The Europeanisation of national foreign policy: Portuguese foreign policy towards Angola and Mozambique, 1978-2010

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A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, January 2012
Declaration

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Abstract

After its transition to democracy and decolonisation in the mid-1970s, Portugal’s main external focus shifted from Africa and the Atlantic to Europe. However, past priorities continued to occupy an important place in its foreign policy. This thesis assesses the impact of European Union (EU) membership on Portuguese foreign policy by focusing on relations with Angola and Mozambique, the two largest former colonies of Portugal in sub-Saharan Africa.

The thesis uses the concept of “Europeanisation”, comprising three relevant dimensions for examining possible changes in the foreign policy of an EU member state: national adaptation (a “top-down” process), national projection (“bottom-up”), and identity formation (socialisation process). In order to better control for the influence of other variables (beyond the EU) on Portuguese policy, the concept of Europeanisation is framed within a foreign policy analysis approach. The study focuses on the period between 1978 and 2010, and covers three policy areas: external trade, development aid and political-diplomatic issues.

The application of this analytical framework produced significant evidence of Europeanisation, both in its dimension of national adaptation and, chiefly, national projection. The analysis also revealed variations across policy areas and country cases, with the strongest evidence of Europeanisation found for the domain of trade and for the case of Mozambique in general. These findings give support to studies stressing that EU membership “strengthened” Portugal’s post-colonial relations, but also add a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the EU’s impact on the national level.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Common Commercial Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Democratic and Social Centre Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPLP</td>
<td>Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBA</td>
<td>Everything-But-Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<td>EOM</td>
<td>Election Observation Missions</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G19</td>
<td>Group of 19 Budget Support Donors to Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBS</td>
<td>General Budget Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAT</td>
<td>Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Armed Forces Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAPs</td>
<td>Programme Aid Partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Portuguese Communist Party</td>
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<td>PPD</td>
<td>Popular Democratic Party</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambican National Resistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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Introduction

Assessing the EU’s impact on Portuguese foreign policy

Traditionally Portugal developed “Atlanticist” and colonial priorities, rooted in its historical presence in different continents. With democratisation and the end of its colonial Empire in the mid-1970s, Europe and the process of European integration became its main external priority. Yet, past priorities continued to occupy an important place in the foreign policy outlook of the small Iberian country. In particular, Lisbon continued to value and promote its bilateral relationship with its former African colonies. The literature on Portuguese foreign policy tends to emphasise its gradual “Europeanisation”, since the country became a European Community (EC) member in 1986. However, academic contributions on the topic are scarce and existing accounts are usually very general and descriptive. Thus, the main purpose of this research project is to further explore the impact of European Union membership on Portugal’s foreign policy towards its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, by looking specifically at the cases of Angola and Mozambique. The key research question addressed in this study is “to what extent has Portuguese foreign policy vis-à-vis Angola and Mozambique been Europeanised”?

This study can be contextualised in the broad domain of European integration studies, engaging specifically with the literature on the foreign policy of EU member states and Europeanisation. For many years the main theoretical debate in this area was the supranationalist/intergovernmentalist divide, which more recently has been absorbed by the wider discussion opposing rationalist and constructivist perspectives. While more rationalist accounts would argue that not much change can be expected on national foreign policies beyond a mere “strategic adaptation” following an instrumental logic, constructivist perspectives would reply that even in the “high politics” domain of foreign policy the EU can have a “deep” impact on the foreign policy of its member states, following a “logic of appropriateness”. In recent years, the concept of Europeanisation has received growing attention in foreign policy studies. However, its usefulness is frequently contested particularly due its ill-defined nature and the methodological challenges in its applicability.
Against this setting, the central aim of this study was to provide a more detailed and nuanced assessment of the impact of EU membership on Portuguese foreign policy, by subjecting to extensive empirical examination the broad claim that its policy has been “Europeanised”. By focusing on the nature and extent of Europeanisation, this study addresses essentially a “what” sort of question. But as it has been argued by some “[s]ometimes the state of knowledge in a field is such that much fact-finding and description is needed before we can take on the challenge of explanation” (King, et al., 1994: 15). Although the analysis is not an exercise in theory-testing, it still provides a theoretically informed analytical framework for the study of Europeanisation.

A second main goal was to test the usefulness of a Europeanisation approach for assessing the impact of EU membership on a member state’s foreign policy. Building on previous studies, the conceptualisation of Europeanisation followed in this research project pays attention to three interrelated dimensions of change: national adaptation, national projection, and identity formation. That conceptualisation is framed within a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach, focusing on Portuguese foreign policy decisions taken with regard to the EU. On the basis of the conceptualisation adopted, the main questions that are asked are whether Portugal has been adapting its policies, projecting its national priorities and/or changing its preferences, due to a potential influence from the EU. Analytical tools for examining the variation of the EU influence across different policy areas are also included. This framework is then applied to two country cases (Angola and Mozambique) and three policy areas (trade, aid and diplomacy).

Based on the empirical analysis undertaken, the study demonstrates that new opportunities and constraints resulting from the European integration process (even during the pre-accession phase) had an impact on Portuguese foreign policy towards Angola and Mozambique. The dimension of Europeanisation which received more support from evidence was national projection, followed by the dimension of national adaptation. EU ideas and norms had limited impact on Portuguese self-understandings towards its former African colonies. The analysis also showed that the EU’s impact was more significant in the trade area (followed by aid and diplomacy), while in terms of countries it was more significant in Mozambique than in the Angolan case. A further qualification was that the EU represented just one factor among others (albeit a very important one) influencing Portuguese foreign policy. Those outcomes represent a more in-depth and nuanced understanding of the EU’s impact on Portuguese foreign policy. In that sense, this thesis makes a contribution to the theoretically-driven literature on Portuguese foreign policy, particularly on matters related to European integration and post-colonial relations.
Simultaneously, the results of the analysis have demonstrated that the adoption of a Europeanisation approach helped uncover specific European dynamics that influence and shape national foreign policy. They have also shown the utility of including in the analysis of Europeanisation the phase of accession negotiations of new members entering the EU. Moreover, it became evident that the analytical attention given to the configuration between EU and national agency in specific cases helps understand the variation of the EU influence across different policy areas. Finally, gauging Europeanisation within a broader FPA approach proved equally helpful to identify other relevant variables and, subsequently, check the EU’s influence against those other factors. In view of these outcomes, the study provided an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of a Europeanisation approach in the foreign policy realm. Therefore, it added to the debate on how to analyse the foreign policy of EU member states. Eventually, those insights could prove illuminating for other studies on the foreign policy of EU member states, particularly in matters related to Africa and for smaller and new member states, which also had to adapt to the existing *acquis communautaire*.

The text that follows is organised in nine chapters. Chapter One delineates the analytical framework and, in particular, defines the conceptualisation and operationalisation of Europeanisation that has served as a “roadmap” for the analysis in this thesis. Chapter Two, provides a background to the central topic of this study, by briefly evaluating the significance of both Portugal’s and EU’s relationship with sub-Saharan Africa, highlighting aspects of relevance for the country cases and policy areas of interest for this research project. Chapter Three applies the theoretical framework of the thesis to the specific case of trade policy in relation to Angola, focusing on the commercial aspects of Portugal’s accession negotiations to the EC and on the reform negotiations of the Lomé Convention trade dispositions. Chapter Four deals with development aid aspects, still in relation to Angola, and centres its attention on the negotiations for the adoption of the Lomé *acquis* during the phase of Portugal’s EC accession, as well as on the post-Cold War reforms of EU development policy. Chapter Five analyses political-diplomatic issues in relation to Angola, keeping the focus on the period of Portugal’s EC accession negotiations, but also examining the Angolan peace and democratisation processes. Chapter Six covers trade aspects in relation to Mozambique, and replicates the focus adopted for the same policy area in the case of Angola. Chapter Seven is devoted to aid issues related to Mozambique, and centres its analysis on the period of Portugal’s EC accession negotiations, as well as on political conditionality aspects under Lomé and the Cotonou Agreement. Chapter Eight, is the
last empirical chapter and examines diplomatic aspects for Mozambique, considering Portugal’s pre-accession phase, but also looking at the Mozambican peace process negotiations and some of the country’s general elections. Chapter Nine offers a summary of the main findings of the empirical analysis and discusses its broader implications, namely gauging the usefulness of the adopted Europeanisation approach and identifying future avenues of research.
Chapter 1

The analytical framework: Europeanisation and foreign policy

Introduction

This chapter presents the analytical framework of Europeanisation and its application in this thesis to assess the impact of EU membership on Portuguese foreign policy. In order to contextualise the framework and provide it with an adequate empirical, theoretical and conceptual basis, the chapter starts by a critical evaluation of the literature on Portuguese foreign policy, but also on European integration theory and on the foreign policy of EU member states. By making use of the concept of Europeanisation this study will be able to better capture the interplay between the European and Portuguese level, but the main focus of the analysis will remain on a possible EU impact on the national policy. In that sense, the thesis takes Portugal as the unit of analysis and, therefore, starts from the assumption that its national foreign policy can still be analysed separately. By framing the Europeanisation conceptualisation of this study within a Foreign Policy Analysis approach it will be easier to stay attentive to other possible causes of change, distinct from the EU. Moreover, by examining Portuguese foreign policy decisions taken with regard to the EU it is assumed that it will be possible to infer about the impact of the EU on national foreign policy. In effect, by examining Portuguese decisions, conclusions can be draw about the role afforded to the EU in the national foreign policy decision-making, and determine whether and to what extent Portuguese foreign policy exhibits evidence of Europeanisation or whether other considerations are more pertinent to explain specific policy outcomes.

The chapter proceeds in three sections. In the first one, a contextualisation for this thesis is provided by reviewing the existing literature, directly related to its main topic. In that sense, contributions from the literature on Portuguese foreign policy, European integration theory and the foreign policy of EU member states are evaluated, underlying their limitations and usefulness for this thesis. The second section spells out the analytical framework of the study, which makes use of the concept of Europeanisation, embedded in European integration theories and framed by a FPA approach. The final section presents the specific methods and sources used in this thesis.
1.1 The topic in context

This section explains the background and context of this thesis by reviewing the existing literature directly related to its topic. As described earlier, this research project aims at assessing the EU’s impact on Portugal’s post-colonial relations in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to establish the empirical basis of the analysis, the section starts by spelling out more in detail the puzzle of the study, evaluating current accounts in the literature on Portuguese foreign policy. Subsequently, the thesis is contextualised in theoretical terms by briefly examining possible answers for our puzzle, derived from European integration theory. Finally, the section closes by looking at the literature on the foreign policy of EU member states and considers potential conceptual insights for the analytical framework adopted in this research project.

Portuguese foreign policy

For many centuries, Portugal’s foreign priorities were oriented towards the Atlantic and its overseas territories. In a geopolitical reading, the development of close ties with the dominant maritime power as well as the preservation of the colonial Empire, were presented as crucial to protect Portugal’s sovereignty from continental pressure, stemming in particular from neighbouring Spain (Macedo, 2006). Writing as an historian, Teixeira (2005: 66) summarised those traditional priorities into four main principles. First, the perception of an opposition between Europe and the Atlantic, which sometimes led to difficult choices. Second, a strategic estrangement from Europe and the Continent (understood as the “Spanish threat”), and the prevalence of the Atlantic or maritime option. Third, the search for a preferential alliance with the maritime powers (historically first with Britain, later with the United States and NATO) and an emphasis on the colonial project (achieved through successive Empires, in India, Brazil, and Africa). Fourth, the constant diversification of the extra-peninsular alliances vis-à-vis Spain, as well as a bilateral diplomacy based on the triangle Lisbon-Madrid-maritime power. That general orientation was the one adopted under the authoritarian Estado Novo in the mid-1930s, which deliberately distanced Portugal from European issues and emphasised its Atlantic and colonial vocation. Salazar’s deep suspicions of any process that might threaten the survival of the regime added to the traditional distancing from continental affairs. Thus, when Portugal became involved in projects of European cooperation, it did so only reluctantly and essentially for pragmatic reasons (Leitão, 2007; A. C. Pinto and Teixeira, 2004). If Britain continued to play an important role for the Atlantic strategy of the Portuguese regime (especially in European affairs), after the Second World War Portugal moved to closer ties with the new maritime power, the
United States (Telo, 1996). Finally, the intransigent defence of the colonial empire manifested itself most clearly through the long decolonisation conflicts fought in three African territories: Angola, Guinea and Mozambique (Newitt, 1981).

Following Portugal’s transition to democracy in the mid-1970s, Europe became more important in Lisbon’s external outlook. After the 1974 military coup that deposed the authoritarian regime and led to a rapid process of decolonisation in Africa, Portugal went to a phase of great instability (Maxwell, 1995). During this initial period of post-1974 turbulence, despite the lack of definition Portugal’s foreign policy was largely pro-Third World, favouring a privileged relationship with its former colonies. A new phase was inaugurated in 1976, through the adoption of an overall Euro-Atlantic orientation (Rato, 2008; Teixeira, 2003). The “Atlantic” dimension of these new guidelines embodied the traditional priority areas of Portuguese foreign policy. In particular, it included strengthening relations with the United States and an active participation in NATO, as well as the development of relations with the other Portuguese-speaking countries. For its part, the “European” dimension presented more elements of novelty and was chiefly expressed in the decision to join the European Communities (Teixeira, 2003: 115-6). Against the challenging domestic context at the time, greater integration with Europe represented a way to help secure the stabilisation and modernisation of Portugal’s new regime, as well as the redefinition of its international orientation (A. C. Pinto and Teixeira, 2004: 122-3; Tsoukalis, 1981: 115-21). The two dimensions were seen as compatible and complementary: Portugal’s Atlanticism could reinforce its position within Europe, just as being European could represent an added value vis-à-vis the Atlantic. But, crucially, in this reformulation of Portuguese foreign policy guidelines, “Europe” replaced the “Atlantic” as the chief priority (Teixeira, 2003: 116; Vasconcelos, 1991: 132). Based on a large consensus, consolidated in the mid-1980s, Euro-Atlanticism became the central premise of Portuguese foreign policy (Cravo and Freire, 2006; MacDonald, 1993; Teixeira, 2005: 71; Vasconcelos, 1996: 271).

In the far from abundant literature on Portuguese foreign policy, the prevalent opinion tends to emphasise its gradual “Europeanisation”. During an initial phase after its accession, in 1986, Portugal’s general involvement in the European Community was described as reserved and mainly economically oriented (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007: 215; Vasconcelos, 2000b: 11-2). That initial participation entailed a necessary period of familiarisation to the new policy environment,

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1 Two important steps in that direction were, first, the signature in 1948 of a bilateral military cooperation agreement and, second, Portugal’s entry into NATO in 1949.
but political dimensions in particular were viewed with great caution (Correia, 2002: 201-2). From the early 1990s, Portugal’s stance started to change and adopted a more open and active approach, including for foreign and security policy matters. Systemic transformations since the late 1980s appear to have brought some important challenges to the general Euro-Atlantic orientation of Portuguese foreign policy. The German reunification and subsequent wave of EU Eastern enlargements and institutional reforms raised growing concerns in Lisbon’s quarters about a potential downgrading of the national position in the European context and, necessarily, in the world (Gaspar, 2000, 2007; Vasconcelos, 1996: 279-80). Moreover, even if the more pessimistic views about the continuity of the Atlantic Alliance in a post-Cold War era were not confirmed, that major event rather signalled a decline in the relevance of NATO than its reinforcement (see Dannreuther and Peterson, 2006: 189-91). On the EU side, the general trend became one of greater coordination and integration in international affairs, including for defence policy (Howorth, 2007: 52). Against this context, several authors have pointed to an increased “Europeanisation” of Portuguese foreign policy, even if with a greater degree of reluctance for military aspects (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007; Gaspar, 2000; Magone, 2000, 2004, 2006; Teixeira, 2005; Tomé, 2007; Vasconcelos, 2000b).

Notwithstanding this trend of greater integration with the EU, during the last decades Portugal kept its post-colonial relations high on its foreign policy agenda. In effect, accession to the European Community did not change the level of importance officially attached to Africa by successive Portuguese governments (Neves, 1996; Venâncio and Chan, 1996). Portugal continued to promote and support several initiatives towards its former African colonies, either at a bilateral or multilateral level. For instance, Portugal started to provide aid assistance to its ex-colonies since very soon and essentially through bilateral channels, despite its limited means. Moreover, under the more favourable post-Cold War context of the 1990s Portugal had an important role in the creation of the Community of Portuguese-speaking countries (CPLP) (Magone, 2004: 251-6). At the societal level, despite the enduring civil conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, many Portuguese companies kept a vivid interest for those former colonial markets (M. E. Ferreira, 1994, 2005). The not so distant colonial experience also assured an important level of resonance among vast sectors of the public opinion and civil society. Furthermore, Africa continued to occupy an important place in the national identity, particularly in view of its association with Portugal’s “Golden Age of Discovery” (Alexandre, 1995; Cravinho, 2005). In effect, the country’s long history and lasting ties in different regions of the world (in Africa, but also South America and Asia) are key elements that Lisbon’s policy-makers and diplomats
continued to value and mobilise. The challenges for Portugal’s overall foreign policy resulting from the evolution of its main pillars (“Europe” and the “Atlantic”), pointed out above, rather worked in the sense of reinforcing the role post-colonial relations play for Lisbon as a factor of international influence and differentiation (see Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 7-10). Ultimately, it can be said that over the last three decades Portugal managed with a considerable degree of success not only to rebuild, but also upgrade its relationship with its former African colonies.

Considering this backdrop, what were the implications of Portugal’s EU membership for its post-colonial relations in Africa? Or, more to the point of this research, to what extent were those relations “Europeanised”? There is very little academic literature examining the relationship between Portuguese foreign policy and the EU, and even less contributions considering directly the potential EU impact on Portugal’s post-colonial relations in Africa. José Magone has published extensively on Portugal’s participation in the EU, but principally from a domestic politics perspective. One important exception to that - and perhaps the most relevant contribution to date on the general topic of this thesis - is Magone’s chapter on Portugal included in the comparative study edited by Ian Manners and Richard Whitman (2000c): “The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States”. In his chapter Magone applies the analytical framework developed by the editors of the volume (which will be considered later) to examine Portugal’s foreign policy in the EU context, focusing on aspects of foreign policy change in general (adaptation and socialisation), foreign policy-making, and foreign policy action. Magone’s analysis includes many interesting empirical insights on Portuguese foreign policy in general and, to a lesser extent, on its post-colonial relations. For instance, the author describes at length how Portugal’s foreign policy making processes and machinery have been “Europeanised” over the years (Magone, 2000: 165-7, 169-70). He also contends that “[t]he integration into a larger role through EU membership strengthened Portuguese foreign policy” (ibid.: 175). Moreover, Magone emphasises that “[w]ithin European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Portugal has remained a supporter of the Portuguese-speaking countries” (ibid.: 162).

Yet the most interesting section of the chapter from the point of view of this research project is the one on foreign policy action, which considers whether Portugal’s foreign policy is conducted “with or without the EU”. While Portugal’s interest in strengthening a Euro-Africa dialogue seems to be categorised as “with the EU” (ibid.: 170-3), Lisbon’s relationship with the other Portuguese-speaking countries (either bilateral or through the CPLP) appears to be classed as
“beyond but within EU parameters” (ibid.: 173-4). In effect, no explicit link is made between those categories and the evidence provided. The author asserts in a general way that “[s]ince 1992 there has been a narrowing of the gap between EU and Portuguese foreign policy” and that “[t]here is no longer a contradiction between Portuguese foreign policy from within and without European parameters” (ibid.: 173). This “blurring” between national and EU policy is also extended to Portugal’s “special relationships”, again in a general fashion (beyond African Lusophone countries, the section also includes references to Brazil, Macao and East Timor):

> “On the whole, Portuguese special relationships are no longer conducted without the EU. On the contrary, the initiatives of the Portuguese foreign policy complement the CFSP. Synergies have been created since Portugal became a member of the EC in 1986.” (ibid.: 174-5).

The conclusion that even Portuguese “special relationships” are conducted in synergy with the EU is certainly a relevant finding, as it challenges the idea that Portugal might have tried to “ring-fence” those relations from Union or Community processes due to national sensitivities. But the fact that the assertion is made in a very generic way, leaves many open questions. For instance, it would be interesting to know whether there are any differences among the different “special relationships” the author seems to refer to, not least because the EU agency is very likely to vary across different geographical areas (e.g. stronger in sub-Saharan Africa than in Macao or Brazil). Similarly, there might be variation across policy areas or over time. Regarding the latter point, Magone does not explain why he considers that since 1992 EU and Portuguese policy became more intertwined. In fact, the author appears to make no use of any theoretical insights to guide his analysis, which ends up being very descriptive.

Álvaro de Vasconcelos has also made important contributions to the broad subject of this thesis, having written widely on Portuguese foreign policy and the EU, as a think tank analyst. His most important work from the perspective of this research project is a chapter on Portugal included in the volume edited by Christopher Hill in 1996: “The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy”. In his chapter, Vasconcelos gives an overall picture of Portuguese foreign policy in an EU context, emphasising Portugal’s views on EPC/CFSP. In that sense, the study does not directly address the question of a possible EU impact on the national policy. Still, even if less interesting that Magone’s contribution from an analytical point of view, Vasconcelos’ chapter does include many relevant empirical insights for this thesis, including on Portugal’s post-colonial relations. For instance, the author highlights the importance of national dimensions in Portugal’s relations in southern Africa, as well as Lisbon’s interest in “projecting” its own priorities onto the EU level in this specific domain:
“Portugal seeks in relation to Portuguese-speaking Africa and South Africa to prolong, through Europe, a national foreign policy objective (the ‘national’ prevails over the ‘European’ in this area)” (Vasconcelos, 1996: 271).

Vasconcelos also significantly concludes that “[m]embership of the Community and participation in EPC have actually proved a factor in strengthening Portugal’s relations with the Lusophone world” (ibid.: 271). Beyond the issue of its focus mentioned above, the wide scope of this study necessarily sacrifices in terms of depth. Moreover, this is essentially an empirical contribution, with some parts of the chapter being openly normative or prescriptive.²

A third main contribution is a chapter written by Miguel Santos Neves, included in a comparative study edited by Franco Algieri and Elfriede Regelsberger (1996): “Synergy at Work: Spain and Portugal in European Foreign Policy”. Differently from the two contributions assessed above, Neves’ chapter focuses specifically on Portuguese foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa and its interaction with the EU level. Moreover, apart from addressing the question of Portugal’s influence on common activities, the analysis also deals in a direct way with the EU’s impact on national policy, but covering essentially EPC. In the title of his chapter, Neves describes Portugal’s role within the EU as a “promoter” for sub-Saharan Africa. The overall argument he puts forward is that the EU’s impact was both limited and positive from Portugal’s perspective:

“(…) the impact of EPC’s work on Portuguese foreign policy has been limited but globally positive, not only as a consequence of the restrictive scope of the latter but also of the low priority status of Africa within EPC. On the other hand, in spite of the fact that Portugal was not able to influence major changes in EPC's policy towards Africa, given the system of ‘reserved areas of influence’, it had the opportunity to make some relevant contributions to specific issues, in particular those related to southern Africa” (Neves, 1996: 138).

While an important amount of background information is provided, the question of the EU’s impact on the national policy ends up receiving a limited amount of attention. Moreover, that specific issue is dealt with only in a very general and aggregated way. In sum, this overview indicates a scarce literature on the topic under analysis. The assessed contributions include interesting empirical insights, but overall they lack nuance, as well as general theoretical foundations.

² Some examples of normative claims can be found in those excerpts: “It seems desirable that the military efforts of member states (…) should become progressively ‘Europeanized’, in order to prevent the renationalization of foreign policies” (ibid. 1996: 282); “(…) clarification of the European Union’s own stances, hopefully resulting from a further deepening of European integration, where it is most needed - in the realm of political union” (ibid. 1996: 283).
This study can be located within the broad field of European integration theory. For many years the main theoretical debate present in this domain opposed two main camps: supranationalists and intergovernmentalists (Pollack, 2005; Wiener and Diez, 2009). Attending to the specific features of foreign policy developments at the EU level, intergovernmentalist perspectives have traditionally been the predominant explanation for this specific policy area. According to this view, member states remain in control of the process and joint initiatives are assumed to have had no significant effects on their national policies. By the mid-1990s the theoretical discussion was broadened to a new divide opposing rationalist and constructivist perspectives. In particular, constructivist scholarship has suggested that greater attention should be given to the “transformatory” effects EU cooperation can have on national foreign policies. In order to theoretically inform this research, those different insights are briefly examined next.

Starting from an extreme position, one could argue that EU membership has had no impact on Portuguese foreign policy since as a small power, geographically peripheral and politico-economically marginal, Portugal does not have a “real” foreign policy in the first place. Assuming that Portugal does have one, still the involvement of the EU in the domain of “high politics” would be either inexistent or at best too weak to produce any sort of impact on national foreign policy. Following this realist perspective, cooperation in foreign and security issues must face the hard test of selfish member states, too cautious about their own autonomy and influence to compromise national interests (Mearsheimer, 1994; Walt, 2002; Waltz, 1979). A test particularly difficult to be passed in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, since traditionally the security prism has not been the main one adopted by the EU towards that region of the world (H. Smith, 2002: 185). Member states with historical links with Africa would prefer to “go it alone”, in order to preserve their “special relationships” from EU influence. Big countries such as France and Britain would be particularly well positioned to do it, attending to their relative power (Chipman, 1989; Krosnak, 2004; Williams, 2004). But smaller members such as Portugal too would struggle to keep their own priorities, either by overtly opposing a decision that threatens their position or, if that direct opposition appears too costly, by “hiding” themselves behind the position of other member states, also with special interests in that region. Thus, instead of the EU Portugal would choose other options to conduct its African policy, either bilaterally or via other multilateral platforms.
Other realist versions would posit that greater activity of external rivals in Africa, such as the United States, China or India, could be a factor leading to a more cooperative stance between Portugal and its European partners. In that sense, the presence of a common external threat produces a convergence of interests which could justify more cooperation (Mearsheimer, 1990; Posen, 2006; Waltz, 1986). Moreover, following the “voice opportunity thesis”, Portugal could favour increased EU cooperation towards sub-Saharan Africa in order to constrain its stronger partners and increase its external influence (Grieco, 1995, 1996). For instance, Portugal has far more possibilities to compete with the African policy of Britain and France through the multilateral framework of the EU than bilaterally. And by bringing into the EU a traditional area of its foreign relations Portugal makes a contribution to the common activities which can increase its influence within the group and signal its specificity vis-à-vis other members, in particular Spain. Thus, apart from expanding its influence, such behaviour could also be seen from the perspective of affirming national prestige and even ensuring survival.

Those arguments are also consistent with intergovernmentalist theories, which give more attention to the facilitating role that European institutions can play for increasing cooperation. Such role is subordinated to the national interests of member states, which will only cooperate if they share common interests and anticipate mutual benefits (Hoffmann, 1966; Milward, 2000). Portugal as a small member is more likely to more often be in a situation where the gains of common action outweigh the potential costs of lost national autonomy. In that sense, Portugal could try to use the EU to “add value” to its own activities and objectives. For example, by complementing its historical and cultural ties in Africa with the instruments and financial means of the Community, Portugal would seek to reinforce its position both in the EU and in sub-Saharan Africa, by presenting itself as an agent or a “bridge” between the two continents. Moreover, the EU adds leverage to Portugal’s position when it negotiates with African countries. Furthermore, the EU can work as a useful “umbrella” for Portugal’s colonial stigma or to face specific demands from African countries, by hiding itself behind the pretext of an EU exigency (see Hill, 1983a; Wallace, 1983). In any case, Portugal will always be unwilling to make any fundamental compromise due to the special importance that it attaches to its former colonies in Africa. In sum, the main idea that derives from the above perspectives is that the attitude of Portuguese policy-makers towards the EU will be based on power-maximising calculations.

From a liberal perspective, common challenges deriving from international dynamics and closer links between European countries could encourage greater cooperation in Africa and therefore
favour a possible impact of the EU on Portuguese foreign policy. In this respect, Ginsberg (1989) speaks respectively of an “interdependence logic” and “regional integration logic”. An interconnected and highly competitive global environment would render autonomous action less effective, especially for states with scarce resources such as Portugal. In that sense, the “politics of scale” resulting from collective action at the EU level would represent a plus, namely to compete with other international players in Africa or to deal with the implications of trade liberalisation promoted by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). At the same time, Lisbon’s special links in Lusophone Africa (historical, cultural, economic and political-diplomatic) would give its diplomacy an issue-specific advantage. By concentrating efforts in this “niche”, Portugal would then be able to exert more influence within the EU than what realist views based on size of states would assume (Cooper, 1997). Conversely, interdependence can make difficult common action due to the multitude of actors involved and the complexity of issues, which may affect member states differently and, therefore, produce divergent reactions. By the same token, increased integration at the EU level can stimulate a greater need for diversification - especially for members with less extensive foreign relations - triggering autonomous initiatives.

More liberal accounts would also pay greater attention to domestic factors, such as Portugal’s constitutional design, the role of bureaucracies, political parties and special interest groups. The fact that sub-Saharan Africa is one of the traditional areas of Portuguese foreign policy gives credit to that approach. For instance, different degrees of “resistance” to the EU’s influence may be offered by the ministry of foreign affairs, on the one hand, and the economic and finance departments, on the other. Another example could be that despite the broad consensus at the elite level about the importance of the European dimension in Portugal’s foreign policy, different political currents (“Europeanists” vs. “Atlanticists”) might value such importance differently in relation to Portugal’s former colonies. Different business groups and also non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can put pressure on governments to adopt either a more national or a more European inclination in Portugal’s post-colonial relations, for specific sectors. In sum, economic interdependence, the possibility of joint gains and the role of European institutions can work as incentives for greater cooperation at the EU-level. Bargaining within the European context would then have an impact on the costs of pursuing and attaining national goals (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). However, possible changes in Portugal’s national preferences will be the result of

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3 Peter Jakobsen (2009) suggests four factors to explain the influence of small states in the EU context: (1) they must be recognised as leaders in the issue area at hand; (2) they must back their initiatives with convincing arguments; (3) they must engage in honest broker coalition-building; (4) they must have the capacity to support implementation with financial and human resources.
strategic adaptation rather than a deeper effect produced by the EU. In sum, those perspectives will base the attitude of Portuguese policy-makers towards the EU on interest-maximising calculations.

Transnationally organised NGOs, national think tanks participating in European networks or more generally “epistemic communities” who supply knowledge to national policy-makers, could be a source of pressure on the Portuguese government for adopting a more transnational and collective perspective (Haas, 1964; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Schmitter, 1969). Also the European institutions, in particular the Commission, can push for EU action (Fligstein and Sweet, 2002; Sandholtz, et al., 2001; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998). Following supranationalist insights, their activity can trigger a process of spill-over favouring further integration, even in the foreign policy realm (M. E. Smith, 2004). For instance, political conditionality in European Union-Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) relations (introduced by Lomé IV in 1990 and subsequently reinforced) produced a politicisation of the EC’s external relations, which indicates a spill-over between “low” and “high” politics. Such result means that institutions like the Commission can indirectly gain a greater say in CFSP issues and therefore contribute for a possible “unintended” impact of the EU on Portuguese foreign policy.

Constructivist accounts would go further, arguing that due to cooperation with the EU Portugal’s identity and interests vis-à-vis its former African colonies have changed (Christiansen, et al., 2001; Wendt, 1992). A “Europeanisation” of Portugal’s foreign policy would have taken place due in particular to the socialisation of Portuguese diplomats and officials in the Council (Lewis, 2005; Tonra, 2003). More generally, decades of interaction with new ideas and arguments stemming from the EU would have transformed the understanding that national policy-makers make of their own identity and preferences (sometimes under the shadow of a “post-colonial guilt complex”), making them more likely to perceive common interests (Checkel, 2001; Risse, 2009). Portuguese African policy would have started to be made more frequently through the EU, not because it maximises the calculated national self-interest but rather because such behaviour resonates with the deeper norms, ideas and values of national decision-makers, according to a “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 1998). Along those lines, European norms and approaches towards sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., promotion of minority rights, support for regional integration, etc.) would seem more adequate to Portuguese policy-makers than the national ones.
Other accounts would contest such interpretation. A general point grounded on the absence of a European state would deny the possibility that a European identity or interest could develop and, as a result, impact national foreign policies (Allen, 1996: 303; Hill and Wallace, 1996: 8-9). Portugal’s “egoistic identity” would endure and resist the influence of EU’s ideas. This would be particularly so in regard to Portugal’s former colonies, which play an important symbolic role for its foreign policy (Cravinho, 2005). The reconstruction of a post-colonial relationship, based on principles of mutual respect and solidarity, is often presented as a way for Portugal to rebuild its self-image and identity, and consequently increase its international prestige and influence. Moreover, the preservation of special relations with a group of countries spread over several continents and sharing historical, cultural and linguistic ties is described as a factor of differentiation and, therefore, influence for Portuguese foreign policy, especially in the context of an enlarged EU. For some sectors of Portuguese society and elite, such relations are even depicted along idealistic and mythical lines, especially in regard to Angola (see Oliveira, 2005).

Other arguments put forward to refute the possibility of changes in Portugal’s foreign policy due to the EU point to the potential role of other factors. For instance the potential transformation of Portuguese ideas and approach towards its ex-colonies could be the result of wider processes, such as Portugal’s process of democratisation. It could also be due to the role of other actors, such as the Council of Europe, the United States or the United Nations.

The different theoretical perspectives depicted above can be organised along the broad divide between rationalist and constructivist views. For rationalist perspectives, Portuguese policy-makers would act purposefully on the basis of preformed and stable preferences to maximise utility. The institutional context of the EU and the interactions that it engenders can have an impact on the costs of pursuing national preferences, but does not affect its substance. In that sense, potential changes on Portuguese foreign policy due to the EU would be the result of instrumental calculations or a mere strategic adaptation. By distinguishing between power and interest-based considerations this logic of action can generate two sorts of hypotheses: a realist-rationalist one, and a liberal-rationalist one. In contrast, for the constructivist perspective actors are driven by a “logic of appropriateness”, following what is normatively expected of them in a particular role or situation. Instead of given, preferences are the product of ideational structures and social interaction. Thus, Portuguese representatives can be affected by EU social norms in which they are embedded. These norms not only regulate their behaviour, but also constitute their identities and preferences. In that sense, the EU could have a deeper impact, including on the substance of Portugal’s positions. Thus, apart from the two rationalist hypotheses mentioned
above, this constructivist understanding would be a third potential explanation for the (possible) Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy.

Rather than mutually exclusive, the insights produced by the approaches mentioned above can be complementary. In effect, some might be more adequate than others to illuminate specific empirical aspects (Fearon and Wendt, 2007; Jupille, et al., 2003). While useful as partial explanations for potential changes taking place on Portuguese foreign policy due to a EU effect, those approaches in general are not at easy to analytically capture the interplay between the European and the national levels. In other words, they either tend to emphasise the way member states influence or shape EU processes, or, conversely, the impact of EU processes on the national level. But as pointed out by White (2004: 16, 20), what is needed is an approach enabling to understand the two-way relationship between national and EU policy, and offering an analytical perspective that facilitates the exploration of the linkages between these different levels of analysis.

Literature on national foreign policy in an EU context

Early studies analysing member states foreign policy within the EU context were mainly focused on national views of the EPC/CFSP in general terms, rather than on a possible impact in the opposite direction (see Hill, 1983b, 1996). As seen above, this reflects the predominance that intergovernmentalist accounts have traditionally enjoyed in the conceptualisation of foreign policy developments at the EU level. More recently, however, numerous studies were published focusing specifically on the impact of EU foreign policy on national foreign policies, in particular by making a greater use of constructivist insights. In that regard, Ben Tonra’s (2001) book on the foreign policy of Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands was a pioneer work. Subsequently, several studies have been conducted assessing the EU’s impact on national foreign policies (particularly case studies on individual member states), by making use of the concept of Europeanisation. This will be the object of the next section. For now, however, our attention will focus on two central works of empirical and, chiefly, analytical relevance for this research project. The first one, is the volume edited by Manners and Whitman (2000c), mentioned above, which formulates and applies an analytical framework to approach the foreign policy of EU member states. The second is a book by Henrik Larsen (2005), which builds up a framework to study the importance of the EU for the foreign policy of small member states across issue areas, using the Danish case.
The main analytical argument put forward in Manners and Whitman’s volume is that EU member states’ foreign policies have been so transformed through membership that the adoption of an adapted FPA approach is justified. This “transformational FPA” would require paying special attention to the specificities of the context in which European member states operate. Based on such understanding, the authors suggest a common framework for analysing the foreign policies of EU member states comprising three general variables: foreign policy change (including adaptation and socialisation); foreign policy process (encompassing domestic and bureaucratic processes); and foreign policy action (formulated as whether foreign policy action takes place with or without the EU). More specifically, the first group of variables considers the ways in which EU member states adapt their foreign policies through membership of the EU. It also asks whether habits of working together might become practices “which shape the participants and may lead to a re-orientation of their beliefs and behaviour” (Manners and Whitman, 2000b: 8). The second group pays attention to the influence that domestic and bureaucratic factors might have in determining the foreign policies of member states. The last group of factors considers whether the constrictions and opportunities stemming from the participation in CFSP and the external relations of the EC have altered the foreign policy of member states. It also takes into account the special relations and issues that member states seek to “ring fence” and the subsequent impact on their foreign policy behaviour. This analytical framework is subsequently applied to specific case studies on fourteen EU member states (including Portugal, as seen above).

Some of the empirical findings of the book deserve special emphasis here. One is the conclusion that most member states have adapted their foreign policies as a means of achieving innovation regarding their domestic politics and external orientation. Adaptation was used by member states to deal with issues such as “historical experiences”, “post-neutrality”, “colonial experiences” or “economic development” - the last two issues are presented as important for Portugal (Manners and Whitman, 2000a: 245-9). Regarding the socialisation of policy-makers, its impact is indicated as stronger for smaller member states - as well as for the less geographically remote. Pre-existing orientations of external relations are described as an important factor shaping member states behaviour. While member states with an extensive network of relations outside the EU perceive it mainly as a constraint or simply as a mean to amplify national foreign policy, member states with less extensive foreign relations (in which Portugal is included) tend to work through the European framework, seen mainly as an opportunity. This last aspect can be due to a lack of capacity or desire to engage in extensive external relations, attempts to cover national
positions, or domestic tensions that the EU can help overcome (ibid.: 262-4). Another conclusion of the book is the difficulty to clearly separate between those policies which are “Europeanised” or conducted through the EU and the policies which are retained or excluded from the EU as a domaine privé, due to their special nature (ibid.: 268). In any case, according to Manners and Whitman “EU member states conduct all but the most limited foreign policies [sic] objectives inside an EU context” (ibid.: 271).

