The London School of Economics and Political Science

Categorising Movement: Mobility and World Order from the Imperial to the International

Alice Engelhard

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Abstract

International Relations often starts with a static understanding of political order and treats people in movement as secondary and epiphenomenal to this order. At the same time, work on people in movement tends to approach world order as a pre-given set of constraints to movement. This thesis inverts both of these starting points, to argue that movement, and the regulation and categorisation of people in movement, are productive of transformations in world order. Understandings of movement produce opposing understandings of 'stasis' which constitute an effect of political order. As such, the contested regulation and categorisation of people in movement is productive of political transformation.

The thesis explores how contested understandings of people in movement contribute to transformations in world order, at moments related to the transformation from an imperial to an international order. First, it analyses the role of the recodification of people in movement as 'migrants', 'tourists' and 'refugees' in creating an 'international' order, in the early twentieth century. Second, it addresses the role of debates over people in movement at key moments of British colonial expansion and decolonisation in the Indian Ocean World, between the seventeenth century and the present. These are related to understandings of 'piracy', 'slavery', 'pilgrimage', 'nomads', 'tourists', 'settlers', and 'contract workers'.

While these debates are articulated in relation to people in movement, they produce relative understandings of political space, belonging, territoriality, sovereignty, race, and class, which set the terms of political order. As debates around people in movement shift, they transform understandings of political order, and as political orders change, so do debates about mobilities. This generates new insight into contemporary world order, as well as providing an analytic approach for understanding how world orders are made and unmade more broadly.

For my grandparents, Lilli and Noah Engelhard, and Iris and Nobby Holland

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Contents

Abbreviations

BIOT	British Indian Ocean Territory
CIL	Customary International Law
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
FCO	Foreign & Commonwealth Office
FO	Foreign Office
HC	House of Commons
HL	House of Lords
IBEAC	Imperial British East Africa Company
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICM	Intergovernmental Committee for Migration
ICEM	Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IOW	Indian Ocean World
IUOTPO	International Union of Official Tourist Propaganda Organizations
KTB	Kenya Tourism Board
LON	League of Nations

LNHCR	League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
NRI	Non-Resident Indian
MPA	Marine Protected Area
OSC	Overseas Settlement Committee
PIO	PIOs
PICCME	Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
SETs	School Empire Tours
SOSBW	Society for the Overseas Settlement of British Women
TA	Travel Association
TNA	The National Archives
UN	United Nations
UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organization
VOC	Vereenigde Nederlandsche Geoctroyeerde Oostindische Compagnie (Dutch East India Company)
WW1	World War One
WW2	World War Two

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Introduction

How do understandings of movement produce political order? And how are world orders transformed through the contested categorisation and regulation of people in movement? Through a genealogical analysis of understandings of people in movement at key moments of political transformation related to colonisation and decolonisation from the sixteenth century to the present, this thesis argues that debates over mobilities are productive of transformations in world order. The stakes of debates over mobilities and transformations in world order are clear in the present moment, as we confront the decline of Western-centred internationalism, along with a reckoning with its overlaps with imperialism. From migration to tourism, and settler colonialism to indigeneity, few issues are as politically charged as understandings of people in movement, but the relations between understandings of people in movement and transformations in world order remain underexplored. In this introduction, I introduce the argument that categorisations of people in movement are productive of transformations in world order and provide an outline of the chapters that follow.

At the time of writing, in 2023, the Great Replacement theory has been gaining traction in the US. In post-Brexit Britain, debates about the rejection of international asylum law, and agreement to export 'small boat arrivals' to migration centres in Rwanda, are sources of controversy. In India, changes in citizenship law in 2018 and 2019 left millions of Muslims off the citizenship register, and excluded others from applying for refugee status (*LSE Human Rights*, 2020; Seiff, 2020). In 2021, the Belarusian government was accused of transporting people in movement to the border of the EU as a political bargaining manoeuvre. The Russian invasion of Ukraine saw a wave of displacement of Russians and Ukrainians, and exceptional reception to them in Europe, starkly contrasting with reception of Afghan and Syrian refugees. In the same period, calls to boycott the 2022 FIFA men's World Cup in Qatar condemned the working conditions of migrant labourers who died building the stadium. The ongoing deaths of people attempting to cross the Mediterranean, while others are held for ransom in prisons linked

to the EU trained Libyan Coast Guard, raise questions about race, human rights, and governance. Meanwhile, in Athens, slogans like 'refugees welcome, tourists go home' appear in graffiti. And, in Mexico City, the role of Airbnb and digital nomad visas in urban gentrification are under sharp critique. While these issues are articulated in relation to people in movement, they each invoke relative understandings of belonging, citizenship, territoriality, race, class, and the terms of political order. As debates around people in movement shift, so do understandings of political order, and as political orders change, so do debates about mobilities.

This forms the core intervention of this thesis: that ways of understanding people in movement produce relative and opposing understandings of stasis, which are productive of world order. This argument departs from existing work on people in movement and world order. On one hand, International Relations work on world order tends to treat people in movement as secondary and epiphenomenal to a pre-existing background across which they move. I invert this, to show how people in movement (and debates over people in movement) are constitutive of world order. On the other hand, when work on mobilities addresses world order, it tends to approach world order as a pre-given set of constraints to movement, rather than something that is produced in these relations. At the same time, implicit understandings of what movement *is* are rarely interrogated, which means that the subject of inquiry is taken as a given, and the politically productive role of *understandings* of movement is not explored. Existing research often does not address the political stakes of making some people appear 'mobile' and occluding the mobility of others. This reifies a norm of sedentarism and overlooks the role of knowledge about people in movement in constituting apparently settled societies.

The thesis advances a postcolonial genealogy of understandings of people in movement, to explore how contested understandings of people in movement contribute to political transformation. In conducting this analysis, the thesis draws on postcolonial work that emphasises the centrality of empire for understanding world order. Within this agenda, it draws on approaches that highlight the role of power-knowledge relations in *producing* political order

(Cohn, 1996; Doty, 1996; Foucault et al., 2008; Mamdani, 2012; Mitchell, 2002; Said, 2003), and *narrating* order through the writing of history (Satia, 2020; Trouillot, 2015). Drawing on these approaches, this intervention does not primarily focus on what movement is, or does, but reorients inquiry towards the question of what *understandings* of movement do. It approaches these understandings in relation to the categorisation and regulation of people in movement. The categorisation and regulation of people in movement is related to, and constitutive of, broader understandings of movement and stasis, which contribute to the production of political order.

This analysis helps to address the question of how political orders are made and unmade, as well as offering insight into transformations in Western international and imperial orders. I address key episodes of transformation in world order that are linked to two broad sites. First, the early-twentieth century making of a Western-centred international order, and second, colonisation and decolonisation in the Indian Ocean World. While the making of international order associated with the League of Nations and the Paris Peace process is an increasingly studied site of Historical International Relations, work on international order has not yet addressed the constitutive role of codifications of mobilities categories. In contrast, the world-making politics of the Indian Ocean World are a less studied site in International Relations, and when they are addressed, the constitutive role of mobilities has not been considered. These sites are complementary in that they represent both familiar and unfamiliar origin stories of international and imperial Western-centred world order that emphasise an understanding of the West as a result of relations between European and non-European actors. Through analysis of debates over 'migration', 'refugees', 'tourism', 'piracy', 'pilgrimage', 'slavery', 'nomads', 'settlers', 'diaspora', and 'contract workers' I show how the episodes clustered around these sites represent exemplary moments where debates over people in movement produce broader understandings of political order, and political possibilities.

i) Categorisations of movement produce world order

International Relations often begins with a static image of politics, with peoples largely contained within the borders of sovereign and territorial states. People in movement are seen as the exception, rather than the norm, as in the case of refugees, migrants, and tourists. This thesis begins from the opposite assumption, that people in movement, and the regulation of people in movement, constitute the political. Departing from this assumption, it advances existing debates by exploring the question of how not only *regulation,* but *categorisation* of people in movement is productive of transformations in world order. As such, it approaches arrangements of movement as a key feature of world order and asks how order is made to appear static through the regulation and categorisation of movement.

This draws attention to a central, but under-explored, axis of power-knowledge relations: the distinction between 'movement' and 'stasis'. This builds on the argument that power works through categorisation (Mitchell, 2002: 272). I suggest that a 'movement-stasis' axis has implications beyond the realm of regulating people in movement. Understandings of 'movement' create an effect of order, by producing relative and opposing understandings of 'stasis'. The implications of this are that: 1) ideas about 'movement' and 'stasis' set the conditions on which people in movement are regulated; 2) this produces forms of political power related to mobilities, such as national borders; and 3) ideas about 'movement' and 'stasis' intersect with, and define, wider political issues that extend well beyond the politics of mobility, setting the terms of political belonging and legitimacy. Because understandings of movement and stasis are productive of wider political issues, they are necessarily specific to the contexts which they produce.

Current debates about movement and stasis tend to work across two axes, which either *normalise* or *exceptionalise,* and *celebrate* or *denigrate* both movement and stasis. For example, in contrast to a general 'sedentarist bias' in International Relations and the Social Sciences (Hannam et al., 2006; Huysmans, 2021), work on people in movement may attempt to *normalise* mobility, for

example, in Clifford's (Clifford, 1997: 2) statement that '[e]veryone's on the move, and has been for centuries: dwelling-in-travel'. Political projects may attempt to *celebrate* movement, such as the no borders movement, or *denigrate* movement, such as through anti-migration activism. This has wide-reaching political implications, for example in relation to debates over indigeneity or migrancy as bases of political belonging which may be in tension with one another.

Debates over mobility and stasis evoke much broader political issues. An example of the centrality of a 'movement-stasis' axis in imagining and denigrating stasis, is in Mahmood Mamdani's analysis of the distinction between 'settlers' and 'natives' in colonial rule (2012). By associating 'natives' with stasis, the figure of the Native is understood to be both historically stuck in the past, and geographically fixed and 'pinned' to a homeland, or even understood as part of the land (Mamdani, 2012). As Mamdani has shown, understanding 'natives' as static, enabled a series of policies to 'conserve' and 'contain' populations, sometimes literally within reserves, producing an understanding of the Native as inert and less than fully human, coupled with attempts to materially fix some people in place. This resonates with Frantz Fanon's analysis, in 1961, that the colonial world is a 'motionless, petrified world' (2002: 78), 'a Manichean world, a world divided up into compartments' (2002: 84), and a world where 'the first thing which the native learns is to stay in his place, and not to go beyond certain limits' (2002: 52). In opposition, 'settlers' were often associated with physical and existential movement, cosmopolitanism, progress, and historical agency (Mamdani, 2012). This shows that an ideal of stasis can be associated with inertia, stagnation, and decline, in contrast to the dynamism of politics on the move.

On the other hand, contemporary studies of the politics of understandings of 'movement' and 'stasis' often identify state power with 'stasis', fixity, and order, and approach 'movement' as an existential threat to this order, whether for better or worse. For example, Nandita Sharma (2020: 4) argues that in a postcolonial world order, the movement-stasis axis is defined by a celebration of imagined stasis, and a distinction between 'natives' (or, 'nationals'), as *autochthons* or '*people*

of a place', and 'migrants', as *allochthons,* or *'people out of place'.* Here, Sharma reads the movement-stasis axis as functioning to associate movement (whether real or imagined) with foreign bodies, contamination, otherness, and outsiderness (Sharma, 2020: 4). In opposition, stasis is associated with socially valued understandings of nativity, citizenship, indigeneity, and belonging (Sharma, 2020: 4). Here, stasis is imbued with positivity, and movement with negativity.

A key site of the production of understandings of 'movement' and 'stasis' is the regulation and categorisation of specific forms of mobility. Regulating and categorising some forms of mobility produces a relative and opposing understanding of political order as relatively static. For example, as critical work on mobilities has argued, current definitions of people in movement tend to define movement in relation to national borders, state citizenship, and an apparent norm of stasis (Haddad, 2003; McNevin, 2019). In contrast, in a colonial order, categorisations of people in movement as 'pirates', 'slaves', and 'pilgrims', defined movement in relation to emergent international law, empire, and religion, producing alternative understandings of political order. Neither the categories, nor the understandings of order that they produce, are directly translatable across contexts.

As I expand on in Chapter One, this intervention contributes to existing debates on people in movement and postcolonial world order, which I engage with throughout the thesis. Key texts include Radhika Mongia's (2018) and John Torpey's (2018) work on how the regulation of 'migration' constitutes the nation-state, as well as Nevzat Soguk's (1999) work on how the invention of the figure of the 'refugee' produced national citizenship. In contrast to these texts, which emphasise the role of movement, or understandings of movement, in constituting nation-states, I focus on the role of understandings of movement in transforming world order more broadly. I draw together multiple categories of mobilities, building on work on tourism and global politics (Lisle, 2016), in order to show how categories work together to produce overarching understandings of movement, with broader political implications. The thesis draws

on Mahmood Mamdani's (2012; 2020) and Nandita Sharma's (2020) work on understandings of the significance of the figures of 'Migrant', 'Settler', and 'Native' in colonial and postcolonial world order. In contrast to Sharma's analysis, I critique the idea of the Migrant as a general figure and focus on how categorisations of people in movement produce specific political possibilities at specific political moments. This builds a general argument about the recategorisation of people in movement producing transformations in world order.

ii) Outline

The thesis is structured in three sections. First, an introductory section where I outline the thesis's theoretical framework, methodology, contribution to existing literature, sites, narrative structure, advance the argument that theories of movement are political, and outline a diagnostic genealogical episode of a present-day 'mobilities imaginary'. Second, an analysis of the role of the institutionalised codification of people in movement in the creation of early-twentieth century Western-centred international order. Third, an analysis of the role of debates over people in movement at key episodes of colonisation and decolonisation in the Indian Ocean World. While these sites are related, I distinguish them to explore analytically distinct episodes of transformation in order, that are linked thematically by the themes of mobility, knowledge, and empire, in line with the project's genealogical methodology.

Chapter One 'Theory, Method, Literature: A postcolonial genealogy of people in movement', outlines the thesis's postcolonial theoretical framework and methodology. This chapter locates the thesis within postcolonial theory and methods, and unpacks the thesis' understanding of race, raciality, and racialised geography. In doing so, it clarifies the distinction between 'imperial' and 'international' order that is built into the project's focus on transformations in world order. It builds on existing arguments to outline the multiplicity of overlapping world orders and recognise the persistence of coloniality and colonialism in the present, while emphasising the distinctiveness of 'international' order as a world order apparently composed of nation-states and not empires. The chapter engages with critical historiography and interpretative approaches to

archives to propose a genealogical approach to understandings of people in movement. As I outline in the literature review, this departs from existing approaches to people in movement and world order, which tend to approach people in movement or the regulation of people in movement as ontological questions, but not the question of *knowledge about people in movement* or the politics of theorising movement. Or, when they do, mobile figures such as 'Migrants' are often treated as abstract metaphors rather than institutionalised categories. Overall, in relation to existing literature, I unpack the thesis' approach to addressing the *productive* role of *contextually specific understandings* of people movement at key moments of political transformation related to colonisation and decolonisation.

In Chapter Two 'Episodes and Sites: International Order and the imperial Indian Ocean World' I outline the thesis' non-chronological narrative structure in relation to its postcolonial theoretical framework and genealogical method. I outline existing debates on the emergence of western-centred international order related to the League of Nations and the Paris Peace Process. I identify two gaps in literature on the making of international order which I address in Part One. First, it does not fully address the role of people in movement, or the regulation and institutionalised codification of people in movement, in producing international order. Second, it does not address the tension between overlapping racialised geographies of national compartmentalisation and transversal global colour lines which are both central to international order. I suggest that a genealogy of understandings of 'migration', 'tourism', and 'refugees' and the role of these categories in producing international order can advance these debates. This chapter also introduces Indian Ocean World studies and highlights the value of theorising the emergence of the West in relation to the imperial Indian Ocean. Indian Ocean World Studies often highlights the role of oceanic mobilities in constituting the political, in ways that sometimes risk essentialising oceanic mobility. In contrast, existing work on world order and the Indian Ocean in International Relations does not take people in movement into account. Departing from both of these approaches, I suggest an approach that does not essentialise or

overlook mobilities, but that addresses the political significance of debates over the contested regulation and categorisation of these mobilities.

In Chapter Three 'The Politics of Theorising Movement' I locate the thesis in relation to theories of movement to make two arguments. First, I argue that the question of what movement *is* is not an ontological given, and that epistemologies of movement are political. I illustrate multiple ways of theorising movement, broadly divided into object-oriented and relational approaches to movement. I draw out the political implications of these, to argue that relational approaches to movement cam advance a postcolonial focus on dispersed political formations and communities, and I bring postcolonial theory to bear on the assumption that the state is 'static', to differentiate between territoriality and sedentarism. Second, I diagnose a contemporary 'mobilities imaginary' through analysis of understandings of 'migration', 'tourism' and 'diaspora' in contemporary academic work. This functions as a genealogical episode to locate the project in the present. This analysis highlights the pervasiveness of object-oriented and presentist understandings of people in movement in relation to sedentarist understandings of national belonging, even in research that attempts to trouble methodological nationalism such as analysis of diaspora.

Building on the insight that contemporary mobilities categories are contained within an international imaginary, in Part Own I turn to the question of how categorisations of people in movement contributed to the creation of international order. In Chapter Four 'Categorising migration and the creation of international order' I introduce a genealogy of the origins of the categories of 'migration', 'tourism' and 'refugee'. I show that all of these categories were internationally defined and institutionally codified for the first time by organisations associated with the League of Nations and the Paris Peace Process in the 1920s and 1930s. The codification of these categories produced political possibilities that did not previously exist. I draw out the implications of the codification of 'international migration' for the transformation of political order in relation to raciality and international racialised geographies. I sketch some ways that the category of 'international migration' created and naturalised political possibilities for eugenicist

population manipulation, which constituted the racialised compartmentalisation of the emergent nation-state based international order. I illustrate this through analysis of the invention of national immigration legislation in relation to debates over race at the Paris Peace Process in 1919, and the World Population Conference in 1927. This builds on existing work to show how the institutionalised codification of 'international migration' provided a shared vocabulary and fora that made the national regulation of migration possible.

In Chapter Five 'Categorising tourism and refugees and the making of international order' I show how the categories of 'refugees' and 'tourists' made the introduction of immigration legislation possible, and how they facilitated both ethnic cleansing in Europe, and settler colonialism outside Europe. I illustrate this through analysis of debates linked to the Evian Refugee Conference in 1938, and activities associated with the British Overseas Settlement Committee and Travel Association in the 1920s and 1930s, including the School Empire Tours. This analysis shows how the categories of 'refugees', 'tourists', and 'international migration' work together to reformulate raciality in an international order, in ways that both *continued* colonial practices and *sharpened* global colour lines. Chapters Four and Five provide an extended genealogical episode to unpack the thesis' core argument: that not only the *regulation,* but the *categorisation* of people in movement is productive of transformation in world order. I demonstrate how this generates insight into international order, exposing a previously under-explored way that orders are made and unmade, as well as addressing the paradoxical co-existence of racialised national compartmentalisation and transversal racial colour lines in an emergent international order, as well as how this order overlapped with specifically twentieth-century forms of settler colonialism and imperial expansion.

In Part Two of the thesis, I explore the argument that understandings of people in movement are constitutive of world order in relation to the making of the West at key moments of colonisation and decolonisation in the Indian Ocean World from the sixteenth century to the present. As I address in relation to the thesis' narrative structure, some of these episodes are temporally

overlapping with the episodes addressed in relation to international order. This is in line with a theoretical approach that emphasises the overlaps between colonial and postcolonial order, the presence of pasts in the present and presence in the past. The choice to analytically distinguish between early-twentieth-century internationalism and Indian Ocean World imperialism is an analytic choice, however, in Chapter Eight on the Chagos Islanders I address some of the tensions inherent in the overlaps between imperial and international orders.

In Chapter Six 'Reordering maritime mobilities: Pirates, Slavery, and Pilgrimage' I address the centrality of debates over people in movement at key moments of colonial expansion in the maritime Indian Ocean relating to pirates, slavery, and pilgrimage. These debates were immensely politically productive. I illustrate this in relation to apparently separate debates over 'piracy' in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, slavery and indenture in the nineteenth century, and the Hajj pilgrimage in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. European attempts to regulate and categorise people in movement were focal points of imperial and anti-colonial politics, which not only 'redistributed' power within the IOW, but transformed understandings of power more broadly, and contributed to the production of 'the West' as a world order. These transformations included the constitution of international law, understandings of sovereignty, war, peace, freedom, the role of the contract, and religious versus imperial belonging. This chapter also advances the overarching argument that imperial mobility was constitutive of Western colonial order, but that understandings of movement defined political authority in relation to sedentarism.

In Chapter Seven 'Nomads, Tourists, and Settlers in the colonisation of British East Africa', I turn to the role of the regulation and categorisation of people in movement in the colonisation of British East Africa at the turn of the twentieth century. I argue that colonisation functioned through the mobility of settlers and tourists, and that these mobilities constituted a continuous political realm, spanning colony and metropole. Far from being a 'sedentary' or 'settled' political project, settler colonialism, and the emergence of Britain as a nation-state, were possible through

mobility. At the same time, by romanticising the 'nomadic' Maasai as 'noble savages', in part due to their itinerant way of living, the British attempted to justify the alienation of Maasai land, and the enclosure of the Maasai in nature reserves. This has present-day resonances, as the romanticisation of the Maasai and their association with nature are prevalent tropes in contemporary tourism to Kenya. On the one hand, the politically productive role of mobility in European colonialism and the emergence of 'the international' is obscured, and on the other, it is through the circulation of tourists that the mobility of the Maasai is romanticised, thus facilitating the ongoing alienation of Maasai land.

Finally, Chapter Eight 'Decolonisation and the displacement of the Chagos Islanders' sketches the overlaps and tensions between colonial and international mobilities orders in calls for decolonising the Chagos Islands from the 1960s to the present. In 1968, the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands were forcibly displaced by the British to set up a US military base on Diego Garcia. As descendants of enslaved people and itinerant labourers, the islanders were represented by British Foreign Office officials as an itinerant 'floating population' with no status as 'belongers' on the atoll. The displacement of the islanders is being contested in the courts through an international framework that hinges on questions of national belonging and indigeneity. Both approaches emphasise territorial fixity, linked to an equally fixed identity. This poses a challenge for postcolonial politics, both for people in movement and their descendants, as well as for apparently 'sedentary' societies, such as the UK. It illustrates the limitations to being able to make political claims on an explicit basis of itinerancy, despite postcolonial Western world order being generated through mobility. In the conclusions I draw out the political implications of this project, implications for broader research, and areas for future research.

1: A postcolonial genealogy of people in movement

Drawing on postcolonial theory and critical approaches to order and historiography, this thesis advances a novel genealogical approach to understandings of movement and world order. In this chapter, I outline the postcolonial theory that I draw on, including understandings of race, raciality, racialised geography, international and imperial order, and postcolonial temporality. I then introduce the genealogical methodology, and critical historiographical approach. Last, I locate the thesis in relation to existing literature on people in movement and world order, in relation to debates in Mobilities Studies and postcolonial political theory.

i) Theory: postcolonialism, race, and order

Postcoloniality and empire

This is a postcolonial project in that it builds on and contributes to scholarship on the colonial encounter. However, in line with postcolonial debates, it recognises that 'empire-centrism' risks becoming another form of Eurocentrism, which overemphasises the agency of a narrow set of European actors. Therefore, the project starts from an understanding that colonialism in the past and the present is formative of the political, and the idea that attentiveness to colonialism can challenge work in International Relations that takes the nation-state as the primary unit of global politics. As postcolonial research has shown, methodologically nationalist frameworks are not adequate for making sense of empires and transversal imperial relations in the past and the present. At the same time, the project is alert to the fact that 'empire-centrism' may be another form of Eurocentrism that overemphasises the agency and impact of European empires in determining global politics.

This thesis draws on approaches that reckon with empire but avoid empire-centrism, by understanding 'Europe', 'the West', or 'Modernity' as the result of relational encounters between 'the West' and 'the non-West', both of which are co-constituted through these encounters

(Dabashi, 2019; Said, 2003). Drawing on this, this project approaches the West as an outcome of colonial encounters. For example, I explore how international law, while often approached as a form of European imperial imposition, drew on multiple circulating legal systems in the Indian Ocean (Mawani & Hussin, 2014). Equally, drawing on Engseng Ho's (2004) argument that the British became a people as they became an empire, I explore how European identities were *constituted* through colonial relations, and emerged from this constitutive encounter. The project draws on a framework that assumes that Europe and the West did not precede the colonial encounters that constituted them. These encounters consisted of highly unequal power relations but these were relations nonetheless.

Second, drawing on subaltern and pluriversal approaches, the project recognises that the project of European coloniality did not achieve the universal reach that it claimed. In other words, empire was not total, and other worlds exist within, alongside, and in excess of the colonial. As Hamid Dabashi (2020: xi) argues, 'the dehumanizing European conquest was neither final, total, definitive, or terminal'. In relation to 'international order' this requires a recognition of the fact that while this thesis focuses on Western-centred international and imperial orders, other world ordering projects existed within, alongside, and in excess of these politics, including anti-colonial internationalisms, for example (Getachew, 2019; Goebel, 2015). This is especially relevant in the Indian Ocean World, which I explore in Part Two of this thesis. As Wilson Chacko Jacob (2019: 12) argues, while European imperialism transformed political order in the Indian Ocean World, it did not define it. Jacob (2019:12) warns against 'the intellectual and political impoverishment that ensues from taking for granted that such (re)organization was tantamount to the subjugation of all life on the planet under a single (colonial) episteme'. While this project centres key moments of European colonisation and decolonisation, it does this with the recognition that these are one set of worlds and relations among many.

Postcolonial Temporality

This understanding of empire as relational and existing within multiple worlds that also exceed imperialism underpins the thesis' approach to temporality in that it allows for contingency, transformation, and multiplicity, rather than consistency, teleology, and determinism or rupture. Working with Spivak, I understand postcolonial temporality as neither one of a rupture between past and present, or a linear chronology from past to present. Because of this, Spivak warns that: 'Colonial Discourse studies, when they concentrate only on the representation of the colonized or the matter of the colonies, can sometimes serve the production of current neocolonial knowledge by placing colonialism/ imperialism securely in the past, and/or by suggesting a continuous line from that past to our present' (Spivak, 1999: 1). In contrast, this project explores both transformation and ongoing coloniality, as well as allowing for multiplicity and the possibility of relations (or 'minor realities'[1]) that exist outside of or in excess of European colonialism (*Interview with Ghassan Hage*, n.d.).

Postcolonial theory does not only imply attentiveness to empire, but also a retheorising of temporarily. The postcolonial argument that the 'post' in postcolonial does not refer to a period after the end of the colonial, but to the period following the beginning of European colonialism and continuing into the present (Seth, 2013) does not only draw attention to ongoing colonialism[2], but also problematizes linear and sequential understandings of temporality, that Glissant calls 'universalizing linear time' (1997: 74). The idea of time as singular, chronological,

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[1] This framework draws on Ghassan Hage's understanding of minor realities as a form of 'alter' that is not only possible, but already exists within and alongside dominant realities. This is a political position, which Hage articulates, stating: 'you can say "instrumentalism rules." And you go to do research and you will find instrumentalism, but then you will also find love. You will find solidarities. You will find all kinds of things, sometimes just hidden in a corner, sometimes in another dimension. And I think the crucial aspect of thinking the alter is precisely this idea what I call, minor realities. That instead of thinking about reality and ideas as alternatives, think of major dominant realities, and minor realities' (*Interview with Ghassan Hage*, n.d.)

[2] For example, through ongoing colonial territories (Immerwahr, 2019), settler colonialism, coloniality (Quijano and Ennis, 2000)', and the 'boomeranging' of colonial racial hierarchies and techniques of governance into 'national' societies (Go, 2024)

and linear, is internal to Western epistemology and international order[3]. The standardisation of linear time as a universal measure was part of creation of the 'international', for example, the 'The International Time Bureau' was one of the earliest international organisations, and contributed to the 'shrinking of time and space' involved in creating the idea of the world as a singular and universal whole (Mazower, 2013: 77). This means that academics are increasingly attentive to multiple temporalities. For example, Rahul Rao calls for a need to 'to turn away from the progressive linearity of straight time' and 'to provincialise the time of Western modernity (2020: 9, 14). In History, Stefan Tanaka writes: 'That there is a problem with linear time is certainly not a new contribution; scholars, including historians, have long criticized linearity. Today, more scholars acknowledge a general decline of the idea of "progress" and are critical of teleology' (2019: 13)[4]. In contrast, Tanaka calls for a recognition of multiple co-existing temporalities, and an approach to history 'that enlarges the past into pasts as well as pasts in the present' (2019: 8). This informs the genealogical approach of this project, which treats episodes as heuristic devices amongst many possible alternatives, rather than moments in a continuous or universal chronology.

This project draws on postcolonial historiography, which emphasises the multiplicity of temporalities, as well as the impossibility of discretely separating 'past' and 'present'. This scholarship is often particularly oriented to the presence of the past in the present, for example, through concepts such as 'the wake' (Sharpe, 2016), 'afterlives' (Hartman, 2008), or 'ghosts' (Trouillot, 2015). An example that Michel-Rolph Trouillot draws on to illustrate the continuous presence of the past in the present is slavery in the USA. He writes that '[s]lavery here is a ghost, *both the past and a living presence*; and the problem of historical representation is how to represent that ghost, something that is and yet is not' (2015: 147, emphasis added). Language of 'ghosts', 'afterlives', and 'wakes' troubles the notion of a discrete past which is over, and evokes

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[3] Which is not to imply it is unique to the West
[4] See also: Tamm and Olivier. *Rethinking Historical Time: New Approaches to Presentism*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.

a looser understanding of beginning and endings, with the potential for multiple moments to be overlaid upon one another and simultaneously existing.

Finally, by drawing on an approach that is attentive to the pasts in the present (or, as Trouillot puts it, the historian's 'presence in the past'), this thesis rejects the separation between 'history' and 'historical narration'. As Viet Than Nguyen writes: '[a]ll wars are fought twice, the first time on the battlefield, the second time in memory' (2016). This locates historical narration within the history that is being narrated and rejects the distinction between the researcher and the research object. Here, Trouillot's thought on historical authenticity is also relevant. Historical authenticity, as Trouillot understands it, 'resides not in the fidelity to an alleged past but in an honesty vis-a-vis the present as it re-presents that past' (2015: 148), it 'implies a relation with what is known that duplicates the two sides of historicity: it engages us both as actors and narrators' (2015: 151). The project's genealogical methodology is based on the idea that the writing of history is not neutral but is written within a regime of truth that it co-constitutes hinges on the idea that the pasts persists in the present, if only because the narration of the past is written within the present rather than existing outside of 'history'. Overall, a postcolonial understanding of multiple pasts persisting in the present, and of the active role of the narrator in constituting understandings of the pasts, informs this project's theoretical and methodological framework.

Imperial order and international order

This project works on the basis that linear understandings of time isolate the past from the present, represent temporality as singular, and treat the writing and making of history as analytically distinct. However, openness to non-linear temporalities does not mean doing away with the possibility to differentiate between moments in time or bypass the question of contextual specificity. For example, a postcolonial approach that is open to multiple overlapping temporalities is compatible with an analytical distinction between international and imperial order. Based on the postcolonial insight that the colonial did not end with formal decolonisation, this project understands international order as far from a clean break from imperial order. At the

same time, 'the international', and international order, as it emerged in the twentieth century are distinct from a formally imperial world order. For one thing the concept of the 'international' did not hold meaning until the late eighteenth century: 'there was no 'international' until this concept entered political discourse towards the end of the eighteenth century' (Bartelson: 2011, 60).

Building on recent histories of the international, this project understands twentieth-century international order as simultaneously a new world order, and an attempt to continue some elements of European imperialism under an international guise, which overlapped with overt forms of continued colonialism. Jeanne Morefield has referred to this as an 'internationalism that assured European domination in the name of liberal principles like freedom, equality, and self-determination' (2014: 198). As such, early-twentieth-century internationalism and international organisations such as the League of Nations allowed for the co-existence of apparently international forms of governance (such as national borders and 'self-determination') with ongoing imperialism. This effectively '"squared the circle" between colonial expansion and "Wilsonian idealism" in a manner that allowed imperial states to effectively have their cake and eat it too' (Mazower 2013 in Morefield, 2014: 196).

At the same time, and as these histories show, however imperial the new international order was, it was different from the imperial order that preceded it. For example, it was characterised by the idea of the nation-state and national citizenship as the primary unit of politics (Heiskanen, 2019; Mamdani, 2020; Mazower, 2013; Smith, 2004; Soguk, 1999), accompanied by a rise in eugenics, population politics, and the problematization of 'minorities' (Bashford, 2007; Weitz, 200), and characterised by multilateral international organisations, which replaced previous forms of bilateral agreement (Mazower, 2013). The nation-state, unlike the imperial state, was founded on 'the assumption that cultural and political boundaries should coincide, and that the state should be a nation state-that the natural boundaries of a state are those of a common cultural community' (Mamdani, 2001: 653). However, the distinctiveness of international order is sometimes obscured by discourse on colonialism that emphasises continuity between the colonial

past and the present. As Sharma writes: '[t]oday we live, primarily, in a world of nation states and I think, oddly, that is the fundamental fact that is ignored, that we actually live in a world of nation states. Even the kind of political vocabulary of the left is still talking about imperialism. When we want to talk about something that is really, really exploitative and violent and destructive, we talk about imperialism, and I wanted to shift the focus onto nationalism and to nation states, and to say that we're actually living in a global world of nation states, and that is fundamentally different than a world of imperial states' (de Noronha & Sharma, 2021).

Here, the project's use of the term 'international order' roughly maps onto Sharma's understanding of a 'Postcolonial New World Order', within which decolonial nationalism facilitated the sharpening of imperialist exploitation, but through structures that were distinct from their imperial predecessors. Sharma writes: 'This Postcolonial New World Order did not represent a challenge to the social relations of imperialism but, instead, organized new modes of managing now-national populations and situating each one within globally operative and competitive—capitalist social relations. Postcolonialism thus worked to contain the revolutionary and liberatory demands to abolish the practices of expropriation and exploitation most closely associated with imperialism. Indeed, the new international system provided the institutional structures (and force of coercive action) for capitalist social relations to expand. They did so through—not against—the nationalization of states, sovereignty, territory, and subjectivities' (Sharma, 2020: 28-29).

Building on this, the thesis recognises that international order is a contested concept[5]. In line with critical historical work, the paper approaches the international as a historically specific and contingent order, in contrast with the primary approach in International Relations, which treats 'the international' as a starting point for analysis, rather than a subject of inquiry (Bigo and Walker, 2007). In references to international order, I mean to evoke a dominant form of early twentieth century racialised Western-centred internationalism as it emerged around the League of

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[5] See Brown (2024) for overview of debates.

Nations and the post-WW1 Paris Peace Process[6]. References to 'international order' are not equivalent to references to 'world order' or 'global political order', which are multiple and overlapping. The paper's focus on Western-centred[7] international order does not deny the existence of these multiple co-existing worlds and world-orders (Agathangelou & Ling in Kristensen 2021: 221).

Worlding and world order

The thesis draws on work on 'worlding' to work with an understanding of multiple overlapping 'worlds' and 'world orders', or 'world order effects'. The thesis focuses on moments of transformation in world order, and specifically the emergence of a dominant Western-centred international order effect in the early twentieth century, and the contested colonisation and decolonisation of the Indian Ocean World, as dominant worlds among many. This draws on work on 'worlding' and 'world-making' in IR, that starts from the basis that worlds are both 'made', and multiple (Blaney and Tickner, 2017: 18). This works with an understanding that worlds are continuously made and unmade through ongoing social processes of worlding. This is not only an issue of multiple ways of knowing or representing one reality (epistemological issues), but about living and being (ontological issues). As Blaney and Tickner articulate, approaches to 'worlding' recognise that 'the ways in which distinct social groups go about living their lives and making their worlds, not just how they know and represent them, are at stake' (Blaney and Tickner, 2017: 18).

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[6] However, I note that both within and around the League, alternative internationalisms were being articulated. For example, in Moscow in 1919, Lenin convened the communist Third International. In Paris, Du Bois convened a pan-African conference (Clarence G. Contee 1972). And, in the same year, Vietnamese revolutionary Ho Chi Minh, and future Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, moved into small apartments in Paris from which they develop global political networks (Goebel 2015) sewing some of the seeds of a century of transnational anti-colonial nationalisms (Getachew 2019). Years earlier, in 1915, 1500 women had met at the International Congress of Women in the Hague to draw up peace plans (Tickner and True 2018).

[7] References to the 'West' are intended as a broad term to invoke colonial and international forms of political order, constituted in relation with 'the non-West' through European colonial expansion, drawing on Dabashi (2019) and Said (2003)

While I focus on the production of Western-centred international and colonial world orders, this exploration is premised on the assumption that these are dominant worlds, within a multiplicity of others. Approaches to 'worlding' and 'world-making' often articulate a multiplicity of worlds, sometimes referring to this through the idea of 'the pluriverse' (De la Cadena and Blaser, 2018; Hutchings, 2019). This contrasts with the primary approach in International Relations, which is that there exists 'an international' which we study (Bigo and Walker, 2007). In contrast, '[t]he basic idea of "worlding" is to move from a totalizing gaze on the international – the Western invention of a singular Westphalian international – toward world politics as a site of multiple worlds' (Agathangelou and Ling, 2009 in Kristensen, 2021: 220). These multiple worlds are entangled with one another, for example, in 'minor realities' that exist within and alongside one another (Hage, 2012). The thesis starts from the basis that worlds are always in a process of becoming and are always in excess of the appearance of 'order' that they may take on. This forms the basis to all references to 'international order' in the thesis, understood as a specific understanding of the world as 'international', rather than as a synonym for 'political order' or 'world order'. Equally, while the 'international' is in many ways 'colonial', I refer to 'colonial order' as a distinct analytic term. References to the 'West' are intended as a broad term to invoke colonial and international forms of political order, constituted in relation with 'the non-West' through European colonial expansion.

The thesis focuses on 'world order', as opposed to 'worlds', to invoke a sense of ordering and regulation, which is both produced and exceeded by the social relations (or 'worlds') that it apparently orders. I work with the concept of a 'world order effect' to evoke the sense of world order as a power-laden arrangement of social and political relations which gives a sense of structuring coherence and stability, however incomplete or partial they are in practice. This draws on Timothy Mitchell's description of the state as a state effect. Mitchell suggests that an effect of a state is produced as an abstraction, in apparent opposition to concrete social relations (1991: 95). The state effect is generated through social processes, but appears as a structure: 'This entity comes to seem something much more than the sum of the everyday activities that

constitute it, appearing as a structure containing and giving order and meaning to people's lives' (Mitchell, 1991: 94). He makes an analogy to the law, which he understands as a set of social practices that appear as a structure which orders these practices, writing: 'the mundane details of the legal process, all of which are particular social practices, are so arranged as to produce the effect that "law" exists as a sort of abstract, formal framework, superimposed above social practice' (Mitchell, 1991: 94). The state effect is both conceptual, or imaginative, and real, or material. In a similar way, I approach 'world order' as a set of social and political practices and power-knowledge relations, which are inseparable from 'worlds', but appear as a structural effect. At the same time, worlds inevitably exceed the effect of order which they generate.

Race and raciality

I draw on an established understanding of the constitutive role of racialised dispossession and racialised hierarchies in ordering the international (Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2014; Jones, 2008; Brown, 2024). Both 'race' and 'ethnicity' are political rather than biological identities (Mamdani, 2001: 652). In references to race I intend race (including whiteness) as an outcome of racialisation, which is fluid and contingent (Ahmed, 2007). In addition, I depart from the argument that 'race' is not only a matter of individual subjectivity or identity, but a social ordering principle (Lentin, 2008: 492). An understanding of race as a social ordering principle on a global level, rather than a question of individual subjectivity is significant, as I am not arguing that the categories of 'migrant', 'tourist' and 'refugee' correspond to racialised subjectivities (although they do at different times in different ways), but that they contribute to the creation of an international order that is structured according to the principle of race difference, which facilitates racialised geographies. Working with Da Silva (2001: 422), the paper considers an 'analytics of raciality' as a strategy of power that produces race difference. Within this framework, race difference does not precede either racialisation, or the analytics of raciality that makes it possible to differentiate according to 'race'.

European colonial expansion and hierarchies between 'the West' and 'the non-West' (Zarakol, 2019: 214-215) are intimately related to racialised hierarchies, with whiteness conceived of as superior (Doty, 1996; Jones, 2008). Racialised hierarchies were central to colonial rule, for example, in indirect-rule colonial Africa 'there was in fact an entire racial hierarchy, with Europeans-meaning whites-at the top, followed by "Coloureds," then Asians, then Arabs, and then Hamites (the Tutsi)' (Mamdani, 2001: 654). However, understandings of 'race' and race difference changed throughout the period of European colonial expansion and decolonisation. In Da Silva's framework, raciality (as an analytic of race difference) emerged in the early-nineteenth-century and persists to the present, but has been reconfigured at key moments. For example, in 'the post–Second World War moral command to erase [race] from the modern political lexicon' (Da Silva, 2007: xxvii)[8]. The contingency and fluidity of understandings of race and race difference is exacerbated by multiple and contradictory uses of understandings of 'race', 'ethnicity' and 'nation' in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries (Bell, 2016). This is significant for the thesis for two reasons. First, because in all references to 'race', 'race' is understood as a signifier of 'raciality', or a logic of race difference, and not an ontological fact. Second, because while the thesis takes as given the centrality of civilisational and racialised hierarchies in European colonialism from the Sixteenth Century to the present, these were not stable in meaning but were fluid and contingent. In relation to the emergence of international order, I focus on the specific codification of raciality in the early twentieth century, which was a moment of debate over population politics, eugenics, and race science that was distinct to earlier colonial debates over race and understandings of race difference (Bashford and Levine, 2010).

The analytic choice to focus on race in 'international order' and not in the chapters on imperial order does not deny the centrality of understandings of race difference to colonial expansion from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries[9]. This was an analytical choice that I made for two

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[8] See also Lentin on the post-WW2 replacement of race with signifiers such as culture and ethnicity (Lentin, 2005: 487)
[9] Notwithstanding overlaps in imperial and international forms of governance. See (Fanon, 2001; McClintock, 1995; Mills, 2022) on race and empire.

reasons. First, because the episodes in the project are all linked by the themes of i) recodification of people in movement, ii) transformations in world order, and iii) colonisation and decolonisation, which 'race' being a secondary theme that emerges in specific analysis of how these three primary themes worked in the creation of the international. And second, because in analysis of the creation of international order, the theme of race emerged as a key area of recodification of political order, as overt forms of colonial racial hierarchy were embedded in implicit forms of racialised geography and national belonging.

Racialised geography

In thinking through the politics of raciality in the twentieth century I draw on theorisations of racialised geographies developed in the work of Frantz Fanon in relation to compartmentalisation, and W.E.B. DuBois in relation to transversality[10]. In *The Wretched of the Earth* Fanon argues that apartheid, as it emerged in South Africa was exemplary of colonial compartmentalisation and represented just one 'form of the division into compartments of the colonial world' (2001: 40). For Fanon, colonial compartmentalisation was both spatial and racialised. The spatial compartmentalisation is apparent in 'the existence of 'native' towns and European towns, of schools for 'natives' and schools for Europeans' (2001: 3), and racialised segregation is based on the observation that: '[w]hat parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging or not to a given race' (2001: 31). In this thesis, I explore how this resonates with contemporary international compartmentalisation of space. As Sharma writes: '[t]hrough the seemingly banal operation of citizenship and immigration controls, the Postcolonial New World Order not only produces but also normalizes a racism in which political separations and segregations are seen as the natural spatial order of nationally sovereign states' (2020: 17). Drawing on these approaches, I argue that the concept of 'compartmentalisation' is a useful way to think about the international ideal of racialised segregation in an 'ethnic geography' of nation-states.

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[10] See also broader debates on racialised geographies which are outside of the scope of this thesis (Conroy, 2023; Neely and Samura, 2011; Noxolo, 2022)

At the same time, as I draw out throughout this analysis, Du Bois' (2012: 15) observation that 'the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line', is one that informs analysis of the way that race functioned transversally, to not only compartmentalise, but also facilitate transnational solidarities that cut across national compartments. As Du Bois diagnosed in 1905 (2012: 17) '[t]he problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line – the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea'. Recent scholarship that has taken up this line of inquiry takes seriously how early twentieth century 'international relations' were imagined as 'race relations' (Anievas et al., 2014; Barkawi, 2017; Thakur and Vale, 2020; Vitalis, 2015), indicating that political solidarities were not defined only by racialised national compartmentalisation, by also by transversal racial imaginaries. For example, Bell identifies an 'Angloworld' around the turn of the twentieth century, within which 'the basic ontological unit was race, and political institutions, including the state, were only of derivative importance' (2016: 184). This is an alternative and transversal racial geography, or 'Anglo-racial imaginary', which Bell argues can be 'seen as an example of what Arjun Appadurai terms "translocal" affiliation—of an emergent cartography that escaped the topological imperatives of the modern territorially bounded nation-state'. The concepts of compartmentalisation and global colour lines underpin my analysis of twentieth century racialised geographies, and structure the argument that raciality became *sharpened* as an organising principle in an apparently race-blind international order. This does not imply that race was not significant in a colonial order, but that is outside of the scope of this analysis.

ii) Methodology: A genealogy of understandings of people in movement

Genealogy

Based on the theoretical framework outlined above, I work with a genealogical approach to uncover the role of understandings of people in movement in producing transformations in world order. This approach is based on three core principles: first, a focus on writing a history of the present, which confuses the linear distinction between past and present; second, a recognition of

the mutual implication of power and knowledge, which means that the present is always present in narrative about the past, and the researcher is always present in the object of research; third, an emphasis on contextual specificity. This genealogical approach to understandings of people in movement is a methodological innovation on existing studies of people in movement which treat 'mobility' as an object or a method, but do not address how understandings of 'movement' and 'mobility' are themselves internal to and constitutive of regimes of power-knowledge. In this section I outline the theory and method underpinning the thesis' engagement with temporality, genealogy, historiography, and archives. I work with a genealogical approach for three key reasons. First, because the project is not a history of how people in movement constitute world order, but of how *knowledge* about people in movement constitutes world order. Second, because it is a history of the present, that treats the present as inside of the power-knowledge relations that it studies. Third, because the project is structured according to the principles of being effective, episodic, and exemplary.

