. The mining industry and accumulation in Tanzania. *Liberalised Development in Tanzania*, 37–108.
- Chazan, N. (1991). The political transformation of Ghana under the P.N.D.C.’. In D. Rothchild (Ed.), *Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery*. Boulder.
- Cheeseman, N., & Hinfelaar, M. (2010). Parties, Platforms, and Political Mobilization: The Zambian

- Presidential Election of 2008. *African Affairs*, 109(434), 51–76.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adp070>
- Chigbu, U. (2019). Visually Hypothesising in Scientific Paper Writing: Confirming and Refuting Qualitative Research Hypotheses Using Diagrams. *Publications*, 7(1), 22.
<https://doi.org/10.3390/publications7010022>
- Chigora, P., & Nciizah, E. (2007). Electoral Fraud in Zimbabwe: a Critical Analysis of Parliamentary and Presidential Elections. *Unpublished Manuscript. Department of History and Development Studies, Midlands State University, Zimbabwe.*
- Chong, D. (1993). How people think, reason, and feel about rights and liberties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(3), 867–899.
- Chua, A. L. (1995). The privatisation-nationalisation cycle: The link between markets and ethnicity in developing countries. *Columbia Law Review*, 95(2), 223–303.
- Cliffe, L. (1976). Rural political economy of Africa. In P. C. Gutkind & I. Wallerstein (Eds.), *The political economy of contemporary Africa*. SAGE Publications.
- Collier, D. (2011). Understanding Process Tracing. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 44(04), 823–830.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096511001429>
- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56(4), 563–595.
- CAP 149. Gold Mining Products Protection, (1909).
- Conteh, F. M., & Maconachie, R. (2021). Artisanal mining, mechanization and human (in) security in Sierra Leone. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 8(4), 100983.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2021.100983>
- Cooksey, B. (2011). *The investment and business environment for gold exploration and mining in Tanzania* (No. 03). chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.publishing.service.gov.uk%2Fmedia%2F57a08ad140f0b652dd00090e%2F20110606-app-background-paper-03-brian-cooksey-june-2011.pdf&clen=1271851&chunk=true
- Cooksey, B. (2017). *IPTL, Richmond and “Escrow”*: The price of private power procurement in Tanzania. AFRICAPORTAL. <https://www.africaportal.org/publications/iptl-richmond-and-escrow-price-private-power-procurement-tanzania/>
- Cooksey, B., & Kelsall, T. (2011). *The political economy of the investment climate in Tanzania*. (APPP Working Paper Series).
- Coulson, A. (2013). *Tanzania: a political economy*. Oxford University Press.
- Crawford, G., Agyeyomah, C., & Mba, A. (2017). Ghana-big man, big envelope, finish: Chinese corporate exploitation in small-scale mining. In B. Engels & K. Dietz (Eds.), *Contested Extractivism, Society and the State* (pp. 69–99). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Crawford, G., & Botchwey, G. (2017). Conflict, collusion and corruption in small-scale gold mining:

- Chinese miners and the state in Ghana. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 55(4), 444–470. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2017.1283479>
- Crenshaw, E. M., & Oakey, D. R. (1998). “Jump-Starting” Development: Hyperurbanization as a Long-Term Economic Investment. *Sociological Focus*, 31(4), 321–340. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00380237.1998.10571112>
- Cross, J. C. (1998). *Informal politics: street vendors and the state in Mexico City*. Stanford University Press.
- Cuellar, F. R. (2005). *The profits of extermination: How US corporate power is destroying Colombia*. Common Courage Press.
- Curtis, M., & Lissu, T. (2008). *A Golden Opportunity? How Tanzania is failing to Benefit from Gold Mining*.
- Cyr, J. (2019). An integrative approach to measurement: focus groups as a survey pretest. *Quality & Quantity*, 53(2), 897–913. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-018-0795-5>
- De Waal, A. (2018). Public Authority: The Political Marketplace: Analyzing Political Entrepreneurs and Political Bargaining with a Business Lens. *Africa at LSE*.
- de Waal, A., & Ibreck, R. (2013). Hybrid social movements in Africa. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 31(2), 303–324. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2013.781320>
- Di John, J., & Putzel, J. (2009). *Political settlements: Issues paper*.
- Diamond, L. (1987). Class formation in the swollen African state. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 24(4), 567–596.
- Dickovick, J. T. (2008). Legacies of Leftism: ideology, ethnicity and democracy in Benin, Ghana and Mali. *Third World Quarterly*, 29(6), 1119–1137. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802201089>
- Domjan, P., & Stone, M. (2010). A Comparative Study of Resource Nationalism in Russia and Kazakhstan 2004–2008. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 62(1), 35–62. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130903385374>
- Dondeyne, S., & Ndunguru, E. (2014). Artisanal gold mining and rural development policies in Mozambique: Perspectives for the future. *Futures*, 62, 120–127. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2014.03.001>
- Downs, Anthony. (1972). Up and down with ecology: The issue-attention cycle. *The Public*, 462–473.
- Downs, Athony. (1957). An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. *Journal of Political Geography*, 65(2).
- Due, J. M. (1993). Liberalization and privatization in Tanzania and Zambia. *World Development*, 21(12), 1981–1988. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X\(93\)90070-P](https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(93)90070-P)
- Dumont, R. (1957). *Types of rural economy: Studies in world agriculture*. Methuen and Co. Ltd.
- Dunning, T. (2008). Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. John Gerring (Cambridge University Press, 2007). *The Journal of Politics*, 70(1), 282–283.
- Duodu, C. (2015). *Ghana: The murky world of galamsey*. NewAfrican.

- Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (1997). Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4), 1203–1250. <https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300555466>
- Editor. (1995). *Dismissal of Mrema Transforms Political Scene*. Tanzanian Affairs. <https://www.tzaffairs.org/1995/05/dismissal-of-mrema-transforms-political-scene/>
- Ejdemyr, S., Kramon, E., & Robinson, A. L. (2018). Segregation, Ethnic Favoritism, and the Strategic Targeting of Local Public Goods. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(9), 1111–1143. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017730079>
- Elbra, A. (2016). *Governing African gold mining: Private governance and the resource curse*. Springer.
- Elischer, S. (2012). Measuring and comparing party ideology in nonindustrialized societies: taking party manifesto research to Africa. *Democratization*, 19(4), 642–667. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.605997>
- Elischer, S. (2013). *Political parties in Africa: Ethnicity and party formation*. Cambridge University Press.
- Ellis, S., & Kessel, I. van. (2009). Introduction: African social movements or social movements in Africa? In S. Ellis & I. van Kessel (Eds.), *Movers and Shakers* (p. 266). Brill.
- Emel, J., Huber, M. T., & Makene, M. H. (2011). Extracting sovereignty: Capital, territory, and gold mining in Tanzania. *Political Geography*, 30(2), 70–79. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2010.12.007>
- Emery, A. (2014). *Informal Miners block roads in Peru on fifth day of protests*. Bnamericas.
- Ephson, B. (1985). The Price of Health. *West Africa*.
- Epstein, E. J. (1982). *The diamond invention*. Hutchinson.
- Erdmann, G. (1999). Political Parties in Africa. Towards a New Beginning in Political Party Research. *Africa Spectrum*, 34(3), 19.
- Erdmann, G. (2004). Party research: Western European bias and the 'African labyrinth.' *Democratization*, 11(3), 63–87. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1351034042000238176>
- Eshun, P. A. (2005). Sustainable small-scale gold mining in Ghana: setting and strategies for sustainability. *Geological Society, London, Special Publications*, 250(1), 61–72. <https://doi.org/10.1144/GSL.SP.2005.250.01.07>
- Esping-Andersen, G. (2017). *Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power*. Princeton University Press.
- Evans, P. B. (2012). 1. States and Industrial Transformation. In *Embedded Autonomy* (pp. 1–20). Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400821723-004>
- Eyerman, R., & Jamison, A. (1991). *Social movements. A cognitive approach*. Penn State Press.
- Fatton, R. (1995). Africa in the Age of Democratization: The Civic Limitations of Civil Society. *African Studies Review*, 38(2), 67. <https://doi.org/10.2307/525318>
- Fearon, J. D. (2006). Ethnic mobilization and ethnic violence. *The Oxford Handbook of Political*

