

The London School of Economics and Political Science

*The Making of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF)
Grand Strategy: Origins and Implementation*

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of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the
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Declaration

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Abstract

This study examines the origins and implementation of Indonesia's grand strategy, the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF), during Joko Widodo's first term (2014-2019). Though Indonesia's leaders sought recognition of the country's geography as an archipelagic state decades ago, they did not adopt until recently a maritime-based grand strategy. The sudden emergence and adoption of the GMF - given the long period during which political leaders had but little appreciation for the country's maritime domain – makes for a puzzle that this dissertation attempts to address.

To approach the topic, the study draws on several theoretical frameworks, builds on Neoclassical Realist theory for insights relating to the role of domestic factors in mediating systemic imperatives. To capture specifically the origins of the GMF, the dissertation also draws on works on policy entrepreneurship. With respect to its implementation in relation to foreign policy and defence, the study relies on insights from the literature on leaders' personality and foreign policy making, bureaucratic politics, and civil-military relations. The analysis provided is informed by multiple interviews with individuals closely related to GMF formulation and implementation.

The dissertation demonstrates that while major shifts in Indonesia's external environment — in form of China's increasing assertiveness and the rise of the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical narrative — stimulated the GMF's formation, it was domestic factors — the 2014 Presidential Election and the dissatisfaction over the previous development policy and foreign policy administration— that led the GMF to be adopted as Indonesia's new grand strategy. Notwithstanding the success of policy entrepreneurship in GMF adoption, its implementation in foreign policy and defence has proven to be half-hearted and ambiguous. The thesis attributes this to President Widodo's general disinterest in foreign policy and defence, fewer influential advocates of the GMF in its implementation phase, and Widodo's close relationship with the army.

Keyword: Jokowi, Indonesia, Grand Strategy, Global Maritime Fulcrum, GMF, Foreign Policy, Maritime

In memory of my father

*To my mother
With love and eternal appreciation*

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I.1 Background

On 13th November 2014, during the ninth East Asia Summit (EAS) in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, the then new inaugurated President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), unveiled his aspiration to transform Indonesia into a “Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF)” (*Poros Maritim Dunia*) through the country’s first-time maritime-based grand strategy. This grand strategy was contrived to reinvigorate the country’s maritime culture and identity located at the crossroad of the two oceans – the Indian and the Pacific Ocean — and two continents — Asia and Australia —, to ameliorate the country’s underdeveloped maritime sector, and to assert control over its waters. Though Jokowi had previously expressed his floated maritime aspiration throughout his presidential campaign, as seen in his political manifesto and during the third presidential debate, the content of his aspiration remained largely rhetorical until his address at the ninth EAS. At the summit, Jokowi elaborated further on the original five pillars that served as the bedrock to achieve GMF aspiration, which were as follows: (1) The revival of Indonesia’s maritime culture; (2) The improvement of Indonesia’s marine resources management by establishing maritime industry and attaining maritime food sovereignty and security; (3) The development of Indonesia’s maritime infrastructure to bolster trade and tourism; (4) The optimization of maritime diplomacy as the only means of settling the regional maritime-related problems; and (5) The advancement of Indonesia’s maritime defence to ensure and maintain its maritime sovereignty, stability, and security.

GMF grand strategy broadly encompasses both Indonesia's domestic and external strategies in attaining the overarching goals of economic prosperity, security, and becoming a respected player in the region. At the domestic level, GMF was designed to augment inter-island connectivity across the archipelago, as expressed in the second and third pillars. Before assuming power, Jokowi considered the country’s poor infrastructure as the chief reason behind the economic underdevelopment of multiple regions of the country. Due to this characteristics, Adelle Neary (2014b) describes the archipelago as “a collection of weakly integrated economies than as a unified market”. Furthermore, GMF’s domestic strategy also includes the struggle to resolve the maritime security conundrum that has resulted from an

underfunded navy by enhancing the capabilities of Indonesia's naval forces and its defence industries (the fifth pillar).

At the regional level, GMF was designated to protect the country's interests in maintaining regional security and stability, which were anticipated to be more heavily contested in the following years (the fourth pillar). In response to this uncertainty, Jokowi also intended to use the grand strategy to advocate for a diplomatic approach that draws all Indonesian partners to cooperate in settling challenges that occur in the region's maritime domain. Two main maritime-based challenges that may hamper the regional security and stability are the "Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing", and territorial disputes amongst countries in the region over several areas of the South China Sea.

GMF's outward-looking aspect, thus, presented an opportunity for Indonesia to project its power at the regional theatre and re-orient its foreign policy, strategic thinking, and position in regional geopolitical settings. While Southeast Asia and the Pacific region have always been the traditional canvas of Indonesia's foreign policy, sitting at the centre of the country's foreign policy concentric circles particularly after the 1950s,¹ little attention had been afforded to the Indian Ocean region despite the historical connection with the region from the ancient era of Srivijaya to the present Indonesia, such as the Afro-Asian Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement.²

Against this backdrop, this research aims to examine the emergence of GMF as Indonesia's new grand strategy and its implementation during Jokowi's first term of presidency (2014-2019). Therefore, this thesis will be guided by two questions:

Why did Indonesia decide to adopt a maritime-based grand strategy?

And considering the minimalist implementation of GMF in the field of foreign policy and defence during Jokowi's first term of Presidency, this thesis therefore seeks to ask;

Why did full implementation of GMF in the domain of foreign policy and defence difficult?

¹ Indonesia's foreign policy is depicted as a series of concentric circles. The model was firstly introduced during Suharto's administration to determine the focus and priorities of Indonesia's foreign policy. ASEAN is located at the first concentric circle (core), following by the Pacific region, the United States and Europe. See Leifer (1983), Tan (2007), and Shekhar (2018).

² For details on Indonesia's bilateral relations with India during Sukarno's era, see Dutt (1972), Leifer (1983), and Sebastian and Syailendra (2014).

In answering these questions, the study sees the formulation and implementation of GMF as its central foci, examining the condition that contributed to the advent of the grand strategy, the process of decision making during the GMF making, the actors involved in the formulation and implementation, and the dynamics that hindered the full concretisation of GMF in foreign policy and defence domain.

I.2 The Puzzle

International Relations (IR) literature has suggested the environment external to state or known as the systemic environment as the primary force that determines the strategic behaviour of a state, including grand strategy. Work in this field has also attributed geographical settings, such as size, location, or character of national territory, as an important consideration, be it as a limitation or opportunity, that influence and shape the formulation or adoption of a grand strategy. However, a brief observation on Indonesia's foreign and strategic behaviour indicates the departure from these arguments.

Although Indonesia is geographically dominated by water and its leaders had sought international recognition as an archipelagic state decades ago, Indonesia did not adopt, until recently, a maritime-based grand strategy. The sudden emergence and adoption of GMF under Jokowi, given the long period during which political leaders had little appreciation for the country's maritime domain creates a question that this dissertation attempts to address, namely "how was such a re-orientation possible?". In addition, given the fact that Indonesia has removed its military, wherein the army as the dominant group, from the country's formal politics since the early 2000s through the abolishment of the military's dual function (*Dwi Fungsi ABRI*)³ also raises a question of "why did the implementation of a maritime grand strategy remain minimalist?". Against this backdrop, the study thus aims to fill the research gap by examining the variables that have driven the adoption of the grand strategy and shaped its implementation.

³ *Dwi Fungsi ABRI* or the Military's Dual Function is a military doctrine implemented during Suharto's military-dominated New Order government. Through the doctrine the military, especially the army as the dominant group, were encouraged to also be active in the country's political process (non-military or defense affairs) and decision-making at all levels within Indonesian society. See Schwarz (1994) and Crouch (2007).

I.3 The Argument

While GMF is Indonesia's first maritime-based grand strategy, it was not the first and the only grand strategy that the country has ever had.⁴ However, for nearly two decades, grand strategy was absent in Indonesia's post-Suharto era. Existing literature has suggested that, as the new democratic administration was more preoccupied with issues of democracy consolidation and institutional reforms, they did not focus on outlining a long-term strategic outlook that would take into account Indonesia's core goals within the regional geopolitical context.⁵

The emergence and adoption of GMF as Indonesia's new grand strategy, therefore, has prompted important considerations. This study demonstrates that, while major shifts in Indonesia's external environment stimulated GMF's formation, it was domestic factors that led GMF to emerge as Indonesia's new grand strategy. As well as enabling the emergence and adoption of GMF, the study also identifies domestic factors that hinder the realization of the country's aspiration from GMF in foreign policy and defence. In this sense, the study argues that, regardless of the successful policy entrepreneurship leading to the adoption of the GMF strategy, such entrepreneurship was unable to change the strategic orientation of the country's foreign policy and defence. This can be seen from the fact that despite the success of the Jokowi administration in producing the blueprint for GMF implementation, the Indonesian Sea Policy, its (partial) realization with respect to foreign policy and defence has, to some extent, refocused the grand strategy away from its original maritime and outward-looking to a more land-centric, inward-looking orientation.

I.4 Literature Review

I.4.a. Understanding Grand Strategy

Grand strategy is a notion that has been widely discussed and examined in IR literature, particularly after the end of the Cold War. Though popular, grand strategy remains a vague concept as there has been no consensus in terms of its precise definition. Scholars who have employed the concept have acknowledged the difficulties in defining the concept

⁴ For elaboration on the development of Indonesia's grand strategy throughout different administrations and leaderships, see Nelson and Sulaiman (2012).

⁵ For further examination on Indonesia's foreign policy orientation and strategic thinking after the fall of Suharto, see Roberts et al. (2015).

precisely (Brands, 2014; Miller, 2016; Milevski, 2016). Though some definitions are cited more frequently than others, there is still no indication of the emergence of a particular definition of grand strategy that overrides other proposed definitions.

Despite the lack of consensus, the majority of scholars and analysts in the realm of IR and strategic studies have agreed on two basic elements that constitute grand strategy, namely means and ends (Howard et al., 1976; Hart, 1967; McDonough, 2011; Posen, 2014). The “means” represents the art of moving available resources, while the “ends” refers to the ultimate objective(s) that should be attained. Collin Dueck (2015: 14) considers grand strategy “a calculated relationship on the part of a country’s leaders of ends and means in the face of potential international opponents”. For Dueck, grand strategy spells out key national goals and priorities, identifies existing challenges to meeting these objectives, and offers recommendations on which means a state should seek to achieve its goals and overcome challenges.

Nina Silove (2018) has attempted to resolve this ambiguity by proposing tools to define the concept and has identified three distinct meanings of grand strategy. The first meaning sees grand strategy as a detailed plan (or grand plan) designed deliberately by the national elites. Paul Kennedy’s work presents the first definition of grand strategy. Influenced by the work of Liddell Hart and Carl von Clausewitz, Kennedy (1991) interprets contemporary grand strategy as being similar to strategy in military affairs, whereby the formulation of grand strategy is purposive and requires the expertise and wisdom of the elites for precise calculations.⁶ Silove (2018: 11) suggests the US National Security Strategy (NSS) document as an example of Kennedy’s version of “detailed” grand strategy.

The second definition understands grand strategy as a set of principles (grand principles) employed as a guidance in statecraft and policymaking. This definition rejects the argument that grand strategy amounts to a detailed grand plan. From this perspective then, grand strategy is defined as less rigid by excluding its necessity to hold the specific, detailed plans and programmes. Grand strategy in this context is thus defined as a shared guiding framework, a doctrine, key principles, or a basic strategic view (Silove, 2018). Silove (2018) further argues that these “shared principles” may flow from either particular individual(s),

⁶ See Parker (1998), Feaver (2012), and Walt (1989).

such as national leaders or from the country's national budget, which often reflects its orientation.

The third definition articulates grand strategy as a pattern of a state's behaviour (grand behaviour). Within this tradition, the source of grand strategy — whether grand strategy emerges from grand plans or set of principles — is disregarded and considered as irrelevant. The grand behaviour perspective does not put its focus on the existence of documents, blueprints, or set of ideas. Instead, it focuses on the existence of a set of behaviours that emerge over time. Regardless of these variations, the three definitions of grand strategy share similarities in the possession of the elements of “means” and “ends” (Silove, 2018). What makes these “means” and “ends” different from one definition to another is the level of clarity.

Aside from the three definitions, Silove (2017) also identifies the “characteristics of grandness” within grand strategy. These “characteristics” are the basic elements that distinguish grand strategy from other products of statecraft, such as foreign policy and military strategy. The first characteristic is related to the time-horizon of grand strategy. William C. Martel (2015) suggests the time-horizon of grand strategy goal as the basic tenet of the concept, whereby it should span not for a middle or even shorter period, but over a longer period.

Similarly, Paul Kennedy (1991: 4) considers grand strategy as a process of “evolution and integration of policies”, in which its operationalisation should take place for several decades or centuries.⁷ The emphasis on the time frame is also highlighted by David Pratt, Canada's former Defence Minister. Pratt (2008: 15) specifically defines grand strategy as “an intellectual construct — a tool — used by policymakers...to better understand what a nation's long-term strategic interest are, and to seek to translate those long-term interests into long-term public policy”.

The second characteristic is related to the scope of grand strategy, or the instruments used in applying the grand strategy that should be overarching. Avery Goldstein (2005) considers this “instrument” or “scope” as the main attribute that defines and differentiates grand strategy from other types of strategy or policy, such as economic, diplomacy, or military strategy. For Goldstein, grand strategy serves as the core logic — connecting the regime's

⁷ See Lobell (2003).

holistic vision with state's policies in other sectors — aimed at attaining the state's global objectives (Goldstein, 2005). Bary R. Posen (2014) also highlights the 'grandness' of grand strategy on its scope that is not just limited to the topic of 'guns' and 'butter'. The scope, as he argues, should encompass every aspect of statecraft that may aid in addressing its own dilemma within the anarchical international system (Posen, 2014). In similar fashion, Alasdair Roberts also considers the term grand strategy to be a capacious concept, as it should not only be relevant to both wartime and peacetime, but also incorporate multiple objectives and the utilization of all national resources (Greve & Ysa, 2023).

The final characteristic is related to the existence of a state's priorities. Dueck's (2015) argument demonstrates the importance for grand strategy to have a specific set of priorities. When available resources are limited, a state is forced to limit its objectives and prioritize the limited resources only to achieve its most urgent and crucial goals. For mainstream IR literature, "physical or military security" is considered as the ultimate goal that every state seeks in the anarchical system.⁸ In their work, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. describe this ultimate goal as "high politics" in contrast to "low politics" that have lesser impact on a state's survivability and security.

For other scholars, the expansion of a state's territory and economic activities, such as promoting trade and investment, may also serve as priorities and sources of grand strategy for some states.⁹ Some scholars even consider non-material forces to be driving states to adopt a particular grand strategy. In *The Challenge of Grand Strategy: Great Powers and the Broken Balance Between the World Wars*, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro et al. (2012) offers a broader definition that does not only include both military and non-military instruments in grand strategy but also stretches grand strategy objectives beyond the physical security of the state (Taliaferro et al., 2012). A similar understanding is also emphasized in the work of Peter Trubowitz (2011) and Benjamin Miller and Ziv Rubinovitz (2020), at least with regard to U.S. grand strategy. Both works highlight the existence of moral and non-material objectives such as reputation and the spread of national ideas (ideology) factors that can drive the formation of grand strategy.

This dissertation adopts the understandings of grand strategy as suggested by Silove as her elaboration of grand strategy provides the most comprehensive take on grand strategy.

⁸ See Art (2003) and Posen (2014).

⁹ See (Narizny, 2007).

To the extent that other authors may agree with Silove's definition, they each only focus on one particular aspect of grand strategy, be it the scope, time-range, or form.

The research argues that applying a definition of grand strategy that examines partial aspects of grand strategy can mislead the identification of grand strategy. Take for example Indonesia's Minimum Essential Force (MEF) initiative, a long-term military modernisation program (2005-2024) oriented to reach the minimum level of military strength: utilizing a definition of grand strategy that is only based on the time frame aspect of grand strategy would be unhelpful. While MEF has a longer history compared to other policies, this policy initiative does not cover other areas beyond defence and thus cannot be considered as a grand strategy. Similarly, Indonesia's Covid-19 counter-measure policy, the PPKM (*Pemberlakuan Pembatasan Kegiatan Masyarakat* (trans. Implementation of Restrictions on Social Activities), can also be potentially considered as a grand strategy if one looks it from a partial definition of grand strategy. Though PPKM touches on multiple sectors, such as health and education, transportation, commerce, and tourism, the policy is not easily categorized as a grand strategy as it is designed for the moment of beating the pandemic, as a reaction to a particular course of event, or what Norrin M. Ripsman et al. (2016) refer to as "crisis decision-making" policy, as opposed to a lengthier time-period.

For this research, Silove's "grand characteristics" of grand strategy are useful to invoke in order to examine the subject of the research. These "characteristics of grandness" are not only helpful to identify GMF as a grand strategy, which will be elaborated further within this sub-section, but also to distinguish it from other products of statecraft. As Richard K. Betts (2019: 18) states:

"A strategy that aspires to grandness needs to be general enough to cover a wide range of contingencies, but specific enough to prescribe priorities and sources of leverage for a particular contingency ... [to] ... mean something more than a grandiose synonym for foreign policy."

Notwithstanding, limiting the definition of grand strategy is still necessary. While grand strategy is not strictly confined to foreign or military affairs, the use of this term is supposed to apply to matters of national security and a state's survival in the anarchical system. Such a perspective to limit grand strategy is pivotal, since it confines and highlights the core of the theory within the scholarship of IR (Gray, 2010; Greve & Ysa, 2023). In the words of Kennedy (1991: 5):

“The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interest.”

Besides its extensive coverage of grand strategy, the research also finds practicability in Silove's definition. In this context, the research takes its cue from Silove's acknowledgement regarding the plurality of grand strategy's forms. While the existence of “characteristics of grandness” may provide useful indicators to identify grand strategy, these are not always clearly visible as leaders might not always openly declare the adoption or launch their country's grand strategy. Furthermore, even when leaders openly declare the adoption of a new grand strategy, they may not always come forth with detailed documents and blueprints as in the case of GMF. The research therefore argues that while the existence of grand strategy's blueprints is important, the identification of grand strategy should not be strictly based on the existence of such documents. Dueck's argument may best capture the importance to identify grand strategy in more flexible ways, when he asserts that (Dueck, 2015: 5):

“If we define grand strategy—wrongly—as simply as a prefabricated plan...then clearly no president and probably no world leader has ever had such a strategy, nor ever will. But if we adopt a less stringent definition, we see that all presidents necessarily make choices and decision in relation to US foreign and national security policy, based at least partially upon their own pre-existing assumptions.”

Goldstein makes a similar point. For him (Goldstein, 2005), the nature of grand strategy is not always or necessarily stated explicitly. Goldstein (2005) contends that, grand strategy, in some cases, is identifiable by looking at a state's foreign policies, which, over time, reflect certain consistent values and ideas. For this reason, the research emphasizes the need to identify grand strategy beyond the existence of such documents, by also focusing on principles and ideas shared by state' leader(s) as well as a pattern of (state's) behaviour that indicates a state's preferences or orientation.

I.4.b Grand Strategy Making and Implementation

Mainstream IR literature argues that geopolitical circumstances and geostrategic realities (third image) are the principal and sole factor that determines the behaviour of

states.¹⁰ For this approach, since states face similar systemic imperatives, they are presumed to respond and follow similarly as expected by the system and in accordance with their position in the system. Therefore, according to this approach, the formation of grand strategy does not differ significantly from one country to another as the unique domestic characteristics of each state does not have any impact on the making of grand strategy.

The approach was first introduced by Kenneth Waltz and referred to as structural Realism or Neorealism (Waltz, 1979). According to Structural Realism, the world is depicted as an anarchical system whereas the relations between states are fragile and volatile; therefore, conflict among them is imminent. Since security is scarce, states are forced to rely on their material capabilities by following Realist dictums, acting as the “prescription” that prevents states from experiencing the consequences that may harm their security and survival (Mearsheimer, 2001; Ripsman et al., 2016).

Some IR scholars have attempted to examine the formation of grand strategy beyond the narrow markers of Realist theories – i.e., external threat, distribution of power, and material power. Scholars using this approach have attempted to include non-systemic factors that exist at the level of the state (also referred to as the second image), which remain somewhat overlooked by the mainstream IR literature, as far as their analysis of grand strategy formulation is concerned. For the proponents of this approach, which focuses on both geopolitical and domestic circumstances, what Trubowitz (2011) refers to as *Realpolitik* and *Innenpolitik* are two faces of the same coin. Domestic factors, therefore, can also hamper the operation of systemic imperatives for the state as well as the capability of states to respond to these imperatives (Rosecrance & Stein, 1993).

In their seminal work, Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein (1993) explicitly highlight the importance of incorporating domestic factors within the examination of grand strategy making. Rosecrance and Stein argue (1993) that an analytical model of examining grand strategy that only focuses on Realist tenets is incomplete in understanding the reasoning behind the adoption of a specific grand strategy. They contend that domestic variables play a pivotal role in the selection of state’s grand strategy, as these variables may constraint and give pressure to the ruling regime to respond to international events (Rosecrance & Stein, 1993).

¹⁰ See Waltz (1979), Gilpin (1981), Posen (1984), Kennedy (1987), Desch (1993), Wohlforth (1993), Mearsheimer (2001), Legro (2005), Narizny (2007), Bramumoller and Brands (2015).

In *The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics*, Steven Lobell (2006) acknowledges that by treating states as rational and unitary actors, a number of studies on grand strategy have overlooked the influence of domestic politics on IR and prevented a more comprehensive understanding of how declining hegemons choose their grand strategy. Lobell (2006) reveals that, in the case of the declining British Empire's grand strategy prior to World War II, the international environment did not directly lead to the shift and adoption of grand strategy. Lobell (2006) argues that the external environment, instead, empowered and enabled domestic actors to become more influential in the selection of the country's grand strategy.

In his work on the U.S. grand strategy shift 1920-1945, William R. Thompson (2016) criticises how the previous existing analyses treat domestic politics and its actors merely as a "black-box". For this reason, Thompson (2016) underlines the importance of examining domestic politics in examining the formation of grand strategy. For Thomson (2016), domestic politics is more like a contested arena, wherein multiple actors, both inside and outside of the government, compete for their ideas and policies to be invoked and applied. A similar critique has also been made by Trubowitz. In his work on *Politics and Strategy*, with the case study on American grand strategy, Trubowitz (2011) criticises the way in which IR scholars have examined grand strategy without examining the national leaders, who sit behind the making of the grand strategy. For Trubowitz (2011), as these strategic political actors possess their own political interests, they do not always follow or make grand strategy solely based on the systemic imperatives that Neorealists say dictate the country's course.

As political actors, national leaders have the intention to at least secure and maintain the power that they possess. By taking national goals seriously, national leaders could secure the offered political incentives that benefit their political career. This relationship between domestic political actors and states' strategic and foreign policy is most accurately explained in the work of Robert Putnam (1998) and Joe D. Hagan (1993). Putnam (1998) asserts that political elites, either in democratic or authoritarian regimes, are forced to play "two-level games", in which they are required to pay serious attention to the implications of the international policies they devised.

Hagan (1993) accounts policy ratification and leadership selection as the two factors that domestically constrain elites. The first factor refers to the evaluation of elites' international policies by domestic audiences through both formal and informal means. This

evaluation becomes the foundation to support the governance of the elites. The second factor is associated with the consequences that political elites usually have to assume responsibility personally when the policies that they devise fail. In this argument, though elites in authoritarian regimes will pay a much “bigger” price should their policy fail, they are less affected by domestic constraints when making strategic choices compared to elites in democratic regimes.

Another work that connects political leaders and grand strategy comes from that of Thomas Christensen (1996), who argues that a source of grand strategy can also come from the intention to mobilize public support. Christensen (1996) criticizes scholars that are too quick to judge the political elites who took an adventurous or ideological grand strategy as distorted or irrational because national leaders are also rational and have previously calculated the benefits and drawbacks of these policies. In some extreme cases, leaders may embrace an aggressive or expansionist grand strategy, i.e. ‘diversionary war’, to divert public attention, anger, or frustration from domestic problems, such as economic crises, corruption, and political scandals.¹¹

Besides domestic politics and elites, other domestic factors may also feature in the examination of grand strategy. For Dueck (2006), domestic variables such as strategic culture are varied between states; these variables to him frequently generate a “dramatic” and “independent” impact on a state’s strategic behaviour. Ashley Tellis *et.al.* (2008) perceive domestic factors encompassing a wide range of aspects, from history, economic arrangements, ideology, and governing institutions as important driving forces in the creation of grand strategy.

Tellis et al. (2008) argue that historically classical political theorists have highlighted, in various ways, the importance of understanding states’ domestic and international behaviour through the “prism” of regime. Regime, in this case, is not only associated with the individuals within it, but also the values and structures related to domestic power distribution shaped by other domestic factors such as ideology and historical experiences. Tellis et al. (2008), therefore assert grand strategy would be most accurately understood as a product of a state’s domestic politics.

¹¹ See Oakes (2012).

Civil-military relations are also included as domestic sources of grand strategy. Though the importance of this variable has not been considered in the mainstream literature on grand strategy, civil-military relations are critical for grand strategy formulation, particularly in countries where the role of military in the country's history, domestic politics, and the construction of nation building is significant and relevant (Alsina, 2014; Balzacq & Krebs, 2021). João Paulo Alsina Jr. (2014) provides an analysis on how civil-military relations contributed to the making of Brazil's maritime grand strategy in the early 20th century by shaping the strategic thinking, military doctrine, and the political stability of the country.

Andrew J. Bacevich's work in *The New American Militarism: How American Are Seduced by War* also suggests the relevance of the military-civilian relations and the adoption of a particular grand strategy. Bacevich (2005) argues that the military attitudes formed from military-societal relations have contributed to the increase of public support over military institution. In this sense, since the military is viewed by the masses as having high prestige due to its efficacy, the use of military institutions to secure the country's interests and attain its goals is logical and important. The increased support for the military as an institution eventually not only contributes to the support for military budget increase, but also supports the increasing involvement of the military in government policymaking, such as in the case of the formulation of grand strategy and foreign policy (Bacevich, 2005).

Geography is also attributed in the analysis of grand strategy. Contrary to what Thomas Friedman (2005) suggests when arguing that "the world is flat", geography still matters.¹² For Kennedy (1991), geography tends to determine the strategic strengths and vulnerabilities of a country. Williamson Murray et al. (2011) understand grand strategy as a "prisoner" of both history and geography and consider geography as the chief reason for which the United States and Britain have a different worldview compared to Continental Europe. Williamson Murray et al. (2011: 11) argue that both the United States and Britain "have enjoyed the inestimable advantage of the sea's protection, an advantage that has allowed them to prepare for future engagement or to accept defeats that no Continental power could accept".

Apart from its origin, another aspect of grand strategy that has become a focus of study in IR scholarship is its execution. Much of the literature on this topic, however, covers

¹² Mahan's (1890) and Mackinder's (1904) studies are examples of classical literature that emphasize the significance of geography in politics and strategic thinking.

case studies of major powers,¹³ some even focus on the grand strategy of great powers of the antiquities¹⁴. One plausible explanation for this strong focus is located in the scope and degree of the impact of the applied grand strategy. In this sense, compared to grand strategies of lesser countries, the grand strategy of major powers is seen to produce a wider and more profound impact, not only on other countries, but also on the systemic environment.

Over recent decades, however, there has been an increasing number of studies focusing on the grand strategy of lesser powers identified as regional powers or countries that might not be included as a major power globally but with considerable influence on regional level. Thierry Balzacq et al. (2019), in *Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases*, however, offers a key contribution to the studies of grand strategy. The work does not only cover both the formation and implementation aspect of grand strategy that goes beyond the cage of systemic and rationalist roots of strategizing, but also encompassing a wide range of case studies, not limited to global great powers, but also regional powers, such as Brazil, Israel, Iran, India, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union (Balzacq et al., 2019). Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs (2021), in the *Handbook of Grand Strategy*, also offer a resourceful reference for the study of grand strategy. In this recently edited volume, Balzacq and Krebs (2021) attempt to provide a holistic study of grand strategy that not only covers both the formulation and implementation of aspects of grand strategy, but also discusses the historical development of the concept, both in Western and non-Western civilization, and other diverse facets of grand strategy.

As regards Indonesia, only few works have been dedicated to the topic of grand strategy. One example is the work of Balaji Chandramohan. In *Indonesia's Evolving Grand Strategy: Foreign Powers*, Chandramohan (2014) examines the country's changing grand

¹³ One example is the work of Betts. In his recent work, Betts outlines three obstacles that often hinder democratic great powers in choosing and executing their grand strategies, namely, the influence of elections and public opinion, frequent leadership turnover, and the constitutional dispersion of policymaking power (Balzacq & Krebs, 2021). For other works on U.S.' grand strategy see Gaddis (2005), Dueck (2006), Layne (2006), Leffler and Legro (2008), Trubowitz (2011), Taliaferro et al. (2012), Wololfson (2012), Brands (2014), Dueck (2015), Martel (2015), Kang (2017), Brands (2018), Balzacq et al. (2019), Miller and Rubinovitz (2020), and Shively (2020). For Russia's (and the Soviet Union's) grand strategy, see, for example, MacDonald (1984), Luttwak (1984), Starr and Cornell (2014), and Balzacq et al. (2019). For Britain's grand strategy see Murray et al. (2012) Taliaferro et al. (2012), and Balzacq et al. (2019). For China's grand strategy, see Swaine and Tellis (2000), Zhang (2015), Balzacq et al. (2019), and Scobell et al. (2020).

¹⁴ For grand strategies in ancient or classical times, see LeDone (2003), Luttwak (2009), Hill (2010), Freedman (2013), Murray and Sinnreich (2014), Rahe (2015), and Gaddis (2018).

strategy, especially with respect to several foreign powers such as the U.S., China, Australia, and India. Vibanshu Shekhar has also provided a significant contribution to the study of Indonesia's grand strategy. In his work on *Indonesia's Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century*, Shekhar (2018) offers an extensive examination of the development of Indonesia's foreign policy and grand strategy in the post-Suharto era, by also focusing on the external factors that drives the emergence and change of the country's foreign policy and grand strategy. The recent work of Michael Hatherell and Alaistair Welsh on *The Struggle for the National Narrative in Indonesia* can also be a reference to the study of Indonesia's grand strategy. In their work, Hatherell and Welsh (2020) discuss how national narratives shape not only domestic politics, but also the country's foreign policy and the practice of grand strategy. Besides the work by non-Indonesian nationals, the work on Indonesia's grand strategy has also been conducted by Indonesian scholar as in the edited work of Atmadji Sumarkidjo and Ian Montratama (2020) on *Strategi Raya Menuju Satu Abad Indonesia Tahun 2045* (trans. "Grand Strategy Toward One Century of Indonesia 2045").

I.4.c The Link Between Policy Entrepreneurship and the Strategic Behaviour of the States

Policy entrepreneurship is usually associated with advocating for policy change. This policy change may occur either as a short-term policy, mid-term, or long-term policy. Though policy entrepreneurship is not always responsible for all policy change, the concept is still useful in understanding the dynamics in policy process that may result in the change or emergence of a particular policy, including grand strategy.

Originating from the field of economics, the term "policy entrepreneurship" was previously known as "political entrepreneur", a term firstly used by Schumpeter (1942) and later popularised following the research by Robert Dahl (1961). Dahl (1961) portrays "political entrepreneurs" as leaders who possess the trait of resourcefulness, creativity, and opportunism, thereby exhibiting the capacity to optimise and exploit available resources to the maximum. Dahl (1961) employs the theory when examining a political change — a shift of political leadership from patrician families to Irish immigrants — occurring in New Haven.

Nevertheless, Dahl's definition of political entrepreneurship was frequently conflated with the concept of political leadership. Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis (2012: 601) identify three factors that contribute to this misconception. The first factor concerns the attributes shared by both concepts, such as interpersonal skills that exist in both leaders and

entrepreneurs. The second factor is the possibility of the two roles existing within a single individual. In this context, a person can be a leader and entrepreneur concomitantly. The final factor attributes a means of labelling a political actor as either a leader or an entrepreneur.

Since Dahl's seminal study, the concept of "entrepreneurship" has been integrated and frequently used to examine policy process and change in multiple case studies across the field of political science, public administration, and public policy (Roberts & King, 1991). One example can be found in the work of Mark Schneider and Paul Teske (1992), who aimed to examine the practice of political entrepreneurship in the dynamics of local politics by identifying the condition that may give rise to political entrepreneurship in local politics. As well as political and policy entrepreneurship, the concept is also identified and known by names such as *public entrepreneurs*,¹⁵ *evolutionary policy maker*,¹⁶ *executive entrepreneur*,¹⁷ and *institutional entrepreneurship*.¹⁸

Scholars have also used the concepts of policy and political entrepreneur interchangeably. For these scholars, both concepts (political and policy entrepreneurship) share similar core values that consider the "entrepreneurs" in politics as the driving force of change, either in the form of a policy shift or institutional change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). The work of Adam D. Sheingate (2003) represents this category, wherein he applies both concepts interchangeably when examining the link between the activity of political/policy entrepreneurship with institutional change in American politics. Though there is not a fixed definition of both concepts, for the purpose of clarity, this research uses the term policy entrepreneurship in referring to policy change instead of political entrepreneurship, which has a broader meaning and may encompass other topics such as leadership and institutional change.

Michael Mintrom and Phillipa Norman (2009: 649) identify policy entrepreneurship as the activity of advocating policy change, and policy entrepreneurs as the "highly motivated individuals" who attract "attention to policy problems, present innovative solutions, build coalitions of supporters, and secure legislative action. For John W. Kingdon (2014), these motivated, highly talented individuals may emerge from any sector of society, not only

¹⁵ See, for example, Ostrom (2005) and Schnellenbach (2007).

¹⁶ See, for example, Witt (2003).

¹⁷ See, for example, Roberts and King (1991).

¹⁸ See, for example, Campbell (2004).

individuals within the government, but also from organizations and civil society. Kingdon (2014: 115; 122; 143) further argues that similar to their counterparts in the business context, policy entrepreneurs are also motivated “to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope of a future return”. However, though the term may be applied in a broader context, it does not mean that it be employed indiscriminately. Similar to the argument that entrepreneurs may not always be credited for all the changes or innovations occur in the field of business, policy entrepreneurs do not always drive policy change.

In IR scholarship, the concept of policy entrepreneurs is used to explain the dynamics behind the change of the state’s strategic behaviour. Thompson (2016) provides an example of the application of the concept in the examination of U.S. grand strategy. In investigating the shift of U.S. grand strategy during 1920-1945, Thompson proposes the use of Kingdon’s analytical model of policy entrepreneurship. Kingdon (2014) observes the emergence of new policies from the conjunction of what he describes as the three process streams. For Kingdon (2014), these streams are separate and independent, consisting of problems, policies, and politics, wherein policy entrepreneurship works within the political stream.

Thompson (2016) argues that the topic of grand strategy is often connected with three points, namely the change of external environment (opportunity), threat perceptions (threat), and the state’s capacity (relative capability) to deal with them. Thompson (2016) treats change in the external (systemic) environment as a crucial element that could drive policymakers, which also includes policy entrepreneurs, to begin evaluating the current strategies and provide an opportunity for new strategies to be adopted. However, when new ideas and strategies emerge, they are not “automatically” adopted. New ideas are required to “win” over other competing ideas by assuring the policy community of their feasibility and relevance toward the existing problems. As Stewart Patrick (2009: xxiv-xxv) argues,

New ideas do not exert influence on their own, however. To compete successfully against rival beliefs and acquire political power within particular government, new policy ideas must first win over experts on the basis of their theoretical appeal and practical relevance, by offering a persuasive explanation for past shortcomings and solutions to current challenges. They must then accommodate or overwhelm the intellectual biases within state bureaucracies...

In this context, the role of policy entrepreneurs can be observed as interpreting

external environment, identifying challenges, and promoting new ideas to cope the rising problems. Aside from “selling” and advocating for new strategies, policy entrepreneurs are also expected to mobilize support and reduce the forces against the new ideas. While external shocks offer a window of opportunity for new strategies to emerge, domestic opposition may pose a risk for the new strategies to emerge. The greater the political opposition, the lesser the chance for the new strategies to be adopted. Policy entrepreneurs are, therefore, required to be skilful in building coalitions of supporters and securing legislative action (Mintrom & Norman, 2009).

Thompson (2016) argues that the difference on the nature of policy entrepreneurship in the 1920s and 1940s may be credited to two contradictory results. Thompson (2016) considers the 1920s policy entrepreneurs handicapped since they were unable either to sway the opposing forces or mobilize the support needed for the adoption of the new strategy. Though Wilson demonstrated his capacity as a key policy entrepreneur at the Versailles treaty, his firm, inflexible approach has incapacitated his efforts to make an important deal with the Republican opposition in the Senate (Thompson, 2016). Wilson’s failure to diminish domestic opposition eventually resulted in the rejection of new strategy.

By comparison, the 1940s policy entrepreneurs were shown to be more powerful since they could mobilize support and diminish the domestic opposition. The success of policy entrepreneurs to advocate for new strategies have resulted in the shift of US grand strategy. Nevertheless, Thompson does not credit policy entrepreneurship as the only factor that fails or drives the shift in the US grand strategy. In his effort to postulate a more balanced approach, Thompson (2016) accounts four other factors that he believes to also determine the success or failure of a shift in grand strategy, namely the perception of threat and state’s capability, shocks, domestic contestation (support-opposition), and reinforcement.

Both external and domestic shocks are important “ingredients” of policy entrepreneurship. Similar to the argument asserting that “new ideas do not exert influence on their own” (Patrick, 2009: xxiv), external and internal shocks do not always “naturally” result in strategy change. Human agency is required to recognize these moments as windows of opportunity and capture these opportunities to bring forward (new) ideas and policies. The ability to identify and seize moments is considered by Mintrom and Norman (2009) as a crucial skill that policy entrepreneurs are required to possess.

In the US grand strategy shift during the 1940s, the attack on several American ships

by the German navy and the Pearl Harbour attack provided the “internationalists” the “opening” and legitimation to advance their ideas. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbour, the late 1930s survey data demonstrated the existence of significant opposition towards the idea of changing the US isolationist grand strategy (Thompson, 2016). However, public opinion dramatically changed following the attack on the US military base in the Pacific (Thompson, 2016).

Jeffrey A. Frieden (1998) points out that the Great Depression weakened the status quo — those who supported the isolationist US — that previously remained relatively powerful.¹⁹ The battle between the two positions over US foreign policymaking, in fact, had been taking place since the end of World War I. This domestic shock, along with an external shock, gave an opening for the internationalist groups to reshape both policy and policy network, which eventually led to the change of US grand strategy.

Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2012) also use the concept of policy entrepreneurship to seek a more balanced explanation of the shift of Greek foreign policy reflected in the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the late 1990s. While Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2012) do not credit policy entrepreneurship as the only factor for the shift of Greece’s foreign policy, their study highlights the contribution of policy entrepreneurship in the policy process. The authors account the ability of policy entrepreneurs to the exploitation of two windows of opportunity, namely the escalation in the Greco-Turkish relations in 1996 and the devastating earthquake of 1999, which lowered the high entry barriers to instigate foreign policy change (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2012)

Charles-Philippe David (2015) also highlights the significance of policy entrepreneurs in the reorientation of the U.S. national security under the Bush Jr. administration. David (2015) examines the success of policy entrepreneurs in framing and reorienting the country’s national security policy in two case studies, namely the invasion of Iraq and the legal redefinition of torture. For David (2015), the key to success of policy entrepreneurs to pull the U.S. government policy in accordance with their preference is located in the ability of these individuals to exploit the environment of the decision-making system and control the policy process.

Policy entrepreneurship is found influencing and shaping the formation of state’s

¹⁹ See also Gourevich (1986).

foreign policy from not only inside of the executive, but also legislative. Ralph G. Carter *et.al.* (2004) elaborate on the historical development of policy entrepreneurs of the U.S. Congress and how these individuals influence and shape U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II. Similar conclusions can also be found in the work of Jeffrey S. Lantis (2019), who provides a more contemporary study of the new generation of foreign policy entrepreneurs in the U.S. Congress. This study focuses on how the junior members of the U.S. Congress advance their ideas and shape the policymaking for U.S. foreign policy (Lantis, 2019). For Lantis (2019), the examination on the activism of these junior congressmen is intriguing as previous examinations on the policy advocacy in the U.S. Congress have focused on seniority, party discipline, and the firm institutional system of Congress.

The latest work of Haacke (2021) also provides a rich analysis that links policy entrepreneurs with the shift in the state's foreign policy orientation. By taking a case study on the shift of US policy towards Myanmar during the Obama administration, Haacke (2021) does not only focuses on the work of policy entrepreneurs in optimizing the window of opportunity that resulted in the change in US foreign policy on Myanmar. His work also examines the policy window itself, which has often been neglected by both scholars of international relations, political science, and public policy.

I.4.d Understanding GMF

Since its emergence in late 2014, GMF has drawn significant attention from a wider audience, not only within Indonesia, but also from neighbouring countries. This attention has manifested itself in the emergence of numerous works that aim to investigate the grand strategy, particularly during its early years. Some works have attempted to comprehend GMF by examining its external and internal objectives and orientation, as well as the pillars that constitute the grand strategy (Shekhar & Liow, 2014; Piesse, 2015; Sambhi, 2015; Saha, 2016b).

Other research has focused on the novelty of the GMF. From this aspect, three broad interpretations have emerged. The first interpretation views the GMF as a new overarching doctrine (Priyambodo, 2014; Yakti & Susanto, 2017). The second considers the GMF as a continuation of the previous administration's policy rather than a novel product of statecraft (Supriyanto, 2016). For this group, the only difference between GMF and previous policies resides in how Indonesia's maritime domain is governed. The third perspective includes

individuals who do not view GMF as genuinely new, but who still consider the novelty of some of its principles that cannot be found in previous policies. Premesha Saha (2015: 5) describes this characteristic of GMF as “an old wine in a new bottle”. Policies related to maritime affairs resembling some of GMF’s pillars can generally be found in the previous administrations, especially in the post-authoritarian era. In fact, the fall of the New Order, which led to the retreat of Indonesian army from the national politics and policymaking, has reemphasized the importance of Indonesia’s maritime domain and allowed topics related to maritime affairs to return to the frontline of the national strategic thinking (Liow & Shekhar, 2014).²⁰ A major breakthrough in the appreciation of maritime field occurred during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) two-term leadership (Liow & Shekhar, 2014).

Another example can be found in the domain of foreign policy. The Yudhoyono administration began to recognize the importance of the Indian Ocean region to Indonesia’s strategic thinking, particularly after the tsunami that hit the north-western part of Sumatera in 2004. During his second term, Yudhoyono’s Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, introduced the “Indo-Pacific-Indo” initiative (Natalegawa, 2013). Though there are some key differences between Natalegawa’s and Widodo’s “Indo-Pacific” concept, both share similarity in emphasizing the necessity to expand the canvas of Indonesia’s foreign policy beyond its conventional focus of the ASEAN and the Pacific.

Other existing studies concern over the core idea of GMF. The prevailing argument presumes that the central point of GMF is located in Widodo’s intentions to embed a maritime psyche, not only to his administration, but also in the mental map of the broader Indonesian population. Ilish Gindarsah and Andhi Priamarizki (2015), for example, consider that the basic tenet of GMF is to foster Indonesia’s maritime culture and identity, reemphasising the prolonged archipelagic outlook. Through GMF, they argue, Widodo attempts to reassert the importance of Indonesia’s maritime domain and to consider Indonesia’s waters a strength rather than a weakness (Gindarsah & Priamarizki, 2015).

Several scholars perceive the economic motive as the principal objective of GMF (SindoNews, 2014). This assumption is derived from one of its pillars, namely, to boost the local economy and reduce the logistics cost through the improvements in maritime infrastructure and interconnectivity. This argument, therefore, interprets the emergence of

²⁰ See also Kingsbury (2003).

GMF as a shift in the orientation of Indonesia's economic and development policy from land-centric to maritime-oriented development (Liow & Shekhar, 2014). Similarly, Andrew Wiguna Mantong, an Indonesian scholar, also considers GMF as an economics/development-driven project rather than an overarching grand strategy (RSIS, 2015). This argument is based on GMF's goal to obtain benefits from Indonesia's maritime domain by increasing the efficiency and effectivity of Indonesia's port management system as to stimulate and bolster maritime trade.

Another interpretation on GMF comes from one of Indonesia's prominent policy practitioners, Ambassador Arif Havas Oegroseno, then Deputy Minister for Maritime Sovereignty of the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs. Oegroseno argues that, to understand GMF, one should see the emergence of GMF from a broader perspective and situate it in the context of Indonesia's attempt at recreating its maritime legacy (RSIS, 2015). For Oegroseno, GMF represents the following three points (RSIS, 2015).

First, GMF highlights the importance of developing the country's maritime identity as also stipulated in one of its pillars. Second, GMF highlights the importance to engage regionally. In this sense, through GMF, Indonesia is encouraged to actively engage in regional affairs, not only because the implementation of the grand strategy requires this effort, but also because of the country's geo-strategic characteristics located at the crossroads of two continents and oceans. Third, the importance of GMF as the building blocks for the country's long-term maritime policy (RSIS, 2015).

Another way to understand GMF is to see it as an overarching concept. Rizal Sukma, a prominent Indonesian scholar and the President's foreign policy advisor, as well as one of GMF's architects, proposes three ways to understand the doctrine (Sukma, 2014). First, GMF should be seen as a representation of Indonesia's ultimate dreams and aspirations of becoming a respected maritime power. For Indonesia, its intention to grow as a global maritime power is not oriented neither at igniting regional instability nor at promoting an arms race (Sukma, 2014; Kemhan, 2015: 2). Instead, GMF is mainly aimed at transforming Indonesia into a unified maritime state with a prosperous population and an elevated status in regional and global affairs (Sukma, 2014).

Second, GMF can be seen as a political doctrine that provides a sense of common purpose. As a political doctrine, GMF underlines the geographical and geostrategic position of Indonesia as a political entity at the crossroads of the two continents and oceans.

Therefore, while the future of Indonesia is influenced by the dynamic of this geographical context, Indonesia should also be able to shape and influence the region's future. Third, Sukma (2014) suggests perceiving GMF as a grand strategy, asserting that GMF not only discusses rhetorical aspirations, but also provides further elaboration on how to attain these aspirations through working agendas that are not only limited to a particular sector, such as the economy, but also encompass other aspects such as foreign policy and defence. Sukma's (2014) definition provides an understanding that GMF is neither a domestic (development) policy nor Indonesia's new foreign policy; it is an overarching grand strategy that encompasses multiple sectors oriented at attaining Indonesia's aspirations, both domestically and internationally.

Thus, is GMF a grand strategy? For this research, GMF will be considered as Indonesia's grand strategy for two reasons. The first reason builds on Sukma's definition of GMF as the country's ultimate aspiration, political doctrine, and -more importantly- the country's grand strategy. Sukma's argument on GMF can be accepted as the most valid and plausible definition of GMF. The validity of Sukma's argument on GMF as a grand strategy comes not only from his proximity to Widodo, as one of the president's closest aids, but also because of his role as one of GMF architects.

Second, GMF meets the criteria of a grand strategy defined by Silove. Not only does GMF have all the "characteristics of grandness" of a grand strategy, namely the lengthier time-period (represented by its long-term programs), overarching scope (reflected by its multiple scope of areas), and the existence of priority goals (reflected by its five pillars), GMF also has the three functions of grand strategy as described in Silove's definition. In the first definition, GMF serves as the grand plan for developing Indonesia into a respected maritime power. Though GMF did not have any detailed blueprint when it was first launched in November 2014, it clearly mentioned the general agendas it had in five areas (the pillars of GMF) before being further elaborated in the Indonesian Sea Policy.²¹

Besides as a grand plan, GMF also outlines the country's grand principles. As Sukma (2014) elaborated previously, GMF serves as the country's shared principle or strategic doctrine oriented at guiding Indonesia's strategic thinking and policymaking. Lastly, GMF can also be considered as a reflection of Indonesia's (grand) strategic behaviour. Not only Sukma's

²¹ See Chapter 7 for further elaboration on the articulation of GMF.

argument on GMF has indicated that notion, Jokowi's introduction of GMF during the 9th East Asia Summit (EAS) also mentioned GMF as Indonesia's strategic behaviour. During the event Jokowi clearly stated that the increasing dynamics in the Asia-Pacific, both geopolitical and geoeconomics, along with the country's position at the crossroad and centre of these dynamics have driven Indonesia to formulate a new overarching strategy that is oriented to transform the country into a maritime power (Witular, 2014b).

All in all, the existence of Silove's "grand characteristics" and the three forms/functions of grand strategy in GMF thus do not only eliminate the assumption that GMF is merely another type of policy, be it foreign policy, domestic policy, infrastructure/development policy, or economic policy, but also confirm GMF's position as a grand strategy.

I.5 Analytical Framework²²

As this study seeks to examine the emergence and implementation of state strategic behaviour, the focus of the study will be directed at examining the dynamics within the state as the place where the strategic behaviour is made and implemented. For this reason, the study employs a Neoclassical Realist framework, whereby its principal premise links systemic factors with domestic variables in examining the formation and implementation of a state strategic behaviour. This study argues that the examination of the decision making and the implementation of GMF cannot be divorced from the domestic context of Indonesia.

The use of Neoclassical Realist approach in this study is therefore driven by a consideration that this approach emphasizes the key role of domestic-level variables in mediating systemic factors both in the formulation and implementation of state strategic behaviour, including grand strategy (Rose, 1998; Lobell et al., 2009; Ripsman, 2011; Ripsman et al., 2016). In investigating the emergence of GMF, the study examines the external environment as the context for GMF emergence. The study, therefore, identifies two external factors that are presumed by the study to stimulate the formulation of GMF. These two external factors are the rise of China and the increasing salience of the regional maritime domain.

²² Further elaboration is offered in the following chapter.

However, as the study argues, the existence of these systemic imperatives did not automatically lead to the formulation of GMF, which specifically can be seen from the fact that, while these external factors were also visible to other countries in the sub-region of Southeast Asia, it was Indonesia as the first and only country that formulated a maritime-based grand strategy. Against this backdrop, the study sees the importance of going beyond “black-boxing” state and delving into the process that occurs inside of the state. However, the study does not overlook nor underrate the role of external factors in the emergence of GMF.

For this research, external factors are mediated by the country’s elites, as the first recipients of these external stimuli. Like foreign policy and defence policy, this research argues that grand strategy is also an affair of the elites (Hill, 2003; Brawley, 2010; Novotny, 2010). As grand strategy, along with foreign policy and defence policy, falls under the prerogative of a small group of decision-makers, the research explores the central role of these elites in the making of this particular state strategic behaviour, by transmitting and translating external stimuli before processing them into strategic policy. Based on this interaction, the study seeks to examine how these stimuli drive the country’s elites in the field of foreign policy and defence to formulate a maritime-based grand strategy.

Beside systemic factors, the study also examines the domestic context that has led to the formulation of GMF. The study identifies three domestic factors that enabled the emergence of GMF. First, the 2014 Presidential Election. The second factor is the dissatisfaction over the orientation of the country’s development, which is not only Java-centric, but also land-centric (Bhinadi, 2003; Kusumastanto, 2010; Yuliadi, 2012; Widodo & JK, 2014; Laksmana et al., 2018), and the third the presence of “*negara-lemah* (weak-state)” mentality identified in the previous administration. For this study, these three domestic factors enabled the emergence of GMF in two ways, firstly by strengthening the systemic factors and shaping the perception of individuals responsible for devising the grand strategy.

In this sense, the domestic factors do not only emphasise the importance of maritime domain for Indonesia and the need to develop this domain due to the increasing regional dynamics centred on maritime affairs, but also increase the urgency for policy change by exhibiting the failure of the previous policies in solving the country’s problems. Secondly, domestic factors also provide a window of opportunity for the grand strategy to emerge. In this context, the study identifies that, along with the change in administration resulting from

the 2014 Presidential Election, new ideas have also been allowed to rise and thrive. This window of opportunity provides the incentives for individuals disappointed with old policies to formulate and advocate for new policies in an attempt to push for policy change.

Beside Neoclassical Realism, this study also uses the concept of policy entrepreneurship in examining GMF formation. In this study, the concept of policy entrepreneurship is used to explain both the individuals behind the advocacy of GMF idea and their strategy to advance GMF idea. While the study acknowledges the role of elites' perceptions in mediating external stimuli and imperatives, it also acknowledges that the perceptions of Indonesian policy elites are never unified and singular. In this sense, the research recognizes the existence of other different elites' perceptions that exist in the same time frame when the GMF emerged. Since grand strategy is also the affairs of the elites, its formulation cannot also be separated from the competition of ideas deriving from the perceptions of the elites responsible for the making of the country's foreign policy (Brawley, 2010; Novotny, 2010). This matches with Patrick's analysis (2009: xxiv) arguing that since "new ideas do not exert influence on their own" they "must first win over experts on the basis of their appeal and practical relevance" before being accepted and acquire political power.

In investigating the difficult concretisation of GMF in the field of foreign policy and defence, the study does not only focus on assessing the progress of GMF implementation, on how many programmes or activities have been executed in the field of foreign policy and defence, but also seeks to examine the articulation of GMF. For the study, the examination of policy implementation cannot be separated from the examination of policy formulation as the process of designing and making of a policy shapes the quality of the policy intended to be implemented (Grindle, 1980; Hogwood & Gun, 1986; Fischer et al., 2007; McConnell, 2010b; Fitzgerald et al., 2011; McConnell, 2015). Therefore, this study examines the domestic context, not only wherein the implementation takes place, but also wherein grand strategy is formulated.

Bureaucratic politics and civil-military relations are the two concepts used to investigate the complex concretisation of GMF in the field of foreign policy and defence. Based on the first concept, the study aims to explain how the dynamics among government institutions and the elites within these institutions play a significant role in hindering the implementation of GMF. Focusing on the second, the study seeks to analyse how the

relationship between the country's civilian elites and military institution impedes the implementation of GMF in foreign policy and defence.

I.6 Methodology

This section elaborates on the methods and methodology used within this research and the reasoning behind their uses. John Gering (2012) distinguishes between methods and methodology, defining methods as a certain means to acquire and process data or information and methodology as the art of choosing a particular method, or research enterprise, and the justification for using it.

In terms of methodology, this research relies on qualitative approach. As a qualitative study, the principal goal of this research is to explain the outcomes of individual/single case or case studies using the causes-of-effects approach.²³ James Mahoney and Garry Goertz contend (2006: 230) the following: “[a] central purpose of research is to identify the causes of these specific outcomes for each and every case that falls within the scope of the theory under investigation.” Furthermore, as Neoclassical Realism falls within the causes-of-effects approach (Ripsman et al., 2016), the application of Neoclassical Realism within this research will also require the usage of qualitative method.²⁴ In the words of Ripsman et al. (2016: 131):

“Since Neoclassical Realism requires researchers to investigate, among other factors, the role of idiosyncratic state institutions and processes on policy choices, it lends itself to careful, qualitative case studies, rather than large-N quantitative analysis.”

The research examines the factors behind the emergence or formation of the GMF under Widodo administration and the rationale behind its minimalist implementation in the field of foreign policy and defence. To investigate the argument and rationale behind these phenomena the thesis aims to look for not only *what* answers, such as “*what is the origin of the GMF?*”, “*what causes the GMF to emerge?*” and “*what causes the implementation of the grand strategy remains minimalist?*”, but also *why* and *how* answers, such as “*why did the GMF only emerge during Widodo's leadership?*”, “*why did it not emerge during the previous administration?*”, “*why did Widodo only have a maritime-based grand strategy during the*

²³ For further details on the difference between qualitative and quantitative methodology, see Geertz and Mahoney (2012).

²⁴ Notwithstanding the fact that Neoclassical Realist model is more inclined to qualitative methods, its positivist key elements certainly allow the usage of quantitative methods to examine a particular phenomenon or phenomena. See Lobell et al. (2009) and Ripsman et al. (2016).

presidential election?”, and *“why is the implementation of the GMF in foreign and defence policy difficult?”*

In doing so, the research employs two qualitative methods for data collection, namely process tracing and in-depth interview. Collier (2011: 824) defines process tracing as an “analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence—often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena.” Another definition is proposed by Bennett and Brunnett, who perceive process tracing as a method that employs “histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources” to identify the causal relationship in a particular case implied by the theory and examine to what extent the intervening variables affect that particular case (2005: 6). Ripsman et al. (2016: 132) describe process tracing as “the most appropriate strategy” to examine the causal chains in a small N-case study.

For this research, process tracing should not only be used to trace and identify which variables or conditions that have correlations with the dependent variable(s), but also to thoroughly examine, if not test, whether these variables and conditions have indeed the causal impact on the dependent variable(s) as well as discerning how this causal impact works, thus confirming the hypothesis of the research (Mahoney, 2015). In practice, in identifying the variables, independent and intervening, the research does not only look on the correlations between the variables and the research topic, the emergence and (minimalist) implementation of GMF, but also examine whether the absence of these variables would still result to the emergence of the research topic.

In the aspect of GMF emergence and formulation for instance, the research finds that without the presence of the increasing salience of the regional maritime domain and the rise of China, as the independent variables, GMF would not likely emergence. For the research, the fact that Indonesia had never adopted a maritime-based grand strategy until recently (despite its geographical features that have always been dominated by water and its well-known search for international recognition as an archipelagic state), indicates that the formation of GMF was initially stimulated by the changing environment outside of Indonesia.

In applying the process tracing method, this research draws on the documentary sources. Documentary sources consist of both primary and secondary sources. The documentary sources used in this thesis constitute of government archives, texts, press

releases, campaign materials, presentations at high-level policy forums, news articles, and academic literature.

The second method is in-depth interviews, which are used to extract specific information from a particular individual or group of individuals. While in-depth interviews are also used in the process tracing, to identify variables and examine their causal impact with the research topic, the research also uses this method to obtain insight from the individuals that were involved or have the expertise on the research topic. In this way, through in-depth interviews the research does not only aim to acquire knowledge regarding the sequence or process of how GMF was formed, but also to acquire insights about the logic that motivated and drove the action. In the words of Ripsman et al. (2016: 131-132):

“Because Neoclassical Realism requires researchers to answer questions about the reasons why particular policies were selected, it requires them to get inside the black box of the state to examine the decision-making processes of particular states to determine why they did what they did and whether the researcher’s variables of interest were at all relevant to their decisions.”

Prior to conducting in-depth interviews, I shortlisted several individuals that would become my targeted interlocutors. I proceeded on the basis that not all the individuals within Jokowi’s circle would have had the knowledge, experience, and more importantly influence both in the formulation and implementation of GMF. As Ripsman et al. (2016: 123-124) state:

“After all, many individuals inside and outside of the government have an interest in foreign policy and make statements about policy, yet not all of these actors have meaningful input into policymaking, nor are they necessarily aware of the true rationale behind policies selected.”

There are two groups of individuals that become the targeted respondents for this research. The first group consists of individuals who were directly involved, be it in the formulation or implementation of GMF. The individuals from this group range from those who had joined Widodo since the presidential campaign in 2014 as members of his campaign team and served as his policy advisors to those who joined later when Jokowi assumed power. The second group consists of individuals that may not have been directly involved in the formation and execution of the grand strategy but possess significant knowledge with respect to the issue. These individuals are not only limited to those outside of the government such as scholars and practitioners but also government officials. These individuals’ perspectives are

also critical in obtaining more extensive and unbiased information that can support the information collected from the previous group of respondents.

All the interviews conducted for this research have previously passed the consent of the targeted respondents, particularly high-ranking officials. In total, the research has conducted eight major interviews with several key interlocutors. While most of the in-depth interviews used within the research followed the semi-structured model of doing interviews, the research also conducted open interviews. These interviews provided the opportunity to obtain knowledge regarding the sequence or process of a particular event by allowing the respondents to discuss in-depth the topic that was being asked. This for example in the case related to the discussion that preceded the birth of GMF.

The author's appointment to the office of the Commission I of the House of the Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia in 2020 has also allowed the author to gain empirical insights about Indonesia's foreign policy and the defence policy process. As the commission dealing with Foreign Policy, Defence, Maritime Security, and Intelligence, the author had the opportunity to attend public and closed-door hearings, and to acquire first-hand information relevant to the research topic. Furthermore, the appointment to the office of the Commission I also allowed the author to obtain the opportunity to interact and build connection with prominent and high-ranking individuals in the country's strategic policymaking who became the points of contact for additional information and insight.

I.7 The Contribution of the Study

This study offers two main contributions. The first contribution of this study is the empirical contribution. Through the topic of GMF, the study seeks to enrich the limited discussion on grand strategy making (or shift) of non-great powers. Since grand strategy has been often associated with great powers, there has been far less focus on investigating the formation of non-great powers' grand strategies. This is true also for Indonesia. By using a combined analytical framework, the study does not only offer an analysis of grand strategy making solely focusing on external environment, but of how domestic variables of non-great powers affect and shape the process. Besides grand strategy making, the study also seeks to contribute empirically to the neglected topic of grand strategy implementation, especially of non-great powers. Within this topic, the study does not only seek to enrich to the analysis of how a non-great power implements its grand strategy, but also seeks to assess and examine

why the implementation of grand strategy may prove difficult.

The empirical contribution of this dissertation aims to enrich the study of Indonesia's grand strategy, both the formation and implementation, especially in the post-authoritarian era. As previously mentioned within this chapter, there has been an attempt to examine the topic in recent years. Nevertheless, studies of Indonesia's grand strategy remain limited to date, especially when juxtaposed with other topics, like foreign policy.²⁵

While the work of Chandramohan (2014) focuses on Indonesia's grand strategy, the work itself is very limited as it is in the form of a brief policy paper rather than a comprehensive academic literature. The work of Hatherell and Welsh (2020) also cannot provide a comprehensive examination on Indonesia's grand strategy as it does not specifically and deeply address the topic of Indonesia's grand strategy. Though it gives insight on how national narrative shapes Indonesia's foreign policy and grand strategy, the work does not examine how a grand strategy is made or emerges let alone how it is implemented. Similarly, the edited work of Sumarkidjo and Montratama (2020) also lacks the analysis on grand strategy making or implementation, as it only discusses the challenges that Indonesia is facing throughout the 21st century without touching the formulation aspect of grand strategy.

The only academic work that the research considers provides an extensive examination of Indonesia's grand strategy in the post-Suharto era, at least until this research is made, is the work of Shekhar (2018). Nevertheless, Shekhar's work does not focus in-depth on the policymaking of grand strategy, or how the development of the country's external environment was translated into grand strategy. This is all the more important as Shekhar explicitly states that his work draws on Neoclassical Realism. In addition, Shekhar's work also leaves the topic of grand strategy implementation essentially untouched. Against this backdrop, this dissertation aims to fill the lacuna on the study of Indonesia's recent grand strategy in terms of not only covering the conditions that have led to the emergence and shift of grand strategy in the context of Indonesia, but also the implementation of grand strategy. In addition, unlike Shekhar's work, this research is a single case study research, focusing only the first term of Jokowi presidency, that offers a much deeper investigation on a particular case of Indonesia's grand strategy, the GMF.

²⁵ For example, see the seminal work of Leifer (1993) for research on Indonesia's foreign policy during the Old and New Order era, and Wibisono (2009) and Wirajuda (2014) for Indonesia's foreign policy in the post-Suharto era (after the New Order).

Besides making an empirical contribution, the research also seeks to contribute to the theorization of grand strategy making and implementation. Utilizing the concept of policy entrepreneurship in examining the GMF's emergence, the study also adds to the theorization of grand strategy formulation by incorporating policy entrepreneurship within the analysis. Though the concept of policy entrepreneurship is relatively common in political science, public policy, and even in foreign policy, the use of policy entrepreneurship remains limited in the study of grand strategy making.

The employment of policy entrepreneurship is aimed to deepen the analysis of grand strategy formation that does not only focus on the role of systemic and domestic factors in shaping its formation, but also on particular individuals who are able to link between particular solutions with policy problems and the stream politics as elaborated by Kingdon (2014). In respect to grand strategy implementation, the study also seeks to contribute – to the limited numbers of studies examining grand strategy implementation – not only in descriptive terms but also in terms of the analysis of why a particular grand strategy may prove difficult to be implemented.

I.8. Study Limitations

The Covid-19 pandemic significantly impacted research for this dissertation. First, while the study examines GMF implementation, it does not offer any assessment of GMF implementation during Jokowi's second term of presidency. The main reason for this limitation is because Jokowi just started his second term by the end of this study and thus it is difficult, if not impossible, for the research to assess and evaluate the implementation of GMF that are still in taken place during Jokowi's second term.

Second, as the study primarily focuses on the assessment of GMF implementation in the dimension of foreign policy and defence, the study does not cover the examination of GMF implementation in other dimensions, such as economy, infrastructure, and culture. This is because this study was designed to contribute to some literatures within International Relations.

Third, as the study examines the domination of the Army's particular doctrines that impede GMF concretisation in the field of foreign policy and defence, the study does not specifically cover the origin of these doctrines, especially in the administration of foreign policy. In this context, the study does not see the aforementioned issue as critical for the

examination of the research topic as examining the origins of the Army's doctrine will not only go beyond the scope of this research but could distort the focus of the research. Because of this consideration, the study therefore did not include the issue within the analytical framework of the study, especially considering also the technical constraints of the study.

Overall, the study acknowledges the technical and non-technical limitations inherent with the study, and the potential expansion and richness of the research's scope and analysis with the inclusion of all aforementioned topics. Nevertheless, the study still considers that even with these limitations the study remains able to explain the phenomena behind the emergence of GMF and its difficult implementation within the dimension of foreign policy and defence.

I.9. The Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of seven chapters and starts with an **introduction** as Chapter 1. Chapter 2 presents the **theoretical framework** that elaborates on theories and concepts linked to the research topic. The chapter not only contains the reasoning for the use of the theories and concepts, but also aims to provide elaboration on how these theories and concepts are used to analyse the research topic and answer the research questions. The framework will serve as guidance in comprehending and examining the following empirical chapters.

The third chapter is the historical chapter that discusses **the evolution of Indonesia's grand strategy and the origins of Indonesia's maritime identity** throughout the history of contemporary Indonesia. As the first empirical chapter of the study, Chapter Three aims to provide an empirical elaboration on the transformation of Indonesia's grand strategy from one government to another. In addition, this chapter will also attempt to examine and locate the origin of maritime identity that serves as the foundation of GMF grand strategy.

The fourth chapter discusses **the external factors that have contributed to the emergence of GMF**. This chapter attempts to examine and analyse the external factors or known as the systemic factors argued by the study to stimulate the emergence of Indonesia's new grand strategy. In this chapter, this study aims to discuss how these external factors stimulate the formulation of GMF. Chapter 5 is dedicated to examining **the domestic factors that influence GMF**. As the study argues that systemic factors do not automatically or directly

lead to the formation of state's strategic behaviour, the study sees the importance of examining the domestic context surrounding the emergence of GMF grand strategy.

The sixth chapter elaborates on the topic of **GMF policymaking**. This chapter aims to examine the transformation of GMF from a campaign idea into actual policy. To achieve the aim of this chapter of analysing the transformation of the GMF, the chapter is divided into two sections. The first section looks at the actors involved and responsible for the emergence of GMF and the dynamics among these actors that led to the use of GMF as Widodo's flagship campaign programme. The second section of this chapter focuses on the analysis of GMF policymaking. In this section, the study aims to analyse the development of GMF from a policy idea into an actual government policy when Widodo took the (presidential) office in late 2014.

