The London School of Economics and Political Science

From Hegemonic Decline to the End of History: The Transformation of International Relations, c.1970-2000

Samuel Dixon

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

I declare that my thesis consists of 87,050 words.

Abstract

This thesis provides a disciplinary history of International Relations (IR) during the late twentieth century. Covering a period that began with fears of the decline of United States hegemony following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and climaxed with celebrations of the 'end of history' after the Cold War, it argues that IR transformed in tandem with a changing global order. This nature and significance of this transformation has been largely overlooked by a booming disciplinary history literature focused predominantly on the discipline's formative years in the early-to-mid-twentieth century. Disciplinary sociologies, meanwhile, though more alert to IR's evolution than disciplinary histories, are methodologically limited as a means of narrating the story of such transformation. Combining substantive insights from sociologists of IR with the methods of disciplinary historians, this thesis contends that IR's transformation consisted in entwined processes of intellectual diversification, institutional expansion, and disciplinary self-reflection. With primary focus on the United States and Britain, the thesis documents how a generation of scholars clashed and collaborated across the Atlantic to construct an array of new theories, subfields, institutions, and second-order modes of looking at IR which remade the discipline between 1970 and 2000. Responding to developments within and outside the academy, these scholars sought – with much, if not total, success – to redirect IR from its earlier origins, helping forge the expansive and increasingly global discipline we know today.

The thesis offers three main contributions to IR. First, it advances methodological debate in the disciplinary history literature by moving beyond the internalist/externalist controversy and engaging with disciplinary sociologies, highlighting and addressing a temporal imbalance within the literature that has naturalised an 'originalist' approach to writing the history of IR. Second, it problematises historical self-images popularised in and about late-twentieth-century IR, specifically ideas that the discipline had developed as 'an American social science' or had opened into a pluralistic paradigm war following a sequence of 'Great Debates'. The thesis shows that IR has undergone more intellectual and institutional evolution internationally than the former suggests, but that the vaunted theoretical pluralism of the late twentieth century did not completely escape the discipline's deeper past – particularly the legacy of Eurocentrism. Third, however, by highlighting a transformation that did occur, space is opened to consider how IR could change again in the present and future.

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[1] Samuel Dixon, 'Why Studying the Late Twentieth Century Is Crucial for Understanding IR Today', *BISA* (blog), 2022, https://www.bisa.ac.uk/articles/why-studying-late-twentieth-century-crucial-understanding-ir-today.

Finally, I would like to thank friends and family who supported me all the way and reminded me there was a world outside academia. I would first like to acknowledge my peers in the IR PhD programme – above all the 'Pancake' gang consisting of Bruno Binetti; Alice Engelhard; Jonny Hall; Asha Herten-Crabb; Andy Li; and Johanna Rodehau-Noack. They were a constant source of both intellectual inspiration and moral support. I also want to thank my flatmates Joe, George, and Gianna, for the fun times and companionship we have shared over the last four years, particularly during successive COVID-19 lockdowns. Most importantly, thanks go to my Mum, Dad, and sister Alexandra for their love and encouragement. I could not have done this without them.

Contents

1. Introduction

'Every true history is contemporary history.'
- Benedetto Croce[2]

International Relations (IR) is one of the largest and most vibrant social scientific disciplines. Despite its relatively young age compared to fields such as sociology or economics, IR is studied and researched all over world through a vast and growing number of theoretical perspectives, methods, and substantive foci. It is institutionally well established, with degree-granting university departments in dozens of countries, an array of internationally recognised disciplinary and subfield journals, and professional societies such as the International Studies Association (ISA) boasting thousands of members worldwide. No wonder, some say, that 'the time for a Global IR has come'.[3]

It was not always so. In the decades following the Second World War, IR looked rather different. Its character was well summed up in a famous 1977 essay by Stanley Hoffmann in which he claimed IR was, narrowly, 'an American social science'.[4] The United States, he argued, was the only country where IR had become a professional discipline with international reach – and for typically 'American' reasons. Of these reasons the most important were the scientific reformism of post-war US culture and society; the integration of exiled European scholars of *Realpolitik*; and above all the United States' rise to world power status after the Second World War. 'The growth of the discipline', Hoffmann wrote, 'cannot be separated from the American role in world affairs after 1945'.[5] In turn, IR was converted from an interwar field of liberal foreign affairs discussion into a national science, whose purpose was to uncover 'laws' of state interaction to inform the containment and deterrence of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. These laws – of ever-present power struggle and clashing national interests – were illuminated by the theory of 'realism'. Yet this was parochial knowledge posing as universal, Hoffmann believed, ignoring historical change, disguising a hierarchical international order, and neglecting normative questions in an age of transition.[6]

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[2] Benedetto Croce, *Theory and History of Historiography*, trans. Douglas Ainslie (London: Harrap, 1921), 12.
[3] Amitav Acharya, 'Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies', *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2014): 657.
4 Stanley Hoffmann, 'An American Social Science: International Relations', Daedalus 106, no. 3 (1977): 41–60.
[5] Ibid., 47.
[6] Ibid., 60.

Decades later, Hoffmann's arguments remain a useful guide for understanding IR in the post-war era, and an interesting example of a discipline reflecting on its world role during the 1970s. As a guide to understanding contemporary IR, however, its relevance is ambiguous. While it has been a touchstone for an industry of reflective anatomisations of IR that grew in its wake, this has been as much to highlight changes as continuities in the discipline.[7] Meanwhile, it has been invoked by 'mainstream' and 'dissident' scholars alike to legitimise their centrality or marginality of identity within IR, often to the neglect of Hoffmann's original purposes.[8] With détente and the crisis of United States economic hegemony, times were changing in the 1970s, and world politics would soon transform further with the fall of the Soviet empire. If Hoffmann was correct about IR in the post-war years, then at some point following the discipline was transformed too.

1.1 Three Processes of Change

This thesis is a history of the transformation of IR which it identifies as taking place primarily in the late twentieth century. Covering a period that began with fears of the decline of United States hegemony following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and climaxed with celebrations of the 'end of history' after the Cold War, it argues that IR radically changed in tandem with a changing global order. More specifically, it explores how IR's transformation consisted in entwined processes of *intellectual diversification*, *institutional expansion*, and *disciplinary self-reflection*. With primary focus on the United States and Britain, it shows how a generation of scholars clashed and collaborated across the Atlantic to construct an array of new theories, subfields, institutions, and second-order modes of looking at IR which remade the discipline from around 1970 to the early years of the new millennium. Responding to developments within and outside the academy, these scholars sought – with much, if not total, success – to redirect IR from its earlier origins, helping forge the expansive and increasingly global discipline we know today. The thesis marries

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[7] Ole Waever, 'The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations' 52, no. 4 (1998): 687–727; Robert M.A. Crawford and Daryl S.L. Jarvis, eds., *International Relations - Still an American Social Science?: Toward Diversity in International Thought* (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2000); Peter Marcus Kristensen, 'Revisiting the "American Social Science" - Mapping the Geography of International Relations', *International Studies Perspectives* 16, no. 3 (2015): 246–69.

[8] Stephen M. Walt, 'Is IR Still "an American Social Science"?', *Foreign Policy* (blog), 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/06/is-ir-still-an-american-social-science/; Steve Smith, 'The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: "Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline"', *International Studies Review* 4, no. 2 (2002): 67–85.

substantive insights from recent sociologies of IR with the methods of disciplinary historians, telling a story whose contours may be vaguely known but have not yet been subjected to systematic historical study. Disciplinary historians, indeed, have been largely preoccupied with IR's formative years in the early-to-mid-twentieth century, recovering the discipline's origins and initial development that were for many years grossly misrepresented.[9] Yet a comprehensive understanding of how IR came to be the way it is today is impossible if only the first half of its history is being studied. As the topography of IR becomes increasingly complex, disciplinary histories risk not being able to comprehend an evolving discipline. This thesis aims to be a first significant step towards highlighting and addressing this issue, at least in an Anglo-American context (though, as we shall see, there is great scope to expand the geographies of disciplinary history by focusing on the late twentieth century).

Before proceeding further, however, it is necessary to confront several important questions. Namely, what exactly are these processes of change? How can they be identified? How did they relate to one other? As we shall see, the processes of intellectual diversification, institutional expansion, and disciplinary self-reflection in IR have been well gauged by sociological stock-takers in recent years, though this threefold categorisation is to some extent my own. The primary originality of this thesis lies in the empirical-historical study of these processes and their intertwining to form a narrative of transformation whose nature and significance has been largely overlooked by historians of the field.

The first two processes – intellectual diversification and institutional expansion – are the principal components of what William C. Olson once termed 'the growth of a discipline'.[10] Such growth accelerated within and beyond the US during the late twentieth century on a cross-national basis, with IR in Britain the prime example used in this thesis. Before the 1970s, British IR consisted institutionally of a small network of departments, journals, and teaching and research posts at three universities (Aberystwyth, Oxford, and the London School of Economics) and the thinktank Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). Drawing together members of this network were the regular 'Bailey conferences' on teaching, which grew out of the League of Nations-linked International Studies Conference that sought to enlighten national publics on international affairs, and the Rockefeller-funded British Committee on the Theory of International

[9] Brian C. Schmidt, ed., *International Relations and the First Great Debate* (London: Routledge, 2012).
[10] William C. Olson, 'The Growth of a Discipline', in *The Aberystwyth Papers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 3–29.

Politics.[11] Inviting small numbers of typically senior male university professors, the intellectual tenor of these meetings was in line with the dominant perspective in post-war British IR – the state-centric 'international society' view or 'English School'. They were indeed a far cry from the activities of today's British International Studies Association (BISA), a major organisation founded in 1975 as 'a more modern, democratic, academic professional association' adapted to a new expansion of higher education and IR courses in Britain, and the rise of areas of interest such as International Political Economy (IPE) in a world of growing interdependence.[12] So too were they from the contemporary ISA with its dozens of thematic sections, committees, and 'caucuses', several journals catering to varied interests, and sprawling annual conventions. ISA – a model for BISA and the subject of chapter 6 – was remade from the late 1960s in response to common global problems that many felt the community of US-based realists were ill-equipped to deal.

These brief comments illustrate several themes that are worth elaborating. First, intellectual diversification and institutional expansion were analytically distinct but nonetheless historically entwined processes in late-twentieth-century IR. Most obviously, intellectual growth – novel theories, methods, epistemologies, topics of interest etc. – was reflected in, and drove, institutional growth in the form of new university courses, departments, journals, and the emergence and expansion of IR professional societies. Less obviously, but by no means unimportant, institutional growth in turn moulded – and sometimes delimited – the character of intellectual developments. Indeed, just as the structures of the Bailey conferences and the British Committee circumscribed what could be taught and researched, so newer institutions facilitated a much wider range of people and ideas to establish themselves as IR students and scholars (within certain Eurocentric boundaries). The rise of professional academic societies like ISA and BISA – member-based organisations that act as fora for new ideas and set the identity and purpose of disciplines – were particularly important in this respect, with proliferating sections, prizes, and publication opportunities affording academic legitimacy and credentials to intellectual agendas. While other social sciences had established such associations decades before, IR only truly gained them in the

[11] David Long, 'Who Killed the International Studies Conference?', *Review of International Studies* 32, no. 4 (2006): 603–22; Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School of International Relations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); Brunello Vigezzi, *The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (1954-1985)* (Milano: Edizioni Unicopli, 2005); Barry Buzan, 'Before BISA: The British Coordinating Committee for International Studies, S.H. Bailey, and the Bailey Conferences', *International Politics* 57, no. 4 (2020): 573–87.

[12] On how BISA grew out of dissatisfaction with the fit between the Bailey Conferences and the external intellectual and institutional growth of British IR see Buzan, 'Before BISA', 82.

late twentieth century.[13] Intellectual diversification and institutional expansion were thus mutually reinforcing.

The final two themes to note are that these processes did not just take place within countries but also across them, and that both were impacted by developments elsewhere in the academy and wider world. The birth and early development of the IPE subfield, for example, were inseparable from the transatlantic experiences and connections of the scholars involved from Harvard to LSE to Geneva, as well as international economic shocks, the crisis of US hegemony, and Global South revolt in the 1970s. Rather than the static and parochial 'American social science' of the post-war years, IR began to become a more transnational enterprise in these years, much like the world it studied. And while the direction of travel was often, if not only, from the US to Britain and elsewhere, the American discipline itself was undergoing intellectual diversification and institutional expansion away from its roots. As we shall see, pioneers of BISA and British IPE such as Susan Strange were inspired by US IR's size and openness to new ideas that were not present in such 'dreadfully constipated and hierarchical' spaces as the Bailey conferences.[14] The idea of a hegemonic and conservative 'American school' of IPE battling with a marginalised but upstart 'British school' (and indeed the rest of the world) – a common self-image of the subfield today as in sociologies of IR 'around the world' – is complicated by the historical record of their actual origins. As chapter 2 will argue, the ability to identify and narrate the transnational elements of IR's transformation is one area where, methodologically, disciplinary historians may have certain advantages over disciplinary sociologists.

What, then, of the final process of change identified above – disciplinary self-reflection – and how did it relate to the other two? By highlighting increased disciplinary self-reflection during the late twentieth century, this thesis argues that there was rising awareness of IR as a legitimate enterprise among the social sciences, with a distinct character – even cachet – and understanding of itself in time and space. There are a few ways in which this could be demonstrated, from the exponential rise in use of the swish acronym 'IR' after 1980,[15] to the proliferation of IR textbooks

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[13] Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at Its Centenary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 143–48, 219–22.
[14] Susan Strange, 'I Never Meant to Be an Academic', in *Journeys Through World Politics: Autobiographical Reflections of Thirty-Four Academic Travellers*, ed. Joseph Kruzel and James N. Rosenau (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 435.
[15] See the respective Google Ngram data for 'IR theory' and 'IR international relations' respectively: https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=IR+theory&year_start=1800&year_end=2019&corpus=en-2019&smoothing=3

that occurred from the 1970s onwards.[16] This thesis, however, focuses more on the explosion of what Ole Waever has described as 'second-order' reflexivity in IR, wherein methods of other disciplines – notably history and sociology of science – were used to study the discipline itself as an object.[17] To this extent, it was a part of the process of intellectual diversification discussed above and reflected IR's institutional expansion; a changing discipline naturally prompted a greater consciousness of something called 'IR' and its place in history and the world. Furthermore, the more simplified 'self-images' produced by these reflections in turn gave form to academic artefacts such as introductory textbooks and university courses, as we shall see. The thesis thus figures the disciplinary history and sociology literatures as themselves exemplars of increasing second-order reflection in late-twentieth-century IR, as much as resources for understanding the period and its legacy today.

1.2 The Disciplinary History and Sociology of International Relations

When Croce wrote that 'every true history is contemporary history', he meant that history was inevitably written from the perspective of present concerns. The growing literature that now exists on the disciplinary history of IR has certainly been neither blind nor immune to this possibility. This is particularly the case with regards to recent works on the imperial, raced, and gendered origins of IR, which have reflected the growing influence of global, postcolonial, and feminist ideas within and beyond the discipline.[18] In another sense, however, disciplinary histories of IR have largely not been contemporary in terms of being *about* the recent past. Indeed, as indicated, there

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https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=IR+international+relations&year_start=1800&year_end=2019&corpus=en-2019&smoothing=3, accessed 16 February, 2023.

[16] E.g. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations* (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1971); Michael Smith, Richard Little, and Michael Shackleton, eds., *Perspectives on World Politics: A Reader* (London: Croon Helm and the Open University, 1981); Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism* (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1987); John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[17] Ole Waever, 'Keeping It Worldly: A Sociologist's View', in *The Sage Handbook of the History, Philosophy, and Sociology of International Relations*, ed. Andreas Gofas, Inanna Hamati-Ataya, and Nicholas Onuf (London: Sage, 2018), 556–57.

[18] David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, eds., *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2005); Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015); Patricia Owens, 'Women and the History of International Thought', *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (2018): 467–81; Patricia Owens and Katharina Rietzler, eds., *Women's International Thought: A New History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021); Vineet Thakur and Peter Vale, *South Africa, Race, and the Making of International Relations* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2020); Alexander E. Davis, Vineet Thakur, and Peter Vale, *The Imperial Discipline: Race and the Founding of International Relations* (London: Pluto Press, 2020).

has been a broad propensity to write the history of IR as if only its formative years mattered for an understanding of the historical development of the field. The contemporary history of IR – that is, its development since the 1970s – has been largely neglected by disciplinary historians, despite important the changes this thesis explores. As chapter 2 argues, notwithstanding notable exceptions, this has had the effect of naturalising a methodological assumption I term 'originalism' within the disciplinary history literature. Why, then, if the contemporary history of IR is so important, have disciplinary historians neglected it?

Two superficially plausible and related explanations for this oversight – that the period is too recent to study objectively and that no archives exist – are unconvincing. As professional historians can attest, it is perfectly legitimate and worthwhile to study the post-1970 and even post-millennium periods as 'history', provided various sources are consulted and handled carefully (as is true of any period).[19] In fact, studying the recent past could arguably be more objective as fewer sources are likely to have been lost, including memories of those with first-hand experience who can inform the historian's interpretation of events.[20] Of course, sometimes relevant records may be classified or otherwise unavailable for a certain period, but that is not the case here. For instance, an email to the Executive Director of ISA was enough to learn that the Association retains an extensive (if uncatalogued) archive of historical records at the University of Connecticut, which I was granted permission to consult and cite.[21] Similarly, the records of BISA are readily available in the Women's Reading Room at the LSE Library. While many prominent late-century IR scholars have not yet made their individual papers available for consultation, the ISA and BISA archives are invaluable and almost entirely untapped resources for understanding IR in the late twentieth century. With interviews and correspondence with relevant scholars possible too alongside analysis of primary source publications, a detailed if not exhaustive historical reconstruction of the period

[19] The well-established field of 'Contemporary History' testifies to this. For the classic statement see Geoffrey Barraclough, *An Introduction to Contemporary History* (London: C.A. Watts and Co., 1964). More relevantly perhaps, a focus on the recent past has also been a core aspect of the so-called 'turn to the present' among Anglophone historians of political thought in light of the post-2016 'crisis of democracy'. Disciplinary historians of IR have surprisingly not followed this trend. See the recent forum on this turn in *Modern Intellectual History*: Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins, 'Introduction: Whose Present? Which History? [First View]', *Modern Intellectual History*, 2022, 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479244322000142.

[20] Oral history methodology has, to be sure, been excellently advocated by Sarah C. Dunstan of the Leverhulme Women in the History of International Thought Project (WHIT) to reconstruct 'scholarly habitus'. Sarah C. Dunstan, 'Women's International Thought in the Twentieth Century Anglo-American Academy: Autobiographical Reflection, Oral History and Scholarly Habitus', *Gender and History* 33, no. 2 (2021): 487–512. Yet, tracking the temporality of most disciplinary histories, WHIT focuses on 'historical women – that is, women writing before the late twentieth century –' and so I would argue has not yet fully redeemed this promise. Owens, 'Women and the History of International Thought', 467.

[21] Author's correspondence with Mark A. Boyer, 28 July 2022.

is certainly attainable. Thus, it is not lack of access to the past that has prevented IR's contemporary history from being studied.

There is also no dearth of interest among IR's historians in the kinds of disciplinary institution (departments, journals, professional societies etc.) which flourished in the late twentieth century, nor is IR's recent past so widely understood that it is not worth researching – two other possible explanations. The International Studies Conference (ISC), a regular interwar IR conference involving national delegations of the League of Nations-linked International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, is the subject of four major works,[22] while the records of smaller institutions such as the 1954 Conference on the Theory of International Politics have also been mined.[23] And while many scholars can recall aspects of IR's development in this period – including its earliest years – these remembrances will neither be familiar to everyone today nor to future generations, and thus should be recorded. Furthermore, as disciplinary historians have themselves shown, collective memory is often mistaken and requires amending through engagement with primary documents.

This leads us to what is the most likely reason for the neglect: the history of the disciplinary history literature itself. Disciplinary historians have been at least somewhat reflective on their own origins and purposes, if not their methodological effects. When scholars first began applying rigorous historical methods to study IR's past in the mid-1990s, three main intellectual tributaries were cited. For Brian Schmidt, whose *The Political Discourse of Anarchy* was the first major book-length history of early US IR, a central contributing factor was the growth of a revisionist disciplinary history literature within American political science as practised by scholars such as James Farr and John Gunnell.[24] Against a 'cumulative, progressive image of science' that legitimised the prevailing positivist identity of mainstream political science, these scholars sought to advance a more accurate and less partisan account of the discipline's past based on rigorous research into actual discursive and institutional contexts. Schmidt, indeed, specifically applied to IR Gunnell's 'internalist' method which aimed at an 'archaeological' study of the past discourse of

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[22] Long, 'Who Killed the International Studies Conference?'; Jo-Anne Pemberton, *The Story of International Relations, Part Three: Cold Blooded Idealists* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020); Jan Stöckmann, *The Architects of International Relations: Building a Discipline, Designing the World, 1914-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022); Peter Marcus Kristensen, 'Subject Matters: Imperialism and the Constitution of International Relations [First View]', *Review of International Studies*, 2022, 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210522000420.

[23] Nicolas Guilhot, ed., *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011).

[24] Brian C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), 5.

political science, seeking the causes of intellectual developments within that disciplinary matrix rather than the wider world of politics.[25] Others in IR soon followed.[26] Yet there was also both a broader and a more specific reason for the rise of IR's disciplinary history literature. The broader context was the 'post-positivist' turn in the social sciences from the late 1960s, which forced a reassessment of ideas of progressive knowledge cumulation and theory-fact correspondence, and a greater awareness of the role of history in cementing disciplinary identities. The philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn was particularly important here by positing a discontinuous history of sequential and incommensurable 'paradigms', which succeeded each other via power-mediated 'scientific revolutions'.[27] This had the positive effect of undermining a teleological idea of rational intellectual evolution and showing that disciplines were in fact social objects affected by internal and external power struggles. Yet Kuhn's ideas did not entirely displace the idea of scientific advance. Indeed, they were adapted and used to bolster newer post-positivist identities which held theory and ideology to be blended, but which also figured themselves at the progressive end of the story. It was in reaction to this that a more rigorous literature and methodological debate emerged across histories of social science.[28]

Within IR specifically, post-positivism's arrival and a general intellectual pluralisation cemented themselves within disciplinary lore as the discipline's third 'Great Debate'.[29] As we shall see, there were overlapping conceptions of what constituted this debate – either it reflected the rise of IPE in the 1970s or the entry of 'dissident' critical theories by the late 1980s – but they shared a narrative structure influenced by a sociologised rendering of Kuhn, grounded in an unsophisticated account of intellectual causation. As Schmidt observed, '(t)he current tendency to write disciplinary history for the purpose of validating contemporary intellectual identities is, in part, a ramification of developments within post-positive philosophy.'[30] In a series of textbooks and stock-taking articles, Anglo-American scholars after the 1970s constructed a discipline-

[25] Ibid., 20–21.
[26] Dunne, *Inventing International Society*; Cameron Thies, 'Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate', *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 2 (2002): 147–85.
[27] Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
[28] Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*, 6, 16.
[29] Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg, eds., *Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982); Michael Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate', in *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory*, ed. Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), 7–26; Yosef Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era', *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (1989): 235–54.
[30] Brian C. Schmidt, 'The Historiography of Academic International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 20, no. 4 (1994): 358.

defining myth that IR had evolved through a sequence of 'paradigms' punctuated by revolutionary 'Great Debates'. While there was some disagreement about the nature of these debates and the parties involved, by the 1990s it had become established that IR was born after the First World War and was dominated initially by an 'idealist' liberal paradigm; followed by realism after 1945; behavioural-scientific theory in the 1960s; a plural 'inter-paradigm' contest between realism, liberalism, and Marxism in the 1970s and early 1980s; through to an ongoing debate between positivism and post-positivism.[31] Crucially, the evolution of the discipline was said to have been driven by events and ideological contests in the external world of politics – particularly during the end and onset of major wars – which created 'anomalies' (in Kuhn's terms) that a prevailing paradigm could not explain. In this context, it is worth noting, Hoffmann's 'American social science' was confronted on arrival by a competitor – and ultimately more influential – narrative of positive evolution.

IR's disciplinary history literature has been correctly understood as a reaction against this 'progressivist', though sometimes declinist, myth, if largely from a position sympathetic to post-positivist agendas.[32] As Lucian Ashworth argues, it was simply 'the misfit between these narratives and the textual and archival record that in its turn spurred a vibrant disciplinary history', whose aim was to reveal the dependence of IR theory on historical context.[33] Schmidt highlighted several reasons such revisionism would be beneficial in the post-positivist era, particularly the ability to identify instructive 'discursive continuities' running through the history of the discipline.[34] In his book, Schmidt argued that the concepts of 'anarchy' and state sovereignty had constituted IR's foundational discourse from the late nineteenth century, thus highlighting American realism's continuing power but – more importantly – the historically contingent nature of its conceptual framework. As Schmidt showed, realism was neither a timeless tradition nor a necessary response to the Second World War during the 'First Great Debate', but rather just one position in an ongoing discussion on the meaning of anarchy within American political science.[35] Yet while

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[31] Joel Quirk and Darshan Vigneswaran, 'The Construction of an Edifice: The Story of a First Great Debate', *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 1 (2005): 89–107.
[32] Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*, 10; Gerard Holden, 'Who Contextualizes the Contextualizers? Disciplinary History and the Discourse about IR Discourse', *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 2 (2002): 253–70; Duncan Bell, 'Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond', *International Affairs* 85, no. 1 (2009): 6.
[33] Lucian M. Ashworth, 'A Historiographer's View: Rewriting the History of International Thought', in *The Sage Handbook of the History, Philosophy, and Sociology of International Relations*, ed. Andreas Gofas, Inanna Hamati-Ataya, and Nicholas Onuf (London: Sage, 2018), 91.
[34] Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*, 231; Brian C. Schmidt, 'On the History and Historiography of International Relations', in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 12.
[35] Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*, 39–42.

similar continuity narratives have become commonplace in the disciplinary history literature, less prominent in Schmidt was the mobilisation of historical methods to retrieve marginalised – but valuable – insights from the past. This has been a focus for histories of realism, for example, which have sought to highlight the radical potential present in earlier realist thought, following critical IR theorists who first distinguished 'classical realism' from 'neorealism'.[36] For Duncan Bell, the ability to excavate normative arguments 'lost through multiform processes of historical evolution' is one of the 'central tasks' of disciplinary history, helping 'enrich the theoretical imagination and expand the number of options, of choices, available to confront the problems of the present and future.'[37] Due to the acceptance of the Great Debates narrative, disciplinary historians have argued, 'a rich variety of progressivist ideas have been consigned to oblivion'.[38]

These histories – whether of continuity or retrieval – have certainly contributed to IR with richer and more accurate accounts of the discipline's past, and in recent years have combined fruitfully with feminist and post-colonial trends in the humanities and social sciences. Yet, there have been at least three related issues with the way this literature has developed from its 1990s origins. One issue in the early years was Schmidt's 'internalist' methodology, which overlooked important interactions between academic discourse and evolving political developments in its quest to reveal 'deep discursive continuities'. However, this restrictive method has been controversial and has largely not been followed by recent disciplinary historians. Nevertheless, despite its faded influence, there remains no shortage of statements and pronouncements praising or complaining about its continuing dominance over the literature.[39] The ongoing debate over internalism, indeed, has arguably reinforced an existing lack of attention on more fundamental issues. One has been the naturalisation of what will be termed 'originalism' – that is, the assumption that only the formative years of IR matter for a historical understanding of the discipline. As with internalism, this is mainly related to disciplinary historians' contestation of the progressivist Great Debates narrative, which naturally led to a focus on highlighting the connections between IR's formative history in the early-to-mid-twentieth century and its present

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[36] Charles Jones, *E.H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Michael C. Williams, *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Seán Molloy, *The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Vibeke Schou Tjalve, *Realist Strategies of Republican Peace: Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and the Politics of Patriotic Dissent* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); William E. Scheuerman, *The Realist Case for Global Reform* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2011).

[37] Duncan Bell, 'Political Theory and the Functions of Intellectual History: A Response to Emmanuel Navon', *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 1 (2003): 158.

[38] Peter Wilson, 'The Myth of the "First Great Debate"', *Review of International Studies* 24 (1998): 1.

[39] Brian C. Schmidt, 'Internalism versus Externalism in the Disciplinary History of International Relations', in *Historiographical Investigations in International Relations*, ed. Brian C. Schmidt and Nicolas Guilhot (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 127–48.

condition. Even if this broad focus does not mean such historians have necessarily held originalist assumptions, it has nevertheless contributed to originalism's appearance of reasonability in ways that will have negative effects on historical understanding.[40] Without addressing this issue, histories of IR will continue to have blind spots regarding IR's transformation in the late twentieth century, meaning that self-images popularised during and about this period – notably Hoffmann's 'American social science' thesis and pluralistic visions of the 'Third Debate' – will not be adequately scrutinised. It also means that disciplinary historians, despite themselves being part of IR's late-century transformation, may be less able to understand and contribute to disciplinary change in the present and future.

The final issue, which underlies the other two, has been a divorce between the disciplinary history and sociology literatures. Originating in a critique of accounts that sought to explain IR's structure with reference to evolving social realities, disciplinary historians have been inclined to focus on uncovering continuous or relevant (but forgotten) discourses of distant origin. While there have been methodological benefits to this focus, the temporal balance of the literature has become too skewed towards the formative history of the discipline, potentially distorting understanding of IR's development over time. However, a proper engagement with a new generation of disciplinary sociologists would provide a useful tonic to the issues of internalism and – above all – originalism within the disciplinary history literature. As we shall see, since the millennium scholars such as Ole Waever and Amitav Acharya have demonstrated the interaction between academic discourse and external contexts with more sophistication than the earlier accounts of Great Debates, and have mapped processes of intellectual pluralisation, institutional expansion, and disciplinary self-reflection on an international basis. Their substantive insights – along with a small handful of disciplinary historians who have begun to address aspects of late-twentieth-century IR – can thus offer a guide for disciplinary history writing going forward. As chapter 2 will argue, this rapprochement can be doubly beneficial given disciplinary historians possess valuable methodological tools for providing a meaningful narrative of IR's transformation, which formalistic sociological accounts lack. These concern the ability to uncover the ideological meaning of written texts; to recount the self-reflective discourse of which both disciplinary historians and sociologists have been part; and to account for the transnational production of knowledge and institutions.

[40] Thakur and Vale, *South Africa, Race, and the Making of International Relations*; Stöckmann, *The Architects of International Relations*.

1.3 Chapter Overview

The next chapter addresses these methodological issues in more depth, arguing that disciplinary historians' reaction against the 'Great Debates' narrative led to issues of internalism and originalism, and a regrettable alienation from their sociologist cousins. The chapters which follow then seek to take forward the methodological principles established.

In chapter 3, the ways in which international events from the late 1960s – the Vietnam War; détente; the Nixon shock; the rise of the Global South and the decline of the US – as well as academic developments such as the 'post-behavioural' turn, intruded upon IR are explored with reference to the birth of the subfield of International Political Economy (IPE) and the establishment of the Great Debates narrative. Thus, it documents how processes of intellectual diversification, institutional expansion, and disciplinary self-reflection began to intensify from around 1970 onwards on both sides of the Atlantic. With the rise of non-realist scholarship that sought to integrate political and economic phenomena in an age of 'interdependence',[41] a suite of journals, departments, university courses, and professional societies flourished that quickly came to occupy central places in the discipline. In the US, these included existing but until then small-scale institutions such as the journal *International Organisation* and IR's premier professional society, the International Studies Association (ISA). Meanwhile, many of the core institutions of contemporary British IR originated during the 'global 1970s', including the journals *Millennium* and *Review of International Studies*, the latter of which was the house publication of the 1975-founded British International Studies Association (BISA). Using untapped material from the BISA and ISA archives, perhaps the most important finding of this chapter is that the pioneers of British IPE – indeed British IR – often looked across the Atlantic for inspiration when establishing the new field. This problematises contemporary understandings within IPE that there has always been an intellectually narrow and hegemonic 'American school' pitched against an eclectic and renegade 'British school'. In fact, the chapter shows that British IPE scholars such as Susan Strange originally viewed the American scene as more open and exciting than post-war British IR, even seeking to imitate some of its ideas and institutions. Similarly, responding to IPE's emergence and the threat it posed to the post-war state-centric identity of IR, the idea that the discipline had

[41] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1977).

evolved into a plural 'Inter-paradigm Debate' between realism, liberalism, and Marxism was a transatlantic collaborative construction.

The late 1970s and early 1980s saw a resurgence of realism in a scientised form, embodied intellectually in Kenneth Waltz's cybernetically informed *Theory of International Politics*, and institutionally in the founding of the journal *International Security*.[42] As the United States looked to shore up its global power, this gave credence to another sociological view of IR, one encapsulated not only in Hoffmann's 'American social science' thesis but other studies that sought to prove – and critique – the dominance of the realist paradigm.[43] The 'Great Debates' idea here took on more of a declinist tenor, though still largely from a perspective aiming to pluralise the discipline. Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s, it was well established in textbooks and other state-of-the-art publications that IR was in the throes of an 'inter-paradigm' tussle between realism, liberalism, and Marxism.[44] One of the reasons for this was that the scientised realism of Waltz and others did not hinder processes of change in IR, as Hoffmann and others argued, but rather accelerated them. While chapter 3 explores the rise of what was classed (perhaps inappropriately) as a liberal or 'pluralist' paradigm, chapter 4 examines a more radical stream of thought which originated in 1970s IPE debates but made its mark in IR during the early 1980s as a critical reaction to what it termed 'neorealism'. Once again, it is interesting that this reaction had American origins. In particular, the chapter looks at the origins and emergence of the self-conscious 'critical' theories of Robert W. Cox and Richard K. Ashley. While there have been some (decontextualised) analyses of these pioneering critical IR theorists by later followers and critics, this chapter resituates them within the historical contexts in which they constructed their theories during the 1970s, and the meaning of their (somewhat belated) arrival in the early 1980s. It argues that their theories were, in different ways, attempts to adapt ideas from 1970s European social theory – particularly Gramscian and Frankfurt-School concepts – as well as the norms of transnational social movements such as the New International Economic Order (NIEO), to comprehend and counteract the rise of neorealism as a positivistic ideology of US political and economic empire. Introduced in the age of the neoliberal and neoconservative 'New Right' under Ronald Reagan, however, the chapter

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[42] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
[43] John Vasquez, 'Colouring It Morgenthau: New Evidence for an Old Thesis on Quantitative International Politics', *British Journal of International Studies* 5, no. 3 (1979): 210–28; John Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983); Hayward R. Alker and Thomas J. Biersteker, 'The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archaeologist of International Savoir Faire', *International Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (1984): 121–42.
[44] Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate'; K.J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985); Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism.*

contends that these critiques did not quite hit their mark politically, despite important effects within the discipline. Ironically, by distinguishing neorealism from a more sophisticated 'classical' variant, they also contributed to increasing academic interest in the history and nature of the realist tradition, as surveyed in chapter 2.

Through the 1980s, Cox and Ashley helped set off a wave of reaction to neorealism and its underlying philosophy of science, as proliferating post-positivist 'voices of dissent' coalesced within IR – an intellectual contest that would be cemented in lore as the 'Third Debate' (or fourth, if the Inter-paradigm Debate was included in the sequence).[45] Including an eclectic group of postmodernists, Frankfurt-School discourse ethicists, feminists, constructivists, historical sociologists, and normative theorists, these 'dissidents' had incited significant metatheoretical reflection on the epistemological, methodological, ontological, and normative bases of IR by the end of the 1980s. While this was catalysed by the end of the Cold War and came to be remembered as an abstract metatheoretical contest, that Cox and Ashley's IPE-adjacent theories were considered to have inaugurated the Third Debate suggests an overlooked connection with the Inter-paradigm Debate and the ideological struggles of the 1970s. Along with further intellectual pluralisation came a transnational spread of 'critical' IR from the US to the UK and Europe, as well as Canada and Australia, and a rearticulation of its opposition to neorealism in geographic terms. This both reflected and shaped a growing institutional ferment, epitomised by a conflict between ISA and BISA during the late 1980s concerning the latter's globalisation and expansion, which led – among other developments – to the founding of a European-wide professional association and journal.[46] IR, as a new industry of disciplinary sociologies liked to put it, had become 'quite different in different places'.[47]

While the full intricacies of these fraught intellectual debates and institutional controversies are beyond the bounds of this thesis, several themes are taken up in chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 questions head on the Third Debate's self-image of radical pluralism, exploring in more depth critical IR's relation to its political and ideological context. It starts from the observations that Cox

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[45] Robert O. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (1988): 379–96; Lapid, 'The Third Debate'; Jim George, 'International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate', *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (1989): 269–79. Ole Waever, a pioneering sociologist of IR, coined the idea of a 'Fourth Great Debate'. See Ole Waever, 'The Rise and Fall of the Interparadigm Debate', in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 149–85.

[46] Walter Carlsnaes, 'Editorial', *European Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 1 (1995): 5–7.

[47] Waever, 'The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline', 723.

and Ashley's early Marxist-inspired theories became marginalised within IR's post-positivist constellation, and that this constellation began to flourish in the early 1990s – an era of liberal-capitalist US supremacy. As is well known, this era was notoriously crowned by the American political scientist and neoconservative foreign policy analyst Francis Fukuyama as 'the end of history'.[48] Chapter 5 uncovers unexpected theoretical connections and affinities between Fukuyama's end of history thesis and post-positivist perspectives from the Third Debate. Through an intellectual historical reconstruction of Fukuyama's thesis and its receptive audience of critical scholars in the 1990s, it advances two main claims. First, it argues that Fukuyama drew upon, sympathised with, and strikingly reproduced core ideas from several critical IR theories when developing the international dimensions of his thesis. Second, it argues that prominent theorists from the 'foundationalist' wing of critical scholarship received the end of history thesis seriously and positively, sympathising with Fukuyama, using him to develop their theories, and even viewing him as a critical theorist. In advancing the latter claim, the chapter homes in on a set of British scholars collecting particularly around the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. The department played an important role in the Great Debates narrative as purported instigator of the idealist phase, and now again took up a position as a global centre of critical IR during the Third Debate. Yet, against a celebratory narrative of evolution, this chapter highlights the continuation of Eurocentric liberalism from the early history of IR to the Third Debate.

Chapter 6, finally, steps back to provide an illuminating example of the transformation of IR in the broad period covered in this thesis. The North American International Studies Association (ISA) is the world's largest professional society for the study and teaching of international affairs. Yet despite this and the booming literature on the history of IR, scant scholarly attention has been paid to ISA's origins and development. Indeed, as mentioned, disciplinary historians have paid far more attention to the long-dead interwar ISC than IR's major professional society of the past half century. Using untapped archives and interviews with past institution-builders, this chapter offers a first reconstruction of ISA's history from its late 1950s origins to the early years of the twenty-first century. It argues that despite unfulfilled aims of interdisciplinarity and institutional hegemony, ISA not just reflected but shaped IR's evolution into an intellectually pluralistic and increasingly global social science. It contextualises this history amidst developments within academe and the world at large, highlighting four major – but non-linear – periods of growth: maturation from Western regional origins to national status (c.1959-

[48] Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', *The National Interest*, no. 16 (1989): 3–18; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1992).

65); intellectual diversification and internationalisation (c.1965-80); abortive globalisation (c.1980-95); and non-hierarchical globalisation and expansion (c.1995-2010). In so doing, it highlights the entwining of processes of intellectual diversification and institutional expansion in IR's recent past, and the benefits of studying such processes for understanding and critically evaluating the discipline today.

The concluding chapter draws together the various strands of the story of IR's transformation during the years circa 1970 to 2000, and recounts more recent developments that have continued the trajectory. It also highlights the contributions of the thesis to IR, and especially to the disciplinary history literature that has grown since the mid-1990s. Like this literature, the thesis problematises early sociological self-images of IR popularised during (and about) the late twentieth century, in particular the Great Debates narrative but also the 'American social science' thesis. Unlike most disciplinary historians, however, it highlights the recent past as a highly important period of IR's development that is necessary to study for a comprehensive understanding of the discipline today. It does not claim to provide a complete or final history of late-twentieth-century IR but rather seeks to demonstrate the need for greater temporal balance in the disciplinary history literature, and points towards three main processes of change that occurred in this period (as shown by disciplinary sociologists). Confronting originalism does not require an end to studying the early history of IR, the thesis suggests, but rather greater acknowledgement that studying deep past of the discipline does not provide all the keys to understanding its present. It also requires more historical studies of IR during the late twentieth century and even beyond. In turn, a final contribution of the thesis is that it opens space to consider how the discipline of IR might undergo transformation again in the present and future. Indeed, as the world that emerged from the 1970s onwards shows signs of having broken down, it is legitimate to wonder whether IR might once again transform in tandem with a changing global order. The conclusion evaluates several possible trends for IR's short to medium-term future considering its recent past.

2. Internalism and Originalism in the Disciplinary History and Sociology of International Relations

2.1 Introduction

The three decades since the end of the Cold War have witnessed a substantial growth of interest in the history of the International Relations (IR) discipline. Conducted mostly by IR scholars, with occasional contributions from professional historians, disciplinary histories have subjected IR's origins and development to searching re-evaluation. 'Piecing together forgotten debates, dusting off long-unread volumes, and tendering new perspectives on old questions', they have revealed that much of the conventional story about the discipline's past is either wrong or partial at best.[49] The conventional story, influenced by Thomas Kuhn's work, holds that IR progressed through twentieth-century history in a series of 'paradigms' punctuated by three or four 'Great Debates'. However, influenced by revisionist histories of political science and thought, and by post-positivist developments in IR and beyond, disciplinary historians argued this story was no more than a myth constructed for contemporary intellectual purposes. The story had been popularised amidst the huge growth of IR during the 1970s and 1980s, but there were fears it could be doing more harm than good in this respect. The myth, as we have seen, was thought to overplay the connection between theories and political contests, and to reinforce, or ignore the continuing dominance of, traditional positions such as realism via the idea of conflictual Great Debates and by presenting more intellectual pluralism than really existed. Furthermore, it caricatured and rejected as outmoded certain ideas from the past that could have 'critical purchase' in the present.[50] In response to these concerns, two non-mutually exclusive streams of historical literature have emerged, one focusing on reconstructing IR's formative years and their legacy, and another seeking to retrieve valuable forgotten insights.[51]

In addition to performing these functions with more accurate historical accounts, the disciplinary history literature has also advanced methodological discussion about how to research IR's past. Yet, because of its own origins and development, some methodological problems have attracted more interest than others. This chapter takes up the issues raised in the introduction

[49] Duncan Bell, 'Writing the World (Remix)', in *Historiographical Investigations in International Relations*, ed. Brian C. Schmidt and Nicolas Guilhot (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 16.
[50] Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*, 5.
[51] Bell, 'Writing the World (Remix)', 19–23.

regarding IR's disciplinary history literature, pushing forward existing debate by examining issues of internalism, originalism, and the divorce between disciplinary histories and sociologies. Methodological debate has hitherto focused on this literature's 'internalism' – that is, its attempt, in Brian Schmidt's words, reconstruct the 'actual conversation among academic scholars and other participants who self-consciously thought of themselves as participating in a formalised academic setting devoted to the study of world politics', without attributing causal force over this conversation to 'external' political contexts.[52] For Schmidt and others, this is crucial for rescuing the sophistication of past IR discussions from the Great Debates narrative, which straightforwardly assumes disciplinary knowledge progressed in lockstep with international political contestation. Yet given internalists are largely self-taught historians educated within the discipline, critics argue they focus restrictively on the internal scholarly contexts with which they are familiar, downplaying the role of 'external' history in the making and influence of IR. As Duncan Bell put it in his review of Schmidt's *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*: 'it seems overly simplistic to present the history of the field without serious reference to actual events, or the major role that they can and do play in the generation of ideas, and in the bolstering of one position as opposed to another.'[53] Other commentators have made similar complaints, highlighting a lack of attention to the relationship between theory and ideology, for example,[54] or even claiming that disciplinary historians have been forced to contradict internalism.[55] For Bell, a long-standing advocate of the 'Cambridge School' approach to intellectual history, disciplinary historians are 'best advised to remain agnostic about what general forces shape academic institutions and discourses,' ascertaining the relevance of particular contexts from the historical question being asked.[56]

Twenty years later, as a recent overview of IR's 'historical turn' suggested, internalism remains the central issue in methodological debate among disciplinary historians.[57] While Schmidt offers continued defences of the relevance of internalism,[58] many remain highly sceptical, arguing that both internal and external contexts need to be accounted for.[59] Consciously or not, though,

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[52] Schmidt, 'The Historiography of Academic International Relations', 365.
[53] Duncan Bell, 'International Relations: The Dawn of a Historiographical Turn?', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 3, no. 1 (2001): 121.
[54] Richard Little, 'Historiography and International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 2 (1999): 291–99.
[55] Holden, 'Who Contextualises the Contextualisers?'
[56] Bell, 'Writing the World (Remix)', 25.
[57] Nicolas Guilhot, 'Introduction', in *Historiographical Investigations in International Relations*, ed. Brian C. Schmidt and Nicolas Guilhot (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 10–11.
[58] Schmidt, 'Internalism versus Externalism', 129–31.
[59] Bell, 'Writing the World (Remix)'; Or Rosenboim, 'Threads and Boundaries: Rethinking the Intellectual History of International Relations', in *Historiographical Investigations in International Relations*, ed. Brian C.

recent disciplinary histories – whether focused on IR's implication in early-twentieth-century US empire or its role post-war American social science (among other topics) – have largely followed Bell's plea to attend to 'the complex intercalating of institutions, agents, and knowledge'.[60] Furthermore, they have been backed up by sophisticated sociological analyses of IR demonstrating clear interconnections between knowledge and power, in ways that overcome the naïve sociological explanations of the Great Debates.[61] Yet there has not been adequate reflection on how scholarly practice has largely outpaced methodological debate. Critics as much as Schmidt himself, who claims newer approaches are compatible with his method, overlook how disciplinary history writing has moved beyond internalism. In turn, other methodological issues continue to go unaddressed.

This chapter thus seeks to move beyond the debate on internalism. While agreeing with critics of internalism, it argues that this debate is to some extent exhausted given most disciplinary historians no longer follow internalist methodology and often offer systematic alternatives – notably, the variations on the 'Cambridge School' approach.[62] Furthermore, it suggests the controversy overlooks how disciplinary sociologists, with whom disciplinary historians have not adequately engaged since first critiquing the Great Debates narrative, can help find a resolution. More importantly, however, the debate over internalism has left unquestioned a further assumption within the literature: namely, 'originalism'. This, in short, is the assumption that studying IR's formative period provides the keys to understanding, and intervening in, the discipline from a historical perspective. By focusing overwhelmingly on the early-to-mid-twentieth century, disciplinary historians assign exaggerated importance to IR's formative years in the early-to-mid-twentieth century, downgrading the significance of much of its later development. This is

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Schmidt and Nicolas Guilhot (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 97–125; Lucian M. Ashworth, 'How Should We Approach the History of International Thought?', in *Historiographical Investigations in International Relations*, ed. Brian C. Schmidt and Nicolas Guilhot (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 79–95.

[60] Bell, 'Writing the World (Remix)', 21–23. See Guilhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory*; Nicolas Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment: Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Vitalis, *White World Order*.

[61] Waever, 'The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline'; Stefano Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold* (London: Routledge, 1998); Knud Erik Jorgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen, 'Introduction', in *International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives and Destinations*, ed. Knud Erik Jorgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen (London: Routledge, 2006), 1–15; Ido Oren, *Our Enemies and US: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Piki Ish-Shalom, *Democratic Peace: A Political Biography* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013).

[62] Another important approach of course exists – the 'traditions' view of Ian Hall (influenced by Mark Bevir) – but I shall not discuss this here as it is not widely used for disciplinary history writing in IR. See Ian Hall, *Dilemmas of Decline: British Intellectuals and World Politics,1945-75* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012).

particularly the case regarding the history of the discipline since 1970, for which only a small handful of studies have touched upon, let alone properly accounted. The chapter argues that this focus on connecting IR's present with its deep past – a product, even more so than internalism, of a concern to critique the evolutionary Great Debates narrative – means originalism has become a reasonable or natural assumption when writing the history of IR. This will lead to continued distortion of the history of IR through lack of attention to its recent past, and could even limit understanding of IR as a discipline capable of historical change.

Here again, however, disciplinary sociologies provide an underappreciated tonic with their identification of major processes of change in IR's recent past. In particular, they demonstrate significant intellectual diversification, institutional expansion, and increased self-reflectiveness on an international basis since 1970. Underlying both the continuing debate on internalism and the unaddressed issue of originalism, then, has been the issue of a divorce between the disciplinary history and sociology literatures. Bringing them together, the chapter concludes, provides a key to their resolution – in particular, the issue of originalism. With disciplinary sociologists providing substantive guidance by mapping the changing topography of IR, disciplinary historians have tools to provide a meaningful narrative of the discipline's transformation, which formalistic sociological studies lack.

Before proceeding further, two points are worth clarifying. First, in critiquing originalism, this chapter is neither suggesting that no account of the early history of IR is necessary for understanding the discipline today nor that disciplinary historians have always held originalist assumptions. Originalism, to define the term more systematically, is *the methodological assumption or precept that a return to IR's formative period will yield the only or most valuable viewpoint from which to understand and intervene in the contemporary discipline through a study of its history*. The chapter argues that the general temporal focus of the literature over the years means originalism has become a natural or justified assumption for disciplinary history writing today, and recommends scholars avoid holding the assumption or perpetuating it going forward. But it does not accuse individual disciplinary historians of themselves being 'originalists'. Second, one set of methodological critiques of the literature pursued only indirectly in this chapter is that it is 'Eurocentric' and/or gendered, given that it focuses on Western and especially American IR, paying overwhelming attention to the thought of white men within these locales. Such criticisms are increasingly being acknowledged among disciplinary historians, who have written major works recovering the thought of scholars hitherto erased from the history of IR within and beyond the West, and the racialised, colonial,

and gendered nature of that history (with much work remaining to be done in these directions).[63] This thesis can add little to these critiques except to acknowledge their force and endeavour to put their implications into practice as best as possible given its Anglo-American focus. The methodological contributions here concern issues of internalism, originalism, and the divide between disciplinary histories and sociologies, and so the focus of the following chapter is upon them. There is no necessary contradiction between these critiques and the arguments below.