This project is a genealogy of understandings of people in movement and their co-constitutive relations with power. Broadly, 'genealogy' is understood as 'a historical narrative that explains an aspect of human life by showing how it came into being' (Bevir: 2008, 263). The element of human life that I explore in this project is understandings of people in movement, which are underpinned by corresponding understandings of what 'movement' and 'stasis' are. I explore how contextually specific understandings of people in movement, with underlying understandings of movement and stasis, came into being at specific historical moments. As Vucetic (2011: 1301) writes, 'effective genealogies are those that focus on a 'problem' - a social phenomenon that appears (seems, feels) normal or true (commonplace, natural, intuitive) and then turns it into a question, that is, it asks how it came about in the light of contingency and power'. This thesis problematises present-day taken for granted understandings of what 'movement' is, and how people in movement are understood (for example, as 'migrants', 'tourists', 'pirates', or members of a 'diaspora'), by exploring how these come into being within specific contexts and vary between them.

As I will outline in more detail in the section on narrative structure, the project is arranged according to the principles of being effective, episodic, and exemplary. This draws on within Bartelson's (2011) framework. 'Effective' is taken to mean that the work effectively problematizes an aspect of the present. For Bartelson, a genealogy is effective in so far as it must start from an analysis of the present and identify something as problematic in that present in order to write a history of it' (2011: 73). 'Episodic', in that it is structured according to episodes that do not claim to be all-encompassing or causally related, but that are selected in relation to the first criteria of effectiveness. Bartelson writes: 'genealogy is episodical insofar as it does not aim to supply a history of the past as it actually was, or to recover a past age in its full density or significance' (2011: 73), which is what differentiates it from a 'history'. Because of the episodic nature of a genealogy, a genealogy is also exemplary, 'but not in the Renaissance sense of exemplary history. It relies on examples, but it does not assume these examples to be transhistorically valid, since this necessarily would presuppose a cyclical recurrence of historical events or a cyclical concept of time, or both' (Bartelson, 2011: 73). The principles of being effective, episodic, and exemplary, underpin the narrative structure of this project, and are grounded in an understanding of power-knowledge relations, and historiography, which I now outline.

Power-knowledge relations

The genealogical approach draws on Foucault and Nietzsche's genealogies, which constitute 'historical studies of the interpellations of power and knowledge' (Foucault and the Political, 20)[11]. The project starts from a Foucauldian understanding of power-knowledge relations as inseparable from one another. In line with an understanding of truth claims as internal to power-relations, I do not treat 'people in movement', 'movement', or 'stasis' as ontological realities. Instead, I ask how knowledge about 'people in movement' and 'movement-stasis' is constituted, and how this is productive of power relations. This is because within a Foucauldian

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[11] For a postcolonial critique of Foucault's work see Weheliye (2014)

approach to genealogy, 'the genealogical approach provides historical rather than epistemological answers to the questions of what constitutes knowledge and truth' (Simons, 1995: 27), which, in the context of this project, means that rather than providing new knowledge about people in movement, my thesis provides interpretations of existing knowledge claims about movement-stasis, and their relations with power. This is because, as a genealogy, it is concerned with 'the interpretation of interpretations', and not the uncovering of fixed historical truths (Bartelson, 2011: 75). In other words, it is not a history of the politics of people in movement, but a history of how people come to be understood and categorised as 'in movement' at specific historical moments. This mirrors Bartelson's genealogy of sovereignty. Because there is no fixed referent of 'people in movement' this project cannot be a history of people in movement. Bartelson states: 'a history of sovereignty must be a history without fixed referent, since it is precisely a history of this referent and its formation in time' (2011: 53). Equally, this project is a genealogy of how people are understood to be in movement, rather than people in movement per se.

The assumption that power and knowledge imply one another does not mean that power relations are merely discursive. They are embedded within 'institutions, economic processes, and social relations' (Foucault (1972a: 164) in Simons, 1995: 26), which this project is also attentive to. It is the embeddedness of discourse within institutions, academic work, and social relations that gives weight to knowledge claims. This means that 'genealogy is not a history of opinions, but a history of the knowledges and the metastories which furnish other stories with validity and coherence' (Bartelson, 2011: 74). The validity and coherence of specific knowledge claims derives in part from their location within broader social relations and knowledge practices (Foucault et al., 2008: 24–25). As I explore in this thesis, knowledge claims about movement are located in relation to (often implicit) knowledge claims about stasis. For example, defining a pirate as someone with no fixed abode implies that the norm among other seafarers is to have a fixed abode. Or, defining migration as the crossing of a border, produces an opposing understanding of bounded society as a norm. This is what Skinner refers to as 'a network of

beliefs', writing: 'Any particular belief in which an historian is interested will therefore be likely to present itself holistically as part of a network of beliefs, a network within which the various individual items supply each other with mutual support' (Skinner 1990 in Bartelson, 2011: 257)[12]. Individual knowledge claims are embedded within broader social relations, as well as wider regimes of truth, which render them meaningful, and which they often invoke implicitly.

A genealogical approach is coherent with an understanding of historical narrative and history as intimately entangled. This is compatible with Trouillot's understanding of historical narration as an active practice that problematises the distinction between past (History) and present (historical narration) (2015: 150-151). From a genealogical perspective, knowledge production is always participating within a field of power-knowledge relations that it is contained by and productive of. Bartelson writes: 'there is no spot itself uncontaminated by power from where to reflect on its interplay with power' (2011: 80). Because of this, 'genealogy must start from an analysis of the present, which serves as the point of departure for the historical inquiry' (Bartelson, 2011: 77). In this project, my location in the present, and current debates unfolding around people in movement, is a part of the historical narration that I undertake. Rather than implying a direct continuity from the past to the present, this acknowledges that my perspective on the past is only possible within the present moment. Finally, the project draws on a genealogical recognition of contingency. This is crucial to avoid teleology not only in the sense of linear time, but also in the fatalist sense of predetermination, within which retrospectively all moments leading up to the present are understood to have followed a logical structure which did not exist at the time. Overall, this project is concerned with change, transformation, and multiplicity, not only in the sense that they are possible, but in the sense that they are continuously occurring, and this means that the episodes are analytical devices among many alternative options.

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[12] While recognising that Skinner's approach is not strictly genealogical, this is relevant for how I make sense of power-knowledge relations.

Historiography

The project's methodology and attentiveness to *understandings* of movement at specific historical moments is influenced by Trouillot's work on power and the narration of history, and by contextualist approaches to history[13]. The project works according to the idea that historical narratives are produced through specific power relations, 'that makes some narratives possible and silences others' (Trouillot, 2015: 25). All historical or genealogical narratives, including this one, are selective and involve silences and elisions (Trouillot, 2015: 49). A focus on power and the narration of history is significant for my project for three reasons. First, because I am concerned with understandings of people in movement and the interpretation of existing historical narratives, my sources include 'so-called "secondary" sources- that is material already produced as history' (Trouillot, 2015: 54) as primary sources from which to identity and interpret narrative understandings of people in movement[14]. Second, based on an understanding that historical narratives are not limited to academic histories but are produced through popular culture, including television, film, tourism, school curriculums (Trouillot, 2015: 21) I draw on a wide range of sources to identify understandings of people in movement. Third, because the thesis is not *only* involved in the interpretation of existing narratives, but the writing of a new one, in that it attempts to reinterpret historical narratives to address the underexplored but constitutive role of understandings of people in movement in producing political transformations[15].

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[13] For the purposes of this thesis, this is compatible with a genealogical approach, although Trouillot does not frame his work as genealogy. Similarly, I draw on contextualist historical approaches which Bartelson (2011) distinguishes between contextualist and genealogical approaches to history, but Bevir (2008) emphasises the complementarity between radical historicity and genealogy

[14] Although I also sometimes I treat them as secondary sources from which to draw facts

[15] This is in line with Trouillot's claim that his work on the 'unearthing of Sans Souci required extra labor not so much in the production of new facts but in their transformation into a new narrative' (2015: 58)

Archives

In compiling my sources, I have drawn on archival materials[16]. The sources I draw on include formal state archives, existing academic work, touristic materials, and popular journalism and fiction. Working with Trouillot, I take archives to mean 'the institutions that organize facts and sources and condition the possibility of existence of historical statements' (2015: 52), including official state and organisational archives and libraries, as well as museum tours, tourist guides, and other potential 'archives' (2015: 52). The assembling of archives, and the process of selecting archival materials to interpret, are both sites of power, where some narratives are silenced and others are made possible (2015: 53). In line with critical archival methods, the paper takes an interpretivist approach to archives as a subject of research rather than a source of facts (Lobo-Guerrero and van't Groenewout, 2016; Redwood, 2020; Stoler 2009). As Stoler notes, '[t]ransparency is not what archival collections are known for' and archives are characterised by omissions and erasures (2009: 19). Archives or not neutral repositories of facts, but sites of archival power (Trouillot, 2015). In addition, it is important to note that while this project is an attempt to recover the significance of debates over people in movement in dominant archives, it is not an attempt to recover or assemble alternative archives or subaltern archives or sources of knowledge.

Direct engagement with official archives was necessary for this research for two reasons. First, because the project is influenced by contextualist approaches, which make it necessary to understand how concepts are used in the context of their emergence. Second, because it considers practices of archiving to be internal to the power relations which are under scrutiny, and therefore treats the archive as an *active site* of the contestation of power-knowledge relations. The project takes a broadly contextualist approach, which asks 'how the concepts we still invoke were initially defined, what purposes they were intended to serve, what view of public power they were used to underpin' (Skinner 1998 in Jahn, 2006: 16). In contrast, many

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[16] While recognising that the question of what an 'archive' *is* is not self-explanatory. See Julietta Singh (2018) on the question of what the archive is.

existing histories of 'migration' engage in 'presentism', understood to mean that contemporary assumptions (in this case categories) are read back into historical materials (Jahn, 2006: 3). This meant that some engagement with archival materials was necessary for a genealogical inquiry into the question of how categories came about, to see how these categories were used in the context of their codification.

At the same time, within an anthropologically informed approach to archives as process, the practice of archiving and the question of what knowledge enters the archive is a subject of research. This approach treats 'archives not as sites of knowledge retrieval but of knowledge production' (Stoler, 2002: 90). This is a question I address in this project, for example, in asking how knowledge about the Chagossians in the 1970s or 'nomads' and 'refugees' in the 1930s *was produced* in FCO internal and public documents. It reads the archival documents as a source of the production of narratives representing people in movement. This draws on work on the role of categorisations in colonial governance (Cohn, 1998; Mamdani, 2012; Mitchell, 2002; Stoler, 2002). I read archival materials with attentiveness to how categories are produced, contested and erased in the archive. For example, it was important to engage with the primary source of one FCO file (FCO 37/388) documenting internal communications from 1968 and 1969. I chose this file because it is constituted of documents relating to the period when the displacement and relocation of the islanders' was being carried out, and it represents a moment where the narrative was being articulated on an ad hoc and often somewhat candid basis in internal communications. It offers a glimpse into official practices of categorisation at a moment when they were being transformed, as the file charts the erasure of the 'Ilois' identity category within official sources. This was not a question addressed by existing literature, and therefore direct engagement with archival materials was necessary, and is equally relevant in reference to archival resources on 'tourism', and 'migration'.

The genealogical approach to people in movement is an original methodological contribution of this thesis that builds on and problematises the idea of mobility as method[17]. Engseng Ho writes that 'mobility is not so much a concept as a method' for getting out 'the internalist box of classic social theory' (2017: 918). However, most research on mobility reproduces methodologically nationalist, statist, and sedentarist understandings of bounded political entities (Aradau et al., 2010; McNevin, 2019). This is because the question of mobility is approached as the study of what movement *is* and not how movement *is known.* As such, the power-knowledge relations that render movement legible in relation to relatively static understandings of political units are never troubled, even in the study of mobility. This thesis proposes the original method of a genealogical approach to understandings of people in movement, rather than people in movement per se. This frames analysis in relation to key questions about power-knowledge about movement and stasis: How are movement and stasis understood? How does this relate to key tenets of political order at a given moment? What or who is understood to be static? What or who is understood to be mobile? Does political legitimacy derive from a claim to mobility, or not? How do these understandings change at key junctures? How does this produce political transformation? And what can this tell us about underlying understandings of political order?

iii) Literature review: (im)mobilities and world order

In carrying out a postcolonial genealogy of understandings of people in movement, this project draws on and contributes to existing literature on world order, mobilities, and postcolonial political theory. In this section, I outline the intervention into work that explicitly addresses themes of movement and world order. I also address how these works approach the question of power-knowledge relations, and the methodological innovation offered by a genealogical approach. For analytical purposes, I split this section into a review of work on mobilities and

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[17] As I address in the literature review, a genealogy of understanding of people in movement is different to Radhika Mongia's genealogy of the nation-state through analysis of the regulation of migration, which is not a genealogy of the understanding of movement as 'migration', but a genealogy of the nation-state and its constitution through the regulation of migration.

world order, and postcolonial political theory work on people in movement, ideas about people in movement, and world order.

Mobilities Studies

This project builds on and reorients existing work on the global politics of people in movement to propose a focus on the power-knowledge that make 'movement' legible. Work on people in movement, including the Mobilities Turn, has made a fundamental insight for work on global politics in its central and insistent observation that the ways people and things move are fundamental elements of the social[18]. In *The New Mobilities Paradigm,* Sheller and Urry state that '[a]ll the world seems to be on the move. Asylum seekers, international students, terrorists, members of diasporas, holidaymakers, business people, sports stars, refugees, backpackers, commuters, the early retired, young mobile professionals, prostitutes, armed forces these and many others fill the world's airports, buses, ships, and trains' (2006: 1). This is not only an empirical focus on movement but aims to shift a 'sedentarist bias' in work on the social and political. The 'Mobilities turn' aims to '[put] into question the fundamental 'territorial' and 'sedentary' precepts of twentieth-century social science (Sheller and Urry, 2006: 2), by focusing on 'both the large-scale movements of people, objects, capital and information across the world, as well as the more local processes of daily transportation, movement through public space and the travel of material things within everyday life' (Hannam et al., 2006: 9). Building on the idea that attentiveness to mobilities can trouble bounded understandings of societies, Engseng Ho suggests that *'*mobility is not so much a concept as a method' for getting out 'the internalist box of classic social theory' (2017: 918). However, as I unpack below, a focus on people and things in movement does not necessarily disturb an understanding of politics as primarily contained within territorial borders.

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[18] It is beyond the scope of the thesis to give a full account of this literature, but useful overviews of debates on Mobilities in Anthropology, International Relations, and Mobilities Studies are offered respectively by Salazar (2014), Mayblin & Turner (2021) and McNevin (2019).

This thesis draws on research on (im)mobilities, a term intended to recognise the politics of restrictions and immobilisations as well as mobility in global politics. A focus on (im)mobilities responds to critiques that mobilities approaches associated with 'liquid modernity' overemphasised mobility at the expense of immobilisations, work on mobilities often recognises racialised (im)mobilities and enforced displacements, including governing through enforced mobility (Tazzioli, 2020), incarceration and exile (Kothari, 2012), funnelling people into more dangerous pathways, (for example, on the US-Mexican border (Nail, 2020)), and the restriction of rights through the regulation of mobility in relation to 'illegal migrants' (Sharma, 2020).

Mobilities regulation and the production of world order

These works, and others, demonstrate the systematic and racialised regulation of mobilities on a global level, in what is sometimes referred to as a 'global apartheid' (Besteman, 2019; Richmond, 1994; Sharma, 2020; Walia, 2021). One such framing that approaches the entanglements of (im)mobilities with global order is Glick Schiller and Salazar's (2013) understanding of 'regimes of mobility'. Their analysis explores the relationships between privileged or desirable mobilities, and condemned and restricted mobilities, based on power (Glick Schiller and Salazar, 2013: 196). While Glick Schiller and Salazer address 'regimes of mobility' as *internal to* and *characteristic of* broader political orders, they do not address regimes of mobility as *productive of* political orders or address the centrality of power-knowledge relations in constituting these orders. I build on this to address the *productive relations* between mobilities regulation, mobilities categories, and global order.

This important distinction between the *containment* of the regulation of mobilities within political order, and the *production* of political order, builds on Torpey and Mongia's work on the regulation of migration and the emergence of the modern state. John Torpey (1998: 240) argues that a primary characteristic of the modern state is a monopoly on the claim to the legitimate 'means of movement', or the 'right to authorize and regulate movement'. Inverting this

argument, Radhika Mongia (2018) argues that, rather than a pre-existing state that claims a monopoly on the right to regulate movement, the modern state itself was constituted through the regulation of people in movement. She writes: 'the regulation of migration is one of the primary mechanisms for the production of the state and of sovereignty as enclosing a fixed territory and a fixed population; for defining membership in political communities; and for consolidating the notion of state borders' (Mongia, 2018: 13). In other words, mobilities regimes are not only *constrained* by existing power relations, but *constitutive* of them.

The politics of mobilities categories

In parallel to a focus on the productive relations between the regulation of people in movement and world order, this thesis reorients research towards the question of the productive relations between *categorisations* of people in movement and world order. Critical work on mobilities has increasingly reflected on the role of *knowledge* about mobilities in *re*producing and reifying methodologically statist or nationalist and racialised understandings of the political. However, these analyses have not explored the role of knowledge about mobilities in *producing* international order. Illustrative of critical inquiry into the role of mobilities research in reifying international order, Aradau, Huysmans and Squire (Aradau et al., 2010: 15) argue that '[m]obility does not necessarily pose a challenge to territorial or culturalist models of citizenship if understood as movement across borders'. This is a widespread issue, as Anne McNevin (2019: 4) notes that 'the vast bulk of inquiry into migration starts from what Radhika Mongia (2018: 5) calls 'methodological statism' such that what is also an effect of state regulation – the material and symbolic production of the border – is mistaken for a preexisting background against which human mobility unfolds'.

The naturalisation of state-centric understandings of the political is exacerbated by what Sharma (2020: 15), drawing on Brubaker (1996), identifies as the muddling of state *categories of practice* with academic *categories of analysis*. This means that state governance oriented, and/or methodologically nationalist understandings of the political, are imported into studies of people

in movement, which therefore reinforce these understandings. For example, the category of 'migrant' tends to be treated as a subjectivity rather than an analytical category, in what Scheel and Tazzioli (2022: 2) describe as the 'ontologisation of 'migrants' as ready-available objects of research'. One way that scholars are attempting to counter methodological nationalism and statism in research on mobilities is by questioning racialised understandings of subjects such as 'migrants' (Mongia, 2018; Sharma, 2020). Equally, questioning the exceptionalisation of migration, Bridget Anderson (2019) calls on researchers to trouble the distinction between 'migrant' and 'citizen' by 'migrantizing the citizen'. At the same time, Tazzioli and Scheel (2022: 3) look for less state-centric definitions of migrants, by proposing an alternative understanding of migrants as subjects who 'struggle against bordering practices'. Rather than proposing alternative categories or definition, this thesis is concerned with understanding what political possibilities are produced by existing categories. Overall, the thesis builds on insights generated in work on mobilities, to propose a research agenda that is attentive to the *productive* role of *categorisations* of people in movement in the production (and not only reproduction) of world orders.

Political theory

The genealogical approach to power-knowledge about movement and stasis, is closely aligned to a broader research agenda that shares the question of how *understandings of* and *the regulation of* people in movement constitute postcolonial world order. However, the approach also differs from existing work. In this section I will locate the thesis in relation to key texts by Radhika Mongia, Mahmood Mamdani, Nandita Sharma, and Nevzat Soguk on people in movement and postcolonial world order.

First, this project builds on arguments made by Radhika Mongia in *Indian Migration and Empire: A Colonial Genealogy of the Modern State.* While both projects are genealogies, Mongia's work is a genealogy of the modern state and how it is constituted through the regulation of migration, and not a genealogy of the origins of understandings of movement as

'migration'. My project draws on Mongia's argument that the shift from a world of empire-states to a world of nation-states was produced in part through the 'nationalisation' of migration, or the establishment of a state monopoly over the regulation of migration. This argument serves as a basis for the assumption that I work from in this project that the regulation of people in movement is not only *restricted by* political order, but *productive of* political order. Mongia's work inverts John Torpey's argument that the modern state is *characterised* by a monopoly over migration, to the argument that the modern state is *produced* through the regulation of migration. Empirically, Mongia focuses on what she identifies as a shift from the *facilitation* to the *restriction* of Indian migration in a nascent international order, at key episodes related to the British Empire from the 1834 abolition of slavery in British plantation colonies to 1914. I draw on Mongia's archival analysis of debates over slavery and indenture in Mauritius, and analysis of the nationalisation of immigration restrictions in Canada[19].

While my research draws on Mongia's work and builds on the assumption that the regulation of mobilities is constitutive or political order, it differs from Mongia's agenda in significant ways. Firstly, I depart from Mongia's focus on the productive role of *the regulation* of migration to address *the codification of mobilities categories* and the understandings of movement that underpin them. For example, the question of how movement comes to be imagined as 'migration' is not a question that Mongia addresses. In contrast, in addressing the role of migration in creating international order, I explore how 'international migration' was codified as a category by international organisations. Apart from the complementary shift in focus from *regulation* to *codification,* this expands the focus from a focus on the Canadian nation-state, to the role of the emergent realm of inter-war international organisations associated with the League of Nations, which fall outside of Mongia's timeframe and analysis. This points to the wider timeframe that my study works with (addressing key moments of debates over mobilities categories from the Sixteenth Century to the present), as well as the approach that I adopt to explore relations between multiple mobilities categories, including migration as well as tourism,

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[19] This analysis draws on Mongia (2018) and The Disorder of Things Symposium (2021).

diaspora, refugees, contract labourers etc. Because of this holistic focus on a range of mobilities categories, my findings contradict Mongia's argument of a broad brush shift from *facilitation* to *restriction* of migration, as I emphasise how the creation of the nation-state entailed not only the racialised restriction of immigration, but also the facilitation of the displacement of 'minorities', and the creation of tourism legislation to complement the facilitation of ongoing settler colonialism. Crucially, my genealogical approach to understandings of people in movement means that this thesis is not so much on substantive shifts in changes to levels of mobility or regulation of mobility over time, but to the related changing *understandings* of mobility.

Insofar as my focus is on how movement is *understood* as much as *regulated,* it aligns with work by Mahmood Mamdani and Nandita Sharma on the centrality of the figures (or political identities) of the Migrant and the Native to colonial and international order. The genealogical approach that I adopt contributes to debates between Mamdani and Sharma, by emphasising the contextual specificity of mobilities categories and the risks of generalising mobilities categories into universal 'figures' of movement or stasis. In *Neither Settler or Native: the Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities* Mamdani (2020) picks up the question of the role of the manufactured political identities of 'native', 'settler', 'minority', and 'majority' and their role in the perpetuation of political violence, specifically in relation to the peculiarly Twentieth Century prevalence of genocide. In the text, Mamdani addresses the relations between the nation-state, ethnic cleansing, and the political construction of majority and minority identities in the US, de-Nazification in Germany, South African Apartheid, Sudanese Independence, and Israel / Palestine. This builds on his long-term research agenda of the role of the politicization of difference under colonial rule (Mamdani, 2009, 2012). While the question of understandings of 'movement' and 'stasis' is not explicitly central, it is a core theme in relation to how the 'native' is constructed as static, and the 'migrant' is constructed as mobile. However, as Sharma notes (2021), Mamdani does not explicitly suggest the role of the regulation and codification of people in movement in constituting world order.

In contrast, in *Home Rule: National Sovereignty and the Separation of Natives and Migrants* Nandita Sharma presents a big picture analysis of postcolonial order that is centred on the transition from an imperial to a national 'government of mobility and stasis'. Sharma focuses on the centrality of discourses of 'autochthony' (being of-place), and 'allochthony' (being out-of-place), that (for Sharma) under colonial rule distinguished between 'Indigenous-Natives' and 'Migrant-Natives', and under national rule distinguish between 'Nationals' and 'Migrants'. Sharma argues that '[h]ostility to those who move- or who are imagined to have moved- is thus bred in the bone of the Postcolonial New World Order' (2020:4). Here, movement (whether real or imagined) is associated with foreign bodies, contamination, otherness, and outsiderness (Sharma, 2020: 4). In opposition, stasis is associated with socially valued understandings of nativity, citizenship, indigeneity, and belonging (Sharma, 2020: 4). This is a perspective that I hold close throughout the analysis, to expand on the question of what forms of movement (while clearly visible) are not *imagined as movement,* or not perceived as challenging politically, both drawing on and departing from Sharma's work. For example, Sharma draws on Mongia's focus on the *constraint* of mobility in an international order (e.g. 2020:5), whereas I also address the question of how certain forms of movement associated with diaspora, tourism, and imperial mobilities, for example, are facilitated, but made to appear analytically sedentary to an assumed norm of state stasis. This challenges the assumed sedentarism of the state.

In contrast to the figure of the Migrant, the figure of the Native, in Mamdani and Sharma's work, is associated with the politicisation of stasis or sedentarism. The denigration of the Migrant (associated with movement) is in some ways an inversion of the colonial denigration of the figure of the Native (associated with stasis). As Mamdani has argued, colonialism often operated through associating 'natives' with stasis. This meant that the figure of the Native was understood to be both historically stuck in the past, and geographically fixed and 'pinned' to a homeland, or even understood as part of the land (Mamdani, 2012). As Mamdani has shown, understanding 'natives' as static, enabled a series of policies to 'conserve' and 'contain' populations, sometimes literally within reserves, producing an understanding of the Native as inert and less than fully

human, coupled with attempts to materially fix some people in place. In opposition, 'settlers' were often associated with physical and existential movement, cosmopolitanism, progress, and historical agency (Mamdani, 2012). Mamdani emphasises how, in indirect rule colonial Africa, the 'Native' (indigenous) and 'Migrant' (nonindigenous) figures were related to legal and political categories, rather than ontological realities. For example, '[s]ubject races were either *nonindigenous immigrants*, like the Indians of East, Central and Southern Africa, or they were *constructed as nonindigenous* by the colonial powers, such as, for example, the Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi' (Mamdani, 2001: 657). This emphasises how the question of 'indigeneity' or 'nativity' was politically constructed. For Sharma as well, the figure of the Native is associated with 'autochthony' and 'indigeneity'. She writes: 'Like autochthon, indigenous denoted someone (or something) "born or produced naturally in a land or region; native or belonging naturally to (the soil, region, etc.)"' (OED, "indigenous" [adj.], in Sharma, 2020: 53). Both Mamdani's and Sharma's work historicizes the politicization of indigeneity, treating indigeneity as *constructed* rather than *natural*, however, debates between the scholars lose track of the contextual specificity of constructions of indigeneity.

In Mamdani and Sharma's work, 'Migrant' and 'Native' are at times treated as abstract figures, rather than concrete categories. A genealogical approach to the politicisation of figures of movement and stasis is complementary to this agenda by working with contextually specific analysis of mobilities categories which is attentive to change over time. Crucially, Sharma's analysis of the figures of 'Migrant' and 'Native' does not work with the form of contextually specific genealogical analysis that I propose in this thesis. This leads to a lack of analytical clarity over her approach to the figures of 'Migrant' and 'Native'. Drawing on Brubaker's framework, Sharma argues that 'Migrant' and 'Native' should be treated as 'categories of practice', rather than 'categories of analysis' (2020: 21) however, throughout the text Sharma's use of the categories of 'Migrant' and 'Native' does not align with how actors at the time were using the categories. In other words, her analysis is of metaphorical figures, rather than state

categories. To illustrate this, it is helpful to address an ongoing debate between Sharma and Mamdani on how the figures of 'Migrant' and 'Native' are understood.

Ongoing debates between Mamdani and Sharma over the categories of Migrant and Native highlight the political stakes of these distinctions, specifically in relation to descendants of enslaved and indentured labourers, whose mobility was in some way forced[20]. Sharma critiques Mamdani, suggesting that 'Mamdani sometimes refers to enslaved people moved from Africa by the transatlantic slave trade to the United States (and their descendants) as "settlers"' (2021: 8). In turn, Mamdani accuses Sharma of 'reifying [the notion of the native] so as to incorporate those (or some of those) whose migration was in some sense 'forced' into the category 'native'' (2021). Identifying enslaved Africans, European indentured servants, Indian indentured labourers, and Malay slaves as people whose migration was 'forced', Mamdani asks: 'Are we to understand that African slaves were also *natives* of the Americas? And that European indentured servants brought to North America (before the large-scale import of Africans beginning the 17th century) should also be considered *natives of the land*, also *colonised*? And similarly, in South Africa, should we also consider Indian indentured labour in Natal and Malay slaves on the Cape, *natives*, also *colonised*?' (2021: 5). This debate raises interesting questions regarding the politicisation of the identities of descendants of enslaved and indentured labourers, and other diasporic groups, in relation to current debates over migration and settler colonialism, that I address in Chapter Eight. However, I suggest that the disagreement between Mamdani and Sharma is ultimately down to a methodological distinction between their work, and the fact that Sharma's framing of 'Migrants' and 'Natives' does not correspond to categories of practice.

To illustrate this distinction, it is helpful to look at how Sharma reads the category of 'Migrant-Native' into Mamdani's work on Darfur, where Mamdani does not identify that category. Drawing on Mamdani, Sharma writes that '[i]n the British imperial territory of Darfur

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[20] With Mamdani I acknowledge debates over the distinction between 'forced' and 'unforced' mobility, see Bahadur (2013) for questions of agency of indentured labourers, and Mongia (2018) on the politics of the 'free' and 'unfree' distinction.

(in western Sudan), a distinction between "Black Natives" and "Arab Natives" was first made in the 1920s British imperial census. Black Natives were defined as the "original" and, thus, Indigenous-Natives, while Arab Natives, said to "originate" elsewhere, became Migrant-Natives' (2020:43). However, in Mamdani's original analysis, the 'Arabs' are not identified as either 'migrant' or 'native', but were identified by the colonial discourse as 'nonnative' and 'settlers', in part of what Mamdani refers to as the 'settler-native narrative'. Mamdani writes that '[r]ace was wholly a political construction for political purposes. It was the master category that distinguished between native and settler, the former considered indigenous and the latter foreign' (2009: 150). In Mamdani's framework, 'native' is a category of governance (not a figure) and one that was at odds with the category of 'settler' in colonial legal frameworks, in this example. To give an example of discourse at the time, he quotes Churchill (1899 in Mamdani, 2009: 78): 'The Soudanese are of many tribes, but two main races can be clearly distinguished: the aboriginal natives, and the Arab settlers. The indigenous inhabitants of the country were negroes as black as coal'. In terms of the *categories of colonial practice,* the category of 'Migrant-Native' did not exist in this analysis. Therefore, in framing this as a debate over 'Migrant-Natives' and 'Indigenous-Natives', Sharma is imposing an alternative framework on debates which, drawing on Mamdani's examples, at the time were framed in relation to 'settlers' and 'natives', and not 'migrants', with the category of 'settler' being opposed to 'native', and not analogous to 'migrant', or corresponding to a third category of 'migrant-native'. I pick up on this again in relation to the figure of the Migrant, which I suggest does not emerge as a category of practice until the twentieth-century, and is confused in Sharma's analysis which reads the Migrant back into colonial debates, but make this distinction now to highlight the methodological contribution of this project. By drawing research back towards a genealogical approach to understandings of people in movement, I aim to advance these debates by highlighting the contextual specificity of understanding of movement and stasis and avoiding the generalisation of these debates across historical moments.

Methodologically this project is closest to Nevzat Soguk's 1990 text *States and strangers: refugees and displacements of statecraft,* which focuses on the problematization of the figure of the Refugee. Soguk conducts a 'genealogical reading' of the international refugee regime from the early twentieth century to the present. He argues that the problematization of displaced people as *refugees* was specific to the early twentieth century and contributed to the '*nationalization of statecraft'* in this period. For example, he writes: '*events of human displacement were problematized* in state-oriented terms, that is, they were rearticulated (reinscribed) as a specific *refugee problem* characterized in terms of images, identities, and subjectivities that support the sovereign state' (1999: 119). Soguk addresses the refugee as both a 'figure' (the foreign 'other' to the state-citizen-territory triad), and as an institutionally codified category of governance, through analysis of how the category of refugee was 'institutionalized into a *formal* intergovernmental refugee regime'. Soguk's work contrasts to work that critiques the methodological nationalism of mobilities categories but does not address how these categories *produce* the nation-state. It also contrasts to work that treats the concepts of 'Migrant', 'Native', or 'Refugee' as abstract figures, by locating them in contextually specific and institutionalised governance. Methodologically, this thesis aligns with this approach to mobilities *categories* as co-*constitutive* of specific contexts. It generalises this approach to address the productive role of other mobilities categories, and at other moments of political transformation.

While this research project fits within a rich body of work on mobilities and world order, it makes a unique contribution. First, it emphasises the productive role of regulating and categorising people in movement in producing world order. Second, it specifically focuses on how movement is understood and categorised. Third, it treats categorisations of people in movement as contextually specific, rather than abstract figures. And fourth, it approaches understandings of people in movement in relation to a range of categories that change across time, including migration, tourism, refugees, diaspora, settlers, nomads, pirates, indentured labour, pilgrimage, and contract workers, to address underlying understandings of movement and stasis, rather than focusing on specific categories and historic moments in silo. In doing so, it

contributes to scholarship on how world orders are made and unmade, through analysis of the under-explored area of understandings of movement and stasis.

2: Episodes and sites: international order and the imperial Indian ocean

In this chapter I outline the thesis' narrative structure and introduce the sites of transformation in world order which it addresses: the early-twentieth century making of international order, and colonisation and decolonisation in the Indian Ocean World. In doing so, I outline the thesis' contribution to existing work on these sites, which has not addressed the role of debates over people in movement in contributing to these transformations. I chose to focus on the familiar site of the making of a Western-centred international order, to draw out the previously underexplored significance of understandings of people in movement. While the making of international order associated with the League of Nations and the Paris Peace process is an increasingly studied site of Historical International Relations, work on international order has not yet addressed the constitutive role of codifications of mobilities categories.

In contrast, the world-making politics of the Indian Ocean World are a less studied site in International Relations, and when they are addressed, the constitutive role of mobilities has not been considered. I engage with Indian Ocean World literature to illustrate the global political significance of the Indian Ocean both historically and in the present, as well as the way that oceanic approaches can highlight the role of movement in global politics. However, this literature sometimes romanticises movement. I therefore propose an approach that neither ignores or essentialises Indian Ocean mobilities, but that explores the role of the contested categorisations and regulation of people in movement in the making and unmaking of Western imperial order in the Indian Ocean. This highlights how the thesis contributes to debates on present-day transformations in world order. Empirically, the focus on the Indian Ocean World draws attention to a geopolitical and heuristic focus which does not over-emphasise the centrality of Europe but does not attempt to bypass the impact of European imperialism. This contributes to debates over order 'after the West', by approaching 'the West' as the result of relations between European and non-European actors. This contributes to the question of world order after 'the

West' through an exploration of worlds that actually existed alongside and were entangled with Western order.

i) Narrative structure

The project's narrative structure is based on Bartelson's understanding of genealogies as effective, episodic, and exemplary. Based on the genealogical method, the project is structured according to exemplary episodes, which I have chosen based on my position in the present, and their effectiveness for me to address the question of the political significance of understandings of people in movement in the present. They are linked by the project's core themes: i) transformation in world order; ii) linked to colonisation and decolonisation, and where; iii) understandings of movement and stasis are being contested and play a central role. Within this theoretical framework, I have made choices based on my interests which are informed by the context within which I am writing the project, which has been the UK from 2018 to 2023, and the ongoing debates on people in movement within this context.

The episodes are grouped around two sites: the creation of Western-centred international order (in the early-twentieth century and the present), and European colonisation and decolonisation in the Indian Ocean World (from the sixteenth century to the present). These sites are temporally and thematically overlapping. I chose these sites because they represent moments of transformation of world order, where the role of contestation of understandings of mobility is visible, but not currently explored in existing literature. First, the Paris Peace Process and League of Nations are increasingly recognised as key moments in the crystallisation of an international order (Mazower, 2013; Morefield, 2005; Smith, 2004; Soguk, 1999; Weitz, 2008). However, extant literature does not explore the role of the codification of people in movement in the creation of this international order[21]. The choice to focus on understandings of people in

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[21] With key exceptions including Soguk (1999) on the codification of refugees, Mongia (2018) and Sharma (2020) on the regulation of migration and the making of international order, and Lake and Reynolds (2008) on immigration regulation and the sharpening of global colour lines.

movement at a key episode in the emergence of international order is to provide a new narrative about a familiar site. In contrast, the Indian Ocean World is less studied site of the emergence of 'the West' through European colonisation and decolonisation but is an emergent area of research both within International Relations and related interdisciplinary work. Existing IR engagement with the Indian Ocean World (Phillips & Sharman, 2015) does not draw out the constitutive role of the regulation and categorisation of people in movement at key moments of ordering[22]. I draw on existing work in adjacent disciplines that does address the circulation of key figures such as pirates, law, and pilgrims (Benton, 2005; Low, 2020; Mawani, 2018), to develop a new overarching narrative about the role of contested understandings of movement in the ordering of the political, and the significance of a power-knowledge informed genealogical approach to studying mobilities to understand this.

In line with genealogical approaches and critical historiography, these episodes are not structured chronologically, and are sometimes temporally overlapping. They are intended to be read as discrete but related episodes, rather than moments in a continuous teleology. This draws on Satia's (2020: 9-10) writing on the selection of 'uneven' and 'disparate' episodes that are 'culturally, emotionally, temporally, geographically, and topically distinct' but nonetheless connected by a thread- in this case, both empire and understandings of movement. While there are substantive links between episodes, as analytical devices, the episodes are separate but linked by the theme of transformations in world order related to empire and people in movement. This is based on an understanding of each episode or moment as a heuristic device, a model borrowed from Trouillot who writes '[t]he moments I distinguish here overlap in real time. As heuristic devices, they only crystallize aspects of historical production that best expose when and where power gets into the story' (2015: 28). The narrative structure takes a cyclical route. The narrative starts in the present and loops back in time to early-twentieth-century Europe, before travelling further back in time to the sixteenth-century Indian Ocean, and working its way back to the

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[22] Interdisciplinary work including work including work by Benton (2005), Mawani (2022) and Mawani & Hussin (2014) does address circulation and mobility of people and law, but not the constitutive role of regulating and categorising movement and stasis.

present, pausing at key episodes. The initial backwards trajectory is informed by a genealogical approach, within which the narrative starts in the present (understood as 'an episode among others' (Bartelson, 2011: 76), with analysis of present-day mobilities categories of 'migration', 'tourism', and 'diaspora', and their underlying containment within an international way of imagining movement. It then travels backwards in linear time to the early-twentieth-century codification of mobilities linked to the Paris Peace Process, which I identify as a key moment where this 'international' way of imagining movement was emerging.

Based on the genealogical approach of narrating and interpreting a version of the past from my perspective in the present, and in relation to my present-day concerns a narrative structure that starts in the present and working backwards is logical, as is the continuous elliptical movement between past and present. The elliptical structure draws on Bartelson's understanding that 'genealogy therefore becomes deliberately elliptical in its mode of emplotment and in its narrative structure. Genealogy does not only recognize that what we call the past is dependent on the present, but that the point from which the past is apprehended itself has a past which coincides with our comprehension of the present. If genealogy is elliptical, it is not because history repeats itself or because time is cyclical, but because one simultaneously has to write the history of the concept of history in order to make sense of the present as something contingent upon a specific historical process' (2011: 77). The movement between present and past in the narrative structure, and the structuring of the thesis in a loop starting and ending in the present, reflects a genealogical approach within which disparate episodes are understood in relation to the present, within an understanding of temporality that allows for multiple forms of relation between pasts and presents. This is key for the narrative structure, which does not track an overarching transition from 'empire' to the 'international', or the continuity of imperial order in international order, but multiple instances of transformation that layer imperial and international political relations, while also representing substantive differences.

After focusing on present-day understanding of people in movement, and the internationalisation of mobilities categories, in Part One of the thesis, Part Two explores the relations between understandings of people in movement and world order in an alternative context: the colonial Indian Ocean World. The core intention is to identify the continuity of *the principle* that understandings of people in movement shape political order in a different context, and not to identify a continuous understanding of people in movement across episodes or sites. However, there are resonances between episodes and sites, which may be linked by understandings of movement in Western Modernity, in ways that need further research. Crucially, I focus on a recurrent understanding of sovereignty as deriving from territorial fixity, even when it is interpellated in debates over mobile actors such as pirates or settlers. Temporally, Part Two starts in the sixteenth century, and pauses at key episodes between then and the present, so that the episodes begin to temporally overlap with Part One on the international, and bring the narrative from the past to the present moment in which it is written. The overlaps between episodes of 'international order' and episodes of colonisation and decolonisation is a narrative choice to emphasise that the relationship between 'imperial' and 'international' order is not one of rupture, but of layering and resonances, despite substantive political transformations. This reflects a postcolonial approach to temporality and attentiveness to the presence of colonial pasts and presents in the present.

ii) International Order and the Paris Peace Process

This analysis makes an intervention to recent work in Historical IR, which has turned to the Paris Peace Conference as a crucial moment in the transition from a formally imperial to international world. However, existing scholarship on the transition from imperial to international world order has not addressed the constitutive role of the recodification of people in movement. Throughout the analysis, I suggest that attentiveness to mobilities categories can bridge understandings of overlapping international racialised geographies: national compartmentalisation, and transversal global colour lines. Paris is regarded as a watershed moment in the creation of a new international order (Mazower, 2013; Morefield, 2005; Smith, 2004; Soguk, 1999; Weitz, 2008).

It marked the end of World War One, and the unravelling of the Ottoman, Habsburg and Russian Empires, the intensification of European imperial ambitions, and a shift in power from the British Empire to a rising alliance of white settler nations. Recognition of this in IR represents a departure from previous approaches that took 'the international' as a pre-given object of analysis (Bigo and Walker, 2007). In contrast, historical approaches locate the emergence of the 'international' in a specific set of historical conditions, many of which were under negotiation at Paris. The Paris Peace Process was convened in 1919 and spanned the period to the treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Japan, the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy were all accorded 'great power' status (Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 234), and the defeated Central Powers were excluded, including Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. The British Empire voted as a block, while the Dominions and representatives from India had some independent representation (Valkoun, 2014)[23]. At the Paris Peace Conference, a new political order and vocabulary were crystallised, that introduced and codified central concepts to twentieth-century politics, including 'majority' and 'minority' (Weitz, 2008), and 'national self-determination' (Smith, 2004), as well as the under-explored reorganisation and redefinition of people in movement as 'migrants', 'tourists', and 'refugees'.

Making the international

In the early nineteenth century, the nation-state, and a nation-state based international order, were more of an ideal than a structuring principle of political order. Mazower (2013: 10) describes 1850s Europe as a 'political kaleidoscope' that was compiled of 'some very large absolutist empires, a few constitutional monarchies, and a large number of tiny intermediary statelets with their own rules, laws, and currencies'. At this time, the nation-state was the exception: 'Neither Germany nor Italy yet existed', and, '[i]f a nation-state is defined as a state ruled in the name of an ethnic majority, there were no nation-states with the exception of France' (Mazower, 2013: 10). The immense success of, 'the international' rather than an alternative global imaginary,

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[23] This was not an equal alliance, and politics outside of the conference continued. During the period of the peace process the British carried out the Amritsar massacre in India (Wagner, 2016), while Indian anti-colonial networks spanned London, Paris and Mumbai (Laursen, 2021).

meant that by the end of the nineteenth century, even conflicting visions of internationalism tended to share 'a fundamental realization that nations remained the essential building blocks of any international order' (Mazower, 2013: 53). The emergence of 'the international' constituted part of the global transformation of the long nineteenth century. This transformation was characterised by an apparent 'shrinking of time and space', and what Buzan and Lawson (2013) identify as key features of 'modernity', including industrialization, rational state-building, and ideologies of progress.

The ability to conceive of the political as an interconnected 'international' rested on a sense of shrinking time and space, produced in part by new technologies, and formed the basis of novel transversal affiliations, such as transnational whiteness. This 'shrinkage of time and space', Mazower argues, was characteristic of nineteenth-century European thought (2013: 24-25). This produced a 'consciousness of the world as an interconnected whole' that was linked to transport and communications technologies, including 'the impact of steamships, rail, the telegraph, and airpower' (Mazower, 2013: 26). It was also generated by the emergence of the great universal geographies, bestselling illustrated periodicals such as the French *Le tour du monde,* and associations like the National Geographic Society' (Mazower, 2013: 25), and the rise of genres such as travel writing in the period.

This thesis draws on the established argument that a sense of inter-connectedness was reinforced by mass migrations, which scholars are increasingly addressing of constitutive of international order. For example, in the nineteenth century, an estimated 50 million Chinese people, 50 million Europeans, and 30 million Indians relocated around the world (Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 6). These mass migrations responded to transformations in the global economy. In Britain, Marx (1853) referred to this as 'compulsory emigration', and saw it to be caused by 'landlordism, concentration of farms, application of machinery to the soil, and introduction of the modern system of agriculture on a great scale'. One outcome of these migrations was the constitution of an 'anglo-world', which 'was … fashioned in North America, Australasia and southern Africa

through a mass migration, which saw around 12 million Britons permanently emigrating to these places between 1815 and 1930' (Thakur and Vale, 2020: 56) in what Belich (2011) has termed a 'Settler Revolution'. At the same time, European settlers were not the only people on the move, for example, the transition from slavery to indenture in the colonies led to new forms of mobility.