- Economy*, 852–868.
- Feige, E. (1990). Defining and Estimating Underground and Informal Economies: The New Institutional Economics Approach. *World Development*, 18(7), 989–1002. chrome-extension://efaidnbmninnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%3A%2F%2Fd1wqxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net%2F39539796%2FDEFINING_AND_ESTIMATING_UNDERGROUND_AND_INFORMAL_ECONOMIES-with-cover-page-v2.pdf%3FExpires%3D1631789650%26Signature%3DUUHczJ6F
- Fernández, R., & Levy, G. (2008). Diversity and redistribution. *Journal of Public Economics*, 92(5–6), 925–943. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.012>
- FIAN. (2008). *Universal Periodic Review - Ghana (May 2008). Human Rights violations in the context of large-scale mining operations. Submission by FIAN International.*
- Fisher, E. (2007). Occupying the Margins: Labour Integration and Social Exclusion in Artisanal Mining in Tanzania. *Development and Change*, 38(4), 735–760. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00431.x>
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five misunderstandings about case-study research. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 12(2), 219–245.
- Forson, F. K. (2017). *Ghana Launches Free High School Education*. VOA. <https://www.voanews.com/a/ghana-launches-free-high-school-education-nationwide/4030588.html>
- Fortes, M. (1971). Some aspects of migration and mobility in Ghana. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 6(1), 1.
- Fossum, J. E. (1997). *Oil, the State, and Federalism. The Rise and Demise of Petro-Canada as a Statist Impulse* (Vol. 2). University of Toronto Press. <https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.3138/9781442678019/html>
- Frempong, A. K. D. (2001). Ghana's election 2000: The ethnic undercurrent. In *Deepening Democracy in Ghana: Politics of the 2000 Elections*. (p. 202). Freedom Publications: Oxford.
- Frimpong-Boateng, K. (2021). *[Full text] Prof. Frimpong Boateng report on work of IMCIM and the way forward*. Modern Ghana.
- Frimpong, N. A. (2019). *Political Economy of Ghanaian Media: Conceptualizing News Media's Role Through the Media Coalition Against Galamsey*. Michigan Technological University.
- Gamu, J., Le Billon, P., & Spiegel, S. (2015). Extractive industries and poverty: A review of recent findings and linkage mechanisms. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 2(1), 162–176. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2014.11.001>
- GCM. (n.d.). *Chamber of Mines Supports Media Coalition against Illegal Mining*. The Ghana Chamber of Mines.
- GCM. (2011). *Performance of the Mining Industry in 2011*.
- GCM. (2012). *Performance of the Mining Industry in 2012*.

- GCM. (2021). *2020 Mining Industry Statistics and Data*.
- George, A. L., & Bennet, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social science*. MIT press.
- George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. MIT press.
- Gerring, J. (2006). *Case Study Research. Principles and Practices*. Cambridge University Press.
- Gerry, C. (1978). Petty production and capitalist production in Dakar. *World Development*, 6(9–10), 1147–1160.
- GhanaWeb. (2014). *Mining firms blackmail Ghana over windfall tax - Mahama*. GhanaWeb. <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Mining-firms-blackmail-Ghana-over-windfall-tax-Mahama-298565>
- GhanaWeb. (2017). *REVEALED: Gov't to pay Wontumi US\$1bn judgement debt*. GhanaWeb. <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/REVEALED-Gov-t-to-pay-Wontumi-US-1bn-judgement-debt-499724>
- GhanaWeb. (2019). *FLASHBACK: Jailing Aisha Huang in Ghana wasn't important; won't give us cash - Osafo Maafo*. Ghanaweb. <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/FLASHBACK-Jailing-Aisha-Huang-in-Ghana-wasn-t-important-won-t-give-us-cash-Osafo-Maafo-782723>
- Giraut, F., & Vacchiani-Marcuzzo, C. (2013). Part III. The spatial and territorial dimensions of urbanisation. In *Territories and urbanisation in South Africa: Atlas and geo-historical information system (DYSTURB)*. (IRD Editio).
- GNA. (2017a). *Goil and others support Media Coalition Against Galamsey*. Ghanaweb. <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Goil-and-others-support-Media-Coalition-Against-Galamsey-569729>
- GNA. (2017b). *Media coalition against galamsey launched*. Citifmonline.Com. <https://citifmonline.com/2017/04/media-coalition-against-galamsey-launched/>
- Golooba-Mutebi, F., & Hickey, S. (2013). *Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda: Towards a Research Agenda*. (No. 20).
- Gonzalez, D. J. . (2016). *Opportunities, Not Oppression, to Stop Illegal Mining in the Peruvian Amazon*. YaleGlobal Online Magazine.
- Gould, W. (1997). Regional Surveys of the World. Africa South of the Sahara. *The Geographical Journal*, 163(226).
- Green, E. (2010). Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 45(1), 83–103. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-009-9058-8>
- Green, E. D. (2006). Ethnicity and the Politics of Land Tenure Reform in Central Uganda. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 44(3), 370–388. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662040600997148>

- Green, T. (1987). *The Prospect for Gold: The view to the Year*.
- Griffis, R. ., Barning, K., Agezo, F. ., & Akosah, F. . (2002). *Gold deposits of Ghana*.
- Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1990). Economic recovery and politics in the PNDC's Ghana. *The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 28(3), 328–343.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14662049008447595>
- Haggard, S., & Maxfield, S. (1996). The political economy of financial internationalization in the developing world. *International Organization*, 50(1), 35–68.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300001661>
- Haggard, S., Maxfield, S., & Schneider, B. R. (2019). 2. Theories of Business and Business-State Relations. In *Business and the State in Developing Countries* (pp. 36–60). Cornell University Press. <https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501731976-004>
- Hart, K. (1973). Informal income opportunities and urban employment in Ghana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 11(1), 61–89.
- Hart, K. (1982). *The political economy of West African agriculture*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hart, K. (1990). The idea of economy: six modern dissenters. In A. F. Robertson & R. O. Friedland (Eds.), *Beyond the Marketplace. rethinking economy and society* (pp. 137–160). Aldine de Gruyter.
- Hartshorn, J. E. (1993). *Oil Trade: Politics and Prospects*. Cambridge University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2007). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford University Press.
- Haslam, P. A., & Heidrich, P. (2016). From neoliberalism to resource nationalism: states, firms and development. In P. A. Haslam & P. Heidrich (Eds.), *The Political Economy of Natural Resources and Development* (1st ed., p. 32). Routledge.
- Hatcher, P. (2016). The politics of artisanal and small-scale mining in Mongolia. *Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal*, 1(2), 184–201. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2016.1231592>
- Hawley, A. H. (1971). *Urban Society: An Ecological Approach*. Ronald.
- Hay, J. L. (2009). Challenges to liberalism: The case of Australian energy policy. *Resources Policy*, 34(3), 142–149. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2008.05.001>
- Heilman, B., & Ndumbaro, L. (2002). Corruption, Politics and Societal values in Tanzania: An evaluation of the Mkapa administration's anti corruption efforts. *African Journal of Political Science*, 7(1), 1–20.
- Herbst, J. (1990). The structural adjustment of politics in Africa. *World Development*, 18(7), 949–958.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X\(90\)90078-C](https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(90)90078-C)
- Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. *American Political Science Review*, 71(4), 1467–1487. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400269712>
- Hilson, G. (2002a). Harvesting mineral riches: 1000 years of gold mining in Ghana. *Resources Policy*, 28(1–2), 13–26. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0301-4207\(03\)00002-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0301-4207(03)00002-3)
- Hilson, G. (2002b). Land use competition between small- and large-scale miners: a case study of

- Ghana. *Land Use Policy*, 19(2), 149–156. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0264-8377\(02\)00003-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0264-8377(02)00003-0)
- Hilson, G. (2011). Artisanal mining, smallholder farming and livelihood diversification in rural Sub-Saharan Africa: An introduction. *Journal of International Development*, 23(8), 1031–1041. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1829>
- Hilson, G. (2017). Shootings and burning excavators: Some rapid reflections on the Government of Ghana’s handling of the informal Galamsey mining ‘menace.’ *Resources Policy*, 54, 109–116. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2017.09.009>
- Hilson, G. (2019). Why is there a large-scale mining ‘bias’ in sub-Saharan Africa? *Land Use Policy*, 81, 852–861. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.02.013>
- Hilson, G. (2020). The ‘Zambia Model’: A blueprint for formalizing artisanal and small-scale mining in sub-Saharan Africa? *Resources Policy*, 68, 101765. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2020.101765>
- Hilson, G., & Garforth, C. (2013). ‘Everyone Now is Concentrating on the Mining’: Drivers and Implications of Rural Economic Transition in the Eastern Region of Ghana. *Journal of Development Studies*, 49(3), 348–364. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2012.713469>
- Hilson, G., Hilson, A., & Adu-Darko, E. (2014). Chinese participation in Ghana’s informal gold mining economy: Drivers, implications and clarifications. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 34, 292–303. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2014.03.001>
- Hilson, G., Hilson, C. J., & Pardie, S. (2007). Improving awareness of mercury pollution in small-scale gold mining communities: Challenges and ways forward in rural Ghana. *Environmental Research*, 103(2), 275–287. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2006.09.010>
- Hilson, G., & Maconachie, R. (2020). For the Environment: An Assessment of Recent Military Intervention in Informal Gold Mining Communities in Ghana. *Land Use Policy*, 96(May), 104706. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.104706>
- Hilson, G., & McQuilken, J. (2014). Four decades of support for artisanal and small-scale mining in sub-Saharan Africa: A critical review. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 1(1), 104–118. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2014.01.002>
- Hilson, G., & Potter, C. (2003). Why Is Illegal Gold Mining Activity so Ubiquitous in Rural Ghana? *African Development Review*, 15(2–3), 237–270. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8268.2003.00073.x>
- Hilson, G., & Potter, C. (2005). Structural Adjustment and Subsistence Industry: Artisanal Gold Mining in Ghana. *Development and Change*, 36(1), 103–131. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0012-155X.2005.00404.x>
- Hilson, G., Sauerwein, T., & Owen, J. (2020). Large and artisanal scale mine development: The case for autonomous co-existence. *World Development*, 130, 104919. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104919>
- Hilson, G., & Yakovleva, N. (2007). Strained relations: A critical analysis of the mining conflict in