Larsen’s monograph takes a different approach and starts by asking whether the foreign policy of small EU member states is today mainly conducted through the EU framework. The book follows the assumption that the role of the EU in national foreign policy varies according to the “fit” between the strength of EU policy and the national articulation of agency in relation to particular areas (pp. 10-1). On the basis of a constructivist perspective, four main categories of articulation of Danish actorness are used: “Denmark”, only “the EU”, “Denmark and the EU”, and “Denmark through the EU”. The possible articulations of “Denmark” with other international actors are not ignored. In order to analyse the relationship between EU and Danish foreign policy, the analytical framework put forward looks at three main aspects: (i) inside/outside the EU; (ii) passive/active within the EU; (iii) and constitutive use of EU foreign policy concepts (pp. 39-43). The book tries to answer those questions by focusing on the substance of Danish foreign policy in relation to seven different areas: bilateral relations with EU member states, security, Balkans, development, Africa, Latin America, and trade. The general conclusion is that the relationship between the EU and Danish foreign policy varies according to the policy area under consideration (pp. 199-200).

This nuanced picture is presented as valid for all sub-questions (inside/outside the EU; active/passive role; constitutive effects or not). The Danish foreign policy and the EU are closely interwoven in most policy areas (with the exception of military issues), and the domains where the Danish policy is not mainly conducted through the EU are not many (chiefly development issues and relations with the United States/NATO). Moreover, the EU is the most important multilateral framework for Denmark in the majority of areas. Hence, the role of the EU for Danish foreign policy is significant, but it also varies considerably across areas according to the fit between EU policy and national articulations of actorness. Thus, as Larsen puts it, we cannot take for granted that small states participating in the EU framework will make use of the EU, be active within it or import its concepts, in the same way across all policy areas (p. 209). Further, if the importance of the EU framework varies across areas the implication for the analysis of small
states foreign policy in the EU context is that different variations of FPA might be necessary for
different policy areas and different countries within the EU (p. 209). In areas where the EU does
not play a central role, a more traditional FPA understanding might be adequate, whereas in the
others a “transformational” FPA would be needed. Larsen’s concluding suggestion is that more
in-depth studies of the role of EU foreign policy in national foreign policy are necessary in order
to ascertain the need for change in the way national foreign policy in an EU context is studied (p.
212).

In sum, both books present interesting elements for this research in terms of empirical outcomes
and approach. In particular, Manners and Whitman’s framework includes many relevant
variables to examine Portugal’s foreign policy in the EU context. However, the framework is in
general under-theorised (Brighi, 2001: 449). No satisfactory explanation is provided for when
and why those specific variables operate (e.g., in which specific situations and why do member
states conduct their foreign policies “with” or “without” the EU). In contrast, the focus of
Larsen’s book is precisely in discriminating outcomes across specific areas and its framework
presents interesting analytical tools in that regard. Moreover, by not assuming a transformation of
national policy due to a EU effect, Larsen’s approach seems to provide a more robust and useful
starting basis. In effect, Larsen’s analytical framework can more accurately identify the situations
where a special FPA might be necessary to examine the foreign policy of a EU member state. On
the other hand, his findings emerge as mainly descriptive, rather than explanatory. Due to its
epistemological position, the study addresses chiefly the “what” and “how” sort of questions. The
book does not provide any answer about why is national foreign policy conducted inside/outside
the EU framework in some specific areas: is it due to a rational calculus or to a “deep belief”?

1.2 The framework of analysis

This section presents the analytical framework of the study. In order to assess the EU’s impact on
Portuguese foreign policy this thesis makes use of the concept of Europeanisation, imported from
general EU studies. Building on previous work, the section starts by offering a working
definition of the concept, justifying its applicability to the domain of foreign policy, as well as
assessing its usefulness and limits. The second part of the section frames the conceptualisation of
the study within an FPA approach. In order to measure the concept of Europeanisation, indicators
are provided, main terms of the operationalisation are defined, and hypotheses spelled out.

4 In a more recent publication, Larsen (2009) extends this argument to all member states (i.e. beyond small EU
member states).
Since the late 1990s, “Europeanisation” has become a popular area of research in EU studies (Cowles, et al., 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Graziano and Vink, 2008b; Ladrech, 2010). The term Europeanisation has been given different meanings by different authors, but in general its usage refers to the domestic impact of European integration (Graziano and Vink, 2008a: 7). The concept was initially formulated for policy areas in the Community pillar. In this domain pressures emanating from the EU level are relatively strong and changes in national policies and institutional structures have been widely documented (see Featherstone, 2003). Differently, foreign policy lies essentially in the intergovernmental pillar and deals with aspects traditionally understood as more “sensitive”. Here the “EU input” is weaker, less clearly defined and more difficult to detect (see Major, 2005). An exception can take place in the context of the accession of new members to the EU. In those circumstances, members joining the Union need to adopt the *acquis politique* and, in case there is a “misfit”, adapt their foreign policy to it (de Flers, 2005: 13; Manners and Whitman, 2000b: 7). Changes in states’ foreign policies due to national and European interactions have been documented in the literature. Such results point towards a “coordination reflex” and a socialisation dimension, expected to lead to changes in preferences and interests (see Glarbo, 1999; Nuttall, 1992; Øhrgaard, 1997; M. E. Smith, 2000; Tonra, 2003). In recent times, several authors have used a Europeanisation approach to document changes in national foreign policies (e.g. Economides, 2005; Gross, 2009; Miskimmon, 2007; Tonra, 2001; Torreblanca, 2001; Vaquer i Fanes, 2005; White, 2001; Wong, 2006; Wong and Hill, 2011).

Reuben Wong (2005, 2008a) suggests that three dimensions of Europeanisation can be useful to explain possible changes taking place in the foreign policy of an EU member state: national adaptation (“top-down”); national projection (“bottom-up”); and identity reconstruction (socialisation of interests and identities). The first dimension refers mainly to situations where the EU acts as a constraint on member states, becoming an increasingly important point of reference for national actors. This process follows an incremental path - rather than a self-sustaining one - constrained by endogenous factors. Such dimension relates to explanations emphasising domestic structures approaches and the international sources of domestic change (Gourevitch, 1978). A second dimension of Europeanisation focuses on how member states use the EU to achieve their own objectives, by exporting their domestic policy models and ideas to the European level. Member states “Europeanise” what were previously national priorities and
generalise them onto a larger stage. Such understanding gets close to an intergovernmental logic and the concept of “politics of scale” described above (Ginsberg, 1989; Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik, 1993). The third dimension is concerned with the process of identity and interest convergence in the EU context, and is consistent with supranational institutionalism and social constructivist explanations (Christiansen, et al., 2001; Sandholtz, et al., 2001).

This three-dimensional conceptualisation of foreign policy Europeanisation is useful because it “evokes parallel and interconnected processes of change at both the national and European levels” (Wong, 2005: 149). Moreover, it captures domestic change and puts it in a dynamic perspective with the EU level (Major and Pomorska, 2005: 3). In Roy Ginsberg’s words the concept of Europeanisation offers a “healthy corrective to overemphasis on interstate bargaining and opens the door to new, more nuanced theoretical insights” (Ginsberg, 2001: 38). Applied to the domain of foreign policy, a Europeanisation approach position itself in a “middle ground” regarding the divide between paradigmatic European integration theories by accepting that member states adapt to EU foreign policy decision-making structures and norms, while at the same time recognising that member states are themselves actively involved in creating these structures and norms (Wong, 2008a: 323). The conceptualisation proposed by Wong has been already operationalised and applied in studies examining the Europeanisation of national foreign policy (Gross, 2009). But before moving to that part of the research design it is apposite to consider, at least briefly, some of the main limits and methodological challenges often identified when applying a Europeanisation framework.

Firstly, Europeanisation is often presented as just a descriptive concept, rather than a theory (White, 2004: 21). However, it has also been argued that instead of working as an explanatory concept Europeanisation can be useful as “an attention-directing device and a starting point for further exploration” (Olsen, 2002: 943). Moreover, the concept can be embedded in wider theoretical or meta-theoretical frames of international relations, comparative politics and policy analysis (Featherstone, 2003: 12). Thus, rather than a new ad hoc theory Europeanisation would represent a useful way to “orchestrate” existing concepts and mainstream theories, contributing to cumulative research (Radaelli, 2004). Secondly, it has been pointed out that defining Europeanisation as multi-dimensional and “a matter of reciprocity between moving features” raises methodological problems as it blurs the boundaries between cause and effect (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2005: 340). To illustrate, the “top-down” and “bottom-up” dimensions mentioned above are in practice linked, since member states are at the origin of the EU policies that they
later have to adapt to. However, it is not impossible in analytical terms to disentangle the effects of the EU input at the national level from the national moves of policy projection. By presenting the impact of the EU on the national level as the “added value” of Europeanisation it is possible to safeguard the internal coherence of the concept and to differentiate it from others, in particular the concept of European integration (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 14-5, 20).

Finally, the adoption of a Europeanisation approach brings along the risk of overestimating the impact of the EU. By focusing on the interplay between the national and the European level there is the possibility of misjudging Europeanisation, either by ignoring other possible influences or by inflating the “EU effect” (Major, 2005: 183). Yet Europeanisation is better understood as only one factor among others spread over different level of analysis, which may have an effect on the foreign policies of EU member states (Wong, 2005: 151). This important qualification offers good prospects for gauging the impact of the EU factor through a FPA methodology. In fact, by examining foreign policy-making processes in detail it should be possible to establish the relative significance of those different influences (Moumoutzis, 2011: 621). Other procedures suggested by the literature to cope with the challenge of assessing the “net impact” of the EU are process-tracing, time sensitive approaches and “bottom-up-down” research designs (Haverland, 2008: 62-3; Radaelli and Exadaktylos, 2010: 198). The researcher starts by process-tracing the set of actors, problems, resources, ideas and styles present at the domestic level at time zero (i.e. the “domestic system” *ex ante*). Then, it goes “up” and analyses how policies are formed at the EU level. Finally, the researcher determines the effects of European integration at the domestic level by looking at temporal causal sequences. These issues will be taken into account and further specified in the subsequent steps of the research design to which we move next.

**Operationalisation**

After having presented a working conceptualisation of Europeanisation, its main analytical components need now to be operationalised. Given that this study aims at assessing the EU’s impact on a member state’s foreign policy, its primary level of analysis is Portugal and its foreign policy. In recent years, the use of the expressions “European foreign policy” or “European foreign policy system” has become very frequent (Carlsnaes, et al., 2004; Nuttall, 2000; White, 2001; Zielonka, 1998). Following White (2001: 39-41), that broad understanding of foreign policy activity in Europe encompasses three different types: 1) Community foreign policy (EC policies insofar as they deal with the outside world); 2) Union foreign policy (CFSP); 3) and
National foreign policy (the separate foreign policies of member states). Those different types or “subsystems” of European foreign policy are viewed as intertwined, but its analytical differentiation allows the researcher to study member states’ foreign policy without assuming or implying that national foreign policies can be entirely subsumed within the EU foreign policy subsystems (type 1 and 2) (White, 2004: 13). Thus, similarly to Larsen’s (2005) approach, this study does not take for granted a transformation of national policy due to a EU effect, but rather subjects that possibility to empirical testing. The degree of national agency towards Africa described earlier gives some ground for adopting this more cautious starting point. Moreover, even if the results do not confirm the relevance of this perspective, the endeavour will still allow us to reach a more solid picture about the level of overlap and interweaving between national and EU foreign policy suggested by the literature. The concept of Europeanisation is central to explore those linkages between the national and EU level. But in order to better assess the potential EU impact on Portuguese foreign policy, that conceptualisation is framed within an FPA approach.

FPA is the subfield of International Relations that seeks to explain foreign policy, by opening the “black-box” of the state and examining the various units that make up its decision-making apparatus (Carlsnaes, 2008; Hill, 2003). It sees the process of foreign policy decision-making as a subject of equal importance to the outcome, given that foreign policy is to a greater or lesser extent a product of the way it is made. An FPA approach presents several advantages for this research. Firstly, it will permit to stay attentive to explanatory variables at all level of analysis. Such feature will be particularly useful to control for other variables - distinct from the EU - with an influence on Portuguese foreign policy. In so doing, the exaggeration of the EU’s impact of some of the literature on “Europeanisation” will be more easily avoided. Secondly, the agent-oriented and actor-specific focus of FPA allows for a better account of agency. Through its ability to manifest human agency FPA is better positioned to explain creativity and change than the major IR paradigms, which provide more insight into structure. In that sense, the approach will give more room to consider Portugal’s action within the EU context, rather than depicting it as a largely passive entity subjected to external influence. Finally, through FPA it becomes possible to take into account diverse factors as well as insights from different disciplines in an integrated way. Its eclectic nature will allow taking on board both material and ideational factors (Hudson, 2005). An FPA approach in itself does not provide an explanation to the puzzle of this research. However, as an analytical tool that helps incorporating different explanatory elements, in an organised and systematic manner, its usefulness in this thesis is warranted.
This focus on decision-making is complemented by a broader contextualisation. This will be particularly useful for situations where a detailed collection of data is not possible, namely in view of the exploratory facets of this study. Standard FPA variables can be of use to analyse Portuguese foreign policy (e.g. goals, capabilities and instruments, actors and processes, policy context). The same analytical tools can be employed to examine the EU side, as previous studies have shown that FPA can be adapted to a European context (White, 2001, 2004). In order to guide the analysis of Portuguese decisions, a set of indicators and questions derived from the adopted conceptualisation of Europeanisation are used (see tables below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator of “no change”</th>
<th>Operationalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persistence of traditional national positions despite the progress of EU projects</td>
<td>Did Portugal keep defending a national approach despite the developments at the EU level?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non adherence to EU policy objectives</td>
<td>Did Portugal offer resistance or even block an initiative of the EU?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The preference for other initiatives, especially over available EU options</td>
<td>Did Portugal favour other bilateral or multilateral initiatives over available EU options?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The preference for the use of other policy instruments, especially over available EU options</td>
<td>Did Portugal favour other bilateral or multilateral instruments over available EU options?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National definitions of preferences are kept separate and favoured over European understandings</td>
<td>Did Portuguese policy-makers keep defending separate definitions of preferences, despite the development of European perspectives? Did Portuguese policy-makers favour national definitions of preferences, despite the development of European perspectives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese elites remain supportive of national norms and preferences, despite the development of European perspectives</td>
<td>Did Portuguese policy elites favour national definitions of preferences, over European perspectives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese public opinion remains supportive of national norms and preferences, despite the development of European perspectives</td>
<td>Did Portuguese public opinion favour national definitions of preferences, over European perspectives?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Indicator of “change”**  
**Europeanisation)** | **Operationalisation** |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|
| The salience of the European agenda in Portuguese foreign policy (adaptation) | Was the EU suggested as the appropriate institution?  
Was the application of EU instruments in the decision-making process considered important, or a priority, by Portuguese policy-makers? |
| Portugal adheres to EU policy objectives, especially over other considerations and preferences (adaptation) | Did Portugal compromise its national preferences in order to accommodate the use of EU instruments? |
| Portugal uses the EU to influence the foreign policies of other member states (projection) | Did the EU represent a vehicle for Portugal to influence the foreign policies of its European partners in this particular policy case? |
| Portugal exports its national priorities onto the EU level (projection) | Did Portugal pursue national policy preferences through the EU in this particular case? |
| Portugal uses the EU to increase its national influence in the world, by initiating or participating in joint initiatives (projection) | Did the EU represent a vehicle for Portugal to increase its international influence in this particular case? |
| Portugal uses the EU to push through policies on the domestic level (projection) | Did Portugal pursue national policy preferences through the EU in this particular case? |
| Portugal uses the EU as a cover/umbrella for its national positions on the international level (projection) | Did Portugal pursue national policy preferences through the EU in this particular case? |
| The existence of shared definitions of national and European preferences among Portuguese policy makers (identity formation) | Did Portugal equate national with European preferences in this particular case? |
| The existence of norms and preferences among Portuguese elites that favours the application of EU instruments over other available possibilities (identity formation) | Did policy elites favour the application of EU instruments? |
| Increase in public support for political cooperation at the EU level (identity formation) | Was there public support for the use of EU instruments? |
Value attached to a European approach in a particular policy decision (identity formation)

Did Portuguese policy-makers value a EU approach in this particular case?

Policies are agreed for the sake of EU unity (identity formation)

Did Portuguese policy-makers value a European approach in this particular case in order to strengthen the idea of EU unity?

Recourse to the European option as an instinctive choice (identity formation)

Did Portuguese policy-makers instinctively opt for an EU approach in this particular case?

Relaxation of traditional policy positions to accommodate progress of EU projects (adaptation/ identity formation)

Was the EU suggested as the appropriate institution in this case despite previously held preferences to the contrary that would have suggested the adoption of a different course of action?


The analysis of national decisions through the set of questions presented above will allow us to draw conclusions about the role afforded to the EU in Portuguese foreign policy decision-making, and help determine whether and to what extent national foreign policy exhibits evidence of Europeanisation or whether other considerations are more pertinent to explain specific policy outcomes. The broad postulation is that the more significant such role is the higher is the probability that the EU has had a significant influence on national foreign policy. In order to proceed with the research these general terms of the reasoning need to be further specified.

Building on Gross’s (2009: 25-8) framework, “role” can be understood here as the nature of the task assigned to the EU, and the application of its instruments. Three categories of outcomes are considered: “significant” role, “small” role, and “no” role. A “significant” role for the EU can be expected to involve a mandate for the EU to negotiate on behalf of Portugal in a given situation; the use of EU’s instruments; the adoption of common positions, joint actions, joint policies as well as joint agreements in addition to a high profile for the EU in national foreign policy discourse. This could mean, for instance, that EU tools are suggested and supported as the most appropriate instruments for dealing with a specific situation. In contrast, a “small” role for the EU can be expected to entail the adoption of some joint initiatives, but without the corresponding high profile in national foreign policy discourse; no exclusive mandate for the EU to negotiate on behalf of Portugal in a given situation; and the refusal to seriously consider the use of all EU instruments, or to block or delay decisions. Finally, “no” role for the EU would mean that the
application of EU instruments, although it may be discussed, does not lead to the adoption of policies that involve EU instruments.

A second aspect that needs to be specified is the distinction between a “significant” and a “small” influence of the EU on national foreign policy decisions. Following from the definition of Europeanisation discussed above “significant” influence of the EU can be conceptualised as either adaptational pressures acting on policy makers to utilise EU institutions; as the potential for policy projection of national preferences onto the European level; or a reflexive preference for the utilisation of EU instruments. By contrast, a “small” influence can be expected to manifest itself as the opposite: weak or nonexistent adaptational pressures; no potential or perceived advantage to export national preferences onto the European level; and the absence of preferences for the utilisation of EU instruments. Having defined the terms of the approach, it is now possible to derive more specific assumptions and formulate a set of hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical chapters. Two competing assumptions can be derived from the adopted approach, which focuses on the analysis of national decision-making in order to infer the EU’s impact:

(1) If Portuguese decision-makers favour the utilisation of the EU over other institutional venues, and if they succeed in implementing their preferences, this results in a significant role for the EU and points towards evidence of Europeanisation;
(2) If Portuguese decision-makers do not favour the utilisation of the EU, or favour the utilisation but do not succeed in implementing their preferences, then this results in a small role for the EU and disproves the Europeanisation hypotheses.

Those assumptions generate the following hypotheses:

(1) If there is a significant influence of the EU on national foreign policy, then one would expect to find national governments to advocate a significant role for the EU.
(2) If there is little evidence of an influence of the EU on national foreign policy, then one would expect to find a small role afforded to the EU.
(3) If there is significant influence of the EU but this influence is weighted against other factors, then one would expect to find a role afforded to the EU in specific cases only, or only a partial role afforded to some policy instruments.
The answers that will be obtained from this operationalisation can be organised following two broad criteria, which also represent two possible outcomes for the puzzle of this research: “no change” and “change”. More precisely, the first outcome corresponds to situations where EC/EU membership has had no significant influence on Portuguese foreign policy, which manages to keep its national priorities. “Change” identifies situations where a “Europeanisation” process has taken place - along some or all of the three dimensions described above: national adaptation, national projection and identity formation - producing an adaptation or even transformation of Portugal’s preferences and/or identity. Yet the influence of the EU on national foreign policy is not likely to be the same across all policy areas. This is so because such relationship depends on features from both the European and the national side, which are not likely to remain unchanged across all policy areas. Therefore, the variance of those features will be reflected on the influence that the EU might have on national foreign policy in a particular area.

In order to consider such variance I draw on Larsen’s (2005) framework - briefly introduced above - which posits that the role of the EU in national foreign policy is based on the “fit” between the strength of EU policy and the national agency in specific areas. For the purpose of this research (and departing from Larsen’s constructivist position) the strength of EU agency is conceptualised as falling within a continuum, where at one end it has exclusive competences, its policies are resourceful, detailed and long-term, with day-to-day involvement; and, at the other extreme, the EU has limited competences and its policies are based on few resources, only general policy statements, few instruments, little day-to-day involvement. While in the former situation the EU agency can be categorised as “strong”, in the latter case it is classified as “weak”. Similar criteria can be used to conceptualise Portugal’s agency, paying special attention to the amount of resources allocated to foreign policy (economic and administrative/diplomatic), and also to the concrete interests of domestic actors. Taking into account the conceptualisation of EU influence described earlier (adaptation pressure, potential for projection, reflexive preference) and intersecting it with the consideration of the specific fit between EU and national agency in specific areas (weak/strong), more nuanced results can be predicted. Those outcomes can be straightforwardly graded according to a qualitative scale of “high”, “medium”, “low” (see table below).
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Portugal “strong”</th>
<th>Portugal “weak”</th>
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</table>
| **EU “strong”**  | - National adaptation: medium  
|                  | - Policy projection: high  
|                  | - Identity formation: medium  
| (1)              | - National adaptation: high  
|                  | - Policy projection: medium  
|                  | - Identity formation: high  |
| **EU “weak”**    | - National adaptation: low  
|                  | - Policy projection: medium  
|                  | - Identity formation: low  
| (3)              | - National adaptation: low  
|                  | - Policy projection: low  
|                  | - Identity formation: low  |

On the basis of this more nuanced consideration of the EU influence for specific policy areas, four categories of expectations can be established:

(1) If in a specific area the fit between agencies is “EU strong” vs. “Portugal strong”, the adaptational pressures are expected to be high. However, due to the strong policy on the national side, some resistance to those pressures is also possible. Moreover, Portugal will try actively to project its national preferences onto the EU level in order to take advantage of the opportunities that a strong common policy creates. A reflexive preference for the EU in this area is probable, particularly if EU policy legally excludes separate national action.

(2) If the configuration is “EU strong” vs. “Portugal weak” configuration, as in the previous category the expectation is that there will be high adaptational pressures on Portuguese policy makers to utilise EU institutions. Due to the weakness of national agency in this case, the possibility to export national priorities will be more limited, despite the opportunities at EU level. Taking into account features on both sides of the relationship, the preference for EU instruments in this area is very likely.

(3) In a “EU weak” vs. “Portugal strong” setting, low adaptational pressures can be anticipated. Despite the more limited opportunities, Portugal is expected to try to project its priorities onto the EU level. Preference for the utilisation of EU instruments in this area is likely to be limited.

(4) Finally, if the configuration is “EU weak” vs. “Portuguese weak”, the influence of the EU on Portuguese foreign policy decisions is likely to be low, as limited or nonexistent adaptational pressures are expected. Both the opportunities and capacity to export national preferences are likely to be limited. There will be no reflexive preference for the utilisation of EU instruments.
Ranking by decreasing order the expectations described above, the postulation is that the EU influence on the national level will be the most significant for situations representing a “EU strong” vs. “Portugal weak” fit (cell 2); followed by configurations of “EU strong” vs. “Portugal strong” (1); then “EU weak” vs. “Portugal strong” (3); and, finally, “EU weak” vs. “Portugal weak” (4).

1.3 Methodology and sources

The purpose of this section is to present how the analytical framework of this thesis is applied and, specifically, to what. As discussed previously, the main goal of the present study is to provide a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the EU’s impact on Portugal’s post-colonial relations. In that sense, this thesis follows a case study strategy, focusing on two country cases: Angola and Mozambique. Both are ex-Portuguese colonies and large territories in sub-Saharan Africa, but traditionally Portugal has had stronger ties with the former country. In order to take into account variations on the EU side, this study follows a broad understanding of foreign policy and looks at three policy-areas: diplomacy, trade, and aid. The section also explains how data was analysed and describes the type of sources used in this study.

Methods

This is essentially a qualitative research project which uses a case study methodology for a close and in-depth examination of Portuguese foreign policy within the EU context. The focus of the analysis is on the foreign policy of Portugal towards two countries: Angola and Mozambique. As described above, post-colonial relations have remained one of the top priorities of Portugal’s foreign policy. Moreover, Angola and Mozambique are the two largest Portuguese former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, with which Portugal has kept and nurtured important political, economic and socio-cultural links. In comparison, Portugal’s relationship with its smaller ex-colonies in the region (Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe) has been less intense and significant. Therefore, these later countries represented less data-rich cases to be analysed here. On the EU side, the relationship with sub-Saharan Africa has also been a long-lasting one, based on the historical ties of some of its member states such as France and the United Kingdom (UK). Financial assistance has been by far the most important feature in those highly institutionalised relations. Yet, since the 1990s trade issues as well as political and security dimensions gained greater visibility.
Accordingly, the significance of those relations for both Portugal and the EU is the main justification for this case selection. To explain, if the goal of this thesis is to assess the EU’s impact on Portuguese policy there has to be something on both sides in the first place in order to potential changes (or lack thereof) to be identified. Moreover, cases presenting interest for only one of the two sides would make the findings of our analysis less noteworthy as the final outcome would be more predictable. Hence, the choice of cases made in this study allow us to contrast different predictions and, therefore, reach more robust results. In effect, while the importance of those relations for the EU can more easily lead to the expectation of an impact on the national level, Portugal’s enduring ties in its ex-colonies rather point to the limits of that influence. As it is further described in Chapter Two, the EU’s policies towards Angola and Mozambique have in general terms followed similar lines, with the individual bilateral relations being complemented and framed within broader regional approaches and programmes. However, the EU has overall had a more cohesive and significant presence in Mozambique than in Angola. Concurrently, Portugal has traditionally had stronger relations with Angola than with Mozambique (either in economic, socio-cultural and political terms). In that sense, this study started from the expectation that the EU’s influence on Portuguese policies would eventually be stronger in the case of Mozambique. By the same token, it was expected at the outset that the limits on the EU’s influence, due to variables on the national side, could be greater in the case of Angola than for Mozambique.

Apart from assessing the overall EU’s impact on Portuguese foreign policy mentioned above, this study also aims at examining possible differences across issue areas. In that sense, beyond a focus on two country cases this thesis also looks at three different policy areas: political-diplomatic issues, external trade, and development aid. Those three areas include dimensions along which foreign policy is often described, since apart from the more obvious diplomatic domain, trade is an economic area with important political implications and aid contains important aspects of value promotion - together with economic and security concerns (Larsen, 2005: 10). Moreover, all three domains have relevance in both Portuguese and EU relations with Angola and Mozambique. Furthermore, and not least important for the analytical purposes of this research design, those three areas fall under different legal frameworks or institutional configurations within the EU, even if in practice they can interact and overlap (see Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Nugent, 2010). Since those institutional configurations include different levels of competence, instruments and policy-making rules, the potential EU influence on the national level is assumed to vary across the three areas. The domain of trade is the one
where the level of Europeanisation is likely to be more significant since it represents the area where the European Community has the strongest powers. In this domain the Community has important policy instruments and decision-making is largely supranational, meaning that member states can in principle be outvoted. Next comes the development aid area where the Community has substantial programmes, but its competences are “shared” with the member states. Finally, Europeanisation is likely to be the weakest in political-diplomatic issues, due to the essentially intergovernmental features of this domain, where few instruments are available and member states have retained great control, as they can veto decisions.

The time span of this study centres in the period between 1978 and 2010. This long-term perspective was chosen in order to better examine potential changes over time. The adopted starting point corresponds to the beginning of Portugal’s accession negotiations to the EC. As seen above, the need for candidate states to adopt the *acquis communautaire* can lead to adaptational pressure and an adjustment on national foreign policies. Other studies on the Europeanisation of member states foreign policies have drawn attention to pre-accession stages (e.g. Pomorska, 2007; Vaquer i Fanés, 2005). This starting point is not understood in rigid terms though. Instead, there was a concern with providing enough contextualisation in order to better consider the domestic situation existing in Portugal before the start of its EC accession negotiations. The end point of this thesis was conditioned by the need to embrace a period sufficiently long in order to more adequately reach the objectives of a longitudinal study mentioned above, as well as by a more practical reason related to the duration of this PhD project. The 2007 Lisbon Treaty introduced important changes in terms of EU external relations. Although the treaty entered into force in December 2009, some of its main innovations in the domain of foreign policy were only adopted the following year and remained in a very early stage of its implementation. In that sense, those changes are not considered in this study.

Starting from a careful consideration of domestic conditions, the analysis focuses on major “turning points” or “critical junctures” in the EU side. It is assumed that by examining important variations in the independent variable of this thesis it is easier to identify potential changes on national policy. That examination combines a “before-after” comparison with intensive process-tracing, not just on the change of the EC/EU’s influence but also on potentially “confounding” variables that changed at the same time (George and Bennett, 2005: 166-7). Following the method of “structured, focused comparison” the set of questions identified by the analytical framework was asked of each case, in order to guide data collection, thereby making systematic
comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible (ibid.: 67-72). Through the within-case method of causal interpretation theoretical predictions were tested in the different policy-areas. Specifically, the congruence procedure was employed to explore the case in order to show whether the theory is congruent or not congruent with the outcome in the case (ibid.: 181-3). This method was combined with process-tracing in order to be able to identify the links between potential causes and observed outcomes (ibid.: 205-24). The results for each case were compared over time across policy areas, within each country case (see table below). Through within-case analysis a strong control for the effect of perturbing third variables (beyond the EU) was achieved, due to the uniform character of the background conditions of each country case under consideration. A comparison was also made across country cases, for the same policy area. The logic in this instance was to uncover case-specific factors, by keeping the independent variable (the EU influence) constant. Finally, the analysis of each case is put into its broader context.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Aid</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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Sources

This thesis is based on five main types of sources: 1) academic literature on theoretical and conceptual approaches to the study of EU foreign policy, the foreign policies of EU member states, EU-Africa relations and Portuguese foreign policy; 2) publications from think-tanks and other non-governmental organisations; 3) press articles and reports; 4) official documents, particularly from Portuguese official bodies and EU institutions; and 5) interviews. Those different sources of evidence were used in a complementary way. Secondary material was especially useful to analyse broad historical trends and to put interviews into context. However, as little in-depth research has been done on Portuguese foreign policy for the period under study, a great part of the empirical work was based on primary sources. The annual report on Portugal’s participation in the EC/EU produced by the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was particularly helpful in that regard, even if the information it tends to produce is of a very general nature. Broadly speaking, Portuguese official documentation on external affairs can be difficult to obtain, either because generally not much is published or, if it is, its access can be complicated.
by its dispersion and lack of systematisation. In the absence of usable accounts giving a detailed and long term perspective on Portuguese policies, some statistical analysis was necessary for more economic-related aspects, such as external trade and development aid relations. Some limited archive work was also conducted (at the National Archives in London, Historical Archives of the European Commission in Brussels, and the Portuguese Foreign Ministry archives in Lisbon) for the initial period covered by this study.

Interviews were an important source in this study in view of the limitations in the literature and documentation mentioned above, as well as due to the targeted insights that they produced. Indeed, the use of semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions allowed more flexibility to gather factual information with detail and depth, but also to explore the views and motivations of key policy-makers. A total of 39 interviews were conducted in Lisbon, Brussels and London between 2009 and 2011. Most were carried out with diplomats, officials, and policy-makers from Portugal, the EU institutions, and other EU countries. Guided interviews with civil society representatives, academics and analysts also proved useful, mainly as auxiliary sources. Fieldwork in Africa (principally in Angola and Mozambique) could have eventually helped to gather more data, but this option was not followed due to three main reasons. Firstly, travelling and organising interviews in Africa would have proved difficult, costly, and very time consuming. Secondly, and more substantially, the main focus of this thesis is on the relationship between Portugal and the EU. Relations with Angola and Mozambique are used in this study only secondarily, to better examine that main problématique. In that sense, conducting fieldwork in Africa was not essential for this research project. Finally, but not less importantly, it was still possible to conduct interviews with African diplomats and officials based in Europe. African representatives posted in EU countries are necessarily familiar with broad EU-Africa relations and, in principle, have been dealing with that subject for several years. In general, access to interviewees was not difficult, except for older matters since some diplomats and other officials who were involved in those aspects were not always easy to locate and contact. Some interviewees (especially, from Portugal) had “multiple-hats”. In those cases it was particularly necessary to pay attention to bias and other inaccuracies. For behavioural events, that interview data was triangulated with information from other sources (see Yin, 2009: 106-9).
Conclusion

This chapter has served as an introduction both to the analysis itself and to the topic of Europeanisation of national foreign policy more generally. It has identified the central research question of the analysis as being: “to what extent has Portuguese foreign policy vis-à-vis Angola and Mozambique been Europeanised?” The evaluation of the existing literature on Portuguese foreign policy revealed a very incomplete picture. It is also apparent that traditional European integration approaches face difficulties to adequately address the topic of this research project. In effect, despite the useful explanatory insights both rationalist and constructivist perspectives can provide, those approaches are inadequate to analytically capture the interplay between the European and the national levels.

Building on those insights, as well as on other studies on the foreign policy of EU member states, an analytical framework for the study of the EU’s impact on Portuguese foreign policy has been developed, based on the concept of Europeanisation. Despite the main focus of interest being the EU impact on the national level, the conceptualisation of Europeanisation followed in this research project pays attention to three interrelated dimensions of change: national adaptation, national projection, and identity formation. That conceptualisation is framed within an FPA approach, focusing the analysis on Portuguese foreign policy decisions taken with regard to the EU. Analytical tools for examining the variation of the EU influence across different policy areas are also included. This framework will be applied to two country cases (Angola and Mozambique) and three policy areas (trade, aid and diplomacy).

The analysis will, therefore, serve a number of functions. First, it will ascertain the extent of Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy towards its former African colonies and, thereby, produce a better understanding of the foreign policy of that EU member state. Secondly, this research project will add to the debate on the usefulness of a Europeanisation approach in the foreign policy realm. Ultimately, those insights could prove of wider utility for the understanding and analysis of the foreign policy of other member states, particularly for smaller and new member states.
Chapter 2

Setting the scene:
Portugal, Africa and the European Union

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background to the central topic of this thesis in order to facilitate the rest of the analysis. The chapter looks at both Portugal’s and EU’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa, particularly with Angola and Mozambique, the two countries of interest for this research project. Beyond this geographical focus it also pays a special attention to the three policy areas examined in this thesis: political-diplomatic issues, development aid and external trade. This background information is useful to help identify and contextualise the relevant issues, which are more closely scrutinised in the empirical chapters. The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first part, an overview of Portugal’s relations with Angola and Mozambique, over time, is provided. Apart from that, a brief comparison is also offer about the significance of Portugal’s policies towards the two countries in the policy areas examined in this study. A second part is dedicated to the EU’s policies in each of the three policies areas of interest. In view of the larger scope of the EU approach, its policies towards Angola and Mozambique are given a broader regional contextualisation. Finally, the chapter concludes, by succinctly comparing Portugal’s and EU’s policies across the countries and policies areas considered in this study.

2.1 Portugal-Africa relations
As seen in Chapter One, following transition to democracy and decolonisation in the mid-1970s Africa lost great part of the importance it has enjoyed for many centuries in Portugal’s external outlook. Yet, Lisbon continued to value and promote those traditional ties. Successive Portuguese governments have re-affirmed the importance of the relationship with the former African colonies, based on an intricate set of historical, cultural, economic, political and symbolic reasons. Political considerations in particular play an important role, as Lisbon authorities perceived those relations as important in themselves, but also in view of the possible benefits they can bring to other dimensions of Portuguese foreign policy. The reconstruction of
relations with the two largest former colonies (Angola and Mozambique) proved a difficult and rather slow process, from Lisbon’s perspective. But over time the relationship with those two countries too has been improved and reinforced.

**Portugal’s long-standing presence in Africa**

Portugal’s relations with Africa date back to the fifteenth century, when the small Iberian country initiated its period of overseas exploration: the “Golden Age of Discovery” (Newitt, 2009). This presence in Africa, however, was not very substantial. During an initial stage of the Portuguese Empire African territories were essentially a link in the lucrative trade with India and Southeast Asia. Later, they became a major source of slaves for Portugal’s largest colony of Brazil. With Brazil’s independence, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Africa turned out to be more important for Portugal’s political elites. A “Third Empire” was then presented as necessary to preserve Portugal’s historical heritage and to guarantee its survival vis-à-vis external pressures, in particular from its more powerful Iberian neighbour. As put by Norrie MacQueen (2003: 182), Africa “provided an affirmation of Portugal’s self-image as a ‘major power’ and at the same time an escape from geographically closer realities.” By the late nineteenth century, the “Scramble for Africa” pressed Portugal to a more active policy in Africa in order to secure its interests there. The 1885 Berlin Conference established the borders of colonial Africa, but without matching Portugal’s dreams of a “New Brazil”. The territory obtained by Portugal went beyond pre-existing occupied enclaves, including Angola, the largest territory on the western coast, and Mozambique, covering an elongated coastal area on the east. It also included Guinea, a small territory south of Senegal, and the Atlantic islands of Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. However, Portugal’s initial claim was a contiguous area in Central Africa stretching from Angola to Mozambique (the so-called “Pink Map”). This ambition clashed with Cecil Rhodes’ “Cape to Cairo Red Line” and led to a British ultimatum in 1890, to which Portugal conceded. Such “diplomatic humiliation” at the hands of a traditional ally weakened the Portuguese Monarchy in favour of the Republican cause. Another important consequence was to feed an imperialist nationalism, which also led to a “deification” of the colonies (see Monteiro and Pinto, 2003).

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5 For a brief account on Portuguese colonialism in Africa, see Alexandre (2003). A more extended analysis can be found in Newitt (1981). See also Clarence-Smith (1985) and Hammond (1966), respectively emphasising the economic and non-economic dimensions of Portuguese presence in Africa.