The next section outlines the past and continuing debate over Schmidt's method of 'critical internal discursive history'. While agreeing with critics of internalism such as Bell, it argues that the debate may be exhausted given disciplinary historians today do largely situate IR in broad historical contexts (often systematically so). It also identifies underappreciated resources within a parallel but estranged disciplinary sociology literature, where scholars have demonstrated clear interconnections between IR and 'external' political realities that should help settle the debate. Section 2.3 in turn suggests originalism as a methodological issue neglected due to the disciplinary history literature's opposition to the Great Debates narrative and an abiding focus on internalism as the core methodological dispute. It unpacks further the notion of originalism and demonstrates how disciplinary histories have overwhelmingly privileged the early-to-mid-twentieth century period, deflecting attention from changes occurring particularly since 1970. The section argues that the temporal imbalance of the historical literature, and its accompanying desire to connect IR's deep past to its present, have naturalised an originalist approach with negative intellectual effects. Once again, the divorce from a sophisticated sociological literature is shown to be regrettable, given it has identified at least three major processes of change in IR's recent past. Thus, the concluding section argues that disciplinary historians should pay particular attention to the substantive insights of disciplinary sociologists. At the same time, it argues that they nevertheless retain advantages over disciplinary sociologists for providing a meaningful narrative of IR's post-1970 transformation. These concern the ability to uncover the ideological meaning of written texts; to recount the self-reflective discourse of which both disciplinary historians and sociologists have been part; and to account for the transnational production of knowledge and institutions.

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[63] Long and Schmidt, *Imperialism and Internationalism*; John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Vitalis, *White World Order*; Owens and Rietzler, *Women's International Thought: A New History*; Patricia Owens et al., eds., *Women's International Thought: Towards a New Canon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022); Martin J. Bayly, 'Lineages of Indian International Relations: The Indian Council on World Affairs, the League of Nations, and the Pedagogy of Internationalism', *The International History Review*, 2021, 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2021.1900891.

2.2 Internalism in the Disciplinary History and Sociology of International Relations

Much scholarship on IR's disciplinary history has followed the example of Brian C. Schmidt. In a 1994 article, 'The Historiography of Academic International Relations', Schmidt produced a methodological statement that would lay the basis for his later book, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*. Situating his contribution within the 'prolonged period of intense intellectual ferment about the contemporary identity of the field' occasioned by the 'post-positivist age', Schmidt argued that critical scholars in the 'Third Debate' had not paid adequate attention to the earlier history of the field. This was unfortunate, he suggested, given the recognition among such scholars that 'the capacity to examine the contemporary nature of an intellectual discipline is inseparable from an understanding of the intellectual roots from which it evolved.'[64] Proceeding to survey conventional 'Great Debates' renditions of IR's history, Schmidt sought not to identify their historical inaccuracies directly, but to critique the methodological flaws which gave rise to them.

Schmidt highlighted two errors in particular. The first was the idea that there were 'epic traditions of international thought that connect ancient and modern writers and thus have given rise to coherent schools of thought or paradigms such as realism.'[65] This 'unreflective orthodox regulative ideal for teaching and writing,' Schmidt argued, confused analytical constructs with historical reality, conflating categories denoting the functional similarity of certain ideas *across* history for their actual inheritance *through* history. In this way, contemporary IR was tethered to a noble past – notably grand thinkers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, or Kant – rather than the 'real academic practices and individuals that have contributed to the development and current identity of a discipline.'[66] The second, and apparently more significant, error was the assumption that the development of IR could be explained solely 'by reference to contextual or external factors.'[67] To Schmidt's consternation, the discipline's story was often told with particular reference to the two world wars, the first of which supposedly initiated a period of utopian legalism after the Treaty of Versailles, the second of which yielded a sober realist approach to justify and orient, in Stanley Hoffmann's words, 'the American role in world affairs after 1945.'[68] Yet, while not denying that IR debate could construct world events in the other direction, Schmidt felt the conventionally

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64 Schmidt, 'The Historiography of Academic International Relations', 349.
65 Ibid., 351.
66 Ibid., 353.
67 Ibid., 360.
68 Ibid., 361.

posited links drawn from events to academic theory to be simplistic, unsubstantiated, and difficult to prove, and the external context itself assumed rather than empirically demonstrated. Like traditionalism, the error of external accounts for Schmidt reflected the 'presentist' desire to cast judgement on IR's contemporary or desired character rather than produce accurate history.[69] These errors together underlay the welter of 'generic synoptic accounts' of the Great Debates, with grand traditions of thought presented as giving rise to coherent scientific communities or 'paradigms' in the twentieth century whose fortunes rose and fell in line with international events. While Hoffmann's critical 'American social science' thesis – which had followers in Steve Smith and John Vasquez – was a target, Schmidt very much had in mind particularly progressivist accounts popularised amidst overlapping interpretations of a pluralistic 'Third Debate'.[70]

Schmidt, by contrast, recommended a method of 'critical internal discursive history', whose aim would be to recapitulate 'the main contours and content of a circumscribed realm of discursive activity conventionally designated as international relations'.[71] That is, it would trace 'the descent of the field from the point of the incipient academic discourse of international relations', reconstructing 'the conceptual and genealogical emergence of this conversation without the imposition of any preconceived presentist frameworks'. A discourse on IR discourse, it would thus involve only figures who 'self-consciously thought of themselves as participating in a formalised academic setting devoted to the study of world politics', and who wrote in 'scholarly journal articles, texts, manuscripts and biographies'.[72] This was not of mere antiquarian concern, however, since Schmidt was clear that a critical internal discursive history could have a positive effect in IR. Through its application, Schmidt hoped not only to identify the continuing power of the realist discourse on anarchy, but more importantly demonstrate the historical and discursive construction of its conceptual framework, as well as retrieve valuable forgotten insights.[73] He went on to demonstrate in *The Political Discourse of Anarchy* that early American IR had incubated sophisticated interdisciplinary discussions concerning the nature of anarchy and sovereignty, which anticipated later debates in multiple complex ways – which, as we will see in the next section, inaugurated a fascination among disciplinary historians with IR's formative history.

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[69] Ibid., 363.
[70] Ibid., 356–57, 362–63.
[71] Ibid., 364. As seen in the introduction, Schmidt's approach here was influenced heavily by the revisionist histories of political science of the 1980s, and especially the work of John Gunnell who was Schmidt's PhD advisor. See John G. Gunnell, *Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1979); John G. Gunnell, *Between Philosophy and Politics: The Alienation of Political Theory* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986).
[72] Schmidt, 'The Historiography of Academic International Relations', 365.
[73] Ibid., 367; Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*, 5.

In outlining these lineages, Schmidt indeed contributed to what Duncan Bell termed 'the dawn of a historiographical turn' in IR.[74] It also led to a suspicion of sociological accounts of IR – often influenced by Kuhn – where scientific communities united by paradigms emerged and declined in total alignment with international change. At the same time, while not questioning the temporal focus and stress on continuity that Schmidt inaugurated, scholars have nonetheless queried his internalist method. Two broad and telling critiques have been levelled. The first and most prominent is that it is, as Bell points out, implausible. In his essay 'Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond' (first published in 2009 but recently modified), which expanded brief complaints raised in his otherwise sympathetic early review, Bell argued this was because Schmidt had turned 'a useful corrective heuristic' – the avoidance of simplistic external explanations – into 'a problematic methodological precept'. For Bell, the contexts shaping the development of academic disciplines 'differ across time and space', and so privileging any particular one was 'unnecessarily restrictive'. Thus, while the question, 'What role has the International Studies Association (ISA) played in setting the agenda of the discipline?' might require an internalist approach, a question such as 'How did "national security" imperatives influence the field' required looking beyond disciplinary conversations.[75] Bell has not been alone in making this critique – he was one of several original reviewers to do so –[76] but he has done the most to move methodological debate forward, short of writing his own disciplinary history. Following his original appraisal of Schmidt, Bell argued repeatedly that the contextualism of Quentin Skinner's 'Cambridge School' – whose emphasis on discerning the meaning of texts from their linguistic and ideological context Schmidt curiously rejected as events-driven – offered a cogent method of examining IR's history.[77] He later added in 'Writing the World' the suggestion that IR be situated within 'histories of the global', that is, 'histories of the multiple and conflicting

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[74] Bell, 'The Dawn of a Historiographical Turn?' By this, Bell meant not only the emergence of more sophisticated disciplinary histories, but also that 'the study of the history of political thought…is now taken far more seriously, studied more carefully and explicitly, and plays a greater role in shaping the theoretical debate, than it has in the past.' Ibid., 123.

[75] Bell, 'Writing the World', 10–11. As we shall see, it is surprising Bell should have raised the first question at all given disciplinary historians have shown scant attention to ISA's history – a product of their general neglect of the post-1970 period.

[76] See, for example, Little, 'Historiography and International Relations'; Mary Durfee, 'Review of The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations, by Brian C. Schmidt', *American Political Science Review* 93, no. 4 (1999): 1026–27; Samuel Makinda, 'Reading and Writing International Relations', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 3 (2000): 389–401.

[77] Duncan Bell, 'Language, Legitimacy, and the Project of Critique', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 3 (2002): 327–50; Bell, 'Political Theory and the Functions of Intellectual History'.

ways in which global politics…have been and are envisioned across a plethora of institutional spaces'.[78]

The second critique of internalism has been most fully elaborated by Gerard Holden.[79] Holden, who also recommended a Cambridge School approach to disciplinary history, argued that Schmidt ultimately was forced to contradict his stated method. Highlighting references to such real-world phenomena as forced European migration, colonial empires, and the League of Nations in *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*, Holden argued that 'Schmidt refers repeatedly to historical context as he explains how and why American political science and IR developed as they did'.[80] Thus, what Schmidt was really recommending, Holden suggested, was a method that revealed the complex interplay of internal and external contexts in IR's making, not a restrictive internalism. For Holden, this method was that of Skinner and the Cambridge School, which Schmidt had caricatured as externalist even as he vindicated it in practice. This was also largely true of Tim Dunne's history of the English School, which was published in the same year as Schmidt's book and explicitly followed its methodological precepts.[81]

Drilling deeper into Schmidt's specific arguments in favour of internalism, both in his original statement and responses to critics, we find further weaknesses. First, Schmidt often simply states without much development that the internal context is the most 'appropriate' or 'relevant' for studying IR's history. As he leadingly put it in his 2013 chapter on disciplinary history for the *Handbook of International Relations*, which restated his methodology, '(t)he debate should not be construed in terms of whether (external) context matters or not, but what is the most appropriate context.'[82] Furthermore, it does not require some great feat of causal empirical analysis to demonstrate the impact of certain political developments on IR theory. While there is sometimes only a tangential or lagged relationship between politics and academic debate, it is simply common sense to note that the birth of the subfield of International Political Economy (IPE) was heavily influenced by the events of the early 1970s, or that the Cold War provided highly propitious

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[78] Bell, 'Writing the World', 11.
[79] Holden, 'Who Contextualises the Contextualisers?' Though see also reviews by Keith Krause, 'Review of The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations, by Brian C. Schmidt', *Political Science Quarterly* 113, no. 4 (1998): 749–50; Bruce Kuklick, 'Review of The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations, by Brian C. Schmidt', *Journal of the Behavioural Sciences* 35, no. 1 (1999): 61–63.
[80] Holden, 'Who Contextualises the Contextualisers?', 257.
[81] Ibid., 258; Dunne, *Inventing International Society*.
[82] Brian C. Schmidt, 'On the History and Historiography of International Relations', in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2013), 13. This statement is repeated in his 2019 stocktaking. Schmidt, 'Internalism versus Externalism', 145.

conditions for realist theory to flourish. Even if there was no relationship in certain cases, or if IR theory either outpaced or was slow to respond to political events, that itself would say something important about the meaning of those theories in context. Indeed, what IR theories do not say about the world is just as important as what they do. Finally, Schmidt seems to claim that the choice of which external political contexts to invoke is riddled with possibilities for bias, and therefore not worth invoking at all. However, it is arguably a more problematic interpretative choice not to seriously invoke external contexts, as it disguises the political/ideological functions of theory. In addition, as Richard Little pointed out in his review of *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*, reconstructing internal contexts is also a selective enterprise: 'Schmidt tell us nothing, however, about how he selected what to read and so we have to take on trust that he has not drawn on a biased sample.'[83] It has been shown that Schmidt did in fact miss out a number of important figures from his disciplinary history, particularly marginalised women and African American scholars.[84]

It is far from clear, however, that Schmidt and Dunne are representative of disciplinary history today. Recent intellectual histories of IR, while building on Schmidt's revisionist impulse, largely do not work with his methods. At the same time, it is also not clear that methodological debate has properly accounted for this fact. In a recent book, edited by Schmidt and Nicolas Guilhot, prominent figures in the debate were brought together, promising to account for new developments in the field.[85] Yet, as Guilhot pointed out, the merits of internalism remained the central methodological concern of the authors.[86] This surely exaggerated the dominance of internalist methodology in practice. Following chapters reiterating the narrowness of internalism and offering possible alternative methods, including the updated version of Bell's 'Writing the World', Schmidt's response to his critics most obviously did so. While Bell's essay took account of recent histories by Guilhot and Robert Vitalis which situated American IR's emergence in the context of scientific cultures and imperialism – albeit without crediting their advances beyond internalism – Schmidt strikingly claimed such approaches either followed or were compatible with his method.[87] Along with Dunne, Schmidt claimed that research by Guilhot and David Long, respectively, on the role of the Rockefeller Foundation and the rise and fall of the International Studies Conference (ISC) were exemplars of internalism. This was because they focused on philanthropic foundations, institutional support networks, and 'the nature and status of academic

[83] Little, 'Historiography and International Relations', 293.
[84] Owens, 'Women and the History of International Thought'; Vitalis, *White World Order*.
[85] Brian C. Schmidt and Nicolas Guilhot, eds., *Historiographical Investigations in International Relations* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
[86] Guilhot, 'Introduction', 10–11.
[87] Schmidt, 'Internalism versus Externalism'.

disciplines' as relevant contexts instead of factors such as US power and interests.[88] Yet this diverged from what Schmidt originally conceived as 'internal' factors, namely, the self-conscious discourses of a given IR community as embodied in published written texts. As we will see, it also did not fully engage with how both Guilhot and Long explicitly distanced themselves from internalism. Schmidt's continued defence of internalism also overlooks how a new wave of disciplinary sociologists demonstrate the inadequacy of his methodology. Bizarrely, indeed, he claims they support it.[89]

Early on, even Dunne criticised Schmidt's approach. In *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School*, Dunne recovered the main thinkers and research institutions involved in developing British IR's most successful export – the 'international society' approach – through an internalist methodology. 'One of the principal objectives of the book', Dunne wrote, was 'to provide an account of the internal history of the English School, thereby contributing to the new or revisionist historiography of the discipline'. Schmidt's approach for Dunne was 'more sophisticated' than previous methods in this task, attending to the 'academics who self-consciously and institutionally understood themselves as carrying on a distinctive conversation about International Relations'.[90] Unlike Schmidt, however, Dunne used archival as well as published sources to reconstruct the *institutional* as well as discursive history of IR, anticipating the work of Guilhot and Vitalis. Dunne was particularly interested in the creation and proceedings of the Rockefeller-funded British Committee on the Theory of International Politics in the post-war years, which required engaging with an array of figures drawn from outside the discipline and even involved in political practice, from historian Herbert Butterfield to diplomat Adam Watson. Further, in his own review of Schmidt's book, Dunne also felt he did not fully adhere to his stated method, commenting that 'what emerges from his analysis is a more complex interplay of internal and external factors'. Schmidt's assertion that external factors were included in his methodology via scholars' interpretation and construction of them, was thus not a 'persuasive view of the interplay of academic discourses and political practices'. 'Just as sovereignty is not something with a fixed reality independent of our theories…nor is it something generated in the pages of the *American Journal of International Law*.'[91]

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[88] Ibid., 141–42.
[89] Ibid., 128, 142–44.
[90] Dunne, *Inventing International Society*, 1.
[91] Tim Dunne, 'International Theory and the Mirror of History', *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (1998): 353.

Guilhot's historiographical contributions have hinged on his reconstruction of the proceedings of a 1954 conference of US-based scholars, who sought to found a distinct theory of IR to insulate themselves from the behavioural revolution in political science.[92] Bringing together anti-Enlightenment realists such as Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and K.W. Thompson, the Rockefeller-funded conference revealed the ambiguities and tensions of the early realist project – which opposed positivism while strategically co-opting scientistic rhetoric – paving the way for its ultimate incorporation into American social-scientific culture.[93] In turn, Guilhot claimed that he was not 'much concerned with the internal history of the discipline per se', instead aiming 'to step back and trace some of its formative stages' through 'the set of upstream decisions, external resources, and processes of differentiation initiated in adjacent fields that created a space where IR could exist as a distinct disciplinary project'.[94] Schmidt, to be sure, maintains that Guilhot's work is 'entirely consistent with an internal approach to disciplinary history'. Despite Guilhot's claim to denaturalise the boundaries of the discipline and look beyond published texts, by recounting IR's early development through academic conference proceedings and scholarly developments within the American academy he was clearly 'giving more weight to internal disciplinary factors than to external factors'.[95] What Schmidt ignored, however, was that for Guilhot post-war realism was motivated by an ideology of 'conservative liberalism'.[96] Deeply affected by the collapse of the Weimar Republic, émigré realists sought to segregate IR from positivistic social science since they believed it had totalitarian implications. For them, the international was a space of irreducible conflicts incapable of rational comprehension and control, requiring the defence of liberal democracy by elite decision-makers trained in the arts of realist power politics and insulated from democratic oversight.[97] It was an intensely *political* rather than simply academic project. Similarly, Kenneth Waltz's neorealism is partly explained with reference to the crisis of US democracy and global power during the 1970s.[98]

Where Guilhot can be faulted, to be sure, is in his neglect of one *type* of 'external' context, namely race relations in post-war United States. In particular, realism's engagement with the

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92 Guilhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory*.
93 Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment*.
94 Nicolas Guilhot, 'One Discipline, Many Histories', in *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory*, ed. Nicolas Guilhot (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), 7.
95 Schmidt, 'Internalism versus Externalism', 140.
96 Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment*, 17.
97 Ibid., 58–59.
98 Daniel Bessner and Nicolas Guilhot, 'How Realism Waltzed Off: Liberalism and Decisionmaking in Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism', *International Security* 40, no. 2 (2015): 87–118.

fraught domestic and international politics of 1950s and 1960s America is rarely explored.[99] As Jeanne Morefield put it in her review of Guilhot's work: '(w)e get virtually nothing', she writes, 'of the domestic context of Jim Crow race relations, the emergence of the United States as an imperial power before the Second World War, and the relationship between this global, racialised empire to the emerging postwar discipline of IR.' Despite acknowledging Guilhot's attention to realism's origins in émigré fears of totalitarianism, she continued, his work thus 'should appear alongside Robert Vitalis's *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* on any syllabus dealing comprehensively with the twentieth-century history of IR in America.'[100]

Guilhot credited Vitalis's ground-breaking 2015 book as a 'recent exception' to the tendency of IR historiography 'to remain trapped in the accepted canon of the discipline'. 'Almost exclusively practised by international relations scholars', Guilhot averred, 'it has usually ignored the writings of historians, theologians, and public intellectuals who…contributed – sometimes more powerfully than political theorists – to the emergence of a realist vision in American politics.' By considering the place of race in IR's early development, therefore, Vitalis 'considerably reframes the history of the discipline.'[101] Vitalis did indeed situate the birth of IR in the context of American imperialism, returning to the figures of Schmidt's study in order to excavate their role in the justification and maintenance of global white supremacy. As Vitalis described to the author, the failure to fully see this aspect of the early history of IR was one of Schmidt's 'blinkers'.[102] Thus, his book was not a 'history of academic institutions and the politics of academic life as if they constitute a cloistered world', but 'as an important part of the history of the United States in the world.'[103] Along the way, Vitalis also recovered the resistance to the incipient discipline by African American scholars based at Howard University in Washington, D.C., whose anti-imperial and anti-racist ideas were subsequently erased from disciplinary memory. This erasure was itself explained by a conjunction of external developments after 1945: namely, the Cold War and McCarthyism, and the Supreme Court's *Brown v. Board of Education* decision.[104] Thus, 'in the first decades of the twentieth century in the United States', Vitalis showed, 'international relations meant race

[99] Though see Nicolas Guilhot, 'Imperial Realism: Post-War IR Theory and Decolonisation', *The International History Review* 36, no. 4 (2014): 698–720.
[100] Jeanne Morefield, 'Crashing the Cathedral: Historical Reassessments of Twentieth-Century International Relations', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 81, no. 1 (2020): 140.
[101] Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment*, 14n23.
[102] Author's interview with Robert Vitalis, 30 November 2021.
[103] Vitalis, *White World Order*, 3.
[104] Ibid., 158–68.

relations.'[105] Interestingly, Vitalis described *White World Order* as based on 'a sociological model of academic knowledge production,' albeit without spelling out the specifics of his approach.[106]

In a recent book, Jan Stöckmann has argued that IR emerged during the first half of the twentieth century as a product of a 'dual motive, in education and in politics'.[107] Tracing the activities of a transnational group of scholars, activists, politicians and diplomats, Stöckmann shows how they were 'architects of international relations' as a form of study and practice: 'Like architects, they *built* a set of institutions (departments, journals, libraries etc.) and *designed* plans for a new world order (draft treaties, petitions, political commentary etc.).[108] Such a cast included well-known IR figures such as US President Woodrow Wilson and Oxford historian Zimmern, as well as lesser known but central disciplinary architects including American educationalist Fannie Fern Andrews and German lawyer Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy. They operated across rather than within 'national silos', creating centres for IR research and teaching and seeking to shape a more peaceful and just world order – that is, until Nazi onslaught cut short their agendas.[109] One of Stöckmann's main contributions, then, is to move beyond Schmidt's approach that reinforces the boundaries of a discipline to which historians of IR themselves typically belong.[110] A professional historian himself (like Guilhot), Stöckmann is thus part of a broader move of disciplinary historians away from internalism.

If internalism has been transcended by IR's historians (albeit often unreflectively), then its inadequacy has been empirically demonstrated in sociological studies of IR's intellectual and institutional structure which have emerged simultaneously. Yet, likely because of the origins of disciplinary histories in a critique of naïve sociological approaches, what should have led to a resolution to the internalism controversy has been postponed. Sociologies of IR, indeed, have not been adequately engaged by disciplinary historians. Over the last twenty years, a new wave of disciplinary sociologists have performed sophisticated syntheses of both internal and external factors to account for the intellectual and institutional structures of IR. The large and increasingly quantified sociological mapping of IR's structure 'around the world' will be explored in more depth

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[105] Ibid., 1.
[106] Ibid., xiii..
[107] Stöckmann, *The Architects of International Relations*, 3. See also Jan Stöckmann, 'Studying the International, Serving the Nation: The Origins of International Relations (IR) Scholarship in Germany, 1912–33', *The International History Review* 38, no. 5 (2016): 1055–80.
[108] Stöckmann, *The Architects of International Relations*, 19.
[109] Ibid., 288.
[110] Ibid., 11.

in the next section, yet even from the literature's early publications the distortions of internalism were demonstrable.[111]

Ole Waever and Stefano Guzzini penned two of the first publications, the former admitting that existing accounts – 'slightly sociologised' renderings of Kuhn – were 'usually not based on systematic research or clear methods' and were 'at best elegant restatements of 'common knowledge' of our past'.[112] Waever instead sought to ground the second-order study of IR on a proper 'sociology of science' that had overcome earlier reductions of academic fields to social context.[113] Yet, critiquing Schmidt's narrow internalism and parochial US focus, external contexts remained central to Waever's analysis, which was grounded in a sociology of science approach owed to Peter Wagner.[114] Following Wagner, Waever proposed three relevant 'layers' for analysing national IR communities, which he then applied to the US, Germany, the UK and France: 'society and polity'; 'social sciences'; and 'intellectual activities in IR'.[115] While the final layer paid attention to internal theoretical developments, the former two looked beyond the boundaries of the discipline to consider influences on IR from adjacent social sciences, as well as national culture, ideology, state-society relations, and foreign policy concerns. Thus, Waever argued that American IR was a global leader due to its hierarchical internal intellectual structure centred on elite theoretical journals, but that its rationalist ontology derived from unique external contexts was not easily exportable, meaning the discipline was becoming more pluralistic.[116]

Guzzini offered a similar approach in his 1998 account of post-war American realism.[117] Through a 'historical sociology' of realism's post-war development, he sought to show 'that the evolution of realist thought in International Relations can be fruitfully understood as the attempt, repeated and repeatedly failed, to translate the maxims of nineteenth century's European diplomatic practice into more general laws of an American social science.'[118] Guzzini claimed to

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111 For a good overview see Waever, 'Keeping It Worldly'.
112 Waever, 'The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline', 692.
113 Ibid., 694.
114 Waever in fact acknowledged Schmidt for offering 'the first major attempt at serious historical scholarship', but commented that 'unfortunately, he only covers America (political science based) IR from the mid-1800s to 1940 and only with internal discursive explanations'. Further, though Schmidt showed the historical falsity of the (First) Great Debate idea, he did not 'explore how and with what effects this myth has been established and thus how it has become socially real'. Ibid., 692n13. This is an interesting example of the intellectual-historical link between the earlier Great Debates narrative and contemporary disciplinary sociology.
115 Ibid., 695.
116 Ibid., 727.
117 Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*.
118 Ibid., 1.

deploy Kuhn in a more sophisticated way than advocates of the 'Great Debates' narrative, arguing that he provided an explicitly sociological apparatus for analysing the knowledge structures and institutional boundaries of a scientific community in a social context.[119] This certainly entailed an 'internal story of the debates around central realist concepts and assumptions', but these, he argued, 'took place within a particular political and academic environment. Realist theorising shaped, and in turn was shaped by, US international policy concerns and the scholarly criteria typical for academic communities in US social sciences.'[120] Traditionally a practical wisdom, realist theory on this account was the product of the interaction of European émigré scholars with the new superpower's demand for guidance in the policy of 'containment', the implications of nuclear bipolarity, and US positivism. Later, under the impact of the 1970s oil shocks and concerns about hegemonic decline, the realist community turned to international political economy in an unsuccessful attempt to ward off threats to its paradigmatic status.[121] In both its rise, subsequent crisis, and resurgence, then, realism was embedded within interlocking internal and external disciplinary contexts.

Following Waever and Guzzini emerged similar studies, such as Knud Erik Jorgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen's 2006 essay collection, *International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives and Destinations*.[122] In it, the authors examined the development of IR in seven national or regional communities, taking an explicitly 'cultural-institutional' approach to knowledge construction. This approach held that IR communities could be differentiated along three levels, similar to Waever's 'layers': namely, the political culture of a society; the organisational culture of science bureaucracies and university systems; and internal disciplinary habits and professional discourses.[123] Like Waever, then, Jorgensen and Knudsen were not taking sides in an internalist/externalist dichotomy, but rather combining the two in a more differentiated way. Yet this did not prevent Schmidt, in his epilogue to the book, from arguing that 'the cultural-institutional approach…shares a number of similarities with an internal approach to disciplinary history.' While he did not recommend disciplinary historians 'direct all of their attention to the concept of political culture to explain the development of IR' as 'causal logic' was difficult to decipher, the final two levels of the approach

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[119] Ibid., 12. According to Guzzini, those who had previously used Kuhn to describe IR's development had 'hopelessly trivialised' his insights by equating paradigmatic divisions ('incommensurability') with value/ideological ones. They thus ironically helped shield the mainstream from criticism and overlooked how Kuhn left space for theoretical linkages between paradigms. Ibid., 116–20.
[120] Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*, 1.
[121] Ibid., 142.
[122] Knud Erik Jorgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen, eds., *International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives and Destinations* (London: Routledge, 2006).
[123] Jorgensen and Knudsen, 'Introduction', 3–6.

he argued were compatible with 'critical internal discursive history'.[124] Schmidt later repeated this sentiment in the volume edited with Guilhot, commenting that the authors' focus on factors such as departmental location, government funding structures, and professional discourses all exemplified internal explanations.[125] Likewise with Waever's layers: 'all of the three sets of factors that Waever draws on to develop an explanatory model to account for national variations…of IR are internal.'[126]

Yet Schmidt's original stated method held self-conscious IR discourses to be the master explanandum of the discipline's development. As we have seen, it was not interested in scientific and bureaucratic cultures or domestic political environments, except in so far as they entered the discursive universe of IR scholars. Schmidt, then, exaggerates the extent to which internalism dominates the disciplinary history literature. Yet in continuing to rehearse critiques of the method, so too, arguably, have Schmidt's critics. Recent disciplinary histories and sociologies of IR, this section has shown, take both internal and external contexts to be relevant to the development of the discipline. This would seem to be a common-sense and uncontroversial position. Methodological debate should move on to address other issues.

2.3 Originalism in the Disciplinary History and Sociology of International Relations

By exaggerating the extent to which internalism dominates the historiography of IR, methodological debate has in turn neglected a larger issue. For a review of the literature shows that what unites disciplinary historians is not a dogmatic attachment to internal IR discourses, but rather a particular temporal focus. From Schmidt onwards, that is, disciplinary historians have paid overwhelming attention to a set of formative theoretical debates and institutional manoeuvres in the early-to-mid-twentieth century, downgrading – however inadvertently – the significance of much of IR's later development. As this section argues, this has meant a crucial period in IR's history since the 1970s has been substantially underexamined, distorting understanding of how the discipline arrived at its current state. This has presented as natural or justified a methodological assumption – 'originalism' – which could have conservative effects on disciplinary self-

[124] Brian C. Schmidt, 'Epilogue', in *International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives and Destinations*, ed. Knud Erik Jorgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen (London: Routledge, 2006), 259–62.
[125] Schmidt, 'Internalism versus Externalism', 142–43.
[126] Ibid., 144.

understanding. This is not only true of histories such as those discussed in the previous section, which focus on uncovering the nature and legacies of IR's discursive and institutional origins, but also the array of 'retrievals' of the two camps supposedly involved in the 'First Great Debate'.

The notion of 'originalism', discussed briefly in the introduction, typically refers to a school of constitutional interpretation in the United States, though it has recently emerged in historical debates over slavery as the nation's 'original sin'. In the former sense, originalism is the belief that constitutional texts ought to be interpreted today in terms of the meaning they had at the time of their adoption, whether in terms of the intent behind them or their public significance.[127] This contrasts with the idea of a 'living constitution', wherein meaning changes in line with evolving societal needs and attitudes.[128] In the latter sense, originalism has been invoked as an auto-critique of progressive American historians reacting to US imperialism and racist populism, wherein a focus on legacies of the nation's distant past has been feared to limit the fight for future progress.[129] While IR's disciplinary historians emerged in more optimistic times, particularly in recent work on the discipline's imperial past they have to some extent reflected this trend.[130] The emphasis on an overwhelming need to connect the present to (a little understood) deep past is conveyed also by the application here of the 'originalist' label to the approach disciplinary historians of IR have made natural within their subfield. To reiterate, originalism is defined here as *the methodological assumption or precept that a return to IR's formative period will yield the only or most valuable viewpoint from which to understand and intervene in the contemporary discipline through a study of its history*. While disciplinary historians may disagree about the exact location of this period, they nevertheless agree that it lies broadly in the early-to-mid-twentieth century. And while they may not hold originalist assumptions themselves, the increasingly logical inference to take from their output is that originalism is a justified assumption to make.

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[127] Lawrence B. Solum, 'What Is Originalism?: The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory', in *The Challenge of Originalism: Essays in Constitutional Theory*, ed. Grant Huscroft and Bradley W. Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 12–41.
[128] Lawrence B. Solum, 'Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate', *Northwestern University Law Review* 113, no. 6 (2019): 1276.
[129] Matt Karp, 'History as End: 1619,1776, and the Politics of the Past', *Harpers*, July 2021, https://harpers.org/archive/2021/07/history-as-end-politics-of-the-past-matthew-karp/?fbclid=IwAR1bZJqcJXZVS2myzhL9YGz227w1eprUqOD8UleWGgWdBgVc-bubvIEfAr0.
[130] Robert Vitalis, 'The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000): 331–56; Vitalis, *White World Order*; Long and Schmidt, *Imperialism and Internationalism*; Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*; Davis, Thakur, and Vale, *The Imperial Discipline*; Thakur and Vale, *South Africa, Race, and the Making of International Relations*; Kristensen, 'Subject Matters'.

It is easiest to see how this is so in the mode of disciplinary history writing which charts the early formation of (Anglo-American) IR. Upon reading the accounts of Schmidt, Dunne, Guilhot, Vitalis, and Stöckmann – as well as several important studies not mentioned in the previous section –[131] it is difficult to come away without the impression that the best vantage point from which understand and critically evaluate IR through a study of its history is to exhume its early discursive and institutional contexts. Schmidt, whose reconstruction of the political discourse of anarchy extended from the late nineteenth century to World War II, sought to show how IR in the US had long been dominated by debates over the meaning of anarchy and sovereignty. The early history of the discipline, he showed, was dominated by debate between 'juristic' and 'pluralist' theories of state sovereignty, and their application to colonised parts of the world. This, Schmidt claimed, anticipated modern debates about interdependence and cooperation between realists and liberals, while the plurality of discourses about anarchy and sovereignty showed that IR's recent 'post-positivist' and 'constructivist' identities were hardly new. Thus, he concluded, there were 'deep discursive continuities between the earlier-twentieth-century discourse of international relations and the contemporary discourse', the insights of which IR's conventional self-images had obscured.[132]

Guilhot, a professional historian perhaps less acquainted with the condition of IR today, follows a similar narrative structure based on uncovering the nature and continuing effects of the discipline's origins and early development.[133] In his two books, *The Invention of International Relations Theory* and *After the Enlightenment*, Guilhot paints a picture of a discipline historically dominated by the quest for realist theory despite, and often without, resistance. The variegated pre-war discursive and institutional history painstakingly reconstructed by Schmidt and Vitalis for Guilhot was therefore not relevant to creating an autonomous discipline of IR. As Bell perceptively points out, this was the main point of dispute between Guilhot and Vitalis, since for the former pre-1945 IR was an interdisciplinary 'field'.[134] In Guilhot's account, IR was only born when it 'started developing a theory of its own', something not achieved 'until the 1950s, when an influential network of realists embraced this project in order to prevent the pre-emption of the field by

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131 Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*; Pemberton, *The Story of International Relations, Part Three: Cold Blooded Idealists*; Thakur and Vale, *South Africa, Race, and the Making of International Relations*; Owens and Rietzler, *Women's International Thought: A New History*.
132 Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*, 228.
133 It is interesting that while this identity has helped Guilhot transcend internalism, it may have led him towards the deep past of the discipline.
134 Bell, 'Writing the World (Remix)', 23.

behavioural social science'.[135] This project, dated rather precisely to the 1954 Conference on Theory, Guilhot termed the realist 'gambit'. In this sense, Guilhot agreed with the First Great Debate narrative in that realism did emerge victorious after World War II, though its victory was more contingent and less progressive than the narrative implied. As realism came to embrace cybernetics and systems theory, Guilhot argued it further tightened its grip on the discipline, with Kenneth Waltz's 'neorealism' becoming 'the basic intellectual regimen taught to cohorts of student enrolled in international relations courses, at least in the United States'.[136] Ultimately, any 'post-positivist' critique had little effect on realist hegemony, and even 'consolidated' it through misunderstanding its nature.[137]

Guilhot and Schmidt thus overturned mythologies of evolution only to replace them with narratives of continuity from new – even if more historically accurate – origins, shifting attention away from historical change and transformation in IR's recent past. To a lesser extent, so too did Vitalis, holding that although post-war scholars conspired to expunge the language of empire and race from their theories, the original implication of IR in imperial and racial hierarchy still explained much, if not most, of the contemporary discipline.[138] Dunne's history of the English School partly avoided a continuity narrative, charting how the idea of international society had begun to evolve in a more 'solidarist' cosmopolitan direction in the 1970s and early 1980s. Yet his main argument was that the rudiments of the approach were laid in the early years the School, and especially by figures such as E.H. Carr, Hedley Bull, Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield. For Dunne, the English School from the start had always been a highly valuable resource for a post-positivist, critical challenge to realism with 'radical potentiality' in the age of Third Way social democracy.[139]

Overall, then, these disciplinary historians very much imply – however inadvertently – that originalism is a natural and justified assumption when analysing the history of the discipline. Origins-focused disciplinary histories of IR are now unsurprisingly appearing at a rapid pace, including work in the past half decade by scholars including Stöckmann, Vineet Thakur, and Jo-

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135 Nicolas Guilhot, 'Author's Reply', *H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable* 3, no. 5 (2011): 32.
136 Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment*, 221.
137 Ibid., 169, 182.
138 Vitalis, *White World Order*, 176–79. In this, Vitalis was reinforcing the arguments of John M. Hobson's 2012 book *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010*, which argued that since 1760 international thought had consistently sought to 'parochially celebrate and defend or promote the West as the proactive subject of, and as the highest normative or ideal referent in, world politics'. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, 1.
139 Dunne, *Inventing International Society*, xi.

Anne Pemberton.[140] Today at the cutting edge of IR disciplinary history writing, the Leverhulme Trust-funded 'Women and the History of International Thought' (WHIT) project based at the University of Oxford is often considered to radically revise existing historiographies of international thought and IR.[141] To the extent that it pioneeringly reveals the role of women and gender in the development of international thought and academic IR this is perfectly true, but in respect of its temporal focus, it clearly follows more than bucks existing trends. As its website states: 'Focusing on the major centres of IR research, Britain and the United States, *and the early-to-mid-twentieth century*, we are examining a variety of sites of knowledge production, including academe, but also occupational fields and less obvious pathways and genres to international thought.'[142] In other words, though transcending a narrow internalism, WHIT reproduces the temporal imbalance of the literature as a whole, reinforcing the impression that the early history of IR is the only or at least primary horizon for historical self-understanding. Despite a set of valuable oral history interviews of contemporary women scholars such as V. Spike Peterson and J. Ann Tickner, WHIT only examines the ideas of what it terms 'historical women – that is, women writing before the late twentieth century'.[143] Needless to say, the idea that the late twentieth century is not 'real history' is a oddly exclusionary move, given it is considered a perfectly legitimate terrain for research within the broad field of intellectual history, including the history of international thought.[144] Thus, even non-masculinist, non-Eurocentric disciplinary histories of IR are liable to adopt the temporal horizon of the historical accounts they critique.[145] For WHIT, the primary aim

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[140] Stöckmann, *The Architects of International Relations*; Thakur and Vale, *South Africa, Race, and the Making of International Relations*; Davis, Thakur, and Vale, *The Imperial Discipline*; Vineet Thakur and Karen Smith, 'Introduction to the Special Issue: The Multiple Births of International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 47, no. 5 (2021): 571–79; Pemberton, *The Story of International Relations, Part Three: Cold Blooded Idealists*.

[141] Owens, 'Women and the History of International Thought'; Owens and Rietzler, *Women's International Thought: A New History*; Owens et al., *Women's International Thought: Towards a New Canon*; Sarah Dunstan and Patricia Owens, 'Claudia Jones, International Thinker', *Modern Intellectual History*, 2021, 1–24; Kimberley Hutchings and Patricia Owens, 'Women Thinkers and the Canon of International Thought: Recovery, Rejection, and Reconstitution', *American Political Science Review* 115, no. 2 (2021): 347–59; Valeska Huber, Tamson Pietsch, and Katharina Rietzler, 'Women's International Thought and the New Professions, 1900–1940', *Modern Intellectual History* 18, no. 1 (2021): 121–45; Dunstan, 'Women's International Thought in the Twentieth Century Anglo-American Academy'.

[142] See https://whit.web.ox.ac.uk/about. Accessed 25 November 2021. Emphasis my own.

[143] Owens, 'Women and the History of International Thought', 467. For the interviews visit https://whit.web.ox.ac.uk/oral-history-archive.

[144] Samuel Moyn, *Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap, 2018); Katrina Forrester, *In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019).

[145] In addition to the revisionist work of Vitalis and WHIT in the US and British contexts, it is worth noting that some of the first intellectual histories of IR beyond the Anglo-American West also focus on the early-to-mid-twentieth century. See, indicatively, Jan Stöckmann's history of German IR between 1912 and 1933; Martin Bayly's excavation of the 'lineages of Indian International Relations' in League of Nations Societies and the Indian Council on World Affairs; Vineet Thakur's and Peter Vale's exploration

is to demonstrate that women and feminist themes were present in IR long before the 'Great Debates' narrative tells us, thereby demonstrating overlooked disciplinary continuities that unsettle IR's traditional male-dominated 'canon'.[146]

Histories of IR's origins and early development have certainly helped to overturn the 'myth' of the First and, to a lesser extent Second, Great Debates, demonstrating that IR's birth was more complex and often uglier than these stories imply. They have also sought to retrieve valuable insights from the past for present purposes that the Great Debates narrative had either caricatured as outdated or ignored. This impulse has been particularly clear in the work of Vitalis, who recovered a radical group of African American scholars including Ralph Bunche, Alain Locke, and Merze Tate – what he termed the 'Howard School' – that provided resistance to the early 'race science' of IR. It is also manifest in the activities of WHIT and its studies of early women IR thinkers such as Lucy Philip Mair and Helena Swanwick.[147] Analytically, however, they constitute a distinct category of disciplinary history. Another motif focuses more specifically on re-evaluating and retrieving the paradigmatic camps involved in the First Debate, and thereby questioning its very status as a 'debate'. Through the writings of David Long, Lucian Ashworth, Peter Wilson and others during the 1990s and early 2000s, this latter category was a pioneering early form of IR historiography, becoming a particularly vibrant field of research in its reappraisals of 'classical' realism. In so doing, however, it also contributed to a broader fixation of disciplinary historians on the formative history of IR.

Despite the now vast literature recovering the historical complexities of classical realism, this mode of disciplinary history writing was first concerned with reassessing interwar 'utopianism'

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of the making of South African IR in the 1920s; and a recent special issue of *Review of International Studies* exploring the 'multiple births' of IR outside the West. Stöckmann, 'The Origins of International Relations (IR) Scholarship in Germany'; Bayly, 'Lineages of Indian International Relations'; Thakur and Smith, 'The Multiple Births of International Relations'. However, since non-Western IR communities such as Brazil developed more recently, certain articles of the special issue by default help shift the temporal frame of the historiography, albeit without questioning the general focus on 'origins' and 'births' and dedicating single sections at most to the late twentieth century. See Thomas Kwasi Tieku, 'The Legon School of International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 47, no. 5 (2021): 656–71; Carlos R.S. Milani, 'The Foundation and Development of International Relations in Brazil', *Review of International Studies* 47, no. 5 (2021): 601–17; Jungmin Seo and Young Chul Cho, 'The Emergence and Evolution of International Relations Studies in Postcolonial South Korea', *Review of International Studies* 47, no. 5 (2021): 619–36.

[146] Owens et al., *Women's International Thought: Towards a New Canon*; Hutchings and Owens, 'Recovery, Rejection, and Reconstitution'.

[147] Owens, 'Women and the History of International Thought'; Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Women Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the Problem of Collective Security', in *Women's International Thought: A New History*, ed. Patricia Owens and Katharina Rietzler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 136–57.

or 'idealism', a pejorative category early realists constructed to legitimate their more 'scientific' theories. In the post-Cold War world, where realism was questioned and international liberalism seemed to triumph, intellectual space was opened to reach back and reclaim the insights of interwar IR and international thought more generally. It was, as Charles Kegley Jr. put it in his 1993 Presidential Address to the ISA, a 'neo-idealist moment in international studies'.[148] Seemingly sympathetic to this moment but also wary of historical misrepresentation, early disciplinary historians believed it important to understand accurately the nature of interwar theories to reclaim their lost insights. Long and Wilson published in 1995 their edited volume *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Interwar Idealism Reassessed*, resurrecting the liberal visions of both IR scholars and international thinkers outside the formal discipline, from Alfred Zimmern, the first Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, to John A. Hobson and Leonard Woolf.[149] Contrary to posterity's judgement, in particular the critique of idealism contained in E.H. Carr's classic 1939 treatise *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, the volume showed that 'idealists' were not 'as naïve in their assumptions, as simplistic in their analysis, or as uniform in their outlook, as the received wisdom suggests'.[150] Soon, Long and Wilson published book-length studies respectively on Hobson and Woolf, while other similar works by Ashworth and Casper Sylvest appeared either simultaneously or following them.[151] Schmidt even contributed an article in *International Studies Quarterly*, making the argument that pluralist state theory not idealism defined the interwar discourse of American IR.[152] In the same issue, Andreas Osiander offered his own, slightly less

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148 Charles W. Kegley, 'The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities', *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (1993): 131–46.
149 David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Interwar Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995).
150 David Long and Peter Wilson, 'Preface', in *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Interwar Idealism Reassessed*, ed. David Long and Peter Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), vii.
151 David Long, *Towards a New Liberal Internationalism: The International Theory of J.A. Hobson* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Peter Wilson, *The International Theory of Leonard Woolf: A Study in Twentieth-Century Idealism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Lucian M. Ashworth, *Creating International Studies: Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal Tradition* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Where Are the Idealists in Interwar International Relations?', *Review of International Studies* 32, no. 2 (2006): 291–308; Casper Sylvest, 'Interwar Internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the Historiography of International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (2004): 409–32; Casper Sylvest, *British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930: Making Progress?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).
152 Brian C. Schmidt, 'Lessons from the Past: Reassessing the Interwar Disciplinary History of International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 3 (1998): 433–59.

revisionist, account of interwar idealism.[153] This impulse arguably continues in the stream of literature now on the aforementioned International Studies Conference (ISC).[154]

Systematic historical research into classical realism was slow to emerge, but critical IR theorists had for some time noted the potentially radical insights offered by mid-century realists such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and John H. Herz. One principal reason for this reclamation, the contours of which is detailed in chapter 4 of this thesis, was to deny the positivistic transhistorical theory of 'neorealism' of the 'realist tradition' it claimed for itself.[155] In the 1990s, British critical IR theorists such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth looked particularly to Carr's 'utopian realism' as a resource for thinking through the possibilities of post-national cosmopolitan citizenship.[156] By the turn of the 2000s, revisionist historical studies of Carr had begun to emerge in what arch-neorealist John Mearsheimer derided as 'a veritable cottage industry', alongside a new edition of *The Twenty Years' Crisis*.[157] It was in this context of proliferating historical research into interwar idealism, and embryonic revisionist accounts of Carr's realism, that a series of articles appeared questioning the very notion of a 'debate' between realism and idealism.[158] The most widely cited of these, Wilson's 'The Myth of the First Great Debate', made the case that 'in the sense of a series of exchanges between interlocutors holding opposing "idealist" and "realist" points of view, the first great debate never actually occurred', and that 'in the sense of a cohesive, and certainly self-conscious, school of thought, an "idealist" or "utopian" paradigm never actually existed'.[159]

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153 Andreas Osiander, 'Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited', *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 3 (1998): 409–32.
154 Long, 'Who Killed the International Studies Conference?'; Stöckmann, 'The Origins of International Relations (IR) Scholarship in Germany'; Pemberton, *The Story of International Relations, Part Three: Cold Blooded Idealists*; Kristensen, 'Subject Matters'.
155 Richard K. Ashley, 'Political Realism and Human Interests', *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (1981): 204–36; Richard K. Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (1984): 225–86.
156 Ken Booth, 'Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice', *International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (1991): 527–45; Andrew Linklater, 'The Transformation of Political Community: E.H. Carr, Critical Theory and International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 3 (1997): 321–38.
157 John J. Mearsheimer, 'E.H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On', *International Relations* 19, no. 2 (2005): 147. See Jones, *A Duty to Lie*; Jonathan Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity: E.H. Carr, 1892-1982* (London: Verso, 1999); Michael Cox, *E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
158 Wilson, 'The Myth of the "First Great Debate"'; Thies, 'Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory'; Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of International Relations', *International Relations* 16, no. 1 (2002): 33–51; Quirk and Vigneswaran, 'The Construction of an Edifice'.
159 Wilson, 'The Myth of the "First Great Debate"', 1.

Thus, from the start, this mode of disciplinary history writing clearly supported an assumption that the study of IR's past should be primarily concerned with reassessing its formative moment: the First Great Debate. To reiterate, this is not to suggest that disciplinary historians held originalist assumptions; as Wilson rightly pointed out, disciplinary self-consciousness – including in the United States but particularly in Britain – only really began in the 1970s, and the very interest in recounting the discipline's past reflected this.[160] This argument was strengthened by Joel Quirk and Darshan Vigneswaran, who demonstrated that the 'myth' of the First Debate was just as much propagated in the 1980s by anti-realist scholars to preface the 'Third Debate' paradigm wars, as by mid-century realists.[161] Revisionist IR historiography, we have seen, originated in a self-conscious reaction to these simplistic Kuhnian constructions, which were felt to undermine the agendas of more critical IR perspectives. Yet revisionist disciplinary historians did not proceed to examine the more recent contexts which made their scholarship possible. This was further reinforced by the explosion of research into classical realism which followed.

After the 1990s Carr 'cottage industry', reappraisals of Morgenthau soon overtook those of his British counterpart, often also reconstructing him as a proto-critical IR theorist or progressive liberal. Sparked by Cristoph Frei's intellectual biography of the German-Jewish émigré, this was most clear in the work of William E. Scheuerman, though there were many contributions along similar lines.[162] In other works, this argument was made within broader histories encompassing multiple realist thinkers, such as Richard Ned Lebow's reconstruction of realism's prudent ethics of tragedy,[163] Michael C. Williams's excavation of a tradition of 'wilful realism',[164] Scheuerman's recovery of 'the realist case for global reform',[165] and more recently Alison

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160 Ibid., 8.
161 Quirk and Vigneswaran, 'The Construction of an Edifice', 101–3.
162 Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2001); William E. Scheuerman, 'Realism and the Left: The Case of Hans J. Morgenthau', *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 1 (2008): 29–51; William E. Scheuerman, *Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); Michael C. Williams, ed., *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007); Murielle Cozette, 'Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism: Hans J. Morgenthau on the Ethics of Scholarship', *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 1 (2008): 5–27; Mihaela Neascu, *Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Oliver Jütersonke, *Morgenthau, Law and Realism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
163 Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
164 Williams, *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations*.
165 Scheuerman, *The Realist Case for Global Reform*.