Chapter seven elaborates on the **implementation of GMF**. The chapter begins with an elaboration on the period immediately after GMF had been officially adopted as the country's new grand strategy. Following this section is an elaboration on the articulation of GMF as part of its implementation. Once GMF is articulated into more detailed programmes and activities, another section is oriented at elaborating on the execution of these programmes and activities in the field of foreign policy and defence.

Chapter eight serves as the final empirical chapter of the study. This chapter focuses on an **evaluation of GMF implementation**. To meet its objectives, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section is dedicated to examining the execution of GMF in the field of foreign policy and defence throughout Widodo's first term of presidency. In the second section, the study examines the factors that resulted in the minimalist implementation of GMF in the field of foreign policy and defence.

Chapter 9 is the **conclusion**. This chapter provides a summary of the study and the findings from examining the research topic. This chapter also provides further elaboration on the contributions of this study and other aspects of the research topic that are not covered in this study as a future research area.

CHAPTER II

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:

UNDERSTANDING GRAND STRATEGY MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter outlines the framework used to examine the research topic: the formation of the grand strategy and its implementation. The chapter is divided into four sections, each oriented around one of the aforementioned themes. This chapter begins with a section dedicated to elaborating Neoclassical Realism. In this section, the chapter aims to address not only the theory and its operationalisation in this study, but also the justification for using the theory. An extensive overview of other theories that may seem helpful to examine the research topic but certainly will lead to misguided analysis will also be a part of this section. The use of Neoclassical Realism in this research is oriented at providing an analytical framework that can be used to examine the rationale behind the emergence of GMF and the implementation of GMF as Indonesia's grand strategy.

The second section of the chapter elaborates on the concept of policy entrepreneurship. While Neoclassical Realism may provide an explanation of the context, be it in external or internal environment of the state, that leads to the emergence of the grand strategy, it is incapable of explaining the rise and transformation of GMF from policy idea into grand strategy. The concept aims to analyse the action of certain individuals, namely the architects of GMF, in advocating for and advancing the policy idea of GMF as so to be accepted and chosen as the country's new grand strategy.

The third and the final section of this chapter is discussing the analytical tools used to approach the second research question on complex GMF implementation in the field of foreign policy and defence. For this reason, the study applies the theory of bureaucratic politics and the concept of civil-military relations as the analytical tools. Both the theory and concept are used to seek the rationale of GMF's complex implementation in these fields by investigating the dynamics that transpired during the implementation of GMF, as well as how these dynamics impacted the implementation of the grand strategy in the field of foreign policy and defence

II.1 Neoclassical Realism

II.1.a. Why Not Other Theories?

Before elaborating further on the application of Neoclassical Realism as the analytical framework of this research, it is necessary first to explain why other theories are insufficient in investigating GMF formation. The first theory that may explain the formation of GMF comes from the sub-field of foreign policy analysis (FPA).²⁶ The first analysis observes foreign policy using the Rational Actor Model (RAM), an approach founded on the theory of rational choice in the field of economics. This approach views states (and their leaders) as unitary and rational actors capable of correctly translating international imperatives, thus making them able to produce rational decisions through the maximisation of utility (Alden & Aran, 2017). However, applying this model as an analytical tool could lead to an erroneous analysis. If GMF is seen as a rational decision and the state as a unitary-rational actor, then why did not it emerge in the previous administrations? And why only Indonesia but not other countries sharing similar characteristics like the Philippines that is also an archipelagic country?

Another FPA theory that may be used to explain GMF emergence is the psychological or cognitive model of decision making. This model is a critique of the previous model emphasising the psychological aspects of decision making. The physiological model rejects the argument overemphasising rationality in decision making.²⁷ For this theory, as foreign policy is a man-made product, focusing on the nature of individual actors responsible for the policymaking is pivotal if one wants to understand why a particular country pursues a specific foreign policy. Similar logic is also presented by Valerie M. Hudson (2014: 4), stating that “the ground of international relations is human decision-makers” and contending the following (Hudson, 2014: 23):

The mind of foreign policymaker is not a tabula rasa: it contains complex and intricately related information and patterns, such as beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, traits, style, memory, and national and self-conceptions. Each decision maker’s mind is microcosm of the variety possible in a given society. Culture, history, geography, economics, political institutions, ideology, demographics, and innumerable other factors

²⁶ While FPA is a study of foreign policy, the subfield, along with other theories of foreign policy, may be used to examine the formation of grand strategy, not only because no theory specifically deals with grand strategy making, but also because of the similarities that grand strategy shares with foreign policy, given that both are part of a state’s (strategic) behaviour (Silove, 2018) and the product of statecraft or policy (Kennedy, 1991).

²⁷ For further details on this theory and its application in empirical research, see Brecher (1972) and Chan and Sylvan (1984).

shape the societal context in which the decision maker operates.

This study is also addressed by the scholar Robert Jervis, who is known for his studies on “misperception”. Jervis (1976) argues that foreign policymakers base their interpretation of external events and decisions on their personal understanding of the world instead of what is really happening (operational environment). This personal worldview stems from pre-existing beliefs — of other countries and the external environment in general — shaped over time by multiple factors. For this approach, the subjective and personal “images” of policymakers play a critical role in promoting “misperceptions” and hindering individual actors in formulating rational foreign policy (Boulding, 1959).

However, similar to RAM, the application of a psychological model as the analytical tool for this research is also unhelpful for three reasons. Firstly, GMF is a policy formulated by a group of people rather than a specific individual. While GMF is attributed to Widodo, the President’s limited foreign policy experience suggests that he did not play a significant role in the formulation of the doctrine. Second, even if the model could be extended to observe a foreign policy made by a group of individuals, it does not provide further elaboration on how to measure the impact of these psychological factors (images and perceptions) in foreign policymaking. Third, by putting too much emphasis on the psychological aspects of individual actors, the model downplays the significance of the operational environment in state foreign policy behaviour.

Ole Holsti (1970) criticises the way in which the psychological model addresses the nature and psychological aspects of the individual actor as the determinant variable of state behaviour. Holsti contends that since psychological factors (images and perceptions) do not emerge by themselves or are not produced by individual actors — they are socially constructed — foreign policy should not be examined by focusing solely on the individual. For him, to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the genesis of foreign policy, it is important to look at the other levels of analysis (Holsti, 1970). These other levels include the external environment and the institutional or organisational constraints wherein these psychological aspects operate.

As a part of FPA, *poliheuristic* theory is also a theory that can be used to examine formation of state strategic behaviour. Briefly, *poliheuristic* theory examines foreign policymaking by combining both the cognitive and rational decision-making approaches (Mintz, 2004; Alden & Aran, 2017). According to this theory, states’ elites formulate foreign

policy in a two-level system, where options and alternatives are filtered by a set of attributes. For this theory, as actors behind the decision making of states' foreign policy are political actors, they seek or protect their personal interests in the making of foreign policy. Therefore, domestic politics are considered by this theory as the "essence of decision", the primary consideration in the decision making of foreign policy (Mintz, 2004). This two-stage decision process consists of the following: (1) a selection phase to reject available alternatives whose consequences are deemed unacceptable by the political elites; and (2) a phase to select alternatives that maximise benefits while minimising risks (Mintz, 2004).

Similar to previous theories, the application of *poliheuristic* theory to examine the research topic may lead to a misleading analysis for two reasons. First, since *poliheuristic* theory is based on decision-making, it finds difficulty to provide an analysis external to the decision-making process, such as of factors that stimulate and drive the emergence of GMF and the dynamics that have led GMF to emerge. Second, the theory's emphasis on domestic politics as the primary consideration in making foreign policy cannot be applied to GMF. Though the introduction of GMF in Widodo's presidential campaign was also aimed at achieving electoral gain, GMF had little relevance to Indonesia's domestic politics, particularly during the presidential election because high-level policies such as grand strategy and foreign policy often do not buy public attention and interest unless they have direct consequences on daily lives (Aldrich et al., 1989; Wibisono, 2009).

The final theory from the sub-field of FPA that may seem useful to examine the emergence of GMF is the theory of bureaucratic politics. For this theory, since states are seen as a body consisting of different, independent, and competing units with their own values and perceptions of national interest, foreign policy decision making, thus, occurs mostly as a non-formal procedure. Furthermore, foreign policy outputs emerge from the bargaining and struggle of individuals or coalitions of individuals instead of from a formal chain of command (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1990). Though bureaucratic politics is applied in this study to examine GMF implementation (the second research question), the application of this theory to examine the emergence of GMF is considered misleading. One primary reason for the unsuitability of this theory is because GMF did not emerge from inside the state, wherein bureaucracies were not involved in the initial discussion and formulation of GMF. The role of bureaucracy begun when GMF was accepted as the country's new grand strategy, marked by Widodo's inauguration as Indonesia's President in 2014.

Applying foreign policy theories to examine the research topic will also result in a misguided analysis. One example is the foreign policy theories of *Innenpolitik*, which consists of a range of theories that emphasise the connection between state behaviour and domestic politics.²⁸ Though *Innenpolitik* theories favour different unit-level factors as independent variables, they share commonality in terms of the centrality of domestic politics in explaining state foreign policy behaviour. For *Innenpolitik* theories of foreign policy, domestic context, namely political system, socioeconomic structure, and ideology, determine state behaviour in international politics (Rose, 1998). Therefore, to understand why a particular country behaves in a specific way, *Innenpolitik* approach suggests a deeper examination of state, which structuralist theories neglect and consider a black box, by investigating principal domestic actors' preferences and configuration (Rose, 1998).

Innenpolitik theories generally share similar notions to the argument of the study, emphasising the significance of domestic factors in shaping a state's strategic behaviour. Nevertheless, the application of *Innenpolitik* to investigate the research topic is problematic. The study sees *Innenpolitik's* approach, which overestimates the role of domestic variables in the formulation of state's strategic behaviour, as well as its downplaying of the role of systemic constraints (Trubowitz, 2011) as a flaw that weakens the explanatory power of *Innenpolitik* in examining GMF formation.

One example of *Innenpolitik* theories is the theory of "diversionary war". The "diversionary theory of war", also referred to a "diversionary foreign policy", asserts that what drives the political elites of a state to pursue aggressive and adventurous foreign policies is an intention to divert public attention from internal economic and social problems, as well as to consolidate domestic political support (Midlarsky, 1989). For Jack Levy, the creation of a new external common enemy aims to provide a state's elites with a temporary relief for domestic failures (Midlarsky, 1989). A hypothesis known as the in-group/out-group or conflict-cohesion offers a sociological explanation of the motivation for this endeavour, arguing that the existence of an external enemy or conflict with an out-group tends to lead to internal cohesion (Kanat, 2013; Coser, 1956).

However, the "diversionary theory of war" is not applicable for the study. While GMF suggests the build-up of Indonesia's defence capabilities and industries, the grand strategy is

²⁸ For further details on the historical development of *Innenpolitik* theories of foreign policy, see Brown (1995).

far from an aggressive grand strategy. In addition, as Widodo's rating had never been low before the adoption of GMF (Mietzner, 2015; Alhamid & Perdana, 2018), there was also no urgency for Widodo to divert public discontent with an aggressive grand strategy. Against this backdrop, the application of "diversionary theory of war" to examine the formation of GMF is not only misguided but also can result in a counterfactual analysis.

Another example of applying *Innenpolitik* is to consider GMF emergence as a direct result of Indonesia's democratisation. As highlighted in Chapter I, prior to Widodo's rise, the maritime domain has received little appreciation from the political leaders of Indonesia, particularly during the militaristic New Order administration. The fall of this authoritarian regime, therefore, allowed not only different domestic groups to arise, but also (their) new perspectives on the governance of the country, including for the country's orientation in the field of development and strategic thinking. Considering the formation of GMF as a by-product of the country's democratisation presents a question that the theory will find difficult to answer: Why did a maritime-based grand strategy emerge for the first time under the Widodo administration, approximately fourteen years after the fall of the New Order, but not immediately after the beginning of the reformation era?

While this research sees GMF as a brainchild of the individuals aspiring for (policy) change in the country's orientation, in foreign policy, defence, and development, it argues that the emergence of the grand strategy cannot be separated from the dynamics in the country's external environment, wherein systemic constraints and imperatives serve as stimuli for GMF to emerge. In fact, Indonesia's strategic behaviour never departs from realities that occur in the environment external to it. Literature on Indonesia's foreign policy has suggested that, even since its independence, the country's foreign policy behaviour has always been influenced and shaped by systemic imperatives, manifested mainly in its entitlement to the region and sense of vulnerability against foreign intrusions (Leifer, 1983; Chacko, 2016).

Applying IR theories other than Neoclassical Realism to examine the research topic may also result in a misguided analysis. The first of these theories is Social Constructivism. This theory offers a rich explanation for the influence of non-material forces, such as (shared) ideas, norms, and beliefs, in driving states to choose a specific policy or strategy. In this context, Constructivism prioritises non-material factors over material factors as the determinant variables in its analysis (Wendt, 1999; Jackson & Sørensen, 2013). One example

may be found in the work of William C. Wohlforth (1993), who suggests that the development of new ideas carried by Soviet leaders were the primary factors in changing the strategic behaviour of the Soviet Union in its final years.

Nevertheless, Social Constructivism has been criticised for overestimating the role of (the diffusion of) norms in shaping state behaviour, while neglecting the impact of power relations in the adoption of these norms and in the making of state's strategic behaviour. Bucher (2017: 13) argues that "power should not be neglected not least because a failure to do so furthers the impression that the inherent appeal of the norms themselves is driving change". For Bernd Bucher (2017), norms and identities are inseparable from power; therefore, power cannot be excluded from the explanation, as is done by Constructivism. He also affirms that the diffusion of norms does not occur "naturally" since norms and ideas are interpreted, delineated, and applied by human agency, and this role cannot simply be replaced by the internal logic that supposedly drives a system of norms (Bucher, 2007).

Employing Social Constructivism to analyse the research topic would mean assuming GMF solely as a product of the social construction of reality of Indonesian elites, namely the building of the country's maritime awareness. While this assumption may seem correct, especially when one sees the GMF as an effort to revive the country's maritime culture, GMF cannot be understood as a product of social construction of reality that have occurred throughout the history of Indonesia. If so, the theory then has to address the question of why did GMF only emerge under Widodo administration but not before, underlining the fact that maritime awareness that founded the grand strategy was also evident in the previous administrations, particularly after the fall of Suharto's authoritative regime?

Liberalism is another IR theory that employs non-systemic variables to examine states' strategic behaviour. Andrew Moravcsik (1997) argues that liberalism incorporates different theories, such as liberal and democratic peace theories, liberal inter-governmentalism, and commercial liberalism. Most of these theories observe the policymaking process in a bottom-up fashion (similar to *innenpolitik*), which treats domestic actors — individuals or societal groups — "as analytically prior to politics" (Moravcsik, 1997: 518). Liberalism considers that the interests of dominant domestic societal groups initiate and drive the state to formulate specific strategy that represents the dominant interests. Liberalism also assumes that multiple domestic actors mobilise their proponents and representatives to influence policymaking to their advantage. Therefore, state strategic behaviour, for this approach, is a

reflection of the aggregate interests of the dominant group at a particular point in time.

Similar to *Innenpolitik* and Social Constructivism, Liberalism also overlooks or rejects the significance of systemic constraints in determining states' strategic behaviour. By adopting this logic, the three theories will find difficulties to explain the formation of states' strategic behaviour, particularly during high stakes events (Ripsman et al., 2016). Similar to *Innenpolitik*, Liberalism has been criticised for treating states and their leaders as the servants of the dominant domestic group(s) (Moravcsik, 1997). For both theories (Liberalism and *Innenpolitik*), the making of a state's strategic behaviour is a "bottom-up" process, wherein the interests of domestic dominant group(s) initiate and drive the policymaking.

Liberalism has also been criticised for downplaying the power interplay among political elites and ignoring the important role of foreign policy executives, particularly related to how security issues are addressed by the state (Ripsman et al., 2016). The logic that the state is weak and dependent is misguided. In reality, states operate independently, particularly when dealing with strategic issues related to foreign policy, security, and defence. Mark R. Brawley (2010) argues that states do not treat defence, foreign policy, and grand strategy in a similar fashion as they do to trade or other policies. Grand strategy and defence policy, for example, are oftentimes formulated by a small group of elites and do not rest on the divisions within domestic society as argued by the Liberalist approach (Brawley, 2010). In dealing with imminent external threats, states' actions tend to override domestic cleavages of interests, thus negating the argument of Liberalism regarding the bottom-up nature and inclusion of domestic societal groups' interests in policymaking.

In terms of this research, Liberalism, therefore, would struggle to investigate the emergence of GMF. Assuming the emergence of the GMF as a reflection of the dominant domestic group's interest instead of a result of systemic imperatives will lead to unclear conclusions. Unlike American politics, wherein domestic groups share interests in its foreign policy, i.e., "gun versus butter" (Trubowitz, 2011) or "isolationism/protectionism versus internationalism" (Gourevitch, 1986), domestic groups in Indonesian politics, in general, do not share substantial interests in the realm of foreign policy.²⁹ Therefore, to correlate GMF with the interests of the dominant domestic group is problematic because there has been no dominant domestic political group that has manifestly supported the core issue of the grand

²⁹ Only few foreign policy issues attract the attention of Indonesia's domestic political groups, such as the free trade issue and identity conflicts such as the Israel-Palestine conflict and the Rohingya case.

strategy.

Like Liberalism and Constructivism, Classical Realism, a variant of Realist theories, also incorporates non-systemic factors (domestic and ideational factors) to examine state strategic behaviour.³⁰ In fact, this theory posits a strong emphasis on human nature, such as the emotions and ambitions of world leaders, as variables that shape states' strategic behaviour (Brawley, 2010). However, Classical Realism lacks the explanatory power to examine the research topic empirically; its emphasis on the characteristics of the state and its relation to domestic society will not result in a satisfactory explanation and may lead to a more philosophical or descriptive analysis (Kitchen, 2010). In addition, since most of the analysis of this approach on foreign policy is based largely on the experiences of great powers in Europe between the sixteenth and twentieth century (Lobell et al., 2009), the application of Classical Realism is unhelpful for explaining the foreign policy of Indonesia as a modern non-Western country.

Examining GMF emergence using the variants of Structural Realist or Neorealist theory is also tempting. Though Offensive and Defensive Realism opened the analysis on foreign policy by observing the impact of structural imperatives on state behaviour, they differ in terms of threat perception, the incentives offered by the international system, and the arguments regarding the outcome in which these imperatives result in the sense of how states are likely to respond (Rose, 1998). Offensive Realism emphasises the need for states to not only accumulate material power internally, but also to "look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of (their) rivals, and to take the advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs (Mearsheimer, 2001: 21)", for the sake of survival in an anarchical system where security is scarce.

Unlike Offensive Realism, Defensive Realist theory does not share the Offensive Realist argument on the scarcity of security. Because the anarchical international system is often more benign and security is abundant, states are not usually aggressive nor forced to be so. Defensive Realism contends that the international system often offers clear systemic incentives that permit states to respond effectively and in a timely manner (Rose, 1998). The security dilemma occurs only rarely in particular states (labelled rouge states) that fail to translate clear systemic incentives.

³⁰ See Carr (1962) and Morgenthau (1997)

Despite attributing domestic factors in its analysis, Defensive Realism contends that domestic-led foreign policy is an uncommon phenomenon in international politics. In this sense, Defensive Realism asserts that states normally behave rationally in the international system without paying substantial attention to domestic political dynamics, following the systemic imperatives and incentives and avoiding aggressive foreign policies. Only states led by militaristic regimes or founded on dysfunctional ideologies base strategic behaviour on domestic variables (Waltz, 1979).

Examining the research topic from the Structural Realist perspective may lead to the assumption that considers the GMF purely an output of systemic imperatives. For structural Realist theories, the pressures resulting from international competition “weigh more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures” (Keohane, 1986: 329). By privileging systemic factors, Structural Realist theories may overlook the role of domestic variables in shaping states’ responses and behaviour. For these theories, states’ strategic behaviours are conditioned only by the international system, forcing states to behave based on systemic imperatives. States that fail to or are reluctant to follow these imperatives accordingly tend to be perish. Therefore, according to these theories, in the face of structural constraints, states will behave similarly despite differences in unit-level variables.

The theories cannot address the critical question of why GMF emerged under Widodo administration but not before, taking into account the idea that the existing structural constraints were also apparent in the previous administrations. Even if the degree of the constraints was different between Widodo’s era and previous eras, the theories still could not answer specifically why these differences—in the degree of the constraints— may have led to a significant change in Indonesia’s strategic behaviour. Furthermore, the theories are unable to explain why other countries in the same (sub-)region behave differently despite encountering similar external constraints. In this sense, the theories cannot provide a rationale for why Indonesia decided to pursue a maritime grand strategy, even though Indonesia is relatively less constrained by external imperatives (such as not part of claimant state) compared to other countries in the region such as Vietnam and the Philippines.

II.1.b. Why Neoclassical Realism?

As a Realist theory, Neoclassical Realism, shares similarity with the other two variants, namely Classical Realism and Neorealism. Dunne and Schmidt term the similarity that links all

the variants of Realism as the “three S’s”, consisting of statism, wherein the state is the principal actor in the anarchical international system; survival, as the principal goal of every state; and self-help, as the only means for the state to survive in the system (Baylis et al., 2014). Sterling-Folker (1997) argues that similar to Neorealism, Neoclassical Realism also shares an environment-based ontology, considering the international political environment as a primary factor that shapes states’ policy options.

However, Neoclassical Realism does not consider that systemic factors directly determine states’ strategic behaviour (external determinism) since systemic stimuli are not transmitted directly, but are mediated by domestic politics and leaders’ perceptions (Rose, 1998). Risks and opportunities emanating from the systemic environment are not shown clearly to policymakers. Policymakers are required to comprehend these incentives by employing a wide range of tools, such as ideology and political institutions (Brawley, 2010; Kitchen, 2010). For Neoclassical Realists, though states face similar structural constraints imposed by the system, they do not always share similar interests and may also pursue a different strategy. Andrew Wivel (2005: 363) briefly describes Neoclassical Realism as an approach that aims to understand “why state X made a certain move last Tuesday”.

Ripsman et al. (2016) identify four Neoclassical Realist critiques of its predecessor, Neorealism, the first of which is the clarity of the systemic stimuli. In this sense, Neoclassical Realism argues that the international system does not always provide clear, complete information — about threats and opportunities — to state leaders. Ripsman et al. (2016) take the 1967 Six-day War as an example of when the external environment provided a clear signal. The mobilisation of the Egyptian armed forces around the border of Israel, the blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and a request for the UN to evacuate its peacekeeping forces from the Sinai gave a clear message to the Israeli leaders of the incoming threat. Therefore, a pre-emptive strike by Israel was seen as an appropriate option.³¹

The second critique is the problem of perception and misperception. Neorealists contend that state elites are able to correctly comprehend and translate systemic imperatives. Neoclassical Realism, in contrast, asserts that state leaders are not always able to interpret systemic stimuli correctly. Jervis’ *Perception and Misperception* supports this argument. For Jervis (1976), since state leaders are also human, they have the potential to

³¹ For further details on the Six Days of War, see Oren (2002).

process information, assess a situation, and identify available options incorrectly, even when the systemic stimuli are clear. Jervis (1976) adds that misperception occurs not only because of incomplete information provided by the external environment, but also because of the bias emerging from inside of the state leaders' cognitive aspects, such as their worldviews, ideologies, and beliefs (Rotberg & Raab, 1988). Therefore, since the worldviews, images, and perceptions concerning the international environment differ from one leader to another, Neoclassical Realism contends that Neorealism cannot provide a full account related to the sources of state foreign policy behaviour.

The third issue is the problem of rationality. Neoclassical Realist has criticised Neorealism's argument relating to the rationality of state leaders. Neoclassical Realism argues that the making of a state's strategic behaviour does not always come from a rational decision-making process. For this variant of Realism, even if state leaders are able to discern systemic stimuli correctly, this discernment does not assure that they will formulate a policy rationally. Multiple factors may contribute to the irrationality of leaders in decision making, such as their perceptions and temperaments (Jervis, 1976; Byman & Pollack, 2001). Sukarno's decision to withdraw Indonesia from the UN in 1965 as a protest of the inclusion of the new Federation of Malaysia into the Security Council (Leifer, 1983) is an example of such irrational policy. Sukarno's unique temperament and megalomaniacal character have led him to, most of the time, dominate foreign policy decision making, overriding others' opinions and views.

The final problem is related to the mobilisation of state resources. Neoclassical Realism renounces the logic of its predecessor that perceives state as a rational unitary actor. For Neorealism, all states hold the same capacity to extract and mobilise state resources, regardless of differences in domestic political condition (Taliaferro, 2006; Lobell et al., 2009; Ripsman et al., 2016). On the contrary, Neoclassical Realism assumes that the ability of a state to extract and mobilise its resources critically depends on the existence of domestic constraints, such as those from powerful domestic political, interest, or societal groups (Taliaferro, 2006; Lobell et al., 2009; Ripsman et al. 2016). To extract and mobilise the needed resources, national elites are required to negotiate with other political components within the country, such as legislative, political parties, economic sectors, or the public in general. Though elites seem to be free from society, they are subject to domestic constraints. Therefore, the pursuit of a particular state's strategic behaviour within the Neoclassical Realist model is not only determined by systemic factors and the assessment on power and

security, but also shaped by domestic factors.

As mentioned in the previous chapter that since the focus of this study is to investigate the emergence and implementation of a state's strategic behaviour, the study sees the importance to put the focus on examining the process of policymaking and implementation that happen within the state. In this sense, the level of analysis that will be applied in this study will take place at the state (unit) and sub-state (or sub-unit) level, namely the government. For the research, compared to other theories, Neoclassical Realism provides the analytical framework that can investigate the research topic comprehensively.

The research agrees with the Neorealist viewpoint that systemic imperatives shape the range of policy options that a state possesses. As noted in Chapter 1, this study perceives systemic imperatives to stimulate and initiate GMF formulation by highlighting the increasing importance of maritime domain to the country. However, for this study, these imperatives did not directly cause the emergence or adoption of GMF; instead, they are transmitted and mediated by domestic-level variables. As Ripsman et al. (2016: 31) state that:

“Policy choices are no longer conceived of as a direct product of systemic stimuli; instead, they pass through the prism of the state, which perceives them and responds to them within the institutional constraints of its unique domestic circumstances”.

In similar fashion, the research also agrees with the theories that emphasize the role of domestic-level variables, including non-material variables, in shaping state strategic behaviour. Notwithstanding the influential domestic-level variables have over state strategic behaviour, the research still argues that in anarchical international system, states remain unfree from the systemic pressures. In this sense, for the research, opportunities and threats that arise in the anarchical system remain the primary aspect that states see when forming their strategic behaviour. In the context of the research topic, the research sees that while domestic-level variables provided the condition for GMF to emerge, domestic-level variables did not drive the emergence of GMF at the first place as the grand strategy is a manifestation of Indonesia's response over its changing external environment. The application of Neoclassical Realism is therefore based on the consideration of how the theory treats and incorporates domestic factors into its analysis without downplaying the role of systemic imperatives.

II.1.c. Neoclassical Realist Grand Strategy Making and Implementation

In their work, Ripsman et al. (2016) elucidate three types of Neoclassical Realism based on the purpose of their analysis. The first type is the Neoclassical Realism that explains foreign policy deviations. In this context, Neoclassical Realism is applied to investigate anomalies from Structural Realist baselines, or why a particular state does not follow the structural dictums or behave as predicted by the Neorealist approach. The second type is to explain the formulation and adoption of a range of foreign policy choices and grand strategic shifts and adjustments.

Foreign policy and grand strategy formulation occur over a longer term than anomalies (crisis decision making), with a time span ranging from short to medium-term (months to years, but not decades). As well as formulation, the second model is also designed to examine the implementation of foreign policy and grand strategy. For Ripsman et al. (2016), to understand foreign policy/grand strategy, it is necessary to look at not only its decision-making, but also its implementation or ability to mobilize resources.

The inclusion of foreign policy implementation within the study of foreign policy allows for the investigation of the question of why countries facing similar challenges respond differently. In addition, this incorporation will also allow for a much broader focus of study, which is the impact of states' responses to the system. The final type of Neoclassical Realism is oriented at addressing this issue, setting the theory as an approach to international politics (Ripsman et al., 2016). For this type, Neoclassical Realism is used to explain international outcomes and structural changes as the impact of the interaction of various strategic choices of different great and major powers.

The model of Neoclassical Realism is applied in this study to examine GMF emergence and its implementation is the Type II Neoclassical Realism. In the Type II, Neoclassical Realism attempts to more than just explaining anomalies in international relations, expanding its explanatory power to examine the formulation of a range of foreign policy options and grand strategic adjustment. The adoption of GMF may also be categorised as Indonesia's grand strategic shift/adjustment not only because grand strategy, in general, was relatively absent in the previous administration, but also because GMF reflects an attempt to shift the country's orientation and strategic thinking from land- to maritime-centric.

To understand why states pursue a particular foreign policy or conduct grand strategic adjustment, Neoclassical Realism focuses on the dynamics that occur within a state. With

different unit-level variables, states adopt strategies or foreign policy differently even when facing similar external constraints. Jeffrey Taliaferro (2006) exemplifies how domestic variables matter in differentiating state's strategic behaviour, comparing the response of both 19th century China and Japan to similar structural imperatives (the increased presence of Western powers in the Asia-Pacific). This analysis found that both countries responded contrastingly different, where Japan, unlike China, was able to modernise and transform itself into a major power equal to other Western imperialist powers at the time (Taliaferro, 2006).

To operationalise the theory, it is necessary to identify and define the variables used in the analysis. Neoclassical Realism, as a variant of Realism, still posits the international system as the starting point for analysing state foreign policy or strategic adjustment. Waltz (1979) contends that, similar to the system of economic markets, the international political system is constituted by the interaction of a group of self-regarding units, which, in this context, are sovereign states. Waltz (1979) adds that this international structure, where states may find themselves constrained within the system, was not formed intentionally by the state. Instead, similar to the economic system, the international (political) system was formed unintentionally and spontaneously (Waltz, 1979).

Neoclassical Realism suggests that state leaders primarily assess the external environment, including threats and opportunities, and the country's relative power before processing the strategic formulation or adjustment. Rose (1998) asserts that, "the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system". Contrary to Waltz's theory of balance of power that focuses on the shift of aggregate (military) power in the system, Neoclassical Realists argue that states not only observe and respond to aggregate power of others, but also disaggregate other states' power into elements or particular abilities. The differentiation of how states discern the specific capabilities of other states will also result in the differentiation of their responses.

Neoclassical Realism acknowledges that various domestic variables scattered across multiple sectors have the capacity to influence and shape the perspectives of state elites, as the first and primary recipients of the systemic stimuli. Lobell *et.al.* (2009) deem state elites responsible for formulating foreign policy as the Foreign Policy Executive (FPE). FPEs largely consist of individuals from different types of government institutions, wherein each of them holds a different worldview and interest in foreign policy.

Though states' FPEs have the autonomy to formulate foreign policy and grand

strategies, they cannot work independently in implementing these policies and strategies. FPEs are obliged to cooperate with other (key societal) elites within or outside of the government that often pursue different material interests. Therefore, even when FPEs can translate systemic stimuli or assess the situation correctly and are ultimately able to formulate a particular foreign policy, key societal elites may adversely affect the execution of the planned foreign policy. When this planning occurs, states are likely to adopt a foreign policy considered deviant by structural Realist theories.

One of the major critiques of Neoclassical Realism is its tendency to loosely incorporate too broad, irrelevant unit-level variables, whose adoption into the analysis is regarded as inconsistent with the basic tenets of Realism. Another critique also concerns the application of the intervening variables. Neoclassical Realism is accused of incorporating unit-level variables in an *ad-hoc* manner, without providing further elaboration on the conditions for these variables to exert their influence (Katznelson & Milner, 2002). In response to these critiques, Ripsman *et.al.* (2016) have developed a framework for applying the intervening variables. The authors first identified three activities that occur during the intervening process, namely perception building, decision making, and policy implementing and classified multiple intervening variables into four groups, namely leaders' images, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions (Ripsman et al., 2016).

The first variable is leaders' images. Leaders' image relates to the personal view that individuals hold about the environment around them. As elaborated on within this chapter, this personal perception stems from an individual's prior values and experiences. The second variable is strategic culture, a term that was firstly introduced by Snyder (1977). Snyder (1977: 8) defines the concept as follows: "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other".

The third variable is state-society relations. Neoclassical Realists pay significant attention to how the dynamics of state-society interactions affect the making and implementation of states' strategic behaviour. The variation in the level of fragmentation or divisions in state-society relations, both at elite and societal level, generates differentiation in the strategic behaviour of states (Randall, 2006; Narizny, 2007). In this context, the lower the cohesiveness among the elites and societal actors in a state, the higher possibility for that state to pursue underbalancing, be it because the state fails to respond or because it is unable

to extract and mobilize the necessary resources (Randall, 2006; Ripsman et al., 2016).

Societal groups, as an actor, hold particular interest in a state's foreign policy, not only because of their perspective, the particular way in which they perceive the external environment, but also because they are also entitled to satisfy the interests of their base supporters. Key societal leaders are also influential in the making of a state's strategic behaviour. Not only are they able to hamper the making and implementation of a state's strategic behaviour, but they can also adversely affect the elites' political profile and legitimacy. A failed or ineffective foreign policy will directly lead to underbalancing; when underbalancing happens, state elites will mostly lose support, trust, and credibility at home.


Trubowitz (2011) argues that aside from producing effective state strategic behaviour, state elites are also a strategic/rational political actor that holds his (or her) own political interests; these actors want to at least secure and maintain the power that they are currently holding. Policy ratification and leadership selection constrain state elites domestically and drive them to establish coalitions with key societal elites, not only to acquire the required support, but also to secure their legitimacy and power (Hagan, 1993). Putnam (1998) contends that state elites, either in democratic or authoritarian regimes, are forced to play a "two-level game" as they must pay serious attention to the implications of the international policies that they devise that can affect their authority and legitimacy at home.

The final intervening variable is domestic political institutions. This variable concerns the overview of state institutions, formal and less formal, involved in the decision making of foreign policy. For Neoclassical Realists, the differentiation in domestic institutions between states shapes and affects the output of the strategy making (Ripsman et al., 2016). For example, the nature and the degree of checks and balances in the U.S. political system creates more hindrances in decision making and implementation compared to other countries that may have a less strict system of check and balances.

Based on the classification of the existing intervening variables, Ripsman et al. (2016) also elaborated on the operationalisation of these variables by linking them to activities in the formulation phase. Ripsman et al. (2016) consider the first variable, leader's image, the weakest variable since it affects only perception building. The second variable, strategic culture, is considered to hold leverage on all the aforementioned phases/activities, namely perception, decision making, and policy implementation. The last two variables are not as dominant as the second variable but are more influential than the first variable. Both state-

society relations and domestic institutions variables share a similar capacity to influence both the decision-making process and implementation. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship among all four intervening variables in foreign policy making and grand strategic adjustment (Ripsman et al., 2016: 59).

Figure 2.1 Neoclassical Realist Model of Foreign Policy/Grand Strategy Making and Implementation



II.1.d. GMF Analytical Framework

In answering the research questions, the study employs the logic from the Neoclassical Realist model type II developed by Ripsman et al. (2016) with a modest modification on the model (see Figure 2.2). The figure depicts the flow of GMF formulation and implementation that have become the foci of this study as the dependent variables. As highlighted earlier in this chapter, the study sees the dynamics in the system (or systemic factors) as the starting point, or the independent variables, for examining the formulation of Indonesia’s new grand strategy. The study identifies systemic imperatives that stimulate GMF emergence, namely the increasing salience of Indonesia’s maritime domain – that centred on three issues namely the increasing non-traditional threats in Indonesian waters, the South China Sea disputes, and the emergence of Indo-Pacific geopolitical construct — and the Rise of China that brought opportunity through its Maritime Silk Route Initiative (MSRI).


However, the study argues that GMF is not a product of direct systemic imperatives,

as these imperatives are mediated and processed by the country’s elites. In processing systemic imperatives, the country’s elites are influenced and shaped by domestic level variables. As Ripsman et al. (2016: 31-32) contend:

“Policy choices are no longer conceived of as a direct product of systemic stimuli; instead, they pass through the prism of the state, which perceives them and responds to them within the institutional constraints of its unique domestic circumstances. To understand foreign policy, therefore, it becomes essential to study the unique processes of perception, decision making, and policy implementation in individual countries, which will lead them to enact different policy responses to similar challenges.”

Unlike the model proposed by Ripsman et al., however, the study does not highlight leaders’ images and perceptions within the variable of elites. Though this thesis does not deeply analyse the cognition aspect of the elites, due to the difficulty in measuring and analysing this aspect, the research still consider the importance of elites’ perception on the emergence of GMF.³²

Figure 2.2 The Neoclassical Realist Model of GMF



Thus, why did the images and perceptions of elites matter for the emergence of GMF? and how these variables play in the emergence of GMF? For the research, elites’ images and perceptions are crucial for the emergence of GMF not only because the elites are among the main human agency whose decisions determine the policies and actions of the country, but also because, as mentioned earlier, the formulation of grand strategy, like foreign policy and

³² The study does not include strategic culture within the analysis of GMF, not only due to its problematic conceptualization, but also due to the difficulty in measuring and examining the variable.

defence, is specifically the affairs of the elites (Hill, 2003; Brawley, 2010; Novotny, 2010). As the position of the elites is central to the construction of grand strategy, their perceptions and images are also therefore pivotal.

In his seminal work, Jervis (1976) contends that instead of examining the actual external environment, leaders often rely on their perception of this environment in making foreign policy. Kenneth Boulding (1959) also shares similar argument underlining the central role of elites as the most influential variable in shaping foreign policy making. In this sense, in making decisions, elites, as part of human agency, rely more on their psychological aspects rather than the “objective” facts of the (external) environment as the guide and filter to evaluate and process the incoming information. In this sense, since images and perceptions are used as a tool to analyse and understand external environment, the research sees elites’ images and perceptions can therefore shape the policy choices to respond the changing of this environment (Boulding, 1959). As Wohlfort (1993) contends:

“If power influences the course of international politics, it must do so largely through the perceptions of the people who makes decisions on behalf of the states.”

In the context of Indonesia, elites’ perception has always been an integral and important aspect in the country’s foreign policy. One of the studies examining this topic is the seminal work of Franklin B. Weinstein. In his work, Weinstein (2007) examines how the worldview of the country’s elites, one example is the “pretty maiden” analogy and “hostile world” narrative, shaped Indonesia’s foreign policy during 1960s and 1970s. Similar emphasis can also be found in the work of Leo Suryadinata (1996) on *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership*. In this work, Suryadinata (1996) also highlights the centrality of Indonesian elites’ perceptions in the country’s foreign policymaking.

A similar perspective is also shared in the more recent work of Daniel Novotny on *Torn Between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy*. In his work, Novotny (2010) examines the influence of the strategic thinking of Indonesian leaders in navigating the country in the post-Cold War world. Though the end of the Cold War has brought a new era of multipolarity, Indonesia’s foreign policy is still shaped by the bipolar perceptions of its elites who still consider both China and the U.S. as the greatest malign factor that can threaten the country’s national security (Novotny, 2010).

From the aforementioned literature one can infer that while Indonesia’s strategic behaviour has never departed from the realities that occur in the environment external to it,

its strategic behaviour has never been the direct product of this changing environment. Instead, Indonesia's strategic behaviour often emerges from the conduct of processing incoming information done by its elites. Based on this argument, the research thus also considers the importance of Indonesian elites and their perceptions in the making of GMF, as they do not only sit at the centre of policymaking but also at the forefront of the country's foreign and strategic affairs who filter and process incoming external stimuli. This thus matches the description of Muthiah Alagappa (1998) that sees the importance of the inclusion of elites' perceptions within the analysis that attempt to explain the behaviour and strategic thinking of Asian governments.

If the images and perceptions of the elites on external environment are important in the making of state strategic behaviour, then are these variables just a (psychological) construction of the elites? For the research, the perception of elites can be both reflecting and contradicting the actual "operational environment" (objective reality). The work of Jervis (1976) on "misperception", as discussed previously within this chapter, provides the best example on how leaders can, at some point, erroneously perceive the changing environment external to them. This can particularly happen when the national leaders do not have a full or clear information regarding the situation as what Ripsman et al. (2016) refer to as the problem of clarity.

Nevertheless, regardless of the factuality of elites' perceptions, the research still sees external stimuli as an objective reality. As an objective reality, this research contends that the existence of the external environment and its dynamics exist outside the mind of the observers, namely the elites. In this sense, even when the elites do not see and capture accurately the changing external environment, such change is still factual. Take for example the growth of German power during the 1930s or the mobilisation of the Egyptian armed forces around the border of Israel followed by the blockade of the Straits of Tiran and a request for the UN peacekeeping forces to evacuate from the Sinai. Even if the leaders of Britain and France – in the case of the rising German power –, and Israel – in the case of the mobilisation of Egyptian armies – fail to see this changing environment, the rise of German power and the mobilisation of Egyptian forces remain a factual reality and not just a psychological construction of a small group of individuals.

In the context of GMF, the factuality of the perceived external stimuli that in this research are considered as the independent variable, such as the China factor, can be

assessed from the perception of the elites of the countries surrounding Indonesia. In the 2014 *Regional Power and Order in Asia* survey that targeted elites from across 10 economies in the Indo-Pacific³³, Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi (2014) found that China was perceived as the most important factor for the regional geopolitics as well as for the foreign policy of several countries in the region where the survey was taken. According to this study, 53 percent of the respondents on average considered China would be the greatest power in East Asia in the next 10 years, with the U.S. at 43 percent; also, 56 percent expected China to be the most important economic partner for their respective country compared to 28 percent who considered the U.S. to be in that position (Green & Szchenyi, 2014).

For this study, the survey strengthens the argument that the rise of China is not just a psychological construction of some of Indonesia's elites as the same phenomenon was also felt and seen by other countries within the same region.³⁴ Though it is intriguing to investigate why China captured more attention of Indonesian elites compared to other countries, this study will not attempt to answer such question. As a focal point of this study is to investigate the emergence of GMF, the attention will thus be oriented to examining how the evolution of Indonesia's external environment led Indonesian elites to formulate GMF.

As mentioned previously, in processing systemic imperatives, elites are not free from the influence of the dynamics that occur at the domestic level. In this study, several domestic factors are identified to have influence on the emergence of GMF, namely the dissatisfaction over the country's (development) orientation and the presence of weak-state mentality. The study argues that these domestic factors strengthen the narrative highlighted by systemic imperatives on the increasing maritime salience and the need for change in a country's orientation. While systemic imperatives and domestic factors have shown the increasing salience of maritime domain and the urgency for Indonesia to shift its orientation, the grand strategy did not emerge until there was an opening in the form of the presidential election. The presidential election, thus, served as a window of opportunity that lowered the entry barrier for the policy idea to enter the formal political process of policymaking. The presidential election provided the incentive that stimulated proponents of policy change to inject their aspirations.

³³ These countries are China, U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan, and India (Green & Szechenyi, 2014)

³⁴ See Chapter IV for some statistical data of this survey.

For this study, the examination of policy implementation cannot be separated from the examination of the phase preceding the implementation, namely policy articulation. For this study, policy articulation lies between the phase of its formulation and implementation. As highlighted in Chapter 1, the literature on grand strategy has suggested that the conceptualisation of grand strategy should not be based on the existence of a detailed plan and strategy (Dueck, 2015; Silove, 2018). In fact, as Dueck (2015) argues, there is no country or world leader that has had a grand strategy with a highly detailed plan. The study, therefore, argues that, for a grand strategy to be executed, it needs to be firstly articulated and translated into more detailed and concrete behaviours in form of doctrines, goals, policies, and programmes. For this reason, the act of translating a grand strategy not only falls under the category of policymaking but also falls under the category of policy implementation since it is conducted in order to implement the grand strategy.

The study, therefore, sees GMF articulation as a pivotal stage that determines the success of GMF implementation to bring substantial changes in the areas (or pillars) targeted by the grand strategy. For the study, two factors have impeded GMF concretisation and caused the minimalist implementation³⁵ of GMF in the field of foreign policy and defence. These two factors are bureaucratic politics – representing the "domestic institutions" variable – and civil-military relations – representing the variable of "state-society relations" of Ripsman et al.'s Neoclassical Realist model of foreign policy and grand strategy. The study will, therefore, see how the dynamics and competition among the bureaucracies, not necessarily the institution, but also the individual actors, involved in GMF. Furthermore, the study will also see how the relations between the civilian elites and military institution impede the effort to implement GMF and refrain the grand strategy from delivering expected outcomes.

II.2 Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy Change

By incorporating domestic variables to explain foreign policymaking or grand strategic adjustment, Neoclassical Realism may provide a richer, more accurate analysis compared to other theories of IR and foreign policy. However, the theory is unable to explain the processes

³⁵ The term "minimalist" implementation, in this context, refers to a condition of minimum implementation, signifying that, though there has been process of implementation, this implementation has not progressed much and does not have a significant impact.

behind the rise of policy idea and policy change. One concept is specifically oriented at addressing these issues, examining the processes of advocating policy idea(s) and driving policy change by certain group of individuals, a concept coined as policy entrepreneurship.

As highlighted in Chapter I, policy entrepreneurship is usually associated with the practice of advocating for policy change. This policy change varies from a short-term policy (i.e., trade policy) to a much longer policy (i.e., long-term development plan). Though policy entrepreneurship is not responsible for all policy change, the concept is still helpful in understanding the emergence of a particular policy, as well as the dynamics of policymaking and contestation within it.

The study of policy entrepreneurship highlights the significance and necessity of focusing on the “agency” instead of “structure” (David, 2015). Agency-based analysis involves scrutinising the decision-making process by observing the role of the decision makers in control of the process, specifically how these individuals exercise their influence on directing debates, and the management of the (whole) bureaucratic process in attaining favourable results. Policy entrepreneurs are not only the decision makers or advisers, but also those actively involved in the promotion of policy change. These actors are not necessarily those who devise or design a policy intellectually, though they must be sensitive to opportunities, having expertise on the issues, and be competent in agenda framing, building coalitions, and shaping the public and private debate. In this context, policy entrepreneurs are individuals who can market and convince enough individuals of their ideas, at least within the decision-making circle, on the necessity to redefine or reorient state interests (Cramer & Thrall, 2012).

Though policy entrepreneurs may emerge from any part of government and society, not all individuals can be categorised as policy entrepreneurs, even when they have the decisive power, such as the President. The exclusion of the head of the state or government from the category of policy entrepreneurs is based on two factors. The first factor relates to the fact that the President or Prime Minister’s expertise usually does not include familiarity with the (specific) issues of, for example, foreign policy and security. Therefore, the President or Prime Minister is dependent on his top advisors regarding policy choices. The second factor is the position of the President or Prime Minister as the final decision maker, which refrains him from participating in the promotion of policy change.

In addition, policy entrepreneurs are political figures who are able to identify the shortcomings of the previous policy, provide solutions to overcome these drawbacks, and

know exactly how to attain this solution (Malnes, 1995). David (2015) shares a different opinion on the characteristics of policy entrepreneurs, suggesting that, aside from possessing certain traits and competences, policy entrepreneurs must also be posited at the heart of power, for instance, in the presidential office. Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2012) identify the entry barrier that conditions the emergence of policy entrepreneurs in a policy arena (Schneider & Teske, 1992). The authors argue that, while low entry-barriers may encourage policy entrepreneurs, barriers that are too low will discourage policy entrepreneurs from entering the policy arena (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2012). A low entry-barrier means that the policy arena will be easily infiltrated by other newcomers; this infiltration signifies that the return from the policy change will not last long due to the imminent competition.

Meanwhile, high entry barriers may offer policy entrepreneurs with additional incentives, such as the temporary (policy) monopoly once the (policy) change is made. However, very high entry barriers will lead to similar results as those of very low entry barriers; policy entrepreneurs are hesitant to enter the policy arena. Based on this logic, policy entrepreneurs will calculate the cost that they have to invest for promoting policy change vis-à-vis the potential return that they may receive once the change has been attained. Therefore, according to Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2012), the principal condition for policy entrepreneurs to enter a particular policy arena is equivalent to what is described by the positive cost-benefit analysis, where potential return surpasses the expense of entering the policy arena.

Nevertheless, due to their characteristics — full of uncertainty, high stakes, and significant risk — unlike other policies, strategic policies such as foreign, policy, defence, and grand strategy are usually the privilege of a particular small group of individuals (Renshon & Renshon, 2008; Brawley, 2010). The policy choice of these individuals depends on the state's political and institutional features. Though public opinion matters in the evaluation of foreign policy outcomes, foreign policy, grand strategy, and defence policy are not formulated publicly, nor do they involve a wide range of actors, particularly in the case of Indonesia. Based on this logic, strategic policies, thus, usually reflect continuity and stability rather than change. Due to high entry barriers, policy entrepreneurs are usually refrained from entering the foreign and defence policy making and initiating policy change.

Despite the high entry barriers, there are times when the entry barriers are low following the emergence of “opportunity windows” and “critical junctures”. To some extent,

both events occasionally overlap with each other, though each of them generally has distinctive characteristics. Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2012) identify the first term (opportunity windows) as the external and internal shocks – i.e., security crisis — that display the drawbacks of the current foreign policy and later attract policy reform. The second term (critical junctures) is described as the systemic developments that can change the condition of interstate relations in the system. This systemic change provides an opportunity for policy entrepreneurs to induce (policy) change because states are required to undertake adjustment following the emergence of a new systemic environment.

In his seminar book *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, Kingdon (2014) identifies three streams within the (pre-decision) policy processes. These streams are the problem stream – where the problems are identified or capture the attention of people within and without the government due to dramatic events such as crises or disasters — , policy stream – where proposals of solutions interact and even compete one to another — , and the political stream – the environment where the policy takes place, the political forces (supporters and oppositions) exist in the policy process, and the turnover of administration or legislative. Kingdon (2014) contends the three streams move separately, and they are independent of one another until the three streams cross and come together at some critical points in time, generating policy or opportunity window for policy change. Kingdon (2014) describes that these policy windows are not only those who come unpredictably like sudden events or crises, but also the predictable ones like the cycle of administration through periodical election.

For Kingdon (2014), policy entrepreneurs are not only those who are tirelessly shop for opportunity windows as a venue to promote their policy ideas or proposals. Policy entrepreneurs are also characterized as those who are able to benefit from the intersection of these three streams, by linking the policy problems with policy solutions through political opportunities. He argues that (Kingdon, 2014: 178):

“[p]roblems or politics by themselves can structure the governmental agenda. But the probability of an item rising on the decision agenda is dramatically increased if all three streams — problems, policies, and politics — are joined.”

Nonetheless, aside from the existence of windows of opportunity and the ability of policy entrepreneurs to capitalise on these opportunities, policy change is also dependent on the institutional and political features of the decision-making in a state, which is also known

as the policy environment. This environment is not only limited to the formal structure of the state, for example, its system of government (presidential or parliamentary system), but also includes informal structures, such as the number of (informal) veto points and societal inputs (Hermann, 2001; Hagan, 2001).

The logic, then, suggests that the more autonomous and insulated the policy environment of politics, the more possible it is for policy entrepreneurs to induce their ideas and trigger policy change. Nevertheless, a fertile ground for policy change, marked by the existence of both the external and internal shocks as well as critical junctures, does not always result in (policy) change. The emergence of these shocks only opens the windows of opportunity for policy change; they do not assure the success of change. When windows of opportunity or critical junctures emerge, policy entrepreneurs are expected to capitalise on these openings without downplaying the role of a domestic audience (Mazarr, 2007). By marginalising and highlighting the failure of the previous (foreign) policies, policy entrepreneurs can reap domestic support, particularly from those who opposed the previous policies, thus initiating the process of policy reorientation (Meydani, 2009). Without capitalising on domestic support, windows of opportunity will not only be fruitless for policy change, but also may even strengthen the old policy orthodoxy.

In his study investigating the shift of U.S. policy toward Myanmar during Obama administration, Jurgen Haacke (2021) identifies four factors the significance of policy window emerging from the rise of a new administration in the U.S. political context. First, the position of foreign policy entrepreneur. Haacke (2021) argues that the position of foreign policy entrepreneur within the policy process determines the significance (or size) of policy window for (foreign) policy entrepreneurs. The importance of foreign policy entrepreneurs' position within the policymaking process is also shared by David (2015), wherein he highlights the importance of policy entrepreneurs to remain at the heart of the power to ensure their success of advocating policy reform.

David Mitchell (2005) contends that hierarchical (formal) policy environment offers more openings for policy entrepreneurs to trigger (policy) change than the environment with a collegial model. In this context, by establishing a closer relationship with the authoritative decision unit, such as the President, policy entrepreneurs will have a higher probability of employing their strategies to influence the domestic audience. In formal structures, which are often marked by strong centralisation, particularly in terms of information access, policy

entrepreneurs are easily facilitated to manipulate the process. Moreover, the characteristic of the policy environment in a centralised system, where decision making is posited in a smaller group of individuals or a dominant groupthink, is such that it can save policy entrepreneurs from wasting time and energy in an endless bureaucratic turf-war.

Second, the level of the policy contestation. Similar to the first factor, the policy contestation of the issue concerned is also able to determine the size of policy window for policy entrepreneurs (Haacke, 2021). The more controversial is the issue concerned and the more opposition it brings will indeed impede the effort of policy entrepreneurs to induce policy change even though the existing policies have clearly shown failure to resolve a particular problem.


Third, geopolitical context. This factor can affect and determine the size of policy window by hampering the effort for policy change and pursuing a particular (foreign) policy (Haacke, 2021). Fourth, the existing policy beliefs of the administration or grand strategic orientation. In this context, the size of the opportunity window is also determined by the existing policy ideas or grand strategy, as these two elements can impede, if not prevent, the adoption of a new policy ideas.

Thus, how do policy entrepreneurs promote policy change? In triggering policy change, policy entrepreneurs employ multiple strategies regarded by scholars as manipulative (Maoz, 1990). Jean Garrison (1999), for example, describes manipulative tactics as individual or group actions intended to optimise the possibility for the expected results to come or reduce the probability for the less desirable one to emerge by intentionally designing the group's decision-making environment. The first tactic involves controlling access to policymaking. In this tactic, policy entrepreneurs may include participants that are perceived to support their ideas and exclude those considered to have the potential to hamper the policy change attempt from the decision-making process (David, 2015).

The second tactic is related to agenda-setting, in which policy entrepreneurs control the content of information (Elder & Cobb, 1983). In an attempt to affect and direct the discussion flow, policy entrepreneurs will not only determine the content of the information, but also establishing the timing of when this information should be distributed among decision makers (Maoz, 1990). The third tactic is a strategy aimed at obtaining bureaucratic backing and control deal making. For these tactics to be fruitful, policy entrepreneurs are expected to build interpersonal relationships, formally and informally, with key actors in

bureaucracy. An effective relationship with bureaucracy and its key actors will enable policy entrepreneurs to more effectively influence the perceptions and preferences of the bureaucracy (Drezner, 2000).

Figure 2.3 The Cycle of Foreign Policymaking



The model (Figure 2.3) developed by Charles Jones and modified by Jean-Frederic Morin and Jonathan Paquin (2018: 42) is useful in understanding the process of foreign policymaking and incorporates the role of policy entrepreneurship within the process. Though this model does not represent the actual complex process of decision making, it does provide a general overview of the process.

The cycle of foreign policymaking begins with framing as the first stage. In a policy process, for an issue to be processed into a policy, it is necessary to frame it as a problem (Kingdon, 2014). A particular actor or group of actors who do this kind of job, namely framing an issue into problem or political issue, are indeed policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Kingdon, 2014; Morin & Paquin, 2018). Framing also includes packaging or repackaging the problem for the purpose of gaining the attention and acceptance of policy elites.

The second stage of this process is the agenda-setting. In this phase, proponents of the framed (political) issue will try to convince and look for support from particular actors with access to key political leaders (i.e., political advisors). The setting is aimed at obtaining the attention of key political leaders by exhibiting the importance or urgency of the issue (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Kingdon, 2014; Morin & Paquin, 2018). On some occasions, an eruption of sudden event or crisis (shocks) may increase the salience of the framed issue.

The third stage is policy options. Upon entering the political process (in the second stage), the (framed) issue is examined based on its feasibility and the availability of other

alternatives or policy options. In this stage, unless the proponents of the issue (who previously framed the issue) have recognized expertise on the issue (such as analysts, scholars, members of reputable think-tanks), they will be replaced by experts, civil servants, and advisors (Morin & Paquin, 2018).

In the fourth stage, the selected numbers of (policy) options from the previous stage are assessed and evaluated by a decision-making unit. The composition and structure of the decision-making unit is dependent on the type of the issue, as well as the political system of the country. In the field of strategic policies such as foreign policy, there is a clear difference between (foreign policy) decisions and (foreign policy) actions. For Hudson (2014), not all decisions will result in actions because there are some decisions are oriented not to act, whereas others cannot secure enough support to act.

The fifth and six stages are largely focused on the domain of public administration and bureaucracy to implement and evaluate the decision or policy. The existence of both stages within the cycle of (foreign) policymaking indicates the inclusion of policy implementation as an integral component of (foreign) policymaking. In the fifth stage, the capacity of the administration to translate the decision and mobilize the required resources, as well as the composition of bureaucratic players in the issue, determine the prospects of the implementation of the doctrine (Morin & Paquin, 2018). In the sixth stage resides the evaluation. In this stage, the implemented policy is evaluated based on the effectivity of its impact or outcomes. Due to the characteristics of the results, which tend to be diffused and multicausal, the evaluation is usually open to interpretation (Morin & Paquin, 2018).

In terms of the research topic, the application of this concept is to supply the analysis on GMF emergence and formulation by investigating the transformation of GMF from (policy) idea into an adopted grand strategy. While Neoclassical Realism is oriented at answering the “why” question, by investigating the rationale, factors, and context that lead to GMF emergence, policy entrepreneurship seeks to answer the “how” question by examining the process of GMF emergence and the conditions that enable this emergence. As highlighted in the previous section, the study considers the 2014 presidential election as the opportunity window that provided an avenue for GMF to emerge.

For policy entrepreneurs, general elections offer an opportunity for new policy idea(s) to emerge and thrive, particularly when the general election has the potency to bring regime change as it happened in the 2014 presidential election. However, this study does not argue

that the practice of policy entrepreneurship only occurred during or started to happen from the election day. In the case of GMF, the process of policy entrepreneurship, i.e., policy advocacy and agenda setting, began almost a year before the actual election day. Unlike other opportunity windows, presidential elections are identifiable and predictable in terms of the time and place of its occurrence, thus allowing the process to begin earlier, even before the opening of the opportunity window.

Though the presidential election provided an opportunity for policy change and the introduction of new (policy) idea, it is the role of policy entrepreneurs that enabled the policy change. Without the presence of policy entrepreneurship, it was unlikely for GMF to emerge exists.

II.3 Bureaucratic Politics, Civil-Military Relations, and Grand Strategy Implementation

Despite a number of studies investigating the formation of state's strategic behaviour, especially foreign policy, little effort has been made to explore how these governmental products are implemented once they have been formulated. This situation is captured within the *Handbook of Political Science*, which describes "the concentration on policy process and the neglect of policy output" as "one of the major deficiencies in the study of foreign policy" (Greenstein & Polsby, 1975: 382-383). In his seminal work, Michael Clarke (1979: 114) elaborates on how foreign policy implementation is often observed merely as technical and administrative issues, thereby making it apolitical. Clarke further illustrates this perspective with an example of two types of policy, namely a "bad" decision/policy implemented correctly but does not lead to expected results, and a "good" policy/decision that is not faithfully implemented and produces similar results to the "bad" decision.

These two examples suggest a notion that the problem of implementation is considered only an operational or technical matter rather than conceptual or political. This perspective is erroneous in the sense that it may drive us from the central concern of making policy implementation an integral part of the policymaking process (Allison & Halperin, 1972), hindering researchers from determining the actual rationale of why a certain policy fails to be implemented or produce the desired results. Technical and administrative problems are commonly encountered in the implementation phase, stemming from the organisational context in which a policy is formulated. Though these issues may hamper the efforts of policy

implementation, they are not the central cause of why a policy fails to produce the expected outcomes.

Take for example, geographical factor, the inability of the bureaucratic machine to operate new policies, or the limitations on the provisions required to implement a policy. For Clarke (1979), while politics may manipulate these administrative/technical shortcomings to obstruct the implementation of policy, the same politics may also be utilized to overcome these shortcomings and administer the implementation. Clarke (1979), therefore, argues that implementation is not only surrounded by technical/administrative issues, but also principal issues, referring to articulated behaviours and attitudes shared by decision makers on a particular policy.

A similar perspective is also shared by Christopher Hood (1976) with his “quasi-administrative” analysis. Using this analytical tool, Hood argues that, aside from the organizational or administrative shortcomings, a state’s inability to implement a particular policy is also caused by the inadequacy of available resources and the lack of the political acceptability of the policy (Hood, 1976). The notion of this analytical tool suggests that it is necessary not only to focus only on the implementation phase, but also to observe other issues related to the context of the implementation stage, including the nature of the decision, the environment in which a decision is made, and the nature of controls available to decision makers (Clarke, 1979).

David A. Baldwin (2000) offers another perspective in examining foreign policy implementation and underscores the necessity to firstly deal with the problem of clarity on the meaning of “success” or “failure” in policy implementation. Baldwin contends that disagreement on the definition of “policy success” or “policy fiasco” will refrain policy practitioners from evaluating policy implementation. He takes an example on the work of Druckman and Stern, which saw difficulties in evaluating the effectiveness of “peacekeeping operations”, not only because of methodological, but also because conceptual problems (Baldwin, 2000).

One specific theory that adopts a similar notion is bureaucratic politics. Bureaucratic politics theory was historically pioneered by a number of studies who attempted to observe the effect of government bureaucracies on foreign policy at the beginning of the 1960s (Alden & Aran, 2012). The results of these studies suggest that (members from) different government bodies have different prisms through which they perceive and understand a

particular issue. Therefore, different institutional settings may result in different ways of viewing a foreign policy issue or, as stated by the Miles' Law as, "where you stand depends on where you sit" (Miles, 1978; Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Alden & Aran, 2012).

In their work on the 1969 Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison and Zelikow (1999) criticise the prevailing (Realist) rational policy model that perceives the state as a unitary actor and foreign policy as a product from a unified decision-making process, thereby ignoring the role of bureaucracy in this process (Allison & Halperin, 1972; and Allison & Zelikow, 1999). To fill the research gap, Allison and Zelikow (1999) suggest two different models of analysis as an alternative, namely the organisational process model (Model II) and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III). The organisational model portrays (foreign) policy as a product of previous bureaucratic procedures. Adopting this model means perceiving that decision making is conducted by the organisational culture that was previously established, not by the interplay among the key members of the bureaucracy. Due to the limitations in its explanatory power, particularly explaining policy change,³⁶ Model II is not frequently applied.³⁷

In contrast to the first model, the theory of bureaucratic politics defines states in a pluralist way, consisting of different units that are often competing with one another. Based on this model, policy is therefore decided by a single decision maker; instead, it emerges from a process of bargaining and negotiation among members of the bureaucracy, or what Allison and Halperin (1972) refer to as "pulling and hauling". This model suggests that bureaucratic actors do not focus on a similar or single dimension when deciding the objectives that they need to achieve from a particular foreign policy. Various dimensions, namely national, organizational, domestic, and personal interests, become consideration for bureaucratic actors to define their stances depending on their position and institution.

One example is the attitude of the Ministry of Finance in deciding about war. In a normal circumstance, when there is not any imminent threat for the state, the Ministry of Finance will be usually not in favour of increasing the defence budget because doing so can disrupt the state's balance of payment. However, during times when state security is at stake, the Ministry of Finance will mostly take the opposite stance, transgressing their nature and sacrificing their core parochial or organisational interests.

³⁶ See for example Freedman (1976).

³⁷ Consequently, the Model II was absorbed into the Model III and treated as one of the "constraints" within the Model III; See for example Welch (1977).

However, in some cases, even when facing critical situation, bureaucracies are not only able to distort the perception of external threats in foreign policymaking, but also capable of distorting the perception of how this external threat affects the national security interests and how to best deal with this threat (Allison & Halperin, 1972; and Halperin *et.al.*, 2006). These institutions do so by continuing to push their respective organisational perspectives, perceiving that the health of their respective institutions is crucial to national security interests. Organisational or parochial interests are a major driving force for members of bureaucratic institutions to insistently impose their perspectives or ideas on a particular issue. These interests are manifested in the following forms: prestige, the interest in remaining at the core of the decision-making process; financial benefit, the interest in increasing the budgetary proportion or preventing budgetary cuts; and power, the interest in remaining a dominant, influential institution in decision-making (Halperin *et.al.*, 2006; and Alden & Aran, 2012). Aside from organisational interests, the motivation of bureaucracy members to be involved in the decision-making and implementation processes is also influenced by their personal ambitions.

As most members of bureaucracies are career officials, their involvement in policy making and implementation is an opportunity not only to increase their leverage, but also to build their personal careers, attracting the attention of political elites by exhibiting their ability and expertise in a particular area. The more active or involved these officials' respective home institutions are in the decision-making of critical issues, the more likely that their careers will advance. One's career path will be more promising in an institution located at the heart of power than a career path in the periphery.

In their analysis, Allison and Halperin argue that foreign policy is formulated and implemented through multiple processes also known as "action channels". Allison and Halperin (1972: 45) argue the following:

Regularized sets of procedures for producing particular classes of action ... The path from initiation to action frequently includes a number of decisions, that is authoritative designations, internal to a government, of specific actions to be taken by specific officials.

The authors further elaborate that foreign policymaking consists of two components, namely decisions made by senior officials and the processes following the decisions (Allison & Halperin, 1972). Based on this perspective, foreign policy implementation is considered an inseparable component of policy formulation in general.

For most cases, due to the crucial nature of the issue, the policymaking of national security and foreign policy is largely dominated by senior officials, such as the head of national security bodies, foreign policy councils, intelligence, and even the head of the government. Each actor does not possess the same degree of power and influence. Other actors may be involved on an *ad hoc* basis or regularly, though some may also enter the game simply based on their proximity to the chief executive of the government.

Though the theory of bureaucratic politics is commonly known for explaining policy decision making, it is also useful for explaining policy implementation as this study considers policy implementation as an inseparable component of policymaking. Halperin *et.al.* (2006) also attempt to examine bureaucratic politics within the implementation of foreign policy and build their analysis by focusing on the relationship between presidential decisions and the following actions of bureaucracy members. For these actors, presidential decisions (Halperin *et.al.*, 2006: 243)

... vary in specificity. They often are conveyed only in policy statements expressing a sentiment or intention. The statements may indicate in general terms that certain kinds of actions should be taken but not say who should take them. Even if they do specify the actor, they seldom indicate when the action should be taken or the details of how it should be done. In fact, the instructions are often so vague as to leave all the actors free to continue behaving as they have in the past.

Numerous factors may drive the President to generate such vague statements. One particular reason is a lack of expertise on a specific issue. A President new to the office or lacking the previous experience of holding strategical positions will just leave the details on how to convert his decisions into practice to his subordinates. The next factor stems from the President's desire to maintain consensus among his coalition. A vague decision may appease all parties because it displays the President's disinterest in favouring one actor or particular groups in the coalition. Similarly, the final factor also derives from the interest to maintain harmony among his subordinates, wherein the President observes the need to remain neutral before his officials by not showing disproportional interest to a particular individual or group of individuals, thus leaving subordinates to debate over the details.