6 The “Third Empire” in Africa followed from the “First Empire” in India and Southeast Asia during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and from the “Second Empire” in Brazil throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Under the First Republic (1910-1926) Portugal pursued the “pacification” of its African colonies. The need to defend the colonies was one of the main reasons behind Portugal’s participation in World War I. Effective occupation was only concluded in the 1920s and control - through a system involving a considerable degree of local autonomy - remained precarious. Following the rightist military coup of 1926, several measures were adopted to reinforce the colonial project. Such measures were further developed and systematised under the authoritarian regime of Salazar (the Estado Novo), installed in 1933. A key move was the imposition of a uniform colonial administration, centrally controlled from Lisbon along nationalist lines. State oversight of the empire’s economy was increased and the system of protected colonial trade reinforced. Moreover, a series of initiatives were implemented in order to inspire an imperial mentality among the Portuguese. World War II triggered a new dynamic in the colonial project, with economic links between Portugal and its colonies reaching its historical peak during the 1950s (see Table 2.1). Rising demand for the main colonial products amplified the importance of imperial trade. Investments overseas also rose significantly during this period, conducted both by the State and by some of the most important Portuguese economic groups (closely interwoven and protected by the regime), in trade, finance, but also in productive sectors. Additionally, Portuguese emigration to Angola and Mozambique increased, stimulated by the economic growth and the imperial “mystique”.

### Table 2.1 Portugal’s trade with Angola and Mozambique (% of total)

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<tr>
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<th>Angola</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Total colonies</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>Exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>1940s</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
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**Note:** “Total colonies” includes Portugal’s African colonies and its small possessions in Asia (Macau, Timor and the Portuguese India, until 1961).

**Source:** adapted from M. E. Ferreira (2005).

The post-war period brought also new challenges for the Estado Novo and its colonial project. To the growing international pressures for decolonisation the regime responded with new measures seeking to integrate the colonies more closely with Portugal in administrative and economic terms. Thus, in 1951 the colonies were rebranded as “Overseas Provinces” and presented as integral parts of a “single and unitary” Portuguese State. Moreover, “Lusotropicalism” was
adopter as official doctrine, underscoring the exceptionalism of Portugal’s colonialism, proclaimed as more tolerant and open to miscegenation, as well as pursuing a “providential mission” of civilisation. This vision of a “multi-continental and multiracial nation” also included a new economic policy seeking to create a single market encompassing Portugal and its overseas colonies (the so-called “Portuguese Economic Area”). However, the awaited integration did not materialise. By the 1960s important changes in Portugal’s economy were shifting its orientation towards Western Europe, to the detriment of the colonies. Indeed, the gradual industrialisation of the Portuguese economy, as well as its initial liberalisation and internationalisation, were affecting the calculations of the national “oligopolies”. By the early 1970s the main Portuguese conglomerates were divided in their assessments of their interests in Africa. While some appeared to favour the status quo, others were questioning the future of the empire as an integrated entity and diversifying their operations, particularly towards western European markets.

Further tensions came about as a corollary to the colonial wars. Nationalist revolts erupted first in Angola, in 1961, and then in Guinea (1963) and Mozambique (1964). The firm reaction of the regime embroiled Portugal in a guerrilla war in those three territories. With a complex international and regional backdrop, the wars were widely criticised and condemned (especially in the United Nations General Assembly), but also found important support in several western countries and the white minority regimes in southern Africa. Apart from that, during the conflict the colonies continued to grow favoured by a set of new initiatives, including the attraction of foreign capital. Salazar’s replacement as head of government by Marcello Caetano in 1968 produced no significant change in the colonial policy, as the few attempts of reform faced strong resistance particularly from the regime’s hardliners in both the government and military. However, the protracted and costly colonial war led to a growing dissatisfaction, especially in two of the main pillars of the system: the Church and, above all, the armed forces. Such developments finally culminated in the military coup of 25 April 1974, which opened the way to democratisation and a rapid process of decolonisation.

Decolonisation and its legacies

Decolonisation was a central issue in the power struggles that followed the overthrow of the authoritarian regime in Portugal (Norrie MacQueen, 1997; Maxwell, 1995). It both directly

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7 Angola, in particular, experienced high growth rates during the war, in part led by exports of coffee, iron, oil and diamonds.
influenced and was influenced by the democratisation process. Two initial currents emerged within the revolutionary leadership, assumed by the military, over the future of the colonies. A first position inspired by General António de Spinola - designated provisional President of the Republic in the aftermath of the coup - argued for a gradual disengagement in Africa. The “Spinolist” project included maintaining the Portuguese troops in the colonies until attaining cease-fires from the liberation movements. It also comprised the promotion of “third forces” in Africa that would campaign for “self-determination” within a federalist structure. The end result would be the preservation of Portuguese interests, by replacing the empire with the idea of a vast “Lusitanian community”. Opposing this conservative position, a second current led by leftist officers of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), defended an immediate decolonisation. Negotiations for the transfer of power should take place with the nationalist movements, as legitimate representatives of the colonial people. In a further elaboration of this position, a new special relationship should be forged between former adversaries based on a shared revolutionary identity, as well as political and economic affinities. As MacQueen (1997: 84) put it, the purpose of decolonisation for this “Third Worldism” was to “purge the relationship between Portugal and Africa of its unequal distribution of power in order to create the conditions for a new Luso-African community of radical states”. While sharing a traditional nationalist element, “Third Worldist” radical leftism contrasted with the right-wing and neo-colonial orientation of “Spinolism” (Rato, 2008; Teixeira, 2003).

The second position won the battle in a complex process which added to the impetus towards the full independence of the colonies. Indeed, the power shift to the left in Portugal’s revolutionary leadership led to a temporary convergence of views between the MFA and the African nationalists which blocked any option other than the unconditional transfer of sovereignty to the Marxist guerrilla movements (Norrie MacQueen, 1997: 84). In just a few months cease-fires were implemented and independence agreements concluded between Lisbon and all the liberation movements. The case of Angola was, however, more complex. Compared to Guinea

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8 The MFA was the group within the military which carried out the 25 April coup. Apart from the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), which was the main supporter of the left-wing MFA, also the Socialist Party (PS), the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) and even the relatively conservative Democratic and Social Centre Party (CDS), all favoured independence. However, the firmness of such stances was conditioned by the circumstances of the revolution, in particular by the central role assumed by the military during this period (see Norrie MacQueen, 1997: 81-2).

9 The first accord was signed in August 1974 with Guinea-Bissau, which had already unilaterally declared its independence in 1973. In the following month Lisbon and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) agreed the terms of Portugal’s withdrawal in Mozambique (Lusaka Accord). Later in the year the same happened for the archipelagos of Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. Finally, in January 1975 Portugal signed an
and Mozambique, the military situation was more stable and the influence of the MFA radicals less pressing. Moreover, with the backdrop of the territory’s extensive wealth, a large community of white settlers, and the presence of three nationalist movements divided between and within them, Spinola and its followers saw in Angola a central opportunity to put into practice their federalist ambitions. It was over the decolonisation of Angola that some of the fiercest political battles of the revolutionary process were fought. Despite this greater conservative resistance, also in this instance the “Spinolist” project failed, greatly conditioned by the rise of the Left. An independence agreement was finally signed in Portugal in January 1975, with the participation of all three liberation movements, providing for a transitional government until the effective transfer of power later in the year. Just a few weeks later, however, a civil war broke out in Angola, which was subsequently regionalised and internationalised. Adding to the deep divisions and successive political crisis in Portugal during this period, such escalation of the Angolan conflict meant that Lisbon lost its capacity to intervene in any meaningful way.

In sum, Portugal’s control of the process of decolonisation was very limited, especially in the case of Angola. The determination of the guerrilla movements in obtaining independence plainly contrasted with the disunity and instability in Portugal. Moreover, international pressure for full and unambiguous decolonisation, combined with Portugal’s need to secure international legitimacy for its nascent regime, led to a hasty and chaotic withdrawal from Africa. More than half a million Portuguese settlers left the territories, in some cases under traumatic and violent circumstances, producing much resentment in both Portugal and Africa. Mutual links were further complicated by the expropriation of Portuguese goods resulting from the nationalist takeover by the Marxist African regimes. This turbulent process of decolonisation had important repercussions for Portugal’s post-colonial relationship with Africa.

**Post-colonial re-engagement**

Following the end of the radical phase of the Portuguese revolution, the first constitutional government elected in 1976 adopted an essentially western orientation, founded to a great extent on the decision to apply for European Community membership. The priority was to pursue the socio-economic modernisation of the country initiated in the 1960s, by firmly locating Portugal within the “European project”. According to this “Europeanist” position - supported by the independence agreement (Alvor Accord) with the three liberation movements of Angola: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).
civilian parties across a spectrum from centre-right to centre-left - relations with the former African colonies were important, but could only represent a secondary position (Gaspar, 1988: 42). This shift in Portugal’s priorities was also visible in the level of trade with Africa, which declined abruptly in the mid-1970s. With decolonisation the preferential trade arrangements of the past came to an end. Moreover, the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, the nationalisation and confiscation of Portuguese goods, the adoption of socialist policies and the search for alternative partners by the former colonies further deteriorated the significance of those relations (M. E. Ferreira, 2005).

A particularity of Portugal’s post-revolutionary constitutional arrangements, however, made the “European option” of Portuguese governments a more nuanced matter. Indeed, the “semi-presidential” nature of the Portuguese executive allowed a considerable room for manoeuvre to the president. Between July 1976 and March 1986 the presidency was occupied by General Ramalho Eanes, an army officer seen as a “moderate” when he was elected, but who also represented the pro-Third World orientation of the MFA and was very much committed to the “African vocation” of Portugal and its role as a unique “bridge” between Africa and the West.10 This intention to play an intermediary role between Lusophone Africa and the West became increasingly important to Portuguese foreign policy during the eighties and early nineties. By making use of his presidential prerogatives Ramalho Eanes led a largely successful process of rapprochement with lusophone Africa (Norrie MacQueen, 1997: 220). Such process of re-engagement was easier with the smaller former colonies. In the case of Angola and Mozambique the situation was made more complex by factors such as the process of transfer of power, the presence of large communities of white settlers, the existence of unresolved disputes over the financial aspects of independence (economic contenciosos), as well as by the closer ties that the ex-colonies developed with the Soviet bloc (see Antunes, 1990; Norman MacQueen, 1985; Venâncio and Chan, 1996).

Angola was the case which initially posed the greatest challenges for a post-colonial adjustment (Norman MacQueen, 1985: 40-4). Luanda suspected Lisbon of over-tolerance towards anti-MPLA activity in Portugal. The independence of Angola in November 1975 coincided with the end of the radical phase of Portugal’s revolutionary process. During that period, the leftist

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10 The military of the MFA came to occupy an influential position through the Council of the Revolution. This institutional body created in March 1975 was in practice controlled by the military and worked in essence as the watchdog of the revolution. In 1976 it was enshrined in the Constitution and was only abolished in late 1982.
military were the main supporters of the pro-Soviet MPLA, against the two other nationalist movements. Subsequently, the refusal of post-revolutionary Lisbon to transfer power formally to the MPLA, as well as its late recognition of the Angolan regime contributed to nurture pre-existing suspicions. The thousands of white settlers (the so-called retornados) who in the months leading up to independence fled to Portugal were perceived by the MPLA as exercising a negative influence on Portuguese policy. Moreover, the quarrels over the nationalisation of Portuguese assets by Angola further complicated the relationship for several years. By the late 1970s the situation started to change, due in part to the cool-down of some of the reciprocal bitterness, but also to the strong commitment of President Ramalho Eanes to improve Portugal’s post-colonial relations. The meeting between Eanes and Angolan President Agostinho Neto in Bissau in June 1978, as well as the presence of President Eanes at Neto’s funeral in September 1979 were two important symbolic moments in the normalisation of the bilateral relationship.

Despite the relatively orderly independence, Portugal’s relationship with Mozambique took longer to improve than in the case of Angola (Gaspar, 1988; Norman MacQueen, 1985: 44-8). First, the dominant position of a single liberation movement (FRELIMO) meant that power was transferred in a comparatively more peaceful way. As a consequence, during an initial phase a larger proportion of Portuguese settlers stayed, which subsequently complicated the relations between Lisbon and Maputo. Second, the economic contenciosos with Portugal were much more intractable for Mozambique than for Angola. As a poorer country Mozambique could not afford to be patient in the resolution of those issues in the same way as Angola could. Such a situation had a concrete translation in the series of nationalisations undertaken by the FRELIMO regime between independence and the beginning of 1978. An additional disruptive factor was the strong hostility towards Portugal by the FRELIMO government, due in part to personal reasons but also to a perceived tolerance of Lisbon vis-à-vis opposition groups (RENAMO) in its territory. By the early 1980s some improvements took place, once again favoured by Eanes’s African diplomacy. The informal talks between Eanes and Machel held in Luanda at the time of Agostinho Neto’s funeral in late 1979 helped reduce some of the bilateral tension. But this relative improvement in the relationship was also the result of concessions made by the Portuguese liberal-conservative coalition led by Sá Carneiro, which in October 1980 put an end

11 Such hostility was particularly visible in the case of the Mozambican President and former FRELIMO military leader, Samora Machel, who in contrast to most of the other revolutionary leaders in Portuguese-speaking Africa had no personal experience of Portugal. Formed in 1976 RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) opposed FRELIMO and was supported by right-wing elements in Portugal, many of them retornados from Africa (Norrie MacQueen, 2003: 193).
to most of the bilateral economic *contencioso*, as well as of the broader re-orientation towards the west in Mozambique foreign policy (Gaspar, 1988: 56; Norrie MacQueen, 1997: 228). A series of reciprocal high level state visits between 1981 and 1983 formalised the developments in the process of re-engagement.\(^{12}\)

In sum, between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s the African diplomacy of President Eanes was pivotal for allowing Portugal to gradually re-engage with its former colonies in Africa. As MacQueen argues (1997: 220) such initiatives represented an attempt “to manage the diplomacy of post-colonial adjustment which would otherwise have been neglected by the civilian politicians.” However, those initial steps also faced considerable difficulties in order to permit a stronger engagement. Eanes’s efforts were frequently a source of tension with his prime ministers, which by and large were more oriented towards the West and Europe. Moreover, the fragility and instability of Portuguese governments during that period worked against continuity in the formulation of policy towards the ex-colonies. On the African side, despite the progress suspicion and post-colonial resentment were still very much present, magnified by the strong pressures stemming from the ideological orientations and geographical positions of Angola and Mozambique, in a context of Cold War.

*The “renewal” of relations*

From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s a combination of different factors led to a more favourable context for the strengthening of Portugal’s post-colonial relations. In 1986 Portugal became a member of the European Community, which also signalled the stabilisation of its foreign policy (Teixeira, 2003). By openly assuming its new European and Western priorities, the African dimension in Portuguese foreign policy was clearly relegated to a secondary position. But this clarification also entailed increased stability and continuity in the formulation and implementation of post-colonial policy, which continued to be valued in itself and for the added value it can bring to other dimensions of Portugal’s external orientation (Cravinho, 2005). Such evolution was also favoured by the broader political stability resulting from the better relationship between presidency and governments, as well as the long period in power of the

\(^{12}\) Mozambican foreign minister, Joaquim Chissano, made a formal visit to Portugal in March 1981, which was followed a few months later by a state visit to Mozambique by President Eanes. In June 1982 the Portuguese prime minister Pinto Balsemão led an important economic delegation to Maputo. Finally President Machel visited Portugal in October 1983.
centre-right (PSD) governments of Cavaco Silva (1985-1995). Moreover, during that period Portugal’s economic situation became more favourable, in particular due to the significant financial and economic benefits resulting from its European membership (Telo, 2008: 273-5).

By the late 1980s the passage of time, the extreme difficulties in Angola and Mozambique resulting from the civil wars, and the abandonment of previous ideological convictions had dissolved much of the post-colonial sensitivity in Africa (Norrie MacQueen, 1997: 221). With the gradual Soviet disengagement from the continent Portugal started to be seen as a useful means of strengthening relations with the West. In particular, the fact that Portugal joined the EC made it more attractive to its former colonies, which by 1985 had all become members of the Lomé Convention (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 55). Moreover, the important geopolitical changes brought about by the end of the Cold War opened greater opportunities for cooperation, in both the political and the economic spheres. In the early 1990s the initial enthusiasm of Portugal’s EC membership also started to be replaced by doubts over the competitiveness of its economy in the European context. Increased European integration and the process of enlargement raised further challenges for Portugal’s participation in the group (see Gaspar, 2000; Vasconcelos, 2000a). All those factors contributed to ascribe more relevance to Portugal’s post-colonial relationship with Africa (see Cravinho, 2005: 93).

Since his arrival into power in the mid-1980s Cavaco Silva expressed a clear desire to develop a new relationship with Lusophone Africa, defined as a “strategic priority”. Following Venâncio and Chan (1996: 54) such level of priority had two main goals: first, “establish a more positive and mutually beneficial post-colonial relationship”, and second, “introduce a new dynamism to Lisbon’s linkage between a close political and economic relationship with Africa and a strengthening of Portugal’s international relevance in Brussels.” To some extent Cavaco Silva’s initiative built upon the efforts of Eanes and the centre-right governments of the early 1980s, but under more propitious circumstances, which led to a significant improvement of Portugal’s relations with its ex-colonies in Africa (Antunes, 1990: 130-1).

Portugal played a major mediatory role in the peace process of Angola in the early 1990s (Venâncio and McMillan, 1993). Such diplomatic “success” had several implications for

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13 In March 1986 General Ramalho Eanes was replaced in the presidency by the civilian Mário Soares. PSD is the acronym for Social Democratic Party, which until 1976 was called PPD. Cavaco Silva was first elected Prime Minister with a short majority (1985-1987). Subsequently, he led two majority governments between 1987-1991 and 1991-1995.
Portugal. First, the broader upgrading in the bilateral relationship contributed to secure Portuguese economic interests in Angola. Second, Portugal’s self-perception about its role in Africa was reinforced (Cravinho, 2005: 96). Third, it increased the international prestige of Portuguese diplomacy, especially within the European Community. As put by Venâncio and Chan (1996: 64), “Portugal’s central role in the Angolan peace process became the clearest action by Lisbon designed to promote Portugal as a leading Euro-African link.” Moreover, the closer links that Portuguese diplomacy sought to establish with Washington in this instance appeared to have been motivated by the intention of balancing other European interests in the region and more generally to strengthen its own position within the European Community (Venâncio and McMillan, 1993: 115). With the failure of the peace process and the return of war in Angola at the end of 1992, Portugal largely withdrew from the mediation effort.¹⁴ Despite the conflict, Portugal kept pursuing closer relations with Angola, particularly due to the wealth of its resources, which also attracted other international actors. With the end of the civil war in the early 2000s, such trend was reinforced (Oliveira, 2005).

Unlike the Angolan case, Portugal’s role in the peace process of Mozambique was only peripheral (Norrie MacQueen, 1997: 230-1; Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 54-8). Italy was the principal mediator in the negotiations that led to the signature in Rome of a peace agreement between the Maputo government and RENAMO, in 1992. Assessing Portugal’s involvement in this context Venâncio and Chan (1996: 50) argue that “relations with Mozambique have done little to further Lisbon’s desire to use close relations with Africa as a means of strengthening Portugal's international profile in the world, and the country’s international relevance in Brussels.” Portuguese forces, however, made a significant contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping operation (UNOMOZ), which oversaw the implementation of the peace agreement between 1992 and 1994. Portugal’s “emotional attachment” to Mozambique is often presented as weaker than in the case of Angola (Cravinho, 2005: 97). Moreover, as a poorer country it has traditionally attracted less attention from the Portuguese business community. Nevertheless, with the return of peace and greater economic liberalisation over the 1990s Portugal’s interests in Mozambique increased.

¹⁴ Rather than mediator, Portugal stepped back to join the US and Russia as observer. Portugal did contribute, however, to subsequent UN peacekeeping operations mandated to oversee later peace processes. That was the case of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III, 1995-1997) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA, 1997-1999).
Over the last three decades or so Portugal has managed to gradually, but successfully, rebuild its relations with its ex-colonies in Africa. Closer political relations were facilitated by the creation of the Community of Portuguese-speaking countries in 1996. The CPLP is essentially an instrument of the Portuguese diplomacy created to institutionalise a new relationship with the former colonies. Its genesis was a difficult process, with the first attempts of institutionalisation dating from the early 1980s. The difficulties related principally to suspicions from the independent African states towards its former colonial power, as well as to the rivalry between Portugal and Brazil, which is a competing pole of influence in the Portuguese-speaking world (EIU, 2008b: 54). Subsequently, many challenges remained, in part due to Portugal’s limited capabilities and persistent divergences among its members. Nevertheless, CPLP’s achievements so far include a stronger diplomatic dialogue and international coordination, as well as greater cooperation in other areas, such as culture and economy (Cardoso, 2003; Santos, 2003).

Portugal is a relatively recent donor, with no consolidated tradition in development cooperation, but its efforts in this area have been centred in Lusophone countries (Portugal, 2011; Rosa, 2008). Even if not substantially, soon after decolonisation Portugal started to provide assistance to its former African colonies. Since the late 1980s, however, those efforts were reinforced. Traditionally Portugal aid has been distributed mainly through bilateral channels (more than 70% in the early 1990s) and highly concentrated in its ex-colonies, particularly in Lusophone Africa (see Table 2.2). Apart from that, an important fraction of Portugal’s bilateral aid has been provided in technical assistance, tied to Portuguese goods and services. Portugal’s assistance to Lusophone countries has tended to be centred in sectors where it has “competitive advantages”, based on a shared language, as well as similar legal and institutional arrangements (e.g. education, health, and capacity-building activities). In general terms, Mozambique has been a more important recipient of Portugal’s bilateral aid than Angola. Under a broader definition of aid, an interesting feature to be underlined is the important dimension of technical-military cooperation Portugal has provided to Lusophone African countries (Seabra, 2011). Portugal’s cooperation has often been criticised for its lack of coordination, strategic orientation, political control, and effectiveness (OECD, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2006, 2010). Indeed, despite some progress in recent years, the proliferation of entities involved and the absence of a centralised aid

15 Its constitutive declaration was signed in Lisbon, where its executive secretariat is also based. Initially composed by seven members (Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal and São Tomé e Príncipe), East Timor became the eighth member in 2002 after gaining independence.
administration have led to a deficient planning and coordination, which ultimately has reduced the efficacy of Portuguese aid policy (Cravinho, 2004).

Table: 2.2 Main recipients of Portugal’s bilateral ODA (% share)

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<td>44</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
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<td>East Timor</td>
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<td>Angola</td>
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<td>S. Tomé e Princ.</td>
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<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>Total top 5</td>
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In general, Lusophone Africa is not very significant for Portugal from a strict economic point of view (M. E. Ferreira, 1994, 2005). In terms of trade, the most significant dimension is Portugal’s exports to those countries. Yet, in recent decades even that dimension has only represented a small part of Portugal’s global exports. However, many Portuguese companies have kept an interest for those markets, where the competitiveness of their products can benefit from historical and cultural factors (e.g. “business inertia”, language, food habits). Moreover, Portugal’s high level of trade concentration in Europe (especially in Spain) reinforces the importance of African markets. Angola is by far the more important economic partner. It is the largest former Portuguese colony in Africa and also the one with more valuable natural resources (including oil). Mozambique has traditionally been a less important economic partner for Portugal (see Figure 2.1). In the mid-1980s the country was even replaced by the small islands of Cape Verde as the second main market for Portuguese exports in Lusophone Africa. Following the end of the Angolan civil war in 2002 trade exchanges between Portugal and its ex-colony were boosted. Portuguese exports, in particular, moved from 2 per cent of its total in 2002 to 7 per cent in 2009 (Banco de Portugal, 2010: 140). Angola, which for many years was the tenth client for Portuguese exports, moved to the fourth position in 2008, becoming the main client outside the EU and overcoming traditional markets such as the United Kingdom and Italy (AICEP, 2010). The slowdown of the Portuguese economy since the early 2000s and the need of economic diversification beyond Europe have in general reinforced the importance of Lusophone African markets for Portugal.

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16 Portugal’s total exports to its former colonies in Africa represented around 3% in 1990 and 2% in 2000 (Banco de Portugal, 2010: 140).
In global terms, there has been a general improvement in the relationship between Portugal and its former African colonies over the last three decades and a half. Political-diplomatic dimensions appear to be the more important ones, but economic and cultural-sociological dimensions also play a relevant role in that relationship. Between the two larger ex-colonies, the relationship with Angola was the one which developed more easily, and also the one which presents more interest for Portugal. Notwithstanding such improvement and the strong existing links, Portugal does not seem to have a proper or systematic “African policy” (Cardoso, 2004; Cravinho, 2005: 98). Lack of means, short-term orientation, lack of consistency and, sometimes, mythological exaggerations, are features which often come up in this context. Yet, Portugal’s post-colonial relations are also valued in view of the other dimensions of Portuguese foreign policy. To explain, apart from the links Portugal wants to preserve and develop bilaterally with Lusophone Africa, Lisbon has also tried to reconfigure that relationship as an instrument to strengthen its international position, especially within the European Union. Simultaneously, EU membership reinforces Portugal’s international credibility and influence, in particular vis-à-vis Lusophone Africa.

Conscious about its economic and political limitations, Portugal has attempted to develop a synthesis between its historical African presence and its European membership, in a manner that safeguards its international autonomy and identity (Venâncio and Chan, 1996). To achieve those goals, the strategy adopted was to intensify its diplomacy towards its former colonies (but also towards the United States/NATO) in order to be able to play a role of “intermediary” between Africa and the EU. Portugal’s minor power status and enduring ties in sub-Saharan Africa give it some “competitive advantages” vis-à-vis other EU members, also with special links in Africa. A good illustration of that were the EU-Africa summits held in 2000 and 2007 during the
Portuguese EU Presidencies (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008b, 2008c). By pushing for European economic and political support Portugal’s “bridging” role can benefit its former colonies and, therefore, value its own policy towards those African countries. At the same, Portugal’s diplomatic specialisation in the “African niche” can reinforce its reputation and influence within the EU by making a unique contribution to common objectives. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent transformations in Europe (e.g. German reunification, successive EU enlargements and institutional reforms) seem to have increased the importance of the African factor for Portugal’s diplomacy.

2.2 EU-Africa relations

The EU has long and highly institutionalised relations with sub-Saharan Africa, in which the relationship with Angola and Mozambique can be contextualised. Marked by the historical legacies of some of its member states, those relations have traditionally privileged economic dimensions (development aid and, to a lesser extent, trade), rather than political aspects. Drawing on previous arrangements, the Lomé Convention was the main mechanism through which the EU structured its relations with sub-Saharan Africa for a quarter of a century (1975-2000). Both Angola and Mozambique joined the Lomé Convention in the mid-1980s. Lomé members came to occupy a privileged position in the context of the Community’s relations with the developing world. Proclaimed as a “partnership of equals”, the Lomé model included an institutionalised dialogue, aid assistance and special trade preferences. However, since the 1990s, with the increased politicisation of aid programmes and progressive liberalisation of trade preferences, the EU-ACP relations became less “special”. In that regard, the adoption of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 marked a turning point in EU-ACP relations. Despite this evolution, Africa as a whole remained important to the Community. New developments have been pressing for a more comprehensive and coordinated EU approach towards Africa, but where development considerations are just an element among broader foreign policy goals.

Political-diplomatic relations

Foreign policy is one of the most recent and less integrated policy domains of the European Union. Since the early 1990s, greater “Brusselisation” and “legalisation” of institutions and procedures led to increased foreign policy activity, which made the EU an important regional

17 The Convention was in fact celebrated between the EU and the ACP group, which over time came to include most sub-Saharan countries.
actor (Peterson, 2008). Yet, member states have been particularly jealous of their sovereignty in this politically sensitive area and the powers they have agreed to delegate to the EU have been less significant than in other external domains (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 187). Sub-Saharan Africa has not been a top foreign policy priority for the EU. Neighbouring areas such as Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean are of much greater concern to the EU from a strict foreign policy perspective. Rather than the presence of strong common mechanisms and programmes, the ascendancy of national foreign policy, linked to the historical legacies of some member states, has been a far more common feature in the EU’s political relationship with the region. Yet, since the 1990s EU’s development programs towards Africa became increasingly linked to political issues, such as human rights, democracy, and security. For instance, political conditions for the disbursement of aid were introduced for the first time by Lomé IV (1990) and later reinforced (Holland, 2004). Since the same period southern Africa also became a more frequent target for different types of EU diplomatic instruments focused on the stabilisation and democratisation of individual countries, including Angola and Mozambique (H. Smith, 2002: 185-6). Additionally, from the mid-1990s onwards the EU has actively promoted political dialogues in Africa, at different levels (K. E. Smith, 2008: 84-5). One example of that are the EU-Africa summits inaugurated in 2000, as mentioned before.

Those different EU initiatives towards Africa in general indicate, first, that the traditional focus on development cooperation was expanded towards a broader set of political issues and, second, that those political aspects became in themselves more prominent. To put it another way, Africa remains important for the Union not so much in strict development terms, but, more widely, in terms of its overall foreign policy (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 216). Security and migration concerns, a growing competition in African soil from other actors (such as the United States and China), as well as the EU’s ambition to play a greater international role, seem to have been the main driving forces behind this new trend in EU-Africa relations (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008a: 156). In order to achieve those new goals, the EU has been trying to move away from the short-term, reactive, fragmented and inconsistent approach of the past, by adopting a more comprehensive strategy, which in particular tries to integrate a set of different policies and issues, as well as increase the coordination between the Community and the member states. However, this is something whose implementation in great part still lies ahead. To sum up, despite recent changes EU foreign policy actions towards sub-Saharan Africa have been weak, especially when compared with development cooperation activities, as will be shown next.
Development aid relations

Development cooperation matters are an old policy domain of the European Community, but its competences in this area have evolved only slowly, in a parallel and complementary way to the separate prerogatives of the member states. The European Community is one of the world’s largest donors of development aid. Its considerable resources and geographical coverage make development policy one of the EU’s most powerful foreign policy instruments. However, problems of “overstretch” and consistency (institutional and between different objectives) have limited the EU’s action in this domain. Moreover, due to the system of “shared competences” member states have retained extensive powers in this realm, which despite some efforts to increase coherence has led to problems of coordination between Community and national policies (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Peterson, 2008).

Historically, sub-Saharan Africa has been the oldest and most important EU development relationship. Reflecting the colonial legacies of some member states, such relations have traditionally benefited from substantial resources and a high level of institutionalisation. As seen above, for many years the Lomé Convention was the main instrument that framed the EU’s relationship with sub-Saharan Africa and which came to represent a “model” for development relations (see Grilli, 1993; Holland, 2002). Mozambique joined the Lomé Convention in 1984 and Angola did the same the following year. But since the late 1970s both countries were already receiving Community assistance under a special arrangement covering non-associated developing countries. The European Community has been an important donor to both Angola and Mozambique. Yet, its presence and weight has been traditionally more significant in the case Mozambique, which has consistently been among the main targets of EC aid, as well as of efforts of aid coordination between the EC and the national programmes of EU countries (see Figure 2.2 and Table 2.3).
As mentioned above, over time the EU-ACP relationship has diminished in relative importance and acquired a less unique aspect (Arts and Dickson, 2004; Holland, 2004). Those changes were visible in the regional distribution of European Community aid. Moreover, since the early 1990s Lomé aid packages were increasingly linked to conditions such as respect of human rights and democracy. The replacement of Lomé by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 reinforced this trend. Such evolution, however, cannot be equated with a full loss of interest from the EU in Africa. Indeed, the region has remained by far the main destination of EC aid (OECD, 2002, 2007). Africa, therefore, remains important for the EU not so much in strict development aid terms, but, more broadly, in terms of its overall external affairs (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 216). In sum, this brief assessment indicates a relatively “strong” EC development policy towards sub-Saharan Africa, with the Community having a more prominent presence in Mozambique than in Angola.

For instance, the share of sub-Saharan Africa in total EC aid moved from approximately 70% in the early 1970s to some 30% in the mid-1990s. In contrast, the share of neighbouring Eastern and Southern countries increased rapidly during the 1990s (Cox and Chapman, 1999: 133).

Under Cotonou conditionality was expanded and political dialogue became more central, covering a broad range of issues that fall outside traditional development cooperation - such as peace, security, and migration (see Bretherton and Vogler, 2006).
Trade relations

The domain of trade is one of the oldest and more integrated policy areas of the EU. Differently from foreign policy or even development aid, in the domain of external trade the EU can rely on strong competences, supported by substantial resources together with well established mechanisms and instruments. From the founding Rome Treaty member states accepted to grant exclusive powers to the Community over international trade (Woolcock, 2010). Moreover, community action can rely on valuable resources, embodied in the administrative structures and staff of the Commission, which plays a central role in this domain. Simultaneously, in most international trade matters it has the ability to act in a united manner, supported by a system of well-oiled mechanisms and diversified set of policy instruments. The EU has been described as a world power in and through trade (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2005).

As for the other policy domains, the importance of the ACP countries to the Community has progressively declined over the last decades. The comparatively privileged trade terms of the past for ACP countries were gradually diluted by the increased emphasis on liberalisation. In the late 1980s, the European Community introduced economic conditionality clauses in the Lomé Convention, linking the provision of aid to the implementation of structural adjustment programmes and market-oriented policies (Brown, 2004; Farrell, 2010). Through the 2000 Cotonou agreement the EU and ACP countries agreed to progressively phase out the preferential treatment of Lomé, replacing it by a reciprocal regime (Holland, 2002). To this end, ACP countries were to form regional sub-groupings and negotiate free trade areas (Economic Partnership Agreements - EPAs) with the EU until the end of 2007. Angola and Mozambique, as members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have been negotiating a full EPA with the EU since 2004. The EU-SADC EPA did not meet the original deadline. Instead, an interim region-to-region EPA (“goods only”) was signed in June 2009 by some of the SADC members, including Mozambique (but not Angola). Through this agreement Mozambique has continued to benefit from preferential access to the EU market. Angola also continues to benefit from preferential access to the EU market through the “Everything-But-Arms” (EBA) initiative.

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20 The agreement in the case of Mozambique includes: no duties/quotas for its exports to the EU; no duties/quotas for 81% of EU exports to Mozambique (excluding sensitive sectors for local producers, e.g. farm goods and textiles). Liberalisation will take place gradually by 2023.
The EU has been a leading economic partner (after South Africa) for Mozambique, but less for Angola (see Figure 2.3). In fact, Angola relies heavily on its exports of oil (95% of total in 2007), having as main clients the United States and China (EIU, 2008a). Despite the increased “regionalisation” of Mozambique’s trade since its independence, in 2000 the EU’s market still represented around 26 and 17 per cent of Mozambique total exports and imports respectively. Moreover, the fact that Mozambique is a poor country, highly dependent on foreign aid (the EU is its main donor) and with a relatively open economy greatly interlinked with the stronger economy of South Africa, reinforces the European position in its market, particularly for diversification reasons. To sum up, this brief overview shows that the EU is a “strong” player in sub-Saharan, having a stronger position in Mozambique than in Angola.

Figure 2.3 EU’s share of Angola and Mozambique’s exports, 1981-2010 (% of total)

Conclusions

In spite of the weaknesses of Portugal’s diplomacy in general terms - due particularly to its limited resources and reactive nature, characteristic of a small state - Lisbon’s actions are more significant in relation to its former colonies, where it has carved a “niche” for itself building on historical and cultural ties. Even though both countries play an important role in Portugal’s foreign policy, in general terms Lisbon has had stronger ties vis-à-vis Angola than towards Mozambique. For its part, the EU has remained a relatively “weak” actor in strict foreign policy terms, notably due to its limited competences and instruments in this domain. Despite some recent changes, the same can be said about its relations with sub-Saharan Africa. Broadly

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21 The sharp increase of Mozambique’s exports to the EU in 2000 is essentially related to the beginning of operation of a large aluminium producer (Mozal), which output became the country’s main exported product.
speaking, the EU has had less influence vis-à-vis Angola than towards Mozambique, which is a poorer and more open country.

By and large, Portugal’s development aid policy can be described as “weak”, due particularly to its limited resources, as well as its traditional lack of strategic orientation and coordination. However, Portugal’s cooperation is more significant in relation to its former colonies, where the bulk of its resources and efforts have been highly concentrated. Again, despite both countries being important partners, Portugal’s bilateral aid has been more significant in the case of Mozambique, than in Angola. EC development aid is “relatively strong”, attending notably to its considerable resources, geographical coverage and shared competences with the member states. Sub-Saharan Africa in particular has historically been a privileged region, benefiting from substantial EU assistance in the framework of highly institutionalised programmes. In comparative terms, the EC is a more important aid actor in the case of Mozambique, than in Angola.

Finally, external trade plays an important role for the small and open economy of Portugal. Overall, Portugal trade with its former African colonies is not very significant, but those markets are still important for many Portuguese companies, especially Angola. On the EU side, trade is one of its oldest and more integrated policy domains. Differently from the other realms assessed here, in the area of trade the EU can rely on strong competences, substantial resources, well established mechanisms and instruments, and is often described as a world power. That is also the case in sub-Saharan Africa, but more in Mozambique than in Angola.

Having set this general background on the significance of both Portugal’s and EU’s relations in sub-Saharan Africa, the next six chapters deal with the empirical part of the thesis, which is divided by country cases and policy areas. Thus, Chapters Three, Four and Five deal with the case of Angola, by looking respectively at trade, aid and political-diplomatic issues. In turn, those same policy areas are considered in that order for the case of Mozambique in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight.
Chapter 3

Portugal’s trade relations with Angola: 
Between national adaptation and projection?

Introduction

This chapter centres on trade issues to explore the impact of EU membership on Portuguese foreign policy towards Angola. Following the conceptualisation of the thesis, the analysis asks to what extent Portuguese foreign policy vis-à-vis Angola has been “Europeanised”. More specifically, the chapter considers whether Portugal has been adapting its policies, projecting its national priorities or/and changing its preferences and identity due to a potential influence of the EU. As described in Chapter Two, Portugal has a small and open economy, where the external trade sector plays an important role. Its relations with Angola are long-lasting and complex, being marked by a colonial presence. After decolonisation, Portugal’s economic relations with Angola lost great part of its significance. However, Angola continued to be significant for many Portuguese companies and Portugal’s economic presence in its ex-colony has remained important. Furthermore, from Lisbon’s perspective, those relations are valued not only in strict economic grounds, but also for broader foreign policy reasons. On the EU side, trade is one of the oldest and more integrated policy domains. Differently from other areas, in the realm of trade the EU can rely on strong competences, substantial resources, well established instruments, and is often described as a world power. Moreover, the Community has a long history of highly institutionalised relations with sub-Saharan Africa, within which the relationship with Angola can be contextualised.