McQueen's tracing of 'realism in apocalyptic times'[166] – to name just a few.[167] Others, however, offered more conservative readings of Morgenthau and classical realism, highlighting his debts to Carl Schmitt, Sigmund Freud, Max Weber and Friedrich Nietzsche, though still aiming to provide more sophisticated claims over the realist tradition than neorealism provided.[168] Unlike the Carr reappraisals of the 1990s, the proliferation of historical research into classical realism in the 2000s took place in the shadow of the United States's 'global war on terror', often seeking a moral resource with which to oppose this policy without association with controversial neorealist critics of intervention.[169] Indeed, as one sceptic of this literature has pointed out, in their quest to recover a morally progressive realism to contrast with the static amorality of neorealism, revisionist histories of classical realism may have been seeking 'a perfect justification for a policy of selective and limited interventionism that will not relinquish the moralistic tones of the past decades'.[170]

Thus, though it is impossible to review in depth the entire literature examining IR's disciplinary history literature, it is clear from this comprehensive summary that it has overwhelmingly privileged the early-to-mid-twentieth century. In so doing, scholars have demonstrated illuminating continuities between the deep past of the discipline and its current state, highlighted the contingency of its origins, and recovered valuable but forgotten theoretical insights. However, they have also come to naturalise an originalist approach to disciplinary history. That is, the logical inference to take from their scholarly output is that to understand and critically evaluate IR today through a study of its history, one is best advised to exhume its early discursive and institutional contexts. As we have seen, it is an inference that seems to be being made, as evidenced by the continued reproduction of this temporal focus in the literature itself. That IR today might in some way be a product of more recent developments, particularly since 1970, is one that is

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166 Alison McQueen, *Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
167 See, inter alia, Craig Campbell, *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003); Molloy, *The Hidden History of Realism*; Brent J. Steele, '"Eavesdropping on Honoured Ghosts": From Classical to Reflexive Realism', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 10 (2007): 272–300; Tjalve, *Realist Strategies of Republican Peace*; Rens van Munster and Casper Sylvest, *Nuclear Realism: Global Political Thought During the Thermonuclear Revolution* (London: Routledge, 2016); John Bew, *Realpolitik: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Matthew Specter, *The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought Between Germany and the United States* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2022).
168 Hans-Karl Pichler, 'The Godfathers of "Truth": Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau's Theory of Power Politics', *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 2 (1998): 185–200; Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civiliser of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Robbie Shilliam, 'Morgenthau in Context: German Backwardness, German Intellectuals, and the Rise and Fall of a Liberal Project', *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (2007): 299–327.
169 Morgenthau and other realists had, of course, vociferously opposed the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s.
170 Guilhot, 'One Discipline, Many Histories', 6.

sometimes acknowledged but rarely studied. What is being argued here concerns the temporal balance of the literature as a whole and its effects on disciplinary self-understandings.

The period after 1970 saw important changes in the discipline of IR. Once again, disciplinary sociologies can provide an important guide here, though like disciplinary histories they constitute a large and growing industry that is difficult to synthesise and analyse. A full, in-depth analysis of the entire sociological literature is not possible here and relies to some extent on a recent summary provided by Felix Grénier and Jonas Hagmann, drawing on Waever's original 'three layers'.[171] As they show, Waever launched a methodologically systematic literature that analysed the evolving intellectual, institutional, and political elements of the discipline (albeit noting the institutional element had been relatively neglected). The political bases and relations of IR as a subject of disciplinary sociology was highlighted in the previous section, but it has undergirded sociologists' ability to identify the intellectual and institutional growth of the discipline around the world. Such scholars, it is argued, have highlighted three important processes of change in the discipline since 1970 whose story should be of interest to disciplinary historians: *intellectual diversification*; *institutional expansion*; and *disciplinary self-reflection*. A brief review of recent sociological maps of IR shows a transformation has occurred since Stanley Hoffmann catalysed such self-reflection with his 1977 diagnosis of a singular 'American social science'.

This is, however, not to suggest that sociologists of IR do not identify important continuities in the discipline from its deep past. Waever acknowledges that an important – if least popular – strand of disciplinary sociology has explored the 'internal regulating mechanisms' of IR's 'core'. This began with Hoffmann's 1977 'American Social Science' essay and was catalysed by Waever's 1998 article discussed in the previous section.[172] Analysing the past, it has included work on the role of American state and philanthropic interests in powering IR research by scholars such as Inderjeet Parmar and Ido Oren (as briefly alluded to in the last section).[173] Analysing the present, it has come to include increasingly complex quantitative and qualitative mapping of publication, citation, pedagogical, and disciplinary reward hierarchies based on nationality, metatheory, and

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[171] Félix Grenier and Jonas Hagmann, 'Sites of Knowledge (Re-)Production: Toward an Institutional Sociology of International Relations Scholarship', *International Studies Review* 18, no. 2 (2016): 333–36.
[172] Waever, 'The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline'.
[173] Oren, *Our Enemies and US: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science*; Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012).

gender.[174] Such analyses are produced largely for purposes of critique of the (American) mainstream, as Hoffmann's sociology – and those of his early followers – was originally.[175] At the same time, this strand of the literature has highlighted other reflective modes of ordering the core, including the paradigmatic image of IR as composed of various competing approaches (i.e. the Great Debates). While historians of IR critique the Great Debates narrative as historically false, sociologists of IR demonstrate how it has, in Waever's terms', 'become socially real' or, as Steve Smith puts it, a core 'self-image'.[176] Peter Marcus Kristensen, as a prime example, has shown that attention to intellectual fragmentation (of epistemology, method, ontology, theory etc.) has been a core theme throughout the history of IR but even more so since the so-called third/fourth Great Debate, where the narrative has attributed greater intellectual coherence to previous phases of the discipline.[177] For Kristensen, while this narrative may be false, it is important to enquire into the functions it plays for legitimating disciplinary identities. While for some this is a tool to bemoan – and seek to reverse – the demise of intellectual coherence, many others welcome and celebrate pluralism even if this means the 'end of IR' in its traditional sense.[178] Thus, it can be said that sociologists of IR have highlighted the rise of disciplinary self-reflection as a process of change itself within an evolving discipline.

Disciplinary historians have, though, been more cognisant of, and willing to examine, the rise of disciplinary self-reflection than other developments during the late twentieth century. Histories of how the 'Great Debates' idea was constructed during the 1970s and 1980s have been provided by Joel Quirk and Darshan Vigneswaran, as well as in recent essays by Lucian Ashworth, who even suggests 1985 as an overlooked origin point for IR.[179] '(M)uch of the view of IR as

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[174] E.g. Daniel Maliniak et al., 'Women in International Relations', *Politics and Gender* 4, no. 1 (2008): 122–44; Daniel Maliniak, Ryan Powers, and Barbara F. Walter, 'The Gender Citation Gap in International Relations', *International Organization* 67, no. 4 (2013): 889–992; Jonas Hagmann and Thomas J. Biersteker, 'Beyond the Published Discipline: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of International Studies', *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 2 (2014): 291–315.

[175] Vasquez, 'Colouring It Morgenthau'; Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique*; Alker and Biersteker, 'The Dialectics of World Order'; Steve Smith, 'Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 16, no. 2 (1987): 189–206.

[176] Waever, 'The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline', 692; Steve Smith, 'The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory', in *International Relations Theory Today*, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 1–37.

[177] Peter Marcus Kristensen, 'Discipline Admonished: On International Relations Fragmentation and the Disciplinary Politics of Stocktaking', *European Journal of International Relations* 22, no. 2 (2015): 243–67.

[178] Ibid., 261.

[179] Quirk and Vigneswaran, 'The Construction of an Edifice'; Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Was International Relations Really Founded in 1985? Revisiting the Second and Third "Great Debates"' (Unpublished, 2014),
https://www.academia.edu/15004881/Was_International_Relations_Really_Founded_in_1985_Revisitin

discipline going through Great Debates', Ashworth rightly notes, 'seems to originate from a small group of key 1980s texts'.[180] Yet, valuable as these are, they remain exceptions to the broader trend of disciplinary historians to focus on the continuities from, and relevance of, early-to-mid-twentieth century IR. They also do not explore how the Great Debates narrative intersected and interacted with other modes of self-reflection that arose after 1970 within the disciplinary history and sociology of IR. In other words, there remains a need to 'contextualise the contextualisers', as Gerard Holden once insightfully suggested (again demonstrating some awareness of, if not willingness to address, the temporal imbalance of the disciplinary history literature).[181] As yet, moreover, there has been no historical account of how other processes of change identified by disciplinary sociologists were entwined with this one: did the image of later Great Debates, for example, bear any relation to actual research and teaching in IR?

Despite highlighting continuing hierarchies, sociologists have demonstrated a large intellectual diversification and institutional expansion of IR not only within the US core but around the world. Attention to increasing disciplinary self-reflectiveness is part of the broader focus on intellectual diversification among sociologists of IR. Following Waever, as Grénier and Hagmann point out, scholars attended to the 'multifaceted intellectual structures of IR, identifying and problematising its theoretical, thematic, communicative, and pedagogical penchants'. What is more, they did so by looking at how these intellectual structures connected to evolving external political contexts in international practice and within various countries. Thus, it was shown via bibliometric analysis, for example, that IR was indeed a discipline that had become divided into various theories, metatheoretical orientations, research specialisms, and national communities (albeit with a range of highly cited, 'core' American journals).[182] Diversification over time was also shown within specific subfields such as security studies.[183] In the US, constructivism and liberalism have overtaken realism as paradigms attracting the adherence of its scholars, with constructivist Alexander Wendt consistently cited as the scholar whose work has had the greatest influence on

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g_the_Second_and_Third_Great_Debates_; Ashworth, 'A Historiographer's View'; Ashworth, 'How Should We Approach the History of International Thought?'

[180] Ashworth, 'A Historiographer's View', 91.

[181] Holden, 'Who Contextualises the Contextualisers?'

[182] Peter Marcus Kristensen, 'Dividing Discipline: Structures of Communication in International Relations', *International Studies Review* 14, no. 1 (2012): 32–50; Peter Marcus Kristensen, 'International Relations at the End: A Sociological Autopsy', *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 2 (2018): 245–59; Inanna Hamati-Ataya, 'IR Theory as International Practice/Agency: A Clinical-Cynical Bourdieusian Perspective', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 40, no. 3 (2012): 625–46.

[183] Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

IR in the United States over the last twenty years.[184] Thus, even if the US discipline retains a global influence and prestige no other community can boast, it is important to note that its intellectual structures are not those Hoffmann diagnosed in 1977. What is more, the global influence of its ideas is less than other social sciences and in decline.[185] As a growing literature attests, IR is indeed 'studied differently in different places'; this, at least, is part of a claim pressed by the 'Global IR' movement led above all by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan.[186] At the same time, Acharya and Buzan demonstrate a 'diversity and differentiation' of IR thinking since the 1970s within the US and Western 'core', and a linking with the 'periphery' (i.e. everywhere else) through the rise of postcolonial IR as well as internet connectivity.[187] 'Although the United States remained the biggest centre for IR', they insightfully note, 'the peak of US power in the unipolarity and globalisation of the 1990s was not accompanied by a strengthened American intellectual hegemony in IR'.[188]

In 2016, Grénier and Hagmann complained that the institutional aspects of IR – 'the diversity of sites and settings where specialised knowledge about IR is produced, shaped and reinstatiated' –[189] had thus far been relatively neglected by disciplinary sociologists. In their wake, however, several studies have emerged of IR's institutional topography – which had changed significantly since Hoffmann's time – including articles in the *International Studies Review* forum they introduced on educational institutions.[190] Exploring how one globally shared political context – namely the end of the Cold War – affected not only the ideas but also the institutions of the discipline in different locales, participants in the forum later established such institutions as

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[184] Wendt comfortably came out on top in the 2011, 2014, and 2017 Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) US Faculty Surveys. See Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney, *TRIP Around the World: Teaching, Research, and Policy Views of Faculty in 20 Countries* (Williamsburg, VA: Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations, 2012), https://trip.wm.edu/; Daniel Maliniak et al., *TRIP 2014 Faculty Survey* (Williamsburg, VA: Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations, 2014), https://trip.wm.edu/; Daniel Maliniak et al., *TRIP 2017 Faculty Survey* (Williamsburg, VA: Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations, 2017), https://trip.wm.edu/.

[185] Kristensen, 'Revisiting the "American Social Science" - Mapping the Geography of International Relations'; Helen Turton, *International Relations and American Dominance: A Diverse Discipline* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).

[186] Jorgensen and Knudsen, *International Relations in Europe*; Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Waever, eds., *International Relations Scholarship Around the World* (London: Routledge, 2009); Henrik Breitenbauch, *International Relations in France: Writing Between Discipline and State* (London: Routledge, 2013); Acharya, 'Global IR and Regional Worlds'; Acharya and Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations*.

[187] Acharya and Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations*, 243.

[188] Ibid., 223.

[189] Grenier and Hagmann, 'Sites of Knowledge (Re-)Production', 335.

[190] Jonas Hagmann and Marina Lebedeva, 'Teaching (as) Statist Practice: Diplomatic Schools as Sites of International Education', *International Studies Review* 18, no. 2 (2016): 349–53; Martin Müller, 'An Ethnographic Perspective on Educating State Subjects in Russia', *International Studies Review* 18, no. 2 (2016): 358–65.

effective 'hinges' in the translation of political events into intellectual change in Canada, Russia, and Switzerland.[191] Above all, however, in their survey of the making of Global IR, Acharya and Buzan demonstrate very clearly that a major institutional expansion of the discipline took place during the second half of the twentieth century. Demonstrating that IR tracked developments in the 'real world' of international relations, Acharya and Buzan document painstakingly – albeit without much primary source analysis – 'a massive expansion of institutionalisation in terms of teaching, research, and publication' as well as 'the rise of independent academic IR associations' such as ISA and BISA between 1945 and 1989.[192] This process accelerated and became globalised after 1989, with a 'very substantial widening and deepening of the institutionalisation of IR' within and outside the 'core', and 'an erosion of the institutional boundaries between core and periphery'.[193] New professional societies such as the Nordic International Studies Association and outlets such as the *European Journal of International Relations* appeared, as well as the World International Studies Committee (WISC), a new global organisation for IR associations (in whose founding Buzan himself was centrally involved).[194]

Disciplinary historians, overall, have paid a small amount of attention to these processes of change since Hoffmann diagnosed the 'American social science'. For them, the formative years of IR appear far more interesting. Of course, there has been a small handful of exceptions; in addition to Quirk, Vigneswaran, and Ashworth who have charted the rise of the 'Great Debates' narrative, Richard Devetak and Benjamin Cohen have offered important histories of Frankfurt School-inspired critical IR theory and International Political Economy (IPE) respectively.[195] It is worth noting that these histories also avoid internalism, with Devetak claiming to adopt Duncan Bell's Cambridge School prescriptions, and Cohen exploring the interplay between 'intellectual entrepreneurship' and 'historical contingency'. Cohen's book, however, could well be classed as within the sociological literature as he claims to follow both classical and 'new' sociologists of knowledge such as Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, Ann Swidler, and Jorge Arditi.[196] Though he provides more in-depth analysis of his chosen IPE pioneers such as Robert Keohane and Susan Strange than sociological approaches typically do, Cohen's division of distinct 'American' and

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[191] Félix Grenier et al., 'The Institutional "Hinge": How the End of the Cold War Conditioned Canadian, Russian, and Swiss IR Scholarship', *International Studies Perspectives* 21, no. 2 (2020): 198–217.
[192] Acharya and Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations*, 139.
[193] Ibid., 219.
[194] Ibid., 222.
[195] Richard Devetak, *Critical International Theory: An Intellectual History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Benjamin J. Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
[196] Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*, 7.

'British' schools bears a curious resemblance to the 'national style', or 'geo-cultural epistemology', approach of disciplinary sociologists.[197] Devetak, meanwhile, spends more of his book discussing the deep 'sources' of critical IR theory in Kant, Hegel, Vico, and the 'rising prestige of theory' than the ideas and contexts of actual critical IR theorists since the late twentieth century.[198] He has thus arguably fallen foul of Brian Schmidt's important injunction to avoid viewing the history of IR as a progressive play of grand 'traditions' of thought through the twentieth century.

Even without these issues, however, these histories would still be exceptions proving a much larger trend. Focusing on specific aspects of three processes of change mapped by disciplinary sociologists, sense of a broader transformation of IR after 1970 continues to elude disciplinary historians. Originalism in turn remains a naturalised assumption, distorting understanding of the historical development of IR. Should disciplinary history writing be taken seriously in the wider discipline, this also risks orienting IR towards legacies and resources in its deep past – and very different contexts to today – rather than the possibility of change in the present and future. The specificities and opportunities of the contemporary discipline require an understanding of the broad sweep of IR's past, not just its opening gambits.

2.4 Conclusion

Debate over the methods appropriate to studying the history of the IR discipline has focused to a debilitating extent on the merits of the 'internalist' approach first popularised by Brian Schmidt in the 1990s. As this chapter has shown, recent intellectual and sociological histories of IR, though guided by Schmidt's early revisionist impulse, have found his recommended method implausible and restrictive. Instead, they have both implicitly and explicitly transcended the internalist/externalist divide by remaining more 'agnostic about what general forces shape

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[197] Tickner and Waever, *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*.

[198] Only two of five chapters in Devetak's intellectual history are dedicated to actual critical IR theorists such as Robert Cox, Richard Ashley, and Andrew Linklater. Devetak, *Critical International Theory*, 84–157. Philip Conway, in a recent series of publications, has offered a revisionist history of critical IR in the broad sense, albeit focusing more on the encoding of the term 'critical' over time and the forgotten work of Vithal Rajan. As we shall see, I draw on Conway and Devetak's insight that the origins of critical IR theory need to be traced back before its conventionally understood early 1980s arrival, while also stressing that it needs to be contextualised in that context too. Philip Conway, 'Radicalism, Respectability, and the Colour Line of Critical Thought: An Interdisiplinary History of Critical International Relations', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 49, no. 2 (2021): 337–67; Philip Conway, '"The Citadel of Scholarship": Rediscovering Critical IR in Millennium 1:1 [First View]', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 2023, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298221142947.

academic institutions and discourses'.[199] Thus, it is necessary to move beyond this debate to consider what methodological issues that have hitherto concealed by it, and to evaluate the alternatives to critical internal discursive history. One principal unexamined flaw of the disciplinary history literature highlighted in this chapter has been its overwhelming focus on the formative history of the IR discipline, which has naturalised an 'originalist' methodological approach with negative intellectual effects. Furthermore, the chapter has highlighted a regrettable separation between the disciplinary history and sociology literatures that can be traced to the former's critique of the evolutionary Great Debates narrative, which simplistically reduced academic developments to social contexts. This separation is to some extent responsible for the issues of internalism and originalism within the disciplinary history literature, alienating historians from more recent and sophisticated sociological studies of the contemporary discipline.

This concluding section argues for a rapprochement between the two literatures driven by a (re-)engagement of disciplinary historians with their sociologist cousins. To address issues of internalism and – above all – originalism, the three processes of change since 1970 identified by disciplinary sociologists can be used as a substantive guide for historians seeking to provide a story of how IR came to be the way it is. The sociological literature is able not only to provide concrete evidence of how IR interacted with external political and social contexts, but more importantly, it can be a starting point for historians to investigate the late twentieth century with their own methods. Indeed, if this occurs, disciplinary historians have tools to add greater empirical depth and narrative power to the 'birds-eye' picture or 'maps' painted by disciplinary sociology, making the rapprochement mutually advantageous. At the same time, however, this is not an argument for ceasing studies of the formative history of IR. Rather, it is a call for greater reflection on the temporal bias of the literature and its intellectual effects, as well as acknowledgement of the importance of the history of IR in the late twentieth century.

The Cambridge School approach needs little introduction to the disciplinary history of IR. As mentioned, its merits for studying IR's history have been highlighted by *inter alia* Duncan Bell, Gerard Holden, Richard Devetak, and recently, it is also worth mentioning, by Claire Vergerio in her method for analysing the reception of great thinkers in IR.[200] The Cambridge School has also

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[199] Bell, 'Writing the World', 11.

[200] Holden, 'Who Contextualises the Contextualisers?'; Bell, 'Language, Legitimacy, and the Project of Critique'; Bell, 'Political Theory and the Functions of Intellectual History'; Bell, 'Writing the World (Remix)'; Devetak, *Critical International Theory*; Claire Vergerio, 'Context, Reception, and the Study of Great Thinkers in International Relations' 11, no. 1 (2019): 110–37.

been engaged as a methodology for IR theory.[201] It thus offers a readily available and widely understood methodological path for disciplinary history research, and, if not the only possible mode of intellectual history, then certainly the most well-understood and systematised within IR. The crucial point to note, as Bell points out, is that it approaches written texts as 'highly complex historical objects, which were written with a purpose in mind; they are thus regarded as a form of action'. To recover these purposes, texts need to be placed in their immediate linguistic and ideological contexts.[202]

The term 'Cambridge School' commonly denotes a group of historians – and their followers – who reoriented the study of the history political thought in the 1960s and 1970s at the University of Cambridge. More specifically, it refers to the work of John Dunn, J.G.A. Pocock and, most importantly, Quentin Skinner.[203] Notwithstanding the differences among these scholars, and the evolution of their thought, scholars advocating the use of the Cambridge School in IR historiography have usefully summarised its core principles. A common starting point is to distinguish it from two other faulty approaches. That is, the Cambridge School can be viewed as a critical response to 'textualism' and 'social contextualism'.[204] In contrast to textualism, which anachronistically views texts as responses to timeless political questions, and social contextualism, which sees them as determined by socio-political contexts, Skinnerian contextualism directs attention to the linguistic milieus from which they arose and upon which they impacted. This enables historians to comprehend what the authors of texts were '*doing* in writing them' – that is, their 'illocutionary', not merely 'locutionary', force.[205] Thus, as Holden early pointed out, Schmidt and Tim Dunne had caricatured the Cambridge School as naïvely social contextualist when in fact it shared important commonalities with critical internal discursive history.[206]

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[201] Bell, 'Language, Legitimacy, and the Project of Critique'; Christian Reus-Smit, 'Reading History Through Constructivist Eyes', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2008): 395–414; Richard Devetak, 'A Rival Enlightenment? Critical International Theory in Historical Mode', *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 417–53.

[202] Bell, 'The Dawn of a Historiographical Turn?', 116.

[203] Richard Tuck, 'History of Political Thought', in *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*, ed. Peter Burke (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 100–130.

[204] Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', *History and Theory* 8, no. 1 (1969): 3–53.

[205] Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol.1: The Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), xiii. As is well-known, Skinner was drawing here on the speech-act theory of J.L. Austin. See J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961).

[206] Holden, 'Who Contextualises the Contextualisers?', 258.

Whether or not Schmidt and Dunne in practice followed the tenets of their own approach, however, Skinner's contextualism was also broader than their stated internalism. It did not deny the interpretive utility of situating texts in socio-political contexts, but rather found social contextualism unable to comprehend the *meaning* of texts: 'To whom were the arguments addressed and why? Was the author improving upon a widely understood argument or was he or she attacking convention? Was she being ironic? Was he joking? What can the silences tell us, for often do they not speak louder than words? Why did he write in the specific mode in which he did?'[207] To glean such information, the Cambridge School demands 'a comprehensive study of the set of texts, both minor and major, that existed at the time of writing of the particular text under examination.'[208] Applied to disciplinary history, this clearly means focusing upon the internal conversations of academic IR, for these constitute a primary audience for the scholarly texts under investigation. Yet it also demands awareness of broader academic and political discourses, as the Cambridge School would rightly find it implausible that IR debates could not impact upon or be influenced by these.[209] Through using a Cambridge School-inspired approach, Devetak can find, for instance, that early critical IR theorists self-fashioned a specific intellectual 'persona' within the context of a sense of crisis in the social sciences and world political economy. Mastering dialectical forms of philosophy from the post-Kantian tradition, they imagined themselves to be freeing both the discipline and the world from oppressive modes of thought and practice.[210] From a different angle, later in this thesis it will be asked what the silences of early critical IR theorists regarding the rise of the New Right in the early 1980s reveals about their meaning in context, as well as what the sympathetic conversation between Francis Fukuyama and various critical perspectives reveal about their ideological valence in the 1990s.[211]

Such insights, however, would not be adequately captured by an internalist method focusing on theoretical arguments as solely rhetorical plays within a disciplinary conversation. When critical IR theorists have argued for emancipation, from a historical perspective we need to know what exactly could have been imagined by this statement in context, particularly when such

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[207] Bell, 'Language, Legitimacy, and the Project of Critique', 331.
[208] Ibid., 332.
[209] This is evidenced by Bell's incredulity at Schmidt's method. Bell, 'The Dawn of a Historiographical Turn?', 121.
[210] Devetak, *Critical International Theory*, 89–90.
[211] See chapter 5 below. Like Devetak, this approach to some extent shares Bell's modified Cambridge School method – drawing on work by Peter Galison, Joel Isaac, and Ian Hunter – that calls for examining how ideas and personae are cultivated within and across various 'subcultures' and institutional settings. See Bell, 'Writing the World (Remix)', 26–38. See also Lucian M. Ashworth, 'The Poverty of Paradigms: Subcultures, Trading Zone and the Case of Liberal Socialism in Interwar International Relations', *International Relations* 26, no. 1 (2012): 35–59.

scholars were not only interested in internal debates. Thus, while the appropriate context of Robert Cox's critical theory of the early 1980s was Global South demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) – a phenomenon in which he had been interested since his days as an international civil servant – Andrew Linklater's 1990s version must be situated within a quite different milieu of Western liberal debates over European integration, humanitarian intervention, and 'Third Way' social democracy in Australia and Britain.[212] One must properly contextualise for the interpretive/ideological meanings of IR thought to be revealed. Of course, the sociological approaches discussed above also cannot capture these meanings, since they are not concerned with detailed, hermeneutic reconstructions of people and arguments in context. Instead, they seek to outline and explain general patterns of research and the evolving structure of IR, often in a rather formalistic social-scientific manner such as bibliometric mapping.[213] Thus, while useful in providing proof of the transformation of IR in the late twentieth century and certain constitutive links between internal and external – material – contexts, they lack the power to provide a meaningful historical narrative of this transformation.

In turn, two other benefits of a Cambridge School method become clear. First, it can chart the transnational features of IR's transformation. Sociological approaches, as seen, largely explore how distinct 'national styles' of IR have been produced by looking at the intellectual, institutional, and (domestic) political contexts of their production. They have also mapped how IR's various intellectual 'camps' are configured and relate to one another, whether across national/regional borders or not. However, these are often rather static and formalised pictures of the discipline, revealing little about possible transnational processes of knowledge and institutional production. While there may be unredeemed sociological approaches that can help here, a Cambridge School approach provides a ready and well-utilised lens into how scholars as actual historical agents interacted with other agents, institutions, and ideas across national silos. Finally, this approach can provide an account of the self-reflective, second-order conversation about IR of which both disciplinary historians and sociologists have been part. In many ways, this is to return to the traditional superiority of disciplinary history over sociology, namely the focus on the specificities and complexities of discursive conversation rather than schematic overviews.[214] This chapter has indeed been as much a history of this conversation as a process of change within IR, as it has been an appraisal of the methodological tools offered therein for studying such change.

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[212] See chapters four and five below.
[213] Kristensen, 'Dividing Discipline: Structures of Communication in International Relations'; Kristensen, 'International Relations at the End: A Sociological Autopsy'.
[214] Schmidt, 'The Historiography of Academic International Relations'.

By marrying the substantive insights of disciplinary sociologists with the methods of disciplinary historians, then, a history of the transformation of IR during the late twentieth century becomes more possible. The critique of the disciplinary history literature put forward above has been partly informed by a Cambridge School sensibility. By emphasising the possibility of separation and discontinuity between the formative history of IR and its current state, it has drawn on the Skinnerian insight that knowledge is worth considering as much in its own time as in reference to a more distant past. That is, if we accept that IR today is continuous with its origins in some senses, in what ways has it changed in connection with changing historical circumstances? Similarly, even if forgotten and caricatured ideas such as those of classical realism or interwar idealism retain value in the present, in what ways do they not speak to a rather different world and discipline? Just as importantly, how has IR come to be able to reflect on its own history in these ways?

In raising these questions, this chapter does not seek to deny the importance of studying the early history of IR, particularly regarding its raced, imperial, and gendered origins. Indeed, research in these directions has only just begun. What these questions highlight are the risks of reifying distant 'origins' as the explanandum of a contemporary discipline shaped greatly by more recent developments which should not be ignored. There thus emerges a mismatch between social scientific evidence of the recent transformation of IR, and histories of the discipline fixated on the early-to-mid-twentieth century. IR's intellectual historians thus need to address the temporal bias of their scholarship to provide a balanced and comprehensive understanding of how the discipline has come to be the way it is today. As mentioned, this does not need to entail abandoning research into the early-to-mid-twentieth century, but rather greater scholarly reflection and recognition of the potential limitations of continuing to do so. Likewise, if historians of IR do indeed hold originalist assumptions – an argument this chapter has not broached – these will need to be properly justified rather than taken for granted. Finally, and most obviously, addressing the temporal bias of the literature requires further historical studies of IR in the late twentieth century. This thesis can be seen as a first significant step towards addressing these issues.

3. The Birth of International Political Economy and the Idea of the Inter-Paradigm Debate, c.1970-85

3.1 Introduction

The late twentieth century, this thesis argues, saw a transformation in the discipline of IR, as it underwent significant intellectual diversification, institutional expansion, and disciplinary self-reflection. This chapter explores how these entwined processes began to work through the discipline from the start of the 1970s, focusing on the birth of the subfield of International Political Economy (IPE) and the consolidation of the 'Great Debates' narrative as a mode of understanding IR's evolution.

As disciplinary sociologists have noted, global economic and political developments around the turn of this decade triggered an intellectual fragmentation within (Anglo-American) IR, and an associated crisis of disciplinary identity.[215] After the Second World War, IR had defined itself as a discipline on the premise that there was an ontological distinctiveness to international politics which separated it from other spheres of social life, and thus required distinct intellectual tools to comprehend.[216] More specifically, IR was demarcated through a theory – realism – which illuminated laws of ever-present power struggle between autonomous states in a system without central authority.[217] In large part, this was driven and given credence by the Cold War superpower stand-off, yet soon it became clear that interstate relations could not entirely be separated from a broader social environment. Amid such contexts as accelerating economic interdependence, détente, the collapse of the Bretton Woods economic system, the 1973 oil shock, and Global South demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), IR's attention was shifted from superpower competition to social forces operating below, above, and across states, and binding them together in relations of 'linkage' and 'interdependence'. Realism, if not removed from its dominant position within IR, saw its state-centric ontology brought into question, as new

[215] Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*, 109; Acharya and Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations*, 157–62.
[216] For Duncan Bell the 'establishment and stabilisation of a discipline requires the delineation of a specific domain, which its members can claim as their own, demarcating it from other disciplines and providing a focal point for research and debate.' Bell, 'Writing the World (Remix)', 21.
[217] Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*, 10–11; Guilhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory*.

perspectives arose emphasising novel realities and looking to converse with other social sciences such as economics and sociology.

In the sequential imagination of Great Debates mythology, these developments are typically understood in terms of the emergence of a three-way theoretical tussle between realism (or neo-realism), liberalism (or globalism/pluralism), and Marxism (or structuralism),[218] a depiction mirrored in state-of-the-art overviews of the early field of IPE.[219] Michael Banks, an LSE Lecturer who was one of the first to draw on Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science to reflect on IR's evolution, famously termed this 'the inter-paradigm debate', while Kal Holsti spoke of a 'dividing discipline'.[220] Following Stanley Hoffmann's depiction of IR as 'an American social science', however, some disciplinary sociologists including Steve Smith, Ole Waever, and Stefano Guzzini questioned this inter-paradigmatic self-image, claiming that it exaggerated realism's decline, misused Kuhn's ideas – particularly the notion of 'incommensurable paradigms', on whose definition Kuhn was ambiguous and applied largely to the natural sciences – and/or inhibited constructive dialogue in IR.[221] To this the intellectual historian Nicolas Guilhot has added the argument that, far from reflecting and encouraging diversity, the inter-paradigm debate idea 'actually *consolidated* realism' by reproducing at the level of IR theory the realist vision of an irrational and conflictual world.[222] For Guilhot, the major contribution of Kuhn to IR was to make political realism and science compatible, not liberate the discipline.

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[218] As we will see, this image is the legacy of a proliferating 'stock-taking' literature that emerged in the early 1980s. See James N. Rosenau, 'Order and Disorder in the Study of World Politics: Ten Essays in Search of a Perspective', in *Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982); Michael Banks, 'The Evolution of International Relations Theory', in *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations*, ed. Michael Banks (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984), 3–21; Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate'; Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline*; Robert D. Mackinlay and Richard Little, *Global Problems and World Order* (London: Pinter, 1986); Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*; William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom, *International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation* (London: Harper Collins, 1991).

[219] E.g. Robert Gilpin, 'Three Models of the Future', *International Organization* 29, no. 1 (1975): 37–60; Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Stephen D. Krasner, 'International Political Economy: Abiding Discord', *Review of International Political Economy* 1, no. 1 (1994): 13–19; Stephen D. Krasner, 'The Accomplishments of International Political Economy', in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 108–27.

[220] Banks, 'The Evolution of International Relations Theory'; Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate'; Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline*.

[221] Alker and Biersteker, 'The Dialectics of World Order'; Smith, 'The Development of International Relations as a Social Science'; Smith, 'The Self-Images of a Discipline', 15–21; Colin Wight, 'Incommensurability and Cross-Paradigm Communication in International Relations Theory: What's the Frequency Kenneth?', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 25, no. 2 (1996): 291–319; Waever, 'The Rise and Fall of the Interparadigm Debate'; Waever, 'The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline'; Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*.

[222] Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment*, 182.

What these accounts do not adequately grapple with, however, is how and why the notion of an inter-paradigm debate, situated within a broader Great Debates mythology, gained so much traction in the 1970s and early 1980s. As we have seen, it was in the late twentieth century that the Debates sequence was cemented as 'disciplinary orthodoxy', with scholars repeatedly using it to validate the progressiveness of new theoretical and metatheoretical themes.[223] Exactly why this happened, however, is not entirely clear. This chapter argues that the inter-paradigm debate image not only helped comprehend intellectual and institutional growth amid global change – particularly the birth of IPE and a major expansion of higher education – but also that it helped avert a disciplinary identity crisis by figuring IR's intellectual growth and fragmentation as part of a standard (Kuhnian) process of social scientific evolution. This self-image was also situated within a broader discourse of early sociological reflections on IR that blossomed in the period – Hoffmann's 'American social science' thesis being perhaps the prime other example – which in different ways helped (re)affirm the identity of the discipline, and of diverse scholars within it, in an age of transition and uncertainty. Of these, however, the inter-paradigmatic view came to structure most how IR was perceived by students and scholars, combining a distinct sense of disciplinarity with an allowance for intellectual progress and pluralism – one easily replicable in pedagogical textbooks as the discipline's 'menu for choice'. Ironically, then, just as IR was seeking to integrate with other social sciences and as international politics itself seemed to lose distinctiveness, IR both grew and developed a stronger sense of its situation in time and space.

Alongside examining the contributions of familiar figures such as Robert Keohane and Susan Strange – surveyed by Benjamin Cohen's account of IPE's 'magnificent seven' founding scholars –[224] this chapter connects them with less well-known, archivally based institutional histories. This includes a new account of the founding and early development of the British International Studies Association (BISA),[225] in which Strange was centrally involved, as well as existing but largely neglected histories of institutions such as Harvard's Centre for International

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[223] Quirk and Vigneswaran, 'The Construction of an Edifice', 102–3; Ashworth, 'Was International Relations Really Founded in 1985?'; Ashworth, 'A Historiographer's View'.

[224] The others being Stephen Krasner, Robert Cox, Peter Katzenstein, Charles Kindleberger, and Robert Gilpin. Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*.

[225] As noted in the introduction to this thesis, the rise of the professional association has been a core element of IR's institutional expansion in the late twentieth century. The precursor to BISA, the British Coordinating Committee for International Studies and its annual 'Bailey' teaching conferences, has been surveyed by Buzan, 'Before BISA'. The story of ISA is more fully explored in chapter 6 but a useful early overview can be found in Henry Teune, 'The International Studies Association' (Unpublished paper to ISA Futures Leadership Meeting, October 1982, 1982), https://www.isanet.org/Portals/0/Documents/Institutional/Henry_Teune_The_ISA_1982.pdf.

Affairs (CFIA) and LSE's Department of International Relations and Centre for International Studies (and associated scholarly journals).[226] In addition, and to some extent in turn, Cohen's division of distinct British and American 'schools' of IPE will be questioned given that there was more intellectual and institutional cross-pollination than he suggests in the early years. The previous chapter argued that while sociological accounts of IR have been more alert to disciplinary evolution than have intellectual histories, the latter possess distinct – if unredeemed – methodological advantages for telling the story of such change. Through detailed engagement with primary source materials and the discursive and other contexts of their authors, intellectual history is better positioned to reveal and recount the interpretive/ideological meaning of texts, the process of self-reflection of which both disciplinary sociologies and histories have been part, and lines of transnational influence and inheritance.

The remainder of this chapter contains three sections, covering roughly the period from 1970 to 1985. The first two sections survey key intellectual and institutional moves in the creation of IPE as a field of IR in the United States and Britain, with particular focus on the work of Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Strange. Since much of this ground has been covered by Cohen, no claim to a major revisionist history of IPE's founding is made here, though these sections add further context and detail to the story, revealing important moments of transatlantic overlap and cross-fertilisation, at least in the early years. Above all, it will be shown that Strange and other British scholars, despite some major intellectual differences, often looked *across* the Atlantic for inspiration when institutionalising IPE as a more modernised and professional academic space compared to existing British IR.[227] Yet what was the effect of the new field on wider disciplinary self-understandings? As indicated, this proliferation of intellectual and institutional activity in the context of global change constituted a crisis of IR's post-war (realist) disciplinary identity. Strange, indeed, viewed IPE – or, more broadly, 'international studies' – as an inter-discipline transcending IR and providing a trading zone with other fields, particularly international economics. The third section argues that while there were a range of responses to this issue – from Hoffmann's 'American social science' continuity thesis to Strange's vision of IPE as a new overarching discipline merging IR and economics – perhaps the most important and enduring idea on both sides of the Atlantic envisioned IR as in the throes of a three-way inter-paradigmatic contest,

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[226] David C. Atkinson, *In Theory and Practice: Harvard's Centre for International Affairs* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi, eds., *International Relations at LSE: A History of 75 Years* (London: Millennium Publishing, 2003).

[227] This stands in interesting contrast to later moments of resistance by British scholars to American trends, for example an episode recounted in chapter 6 whereby tensions emerged between BISA and ISA regarding the latter's attempts at internationalisation.

situated within a broader evolutionary 'Great Debates' story. No matter whether any of these self-images were empirically accurate, it will be argued that they themselves constituted a process of change, securing IR's disciplinary and social scientific status in a supposed 'age of transition'.

3.2 Power and Interdependence Revisited

'We live in an era of interdependence. This vague phrase expresses a poorly understood but widespread feeling that the very nature of world politics is changing.'[228] So Keohane and Nye famously began their classic 1977 *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, signalling the crisis of realist ontology and gesturing at a necessary theoretical reformulation. According to Cohen, 'more than anyone, Keohane and Nye may take credit for setting the study of IPE in the United States on its present course…no one came close to matching them for the speed and ingenuity with which they acted to convert potential into reality'.[229] Following his method of unravelling the interplay between individual agency and historical contingency, for Cohen Keohane and Nye were 'intellectual entrepreneurs' *par excellence* who transformed propitious national and international conditions into the reality of IPE.[230]

Such conditions were many at the turn of the 1970s, when Keohane and Nye, two recent PhD graduates of Harvard University's Government Department, sought to establish the new field. In particular, international politics and the global economy were undergoing major interconnected changes which existing realist theories could not capture. The post-war period had lent a certain reality to realism's separation of interstate relations from economics, with the US-led Bretton Woods system allowing (Western) states to remain relatively insulated from the vagaries of the international economy through pegged exchange rates, capital controls, and neo-Keynesian domestic planning. Realism, in turn, could usefully focus on a relatively autonomous international-political domain and the interactions between economically independent superpowers. Yet by the mid-1960s this order was under strain, as Western European and Japanese economies recovered – the former increasingly institutionalised as a cohesive bloc and both integrated into rapidly

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[228] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Second (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1989), 3. Here I am using the second edition of the book, which included a new preface and an appended Part V reflecting on the reception of their work and its policy implications but left the main text unedited.
[229] Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*, 17.
[230] Ibid., 6–7.

expanding international markets in production and finance – and Global South states and allied movements organised to critique the structural iniquities of post-war international capitalism. Through the early-to-mid-1970s, such challenges multiplied with the US effectively ending the Bretton Woods system in 1971 through the suspension of dollar-gold convertibility, and the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposing an oil embargo on states supporting Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Together with the American defeat in Vietnam and the Soviet Union's apparent achievement of nuclear parity, these developments spurred a thaw in Cold War superpower relations (détente) and emboldened non-aligned demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) within the United Nations (UN).[231] In this context, the realist separation of international economics and politics became increasingly difficult to defend, as domestic politics were exposed to external economic shocks, and boundaries between economic and geopolitical policy blurred.

If this was the socio-political environment in which Keohane and Nye intervened, there were also existing and emerging ideas within (US) IR and other social sciences on which they could – and did – draw. Cohen rightly mentions the importance of the neo-functionalist theory of Ernst B. Haas, which was first applied to the case of European integration and Franco-German cooperation but which others including Nye had transferred to regions such as East Africa, too.[232] Less influential, but by no means unimportant, was Karl Deutsch's work on 'pluralistic security communities' and the development of reliable expectations of peaceful relations in the North Atlantic area.[233] As Keohane and Nye wrote in the Afterword to the second edition of their 1977 book, a revised version of a retrospective entitled 'Power and Interdependence Revisited': 'What these studies have in common was their focus on how increased transactions and contact changed attitudes and transnational coalition opportunities, and the ways in which such institutions helped foster such processes. They focused directly on the political processes of learning and the

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[231] Nils Gilman, 'The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction', *Humanity* 6, no. 1 (2015): 4. The NIEO will be discussed further in the next chapter as an important context for the rise of critical IR theory.

[232] Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*, 29–30. For the famous statements of Haas' neo-functionalism see Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958); Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organisation* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964). Nye's 1964 doctoral dissertation, *Functionalism and Federalism in East Africa*, was published in 1965 as *Pan-Africanism and East African Integration*. See Joseph S. Nye, *Pan-Africanism and East African Integration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

[233] Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North American Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). Deutsch was of course a professor at Harvard from 1967.

redefinition of national interests'.[234] Keohane and Nye in their turn saw the potential to transfer Haas and Deutsch's insights 'to the growing and broader dimensions of international economic interdependence' at the turn of the 1970s.[235]

The wider intellectual milieu of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the economic and political upheavals of these years, helped to facilitate this broadening. Of particular importance in this context was a scholarly group collecting around the Centre for International Affairs (CFIA), an interdisciplinary research institute based in Harvard's Faculty of Arts and Sciences though maintaining close links to scholars at the nearby Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Founded at the height of the Cold War in 1958, the CFIA was the product of several years of reflection within the university on the status of IR as an academic discipline, and the prevailing demands of US foreign policy. The revisionist disciplinary history literature discussed in the previous chapter has recounted much of this background. As Brian Schmidt and Robert Vitalis in particular show, IR had existed at Harvard and other centres of learning in the United States since the late nineteenth century as an interdisciplinary field within departments of political science, dedicated to the study of international anarchy and practical problems of American empire.[236] Nicolas Guilhot, on the other hand, argues true disciplinary origins were located in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and the realist 'gambit' to insulate IR from the behavioural revolution in the social and political sciences, a project that was unsuccessful methodologically and epistemologically but ultimately cemented realist theory as the basis of the Cold War IR discipline.[237]

The demand for a CFIA emerged in this post-war moment, as the university developed what David Atkinson has termed an unprecedentedly 'durable and concerted commitment to the discipline' in an era where 'the exigencies of US foreign policy…had become increasingly complex and fraught with potential danger'.[238] Across American colleges, '(d)ramatic international developments and soaring enrolment numbers following the demobilisation contributed to

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[234] Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 1989, 248.
[235] Ibid.
[236] Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*; Long and Schmidt, *Imperialism and Internationalism*; Vitalis, *White World Order*.
[237] Nicolas Guilhot, 'The Realist Gambit: Post-War American Political Science and the Birth of IR Theory', in *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory*, ed. Nicolas Guilhot (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), 128–61; Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment*.
[238] Atkinson, *In Theory and Practice*, 2.

creating a strong demand for courses in international relations',[239] with Harvard itself in the 1950s bringing forth a generation of talented young IR scholars.[240] Following the enormous facilitation and mobilisation of university knowledge by the US government in the World War II era – principally in technological innovation and public policy – the onset of the Cold War and the US pursuit of global (military) dominance brought government and academic expertise ever closer, a relationship catalysed by the philanthropic endeavours of the Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie Foundations.[241] Ford indeed provided the initial impetus for the CFIA in 1953, offering to fund a study on behavioural sciences at Harvard across a number of disciplines, and pushed in the direction of an IR research institute by a faculty committee considering the proposal.[242]

The Centre, to be sure, took a view of IR which diverged from the anti-behavioural realism proposed by those at the 1954 Rockefeller Conference on the Theory of International Politics. In its first decade, the CFIA contributed to the broader scientific transfiguration of Cold War realism by focusing on the role of force – particularly military policy and arms control, a programme overseen by Kissinger and Thomas Schelling and counting such figures as Kenneth Waltz among its research associates – development, and modernisation theory, all of which was pursued through policy-oriented, interdisciplinary research. Yet while the CFIA brought together methods and personnel from across the social sciences, applying, for example, Schelling's economistic game theory to questions of international conflict and cooperation,[243] Centre research in general did not depart from the basic realist worldview and state-centric ontology on which both sides of IR's

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[239] Guilhot, 'The Realist Gambit', 132.

[240] These included such major figures of post-war American IR and foreign policy as Karl Deutsch, Samuel P. Huntington, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Stanley Hoffmann, and perhaps most famously, Henry Kissinger.

[241] Edward H. Berman, *The Influence of Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1983); Inderjeet Parmar, 'American Hegemony, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rise of Academic International Relations in the United States', in *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory*, ed. Nicolas Guilhot (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), 182–209; Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*; Stephen Wertheim, *Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of US Global Supremacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020).

[242] Despite the existence of IR courses and scholars at Harvard in the post-war period, it was believed the discipline was intellectually and theoretically immature, and lacking institutional focus within the university. Atkinson, *In Theory and Practice*, 5–12. These were of course common concerns among American scholars, funders, and practitioners interested in international affairs during the 1950s. See Guilhot, 'The Realist Gambit'; Brian C. Schmidt, 'The Need for Theory: International Relations and the Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on the Theory of International Relations, 1953-1954', *International History Review* 42, no. 3 (2020): 589–606.

[243] Atkinson, *In Theory and Practice*, 67–68.

'Second Great Debate' were broadly agreed. It was undeniably part of the construction of what Isaac Kamola terms the 'national imaginary' in Cold War America.[244]

In a different context, however, it was this attempted interdisciplinarity that would foster Keohane and Nye's efforts to establish IPE. As Atkinson comments, reflecting particularly on the aftermath of anti-Vietnam War protests that roiled the Harvard campus in the late 1960s, 'the ravages of a changing domestic and international context – coupled with the shifting composition and scholarship of the Centre's research staff – ensured that the second decade at the Centre would be far more dynamic…than the previous one'.[245] Amid political turmoil and radicalism within and beyond the university, the departure of Kissinger to the Nixon administration, and the new directorship of economist Raymond Vernon, the CFIA's research programme was transformed. It pivoted from immediate strategic policy concerns to theoretical analyses of a changing international system, with research staff united on the reality of shrinking space and increasing contact among peoples of the globe, the blurring of national and international affairs, and the erosion of the primacy of the state and international conflict.[246] In autumn 1969, the CFIA sponsored a major new programme led by Nye – now Professor of Government at Harvard –[247] on transnational relations and international order, which would attend to non-state actors and their relations with international governmental organisations. This led to three-day conference in June 1970 with some seventeen scholars from several countries and four different disciplines, the aim of which was to discuss a set of papers to be published as a special issue of the journal *International Organisation*, on whose editorial board Keohane and Nye served since 1968 and had decided to collaborate.[248] Keohane and Nye would from this point play 'a critical role in establishing *International Organisation* as a core venue for IPE's pioneer generation', raising the legitimacy of the field and the journal in IR, and boosting their theoretical profile.[249]

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[244] Isaac Kamola, *Making the World Global: US Universities and the Production of the Global Imaginary* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019), 29–80.
[245] Atkinson, *In Theory and Practice*, 135–36.
[246] Ibid., 162–63.
[247] Nye had first come to the Centre in 1961 as a research assistant to then Director Robert Bowie, and more recently had led efforts to engage student concerns following the Vietnam War protests and accusations the CFIA was an arm of US imperialism. Ibid., 43, 137. Keohane, for his part, had been an anti-Vietnam War activist while an Assistant Professor at Swarthmore College.
[248] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Preface', *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (1971): vi. The two had not met until 1967 despite overlapping on the Harvard Government PhD programme. Their special issue was later published as the book *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. See Keohane and Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*.
[249] Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*, 35.