Halperin *et al.* (2006:) further identify three reasons for which presidential directives are not obeyed or implemented by bureaucracies. The first of these reasons is the uncertainty surrounding orders. Not all bureaucrats on an operational level have the opportunity to meet

or attend meetings with the President or parties from the inner circle of decision-making. The directives or decisions resulting from these meetings are mostly transmitted to the operational-level bureaucracies indirectly through senior-level officials. In this context, presidential directives may have been modified, intentionally or unintentionally, by the perception or understanding of senior officials.

The second reason is the level of difficulty of the implementation. In some cases, officials are given orders to attain particular outcomes without receiving further elaboration on how to achieve these objectives. In addition, the scope of the orders may cause difficulties for the officials who are to implement it. A policy that requires the cooperation of vast networks of government institutions, such as grand strategy, is more complex, arduous, and laborious, requiring more time for implementation than directives that can be conducted by a small group of individuals in the same institution. In this context, officials responsible for following up presidential directives are required to negotiate and bargain with various individuals across different institutions that share various parochial perspectives and interests.

The third reason is the officials' resistance to execute the directives. In extreme cases, bureaucratic officials from the operational level may refuse to follow and execute the order. The most plausible factor that drives this attitude is a personal perspective or belief that these bureaucrats hold. Based on a certain perspective or belief, these individuals may perceive a particular issue differently and be likely to decline to implement an order that they perceive as undermining national interests or those of their organisation. The attitude of imposing one's personal or organisational views instead of obeying established administrative decisions is commonly shared by career officials. One clear example can be found in the case of bureaucratic blockage on a certain government policy in Japanese politics (Bochorodycz, 2010).

Some scholars have observed a strong link between the degree of the President's involvement in policy formulation, in decision making and policy implementation, and the success or failure of the implemented policy to produce the desired outcomes. Hood (1976), for example, contends that the stronger the control of the government over its bureaucracy, the weaker the influence of the bureaucracy over the policy, and contrariwise. A similar notion is also shared in the work Halperin et al. (2006), who suggest that the more actively

involved the President is in policymaking, the more likely for the policy to be implemented as previously decided.

Civil-military relations are another example of “state-society relations” variable within the Neoclassical Realist model of foreign policy formulation and implementation developed by Ripsman et al. (2016). The central issue in the study of civil-military relations involves the effort to establish a balance in the relations between civilian elites, military institutions, and civil society in state governance.³⁸ According to Huntington (1981), what distinguishes members of military institutions from their civilian partners is the military’s particular perspective, which he refers to as a “military mind”. This unique mindset is developed and institutionalised over the long term. Members of the military are instilled with this mindset as soon as they join the institution. The military mind serves as the prism through which military officers perceive and understand the external environment, which is regarded as evil and full of conflict as a result of a weak, corrupt human nature (Huntington, 1981). The military mind also serves to guide the behaviour of military officers by underlining the primacy of society over the individual and the importance of hierarchy, order, and differentiation in function.

In respect to national strategic policy, the military mind posits the military institution as guardian of the state, providing the state, as the basic unit of political organisation, with security from internal and external threats. The military institution considers three responsibilities to the state (Huntington, 1981: 72). The first responsibility is a representative function, in which the military is required to supply the state with continuous information on security matters and minimum defence capabilities. The second responsibility is an advisory function. In this function, the military is responsible for providing the state with an analysis of the implications of every course or policy taken from the perspective of the military. The third responsibility is the executive function, through which the military serves as an executor of formulated policies relevant to security and defence affairs.

While limited attention has been afforded to this variable in relation to grand strategy, civil-military relations are still important in the creation and implementation of states’ strategic behaviour (Balzacq & Krebs, 2021). This strategy is particularly relevant to countries where the role of military in the country’s history, domestic politics, and the construction of

³⁸ See Huntington (1952), Janowitz (1960), and Finer (1962) for early work on civil-military relations. For more contemporary examples, see Dunlap (1992), Lutwak (1994), Foster (1997), and Kohn (2008).

nation building is significant and relevant (Alsina, 2014). In her recent work, Risa Brooks explicates three relevancies of civil-military relations to state's grand strategy (Balzacq & Krebs, 2021). The first of these relevancies is the influence of civil-military relations in the substance of state's grand strategy. In this context, the degree of relations between the military institution and the civilian population of a country can shape the core principles of a country's grand strategy. The change in the core principles of state's grand strategy also signifies the change in the state's orientation and the strategic choices it will pursue through grand strategy.

One example of how civil-military relations affect the substance of the grand strategy is through the rise of militarist attitudes within the general population. While the increasing military attitude among the civilian population will contribute positively to the image of the (military) institution before the public, the rise of this attitude will also lead to the increase of public support to the military (Balzacq & Krebs, 2021). This support not only manifests in terms of ratings, but also approval, be it for a budget increase or the involvement of this institution in almost every state affair, both domestic and abroad (Bacevich, 2005; and Fallows, 2015). By shaping the social and domestic political environment, militarist attitudes are able to shape the decision-making process of grand strategy (Bacevich, 2005). This influence can occur not only because state's leaders may be indoctrinated by the attitude, but also if they are not convinced by the attitude, as political actors, state's leaders will still follow the majority as to protect their personal (political) interests.

The second relevancy is the impact of civil-military relations on the character of grand strategy. For Brooks, the character of grand strategy refers to the level of cohesiveness and integration of all the components of grand strategy, or the consistency in its "mean-ends" chain (Balzacq & Krebs, 2021). While civil-military relations in the previous point are manifested at a grassroot levels, between military institution and the civilian public, in this impact, the configurations of civil-military take place in the engagement between military institution and civilian elites of the state. The degree of the civilian oversight over the military or the degree of influence of the military over domestic politics are examples of manifestation of civil-military relations at the elite level that can shape state's strategic assessment and making (Balzacq & Krebs, 2021).

The Dual Function (*Dwifungsi ABRI*)³⁹ of Indonesia's military during the New Order era offers an ideal example. *Dwifungsi ABRI* is a security doctrine reflecting not only the ideology and the constitution of the state, but also the origin of Indonesia's armed forces as a guerrilla army. The doctrine legitimates the dual function of the armed forces in both defence and non-defence affairs, placing them both as the guardian of the state and participant of political process (Sebastian, 2006; Honna, 2003; Crouch, 2007). With an expanded role, under the premise of "the guardian of state ideology and constitution", Indonesia's armed forces were not only able to shape state's strategic making, but also to intervene in this process (Haripin et al., 2021).

The third relevancy is the impact of civil-military relations on the implementation of grand strategy. The configurations between military institution and civilian actors not only shape the making of grand strategy but also impact its implementation (Balzacq & Krebs, 2021). Civil-military relations are not only able to jeopardize the execution of state's grand strategy during critical times, be it when facing external imminent threats or during wartimes, but also hamper grand strategy execution during peacetimes.

Problems in the implementation of grand strategy may occur because of the failure to mobilize the necessary resources on time. In this context, the dynamics of civil-military relations may incapacitate the state's ability to mobilize its resources through political conflicts, contestation, or even public pressure (Balzacq & Krebs, 2021). Besides the inability to mobilize required resources, problems in grand strategy implementation may also stem from its articulation, whether articulated differently or even erroneously.

As grand strategy does not necessarily come with detailed plans and strategies (Dueck, 2015), its implementation requires articulation and translation of the goals and principles within the grand strategy (Silove, 2018). State leaders may devise grand strategy but may also leave the execution to the military institution for a number of reasons. Civilian elites' inclination to the military may stem from their dependency on the military institution to assist the civilian government in executing numerous programmes and policies and even resolving a number of issues (Liddle, 1996; Bland, 2020). This dependency is primarily rooted in the image of the military as an organized and disciplined – and in some cases, such as in Indonesia they are present in almost every region in the country — , instrument of state that can work

³⁹ The doctrine of an expanded military role not only affects defense and security affairs, but also encompasses political, social, economic affairs of the country.

efficiently and effectively. Indeed, in comparison with civilian bureaucracy, military institution is far above the bureaucracy in terms of these traits.

Civilian leaders are also inclined to the military due to the influence this institution has in the local politics. In this condition, civilian leaders will seek and depend on the political support from the military institution in consolidating their power and legitimacy at the domestic political level (Lowry, 1996; Crouch, 2007; IPAC, 2016; and Sebastian *et.al.*, 2018). In the most extreme case, civilian leaders are inclined to the military because of their fear over the potential *coup* that the military can do to their civilian counterpart.⁴⁰

Though the application of Neoclassical Realism provides the framework to approach the examination of grand strategy implementation, the theory is incapable of investigating the rationale behind the complex implementation of GMF in the field of foreign policy and defence. Therefore, this study applies both the bureaucratic politics theory and civil-military relations as the analytical tool to investigate the dynamics in GMF implementation in the field of foreign policy and defence. In other words, the application of bureaucratic politics theory and civil-military relations in the study is primarily aimed at answering the question of what Allison and Zelikow refer to as “Why did X happen?” instead of “Why did state A do X?” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).

Specifically, the application of bureaucratic politics in this research is oriented at investigating the dynamics among the participating actors in GMF implementation and how these dynamics affect and impede the implementation of the grand strategy in the field of foreign policy and defence. Unlike his predecessor, Yudhoyono, who exhibits leadership in strategic issues, especially foreign policy, Widodo has not only limited experience, but also little interest in directly governing these issues. With the departure of the president, Indonesia’s strategic policies under Widodo administration are mainly driven by ministers and advisors. Therefore, the implementation of the grand strategy in the field foreign policy and defence is affected as much of the effort to execute it will be given to the bureaucratic machine of Widodo administration without real supervision from the President. Therefore, the application of bureaucratic politics theory is suitable for examining how the dynamics among bureaucracies implementing GMF impede grand strategy concretisation and refrain it from achieving the expected goals.

⁴⁰ See Brook (1998).

In terms of civil-military relations, the application of this concept is oriented at investigating the impact of Indonesia's civil-military relations on GMF implementation in foreign policy and defence. In this study, the examination of civil-military relations not only focuses on the relations between civilian actors and the military, both as an institution or individuals, including former or retired military officer,⁴¹ but also considers the products coming out of this relation in terms of specific military doctrines. Applying this concept, this study investigates how both the relations and the doctrines refrain GMF implementation from bringing substantial changes in the field of foreign policy and defence

⁴¹ Although retired military officers are no longer included as members of the military, their perspective or mindset still reflects the core mindset of their former institution, which is reasonable as a mindset that has been indoctrinated for years is not easy to be replaced or even diminished.

CHAPTER III

THE EVOLUTION OF INDONESIA'S GRAND STRATEGY AND THE ORIGIN OF GMF

This chapter aims to examine the historical development of Indonesia's long-term foreign and security policy orientation, as well as the origin of the GMF. The first section begins with the policy orientation, elaborating the evolution of Indonesia's grand strategy from shortly after self-declared independence in August 1945 to the post-financial crisis era. The purpose of this section is not only to demonstrate that Indonesia is familiar with the concept of grand strategy as it has adopted different grand strategies before, but also to demonstrate that Indonesia has been historically responsive to geopolitical changes.

The following section traces the roots of the GMF. This research assumes that though the GMF is a novel strategy in the history of Indonesia's foreign and defence policy, the elements constituting the doctrine do not all originate in the current regime. In fact, these elements have existed for long time and have been shaped through historical processes. In this sense, the GMF did not coincidentally emerge in Widodo's administration. The GMF is not a product of stasis. Its materialisation is strongly linked with the dynamics that occurred before Widodo assumed office in late 2014.

III.1 The Evolution of Indonesia's Grand Strategy

Scholars in Indonesian studies assert two motives that drive Indonesia's foreign policy: the sense of vulnerability derived from Indonesia's geostrategic position and historical experiences, and the regional entitlement or the sense of leadership that again originates from the geostrategic environment (Leifer, 1983). Weinstein (2007: 42) equates Indonesia's sense of vulnerability with the analogy of "a pretty maiden constantly being approached by men who wanted to take advantage of her". These driving forces were later embodied within the sacrosanct principle of Indonesia's foreign policy, namely the independent-active (*bebas-aktif*) foreign policy. The term emanates from Indonesia's founding father and the first vice President Mohammad Hatta's speech asserting that (Suryadinata, 1996: 25):

“Indonesia should not become an ‘object’ in the international political struggle. On the contrary it should become a ‘subject’ which has the right to make its own choice. The part will be divided into several sections based on the time frame or existed regimes in Indonesia.”

The following section elaborates the historical development of Indonesia’s grand strategy from the era of Sukarno (Old Order) to the Yudhoyono administration.

III.1.a. The Old Order Era (1945-1966)

Historically, Indonesia began to adopt a grand strategy at the point of self-declared independence in 1945. Given the fact that Indonesian independence was not automatically acknowledged by other countries, especially by great powers, Indonesian elites were preoccupied with the issue of securing and protecting the fragile independence. Facing a great threat following the Hague’s aspiration to reinstall its colonial authority across the archipelago shortly after the surrender of the Japanese army, early post-independence Indonesian politics was contested between intellectuals and leaders of militia groups (Strategic Review, 2012). The debate was over the actions that Indonesia should take to respond to the incoming threat, whether to respond by violent or peaceful means (Leifer, 1983).

Eventually, the proponents for diplomatic resolution defeated those who favoured armed resistance. One prominent figure from the intellectual group, Sutan Sjahrir, who later served as Indonesia’s first prime minister, published a political pamphlet titled *Onze Strijd* or *Perjuangan Kita* (Our Struggle) in October 1945 (Ricklefs, 2001). Through his political pamphlet, he underlined the necessity for Indonesia to pursue a diplomatic solution to resolve the conflict with the Dutch, not only because of the superiority of the Dutch army over Indonesian’s young armed forces, but also to court international recognition, especially with the United States (Sjahrir, 1968). Being aware of the international environment, Sjahrir thus acknowledged the pivotal roles of the United States, the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent the British, as the victors of the World War II in shaping the course of the conflict between Jakarta and the Hague. He believed that the three countries possessed great leverage over the Dutch, and this was seen as a potential route to Indonesia attaining its ultimate goals of survival and international recognition.

Armed struggle continued across the country because the new republic did not have effective control over its military and also because there were many independent militia

groups. However, Indonesia's new leaders officially remained focused on a diplomatic approach to settle the conflict. The reliance on diplomacy invited criticism from fellow Indonesians, both within the political elites and other segments of society. Diplomacy was principally perceived by the army as a sign of weakness and as compromising the national interests and sovereignty (Leifer, 1983).

The military's dissatisfaction with diplomacy was reasonable. Take for example the first two agreements Jakarta struck: the Linggarjati and Renville agreements⁴². In the short-term, the result of both agreements not only weakened Indonesia's bargaining position but also reduced the territory of the new republic (Leifer, 1983). In addition, the indirect consequence of both agreements was the emergence of multiple rebellions which arose because local political leaders were not satisfied with the central government's diplomatic strategy. Key rebellions included efforts to establish the Islamic state, the *Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia* (DI/TII) (trans. the *Darul Islam/Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia*) in West Java and other parts of Indonesia, as well as the Communist rebellion in the city of Madiun, East Java in 1948 (Frederick & Wordern, 2011). The emergence of some secessionist movements forced the central government to divert some of its already limited armed forces while also facing increasing Dutch aggression.

However, in the mid and longer term, Indonesia's decision to pursue diplomatic means instead of a military operation as its grand strategy to achieve actual independence in the early years post-independence (1945 - 1949) led to the victory of the republic in the struggle for survival and international recognition. Through diplomacy Indonesia displayed its goodwill to settle its conflict with the Dutch peacefully. By complying with all the legally binding results from the agreements even when the results disadvantaged Indonesia's interests and limiting the use of armed force in response to the Dutch aggression, Indonesia successfully portrayed

⁴² Both Linggarjati (November 1946) and Renville Agreement (December 1947) are the two agreements between the then newly self-proclaimed Indonesia with the Dutch Colonial Administrative. Exploiting the absence of power following the surrender of Japan to the Allies in August 1945, several Indonesia's youth activists declared the independence from the colonial power. Driven by the intention to re-establish its Southeast colony, the Dutch forces returned to Indonesia along with the British in September - October 1945. Fighting erupted between the Dutch-British forces against the militia/guerrillas of the then new republic from the following month, as the Dutch did not acknowledge the independence of Indonesia and attempted to re-establish again its Dutch-East-Indies colony. See, for example, Leifer (1983) and Crouch (2007).

itself as a good member of international society and won sympathy among the wider international community, including the U.S. (Strategic Review, 2012).⁴³

Though Indonesia acquired recognition from both the Dutch and international community by 1950, Indonesia was still facing the issue of West Papua. Indonesian elites were preoccupied not only because of the status of West Papua, which was still unclear, but also because West Papua was perceived to be the outpost from which the Dutch launched their operation to destabilise Indonesia (Strategic Review, 2012). Therefore, the inclusion of West Papua, previously known as West Irian, into Indonesia's territory was considered to be an important goal by Sukarno and other Indonesian elites.

Indonesia once again attempted to apply a similar strategy of courting the U.S. to support Indonesia's aspiration in dealing with the West Papua issue. Nevertheless, with the communist victory in China in 1949, the U.S. and Australia had become concerned with the growing communism in the archipelago, especially knowing that Sukarno had included communism into the country's formal political system and ideology, the NASAKOM (*Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis* – Nationalism, Religion, and Communism). Thus, the U.S. refused Indonesia's request to support its claim over West Papua. The U.S. government decided to side with the Dutch since it perceived the Dutch authority to have better capability to prevent communist infiltration to West Papua and its vicinity.

The U.S. refusal to support Indonesia's claim forced Indonesia to look for other alternative avenues to obtain foreign support (Leifer, 1983). In 1955, Indonesia organised the first inter-continental conference in Bandung, the Asian-African Conference, that gathered many countries from the continent of Asia and Africa. The conference was designed to establish a third bloc of non-aligned countries that could avoid the growing rivalry between the two blocs, the Western and the Soviet blocs. Aside from the manifestation of Indonesia's independent foreign policy (Acharya, 2009), the Asian-African conference was also considered as a platform to internationalise the issue of West Papua by attributing it to the spirit of anti-colonialism and imperialism.

In 1959, the fall of Indonesia's parliamentary system strengthened the position of Sukarno as the head of both the state and the government of Indonesia. No longer

⁴³ Indonesia only used its full military forces to quell internal secessionist movements, including the Communist rebellion in 1948, but not to retaliate the Dutch aggressions. Indonesia was also able to court the U.S because of the effort to crush the communist rebellion, which was perceived as anti-communism.

constrained by the strong legislative and other political parties, Sukarno established a new political doctrine that incorporated the three biggest elements in the Indonesian political system: the nationalist, religious, and communist groups. Supported by Indonesia's Communist Party (PKI), Sukarno pursued an aggressive foreign policy against the Dutch in the case of West-Papua. Indonesia's aggressive approach toward West-Papua was perceived negatively by the U.S. at first and this led to the reluctance of Washington to provide support for Indonesia's cause in West-Papua. U.S. refusal of Indonesia's request was then exploited by the PKI to alienate Sukarno and Indonesia from the Western bloc and to bring the country closer to the communist bloc (Leifer, 1983). The Soviet Union eventually responded positively to Indonesia's request for military assistance (Strategic Review, 2012). Knowing Indonesia had become the recipient of the Soviet advanced weaponry system, the U.S. eventually pressured the Dutch to settle the West Papua issue peacefully by giving the disputed territory back to Indonesia. The main factor that drove the U.S. to suddenly shift its stance on West Papua was the U.S. fear that Indonesia would be dragged deeper into Soviet proximity (Strategic Review, 2012).

After 1950, Indonesia's long-term foreign policy orientation changed from attaining international recognition to promoting the ideas of anti-neo-colonialism and imperialism. Indonesia also struggled to establish an alternative world order. Nevertheless, the methods and strategies applied by Sukarno became even more aggressive following his power consolidation after the Presidential Decree in 1959. Sukarno's close relationship with the PKI, which was driven by his desire to balance the growing influence of the army, had also impacted Indonesia's foreign policy (Leifer, 1983).

During Sukarno's last years in power, Indonesia's foreign policy started to align with that of Communist China. This was observed particularly by the army as a sign of violation against the country's principle of independent foreign policy, in which Hatta asserts that (Hatta, 1953: 444):

"Indonesia plays no favourites between the two opposed blocs and follows its path through the various international problems. It terms this policy 'independent', and further characterizes it by describing it as independent and 'active'. By active is meant the effort to work energetically for the preservation of peace and the relaxation of tensions generated by the two blocs."

From 1955 to 1966, Indonesia's grand strategy was marked by strong anti-colonialist and imperialist sentiments (Weinstein, 2007). Sukarno called his foreign policy the "lighthouse" policy. This foreign policy was designed to make Indonesia as an example or a "lighthouse" for other newly independent countries, which he referred to as the New Emerging Forces or NEFO. This "lighthouse" policy was devised to enlighten their paths in a world dominated by the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO), referring to the U.S., its Western allies, and the Soviet Union (Vickers, 2005; Tan & Acharya, 2008). Sukarno's adventurous foreign policies peaked in the mid-1960s when he opposed the formation of the new Malaysian Federation because he considered it an extension of colonial rule in the region and threatening to Indonesia's effort to fight imperialism. The establishment of the Malaysian Federation and its inclusion into the U.N. resulted in the withdrawal of Indonesia from the U.N. and the pursuit of a confrontational policy toward the Malaysian Federation.

III.1.b. The New Order Era (1967-1998) and the Birth of Regionalism

In late 1965, Indonesian domestic politics changed dramatically, marked by the outbreak of the G30-Sept Movement that killed several top army generals. The PKI and its affiliates were directly blamed and considered to be the masterminds behind the kidnappings. This political turmoil culminated with the disbanding of the PKI, extermination of its supporters, and ultimately the fall of the Sukarno regime. By 1966, though Sukarno was still officially the President of the country, most of the power had been transferred to Suharto (Hagiwara, 1973). Eventually, in February of 1967, Suharto officially took over the Sukarno regime, marking the beginning of the New Order era.

The change of regime in Indonesia automatically shifted the orientation of Indonesian foreign policy, which was previously marked by aggressiveness toward the West and proximity with the Communist China. When Suharto ascended to power, Indonesia encountered unstable and turbulent internal politics and devastating economic conditions. Sukarno's adventurous foreign policies that led to Indonesia's isolation from the international community had depleted and destroyed the country's economic performance. Under these conditions, Suharto perceived Indonesia's economic recovery as the top priority in the early years of his administration (Strategic Review, 2012).

Aside from the deteriorating domestic economic and political environment, Suharto was also preoccupied by the growing influence of China in the region. The dissolution of the

PKI did not assure Indonesia's security from communism. To cope with these two problems, Suharto decided to pursue a grand strategy that was designed to establish regional cooperation. This regional cooperation may be seen as an attempt to boost Indonesia's economy, but the actual motives were to create a buffer zone for Indonesia, contain the spread of communism, as well as to exclude great powers from the region (Habir et al., 2015).

In contrast to Sukarno who observed multilateralism as an avenue to attain Indonesia's strategic interests, Suharto's foreign policy did not consider all elements in the external environment to affect Indonesia's interests similarly. A new concept of *Mandala* or "concentric circles" was adopted in the geostrategic thinking of the New Order (Dellios, 2003). Using this concept, Indonesia observed its external environment in an orderly way based on proximity (Anwar, 2014). Therefore, the Southeast Asian sub-region, which Indonesia is located in, would lie at the very inner circle and therefore hold the highest priority in Indonesia's strategic thinking.⁴⁴

For Suharto, the desired recovery could not be attained without the assistance from the Western countries, mainly the United States. To obtain this support, Suharto was first required to assure the Western countries and their allies of Indonesia's goodwill. There was no better step to demonstrate Indonesia's good intention than to terminate the confrontational policy and improve Indonesia's relations with its neighbours. In mid 1966, following Suharto's ascend to power since March 1966, the Indonesian government began to end its confrontation with Malaysia, marked by the establishment of unofficial diplomatic offices in both countries' capitals and ASEAN (Crouch, 2007; Roberts et. al, 2015).

The peaceful settlement between Indonesia and Malaysia allowed the seed of regionalism to grow again. By 1967, five Southeast Asian countries established a regional association called ASEAN (Association of the Southeast Asian Nations). From this moment, ASEAN has served as the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy. For Suharto's New Order, ASEAN served Indonesia's interests satisfactorily. At least six of Indonesia's goals were successfully achieved through ASEAN during the New Order era (Sukma, 2017). The first was the reintegration of Indonesia into the international society, especially within Southeast Asia. Second, the formation of ASEAN was also designed to restore Indonesia's image and credibility as a peaceful and responsible member of the international community.

⁴⁴ Based on the Mandala concept, the Southeast Asian sub-region sits at the core/center of this concentric circle, following by the region of Asia-Pacific, Indian Ocean, the Asian continent, Europe, and American continent.

Third, with the establishment of ASEAN, Indonesia attempted to reduce and diminish the suspicion of neighbouring countries about the country's intentions in the region, especially Malaysia and Singapore which had previously experienced Indonesia's aggressive foreign policy. Fourth, as a regional grouping, ASEAN served as a collective bargaining tool in relation to extra-regional powers. These advantages benefited ASEAN member states, including Indonesia. Through ASEAN, member states had a better position from which to bargain with more powerful and developed countries.

Fifth, aside from being a collective bargaining tool, ASEAN also functioned as a collective diplomatic buffer against external pressure and criticism. For example, when Indonesia invaded Timor-Leste in 1975, ASEAN provided Indonesia with a cover against international outcry by actively providing an explanation of Indonesia's action in many international forums (Sukma, 2017; Leifer, 1983). This type of behaviour is commonly referred to as ASEAN Solidarity. Sixth, ASEAN served as a vehicle for Indonesia to exercise its desire for leadership and to realise its vision of regional order.

Indonesia's economic success in the 1980s and early 1990s encouraged Suharto and his administration to abandon their previous modest and low-profile foreign policy of silent leadership and start to pursue a more active foreign policy. This active foreign policy was aimed to raise Indonesia's profile internationally which had been restrained to prevent more suspicions from neighbouring countries (Sukma, 1995). Indonesia's strategy to pursue a more active foreign policy when the country was capable derived from the perception shared by elites in Jakarta who considered foreign policy as a "by-product of the domestic politics". This belief was also reflected in Suharto's speech in 1969 stating that "We shall only be able to play an effective role if we ourselves are possessed of a great national vitality" (Leifer, 1983: 181).

Since the end of Cold-War, Indonesia has been actively engaged in the effort to reshape the Post-Cold War regional architecture. Indonesia was still interested in ensuring the centrality of ASEAN, but with a new political environment after the Cold War, Indonesia had begun to see the necessity to incorporate the participation of other major powers in the greater Asia-Pacific region. Indonesia's approval of Australia's initiative to establish the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989 marks the beginning of Indonesia's grand strategic shift. Indonesia's action indicated a shift in its perception of regional politics which previously opposed the idea of marginalising ASEAN or involving extra-regional actors in

regional politics (Habir et al., 2015). Indonesia's rationale for accepting the establishment of APEC amidst early criticism from other ASEAN member states was driven by its perception that the forum could serve as a new venue for Indonesia to satisfy its sense of regional entitlement and leadership (Suryadinata, 1996).

Indonesia's interest in expanding the scope of ASEAN diplomacy was eventually reflected in the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. Indonesia initially rejected the establishment of the ARF since the forum underlined the centrality of the powers outside of Southeast Asia instead of those in ASEAN. This later raised Indonesia's fear over potential marginalisation if Jakarta invited external major powers to the regional politics theatre (Ross, 1995).

Regardless of economic achievement, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis created havoc in several Asia Pacific countries, including Indonesia. The crisis not only jeopardised Indonesia's economic performance but also worsened its socio-political problems. The effect of this financial crisis rapidly spread from the financial and economic to the social and political sectors, which eventually resulted in the collapse of the New Order in 1998. As a consequence of this financial crisis, Indonesia's leadership in the region was severely weakened. It took years for Indonesia to fully recover from this devastating condition and regain its leadership in the region.

III.1.c. The Reformation Era (1999-2014)

In the early years of the Reformation Era, Indonesian political elites did not put much emphasis on outlining or discussing a long-term strategic perspective that would take account of the country's core goals, including its power projection within the regional geopolitical context. Elites in Jakarta were more preoccupied with domestic problems that arose as the consequence of the financial crisis. These issues included deteriorating economic performance, social and political instability, and more importantly, separatism that threatened the unity of the republic. The lack of attention to a long-term strategic perspective resulted in the failure of the early post-authoritarian regimes (1998-2004) to formulate a grand strategy. Without a clear and coherent long-term and overarching strategy, Indonesia's policies, including in the realm of foreign affairs, were seen to be disoriented, reactionary,

passive, and often were found less effective or even counterproductive for the country's national objectives (Reid, 2012).⁴⁵

Indonesia began to re-establish its preeminent position in the region during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's (SBY) presidency. During his first term, the Yudhoyono administration successfully achieved progress, particularly in the security realm. A peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM), a separatist movement based in Aceh, was signed, ending the protracted conflict that had lasted for more than three decades. In addition to this success, Indonesia was also able to consolidate and institutionalise its democracy. This institutionalised democracy later laid the groundwork for establishment of a more stable socio-political situation. These achievements, a combination of a stable domestic environment and positive economic performance, had provided the elites in Jakarta with a confident basis for the further development of Indonesia's international role (Brooks, 2011).

In the post-Suharto era, ASEAN continued to remain at the core of Indonesia's foreign policy thinking. Indonesia still holds a sense of entitlement as a natural leader of the region that is based on its sheer size, strategic location, and size of its population (Chacko, 2016). However, in Yudhoyono's second term (2009-2014), there was a change in the way the Indonesian political elites perceived Indonesia's position in international relations. There was also a growing desire among elites in Jakarta for Indonesia's active participation in broader multilateral forums. Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia's Foreign Minister in Yudhoyono's second term, underlined this vision by describing Indonesia as a regional power with global interests (Natalegawa, 2014). This aspiration signifies that Indonesia is not only eager to contribute in the effort to maintain regional stability, but also desires to be an active player in addressing other global issues, such as food and energy security, transnational crime, natural disasters, climate change, and environmental sustainability (Kemlu, 2014). This increasing ambition was attributed to multiple factors.

The first factor was Indonesia's positive economic performance as well as its proven economic resilience during the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. Indonesia's resilience during the crisis has provided elites in Jakarta with the confidence to nurture a more ambitious foreign policy. The second factor was Indonesia's success in consolidating its democracy.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ See also Roberts *et al.* (2015) and Shekhar (2018)

⁴⁶ See for example the work collection of Aspinall & Mietzner (2010).

Supported by Indonesia's burgeoning democratic identity as the third largest democracy, Indonesia under the Yudhoyono administration promoted both democracy and human rights or human security as its new foreign policy objectives (Reid, 2012). Indonesia's transformation into a norm entrepreneur that promotes liberal-cosmopolitan values was observed as an effort to regain its reputation in regional affairs after the Asian Financial Crisis. Through multilateral forums, Indonesia was very keen to share its experience in managing democratic transition with other aspiring democracies (Picone & Yusman, 2014). The establishment of the annual Bali Democracy Forum in 2008 as a platform for countries in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond to exchange lessons learned and experiences on democracy reflects Indonesia's strong intention to be a global promoter of democracy (Kelm, 2014).

In terms of human rights, Indonesia's keen interest in including human rights aspects in the ASEAN Charter and its encouragement of the establishment and strengthening of the regional body on human rights, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), were examples of Indonesia's strong interest in promoting human rights throughout Southeast Asia. In addition to democracy and human rights, Indonesia was also an enthusiastic promoter of moderate Islam. For many, Islam and secular democracy are seen as incompatible (Barton, 2010). This is not only because democracy is a by-product of Western or non-Islamic civilisation but also because some values surrounding democracy such as secularism and free-thinking are widely considered to be non-Islamic, such as primary the concept of separation of religion and state that is perceived to have no basis in Islamic teachings (Buehler, 2016; Menchik, 2017).

The failure of Turkey to wed Democracy and Islam, as well as other Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East, has strengthened this widespread assumption. Nevertheless, the success of democratic transition in a Muslim-majority society made Indonesia antithetical with the prevalent view. As a secular democratic country with the largest Muslim population, Indonesia certainly holds a significant position in international affairs. Hassan Wirajuda considers Indonesia's new identity as a democratic country with a moderate Muslim population to be a valuable asset for Indonesia's foreign relations (Sukma, 2011). In fact, as Sukma contends, Indonesia has started to project itself as a bridge that connects the West with the Muslim World, as well as projecting Indonesia as the voice that promotes moderate Islam in the Muslim world (Reid, 2012).

The last factor is Indonesia's membership in the G20. Indonesia's participation in this prestigious international forum has leveraged Indonesia's international status. The G20 membership served as an endorsement of Indonesia's leadership in the region, not only because the G20 was proclaimed as the successor of the G8 or because it is a grouping of major global economic powers but also because Indonesia is the only country from Southeast Asia that sits in the forum. With its membership, Indonesia has begun to feel a sense of responsibility to represent both ASEAN and other developing countries in the G20.

Although Indonesia has begun to expand its leadership beyond ASEAN through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the G20, the UN, the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Yudhoyono administration continues to posit ASEAN at the core of Indonesia's foreign policy thinking (Hadi, 2012). In an effort to balance the commitment to ASEAN centrality and the increasing global interests, Indonesia chose to continue the policy that had been pursued by the New Order in the early 1990s and to expand the international relations of ASEAN. The Yudhoyono administration supported the effort to advance the previous initiative that was oriented to expand ASEAN external relations and cooperation with other extra-regional powers. The transformation of ASEAN Plus Three in 2005 into a broader regional grouping, the East Asian Summit (EAS), was an example of Indonesia's desire to play in a greater arena without sacrificing ASEAN centrality. See Seng Tan observes Indonesia's initiative to establish the EAS, incorporating other regional powers such as India, as Indonesia's attempt to balance the Chinese influence in ASEAN+3 (Habir et al., 2015; Novotny, 2010).

The Yudhoyono government's foreign policy, "zero enemies, thousands of friends", was also manifested in a doctrine coined by Marty Natalegawa as the "dynamic equilibrium". The doctrine emphasises that the establishment of the regional architecture should not be based on a traditional adversarial "balance of power", a system dominated by one or two major powers. Instead, it should be based on the involvement of a greater number of related major powers in a cooperative framework (Poling, 2013). One example of the application of this doctrine is the expansion of Indonesia's diplomacy canvas that started to include the Indo-Pacific region.

One of the factors that led to the effort to diversify Indonesia's foreign policy canvas during Yudhoyono's second term was Indonesia's disappointment in ASEAN. Indonesia's dissatisfaction with the organisation occurred during the ratification of the ASEAN Charter.

Syamsul Hadi notes the debate among political elites in Jakarta over the issue of whether Indonesia should ratify the charter (Hadi, 2012). Indonesia's foreign ministry emphasised the necessity of ratifying the charter as a prerequisite to consolidate the regional association, in which Indonesia has played a substantial leadership role. For Indonesia, ASEAN ratification of human rights was also expected to raise its image in the international community as a promoter of human rights (Hadi, 2012).

Indonesia's frustration over ASEAN was also driven by the disunity of the association due to the "trust-deficit" among its members. Two particular examples represent the argument on disunity among ASEAN member states in the Post-Cold War era. The two cases are the Thai-Cambodian territorial conflict over the Preah Vihear temple and the ASEAN first-ever failure to produce a joint communiqué during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Phnom Penh in July 2012 over the issue of the South China Sea. As a result of this disunity, Indonesia was required to work arduously, not only to mediate the disputing parties but more importantly to save the unity of ASEAN and her image. Aside from hampering the effort to consolidate the organisation's internal cohesion as the principal foundation for ASEAN transformation into a 'political-security' community, the two cases also left negative impressions on Indonesian political elites in Jakarta.

First, the futile Jakarta's regional policy and her compromises were, or what some Indonesian elites would refer to as "sacrifices" to maintain the unity and cohesion of the association. The second impression was the feeling of no longer being accepted as the natural leader of ASEAN. Indonesian political elites began to feel that Indonesia's leadership within the association was taken for granted by other members. This sentiment of not being appreciated arose when Indonesia started to engage actively in more prestigious economic and diplomatic groupings, such as the G20. As a consequence, both cases, the disappointment over the rejection of Indonesia's recommendations during the drafting of the charter as well as the sentiment over the trust deficit, have led some of Indonesia's prominent intellectuals and policy experts to express their dissensus toward ASEAN and its member states by questioning their commitment and passion for developing the association. Aside from expressing their frustration with ASEAN, these leading policy experts have also begun to urge the Indonesian government to formulate and pursue "a post-ASEAN" foreign policy.⁴⁷ Table 3.1 summarises

⁴⁷ See for example Sukma (2012), "Insight: Without unity, no centrality"; Sukma (2009), "Indonesia needs a post-ASEAN foreign policy"; Sukma (2009), "A post-ASEAN foreign policy for a post- G8 world"; and Wanandi (2008),

the evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy orientation from the Sukarno era to the Yudhoyono presidency (Shekhar, 2014: 71)⁴⁸.

Table 3.1 The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy Orientation

Eras	National Character	Regional/Systemic Contexts	Geographical Focus	Methods & (Grand)Strategies
Sukarno (1945-1950)	Anti-colonial, nation-building process	The return of Colonial Powers to former colonies	The Indonesian archipelago	Diplomacy (Officially) and armed resistance to maintain the independence and obtain international recognition
Sukarno (1950-1965)	Anti-colonial, anti-western, non-aligned	Cold War Polarization	Pan-Asian	Assertive, Non-alignment, Confrontation
Suharto (1966-1998)	Authoritarian dictatorship, pro-western, Anti-China, ASEAN Centric,	Cold War Polarization, Chinese subversion	ASEAN-5 focus	Grand Strategy is more economic oriented with land-centric development doctrine
Reformation (1998-2004)	Democratic consolidation, Political Instability, Economic Recovery	Rise of China, Regional Economic Integration	ASEAN but unclear foreign policy	Reactive and Passive foreign policy. No Grand Strategy
SBY I (2004-2009)	Coalition-based democratic regimes, gradual economic recovery, stable polity	Rise of China, Regional Economics Integration, Expansion in the ASEAN functions	ASEAN-centric, Gradual expansion towards East Asia (Northeast and Southeast Asia)	Initiate the discussion of grand strategy
SBY II (2009-2014)	Confident Democracy, Growing economy, Stable polity	Crisis in the West, Return of the US, China's increasing assertiveness	Pan-Asia Pacific/ East Asian, has started to include the region of Indian Ocean	Long term foreign policy orientation; Rising power diplomacy, Norm entrepreneurs

⁴⁸ 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy and the Meaning of ASEAN'.

⁴⁸ With a modest modification.

III.2 Tracing the Foundation of the GMF and the Development of Indonesia's Maritime Policy: A Historical Approach

Table 3.1 clearly demonstrates that the emergence of the GMF was a breakthrough in Indonesia's history since, for the first time, maritime sense is positioned at the core and vanguard of Indonesia's strategic outlook. Despite the fact that Indonesia is geographically an archipelagic country, land-centric doctrine had dominated the strategic thinking of Indonesian elites, especially during the New Order Era. This domination led to the marginalisation of the maritime aspects in the state's strategic thinking and development plans in the previous administrations.

Another example can be seen in the mental map that is adopted in contemporary Indonesia. In general, this mental map stresses the necessity for Indonesia to be aware of its strategic position at the crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as well as the two continents of Asia and Australia, as both empires previously positioned themselves along the international trade route (Hatta, 1953; Frederick & Worden, 2011; Reid, 2012). While recognising the potential benefit of such a position, Indonesia is also required to ensure the security of its maritime domain, such as the sea-lanes, from foreign intrusions or any other imminent threats by building powerful defence capabilities. The capacities of both empires to deter external threats and to reap political and economic dividends using their strong fleets were considered the main reasons that legitimated these two ancient empires' positions as the pivots for the regional maritime power at the time (Till, 2005; Pattiradjawane & Soebagjo, 2015; Saha, 2016b).

In post-colonial Indonesia, then President Sukarno attempted to re-establish this maritime psyche in the mental map and strategic thinking of the Indonesian policy community. Sukarno once said, "to become a strong and prosperous nation, we Indonesia must become a maritime nation" (Kusumoprojo, 2009). His statement clearly displays the perception derived from the logic of Srivijaya and Majapahit, which strongly links state prosperity with the international status of the state as a maritime power. In 1953, through his poem, titled "*Jadilah Bangsa Pelaut (Be a Maritime Nation)*", that he read during the official inauguration of the Indonesian Naval Academy, Sukarno highlighted the importance

of the country's maritime status as the prerequisite for Indonesia's development. As Sukarno said (Kusumoprojo, 2009),⁴⁹

Make an effort to be once again a maritime nation,
A maritime nation that has its own merchant vessels,
A maritime nation that has its own fleet,
A maritime nation that its affairs rival the rhythm of the ocean waves itself,

A similar point was also emphasised by the late Vice-President Mohammad Hatta. In his words (Hatta, 1953: 450):

"Indonesia, lying between the waters of two continents—the Asian mainland and Australia—and washed by the waters of two vast oceans—the Indian and the Pacific—must maintain intercourse with lands stretching in a great circle around it.. Its position at the heart of a network of communications has for centuries made the archipelago a halting place for all races and a staging base in international level."

In Sukarno's last years in power, a Maritime Compartment⁵⁰ was established for the first time in 1964. This compartment oversaw and administered four ministries including two ministries related to maritime affairs: the Ministry of Fisheries and Seafood Processing and the Ministry of Maritime Industry. The establishment of this ministerial-level body demonstrated Sukarno's acknowledgement of the significance of Indonesia's maritime character. Nevertheless, the compartment would last for less than two years before it was dissolved in July 1966 as a consequence of the fall of Sukarno. Aside from introducing the maritime status into Indonesian politics, Sukarno was also mindful of Indonesia's maritime identity when developing his thinking on strategy and defence. As a result, by the mid-1960s, Indonesia had one of the largest and best-equipped armed forces in Southeast Asia, particularly related to naval power (Frederick & Worden, 2011).

Thus, under President Sukarno, Indonesia articulated its strategic doctrine based on its distinctiveness as an archipelagic country. This strategic doctrine was later referred to as the Djuanda Declaration of 1957. The doctrine included the waters connecting the islands and surrounding the archipelago as an integral part of the country (Habir et al., 2015). Furthermore, the Djuanda Doctrine also extends the breadth of the country's territorial waters to 12 miles (Siahaan & Suhendi, 1989). Prior to the establishment of the Republic, the colonial administration adopted the Territorial Sea and Maritime Districts Ordinance in 1935

⁴⁹ Translated personally.

⁵⁰ A compartment is equal to coordinating ministry/department.

(later revised in 1939) that extended the colonial entity's sovereign water space to only 3 nautical miles from the low-tide line of each island. Therefore, according to the previous doctrine, the seas that separate the islands within the archipelago were regarded as international waters or high seas (Chen et al., 2014).

The adoption of the colonial ordinance by the new but fragile republic soon revealed its geographical vulnerabilities in the early years after the independence. The ordinance not only stopped Indonesia from obtaining economic benefits from its abundant marine resources due to the practice of exploitative poaching and smuggling, but also undermined Indonesia's security and sovereignty. Trespassing by foreign warships and submarines, as well as foreign clandestine support for secessionist and separatist movements, had given the new Republic an awareness that unpatrolled seas between its islands could hamper its effort to maintain unity (Djalal, 1995; Habir et al., 2015). The Djuanda Declaration highlights the significance of the maritime domain for the archipelago by inculcating the notion that seas are an inseparable element of the archipelago, as echoed by the local term for homeland, *tanah air*, which literally means "land and water". Therefore, the doctrine not only extended the breadth of Indonesian territorial waters but also maintained that "all waters surrounding, between, and connecting the islands constitutes the Indonesian state, and, regardless of their extension or breadth, are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and, therefore, are under the exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian state." (Leifer, 1978: 201)

Along with the doctrine, another policy emphasising the geographical context of Indonesia has arisen and become the focal point of Indonesia's geopolitical thinking since then, encapsulated in the term *Wawasan Nusantara* (archipelagic outlook). Through the archipelagic outlook, Indonesia conceives of its identity as an integrated territory stretching from Sabang to Merauke (*dari Sabang sampai Merauke*) (Chen et al., 2014: 3). As a political concept, the archipelagic outlook provides legitimacy for the central government to bind the scattered islands along with their socio-culturally diverse islanders under a unified polity.

Aside from this self-perceived identity, the archipelagic outlook also highlights the national security concept in which Indonesia is considered vulnerable to foreign forces' divide and rule (*divide et impera*) strategies, especially considering Indonesia's heterogeneity. As a matter of fact, the fear of disunity driven by these two factors, the geographical and demographic vulnerabilities, has long preoccupied the minds of Indonesian elites (Acharya & Buzan, 2010). Through the notion of national security, the sense of ownership to govern the

territorial waters of the archipelago has been constructed and inculcated deeply into the common sense of the Indonesian policy community (Habir et al., 2015). Other elements of the archipelagic outlook correlate the necessity for economic development, economic nationalism, and political stability in building the country's resilience and independency.

The archipelagic outlook was formulated to complement the archipelagic principle (the Djuanda Declaration) in expunging all the possibilities that could arise from the vulnerabilities of Indonesia's geographical nature prior to the adoption of the archipelagic principle as part of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). These vulnerabilities include the status of Indonesia's EEZ (as international waters), which was considered to be the principal loophole for foreign powers to exploit Indonesia's marine resources and undermine its security. Expressing concerns at the time, Munadjat Danusaputro contended that Indonesia's capacity to manage its geographical vulnerabilities not only determines the future and the very survival of Indonesia (Danusaputro, 1974). He further warned Indonesian elites that a presence of foreign power in Indonesia's maritime domain, even if for peaceful purposes, could undermine Indonesia's security and sovereignty over its waters (Danusaputro, 1974). If the incoming foreign powers were hostile to each other, he suggested this could even result in a deteriorating situation whereas Indonesia would most likely be affected by an imminent conflict.

While both concepts share similarity in underlining the geographical context of Indonesia, each doctrine differs in its original purpose. The Archipelagic Outlook was designed for internal use to boost the psyche and sense a unitary political entity among the heterogeneous population. Leonard Sebastian (Habir et al., 2015) describes the outlook as "an inherently inward-looking concept." By comparison, the Djuanda Doctrine represents an "outward-looking doctrine" as it was destined for external purposes. In addition, it was also designed to assist Indonesia in positioning itself within the regional and global political constellation. Despite this discrepancy, both the archipelagic principle and the archipelagic doctrine represent and serve as the bedrock of Indonesia's strategic thinking with an emphasis on Indonesia's geographical nature, geostrategic location, and, as Michael Leifer called it, a sense of regional entitlement based on "pride in revolutionary achievement, size of population, natural resources, and land and maritime dimensions (Leifer, 1983: 173)."

After the fall of Sukarno (the Old Order era), the appreciation of Indonesia's maritime domain was gradually abandoned. During Suharto's rule, Indonesia's maritime realm was

overlooked because of five factors. First, the end of confrontation and aggressive foreign policy with neighbouring countries in the early years of Suharto's leadership (the New Order era). Without any imminent 'external threat', the strategic thinking of the new regime was no longer overwhelmed with the urgency to secure its maritime space and advance its naval power. Second, the outbreak of a Communist coup attempt at the end of September 1965 had strengthened the perception of the New Order that internal threats were more imminent and dangerous to the existence of the republic than other threats coming from outside the country (Anwar, 1996).

Based on this logic, Indonesian strategic planners perceived a necessity for the country to develop its land-based power to cope the internal threats which are mostly land-based. The adoption of a land-centric (defence and development) doctrine and the practice of treating the army (in this case is the TNI-AD⁵¹) as the primary defence force of the republic are the consequences of following this perspective. For the other two branches of the armed forces, the navy (TNI-AL) and the air force (TNI-AU), the adoption of such logic led to the marginalisation of these two forces from the country's strategic thinking and formulation (Widjajanto, 2010; Raymond, 2017).⁵²

Third, the rise of Suharto had also provided an opportunity for the Indonesian army, in which Suharto was a member,⁵³ to dominate national politics (Kasim, 2005). The failed attempt of the Communist paramilitary group to seize power had re-emphasised the pivotal role of the Indonesian army as the only capable force to safeguard and maintain the country's security and stability. Compared to its counterparts, the navy and air force, the characteristics of the Indonesian army, as the oldest and the biggest branch of the Indonesian military forces, had allowed the army to sustain its leverage and domination not only within the military institution but also in domestic politics (Tellis et al., 2016). In addition, the involvement of the Chief of Staff of the air force, Omar Dhani, in the coup attempt (*Gerakan Tiga Puluh*

⁵¹ TNI stands for *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or Indonesian National Armed Forces. AD stands for *Angkatan Darat* means the army or ground forces; AU for *Angkatan Udara* or the Air Force; and AL for *Angkatan Laut* means the Navy.

⁵² The manifestation of the logic would be evident even after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Based on IISS statistical data in 2014 (IISS, 2014), the army (TNI-AD) dominated the overall composition of the Indonesian military with approximately 300,400 personnel, followed by the navy and air force with 65,000 and 30,100 personnel, respectively. While these numbers are acceptable because Indonesia has been pursuing a peaceful profile policy rather than an assertive one, the size and composition of Indonesian armed forces are still far from adequate to meet the Minimum Essential Forces (MEF), particularly in terms of the effort to secure its vast maritime domain.

⁵³ Suharto was a Major General of the Indonesia's Army Strategic Command (*Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat* or KOSTRAD)

September or G30S, trans. The Thirty September Movement) had legitimised further marginalisation of the air force in both the leadership and the forefront of national strategic thinking (Frederick & Wordern, 2011).

Fourth, though Indonesia had successfully attained international recognition through the incorporation of the Djuanda Declaration into the UNCLOS in 1982 during the Suharto leadership, Indonesia's maritime domain was insufficiently appreciated. Instead of formulating a strategy based on maritime attributes, the Suharto regime adopted the concept of *Ketahanan Nasional* (National Resilience) as its security doctrine (Widjajanto, 2010). The concept was devised to provide Indonesia with guidelines to counter incoming threats (both external and internal) by mobilising available national power. These guidelines are based on Indonesia's characteristics reflected in the state's ideology, constitution, and the archipelagic outlook. Though it includes the archipelagic outlook as one of its foundations, the concept is more about a land-based strategy rather than a maritime-based defence strategy, which fits with Indonesia's geographical context. Nevertheless, the National Resilience doctrine does not precisely elucidate how these mobilised national forces and attributes are to be used to achieve the aims of the outlook or to protect Indonesia's maritime interests.

Fifth, the promulgation of UNCLOS, which gave Indonesia a special status as an archipelagic state, was not followed by the incorporation of maritime thinking in Indonesia's strategic thinking. In fact, 'maritime affairs' had never been represented in an independent ministerial body from the early years of Suharto's administration to his fall in 1998. 'Maritime affairs' were mostly positioned under the supervision of the Ministry of Transportation throughout the New Order era. In addition to this anomaly, although marine products consumption was relatively significant, the fisheries sector was also not embodied in a separate ministerial body. Instead, this sector was put under the guidance of the Ministry of Agriculture. The policy to include fisheries beneath the agriculture sector, along with the maritime affairs' subordination to transportation affairs, had shifted and replaced the sense of maritime status within the Indonesian population with a more land-based psyche. Therefore, it is not surprising that during this era agriculture was more valued in Indonesia than maritime attributes.

The fall of the authoritarian regime (the New Order) brought 'a breath of fresh air' to Indonesian politics (the Reformation era), including Indonesia's maritime domain. In general, there were two significant impacts on the maritime discourse as a result of Suharto's fall.

First, the retreat of the Indonesian army (TNI-AD) from national and local politics and policymaking. Due to its characteristics and historical experiences, the Indonesian army's stance is perceived to be inundated with land-based psyche and perspective (Tellis et al., 2016).

Second, the fall of Suharto also allowed the country to reappraise the significance of its maritime infrastructure and security for national politics that was overlooked during the Suharto administration. In the Reformation era, the reappraisal of the country's maritime domain was initiated by Abdurrahman Wahid's (also known as Gus Dur) administration. For the first time in more than three decades, a new ministry for maritime affairs was established in October 1999, the Ministry of Marine Exploration, which became the Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs in August 2000. The establishment of the ministry was an effort to concede the growing importance of Indonesia's maritime domain to the national interest and the establishment of this ministry also demonstrated the government's commitment to accelerate the development of maritime sector.⁵⁴

The appraisal of Indonesia's maritime space reached a new level during the era of the Yudhoyono administration which did not stop with the continuation of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs. The Yudhoyono administration expanded the scope of this appraisal in three major fields: defence and security strategy, foreign policy, and economic development. Though the issue of maritime security has returned to the national strategic thinking domain since the fall of Suharto's regime and the retreat of the army from domestic politics, it was Yudhoyono who brought the topic of maritime affairs into the mainstream of national security discourse. Under his administration, publications such as blueprints and white papers with medium or long-term goals have been circulated to a wider audience beyond the government and policymaking circles (Liow & Shekhar, 2014).

Aside from that, the Yudhoyono administration also commenced the development of Indonesia's maritime forces capability under his military modernisation agenda. In 2005, Yudhoyono launched the MEF initiative, a long-term modernisation program (2005-2024) aimed at reaching the minimum level for the strength of Indonesian armed forces, especially

⁵⁴ By establishing a separate body at the ministerial level that specifically manages maritime affairs, the sector was meant to receive greater attention and funding from the government compared to when maritime affairs were under other ministries or departments such as the departments of transportation or agriculture, DELETED WHAT FOLLOWS??having to compete with other sectors within these two ministries.

the navy and air force, through the procurement and modernisation of their weaponry and armament (NIDS, 2012; Ganguly et al., Rüländ et al., 2013; Till & Chan, 2014; Collin, 2015; Wiranto, 2016). Through his program, Indonesia was poised to reach a green-water navy with the capacity to patrol Indonesia's littoral and archipelagic waters. The term green-water navy refers to the competency possessed by the naval forces to conduct an effective operation in their littoral waters as well as in the open sea around their territorial waters (Supriyanto, 2012; Till & Bratton, 2012).

The program ambitiously targets the development of a five-fleet force consisting of 274 ships equipped with the capability to patrol and also to strike and provide support by 2020 (Collin, 2015). In addition to military modernisation, Yudhoyono's MEF was also designed to develop an indigenous defence industry and defence research facilities. Though Yudhoyono increased Indonesia's defence expenditure to meet all these ambitious goals to 0.9% of the GDP in 2013 (approximately USD 8.44 billion) according to report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IIS) (IIS, 2014), Indonesia's defence budget still remained lower compared to the majority of great powers in the region such as Japan (USD 51 billion), India (USD 36 billion), China (USD \$112 billion), Australia (USD 26 billion), and even Singapore (USD 12.2 billion) (Chow, 2014).

Another of Yudhoyono's policies related to maritime security was the issuance of the Presidential Decree of 2005. The decree mandated the transfer of Indonesia's Maritime Security Coordination Agency's (*Bakorkamla*⁵⁵) authority from the military (navy) to the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Legal, and Security (*Kemenkopolhukam*⁵⁶). Since 2015, *Bakorkamla* has been responsible for formulating policies related to maritime affairs and also has the responsibility to coordinate the activities of twelve different maritime-related agencies, including the navy, *PolAir* (Marine Police), and *Kesatuan Penjagaan Laut dan Pantai* or KPLP (Indonesian Coast Guard) (Honua, 2008; Rüländ et al., 2013). Though there was significant public scepticism of its operational capability due to the status of *Bakorkamla* as a merely coordinating agency, this was the first effort undertaken by the Indonesian government to reorganise the governance of its maritime space in the post-Suharto era.

⁵⁵ *Bakorkamla* stands for *Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut* translated as Coordination Body for Maritime Security.

⁵⁶ *Kemenkopolhukam* stands for *Kementerian Koordinasi Politik Hukum dan Keamanan*.

In foreign policy, Indonesia began to expand its foreign policy canvas to the Indian Ocean. The rise of the Indo-Pacific⁵⁷ as a new spatial term during the second decade of the 21st century has also contributed to the growing salience of the maritime domain. Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical region is not new to Indonesia's foreign policy, as the concept of "Two Oceans" had been promulgated since the early years of the Republic by the late Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta. In fact, Indonesia had become a member of Indian-Ocean Rim Association (IORA) since 1995, however neither the forum nor the topic of the Indian Ocean had ever gained significant attention from Indonesian strategic planners before the end of 2004. It was the catastrophic tsunami in December 2004 that led the Yudhoyono administration to start considering the significance of the Indian Ocean and incorporating the IORA as one of Indonesia's foreign policy focus areas (Liow & Shekhar, 2014). Indonesia's participation in the Ind-Indo CORPAT (India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol) naval drill along with the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with India in 2005 marked the increase of Indonesia's foreign policy interest in the Indian Ocean (Saha, 2016a; 2016b).

During Yudhoyono's second term, the importance of the Indian Ocean to Indonesia's foreign policy was reiterated by the president himself. At the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Yudhoyono attempted to fill the lacuna in Indonesia's maritime strategic thinking with a new perspective on the reappearance of the Indian Ocean. He also emphasized the need for Indonesia to be sensitive towards the changes of the regional political constellation and able to capture the opportunity to be actively involved in maintaining regional stability through the establishment of (mutual) cooperation. Yudhoyono states that (Shangri-La Dialogue, 2012):

"...there is every likelihood that in the twenty-first century, the Indian Ocean will grow in geostrategic importance. We must make sure that the Indian Ocean does not become an area of new strategic contest and rivalry. Indeed, now is the time to cultivate the seeds for long-term cooperation, based on common interest in that part of the world."

Apart from Yudhoyono's view on the Indian Ocean, Natalegawa has also expressed the interest to include the Indian Ocean region into Indonesia's foreign policy canvas. Natalegawa terms his vision as the "Indo-Pacific-Indo", wherein he defines the term as (Natalegawa, 2013):

⁵⁷ There are also other names referring to the same geopolitical area, such as Indo-Asia-Pacific, Indo-Pacific Asia, Indian Pacific, and Pacindo (Pacific-Indian Ocean) a term coined by Rizal Sukma.

“...an important triangular spanning two oceans, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, bounded by Japan in the north, Australia in the southeast and India in the southwest, notably with Indonesia at its centre. Thus as a result, in this largest archipelagic state in the world, amid its archipelagic waters, are found some of the most strategic sea lanes in the world: connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans.”

In a similar occasion, Natalegawa also introduced his idea to create an Indo-Pacific “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation”, that shares similarity with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. For Natalegawa, the treaty served as the prerequisite before establishing a new regional architecture encompassing both the Indian and Pacific Ocean (“Indo-Pacific-Indo”) (Georgieff, 2013). He believed the treaty could address three issues that surround the development of ASEAN namely, the trust deficit, unresolved territorial disputes, and the management of regional change (Georgieff, 2013).

Yudhoyono’s effort to include maritime priorities in policymaking was not limited to the field of security and foreign policy, but also extended to the economic sector, whose attributes can also be found in the GMF. In 2011, Yudhoyono launched a long-term development agenda called the Master Plan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesian Economic Development (*Masterplan Percepatan dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia* or MP3EI). The masterplan is comprised of Indonesia’s ambitious plan to accelerate and expand the country’s economic growth and attaining the country’s ultimate goal of becoming one of the 10 major world economies by 2025 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2011). In addition to its purpose to transform Indonesia into a more developed country, the masterplan also targeted Indonesia’s transformation into a “centre for global logistics” by 2025 or before by focusing on the improvement of logistics and connectivity throughout the country (ASEAN, 2011; Rohman, 2014). Following this masterplan, another initiative was also proposed during Yudhoyono’s leadership, known as the “Archipelagic Pendulum” (*Pendulum Nusantara*). In general, the Archipelagic Pendulum is similar to the GMF’s Sea Highway (*Tol Laut*), a development initiative to enhance and boost the distribution of goods and services across the archipelago by integrating land-based transportation, including trains, with factories, markets, and seaports (The Report Indonesia, 2013; Blanchard, 2019).

While the previous section highlights the novelty of the GMF, since only under the Widodo’s rule has the maritime-based grand strategy emerged and been adopted, this part argues that the GMF is not genuinely a new concept. Some attributes of the GMF are present

not only in the previous administrations of post-colonial Indonesia, but can also be traced to the eras predating Indonesia during the reign of Srivijaya and Majapahit. The very attribute that constituted the GMF is geographical awareness. This awareness not only highlights the geostrategic position of Indonesia at the crossroads of two oceans and two continents, but also underlines the country's geographical characteristics as an archipelago where maritime culture has a strong influence on the life of most of its inhabitants (maritime sensitivity).

From this geographical awareness, Indonesia's maritime culture and identity were born. Elites and society in the era of *Nusantara* (a term used to refer the archipelago before the formation of Indonesia) perceived a strong link among the maritime aspect, statecraft, and everyday life. This notion was also emphasised in Widodo's inaugural speech in which he referred to as "the future of our civilisation... It is time for us to actualise *jalesveva jayamahe* (a Sanskrit slogan signifying 'in the ocean we triumph'), a motto of our forefathers" (JakartaGlobe, 2014).

Nevertheless, both geographical awareness and maritime sensitivity were not automatically adopted in the strategic thinking and formulation of Indonesia. Another factor, historical experience, shapes and determines the degree of maritime sensitivity applied in strategic formulation. While the geographical setting of Indonesia provides the country with an advantageous and strategic position, historical experiences demonstrate that aside from providing economic benefits, this geographical setting, geostrategic position, and vast sea territory also create vulnerability and a security dilemma for the country.

This research argues that the historical experiences — i.e., the struggle for independence — shape the perspective and mental map of Indonesian elites, especially the military institution, in discerning Indonesia's maritime space. In most cases, historical experiences contributed to the marginalisation of maritime attributes in the strategic formulation. In his scholarly work, David R. Jones incorporates the elements such as geography and historical experiences to understand a country's particular military "behaviour or culture" that is mostly manifested in the state's policy motives.⁵⁸ He contends that (Jacobsen, 1990: 35):

"the assumption is that thanks to unique historical and geographical circumstances, particular nations have had to face defence problems that are 'uniquely defined'. These in

⁵⁸ For discussion on the strategic culture of Indonesia, see for example Anwar (2008), Tellis et al. (2016), and Arif & Kurniawan (2017).

turn have produced a unique military 'culture' or 'pathology' which, when investigated, can provide valuable insights into a nation's self-image and policy motives."

One example of these historical experiences that led to the marginalisation of maritime attributes in strategic formulation is the rare involvement of the Indonesian military in conventional naval warfare (Arif & Kurniawan, 2016). Since its early years, Indonesia has experienced multiple armed conflicts both with internal and external enemies. The Dutch aspiration to reassume power in its former colony following the surrender of the Japanese army in 1945 and to destroy the newly founded republic met with fierce resistance from the local population where the foreign forces were present, for example the Battle of Surabaya in November 1945.

Multiple acts of armed resistance occurred across the country, but almost all of them occurred in the inland areas and hinterland of Indonesia. With these warfare characteristics, Indonesia's TNI-AD was given the opportunity to be the main military actor that played a significant role in the armed struggle to maintain Indonesia's independence. Despite the fact that both TNI-AU and TNI-AL were officially founded less than a year after the self-declared independence in August 1945, these two branches of the military did not acquire such roles mostly due to the fact that the new republic did not have enough time or resources to develop other branches of the military service as a result of the on-going conflict with the Dutch (Frederick & Wordern, 2011).

When Indonesia was able to begin developing its navy and air forces after the peace settlement with the Dutch in 1949, the two forces were still not utilised optimally in military operations. The two forces' roles were largely limited to support and logistics (Arif & Kurniawan, 2016). The only significant non-land based armed conflict occurred during the Irian campaign (1963-1966). At the time, Indonesia's command of the sea was challenged by the superior Dutch naval force (Liow & Shekhar, 2014). The superiority of the Dutch navy was proven when the Indonesian navy failed to infiltrate 150 Indonesian troops in Dutch New Guinea, or West Papua, during the battle of the Arafura Sea or *Vlakke Hoek* (Djiwandono, 1996).

Though geographical vulnerability demonstrates the need for Indonesia to develop its maritime defence capacity, historical experiences have led Indonesian elites to pursue a different strategy. It may be argued that Indonesia's limited financial capacity is the reason for the reluctance to augment the country's maritime defence capability. While this argument

is true to a certain degree, limited financial resources cannot be taken as the principal factor, particularly when observing the period between the 1970s and the 1980s, during which Indonesia was able to recover from the devastated economy left by the Old Order (Schwarz, 1994; Elias & Noone, 2011). In this period, although Indonesia's economy showed positive performance, there was no significant effort made to develop the country's maritime defence capability by, for example, augmenting and enhancing Indonesia's naval capabilities (Raymond, 2017).

Dewi Fortuna Anwar identifies Indonesia's military doctrine as the factor that hinders the development of other branches of the military. For the Indonesian military, the final or decisive battle that determines the fate of the country is perceived to take place on land rather than at sea or in the air (Anwar, 1996). Therefore, it is logical for Indonesian strategic thinkers to regard the TNI-AD as crucial in Indonesia's defence strategy. The institutionalisation of these historical experiences has led to the creation of a security doctrine that emphasises land-based capabilities instead of air or maritime-based capacity, regardless of the fact that Indonesia is an archipelagic country. National Resilience (*Ketahanan Nasional*) and Total People Défense (*Hankamrata*) are examples of land-based defence doctrines that emphasise the incorporation of all of the country's land-based elements, including its population, in a defensive operation (Widjajanto, 2010).

CHAPTER IV

THE EXTERNAL DRIVING FORCES OF GMF

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the external factors that provided the context in which GMF emerged. As emphasised earlier in the Introduction Chapter, this research shows that the emergence of GMF cannot be separated from the dynamics of the environment external to Indonesia. In this context, external factors are seen as the driving forces that trigger and stimulate the birth of GMF. In fact, as literature in Indonesia's foreign policy suggests, throughout the modern history of Indonesia, systemic imperatives have always influenced and shaped the country's strategic behaviour (Shekhar, 2014; Chacko, 2016).

The two sections in this chapter aim to delineate the external factors key to the birth of the grand strategy. The chapter begins with the first section discussing the growing salience of the maritime domain surrounding Indonesia and how this increasing salience has both re-invigorated Indonesia's maritime identity and exposed the country's vulnerability. In the latter case, the section discusses how exposure of this vulnerability incrementally pushes Indonesian foreign policy and strategic elites to rethink the country's maritime strategy and policy.

The second section addresses the rise of China in the region. On the one hand, at the heart of China's rise lies the country's increased assertiveness in the contested South China Sea. While Indonesia denies being among the claimant states, China's claim over the South China Sea through its "nine-dash lines" – China's claim that also overlaps some parts of Indonesia's EEZ in the North Natuna Sea – shows the opposite. On the other hand, the rise of China has also brought a wave of economic opportunities for Indonesia through the Maritime Silk Route Initiative (MSRI). These two opposing outcomes of China's rise have further complicated not only the already intricate regional geopolitics but also Indonesia–China relations. Therefore, the second section of this chapter examines how China's rise, militarily and economically, has shaped Indonesia's foreign policy and laid the groundwork for the GMF to emerge.