Against this broad background, different possibilities can be considered here. Firstly, in view of the broader importance Angola plays for Portuguese foreign policy, Lisbon may have adopted an active stance within the EU, each time it shared a common interest with its European partners and anticipated mutual benefits. Moreover, on the basis of its proximity to Luanda, Portugal may have under certain circumstances presented itself as a facilitator in the negotiations between the EU and Angola, in order to increase its own credibility and influence both among its European partners and vis-à-vis its ex-colony. Common action would “add value” to its national policy,
which ultimately Lisbon was always unwilling to compromise. Thus, according to this view the EU had no substantial impact on Portugal’s foreign policy towards Angola, with the level of its involvement in Brussels being determined by power considerations. Secondly, following liberal intergovernmentalist insights the presence of important domestic interest groups may have pushed Lisbon authorities to adopt a more active stance in Brussels, each time their issue-specific preferences were at stake. This would have become more likely in a later stage, when larger and more influential Portuguese companies became involved in the Angolan market, as well as in its sub-region. Also in this case, Portuguese policy-makers would have been unwilling to make any fundamental compromises, but potential costs could result from bargaining at the EU level. Finally, according to constructivist views, repeated interactions with new ideas and arguments stemming from the EU would have transformed Portuguese policy makers’ understandings of their preferences, making them more likely to perceive common interests. This could have been the case in relation to more regional or liberal understandings of trade relations, but those ideas are likely to have been present among Portuguese representatives, independently from an EU influence. Thus, the hypotheses that appear to receive more support are national adaptation and the projection of national preferences.

The chapter is structured in two sections. The first one centres its attention on Portugal’s accession process to the European Communities, which formally lasted from 1978 until 1985. As discussed in Chapter One, during the pre-accession period the EU can exert a strong influence on candidate members, due particularly to the prospect of membership and the legal obligation of adopting the *acquis communautaire*. In that sense, this section gives special attention to the commercial aspects of that *acquis*, applicable to Angola. The second section focuses on the intra-EU discussions for negotiating the 2000 Cotonou Agreement and the Economic Partnership Agreements, which as seen in the previous chapter introduced important changes to the trade regime developed over 25 years under Lomé.

3.1 The EC accession negotiations and the trade *acquis* of Lomé

When Portugal made its decision to join the European Community in the second half of the 1970s, the Lomé Convention was the main mechanism through which the EC structured its relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific group, which Angola joined in 1985. Rooted in the colonial legacies of some EU member states and established under a favourable context for the large ACP group, Lomé was at the top of the “pyramid of privilege” of the Community.
Proclaimed as a “partnership of equals”, the Lomé model followed a group-to-group approach and included an institutionalised dialogue, substantial aid assistance, as well as special trade preferences. More specifically, the EC granted preferential access to its market without requesting reciprocal liberalisation. Simultaneously, as a “mixed” agreement the Lomé Convention allowed a great say to EU member states, in contrast with simple trade agreements where supranational features are more present. At the time Portugal’s relationship with Luanda was far from unproblematic. As seen in Chapter Two, after decolonisation in 1975 Lisbon was interested in rebuilding on a new basis its historical ties with Angola, but those intentions were hindered by various factors, including the eruption of the Angolan civil war, strong post-colonial frictions, and the divergent orientation the two countries came to follow in the Cold War divide. From the late 1970s, Lisbon authorities sought more actively to put forward new bilateral initiatives towards Angola, aiming in particular to promote Portuguese economic interests in that country. However, Portugal’s political instability and serious economic difficulties until the mid-1980s meant that those initiatives were often far from consensual and significant. Mirroring those circumstances, the bilateral cooperation over this period had a low level of institutionalisation and effective implementation.

Considering this general background, what was the impact of Portugal’s accession to the European Communities on its relations with Angola in the realm of external trade? More specifically, the main questions derived from the analytical framework of the thesis to be asked are as follows. First, what significance was given to the Lomé agenda by Portuguese foreign policy-makers during the national discussions that took place during the pre-accession phase? How significant were possible internal resistances to the adoption of a more European approach towards Angola? Did Portuguese authorities adopt any initiative after making the decision to apply for EC membership that indicates an intention to protect a national position or to pursue its preferences using the EC as a tool? How was the participation in the Lomé Convention assessed by Portuguese foreign policy-makers in comparison with the adoption of other options? Did separate norms or national definitions of preferences receive great attention? What were the immediate implications for Portugal resulting from the adoption of the Lomé acquis? Finally, did Portugal compromise any national preference towards Angola in order to accommodate its participation in the Lomé Convention?
National adaptation to a potentially useful acquis

Portugal’s adoption of the Lomé Convention acquis was on the whole unproblematic. The lengthy accession negotiations (1978-1985) were mainly due to the simultaneous accession of Spain, whose negotiation process was far more complex than the Portuguese one. Moreover, the dossier of “external affairs” was not among the most difficult to close (Dinan, 2004: 184). As put by a former Portuguese politician, Portugal had virtually no foreign policy at the time. Apart from that, Portuguese interests groups had a limited involvement in the negotiation process, which was largely dominated by the political elite. In fact, Portugal’s turbulent transition to democracy, including widespread nationalisations and the adoption of other socialist-inspired policies, meant that while civil society groups were weak the state came to occupy a strong presence in the Portuguese economy (A. C. Pinto and Teixeira, 2004: 124). For Portuguese decision-makers the Lomé acquis was important primarily in view of the overall goal of EC membership. This was particularly the case during an initial phase, when domestic resistance and doubts over accession were more significant. In effect, following the overthrown of the long-lived right-wing authoritarian regime, Portugal went to a phase of great instability and uncertainties marked by a strong influence of the military and leftist movements. During those revolutionary years (1974-1975), despite all volatility pro-Soviet and chiefly “Third Worldist” perspectives, favouring privileged relations with the ex-colonies, were largely dominant (Teixeira, 2003: 114). Against this context, for the pluralist and pro-Western political forces EC membership came to represent a means to secure the stabilisation of Portugal’s nascent democracy and the redefinition of its international orientation (A. C. Pinto and Teixeira, 2004: 123). Thus, in order to more effectively pursue that goal the instrumentality of Europe and the Lomé Convention for Portugal’s traditional ties in Africa were highlighted in the domestic debate.

When in 1976 the charismatic Prime Minister Mário Soares presented the objective of joining the EC as the main foreign policy priority of its minority government, much emphasis was put on the idea that such decision would not be detrimental to the relationship with the former colonies: “Portugal is a European country and can only benefit from European integration, including for improving relations with its ex-colonies” (Portugal, 1976a: 406). At the time, some former Portuguese colonies had started to move closer to Brussels and become part of the Lomé Convention. Such was the case with the smaller countries, but the picture was less clear for

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22 Interview by the author (n.º 11).
23 All quotations originating from non-English sources are the author's own translation.
Angola (and Mozambique) due to its links with the Soviet bloc. In any case, this development was not overlooked by the pro-European Soares government, which used it as an additional argument for justifying Portugal’s EC accession:

“in the domain of economic and commercial exchanges any claim to privileged relations established exclusively on a bilateral basis seems difficult to be achieved, given that we are witnessing a move from those new African countries to become members of the Lomé Convention. This Convention does not allow special concessions to countries that are not full members of the European Community. Here lies one of the reasons for Portugal to integrate the Common Market, since until that happens Portugal will assume the role of a third country, being forced to witness the creation of privileged arrangements between the new Portuguese-speaking African countries and the European Economic Community” (Portugal, 1976b: 130).

After the decision to join the European Community was made effective in 1977, the pre-existing internal misgivings gradually weakened and became secondary (J. M. Ferreira, 1999: 42-4). In effect, the “European option” made initially by the centre-left Soares government was backed by all main political parties (except the Communists) and became part of a consensual general Western orientation. In view of the concentration of efforts in the EC accession priority, Portugal’s post-colonial relations necessarily started to receive less political attention. Yet, the importance of those relations for the country’s external outlook did not disappear.

As mentioned above, in the late 1970s Portugal began to adopt a more active stance towards its former African colonies, especially in relation to Angola. This bilateral activism was meant to be complementary to Portugal’s EC accession goal. But in view of the country’s political instability at the time, that general principle also incorporated some nuances with important internal corollaries (see Gaspar, 1988). Ultimately, Portugal’s bilateral initiatives (even if not always consequential) signalled an intention to preserve a voice in relation to its former African colony. To illustrate, as a result of a summit that represented a breakthrough in the bilateral rapprochement, Portugal and Angola signed a general cooperation agreement in 1978. Other initiatives followed, particularly in the economic domain. Thus, in 1979 the two countries signed several agreements in different economic areas, including a trade agreement comprising a “most favoured nation” clause. That same year a US$40 million credit line was open to support Portuguese exports, which was subsequently reinforced. By 1984 those credit facilities had reached a ceiling of US$130 million, at a moment when economic competition from other Western countries (such as France and Spain) was becoming more pressing (Rolo, 1986: 167).

24 When in March 1977 an initiative of support for the government’s objectives in relation to EC accession was passed at the national parliament only the Communists (PCP), the far-left (UDP) and one independent member of the parliament voted against it (Portugal, 1977: 3039). In the legislative elections of 1976 PCP and UDP only received 14 and 2% of votes respectively.
The European Community added a further impulse to Portugal’s initiatives towards Angola. Since the beginning of Portugal’s EC accession process, Brussels had pointed out to the potential utility of Lisbon’s historical links in Africa, and other continents, for the international role of the Community (European Commission, 1978: 7). Moreover, as the EC was interested in strengthening its relations with the Frontline States (which included Angola), Lisbon increasingly linked strong ties with its ex-colonies in Africa to a reinforcement of its own position next to the Community (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 45).

Portugal’s intention to play a specific role in the relationship between Europe and Africa became perceptible since the early stages of its EC accession process. Yet considering the intrinsic uncertainties of those negotiations and Portugal’s enduring political instability, it was only in the final phase of the accession process that Lisbon’s claim started to gain more grounds and clarity. As explained by the Foreign Minister of the “Central Bloc” government (a coalition of the two largest parties), in early 1985, the role Portugal envisaged for itself in the context of Euro-Africa relations was that of a “privileged interlocutor” (Gama, 1985: 312). Through accession Portugal would join the group of member states with historical links to Africa, such as France and the United Kingdom. But as a small and, therefore, more “equal” country Portugal could bring in a distinctive contribution, not least for relations with Lusophone Africa.25 Portugal’s future participation in Community mechanisms was depicted as “adding value” to its national policy, but potential advantages for the EC and Africa were also officially underlined:

“Portugal’s integration in the European communities will provide Europe with the Portuguese sensitivity to African problems and will give Portugal the support of community mechanisms to expand its African vocation. As a result, it will also provide Portuguese-speaking African countries with an ally and a friend within the community structures, balancing the game of influences which has been conducted there by other linguistic areas” (Gama, 1985: 251).

This emphasis on reciprocal benefits indicates that Portuguese authorities were aware of the conditions involved in the bridging role Lisbon wanted to play in Euro-Africa relations, not least the need to strike a balance between its national goals and common Community objectives.

By becoming a member of the European Community in 1986 Portugal had to adapt its trade relations with Angola to the *acquis communautaire*. In effect, Community instruments and procedures started to be applied to those relations as EC membership required the adoption of the *acquis* in full. Due to the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), Portugal adopted all Community external trade arrangements. Moreover, all Portuguese previous external links contrary to the

25 Interview by the author with Portuguese diplomat (n.º 21).
CCP were abolished and future ones subjected to its rules, including the exclusive right for the Commission to offer and negotiate new trade agreements. Since Angola had joined the Lomé Convention in 1985 (Lomé III), this agreement became the framework for Portugal’s trade relations with its ex-colony. Also, the “most favoured nation” clause inserted in the 1979 trade agreement between Portugal and Angola lost its potential benefits in relation to other European member states.26 Nevertheless, Portugal’s trade agreement with its ex-colony continued to be potentially advantageous vis-à-vis other countries outside the EC, as its content was not incompatible with the **acquis communautaire** (Álvares, 1986: 201-3). In fact, owing to Lomé’s non-reciprocal trade regime the main implications of Portugal’s accession to the Convention concerned its imports from ACP countries. Yet, as seen above Portugal’s trade with Angola was at the time very low, especially regarding imports.27 Moreover, Portugal was allowed to only gradually open its market to ACP products over a seven-year transition period. Thus, in practical terms Community obligations had limited implications for Portugal’s bilateral trade relationship with Angola. As bluntly put by a senior Portuguese diplomat referring to Community trade dispositions: “Community rules are not as rigid as they seem; even the rules we need to abide by do not impede bilateral relations.”28 In contrast, the participation in common mechanisms and resourceful programmes opened the possibility for Portugal to reinforce its enduring national preferences vis-à-vis Angola.

### 3.2 The impact of the Cotonou Agreement and the EPAs

As mentioned before, the 2000 Cotonou Agreement introduced major changes to the EU-ACP relationship. Ideas of solidarity continued to permeate those relations, but globalist and liberal views gained more attention. In particular, Cotonou introduced a principle of trade liberalisation, where the uniform preferential regime of Lomé was to be gradually replaced by reciprocal arrangements. Greater “differentiation” between ACP countries and “regionalisation” of trade relations represented additional departures from the Lomé regime. Further, though a mix of trade and aid measures was maintained, the development focus of previous arrangements gave more room to market-oriented approaches. This was reflected in a larger role for the European Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for Trade in EU-ACP relations. When the reform of the Lomé Convention started in the mid-1990s, Lisbon’s relationship with Angola had relatively

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26 Under Lomé dispositions Angola assumed an obligation of non-discrimination among EC members (see article 136 of Lomé III).
27 Between 1978 and 1986 less than 0.4% of Portugal’s total imports came from Angola (Banco de Portugal, 2000).
28 Interview by the author (n." 13).
improved. By then Portugal could benefit from favourable domestic political conditions to pursue its largely consensual foreign policy goals. The same was applicable in the economic domain where despite greater liberalisation the Portuguese state continued to have an important presence, often favouring more protectionist views. Additionally, EC membership had contributed to bolster the country’s international status. In a more specific way, Lisbon’s role in the Angolan peace efforts in the early 1990s had helped to reinforce the bilateral relationship. Subsequent progress was constrained by the enduring Angolan conflict, but Portugal continued to push for closer bilateral ties, namely in economic areas. Meanwhile, at the European level Lisbon became a strong supporter of the EU-ACP partnership, with a particular focus on Africa and aid approaches.

Against this broad setting, what was the impact of the Cotonou trade innovations on Portugal’s relations with Angola? In particular, what importance was given to the European agenda by Portuguese policy-makers during the discussions that preceded the reform of the Lomé trade regime? Were Portuguese authorities active at EU level trying to influence the outcome of the reform? Did Portuguese actors pushed for specific approaches or issues that indicate an intention to pursue a national preference using the EC as an instrument? Were national definitions of interests favoured over European perspectives? Finally, did Portugal compromise any national preference to accommodate the promotion of joint European objectives towards Angola?

Between national adaption and policy projection

The reform of the Lomé Convention that led to the signature of the Cotonou Agreement was seen by Portuguese authorities as an important process. More than trade aspects per se, Portugal’s concerns related to the potential political and aid implications of the reform. In the face of growing dissatisfaction towards the Lomé Convention since the early 1990s, Lisbon was interested in preserving a special relationship between the EU and the ACP, particularly with African countries. In effect, it was in that sense that in March 1996 Portugal had put forward the initiative of organising for the first time a EU-Africa summit (Gama, 2001: 269-70). The debate on the future of Lomé was launched by the Green Paper released by the European Commission in November 1996. The document suggested four options to reform EU-ACP arrangements. A first option was to maintain the status quo, that is, a non-reciprocal trade regime underpinned by an overall agreement with all the ACP countries. All other options recommended a liberalisation of the trade relationship in conformity with WTO rules. Thus, the second possibility was to
integrate Lomé into the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences, which would diminish preferential margins and reduce the partnership to its aid and political dimensions. A third alternative (“uniform reciprocity”) consisted in a general EU-ACP Free Trade Agreement, extending reciprocity to all ACP countries after a transitional period. Finally, a fourth option (“differentiate reciprocity”) involved a series of trade agreements between the EU and separate regional groupings of ACP countries (Holland, 2002: 173-6). Subsequent discussions revealed three main cleavages among EU member states: “traditionalists” (who wanted to preserve the “spirit of Lomé”) versus “revisionists” (who pressed for an all encompassing revision); “social development-oriented aid supporters” versus “growth-oriented free market proponents”; and “trade sceptics” versus “free trade enthusiasts” (Elgström, 2000: 187). In general terms, a “traditionalist”, “pro-development aid” and “trade sceptic” perspective appears to have inspired Portuguese representatives during the negotiations.

From the beginning Portugal declared itself in favour of the reform, but in order to “revitalise” EU-ACP ties. Accordingly, in its opinion the positive aspects of Lomé (“contractual nature, predictability, dialogue and partnership”) should be preserved. Another distinctive element of Portugal’s stance was the support for a positive discrimination in favour of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (Portugal, 1997b: 101-2). These same elements as well as a critical view over following a primarily free trade approach in the forthcoming reform were buttressed by the Portuguese Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, José Lamego, at the national parliament in January 1997:

“We do not want this framework of cooperation [Lomé model], which has existed for over 30 years, to be dismantled under the guise of a future reform. More differentiation needs to be introduced. However, we do not believe that the current cooperation framework, based on a partnership model, can be dismantled and replaced by a system of relations only in terms of a Generalised System of Preferences or of pure unfettered free trade. The economic vulnerability of our partners would not stand it” (Portugal, 1997c: 1264).

Among the preliminary written responses that the Commission’s Green Paper received from the member states, Portugal’s one was described as using some of the strongest language (Posthumus, 1998: 11). The document, circulated in May 1997, clearly stated that Portugal would consider reviewing its involvement in EU-ACP cooperation if the reform did not minimally meet the objective of strengthening this relationship at all levels, favouring the ACP countries’ development (Portugal, 1997a: 6). Portugal’s paper depicted the geographical coverage and trade arrangements of the partnership as interrelated matters (ibid.: 14). Whilst pointing to the fact that the decision was ultimately to be made by the ACP group itself, Portugal
explicitly favoured maintaining the geographical set-up as it was (ibid.: 10). Regarding trade aspects, although no clear and definitive choice among the different options of reform was made, a preference for an “enhanced status quo” formula was indicated (ibid.: 12). As noted by some, in its initial response Portugal (together with France) was more optimistic than other member states about the possibility of obtaining WTO waivers to preserve the non-reciprocal regime of Lomé (Posthumus, 1998: 5).

Following the consultation phase, in October 1997 the European Commission issued its policy guidelines for reforming Lomé, indicating a clear preference for the negotiation of economic agreements with regional ACP subgroups (European Commission, 1997: 4). This was in line with Portugal’s own position at this stage, as revealed by the following excerpt from the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 1997 report:

“(…) the EU should move from the current unilateral concessions granted to the ACP to a regime of reciprocity (except for LDCs). Yet, this should be done in a measured and gradual manner in order to avoid disruptions. Focusing first on deepening regional integration processes that are under way in the ACP countries before moving to the requirement of reciprocity vis-à-vis the EU corresponds to the gradualism that we advocate” (Portugal, 1998: 128).

The Commission guidelines were subsequently expanded and formed an important basis for the negotiating mandate adopted by the Council in mid-1998 (Holland, 2002: 178). In fact, the European Commission played an important role in the process, particularly DG Development as the directorate traditionally in charge of EU policies towards the ACP (Forwood, 2001b: 433-4). At the time, DG Development was led by Commissioner Deus Pinheiro, a former Portuguese Foreign Minister. The outcome of the internal EU negotiations was a compromise between different perspectives, but one that according to the assessment made by a high-level Portuguese politician was not so negative for Portugal.29 On the one hand, a principle of trade liberalisation was introduced, replacing the non-reciprocal regime of Lomé. As put by a senior Portuguese official “no member state was willing to pay the price for keeping an exception to WTO rules; nor were we!”30 In any case, Portugal’s stance on trade matters was closer to France, Belgium and Italy than, for instance, to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the Nordics (Forwood, 2001b: 428-9; Posthumus, 1998: 4-5).31 On the other hand, the trade liberalisation agreed by the Council did not include LDCs and was to be conducted gradually, through the negotiation of the so-called EPAs with different regional ACP sub-groups. Member states with closer ties with

29 Interview by the author (n.º 7).
30 Interview by the author, Portuguese aid agency (n.º 31).
31 Interviews by the author, Portuguese Foreign Ministry (n.º 13).
Africa ended up preferring the EPAs. And so did Portugal, as that option seemed to better preserve the EU relationship with the continent.  

Even if an EU-ACP link was retained, the potential impact of trade changes on the overall partnership raised more concerns in Portuguese quarters. Some apprehension was already visible during the intra-EU negotiations described above, namely in the emphasis that Portugal put on the interdependence between the different dimensions of the reform. But it continued to be voiced even after the EPAs principle was adopted: “the new economic and trade partnership framework cannot diminish or weaken the special relationship the EU has with the region [ACP]” (Portugal, 1999b: 134). More specifically, while backing the negotiation of EPAs Portugal was less comfortable with the new emphasis put on trade liberalisation in comparison to development approaches based on aid measures. Thus, in 1999 when the United Kingdom and the Netherlands broke away from the EU position, doubting about the EPAs feasibility, Portugal (and other seven member states) reaffirmed their adherence to the negotiating mandate (Forwood, 2001b: 435). Accordingly, in June 2000, when the negotiations of Cotonou were already concluded, Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Luís Amado, publicly raised questions about the availability of adequate instruments to support the setting up of EPAs and the possible effect of “disintegration” that greater liberalisation could produce in some regions, especially in Africa (Portugal, 2000a: 89-91). These concerns were not dissipated with the beginning of the EPAs negotiations. The EU mandate for those negotiations was based on a recommendation drafted by DG Trade, putting greater accent on trade objectives than on development aims (Elgström, 2009: 458). In essence, the recommendation called for more autonomy for the Commission, as well as greater openness of both EU and ACP markets. Portugal appears to have pushed for a less flexible mandate for DG Trade and joined a more protectionist camp opposing full access to the EU market due to defensive interests in agricultural sectors (Sicurelli, 2010: 97-8). In the end, the mandate adopted by the Council in June 2002 watered down the full opening of European markets, while confirming a trade-centred approach for the EPA negotiations.

The negotiations of EPAs between the EU and the different ACP sub-groups revealed many difficulties. At least initially, EU countries in general showed little interest in the process. To illustrate, only three European ministers (including from Portugal) attended the first EU-ACP

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32 Interview by the author, Portuguese aid agency (n.º 31).
33 Telephone interview by the author with Portuguese official, Portuguese Foreign Ministry (n.º 10).
council meeting that took place after the adoption of the EU negotiating mandate (IPS, 1 July 2002). Against this setting, DG Trade was left with great room for manoeuvre and started to conduct the negotiations as if they were a pure trade negotiation (Elgström, 2009: 459-60). Lisbon was critical of this primarily free trade approach. According to Portuguese officials, since the beginning Portugal stood for the creation of EPAs as tools for development. The way DG Trade handled the negotiations would have contributed to delay the process and, consequently, complicated Portugal’s plans. The negotiation between the EU and the Southern African Development Community - which comprises Angola - was no exception to the slow progress of the EPAs. Indeed, after a late start in mid-2004 the EU-SADC EPA discussions were complicated by the inclusion of South Africa (Sicurelli, 2010: 102). During an initial phase the country (the dominant economic player in the region) participated only as an observer. In 2006 the SADC presented a proposal to include South Africa as a full party, but excluding Mozambique (and also Angola, and Tanzania - the so-called MAT). Portugal (and other EU members) was against the exclusion of the MAT from the EPA process (Portugal, 2008b: 114). Moreover, it pressed for the acceptance of South Africa to be subjected to specific conditions, allegedly for “safeguarding the interests of the MAT countries” (Portugal, 2008c: 110). Eventually, the deadline of end of 2007 for concluding the negotiations was not met. Instead of a full regional EPA, interim deals were initialled by some SADC countries. Angola was not one of them, but expressed the intention of joining later. Meanwhile, the country continued to benefit from a preferential access to the EU market through the EBA scheme, while gaining time to prepare the liberalisation of its economy. In sum, while the trade changes introduced by Cotonou have not produced a significant impact on Portugal’s relations with Angola so far, Lisbon was able to an extent to protect its own market and project an image of a pro-Africa partner. In addition, the important level of activity that Portugal has continued to have with Angola in the economic domain seems also to point to the limits of the EU influence on Portuguese preferences.

Portugal’s economic initiatives towards Angola have included measures to promote trade and economic cooperation, as well as to restructure Angola’s bilateral debt. Those initiatives appear

34 Interviews by the author, Portuguese Permanent Representation to the EU (n.º 28) and Portuguese aid agency (n.º 31).
35 The SADC countries that in 2004 started negotiating an EPA with the EU as full members were: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Tanzania.
36 As LDCs these three countries benefited from the Everything-But-Arms scheme, which the SADC proposal wanted to “contractualise” on a non-reciprocal basis in the EPA.
37 Interviews by the author with EU officials, DG Development (n.º 32) and DG Trade (n.º 39).
to have been stepped up with the return of peace in Angola in the first half of 2002. Thus, in November 2002 the two countries signed a protocol to regularise Angola’s debt to Portugal, estimated at the time at 2.2 billion Euros. Speaking to the press on that occasion Portuguese Prime Minister Santana Lopes said: “by getting beyond this old and complex question, a new economic and financial cycle opens up with new possibilities” (Agence France Press, 19 August 2004). Four months later, the two countries initialled a convention on credit risk insurance for Portuguese exports, with an initial line of credit worth 100 million Euros. In April 2006 Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates made a three-day official visit to Angola seeking to boost economic bilateral ties. During this visit a 100 million dollars credit was created to finance joint projects and existing credit lines were reinforced to 300 million Euros. In February 2008 a new bilateral investment promotion and protection agreement was signed. Five months later Prime Minister José Sócrates made a second visit to Angola to participate in the International Fair of Luanda, while a new credit line of 500 million Euros was announced. Several initiatives were also made public in the context of the two-day visit of President Eduardo dos Santos to Portugal in March 2009, such as the creation of a joint investment bank and the duplication of Portugal's credit line to Angola to 1,000 million Euros.

The fact that those national initiatives are not totally proscribed by EU dispositions makes their existence less surprising, as the adaptation pressure stemming from the EU is weak or even inexistent. As put by a DG trade official, these sorts of initiatives are “normal” since they do not breach EU rules, in particular the Common Commercial Policy. Simultaneously, its great use may also be a reflexion of greater constraints at the EU level. To explain, because other measures became excluded by EU rules, member states may feel the need to revert more to allowed exceptions in the economic domain. Ultimately, those national actions indicate at least the persistence of Portuguese interests towards Angola and the will to promote them, even through channels separate from the EU.

Conclusions

Portugal’s membership of the European Union led to an important Europeanisation of its trade policy towards Angola. This impact was mainly translated in a national adaptation to the EU’s influence, but also as the projection of national priorities onto the European level. Lisbon’s legal obligation of adopting the acquis communautaire in full during the EC accession process was a

38 Interview by the author (n.º 17).
powerful mechanism to produce national adaptation. More broadly, the importance accession came to represent for Portugal’s main political forces, as a tool for democratic stabilisation and foreign policy reorientation, together with the new opportunities Community membership promised to create for Portugal’s meagre and problematic relations with Angola, helped overcome domestic reservations over closer relations with Europe in Africa. Even if the instrumentality of EC membership was given great emphasis during this phase, more ideational factors favouring national adaptation might not have been completely absent. This is an aspect that deserves further investigation, as decision-makers with stronger European convictions may have had to conceal their beliefs in order to facilitate the process of accession. Yet, a possible identification with European ideas was not necessarily incompatible with own representations in relation to the ex-colonies. These continued very present among vast sectors of the Portuguese elite and society in general. The difference, however, was that with Portugal’s EC membership the national and European side became more intertwined. In effect, through accession Lisbon transferred to the Community most of its powers in external trade matters, and EC instruments became a central framework for Portugal’s commercial relations with Angola. In practical terms, the constraints on Portugal’s bilateral relations with Angola resulting from accession were more limited, namely due to the low level of trade between the two countries.

The reform of the Lomé trade regime provided another good case for assessing the potential EU’s impact on Portugal-Angola relations. The greater role commercial aspects came to occupy in EU-ACP discussions seems to have gone beyond Portugal’s preferences, due to its traditional “trade sceptical” stance. Lisbon had to compromise its position in order to achieve the common goal of revising the partnership with the ACP. However, Portugal did not have major commercial interests at stake, being more interested in the aid and political implications of the reform. Even if further research is needed on this point, Lisbon appears to have been able to protect its (limited) defensive interests, while showing more flexibility with regard to greater openness of ACP markets in general. In any case, the compromise outcome of the reform, including a “gradual”, “regional” and “differentiated” trade liberalisation, did not move too far away from Portugal’s interests. Notwithstanding the complications of the EU-SADC EPA negotiations, Angola remained linked to the process and as a LDC continued to benefit from a non-reciprocal regime. Thus, in practice the reform did not have major implications for Portugal-Angola trade relations so far. Simultaneously, the evidence above indicates that Portugal was able to project some of its preferences. This was the case in relation to the acceptance of the EPAs option, despite all the difficulties that followed. In that process Portugal appears to have benefited,
among other factors, from the unanimity requirement for revising Lomé (as a “mixed” agreement), the similar position of other member states (such as France), and the support of DG Development. Apart from that, by putting forward proposals favouring the ACP (particularly LDCs, such as Angola) Portugal was able to draw attention to the specificities of its national position within the EU, therefore, favouring its interests in Africa.

What is more, Lisbon continued promoting its interests towards Angola autonomously, by taking advantage of the (many) exceptions of the CCP. In other words, reliance on just Community policies and instruments was not regarded as being in its best interests. Thus, rather than a “deep” transformation of its national preferences due to an EU influence, Portugal continued to value its national policy towards its former colony. This was translated not only in a declaratory way, but also through the effective implementation of numerous bilateral initiatives. In sum, even if the EU had an important impact on Portugal’s policy, such influence was more significant at the level of policy instruments and procedures than at the level of detailed policy content. Moreover, Lisbon was able to make an instrumental use of EU mechanisms to pursue, along common EU objectives, its own national goals.
Chapter 4

Portugal’s aid towards Angola: Chiefly projecting national preferences?

Introduction

This chapter focuses on development cooperation issues to examine the impact of EU membership on Portuguese foreign policy towards Angola. As discussed in Chapter Two, Portugal’s development aid policy is in general terms “weak”, due particularly to its limited resources, as well as its traditional lack of strategic orientation and coordination. However, Portugal’s cooperation has been more significant in relation to its former colonies (including for Angola), where the bulk of its resources and efforts have been highly concentrated. In contrast, European Community development aid can be considered as “relatively strong”, attending to its considerable resources, geographical coverage and shared competences with the member states. Sub-Saharan Africa in particular has historically been a privileged region, benefiting from substantial EU assistance in the framework of highly institutionalised programmes. Even if less significant than in the case of Mozambique, the EC has also been an important actor in Angola, particularly during an initial phase when the African country was in more need of external aid.

Taking into account the type of “fit” between national and EU policies, the general expected outcomes are as follows. Firstly, the constraints on Portuguese policy due to its EU membership were in principle not very significant, notably due to the limitations of Community aid competences. At the same time, Portugal is likely to have played the “EU game” in order to take advantage of the considerable Community means, seeking to compensate its weak capabilities. Secondly, and related to the previous point, attending to the importance of Angola for Portuguese foreign policy, Portugal has expectedly tried to project its national preferences onto the EU level, seeking to influence its European partners and reinforce its national position. Thirdly, the influence of EU norms and concepts on Portuguese policy was possibly stronger in development matters in general terms than specifically in relation to Angola, which plays an important role in Portugal’s self-image and identity.
In order to tackle those questions, the chapter is organised in two sections. The first one corresponds to Portugal’s accession negotiations to the European Communities, focusing particularly on the adoption of the aid *acquis* of Lomé. As seen before, during the pre-accession period, the EU can exert a strong adaptation pressure on candidate states. The second section examines the post-Cold War reforms of EU development policy, focusing on the period after the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty represents a starting point for important changes in EU development policy, happening after Portugal’s accession. Hence, those are appropriate issues to assess the potential Europeanisation of Portuguese policy towards Angola.

### 4.1 The EC accession process and the aid *acquis* of Lomé

As seen in the previous chapter, when Portugal decided to formally apply for European Community membership in the mid-1970s, the Lomé Convention was the main mechanism regulating the relationship between the EC and the ACP group, which Angola joined in the mid-1980s. For the purposes of this section, the main features of the Lomé model can be summarised as follows. First, it was based on a broad concept of “partnership”, emphasising ideas of respect, solidarity and interdependence between rich and poor, and the possibility of mutual interests. Second, in line with the EC objective of supporting regional cooperation it followed a group-to-group approach. Third, as part of a larger mix of political and economic instruments, Lomé included large financial aid packages provided through a special fund run on an intergovernmental basis. Finally, it comprised a highly institutionalised dialogue and long-term contractual aid, committed to the ACP countries irrespective of performance. Alongside, after the overthrow of its long-lasting authoritarian regime and decolonisation in the mid-1970s Portugal was interested in rebuilding its historical relationship with Angola on the basis of “equality”. However, after Angola became independent various factors complicated the bilateral relationship, including post-colonial tensions and the divergent orientation the two countries came to follow in the Cold War divide. From the late 1970s, Portuguese authorities sought more actively to put forward new bilateral initiatives towards its ex-colony. Yet Portugal’s political and economic instability until the mid-1980s meant that the assistance it started to provide to the new regime in Luanda was by and large short of clear policy direction and real significance. Mirroring those circumstances, this bilateral cooperation had a low level of institutionalisation and effective implementation.
Against this broad scene, what was the impact of Portugal’s accession to the European Communities on its aid relations with Angola? On the basis of the analytical framework of this thesis more specific questions can be asked. First, what importance was given to the European agenda by Portuguese foreign policy-makers during the national discussions that took place during the pre-accession stage? How significant were potential domestic resistances to the adoption of a more European approach vis-à-vis Angola? Second, did Portuguese authorities adopt any initiative after making the decision to apply for EC membership that indicates an intention to protect a national position or to pursue its preferences using the EC as a means? Third, how was the participation in the Lomé Convention assessed by Portuguese foreign policy-makers in comparison with the adoption of other options? Did separate norms or national definitions of preferences receive great attention? Finally, what were the immediate implications for Portugal resulting from the adoption of the Lomé acquis? Did Portugal compromise any national preference to accommodate its participation in the Lomé Convention?

Adapting to a relatively weak, but potentially useful acquis

As described in Chapter Three, EC membership was perceived by Portuguese authorities as favouring its foreign policy in general terms and, in particular, its cooperation with its former colonies in Africa. This was also valid for the relationship with Angola in the domain of aid. Portugal’s cooperation with Angola was institutionalised later than with its other former African colonies. After signing a general cooperation agreement in 1978 other accords followed in 1979 and 1982. Coinciding with the first two meetings of the Luso-Angolan cooperation commission, those agreements covered mainly economic and financial measures, as well as technical assistance in domains such as education and health. The results were, however, not very significant due mainly to the persistent fragility of Portugal’s initiatives and to problems in the bilateral relationship.  

39 Seeking to overcome the weaknesses of its bilateral aid policy, Portugal tried from the early 1980s to develop a network of agreements with more financially powerful entities present in Africa. Thus, Portugal started tripartite ventures in Africa with countries such as the United States, Sweden, Austria and Italy. Yet, the output of those initiatives was not impressive. Amongst the reasons for that seems to have been the lack of willingness to collaborate from some of the partners. Angola was one of Portugal’s ex-colonies less interested in these forms of trilateral cooperation. But Portugal too seems to have shown some reluctance,

39 An illustration of that is the fact that the third meeting of the joint cooperation commission only took place in 1987.
for fear of assuming a mere secondary position in some of those partnerships. Apart from collaborations with individual countries, Portugal also became involved in projects with international bodies such as the World Bank, the United Nations agencies, and other African regional organisations. Moreover, in 1982 Portugal and the Community began talks for cooperation initiatives in Africa, which led to several trilateral projects (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 107). This evidence suggests that Portugal may have preferred to cooperate in Africa under multilateral schemes as a way to increase its room for manoeuvre.

In view of the dire weaknesses of Portugal’s development programme, the direct access to EC mechanisms and resources was seen as rather advantageous. Portuguese authorities put great emphasis on the idea that the country would be better positioned to face competition from other external actors in Africa (in particular European countries) by participating in a multilateral forum such as the EC. Those ideas are visible in the comments made by the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jaime Gama, during an interview to a newspaper in early 1985:

“If Portugal were not to join the EEC, it would be excluded from the mechanisms of financial assistance and the decision-making bodies that define the development cooperation between the EEC and the Third World. Due to a lack of own resources, Portugal could hardly compete under these circumstances” (Gama, 1985: 251).

Further, due to its “privileged” ties with some African countries, Lisbon would be able to make a relevant “contribution” to Community activities and, as a result, reinforce its position both in Europe and in Africa. Again this understanding can be found in the declarations made in mid-1985 by Foreign Minister, Jaime Gama:

“(…) due to its good relations and open dialogue with other regions of the world, especially with Africa and Latin America, Portugal can become in the near future a reference in the Community context for the relationship with those areas. Moreover, an adequate use of the mechanisms of the Lomé Convention III will certainly represent a positive factor for our cooperation policy, particularly with regard to the Portuguese-speaking African countries” (Portugal, 1985: 4052).

These elements indicate that the EC was presented by Portuguese decision-makers as a useful tool to pursue national objectives. The accent on the advantages of joining Lomé appears to have

40 Countries such as France, Italy, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Austria and the US showed interest in collaborating with Portugal in Africa. But by the mid-1980s Portugal had signed trilateral agreements only with Austria, the US (in relation to Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique), Italy and Sweden (for Guinea-Bissau). Moreover, the only agreements that had been effectively implemented by then were the ones with the US and Sweden in relation to Guinea-Bissau (see Venâncio and Chan 1996: 106-8; Silva et al. 1986: 125-8).

41 From 1982 Portugal signed several protocols with different United Nations specialised agencies. Moreover, it became a state participant of the African Development Fund (ADF) in 1982 and a member of the African Development Bank (AfDB) in 1983. Also in 1983 Portugal started a closer involvement with the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which led to cooperation activities in different areas (Silva et al. 1986: 125-6).
been particularly directed to a domestic audience, seeking to surmount any remaining reluctance in having Portugal’s relations with its ex-colonies more linked to the programmes of the EC. At the time, this potential negativity is more likely to have come from Portuguese private sectors, rather than from political forces which has mentioned before where in their vast majority supportive of the objective of EC accession.