In 1970, Stanley Hoffmann, Keohane and Nye's advisor at Harvard and sometime participant in a not insignificant early programme on French and European politics within the CFIA,[250] had published an article in *International Organisation* arguing that transnational society was increasingly penetrating the international system. This, he suggested, was diversifying the number of 'chessboards' on which inter-state politics could play out – from trade to culture – hopefully leading to bargaining and reduced conflict among states, even though war and diplomacy would remain important elements of the system.[251] In the liberal-leanign *Foreign Policy* magazine, founded in 1970 by Samuel P. Huntington and Warren Demian Manshel to reassess US policy post-Vietnam, Hoffmann outlined a 'modest' approach to America's global role based on this viewpoint. It would transcend the '*modernes*" focus on 'global society' – those who 'believe that world politics will become more like domestic politics' and 'act as if the millennium had arrived' – and the '*classiques*" focus on 'the state of war' and the dominance of security concerns.[252] The era of US hegemony was over but harmony had not yet arrived; needed, he would argue, was a strategy of 'world order'-building that eschewed primacy but retained a leadership role in the construction of a more peaceful international community taming violence and economic disruption.[253]

At the opening of *Power and Interdependence*, Keohane and Nye would invoke Hoffmann's synthesis of 'modernist' and 'traditionalist' schools, neither of which, they suggested, 'have an adequate framework for understanding the politics of global interdependence'.[254] Yet, looking back, they admitted that realism as taught to them at Harvard – Hoffmann after all had been an admiring reader and friend of French realist Raymond Aron – still "bore the brunt" of their critique.[255] This was perhaps due to the connection of *Power and Interdependence* to the transnationalism special issue, which it is possible Hoffmann had in mind when characterising the '*modernes*' school. Despite the discordant voice of Robert Gilpin, the contributions signalled a need to shift away from the state-centrism defining post-war IR, and turn particularly to the insights of international economists such as Vernon – then adding final touches to his 1972 book on multinational enterprises, *Sovereignty at Bay* – and Richard Cooper, author of *The Economics of*

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[250] This broke off in 1969 to become the Centre for European Studies, of which Hoffmann was founding Chairman.
[251] Stanley Hoffmann, 'International Organisation and the International System', *International Organization* 24, no. 3 (1970): 389–413.
[252] Stanley Hoffmann, 'Choices', *Foreign Policy* 12 (1973): 3–42.
[253] Stanley Hoffmann, *Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War* (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1978).
[254] Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 1989, 4.
[255] Ibid., xi.

Interdependence.[256] Focusing primarily on economic activity, Keohane and Nye defined transnational relations as 'contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government', and where at least one actor was not a state.[257] Taking their lead from Cooper, their argument was that transnational relations 'increase the sensitivity of societies to one another and thereby alter relationships between governments', pluralising influences on government policy and the 'issue areas' to which it was turned.[258] To account for these effects, a 'broader world politics paradigm' was needed to explain the relationship between transnational relations and the state system.[259]

In so doing, Keohane and Nye undercut the foundational realist ontology of the autonomy of international politics. State preferences, their analysis implied, could not just be assumed but had to be gleaned through an understanding of a broader environment of societal interdependence, where the 'high politics' of military-security concerns became one among several issue areas with which governments had to deal. Yet while the special issue laid out the flaws of realist ontology and a future research agenda, it provided no integrated alternative theory for explaining the relationship between transnational relations and state interaction. To this problem, and the necessity of overcoming what they believed were the realist premises of a flawed American foreign policy, *Power and Interdependence* was their answer.[260]

Here, the world picture of the special issue was given ideal-typical formulation, namely a 'complex interdependence' that was the 'opposite of realism', a theory that was 'often an inadequate basis for analysing the politics of interdependence'.[261] Three characteristics defined complex interdependence: multiple channels of communication between societies (interstate; transgovernmental; and transnational); the absence of hierarchy among issues, with foreign policy agendas expanding beyond military security and its locus dispersing among government departments; and a diminution of military force.[262] This contrasted with the tenets of realism,

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[256] Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1971); Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community* (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1968).
[257] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction', *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (1971): 331–32. There were four categories of object being moved: information, goods, money, or people.
[258] Ibid., 336–42.
[259] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion', *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (1971): 721.
[260] Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 1989, v–vi.
[261] Ibid., 23.
[262] Ibid., 24–25.

where states as coherent units were considered the dominant actors, force a usable and effective policy instrument, and issues as ordered in a hierarchy headed by the 'high politics' of military security. Both, certainly, were polar ideal types rather than universal in time and space, each useful analytical heuristics against which reality could be compared. Nevertheless, Keohane and Nye's point was that the realist model was becoming much less applicable, and that in certain places – Europe and the North Atlantic specifically with Canadian-US relations being the main example – complex interdependence was a more useful description. Here, many issue areas had become governed by what John Ruggie termed 'regimes', that is, strong 'networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularise behaviour and control its effects', and with which any attempt to undertake or understand international change had to grapple.[263]

These interventions would lead to a flourishing IPE field and literature, including an updated realism. In fact, though this is not examined in great depth in this thesis, within the context of a revived Cold War and the rise of 'neorealism', Keohane and Nye's ideas would *converge* in important respects with those of former debating partners such as Gilpin and Waltz, forming what became known as 'the neo-neo consensus'. Hinting at this point but without pursuing it to its conclusion, Cohen argues Keohane and Nye's foundational role in American IPE entailed not simply their ideas on complex interdependence and the development of the journal *International Organisation*, but also 'their encouragement of the ideas of others' through collective research projects – of which Gilpin's realism and the 1980s literature on international regimes are prime examples.[264] Yet how lines of influence turned in the other direction within these collective projects is not explored in Cohen's account, where Keohane and Nye are posited at the root of almost all that followed after 1970 in American IPE. Also overlooked is the sympathetic reception of US trends within the formation of what he terms 'the British School' of IPE.

3.3. A Special Relationship? Susan Strange and the Birth of IPE in Britain

At the thirteenth Executive Committee meeting of the newly formed British International Studies Association (BISA) in April 1976, BISA Secretary R.J. Barry Jones presented a report of his recent attendance at the annual convention of the International Studies Association (ISA) in Toronto, Canada. The aim of the report was to comment on 'impressions, contacts, and information' gained

[263] Ibid., 19.
[264] Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*, 31.

at the February convention, with a view to furthering links between the American and British IR communities. In addition to outlining how British scholars might be financed to travel to ISA conventions and arrange visits to American universities, Jones also provided an analysis of the February convention's intellectual topography. This was 'to divine the developing foci of interest among American International Studies' scholars, so as to assist with the promotion of the BISA and the BJIS [British Journal of International Studies] on the North American continent'.[265]

Compared to the first two BISA conferences held in 1975 at Oxford and Birmingham, which together held less than 20 panels,[266] the ISA convention was a singularly large event, with, according to Jones, 253 panels covering 23 areas of inquiry, from education to peace research. With 49 panels in total, however, by far the most prominent area of inquiry was IPE, whose 'overwhelming dominance' of proceedings was 'easily verified from a casual glance at the Annual Convention's programme'.[267] 'One of the key events', Jones added in a shorter report for the BISA newsletter, was a panel on 'The Direction of International Relations Theory Over the Next Ten Years' with Karl Deutsch, James Rosenau, Robert C. North, Richard Rosecrance, and Joseph Nye, where consensus was reached on the need for theory 'to embrace all dimensions of interaction and transaction, between states and across national frontiers'. Above all, Nye came closest to 'specifying a procedure for theory development, rather than a mere focus', citing future work with Robert Keohane. In turn, 'ISA's Convention proved to be a stimulating and rewarding experience for a visiting British academic, despite the awe with which such a large and complex (confused) event inevitably endangered'.[268] In terms of its implications for BISA, '(t)he strength of interest in International Political Economy, and its probable further growth', Jones concluded in his report to the Executive Committee,

> suggests much that is of pertinence to the strategy that might be adopted if the British International Studies Association, and particularly the British Journal of International Studies, is to make an impact in North America.

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[265] 'R.J. Barry Jones. Report on impressions, contacts, and information gained at the American International Studies Association's Annual Convention, Toronto, February 1976'. BISA/3, LSE Archives and Special Collections (henceforth BISA/?).
[266] Conference programmes and attendance lists of BISA past conferences can be found at https://conference.bisa.ac.uk/past-conferences .
[267] In addition, 29 panels were dedicated to international organisations, international law, integration, and domestic sources of foreign policy.
[268] 'BISA Newsletter, Summer 1976'. BISA/14.

> This strategy would seem to be particularly pertinent to placing the Journal on a subscription basis.[269]

Jones' impressions and recommendations are testament to the centrality and vitality of IPE in Anglo-American IR during the mid-1970s, and the intellectual and institutional growth of the discipline. Henry Teune's brief history of ISA from 1959 to 1982 notes changes that had seen what was originally a regional association of only 60 paying members in 1963, become a national – and increasingly international – organisation with several regions, sub-sections, and 1900 members just a decade later.[270] Important here was an injection of funds from the Ford Foundation towards internal and international expansion after 1970, with the ISA seeking to remake itself as 'an individually based organisation, and international community of scholars, identified with no government or nation'.[271] Yet underlying and being shaped by this institutional expansion, Teune implied, were broader intellectual shifts. Hitherto, ISA had been a small West-coast-based organisation focused on security policy and analysis of the international political system, formed to address the relatively marginal position of IR within the American Political Science Association (APSA).[272] Amid the turbulence of the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, ISA's transformation tracked attempts of scholars to link the international system to 'general human problems that had no clear national boundaries', with 'comparative interdisciplinary studies' approaches to the fore and sections on the environment and political economy coalescing.[273] The development of professional associations of IR scholars in other countries – notably Britain, Poland, and Japan – soon saw the ISA internationalise in a less 'imperialistic' fashion, relating to the outside world not just through individual scholar memberships but also national-organisational partnerships.[274]

The Toronto convention that Jones attended was, according to Teune, the most well-attended ISA conference to date. Openness and tolerance meant both *modernes* who wished for the millennium and *classiques* concerned with the state of war could be accommodated. In addition, unlike other professional associations within the social sciences, no Vietnam-era crisis was evident; on the contrary, ISA flourished as never before, if only because discussion of US political issues

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[269] Barry Jones 1976 ISA Report. BISA/3.
[270] Teune, 'The International Studies Association', 3, It had taken first steps towards internationalisation by including Canadian and Caribbean regions.
[271] Ibid., 4.
[272] Author's interview with Thomas Volgy, 2 May 2022.
[273] Teune, 'The International Studies Association', 5-6.
[274] 'no longer did ISA see itself organisationally as a global organisation but one of several in international studies and in some cases as an organisation representing scholars in North America'. Ibid., 7.

was resisted by non-North American scholars: 'The large organisational space of ISA and its pattern of co-optation that allowed each component to sit on the Governing Council avoided the traumas of our sister social science associations'.[275] A year earlier, on the eve of BISA's founding, Chatham House economist and former White House correspondent of the *Observer* Susan Strange had been made ISA Vice President. Twenty years later, now presiding over the Association, Strange could, like Jones, reminisce how she 'found the experience refreshing and inspiring', quite different from the British IR setting:

> Back in Britain, if we had conferences, the 'barons' as I irreverently called them, were in charge. They chose the subject, picked the speakers, and invited the participants. ISA was different. It was open, democratic, competitive: a game anyone – economists, lawyers, historians, sociologists – could join in, and where audiences voted with their feet…A model, I thought, of interdisciplinarity – and a good one for the more hierarchical Europeans to follow.

Impressed with the operation, Strange recalled, she soon 'set about the sincerest form of flattery – imitation',[276] founding BISA in 1975 with Rockefeller and Ford Foundation backing and her Chatham House IPE study group (IPEG) as one of its first sections.

Strange, according to Benjamin Cohen, was the founder of a 'British School' of IPE that defined itself sharply in opposition to the field as founded by Keohane and Nye in the US. This encompassed most IPE scholars in the British Isles and 'outposts elsewhere in the former empire, such as Canada or Australia'. It was and is, Cohen writes not incorrectly, 'more multidisciplinary in scope and normative in ambition, more critical of established orthodoxies and more engaged in social issues, more impatient with the status quo and more eager to change attitudes or practices'. It also favoured qualitative rather than quantitative methods.[277] Thus, '(i)t is symptomatic of the differences between the American and British schools that while the preeminent showcase for IPE scholarship in the United States is the annual meeting of the American Political Science

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[275] Ibid., 8.

[276] Susan Strange, '1995 Presidential Address: ISA as a Microcosm', *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (1995): 289. In a short auto-biographical essay from 1989, Strange stated similarly about the ISA: 'it seemed to me lively, democratic, liberal and, in a peculiarly American way, friendly and unstuffy…When I got the chance, I resolved to get something similar started in Europe, or at least in Britain'. Strange, 'I Never Meant to Be an Academic'.

[277] Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*, 45.

Association, in Britain it is BISA, a more multidisciplinary association'.[278] The British School, in short, is and has been resistant 'to any new scholarly fashion emanating from the other side of the pond'.[279] Yet, while not without elements of truth, this characterisation is clearly complicated by the impressions of Jones and – in particular – the very founder of the British School herself during its early years. Undoubtedly more intellectually and politically radical than its American counterpart today, British IPE nevertheless originally sought to imitate its success to an extent.

Indeed, there was much with which Strange was *dissatisfied* in British IR – which is partly why she looked across to the United States in seeking inspiration for how to transform it. Also important were her professional experiences in the United States after graduating from the LSE during its wartime evacuation to Cambridge.[280] Following a short period working at *The Economist* magazine, at the young age of twenty-three Strange was recruited by *The Observer* Sunday newspaper as White House correspondent. In her 1995 ISA Presidential Address, she wrote of the US as a 'second home…of us *de facto* quasi-Americans' – those 'millions' of foreign academics, businesspeople, bankers, sportspersons, and media types who, "when we come back to the US, find ourselves on familiar ground'.[281] The thrust of her provocative speech, titled 'ISA as a Microcosm', was to analogise the Association's ambiguous role as both a national and global organisation with the position of the United States after the Cold War. Strange wanted ISA and the US each to resist isolationism and reckless self-aggrandisement; 'bound to lead', as Nye had – she thought – rightly put it, Strange valued an inclusive 'benign hegemony' for the US of the type that had successfully managed the world economy in the post-war period, and an interdisciplinary American academic community of the type that had pioneered an open and eclectic 'international studies' and IPE in the 1970s.[282] Since the middle of that decade, however, the US had begun to retreat from its imperial responsibilities, seduced by prophets of decline and the deregulation of global markets, while American scholars had retreated into a narrow, state-centric positivism within the bounds disciplinary IR.[283] The effect of both, Strange believed, was to disguise the real

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[278] Ibid., 48.
[279] Ibid., 61.
[280] Cohen, in line with other retrospectives of Strange's life, states that she graduated in economics. Yet while she would have received the standard LSE BSc (Econ), in her auto-biographical essay Strange mentioned choosing 'from a broad social science menu' and specialising in politics and especially IR as an undergraduate. As was not uncommon at that time, Strange never completed a PhD.
[281] Strange, 'ISA as a Microcosm', 293.
[282] Ibid., 294. Strange was ambiguous about the differences between IPE and international studies: both were envisaged as eclectic inter-disciplines marrying IR, economics, sociology, history, geography and other subjects.
[283] Strange also briefly referred to a project of unilateral internationalisation undertaken by ISA in the late 1980s, which was successfully resisted by BISA. The story of this episode is recounted in chapter 6.

existence and actions of the 'transnational empire'. Her high (if unfulfilled) expectations of US hegemony in world politics thus paralleled and fed into those for IPE and international studies.

Certainly, Strange and British IPE in general always had intellectual and political differences with the so-called 'American School'. Cohen is correct that British IPE, lacking the scientific grounding of US IPE and culturally more open to Marxist and other leftist currents of thought, has thrown up more radical challenges to mainstream IR and world politics. Yet were these as prominent at the start as in later years, when figures such as Robert Cox – a figure who, as we shall see in the next chapter, also complicates any sharp American/British School division – came to the fore within a more established British School, and a resurgent neorealism's influence began to be felt within the American? Indeed, the original intellectual sympathies and institutional mimicry of the British School vis-à-vis the American are striking considering later divisions.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the years leading up to the founding of BISA, where Strange, as mentioned, played a critical role. After returning from the United States in 1948, Strange took up a lectureship in IR at University College London (UCL) working under realist international lawyer Georg Schwarzenberger, whom she found 'overbearing and intolerant of contradiction'.[284] Escape was periodically granted by continuing work at the radical *Observer* as economics correspondent, and permanently in 1964 by a research position at Chatham House to work on the emerging sterling crisis. There, she developed her thinking on the connections between international economic and political life, including powerful critiques of Establishment thinking in British politics and the IR discipline. Just as Britain continued to maintain post-imperial fantasies about the power of the pound and Commonwealth against the US dollar empire, so too IR scholars were ignoring the structural economic environment in which interstate relations took place. Strange made these points separately in two major publications at the turn of the 1970s, first in a famous manifesto for combining IR and economics in Chatham House journal *International*

[284] Not to mention sexist. Strange recalls falling out with UCL on account of Schwarzenberger's 'bullying' over multiple periods of maternity leave. Further, John Burton, theorist of the 'cobweb' model of 'world society', had arrived at UCL and was similarly a disciple-seeker despite his political commitment to dialogue and conflict resolution. Patricia Owens, 'Susan Strange - World Renowned International Relations Scholar', *LSE* (blog), 2018, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsehistory/2018/09/19/susan-strange-world-renowned-international-relations-scholar/..These British male IR figures contrast with Strange's American friend Robert Keohane, who, as Cohen notes, found mentorship in liberal political theorist Judith Shklar at Harvard, moved across the US for his wife's career, and mentored multiple women in IPE. Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*, 25.

Affairs,[285] and then in her 1971 book *Sterling and British Policy*.[286] Yet, without denying connections between theory and practice, it was the transformation of academic IR that became Strange's central focus, as she sought to remake the discipline as 'International Political Economy' – a term first used in her 1970 manifesto, which Cohen dates as the birth point of IPE in Britain.

Strange, certainly, was as concerned about prophecies of American decline masking a lack of American political will to properly manage the global economy – she famously termed this "the persistent myth of lost hegemony" –[287] as she was about the failure of Britain to adjust to its secondary role. She was less accepting than her American IPE counterparts of the inevitable and even benign nature of the new interdependence and liberalised trade and monetary policy. Indeed, her work over the next twenty years would largely focus on uncovering how, under global interdependence, power was unjustly distributed across security, monetary, trade and knowledge structures.[288] At the same time, Strange believed that American scholars were originally ahead of their British counterparts in grappling with the subject of interdependence. In her 1970 article, the IR scholars and economists she cited as among the few existing 'bridge-builders' between disciplines were American or US-based, including regional studies experts Ernst Haas, Richard Gardner, and Miriam Camps, and economist Richard Cooper.[289] Surely not uncoincidentally, Strange had encountered Camps, Gardner, and Cooper at Chatham House around this time. While Camps was a research fellow in the Euro-Atlantic relations programme, visits were arranged for both Cooper and Gardner in the early 1970s. In 1970, when Cooper was spending a sabbatical year at Chatham House and Strange published her manifesto, she set up the IPEG study group 'to bring together teachers in the two disciplines for discussion of particular international problems with a view to promoting a broader interdisciplinary approach to these interlocking subjects'.[290] This led to a nine-day conference at Cumberland Lodge, Windsor, in July 1972 with around three dozen scholars to discuss existing and future paths for IPE research and teaching. While attendees

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[285] Susan Strange, 'International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect', *International Affairs* 46, no. 2 (1970): 304–15.
[286] Susan Strange, *Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of an International Currency in Decline* (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1971).
[287] Susan Strange, 'The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony', *International Organization* 41, no. 4 (1987): 551–74.
[288] See in particular Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986); Susan Strange, *States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy* (New York, NY: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
[289] Strange, 'A Case of Mutual Neglect', 305–8. Cooper was Strange's first citation in this piece, as she sought to highlight changes to state behaviour caused by the integrated international market (namely disturbance, hindrance, and 'beggar thy neighbour' effects). Ibid., 305.
[290] 'Annual Report of the Council: 1970-71', 17. Chatham House Online Archive.

were mostly British economists and IR scholars, two academics from France, one from Germany, and three from the US were also invited, including Gardner who delivered the opening address on 'Politics, Economics and Law in the International System'. A survey of the past success and recent problems of the Bretton Woods system, Gardner's address 'was greatly appreciated both in its own terms, and as an introduction to the issues that would dominate the conference', noted the official report.[291]

These were just the first of several invitations to be extended to US scholars of interdependence to participate in the parallel evolution of British IPE. Soon, Nye was awarded a visiting fellowship at Chatham House in 1974, where he worked with Strange on the Ford-funded project on 'Transnational Relations as a Factor in International Affairs'. Strange saw Keohane and Nye's 1971 special issue as 'a most valuable lead' for the project, whose 'quality – as well as its timing in the crisis summer of 1971 – made it a really influential and seminal volume. Among others, the Chatham House application to the Ford Foundation early in 1972 undoubtedly owed much to the Keohane-Nye lead'.[292] Meanwhile, at the London School of Economics (LSE), where Strange occasionally taught on economic aspects of IR and would be appointed Montague Burton Professor in 1978, her predecessor in the chair Geoffrey Goodwin had founded and led a Centre for International Studies (CIS) since 1967 – again, with the support of Ford.[293] Explicitly based on the model of Harvard's CFIA, it aimed to support multidisciplinary work on international issues through visiting and postdoctoral fellowships, graduate studentships, a master's course in European studies, public lectures, and an influential Cambridge University Press book series.[294] While, like the CFIA, it was originally concerned with conflict and area studies – particularly Southeast Asia in the context of the Vietnam War – the CIS soon expanded focus. The most important CIS lecture series of this period was held in spring/summer 1974 on 'New Dimensions of World Politics', which invited (among others) Nye, Rosecrance, and Ernst Haas to advance new theoretical avenues beyond the realist 'billiard-ball' model, a move which reflected Goodwin's interests in international organisation, political economy, and an expansive vision of IR.[295]

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[291] 'Christopher Brown. Conference Report. Economics and Politics in International Studies: Report of the International Political Economy Summer Conference, July 1972', 2-3. Chatham House Online Archive.
[292] Susan Strange, 'The Study of Transnational Relations', *International Affairs* 52, no. 3 (1976): 335.
[293] F.S. Northedge, 'The Department of International Relations at LSE: A Brief History, 1924-1971', ed. Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi (London: Millennium Publishing, 2003), 19.
[294] McKeil 2017, 8-15.
[295] Ibid., p.16. A young PhD student Andrew Linklater kept notes during these lectures and edited and wrote an introduction with Goodwin to the published record of them. Geoffrey L. Goodwin and Andrew Linklater, eds., *New Dimensions of World Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1974). On Linklater see chapter 5.

Nonetheless, IPE had still not acquired much of an academic, university presence in the UK. Indeed, when the Cumberland Lodge conference compiled a list of existing university courses and seminars relevant to IPE, just one currently ran in the UK (Goodwin's LSE undergraduate and master's courses on 'The Politics of International Economic Relations'). Four were in North America and one was in Geneva, including the master's programme of John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the seminars of the Harvard CFIA, and a course on transnational society run by Robert W. Cox (then of Columbia University) during his final year at Toronto.[296] Developments within LSE's CIS were soon also to offer promise, as was the IR Department's new postgraduate-run journal *Millennium*, founded in 1971 – aptly named to reflect a forward-looking and globalist orientation to IR, which consisted in a pluralistic 'international studies' view and counterpoint to political realism.[297] Yet no British equivalent of *International Organisation* would emerge until the 1990s. There was also, as yet, no British version of the ISA.

British IR until the late 1960s was limited in size and stature. Since the end of the First World War, it essentially consisted of a few university chairs and lectureships at Oxford, LSE, and Aberystwyth – typically held by scholars of international history and law – who taught primarily undergraduate courses within broader social science and humanities degrees. These were loosely connected with policy think tank Chatham House and its journal *International Affairs*, established in 1920 and 1922 respectively, which would remain central hubs for IR research and scholars into the 1970s. At the prompting of the International Studies Conference (ISC) held under the auspices of the League of Nations' International International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC), this network regularly came together through the British Coordinating Committee for International Studies (BCCIS) and its 'Bailey Conferences on Teaching'. After the Second World

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Kenneth Waltz also visited LSE at this time, though it is telling that he spent most of his time in the Philosophy of Science Department rather than IR.

[296] 'Appendix B. Economics and Politics in International Studies: Report of the International Political Economy Summer Conference, July 1972', 46-53. Chatham House Online Archive.

[297] These are Mark Hoffman's impressions in his admittedly 'congratulatory, even hagiographic' overview of *Millennium's* history. Mark Hoffman, 'Critical Voices in a Mainstream Local: Millennium, the LSE International Relations and the Development of International Theory', in *International Relations at LSE: A History of 75 Years* (London: Millennium Publishing, 2003), 142–46. The globalist tenor of the journal and its academic and political milieu at this time is also reflected in its cover logo, 'the distinctive "Millennium" against a rising orb'. Hoffman notes that *Millennium's* editorial direction was set by students under the influence of the Burtonian Michael Banks and his 'inter-paradigmatic' view of IR. Barry Buzan, a graduate student at the LSE present at the creation of *Millennium* and editor of volume 1, issue 3, argues that the journal was founded rather to provide an induction into the IR profession for postgraduate students. Author's interview with Barry Buzan, 12 October, 2021. See also Conway, '"The Citadel of Scholarship": Rediscovering Critical IR in Millennium 1:1 [First View]'.

War, British IR did grow institutionally with the founding of the Rockefeller-funded British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (BCTIP), the Cold War-oriented think tank Institute of Strategic Studies, and the journals *International Relations*, *Survival*, and *Coexistence*. Here also had seen the first real emergence of IR undergraduate and postgraduate university degrees. However, with 1950s institutional expansion came an intellectual narrowing of the multidisciplinary view of IR popular in the interwar years, towards autonomy underpinned by a more realist ontological focus on the specificities of international politics – or 'international society' as members of the BCTIP such as Martin Wight and Hedley Bull famously understood it. Indeed, it was with this in mind that Strange would assail the 'hierarchies' and 'barons' of British IR in her ISA Presidential Address, and in her autobiographical sketch note 'the dreadfully constipated and hierarchical Bailey conferences that Charles Manning used to run at the LSE'.[298]

As British IR institutions further grew in the 1960s and early 1970s in the context of the expansion of UK higher education more generally, and as IPEG and others emerged to highlight global changes, a group of younger scholars sought to effect a shift. By the early 1970s, as Barry Buzan has observed in his history of the Bailey Conferences, there was a movement to create 'a more modern, democratic academic professional association for IR in Britain'.[299] Within the soon-moribund BCCIS, a BISA steering committee including Strange, Jones, and Oxford's Alistair Buchan was set up in 1973 to outline the aims and structure of the organisation.[300] These were contained in the constitution adopted at the first BISA Annual General Meeting during the inaugural Oxford conference in January 1975, which reflected the steering committee's recommendations. It stated that BISA would have six purposes: to promote international studies in British and other centres of higher education; to encourage international studies teaching in relevant disciplines; to facilitate interdisciplinary communication; publish *The British Journal of International Studies* and other topical papers;[301] convene an annual conference for members; and organise interdisciplinary study groups and enable their findings to be published. Meanwhile, its structure would consist of an individual paying membership of interested academics, non-university researchers, and postgraduate students, as well as an Executive Committee comprising

[298] Strange, 'I Never Meant to Be an Academic', 435.
[299] Buzan, 'Before BISA', 582.
[300] An interim Executive Committee was set up immediately after the final BCCIS conference in January 1974 and was tasked with preparing the launch of BISA at the inaugural 1975 conference and of a journal for publication. It consisted of Buchan (Chair), Jones (Secretary), Strange (Treasurer), Goodwin (LSE), Christopher Mason (Glasgow), Alan James (Keele), Philip Reynolds (Lancaster), Jack Spence (Leicester), Trevor Taylor (North Staffordshire Polytechnic), and David Wightman (Birmingham).
[301] From spring 1976 a BISA newsletter was also published and distributed to members.

an Honorary President, Chair, Vice-Chair, Secretary, Treasurer, the journal editor, BISA Trustees, and seven other members elected annually.[302]

Buzan argues that while the ISA partly informed BISA's founding, there was 'a strong sense', represented by IPEG among others, 'that British IR was quite different from the positivist, and political science-dominated, US mainstream in some quite fundamental ways, and that this difference needed to be maintained'.[303] Indeed, in the first BISA steering group working paper outlining the association's possible aims, it was noted that the ISA focused excessively on policy guidance over deeper theoretical understandings. Yet, the paper went on to note that in its focus on interdisciplinarity, transnational contacts, and improving teaching, ISA was still the main 'example of an operating organisation that corresponds, in certain respects, to the kind of organisation envisaged in the BISA'.[304] Moreover, if the transatlantic activities of IPE figures such as Strange who were part of BISA's founding are added to the picture, a different conclusion further emerges. Once again, then, the depth of connection between the 1970s evolution of British and American IPE is underplayed. While Cohen overlooks the sympathies of early British IPE figures towards US developments as exemplified by BISA's founding, Buzan overlooks more the significance of a changing world order and the transatlantic emergence of IPE for BISA's founding.

IPEG, as mentioned, was one of BISA's first working groups and its largest and best funded, electing to associate at the second annual conference in Birmingham, December 1975. Meanwhile, the first BISA conference on the theme 'The New Dimensions of Foreign Policy' was dominated by IPE papers, its keynote speech on 'The Fragmentation of Power' being delivered by economist and Director of Chatham House Andrew Shonfield, and its four panels dealing respectively with the monetary, technological, energy, and maritime aspects of foreign policy. In its wake, US interdependence scholars were invited as plenary speakers to BISA's first annual conferences, starting with James Rosenau in Birmingham 1975 on 'International Studies in a Transnational World', a paper which was promptly published in *Millennium*.[305] The next year, Robert Keohane delivered what the BISA newsletter described as 'a magisterial review of the past progress and future requirements of the study of Transnational Relations and International

[302] 'British International Studies Association Constitution, 4 February 1976'. BISA/3.
[303] Buzan, 'Before BISA', 582.
[304] 'Discussion Working Paper on the Foundation of the British International Studies Association, 15 July 1973'.
[305] James N. Rosenau, 'International Studies in a Transnational World', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 5, no. 1 (1976): 1–20.

Political Economy' as the opening keynote address, later joining in an IPEG roundtable with John Ruggie and a young former *Millennium* editor Barry Buzan.[306]

This is not to suggest that British IPE has completely followed US fashion, an implausible argument that would go to the other extreme of Cohen's sharp dichotomy. Through her manifesto for bringing IR and economics together, as well as books such as *Casino Capitalism*, and *States and Markets*, Strange's ideas would in particular cast a shadow over future 'British school' scholars. Meanwhile, the institutions she helped construct, from the IPEG to BISA, the *British Journal of International Studies* (later *Review of International Studies*) to the later *Review of International Political Economy* (RIPE), served as a hub for an expansionist subfield of IPE that grew outside the US 'mainstream'. For Cohen, as with Keohane and Nye in the US, it was Strange's institution-building and encouragement of others as much as ideas that made her the founder of British School IPE.[307] Yet, in the beginning, she and others often looked *across* the Atlantic for inspiration, in ways that complicate the sharp division between British and American schools that Cohen draws. To understand the birth of IPE in Britain, it is important to note that the American IPE community, for all its scientism, appeared to Strange et al. a more open, modern, and professional space than was the case in the UK. Moreover, another similarity was that both schools would ultimately develop as a subfield of IR, rather than the original inter-discipline that Strange hoped for. In large part, this was due to the fact scholars from other disciplines did not engage with IPE to the same extent as IR scholars, leading the latter to borrow ideas from the former rather than engaging in mutually beneficial conversation. Yet this was also due to the ways IR adapted its self-conception to accommodate it.

3.4 Models of the Future: The Inter-Paradigm Debate

In Britain and the United States, IPE – and the global changes to which it responded – threw the realist worldview on which IR had previously defined itself into crisis. As Stefano Guzzini has argued, though the behavioural revolution had to some extent opened IR to other social sciences, the 1970s constituted the first major crisis of post-war realism, as the ontological specificity of international relations was undermined. In his 'modified' Kuhnian sociology of realism, Guzzini posits the 'relentless expansion' of IR as responding to the 'linkage politics' of the period, as

306 'BISA Newsletter, Spring 1977', BISA/14.
307 Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*, 45.

embodied in the tying of United States geopolitical and diplomatic agendas to economic, financial and other policy areas under Richard Nixon. For him, 1970s IR began to resemble a 'global web', with the distribution of power between states no longer seen as a sufficient explanation of foreign policy behaviour.[308] As Guzzini noted, a widespread mode of reflecting on the place of the discipline within a changing world order at the time and since – produced in stocktaking publications and pedagogical textbooks – was that IR had opened into an 'inter-paradigm debate' between conflicting realist, liberal, and Marxist theories. This was supposedly the latest in a series of 'Great Debates' stretching back to the end of the First World War. Yet, observing the continuing strength of realism among other issues, Guzzini criticised this self-image. This was because it misconstrued relevant philosophy of science debates, compartmentalising IR into doctrinal spheres of influence, and erroneously ran together theoretical with ideological differences, ignoring theoretical differences within shared ideological positions (and vice versa).[309]

Seemingly providing an innocuous historical sociology of IR in 1998, Guzzini was nevertheless contributing to a flourishing reflective discourse of which the idea of an inter-paradigm debate was an early product. For alongside and in response to the rise of IPE, a proliferating 'stocktaking' literature – 'second-order' discussion of the development and present state of IR – emerged to comprehend the discipline's evolution. Both disciplinary historians and sociologists have shown that the 'Great Debates' mythology and related 'paradigm' self-image of IR were cemented during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet they have not, to my mind, provided a full explanation as to why (sociological) stocktaking took the form and intensity that it did after 1970, nor have they explored in much depth the relation of the Great Debates motif to other modes of stocktaking popularised at the time. As seen, the work of Peter Marcus Kristensen, Lucian Ashworth, Joel Quirk, and Darshan Vigneswaran has been particularly important here, while Brian Schmidt self-consciously pitched his work against heroic post-positivist accounts of the third/fourth Great Debate. For them, however, such stocktaking merely reflected a desire to bring order to a complex intellectual topography with the help of Thomas Kuhn and had even been a long-standing feature of IR. As Kristensen puts it, far from being a novelty of more contemporary disciplinary discourse, the fear of fragmentation and the need for intellectual ordering 'has a prominent historical record' in IR.[310] For Quirk and Vigneswaran, the idea of 'Great Debates' was inaugurated – albeit vaguely – after the Second World War by self-proclaimed realists to burnish

[308] Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*, 109–11.
[309] Ibid., 191–93.
[310] Kristensen, 'Discipline Admonished'.

their scientific credentials,[311] while for Ashworth the inter-paradigm debate idea was the end result of two decades-worth of attempts to comprehend an increasingly perceived intellectual chaos.[312]

However, if, as these scholars show, the Great Debates sequence would not become fully established before the so-called inter-paradigm debate, why exactly did the penchant for 'Debatism' take off as it did after 1970? Further, were there any other understandings of IR put forward simultaneously, and how did the Debates idea relate to them? This section argues that the inter-paradigm debate idea was one – albeit the most enduring – reflective response among several in a burgeoning stocktaking genre to IR's growth and identity crisis amid the rise of IPE and the global changes it reflected. This connection to IPE is made particularly clear by two publications in 1975 and 1977 respectively, which offered different visions of the state of the discipline in the 1970s. These were Robert Gilpin's 'Three Models of the Future', published in *International Organisation* as part of yet another IPE special issue, and Stanley Hoffmann's famous 'American Social Science' thesis.[313]

In the 1975 special issue, Gilpin was tasked with presenting 'three alternative models of international economic arrangements for the future, against which the analyses of specific topics in the subsequent essays can be compared'.[314] Gilpin, reflecting on recent changes in the world economy, which had seen the Bretton Woods order under US hegemony collapse with the rise of Japan, Europe, and Soviet military power, sought answers as to whether a harmonious interdependent system would emerge from the ruins. He identified three predominant 'models of the future' based on three 'prevailing schools of thought on political economy' – each 'an amalgam of the ideas of several writers…falling into one or another of these three perspectives'. Gilpin named these the liberal or 'sovereignty-at-bay' school, the Marxist or '*dependencia*' school, and the economic nationalist or 'mercantilist' school.[315] The former, which included Vernon, Keohane and Nye, believed increasing economic interdependence and technological advances were 'making the nation-state an anachronism', forcing it to give way to multinational corporations, the Eurodollar market, and international economic institutions, even with US relative decline.[316] From the margins, the Marxist school, represented by Latin American dependency theory, conceived not of interdependent partnerships, but 'a hierarchical and exploitative world order' where global

311 Quirk and Vigneswaran, 'The Construction of an Edifice', 95–100.
312 Ashworth 2022, 3-8.
313 Gilpin, 'Three Models of the Future'; Hoffmann, 'An American Social Science'.
314 C. Fred Bergsten and Lawrence B. Krause, 'Preface', *International Organization* 29, no. 1 (1975): vi.
315 Gilpin, 'Three Models of the Future', 38, 39–48.
316 Ibid., 41.

economic benefits were transferred from periphery to centre via the multinational corporation.[317] Reversing the relationship between economics and politics, however, a resurgent mercantilist school reintroduced the nation-state in analysis, arguing that it retained abilities 'to manipulate economic arrangements' to maximise domestic economic needs or external political ambition. Far from interdependence increasing, then, mercantilists argued it was in decline, being replaced by intense economic competition between national or regional blocs over markets, investments, and natural resources.[318]

In a curious example of American IPE discourse imitating the British, Gilpin's view of the relationship between IR and economics was intriguingly close to that of Strange. While Cohen notes that Gilpin had read and been influenced by Strange,[319] he does not explore how this may complicate his American/British School dichotomy. Indeed, much like Strange, Gilpin defined IPE as the study of 'reciprocal and dynamic interaction' between 'the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power', where both economics and IR were integrated.[320] Though Gilpin's preferred model was the realist or mercantilist vision, he did not view IPE as a mere subfield of IR, but more as a new inter-discipline like Strange. The three models – which placed dependency economists in conversation with IR realists – reflected this, with an acknowledgement that the state-centrism of IR could not be taken for granted but had to be combined with attention to the historically evolving global economy. As seen, there is good evidence that this inter-disciplinary view had currency among both US and British IR scholars in the 1970s. While we will meet two North America-based critical IPE scholars in the next chapter – Robert Cox and Richard K. Ashley – it is important to note that there were several Marxists operating within early American IPE discussions that Cohen's history rather overlooks.[321] In time, Gilpin's triad would be reproduced in IPE stocktakings – including his own 1987 *The Political Economy of International Relations* –[322] but more importantly in IR ones. For ultimately an inter-discipline did not fully emerge; instead, as we shall see, it was more IR itself that was seen to have expanded.

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317 Ibid., 43–45.
318 Ibid., 45–46.
319 Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*, 32.
320 Robert Gilpin, *US Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1975), 43.
321 Sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems theory was particularly influential, as was one of his followers, Christopher Chase-Dunn. As Craig Murphy points out, the early trajectory of ISA's IPE section is testament to this, with its distinguished scholar award list including multiple leftist scholars active during the 1970s, including Wallerstein, Chase-Dunn, Samir Amin, and Fernando Cardoso. Craig N. Murphy, 'Do the Left-Out Matter?', *New Political Economy* 14, no. 3 (2009): 358–60.
322 Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*.

Thus, on the eve of its publication, Hoffmann's 'American social science' thesis cut against the direction IR was thought to be travelling – even by 'the dean of realist international political economy'.[323] Indeed, what Hoffmann's intervention provided was an articulate description and explanation of IR's *post-war* claim to disciplinarity, despite the changes of the 1970s that his students helped pioneer. For Hoffmann, the *modernes* had certainly not triumphed over the *classiques*; IR was an overwhelmingly US and realist-dominated discipline, with other countries either having no disciplinary community of which to speak or else following US fashion. Alongside the concept of international system and the development and influence of deterrence theory, 'the current attempt to study the political roots, the originality, and the effects of economic interdependence', was indeed a significant advance 'thirty years after the "realist" revolution'. But it was not clear that this attempt had yet 'shattered the realist paradigm'.[324] Indeed, Hoffmann would have been more than aware of the continuing strength of realism through the challenges of the 1970s, from the mercantilist IPE and hegemonic stability theories of Gilpin, Krasner (at Harvard until 1976), and Robert Tucker,[325] to the societal and structural visions of Kenneth Waltz and his friend in England Hedley Bull.[326] At Harvard, the CFIA had also revived a focus on security and deterrence, founding the Centre for Science and International Affairs and journal *International Security* in 1973 and 1976 respectively – albeit not without attention to themes of the transnational relations study group such as technology and oil.[327] The rise of neorealism is a topic to which we shall return in the next chapter.

Like Gilpin's triad, Hoffmann's account soon became an influential yardstick for disciplinary stocktaking. Indeed, some disciplinary sociologists would explicitly invoke and follow Hoffmann in important publications through the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, despite his own attempts to diversify and grow IR in the UK,[328] Steve Smith could write in *Millennium* in 1987 that the discipline had developed as a 'US social science' dominated by the realist paradigm and reflecting

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[323] Craig N. Murphy, 'Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood', *International Affairs* 76, no. 4 (2000): 798. Cited in Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*, 32.
[324] Hoffmann, 'An American Social Science', 51.
[325] Gilpin, *US Power and the Multinational Corporation*; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Stephen D. Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', *World Politics* 28, no. 3 (1976): 317–47; Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); Robert W. Tucker, *The Inequality of Nations* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1977).
[326] Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Theory of International Relations', in *The Handbook of Political Science, Vol.8*, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 1–86; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977).
[327] Atkinson, *In Theory and Practice*, 169.
[328] On this see chapters 5 and 6.

the ideological concerns of the Westerm hegemon.[329] Little had changed thirteen years later when he argued that IR was still in thrall to a state-centric positivism unable to confront 'the dominant global problems of the new millennium'. For Smith, accounts stressing evolution and diversity had misled scholars into thinking 'that there has been far more openness and pluralism than has in fact been the case'; indeed, 'Hoffmann's assertions about IR as an American social science remain accurate' due to 'the policy agenda that US IR exports to the world in the name of relevant theory and in terms of the dominant (and often implicit) epistemological and methodological assumptions contained in that theory'.[330] Meanwhile, in his 1998 essay 'The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline' – hailed by Smith as 'an excellent recent paper' –[331] Ole Waever argued that '(d)ramatic change has not materialised so far', with IR remaining dominated by American rational choice theory.[332] US-based scholars, Waever showed, published in more highly ranked journals (themselves usually American), and were far more widely cited and read than IR academics elsewhere. Thus, '(w)ithin the genre of self-reflections of the discipline', he acknowledged, 'one contribution stands out…Stanley Hoffmann's "American Social Science: International Relations". It contains many brilliant insights and is generally very convincing about why IR emerged as a full-size discipline in the United States, why it took the form it did, and what the peculiar problems of the American condition are'.[333]

On the other hand, as seen in the previous chapter, Waever was also highlighting changes since Hoffmann's time, noting the rise to prominence of European IR communities and the likely decline of American influence there. Smith himself edited a 1985 BISA volume detailing the growth of American and UK IR and highlighting their increasing estrangement.[334] Thus, Hoffmann's account has certainly been a touchstone for stocktaking, but not always to highlight continuity. For Smith at least, its invocation was also a tool to legitimate his critique of American realism – and justify a far more radical theoretical agenda than the Harvard professor would have countenanced – as much as a sociologically accurate account of the discipline. In fact, sociological reflections on IR from the 1970s onwards largely depicted the discipline as evolving *away* from US

[329] Smith, 'The Development of International Relations as a Social Science', 203.
[330] Steve Smith, 'The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science?', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 2, no. 3 (2000): 399–400.
[331] Ibid., 394.
[332] Waever, 'The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline', 688.
[333] Ibid., 692.
[334] Steve Smith, *International Relations: British and American Perspectives* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).

realism in response to major changes in social context. As Ashworth notes, 'Hoffmann's claim that IR was an American social science was largely unravelling even as it went to press'.[335]

In his essay, Hoffmann acknowledged prevailing debates about the 'persistence or demise of the realist paradigm' and positioned himself as a self-conscious intervenor in them.[336] Within these reflective debates, the use of the 'paradigm' concept owed to the reception of Thomas Kuhn in IR from the late 1960s onwards during the so-called 'post-behavioural revolution' in political science, which sought to acknowledge the ideological nature of academic knowledge. Kuhn-inspired stocktaking in IR began to emerge as a critical appraisal of American realism's dominance as the 'normal science' of IR – notably through John Vasquez's influential 1973 thesis, later published in the *British Journal of International Studies*, that behaviouralist realism was merely a methodological update to Hans Morgenthau's 1948 *Politics Among Nations*.[337] Kuhn argued in his *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* that a paradigm was a set of taken-for-granted assumptions about the world provided by a single exemplary work, which oriented progressive research in scientific disciplines. A dominant paradigm, however, was displaced when 'anomalies' emerged which it could not explain, leading to disciplinary crisis and its eventual replacement in a repeating process. Thus, as world politics moved away from Cold War power struggle, Vasquez argued that IR needed greater 'paradigm diversity' as realism was performing poorly and being outpaced by events.[338]

The 'Colour it Morgenthau' thesis, advocated by Vasquez, Hoffmann, and later Smith (and to a partial extent Waever and Guzzini), argued that major change had yet to occur in IR after 1970. Yet, as their pleas for diversity demonstrate, these arguments were critically inclined to demand change and greater intellectual pluralism. They were also themselves ironic indices of change in the sense that they reflected a growing self-awareness of IR as a discipline, and its place in history, despite its existential crisis. Others, however, often also drawing on Kuhn, were becoming aware of a discipline evolving and flourishing as never before. Here, Gilpin's three ideologies of IPE were indicative but not entirely taken forward. Somewhere between Hoffmann's 'American social science' and the vision of an emergent new inter-discipline of IPE or international studies, was the idea of the inter-paradigm debate.

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[335] Ashworth 2022, 9.
[336] Hoffmann, 'An American Social Science', 53.
[337] Ashworth 2022, 8; Vasquez, 'Colouring It Morgenthau'. The paper, well-known at the time as the 'Colour it Morgenthau' thesis, was first presented as a paper at the 1973 ISA Conference in New York City.
[338] Ibid., 227.

Though the notion of the inter-paradigm debate was coined by Michael Banks in a 1984 essay on the evolution of IR theory,[339] it had clear 1970s analogues and roots, not least in his 'Concepts and Methods of International Relations' lecture series at the LSE.[340] There were also several important stocktaking essays and pedagogical textbooks produced in the late 1970s and early 1980s which established the theme for IR more broadly after Gilpin's appraisal of IPE. Banks himself penned an early essay in 1978 divining a four-way division between 'state-centric', 'international relations', 'world society', and 'global class system' paradigms in a British IR theory bibliography.[341] Yet Banks, who had studied in the US, was reflecting a broader trans-Atlantic conversation. From the US, Michael P. Sullivan, writing in a *Millennium* article first presented as a plenary address to the BISA 1977 conference, saw a two-way tussle between realism and 'globalism',[342] as did J. Martin Rochester of the University of Missouri-St. Louis.[343] In these essays, the realist paradigm included both traditional and scientific versions (thus partly aping the Colour it Morgenthau thesis), while the globalist paradigm included John Burton's world society theory and Keohane and Nye's writings. In 1981, Ralph Pettman in the newly named *Review of International Studies* saw pluralism (curiously his label for realism) and structuralism (dependency theory and a small number of Marxist IR scholars) as IR's 'basic arenas of discourse', strangely without mentioning Keohane and Nye.[344] As Ashworth notes, however, the first three-paradigm approach at this time was put forward by Richard Little – first as part of a joint UK-US collection on teaching IR, and subsequently in a pioneering Open University IR course based around a debate between realism, pluralism, and structural Marxism.[345] It was reproduced in the United States in Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg's *Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate*, which despite its editors vision of a two-way debate included a preface by James Rosenau detailing a disciplinary contest between 'state-centric', 'multi-centric', and 'global-centric' paradigms.[346]

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339 Banks, 'The Evolution of International Relations Theory'.
340 Hoffman, 'Critical Voices in a Mainstream Local', 146. Author's personal conversation with Mark Hoffman, May 2020.
341 Michael Banks, 'Ways of Analysing World Society', in *International Relations Theory: A Bibliography*, ed. A.J.R. Groom and C.R. Mitchell (London: Frances Pinter, 1978).
342 Michael P. Sullivan, 'Competing Frameworks and the Study of Contemporary International Politics', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 7, no. 2 (1978): 93–110.
343 J. Martin Rochester, 'The Paradigm Debate in International Relations and Its Implications for Foreign Policy Making: Toward a Redefinition of the "National Interest"', *The Western Political Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (1978): 48–58.
344 Ralph Pettman, 'Competing Paradigms in International Politics', *Review of International Studies* 7, no. 1 (1981): 39–49.
345 Ashworth 2022, 9, 11. See R.C. Kent and G.P. Nielson, eds., *The Study and Teaching of International Relations: A Perspective on Mid-Career Education* (London: Frances Pinter, 1980); Smith, Little, and Shackleton, *Perspectives on World Politics*.
346 Rosenau, 'Order and Disorder in the Study of World Politics'.