Race and the international

The thesis draws on scholarship that recognises both transversal racial alliances, and racialised national compartmentalisation, as key elements of the restructuring of raciality in the making of international order. Few issues were as politically contentious as race in the early twentieth century. Race war was a widely held concern at the time, and a 'War of the Color Line' was seen as a real political possibility (Du Bois, 1973). Exemplary of race-thinking at the turn of the century, US President Theodor Roosevelt was obsessed with 'competition between the races', which he understood in demographic terms related to birth-rates as 'warfare of the cradle' (in Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 99). For Roosevelt and others, racial miscegenation was seen as a threat that could lead to 'race suicide' (1903, Thakur and Vale, 2020: 54), and he lamented 'the terrible problem offered by the presence of the negro on this continent' (1901, in Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 111). In addition, race-thinking was being recalibrated and sanitised by the emergence of the 'scientific' disciplines of eugenics and demographics. By the 1920s, geopolitics and biopolitics had merged into a framing of political questions in terms of a 'population problem', understood in relation to reproduction, race, and land (Bashford, 2007). This was both a transversal issue, and one inherently linked to the rise of the nation-state.

On one hand, a recalibration of raciality sharpened transversal racialised affiliations. For example, Duncan Bell (2014, 2016) has addressed late nineteenth-century visions of 'racial utopias' of White Anglo-Saxon Anglo-American unity. Bell (2016) articulates this in relation to 'British racial-national consciousness in the Victorian age', which was able to emerge in part because '[a]s the world appeared to shrink (and as time appeared to contract) so it became possible to argue—however unrealistically—that a strong sense of affiliation and belonging

could be felt with individuals scattered throughout the world'. At the end of the nineteenth century one expression of this imaginary of transversal white solidarity was what Bell (2016) has identified as 'the anglosphere', or 'the 'project for a new Anglo century'—the repeated attempt to create the political and social conditions necessary to secure the global domination of the 'Anglo-Saxon' or 'English-speaking' people. Another example of an imaginary of transversal white solidarity is apparent in articulations of the ideal of 'EurAfrica'. For example, in a 1923 pamphlet stating that '[a]ll the 'linguistic nations' of Europe would be gathered into 'one single racial nation', through emigration to, and colonisation of, Africa (Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, in Hansen and Jonsson, 2014: 26–27). These racial utopias built a sense of political affiliation based on transversal global colour lines.

On the other hand, the nation-state, and its ideal of ethnic homogeneity, represented a departure from previous imperial and dynastic orders, where multi-ethnicity within a territory was a norm (Weitz, 2008: 1315). By linking 'the people', the state, and territory, the 'nation-state' made the question of defining who 'the people' are uniquely urgent (Heiskanen, 2021: 245), and in a world of race-thinking, this was a racialised question, articulated in relation to mobilities. In contrast to earlier forms of territorial state, which did not require governance in the name of an ethnically homogenous nation, nationalism in nineteenth century Europe was tied to popular sovereignty, and the linking of the 'nation' (or people) with the 'state', in the form of the nation-state (Heiskanen, 2021). Because of this, population politics was not a marginal question, but intrinsic to the rise of the nation-state. Nation-state making was linked to the rise in biopolitics (Foucault et al., 2008) and eugenics (Bashford and Levine, 2010). Soguk refers to this phenomenon as 'the nationalization of statecraft', which constituted 'the transformation of the state from the territorial state to the territorial nation-state', and articulated 'the citizen/nation/state hierarchy as the hierarchy of legitimate governance' (1999: 81). This brought race and ethnicity into the centre of political belonging, as the fusion of 'nation' and 'state' based political claims on ties drawn between ethnic identities, territory, and sovereignty (Weitz, 2008: 1315). While 'nations'

and 'states' had existed in earlier forms, nation-states, and the ideal of an ethnically homogenous sovereign nation within a discrete territory, is a distinctly novel formation.

The rise of the ideal of the nation-state meant that, by the time of the Paris Peace conference, ethnic division, rather than multi-ethnicity within a state, was the norm. As Weitz (2008: 1315) outlines, under a dynastic order, multi-ethnicity within a territory was 'the preeminent form of society'. However, unlike earlier political negotiations, the redistribution of territory at Paris was understood in relation to ethnicity and identity. Neil Smith (2004: 177) writes, '[w]hereas previous geographical settlements following war in Europe were unashamedly about resources, territory, and military advantage—land grabs for absolute space and what it contained—Paris combatants were obliged, however much they sought territory, to fight their disputes in terms of competing national and ethnic justice'. Building on these agendas that have identified Paris as a watershed moment in the creation of international order, this thesis addresses the underexplored role of the *recategorisation of mobilities* in this context. In doing so, it explores how raciality was recalibrated in early twentieth century internationalism, through both the compartmentalised nation-states, and the sharpening of transversal racialised alliances.

iii) Colonisation and decolonisation in the Indian Ocean World

The second site I explore is the Indian Ocean World (IOW), in relation to key moments of colonisation and decolonisation. The role of the IOW in the making of Western and post-Western world order is an area of increasing scholarly attention. Existing work in Indian Ocean World Studies tends to emphasise the IOW as a site where movement is visible. I build on this observation but emphasise that this does not necessarily make IOW mobilities alternative to or outside of Western world order, which they are constitutive of. At the same time, work in International Relations on the Indian Ocean has not addressed the world-making role of contested categorisation and regulation of people in movement. It is important to note that I approach British East Africa as part of the Indian Ocean World, although this chapter is not specifically related to maritime mobilities. This is consistent with an understanding of the Indian

Ocean World as a region or set of relations that incorporate both littoral and inland areas surrounding the Ocean.

The postcolonial Indian Ocean

The thesis draws on a current turn to the Indian Ocean World, which is linked to a contemporary shift in world order, and the question of what comes after Western world order. The rediscovery of long-durée histories of relationality in the IOW in extant literature responds to the current decline of Western world order, and search for alternative imaginaries of political relationality, including South-South connections, which are not defined by (or against) European imperialism. At the same time, the Indian Ocean as a region is growing in geopolitical significance. The rediscovery of the IOW is not a politically neutral academic move, but related to the search for, and making of, a post-Western world order, which is understood by some in relation to forms of South-South relationality that exceed Bandung iterations of anti-colonial nationalism. However, there is nothing necessarily less coercive about 'post-Western' worlds, which are entangled with colonial or national power relations. The narration of IOW stories and histories is not only a 'rediscovery' of obscured pasts, but also an active production of narratives that may shape future world orders based on alternative understandings of history[24].

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[24] This is related to a growing interest in Indian Ocean World narratives in literature, for example (Ghosh, 2012; Gurnah, 2017; Owuor, 2019).

Image 1: Map of the Indian Ocean (Sivasundaram, 2017: 32)

From a strategic and military perspective, the Indian Ocean is receiving increased attention as a region of emergent Chinese naval power, the growing significance of African, Chinese, and Indian trade, and as a strategic area for energy and military infrastructure. An indication of the military significance of the maritime area is the political significance of military bases in the region, which I explore in more detail in Chapter Eight in relation to the US-UK military base on

Diego Garcia, in the Chagos atoll. In addition, China has recently built a naval base in Djibouti, France has a military base on Reunion, and India is allegedly building a military base on Agalega, in partnership with Mauritius (Khan, 2021). On top of this, it is estimated that 60% of the world's oil trade travels through the Indian Ocean (Khan, 2021). These sea routes and shipping lanes are specifically significant for Chinese trade, reflected in the opening of a 'string of pearls' series of naval stations (Colley, 2021; Prestholdt, 2015). Based on these military and logistics interests, political commentators have described the Indian Ocean as 'coming strategic arena of the twenty-first century' and a zone 'where global power dynamics will be revealed' (Kaplan in Hofmeyr, 2012: 584).

The growing strategic significance of the Indian Ocean World is linked to academic questions about post-Western, and post-national world order. For example, in International Relations, Sharman and Phillips look to IOW history as a potential model for future world order, writing '[a] greater understanding of diverse historical international systems may also help to understand the resurgent heterogeneity now reshaping today's global international system' (Phillips and Sharman, 2015: 437). This approach treats the history of the IOW as a potential model for the future of world order, however, as I argue in this chapter, it misrepresents key elements of this order, and specifically the role of movement in constituting world order.

The Indian Ocean World as an approach

The Indian Ocean framing of this thesis draws on post-area studies understandings of the Indian Ocean World. The IOW is associated with the long-durée histories of trade and exchange, connecting East and South Africa, China, Indonesia, India, Oman, Iran, and the Arabian Peninsula, as well other areas bordering the Indian Ocean. IOW studies explores relations with these oceanic networks, and inland areas, including non-littoral areas of East and South Africa (Gooding, 2022). Rather than a strictly geographic region, these approaches treat the IOW as an analytic lens to parse political relations and networks, especially those in the 'Global South' (Hofmeyr, 2012: 584). This post-regional approach to the IOW is sometimes described as a

'method' (Hofmeyr, 2012), or 'heuristic device' (Prestholdt, 2015: 441). IOW approaches often turn to the pre-colonial IOW in an attempt to 'bypass the question of the impact of European empires' (Sivasundaram, 2017: 40). Others argue that European imperialism transformed political order in the IOW, but did not define it (Jacob, 2019: 12). Equally, South-South relations were not necessarily emancipatory, or outside of coercive power relations, including colonial relations (Bayly, 2022; Dilawri, 2023; Hussin, 2022; Mawani and Hussin, 2014; Sivasundaram, 2017). Within an understanding of the IOW as a realm of long-durée connections, I focus on key moments of transformations generated by European imperial expansion and decolonisation from 1600 to the present, in relation to people in movement.

Work on the IOW is often characterised by an emphasis on mobility, circulation, and on political formations generated in movement. For example, Engseng Ho suggests that a 'diasporic perspective' of 'mobile societies' in the Indian Ocean is one way to challenge Eurocentric and nationalist understandings of political order (2004: 239). The IOW is not outside of colonial or national power relations, but it does provide a way of theorising political relations that try not to over-centre Europe or the international, and which is attentive to alternative political relations generated in movement. However, work on the IOW risks romanticising and exoticising mobility if it is presented as an alternative to a more sedentary norm of Western order. This risks obscuring the role of mobility in 'the West', and the entanglements between diaspora and empire, by overemphasising the emancipatory possibilities of diasporic and mobile politics. In engagement with this work, I approach mobility and diaspora as analytic devices to make transversal relations generated in movement visible, rather than as descriptive devices about a necessarily more mobile world. In addition, I emphasise the entanglements between existing IOW actors and Western world order, including diasporic connections with empire and nationalisms.

This thesis draws on the 'oceanic turn' and 'ocean as method' to critically engage with the political distinction between land and sea, and the association of the sea with movement[25]. The role of the 'ocean' itself in IOW studies often associates oceans with movement, in contrast to more sedentary understandings of terrestrial geographies. This analysis critically reflects on this starting point. It suggests that an understanding of the ocean as mobile underpins the political significance of the ocean, in contrast to approaching the ocean as an actually more mobile or connective realm. At the same time, it draws on what Renisa Mawani outlines as 'ocean as method' involving attentiveness to the ocean as both metaphorical and material. Mawani draws on ocean currents as a method to trace connections, writing: 'Ocean currents, as I envision them, offer a productive method through which to explore the plurality, globality, and connectivity of colonial, legal, and racial histories that continue to be written as differentiated and divided' (Mawani, 2018: 25). At the same time, she recognises that movement is also constantly occurring on land, in ways that may be less visible than on sea (Mawani, 2018: 20). This is significant, as the distinction between land and sea is in itself socially constructed and contextually specific to European colonial expansion (Mawani, 2018: 19). In other words, an analytic attentiveness to oceanic connections can make movement visible, but this does not mean oceans are more mobile than terrestrial constructions of space.

Overall, the analysis in the following chapters attempts to challenge romanticised understandings of movement as an alternative to Western world order, by showing that movement is central to the creation of Western world order. However, dominant analytic frameworks often obscure the political significance of movement. Attentiveness to movement, as well as how it is understood, can help to displace this framework, and point to new understandings of political order and its relations with movement, which I will demonstrate in this thesis.

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[25] This is linked to an 'oceanic turn' in Global History, which has often focused on the Atlantic.

International Relations and the Indian Ocean

The main intervention on world order and the Indian Ocean in International Relations has been Phillips and Sharman's work on durable diversity in the Indian Ocean. It is important to note that Phillips and Sharman focus on an international system that is internal to the Indian Ocean. In contrast, this analysis emphasises the role of relations in the Indian Ocean in contributing to the production of a broader Western world order. Phillips and Sharmans' analysis makes an important contribution to shifting IR analysis of transformations in world order towards the Indian Ocean. However, it does not address the role of people in movement in constituting political order, representing the ocean as a realm of interaction between already fixed units with fixed political preferences, which were displaced from one place to another. This obscures the role of people in movement in constituting new and emergent political orders and limits its explanatory potential.

Phillips and Sharman approach the Indian Ocean region between 1500 and 1750 as a model for a 'durably diverse international system'. They focus on the Portuguese *Estado da India,* the Dutch and English East India Companies, and the Mughal Empire as key actors and address the ways that 'increased interaction between units' led to the 'interweaving of heteronomous, overlapping polities' (Phillips and Sharman, 2015: 437). After 1750, Phillips and Sharman suggest that this system of collaborative diversity was replaced with one of colonial hierarchy that overlaid (but did not efface) the earlier order (Phillips and Sharman, 2015: 437). The puzzle that they address is why increased interaction between 'unlike units' between 1500 and 1750 led to increased heterogeneity, and not homogenisation. A key reason which they identify is Mughal preference for land-based conquest, and a European preference for sea-based conquest. Below, I question this conclusion, and suggest that attentiveness to debates over people in movement can lead to alternative routes towards addressing the question of how world orders are made and unmade.

This thesis shares a core question with this analysis, which is the question of how world orders are transformed. It also shares the argument that attentiveness to the history of European empires

in the Indian Ocean can help to understand contemporary shifts in world order. However, Phillips and Sharman's analysis minimises the politically constitutive role of people in movement, and as a result, reproduces an understanding of the nature of the political as primarily defined in relation to pre-existing contained units linked to territory. This risks presenting empire as the 'importing' of one political order, ready-made, into another political context. This does not capture the transformation of world order generated through movement, or the role of debates over people in movement in producing this transformation, which limits understandings of transformation in world order.

Here I will briefly outline two sympathetic critiques of this work. Through this critique, I aim to introduce the value of an analytical focus on people in movement, which I illustrate in the remainder of this thesis. To establish the grounds for these critiques, it is important to note that in their analysis of interaction of units in the Indian Ocean, Phillips and Sharman present European Empires and local polities (including the Mughal empire) as distinct units with distinct preferences. Specifically, they argue that 'European and local polities possessed different preferences for maritime versus land-based conquest', which mean that 'competition did not drive homogenization because the system's most significant actors, European maritime polities and Asian land-based empire, did not compete' (Phillips and Sharman, 2015a: 439). They write that, '[w]hile the Europeans sought to build maritime networks, major land-based local empires derived power, wealth and prestige from the control of sedentary populations' (Phillips and Sharman, 2015b: 18). This minimises the role of the contested control of maritime mobilities in the transformation of world order in the IOW. It presents populations as primarily 'sedentary' and obscures the politics of movement within the Indian Ocean, which were key to both colonialism and anti-colonial resistance.

First, Phillips and Sharman overemphasise the extent of Mughal 'indifference' to the ocean and minimise the role of contested regulation of mobilities in transforming world order, which I explore further in Chapter Six. This is a broader issue in some histories of the Indian Ocean,

which is now challenged (Benton, 2010: 141). In contrast, Benton (2010: 143-144) suggests that the Mughals used ports to influence maritime affairs, and strategically affirmed European legal authority at sea, for example, to put pressure on Europeans to police 'piracy', which threatened Mughal trade. Mughal intervention was key to the outcome of the trial of William Kidd, which I address in Chapter Six. These debates over piracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries led to the emergence of international law. International law was not a European invention that was imposed on the IOW, but an arrangement of power that emerged through the colonial encounter. In addition, debates over piracy illustrate that sovereignty was not contained in political units, linked to territorial sovereigns. In contrast, through a system of passes and contracts, diverse maritime actors were imbued with 'sovereign' authority in ways that were fluid and changeable. The contested regulation of 'pirates' was not only a site of power struggle between European, Mughal, and other actors, but also a site of debate over the form of power, including understandings of legality and sovereignty which were transformed in these relations.

Second, contested regulation of maritime mobilities, including debates over piracy, slavery, and the Hajj pilgrimage, were moments where European colonial expansion was contested. As I show in the following chapter, transnational anti-colonialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was linked to the contestation of the British abolition of the slave trade, and the introduction of steamships challenging the existing dhow trade. This was specifically contested by the Hadrami diaspora. However, Phillips and Sharman treat merchant diasporas as social actors, who they engage with in relation to territorial authorities, writing about 'the merchant diasporas that mediated long-distance trade by granting them rights of residence and limited self-government in exchange for their deference to local authorities' (Phillips and Sharman, 2015: 439). However, it was exactly these social actors who constituted transnational anti-colonial networks, which Engseng Ho (2004: 240) has described as 'mobile cosmopolitans whose agendas were presumably extra-territorial. They were often members of diasporic groups such as Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Arabs, Chinese, and Indians, found across imperial domains in

more innocuous dress as "trading minorities" and indentured labour'. These mobile societies constituted the basis of anti-colonial projects (Alexanderson, 2019).

It is important to note that while nineteenth and twentieth-century anti-colonialism is outside of the temporal scope of Phillips and Sharmans' engagement with the Indian Ocean, these anti-colonial networks were built on longue durée relations which Phillips and Sharman treat as 'social'. The politics of these apparently social relations is illustrated by the argument that these geographies continue to underpin attacks on U.S. interests around the Indian Ocean associated with Al Qaeda (Ho, 2004: 237). Phillips and Sharmans' analysis ends in 1750, before the abolition of the slave trade and the introduction of the steam ship, however, the contestation of these ways of regulating movement were based on the disruption to an earlier way of regulating mobility, which is not treated as political in their analysis.

This challenges the conclusion that durable diversity in the Indian Ocean can be accounted for by a lack of competition over the maritime. While European and non-European actors may have had alternative understandings of maritime territoriality and legality, I argue that it was precisely through (and not despite) the contested regulation of maritime mobilities that Western world order was constituted through relations in the Indian Ocean World. Throughout the chapters that follow, I illustrate an account of colonisation and decolonisation not as encounters between territorially fixed and contained units, which are displaced from one place to another, but as relations that are genuinely politically transformative. This approach makes visible that political transformation did not only constitute new *distributions* but also new *understandings* of power.

Conclusions

Both the making of international order and colonisation and decolonisation in the Indian Ocean World represent sites where world orders were made and unmade through recategorisations of people in movement. This thesis contributes to existing work on both sites, by presenting a new narrative on the previously under-explored role of debates over mobilities in the making and

unmaking of these world orders. It does this through analysis of a series of related but analytically distinct moments where mobilities categories were under debate. In doing so, it aims to generate new insights into Western-centred imperial and international orders, as well as how they overlap in the present.

3: The politics of theorising movement

This chapter serves two purposes, first it functions as a theory-building chapter, and second as a literature review of work on people in movement and theories of movement. It proceeds in three stages. First, it locates the thesis within existing work on mobilities and world order that it builds on. In line with a genealogical approach, I build on this work to emphasise the *productive* role of *categorisations* of mobilities, an underexplored area of research. Second, I address the underexplored question of how movement is *thought about.* I argue that movement is often treated as an ontological rather than an epistemological question. In this section I outline object-oriented and relational epistemologies of movement, in order to demonstrate multiple ways of understanding movement. In the third section I draw out some political implications for exploring alternative epistemologies of movement in relation to postcolonial research on empire. I argue that postcolonial and relational approaches to movement are analytical tools to conceptualise geographically disperse political formations, mobile political communities, and to problematise the assumption of state sedentarism. Overall, the chapter lays out the theoretical framework that underpins the arguments that i) mobilities studies is not the study of movement, and ii) that phenomena that are often taken to be static (such as the state) are in fact mobile. This points to the politics of making claims about 'movement' and 'stasis', both of which are constructed through power/knowledge relations.

i) What is 'movement' and how is it known?

This project builds on work in Mobilities that addresses the politics of mobilities categories. However, this agenda has been limited by a lack of reflexivity over the question of what *movement* is and how it is known, even in work that addresses how movement is categorised. This is because movement is largely treated as an ontological rather than epistemological question, so that question of what movement *is* is taken as given. This is embedded in the wrongly held assumption that mobilities studies is the study of *movement*. In contrast, I argue that mobilities studies is the study of *politicised* movement. Movement is not only politicised

through differential immobilities (or ontological questions), as suggested by Adey, or through relations between movements (phenomenological questions) as suggested by Huysmans, but through power/knowledge relations (epistemological questions) which remain underexplored. However, before making this argument, it is necessary to outline two epistemological approaches to movement: object-oriented approaches, and relational approaches, to demonstrate that what movement *is* is not a given.

Rather than answering the question of what movement *is* (or what is in movement), I address the question of how movement is *understood* or *known*. This is based on an assumption that there are *multiple* ways to identify and make sense of movement, or multiple epistemologies of movement, and that these are political. Broadly, I will outline object-oriented and relational approaches to movement. While the thesis attempts to adopt a relational approach to movement, the primary aim of this section is to illustrate that there are multiple ways of thinking about movement (in a similar way to the multiplicity of understandings of worlds or temporalities already outlined).

Object-oriented understandings of movement

The primary way that movement is theorised and known in International Relations is through object-oriented epistemologies of movement. A diagnosis of 'object-oriented' understandings of movement draws on Jef Huysmans (2021) observation that in IR '[m]ovement is often primarily understood as a phenomenon: things, organisms and people on the move that one can observe'. When movement is regarded as politically productive, it is regarded as so in relation to apparently fixed phenomena, such as borders, territories, and bounded identities (Huysmans, 2021). This is not only related to the national borders, but to a more general understanding of coherent objects which move across fixed backgrounds, as opposed to a relational worldview. This critique aligns with relational critiques of object-oriented analysis in general. Milja Kurki (2020: 3) argues that International Relations tends to approach the global with a substantialist cosmology that sees a world of 'things': 'In a cosmology inherited from Newton, via 'modern

science', the rise of the state system, and also through colonialism, we come to see an international political world of 'things' (e.g. people, states) that 'move' (e.g. balance, trade), against 'backgrounds' (e.g. resources, the environment) in 'patterns' traceable and understandable by 'us', 'humans'' (Kurki, 2020: 69).

Understandings of movement as 'displacement' are linked to 'transport' oriented understandings of movement, which emphasise the containment of destinations which are moved between, rather than the unfolding of a continuous social realm in movement. Tim Ingold outlines two ways of understanding movement, as 'transport', and as 'wayfaring'. 'Transport' oriented understandings of movement conceptualise movement as the movement of pre-constituted 'things' between points on a map. Ingold (2011: 150) writes: 'Transport… is essentially destination-oriented (Wallace 1993: 65-66). It is not so much a development *along* a way of life as a carrying *across,* from location to location of people and goods in such a way as to leave their basic natures unaffected'.

Object-oriented claims about movement as the 'displacement' of a coherent object from one fixed point to another are often made in relation to claims about stasis. For example, Noel Salazar (2020: 772) comments, to 'observe' movement, it is necessary to have a counterpoint that appears relatively static: 'As any human mobility scholar should know, to assess the extent or nature of movement, or, indeed, even 'observe' it sometimes, you have to spend time studying things that stand still: the borders, institutions and territories of nation-states, and the (imagined) sedentary 'home' cultures of those that do not move'. However, this process of 'observation' of movement is not neutral but involves rendering movement legible in relation to an opposing set of (normally implicit) claims about relative stasis (that are in this case made explicit). An object-oriented approach to movement sees objects (goods, migrants) on the move across fixed backgrounds (nation-states) and limits the potential of research on movement to problematise the fundamental sedentary frameworks of International Relations.

This resonates with Amitav Ghosh's (2021) argument that 'mechanistic' understandings of movement are central to colonialism. Ghosh identifies a 'mechanistic' strand of European colonial thought that envisioned the Earth 'as a "vast machine made of inert particles in ceaseless motion"' (Merchant, 1983 in Ghosh, 2021: 37). Ghosh argues that 'It was the rendering of humans into mute resources that enabled the metaphysical leap whereby the Earth and everything in it could also be reduced to inertness' (2021: 37). This was closely linked to the subjection of 'Nature' and the ability to imagine nature as inert (Ghosh, 2021: 38). Ghosh writes: 'To envisage the world in this way was a crucial step toward making an inert Nature a reality. As Ben Ehrenreich observes: "Only once we imagined the world as dead could we dedicate ourselves to making it so"' (Ehrenreich, 2020, in Ghosh, 2021: 34). In contrast, Ghosh proposes a 'vitalist' (or even 'animist' (2020:86)) understanding of life takes 'the universe to be a living organism, animated by many kinds of unseen forces' (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014, in Ghosh 2021: 37). In Ghosh's framework there is a spiritual view that imbues life with a spirit. Without entering into the question of the spiritual, this thesis builds on Ghosh's argument that the disavowal of the vitality of both the human and nonhuman is key to the objectification of life into 'resources', which was central to colonial conquest and capitalist modernity. Ghosh's distinction between 'animate' (vital) and 'inanimate' (inert) understandings of life can help to emphasise the politics of the objectification of life or matter as inert and inanimate when movement is approached from a mechanistic perspective.

Relational epistemologies of movement

In contrast, what I term relational approaches to movement emphasise the relationality of life unfolding in movement. These approaches often problematise the idea of 'objects' on the move, to emphasise relations and processes in movement. They also tend to problematise the idea of 'stasis', or a fixed background, to foreground relations between movements at different speeds and slownesses. This aligns with a general relational epistemology, within which: 'All seemingly thing-like 'objects'—mountains, planets, or can-openers—are in fact processes, in the process of processing relations' (Kurki, 2020: 69). In relation to movement, Huysmans (2021: 9) has argued

that giving movement conceptual primacy can shift attention to 'relations between movements rather than subjects', which could destabilise a substantialist cosmology.

This understanding of relational approaches to movement draws on Tim Ingold's concept of 'wayfaring' as a way of understanding movement as happening *along* a way of life, rather than occurring *between* points on a map. Ingold suggests: 'To the wayfarer… the world is not presented as a surface to be traversed. In his movements he threads his way *through* this world rather than routing *across* it from point to point' (2011: 151). This emphasises the unfolding of life in movement along a pathway, rather than between pre-fixed points or containers, such as territorial states. In addition, I draw on Manning's argument that '[m]ovement is not to be reduced to displacement' (2014: 163). Manning rejects the notion of a movement stasis binary, and argues that '[m]ovement is everywhere, always, at all scales, speeds, and slownesses' (2013: 13). Because of this, '[t]here is never stability. And there can never be non-movement- even in what appears to be complete stillness there is quality of movement-moving, force of form' (Manning, 2013: 12). This problematises the idea that it is possible to distinguish between movement and stasis. By problematising the idea that movement is easily distinguishable from stasis this helps to shift focus towards the question of when movement is made visible and legible as movement. I work on the basis that by foregrounding the unfolding of life in movement, relational approaches to movement can problematise the reification of apparently fixed phenomena such as state borders in research on people in movement. However, relational approaches to movement do not address the question of what makes movement meaningful. I argue that this is a question that requires attentiveness to power-knowledge relations.

Relational approaches to movement risk losing analytical traction on the social meaning of movement. To make this distinction I would like to build on the example of the football game that Huysmans uses in his article on motioning security. Huysmans writes that 'Michel Serres expresses a similar idea of movement in his discussion of how to make sense of a football game. Giving primacy to movement introduces a point of view that reads the game through the ball's passings rather than the formal rules that define the game, the identity of the teams or the

bounded space of the field' (2021: 8). However, as Huysmans acknowledges, this would make the football game incoherent. Reading a football game through movement may destabilise pre-given understandings of team affinity, subjecthood, and rules and structure, and lead to new starting points to theorising the social. But it may also lose sight of the social and political meanings of the movement, by attempting to observe movement on 'its own terms', rather than the terms on which it is rendered socially meaningful. To parallel this in relation to international borders, an approach that foregrounded movement would not necessarily reify national borders in the study of (im)mobilities, but it would also struggle to make sense of how movement is politicised in relation to these borders.

This critique is similar to, but different from, Adey's (2006) lament that 'if movement is everything then it is nothing'. Broadly, Adey argues that an understanding of life as movement loses analytical traction without a focus on relations between movements. Adey (2006) suggests that 'if mobility is everything, then it is nothing' and argues for a focus on contingent, relational, and differential (im)mobilities to maintain the analytical utility of attentiveness to mobility. He writes: 'Although I argue that practically everything is mobile, for mobility to be analytically useful as a term we must focus on the contingent relations between movements', as 'while everything might be mobile, mobilities are very different, and they also relate and interact with one another in many different ways' (Adey, 2006: 90). In parallel, this thesis works on an assumption that everything can potentially *be understood* as mobile. However, Adey's proposed focus on differential mobilities treats *the political significance of movement* as an ontological rather than epistemological question. In contrast, I argue that a more politically salient question is 'if movement is everything, then when and how is it *identified (categorised or known) as* movement?'. This is arguable the more politically relevant question, as it addresses the politics of movement as a question of power-knowledge relations, rather than a question of differential mobilities.

This distinction between approaches to movement and approaches to the politicisation of movement through attentiveness to power-knowledge relations is close to but different from Tim

Cresswell's distinction between 'movement' and 'mobility'. Cresswell's approach allows for an ontological understanding of pre-political movement, which is already framed through an epistemic lens as 'displacement'. Cresswell distinguishes between 'movement' (pre-politicised) and 'mobility' (politicised). He argues that 'movement can be thought of as abstracted mobility (mobility abstracted from contexts of power)' (2006:2). For Cresswell, 'mobility' refers to movement once it has been loaded with political meaning, whereas 'movement' refers to pre-politicised displacement. He writes: 'Movement is the general fact of displacement before the type, strategies, and social implications of that movement are considered' (Cresswell, 2006: 3). In contrast, I argue that an understanding of pre-politicised movement as 'displacement' is already aligned with a politicised object-oriented epistemology of movement as displacement. As outlined above, 'displacement' lends itself to a bounded understanding of 'things' on the move between geographically discrete containers or societies. An understanding of movement as 'displacement' from A to B reproduces an understanding of both 'A' and 'B', as well the 'object' on the move, as relatively fixed or static entities. Rather than making an argument for recovering a pre-politicised understanding of movement (as Cresswell does), a genealogical approach to understandings of movement suggests that there is no way to analyse movement that is not political, because all understandings of movement are part of a power-knowledge regime.

Mobilities studies is not about ontological movement

A genealogical approach to movement enables an analysis of Mobilities Studies, not as the neutral study of movement, but as part of a regime of power-knowledge that renders movement meaningful. The clearest way to illustrate that the political significance of 'mobilities' is not defined by 'movement' (or that the political significance of movement is epistemological and not ontological) is through the observation that phenomena such as 'migration', which are often treated as 'mobilities', involve little 'movement'. In contrast, phenomena such as walking around the house, while being included in a broad span of mobilities studies, are rarely considered noteworthy or picked out as 'mobilities'. This is because movement becomes recognisable as

mobility once it is imbued with political meaning, which has little to do with the process of moving or even with relations between movements.

This argument builds on Ghassan Hage's (2005) observation that an 'uncritical assumption often made that the study of migration is the study of 'mobility'. This is not to deny that migration involves movement, but it's a recognition that 'most migrants move once or twice in their lives. Empirically, that is, they spend a day or two doing that kind of mobility we call migration' (Hage, 2005: 469). In a similar way, in her research on Afghan migrants' journeys to Turkey, Esra Kaytaz (2016) argues that 'the journey can be conceived as a form of narrative and that this narrative is constituted of long periods of immobility punctuated by shorter instances of travel'. Migrants are often stuck in camps, where people displaced as 'refugees' (and their descendants) may spend lifetimes or multiple generations. There is nothing inherently 'mobile' about subjectivities such as 'migrant' that are often studied in work on mobilities. The significance of the movement is the meaning that it is imbued with, which evokes a set of implicit standards in relation to which movement is made meaningful, and an underlying epistemology of what movement *is* (or *who* is understood as *mobile*) that is not explicitly addressed.

On the other hand, many forms of movement are so banal that they are not noteworthy in studies of mobility. For example, in his theory of life as movement, Tim Ingold (2011: 146) writes that '[a]ny ordinary day sees me wandering around between the sitting room, dining room, kitchen, bathroom, bedroom, study and so on, as well as in the garden. Nor am I housebound, as I travel daily to my place of work, to the shops and to other places of business, while my children go to school'. In contrast, if Ingold lived in Mexico and his place of work was 10 minutes across the border in California (Gurley, 2022), even if the distances covered and amount of 'movement' were the same, the experience, regulation, categorisation, and understandings of the political significance of the movement would be different.

This exposes the fact that the significance of 'migration' is not defined by the amount of movement, but by how that movement is understood in relation to imagined political

geographies. For example, if movement is understood to be occurring from one geographically contained society to another, that movement is imbued with political meaning in relation to an often implicit and opposing understanding of societies as geographically bounded. This is apparent, for example, in the statement that 'migration is a movement of people across political boundaries, and migrants are people who live in societies other than their own' (Bhambra, in Mayblin and Turner, 2021: ix). In this understanding of 'migration', it is not the amount of movement that makes migration meaningful as a 'mobility', but the understanding of movement in relation to geographically bounded societies. It is not the movement per se that is politically significant, but the politicisation of movement in relation to contextually specific conditions. The politicisation of movement as 'mobility' produces a relative and opposing set of criteria against which movement is made meaningful or even visible. In the case of geographically bounded societies, this creates an over-emphasised understanding of 'stasis'. Without reflexive acknowledgment of this, work on 'mobilities' contributes to making some phenomena visible as 'mobile' (migrants, diaspora, etc.), in relation to implicit and opposing static understandings of political belonging (e.g. states). There are multiple potential ways of understanding movement, that all have political implications. Contemporary studies of mobilities too often adopt an object-oriented approach that makes some subjects appear mobile (e.g. migrants) and obscures the movement of others (e.g. empires).

iii) Postcolonial research and relational mobilities

The thesis draws on relational approaches to movement to explore a postcolonial research agenda in relation to three key themes. First, it suggests that relational approaches to movement can support postcolonial analysis of geographically dispersed political formations. Second, it explores whether relational understandings of movement could advance the possibility of making political claims from an explicit recognition of mobility. And third, I suggest that relational understandings of movement can disturb the conflation of territoriality with sedentarism, which obscures the constitutive role of imperial mobilities in producing the nation-state. These are

arguments that I develop in depth through the substantive chapters, however, I will briefly locate them within postcolonial debates here.

Geographically dispersed political formations

First, relational understandings of movement can bring geographically dispersed political geographies into focus. This can foreground transversal political communities such as empires and diasporas. This lends itself to a postcolonial sensibility, and can help to respond to Cooper and Stoler's call that 'metropole and colony, colonizer and colonized, need to be brought into one analytic field' (1997: 4). For example, rather than imagining the international as a grid of territorially bounded sovereign nation-states, a framework that foregrounds movement understood as 'wayfaring' could explore whether a socially constructed concept such as sovereignty can be understood to exist along pathways that form 'a tangled mesh of interwoven and complexly knotted strands' (Ingold, 2011, p. 170), that might more accurately reflect imperial political formations.

A concrete example of research that emphasises movement *within* a geographically dispersed social or political formation, rather than *between* geographically dispersed political formations is Ghassan Hage's (2005) research on a geographically dispersed family from a Lebanese village. Hage (2005) approaches the family as one geographically dispersed research site*,* rather than a 'multi-sited ethnography'. Hage approaches the field as a 'geographically non-contiguous space where a specific transnational familial culture with its enduring social relations was flourishing' (2005: 466). Hage insists that he was studying one site- the site occupied by the transnational family- and not conducting a multi-sited ethnography. He states that '[i]t was a globally spread, geographically non-contiguous site, but it was nevertheless one site' (2005: 466). This is significant in that it positions the movement of the researcher, as well as the transnational family, as occurring *within* a dispersed field of relations, rather than *between* discrete sites that are defined by geographical separation. This resonates with an understanding of movement as

wayfaring *along* an unfolding pathway, which I suggest can advance a postcolonial focus on geographically non-contiguous realms of political relations, such as empire and diaspora.

Mobile political communities

Second, relational approaches to movement have the potential to address not only people, but political communities, as not only dispersed but also mobile (or constituted in movement). This argument draws on and departs from Édouard Glissant's concept of 'errantry'. First, I suggest errantry as the basis for an alternative analytical or political framework that allows for claims to political belonging based on an 'errant' recognition of mobility and relation, and in contrast to statist imaginaries of fixed national or territorial belonging. Second, through an analytic focus on 'imperial mobility' as a form of *disavowed errantry*, the paper attempts to expose the ongoing but occluded dependence of a world of seemingly sedentary or fixed nation-states on movement.

With Glissant, the thesis works with 'errantry' as an understanding of political belonging rooted in movement and relation that can serve as an alternative basis to an international legal system that privileges claims to territorial fixity linked to equally fixed identities. For Glissant, 'errantry' not only evokes movement rather than sedentarism within a fixed territory, but also relation with the Other, *as* the root of identity (or political community). He writes that 'errantry… silently emerges from the destructuring of compact national entities that yesterday were still triumphant and, at the same time, from difficult, uncertain births of new forms of identity that call to us' (Glissant, 1997: 18). These errant forms of identity displace 'simplifying, ethnocentric exclusions' (Glissant, 1997, 21) with relation, writing that '[i]dentity is no longer in the root but also in Relation' (Glissant, 1997: 18). While errantry is not necessarily a form of movement, but may also be a form of thought (Glissant, 1997: 18), it offers a heuristic device to think about politics that does not start from the 'fixing' of political communities in relation to territory or intransigent identity, and a political device to make claims to belonging from an explicit position of mobility.

Departing from Glissant, I approach imperial mobilities as a form of *disavowed errantry*. For Glissant, colonial conquest does not imply errantry, because conquest is associated with a commitment to a single intransigent root, and not the openness to relation implied by 'errantry'. He writes: 'Conquerors are the moving, transient root of their people' (Glissant, 1997: 14). This is a form of movement that Glissant identifies as 'arrowlike nomadism', writing: 'In contrast to arrowlike nomadism (discovery or conquest), in contrast to the situation of exile, errantry gives-on-and with the negation of every pole and every metropolis, whether connected or not to a conqueror's voyaging act' (Glissant, 1997: 19). While recognising the political differences between 'errantry' (as a form of movement that implies openness to relation with the Other) and imperial mobility, as a form of movement implying territorial expansion, domination, and subjugation of the Other, this thesis works with an understanding of 'imperial mobility' as a form of disavowed errantry for two reasons. First, imperial mobility implies the *disavowal* of the constitutive relation with the Other. However, whether Western conquerors were 'open' to relation with the Other or not, they were made by it as much as the colonised. This builds on the argument that 'the West' was constituted as the outcome of power-knowledge relations of colonial encounter (Dabashi, 2019; Said, 2003), and the argument that modern European nation-states emerged as imperial-states, rather than evolving endogenously from sedentary societies within Europe (Bhambra, 2016: 346; Cooper and Stoler 1997: 1). Second, imperial mobility implies the *disavowal* of the constitutive role of movement. However, the recognition of the imperial roots of the nation-state also recovers the role of mobility and circulation in constituting the nation through the circulation of settlers, merchants, soldiers, missionaries, and others that maintained and built empires (Cooper and Stoler 1997: 28; Barkawi, 2017: 18). Because of this, there is a powerful resonance between Glissant's articulation of movement and relation as the root of identity (or 'rooted errantry') (1997: 37), and Engseng Ho's claim that '[t]he British became an imperial people—that is to say, they became *a people* as they became *an empire*' (2004: 214, emphasis in original) that underpins this thesis' focus on the constitutive role of imperial mobility.

Challenging understandings of the state as sedentary

Third, relational approaches to movement may be able to trouble the conflation of territoriality with sedentarism, related to a conflation of 'state' with 'stasis', that obscures both empire and the constitutive role of mobility. There is a strong association between states and sedentarism in literature on mobilities, for example, Anderson et. al note that 'It is not for nothing that an origin of "state" is "stasis," or immobility (Anderson, Sharma, and Wright 2009 in Sharma, 2020: 18). At the same time, movement is often associated with 'deterritorialisation', implicitly associating sedentarism with 'territorialisation', even when both deterritorialisation (associated with movement) and territorialisation (associated with stasis) are recognised, as in this statement: "The forms of detachment or `deterritorialisation' associated with `liquid modernity' (Bauman 2000) are accompanied by attachments and reterritorialisations of various kinds (Sheller, 2004a inSheller and Urry, 2006: 210). Here, Sheller and Urry resist a metanarrative of either movement or stasis to emphasise the complementarity of (im)mobilities. In contrast, I emphasise that territoriality is not the same as immobility or stasis. Within this theoretical framework I distinguish between 'territoriality' and 'sedentarism', so that state and territoriality can both be understood to be *mobile.*

Territoriality, a concept I explore further in relation to debates over nomadism and piracy, is understood as 'the attempt to affect, influence, or control actions, interactions, or access by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a specific geographic area' (Sack, 1983: 55, in Goettlich, 2019)[26], is distinct to sedentarism, understood as an understanding of societies as relatively static, fixed, and territorially *contained*. However, while the territorialisation of the state is linked with practices such as border controls that can function to restrict mobility, the process of state territorialisation was part of a colonial politics which operated through mobility which facilitated the expansion of territorial claims. This builds on Bhambra's (2016) argument that what are often taken as 'nation-states' within Europe, are in fact better understood as

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[26] See (Branch, 2012; Goettlich, 2019; Li, 2022; Mukoyama, 2022) for recent work on territoriality in IR.

'imperial-states'. It also explores how in an imperial context, power relations do not always function in relation to territoriality (Barkawi, 2017; Go, 2011), and, when they do, this territoriality is often patchy and partial (Benton, 2005: 701). Postcolonial analysis emphasises how empires work through the circulation of diverse actors and ideas (Barkawi, 2017: Cooper and Stoler, 1994; Mawani and Hussin, 2014). Overall, attentiveness to empire and a relational understanding of movement can foreground how apparently static objects such as 'states' are constituted in and through movement. This is crucial to avoid conflating 'territoriality' with 'sedentarism' and to address the constitutive role of disavowed imperial mobilities, which are unintentionally obscured in work that approaches movement as a *challenge* or *alternative* to an assumed norm of state stasis.

iii) Diagnosing the contemporary mobilities imaginary

Given that the question of what movement *is* is imbued with power-knowledge relations, I now turn to the question of how movement is currently imagined in contemporary academic work. This functions as a genealogical episode, to locate this thesis within the present. Rather than attempting a comprehensive analysis, I focus on three primary categories of mobilities that help to highlight the political stakes of studying movement in the present, and the challenges faced by contemporary studies of people in movement. My intention is to highlight how a genealogical approach to *understandings* and *categories* of people in movement can advance contemporary debates on mobilities by critically distancing from existing understandings of mobilities. This sets up the turn to early twentieth century international order and the Indian Ocean World as sites that can help to understand both the origins of contemporary understandings of mobilities, as well as the politically productive role of contestations of mobilities categories.

I chose to focus on the categories of 'migrant', 'tourist', and 'diaspora' in this chapter because these categories are exemplary of challenges faced by contemporary research on mobilities. First, the category of 'migration' is a primary category for understanding people in movement today, and understandings of migration are exemplary of *presentist* approaches towards people in

movement, which often assume that present-day mobilities categories are applicable across historical contexts. Second, understandings of 'tourism' are exemplary of the confusion between categories of practice and categories of analysis, and work on tourism highlights the confusion this generates in relation to understandings of 'tourist' as a subjectivity which is assumed to be both white and Western. Third, I focus on 'diaspora' as exemplary of the extent to which even critical concepts for addressing transversal political formations are constrained by contemporary international understandings of politics and argue that 'diaspora' (as both concept and community) is not necessarily outside of either international or imperial power/knowledge relations.

The framing of a 'mobilities imaginary' as a 'social imaginary' draws on Kamola's articulation of 'social imaginaries'. Rather than corresponding to 'an observable, empirical world', Kamola (2014: 515–516) articulates social imaginaries as themselves constituting 'a world-view produced and reproduced within contradictory and contested political and economic relations'. Social imaginaries make social life legible in relation to 'commonly shared understandings and practices' (Kamola, 2014: 515–516) . These imaginaries are constituted through inter-related academic, institutional, and popular understandings and practices. The categories of 'migrant', 'tourist', and 'diaspora' are approached as part of an overarching mobilities imaginary. While each of these categories has a distinct meaning, they all evoke understandings of movement that are defined in relation to a fixed and contained 'home'. Last, this engagement with mobilities categories in the present is not intended to imply a direct teleology in their meaning from the past to the present. In contrast, it is intended to problematise present-day understandings, and illustrate that they are not directly translatable to other political orders or moments. At the same time, in the following chapters, I draw out some resonances and transformations in understandings of people in movement, and ways that historic functioning of categories of mobilities can inform understandings of present-day politics.