- Prestea, Ghana. *Political Geography*, 26(1), 98–119.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.09.001>
- Hirsch, A. (2013). *Ghana deports thousands in crackdown on illegal Chinese goldminers*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/15/ghana-deports-chinese-goldminers>
- Hirschman, A. O. (1978). Exit, Voice, and the State. *World Politics*, 31(1), 90–107.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2009968>
- Hodgkin, T. (1961). *African Political Parties. An Introductory Guide*. Penguin Books.
- Holland, A. C. (2016). Forbearance. *American Political Science Review*, 110(2), 232–246.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000083>
- Horowitz, D. L. (2000). *Ethnic groups in conflict, updated Edition with a new preface*. University of California Press.
- Hsieh, H.-F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. *Qualitative Health Research*, 15(9), 1277–1288. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732305276687>
- Hutchful, E. (2002). *Ghana's adjustment experience: The paradox of reform*.
- Hymer, S. H. (1970). Economic Forms in Pre-Colonial Ghana. *The Journal of Economic History*, 30(1), 33–50.
- Ikelegbe, A. (2001). The perverse manifestation of civil society: evidence from Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39(1), 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X0100355X>
- Illife, J., & Illife, A. (1969). *Tanganyika under German rule*. Cambridge University Press.
- ILO. (1972). *Employment, Income and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya*.
- Ireson, C. J., & Ireson, W. R. (1991). Ethnicity and Development in Laos. *Asian Survey*, 31(10), 920–937. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645064>
- ISDS. (2016). *AngloGold suit against gov't unnecessary - Ayikoi Otoo*. ISDS PLATFORM.
<https://www.isds.bilaterals.org/?anglogold-suit-against-gov-t>
- Jackson, K. (2013). Diversity and the Distribution of Public Goods in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of African Economies*, 22(3), 437–462. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jae/ejt002>
- Jackson, R. (1992). New mines for old gold: Ghana's changing mining industry. *Geography*, 77(2), 175–178.
- Jacob. (2008). *Report on Richmond scandal*. Tanzanian Affairs.
- Jacob, T., & Pedersen, R. H. (2018). New resource nationalism? Continuity and change in Tanzania's extractive industries. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 5(2), 287–292.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2018.02.001>
- Jamasmie, C. (2016). *Illegal miners refuse to leave AngloGold's Obuasi Operation*. MINING[DOT]COM. <https://www.mining.com/illegal-miners-refuse-to-leave-anglogolds-obuasi-operation/>
- Jennings, N. (1999). *Social and labour issues in small-scale mines: report for discussion at the*

- tripartite meeting on social and labour issues in small-scale mines, Geneva, 1999. International Labour Organization.*
- JoyNewsPrime. (2021). *Fight against illegal mining: Small Scale Miners Association alleges military burnt equipment belonging to members.*
- JoyOnline. (2016). *Illegal mining: Chamber of Mines wants gov't intervention.* Myjoyonline.
- Kamata, N. (2012). The Economic Diplomacy of Tanzania: Accumulation by Dispossession in a Peripheral State. *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy: A Triannual Journal of Agrarian South Network and CARES*, 1(3), 291–313.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/227797601200100303>
- Karl, T. L. (2007). Oil-led development: social, political, and economic consequences. *Encyclopedia of Energy*, 4(8), 661–672.
- Kasarda, J. D., & Crenshaw, E. M. (1991). Third World Urbanization: Dimensions, Theories, and Determinants. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 17(1), 467–501.
<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.17.080191.002343>
- Katsaura, O. (2010). Violence and the political economy of informal diamond mining in Chiadzwa, Zimbabwe. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 12(6), 340–353.
- Kelsall, T. (2003). Governance, democracy and recent political struggles in Mainland Tanzania. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 41(2), 55–82.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14662040412331310101>
- Kelsall, T. (2018). *Thinking and working with political settlements. The case of Tanzania* (No. 541).
<https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/12520.pdf>
- Kelsall, T., Hart, T., & Laws, E. (2016). *Political settlements and pathways to universal health coverage.* (No. 432). chrome-extension://efaidnbmninnibpcjpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%3A%2F%2Fcdn.odi.org%2Fmedia%2Fdocuments%2F10382.pdf&clen=483021&chunk=true
- Kemp, D., & Owen, J. R. (2019). Characterising the interface between large and small-scale mining. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 6(4), 1091–1100.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2019.07.002>
- Kesse, G. . (1985). *The mineral and rock resources of Ghana.* OSTI.GOV.
- Khan, M. (2010). *Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions.*
https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968/1/Political_Settlements_internet.pdf
- Khan, M. (2017). *Anti-Corruption in Bangladesh: A political settlements analysis* (No. 003).
- Khan, M. H. (2018). Political settlements and the analysis of institutions. *African Affairs*, 117(469), 636–655. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adx044>
- Kimenyi, M. S. (2006). Ethnicity, Governance and the Provision of Public Goods. *Journal of African Economies*, 15(Supplement 1), 62–99. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jae/ejk006>
- Kinyondo, A., & Huggins, C. (2019). Resource nationalism in Tanzania: Implications for artisanal

- and small-scale mining. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 6(1), 181–189.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2018.08.005>
- Kipole, E. (2010). *The relevance of bilateral investment treaties in Africa. A case of Tanzania*. University of Dar es Salaam.
- Kireey, A. (n.d.). *Tanzania. Presidential Election 2005*. Electoral Geography 2.0. Retrieved February 17, 2021, from <https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/t/tanzania/tanzania-presidential-election-2005.html>
- Kirschen, E. S. (1964). *Economic policy in our time*. North-Holland.
- Klapp, M. G. (1987). *The Sovereign Entrepreneur. Oil Policies in Advanced and Less Developed Capitalist Countries*. Cornell University Press.
- Kraus, J. (1991). The Political Economy of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment in Ghana. In D. Rothchild (Ed.), *Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner.
- Krueger, R. (1988). *Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research*. SAGE Publications.
- Kwawukume, V. (2017). *I will put my Presidency on line ot stop galamsey - President*. Graphic Online. <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/i-will-put-my-presidency-on-line-to-stop-galamsey-president.html>
- Lange, S. (2006). *Benefit stream from mining in Tanzania: Case studies from Geita and Mererani*. Chr. Michelsen Institute.
- Lartey, N. L. (2018a). *Ghanaians struggle to acquire Tax Identification Numbers*. Citi Newsroom. <https://citinewsroom.com/2018/11/ghanaians-struggle-to-acquire-tax-identification-numbers/>
- Lartey, N. L. (2018b). *Small-scale miners call for transparency in vetting process*. Citi Newsroom.
- Lavers, T. (2018). *Taking Ideas Seriously within Political Settlements Analysis* (No. 95).
- Lawson, K. (1980). *Political Parties and Linkage. A Comparative Perspective*. Yale University Press.
- LeBas, A. (2006). Polarization as Craft: Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe. *Comparative Politics*, 38(4), 419. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20434010>
- Ledwaba, P. F. (2017). The status of artisanal and small-scale mining sector in South Africa: tracking progress. *Journal of the Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy*, 117(1), 33–40. <https://doi.org/10.17159/2411-9717/2017/v117n1a6>
- Lemelle, S. J. (1986). *Capital, state and labor: a history of hte gold mining industry in colonial Tanganyika, 1890-1942*. [University of California, Los Angeles]. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/303455934?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true>
- Levy, J. S. (2008). Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 25(1), 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940701860318>
- Li, Q., Owen, E., & Mitchell, A. (2018). Why Do Democracies Attract More or Less Foreign Direct Investment? A Metaregression Analysis. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(3), 494–504. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy014>
- Lindberg, S. I., & Morrison, M. K. C. (2008). Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic?