Setting a course that would be replicated in IR textbooks down to the present, Little and Rosenau included pedagogical tables or 'grids' to help students visualise the stakes of the contest. As Quirk and Vigneswaran have shown, this proliferating stocktaking literature also cemented an agreed 'Great Debates' story as the lore of IR's evolution, where idealism dominated the interwar years, followed by realism and behaviouralism after 1945, through to the present pluralism. While post-war American scholars occasionally spoke of an ongoing Great Debate between realism and idealism, this was originally a reference to divergent foreign policy philosophies that were not always considered homogeneous or opposed. During the 1960s, participants in the so-called 'Second Great Debate' such as Hedley Bull and Morton Kaplan did self-consciously see themselves as part of a 'traditionalism vs. science' contest but made little detailed reference to a debate sequence.[347] Instead, it was the many reflections on the inter-paradigm and Third Debates – Maghroori, Banks, Kal Holsti and Yosef Lapid above all – who ultimately established the narrative and its chronology known today.[348]

Offering his most well-developed conception of the inter-paradigm debate in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom's 1985 *Handbook of Current Theory*, Banks thus began by describing how IR had undergone constant evolution in a 'sequence' of Great Debates since 1918 – a construction Banks admitted he done much to popularise.[349] Following Kuhn, he argued that theoretical 'challenge and modification' was a necessity of 'any discipline to remain alive and well'.[350] The 'inter-paradigm debate' between realism, pluralism, and structuralism was merely the third in the sequence and thus signalled the continuing health, rather than crisis, of IR. Indeed, now that students and scholars of IR could 'choose and compare' approaches rather than deal with a single dominant one, the inter-paradigm debate 'provides stimulus, hope and even excitement in the demanding business of analysing international relations'.[351] Banks situated his intervention within the stocktaking genre, noting that Hoffmann and Vasquez had respectively 'elegantly censured' and provided a 'devastating critique' of realist victors in the First and Second Debate, while scholars including Maghroori, Rosenau, Little, Pettman and Sullivan had deployed Kuhn admirably to investigate new paradigmatic divisions.[352] Nevertheless, '(t)he full breadth of competing paradigms debate' was, Banks believed, 'well represented in the Open University reader'.[353] Disciplinary

[347] Quirk and Vigneswaran, 'The Construction of an Edifice', 98–100.
[348] Ibid., 101–3.
[349] Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate', 10.
[350] Ibid., 9.
[351] Ibid., 20.
[352] Ibid., 10–12, 16.
[353] Ibid., 11.

progress had led to 'new questions' and 'better answers', with three broad paradigms (or 'world views') offering different general explanations of how world society functioned.

Each paradigm, Banks argued, offered its own 'basic image' or ontology of the world that led to starkly divergent general theories. Thus, realism saw a system of 'billiard-ball states in intermittent collision', pluralism (following John Burton, his mentor) a 'cobweb…of numerous criss-crossing relationships', and structuralism a 'multi-headed octopus, with powerful tentacles constantly sucking wealth from the weakened peripheries towards the powerful centres'.[354] The task of IR for each was also divergent, with realism seeing it narrowly as the attempt to explain state behaviour, pluralism seeking to explain all major global developments, and structuralism offering to explain global economic inequality. Crucially, however, Banks introduced the debate as one internal to IR, albeit in conversation with other disciplines. Realism clearly was a product of IR despite a classical heritage stretching back to Thucydides, with a lineage descending from E.H. Carr to Kenneth Waltz. The same was true for pluralism which grew out of the anomalies demonstrated in state-centrism during the 1970s but was not simply a product of an IPE inter-discipline. Instead, IPE was considered a subfield of IR 'whose neo-mercantilist, liberal and radical views mirror the wider inter-paradigm debate' and converged with other subfields such as peace research to produce the pluralist paradigm.[355] Structuralism, meanwhile, though originating in Marxist-Leninist theories of imperialism and still on the discipline's fringes, was making progress in Eastern European IR and had individual adherents in the West such as Robert Cox, Richard Ashley, and Fred Halliday.[356]

Along with Little, Banks perhaps did most to popularise the paradigmatic image in the UK, though the process of its coalescence, as seen, was a transatlantic one. This was not just through his articles and textbook contributions. Even before teachers and students imbibed his publications – which were not printed until the late 1970s and early-to-mid-1980s – many postgraduate students at the LSE who had taken Banks's classes in the 1970s were parachuted in to teach on IR courses then growing across the country. Often without PhDs or much professional experience, they drew on Banks's lectures to help (the occasional Banks student, such as Margot Light, even became textbook writers themselves).[357] Across the Atlantic, a set of 1980s stocktaking publications performed the same function, some merging interestingly with the 'Colour it

[354] Ibid., 12.
[355] Ibid., 17.
[356] Ibid., 18–19.
[357] Light 2019.

Morgenthau'/'American social science' thesis. In the same year as Banks's *Handbook* essay, Holsti published his influential *The Dividing Discipline*, surveying a normatively-laden debate between 'classical' (realist), 'global society' (liberal), and 'neo-Marxist' paradigms. While he admitted IR was 'in a state of disarray' due to the crisis of the realist paradigm, the book also identified patterns of continuing realist-American hegemony and parochialism. Realism's dominance, however, was no bad thing as it best explained the causes of war and offered to unify to the Anglo-American core.[358] Similarly, Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker surveyed US course syllabi and found that traditional, behavioural, and dialectical-Marxist approaches were all present but highly unequally represented, with traditional and behavioural realist readings dominant and only 10% classed as dialectical.[359] Nevertheless, textbooks were being prepared and disseminated detailing IR's 'contending theories', 'menu for choice', and the 'realism, pluralism, globalism' debate.[360] Once again, the British and American communities had converged.

3.5 Conclusion

There were undoubtedly many issues with the paradigmatic self-image of IR which took hold from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s – and survived through the subsequent positivist/post-positivist 'Third Debate' examined in the next chapters – which disciplinary historians and sociologists alike have highlighted. While acknowledging that it helped scholars and students order and recognise the normativity of IR theory, Ashworth himself argues that paradigmatic thinking has had five downsides. Namely, it has acted as a gatekeeping device by marginalising older approaches and setting terms for present ones (e.g., Holsti on the causes of war); simplified differences within paradigms; misapplied Kuhn's very concept of paradigm; overburdened the discipline with contending approaches; and distorted the actual history of IR. Thus, despite the success of 'stocktaking' in 'refounding' IR, Ashworth wonders whether 'a renovation' is needed in how scholars structure the field that would evaluate the merits of the paradigm imagery and engage with recent debates in philosophy of science and intellectual history.[361]

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[358] Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline*, 144.
[359] Alker and Biersteker, 'The Dialectics of World Order', 130.
[360] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1981); Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice* (San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1981); Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*.
[361] Ashworth, 'Was International Relations Really Founded in 1985?', 17–20.

This chapter has sought to push forward the work of Ashworth and others to consider how and why this way of looking at IR became so influential historically. It has argued that it was one among a set of responses to an existential crisis for IR during the 1970s, in large part brought about by the emergence of IPE and the global changes it reflected. Disciplinary stocktaking bloomed as the identity and boundaries of IR were challenged by the demise of the realist consensus, ranging from Stanley Hoffmann's restatement of the discipline as an 'American social science' to Gilpin and Strange's view of an emergent inter-discipline of IPE or 'international studies'. Of these, however, the view of an inter-paradigmatic present following a sequence of 'Great Debates' was most enduring, redefining the discipline around a shared body of theory that was at once plural and influenced by developments outside IR, while retaining a distinct sense of disciplinarity. Like the intellectual and institutional rise of IPE/international studies to which it responded, this was a transatlantic process that complicates Benjamin Cohen's account of the history of the subfield as one sharply divided between British and American brands. Familiarity with the development and divisions of 'IR theory' – a phrase that was not widely used until the 1980s – soon became a rite of passage for undergraduate and postgraduate students and a staple of disciplinary textbooks down to the present in Britain and the United States. IPE's challenge to, if not overthrowing of, the realist consensus contributed centrally to this.[362]

Over time, of course, the number and content of perceived paradigmatic divisions would change. While the image of a three-way debate originally united the British and US communities, in the late 1980s what was known as the 'Third Debate' would divine a two-way division between opposed meta-theoretical positions: alternatively named rationalist/reflectivist, explanatory/constitutive, or positivist/post-positivist approaches.[363] This of course was not the only way in which the theoretical pie would be sliced. What continued, however, was the penchant for disciplinary self-reflection and the primacy of the Great Debates narrative within this discourse.

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[362] Though not explored in this chapter, the fact that IR scholars ultimately took over stewardship of IPE – as Cohen notes, for various reasons few economists contributed to the conversation after Vernon and Cooper – surely also helped establish it as a subfield seen as expanding, rather than transcending, IR. See Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*, 37–41.

[363] Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches'; Lapid, 'The Third Debate'; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); Smith, 'The Self-Images of a Discipline'.

4. Cox, Ashley, and the 1970s Origins of Critical International Relations

4.1 Introduction

Despite the apparent 'unravelling' of Hoffmann's 'American social science' thesis, the realism he was diagnosing was certainly resurgent by the late 1970s. Typically, this resurgence is attributed to the publication of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* in 1979, though he had already trailed the argument for the book in a 1975 chapter which Hoffmann read and cited in his essay.[364] Moreover, as Daniel Bessner and Nicolas Guilhot have shown, Waltz's argument was not particularly unique for its time and simply put in the clearest terms yet ideas already swirling around IR from cybernetics and systems theory.[365] Waltz's landmark text, they argue, was so influential for political reasons related to the anti-liberal orientation of earlier realists such as Hans Morgenthau, and the political-economic context of the 1960s and 1970s. By ridding post-war realism of an anti-liberalism that 'longed for a return to elitist forms of rule, unaccountable to the hoi polloi of modern democracy', Waltz's theory was 'profoundly ideological', making realism palatable to an American audience by removing the question of decision making from its intellectual architecture.[366] While early realists such as Hans Morgenthau saw international politics as the proper domain of artful and wise statesmen, Waltz argued that international outcomes were primarily determined by the 'system' rather than national leaders or domestic political arrangements. Amidst a crisis of democratic governance and fears of hegemonic decline in 1970s United States, Waltz's theory thus acted as a soothing balm for the liberal superpower, reassuring it that system stability and great power politics would endure. This, they argue, explains how Waltz-inspired realism came to be the dominant force in IR thereafter.

Whatever the merits of this reading of Waltz himself, this argument is typical of the continuity narratives provided by revisionist disciplinary histories since the 1990s. As we saw in chapter 2, these originated in reaction to the evolutionary story of 'Great Debates' during the

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[364] Waltz, 'Theory of International Relations'.
[365] Bessner and Guilhot, 'How Realism Waltzed Off: Liberalism and Decisionmaking in Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism'.
[366] Ibid., 87–88.

1990s, valuably highlighting the flaws of this disciplinary 'myth' with reference to the formative years of IR and their complex legacies. In turn, however, disciplinary histories have largely overlooked the period since the 1970s and thus downplayed the nature and significance of major changes occurring in IR during that time. This is particularly so for Guilhot's overarching claim that post-war realism has become dominant in IR, which is today contradicted by multiple sociological analyses of the contemporary discipline in the US and beyond.

This suggests that studying the critical reaction to, as much as the rise of, Waltzian realism is just as important for understanding IR today. If not the dying gasp of a theory fading in the face of other paradigmatic challengers, what came to be known as 'neorealism' – a term tellingly coined by its critics – did not hinder processes of intellectual pluralisation, institutional expansion, and disciplinary self-reflection instigated during the 1970s crisis of realism. In fact, as this chapter and the next show, it accelerated them. Though Waltz influenced a generation of subsequent realists and participated in an increasing theoretical sophistication in IR on all sides, he nevertheless helped trigger a wave of critical reaction that eventually crystallised in disciplinary lore as the third 'Great Debate' (or fourth if the Inter-paradigm Debate was included). This chapter analyses and recontextualises Waltz's intervention and its immediate effects, with particular reference to the 'critical' IR theories of Robert W. Cox and Richard K. Ashley.

Until the mid-1980s, the conversation around Waltz and neorealism would continue to be subsumed into the influential three-way 'inter-paradigm' construction.[367] This indicates, if it was not already clear from the overlapping descriptive terminology, that IR's Inter-paradigm and Third Debates melted into each other just as the scientific paradigm of the second was previously shown to have filtered into the interdependence literature. There was thus more continuity through the history of IR in the second half of the twentieth century than the evolutionary Great Debates narrative implies. More specifically, it means that the Third Debate had origins in the ideological-economic struggles of the 1970s, rather than the simple 'meta-theoretical' differences between positivists and post-positivists for which it became known at the end of the Cold War – an erasure explored more fully in chapter 5. On the other hand, the conversation around neorealism again highlights pluralism that the 'Colour it Morgenthau' or 'American social science' theses did not anticipate, since the rise of neorealism was immediately met with influential radical challengers to its left. Examining the work of Cox, Ashley, and their collaborators, this chapter shows that these

[367] Banks, 'The Evolution of International Relations Theory'; Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate'; Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline*.

challengers initially emerged to a large extent within the United States and constituted a critical, Marxist-inspired school of IPE whose ideas – already well-formed by the late 1970s – were overlooked by Hoffmann, Vasquez et al.[368] It also again complicates the American/British divide popularised by subfield histories of IPE and methodologically nationalist sociologies of IR.[369] Though this critical school were influenced by European social theory – in particular, a post-1917 'Western Marxist' tradition of ideology critique – and Global South movements for economic justice, the American location of its theorists has been concealed by their more positive reception by later readers outside the US.

The chapter turns, following Guilhot, on the assumption that Waltz's intervention was to some extent a response to political and economic crises besetting 1970s United States, part of a broader 'neorealist' movement which sought to reassert the primacy of the state system over global political-economic structures. Though originating earlier, neorealism became highly influential in the early 1980s after the publication of Waltz's book and against the backdrop of rising Cold War tensions, even winning over supposed members of the liberal/pluralist paradigm such as Robert Keohane.[370] Against a narrative of total neorealist domination, however, the chapter analyses how Cox and Ashley reacted to Waltz and neorealism during the early 1980s. Introducing self-conscious 'critical IR theories' for the first time, they sought to use ideas popular among Western Marxists in the 1970s – Antonio Gramsci and Jürgen Habermas respectively – to transcend narrow ideological perspectives such as neorealism and aid progress towards an enlightened global future. This reflexive self-presentation is what Richard Devetak usefully describes as 'cultivating a critical intellectual persona' in his history of this Frankfurt School-inspired critical IR theory.[371] This chapter does something different to Devetak, however, highlighting the more concrete political work that Cox and Ashley's theories performed in historical context. Thus, it enquires not into the ethical 'personae' they cultivated against a particular intellectual background, both within IR and the history of social and political thought, but also the institutions in which they operated, the

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[368] As will be seen, this perhaps is less surprising than it might seem in the context of the US academic scene more generally, which has been a hub for critical social theories since the late twentieth century (if often influenced by sources beyond the 'Western Marxist' canon). Razmig Keucheyan, *The Left Hemisphere: Mapping Critical Theory Today* (London: Verso, 2014).

[369] Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*; Daniel Maliniak and Michael J. Tierney, 'The American School of IPE', *Review of International Political Economy* 16, no. 1 (2009): 6–33.

[370] Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, 'Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics', in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 1–26. Keohane's move towards Waltzian realism was sometimes said to herald a 'neo-neo consensus'. See Waever, 'The Rise and Fall of the Interparadigm Debate'.

[371] Devetak, *Critical International Theory*, 88–89.

academic connections they fashioned, and particularly how they related to actual political events and struggles in their time. The chapter shows that they did not entirely abstract from empirical history and the 'offices of civil government', as Devetak claims. Indeed, it argues that their critical theories of the early 1980s were largely attempts to apply ideas from 1970s social theory, but also the norms of transnational social movements such as the New International Economic Order (NIEO), to comprehend and counteract neorealism as an ideology of US political and economic empire. Introduced belatedly in the age of the neoliberal and neoconservative 'New Right', however, these ideas did not always hit their mark politically.

Section 4.2 contextualises Cox's reaction to Waltzian realism in two major pieces published in *Millennium* outlining his novel Gramscian critical IR theory.[372] Popularising the term 'neorealism' – though not quite in its current usage – Cox argued that Waltz and others were not so much offering an objective science as advancing a Cold War ideology that naturalised bipolar relations and reinforced a transnational, hierarchical economic order within the capitalist world. Using his historicist approach, however, he saw the crisis of US hegemony and Global South demands for the NIEO – perhaps optimistically at the start of the 1980s – as portending a more just world order. The section analyses not only Cox's intervention but also shows the circuitous route by which he arrived at this position, from his career in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to his engagement with American-School liberal IPE and discovery of Gramsci.

Section 4.3 outlines Ashley's Habermasian approach to IR and his blistering assault on neorealism as demonstrated especially in his 1984 essay 'The Poverty of Neorealism'.[373] Similarly to Cox, Ashley was shaped by Global South struggles of the 1970s, but his main formation occurred within a radical group of interdisciplinary peace researchers and IPE scholars at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Adding a reading of Frankfurt School theorist Habermas to these influences, the 'lateral pressure' theory Ashley developed at MIT sought to comprehend how economic and population expansion lay at the heart of international conflict. In the early 1980s, Ashley remained optimistic about the possibility of transcending the 'modern security problematique', yet by the middle of the decade amid Ronald Reagan's 'New Right' revolution he believed its dynamics had returned with neorealism as its ideological cover.

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[372] Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55; Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12, no. 2 (1983): 162–75.

[373] Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism'.

Interpreting Waltz and other younger realists in this way, Ashley more carefully defined the term 'neorealism' and in so doing constructed the idea of 'classical realism' – a more practical and open discourse with progressive political potential. Thus, his critique of realism would ironically increase interest in a realist 'tradition' and the nature of realism.

4.2 Robert W. Cox and the Gramscian School

In subfield histories of IPE such as that of Benjamin Cohen discussed in the last chapter, the primary resistance to the American 'neo-neo consensus' has come from scholars such as Susan Strange and the 'British School'. This is often said to include most IPE scholars in Britain and its former colonies such as Canada and Australia. From an outpost at York University, Toronto, the former international civil servant Robert W. Cox developed an approach influenced heavily – among others – by Antonio Gramsci and is thus said to have been a core member of this School from the mid-1970s. As Cohen puts it, given Britain's long-term encouragement of interpretative historical analysis in IR, Cox was 'completely at home working in the same tradition' and his writings 'quickly gained acceptance among British scholars and soon came to be widely taught in British universities'.[374] There is truth to this insofar as Cox's writings were considered part of an emergent Marxist/structuralist paradigm within textbook and other state-of-the-art depictions of the Inter-paradigm Debate in Britain.[375] Cox also spent two months as a visiting researcher at LSE's IR Department in autumn 1980, and on Strange's prompting would submit a major paper to *Millennium* in 1981.[376] Until that point, however, Cox's engagement with IR and IPE had taken place in 'in the milieu of contemporary American political science', which, as the previous chapter showed, was often perceived by early British IPE scholars as more exciting than the IR community at home.[377] And while Cohen has assumed a sharp break after Cox's early work, more in-depth historical analysis reveals this was a formative period for Cox both intellectually and professionally.

In 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders', Cox argued that the decline of US hegemony and the intensification of economic interdependence in the 1970s had exposed realism as descriptively flawed and ideological. The post-war Bretton Woods economic system of capital controls and pegged exchange rates had come apart, exposing states to external financial shocks

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374 Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*, 87.
375 E.g. Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate', 19.
376 'Visitors', *BISA Newsletter*, Autumn 1980. BISA/14. In his memoir to which Cohen did not have access, Cox says Strange recommended *Millennium* as a venue at an ISA Convention in Washington, D.C. (presumably 1978). Robert W. Cox, *Universal Foreigner: The Individual and the World* (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Publishing, 2013), 234, 274.
377 Ibid., 222.

and the monetarist whims of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Meanwhile, a decision of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to impose an oil embargo on nations supporting Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War sent inflation in the West spiralling. As the dollar plunged, the idea that states could be insulated from the world economy was revealed as fiction. The root of this overall material and ideological collapse for Cox was the declining hegemony of the 'state-civil society complex' that had sustained and profited from the Bretton Woods system, a protectionist alliance of labour, big business and government in New Deal America.[378] Now, a new transnational and transgovernmental financial class was to the fore from Europe to Japan, charting a liberalising course through the Bretton Woods institutions and burying the corporatist post-war order.[379] As an official at the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Montréal and Geneva from 1947 to 1972, Cox was able to observe these developments from inside the crumbling architecture itself.

Cox opposed a post-war school of US realism stretching from Hans Morgenthau to Kenneth Waltz. In slight contrast to later usage, Cox termed this 'neorealism' for its debasement of an earlier and more sophisticated 'historical mode' of the theory that was more alert to change.[380] As a label of a position within the realist tradition, 'neorealism' was essentially Cox's coinage and was not originally a positive self-description for Waltz et al., though the term had been used occasionally during the 1970s to denote advocates of military restraint and diplomacy in US foreign policy vis-à-vis rising powers (both superpowers and Third World states).[381] Delineating the prescriptive and descriptive values of realism, Cox contended that neorealism was not a value-free theory, since it would only be valid if states adopted neorealist rationality.[382] This followed from Cox's categorisation of neorealism as a 'problem-solving theory', which was defined by its ability to isolate a domain of social inquiry and fix its historical parameters as the given framework for human action. Aping natural science methods, its 'positivist' aim was to study such a closed system through empirical research, producing general laws of state behaviour that would then inform action to correct imperfections in the system.[383] For Cox, neorealism was like an instruction

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[378] Because it contains an important post-script, I shall cite from its later reprinting: Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 224–25.
[379] Ibid., 230–34.
[380] Ibid., 211.
[381] David V. Edwards, *Creating a New World Politics: From Conflict to Cooperation* (New York, NY: David Mackay Company, 1973); Tom J. Farer, 'Searching for Defeat', *Foreign Policy*, no. 40 (1980): 155–74.
[382] The ideological concatenation of descriptive and 'axiomatic' realism was also the subject of a widely cited article by Justin Rosenberg. See Justin Rosenberg, 'What's the Matter With Realism?', *Review of International Studies* 16, no. 4 (1990): 285–303.
[383] Cox, 'Social Forces', 1986, 208, 242–43.

manual, elucidating the clockwork operation of the balance of power among autonomous political units in order to guide technical adjustments by the holder of the balance.[384] It was, he argued, an ideology committed to the 'defence of American power as a bulwark of the maintenance of order', performing a pragmatic 'proselytising function' that kept the hegemon from moralistic overreach within a hierarchical bipolar order.[385]

By the late 1960s, however, the neorealist separation of state and transnational civil society could no longer be sustained. With US hegemony revealed as contingent, neorealism's persistence only betrayed its 'Panglossian quality' as it carried out a rear-guard action in defence of an ailing superpower order: 'The historical moment has left its indelible mark upon this purportedly universalist science.'[386] In this context, IR appeared out of step. For neorealists such as Waltz and Gilpin, the decline of the US was just another episode in the rise and fall of hegemons, leaving untouched the basic structure of international political-economic relations and the role of the US as a great power.[387] Yet, as Cox was well aware, this was not the whole story. For an emergent cast of scholars of international interdependence – Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye and Susan Strange in particular – global volatility and the purported decline of US hegemony made a reconstruction of the institutions of global capitalism necessary and possible. Out of these debates about hegemonic stability and international regimes had emerged the subfield of International Political Economy (IPE).

While in Geneva, Cox had been engaged in post-war international reconstruction efforts at the ILO, later taking up a professorship at the Graduate Institute of International Studies (GIIS) alongside his institutional work. As an undergraduate, Cox majored in History at McGill University in his home city of Montréal and developed political interests in French-Canadian nationalism.[388] His introduction to IR thus came during his later Geneva years when he was appointed Director of the International Institute for Labour Studies (IILS) – an autonomous social research centre founded by ILO Director-General Edward Morse in 1960 – and began teaching at GIIS in 1964. Along with Ernst Haas and Harold Jacobson whom he met in Geneva (as well as other IPE figures including Nye and Strange),[389] Cox developed neo-functionalist integration theory which led him

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[384] Ibid., 212.
[385] Ibid., 213.
[386] Ibid., 248.
[387] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Gilpin, *War and Change*.
[388] Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19–21; Cox, *Universal Foreigner: The Individual and the World*, 19–49. The ILO was moved from Geneva to the McGill campus during the war, explaining Cox's appointment there after completing his degree.
[389] Cox, *Universal Foreigner: The Individual and the World*, 227–28.

to question distorting influences in post-war international organisation and idealise the role of a free-floating 'executive leadership' that could rise above particular interests and advance universal ends.[390] Cox was especially interested in highlighting the 'tripartite' bias of the ILO towards Western – particularly anti-Communist American – labour unions, publishing a controversial report demonstrating that only 9% of global workers were subject to corporatist labour management regimes.[391] Radicalised by the transnational movements of 1968 which revealed Cold War ideology to be 'fragile and transparent', and conflicting with a new organisational leadership, Cox resigned from the ILO in 1972.[392] He took up IR professorships at Columbia University and York University, Toronto, which afforded time and space to think broadly about world order, reconstructing historicist and cultural relativist ideas he had encountered during his youth in French Canada, including those of E.H. Carr, Georges Sorel, and Giambattista Vico.[393] The Third World declaration of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) at the UN in 1974, which demanded a transformation of global economic governance, fired his imagination of future world orders.

Yet, as Richard Devetak has shown (albeit without drawing out the complications his findings pose for IPE histories), Cox's engagement with early liberal IPE helped open up these avenues, too, nurturing his critique of state-centrism and the class basis of international politics, and highlighting a conduit for global change in the form of visionary executive leadership.[394] It also provided Cox with considerable academic capital in the United States and beyond, including connections with important figures at prestigious institutions, as well as publication in *International Organisation* (on whose editorial board Cox served after 1969) and books in influential university presses.[395] Cox's later intellectual and professional trajectory thus in large part depended on his original socialisation into the 'American School' of IPE, complicating Cohen's Atlantic divide.

Returning full-time to the academy in 1972, Cox now developed a unique 'historical materialist' approach to IPE, which analysed the rise and decline of successive world orders in

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390 Robert W. Cox, 'The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization', *International Organization* 23, no. 2 (1969): 205–30; Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organisations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972).
391 Robert W. Cox and Jeffrey Harrod, *Future Industrial Relations: An Interim Report* (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1972).
392 Cox and Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order*, 24–25.
393 Ibid., 19–26.
394 Devetak, *Critical International Theory*, 110–11.
395 Cox and Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence*; Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1987).

terms of Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony. While Cox claimed to embody the spirit of Carr and Vico, it was this interpretation of Gramsci that provided the basic building blocks of his IR theory and from which a 'Gramscian school' of IPE later grew.[396] He first used the Gramscian concept of hegemony explicitly in a 1977 *International Organisation* article analysing how the recent US withdrawal from the ILO did not affect its reining ideology and direction.[397] In 'Social Forces', Cox termed his new approach 'critical theory' for its ability to stand apart from a given social order, inquiring holistically as to how it came about and how it might change.[398] Cox elaborated this with reference to those who had realised its spirit: the Marxist historians Eric Hobsbawm and E.P. Thompson, and historical realists such as Vico and Carr.[399] Yet it was in his 1983 *Millennium* article, 'Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations', that Cox provided the major theoretical statement; the earlier 1981 article was more a critique of neorealism than a full elaboration of the ontological, epistemological, and methodological underpinnings of a new theory. Gramsci in his *Prison Notebooks* had explored the hegemony of one economic class over another within the boundaries of the state, which combined an administrative-coercive aspect with a vibrant civil society that ensured consent of subordinates. Cox believed these ideas were readily transplantable to the international domain to understand historical change and identify 'counter-hegemonic challenge'.[400] Indeed, Gramsci himself had briefly mentioned there was 'no doubt' that 'international relations…follow (logically) fundamental social relations.'[401]

For Cox as for Gramsci, global hegemony was far more than the material dominance of state over state as neorealism imagined. It was achieved when a dominant group secured the consent of subordinates through powerful capabilities, and ideas and institutions that appealed to universal interests.[402] Global hegemony was thus the outward extension of the victory of a hegemonic social class matrix within a dominant state, as in the corporatist alliance underlying the *Pax Americana* and embodied in the post-1945 Keynesian consensus and international institutional architecture:

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396 Stephen Gill alternately terms this the 'Italian School'. Stephen Gill, 'Epistemology, Ontology and the "Italian School"', in *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 21–48.
397 Robert W. Cox, 'Labour and Hegemony', *International Organization* 31, no. 3 (1977): 385–424.
398 Cox, 'Social Forces', 1986, 208.
399 Ibid., 213–16.
400 Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations', 174.
401 Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1971), 176. Quoted in Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations', 169.
402 Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations', 171.

> These superstructures…are connected with the national hegemonic classes in the core countries and, through the intermediacy of these classes, have a broader base in these countries. In the peripheries, they connect only with the passive revolution.[403]

The passive revolution constituted the transformation of peripheral societies by a non-popular exogenous force such as a dictator, or by co-optation of subaltern leaders (*transformismo*).[404] Yet not all historical structures were hegemonic, since the fit between ideas, capabilities and institutions had to be 'coherent', which is to say that the material basis of hegemony needed to appear natural and given.[405] Moreover, hegemony could be challenged when the nature and balance of class structures shifted, such that it would be confronted with a rival combination of ideas, material power and institutions – a new 'historic bloc'. Geared towards emancipation, it was the principal task of critical theorists to identify the contours of such potential counter-hegemonic challenges. 'Theory', as Cox wrote famously in his earlier *Millennium* essay, 'is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose'.[406]

Mirroring the theoretical triangle of the so-called Inter-paradigm Debate, Cox argued that there were three principal possibilities for future world order. With the post-war era of American hegemony over, it could either be reconstituted with a broadened political management according to the liberalising proposals of the Trilateral Commission, fragment into mercantilist regional power blocs, or spur a 'Third-World-based counterhegemony with the concerted demand for a New International Economic Order'.[407] As noted earlier, this final possibility was Cox's preferred future. Concluding his 1983 essay on a somewhat optimistic note, Cox argued the 'prolonged crisis in the world economy' was 'propitious for some developments which could lead to a counter-hegemonic challenge.' The disintegration of capitalist management, he argued, was likely to create large-scale unemployment in the core countries and thus an impoverished bloc who could connect with Third World revolutionaries. Effective political organisation within national boundaries was a first step towards this, though with the perennial risk of *transformismo*.[408] Only then could the global order be transformed.

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[403] Ibid., 173.
[404] Ibid., 167.
[405] Ibid., 171; Cox, 'Social Forces', 1986, 219.
[406] Cox, 'Social Forces', 1986, 207.
[407] Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations', 171.
[408] Ibid., 174.

Arriving in the early 1980s, however, Cox's critical theory clearly was to some extent out of time. A product of the 1970s, it did not properly comprehend the world that was coming into view in the present: the neoliberal economy, the coercive state, and a resurgent Anglo-American alliance.[409] Indeed, so intent was Cox on burying the post-war order that he had strangely little to say about the crushing of established labour, welfare cuts, and the explosion of debt and inequality under the neoliberal and neoconservative 'New Right' represented by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. In fact, in the conclusion to his 1983 essay, he suggested that social security cutbacks could even 'open prospects of a broad alliance of the disadvantaged' in the core countries, thus suggesting they were a useful stage in a progressive historical process.[410] While Francis Fukuyama would later channel his critique of realism to advance the liberal project globally, Cox's intervention left it unchallenged at birth, diverting attention from its conservative features. As suggested, like Keohane and Nye, Cox's picture of neoliberal capitalism was curiously multilateral and independent of US state power, depicting instead a consensual order held together by a coalition of North American, European, Japanese, Latin American and Middle Eastern managerial elites, and the integration of Soviet countries via détente.[411] This was reminiscent of a 'globalist' ideology of neoliberalism that sought to separate distorting national interests from administration of an 'unknowable' transnational economy of 'complex interdependence': a 'doubled world' of *imperium* and *dominium*.[412] Interestingly, such an ideology was popular in the internationalist milieu of mid-century Geneva and at GIIS, where many neoliberal economists such as Wilhelm Röpke, Jan Tumlir, and Gerard Curzon worked simultaneously. Indeed, Curzon and wife had even collaborated with Cox.[413]

In the end, neoliberal globalism would rely more on state coercion and US hegemony than the pioneers of IPE would suggest.[414] Trade union rights would be curtailed in many countries; incarceration rates and police powers – particularly in the US – would expand to combat the social consequences of economic and racial inequality; and 'shock therapy' would be enforced via US-

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[409] Andrew Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism* (London: Macmillan, 1988).
[410] Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations', 174.
[411] Cox, 'Social Forces', 1986, 237.
[412] Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 10.
[413] See essays by Gerard and Victoria Curzon in Cox and Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence*.
[414] Susan Strange being the exception. Strange, *Casino Capitalism*; Strange, 'The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony'.

led military operations and international institutions.[415] Cox and his followers later revised his understanding of what he called the 'hyper-liberal' age to take into account US hegemony and state power.[416] Yet this was only once other versions of critical IR theory were gaining ascendancy, and his preferred future – based on the anti-colonial NIEO – had long faded from view under the strain of debt crises and neoliberal structural adjustment programmes.[417] Presenting an international theory of emancipation just as the global left was being defeated in one country after another, Cox's critical theory at birth bounced off reality just as its academic influence was about to take off within the British School of IPE.

4.3 Richard K. Ashley and the Modern Security Problematique

Cox's writings of the early 1980s also overlooked much of what later international theorists would take to be constitutive features of world politics. In an otherwise innovative Gramscian scheme, little space was made for race, nation, religion, gender, sexuality or ecology. Again, these were blind spots later Cox-influenced scholars such as Randolph Persaud and Sandra Whitworth would later address. At the time, for all his concern with global economic inequality, much of the radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s passed Cox by. With greater visibility of famine, war crimes and environmental degradation – made possible through advanced telecommunications, computational methods and outer-space technology – the 1970s 'shock of the global' had birthed international humanitarian, peace, feminist and ecological movements.[418] These contexts were unfamiliar to Cox, but they confronted Richard Ashley as he separately sought to construct a critical theory alert to global change amidst capitalist crisis and hegemonic decline.

Like Cox, Ashley was thrust to prominence in the early 1980s through a theoretical and political assault on neorealism, despite the origins of his thinking lying in the previous decade. This critique was best articulated in his 1984 polemic, 'The Poverty of Neorealism'. Ashley saw little

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[415] David Harvey, 'Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 610 (2007): 22–44; Elizabeth Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).
[416] Stephen Gill, 'American Hegemony: Its Limits and Prospects in the Reagan Era', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 15, no. 3 (1986): 311–38; Cox, *Production, Power and World Order*. Curiously, Cox referred to post-war capitalism as 'neo-liberal'.
[417] On the rise and fall of the NIEO see Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 142–75.
[418] Niall Ferguson et al., eds., *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Harvard University Press, 2010).

coherence in the neorealist system, identifying deep epistemological and ontological contradictions: 'an "orrery of errors", a self-enclosed, self-affirming joining of statist, utilitarian, positivist and structuralist commitments.'[419] Central to this critique was the pathbreaking insight that Waltz's explanatory holism/structuralism was contradicted by his assumption of the ontological priority of the state. This theoretical basis made neorealism ahistorical and politically conservative, 'reducing the history and future of social evolution to an expression of those interests which can be mediated by the vectoring of power among competing states-as-actors'.[420] Unlike Cox, however, Ashley did not implicate all post-war realists in his critique. His opposition was both more polemical and less wide-ranging, limited to a group of younger and reformed American scholars represented by Waltz.[421] Ashley endowed 'neorealism' with meaning closer to its current usage, distinguishing it from an earlier hermeneutic 'classical' variant characteristic of mid-century émigrés such as Morgenthau, Kissinger and John Herz. Classical realism was 'the ethnomethodology of the modern tradition of statesmanship', a participant observation of, and practical guide to, the historically evolving society of states people. [422] Here, states were not conceived as pre-given automatons; rather, they were intentional social agents seeking 'recognition' as competent members of a community, playing off its evolved structures of discourse and ritual, and mobilising its collectively remembered experiences to strike artful and never-final diplomatic balances among shifting social forces.[423] Clearly, the image of Kissingerian diplomacy loomed large in this depiction, though Ashley believed classical realism could offer more than mere foreign policy prudence. If folded into a theory of political economy that accounted for the possibility and limits of the behaviour it interpreted, classical realism's insight into pluralistic political practice could provide a transformative route beyond 'modern global hegemony', diagnosing and transcending neorealist ideology.[424]

This was a dialectical conception of the relationship between politics and economics that neorealism denied. Neorealism was a 'totalitarian' response to what Frankfurt School theorist Jürgen Habermas in 1973 termed the 'legitimation crisis' of the modern state in its efforts to manage late capitalist societies. That is, its function was not to guide Kissingerian bargaining but to orient and justify

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[419] Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', 228. This was a metaphor he borrowed from English historian E.P. Thompson in his polemic against Althusserian structuralism.
[420] Ibid., 260.
[421] Ashley listed Waltz, Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Robert W. Tucker, George Modelski and Charles Kindleberger as part of this 'neorealist movement'.
[422] Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', 265.
[423] Ibid., 265–73.
[424] Ibid., 274–79.

> expanding the reach of control…(laying) bare the structural relations – causal connections between means and ends – that give form to the dynamics of hegemonic rise and decline and in light of which a hegemon might orient its efforts both to secure its hegemony and to preserve cooperative economic and ecological regimes.[425]

To understand what Ashley meant here, it is useful to combine a reading of his 1984 essay with attention to a 1983 article, 'Three Modes of Economism', which attempted to undercut charges of economic determinism levelled by neorealists against their IPE challengers through demonstrating that neorealism itself was economistic.[426] In doing so, it becomes very clear that Ashley's critique was not just abstract metatheory. He was in fact explicitly associating neorealism with the transformation of the nation-state after World War II into a disinterested manager of market dysfunction – a positivist ideology of 'the end of ideology' reflecting 'the evolved legitimations of the advanced capitalist state under conditions of crisis'.[427] Based on the nineteenth-century *laissez-faire* separation of state and civil society, classical realism could avoid theorising the economy in mid-century, since despite some state intervention, international economics were stable and the rules of trade and finance largely unchanging. With international free trade taken for granted, economic analyses in IR were rare and viewed as violating the 'autonomy of the political'.[428] In this period of relative calm and steady growth, classical realism thus had plausibility as a theorisation of creative diplomacy in Cold-War conditions.

Like Cox, however, Ashley viewed this separation of politics and economics as an artifice exposed by the events of the 1970s – albeit this time not primarily through the impact of external economic shocks on domestic societies, but the politicisation of the international economy that occurred in response. This politicisation involved a movement – particularly by the United States – towards increased protectionism and away from multilateral collaboration in response to fiscal and legitimation crises and resource vulnerabilities. He thus partly agreed with neorealists that the events of the 1970s proved the foolish optimism of 'extremely simplistic and superficial' celebrations of interdependence as a harbinger of structural change.[429] Ashley's innovation, though, was to posit neorealism as a 'neo-Keynesian internationalist' response to crisis via the concept of

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[425] Ibid., 228, 232; Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1976).
[426] Richard K. Ashley, 'Three Modes of Economism', *International Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (1983): 463–96.
[427] Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', 261; Ashley, 'Three Modes of Economism', 465.
[428] Ashley, 'Three Modes of Economism', 468.
[429] Ibid.

'hegemonic stability' encountered above – the notion that only a great power pursuing its own rational self-interest and acting instrumentally in competitive environments could produce international order. In a curious footnote, he claimed neorealism was the American embodiment of post-imperial British political economy whose theoretical representative was Joan Robinson.[430] Far from assuring the primacy of politics over economics, Ashley suggested, this economised politics by conceiving the state as a rational economic actor (*homo economicus*).

The immediate force of these arguments, of course, was ambiguous. This is not least because the European strands of social theory Ashley was drawing upon were largely incomprehensible to those with whom he was debating, and the elision of important differences within the neorealist 'movement'. In a response to 'The Poverty of Neorealism' that sought to rebuff its sweeping critiques and classical/neo- division, Gilpin commented that it was unfortunate *International Organisation* 'did not send an English translation' as he 'frequently could not follow [Ashley's] argument'.[431] More importantly, Keynesianism had been politically exhausted since the mid-1970s, its legitimacy crisis met by the New Right. Ashley was likely relating realism's mercantilist turn to the short-lived 'Nixon Shock' protectionism of the early 1970s – from the cancellation of the gold standard to the hiking of import tariffs – yet by 1984 neorealism was hardly likely to have produced such effects. Ashley particularly had in mind arguments against North-South economic redistribution in the wake of the defeat of the NIEO, but again it was not Keynesianism that had defeated it.[432] Like Cox, Ashley seemed more concerned by a revival of a mercantilist US denying its exploitative global relationships and reparative duties than by the rise of financialised neoliberalism under US leadership. In another sense, though, Ashley's association of neorealism with 'expanding the reach of control' is more understandable, if still misapplied. Placing this argument in its immediate political context, Ashley appeared to be connecting neorealism with the transformation in US foreign policy completed under Ronald Reagan: the end of détente and the arrival of neoconservative rollback of Soviet influence in the Third World. To see why, it is necessary to explore Ashley's intellectual formation at MIT during the 1970s.

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[430] Ibid., 493, note 8.

[431] Robert G. Gilpin, 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism', *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (1984): 289.

[432] Author's interview with Craig N. Murphy, 3 November 2020. Trained in peace research and IPE during the 1970s, Murphy embarked on a Habermasian approach to these subjects around the same time as Ashley, though he has not received much attention in the formation of critical IR theory. Ashley cited Murphy's critique of Robert Tucker and Stephen Krasner's mercantilist opposition to dependency theory and the NIEO as a good demonstration of the 'agenda-limiting effect' of neorealism. See Craig N. Murphy, 'What the Third World Wants: An Interpretation of the Development and Meaning of the New International Economic Order Ideology', *International Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (1983): 55–76.

Prominent outside the realist mainstream in American IR, peace research was a transnational and interdisciplinary enterprise studying the causes of conflict and conditions of peace. Aiming to guide policies of arms control and conflict resolution, its most prominent figures – Karl Deutsch, J. David Singer and Johan Galtung among them – pioneered 'scientific' approaches to IR such as game theory, cybernetics and statistics. For them, foreign policy in a complex-interdependent world was best served by studying the systems which made war and peace possible, rather than relying on the outdated wisdom of a realist aristocracy. In the 1970s, this often took the form of exploring the foundations of war in dynamics of economic growth, inequality and crisis, in dialogue with liberal theories of interdependence and Marxian world systems and dependency theory. At MIT, where Ashley completed his PhD in 1976, this research programme was taken in a radically environmentalist direction. It was here that Ashley's critique of neorealism took shape, although its initial target was neither neorealism nor peace research per se. In the early 1970s, population growth and scarcity of resources were live issues as capital accumulation slowed and oil crisis struck. Two famines in Bangladesh killed over a million. In the Global South, these developments emboldened efforts to secure an NIEO and justified theories of dependency and global exploitation. In the North, they gave birth to movements for human rights and individualist philosophies of basic needs and philanthropy – often in opposition to the demands of the South.[433] Yet they also triggered the rise of computer-driven 'world modelling', or, as Ashley later described it in a 1983 retrospective, 'the attempt to develop, validate, and exercise computer simulation models of global processes and relations that have potentially significant social, political, technological, economic, and natural environmental effects.'[434]

In the first world model of its kind, a 1972 Club of Rome-sponsored simulation run by MIT scientists predicted 'overshoot and collapse' if rates of population and industrial increase continued unabated.[435] The report had important implications for IR in an age where conflict in Indochina raged and the OPEC scenario threatened to spiral. In the hands of Ashley's advisor, the Stanford-educated Egyptian scholar Nazli Choucri, *Limits to Growth* had clear anti-imperial implications: her 'lateral pressure' theory of conflict, which she developed with Robert North at Stanford, updated the 'Hobson-Lenin thesis' by demonstrating the links between excess domestic

[433] Forrester, *In the Shadow of Justice*, 140–71.
[434] Richard K. Ashley, 'The Eye of Power: The Politics of World Modeling', *International Organization* 37, no. 3 (1983): 496–97.
[435] Donella H. Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (New York, NY: Universe Books, 1972).

growth and expansionary international behaviour in capitalist and socialist societies.[436] The theory, further elaborated in Ashley's dissertation and 1980 book, held that a state which could not meet the ever-expanding demands of its social reproduction – given by population, economic and technological growth – would seek to acquire these capabilities beyond its boundaries. Evolving through peaceful economic means at first, as other units adapted to this logic of expansion, familiar rivalries and balance of power dynamics would intervene, in turn constraining opportunities for the collective control of growth in an 'eclectic and vicious circle'.[437] Lateral pressure theory, in short, was not an attempt to negate particular IR theories, but rather to capture the main dynamics they described in a single 'conceptual framework' linking human society and nature.

Ashley's innovation was to add ideology to the structural mix. Hayward Alker, a former student of Karl Deutsch and professor at MIT since 1968, had recently sought to build into world models the subjective 'narrative mythologies' and 'grammars' actors used to orient their action, under the influence of Chomskyian linguistics and Habermasian universal pragmatics.[438] Contrary to the idea of post-positivism being simply an end-of-the-Cold-War development, radical critical-theoretic ideas were being taught and absorbed by many American IR graduate students and early career scholars swept up by the 1960s and 1970s anti-war and student movements. This included figures such as Raymond Duvall, whose quantitative training at Northwestern University encountered Foucauldian ideas through links to the Cultural Studies Department while a young professor at the University of Minnesota;[439] Craig Murphy, who encountered Habermas at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, in an interdisciplinary graduate programme that included on the faculty Craig Calhoun and two Chilean dissidents;[440] and Thomas Biersteker, two years below Ashley on the programme at MIT but who took with him a crucial class by Alker on Philosophies for Political Analysis in the Spring of 1973, and joined Alker's 'Dialectics of World Order' project which sought to shift IR thinking in order to effect world transformation.[441] Cox and Ashley were thus heads of a broader wave to come.

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[436] Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, *Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence* (San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1975).
[437] Richard K. Ashley, *The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique* (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), 204. An application of lateral pressure theory to post-war relations between the US, the Soviet Union and China, Ashley's PhD was published as *The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique.*
[438] Hayward R. Alker, 'Individual Achievements Rarely Sum to Collective Progress', in *In Search of Global Patterns*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1976), 38–58.
[439] Author's interview with Raymond Duvall, 16 April 2020.
[440] Author's interview with Craig Murphy, 3 November 2020.
[441] Alker and Biersteker's 1984 stocktaking mentioned in the previous chapter grew out of this project and was intended as a preliminary step towards a textbook that would be 'non-alienating on a global scale'. Author's interview with Thomas Biersteker, 13 August 2022. I am grateful to Thomas Biersteker for a

Ashley, a graduate student who served as Alker's research assistant, took up these themes fervently in his own work. He argued that any attempt to represent the global system without accounting for all its parts – which included the ideologies reinforcing it – was itself complicit in a death drive at the heart of what he termed 'the modern security problematique.'[442] Such ideologies were the product of a 'technical-rational grammar of thought' demanded by lateral pressure dynamics, which required the control and manipulation of external environments. The distinguishing feature of technical-rational grammar, Ashley wrote, was that it 'denied the possibility that people and social organisations might to a large extent become what they do.'[443] That is, it oriented thought and action on the premise that rational actors aimed merely to survive as they are, and that they did so by acting technically on nature within and across given sectors in time and space. As in Cox, these sectors were conceived as 'discrete problem-solving exercises', where problems were defined by given utility-maximising purposes and the obstacles standing in the way of their achievement.[444] Absent this grammar was any notion of 'rationality proper', which could 'begin with the specific problem situation and…'import' the larger historical reality within it', engaging, criticising and synthesising competing vantage points from other sectors, and revealing the dependence of the acting unit on its evolving environment.[445]

Technical-rational grammar produced different ideologies of status-quo management over time. The problematique, Ashley argued, was a 'recurring historical progression' where 'global unity manifested in the individuation of fragmented and violence-prone social and political forms.'[446] In normal times, high lateral pressure states could easily subordinate and transform weaker ones without direct military intervention, establishing an exploitative global economic order while giving an impression of peaceful integration. For Ashley, post-war capitalism in the West was one such era, and its perfected ideology – contra Cox – was liberal IPE, with its vision of an open world economy regulated by technocratic multilateral regimes.[447] 'Balance of power theory', a holdover from an earlier crisis period, could also function here so long as it limited itself

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photocopy of Alker's course outline on post-positivist methodologies, which had a huge impact on himself and likely Ashley, too. Biersteker also notes that the IPE debates pioneered in Cambridge, Massachusetts, were highly important for 'opening up' new avenues in IR.

[442] The concept of the 'world problematique' was coined by the Club of Rome's original convenors to denote the intertwining of global economic, environmental, political and social problems. For Ashley the modern security problematique denoted the interpenetration of dynamics of differential growth (population, technology, and economy), international rivalry, and balance of power. Ashley, *The Political Economy of War and Peace*, 174–230.

[443] Ibid., xi.

[444] Ibid., 209.

[445] Ibid., 216.

[446] Ibid., 49.

[447] Ibid., 280.

to international-political matters. However, such perspectives ignored that the origins of power politics lay in the very processes economic liberals reified. High lateral pressure states eventually bumped up against one another or encountered subaltern resistance, requiring technical reorientation of the overall system. In the 1970s, the belated liberalism of Keohane and Nye was thus duly replaced by a mercantilist balance of power theory that inflated the functions of the technocratic state, stressing zero-sum games, economic nationalism, and the unilateral use of military power to remove external obstructions to lateral pressure.[448] All these theories were ideologies of the problematique, each smoothing the workings of the system in a particular time and space while concealing the historical progression of the whole.

Many of the key elements of Ashley's approach in 'The Poverty of Neorealism' were here already in place, particularly a critique of atomism and ahistoricism in IR theory – later termed the 'double move' –[449] and a distinction between non-economic and mercantilist 'crisis' realism. Yet polemical critique of neorealism, combined with creative reclaiming of classical realism, was an absent theme. From Morgenthau to Waltz, Ashley originally saw all 'balance of power theories' as technical-rational ideologies of high lateral pressure states. Moreover, even though he admitted their ascendance during the 1970s, they were just one of several theories Ashley sought to diagnose as ideologies of the security problematique. These diagnoses themselves formed part of a broader attempt to radicalise the fields of peace research and world modelling, disabusing them of their own technical-rational grammar, which – like mainstream IR theories – took the form of a positivist search for fixed laws of social action.