Migration

Analysis of studies of 'migration' illustrate the widespread presentism in relation to contemporary mobilities categories. Contemporary studies of 'migration' tend to treat migration as a category that is applicable across time and place, in ways that obscure its contextual specificity. While information on 'immigration' and 'emigration' was sometimes collected in earlier contexts, these were not standardised categories, and were among many contested forms of collecting information on people in movement. This is illustrated by the fact that studies on the history of migration have to reconstruct datasets on 'migration' from alternative sources of data, rather than use data that specifically measured movement as 'migration' (or even 'immigration' or 'emigration') at the time. For example the author of *Migration in World History* states that '[i]n the seventeenth century, the logs of slave ships and military rosters kept track of migrants; in the twentieth century, passport and border-crossing data' (Manning, 2013: 194). This means that data on enslaved people and soldiers is included in data on contemporary migration, when this movement was not understood as 'migration' at the time. In another study on the history of migration in Britain, the authors state that 'most of our current knowledge about migration in the past comes from census birthplace data, supplemented by sources such as Poor Law certificates, apprenticeship registers, diaries and oral reminiscences' (Pooley and Turnbull, 2005: 20). Using census data to reconstruct information about movement as 'migration', when it was not understood as such at the time, obscures the cultural, social, and political meanings of both movement *and* political order.

Migration, as a term to categorise people in movement, is specific to an international order that emerged in the early twentieth century. When it is used as a general descriptive category this clouds understandings of political order and the political meaning of movement. It can be helpful to consider the contextual specificity of 'migration' in relation to Timothy Mitchell's understanding of 'the economy'. Mitchell shows that 'the economy' is an object that is constituted through a transformation of processes of exchange, and also the representation of these processes as 'the economy' (2002: 5). In other words, the object of 'the economy' is

neither a new form of representing a previous existing materiality, nor a new set of material processes, but an object which is inseparably both material and ideational. Equally, the category of 'migration' is not only a new way of representing practices such as slavery, or an entirely new set of practices, but a distinct social object that is related to both practices and understandings of these practices. Because understandings of people in movement produce opposing understandings of political order, imposing contemporary understandings of movement onto earlier political contexts not only mis-represents the meaning of movement, but the meaning of political order.

To illustrate the relations between categorisations of people in movement and order, it is helpful to consider what Linebaugh and Rediker (2002: 4) outline as the multiplicity of a 'many headed hydra' in the Trans-Atlantic world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This included 'dispossessed commoners, transported felons, indentured servants, religious radicals, pirates, urban laborers, soldiers, sailors, and African slaves as the numerous, ever-changing heads of the monster' (Linebaugh and Rediker, 2002: 4). These subjects were all moving across the Atlantic ocean, but these terms are defined by vocation, rather than primarily mobility, and there was no data collection that bunched together all of these identities as 'migrants' at the time, or that consistently identified this mobility as 'immigration', 'emigration', or 'migration'. This is not only a matter of representation, but reflective of the fact that the concept of 'international migration', and the widespread categorisation of people as 'migrants' is specific to a twentieth-century international order. As I unpack further in the following chapters, the category of 'international migration' was controversial in the early twentieth century, because it posed a challenge to an imperial worldview of people moving within a continuous imperial political realm. Neither the category nor the practice existed outside of the co-constituted political conditions that make mobility meaningful as migration.

The problem of presentism is also apparent in Sharma's research on the political significance of the figure of the Migrant. Sharma evokes the figure of the Migrant in her analysis of the politics

of rendering some people 'out of place' in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, this figure does not map into a stable category of 'migrant', as this did not exist in this period. Sharma writes that '[t]he British Empire's categorization of some Natives as Migrants in the 1830s proved to have world-historic ramifications', and links the figure of the Migrant with the colonial category of 'coolies', writing: 'the regulations imposed by the British on the movement of coolie workers marked the emergence of the figure- *and state category*- of the Migrant' (2020: 75, *emphasis added*). Sharma suggests this was reflected in the US 1875 Immigration Act which restricted the mobility of 'coolies' (2020: 63). However, while the Act refers to 'immigrant', 'cooly', and 'alien', the category of 'migrant' was not used (United States Page Act. 18 Stat., 1875). In Sharma's analysis, 'Migrant' is a figure to evoke a sense of being out-of-place, and a subject whose mobility is restricted, rather than strictly a state category, or a 'category of practice', as is sometimes suggested in the text. As I go on to demonstrate in the following chapters, the stabilisation and codification of the categories of 'migrant', 'tourist', and 'refugee' was specific to twentieth-century politics. This illustrates the challenge and necessity of maintaining critical reflexivity on the specificity of contemporary mobilities categories.

Tourism

Within the contemporary mobilities imaginary, 'tourism' is a dominant category for making movement meaningful. As part of this imaginary, 'tourism' evokes an understanding of movement as displacement. This defines movement in opposition to a norm of sedentary societies, which the tourist travels 'between', in ways that obscure the political relations produced through this movement. In addition, by defining tourism in relation to Eurocentric histories, efforts to add in analysis of tourism from the Global South lead to confusion over the meaning of contemporary practices categorised as 'tourism', and constitutes a mobilities imaginary that reifies assumptions about race. In a similar way to 'migration', 'tourism' is used as a blanket category to capture a range of residual travel practices that are not contained within national borders. But, in contrast to 'migration', the category of tourism evokes a narrow understanding of practices deriving from a Eurocentric history. This makes tourism both a very

general category which encompasses a range of travel practices, and a very specific category, which occludes the political meaning of these practices by associating them with an ideal type in ways which may be misleading.

One issue with the association of tourism with whiteness is that it produces a binary between adventurous Western tourists, and abject Southern migrants. Edensor and Kothari make this critique, writing: 'Many academic accounts continue to evoke a geographical imaginary of a dynamic, proactive, primarily Western core that contrasts with a parochial Third World periphery, a dichotomy that suggests that those from the west travel while others are sedentary, anchored in place' (2018: 702–703). They specifically critique 'reductive historical understandings' that present a dichotomy between 'the ever-curious, adventurous western tourist', and 'non-western travellers who move to Europe and North America, not as tourists but as migrants, emigrants, exiles, domestic servants and refugees, travel for trade, business or education, or are part of an extended diaspora' (Edensor and Kothari 2018: 705–706). The issue of an emphasis on white Western tourists is acknowledged in work on tourism in International Relations (Becklake and Wynne-Hughes, 2023), which often calls for studies of non-Western tourists to counterbalance this. However, the inclusion of non-Western tourists into studies of 'tourism' would not necessarily trouble the understanding of ideal type tourists and tourism as white and European.

This analysis builds on critical work on tourism in International Relations. For example, Debbie Lisle's (2006, 2013, 2016) work shows that tourism is not a politically neutral realm, but is central to war and empire. This thesis builds on the finding that tourism is entangled with imperial power relations, which is increasingly explored in work on tourism and IR (Becklake and Wynne-Hughes, 2023; Enloe, 1990; Vrasti, 2013; Wynne-Hughes, 2012). Because of the analytical focus on the links between tourism and colonialism, work on tourism in International Relations often has an empirical focus on white tourists or tourists from the Global North. At the same time, the challenge of associating tourism with whiteness is critically reflected on

(Becklake and Wynne-Hughes, 2023). Building on the work to include tourism within analysis of the political, I depart from this to consider 'tourism' not only as a set of practices, but as a politically productive category.

Defining tourism

Work on 'tourism' addresses the difficulty in defining tourism due to the breadth of technical categories of 'tourism', and the overlaps between forms of travel such as tourism and pilgrimage (O'Reilly, 2003; Salazar, 2014)[27]. At the same time, a commonly held reference point is the UNWTO definition of a tourist, which in 2019, was defined anyone who is 'taking a trip to a main destination outside his/her usual environment, for less than a year, for any main purpose (business, leisure or other personal purpose) other than to be employed by a resident entity in the country or place visited', and 'stays overnight' (UNWTO, 2008). While this the technical definition of tourism is not strictly 'cross-border', most data on 'tourism', which is often used in academic and journalistic work, uses tourism statistics that are collected based on inbound border-crossings, or 'bednights' booked in hotels (for example: KTB, 2022). This changes the definition of tourism in practice, to reify it as a form of mobility either defined by border-crossing, or hotel consumption.

This categorisation of 'tourism' produces an understanding of movement as 'displacement'. The tracking of border crossing and hotel consumption makes movement meaningful as 'tourism' through border crossing, understood as a move from a 'usual environment' to outside of a usual environment, and through consumption. This relates to a mobilities imaginary, which starts from an understanding of movement as 'displacement' from one environment to another, often measured through a border crossing, and then renders movement meaningful in relation to consumption. This approach makes sense in relation to the needs of states and businesses, which

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[27] This analysis does not enter into broader cultural debates over tourism, for example, Jamaica Kincaid's diagnosis of the tourist as 'an ugly human being. You are not an ugly person all the time; you are not an ugly person ordinarily; you are not an ugly person day-to-day' but, 'when you become a tourist', you are an 'ugly, empty thing' (Kincaid, 2018).

Raoul Bianchi (2009) and others have argued dominate academic work on tourism which tends to take a 'managerial perspective' towards tourism. This contributes to a state and business-centric mobilities imaginary, and, in turn, makes sense of movement in relation to this imaginary.

'Tourism' as a category, also illustrates a racialised understanding of mobilities in a mobilities imaginary. The categorisation of movement as 'tourism' is linked to an association between tourism and whiteness, and is often understood as a practice that emerged in Europe and diffused outwards. Most academic work on tourism in general, and tourism in International Relations, focuses on white and or Western tourists. The Eurocentric focus in work on tourism has been widely critiqued (Cohen and Cohen, 2015; Franklin and Crang, 2001; Hazbun, 2006; Kothari, 2012). Edensor and Kothari (2018: 703) call this 'the extraordinarily Western-oriented preoccupations of popular travel writing and Eurocentric academic accounts of travel and tourism, despite the recent surge in tourism from non-Western countries'. The linking of 'tourists' with 'the West' is linked with a racialisation of tourists as white. Tesfahuney (n.d.) writes: 'The tourist as 'white' and a Westerner is taken to be the norm for the very idea of travelling, experiences, leisure and recreation and the premise for the creation of tourist destinations, wishes and desires'. This overall focus is made apparent by its exceptions, for example, Mkono's work presents itself as an exception 'being one of a few studies in which Africans are represented as tourists' (Mkono, 2013: 195). The link between tourism and whiteness is often taken as a starting point, and not as a subject for investigation.

Eurocentric histories

Related to the association between tourism and whiteness is a Eurocentric ideal-type of tourism, and a related understanding of tourism as emblematic of Western-centred modernity. Urry and Larsen argue that 'acting as a tourist is one of the defining characteristics of being 'modern' (2011: 4). They are not alone in this account, for example, Thiel (2016: 176) states that 'we can think of tourism as the archetypal modern experience, and as an allegory of Europeanness as a

whole', and in a central text to studies of tourism, MacCannell writes 'the tourist' is one of the best models available for modern-man-in-general' (MacCannell, 2013: 1). This linking of tourism with 'modernity' is paralleled by an assumption in the literature that tourism originated in Europe, which links Europe with modernity[28].

A standard narrative of the history of tourism locates the emergence of tourism in eighteenth-century Europe and gives a narrative of it diffusing outwards. For example, Urry and Larsen (2011: 14), state that '[w]e can date the birth of the tourist gaze in the west to around 1840'. They describe the way that tourism developed in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe through the 'Grand Tour', which was established for young men from aristocratic classes, and then the expansion of tourist practices to the middle classes (Urry and Larsen, 2011: 9). This is a widely accepted version of the history of tourism, which continues with an increase in middle class tourist travel in the nineteenth century, helped by the invention of the steam-ship and the railway (Britannica, 2023), as well as the rise of popular tourism and package tours associated with Thomas Cook (Brendon, 1991: 118)**.** This was followed by a rise in commercial tourism through the period between WW1 and WW2, and then a post-WW2 increase in government involvement and interest in tourism as a diplomatic tool, helped by the increased accessibility of air-travel in the 1950s and again in the 1990s (Britannica, 2023).

The problem with an almost exclusive understanding of tourism as emerging from European modernity, is that it then makes sense of non-European practices as originating in Europe. For example, Hazbun (2009: 204) critiques the assumption that 'tourism is a product of (Western) modernity' and questions the idea that 'Islamic tourism' can be made sense of in this framework. He writes that '[d]rawing on such traditions, histories, and religious sources, today the Arab world has witnessed the rise of efforts to promote 'Islamic tourism' (al-Hamarneh and Steiner, 2004; Stephenson et al., 2010), and forms of 'pious leisure' (Deeb and Harb, 2007) that cannot be simply viewed as the result of the diffusion of Western styles of leisure' (Hazbun, 2009: 218).

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[28] Echoing Chakrabarty's analysis (2008) of the linking of Europe with modernity.

This is a problem in mobilities work on tourism, which often incorporates forms of religious travel outside of the West as 'tourism' but defines tourism proper in opposition to these practices. This makes 'tourism' function as a residual category to capture a wide range of practices, which are then bundled into a definition which evokes a form of white Western mobility, which do not neatly fit an imaginary of international belonging. For example, having distinguished tourism from pilgrimage, which 'included a mixture of religious devotion and culture and pleasure', Urry and Larsen then include the 'reverential gaze' as a form of 'tourist gaze', writing: 'there is the notion of the *reverential* gaze used to describe how, for example, Muslims spiritually consume the sacred site of the Taj Mahal. Muslim visitors stop to scan and to concentrate their attention upon the mosque, the tombs and the Koranic script' (Urry and Larsen, 2011: 5). Muslim visitors to the Taj are simultaneously incorporated into analysis of the 'tourist gaze', while being distanced from this by being described as 'visitors' (not tourists), and by tourism being defined in relation to Europe. This is paralleled in Edensor's work on tourists at the Taj, which Urry draws on, where Edensor writes that 'by far the commonest form of tourism in India is for pilgrimage' (1998: 28), but then distinguishes pilgrimage from 'secular' tourism, writing '[t]here are certainly aspects of secular tourism in the practices of pilgrims to Mathura, for instance, a visit to the Taj...However, the central purposes of the pilgrim's visit… are not comparable to secular tourism' (1998: 34). This has the double effect of including pilgrimage in studies of tourism but distinguishing it from a Eurocentric ideal-type.

Overall, the treatment of 'tourism' as a category of analysis which is defined in relation to a narrow European history, reproduces a link between tourism and whiteness, which often goes uninterrogated. This cannot be corrected by 'globalising' the study of tourism, which risks merely including new case studies but leaving the underlying conceptual framework untouched. This is because of what Bhambra identifies as the resilience of ideal types to incorporate new evidence and remain unchanged. Bhambra argues: 'The failure to reconstruct ideal types in light of new evidence suggests not only a commitment to the theoretical construct separate from its

relation to the empirical, but also a commitment to the evaluative scheme associated with it' (Bhambra, 2014, p. 147). Instead, I suggest analysis of what contemporary understandings of tourism produce.

On one hand, there are real links between tourism, European colonialism, and racial hierarchies. At the same time, the question of how tourism comes to be associated with whiteness is not addressed, which reproduces an essentialised understanding of an adventurous West and static Rest, obscuring both the historical co-constitution and multiple genealogies of contemporary practices categorised as 'tourism', and muddling understandings of present-day travel, and non-Western travellers. Equally, practices such as pilgrimage and visiting friends and relatives point to meaningful, continuous social relations, which are not divided into national containers. The category of 'tourism' folds these relations into an international imaginary, by presenting tourism as 'displacement'. It also folds these practices into an ideal type understanding of tourism linked with whiteness and European modernity, which confuses analysis of the politics of people in movement. This contributes to a racialised binary between 'Western' tourists, and 'non-Western' migrants, which does not only reflect real racialised hierarchies, but also reifies them.

Diaspora as a route out of the mobilities imaginary?

In contrast to more state-centric categories of 'tourism' and 'migration', 'diaspora' is at odds with strictly 'international' imaginary. However, work on 'diaspora' often shares underlying understandings of belonging deriving from links to territory, and 'diaspora' is not at odds with international or imperial political projects. While 'diaspora' is often understood as a category that evokes forms of transversal belonging that are opposed to international understandings of the political, which emphasise territorial containers as the basis of political affiliation. I include this analysis to illustrate the pervasiveness of a mobilities imaginary, even in attempts to displace it, by sketching how understandings of diaspora often evoke national homelands. At the same time, the concept of 'diaspora', and diasporic political communities, are linked to imperial

projects, both in theory and in practice. This draws out some overlaps between 'international' and 'imperial' understandings of people in movement, that I expand on throughout the thesis. Both underpin a contemporary mobilities imaginary. The concept of diaspora does not necessarily challenge a 'mobilities imaginary' which understands movement in relation to displacement from 'A' to 'B' or the normalisation of territorially contained societies which this understanding of movement produces. It often presents 'diaspora' as an exception to this norm, but one that is defined on the same terms.

Diaspora and territorially contained identities

Work on diaspora explores the ways that attentiveness to dispersed political relations is a route towards a less compartmentalised understanding of the political. As Soguk (2008: 175) argues, drawing on Glissant's *Poetics of Relation,* attentiveness to diasporic people can 'highlight transversal identities' and the 'subterranean transversality' of the 'condition of flows and networks, or wandering roots and errant politics, of border-crossings and borderisations, and of shared deterritorialisations'. This suggests that by emphasising flow over fixity, transversality over territorially bound belonging, and the 'trail-making' of individuals in movement over the 'map-making' of state practices, attentiveness to diaspora can draw alternative understandings of the political, which are less contained in a frame of inter-state interactions. This has political implications. As Clifford (1994) outlines, cosmopolitanisms, often associated with diasporic forms of political belonging, are at odds with claims to political belonging associated with the nation-state, indigeneity, and autochthony that increasingly form the basis of both nationalist and some decolonial debates.

The concept of 'diaspora' is a subject of ongoing debate in Anthropology and political theory. Definitions of diaspora tend to contain three elements, 'dispersion in space', 'orientation to a 'homeland'' and 'boundary-maintenance' (Brubaker, 2005: 5). These elements are flexible, and not all understandings of diaspora deploy all elements. Similar to 'mobilities' and 'tourism', the

expansiveness of the concept of 'diaspora' means that it risks losing analytical traction (Brubaker, 2005; Cohen and Fischer, 2019). While 'dispersion in space' is relatively uncontroversial the questions of 'homeland', and a bounded group identity, are points of tension. However, the linking of diaspora with 'homeland' is widespread in the study of diaspora. For example, Varadarajan, while critical of the celebration of the emancipatory possibilities of diaspora, suggests that 'it is possible to settle on a relatively non-controversial understanding of diaspora as capturing the essence of a link (however tenuous, ambiguous or contradictory) between mobile populations perceived by themselves and others as living outside the territories of their 'homeland' (2008: 80). However, when the concept of 'diaspora' is understood in relation to a territorial homeland, it is not at all at odds with an interpretive framework that privileges the territorial nation-state, as it emphasises territorialised national belonging, often linked with ethnic understandings of national identity.

While outside of the scope of this thesis to investigate this fully, it is notable that understandings of diaspora linked to 'homeland' are historically linked to the emergence of the nation-state in the early twentieth century. Clifford (1994: 321) notes the links between early twentieth-century pan-African and Zionist diasporic political projects with European nationalism, and 'the influence of von Treitschke on Du Bois, or Blyden's interest in Herder, Mazzini, and Herz'. A 'homeland' oriented understanding of diaspora emerged alongside understandings of national homelands and the nation-state. As such, the concept of 'diaspora', when linked to 'homeland', is not at odds with nationalist interpretive frameworks or political projects. This is compatible with a mobilities imaginary understanding of movement as displacement between social containers. The linking of 'diaspora' with 'homeland' also poses the problem of bifurcating the diaspora's geography between 'home' and 'away', rather than understanding the diaspora to be moving within a continuous diasporic realm. This is an idea I introduced in relation to 'displacement' understandings of movement, which cut across understandings of a continuous colonial realm. For example, Varadarajan (2008: 93) writes about an imperial 'bureaucratic

diaspora' of 'local elites who migrated from their *homeland* to the imperial metropole for short periods of time to acquire a Western education'.

In contrast, other theorists of diaspora emphasise the continuity of diasporic relations. For example, exploring how geographically separate places can be understood as part of a continuous community (Rouse in Clifford, 1994: 303), or site (Hage, 2005). At the same time, critics of a 'homeland' oriented understanding of diaspora emphasise alternative articulations of diaspora, such as anti-Zionist understandings of Jewish diaspora (Clifford, 2004). This is an idea that Stuart Hall explores in relation to African diaspora in the Caribbean, writing '[t]o *this* 'Africa', which is a necessary part of the Caribbean imaginary, we can't literally go home again' (1990: 232), emphasising the 'imaginary' nature of the 'homeland', in contrast to 'back to Africa' understandings of diaspora. He approaches the 'imaginative rediscovery' of 'Africa' as a question of 'what Africa has become in the New World, what we have made of 'Africa': 'Africa' - as we re-tell it through politics, memory and desire' (Hall, 1990: 232). 'Diaspora' can function as a category to capture political relations that are not defined by territory, but only when the link with homeland is explicitly challenged.

These critical approaches also problematise essentialist understandings of diaspora identity, which risk replacing territorially contained understandings of belonging, with essentialised identities. As Brubaker notes, 'diaspora can be seen as an alternative to the essentialization of belonging, but it can also represent a non-territorial form of essentialized belonging' (2005: 12). Overall, as a concept, 'diaspora' can trouble territorial understandings of belonging through attentiveness to dispersed political relations. At the same time, when diasporas are understood in relation to a 'homeland', this reproduces essentialist understandings of national belonging. Even when diasporas are separated from the ideal of homeland, 'diaspora' can represent another form of essentialised identity. These are not only questions of conceptualisation but are also illustrated in some ways that 'diasporas' are entangled with nationalist and imperial politics.

National and imperial diaspora politics

Attempts to attend to diaspora as a way of 'bypassing' European imperialism and Western imperialism risk obscuring the historic entanglements of diasporic politics and empires and occluding the deployment of diaspora narratives in the furtherance of nationalist and imperial agendas. Understandings of diasporas as dispersed political relations are not opposed to imperialism, as Robert Cohen noted in his identification of white settlers as an 'imperial diaspora' (1997, in Varadarajan, 2008:90). This is a definition expanded by Varadarajan to include imperial labour diasporas, mercantile diasporas, and bureaucratic elites as examples of imperial diasporas that include colonised populations (2008: 90-91).

Diasporic political affiliation, in this sense, is compatible with the forms of transversal white solidarity invoked in political visions such as the 'Anglosphere' and 'Eurafrica', that are compatible with ethnic understandings of 'nationality'. For example, Duncan Bell explores a transnational imagined community of white men as a translocal political formation, arguing '[i]t is possible to view the Anglo-racial imaginary as an example of what Arjun Appadurai terms 'translocal' affiliation—of an emergent cartography that escaped the topological imperatives of the modern territorially bounded nation-state' (2016: 242). This was linked with a racialised understanding of nationality that was compatible with imperialism, illustrating the entanglements between dispersed political relations which can be understood as 'diasporic' with overlapping nationalist and imperial political projects. Far from being an emancipatory category, the 'diasporic' involves ethno-nationalist understandings of extraterritorial political affiliation, spanning the gap between colonial and national forms of political order.

An example of the politicisation of diaspora as a form of extra-territorial nationalism is contemporary Hindu nationalism. A 'rediscovery' of longue durée histories of South Asian diaspora in East Africa, which I addressed in relation to the Indian Ocean World which I address in Chapter Two, is linked to extraterritorial vision of Hindu nationalism. This is part of a wider trend of diasporic discourse becoming a technology of governance, related to the invention of

'state categories' of diaspora (Ragazzi, 2009: 379). In India, these categories include 'Non-Resident Indians' (NRIs) and 'Persons of Indian Origin' (PIOs). Both PIO and NRI categories are interpreted as part of a 'diaspora strategy' to not only raise revenue but also to 'globalise' Indian citizenry, and create an 'ethnic, rather than territorial, redefinition of Indian nationalism' (Dickinson, 2012: 612). The promotion of a diasporic understanding of Indian identity as an ethnic (or perhaps religious) identity, necessarily had to exclude non-Hindus, and the definition of PIOs excludes anyone who is a national of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Iran, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Nepal, or whose parents, grandparents or great grandparents had ever been a national of those countries (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.). These moves are linked to state discourse relating to South Asian East Africans, which, according to Dickinson, attempt to project a longue durée global history of Indian affiliation with East Africa that bypasses the participation of South Asians in British colonialism, and also project an 'Indian' (Hindu) ethno-nationalist identity onto a multi-ethnic South Asian East African population (2012: 618). Far from being separable from either imperial or nationalist political agendas, the recent repoliticisation of Indian diaspora may be linked to the occlusion of nineteenth-century imperialism, the naturalisation of twenty-first-century ethno-nationalism, and a sharpening of extra-territorial and ethnic understandings of the nation, which echoes older white supremacism and global colour lines.

Conclusions

Analysis of 'migration', 'tourism', and 'diaspora' suggests that a contemporary 'mobilities imaginary' makes sense of movement as displacement between compartmentalised social containers. This produces an understanding of the political associated with territorial fixity and associated with discrete identities. This is linked to both imperial and international political orders. This imaginary reifies international political order. It also facilitates ongoing imperial relations by obscuring the political significance of movement, by making it appear secondary to fixed locations which are moved between. As I posit in Part Two of the thesis, this creates a fundamental premise of Western political order, which is that political legitimacy derives from

territorially fixity and sedentarism. In contrast, I show that Western order, and its core understandings of sovereignty, territoriality, and international law, emerged in movement. While this present-day mobilities imaginary is grounded in earlier understandings of movement, it is also changing, contingent, and not directly continuous from early twentieth-century internationalism, or European colonial expansion. However, I suggest that attentiveness to the early-twentieth-century institutionalised codification of mobilities categories can expose some of the origins of contemporary *international* understandings of mobilities and their role in creating international order.

Part One: Making an International Order

4: Categorising migration and the creation of international order

Between 1919 and 1925, international organisations were created that defined and naturalised new categories to codify people in movement, in relation to an international order. This process was institutionalised by organisations associated with the League of Nations, namely, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (LNHCR), and the International Union of Tourism Propaganda Organisations (IUOTPO). Before this, there were no standardised understandings of, or ways of collecting information about, people as 'migrants', 'tourists', or 'refugees'. These categories were central to the creation and naturalisation of a racialised Western international order, by making movement legible in relation to apparently international borders, nation-state citizenship, and national belonging. This created the conditions for the compartmentalisation of the political into nation-states, and the simultaneous sharpening of global colour lines. In this chapter, I describe the institutionalised codification of the categories of 'international migration', 'tourism', and 'refugees'. I then analyse the role of the codification of 'migration' in creating a racialised international order.

The institutionalised categorisation of mobilities in the early twentieth century was not coincidental, but part of a larger transformation of world order that it contributed to producing. A sense of political upheaval, and an openness to the making and un-making of order, characterised world politics at the time. In 1915, Du Bois (1973) evoked the uncertainty of the period, writing: 'What shall the end be? The world-old and fearful things, War and Wealth, Murder and Luxury? Or shall it be a new thing—a new peace and new democracy of all races: a great humanity of equal men?'. In this context, the future of empires was unclear, and while it would not have been

possible to foresee or design a future that looks like 'the international' of today, the end of World War One marked the beginning of decades of negotiation and manoeuvring, attempts to maintain European imperial power, as well as anti-colonial projects, and attempts replace empire with a rising white men's alliance. This transformation in political order was constituted and naturalised through the newly codified categories of mobilities.

The recodification of mobilities categories, and recalibration of raciality, were closely related. Addressing links between racialisation and the *regulation* of mobilities in the early twentieth century, Du Bois (1973) noted in 1915, 'a white man is privileged to go to any land where advantage beckons and behave as he pleases; the black or colored man is being more and more confined to those parts of the world where life for climatic, historical, economic, and political reasons is most difficult to live and most easily dominated by Europe for Europe's gain'. This was a diagnosis shared by Theodor Roosevelt two decades earlier, who applauded white people's 'race selfishness' which had limited Chinese immigration into white men's countries (1897, in Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 102). At the same time, advocating for continued white mobility, Roosevelt hoped that 'the modern conditions of easy travel may permit the permanent rule in the tropics of a vigorous northern race' (1897, in Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 102). Both the strengthening of global colour lines, and the emergence of the nation-state, were articulated, and made possible, in relation to the regulation of people in movement. And, as I address in this chapter, the re-codification of mobilities categories was a precondition for making this possible.

This chapter makes three interventions. First, it outlines the codification of 'international migration' by the ILO and draws out the implications of an *international* understanding of people in movement, in contrast to earlier *imperial* understandings. Second, I contextualise this within existing debates on the role of *both* the restriction and facilitation of mobility in constituting the nation-state, to argue that the institutionalised codification of 'international migration' contributed to this process by crystallising and naturalising an understanding of movement as migration. Third, I argue that the codification of the concept of 'international

migration' by the ILO created a shared vocabulary and platforms that contributed to i) the decline of formal imperialism and ii) the rise of rise of eugenicist demographic manipulation linked to the naturalisation of the nation-state. I unpack this in relation to international debates over 'migration' at Paris and the 1927 World Population Conference.

These arguments build on the assumption that the issue of people in movement was at the centre of debates about the transformation of world order in the early twentieth century. The new categories of mobilities produced relative and contested understandings of order and contributed to the crystallisation of an ideal of order as 'international'. They also created political possibilities for practices which may not have been thinkable or actionable without these categories. This was part of the production of an 'international' political order, which rendered movement legible in relation to the crossing of international borders, national citizenship, and a related ideal of ethnic homogeneity as the basis of the polity.

Image 2: Government officials signing the Treaty of Versailles, December 2, 1918 (Weitz,

i) The international codification of migration

Building on existing research on the role of the regulation of migration in producing the nation-state, I explore how the codification of 'international migration' by the International Labour Organization (ILO) contributed to the possibility of thinking about and acting in relation to the concept of 'international migration'. This analysis illustrates: i) that the creation of twentieth-century international order was related to the *categorisation* as much as the *regulation* of people in movement, and ii) that this was an international and institutionalised process.

The 1919 creation of the ILO was the first League of Nations affiliated international organisation created to codify people in movement. To contextualise the ILO, it was founded in 1919 in the original covenant of the League of Nations, included in the Treaty of Versailles, and led by French Socialist Albert Thomas. The ILO was committed to workers' rights, and this included a commitment to the 'protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own' (in Lebon-McGregor, 2020: 35). In practice, this was limited in many areas to the protection of specifically European workers. The ILO's membership was mostly composed of colonial powers, including Belgium, France, Britain and Japan, and, until 1939, India was the only colonised country with full membership of the ILO (Hepburn and Jackson, 2022). In some ways the ILO countered European hegemony, for example, it served as a forum that facilitated transnational labour solidarity between Australia and China, and advocated for the elimination of racial discrimination (Lake, 2016). It also manifested double standards, for example in the application of conventions related to child labour in the metropole and the colony (Hepburn and Jackson, 2022). In addition, emigration schemes focused on relocating people from Europe. In line with race thinking of the time, the ILO's leading emigration statistician 'linked the international challenge of the emigration question with the upholding of rule of 'the higher races' in the 'tropical zones' (Ferenczi, 1923 (Stricker, 2019: 477). This is often unacknowledged in

work on the ILO, which tends to take at face value the role of the ILO in facilitating European emigration as a response to an overpopulation problem in Europe (for example, see Allen & Easton-Calabria (2022)).

Central to the argument of this thesis, the ILO was the first organisation to define and collect information on 'international migration'. Between 1920 and 1929, the ILO codified the category of 'international migration' for the first time. In 1920, the ILO circulated a questionnaire to collect data on 'emigration' (Stricker, 2019: 474). This was followed in 1922 by another questionnaire to collect information on 'world migration statistics' (Stricker, 2019: 479). In 1926, the ILO self-consciously began to use the term 'migration', rather than collecting information on 'immigration' and 'emigration' as separate categories (Stricker, 2019: 480). This was a deliberate change in language, intended to indicate a concern with the interests of countries of both emigration and immigration, unlike earlier reports which had only focused on 'emigration' from Europe, associated with European interests (Christie, 1927: 25, in Stricker, 2019: 481). By 1929, the ILO cooperated with the US Bureau of Economic Research to produce a study on 'international migration' (Stricker, 2019: 481), which was the first time that a report on 'international migration' had been created. It represents the codification of a specifically international way of interpreting people in movement, the implications of which were to contribute to producing the effect of an *international* order.

The collection of statistics on 'international migration' was controversial at the time, especially within the British Empire. The term 'international migration', in comparison to the Empire's preferred term of 'oversea settlement', implied leaving one *national* polity and entering another, rather than moving within a continuous imperial polity (Stricker, 2019). Even the term 'emigration' was controversial in Britain at this time. Speaking in British parliament in 1920, Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Leo Amery stated: 'I shall be glad if the word 'emigration', with its implied suggestion of expatriation on the part of the individual and of loss on the part of the community which he leaves, could be habitually confined to migration to foreign countries. Change of residence to another part of the Empire is, I suggest, more

appropriately described by some such term as 'overseas settlement' (HC Debate, 1920). This highlights the controversial categorisation of movement as 'emigration' or 'international migration', in ways that actors at the time were alert to, in its naturalisation of nation-state borders and polities.

The ILO gave the category of 'international migration' a sense of reality by acting in relation to this category. For example, as well as collecting data on international migration, the ILO also facilitated migration from Europe in a continuation of colonial emigration practices, and white settler nation-state-making. The ILO's role included working with the League of Nation High Commission for Refugees on the settlement and employment of refugees (Long, 2013: 11), and also developing plans (that were never put into place) for the 'rational management' of European emigration (Stricker, 2019). For example, from 1925 to 1929, the ILO acted as the operational arm of the League of Nations' relocation of refugees (Long, 2013: 11). The ILO Refugee Service's role included '[m]atching refugees with labour needs outside Europe', including agreements with Brazil, Canada, and also within Europe in France, Luxembourg, and Belgium (LNA, 1926, in Long, 2013). Existing scholarship often non-critically quotes the ILO's role in promoting emigration as a solution to unemployment and a 'refugee problem' in Europe, without engaging with the politics of these stated agendas, including recent work that recovers the role of the organisation in the regulation of people in movement. For example, Allen & Easton-Calabria state: 'between 1925 and 1929, [the ILO] initiated and maintained a successful 'employment-matching scheme' for over 50,000 refugees' (2022: 6). They write that '[t]his scheme was premised on European countries' need for foreign employment and the availability of skilled refugees for jobs' (Allen & Easton-Calabria, 2022: 6) (see also (Long, 2013: 13). However, this does not reflect on the politics of this agenda, and the ideas of surplus populations in Europe, and unpopulated land overseas, which it evokes and naturalises.

ii) 'International migration' and making the nation-state based international

The institutionalised codification of 'international migration' crystallised and formalised an *international* way of thinking about and regulating people in movement. This provided a shared vocabulary and institutional architecture for what had been up until that point the regulation of mobility on a *national* basis. The international codification of this category contributed to the naturalisation of the nation-state. As existing scholarship has shown, the early-twentieth-century introduction of immigration legislation was key to the creation of the nation-state. It did this by regulating immigration on the basis of national territory (Torpey, 2018), and differentiating by racialised national identity, for example in the document of the passport (Mongia, 2018). This produced the effect of a national understanding of territory. For example, in Canada, restrictions were based on implicit or explicit racialised nationality clauses, producing a nationalised understanding of identity and political belonging (Mongia, 2018: 136). These policies produced the nation-state in practice, and without them it may have remained only an ideal.

These policies were not a cluster of isolated 'national' policies but a global process. In the years before and after Paris, immigration legislation was introduced around the world, to both restrict and facilitate mobility, in relation to national territory, and according to racialised and nationalised understandings of desirable migrants. These policies included Asian exclusion acts in the US, 'White Australia' policies in Australia, Aliens Acts targeting Jews in Britain, and policies in Canada, Kenya, and South Africa to restrict South Asian migration (El-Enany, 2020; Jones, 2021; Lake and Reynolds, 2008; Mongia, 2018; Walia et al., 2021). This was part of an entangled process in Europe and the settler colonies, as 'Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand were far 'in advance' of the metropole' (Vigneswaran, 2020), and their immigration policies were used as a model in Britain (Bashford and Gilchrist, 2012). At the same time, states in Latin America, including Peru, introduced racist immigration policies before the US (Sharma, 2020: 82). In Mexico, inter-war immigration controls barred Black people, 'Gypsies', Jewish

people, prostitutes, and a range of nationalities deemed 'undesirable' (Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin 2014, 256, in Sharma, 2020: 83).

Nor were they entirely *restrictive* policies, as many of these policies were designed to *facilitate* white migration, and were introduced at the same time as a proliferation of emigration schemes in Britain, both as a last gasp of empire, and in the creation of postcolonial white men's countries (Bashford, 2014; Foks, 2022; Kennedy, 1988). In fact, early twentieth century immigration legislation was often intended to facilitate white migration[29]. For example, by the end of the eighteenth century Argentina had enshrined a ''preference' for people categorized…as 'Europeans'', and Peru had 'declared that immigrant recruitment would be made up 'exclusively of the white European race' (Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin 2014: 374, in Sharma, 2020: 83).

Equally, in Britain, alongside the unprecedented levels of state involvement in restricting the entry of 'aliens', the 1920s also saw unprecedented state involvement in facilitating *emigration*. As Dane Kennedy (1988: 404) notes, migration was a consistent element of empire: '[m]igration to empire had been a consistent part of imperial strategy, aimed to promote racial unity, and distribute 'surplus' population of unemployed men and unmarried women within the empire'. This was increasing, not decreasing, in the 1920s. The 1922 passing of the Empire Settlement Act represented the 'government's most significant intervention in emigration since the temporary prohibition it had imposed on overseas movement during the American War of Independence' (Harper, 2022: 3). It was a crucial part of the first state assisted migration and settlement program since the early nineteenth century (Kennedy, 1988: 406). The coeval increase in state intervention in the restriction of the entry of 'aliens' to Great Britain, and the promotion of emigration from Great Britain, was a contradictory situation that actors at the time were aware of. For example, criticising the introduction of immigration restrictions, Lord Phillimore asked: 'What are we to say to our English people who want to go abroad and prosper? Are we to expect

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[29] This is an important distinction which complicates what Radhika Mongia (2018) and others identify as a shift from *facilitation* to *restriction* of movement in the early twentieth century.

other countries to say to them: 'You must not come here, for you are taking the bread out of our mouths?' (HL Debate, 1927).

Overall, the global adoption of national immigration legislation (to both restrict and facilitate migration) required an understanding of 'immigration' as movement from one nation-state to another. The codification of 'international migration' by the ILO from 1919 to 1929 crystallised the concept of 'international migration' within international institutionalised architecture. Through a sketch of debates over racial equality at Paris, and demographic manipulation at the 1927 World Population Conference, I will illustrate two moments that the category of 'international migration' became productive of these political transformations on an international basis, and not only through a series of coeval national processes.

iii) Migration and the making of racialised international geographies

By naturalising an understanding of movement as 'international migration', (as opposed to an imperial framing of movement as 'overseas settlement' or similar), the institutionalised vocabulary that was codified at Paris contributed to two key transformations in world order, first, the decline of formal imperialism, and second, the rise of eugenicist demographic manipulation linked to the naturalisation of the nation-state.

'Migration' and the decline of formal imperialism at Paris

As I have already suggested, the categorisation of mobility as 'international migration' was at odds with an imperial vision of movement unfolding within a continuous imperial realm. In this section, I explore how debates over 'migration' were at the centre of a shift in power from the British Empire to an alliance of white men's countries, which constituted the decline of formal imperialism and its replacement with 'international' order. At the Paris Peace Process, these debates were visible in relation to the contestation and ultimate rejection of the Japanese delegation's proposal that racial equality and the principle of non-discrimination to be included in the League of Nations Covenant (Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 287). While this question was

abstracted from policy implications, it was proposed and rejected in relation to migration legislation. This was a response to the introduction of racialised discrimination in immigration legislation and was recognised as such by actors at the time. It was also rejected due to the implications for regulating people in movement, illustrating the centrality of questions of mobility to political debates at the time.

In response to the restriction of Asian migration to the USA, the Japanese Empire campaigned for racial equality and the principle of non-discrimination to be included in the League of Nations Covenant (Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 287). The Japanese delegation circulated a draft text, proposing that: 'The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree that concerning the treatment and rights to be accorded to aliens in their territories, they will not discriminate, either in law or in fact, against any person or persons on account of his or their race or nationality' (in Morinosuke in Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 289). This posed a challenge to US President Wilson, who wanted to keep race off the agenda at Paris. Speaking to the League Commission, he stated '[m]y own interest, let me say, is to quiet discussion that raises national differences and racial prejudices... I would wish them, particularly at this juncture in the history of the relations of nations with one another, to be forced as much as possible into the background' (in Lewis, 2015). Wilson also understood the wide-reaching significance of the proposal, and had been warned by an advisor that 'if this Commission should pass it, it would surely raise the race issue throughout the world' (Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 67). Wilson had been elected on a platform of opposing Asian immigration to California, a policy that would not be consistent with supporting the racial equality proposal (Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 292).

But, to avoid a diplomatic incident, Wilson did not want to reject the proposal outright. Rather than voting on the principle of racial equality by majority, Wilson chose to require a unanimous vote in order to pass the proposal, knowing that the British delegation would be forced to reject it, under pressure from Australia (Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 301). Indeed, the Australian Prime

Minister, W.M.Hughes, refused to consider the proposal on explicitly racial grounds, because 'there was no guarantee of upholding 'our policy of excluding Asiatics' (Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 294). Spelling out a link between migration and racial demography, Hughes argued that '[i]f the principle of racial equality were ever conceded it would mean the 'end of the White races' (Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 311). Hughes refused to accept the proposal and to oppose the League of Nations in general if it was approved, and the proposal was rejected.

This represented a key moment in the transition from formal imperialism to an international order and posed a challenge to the British Empire. The Empire's authority rested, in part, on the equality of British subjects, in theory, though not in practice, which Britain was unable to uphold at Paris. Britain had previously put pressure on the dominions to introduce implicit rather than explicit immigration restrictions. For example, in 1897, 'Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain had [persuaded]... the colonial premiers to adopt an educational test, to preserve at least the appearance of the equality of imperial subjects' (Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 300-301). This had changed by Paris, and the ability of Hughes to push for a rejection, represented the power of a rising alliance of settler colonies, including the USA, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa, identified as 'an emerging white man's alliance [that] might well exclude Britain altogether' (Lake and Reynolds, 2008; Thakur and Vale, 2020: 5).

In addition to representing a shift in power from the British Empire to the white settler states, national immigration restrictions served as a focal point for Indian anti-colonial nationalism. A petition by Indians in Canada in 1910 highlighted the challenge that the restriction of Indian migration to Canada posed to the Empire, stating '[t]he present Dominion Immigration Laws are quite inconsistent to the Imperial policy because they discriminate against the people of India who are British subjects' (in Mongia, 2018: 126). As Mongia (2018: 126) highlights, the petition questioned *both* the legitimacy of Canadian policy, and the legitimacy of the British empire, suggesting that 'as long as we are British subjects any British territory is the land of our citizenship', and thereby opening up the possibility of resisting British subjecthood. In parallel,

by 1924, protests over the discrimination against Indians in Kenyan immigration policies led to calls for India to boycott the 1924 Empire Exhibition, which acted as a 'lightning rod' for Indian nationalism (Hughes, 2006). In both British East Africa and Canada, the introduction and contestation of racialised immigration legislation represented the pulling apart of empire at the seams, under pressure from India as well as the white settler states.

Rather than being an abstract debate, the question of racial equality was articulated and rejected in relation to the racialised regulation of mobility, which was made possible by the naturalisation of 'international migration' as a way of regulating and understanding people in movement. Conceptualising movement on a national basis normalised a linking of territory with 'people', understood in racialised terms at the time, in ways that facilitated ongoing white solidarity, while representing a shift from formal empire to an 'international' order. The categorisation of mobilities as 'international migration' contributed to the decline of formal empire. The inability of the British Empire to continue to define movement within the empire as 'settlement', rather than 'migration', and its inability to maintain the formal equality of British subjects in Dominions immigration legislation, reflected the decline of an imperial worldview, the British Empire, and formal imperialism in general, which was being replaced by an international world order.

However, the British Empire itself did not immediately unravel, and in fact the occlusion of imperialism in data on 'international' migration, and 'international' tourism, may have contributed to the continuity of imperialism, in ways that require further investigation. Indeed, the British Empire, at least for a period, attempted to gain 'international' recognition, for example, looking for recognition of 'empire-wide nationality', as a way to counter demands in the colonies for national autonomy (Siegelberg, 2020: 135). In other words, the shift from an imperial to international way of understanding mobilities did not imply the end of empire but may have provided ways to hide ongoing imperialism. What this analysis has attempted to illustrate is how questions and understandings of mobility were at the core of these debates.

'Migration' and demographics at the 1927 World Population Conference

The role of the category of 'international migration' in producing the nation-state on a eugenicist basis is illustrated by the perceived affinity between international migration policymakers and eugenicists at the 1927 World Population Conference. This section sketches the complementary understandings of eugenics and migration regulation and illustrates some ways the eugenicist politics became possible to articulate and implement in practice through the category of 'international migration', without which they may have remained an ideal. As Albert Thomas, French Socialist and head of the ILO, stated: 'I believe that emigration and immigration are more immediately effective in influencing the population situation of a country than any other method' (in Sanger, 1927: 266). This population manipulation was central to the production of the 'nation-state' and its emphasis on population politics over territorial control.

Both segregation and eugenics were linked to the turn to population politics that is inherent in the nation-state form. As Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rudolph Holsti, commented in 1927, 'from a scientific point of view, the worst enemies of the great statesmen are not the nations living on the others side of the political frontiers, but are all the anti- and a-social forces keeping even the highest of nations internally weak and socially sick' (in Sanger, 1927: 360). The manipulation of population that was made possible by the category of 'international migration' facilitated segregationist racialised compartmentalisation, as well as eugenicist ideals of demographic improvement. Articulating this, Lothrop Stoddard advocated for immigration restriction as 'a species of segregation on a large scale' (1920, in Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 315). At the same time, the leader of the US Immigration Restriction league referred to immigration regulation as 'world eugenics' (1919, in Bashford and Levine, 2010: 164).