- Survey Evidence from Ghana. *Political Science Quarterly*, 123(1), 28.
- Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: an introduction. In S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (Eds.), *Party Systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives*. (pp. 1–64). The Free press.
- Lissu, T. A. (2002). *In gold we trust: The political economy of law, human rights and the environment in Tanzania's mining industry*.
- Lomnitz, L. A. (1988). Informal Exchange Networks in Formal Systems: A Theoretical Model. *American Anthropologist*, 90(1), 42–55. <https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.1988.90.1.02a00030>
- Lund, C. (2014). Of What is This a Case?: Analytical Movements in Qualitative Social Science Research. *Human Organization*, 73(3), 224–234. <https://doi.org/10.17730/humo.73.3.e35q482014x03314>
- Luning, S. (2014). The future of artisanal miners from a large-scale perspective: From valued pathfinders to disposable illegals? *Futures*, 62, 67–74. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2014.01.014>
- Luo, Y. (2001). Toward a Cooperative View of MNC-Host Government Relations: Building Blocks and Performance Implications. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 32(3), 401–419. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490974>
- Lydersen, K., & Cardona-Maguigad, A. (2015). *Survival, Profit, and War: The Many Faces of Gold Mining in Colombia (Pt.1)*. Nacla Reporting on the Americas. <https://nacla.org/news/2015/11/09/survival-profit-and-war-many-faces-gold-mining-colombia>
- Maccatory, B., Oumarou, M. B., & Poncelet, M. (2010). West African social movements ‘against the high cost of living’: from the economic to the political, from the global to the national. *Review of African Political Economy*, 37(125), 345–359. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2010.510631>
- Malterud, K. (2001). Qualitative research: standards, challenges, and guidelines. *The Lancet*, 358(9280), 483–488. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(01\)05627-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(01)05627-6)
- Malterud, K., & Hollnagel, H. (1999). Encouraging the strengths of women patients. *Scandinavian Journal of Public Health*, 27(4), 254–259. <https://doi.org/10.1177/14034948990270040901>
- Mann, M. (1984). The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results. *European Journal of Sociology*, 25(2), 185–213. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975600004239>
- Manning, C. (2005). Assessing African Party Systems after the Third Wave. *Party Politics*, 11(6), 707–727. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068805057606>
- Maponga, O., & Ngorima, C. F. (2003). Overcoming environmental problems in the gold panning sector through legislation and education: the Zimbabwean experience. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 11(2), 147–157. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0959-6526\(02\)00034-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0959-6526(02)00034-3)
- Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (2014). *Designing Qualitative Research*. SAGE Publications.
- Matthews, R., & Ross, E. (2010). *Research methods: A practical guide for the social sciences*. Pearson Education Ltd.

- Mawowa, S. (2013). The Political Economy of Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining in Central Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39(4), 921–936.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2013.858540>
- Maxwell, J. (1928). *The Gold Coast Handbook, 1928*. (J. Maxwell (ed.)). Government of the Gold Coast.
- McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1988). Social movements. In N. J. Smelser (Ed.), *Handbook of Sociology*. SAGE Publications.
- McCain, J. A. (1975). Ideology in Africa: Some Perceptual Types. *African Studies Review*, 18(1), 61.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/523710>
- Meagher, K. (2014). Smuggling ideologies: From criminalization to hybrid governance in African clandestine economies. *African Affairs*, 113(453), 497–517. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adu057>
- Mertig, A. G., & Dunlap, R. E. (2009). Environmentalism, New Social Movements, and the New Class: A Cross-National Investigation*. *Rural Sociology*, 66(1), 113–136.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1549-0831.2001.tb00057.x>
- Merton, R. K. (1987). The Focussed Interview and Focus Groups: Continuities and Discontinuities. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 51(4), 550–566.
- Mikell, G. (1989). Peasant Politicisation and Economic Recuperation in Ghana: Local and National Dilemmas. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27(3), 455–478.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00020383>
- Miles, M. B., & Huberman, M. A. (1994). *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook*. (Second Edi). Sage Publications.
- Minerals Commission. (2015). *Artisanal & Small-scale Mining (ASM) Framework*.
- Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources. (2017). *Project Appraisal and Implementation Document (PAID), Multi-Sectoral Mining Integrated Project (MMIP)*.
- Mkapa, B. W. (2010). Leadership for growth, development, and poverty reduction: An African viewpoint and experience. In D. Brady & M. Spence (Eds.), *Leadership and growth* (p. 61). World Bank Publications.
- Mohammed Banchirigah, S. (2006). How have reforms fuelled the expansion of artisanal mining? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa. *Resources Policy*, 31(3), 165–171.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2006.12.001>
- Mohan, G., & Lampert, B. (2013). Negotiating china: Reinserting african agency into China-Africa relations. *African Affairs*, 112(446), 92–110. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ads065>
- Mosley, P., Harrigan, J., & Toye, J. F. (1995). *Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-based Lending*. Routledge.
- Mumbere, D. (2018). *Tanzania's Magufuli explains why he skipped U.N. General Assembly*. Africanews. <https://www.africanews.com/2018/10/04/tanzania-s-magufuli-explains-why-he-skipped-un-general-assembly//>

- Munk, R. (2004). Neoliberalism and Politics, and the Politics of Neoliberalism. In A. Saad Filho & D. Johnston (Eds.), *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader* (pp. 60–69). Pluto Press.
- Musisi, F. (2021). *New dawn as government, miners reach deal over Mubende gold fields*. Monitor. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/new-dawn-as-government-miners-reach-deal-over-mubende-gold-fields-1790856>
- Nabila, J. S. (1972). Rural depopulation in Northern Ghana with special reference to the migration of the Frafra people. *Proceedings of the West African Regional Seminar on Population Studies*.
- National Development Planning Commission. (2003). *Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005: An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity*. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%3A%2F%2Fplanipolis.iiep.unesco.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fressources%2Fghana_prsp_2003_vol_1.pdf&cflen=1639658&chunk=true
- National Development Planning Commission. (2005). *Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) (2006-2009)*.
- NDC. (1992). *Constitution of the National Democratic Congress (NDC)* (p. 73). chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://ndcgh.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/NDC-Constitution-mini.pdf
- NDC. (2008). *Manifesto for a Better Ghana. Overview* (p. 8). [https://codeoghana.org/assets/downloadables/NDC MANIFESTO 2008.pdf](https://codeoghana.org/assets/downloadables/NDC%20MANIFESTO%202008.pdf)
- NDC. (2012). *2012 Manifesto. Advancing the Better Ghana Agenda. Jobs. Stability. Development* (p. 56). chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.codeoghana.org/assets/downloadables/NDC-2012-Manifesto.pdf
- Nellis, J. R. (1986). *Public enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa*. (No. 1; p. 68). World Bank.
- Noetstaller, R. (1987). Small-scale Mining. *World Bank Technical Paper*, 23(75), 1–100.
- North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5(1), 97–112. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.1.97>
- Novicki, M. A. (1988). Interview with President Ali Hassan Mwinyi. *Africa Report*, 33(1), 3.
- NPP. (1996). *The Manifesto: Development in Freedom. An Agenda for Change*. <https://www.scribd.com/document/93809268/Npp-Manifesto-2004>
- NPP. (2016). *Change: An Agenda for Jobs; Creating Prosperity & Equal Opportunity for All*.
- Nunoo, C. (2020). *Obuasi Mine bounces back as AngloGold Ashanti pours first gold*. Graphic Online. <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/obuasi-mine-bounces-back-anglogold-ashanti-pours-first-gold.html>
- Nyaluke, D., & Connolly, E. (2013). The role of political ideas in multi-party elections in Tanzania: Refuting essentialist explanations of African political systems. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 24, 41–57.