IV.1. The Growing Salience of the Regional Maritime Domain

The first external factor the study identifies stimulating the formation of GMF is the increasing salience of maritime domain. Within this external factor, the study identifies further two issues that contributed to elevating the salience of maritime-related topics especially for Indonesia's policy elites. The first issue is the rise of piracy activities. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the region's maritime domain has increasingly attracted the attention of many, especially in relation to the topic of maritime security. In the context of Indonesia, policy elites in Indonesia have begun to acknowledge the importance of maritime security for the country's strategy. Maritime security has been elevated to the forefront of the country's strategic thinking following the fall of Suharto in 1998 and the departure of the army from domestic politics (Liow & Shekhar, 2014). Yudhoyono later brought the topic to a much wider audience through numerous official documents such as white papers, defence postures, and blueprints (Liow & Shekhar, 2014).

Piracy has become one of the top issues of maritime security in the region, especially in the beginning of the 21st century. Basil Germond (2015) considers piracy to be among the main contributors to the surge of research and literature in maritime security. Extensive literature indicates that while modern piracy in Southeast Asia has been documented since the 1980s, this crime greatly increased during the last decade of the 20th century (Beckman et al., 1994; Caballero-Anthony et al., 2006; Evers & Gerke, 2006; Wu & Zou, 2009; Ismail & Sani, 2010; Liss, 2011; Kimura et al., 2015).

One particular factor that contributed to this surge was the rise of Asian economies. The end of the cold war and the emergence of globalisation at the end of the 20th century have brought the intensification of economic interdependence between countries. This is a result of increasing economic activities which mostly occur within a maritime domain (Fernandez-Armesto, 2006; UN, 2008; Kaplan, 2010; WTO, 2014). From the end of the last century, Southeast Asia⁵⁹ began to play an important role and emerged as the main driver for regional and global economic growth and integration (McDonald et al., 2008; UN, 2008; Wu & Zou, 2009; Shekhar, 2018). Therefore, due to the profound impact of Asia's economic performance on the global economy, the first half of the 21st century is considered the era for

⁵⁹ Some countries in this region, like India and China, were even called as the "Asian drivers of global change", as their economic performance brought a profound impact on the global economy.

a new “Asian Dynamism” or the “Asian Century” (Kaplinsky & Messner, 2008; Nougayrede, 2017).

Due to its strategic position, Southeast Asia found itself at the core of the global economy and serving as the artery for maritime trade and the supply chain (Barrios, 2005). Apart from the South China Sea, Southeast Asia’s maritime domain also comprises major Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) in the form of straits that are pivotal for the world seaborne trade, including the Strait of Malacca (and Singapore), Sunda, and Lombok. Of these regional chokepoints, the Strait of Malacca sits at the most important chokepoint that serves as one of the world’s gateways and traffic bottlenecks, where almost 100,000 vessels, accounting for one-quarter of the world’s trade, pass through this shallow channel every year (Wu & Zou, 2009; Kaplan, 2014; Calamur, 2017). Table 4.1 shows the volume of fossil-based energy (crude oils and petroleum liquids) transported through world chokepoints and via the Cape of Good Hope from 2009-2014 (EIA, 2014: 2; EIA, 2017: 2).

Table 4.1 Volume of Crude Oil and Petroleum Liquids Transported Through Multiple Chokepoints Across the Globe 2009-2014 (million barrels per day)

Location	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Strait of Hormuz	15.7	15.9	17	16.8	16.6	16.9
Strait of Malacca	13.5	14.5	14.6	15.1	15.4	15.5
Suez Canal & SUMED Pipeline	3	3.1	3.8	4.5	4.6	5.2
Bab el-Mandeb	2.9	2.7	3.3	3.6	3.8	4.3
Danish Straits	3	3.2	3	3.3	3.1	3
Turkish Straits	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.6
Panama Canal	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9
Cape of Good Hope	n/a	n/a	4.7	5.4	5.1	4.9

Table 4.2 Flows of Oil and LNG in Malacca Strait (2011-2014)

million barrels per day	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total oil flows through the Strait of Malacca	14.5	15.1	15.4	15.5
crude oil	12.8	13.2	13.3	13.3
refined products	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.2
LNG (Tcf per year)	2.8	3.5	3.9	4.1

Note: Tcf (trillion cubic feet)


Other statistics describe the traffic of oil and LNG passing the Strait of Malacca from 2011 to 2014, as shown in Table 4.2 (EIA, 2017: 7). These statistics show how the Malacca Strait remains the second most visited strait by oil tankers after the Strait of Hormuz. The number of vessels passing the Malacca Strait is expected to increase in the upcoming years as economies across East Asia continue to grow and will require more energy to fuel the growing cities and industries.

Given these statistics, the waterway within the region is undoubtedly important not only to the littoral states of the Asia-Pacific region but also to international users, as it serves as the only feasible gate to connect Asia-Pacific and other regions west of Asia, such as the Middle East. In fact, compared with other shipping lanes, the Malacca Strait is geographically the shortest route by which to transport goods from the western part of Asia and other nearby continents to ports across East Asia and vice-versa. (Freeman, 2003: 6). As the significance of the Malacca Strait continues to rise as a result of its status both as the second busiest strait in the world and as the economic lifeline of many countries, the Strait of Malacca is not only attractive to state actors but also to non-state actors intend on reaping illegal benefits from these lucrative maritime activities. Such a phenomenon is best represented by a local Malay proverb stating that “where there is sugar, there are bound to be ants”.

Among the criminal activities occurring in the maritime domain of Southeast Asia, piracy has become the most prominent non-traditional threat to the security and safety of the SLOCs in the sub-region of Southeast Asia (Ismail & Sani, 2010). Many of pirate attacks in the Strait of Malacca and in the Southeast Asia do not occur far away on the high seas but within the jurisdiction of the littoral states, such as in territorial waters, EEZ, or even at or near the ports (Liss, 2011). Pirate attacks not only result in high economic losses in the form of lost cargo and even lost ships, but also risk the safety and lives of shipping crews. Frequent pirate attacks may also result in insurance premium increases that will eventually lead to price increases for cargo and goods. In addition to these losses, piracy can also affect the economy in a larger scope by disrupting and slowing down the flow of goods and energy through this narrow channel as ships are forced to detour around the west coast of Sumatera then pass Sunda Strait or Lombok Strait before heading back north (Kimura et al., 2015).

Compared to other neighbouring subregions, Southeast Asia has become the hotspot for pirate attacks in Asia as reported by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)⁶⁰ and shown in the Figure 3.1 (IMB, 2004; IMB 2007; IMB 2010; IMB, 2014). The figure shows that the number of piracy cases in Southeast Asia are not significantly different from those in other subregions at the beginning of 1990s. However, this trend changed as the surging cases of pirate attacks at the end of 1990s left Far East Asia and the Indian Sub-Continent far behind Southeast Asia.

Figure 4.1 IMB’s Report on the Actual and Attempted Attacks of Ships in the Southeast Asia Compared to Other Areas Nearby (1993-2014)⁶¹




Southeast Asia has become the global hotspot for piracy activities. According to IMB’s report, from 1993-2014 almost 60% of pirate attacks worldwide happened in Asia. Of all the piracy cases in Asia, a full two-thirds occurred in Southeast Asia, with Indonesia experiencing 23% of the attacks. Figure 4.2 shows the geographic distribution of global piracy incidents from 1993-2014 (The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2016: 8). The data shows that Indonesia is second only to Somalia in piracy incidents, especially during the peak between 2008-2011 (Buerger, 2015).

⁶⁰ IMB is a specialised division of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) that was established 1981 and based in Kuala Lumpur. This non-profit organisation acts as a focal point in the fight against all types of crimes and malpractices occurring in the maritime domain. For further information about the organisation, please see <https://icc-ccs.org/icc/imb>.

⁶¹ The statistical data were taken from IMB’s report for 2004, 2007, and 2014 combined with a slight modification in the rearrangement in the classification of places and regions. While IMB excluded Vietnam and the South China Sea from the category of Southeast Asia in its report, and even put these two areas under the category of Far East Asia with Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, the present research removed these two areas (South China Sea and Vietnam) from the “Far East Asia” group and put them under the Southeast Asia classification. The main consideration was that Vietnam geographically and politically belongs to Southeast Asia, and also because the majority of South China Sea also lies within Southeast Asia.

Figure 4.2 Piracy Incidents Worldwide 1993-2014



Although the increasing seaborne trade undoubtedly contribute to the economy of littoral states around the areas passed by shipping vessels, such increases in economic activities do not necessarily improve the socio-economic condition of the people living within those areas (Phaovisaid, 2005). Another factor responsible for the surge of piracy attacks in the subregion of Southeast Asia is the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Statistics in Figure 3.1 shows that a sudden surge in pirate attacks happened at the end of 1990s. (IMB, 2004; IMB 2007; IMB 2010; and IMB, 2014). The crisis not only destroyed the economy of multiple countries in Asia, including countries in Southeast Asia such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, but also created havoc in the socio-politico environment of those countries through mass unemployment and political instability. All these issues provided a fertile ground for piracy to surge (Barrios, 2005).

The region's seas continued to host increasing pirate activities from the beginning of the 21st century before the attacks significantly declined from 2005 onward. One plausible factor that may have reduced piracy attacks in the region was the 2004 tsunami that struck and devastated the northern part of Sumatera and areas surrounding the Andaman Sea, which were believed to be the areas from which pirates operated (Phaovisaid, 2005). Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 3.1, while there was a significant reduction in piracy attacks in 2005, piracy increased again substantially in 2010 and continued to rise steadily in the following years.

With this increasing number of cases, piracy has caught the attention of scholars, private sectors, and government entities in the Post-Cold War Southeast Asia. A simple application of the Google Scholar search engine indicates there were less than 3,000 (precisely 2,670) scholarly works that contain the words piracy and Southeast Asia from 1950 to 1989.⁶² However, a search using a similar category for the period 1989-2014 found more than 16,000 publications on the topic of piracy in Southeast Asia.⁶³ As piracy is also a part of wider maritime theme, the surge of literature on this issue in less than 30 years has indeed contributed to the rising salience of the region's maritime domain in the 21st century.

Notwithstanding such increases, rising piracy cases alone did not necessarily motivate Indonesia's policy elites to respond to the problem immediately or give more attention to its maritime space. While the Indonesian government increasingly recognised the importance and value of the maritime domain, it is the security dimension of this maritime issue that eventually gave the first push for Indonesia's policy elites to start embracing maritime topic in their policy debates. In this context, the security dimensions of the piracy issue not only refer to the security of Indonesian vessels and ships that pass by or operate near the hotspots of piracy activities, but more importantly refers to the security of the country's sovereignty.

Although most cases occurred within Indonesia's waters, it is those that occurred in critical areas, such as the international sea lanes of communication at the Strait of Malacca, that made Indonesia take these matters more seriously. Indonesia's early disinterest in the issue of piracy in the Malacca Strait was indeed not surprising. Most of the vessels that passed the Strait of Malacca provided little economic benefit to Indonesia, as they were only passing. In addition, the distance of these piracy spots from the capital of Indonesia and the insignificant percentage of Indonesian trade in the overall traffic in this narrow channel caused Indonesia to ignore the problem (Teo, 2007; Ismail & Sani, 2010).

Nevertheless, the increase in international attention to these issues led Indonesian authorities to realise that letting the problem of piracy go unresolved, especially piracy activities in critical waterways as the Strait of Malacca, would open the way or provide a legitimate reason for foreign powers to intervene and secure this critical chokepoint. The fear of foreign intervention was also shared among littoral states around the Malacca Strait,

⁶² By using <https://scholar.google.com/> with search option of having all the words "piracy" and "Southeast Asia" in any part of the article.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

namely Indonesia, and Malaysia, but not Singapore (Hadiz, 2006). In addition, the issue of piracy was also conflated by the rising narrative of the “global war on terror” promoted by the United States following the terrorist attack on its soil on September 11, 2001 (Young & Valencia, 2003; Caballero-Anthony et.al., 2006). With the rise in the war on terror, fighting maritime piracy also gained salience as it was considered to be strongly related to terrorism, particularly in Southeast Asia with the rising threat from the *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI)⁶⁴ (Caballero-Anthony et al., 2006).

From the beginning of the 21st century, Indonesia’s nonchalant attitude toward maritime issues has also changed. Indonesia started to find it difficult to avoid or neglect maritime issues in its policymaking without risking its sovereignty. The loss of Sipadan and Ligitan Island at the end of 2002 gave Indonesia’s policy elites a costly lesson that their continuing negligence with the country’s maritime domain and affairs would eventually cost the territorial integrity of the country (Teo, 2007; Bateman & Emmers, 2009). Not only was Indonesia reluctant to invite foreign powers⁶⁵ to solve regional matters, it was also concerned with being labelled a failed state for not being able to resolve issues like piracy.

The inability of a country to resolve domestic issues that have global implications, such as piracy in a pivotal chokepoint, could eventually lead to international forces stepping in and replacing that country’s role in resolving its own domestic issue, as in the case of Somalia (IMB, 2014; Germon, 2015). Given these concerns over the imminent threat posed to its sovereignty and integrity, neither by pirates nor by terrorism, but instead by the risk of losing some of its own territory and the possibility of foreign intervention in the region, Indonesia was pushed to take action to solve the piracy problem. In July 2004, Indonesia and other littoral states of the Malacca Strait agreed to enhance the security of the strait through joint patrol in the strait (Yale Global Online, 2004).

The second issue is IUU (Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated) Fishing. With its wide maritime domain and tropical climate, Indonesia is home to various marine food resources. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Indonesia ranks among the top five major producers of seafood, as illustrated by Table 4.3 (FAO, 2014: 10) and Table 4.4 (FAO, 2016: 11). Table 4.2 shows that since 2012 Indonesia has replaced Peru as the second

⁶⁴ A regional terrorist group was responsible for several terrorist attacks such as the Bali Bombing I and II. The organisation claimed, and is believed to have, an affiliation with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

⁶⁵ Foreign powers here mostly refer to powers coming from outside of the region.

biggest seafood producer in the world, and the country's increase in production from 2003-2014 also puts Indonesia among the countries that have substantially increased their seafood production (FAO, 2016).

Table 4.3 Marine Capture Production: Major Producers (2003, 2011–2012)

2012 Ranking	Country	Continent	2003	2011	2012	Variation	
						2003–2012	2011–2012
			(Tonnes)		(Percentage)		
1	China	Asia	12 212 188	13 536 409	13 869 604	13.6	2.4
2	Indonesia	Asia	4 275 115	5 332 862	5 420 247	27.0	1.7
3	United States of America	Americas	4 912 627	5 131 087	5 107 559	4.0	-0.5
4	Peru	Americas	6 053 120	8 211 716	4 807 923	-20.6	-41.5
5	Russian Federation	Asia/ Europe	3 090 798	4 005 737	4 068 850	31.6	1.6
6	Japan	Asia	4 626 904	3 741 222	3 611 384	-21.9	-3.5

Table 4.4 Marine Capture Production: Major Producers (Av. 2003–2012, 2013–2014)


COUNTRY OR TERRITORY	AVERAGE 2003–2012	2013	2014	VARIATION		
				AVERAGE (2003–2012) – 2014	2013– 2014	2013–2014
		(Tonnes)		(Percentage)		(Tonnes)
China	12 759 922	13 967 764	14 811 390	16.1	6.0	843 626
Indonesia	4 745 727	5 624 594	6 016 525	26.8	7.0	391 931
United States of America	4 734 500	5 115 493	4 954 467	4.6	-3.1	-161 026
Russian Federation	3 376 162	4 086 332	4 000 702	18.5	-2.1	-85 630
Japan	4 146 622	3 621 899	3 630 364	-12.5	0.2	8 465
Peru	7 063 261	5 827 046	3 548 689	-49.8	-39.1	-2 278 357
	918 049 ¹	956 416 ¹	1 226 560 ¹	33.6	28.2	270 144

¹ Totals excluding catches of Peruvian anchoveta (*Engraulis Ringens*) by Peru and Chile

While Indonesia's vast maritime domain provides it with abundant marine resources, this vast territory is also a conundrum for Indonesia's policymakers when juxtaposed with the country's limited and crippled maritime law enforcement from its navy and other maritime agencies. In this sense, it was arduous if not impossible for Indonesian authorities to protect and secure all its waters from intrusion and illegal fishing. This condition was worsened by the rampant corruption within the country's bureaucracy, including government agencies working in the maritime sector. This not only reduced the law enforcement level of the country's authorities, but in some cases made some of the officials participate with the *modus operandi* of the crimes related to fisheries (Erdmann, 2001).

Figure 4.3 displays the numbers of foreign fishing vessels arrested by Indonesian authorities conducting IUU Fishing in Indonesian waters annually (Laksmana et al., 2018). According to this figure, Vietnam and Thailand champion the number of fishing vessels that are captured by the Indonesian authorities, while Chinese fishing vessels' numbers were not that significant within the issue of illegal fishing in Indonesia's maritime space. Nevertheless, the statistical data do not necessarily reflect the real numbers of these illicit activities because evidence shows that in several cases, Indonesian authorities failed to arrest foreign fishing vessels due to the intervention from the coast guard of the origin countries of these vessels (Heriyanto, 2012).⁶⁶

Figure 4.3 Fishing Vessels Arrested by Indonesian Authorities Based on Country of Origin



The annual economic loss due to IUU fishing can be estimated and used to see the adverse impact these illicit activities have on the country's economy. Heriyanto (2012) estimated that Indonesia lost around US\$1 to 2 billion every year due to this illicit activity. For Widodo, the economic cost of IUU fishing was even higher, reaching around US\$20 billion annually, and he considered the issue to be a major drain on the country's (natural) resources (Bland, 2015). Not limited to the economy, IUU Fishing also negatively impacts on the livelihood of many Indonesians, such as traditional fishermen, who depend heavily on marine products. Since foreign fishing vessels are generally larger and more advanced which allows them to catch large amounts of fish, overfishing can result, making this resource scarce and difficult to catch even in places that were previously traditional fishing grounds for local

⁶⁶ The data are scattered among different government agencies at multiple levels (some may not even be recorded properly or intentionally due to bribery), and there was no effort to combine all these data into one single official report before Widodo's administration. However, from the small amount of data captured in several news media, there is an indication that a majority of foreign fishing vessels that conducted this illicit activity came from Vietnam and other countries, such as Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and China.

fishermen. With the scarcity of fish and other marine products, local fishermen have to spend more time and money for fishing as they are forced to go farther beyond their traditional fishing grounds.

As IUU fishing became rampant, especially during the Asian Financial Crisis that devastated the country's economy and its capability to secure its own territory, Indonesia's policy elites were pressured to take more concrete actions and give more attention to their maritime space. However, unlike piracy, Indonesia's policy elites were not compelled to give more attention to its maritime space because there was no imminent risk of foreign powers' intrusions should the problem remain unresolved. Instead, it was the increasing domestic pressure that eventually pushed the Indonesian government to enforce its writ within the country's own waters (Shekhar, 2018). The result was the inclusion of maritime issues in the national policy assessment.

The emergence of new traditional security threats in the maritime domain, such as illegal fishing and piracy, did not suddenly drive Indonesia to formulate a maritime-based grand strategy. These factors, however, altered how the Indonesian elites saw and perceived the maritime domain and its position among national strategic interests. The decision to seriously address these non-traditional security threats provides indication of Indonesia's gradual acceptance and attention to maritime (security) issues as an important factor worth considering.

Over the years, Indonesia's maritime strategy and behaviour became not only more active but also more ambitious, especially in regard to naval development. Within the first decade of the 21st century, Indonesia's naval forces experienced a substantial transformation as a consequence of the change in both internal and external environments (NIDS, 2010; Till & Chan, 2014).⁶⁷ This gradual acceptance of maritime issues within the field of security and defence was clearly reflected in Indonesia's emerging policies related to maritime affairs. One example can be found in the country's Defence White Papers of 2003. In this official document, the word *maritime* was mentioned 14 times, and the word *sea* 47 times (Kemhan, 2003).

⁶⁷ The preceding chapter has examined the attitude of the past administrations toward maritime issues, including the launch of a long-term military modernisation plan of the MEF that emphasises on the modernisation of the Navy and the Air Force.

With the increased salience of the maritime domain through the growth of non-traditional threats and their risk to the country's security and sovereignty, Indonesia became more active or even reactive toward maritime topics (NIDS, 2010). Indonesia became much more aware of its maritime boundaries and critical sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) within the country's territory, such as the three Archipelagic lanes known locally as ALKI (ALKI I, II and III). Not limited to SLOCs, Indonesia also started to shift its focus from major islands (like the five main largest islands) to the outermost small islands, which were mostly undeveloped, unmonitored, and vulnerable to foreign claims (Shekhar, 2018). By naming these outermost islands through Presidential Decree No. 78/2005 as a part of inventorying the country's islands and putting demarcation points on some of these islands, Indonesia's Yudhoyono not only attempted to clarify the country's ownership of these small and uninhabited islands but also to form clear maritime boundaries and delimitation.

Indonesia's increasing active approach to maritime issues was also visible, not only when dealing with non-traditional security threats such as piracy and IUU fishing, but also to traditional threats from state agencies in form of foreign intrusions and territorial claims. Though countries in the Asia Pacific region were concerned with the increase of non-traditional threats such as Japan's concern for the safety of its oil supplies⁶⁸ and shipping lanes that passed through Southeast Asian waters, they still had significant concern for the security of their respective territorial waters (Tarling & Chen, 2017). Take for example what happened in 2005 and 2009 when Indonesia decided to confront the Malaysian navy over the claim on Ambalat (Rüland et al., 2013; Weiss, 2014; Liow & Leifer, 2015). The ship collision incident between the navies in 2005 almost triggered the first armed conflict between the nations since the Confrontation (Weiss, 2014).

The country's 2008 Defence White Paper also shows the country's increasing interest in maritime defence and naval development, in which new ambitious terminologies related to the country's maritime defence such as deterrence and sea denial emerged and started to gain salience. While the word denial only appeared twice, the word deterrence was mentioned more than 20 times in this white paper (Ministry of Defence, 2008). The appearance of such words is an indication of the transformation in Indonesia's maritime behaviour as these two words were not prevalent in the previous white papers.

⁶⁸ Since the 1960s, Japan's dependence on imported oil rose drastically due to its rapid re-industrialisation.

Indonesia's increasing interest in its maritime domain has not only made the country incorporate such topics into the country's policy debate on security but has also led the country to embrace the discourses in policy debates in other fields. Under the presidency of Yudhoyono, maritime theme was absorbed into the core of the country's developmental agenda. The Long-Term National Development Plan Year 2005-2025 (locally known as *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional Tahun* or RPJPN 2005-2025), a replacement for the Suharto era's Broad Guidelines of State Policy (*Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara* or GBHN), explicitly states that the national development agenda should be aimed at attaining an independent, developed, and strong maritime state with the emphasis on the development in five key areas: maritime identity, maritime culture, maritime economy, maritime security, and maritime diplomacy (Bappenas, 2007). This explicit statement clearly demonstrates Indonesia's increasing enthusiasm for maritime discourse. The country placed establishing a strong and independent maritime state among its ultimate goals, thus putting the maritime realm at the top of Indonesia's development agenda. The key areas that are prerequisites to attaining the country's goals are all related to maritime.

In addition to these initiatives, to respond to the growing salience of the maritime domain, Indonesia established the Indonesian Maritime Board (*Dewan Kelautan Indonesia* atau, or DEKIN), a consultative body responsible for providing Yudhoyono with consultation, consideration, and inputs regarding maritime-related affairs. The establishment of such a body also indicates the country's increasing keenness for maritime discourses as these topics became more prominent over the years. One report issued by this consultative board, "Indonesia's Maritime Policy Book II", also suggests the importance of developing the five areas similarly stated within the RPJPN as the main pillars for Indonesia's maritime policy: maritime culture, maritime governance, maritime economy, maritime security, and marine environment (Dewan Kelautan Indonesia, 2012).

From the early 2000s to first half of the 2010s, the increasing salience of maritime discourses has both driven and attracted the attention of the Indonesia's policy elites. Sukma, one of GMF architects and a leading Indonesian scholar in foreign policy, even anticipates the future trajectory of maritime domain. He states that as the majority of the competition for economic resources would take place in the ocean in 10-15 years, the centre of gravity of global affairs would also move to maritime domain (Djumena, 2014).

The increasing interest of Indonesia in the maritime theme is not only manifested at home but also abroad by pushing the inclusion of the maritime theme into the agenda of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the main regional grouping of countries in Southeast Asia. Apart from the 2002 “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” or popularly known as the South China Sea Code of Conduct⁶⁹, maritime-related issues are visible in other agendas of the organisation, such as in relation to maritime infrastructure and transportation, maritime navigation, and maritime security within the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (Koh, 2009).

ASEAN’s focus on the maritime theme was also increased following the 2004 Tsunami in the north-western part of Indonesia that brought catastrophe not only to some members of ASEAN, but also to countries beyond Southeast Asia. This horrendous catastrophe undoubtedly shocked not only Indonesia, but also ASEAN member states and triggered the organisation and its members not only to increase their attention to the maritime space but also to widen the scope of their attention beyond the issue of maritime security and economy. The maritime environment and maritime disaster mitigation and management are among the example of new fields within the larger maritime theme that has begun to receive attention from ASEAN and its member states (Gentner, 2006).

The establishment of the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) in 2010 and the extension of this forum known as the Expanded AMF (EAMF), which includes ASEAN’s dialogue partner countries, is another indication of the inclusion of the maritime theme in the organisation’s agenda. Both AMF and EAMF were established as a platform to discuss problems and identify maritime cooperation opportunities related to maritime domain (The 2nd ASEAN Maritime Forum, 2011). The maritime aspect can also be found within the ASEAN’s Master Plan on Connectivity that was launched in 2010. In this official document, aside from being mentioned 27 times, the concept of maritime issues was also acknowledged as one of the critical points that needs attention and development to boost regional integration (ASEAN, 2010).

The third issue central to the increasing salience of the maritime domain in the region external to Indonesia is the emergence of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical construct. The emergence of this new geopolitical construct cannot be divorced from the economic and

⁶⁹ While the official calling is DOC or Document of Conduct, scholars often quoted as Code of Conduct (COC). See for example Ha (2020), “ASEAN and the South China Sea Code of Conduct: Raising the Aegis of International Law”.

geopolitical dynamics in these two regions at the beginning of the 21st century. In the economic context, the rise of Asia-Pacific economies has not only led to the increasing salience of this region for the global economy, but has also increased the economic interdependence⁷⁰ between the two regions, eventually shifting the “centre of gravity” of the global economy to these two regions (Khurana, 2007; Kuo, 2018).

In the geopolitical context, the shift of the world’s economic centre of gravity has also led to a change of behaviour in the states within these two regions. Not only the growing economy has led to the increase capabilities of states, but also the rapid growth has contributed to the increasing ambition and assertiveness of these states (Shekhar, 2018). The increasing interaction and interest intertwined with increasing capabilities and ambitions have turned both the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean into the most pivotal region and epicentre of the global geostrategic and economic seismic shifts (Natalegawa, 2013; Shekhar, 2018; Auslin, 2020; Medcalf, 2020).

Shekhar (2018) accounts the increasing regional uncertainties as the primary element that has contributed to the emergence and ascent of Indo-Pacific as a new regional geopolitical landscape. He further attributes two aspects constituting regional uncertainties, namely the structural and behavioural aspects of uncertainty (Shekhar, 2018). Shekhar (2018) considers structural uncertainty as the bedrock that shapes the new regional and geopolitical landscape; this uncertainty emanates from an unstable multipolarity, a weak ASEAN-led regional cooperation architecture, long-standing regional rivalries, and long-standing contested maritime space. Meanwhile, he defines behavioural uncertainty as the multiplier effect in that it is sourced from the increasing hedging behaviour, increasing assertiveness of rising powers, and the most important component, the uncertain dynamic of great power behaviour (Shekhar, 2018).

The term “Indo-Pacific” was firstly used both by Gurpreet S. Khurana (2007), a Captain of the Indian Navy and executive director of the National Maritime Foundation, in a paper on the potential of maritime cooperation between Japan and India, and by the late Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2007) during his address to the Indian Parliament (Abe, 2007). The term

⁷⁰ For Asia-Pacific countries, the Indian Ocean region offers an abundant supply of energy and raw materials that are pivotal to fuelling their industry and economy and has also become potential market for their industries. Meanwhile, for countries across the Indian Ocean region, the Asia-Pacific is home to many advanced economies that can provide financial resources, be it as buyers for their natural resources or source for loan and investment needed to develop the country.

has, since then, been commonly known in the lexicon of geopolitics to refer the maritime space consisting of the Western Pacific, along with its littoral states, and the Indian Ocean, along the states in Eastern Africa, West Asia, and the Middle East.

Indonesia joined the Indo-Pacific narrative in 2013 when then Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Marty M. Natalegawa, proposed the creation Indo-Pacific Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation as the foundation for the architecture of Indo-Pacific cooperation (Natalegawa, 2013). However, as highlighted in Chapter III, the Indo-Pacific is not entirely new to Indonesia, as, during the Old Order, Indonesia had incorporated this geopolitical construct within the country's mental map and strategic thinking, though in a different name, called the "Two Oceans Two Continents" worldview. Through this worldview, Hatta, the country's first Vice President and the architect of this worldview, wanted to establish the foundation of the country's foreign policy and diplomacy canvas by instilling three geopolitical realities to the mental map of Indonesian elites, namely archipelagic destiny, two-oceans worldview, and an awareness of the country's strategic position at the centre of the inter-oceanic communications, later known as the *posisi-silang* (crossroad) (Shekhar, 2018).

However, with the fall of Sukarno, the two-oceans worldview began to lose its position in the strategic thinking of Indonesia. The Indian Ocean, as a geopolitical canvas, began to return into the country's mental map and foreign policy canvas during the administration of Yudhoyono, reaching its peak during Jokowi's first term of presidency. So, why does the ascent of the Indo-Pacific as a new geopolitical construct matter to the GMF?

The research identifies two ways in which the ascent of the Indo-Pacific contributes to the emergence of GMF. Firstly, the emergence of the Indo-Pacific highlights the need to change the country's orthodoxy in foreign policy. The rise of the Indo-Pacific narrative has increased the salience of the Indian Ocean as equally important as the Pacific Ocean, which had previously been the sole focus of Indonesia's foreign policy. As a country located at the crossroad of these two (maritime) regions, the Indian and Pacific Ocean, Indonesian foreign policy elites began to be aware that the increasing dynamics and uncertainties that happened across the Indian Ocean may now also equally affect the country.

Therefore, Indonesian foreign policy elites saw the need for the country to respond to these challenges and uncertainties as to prevent the country from being put in a position that diminishes its strategic autonomy. The embrace of a worldview that sees the two maritime regions as a unified geopolitical canvas was, therefore, seen as an important initial step in the

formulation of a strategy aimed at responding to increasing regional dynamics and uncertainties. Furthermore, Indonesia's participation in the Indo-Pacific chorus was also driven by the shift in Indonesia's strategic thinking that begun to see the need for the country to expand its diplomatic canvas beyond its traditional foreign policy canvas of ASEAN, be it because of its rising economy (Reid, 2012; Acharya, 2015; Roberts et al., 2015), its confidence in its democratic achievements (Reid, 2012; Acharya, 2015; Rüländ, 2018), its increasing displeasure over ASEAN (Shekhar, 2018), or the combination of these factors (Shekhar, 2018).

Secondly, the rise of the Indo-Pacific narrative increased the salience of maritime space. The rise of the Indo-Pacific ascended the geopolitics based on maritime space. In this sense, the rise of the Indo-Pacific has made "maritime" the core issue or main locus where most of the geopolitical dynamics take place. In fact, even based on the name of the term, the "Indo-Pacific", it is possible to determine centrality of maritime space within this geopolitical canvas, as both "Indo" and "Pacific" refer to the Indian and Pacific Ocean. The rise of the Indo-Pacific narrative has, therefore, highlighted some Indonesian foreign policy elites on the importance of having a strategy that emphasizes and is based on maritime space. The existence of a maritime strategy not only reflects the geographical characteristics of Indonesia that is surrounded by water, but also is seen to align with the current regional geopolitical dynamics that not only are about the maritime arena, but also take place in the regional maritime space (Jokowi, 2014).

While external maritime-related events mentioned in this part raised the salience of maritime domain, these events were not strong enough and remained too limited to generate the political momentum that led to the sudden emergence of GMF. Nevertheless, the increasing salience of maritime domain has served to remind the Indonesian government that they can no longer avoid or neglect this important aspect and thus provided the opportunity for maritime-related topics to rise and gain prominence within the framework of national discussions and debates among different segments of Indonesia's policy elites.

IV.2 The Rise of China

Another external factor considered to be a catalyst for the emergence of the GMF is the rise of China. The rise of China has become an active area of discussion, not only in the Asia-Pacific region more generally, but also in Indonesia specifically. Though China began to rise in the early 1990s, it was only after the Asian Financial Crisis and China's integration with

the global economy, as well as the country's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), that China's rise was afforded attention from scholars, policy elites, and strategists (Wong & Liu, 2007; Ayres & Mohan, 2009).

The emergence of China as a powerful player has undeniably shaped the characteristics both of the global and regional stage (Clegg, 2009). Though some similar phenomena occurred in the Post-World War II era, nothing has been as unique and controversial as the rise of China. China's rise amidst the heightened "unipolar versus multipolar world" discourse in the post-Cold War age has also contributed to the debate over the discourse. One factor that distinguishes the rise of China from other similar phenomena, such as the rise of Japan, is its multi-dimensional nature. China's rise not only refers to a rising economy but also includes its rising foreign⁷¹ and defence policy in the form of rapid increase of global influence and military power. As China's economy continues to improve, its approach to international affairs is changing as policy elites in Beijing have started to abandon the long-bounded Deng Xiaoping's "low profile" foreign policy and chosen to advocate and play a more significant role within the international order (Yan, 2014; Johnson, 2016a). Against this backdrop, the rise of China, and later India, both economically and politically, has become one of the most prominent transformative processes of the 21st century as it challenges the domination of the international political economy by the "transatlantic West" (Kaplinsky & Messner, 2008)

The rise of China affected Indonesia and its elites in both the economic and the security dimensions. China's rising economy marks the first and prominent characteristic of the country's rise. China's successful economic reform 25 years ago allowed its economy to achieve such positive performance. China has also been included among the new "Asian Drivers" in the Asia-Pacific region; a group consisting of top Asian economies considered the economic drivers of the region and the world. The Asian Drivers include India and other new emerging economies in Southeast Asia (IDS, 2006; Kalpinsky & Messner, 2008; McDonald et al., 2008). This categorisation is justified.

In the period from 1979 to 2005, the average annual growth rate of China's GDP reached over 9.6 percent (Wong & Liu, 2007), and this trend continued before it decreased

⁷¹ The foreign policy dimension of China's rise refers to Beijing's intention to enhance its position within the international system by increasing its leverage in international organizations and affairs, using techniques such as the disbursement of foreign aid.

after 2010 when it entered the phase known as the “New Normal”.⁷² In addition to this growth rate, China is also among the top countries for foreign exchange reserves.⁷³ With high levels of annual growth and a significant amount of foreign exchange reserves, China has not only become the largest economy in Asia but also to become the world’s second largest economy after the U.S. China has turned itself into a global commercial powerhouse (Shambaugh, 2013).

According to the statistics, in 2013 China’s economy contributed 15.84% to the world’s GDP (PPP) (Damuri et al., 2014). This number was much lower in 1990 when the country’s share of world GDP (PPP) was only 3.8% (Damuri et al., 2014). In comparison with other countries, especially emerging markets, no countries equal China’s 16% increase in the share of world GDP (PPP) within the same period (Damuri et al., 2014). Notwithstanding with this achievement, China’s economy also started to experience the “new normal”. The “new normal” in China’s economy refers to the rebalancing of the economy that ended the extraordinary double-digit growth rate (Peston, 2015).

Yang Yao identifies three main factors that contributed to the emergence of this “new normal” condition: the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, demographic transition, and the decline of investment rate within the country (Ahluwalia et al., 2014). Despite China not being among the countries hit by this crisis, the effect of the crisis in 2008 in the following years substantially reduced China’s GDP growth rate from approximately 10% in 2010 to approximately 7% in 2013.⁷⁴ China’s demographic transition has also affected its economic performance. China’s working-age population has begun to shrink, and the country has also started to face a reduced workforce in the countryside because much of the working-age population has migrated from rural to urban areas (Brandt & Rawski, 2008). The change in China’s demographic composition has significantly reduced the speed of the country’s economic growth through an increasing discrepancy among growth rates in different areas within China and the decline of the country’s agricultural sector.

Similarly, the slowdown of investment growth has contributed to the slowdown of economic growth. As China has heavily depended on investment for its economic growth, a

⁷² Retrieved from <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CHN/china/gdp-growth-rate> and <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN>.


⁷³ Since 2008, China has overtaken Japan as a top holder of U.S. Treasury Securities. See Salidjanova (2014), “China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves and Holdings of U.S. Securities”.

⁷⁴ Retrieved from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN>.

disturbance in this sector brought serious consequences to the country's economic performance. Despite China's effort to mitigate the impact of the 2008 Financial Crisis by launching a major investment drive late 2008, the drop in the investment growth rate was inevitable and, combined with the other two factors, eventually started to slow the growth rate of China's economy (Damuri et al., 2014).

Faced with this condition, which is described by Yao as the inverse U-curve of the manufacturing sector, a phenomenon commonly found in the early years of the advanced economies such as the U.S. in the late 1950s and Japan in the early 1970s, China was encouraged to look for and open up to the large Eurasian market (Ahluwila et al., 2014). Among Beijing's strategies to tackle these challenges, nothing was as grand and ambitious as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).⁷⁵ The BRI reflects the structural changes that have occurred with China's "new normal" economy, which is characterised by a slower but higher quality growth rate (Zhao, 2015b; Wang, 2016).

Figure 4.4 Map of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)



With its "grandness", this initiative appears to be China's new grand strategy under the leadership of Xi Jinping, who assumed power in early 2013 as the seventh president of the country (Yan, 2014; Ferdinand, 2016; Wang, 2016). There is on-going debate about the main purpose of this initiative, namely whether it was for geo-political purposes or purely for the economy, such as to increase exports to reduce excess capacity, stimulate investment, or secure the sources of raw materials (Cai, 2017; Blanchard, 2018b; Blanchard, 2019). However,

⁷⁵ Previously known as the China's One Belt One Road (OBOR).

it is certain that the BRI, as a grand strategy, is primarily designed to increase the country's influence beyond its conventional domain through the optimisation of the country's economic prowess. There are two elements that serve as the bedrock for the BRI: the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the MSRI. As its name indicates, MSRI is the maritime or sea component of the BRI. Figure 4.4 depicts both of the components of the BRI⁷⁶.

Within the MSRI's core lies a large-scale infrastructure and connectivity scheme primarily designed to enhance the flow of people, goods, and services within and between countries (Blanchard, 2018a). This mega development initiative is expected to establish infrastructural and investment projects in almost 70 countries across Asia, Europe, and Africa. While MSRI is oriented at improving maritime connectivity through the development of physical maritime infrastructure *inter alia* seaports, the scheme within the MSRI is not rigid because it also includes non-maritime infrastructure projects, such as airports, highways, pipelines, and high-speed railways (Hillman, 2018; Blanchard, 2019).

The initiative has also funded projects beyond the scope of transportation, such as hydropower plants, development of special economic zones (SEZs), and educational institutions (Xinhua, 2017; Zhen, 2017). As well as hard infrastructure, the MSRI also included schemes for soft infrastructure as emphasised by Xi Jinping himself, who stated that linking Asian countries is (Bodeen, 2014)

“... not merely about building roads and bridges or making linear connection of different places. More importantly, it should be a three-way combination of infrastructure, institutions, and people-to-people exchanges and a five-way progress in policy communication, infrastructure connectivity, trade link, capital flow and understanding among peoples.”

Examples of the MSRI's soft infrastructure include bilateral investment treaties, cooperation projects to reduce barriers and transaction costs through customs and tax matters, agreements on people-to-people exchanges, policy coordination among MSRI participant countries, and accords on air travel, shipping, and logistics (Wallstreet Journal, 2015).

The MSRI was officially launched by Xi Jinping through an official speech to the Indonesian Parliament during his state visit to the country on 3rd October 2013 (State Council Information Office the People's Republic of China, 2017). Aside from the launch of MSRIs, Xi Jinping simultaneously announced the plan to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment

⁷⁶ “The Belt-and-Road initiative and the rising importance of China's Western cities” retrieved from <https://www.asiagreen.com/en/news-insights/the-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-rising-importance-of-china-s-western-cities>.

Bank (AIIB), a funding body for MSRI projects (Banyan, 2013). The launch of the MSRI in Indonesia was not without purpose because it was politically motivated. For China, Indonesia is a strategic partner, not only due to its sheer size as the world's largest archipelagic country, thus suitably representing MSRI, or its abundant natural resources and huge market, but also because of Indonesia's characteristics that allow it to play a key role in the successful implementation of the proposed initiative (Damuri et al., 2014; Acharya, 2015).

As the largest country in Southeast Asia, as well as one of the ASEAN pioneers, Indonesia is undoubtedly the *primus inter pares* within this regional body (Caballero-Anthony, 2005; Liow & Emmers, 2006; Acharya, 2009; Smith, 2018). Though Indonesia's participation in the MSRI did not guarantee that all ASEAN countries would follow and join this initiative because they share different perceptions on China and its behaviour⁷⁷, the country's inclusion at least endorses its credibility. Involving a respectable country of a region or sub-region in this initiative was necessary for China to increase the attractiveness of the MSRI. In addition to increasing the attractiveness of the approach, Indonesia's participation is also important in avoiding increasing hostility against a still rising China in Southeast Asia at a time when the South China Sea issue is heating up. With Indonesia joining the MSRI framework, China may expect Indonesia to take a more amicable stance towards the country and reduce the possibility of increasing regional tensions (Blanchard, 2019).

Aside from its status as the *de facto* leader of ASEAN, Indonesia is also crucial for the MSRI due to its geographical position (Emmers, 2014). Located at the crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, home for all the SLOCs and chokepoints that connect the two oceans, as well as hosting the shortest maritime route connecting East Asia with regions such as the Middle East, Mediterranean, Europe, and Africa, Indonesia's maritime space has made the country irresistible in the eyes of any countries intending to develop maritime cooperation in the region of Indo-Pacific. As Figure 4.4 shows, the MSRI is a rejuvenation of the maritime Silk Route of the 15th-17th century that connected China with other parts of the world.

Though the contemporary maritime silk route is different from its classical version and now includes new destinations on the Eastern Coast of Africa (Tiezzi, 2015), Southeast Asia's water space, in which Indonesia shares the largest portion, remains pivotal as it connects

⁷⁷ The different perceptions of China's rise among ASEAN countries have led to differences in how each member of ASEAN perceives MSRI, in terms of whether to embrace or counter it due to concerns with the consequences of joining this initiative.

China with other parts of the world, through the South China Sea and Malacca Straits. While Beijing emphasised the importance of its neighbours during the Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference in October 2013, the emergence of the MSRI has significantly increased the strategic value of Southeast Asia (Cai, 2017). The acknowledgement of the importance of this region to the MSRI was also emphasised in Xi's speech when he announced the MSRI to the Indonesian Parliament. Xi asserts that "Southeast Asia has since ancient times been an important hub along the ancient maritime silk road", meaning that "China will strengthen maritime cooperation with ASEAN countries...and vigorously develop maritime partnership in a joint effort to build the 21st-century Maritime Silk Route" (Lei, 2018: 3).

Indonesia's response to MSRI has been relatively positive. Though Indonesia did not publicly express interest or an intention to join the initiative shortly after it was launched, the country also did not express opposition to the MSRI. The first plausible reason for this position was due to the limited information provided by Beijing about this initiative when it was first launched. In fact, there was no official document or further explanation outlining the conceptual details of the initiative. Almost three years later, precisely during the First Belt and Road Forum held on 14th-15th May 2017, Beijing began to provide further details of this initiative to representatives of over 130 countries (State Council PRC, 2017; Tiezzi, 2017; and Xinhua, 2017). The absence of a more detailed concept of the MSRI has led to the perception shared by Indonesian policy elites that this initiative had not been developed when it was launched in the first place (Garcia, 2019). As a consequence, policy elites in Indonesia were unwilling to follow-up on this initiative or respond properly as it was still under-development.⁷⁸

The second reason was the country's domestic dynamics at the time when the initiative was introduced. While there was almost a year before Yudhoyono finished his second term, for many Indonesian political elites, the final year of a presidential term is already considered a *tahun politik* (political year). "Political year" here refers to a period in which most of the attention of the country's political elites is given to consolidating political

⁷⁸ An online study conducted on the media coverage of the activities or responses following the launch of the MSRI in Indonesia from September 2013 to September 2014 from Google Search and Google Trends did not find news coverage on government activities related to MSRI. Most of the local news regarding MSRI was affiliated with Widodo's campaign materials.

support to prepare for the upcoming general election, including the presidential and legislative elections held in July 2014.

During this period, the incumbent administration⁷⁹ avoids dealing with issues that require excessive attention and resources but bring little impact or even harm political electability (Sari, 2019). Though foreign policy is an integral element of the Indonesian presidential election, as presidential candidates are required to present their foreign policy agendas during the presidential debates, domestic issues are often more pressing and may overshadow foreign policy discourse. One particular argument that may explain this phenomenon is the general public's lack of knowledge on foreign policy, which is largely due to a lack of interest unless the foreign policy in question has direct consequences on the daily life of the general public (Aldrich *et.al.*, 1989). Combined with the insufficient details of the MSRI, the timing of Indonesia's positive gesture towards the policy was more apparent after the election of Widodo in late 2014, which was marked by the official announcement of the GMF as Indonesia's new foreign and strategic policy (Witular, 2014a). However, the belief that Indonesia should also benefit from China's MSRI existed even before the inauguration of Widodo in September 2014 and was shared by several Indonesian key policy elites. Many of these elites later became campaign advisors for Widodo, helping him to develop his foreign and defence programs for the presidential election.

Within Widodo's *Visions and Missions Manifesto*, the term "maritime" was mentioned 18 times and the word "infrastructure" 26 times (Widodo & Kalla, 2014). In contrast, similar words were not mentioned with the same frequency in the nine-page vision and mission of Widodo's rival for the presidency (Prabowo Subianto) which used the word "maritime" zero times and the word "infrastructure" less than five times (Prabowo-Hatta, 2014). During one presidential debate in June 2014, Widodo introduced a vision for Indonesia as the world's maritime fulcrum, though he did not further elaborate on the details of this vision until November 2014 during the East Asia Summit (AS) in Myanmar (Kompasiana, 2014; Sukma, 2014; Connelly, 2015; Muhibat, 2019).

⁷⁹ Despite Yudhoyono no longer being allowed to run for office again in the 2014 Presidential Election as he had already served the Presidency for two terms, Yudhoyono remained interested in the general election as he was leader of the Democrat Party. Furthermore, his ministers, who were mostly leaders of other political parties, were preoccupied with the effort to consolidate political support to win the election.

It is still unclear what motivated Widodo and his team to formulate the GMF and put maritime narratives at the frontline of his campaign. The motives can range from the intention to reap the economic benefits of the MSRI in the form of foreign direct investment and loans to sincerely intending to develop Indonesia's underdeveloped maritime sector, or a combination of both motives.⁸⁰ However, regardless of the motives for the formation of the GMF, the emergence of this policy not long after the launch of the MSRI suggests a strong causal relationship between the two initiatives, as argued by this research.

In a study of MSRI, Blanchard (2019) puts Indonesia in the second category of MSRI's recipient countries, namely the countries which are conditionally supportive toward the MSRI, along with Singapore, Brunei, and Myanmar. The other categories are the countries that strongly support the initiative, are least supportive, and swing states that change from one category to another over time. Blanchard builds an analysis based on two indicators: symbolic gestures and real actions. He refers to symbolic gestures as a range of behaviours that include verbal support or opposition from the country's top powerholder, the attendance of the country's top leadership to MSRI-related meetings, and the participation in the AIIB. On the other hand, an action indicator refers to the manifestation of gestures in the form of real policies, such as allowing Beijing to establish Special Economic Zones within the recipient country or signing a bilateral cooperation agreement between a recipient country and China.

Since the establishment of a strategic partnership in 2003, China-ASEAN relations have improved. This improvement is shown by the substantial increase in bilateral trade and investment, from US\$60 billion in 2003 to over US\$500 billion in 2014 for trade and from US\$0.12 billion to US\$7.3 billion in 2013 for investment (Zhao, 2015a). Based on these numbers, one can infer how important China's economy is to the region and the countries within it, although the degree and nature of such relations varies among countries in the sub-region.

⁸⁰ While the motive to increase electability or attract more votes through the GMF is plausible due to the context of the election, this argument is indeed fallacious for two reasons: (1) Because Widodo did not detail the GMF during the presidential campaign, the public did not have sufficient understanding on the GMF. This lack of understanding meant that the GMF had a limited effect on boosting Widodo's popularity; (2) As Widodo has never been within the circle dealing the country's foreign and strategic policies, the public is less likely to see Widodo from his foreign and strategy policies agenda, particularly when one compares Widodo with his rival, who has a military and oligarchy background.

Despite more peaceful economic cooperation, the political security realm remains untouched as increasing geo-economic power does not necessarily lead to an increased influence or mutual trust. Many ASEAN countries are concerned about the rise of China as they are suspicious about the real motives behind China's rising power, particularly with its rising military power. These countries' concerns are also related to the implications of China's rise for the continuing relevance of ASEAN, the overreliance on China's economy, the growing control over member states and foreign policy, regional security and stability, and the issue of China's growing military capability vis-à-vis the sovereignty of ASEAN member states within the maritime space of South China Sea (Suryadinata, 2017; Blanchard, 2018b; Blanchard, 2019). Though countries in Southeast Asia share similar preoccupations over China's increasing power, they differ from one another in terms of the level of concern and the issues with which they are most concerned.

Similar to many other ASEAN countries, Indonesia has several concerns related to the rise of China, including its MSRI. These issues include the increasing influence of China within ASEAN which undermines the unity of this regional grouping, overreliance on China's loans and investments which may harm Indonesia's independence, and the possibility of Beijing taking over Indonesia's strategic assets. Furthermore, there is also a lesser concern surrounding the massive influx of China's goods and migrant workers into Indonesia (Jakarta Globe, 2015; Desnikia, 2017; Herlijanto, 2017; Shekhar, 2018; Smith, 2018; Blanchard, 2019). However, among these concerns, there is one particular issue that preoccupies Indonesian policy elites: the militarisation of the South China Sea and China's approach to the South China Sea issue (Yee & Storey, 2002; Herlijanto, 2017).

While Indonesia does not consider itself part of the claimant parties within the territorial dispute over the South China Sea, the country has been cautious with the issue. One prominent reason for this caution is the fact that Beijing's claim over a major part of the South China Sea through the demarcation line widely known as the "nine-dash line" overlaps with Indonesia's EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) in the northern part of the Natuna islands⁸¹ (Sinaga, 2013; Acharya, 2015; Suryadinata, 2017; Garcia, 2019; Shekhar 2018). One implication of this one-sided claim has been the frequent trespassing of several Chinese fishing vessels into Indonesian waters, which have also been claimed by Beijing as Chinese

⁸¹ The area later was renamed into Natuna Sea.

waters. This topic is discussed further in the following section (Gosman, 2016; Johnson, 2016b; Supriyanto, 2016).

Despite China's growing military capabilities and its increasing assertiveness in Southeast Asia, particularly in the South China Sea and the Natuna waters, Indonesia still has not officially identified China as a threat to its national security. On the contrary, Indonesia still considers China one of its important partners, which is reflected not only symbolically, but also in Jakarta's behaviour toward Beijing (Shekhar, 2018; Smith, 2018). Since the normalisation of diplomatic relations in the 1990s and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998, China has become one of Jakarta's strategic priorities as it plays a significant role in the country's economic recovery following the Asian Financial Crisis through trade and investment (Smith, 2018). In 2005, Indonesia and China signed an agreement to establish a Strategic Partnership aimed at formalising and strengthening cooperation in the fields of the economy, security, and society/culture (New York Times, 2005). By 2011, China ranked as the second largest trading partner for Indonesia, reaching US\$42.7 billion in 2010 with an average annual growth of 22.8%.⁸²

In October 2013, the leaders of the two countries agreed to elevate their bilateral relations to the level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Antara News, 2013). This agreement was signed during the visit of Chinese President Xin Jinping to Indonesia concomitantly with the launch of the MSRI. Considering these facts, it is therefore acceptable to assert that Jakarta remains committed to expanding Indonesia's bilateral relations with Beijing despite Indonesian policy elites having been proven incapable of dispelling their broader sense of ambivalence, if not suspicion, toward China's rise, behaviour, and policies in Southeast Asia (Smith, 2018). If one compares Indonesia's relations with those of other great powers, such as the U.S., one may find that Sino-Indonesian relations have made more significant progress since the beginning of the 21st century. As one analyst states, while Indonesia-China relations are reflected as being "at an all-time high" and requiring a "high-level of complementarity," the U.S.-Indonesian relations are still considered "under the radar" and have been rated as "second-rate and disappointingly lukewarm" (Shekhar,

⁸² Retrieved from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/wenzonglifangwenmlxyheidnxy_665760/t820936.shtml

2018).⁸³ Some scholars have even contrasted the different approaches taken by the two great powers, one of which is considered keen and active in lobbying the government of Indonesia to increase China's position within the country's strategic calculus, while the other being viewed as "lethargic" (Halim & Lubis, 2016).

Similarly, Indonesian policy elites were also concerned with the possible implications of the MSRI when it was first launched. Looking at China's policy and behaviour in the South China sea, it is unsurprising that this initiative was seen as a tool aimed to achieve China's regional maritime doctrine and regional if not global dominance (Blanchard, 2018b). However, the same policy elites were also aware of the economic opportunities that the MSRI offered to Indonesia, particularly when juxtaposed with the country's need for funding to finance its development projects.

Indonesia has always been eager to consolidate and project its power within the regional and global theatre, particularly since the Asian Financial Crisis in the post-New Order era. While Indonesia has eventually been able to emerge as a norms-promoter or "norms-entrepreneur," both on a regional and global level (Wilton Park, 2012; Acharya, 2015; and Rüländ, 2018), the country remained unable to substantially resume its pre-crisis position in the fields of defence and the economy as one of the "Asian Tigers" (Shekhar, 2018). To recover from its devastated economy, the Indonesian government has been actively promoting the country to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Indonesia, particularly investment in labour-intensive sectors such as manufacturing (Tambunan, 2006).

Aside from enhancing Indonesia's exports, FDI in heavily labour-intensive sectors was also aimed at alleviating the country's massive employment issues (Damuri et al., 2014). While the manufacturing sector's share in the country's economy has grown significantly over the years, it has still been unable to boost and accelerate the slow economic growth. This happened because the manufacturing industry in Indonesia is mostly focused on commodities that have lesser added value such as food, tobacco, and textiles rather than on transformed manufacture goods which have more added value, as have been the focus of other countries in the region (Elias & Noone, 2011). To reap the benefits of the ASEAN market and consolidate its position in the global value of chain, Indonesia's policy elites thus saw the necessity for the country to increase its secondary industry through FDI in multiple sectors, such as machinery,

⁸³ Nevertheless, the US-Indonesia relations in defense cooperation (military exercises) remains above the same cooperation between Indonesia and China. For further details see Weinas (2021).

electronics, agriculture, and transportation, which also includes shipping industries (Damuri et al., 2014).

Nevertheless, attracting FDI appears to be a difficult task, even for a country as big as Indonesia that may offer significant opportunities for businesses. Statistics indicate that, despite the decrease in the negative trend of investment growth rate in Indonesia since 2000, Indonesia remained among the ASEAN countries with a lower trend of inbound FDI compared to other ASEAN countries (World Bank, 2021). Scholars and analysts have identified several factors that determine (FDI determinants) the level of attractiveness of a country for FDI, which include level of corruption, bureaucratic efficiency, and adequate infrastructure, all of which fall under the category of basic requirements for investment.

While the awareness of Indonesia's policy elites on the issue of infrastructure connectivity and its importance for Indonesia has improved, one particular pressing issue that concerned the Indonesian policy elites was determining how to fund and finance the country's infrastructure projects. The emergence of the MSRI has thus provided Indonesia with the opportunity to obtain funding for continuing a number of its development projects. Despite China's conduct in the region and Indonesia's suspicion and concerns towards this behaviour, the country's policy elites, at least those who have joined Widodo's team like Sukma, Widjanto, and Pareira⁸⁴, still perceive the MSRI positively as an untapped opportunity that the country should also benefit from. This perception was clearly reflected in the gestures and statements of some of Indonesian policy elites, such as Rizal Sukma, who stated that the rise of China would continue to occur with or without Indonesia. Therefore, when one is not able to stop a wave from coming towards him, the person should at least learn how to surf the wave.⁸⁵

However, this behaviour towards China is not only found during Widodo's presidency, but also in the previous administrations. For Leifer, Indonesia's strategic approach to China has always been a combination of both engagement and limited balance of power (Johnston & Ross, 1999). Similarly, Anwar argues that Indonesia's approach towards China is similar to that of other great powers. Anwar (2010) considers Indonesia's approach as a multi-hedging strategy that seeks stronger relations and increased engagement with China through

⁸⁴ See Chapter VII for further detail on these individuals.

⁸⁵ Informal talks during the welcoming dinner with the Indonesian students in the UK as well as public lecture at the LSE.

counterbalancing China in the form of simultaneous engagement with several other regional and extra-regional powers. In his research on the perception of Indonesia's policy elites, Novotny (2010) describes Sino-Indonesia relations as ambivalent in which Indonesia's elites see China's rise both as an opportunity and a threat due to the uncertainty of its behaviour. Local media even depicts the ambivalent relations with China as resembling a title of a local song named *Antara Madu dan Racun* (trans; Between Honey and Poison), wherein in one side provides benefit (honey) but the other side holds the risk of deadly poison (Gatra, 2006).

Figure 4.5 The Country that Will Exert the Greatest power in East Asia in 10 years




Figure 4.6 The country that will be the most important economic partner





Figure 4.7 The positive impact of China's Rise to the Regional Economic Development and Regional Security



The 2014 *Regional Power and Order in Asia* survey clearly displays the ambivalence of Indonesian elites' perception over China (Green & Szechenyi, 2014). As seen in Figure 4.5, Indonesian foreign policy elites perceive China as surpassing the US as the country with the greatest power in East Asia in 10 years. Moreover, Indonesian foreign policy elites are also expecting China to be the most important economic partner once it achieves its status as the greatest country in East Asia, as shown in Figure 4.6 (Green & Szechenyi, 2014: 4, 6). Another

figure even shows more the ambivalence of Indonesia's foreign policy elites' perception on China's rise. Figure 4.7 displays that though China's rise is perceived as not having a positive impact on the regional security, the majority of Indonesian foreign policy elites still consider China's rise as having a positive impact on regional economic development (Green & Szechenyi, 2014: 5).

In conclusion, this section shows that the rise of China in the economic realm plays a much greater role in stimulating the emergence of the GMF compared to the rise of China in the security realm. While there is still a preoccupation shared among the foreign policy elites of Indonesia regarding the security aspect from China's rise, stemming from its uncertain behaviour, and also concern over non-security aspect such as the dependence on China's economy and the overflowing of Chinese product into the local market (Novotny, 2010; Shekhar, 2018), the rise of China is also seen to provide an economic opportunity for Indonesia, especially coming from the emergence of MSRI. The absence of any description describing China as a source of threat in any of Widodo's campaign materials, be it in written or oral during debates indicates a strong positive sentiment over China. The positive tone in China can also be seen from Sukma's argument that the main issue of Indonesia's problem with China in the South China Sea centres on the issue of fishing rights rather than territorial claims (Sukma, 2016). As one of the central actors for the formulation of the GMF, Sukma's opinion thus can be seen representing the perception of the emergence of the GMF.

CHAPTER V

DOMESTIC FACTORS OF GMF

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the domestic factors that prompted the emergence and development of GMF. As underscored in previous chapters, the study asserts that the emergence of GMF cannot be separated from the dynamics that occurred both in the region surrounding Indonesia and those within the country wherein all state policies, including grand strategy and foreign policy, are formulated. The three sections within this chapter aim to examine each domestic factor that the research argues has driven the emergence of GMF.

This chapter begins by outlining the causal linkage between the 2014 presidential election and GMF. Within this section, the research aims to answer the question of why the election was important for GMF's emergence. The following section discusses the domestic issues relevant to the emergence of the GMF. The research identifies two specific domestic issues contributing to the emergence of the GMF, namely the Java- and land-centric model of development, as well as the presence of weak-mentality state in the previous administration.

In the first issue, the research examines how the land- and Java-centric model of development used in the previous administration highlighted the need to formulate a new development model that would not only match the characteristics of Indonesia as an archipelagic country, but also be able to match the need of Indonesia in resolving its economic conundrum. In the second issue, the research addresses the topic of 'weak-state mentality' by focusing on two main cases. The first is the incapability of the Indonesian government to protect its country's maritime territory from foreign trespass and incursion. Here, the study seeks to examine the topic by elaborating on cases to establish this critique or perception. The second issue concerns growing dissatisfaction over Indonesian foreign policy. Similar to the previous sub-section, this part aims to examine the topic by elaborating on specific cases that brought dissatisfaction to the forefront.

V.1. The 2014 Presidential Election: Change in Government and Strategy

For Indonesia and its people, 2014 was a year of politics and enthusiasm. During it, Indonesia not only experienced two general elections—a legislative and a presidential election—but, more importantly, it had to choose a new leader. Under the country's

constitution, a president may stay in office for two terms at most, and therefore, a two-term incumbent is not allowed to run again.⁸⁶ For analysts and scholars of Indonesian studies—especially those in the field of economics, defence or foreign policy—a year like this would be considered critical and decisive, as it would mostly determine the landscape of the country’s economic, defence and foreign policy (through either continuity or change).

The examination of the linkage between elections, government/administration change and foreign policy is not singular, as it is observed both in the study of political science and international relations. In these realms of study, foreign policy is observed as (among) the factors responsible for government change.⁸⁷ While foreign policy fiascos may not necessarily lead to the fall of an administration, a failed foreign policy can certainly initiate and strengthen opposition against the incumbent and be a factor that undermines political cohesiveness; with an election approaching, a foreign policy fiasco can be utilised to diminish the incumbent’s electability. Besides becoming a factor for government change, foreign policy is also affected by a change in government.

Following a change in administration after an election, there is the opportunity for the adoption of a new foreign policy, as the incoming leadership may possess a different understanding not only of the external environment but also about how to approach it and the issues that stem from it (Welch, 2005; Novotny, 2010; Alden & Aran, 2017).⁸⁸ While a change in the executive may not necessarily lead to a new foreign policy, many (foreign) policy changes are often preceded or driven by a change in government or regime. Numerous studies show examples of countries whose foreign policy orientation changed alongside their respective leadership.⁸⁹ In the context of Indonesia, the transfer from Sukarno’s Old Order to Suharto’s New Order led to some profound changes across multiple sectors, including to defence and foreign policy (Leifer, 1983; Acharya, 2015; Roberts et al., 2015; Shekhar, 2018). Examples of recast foreign policy during this period include the abandonment of Sukarno’s adventurous policy of ‘Confrontation’; Indonesia’s re-entry to the United Nations; the (temporary) termination of diplomatic ties with the Communist countries, especially China; and an enhancement of relations with the US and its allies. Similarly, in the Reformation era,

⁸⁶ See Art. 7 of the Constitution of 1945 and Law No. 7/2017 about General Election.

⁸⁷ See, for example, the studies of Michael Leifer (1983), David Barker Huxsoll (2003), David A. Welch (2005).

⁸⁸ See also Ole Holsti (1976) and Robert Jervis (1976).

⁸⁹ See, for example, Michael Leifer (1983), David Barker Huxsoll (2003) and David A. Welch (2005).

Indonesia's foreign policy also experienced some substantial changes—albeit not as radical as during the transition period from Sukarno to Suharto—wherein it began to promote and advocate democracy and human rights through foreign policy, or what Jürgen Rüländ (2018) referred to as 'norm entrepreneurship'. Against this backdrop, this study considers that the 2014 presidential election was the primary domestic factor that enabled the emergence of GMF.

In light of this, why did the presidential election pivotal towards GMF? The simplest and most straightforward answer to this is that without the 2014 presidential election, there would have been no GMF. Since that election resulted in the country's top leadership transferring from Yudhoyono to Widodo, the absence of that election would also signify an absence of government change. Without a window of opportunity in the form of change in government, a grand strategic reorientation would be less likely to happen, since new policy ideas would not only be more difficult to take root under the old administration but their entrance into the policymaking arena would have been much harder due to its high barrier of entry.

As highlighted in the previous chapter, Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2012) identified an election as a window of opportunity to lower a high entry barrier, thus allow policy entrepreneurs and the proponents of policy change to enter the policy arena and induce policy change. In fact, policy change is likely to occur when there is a change of administration, as the new administration may try to look for new and different approaches to respond to challenges or crises in ways that previous strategies had failed to do (Walsh, 2006). The failure of Sukma to advocate for the reorientation of Indonesia's foreign policy in 2009 through his post-ASEAN foreign policy narrative can be held up as an example to demonstrate the importance of this opportunity window, be it in form of a change of administration or an external shock, to enter the policy arena and induce policy reform.

Besides serving as a determinant factor for the existence of GMF, the 2014 presidential election also stimulated its emergence. For Indonesia's policy elites, and those who would usually be involved in high-level policymaking such as for foreign policy and grand strategy, a presidential election year is critical, as it can result in government change and policy reorientation. While some of these elites may choose to 'wait and see', others may already have started to participate in the existing political process by joining with one of the competing candidates as a means to seek incentives. Despite the various incentives one can

benefit from by supporting one candidacy, a particular incentive that is often sought is political incentive. Political incentive does not necessarily refer to certain powers or positions within the government or bureaucracy of the new administration; instead, it can refer to access and the opportunity to shape the national policy agenda.

Access to policy decision-making is pivotal because the closer the policy elites get to the centre of decision-making, the greater their opportunity not only to successfully instil their ideas into the policy process but also to influence and shape the output of such decision-making. This matches with the argument of Mitchell (2005) and David (2015), as highlighted in the previous chapter. For both of them, policy elites have to be as close as possible to the centre of power to establish a closer relationship with the authoritative decision unit as a means to increase their chance of championing their own policy idea or aspiration. Their descriptions somehow reflect the contextual background of the emergence of GMF.

In this sense, the close relationship of GMF's architects with Widodo—and their participation within Widodo's campaign team as his advisors—may also have been driven by their intention to instil their policy aspirations and instigate policy change once Widodo had assumed his presidency.⁹⁰ As has already been highlighted, although GMF served as Widodo's flagship campaign programme, neither the president nor his running mate, Jusuf Kalla, were the pioneers or architects of it. For Widodo, foreign policy and diplomacy were still new when he decided to run for the presidency, as he had not yet had the opportunity to learn and experience them (Connelly, 2015). Meanwhile, Kalla's experience as vice-president might have equipped him with a more than adequate understanding of Indonesia's foreign policy and the country's external environment, especially since he had already played a major role in the peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Aceh Freedom Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, or GAM) in August 2005 (Connelly, 2015); however, this experience did not necessarily make him familiar with other issues, such as those related to maritime affairs and maritime grand strategy. His interests and experience during the Yudhoyono's first term were mainly focused on issues of political identity and conflict resolution (Connelly, 2015). Considering these facts, the study thus sees GMF as a brainchild of individuals beyond Widodo and Kalla.