The categorisation of people in movement created political possibilities for implementing segregationist and eugenicist politics that would not have been possible without these categories. As Bashford has observed, the interwar period's 'phenomenal uptake of migration law, and the eugenic clauses and powers therein, is arguably the most *internationally consistent* manifestation

of eugenic ideas not just as policy, but also in practice' (Bashford and Levine, 2010: 155, emphasis added).

Image 3: Participants at the 1927 World Population Conference.

Left to Right: Lucien March, F.A.E. Crew, C.C. Little, E.F. Zinn, H.P. Fairchild, C. Gini, Sir Bernard Mallet, J.S. Huxley, R. Pearl, A.M. Carr-Saunders, B. Dunlop, and J.W. Glover. (Sanger, 1927, in Hajo, 2013)

To contextualise this, it is helpful to consider how the concepts of 'Lebensraum' and eugenics are often associated with Nazi Germany, but in fact were part of a shared Western shift to an international order. As Mazower (2013: 109) has argued, while the notion of 'Lebensraum' is associated with Nazism, '[t]here was, in fact, general agreement that Europe was suffering from a chronic problem of overpopulation, that it needed to be able to export its surplus population overseas'. This belief underpinned projects such as 'Eurafrica' which meant that 'European politicians and writers could reject African presence in Europe as an absurdity, with the same

ease as they could affirm European presence in Africa as a necessity' (Hansen and Jonsson, 2014: 40). Equally, a belief in eugenicist politics of population improvement were not unique to Nazi Germany, but were widely held, and linked to the growth of demographics as a mainstream science. For example, at the international World Population Conference, topics covered included reproduction, sterilisation, 'race hygiene', 'hereditary pauperism', and migration, which participants were able to present as 'scientific' rather than political concerns. One participant ominously stated that 'when science has shown there is an undesirable reproductive element in human society underlying its social problems, the collective intelligence of mankind can be relied upon to find a means to apply that knowledge and make it effective' (EJ Lidbetter in Sanger, 1927: 334). In practice, one of the primary ways that eugenicist principles were implemented was through legislation made possible by the category of 'international migration'.

The mutual admiration between Albert Thomas, head of the ILO, and other participants of the World Population Conference, illustrates the significance of the categorisation of 'international migration' for articulating and making population politics possible. Reporting on the conference, one observer commented that, '[i]t is only within the last few years, owing to the admirable work of the International Labour Office, that trustworthy and comprehensive statistics of migration have become available' (C. -S., 1927: 465). Alluding to the use of this data for white supremacist world order in the face of a fear of Asian population growth, they hoped that the availability of this data might lead to 'a common action by civilised States… United upon a population policy, they may be able to maintain world order in face of developments in Asia which seem inevitable' (C. -S., 1927: 465). Articulating his own excitement at participating in the conference, Albert Thomas commented that, 'even before I was called upon to occupy an international post, I had an absorbing interest in the problem of population' (in Sanger, 1927: 266). At the conference, he outlined a vision under the banner of 'international migration' regulation, which encompassed both the facilitation of European migration to solve the problem of surplus population, and the restriction pf immigration on a nationalised basis, in ways that make both racialised compartmentalisation, and transversal global colour lines, politically compatible.

Speaking at the conference, Thomas outlined the link between 'international migration' and population control, stating: '[o]f all demographic phenomena, migration is the most susceptible to direct intervention and control. The rate of births and deaths is a factor on which it is impossible to exercise any profound influence at short notice' (in Sanger, 1927: 257). Thomas outlined his vision for a 'supernational authority which would regulate the distribution of population on rational and impartial lines, by controlling and directing migration movements and deciding on the opening-up or closing of countries to particular streams of immigration' (in Sanger, 1927: 262). This would be based on balancing state demands for a 'right of selection, as the vital principles of the different States should certainly not be threatened by invading swarms of migrants', with the need for settling unoccupied territory within another state (in Sanger, 1927: 262).

The 'right of selection' was racialised. Describing the restriction of immigration to the USA, Thomas presented the prevention of racial intermixture as an objective and neutral aim: '[t]he immigration of Asiatics is subjected to specially strict control, the normal restrictions in regard to immigrants in general being supplemented in their case by special restrictions, the aim of which to avoid the effects which result from collisions and intermixture between races' (in Sanger, 1927: 259). He also raised the question of whether it is 'possible to impose on a people the presence of national minorities, with all the inconveniences that such minorities imply?' (in Sanger, 1927: 269). Thomas advocated for a country's 'right of selection', 'to admit only such persons or *races* as are considered capable of maintaining local traditions, customs and ideas of morality' (in Sanger, 1927: 261, emphasis added).

At the same time, Thomas (in Sanger, 1927: 262) celebrated, 'the assistance of refugees and the plan for a better distribution of the white inhabitants of the British Empire', indicating a vision of racial segregation, and white mobility. He viewed the British Empire as a model for the facilitation of the movement of white people, stating 'more recently, important programs have

been drawn up for the encouragement of migration and colonization within the British Empire, and the British Imperial Conference has expressed the opinion that by such means a better distribution of the white population of the Empire may be secured' (in Sanger, 1927: 257). Thomas controversially suggested that under certain conditions 'territory lying within the sovereignty of a given State and obviously unoccupied might be thrown open to certain classes of emigrants', implicitly white ones, with no 'question of any offence to national sovereignty'(in Sanger, 1927: 263). These logics combined to support a right of *national* selection, and *colonial* settlement. This logic was echoed in another presentation on international migration, where the speaker stated that '[e]very nation has the right to protect itself from *deterioration* by racial intermixture', and '[e]very country has the right to prevent that *lowering* of its standards of life that would inevitable result from the unrestricted entry of people who live *at a lower stage* of culture' (JW Ledbury, in Sanger, 1927: 4, emphasis added). Under a biologically racist worldview, no protection was needed from migrants at 'a higher stage' of culture.

The concept of 'international migration' made it possible to advocate for segregation on an international basis, as well as continued white settlement and segregation within settler states. Articulating segregation within the settler states, South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts, a prominent figure at Paris, advocated for 'the territorial and institutional separation of Europeans and non-Europeans within the same country, under the supervision of the Europeans' (in Thakur and Vale, 2020: 130). In fact, the fear of racial mixing was used as an argument for *increasing* white immigration to South Africa, in order to maintain the critical mass of whites necessary to avoid racial corruption. In the minds of early twentieth century theorists: '[i]n the overwhelming presence of Africans, there was continually a danger of 'throwing back', as it was termed: the pulling down of Europeans into barbarism, as with the Boers and with poorer whites in the American South' (Thakur and Vale, 2020: 75). All this led to a paradoxical situation whereby immigration restrictions were intended to enforce segregation on a global scale by restricting immigration in general, but for segregation to be effective in racially mixed settler colonies, it was deemed necessary to facilitate white migration to maintain a critical mass of whites.

Imagining mobility on an international basis meant making sense of people in movement in relation to the nation-state, and its constitutive norm of ethnic homogeneity within a territory. The category of 'international migration' served to naturalise and produce the nation-state, through the regulation of people in movement on the basis of preserving or producing ethnic homogeneity. At the same time, discussions that were made possible through the category of 'international migration' argued for the 'rational distribution' of white population, and a layered functioning of segregation both within a territory and internationally, that facilitated white mobility.

This analysis points to some ways that 'international migration' in the early twentieth century functioned as a category that, in part, facilitated European migration, while naturalising racialised immigration restrictions to promote national compartmentalisation. By the end of the twentieth century, it may function in a similar way to earlier categories of 'indentured labour', which facilitated labour mobility from the non-West to the West, but restricted workers' rights. This is an area for further analysis. It also points to the question of locating when the figure of the Migrant took on the contemporary raced and classed meaning as the figure of the 'Migrant' as outlined by Sharma (2020), as it suggests that in the early twentieth century the ILO's work on migration was intended to facilitate the mobility of white Europeans.

Conclusions

Without the category of 'international migration' it may not have been possible to produce an international order. At Paris in 1919, and at the World Population Conference in 1927, international migration was at the centre of debates over racial homogeneity, eugenics, and population manipulation. The category of international migration was not only at the centre of the reordering of the political, it created political possibilities that may not have existed without it. 'International migration', was almost unique in providing a category within which to implement policies intended to facilitate the homogenisation of national populations. These

debates facilitated the implementation of apparently compartmentalised national immigration restrictions. These national immigration restrictions constituted more than the sum of their parts, producing an international order based on the premise of racial compartmentalisation and racial hierarchy. The belief in racial hierarchy meant that immigration policies did as much to facilitate white migration, and transversal global colour lines, as they did to restrict the movement of people deemed undesirable. Crucially, the international institutionalised codification of the category of 'international migration' leant these policies a shared vocabulary and provided fora for international collaboration.

However, the rapid introduction of immigration restrictions also posed a challenge to the continuation of transversal white solidarity, which was central to imperial politics as well as an emergent international alliance of white men's countries. The following chapter turns to the ways that the categories of 'refugees' and 'tourism' resolved these problems. It illustrates moments in Britain where immigration restrictions were built around protected forms of elite white mobility, codified as 'tourism'.

5: Categorising tourism and refugees and the making of international order

While many studies of the politics of people in movement emphasise migration, the category of 'international migration' worked together with the categories of 'refugee' and 'tourism'. These were a holistic set of categories for imagining people in movement, which worked together and depended upon one another. In this chapter I outline the institutionalised codification of the category of 'refugee' by the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (LNHCR). I sketch how the category of 'refugee' naturalised ethnic homogeneity as the basis for nation-state citizenship and facilitated ethnic cleansing through analysis of debates over refugees at the 1938 Evian conference. Then, I outline the institutionalised codification of the category of 'tourism' by the International Union of Tourism Propaganda Organisations (IUOTPO), and show how the category of 'tourism' made possible the exceptions around which early immigration legislation was introduced, and facilitated settler colonialism. Immigration policies may not have been thinkable or implementable in the same way without the complementary categories of 'refugee' and 'tourist'.

Broadly, I explore how the category of 'refugee' naturalised ethnically homogeneous national citizenship as the basis for political order. The chapter sketches this in relation to debates over the 1938 Evian conference on the 'refugee problem'. This analysis suggests that the category of 'refugee' facilitated ethnic cleansing and contributed to the production of a specifically international order. This is illustrated by the way that the category of 'refugee' made it possible to convene a conference on the 'Jewish problem' in Europe, while also posing a Jewish nation-state as the solution for this problem. While the export of 'surplus' population to settler colonies was a continuation of settler colonial politics, the proposed establishment of a Jewish nation-state was specific to an international order and represented the logic of ethnic or racialised compartmentalisation within national containers.

At the same time as compartmentalising the world into racially segregated national containers, the categorisation of mobilities in the early twentieth century also produced possibilities for transversal racial alliances which depended on white mobility. The category of 'tourist' in Britain emerged in part to address the problem that blanket immigration restriction was inhibiting the mobility of elite white people, which the 'anglosphere' depended on. I sketch how the category of 'tourism' began to be used to facilitate the protection of elite white mobility, without which the imposition of immigration legislation would not have been possible. As such, it is not a secondary category, but a core part of the institutional and imaginative architecture of the twentieth-century international management of mobilities. At the same time, state facilitated tours were organised to promote continued settler colonial migration. This illustrates some ways that 'tourism' and 'migration' worked together to produce transversal political alliances, while being defined in relation to national political belonging.

Turning to the origins of the categories of 'refugees' and 'tourists' can help to make sense of contemporary debates over refugees. For example, in 2022, debates over the differential treatment of Ukrainian and Middle Eastern Refugees, multiple arguments were mobilised that justified this in relation ethnic homogeneity and 'kinship'. These include the widely criticised statement that '[t]hese are not refugees from Syria … These are Christians. They're White. They're very similar to people who live in Poland' (ABC News correspondent Kelly Cobiella in, *The Independent*, 2022b). Similarly, in a Foreign Policy think piece on the apparent moral ambiguities of the racialised discrepancy, the author reflects that he 'felt a little ashamed as I tried to persuade my idealistic and devoutly cosmopolitan students to accept the limits of universalism and the political reality of kinship and nationalism' (Traub, 2022). He asks: '[w]hat are we to make of the deep sense of kinship that has led Poles to welcome desperate Ukrainians but spurn Syrians and Iraqis? … Should we accord any legitimacy to 'blood ties' when they are used to justify repudiation rather than passionate acceptance?' (Traub, 2022). Analysis of the early-twentieth-century codification of the 'refugee' category exposes that these perspectives are

not misinterpretations of the concept of refugee but resonate with the origins of the refugee category as a means for *facilitating* ethnic displacement and *creating* ethnically homogenous nation-states, rather than *integrating* displace people within multicultural societies. This points to the role of categorisations of people in movement in not only producing *racialised subjectivities*, but *racialised geographies.*

i) Refugees and the 'unmixing of peoples'

The League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

The category of 'refugee' was defined and codified through the creation of the role of the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In 1921, Fridtjof Nansen, the Norwegian delegate to the League, was given this newly created role. The role would eventually lead to the establishment of the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees (LNHCR), which after WW2 developed into the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The LNHCR facilitated the displacement of some newly coined 'minorities' as 'refugees' and defined the category of 'refugee' as an international category for the first time. This not only gave solidity to the concept of the 'refugee', but in doing so constituted the norm of nation-state-citizenship in international law, as well as creating possibilities for settler colonialism.

The creation of the role of League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees institutionalised and gave meaning to the category of the refugee. This was the first time that the category of the refugee was formalised and defined in international law, as: 'The council also specified the commissioner's duties as 'defining the legal status of refugees' (Soguk, 1999: 105). As Soguk (1999: 111) has observed, this meant that '[d]uring the tenure of the LNHCR 'the ontology of the refugee was fully determined and thoroughly formalized'. While displaced people had existed much earlier, no internationally standardised definition of such people existed. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, displaced people were referred to by a range of terms such as

'refugees, exiles, fugitives, and/or emigres', but these were 'permissive vocabularies' with no standardised definition (Soguk, 1999). This was distinct from the internationally codified category of 'refugee' which was created in the twentieth century in relation to a presumed 'citizen/nation/state ensemble' (Soguk, 1999: 58). As Haddad (2003: 298) outlines, '[w]ithin this prior, rooted existence the refugee is seen as an exception to the norm, an aberration of the "proper" citizen-state-territory trinity'. The category of 'refugee' was partly given a sense of reality through the LNHCR's involvement with specific groups of displaced people as 'refugees'. These groups were initially limited to 'Russian refugees in 1922, then Armenians in 1924, later extended to Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean and Turk refugees in 1928, and finally Saar refugees in 1935' (Haddad, 2003: 317).

1923 Greco-Turkish population exchange

At the same time as the LNHCR and the category of 'refugee' naturalised nation-state citizenship in theory, they facilitated ethnic cleansing in practice. The category of the refugee is often taken as a category for the integration of displaced people, however, in the early twentieth century it functioned as a category of 'unmixing', rather than integration. This is visible in the role of the LNHCR in facilitating population exchange. These logics were articulated at Lausanne in 1923, epitomised in the 'egregious term invented by Lord Curzon, 'unmixing of peoples', as if there were something unnatural in the fact that people of different identities lived side by side and interwoven' (Weitz, 2008: 1326). In the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, around 1.5 million people were displaced in the 'exchanging' of Orthodox Christians from Turkey and Muslims from Greece (Mazower, 2006). This population exchange was facilitated by the LNHCR, and Fridtjof Nansen is sometimes credited with suggesting it (Huntford, 1998; Weitz, 2008: 1326). By having an international body, and a category, of 'refugee'm a new form of ethnic cleansing was made possible, to produce the conditions for ethnically homogenous nation-states.

The categorisation of people as 'refugees' naturalised nation-state citizenship as a norm of political belonging, and the role of the LNHCR in facilitating population exchange illustrates the

ethnic cleansing required to achieve the ideal of an ethnically homogenous population in practice. This was the first time that the category of 'refugee' had been standardised or institutionalised, and this codification contributed to the transformation of political order and the production of the international.

Evian 1938

The role of the category of 'refugee' in naturalising racialised nation-state citizenship and facilitating ethnic cleansing through population exchange is illustrated by the 1923 Greco-Turkish population exchange which had the support of Nansen and the LNHCR. The naturalisation of displacement of minorities, and implicitly ethnic national citizenship, set the terms of debate fifteen years later, when the category of 'refugee' provided a banner under which to convene a conference on the 'Jewish problem' in Europe. In July 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt convened a conference of 32 states and other actors to discuss solutions for Jewish refugees (Lebon-McGregor, 2020). As Mamdani (2020: 29) has articulated, 'because the response to Nazism took the nation-state for granted, the solution for the Jews turned out to be the nation-state, again'. At the same time, the settler colonial outlet for surplus population constituted a specific fusion of international and colonial political practices: one that was made possible by the category of 'refugee'.

Despite being a category of mobility, the Evian 'refugee' conference in 1938 dealt largely with people who had not been displaced, and were in many cases unable to leave Germany due to newly introduced immigration restrictions elsewhere (Sharma, 2020: 27; Siegelberg, 2020: 150). The conference did not lead to commitments to increase Jewish migration to Europe or the USA. Within a nation-state system that idealised ethnic homogeneity, the presence of Jews in Europe was presented as a problem, and the establishment of a Jewish nation-state was seen as a solution- one that was made partly thinkable through the category of 'refugee'. Exemplary of this thinking, Conservative MP Captain Cazalet, speaking in UK Parliament a few months after the conference stated: '[w]hether you give the Jews a State in Palestine or elsewhere, I must

emphasise the importance of giving them a State. Why? For 2,000 years we have had a Jewish problem, and to-day we have a golden opportunity of solving it' (HC Debate, 1938).

The logics of solving the 'Jewish problem', or 'refugee problem', by establishing Jewish settler colonies were also articulated at Evian, where proposed areas for colonisation included 'North America, Canada, Africa (Rhodesia, Kenya-land, Uganda), South America, and Australia', and 'Transyordania, the Irak, Madagascar, Rhodesia, South Africa, the United States of America, Canada, South America and especially Australia', and Palestine (TNA, FO 919/5). The proposed establishment of settler colonies as an outlet for 'refugees' was a continuation of the practice of overseas settlement for surplus populations (Shaw, 2012), however, the suggestion of establishing a nation-state was novel to the twentieth century. The category of 'refugee' bridged these two realities: of settler colonialism, and emergent nationalism, and contributed to the facilitation of ethnic cleansing in Europe. This foreshadowed ongoing politics of genocide, partition and ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century (Mamdani, 2020; Mufti, 2007; Sharma, 2020), in ways that were partly made possible through the category of 'refugee'.

A popular solution for the problem of Jewish refugees in Europe was the proposed establishment of settler colonies. In a dossier of letters, articles, and memoranda received by the British delegation to Evian, these proposals come up repeatedly (TNA, FO 919/5). A letter from a member of the public suggested 'Transyordania, the Irak, Madagascar, Rhodesia, South Africa, the United States of America, Canada, South America and especially Australia' (TNA, FO 919/5). Indicative of the normalisation of ethnic cleansing at the time, the letter recommended Australia 'considering that the natives of that country are physically so much exhausted, that they will probably become extinct in a couple of decades' (TNA, FO 919/5). In a British Parliamentary debate in November 1938, options for Jewish colonisation included British Guiana, Tanganyika, Portuguese West Africa, and Palestine (HC Debate, 1938). As historians have documented, '[t]hrough the 1930s and 1940s, the British government considered resettling

refugees in British Guiana, British Honduras, Tanganyika, and Cyprus, among other locations',
including Texas (Shaw, 2012; Smith, 2004).

The establishment of settler colonies as an outlet for refugees was a continuation of the practice
of overseas settlement for surplus or unwanted populations. Caroline Shaw (2012) argues that
'[t]he 1917 Balfour Declaration, by which the British government declared its intent to make
Palestine a Jewish homeland, was as much a logical extension of a long-standing imperial model
for refuge as it was an outgrowth of late nineteenth-century Zionism'. In fact, the nineteenth
century British practice of offering refuge was only made possible through the 'multipurpose
social safety valve' of overseas settlement that allowed Britain to offer refuge without straining
domestic politics (Shaw, 2012: 109). The overseas settlement of refugees also functioned to
promote a transnational white world. As Anne Schult outlines, a 1938 report of the British
Oversea Settlement Board 'advocated for 'the admission of a carefully regulated flow of foreign
immigrants of assimilable type… whether of Northern or other European extraction' in order to
'bolster and redistribute the white population across the empire' at a time when observers were
anxious about low white population growth (Cmd. 5766, London: HMSO, 1938, in Schult, 2022:
15). This demonstrates how the category of 'refugee' worked alongside settler colonialism to
present solutions to the 'refugee problem' that also functioned to promote transnational
whiteness.

These overseas settlement schemes were not popular in the colonies. For example, the Palestine
Arab delegate noted that '[b]ecause of the Balfour Declaration it might be supposed that, in the
minds of the Commissioners, Palestine will hold first place as the refuge for the persecuted Jews.
In this memorandum it is hoped to explain why Palestine should be deleted from the programme
of the Conference as offering any chance of solving the problem' (TNA, FO 919/5). At the same
time, supporters of white men's countries', such as Kenya, opposed an increase in Jewish
immigration. For example, in a September 1938 Spectator article on 'Jewish Settlement in
Kenya', settler Cleland Scott worried that if destitute Jewish refugees were seen doing manual

labour they would disturb race relations as 'the African, like all primitive peoples, objects to his master doing menial tasks… he immediately regards him as an inferior individual and not a real *musungu* (white man)' (*The Spectator Archive*, 1938). Noting that, in addition, '[n]umbers of Jewish refugees might very easily suffer… from an inferiority complex. If they did, they might not then be an ideal people to come in close contact with the African, who can extremely easily be adversely influenced by too much 'kindness'' (*The Spectator Archive*, 1938). For political reasons, and due to racial anxieties, while British politicians saw overseas settlement as a solution to the 'refugee problem', this was often opposed by existing inhabitants and settlers.

The role of the category of 'refugee' in facilitating the articulation of the export of Jews from Europe suggests that 'refugee' functioned as a category of racialised 'unmixing' rather than integration. While interwar Jewish refugees were considered 'to be at least 'near-white'' and, by association 'more 'civilized' than colonial subjects' (Schult, 2022), they were not considered white enough to be easily assimilated in Europe. Emphasising the point that the category of 'refugee' functioned to facilitate unmixing, rather than integration, the 'refugee problem' was interchangeably presented as the 'Jewish problem'. This implies that the problem was not only that Jewish people were displaced in Europe, but that they were there in the first place. For example, in a letter in the Evian dossier titled 'Great Britain and the Jewish Problem', the author writes that 'There are namely about six millions of Jews in Europe, of which the European countries would be pleased to get rid' (TNA, FO 919/5). Under an international imaginary, the solution was a Jewish state.

The focus on assimilability and difference in debates over refugees enabled racial discrimination that did not explicitly advocate racial hierarchy, which I suggest is relevant for contemporary politics. For example, in broader debates, Australian Prime Minister Hughes 'declared that his hostility to Asian migration was not motivated by racial superiority, but by Asiatic difference' (in Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 295). The category of the refugee was one that facilitated unmixing based on 'difference' and not integration based on diversity. The question of assimilation of

refugees also illustrates the concern with ethnic homogeneity that set the terms of debates on displaced people. This logic is apparent in Commander James' suggestion to ensure admittance of 'part-Jews', as 'owing to their lesser degree of distinctiveness, part-Jews are less difficult of absorption into non-Jewish populations' (HC Debate, 1938). This is shared by Cazalet's hope that 'some of us will live to see the day when many hundreds of thousands of Jews will be completely assimilated to the country where they live and, incidentally, I believe that vast numbers of them may become Christians as well' (HC Debate, 1938). Framing refugee debates in relation to assimilability positioned the question of refugees in relation to racialised difference, rather than explicit racial hierarchy, in ways that resonate with contemporary debates over refugees. This points to the role of the 'refugee' category in providing a way to articulate and implement policies to create ethnically compartmentalised international geographies.

ii) Global colour lines and the categorisation of 'tourism'

The introduction of national migration legislation both strengthened and challenged transversal white solidarity, in ways that the category of 'tourism' helped to work around. Illustrating the role of white solidarity in national immigration legislation, in 1924, Australian Prime Minister W.M. Hughes asked for solidarity from the people of the United States to help 'Australia to keep white 'as much of the world as is white today' (1924, in Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 311), firmly placing the national immigration policy of 'White Australia' within a wider alliance of white world order, and not as a specifically national issue. But, at the same time, national immigration legislation also posed a challenge to white solidarity, which the category of 'tourism' helped to circumvent.

In Britain the Liberal Party MP Sir Charles Dilke outlined this dilemma in a 1904 parliamentary debate on the proposed Aliens Act, stating that it was 'extraordinary' that Parliament 'should be called upon to consider a measure... which, for the first time, was going to prevent European white men from coming, at their own cost, as free men to a free country' (in El-Enany, 2020: 64). This illustrates the concern that newly introduced migration legislation would pose a challenge to

transversal white mobility and solidarity. Picking up these concerns in 1911, Liberal Party MP Mr. Booth contested an Aliens Bill arguing that '[t]his Bill would apply to Americans and other distinguished people, who speak our language' (HC Debate, 28 April 1911). Exposing the implicit targets of the legislation, Booth suggested that '[t]he hon. Member… had in mind a Polish Jew coming here to spend the rest of his life. This Bill has no such contemplation. This measure would deal with an American and all those travellers from foreign countries who spend little time on our shores' (HC Debate, 28 April 1911). Booth pointed out that it was in the interests of the hotel and pub industries to attract travellers, and that '[t]hose who have invested in the stocks of West End hotels will not be satisfied with a Bill like this' (HC Debate, 28 April 1911). These quotes are illustrative of the problem posed by immigration restrictions but have not yet codified the category of 'tourism', to capture both the hotel industry and elite, white, travellers. Equally significant is the fact that these debates were not articulated in relation to 'immigration' but in relation to 'aliens' and 'passengers'. This highlights that the category of 'tourism' emerged coevally with the category of 'immigrant', and 'immigration', as part of an overall recategorisation of people in movement. This was not a national process but was internationally and institutionally codified.

The International Union of Tourism Propaganda Organisations

The category of 'tourism' was defined and institutionalised at the same time as the categories of 'refugee' and 'international migration'. In 1925, the Dutch National Tourism Office convened the 'First Annual Congress of Official Associations of Tourism Propaganda' (Shackleford, 2020). The Congress met on an almost annual basis, and by 1934 was legalised into an association, named the International Union of Tourist Propaganda Organisations (IUOTPO) (Shackleford, 2020). The IUOTPO collaborated with the League of Nations Statistical Committee to codify and define the 'tourist' as an international category, for the first time.

In 1934, the IUOTPO and the League of Nations Economic Committee collaborated to establish The League of Nations Sub-Committee on Tourist Statistics and defined the category of 'tourist'. The definition of 'tourist' was broad:

> '*From the international standpoint, the term tourist shall be interpreted to mean any person travelling for a period of 24 hours or more in a country other than that in which he usually resides, such as:*
>
> *Visitors travelling for pleasure, for domestic reasons, for health, etc.; Visitors arriving in the course of a sea cruise, even when their stay is of less than 24 hours; Visitors travelling to congresses or in a representative capacity of any kind (scientific, administrative, diplomatic, religious, athletic, etc.); Students; Visitors travelling for business purposes.*'

<div align="center">(Pullinz, 1935, in Shackleford, 2020)</div>

Like the categories of 'international migration' and 'refugee', the definition of 'tourist' rendered people in movement legible on an explicitly international basis. The 'tourist' was defined from 'the international standpoint', explicitly constituting tourism in relation to an international order. At the same time, the definition encompassed a range of transversal mobilities that did not fit with an imaginary of life contained in nation-states. For example, domestic, religious, and business reasons all indicate meaningful forms of transversal social relations. In this sense, the category of 'tourism' functioned as a catch-all term to define mobility on an international basis, while folding in transversal, transnational, and diasporic relations.

While often overlooked in studies of the politics of people in movement, the codification of the category of tourism was part of the broader transformation of political order. The agenda of the IUOTPO covered key political issues of the time, including the introduction of passports, access to foreign currency, and newly introduced visa requirements (Shackleford, 2020). The perceived superficiality of 'tourism' elided the weight of these relations and removed them from political scrutiny. However, the IUOTPO's agenda, and the category of 'tourism', responded directly to

the political problems posed by the early twentieth century proliferation of immigration restrictions and visa legislation. In fact, without the exceptions permitted by the category of 'tourism', immigration restrictions may not have been possible.

At the First Annual Congress in 1924, obstacles to tourism that were discussed included the introduction of passports, and limited access to foreign currency (Shackleford, 2020). At the Fourth Congress in 1928, representatives proposed 'the elimination of visa requirements between European countries' and the 'elimination of other bureaucratic burdens and barriers'. And, in the League of Nation's Economic Committee's report on its 41st session in 1934, it recommended research on 'the simplification of unnecessary and excessive formalities hampering the development of tourist traffic', including limited access to foreign currencies, and the relative inequality of value of some currencies in the shift of some countries from the gold standard (in Shackleford, 2020). At the time, passports and visas were considered controversial and temporary war-time measures, and access to foreign currency was far more difficult and politicised than it is now. These were salient political issues, but the role of 'tourism' in negotiating these issues is rarely addressed.

Tourism and immigration: the Travel Association

The international codification of 'tourism' crystallised and facilitated legislation at a national level, which I explore in relation to Britain and the British Empire. In Britain, the category of tourism provided a way to articulate desirable, wealthy, white American or European travellers, and to create exceptions to restrictions to mobility. Without the category of 'tourism' the introduction of immigration restriction may not have been possible, precisely because of the challenge it posed to white mobility. For example, in 1911, Winston Churchill disputed the proposal to impose an upper limit on the number of 'aliens' that could be carried by railway companies, because: '[o]ne of the difficulties involved in the administration of the existing Act is that of avoiding undue interference with the tourist traffic through the cross-Channel ports' (HC Debate, 27 February 1911). Later that year, he disputed another amendment to the Aliens Acts as

it would 'impose an obligation to fill up a long form on landing and to notify to the police all changes of address of tens of thousands of second-class passengers and many thousands of perfectly harmless *bonâ fide* tourists calling at the Channel Ports and impose the same disabilities on all the second and third - class alien passengers that come to us from the United States, Canada, and South Africa' (HC Debate, 28 April 1911). Churchill identified 'perfectly harmless tourists', and travellers from the white settler states as two groups who would be unnecessarily inconvenienced by this amendment, exposing his qualms about blanket legislation that would interfere with white mobility.

Over a decade later, in a 1927 debate on making permanent Aliens Restrictions Acts that had been introduced as temporary war time measures, the function of the category of tourism was articulated again by Lord Desborough (HL Debate, 5 May 1927). He stated:

'while it is necessary, for the reasons I have described, to regulate closely the entry of aliens, it is equally necessary that the machinery for the control of alien passenger traffic should not interfere unduly with the entry into this country of the very large number of visitors who come here for business purposes, for holiday tours and for other legitimate objects. In the course of a year something over 380,000 alien passengers come into and go out of the United Kingdom. A great number of these are holiday tourists: for instance, in 1925, 185,000 tourists, including over 89,000 Americans, visited this country.'

Throughout the period when restrictions on the entry of aliens into Britain were being introduced, the importance of 'not interfering' with 'holiday tours', and especially those of Americans, implicitly understood as white, was repeatedly emphasised. By 1929, the desirability of tourism was naturalised in parliamentary debates. Speaking in 1929, the Prime Minister stated '[h]is Majesty's Government is fully alive to the importance of encouraging tourists to visit this country both from the point of view of the revenue accruing from an increased number of visitors from abroad and of the good effect of an interchange of visits on international relations' (HC Debate, 18 July 1929).

This statement followed shortly after the 1928 establishment of a semi-official organisation, 'The Travel Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland' (TA). The TA included hoteliers and MPs, including Lord Hacking, then Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade, and Mr. Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer (Government Communications Service, 2017). The TA was explicitly and implicitly concerned with attracting elite and American tourists (Government Communications Service, 2017). With the end of attracting visitors from geopolitically strategic sites, the TA established offices in New York, Buenos Aires, and Paris. The object was to promote elite travel, and the head of the Paris office stated in a 1934 speech that their activities constituted an 'appeal to the 'elite' in the great cities' (Taylor, 2009: 153). Debates in parliament in this period referred to explicit increases in visas issued to American visitors as an outcome of the TA's work (HC Debate, 1 May 1931; HL Debate, 22 July 1930), as well as repeated implicit associations of tourists with Americans. For example, in the statement that '[m]y experience in travelling is this, that a tourist coming from America to this country or a Britisher going to France or Germany can sometimes do as much towards the peace of the world as a diplomat or a delegate to the League of Nations' (HC Debate, 21 November 1930), again emphasising the significance of tourism in promoting Anglo-American unity.

Image 4: Travel Association headed paper January 1931 (Government Communications
Service, 2017)

Image 5: Travel Association Paris Office (Government Communications Service, 2017)

While the TA was supposedly non-political, its remit encompassed clearly political areas such as visas and customs legislation. In a 1929 circular, the organisation's aims were stated to be: 'To increase the number of visitors from overseas to GB and Ireland; to stimulate the demand for British goods and services and to promote international understanding by every means', including, '4) by the examination of customs and passport facilities, etc. [and] 5) by the examination of laws affecting the overseas visitor' (Taylor, 2009: 95). To this end, the organisation intervened on a wide spectrum of issues. These ranged from laws affecting barbershops opening hours, to the proposed abolition of passports. Speaking in a 1930 debate on closing barbershops on Sundays, Lord Jessel stated: 'I belong to an association called the Travel Association. We are doing our very best to get Americans and other foreigners to come to this country. They do not shave in the same way as we do, and for the purposes of those who travel it is very inconvenient if they cannot get a shave from Saturday night until Monday morning' (HL Debate, 22 July 1930).

As late as 1946, Lord Hacking was asking: 'Now that the war is over, can passports be simplified or abolished altogether? Secondly, will the charge for visas be reduced, or, better still, will visas be issued free, if, in fact, they are necessary at all? Thirdly, can it be made easier, more expeditious and more pleasant for the tourist to pass through our Customs at the various ports of entry into this country?' (HL Debate, 19 February 1946). While the outcome of these demands may not have been achieved, or at least not fully, the possibility of making them demonstrates the constitution of the category of 'the tourist', imagined as a wealthy American, was successful in this period. The possibility of making claims in relation to this figure was well established. This was a key part of debates over mobilities, and the category of 'the tourist' made it possible to introduce immigration legislation on a national basis, while facilitating transversal racial alliances.

Tourism and overseas settlement: The School Empire Tours

'No amount of books or lectures will have half the effect of a voyage across the water.
For the young, certainly, seeing is believing.'

(Rendall, 1928 in Winfield, 2011: 65)

Around the same time, another set of official and semi-official organisations was being established to promote emigration within the anglo-world through tourism. For example, through schoolboy and schoolgirl tours of the British Dominions organised by the School Empire Tours Committee (SETC), and the Society for the Overseas Settlement of British Women (SOSBW) in the 1920s and 1930s. Both worked with the Overseas Settlement Committee (OSC), which was founded in 1919 and led by Lord Milner and Lord Amery. The OSC had been largely unsuccessful in increasing emigration within the empire, and the 1922 Empire Settlement Act committed '3 million per year for the next fourteen years on emigration and settlement in the empire' (Kennedy, 1988: 417). In 1925, despite the ambitions of the OSC, overseas settlement was lower than planned. Warrender suggested that a part of the issue was a low level of consciousness about the empire, complaining that 'the British people…have no conception of the enormous tracts of land ruled over by the English-speaking people. They have no idea of the distance and the enormous limits which our great Empire possesses' (HL Debate, 2 April 1925). Warrender suggested organising similar tours of the Empire for British school boys (HL Debate, 2 April 1925).

Between 1925 and 1939, more than 500 public school-boys, aged between 17 and 19, participated in 22 tours through the School Empire Tours (SETs) (Winfield, 2011). These included tours of Australia, New Zealand, India, South and East Africa, the Caribbean and Canada (Winfield, 2011). The first tour, to Australia, involved the participation of forty boys from public schools (Mangan, 1998: 29). The Chairman of the SETs committee, Rendall, was appointed directly by Leo Amery (Mangan, 1998: 29). Rendall, a former headmaster of a public school, and regarded the Anglo-Saxon race as the rightful leaders of the world, and 'those who

had a higher secondary boarding-school education on the English model as the elite of that elite' (in Mangan, 1998: 33). The content of the tours was to promote emigration and to disseminate information about the empire upon return. The tours were designed to give the boys information about the life of colonial administrators 'with a view to their settling in the country' in this role, so, for example, one of the boys' activities was to stay with District Officers in the Punjab to see how the District was managed (*Bodleian Library*, 2021). This was not unusual, as '[m]ost of the tours incorporated visits to colonisation projects and group settlement schemes subsidised from the Empire Settlement Act's coffers, particularly in Australia' (Harper, 2022: 7). This focus illustrates the function of the tours to promote empire, and unity in the Anglo-world.

Aside from public school boys, another group of people targeted for emigration was unmarried women, who were perceived as being 'surplus' in Britain, but a shortage in the Dominions. In line with this logic, through the women's branch of the OSC, called the Society for the Oversea Settlement of British Women (SOSBW), four schoolgirl tours of the empire were organised between 1928 and 1938 (Pickles, 2000: 86). The destinations included Australia, New Zealand, Panama, Fiji, Ceylon, Suez, Canada, South Africa, and Rhodesia, with an additional planned tour to East Africa cancelled. Similarly to the SETs, the school girl tours were designed to promote emigration, empire unity, and display the girls as 'the most suitable 'stock' to populate Canada' (Pickles, 2000: 93). The tours included time in nature, meetings with political figures and MPs, courses on Canadian History, and a visit to the Empire Marketing Board (Pickles, 2000). In contrast to the tours for boys, the girls' tours also incorporated a specifically gendered representation of the girls as reproductive, and '[t]hey were referred to as 'fine 'British stock', the carriers of racial purity, the reproducers of the next generation' (Pickles, 2000: 89).

Image 6: Schoolgirls on SOSBW tour to Canada arriving in Quebec (Echoes, 1928, in Pickles, 2000:82)

The work of the Travel Association and the Overseas Settlement Committee illustrates how the category of 'tourism' works with the category of 'migration' to facilitate desirable movement, while restricting other forms of mobility. The concern with protecting mobility within the Anglo-world pointed to a sensitivity to the fact that policymakers saw the future of Britain as depending as much on the maintenance of diplomatic relations with 'white men's countries', as on previous forms of imperial control. The rise of the category of 'tourism' was not coincidental to this shift in world order but produced and responded to a changing world order.

Conclusions

Together, the categories of 'international migration', 'refugees', and 'tourism' worked to facilitate both a rise in racialised nationalism, and the entrenchment of transversal global colour lines, which characterise international order. They were central to debates around the transformation of world order, as articulated at Paris and in the surrounding years. The category of 'tourism' facilitated the protection of exceptions for white travellers, codified as 'tourists',

which immigration legislation was built around. Without the category of 'tourism' it would not have been possible to introduce the restrictions to people in movement which proliferated in the early twentieth century, while maintaining transversal white mobility, making tourism an integral rather than secondary part of this process. At the same time, the category of 'international migration' produced a nation-state effect, by making the management of people in movement appear as a national issue, while being co-constitutive of a transversal white alliance. Equally, the categorisation of people as 'refugees' was the pinnacle of an understanding of political belonging based on national citizenship, but one that facilitated ongoing possibilities of settler colonialism, to achieve ethnic cleansing within Europe. By creating these political possibilities, the categorisation of people in movement contributed to a shift in world order, in the ways that race, political belonging, and mobility, were understood in theory and practice.

The role of the regulation and categorisation of people in movement in producing and contesting world order only became more visible in the years following Paris. From the establishment of Bantustans in Apartheid South Africa, the massive displacement of people and controls on mobility in present-day Israel-Palestine, the ever-increasing politicisation of migration to Europe, and the explosion of and increasing cosmopolitanism of the 'tourism industry' both inside and outside of the West, the political issues articulated in relation to mobilities continue to be of primary significance. The history of the categorisation of people in movement in the early twentieth century cannot explain all these phenomena, or their changing political significance, as the meaning of the categories has changed along with changes in political order. However, it opens a research agenda for serious interrogation of the role of understandings of movement and stasis in producing political order, in ways that far exceed the regulation of mobilities themselves. In the present moment of debates about rapidly shifting world order, this has two implications. First, it points to understandings of mobilities as an under-explored area for inquiry into political transformations. Second, it emphasises the role of current categorisations of mobilities in not only producing Western international order, but also obscuring alternative political worlds that exist within and alongside IR's dominant modes of understanding the global.

Part Two: Colonisation and Decolonisation in the Indian Ocean World

6: Re-ordering maritime mobilities: Pirates, Slavery, and Pilgrimage

Debates over categorisations of people in movement are not a contemporary phenomena but have a long history. This is a question that I address in relation to how Western world order was produced in part, through debates over people in movement in the Indian Ocean World (IOW). I argue that these debates produced an understanding of political authority that was tethered to territory but emerged in relation to mobility. At the same time, these debates often occluded the political significance of movement, by defining political legitimacy in relation to an imagined norm of sedentarism.

To make this overarching argument, I sketch three seemingly separate cases of the contested regulation and categorisation of people in movement in European expansion in the IOW: debates over 'piracy' in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century; and the contested regulation of the Hajj pilgrimage at the turn of the twentieth century. While widely discussed separately, these sites have not been conceptualised together as moments of political transformation which are underlain by the contested regulation and categorisation of people in movement.

This chapter does not provide in depth historical analysis of these sites but engages with existing historical work to draw out a previously unarticulated narrative on the role of contested understandings of people in movement in transforming political order. By regulating movement, these categories produced implicit and opposing understandings of political order, ultimately

setting the conditions of emergence and contestation of a Western world order. I illustrate this in relation to the emergence of international law, transformations of liberalism and capitalism, and contested understandings of imperial, national, and religious belonging.

As a result, this chapter furthers extant understandings of the emergence of Western world order, and its relations with political order in the Indian Ocean. It does this by unpacking how movement provides the conditions within which 'the West' emerged, but people in movement were then categorised in relation to a norm of bounded abode being the precondition for political legitimacy. This renders movement analytically secondary for understanding the political, but in practice, the primary condition within which political order was constituted. This challenges a constitutive myth of Western world order, that of the primacy of territorially bounded polities for political legitimacy, and the minimisation of the productive role of mobility, by illustrating that this myth emerged in relation to debates over mobility. In short, this chapter demonstrates the centrality of people in movement, and debates over people in movement, to political order.

I illustrate how understandings of territorial sovereignty as the marker of political authority were articulated in relation to politics in movement. This is a paradox, as movement was the condition of possibility for the emergence of a world order that emphasised territoriality. While movement was primary, debates over movement produced categorisations that emphasised sovereignty linked to territoriality as the legitimating standard of movement. Territorial sovereignty as a legitimating principle did not emerge through sedentarism, but was produced, in part, in relation to people in movement in the Indian Ocean.

This analysis begins to develop an alternative framework for analysing changes in political order, which focuses on politics in movement. This builds on the critique of dominant understandings of colonial expansion in the Indian Ocean World which tend to analyse mobile units as extensions of contained societies, that I made in Chapter Two. I argued that this relates to an underlying understanding of political society as static, and people in movement as secondary and

epiphenomenal to these. For example, in Sharman and Phillip's (2015) scholarship on world order and the Indian Ocean, actors such as the East India Company, while not strictly state actors, are made sense of as political units that are defined in relation to territorial polities. In this framework, the extra-territorial actions of imperial actors are defined in relation to an understanding of a pre-existing identity, linked to territory. The extra-territorial is understood as a secondary by-product of already existing political units. In contrast, I sketch how transformations in political order emerged through relations in movement, which I explore in relation to European colonial expansion.

The chapter proceeds in three sections. The first section analyses debates about the definition of piracy in the seventeenth century Indian Ocean, focusing on the work of Hugo Grotius. It argues that definitions of 'piracy' produced an understanding of sovereignty that was paradoxically linked to territoriality but produced through mobility. The second section explores debates about the abolition of slavery and the introduction of indenture in the nineteenth century. It argues that this was a site of power political contestation, which also produced an understanding of legality and contract law as the basis for freedom within an emergent form of liberal capitalist imperial order. Third, it explores the regulation of the Hajj pilgrimage and steadily increasing attempts to increase European regulation of the pilgrimage linked to debates over sanitation and a perceived pan-Islamic threat. It argues that the collection of knowledge on pilgrims was intimately linked to imperial governance and shifting understandings of religious, imperial, and national belonging which set the scene for the twentieth century emergence of the international.

i) Regulating piracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

Debates over piracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were a site of transformation of political order. These debates took on an exaggerated significance, as pirates were understood as a threat to oceanic mobility, which was of primary significance to colonial and pre-colonial order. At the same time, debates over piracy rendered movement secondary to an understanding of political legitimacy derived from a settled dwelling, linked to understandings of territorial

sovereignty. This section first makes the argument for studying 'piracy' as a legal category which is internal to colonial order, and not as a radical practice which is alternative to order. Second, it argues that the weight attributed to piracy is related to the primary political significance of movement, but that paradoxically debates on piracy rendered movement analytically secondary to a sense of political legitimacy linked to settled dwelling. Third, it sketches the political possibilities that the regulation of 'piracy' made possible, and the ways that these set the broader terms of political order, including understandings of war, sovereignty, and legality.