- O’Faircheallaigh, C., & Corbett, T. (2016). Understanding and improving policy and regulatory responses to artisanal and small scale mining. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 3(4), 961–971. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2016.11.002>
- Okoh, G. A. (2014). Grievance and conflict in Ghana’s gold mining industry: The case of Obuasi. *Futures*, 62, 51–57. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2013.09.007>
- Okoh, G., & Hilson, G. (2011). Poverty and livelihood diversification: Exploring the linkages between smallholder farming and artisanal mining in rural Ghana. *Journal of International Development*, 23(8), 1100–1114. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1834>
- Olson, M. (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard University Press.
- Olson, M. (2012). The logic of collection action [1965]. *Contemporary Sociological Theory*, 124.
- OneLife Ghana Investrips. (2020). *Pres. Of Small Scale Miners “attack” Chairman Wontumi & NPP Again...Listen To Why*. <https://www.facebook.com/investrips/videos/738019090398111>
- OpenAFRICA. (2018). *Tanzania Election Result 2015*. Code for Africa. <https://africaopendata.org/dataset/tanzania-election-result-2015>
- Osei-Assibey, E. (2015). *Export Promotion in Ghana*.
- Osei, A. (2012). *Party-voter linkage in Africa: Ghana and Senegal in comparative perspective*. Springer VS.
- Osei, A. (2013). Party System Institutionalization in Ghana and Senegal. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 48(5), 577–593. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909612465720>
- Owusu-Abedi, J. (2019). *Shaanxi Mining Fined \$50,000 But No Compensation For The Decased*. Modern Ghana.
- Oxford Business Group. (n.d.). *Ghana lifts ban on small-scale mining*. Oxford Business Group. Retrieved May 5, 2021, from <https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/healthier-environment-after-lifting-ban-small-scale-mining-authorities-are-set-reform-and-regulate>
- Paget, D. (2019). The authoritarian origins of well-organized opposition parties: The rise of Chadema in Tanzania. *African Affairs*, 118(473), 692–711. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady061>
- Paget, D. (2020). Again, making Tanzania great: Magufuli’s restorationist developmental nationalism. *Democratization*, 27(7), 1240–1260. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1779223>
- Paget, D. (2021). Mistaken for populism: Magufuli, ambiguity and elitist plebeianism in Tanzania. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 26(2), 121–141. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2020.1796345>
- Park, T. G. (2012). The Roles of the United States and Japan in the Development of South Korea’s Science and Technology during the Cold War. *Korea Journal*, 52(1), 206–231.
- Park, Y. J., Huynh, T. T., & Lumumba-Kasongo, T. (2010). China in Africa. *African and Asian Studies*, 9(3), 201–391.
- Patton, M. Q. (1990). *Qualitative evaluation and research methods*. Sage Publications, inc.

- Pepinsky, H. E. (1992). Corruption, bribery and patriarchy in Tanzania. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 17(1), 25–51.
- Petetsi, J. Y. (2020). *Ghana: Produce 500 Missing Excavators - Minority to Govt*. AllAfrica. <https://allafrica.com/stories/202010090236.html>
- Plange, N.-K. (1979). ‘Opportunity Cost’ and Labour Migration: a Misinterpretation of Proletarianisation in Northern Ghana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 17(4), 655–676. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00007497>
- Plange, N. (1979). Underdevelopment in Northern Ghana: natural causes or colonial capitalism? *Review of African Political Economy*, 6(15–16), 4–14. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056247908703393>
- Poku, N. O. (2016). *Effects of illegal small scale mining on crop production in Amansei Central, Ghana* [Mendel University in Brno]. <https://theses.cz/id/e3gmlc/18327160>
- Polanyi, K. (1957). *The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Beacon Press, Boston.
- Poncian, J. (2019). Galvanising political support through resource nationalism: A case of Tanzania’s 2017 extractive sector reforms. *Political Geography*, 69, 77–88. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.12.013>
- Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.
- PREALC. (1985). *Mas Alla de la Crisis*.
- Przeworski, A. (1980). Social democracy as a historical phenomenon. *New Left Review*, 122(8).
- Quashie, L. A. K., Pentsil, B. K., Kesse, G. O., & Thompson, P. T. A. (1981). *Report of the Committee for Increased Gold Output presented to teh Minister of Lands and Natural Resources; Executive Summary and Basic Report*.
- Randall, V. (2001). Party systems and voter alignments in the new democracies of the Third World. In L. Karvonen & S. Kuhnle (Eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited* (1st ed.). Routledge.
- Randall, V. (2007). Political parties in Africa and the representation of social groups. In *Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*. (pp. 82–104). Nordic Africa Institute.
- Randall, V., & Svåsand, L. (2002). Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Africa. *Democratization*, 9(3), 30–52. <https://doi.org/10.1080/714000266>
- Reno, W. (2000). Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa. *Journal of International Affairs*, 53(2), 433–459. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357760>
- Republic of Ghana. (1962). *Minerals Act, 1962*. <http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/gha40883.pdf>
- Republic of Ghana. (1986). *Minerals and Mining Law, 1986*. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnribpcajpcglclefindmkaj/<https://asgmrsearch.weebly.com/uploads/3/0/1/6/30160743/ghana1986.pdf>

- Republic of Ghana. (2006). *Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703)*.
- Republic of Ghana. (2007). *Amendment to the mining lease dated 5 March 1994 between the government of the Republic of Ghana and Ashanti Goldfields Company Limited*.
- Republic of Ghana. (2013). *The budget statement and economic policy of the Government of Ghana for the 2014 financial year presented to parliament on Tuesday, 19th November 2013 by Seth e. Terkper, Minister for Finance on the Authority of H.E. President John D. Mahama*.
- Republic of Ghana. (2014). *Minerals and Mining Policy of Ghana*. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=http%3A%2F%2Fextwprleg.s1.fao.org%2Fdocs%2Fpdf%2Fgha194056.pdf&clen=583773&chunk=true
- Republic of Ghana. (2015). *Minerals and Mining (Amendment) Act, 2015 [Act 900]*. Government Printer, Assembly Press. <http://mlnr.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Minerals-Mining-Amendment-Act-2015-ACT-900-1.pdf>
- Riessman, C. K. (1993). *Narrative analysis*. Sage Publications.
- Roberts, A. D. (1986). The Gold Boom of the 1930s in Eastern Africa. *African Affairs*, 85(341), 545–562.
- Rochlin, J. (2018). Informal gold miners, security and development in Colombia: Charting the way forward. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 5(3), 330–339. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2018.03.008>
- Rodrik, D. (2008). *One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth*. Princeton University Press.
- Rondinelli, D. A., Nellis, J. R., & Cheema, S. G. (1983). *Decentralization in developing countries* (No. 581).
- Ross, M. L. (1999). The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. *World Politics*, 51(2), 297–322. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100008200>
- Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). The curse of natural resources. *European Economic Review*, 45(4–6), 827–838. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921\(01\)00125-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00125-8)
- Salih, M. M. (2003). *African political parties: Evolution, institutionalisation and governance*. Pluto Press.
- Sartori, G. (2005). *Parties and Party Systems*. ECPR Press.
- Scully, B., & Britwum, A. O. (2019). Labour reserves and surplus populations: Northern Ghana and the Eastern Cape of South Africa. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 19(3), 407–426. <https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12309>
- Segbefia, L. (2017). *Govt to revive AngloGold Obuasi Mines - Pres. Akufo-Addo*. Citifmonline.Com. <https://citifmonline.com/2017/02/govt-to-revive-anglogold-obuasi-mines-pres-akufo-addo/>
- Sethuraman, S. V. (1981). *The Urban Informal Sector in Developing Countries*.
- Short, R. P. (1984). The Role of Public Enterprises: An International Statistical Comparison. In *Public Enterprise in Mixed Economies* (p. 219). International Monetary Fund.

- <https://doi.org/10.5089/9780939934300.071>
- Siegel, S., & Veiga, M. M. (2009). Artisanal and small-scale mining as an extralegal economy: De Soto and the redefinition of “formalization.” *Resources Policy*, 34(1–2), 51–56.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2008.02.001>
- Siwale, A., & Siwale, T. (2017). Has the promise of formalizing artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) failed? The case of Zambia. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 4(1), 191–201.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2016.12.008>
- Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. *American Sociological Review*, 51(4), 464.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2095581>
- Spiegel, S. (2016). Land and ‘space’ for regulating artisanal mining in Cambodia: Visualizing an environmental governance conundrum in contested territory. *Land Use Policy*, 54, 559–573.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.03.015>
- Starfmonline.com. (2016). *NPP will regularize “galamsey” - Akufo-Addo*. Ghanaweb.
<https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NPP-will-regularize-galamsey-Akufo-Addo-455652>
- Stevens, P. (2008). National oil companies and international oil companies in the Middle East: Under the shadow of government and the resource nationalism cycle. *The Journal of World Energy Law & Business*, 1(1), 5–30. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jwelb/jwn004>
- Stigler, G. J. (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. *The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science*, 2(1), 3. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3003160>
- Sturges, J. E., & Hanrahan, K. J. (2004). Comparing Telephone and Face-to-Face Qualitative Interviewing: a Research Note. *Qualitative Research*, 4(1), 107–118.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794104041110>
- Sullivan, G. M., & Sargeant, J. (2011). Qualities of Qualitative Research: Part I. *Journal of Graduate Medical Education*, 3(4), 449–452. <https://doi.org/10.4300/JGME-D-11-00221.1>
- Tabatabai, H. (1986). Economic stabilisation and structural adjustment in Ghana, 1983-1986. *Labour and Society*, 11(7), 395–414.
- Tabi, P. (2020). *Any Reasonable person from GALAMSEY AREA will VOTE for INCOMING...*
- TEMCO. (1997). *The 1995 General Elections in Tanzania: Report of the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee*.
- Teschner, B. (2013). How you start matters: A comparison of Gold Fields’ Tarkwa and Damang Mines and their divergent relationships with local small-scale miners in Ghana. *Resources Policy*, 38(3), 332–340. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2013.03.006>
- Teschner, B. A. (2012). Small-scale mining in Ghana: The government and the galamsey. *Resources Policy*, 37(3), 308–314. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2012.02.001>
- Tesha, A. (2000). Cooperation between small-scale and large-scale mining: Tanzania experience.