While openly stressing the advantages of joining the Community, Portuguese decision-makers were also fully aware of the challenges membership would bring to its aid programme. In a study commissioned by the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the “Central Bloc” (1983-1985) - a coalition government formed by the two main political parties - to assess Portugal's aid policy in view of its EC accession, the Community was presented as a new, broader and more complex arena to Portugal's development cooperation, bringing about new opportunities, but also new challenges. One of the main risks pointed out by the study was that due to the weaknesses of its aid policy Portugal might lose the capacity to maintain an autonomous cooperation policy towards its ex-colonies in Africa (Silva, et al., 1986: 111-2). In particular, the report argued that Portugal’s financial contributions to EC aid could represent a constraint for the development of its own bilateral cooperation. Moreover, the limitations of Portugal’s economic structure could make it more difficult to take full advantage of the new opportunities stemming from that multilateral cooperation (ibid: 158-63). Therefore, Portugal would need urgently to reinforce its bilateral policy in order to prevent the risk of its “dilution” within the broader framework of EC cooperation (ibid: 134).

By becoming a member of the European Community in 1986 Portugal adopted the development cooperation acquis. That acceptance meant a national adaptation to European objectives and instruments. Thus, Portugal would have to start contributing to the different sources of Community aid, i.e., the European Development Fund (EDF), the EC budget, and the European Investment Bank (EIB).\(^{42}\) Moreover, the Lomé Convention (Lomé III) became applicable to Lisbon’s cooperation with Angola, who had joined the ACP group in 1985. Considering the benefits that the participation in EC mechanisms and programmes could bring to Portugal’s weak cooperation with its former colony, that adaptation was rather welcomed. Indeed, due to the

\(^{42}\) A special regime was introduced allowing Portugal to: i) start its financial contribution to the EDF only in 1989; ii) pay a reduced contribution to the EC budget during the first years after accession; iii) pay its initial contribution to the EIB through five semi-annual instalments (Silva, et al., 1986: 158). Such flexibility, however, had more to do with a general principle of gradual adaptation to Community rules (due to the economic weaknesses of Portugal), rather than being the result of a direct attempt to protect a specific national interest in development cooperation matters.
system of “shared competences” in the development area, Portugal was able to keep its own aid programme, while preserving great control over financial decisions taken for EC aid (only aid management and implementation are a competence of the European Commission). Furthermore, Portugal became involved in a multilateral system of cooperation with an extensive scope, covering all ACP countries, as well as other regions in the developing world. Thus, the participation in the “mixed” features of Lomé represented the possibility for Portugal to contribute to common European objectives, but also to continue pursuing its national goals towards Angola, under better circumstances.

4.2 The post-Maastricht era and the reform of EC development policy

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty introduced for the first time an explicit and specific mandate for the Community in the field of development cooperation. A set of common development objectives was defined - even if in general terms - and Community procedures were extended to this domain, including an important role for the Commission as the main initiator and implementer of development policy. Relations with the ACP countries were expressly excluded from those new common procedures. Yet, the “mixed” nature of the Lomé Convention (including, for instance, trade measures), as well as the fact that general development dispositions might still have an indirect effect on relations with ACP countries, justifies a closer look at the changes introduced by Maastricht. An additional justification stems from the principles of complementarity and coordination between Community and member states development policies, which also received legal recognition at Maastricht. In turn, development aid has represented one of Portugal’s most important foreign policy instruments. Improved domestic conditions from the second half of the 1980s onwards helped the country reinforce this policy tool. Nonetheless, the efficacy of Portugal’s aid has been traditionally hampered by its weak capabilities, limited planning and poor coordination. Over this period, the country remained committed to its post-colonial relations, namely with Angola which has been consistently one of top recipients of Lisbon’s bilateral aid. Portugal’s membership of the European Community represented a major opportunity to reinforce those relations. In particular, the ex-colonies became interested in Portugal’s new status as a way to improve their position vis-à-vis the Community. By assuming the role of an “intermediary” between EU resources and the development needs of its former African colonies, Portugal tried to conciliate the achievement of Community goals with the reinforcement of its own position, both in Europe and in Africa. Considering this broad backdrop, what was the impact of the reforms of EC aid on Portugal’s development policy?
Continuing attempts at projection under increased adaptational pressure

The discussions around the new provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on development aid provide some clues about the stance Portugal adopted vis-à-vis the intention to increase coordination at the European level in this policy domain. Following Loquai (1996: 10, 19-20), while the Commission defended that complementarity could best be achieved via a harmonisation of policies, Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany adopted a less integrationist stance. All those countries advocated a limitation of Community powers through the application of the subsidiarity clause, although not without divergences about the actual distribution of Community and national competences. Some southern member states (not specified by the author) took a more cautious approach, warning that a reorganisation of tasks could easily lead to a re-nationalisation of Community competences. Still following the same author, this position was understandable in view of the comparatively inefficient implementation systems of those countries and their heavy reliance on the Commission for the disbursement of their aid. For its part, France was initially sceptical about task specialisation and attempts to re-attribute competences between the Community and the member states. Paris had been traditionally reluctant in enlarging Community competences in the domain of development cooperation for fear of reducing the importance of Lomé within a more global European development policy. In the end, French representatives acknowledged that task specialisation could improve the effectiveness and quality of European aid.

Portugal’s position appears to have been a sort of mix between the stance of other southern member states and the one adopted by France. Indeed, due to the weakness of its development policy Portugal was interested in sharing costs by allowing some competences in this domain to be transferred to the Community. On the other hand, since Portugal’s cooperation priorities and efforts were concentrated on its former colonies in Africa, Lisbon was also concerned about a possible downgrading in the level of importance traditionally granted to the Lomé Convention. Those general viewpoints can be found in several declarations expressed by Portuguese authorities throughout the late 1980s. For instance, during an interview to a Brussels magazine in 1988 Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Durão Barroso, underlined the advantages of aid cooperation ran at the Community level:

“I do not think we can restrict our cooperation to its bilateral dimension. (...) Portugal has great potential resulting from its experience in this field, but we have more financial constraints than other member states. Therefore, we believe that a multilateral framework is an excellent means for Portugal to effectively insert its development cooperation efforts” (Barroso, 1990a: 93-4).
This perspective was confirmed by Community officials, according to whom Portugal’s economic limitations made it less reluctant to collaborate with the Community in development matters than other wealthier member states with stronger bilateral aid programmes (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 107). Furthermore, the importance of the Lomé Convention for Portugal was bluntly expressed by Secretary of State Durão Barroso in its communication during a business fair in Lisbon in 1989: “Lomé is, and must remain, the priority and preferential framework in the external cooperation relations of the Community” (Barroso, 1990a: 121).

In the immediate period following the entry into force of Maastricht provisions the degree of European coordination in development matters did not evolve much. Indeed, over the 1990s new measures were adopted seeking to reinforce the complementarity between Community development policy and the policies of member states, but little progress was achieved (Forwood, 2001a: 217-8). In general terms, this period represented a phase of transition in the system of EC aid and of EU-Africa relations. A combination of different factors, including growing doubts about the effectiveness of EU development measures and a sense of “aid fatigue”, together with a reorientation of European priorities linked to the process of enlargement, seem to have put some pressure on one of Portugal’s traditional stances within the EU consisting in pushing for more Community aid towards sub-Saharan Africa. During the mid-term review of Lomé IV (1994-1995) Portugal’s stance still showed great continuity with past positions. In a public address in Lisbon in 1994 Secretary of State for Cooperation, Briosa e Gala, after emphasising the importance of Lomé for Portugal’s cooperation, explained that the strategy of its government in the reform of Lomé was to “prevent that in the future the means to mobilise support, at Community level, to our main African partners are not harmed” (Gala, 1994: 90). In a context of “aid fatigue”, Portuguese representatives kept pushing for more EC aid in those negotiations. In this endeavour, Portugal seems to have joined forces with France. Yet, in the end the financial provisions of the revised convention were (for the first time) not increased in real terms. 43

During the negotiations, Portugal also maintained its traditional position in terms of favouring the poorest developing countries, as well as its preference for aid measures over further trade concessions. Such position is illustrated by the following statement produced by Secretary of State, Briosa e Gala, in August 1995:

43 The share of Portugal’s contribution to the EDF has increased over the successive programmes: it was 0.88% for both EDF VI (1985-1990) and EDF VII (1990-95), 0.97% for EDF VIII (1995-2000) and EDF IX (2000-2007), and it was augmented to 1.15% for EDF X (2008-2013).
“The argument repeatedly used by some about providing more trade concessions and less financial aid does not seem applicable, especially in the case of less developed countries - as many African countries are. Financial assistance to certain countries, especially to the poorest, remains essential to help them in other domains and to enhance their capacity to take advantage of trade concessions” (Gala, 1995: 119).

The new century brought about more significant measures in terms of Community and member states coordination. A first step in that direction was the adoption by the European Commission and the Council of a statement on development policy in 2000, which sought to achieve greater complementarity on the basis of areas of added value for Community assistance (European Union, 2000). Portugal supported this general effort of coordination, as illustrated by its policy document adopted the year before:

“Portugal, as a European Union member, must actively follow the debate and the ongoing reforms, in order to reinforce the effectiveness of EU cooperation, because the EU is currently the major international donor and its Member States play a dominant role in bilateral development aid. Better coordination between EU and Member States policies is absolutely crucial to achieve a new outcome from the actions being implemented in the recipient countries” (Portugal, 1999a: 2644).

This document also backed greater coherence between EU policies, the reform of EU mechanisms and procedures, as well as a more effective coordination among different Community services and institutional bodies. Also in 2000, the Commission launched a reform of the management of its aid programmes, which among other measures introduced a comprehensive system of multi-annual programming, created a new body in charge of implementing all EU aid (EuropeAid), and led to greater devolution of powers to the delegations. The process of devolution was assessed by Portuguese authorities as one of the most positive elements of the reform (Portugal, 2003: 193). According to a senior Portuguese politician with responsibilities in this domain, while having supported the process, Portugal also finds some difficulties to keep pace with it due to its lack of means.44

During Portugal’s second EU Presidency in the first semester of 2000 development matters in relation to Africa occupied an important place. The presidencies of the Council are commonly perceived as a good opportunity for member states to increase their visibility and promote their national priorities, while having simultaneously to run a presidency as successful as possible. In January 2000, an informal meeting of Development Ministers held in Lisbon launched the debate on the conditions for a “new partnership” with Africa, “taking into consideration the specific development problems of this continent” (Gama, 2002: 99). The link between development and

44 Interview by the author (n.” 7).
security issues in Africa was a central topic of the discussions (Gama, 2002: 292). It was also under the Portuguese presidency that the negotiations for the reform of the Lomé Convention were concluded, through the signature of the Cotonou agreement. A key event for Lisbon authorities was the organisation of the first-ever EU-Africa summit, which took place in Cairo that year at the beginning of April. As seen before, the idea of a summit had been proposed by Portugal in 1996 and was presented as a way to produce a sort of “institutional shock” that might reverse a certain disinterest of Europe vis-à-vis Africa (Portugal, 2000a: 157). While presenting the Presidency programme at the European Parliament, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jaime Gama, referred to Portugal’s intentions to promote “an integrated political dialogue with the whole Africa” and “assure a satisfactory continuity to the process created under the Lomé Convention” (Gama, 2002: 80). The summit produced a final declaration and an action plan, and ultimately, according to Portuguese authorities, “re-launched the Euro-African partnership by establishing a solid ground for an efficient and promising dialogue” (Gama, 2002: 99). This level of agency suggests that Portugal tried to use the “window of opportunity” of its Presidency to combine the promotion of common goals, with the reinforcement of its own role as a leading promoter of Africa matters within the EU. Despite the positive results for Lisbon’s diplomacy (namely in terms of visibility), such achievement was not without difficulties or limitations, as will be described later in this section.

Another important step towards greater coordination between Community and member states in development aid matters (perhaps the most significant so far) was the adoption of the so-called “European Consensus on Development” in 2005. Rather than legislation, this political strategy was aimed at providing guidance in the field of development policy. But it also represented the first document in fifty years to put forward a shared vision in this area, comprising both the European Community and the individual member states. According to Portuguese officials, the negotiation of this joint document was a difficult process, but one that in the end was positive from Portugal’s perspective, namely due to its emphasis on Africa.45 Two years later the “Consensus” was complemented by a common implementation strategy, translated in a “Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour”, of a voluntary nature. In more specific terms, an “EU Strategy for Africa” was approved in 2005 seeking to “give the EU a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with the African continent”, and making donor coordination one of its central priorities.

45 Interview by the author, Portuguese aid agency (n.º 31)
In spite of this profusion of new coordination measures, the advances were still not very significant. In fact, the record of past attempts at improving coordination has shown the great difficulty in achieving concrete results in practice. Moreover, it has been pointed out that member states have tended to concentrate their national programmes in traditional partners, or the poorest countries, leaving the rest to the Community (Forwood, 2001a: 218). The logic of “division of labour” seems to follow on that track, by leaving enough room for manoeuvre for member states to pursue with their traditional priorities. More flagrantly still, cooperation with ACP countries appears to have been to a great extent left outside the dynamic of increased coordination. The failure of renewed attempts to “budgetise” EDF seems to support that point. In fact, during the negotiations on the 2007-2013 financial perspectives the Commission proposed to integrate the EDF in the Community budget, but the initiative was rejected by the European Council in late 2005. In that instance, Lisbon was in favour of maintaining the EDF as an autonomous instrument as it considered that option “the best way of ensuring the quality, predictability and level of the [sic] cooperation with the ACP countries” (Portugal, 2005c: 90). By acting that way, Portugal appears to have been once more trying to project a more pro-Africa stance in the context of the EU.

As mentioned above, Lisbon’s intentions to play an important role for African issues within the European Union have not always been an easy task. A clear illustration of that came when the second EU-Africa summit, scheduled for 2003 in Portugal, had to be postponed because several EU member states - led by the United Kingdom - opposed the participation of the Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe. In turn that opposition produced new difficulties from the African side. The exact same difficulty re-emerged in 2007 during the third Portuguese Presidency of the Council. This time, however, Portugal was determined to take advantage of this new opportunity to re-affirm its commitment to the strengthening of Euro-African relations and, in the end, managed to organise effectively a second EU-Africa summit, despite the resistance from some important member states (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008b: 66). The summit was held in Lisbon at the beginning of December and included the approval of a joint Africa-EU strategy and an action plan (2008-2010), intended to cement “a new strategic relationship”, based on a “partnership of equals”. More specifically, the Presidency organised in November the first joint Council meeting between defence and development ministers, where pragmatic actions related to the “security-development nexus” were identified in order to increase the coherence of the EU’s external action. Also in November, the European Commission and the Community of Portuguese-
Speaking Countries signed a “memorandum of understanding”, aiming at strengthening their cooperation and coordination, and finding synergies for joint actions in different areas.

A combination of different factors seems to have favoured Portugal’s African agenda during its third Presidency. Lisbon might have received valuable support from the Commission, at the time composed of a former Belgian Foreign Minister, Louis Michel, in the development portfolio, and presided by the Portuguese Durão Barroso. Moreover, the fact that the Euro-African relationship became so encompassing, both in geographic and thematic terms, might have contributed to a broader support by EU member states. In a way, this could mean that developments in this domain resulted predominantly from the emergence of an “EU objective”, where Portugal was a mere handy “agent” of a more powerful “principal”. But this viewpoint seems too narrow, since Portugal was rather very active and efficient in building a broad “support coalition”. Illustrations of that can be seen, in the argumentation used by Portuguese actors to present the advancement of relations with Africa as an adequate contribution for EU’s international ambitions, as well as “fair” and urgent in view of the delay of those relations vis-à-vis other regions of the world and other actors’ actions, notably of China. Furthermore, even if the final outcome favoured EU common goals, they also served very well Portugal’s preferences. Thus, Portugal used the EU mechanisms to influence its European partners and pursue its national objectives, which ultimately reinforced its position both within the group and internationally.

In sum, the evidence presented in this section allows to draw two set of implications. Firstly, since the beginning of the 1990s the adaptational pressures stemming from the European level on Portugal’s development cooperation have gradually increased. However, the constraints imposed by greater European coordination were not high, since they did not exclude autonomous bilateral action and they were even less significant in relation to Africa. In other words, EU adaptational pressure seems to have been stronger in relation to aid matters in general terms, than regarding specifically Africa, where Portugal’s priorities have been concentrated. Given that Portugal’s development capabilities were in general weak, possible constraints must have sounded secondary in face of the new opportunities opened by increased collaboration at the European level. In that sense, a more coordinated, coherent and effective European action was also in the

46 Apart from an active participation in the official dialogue between the EU and Africa, Portugal has been encouraging and promoting research into and debate on issues related to the Community’s development cooperation policy, with a particular focus on EU-ACP and EU-Africa relations. For instance, since 1997 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (through its development agency) has been celebrating protocols of cooperation with a Portuguese think-tank (Institute for Strategic and International Studies - IEEI) and with the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), in order to promote activities focused on the topics mentioned above.
interest of Portugal, which ultimately supported initiatives in that direction as a means to reinforce its own policy. This support found an important limit whenever Portugal’s African priority came under threat. Over time the constraints on that priority appear to have increased more than the opportunities, in strict development terms. Thus, Portugal might have felt the need to project its priorities in a different way. This leads us to the second set of implications. Since its EC accession Portugal has been continually trying to project its national priorities onto the European level, in particular regarding development matters in sub-Saharan Africa. Around the second half of the 1990s the conditions under which Portugal kept pursuing its national preferences changed significantly. The reorientation and widening of the EU’s foreign priorities put more pressure on the level of attention and support traditionally received by Portugal’s former colonies in the context of Lomé. Related to that, Portugal had to adapt its strategy in order to keep pursuing its national objectives at EU level. Indeed, mirroring trends at the European level, Portugal widened the scope of its activities to the whole African continent and increasingly linked development with security and foreign policy issues.

Conclusions

The main conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis above are as follows. Firstly, the overall level of national adaption was not very significant. As a result of Portugal’s accession negotiations to the Community some adaptation took place, in particular due to the obligation of adopting the sectoral “acquis”. The level of importance given to EC accession by Portugal’s main political forces, as well as the prospect of being able to take advantage of common assets once becoming a Community member, facilitated such adaptation. However, since the Community only had (and still has) “shared” competences in the domain of aid, the constraints imposed on Portugal’s actions were not considerable - this is in clear contrast to the domain of trade, as seen in the previous chapter. Those constraints were even less important in relation to Africa (and necessarily for Angola), where intergovernmental features have been even more present. During the post-accession phase, especially from the mid-1990s, mounting efforts to reinforce coordination between Community and member states development policies brought about some changes. Yet, again those constraints left more room for manoeuvre in relation to Africa.

Secondly, the analysis above shows that Europeanisation understood as national projection was a central feature. After becoming an EU member, Portugal was able to participate in the common programmes and decision-making mechanisms in order to push forward its own preferences vis-
à-vis Angola. Those actions were facilitated by some of the “competitive advantages” Portugal has vis-à-vis its former colonies. Lisbon also sought to take advantage of its small state status to present itself as an “honest broker”, better able to bridge the EU-Africa relationship. Due to its leading role in the development domain, the EU became a key platform for Lisbon’s actions, which have greatly benefited from such close association.

Thirdly, the use of the EU channel might have also put more pressure on Lisbon authorities to define an autonomous and parallel policy in order to safeguard its national preferences and identity. Indeed, while closely collaborating with the EU, Portugal has also been very keen in presenting itself has a distinctive actor. This stance might have produced more rhetorical than concrete outputs, but with the gradual improvement of Portugal’s aid policy, the trend seems to be a positive one. The underlying explanation is the fact that Portugal’s collaboration with the EU has been driven mainly by instrumental reasons, rather than by a “logic of appropriateness”. Even if in relation to general aid issues Portugal might have accepted more easily some EU’s ideas (or other international norms), the picture was not the same in matters more directly related to its former colonies and in particular towards Angola. Indeed, in the latter situation Portugal has kept a very strong national understanding of its aid actions. In sum, the dominant feature that comes out from the previous analysis is that of a significant Europeanisation of Portugal’s aid actions towards Angola, understood as national projection.
Chapter 5

Portugal’s diplomatic relations with Angola:
Mainly keeping national preferences “outside”?

Introduction

This chapter examines the impact of European Union membership on Portuguese foreign policy towards Angola by centring on diplomatic aspects or foreign policy in the narrow sense. In spite of the weaknesses of Portugal’s diplomacy in general terms - due particularly to its limited resources and reactive nature, characteristic of a small state - Lisbon’s actions are more significant in relation to its former colonies, where it has carved a “niche” for itself building on historical and cultural ties. For its part, the EU has remained a relatively “weak” actor in strict foreign policy terms, notably due to its limited competences in that domain. Despite some recent changes, the same can be said about its relations with sub-Saharan Africa or Angola. Taking into account this type of “fit” between national and EU policies, the expected outcomes are as follows. Firstly, due to the essentially intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy, the constraints on Portuguese policy towards Angola were low. Simultaneously, Portugal is likely to some extent to have played the “EU game”, in order to take advantage of some mechanisms existing at the European level. Secondly, and on a related note, since Portugal gives great importance to its relations with Angola it has probably attempted to project its national preferences onto the EU level, seeking to influence its European partners and reinforce its national position. In any case, the national policy conducted “outside” the EU is expected to have been significant. Thirdly, the influence of EU norms and concepts on Portuguese policy was probably low, attending notably to the important role Angola plays for Portugal’s self-image and identity.

The chapter proceeds in two sections. The first one examines Portugal’s accession negotiations to the European Communities, focusing on the acquis politique applicable to Angola. The second section examines the post-accession period focusing on the participation of Portugal in the Angolan peace process in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as on the impact of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, established in 1993, on Portugal’s foreign policy towards Angola.

5.1 The EC accession negotiations and the *acquis politique*

When Portugal applied for European Community membership in the second half of the 1970s, the *acquis communautaire* in the field of foreign policy was the so-called European Political Cooperation. EPC was a loose framework for foreign policy cooperation oriented by broad interests rather than by clearly articulated goals. This was particularly the case in relation to Africa as despite a declared common interest to reinforce “long-standing links” some member states remained very jealous of their national prerogatives towards former colonies. Kept rigidly separated from the EC legal framework, EPC produced an essentially declaratory output. Moreover, it relied entirely on intergovernmental arrangements, particularly on the rotating Council presidency. Member states committed themselves to regular consultations, coordination of national positions, and, where possible, common action. But decisions were taken by unanimity, allowing the possibility of a national veto. At the time Portugal’s domestic situation was far from comfortable. Following the collapse of the authoritarian regime in 1974 the country went through a process of great political instability and economic difficulties. The election of the first constitutional government in 1976 marked the beginning of a more stable period, but the political situation remained fragile until the mid-1980s. During this period Portugal’s foreign policy orientation was going through a process of clarification, where the “Europeanists” had gained more strength against the “Third Worldists”. However, this was a battle that was only concluded after Portugal’s EC accession negotiations ended. Portugal’s relations with Angola were not in good shape either. With decolonisation in 1975 the political relationship went to a phase of great difficulties. Post-colonial resentment and the fact that the two countries were in different sides of the bipolar international order were important factors in that regard. A relative improvement in the bilateral relationship took place in the late 1970s, but more significant progress only happened in the second half of the 1980s.

Considering this general background, what was the impact of Portugal’s accession to the European Communities on its relations with Angola? More specifically, what importance did Portuguese foreign policy-makers give to the *acquis politique* applicable to Angola? How significant were potential domestic resistances to the adoption of a more European approach? Did Portuguese authorities espouse any initiative after applying for EC membership indicating an
intention to protect a national position or to pursue national preferences using the EC as a means? Further, how was the participation in EPC assessed by Portuguese foreign policy-makers in comparison with the adoption of other options? Did separate norms or national definitions of preferences vis-à-vis Angola receive great attention? What were the immediate implications for Portugal resulting from the adoption of the *acquis* applicable to Angola? Finally, did Portugal compromise any national preference towards its ex-colony in order to accommodate its participation in EPC?

*National adaptation to a weak but potentially useful acquis politique*

As seen in other chapters, Portugal’s long process of accession to the Community was mainly due to the simultaneous accession of Spain, whose negotiation was far more complex than the Portuguese one. Moreover, among the more difficult chapters in Portugal’s negotiation were the economic and social ones, rather than the “external affairs” dossier. EC membership was presented by Portuguese authorities as favouring its foreign policy in general terms and, in particular, its relations with its ex-colonies in Africa. Due to its historical and cultural links in the continent, Lisbon could make a relevant “contribution” to Community activities and, as a result, reinforce its position both in Europe and in Africa. Indeed, Portugal’s Africa dimension was followed with attention by Brussels, which was interested in strengthening its ties with the Front-line States of Southern Africa, in particular with Communist Angola (Antunes, 1990: 115-7; Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 45).

However, as mentioned above, the consolidation of the Euro-Atlantic foreign policy orientation of democratic Portugal only took place in 1986, precisely after full membership of the European Community was secured. Before that, stark domestic divisions were still very much present. As explained by Vasconcelos (1996: 270-1):

> “Two rival camps emerged during the pre-accession debate in Portugal. On the one hand, there were those both on the traditional left and the traditional right who feared that membership would cause Portugal to lose freedom of external action and gradually drift away from the Lusophone world, thus putting at stake its very survival as an independent entity in the Iberian Peninsula; on the other hand, there were those who strongly believed that membership of the Community in no way prejudiced the country’s ‘Atlantic vocation’ and proposed a Euro-Atlantic foreign policy.”

Even if with the passage of time these divisions became less acute than during an initial stage after the overthrown of the authoritarian regime, they were particularly strong in relation to Angola. In that sense, the degree of emphasis that mainstream political parties put on the benefits Community membership could bring for Portugal’s relations with Angola appears to have been
employed, at least to some extent, to overcome domestic resistances to that same EC accession. Thus, the Community worked as an instrument to push through policy preferences on the national level.

From 1983, as part of the accession process, Portugal became involved in EPC. This initial participation was largely passive, with the Portuguese foreign minister being directly informed of the main foreign policy orientations adopted after each meeting of the Council of Ministers and European Council. In August 1985 - two months after signing the accession Treaty, but before formally joining the Community in January 1986 - Portugal started to participate in EPC as an observer with the exception of African and Latin American issues, areas in relation to which Lisbon was invited to take part as a *de facto* full member. This early participation in EPC worked as a familiarisation period with European mechanisms and working methods, to which Portuguese administrative structures and diplomats were supposed to adjust (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007: 211). At the same time, it gives an indication of the geographical areas where the other Eleven expected Portugal to have a more relevant contribution (Vasconcelos, 1991: 130).

In September 1985 the Intergovernmental Conference that led to the Single European Act and the formal institutionalisation of EPC, in February 1986, began. Regarding the negotiations on foreign policy cooperation that took place in that context, Portugal’s position was explained by the then Portuguese director of political affairs as having consisted chiefly in defending the rule of consensus as a means to preserve the maximum of national autonomy:

“(…) the consensus rule was perceived as the only one capable of safeguarding the existing and future position of Portugal. (…) As far as European Political Cooperation is concerned, a consensus at eleven, ten or nine is not acceptable; consensus can only be reached with the Twelve” (Proença, 1988: 161).

This evidence indicates that participation in EPC was at this stage seen with caution by Portuguese authorities, especially with regard to proposals seeking to move away from unanimity. According to some authors, this attitude of some distrust only changed with the first Portuguese Presidency of the Council of Ministers in 1992 (Correia, 2002: 202). In any case, since intergovernmentalism continued to be the norm in foreign policy matters, the acceptance of EPC arrangements by Portugal was overall unproblematic (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007: 211). To put it another way, the adaptational pressures stemming from the Community were low due to the intrinsic nature of EPC. That circumstance ultimately worked as a reassurance for Portuguese authorities. In contrast, the new opportunities for Portuguese foreign policy resulting from its participation in this platform of coordination were perceived as more significant. More
specifically, as a small state, with scarce resources, trying to overcome the difficulties of reconstructing a post-colonial relationship with Angola in a Cold War context, the “non-threatening” mechanisms and the “umbrella” of EPC must have sounded rather beneficial for Portuguese decision-makers. Thus, the low constraints in combination with the potential benefits resulting from EPC greatly facilitated the adoption of the “acquis politique” by Portugal, which anyway was a necessary condition for accession. In sum, during the EC accession period the level of national adaptation was low, but new opportunities were open for Portugal to promote its national preferences towards Angola.

5.2 The post-accession period and EU’s growing international ambitions

This section is focused on the period post-1985, when Portugal is already a Community member and is able to fully participate in all the mechanisms existing at the European level, particularly in the domain of foreign policy. This period also corresponds to a phase of greater political and economic stability in Portugal, as well as to a moment when its main foreign policy guidelines were already consolidated. More specifically, Portugal’s relations with Angola at this stage had significantly improved. On the European side, from the early 1990s onwards important steps were taken towards a greater institutionalisation of foreign policy cooperation. Apart from that, after a period of relative neglect and increased politicisation, the 2000s brought some efforts for a more coordinated and integrated approach in EU-Africa relations. In order to better deal with those variations, the analysis that follows is divided in two parts. A first part considers the period before the Maastricht Treaty, focusing on the Angolan peace process that led to the signature of the Bicesse Accords in 1991. A second part tackles the post-Maastricht phase, focusing on the 2000 EU common positions on Angola and the election observation mission sent by the Union to that same African country in 2008.

Before Maastricht: mainly “outside” and some national projection

As seen in previous chapters, after its accession Portugal became very active in relation to African issues in the EU context. Within EPC Portugal was particularly active in promoting improved relations with Angola and a stronger involvement of the Twelve for the achievement of peace in that African country (Vasconcelos, 1991: 135). According to some authors, in so doing Portugal was essentially projecting its own national priorities to the Community level (Vasconcelos, 1996: 271). In the early 1990s Portugal played a major mediatory role in the peace process of Angola. The gradual “de-internationalisation” of the Angolan civil war over the late
1980s offered a window of opportunity for Lisbon’s diplomacy (see Venâncio and McMillan, 1993). Following the 1988 New York accords on the Cuban withdrawal from Angola and Namibian independence, as well as the failure of MPLA’s preferred “African solution” in Gbadolite in 1989, the Luanda government was faced with the unappealing prospect of negotiations with its rival UNITA under US mediation. Instead, the Portuguese option was favoured. That alternative was also acceptable to the two superpowers, as Portugal was not in a position to change international events nor did it have a clear vested interest in the victory of either belligerent (Meijer, 2004: 85). As further explained by Venâncio and McMillan (1993: 100-1), Portugal’s role as intermediary was seen by Washington and Moscow as a useful instrument in their final disengagement from the conflict, by masking their responsibilities in resolving the hostilities they actively encouraged. Moreover, that intermediary role was at the time particularly important in concealing the growing preponderance of the United States in world affairs and the Soviet surrender to western interests. After a year of negotiations under Portuguese mediation - and with additional pressure from Washington and Moscow - in May 1991 the MPLA and UNITA signed a peace agreement (the so-called Bicesse Accords) in Portugal. The accords laid out a transition to multi-party democracy, including the holding of elections under international supervision. The Angolan general elections took place in September 1992, but the results were not accepted by the UNITA, plunging the country again into war.

Although peace was short-lived, Portugal’s central role in the Bicesse accords represented an important victory for its diplomacy. As pointed out by Maxwell (1995: 179): “(...) for Portugal, the important point was that the former colonial power had returned, not as a participant, and then bystander, as it had been for almost thirty years in the making of war, but as part of an international effort to bring peace.” As a result, the international profile and African dimension of Portuguese foreign policy were reinforced. Less than four months after the peace agreement was signed, Portuguese Prime Minister, Cavaco Silva, made his first official visit to Angola. This development illustrated Portugal’s continuing support for the peace process and democratisation of its former colony. But following MacDonald (1993: 109), it also indicated that “Portugal was not going to relinquish the central role it had been playing in Angola’s foreign affairs to other European countries like Italy, which supplanted the Portuguese role in negotiations to end Mozambique’s civil war”. During the visit, Cavaco Silva promised to increase Portugal’s bilateral aid to help Angola’s reconstruction, as well as to enlist more EC and international support when Portugal occupied the EU Presidency in 1992.
What influence did Portugal’s Community membership have in this context, specifically in relation to foreign policy matters? Taking into account the intergovernmental and essentially voluntary nature of EPC, the level of constraint imposed by the Community on Portugal’s actions was very low. A general obligation of consultation and coordination seems to have been followed, but, not least, because of the new opportunities such action at European level opened. For instance, in June 1990 the European Council issued a declaration supporting the mediation role of Portugal in the Angolan peace process. Moreover, a Troika mission visited Angola in February 1992, during the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Neves, 1996: 157). Thus, apart from economic support (as seen in Chapter Four), Portugal mobilised EC political backing for the stabilisation and democratisation of Angola. This evidence suggests that EPC mechanisms and instruments were used by Portuguese decision-makers not only to fulfil an (informal) obligation of coordination, but also to project national preferences. Indeed, by promoting EC political support to Angola Portugal was contributing to the achievement of several of its national goals. Firstly, the improvement of the security and political situation in Angola favoured a reinforcement of Portugal’s bilateral relationship with its ex-colony, notably in economic and symbolic terms. Secondly, by pushing for Community support Lisbon raised its profile in Angola’s eyes. Finally, due to Portugal’s “special relationship” with Angola the EC was able to have a greater say in Southern Africa, which ultimately reinforced Lisbon’s credibility and prestige among its European partners. In brief, while national adaptation was low, the level of national projection appears to have been much more significant.

Still more significant than national projection during this period was the level of activity conducted by Portugal “outside” the European Community framework. As seen above, the peace negotiations in Angola were conducted by a troika of international mediators, consisting of Portugal, the URSS and the United States, with the latter pulling most weight. The United Nations had no role in the negotiations, and only joined later for monitoring the elections. In this context, the fragility (or even absence) of Community mechanisms and instruments sharply contrasted with the strength of the national interests of some of its member states. Thus, the old logic of “spheres of influence” seems to have predominated, but with an important nuance. By playing a role of intermediary for the superpowers Portugal was able to offer itself some advantages vis-à-vis some of its (more powerful) European partners, also with a special interest in the region. Along those lines, Venâncio and McMillan (1993: 115) have pointed out that:

“Portugal is well aware that its main competitors for the African markets are in the EC. In order to balance the economic incentives that these countries may call upon to compete with Portugal,
Lisbon is developing closer links with Washington in African co-operation - a relationship that is self-evident in the resolution of the Angolan conflict. In turn, Lisbon hopes that its stronger links with Washington will further strengthen its position in the EC.”

Yet, some “partition of the benefits” among the “usual suspects” appears to have taken place. Indeed, one indication of that is the fact that Portugal together with France and the United Kingdom (apart from the MPLA and UNITA) were represented in the commission established by the Bicesse accords in charge of assisting and monitoring the creation of a new single Angolan military force. According to a Portuguese diplomat, Lisbon pushed for the involvement of Paris and London, in order to prevent their potential “negative influence” in the peace process. Still following the same source, Portugal tried to have them as allies, but keeping a certain distance.47

Another good illustration of absence of national adaptation took place in the context of the Angolan elections in 1992. Under Portuguese influence, the Twelve greeted the holding of elections declared generally “free and fair” and, at a later stage, issued political statements urging UNITA to respect the results. But following Vasconcelos (1996: 279), the Portuguese government also showed greater restraint than the EC, when condemning UNITA:

“While it [Portugal] did condemn UNITA for going back to war, the harsher words were left to the UN Security Council and EPC statements, which the government certainly supported but could not publicly endorse without paying an internal political price.”

A British analyst confirmed that Portugal was less clear in supporting the MPLA than other European countries, such as Britain and France.48

The evidence presented above emphasises the absence of national adaptation, with Portuguese policy being conducted mainly “outside” the EPC framework and partially “inside” following an instrumental logic. More specifically, during the Bicesse negotiations the predominant feature seems to be a general absence of Europeanisation. Visibly, Portuguese decision-makers sought to take advantage of the circumstances to reinforce the national policy in general terms, but also following a logic of competition against some of its European partners. Regarding the elections, the outcome is also mixed. By showing a softer stance vis-à-vis UNITA, the Portuguese government tried to move away from the common stance of its Community partners (even if without serious costs, due to the “voluntaristic” nature of EPC). But, on the other hand, a dimension of national projection seems also to be present, and following a “two-level games” logic. Indeed, by using the EPC “umbrella” Portuguese authorities were able to condemn UNITA (“EC game”), while simultaneously having at disposal the Community “alibi” to overcome

47 Interview by the author (n.º 21).
48 Interview by the author (n.º 38).
potential criticism at home for endorsing such condemnation (“domestic game”). Summing up, during the pre-Maastricht period the predominant features are the conduct of national foreign policy “outside” EPC and the efforts conducted “inside” to project national preferences.

Post-Maastricht phase: more “inside”, but still very “national”

As mentioned above, from the early 1990s the level of institutionalisation and formalisation of foreign policy cooperation at the EU level increased significantly. In particular, the Maastricht Treaty replaced EPC with the CFSP, which established two new instruments: Common Positions (declaratory measures) and Joint Actions (operational measures). Differently from EPC statements, those CFSP instruments are legally binding, committing the member states in their positions and the conduct of their activities. In practice, however, member states have shown great resistance to any “supranational” evolution and, therefore, the binding effect of those new instruments has been less significant than what the treaty texts might suggest (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 156-9). From the second half of the 1990s onwards the EU adopted several common positions on Angola. Some of them essentially implemented United Nations sanctions and restrictive measures against UNITA (in 1997 and 1998) or repealed previous positions (in 2002 and 2005), but others were used to define the EU’s approach towards Angola (in 1995, 2000 and 2002). The analysis next will give special emphasis to the Common Position of 2000, adopted while the Portuguese Presidency of the EU was taking place.

The attitude of successive Portuguese governments vis-à-vis the Luanda regime has been described by several commentators as being of great pragmatism. Following Oliveira (2005: 59) an explicit pro-MPLA bias in Portuguese policy can be traced back to the end of 1992, when following the collapse of the peace process and the return to violence, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Durão Barroso, described euphemistically the massacre of UNITA supporters in Luanda as a “public order operation”. Subsequently, while the reputation of the UNITA in Lisbon continued to decline, the complicity with the MPLA regime was gradually reinforced, and despite some resistances - due particularly to internal divisions, both among and within political parties - became the real face of the official policy of centre-right and centre-left governments alike, concealed by a mask of impartiality. Thus, this evolution can provide a useful prism to understand the position of Portuguese decision-makers vis-à-vis EU decisions on Angola.