Piracy as a legal category: the trial of William Kidd

Academic work on the relations between piracy and transformations in world order often takes 'piracy' as a subjectivity or empirical reality. 'Instead, I address 'piracy' as a contested legal category. This reflects the way that 'piracy' was understood in debates about, and trials of, 'pirates' in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Moreover, these debates illustrate the political weight of 'piracy' as a challenge to the movement that was essential for imperial expansion, but one that defined legitimate politics in relation to territorial tethers. Debates over 'piracy', which included the participation of people understood as 'pirates', functioned as much to affirm as challenge the emergent colonial world order. They were internal to and constitutive of legal authority and the emergence of international law, central to the constitution of Western world order.

Illustrative of the emancipatory valence that piracy is often imbued with in academic work, Linebaugh and Rediker write that '[t]e early eighteenth-century pirate ship was a 'world turned upside down,' made so by the articles of agreement that established the rules and customs of the pirates' social order, hydrarchy from below' (Linebaugh and Rediker, 2002: 162). They continue: 'Pirates distributed justice, elected officers, divided loot equally, and established a different discipline. They limited the authority of the captain, resisted many of the practices of the capitalist merchant shipping industry, and maintained a multicultural, multiracial, multinational social order' (Linebaugh and Rediker, 2002: 162). This analysis draws on evidence of records of

specific pirate practices and actors who self-identified as pirates. Without intending to dispute these practices or give an alternative history of pirate practices, I would like to reorient debates towards the productive role of the pirate category. The category of 'piracy' was as much a legal category as a subjectivity or empirical reality, and one that encompassed a broad range of actors and practices, many of which affirmed and produced a colonial and mercantile social order as much as, or more than, they opposed it.

Debates about piracy were constitutive of the emergence of international law. International law, as opposed to national law, emerged through contestation about people in movement in the oceanic spaces that fell outside of understandings of national sovereignty. As Lauren Benton (2010: 113) argues, 'the extension of jurisdiction into the international space of the seas was a function of the extension of municipal law through the presence of legal actors with ties to particular sovereigns'. The presence of maritime actors in the sea facilitated the extension and contestation of legal authority, through people in movement. At the same time, the actions of people in movement were made sense of in relation to these contested understandings of law. Benton writes that, far from being outside an emergent legal order produced through European colonial expansion, people identified as 'pirates' worked within and affirmed this order: 'Even pirates participated in and reinforced this legal order' (2010: 113). This is because mariners, including those identified as 'pirates', participated in the affirmation of European legal order by presenting their actions as legally justifiable 'privateering' in opposition to 'piracy'.

Illustrating the nature of 'piracy' as a legal category rather than a subjectivity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Benton (2010: 113) argues that 'The term piracy in the seventeenth century could be applied to an array of actions, including mutiny, shipboard felonies, and unlicensed raiding of various kinds. The line between privateering and piracy was thin, and the distinction was blurred by cycles of interimperial war and peace: in times of war, the demand for privateers surged, and in periods of peace, experienced and decommissioned sea raiders found themselves without sponsors and sometimes continued to engage in raiding, especially in places

where lucrative shipping was poorly protected'. In other words, the question of whether an act or actor was 'piratical' was a question of legal justification, based on shifting alliances, states of 'war', and commissions, and not of self-understanding or subjectivity. Benton (2010: 113) writes: 'The legality of their actions depended on open and conflicting interpretations of whether the timing, location, and targets of raids fell within the terms of often-dubious commissions'. This is illustrated in relation to high profile pirate trials.

In 1701, William Kidd was tried and hanged in London on the charges of piracy and murder (Benton, 2010: 116). Kidd contested these charges, and the debates illustrate how the category of 'piracy' was a legal category to deem actions by mobile maritime actors legitimate or illegitimate based on multiple forms of tether to sovereignty, understood on a territorial basis. As Benton (2010: 116) argued, Kidd did not understand his actions to be outside of the legal order at the time: 'Like most other seventeenth-century pirates, Kidd never perceived his actions as entirely outside the regulatory order and fashioned a narrative of his voyage that he hoped would protect him at trial'. This troubles the idea of pirates as actors who challenged the emergent colonial order, by illustrating that actors that identified as 'pirates' affirmed the emergent colonial legal order by narrating their actions in relation to it and legitimising their actions in relation to both a sovereign and an international legal system. At the same time, the specific definition of 'piracy' in law, affirmed sovereignty, understood to be linked to territory, as definitive of political authority.

The question of whether Kidd was a 'pirate' or not depended on the terms of his commission, and the passes which the seized ship was carrying. Kidd's crew captured two merchant ships in the Indian Ocean and argued that because the ships were carrying French passes this was a legitimate act, and not an act of piracy (Benton, 2010: 116). This defence would have been based on the terms of Kidd's commission, which may have justified the seizure of French ships, if Britain was at war with France. However, as the ships' French passes were lost this defence did not stand, and Kidd was charged and executed for piracy (Benton, 2010: 117). The significance

of this trial is that it shows where the line between 'piracy' and 'privateering' was contested. Moreover, this contestation happened in relation to two sovereigns, the sovereign issuing the ships' commissions, and the sovereign issuing the seized ship passes. In other words the definition of an act of 'piracy' was dependent on the actor's relation with a sovereign entity. This constituted 'sovereignty' by defining mobile actors in relation to their affiliation with a sovereign. These debates over extra-territorial actions falling inside or outside the realm of legitimate sovereign authority nevertheless linked sovereignty to a territorial tether. This becomes explicit in relation to the 1604 Santa Catarina incident, and Grotius' definition of piracy.

The political weight of piracy: the Santa Catarina incident

I have suggested that 'piracy' should be considered as a legal category as much as a subjectivity. I now turn to how contested understandings of the category of piracy illustrate i) the political significance of movement, ii) the role of debates over movement in defining broader political order, and iii) the ways that movement was made to appear analytically secondary to territoriality. On one hand, the gravity of 'piracy', in contrast to terrestrial robbery, illustrates the perceived political significance of maritime mobility. At the same time, legal debates about piracy made sense of piracy in opposition to apparently territorially bound polities. These debates produced broader understandings of political order, relating to law, war, and sovereignty. This represents a paradox by which the weight of piracy relates to the centrality of movement to the political, but understandings of piracy made movement analytically secondary to apparently territorial polities.

The significance of maritime mobility to existing Indian Ocean politics, and European colonial expansion, illustrates the primary significance of movement in constituting the political. Far from representing interactions between already existing territorial units, political relations in the Indian Ocean were a productive realm, where ordering techniques, such as international law, emerged in relations between European and non-European legal theorists, merchants, and

sovereigns. The overall political system in the seventeenth-century Indian Ocean World has been defined by Lauren Benton as a form of 'non-territorial sovereignty' (Benton, 2005: 721). What is curious is that debates over piracy, while emerging in a highly mobile and extraterritorial political environment, and on the basis of threats to mobility as the most extreme political threat, evoked ties to territorially bound polities as the terms against which mobility could be made sense of. This rendered movement politically primary, but analytically secondary.

This is illustrated by debates about piracy related to the 'Santa Catarina incident'. In 1603, a Dutch ship, in alliance with the King of Johore, seized the 'Santa Catarina', a Portuguese ship, off the coast of present-day Indonesia. The legality of this act formed the basis of Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius' reflections in *De Jure Praedae* or *Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty,* which would become foundational for international law (Mawani, 2018: 41), which hinged on definitions of piracy.

The gravity of piracy, associated with a threat to maritime mobility, did not pre-exist colonial expansion but emerged in relation with existing Indian Ocean practices. The significance of 'piracy', in comparison to land-based robbery shows its perceived threat to transoceanic movement*,* which was of primary significance to the emergence of a colonial world order. The weight of piracy is illustrated by the emergence of the figure of the pirate as the 'common enemy of all mankind', in contrast to the relative insignificance of land-based robbers (Kempe, 2007: 388). Kempe (2007: 388) interprets this as being related to a construction of the ocean as a connecting 'highway', noting that 'from the standpoint of international law it is the pirate and not the highwayman who potentially threatens all nations because he plunders on the high seas as the connecting 'highway' of the peoples and all nations'. This evokes understanding of the ocean as 'mobile' and a connective fabric, in contrast to more bounded constructions of terrestrial space, that, as I suggested in the introduction to Part Two, still stand in academic understandings of the Indian Ocean.

Understandings of the ocean as a connective realm were influenced by Indian Ocean practices and histories, which likely influenced Grotius' writings on piracy. Within Indian Ocean traditions, 'the high sea had been, since time immemorial, considered a free international highway' (Alexcandrowicz in Mawani, 2018: 46). Mawani suggests that these traditions influenced Grotius' writing. This is supported by the fact that the political weight that Grotius attributed to piracy was distinct to earlier understandings of piracy. For example, in Gentili's definition, takings at sea were analogous to land-based robbery (Benton, 2005: 704). The political weight of piracy may be related to existing Indian Ocean legal traditions, which emphasised maritime mobility.

The distinction between land and sea that underpinned the political significance of piracy is also illustrated by the definition of pirates as the enemy of all mankind. For Grotius, no public authority existed at sea, and the punishment of piracy fell under the banner of natural law in that it constituted 'a violation of the law of all nations and peoples. If no public authority exists or if it would fail to prosecute and punish pirates, the ius gentium guarantees every single person a private jurisdiction over pirates.' (Kempe, 2007: 386). As such, because the ocean fell outside the realm of the law of nations, pirates were the enemies in natural law, or for *all nations*.

While the weight of piracy derived from the political significance of mobility, debates over piracy produced a territorially bounded understanding of political belonging. In *De Jure Praedae*, Grotius critiqued the Portuguese for describing the Dutch as pirates, and telling the 'malicious lie 'that pirates had come [venisse piratas], whose *home was the sea*, whose trade was robbery, and who had *no peaceful dwelling-place*'' (in Kempe, 2007: 384, emphasis added). This associated piracy with a lack of tether to an implicitly territorial 'dwelling-place' and rendered pirates legible as an untethered mobile population with no home other than the sea. This produced an opposing understanding of the political legitimacy of maritime acts deriving from a tether to a fixed home or dwelling place, and a mistrust of those represented as 'mobile'.

The tie to a territorially fixed home or dwelling place does not map onto either the ship's crew, or the crew's fixed ties to a sovereign authority, but an abstract sense of political sovereignty that is linked to territoriality. In practice, individual mariners (whether 'pirates', 'privateers', 'merchants', or other maritime actors) may have had multiple and shifting land-based dwellings, both individually and as a group. Crews were often polyglot, for example, the crew of the Santa Catarina included Portuguese, Arab, Turkish, and Indian members (Mawani, 2018: 41), who had links to multiple 'homes'.

In addition, the linking of ships to specific sovereigns was fluid and open to manipulation. As Benton writes '[a]ny experienced trader in the east knew that the pass system provided only a loose set of rules for much more complex and layered arrangements' (Benton, 2005: 714), and many '[s]hips sailed with multiple passes and multiple flags, and they chose to display the colors and present the passes selectively and according to the ports, ships, or courts with which they were engaged.' (Benton, 2005: 714). In other words, the legitimation of a ship's acts as 'piracy' or not was determined by a ship's association with a sovereign. The association of 'piracy' with a lack of fixed abode did not reflect on individual mariners, but on an understanding of sovereignty that derived legitimacy from territorial boundedness. At the same time, the political system within which forms of sovereign authority emerged (defined in opposition to piracy and linked to emergent international law) was an extraterritorial system, produced in movement. The significance of debates about piracy is that they made this movement appear analytically secondary to an idea of political legitimacy deriving from a fixed dwelling place.

Sovereignty and the contested regulation of piracy

The legal categorisation of 'piracy' created political possibilities for the contested regulation of maritime mobility, in ways that had wider political implications in the constitution of ordering concepts such as 'war' and 'sovereignty'.

In line with the observation that modern state power derives in part from a monopoly over the legitimate means of movement, the expansion of European colonial power in the IOW played out in relation to attempts to regulate sea routes, which were related to contested understandings of 'piracy'. Rather than aiming for blanket territorial control, European imperial expansion functioned through enclaves and corridors (Benton, 2005: 700). These territorial lanes were linked to the possibility of regulating people in movement. For example, Benton argues that 'the geography of the Portuguese trading-post empire in sixteenth-century Asia was shaped by the ability to monitor sea lanes and ports' (Benton, 2005: 702). To do this, the Portuguese introduced a 'pass system' which required 'every Asian merchant within Portuguese purview to purchase a pass or license called a cartaz' (Benton, 2005: 713). This pass system constituted a system of regulation of the legitimate means of movement, which, in lieu of blanket territorial control, was a primary way in which Portuguese authority over the Indian Ocean was expressed.

The term 'pirate', then, was used to deny legitimacy to actors who evaded the Portuguese pass system and was also a site of inter-imperial contest. With some exceptions, 'the Portuguese considered anyone who refused to accept their system of passes as pirates' (Campbell, 2014: 777). This meant that, while European empires also identified each other as pirates, they often collaborated to recognise local actors as pirates (Kempe, 2007: 385). For example, in the seventeenth century, Grotius called the Indian leader Cunala, 'the pirate chief of the Malabar Indians [Cunalam Indorum Malabarum archipiratam], notorious for his fifty years of freebootery' (Kempe, 2007: 386). In a more general sense, Subramanian (2021: 144) argues that in India's Western littoral, Maratha marine activity was only ever seen as piracy by Europeans, 'who saw all Indian action as predatory and incapable of fitting into the well-known lexicon of maritime politics'. She writes that 'for every Kit or Avery who were extolled as brave pirates and comprehended as privateers fighting for the British crown, there was, on the Indian side, only lawless pirates like the dreaded Angria or nest of vipers (Subramanian, 2021: 144). In the late nineteenth century, this trope was perpetuated in descriptions of the 'Malay race' as 'almost

amphibious', 'pirates by sea', and 'sea gypsies' (Campbell, 2014: 783) associating 'piracy' with racialised understandings of private criminality linked with maritime itinerancy.

These strategies were sometimes inverted by anti-colonial actors, for example, in relation to the Komagata Maru incident in the early twentieth century, Mawani (2018: 219) notes that 'Singh accused the Indian police of 'looting . . . the ship treasure', which represented a strategic use of the language of piracy 'which Britain deployed strategically to maintain its legitimacy as a maritime empire and to expand its territorial control across the sea. At the same time, the depoliticising deployment of the term 'piracy' in relation to non-Europeans continues in academic work, which often characterises pre-colonial maritime violence in the IOW as 'piracy', and continues to minimise the political nature of these actions, and relegate them to the realm of the private (Prange, 2013: 11).

In short, it is precisely movement and the categorisation of "people on the move" that underpinned the conceptualisation of seemingly natural ideas such as sovereignty and territoriality. As paradoxical as it might sound, via piracy, what counted or did not count as sovereign had less to do with territorial integrity, than with a definition of movement in relation to an imagined ideal of fixed territory. This is demonstrated by the strategic recognition of non-European mariners as 'privateers' and of non-European sovereignty, in relation to debates over piracy. For example, Grotius treated the *Santa Catarina* incident in relation to the questions of whether it constituted an act of sovereign maritime violence within the context of war. Aside from making the legal argument that the Dutch were at war with the Portuguese and therefore had a right to seize the Santa Catarina, Grotius also argued that the Dutch were acting on behalf of the king of Johore, whom Grotius recognised as a sovereign actor, with the right to go to war with the Portuguese. Grotius argued that, as a sovereign authority, the Johorian war against the Portuguese was just, and was a defence of the right of a king to '[carry] on trade with another people' (Keene, 2002: 51). Here, in defending the actions of the Dutch as legal, and therefore not piracy, Grotius recognised the King of Johore as a sovereign and political actor.

Grotius' understanding of the relations between sovereignty, war, and piracy, also drew on examples from North Africa, and the strategic endowment of sovereign status to 'Barbary' corsairs. Based on understanding of legal conventions at the time, goods seized from pirates had to be returned to their original owners, but goods seized from mariners under the authority of a sovereign (during war) were legitimate spoils. This led Grotius to two questions: first, were the Barbary mariners sovereign actors, and second, were European powers at war with them. If the Barbary corsairs were sovereign actors who were at war with the sovereigns of the goods they seized, then these acts were not piratical. It was therefore a subject of debate whether the Barbary corsairs were 'pirates, raiding for their own sake', or 'privateers spoiling with an official commission of the state.' (Kempe, 2007: 392). In addition, the definition of 'sovereignty' was at stake, as 'it was not clear whether the 'Barbary' cities Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis are to be seen as sovereign states or only as parts of the Ottoman Empire.' (Kempe, 2007: 392).

The second question facing Grotius is whether or not European states were at war with the Barbary states. As Benton points out, this was necessary only in Grotius', and not in Gentili's definition, of piracy, as for Grotius 'privateering' was only legitimate when in the context of warfare. Grotius legitimised the seizure of Barbary goods by Europeans, by interpreting the Barbary states and European nations to be at war with one-another (Benton, 2005: 705). At the same time, this meant that goods seized by Europeans from Barbary mariners did not have to be returned to their original owners, as they had been seized by Barbary actors who were legally equivalent to European state-sponsored 'privateers', acting in a context of war (Kempe, 2007: 392).

The contestation of piracy in the IOW produced and naturalised international law as a source of authority, and, by proxy, legitimised sovereignty through international law. As Benton has argued, definitions of piracy naturalised understandings of sovereignty, which meant that piracy was not only a challenge to order, but constitutive of key elements of the emergent political order

(Benton, 2005: 704). This is illustrated, in part, by pirates' own understanding of the necessity to present legal cases that emphasised their ties to particular sovereigns (Benton, 2005: 713). International law, and its naturalisation of specific understandings of sovereignty, emerged through seventeenth-century encounters in the IOW, where 'Mariners in general, and pirates in particular, helped to shape this geographically variegated legal sea-space, in part through their own strategies of hedging to sustain potential claims to legality and playing one power off against the other' (Benton, 2005: 722).

This sketch of debates about piracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has illustrated that 'piracy' was a contested legal category, rather than strictly a subjectivity. Contested understandings of 'piracy' produced opposing understandings of political legitimacy, which linked political legitimacy to an understanding of territorially tethered state sovereignty. The paradox is that these understandings emerged in the extraterritorial realm of the Indian Ocean, but that the movement which was the precondition for this emergence was rendered analytically secondary to a bounded understanding of the polity. These debates created political possibilities for regulating mobility. They also had wide-reaching implications for broader political order, producing understandings of sovereignty, legality, war, and peace.

ii) The nineteenth-century transition from slavery to indentured labour

Just as piracy was at the centre of political debates in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, few issues were as controversial in the nineteenth century as the abolition of slavery and the slave trade. At the core of these debates were questions of the terms on which people in movement were regulated and categorised.

As with piracy, debates about the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century produced transformations in political order. The slave trade was a site of the contested regulation of mobility, and a focal point of conflicts between the British Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Omani ruling class, existing maritime trade networks, and European planters. The contested

categorisation of the movement of bonded labourers as 'slavery' or 'indenture' constituted a site of transformation of the categorisation of mobile actors as much as a transformation of practices. These debates set the terms for understandings of 'free' and 'unfree' labour, and the centrality of the contract in liberal capitalism and imperialism.

This section proceeds in three stages. First, it presents the abolition of slavery as a site of contested imperial power to illustrate the centrality of the control and regulation of people in movement to political order. Second, it contextualises this question as one of categorisation and regulation. Third, it illustrates how contested understandings of unfree labour mobility produced a transformation in broader forms of political order, including the centrality of contracts to late imperial capitalism. Notably, the history of slavery and indenture in the Indian Ocean World is a broader issue than this thesis can engage in fully. In this section, then, I draw on these debates to focus on the specific question of the relations between the categorisation and regulation of people in movement and transformations in world order.

Debates about the abolition of slavery were at the centre of transformations in world order in the late eighteenth century. Understandings of capitalism, law, and the links between liberalism and empire were at stake. Abolitionist acts in Britain such as the Slave Trade Act of 1807 and the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833 abolished slavery and the slave trade, and led to new forms of state-sanctioned and facilitated labour mobility, such as indenture, which was characterised by some as a 'new system of slavery' (Lowe, 2015: 45). This was a patchy process that involved multiple loopholes as well as the introduction of other forms of apparently 'free' labour. For example, the parliamentary 'Dickens Committee Report' published in 1840 addressed the question of whether indentured migration could be meaningfully considered to be 'free' (Mongia, 2018: 48). Regardless of the extent to which it constituted a transformation in practices, my point here is that the abolition of slavery was part of a narrative of liberal imperialism (Lowe, 2015: 13) that led to new ways of understanding and ordering the political.

Abolition and the contestation of British colonial rule

The centrality of the abolition of slavery as a site of contestation of British imperial power is illustrative of the political centrality of the regulation and categorisation of people in movement. On one hand, the abolition of slavery was seen as a power political move by the British to undermine existing maritime trade networks in the Indian Ocean and the pre-colonial slave trade, centred around Zanzibar. On the other hand, European planters on Mauritius also opposed the abolition of slavery and challenged the authority of the British Empire.

Debates on slavery and abolition in the IOW often differentiate the Indian Ocean slave trade from the Atlantic slave trade and chattel slavery (Sheriff et al., 2016). European colonial expansion in the IOW transformed the political order through a reordering of the slave trade, first, through the establishment of Atlantic style plantations on the previously unoccupied island of Mauritius in the eighteenth century. This had the effect of increasing demands for enslaved labour, and increased significance of the slave trade through Zanzibar (Campbell, 2005: 5). From the late eighteenth century, 'the bulk of slaves arriving in Mauritius… were shipped from Zanzibar' (Sheriff et al., 2016: 4), which from 1828, was the base for the Omani ruling elite (Sheriff et al., 2016: 38). At the same time, by the late nineteenth century, abolitionism was a key justification for European colonial expansion, and inversely, anti-imperial movements often opposed abolition (Campbell, 2005: 7-9). European colonial expansion functioned both through the movement of enslaved people, and through calls to abolish slavery.

While European colonial expansion was facilitated through the slave trade, the abolition of the slave trade was also understood as a strategic attempt by the British to legitimise their colonial presence and regulate people in movement. British abolitionism was seen by many as a geopolitical move, related to regulation of the means of maritime mobility. In 1847-8 Ottoman rulers, under pressure from the British, banned the maritime slave trade (Campbell, 2005: 7). At the same time, in Iran, the Shah, under pressure from the British, issued a *darman* that stipulated: '[l]et them no longer bring Negroes by sea, only by land' (in Campbell, 2005: 91). British

pressure to end the slave trade in Iran was perceived as a political manoeuvre and was challenged by opposition leaders who 'presented themselves as the custodians of Iran's religious heritage' (Campbell, 2005: 88). It was also resisted in the Hejaz, where the King refused to deal with the British, and cooperated with slave traders to smuggle slaves and tax the slave trade (Campbell, 2005: 192). These debates sat at the centre of growing British fears about pan-Islamic anti-colonialism.

Pan-Islamism as a political project emerged in the twentieth century, and was imbued with political meaning as a result of imperialism and resistance to imperial racism (Aydin, 2017: 7). It had roots in earlier transimperial connections, and, relatedly, by the late nineteenth century was a source of anxiety for British imperial administrators, whether or not this reflected an actual threat to empire. Apparently confirming these fears, in 1858, Europeans in Jidda, including the British vice-consul and the French consul and his wife were killed, in what was known as the 'Jeddah massacre' (Low, 2008: 275). This has been linked by Juan Cole (in Low, 2008: 276) to a wider pattern of pan-Islamic anti-colonial violence, including the Sepoy Mutiny (1857-58), the Urabi Revolt in Egypt (1881-82), episodes of urban violence in Lucknow and Delhi (1857-58), Damascus (1860), Alexandria (1882), and the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78). In response to the violence in Jidda, Low argues that Hadrami diaspora spread news about the violence elsewhere in the British Empire in hopes of promoting anti-imperial resistance, and links this to the contested regulation of the slave trade, arguing that the primary source of Hadrami displeasure stemmed from their opposition to Anglo-Ottoman efforts to abolish the slave trade', which, as a port diaspora, they were heavily involved in (Low, 2008: 276-278). The contestation of the abolition of slavery was linked to a possible emergent form of pan-Islamic anti-imperialism, and to colonial anxieties of the same.

At the same time, the abolition of slavery was a focal point of conflict between the British government and European planters. A double standard between intra- and extra-imperial policies towards slavery, and the question of the transition from slavery to indenture in Mauritius, is illustrated by the positions of Robert Farquhar, the British Governor of Mauritius. In 1811,

Farquhar made a request to the metropolitan government to exempt Mauritius from the ban on slave trading by British subjects, which was rejected (Allen, 2009: 891). This led to decades of illegal slave trade in Mauritius, and planter opposition to British prohibition of slavery, which ultimately led to the introduction of a system of indenture. Contradicting this earlier position, in 1822, Farquhar requested a treaty be signed with Sultan Seyiid Said of Oman to prohibit Omani subjects from selling slaves to Christians (Allen, 2009: 893). This illustrates some of the links and hypocrisies involved in the challenge of regulating slavery within the British Empire, combined with the aim of abolishing the slave trade externally.

The significance to British colonial expansion and its contestation of the regulation of people in movement, through the abolition of the slave trade, illustrates the centrality of the regulation of people in movement to power politics. At the same time, this was as much a question of contested categorisation as of regulation. Debates about the contested categorisation of slavery and indenture set the terms for broader understandings of political order, including the role of contract law in the emergent capitalist order, and understandings of the links between liberalism and empire.

Categorising 'slavery', 'indenture' and political transformation

Indenture was not just a continuation of slavery under another name. The recategorisation of unfree labour mobility was a productive part of the transformation of political order in the nineteenth century. The categorisation of 'indenture' was fundamental to the rise in significance of contract law, and a related understanding of state regulation as a condition for freedom. These questions have implications for labour, mobility, and also political order more broadly. The transition from slavery to 'apprenticeship' to indenture in Mauritius illustrates the contested categorisation of people in movement, and its role in defining political order. Mauritius was a 'test case' for the transition from slavery to 'free' labour' in colonial plantations from 1834 to the early 1920s (Allen, 2009: 893).

While earlier colonial ideologies were compatible with a category of 'slavery', mid-nineteenth-century humanitarian colonialism required other categories of mobilities. As Lisa Lowe (2015: 24) has argued, '[t]he representations of indentured labor as 'freely' contracted buttressed liberal promises of freedom for former slaves, while enabling planters to derive benefits from the so-called transition from slavery to free labor that in effect included a range of intermediate forms of coercive labor, from rented slaves, sharecroppers, and convicts, to day laborers, debt peonage, workers paid by task, and indentureship'. Across the British Empire, slave labour was replaced with other forms of bonded servitude, including 'the forced employment of liberated Africans or 'prize Negroes', many of them children, who were seized by the British from slaving vessels after the abolition of the slave trade in 1807' (Anderson, 2012: 42). In Mauritius these shifting categorisations, and their role in constituting the political, were particularly clear.

At stake in the reordering of mobility and the terms on which it would be understood was the restructuring of production and rise of a belief in free-market economics and the economic theories of liberal theorists including Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill (Lowe, 2015: 14). The Slavery Abolition Act of 1834 was part of an 'imperial experiment' (Lowe, 2015: 37) that signalled a move 'away from colonial slavery, mercantilist exclusivity, and older forms of territorial conquest, toward a British-led worldwide trade in manufactured goods and new forms of imperial governance' (Lowe, 2015: 14). This experiment was addressed in 1842 by Lord Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, who stated that: '[t]he abolition of slavery has rendered the British colonies the scene of an experiment, whether the staple products of tropical countries can be raised as effectually and as advantageously by the labour of freemen, as by that of slaves' (in Mongia, 2018: 66). This was a question of labour *mobility* and the terms of this mobility, as he went on to state that '[t]o bring that momentous question to a fair trial, it is requisite that no unnecessary discouragement should be given to the introduction of free labourers into our colonies'. The question of defining and regulating people in movement, in this case 'free' labourers, was at the core of these politically transformative

debates. It also defined the nature of contract law, legality, and the transformation in late imperial transformation in political order.

These questions were articulated in relation to the 'test case' of Mauritius. Mauritius had been unoccupied until European colonial expansion, when it became a base for French colonial government in the eighteenth century and was taken over relatively late by the British in 1810 (Sheriff et al., 2016: 27). Illustrative of European resistance to the abolition of slavery, in 1832, the 'Mauritius rebellion' took place, when a handful of white planters refused to accept abolitionist ordinance, and refused to pay taxes (Burroughs, 1976: 252). By then, Farqahar had been replaced by Sir Charles Colville as Governor of Mauritius. Colville aligned himself with pro-slavery interests and against the metropolitan government (Burroughs, 1976: 244). The revolt ultimately led to the introduction of a system of apprenticeship, a cash grant to the Mauritian planters, and the secession of control of the colony's affairs to the French Mauritian planters in exchange for agreements to abolition (Burroughs, 1976: 262), in effect, paving the way for a shift in the categorisation as much as the characterisation of the colonial labour system.

As a result, the transition from 'slavery' to 'indenture' in Mauritius involved multiple overlapping forms of bonded labour. It also served as a model and test-case for the wider introduction of indentured labour in the British Empire. After abolition in Mauritius, the British introduced a system of 'apprenticeship', which 'tied ex-slaves to their former owners until 1839' (Anderson, 2012: 43). This was immediately supplemented by the introduction of 'indentured labour'. As Mongia (2018: 38) writes, '[f]rom the day of abolition, planters also sourced alternative sources of unfree labour: between 1834 and 1839, that is, the period of apprenticeship, more than 20,000 indentured Indians arrived in Mauritius. In fact, on August 1, 1834, the date Emancipation came into effect, the ship Sarah sailed into the harbor at Mauritius carrying thirty-nine indentured Indian migrants'. Mauritius was the first colony to initiate migration of labour from India, and also served as a model to indentured migration elsewhere, for example, in 1836 'learning of the system used by the planters in Mauritius, John Gladstone (father of William Gladstone, four-time liberal Prime Minister of Britain) initiated

correspondence to have indentured Indian labor shipped to work on his plantations in British Guiana (Guyana)' (Mongia, 2018: 38).

This transition was at the centre of legal debates and controversies in Britain. For example, the polemic 1840 'Dickens Committee Report' centred on the question of whether or not indentured labourers had freely consented to the conditions of their labour, and found that 'the Coolies and other natives exported to the Mauritius and elsewhere were (generally speaking) induced . . . by misrepresentation and deceit' (Mongia, 2018: 48). Mongia argues that this report, which called for greater state regulation of migration (which at the time meant state facilitation), was also at the centre of colonial debates which provided the roots of the contemporary regulation of 'free' migration (Mongia, 2018: 36), and the concomitant distinction between 'free' and 'unfree', 'wherein slavery (signifying violation, coercion, unfreedom) appears at one end of the spectrum and free labor (signifying volition, consent, freedom) at the other' (Mongia, 2018: 52). These debates had broad legal and political implications in relation to the role of state regulation, contracts, and understandings of freedom, which were all shifting in nineteenth-century liberal thought.

These debates highlighted the double standard of British liberal morality. The Dickens Report suggested that reopening indentured migration would 'weaken the moral influence of the British Government throughout the world and deaden or utterly destroy the effect of all further remonstrances and negotiations respecting the slave trade' (in Mongia, 2018: 58). This amounted to a recognition of the double standard of pressuring for abolition outside the British Empire, while facilitating other forms of bonded labour mobility within the Empire.

Broader political implications and contract law

The recodification of labour mobility from slavery to indenture had broader implications for the political order. In particular, contract law came to monopolise discussions about 'free' and 'unfree' labour. In the nineteenth century, understandings of binding contracts changed from requiring equality in exchange, to simply requiring consent (Mongia, 2018: 54, 67). This meant

that, in liberal thought, 'freedom' became synonymous with freedom to sign a contract term, and 'unfree' meant the absence of a contract (Mongia, 2018: 61). This had the second consequence that state regulation of migration was a necessary condition for 'free' labour (Mongia, 2018: 68). Debates about the definition and regulation of labour mobility were at the centre of understandings of 'freedom' and the role of the contract in defining it. These questions were at the centre of transformations in nineteenth-century liberal thought and political order.

Together, both power politics and the production of a shift in the form of political power were produced and contested through the regulation of slavery and indenture in the IOW. First, British attempts to regulate labour mobility by abolishing the slave trade were linked to attempts to expand their influence in the IOW, as well as to a shift to 'liberal' forms of empire. Opposition to abolition produced emergent forms of pan-Islamic anti-colonialism, as well as revolt from European planters on Mauritius. Second, the nature of liberal politics was produced through debates over abolition and indenture. Specifically, the role of contract law in determining the distinction between 'free' and 'unfree' cemented the centrality of law and the contract as determiners of what is right, thus evacuating political and ethical questions from the organisation of labour and shifting towards a more technocratic form of economic governance. The contested regulation and categorisation of slavery in the IOW was not only a question of ordering mobilities but produced ways of thinking about the political and the conditions of political possibility, with broader world-ordering implications.

iii) Regulation of the Hajj at the turn of the twentieth century

So far, this chapter has shown that the categorisation of people in movement is constitutive of political order. This is clear in relation to the transformation of understandings of sovereignty, territoriality, legality, and freedom, in debates over piracy and slavery. Debates over pilgrimage in the nineteenth and twentieth century further illustrate the role of understandings of people in movement in defining the terms of political order. The Hajj pilgrimage is a primary example of a realm of political relationality generated in movement, but debates over the regulation of the Hajj

in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries hinged on understandings of pilgrims as linked to territorially bound national or imperial belonging. This last section illustrates i) the political centrality of people in movement and their regulation, ii) the role of empires in claiming authority over their subjects extraterritorially, and iii) sets up a transition towards a twentieth-century mobilities order and the centrality of tourism and data collection to this order.

The Hajj was considered a strategic political site by British, Dutch and Ottoman empires, both practically and symbolically, as well as a central part of oceanic routes partially controlled by other maritime actors including Hadrami diaspora. The rise of steamships from the 1830s onwards, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, created new opportunities for colonial expansion and regulation of the Hajj, and disrupted existing Dhow routes (Low, 2008: 269). At the same time, the rise of accessibility of the pilgrimage was seen as a threat to European empires, due to fears of pan-Islam and mobile populations, and the Dutch introduced a series of unsuccessful prohibitive travel regulations on Indonesian pilgrims between the 1820s and 1850s (Alexanderson, 2019). The regulation of the Hajj was a strategically significant site, where understandings of pilgrims' religious, imperial, or national, belonging were constituted and contested.

This section briefly sketches the symbolism of the Hajj pilgrimage in the mid-nineteenth century, as well as its increasing significance as a site not only of inter-imperial competition, but contestation over understandings of pilgrim's religious, imperial, or national belonging. The way that the regulation of the Hajj pilgrimage was carried out indirectly, through sanitation regulation, surveillance, data collection, and the involvement of the Thomas Cook tourism agency, reflect themes that became increasingly relevant with the invention of immigration restrictions in the early twentieth century. This opens up questions for further investigation, in relation to the Hajj as a testing ground for the international regulation and categorisation of people in movement.

Political contestation of the regulation of the Hajj

The British and Dutch increasing involvement in the management of the Hajj was a challenge to the Ottoman empire, who had managed the Hajj since the sixteenth century. This had practical and symbolic significance, and served as the basis for the Ottoman sultan's 'claim to be 'protector' of Hajj pilgrims and 'caliph of all Muslims' (Kane, 2016). At the same time, the Hajj took on symbolic significance in popular imagination in Britain, centred on an Orientalist narrative of British liberal imperial 'decency'.

The Hajj pilgrimage was part of nineteenth-century British popular imagination. For example, Victorian explorer Richard Burton wrote a popular travel account of the Hajj pilgrimage, which he carried out in disguise in 1855, titled *A Pilgrimage to Al-Medinah and Makka* (Riyāḍ, 2017: 117). In 1899, Joseph Conrad's fictional series 'Lord Jim' gave an account of the moral dilemmas of a sailor who had abandoned a ship of pilgrims. The text dealt with the poor conditions of the Hajj infrastructure, as well as constructions of British 'decency'. One character states: 'We are trusted. Do you understand?--trusted! Frankly, I don't care a snap for all the pilgrims that ever came out of Asia, but a decent man would not have behaved like this to a full cargo of old rags in bales. We aren't an organised body of men, and the only thing that holds us together is just the name for that kind of decency' (Conrad, 2008: 49). The idea of terrible conditions for Hajj pilgrims was a justification for increased colonial involvement, and articulations of British decency that had popular resonance.

The Hajj was a focal point for British anxiety about a perceived pan-Islamic threat to the empire, and of the perceived threat of British imperial influence to the government of the Hejaz. On the one hand, a large mobile Muslim population, and the forms of pan-Islamic politics it might generate were perceived as a threat by the British imperial government, especially after the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857, and the killing of Europeans in Jidda in 1858, events which were linked by the British to an overall fear of pan-Islamic anti-colonialism (Low, 2008: 269). This was paralleled by other European empires, and by the 1860s, France, Russia and the Netherlands all

had consulates in Jidda (Slight, 2017: 95). Pan-Islamism, while a colonial anxiety, was also an emergent realm of political relations (Aydin, 2017; Can, 2020).

At the same time, the extending influence of the British empire through governance of their itinerant subjects may have represented 'the cat's paw of British territorial and legal influence' in the Ottoman Hejaz, and posed a threat to other authorities in the region (Low, 2020). The question of extraterritorial European intervention over pilgrims from their empires was vexed, as was contestation over the transportation of pilgrims, especially among Hadrami mercantile networks (Ahmed, 2022). In other words, the Hajj was a site of both transimperial connection, and imperial extraterritoriality (Can, 2020). While European imperial expansion was far from the only political issue at stake, the Hajj pilgrimage was a key site of its contestation.

The combined symbolic and perceived political threat of the Hajj and the management of the Hajj are illustrative of the political centrality of the regulation and categorisation of people in movement in the reordering of political order through European colonial expansion in the IOW. In contrast to the other illustrations offered in this chapter, European empires were unable to regulate Hajj pilgrims directly. The British imperial strategy in Jidda has been characterised as a 'sanitary regime' that functioned through surveillance linked to medical concerns and was increasingly linked to the informal realm of tourist agencies (Low, 2008: 284). Together, these techniques suggest that the late nineteenth-century regulation of the Hajj pilgrimage was a site where an international (as opposed to imperial) order was beginning to emerge, in ways that require further investigation. The centrality of sanitation, surveillance, data collection, and tourism to the current regulation of people in movement is illustrated, for example, by restrictions to travel linked to Covid-19, and the politics of data collection on migrants. This opens up questions for further exploration as to how the transformation of the regulation and categorisation of people in movement in the late nineteenth-century Hajj set some of the foundations for the production of an international order through the regulation of people in movement.

Surveillance linked to sanitation concerns enabled indirect forms of European involvement in the regulation and collection of data on the Hajj. The introduction of a 'sanitary regime' of regulation and surveillance of the Hajj came to a head in relation to an 1865 outbreak of cholera on the pilgrimage (Low, 2008: 270). The spread of cholera prompted an 1866 international sanitary conference, which led to calls for quarantine of pilgrims (Low, 2008: 270). The British resisted these calls and denied that cholera was a contagious disease (Low, 2008: 271). This was motivated by political concerns, as Britain did not want to be bound by international agreements that would give more authority to the Ottoman Empire to govern the Hajj, and they also did not want to introduce restrictions that could lead to anti-imperial backlash from Indian Muslims (Low, 2008: 282). This meant that Britain rejected proposed sanitation and quarantine measures, but simultaneously used the threat of cholera to increase British surveillance and regulation of the Hajj.

British and Dutch imperial strategies attempted to increase their involvement in the Hajj through indirect regulation and surveillance, linked to sanitation concerns. In the 1880s, the Dutch created a hajj agency in Jidda, 'ostensibly to protect their subjects from fleecing and epidemic disease' (Low, 2008: 287). In parallel, from 1878 to 1882, the British colonial Indian Government contracted Doctor Abdur Razzack, an Assistant Surgeon in the Bengal Medical Service, to perform the Hajj annually, and produce reports which were read by British officials in London, Aden, Egypt, India, and Malaya (Slight, 2017: 103). As well as collecting information on pilgrims in Jidda, the British also began publishing an annual report on pilgrims leaving Bombay. From the 1860s, reports were produced in Bombay on Indian pilgrims on an annual basis (Slight, 2017: 96). This was part of the imperial strategy from 1869 onwards, which depended on the systematic collection of information(Slight, 2017: 102). This constituted a form of regulation of people in movement linked to surveillance and extraterritorial sanitation concerns.

Tourism and the beginning of the end of imperial order

It was in this context that in 1885 the government of India contracted Thomas Cook & Son to manage the pilgrimage for British Indian subjects. Cook & Son were charged with handling 'all rail transportation to the ports of embarkation, shipping, passports, and the issuing of return tickets covering all the necessary fees for a successful round-trip from Bombay to Jidda' (Low, 2008: 284). This represented a significant practical and symbolic expansion of European involvement in facilitating and regulating the Hajj, which was linked with the growth of 'tourism' in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Practices which were in some ways a precursor to the international regulation of people in movement.


Image 7: T. Cook & Son's Mecca Pilgrimage Ticket (Tomkiw, 2013)

From 1886 to 1893, Thomas Cook & Sons managed a round-trip from Bombay to Jidda for pilgrims from British India, at the request of the British Government (Low, 2008: 284). As a British newspaper reported at the time:

> *The government of India has just done a very kindly and a very odd thing for its Mussulman subjects. The Mussulmans of India proceed in thousands every year to Mecca, where they are greatly liked, being comparatively wealthy, and are most outrageously fleeced. The Government cannot help that, but it can stop the frightful misery endured by the pilgrims in their voyage in rotten Arab dhows across the Arabian Sea, and up the Red Sea to Jeddah. They are often packed like slaves, half-fed, and frequently wrecked, and the consequent loss of life is enormous. The Government has accordingly taken control of the pilgrimage, and has contracted with Messrs. Cook and Co., the well-known contractors for tourists, to convey all pilgrims in steamers to Jeddah, feed them properly, and bring them back in safety. It is not stated that Messrs. Cook will convoy them to Mecca, and certainly they will not do it personally, for they would be killed; but they can find trusty Mussulraan agents, and have means of permanently conciliating the Grand Shereef, who can protect the pilgrims.*

(The Spectator Archive, 1886)

This was controversial materially and symbolically, representing a culmination of decades of contested control and surveillance of the pilgrimage. It also forms part of the transition from an imperial to an international order, and the role of 'tourism' in producing this transition.

By the end of World War One, the regulation and categorisation of Hajj pilgrims was transformed. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire was a key part of this, as was the transformation of practices of data collection. By the inter-war period, European consulates in Jidda served as hubs of a 'vast system of espionage and control over pilgrims by Western power' (Slight, 2017: 100). This led to debates over the categorisation of Hajj pilgrims. For example, '[o]fficials blamed quarantine authorities in non-British territories for classifying pilgrims by race rather than nationality' (Slight, 2017: 108). By the 1930s, there was widespread introduction of

passes and passports, linked to nationality, indicating a shift from an imperial to international management of people in movement. In turn, the imperial experience of monitoring and regulating the Hajj may have been influential in producing international techniques of regulating people in movement that emerged in the twentieth century, in ways that require further investigation.

What is clear is that Ottoman, British, Dutch, and Hadrami political projects contested the regulation of the Hajj pilgrimage. These attempts to regulate the Hajj hinged on the collection of information, and at the core were contested understandings of political belonging, and the question of whether religious, national, or imperial authority took political precedence. By the early twentieth century, these debates were increasingly articulated in national terms in relation to data collection and were inherently linked to the expansion of a global 'tourist' infrastructure and tourist agencies- itself a novel way of ordering and understanding the politics of people in movement.

Conclusions

From the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries, key moments of contested European imperial expansion in the Indian Ocean world were linked to the regulation and categorisation of people in movement. The inter-relations between these moments, as exemplary sites of the centrality of the role of the regulation of people in movement in constituting the political, have not been previously explored. On one hand, piracy, slavery, and pilgrimage were sites of power politics in relation to imperial realms of influence and control of mobility. At the same time, these debates produced transformations in the nature of the political, including the emergence of international law, the role of understandings of territoriality and its links to sovereignty, questions of contract law and labour conditions in liberal capitalism, and contested forms of national, imperial, and religious political belonging. The contested regulation and categorisation of people in movement continually transformed the conditions of political order, not only in the Indian Ocean, but on a global level.

A key paradox of these debates was the extra-territorial production and contestation of sovereignty, that nevertheless drew authority from claims to contained and fixed territoriality. In relation to piracy, this manifested in relation to the production of international law through the contested legitimacy of mobile maritime actors through their tethering to apparently territorial sovereigns. In relation to slavery, the question of 'freedom' and 'unfreedom', and its role in constraining political debates in relation to technical contracts, was produced through the regulation of labour mobility in the Indian Ocean. In relation to pilgrimage, the question of political belonging was defined in relation to contested imperial, national, and religious authority over mobile subjects. Each of these sites was a moment of contested understanding of movement and fixity, which transformed political order. This is a question that I continue to explore in Chapter Seven, where I ask how it was possible to alienate land from the Maasai on the basis of their itinerancy, in the name of an equally (but differently) itinerant imperial project.

7. Nomads, Tourists and Settlers in the colonisation of British East Africa

The contested regulation and categorisation of 'piracy', 'slavery', and 'pilgrimage' between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries was a site of power politics. These debates established the political conditions for the emergence of international law, and the terms of debates on understandings of sovereignty, territoriality, war, freedom, the role of contracts, and the place of religion and transversal forms of belonging not only in the IOW, but within a broader Western world order. I argued that these debates show that movement was politically primary, but made to appear analytically secondary, by understandings of people in movement that defined political legitimacy in relation to territorially boundedness, even when these debates were unfolding extraterritorially. This is an argument that I unpack further in this chapter, to argue that representations of the Maasai as 'nomadic' had the effect of denying them political legitimacy and produced an opposing understanding of 'sedentary' states, even when imperial states were constituted through people in movement.