By the time of his 1983 article on political cybernetics and world modelling, a review of books at the intersection of these fields, Ashley was less sanguine about their emancipatory potential. Now drawing as much on Michel Foucault as Habermas, the concept of retrieving a 'rationality proper' was fading in the face of the Panopticon-like 'eye of power' that was positivist social science, and neorealism in particular.[450] What helps explain this shift is not just intellectual but also external-political: the rise of the New Right in the early 1980s. Indeed, in both his book and a 1981 article, which – alongside Cox's 'Social Forces' – introduced critical theory to IR, Ashley had held out the possibility of emancipation from the security problematique. Here he saw unprecedented opportunities for subordinating technical rationality to rationality proper, pointing in particular to the combined impact of three material developments:

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[448] Ibid., 281.
[449] Richard K. Ashley, 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 12, no. 4 (1987): 403–34.
[450] Ashley, 'The Eye of Power'.

> (a) possible revolutionary developments in technologies of communication, (b) mounting signs of global interdependence and their implications, and (c) the growth of a multifaceted, transnational social scientific community.[451]

'Interdependence', he noted, had become a celebrity phrase in the 1970s not because it was a new reality in need of technical control, but because the dangers of not recognising it were becoming lethal. The awareness of humans of their dependence on each other and the environment reflected the turning of technical rationality against itself, as it destroyed in the name of human survival that on which survival depended. It bespoke the prospect of '(w)orld empire via massive violence' as the 'logical conclusion' of never-ending growth,[452] and the need to bring the global system under democratic control. This democratic promise could in turn be realised by the two other developments: rapid computerised processing and dispersion of information on global social and natural forces, pressed into the service of human emancipation by a transnational community of reflective natural and social scientists communicating different viewpoints on the world.[453] He envisaged his book as part of this 'participatory experiment in social change', wherein each research participant imported into their perspectives those of others, the past and the future, and aimed at universal consensus.[454]

Even as the Reagan revolution began in earnest, Ashley saw the possibility of realism itself being transformed. His article in *International Studies Quarterly* 'Political Realism and Human Interests', focused on John Herz, the German émigré scholar who coined the concept of the 'security dilemma' and explored its suicidal implications in the atomic age.[455] Unlike a predominant form of realism characterised by consensus on technical rationality, Ashley argued that Herz's 'emancipatory' realism attended to the progressive whole of the world system and its alternate logics of unity and fragmentation. In an age of global threats to human survival, Herz foresaw a dialectical synthesis of realism and idealism where self-interest and universal morality would converge on collaboratively meeting these challenges at the world level. In so doing, Herz aimed to delegitimise static notions of balance of power and unitary states-as-actors, expanding the hermeneutic circle of realism to include a notion of universal consensus in the name of survival.[456]

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[451] Ashley, *The Political Economy of War and Peace*, 219.
[452] Ibid., 214.
[453] Ibid., 221–28.
[454] Ibid., 227–28.
[455] Ashley, 'Political Realism and Human Interests'.
[456] Ibid., 226–31.

What ensued, however, was not universal consensus but the Second Cold War. Between 1981 and 1984, the Reagan administration ramped up support to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua, and right-wing regimes from Guatemala to the Philippines. In 1983, US forces rolled into Grenada and removed its Communist government. Herz's emancipatory realism did not carry the day. 'The Poverty of Neorealism', it is clear, was Ashley's attempt to recognise these developments. His despairing contention that Waltz et al. sought to orient the hegemon's 'expanding the reach of control' in order to 'preserve cooperative economic and ecological regimes', was a blunt acknowledgment of the problematique's continuation. So too his depiction of the all-consuming neorealist 'orrery', with its economistic state-as-actor model interacting uncomfortably with its structuralist promise, trapping the unwitting in a centripetal whirl: 'Around and around it spins, eroding and then consuming the ground upon which opposition would stand. Around and around it spins, until we lose sight of the fact that it is only motion.'[457] Ashley thus clearly no longer believed the security problematique was in the process of transcendence – his early optimism had faded. And yet, at the same time, he was still simply transferring ideas developed in the 1970s into the 1980s. If 'The Poverty of Neorealism' was an attempt to recognise changed circumstances, it did so within a framework in which Ashley had been working since his MIT days. For him, the rise of the New Right reflected the continued legitimacy crisis of the capitalist state in the context of the security problematique, with neorealism as its ideological cover. Finally, that Ashley was very much thinking about the relationship between lateral pressure and the New Right's emergence is also undeniable given a paper he presented at the 1983 ISA Convention was titled 'Lateral Pressure and the Reagan Shift: An Interpretation of American Foreign Policy'.[458] He elsewhere described Reagan's 'smashing of the independence of Grenada' as not only a political performance of strength within a community of realist self-understanding, but also as a 'specific historical response to a global crisis in relations of production and exchange – a crisis that opens the way for resistance on the part of subordinate peoples and necessitates the legitimation of coercive reaction on the part of the dominant'.[459] This of course was precisely the context in which he understood neorealism via application of his lateral pressure framework.

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[457] Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', 261–62.
[458] ISA 1983 Annual Convention Programme. ISA Archives.
[459] Richard K. Ashley, 'At the Impasse: Epistemology and the Scientific Evaluation of Foreign Policy', in *Evaluating US Foreign Policy*, ed. John Vasquez (New York, NY: Praeger, 1986), 190.

4.4 Conclusion

Ashley's ideology critique of neorealism in the 1980s therefore emerged from a position already arrived at. Neither neorealism nor Reaganism was understood on their own terms; in Ashley's framework their complementarity was assumed once the coercive powers of the state were put to work abroad. That the New Right programme rested on explicit critiques of both realism and Keynesian economics, which in polemical tone and substance mirrored much of what Ashley himself was saying, was an irony he did not reflect upon. Arch-neoconservative Charles Krauthammer himself wrote an article in 1986 called 'The Poverty of Realism: The Newest Challenge to the Reagan Doctrine', criticising post-1970 variants as a debilitating restraint on an expansionist, freedom-fighting US foreign policy, and betrayed an older form of realism that joined morality with power and faced down the anti-war left.[460] Nor did Ashley have much to say about the vociferous opposition to Reaganism by many realists, who unlike Ashley engaged head-on with its neoconservative ideologues in the public sphere. And while he no longer held out the promise of Herz's emancipatory realism, his attempt to integrate classical realism into a 'dialectical competence' model accounting for global transformations was cut from much the same cloth.

Cox's critical theory, as we have seen, did not quite hit its mark politically either, however. Indeed, it was not until later in the decade that the Gramscian approach would be properly adapted to the age of the New Right. The possibility of the NIEO by that point had certainly faded and what Stephen Gill would term 'disciplinary neoliberalism' cemented.[461] Nonetheless, the theoretical avenues Cox and Ashley opened were remarkable and highly influential for later critical theorists. By distinguishing classical realism from neorealism, they also set in train an increased interest in the nature of realism, and in particular the history of the realist tradition, even as the realist paradigm was seemingly in decline. Many of the histories of classical realism mentioned in chapter 2 indeed were influenced by this critical impulse of 'retrieval'. So too, however, did it impact upon realists themselves, who began to divide into splinters and research specialisms of their own.[462]

In 1986, Robert Keohane published an important edited collection, *Neorealism and its Critics*. It brought together chapters from Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* and the most important

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[460] Charles Krauthammer, 'The Poverty of Realism: The Newest Challenge to the Reagan Doctrine', *The New Republic* 194, no. 7 (1986): 14–22.
[461] Stephen Gill, 'Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 24, no. 3 (1995): 399–423.
[462] Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Is Anybody Still a Realist?', *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 5–55.

responses to it, including his own sympathetic appraisal.[463] Perhaps surprisingly, it also included centrally Cox and Ashley's 1981 and 1984 essays, as well as a more moderate critique by John Ruggie.[464] Cox, Ashley, Ruggie, and several others including Hayward Alker, Friedrich Kratochwil, Alexander Wendt, and Nicholas Onuf, would help open up a post-positivist constellation within what became known as the 'Third Debate' during the mid-to-late 1980s. Feminist scholars such as J. Ann Tickner, Cynthia Enloe, and Jean Bethke Elshtain entered from the late 1980s through a series of panels and events at ISA and BISA conventions, as well as special seminars organised at various universities in the US and Britain. In his 1988 ISA Presidential Address, Keohane would group such figures under the label 'reflectivist' – that is, those who 'emphasise the importance of "intersubjective meanings" of international institutional activity' and do not 'treat the preferences of individuals as given exogenously' but rather 'affected by institutional arrangements, by prevailing norms, and by historically contingent discourse among people seeking to pursue their purposes and solve their self-defined problems'.[465] Unlike 'rationalists' such as Keohane and Waltz, however, they had not developed a 'clear reflective research programme that could be employed by students of world politics', and without this would 'remain on the margins of the field, largely invisible to the preponderance of empirical researchers'.[466] This did not silence critics, however.. Combined with controversies related to ISA's apparent institutional hegemony (as recounted in chapter 6), a wedge also began to be driven between the US and British communities.

[463] Keohane, 'Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics'.
[464] John Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis', in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 131–57.
[465] Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', 381–82.
[466] Ibid., 392.

5. The End of History and the Third Debate in International Relations

5.1 Introduction

This chapter uncovers unexpected theoretical connections and affinities between Francis Fukuyama's famous end of history thesis and post-positivist, 'critical' theories from the Third Debate in International Relations (IR). It does so through an intellectual-historical reconstruction of Fukuyama's thesis and its receptive audience of critical scholars in the 1990s, offering two main claims. First, the chapter argues that Fukuyama drew upon, sympathised with, and strikingly reproduced core ideas from several critical IR theories when developing the international dimensions of his argument. Meanwhile, apparently unaware of this, prominent scholars from the 'foundationalist' wing of critical scholarship received the end of history thesis seriously and positively, sympathising with Fukuyama, using him to develop their theories, and even viewing him as a critical IR theorist.

Fukuyama and Third Debate critical IR have not yet been studied together historically. Often understood as simply neoconservative spin on post-Cold-War US triumphalism, Fukuyama's idea that liberal democratic capitalism constitutes the 'endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution' has courted global public attention and controversy ever since a 1989 article.[467] While sophisticated studies exist of the philosophy underlying Fukuyama's argument,[468] its connections to academic IR have not been systematically examined. This is surprising given Fukuyama – then an experienced foreign policy analyst at the US State Department with a PhD in IR from Harvard – was hardly coy about the implications of the end of history for international theory and practice. He was also a prolific reviewer of IR books for *Foreign Affairs* from 1993 to 1998, going on to occupy positions in International Studies institutes at Johns Hopkins and Stanford universities. For Fukuyama, the global spread of liberal democratic capitalism promised the pacification of international relations through the abolition of intersubjective recognition

[467] Later expanded into a book, *The End of History and the Last Man*. Fukuyama, 'The End of History?'; Fukuyama, *The End of History*. This chapter sees these statements as core expressions of Fukuyama's thesis, while taking some account of its prior and later development.
[468] Perry Anderson, *A Zone of Engagement* (London: Verso, 1992); Christopher Bertram and Andrew Chitty, eds., *Has History Ended? Fukuyama, Marx, Modernity* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994).

hierarchies, rendering Cold War 'realist' IR theories largely obsolete and practically dangerous. Though the grounding of this vision in liberal IR theory is often vaguely acknowledged,[469] this chapter reveals important links to the 'post-positivist' moment in IR with which it coincided. In turn, a novel and intriguing connection between neoconservative foreign policy ideology and critical IR theory can be established.[470]

Such findings meanwhile complicate conventional wisdom surrounding the Third Debate. In disciplinary lore established at the time by scholars such as Yosef Lapid, the Third Debate is remembered as a moment of great ferment and pluralism in 1980s and 1990s IR theory, where hegemonic shibboleths were questioned, and radical 'dissident' voices emerged from the margins of the discipline.[471] Importing alternatives to positivist philosophy of science from mid-century social theory, such as Michel Foucault or Jürgen Habermas, four features united this constellation: an epistemological rejection of empiricist attempts to formulate fixed and objective societal laws; a commitment to pluralism of scientific method; an ontology stressing the socio-historical construction of actors' identities over rational-individualist conceptions of agency; and a normative condemnation of 'neutral' theorising, coupled with call for theories to expose and even transform oppressive international hierarchies.[472] Thus, metatheoretical analysis of mainstream theory was often tied to a critique of its implication in unjust political practices, with realism's role in naturalising Cold War US foreign policy a particular target.[473] Meanwhile, critical IR itself split

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469 E.g. Martin Griffiths, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1999); Howard Williams, 'The Idea of a Liberal Democratic Peace', in *The Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 241–53; Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Structural Realism After the Cold War', *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 5–41.

470 Historians seek to show how neoconservatism was once more than a post-Reagan foreign policy crusade – a species of American liberalism incubating complex views on domestic culture and economics since mid-century – while IR scholars primarily investigate its links to realist and liberal theory. Justin Vaïsse, *Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap, 2011); Jacob Hamburger and Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins, 'Why Did Neoconservatives Join Forces with Neoliberals? Irving Kristol From Critic to Ally of Free-Market Economics', *Global Intellectual History*, 2018, 1–16, https://doi.org/10.1080/23801883.2018.1423740; Michael C. Williams, 'What Is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory', *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 3 (2005): 307–37; Brian C. Schmidt and Michael C. Williams, 'The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists', *Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (2008): 191–220; Jean-François Drolet, 'A Liberalism Betrayed? American Neoconservatism and the Theory of International Relations', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 15, no. 2 (2010): 89–118. On "unexpected affinities" with constructivism see Aaron Rapport, 'Unexpected Affinities? Neoconservatism's Place in IR Theory', *Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (2008): 257–93.

471 This image is passed down from stock-taking publications of the time, especially Lapid, 'The Third Debate'; Richard K. Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, 'Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies', *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (1990): 259–68.

472 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons?: Critical International Theory and Constructivism', *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (1998): 261–63.

473 Ibid., 263.

along 'foundationalist' and 'anti-foundationalist' lines, a division hinging on whether epistemological and normative grounds for truth could be established,[474] and the appropriateness of a 'reconstructive' or 'celebratory' attitude towards IR's pluralist 'next stage'.[475]

The Third Debate – characterised by insurgency and heterogeneity – should thus have little to do Fukuyama's neoconservative end of history thesis, reflecting as it did an increasing ideological *homogeneity* and US supremacy in world politics. Further, even if there were connections, surely it was mainstream liberal theories that reflected any broader triumphalism, with the Fukuyama-critical IR synthesis a mere coincidence?

On closer inspection, however, much post-positivist IR was also seeking to welcome in the new order, albeit with different metatheoretical tools. The mid-century 'restructuring of social and political theory' – and the first shoots of critical IR, as we have seen – emerged amid the global contestation of capitalism and empire, and the rise of leftist 'new social movements'.[476] Yet critical IR flourished in rather different circumstances, for often different ends, and with selectivity as to the types of theory accepted.[477] While neo-Marxist approaches of Cox and Ashley were important originally, the confounding of rationalist models by the end of the Cold War was said to have catalysed the critical IR constellation. Note, for example, how its self-described 'dissenting' character echoed mediatised depictions of anti-Soviet rebels such as Czech dissident Václav Havel – a touchstone for such scholars as Jim George and Ned Lebow –[478] or how the attitudes of 'celebration' and 'reconstruction' towards IR's 'next stage' mirrored a carnival atmosphere accompanying the defeat of socialism. Indeed, for constructivist Alexander Wendt, perhaps the most influential theorist of the time, Soviet leader Gorbachev's 'New Thinking' was the archetypal 'critical rather than problem solving theory', reimagining Soviet identity relative to the West and

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[474] The former included historical sociology, Gramscian international political economy, forms of constructivism and feminism, and normative cosmopolitan theory, while the latter encompassed approaches inspired by postmodern literary deconstruction. See Smith, 'The Self-Images of a Discipline', 26–30. This chapter takes what might be considered an inappropriately broad definition of 'critical IR theory' but such breadth is consonant with a contextualist intellectual-historical approach that defines as 'critical' those scholars who self-defined or who were categorised by others as such during the Third Debate.

[475] Lapid, 'The Third Debate'; Mark Hoffman, 'Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical International Theory', *Millennium* 20, no. 2 (1991): 169–85.

[476] Richard J. Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976).

[477] Conway, 'Radicalism, Respectability, and the Colour Line of Critical Thought'.

[478] Jim George, 'Understanding International Relations after the Cold War: Probing Beyond the Realist Legacy', in *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities*, ed. Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 33–79; Richard Ned Lebow, 'The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism', *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (1994): 249–77.

transforming their interactions.[479] Above all, though, foundationalist claims to mediate diversity best reflected the political centrism the era, aping Anthony Giddens's 'systematic reconstruction' of social theory underpinning 'Third Way' ideology.[480] As we will see, Giddens sympathisers in IR were particularly receptive to Fukuyama.

Complicating Third Debate self-images again brings understanding of IR's history more up to date. Disciplinary historians have hitherto challenged renditions of earlier 'Great Debates', demonstrating their historical inaccuracy and limiting effects on present scholarship.[481] This chapter demonstrates that the Third Debate also did not occur as depicted in disciplinary lore. Cutting through the metatheoretical ferment, it demonstrates that IR's intellectual 'opening up' was, in important respects, implicated in an ideological *closing down* at Cold War's end, embodied in the triumph of Western liberal capitalist modernity.[482] As explained in the conclusion, this is not merely of antiquarian interest, since it demonstrates a continuity of Eurocentric liberalism through the history of the discipline that complicates the idea of the progressive Great Debates.

The next section contextualises Fukuyama's perspective on international relations. It argues that it relied not only on certain philosophical influences, neoconservative ideology, or liberal IR theory, but also a proto-constructivist understanding of liberal peace, and engagement with feminist IR. Section 5.3 discusses Fukuyama's critique of realism, arguing that it channelled metatheoretical analysis pioneered by Wendt, Richard Ashley, and Robert Cox: namely, that realism was dangerously 'reductionist' and 'ahistorical'. Favourable citations and book reviews demonstrate that the striking similarities between their critiques are unlikely to be coincidental. Section 5.4 examines the reception of Fukuyama in 1990s Britain, the major centre of Anglophone critical IR, showing how prominent foundationalists sympathised with and adapted his ideas amid Third-Way enthusiasm. The conclusion, finally, summarises the chapter's arguments and historiographical contributions.

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[479] Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 418–22.

[480] Lapid, 'The Third Debate', 235–37; Hoffman, 'Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation': 169–76.

[481] Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*; Schmidt, *International Relations and the First Great Debate*; Vitalis, *White World Order*; Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment*; Owens and Rietzler, *Women's International Thought: A New History*.

[482] This is not to reduce all critical IR theories to a 'utopianism of unipolarity' – particularly not postcolonial/decolonial work on race and empire, for example – nor to deny their salutary role in opening IR to marginalised voices. Cf. Philip Cunliffe, *The New Twenty Years' Crisis, 1999-2019* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2020). However, on the side-lining and belated inclusion of theories of race and empire within critical IR see Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam, eds., *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line* (London: Routledge, 2015); Conway, 'Radicalism, Respectability, and the Colour Line of Critical Thought'.

5.2 The Democratic and Feminine Peace

Fukuyama's 'The End of History?' was the product of a lecture delivered at the University of Chicago on invitation of Allan Bloom, Fukuyama's philosophical mentor since studying Classics at Cornell in the 1970s. Published in neoconservative magazine *The National Interest*, it attained instant notoriety. The Berlin Wall remained standing, but anti-Communist protests across Central and Eastern Europe seemed ample evidence for the State Department official to conclude:

> What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War…but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.[483]

Following confusion over the meaning of these arguments, *The End of History* was written to further clarify their philosophical basis. Here, Fukuyama stressed that the victory of liberalism was in ideal not empirical reality, with historical events likely to continue to threaten liberal states. While events offered hope for a world of capitalist democracies, this reality could take decades to reach, with numerous possibilities for hiccups along the way. By 'history', Fukuyama meant capital-aitch 'History' in the tradition of Karl Marx and G.W.F. Hegel – namely, 'a single, coherent, evolutionary process…taking into account the experience of all peoples in all times.'[484] The reason democratic capitalism constituted its endpoint lay in the combination of liberty and equality, with a market economy and modern state harnessing natural science to ever-expanding material needs, and universal rights largely mitigating the Hegelian 'struggle for recognition' stemming from what Plato had termed *thymos*. *Thymos* was the human desire to be respected by others, which had historically manifested in master-slave hierarchies of lordship and bondage, such as slavery or empire. As capitalism developed, educated bourgeois classes would demand recognition of their human dignity, yielding democratic overthrow of aristocracy.[485]

The End of History was also an attempt to infer future implications, from the organisation of political authority and work to the rise of what Nietzsche termed the 'last man'. The 'last man' was a situation of boredom and valueless existence, where humans would strive for petty wants

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[483] Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', 3–4.
[484] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, xii. Fukuyama interpreted Hegel through French philosopher Alexandre Kojève, whose lectures on Hegel Bloom edited in English. Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the 'Phenomenology of Spirit'*, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1969).
[485] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 206.

rather than cultural excellence without recognition struggle.[486] Much of this discussion, however, was dedicated to explaining the end of history's international ramifications. This was not surprising, since – despite his philosophical background – international politics dominated Fukuyama's career, from his graduate education under Nadav Safran and Samuel Huntington at Harvard, to work as a foreign policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and State Department through the 1980s. He appeared on several ISA convention programmes through the 1980s and 1990s, mostly discussing Soviet foreign policy but also comparative historical and cultural analysis in international politics.[487] As a foreign policy analyst, Fukuyama offered comparative case studies of Soviet foreign policy, focussing on the interplay between balances of material power, leaders' perceptions and misperceptions, and regional and domestic social change – core themes of 'third-wave' deterrence theory, which Fukuyama encountered at Harvard.[488] Reacting against rationalist game theories of nuclear stalemate, third-wave deterrence theory was a clear precursor to constructivist research into the cultural constitution of national security interests, providing early grounding for constructivists such as Ned Lebow and Ted Hopf, and British cosmopolitan Ken Booth.[489]

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[486] This reflected the influence of Bloom's conservative critique of postmodern cultural relativism. Ibid., 387n11; Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1987).

[487] At the 1994 convention, for example, Fukuyama was listed as discussant on a panel concerning historical and cultural analysis in IR including Adam Watson, Adda Bozeman, and Donald Puchala. ISA 1994 Annual Convention Programme, ISA Archive. While Watson was a major figure from the traditional 'English School' and Bozeman a historian, Puchala aligned with 'dissenters in the third debate' and would hold Fukuyama be part of a broader 'historical turn' away from positivism within IR. See Donald Puchala, 'The History of the Future of International Relations', *Ethics and International Affairs* 8, no. 1 (1994): 177–202; Donald Puchala, 'The Pragmatics of International History', *International Studies Review* 39, no. 1 (1995): 1–18; Donald Puchala, 'Marking Our Weberian Moment: Our Discipline Looks Ahead', *International Studies Perspectives* 1, no. 2 (2000): 133–44.

[488] The classic outline is Robert Jervis, 'Deterrence Theory Revisited', *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (1979): 289–324. Fukuyama's PhD on post-war Soviet threats to intervene in the Middle East clearly reflects the influence of such thinking, such as the work of Alexander George and Richard Smoke. Francis Fukuyama, 'Soviet Threats to Intervene in the Middle East, 1951-1973', PhD diss., Department of Government, Harvard University (1981). PDF in author's possession.

[489] Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 32–64; Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996). Lebow comments that while not producing systematic constructivist metatheory, third-wave deterrence theorists identified with and contributed to constructivist research as they studied international events from 'bottom-up' participant perspectives. Author's interview with Ned Lebow, 5 January 2022. Note also Michael C. Williams's adaptation of third-wave deterrence theory, which 'had more than a little in common with the contemporary "critical" movement in international relations theory'. Michael C. Williams, 'Neo-Realism and the Future of Strategy', *Review of International Studies* 19, no. 2 (1993): 120.

Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' thesis, which predicted a post-1989 world of cultural conflict, was an explicit riposte to Fukuyama.[490] In contrast to Huntington's pessimism if not culturalism, Fukuyama helped popularise research begun by Michael Doyle by and others in the 1980s,[491] and transformed into a major research programme by figures such as Bruce Russett.[492] Doyle's liberal peace theory sought to verify Immanuel Kant's vision of a perpetual peace between free republics, while noting the possibility of war between liberal and non-liberal states. Fukuyama was struck by Doyle's observation that no war between liberal states had ever taken place.[493] Fukuyama was not the only one impressed, as Communism fell and democracy promotion emerged as a cause of the Bush and Clinton administrations following the Gulf War. The theory supposedly attained 'law-like status' among US policymakers and academics, with debate limited to discussion of the explanatory role of liberal culture or institutions.[494] Fukuyama mirrored the former 'normative' school, which connected liberal domestic norms to pacific international behaviour.

Doyle's more structural-institutional explanation developed Immanuel Kant's three definitive articles for perpetual peace: republican constitution, pacific union, and cosmopolitan hospitality.[495] Fukuyama did not disagree with these, but Doyle's analysis of their functioning. Regarding the first, Doyle cited a lack of citizen consent for war expressed through democratic procedures.[496] Fukuyama, by contrast, applied his Hegelian idealism, mediated by Joseph Schumpeter's sociology of empire, a proto-constructivist appreciation of culture's role in threat perception, and later feminist IR theory.[497] Fukuyama argued that with the spread of liberal states, not only would equal recognition reign internally, but also externally:

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[490] Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilisations?', *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

[491] Dean Babst, 'A Force for Peace', *Industrial Research* 14 (1972): 55–58; R. J. Rummel, 'Libertarianism and International Violence', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, no. 1 (1983): 27–71; Michael W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, no. 3 (1983): 205–35; Michael W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 12, no. 4 (1983): 323–53; Michael W. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151–69.

[492] Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[493] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 263, 383n18.

[494] Jack S. Levy, 'The Democratic Peace Hypothesis: From Description to Explanation', *Mershon International Studies Review* 38, no. 2 (1994): 252.

[495] Immanuel Kant, *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. H.S. Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', 1157–58.

[496] Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', 1160.

[497] Kant, for Fukuyama, was the first to propose a Universal History culminating in the liberal state but only Hegel completed the project. Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 59.

> The civil peace…should logically have its counterpart in relations between states. Imperialism and war were historically the product of aristocratic societies. If liberal democracy abolished the class distinction between masters and slaves, then it too should abolish imperialism.[498]

Both self-preservation and *thymos* instincts were historical causes of war, the former to secure territory and resources, the latter to extract prestige and legitimacy. But the drive to war was significantly attenuated among liberal states, where rational recognition domestically dampened international struggles. This would be registered as much through the sociability of leaders as elections. Such elites would alter their threat perception of liberal states, no matter the material power relation between them: 'Perceptions of foreign threat', Fukuyama argued, 'are not determined 'objectively' by a state's position in the state system, but are instead heavily influenced by ideology.'[499] The choice of friends and enemies was thus not materially given but socially constructed through intersubjective recognition/perception structures. As one prominent constructivist put it similarly: 'Perceptions are the starting point…Democracies do not fight each other because they perceive each other as predisposed toward peacefulness and then act on this assumption. They perceive each other as peaceful, because of the democratic norms governing their domestic decision-making processes.'[500]

Fukuyama here also cited Schumpeter, the twentieth-century Austrian economist who argued imperialism derived from an atavistic and 'objectless disposition of a state to unlimited forcible expansion' – a holdover of aristocratic mores and pre-modern survival instincts – whose energies would be devalued in liberal states and/or redirected into civil society activity.[501] Here, imperialism could only re-emerge if socially useless aristocracies retained political power, since without domestic outlets for *thymos* they turned outwards, reviving 'ideas of overlordship, male supremacy, and triumphant glory.'[502] Otherwise, norms of compassion would reduce tolerance towards violence and death.[503]

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[498] Ibid., 260.
[499] Ibid., 263–64.
[500] Thomas Risse, 'Democratic Peace - Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument', *European Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 4 (1995): 503–9.
[501] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 260.
[502] Joseph Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes*, trans. Heinz Norden (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing Co., 1955), 97.
[503] Fukuyama believed John Mueller's 1989 book *Retreat From Doomsday* empirically supported Schumpeter's theory; war being 'merely an idea' that would go the way of slavery and duelling. Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 382n13.

Yet while Schumpeter saw male supremacy as constitutive of illiberal states, Fukuyama assumed that *thymos* manifested equally within and between genders. He conceded that if societies in which 'the female side of the human personality' was liberated were historically more peaceful, as feminist archaeologist Marija Gimbutas posited, the end of history would be questionable, since no current society was matriarchal.[504] Fukuyama, however, would soon change his mind on these counts, in the context of a broader turn towards studying the role of cultural norms in post-industrial societies.[505] In a rather unremarked 1998 *Foreign Affairs* article, 'Women and the Evolution of World Politics', Fukuyama argued that not only were liberal societies reaching gender parity, but that women were less prone to violent struggles for recognition. The liberal world, therefore, was feminised, while the non-liberal remained authoritarian and masculine. What seems to have changed Fukuyama's mind was a curious combination of neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology with the increasing visibility of women in international politics, highlighted and theorised by 'a vigorous feminist subdiscipline within the field of international relations theory based on the work of scholars like Ann Tickner, Sara Ruddick, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Judith Shapiro and others.'[506]

In Fukuyama's words, feminist IR sought to raise 'female participation in all aspects of foreign relations, from executive mansions and foreign ministries to militaries and universities', uncovering also 'how international politics is 'gendered', that is, run by men to serve male interests and interpreted by other men, consciously and unconsciously, according to male perspectives'.[507] Though thin, this characterisation partly echoed other attempts to synopsise the literature, which combined the second-wave impulse to centre 'everyday' experience with the deconstruction of gender identity in theory and practice.[508] Fukuyama was correct, too, to highlight the coincidence between growing women's representation in military and foreign policy establishments and the rise of feminist IR, though – as with Third Debate narratives more broadly – overlooked contexts such

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[504] Ibid., 137–38.
[505] Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1995); Francis Fukuyama, *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1999).
[506] Francis Fukuyama, 'Women and the Evolution of World Politics', *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 5 (1998): 32.
[507] Ibid.
[508] Christine Sylvester, 'The Contributions of Feminist Theory to International Relations', in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 254–78; Craig N. Murphy, 'Seeing Women, Recognizing Gender, Recasting International Relations', *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (1996): 513–38. Early feminist IR's straddling of themes in second-wave feminist activism and the third wave it coincided with is explored in David Duriesmith and Sara Meger, 'Returning to the Root: Radical Feminist Thought and Feminist Theories of International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 46, no. 3 (2020): 357–75.

as the increased invocation of women's rights in an ascendant West's foreign policy.[509] Strikingly aware of relevant names and scholarship, Fukuyama cited Tickner to assail realism for universalising the behaviour of male-governed states, describing Elshtain and her insights into the gendering of war as 'sophisticated'.[510] Fukuyama admitted with Elshtain that women could be 'intoxicated by war and…men repulsed by its cruelties'; the common stereotype of men as 'just warriors' and women as 'beautiful souls' was often transcended.[511] Elshtain would support the post-9/11 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, alienating her from many feminists if not Fukuyama, who signed her 2002 open letter on the justice of the war on terror and contributed to her festschrift.[512] Theoretically, though, Fukuyama believed gender norms, despite transgressions, were reflected in political practice.

Thus, he added a gender dimension to Kant's first article. What distinguished Fukuyama from much feminist IR was his understanding of the relationship between human biology and sociality. Fukuyama was not a simple biological determinist who assumed an egoist male will-to-power; as seen, war for him was significantly a function of man's natural sociability (*thymos*). Citing controversial neo-Darwinian life science and anthropological studies of chimpanzee communities, he argued 'only chimps and humans live in male-dominated, patrilineal communities in which groups of males routinely engage in aggressive, often murderous raiding of their own species'.[513] Yet this for him was a question of intersubjective status dominance, not simply egoist rational action. While males engaged more in violent struggles for dominance than women, these conditions were continuously mediated by norms and values to legitimate and challenge them. In particular, where women were increasingly involved as political leaders and voters – as in liberal states – international relations would be 'more conciliatory and cooperative', not simply because women formed better emotional attachments but because male behaviour could be moulded by

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[509] Another relevant end-of-century context was the refocusing of Global North feminist activists on international advocacy against sexual violence during the Bosnian crisis, and the associated marginalising of critiques of capitalism and empire. Moyn, *Not Enough*, 203–6; Karen Engle, *The Grip of Sexual Violence in Conflict: Feminist Interventions in International Law* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020).

[510] Fukuyama, 'Women and the Evolution of World Politics', 27, 32–33.

[511] Ibid., 33.

[512] Francis Fukuyama, 'Civil Society and Political Society', in *Jean Bethke Elshtain: Politics, Ethics, and Society*, ed. Debra Erickson and Michael Le Chevallier (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2018), 317–31. Elshtain was a principal author of the letter: https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/justwar_letter020102.html

[513] Fukuyama, 'Women and the Evolution of World Politics', 25. Fukuyama was reading these sources for his 1999 book *The Great Disruption*, which argued that post-industrial liberal societies – though disruptive of traditional cultural values – would 're-norm' given human sociability, not just because of Axelrodian game-theoretic interaction. As we will see, Fukuyama was also reading multiple critical IR theorists at this time.

feminine norms of equal recognition: 'Biology', he wrote, 'is not destiny'.[514] Thus, Fukuyama found the 'feminist goal' of increasing female participation in foreign relations 'laudable', and its 'core agenda' of constraining traditional masculinity through 'norms, laws, agreements, contracts' 'fundamentally correct'.[515] Biology and what he termed 'social constructionism' were intertwined in his international theory.

Feminist critics acknowledged this point. Responding, Tickner admitted Fukuyama's piece was likely the only ever discussion of feminism in *Foreign Affairs*. It was 'not overtly antifeminist', highlighting a 'vigorous feminist subdiscipline' and recognising how 'culture also shapes human behaviour', while offering a 'seemingly optimistic, even radical vision of a different, relatively peaceful, "feminised" world…where men's aggressive animal instincts have been tamed and channelled.'[516] Fukuyama indeed referenced favourably Tickner's critique of realism's masculine bias. Despite claiming to uncover universal laws, she believed, realism reflected the contingent experience twentieth-century warfare, analogising the state to the amoral and controlling 'political man' of Hobbes's state of nature.[517] Absent from this ontology was the possibility of discursive cooperation and mutual 'enablement' among states – behaviours associated with femininity – which were best understood through a feminist epistemology grappling with the social embeddedness of knowledge.[518]

Ultimately, Fukuyama adopted a simplified version of these arguments, since Tickner's goal was not exactly international 'feminisation'. For her, associating women with peace could disempower both, distracting from 'the variety of oppressions faced by women worldwide', from poverty to sexual violence.[519] Understanding and challenging these, which were also drivers and consequences of war, were feminist IR's main focuses. Meanwhile, Fukuyama's acknowledgement that men could be 'feminised' was caveated by the limits he placed on its immediate achievement. While welcoming it within the liberal world – despite the fact that, as Tickner pointed out, there were fewer high-powered women here than Fukuyama suggested – the non-liberal world remained male-dominated, requiring continued male stewardship of US foreign policy: 'In anything but a totally feminised world, feminised policies could be a liability.'[520] Aggressive 'masculine policies'

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514 Ibid., 33.
515 Ibid., 32–34.
516 J. Ann Tickner, 'Why Women Can't Run the World: International Politics According to Francis Fukuyama', *International Studies Review* 1, no. 3 (1999): 5.
517 J. Ann Tickner, 'Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17, no. 3 (1988): 430–34.
518 Ibid., 436–37.
519 Tickner, 'International Politics According to Francis Fukuyama', 4.
520 Fukuyama, 'Women and the Evolution of World Politics', 36.

were necessary to deal with authoritarian leaders such as Iraq's Saddam Hussein, with combat units segregated by gender for the purpose of male bonding, 'which can only be jeopardised once men start competing for the attention of women'.[521] Tickner thus concluded that Fukuyama's article was 'deeply conservative', serving 'not to put women in control, but to keep them out of positions of power'. She added that it reinforced racist divisions of the world into 'zones of peace' and 'war', analogising Global South societies to chimp communities.[522] How feminist IR may itself have related to a broader 'end of history age' was not discussed.

In his vision of liberal peace, then, Fukuyama worked through well acknowledged constructivist premises and an engagement with feminism. Yet this was only true of Kant's first article. Elsewhere, Fukuyama's well-known other influences were more prominent. Regarding cosmopolitan hospitality – where mutually beneficial cross-border trade disincentivised international conflict –[523] Fukuyama situated it within his universal history of science and morals. Economically interdependent states, Fukuyama argued, could still go to war if at least one was undemocratic, and even if not, the cause was not necessarily fear of lost trade. Indeed, the invention of nuclear weapons by economically independent superpowers and the rise of information economies had also rendered war costly and unnecessary, while capitalism channelled *thymos* into Schumpeterian civil society competition on a national level.[524]

Fukuyama's neoconservative proclivities emerged when discussing pacific union. He envisaged a 'Kantian liberal international order' of 'free states brought together by their common commitment to liberal principles' and embodied in exclusive institutions such as the European Community (EC) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Within this security community, the use of force was 'unthinkable' but coexisting alongside it was a 'historical world' of authoritarian aggressors possessing destructive weapons and crucial oil reserves. It would thus have to be 'capable of forceful action to protect its collective security from threats arising from the non-democratic part of the world', and to spread democracy 'where possible and prudent'.[525] Such conflicts would provide another channel for *thymos* in liberal societies, giving 'last men' a cause to fight for.[526]

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[521] Ibid., 37.
[522] Tickner, 'International Politics According to Francis Fukuyama', 5–6.
[523] This was Doyle's argument and was likely influenced by Keohane and Nye, the latter of whom had taught Doyle while he was also a PhD student at Harvard in the 1970s (though did not overlap with Fukuyama). Author's correspondence with Michael Doyle, 7 September 2020.
[524] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 260–62.
[525] Ibid., 276–84.
[526] Ibid., 329–30.

5.3 The Realist Double Move

Many neoconservatives were disappointed by the quality and quantity of US-led interventions after 1989, often blaming the influence of an amoral realism. After Bush stopped short of toppling Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, Republicans and Democrats supposedly formed a 'tepid consensus' around Clinton's economic agenda, acquiescing in an uneven and restrained foreign policy.[527] Fukuyama was one of twenty-five signatories to a statement of the Project for a New American Century in June 1997, calling for 'a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity' to remake the world, and in January 1998, signed a Project letter to Clinton calling for the removal of Hussein's regime in Iraq. Bush's 'pullback from full military victory', he had earlier written, exemplified 'hyper-realism in practice'.[528]

For Fukuyama, realism's progenitor was Machiavelli but only arrived as a policy doctrine in post-war America, first with Hans Morgenthau, but most importantly with the entry of Henry Kissinger into US government. Kissinger's 'long-term task' was to disabuse Americans of their Wilsonian liberalism, his thinking shaping US foreign policy years after his departure from office, particularly through protégés such as Brent Scowcroft in the Bush administration.[529] For Fukuyama, realism was both a '*de*scription of international politics and a *pre*scription for how states ought to run their foreign policies'.[530] Descriptively, it assumed a 'billiard-ball' image of a state-system operating according to 'mechanical laws of physics', where the internal character of units was irrelevant to understanding their behaviour. Such states became caught in perennial security dilemmas due the lack of an international sovereign, leading to vicious cycles of rearmament where only balances of power prevented war. Realism thus prescribed four rules of statecraft: that insecurity be avoided by balancing militarily against an enemy; that friends and enemies be chosen on the basis of power not ideology; that intentions be inferred from military capabilities; and that moralism be expunged from foreign policy.[531] 'This leads to a somewhat paradoxical situation: realists, who are constantly seeking to maintain a balance of power based on military force, are also the most likely to seek accommodation with powerful enemies'.[532] Hence, Kissinger masterminded 1970s détente, since coexistence with nuclear powers was preferable to conflict.[533]

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527 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, 'Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (1996): 18–32.
528 Francis Fukuyama, 'The Beginning of Foreign Policy', *The New Republic* 207, no. 8–9 (1992): 25.
529 Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 246; Fukuyama, 'The Beginning of Foreign Policy', 28.
530 Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 248.
531 Ibid., 247–50.
532 Ibid., 250.
533 Ibid., 251.

Fukuyama conceded that realism would remain prescriptively useful for maintaining restraint against powerful non-democracies: 'No one…would advocate a policy of military challenges to non-democratic states armed with powerful weapons, especially nuclear ones.'[534] Otherwise, however, realism's 'appointed time' was over, and it now risked atavistically prescribing 'costly and dangerous cures to healthy patients'.[535] Exemplary post-Cold-War realist analyses were offered early by J.L. Gaddis and John Mearsheimer, who predicted unipolar and multipolar instability respectively, urging prudential balancing.[536] For Fukuyama, two flaws rendered these misguided: 'an impermissible reductionism concerning the motives and behaviour of human societies, and failure to address the question of History'.[537] In the first part of this double move, realism posited the state as a given, power-hungry presence – analogous to Hobbes's man in the state of nature – occluding how such an agent was constituted.[538] This included realists who, despite attending to national-level analysis, referred only to leaders' unchanging *animus dominandi*: 'Realists…tend to be driven to highly reductionist explanations of state behaviour when talking about internal politics.'[539]

This analysis reversed arch-realist Kenneth Waltz's critique of theories which explained international outcomes through national-level variables.[540] For Waltz, any theory which understood the international whole through studying its parts had failed systemically. In an endnote, Fukuyama argued that Waltz's definition of reductionism was an 'astonishing reversal of conventional linguistic usage', presumably since it usually referred to explanations locating causation in one underlying structural factor.[541] In the text, however, Fukuyama suggested that realism was reductionist *on its own terms* – a move that was 'impermissible' and 'covertly reintroduced'. This was an intriguing argument, one that strikingly echoed postmodernist Richard Ashley's suggestion that Waltz's methodological/explanatory holism depended on a micro-economic analogy of states to a Hobbesian 'paradigm of sovereign man', a point taken up by constructivist Alexander Wendt who first described Waltzian realism as reductionist in a seminal

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534 Ibid., 280.
535 Ibid., 253.
536 John Lewis Gaddis, 'One Germany - in Both Alliances', *New York Times*, 21 March 1990; John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5–56.
537 Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 254.
538 Ibid., 254–55.
539 Ibid., 256.
540 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 18.
541 Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 380n9.

1987 article.[542] On this account, Waltzian realism was ontologically reductionist, since anarchical structure was only given explanatory power by the distribution of capabilities among exogenously given, power-seeking states, not as generative of agents themselves: 'the social relations in virtue of which that individual [the state] is a particular kind of agent with particular causal properties', Wendt suggested of Waltz's theory, 'must remain forever opaque and untheorized'.[543] As Fukuyama put it:

> (R)ealism tries to…deduce the possibility of war from the structure of the states system…But this pure form of realism covertly reintroduces certain highly reductionist assumptions about the nature of the human societies that make up the system, mistakenly attributing them to the "system" rather than to the units that make up the system. There is…no reason to assume that any state in an anarchic international order should feel threatened by another state, unless one had reason to think that human societies were inherently aggressive.[544]

For Fukuyama, Wendt and Ashley, states had to be related to the domestic and international structures in which they were embedded, particularly *normative* structures. Their point was that realism was only implicitly doing so, making 'pre-theoretical assumptions based in intuition or ideology' about the constitution of states.[545] For Fukuyama, realism was based on 'a hidden assumption that that human societies in their international behaviour tend to resemble Hegel's master seeking recognition, or the vainglorious first man of Hobbes', disguised as a rational, self-preservationist response to anarchy.[546] Taking this as given, realism was silent about how states were socially constructed and constructing agents, itself constituting what Ashley might have termed 'the realist community of statesmanship'.[547] Realism, in other words, universalised a contingent configuration of recognition hierarchies as a necessary order. For Fukuyama, states were not given utility-maximising agents, but 'thymotic individuals' pursuing changeable, intersubjective norms given by the recognition structures obtaining across states. International

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[542] Alexander E. Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (1987): 335–70; Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism'; Ashley, 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space'; Richard K. Ashley, 'Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War', in *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, ed. James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 259–321.
[543] Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem', 343.
[544] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 254.
[545] Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem', 343.
[546] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 255.
[547] Ashley, 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space', 421.

struggles for recognition thus did not entail the pursuit of objective national interests, but rather goals 'dictated by concepts of *legitimacy*'.[548] Ashley similarly articulated this in his 1984 polemic 'The Poverty of Neorealism'. 'The power and status of an actor':

> depends on and is limited by the conditions of its *recognition* within a community as a whole. To have power, an agent must first secure its recognition as an agent capable of having power, and, to do that, it must first demonstrate its competence in terms of collective and coreflective structures…by which the community confers meaning and organises expectations. It is always by way of a performance in reference to such collectively "known" (but not necessarily intellectually accessible) generative schemes that actors gain recognition and are *empowered*.[549]

To illustrate the power of normative legitimacy in international politics, Fukuyama pointed, like most constructivists of the time, to the retreat of Soviet power in Central and Eastern Europe. How else to explain one of the most extraordinary peacetime shifts in balance of power, where the Warsaw Pact disintegrated, and a unified Germany emerged without any change in the distribution of capabilities? '(N)ot a single tank in Europe was destroyed in combat, or even displaced because of an arms control agreement.'[550] The case of Germany – where constructivism would, incidentally, find fertile soil – was the prime example of why realism was wrong. An empowered Germany would make Europeans more secure not less, since it was 'subrationally unthinkable' that developed liberal democracies could have imperial designs on neighbours. Meanwhile, a unified Germany would be socialised into the collaborative economic norms of the EC, becoming a valuable trading partner.[551] In short, what Fukuyama was suggesting was that anarchy was what thymotic states made of it. World politics was a normative universe in which 'the power of the powerless' could make itself felt via the demand for recognition: 'It does not matter how many tanks and planes a country has if its soldiers and airmen are not willing to get in them…Realists who look only at capabilities and not at intentions are at a loss when intentions change so radically.'[552]

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[548] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 257.
[549] Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', 259.
[550] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 258.
[551] Ibid., 276–84.
[552] Ibid., 258. Channelling Havel, Fukuyama's chapter critiquing realism was called "The Power of the Powerless".

Fukuyama does not recall reading Ashley or Wendt.[553] Though it is very possible he had read 'The Poverty of Neorealism' (as will become clear), Fukuyama was soon aware of both scholars and sympathetic to their critiques of realism. Fukuyama then reviewed two books by Hayward Alker, Ashley's close mentor, in *Foreign Affairs*. Alker's 1996 *Rediscoveries and Reformulations*, Fukuyama advised, was of limited foreign policy utility but 'worth it' for one 1986 essay called 'The Presumption of Anarchy in World Politics: On Recovering the Historicity of World Society.'[554] The essay, originally written for a book co-edited with Ashley called *After Neorealism*, offered a critique and transcendence of what both termed 'the anarchy problematique', the game-theoretic realist approach to IR which deduced the consequences of anarchy from Hobbesian microeconomic assumptions about state behaviour. It significantly drew on and quoted from Ashley, crediting him for revealing the social construction of a realist community in the 'reduction' of international politics to economic logic.[555] Meanwhile, Alker's edited *Challenging Boundaries* contained 'a number of useful critiques of positivistic social science, such as Jim George's discussion of realist theory.'[556] George's chapter criticised the closures of realist theory and pointed to ways beyond it through extended discussions of the work of Ashley, Robert Cox, and R.B.J Walker.[557] Reviewing Peter Katzenstein's 1996 edited volume *The Culture of National Security*, Fukuyama expressed admiration for constructivists such as Wendt, Thomas Risse, and Michael Barnett, welcoming them as 'younger scholars who have abandoned the realist model in favour of a much richer view that draws on concepts from sociology and cultural studies like norms and identities'.[558] Further, in 1998, Fukuyama reviewed Robert Jervis's *System Effects*, in which Jervis offered an alternative to Waltzian realism, partly engaging Wendt's critique to argue that social systems were complex, interconnected and unintentionally produced.[559] For Fukuyama, Jervis's book upgraded Waltz's 'highly reductionist' theory, proving that the international system 'was more than the sum of its parts.'[560] And, as seen, Fukuyama updated his critique of realism's

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553 Author's correspondence with Fukuyama, 26 March 2021.
554 Francis Fukuyama, 'Review of Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies, by Hayward R. Alker', *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 2 (1997): 176.
555 Hayward R. Alker, *Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 372, 383–86.
556 Francis Fukuyama, 'Review of Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities, by Michael Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker', *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 5 (1996): 137.
557 George, 'Understanding International Relations after the Cold War'.
558 Francis Fukuyama, 'Review of The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, by Peter J. Katzenstein', *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 3 (1997): 123–24.
559 Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 92–124.
560 Francis Fukuyama, 'Review of The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration, by Robert Axelrod and System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, by Robert Jervis', *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 2 (1998): 142.

reductionism through Tickner, Alker's wife, who debunked realism's gendered analogy of states to 'political man'.

However, the reductionism of realism produced what for Fukuyama was its most awful sin: 'it does not take account of history.'[561] This was the second part of the double move, the limiting of community and historical progress to the domestic realm. Citing Robert Cox's 1981 essay 'Social Forces, States and World Orders',[562] Fukuyama argued that

> (I)n sharp distinction to every other aspect of human political and social life, realism portrays international relations as isolated in a timeless vacuum, immune from the evolutionary processes taking place around it. But those apparent continuities in world politics from Thucydides to the Cold War in fact mask significant differences in the manner in which societies seek, control, and to relate to power.[563]

In claiming that realism ossified contingent recognition hierarchies, Fukuyama cited three specific pages from the middle of Cox's essay, suggesting that he had read it – and perhaps the seminal reader in which he had found it, Keohane's *Neorealism and its Critics*, which included Ashley's 'The Poverty of Neorealism' as the following chapter – carefully.[564]

Like Fukuyama, as we have seen, Cox opposed a whole post-war school of realism stretching from Morgenthau to Waltz (i.e. without making the classical/neo- distinction Ashley did).[565] Anticipating Fukuyama's delineation of the prescriptive and descriptive nature of realism, Cox contended that realism was not a value-free theory, since it would only be valid if leaders believed in its premises in a self-fulfilling manner. This followed from Cox's categorisation of realism as a 'problem-solving theory', defined by its ability to isolate a domain of social inquiry and fix its historical parameters as the given framework for human action. Aping natural science methods, its 'positivist' aim was to study such a closed system through empirical research, producing general laws of state behaviour that would then inform corrective action in the system.[566] As seen, Fukuyama similarly invoked a scientific metaphor to characterise post-war realism: the

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561 Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 258.
562 Ibid., 381n6.
563 Ibid., 259.
564 Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986).
565 Cox, 'Social Forces', 1986, 211. Cox termed this 'neorealism' to highlight an earlier 'historical' variant, a coinage that was focused on the Waltzian version by Ashley. The distinction is irrelevant here as Fukuyama applied their critiques to all post-war realists.
566 Ibid., 208, 242–43.

doctor prescribing cures for healthy patients. As he put it on the first page cited by Fukuyama, realism was an ideology committed to the 'defence of American power as a bulwark of the maintenance of order', performing a pragmatic 'proselytising function' that kept the hegemon from moralistic overreach.[567] Yet, as Fukuyama demonstrated, such a critique could also suit the goal of unleashing unipolar US power.