⁹⁰ Further elaboration about the interaction between Widodo and his advisors during the early phase of GMF development will be discussed in Chapter VI.

The 2014 presidential election attracted the architects of GMF by providing them the opportunity to introduce their policy ideas about maritime grand strategy to a general audience through presidential debates and campaigning. The election also provided the architects a platform to highlight the failure of previous policies to face the challenges of the time, and thus to propose a solution for these shortcomings through their new policy idea (Widodo & Kalla, 2014; Tim Ahli Seknas Jokowi, 2014; Almuttaqi, 2020). By doing so, the architects of GMF were not only able to inform the public about their policy ideas and proposals, but more importantly they could stress the urgency for reorientating Indonesia's strategic thinking in terms of foreign, defence and development policy (Djumena, 2014).


Though a presidential election may stimulate policy change, such a policy window does not guarantee that every new policy will be adopted. In that respect, notwithstanding the election and the potential change of administration, these internal shocks only constitute an opportunity for a new policy to be introduced and become known, but such shocks cannot ensure the adoption of new policy proposals (Legro, 2005). As highlighted in the previous chapter, various new policy proposals may appear with the arrival of a new administration, and since these (new) ideas do not exert influence on their own, their initiators have to compete among themselves and convince members of the policy community—bureaucracy, scholars, advisors, parliamentarians and key political actors—of their appeal and practical relevance before being adopted as state policy (Patrick, 2009; Kingdon, 2014)

V.2. Domestic Factors of GMF

As highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, the research identifies two domestic factors relevant to GMF emergence. For the research, domestic-level issues are not only useful as a prism to comprehend incoming external stimuli, but also, as in the case of GMF, a means of highlighting the importance of having a maritime-based grand strategy. In this context, the research sees the use of domestic issues to ensure the acceptance of Jokowi and the wider policy community in Indonesia over the idea of a maritime-based grand strategy. The research sees that as foreign policy and strategic issues are the issues exclusive to the elites, the proposal of a policy idea as a flagship campaign programme that only contains foreign policy and strategic issues would discourage the contestants of election to accept and adopt such policy idea as it would be certainly difficult for them to gain support from wider population.

V.2.a. Land- and Java-Centric Model of Development

Under his administration, Yudhoyono was not only able to maintain an economic recovery but also to boost GDP growth. Figure 5.1 shows Indonesia’s rate of GDP and loan growth from 2005 to 2017. According to the data, GDP growth during Yudhoyono’s two terms (2004–2014) reached an average of above 5% (Soejachmoen, 2015; Wisnubroto, 2016). Due to this economic performance, Yudhoyono also claimed during his presidency that his administration had been able to substantially reduce national poverty (Paramaesti, 2018).



Notwithstanding this achievement, the critics of Yudhoyono’s leadership, including the architects of GMF, remained firm in questioning the actual impact of the high economic growth, which did not really have a tangible impact on the development of Indonesia and its people (Agustiyanti, 2018; Tribunews, 2018; Kumparan, 2019). One indicator that can be used to verify such criticism is the Gini coefficient, an index used to examine the income or wealth inequality of different groups of people within a nation. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 display the Gini ratio trend for Indonesia on a scale of 0–100 (World Bank & Australian Aid, 2016: 8; Tjoe, 2018).

According to Figures 5.2 and 5.3, there was a substantial increase in wealth inequality among Indonesians throughout the two terms of Yudhoyono’s leadership. The data show a dramatic increase in this during Yudhoyono’s second term (2009–2014), from 37 points in 2009 to 40 points in 2014. Contrastingly, this rise in inequality occurred at the same time that Yudhoyono was able to successfully restore the economic growth rate to above 5 percent after it had plummeted during the global financial crisis of 2008, (see Figure 5.1). Figure 5.4 not only demonstrates the astonishingly rapid increase of Indonesia’s inequality over less

than 20 years but also how Indonesia had one of the fastest inequality growth rates of all countries in the Indo-Pacific region (World Bank & Australian Aid, 2016: 8).

Figure 5.2 Gini Coefficient for Indonesia 1990–2016






Figure 5.3 Gini Coefficient and Poverty Rate in Indonesia



NOTE Nominal consumption Gini. The national poverty line was changed in 1998, and the 1996 rate calculated under both the new and old methodologies.

Figure 5.4 Gini Coefficient in the Asia-Pacific




*Gini coefficient in East Asia
1990s & 2000s*

■ 90'S
■ 00'S

NOTE Consumption Ginis for all countries except Malaysia, which uses income. The periods for each country are: Indonesia 1990-2011; Malaysia 1992-2009; Lao PDR 1992-2008; China 1990-2008; Vietnam 1992-2008; Thailand 1990-2009; the Philippines 1991-2009; and Cambodia 1994-2008.

Figure 5.5 Indonesia's GDP by Main Islands (2013)



Meanwhile, Figure 5.5 outlines the distribution of GDP among the main islands of Indonesia in 2013 (Roughneen, 2015). It shows that Java dominated Indonesia's GDP, compared to other islands, reaching almost 60%—or more than half of overall GDP—with the remainder spread across a vast region of far-flung islands from Sumatra in the west to Maluku and Papua in the east. Though Sumatra sat in second position, its share was not even half of Java's and amounted to only 24% of Indonesia's GDP. This signifies that the disparity was not only between the western part of Indonesia (Java and Sumatra) and its east, but also between Java and outside it (Bhinadi, 2003; Yuliadi, 2012).

Numerous analysts have identified insufficient infrastructure as being among the primary reasons for income disparity increasing across the country (Roughneen, 2015; Indonesia-Investment, 2017; Tjoe, 2018). However, for the proponents of GMF, not only did poor infrastructure conditions hinder the distribution of wealth, but they also noted, more importantly, the failing development model used by previous administrations, including that of Yudhoyono. They argued that the development strategy being used was 'Java-centric'⁹¹ and 'land-centric',⁹² causing infrastructure to lack proper distribution across archipelagic Indonesia. Eventually, this led to a discrepancy gap between the islands that continues to increase each year (Widodo & Kalla, 2014; Roughneen, 2015; Liputan6, 2016; Laksmana et al., 2018).

⁹¹ Heavily focusing on Java Island as the island wherein the capital of Indonesia, as the center of the economy and political activities, is located as well as the most populated within the archipelagic Indonesia.

⁹² In this sense, the existing development give much attention to the development of land-based space instead of maritime space which comprises majority of the country's territory.

As a matter of fact, Indonesia under Yudhoyono had actually two initiatives that aimed to develop the country's maritime space and regions outside Java. The first of these, MP3EI, was launched in May 2011 and was specifically orientated to accelerate the country's economic growth through its waters (ASEAN, 2011). Following this masterplan, the second initiative was implemented; the Archipelagic Pendulum (*Pendulum Nusantara*), which has some similarities with GMF's Sea Highway (*Tol Laut*) programme, aimed to enhance inter-island connectivity to boost the distribution of goods and services across the archipelago (Blanchard, 2019). Though these initiatives may have offered solutions for the country's underdeveloped maritime space and its increasing disparity problem, their realisation was apparently still far from what had been expected, especially when one considers the previous statistics and other statistical data presented in with this section.


Throughout his campaign, Widodo strongly criticised Yudhoyono's development policy approach, which paid little attention to Indonesia's maritime space, despite the fact that a Defence White Paper in 2003 had identified its vital role in Indonesia's strategic environment (Ministry of Defence, 2003). The maritime domain comprises 75 percent of Indonesian territory, with a total area reaching 5.8 million square kilometres (Setiawan & Guritno, 2007). This consists of 800,000 square kilometres of territorial sea, 2.3 million square kilometres of archipelagic waters, and an exclusive economic zone of 2.7 million square kilometres (Setiawan & Guritno, 2007). All this is estimated to have a potential value of around USD 1.2 trillion per year (Setiawan & Guritno, 2007; Kusumastanto, 2010; Darmawan, 2014; Djumala, 2015). In addition, other statistical data show that more than 70 percent of industries and cities in Indonesia are located within coastal regions, and almost 70 percent of the national energy supply comes from the country's maritime space (Adrianto, 2015).

In his inaugural speech, Widodo strongly criticised Indonesia's nonchalant attitude toward its maritime domain. He contended that the country and its people had long been disregarding and abandoning the country's waters, and he reminded the public that they should embrace Indonesia's traditional identity as a maritime nation if they want the country to attain its longstanding aspiration to be a developed nation. Nevertheless, for Widodo and his team, paying more attention to maritime development did not signify that they had abandoned the land-based economy. By developing its maritime infrastructure and connectivity, Indonesia can increase the efficiency and productivity of its land-based economy

that encompasses agriculture, plantations, and the manufacturing industry (DetikNews, 2014c). Widodo asserted the following (TribuneNews, 2014):⁹³

(We must work very diligently to return Indonesia as a maritime country. The oceans, seas, straits, and bays are the future of our civilization. For so long we have turned our back on the sea, turned our back on the oceans, turned our back on the straits and bays. Now, it is the time for us to return everything so that *Jalesveva Jayamahe*, in the Sea we are triumph, as the motto of our ancestors in the past, can once again resound).

There has also been criticism of the imbalanced development model that heavily focused on the island of Java (Kusumastanto, 2010; Widodo & Kalla, 2014). Although infrastructure is pivotal, its presence does not necessarily lead to poverty reduction and a decline in the extent of wealth inequality (Brakman et al., 2002; Banerjee, 2004; Ravallion, 2004; Banerjee & Somanthan, 2006; Chatterjee & Turnovsky, 2012). In fact, excessive development (of infrastructure) in one particular region can considerably contribute to an increase in inequality among regions within that country (Sukwika, 2018).




Sukma asserted that GMF as a grand policy would contain a concrete action plan that aimed to address problems related to inequality and development (Sukma, 2014; Nasution, 2016). He further argued that within this doctrine is the ‘Maritime Highway’ (*Tol Laut*) project, as shown in Figure 5.6 (Susanty, 2016). This is an infrastructure project designed to better handle international traffic, augment inter-island connectivity, and streamline more local trade by building new ports and coordinating them, increasing the number of transport ships and raising their frequency of sailing (Shekhar & Liow, 2014; Mandi, 2017). Through this

⁹³ An official translation.

project, the proponents of GMF aimed to reduce the disparity of (commodity) prices between the more developed western part of Indonesia and its struggling eastern counterpart (BBC Indonesia, 2014; Tempo.co, 2014a). A report written by the World Bank in 2011 shockingly revealed that the cost of shipping a container from Jakarta to Singapore was more than three times cheaper than the cost of sending the same container to Padang, the capital of West Sumatra province, despite it being much closer to Jakarta (Sandee, 2011).

Similarly, goods coming from abroad to big cities like Jakarta were mostly cheaper than products coming from other regions within the country. As a consequence, local products became less competitive and less attractive compared to imported goods, even within the local market, as consumers and even distributors such as retailers would prefer to buy cheaper products (Sandee, 2011). Over time, this condition has hindered local economic growth and increased wealth inequality, as many businesses have found it difficult not just to thrive but even to survive.


Figure 5.7 Indonesia's LPI 2007-2018



Indonesia has been among the countries with the highest cost of transportation and logistics. According to the Logistics Performance Index (LPI), Indonesia ranked 53 out of 160 countries in 2014 (Arvis *et.al.*, 2018). In comparison with neighbouring ASEAN countries, for which logistics costs would account for around 8–9% of GDP, these costs were much higher in Indonesia, amounting for 15% of GDP (KADIN Indonesia MP, 2015). Based on the World Bank's LPI, as outlined in Figure 5.7, Indonesia's LPI score between 2007 and 2014 (or prior to Widodo's administration, as the focus of this chapter) can be considered less than satisfactory. Where a score of 5 reflects the highest appreciation for performance in the logistics sector, Indonesia's overall LPI remained below 3.2. Among the contributing factors

for such a low score were infrastructure issues and customs, and these factors became the main reasons for the performance Indonesia's logistics sector being undermined.

Infrastructure is therefore important, and the link between this sector and economic growth is undoubtedly strong, as demonstrated in numerous studies (Munnell & Cook, 1990; Holtz-Eakin & Schwartz, 1995; Démurger, 2001; Fedderke et al., 2006; Muljono et al., 2010; Maryaningsih et al, 2014; Chotia & Rao, 2017; Sukwika, 2018; Lestari & Suhadak, 2019).⁹⁴ In fact, many have considered infrastructure to be the economic backbone and a prerequisite for growth; these included Widodo and his team, who viewed it as one of the primary bottlenecks for Indonesia's economic development (Puentes, 2015; Indonesia-Investments, 2017). For Widodo and his advisors, GMF was not only designed to reduce the inequality of infrastructure and commodity prices; more importantly, it was aimed to increase the competitiveness and attractiveness of many parts of the country towards investment, both locally and in particular from abroad, in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI; BBC Indonesia, 2014; Shekhar & Liow, 2014; Widodo & Kalla, 2014). The increase of investment in Indonesia, and especially in areas that were previously not well connected, was expected to provide more job opportunities, revive local economies as purchasing capability increased, alleviate poverty and decrease wealth disparity.



⁹⁴ See Indonesia's score card from 2007 – 2018 <https://ipi.worldbank.org/international/scorecard/line/254/C/IDN/2014#chartarea>.

For the architects of GMF, infrastructure had become a prerequisite for attaining the goal of a grand strategy to develop Indonesia’s maritime sector and obtain benefit from the sector’s optimisation (Irawan, 2015; Sulistyoningrum, 2015). Considering its importance, infrastructure was even included among the key pillars of GMF—namely the third pillar. Within this pillar, GMF was orientated to develop Indonesia’s maritime infrastructure to bolster inter-island connectivity, trade and tourism (Witular, 2014a). Without this infrastructure, Indonesia would not be able to achieve the goals set within the third pillar and also some of the goals of the second pillar related to the development of marine industries. As much as these industries would be funded by the private sector, infrastructure would play a critical role as a determinant factor for investment attractiveness.

Despite the positive impact that infrastructure could bring to the national economy and the struggle to alleviate poverty, for Widodo and his (campaign) team, Yudhoyono’s administration had not giving serious attention to developing it (Wisnubrata, 2016). Widodo’s concern over the condition of Indonesia’s infrastructure is not surprising. For almost two decades since the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia’s infrastructure sector had been neglected, and investment in it had also been extremely low (Duffield et al., 2019; Fauzie, 2019). Figure 5.8 shows that infrastructure spending during Yudhoyono’s leadership can be considered low, especially for a country of the size of Indonesia (Katadata, 2016). Although there were increases in its infrastructure spending between 2009 and 2014, the rate of increase had been low and slow-paced. Even at the end of Yudhoyono’s leadership, it had decreased slightly, before it climbed considerably at the beginning of Widodo’s first term.





Figure 5.9 shows the budget allocation trend for several sectors, including infrastructure, from 2011 to 2017 (Katadata, 2018). According to these statistics, fuel subsidy

had the second largest share of allocation prior to Widodo being elected as president, and it reached its peak at the end of Yudhoyono’s administration. As also shown in the figure, the infrastructure budget allocation ranked below the allocation for fuel subsidy, but it gained momentum and drastically increased following the election of Widodo. The significant increase in the infrastructure budget thus demonstrates Widodo’s commitment to concretise his campaign pledges to develop more infrastructure once he was elected (DetikFinance, 2014; Rinaldi, 2014; Winanti, 2016; Wisnubrata, 2016; Romana, 2019).

Figure 5.10 Infrastructure Spending of Asian Countries and Variability in Infrastructure Spending (1992–2011)



In comparison with the infrastructure spending of neighbouring countries, as shown in Figure 5.10, Indonesia ranked among the lowest in the region (CARI ASEAN Research, 2013). The figure shows that its infrastructure spending under Yudhoyono’s leadership still lagged behind some ASEAN countries, and it was even lower than that of Malaysia and Singapore, whose combined territories are not even half of Indonesia’s. Additionally, such spending was certainly far behind the other two rising Asian giants of China and India. Though Indonesia was slightly ahead of Thailand in terms of infrastructure spending until 2011, the latter’s infrastructure quality score had improved beyond Indonesia’s by 2013 (Schwab, 2013).

Widodo not only saw Yudhoyono’s decision to maintain high spending on fuel subsidy, instead of diverting it into a more productive sector, as an act of wasting money and undermining the country’s financial capability. He also considered it to be an approach that prevented the country from developing other sectors, including infrastructure (Tempo.co, 2014c). For this reason, Widodo decided to significantly reduce the budget subsidy, since he considered that that it did not provide long-term economic benefits for the country, and by

doing so, he could divert the subsidy to finance other productive projects (Seskab, 2014c; Tempo.co, 2014b). Analysts have argued that, without sufficient funding, Indonesia was not only faced with a critical insufficiency in terms of both quality and quantity of infrastructure—this was especially the case for connective infrastructure such as roads, railways, seaports, and airports—but also it was prevented from accelerating its economic growth rate over the longer term (Bareksa, 2016).

The Global Competitiveness Report is a study published by the World Economic Forum (WEF) each year that ranks countries according to their levels of competitiveness—the level of attractiveness a country has for FDI. Numerous indicators serve as the baseline for this Global Competitiveness Index, including corruption level, bureaucratic efficiency, and adequate infrastructure. These are all placed under the category of ‘basic requirements’ for investment. According to the Global Competitiveness Index for 2013–2014 (prior to the Widodo administration), Indonesia was ranked 38 out of 148 countries (Schwab, 2013). Although this was an improvement from 50th position in the previous year, the report still highlighted three major problems that hindered Indonesia’s private sector from doing business: corruption, government bureaucracy and insufficient infrastructure (Schwab, 2013). In terms of infrastructure, Indonesia’s performance ranked 61 out of 148, with a score of 4.2 (Schwab, 2013). While this had improved from the previous year’s 3.7 and ranking of 78 out of 144 nations (Schwab, 2012), Indonesia’s (infrastructure) score in 2013 was still below the average score of other ASEAN countries, at 4.3 (Schwab, 2013).

Continuous, sustainable investment in infrastructure is therefore a prerequisite for maintaining the economic growth of Indonesia. Underinvestment in infrastructure is perceived as a major hindrance, not only for the development of businesses but also for attracting FDI (Kusumawardhani, 2019). In addition to FDI, improvement in the quality and quantity of infrastructure, particularly in relation to connectivity, will also positively affect trade performance by enabling Indonesia to obtain more trade deals with other countries. Singapore and Hong Kong are highlighted as examples of how an effective infrastructure sector can also lead to positive performance in international trade (Carruthers et al., 2003). With the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015, the urgency to develop an adequate quantity and quality of infrastructure grew, as this regional community would increase Indonesia’s trade opportunities within the region.

Aside from economic potential, the focus of GMF on infrastructure was also driven by a feeling of ‘social justice’. For Widodo and the architects of GMF, access to infrastructure and connectivity should be a right for all Indonesian people, as mandated by the constitution and Pancasila, the state philosophy foundation, under the pretext of the fifth principle of ‘social justice for all the people of Indonesia’ (Widodo & Kalla, 2014; Sutrisno, 2017; Warta Ekonomi, 2018). Insufficient infrastructure—or, more importantly, imbalanced infrastructure development among Indonesia’s regions—was seen by Widodo and his team as the failure of the country to provide social justice, as well as the “absence of the state” for some of its citizens (Widodo & Kalla, 2014). Against this backdrop, GMF’s architects would underscore the necessity for Indonesia to adopt a new development doctrine that could direct the country’s development policy to match its geographical environment and the philosophical foundation of the country.

All in all, dissatisfaction that Indonesia’s development model was not only Java-centric but also land-centric became one of the main domestic push factors for policy elites who aspired for policy change to reform the country’s model of development. Widodo and his team saw this model of development as the key factor behind the imbalance of (infrastructure) development among the regions of Indonesia that would eventually lead to increasing of economic disparity between them (Widodo & Kalla, 2014). Widodo and his team saw that an unbalanced model of development had not only resulted in an imbalance in the distribution of infrastructure within the country, but it also sacrificed the development of the country’s maritime space (Widodo & Kalla, 2014). For the architects of GMF, Indonesia’s maritime space was critical for the development of the country (Djumena, 2014; Sukma, 2014). This was not only because the waters constitute the majority elements of Indonesia’s territory but also because of the geostrategic location of the country at one of the centres of global sea trade and the future centre of gravity of regional dynamics (Djumena, 2014; Sukma, 2014).

V.2.b. ‘Weak State’ Mentality

Another domestic factor this study identifies for driving the emergence of GMF is the ‘weak state’ mentality. Before entering further into the discussion, and for the purpose of clarity, it would be best first to convey what this research means by this, especially within the context of the emergence of GMF. Still, as neither this chapter nor this research is dedicated to

examining the topic of weak state or attempting to define the term scholarly, there will not be an extensive elaboration of the topic.

In their campaign manifesto, Widodo's presidency campaign team clearly put 'We reject a weak state' (*Kami menolak negara lemah*) among the nine priority agendas (*nawa cita*) of Widodo and Kalla's campaign (Widodo & Kalla, 2014). Through this agenda, Widodo aimed to reinforce the country's legal system and the practice of law enforcement for multiple issues, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

A similar notion was emphasised in another agenda, which concerned 'bringing back the state to protect the whole nation—the people, the territory and the interests' (*menghadirkan kembali Negara untuk melindungi segenap bangsa*). Although there was no direct reference to the wording of 'weak state' (*negara lemah*) within this agenda, its content shared a very similar notion to that of the previous one: to reject a weak state. While the former agenda largely dealt with domestic law enforcement, the latter was concerned with the issues of foreign policy and defence through the act of protecting and securing the sovereignty of the state (Widodo & Kalla, 2014). This included securing the maritime domain, border and resources.

In one presidential debate, Widodo stated the necessity for Indonesia to have credibility (*kewibawaan*) before other nations (Al-Ayyubi, 2014). He asserted that one of the reasons why some countries often had tensions with Indonesia was because it did not have enough *wibawa*, and it was often perceived as a weak state (Al-Ayyubi, 2014). For this reason, Widodo suggested that the leadership of the country should begin building pride and prestige to prevent it from being underestimated and perceived as being a weak state (Al-Ayyubi, 2014).

Many will agree that the term 'weak state' is a contentious one. A simple examination of the *Google Scholar* search engine found 22,900 scholarly works with the term between 1900 and 2014, and more than half of these were published after 2001 (approximately 17,200 literature sources).⁹⁵ This finding demonstrates that the term gained salience following globalisation, and especially after the 9/11 attacks, when numerous governments and

⁹⁵ The search uses the term 'weak state' with the 'exact phrase' set to search 'anywhere in the article' and with the range of time set to '1900–2014'. Retrieved from https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%22weak+state%22&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&as_ylo=1900&as_yhi=2014.

international organisations began to classify and identify countries that started to lose their ability to perform core functions, or had already done so (The Brookings Institution, 2008).

Despite the term's widespread use, it still has no definitive definition. Nevertheless, one can still use the term and define it by putting the concept of 'weak state' in a spectrum along with other concepts such as 'strong state' and 'failed state'. In fact, these other terms are much easier to define, and there is more consensus about their meaning, as the absence of characteristics comprising either one of these terms is the definition of the other (Brooks, 2005). In a spectrum where a strong and a failed state are located on opposite poles, the weak state is hence located in between them. Nevertheless, its position certainly leans closer to the failed state than the strong one.

Within the realm of international relations, where the term originates and is often used, 'strong state' can be defined generally as a political entity that is not only required to meet the characteristics of a modern state, as suggested by both Weber (Roth & Wittich, 1978) and Buzan (1983), but, more importantly, is able to deliver most crucial political goods to its citizens, such as (human) security (Rotberg, 2003). On the contrary, failed state is the dark mirror image of a strong state, meaning that the state not only lacks Buzan's and the Weberian basic characteristics, but it is also unable to deliver the most basic political goods to its citizens (Brooks, 2005). Additionally, 'weak state' can thus be seen as a condition of state that sits between the other two types of state, whereby it may have some of the characteristics of a strong state, but it is still lacking the capacity to perform its function as well as a strong state would do so.

Within the context of Indonesia, 'weak state' is not only defined as lacking the capacity to deliver political goods to its people due to a lack or absence of competence (power) to coercively uphold its authority within its territory. The term is also understood as lacking the courage or firmness in taking the decisions required, as the word *lemah*, for the English word 'weak', is also translated that way.⁹⁶ In relation to the topic of this chapter (the emergence of GMF), weak state mentality is reflected within two issues: (1) the inability of the Indonesian government to protect its marine resources from illegal fishing and (2) the orientation of Indonesian foreign policy, as perceived by Widodo's team and especially the architects of

⁹⁶ Retrieved from <https://kbbi.web.id/lemah>.

GMF, as being too soft and sacrificing the country's interests when dealing with the issue of foreign incursion (Widodo & Kalla, 2014; Nainggolan, 2015).

V.2.b.1 The Problem of Territorial Incursions⁹⁷

One issue that often occurs within Indonesia's maritime domain and has served as a driving force for the emergence of GMF is the issue of foreign incursion. As most of the country's boundaries are located within its maritime domain, except for the borders with East Timor, Papua New Guinea and the eastern part of Malaysia, the issue of incursion is therefore heavily related to maritime security. While a majority, if not all, of the foreign vessels that have conducted illegal fishing activity entered Indonesia's territorial waters illegally, there have also been some incursions that were not for the purpose of illegal fishing. According to a government report, of the countries that have trespassed into Indonesia's maritime territory, Malaysia ranks as the most frequent violator (Laksmana, 2011).

Table 5.1. Malaysia's Maritime Incursions to Indonesia 2006–2009

Year	Total	Cases	Note.	Year	Total	Cases	Note.
2006	28	5	Warships	2008	39	18	Warships
		15	Marine Police vessels			4	Marine Police vessels
		2	Helicopters			6	Helicopters
		6	Naval aircrafts			11	Naval aircrafts
2007	94	41	Warships	2009	26	19	Warships
		22	Marine Police vessels			2	Marine Police vessels
		7	Helicopters			1	Helicopters
		19	Naval aircrafts			4	Naval aircrafts
		5	Others			–	Others

Table 5.1 shows the number of Malaysian maritime incursions (non-illegal fishing) into Indonesia's maritime territory between 2006 and 2009 (Laksmana, 2011: 105). According to this table, many of those in 2006 were conducted by Malaysia's marine police, but this changed over subsequent years due to more involvement by Malaysian warships. The increase in the number of incursions by Malaysian warships happened along with rising tensions that even led to military altercations between the Indonesian and Malaysian navies following Malaysia's claim over the Ambalat Bloc (Weiss, 2014).

Malaysia, following its victory in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over Sipadan and Ligitan from Indonesia in 2002, has established new maritime boundaries that have been strongly protested by Indonesia as the new baseline for maritime boundaries that were not

⁹⁷ For an elaboration on IUU Fishing, see the previous chapter.

included in the decision of the ICJ. Notwithstanding the Ambalat issue, analysts have blamed the increase of foreign intrusion into Indonesia's territorial waters on unclear or unfinished maritime border agreements with several neighbouring countries and Indonesia's underfed naval forces that were unable to effectively deter other ships while protecting their waters (Laksmana, 2011; Till & Chan, 2014; JakartaPost, 2017).

V.2.b.2. Zero Enemies, Thousands of Friends: Between the Country's Interests and Image

Under Yudhoyono, Indonesia had made efforts to address the issue of illegal fishing and foreign incursions into its territorial waters. Prominent among these efforts was the establishment of the Maritime Security Coordinating Board (*Bakorkamla*) in December 2005, which specifically works to secure Indonesia's maritime domain. While the new body was given a function more akin to a coast guard unit, it differed by not having its own personnel or vessels. Specifically, *Bakorkamla* is merely a coordinating body among government agencies and ministries whose core work is related to maritime affairs.

Another prominent effort was the modernisation of the Indonesian navy through the Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) scheme. Launched in 2008, this 20-year modernisation programme (2005–2024) set out to boost the quantity and quality of Indonesian military forces, and especially the performance of its naval and air forces (Ministry of Defence, 2008). The naval focus of the MEF is not only limited to augmenting and modernising armaments, but it also planned to increase the size of Indonesia's fleet by 2020 to cover military threats coming from the country's north, trouble areas related to its maritime borders and jurisdiction and maritime 'hot spots' or troubled territorial waters near its naval bases (Till & Chan, 2014).

The role of the navy as part of the effort to fight IUU fishing and protect Indonesia's maritime boundaries is vital not only because of its capacity in terms of personnel and equipment but also because Indonesia, especially during the tenure of Yudhoyono, did not have forces that specifically worked to patrol the seas, as a coast guard unit would do. For years, the function of patrolling and enforcing the law within its maritime space fell to different agencies and institutions, including the navy, police force, immigration and customs departments and the fisheries and transportation ministries, without any clear differentiation in their roles, limitation of functions or prescribed authorities. Even when *Bakorkamla* was

established in December 2005, the role of the navy remained vital, as much of the personnel assigned to the coordinating agency were from the navy.

Notwithstanding the efforts that had been made, Widodo and his team still criticised the way Yudhoyono's administration had addressed the issue of illegal fishing and trespassing, which they considered to be slow and not firm enough. For Widodo and the GMF architects, neither of Yudhoyono's *Bakorkamla* and MEF plans could meet expectations for protecting Indonesia's maritime space and the resources within it, as indicated in Figure 5.13 and Table 5.1. While *Bakorkamla* was prevented from performing its tasks effectively due to its unclear responsibilities and the overlapping authority, the MEF also failed to reach its expected result due to budget restrictions (Shekhar, 2018).

For Widodo and his advisors, as well as other analysts, Yudhoyono's 'zero enemies thousands [of] friends' doctrine was not seen as a symbol of goodwill within foreign affairs. Instead, it was considered more as a weakness, since it often prevented the country from taking firm action for the sake of maintaining its 'friendship' with other nations (Ihsanuddin, 2014a; 2014b). During the Ambalat crisis, Malaysia's action of sending warships into Indonesian waters sparked anger across Indonesia. A strong response not only came from the public in the form of massive demonstrations in front of the Malaysian embassy in Jakarta, it also came from the country's top officials, including the vice-president at the time, Jusuf Kalla, who threatened to wage war with Malaysia over the dispute (Liputan6, 2005; Fajar, 2009; Liow, 2015).

Numerous Indonesian parliamentarians also responded similarly, with some even joining the demonstration at the Malaysian embassy to condemn Malaysia's actions. They even considered its actions to be a sign of provocation that needed a firm response (Tempo, 2005; Kompas, 2009; DPR, 2019). Members of the Commission I, which works on foreign affairs and defence policy issues, among others, even published an official statement urging the government not to conduct any talks with Malaysia over Ambalat, claiming it undoubtedly belonged to Indonesia (DPR, 2009). While the public was expecting a firmer response towards Malaysia's incursions, Yudhoyono's administration eventually de-escalated the tension through diplomatic channels, and both countries agreed to refrain from taking action that could further escalate the situation. To date, there has still been no agreement between the two countries over the status of Ambalat.

Yudhoyono's 'peaceful' response to the Ambalat issue was observed as an indication of weakness, not only by his rivals but also by members of parliament, policy analysts and scholars such as Rizal Sukma. Sukma argued that Yudhoyono's 'soft' response on Ambalat was driven by his intention to maintain the unity of ASEAN (Acharya, 2015). Thus, Sukma questioned why, for the sake of ASEAN, Indonesia had to restrain itself towards a neighbour that did not even understand and respect Indonesia's core interest (Acharya, 2015). Sukma's concern and disagreement, if not disappointment, towards Indonesia's foreign policy approach did not stop at the case of Ambalat, but it also continued over other issues and reached a peak when he introduced to the country and its apparatus the idea of a new foreign policy direction, the 'post-ASEAN foreign policy' (Sukma, 2009).

Through this policy, Sukma suggested that Indonesia should no longer bind and limit itself to seeing ASEAN as the country's only foreign policy cornerstone. Instead, it should also start identifying other platforms that could be used for its diplomatic canvas, asserting the following (Sukma, 2009):

"Indonesia ... needs to begin formulating a post-ASEAN foreign policy. ASEAN should no longer be treated as the only cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy. For Indonesia, ASEAN should constitute only one of the available platforms through which we can attain and fulfil our national interests. Some of our foreign policy initiatives—such as the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), the G20 and strategic partnerships with global and regional major powers—have already shown signs toward that direction."

Sukma's disagreement over Indonesia's foreign policy orientation remained the same over some years, even until he joined Widodo's advisory team in 2014. For example, Sukma publicly stated during a conference in Washington D.C. in late 2015 that ASEAN was no longer 'the' but 'a' cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy (Poole, 2017), even when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, continued to state that ASEAN was 'the' cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy.

For Widodo and his team, Indonesia's hesitant behaviour to take fast and firm action against the illegal fishing and incursions that had been happening for years reflected weakness (*lemah*), or what he referred to as the 'degradation of state's authority' that can undermine the country's sovereignty (*kedaulatan*) and harm its credibility (*wibawa*) in the international sphere (Widodo & Kalla, 2014). In fact, 'degradation of the state's authority', defined as the inability to address issues and identify threats to sovereignty, was also among

the country's top three problems identified by Widodo in his campaign manifesto. For that specific reason, through GMF, Widodo aspired to the defeat a 'weak state' mentality and 'bring back the state' by reinforcing its authority and credibility across its territory by improving Indonesia's maritime governance and the performance of its naval forces (Widodo & Kalla, 2014; Maharani & Aritonang, 2014).

CHAPTER VI ELECTION AND THE MAKING OF GMF

This chapter examines the process behind the birth of GMF and its transformation as Indonesia's new grand strategy. To achieve the aim of this chapter of more precisely analysing the transformation of GMF, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section looks at the process of GMF emergence by focussing on the context and environment that surround the emergence of GMF, namely the 2014 Presidential Election. The moment of election is important to be examined as argued in the previous chapter that the emergence cannot be separated from Jokowi and his journey to the presidency through 2014 Presidential Election.

The second section of this chapter focuses on analysing the policymaking of GMF once Jokowi assumed his power as the new president. In this section, the research attempts to analyse the development of GMF from the early stage of agenda setting and discussion into its transformation as a grand strategy of Indonesia. The third and the last section is an elaboration on the link between policy entrepreneurs and the emergence of GMF. In this context the research aims to examine the role of these policy entrepreneurs in the emergence of GMF.

VI.1. The Birth of the Maritime Doctrine

VI.1.a. The 2014 Presidential Election: An Opportunity for A New Leadership, A New Trajectory

The birth of GMF cannot be separated from the political context of Indonesia in 2014, namely the change in government that took place through election. As emphasized in Chapter IV, the 2014 Presidential Election was special for a number of reasons. In this election, Indonesians were expected to elect their new leader for the next four years as, under the prevailing law, the incumbent President was no longer allowed to run for another term after already serving two consecutive terms.⁹⁸ 2014 has therefore provided a "window of opportunity", if not impetus, for a new (political) leadership to rise.

However, not only certain individuals had the opportunity to rise and assume power through election, new policy ideas and agendas had also the opportunity to rise and flourish

⁹⁸ The Amended 1945 Constitution Article 7, "The President and the Vice President hold office for five years and may subsequently be re-elected for the same office for only one term of office."

with arrival of the 2014 Presidential Election. While the continuation of a particular policy orientation may happen despite change in government, policy change is often prone to occur following a change in administration (Kingdon, 2014). Since policy is a product of the dynamics of elites within a regime (Allison & Halperin, 1972; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1990; Hart *et al.*, 1997; Hill, 2003; Kegley Jr., 2007; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010; Hudson, 2014), the change of a regime will most likely lead to the change of policy orientation (Kingdon, 2014). In this sense, individual members of each administration may possess differing views on the country's future priorities and trajectories, and the change of these individuals with other individuals from different group is likely to drive the change as these new individuals (from the new regime) may have different views on and understandings of the issues related to statecraft and surrounding issues such as foreign policy (Crichlow, 2002; Novotny, 2007 & 2010; Alden & Aran, 2017).⁹⁹

The 2014 Presidential Election was the third direct presidential election that Indonesia has experienced throughout its modern history. Under the country's amended constitution,¹⁰⁰ in the direct presidential election, Indonesians directly elect the presidential and vice-presidential candidate proposed and supported by a single or coalition of political parties instead of only voting for the political party that would later be given the responsibility to elect the President and Vice President on behalf of constituents.¹⁰¹ The first direct presidential election took place in 2004 and resulted in the victory of Yudhoyono over the incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri (the leader of Jokowi's party *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (PDIP) and the daughter of Sukarno), and another one in 2008 that resulted in the re-election of Yudhoyono for a second term (Kasuya, 2013).

Similar to the previous (direct) presidential election, the 2014 Presidential Election was also preceded by a series of legislative elections. (The 2014 legislative elections) These were held three months before the presidential election on April 9th 2014. Twelve political parties (plus three local parties in Aceh) contested seats in the national, regional, and

⁹⁹ See for example the seminal work of Sprout & Sprout (1956), and Jervis (1976) for the studies of FPA using the behavioralist approach. See also the work of Philip M. Burgess (1968) on the case studies of Norway.

¹⁰⁰ The Amended 1945 Constitution Article 6A, "The President and Vice-President shall be elected in one pair directly by the people".

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

municipal representative councils. PDIP, Golkar Party,¹⁰² and Gerindra Party¹⁰³ emerged as the three parties with the largest percentage of votes for the national legislative election in 2014, respectively 18.95% (109 seats), 14.75% (91 seats), and 11.81% (73 seats) (KPU, 2014). The result of the legislative election at the national level is important because it decides which party will be able to nominate its own presidential candidate. According to election law, only a party or a group of political parties with a minimum of 20% of seats in the national assembly or 25% of votes from the overall national votes is allowed to nominate a candidate for presidency¹⁰⁴.

Despite the confidence that PDIP had due to its rising popularity and electability shown from multiple surveys conducted throughout 2013 and early 2014, PDI-P still could not pass the threshold to nominate its own presidential candidate as its total vote in the national ballot only reached 18.95% (DetikNews, 2013a; Maharani, 2013; Rochmanuddin, 2013). Though the Jokowi coat-tail effect¹⁰⁵ may have contributed to the increase in PDIP's electability, particularly when compared to the previous election in 2009, the increase of this effect was not as predicted by survey institutes and PDIP elites (Arimbi, 2014; DetikNews, 2014a; DetikNews, 2014b; Fami, 2014; Mietzner, 2014a; Saragih, 2014; Tempo, 2014b). Apart from a number of external factors that can be attributed to why Jokowi's coat-tail effect failed to boost the electability of PDI-P, such as massive fake news or hoaxes and black campaigns against Jokowi, analysts have also identified internal factor that significantly decreased the effectiveness of Jokowi coat-tail effect (Firdaus, 2014).

While Jokowi had officially obtained support to run as presidential candidate for the PDIP from mid-March 2015, a number of analysts observed that Jokowi did not receive substantial attention and support from PDIP members, especially the party's hardliners, in their campaign for legislative election due to personal dislike and opposition for his nomination (Ihsanudin, 2014). These party hardliners still considered the descendants of Sukarno, Megawati, and Maharani, as the rightful presidential candidates from PDIP

¹⁰² Golkar Party or *Partai Golongan Karya* is one of the oldest political parties in Indonesia. From 1971 to 1999, Golkar Party was the ruling group under the late President Suharto and Habbie.

¹⁰³ Gerindra stands for *Gerakan Indonesia Raya* (Great Indonesia Movement) is a party founded by Prabowo Subianto, the current Defence Minister, as well as Jokowi's former rival in both 2014 and 2019 Presidential Election.

¹⁰⁴ See Law No 48/2008 about the Presidential and Vice-Presidential General Election Article 9, and later replaced by Law No 7/2017 about General Election Article 222.

¹⁰⁵ A strategy uses by political party leader to attract votes for their party using the popularity of others. In this context, PDIP nominated Jokowi as its own Presidential Candidate to attract and boost votes.

(Ihsanudin, 2014). As a result, Jokowi's promotion to the public were much less significant compared to the promotion of Megawati, particularly Puan Maharani (Burhani, 2014; Mietzner, 2014a; Tempo, 2014b).¹⁰⁶ With the election outcome significantly below the expected results (above 20%), PDI-P did not have a choice but to form a coalition with other parties.

This research argues that the failure of PDIP to obtain at least 20% of the parliamentary seats provided the opportunity for the emergence of GMF in two ways. First, PDIP could not nominate both candidates, the President and Vice-president, from its own party. In this sense, the inability of the PDIP to pass the presidential threshold had closed the opportunity for Megawati and Puan Maharani to run for President or Vice-president. Prior to the 2014 legislative election, there had been voices within the PDIP to pair Jokowi with either Puan Maharani or Megawati herself¹⁰⁷ as the presidential and vice-presidential candidates from the PDIP (Tempo, 2013; Tempo, 2014a; Alhamid & Perdana, 2018). With the absence of both Megawati and Puan from the candidacy of President and Vice-president in the 2014 presidential election, Jokowi became less constrained by PDIP's, and more importantly, Megawati's grip, and had more room to manoeuvre, particularly in relation to freedom to formulate his campaign programs and manifesto (Tempo, 2014c; McRae & Robet, 2020).

Second, the increase influence of Jokowi's advisory team, known as the Team of 11 (eleven) or Team *Guyub*.¹⁰⁸ This team, in general, was responsible for providing Jokowi with input regarding multiple issues from campaign strategies to policy ideas, and preparing his campaign materials for presidential debates and campaigns. Despite its name, the Team of 11 consisted of more than just 11 individuals, the majority of whom came from non-partisan at several prominent universities and think-tank organizations across the country (Tempo, 2014c; 2014d; 2014f; DetikNews, 2015; Alhamid & Perdana, 2018; McRae & Robet, 2020).

The Team of 11 was founded in early 2013, a year before the general election in 2014, and was originally oriented [meant] to draft PDIP's campaign strategy, and to assist Megawati's nomination (Teresia, 2014; Mietzner, 2014a; Connelly, 2015; Mietzner, 2015;

¹⁰⁶ Due to this fact, majority of Jokowi's supporters would mostly come from non-partisan voluntarily groups, see for example Hurriyah (2009).

¹⁰⁷ In this scenario, Jokowi would be serving as Megawati's vice-presidential candidate.

¹⁰⁸ *Guyub* means friendly. It signifies that even though the Team of 11 was disbanded following Jokowi's nomination by PDIP in March 2014, members of this team remained friends one to each other (Tempo, 2014c). The Team of 11 was then absorbed into Jokowi's larger campaign team. However, the general public and some media continued to refer to Jokowi's inner circle or this team of advisors as the Team of 11.

Alhamid & Perdana, 2018). The Team of 11 eventually became the advisory council for Jokowi when he obtained the ticket from PDIP to run as a presidential candidate due to his rising ratings in almost every pre-election poll and survey since mid-2013 (DetikNews, 2013b; Firdaus, 2013; Tempo, 2013; Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014). According to several sources, the Team of 11 was among the few who firstly promoted Jokowi and vividly sought Megawati's endorsement for Jokowi's nomination from the PDIP due to his increasing electability (Tempo, 2014a; Mietzner, 2015; Alhamid & Perdana, 2018). However, despite Megawati's endorsement of Team 11's proposal to nominate Jokowi, Megawati sought to remain in as much control as possible of Jokowi's candidacy and left little room for the team to make important decisions related to Jokowi's presidential campaign until the legislative election in early April 2014 (Mietzner, 2015).

The failure of the PDIP to obtain 25% of the national votes and the small gap of votes between PDIP and its rivals Gerindra and Golkar had lowered its confidence in being able to participate in the presidential election with its own candidates (Mietzner, 2015). As Megawati was worried that her party would not be able to perform well in the upcoming election or optimize Jokowi's rising popularity, she began to release her grip over Jokowi candidacy and rely upon the inputs given from her (external) advisors who were also part of Jokowi's team. This eventually had led to the increase of influence of the Team-11 over Jokowi until his election on July 2014 (Tempo, 2014b; 2014c; Alhamid & Perdana, 2018).

Overall, the withdrawal of Megawati and other PDIP elites from the 2014 Presidential contestation, due to the inability of the party to amass votes and reach targets, gave both Jokowi and his expert advisors the freedom to devise Jokowi's campaign strategy as well as the opportunity to explore various ideas and issues of policy future agendas that Jokowi would bring in his campaign with fewer intervention, if not at all, from Megawati and her own party (McRae & Robet, 2020). Against this background, the research argues that, apart from examining the political context of the emergence of GMF, it is also necessary to examine the actors that were involved within this process. The following section discusses the actors involved in the formulation of GMF as a campaign agenda during the 2014 presidential election, beginning with a brief description on the background of these actors.

VI.1.b. Jokowi's Advisory Team: The "Brain" Behind GMF

Aside from the 2014 general election, the emergence of GMF cannot be separated from the role of numerous individuals within Jokowi's advisory circle. The members of this team, among others, are the late Cornelis Lay—a professor of government studies from the Gajah Mada University (UGM)—, Ari Dwipayana —lecturer and scholar of political science from the UGM, Andi Widjajanto —a Defence and International Relations analyst, a senior lecturer of International Relations at the University of Indonesia (UI) and the son of a former general and PDIP grandee, the late Theo Syafei—, Jaleswari Pramodhawardani—senior researcher of Gender Studies and Military Reformation from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)—, Hariadi—political observer and senior lecturer of Airlangga University—, Muradi—a professor of Political Science and security studies of Padjajaran University (UNPAD)—, Alexandra Retno Wulan—military observer and senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta—, Edy Prasetyono—Defence Expert and a senior lecturer at the Department of International Relations at the UI—, Romanus Sumaryo—Communication and Marketing Consultant—, Makmur Keliat—senior researcher and lecturer of International Relations at the UI—, Teten Masduki—senior and prominent activist of anti-corruption—, Rizal Sukma—a leading international relations and Foreign Policy scholar and the former executive director of CSIS—, Andreas Hugo Pareira—a senior lecturer of International Relations at the Parahyangan Catholic University and a current member of the Indonesian Parliament—, Hasto Kristiyanto—Secretary General of PDIP—, and Prananda Wibowo—PDIP cadre and the son of Megawati— (Tempo, 2014f; Teresia, 2014).

While the function of this team was to supply Jokowi with campaign strategies and materials, not all of the members of Jokowi's team of advisors were responsible for the birth of GMF, though they might have witnessed or participated in the discussions preceding the emergence of the doctrine. Jokowi's advisory or expert team consisted of individuals from various background of expertise, and their work was mostly limited to the respective issue on which they were expert (Dewi & Aritonang, 2014; Weatherbee, 2016). However, as Makmur Keliat states that the majority, if not all, of Jokowi's advisors agreed to put the country's maritime sphere at the frontline of Jokowi's campaign theme and agenda as the maritime topic also encompasses a range of (different) issues that also fall under the expertise of each member (Interview with Keliat, 2021).

When asked about his role within GMF formulation, Andi Widjajanto, a former cabinet secretary during Jokowi's first term, refused to be considered among the architects of the doctrine (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021), instead describing himself as only a coordinator in Jokowi's advisory team whose role was limited to coordinating and facilitating the discussion between the members of the team and Jokowi (Interview with Widjajanto, January 2021). Widjajanto then mentioned three names of his colleagues within the advisory team, namely Makmur Keliat, Andreas Hugo Pareira, and Rizal Sukma, whom he believed had played a pivotal role in conceptualising the doctrine from its early stage (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021). Widjajanto even described Sukma as the individual who proposed the term "fulcrum" to be included or attached into the grand strategy's name (Weatherbee, 2017; Interview with Widjajanto, 2021). According to Tempo magazine, Indonesia's main investigative media outlet, to make the team work effectively, members (of Jokowi's advisory team) divided themselves and created a smaller group or caucus based on multiple areas, such as economy, politics, culture, defence, and foreign policy (Tempo, 2014d). Due to the number of issues surpassing the number of Jokowi's advisors, each member of the advisory team usually got more than just one area of work, such as Sukma, Keliat, and Pareira who were not only responsible for foreign policy but also other issues (Connelly, 2015).

Widjajanto may identify himself merely as the facilitator or coordinator of the team, but he was certainly not an outsider to the development of GMF. Throughout the presidential campaign, Widjajanto, along with another prominent figure within Jokowi's advisory team, Teten Masduki, were tasked to accompany Jokowi on almost every occasion and meeting that Jokowi had to attend through the presidential campaign (Tempo, 2014d). Widjajanto's position within the inner circle of Jokowi continued even after the presidential election. Following Jokowi's election, Widjajanto was appointed as one of the deputies within Jokowi's transition team whose primary work was to smooth the (government) transition from Yudhoyono to Jokowi and to assist the new elected President and Vice-President in designing the model of the new cabinet (Siregar, 2014; Tempo, 2014f; McRae & Robet, 2020). After Jokowi's inauguration in October 2014, Widjajanto joined Jokowi's first cabinet and was appointed as the Cabinet Secretary (Sa'diyah 2014; Saragih & Parlina, 2014; McRae & Robet, 2020), whose main duties were to formulate and prepare the analysis of government policy plans and programs in the fields of politics, law, security, economy, human development,

culture, and maritime affairs, as well as to guide and ensure that ministers' programmes were in line with the President's and Vice-President's visions (Siregar, 2014).¹⁰⁹

In comparison with other members of the Team of 11, Widjajanto was among the few individuals who obtained a ministerial-level position within Jokowi's advisory team. Widjajanto's continuing role at the centre of Jokowi's team is unsurprising. His status as a son of a retired army general and a son of a PDIP's grandee, contributed to his rising career in the national political theatre (Sukoyo, 2014; Connelly, 2015; McRae & Robet, 2020). Mietzner, a democracy analyst and Indonesian observer from the Australian National University (ANU), refers to Widjajanto as one of the individuals responsible for Jokowi's victory in the 2014 Presidential Election as much of Jokowi's campaign materials, including speeches, were drafted by Widjajanto himself (Rinaldo, 2014).¹¹⁰ Similarly, some of the Indonesian media has even called Widjajanto "the man behind Jokowi" to refer to his activism and vigorous involvement in the presidential campaign (Rinaldo, 2014; Sukoyo, 2014). With this kind of role and position, it is difficult to argue that Widjajanto was not present in the development of GMF, even from its early stage.

Another prominent scholar within Jokowi's (expert or advisory) team was Makmur Keliat. Keliat is an active scholar and lecturer at the Department of International Relations at the University of Indonesia (UI). Throughout his academic career, aside from teaching, Keliat has also published widely, ranging on subjects from ASEAN, intelligence, to maritime security.¹¹¹ Similarly, Rizal Sukma, one of Indonesia's prominent scholars in International Relations, who obtained his doctoral degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science, has also produced a body of scholarly work, which is not only limited to International Relations but also Indonesian Politics, Islam, and security studies.¹¹² Sukma's role throughout Jokowi's presidential campaign was indisputably important as he also became one of Jokowi's mentors for international politics and foreign policy (Santika, 2014). Aside from sharing similar expertise, both Sukma and Keliat were also known for their sharp critiques on the orientation and trajectories of Yudhoyono's Indonesia, including as concerns

¹⁰⁹ See *Peraturan Presiden No. 25 Tahun 2015 tentang Sekretariat Kabinet* (Presidential Regulation No.25/2015 on the Cabinet Secretary).

¹¹⁰ Within the structure of Jokowi's national campaign team, Andi Widjajanto was included within the BAPPILU (*Badan Pemenangan Pemilu Presiden*) or the *Presidential Election Winning Agency* headed by Puan Maharani.

¹¹¹ See for example Catley & Keliat (1997); Podcast of Keliat (2016) on "Talking Indonesia: The South China Sea", retrieved from <https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/talking-indonesia-south-china-sea/>.

¹¹² See for example Sukma (2003; 2004).

the practice of the country's foreign policy (Neary, 2014a).¹¹³ With this expertise and perspective on Indonesia's foreign policy practice, a perspective that sees the necessity for a change in the country's trajectories, including in its foreign policy practice, both Sukma and Keliat were not only pivotal for Jokowi, a presidential candidate unfamiliar with foreign policy and international politics, but also ideal for the candidate's vision to bring changes to the country's governance.

Unlike the other three figures, Pareira falls under the category of half scholar and half politician. Although Pareira has an academic background, and to a lesser extent, is/was an expert staff at the Commission I of Indonesia's Parliament (DPR), much of his career was spent in politics, especially as a PDIP cadre. With his expertise in International Relation and Foreign Policy, Pareira chaired the PDIP's Office for International Relations, Defence, and Foreign Policy from 2010 to 2015, and in the 2014 general election he obtained a seat in the Parliament and was re-elected for another term in the 2019 election. Equipped with the expertise and experience on the issues of international relations and foreign policy as well as his connection to PDIP, Andreas was also then included to consolidate Jokowi's team of experts for the 2014 Presidential Election.

Unlike Widjajanto and Pareira,¹¹⁴ who were responsible for both developing Jokowi's campaign programmes and strategy, much of the work conducted by Keliat and Sukma during Jokowi's presidential campaign was primarily focused on issue-based consultancy. In this sense, both figures were mainly responsible for familiarising the presidential candidate with the issues of foreign policy and international politics, particularly during the early phase of Jokowi's candidacy or before the presidential campaign begun (Tempo, 2014e). After the legislative election, which preceded the presidential election, many other individuals joined Jokowi's advisory team and worked closely with both Sukma and Keliat in conceptualising and drafting Jokowi's programme plans in the field of defence and foreign policy.

During the early phase of Jokowi's rise as a candidate, much of the effort to introduce foreign policy and international politics to Jokowi took place through small talks and short

¹¹³ See for example Sukma (2009); Keliat *et.al.* (2014).

¹¹⁴ Since Andreas Hugo Pareira was also a PDIP cadre as well as a contestant for the 2014's legislative election, he spent much of his time campaigning for PDIP and himself in his constituency in the island of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) throughout the legislative election period or prior the commencement of the 2014 Presidential Election period.

briefings, often being conducted on Friday evenings¹¹⁵ so as not to disturb Jokowi's during his daily routine as the then Governor of Jakarta (Tempo, 2014d). When Jokowi officially entered the race for the presidential election, briefings and mentoring about foreign policy issues became even more intensive and mobile, sometimes being conducted inside of a car during a short trip from one point to another (Tempo, 2014d).

After the presidential election, Pareira served as a member of the Commission I of Indonesian Parliament whose work included issues of defence and foreign policy. Meanwhile, Widjajanto was tasked with assisting the transition from Yudhoyono to Jokowi before being appointed as the Cabinet Secretary in Jokowi's cabinet. Similarly, Keliat was also appointed within the Transition Team and as a Special Staff for the Cabinet Secretary after the establishment of Jokowi's first cabinet, along with Jaleswari Pramodhawardani and Alexander Lay (Dariyanto, 2015). However, unlike Widjajanto and Keliat, Sukma was neither included within the transition team nor appointed at any position within Jokowi's cabinet. Indeed, Sukma remained outside of the palace after the inauguration, though he continued to be Jokowi's closest foreign policy aide, providing the President with foreign policy speeches and interventions at various major international summits (Connelly, 2015). Sukma was later appointed as Indonesia's Ambassador to the United Kingdom (UK), Ireland, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) a year later.

VI.1.c. The Presidential Debate and the Birth of Jokowi's Maritime Vision

From the interview conducted with the former members of Jokowi's advisory team, the study identified a link between the emergence of GMF with the Third Presidential Debate¹¹⁶ on foreign policy, national security, and defence that took place on 22nd June 2014. For Keliat, GMF should be understood from two different points of view (Interview with Keliat,

¹¹⁵ Jokowi and his advisor used to meet around 9 PM to discuss and brief the presidential candidate with multiple issues that the candidate had to know for campaign purposes.

¹¹⁶ Presidential Debate is a part of official event during the campaign period (1 month, June to July) organized by the Indonesia's Election Commission (KPU) aims to introduce the programs and agendas of the candidates in multiple sectors. There are five debates that were organized separately (every weekend) throughout the campaign period, each with specific topic and candidate. In the case of 2014 Presidential Election, the list of the debate are: 1st Debate on Democracy Building, Clean Government, and Law Enforcement, and attended by both the competing Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates; 2nd Debate on Economic Development and Social Welfare attended only by the competing presidential candidates; 3rd Debate on Foreign Policy, National Security, and Defence attended only by the competing presidential candidates; 4th Debate on Human Resources and Technology Development attended only by the competing vice-presidential candidate; 5th Debate on Food, Energy, and Environment attended by both the competing presidential and vice-presidential candidates.

2021). Firstly, GMF should be understood as a scholarly doctrine. In this sense, GMF is considered a product of academic thought that reflects Indonesia's needs and long-term aspirations to have an overarching development doctrine, as well as one that could guide the country on how to behave internationally based on the country's geographical contours and characteristics.

The second point of view considers GMF a product that emerged from an electoral competition. Though GMF can be considered a fruit of Indonesia's academic-technocratic invention, the doctrine should not be solely seen from an idealistic and scholarly point of view. Keliat, instead, argues that the examination of the emergence of GMF should be conducted without isolating the phenomenon or disconnecting it from the reality adhering to the birth of the doctrine, namely the domestic context in form of presidential debate (Interview with Keliat, 2021). In this context, he suggests seeing GMF emergence from a more realistic or pragmatic perspective, as an instrument for of electoral gain.

Keliat acknowledges the link between the presidential debate and the birth of GMF, asserting that the introduction of the doctrine during the third presidential debate was also aimed to gather and attract wider electoral support, and Jokowi's advisory team was intentionally looking for (foreign policy) agendas or issues that would garner public attention and gain electoral spotlight (Interview with Keliat, 2021). Alongside Keliat, Widjanto makes the same claim, arguing that Jokowi himself specifically asked his advisory team to formulate a new foreign policy doctrine that he could introduce during presidential debate (Interview with Widjanto, 2021). Pareira offers a similar argument as he was also a member of the team that was tasked to conceptualize Jokowi's foreign policy programmes for the third presidential debate.

Pareira underlines the connection between the birth of the doctrine and the 2014 presidential election as the backdrop for the doctrine's emergence and asserts that GMF was born from a discussion oriented to determine the issues that the presidential candidate should bring up and present during the third presidential debate on defence and foreign policy (Interview with Pareira, 2021). Pareira further also argues that the emergence of the maritime-based doctrine cannot be separated from the reality of Indonesia (Interview with Pareira, 2021). In this sense, Pareira contends that, though Indonesia has, in reality, a strategic geopolitical position, even acknowledged internationally through several international laws such as the UNCLOS, the country had never had any grand doctrine that represents its identity

as an archipelagic country and serves as primary guidance for the country's development strategy and trajectories (Interview with Pareira, 2021).

Similar to Yudhoyono's "zero enemy, thousand friends" (foreign policy) doctrine, the purpose of formulating a new grandiose strategy, as in the case of GMF, was also intended to increase Jokowi's exposure to foreign policy and its community (Interview with Widjanto, 2021). The effort to associate Jokowi with a grandiose strategy was logical because he did not come to the presidency with a very strong understanding of either foreign policy or international politics. Therefore, the effort to associate Jokowi with a grandiose and sophisticated strategy was important in the contestation for presidency in Indonesia.

Though foreign policy issues are not the primary issue that determined victory in Indonesia's presidential election, a presidential candidate in Indonesia is expected to have at least a decent understanding and knowledge of the practices of foreign policy and international politics. As foreign policy has been mostly considered by the general population in Indonesia as an issue of the elites (Aldrich et al., 1989; Wibisono, 2009),¹¹⁷ more importantly representing the education level of an individual, the possession of a decent level of knowledge on foreign policy and international politics is also expected from individuals who intend to lead the country.¹¹⁸

Jokowi's introduction of GMF to the broad audience during the third presidential debate was surprising. Despite Jokowi emphasizing maritime themes from the beginning of his campaign, reflected by the use of the word "maritime" in Jokowi's campaign manifesto (which was known as Jokowi's Vision and Mission manifesto), the term GMF did not appear either in Jokowi's campaign manifesto or in any of Jokowi's campaign materials (Widodo & Kalla, 2014; Sambhi, 2015). Therefore, the third presidential debate became the first moment at which Jokowi brought GMF to the general audience.

Tempo magazine reported that a day before the third presidential debate, Jokowi gathered his advisory team in the Gadok-Puncak area of West Java Province (Tempo, 2014d). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the preparation for the then upcoming third presidential debate taking place on Sunday 22nd June 2014. Widjanto recounts the

¹¹⁷ Issues that are considered as more earthly and related to the general public food commodities prices, jobs creation, subsidy, cheap housing, wage increase, free health coverage and education.

¹¹⁸ Javanese culture also plays important role in shaping the criteria of the country's leader, that should not only be benevolent but also has credibility, and knowledge.

participants who attended the meeting in Gadok, a list not limited to those whose expertise related to the issues that became the main theme of the third presidential debate (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021). They were Sukma, Keliat, Pareira, Widjajanto himself, and other advisory members from different field of expertise, such as Teten Masduki, Ari Diwipayana, Muradi, and Jaleswari Pramuwardhani. Focusing on the topic of foreign policy, defence, and national security, the third presidential debate served as an opportunity for each presidential candidate to introduce their respective foreign and defence policy programmes to the public. In addition, the debate was intentionally oriented to ascertain the feasibility and applicability of each candidate's proposed foreign and defence policy programmes and to test each candidate's general understanding and knowledge of aforementioned topics through an exchange of questions and remarks between presidential candidates.

During the meeting at Gadok, Jokowi asked his advisory team to formulate a new foreign policy doctrine that could be presented during the third presidential debate equivalent to the renowned 1957 Djuanda Declaration, the Archipelagic State Doctrine, as well as Yudhoyono's "zero enemy, thousand friends" doctrine. Jokowi clearly told his (policy) advisors that in the debate he did not want to present a limited issue-based and very technical solution and approach to the country's practice of diplomacy and foreign policy, like in the issue of the Asian-African cooperation, Palestine, and Islam in global affairs. Instead, Jokowi wanted to use the presidential debate as an opportunity to introduce a new overarching doctrine, a grand design of statecraft, that would not only reflect the country's geographical characteristics, namely as an archipelagic country, but also strengthen the country's "free and active" foreign policy, as well as serving as guidance for the country's development trajectories (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021).

Jokowi and his advisory team returned to Jakarta in the late afternoon on the same day he held the meeting in Gadok and stayed in a hotel in Menteng, Jakarta for another meeting to prepare for the third presidential debate (Tempo, 2014d). According to Widjajanto, shortly after the meeting in Gadok, the result of Gadok's meeting was followed up and discussed by another special team consisting of himself, Keliat, Sukma, and Sukardi Dinakin, whose responsibilities were mainly to brief Jokowi and draft his debate materials (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021). From the internal discussion, the team anonymously agreed and decided to explicitly use the term "Global Maritime Axis" in Jokowi's speech text for the third presidential debate. However, following the short discussion during a breakfast

session, the special team eventually dropped and replaced the word “Axis” with “fulcrum” based on the input from Sukma (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021).¹¹⁹

Similar to Keliat’s argument, Widjajanto also admits to the electoral factors behind the emergence of GMF by stating that the introduction of GMF during the third presidential debate was first driven by the intention to create a political soundbite expected to enhance Jokowi’s electability (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021). During the third presidential debate, Jokowi mentioned the term GMF approximately three times. Jokowi argued that, because the future dynamics and most acute contest for power would move to and take place in the region of Asia-Pacific, it is important for Indonesia, as an archipelagic country, to optimize its role as a maritime state by developing entirely its maritime domain. However, due to time limitations in the duration of the debate, Jokowi neither elaborated further on the details of the new doctrine during the third presidential debate nor during his presidential campaign. As a consequence, the details of GMF remained shrouded in mystery for many months until its revelation when Jokowi attended his first international summit as the newly elected President of Indonesia in November 2014.

The lack of detail on GMF when it was first presented to the electorate, in general, supports the argument that the introduction of GMF was among others motivated by the intention to gain electoral support not only because of the limited time Jokowi had during the third presidential debate that refrained him from elucidating further the detail of his foreign policy doctrine¹²⁰, but also because Jokowi’s advisory team did not have the details of the doctrine by the time of the third presidential debate. The absence of GMF’s detailed elaboration was not a strange phenomenon as Jokowi’s advisory team also had to draft, prepare, and brief Jokowi with other strategic issues besides foreign policy in a limited time. Jokowi’s personal profile, wherein the (presidential) candidate did not come from the ruling elites or have a (professional) background and significant experience on high politics or strategic issues like defence and foreign policy, may also have contributed to the limited time

¹¹⁹ In Indonesian language both the word Axis and Fulcrum share the same translation namely *Poros*. However, since the term was also aimed to capture international audience, the special team agreed to use the word Fulcrum for official use instead of Axis as this word contains negative connotation referring to the Axis of Powers of the World War II.

¹²⁰ The study in this part refers GMF as a doctrine because GMF had not been officially adopted as Jokowi had not yet been elected and inaugurated as the President. As discussed in the introduction Chapter on the conceptualization of grand strategy, Silove (2018) defines grand strategy, among others, as grand doctrine. In this definition, grand strategy is not seen as a detailed grand-plan, instead as guiding-framework or basic strategic view based on shared principles, values, or norms existed in the state.

and chance for Jokowi's advisory team to thoroughly draft, conceptualise, and brief Jokowi in advance on a particular policy agenda or programme. Widjajanto recounts that, in briefing Jokowi regarding foreign policy and discussing his aspirations for the country's foreign policy Sukma had to use any available opportunities, including when accompanying Jokowi from one place to another inside of his vehicle (Tempo, 2014d; Interview with Widjajanto, 2021).

Widjajanto points to the example about Jokowi's idea of Indonesia having a *tol laut* (sea highway or sea toll)¹²¹ to support his statement that GMF before Jokowi's election was not thoroughly defined and elaborated on. According to Widjajanto, the idea of a "sea highway/toll" came into being in a separate discussion from that of GMF although when Jokowi introduced the details of his maritime doctrine at the ninth East Asia Summit in November 2014, the "sea highway" agenda became an integral part of GMF doctrine. Similar to GMF, the discussion of other topics, like the "sea highway", was also mainly oriented to boost Jokowi's performance and electability by creating another "soundbite" in other presidential debates with different topics (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021).

When being asked about whether there were other ideas or themes, aside from GMF, that emerged during the early discussion and formulation of Jokowi's (presidential) campaign theme and narrative, Widjajanto states that since Jokowi from the beginning wanted to have a particular doctrine reflecting the country's identity as his presidential campaign's main narrative, other themes or narratives were eliminated from the discussion (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021). Similarly, Keliat's statement also supports Widjajanto's claims that Jokowi's request and decision to choose a program reflecting the country's identity as his flagship programme eventually limited and dismissed the existing competing ideas that emerged during the early phases of his presidential campaign, such as a unified national database. For Keliat, therefore, GMF was one of the main ideas distilled from an array of intellectual discourses that were produced by Keliat and other members of the advisory team (Interview with Keliat, 2021).

Pareira confirms the argument from both Widjajanto and Keliat. Pareira recounts that several topics emerged during the discussion to decide which foreign policy issues should be

¹²¹ Sea Highway is an infrastructure project that aims not only to augment inter-island connectivity, but also to reduce the disparity of commodities prices between the more developed western part of Indonesia and its struggling eastern counterpart by increasing the number of transport ships and their frequency of voyage, and by improving and building new ports

presented for the third presidential debate, but all of team members shared the idea that Jokowi had to present a doctrine that reflected the country's geographical identity. In terms of the naming of the maritime-based doctrine, Pareira states that he also proposed names for the doctrine that Jokowi would present in the debate, though the team later decided to call it GMF (Interview with Pareira, 2021).