The Common Position of 1995 (1995/413/PESC), adopted under the Spanish Presidency at the beginning of October - one day after the Portuguese elections that brought to power a minority
centre-left government - produced only a “mild” result that could hardly embarrass a (even veiled) national position from Lisbon. Indeed, at the time there were still contacts between the MPLA government and UNITA and, thus, the position of the Fifteen was merely to offer support for the national reconciliation efforts and the democratization of the country. According to a senior Spanish diplomat, while Madrid pressed for a tougher stance on UNITA, Lisbon diplomacy adopted a more equidistant position towards the two Angolan parties.\footnote{Interview by the author (n.º 23).} Regarding the Common Positions adopted in 1997 (1997/759/PESC) and 1998 (1998/425/PESC), again no significant “threat” to Portugal’s stance was produced, since they punished UNITA. If anything, those decisions emanating from international bodies provided a new argument to be used against remaining domestic opposition, further “legitimising” an already strong position in Lisbon diplomatic and governmental quarters. It should be noted that during that period (1997-1998) Portugal was serving its two-year term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. A British analyst corroborated the idea that, in view of the condemnation of UNITA, such “umbrella” facilitated Portugal’s position domestically.\footnote{Interview by the author (n.º 38).}

The Portuguese EU Presidency in the first semester of 2000 seems to have brought new elements into the scene. According to official accounts, during its Presidency Portugal played a “role of particular importance” in the definition of the stances of the Union on Angola (Portugal, 2002: 247). In mid-January Portuguese foreign minister, Jaime Gama, made a short visit to Angola in representation of the EU. Yet the official agenda of the visit also included many bilateral issues, namely the dossier of Luanda’s bilateral debt to Portugal (Xinhua, 14 January 2000). A point that was made very clear throughout that occasion was that during its EU Presidency the Portuguese government would give a strong boost to the revision of the Union’s position on Angola adopted in 1995. Reported by the press (BBC, 17 January 2000), Jaime Gama, said that:

> “It is necessary that EU [sic] also adjusts its policy, in view of developments in Angola and in this area of Africa, and to this end the Portuguese presidency has been boosting efforts so that very soon the EU will take a stance on the Angolan question. We hope that during the presidency there will be acts which will demonstrate this change in position towards the Angolan problem.”

This statement is vague enough regarding the nature of the adjustments to be introduced. However, still according to the press, the circumstances of the visit suggested that the Portuguese government was trying to help its Angolan counterpart with regard to its image in the EU. A few days after the visit, the Presidency issued a declaration on Angola with a mixed wording. The statement stressed the need for a political solution for the Angolan conflict, but also supported
the international efforts to tighten the UN sanctions against UNITA for bearing “prime responsibility” for the war. Finally, it added that the MPLA government had “a special responsibility” for the promotion of democracy and human rights in the country (European Council, 2000b). Reacting to the content of the declaration, representatives of UNITA accused Portugal of using its presidency of the EU to promote an unbalanced view of the conflict. That pressure on Portuguese authorities to adopt a “more balanced position” was exerted namely in Lisbon and next to the European Parliament (Agence France Press, 19 January 2000; Público, 20 January 2000). In fact, the following month, in the context of the detention of some journalists in Angola, the European Parliament passed a resolution on press freedom in the country, urging the MPLA government to comply with its obligations in that domain (European Communities, 2000b).

When on mid-June the new Common Position on Angola (2000/391/PESC) was finally adopted it included a more explicit phrasing than the position of 1995. Indeed, apart from reiterating the need for a political solution to the Angolan civil war, the document also expressly supported the UN sanctions against UNITA. Additionally, the position stipulated some requirements to the Angolan government in terms of the promotion of democracy, human rights, peace-building initiatives and management of public resources (European Communities, 2000a). A senior Portuguese diplomat who was directly involved in the process described the Common Position as “relatively anodyne” and easy to approve. Still according to him, by making use of its “expertise” Portugal played on that occasion a “leadership” role within the EU, but at the same time “without renouncing to its bilateral actions towards Angola”. A few days after the position was passed, in declarations to the press - following a meeting with the Portuguese ambassador in Luanda - the Angolan Foreign Affairs Minister welcomed the EU’s decision and praised the “clear-sightedness” of the Portuguese Presidency (BBC, 22 June 2000).

Although further investigation is needed on this point, the evidence above indicates that Lisbon appears to have used the “window of opportunity” of its Presidency to promote common EU goals, but also to project its own national preferences vis-à-vis Angola. Indeed, by emphasising its “special” ties to Angola, Portugal could more easily adopt a more active role within the EU during that particular occasion. Simultaneously, Lisbon seems to have skilfully promoted its temporary position “at the helm” of the EU next to the Angolans. In relation to the latter,

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51 Interview by the author (n.º 3).
Portugal’s intentions may have been notably facilitated by the EU “cover”. To explain, pro-UNITA pressure (namely from Portuguese actors) against an explicit condemnation by the Union may have been deflected by Lisbon with the excuse of having to decide taking into account the views of its European partners. A similar alibi may have been used against potential dissatisfaction from MPLA quarters due namely to the references to democratic standards in the new EU Common Position. Paradoxically, greater European criticism against the MPLA government (displayed in particular through the European Parliament resolution) may have worked to reinforce the utility of Lisbon’s “good offices” in the eyes of the Luanda regime.

At the end of July 2008 the European Commission deployed an observation mission for the legislative elections held in Angola on 5 and 6 September of the same year. The mission included 108 observers (9 from Portugal) and was funded with €2.8 million from the Community budget (Portugal, 2009: 147). The European Parliament also sent a small delegation composed of seven members (including two from Portugal) and headed by a British parliamentarian (European Parliament, 2008). In its preliminary statement, released on 8 September, the EU mission said the elections marked an advance for democracy, but it also noted important problems:

> “Angola consolidates its commitment to peace and takes a positive step towards strengthening democracy with a high voter turnout and a calm electoral process that revealed, however, organizational weaknesses, procedural inconsistencies on Election Day and an uneven playing field for contestants” (European Union, 2008).

While presenting those results at a press conference, the head of the mission, the Italian Luisa Morgantini vice-president of the European Parliament and member of European United Left-Nordic Green Left Group, said that despite the problems the EU would not declare the elections invalid, but she also refused to call the vote free and fair (BBC, 8 September 2008). In contrast, the day before the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made an announcement acknowledging “logistic problems” in the elections, but praising the “free” vote and important step for the consolidation of democracy:

> “Recognising the existence of difficulties of a logistic nature, it is considered that these elections have allowed the free expression of the preferences of the Angolan population. The Government welcomes the firm and resolute commitment in the consolidation of democracy in Angola that these elections have represented” (Portugal, 2008a).

For its part, Portuguese Prime Minister, José Sócrates, declared itself “deeply satisfied” with the “transparent, free and democratic” vote in Angola (Público, 8 September 2008). Also the small observation mission of the CPLP, sent to Angola at the end of August, issued a preliminary
statement the day after the poll saying that the elections had been “transparent and free” (ANGOP, 7 September 2008).

Again, despite the sometimes ambiguous and elusive nature of declarations, the elements above indicate an attempt by Portuguese decision-makers to present a distinct and “friendly” stance vis-à-vis Luanda. The timing of the statement made by the Portuguese Foreign Office is particularly noteworthy in that regard. Differently from the 1992 Angolan elections, in 2008 the EU had a “voice”. Indeed, observation missions are decided under CFSP mechanisms, but by including Community funding a more “supranational” dimension is also added. Additionally, as seen above, Angola and Africa in general gained an added importance more recently linked to the reinforcement of the EU’s international ambitions. Thus, the adaptational pressures in 2008 were stronger than in the pre-Maastricht period. That situation might have increased the need for Portuguese authorities to make its own stance more visible than before, in order to better assert its national priorities. Concurrently, the option to adopt an approach including more national features indicates the intention to protect a “Lusophone voice”. The features of the CPLP election mission, together with the timing and content of its preliminary statement seem to support that idea. In fact, independently of the precise role Lisbon authorities may have had in the deployment of the mission, Portugal was in the end involved in that initiative “outside” the EU. Therefore, its “allegiance” was divided. Summing up the post-1993 period, despite the relative increase of constraints on Portuguese foreign policy, the EU framework remains sufficiently flexible to allow Portuguese decision-makers to “freely” express enduring national goals towards Angola.

Conclusions

The analysis presented in this chapter can be summarised along three main points. Firstly, the overall level of national adaption was low. During the accession period, attending to the weak “acquis politique”, the adaptional pressures suffered by Portugal were not significant - this is in clear contrast to the domain of trade, and to a lesser extent for development aid, as seen in previous chapters. Much more significant were the new opportunities European membership promised to create for its problematic relations with Angola and the rest of the former colonies. Those prospects greatly helped overcoming some initial reservations, as well as domestic

52 The CPLP mission comprised 15 observers, including some Portuguese, and was lead by a former Minister of foreign affairs of Mozambique. At the time Portugal was holding the Presidency of CPLP, which main decisions tend to be taken by consensus.
resistances. The “Europeanist” convictions of the main Portuguese political forces were certainly another facilitating factor, but the main driving force seems to have been a rational calculation. During the post-accession phase, the level of constraint on national policy remained low, even after the post-Maastricht era. New mechanisms and instruments were adopted by the EU, but they remained too weak to have a significant impact on Portuguese’s actions towards Angola.

Secondly, the analysis above demonstrated that Europeanisation understood as national projection was more significant than national adaptation. After becoming an EU member, and particularly in the post-Maastricht era, Portugal was able to use the common mechanisms and instruments existing at the European level in order to push forward its own preferences vis-à-vis Angola. A very good example of that was seen during the Portuguese Presidencies. The export of national preferences was facilitated by some of the “competitive advantages” Portugal has in relation to its ex-colonies. In particular, by building on historical ties Portuguese diplomacy played an important role as mediator during the Bicesse process and was, therefore, able to reinforce its “Africanist specialisation” within the EU. Moreover, Portugal also tried to differentiate itself from other more powerful European member states by making use of its small state status in order to facilitate its role next to the African partners.

Thirdly, the activity conducted “outside” the foreign policy framework of the EU is the central feature of this chapter. During the pre-accession period, this is clear for obvious reasons. But, also after becoming a member, this trait is maintained - even if with an important nuance. Portugal continued to value and actively promote its bilateral relations with Angola, but not in a completely separate way from the EU. Indeed, keeping strong bilateral ties with Luanda was a means for Portugal to reinforce its position within the Union, particularly in matters related to Africa. During the period pre-Maastricht, the example of Portugal’s participation in the Angolan peace process is the best illustration of that point. Indeed, a closer collaboration with Washington allowed Lisbon to reinforce its bilateral relations with Angola and, more generally, reinforce the African dimension of its foreign policy. Such collaboration with the USA was instrumental in the competition with stronger European countries, also with a colonial past in Africa. Ultimately, the important mediation role Portugal played in the peace process opened the possibility for its diplomacy to play a more active within the EU for that particular geographical region. After Maastricht, some changes took place. Portugal’s diplomacy kept an interest in “playing the European game”, namely due to some of its persistent structural weaknesses and the advantages it can take from that coordination. It is not impossible that Europeanist convictions
among some political forces may have also worked in that sense. However, Portugal also continued promoting its national priorities vis-à-vis Angola, which were over time reinforced. And, crucially, when those priorities somehow “clashed” with European initiatives (which was not often the case), Portuguese authorities found a way to preserve its distinctive voice. The example of the 2008 elections comes to mind in that regard, with the statement by the Portuguese Foreign Office timely anticipating a potentially “embarrassing” EU position. In sum, despite the importance of the dimension of national projection, the predominant feature of this chapter is the amount of national policy conducted “outside” the EU framework.
Chapter 6

Portugal’s trade relations with Mozambique: Between national adaptation and projection?

Introduction

This chapter centres on trade issues to explore the impact of European Union membership on Portuguese foreign policy towards Mozambique. As described in Chapter Two, Portugal is a small and semi-peripheral country with an open economy, where the external sector plays an important role. Its relations with Mozambique are long-lasting and complex, being marked by a colonial presence. After decolonisation, Portugal’s economic relations with Mozambique lost great part of its significance. Yet, Portugal has remained a relatively important economic actor in its ex-colony and those relations are valued also for broader foreign policy reasons. For the EU, in turn, trade is one of its oldest and more integrated policy domains. Differently from other realms, in the area of trade it can rely on strong competences, substantial resources, well established mechanisms and instruments, and is often described as a world power. Moreover, the Community has a long history of highly institutionalised relations with sub-Saharan Africa, within which the relationship with Mozambique can be contextualised.

Against that background, different possibilities can be taken into consideration. Firstly, in view of the importance Mozambique plays for Portugal’s broader foreign policy goals and the strong economic presence other countries (such as South Africa) have in the sub-region, Lisbon may have followed a more active stance in Brussels, pushing for an EU involvement that might balance the influence of those other external actors in its ex-colony. By giving visibility to its actions, Portugal may have also tried to present itself as a valid “bridge” for EU-Mozambique relations, in order to favour its own position vis-à-vis its European peers and Maputo. Secondly, following a liberal intergovernmentalist explanation, societal interests may have put pressure on Portuguese authorities to adopt a proactive posture in Brussels, each time their issue-specific preferences were at stake. This is likely to have happened more often from the 1990s onwards, with Mozambique’s greater economic liberalisation. Despite Portugal’s unwillingness to compromise its interests, it is likely to have paid some costs during the bargaining processes at
the EU level. In that sense, some “strategic adaptation” may have taken place. Finally, according to social constructivist perspectives, EU ideas and arguments may have had an influence on Portuguese decision-makers’ understandings of their national preferences. This could have been the case in relation to European approaches and norms such as regional integration or free-trade. However, those ideas are likely to have been already present on the national level or to have been followed essentially due to an instrumental logic, rather than because they are judged more adequate. Thus, the hypotheses that appear to receive more support are national adaptation and the projection of national preferences. That was also the main expectation for the equivalent chapter on Angola (Chapter Three), but in this case the level of national adaptation is likely to have been more significant, in particular due to the more open position of the Mozambican economy vis-à-vis the EU.

In order to tackle these issues, this chapter is organised in two sections. The first one deals with Portugal’s accession process to the European Communities, centring its attention on the Lomé Convention acquis applicable to Mozambique. As seen in previous chapters, during accession talks the EU can exert a strong adaptation pressure on candidate states due in particular to the prospect of membership and to its conditionality. The second section examines the reform of the Lomé regime, which led to the signature of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement and the introduction of new trade arrangements in the EU-ACP relationship.

6.1 The EC accession process: the impact of the Lomé trade acquis

When Portugal made its decision to join the European Communities in the second half of the 1970s, the Lomé Convention was the main mechanism through which the EC structured its relations with the ACP group, which Mozambique joined in 1984. As described in previous chapters, the Lomé model was based on an idea of “partnership”, including a group-to-group approach, an institutionalised dialogue, as well as a combination of aid measures and special trade preferences. For its part, Portugal during this period was interested in rebuilding on a new basis its historical ties with Mozambique. However, those intentions were hindered by various factors, including strong post-colonial frictions and the divergent orientation the two countries came to follow in the Cold War divide. From the end of 1970s, Lisbon authorities sought more actively to put forward new bilateral initiatives towards Mozambique, aiming in particular to promote Portuguese economic interests in that country. However, Portugal’s political instability
and serious economic difficulties until the mid-1980s meant that those initiatives were often controversial and not very significant.

Considering this general background, what was the impact of Portugal’s accession to the European Communities on its relations with Mozambique in the domain of trade? More in particular, what significance was given to the Lomé agenda by Portuguese foreign policy-makers during the national discussions that took place during the pre-accession phase? How significant were possible internal resistances to the adoption of a more European approach towards Mozambique? Did Portuguese authorities adopt any initiative after making the decision to apply for EC membership that indicates an intention to protect a national position or to pursue its preferences using the EC as an instrument? How was the participation in the Lomé Convention assessed by Portuguese foreign policy-makers in comparison with the adoption of other options? Did separate norms or national definitions of preferences receive great attention? What were the immediate implications for Portugal resulting from the adoption of the Lomé trade acquis? Finally, did Portugal compromise any national preference to accommodate its participation in the Lomé Convention?

**National adaptation to a useful acquis**

As described in previous chapters, when the first constitutional government led by Mário Soares announced in 1976 its intention to present Portugal’s application for EC membership, much emphasis was put on the idea that by joining the Community Portugal would not sever its ties with its former colonies. Further, EC membership was presented as a way to improve that relationship, even in economic terms. This overt accent on positive effects concealed the need from the Soares centre-left minority government to address domestic resistances and doubts towards EC accession. Internal misgivings vis-à-vis Community accession lessened over time, but they were more considerable while Portugal’s application was still pending. In the words of a former Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs: “would the Nine have said ‘no’ to Portugal, the Soares government would have fallen.”53 Portugal’s accession to the European Community was important to define the balance among internal forces. More specifically, European integration was used as a tool by the civilian “Europeanists” to neutralise the role of the military (and their Communist and far-left allies) in the political life of the young democracy and to better face the different nationalisms linked to Africa (both on the left and on the right) in order to redefine

53 Interview by the author (n.º 11).
Portugal’s international orientation. In other words, the accession “card” was instrumental to push through policy preferences at the domestic level. Even if the potential advantages of EC accession for improving and promoting a post-colonial relationship might have been overemphasised - since the European option had become the main priority and there was a need to overcome domestic veto players for achieving this foreign policy re-orientation - the African dimension in Portuguese foreign policy did not disappear.

For the “Europeanists” the main priority was to firmly locate Portugal within the “European project” in order to consolidate the democratic regime and pursue the socio-economic modernisation of the country. According to this understanding relations with Africa were important, but could only represent a secondary position. Those general guidelines were supported by all main political parties across a spectrum from centre-left to right. But there were also some nuances. It should be kept in mind that those parties were during that period still fragile, as they had all been recently formed and were constrained by the strong presence of the military in the political arena, which remained important at least until 1982. Moreover, their emergence in the radicalised context of the revolution also meant that they were conditioned ideologically, having to “artificially” position themselves more to the left. The dominant role assumed by the Communists and their military allies in the process of democratic transition led to an alliance among the main parties to the right of the PCP in order to secure a “Western-style” pluralist democracy. This focus on the stabilisation of the democratic regime, which lasted until the mid-1980s, implied that other political cleavages were temporarily downplayed (Jalali, 2007: 71-7; Lobo, et al., 2009: 142-7). Besides facilitating political democratisation, for the right (CDS) and centre-right (PSD), Community membership became increasingly linked to the possibility of implementing internal economic reforms. Indeed, accession was seen as an opportunity to recover some of the ground lost during the revolution, as many provisions from the 1976 socialist constitution were deemed to be incompatible with the *acquis communautaire* (Tsoukalis, 1981: 119). At the same time, the openness to the influence of former settlers and to sectors more attached to a belief on Portugal’s “glorious” imperial past than to an unequivocal idea of responsibility resulting from colonialism meant that despite their pro-Western and pro-European general stance those two parties also displayed a more pragmatic attitude towards the ex-colonies (Antunes, 1990: 116-7; J. N. Pinto, 1996: 241-3).

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54 Interview by the author with Portuguese analyst (n.º 14).
The centre-right/conservative coalition government elected in December 1979 provided the best illustration of that pragmatism. Led by the combative Sá Carneiro (PSD) and having as Foreign Minister the leader of CDS, Freitas do Amaral, this majority government was the first to be dominated by parties on the right of the political spectrum in the post-authoritarian era. Both leaders were committed to restricting the “parallel diplomacy” of the Presidency and its “Third Worldist” advisers in the Council of the Revolution in matters related to the former African colonies (Norman MacQueen, 1985: 37-8). Overriding anti-FRELIMO resistances from part of its electorate, in 1980 the coalition government broke the economic impasse that was blocking closer relations between Portugal and Mozambique by putting an end to most of the financial disputes that had remained unresolved since 1975 (Gaspar, 1988: 56). Apart from that, a credit line worth US$100 million was opened to promote Portuguese exports to Mozambique. Despite the interruption of this policy following Sá Carneiro’s death in an air crash in December 1980, the initiatives above contributed to improve the bilateral relationship, namely in the economic domain. Under the subsequent centre-right/conservative coalition governments (1981-1983), other economic measures were introduced. For example, in May 1981 Portugal and Mozambique signed a trade agreement, which included a “most favoured nation” clause (similar to the one Portugal signed with Angola in 1979, as seen in Chapter Three). In practical terms, that clause provided Portugal with an access to Mozambique’s market not less favourable than the one granted to other countries in possession of similar arrangement. On the same occasion an economic cooperation agreement was also initialled by the two countries and in the following year Portuguese Prime Minister Pinto Balsemão led a largely economic delegation to Maputo. In sum, the elements above point to the pre-existence of strong national understandings and preferences towards Mozambique during the period preceding Portugal’s EC accession.

By becoming a member of the European Community in 1986 Portugal had to adapt its trade relations with Mozambique to the *acquis communautaire*. As seen for Chapter Three, due to the Common Commercial Policy, Portuguese authorities transferred to the Community most of its powers in external trade matters. All previous external links contrary to the CCP were abolished and future ones were subject to its rules, including the exclusive right for the Commission to offer and negotiate new trade agreements. On the other hand, the country’s commitments were considerably extended through the adoption of all Community external trade arrangements (see Ordaz, 1993). Since Mozambique had joined the Lomé Convention in 1984 (Lomé III), this agreement became the framework for Portugal’s trade relations with its former colony. In other words, Community procedures and instruments were adopted by Portugal as that was a necessary
condition for becoming a Community member. In that sense, the legal obligation of assuming the whole *acquis* was a powerful mechanism in producing national adaptation. As a result, EC rules and programmes became an important point of reference for Portuguese policy-makers and a constraint for national policies. Yet, as shown next, those constraints were less significant than what legal texts might at first suggest.

With accession, the “most favoured nation” clause inserted in the 1981 trade agreement between Portugal and Mozambique lost its potential benefits in relation to other European member states, since under Lomé dispositions Mozambique assumed an obligation of non-discrimination among Community members.\(^{55}\) Nonetheless, Portugal’s trade agreement with its ex-colony continued to be potentially advantageous vis-à-vis other countries outside the EC, as its content was not incompatible with the *acquis communautaire* (Álvares, 1986: 201-3; 1999: 35). In fact, owing to Lomé’s non-reciprocal trade regime the main implications of Portugal’s accession to the Convention concerned its imports from ACP countries. Yet, Portugal was allowed to only gradually open its market to ACP products over a seven-year transition period (Martha, 1985: 20-1). Moreover, as noted earlier, Portugal’s trade with Mozambique was at the time very low, especially regarding imports.\(^{56}\) Thus, in practical terms Community obligations had limited implications for the bilateral trade relationship. In contrast, the possibility to participate in common mechanisms and resourceful programmes as an EC member opened significant opportunities for Portugal to continue promoting enduring national self-understandings and preferences vis-à-vis Mozambique.

The potential opportunities for Portugal to project its national priorities started to materialise very soon. One of the consequences of Portugal’s EC accession was the application of the Lomé Convention’s sugar protocol, which imposed restrictions on Portuguese imports of cane sugar from ACP countries.\(^{57}\) Although Mozambique was one of the traditional suppliers of Portugal (Angola was too, but less significantly), it was not included in the list of countries which continued to supply Portuguese refineries under the ACP-EC sugar protocol.\(^{58}\) In fact,

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\(^{55}\) See article 136 of Lomé III.

\(^{56}\) Between 1978 and 1985 bilateral trade represented an average of only 1 and 0.3% of Portugal’s total exports and imports respectively (Banco de Portugal, 2000).

\(^{57}\) With EC accession the annual amount of raw cane sugar Portugal was allowed to import from the ACP at a reduced levy was limited to a maximum of 75,000 tons, whereas in the past it used to import an amount of 300,000 tons. See article 303 of Portugal’s Act of Accession to the EC (European Communities, 1985).

\(^{58}\) The ACP countries allowed to export raw sugar to Portugal at a reduced levy were Ivory Coast, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Swaziland.
decolonisation and war severely damaged the production capacity of Mozambique, but its potential to export sugar to Portugal remained. Concurrently, the ACP countries were interested in supplying the raw sugar deficit of Portuguese refineries. Indeed, during the negotiations of Portugal’s accession to the Lomé Convention the ACP group was against the introduction of a transitional arrangement and pushed for additional concessions for agricultural products, including for sugar. After protracted negotiations that request was rejected in 1987, but the ACP continued to raise the issue in subsequent discussions (Xinhua, 15 May 1987). This situation gave Portugal the opportunity to make more visible the specificities of its position within the EC.

In an interview published in early 1988 the Portuguese Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, Durão Barroso, said that “[w]ithin the European Community Portugal maintains a position of openness for sugar imports from ACP countries. (...) Angola and Mozambique are major potential producers of sugar and this is one additional reason to support a more generous position from the Community.” Further asked whether Portugal would revise previous arrangements in order to facilitate ACP exports, the response was that “[n]o decision has been made in that regard yet. Moreover, this is a complex question and we do not want to make decisions that are not acceptable at Community level” (Barroso, 1990a: 94). More generally, Portuguese officials confirmed that during the negotiations of accession to Lomé, Portugal adopted a more flexible approach in relation to exchanges with its ex-colonies, which in any case were very small. This more “generous” stance vis-à-vis its former colonies and the ACP in general indicate that Portugal tried to assume a distinctive position among its EC partners. Portugal’s efforts of differentiation would be a way to preserve some visibility and autonomy for its own position, rather than accept its full “Europeanisation”.

6.2 The impact of the Cotonou Agreement and the EPAs

As previously described, the 2000 Cotonou Agreement introduced major changes in the trade relationship that had developed over 25 years between the EU and the ACP under the Lomé Convention. Ideas of partnership and solidarity continued to permeate the relationship, but the accent moved more clearly towards liberal views emphasising the role of free trade as a factor of...
economic development. More specifically, the Cotonou Agreement introduced a principle of trade liberalisation, where the uniform preferential regime of Lomé was to be gradually replaced by reciprocal arrangements, the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements. Concurrently, when the reform of the Lomé Convention started in the second half of the 1990s, Portugal could benefit from favourable domestic political conditions to pursue its largely consensual foreign policy goals. The same was applicable in the economic realm where despite greater liberalisation the Portuguese state continued to have an important presence, often favouring more protectionist views. Additionally, EC membership was an important factor to bolster the country’s international status. Moreover, although Lisbon was not able to play the role it had initially envisaged for itself in the peacemaking efforts in Mozambique its contribution to the process and the subsequent institutionalisation of the Community of Lusophone countries contributed reasonably to improve its bilateral relationship with Maputo.

Against this setting, what was the impact of the Cotonou trade innovations on Portugal’s relations with Mozambique? More specifically, what importance was given to the European agenda by Portuguese decision-makers during the discussions that preceded the reform? Were Portuguese authorities active at EU level trying to influence the outcome of the reform? Did Portuguese actors pushed for specific issues or approaches that indicate an intention to pursue a national preference using the EC as a means? Were national definitions of interests favoured over European perspectives? Finally, did Portugal compromise any national preference to accommodate the promotion of joint European objectives?

Between national adaption and policy projection

As seen in Chapter Three, the reform of the Lomé Convention that led to the Cotonou Agreement was seen by Portuguese authorities as an important process. More than trade aspects per se, Portugal’s concerns were related to the potential political and aid implications of the reform. In a context of growing dissatisfaction towards the Lomé Convention, Lisbon was interested in preserving a special link between the EU and the ACP, particularly with African countries. During his address to the national parliament in January 1997 Portuguese Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, José Lamego, explained the meaning of the approaching Lomé reform: “this is an important debate not only from the point of view of development aid policy definition but also from the perspective of national interests and from the perspective of Portugal’s relationship with the countries with which it has closer ties and which are the main beneficiaries of our
development aid.” In view of that, he urged parliamentarians to follow the reform “with the greatest attention” and gave details about the national approach: “in the forthcoming discussions, the Portuguese Government and the Portuguese diplomacy must stand as strong advocates of a stable EU-ACP relationship. It was in that sense too that the Portuguese diplomacy proposed a Euro-African summit in order to gauge the evolution of this political and development cooperation relationship between the EU and the African continent” (Portugal, 1997c: 1264-5).

In fact, the initiative of organising an EU-Africa summit was originally put forward by Portugal in March 1996 and was subsequently justified in these terms: “(...) we want to reverse the African-pessimism that has invaded European political thinking by holding an EU-Africa summit during our Presidency in order to influence the post-2000 approach” (Portugal, 1999c: 168).

As described in more detail in Chapter Three, Portugal engaged actively in the process of reform that led to the Cotonou Agreement. Its initial stance in the intra-EU negotiations was close to the “traditionalist” and “trade sceptic” perspective endorsed by France. More specifically, while not being against the reform, Lisbon wanted its final outcome to preserve the “positive elements” of the Lomé acquis and produce a “revitalisation” of the EU-ACP relationship, rather than its downgrading. As regards trade matters, its position displayed some flexibility, but it was less enthusiastic about trade liberalisation than other member states such as the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. Moreover, Portugal pushed for the introduction of a principle of positive discrimination in favour of LDCs (Portugal, 1997a; 1997b: 101-2). Ultimately, Portugal supported the creation of Economic Partnership Agreements, under the argument that such option of reform would help preserving a special relationship with Africa. This justification receives some support from the fact that Portuguese business representatives confirmed that despite having pushed for greater openness in African markets during the negotiations their input did not receive much attention from Portuguese authorities.62

Portugal’s position in the process of reform of the trade arrangements of Lomé appears to have been well accommodated. Indeed, the compromise outcome of the EU-internal negotiations retained the EPAs as the favourite option. More specifically, it was agreed to replace Lomé’s privileged trade preferences with reciprocal arrangements, but only gradually and excluding from this liberalisation LDCs, such as Mozambique. In the assessment made by Portuguese officials this relative increase in trade liberalisation did not produce major practical implications for

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62 Interview by the author with the head of a Portuguese business lobby (n.º 19).
Portugal. In that regard a Portuguese diplomat expressed itself in those terms: “as far as I know, there are not many African products posing a competitive threat in European markets.” Still in his opinion, “Portugal’s main concerns in Africa are the emerging economies, not other EU countries. Figures in Africa are not unfavourable to Portugal vis-à-vis its European partners. There is a certain loyalty to Portuguese products in its ex-colonies. Who wins is who was already there. Large countries enter into sectors where Portugal would necessarily have no chances to be competitive”. Part of the latter was corroborated by an official at DG Trade, who explained that “in principle, Cotonou trade liberalisation does not change the rules of the game among EU countries in Africa, because those new rules will be the same for all of them. EU member states, as a group, will benefit from having preferential agreements with African countries vis-à-vis third parties, such as China”. Yet, as seen in Chapter Three, the level of priority given to trade aspects in relation to other dimensions of the EU-ACP partnership (particularly aid) appears to have gone beyond Portugal’s preferred outcome. Moreover, even if an EU-ACP link was maintained through the Cotonou Agreement, the potential impact of the new trade regime on the overall partnership seems to have raised some concerns in Portuguese quarters. These concerns did not disappear with the beginning of the EPAs negotiations between the EU and the different ACP sub-groups in the early 2000s, which revealed many difficulties.

Mozambique started negotiating an EPA as part of the SADC group in 2004. During an initial stage South Africa, the dominant economic player in the region and also a SADC member, participated in the SADC EPA negotiations only as an observer. In 2006 the SADC presented a proposal to include South Africa as a full party in the negotiations, but excluding Mozambique (and also Angola, and Tanzania - the so-called MAT countries). Portugal, together with other EU members, was against the exclusion of the MAT from the EPA process (Portugal, 2008b: 114). Moreover, it pressed for the acceptance of South Africa in the negotiations to be subjected to specific conditions, allegedly for “safeguarding the interests of the MAT countries” (Portugal, 2008c: 110). This point needs further investigation, but it appears that Lisbon adopted that stance in order (or at least also) to present itself as a “promoter” of Mozambique’s interests. As described earlier, the fact that Mozambique has a weak economy, relatively open and greatly interlinked with South Africa values the position of the EU in Maputo’s eyes. Mozambique is the only country in Southern Africa who belongs to a single regional organisation and despite being a LDC it opted to be part of the EPA process. This is in clear contrast to the case of Angola,
which so far has decided to remain under the EBA regime. In fact, Mozambique has already signed an interim EPA (“goods only”) and has also expressed the intention to negotiate services. South Africa, for instance, “opted out” from this commitment on services. According to the explanation provided by a DG Trade official, “Mozambique wants to break South Africa’s monopolies. By opening its market to the EU Mozambique expects to gain more leverage in its region”.65 Perhaps also revealing in this context is the fact that, while talking about the EPAs process in Africa, a senior Portuguese diplomat remarked, without further specifications, that “there are also ‘wolves’ in Africa”.66

Whatever the case might have been, the idea that in general Portugal plays a valuable role for its former African colonies in the EU context was pointed out during interviews with Mozambican diplomats. Frequent meetings with Portuguese representatives both in Brussels and in Lisbon was a concrete example noted by a top diplomat at the representation of Mozambique to the European institutions, who also said that “Portugal is the first country to which we turn to within the EU”.67 Apart from that, the fact that Portugal has continued to promote economic and trade bilateral initiatives (“outside the EU”) towards Mozambique is also illuminating for the purpose of this chapter. For instance, from 1987 Portugal endorsed several agreements to restructure Mozambique’s bilateral debt in concessional terms.68 More significantly, perhaps, in 1995 the two countries agreed to convert part of Mozambique’s debt into stakes in companies under privatisation. That process allowed Portuguese interests to take up a significant position in different sectors of Mozambique’s economy. Despite the high associated costs, Portugal’s majority participation in the Cahora-Bassa dam until 2006 also allowed it to preserve important economic links in the sub-region. Other examples are the credit facilities Portugal has continued to launch in order to facilitate Portuguese exports and investments in Mozambique.69 As seen in Chapter Three, the fact that those national initiatives are not proscribed by EU dispositions makes their existence less surprising. But ultimately those national actions also indicate the

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65 Interview by the author (n.º 39).
66 Interview by the author (n.º 3).
67 Interviews by the author (n.º 16, 20).
68 Those agreements took place in the context of the Paris Club and (from 1999) under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, promoted by the IMF and the World Bank. The last agreement was signed in 2008 and foresees the cancellation of Mozambique’s bilateral debt until 2025 (Banco de Portugal, 2000: 164; 2008: 140).
69 In 2008 Portugal announced a €100 million credit line to Mozambique, which was reinforced in 2009 and 2010 reaching a total amount of €700 million. Moreover, a €124 million fund to support Portuguese investments in Mozambique was created in 2008 and in 2010 the two countries launched a joint investment bank with an initial capital of €500 million.
persistence of Portuguese interests towards Mozambique and the will to promote them, even through channels separate from the EU.

Conclusions

Portugal’s accession to the European Community led to an important adaptation of its trade policy towards Mozambique. The strong Community competences in trade matters and the comprehensiveness of its programmes applicable to Mozambique had a significant influence on national procedures and instruments. In particular, Lisbon’s powers to negotiate new trade agreements were transferred to the Community and the Lomé Convention became applicable to its relations with its former colony. In fact, the legal obligation of adopting the *acquis communautaire* in full was a powerful mechanism to produce national adaptation. The top priority given to EC accession by the main political forces, particularly as a tool for democratic stabilisation and foreign policy reorientation, together with the new opportunities European membership promised to create for Portugal’s meagre and problematic relations with Mozambique helped overcoming domestic resistances and hesitations. In other words, by making the argument about the advantages of Lomé for national policy and by framing Portugal’s African dimension more “within” Europe, the “Europeanists” managed to an extent to compensate and constrain more traditional forces. The European convictions of some of the main political leaders were also a facilitating factor for national adaptation. But, importantly, that identification with European ideas was not incompatible with own representations in relation to the former colonies, which continued to be valued by the overall Portuguese elite and society. Ultimately, the level of constraint on Portugal’s bilateral relations with Mozambique resulting from accession was in practical terms moderated, chiefly by the low level of trade between the two countries, the negotiation of transitional arrangements, and the non-reciprocal nature of Lomé. Apart from that, Portugal’s enduring national understandings and preferences towards Mozambique were reflected in its active participation at Community level in matters related to Africa in the immediate period following accession, promoting its own views and interests in a very utilitarian way.

The changes brought about by Cotonou in EU-ACP trade relations were the most important ones since Portugal’s accession. Thus, they provided a good case for assessing the EU’s impact on Portugal-Mozambique trade relationship. The introduction of a principle of trade liberalisation in the EU-ACP partnership seems to have gone beyond Portugal’s preferred outcome, due to its
traditional “trade sceptical” stance. But Lisbon’s position was not so inflexible with regard to
greater openness of ACP markets in general. Further, Portugal did not have major commercial
interests at stake, being more interested in the aid and political implications of the reform. In any
case, the “mixed” outcome of Cotonou, including a “gradual”, “regionalised” and
“differentiated” liberalisation, moderated the degree of adaptation of Portugal’s position. More
specifically, as a LDC Mozambique continued to benefit from a non-reciprocal regime and a
liberalisation (gradual and asymmetrical) of its market was only agreed in 2009. This situation
means that in practical terms Cotonou trade dispositions did not have major implications for
Portugal-Mozambique relations so far. On the other hand, Portugal engaged actively in the
reform negotiations and some of its favoured results were also taken on board by Cotonou. This
process of projection of national preferences appears to have benefited, among other factors,
from the unanimity requirement for revising Lomé, the similar position of other member states
(such as France) and the support of DG Development. By putting forward proposals that
benefited specifically Mozambique (such as the positive discrimination of LDCs) and by drawing
attention to its “friendlier” stance, Portugal continued to promote the specificities of its national
position within the EU. Moreover, Lisbon did not stop advancing new economic and trade
bilateral initiatives (“outside the EU”) towards Mozambique. In other words, reliance on just
Community policies and instruments was not regarded as being in the best interests of Portugal.
Lisbon continued to value its national policy and expressed it not only in a declaratory way but
also through the implementation of numerous bilateral initiatives.

In sum, the elements above show that the EU had an important impact on Portugal’s trade
relations with Mozambique. Yet, that impact was translated more into a national adaptation to
EU mechanisms and instruments, than into a transformation of national goals. In other words,
since Portugal became an EU member its trade policy started to be conducted essentially through
Community channels. In that process, however, Portugal more often than not made an
instrumental use of common mechanisms and programmes to pursue national objectives.
Moreover, the “mixed” nature of EU agreements and the flexibility of its trade rules still allowed
some room for manoeuvre for the conduction of autonomous actions. Thus, in spite the
increasing pressure for greater coordination the evidence gathered so far indicates the persistence
of an “egoistic identity” and significant national interests.
Chapter 7

Portugal’s aid policy vis-à-vis Mozambique: Chiefly projecting national preferences?