In the remaining pages cited by Fukuyama, Cox elaborated his Gramscian approach and its emancipatory promise. 'Theory', indeed, was 'always *for* someone and *for* some purpose'.[568] Immediately upon citing Cox, Fukuyama argued that international politics was indeed formed by class struggle: 'The desire of the masters for recognition, and not the structure of the state system, is the original cause of war. Imperialism and war are therefore related to a certain social class, the class of masters, otherwise known as the aristocracy.'[569] We have seen earlier how Fukuyama's arguments here connected to the ideas of constructivist and feminist IR during the Third Debate. To this we can now add Robert Cox and his critique of realism's ahistoricism. How, though, did connections travel in the other direction?

5.4 The End of History in Britain

As the Third Debate intensified at the turn of the 1990s, Cox's Gramscian School was marginalised within an increasingly post-Marxist critical constellation. As foundationalists and anti-foundationalists divided, their abovementioned theoretical 'attitudes' nevertheless mirrored end-of-history triumphalism, inspired as much by the dissidence and reformism of Havel and Gorbachev as the leftist struggles once animating critical social theory. One major indication of this was the increasing references to Anthony Giddens in IR, both by American constructivists but particularly scholars in the United Kingdom, whose IR community had long resisted US positivism, as we have seen. While critical IR theory originated largely in North America, now its centre of gravity moved towards Britain and Europe. British sociologist Giddens was then seeking intellectual support for a centrist ideology adapted to 'runaway' capitalist globalisation, where socialism was rejected but its emancipatory sheen retained through aspirational education and human rights advocacy.[570] Giddens's social theory, his 'Third Way' ideology, and the New Labour

[567] Ibid., 213.
[568] Ibid., 207.
[569] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 259.
[570] Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

government it influenced, attracted prominent British IR scholars, many of whom were drawn to the promise of 'ethical foreign policy'. Among them, Fukuyama found a most receptive audience.

In 1995, Giddens suggested through Polity Press a textbook on contemporary IR theory to Ken Booth and Steve Smith, both professors in the Department of International Politics (now known with the swish 'Interpol' nickname) at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth.[571] Founded in 1919 with liberal internationalist aims through the benefaction of Lord David Davies, the department was arguably the global hub of critical scholarship under the leadership of Smith – previously head of the Centre for Public Choice at the University of East Anglia, and later Exeter University Vice-Chancellor and President of Universities UK, where he would advocate marketisation processes in higher education. Through what Smith calls 'the roaring nineties and noughties', Aberystwyth became a veritable market of 'cutting-edge' critical ideas, driven by Smith's attempts to 'modernise' the department and excel in the government's controversial Research Assessment Exercise.[572] Faculty included Marysia Zalewski, Nicholas Wheeler, Tim Dunne, and Howard Williams, all of whom were involved in the 1995 volume or a major departmental anniversary conference in July 1994. While the conference and book debated the merits of IR's post-positivist phase and cemented Aberystwyth's place at the heart of IR's Great Debates,[573] *International Relations Theory Today* headed straight for 'the frontiers of international relations theory'.[574] For Smith, the most profound discussions and were among post-positivists, particularly between foundationalists and anti-foundationalists, propelling 'international theory towards the central debates within the other social sciences'.[575]

Perhaps IR's principal frontier question, suggested in opening chapters by Fred Halliday and Richard Little, was liberalism's global victory. For Halliday, professor at the London School of Economics (LSE) and prominent centre-left defender of 1990s interventions in the Balkans and Persian Gulf (as well as an major early pioneer of feminist IR), Fukuyama's argument was 'to a

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[571] Ken Booth and Steve Smith, 'Preface', in *International Relations Theory Today*, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), xii.
[572] Steve Smith, 'The Roaring Nineties and Noughties: The Transformation of the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth', Aberystwyth Department of International Politics Centenary Lecture, 5 March 2019. Available at: https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/interpol/about/centenary/events/steve-smith-the-roaring-nineties-and-noughties/.
[573] Attended by a transatlantic cast of scholars including Cynthia Enloe and Richard Ashley, the conference papers were published in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
[574] Booth and Smith, 'Preface', xi.
[575] Smith, 'The Self-Images of a Discipline', 30.

considerable degree valid. It is in this above all that the historic importance of 1989 consists'.[576] What 1989 signified was the collapse of one socio-economic system in the face of another, an international revolution misunderstood by IR's mainstream. Realism took for granted the contestation of capitalism but ignored the Cold War's 'inter-systemic' origin: the doomed Soviet desire to escape modernisation. The Cold War's end vindicated the inter-systemic view, Halliday believed, since it involved the 'unconditional surrender' of Soviet elites who had judged comparatively that Communist societies could not keep up with the West, particularly in consumer goods: 'it was the t-shirt, not the gunboat, that broke down the communist system's resistance to global capitalism'.[577] For Halliday there were now four empirical trends to analyse in IR: democratic peace and the end of great-power war; the political defeat of Communism and socialism; the fission and fusion of states; and the spread of democracy. These themes – well identified by Fukuyama – suggested for Halliday a programme of international 'historical sociology', focusing on the interaction between capitalism and states, and the homogenisation of international relations.[578] Following Halliday, historical sociology became a key 'critical' perspective in British IR and beyond through scholars such as Justin Rosenberg and John Hobson, though it is important to note that Halliday himself was not fond of being associated with postmodernists such as Richard Ashley. Nevertheless, Yosef Lapid, the principal stock-taker of the Third Debate saw him as a key post-positivist voice and historical sociology was recognised as such too.[579]

Homogenisation was for Halliday 'the unfinished business' of the Cold War, and 'the most fundamental' theoretical issue. Fukuyama was naïve about the stability and equality of democratic capitalism, but correct that 'no other plausible answer of global relevance' could challenge it.[580] Halliday argued that Fukuyama represented a tradition of thought subsuming transnational and state-centric IR theories within a synthesis connecting both to domestic politics.[581] Denoted by Halliday the tradition of 'international society as homogeneity', it saw international relations as driven by, and promoting homology between, the socio-economic and value systems of states.[582]

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[576] Fred Halliday, 'The End of the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic and Theoretic Conclusions', in *International Relations Theory Today*, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 41.
[577] Ibid., 48.
[578] Ibid., 51–57.
[579] Lapid, 'The Third Debate'; Steve Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond', in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11–44.
[580] Halliday, 'The End of the Cold War and International Relations', 59.
[581] Fred Halliday, 'International Society As Homogeneity: Burke, Marx, Fukuyama', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 21, no. 3 (1992): 435–61.
[582] Halliday, 'The End of the Cold War and International Relations', 49–51.

An uncontroversial idea in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Europe, Fukuyama helpfully reintroduced it after a century of global conflict, presenting an ontology of inter-societal processes of 'imitation, competition, and defensive modernisation, and influence'.[583] This was also normatively valuable, suggesting how a new liberal homogeneity could be realised, perhaps – as earlier homogeneity theorists such as Burke believed – through military intervention.[584] The end of history, for Halliday, was thus very much welcomed.

To understand the processes leading to it, however, Halliday turned not to Fukuyama, instead filtering the internationalist Marxism of his more radical youth – he had by this point fallen out with 'New Left' colleagues such as Perry Anderson, partly over his support for the US during the Gulf War – through sociological literature seeking to 'bring the state back in' to social analysis.[585] In a 1992 review of *The End of History* reiterating his above arguments, Halliday argued this was because Fukuyama's Hegelianism downplayed collective human agency.[586] Among others, Halliday sought to rectify this flaw through the reconstructive sociology of Giddens, and his focus on the state's role in facilitating global capitalism. A discussion of Halliday's use of Giddens is beyond this chapter's remit, but it is worth noting important institutional connections here, as Halliday sat on the committee to appoint Giddens LSE Director in 1996, the two forming a close relationship thereafter. Nevertheless, for Halliday it was still Fukuyama who had posed the important orienting questions for post-Cold War IR:

> The end of history may indeed mean the end of international relations as power politics. It may also presage the beginning of International Relations as a comprehensive and adequately theorised interpretation of the multiple dimensions of international society.[587]

In 'International Relations and the Triumph of Capitalism', Richard Little largely agreed. Via a lengthy discussion of *The End of History*, juxtaposed to Immanuel Wallerstein's Marxism, Little argued that Fukuyama was a 'critical theorist' in Cox's terms. That is, Fukuyama contemplated a world united by a common ideological base through an evolutionary theory of history, not simply seeking to analyse but transform international order.[588] On this account realism

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583 Halliday, 'International Society as Homogeneity', 458.
584 Ibid., 447–54.
585 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
586 Fred Halliday, 'An Encounter With Fukuyama', *New Left Review* 1, no. 193 (1992): 95.
587 Halliday, 'International Society as Homogeneity', 461.
588 Richard Little, 'International Relations and the Triumph of Capitalism', in *International Relations Theory Today*, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), 66.

was 'problem solving' and ideological, formulating theories reproducing power politics: 'Fukuyama…believes that realists are not only observers of international relations. He insists that they have had a decisive influence on the formulation of US foreign policy since the Second World War.'[589] Here, 'a self-fulfilling prophecy is…established, with foreign-policy makers assuming that the world is hostile and then acting in a way which justifies and reinforces this assumption'.[590] This was indeed what Fukuyama himself found useful in critical IR, though Little was seemingly unaware.

Like Halliday, Little believed post-war IR was silent about capitalism, framing the Cold War as a stable, non-ideological power structure. The collapse of bipolarity was therefore shocking to mainstream IR, since it was caused by evaporating support for Communism within the USSR rather than military weakness or defeat. Thus, Fukuyama's book had 'important implications for the theory of international relations'.[591] Little found Fukuyama's assertion that there were 61 stable democracies – the US the oldest – 'extremely questionable'. Nevertheless, Fukuyama was 'at liberty to speculate' whether human history had reached a point where the future could not improve the present.[592] This was justified by Fukuyama's historicism: the development of science historically undergirding capitalism and the state, and the struggle for recognition which saw humans interact on more than 'economistic' terms. Nor was Fukuyama a naïve triumphalist given his acceptance of the nation-state as a locus of identification into the near future, his distinction of ideal and reality, and his 'last man' concept.[593] Yet Fukuyama was not a 'problem solving theorist' as he located 'capitalism and its effect on international relations within a trans-historical framework' – 'the critical challenge to mainstream theorists in the study of international relations'.[594]

While Little admired Fukuyama's critical-theoretic sensibility, *The End of History* was also for him more an ontological and normative anchor than methodological or epistemological. Little also discussed Wallerstein's Marxism, which theorised a world-historical, internationalised conception of capitalism.[595] In this account, capitalism emerged in the sixteenth century and triumphed globally in the nineteenth, a steady core of Western states benefitting from the exploitation of 'semi-peripheral' and 'peripheral' spaces within a 'world system'. Despite constraints, it was possible to transform this system in a more equitable direction, particularly after

[589] Ibid., 71.
[590] Ibid., 84.
[591] Ibid., 67.
[592] Ibid., 68.
[593] Ibid., 73.
[594] Ibid., 86.
[595] Ibid., 75–76.

1989 without the USSR to unite core states under US power.[596] Wallerstein was important for Little in the 1990s, as he sought to engage world history and IR theory to comprehend international structural change. Little and his collaborator Barry Buzan developed prior critiques of Waltzian realism, first through a reconstructed 'structural realism', and subsequently reconvening the so-called 'English School', aiming to uncover 'logics of anarchy'.[597] Nonetheless, their description of the post-Cold War world hewed to Fukuyama's account, despite Wallerstein's useful world-historical method. As Buzan wrote, echoing Halliday's thoughts on the 'considerable validity' of Fukuyama's thesis: 'Fukuyama's liberal triumphalism is not without impressive foundations'. The case for the present as a 'historic turning point', he believed, rested on great-power democratic peace; the victory of capitalism; national self-determination and sovereign statehood; and science and technology.[598]

Assessing world order in a 1999 special issue of *Review of International Studies* marking a decade since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Buzan and Little agreed again with Fukuyama that democratic capitalism's spread meant peaceful intercourse and ethical intervention would largely replace geopolitics.[599] Yet the state would remain the principal actor in world politics, despite blurred sovereignty and powerful non-state agencies in 'developed' regions such as the EC. What was needed was an understanding of how different spaces related, in particular – here using Fukuyama's terminology – the 'post-historical zone of peace' and the 'historical zone of conflict'.[600] One answer they located in former Yugoslavia, where a welcome form of 'postmodern colonialism' saw liberal states engage in peacekeeping and human rights enforcement. However, putting themselves normatively at odds with Fukuyama, they considered such practices impossible outside Europe: 'the West did not try to recolonise and remake Iraq, Rwanda or Liberia, and nor will it do so'.[601] These were consistent themes of the special issue whose contributors also included Halliday, Ned Lebow and Chris Brown, the editors Booth, Dunne and Michael Cox noting how 'several of the authors…express more than a passing sympathy with [Fukuyama's] way of defining the problem, without necessarily agreeing with his philosophical method…or his triumphal conclusions'.[602] The value of the English School, Buzan and Little believed, was its comprehension

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[596] Ibid., 81.
[597] Barry Buzan, Richard Little, and Charles Jones, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993).
[598] Barry Buzan, 'The Present as a Historic Turning Point', *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 4 (1995): 293.
[599] Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 'Beyond Westphalia? Capitalism after the "Fall"', *Review of International Studies* 25 (1999): 89–104.
[600] Ibid., 101.
[601] Ibid., 103.
[602] Michael Cox, Ken Booth, and Tim Dunne, 'Introduction: The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics, 1989-99', *Review of International Studies* 25 (1999): 5.

of how different 'zones' of international relations operated, related, and changed without assuming historical directionality. 'International systems', 'international societies', and 'world societies' operated on an ontological continuum not conveyor belt, necessitating a 'great conversation' among mainstream and critical theorists.[603]

Yet this caused divergence from an increasingly influential cosmopolitan 'normative theory'. Even more enamoured with Fukuyama, Howard Williams was representative. An Aberystwyth professor from 1992, Williams argued in a series of books for merging IR and political theory amidst capitalist interdependence.[604] He concurred with Giddens and David Held – British sociologists 'in the forefront of trying to conceptualise society globally' – that globalised capitalism was 'typical of modernity' and demanded 'a new type of social and political theory'.[605] Political theory focused excessively on the good life domestically, ignoring how its utopias could be impacted by international processes, while IR overlooked how political theory engaged issues of international justice.[606] Williams pursued this rapprochement through schematic expositions of the international ideas of canonical political thinkers – 'masters of political thought' who provided 'valuable and stimulating starting points'.[607] Kant's ideas were 'particularly helpful', containing 'a great deal of good sense' in an age of European integration and ''ethical statesmanship'.[608]

Exploring how Kantian norms could be furthered in the present, Williams's inquiries extended to contemporary thought. He saw hope in the international legal possibilities of Jürgen Habermas's 'universal communication community'.[609] Yet, as his 1997 book *Francis Fukuyama and the End of History* suggested, Fukuyama was just as useful a methodological and epistemological inspiration. Here, Williams offered the first book-length discussion of Fukuyama's work and its implications for philosophy of history, providing a detailed and near-hagiographical exposition of *The End of History* and its relationship to Kant, Hegel and Marx. While Fukuyama's historical speculations were not entirely accurate empirically, Williams believed they spoke 'very directly to…the preoccupations which dominate our thinking at the end of the twentieth century': '*The*

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603 Barry Buzan, 'The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR', *Review of International Studies* 27, no. 3 (2001): 471–88. It was common in this period to associate the revived English School with the critical movement in IR, though whether the likes of Hedley Bull and Martin Wight would have supported it is unclear.
604 Howard Williams, *International Relations in Political Theory* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992); Howard Williams, *International Relations and the Limits of Political Theory* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996).
605 Williams, *International Relations and the Limits of Political Theory*, 142.
606 Ibid., 155.
607 Williams, *International Relations in Political Theory*, 131.
608 Ibid., 137.
609 Williams, *International Relations and the Limits of Political Theory*, 162–63.

End of History…is a speculative piece for our times, perhaps marking a watershed period in world history and in the development of relations among states'.[610] Its accomplishment, Williams argued, was to revive philosophy of history in normative theory, providing historical support to the argument for liberal progress. Further, it uniquely figured America as the engine of emancipation, a welcome move since 'the people of the United States will take the rest of the world with them in whatever direction they may choose to go'.[611] This was 'the most fascinating part of Fukuyama's work' and 'much to be preferred to the gloomy prognosis of Huntington because it does at least encourage us to expect more of those societies which lie outside the advanced Western world'.[612]

Through a Marxist-Hegelian philosophical history and developmental historical sociology, Andrew Linklater similarly saw progression towards a Kantian 'kingdom of ends', and theoretical movement towards Habermasian critical theory.[613] This cosmopolitan *telos* would see a global legal and political system transcend nation-states and protect human rights, a normative vision developed in conversation with Giddens and Held, and Booth's approach to human security.[614] As Beate Jahn noted in 1998, it was 'reminiscent…also of Francis Fukuyama's end of history'.[615]

Like Buzan and Little, Linklater believed the English-School system-society triad remained relevant, since the kingdom remained unrealised even in the EC. In a 1992 paper – presented at a workshop on post-Cold-War order at which Halliday delivered a draft of his *International Theory Today* chapter –[616] Linklater examined Fukuyama's argument and developed its normative implications. He found persuasive Fukuyama's 'zones', ranging from spaces approximating world society to others an international system, but also feared for 'rule of the strong': 'On the subject of how liberal governments should conduct relations with societies which are culturally and politically different, Fukuyama is remarkably silent.'[617] Instead of democracy promotion, Linklater argued the 'new world order' should be based on 'constitutionalism', setting an example by

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[610] Howard Williams, David Sullivan, and Gwynn Matthews, *Francis Fukuyama and the End of History* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1997), 160.
[611] Ibid., 178.
[612] Ibid., 177.
[613] Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
[614] Author's interview with Andrew Linklater, 30 June 2020.
[615] Beate Jahn, 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Critical Theory as the Latest Edition of Liberal Idealism', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 27, no. 3 (1998): 635.
[616] Linklater recalls that, like Halliday, he took Fukuyama seriously. Author's interview with Andrew Linklater, 30 June 2020.
[617] Andrew Linklater, 'Liberal Democracy, Constitutionalism, and the New World Order', in *Charting the Post-Cold War Order*, ed. Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 33.

respecting legal constraints on force. This was 'the first hallmark of an ethical foreign policy', elsewhere described as 'good international citizenship'.[618] Booth shared this qualified support, going further in his cosmopolitan goals while resisting new-world-order crusades. For him, Fukuyama's thesis was 'flawed' and 'astonishing historical parochialism' since ideological challenges to liberalism remained likely, evidence for democratic peace limited, and environmental dangers widespread. 'World society' values of non-violence, human rights, economic justice, and environmentalism were best realised through 'trans-national social movements' and 'a multi-layered, patchwork system of governance'.[619] Nevertheless, Fukuyama had established 'an important benchmark' and 'a comprehensive and important account of the Cold War and beyond'. Liberal democratic capitalism was 'a very powerful force', and there was an 'obvious element of truth' in the idea that democracy was 'the height of political rationality'.[620]

5.5 Conclusion

Smith does not mention this broader political context of these 'roaring' years for British and critical IR at Aberystwyth. Yet even as post-positivists reacted forcefully against realist and US dominance of IR, it is interesting that their politics often did not match their radical disciplinary reputation. While realists would mount forceful public critiques of post-Cold War 'liberal hegemony', critical scholars converged with US neoconservatives to undercut this opposition. This chapter has demonstrated how this convergence became a sympathetic and fruitful engagement across the Atlantic, uncovering significant connections and affinities between Fukuyama's end of history thesis and Third Debate critical theories. Doing so offers fresh historical perspectives on the intellectual foundations of Fukuyama's thesis and neoconservatism, showing also that the storied ferment of the Third Debate disguised the implication of prominent critical voices – particularly from the 'foundational' wing – in a closing down of actual political possibility.

This story has several implications for IR, reflecting the broader contributions of this thesis. For one, it shows that the boundaries between theory and practice are not clean-cut,

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[618] Ibid., 38. Nevertheless, Wheeler and Dunne adapted Linklater's concept in their articulation of a "Third Way for British foreign policy" under the first Blair government. This "critical approach" entailed "a duty to use force…to maintain peace and security, or to stop genocide or mass murder" – in "exceptional cases" without UN sanction. Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, 'Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy', *International Affairs* 74, no. 4 (1998): 869.
[619] Ken Booth, 'Cold Wars of the Mind', in *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond*, ed. Ken Booth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 52.
[620] Ibid., 46–47.

reinforcing the metatheoretical claims of critical theorists and the idea that the Third Debate had 'real-world' referents, albeit turning attention to features of the external ideological context disciplinary lore overlooked. The chapter thus highlights the limits of 'internalist' methodological approaches to disciplinary history, demonstrating that connecting academic theories to their political context aids rather than hinders comprehension of their meaning.[621] At the same time, boundaries within IR theory have been blurred – particularly between liberal and critical theories – questioning paradigmatic thinking and the common IR assumption that political radicalism and opposition to positivism necessarily go together. The celebratory story of the Third Debate thus muddies the actual history of the discipline, as it shrouds the ideological valence of much of the metatheoretical ferment. Celebration in this context seems in fact to have dovetailed neatly with liberal triumphalism of the end of history age. Therefore, there was, despite the undeniable *intellectual* opening up of the discipline during the late twentieth century, a continuity from the deep past of the discipline in terms of the legacy of Eurocentrism (or more specifically Eurocentric liberalism of the type popular on one side of the First Great Debate). That the Aberystwyth department should have maintained this continuity is also intriguing. This chapter thus supports John Hobson's thesis that IR theory since its origins through to the critical turn has sought to 'celebrate or defend Western civilisation as the subject of, and ideal normative referent in, world politics'.[622] Such a definition of Eurocentrism surely applies to many of the ideas discussed above. At the same time, the chapter highlights how in this end-of-history context, this celebration and defence of Western civilisation also entailed a critique of neorealist state-centrism. This is not to resurrect realism as a source of anti-imperial critique, which in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war today would be difficult to defend, but rather to note that the effects of Eurocentrism play out in actual historical argumentative battles and not through abstract theoretical logic.

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[621] Cf. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*. As mentioned, by connecting IR with broader intellectual and institutional sites of knowledge such as the neoconservative movement, the approach here has certain affinities with Duncan Bell's 'histories of the global'. See chapter 2.

[622] Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*.

6. A History of the International Studies Association

6.1 Introduction

As noted in the introduction, a complete account of all the intellectual and institutional developments within IR during the late twentieth century is of course impossible in the space of one study. The intricacies of debates between neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists,[623] 'critical' and 'conventional' constructivists in the 1990s,[624] and so on, await further studies of IR in the late twentieth century. These are future research paths this thesis hopefully opens. What this thesis aims at instead is simply a story of what is taken to be three (transnational and interconnected) processes of change that transformed IR in this period: namely intellectual diversification, institutional expansion, and disciplinary self-reflection. To this end, this chapter takes a step back from the largely chronological narrative recounted so far to provide a history of one of the most important institutions of IR's recent past, and its place within the preceding story. The North American International Studies Association (ISA) is the world's largest and most well-known professional society for the study and teaching of international affairs. Founded in 1959 as a regional organisation dedicated to improving research and education in the International Relations (IR) discipline, it has grown to over 7000 members from 100 countries and a variety of theoretical perspectives and academic disciplines worldwide.[625] Yet, despite this and a booming literature on the history of IR covering institutions as well as ideas, little serious scholarly attention – save for some elegant, but brief, restatements of individual memory – has been paid to ISA's origins and development.

Using untapped archival material and interviews and correspondence with key historical institution-builders, this chapter addresses this gap by offering a first reconstruction of ISA's history from its origins in the 1950s to the early years of the twenty-first century. It argues that despite unfulfilled aims of interdisciplinary synthesis and institutional hegemony, ISA has not only reflected but shaped the evolution of IR into an intellectually pluralistic and increasingly global social science. The chapter contextualises this history amidst developments within the academy

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[623] Joseph S. Nye, 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism', *World Politics* 40, no. 2 (1988): 235–51; David Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993).
[624] Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*; Ted Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200; Alexander E. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
[625] Data available at https://www.isanet.org/ISA/About-ISA/Data , accessed February 5, 2023.

and the world at large across four main periods of growth: maturation from Western regional origins to national status (c.1959-65); intellectual diversification and internationalisation (c.1965-80); abortive globalisation (c.1980-95); and non-hierarchical globalisation and expansion (c.1995-2010). In this way, the chapter not only corrects a significant blind spot in IR's understanding of its past, but also opens space to consider how the discipline and its major professional society may evolve again in the present and future. These latter concerns will be taken up more fully in the concluding chapter.

Before proceeding further, however, one question again needs to be confronted: if ISA's history is so important, why have historians ignored it? This indeed returns us to issues addressed in the introduction to this thesis. Again, the two obvious explanations for this oversight – that ISA's history is too recent to study objectively and that no archives exist – are unconvincing. As noted, it is perfectly legitimate and worthwhile to study the post-1970 and even post-millennium periods as 'history', provided various sources are consulted and handled carefully.[626] Studying the recent past in fact means fewer sources are likely to have been lost, including memories of living scholars who can inform the historian's interpretation of events. This chapter thus makes use of useful interview and correspondence material with figures such as Margaret Hermann and Barry Buzan, sources which would be much less available in earlier periods.[627] It is also not the case that relevant records have been classified or hidden for a certain period. As mentioned, ISA retains an extensive (if unofficial) archive of historical documents at the University of Connecticut, which I was granted permission to consult and cite.[628] It is not lack of access to the past that has prevented ISA's history from being studied. There is also no dearth of interest among IR's disciplinary historians in academic institutions per se, nor is ISA's history so widely known that it is not worth researching – the two other obvious explanations. The International Studies Conference (ISC), which predated ISA by decades, is the subject of several major studies by David Long and Jo-Anne Pemberton among others, as we have seen.[629] And while many IR scholars can recall certain periods of ISA's development – including its early years – it is surely better to record these memories while they are fresh rather than lose them to time. Furthermore, as disciplinary historians have themselves shown, collective memory is often mistaken and requires amending through

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[626] Barraclough, *An Introduction to Contemporary History*.
[627] This is certainly not to suggest I am the first disciplinary historian to make use of oral history methods, or that such methods are only possible for reconstructing the recent past. Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*; Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment*; Dunstan, 'Women's International Thought in the Twentieth Century Anglo-American Academy'.
[628] Author's correspondence with Mark A. Boyer, July 28, 2022.
[629] Long, 'Who Killed the International Studies Conference?'; Pemberton, *The Story of International Relations, Part Three: Cold Blooded Idealists*.

historical research into primary documentary material.[630] Indeed, the account of ISA's past that do exist are largely brief and based on the memories of early members rather than historical research, and the most thorough by former President Henry Teune only takes us to 1980.[631] What these accounts have gotten right and wrong and/or missed will be highlighted in what follows.

Like the history of IR during the late twentieth century more generally, then, there is no obvious reason why ISA's past has been neglected. As this thesis has argued, the true reason likely lies in the history of IR's disciplinary history literature itself. Motivated by a critique of popular understandings of IR's history – notably the 'Great Debates' narrative of scientific progress – disciplinary historians have (with some exceptions) focused on highlighting the continuities and relevance of IR's deep past for the present, rather than the field's evolution over time. This has meant an outsize focus on IR's origins in the early-to-mid-twentieth century and on debunking the 'myth of the First Great Debate', at the expense of the latter third of the century and beyond. In this context, ISA was bound to be overlooked by a literature more interested in precursors such as the ISC. At the same time, if ISA's neglected history highlights a methodological bias of disciplinary historians towards IR's formative periods, it also supports many findings from their research. As we shall see, the second and third 'Great Debates' also did not occur precisely as their textbook renditions suggest.

The chapter proceeds in four sections corresponding to the phases mentioned above – with the middle two slightly longer than the first and last – followed by a conclusion. The first surveys how ISA originated in a series of IR teaching seminars in Western and Midwestern USA in the mid-1950s, establishing itself as a national membership organisation with a journal, annual convention, and several sub-regions by 1965. It analyses ISA's early purposes and activities, showing that the Association was an information-sharing mechanism for political scientists who sought a coherent and practical science of IR – protagonists of the 'Second Great Debate' – but who felt isolated both from each other and developments in other disciplines. The chapter then examines a transformative period between the mid-1960s and 1980. Driven by increasing

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[630] As Robert Vitalis commented to the author, the impulse of revisionist disciplinary history came from 'seeing the flaws of oral histories' and a desire to construct 'coherent stories' from actual historical artefacts. Author's interview with Robert Vitalis, 30 November 2021.

[631] Teune's account was an attempt to record a history of ISA at its 25th anniversary for the benefit of a new generation of members and leaders, and in the context what we will see were rapid changes to the Association at the time. Brief recent overviews by Ole Holsti and Michael Haas offer some interesting general insights into ISA's formative years but like Teune are light on detail, particularly after 1980. Teune, 'The International Studies Association'; Ole Holsti, 'Present at the Creation' (Unpublished Address to the Annual Meeting of ISA-West, 27 September 2014, 2014), https://www.isanet.org/Portals/0/Documents/Institutional/Holsti_ISA_West.pdf; Michael Haas, *International Relations Theory: Competing Empirical Paradigms* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 1–31.

awareness of an interdependent world within IR and a vocal 'peace research' community, ISA gradually became more intellectually diverse and international in character, as well as structurally complex. More than reflecting IR's external evolution, ISA became a forum for disciplinary agenda setting and credentialling through thematic 'sections', scholarly prizes, and an annual 'presidential address', as well as the seed for a network of like associations around the world. During the subsequent third phase, major developments included a controversial pursuit of membership on UNESCO's Social Science Council and expansion of the associate network, and a 'post-positivist' intellectual turn as the Cold War ended. By 1990, ISA was being forced from within and without to relinquish pretensions of becoming a global 'association of associations', catalysing IR's professional institutionalisation elsewhere, particularly in Europe. The fourth section thus outlines ISA's pursuit of a 'non-hierarchical' form of globalisation from the mid-1990s through the 2000s. During this period, ISA focused on growing and diversifying the global membership and representing their interests in a suite of new sections, journals, and 'caucuses'.

By 2010, ISA was recognisably the institution it is today, with a membership above 6000, an elaborate structure of sections, committees, and caucuses, and an annual convention of truly gigantic proportion. Yet with this has emerged growing concerns about intellectual fragmentation, the representation of historically marginalised groups (particularly from the Global South), and the Eurocentric character of the research ISA has traditionally housed. The chapter's conclusion outlines changes that have occurred within ISA over the last decade, arguing that while seemingly threatening certain legacies of the Association's history, these recent developments continue core paths laid through the late twentieth century. The conclusion then explains how the story of ISA highlights the complex interplay between processes of intellectual diversification, institutional expansion, and disciplinary self-reflection in IR's recent past.

6.2 The Early Years: From Region to Nation, c.1959-65

Likely not without some truth, a common story is that ISA grew out of general dissatisfaction with the American Political Science Association (APSA) for its neglect of the International Relations (IR) subfield.[632] Accounts at the time suggest it more specifically grew out of a series of teaching seminars held at the State University of Iowa and San Francisco State College between 1955 and

[632] This idea seems to have been popularised by a widely circulated speech by Henry Teune on ISA's history from a 1982 leaders' conference on the future of ISA, and repeated elsewhere by Ole Holsti and Michael Haas. See Teune, 'The International Studies Association', 1–2; Holsti, 'Present at the Creation', 2; Haas, *International Relations Theory: Competing Empirical Paradigms*, 10.

1958.[633] Attended predominantly by younger scholars from Western United States, the seminars sought to address a sense of isolation felt among a new generation of International Relations (IR) specialists in post-war USA. Though rapidly growing, IR nevertheless occupied a rather constrained position within American political science, and there was a desire to raise its profile and integrate a fragmented literature bearing upon a science of the international system within and – increasingly – beyond the discipline and across sectors and 'levels of analysis'.[634] This was felt particularly across Western and Midwestern regions, where behavioural-scientific and systems approaches were being pioneered at institutions including Stanford's Centre for Advanced Study in the Behavioural Sciences and Michigan's Centre for Research on Conflict Resolution,[635] but institutional separation, a growing literature, and meagre graduate training made it difficult for scholars to keep up with new developments. The seminars were thus designed to improve scholars' grasp of emerging work and the intellectual coherence of their teaching and research.[636] ISA was an attempt to provide a permanent centre for such information sharing, aimed at cumulative science and better-informed foreign policy.[637] Several seminar participants, including Vernon Van Dyke, Charles McClelland, Fred Sondermann, and Richard C. Snyder, would occupy key leadership roles in ISA's early years and the journal *Background* (a quarterly digest of IR-relevant research sponsored by the Association from 1962).[638] While dissatisfaction with APSA seems likely to have

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[633] See especially Fred A. Sondermann, 'The Merger', *Background* 6, no. 1/3 (1962): 3–4. A slightly different account was provided by Vincent Davis, ISA's first Executive Director. While Sondermann – ISA's third President – discussed seminars at Iowa and San Francisco in 1955 and 1958 respectively (stating the latter as particularly foundational), Davis mentioned a 1956 Iowa teaching seminar and a 1959 founding meeting at the University of California, Berkeley, in his 1976 Presidential Address: 'Presidential Address', *ISA Newsletter*, May 1976. International Studies Association Archive. Held every summer from 1955 to 1957 and funded by the Ford Foundation, the Iowa seminars were documented in published reports though these do not mention ISA. I found no record of other meetings apart from brief descriptions by Sondermann and Davis.

[634] Teune, 'The International Studies Association', 2–3; Haas, *International Relations Theory: Competing Empirical Paradigms*, 10–11. Margaret Hermann also supports this view, though suggests the original founders wanted more scholars from other disciplines to participate than ultimately did. Author's interview with Margaret Hermann, 8 February 2023.

[635] Disciplinary historian Nicolas Guilhot has excellently surveyed the scientisation of post-war IR theory yet curiously overlooks ISA's founding. The founding of ISA and its links to foundation and policy circles supports his narrative of a redistribution of scientific authority within US IR from the East Coast 'classical realists' to the 'cool young men' of Western laboratories. See especially Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment*, 184–219. It also supports Vitalis' claim that a race relations focus was replaced by a state-centric one.

[636] For the reports on which this paragraph is based see Sondermann, 'The Merger'; Vernon Van Dyke, 'The Improvement of Teaching in International Relations: The Iowa Seminars', *American Political Science Review* 51, no. 2 (1957): 579–81; Ronald J. Yalem, 'The Ford Foundation Seminars on International Politics', *Background* 7, no. 2 (1963): 65–75.

[637] Sondermann, 'The Merger', 3.

[638] Created in 1956 under the lengthier title *Background on World Politics*, this journal also grew out of the Iowa seminars but would remain separate from ISA until 1962. H. Dicken Cherry, 'An Introduction to Background', *Background on World Politics* 5, no. 1 (1961): iii; Sondermann, 'The Merger'.

been part of the rationale behind ISA, more research into the exact details of the discussions during these meetings in the mid-to-late 1950s is necessary to establish this as historical fact.[639]

ISA's first Constitution stated its purpose was to promote contact between IR and other disciplines, through inter alia 'periodic professional meetings…professional exchanges and the diffusion of information about developments in international studies.'[640] The first President was Minos Generales, an IR professor and long-time Director of the Institute on World Affairs at San Diego State College, with the first annual convention hosted at the University of California, Berkeley, on 14 April 1960.[641] The annual convention was ISA's only major activity at this time, organised and attended by a relatively small, typically white and male, assembly of scholars and policy practitioners keen to learn of new ideas in and around the IR discipline. An emphasis on the scholar-practitioner interface was indeed one of the hallmarks of ISA's early years. Central figures such as McClelland received research funds from the Department of Defense, while the geographical location of the Association lent itself to links with the Air Force and RAND Corporation.[642] Until 1964, conventions were held in conjunction with the Western Political Science Association (WPSA). Early convention themes included: 'Is there a Discipline of International Relations?'; 'The Cold War: An Interdisciplinary Inquiry'; and 'The Physical Scientists and their Conception of International Politics'. Though 'realist' systems approaches were predominant in ISA during these years, a wide berth was also given to interdisciplinary peace research in its leadership teams, publications, and conventions – a preface, perhaps, to a broader opening up that would occur from the mid-1960s.

After an initial burst, the Association's membership collapsed to under 60 in 1963. A decision was made that ISA needed to expand beyond its regional base and offer more and better services to members. Under the presidency of John Gange, a membership drive was initiated, and a two-year, $30,000 Carnegie Endowment grant acquired for a permanent headquarters and salaried staff at the University of Denver, with Vincent Davis as the first Executive Director. ISA

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[639] I searched in vain for minutes of the meetings in the ISA Archive, which is light on material before c.1965.
[640] '1960 Constitution'. Documents of incorporation as a Colorado non-profit, August 1965. ISA Archive.
[641] A copy of the 1960 Constitution states that it was adopted 'by unanimous vote in plenary session of the first meeting of the Association, at Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley, California, April 14, 1960.' '1960 Constitution'. Documents of incorporation as a Colorado non-profit, August 1965. ISA Archive.
[642] Wesley Posvar of the Air Force Academy was, for instance, ISA's second President and later played a role in the successful transfer of the ISA Headquarters to the University of Pittsburgh where he was appointed Chancellor in 1967. Many key early figures, including peace researchers such as Robert North, had also fought in the Pacific theatre during the Second World War. Author's interview with Margaret Hermann, 8 February 2023.

was officially incorporated as a non-profit organisation in August 1965. Following the model of WPSA and others, regional affiliates of the new 'ISA National' coalesced (albeit encompassing certain adjacent Canadian areas), beginning with Midwest and Southern divisions in 1964, and followed by Southwest, West, New England, Middle Atlantic, and Washington Capital divisions in 1965 and 1966.[643] The opportunity for individual members to participate in regional affiliates was included in a yearly membership due of $5 ($3.50 for students), as was subscription to *Background* and a regular Association newsletter beginning in summer 1964. As Charles Hermann points out, the regional conferences performed a valuable professionalisation function by making it easier for 'young people to get on the programme and meet people' (costs of travel to the national convention being often prohibitive).[644] They also offered an opportunity for women to begin to play leadership roles within the Association, though it would not be until the mid-1980s that any conscious effort was made to increase women's involvement at ISA.[645]

In perhaps the most symbolic move, after 1966, *Background* would rebrand as *International Studies Quarterly* under the editorship of Sondermann, a more formal journal of original articles that would come to occupy a major position in IR and beyond. Carrying in its first issue original articles by scholars including Bruce Russett, Irving Louis Horowitz, and William Caspary, *ISQ* aimed, as then President Van Dyke put it in an introductory note,

> to be a journal of the highest quality, carrying articles from various disciplines and perspectives bearing on international relations. The International Studies Association shares these goals and will provide all possible support.[646]

6.3 Intellectual Diversification and Internationalisation, c.1965-80

With its establishment as a national organisation, ISA entered what Vincent Davis in a membership plea of February 1966 termed 'a critical and challenging new stage' in its history.[647] Membership, conference sizes, and journal subscriptions were already swelling – the first alone was at 450 by summer 1965 and would touch 1000 by 1970 – but growing too was the need to reflect a discipline

[643] Washington Capital was technically classed as a 'metropolitan chapter'. A later Philadelphia chapter was also formed along these lines.
[644] Author's correspondence with Charles Hermann, 24 January 2023.
[645] Author's interview with Margaret Hermann, 8 February 2023.
[646] Vernon Van Dyke, 'Under New Management', *International Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (1967): 2.
[647] 'A Critical and Challenging New Stage in the History of the International Studies Association', *ISA Newsletter*, February 1966. ISA Archive.

whose identity was being destabilised by an increasingly interconnected world. Central here was emergence of common problems at a global level that 'spilled over' state boundaries and required knowledge of multiple social domains and coordinated, cross-national solutions – above all the threat of nuclear annihilation, resource depletion and environmental collapse, and economic interdependence.[648] Part of this story was touched upon in chapter 3, and it is striking that it had such an effect within ISA. Yet despite interdisciplinarity being an original stated goal of ISA, the early years had focused largely on improving the coherence, visibility, and practical relevance of IR as a (American) political science subdiscipline.[649] If ideas and scholars from other fields were entertained, they were used primarily to develop knowledge of interstate politics as a distinct social domain. Despite an original desire to develop IR by looking beyond the bounds of political science, ISA remained dominated by the parent discipline not just in its membership make-up and journal content, but also its affiliative ties to WPSA (abovementioned) and APSA (at whose convention each year a special 'ISA Luncheon' and later Governing Council meetings were customarily held). In this context, a conscious effort was now made to nurture a more intellectually diverse and international organisation.

Intellectual diversification largely entailed facilitating more scholars from the margins of IR and from other disciplines to participate in ISA, particularly comparative social scientists who were well-placed to assess the effects of common problems on different countries.[650] This created a tension with the original core focus of ISA – the international system of states –[651] but ultimately this was resolved in favour of allowing for a pluralism of approaches within the Association. Alongside electing more non-political scientists to leadership positions, there were two major steps taken in these years towards intellectually diversifying ISA.

A first step was to construct a system of committees and, especially, 'sections' within the Association. While committees evaluated and made recommendations on specific ISA functions – including, but not limited to, developing interdisciplinary and international connections – sections were envisaged as miniature professional societies organised by research area or method, conducting activities and charging dues under ISA auspices. Sections not only reflected and moulded the maturing 'subfield' structure of IR, but also were attempts to enhance intellectual communication by mapping the field's growing diversity and bringing together scholars across disciplines to tackle issues of global concern. Informal organisation of sections began in the mid-

[648] Teune, 'The International Studies Association', 5.
[649] Author's interview with Margaret Hermann, 8 February 2023.
[650] Author's interview with Margaret Hermann, 8 February 2023.
[651] Teune, 'The International Studies Association', 6.

1960s, with the first two – Comparative Interdisciplinary Studies (CISS) and International Organisation – officially chartered in spring 1971.[652] As Teune pointed out, the explicit purpose of CISS, a highly popular and active early ISA section with its own subnetworks (or 'Internets), was to address '(c)ommon problems that spilled over national boundaries' through '(c)omparative methodology and the perspectives of more than one discipline'.[653] By 1980, Interpolimetrics (forerunner of Scientific Study of International Processes), Military Studies, Foreign Policy, International Political Economy, International Law, Peace Studies, Education, Environmental Studies, and American-Soviet Relations sections had formed. Such networks attracted scholars from a wider variety of disciplines including Economics and History to participate in ISA and added to the Association's offering through smaller section meetings and publications,[654] sponsored convention panels, and supporting a new ISA-wide journal for state-of-the-art research and curriculum 'notes' (precursor of the current *International Studies Perspectives*).[655]

The next task was to revise ISA's governance to reflect and manage this enlarged structure. This had partly been anticipated in 1965 by the creation of a powerful 'Governing Council' consisting of ISA's executive officers (President, Vice President, and Executive Director), the immediate past President and Vice President, the Editor and Associate Editor of *Background/ISQ*, and regional division chairs.[656] From the early to mid-1970s, however, a series of constitutional reforms were passed not only to recognise the newer subunits but also expand the Association's leadership and provide it with a civic role. Henceforth, two Vice Presidents and Presidents past and elect would join the Executive Committee and the Governing Council expanded to include section chairs, while the position of President took on a grander significance as proposer of policies to advance the interests of the Association. It is also undeniable that the broader allure and status of the Presidency began to rise during this period. Indeed, it is no devaluation of earlier Presidents – without whose vital institutional work ISA could not have become what it is – to suggest that it was only from the late 1960s that the ISA Presidency began to attract and index academic 'stardom' such as a William T.R. Fox (1972-73), Kenneth Boulding (1974-75), or Herbert Kelman (1977-78).[657] It was thus becoming clear, as is the argument of this chapter, that ISA as an institution was

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[652] 'Minutes of the Meeting of the Governing Council, 17-18 March 1971'. ISA Archive.
[653] Teune, 'The International Studies Association', 5.
[654] In addition to hosting their own conferences, sections often published newsletters and occasional papers or even book series. A widely circulated 'CISS Bulletin' was perhaps the most visible of these section publications in the early years.
[655] Carl Beck and Karen Eide Rawling, 'An Editorial Comment...', *International Studies Notes* 1, no. 1 (1974).
[656] 'The Recent ISA National Convention', *ISA Newsletter*, August 1965. ISA Archive
[657] It is also important to note that two of these figures – Boulding and Kelman – were not part of the IR subdiscipline of political science in the United States but economics and psychology respectively. This again testifies to the efforts of ISA to become more interdisciplinary in these years.

shaping IR as an intellectual field itself, in particular by providing legitimacy to particular scholars and their various research programmes. What is interesting is that very few canonical 'realists' who were said to have dominated the post-war study of IR in the United States – Fox excepted – played a major role in ISA leadership even in its early years. This is not to suggest that realism was never dominant in IR, but it does again suggest a picture of the character of the discipline in the United States that the uniform 'American social science' thesis suggests. Yet legitimising diverse research programmes was not the only way in which the institutional structure and activities of the Association impacted upon IR as a discipline. Opportunities for agenda setting and credentialling mattered, too.

In the years before open elections, the chief medium for transmitting the President's vision for ISA and the field to members was an inaugural address delivered at the Annual Convention, a tradition begun by Robert North in 1969.[658] Early presidential addresses, including North's on 'ISA and Problems of the World Future', testified to the newfound commitment of ISA to interdisciplinary, global problem-solving (as did the granting in 1974 of the first named Association prize, the Sprout and Sprout Award for the best book on ecological issues). With North as President and Nazli Choucri appointed to the first Sprout Award committee, it was clear more global theoretical perspectives – including North and Choucri's 'lateral pressure' peace research framework encountered in chapter 4 – were making their influence felt within the Association and discipline more broadly. Similar to the journal *Millennium*'s 'rising orb' mentioned in chapter 3, ISA also created a logo for itself in line with the globalist tenor of the 1970s, featuring a silhouette of a dove carrying an olive branch overlaying the Earth. ISA appeared to be taking seriously the interconnection and interdependence of nations, and problems of the world future rather than simply the international system of states. The start of the 1970s, as Henry Teune has rightly pointed out, thus 'marked a clear turning point in the intellectual direction of ISA toward the world'.[659]

Aided by a Committee on Transnational Activities and abetted by a Ford Foundation grant through the early 1970s, ISA's internationalisation also proceeded in two directions. First, from the mid-1960s the Association began to facilitate international membership and convention attendance, beginning with funding travel grants for the latter (particularly from Asia),[660]

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[658] These were initially published in the newsletter before the current practice of appearing in *ISQ*. 'ISA and Problems of the World Future', *ISA Newsletter*, October 1969. ISA Archive.
[659] Teune, 'The International Studies Association', 3.
[660] From early on, the Asia Foundation had provided funds for Asian scholars – particularly from South Korea, Taiwan, India, and Vietnam – to attend ISA conventions and become members. A 1979 membership survey revealed 108 ISA members were from Asia, the largest of any continent outside North America and larger even than Canada (which had hosted two conventions during the 1970s). 'Membership Survey', *ISA Newsletter*, November 1979. ISA Archive.

introducing reduced foreign member dues, and internationalising *ISQ*'s editorial board. From its first volume, in fact, *ISQ*'s board admitted three scholars affiliated to non-North American institutions – Hedley Bull and C.H.G. Oldham from Britain and Indra D. Sharma from India –[661] but from 1970 it expanded to five.[662] Subsequently, amid the leadership reforms of the early 1970s, a practice developed (though not constitutionally fixed until the early 1990s) that one Vice President each year be elected from outside North America, with the Ugandan scholar-in-exile and LSE graduate Yashpal Tandon the first elected under this convention in 1973. The second was Britain's Susan Strange, who in turn became the second woman after nuclear weapons specialist Claire Nader (who had previously been a Vice President and Associate Editor of *ISQ*) elected to an officer position. The third was the historian of Anglo-Japanese relations Chihiro Hosoya.

In a second – albeit later controversial – move, ISA looked to forge 'associate' relationships with organisations of similar nature and purpose around the world. The formation of ISA-Caribbean in 1969 – and the hosting of the 1971 convention in Puerto Rico – was a preliminary move in this direction, though a subsequent decline in its activity limited ISA to at most a North American identity. Associate relationships were not intended to overcome this identity but nonetheless reoriented ISA towards the wider world, seeding a network of like associations communicating on activities, sharing resources, and planning joint conferences.[663] In the 1970s, such relationships were agreed with associations in Britain, Japan, and Poland. This led to a 'World Assembly of International Studies Associations' in Tokyo, 1977, aimed at harmonising intellectual agendas and discussing cooperative strategies among representatives of ISA, the British International Studies Association (BISA) – which we have seen was based on the model of ISA – and the Japan Association for International Relations (JAIR). The further expansion of this network in the 1980s, however, would meet with great resistance from BISA above all.