Notwithstanding the lack of detail, the introduction of GMF had underlined the country's maritime ambition, increased national debates on issues such as maritime affairs, maritime diplomacy, maritime security and defence, and had also raised regional attention on the country's future foreign policy trajectories (Shekhar, 2018).¹²² While the detail was not revealed for the reason discussed previously, GMF to be embraced by Jokowi on two separate occasions. First, in his speech following the official announcement from Indonesia's General Elections Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum* or KPU) that confirmed Jokowi and his running mate Jusuf Kalla as the new elected President and Vice-president in July 2014. Second, during his inauguration as the new President in October 2014. Widjanto contends that following Jokowi's victory in the 2014 presidential election, the composition of Jokowi's advisory or policy team, responsible to design further Jokowi's policy agendas and programmes post the election including in developing GMF, had also changed, as more and more people begun to be involved within this circle (Interview with Widjanto, 2021).

VI.2. Jokowi's Election and GMF Transformation

VI.2.a. Winning the Election: A New Path Towards GMF

On 22nd July 2014, KPU Chairman Husni Kamil Malik announced the official final vote tally and declared Jokowi and his running mate Jusuf Kalla as the President-elect and Vice President elect of the 2014 presidential election (JakartaPost, 2014a; BBCNews, 2014a). According to the official final count, Prabowo obtained approximately 62 millions of votes or 46.8%, whereas Jokowi obtained approximately 70 million votes or 53% of total ballots, surpassing his rival by approximately 8 million votes (BBCNews, 2014b). Following the victory announcement, along with Jusuf Kalla, Jokowi delivered a victory speech on a *Phinisi*-rigged ship, a ship that was mostly used by local traders and often symbolized the maritime culture

¹²² Multiple commentaries had emerged following the introduction of the GMF into a wider audience, both domestic and internationally. See for example commentary from Jamaludin Jompa "Jokowi-JK Brings New Hope for Maritime Awakening", Antara News, August 20th 2014.

and life of the country. While much of the content of Jokowi's speech was oriented to thank and appreciate the hard work of his team and Jokowi's wider team of volunteers, the speech was also staged to re-affirm Jokowi's commitment to the development of Indonesia's maritime aspect as Jokowi explicitly mentioned GMF in his victory speech (Kompas, 2014a Malau, 2014; Polycarpus, 2014).¹²³

Another speech that re-affirms Jokowi's commitment to maritime development was his speech during his inauguration on October 20th 2014. Though Jokowi's speech did not explicitly mention the maritime doctrine, Jokowi expressed his intention to "restore" Indonesia as a maritime country. While it is not the focus of this research to scrutinise and analyse Jokowi's speech semantically, it is still important to look at the content of the speech as to identify the GMF's elements within it. Through his speech, Jokowi explicitly emphasises the importance of the country's maritime features by clearly stating it as the future of the country, and he also openly criticises Indonesia's behaviour for having forsaken its sea and other maritime features (Seskab, 2014a). Jokowi also used languages and cultural symbols connected to the maritime culture in the archipelago, such as citing a Sanskrit phrase (which also serves as Indonesia's Navy motto) *Jalesveva Jayamahe*, which is translated as "in the sea we triumph", underlining the importance to capture the spirit of *Chakarawati Samudera* (a spirit of strong and brave sailor) and closing his speech by referring to himself as the captain of the ship Republic of Indonesia and invited his comrades to sail with him (Seskab, 2014a).

Widjajanto argues that, although the drafting of both speeches involved different individuals beyond those who designed the doctrine in the first place (TribuneNews, 2014; Auliani, 2014; DetikNews, 2014d), the victory and the inauguration speech were still integral in the evolution of GMF as they provided further elaboration on the doctrine. However, compared to the version presented by President Jokowi at the East Asian Summit (EAS) in November 2014, both aforementioned speeches were still much lacking in details. Widjajanto's statement on the architects of Jokowi's speeches in the post-election signifies that GMF, which was once a topic of a small group of people, had become the topic a much broader audience once Jokowi had been named as the winner of the 2014 presidential

¹²³ According to the organizer team, Jokowi personally chose to deliver his victory speech specifically on the deck of the *Phinisi*-rigged ship as to symbolically show his commitment to develop Indonesia's maritime dimension and attain his maritime vision.

election and secured his presidency.¹²⁴ In the study of policy making, the expansion of a group responsible for developing a particular policy agenda, which involves adding more members into it, often resulted to the increase of (group) dynamics as the new individuals would often carry different perspectives, and at some points, even bring different interests in developing the policy agenda (Hart *et.al*, 1997; Hagan, 2001; Hudson, 2014; Kingdon, 2014).

In the case of GMF's development, the announcement of Jokowi as the new President-elect had also resulted to the change in the composition of the team responsible for developing further GMF and transforming it into a more detailed and applicable concept. The expansion of the policy circle was not only marked by the increase of its members, but also characterised by the replacement of the "old" members, i.e. those individuals who first designed the doctrine, by new individuals making up members of the circle. While GMF was not fully developed yet as a practical grand strategy when Jokowi was named President-elect by the KPU until his inauguration, effort had been made by Jokowi's (transition) team to not only fasten and smoothen the government transition, but also to conduct several adjustments to the structure of the government in order to support the new administration to execute and implement the promised policies and programs, including the GMF. One prominent effort was the establishment of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs, which later was renamed as the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs, which was considered by Jokowi's transition team as pivotal in the realisation of the GMF (Ina, 2014, DetikNews, 2014e).

Notwithstanding this effort, in terms of further conceptual development, little progress was achieved of bringing GMF into the later phase of policy process, namely the conceptualization and articulation of GMF. One particular reason that may have caused the slowdown in the development of GMF was the overwhelming focus given to the political transitional process. Following his election, Jokowi and his team had to focus on designing the cabinet architecture of his future administration that was not only aimed to attain idealistic goals of being able to effectively execute his policy agendas and programs, but also intended, at least, to meet the expectations of his alliance.

¹²⁴ "Secured his presidency" refers to the phase when the Constitutional Court rejected Prabowo's claims over fraud election.

Despite Jokowi's repeated claims that he explicitly rejected "power sharing" or "horse trading politics"¹²⁵ among the parties within his coalition (JakartaPost, 2014b; Kuwado, 2014), *realpolitik* was still unavoidable, particularly once Jokowi had assumed his presidency (Muhtadi, 2015). The fact that Jokowi's coalition was not able to secure power at the Parliament, the DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* or People's Representative Council), as Prabowo's Red-and-White coalition, the opposing coalition, held the majority of seats in this legislative chamber, thus dominating all available positions in the leadership of DPR,¹²⁶ leaving Jokowi with little room to manoeuvre from the strong pressures coming from his own coalition to accommodate their vested interests (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014). Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that defining or articulating Jokowi's flagship campaign programme was not the main priority for Jokowi and his team after the 2014 Presidential Election; instead, much of the energy concentrated on the consolidation of Jokowi's coalition.

Another reason for the delay in the articulation of GMF was the absence of a bureaucratic machinery that was able to convert a vague vision into a more practical concept, if not an actual policy. Despite Jokowi having an advisory team, such as Sukma and Keliat, who are well-known for their expertise in policy design, Jokowi still needed a "formal" machinery to translate his maritime aspiration into an official state policy.¹²⁷ In this context, the importance of bureaucracy is not only for policy implementation, but also essential in articulating and transforming a vague policy idea or vision into a clearer and more doable product of statecraft, like policy.

Widjanto recounts that once Jokowi had commenced his presidency and Andi Widjanto joined the government as the Cabinet Secretary shortly after inauguration, one of the issues that became a topic of discussion within Jokowi's administration focused on when to introduce GMF. Widjanto further states that within the first month of Jokowi's presidency there were three prominent international high-level summits that Jokowi had to attend as the new president of Indonesia: the 25th ASEAN Summit that took place from 11th to 13th November 2014 in Nay Pyi Taw (Myanmar), the ninth East Asia Summit (EAS) also in Nay Pyi

¹²⁵ In the local language known as *bagi-bagi kursi* or literally "distributing seats" or *politik dagang sapi* (horse trading politics), a term referring to the practice of giving away ministerial seats as a reward for supporting particular candidate in a presidential election. THE SENTENCE HERE NEEDS MORE WORK.

¹²⁶ This was also worsened with the existence of the new MD3 Law or the law about Indonesia's Parliament.

¹²⁷ State's (official) product in this context refers to any outputs coming from the formal process within the state. The output(s) can be in the form of a policy, laws, recommendations, doctrine, or in a very loose way, official statement.

Taw from 12th to 13th November 2014, and the G-20 Summit in Brisbane (Australia) from 15th to 16th November 2014.

After consulting with the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Presidential Palace team (Jokowi's former advisory team appointed to several positions inside the presidential palace, including Widjajanto) agreed to set the East Asia Summit (EAS) as the moment for Jokowi to officially present and launch his GMF doctrine. Following this decision, as Widjajanto reveals, Sukma was then tasked to draft Jokowi's speech for the GMF's launching at the ninth East Asia Summits (EAS) along with the team from Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The introduction of the GMF at the ninth East Asia Summit (EAS) therefore marked an important step in the development of the doctrine beyond being simply a vague campaign narrative aimed to boost Jokowi's electability to a more defined doctrine.

VI.2.b. The East Asian Summit (EAS) and the Introduction of a More Solid Doctrine

On November 13th 2014, at the ninth East Asia Summit (EAS) in Nay Pyi Taw the newly inaugurated President Jokowi, for the first time, unveiled his vision of transforming Indonesia into a "Global Maritime Fulcrum" (*Poros Maritim Dunia*) (DetikNews, 2014f; Neary, 2014b; Witular, 2014a). He further elaborated on the five pillars that he contended would serve as the foundation for the maritime doctrine. These five pillars were as follows: the revival of Indonesia's maritime culture; the improvement of Indonesia's marine resources management by establishing maritime industry and attaining maritime food sovereignty and security; the development of Indonesia's maritime infrastructure to bolster inter-island connectivity and trade, as well as tourism; the optimisation of maritime diplomacy as the only means to settle regional maritime-related problems; and the advancement of Indonesia's maritime defences to ensure and maintain its maritime sovereignty, stability, and security.

Using the opportunity of the ninth East Asia Summit (EAS) meeting to officially introduce the GMF not only to an Indonesian audience back home, but also to various foreign audiences, was a deliberate decision. It would appear that this decision was made conjointly by the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with Jokowi's team, given the position and value of the summit to Indonesia's interests. Compared to the East Asian Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Summit was much smaller in terms of audience, scope, and level as it was attended only by the ten members of ASEAN. By comparison, the EAS was a more strategic forum (Natalegawa, 2005; Pakpakhan, 2013). Indonesia might also have used the G-20 Summit for

the purpose of introducing the GMF, not least given its still larger membership and audience, but with Indonesia being the only member of the G-20 from Southeast Asia the preference for the EAS was clear-cut. Also, it was recognised that Indonesia is neither among the founders of the organization nor had actively been involved in its development or expansion. Therefore, the G-20 is not posited generally within the inner circle of Indonesia's foreign policy canvas. However, Indonesia showed a vast interest in the East Asia Summit (EAS) since its establishment in November 2004, which also included support for the expansion of the organization's membership beyond the geographical confines of the East-Asia region (Richardson, 2005; Sebastian, 2013; Roberts et al., 2015; Shekhar, 2018). The summit was another product of regional institutionalism created through a meeting between ASEAN and its three regional partners (Japan, China, and South Korea), which is known as ASEAN Plus Three. In this sense, the position of ASEAN within the East Asia Summit (EAS) is indisputably central and strategic, and the fact that Indonesia is the largest member and one of the founders of ASEAN, the *primus inter pares* and the natural leader of the regional body, has resulted in the importance and centrality of Indonesia within the grouping and vice versa (Anwar, 2009; Islam, 2011; Sebastian, 2013; Roberts et al., 2015; Shekhar, 2018).

With the membership of the summit that also encompasses external regional super and great powers, such as the U.S., Russia, Australia, and India, the value of this grouping is therefore important and strategic for Indonesia. ASEAN's centrality and leadership within the East Asia Summit has given Indonesia the opportunity to shape the agenda setting of regional cooperation in the much broader (regional) context of the region of Indo-Pacific as Indonesia is also central to the leadership of ASEAN (Islam, 2011; Kemlu, 2011; Sebastian, 2013; Shekhar, 2018). Against this backdrop, it is rational for Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Jokowi's advisors to choose the East Asia Summit (EAS) as the venue to present and launch the GMF because the summit could provide much broader exposure and a precise targeted audience, namely the Indo-Pacific region, that started to become significant for the country's foreign policy practice.¹²⁸

Though the GMF in this phase may still be considered aspirational (or not in the form of actual policy) as it did not consist of derivative or detailed policy actions and activities related to realising the GMF doctrine, Jokowi's elucidation of GMF at the East Asia Summit

¹²⁸ From the beginning of Jokowi's campaign, the Indo-Pacific region has become one of the focus points of Jokowi's future administration that was also manifested in Jokowi's Vision-Mission document.

(EAS) was seen as an important step in providing greater clarity and detail on the GMF (Muhibat, 2017). The fact that GMF version introduced during the East Asia Summit (EAS) meeting being still far from being operative was understandable as it was difficult for Jokowi to elaborate a detailed programme during an international summit and considering also the fact that Jokowi had just commenced his presidency less than a month prior. Nonetheless, in comparison with the earlier version, when it was first presented during the third presidential debate in June 2014, the GMF, as presented at the East Asia Summit (EAS), at that point contained further elaboration that explained not only the goals that Indonesia was trying to achieve, including to become a great maritime nation, but also the dimension, underpinning GMF; its five pillars.

The five pillars presented by Jokowi at the East Asia Summit (EAS) provided more elucidation and served as the skeleton for the doctrine and a reflection of its overarching characteristic. The five pillars not only elucidated the objectives that Jokowi sought to achieve in different policy sectors, ranging from maritime culture to maritime economy, from infrastructure to defence and diplomacy, but also highlighted the level of goals that Indonesia's Jokowi intended to achieve, namely at national and regional level. Domestically, the GMF was intended to augment inter-island connectivity across the archipelago. This goal recognised Indonesia's underdeveloped infrastructure that was at fault for bottlenecks that hindered the economic development across the archipelago, particularly in areas in the outer islands and along the border of the country. This situation was best described by Adelle Neary (2014), a scholar of Lowly Institute from Australia who refers Indonesia as to "a collection of weakly integrated economies than as a unified market". As well as aiming for an improvement of the country's maritime infrastructure, the domestic objectives of the doctrine also included the advancement of the country's marine resource management and maritime industry, particularly related to fishing and shipbuilding industry, and the augmentation of the capabilities of the country's naval forces and its defence industry.

Externally, the GMF was designed to protect Indonesia's interests in the region, which were anticipated to be more heavily contested in future years as a result of territorial disputes and power rivalries. Through the GMF, Jokowi also aimed to advocate for the use of a diplomatic approach that would draw all of Indonesia's partners to cooperate in settling regional issues that occur mostly in the maritime realm, and which are limited to not only traditional security issues, but also extend to non-traditional security issues such as piracy,

human trafficking, and IUU Fishing. In addition, one of the pillars of the GMF also reflects the country's intentions to project its power and reorient its foreign policy trajectory by expanding the country's geopolitical scope or circle to include the Indo-Pacific into its foreign policy canvas. By presenting the five pillars, Jokowi was finally able to bring a more solid concept and diminish the obscurity that surrounded the vision since its first appearance in the third presidential debate back in June 2014 and transformed the vision into a much clearer concept by presenting the practical objectives that the doctrine would possibly achieve.

Following the introduction of the GMF at the East Asia Summit (EAS), a number of developments and initiatives were then taken forward by Jokowi's administration as a follow-up of the launch of the doctrine. The first development concerned establishment of an Indonesian maritime patrol agency.¹²⁹ This was achieved by transforming BAKORKAMLA (*Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut* or the Coordinating Agency for Maritime Security) into BAKAMLA (*Badan Keamanan Laut* or the Maritime Security Agency) in December 2014 (Kemkominfo, 2014). The main differences between these two bodies relate to their respective core work and authority in ensuring the maritime security of the country. While the BAKORKAMLA served as a coordinating agency for maritime security affairs, the BAKAMLA was given much more power and authority to act and enforce the law and the country's sovereignty in Indonesia's territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Despite Jokowi's administration having planned a more solid, powerful maritime security agency a month before the official launch of the GMF, the transformation of BAKORKAMLA to BAKAMLA chimed with the objectives of the GMF as this new maritime security agency aimed to protect marine resources. In this sense, the transformation into BAKAMLA was in line with the implementation of the GMF doctrine. Much of the details about the roles of BAKAMLA and its work within Indonesia's maritime security affairs are discussed further in Chapter VI, which focuses on the implementation of the GMF.

At the beginning of 2015, GMF was mentioned within the country's Foreign Minister's Annual Press Statement. In her statement, Indonesia's Foreign Minister's, Retno Marsudi

¹²⁹ While the function of this agency is more like a coast guard, Indonesia basically has its own coast-guard-like unit named the Indonesia Sea and Coast Guard Unit (*Kesatuan Penjagaan Laut dan Pantai* – KPLP). Nevertheless, this KLP is a unit under the Ministry of Transport. Other ministries do also have similar unit, such the Ministry of Finance, the National Police, and the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery. Bakamla, however, sits outside of any ministry and directly responsible and under the supervision of the President.

explicitly stated that Indonesia's foreign policy and diplomacy, under the leadership of President Jokowi, would be oriented to reflect the country's character as a maritime nation and "take advantage of its strategic position between the Indian and Pacific Oceans" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). In this sense, Retno Marsudi underlined the importance of the country's geographical characteristics, both as an archipelagic state and as a bridge between the two oceans, as a foundation for the country's practice of foreign policy and diplomacy.

Furthermore, the annual press statement puts maritime as the new "theme" and topic for Indonesia's foreign policy practice under the new administration (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). These including maritime borders, boosting maritime cooperation both regionally and bilaterally in the field of maritime infrastructure, energy, fishery and the protection of marine environment, including the commitment to emphasise maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as Indonesia would assume chairmanship in this organization at the end of 2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). The 2015 Annual Press Statement also displays a strong commitment and determination of the new administration on the issue of maritime security as an effort to enforce laws and regulations in Indonesia's territorial water and eradicate illegal activities in the seas, such as Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, which was strongly believed to have depleted the country's marine resources and brought losses of up to 20 billion USD per year (Otto, 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

GMF did not only appear within the annual statement of Indonesia's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2015, but was also included the next annual press statements in 2016 and 2017, prior the establishment of Indonesia's 2017 Indonesian Sea Policy. In comparison to the previous years' annual press statement, the concept of maritime did not exist within the official documents (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Therefore, the incorporation of GMF within the 2015 Annual Press Statement of Indonesia's Minister of Foreign Affairs demonstrated the effort of Jokowi's administration to the implementation of the doctrine (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

Another follow-up taken by the new administration following the introduction at the East Asia Summit (EAS) may be found in the publication of Indonesia's Ministry of Defence. Similar to the 2015 Annual Press Statement from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, GMF also appeared in the 2015 Indonesia's Defence White Paper. The word "maritime" was quoted 32 times in the document, which was doubled compared to the previous white paper in 2008

that quoted it approximately 12 times (Ministry of Defence, 2008). Not only in terms of multiple quotations of the word “maritime” within the official document, the 2015 Defence White Paper also explicitly stated the adoption of GMF as an integral component of the country’s defence strategy (Ministry of Defence, 2015). Therefore, as mentioned in the 2015 Defence White Paper, the focus of Indonesia’s defence strategy would be on the development and augmentation of the country’s maritime defence and power.

The word GMF also appeared in the Ministry of National Development Planning’s publication. In its *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional* (the National Mid-Term Development Plan [RPJMN])¹³⁰ 2015-2019, GMF was mentioned five times. However, similar with other official documents, this five-year development plan did not also provide much elaboration and detailed action plans and programmes oriented to realise Jokowi’s GMF, which aimed to transform Indonesia as a strong and independent maritime power.

Notwithstanding the incorporation of the GMF within several state’s documents, the development of the GMF into a more practical policy programmes remained unclear. From its launch in November 2014 to the beginning of 2017, there had never been any single state’s document, in the form of either law or regulation, published in relations to concretising the GMF and serving as a practical guidance to implement it. In February 2017, Jokowi’s administration eventually issued a regulation in the form of *Peraturan Presiden* (Perpres) or presidential regulation that outlines numbers of strategies to implement the GMF doctrine and attain the country’s maritime aspirations.

VI.3. Policy Entrepreneurship and the Birth of the Doctrine

As discussed in Chapters I and II, this thesis argues that it is important to explain the emergence of the GMF doctrine with reference to policy entrepreneurship. Central to this phenomenon were certain individuals, largely non-partisan academics and think-tank researchers, who were involved and served as Jokowi’s expert advisors in his core campaign

¹³⁰ The foundation of the RPJMN 2015-2019 is the *Peraturan Presiden Nomor 2 Tahun 2015 tentang Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional Tahun 2015-2019* (trans. Presidential Regulation Number 5/2015 on the National Mid-Term Development Plan). RPJMN is the elaboration of the vision and mission of the elected President resulting from the Presidential Election of 2014. In this context, the regulation serves as the articulation of the more abstract and general agendas of the elected President during his/her presidential campaign.

team during the 2014 Presidential Election. The role of these individuals is considered crucial for the birth and adoption of GMF as Indonesia's new grand strategy.

In this research, policy entrepreneurship is referred to as a practice of advocating for a particular, often new, policy, ranging from short-term policy (i.e., trade policy) to mid- and long-term policy (i.e., grand strategy), which is seen as a solution to a particular problem(s) (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). Furthermore, the "highly motivated individuals" who are able to attract "attention to policy problems" and who actively push a policy through other different streams are known as policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). These "highly motivated individuals", in general, may come from any part of the society, not necessarily from the government side, and similar to their counterparts in the private and business sector, policy entrepreneurs are also motivated "to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the hope of a future return" (Kingdon, 2014: 115, 122, 143).

In research on the practice of foreign policy entrepreneurship in the U.S. Congress, Carter and Scott (2010) assert that the practice of advocating for a particular policy idea is driven not only by the absence of a policy aimed to deal the identified problem(s), but also by the fact that the existing policy is inadequate or even unable to address the identified challenge(s) (Malnes, 1995; Meydani, 2009). While the practice of advocating for new policy idea in the former scenario is aimed to fill the policy vacuum, in the latter scenario, policy entrepreneurship is oriented to provide policy correction. In the process of policy correction, advocating for a new policy idea may lead to policy change, a condition in which the existing or prevailing policy (known as the status quo policy) is replaced by a (new) advocated policy.

In the context of the research topic, the emergence of GMF also commenced with the identification of problems by the architects of GMF. These individuals argue that the inconsistency and discordance in the country's development and trajectories, which eventually prevented the country from growing, were primarily caused by both the absence of a grand doctrine¹³¹ and the fact that existing government instruments were insufficient to deal with the issues (Interview with Keliat, 2021; Interview with Pareira, 2021). The architects of the GMF further argue that the doctrine is not just a random grand doctrine that is needed by the country, but instead one that reflects the country's main identity and characteristics

¹³¹ See footnote 23

as an archipelagic and maritime nation (Interview with Keliat, 2021; Interview with Pareira, 2021). By having a grand doctrine based on Indonesia's characteristics, conceivers of the GMF contend that Indonesia would then have the guideline that not only matches with the needs of the country, but also suitable and applicable to the situation and the context of Indonesia (Interview with Keliat, 2021; Interview with Pareira, 2021).

The conceivers of the GMF account for the limited appreciation that the country had given to its geographical characteristics, namely its maritime domain (Tim Ahli Seknas Jokowi, 2014). Indonesia's lack of appreciation for its maritime domain did not stem from a lack of awareness of the country's top leadership as regards the country's geographical characteristics and identity, instead it originates from the reluctance (of its political elites) to place maritime factors at the top of the country's priorities. Pareira argues that, despite international acknowledgement of Indonesia's geographical condition and maritime domain through several international laws, such as UNCLOS, Indonesia remained unmoved to establish a grand strategy based on its (geographical) identity (Interview with Pareira, 2021).

The ability to critically identify problems is a quality often owned and expected from policy entrepreneurs. Mintrom (1997) asserts that the salience of policy entrepreneurs' roles within the (policy) agenda setting depends on the various activities conducted by policy entrepreneurs, one of which is problem identification. As an activity at the beginning of a long policy advocacy process, the role of problem identification is important and even pivotal for the success of policy entrepreneurship. A sound problem identification would not only make policy entrepreneurs able to see an opening to inject their (policy) ideas into the system, but would also help policy entrepreneurs to obtain more support for their cause by increasing the urgency to adopt the advocated for (policy) idea (Cramer & Thrall, 2012).

This research finds that GMF policy entrepreneurs were able to shape the agenda setting of GMF formulation by highlighting the urgency to reorient Indonesia's interests and strategy. In this sense, the research argues that the founders of GMF were able to convince Jokowi and his campaign team of the importance of adopting a maritime-based grand strategy that would benefit not only Indonesia in the mid-and longer term, but also Jokowi's electability in the short-term. Besides highlighting the urgency for adopting a grand strategy, the research also found these policy entrepreneurs were able to direct, if not controlling, the course of the discussion. This can be found in the process of determining which identity of the country that should be adopted in the doctrine Jokowi wanted to present in the third

presidential debate. As we may all know that Indonesia also shares other multiple distinctive identities beside as an archipelagic country, such as a multi-ethnic or heterogenous country, a democratic country with the largest Muslim population.

As argued before that Jokowi may have requested a grand doctrine that reflects the country's identity and characteristics to be presented in his presidential campaign. However, the choice to use Indonesia's geographical features as the foundation of this grand strategy did not come directly from Jokowi, instead being an output of what Widjajanto and Keliat refer to as "intellectual discourses" and "idea consolidation" (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021; Interview with Keliat, 2021). Through "intellectual discourses" and "idea consolidation", the GMF advocates demonstrated other traits of policy entrepreneurs of not only being able to identify problems and shape the agenda setting, but also being able to bridge and articulate the perspective of the leaders (on particular issues) and ensuring that ideas meet the demands of the local context (Checkel, 1993; Acharya, 2004).

To reiterate, the emergence of the GMF doctrine cannot be divorced from the activity of policy entrepreneurship because the absence of the individuals promoting the maritime based (grand) doctrine would mostly lead to a different result, a different policy output. The role of policy entrepreneurs was central to this activity in not only preparing the reasonings and justifications for the advocacy of the doctrine, such as the problem identification and highlighting the urgency of adopting the doctrine, but also observing the (window of) opportunity to introduce the doctrine as part of their intention to promote policy change. Policy change was a strong motive that drove the practice of policy entrepreneurship in the context of the GMF's emergence. Based on the interviews conducted, both Widjajanto and Keliat point out the intention to influence or shape the policymaking process and the intention to promote policy change as the two primary motivations for the participation of these policy entrepreneurs to be part of the existing political process (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021; Interview with Keliat, 2021).

When asked the reason for joining or using Jokowi as the channel to advance their policy change agenda, Keliat highlights personal preference reasoning. Keliat argues that the architects of the GMF viewed Jokowi as not only a "doer" compared to his predecessor, but also as a remedy to the dissatisfaction over the governance of the previous administration. Jokowi, therefore, in this context, was portrayed as a figure of change, whereas his rival, Prabowo, was seen as the continuation of the previous regime. Despite Prabowo not being

an incumbent, he was still considered part of the ruling elite due to his close connection with Yudhoyono's administration as his running mate, Hatta Rajasa, was Yudhoyono's Coordinating Economic Minister.

Aside from Jokowi's personal attributes, this research also finds another pull-factor that attracted policy entrepreneurs to Jokowi, particularly foreign policy entrepreneurs in the context of the GMF, namely Jokowi's lack of knowledge in a number of fields of government, more importantly foreign policy. Keliat asserts that Jokowi's inadequate knowledge of foreign policy simply means that Jokowi would most likely accept the opinion, perspective, and argument expressed by (foreign) policy entrepreneurs compared to his rival. Due to Prabowo's experience and knowledge about foreign policy, he would most likely have his own worldview and perspective on foreign policy and how to most effectively approach this issue, thus decreasing substantially the chance for input to be accepted and used under his leadership from foreign policy entrepreneurs such as Keliat (Interview with Keliat, 2021).

In summary, this chapter argues that the role of policy entrepreneurs was evident and influential during the phase of bringing the GMF doctrine to the surface (during the early stages of the GMF formulation), but not in the later stage of the doctrine's development, namely converting the doctrine into a policy action. The research does not only base its argument on the fact that many policy entrepreneurs involved in the early stages of the doctrine's development were no longer involved during the later stage, but also on the idea that, because the GMF was already accepted as a state's official policy agenda and had already entered the formal process of policymaking, the doctrine did no longer need support to be pushed forward. As found in the interviews, architects of GMF were aware that the introduction of GMF to a wider audience through the adoption of this doctrine as Jokowi's main program once he had won the election did not necessarily mean the doctrine would be executed or implemented as planned (Interview with Keliat, 2021). In this context, the success of policy entrepreneurs to introduce GMF through its adoption as the country's official doctrine did not guarantee that the same result would also happen in other phases of the doctrine development or even in the doctrine implementation. As both Widjajanto and Keliat contend, policy articulation and implementation are considered a different battleground that requires different strategies in contrast to that adopted when introducing the policy idea (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021; Interview with Keliat, 2021).

CHAPTER VII

THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GMF

This chapter examines the implementation of GMF. Specifically, it examines the period immediately after the ‘grand strategy’ was adopted and transformed into a more detailed policy action by the Widodo administration. As mentioned in Chapter I, this research is limited to GMF implementation in the period of Widodo’s first term of presidency (2014–2019). To provide a clear, structured examination, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section begins with an elaboration on the birth of the 2017 *Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia* (Indonesian Sea Policy).

In this section, the contents of the regulation serving as the legal foundation for GMF implementation is outlined. Although the Indonesian Sea Policy falls under the category of a policy because it contains programmes, means and targets or expected outputs, the birth of this regulation is most accurately explained within the chapter in reference to GMF implementation. For this research, the 2017 Sea Policy is considered a transitional stage that bridges GMF policymaking and the implementation of this ‘grand strategy’, as the emergence of this regulation marks the first practical steps taken by the Widodo administration in implementing the GMF.

The second section of this chapter elaborates on GMF implementation. In this section, much of the elaboration aims to assess GMF implementation progress through the 2017 Sea Policy in Widodo’s first term of presidency. Because the research topic falls into the field of international relations, the examination of GMF concretisation is largely focused on the foreign policy and defence dimensions of the GMF.

VII.1. From Policymaking to Policy Implementation: The Birth of the 2017 Indonesian Sea Policy

On 23rd February 2017, after more than two years, Widodo administration issued a regulation expected to serve as the main guide to implement the GMF (Laksmata, 2017a; Marzuki, 2017; Muhibat, 2017; Anwar, 2018). Presidential Regulation No.16/2017 on

Indonesian Sea¹³² Policy¹³³ was the country's first unified sea regulation that comprehensively regulated maritime affairs in Indonesia in relation to GMF implementation. One of the principal conundrums that Indonesia had been facing in implementing the GMF was the absence of a single set of comprehensive guidelines that all of government institutions would be able to follow. Before the issuance of the Indonesian Sea Policy, the implementing GMF was based on dozens of regulations scattered over multiple areas (ministries and agencies) and different levels of government (central and regional), with some overlapping one another.

Without a unified regulation serving as the clear guidance, the implementation of GMF was chaotic, representing only the parochial interest of the executive institutions. While much attention had been given to developing the maritime domain in Indonesia, particularly since the fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime, little had been done to resolve this conundrum, thereby bottlenecking the effort to govern the country's maritime domain effectively. The emergence of the Indonesian Sea Policy was a breakthrough, not only for the realisation of GMF, but also for the development of the country's maritime dimension. This policy provided a formal authoritative umbrella for the management and governance of Indonesia's maritime affairs, which covered GMF implementation.

The existence of a national sea or ocean policy is undoubtedly important. The UN has emphasised the strong correlation between ocean governance and ocean policy, as well as the need for coastal countries to develop an integrated national sea policy that serves as a base to develop activities related to and conducted within the maritime domain (Repetto, 2005). While the UN version of an integrated national policy tends to include more technical guidance for conducting activities related to the sea that respect and meet international norms, such as those related to the environment, UN's recommendation is still relevant. A legal framework is needed as a base for a country that aspires to develop and govern its maritime domain; for example, China first based its aspirations for maritime domain on its national ocean policy in 1998 (Cole, 2013).

The 2017 Sea Policy defines the GMF as follows:

¹³² The term 'sea' as used in the official name of the presidential regulation, instead of 'maritime' or 'ocean', stemmed from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

¹³³ Peraturan Presiden No. 16 Tahun 2017 tentang Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia (trans. Presidential Regulation No. 16/2017 on the Indonesian Sea Policy).

The vision of Indonesia is to become a sovereign, advanced, independent, and strong maritime country that is able to provide a positive contribution to peace and security of the region as well as to the world, in accordance with its national interest.¹³⁴

This is the first official definition of the grand strategy since the development of the concept in 2014. As noted, the absence of a unified official definition of GMF had led different ministries and government agencies to formulate GMF-related programmes merely based on their respective parochial interests and understandings of the grand strategy (Bayu, 2016; Ekawati, 2016). The emergence of the 2017 Ocean Policy was therefore seen as an effort to codify the grand strategy and incorporate it into the country's regulatory structure and hierarchy as well as to solve the long-standing conundrum in coordination-related maritime policies across government institutions.

Structurally, the Indonesian Sea Policy comprises of two sections. The first section consists of the primary document of the regulation, which serves as the legal bedrock for implementation of the GMF grand strategy. It outlines a number of important aspects of the governance of sea policy, such as the aims and objectives of the regulation, the principles based on the country's national sea policy, and the roles of actors responsible for designing and implementing maritime policy.¹³⁵ The second section consists of two documents that serve as further elaboration of the regulation and GMF grand strategy: the National Document of the Indonesian Sea Policy and the Action Plan of the Indonesian Sea Policy (2016–2019).

The first document comprises five chapters that outline the explanatory narrative of the country's ocean policy, including technical definitions of different jurisdictional terminologies related to the country's maritime domain, such as the definition of Indonesia's territorial sea and its Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), challenges in implementing the sea policy (more specifically, the country's maritime aspirations), and the goals and principles of the 2017 Sea Policy. In this section, a detailed elaboration of the GMF grand strategy is provided to concretise the GMF grand strategy through expansion of the five pillars of the GMF previously introduced during the ninth East Asian Summit (EAS) in November 2014. The new expanded pillars of the GMF are as follows: (I) Management of maritime resources and

¹³⁴ 'Pasal 1 Ayat (2) Peraturan Presiden No. 16 Tahun 2017 tentang Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia' (trans. Art 1 point 2 of the Presidential Regulation No. 16/2017 on the Indonesian Sea Policy)

¹³⁵ Sea Policy, *Op. Cit.*, Art. 4 & 5.

human resources development; (II) Maritime defence, security, law enforcement and safety; (III) Maritime governance; (IV) Maritime economy and infrastructure, as well as welfare improvement; (V) Maritime spatial management and the protection of marine environment; (VI) Maritime or nautical culture; and (VII) Maritime diplomacy.

The second document contains the four-year (2016–2019) action plan of maritime-related programmes and activities with aims and objectives derived from the seven pillars of the GMF grand strategy, oriented to speeding up the achievement of the grand strategy. As well as outlining the programmes and activities related to GMF implementation, the document also elaborates on the different ministries and non-ministerial government agencies given the responsibility for conducting these programmes and activities and the deadline for each specific activity and programme. In a brief, Presidential Regulation No. 16/2017 on Indonesian Sea Policy articulates the GMF grand strategy into the seven pillars and further details 76 main policies, divided as follows: 21 main policies allocated to attaining the first pillar, management of maritime resources and human resources development, including nine main policies for maritime resource development and 12 for human resources development; eight main policies for the second pillar, dealing with maritime defence, security, law enforcement, and safety; three main policies for the third pillar, the pillar of maritime governance; 20 main policies for attaining the fourth pillar focusing on the maritime economy and infrastructure as well as welfare improvement; 12 main policies for the fifth pillar, the pillar of maritime spatial management and protection of marine environment; five main policies for the sixth pillar, maritime or nautical culture; and seven main policies for the final pillar, which relates to maritime diplomacy.

The 76 main policies were then translated into 425 programme activities designed to achieve 330 targets across multiple sectors and government agencies and clustered into five priority programme clusters: (1) maritime boundaries, ocean space and maritime diplomacy; (2) maritime industry and sea connectivity; (3) sea resources and services industries and marine environmental management; (4) maritime security and naval defence; and (5) maritime or nautical culture. Despite the country's updated sea policy putting the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs in charge of monitoring, coordinating and evaluating the implementation of the programmes and activities, including annually reporting its progress to President Widodo directly, the planning, budgeting and execution of the multiple planned activities and programmes still falls under the authority of respective

agencies and ministries, amounting to 34 ministries and government agencies (Laksmana, 2017a).

In the field of foreign policy, the focus of the Widodo administration lies in the conduct of maritime diplomacy. According to the 2017 Sea Policy, maritime diplomacy is defined as the (implementation of) foreign policy that aims to optimise maritime potentials to fulfil national interests in accordance with national and international laws.¹³⁶ The law also asserts that maritime diplomacy should not be understood solely in its traditional form as international negotiations dealing with maritime issues, maritime boundaries and naval diplomacy. Instead, the term should be seen as a practice of foreign policy not only related to maritime aspects at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, but also linked to the use of (the country's) maritime assets, both military and non-military, in an effort to uphold the interests of the nation.¹³⁷

The 2017 Sea Policy further breaks down maritime diplomacy into seven main programmes.¹³⁸ The first of these programmes is the increase of Indonesia's leadership in maritime cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. The second is the increase of Indonesia's active participation in building and maintaining global peace and security in relation to the maritime sector. The third programme is Indonesia's leadership and active role in creating international norms in the maritime sector. The fourth is the acceleration of maritime boundary negotiation between Indonesia and the neighbouring countries. The fifth programme is the acceleration of the submission of the extended continental shelf in accordance with international laws. The sixth is the placement of Indonesian nationals in multiple international maritime organisations, and the seventh and final programme is the standardisation of the names of islands. In the Action Plan of the 2017 Sea Policy (two annexed documents), these seven main programmes were then translated into dozens of activities and targeted outputs and later included in the first cluster of maritime boundaries, ocean space and maritime diplomacy.

For the first cluster, the 2017 Sea Policy outlines 84 activities, or approximately 16 per cent of the activities elaborated by the national sea policy. To carry out these activities, the national sea policy stipulates 14 government bodies responsible for executing the activities,

¹³⁶ Sea Policy, *Op. Cit.* Annex I: 32.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Kementerian Luar Negeri* or *Kemlu*) and Indonesia's Armed Forces (TNI) share the largest portion of activities, 25 and 21 per cent of the total activities planned for this cluster, respectively. For the cluster of maritime security and naval defence, the national sea policy allocates 49 activities under the responsibility of seven ministries and agencies, the majority lying in the hands of the Indonesian Armed Forces (51 per cent), the Ministry of Defence (*Kementerian Pertahanan* or abbreviated as *Kemhan*; 24 per cent), and the Indonesian Maritime Security Board/Body or *Bakamla*¹³⁹ (8 per cent). Graph 7.1 presents the distribution of policy activities and the ministries and agencies responsible for carrying out these activities, as outlined in the 2017 Sea Policy.

Table 7.1 Action Plan of Presidential Regulation No. 16 of 2017

No.	Clusters	Number of Policy Activities	Lead Ministries / Agencies	Top Lead Ministries / Agencies	Share of Policy Activities (%)
1	Maritime Boundaries, Space, and Maritime Diplomacy	84	14	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	25
				TNI	21
				Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries	18
				Information and Geospatial	14
2.	Maritime Industry and Sea Connectivity	56	7	Ministry of Transportation	38
				Ministry of Industry	18
				National Agency Search and Rescue	16
				Ministry of Environment and Forestry	12
3.	Marine Natural Resource Industry and Marine Environmental Management	148	16	Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries	36
				Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources	14
				Ministry of Industry	12
				Ministry of Environment and Forestry	12
4.		49	7	TNI	51
				Ministry of Defence	24

¹³⁹ *Bakamla* stands for *Badan Keamanan Laut*, translated as the Maritime Security Body/Board. The roles of this body/board are similar to the coast guards, and this body often claims itself to be the country's coast guard (as shown in its website); however, the claim is questionable, as Indonesia has other bodies and agencies that work in a similar way to *Bakamla*, with the most similar one being the *Kesatuan Penjaga Laut dan Pantai* (KPLP), translated as Sea and Coast Guard.

	Maritime Security and Naval Defence			<i>Bakamla</i>	8
				Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries	7
5.	Nautical Culture	86	12	Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries	25
				Ministry of Transportation	18
				Ministry of Manpower	11
				Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education	11

Data were collected from the Presidential Regulation No. 16 of 2017 and Annexe II.

In an interview, Widjajanto stated that the transformation of the GMF grand strategy into a more solid, ‘technocratic’ policy began only after the appointment of Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan as new Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, replacing Rizal Ramli in the second cabinet reshuffle in July 2016 (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021). In a separate interview, Luhut stated that Widodo moved the senior retired general from the post of Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law and Security (*Menkopolhukam*) to Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs (*Menkomaritim*) and asked him personally to immediately commence the realisation of the GMF (Interview with Luhut, 2021). Luhut further asserted that articulating the GMF into a more technical, applicable policy had become a priority following his appointment as the new Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs (Interview with Luhut, 2021). In less than eight months, Luhut was able to design a ministry that not only matched the institutional necessity for implementing the grand strategy, but was also capable of producing the first main guidelines for the implementation of the grand strategy.

Widodo’s decision to appoint Luhut was not random. The Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs is considered among the most influential executive bodies within the administration, rivalled only by the Vice President and the Presidential Staff Office, positioned at the centre of the effort to concretise Widodo’s most ambitious presidential agenda—the GMF grand strategy. In later developments, in his second term, Widodo even expanded the authority of the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs to include the management of national projects and investments, which had previously fallen under the oversight of the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs. Thus, the name of the ministry was changed to the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime and Investment Affairs (JakartaPost, 2019a; 2019b; Bland, 2020). The appointment of prominent individuals such as Luhut, one of Widodo’s loyalists and ‘enablers’, in the leadership of the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs,

demonstrated the aspiration not only to further consolidate the ministry related to maritime affairs, but also to secure the implementation of the GMF grand strategy to a person he trusted (Patria & Herriyanto, 2016; Syailendra, 2016).

In addition to the appointment of Luhut, Widjajanto also explicitly appointed to the role of Ambassador Arif Havas Oegroseno, a senior diplomat of Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and one of Hassan's Boys (Khalik, 2009), who served as a prominent official as the Deputy of Maritime Sovereignty-Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs. He was among those responsible for articulating and transforming Widodo's maritime grand strategy into a more formal, technocratic product with Presidential Regulation No.16/2017 (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021). In another interview, Ambassador Arif Havas Oegroseno recounted that after serving as the Indonesian Ambassador for Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union (EU) in early 2015, he was asked personally by Dwisuryo Indroyono Soesilo, the first Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs during Widodo's presidency, to assist the minister to develop this new ministry as a deputy¹⁴⁰ (Interview with Oegroseno, 2021). Soesilo's decision to include Havas in the ministry was without apparent reason, because Oegroseno, a legal-background diplomat, had been exposed to abundant maritime-related experiences and issues throughout his diplomatic career.

For Oegroseno, delays in the issuance of the 2017 National Sea Policy were understandable and expected. He recounted that when he first joined the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs in mid-2015, the ministry not only lacked personnel, but also did not have its own building (Interview with Oegroseno, 2021). Oegroseno further asserted that the effort to translate the GMF grand strategy into a more technical policy did not begin until the ministry was more stable, which was marked by the appointment of Luhut as the third Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs since Widodo's inauguration, replacing Minister Rizal Ramli in mid-2016 (Interview with Oegroseno, 2021). Oegroseno recounted that, after presenting the draft to the President four times in less than a year, the Presidential Regulation was finally issued along with the derivative technical document, an Action Plan for the Indonesian Sea Policy. Considering this condition, Oegroseno argued that the delay of less than a year in making the national sea policy was reasonable. He even asserted that compared to other countries, Indonesia's 2017 National Sea Policy was not even lagging. He took the EU

¹⁴⁰ The position of deputy only exists within the Coordinating Ministry, as a first-echelon position.

Maritime Security Strategy as an example, whose creation took place over two decades after the establishment of the regional organisation (Interview with Oegroseno, 2021). He further asserted that even if it was considered late, Indonesia remained the only country in the Southeast Asian region with its own national sea policy.

During the formulation of the 2017 Sea Policy, Oegroseno recounted the involvement of a number of actors coming from various ministries and government bodies. Among these were the Indonesian Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Transportation, and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (Interview with Oegroseno, 2021). He added that a weekly meeting was scheduled to discuss the contents of the law, including the Action Plan for the Sea Policy. While most individuals representing the institutions involved in the meeting changed over time, Havas stated that individuals representing the core institution within the formulation remained the same: the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), Cabinet Secretariat, and Ministry of National Development Planning.

The emergence of the 2017 Sea Policy had been long awaited when it emerged more than two years after the GMF was officially introduced in November 2014. Oegroseno's argument indicates that the process of transformation and articulation of the GMF grand strategy may have been hindered by technical and administrative setbacks, as the new Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, the ministry responsible for implementing the GMF, required time for consolidation before it could undertake its tasks and responsibilities. However, there was another factor aside from the technical and administrative issues that had led to delays not only in the efforts to consolidate the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs quickly, but also in the efforts to concretise the grand strategy.

One plausible factor that may have caused delays in the concretisation of the GMF grand strategy was the dynamics of domestic politics that occurred during Widodo's first two years of leadership. As discussed in Chapter II, the domestic political environment can influence and shape the process of foreign policymaking (Putnam, 1988; Hagan, 1995; Fearon 1998). The domestic political environment shapes foreign policymaking in many ways, such as in terms of government system or regime type, which determines the structure and actors, as well as the degree of their power within the decision-making process. The existence of a particular state's ideology, which is able to limit and specify policy preferences, and determine the degree of influence of (domestic) actors from outside of the formal decision-

making system, such as civil societies, the general public, the media, and domestic political dynamics that undermine decision making in foreign policy (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010; Hudson, 2014).

In the context of the research subject, the domestic political dynamics responsible for the delayed transformation of the GMF grand strategy into a more articulated policy during the early years of Widodo's administration were not directly related to GMF implementation. Instead, internal dynamics were related more to the political consolidation that took place after the 2014 presidential election, not only in terms of the dynamics within Widodo's administration, but also in the relations between Widodo's administration and his opposition's coalition in Parliament, as well as within his own party, the PDIP. Despite these dynamics not being related to the GMF, the administration's effort to consolidate their power and ameliorate domestic political conditions had depleted their focus and resources, thus further compromising their efficiency in concretising Widodo's visions and programmes promised in his presidential campaign, including the GMF (Tempo, 2015g). In this sense, the effort to concretise the GMF as a grand strategy was side-lined and, for a long time, was no longer the top priority for his administration. Similarly, Dino Patti Djalal, former Indonesian Ambassador to the U.S. (2010 to 2013) and former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs (2013–2014), also described domestic politics as Widodo's primary hindrance in implementing his foreign policy during his first two years, which he considered the most challenging (ISEAS-Seminar, 2019). While Djalal did not mention the GMF explicitly, his argument on Jokowi's foreign policy indirectly indicates the difficult execution of GMF in the field of foreign policy, as to become a strong, respected, and independent maritime nation promulgated in the GMF was Widodo's top foreign policy agenda.

This research details several major (political) dynamics that affected Widodo's administration during his early years as Indonesia's seventh president. The first of these dynamics was the cancellation of Budi Gunawan's inauguration as the new Chief of the Indonesian Police force. At the beginning of 2015, Widodo refused to continue with the nomination of Budi Gunawan as the only candidate after *Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi* (KPK), Indonesia's main anti-graft commission, named the senior Police General a suspect in a bribery scandal while he was leading the Career Planning Bureau and several other posts at the police headquarters (Mietzner, 2015; Muhtadi, 2015; Roberts, 2015; Tempo, 2015a; 2015b). Widodo's decision to exclude Gunawan from the nomination resulted not only in the

emergence of interinstitutional conflict between the KPK and police forces, but also result in the emergence of the second dynamic (Nazeer, 2015).

The second dynamic was the deterioration of Widodo's relations with Parliament and the PDIP, the main party bidding for Widodo's presidency in the 2014 presidential election. Widodo's reluctance to continue with the nomination of Gunawan as the next Indonesian Chief of Police was seen by the PDIP as an act of betrayal of the constitution (Mietzner, 2015; Muhtadi, 2015; Tempo, 2015e). The PDIP, through its cadres, argued that Widodo should neither bow down to the voices from outside his administration nor back down on his decision to appoint Gunawan, particularly after Parliament had unanimously agreed on his nomination and after the court had granted a pretrial motion that revoked Gunawan's status as a graft suspect (BBC News, 2015; Jakarta Globe, 2015; Shite et al., 2015). Gunawan was not a random figure for PDIP, as he had established a close relationship with Megawati when serving as her aide during her presidency. Therefore, Widodo's insistency not to bow down to the PDIP's request to inaugurate Gunawan as the next Chief of Indonesian Police was translated as disloyalty, disobedience and 'rebellion' against the party's decision and leadership (Tempo, 2015e).

From this point, Widodo's relations with his own party would continue to deteriorate, particularly when converging with other issues, such as the dissatisfaction of the PDIP over the distribution of ministerial posts in Widodo's administration. PDIP argued that, as Widodo's party and winner of the previous election, they should have been given more seats in government than other parties in Widodo's coalition, and Widodo's reluctance to fight for this issue was translated by the PDIP into a sign of disloyalty and *tidak tahu balas budi* (not having the intention to repay a favour; Tempo, 2015e). In addition to the distribution of ministerial seats, the issue of Megawati's distrust of several figures within President Widodo's inner circle, who were feared to be dominating the President and distancing him from PDIP, also contributed significantly to the deterioration of Widodo's relationship with his party (Mietzner, 2015; Tempo, 2015b; 2015c).

The third major domestic issue that hindered Widodo's administration from working effectively in his first two years of presidency, including when concretising the GMF grand strategy, was the internal disagreements in Widodo's administration. These internal disagreements took place in the form of incoherency among Widodo's ministers across several issues and policies, such as the relationship between the former Coordinating Minister

of Maritime Affairs Rizal Ramli and other ministers, including the Minister for State Enterprises, Rini Soemarno, and the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Sudirman Said (Tempo, 2015f; 2016; Syailendra, 2016). As well as incoherency among Widodo's ministers, disagreements transpired between the President and Vice President over a number of issues, including the appointment of Gunawan, the establishment of the country's Presidential Staff Office, and the appointment of Luhut as the chief of this office and other posts (Tempo, 2015d). While different opinions among stakeholders and policy elites may appear normal in policymaking, disagreement in this context was vivid and captured the attention of the general public (through the lens of the media), creating controversy and sparking public debate, not only about the effectiveness of Widodo's administration, but also their response to disputed issues (Tempo, 2016).

The fourth major domestic issue was Widodo's weak coalition vis-à-vis the opposition. Widodo and his administration not only had to divert much of their attention and resources to consolidate internally, but also were preoccupied with running the government amid pressure from the opposition that dominated the country's Parliament. At the beginning of his presidency, Widodo's coalition was only able to secure approximately 37 per cent of seats in Parliament. Though Indonesia uses a presidential system, the position and role of legislature in governance in the post-Suharto era remains powerful and important. Before the reformation and during the New Order era, Parliament (DPR) was viewed as a national body whose primary job was to provide rubber stamps to any government decisions or policy (Ziegenhain, 2008; Chen & Marzuki, 2014). It received tremendous new power, role and authority in the form of several amendments to the country's constitution.¹⁴¹

As power was returned to the hands of the people with the fall of the New Order, this power vested collectively through representation in Parliament became much more significant and equally weighted with the power given to the executive through presidential elections (Wibisono, 2010; Chen & Marzuki, 2014). According to Article 20A, Paragraph (2) of

¹⁴¹ The passing of the amended law about *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR), collectively known as the MD3 Law or the People's Consultative Assembly, the House of Representatives (DPR), the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD), and the Regional Representatives Council, had become a scourge for the new Widodo administration. According to this new law, the leadership body (the speakership) should be decided by a members' vote based on the package system (*satu paket*), instead of being based on who wins the election (the party which gained the most seats in the parliament), requiring each faction to nominate four candidates from other factions. The impact of this practice was that despite PDIP winning the most seats in the parliament, it gained no seats in the leadership of the legislative body (speakership).

the Amended 1945 Constitution, as well as having the function of budgeting, legislation and monitoring, the DPR is also equipped with the right to interpellation, opinion and enquiry (1945 Amended Constitution). While others may see this development as an advancement of Indonesia's democracy (Rachman & Wardani, 2020), with a stronger legislative branch, for some, the new rights afforded to the DPR are seen as an anomaly in Indonesia's presidentialism (Hanan, 2012; Kasuya, 2013; Kumoro, 2013; Kuswanto, 2018; Slater, 2018).

In less than three years, Widodo was able to overcome these challenges and consolidate his power,¹⁴² though these "successes" came with a price in the form of changes to the composition of his cabinet and individuals in his inner circle (Syailendra, 2016; Tomsa, 2016). Several cabinet reshuffles that occurred during Widodo's first two years were necessary to accommodate, as a form of compromise, the aspirations and interests of different parties, not only from Widodo's own group (i.e., Megawati and the PDIP), but also from the opposition of Widodo's coalition and others. One striking example of these interests was the removal of Widjajanto from the Cabinet Secretary post, a position believed to have proximity with the President, and the inclusion of new figures in Widodo's cabinet from previously opposing (political) parties, such as Golkar and the PPP (Castle, 2015; Armenia, 2015; Mietzner, 2016).

Although this research is not oriented to examining Indonesia's domestic politics or the Widodo administration in their first two years of presidency, it is still important to include the domestic context in the explanation, as it shaped the development of the grand strategy. The four major issues identified in this research slowed, if not halted entirely, the progress of moving the grand strategy to further phases, transforming it instead into a more achievable policy by diverting and exhausting the focus and resources that Widodo and his administration required to articulate it in the early days of his presidency. The domestic context also shaped the articulation of the grand strategy through changes in the composition of individuals in Widodo's circle responsible for concretising the GMF. Changes of members within the policy circle, including the removal and appointment of different individuals, may

¹⁴² Along the oligarchy thesis, party cartelisation (or the cartelisation thesis) has also been discussed by scholars of Indonesian politics as a main factor behind the failure of democratic reform in Indonesia. See, for example, Mietzner (2016) on the coalitional model during Widodo's presidency and Slater (2018) on party cartelisation in the Indonesian context.

affect and shape the output of the discussion, as each individual may have different perspectives on the discussed policy.

Notwithstanding the delay in its emergence, Presidential Regulation No. 16/2017 on Indonesian Sea Policy was a milestone in the process of concretising Indonesia's GMF. With the formulation of this new regulation, the grand strategy was equipped with a formal foundation and more detailed guidelines on how to realise the GMF. The birth of this regulation marks the transition phase of the GMF from policymaking into policy implementation. The enactment of the law also marked the commencement of the GMF in a new phase—the implementation phase—as the formulation or creation of the GMF into a state policy ended when the regulation arrived.

VII.2. Implementing the GMF: How has the GMF Materialized in Five years?

The implementation of the GMF grand strategy has been strongly associated and cannot be separated from the implementation of the Indonesian Sea Policy launched in 2017. The presence of this regulation is important not only because it serves as a formal umbrella for any policies related to the country's maritime dimension, but also because of its direct relevance to the realization of the GMF grand strategy, and the Art.1 point 1 stipulates the following:¹⁴³

“Indonesian Sea Policy is the general guidelines on sea policy that is adopted to accelerate the implementation of the Global Maritime Fulcrum.”

However, examining the implementation of the GMF through the implementation of the action plan stipulated by the 2017 Sea Policy is difficult, if not impossible, particularly because the regulation consists of hundreds of policies and goals encompassing multiple sectors. Though this research only looks at the implementation of the foreign policy and defence dimension of the GMF grand strategy, through the observation of the 2017 Sea Policy implementation, the research is still considered difficult as there has been no official publication on the report of the implementation progress of the regulation in these specific sectors open for public consumption.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Sea Policy, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁴⁴ Some of the activities and targets/outputs elaborated within the Action Plan are difficult to evaluate or crosscheck without any official report. Take, for example, an activity in the fourth cluster about the “Construction and the Development of the Infrastructure and Facilities of Navy's Airbase”, which only mentioned one package for each year (from 2017 to 2019) and did not include any further mention of the location of the base. Another example, also from the fourth cluster, concerns the “Fulfilment of Ammunition for

Though the law stipulates the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs as the coordinator for the monitoring and evaluation of the 2017 Sea Policy, including submitting an integrated report to the President at least once a year regarding the progress in the implementation of the 2017 Sea Policy, the same law did not mention responsibility for the ministry to make the report accessible to the public. According to Oegroseno, the main reason the annual report was not made public concerns the confidentiality of the content which contains the budget of several programmes, especially the budget related to the defence sector. Despite the absence of the report, it is still possible to examine the implementation of the GMF through the examination of government annual reports.

Government reports in this context are the reports published by ministries and government agencies, whose fields of work touch dimensions of the GMF. Though the annual reports may not cover the entire and detailed activities outlined in the action plan of the 2017 Sea Policy,¹⁴⁵ annual reports from ministries and government agencies can serve as a secondary source of data in examining the concretization of the GMF grand strategy. One example of government report that is useful in examining the implementation of the GMF several sectors is a report from the Ministry of National Development Planning (*Bappenas*) on the evaluation of the RPJMN 2015-2109. Oegroseno identifies the RPJMN as one of the sources used in developing the Action Plan of the 2017 Sea Policy (Interview with Oegroseno, 2021). He asserts that the activities of this regulation were synchronized and harmonized with the programmes and objectives outlined within the RPJMN 2015-2019, which serves as a key source for ministries and government agencies in formulating their own five-year Strategic Planning document (*Renstra*¹⁴⁶) (Interview with Oegroseno, 2021).

Against this backdrop, the use of the evaluation report is therefore very useful in assessing the progress of the GMF implementation, particularly under circumstances without the presence of the official implementation report of the 2017 Sea Policy. Considering the limitations in terms of the absence of the official report on the implementation of the Action Plan of the 2017 Sea Policy, this research therefore does not cover in detail the


an Indonesian Warship” that lacks any mention of what kinds of ammunition were supplied or what ship was designated to receive the ammunition.

¹⁴⁵ The programmes and activities noted in a government annual report comprise mainly the programmes and activities within the sector or field of the respective ministry or government agency that published the report.

¹⁴⁶ *Renstra* (*Rencana Strategis* trans. as Strategic Planning) is a programmes and activities plan of a single ministry or government agency in a duration of one term of presidency (5 years). *Renstra* is more like the RPJMN but at the level of bureaucracy.

implementation of every activity elaborated in the action plan. To approach the topic of this section, the dissertation groups the implementation of the GMF grand strategy into three main dimensions,¹⁴⁷ namely economy, foreign policy, and defence (Tiola, 2019).

Figure 7.1 Sea Highway Map




The economic dimension of the GMF comprises programmes and activities oriented towards attracting investment, stimulating local economies (both from local trade and tourism), and reducing the disparity of prices of goods between the more developed, populated areas of western Indonesia and the less populated, developed areas of eastern Indonesia. The implementation of the GMF in this dimension is marked by multiple progress, notably in the sector of infrastructure and connectivity (Teresia, 2015; Liputan6, 2016; Tempo.co, 2018). Until 2019, the Jokowi administration had built more than 20 new (hub and feeder) ports across the country and 50 new pioneering ships, which were designated to concretizing one of Jokowi’s flagship programmes, the Sea-Highway (*Tol Laut*) project—as depicted in the Figure 7.1 (Bappenas, 2019: 96)—, built 18 routes of the Sea Highway (JawaPos, 2018), and developed over 200 hundreds existing ports (Bappenas, 2019; Kemenkomarves, 2019; KSP, 2019).¹⁴⁸ In addition to building and developing the country’s

¹⁴⁷ The research considers these three dimensions as the most notable of the GMF. As for the last dimension, the cultural dimension (the building of maritime culture), the research considers it as less pivotal for achieving the GMF aspiration.

¹⁴⁸ The ports are not limited to commercial trade (for the distribution of goods and logistics); the ports are also crossing ports and fishery ports. The development of existing ports includes the development of the physical condition of the ports (expansion) and the management as well as the administrative aspects of the ports (i.e. dwelling-time and loading).

maritime infrastructure, the Jokowi administration had also built other non-maritime infrastructure to support the inter-connectivity agenda, both to stimulate local economies and ameliorate supply and chain lines, including 15 new airports, over 1,000 kilometres of highways, 65 hydroelectric power plants aim to meet the growing energy demand, and more than 3000 provincial, regional, municipal, and village roads (Bappenas, 2019; KSP, 2019) (Asmara, 2019).

Jokowi’s commitment to developing the country’s infrastructure was clearly reflected in the allocation of infrastructure budget throughout his first term of presidency. Figure 7.2 displays the increasing trend of budget allocation for spending in infrastructure from 2015 to 2019. According to this data, from 2015 to 2019, infrastructure spending comprises, on average, 16-17% from the total state budget (APBN¹⁴⁹), making the Ministry of Public Works and Housing the largest recipient among the ministries and government agencies in the country.




While Jokowi administration had allocated over 15 per cent of the state budget for infrastructure development during Jokowi’s first term of presidency, it only seconded from the spending for education that reached 20 per cent, the overall budget allocated for infrastructure development was still far from sufficient. This allocation happened especially because the funding from the state (combined central and regional budget) could only cover around 30 per cent of the overall budget required for the period of four years (2015-2019), reaching almost approximately USD 345 billion (Desfika, 2019). To meet the financial needs for Jokowi’s massive infrastructure development, the administration depended on and

¹⁴⁹ APBN stands for *Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara* trans. as State Revenue and Expenditure Budget.

desperately looked for alternative sources of funding, which mostly came from external sources both in form of foreign investment and loan, in which China sits among the top sources of funding.

As well as infrastructure, the implementation of the GMF in the economic arena can also be seen from the construction of multiple Integrated Marine and Fisheries Centres (SKPT) across the archipelago. By the end of 2019, the Jokowi administration had built and developed 11 Marine and Fisheries Centres across the countries.¹⁵⁰ The development of these centres is important not only because they are designated to increasing the production and export of Indonesian fisheries products, but also for boosting the regional economy as all the centres were constructed outside of the populous island of Java; some were even built in Indonesia's outermost islands.

Figure 7.3 The distribution of SEZs in Indonesia



Another feature that reflects the implementation of the GMF grand strategy in the economic realm, outside of infrastructure and connectivity, is the development of multiple Special Economic Zones (SEZ). Out of the 19 planned SEZs, eleven SEZs have been developed and were fully operational by the end of Jokowi's first term.¹⁵¹ Figure 7.3 displays the location

¹⁵⁰ Sentra Kelautan dan Perikanan Terpadu (SKPT), "Sentra Bisnis Perikanan Siap Pacu Perekonomian" (trans. Fishery Business Centre Ready to Spur the Economy), accessed from <https://kkp.go.id/SKPT/infografis-detail/1887-sentra-bisnis-perikanan-siap-pacu-perekonomian>

¹⁵¹ Dewan Nasional Kawasan Ekonomi Khusus Republik Indonesia (Indonesian National Council for Special Economic Zones), "Peta Sebaran KEK" (trans. the Distribution Map of Special Economic Zones), accessed from <https://kek.go.id/peta-sebaran-kek>.

and types of SEZs that are operational or under construction across Indonesia (Bappenas, 2019; Khou & Yansim, 2020). The SEZ project is not limited to industrial purposes and includes other types of economic activities, such as tourism. To enhance the value and effectivity of these SEZs, the Jokowi administration has also integrated this economic development project with their infrastructure and connectivity programmes, particularly the Sea Highway programme.

In respect to foreign policy, the Widodo administration also used several measures to concretise the grand strategy throughout his first term of presidency. Much of the administration's effort to concretise GMF in the foreign policy realm revolves around the practice of maritime diplomacy, which is notably manifested in the practice of border diplomacy. The decision to pursue maritime diplomacy was expected as GMF is a maritime-based grand strategy, and pursuing maritime diplomacy is coherent with the adopted grand strategy. Moreover, most of the regional and often global issues, disputes, and debates centre around the maritime aspect of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

As discussed in Chapter I, even before assuming power, Widodo had placed border diplomacy with the 10 countries that share Indonesia's border (Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Australia, East-Timor, and India) among his top foreign policy goals for the upcoming administration.¹⁵² For Widodo, resolving border negotiations was crucial; he viewed success on this matter not only as a means of protecting the country's unity and sovereignty but also as a manifestation of a foreign policy that would reflect the country's geographical identity (Widodo & Kalla, 2014; Strategic Review, 2016).¹⁵³ When he assumed power, Widodo ensured that this particular agenda was incorporated in his new administration, which later may be seen in the original version of the GMF with its five pillars (the EAS version), the first Minister of Foreign Affairs' Annual Press Statement of 2015 (Kemlu, 2015), the ministry's mid-term strategic programmes and goals 2015-2019 document, and in the Action Plan of the 2017 Sea Policy.

While there may not be difficulty in understanding the term "land border", it is important to know the three types of maritime borders within the context of border

¹⁵² Though usually these unsettled border negotiations concerned maritime borders, Indonesia also had three unresolved land-border negotiations with its neighbouring countries when Widodo assumed power.

¹⁵³ *Keputusan Menteri Koordinator Bidang Kemaritiman Republik Indonesia Nomor 128 Tahun 2019 tentang Buku Putih Diplomasi Maritim* (trans. The Decree of Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs No. 128/2018 on the White Book of Maritime Diplomacy).

diplomacy in the maritime domain: Territorial Water/Sea, Continental Shelf Boundaries, and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Table 6.2 displays the three types of maritime boundaries that Indonesia shares with its neighbouring countries (Andika, 2017:58). According to this table, Indonesia has territorial sea borders with four countries and shares both its EEZ and Continental Shelf with eight countries.

Table 7.2 Indonesia’s maritime boundaries with neighbouring countries

Continental shelf	Exclusive economic zone	Territorial water
Australia	Australia	East-Timor
East-Timor	East-Timor	Malaysia
India	India	Papua New Guinea
Malaysia	Malaysia	Singapore
Palau	Palau	
Philippines	Philippines	
Thailand	Thailand	
Vietnam	Vietnam	

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the first four years of Widodo’s presidency, the ministry conducted approximately 186 border negotiations, comprised of 79 maritime border negotiations with nine countries and 87 land-border negotiations with three countries (Kemlu, 2020). Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs contends that these negotiations were not only conducted on a technical level, but also carried out at the ministerial level. In addition, a special envoy was appointed to raise the status of the negotiations (Kemlu, 2020). Before 2019, these negotiations by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had achieved multiple agreements and made progress regarding Indonesia’s border diplomacy, most notably including ratification of two resolved border negotiations: the Agreement on the EEZ Boundaries between Indonesia and the Philippines and the Treaty Between the Republic of Singapore and the Republic of Indonesia Relating to the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas in the Eastern Part of the Strait of Singapore (StraitTimes, 2017; Kemlu,

2019).¹⁵⁴ The two agreements were also targeted outputs in the first cluster of maritime border and diplomacy in the Action Plan of the 2017 Sea Policy.¹⁵⁵

In responding to the low number of resolved border negotiations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contended that the achievement of border diplomacy cannot be measured merely in terms of how many border negotiations were resolved since multiple domestic factors may play a significant role in determining the progress of the negotiation (Kemlu, 2015). As border negotiation involves two parties, one cannot force its counterpart to attend meetings and participate in negotiation. Therefore, the frequency or number of meetings should not be used as a primary indicator for assessing the progress of border diplomacy for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu, 2015).