Introduction

This chapter examines the impact of European Union membership on Portuguese foreign policy towards Mozambique by centreing on development aid issues. As discussed in Chapter Two, Portugal is a relatively recent donor, with no consolidated tradition in development cooperation. Its policy in this domain has in general terms reflected broad foreign policy goals, as well as economic interests. Limited resources and the lack of strategic orientation and coordination have been long lasting problems for Portugal’s aid programme. On the other hand, Portugal’s development aid has been more significant in relation to Mozambique (and to its other ex-colonies in Africa and East Timor), where the bulk of its efforts have been highly concentrated. In contrast, European Community development aid is “relatively strong”, attending notably to its considerable resources, geographical coverage and shared competences with the member states. Sub-Saharan Africa in particular has historically been a privileged region, benefiting from substantial EU assistance in the framework of highly institutionalised programmes.

Taking into account the type of “fit” between Portugal’s and EC policies, the expected outcomes in relation to the analytical framework of this study were as follows. Firstly, Portugal is likely to have played the “EU game” in order to take advantage of the considerable Community means and its useful “umbrella” for improving relations with Mozambique, which were particularly weak and difficult during an initial phase. Moreover, attending to the importance of Mozambique for Portuguese foreign policy, Portugal has expectedly tried to project its national preferences onto the EU level, seeking to influence its European partners and reinforce its national position. Secondly, the constraints on Portuguese policy due to its EU membership were in principle not very significant, due to the limitations of Community aid competences. Thirdly, in view of the great EU involvement in Mozambique, its impact on instruments and mechanisms is likely to have been more significant than in norms because Mozambique plays an important role in Portugal’s self-image and identity. Thus, the hypothesis which receives more support in this
situation is the projection of national preferences. This was also the case for Angola (Chapter Four), but Portugal is likely to have had more opportunities to export its priorities in this case due to the greater level of EU activity in Mozambique.

The chapter is organised in two sections. The first one examines the period of Portugal’s accession negotiations to the European Communities, centring on aid aspects related to Mozambique. The second section examines the issue of political conditionality under the Lomé Convention and the Cotonou Agreement. As mentioned in Chapter One, aid measures can encompass other dimensions. In the case of EC development programmes towards Africa, since the late 1980s they became increasingly linked to political aspects, such as democracy and human rights. Thus, those are two interesting cases for assessing the EU’s impact on Portugal’s policies towards Mozambique.

7.1 The EC negotiations and the Lomé acquis on aid

As discussed in Chapter Two, for many years the Lomé Convention was the main mechanism through which the European bloc structured its relations with the ACP group, which Mozambique joined in 1984. The Lomé model was based on a broad concept of “partnership”, emphasising ideas of respect, solidarity and the possibility of mutual interests. In line with the EC objective of supporting regional cooperation it followed a group-to-group approach and included large financial aid packages provided through a special fund run on an intergovernmental basis. Lomé also comprised a highly institutionalised dialogue and long-term contractual aid, committed to the ACP countries irrespective of performance. For its part, Portugal during this phase was interested in rebuilding its historical relationship with Mozambique on the basis of “equality”. However, after Mozambique became independent various factors complicated the bilateral relationship, including the divergent orientation they came to follow in the Cold War divide. In the early 1980s a relative improvement took place, but many difficulties persisted. Simultaneously, Portugal’s political and economic instability until the mid-1980s meant that the assistance it started to provide to the new regime in Maputo (essentially technical assistance on a bilateral basis) was by and large short of clear policy direction and real significance. Mirroring those circumstances, bilateral cooperation had a low level of institutionalisation and effective implementation.
Against this backdrop, what was the impact of Portugal’s accession to the European Communities on its aid relations with Mozambique? More specifically, the core questions derived from the analytical framework of the thesis are as follows. First, what importance was given to the European agenda by Portuguese foreign policy-makers during the national discussions that took place during the pre-accession stage? How significant was possible domestic resistance to the adoption of a more European approach? Second, did Portuguese authorities adopt any initiative after making the decision to apply for EC membership that indicates an intention to protect a national position or to pursue its preferences using the EC as a means? Third, how was the participation in the Lomé Convention assessed by Portuguese foreign policy-makers in comparison with the adoption of other options? Did separate norms or national definitions of preferences receive great attention? Finally, what were the immediate implications for Portugal resulting from the adoption of the Lomé acquis? Did Portugal compromise any national preference to accommodate its participation in the Lomé Convention?

**National adaptation to a potentially useful aid acquis**

Given that in the second half of the 1970s accession to the European Communities became a foreign policy priority for Portugal, the Lomé agenda came to occupy an important place in the considerations of Lisbon’s decision-makers concerning relations with Mozambique. Since Mozambique’s independence in 1975 the EC indicated its willingness to see that African country join the Lomé Convention and subsequently started to provide it with aid under the non-associated countries regime (European Commission, 2004b; Hall and Young, 1997: 142). Meanwhile, other former Portuguese colonies had started to move closer to Brussels and become part of the Convention. Portuguese authorities were aware of that development, which ended up turning into one of the main arguments put forward for justifying Portugal’s own accession to the EC (J. M. Ferreira, 1999: 41; Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 37-8). As seen in previous chapters, when in 1976 the centre-left minority government led by the charismatic and pro-European Mário Soares presented the “European option” as its main foreign policy priority, much effort was put in emphasising that such decision would not be detrimental to Portugal’s relations with its ex-colonies (Portugal, 1976a: 406). In fact, Portugal was just coming out from the most unstable phase of its transition to democracy, which after the 1974 coup that overthrown the almost fifty-years long right-wing authoritarian regime led to a strong influence of the military and leftist political forces. Moreover, Portugal had recently relinquished its five-century long “Glorious Empire” and despite all volatility pro-Soviet and chiefly “Third Worldist”
perspectives, favouring privileged relations with the ex-colonies, had become predominant. In face of this, the decision to apply for EC membership sought to help secure the stabilisation of the democratic regime and the redefinition of Portugal’s international orientation (A. C. Pinto and Teixeira, 2004: 123). According to the new foreign policy guidelines (subsequently backed by all main political forces, except the Communists and small far-left and far-right parties) relations with the former African colonies were still important, but they were to be subordinated to the priorities of integration with Europe and the West (Gaspar, 1988: 42).

After the decision to join the European Community was made effective, domestic resistance and reservations over the possibility of closer relations between Portugal and Brussels in Africa gradually weakened and became secondary. During an initial phase, taking advantage of the instability in Lisbon the Portuguese Communist Party tried to control relations with the Marxist-inspired regime in Maputo (Gaspar, 1988: 50). However, it should be kept in mind that after 1975 the PCP was successfully kept out of power by an alliance among the other main parties in order to secure a “Western-style” pluralist democracy (Jalali, 2007: 24). A more institutionalised challenge to the “European priority” of Portuguese governments came from the “parallel diplomacy” conducted by the Presidency. As seen in Chapter Two, Portugal’s post-revolutionary constitutional arrangements allowed considerable room for manoeuvre to the president, who was also the commander of the armed forces and chair of the Council of the Revolution.70 Between 1976 and 1986 the Presidency was occupied by general Ramalho Eanes, a “moderate” who without being opposed to Portugal’s Western European orientation also expressed a “diluted” form of “Third Worldism”, particularly in relation to Africa. In fact, President Eanes, who had spent a long part of his military career in the colonial wars, was very much committed to the “African vocation” of Portugal and its role as a unique “bridge” between Africa and the West (Norrie MacQueen, 2003: 189). Less intensely than towards Angola, the initiatives President Eanes started to promote in relation to Mozambique in the late 1970s helped to reduce some of the persistent bilateral tension, at a time when other European countries (such as Italy, France, Sweden and Britain) were starting to establish close ties with the Maputo regime (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 44). Following Gaspar (1988: 53-4), Eanes’ emphasis on Africa “was seen both as insurance against the risks associated with accession to the European Community, and to blunt the drive towards centring Portugal's international position in Europe”. On the other hand, the

70 Because the Council of the Revolution was controlled by the armed forces, which had a central role during the process of decolonisation, the leaders of the former colonies associated that image of sympathy from the past with the Presidency.
President’s African diplomacy became a source of friction with some of his prime-ministers. To be sure, the debate was more one on emphasis than between stark alternatives, as the Eanes’ initiatives towards the ex-colonies were seen as complementary to EC accession. As summed up by a former Portuguese top politician, “the resistances to Europe were not strong enough to obstruct the main objective of accession, assuming that a privileged relationship with the former colonies was to be kept”.

Apart from the initiatives promoted by the Presidency, since the beginning of the 1980s some important efforts were also made by Portuguese governments to establish closer relations with Mozambique, in a way that revealed a great concern for safeguarding national interests. This was particularly the case under the centre-right/conservative coalition, in power in 1980. Despite insisting on a Western European priority, the coalition government also adopted a pragmatic attitude towards Angola and Mozambique. As seen in previous chapters, this majority government was the first to be dominated by parties on the right of the political spectrum in the post-authoritarian era. The Prime Minister, Sá Carneiro, was one of the founders of the main centre-right party (PSD), and the Foreign Minister, Freitas do Amaral, was the leader of the principal right-wing party (CDS). Both leaders were committed to restricting the “parallel diplomacy” of the Presidency in matters related to the former African colonies, and their parties (especially CDS) were perceived as being open to the influence of ex-settlers (Antunes, 1990: 116-7; Norman MacQueen, 1985: 37-8). Overriding anti-FRELIMO resistances from part of its electorate, the coalition government solved most of the economic disputes (including over nationalised property) that had remained unresolved since decolonisation on favourable terms for Mozambique (Gaspar, 1988: 56). This political decision was made in the context of the changes in eastern southern Africa (linked to the independence of Zimbabwe) which were opening some room for a more active Portuguese role in the sub-region. That was an aspect that Portugal sought to emphasise next to its European partners. In a speech at the Council of Europe in April 1980 Prime Minister Sá Carneiro said:

“Portugal’s role in Africa has definitely changed since 1974, but our presence there should be able to open new perspectives for the relations between Africa and Europe, (...) As we join the various European institutions we are conscious of the special role we ought to play in Africa and we look forward to the efforts that can be done in coordinating our cooperation with the countries of that continent” (Portugal, 1980).

71 In particular with Mário Soares (in office in 1976-1978 and 1983-1985) and with Sá Carneiro who was Prime Minister in 1980 (Gaspar, 1988: 60, 65; Norrie MacQueen, 1997: 220).
72 Interview by the author (n.º 11).
In 1982, under a new centre-right/conservative coalition, the office of Secretary of State for Cooperation was created in an attempt to reinforce the coordination of Portugal’s activities towards Africa. In fact, after transition to democracy numerous departments had become involved in assistance initiatives towards the ex-colonies in a fragmented and inefficient way. The dispersion and lack of planning favoured the emergence within the Portuguese administration of bureaucratic dynamics, which owed more to inertia, ideology and personal ties than to any official logic (Cravinho, 2004). In a protocol on military aid signed in April 1982 Portugal assumed a range of training and supply commitments towards Mozambique (MacDonald, 1993: 113). This initiative came in the wake of a visit to Mozambique by President Eanes, who at the time still had exclusive oversight over military assistance as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In any case, the frictions between Presidency and governments were reduced under Prime Minister Pinto Balsemão (1981-1983), who showed increasing interest in the progress of rapprochement with Africa (Norman MacQueen, 1985: 38). Even if Lisbon’s assistance to Mozambique at this point may have been modest it was certainly far from insignificant, as the Maputo regime was starting to move away from the Soviet bloc and towards the West in search for support for its increasingly difficult domestic situation affected by intense civil war and famine (Hall and Young, 1997: 145; Norman MacQueen, 1985: 48). Thus, the view that Portugal had the advantage of being able to offer support without the strings other bigger countries attached to their aid programmes gained more ground (Figueiredo, 1986: 100). In this context, Portuguese authorities continued to promote the country’s role as a “bridge” between the Marxist-inspired regime in Maputo and the West. In Brussels Portugal’s military assistance was presented as demonstrating the country’s willingness to cooperate with the EC on Southern Africa issues. But Lisbon’s diplomacy in the sub-region was also used next to Washington, revealing itself as a useful “channel of communication” at a time when United States aid to Mozambique was frozen (Antunes, 1990: 123-5; Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 45-6).

Already observable in some of the situations examined above, Portuguese attempts to pursue national preferences through the European Community became more visible once Mozambique

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73 Some institutions of the former colonial administration were converted under the democratic regime and kept working on areas related to the ex-colonies (e.g. tropical science research, tropical medicine). The same happened with many Portuguese officials who had developed special competences or personal ties in Africa under the authoritarian regime.

74 The 1982 reform of the Portuguese Constitution put an end to the military's control of Portuguese politics and reduced presidential powers. Accordingly, in 1983 the overall oversight of military-technical cooperation was transferred from the commander of the armed forces’ cabinet to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (with main decisions in this domain being taken jointly with the Ministry of Defence).
started to move closer to the EC. As seen in previous chapters, Portugal’s *rapprochement* with its ex-colonies was followed with attention by Brussels, which was interested in strengthening its ties with the Frontline States.\(^{75}\) As a consequence, Lisbon increasingly linked strong ties with Mozambique to a strengthening of its own position next to the EC (Antunes, 1990: 115-7; Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 45). This aspect also had a strong domestic facet, as whilst Portugal was moving closer to Europe the linkage mentioned above allowed the supporters of a stronger post-colonial African dimension in Portuguese foreign policy to reinforce their standpoint in the internal debate. In 1979 the EC suspended its aid to Mozambique as a means of pressuring it into becoming a full member of the Lomé Convention. But it was only in the second half of 1982 that Mozambique agreed to take part in the Convention, which it finally joined two years later. Despite some interest in certain domestic quarters, the Portuguese government had no involvement with Mozambique regarding its accession process to Lomé. By and large, Portugal was interested in lessening Soviet influence in its ex-colony and therefore looked favourably at the development of closer ties between Maputo and the EC (see Figueiredo, 1986: 100).\(^{76}\) When the negotiations on Lomé III were launched in October 1983 Lisbon requested an observer status. But that request was refused and no official contacts took place between Portuguese and Mozambican authorities in order to coordinate their approaches in their respective negotiations with the EC (E. d. S. Ferreira and Santos, 1985: 41, 57, 73).\(^{77}\) In fact, Mozambique already had a considerable set of potential supporters in Brussels and a greater Portuguese involvement at the time may also not have been welcomed, both in Maputo and Lisbon.\(^{78}\) In any case, the prospect of both countries establishing closer links with the EC created a common interest and, even though its potential would become greater only later, it soon started to open some opportunities for collaboration. For instance, in 1982, after bilateral consultations with its ex-colonies, Lisbon started talks with the EC on tripartite cooperation initiatives in Africa. At this stage, Mozambique seems to have been more receptive than Angola regarding projects involving Portugal (Financial Times, 4 October 1982). Moreover, Lisbon appeared more open to collaboration with the EC than with its individual member states (Silva, et al., 1986: 126-7; Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 106-8).

\(^{75}\) At the time, Mozambique and Angola were the only members of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference not to be part of Lomé. That situation reflected a disagreement between the EC and the two communist regimes who refused to recognise the status of West Berlin, while claiming that the EC was not taking a strong enough stance on the Namibian question (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 110-1).

\(^{76}\) Interview by the author with a senior Portuguese diplomat (n.º 8).

\(^{77}\) Interview by the author with a Mozambican diplomat (n.º 36).

\(^{78}\) For example, when the EC suspended its aid to Mozambique (under important pressure from West Germany) and decided to divert part of it to Zimbabwe in 1980-1981, countries such as Holland, Denmark, Ireland and Italy stood for Mozambique (E. d. S. Ferreira and Santos, 1985: 24).
In general, Portuguese decision-makers perceived the participation in the Lomé Convention essentially through an instrumental prism and emphasising national views. As described in Chapter Four, the participation in Lomé was depicted by Portuguese authorities as beneficial and complementary to Lisbon’s own aid programme. The direct access to EC instruments and resources would “add value” and help reinforce the African dimension of its foreign policy. This would be particularly advantageous for Portugal as it would be more able to “compete” under the “protection” of Community mechanisms. Advantages for Africa and for the European Community started also to be stressed in a more specific way. African countries (particularly Portugal’s ex-colonies) would benefit from an “ally” and “friend” inside the EC. Simultaneously, Portugal would make a valuable contribution to the Community by bringing in its own “experience” and “sensibility” towards Africa (Gama, 1985: 251; Portugal, 1985: 4052). In fact, Lisbon also made considerable efforts to highlight the “comparative advantages” of its bilateral aid programme, as well as the specificities of its future role within the EC. In 1983 during a meeting with ambassadors from Lusophone Africa the then Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaime Gama underscored the greater cultural proximity, complementarity, and less “threatening” features of Portugal’s assistance, as a counterpoint to its limited capabilities (Gama, 1985: 15). The fact that a study commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during this period pointed to the urgent need to reinforce Portugal’s bilateral aid in order to prevent the risk of its “dilution” within the broader framework of EC aid (and other forms of cooperation) is also illuminating in this regard (Silva, et al., 1986: 134). The general official view became that after EC accession Portugal would be a “privileged interlocutor” in Euro-African relations (Gama, 1985: 312). A similar perspective was echoed by the national platform of NGOs, in its protocol of creation in March 1985. That document indicated the platform’s intention to pursue goals and methods equivalent to the ones of other European NGOs, but it also mentioned that since “Portugal is the matrix of many of the values that shaped the national feeling of Lusophone countries” the Portuguese NGOs had a “special vocation” for working with those same countries (Silva, et al., 1986: 129).

Summing up the main findings of this section, it is possible to conclude that Portuguese foreign policy decisions concerning aid relations with Mozambique exhibit some evidence of Europeanisation. During the period under analysis the salience of the EC agenda was high and the prospect of Community membership was used to push through policy objectives at the domestic level. Portuguese policy decisions and the underlying motivations behind them therefore support indicators of Europeanisation that point towards adaptation and projection. The
salience of the EC agenda is evident from the importance given by policy-makers to the application of the Lomé Convention in order to help rebuild Portugal’s weak and problematic relations with Mozambique. That importance was considerably amplified by the fact that participation in Lomé involved as a necessary step EC membership, which was the top foreign policy priority of the main political forces. However, Portuguese decision-makers did not adhere to EC policy objectives over other considerations and preferences. In other words, the adoption of the *acquis* by Portugal did not lead to any compromise of its national preferences. Through accession Portugal became entitled to participate in the Lomé Convention, but without having to abandon its bilateral aid programme towards Mozambique. With regard to the second indicator of Europeanisation, the use of the EC to push through policy objectives at the domestic level is evident from the way “Europeanists” emphasised the benefits of Lomé for Lisbon’s post-colonial relations in order to overcome national resistances and hesitations over Portugal’s EC accession. Some evidence of other forms of policy projection was also gathered, but at a less significant level. Finally, Portugal did not explicitly equate national with EC preferences, although the European convictions of some of the political leaders may have produced some identification and thus facilitated adaptation. In any case, Portuguese policy-makers gave great attention to cost-benefit considerations, as well as to national views and specificities (such as Portugal’s “African vocation” or “sensibility”).

7.2 From Lomé to Cotonou: political conditionality

From the second half of the 1980s the European Community started to introduce explicit political conditions to its aid programmes towards the ACP countries, in a trend that was subsequently reinforced, mirroring global developments. For the purposes of this section, the main features of that change in EU-ACP relations can be briefly summarised as follows. First, the concept of “partnership” upon which the Lomé Convention had been based since the beginning came under increasing pressure as the EU became gradually a more demanding donor. Thus, ideas of “neutrality”, moral responsibility or solidarity lost ground to a new emphasis on political aspects, aid efficiency and neo-liberal views. Second, EC aid packages were increasingly linked to conditions such as the respect of human rights and democracy. Simultaneously, development assistance was made conditional not only on “needs” but also on “performance”, while trade policies gained a foothold over aid instruments. Finally, aid suspension and consultation mechanisms were introduced for cases of non observance of political conditions, together with a greater emphasis on “political dialogue”. Moreover, the door was open for a stronger
involvement of non-state actors, while changes in aid programming brought more “flexibility” in the allocation of financial resources. For its part, Portugal’s traditional perspective vis-a-vis Africa and more specifically towards its ex-colonies has been a more complacent one. Rooted in its “African sensibility” and the existence of “special ties”, Lisbon’s stance has rather emphasised ideas of “non-interference”, “respect” and “ownership”. Accordingly, its aid programmes towards Mozambique have been devoid of any explicit political conditions, in part reflecting the inherent difficulties of a relatively recent decolonisation and Portugal’s own weaknesses as an international actor. The enduring dispersion, fragmentation and lack of continuity in Portugal’s aid system and policies are also central features in this context.

Considering that broad setting, what was the impact of EC political conditionality on Portugal’s aid towards Mozambique? More in particular, the main questions derived from the analytical framework of the thesis to be asked of this precise event are as follows. First, what importance was given to the European agenda on political conditionality by Portuguese decision-makers during the national discussions that preceded changes at Community level? Did Portuguese authorities try to resist the application of political conditionality to Mozambique? Second, how was the adoption of a European approach assessed by Portuguese foreign policy-makers in comparison with other options? Were separate norms or national definitions of preferences favoured over European perspectives? Third, did Portuguese authorities promote any initiative that indicates an intention to pursue a national preference using the EC as a means? Finally, did Portugal compromise any national preference to accommodate the application of EC political conditionality?

*Lomé III and IV*

Throughout an initial phase of Portugal’s participation in the European Community as a full member, political conditionality did not occupy an important place in the considerations of national decision-makers. Governments’ programmes, main official documents and statements on Portugal’s external assistance produced during the second half of the 1980s unsurprisingly give no particular attention to issues related to democracy or human rights in those Cold War times. Peace and economic aspects were of greater concern, in part also reflecting the situation at the time in some of Portugal’s ex-colonies in Africa. Those priorities were translated in the sort of participation Portuguese authorities had at EC level. For instance, in relation to the “apartheid” regime in South Africa, Portuguese positions over this period were not far from those of Britain
and West Germany opposing the “tougher” stance of other member states. One of the reasons Lisbon invoked against imposing further economic sanctions were the potential implications for the black population, in particular for the large community of Mozambican migrant workers living in South Africa. On the other hand, Portugal tried to mobilise European political and economic support for the peace process and reconstruction in Angola and Mozambique (Neves, 1996: 157-9; Vasconcelos, 1996: 272). As described in previous chapters, during the negotiations of Lomé IV in the late 1980s Portugal’s involvement was largely focused on economic matters. With regard to the discussions on the political aspects of development, following the opinion of a high-ranking Portuguese politician Portugal was virtually a “spectator” with no clear position.79

In fact, the incorporation of a “human rights clause” in the new version of the Lomé Convention signed in 1989 received only a scant consideration in official reports and other national assessments (Barroso, 1990a: 127; Portugal, 1990: 67). Although the convention included no mechanisms for enforcing its “human rights clause”, Portugal is likely to have received that innovation without much enthusiasm (K. E. Smith, 2008: 271, note 46). Indeed, over this period Lisbon’s authorities continued to emphasise the country’s specificities as a less “threatening” partner for its ex-colonies: “Portugal is a partner with no temptations of political hegemony or otherwise, without the paternalistic vices of great powers, lacking an economic dimension that could endanger their [lusophone countries] sovereignty through the creation of neo-colonial ties” (Barroso, 1990a: 100).

That prudent approach very well fitted Portugal’s bilateral cooperation with Mozambique. As seen in Chapter Two, over the 1980s relations between the two countries visibly improved. Yet, some suspicion and post-colonial resentment persisted, precisely at a time when Lisbon was trying to play a central role in the Mozambican peace process (see Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 54-8). As an illustration, the main mechanism to regulate Portugal’s bilateral cooperation with Mozambique was a joint committee institutionalised immediately after decolonisation, but which subsequently worked unevenly. Originally meant to gather annually, the first joint committee meeting only took place in 1983. A second meeting happened in 1988 and was depicted by Portuguese authorities as an opportunity to bring a “new momentum” and “re-launch” the bilateral cooperation (Barroso, 1990a: 195-7). In that context, the two countries signed several agreements in different domains, including in the area of military-technical cooperation. As it is described in detail in the next chapter, Portugal’s highest ambitions were in the end frustrated as

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79 Interview by the author (n." 7).
the principal mediating role in Mozambique’s peace negotiations came to be played by Rome. In fact, Italy had become one of the main international partners of Mozambique, including in terms of trade and aid relations (Hall and Young, 1997: 143-4; MacDonald, 1993: 114-6). In comparison, Lisbon’s assistance, notwithstanding all efforts, remained more limited during this period. Against those difficulties and challenges for Portugal’s attempts to reinforce its profile next to its former colony it is not difficult to image that the enthusiasm in Lisbon’s quarters for making its aid more conditional of any sort of criteria must have been low. Moreover, even if Portugal could have had that willingness (linked to either domestic or external stimuli) the instruments to implement its decisions at bilateral level would have been at a minimum weak and partial. Indeed, from the late 1980s until the end of the 1990s Lisbon’s bilateral assistance was organised under a system of biennial “framework programmes” for each partner country, initially intended to integrate “all cooperation initiatives” defined on the basis of the “recipients’ needs” and “Portugal’s capacities” (Barroso, 1990a: 28, 37). In practice, however, those aid programmes were a rather loose compilation of activities, with no clear policy orientation (still less any conditionality) and were far from covering all assistance initiatives (Cravinho, 2004; OECD, 1994, 1997).

In the early 1990s political aspects started to gain more visibility in Portugal’s foreign aid guidelines. This development was to a great extent associated to the unfolding peace and democratisation processes in Angola and Mozambique (Portugal, 1991: 12). In reality, the new orientations were not so much in the sense of making Portugal’s assistance conditional to the respect of specific political criteria, but rather in terms of supporting the processes of change in those countries. Moreover, Portugal’s support was officially described as being made in a “frank and open dialogue”, following a “strict principle of non interference in domestic affairs” (Barroso, 1991: 35; Portugal, 1995b: x). Lisbon’s views on conditionality over this period were expressed with more detail by the then Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Durão Barroso, during an interview to a Portuguese journal conducted in 1990:

“The principle of political and economic conditionality in international aid for developing countries is not endorsed by the Portuguese State, except in extreme situations. [...] notwithstanding the interest in supporting the adoption by those countries of policies more in line with our values, it is not up to us to decide, in a paternalistic way, about the best evolution path for their own societies” (Barroso, 1990b: 76).

80 Between 1990 and 1994 Portugal was Mozambique’s fifth main donor with an average of 7.2% of total flows, slightly behind the EC (7.2%), but also the World Bank (7.9%), Sweden (8.1%) and Italy (10.9%) (see Batley, et al., 2006: 11).
In his opinion, two exceptions to that general rule would be acceptable. First, situations of “misappropriation of aid funds in benefit of certain groups”, which would give good reason for “a concrete sign of rejection of those practices” by the international community. And second, cases of “serious violations of human rights” which would justify the adoption of a “very firm stance” from international donors, including the “threat of withholding aid” (ibid.: 76). Yet, in the latter situation the potential impact on populations should be “carefully considered”. Moreover, a distinction should be made between “acceptable forms of pressure” and “intolerable domestic interference”. Durão Barroso then acknowledges that “is not always easy to define the boundary between the two attitudes and it is for this reason Portugal has always shown the utmost caution in dealing with this sort of questions” (ibid.: 76). It was with this “extremely cautious” approach on political conditionality that Portugal faced the revision of the Lomé Convention in the first half of the 1990s.

Lomé IV- bis

During the negotiations of the revised Lomé IV convention (1993-1995) political conditionality received more attention from Portuguese decision-makers, not least because of its greater prominence in the European agenda. As seen in previous chapters, the review of the convention took place under a context of growing uncertainty about the EU’s level of commitment to its “partnership” with the ACP. In the new post-Cold War era European priorities were shifting towards its “near abroad”. Moreover, several member states were facing economic difficulties and a feeling of “aid fatigue” was spreading. The revised convention expanded political conditionality, establishing human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law as “essential elements”. Non observance of those conditions could allow the EU to partly or totally suspend its assistance, following a process of consultations (Arts and Byron, 1997; Lister, 1997). In the words of a Portuguese senior official who took part in the mid-term review: “Portugal was one of the member states less in favour of political conditionality. But in the end we did not stay out, as we accepted conditionality”. In fact, in December 1993 during the first EU Development Council meeting following the adoption of the European Commission’s negotiation guidelines Portuguese authorities expressed an overall favourable position regarding the reinforcement of measures to promote the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, but also stressed the need to avoid “hurting unnecessarily ACP susceptibilities” and putting those...

81 Under the Lomé IV revised convention (1995-2000), for the first time the financial provisions of the EU-ACP partnership were not increased in real terms.
82 Interview by the author, Portuguese aid agency (n.º 31).
countries in an “unequal position” vis-a-vis other EU developing partners (Gala, 1993: 2). Summing up Portugal’s views on that same occasion, the Portuguese representative added:

“[w]e do not want our position to be read as a less rigorous or less demanding understanding of our relationship with the ACP. [...] What we want to avoid is that some well-intentioned proposals end up harming the poorer, marginalising populations and hurting unnecessarily ACP countries political susceptibilities” (ibid.: 4-5).

This stance shows an attempt to combine the assertion of a specific position (the demonstration of a special concern for the ACP side), with the safeguard of Portugal’s own image among its European peers (as a cooperative member, despite some of its reluctance). In any case, Portugal’s role in the negotiations was conspicuously emphasised in the account of the Lomé IV review later given by the then Secretary of State for Cooperation, Briosa e Gala:

“Under Portuguese initiative a parallel statement was adopted by all Member States and the Commission stipulating that any disposition in the Lomé Convention relating to respect for human rights, must be included, from now onwards, in the new agreements the EU will sign with third countries. This Portuguese proposal reveals our commitment in promoting the coherence and, thus, the EU’s credibility on human rights policy” (Gala, 1995: 118).

Thus, notwithstanding its lack of enthusiasm Portugal ended up supporting the reinforcement of aid conditionality. Yet, the additional political conditions had been slightly moderated by the new dispositions on EU-ACP consultations, which brought more clarity and transparency to the process. Furthermore, Lisbon did not relinquish the affirmation of a distinctive stance in EU-ACP relations.

The entry into force of the Lomé IV revised convention coincided with developments in Mozambique seen as encouraging by the EU. After putting an end to its long civil war in 1992, two years later Mozambique held its first democratic elections, declared “free and fair” by international observers. During this period the country also accelerated economic liberalisation, which attracted external investors and led to rapid growth. Simultaneously, as one of the poorest countries in the world and one of the few “success” stories in Africa, many international donors became actively involved in supporting Mozambique’s rehabilitation. That was the case of several EU member states, as well as the European Commission. In 1996, during a meeting with African representatives, Development Commissioner Deus Pinheiro said:

“Mozambique has gone further than Angola along the road to peace, reconciliation and democracy. But this road is long and hard. We should remain committed in our support to the people of Mozambique in their efforts to strengthen their institutions and to promote the participation of civil society in the overall process of rebuilding the country” (Pinheiro, 1996).

In fact, Mozambique has remained one of the main destinations of EC aid and the Community one of the largest donors to that African country (Batley, et al., 2006: 11; OECD, 2002: 99).
There have been no cases of EC aid reduction or suspension in relation to Mozambique. Moreover, despite some reported problems, the EU adopted an overall positive and supportive tone during the electoral processes that took place in Mozambique in 1998 and 1999 (European Council, 1998, 1999b). Thus, during the second half of the 1990s, Brussels used its significant leverage to engage positively on Mozambique’s process of democratic consolidation, rather than imposing negative measures. That EU approach served well Portugal’s own position, which could benefit from a useful “cover” to keep encouraging the democratisation of its ex-colony.

Under the Portuguese centre-left minority government arrived into power in 1995 (ending a decade of centre-right rule), political aspects such as democracy and the rule of law continued to be defined as objectives, rather than as conditions for granting aid (Portugal, 1995c: 29). Moreover, despite some nuances, the new government’s aid policy towards Portugal’s former African colonies was to maintain many of its traditional traits, as illustrated by the words of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jaime Gama, speaking in 1996: “[w]e want a mature and uninhibited relationship between sovereign states with deep affinities, devoid of interference and characterised, constantly, by a spirit of friendship and also efficacy” (Gama, 2001: 27). Signs of continuity were also visible in Portugal’s actions at EU level. For example, during the discussions that led to the adoption of the 1998 Council’s common position on “human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance in Africa” (98/350/CFSP), Portuguese authorities kept alerting for potential double standards: “Portugal has always considered the question of respect for human rights as fundamental not only for the ACP countries, but also in relation to all third countries, advocating a coherent and credible EU policy in this area too” (Portugal, 1999b: 191). Over this period Mozambique continued to be a privileged destination for Portugal’s bilateral aid, who also remained a top donor for its former colony (Batley, et al., 2006: 11; OECD, 2001: 65). Notwithstanding its limited significance in the domain of development cooperation, the launch of the Lusophone Community in 1996 opened an additional diplomatic channel for the promotion of the bilateral relationship. The CPLP was to be based on “immutable values” such as peace, democracy and human rights, but also on a shared identity, “respect” and “non-interference” (CPLP, 1996). Yet, some of the

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83 See appendix 2 in Smith (2008).
84 For most of the 1990s Mozambique was the main recipient of Lisbon’s bilateral aid. This outcome did not exactly reflect a higher priority in relation to other privileged partners as it was in part related to debt reorganisation schemes (Portugal, 2011: 351). But the facilities Lisbon created for Maputo to solve its bilateral debt also indicates a more purposeful use of that economic instrument. For instance, over the 1990s Portugal endorsed several agreements in the context of the Paris Club to restructure Mozambique’s bilateral debt on concessional terms (Banco de Portugal, 2000: 164).
traditional distance from the political leadership in Maputo vis-à-vis Lisbon still persisted at this stage, and Mozambique was one of the least enthusiastic about the CPLP among the African Lusophone countries (Cardoso, 2003; Norrie MacQueen, 2003: 195). In that sense, the EU “umbrella” was not without advantages for Portugal’s diplomacy.

Cotonou and beyond

Portugal had a greater involvement in the preparation of the Cotonou Agreement, as it held the EU Presidency in the first semester of 2000. But even on that occasion Lisbon did not have strong views on political conditionality and continued to display a reluctant attitude over its reinforcement. Under the 2000 Cotonou Agreement political concerns gained further ground over traditional development cooperation dimensions. Political dialogue became a more central feature and its scope was expanded to new political issues. Apart from restating human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law as “essential elements”, Cotonou introduced new dispositions on good governance and corruption. After extensive discussions, good governance was included only as a “fundamental element”, but its violation could still lead to suspension of aid in “serious cases of corruption”. On the other hand, the “consultation procedure” was strengthened, including the possibility of external arbitration (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 122; Holland, 2004). As seen in previous chapters, Lisbon’s general stance during the intra-EU negotiations that preceded Cotonou was to preserve the special relationship with the ACP. Specifically on aid, according to Portugal the main criterion for granting Community assistance should be “poverty”. Moreover, while hinting doubts about the introduction of concepts such as “good management”, Lisbon’s initial position paper circulated in 1997 expressly stated that community aid was already “sufficient and properly conditioned” by the dispositions of the convention on human rights, democracy and the rule of law (article 5), that “will certainly be incorporated” into any new agreement with the ACP countries (Portugal, 1997a: 19-20). Those doubts continued to be expressed even after the reform was agreed. Indeed, at an international seminar held by the Portuguese EU presidency a few days before the Cotonou agreement was signed, the then Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Portugal, Luís Amado, voiced his reservations about the effective implementation of the changes introduced, stressing the potential difficulties ensuing from the “element of relative arbitrariness” of assessing “good governance” (Portugal, 2000a: 87). As examined next, that approach was also the one followed in relation to Mozambique.

85 In 1995 Mozambique became a member of the Commonwealth, raising anxieties in some Portuguese quarters.
86 Interview by the author with Portuguese senior politician (n.º 7).
From the early 2000s, Mozambique went through a phase of some political and social instability that led to more overt pressure from international donors, including the EU. Following the December 1999 general elections in Mozambique won by FRELIMO, the main opposition party, RENAMO, decided not to accept the results and filed a complaint with the Supreme Court, which was rejected. This led to political violence in some parts of the country, in November 2000, which was condemned by the EU (European Council, 2000a). Soon after, a banking crisis erupted as two partly-privatised banks were declared insolvent under the weight of bad debts incurred mainly when they were in public ownership. Moreover, in a period of less than nine months, a prominent Mozambican journalist who had been investigating cases of corruption and the government’s head of banking supervision were assassinated (see EIU, 2001; Hanlon, 2002).

Against this background, in the first half of 2001 the EU, under Swedish presidency, embarked on a political dialogue with the government of Mozambique and the parliamentary opposition, covering issues such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, good governance and conflict prevention (Council of the European Union, 2001b). In December of the same year, the EU made a démarche, which content included “transparent elections” and “demand of consultations with the government of Mozambique” (Council of the European Union, 2002a: 78). Another démarche followed in September 2002 covering “weaknesses in legal sector and spread of corruption and crime” (Council of the European Union, 2003: 81). In a parallel process, a group of donors providing general budget support (GBS) to Mozambique temporarily withheld or threatened to withhold disbursement during this period. Pressure came especially from some Nordic countries, but they were ultimately overridden by the others (Batley, 2005: 423; Hanlon, 2004: 753). Also, the government of Mozambique seems to have negotiated with donors not involved in budget support, to counterbalance the GBS group influence (OECD, 2009: 5). At the time Portugal was not a member of the GBS group. The 2003 national report on Portugal’s participation in the EU gives an indication of the role Portuguese authorities may have had in the developments above: “[w]ithin the European Union, Portugal has sought to convey a positive image of the process of democratic transition in Mozambique” (Portugal, 2005b: 226).