6.4 Going Global? c.1980-95

Approaching its 25th anniversary, ISA had largely succeeded in becoming more interdisciplinary and international, and there was a desire to maintain this trajectory in the 1980s. Between 1979 and 1982, three 'Futures' conferences were held at the Universities of Kentucky and South Carolina – the new headquarters from 1979 – inviting ISA leaders past and present to give papers

661 'Front Matter', *International Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (1967).
662 Immediately it included scholars from Australia to Yugoslavia to Scandinavia such as Johan Galtung from the University of Oslo. 'Front Matter', *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970).
663 'Towards an International Community of Scholars', policy statement adopted by the Governing Council at its meeting of 23-26 October 1974. ISA Archive.

on specific Association functions and recommendations for long-term practice. The meetings were convened not only to celebrate progress but also to address certain problems related to ISA's development.

There had indeed been several costs to diversification and internationalisation in the 1970s. One was a weakening of connections with the US foreign policy community, which had naturally taken a backseat as transnational issues gained salience over security issues, and the Vietnam War triggered re-evaluations of the scholar-practitioner interface. Particularly symbolic here was the quiet ending in 1971 of 'scholar-diplomat' seminars ISA had sponsored since its early years.[664] As the preliminary agenda for the October 1981 Futures meeting stated: 'ISA does not and should not share the values of the Department of Defense or a government administration in any country. We do have an interest, however, in recruiting the best students, of keeping open channels for information and exchanges, and enhancing the diversity of scholarship.'[665] At the same time, the newfound commitment of ISA to interdisciplinary global problem solving was reflective of a desire to remain relevant in a different sense to pressing practical issues. Following David Easton's pronouncement of a 'post-behavioural' revolution in political science more generally,[666] ISA was committed in these years to the possibility of value-oriented science, perhaps best demonstrated in its 1974 convention theme: 'Knowledge for Purpose: The Contribution of International Studies'.[667] This again reveals a connection between advocates of 'scientific' IR during the Second Great Debate and globalist thinking during the Inter-Paradigm Debate which was indicated in chapter 3.[668] In the wake of the 1982 Futures meeting, an ad hoc constitutional committee recommended a third Vice President position be filled by an individual not affiliated to an academic institution, who would 'act as a liaison between the Association and government, business, and other relevant non-academic communities'.[669]

Another issue for ISA was an unstable financial situation. Indeed, the expansion and increasing complexity of ISA's activities in the 1970s had to some extent outrun its ability to pay for them. Amid general economic turmoil and increasing competition for foundation funds, budget deficits were not unheard of despite an increased revenue base and crisis support from

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664 Teune, 'The International Studies Association', 4.
665 'ISA Leadership Conference Preliminary Agenda', October 1981. ISA Archive.
666 David Easton, 'The New Revolution in Political Science', *The American Political Science Review* 63, no. 4 (1969): 1051–61.
667 ISA 1974 Annual Convention Programme. ISA Archive.
668 See also Ashworth, 'Was International Relations Really Founded in 1985?'
669 'Memorandum: Recommendations (and Justifications) for Constitutional Changes Regarding the Governing Council and a Non-Academic Vice President', Betty Hanson to Charles Hermann and Charles Kegley, 2 March 1983. ISA Archive.

Executive offices in Minnesota and Pittsburgh. The move of ISA headquarters to the University of South Carolina under Executive Director James Kuhlman, however, provided subventions and services that not only sustained the Association but facilitated further growth after 1979. Indeed, in addition to Kuhlman's 'clear and in some respects penetrating understanding of the recent history of the association, and sensible ideas about where it should be going', South Carolina's proposal convinced ISA's selectors that it 'was adequate to the needs of the Association' and could even provide 'funds to bring members of the Governing Council…together periodically between annual conventions'.[670] Henceforth, this would become an increasingly important factor in the selection of new headquarters.[671]

A final major issue was that interdisciplinarity and internationalisation – along with a membership hovering around 2000 – had reached a 'plateau', as Henry Teune put it in his abovementioned history of ISA, itself a paper presented to the 1982 Futures conference.[672] In advance of the 1981 Futures meeting at Kentucky, Margaret Hermann was tasked by then President Teune to lead a taskforce to improve the interdisciplinary nature of ISA. Despite the drive to increase the participation in ISA of scholars from other disciplines, only 14% of the membership in 1980 were not self-identified IR scholars or political scientists. By the 1982 Futures meeting, the task force had arrived at several recommendations for improving ISA's interdisciplinarity, including the creation of an Interdisciplinary Activities Committee and introducing reduced initial membership and conference rates for scholars from other disciplines.[673] Unfortunately, however, ISA had become – and would continue to be – primarily a professional society for scholars of an expanding IR discipline which imported ideas more than it exported.[674] Like today, scholars tended to pay more attention to their own professional societies than ISA. Instead, the primary task for ISA in the 1980s was to expand by globalising.

Through the 1980s, ISA maintained a pluralist intellectual culture and commitment to future-oriented, global problem solving. Symbolic of this was a plenary discussion session of the 1980 Los Angeles convention with IR grandees Hans Morgenthau and John Herz on 'Realism Revisited'.[675] In what was likely Morgenthau's final public appearance, he claimed there was no need for him to 'revisit' realism – he 'never left' – but Herz set the tone for future conventions by

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[670] 'Memorandum: Final Report of the Transition Committee', John Lovell to Chadwick Alger, 15 May 1978. ISA Archive.
[671] Author's correspondence with Charles Hermann, 24 January 2023.
[672] Teune, 'The International Studies Association', 10.
[673] 'Memorandum: On Making ISA More Interdisciplinary', Margaret Hermann to Members of ISA Futures Conference, 24 September 1982. ISA Archive.
[674] Author's interview with Margaret Hermann, 8 February 2023.
[675] ISA 1980 Annual Convention Programme. ISA Archive.

arguing that a properly 'realistic' theory could no longer focus on parochial national interests but a universal interest in averting transnational threats to human survival.[676] Convention themes in the 1980s included 'Human Development in a Global Economy' (1982); 'Promoting Human Dignity and Justice: An International Agenda for Change' (1983); 'The UN Year of Peace: Cumulative Knowledge for Prudent Policies' (1986); and 'Inquiry for Value Realisation: Peace, Justice, and Global Transformation' (1988). ISA also adapted to IR's post-positivist moment as the Cold War wound to a close, with conventions on 'New Dimensions in International Relations' and 'Prospects for Progress in a Changing International Environment', as well as the chartering of a Feminist Theory and Gender Studies section chaired by Christine Sylvester in 1990.[677] As we have seen, though Robert Keohane censured critical theorists for lacking 'a clear reflective research program' in his 1988 address, he set the stage for a new 'Great Debate' whose stakes were most clearly elaborated two major issues of *ISQ* under Richard Ashley's editorship outlining the dissident agenda.[678]

By this time, this challenge to American-style positivism joined with, and amplified, concerns about ISA's institutional dominance. This was related to the associate network whose expansion was pursued with increasing vigour in the 1980s. Until mid-decade, this had proceeded largely without controversy and according to the original plan for establishing cooperative relations between associations of equal standing.[679] ISA's landmark 1983 meeting was held in Mexico City in conjunction with the Asociación Mexicana de Estudios Internacionales (AMEI), and a second World Assembly convened in Washington, 1984, involving dozens of representatives from a network now including Swedish, South American, and Soviet associations. Yet by the time of the London convention in 1989 – held jointly with BISA – relations within the network had frayed

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[676] John H. Herz, 'Political Realism Revisited', *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (1981): 182–97. Unfortunately there is no official record of Morgenthau's comments apart from Herz's recollections in his published address. In conversation, Betty Hanson also recalls Morgenthau opening with the claim that he had 'never left' realism, remembering the 'thick German accent' in which his speech was delivered and his pessimism for the future of humanity in the nuclear age. Author's interview with Betty Hanson, 2 November 2022.

[677] 'ISA Welcomes Creation of a New Section', *ISA Newsletter*, May 1990. ISA Archive.

[678] Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches'; Richard K. Ashley, Pat McGowan, and Pat Lauderdale, eds., 'Exchange on the "Third Debate" [Special Section]', *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (1989): 235–327; Richard K. Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, eds., 'Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies [Special Issue]', *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (1990): 259–416.

[679] As Chadwick Alger (then chair of the Committee on Transnational Relations) put it in an October 1976 letter to President Davis discussing the incipient associate network: 'Should we simply let this network of associations evolve? Or, should we attempt to set up a very loose confederation…? I would definitely be against any effort to push for centralised organisation.' Chadwick Alger to Vincent Davis, 4 October 1976. ISA Archive. Davis agreed: 'a very loose confederation is what we should seek…a community of scholars worldwide is what we have sought to achieve from the beginning but in a non-hierarchical network.' Davis to Alger, 22 November 1976. ISA Archive.

considerably. With ISA taking a lead on World Assembly administration, requiring its associates to serve on and report to the Governing Council, and in 1986 attaining membership of UNESO's International Social Science Council (ISSC), accusations were levelled that it was seeking to become a global umbrella organisation. There were fears within North America that ISA was neglecting its home constituency, and beyond, more importantly, that it was acting as a vehicle for American social scientific hegemony.

Like the intellectual atmosphere of the Third Debate more generally, the inter- and intra-institutional controversy of this moment was acute and there were strong feelings on each side. In the interests of space and reputational considerations, what is important to note about the affair is that it coincided with William Welsh taking over from James Kuhlman as Executive Director in 1985. Though Welsh's motivations are not entirely clear, he was the driving force behind ISA pursuing a particular form of globalisation built upon membership of the ISSC and in turn integrating the associate network under the Association umbrella.[680] As he complained in a January 1987 memorandum, '(c)ompared to the other 13 organisations which are full members of the ISSC, the ISA is the only one which does no have formal representation of its national associate organisations contained within its governing structure'.[681] On Welsh's recommendation, in September 1987 the Governing Council voted unanimously for the constitutional amendment to add to its number a representative from each associate organisation.[682] A year later, representatives of 39 countries participated in the third World Assembly in Williamsburg, Virginia, 'administered' by ISA on the theme 'Toward a Transnational Community of Scholars', with panels and working group meetings aimed at providing an inventory of IR research themes in each country.[683] As in world politics and the discipline of IR at large, there was a sense that ISA's attempt to 'move in' on smaller countries during the 1980s were at odds with a post-hegemonic global age.[684]

If this was the background to the controversy, then its proximate cause was a memorandum sent from ISA headquarters to associates in May 1988. It requested 'information

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[680] This view has been supported by multiple interviewees, including later Executive Directors of ISA. Author's interview with Tom Volgy, 2 May 2022. Author's interview with Barry Buzan, 19 April 2022. Author's interview with Mark Boyer, 24 May 2022. The documentary evidence also points towards Welsh as the driver of this globalisation.

[681] 'Memorandum: Possible Constitutional Changes Concerning the Leadership of the Association', William Welsh to members of the Executive Committee and Governing Council, 9 January 1987.

[682] 'Minutes of the Meeting of the Governing Council, 3 September 1987'. ISA Archive.

[683] 'World Assembly Hailed as Major Success', *ISA Newsletter*, September 1988. ISA Archive.

[684] I am grateful to Margaret Hermann for this insight. Author's interview with Margaret Hermann, 8 February 2023. She also is of the belief that the failure to involve equal numbers of scholars from disciplines other than IR or political science – particularly comparativists – contributed to Welsh's globalising drive not meeting much initial resistance from within ISA.

pursuant to a renewal' of associate membership on a five-year term, including a copy of each organisation's constitution, a list of its elected and appointed officers, and a summary of activities.[685] So far as it is clear, BISA was the only organisation to object, but its resistance to ISA's globalisation – combined with later dissent from North American scholars – would be central to the future institutional development of IR. Barry Buzan, then BISA Chair, wrote back objecting to the 'tone of this document, as well as its implied substance'. It was BISA's interpretation, Buzan communicated, that there was never any 'formal relationship, and certainly not a subordinate one of "associate" status'. 'The nub of the matter', he continued, 'is that if ISA's internationalisation looks too much like American hegemony (as it will do unless there is some distinction between its American and its international components), then you run the risk of Gaullist responses'.[686] The letter trail, too long and at times sensitive to unravel here, also reveals there were tensions between BISA and ISA over funding for the 1989 conference, as well as the value of the 1988 World Assembly (about which BISA felt inadequately informed and did not send a representative). In the end, Buzan was correct that no official contractual relationship had ever been signed between BISA and ISA; a February 1975 letter from then BISA Chair Alastair Buchan to Executive Director Carl Beck confirmed agreement of a '*sui generis*' relationship based on 'regular exchanges' of newsletters and the right to ex-officio representation on each other's respective Governing Councils.[687] Nonetheless, Welsh subsequently sent to BISA another offer to 'renew' associate relations, albeit this time clarifying that ISA 'would cheerfully remove BISA's name from the list of members of the associate network' if the answer was negative.[688]

Globalisation no doubt saw some success: the first non-North American (and second woman) Helga Haftendorn was elected President at the well-attended London convention in 1989, while global membership numbers began to creep towards 3000. However, just as ISA adapted to post-positivist dissidence, so it ultimately responded to concerns of institutional hegemony. By this time, moreover, resistance from BISA had been matched by resistance from within to funds set aside by Welsh – who was not re-elected at the end of the standard five-year term for ISA Executive Directors – for future World Assemblies (of whose Steering Committee he now became Secretary General). As early as July 1988, for example, ISA President Robert Keohane wrote supportively to Barry Buzan stating he felt 'highly uneasy with the "hegemonic ISA" notion',

[685] 'Memorandum: Review of Associate Networks and Relationships', William Welsh to ISA Associate Organisations, 3 May 1988. BISA/4, File 2. Author's interview with Barry Buzan, 19 April 2022.
[686] Barry Buzan to William Welsh, 28 June 1988. ISA Archive. Tom Volgy has noted that there was a French reaction too, but I found no trace of this in the archive.
[687] Buzan to Welsh, 5 March 1989. ISA Archive.
[688] Welsh to Buzan, 18 July 1989. ISA Archive.

preferring instead 'a rather lean organisation, with a first-rate internationalised meeting and a first-rate internationalised journal, and not much else to distract its members from scholarship and teaching'.[689]

Under new Executive Director Ladd Hollist at Brigham Young University, and with the aid of several hard-working committees in the early 1990s, ISA switched track to pursue a less hierarchical mode of globalisation. Henceforth, ISA would brand itself as a North American association whose membership would remain open to scholars of any nationality, working with others to expand and strengthen the interaction of international studies professionals throughout the world. Among other organisational and constitutional changes, ISA delinked itself from the World Assembly (which soon quietly folded), rebranded associative relationships as 'cooperative', and replaced associate representatives on the Governing Council with six international members-at-large. Together with Ohio State University's Mershon Centre, it also launched the *Mershon International Studies Review* under Margaret Hermann's editorship in 1994, a new journal of reviews and synthetic articles with a large focus on work published outside North America.[690] The *Review* was intended as a 'supplement' to *ISQ*, though soon developed an independent identity and by the end of the decade had emerged from under the wing of the Mershon Centre to become *International Studies Review*.[691]

The controversy over globalisation in the late 1980s also had important effects on the intellectual and institutional development of IR elsewhere. Instead of a neorealist-dominated 'American social science' spreading its reach over the rest of the world, the attempt to turn ISA into a global peak organisation negatively reinforced the identities of other IR communities, particularly in Britain and Europe. Buzan, as we saw in the previous chapter, would lead an eclectic 'reconvening' of the 'English School', which is somewhat ironic given early BISA leaders such as Susan Strange were not enamoured of the post-war 'international society' tradition.[692] Now, however, it would fit well with the logic of intellectual and institutional resistance following the Third Debate and the ISA-BISA conflict. More directly, these developments gave rise to a European-wide association under the steering of BISA Secretary A.J.R. Groom, the Standing Group on International Relations (SGIR) formed within the European Consortium for Political

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[689] Robert Keohane to Buzan, 7 July 1988. BISA/4, File 2.
[690] Margaret G. Hermann and Robert B. Woyach, 'Toward Reflection, Evaluation, and Integration in International Studies: An Editorial Philosophy', *Mershon International Studies Review* 38, no. 1 (1994): 1–10.
[691] Linda B. Miller, 'Transition', *International Studies Review* 1, no. 1 (1999): xi–xii.
[692] Buzan, 'An Underexploited Resource'.

Research (ECPR).[693] As Groom outlined in a 1991 memorandum to the BISA Executive Committee concerning the genesis and nature of the SGIR, the idea for a pan-European organisation emerged from a desire among BISA leaders to counterbalance ISA's attempted globalisation, without being perceived as hegemonic themselves. Furthermore, in an interesting parallel to ISA's origins in the 1950s, it was found by a BISA committee charged with exploring a pan-European organisation that European IR scholars were isolated 'in very small groups in different faculties'. It was thus concluded that such an organisation should be created under the auspices of an existing institution, of which the ECPR was felt most appropriate.[694]

The SGIR held its inaugural pan-European conference in Heidelberg, September 1992, establishing the *European Journal of International Relations* under the editorship of Walter Carlsnaes three years later.[695] In 2013, the SGIR birthed the independent EISA. Both EISA and the *European Journal of International Relations* today play major roles within the discipline of IR within and beyond Europe. While they have had their own trajectories that are worthy of study, what is important to note here is that, unlike BISA and other associations, their emergence was testament to the negative shaping force of ISA's development rather than its positive influence.

6.5 Non-hierarchical Globalisation and Expansion: c.1995-2010

From 1995, ISA moved its headquarters to the University of Arizona, where it would remain for an unprecedented twenty years under Executive Director Tom Volgy. It continued a path of non-hierarchical globalisation but in so doing underwent one of its most important periods of development, 'growing hugely and becoming more dynamic'.[696] Volgy – who had considerable experience in local Arizona government and business – was 'absolutely central' to these changes, bringing his political experience and business acumen to bear in a context where multiple interests needed to be managed in financially sustainable way.[697] At the same time, ISA was responding to structural external contexts including the shifting economics of academic production, broader cultural changes, and advances in digital technology.

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[693] Once seemingly 'heir apparent' of John Burton's world society approach, Groom is a relatively unknown figure intellectually within IR. However, as Buzan has noted, he is one of the most influential institution builders in IR's recent past. Author's interview with Barry Buzan, 19 April 2022.
[694] 'Memorandum: International Studies in Europe', A.J.R. Groom to Members of BISA Executive Committee, 13 February 1991. BISA/77.
[695] Carlsnaes, 'Editorial'.
[696] Author's interview with Tom Volgy, 2 May 2022.
[697] Author's interview with Margaret Hermann, 8 February 2023.

Perhaps most significantly, as the membership rose further, many more from previously underrepresented groups began to join ISA and attend its meetings (particularly women, graduate students, and international scholars). The launch of the Association website in 1995 facilitated such expansion by alerting a wider global audience to ISA news and services, while section pages and email lists helped coordinate existing and prospective subunits.[698] One of the most active list networks was FEMISA, an online space for discussion and resource sharing overseen by the FTGS section that could boast over 800 subscribers by the start of 1997.[699] All this added to ISA's intellectual diversity as registered by new sections such as Global Development Studies and the English School, but also by calls for the Association to better serve the interests of marginal groups. Following the model of other professional academic societies, a new 'caucus' structure developed within ISA to advocate for such groups, beginning with the Women's Caucus for International Studies (chartered in 1996), and later followed by the LGBTQA and Global South Caucuses (chartered in 2010 and 2011 respectively). Like sections, caucuses reported annually to the Governing Council, sponsored convention panels and events, and could raise dues from interested members to fund activities. One enduring endeavour has been the 'Study on the Status of Women' begun in the 1990s and sponsored by WCIS since 2006, which has highlighted continuing barriers facing women in the profession.[700]

Another outcome of membership growth – combined with the steady marketisation of higher education around the world – was a proliferation of ISA publications. With a membership becoming increasingly diverse in identity and research interest, and article publication (ideally in a high 'brand' journal) necessary for early-career advancement, ISA was keen to provide more outlets beyond *ISQ* for peer-reviewed work. *ISR* partly offered this with space for two or three 'synthetic essays' per issue, but it was – and remains – in many ways a journal for book reviews. At the same time, it was thought that the synthetic essays and book reviews in *ISR* played an important function within the discipline, helping graduate students organise literature surveys for their dissertations, and providing early career researchers with important opportunities to review others' work and have their own reviewed in turn. The rebranding of *Notes* as *ISP* in 2000, however, was driven more by professional demands and endeavoured to publish rigorous, peer-reviewed essays on IR as a field, pedagogy, foreign and international-organisational policy, and professional matters.[701]

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[698] 'ISA Now On-Line in Cyberspace', *ISA Newsletter*, October 1995. ISA Archive.
[699] 'FEMISA Update', *FTGS Section News*, Spring 1998. ISA Archive.
[700] Meredith Reid Sarkees and Henehan, 'International Studies as a Discipline and Women's Status Therein', in *Oxford Research Encylopedia of International Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.456.
[701] Mark A. Boyer et al., 'Visions of International Studies in a New Millennium', *International Studies Perspectives* 1, no. 1 (2000): 1–9.

Similar impulses drove the establishment of a suite of other ISA journals after 2000, though these were testament, too, to the growing intellectual and geographical diversity of the Association: *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2005); *International Political Sociology* (2007); *International Interactions* (2009); *Journal of Global Security Studies* (2016); and most recently *Global Studies Quarterly* (2020).[702] The creation of these journals was also reflective of Volgy's political and business skills, as they proved useful for assuaging factions within the Association and significantly boosted revenue streams.[703]

By the turn of the millennium, ISA membership was at around 3200 and its 400-panel conventions attracting over 2000 attendees per year. It had 19 sections and 6 regions, each organising their own growing roster of activities. During the 2000s, ISA's membership and conventions would almost double in size.[704] After the 1993 convention in Acapulco, Mexico, annual conventions were thus not held outside the US or Canada, in large part because of the facilities required to host such a large global event. Nevertheless, ISA maintained its duties to cooperating associations by assisting in the organisation of their own conferences, including JAIR (1996), the European SGIR (1998), and the Central and Eastern European International Studies Association (2003). This continued into the 2010s on an even more global basis. Among other places, ISA or its sections have recently helped organise conferences in: Crete; London; Belgrade; Singapore; Quito; Hong Kong; and Ljubljana.[705] ISA also helped found the World International Studies Committee (WISC) during the early 2000s, a separate umbrella network facilitating cooperation between national and regional associations. WISC was another outcome of the ISA-BISA scuffle of the late 1980s, originating in an Ad Hoc Committee on Inter-Organisational Cooperation formed at Acapulco in 1993, and again owing much to the work of Buzan and Groom (who are honorary members).[706] WISC's founding was the final act in ISA's attempt to disabuse itself of any pretension to sit at the heart of a hub-and-spoke associational system.

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[702] Conversations with Mark Boyer and Jennifer Sterling-Folker have been particularly helpful in formulating ideas in this paragraph. Author's interview with Mark Boyer, 4 November 2022. Author's interview with Jennifer Sterling-Folker, 14 November 2022.

[703] Volgy recalls, for example, that the decision to create *International Political Sociology* was made under pressure from French and postmodernist scholars to provide an outlet for their work. Author's interview with Tom Volgy, 2 May 2022.

[704] Data available at: https://www.isanet.org/ISA/About-ISA/Data, accessed 9 January 2023.

[705] Among other places, ISA or its sections have recently helped organise conferences in: Crete; London; Belgrade; Singapore; Quito; Hong Kong; and Ljubljana. Data available at: https://www.isanet.org/Conferences/Archive, accessed 9 January 2023.

[706] 'About WISC'. Available at https://www.wiscnetwork.net/about-wisc , accessed 7 March 2023. Author's interview with Barry Buzan, 19 April 2022. Groom is also an honorary member of EISA.

6.6 Conclusion

In terms of membership growth, the period since 2010 has not been as dramatic as the first decade of this century, though numbers have still grown steadily to over 7000 in that time. Several other developments are worthy of note, however. Caucus and section growth has continued apace, with existing groups thriving and new ones such as Online Media and Global IR – the latest caucus and section respectively – being chartered. Meanwhile, decades after the quiet disappearance of ISA-Caribbean and streamlining of the original regions, a new Latin American and Caribbean region was chartered in 2019. Reflecting a growing desire to address the dominance of Eurocentric approaches within ISA, both the new region and Global IR section in different ways seek to welcome non-North American social science under the Association's umbrella. This may again place ISA's national and global identities in conflict. A final noteworthy change has been the democratisation of ISA's governance, whereby – among other reforms – it has become constitutionally required that competitive slates for officer positions be presented to the membership annually.[707]

In several respects, there are many continuities between these more recent developments in ISA and the changes recounted in previous sections. With regard to the 'Global IR' movement, for example, has this not been seen before? In fact, history might even suggest caution about whether ISA is an appropriate vehicle for the project given the controversy Welsh's 'umbrella' attempt generated in the late 1980s. Indeed, perhaps WISC or some other 'association of associations' might be better placed to carry it forward to avoid accusations of the very Western/American hegemony it seeks to overcome? On the other hand, the controversy concerning the associate network in the late 1980s was driven primarily by North American concerns that the 'home' community would be neglected, and by British and European scholars who saw the growing network as of hegemonistic intent. 'Ex-imperialists themselves, some of the Brits went predictably bananas', is how Susan Strange retrospectively explained BISA's role during the affair in her 1995 Presidential Address.[708] It is not yet clear whether today's worldwide membership would react similarly to a Global IR section of a much more diverse ISA; the actors involved are quite different to thirty or forty years ago. What is clear is that the institutional

[707] As the 2020 report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Constitutional Reforms noted, the norm had been for a presidentially appointed Nominating Committee 'to put forward a single candidate for each office'. Another constitutional change it recommended was to significantly reduce the presidential power to determine the make-up of this committee. Brent Ashley Leeds, 'ISA Ad Hoc Committee on Constitutional Reforms 2020 Annual Report', 10 April 2020. Available at: https://www.isanet.org/Portals/0/Documents/ISA/2020_AdHocConstitution.pdf, accessed 10 January 2023.

[708] Strange, 'ISA as a Microcosm', 289.

expansion of ISA, and its interaction with the intellectual diversification of IR at large – themselves processes begun around 1970 – likely makes such tensions unavoidable.

Another important continuity is ISA's long-term commitment to professionalising young scholars. As noted, ISA grew out of 'seminars for the improvement of teaching' among early-career IR scholars, who sought to enhance the breadth and coherence of their college courses given a growing literature and lack of prior training. Improving teaching in this way, it was thought, would both prepare the seminar participants for an academic career and benefit the future scholars and practitioners they taught. Today, the pedagogical and professional development sides of ISA might attract less attention than the research outlets provided by its journals and conferences, yet they are still central services provided by the Association. Through, among other things, the work of the Professional Development Committee, the International Education Section, the pedagogical and practical agendas of *ISP*, and the very opportunity to publish in journals and present at conferences, ISA continues to socialise new generations of scholars into the profession. Highlighting this important strand running through the history of ISA may not only prompt more members to participate in this aspect of the Association, but could even help other professional academic societies learn from ISA's success.

Today, ISA is the world's largest and most well-known professional association for the study, teaching, and practice of international affairs. Looking back, most striking are the changes the Association has undergone in response to international events, academic debates, and institutional politics to become the organisation it is today. From a small regional community seeking to improve teaching and research in American IR, it has become a globally oriented organisation home to thousands of scholars of diverse intellectual agendas and geographic origins. Primarily, it has been an association of and for IR scholars – a site of 'Great Debates' and a source of professional identity. Yet over time it has welcomed into its structure larger if not equal numbers from other fields who have expanded IR's horizons, notwithstanding the faded hopes for an 'inter-discipline' that gained credence when peace research and global problem solving once gave ISA philosophical direction. Ironically, the intellectual diversification and internationalisation begun during the late 1960s likely prevented such a unifying vision from again taking hold, though perhaps Global IR may soon do so. Such considerations for the future of IR/ISA will be explored in the concluding chapter. What is important to note for now is that ISA's transformation documented above was neither linear nor inevitable, and depended on the concrete decisions of people involved in its administration and leadership responding to rapidly evolving developments within and beyond the IR discipline.

ISA's history thus provides an intriguing example of the interconnected relationship between the transnational processes of change this thesis has identified and explored – in particular, institutional expansion and intellectual diversification. As this chapter has argued, ISA has not only reflected but in important respects *shaped* the development of IR into an intellectually pluralistic and increasingly global social science. It has been shown that ISA indexed intellectual changes within the discipline through the changing character of its membership, the contents of its journals, and the foci of its sections, from the birth of the subfield of IPE to the positivist/post-positivist 'Great Debate'. It also reflected institutional changes in the discipline within and beyond the United States, associating and cooperating with like organisations around the world including JAIR and BISA. Yet it has not simply been a passive mirror of developments in the discipline at large. As an institutional agent in its own right, ISA has actively contributed to the intellectual and institutional growth of IR in several ways. As we saw earlier, it influenced the creation and development of other national, regional, and global associations both positively (as in the case of BISA in the 1970s) and negatively (as in the case of the European SGIR and WISC). At a lower level, ISA sections have played an important role in helping 'subfields' coalesce by bringing together scholars separated by institutional affiliation or geography to address common interests. Prizes, publication opportunities, conference panels, and presidential addresses meanwhile have helped legitimise – and sometimes delegitimise – various research programmes from ecological themes in the late 1960s to Global IR today. In this way, ISA has also provided a platform and panorama for scholars to pronounce on the state of the discipline (e.g. Yosef Lapid on the 'Third Debate' or John Vasquez's 'Colour it Morgenthau' thesis), thus demonstrating a link between the processes of institutional expansion and disciplinary self-reflection, too. Indeed, it is surely no coincidence that several of the great IR 'stock-takers' – including Vasquez, William C. Olson, James Rosenau, and Steve Smith – have all been ISA Presidents.[709]

[709] 'Presidents of ISA'. Available at: https://www.isanet.org/ISA/Governance/President/Past-Presidents, accessed 7 March 2023.

7. Conclusion

7.1 The Transformation of International Relations

This thesis has presented an intellectual and institutional history of the discipline International Relations (IR) from roughly 1970 to 2000. Though selective in its scope, it has attempted to provide a comprehensive story of three interconnected processes of change that it argues transformed the discipline during this period. As the world changed, it has suggested, so too did IR through entwined and transnational processes of intellectual diversification, institutional expansion, and disciplinary self-reflection. In so doing, the thesis has sought to marry substantive insights from sociological studies of the contemporary intellectual and institutional topography of IR with the methods of disciplinary historians.[710] The rationale for this has been that while disciplinary historians are better placed to provide a meaningful narrative of IR's late-century transformation, they have yet to properly come to terms with the nature and significance of this period for understanding, and critically evaluating, the discipline's present condition. Largely due to their own embeddedness in the transformation of IR during the late twentieth century, disciplinary historians have focused to a distorting extent on the formative years of the discipline in the early-to-mid-twentieth century, naturalising an 'originalist' approach to disciplinary history writing and separating themselves from the insights of disciplinary sociologists.

In this way, the thesis has sought to make several scholarly contributions. While the contributions to intellectual debates in IR have been stressed above all, before proceeding further it is worth highlighting some points of potentially wider applicability. For instance, in chapter 5 a new contextualisation of Francis Fukuyama's 'end of history' thesis was argued not just to complicate conventional IR wisdom around the pluralistic 'Third Debate', but also to scholarly understanding of the development of Fukuyama's thought and the US neoconservative movement. Indeed, while Fukuyama's background in philosophy is well-established, his grounding in late-twentieth-century IR debates have been surprisingly understudied given his graduate education and work at the RAND Corporation. The same is true for the neoconservative movement more generally, where only concrete historical links to realist and liberal IR theories have been studied, despite neoconservatism's heyday coinciding with the discipline's critical turn

[710] Waever, 'The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline'; Grenier and Hagmann, 'Sites of Knowledge (Re-)Production'.

and its affinities with constructivism having been acknowledged.[711] In chapter 6, meanwhile, it was suggested that studying ISA's history could provide useful perspective for those navigating both the Association itself but also other professional academic societies. Finally, adding to IR's disciplinary history literature hopefully contributes to increasing the visibility of the discipline within broader scholarship on the history of the social sciences which, as Duncan Bell has pointed out, has tended to unjustifiably ignore IR.[712]

Regarding IR specifically, this thesis has made three primary contributions. First, in the spirit of existing disciplinary histories, it complicated unsophisticated – if popular – self-images of discipline's development popularised during and about the late twentieth century by early sociological accounts of IR. In particular, it has complicated the 'American social science'/'Colour it Morgenthau' thesis and the evolutionary 'Great Debates' narrative. In contrast to the idea of a realist-dominated US community constituting the sun around which IR orbits, the thesis has shown that IR has undergone more intellectual and institutional development within and beyond the United States than the 'American social science' label suggests. At the same time, however, the idea that IR opened into a pluralistic 'paradigm war' following a sequence of Great Debates was demonstrated to overlook important continuities running through the history of the discipline, as well as how and why the narrative itself was constructed in the late twentieth century. For example, the supposedly incommensurable paradigms of the Great Debates were shown to connect to each other across time and space, with 'post-behavioural' scientific IR of the Second Debate linking to globalist perspectives in the Inter-Paradigm Debate (chapters 3 and 6), the Marxist and liberal paradigms of the 1970s linking to later 'post-positivist' dissidence (chapters 4 and 5), or critical theorists and disciplinary historians reclaiming 'classical' realism (chapters 2 and 4). Perhaps most importantly, however, the Eurocentric legacies of liberal internationalism in the First Great Debate were shown to very much linger during the Third (chapter 5).

The second contribution, however, is that in contrast to the disciplinary history literature, this thesis has highlighted the importance of studying the recent past for gaining a perspicacious understanding of the development of IR. Methodologically, that is, the thesis has sought to move beyond the internalist/externalist controversy to highlight two more fundamental issues: namely, originalism and the divorce between disciplinary histories and sociologies. Due to the critique of early sociological accounts of IR's development – particularly the evolutionary Great Debates narrative – it was argued that disciplinary historians naturally came to focus on IR's formative years

[711] Rapport, 'Unexpected Affinities?'
[712] Bell, 'Writing the World (Remix)', 26.

in the early-to-mid-twentieth century, and on drawing out their continuity and relevance in the present. In this way, IR's recent past – that is, since 1970 – has been unduly neglected and thus the history of the discipline distorted by a temporally imbalanced literature. The broad effect of this output has thus been to naturalise an 'originalist' approach to disciplinary history writing where only studying IR's formative years is considered to matter for understanding and critically evaluating IR today from a historical perspective. In this situation, not only will the history of IR continue to be distorted but also a sense of the discipline as an object capable of novelty and progressive change could be imperilled. (Re-)engaging with more recent and sophisticated sociologies of IR – and the three processes of change they have highlighted – has been shown to be a fruitful way to address the issue of originalism within disciplinary history writing. This thesis has aimed to be a first significant step towards doing so.

In this way, finally, the thesis opens space to consider how IR might evolve again in the present and future. The transformation of IR documented in this thesis indeed took place within the context of the consolidation of a particular American-led, (neo-)liberal international order that climaxed with triumphalist celebrations of the 'end of history' after the Cold War. However, with recent events from the 2008 financial crisis to COVID-19 and the rise of China seeming to break down this order, it is worth examining how IR is responding and whether another major shift is underway. While it is impossible to predict what the discipline will look like in the future, it seems likely that though significantly conditioned by their recent past, IR scholars today are likely to move beyond it – just as those in the late twentieth century did in their own time.

Where, then, do we go from here? In light of the story this thesis has told and the above contributions, the remainder of this conclusion highlights the historical limitations of the study and possible future paths for research, before finishing with a reflection on the future of IR.

7.2 How Should the History of IR be Written?

Though it has been acknowledged by others, one conclusion of the foregoing analysis is that the geographic focus of disciplinary history writing needs to expand beyond national contexts and in particular the United States. This thesis has sought to do through an exploration of IR in Britain in particular, as well as strands of transnational institutional and intellectual production. Yet the focus should certainly be expanded further within and beyond Anglo-America, as some disciplinary historians have begun to do. While Hoffmann's 'American social science' thesis has

been broadly accepted here as a description of post-war IR for the sake of highlighting a transformation which occurred in its wake, recent disciplinary historians have shown that the history of IR before 1945 was a much more transnational and intellectually eclectic affair.[713] The point, of course, is to link the present state of the discipline, which these scholars – more perhaps than previous disciplinary historians – acknowledge is at a point of unprecedented size and diversity, to a deep past that is then presented as a source of unacknowledged continuity or intellectual utility. Yet, as has been argued, this still has contributed to sense that only the formative years of IR matter for a historical understanding of the discipline, with all the negative effects that come with it. The growth of the discipline in the recent past is a largely blind spot of disciplinary historians no matter the geographic scope of their study. As we have seen, this is unfortunate given the global transformation of IR in this period that Barry Buzan and Amitav Acharya have demonstrated.[714] Thus, in addition to exploring new spatial geographies, the recent past of IR needs to be studied to denaturalise what has been termed the 'originalist' approach to disciplinary history writing.

To do so, as we have seen, disciplinary sociologists such as Buzan and Acharya offer a guide in terms of three processes of change historians could focus upon. While the process of increasing second-order reflectiveness has received some attention from disciplinary historians, there is a great amount of scope for histories of aspects of intellectual diversification and institutional expansion. Indeed, to reiterate, this thesis has not claimed to be a complete and comprehensive account of all three processes and their interconnection, but rather a broad (and selective) story that hopefully can be launch pad for future research into late-twentieth-century IR. As such, there is much that has not been possible to explore in full depth here, from the development of the apparent 'neo-neo consensus' into the 1990s, to the rise of individual critical IR theories such as feminism, postcolonialism, securitisation studies, and cosmopolitan discourse ethics, to constructivist attempts to 'bridge gaps' between theoretical categories. While scholars from these formations have often provided schematic overviews of their past based on memory and for present purposes, their genesis and development have not yet been subjected to systematic historical study. Furthermore – and here contra disciplinary sociologies – the more 'post-positivist' of them constitute perfect case studies in the transnational nature of disciplinary development, since while many have had specific national origins (in the United States but also elsewhere), they

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[713] James Cotton, *The Australian School of International Relations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Thakur and Vale, *South Africa, Race, and the Making of International Relations*; Thakur and Smith, 'The Multiple Births of International Relations'; Owens and Rietzler, *Women's International Thought: A New History*; Stöckmann, *The Architects of International Relations*.

[714] Acharya and Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations*.

have been taken up in different geographic contexts over time. This was seen with the transfer of certain critical ideas to Britain in the 1990s in chapter 5, but there are many other interesting examples such as constructivism's continental European (particularly German) and US amalgamations in the 1980s and 1990s; securitisation theory's formation out of Scandinavian peace studies and English School influences; or postcolonialism's interaction with Anglophone literary theory and Global South struggles.

Any history of such developments, meanwhile, should not lose sight of the institutional contexts in which they played out. Analysis of the intellectual conversation between written texts is essential but not enough to understand the discipline's past; academic institutions such as journals, departments, professional associations, and so on not just reflect but mould what is published and said, policing discursive boundaries but also legitimising their expansion. As we saw in chapter 6, resistance to the intellectual and institutional dominance of US IR prompted scholars to create new institutions such as the SGIR (forerunner of EISA), the *European Journal of International Relations*, and WISC that would provide platforms for scholars who felt marginalised by the 'core'. If one wanted to recount the history of constructivism in IR, for example, analysis of the thought and influences of figures such as Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Emanuel Adler would need to be supplemented with attention to important institutions such as the political science departments of the universities of Minnesota (where Wendt studied under Raymond Duvall), Berkeley (where Ruggie and Adler studied under Ernst Haas), and Princeton (where Kratochwil took his PhD and was taught by Onuf and Richard Falk). And while several early statement constructivist texts were published in major US journals such as *International Organisation*, *International Security*, and *World Politics*,[715] it was in British and European outlets such as BISA's book series, *Review of International Studies*, *European Journal of International Relations*, *International Theory* (a journal 2/3 of whose founders were constructivists) that later interventions appeared.[716] This not only tells us something about the changing locus of

[715] John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 379–415; John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis', ed. Kenneth N. Waltz, *World Politics* 35, no. 2 (1983): 261–85; Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem'; Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It'; Alexander Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 71–81; Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory'; Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998): 324–48; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.

[716] Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Logic of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander Wendt, 'Bridging the Theory/Meta-Theory Gap in International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991): 383–92; Alexander Wendt, 'On Constitution and Causation in International Relations', *Review of*

constructivism, but also the development of IR more generally and the narrowing audience to which the former journals have come to speak in the context of a more intellectually diverse and institutionally expansive discipline.

Denaturalising originalism, however, does not entail only focusing on the recent history of the discipline. This would be to push too far in the other direction. As chapter 2 argued, the methodological contribution of this thesis is really to make a plea for *balance* in terms of the temporal focus of disciplinary history writing. *More* histories of IR in the late twentieth century are thus called for rather than a ceasing of histories of the early years. At the same time, histories of IR's early years should certainly reflect more on their temporal assumptions and the potential limits of adding to the already large literature on the formative period of the discipline. In some cases, such a focus may require little defence where an angle is still relatively novel (e.g. explorations of the imperial and gendered origins of IR), but in others where the literature is voluminous (e.g. the history of realism) more justificatory work – and acknowledgement that the present is not always continuous with the deep past – should be carried out. From another perspective, though, histories of post-1970 IR can also be supportive of claims made in histories of earlier periods; as we have seen with the legacy of Eurocentrism, there are indeed important continuities running through the history of IR and accounts of the recent past can help bolster such claims.

Meanwhile, should more contemporary histories of IR be written, they are likely to continue to run up against popular ways of narrating the recent past of the discipline. This is not only because such 'self-images' were themselves constructed in this period to legitimate (and delegitimate) certain theoretical agendas and disciplinary identities as IR grew intellectually and institutionally while losing its earlier ontological 'focus' (chapter 3). It is also because they continue to play a function in constituting the discipline itself and the self-understandings of students and scholars, as sociologists of IR such as Ole Waever have argued. Because of this, disciplinary historians should, as Duncan Bell points out, be 'sceptical about the likely impact' that debunking such self-images might have. Where such images have deeply affected the teaching of IR and

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International Studies 24 (1998): 101–17; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*; Alexander Wendt, 'The State as Person in International Theory', *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004): 289–316; Price and Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons?'; Emanuel Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (1997): 319–63; Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, 'International Practices', *International Theory* 3, no. 1 (2011): 1–36; Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, *International Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Stefano Guzzini, 'A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations* 6, no. 2 (2000): 147–82.

scholarly self-understandings, 'the force of the better argument rarely wins out'.[717] However, scepticism does not justify defeatism and there remain good historical and theoretical reasons to continue problematising the 'American social science' and evolutionary 'Great Debates' formulations. As has been argued in this thesis, both distort the actual history of the discipline during the late twentieth century for particular – if often laudable – agendas in the present. Often invoked to justify intellectual pluralisation, one overemphasises stasis and critique while the other over-celebrates change. Though they are not mutually exclusive – they share, typically, views of the First and Second Great Debates, along with the abovementioned desire to pluralise the discipline – the co-presence of these two narratives can lead to confusion about where the discipline is and where it should go. The Great Debates narrative particularly, as not only disciplinary historians have pointed out, can also limit pluralism as much as expand it.

There are several ways in which such problematisation could be carried out. This thesis has problematised the 'American social science' thesis by demonstrating the transnational transformation of IR both within the United States and beyond, beginning around the time of Hoffmann's writing and continuing in its wake. The US discipline remained central and highly influential, no doubt, but it became much less intellectually homogeneous than Hoffmann feared, with scholars as diverse as Kenneth Waltz, Richard Ashley, and Ann Tickner housed under its umbrella. The ISA, of which Hoffmann seemed to show no awareness, was seen in the 1970s by British scholars such as Susan Strange as a much more open and eclectic space than the UK's 'dreadfully constipated and hierarchical' Bailey conferences dominated by the 'barons' of the English School. In other times and places, the very critique of American narrowness and dominance spurred the creation of new disciplinary communities. This change allowed for new self-reflective accounts such as the evolutionary Great Debates narrative. Yet, as noted above, the idea that IR evolved into a pluralistic 'paradigm war' in the Inter-Paradigm and Third Debates following series of 'Great Debates' was shown to overlook certain important historical continuities and connections between paradigms across time and space.

These are, though, not the only ways such 'self-images' could be problematised. As indicated, the 'American social science' thesis can be explored with reference to multiple disciplinary communities around the world that are beyond the spatial and linguistic scope of this thesis. Meanwhile, instead of unexplored linkages across apparently separate paradigms, the Inter-paradigm and Third Debates could be questioned for eliding differences *within* paradigms. How much sense, for example, does it make to collect the various approaches opposed to the

[717] Bell, 'Writing the World (Remix)', 24.

positivist/rationalist/explanatory 'neo-neo consensus' under the labels post-positivist/reflectivist/constitutive (and vice versa)? The range of labels coined to describe the Third Debate indeed was itself confusing and the groupings not always stable. Depending on the positionality of the stock-taker, constructivism could be described as closer to either wing or a bridge-builder in the middle.[718] Further, were post-positivists really attacking neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism equally or were they rather more concerned with the former? These are just some ideas about how histories of IR during the late twentieth century could proceed.

7.3 The Future of International Relations

We can be somewhat less sure about where IR might go in the next decade, let alone the timespan explored in this thesis. The sheer size and diversity of the discipline today – in large part a result of the changes of the past half century – as well as the inherent instability of world politics at large, make such predictions impossible. Nevertheless, by recounting how IR transformed in tandem with a changing global order since the 1970s, space is opened to consider how the discipline might evolve again in the present and future. This has added importance since the so-called 'Liberal International Order' – which reached its apogee in the late twentieth century – appears to be entering crisis and perhaps even breaking down. Since at least the 2008 financial crisis, the Liberal International Order of democratic nation-states tied together by norms of free movement of goods and capital, human equality (freedom, the rule of law, human rights), multilateralism, and collective security has come under severe strain.[719] The order has faced internal challenges of economic inequality, political disinformation, and national populism, as well as external challenges of illiberal states such as China, transnational terrorism, and potentially de-globalising 'non-agentic forces' such as climate change and COVID-19.[720] To this we can add what Christian Reus-Smit and Ayşe Zarakol have termed 'polymorphic claims of justice' related not just to economic inequality but social hierarchy, institutional unfairness, intergenerational inequities, and historical and epistemic

[718] For an argument constructivism is closer to positivism/rationalism see Smith, 'Still an American Social Science?'; Smith, 'The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: "Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline"'. For the argument constructivism is closer to post-positivism/reflectivism see Price and Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons?'; Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory'. For the argument constructivism is more of a middle way between the two see Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics'; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.
[719] This definition is taken from the introduction to a recent special issue of *International Organisation* exploring the Liberal International Order and its current crisis. See David A. Lake, Lisa L. Martin, and Thomas Risse, 'Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organisation', *International Organization* 75, no. 2 (2021): 229.
[720] Ibid., 234–43.

injustices.[721] The Liberal International Order has of course not been uniformly strong across time and space. In the 1970s, as we have seen, fear – as well as optimism in some quarters – about the crisis of the post-war Liberal International Order emerged relating to the relative decline of US hegemony, economic and ecological crisis, and the rise of the Global South and the Soviet Union. IR, in response, entered its own identity crisis but at the same time both dramatically grew intellectually and institutionally, and developed a new sense of identity and awareness of its place in history. These disciplinary processes continued in a different context as US power and the Liberal International Order recovered but cemented themselves to an unprecedented degree in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in the economic sphere where a globalised 'neo-'liberal order emerged.

Whatever happens to the Liberal International Order in the long run, it seems likely that the precise form it has taken since the 1970s – and which largely coincides with the period covered in this thesis – will not continue. Given the challenges it faces, it will not survive without another round of response and adaptation, perhaps even more significant than previously. Likewise, while the post-1970 period made IR recognisably what it is today, one of its main lessons is that major global changes, and the perception that they are happening, will likely spur scholars to new reflections on their subject and themselves. There are signs this is already happening in the discipline, from aforementioned calls for a 'Global IR' taking in the experiences, perspectives, and histories of scholarship worldwide,[722] to revivals of realism demanding political 'prudence' and 'restraint' in the face of multipolar turbulence and stubborn liberal internationalist ideology.[723] Meanwhile, there are concerns about the 'end of IR' due to the proliferation of paradigmatic 'camps', 'simplistic hypothesis testing', and 'middle-range' theories since the Third Debate that seemingly impede wide-ranging and integrated answers to global problems.[724] Still others call for a postcolonial critique to expose the imperial and racialised features of IR and world politics,[725] or a

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[721] Christian Reus-Smit and Ayşe Zarakol, 'Polymorphic Justice and the Crisis of International Order', *International Affairs* 99, no. 1 (2023): 1–22.
[722] Acharya, 'Global IR and Regional Worlds'; Acharya and Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations*.
[723] Stephen M. Walt, *The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of US Primacy* (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018); John J. Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities* (New Haven, CT, 2018).
[724] Christine Sylvester, 'Whither the International at the End of IR', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 35, no. 3 (2007): 551–73; Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight, 'The End of International Relations Theory?', *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 405–25; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, 'Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing Is Bad for International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 427–57.
[725] Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam, *Race and Racism in International Relations*.

new 'planet politics' or 'posthuman IR' to respond to challenges of the Anthroprocene.[726] Cutting across all these agendas, finally, is a debate about whether IR is or should be a discipline in its own right, a subdiscipline of political science, an interdisciplinary meeting place, or even be abolished outright.[727]

It would be difficult to distil and evaluate these new 'models of the future' in the simplified paradigm 'grids' popular in late-twentieth-century textbooks. The condition of IR today is a product of both its long-term and recent pasts, but it is also moving beyond them. At some point, the late twentieth century will be as distant from the present as the origins of IR are from today.

[726] Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden, *Posthuman International Relations: Complexity, Ecologism, and Global Politics* (London: Zed Books, 2011); Anthony Burke et al., 'Planet Politics: A Manifesto from the End of IR', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 44, no. 3 (2016): 499–523.
[727] Olaf Corry, 'What's the Point of Being a Discipline? Four Disciplinary Strategies and the Future of International Relations', *Cooperation and Conflict* 57, no. 3 (2022): 290–312.

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