As well as border diplomacy, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also pursued other aspects of maritime diplomacy to accelerate the concretisation of the GMF during Widodo's first year of presidency including cooperation on maritime-related issues, defence diplomacy, expanding the country's foreign policy canvas, and norm building and promotion. In her annual speech in 2019, Minister Retno Marsudi outlined a number of initiatives and multilateral cooperative arrangements in which Indonesia played a pivotal role, such as the first Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Summit in March 2017 (Notohamijoyo, 2017),¹⁵⁶ the Our Ocean Conference (OCC) in October 2018,¹⁵⁷ the Indonesia-Africa Maritime Dialogue in October 2018,¹⁵⁸ the IORA High Level Panel on Maritime Cooperation for Inclusive Growth in Indian Ocean in October 2018,¹⁵⁹ the 10th East Asia Summit (EAS) in November 2015,¹⁶⁰ the

¹⁵⁴ See also "Indonesia and the Philippines Ratify EEZ Boundary Agreement", in *Kemlu.go.id* on June 23rd 2019, accessed from <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/389/berita/indonesia-and-the-philippines-ratify-eez-boundary-agreement>.

¹⁵⁵ Sea Policy, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁵⁶ It was the first Summit of IORA since the establishment of the association 20 years prior. Previously, the meetings had only taken place at ministerial level. The summit was organised and initiated by Indonesia, which at the time was also the chair of the association.

¹⁵⁷ According to the Ministry of Foreign Ministry, the conference produced around 305 real and tangible commitments, a financial commitment of up to USD 10.7 billion, and 14 million km² of areas for ocean conservation.

¹⁵⁸ The Indonesia-Africa Maritime Dialogue was a parallel event of the OCC. The forum produced several commitments between Indonesia and African countries on the issue of Maritime Security and Sustainable Fisheries.

¹⁵⁹ A follow-up of the 2017 Summit. The meeting produced a strong commitment to accelerate the five-year IORA Action Plan.

¹⁶⁰ The Summit was closed with the launch and adoption of the Joint Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation, an Indonesian initiative.

13th EAS Summit in November 2018,¹⁶¹ the 8th IORA Bi-Annual Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) Meeting in July 2018,¹⁶² the 49th Pacific Island Forum (PIF), and the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security (CFF) in which Indonesia was initiator (Kemlu, 2019; 2020). Similarly, Oegroseno appreciated the effort that the Widodo administration took to accelerate the concretisation of the GMF through foreign policy. In an interview, Oegroseno spells out a number of initiatives taken by the Widodo administration during the first term of presidency related to GMF implementation in the foreign policy dimension, such as the establishment of the Archipelagic and Island States (AIS) Forum in November 2018 to address issues related to maritime affairs, including climate change mitigation, disaster preparedness, sustainable blue economy, maritime governance (Pandjaitan & Bauhet, 2018), the strengthening of the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security (CTI-CFF), and the advocacy for the creation of an international convention on fisheries-related crimes in the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) (Interview with Oegroseno, 2021). For Havas, these initiatives demonstrated Indonesia's strong commitment to and activism for maritime diplomacy, reflecting the country's unique characteristics (Interview with Oegroseno, 2021).

Aside from using multilateral channels, Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs also optimised bilateral avenues in pursuing maritime diplomacy with more than 10 countries that share an interest in maritime cooperation, with significant emphasis on the Indo-Pacific framework (Kemlu, 2019; 2020). One example is Indonesia's bilateral relations with India. In 2018, with a focus on maritime cooperation, Indonesia was able to deepen its bilateral ties with India, a key regional power in the Indian Ocean region. The deepening ties between the two countries were marked by the elevation of their relationship from Strategic Partnership to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the launch of the Shared Vision India-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation in Indo-Pacific in May 2018 (MEA-India, 2018). Based on this shared vision, both countries agreed to enhance their cooperation in maritime-related issues, including maritime security, through naval cooperation, joint naval exercises and patrols¹⁶³,

¹⁶¹ The 13th EAS Summit was another initiative from Indonesia that was adopted by the Summit, namely the Joint Statement on Combating IUU fishing and Marine Plastic Debris.

¹⁶² Indonesia's initiative on the GMF and Indo-Pacific Framework was included within the Decision Report 8th IORA Bi-Annual CSO.

¹⁶³ India and Indonesia commenced their joint patrol and naval exercise in 2002 under the name India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol (Indo-Ind CORPAT). India has had similar cooperation with other countries in the Southeast

and information sharing related to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region (MEA-India, 2018; Mithal, 2020). Following this meeting, a joint initiative was launched in July 2018 to build a deep-sea port in Sabang, Indonesia's north-western most island that is 90-nautical miles from India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Indian Ocean. The aim of this initiative was to develop the Aceh-Andaman and Nicobar Islands' connectivity in the following year (Panda, 2018; Tempo.co, 2019).

In addition to India, the Widodo administration has also been successful in fostering deeper relations with other major regional powers such as China and Japan. Indonesia's maritime diplomacy with China is marked by two aspects: the security dilemma and the opportunity for cooperation. On one hand, Indonesia-China diplomatic ties reflected uncertainty and deep concern over the stability and security of not only the region, but also and more importantly, the country due to the increasing assertiveness of China in the region. While Indonesia claims not to be a part of the claimant countries in the South China Sea dispute, China's claims with its nine-dash line overlap with Indonesia's EEZ north of Natuna Island. The increasing incursions of multiple Chinese fishing boats in the area since 2013 increased the concern of Indonesia's policy communities in the field of foreign policy and defence (Supriyanto, et al., 2016). In addition, it led Indonesia, especially under Widodo's leadership, to pursue what Christian Le Miere refers to as coercive maritime diplomacy, a type of maritime diplomacy that uses assertive means or limited force to secure advantage or avert loss (Miere, 2014; McRae, 2019). Examples of the coercive maritime diplomacy taken by the Widodo administration are the "vessel-sinking policy" (elaborated further in the next section) of Minister Susi Pudjiastuti (Minister for Marine Affairs and Fisheries) (Parameswaran, 2015), the securitisation of Natuna (SCMP, 2018), and the naming of North Natuna Sea as part of Indonesia's EEZs in the southern area of the South China Sea (Parameswaran, 2017) which later drew strong protest from China (JakartaPost, 2017).

On the other hand, Indonesia's maritime diplomacy towards China is also marked by cooperation and opportunity. Indonesia has explicitly acknowledged the relevance and importance of China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Route Initiative (MSRI) to the GMF (Damuri et al., 2014), notably reflected in a joint statement made during Widodo's attendance to the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) in March 2015 emphasising the complementary nature of both

Asia region besides Indonesia. The joint patrol usually takes place in the International Maritime Boundary Line (IML) in the Indian Ocean region.

grand strategies (Embassy of China ID, 2015). Another joint statement was also made during Li Keqiang's visit to Indonesia in May 2018, emphasising the progress that both countries have achieved through "synergizing China's 21st Century MSRI and Indonesia's vision for the GMF". The progress in the past five years in the field of connectivity and infrastructure development includes the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Railway project and the joint development of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Corridor within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and GMF framework (Xinhua, 2018).

In Japan, following the joint commitment made by Abe and Widodo to "Strengthening the Strategic Partnership Underpinned by Sea and Democracy" in 2015 (MOFA-JP, 2015), Indonesia and Japan agreed to establish the Japan-Indonesia Maritime Forum in December 2016 (Ikeda, 2016; Parameswaran, 2016). The forum promoted a wide range of cooperation in maritime affairs, including infrastructure and connectivity development, fishing facilities (ports and storage) development in Natuna, and maritime security cooperation. Maritime security cooperation included building capacity for Indonesia's maritime security agencies and a commitment to provide surveillance systems (radar) and patrol vessels for Indonesian maritime authorities in Natuna following the visit of Minister Luhut to Japan in December 2017 (Kemenkomarves, 2017; MOFA-JP, 2017). In January 2017, prior to Luhut's visit to Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Indonesia as part of his official trip to four countries in the Asia Pacific region (JakartaPost, 2017; VOANews, 2017).

Abe's visit was seen as an effort to what Suryadinata (2018: 2) refers to as "cast the net wider in the search for close friends and allies" aimed at countering China's increasing assertiveness in the region amidst the increasing uncertainties coming from the new U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration (Suryadinata & Izzudin, 2017). During his visit, Abe introduced Widodo to the Indo-Pacific Strategy, emphasising the security domain and Japan's role in maintaining and promoting rule-based order in the heated region. The strategies included offering maritime security cooperation with Indonesia to secure the country's outermost islands, such as Natuna and surrounding areas, which have become hotspots in recent years (Suryadinata & Izzudin, 2017; Suryadinata, 2018). However, while Abe was more interested in the security aspect of his country's strategy on the Indo-Pacific, Widodo emphasised the economic aspects of developing infrastructure (Suryadinata & Izzudin, 2017; Suryadinata, 2018; Scott, 2019). Following Japan's Prime Minister's visit in June 2018, Indonesia and Japan held a follow-up meeting in Jakarta, the Strategic Dialogue talks to

discuss both countries' concerns about the situation and militarisation of the South China Sea and emphasise the commitment from both countries "to coordinate and see synergy between Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum vision" (Sheany, 2018).

Indonesia has also been able to foster relationships with major non-Asian regional powers in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically Australia and the US. With Australia, Indonesia's maritime diplomacy includes a different feature. Compared to other countries, both Indonesia and Australia have long been known for their active roles in promoting their own versions of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical canvas (Medcalf, 2015; Parameswaran, 2020). Therefore, it is not surprising that the relations between these two countries converged within the framework of Indo-Pacific compared to Indonesia's relations with other countries, both in the areas of foreign policy and defence (Laksmna, 2018; Scott, 2019). This convergence can be seen from the outputs of the 2+2 meetings¹⁶⁴ in 2015, 2016, and 2018 stressing the countries' shared interests in a stable, open, rule-based, and non-militarised Indo-Pacific region (MOD-AU, 2015; MOFA-AU, 2016; 2018).

Indonesia has also been involved in several maritime-related cooperative efforts with the U.S. since the 1990s mainly in the areas of defence and security. In October 2018, the visit of the new U.S. administration's Secretary of the State Mike Pompeo to Indonesia was also part of introducing the US Indo-Pacific Strategy called the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) (Setnas-ASEAN, 2018). Similar to India, Australia, and Japan, Indonesia was also attentive in its approach to the Indo-Pacific strategy, particularly that proposed and initiated by the U.S. which was seen to heavily emphasise the military dimension and sought to contain China (Chandran, 2018; Scott, 2019). The careful approach that Indonesia pursued was reflected clearly with the inclusion of the word "inclusive" in all of the country's press statements to avoid antagonising or provoking China (Scott, 2019; Sulaiman, 2019).

The next example of maritime diplomacy practice closely related to the implementation of the GMF in the foreign policy domain during Widodo's first term of presidency is toponymy conduct, a United Nations (UN) term for the naming of Indonesia's islands. However, the activity of inventorying the country's geographical features, including islands, did not actually happen because of the GMF. In fact, Indonesia had begun to see

¹⁶⁴ A meeting between the Minister of Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs of each country.

urgency in identifying and naming its islands (BBCNews, 2017), particularly since the loss of Sipadan and Ligitan islands to Malaysia in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2002 (Damayanti, 2008). Indonesia considers the inventorying of its approximately 17,491 islands (Paramitha, 2021)¹⁶⁵ and other geographical features as not only serving development and economic purposes, but also and more importantly, focused on the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty as these geographical features serve as baselines to measure the country's maritime jurisdictions (continental shelf, territorial waters, and EEZ) (UN, 2017; Arsana, 2007).

The emergence of the GMF reinforced the importance of inventorying the country's geographical features as an effort to maintain the country's sovereignty over its territory and provide a sense of security but also perceived as a way of reinvigorating the country's national identity as an archipelagic and maritime nation. By 2017, the Widodo administration had registered the names of its 2,590 islands at the 30th United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names (UNGEGN) and the 11th United Nations Conference on Standardization of Geographical Names (UNCSGN) (Infopublik, 2017; Indonesia.go.id, 2018). With this submission, to complete the inventorying of all 17,000 plus islands' names, Indonesia still needs to verify and validate at least another 1,400 islands before the next UN conference on island naming which is held every five years.¹⁶⁶

Aside from island naming, the Widodo administration has also updated the country's national map in 2017. Many of the factors contributing to this change in the features of territorial and jurisdictional lines were due to the resolved border negotiations between Indonesia with some of its neighbouring countries such as negotiations with the Philippines in 2017 over the EEZ in the north of Sulawesi, the EEZ negotiation with Malaysia in the Malacca Strait, and the country's negotiation with Singapore and Malaysia over Indonesia's territorial sea in the Strait of Singapore (Republika, 2017; Kusumawardhani & Afriansyah, 2019). As well as resolving border negotiations, the updating of Indonesia's national map was also prompted by the arrival of a new interpretation of the international law of the seas (UNCLOS) which resulted from the Arbitral Tribunal Ruling between China and the Philippines over the South China Sea in July 2016 (Laksmiana, 2017b). According to the ruling, very small islands, uninhabited islands, reefs, and rocks cannot generate the 200 nautical mile EEZs,

¹⁶⁵ Previously recorded were 17,809 islands (KKP's data).

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

meaning that Tobi Island, Meir Island, and Helen Reef of Palau (SCMP, 2016; Gullet, 2018) only warrant a 12 nautical mile maritime entitlement. As a result, the ruling expanded Indonesia's EEZ, which previously almost encircled (with a U-shape) Palau's islands and reef, to circle around these three geographical features inside Indonesia's jurisdictional waters (Laksmana, 2017b; Kusumawardhani & Afriansyah, 2019).

Aside from the change in territorial and jurisdictional lines, the new Indonesian map was also marked with a name change of Indonesia's EEZ. In 2017, Widodo's administration changed the name of the waters to the north of Natuna to the North Natuna Sea. Previously, these waters were simply known as a part of the South China Sea (Connelly, 2017; Jennings, 2017; Kusumawardhani & Afriansyah, 2019). Though Indonesia's decision was expectedly met with strong opposition from Beijing, the Widodo administration insisted on further use of the new name of the sea (Maulia, 2017). However, Indonesia's decision to change the name of a part of the South China Sea that falls under Indonesia's jurisdictional water was indeed not the first in the region of Southeast Asia. Previously, Vietnam and the Philippines had also changed the names of parts of the same sea adjacent to their respective territorial and jurisdictional waters as the East Sea and the West Philippine Sea (VOANews, 2017).

As well as border diplomacy, inventorying the country's geographical features, and engaging in multilateral and bilateral cooperation, the practice of maritime diplomacy was also manifested in the form of expanding the country's foreign policy canvas and norm building and promotion. Besides receiving proposals regarding Indo-Pacific strategy from other countries, Indonesia was also found to be actively promoting its own version of Indo-Pacific cooperation. During the Widodo administration, Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been actively involved in the promotion of its own concept of Indo-Pacific cooperation since 2018. In the following year, this Indonesian concept would be used as an umbrella for cooperation in the region: the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP).

In comparison with other versions of Indo-Pacific cooperation, Indonesia's version places heavy emphasis on the centrality of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the management of the Indian and Pacific Ocean region. This region is considered by Widodo's Indonesia to be a "single-geostrategic theatre" and rely on the principle of "inclusiveness" which does not exclude any country, including China (Seskab, 2018; Sukma, 2018; Kemlu, 2019; Parameswaran, 2019). Indonesia's interest in the Indo-Pacific region is not only driven by its strategic position at the crossroads of the Pacific and Indian Oceans that

makes it logical for Indonesia to put Indo-Pacific cooperation at the core of its foreign policy, but also by the emergence of the GMF (Widodo & Kalla, 2014; Witular, 2014a; Acharya, 2015; Roberts, et al., 2015; Shekhar, 2018). In this sense, the change in government has also resulted in a change of grand strategy followed by a change in the strategic outlook and trajectory of Indonesia's foreign policy (Sebastian & Syailendra, 2014; Suryodiningrat, 2015; Shekhar, 2018).

The Indo-Pacific narrative is closely related to the GMF. One of the manifestations of the GMF in foreign policy is also the expansion of Indonesia's *mandala* (concentric circles),¹⁶⁷ be it for foreign policy concentration or projection. The aspiration to expand the country's foreign policy canvas to include the Indo-Pacific region was well reflected when Widodo elaborated on his vision and mission during the presidential election debate as well as during his first EAS in November 2014 soon after the presidential inauguration in October 2014 (Seskab, 2014b; Widodo & Kalla, 2014).

Under Widodo's presidency, Indonesia began to introduce its own version of Indo-Pacific cooperation when the country's Minister of Foreign Affairs conveyed a proposal of the concept of this cooperation during the ASEAN Foreign Minister's Retreat Meetings in January 2018 and during the ASEAN 1.5-Track Workshop on Indo-Pacific in mid-March 2018 (Seskab, 2018; Muhibat, 2019). Following these meetings, through Widodo's speech to the heads of states of the ASEAN countries during the 32nd ASEAN Summit in April 2018, Indonesia continued to push its version of an Indo-Pacific cooperation framework (Seskab, 2018; Sapiie, 2018). During the meeting, Indonesia proposed three main points that constitute its own version of Indo-Pacific: the centrality of ASEAN in the creation of an enabling environment that supports international laws, norms, and peaceful dispute settlement; the use of ASEAN-led mechanisms in resolving multiple challenges in the region; and the creation of new economic centres in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific region based on open, fair economic systems (Seskab, 2018).

In addition to these points, Widodo also elaborated on three sectors of cooperation that can serve as the base for Indo-Pacific cooperation: infrastructure, connectivity, and

¹⁶⁷ Briefly, *Mandala* is a concept or way of thinking about the outside world (dividing the world or larger cosmos into several concentric circles), and it is believed to have been conceptualised by Kautilyan, an Indian strategic thinker in ancient times. The concept emerged along with the expansion of Indian culture and influence in the Southeast Asia region. See Chapter I for more elaboration on this topic.

sustainable development (Cabinet Secretary, 2018). At the 51st ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) in August 2018, Indonesia formally presented its version of an Indo-Pacific strategy (ASEAN, 2018; Nathalia, 2018). This version was further discussed during the ASEAN Senior Officials Retreat meeting in September 2018 and was presented again at the 33rd ASEAN Summit (Koestanto, 2018; Kurmala, 2018; Setnas ASEAN, 2018). The advancement of Indonesia's proposal on Indo-Pacific cooperation continued in the following year, commencing with the first AMM under the leadership of Thailand in the beginning of 2019 and continuing with Indonesia's initiation of a High-Level Dialogue on Indo-Pacific Cooperation in March of the same year. After almost 18 months of intensive efforts with a number of difficulties along the way, including internal differences within ASEAN (Saputra, 2019; Septiari, 2019; Yuniar, 2019), Indonesia was finally able to advance its Indo-Pacific initiative as the organisation's framework for cooperation in the region of Indo-Pacific at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in June 2019 (Bayuni, 2019; Choong, 2019). This initiative is known as the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP).

Besides ASEAN, Indonesia had also pushed its Indo-Pacific strategy to the EAS. With the EAS, Indonesia had the opportunity to advance its own initiative with a wider audience, beyond the members of ASEAN countries, even expanding to regional and global powers such as the US, India, China, and Japan. At the 13th EAS meeting, as well as appreciating the support of ASEAN member states through bilateral consultations and reiterating the areas of cooperation that would become the focus of the Indo-Pacific cooperation, Widodo reassured EAS participating countries that Indonesia's version of Indo-Pacific cooperation would not require the establishment of a new institution, re-emphasising ASEAN centrality as the focal point of the Indo-Pacific cooperation (Cabinet Secretary, 2018).

The adoption of AOIP concluded the efforts of the Widodo administration in the pursuit of maritime diplomacy during Widodo's first term. Though the term "Indo-Pacific" does not appear in the Action of Plan of the 2017 Ocean Policy, the country's effort to advance the adoption of AOIP can also be considered an integral part of concretising the GMF in the realm of foreign policy for two reasons. Firstly, since Indo-Pacific is also an integral component of the GMF, as discussed previously in this section, Indonesia's activism to champion its own version of Indo-Pacific cooperation and not be influenced by other countries' versions reflects the country's seriousness and strong commitment to treating the region of Indo-Pacific as an important element of its foreign policy. In this context, considering the importance of the

Indian Ocean region for Indonesia's foreign policy as equal to the Pacific Ocean region represents the manifestation of the country's awareness of its critical position at the crossroads of these two oceans, as suggested by the GMF. Secondly, as the basic nature of the Indo-Pacific cooperation lies in the maritime domain, the effort to conceptualise and move forward the Indo-Pacific cooperation framework is seen as part of the foreign policy practice of emphasising maritime aspects, which comprises the characteristic of Indonesia as an archipelagic country.

During the first term of the Widodo administration, new policies on security and defence were instituted to accelerate the concretisation of the grand strategy. This research contends that some of the activities aimed to concretise the GMF through security and defence may also be included in the implementation of the foreign policy dimension. These actions include the "vessel-sinking" policy against the perpetrators of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and defence diplomacy in the form of joint exercises and patrols. This overlapping happened because the execution of these actions was not only carried out by government agencies from one particular sector, but instead carried out jointly with government agencies from other sectors, specifically government agencies from both the foreign policy and defence-security sectors. Notwithstanding the joint action, for the purpose of clarity and preventing redundancy, this research considers the aforementioned actions to be part of the defence and security of the GMF implementation, considering the fact that a larger portion or the core of the implementation or execution of these actions is conducted by government agencies in the defence and security sectors.

The first notable implementation of the GMF in the defence and security dimension occurred in maritime security. Before being inaugurated as the new president, Widodo vowed to enforce the law in all the territories of Indonesia, including its waters (territorial and EEZ) (DetikFinance, 2014). According to Widodo, the long history of IUU fishing had not only depleted the country's marine resources but had also resulted in the potential loss of billions of dollars of income each year, which could have been used instead to fund the country's development (DetikFinance, 2014). In addition to the loss of potential income, in the Indonesian context, IUU fishing also often intersects with territorial and border issues as the majority of the IUU fishing activities occur within the country's maritime boundaries disputed by other countries (Laksmana, et al., 2018).

As discussed in Chapter V, one of the factors that highlighted the urgency to have a holistic and overarching policy that can develop the country but at the same time is also able to protect the country's resources was the aspiration to "reject weak state mentality." For Widodo, bringing law enforcement to the country's waters and their borders was not merely oriented around stopping the loss of resources and their values (Widodo & Kalla, 2014). More importantly, this approach aimed at strengthening or bringing back the presence of the state in every part of the country's territories to protect its interests, security, sovereignty, pride, and credibility (*wibawa*) (Al-Ayyubi, 2014; Widodo & Kalla, 2014). Widodo's view on the importance of state presence beyond the inner regions of the country matches the argument that Indonesia's motivation to be present in its boundaries and maritime domain was not mainly to develop or take advantage of the richness of these areas, but more driven by the fear that these areas would be exploited and controlled by others, particularly by great powers (Laksmana, 2011).

While Indonesia's security and foreign policy elites do not consider direct invasion by foreign powers as an actual threat to the country (Laksmana, 2011), they are still preoccupied with the view that unattended territories, especially at the country's boundaries, would pave the way for foreign powers to claim or even exert their control over those areas. By not showing the country's presence and allowing foreign fishing vessels to operate illegally and unchecked in the country's maritime boundaries, Indonesia's elites were afraid that this would be used as the basis for foreign power to dispute, if not claim, Indonesia's possession of those areas in the future. As explained previously in Chapter IV, the case of Sipadan and Ligitan provided Indonesia's elites with evidence that territorial disputes that are settled through third party processes would lead to unfavourable results for the country.

Shortly after assuming power, Widodo ordered his administration to destroy and sink vessels found conducting IUU fishing in Indonesian waters rather than capturing them (Asril, 2014). The proposed model of law enforcement was then adopted and implemented as a policy known as the "vessel-sinking" policy by Widodo's Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti. Despite strong reactions over this policy coming not only from countries owning the sunken vessels, especially China, but also within Widodo's cabinet (Nugroho, 2018), Pudjiastuti's "vessel-sinking" remained unchallenged and continued to be used until the end of Widodo's first term (Anggraini et al., 2018).

Figure 7.4 provides detailed numbers of foreign fishing vessels that were captured and destroyed by Indonesian authorities per year from 2014 to April 2021 (Nurhayati, 2021). By the end of Widodo’s first term, it was said that Indonesian authorities had sunk approximately 558 fishing vessels across the country’s waters since the appointment of Pudjiastuti as the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries in October 2014 (Purba, 2019). Nevertheless, the policy was revoked in the second term of Widodo’s presidency which clearly affected the numbers of ship being destroyed.

Figure 7.4 Numbers of Ship Destroyed (2014-2021)





Figure 7.5 Numbers of Ship Destroyed and Their Countries of Origin (2014-2019)



Additional statistics (Figure 7.5) shows not only the numbers of ships sunk by Indonesian authorities but also their countries of origin during Widodo’s first term of presidency (Ulya, 2020). According to this figure, Vietnam sits at the top of the list, with 321 Vietnamese ships having been sunk during the three years of Widodo presidency. However, this data does not represent the actual numbers of IUU fishing cases that happened in

Indonesia's maritime boundaries, as not all of the captured ships were destroyed or sunk. This may explain why China remained among the countries with the lowest number of ships sunk by Indonesian authorities.

In addition to coercive actions, like "vessel-sinking", Indonesia under Widodo also pursued diplomatic means through regional engagement in its effort to tackle the issue of IUU fishing. During Widodo's first term of presidency, Indonesia was at the forefront of the fight against IUU fishing on the regional stage. In their report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs named several activities and initiatives proposed by Indonesia to consolidate the regional effort in fighting this crime, among others the organization of the first periodical "Regional Conference" aimed to establish a regional convention against "IUU Fishing and Its Related Crimes", and the issuance of the "ASEAN Guidelines for Preventing the Entry of Fish and Fishery Products from IUU Fishing Activities into the Supply Chain" to prevent marine products from IUU fishing from entering the regional supply chain (Directorate General of ASEAN, 2016; Kemlu, 2016).

As discussed in the previous chapter, Widodo also established the first maritime patrol agency, called *Bakamla*. *Bakamla* was established under the Law No. 32/2014 on Maritime (Undang-Undang No. 32 tahun 2014 tentang Kelautan) and Presidential Regulation No. 178/2014 on Maritime Security Agency (*Perpres No.178/2014 tentang Badan Keamanan Laut*). Under these laws, the roles of *Bakamla* are: (1) to design the national policy on safety and security in Indonesia's territorial and jurisdictional waters; (2) to conduct patrol, surveillance, and law enforcement in Indonesia's territorial and jurisdictional waters; (3) to monitor early warning systems in Indonesia's territorial and jurisdictional waters; and (4) to synergise the maritime patrol and surveillance activities by other related agencies.

With greater authority to implement law enforcement in the country's maritime domain, *Bakamla* has become a pivotal player and contributor to the fight against illegal activities that violate the country's laws and sovereignty (Suryowati, 2015). This importance can be seen from the numbers of cases that *Bakamla* handles annually in the three regions or zones of its jurisdiction. Figure 7.3 presents the statistics on violations within Indonesia's territorial and jurisdictional seas from 2016 to 2019.¹⁶⁸ In 2015, Widodo established a specific

¹⁶⁸ Hearing session with the Commission I of Indonesia's House of Representatives in 2020. The category of "territorial infringements" only places cases with pure territorial infringement or illegal entry (without any other following activities exploiting the maritime space of Indonesia, i.e., the illegal entry of foreign coast guard) to

task force whose main job was to combat IUU fishing through surveillance and law enforcement. The task force is known as Task Force 115 (*Satgas 115*) whose members come from multiple government institutions: *Bakamla*, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, the Navy, the Attorney General, and the National Police (Idris, 2020). This task force was established to synchronise the action of different government institutions in the fight against IUU fishing.

Another action taken by the Widodo administration during the president's first term was to accelerate the concretisation of the GMF grand strategy in the defence and security dimensions using defence diplomacy. Defence diplomacy, particularly related to maritime defence, is not alien to Indonesia's defence policymakers, as Indonesia was implementing defence diplomacy even before the emergence of the GMF. These efforts were not necessarily designed to harness Indonesia's defence capabilities, but to build the confidence of other countries, counter terrorism, and provide disaster relief and humanitarian assistance (Singh & Tan, 2011; Laksmana, 2012; Miere, 2014; Gindarsah, 2015; Pedrasan, 2015; Gindarsah, 2016; Shekhar, 2018; Inkiriwang, 2021). In the Indonesian context, the close relationship between defence diplomacy and the country's defence institution in the maritime realm, the navy, is even stronger considering the fact that Indonesia's Naval Force (TNI AL) is the only service within the armed forces that by law is given the mandate to conduct naval diplomacy in support of the country's foreign policy.¹⁶⁹

For Le Miere (2014), the suitability of the navy to conduct diplomacy, compared to its counterparts, lies on its flexible characteristics. Since navies do not require physical bases and permission to operate in international waters, they can more freely conduct operations abroad. With the advancement of military technology, such as landing platforms for helicopters and small boats aboard, navies are more than able to reach destinations with little infrastructure for landing or lifting (Miere, 2014).

With the emergence of the GMF, the significance of defence diplomacy, particularly in the maritime domain, has also increased. By adopting a maritime-based grand strategy, the focus of the Widodo administration has also been directed at adopting and prioritising

Indonesia's territorial waters. However, some cases in other categories also may involve territorial infringement, as applies in the IUU fishing cases. To avoid redundancy, the statistics only classify the cases based on their original or main purpose (i.e., conducting IUU fishing and smuggling goods and humans).

¹⁶⁹ Undang-Undang No. 34 Tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia Pasal 9, poin c (trans. Law No. 34/2004 on Indonesian Armed Forces, Chapter 9, point c)

maritime-related programmes and policies in almost every sector, particularly in the area of defence and security. With the mandated authority given to Indonesia's military to conduct diplomacy to support the country's foreign policy, it is not surprising that defence diplomacy has been included in the effort to concretise the GMF as outlined within the Action Plan of the 2017 Ocean Policy.

Like other types of diplomacy, the practice of defence diplomacy can be conducted bilaterally and multilaterally. In the context of Indonesia, bilateral defence diplomacy comprises the majority of the overall defence diplomacy (Inkiriwang, 2021). Bilateral defence diplomacy does not necessarily manifest itself primarily in the form of joint exercises and patrols; it may also include high-ranking military officers' visits, defence industry cooperation, and information sharing. Though ASEAN has long been Indonesia's primary foreign policy canvas (*mandala*), Indonesia has also been successful in conducting bilateral defence diplomacy with other militaries from outside of the region, including those of regional and global great powers (Singh & Tan, 2011; Laksmana, 2012; Gindarsah, 2015; Pedrason, 2015; Gindarsah, 2016; Inkiriwang, 2020; Zulkifli et al., 2020; Inkiriwang, 2021).

Throughout Widodo's first term, his administration conducted a series of bilateral defence diplomacy activities. However, since this research does not aim to examine the topic of Indonesia's defence diplomacy under Widodo's leadership, the research does not describe the details of defence diplomacy activities conducted during Widodo's first term. Instead, the research covers only the notable examples of defence diplomacy that are related to the concretisation of the GMF, namely maritime defence diplomacy. This argument also aligns with the Action Plan of the 2017 Ocean Policy that only targets one activity of maritime defence diplomacy for each year (2016-2019).¹⁷⁰

One example of bilateral defence diplomacy is the India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol (Ind-Indo CORPAT) (Zulkifli et al., 2020). As expressed in its name, this bilateral defence cooperation is a joint naval patrol and exercise between India's and Indonesia's navies that takes place along the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL). The purpose of this joint patrol and exercise is to harness and enhance the capability and interoperability of both countries' navies and ensure the security and safety of this important area of the Indian Ocean. This critical area serves as a main route for international shipping and trade and the

¹⁷⁰ Sea Policy, *Op. Cit.*

goals of the joint patrol are to protect against maritime-related illegal activities and crimes such as maritime terrorism, piracy, and IUU fishing.

Aside from Ind-Indo CORPAT, India and Indonesia also established another joint naval exercise called the *Samudera Shakti*¹⁷¹ (Mighty Ocean) in November 2018 (Pruthi, 2018). While *Samudera Shakti* may share similarities with the Ind-Indo CORPAT, *Samudera Shakti* differs in three key characteristics: (1) the location of the exercise, which is not necessarily conducted in the Indian Ocean, (2) the cooperation does not include a joint patrol, and (3) the reason behind the establishment of the *Samudera Shakti*, which was a result of the elevated status of the relationship between the two countries in 2018 from a “strategic partnership” to “comprehensive strategic partnership”. Notwithstanding these differences, the execution of the Ind-Indo CORPAT and the *Samudera Shakti* indicates Indonesia’s growing attention to both the deepening bilateral relations with India, a major regional player in the Indian Ocean region, and the Indian Ocean itself, which is a critical component of Indonesia’s strategic outlook and foreign policy thinking.

Alongside India, Indonesia has also established defence cooperation with the U.S. under the framework of the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT). CARAT is an annual bilateral naval cooperation in the form of joint exercises between the U.S. and several South and Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia (Parameswaran, 2017; U.S. Embassy, 2017). Indonesia has participated in the exercise ever since the programme was established in 1995 (Parameswaran, 2017). Though Indonesia had been involved in the exercise long before the emergence of its maritime grand strategy, the country’s participation during Widodo’s presidency is considered by this research as even more significant, not only due to the contemporary regional dynamics that centre on maritime space and the fact that Indonesia sits in the middle of the Indo-Pacific, but also because of the current grand strategy that Indonesia attempts to concretise. In addition, Indonesia’s participation in this exercise also provides the country with the opportunity to play a significant role in current regional dynamics that centre around two major actors, the US and China, considering the fact that Indonesia also has a strong bilateral tie with China.

In the realm of multilateralism, Indonesia has also participated several defence diplomacy exercises using multilateral venues, particularly under the ASEAN framework.

¹⁷¹ For the joint army exercise, India and Indonesia have the *Garuda Shakti*.

These diplomacy exercises include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) Plus, the most recent ASEAN-U.S Maritime Exercise (AUMX)¹⁷² established in 2019 (US Mission to ASEAN, 2019).XX In addition, through ASEAN-led platforms, Indonesia has also joined other multilateral defence cooperation efforts on much wider platforms. One example is the US-led biennial Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), the largest multilateral naval exercise carried out since 1971 (Chang & Jenne, 2020). Indonesia firstly joined this multilateral naval exercise in 2008 as an observer and has participated since then. Participation is not only aimed at harnessing the country's navy capability and interoperability, but also aimed at enhancing the recognition of Indonesia's navy on an international scale (AntaraBali, 2016; Antara, 2018).

Another US-led multilateral maritime defence diplomacy in which Indonesia is a member is the Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT).¹⁷³ Unlike other maritime exercises, SEACAT not only involves the naval forces of Southeast Asian countries, but also includes their coast guard units (Parameswaran, 2015; 2019). For this reason, Indonesia uses this opportunity to harness its capabilities and increase the international experience of its new coast guard unit by sending *Bakamla* to the exercise regularly (Vebriyanto, 2017).

As well as participating in other countries' multilateral navy exercises, Indonesia also organised its first multilateral navy exercise. The Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEK) was first launched at the end of Yudhyono's presidency in 2014 and has been carried out every two years since then (Inkiriwang, 2021). The participant countries in this biennial exercise are not limited to ASEAN member states, but also include two major regional powers, China and India. The US was also included in the third MNEK in 2018 (Parameswaran, 2018; Inkiriwang, 2021). While MNEK is a legacy from Widodo's predecessor, the Yudhyono administration, it has gained even more salience during the Widodo administration. Widodo's administration has organised this big event to reflect Indonesia's aspiration to play a more

¹⁷² There had been growing suspicion when the programme was first launched not only because the U.S. had already established maritime defence cooperation with ASEAN countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally, namely via CARAT and SEACAT (Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training), but also because the establishment of this programme came just a year after the launch and execution of the ASEAN-China maritime exercise in 2018.

¹⁷³ SEACAT was originally an acronym for Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism, as it was established in 2002, a year after the 9/11 attack on the U.S. The name was later changed in 2012 to underline the focus of the exercise, namely, to train navies and coast guard in the Southeast Asia in the fight against maritime-related crimes.

active role in the maritime domain as emphasised within its grand strategy, the GMF (Parameswaran, 2018).

The final noticeable feature of GMF implementation in the domain of defence and security is the build-up of Indonesia's navy capabilities. This research identifies three significant policies reflecting the efforts of the Widodo administration to concretise the grand strategy through the build-up of Indonesian naval forces. The first policy was the establishment of a new integrated military unit and base in Natuna in December 2018, which consists of three existing services within the country's military institutions: the Army (TNI AD), the Navy (TNI AL), and the Air Force (TNI AU)¹⁷⁴ as well as the country's Marine Command¹⁷⁵ (SCMP, 2018; CNNIndonesia, 2018).

The establishment of this unit cannot be separated from maritime incidents, if not maritime confrontations, that have occurred in the waters surrounding Natuna in recent years. Located in the northernmost region of the western part of Indonesia, Natuna and its seas serve as the country's frontline gate to the South China Sea. North of this island lies Indonesia's EEZ, where some of the area overlaps with other countries' maritime boundaries, most notably China's nine-dash line. Rich in underwater resources, the sea in this area has, therefore, been often claimed to be a traditional fishing ground by many. Considering these characteristics, it is unsurprising that Natuna and the sea surrounding it has long been identified as among the flashpoints that Indonesia has across its territory (Laksmana, 2011).

This classification is not without reason; even after Widodo had assumed power and explicitly ordered the sinking of boats and vessels found stealing the country's marine resources illegally, encroachment and the incidence of IUU fishing continued within the country's maritime boundaries. The year 2016 not only witnessed the relentless effort of Indonesia's maritime security agency to protect the country's waters and eradicate IUU fishing, but also saw maritime incidents involving Indonesia's Navy, KRI Imam Bonjol, and China's Coast Guard (Cochrane, 2016; Gumilang, 2016). Following these incidents, Widodo and several of his ministers flew to Natuna and conducted a "limited cabinet meeting" specifically discussing the issue in the surrounding sea on the same battleship involved in said

¹⁷⁴ TNI AD stands for *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Armed Forces) *Angkatan Darat* (army or the land/ground armed forces); AU for *Angkatan Udara* (Air Force); and AL for *Angkatan Laut* (Navy).

¹⁷⁵ Marine Corps, or *Korps Marinir*, is a unit within the Indonesian Navy that serves more as the infantry for the navy and the main amphibious unit of Indonesian military.

incident (JakartaPost, 2016). Aside from giving a strong signal of Indonesia's seriousness in protecting its waters, the meeting also was used to accelerate the establishment and development of an integrated tri-service base in Natuna, which was concluded in December 2018 (Laksmana, 2016).

The second policy was the establishment of another navy fleet command, the Third Fleet Command, as well as the Third Marine Corps based in Sorong-West Papua in 2018 (KKP, 2018). The establishment of the Third Fleet Command was important as previous maritime defence and security affairs in the eastern region of Indonesia were conducted under the command of the Second Fleet in Surabaya, which covered the central and eastern areas of Indonesia. The separation of the Third Fleet Command from the Second, and to a lesser extent, the establishment of the Third Marine Corps, reflected Widodo's administration's commitment to build the country's navy by expanding on its organisational and command structure, as well as the commitment to build Indonesia's maritime defence power and capabilities in the three regions of the country's maritime domain.

The final policy is the modernisation of the country's navy through the procurement of primary weaponry. Widodo's first term of presidency marks the second stage of the implementation of the Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) programme (2014-2019). MEF is a 15-year military modernisation programme launched during Yudhyono's first tenure with the aim of attaining a minimum or adequate level of operational readiness and force structure by 2024 that can be deployed to meet the country's strategic defence interests (Acharya, 2015; Roberts et al., 2015; Shekhar, 2018).

In addition to the Army, Yudhyono's MEF also focuses on the advancement of the country's Navy (TNI AL) and Air Force (TNI AU) (Wiranto, 2016). For the Navy, the initiative ambitiously targets the development of a five-fleet force consisting of 274 ships equipped with the capability to patrol, strike, and provide support by 2020 (Koh, 2015). Through this initiative, Indonesia was poised to achieve a "green-water navy" with the capacity to patrol Indonesia's littoral and archipelagic waters. As highlighted in Chapter I, the term "green-water navy" refers to the competency possessed by naval forces to conduct an effective operation in their littoral waters as well as in the open sea around their territorial waters (Supriyanto, 2012; Till & Bratton, 2012).

According to the MEF blueprint, by 2024 Indonesia's Naval Forces (TNI AL) are expected to possess approximately 182 ships, including 58 Frigates and Corvettes and 27 Fast

Attack Craft (FAC), 12 submarines, 100 Naval Aviation vessels, and 978 Marine Armoured Fighting Vehicles.¹⁷⁶ Throughout Widodo's first tenure of presidency, the administration conducted several procurements to enhance the operational readiness of the country's naval forces to meet the MEF target. The most notable example of this enhancement is the procurement of three *Chang Bogo*-class, which are also known as *Nagapasa*-class submarines, which were sent directly from the South Korean Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME). The KRI¹⁷⁷ *Nagapasa* (403) and the KRI *Ardadedali* (405) were commissioned in 2017 and 2018, respectively (Subianto, 2017; Kemhan, 2018). A third submarine was assembled in Indonesia by PT PAL in 2019,¹⁷⁸ though it was not commissioned until 2021 (Kemhan, 2021).

As well as procuring submarines, Indonesia's Navy was also able to add another two new Frigate-class ships during Widodo's first term. The two frigates, the KRI *Raden Eddy Martadinita* (331) and the KRI *I Gusti Ngurah Rai* (332), are guided-missile frigates of the *Martadinata*-class with SIGMA10514 type and manufactured under a joint project between the Dutch Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding and PT.PAL. Indonesia's Ministry of Defence commissioned the KRI *Raden Eddy Martadinita* (331) in April 2017 and assigned it as the flagship of the Indonesian navy (Tempo.co, 2017). The KRI *I Gusti Ngurah Rai* (332) was commissioned to the Indonesian Navy a year later at the beginning of 2018 (NavalToday, 2018). With all these procurements, by the end of Widodo's first term, Indonesia's Navy possessed five submarines, 13 frigates, and 20 corvettes in total (IIS, 2021).

¹⁷⁶ Unpublished materials at the hearing Session between the Commission I with the Indonesian Naval Forces about the Nanggala Incident.

¹⁷⁷ KRI stands for *Kapal Republik Indonesia* trans. as Indonesia's Navy Ships.

¹⁷⁸ PT. PAL is Indonesian State-Owned Enterprise that manufactures, repairs, and provides maintenance service for ships both with military and civilian purpose. The assembled of KRI *Alugoro* was under the agreement of transfer of technology with the DMSE.

CHAPTER VIII

THE EVALUATION OF GMF IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter aims to evaluate GMF implementation during Jokowi's first term of presidency in the field of foreign policy and defence and to seek the explanation of why the implementation of GMF in these two dimensions difficult (2014-2019). To achieve this objective, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents the assessment of GMF implementation in the two dimensions mentioned above during Jokowi's first term of presidency. The second section specifically attempts to examine the factors that hindered and made the implementation of GMF in the field of foreign policy and defence difficult.

VIII.1. Has the GMF Achieved its Goals? Evaluation of GMF implementation

One of the issues that gained attention during the last months of Jokowi's first tenure of presidency was the evaluation of the implementation of GMF grand strategy. Much of the commentary in the national media has claimed that Jokowi and his administration have failed to concretise the vision that he himself launched and vowed to achieve (TribunNews, 2016; Ambari, 2018; Apriani & Daniah, 2018; Ansari, 2019; CNNIndonesia, 2019; Fanani, 2019; Purnamasari, 2019; Tiola, 2019; Pikoli, 2021). Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that an intriguing question about GMF and its implementation came into being: "Is the GMF a policy failure?".

While as a grand strategy, GMF cannot be expected to be realized within the period of five years or even less—as Jokowi required at least two years for internal consolidation—, the research still sees the necessity of evaluating GMF implementation in Jokowi's first tenure. Prior to answering this question, the research defines what is referred to as "policy failure". In the realm of public policy, studying (policy) failure is seemingly much easier compared to studying (policy) success as (policy) failure is more ubiquitous than its counterpart, (policy) success, in much of the literature of public policy (McConnell, 2010a; McConnell, 2010b; Fitzgerald et al., 2011). With a body of literature covering the topic of (policy) failure, it is unsurprising that there have been multiple definitions of (policy) failure.

According to Allan McConnell (2015: 231), "failure resides at the extreme end of a success-failure spectrum where 'failure' is marked by an absolute non-achievement", contending that "failure is rarely unequivocal and absolute". For McConnell (2015: 231),

“even policies that have become known as classic policy failures also produced small and modest success”. Based on these definitions, it may be inferred that the categorisation of GMF implementation as a (policy) failure is difficult as the basic tenet of this version of “failure” definition requires GMF to achieve nothing, whereas the implementation of GMF, as elaborated on in Chapter VI, has produced various outputs.

Similarly, prominent public policy scholars Brian W. Hogwood and Lewis A. Gun (1986) have provided a model of definition that can be used to examine the existence of “failure” on GMF implementation. In their seminal work, Hogwood and Gun (1986) define policy failure in two different situations, namely non-implemented (or unimplemented) policy and unsuccessful (or poorly) implemented policy (Triana, 2011). In the first definition, policy failure is defined as an unimplementable or non-implemented policy as a result of many factors, including the incapacity of implementing actors to materialise the policy into a programme action (Williams, 1975) and the unwillingness of the involved actors to cooperate among themselves to implement said policy (Hogwood & Gun, 1986; Wahab, 2018; and Triana, 2011). In the second category, unsuccessful implementation refers to the condition whereby, though the policy has been implemented, it fails to produce the desired impacts or results (Hogwood & Gun, 1986; Wahab, 2018; Triana, 2011). In this sense, the emphasis of this policy failure is located in the incapacity and inability of the implementing actors to attain the goals targeted within it, whether because of internal or external factor (Grindle, 1980).

Thus, to answer the question, “Is the GMF a policy failure?”, one needs to put GMF implementation within each of the proposed definitions. Under the first definition, it is apparently not accurate to consider GMF implementation a (policy) failure as the primary requirement that constitutes the definition not being met, namely the non-implementation of the policy. The previous chapter, Chapter VI, elaborated on the effort of Jokowi administration to concretise the GMF by pursuing and implementing multiple actions and policies. Though Jokowi administration might have not carried out all the actions and policies designated to concretise the GMF, the evidence that there are some actions taken for the implementation of the GMF had already nullified the definition.

Similarly, the evaluation of GMF implementation using the second definition also leads to the same conclusion. Under the second circumstance, the definition emphasises the ability to attain the desired or targeted goals. As this dissertation has demonstrated that GMF implementation cannot be categorized as a failure as the implementation of GMF has been

able to meet numbers of the targeted goals, mentioned specifically within the 2017 Sea Policy. As an overarching policy, it is reasonable to state that GMF does not only comprise a single policy or programme; instead, it comprises a number of policies and programmes, scattered across multiple sectors, with their own targeted outputs. In this sense, the implementation of GMF should not be seen as a single policy with a small number of goals, but as a group of policies, or what the Action Plan of the 2017 Sea Policy refers to as a cluster of policies. Therefore, although GMF implementation might not have achieved all of the targeted goals assigned by the Action Plan for 2016-2019, the implementation of GMF, especially in the foreign policy and defence, cannot be categorized as a “failure” as a number of goals, both from the 2017 Ocean Policy’s Action Plan and the RPJMN (National Mid-Term Development Plan) 2014-2019 (as the primary source of the Action Plan), have been achieved (Bappenas, 2014).¹⁷⁹

To reiterate, as there was progress in GMF implementation throughout Jokowi’s first term, GMF is not a non-implemented policy. Moreover, considering the fact that GMF’s implementation has also been able to meet numbers of designated goals, as mentioned within the 2017 Sea Policy, it is not a poorly implemented policy either. Therefore, based on the definition, the research argues that it is difficult to say that GMF is a policy failure.

Nevertheless, this research asserts that the implementation of GMF should be evaluated as more than just an observation on its progress as well as on how it meets the targeted outputs designated by the policy document articulating the GMF. Instead of asking whether GMF implementation during Jokowi’s first term was a failure or not, the research attempts to evaluate GMF implementation through the following question: “How has the GMF implementation over the past five years helped Jokowi’s Indonesia to achieve its (maritime) aspiration in the field of foreign policy and defence?”. The research refers to the “country’s aspiration” or “GMF vision” as discussed by Jokowi when launching the GMF at the ninth EAS Summit 2014, stating the following (Seskab, 2014b):

“Indonesia must assert itself...as the power that lies between the two oceans...and therefore Indonesia has the obligation to build its maritime defence power...not only to protect its own maritime resources and sovereignty but also the safety of navigation and security of the maritime domain...and as the Global Maritime Fulcrum, Indonesia certainly has the interest in determining the future of the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.”

¹⁷⁹ The Presidential Regulation No. 16/2017 on Indonesian Ocean Policy

Similarly, the research also describes the “country’s aspiration and vision” as what is written in the Presidential Regulation No.16/2017,¹⁸⁰ as to become “... a sovereign, advanced, independent, and strong maritime country ... able to provide positive contribution for peace and security of the region as well as to the world.”¹⁸¹

From these two sources, the research interprets the country’s “aspiration” and “vision” through the GMF as becoming a strong maritime power that contributes to regional stability and peacebuilding, as well as being able to determine the future of the Indo-Pacific region. While the research recognizes the fuzziness of some of these terminologies based on academic definitions, such as “strong maritime power”, the research neither attempts to draw any indicators to define these concepts from any theoretical framework nor constructs the research’s own definition. Instead, to answer the question, the research looks at the changes that GMF implementation has brought to the aspects or dimensions that constitutes the grand strategy, which, in the context of this research, are foreign policy and defence dimensions.

Examining the implementation of the GMF elaborated in Chapter VI, it may be argued that the implementation of the grand strategy in the field of economics has had a more significant impact and caused changes across the country. Throughout Jokowi’s first term, much of the physical maritime infrastructure and connectivity was not only built and developed, but also operated, such as the Sea-Toll initiative and the construction of multiple ports, highways, and airports.¹⁸² The impact of GMF implementation on the country’s economy may be seen in the increase of Indonesia’s infrastructure index within the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) from 60 (2015)¹⁸³ to 67.7 (2019) of 100 (WEF, 2015; WEF, 2019; DPR, 2020).

Though GMF implementation brought some explicit, if not substantial, changes to the economy, a similar impact could not have been in foreign policy and defence-security, which is unsurprising and was expected. The research contends that the implementation gap, a term

¹⁸⁰ While there may also be some other interpretations of the GMF provided by other scholars, Rizal Sukma argues that it is more legitimate to base the interpretation of the “vision” and “aspiration” on the official definition of the grand strategy and Jokowi’s remarks during official events.

¹⁸¹ Sea Policy, *Op.Cit*, Art 1 Point 2.

¹⁸² While further assessment is needed to see the future level of effectivity of these initiatives and development, the existence of multiple physical maritime infrastructures and their operation in the country reflects explicit change in the country’s economic and transportation sectors.

¹⁸³ The data was equated with the current scoring model. Before 2018, the GCI used a score of 1-7. However, the scoring model was changed in 2018 using the GCI 4.0, with a score of 1-100.

coined by Dunsire (1978) to refer to the discrepancy between what is expected or desired (from a policy) and what is really achieved (after being implemented), occurred not only because of the implementation (poorly implemented), but also because it was poorly formulated, a problem that exists even before implementation phase. For this research, the problem is not merely technical, administrative, or even financial, but also political.

As discussed in the introduction chapter, this research does not treat policy implementation as a separate or independent body. Policy implementation, instead, is considered by the research an integral component of the whole process of policy formulation, in which the process of designing and making of a policy determines the quality of the policy that is planned to be implemented (Grindle, 1980; Hogwood & Gun, 1986; Fischer *et al.*, 2007; McConnell, 2010b; FitzGerald *et al.*, 2011; McConnell, 2015). In the context of the research topic, the research identifies the 2017 Ocean Policy and its Action Plan as the primary cause that created an implementation gap in the implementation of the GMF. For the research, it is indeed contradictory that, even though Presidential Regulation No.16/2017 provides a clear definition of the GMF as the country's grand strategy, the same regulation also consists of elements that diminish the country's capacity to achieve the vision.

According to Evan Laksmana (2017; 2019), a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta, since the GMF was never a well-developed grand strategy crafted through years of research and conceptual development, instead being just a campaign program used to differentiate Jokowi with his rival in the 2014 Presidential Election, it is unsurprising that the policies and programmes within the Action Policy are just programmes and policies that already existed across different ministries and agencies. Instead of proposing new policy actions and programmes, Jokowi administration decided to use existing policies and programmes and connect them under one "bureaucratic umbrella" document (Laksmana, 2017; Sulaiman, 2019).

While the decision to unite different policies and programmes across ministries and agencies under one umbrella policy may appear efficient, Jokowi administration did not set or assign any single authoritative body to, what Laksmana (2017) refers to as, "to corral the ministers or agencies into concerted action". As elaborated on in Chapter VI, though the 2017 Ocean Policy does use the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs to coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the implementation of the GMF – as stipulated under the Article 6.1 of Presidential Regulation No. 16/2017 on the Indonesian Sea Policy — the execution of

hundreds of activities and programmes still fall under the authority of the respective agencies and ministries.¹⁸⁴

To further complicate matters, the authority given to the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs to coordinate with other ministries also overlaps with the authority of other coordinating ministries, namely the Coordinating Ministry of Legal, Security, and Political Affairs. Under the law, the Coordinating Ministry of Legal, Security, and Political Affairs oversees the work of the legal, political, and security-related ministries, such as the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the authority given by Presidential Regulation No. 16/2017 to the Indonesian Sea Policy, both coordinating ministries now must share the coordinating function of overseeing the execution of maritime-related programmes and policies by both the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without clear separation and limit on the scope of authority of each coordinating ministry.

This move has created confusion, if not chaos, in the implementation of GMF in the field of foreign policy and defence. The problem of coordination, in fact, is not only endemic to the 2017 Sea Policy and its Action Plan. The same issue also exists and can easily be found across almost all levels of government, including at the presidential level. Laksmana (2019) asserts that, “even the management of his (Jokowi’s) own office continues to be split between the chief of staff, state secretary, and cabinet secretary”.

Aside from the absence of new programmes and policies, another feature of the Action Plan that contributed to the poor GMF implementation in producing desired changes was because the Action Plan heavily emphasizes domestic (inward looking) and economic issues. Of the total of 425 policy activities, 23 are oriented for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and less than 60 for both the Ministry of Defence and TNI.¹⁸⁵ As the majority of the policy activities are related to domestic and economic issues and not equally distributed to foreign policy and defence, it is unsurprising that the implementation of the GMF did not bring substantial changes to these elements. Therefore, what went wrong with the Sea Policy?

VIII.1.a. Foreign Policy

It is not only the proportion of policy activities that languish the GMF’s foreign policy element, but also the quality of the policy activities (Laksmana, 2017b). This research argues

¹⁸⁴ Sea Policy, *Op. Cit.*, Art 6 Point 3.

¹⁸⁵ Sea Policy, *Op. Cit.*, Annex II

that, from the 23 policy activities listed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the majority are still related to the “business-as-usual” and ceremonial activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in general, such a “norms-building”, border negotiation, and multilateral diplomacy, without paying significant attention to pressing issues such as the South China Sea, as also asserted by Laksmana (2017a). While border diplomacy is important and may also be included among the pressing issues, it should be noted that it has always been one of the duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even before the emergence of the GMF. In addition, as border diplomacy requires an indeterminate timeline since it is based on mutual agreement from both participating sides to commence negotiations and talks, it is expected that this policy cannot to bring significant changes to the practice of foreign policy.

This research argues that the Action Plan of the 2017 Ocean Policy does not provide much aid in bringing significant change to the country’s foreign policy as envisioned in the GMF. This lack of change may have occurred because the policy itself – not only due to its bromidic contents, but also through its “minimalist” programmes and activities — has limited the country’s ability to pursue a foreign policy that truly resembles the vision of GMF, the foreign policy that reflects the country’s geographical characteristics. Though the Action Plan has explicitly mentioned maritime diplomacy as the country’s own foreign policy instrument to concretise GMF, in reality, maritime diplomacy practice has been mainly limited to maritime border negotiation and norms building and promotion that are mostly procedural and ceremonial, and depends significantly on multilateral framework like ASEAN, rather than focusing on impacts (Laksmana, 2018).

Laksmana and Ristian A. Supriyanto (2018) calls the country’s maritime foreign policy style to focus more on something less-critical as “minimalist archipelagic” or “*unthalassic*”¹⁸⁶ foreign policy. For this research, although Indonesia is an archipelago due to its geographical feature, it has never had a real maritime, or what Laksmana and Supriyanto (2018) refer to as “archipelagic” foreign policy,¹⁸⁷ especially after the New Order. Archipelagic foreign policy in this context is a foreign policy that reflects, and manifests archipelagic features,

¹⁸⁶ In Greek Mythology, Thalassa was the primaeval spirit of the sea. In this context, the authors refer to Thalassa as everything related to the sea. Thus, *Unthalassic* negates the original meaning.

¹⁸⁷ The term was first coined by Yayan GF Mulyana, a Senior Diplomat and Yudhyono’s former Special Staff, in his writing in the *JakartaPost.com* in January 2012, titled “Developing Archipelagic Foreign Policy”. While the concept has never been developed by scholars, it can be simply understood as a foreign policy that consistently embraces and manifests the features and interests of the archipelagic Indonesia in accordance with the Archipelagic Outlook (*Wawasan Nusantara*).

characteristics, and interests of the country as promulgated by the Archipelagic Outlook (Mulyana, 2012). Indonesia's archipelagic interests do not only comprise of internal or inward interests, such as maritime trade, development, or even internal security, but also extend to external or outward interests such as Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing and disputes over maritime territory that affect the peace and stability of the region.

Geoffrey Till (2015a), a prominent naval historian, describes Indonesia's lacklustre approach to taking seriously its maritime elements in policy and strategy making as what he refers to as "sea blindness". Till defines "sea blindness" as a condition wherein a country underrates the importance of its maritime domain or acknowledge the importance of this domain but eventually decide to prioritize other issues (Till, 2015a; Till & Supriyanto, 2018). In the context of Indonesia, the treating its maritime domain more as a source of threat rather than opportunity and the disappearance of the Indian Ocean region from the mental map of Indonesia following the fall of the Old Order are examples of "sea blindness" (Till, 2015a; Shekhar, 2018). Indonesia's attitude toward its maritime domain may explain its inwardness and "reactionary" behaviour towards the maritime domain. In this sense, the attention given to the maritime geography of the country has been mostly driven by a sudden or imminent sense of insecurity rather than a deep interest to exploit or maximise the opportunity presented by the potential of the country's maritime domain.

This may explain the disappearance of Indian Ocean from Indonesia's mental map and strategic thinking. While the attention on Indian Ocean begun to fade by the fall of Sukarno, Indian Ocean returned to the core of Indonesia's strategic thinking during 1970s to 1980s when the area started to become a hotspot for great power competition, preoccupying the country's elites that the tension in the Indian Ocean region would spread to the Pacific (Laksmana, 2011; Shekhar, 2018). However, when the sense of insecurity disappeared with the end of the Cold War, the attention on the region begun to disappear as well (Laksmana, 2011; Shekhar, 2018).

For Laksmana and Supriyanto (2018), maritime diplomacy that has been practiced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot be categorised as an archipelagic foreign policy. Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs treats maritime diplomacy as one of the features or priorities of Indonesia's foreign policy (Kemlu, 2015). According to Laksmana and Supriyanto (2018), archipelagic foreign policy should encompass the entire foreign policy itself, which institutionalizes and incorporates the archipelagic interests into the country's foreign policy.

Through the adoption of this foreign policy, Indonesia is expected to firstly be able to define the priorities that meet the archipelagic needs — beyond the conventional external interests of border diplomacy – and mainstream these priorities with existing international agendas that affect the country’s interests, such as climate change and food security (Mulyana, 2012).

Secondly, to help the country in defining its foreign policy instruments to respond to rising archipelagic challenges, such as the instrument of trade to boost the integration of regional markets of Southeast Asia that have an archipelagic portion. Thirdly, to help the country in identifying the imperatives that emerge at the crossing point between the national security and foreign policy for Indonesia. Examples of these imperatives are the urgency to ensure and develop the national tactical and strategic capacity to respond to both traditional and non-traditional security challenges.

However, this research does not argue that Jakarta has never had any foreign policy related to maritime issues. Historically, since its independence, Indonesia has also payed attention to its maritime geography, rooting from its historical narratives and awareness on its strategic position at the crossroads of the two oceans (Weinstein, 2007; Kusumoprojo, 2009; Frederick & Worden, 2011; Mulyana, 2012; Reid, 2012; Till, 2015a & 2015b; Tellis et al., 2016; Butcher & Elson, 2017).

Some of the outputs reflecting the country’s maritime interest are the Djuanda Declaration, Archipelagic Outlook (*Wawasan Nusantara*), and the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) 1982. Though Indonesia has obtained international acknowledgement of its archipelagic domain through UNCLOS 1982, the country remains hesitant to develop its archipelagic foreign policy. The rise of Jokowi has indeed brought “the country’s maritime element” to the top of his administration. Through GMF, Jokowi envisions Indonesia to become a respected maritime country and be able to also determine the future of the region (Cabinet Secretary, 2014). Jokowi’s ascendancy to power along with his maritime grand strategy has also been unable to break the country’s “sea-blindness” and lacklustre approach to considering maritime geography as a determinant factor in the country’s foreign policy. The lack of archipelagic-like foreign policy has clearly resulted in confusion, if not chaos, as well as inconsistency within the implementation of GMF. One of the impacts of the absence of an archipelagic foreign policy can be found in the country’s response to the Permanent Court Tribunal’s ruling on the South China Sea.

Instead of embracing and welcoming this ruling, Indonesia's reaction was silence and apathy (Connelly, 2016; Laksmana, 2016; Weatherbee, 2017; Laksmana & Supriyanto, 2018). Following the ruling, Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release stating several points (Kemlu, 2016a): firstly, calling all parties to exercise self-restraint and refrain from any activities that could escalate the situation, such as through the militarisation of the South China Sea, while also respecting the international laws, including UNCLOS 1982; secondly, calling all parties to continue the common commitment to uphold peace and exhibit friendship and cooperation; thirdly, urging all parties to behave and conduct their activities in accordance with the agreed-upon principles; fourthly, continuing to push for a peaceful, free, and neutral zone in Southeast Asia to further strengthen ASEAN political and security community; and fifthly, urging all claimant states to continue peaceful negotiations over overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea based on international law.

The importance of the ruling for Indonesia is undebatable. Not only it expanded Indonesia's EEZ, but through the ruling, Indonesia's sovereignty over its waters, including territorial and jurisdictional waters around Natuna, has also, once again, been strengthened. The ruling has also made a clear assertion of making UNCLOS the only framework for states to generate their maritime zone. Therefore, other frameworks inconsistent with the UNCLOS cannot be applied, if not illegal, to generate maritime zone. This list of frameworks includes the nine-dash line or claims based on traditional fishing grounds.

For this research, the absence of an explicit mentioning of the ruling within the official statement of Indonesia on the PCA ruling, the change of the country's map and name of its EEZ, and the statement made by Luhut on the Natuna Sea, indicate not only inconsistency in Indonesia's (foreign) policy on the South China Sea, but also Indonesia's lacklustre to external affairs. Furthermore, the absence of Indonesia's efforts and initiatives to push the inclusion of the ruling — that promotes the respect and application of UNCLOS 1982 — to any ASEAN (official) documents or to any dispute settlement related to maritime territory also add the indication of Indonesia's lack of interest to go beyond its domestic confinement (Weatherbee, 2017). Notwithstanding the country's position in the region and the aspiration of GMF that envisions Indonesia as an important actor that should also be able to shape the region's future, Indonesia remains hesitant and shows little interest in taking leadership and going beyond its traditional scope of foreign policy.

Similarly, Indonesia's policies on the Indo-Pacific cooperation were also not fairly represented and very "minimalist" within the 2017 Sea Policy. The term "Indo-Pacific" (PACINDO)¹⁸⁸ was even absent from both Annexes I and II of the 2017 Sea Policy, which hosts the Action Plan document. In addition, even the word "Indian" and "Pacific" only appear less than 10 times each within the 2017 Sea Policy, with each word only appearing once for the word "Indian", referring to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and twice for the word "Pacific". The only IORA reference within the Action Plan does not even contain a more clear and specific target output except "active participation".¹⁸⁹

Indonesia has been active in IORA since 2015, when the country assumed the chair of this organization (2015-2017), which was followed by the success of Indonesia to organise the first IORA Summit in 2017 and the adoption of the Jakarta Concord (Setkab, 2017), 2017.¹⁹⁰ Jokowi's Indonesia has also grown bilateral ties with India, marked by the visit of Jokowi to India in 2016 and Modi's trip to Indonesia in 2018 (JakartaPost, 2016; 2018). However, these two examples cannot be considered the materialisation of one of the GMF's basic tenets, namely the expansion of Indonesia's strategic outlook. The main reason for this evaluation is because both Indonesia's activism in IORA and Indonesia-India bilateral relations remain "minimalist" as they are still "ceremonial" and "procedural".

With the increase of Indo-Pacific narrative, Indonesia began to put more focus on the Indo-Pacific narrative since 2018. Despite Indonesia's active role in promoting its version of Indo-Pacific to ASEAN, which eventually led to the adoption of its version of the Indo-Pacific cooperation by the organization named the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) during the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in June 2019 (Bayuni, 2019), Indonesia's approach to the Indo-Pacific during Jokowi's first term remains minimal and has not been able to achieve the expectations stipulated by the GMF (Widodo & Kalla, 2014).

There are two characteristics of Indonesia's approach to Indo-Pacific that the research argues caused the output of this policy to bring minimal change to the country's foreign policy and particularly the concretisation of the GMF grand strategy. First, of which is what drives Indonesia to suddenly develop its Indo-Pacific concept. In this context, "suddenness" signifies

¹⁸⁸ The term stands for "Pacific Indo" and was used by Jokowi in the beginning to refer his Indo-Pacific narrative.

¹⁸⁹ Sea Policy, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁹⁰ See the official document Jakarta Concord, The Indian Ocean Rim Association: Promoting Regional Cooperation for A Peaceful, Stable and Prosperous Indian Ocean from https://ditjenppi.kemendag.go.id/assets/files/publikasi/doc_20180626_jakarta-concord.pdf.

that the policy to conceptualise Indo-Pacific did not exist in the document that serves as the basis for GMF implementation, the Action Plan document, although Jokowi in his campaign and introduction of GMF had clearly stipulated the necessity to include this region within the country's foreign policy canvas (Widodo & Kalla, 2014).