- Growth and Diversification in Mineral Economies: Regional Workshop for Mineral Economies in Africa*, 7–9.
- The Citizen. (2021a). *PCCB arrests trader in crackdown on sugar hoarding*.
- The Citizen. (2021b). *Sh7bn saved from ban on foreign trips*. The Citizen.
<https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/sh7bn-saved-from-ban-on-foreign-trips-2547250>
- The EastAfrican. (2017). *Magufuli orders seizure and reallocation of undeveloped farms*.
- The Mining Act, 1998, 206 (1998).
- The Mining Act, 1979, 55 (1979).
- The URT. (n.d.). *Embassies and Diplomatic Missions: Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Description*. The United Republic of Tanzania. Retrieved February 2, 2022, from
<https://www.tzembassy.go.tz/ambassadors/view/ali-hassan-mwinyi>
- The URT. (1997). *The Mineral Policy of Tanzania. Ministry of Minerals*.
- The URT. (2001). *Position Paper on the Legal Framework for the Development of the Mining Industry*. <http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/legalframeworkforthedevelopment.pdf>
- The URT. (2009). *The Mineral Policy of Tanzania*. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.tanzania.go.tz%2Fegov_uploads%2Fdocuments%2F0014_11032013_Mineral_Policy_of_Tanzania_2009_sw.pdf&clen=600783&chunk=true
- Thorsen, D. E., & Lie, A. (2006). What is neoliberalism. *Oslo, University of Oslo, Department of Political Science, Manuscript*, 1–21.
- Tilly, C. (1998). Social movements and (all sorts of) other political interactions-local, national, and international-including identities. *Theory and Society*, 27(4), 453–480.
- Tokman, V. E. (1979). An exploration into the nature of informal-formal sector relationships. In R. Bromley (Ed.), *The Urban Informal Sector: critical perspectives on employment and housing policies*. (pp. 1065–1075). Elsevier.
- Tschakert, P. (2016). Shifting Discourses of Vilification and the Taming of Unruly Mining Landscapes in Ghana. *World Development*, 86, 123–132.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.05.008>
- Tuckett, A. G. (2005). Applying thematic analysis theory to practice: A researcher's experience. *Contemporary Nurse*, 19(1–2), 75–87. <https://doi.org/10.5172/conu.19.1-2.75>
- Ulichny, P. (1991). The Role of Hypothesis Testing in Qualitative Research. A Researcher Comments. *TESOL Quarterly*, 25(1), 200. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3587052>
- UNECA. (2011). *Minerals and Africa's Development. The International Study Group Report on Africa's Mineral Regimes*. <https://hdl.handle.net/10855/21569>
- United Nations. (1996). *Recent Developments in Small-Scale Mining: A Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In Natural Resources Forum*.

- University of Dar es Salaam. (2019). *Alumni of the Month: President John Joseph Pombe Magufuli*. Directorate of Internationalization, Convocation & Advancement.
<https://www.udsm.ac.tz/web/index.php/directorates/dica/announcements/alumni-of-the-month-president-john-joseph-pombe-magufuli>
- Van de Walle, N. (2003). Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41(2), 25.
- Van de Walle, N. (2007). *The Path from Neopatrimonialism: Democracy and Clientelism in Africa Today* (No. 3-07).
- van Stekelenburg, J., Klandermans, B., & van Dijk, W. W. (2009). Context Matters: Explaining How and Why Mobilizing Context Influences Motivational Dynamics. *Journal of Social Issues*, 65(4), 815–838. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2009.01626.x>
- Veiga, M. M., & Hinton, J. J. (2002). Abandoned artisanal gold mines in the Brazilian Amazon: A legacy of mercury pollution. *Natural Resources Forum*, 26(1), 15–26.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-8947.00003>
- Verbrugge, B. (2015). Undermining the State? Informal Mining and Trajectories of State Formation in Eastern Mindanao, Philippines. *Critical Asian Studies*, 47(2), 177–199.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2015.997973>
- Walsh, E. J. (1981). Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island. *Social Problems*, 29(1), 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.2307/800074>
- Weis, T. (2014). Dominant parties and the private sector in Sub-Saharan Africa: a typology of approaches. *Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft Volume*, 8(3), 263–281.
- Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2014). *Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Politics, Poverty, and Social Policy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Werthmann, K. (2017). The drawbacks of privatization: Artisanal gold mining in Burkina Faso 1986–2016. *Resources Policy*, 52, 418–426. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2017.04.007>
- Wheeler, D. (1984). Sources of stagnation in sub-Saharan Africa. *World Development*, 12(1), 1–23.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X\(84\)90033-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(84)90033-0)
- Whitehead, R. L. (2000). *The institutionalisation of the Tanzanian opposition parties: How stable are they?*
- Whitfield, L. (2009). “Change for a Better Ghana”: Party Competition, Institutionalization and Alternation in Ghana's 2008 Elections. *African Affairs*, 108(433), 621–641.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adp056>
- Widner, J. A. (1997). Political parties and civil societies in sub-Saharan Africa. In M. Ottaway (Ed.), *Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead* (p. 176). L. Rienner Publishers.
- Wilson, J. D. (2015). Understanding resource nationalism: economic dynamics and political institutions. *Contemporary Politics*, 21(4), 399–416.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2015.1013293>

- Wolpe, H. (1972). Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid
1. *Economy and Society*, 1(4), 425–456. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147200000023>
- World Bank. (1961). *The Economic Development of Tanganyika*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- World Bank. (1986). *Financing adjustment with growth in sub-Saharan Africa, 1986-90*. World Bank. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%3A%2F%2Fdocuments1.worldbank.org%2Fcurated%2Fen%2F330661468742793711%2Fpdf%2Fmulti-page.pdf&clen=7241267&chunk=true
- World Bank. (1989). *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*.
- World Bank. (1994). *Mineral sector development technical assistance project: Tanzania*.
- World Bank. (2009). *Mining Together: Large-Scale Mining Meets Artisanal Mining, A Guide for Action*. <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12458>
- World Bank. (2013). *Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining*. Brief. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/brief/artisanal-and-small-scale-mining>
- World Bank. (2019). *Implementation, completion and results report on a proposed credit in the amount of SDR 33.5 Million (US\$50 million equivalent) and a proposed additional credit in the amount of 32.7 million (US\$ 45 million equivalent) to the United Republic of Tanzania f*.
- World Bank. (2020). *2020 State of the Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining Sector*.
- Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. SAGE Publications.
- Yin, R. K., & Davis, D. (2007). Adding new dimensions to case study evaluations: The case of evaluating comprehensive reforms. *New Directions for Evaluation*, 2007(113), 75–93. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ev.216>
- ZEUS, J. H., & Reif, K. (1990). Evolution of Environmental Attitudes in the European Community. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 13(2), 119–146. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.1990.tb00433.x>
- Ziaba, I. H. (2020). *Indigenous mining can curtail Africa's resource curse*. Africa at LSE.

Appendices.

Appendix A. Ghana's mining fiscal regimes in 1975 vs 1986.

ITEM	Supreme Military Council Decree 5, 1975	PNDCL, 153, 1986.
Corporate income tax	50%-55%	45%
Initial capital allowance	20%	75%
Investment allowance	5%	5%
Royalty	6%	3%-12%
Minimum turnover tax	2.5%	N.A.
Mineral duty	5%-10%	N.A.
Import duty	5%-35%	N.A.
Foreign exchange tax	33%-75%	N.A.
Import license tax/import levy	10%	N.A.
Gold export levy	¢3 for every oz. >100,000oz	N.A.
Additional profit tax	N.A.	25%

Source: Aryee (2018).

Appendix B. Major minerals production in Ghana pre- and post-liberalisation (1983-2020).