To make this argument, I turn to the role of the regulation and categorisation of people in movement in the colonisation of British East Africa at the turn of the twentieth century. I argue that colonisation functioned through the mobility of settlers and tourists, and that these mobilities constituted a continuous political realm, spanning colony and metropole. Far from being a 'sedentary' or 'settled' political project, settler colonialism, and the emergence of Britain as a nation-state, was possible through mobility. At the same time, by romanticising the 'nomadic' Maasai as 'noble savages', in part due to their itinerant lifestyle, the British attempted to justify the alienation of Maasai land, and the enclosure of the Maasai in nature reserves. This has present-day resonances, as the romanticisation of the Maasai and their association with nature are prevalent tropes in contemporary tourism to Kenya. At the same time, descendants of white settlers remain disproportionately involved in tourism and conservation in Kenya. On the one hand, the politically productive role of mobility in European colonialism and the emergence of

'the international' is obscured, and at the same time, it is through the circulation of tourists that the mobility of the Maasai is romanticised, thus facilitating the ongoing alienation of Maasai land. This analysis draws on existing academic work, as well as Hansard parliamentary debates, and limited analysis of media sources in the present and in the early twentieth century.

This analysis has present-day resonances, as the naturalisation of settler claims to land through the enclosure of Maasai in nature reserves continues into the present, through the touristification of the Maasai. The touristification of the Maasai is an ongoing part of the tourist industry in the region, and 'Tanzanian tour guides now jokingly say that foreign visitors do not come to see the 'big five'—a hunting term historically used to denote the five most dangerous African animals: lion, leopard, rhinoceros, elephant, and buffalo—but the 'big six': the big five plus the Maasai' (Salazar, 2009: 60), indicating the prevalence of the colonial trope of the Maasai as 'close to nature'. The exoticisation of the Maasai as 'nomadic' is marketed in tours which offer tourists the opportunity to meet the Maasai (Adventures, 2017), and in Zanzibar and elsewhere, Maasai 'beach-boys' are part of a 'sex tourism' industry (Avieli and Sermoneta, 2020). At the same time, the Maasai continue to contest their displacement from their ancestral homelands. In 2004, protesting an EU funded conservation project in a forest managed by the Maasai, a Maasai elder stated '[t]he British moved us from Nairobi and Nakuru [in the early 1900s], but we shall fight current attempts to move us from Naimina Enkiyio' (in Mbaria and Ogada, 2016). This locates the ongoing contestation of the Maasai for land within a continuation of processes of land alienation that began with British colonisation. Meanwhile, descendants of white settlers remain disproportionately involved in tourism and conservation industries, which, in turn, profit from the romanticisation of the Maasai.

i) Empire and the nomadism-sedentarism binary

Writing in 1961, Frantz Fanon diagnosed the colonial world as a 'motionless, petrified world', 'a Manichean world, a world divided up into compartments', and a world where 'the first thing which the native learns is to stay in his place, and not to go beyond certain limits' (2002: 52). This chapter explores the ways that the British colonisation of East Africa functioned through the fixing of 'natives' in place, through analysis of the alienation of Maasai land and the enclosure of the Maasai in nature reserves. At the same time, this attempted 'fixing' happened through parallel processes of movement, through the circulations of settlers and tourists between colony and metropole, and within a wider Indian Ocean World of mobility. Tracing these circulations is one way to take up Cooper and Stoler's call that 'metropole and colony, colonizer and colonized, need to be brought into one analytic field' (Cooper and Stoler, 1997: 4). Through an exploration of elite mobilities related to tourism and settler colonialism, this chapter explores how colonialism functioned through mobility, while making the world appear to be petrified and compartmentalised. It argues that the romanticisation of the Maasai as a mobile and nomadic people contributed to the alienation of Maasai land- this was paradoxically only possible through the mobility of colonial society through tourism.

In the early twentieth century, the colonisation of British East Africa involved the alienation of land from the local population, including the Maasai, and the endowment of large land grants to white settlers. From the start, tourism was a significant part of colonialism in East Africa, spanning a dense social realm connecting metropole and colony. While this chapter largely focuses on British East Africa within the context of a broader colonial society, it approaches this analysis within the context of the Indian Ocean World, that I outlined in Chapter Two. The role of Africa in the IOW is increasingly acknowledged in academic literature (Gooding, 2022; Hofmeyr 2007), and it is therefore essential to note that British colonisation in East Africa was in no way a 'first contact' or 'discovery', rather, it was an insertion into an existing cosmopolitan and diasporic political realm that involved multiple existing mobilities (Hofmeyr 2007; Campbell 2019). Equally, while this chapter traces some of the ongoing contestation of Maasai

land and the role of descendants of white settlers in tourism in Kenya, this only forms part of the picture of global postcolonial Kenyan politics, which, as Spivak prompts, is shaped, but not defined, by European colonisation.

This chapter explores the representational and material significances of tourism in British East Africa, which functioned to portray a positive vision of colonialism abroad, attract settlers, and generate revenue. Tourism and land alienation worked together in the creation of nature reserves, and the enclosure of the Maasai within these reserves. The material enclosure of the Maasai within nature reserves was accompanied by a representational depiction of the Maasai as 'noble savages'. The chapter presents some evidence of the historic depiction of the Maasai as 'nomadic' and emphasises that in recent academic literature this trope is increasingly apparent. These definitions of nomadism are often framed in opposition to 'sedentarism', and over-emphasise the 'sedentary' nature of societies, which obscures the continuous political realm connecting metropole and colony that is sustained through movement. The occlusion of imperial mobilities in the emergence of the nation-state is compounded by the relegation of 'tourism' to a social, rather than political phenomena. As scholars are increasingly demonstrating, tourism is politically productive (Becklake and Wynne-Hughes, 2023; Lisle, 2016; Vrasti, 2013; Wynne-Hughes, 2012). The core argument that this chapter contributes to this emerging analysis is to draw out the ways that tourism constituted a continuous realm of political relationality, spanning colony and metropole. And, how it did this through the romanticisation of nomadic others, which occluded imperial mobility and facilitated land alienation.

The mobility of the 'nomadic' Maasai is often romanticised in tourism and academic work, in ways that naturalises the apparent 'sedentarism' of the state. The Maasai are commonly understood as a 'nomadic' people, in both contemporary academic literature[30], and touristic guides (Adventures, 2017). Work on nomads tends to evoke a 'nomadism-sedentarism' binary.

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[30] For example, Levin and MacKay (2020: 5) refer to work by Azarya, 1996; Enghoff, 1990; Galaty, in this volume; Ndagala, 1990; and Ochieng, 2007 on the Maasai as nomadic.

This binary is overlaid on a 'mobility-stasis' binary, whereby 'nomadism' is associated with 'mobility', and 'sedentarism' is associated with 'stasis'. For example, the introduction to *Nomad-State Relationships in International Relations* associates nomads with 'mobility', stating 'Nomads have traditionally gotten short shrift from the sedentary peoples of the world. Settled peoples have long understood their mobile or pastoral neighbors as uncivilized' (Levin and MacKay, 2020: 1). This sets up an opposition between nomads as 'mobile' or 'pastoral', and 'sedentary' or 'settled' peoples. This is not unique to International Relations. For example, in International Law, Gilbert writes that: 'Since the dawn of mankind there has been a violent confrontation between two lifestyles: the settled and the nomadic way of life' (Gilbert, 2007: 2). Even though authors recognise nuance, complexity, and hybridity, the overarching narratives that frame the study of nomads tend to define nomads by their mobility, in opposition to apparently sedentary and settled societies. In contrast, I argue that states must also be understood as mobile.

At the same time, sedentarism and stasis are associated with a Weberian understanding of the territorial state, in ways that occlude the emergence of the modern territorial state through imperial mobility. For example, Levin and MacKay write that 'Nomads undermine or stand outside of the core features of the modern international order. The constitutive unit of that order—the Weberian state (Weber, 1978, p. 54)—requires of populations things nomadic peoples are not historically inclined toward' (Levin and MacKay, 2020: 4). This is understood to be because: '[nomads'] lack of fixity constitutes a series of conceptual or identity-based challenges to the state. For example, the movement of people across borders stands at odds with the project of modern nationalism' (Levin and MacKay, 2020: 8). The implications of this are to associate nomads with mobility, and states with fixity, and to suggest that nomads pose a challenge to states *because of* their cross-border mobility. This occludes the fact that the historical emergence of the modern state as defined by Weber was embedded within the context of imperial expansion, and not sedentarism.

By presenting nomads as exceptionally mobile, and states as sedentary, research on nomads risks reproducing an understanding of stasis as a norm, and mobility as exception. Banerjee and Smith observe that 'Despite its important contribution, a focus on 'nomads as the State's other' leaves unchallenged the dominant paradigm of a world of stationary people within territorially bounded political communities.' This is because, representing nomads as exceptionally mobile reproduces 'IR's sedentary bias that assumes that states have 'always' wanted to control borders and the movement across them' (Banerjee and Smith, 2020: 269). Banerjee and Smith counter this by considering links between nomads and migration, to counter the exceptionalisation of nomadic people's mobility, and explore how 'state reactions to migration has brought to light the myriad ways in which statism affects people on the move' more generally' (Banerjee and Smith, 2020: 266). Their intervention makes an important contribution to discussions on nomadism by contextualising nomadism within debates on migration and the broader phenomena of people on the move. However, it continues to position states in opposition to nomads, as relatively sedentary, which reifies an understanding of sedentarism as a norm.

This literature indicates that the political significance of nomads is often taken to be the challenge that they pose to Weberian states. Weberian understandings of the modern state often emphasise territoriality, which is associated with 'sedentarism' in existing literature on nomads. However, attentiveness to empire shows that territoriality is not the same as 'sedentarism' or 'stasis'. Weberian states are generally understood as 'as a form of political association that successfully claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a geographical territory' (Bhambra, 2016: 336). However, a claim to the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a given territory, does not necessarily constitute a 'sedentary' society. It is worth noting that in an imperial context, power relations do not always function in relation to territoriality (Barkawi, 2017), and, when they do, this territoriality is often patchy and partial (Benton, 2005: 701). In fact, the territorialisation of the modern state emerged within a context of imperial expansion through mobility. This becomes apparent if we adopt Cooper and Stolers' approach of bringing metropole and colony into one analytic field (1997: 4).

While the differentiation between 'metropole' and 'colony', and 'home' and 'away', was crucial for colonial governance, the actual realm of political relationality spanned both apparently discrete compartments. Colonising and colonised elites circulated not only between colony and metropole, but across empires, for example, 'Africans served in the Dutch militia in the Indies or in French wars in Asia or Europe itself; Indian soldiers participated in the British conquest of Africa; their officers spread a variety of stereotypes about the military 'fitness' of various groups around the empires' (Echenberg, 1991, in Cooper and Stoler, 1997: 28). As I argued in Chapter Six, imperial politics emerged through the colonial encounter, rather than being displaced intact from the metropole. This in turn constituted the political in the metropole, as 'Europe was made by its imperial projects, as much as colonial encounters were shaped by conflicts within Europe itself' (Cooper and Stoler, 1997: 1). In other words, the circulations of empire were not epiphenomenal to relatively sedentary colonial and metropolitan societies which were 'displaced' from one place to another, but fundamentally constitutive of colony and metropole, and a dense realm of political relationality that spans and exceeds these apparently discrete realms. There was nothing secondary about imperial mobilities. They were the conditions of possibility for both colonial and 'national' politics.

The prevalence of understandings of 'state sedentarism' is linked to a conceptual conflation of 'sedentarism' and 'territoriality'. Attentiveness to empire illustrates the distinctions between 'sedentarism' and 'territoriality', by showing how modern territoriality emerged in the context of imperial mobility. Territoriality is receiving increased attention in IR (Branch, 2012; Goettlich, 2019; Li, 2022; Mukoyama, 2022). Defined by Sack (1983: 55, in Goettlich 2019) as 'the attempt to affect, influence, or control actions, interactions, or access by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a specific geographic area', territoriality is linked to the rationalisation of geography through practices such as map-making and the linearization of borders. However, while the territorialisation of the state is linked with practices such as border controls that can function to restrict mobility, the process of state territorialisation was part of a colonial politics

which operated through mobility. Attentiveness to empire shows how the territorialisation of the modern nation-state in Europe is not the same as 'sedentarism' or 'stasis' of the state. First, nation-states in Europe emerged as part of colonial politics of empire outside of Europe, rather than evolving out of 'sedentary' societies within Europe. And second, in an imperial context, territoriality did not imply 'sedentarism', as territorialisation operated through circulation and mobility.

The imperial nature of state formation is often overlooked or taken for granted. As Mukoyama notes, 'when scholars discuss state formation and linearization of borders, they do not treat states within and outside the empire differently; they speak of the European sovereign state system as a whole, including both in the discussion' (Mukoyama 2022: 10). By not distinguishing between metropole and colony in discussions of state formation, the specific role of imperialism in the territorialisation of the state is not interrogated. The implications of this are, as Bhambra (2016) has outlined, that what are often taken as 'nation-states' within Europe, are in fact better understood as 'imperial-states'. As Bhambra (2016: 346) observes 'The substantive focus has been on the concept of the modern state and the ways in which this has been erroneously delineated from Weber onwards as the national state, instead of, more appropriately, as the imperial state'. The role of empire in constituting the territorial state is being explored in International Relations. For example, Jordan Branch (2012) shows that contrary to mainstream narratives that the territorial state emerged in Europe and was imposed outside of Europe, it emerged through European colonisation of the Americas and then returned to Europe. This implies that the territorialisation of the state was not an endogenous outcome of sedentary polities in Europe. In fact, the rise of the modern territorial state was part of an imperial politics of colonial expansion and mobility.

Taking into account imperial expansion as part of the territorialisation of the nation-state in Europe draws attention to the ways that territoriality was only one part of the state power. Imperial state power also functions through informal and non-territorial relations, including

unequal treaties, proxy wars, and cultural imperialism (Barkawi, 2017; Go, 2011). This points to the insight that imperialism functions through circulation and mobility. In both formal and informal empires, imperial expansion functions through mobility, including the movement of imperial agents, mercenaries, and enslaved people. This is apparent in Barkawi's (2017: 18) understanding of imperialism as a 'full spectrum social phenomenon' which works 'through agencies as diverse as missionaries, businessmen, soldiers, poets and state officials'. The circulation of multiple state and non-state actors, including missionaries, explorers, soldiers, writers, artists, settlers, and tourists, was essential to imperial expansion, in both informal imperialism, and territorial and settler colonial forms of empire. This illustrates the distinction between 'territoriality' and 'sedentarism'. Even when empire involved direct claims to territory, it was not a 'sedentary' political society, but one that operated through the mobility and circulation of diverse actors.

Only when modern states are understood as nation-states that are endogenous to Europe can they be considered to be 'static' or 'sedentary'. In contrast, when modern states are recognised as imperial-states, the role of mobility and circulation, and the links with territoriality as well as extra-territoriality, are made visible. Postcolonial analysis of the modern state system shows that the association of states with 'sedentarism' is misleading. In contrast, it shows that 'territoriality' emerged as a result of colonial circulations (Branch, 2012), and that nation-states may be better understood as imperial-states (Bhambra, 2016). I suggest that the distinctiveness of 'nomadism' from modern state politics may be better understood in relation to competing forms of, and claims to, territoriality, rather than as an opposition between a 'mobile' and 'sedentary' society. This challenges the 'nomadism-sedentarism' binary, which renders nomads politically significant because of their mobility, and produces an opposing understanding of states as static. In the following section, I unpack this claim through a sketch of encounters between settlers, tourists, and the Maasai in the early twentieth-century colonisation of British East Africa.

ii) Tourism, colonisation, and the alienation of Maasai land

Established in 1920, 'Kenya Colony' was both a settler colonial project, which was imagined by many as a 'white man's country' in the style of Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand, and an imperial charge, governed through the Colonial Office in Westminster (Jackson, 2016). British imperialism in East Africa was carried out by an array of actors who blur the boundaries between 'state' and 'non-state' entities and functioned through formal and informal forms of control in different moments. In the 1880s and 1890s the commercial entity of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) began establishing trading stockades, in 1895 the Protectorate of British East Africa was declared, bringing the IBEAC into the imperial state, and in 1898 building began on the Uganda railway (ibid.), an infrastructure project which was definitive of British imperialism in East Africa. Conflict between settlers and the government in the British metropole makes it hard to consider the empire a unitary actor. From the start, imperial expansion involved mobility, including the movement of 32,000 indentured Indian labourers who built the railway[31], along with around 10,000 white settlers by 1920 (Jackson, 2016). The mobility of settlers, who were part of a continuous political society connecting colony and metropole, as well as indentured labourers, and the continuation of earlier forms of Indian Ocean World mobility, meant that British East Africa emerged through mobility, and not sedentarism.

Analysis of settler colonialism in British East Africa suggests that imperial territoriality was not at odds with mobility but functioned through circulation. This disturbs understandings of the conflict between 'nomads' and 'states' as one of 'mobility' versus 'sedentarism' and suggests it may be one of conflicting claims to, and/or relationships with, territoriality. In exploring this question, I continue to work with an understanding of territoriality as 'the attempt to affect, influence, or control actions, interactions, or access by asserting and attempting to enforce

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[31] Note that only some of the South Asians in East Africa were indentured labourers, others had longer histories with East Africa in the context of the Indian Ocean World. See (Nangulu-Ayuku, 2000).

control over a specific geographic area' (Sack, 1983: 55). Territoriality, as a form of asserting influence over a geographic area, is not necessarily opposed to nomadic relations with land. For example, the Maasai's contestation of unequal land agreements in British East Africa can be understood as a form of Maasai territoriality, by making claims to a geographic area, rather than an opposition to territoriality per se. In exploring the relations between settler colonialism and mobility in British East Africa, I address the ways that tourism and hunting were integral parts of imperial expansion. While tourists are often understood to be epiphenomenal to the societies that they travel between, I suggest that in the British Empire tourists were travelling within a continuous imperial polity, spanning colony and metropole. As such, they can be understood as forming part of a continuous society that depended on their mobility.

Encounters between the British Empire and the Maasai at the turn of the twentieth century offer an illustration of the forms of mobility implicated in imperial, and therefore national, state formation, as well as some forms of territoriality associated with nomadic peoples, and the role of tourism in this encounter. This analysis points to some ways that the identification of nomadic people as mobile, in opposition to apparently sedentary European societies, may be politically charged, by occluding empire and reifying a 'nostalgic pastoral genre' (Opondo, 2008: 60) linked with 'nomadic peoples' that enables their exclusion from the political realm. Both the romanticisation of the Maasai, and the mobility that sustained a dispersed imperial polity, were produced in relation to tourism.

The figure of the Maasai

'Even the Masai, hereditary enemies of mankind, are taking to selling cotton instead of accumulating skulls. That change, small as it seems, is for him the first condition of civilisation; and but for the 'conquest ' which Mr. Harrison denounces, it might not arrive for another six thousand years'

(*The Spectator Archive*, 1889)

From the beginning of British colonisation of East Africa, the figure of the nomadic pastoralist Maasai was significant not just materially, but also symbolically. As Jackson notes, 'before construction on the Uganda railway began, East Africa was already well established in the British popular mind', in part, through the genre of 'explorer literature', which 'in turn inspired a new phalanx of late nineteenth-century adventurers, traders and big-game hunters' (Jackson, 2016: 232). Fiction was a key way of producing metropolitan imaginaries of colonial expansion, and often blended in popular discourse with reality. For example, an 1888 Spectator article referring to a factual report of an attack on a mission station in Zambia, reports that the attack is a 'rewritten' account of the popular novel of that time 'Allan Quatermain', which is set in Kenya: 'The Times of Monday last contains the account of an attack upon an African mission station, related in perfect simplicity by one of the chief actors, which is simply chapters iii. to viii. in 'Allan Quatermain' rewritten'(*The Spectator Archive*, 1888). The popular novel, Allan Quatermain, centres on the massacre of a Maasai village, in defence of a young girl 'Flossie', who is kidnapped by the Maasai. As an article from 1895 states: 'the scenes in the un- discovered land are poor when compared with that bloodiest and most exciting of all descriptions, the massacre of a tribe of the fighting Masai, because they threatened the life of a single white child' (*The Spectator Archive*, 1895). Representation of the Maasai in Allan Quatermain can be seen to be exemplary of both 'black peril. The hysteria among whites over black on-white rape' (Shadle, 2015: 9), and the representation of the Maasai as a martial people, which was prevalent at the time.

Real resistance from the Maasai to the construction of the Uganda railway posed an obstacle to the British colonisation of Kenya, and also provided fodder for this colonial representation of the Maasai as a martial race. In 1896, news of a Maasai attack on a caravan reached Parliament and served as a rally to existing opposition to the Uganda railway. Summarising the incident, Mr. Curzon states that: 'A large caravan of Swaheli porters was returning to the coast when some of their number made an irruption at night into a Masai camp. Upon this a large number of the Masai rushed to their arms, and practically butchered the whole caravan. It was a most

lamentable incident, but it arose out of a nocturnal blunder' (HC Debate, 2 July 1896). This incident was brought up multiple times that year by opponents to the railway, most significantly by Mr. Labouchere (a known critic of the Uganda railway). As Mr. Curzon, complained 'Hon. Members opposite are never tired of telling us that the construction of this railway is going to be threatened and retarded by the raids of the Masai tribes' (HC Debate, 2 July 1896). These attacks by the Maasai did not prevent the construction of the railway, and the representation of events such as these may have contributed to the popular imagination of the Maasai as a 'martial race', and legitimated further colonial violence. One commentator, arguing for the recruitment of Maasai as 'sepoys', stated: 'When civilisation comes into contact with a race of this kind it must either enlist or exterminate' (*The Spectator Archive*, 1898).

Represented as simultaneously martial and predatory, it was the pastoralism of the Maasai that cemented their representation as 'noble savages'. As Will Jackson argues, '[t]hat theirs was a pastoral and not an agricultural way of life ruled out their incorporation into the settler economy' (Jackson, 2016: 232). Thus, while they posed a real obstacle to the building of the railway and establishing settler farms, they also captured imagination in 'the romantic tradition of a 'noble savage' immune from corruptive modern life' (Jackson, 2016: 234-235). Paradoxically, it was the nomadism of the Maasai that was used to justify the alienation of their land, in the name of conserving Maasai culture along with Kenyan wildlife, as part of a nascent tourist infrastructure based around game reserves, as I unpack below.

Romanticised representations of the Maasai as pastoral and close to nature were part of a wider politics of associating them with primitivism and excluding the Maasai from political life. As Sam Opondo (2008: 60) outlines, in Eurocentric and colonial representation, 'African modes of life are put in another time, associated with either earlier periods of individual life (childhood) or of human history (primitivism), thus advocating their exclusion from modern or urban forms of life'. The political implications of this are illustrated through analysis of Karen Blixen's autobiography, Out of Africa, popularised in a film in 1985. In Out of Africa, Blixen's settlement

in Maasai country, is represented as 'a 'farm in Africa at the foot of the Ngong Hills' where the Maasai are seen as being co-extensive with the African landscape' (Opondo, 2008: 63). Making the Maasai appear as part of nature, makes the alienation of their land for European settlement appear natural.

Historically, the growth of tourism in British East Africa functioned partly through the touristification of the Maasai. For example, a feature film of Theodor Roosevelt's 1909 Safari in East Africa included significant footage of Maasai, wrongly referred to as 'Zulu' in the captions (*Theodore Roosevelt's camp in Africa*, 1909). This suggests that footage of the Maasai was part of the symbolism of the 'great white hunters' at the time (Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 208). This also points to the ways that tourism connected British East Africa to a wider 'Anglo-world' of white supremacy (Bell, 2020; Lake and Reynolds, 2008), beyond the British Empire, through the mythology of 'great white hunters', such as Roosevelt. While tourists are often viewed as epiphenomenal to the societies that they visit, Roosevelt's visit to British East Africa was part of a conscious effort to promote transversal white solidarity, and society. The circulation of tourists was one form of mobility within entangled political projects, spanning European empires, settler colonial Anglo-alliances, and an emerging 'international 'order. These projects functioned through circulation, rather than sedentarism, as well as involving territoriality.

Land alienation

While the Maasai are represented as 'nomadic', they were also recognised as a political society which involved both mobility and claims to land and territory. When the British began imperial expansion in East Africa, the area between the Swahili coast and Uganda was not empty, but was recognised as Maasai grazing land, and commonly known by the British as 'Masai-land' (L Hughes, 2006). For example, 'setting out from the Swahili Coast, in 1884, Joseph Thomson led an exploration as an agent of the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) with the object of ascertaining 'if a practicable direct route existed through the Masai country to the Lake' (*The Times* in Gjersø, 2015: 833).

Despite recognition of East African highlands as 'Maasailand' (Hughes, 2006: 3), British settlers wanted access to the land for settlement. This was part of a wider politics of the enclosure of the most productive farmland in the Highlands for European settlers, along with the racialised segregation of Nairobi (Nangulu-Ayuku, 2000). In 1903, Lord Delamere, an informal leader of the white settler community, was granted a 100,000-acre land grant in the Rift Valley, which had previously been rejected due to Maasai rights. This was the first and largest significant land grant in the region (Hughes, 2006: 27). Shortly afterwards, in 1904-5, and 1911, agreements were made with the Maasai under unequal circumstances which forcibly moved some Maasai people out of their grazing lands and into two nature reserves, to clear land for white settlement (Hughes, 2006: 5). Originally, some Maasai were moved to the 'Northern Reserve' 'to which half of the Kenya Maasai had been moved in order to free their original lands near the newly-completed Uganda Railway for white settlement' (Hughes 2006: 5). However, under the second Maasai treaty in 1911 'the legal status of Leroghi became that of unalienated crown land. Lotte Hughes has estimated that the Maasai lost 50 to 70 percent of the land they had used through these moves' (Hughes 2006: 6). The Maasai contested these moves in court (Hughes 2006: 6), and as much of the land was never settled, claims to the land continue to be made by other groups including the Samburu (Duder and Simpson, 1997). Maasai and Samburu claims to use of the land point to attempts at a level of control over a geographic area, or a form of territoriality. But, in a period of a few decades, British imperialism, constituted through mobility, had made claims to territoriality, which continue to be contested with little success.

The Maasai moves were controversial in Britain, and debates over their justifiability partly hinged on references to the Maasai as 'nomadic'. Land laws in British East Africa meant that 'natives' were not able to own land. In a parliamentary debate, Conservative MP Ormsby-Gore stated that critics were 'splitting hairs on the word 'owned'', explaining that '[a]ccording to the view expressed in what is known as the 'Barth judgment', all land in native occupation in Kenya has become Crown land, and is the property of the State and not of the individual' (HC Debate,

17 July 1907). The alienation of the Maasai from crown land, which was then often leased to white settlers, was in part justified through references to the Maasai as 'nomadic'.

For example, speaking in 1907, Winston Churchill, then a Conservative MP, stated that '[t]he area from which the Masai were removed was nominally about 920,000 acres. I say 'nominally' because the Masai, being a nomad pastoral tribe and having no fixed abode, occupied at one time or another all grazing land in that part of East Africa, the areas so occupied being however very much in excess of their present requirements' (HC Debate, 17 July 1907). In justifying the removal of the Maasai from their grazing grounds, Churchill acknowledged that '[t]he Masai affected by this arrangement numbered about 11,200 souls. The number of white settlers in the area is at present forty-eight', which undermines the idea that the Maasai had too much land available to them (HC Debate, 17 July 1907). In 1929, Ormsby-Gore drew on this argument again, describing the Maasai as 'nomadic and warlike', a 'wandering tribe… small in numbers but making claims to enormous areas of country', and arguing that 'they have never cultivated or used the land at all' (HC Debate, 30 April 1929). In contrast, MPs asked whether it would be possible to put Kikuyu land 'in the hands of trustees so that they should not be alienated' (HC Debate, 17 July 1907), illustrating a link between perceived nomadism and the possibility of land alienation. However, it is important to note that Kikuyu land was in fact alienated as well, illustrating the limits of this defence.

By presenting the Maasai as 'nomadic', and with 'no fixed abode', British MPs were able to justify the alienation of Maasai grazing grounds, even though it was then leased to a far smaller number of white settlers. At the same time, settler colonial society was characterised by circulation and mobility as much as fixity, and the tourists who settlers depended on were part of colonial society. The creation of nature reserves, and the 'conservation' of the Maasai were part of a tourist infrastructure. Tourism is often understood as a form of mobility which is epiphenomenal to geographically contained societies that are travelled between. However, in the case of the British Empire, tourism was an integral form of mobility within a continuous society,

encompassing colony and metropole. Tourism in the British Empire is one form of mobility and circulation through which imperial society functioned and can illustrate one way in which the imperial state was not a fixed or 'sedentarist' polity.

Tourism and 'zoological gardens' for the Maasai

Tourism was an integral part of colonial society in British East Africa. It was seen as a way to attract income, legitimacy, and settlers for the colony. By the early 1900s 'hunting had also become a big-time business' and attracting tourism was seen by both colonial and metropolitan governments as a way to make a return on the expensive and controversial Uganda Railway (Waithaka, 2012: 25). Will Jackson observes that 'the Uganda railway attracted as many hunters as it did settlers, and not only from Britain – a significant proportion coming from continental Europe and the USA' (Jackson, 2016: 255). This was seen as a potential way to recover the costs of building the railway. For example, in an April 1914 debate in the House of Commons on the East Africa Protectorates Bill, Earl Winterton noted that 'the tourist traffic of Africa was a very valuable revenue, producing part of the income of the railway', and Mr. Harcourt argued for increasing tourist comfort, not only because 'they bring money into the district', but also 'in many cases they remain as settlers in the country which they came originally only to visit' (HC Debate, 7 April 1914). By 1903, Thomas Cook 'launched its first Tour of East Africa, taking visitors from the Nile to Mombasa via the recently completed Uganda railway' (Jackson, 2016: 233). The maintenance of imperial power relations in British East Africa functioned through the mobility of elite tourists, who generated income, a positive reputation for the colony, and encouraged settlement. Tourists can be understood as an integral part of imperial politics, moving within a continuous realm of power relations, rather than hopping between two separate and sedentary polities.

Tourism and the alienation of Maasai lands intersected in the enclosure of the Maasai in newly created nature reserves. The creation of nature reserves responded to controversy over the rise in hunting due to settler colonialism, and a perceived need to conserve wildlife to attract tourism.

White settlers hunting 'for the pot', as well as big game hunters, were controversial at the time (Jackson 2016: 234). This is evidenced by the establishment in 1903 of the 'Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire' by British conservationists anxious about the effects of settler agriculture (Akama, 1998: 105). It is notable that the preservation of wildlife was originally intended for the benefit of tourists, and not settlers. However, despite themselves posing the main threat to the ecosystem, settlers styled themselves as conservationists, whose role in protecting nature became part of the justification for their presence. This form of white saviourism associated with conservationism is an ongoing issue in Kenya (Mbaria and Ogada, 2016), and white conservationists such as Richard Leakey, David Sheldrick, and Joy Adamson, who are now all dead, are still the visible faces of museums and wildlife reserves in Kenya that tourists encounter.

Addressing the double issue of Maasai presence on land wanted for settlement, and wildlife conservation, Lord Delamere proposed combining the creation of game reserves with Maasai reserves 'on the basis that [the Maasai] lived harmoniously in nature. Theirs was not a hunting culture, he observed; the Maasai and their stocks lived sustainably amongst wild animals' (Jackson 2016: 235). Jackson (2016: 235) has argued that, on other occasions, 'Delamere was opposed to the segregation of Africans and Europeans what he referred to as the 'zoological gardens policy', however, 'he was prepared to make an exception for the Maasai. By 'conserving' the Maasai within nature reserves they were rendered on a par with nature, a part of the ecosystem to be preserved, rather than as political actors. It is significant that this was not only carried out in the name of land settlement, but in the interests of tourism and transversal circulation.

The circulation of tourists and hunters in British East Africa was an integral part of the settler colonial project, in terms of economy, identity, and connections to wider political worlds and societies. It illustrates that settler colonialism was not a 'sedentarist' project, but one that functioned in relation with the British metropole, as well as a wider Anglo-world of white

solidarity. It was the circulation of settlers and tourists that facilitated these relations. At the same time, settler colonialism included practices of territorialisation, such as the alienation of Maasai land, and the enclosure of the Maasai in wildlife reserves for tourists. The relations between tourism and wildlife conservation illustrate how territoriality does not imply sedentarism, but, in an imperial context, functions through mobility. It also illustrates the way that tourism both facilitated, and legitimised, colonial politics. The representation of the Maasai as a nomadic people contributed to narratives which attracted tourists, which facilitated settler colonialism and the alienation of Maasai land. By reproducing the nomadism-sedentarism binary, research on nomads hides the role of imperial mobilities in constituting apparently 'sedentary' states, and risks further reifying the exoticisation of nomadic 'others'.

Conclusions

By highlighting this history of the displacement of the Maasai and its contemporary resonances, this chapter aims to open up debates about the ways that people in movement constitute dispersed political relations, which exceed state-centric understandings of nation and empire. At the same time, these mobilities are often occluded through the romanticisation of nomadic 'others', such as the Maasai, in part through ongoing touristic narratives, which are themselves generated through circulation. This develops the two core theoretical arguments of this thesis. First, it emphasises how a 'mobilities imaginary' prevalent in academic work is political not only in the way that movement tends to be defined in relation to fixed understandings of territory, but also the politics of making some forms of mobility visible, in opposition to an apparent norm of sedentarism. Second, it built on the argument that a core paradox of Western world order is its dependence on movement, but definition in relation to a norm of sedentary states. As I illustrated in this chapter, the Maasai were no more or less 'mobile' than the imperial settlers and tourists, without whom the colonisation of British East Africa would not have been possible. However, the exoticisation of the Maasai as a 'mobile' or 'nomadic' society makes their mobility appear exceptional.

Empirically, this chapter begins to draw together distinct threads of the thesis. The colonisation of British East Africa was coeval with the period leading up to World War One, and the recategorisation of people in movement as 'migrants', 'tourists', and 'refugees' by the League of Nations. This chapter illustrates the political utility of 'tourism' in this period. On one hand, the representation of the Maasai as 'enemies of mankind' is evocative of earlier representations of pirates as another mobile group. At the same time, the containment of the Maasai in nature reserves, and the role of tourism in the regulation and categorisation of people in movement, points to representations of the Maasai as nomadic as co-constitutive of specifically twentieth-century organisations of people in movement. This points to overlaps between late imperial and international regulation and categorisation of people in movement. This is a question that I now turn to in relation to calls for the decolonisation of the Chagos Islands, and the contested displacement of the islanders in the 1960s and 1970s.

8. Decolonisation and the displacement of the Chagos Islanders

In 1968, when Mauritius gained independence from the UK, the UK maintained sovereignty over the Chagos Islands. The islands had been excised from Mauritius in 1965 and made into the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). In a secret agreement, the US and UK set up a military facility on the largest island, Diego Garcia, which UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) memos at the time stated, 'you can say… will in no way constitute a base' (TNA FCO 37/388). This agreement depended on the depopulation of the islands, and, as an FCO official lamented, 'along with the Birds go some few Tarzans or Men Fridays whose origins are obscure, and who are being hopefully wished on to Mauritius etc' (D. A. Greenhill, in Vine, 2011: 91). The inhabitants posed a problem, which the FCO wanted to resolve as discreetly as possible. As one official commented: 'The object of the exercise was to get some rocks which will remain ours; there will be no indigenous population except seagulls' (Sir Paul Gore-Booth in Vine, 2011: 91). By 1973, the islanders had all been displaced. Over fifty years later, 81-year-old Chagossian Samynaden Rosemond told reporters '[w]e're like birds flying over the ocean, and we have nowhere to land. We must keep flying until we die' (*BBC News*, 2019). The islands were left with no indigenous population except birds, and the islanders, like birds, were flown away.

As I unpack in this chapter, debates over the displacement of the Chagos islanders as a 'floating population' of 'contract workers', get to the core of the way that understandings of movement and stasis produce political possibilities, in ways that go beyond this specific site. On one hand, the FCO attempted to legitimise the displacement by denying the longevity of the islanders' presence on the island, and the distinctness of a 'Chagossian' (or 'Ilois') identity category. On the other hand, legal arguments contesting the displacement hinge on understandings of belonging linked to permanence and a discrete 'indigenous' identity. Both of these positions produce and reflect an understanding of political legitimacy linked to sedentarism and identity-based claims to territory. As I explore in this chapter, both of these approaches leave

open the question of the possibility of making claims to political legitimacy from an explicit position of itinerancy, and the challenge this poses to making sense of postcolonial politics in an apparently international order.

This bridges the arguments that I have developed throughout this thesis. First, that 'the West' as a world order is produced in movement but makes claims to political authority in relation to sedentarism. Second, that understandings of movement set the terms of political order. Debates over the displacement of the Chagossians are exemplary of both of these arguments, as they illustrate an association of political legitimacy with stasis, while demonstrating that this is a myth. The debates produce an understanding of the political that links the ability to make political claims to ties to territory linked with a contained or discrete understanding of identity. Equally, as descendants of enslaved and indentured labourers whose mobility was part of an imperial world order, the Chagossians displacement is now being contested on the terms of an international order. It demonstrates that the myth of an international world based on ethnic and territorial containment is not compatible with the postcolonial realities that constitute this world order.

The chapter explores how both the displacement of the islanders, and the contestation of this displacement, hinge on the question of political belonging, understood in relation to movement. It argues that the conceptual framework of an international order, which understands sedentarism as the basis of the political, does not only limit analytical understandings of contemporary politics, but also limits the political possibilities for making political arguments on an explicit basis of itinerancy.

While existing academic work has largely focused on the legality of both the excision of the islands from Mauritius, and the expulsion of the islanders, this chapter unpacks these debates from an alternative perspective. It focuses on how the justification and contestation of the islanders' displacement relate to claims about their status as 'belongers' on the island, linked to

representations of the Chagossians as a mobile versus settled population, and as a discrete homogenous and indigenous 'people'. It is also worth noting that I focus on legal debates over the Chagos islanders, and not with the islanders' self-representations.

To carry out this analysis, I primarily draw on secondary analysis of UK government documents, communications, and legal documents on the Islands and the ongoing legal cases. Many of these documents have been recently released by the National Archives, were made available through FOI requests associated with the legal cases or were leaked through Wikileaks. I also supplement secondary sources with a consultation of current UK Government public communications, and parliamentary reports. This analysis also draws on one FCO file (FCO 37/388) of approximately 150 pages of internal FCO materials from 1968 and 1969.

It is important to note that FCO documents and legal arguments hinge on distinctions between the islands' inhabitants as 'Ilois' (or, interchangeably, 'Chagossian'), 'Mauritian', and 'Seychelloise'. I engage further with the politics of these distinctions, but for analytic purposes, when I refer to 'Ilois' or 'Chagossians', this is intended to refer to people who are understood by themselves and others as 'Chagossian' in the present or were categorised as 'Ilois' by the FCO. The categories of 'Ilois' and 'Chagossian' tend to be understood in contrast to identities of 'Mauritian' and 'Seychelloise'. When I refer to 'Chagos islanders', or 'the islands' inhabitants' this is a looser framing that does not engage with specific identity categories but refers to all those who lived on the islands.

Debates over the displacement of the islanders, and the indigenous status of the Chagossians, resonate with wider debates over understandings of 'indigenous' (or 'native') political positions, and their relations with 'migrant', or 'settler', groups. As a group of people descended from enslaved and indentured labourers, who are making a claim to indigeneity, the Chagossians represent a group in between 'migrants', 'settlers', and 'natives'. By staking a claim to indigenous status, these legal arguments make an intervention into a debate between Mahmood

Mamdani and Nandita Sharma. On one hand, Sharma identifies 'Indigenous-Natives', and 'Migrant-Natives' as two forms of colonial category, arguing that 'Empires bifurcated colonized Natives and defined one group—Indigenous-Natives—as both temporally and spatially static. Another group of colonized Natives—Migrant-Natives—was defined by their mobility' (2020: 36). For Sharma, the primary colonial distinction was between 'coloniser' and 'native', with 'migrant' sometimes included in the category of native (2021: 3).

On the other hand, Mamdani distinguishes between 'ethnic natives', and 'ethnic migrants', exploring how European authorities in colonial Africa introduced 'customary law privileging the ethnic native while discriminating against the ethnic migrant' (Mamdani, 2012: 7). This emphasises the distinction between 'migrant' and 'native' in colonial categorisation, while both can be understood as 'ethnic'. He further distinguishes between natives and migrants in relation to South Africa, arguing that '[t]he apartheid census politicised a series of distinctions. The census began with a primary distinction between natives and immigrants – the former said to be indigenous and the latter not indigenous. Immigrants were classified into so many races, and natives into so many tribes. This distinction came to be at the heart of apartheid governance of races and tribes' (Mamdani, 2021).

This has led to a debate between Sharma and Mamdani, with Sharma (2021) suggesting that Mamdani conflates descendants of enslaved and indentured people with 'settlers', and Mamdani (2021) suggesting that Sharma reifies migrants into the category of 'native', and turning 'indigeneity' into a generalised and universalised metaphor. The case of the Chagossians intervenes directly into these debates, by constituting an example of a population descended from enslaved and indentured labourers, who are making a claim to indigenous status. By doing so, they dislocate the category of 'indigenous' from a claim to nativity. But, as I unpack below, these claims evoke understandings of permanent occupancy and attachment to an ancestral homeland. This has implications for the debates in Kenya or the US, for example, by opening questions about whether other descendants of enslaved and indentured labourers could make similar claims

to indigenous status, and what this would mean for understandings of 'native', 'settler', and 'migrant'.

This chapter proceeds in three stages. First, I give a brief overview of the history of the islands and the current legal controversies. Second, I outline the centrality of representations of the Chagossians as a mobile people to the attempted justification of their displacement. Third, I outline the centrality of the 'permanence' of the Chagossians as a discrete indigenous population to the legal contestation of their displacement. I conclude by drawing out the implications for the role of understandings of movement and stasis in producing political possibilities.

i) An overview of the islands

The Chagos Islands, which had been uninhabited until their settlement by the French, and the establishment of a copra factory in 1785 (Stoddart, 1971), were known as the 'oil islands' because of the coconut plantations and their produce (Khalili, 2023). The first inhabitants were French colonisers and enslaved labourers, later replaced with indentured labourers. In 1814 sovereignty over present-day Mauritius, the Seychelles, and the Chagos Islands, was ceded to Britain, and the islands were governed as part of the Mauritius Colony. In 1965, in a controversial agreement, the UK excised the islands from Mauritius, and created the BIOT, shortly before Mauritian independence in 1968. Diego Garcia, the largest island in the archipelago, is now the site of a US-UK military facility.

Image 8: Map of the British Indian Ocean Territory (British Indian Ocean Territory, n.d.)

The islands have been at the centre of legal controversies for over fifty years. These roughly cover three areas: 1) the excision of the archipelago in 1965 and claims to sovereignty by Mauritius and the UK; 2) the islanders' right to return (or right to abode) on the islands, and relatedly, 3) the legality of establishing a 'Marine Protected Area' (MPA) extending 250,000 square miles around the BIOT in 2009. Establishing the MPA is perceived as a way to continue to prevent the resettlement of the islands by the Chagossians. This is supported by a leaked US embassy cable suggested that '[e]stablishing a marine reserve might indeed, as the FCO's [Colin] Roberts stated, be the most effective long-term way to prevent any of the Chagos Islands' former inhabitants or descendants from resettling' (Pilger, 2019). This parallels, to an extent, the alienation of Maasai-land through conservation, that I explored in Chapter Seven.

There are multiple legal debates taking place over the status of the sovereignty of the islands, and of the islanders' right to abode on the islands. These encompass cases in British public law, as well as customary international law (CIL), and are complicated by disputes over whether European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) legislation applies to the BIOT due to legal loopholes (Allen, 2018a).

In 2019, an International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion concluded that: 'the process of decolonization of Mauritius was not lawfully completed when that country acceded to independence' and that 'the United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible' (ICJ, 2019). This led to a vote in the UN General Assembly, 116 in favour to 6 against, calling for the complete decolonization of Mauritius, and 'demanding that the United Kingdom unconditionally withdraw its colonial administration from the area within six months' (UN Press, 2019). This was disputed by the UK representative, who suggested this was a bilateral sovereignty dispute between the UK and Mauritius and noted that advisory opinions were not legally binding.

The transfer of sovereignty to Mauritius would not necessarily resolve the question of Chagossian resettlement, nor the presence of the US military facility on Diego Garcia. This means that both UN and academic calls to 'decolonise' the islands may involve retaining the US military base (Harris, 2021).. The lack of commitment from Mauritian officials to resettling the islanders, along with their alleged agreement with India to establish an Indian military facility on Agalega, another nearby island, has led commentators to distinguish between Mauritian and Chagossian interests (Allen, 2018b).

The geopolitical significance of Diego Garcia is linked to the materiality of its position in the Indian Ocean, as well as constructions of maritime law, and legal grey areas relating to territory. These are areas that I sketched in relation to the present-day significance of the Indian Ocean World, as well as seventeenth-century debates over piracy, which constituted a distinct realm of maritime law. The legal ambiguities of the Chagos Islands mean that Diego Garcia has also attracted controversy due to its role in US renditions of terrorist suspects (*Reuters*, 2008). It is also at the centre of debates over the UK's increasing rejection of international asylum norms, where Tamil refugees have been staying in prison-like conditions on the island since 2021, where they fall outside of the UN's 1951 Refugee Convention due to the legal loopholes associated with the territory (Syal and editor, 2022; The New Humanitarian, 2022).

Within this collection of legal cases and public debates, this chapter focuses on arguments over the displacement and resettlement of the islanders. It does not focus on the legality of the displacement, which seems clearly illegal, but on how its contestation produces understandings of political order.