For this research, Indonesia's "sudden interest" in developing and championing its version of Indo-Pacific was certainly not driven by the tenet of GMF. If so, Jokowi's Indonesia would also have included the activity and output of producing and promoting its version of the Indo-Pacific cooperation, or what Jokowi termed during his campaign as the Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (PACINDO) in the Action Plan of the 2017 Sea Policy. As highlighted in Chapter VI, since the ascendancy of the Trump administration, the great powers in Indo-Pacific had been actively promoting and enticing Indonesia and other ASEAN countries to join their versions of Indo-Pacific framework.

In terms of the content, the existing framework can be separated into two groups; that proposed by countries attempting to balance China (i.e. India, the US, and Japan), which heavily emphasises military cooperation and would exclude China's participation in the Indo-Pacific cooperation, and that proposed by China itself, which emphasises economic cooperation through loans and investment opportunities (Belt and Road Initiative [BRI]) but excludes great powers from outside the Pacific region and across the continent of Asia. Against this backdrop, Indonesia's elites have been anxious that increasing competition among great powers would drag the country into a great power competition, thus undermining the country's strategic and independent position, as well as the centrality of ASEAN, which also serves as Jakarta's primary instrument in hedging vis-à-vis major powers (Chacko, 2016; Scott, 2019; Sulaiman, 2019; Weatherbee, 2017; Anwar, 2020). In this way, one can see that the primary driving force for Indonesia to develop and advocate its own version of Indo-Pacific cooperation was to maintain the status quo rather than to concretise the GMF (Scott, 2019; Sulaiman, 2019).

Besides the original motives, another characteristic that made Indonesia's Indo-Pacific cooperation less significant and "less-helpful" in concretising the GMF is a lack of foreign policy focus. As the development and promotion of Indonesia's Indo-Pacific concept was mostly driven by a sense of insecurity, maintaining the status quo, and preventing the escalation of tension, it is logical and unsurprising that Indonesia did not include foreign policy issues that are sensitive but critical and urgent – such as China's assertiveness in the South

China Sea or the importance of promoting the PCA's ruling as the only mean to resolve maritime territorial issues – for the country's Indo-Pacific framework (Scott, 2019; Sulaiman, 2019; Weatherbee, 2019). While Indonesia may obtain the leadership position in pursuing its version of Indo-Pacific cooperation that was adopted by ASEAN, the absence of a critical foreign policy element has resembled a lost opportunity for Indonesia to project its foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region to pursue its external maritime interests and prevented the country from concretising its maritime vision (Anwar, 2020; Leong, 2020).

For this research, though the Jokowi administration has taken a number of steps in realising the GMF's foreign policy dimension through the implementation of the Action Plan, this dimension remains far from being fully concretised as the implementation during Jokowi's first term did not bring the substantial changes as could be expected based on the grand strategy. In fact, the research argues that, even if Jokowi's administration had been able to implement all the policy activities listed within Action Plan's cluster of foreign policy (Cluster I), Indonesia would still have not achieved the significant changes in the country's foreign policy as envisioned by the GMF. Yohannes Sulaiman's (2019:25) description may give a much clearer idea of Indonesia's foreign policy under Jokowi:

[D]espite all the excitement about the concept of President Joko Widodo's Global Maritime Fulcrum adding something new to Indonesia's foreign policy, in the end the country's foreign policy does not deviate much from its basic principles of *resilience*, *non-intervention*, and a *free and active foreign policy*, which by design has an inward-looking orientation, and focuses only on short-term or immediate foreign policy goals and accomplishments, notably maintaining current peace. In the long run, these three principles severely limit the foreign policy options that Indonesia could take.

VIII.1.b. Defence Policy

Similar to the foreign policy dimension, GMF implementation during Jokowi's first term was not also able to bring substantial changes to the country's defence sector. Budget constraints may be attributed as a factor that has hindered the development of Indonesia's military capabilities and the modernisation of its capabilities, particularly the navy as the main actor in the country's maritime defence. During the presidential campaign, Jokowi promised to increase the country's military spending up to 1.5 per cent of the GDP based on a 7 per cent annual economic growth assumption (Aditya, 2014). However, as the country's

economic growth never reached 7 per cent throughout Jokowi's first term, the country's military spending has only fluctuated between 0.7 and 0.9 per cent of the GDP.¹⁹¹

While budget limitations may have impeded the effort to modernise the country's naval forces, budget limitation should not be the primary hindrance. As political willingness and decisions could override this challenge. One example can be found during the New Order era. While the country's economy during the 1970s and 1980 displayed Indonesia's recovery from the economic crisis left by the previous the Old Order (Schwarz, 1994; Elias & Noone, 2011), in terms of navy development, there was no significant effort made to develop the country's maritime defence capabilities (Raymond, 2017).

The research, therefore, identifies a more substantive factor that hinders the optimal concretisation of GMF within this dimension. The research also identifies the existence of a "minimalist" Action Plan of 2017 Ocean Policy as the primary factor that impedes the realisation of GMF's aspiration of making Indonesia's military a respected maritime regional force (Jokowi-JK, 2014). As discussed earlier in this chapter, among the 425 policies outlined within the Action Plan, less than 60 were dedicated to defence.¹⁹²

Instead of elaborating on novel programme activities reflecting the necessity required for transforming Indonesia's defence forces, the Action Plan on defence mostly contains only existing programmes from the Ministry of Defence and the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). Similar to the policy and programme activities for foreign policy, programme and policy activities for (maritime) defence pillar are "minimalist" and heavily emphasise technical, administrative, and business-as-usual programmes. In addition, several programme activities were also found to be ceremonial, symbolic, and ideological rather than targeting substantial changes or the improvement of Indonesian maritime defence capabilities.

Similar to its implementation in foreign policy, the research also finds that more substantive programmes are needed to concretise the GMF. In relation to foreign policy, the Action Plan failed to address the need to develop an "archipelagic foreign policy"; while with respect to defence, the same document also failed to include the necessity to develop an "archipelagic defence doctrine". Similar to its counterpart in foreign policy, the "archipelagic defence doctrine" in this context is defined as a defence doctrine that not merely reflects and

¹⁹¹ World Bank, "Indonesia's Military Expenditure (% of the GDP) 2008-2020 accessed from <https://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/military-expenditure-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html>.

¹⁹² Sea Policy, *Op. Cit.*, Annex II

manifests the geographical elements of the country, but also pursues archipelagic interests as stipulated by GMF to become a respected regional maritime power (Jokowi-JK, 2014). In this way, the doctrine should have been used not only as the main doctrine for military operational purposes, but also as the guideline to develop Indonesia's maritime defence strategy and capability.

According to Till (2015a), there is a clear distinction between "being maritime" and "being a maritime power" (Till & Supriyanto, 2018). He defines "being maritime" as a condition based on a matter of circumstance, in which a country has little or no control (Till, 2015). In this context, a country may have maritime interests derived from the international context or characteristics already embedded to a country – such as maritime geography and maritime culture – but not the capacity and capability to develop, defend, or pursue maritime interests and turn them into advantages for the country (Till, 2015a; Till & Supriyanto, 2018). On the contrary, "being a maritime power" is described as the capacity and capability possessed by a country to control maritime circumstances and use them as benefits (Till, 2015a; Till & Supriyanto, 2018).

Rather than developing a "maritime defence doctrine" aimed to harness the country's capability and capacity needed to become a maritime power, Jokowi administration continues to use the existing defence doctrines that do not emphasise maritime elements. These two doctrines are *Ketahanan Nasional* (National Resilience) and *Sishankamrata* (Total People's Defence) (Anwar: 1996; Sebastian, 2006; Widjajanto, 2010; Edwards & Ramadhani, 2016; Raymond, 2017; Arif & Kurniawan, 2018; Shekhar, 2018). As both doctrines were formulated long before the emergence of the GMF and based on domestic and international contexts at the time, the research contends that these two doctrines not only do not fit within the GMF framework, but also are outdated as they do not reflect the dynamics of the modern world. In fact, the adoption of these two doctrines has also led to the emergence of two traits that hinder both the transformation of the country's defence institution more adaptive to the contemporary challenges and the concretisation of the GMF. These traits speak to an inward-looking orientation that refrains the country from pursuing its external objectives, and the army-centric perspective that impedes both the development of the country's maritime domain and its naval forces.

Similar to the existence of archipelagic foreign policy, a maritime-based defence doctrine is also critical as it may provide guidelines for the country's defence institutions to

formulate policies and programmes that meet the necessity and support the efforts to concretise the GMF. The relationship and correlation between doctrinal and operational policies are best displayed by Till’s hierarchical tiers of decision making as displayed in Graph 8.1 (Till, 2015; Till & Supriyanto, 2018). Though these tiers may be obscure, the hierarchy may give a clearer picture on the relationship.

Figure 8.1 Tiers of decision making in naval modernization



From this graph, it is apparent that the final outputs (operational level) from this hierarchical and linear process is dependent on the outputs from the previous phases. Different outputs from the previous process also result in different outputs in the later process. In the context of the research topic, the presence of less substantive and “less” maritime-based policies and programmes may be attributed to the absence of a “more” substantive maritime-based doctrine or the use a of totally different doctrine and strategy and not necessarily derived from the grand strategy. This difference could occur as the involved actors in this phase may have different interpretations of the GMF due to their lack of knowledge or the existing perspectives on the country’s strategic thinking, which are further discussed in the following section.

As well as minimalist substantive policies and programme activities in the 2017 Sea Policy’s Action Plan, the impact of the absence of an archipelagic defence doctrine may also be seen in the confusion, inconsistency, and incoherence of Jokowi’s defence policy during his first term. The first example may be found in the country’s 2015 Defence White Paper. Besides not providing a specific elaboration on the budgetary aspects, this paper did not offer elaboration on the country’s strategy to implement the GMF in the dimension of defence or a clear plan on how it will develop its naval forces as the core actor in the GMF’s defence

dimension. In addition, this white paper also focuses on internal (unconventional) threats that often transpire in land, except for IUU Fishing, such as armed rebellion, extremism, trafficking, and drug abuse (Kemhan, 2015).

On the contrary, the white paper does not provide much elaboration on external conventional threats in the form of invasion or territorial intrusion that will mostly take place in the maritime domain of Indonesia. The only external threat mentioned in the white paper is a threat of foreign ideology (Extremism, Communism, and Neoliberalism) and intervention that can threaten the unity of the country, which happened in Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan (Kemhan, 2015). However, this threat cannot be only considered an external threat, regardless of the origin, since it is significant on a domestic level in the form of terrorism and secessionist movement.

Another peculiarity of the 2015 Defence White Paper that reflects the confusion of the Jokowi administration in formulating programmes and policies in line with the efforts to concretise the GMF is the existence of *Bela Negara* (State Defence programme). The State Defence programme is an indoctrination programme that aims to instil nationalism and patriotism to the country's civil population, mostly younger generations, through basic military training (Kemhan, 2015; 2016; Haripin et al., 2021). For this research, while the indoctrination programme may have a positive impact on the increase of the country's defence capability in the long term, the inclusion of this activity in an official document that serves as the skeleton for the implementation of a maritime-based grand-strategy demonstrates confusion and misunderstanding of Jokowi's officials to comprehend in articulating the GMF. *Bela Negara* should be treated as no more than just a ministry's regular programme, though the core of this programme is also ideological and has little relevancy in the development of Indonesia maritime defence capabilities. Furthermore, although the programme also includes some basic military training, it is less related to maritime defence.

Similar to other countries' defence white papers, Indonesia's Defence White Papers also serves as an official document containing a comprehensive long-term plan for the country's defence. The document, therefore, reflects the orientation, programme plans, and objectives of the country's Ministry of Defence at least in two to three years or throughout Jokowi's first term. The lack of clarity and tangible strategies, as well as the incoherent and inconsistent policy and programmes within the white paper, may indicate the existence of

whether the confusion, if not failure, or unwillingness of the Ministry of Defence to articulate and concretise the GMF (Edwards & Ramadhani, 2016).

Aside from the minimalist (archipelagic) defence policy, the absence of an archipelagic defence doctrine also results in the imbalanced attention received by each service of Indonesia's armed forces (TNI), particularly in relation to the development of each service. This research argues that the adoption of land-centric defence doctrines, the National Resilience and the Total People's Defence doctrine, has also resulted in the adoption of land-centric defence and strategic thinking that has reinforced a concentration on one particular service; the army (TNI AD) (Anwar: 1996; Sebastian, 2006; NIDS, 2010; Widjajanto, 2010, Arif & Kurniawan, 2018; Shekhar, 2018). On operational and tactical levels, the Total People's Defence doctrine is translated as territorial warfare and guerrilla tactics.

While the Total People's Defence doctrine also incorporates the country's navy (TNI AL) and Air Force (TNI AU), their roles remain minimal. Under territorial warfare strategy, Indonesia's territory is divided into three zones, namely the buffer zone (located at the country's EEZ), the main defence zone (the territorial waters), and the zone of resistance (main islands) (Widjajanto, 2010; Arif & Kurniawan, 2018). Indonesia's navy and Air Force play an important role in defending the country within the first and second zones, whereas the army is the main force defending the country in the third zone, either by intercepting or denying the enemy. While this schematic defence appears to be fair in terms of the distribution of roles, in reality it is not as the weight of the three zones varies.

In a war or invasion scenario, among the three zones, the last zone weighs far more than the other two. From the perspective of the Indonesian military, the final and decisive battle will certainly take place on land, where the capital resides, and not in the air or even water. Even if Indonesia lose its waters, it cannot tolerate losing its land, its last possession. Even if Indonesia's army is still not able to take counteroffensive measures and repel the invaders, the defence and strategy doctrine of Indonesia, the Total People's Defence, recommends the involvement of all elements to participate in defending the country through guerrilla warfare until the cost of the war is longer bearable by the invader (Sebastian, 2006).

Based on this strategic thinking, the army's position, as the last resort of the country's defence forces, surpasses the other two services. The navy and Air Force, based on this logic, are considered only supporting elements in any military operation, wherein the army plays a central role (Sebastian, 2006; Raymond, 2017; Arif & Kurniawan, 2018). The consequence of

this logic therefore means that the country not only requires a huge amount of army personnel to ensure the safety of the country, but also needs more of the already limited budget to the army, as shown in the military’s budget from 2015 to 2017¹⁹³ in Table 7.1.¹⁹⁴

Table 8.1 Indonesia’s military budget 2015-2019 (in Millions of USD)¹⁹⁵

No.	Service	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
1.	TNI HQ	502	581	768	525	555
2.	TNI AD (Army)	2,958	3,001	3,498	3,160	3,318
3.	TNI AL (Navy)	1,228	1,104	1,564	1,123	1,273
4.	TNI AU (Air Force)	872	954	1,224	878	1000
Total		5,614	5,739	7,054	5,688	6,146

Table 8.1 clearly demonstrates the imbalance in budget distribution between the services within the Indonesian military institution (TNI). According to this data, the Army received the majority of the military budget share each year from 2015 to 2019. Annually, the Army received more than 50 per cent, leaving the other two services less than 30 per cent of budget allocation. Borrowing a term well-known in Indonesian politics, namely “budgetary politics is the solid proof of support”, this research contends that the imbalance in the budget distribution share among the services under the country’s military institution (TNI) reflects the degree of Jokowi administration’s commitment to concretise the GMF grand strategy.

It has been argued that the modest Navy’s budget can be attributed to the fact that it had already received three submarines throughout the first term of Jokowi administration (Tiola, 2019). In addition to these three submarines, Jokowi administration also secured the contract for three further submarines worth USD 900 million expected to be commissioned during the second term of Jokowi’s administration (NavalToday, 2019). However, for a country with a maritime domain as large as that of Indonesia, what the Jokowi administration has done for the country’s navy or maritime defence development in general, including through the Action Plan of the 2017 Ocean Policy, is still “minimal”, particularly considering the country’s aspirations to transform itself into a respected regional maritime power.

¹⁹³ Though the research took the budget only in the years of 2016 and 2017 due to the availability of data, the trend remains similar until the end of Jokowi’s first term as is shown in the new allocated military budget for 2019-2022.

¹⁹⁴ Unpublished data taken from the meeting between the TNI and the Commission I of the House of Representative of the Republic of Indonesia (Confidential).

¹⁹⁵ Confidential data. The data is mix of budget ceiling and allocation. Multiple sources obtained from closed door hearings with TNI and the Ministry of Defense.

Though the Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) modernisation plan provides an opportunity for the navy and Air Force to develop (Shekhar & Liow, 2014; Acharya, 2015; Collin, 2015; Raymond, 2017; Arif & Kurniawan, 2018), MEF is also unable to shoulder the transformation of Indonesia's navy and realize the country's aspirations in terms of the GMF. As the MEF was launched before the GMF and was made not specifically only for the navy, it does not address all of the necessities of the GMF. In this way, this research contends that, even if Indonesia was able to complete all the MEF phases for the navy, a concretized GMF is still far from reality.

As expressed by its name, the MEF is a modernisation plan aimed at achieving minimum defence capabilities or strengths that can be used to attain the country's immediate strategic defence interests through the procurement of a new weaponry system and equipment, and by replacing the outdated main weapon system and equipment.¹⁹⁶ In terms of the navy, the implementation of this programme is oriented at achieving what is known as "green-water navy", a navy that can operate and patrol effectively within littoral or territorial waters of a country while also having a limited capacity to operate beyond a country's territorial waters or high seas (Acharya, 2015; Collin, 2015; Scotts, 2019). Under the MEF, the navy is expected to have 274 ships with strike, patrol, and support capabilities (Shekhar & Liow, 2014; Collin, 2015; Till, 2015a; Arif & Kurniawan, 2018; Scotts, 2019).


Figure 8.2 shows the MEF progress and target sets by the Indonesian government for each phase.¹⁹⁷ According to this figure, Indonesian government has never been able to meet the MEF's target ever since it was launched, and this trend is expected to continue until the end of the MEF programme. Observing this condition, a number of scholars therefore have expressed concerns not only about the ability of the Indonesian government to concretise their MEF initiative, but also to attain "green water navy" status by 2024. For scholars, it is not only about the financial incapability of Indonesian government, but also the thrust of the MEF that does not focus on maritime defence and does not reflect the interest in developing the country's maritime defence by prioritising the navy and Air Force (Collin, 2015; Arif & Kurniawan, 2018). In addition, critiques have also been made of the strategy to implement

¹⁹⁶ *Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 7 Tahun 2008 tentang Kebijakan Umum Pertahanan Negara* (trans. Presidential Regulation No. 7/2008 on General Policy Guidelines on State Defence Policy).

¹⁹⁷ Confidential and unpublished data, Ministry of Defense (2019).

the plan such as through buying second-hand weaponry system or equipment and lack of attention to the risk of overrun projects (Collin, 2015).

Figure 8.2 The Progress of MEF (%)



Pre-MEF : Before 2010

MEF-I : 2010 – 2014

MEF II : 2015 - 2019

MEF III : 2020 - 2024

The research, therefore, contends for the importance of modifying or calibrating the MEF plan to suit the objectives of the GMF in defence if the MEF is still determined to support the concretization of the GMF. In fact, Jokowi himself has stated, in his campaign manifesto, that through the GMF, the advancement of Indonesia’s defence capability is not only oriented to meet the MEF, but also directed at making Indonesia’s defence forces a respected regional maritime power (Jokowi-JK, 2014). Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the use of the existing MEF plan to concretize a new grand strategy is misleading as the existing MEF plan was not derived from the GMF and does not realise the GMF.

In summary, similar to the implementation of the foreign policy dimension, the implementation of the GMF’s defence dimension during Jokowi’s first term can also be considered as minimalist as it did not bring profound changes in Indonesia’s defence sector, particularly in terms of maritime defence. This research also found similar problems that impeded the implementation of the grand strategy in terms of defence, which mostly reside in the Action Plan of the 2017 Ocean Policy. In addition, the research also asserts that, although the Jokowi administration had executed all of the policies and programmes activities

outlined by the Action Plan in the cluster of defence, the administration would have not been to transform Indonesia's maritime defence sector as envisioned by the GMF.

The research also underlines the importance of formulating a maritime-based defence doctrine deriving from the GMF grand strategy. Utilising Till's decision-making framework, the function of the archipelagic or maritime-based defence doctrine would serve as a guideline for the making of more practical policies and programmes on operational and tactical levels. It is through this archipelagic defence doctrine that more maritime-oriented or maritime-centric mindsets and thinking would appear and replace existing "sea blind" ways of thinking and mindsets.

VIII.2. Factors Behind the Difficult Concretization of the GMF in Foreign Policy and Defence

After evaluating GMF implementation in the dimension of foreign policy and defence and determining the status of implementation, this section attempts to examine two factors that the research considers responsible for impeding and increasing the difficulty in the concretization of the GMF in the dimensions of foreign policy and defence.

VIII.2.a. The Lacklustre Performance of Jokowi in Foreign and Defence Policy

First, the research attributes the absence of the President Jokowi's role in the sector foreign policy and defence as a primary factor resulting in the "minimal" implementation of the GMF in relation to its foreign policy and defence dimensions. As highlighted in Chapter II, due to their nature, like foreign policy and defence, grand strategy is normally made by a selected member of individuals (Hill, 2003; Brawley, 2010). While this system may sound exclusive and undemocratic, this pattern and practice also exist in democratic countries (Hill, 2003).

Similarly, in Indonesia, foreign policy also falls under the prerogative of a small group of elites (Novotny, 2010). Article Six (6) of the Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations clearly sets the president and Minister of Foreign Affairs as the core actors for the conduct of foreign affairs. In the case of Indonesia, the influence of the president in foreign policy does not only work through formal channels as within the formal decision-making process. For some scholars, Indonesia's foreign policy has been shaped by and subjected to not only to external

and domestic forces, but also to the idiosyncrasies of its leaders (Sukma, 1995; Novotny, 2007; Mulyana, 2018).

In relation to the research topic, the Jokowi's idiosyncrasy is manifested in his lacklustre performance in high (level) politics, including foreign policy, mostly leading to the absence of Jokowi's involvement in these issues. This research uses the term "mostly" because not all foreign policy issues disinterest Jokowi. The study, however, does not argue, that Jokowi's absence from the country's foreign policy process means that Indonesia has not necessarily implemented foreign policy throughout his presidency.

Instead, the research views that Jokowi's absence in foreign policy making has shaped not only the foreign policy orientation of Indonesia, but also foreign policy direction. For this research, the foreign policy projection of Indonesia in this context refers to how Jokowi and his administration have concretised the GMF as the country's grand strategy. As stated in this chapter, the research does not treat policy implementation as a separate process; for this research, policy making also determines the quality of the policy being implemented (Grindle, 1980; Hogwood & Gun, 1986; Fischer et al., 2007; McConnell, 2010b; FitzGerald et al., 2011; McConnell, 2015).

Jokowi displayed aloofness in foreign policy even during his campaign as a presidential candidate in the 2014 Presidential Election (Santikajaya, 2014). Jokowi criticized his predecessor for his normative, multilateralist, and globalist foreign policy approach that, for Jokowi, was not *membumi* (down-to-earth), referring to a foreign policy useful for the general population (Skhekhar, 2018; Bland, 2020). Ascending to power during the democratic transition period of Indonesia and after the Asian Financial Crisis 1997 that devastated the country's economy, Yudhyono intended to enhance the country's image and position internationally by enhancing relations with other countries and becoming a prominent actor in norms promotion (Connelly, 2015; 2016; Weatherbee, 2016a; Sulaiman, 2019). Approaching the end of his term, Yudhyono's summit diplomacy emphasising "a million friends and zero enemies" principle received criticism as many saw this style of foreign policy as not only ineffective in bringing real benefit to the country's national interests, but also key in reflecting weaknesses and compromising national interest as to avoid tensions vis-à-vis other countries (Connelly, 2015; 2016).

For Jokowi, foreign policy must be oriented to achieving tangible outputs that benefit the country and its people (Connelly, 2016; Rüländ, 2018). Therefore, in his campaign

manifesto, Jokowi clearly asserts that he is going to use his foreign policy instruments to keep improving the people's welfare (Jokowi-JK, 2014). Based on this statement, Jokowi still has interest in foreign policy, but only foreign policy issues that he thinks can have a tangible impact on the population, such as trade and investment (Connelly, 2016; Laksmana, 2016; Sulaiman, 2019; Bland, 2020).

Upon assuming power, Jokowi not only ordered the discontinuation of his predecessor's "a million friends zero enemy" foreign policy, but also instructed his Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make the country's foreign policy practice more "down-to-earth" (Liauw, 2014; Rüländ, 2018). According to Jokowi, "having more friends" should be followed by "more benefits"; therefore, there is no point in having more friends but limited benefits (Wardhy, 2014; Witular, 2014b; Ho & Rahadiana, 2015). Jokowi's interest in economy and tangible diplomacy were also manifested by his picky attitudes when selecting international events to attend.

While Jokowi revealed the GMF at the 13th EAS Summit (Kurlantzick, 2014) and, to a lesser extent, at the 22nd APEC Summit (Witular & Widhiarto, 2014) both in November 2014, he did not do the same thing at the 24th ASEAN Summit. Jokowi chose not to attend the UN General Assembly during his first term of presidency and was also absent from the 2015 APEC Leaders Meeting in Manila (Soeriaatmadja & Dancel, 2015; Septiari & Marchio, 2019), despite attending the previous 2014 APEC meeting when China hosted it. The same case also happened two years later when Jokowi attended the 2016 G20 hosted by China.

Besides being highly selective, Jokowi's heavy interest in the economy was also manifested when he chose the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later in instructing the country's diplomats to be *salesman* for the country's products abroad (Connelly, 2015; Bland, 2020). In choosing the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jokowi not only chose the first female Minister of Foreign Affairs, but also selected a diplomat who had never been posted to the Asia-Pacific region and had no experience as a senior posting to multilateral intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or the European Union (EU), though she may be associated with the group of "Hassan's Boys" (Khalik, 2009; Sambhi, 2014; Connelly, 2015; Weatherbee, 2016a; Sulaiman, 2019). While Megawati's endorsement for Retno Marsudi also contributed to her appointment, Jokowi's decision was driven by economic motives, as he expected the former Indonesian ambassador to the Netherlands to be able to

increase the sale of Indonesia's products abroad (Besant, 2014; Connelly, 2015; Sulaiman, 2019; Weatherbee, 2019).

Therefore, how does Jokowi's aloofness in high politics relate with the "minimalist" implementation of the GMF in foreign policy and defence dimension? The research identified two ways in which Jokowi's lacklustre performance has impeded the concretisation of the foreign policy and defence dimensions of the GMF. Firstly, it is clear that Jokowi's preferences for one specific element surpasses other existing issues. As Hill (2003: 55) argues, "those who occupy the highest position in a state have the opportunity to dispose of a great deal of influence". Jokowi, as the head of the state and chief of executive, has the privilege and power to determine which issues should be furthered and which should be held, if not abandoned.

With Jokowi's preferences in economy and infrastructure development, it is not, therefore, surprising that the implementation of the GMF in its economic and infrastructure dimensions made more significant progress than the implementation of other aspects. This progress could happen, not only because of the prioritisation of the economic and infrastructure dimension of the GMF, but also because, along with this prioritisation comes the support in the form of acquisition of resources. As the head of state has all the state's resources at his or her disposal, this individual leader can allocate or instruct the relocation of the state's resources to support a particular policy or project (Wildavsky 1998; Hill, 2003). One particular impact of this 'privilege' is that, even before the 2017 Ocean Policy was made, some progress in the implementation in this dimension was already visible, such as in the inauguration of several new ports, part of the Sea Highway project, in the eastern part of the country (TribunNews, 2016; Alexander, 2016; Yulika, 2016).

However, the impact of Jokowi's lacklustre performance in the concretisation of foreign policy and defence does not only stop at the less prioritization of the concretization of GMF's foreign policy and defence dimension, but continues with the departure of Jokowi from the field of foreign policy and defence. The departure of Yudhoyono in October 2014 had undoubtedly left a lacuna in the country's foreign policy theatre. Jokowi ascended to power, not only without any experience in foreign policy, strategic thinking, and defence policy, but also without a significant interest in learning about these fields. This lack of interest and ability is not surprising as Jokowi never portrayed himself as an international statesman, but sought recognition as a domestic reformer (Connelly, 2015). Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous chapter, Jokowi did not start his first years of presidency smoothly; he was

not only challenged by the domestic dynamics of the opposition, but also both from within his administration and his party, the PDIP.

By considering himself a domestic reformer—as to meet the expectations of his voters and volunteers seeing him as an honest, clean, and with no relations to existing oligarchy or a negative track record, Jokowi put himself in the middle of the oligarch, where massive waves may come from all directions. As much of his attention and focus were concentrated on solving these domestic dynamics, it is understandable that Jokowi left foreign policy to his trusted advisors. Tasked with the responsibility of the country's foreign policy, these individuals are not only obliged to supply Jokowi with ready-made analysis and inputs regarding regional and international dynamics, but also responsible for determining the direction of the country's foreign policy.

Jokowi's departure from foreign policy process signifies a vacuum of leadership; the "captain" of the entire foreign policy "ship". The existence of this "captain" is critical as it serves as the "glue" that sticks and maintains the unity and coherence of all of the units within the foreign policy "ship" (Weatherbee, 2017). Though the absence of the "captain" may not necessarily lead to "chaos" or the termination of foreign policy practice, it certainly affects the effectiveness of the overall foreign policy.

Bureaucratic politics are indeed a normal phenomenon and should not be translated as a sign of policy failure. The dynamics among actors within a policy process can happen because each actor in the policy process does not only have its own perspective of seeing the policy topic, but also interests that need to be defended and advanced (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Halperin *et al.*, 2006; Thatcher, 2011). In the case of foreign policy, policy making often begins from the top of the leadership in the form of presidential directives or decisions.

Without an authoritative voice, actors of policy process will translate or articulate presidential directive and how to attain this directive freely based on their respective sectoral perspectives as there is no entity to guide the process. In addition, the absence of an authoritative power may also increase potential conflict among the actors, which, as a worst-case scenario, will impede overall policy formulation. In the case of the GMF, Jokowi's distancing from foreign and defence policy has resulted in the emergence of multiple interpretation of the GMF by his ministries and agencies at the beginning of his administration (Bayu, 2016; Ekawati, 2016).

When Luhut was appointed as the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, he was entrusted with the task of providing the official, integrated articulation of the GMF. Jokowi's lack of interest in foreign and defence policy, combined with his absence in the overall process of GMF policy formulation of the GMF, has allowed the grand strategy to be articulated differently and minimally. Two reasons stand out. Firstly, as Jokowi was absent from the process, the guidance for ministries and government agencies to follow and look up as a source of reference were also absent. Without guidance from the more authoritative actor, ministries and agencies not only articulated or translated the GMF in accordance with their respective perspectives, but also advanced their sectoral interests through the inclusion of their existing programme activities in GMF policymaking, instead of developing new more substantive policies.

Secondly, as Luhut was not one of the individuals that devised the GMF, it is less likely that he also shared the same comprehension of the GMF. Luhut's appointment as Jokowi's right-hand man was accurate. Luhut not only provides Jokowi with a channel to the military, but also served as a senior member that can enforce some measure of discipline to the cabinet, a balancer for Jokowi against oligarchic interests, while also increasing Jokowi's leverage against his own party through Luhut's connections to the elites of the Golkar Party, the third largest party after Megawati's PDI-P and Prabowo's Gerindra (Syailendra, 2016). However, considering Luhut's critical position for Jokowi's domestic agendas, he most likely did not have the time or focus to lead GMF policymaking.

VIII.2.b. The Civil-Military Relations

The second factor that impedes the concretisation of the GMF in foreign policy and defence dimensions is the civil-military relations during the Jokowi administration. The civil-military relations that this research aims to examine in this section are the strengthening of army's dominance both within the country's foreign policy and defence policy. In this context, however, this research does not refer the army's dominance of foreign policy and defence policy of Indonesia as to an institutional domination of the institutions of foreign affairs.

The institutional domination of the army by a civilian institution such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is unlikely to happen in the post authoritarian Indonesia as stipulated by the Law No. 3/2002 on National Defence and Law No. 34/2004 on Indonesia's Armed Forces (TNI). Under this law, Indonesia's Armed Forces are forbidden from joining any political activities

and are under the control of civilian supremacy. Instead, the domination that the research refers to in this chapter is the domination of what Huntington (1981) refers to as “military mind” in civilian institutions. This research argues that these military institutional ideas that takes shape in the form of army-centric doctrines hinders the transformation of the country’s foreign policy and defence policy as suggested by the GMF.

This research identifies three Army’s doctrines that impede the concretisation of the GMF in both foreign policy and defence dimensions. These doctrines are the National Resilience (*Ketahanan Nasional*), the Total People’s Defence and Security System (*Sishankamrata*), and Archipelagic Outlook (*Wawasan Nusantara*). As highlighted Chapters II and III, the National Resilience doctrine suggests the optimisation of all aspects of the population’s life as a means of augmenting the country’s perseverance and tenacity in facing threats and disturbances, particularly threats to the state’s unity and ideology, that may come directly or indirectly from inside or outside of the country (Anwar, 1996). In this sense, the National Resilience is a doctrine that incorporates a holistic approach to enabling the survival of both the country and its ideology by boosting not only the capability of the state, but also its entire population in all fields of national endeavours for (Sebastian, 2006; Till & Supriyanto, 2018).

The Total People’s Defence uses and incorporates all elements of power of the country, both military and non-military (civilians), in repelling invasions from external forces (Anwar, 1996; Sebastian, 2006; NIDS, 2010; Shekhar, 2018). In this way, the Total People’s Defence doctrine requires the population of Indonesia to participate in and contribute to the effort of defending the country against foreign aggression, regardless of race, ethnicity, region, social class, or religion (Lowry, 1996; Widjajanto, 2010). Since the doctrine incorporates all elements of the country’s population, the doctrine is deemed the last resort of defence against a much stronger external force that cannot be deterred by the country’s defence and security institutions (NIDS, 2010).

As well as nation building, in instilling the sense of ownership and unity among the population, the doctrine reflects the acknowledgement of the country’s defence and security institution on the lack of defence capabilities in attaining its defence objectives as defending the country from foreign military threats (NIDS, 2010). The emergence of this view cannot be separated from the country’s history, in which independence could not be attained through the deployment of the armed forces alone. Therefore, to stop the country from repeatedly

being in this difficult and threatening position, as the use of the Total People's Defence signifies the extraordinary state of emergency of the country, the country's defence institution has stressed the importance of diplomacy as the country's first line of defence and primary means of resolving conflict (Sebastian, 2006; NIDS, 2010; Kemhan, 2015).

The emergence of these two doctrines cannot be separated from the country's post-colonial historical context. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, these two doctrines become the hindrance for the concretisation of the GMF in defence dimension. As land-centric doctrines, these two doctrines emphasise not only the use of the army, but also the dependence on the army as the primary unit of the country's defence through guerrilla warfare until the cost of the war is longer bearable by the invader (Sebastian, 2006).

Meanwhile, through the Archipelagic Outlook, Indonesia conceives its identity as integrated territory, land, and water, stretching from Sabang to Merauke (Chen et al., 2014). Unlike the other two doctrines, the Archipelagic Outlook is not a defence doctrine. This doctrine is also not, by default, an-inward looking doctrine. While some historical experiences also contributed to the formulation of this doctrine, maritime geography also remains important as the doctrine also emphasises the appreciation of the country's geographical contours.

To easily control the archipelago, the militaristic and authoritarian regime of the New Order infused inward-looking elements into the doctrine or what Laksmana and Supriyanto (2018) refer to as the domestication of the Archipelagic Outlook. By highlighting the vulnerabilities toward the divide and rule (*divide et impera*) strategies (Acharya & Buzan, 2010), the New Order hoped to bind scattered islands along with their socio-culturally diverse islanders under a unified polity (Roberts, *et. al.*, 2015; Supriyanto 2016). Though this geographical vulnerability demonstrates the need for Indonesia to develop its maritime defence capacity, eventually with the infusion of National Resilience doctrine, historical experiences have led Indonesian elites to pursue a non-maritime strategy.

While the existence of these three doctrines is not unique to Jokowi's presidency, Jokowi's closeness with the Army has made it difficult, if not impossible, for the administration to make substantial changes in the foreign policy and defence sectors that align with the GMF. In fact, during Jokowi's administration, the army has even signed numbers of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with various ministries and civilian bodies over multiple sectors, ranging from infrastructure to agriculture throughout Jokowi's first term

(Sebastian *et al.*, 2018). This is not surprising that in Jokowi's presidency the Army is seen as Jokowi's solution to almost all the country's problems (Calistro, 2015).

The importance of the Army for Jokowi is indeed indisputable. Jokowi needs the army, the largest defence unit in the country, not only to implement his policies effectively, such as opening new fields for farming, but also to consolidate his political power and balance against more powerful interests (Calistro, 2015; Sebastian *et al.*, 2018). In an interview made by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflicts (IPAC), one interviewed TNI officer clearly states that Jokowi's alliance with the Army is inevitable and expected especially considering the fact that the president does not come from any established oligarchy. The TNI officer states that "Jokowi is clean and humble, but he's weak and doesn't have backup from elsewhere in the system—that's why he turns to the Army" (IPAC, 2016: 2).

Jokowi's heavy reliance on the Army, along with his lacklustreness in other dimensions of the GMF outside the realm of economy and infrastructure, has also led to the leadership of the Army in concretising the GMF in the realm of defence. In this way, without any significant opposition from other services within the military institution, the Army has become the primary implementing actor that has the authority and power to interpret the implementation of the GMF's defence dimension. Jokowi's appointment of the Army Chief of Staff General Gatot Nurmantyo to replace General Moeldoko, also a former Army Chief of Staff, as the Military Commander in Chief had become a strong indication of Jokowi's permission for the Army to take the leadership not only in formulating the strategy to give effect to the GMF's defence dimension, but also to manage the country's defence affairs in general.

While there is no exact law requiring the president, as the chief of executive, to rotate the leadership of the country's military institution among the services, it would have been very logical decision for Jokowi to appoint his Navy Chief of Staff as the country's Military Commander. Though the appointment of a Navy general as the military commander would not guarantee the expected concretisation of the GMF's defence dimension, as there would have been inter-services dynamics, the appointment would still have given symbolic effect of Jokowi's strong commitment to develop Indonesia's maritime defence capability. The preoccupation of maritime defence development being sidelined with the appointment of an army general as the country's top military commander was proven as Gatot throughout his

leadership focused much of his attention on the issue of “proxy war” and the “rise of communism” (Agastia, 2016; Haripin et al., 2021).

Gatot’s obsession with these narratives clearly reflects the “army mindset” that is not only “land-centric” but also inward looking. While the attention on the “proxy war” narrative is often seen as a part of outward looking as this requires the examination of external players and their dynamics (conventional threat), Gatot’s version of “proxy war” heavily emphasizes on internal and unconventional threats such as terrorism, LGBT-Q movement, foreign NGOs, and narcotics (Agastia, 2016). Though Gatot was replaced by Hadi Tjahjanto, an Air Chief Marshall, in 2017, Gatot’s replacement was not driven by his non-maritime or land-centric agendas but more due to his political maneuver following the political case of Jakarta’s former Governor Ahok (Tempo, 2017; CNNIndonesia, 2020).

For this research, the prevalence of this “army-centric” mindset is not only caused with the appointment of active army officers within the top leadership of the country’s military institution and the increasing of involvement of the army within the non-defence affairs, but also because of the increasing appointment of the retired army officers in several strategical positions. In relation to the GMF implementation, the appointment of two former Army Generals, Luhut and Ryamizard Ryacudu, as the Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs and the Minister of Defence have also significantly shaped the direction of the GMF implementation. As both positions are critical for concretising the GMF, the appointment of individuals who do not share a deep interest on the development of the country’s maritime aspect would have certainly resulted to the “minimalist” implementation of the grand strategy.

While retired army officers are no longer active in-duty, they cannot simply be equally treated or grouped like other general civilians. In this sense, the research argues that retired military officers still possess their previous organizational mindset as this mindset cannot easily be removed by the termination of their career within the organization (Haripin *et.al*, 2021). As the organizational mindset often takes years to be deeply instilled, there is therefore a positive correlation between the numbers of years of service and the level or how deep this mindset has been indoctrinated in an individual within the organization.

Ryamizard’s open and firm supports on the maintenance of the army’s role in non-defence affairs notwithstanding his status as a retired army personnel reflects the still embedded army mindset (Haripin et al., 2021). Ryamizard’s programme of “Bela Negara” can

also be seen as a clear manifestation of the “land-centric” and inward-looking characteristics of the Army that derive from its own mindset. The replacement of Gatot, an army general, with Hadi, an Air Marshall, for the top leadership of the country’s Armed Forces at the end of 2017 did not also automatically lead to the change in the country’s defence strategy and orientation.

In the post-authoritarian Indonesia, the role of defence minister in the country’s defence affairs is pivotal. Under the democratic system, the country’s military institution is positioned under the oversight of civilian authority, represented by the Ministry of Defence. In this way, the civilian defence minister plays a central role not only in shaping but also in determining the orientation of the country’s defence, as the authority to change the country’s defence doctrine, strategy, and posture lies much in the hands of the defence minister. In the context of this research, the preoccupation of the defence minister on the issues that are less maritime and more internal (inward looking) have indeed sidelined the development of the country’s maritime defence aspect, which eventually prevented substantial changes in the country’s defence sector from happening as well as hindering the attainment of the country’s aspiration as stipulated by the GMF.

Besides Ryamizard, the position of Luhut is also central in the implementation of GMF. Not only his ministry serves as the coordinating hub and supervision body in the endeavour of the GMF implementation, the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs has also played an important role in the policymaking of the GMF. As highlighted in Chapter VI, the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs was tasked by Jokowi himself to articulate and transform the abstract GMF in form of doctrine or vision into a more concrete and doable in form of policy programme. Sitting at the top of this institution, Luhut therefore had both much of the power and authority to shape and determine the direction of the GMF implementation.

In an interview, Luhut openly admits that he just realized of the importance maritime dimension for Indonesia once he joined Jokowi administration (Interview with Luhut, 2021). Notwithstanding with this new consciousness, Luhut’s appointment does not also help much the development of the GMF’s implementation beyond the economic dimension. Despite Luhut’s land-centric mindset diminishing, his “inward-looking-ness” seems to remain. For Luhut, GMF has never been oriented for external purposes but more for internal consolidation (Interview with Luhut, 2021). In this way, Luhut sees the necessity for Indonesia

to develop its economy as the prerequisite for its consolidation and developing the country's physical infrastructure posits at the centre on the endeavour to bolster economic development, be it through local trade or more importantly foreign investment. Luhut's strong interest in the economy has indeed shaped and resulted to the GMF implementation that overemphasizes its economic aspects rather than balances the various sectors making up the pillars of the GMF.

Overall, Jokowi's insistence on going along with the army suggests that the GMF's foreign policy and defence dimension are unlikely to be implemented in a similar fashion as it was suggested in the beginning. In addition, the appointment of several individuals, who are not only "seablind" but also possessing the mindset that undermines maritime domain, in various positions strategical for the concretisation of the GMF have also contributed to the difficult concretisation of the GMF's foreign policy and defence dimension. To reiterate that even if the GMF's foreign policy and defence dimension had been implemented under these circumstances, the implementation would have most likely taken place at a minimal level without addressing the core of the problem that needs to be resolved in order to attain the vision of a respected maritime regional power.

CHAPTER IX CONCLUSION

IX.1. Summary

This dissertation has examined the emergence of Indonesia's grand strategy, GMF, as well as its implementation in relation to its foreign policy and defence dimensions during Jokowi's first term of presidency (2014-2019). Two key questions have animated this research: first, why did Indonesia embrace a maritime-based grand strategy? And secondly, why - despite the fanfare surrounding the GMF - has its concretisation with respect to foreign policy and defence proved so challenging? By answering these two research questions, the study aims to provide an account that clarifies both the ideas, agency, and processes behind the formulation of GMF as well as the main factors that have informed its implementation.

A major question pertaining to GMF has focused on its status. As discussed in the Introduction Chapter, the thesis has taken its cue from Silove's (2018) work on grand strategy to conceptualise GMF in precisely these terms. Specifically, this dissertation has suggested that the GMF stands for a grand strategy as it meets the criteria Silove has used, not least to define strategic behaviour.

To explain the emergence and implementation of GMF, the thesis is guided by insights adopted from Neoclassical Realism. As discussed in Chapter II, Neoclassical Realism offers an analytical framework that can be used to examine the creation and implementation of state strategic behaviour (Rose, 1998; Lobell et al., 2009; Ripsman, 2011; Ripsman et al., 2016). For this study, the analysis on the creation and implementation of GMF cannot be divorced from the domestic political environment nor from the actors who are involved within the field of foreign policy and defence policy making and implementation. As shown, the application of Neoclassical Realism allowed for the examination of the formation of state strategic behaviour, taking into account the systemic pressures and the international environment that states face, while also incorporating domestic-level variables within the analysis, such as elites and their perceptions, as well as the political context of the examined state.

In Chapter III, the study has found that since independence Indonesia's foreign policy elites have actually been well aware of the country's extended geographical nature and its geo-strategic position. This awareness had been manifested throughout different

administrations prior to Jokowi's presidency in multiple policies and doctrines related to the maritime domain, some resembling later pillars of GMF. For some scholars, GMF is, therefore, to some extent more like "an old wine in a new bottle" as this grand strategy is not feeding off ideas that are all entirely new (Saha, 2015; Supriyanto, 2016).

Notwithstanding this awareness, the dissertation found that Indonesia's foreign policy elites for many years remained hesitant to seriously develop the country's maritime domain. Indeed, the political leadership opted for Indonesia's strategic outlook, and defence policy to be land-centric and inward-looking rather than maritime-oriented and outward-looking. In this context, this study contends that the country's historical experience shortly after its independence had played a much greater role in shaping the orientation of the elites rather than the awareness on the country's geographical and geo-strategic position. It was Indonesia's particular historical experience (of competing social forces, representing the military, Islam, and communism) that eventually consolidated the country's focus on internal security and other domestic land-centric affairs rather than on expanding the country's influence outward through the maritime domain (Weinstein, 2007; Liow & Shekhar, 2014).

In examining the emergence of GMF, this study identified the increasing salience of the regional maritime domain – centred on the increasing piracy activities around the Malacca Strait, IUU Fishing, the emergence of an Indo-Pacific narrative —, and the rise of China along with its assertiveness in the South China Sea as the external drivers for the emergence of the grand strategy. As highlighted in Chapter IV, the challenges associated with the changing geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific region reinforced Indonesia's strategic position and, more importantly, the salience of its maritime domain. This happened not only because of the focus of the region's main security issues related to the maritime sphere, but also because Indonesia's maritime domain is located at the centre of these dynamics.

Nevertheless, as this dissertation has argued, the existence of these external stimuli did not directly produce GMF, as many of these stimuli predated Jokowi administration. The study thus identified the important role of domestic-level variables in mediating these external stimuli and bringing the idea of maritime grand strategy onto the government's agenda and decision-making. Nevertheless, though this dissertation considers the important role of domestic variables in mediating the external stimuli, it does overlook or underrate the role of external factors in the formulation of GMF.

The first domestic factor that allows the emergence of GMF is the 2014 Presidential Election. As elaborated in Chapter V, the study identified the 2014 Presidential Election as the doorway for the idea of GMF to enter the formal policymaking process. The dissertation has argued that the presidential election provided the window for new policy ideas to emerge which then were pursued by a new administration seeking a new policy orientation. Another domestic factor that was closely linked with GMF emergence is the dissatisfaction over Indonesia's development policy and orientation that was not only Java-centric but also land-centric (Bhinadi, 2003; Kusumastanto, 2010; Yuliadi, 2012; Widodo & Kalla, 2014; Laksmana et al., 2018). For the architects of GMF, this orientation accounted for the economic discrepancy between Java and the rest of Indonesia except Bali, as well as the bottlenecks from which the country suffered as it sought to optimize the benefits from its strategic position at the centre of a regional, if not global, maritime trade network (Widodo & Kalla, 2014; World Bank & Australian Aid, 2016; and Laksmana et al., 2018).

Besides such discontent over the country's development policy orientation, this study also found the presence of the "*negara-lemah* (weak-state)" mentality to be another important domestic factor that contributed to the emergence of GMF. In this research, the definition of "weak state" does not merely relate to its conventional definition, which highlights the absence of sufficient capacity to deliver the most basic political goods to its people (Brooks, 2005); it also understands this concept to refer specifically to the lack of courage of policymakers to take firm decisions, especially in foreign relations. For GMF architects, the country's "weak state" mentality was manifested in two ways, the inability of the Indonesian government to protect its marine resources from any illegal maritime-based activities, and the perceived weakness in Indonesia's foreign policy orientation that was seen as too soft and too often prepared to sacrifice the country's core interests when dealing with territorial incursions and disputes. The architects of GMF therefore saw a maritime-based grand strategy as a solution for the country to consolidate its capacity and capability not only in attaining its goals but also in protecting its interests from external pressures.

Chapter VI examined the process of GMF's emergence by taking account of the domestic political environment that supported the emergence of GMF and the role of policy entrepreneurs within this process. The chapter identified these policy entrepreneurs as the architects of GMF, who had different backgrounds of expertise, but shared dissatisfaction over the governance of the previous administration, especially in the field of infrastructure

development, foreign policy, and maritime governance. These architects of GMF later joined Jokowi's campaign team and served as Jokowi's foreign policy and defence policy advisors for his presidential campaign. The GMF's architects were not just the individuals who devised the grand strategy, but also pushed it to the top of the government.

In Chapter VII, the study examined the articulation of GMF in the field of foreign policy and defence. For this research, as grand strategy initially may not necessarily comprise of detailed plans and programmes when launched, as also argued by Silove (2018), its implementation required the articulation and translation into more concrete and applicable programs and policies. The dissertation has thus considered Presidential Regulation No. 16 of 2017 on Indonesia's Sea Policy along with its Action Plan document not only as the articulation of GMF but also as the legal foundation and the primary guideline for implementing the grand strategy. For this reason, the research found that the release of the document thus marked the commencement of GMF implementation phase.

Within this chapter, the research also sought to examine the explanation behind the delayed issuance of the 2017 National Sea Policy as the implementing document of GMF. The study identified four reasons that were responsible for this delay namely: the cancellation of Budi Gunawan's inauguration as the new Chief of the Indonesian Police force; Jokowi's deteriorating relations with PDIP following Budi Gunawan's case; internal disagreement, if not political infighting within the Jokowi administration; and Jokowi's weak coalition vis-à-vis the opposition in the country's parliament. While all these factors do not specifically relate to GMF, the four aforementioned issues affected the progress of articulating the grand strategy by diverting the attention and resources of Jokowi and his administration.

Before the release of the 2017 Sea Policy, ministries and government agencies had differently articulated and translated GMF based on their respective institutional interpretation (Ekawati, 2016). This incoherence resulted in ineffective, overlapping, or even conflicting activities and programs relating to GMF implementation (Kompas, 2016a). Accordingly, the chapter argued that the Sea Policy document is best viewed as providing the foundation for the implementation of the grand strategy on the basis that it contains the legal foundation of GMF, a (detailed) definition GMF, and the blueprint or guideline for ministries and government agencies to implement GMF in all its pillars.

The last empirical chapter, Chapter VII, examined the evaluation of GMF implementation in the field foreign policy and defence throughout Jokowi's first term of

presidency. The evaluation conducted did not only focus on how many policy activities and programmes mentioned in the Action Plan have been implemented, but also sought to scrutinize the quality of the Action Plan itself, how the Action Plan is decided, and whether the programs and activities arranged within this document were designed to produce substantive result or not. The thesis found that the examination of policy implementation cannot be separated from the examination of policy formulation as the process of designing and making of a policy shapes the quality of the policy intended to be implemented (Grindle, 1980; Hogwood & Gun, 1986; Fischer et al., 2007; McConnell, 2010b; Fitzgerald et al., 2011; McConnell, 2015).

In assessing GMF implementation, the study relied on two yardsticks: the Action Plan and the original vision/aspiration of GMF that was mentioned both in Jokowi's political manifesto and in Jokowi's speech when launching the grand strategy. Based on the first yardstick, the dissertation discussed various aspects of the policies and programmes designated to be implemented in the field of foreign policy and defence. With reference to the second yardstick, the research sought to examine the quality of these policies and programmes intended to be implemented in both dimensions whether they reflected the aspiration/vision of GMF or not. Using this method, the research found that the programmes and policies designated for both GMF's foreign policy and defence dimension were not only insufficient to produce profound impact in both dimensions but also lack the quality as the majority of them, if not all, were limited to ceremonial and procedural rather than substantive policies and programmes.

Based on this assessment, the study thus argues that GMF implementation has brought more substantive changes in the country's economy and infrastructure than in the areas of foreign policy and defence. The research identified two factors that led to the creation of the "minimalist" 2017 Sea Policy that resulted in "minimalist" implementation of GMF in these two latter dimensions. The two factors are the lacklustre approach by Jokowi to foreign policy and defence – which go hand in hand with bureaucratic politics among the participating actors – and Jokowi's close relations with the Army that strengthened the army's influence over the implementation of GMF.

In conclusion, the research sees the emergence and adoption of GMF as a breakthrough in the history of Indonesia's strategic thinking. This is not because Indonesia finally simply became aware of its maritime domain and embraced a maritime identity as a

consequence. Indeed, Indonesia has long been aware of its geo-strategic position and maritime characteristics, ever since it gained international recognition as an independent state. However, GMF marks the first time Indonesia has put its maritime identity at the centre of its strategic thinking through the adoption of a maritime-based grand strategy.

Notwithstanding this achievement, the research has demonstrated the inconsistency and lack of determination exhibited by Indonesia's leadership to fully pursue the country's maritime aspiration through GMF. While domestic politics have in part led to the "minimalist" implementation of GMF in the field of defence and foreign policy, the research also found the country's top leadership to be responsible. Instead of providing extensive guidance and oversight during the implementation of grand strategy, the thesis has shown that there is much evidence indicating the "unwillingness" of the country's top leadership to seriously conduct substantial change needed to realize GMF in the field of defence and foreign policy.

IX.2 Main Findings

In summary, the findings of the research on the emergence of GMF serve as the contribution of the research, particularly to the study of GMF and the making of Indonesia's grand strategy. Though the work of Shekhar (2018) also provides an elaboration on the emergence of GMF by linking this emergence with the changing environment external to Indonesia, his work does not elaborate further on how these external stimuli initiated the grand-strategic shift. By also including the analysis of the dynamics that happened at the domestic environment of Indonesia within the examination of GMF's emergence, this research has filled the lacuna in the work of Shekhar of providing a more comprehensive analysis on the emergence of GMF. In the wider scope of grand strategy studies, the examination of GMF emergence presented in this research may also contribute to the enrichment of the limited literature of grand strategic shift and making that uses the case studies of non-western or non-great power countries, and literature that applies policy entrepreneurship within the analysis of IR topics, like grand strategy.

Similarly, the findings in the implementation part have also filled the void in the work of Shekhar, the implementation aspect of GMF. In fact, until this dissertation is made, there has been any extensive study that assesses and evaluates not just GMF implementation, but also the implementation of Indonesia's grand strategy or foreign policy in general. The findings are as follows:

IX.2.a. The Emergence of GMF

The first finding in the examination of GMF's emergence is the importance of a general election for grand strategic shift, particularly in the case of Indonesia. As discussed in Chapters IV and V, the 2014 Presidential Election was a special event for many, if not all Indonesians, as it was the moment not only for what the Indonesians called *Pesta Rakyat* (People's Party), but also as a political event for the country's change of leadership. Along with the possibility of change in leadership and administration, there was also a possibility of change in the government policies and orientations, including grand strategy. Election in this context, thus, serves as an opportunity window that lowers the entry barrier, providing the opportunity for a new idea of grand strategic shift to enter the policy arena and compete with existing ideas for acceptance within the structure of policymaking.

Without the 2014 election, GMF would most likely not have emerged, let alone become accepted as the country's grand strategy. Sukma's inability, if not failure, to advocate for his policy vision of a post-ASEAN foreign policy serves as an example of the importance of presidential elections as a window of opportunity. As well as providing policy entrepreneurs with the opportunity to connect ideas with politics, presidential elections allow for these new ideas to be taken on board by those filling key positions in the government.

The second finding is the Jokowi factor. The drastic change in the country's orientation was made possible by Jokowi in two ways. Firstly, the Jokowi 'factor' increased the possibility of GMF being accepted within the policy stream. Jokowi increased the possibility of GMF not only through his electability. In fact, during voting, Jokowi's electability did not provide much help as the difference of the vote between Jokowi and his rival, Prabowo, was no more than 6.3% (BBCNews, 2014a).

The research also argues that Jokowi's lack of knowledge in foreign policy, defence and strategic thinking made him an attractive target for the architects of the GMF. Compared to his rival, Jokowi's less substantial knowledge of foreign policy always implied that Jokowi would mostly accept key perspectives and arguments expressed by his advisers. In contrast, Prabowo's long experience and knowledge of foreign policy and defence policy, as someone with an illustrious career in the army, would have made him a figure with his own personal worldview and perspective on these issues, thus substantially lowering the prospect of him taking on board perspectives and worldviews focusing on the maritime domain (Interview

with Keliat, 2021). Furthermore, Jokowi's characteristics, not only as a "doer" compared to his predecessor, but also as a "political outsider" predisposed him as more likely to become an agent of change, whereas his rival, Prabowo, was seen as the continuation of the previous regime (Blend, 2014; Interview with Keliat, 2021). Though Prabowo was technically not an incumbent, as he has never occupied any public post, he was still considered part of the ruling elite due to his close connection with the Yudhoyono administration, as his running mate, Hatta Rajasa, was Yudhoyono's Coordinating Economic Minister.

Third, the research found that, although the changing of the environment external to Indonesia produced the stimuli for GMF to emerge, GMF is not a direct product of the external stimuli, but instead a product of the elites and their perceptions that processed these external stimuli. For the research, this finding is not surprising as grand strategy, foreign policy, and defence policy, particularly in the context of Indonesia, have traditionally been the affairs of the elites (Suryadinata, 1996; Weinstein, 2007; Wibisono, 2009; Novotny, 2010). The research argues that, though Jokowi adopted the idea and made GMF his flagship programme for his presidential campaign, later launching the grand strategy personally after ascending to power, Jokowi did not initiate or devise the GMF. Furthermore, the interviews conducted for this dissertation indicate that, while Jokowi asked his policy advisors to formulate him a grandiose doctrine that he could present during the presidential debate, Jokowi did not give further instructions as to the kind of doctrine that he wanted for his administration, except that this flagship agenda should be greater than just a policy and reflect the country's identity.¹⁹⁸

At the centre of the relationship between the GMF, its architects, and the elites lies policy entrepreneurship. The research found that the activity of policy entrepreneurship conducted by the architects of GMF was crucial to GMF's emergence. As the dissertation demonstrates, even with the election and Jokowi factor combined, GMF would not have been on the political agenda and policy streamline without the presence of policy entrepreneurs. These policy entrepreneurs not only devised and proposed GMF as grand strategy, but also advocated for and clarified the grand strategy idea throughout the policy stream. Their effectiveness in successfully pushing their idea of a grand strategic shift into Indonesia's policy

¹⁹⁸ Jokowi does not mention the kind of identity to which he refers.

streamline lies in their ability to identify and exploit the opportunity window available to them, which, in this context, is the presidential election and candidacy of Jokowi.

As well as capitalizing on the election as an opportunity window, the research also found the ability of policy entrepreneurs to introduce, make sense of, and sell this new policy idea. By highlighting the opportunities and potential of threats from the changing environment external to Indonesia, along with the failure of previous policies not only to respond against external dynamics, but also to address basic domestic problems such as economic inequalities among areas in Indonesia, policy entrepreneurs were able to underline the urgency for Indonesia to reorient its orientation by having a maritime grand strategy. In other words, the research found the success of the policy entrepreneurs in transforming the GMF from an issue of the elites, as it concerns more abstract aspiration of foreign policy and defence policy, into an idea that also embraces aspects relevant to the lives of the general population through its overarching pillars.

Though, at the time, Jokowi did not have sufficient knowledge and experience of defence, foreign policy, and strategic thinking, he had already had a set of interests and focuses mainly on domestic level as Jokowi portrayed himself as *merakyat* (down to earth or close to the people). These interests and focuses include increasing job opportunities and alleviating poverty through the improvement of the country's economic performance and amelioration of the country's infrastructure and connectivity. The research, therefore, argues that had the policy entrepreneurs for the GMF focused only on the field of foreign policy and defence, as all these policy entrepreneurs come from, there is a high possibility that Jokowi would have refused the GMF as his flagship campaign agenda.

Fourth, this research found that GMF grand strategy was a manifestation of a critique of the administration that preceded Jokowi. In this sense, the research found that GMF included the aspiration for policy change resulting from dissatisfaction with the orientation of old policies. For this research, the fact that the architects of the GMF were not only the "outsiders" during the previous administration, but also frequent critics of the then administration has already supported the above finding. Furthermore, though Jokowi personally asked his advisors to formulate a flagship programme that not only reflects the country's identity, but also could boost his electability (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021; Interview with Keliat, 2021; Interview with Pareira, 2021), as highlighted in Chapter VI, the evidence found by this research points out that GMF is a brainchild of those discontent with

the existing policies, particularly in the field foreign policy and defence, more than just a device to gain electoral purposes. The research contends that, if the main purpose of the policy entrepreneurs is only to boost Jokowi's electability, they would have devised a more domestic-centred and inward-looking programme relatively close to the general population.

IX.2.b. The Implementation of GMF

The first finding in this phase is the inability of policy entrepreneurs to control and oversee the articulation and implementation of GMF. While these policy entrepreneurs were able to capitalize on the opportunity window to inject and advocate their aspired idea of a grand strategic shift into the country's policy streamline, they were not able to play a significant role in the phases once the GMF had been adopted as the country's new grand strategy. For the research, the absence of the architects and policy entrepreneurs of the GMF within its articulation and implementation phase is one of the primary contributors for the minimalist implementation of GMF in the field of foreign policy and defence. One particular reason for this incapability was because these entrepreneurs were no longer part of the bureaucracy responsible for transforming GMF into more operational programmes and activities.

In this case, the research found that policy entrepreneurs were unable to consolidate their position within the administration. Eventually, none of the policy entrepreneurs who devised GMF from the early stages remained at the centre of power close to the president or were involved in the articulation and the implementation of GMF. For some of the architects of GMF, they considered their removal from the GMF as a sign of job completion, even arguing that, while the implementation of GMF in the field of defence and foreign policy may still be far from the original expectations, the adoption of the GMF as Indonesia's grand strategy was already an achievement (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021; Interview with Keliat, 2021). This success is because, for the first time, they were able to bring the country's maritime identity not only to the general population, but also to the top of the policy hierarchy by making Indonesia adopted a maritime-based grand strategy (Interview with Widjajanto, 2021; Interview with Keliat, 2021).

For this research, the involvement of GMF architects within its articulation and implementation does not automatically guarantee that the implementation of the grand strategy in the field of defence and foreign policy would be as expected because

implementing a policy that encompasses multiple sectors requires agreement from all parties involved. However, this research argues that these individuals' involvement within the articulation and implementation of GMF would at least add a voice that could maintain the original aspirations of the grand strategy.

Second is Jokowi's proximity to the army and retired army officers. The research found that Jokowi's proximity with the army and retired army officers not only resulted in the arrival of a new group, along with their parochial perspective and interest, into Jokowi's circle, but also increasing the intra-group competition over the influence on Jokowi. The expansion of Jokowi's circle also resulted in the involvement of this new group in many state affairs, including in GMF articulation and implementation, as Jokowi became more dependent on the members of this new group to consolidate his power, particularly following his experience in his first two years of presidency, as highlighted in Chapter VII.

For this research, the appointment of new people to execute GMF has had a substantial impact on the implementation of GMF. These new appointed individuals not only did not share the same perspective and aspiration with the architects of GMF regarding how to implement the grand strategy, but also were found to have their own parochial interest and perspective that guided them in articulating and implementing the grand strategy. The research found it not surprising as these individuals were not just absent from the early phase of GMF formation, but also from an institution that has been traditionally known as "unthalassic" or "less maritime" (Supriyanto, 2018).

IX.3. Where does GMF Go? A Possible Further Research

In May 2019, Jokowi was able to secure his second term following the result of the 2019 Presidential Election. From this moment, one prominent question that came into being and intrigued many, especially scholars in Indonesia's foreign policy, was about the prospect of GMF implementation during Jokowi's second term of presidency. The absence of any reference to GMF in Jokowi's inauguration speech in October 2019, unlike his inauguration speech in 2014, had not only increased the curiosity over GMF's future but also raised the doubt over Jokowi's commitment to seriously concretise GMF as Indonesia's ultimate vision.

When asked whether the absence of any reference to GMF within Jokowi's (second) inauguration speech signifies its end as Indonesia's grand strategy and Jokowi's flagship agenda, Luhut explicitly dismissed this assumption and affirmed Jokowi administration's

commitment to continue the implementation of GMF grand strategy (Interview with Luhut, April 2021). He further asserted that his ministry's strong commitment to developing the second phase of Sea Policy Action Plan (2020-2024) as the guideline for GMF implementation during Jokowi's second term of presidency. Nevertheless, until this chapter is made, there has been any official documents published that clearly refer to the second phase of GMF implementation.

The outbreak of Covid-19 in Indonesia and the emergence of new domestic political dynamics, such as the increase of the ruling oligarchy's grip over the administration (Gokkon, 2019), have also raised the question over the prospect of GMF implementation during Jokowi's second term. In addition, the increasing role of the Army in the civilian affairs, especially following the outbreak of Covid-19, is also expected to affect the implementation of the grand strategy. Following these circumstances that mark Jokowi's second term, further research on GMF implementation during Jokowi's second term is worth examining.

All in all, the research argues that the emergence of GMF cannot be separated from the dynamics that happened in the environment external to Indonesia. This study demonstrates that, while major shifts in Indonesia's external environment stimulated GMF's formation, it was domestic factors that led GMF to emerge as Indonesia's new grand strategy. For the research, domestic factors both serve as the medium that mediated and highlighted the external stimuli and at the same play an important role in enabling the emergence of GMF. Central to GMF emergence is the role of policy entrepreneurs, individuals who are dedicated to advocate policy and able to link policy problem with the political solution. The role of policy entrepreneurs in the context of GMF were not only devising the policy idea of GMF but also advocating this policy idea by highlighting both the necessity to respond to the systemic imperatives and to change some domestic policies that found to failed to respond not only external challenges but also addressing issues at home.

As well as enabling the emergence and adoption of GMF, the study also attributes domestic factors in impeding the implementation of the grand strategy within foreign policy and defence. In this sense, the study argues that, regardless of the successful policy entrepreneurship in GMF formulation, its implementation under the Widodo administration with respect to foreign policy and defence has, to some extent, refocused the grand strategy away from its original maritime and outward-looking to a more land-centric, inward-looking orientation. The research thus argues that Jokowi's lack of interest in high policies primary

resulted to the difficulty

Beside about the continuation of GMF implementation, future research can also be conducted on the topics that surround the implementation of GMF during Jokowi's first term of presidency as highlighted in the previous section of this chapter. These include the examination on the absence of policy entrepreneurs, be it during GMF formulation or its implementation, the origin of the Army's doctrines that hampered the implementation of GMF, and the explanation behind the continued domination of the Army's doctrines in the governance of the country's foreign policy and defence. All in all, the conduct of these new possible research can be oriented not only to offer a more comprehensive analysis on GMF, but also to enrich the analysis and study of Indonesia's foreign policy and grand strategy making and implementation.

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