Year	Gold (oz)	Diamond (carat)	Bauxite (M/t)	Manganese (M/t)
1983	283593	338769	70235	169840
1984	282299	345675	27453	263864
1985	299615	634933	180286	303334
1986	287124	558915	204074	334314
1987	327960	440345	196255	295061
1988	372868	259431	284524	282337
1989	428936	285631	374065	333743
1990	522517	484877	381373	364373
1991	946269	702172	352921	325964
1992	1006943	596236	338244	353476
1993	1,251,010	584848	423747	294789
1994	1,396,887	746949	426128	271989
1995	1,630,309	627319	512977	245432
1996	1,550,814	714717	473218	161690

1997	1,644,622	698585	504401	273224
1998	2,353,000	823125	442514	348406
1999	2,257,681	680343	355260	638937
2000	2,315,000	627000	503825	638937
2001	2,205,473	870490	715455	1,212,338
2002	2,115,196	924638	647231	1,132,000
2003	2,208,154	927000	494716	1,509,432
2004	1,794,497	911809	498060	1,593,778
2005	2,149,372	1,062,930	726608	1,714,797
2006	2,244,680	970751	885770	1,658,701
2007	2, 486, 821	837586	748232	1,1563,39
2008	2,585,993	598042	693991	1,089,021
2009	2,930,328	354443	490367	1,012,941
2010	2,970,080	308679	512208	1,194,074
2011	2,924,385	283369	400069	1,827,692
2012	3,166,483	1,490,634	752771	1,490,634
2013	3,192,648	2,003,176	826994	2,003,176
2014	3167755	241120	798114	1,353,486
2015	2,848, 574	174188	1,014,605	1,288,624
2016	4,131,440	141530	1,143,676	2,018,254
2017	4,222,410	86925	1,476,966	3,003,580
2018	4,792,287	57531	1,011,302	4,551,754
2019	4,577,637	33789	1,116,334	5,383,014
2020	4,022,502	25292	1,162,086	2,357,515

Source: 1983 to 1989 figures from Aubynn (1997); 1990-2020 figures from The Ghana Chamber of Mines (2021).

Appendix C. 13 Mines that came on stream in Ghana post-1986.

Name of Company	Host Community	Host Region	Start Date
Southern Cross Mining Ltd.	Konongo/Odumasi	Ashanti Region	1988
Teberebie Goldfields Ltd.	Teberebie	Western Region	1990
Ghana Australian Goldfields	Iduapriem	Western Region	1992
Billiton Bogosu Gold Ltd	Bogosu	Western Region	1990

Goldenrae Mining Co. Ltd.	Kwaben	Eastern Region	1990
Bonte Gold Mines Ltd.	Essase	Ashanti Region	1991
Goldfields (GH) Ltd.	Tarkwa	Western Region	1994
Cluff Resource (GH) Ltd.	Anyanfuri	Central Region	1994
Obenemasi Gold Mines Ltd.	Konongo/Odumase	Ashanti Region	1995
Prestea Sankofa Gold Ltd.	Prestea	Western Region	1995
AGC (Bibiani) Ltd	Bibiani	Ashanti Region	1997
Abosso Goldfield Ltd	Damang	Western Region	1997
Satellite Goldfields Ltd	Subri	Western Region	1999

Source: Akabzaa and Darimani (2001).

Appendix D. The 14 large-scale mining companies and 19 mines in Ghana by 2000.

Company	Mineral Mined	Mines
AGC	Gold	Obuasi Anyanfuri Bibiani Iduapriem Prestea Sankofa Asikam
Abosso Goldfields Ltd.	Gold	Damang
Goldfields (Gh) Ltd.	Gold	Tarkwa
Teberebie Goldfields Ltd	Gold	Teberebie
GAG	Gold	Iduapriem
Prestea Gold Resources	Gold	Prestea
Billinton Bogoso	Gold	Bogoso
Bonte Gold Mines Ltd	Gold	Akrokkerri
Dunkwa Continental Goldfields Ltd	Gold	Dunkwa
Obenemase Gold Mines	Gold	Obenemase
Amansie Resources	Gold
Ghana Consolidated Diamonds	Diamonds	Akwatia
Ghana Bauxite Company	Bauxite	Awaso
Ghana Manganese	Manganese	Nsuta

Source: Akabzaa and Darimani (2001).

Appendix E. Mineral production in Tanzania from 1977 to 1995.

Mineral Type	Quantity	1977	1979	1983	1986	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Diamonds	'000 Grammes	101.6	68.4	42.9	36.0	20.7	13.8	8.4	3.5	10.1
Gemstone	'000 Grammes	95.2	31.3	10,121.1	300.3	59,625.0	48,938.0	23,979.0	48,507.0	11,140.4
Gold	Grammes	N.a.	8.9	24.1	46.9	3,779.0	4,525.0	3370.0	2861.0	320.0
Salt	'000Tons	39.1	34.4	29.7	15.3	64.4	77.3	83.4	84.3	6.6
Nickel	'000Tons	N.a.	18.8	2.2	2.1	6.4	8.0	12.0	9.0	N.a.
Coal	'000Tons	2.0	5.6	10.0	3.6	93.2	82.9	99.7	109.6	43.2
Phosphate	'000Tons	N.a.	N.a.	25.0	21.0	2.4	4.9	2.2	N.a.	1.1
Mica	'000Tons	5.4	8.6	1.3	0.0	4.3	N.a.	0.9	0.6	0.6

Source: Lissu (2002).

Appendix F. Tanzania's mineral exports from 1989 to 1992 (US\$'000).

Mineral	1989	1990	1991	1992
Gold	1,152	13,635	29,100	40,380
Rough Diamonds	9,753	7,394	10,020	8,301
Diamond Stones	4,662	2,648	1,303	107
Gemstones	784	1,585	611	3,237
Salt	507	906	1,759	3,023
Tin	34	25	1,756	26
Phosphate	56	101	19	144
Gypsum	-	-	11	16
Total	16,948	26,294	44,037	53,234

Source: Lissu (2002).

Appendix G. Mining sector growth rate as a percentage of Tanzania's GDP from 1979 to 1996

1977	1979	1983	1986	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
1.0	0.9	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5

Source: Lissu (2002).

Appendix H. Ghana's macroeconomic indicators: 1974-1983.

Indicator	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Real GNP per capita at 1975 prices (cedis)	520	459	404	403	435	408	393	365	325	320
Money supply (million cedis)	697	1009	1430	2386	3088	4631	6058	9415	11,440	16,861
Current account (million US\$)	-2.7	-25.5	-144.4	-109.3	-40.4	-53.7	-508.1	-192.3	-294.2	-
Inflation (%)	18.4	29.8	56.1	116.5	73.7	53.9	50.1	116.5	122.3	122.8
Govt. budget deficit (million cedis)	357	624	870	1479	1906	1646	4440	4675	3593	4511
Agricultural production ('000, tonnes) (cereals)	890	672	689	639	540	780	674	725	543	308
Agricultural production ('000 tonnes) (Starchy staples)	7988	7462	4435	5995	4105	3927	4349	4114	4431	3657
Agricultural production ('000 tonnes) (cocoa)	382	397	327	277	268	281	254	220	179	159
Exports index: 1968=100	55.1	56.4	59.1	48.7	40.1	38.2	39.5	40.7	346.0	32.6
Index of mineral production (1975=100)	100	97	87	76	65	64	60	54	46	-
Timber production, cubic metres	623	565	586	591	285	185	222	-	-	-
Real minimum wage (1977=100)	292	225	144	100	77	50	44	46	38	32


Source: Bawumia (1998).

Appendix I. Ghana's macroeconomic indicators: 1983-1992.

Indicator	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
GDP growth rate (%)	-4.6	8.6	5.1	5.2	4.8	5.6	5.1	3.3	5.3	3.9
Agricultural production ('000 tonnes) (cereals)	308	669	676	867	1057	1146	1177	845	1436	1254
Agricultural production ('000 tonnes) (Starchy staples)	3657	3814	5868	5362	6001	6815	6840	5208	10,808	10,277
Agricultural production ('000 tonnes) (cocoa)	159	175	219	226.4	205.2	246.6	296.1	284.4	276.7	-
Manufacturing output (1977=100)	18.0	25.0	39.3	49.3	54.2	56.8	63.0	63.5	71.3	76.9
Current account (\$m)	-156.9	-76.5	-156.5	-85.3	-98.0	-66.9	-89.7	-223.1	251.6	-376.2
Inflation (%)	122.8	39.6	10.4	24.6	39.8	31.4	25.2	37.2	18.0	10.0
Savings/GDP (%)	3.0	5.9	7.1	8.2	11.3	12.5	13.7	11.6	-	-
Savings deposit rates	12.5	14.5	16.5	18.5	21.5	21.5	19.0	18.0	19.5	19.0
Urban CPI (1977=100)	2103	2960	3329	4267	6119	8119	10,266	14,331	17,063	-
Rural CPI (1977=100)	2640	3652	3974	4824	6591	8581	10,637	14,310	16,784	-
Minimum wage index (1985=100)	54	56	100	103	120	91	84	79	83	117
Average real public sector earnings	48	67	100	-	122	160	167	164	171	270

Source: Bawumia (1998).