These debates are significant in relation to the question of whether it is possible, in an international order, to make claims to political legitimacy on the basis of itinerancy. This has implications for the Chagos islanders, whose presence on the islands as descendants of enslaved and indentured labourers is linked to a colonial system of mobility, rather than a national myth of

sedentarism. At the same time, it illustrates that the US and UK presence on the islands is no more a result of timeless national belonging and is another iteration of imperial diaspora that I addressed in Chapter Three, one that is central to the projection of the 'nation' in the metropole. These issues resonate with contemporary debates on migrant rights, indigeneity, nationalism, Zionism, and the afterlives of empire, as they get to the heart of the question of whether it is possible, in an international world that is *made in movement* to make political claims on the basis of movement, without invoking an ethnic territory as the source of authority. Or, whether the basis of political 'belonging' is limited to a fantasy of settled and essentialist national groups linked to (if not contained within) a national 'homeland'.

As descendants of enslaved and indigenous labourers, making claims to political rights through an international legal framework, the Chagos islanders bring together the colonial and international regulation of people in movement. They bridge two world orders, produced in opposition to distinct understandings of movement and stasis. On one hand, their presence on the islands, as descendants of enslaved and indentured labourers, results from a colonial regulation and categorisation of people in movement. At the same time, their claims through international law to the right to return to the islands are constituted in relation to an international order, which draws on a myth of sedentarism as the basis of political belonging. On one hand, they demonstrate the incompatibilities between the realities of postcolonial politics, and an international interpretive framework. At the same time, they demonstrate a continuity between colonial and international understandings of people in movement, which both obscure the political significance of movement by interpreting it in relation to an understanding of territorial belonging.

To develop this analysis, the chapter explores understandings of the islanders as 'mobile' or 'settled', and as a discrete or indigenous population, in both the displacement of the islanders and the contestation of this displacement. Broadly, it suggests that attempts to legitimise the displacement of the islanders represented the islanders as a 'mobile' population, and as part of a

broader Mauritian population. At the same time, attempts to contest the displacement emphasise the longevity of the islanders' inhabitation of the island, and their identity as a discrete 'indigenous' population, rather than a Mauritian 'minority'. Without critiquing the Chagossians for mobilising these arguments within international law, I emphasise that these terms of debate are internal to, and productive of, an international order. Within this order, claims to political legitimacy are based on essentialist understandings of land claims linked to ethnic identity, and which make movement appear to be an exception to a norm of settled societies.

ii) Understandings of movement in the displacement of the islanders

In this section I develop the argument that representations of the islanders as a settled or mobile population are at the core of the contestation of their displacement. This produces an implicit understanding of political legitimacy as deriving from sedentarism, even when the islanders were displaced to make way for an equally mobile political entity: empire. This section unpacks this argument in four stages. First, it sketches the centrality of the legal category of 'immigration' for facilitating the displacement of the islanders. Second, it shows how an understanding of the islanders as 'mobile' was used internally and externally to justify their displacement by the FCO. Third, it illustrates how this involved denying the existence of a distinct 'Ilois' identity category. These are points I expand on in the final section of this chapter, to show that both the displacement and its contestation hinge on implicit understandings of political legitimacy deriving from sedentarism and a discrete (possibly ethnic) identity-based claim to belonging in territory.

The displacement of the Chagos islanders was made possible through the international regulation and categorisation of people in movement as 'immigration'. While the islanders had been prevented from accessing the island through a variety of means since 1968, a 1971 Immigration Ordinance 'made it unlawful for a person to enter or remain in BIOT without a permit and allowed those remaining to be removed' (History | British Indian Ocean Territory, n.d.). This made it a criminal offence for any Chagossian to remain on the islands, or for anyone to be on

the islands without a permit (Gifford, 2007). In 2004, the UK Government used immigration legislation again, enacting Constitutional and Immigration Orders which denied the islanders' right of abode, which had been recognised in an earlier case (Allen, 2008: 685). This is indicative of the way that 'immigration' is a category that not only functions to filter people in movement at the border but is also mobilised in legislation that affects the legal status of people within a territory, or facilitates displacement.

In addition, attempts to legitimise the displacement rested on the representation of the islanders as mobile. This produces an implicit understanding of sedentarism as the normal basis of political belonging, by implying that a mobile population may not have grounds to dispute their displacement. This is illustrated by the attempted justification of the removal of the islands' inhabitants in relation to what was called the representation of the inhabitants as a 'floating population' with no claim to belonging on the islands. As I unpack below, this was linked to the denial of the existence of an 'Ilois' (or 'Chagossian') identity category, understood to be distinct to 'Mauritian' or 'Seychelloise'.

Evidence shows that FCO officials were aware that many of the islanders had multi-generational attachments to the islands, but representations of the islanders as a mobile population were used to justify their displacement, both internally and externally. This might account for the lack of anticipation of the level of contestation of the islanders' displacement, which the FCO hoped would be carried out in a discreet way, so that 'The removal of the rest of the Chagos population… [would] attract the minimum outside interest' (TNA, 37/388). One official anticipated that this would not disturb the islanders, as 'The copra plantation workers are quite used to being moved about…. [and are] unlikely to be disturbed by change of location providing that there is no deterioration in their living standards' (K.R. Whithall, in TNA, 37/388). This suggests that an understanding of the islanders as being used to moving, despite many of the islanders having been born on the islands, may have made their displacement thinkable and actionable.

The representation of the islanders as mobile was also used to justify their displacement externally. Beyond this specific case, this produces an implicit understanding of sedentarism as the basis for political participation, by legitimising the islanders' displacement in relation to their apparent mobility. Internal FCO communications reflect this strategy to represent the islanders as a 'transient' 'floating population' of 'contract workers'. Describing this narrative, the Secretary of State for the Colonies wrote that '[t]he legal position of the inhabitants would be greatly simplified from our point of view—though not necessarily from theirs…if we decided to treat them as a *floating population*' (Francis Pakenham, in Vine, 2009: 91 emphasis added). This was related to denying the existence of an 'Ilois' identity category.

Representing the islanders as a 'floating population' meant denying the existence of an 'Ilois' or 'Chagossian' identity category and representing the islanders as 'contract workers' from Mauritius or the Seychelles. Critical of this approach, another FCO official noted: 'We then find, apart from the *transients*, up to 240 'ilois'* whom we propose either to resettle (with how much vigour of persuasion?) or to certify, more or less fraudulently, as belonging somewhere else' (Brooke Turner in Vine, 2009: 91, emphasis added). Moreover, aside from the fact that representing the islanders as a transient or floating population was understood to be 'more or less fraudulent', this also reflects the way that a 'transient' population was believed to be easier to displace than a settled one.

The 'Ilois' category was widely used in internal FCO documents, which differentiated between the population of the archipelago as 'Ilois' 'Seychellois' and 'Mauritians'(see 'Image 9'). They not only categorised the majority of the islanders as 'ilois', but also noted that 'some of whom have lived on the atolls for 2 or 3 generations' (TNA, 37/388). In addition, many of those categorised as 'Mauritian' were born on the Chagos islands, and, officials noted, might also be considered 'Ilois'. This was a reality the officials wanted to hide, noting that 'some of the contract labourers of Mauritian origin have lived on the islands for one or two generations and

(although this should not be admitted to the Mauritian Prime Minister) are dual citizens of Mauritius and the UK and colonies' (TNA, 37/388).

It is important to note, that the practice of categorising subjects by ethnic or national group, was an administrative technique of colonial rule. It did not merely 'reflect' identity positions, but 'defined and ruled', by classifying 'natives' into tribal and ethnic groups, linked to rights and homelands (Mamdani, 2012: 7)[32]. Addressing the question of the relation between administrative category, and identity position in relation to the question of 'tribes', Mamdani asks: 'Did tribe exist before colonialism? If we understand by tribe an ethnic group with a common language, it did. but tribe as an administrative entity that distinguishes between natives and non-natives and systematically discriminates in favor of the former and against the latter—defining access to land and participation in local governance and rules for settling disputes according to tribal identity—certainly did not exist before colonialism' (Mamdani, 2012: 73). The administrative category of 'Ilois' was a politicisation of identity. One that was then erased, in an equally politicised manoeuvre.

---

[32] Note that Mamdani distinguishes between colonial 'tribal' distinctions between 'natives', and racial distinctions between 'migrants'. I don't enter into these distinctions here because for the purposes of my argument the tribal distinctions provide a parallel for forms of classification that 'freeze' identities in time.

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5. Population

        (a)  Details of the population including family size and
citizenship are given in Appendix V.  Compared to the figures for
March 1967, the total population shows a decrease of 155.  The
details of this decrease are as follows:-

                              Change in Number of
                              Adults  Children  Total

        Seychellois            -26      +6       -20

        Mauritians             -33      -18      -51

        Ilois                  -56      -28      -84

        Total                 -115      -40     -155

As can be seen, the main decrease is in the number of Mauritians
and Ilois on the islands.  This is due to communications with the
island now being confined for commercial reasons to Mahe.
```

Image 9: 'Seychellois', 'Mauritians', and 'Ilois' identity categories (TNA 37/388)

In order to distribute all of the islanders between Mauritius and the Seychelles, the officials suggested that no references be made to a distinct 'ilois' group in communications with Mauritius. This posed a challenge, as one plan was to resettle the Ilois onto Agalega, but officials were not able to explicitly recruit 'Ilois' people for this, leading one official to suggest that 'Ilois in this case may be widely interpreted as those with *experience on islands* but can't do better without attracting undesirable attention' (TNA, 37/388). In opposition, as I expand on below, the legal arguments contesting the islanders' displacement also hinge on reconstituting a discreet 'Ilois' identity as an indigenous people. The significance of both the denial and the reclamation of an 'Ilois' identity category is that it illustrates the political links between discrete identities and claims to territorial belonging. On the terms of this argument, if the islanders *had* all been able to trace their ancestors to the Seychelles or Mauritius, their displacement may have been more justifiable, which highlights the centrality of the links between territory and discrete identity in an international imaginary.

S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT.A   **TOP COPY**
IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE   TO SEYCHELLES
TELNO.BIOT 39   25 AUGUST, 1969
                                                     (HPN 18/1)

S E C R E T - U.K. COMMS. ONLY.

ADDRESSED TO GOVERNOR SEYCHELLES TELEGRAM NO. BIOT 39 OF 25/8
RPTD FOR INFO TO PORT LOUIS.

93 - YOUR TELEGRAM NO.BIOT 34: AGALEGA.
WHILE REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF RELOCATING CHAGOS INHABITANTS
THE MOVEMENT OF 50 FAMILIES FROM MAURITIUS COULD ASSIST IN THE
RESETTLEMENT OF THOSE PERSONS FORMERLY RESIDENT IN BIOT WHO
RETURNED TO MAURITIUS IN 1967 AND 1968.
2. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, PREFER ILOIS TO BE RECRUITED BUT AS WE
DO NOT WISH TO MAKE ANY DISTINCTION BETWEEN ILOIS AND MONO

90 - MAURITIANS (WHITHALL'S LETTER OF 8 AUGUST TO TODD REFERS), WE
WOULD NOT WISH TO PLACE ANY EMPHASIS ON THE GROUP TO BE RECRUITED.
IN THE CONTEXT OF RELIEVING THE SITUATION IN MAURITIUS, HOWEVER,
WE WOULD HOPE THAT NUMBERS CAN BE DRAWN FROM THOSE WHO HAVE
RECENTLY RETURNED FROM CHAGOS. WE APPRECIATE THAT HOULINIE
MAY HAVE THIS IN MIND BUT WE HOPE THERE IS STILL TIME FOR YOU
TO DISCUSS WITH HIM AND IF NECESSARY FOR ROGERS TO BE INSTRUCTED.
ACCORDINGLY.

STEWART

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S E C R E T

GGGGG

/ . . . .

Image 10: Illustrates preference for recruiting Ilois but not referring to them as 'Ilois' (TNA 37/388)

The representation of the Chagos islanders as a 'floating population' of 'contract workers' who were *returning* to their places of belonging in the Seychelles or Mauritius was not specific to the 1960s but is still the central narrative of UK Government communications. The quote below, from the BIOT gov.uk website, illustrates 1) an acknowledgement that some formerly enslaved people remained on the islands, but 2) emphasises that the population changed over time with the import of contract labour, moving from island to island, and 3) claims that the 'contract workers' *returned* to Mauritius and the Seychelles:

As for the population of the islands, after emancipation some slaves became contract employees; the population changing over time by import of contract labour from Mauritius and, in the 1950s, from Seychelles, so that by the late 1960s, those living on the islands were contract employees of the copra plantations. Neither they, nor those permitted by the plantation owners to remain, owned land or houses. They had licences to reside there at the discretion of the owners and moved from island to island as work required.

The people affected by these closures were the Mauritian and Seychellois contract workers and their families, who were then given the choice of returning to Mauritius or Seychelles. The majority chose Mauritius where they had close ties and were moved between 1968 and 1973 (British Indian Ocean Territory, n.d.)

Despite the now public knowledge that the FCO were aware that many islanders had inhabited the islands for generations, the current government communications continues to represent the islanders as a transient population of contract workers who belong elsewhere. Aside from the inaccuracy of this representation, it is notable that the attempts to present the islanders as a transient population are intended to legitimise their displacement. This produces an opposing understanding of political belonging based on sedentarism.

The statement also links the category of 'contract worker' to mobility', opening up questions about the role of the contract in understandings of belonging. This tracks with the strategy in the 1960s. In 1969, the British Foreign Secretary suggested that Prime Minister Harold Wilson present the move to the UN, as 'a change of employment for contract workers – rather than as a population resettlement' (Pilger, 2004). This representation of 'contract workers', as having no claim to belonging other than a contractual agreement, has implications for contemporary understandings of 'economic migration'. It also ties into debates that I outlined in Chapter Six, on the role of the contract in defining political status and distinguishing between 'free' and 'unfree' labour, in ways that made 'freedom' a technical and legal, rather than moral and political, question. These are questions that require further investigation. For the purposes of this chapter, it is worth noting that the attempted legitimisation of the displacement of the islanders hinged on representing them as transient, and with no identity-based claim to belonging on the islands, linked to an understanding of their relationship to the island as being defined by a contract.

At the core of these debates are not only the questions of whether or not the islanders were 'contract workers', and whether or not they had inhabited the islands for multiple generations, but also the implicit question of whether or not 'contract workers' could make any claim to political belonging. If the workers had been contract workers from Mauritius and the Seychelles, who weren't born on the islands, and who had moved every few years, would it have been possible to dispute their displacement? Although ultimately FCO attempts to move the islanders without attracting attention or controversy were unsuccessful, the belief that a 'floating population' of 'contract workers' would have no grounds on which to dispute their removal is indicative of an understanding of political legitimacy deriving from sedentarism, and not mobility.

The paradox is that the US military base on Diego Garcia is populated by an equally or more mobile population, of soldiers, and Filipino 'contract workers' (*New Internationalist*, 2017),

constituting not only mobile people, but another iteration of a transversal imperial mobile polity. However, by making the Chagos Islanders appear mobile, in opposition to an apparent norm of sedentarism as the basis of political legitimacy, the constitutive role of mobility as the basis of political order is obscured.

iii) Legal contestation of the islanders' displacement

At the same time, the legal contestation of the islanders' displacement hinges on parallel questions of links to territory based on permanence, and the argument that the Chagossians constitute a discrete 'indigenous' people. This analysis is not intended to intervene on whether or not the Chagossians constitute an 'indigenous' people, but on how the framing of political debates in relation to understandings of indigeneity produces understandings of political order[33].

The legal significance of the islanders' status as a permanent population is apparent in analysis of the displacement of the islanders in academic work. For example, Allen argues that the islands were 'inhabited by a permanent population and was thus a non-self-governing territory under Chapter XI of the UN Charter' (Allen, 2008: 690), and critiques the exile of 'the Chagossians from their ancestral homeland' (Allen, 2020: 214). The multi-generational inhabitation of the islands is often emphasised, for example, in Vine's description of the islanders as people who 'built their own houses, inhabited land passed down from generation to generation, and kept vegetable gardens and farm animals' (Vine, 2011: 3). This emphasises the inaccuracy of the FCO's representation of the islanders as transient. However, it also mobilises the same underlying argument, that long-term settlement is the basis of political belonging. It suggests that, in order to make a claim for the islanders' right to resettle the island, it is necessary to represent the Chagossians as a relatively sedentary, rather than mobile, people, with a multi-generational attachment to place.

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[33] This has proximity to wider debates on indigeneity that are outside of the scope of this thesis.

These arguments are linked to the argument that the Chagossians constitute an indigenous people (Vine, 2011). The claim that the Chagossians are an indigenous people is made, for example, by Human Rights Watch, who write that '[t]he Chagossians are a distinct Indigenous people under UN and African standards, including those set out by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights' (*Human Rights Watch*, 2023). As I sketch below, definitions of indigenous people link the political claim to indigenous status to ethnicity and attachment to territory. This analysis is not to question the politics of the choice to mobilise these arguments, as indigenous status would give the Chagossians access to legal arguments which they would not otherwise have access to (Allen, 2014: 288). However, it does illustrate the centrality of linking identity to territory in mobilising indigenous status, in ways that are echoed by international understandings of belonging.

The recognition of the Chagossians as indigenous or not is significant for the legal arguments available for their resettlement, and also because it cleaves the Chagossians' claim to resettle the islands away from the Mauritian state's claim to sovereignty. It is also productive of broader understandings of political order, by linking political possibilities to the establishment of a discrete identity group with links to a territory.

Academic and legal understandings of indigenous status are open to interpretation, but often invoke attachment to place, precolonial belonging, and the existence of a distinct ethnic or cultural group. Drawing on multiple definitions of indigenous status, Allen argues that the Chagossians constitute an indigenous people, in part because of their self-identification as an indigenous people, as well as their 'communal attachments to 'place'; experience of severe disruption, dislocation and exploitation; ongoing oppression/exclusion by dominant societal groups; and distinct ethnic/cultural groups' (Allen, 2014: 284). While more complex, this links indigenous status to an attachment to place, and a distinct ethnic/cultural group.

At the same time, indigenous status is often linked to having a link with pre-colonial societies. For example, the Martinez-Cobo definition of indigenous status involves 'having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories' (Allen, 2014: 283). As descendants of enslaved people, this does not fit with the Chagossians. Based on this definition, the islanders do not fulfil the criteria of historical precedence, nor inhabitation of the islands before colonisation, as French settlers were the first to occupy the islands (Allen, 2014: 286). Related to this, the Mauritian government disputes the claim to indigenous status, because the Chagos Islands were uninhabited until the nineteenth century and argue that the Chagossians should be recognised as a national minority[34], and not an indigenous people (Allen, 2014: 286). This shows that in some ways this understanding of the Chagossians is at odds with a statist international imaginary. At the same time, an understanding of political belonging based on discrete ethnic identity, linked to claims to land and territory in many ways parallels a nationalist world view.

The debate over the Chagossians' indigenous status opens up questions of how indigeneity should be understood, especially in relation to populations whose presence on a territory is a direct result of colonial order. This is relevant for the Chagossians, but also descendants of enslaved and indentured labourers, and other imperial diasporas. Beyond this, the legal implications of indigenous status raise questions about the relations between identity and territory in an international legal framework. On one hand, indigenous status provides a route to legal rights that bypasses the level of the nation-state. At the same time, it draws on arguments associated with the emergence of the nation-state, that I unpacked in Part One, that link discrete identity-claims associated with ethnicity to a claim to occupation of a territory.

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[34] 'National minority' is a distinctly international category (Mamdani, 2020; Sharma, 2021; Weitz, 2008) and the question of the distinction between 'indigenous group' and 'national minority' is one that could be unpacked more.

CHAGOS	Ilois	75	75		652
	Total	215	123	338	314	652

FAMILY SIZE

	Diego Garcia S	M	I	Total	Peros Banhos S	M	I	Total	Salomon S	M	I	Total	Total S	M	I	Total
1	56	1	12	69	10	1	10	21	14	-	11	25	80	2	33	115
2	9	-	11	20	-	-	4	4	1	-	3	4	10	-	18	28
3	12	-	5	17	-	1	5	6	-	-	3	3	12	1	13	26
4	4	-	3	7	-	-	7	7	-	-	4	4	4	-	14	18
5	4	-	-	4	1	-	-	1	2	-	4	6	7	-	4	11
6	3	-	1	4	-	-	4	4	2	-	5	7	5	-	10	15
7	1	-	1	2	1	-	3	4	-	-	-	-	2	-	4	6
8	1	-	2	3	-	-	1	1	1	-	2	3	2	-	5	7
9	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	-	2	4
10	1	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	2	3
11	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Total Single Men	56	1	12	69	10	1	10	21	14	-	11	25	80	2	35	115
Total Families	37	-	25*	62	2	1	25	28+	6	-	24	30	45	1	74	120

* Includes 7 Seychellois en menage with Iloises and 3 Ilois en menage with Seychelloises

+ Includes 4 Seychellois en menage with Iloises and 1 Ilois en menage with Seychelloises

Image 11: Mixed marriages (TNA 37/388)

| | CITIZENSHIP | | | ORIGIN* | | |
	Legit-mate	Natural	Total Births	Seychellois	Mauritian	Ilois
Diego Garcia						
8.11.65–31.12.68	14	35	49	25	1	23
1.1.69–30.6.69	3	8	11	6	1	4
Total	17	43	60	31	2	27
Peros Banhos						
8.11.65–31.12.68	19	18	37	8	-	29
1.1.69–30.6.69	3	10	13	-	-	13
Total	22	28	50	8	-	42
Salomon						
8.11.65–31.12.68	8	20	28	-	1	27
1.1.69–30.6.69	-	1	1	-	-	1
Total	8	21	29	-	1	28
Total Chagos						
8.11.65–31.12.68	41	73	114	33	2	79
1.1.69–30.6.69	6	19	25	6	1	18
Total	47	92	139	39	3	97

* Origin of father in case of legitimate children or of mother in case of natural children

Image 12: Childrens' citizenship (TNA 37/388)

It also has the effect of freezing a Chagossian identity and associating it with an ancestral homeland, when it may in fact be constituted through the experience of displacement. I interpret this in relation to Mamdani's writing on tribalism. He writes that 'tribalism is reified ethnicity. it is culture pinned to a homeland, culture in fixity, politicized, so that it does not move' (Mamdani,

2012: 7). In contrast, I suggest that an 'Ilois' identity, as opposed to the colonial administrative category of 'Ilois', emerged through movement, and not fixity.

The administrative category of 'Ilois' was not a stable category at the time the islanders were displaced. For example, the FCO documents refer to 'Seychellois', 'Ilois', and 'Mauritian' people being 'en menage', or married, with one another. A footnote on these documents notes that children's citizenship, or 'origin', derived from the father in the case of 'legitimate' births, and the mother in the case of 'natural' births. This means that the identity category of 'Ilois', 'Mauritian', or 'Seychellois' was in some ways contingent on circumstance, and may have changed over time, either in one person's lifetime, or generationally. As some FCO officials noted, many of those categorised as 'Mauritian', were in fact born on the islands.

This suggests that through the process of displacement, an 'Ilois' identity has taken on a meaning and cohesiveness that it may not have had before. This would not be specific to the Ilois. As Engseng Ho has argued, '[t]he British became an imperial people—that is to say, they became *a people* as they became *an empire*' (Ho, 2004: 214, emphasis in original). This is an argument that Stuart Hall (1990: 13) makes in relation to Caribbean people, noting 'the endless ways in which Caribbean people have been destined to 'migrate'', and arguing that the 'New World', 'is the signifier of migration itself- of travelling, voyaging and return as fate, as destiny'. In contrast to understandings of identity grounded in territorial homeland, this gives an account of identity constituted in movement, and as a concept which is 'constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference' (Hall, 1990: 14).

This does not deny the Chagossians' right to return, their relationship with place, or dispute the fact that the British administrators deliberately tried to erase the category of 'Ilois'. It also is not intended to undermine the Chagossians' claim for resettlement on the islands which they were displaced from. However, it does make a critique of the legal framework which forces understandings of identity that are frozen in time and derived from ancestral territory. In the case

of the Chagossians, it may be as much the experience of displacement as sedentarism which has constituted them as a group. This opens up the question of whether it would be possible to make a case for resettling the islanders on the island simply based on the fact that they were displaced from it, and without needing to make a claim to a discrete identity marker or permanent inhabitation. The analysis in this chapter suggests that a pervasive understanding of political legitimacy deriving from a fantasy of sedentarism and politicised identity makes this almost impossible in the current political order.

Debates over the Chagossians are different to some other diasporic and displaced peoples' myths of return, because the Chagossians' return to the islands one which some of them were born is possible[35]. However, the question still remains as to what it would mean for the islands and the islanders should the Chagossians return. Writing about African diaspora in the Caribbean, Stuart Hall describes an 'endless desire to return to 'lost origins', (Hall, 1990: 15). He suggests that it is impossible to return to the 'Africa' of the Caribbean imaginary. He writes that 'what Africa has become in the New World', can only be reached 'by another route' (Hall, 1990: 11). He distinguishes between ''Africa'- as we re-tell it through politics, memory and desire', and a more material 'Africa' (Hall, 1990: 11). The Chagossians have a political right to return to the islands which they and their ancestors were displaced from. At the same time, the construction of the islands as an ancestral homeland may be distinct from the material islands which were actually inhabited. For one thing, when the islanders left, inhabitants were understood as 'Seychellois, 'Mauritian', and 'Ilois'. If they return, will only the 'Ilois' go back? And will 'Ilois' continue to be a discrete identity category, if it was no longer constituted by displacement?

For the sake of the legal arguments, it is convincing that there is a distinct cultural group of people who once inhabited the Chagos islands and were displaced. This is no more imagined than any other national claim to belonging in a territory, nor any less real than other real

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[35] Without the scope to draw out implications or comparisons, this parallels displaced Palestinians' right to return.

attachments that people experience with place. At the same time, by emphasising permanence and indigeneity, these arguments produce an understanding of political belonging associated with stasis and fixity, and implicitly limit the possibilities to base political authority on itinerancy and fluidity.

Conclusions

An understanding of political belonging that derives from ethnic homogeneity linked with claims to territory has implications for present day debates on migrants, the Roma and other travellers, and people in movement and displaced people, and their descendants, more broadly. By establishing a norm of sedentarism as the basis of making political claims, it also obscures the role of movement in constituting apparently sedentary nation-states. In the case of Diego Garcia, the imperial nature of apparently 'national' states is clear. The Chagos Islanders were displaced by equally mobile political formations. At the same time, political legitimacy is derived from an implicit understanding of sedentarism, produced in opposition to the representation of the Chagossians as mobile.

In contrast to an understanding of political order that presents movement as secondary to territorially bound politics, throughout this thesis I have given an account of world order as constituted in movement. I drew out the argument that Western world order emerged through people in movement, including mariners, settlers, and tourists, without whose mobility neither colony, nor metropole, nor the dense realm of relationality spanning these apparently separate realms, would exist. It was through these conditions of mobility that debates over piracy, nomadism, and pilgrimage unfolded, which produced core elements of Western order, including international law, and understandings of sovereignty and territoriality. However, the movement of people which created the conditions for the emergence of these understandings of the political, is made to appear analytically secondary to an understanding of political legitimacy derived from a fixed abode. Movement, while politically primary, is rendered analytically secondary to an understanding of political legitimacy linked to sedentarism.

However, the mobilities imaginary which makes sense of movement within an international order, obscures the political significance of movement. In Part One of the thesis I outlined the core argument that debates over people in movement produce opposing understandings of political order. I argued that, in an international order, the regulation and categorisation of people in movement produces an opposing understanding of sedentarism as the basis of political legitimacy and belonging. This constitutes an 'international order effect', which makes sense of people in movement in relation to an apparent norm of territorially bound nation-states and national citizens.

Debates over the Chagos islanders illustrate the limits for a mobilities imaginary to make sense of the aftermaths of colonial order, and the overlaps between imperial and international politics. At the same time, the displacement of the islanders through immigration ordinances, and its contestation through international law and indigenous legal status, render this a specifically international moment of the contested regulation and categorisation of people in movement.

This poses broader questions about the possibilities of understanding global politics based on a norm of movement, and not stasis. This has political implications for the potential to make political claims from an explicit recognition of the constitutive role of mobility and fluidity, and not from a reification of an understanding of the political as primarily sedentary and contained.

Conclusions

This thesis developed the argument that understandings of movement produce political order. Because of this, debates over the regulation and categorisation of people in movement are moments of political transformation. The world-ordering politics of categorisations of people in movement have not been previously explored. Most analysis either treats categories as reproductive of political order, in that they reproduce methodologically statist or nationalist understandings of the political, or as objective irrespective of order, as in the application of 'migration' as a descriptive category across orders. In contrast, I have shown that categories of mobilities are productive of political order. The reification of categories through institutionalised codification, data collection, and the convening of conferences and reports in the name of each category, produces political possibilities, which would not have otherwise existed.

This is of pressing political significance in the present, as debates over migration, refugees, diaspora, and tourism make clear the extent to which an ideal of ethnic homogeneity underpins Western international order, and the violence inherent in attempting to create this impossible reality. It also points to an area for attentiveness to transformations in contemporary political order. Debates about the politics of allowing child asylum seekers to be kidnapped from hotels in the UK, to shooting migrants at the border in Saudi Arabia, do not only illustrate the violence of international order, but are sites of the articulation of what a future order might look like. The terms on which these debates are carried out set the conditions of the politics they produce. As I illustrated in relation to debates over contested maritime mobilities, the regulation and categorisation of people in movement does not only transform the distribution of power, but the form the power takes in a given political order. For example, debates on piracy produced broader understandings of sovereignty, linked to definitions of war, and the emergence of international law. Analytically, at a moment of changing political order and resurgence in various forms of racial supremacy, debates over people in movement may tell us as much about the form that power takes in an emergent world order, as its distribution.

The thesis draws attention to how movement is categorised and conceptualised. Looking at the relations between mobility and categories of mobility is a tool of critical analysis which helps us see what falls out of dominant understandings and categories of mobility, as well as what this tells us about broader order. This is of specific interest to the analysis of international order but is also applicable to other political orders. Without attentiveness to categorisations of people in movement, International Relations is limited by treating movement as epiphenomenal to order, and missing a core way that orders are transformed. I developed this finding in relation to Western-centred international and colonial orders. This is a first step towards a future agenda that can explore these relations further, and in other orders. In this conclusion I first draw out implications for further research. Second, I address the political implications of my research. Third, I point to some limitations and potential areas for further exploration within the thesis.

i) Implications for further research

By proposing a genealogical approach to understandings of people in movement, and attentiveness to the question of how changing understandings of people in movement produce transformations in world order, this thesis intends to open a broad agenda for future research on people in movement and changes in world order. This has implications for research in International Relations, Mobilities Studies, and Political Theory.

First, it emphasises the centrality of people in movement, and the regulation and categorisation of people in movement, to constituting political order. In doing so, it inverts International Relations' typical framework which starts from an assumption of sedentary societies contained within nation-states, which often treats imperialism as the displacement of actors from A to B. Because of this, IR often approaches imperial expansion as a process of encounter between already existing units, and the imposition of an already existing Western world order within this encounter. This makes movement appear to be secondary to political order and political actors, which are transported from one fixed location to another, or imposed on one fixed location by

another. This also has the effect of making 'sedentarism' appear as the normal condition of the political and making movement and extra-territoriality seem to be secondary or epiphenomenal to pre-existing sedentary units. In contrast, the thesis provides a theoretical basis to explore how world orders are characterised and produced through movement and debates over people in movement. This provides an agenda for further research on contemporary transformations in world order, and points to the productive potential of analysis of changing mobilities categories.

Second, it opens up an agenda for Mobilities Studies on the politics of theorising mobilities. Work on people in movement often unwittingly exceptionalises mobility, or analyses mobility in frameworks that reproduce methodologically nationalist and/or statist imaginaries. In advancing a genealogical approach to understandings of movement I aim to open a research agenda which is more reflexive towards how movement is understood and the politics of theorising movement, as well as the politics of addressing movement in contrast to an implied norm of stasis. In doing so, it opens up an area of research in Mobilities Studies on how power-knowledge relations linked to movement produce political orders.

Third, this has implications for political theory on people in movement, empire, and political belonging. Through a genealogical approach, the thesis emphasises the contextual specificity of particular understandings of movement related to categorisations of people in movement, and the importance of attentiveness to the recodification of these categories as sites of recalibration of political order. This acts as an opening to political theory on the figures of Migrant, Native, and Settler, insofar as it emphasises the contextual specificity of understandings of these categories.

ii) Political implications

By adopting a genealogical approach, this thesis recognises its own position within a field of power-knowledge relations, and the political implications of these arguments. Therefore, while this intervention is mainly focused on the implications for academic understandings of world order, it recognises that these are related to the possibility to articulate alternative forms of

political order. This analytic approach makes it possible to begin to imagine a political order which starts from an explicit recognition of the political significance of movement. This has implications for present day 'migrants' and people descended from migrants, as well as descendants of enslaved and indentured labourers, including the Chagos islanders, by recognising itinerancy (or errantry) as a legitimate political basis. It also has implications for apparently territorially bound and 'sedentary' societies, as it recognises these to be equally constituted by movement. In doing so, it challenges the understanding of society as defined by territory. On the one hand, this challenges ethnonationalism and the nation-state. On the other hand, it has implications for debates on indigenous land rights, and all understandings of political belonging which link land to blood ties, which have been outside the scope of this thesis to fully engage with, but which require further research.

A political order that starts from an explicit recognition of the politically constitutive nature of movement would not necessarily have a 'no borders' agenda. This is one alternative that Nandita Sharma has articulated, as a solution to the denial of full political belonging to people who have moved or appear to have moved (de Noronha and Sharma, 2021). However, attentiveness to settler colonialism shows that free movement does not necessarily lead to justice. An alternative solution that Mahmood Mamdani (2021) offers is keeping borders, but 'liberating the state from the nation'. This is an analytical intervention, and a political proposition, which would involve 'extend[ing] the rule of law to all residents of the territory – not only citizens but also migrants' (Mamdani, 2021). Politically, this is a valuable starting point, but it does not address extra-territorial politics or dispersed societies, or the questions of limits to movement across borders. In relation to the first point, while not everyone in Britain has direct or inherited experience of movement in the British Empire, the circulation of tourists, settlers, mariners, and imperial administrators, constituted Britain and the West through mobility. In other words, the state (and other political entities) are constituted through extra-territorial relations, and not defined by territorial boundaries. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to resolve this question. However, a political project based on territory would still require an analytic approach that

encompasses dispersed political relations, and politics in movement. Equally, a political project based on movement must involve recognition of people's meaningful relationships with land, such as those articulated in relation to indigeneity. The answers are not necessarily to do away with either borders or territory. While it is outside of the scope of this thesis to unpack this fully, I hope to open an agenda that can start from a diagnostic recognition of the constitutive role of mobility and begin conversations there.

In showing the politics of categorisations of people in movement, I challenged the positive and negative valences that movement is often imbued with and presented attentiveness to movement as a diagnostic approach. This highlights the politics of identifying some forms of movement as movement, and points to a need for more reflexivity over the political stakes and productivity of claims about movement and stasis. At the same time, this points to a tension in this thesis, which focuses on 'people in movement'. The implication I have drawn out is that people are always already in movement, it is how this movement is categorised and understood that it becomes political. This does not rule out the possibility that movement can generate new (or new awareness of) political relations with otherness[36]. This does not mean that otherness is contained within geographic containers, but points to an area for further exploration that more directly addresses the role of movement in forging new political relations.

iii) Areas for further research

In this thesis, I focused on the categorisation and regulation of people in movement in the transformation of world order in relation to analytically separate Western-centred international and colonial order. I will point to some relevant areas that are outside the scope of this research project, as well as areas of temporal, empirical, and thematic connections within the material included, which could constitute areas for further research.

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[36] Drawing on Hage's (2012) work on radical alterity and minor realities.

By focusing on understandings of people in movement from a perspective of regulation and categorisation, the thesis did not engage with understandings of world order generated in movement. One area to engage with theory on politics generated *in movement* is existing theory on movement as a basis of political relationality. This includes work on errant and 'in-between' forms of postcolonial political belonging, including Édouard Glissant's (1997) work on 'postcolonial errantry' and the poetics of relation which I began to engage with in this thesis, Gloria Anzaldúa's (1987) work on borderlands, work on the Black Atlantic by Paul Gilroy (2002), Christina Sharpe (2016), Keguro Macharia (2019), and Saidiya Hartman (2008) and feminist work on travel and pilgrimage, including work by Maria Lugones (2003), and Sarah Ahmed (2020).

Empirically, research on politics generated in movement could also draw on ethnography, interviews, and travel accounts, to address the question of social and political world-making in movement. In relation to the sites addressed in this thesis, this could involve research into the Chagos islanders' and Maasai people's own understandings of their experiences of movement and displacement, as well as engagement with people's self-understandings of travel as 'migrants', 'tourists', and 'refugees', and the forms of political relationality they constitute. This could also draw on existing work on subaltern accounts of Indian Ocean mobilities (Anderson, 2012; Bahadur, 2013), and on colonial archives and travel accounts. One question that analysis of colonial travel has begun to explore is the question of affective experiences generated in movement, including 'wonder', and the relations between positive affect and colonial politics (Caraccioli, 2021; Greenblatt, 2017). This points to further areas for research on the forms of knowledge, affect, and politics, generated in movement, which this thesis has not addressed.

Equally, this thesis focused on colonial and international regulation of people in movement and has not engaged in depth with anti-colonial or other alternative ways of ordering and imagining people in movement. While Part Two of the thesis addressed some contestation of colonial regulation of people in movement, the primary focus was on colonialism, and not resistance or

alternatives. An area for further research would be the regulation and categorisation of people in movement in other political orders, that are less defined by relations with Europe. Equally, the role of non-European actors in the moments I addressed could be further explored. This includes the role of the Ottoman Empire and Hadrami diaspora in the regulation of the Hajj.

Temporally, the thesis focused on disparate episodes which are united by a core theme of being key moments of political transformation generated through the contested regulation and categorisation of people in movement. These moments were linked to the colonisation and decolonisation of the British Empire in the Indian Ocean World, and the institutionalisation of 'the international' in early twentieth-century Europe. I separated the international and colonial categorisation for analytic purposes in this thesis, but also identified overlaps in the techniques of governance and underlying logics. These include the use of immigration legislation in the colonial displacement of the Chagos islanders, and the significance of colonial practices of data collection to international regulation of people in movement. In addition, both Western colonial and international categorisations of people in movement are underpinned by the representation of movement in opposition to a norm of sedentarism. An area for further exploration would be how understandings of movement travelled between episodes. For example, (how) did the late-nineteenth-century regulation of the Hajj inform early-twentieth-century regulation of migration?

Another rich area for future research would be how the categories addressed in each episode have changed over time. For example, whereas early twentieth-century debates over tourism focused on an ideal of white subjects travelling within the Anglo- and imperial worlds, the meaning and practices associated with contemporary tourism are different. Analysis of the meaning of 'tourism' at different moments in place and time could address the questions of i) understandings of tourism and travel that are less defined by Europe, ii) the changing meaning and nature of tourism since the early twentieth century, and iii) changes in world order and 'the West' since the early twentieth century. In relation to 'migration' this opens up a route for further

research on the temporality of the emergence of its current raced and classed significance, which I have suggested contrasts with early twentieth-century understandings. Equally, this analysis engaged with 'indigeneity' as a contemporary legal category, without the scope to engage with debates on indigeneity, or the emergence of this category and its legalisation associated with the UN. This points to an area for wider research, into the relations between understandings of people in movement and 'indigeneity' as a legal category that is specific to an international order, as well as an identity category which evokes a precolonial form of world order.

Further research could also involve archival analysis of the international organisations addressed in the thesis. This thesis has engaged with *some* primary archival materials, for example, the ILO's founding charter, but most analysis of archival materials has been focused on debates in Britain, and not at the international level. This could be an area for further empirical research. The LNHCR archives have been analysed by Soguk and others. However, the role of the ILO in regulating people in movement has only recently been addressed in work on International Relations, and there is room for more archival analysis. In addition, the only existing history of the UNWTO and IUOTPO is written by a former head of research at the organisation (Shackleford, 2020). This means that there has been very limited academic or political attention to international debates on tourism, which would strengthen the analysis in this thesis.

An additional area for research would be to draw out the empirical connections between the sites explored in this thesis, especially between 'international' and 'colonial' debates. For example, the colonisation of British East Africa and the emergence of the 'international' were unfolding coevally. Debates over the Maasai were happening at the same time as debates over 'aliens' and tourism in Britain, with the involvement of some of the same people, including Churchill, Amery, and Milner. In addition, the enclosure of land through nature reservations in British East Africa was coeval with the introduction of immigration legislation on an international level, raising questions about relations between land enclosure and national borders, which require research. This is related to a broader question, which is the way that immigration legislation

travelled between colony and metropole (Bashford and Gilchrist, 2012). Equally, these debates travelled across imperial territories, as the restriction of Indian immigration to British East Africa added to Indian anti-imperialism (Hughes, 2006). Aside from sharing an underlying definition of political belonging on the basis of territorial fixity, did these debates inform one another in more concrete or direct ways?

This points to a larger area for future research, which is the extent to which colonial techniques for organising and regulating people in movement served as a model for international order. In this thesis, I pointed to the imperial regulation of the Hajj pilgrimage as an early site of the collection of data on people in movement based on nationality and not race. This was linked to the emergence of the concept of 'tourism' and the involvement of tourist agencies. This suggests that this link could be more than coincidental and could constitute a site to explore the evolution of international practices of data collection, within an imperial context, adding to understandings of continuities and transformations in world order. In addition, this relates to the significance of race in a colonial order, which I have not explored. The thesis focused on understandings of race in an international context, however, an area for further research would be the relations between race and the regulation of movement in a colonial context.

While not addressed in this research project, a concept which would connect late imperial and international regulation of people in movement is 'apartheid'. The term 'global apartheid' is now often used as a metaphor for the international organisation of people in movement, in relation to racialised compartments. Existing research has pointed to the role of South Africa as a model for the international at the League of Nations (Thakur and Vale, 2020). A further area for research would be entanglements between South Africa and the international regulation of people in movement, in the years following World War Two. South African apartheid was characterised by 'pass laws [that] let Black people into white space only for the purpose of working—they lacked political rights in white space' (Besteman, 2019a). As Fanon (2002: 52) articulates, apartheid, as it emerged in South Africa was exemplary of colonial compartmentalisation and represented just

one 'form of the division into compartments of the colonial world'. However, while segregation had existed much longer in South Africa, these policies only began to be known as apartheid in 1948. This points to an area for research, on the international regulation of people in movement between the 1930s and the present, that might tie together some of these sites in other ways.

This research primarily focused on the themes of 'movement' and 'stasis' in relation to political belonging. It explored how these related to core concepts in International Relations, including race, sovereignty, and territoriality, in order to demonstrate the centrality of debates over movement to generating understandings of order. This pointed to thematic connections which could be further explored in relation to understandings of movement. I briefly outline three of these areas: i) the relations between territoriality and sovereignty, ii) the role of the ocean in relation to territoriality, iii) capitalism.

First, I addressed territoriality in relation to the international compartmentalisation of the political into ethnic territories in Part One, and in relation to colonial territorialising practices in British East Africa in Chapter Seven. I also touched on the emergence of distinct understandings of maritime and terrestrial territory in debates over law of the sea and piracy in Chapter Six. This points to the question of how understandings of territorial and extraterritorial sovereignty differ in different political orders, in relation to the regulation and categorisation of people in movement. This suggests a route into researching 'sovereignty' and 'territoriality' as concepts which may have emerged in mobile and extra-territorial relations and been projected back onto apparently sedentary states.

Second, this relates to debates over the distinction between land and sea which I sketched in relation to the oceanic turn, and the contested regulation of maritime mobilities in the introduction to Part Two, and in Chapter Six. One way to further develop research on territoriality and order would be through more robust engagement with the oceanic turn. A

question to address is how understandings of 'territory' emerged in relation to the legal distinction between land and sea, and understandings of the sea as a mobile realm.

Third, the theme of capitalism threads through a number of sites but has not been foregrounded. For example, in Chapter Eight I explored the role of the contract in relegating political questions to legal technicalities. This parallels descriptions of the Chagos islanders as 'contract labourers', which raises questions about the relations between contracts, capitalism, and people in movement. Related to this is the argument for the basis of land alienation on the grounds of non-productivity, a theme that was apparent in relation to both the Maasai and the Chagos islanders and derives from a capitalist order. In addition, the role of the Dutch and British East India Companies as corporate entities is not drawn out in this thesis. This may also be related to the emergence of insurance companies in the seventeenth century. Grotius' *Mare Liberum* was sponsored by the Dutch East India Company (VOC), and written in part to justify the seizure of goods, to protect against legal claims for compensation (Keene, 2002). This resulted in the redefinition of war and peace in relation to 'piracy'. This resonates with contemporary legal debates over the definition of 'war' in determining insurance claims for aeroplanes (a symbol of contemporary mobility) seized by Russia (Dyson, 2022). These areas point to the unexplored relations between understandings of war, ownership (including land ownership), insurance, and capitalism more broadly, in relation to the regulation of people in movement. This links to the question of change over time, and a potential shift in the regulation of 'migration' in the interests of 'migrants' to the interests of businesses post-WW2.

Overall, this thesis made the case for the value of theorising world order and understandings of people in movement together. The thesis provided some answers to a set of analytic questions that could be applied to other political orders, or themes. These questions include: How is movement understood? How does this relate to key tenets of political order? What or who is understood to be static? How do these understandings change at key junctures? How does this produce political transformation? And what can this tell us about underlying shifts in political

order? I addressed these in relation to a limited set of themes, at moments of political transformation related to Western-centred international and imperial order. This is a first step towards opening up a broader and more in-depth research agenda, which this concluding chapter began to map out.

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