Appendix J. Composition of Ghana's primary merchandise exports (2008-2019) in US\$ million.



Source. Author's based on data from Osei-Assibey (2015, p. 18) [2008-2009 cocoa figures] and Statista [gold figures and 2010-2019 cocoa figures].

Appendix K. Face-to-face interviews conducted in Greater Accra Region and Ashanti Region (Kumasi and Obuasi), Ghana. April to July 2019.

Semi-structured interviews in Accra, Kumasi, and Obuasi.			
No.	Date	Interviewee	Place
1	19 th April 2019.	Dr Yao Graham, the Convener of Third World Network.	Third World Network's office, Accra.
2	23 rd April 2019.	Professor Akilagpa Sawyerr, former mining contract negotiator for the Ghanaian state.	At his residence in Accra.
3	26 th April 2019.	MP of the NPP.	At the restaurant of Parliament, Accra.
4	3 rd May 2019.	A former CEO of the Minerals Commission.	At his office in Accra.
5	8 th May 2019.	Professor Johnson Manu.	Department of Earth Science, University of Ghana, Legon, Accra.

6	10 th May 2019.	Licensed gold dealer.	At his office in Accra.
7	13 th May 2019.	A former Chief Director of the Lands and Natural Resources Ministry.	At his Office in Accra.
8	14-15 th May 2019.	Observation of Third World Network's conference proceedings.	At Third World Network's conference, Accra.
9	17 th May 2019.	Ghana Chamber of Mines' Official.	At his office, Ghana Chamber of Mines, Accra.
10	21 st May 2019.	A former CEO of Minerals Commission and Ghana Chamber of Mines.	At his office, Africa Institute for Extractive Industries, Accra.
11	24 th May 2019.	An official of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources.	At his office, Accra.
12	27 th May 2019.	An official of the Geological Survey Authority.	At his office, Geological Survey Authority, Accra.
13	3 rd June 2019.	Ghana Chamber of Mines' Official.	Telephone Interview, Accra.
14	12 th June 2019.	A former employee of the Minerals Commission and Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources.	At an eatery, Accra.
15	13 th June 2019.	A former Minister of Lands and Natural Resources.	At his office in Parliament, Accra.
16	17 th June 2019.	EPA official.	At his office, Accra.
17	21 st June 2019.	Minerals Commission official.	At his office, Accra
18	25 th June 2019.	Two officials of the PMMC.	At their office in the Diamond House, Accra.
19	26 th June 2019.	A PMMC Official.	At his office at Kotoka International Airport, Accra.
20	28 th June 2019.	President of Ghana Jeweller's Association.	At his office in the Diamond House, Accra.
21	4 th July 2019.	Richard Ellimah, Executive Director of CESIS.	At his office, CESIS, Obuasi.
22	5 th July 2019.	A former AGA underground miner.	Obuasi.

23	8 th July 2019.	Executive Director of Social Support Foundation.	Telephone interview, Obuasi.
24	9 th July 2019	An old woman.	A mining village, Obuasi.
25	11 th July 2019	A local government official.	Obuasi Municipal Assembly.
26	12 th July 2019	Police Officer.	Obuasi Municipal Police Command.
27	15 th July 2019	Another former AGA underground miner.	Obuasi.
28	16 th July 2019	An opinion leader in Obuasi town.	Obuasi.
39	16 th July 2019	An opinion leader in Mining Village A.	Obuasi.
30	17 th July 2019	EPA official.	Obuasi.
31	18 th July 2019	A Regent of a paramountcy in Obuasi Municipality.	At his office, Obuasi.
32	19 th July 2019	GNASSM official.	At his office, Kumasi.
33	22 nd July 2019	Awudu Mohammed, a victim of AGA and state security assault.	At his workplace in Kumasi.
34	25 th July	Senior Civil Servant, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources.	At his office, Accra.
35	31 st July	Community relations manager of a large-scale mining company.	At his office, Accra.
Focus group interviews in Obuasi.			
No.	Date	Interviewee	Place
1	1 st July.	Focus group discussion with ten artisanal miners.	Mining Village A, Obuasi.
2	2 nd July.	Focus group discussion with eight artisanal miners.	Mining Village B, Obuasi.

Appendix L. Remote interviews conducted in Talensi, Upper East Region, Ghana. September – October 2021.

Virtual interviews I conducted from my residence in the UK.			
No.	Date	Interviewee	Virtual Platform
1	22 nd September 2021.	The Director of a local NGO in Talensi.	WhatsApp interview.
2	4 th October 2021.	A representative of indigenous galamseyers in Talensi.	WhatsApp interview.
3	9 th October 2021.	EPA official, Bolgatanga.	Zoom interview.
Interviews a third-party research assistant conducted in Talensi			
No.	Date	Interviewee	Place
1	16 th September 2021.	Former District Chief Executive of Talensi District.	At his residence, Namoarog.
2	17 th September 2021.	Acting Chief of Gbane Traditional Area.	At his residence, Gbane.
3	21 st September 2021.	Chief of Datuko traditional area.	At his residence, Datuko, Talensi.
4	24 th September 2021.	A representative of small-scale miners' association.	At a mining site, Gbane, Talensi.
5	27 th September 2021.	Chief of Zaare, Talensi.	At his residence, Zaare, Talensi.
6	29 th September 2021.	Tindana (earth priest) of Zaare, Talensi.	At his residence, Zaare, Talensi.

Appendix M. Face-to-face interviews conducted in Tanzania. December 2019- February 2020.

Semi-structured interviews in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza and Geita.			
No.	Date	Interviewee	Place
1	16 th December 2019.	A professor at University of Dar es Salaam.	At his office, Faculty of Social Science, University of Dar es Salaam.
2	19 th December 2019.	A politician of the CHADEMA.	At Passionate Father's hostel, Mikocheni, Dar es Salaam.
3	28 th December 2019.	An official of the Mwanza Resident Mining Office.	At his office, Mwanza.
4	3 rd January 2020.	An official of the Geita Resident Mining office.	At his office, Geita.
5	6 th January 2020.	A staff of an elution company.	At her office, Geita.
6	10 th January 2020.	Two current underground workers of AGA.	At the Nana Gym, Geita.
7.	13 th January 2020.	A current underground worker of AGA.	At Leni Hotel, Geita.
8	17 th January 2020.	A former underground AGA worker.	At Leni Hotel, Geita.
9	23 rd January 2020.	A former AGA Manager.	At their residence, Geita.
10	27 th January 2020.	A gold dealer in Geita Madini Market.	At his office, Geita Madini Market
11	28 th January 2020.	A gold dealer in Geita Madini Market.	At his office, Geita Madini Market
12	30 th January 2020.	A gold dealer from Mwanza.	At Leni Hotel, Geita.
Focus Group Interviews in Geita.			
No.	Date	Interviewees	Place
1	2 nd February 2020.	Focus group discussions with seven miners.	Mining Village A, Geita.

Appendix N. Remote interviews conducted in Tanzania.

Virtual interviews I conducted from my residence in the UK			
No	Date	Interviewee	Virtual Platform
1.	21 st May 2021.	An official of the Ministry of Minerals, Dodoma.	Zoom.
2.	24 th May 2021.	An official of Lawyers Environment Action Team (LEAT), Dar es Salaam.	Zoom.
3.	26 th May 2021.	An official of HakiMadini, Arusha.	Zoom and Email.
4.	31 st May 2021.	An official of HakiRasilimali, Dar es Salaam.	Zoom.
Interviews a third-party research assistant conducted in Manyara and Arusha Regions.			
No	Date	Interviewee	Place
1	22 nd May 2021.	A local CHADEMA politician, Simanjiro District.	Simanjiro, Manyara Region.
2	25 th May 2021.	Chairman of mineral dealers' association.	Arusha, Arusha Region.
3	27 th May 2021.	Chairman of mineral brokers' association.	Manyara Region.
4	28 th May 2021.	An official of MAREMA.	Babati, Manyara Region.
5	28 th May 2021.	A mayor	Manyara Region.
6	30 th May 2021.	A ward councillor.	Manyara Region.
7	2 nd June 2021.	An official of the Arusha Resident Mining Office.	Arusha, Arusha Region.
8	5 th June 2021.	Mining official	Mererani, Manyara Region.
9	7 th June 2021	A leader of a mining association in Mererani.	Mererani, Manyara Region.