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87 This dialogue, with the same scope, continued at least until May 2002 (Council of the European Union, 2001c, 2002b, 2003).
88 In 2001 there was five EU Heads of Mission reports on Mozambique involving political aspects, comparing with just three in 2000 and two in 2002 (Council of the European Union, 2001a, 2002a, 2003).
89 Drawing on previous experiences of coordination promoted by “like-minded” countries, in 1999 a group of nine bilateral donors (Belgium, Denmark, the European Commission, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) agreed to create a joint programme of GBS in Mozambique, which was formalised in late 2000. Subsequently, the number of joint GBS donors to Mozambique expanded rapidly. It includes at the time of writing 19 full members (beyond the previous 9 donors, also Austria, African Development Bank, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and World Bank) and became known as the Group of 19 (G19) Programme Aid Partners (PAPs). Portugal only joined in 2004, after an initial participation as an observer.
The EU’s evaluation on the electoral processes that took place in Mozambique in late 2003 and 2004 was overall a positive one. However, some concerns were also expressed over “irregularities”, which started to be raised in the context of a dialogue under article 8 of Cotonou (Council of the European Union, 2004: 70; 2005: 92; 2006: 114). Lisbon appears to have had “an important role” in the decision to start that dialogue, but also in the deployment of the EU observation missions to those elections and in the “content” of their evaluation by the Union (Portugal, 2005a: 243; 2005b: 226). Consistently, during the first review of the Cotonou agreement in 2004-2005 Portugal was in favour of “improving the implementation” of the consultation procedure (article 96), namely by making it “a process of dialogue and effective support and not just a form of political pressure, of sanctioning nature” (Portugal, 2005a: 142-3).

Meanwhile, the pressure from the group of budget support donors continued. In April 2004, the then G15 and the government of Mozambique signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for programme aid, providing for frequent joint reviews and detailed monitoring of progress in the implementation of Maputo’s plan for poverty reduction. Among other aspects, the MoU included “targets” (in the areas of governance, financial system reform and poverty reduction) and a set of “underlying principles”, covering Mozambique’s commitments to sound macroeconomic policies, democratic principles, rule of law, human rights, good governance, fight against corruption, etc. The document also oriented the process of dialogue and dispute resolution. A more detailed description and official documentation can be found on PAPs website: www.pap.org.mz/pap_structure.htm.
(and also Italy) broke ranks and openly backed Mozambique’s government, pledging continuing budget support. In February 2010 Portuguese Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Gomes Cravinho, said: “we support Mozambique’s position in its dialogue with the G19. We have confidence in the country, its political institutions and its development” (OJE, 11 Fevereiro 2010). That confidence was confirmed by Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates, during his visit to Mozambique in early March: “Mozambique is today a democratic state based on free and fair elections, already consolidated” (Portugal, 2010). This stance by the Portuguese government took place in the context of a better moment in Lisbon-Maputo relations. As seen in previous chapters, the reversal of the Cahora Bassa dam to Mozambique in 2006, following decades of long disputes, was hailed by both sides as a “turning point” in the bilateral relationship (IPS, 31 October 2006; Pavia, 2010). According to Portuguese officials, this G19 episode represented “an attempt to introduce new conditionalties” vis-a-vis Mozambique. “Within the G19 the EU appeared divided. This is unusual and it was difficult. Portugal was in favour of some changes, but disagreed about the forum for deciding those changes”.

In agreement with the Commission (and other member states, such as France, Belgium and in part Italy) Lisbon maintained that political discussions should go through the mechanisms of the Cotonou Agreement (article 8) and not be dealt with by a technical forum such as the G19. As explained by a senior Portuguese official, the goal was to “prevent a precedent for sidelining Cotonou, which ultimately would also represent a distortion of the G19”.

Summing up the main findings of this section, it is possible to conclude that Portuguese foreign policy decisions concerning aid relations with Mozambique exhibit some evidence of Europeanisation in its dimensions of adaptation and projection. Over time the salience of the EU agenda on political conditionality gradually increased in Portuguese considerations, but that also opened more opportunities for Portugal to project its preferences and the specificities of its own approach. With regard to the first indicator, Portugal was never in a position of demandeur in the discussions at EU level over tying aid to political conditions in the case of Mozambique. In fact, the visibility of that agenda in Lisbon’s considerations followed, rather than anticipated, EU developments. Yet, when pressure for greater conditionality started to grow from other international quarters (G19 event), Portuguese decision-makers showed a clear preference for EU instruments. In any case, Portuguese decision-makers did not adhere to EU policy objectives over

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91 Interview by the author with Portuguese official, Permanent Representation to the EU (n.º 28).
92 Interviews by the author with Portuguese official (n.º 28) and European Commission official (n.º 5).
93 Phone interview with Portuguese official (n.º 28).
national considerations and preferences. Indeed, Portugal accepted the changes that were introduced at EU level, but not without some resistances, or at least reluctance, especially during an initial phase. Moreover, the adoption of those changes did not lead to any compromise of its national preferences, since no conditionality was applied in Portugal’s bilateral aid (or channelled through the CPLP) to Mozambique. Regarding the second indicator of Europeanisation, the use of the EU to export national preferences received great support from evidence. A clear example of that were the recurrent attempts Portugal made to present itself as the promoter of Africa’s interests in Brussels, each time the reinforcement of conditionality was put on the agenda. Moreover, the EU “umbrella” appears to have been of some utility for Lisbon’s diplomacy, especially during an initial (and long) phase, when the bilateral relationship with its ex-colony was more distant. As put by an experienced EU Council official, “it is easier for Lisbon to criticise other African countries than its ex-colonies. But the EU can be useful for that”. Still in his opinion: “Portugal is not strong enough to oppose EU constraints, but it can try to diminish its impact, or influence its direction, and then sell that effort next to its African partners”. Finally, although interviews with different Portuguese politicians and officials revealed nuances in terms of degree of “openness” to external influences, the idea of a specific “voice” towards Mozambique appeared consensual and solid. In fact, national decision-makers did not explicitly equate national with EU preferences, as they continued to underline Portugal’s greater “sensibility” towards Mozambique at the EU level.

Conclusions

Projection is the main feature that comes out from the analysis above. Due to the difficulties Portugal has faced to rebuild its post-colonial relations with Mozambique, as well as the weaknesses of its development assistance programme, Lisbon felt the need to conduct an important part of its policy through EU’s channels and mechanisms. In fact, the substantial means and multilateral “umbrella” of the Community were valuable assets at Lisbon’s eyes, especially during an initial stage when its relations with Maputo were more complicated and its aid policy weaker. Growing coordination of EU activity in Mozambique also came to represent more pressure for greater “Brusselisation”. But even if that level of opportunities and constraints led to more national policy being conducted “inside” the EU framework, Community channels were not the only option considered, nor was Portugal a “passive” actor in Brussels. Indeed, even during an early phase after accession, Portugal’s centre-right governments tried to make the most

94 Interview by the author with EU Council official (n.º 25).
of available bilateral instruments to improve the post-colonial relationship with Mozambique. The institutionalisation of the CPLP in the mid-1990s signalled that more opportunities were opening (even if more slowly in the case of Mozambique). On the other hand, Portuguese decision-makers were very active at EU level attempting to project national preferences. As seen with the case of political conditionality, Lisbon continuously tried to export its more “sensible” approach towards Mozambique. And by doing so, Portuguese decision-makers were targeting goals both vis-a-vis Africa and the EU, as the promotion of a national interest was “packaged” as a European one. But also during the period that preceded Portugal’s EC accession, the Lomé “card” was a useful means in domestic battles. In comparison with the case of aid relations with Angola (Chapter Four), where opportunities and constraints were weaker - due to a lower and looser level of EU activity in the domain of aid - Portugal’s policy towards Mozambique is conducted more “inside” the EU. The fact that Portugal has had a weaker policy towards Maputo than Luanda also works in that sense. On the other hand, due to the greater opportunities of projection that the EU offers in the case of Mozambique, that dimension of Europeanisation appears to be stronger than in the case of Angola.
Chapter 8

Portugal’s diplomatic relations with Mozambique: Mainly projection, despite the difficulties?

Introduction

This chapter examines the impact of European Union membership on Portuguese foreign policy towards Mozambique by focusing on diplomatic aspects or foreign policy in the narrow sense. As discussed in Chapter One, in an immediate post-1974 phase Portugal had to concentrate a great part of its efforts in rebuilding its external relations as a democratic and post-imperial state. Coming out from a period of relative international isolation and deep internal convulsions, the general orientation that came to be supported by the main Portuguese political forces was a Euro-Atlantic one, which also comprised the renovation and deepening of relations with the former African colonies. Taking into account Portugal’s limitations in the economic or military domains, diplomacy has traditionally occupied a central place in the range of its foreign policy tools. After a rapid decolonisation, Portugal’s relations with Mozambique took a relatively long time to improve and remained more distant than its bilateral relationship with Angola. In turn, foreign policy is one of the most recent and less integrated policies of the EU. Intergovernmentalism has remained a defining feature of this policy area, where decisions are taken by consensus, and few instruments are available to implement them. Linkages to Community mechanisms have represented an attempt to overcome some of those limitations, but that has often created problems of its own. Sub-Saharan Africa (including Mozambique) has not been a top foreign policy priority for the EU, which has traditionally looked at the sub-region predominantly through a development prism. This was reflected in the nature of EU mechanisms applicable to the area, which have typically privileged economic dimensions (aid and trade), rather than political aspects. Despite the greater efforts of coordination in more recent times, the ascendency of national policies, linked to the historical legacies of some member states, has been a very present aspect in the political relationship between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa.

Against this broad setting, there are different possibilities here. Firstly, in view of Portugal’s features as a small power and the strong influence that other countries have traditionally had in
Mozambique (especially South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Britain), Lisbon may have favoured increased EU cooperation in order to better face external rivals and constrain stronger EU partners within a multilateral framework. Moreover, on the basis of its historical ties with Mozambique, by contributing to a joint EU approach Portugal might have tried to increase its national influence and prestige within the group. Greater EU cooperation would “add value” to the national policy, which ultimately Portugal was always unwilling to compromise. Thus, according to this perspective the EU had no impact on Portugal’s foreign policy towards Mozambique, with the level of its involvement in Brussels being determined by power considerations. Secondly, according to liberal intergovernmentalist insights the pressure of domestic interest groups may have pushed Lisbon authorities to follow a more autonomous approach, especially during an initial phase when the marks of decolonisation were fresher and EU instruments of foreign policy cooperation weaker. Subsequently, societal factors may have continued to press Portuguese foreign-policy makers to adopt firmer positions in EU discussions related to Mozambique. Yet again Portuguese authorities would have been unwilling to make any fundamental compromises. Possible changes in Portugal’s preferences would be the result of strategic adaptation rather than a deeper effect produced by the EU. Finally, following social constructivist approaches, repeated interactions with new ideas and arguments stemming from the EU would have transformed Portuguese diplomats’ and officials’ understanding of their own identity and preferences, making them more likely to perceive common interests. However, taking into account the importance that Mozambique continues to play for Portuguese foreign policy as well as the significant cultural, linguistic and personal links between the two countries (even if less strong than in the Angolan case) an “egoistic identity” is likely to have endured and resisted the influence of EU’s ideas. Thus, the hypothesis that appears to receive greater support is the projection of national preferences. That was also the main outcome for the equivalent chapter on Angola (Chapter Five), but in this case Portugal is likely to have been less successful at exporting national preferences, namely because of its weaker ties with Maputo and the important relations other EU members have had with that African country.

The chapter is organised in three sections. The first one corresponds to Portugal’s accession negotiations to the European Communities, which formally lasted from 1978 until 1985. The second part examines the peace process negotiations in Mozambique, whose direct talks lasted from 1990 to 1992. This was the most important political event in Mozambique after Portugal’s EC accession and still under European Political Cooperation. The last part focuses on electoral processes in Mozambique, more precisely the presidential and legislative elections of 1994, 1999
and 2004. As general elections they represented important political moments and the choice made here among the many elections held since independence gives enough variety in terms of the stages in the democratisation process of Mozambique. To explain, while the 1994 elections where considered a “success” by the international community, in the context of the 2004 vote the EU was more critical than ever before. An additional reason relates to the fact that all those elections took place after the Common Foreign and Security Policy was launched and EU observers were sent to monitor them.

8.1 The accession to the European Community: the EPC acquis

As seen earlier in Chapter Five, when Portugal started to negotiate its accession to the European Communities in 1978, the acquis politique was the so-called European Political Cooperation. EPC was a loose framework for foreign policy cooperation oriented by broad interests rather than by clearly articulated objectives. This was particularly the case in relation to Africa, in relation to which some member states remained very jealous of their national prerogatives. Kept rigidly separated from the EC framework, EPC produced an essentially declaratory output. Member states committed themselves to regular consultations, coordination of national positions, and, where possible, common action. But decisions were taken by unanimity, opening the possibility of a national veto. In turn, following the collapse of the Caetano regime and decolonisation in 1974-1975 Lisbon was interested in rebuilding its historical relationship with Mozambique. Bearing in mind the instability that Portugal went through until the mid-1980s, the precise definition of what that post-colonial policy should be was far from established. Moreover, the different orientation Lisbon and Maputo came to adopt in the Cold War brought further challenges to an already sensitive bilateral relationship. In this context, Portugal’s policy instruments were unsurprisingly limited and very often ineffective.

Considering this brief background, what was the impact of Portugal’s accession to the European Communities on its relations with Mozambique? On the basis of the framework of the thesis, the analysis next considers the following sub-questions. First, what importance was given by Portuguese foreign policy-makers to the acquis politique applicable to Mozambique? How significant were potential domestic resistances to the adoption of a more European approach? Second, did Portuguese authorities adopt any initiative after applying for EC membership indicating an intention to protect a national position or to pursue national preferences using the EC as a means? Third, how was the participation in EPC assessed by Portuguese foreign policy-
makers in comparison with the adoption of other options? Did separate norms or national definitions of preferences vis-à-vis Mozambique receive great attention? Finally, what were the immediate implications for Portugal resulting from the adoption of the acquis applicable to Mozambique? Did Portugal compromise any national preference towards its ex-colony in order to accommodate its participation in EPC?

Adapting to a weak but potentially useful political acquis

The EPC acquis applicable to Mozambique was important for Portuguese decision makers in view of the overall goal of European Community membership. As described in preceding chapters, in the second half of the 1970s accession to the EC became the top foreign policy priority for Portugal’s main political forces. Yet external affairs (including Africa) did not occupy a central place in Portugal’s accession negotiations (Dinan, 2004: 184). In fact, the acquis politique on Mozambique was not very substantive either. From Mozambique’s independence the EC indicated its readiness to strengthen relations with that African country. Concerned about growing Soviet influence in southern Africa, in 1975 EC member states collectively issued a declaration recognising the independence of Mozambique and expressing their willingness to see the country join the Lomé Convention. The following year, the Nine produced a more general statement setting out their policy towards southern Africa as a whole. Among other aspects, the document asserted the respect for the independence of all African states and the rejection of any action by any country to establish a zone of influence in Africa (Hill and Smith, 2000: 399; Nuttall, 1992: 127-30). After Mozambique’s decision to take part in the negotiations for joining Lomé, in the early 1980s, relations between Maputo and Brussels gradually became closer. Those developments were in tune with Portugal’s European and Western general orientation, who by and large was also interested in lessening Soviet influence in its ex-colony (see Figueiredo, 1986: 100). As mentioned in previous chapters, from the late 1970s Portugal adopted more proactive initiatives towards its former African colonies, including Mozambique. Nevertheless, those initiatives were meant to be complementary to Portugal’s main priorities (including EC accession), rather than in opposition to them. Ultimately, the EPC acquis on Africa did not cause any problems to Portugal during its EC accession negotiations. As put by a Portuguese diplomat: “EPC declarations were not exactly a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States”. Apart from the weaknesses of EPC instruments in general, EC member states

95 Interviews with former Portuguese politician (n.º 11); Portuguese diplomat (n.º 8).
96 Interview with Portuguese diplomat (n.º 8).
joint positions on Africa during this period were in general in accordance to Lisbon’s interests.97 As described in Chapter Seven, Portugal had a distinctive position in relation to the policy of sanctions on South Africa. However, as explained by a senior Portuguese diplomat - certainly referring at least to Britain - “the spoilers were already in”.98 In any event, that acquis politique was part of the conditions Portugal had necessarily to accept in order to become a Community member.

While not officially made “against” Europe, some of the initiatives Portugal promoted in relation to Mozambique during the period of its EC accession negotiations displayed a great concern with national interests and perspectives. As previously mentioned, since Mozambique’s independence Portugal expressed an interest in reinforcing the relationship with its former colony and, despite all difficulties, started promoting some initiatives in that sense. According to some authors, the EC added a further impulse to Portugal’s rapprochement with Africa. As Brussels was interested in strengthening its relations with southern African countries, Lisbon increasingly linked strong ties with its ex-colonies in Africa to a reinforcement of its own position next to the EC (Antunes, 1990: 115-7; Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 45). In view of the political instability in Portugal at the time, that stance incorporated many nuances with important domestic corollaries (see Gaspar, 1988). Notwithstanding those internal differences of emphasis, it was clear that Portugal wanted to preserve a voice in relation to its former African colonies. A good illustration of that was Portugal’s mediation role during the talks between Mozambique and South Africa that led to the signature of the “Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact” in 1984. The pact aimed at preventing Mozambique from supporting the African National Congress, on the one hand, and South Africa from supplying the RENAMO on the other. Portugal’s stake in stability included the presence of a considerable Portuguese migrant community in South Africa and the massive Cahora Bassa dam in Mozambique, providing energy to the large southern neighbour. At the time the hydroelectric scheme was still majority owned by the Portuguese state and its full operation was being disrupted by warfare (Figueiredo, 1986: 96; MacDonald, 1993: 113-4). Following Gaspar (1988: 62), while the main protagonists in the agreement were its two signatories, “for the first time since 1975, Portuguese diplomacy had played an active role in regional politics”. That role appears to have been conducted in coordination with Washington, who had a key involvement in the process exerting pressure on both sides to negotiate and providing assistance to Mozambique (Antunes, 1990: 123-5; Hall and Young, 1997: 146-9; Newitt, 2002: 213). Eventually the pact

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97 Interviews with former Portuguese politician (n.º 11); Portuguese diplomat (n.º 8).
98 Interview with Portuguese diplomat (n.º 8).
collapsed and so did Portugal’s attempt as a regional mediator. Among the reasons pointed out for Lisbon’s failure were regional conditions beyond control, lack of resources and internal Portuguese divisions (Gaspar, 1988: 65). EC membership presented itself as potentially useful to help overcome some of those shortcomings.

In line with the observed in other policy-areas, the participation in EPC was perceived by Portuguese foreign policy makers essentially through an instrumental prism and emphasising national views. Indeed, as seen in previous chapters, the direct involvement in Community mechanisms and instruments was generally described as “adding value” to the national policy. Potential advantages for the EC and for Africa were also officially underlined. That became particularly visible in the final phase of Portugal’s accession negotiations, as illustrated by the following statement produced in January 1985 by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jaime Gama:

“Portugal's integration in the European communities will provide Europe with the Portuguese sensitivity to African problems and will give Portugal the support of community mechanisms to expand its African vocation. As a result, it will also provide Portuguese-speaking African countries with an ally and a friend within the community structures, balancing the game of influences which has been conducted there by other linguistic areas” (Gama, 1985: 251).

While mutual advantages are clearly pointed out, the specificities of Portugal’s position and the sort of role it intended to play within the EC are also openly indicated. A senior Portuguese diplomat confirmed that, from the closing stages of the accession negotiations, Portugal started to consider what would be its distinctive “mark” within the EC in the domain of foreign policy.99 In the context of Euro-Africa relations, in particular, the role Portugal envisaged for itself was that of a “privileged interlocutor” (Gama, 1985: 312). Apart from boosting its prestige and having access to more means, through accession Portugal would join the group of member states with historical links to Africa, such as France and the United Kingdom. But as a small and, therefore, more “equal” country, Portugal could bring an “added value”, not least for relations with Lusophone Africa.100 That potential was at least in part recognised by the Community and its member states, as Lisbon’s anticipated participation in EPC for matters related to Africa (and Latin America) indicates (Proença, 1988; Vasconcelos, 1991: 130). In the case of Mozambique, the failure of the Nkomati pact had revived some of the traditional hostility to Portugal on the part of the FRELIMO leadership and paralysed the bilateral relationship (Gaspar, 1988: 63; Norman MacQueen, 1985: 49). As seen in Chapter Two, part of FRELIMO’s hostility was linked

99 Interview with Portuguese diplomat (n.º 21).
100 Interview with Portuguese diplomat (n.º 21).
to a perceived tolerance of Lisbon vis-à-vis opposition groups (RENAMO) in its territory. In that sense too, the EC “cover” could offer some potential advantages for Portugal’s diplomacy.

Summing up the main elements of this section it can be concluded that Portuguese foreign policy decisions exhibit some evidence of Europeanisation, in its dimension of adaptation. The indicator of adherence receives support from the fact that Portugal adapted to the EPC acquis applicable to Mozambique. That adaptation was automatic as the adoption of the acquis politique was a necessary condition for Portugal to become an EC member. But from Lisbon’s perspective it was also unproblematic due in particular to its limitations. The intergovernmentalist features of EPC were a reassurance for Portuguese foreign policy elites at the time. That explains in part the scarce attention granted by Portuguese authorities to external affairs issues in general during the country’s accession negotiations. Rather than opposition or resistance, the initiatives some political actors started to promote more actively towards Mozambique (and the other former African colonies) while the accession negotiations were taking place were meant to be complementary to the general Euro-Atlantic foreign policy orientation of Portugal, including the objective of EC membership. But at the same time, they reflected an intention to preserve some greater room for national understandings and preferences vis-à-vis the ex-colonies. In contrast with the limited constraints posed by EPC, the new opportunities European membership promised to create for Lisbon’s problematic relations with Mozambique, and for the whole of its foreign policy, were rather significant in the eyes of Portuguese decision-makers in general. In particular, the expectation was that through EC membership Portugal would be able to “add value” to its national policy towards Mozambique, while simultaneously benefiting its European and African partners by playing a role of “interlocutor” in that multi-sided relationship. Those positive expectations were an additional factor facilitating Portugal’s adaptation to the limited EPC agenda related to Mozambique.

8.2 The EPC and the Mozambican peace process

European Political Cooperation was still the foreign policy arm of the Community throughout the unfolding of Mozambique’s peace process in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Despite the novel ambition of “speaking ever increasingly with one voice” and to “act with consistency and solidarity”, during this period EPC remained based on general and vague objectives. A broad commitment of closer cooperation was made towards third countries across the world, including in Africa. But apart from apartheid South Africa the continent continued to receive little attention
and, by the end of the 1980s, the priority given by EPC to neighbouring areas was even reinforced. The 1986 Single European Act codified EPC and explicitly linked it to EC instruments. Consultations on foreign policy became a treaty obligation, but all decisions continued to be made by unanimity. This period also coincided with the initial phase of Portugal’s membership of the European Communities, when Lisbon’s relations with its former African colonies were given a growing emphasis by a succession of centre-right governments. Greater domestic stability and political continuity was reflected in a gradual reinforcement of Portugal’s foreign policy instruments, at a time when the conditions for a peace settlement in Mozambique were progressively coming into existence. While the activities of RENAMO in Portugal were a complicating factor for Lisbon’s plans, Maputo’s network of support in the West (including Italy, Britain and the United States) was being consolidated.

Against this broad setting, what was the impact of EPC on Portugal’s diplomacy towards Mozambique during this phase? More specifically, the main questions derived from the analytical framework of the thesis to be asked are as follows. First, what importance was given by Portuguese foreign policy-makers to the EPC agenda related to the Mozambican peace process? Did Portugal offer resistance to any joint initiative? Second, did Portugal pursue national preferences through EPC in this particular case? Was EPC used as a cover for its national policy towards Mozambique or even as a means to increase its influence among its European partners? Finally, did Portugal equate national with European preferences in relation to the peace process in Mozambique? Did Portuguese foreign policy-makers favour national definitions of preferences over European perspectives?

*Between “outside” and attempts at projection*

While not entirely disconnected from EPC, Portugal’s involvement in the Mozambican peace process negotiations was mainly “national”. Against a fast evolving international and regional context, Portuguese foreign policy makers formulated plans for an active participation in the resolution of the conflicts that persisted in southern Africa as early as 1988. Interestingly enough, the prospects for Portuguese involvement were initially more encouraging in Mozambique than in Angola, due in particular to some positive signs coming from Maputo (Expresso, 27 Abril 1991; Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 55). Following official accounts, rather than making a decision to intervene Lisbon expressed an interest and readiness to have a role of “good offices” or facilitator, ultimately dependent on the will of the parties. In that respect, Portugal’s status as an
According to some authors, the level of importance Lisbon put on ensuring Portuguese involvement (even if less intensively felt in the case of Mozambique than for Angola) was also indicative about the place Africa continued to occupy in the national imagination and identity (Cravinho, 2005: 97; Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 54). In the first half of 1989, when some African initiatives to facilitate peace talks on Mozambique were developing, the then Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Durão Barroso, travelled to Maputo, as well as Zimbabwe and South Africa. Consultations were also made with Washington, which according to Durão Barroso, chose Portugal as the first country to have discussions at the political level on Mozambique (see Barroso, 1990a: 45; Moose, 1995). Then, in September 1989, Portuguese Prime Minister Cavaco Silva paid a four-day visit to Mozambique. Among the initiatives that ensued, Portuguese authorities had unofficial contacts with the RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama in early 1990. The main goal of the contacts appears to have been to secure a summit of Mozambican leaders in Lisbon during the visit of Mozambique’s President Joaquim Chissano (also leader of FRELIMO) to Portugal, scheduled for April that year (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 55-6; Vines, 1995: 143). The initiative failed as Chissano rejected the Lisbon venue, both because of its long-standing role as RENAMO’s propaganda headquarters and the colonial overtones involved (Venâncio, 1993: 149-50). Ultimately, the Mozambican peace talks were transferred to Rome, where they were hosted by a Catholic Church group, backed by the Italian government (see Vines and Hendrickson, 1998).

Even as the chances of playing a leading mediation role were becoming more remote, Portuguese authorities continued to press for greater participation in the process, sometimes to the annoyance of the Italians. For instance, in May 1991, while the peace talks were stalled, one of the church mediators blamed “certain” Portuguese sectors for the dilatory moves of RENAMO. In June both the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and the representative of the Italian government in the peace negotiations arrived in Lisbon for consultations on the status of the Rome talks and held separate meetings with Durão Barroso. Apparently the objective was to support the Italian mediation and stop Portuguese attempts to undermine the process (Venâncio, 1993: 154-6; Vines, 1995: 143). Cameron Hume (1994: 65), an US diplomat who closely followed the Rome negotiations, sheds more light on Lisbon’s stance in that event:

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101 Interview with Portuguese diplomat (n.º 21).
“The Portuguese, while not opposing the Italian mediation, wanted Portugal and the United States to have a significant formal role, one commensurate with the success they had just registered working together on Angola.”

Whilst Portugal was interested in keeping its position linked to the US, the Italians acknowledged the need for increased international participation at a later stage of the negotiations and welcomed US support for the mediators, but expressed doubts about the role Lisbon could play (ibid.: 65-6). In that context, Lisbon authorities took some more resolute initiatives aimed at preventing Portuguese pro-RENAMO lobbies from interfering in the Mozambican peace process (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 58). Eventually, Portugal’s participation in the talks was only upgraded in the final stages of the process. In effect, in early June 1992 Portugal (together with Britain, France, the United States and the UN) was granted formal observer status in the peace negotiations. But that was far from the central mediation role Lisbon played in the Angolan peace process (supported by Washington and Moscow). Later, Portugal had an important involvement in the implementation of the peace agreement signed in Rome in October 1992. In particular, Lisbon took part in all the international commissions that monitored the peace deal and made a significant contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping operation. Moreover, Portugal (together with Britain and France) started to provide military training for the new national army (see Alden, 1995). As noted by Vasconcelos (1996: 282), those military efforts, made through the UN and bilaterally, fell clearly “outside” the European domain.

In parallel to its actions “outside”, Portugal was also active within EPC pushing for a greater engagement with the situation in Mozambique. From the beginning of its participation in EPC Portugal gave great importance to issues related to southern Africa (Vasconcelos, 1991: 134-5). In particular, Lisbon participated actively in the initiatives promoted by the Twelve to strengthen

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102 Portugal and the US (as well as Kenya and Zambia) were in the joint verification commission set up to monitor Mozambique’s partial cease-fire signed in December 1990 as members invited by RENAMO. The members selected by the government were Congo, France, the UK and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Vines and Hendrickson, 1998: 97).

103 For instance, in July 1991 Prime Minister Cavaco Silva took “full responsibility” for the Mozambican “dossier”, in a move designed to prevent any members of the Lisbon lobby obtaining information that might allow them to interfere in the peace process.

104 During the negotiations, after Portugal and the US got accepted by the two sides, the Mozambique government pushed for an increased involvement of Britain and France, while RENAMO was the strongest advocate of a significant UN role (Vines, 1995: 137).

105 Lisbon was represented in the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, which was the central authority overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement. The commission was chaired by the UN Special Envoy, Aldo Ajello (a former Italian politician), and also comprised representatives from Italy, France, the UK, the US, and the Organisation of African Unity. Portugal’s military participation in UNOMOZ involved 480 personnel out of a total of around 6,800, deployed by 40 countries (Teixeira, 2007: 84).
relations with the Frontline States and started to mobilise political and economic support for Mozambique (Portugal, 1987: 200; 1988: 245). Moreover, as seen in Chapter Seven, one of the reasons Portugal cited in opposition to a policy of heavy sanctions on South Africa was the potential negative implications for Mozambique. Yet, the high importance Portugal gave to African issues contrasted with the low level of priority attached to sub-Saharan Africa within EPC in general. To illustrate, when in 1986 a first ministerial meeting was organised with the Frontline States intended to show opposition to South Africa’s policy of destabilisation in the sub-region few EC foreign ministers were present (Hill and Smith, 2000: 403-4; Nuttall, 1992: 234). Following Neves (1996: 156), that disparity complicated Lisbon’s position and led its authorities to promote the “upgrading” of sub-Saharan Africa’s status within EPC more actively from the end of the 1980s. Subsequently, Portugal’s plans benefited to a degree from the evolution of the political situation in South Africa, but they remained challenging.106 From 1989 the conclusions of European Council meetings started to include regular references to Mozambique, specifically to its peace process. In general, the declarations welcomed and encouraged the efforts of peace in that African country. Contrasting with the case of Angola, however, the role of mediation which was explicitly indicated and supported was the Italian one: “[the European Council] hopes that the talks taking place in Rome, under Italian auspices, will lead to an early peaceful settlement of the conflict in Mozambique” (European Council, 1991). The conclusions issued in late June 1992, under the Portuguese Presidency, included a relatively longer reference to the Mozambican peace process, while keeping a generic indication on the role of EC member states in that process:

“The European Council urges the parties involved in the Mozambican conflict to reach, with utmost urgency, a peace agreement in the context of the mediation process in which EC countries play an active role. This will make possible the delivery of international aid to the affected populations, who are already suffering because of the prolonged drought which is having catastrophic effects throughout the sub-region” (European Council, 1992).

In more tangible terms, earlier that year the then Vice-President of the European Commission, Manuel Marín (a Spanish national), travelled to Mozambique for a two-day visit, on the occasion of the SADCC meeting taking place in Maputo. The visit was also an opportunity to show support for Mozambique’s peace efforts, to sign some new agreements granting Community assistance and to promise further support after the conclusion of a peace settlement (European Commission, 1992). Whilst it is not entirely clear the sort of influence Portugal’s Presidency may

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106 For instance, contrary to Portugal’s initial aspirations sub-Saharan Africa was not retained as one of the priority areas for the likely development of the CFSP in the final report presented to the Lisbon European Council of June 1992 (Vasconcelos, 1996: 279-80). Yet, the following year a joint action to support the transition towards democracy in South Africa was adopted (Nuttall, 2000: 186).
have had in this particular event, a senior Portuguese diplomat confirmed that Commissioner Marín was in general supportive of Lisbon’s initiatives towards sub-Saharan Africa at the EU level.\textsuperscript{107}

In sum, the analysis above exhibits some evidence of Europeanisation, mainly in its dimension of projection. During Mozambique’s peace process negotiations Portugal used the EPC in an instrumental way to promote its national priorities, but not without facing some important limits. The EPC agenda related to Mozambique during this period remained very thin. As a result, there was not much Portugal had to adapt to, apart from following a general obligation of consultation and coordination with its European partners. If those features posed little constraints, EPC instruments also offered few opportunities to be mobilised by individual member states. Thus, the level of activity Portugal conducted “outside” EPC is not completely surprising. But that activism by Portuguese foreign policy-makers also echoed the importance bestowed on national views and preferences towards Mozambique. In that sense, Portugal’s close collaboration with the United States and the UN during this period was a way to add value to its bilateral policy (to an extent compensating for EPC limitations) as well as to reinforce its own position, particularly at the EC level. This leads us to the presence of indicators of national projection. By active and visibly pushing for EPC support for Mozambique’s peace process, Portugal tried to favour its position vis-à-vis its former colony. The EC “cover” and means were particularly useful for Lisbon at this stage in view of the persisting difficulties in its bilateral relationship with Maputo. Yet, the low level of priority attached to sub-Saharan Africa in general within EPC (especially during an initial phase) and the support Mozambique could get from other EC members, limited the effectiveness of Portugal’s endeavours. Another form of projection that received important support from evidence relates to Portugal’s attempts to play an important role within EPC for the Mozambican peace process (as it had happened for the Angolan case), in order to reinforce its own status among its European peers. However, since Portugal played only a secondary role in the peace negotiations (other EC members had a more relevant role), that factor constrained its ability to export its interests at the European level.

8.3 The CFSP and the electoral processes in Mozambique

The EU has significantly supported Mozambique’s electoral processes since the country’s first democratic elections in 1994. After putting an end to its long civil war and with the increasing

\textsuperscript{107} Interview with Portuguese diplomat (n.º 21).
signs of political stability, Mozambique attracted great international attention, including from EU countries and institutions. With few success stories to point to in Africa, the Mozambican case became an “example” that international actors were more willing to continue to support. Seeking to promote democracy and the respect of human rights, the EU started to deploy election observation missions (EOM) in the early 1990s, in the context of its growing international ambitions following the end of the Cold War. As described in previous chapters, the replacement of EPC with CFSP reinforced the institutionalisation and formalisation of EU foreign policy cooperation. In particular, new mechanisms and instruments were introduced (such as Joint Actions), which helped to increase the level of CFSP activity. Yet, despite the links to the Community system, CFSP remained largely an intergovernmental policy area, ruled by consensus. Apart from sending observers, EU electoral support has also included the provision of technical and material assistance. While the Commission plays an important role in the planning and implementation of election support, member states have been eager to preserve their rights, namely in terms of the decision to send observation missions. For its part, Portugal continued to value its relationship with Mozambique, in itself and for the value it brings to the other dimensions of its foreign policy. In that sense, after peace was achieved, Lisbon remained committed to the process of stabilisation, democratisation and reconstruction of its former colony, namely at the EU level. As seen in other chapters, the creation of the Lusophone Community in 1996 opened an additional diplomatic channel for Portugal to promote its post-colonial relations, even if Maputo initially was not among its most enthusiastic supporters. Subsequently, Portugal’s bilateral relationship with Mozambique gradually tended to improve.

Given this general background, what was the impact of EU activity on Portugal’s diplomacy towards Mozambique? More specifically, the main questions derived from the analytical framework of the thesis to be asked are as follows. First, how was the deployment of EU electoral missions to Mozambique perceived by Portuguese foreign policy-makers? Was their deployment considered important by Portugal or did it favour other initiatives? Second, did Portugal pursue national preferences through the deployment of EU electoral missions to Mozambique? Were EOMs used as a cover for Lisbon’s national positions or as a means to influence the policies of its European partners? Finally, did Portugal value a European approach in order to strengthen the idea of EU unity? Did Portuguese foreign policy-makers instinctively opt for an EU approach?
Adapting for better projecting

Portugal had a very active involvement in the first multiparty elections in Mozambique held in October 1994. Lisbon’s efforts were mainly channelled through the EU, making relevant contributions while simultaneously trying to influence the process, but not always successfully. In May 1994, during an ACP-EU ministerial meeting taking place in Africa, Portugal presented a proposal for a joint action in Mozambique, involving two main components. First, a component of support for the country’s electoral process, including sending European observers and providing “integrated and coordinated” EU technical assistance. A second component consisted in a fund to assist with the reintegration of demobilised soldiers, implemented according to a “regional and decentralised perspective”. The proposal also suggested the creation of a package of short and medium term measures to be applied immediately after the elections (Gala, 1995: 116). This ambitious programme aimed to “improve, coordinate and maximise the various initiatives that the European Union and some of its Member States have developed and intend to develop in Mozambique” (Portugal, 1995a: 42). In fact, the Portuguese proposal followed the decision by the Twelve to support the democratic transition in South Africa, which Lisbon authorities considered should be integrated in “a overall policy for the whole of Southern Africa” (Gala, 1995: 115). Ultimately, there was no joint action for Mozambique, due to British opposition (Vasconcelos, 1996: 280-1). Yet, in July, under German Presidency, the Twelve decided to provide electoral assistance, funded by the EC budget. It should be noted that around this period Germany was very active pushing for greater regional cooperation in Southern Africa (see Rummel, 1996: 56-7).

More than 2,000 observers were deployed to Mozambique’s presidential and parliamentary elections, under the UNOMOZ umbrella. EU countries contributed to that effort with 200 observers (EUMOZ) and the EC covered a substantial part of the election expenses (European Commission, 2000: 26; 2004b: 11). For its part, Portugal sent a total of 42 elections observers, 30 of them under EUMOZ (United Nations, 1995: 22). Heavily supported by the international community, the electoral process took place without major incidents and the results gave a clear victory to Joaquim Chissano, while its party (FRELIMO) won a majority in the Assembly. Against that setting, the EU joined the other international observers in declaring the elections

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108 The EC provided logistic and financial support worth €8 million, representing more than 50% of the funds needed by the Mozambican National Elections Commission (CNE) for organising the poll.

109 Portugal had a smaller presence in the first democratic elections in South Africa held in April 1994, contributing with 25 observers out of a total EU presence of 312 (Portugal, 1995a: 34).
“free and fair”, at the same time as it considered the overall process a “success” (European Council, 1994).

Mozambique’s second general elections in December 1999 coincided with the Finish EU Presidency and the participation of Portugal in the Troika. Once more, the EU made a substantial contribution by sending the largest foreign observation mission and with EC funds covering more than half of the overall electoral budget (AWEPA, 2000: 3; European Commission, 2000: 26-7). Headed by a former Foreign Minister of Finland, the EU mission included 64 observers from 12 different member states. Portugal’s involvement was noteworthy as it contributed 10 observers (Portugal, 2000b: 241). The second largest foreign mission was a delegation from the Carter Center, with 50 observers. In early December the initial reactions after the voting from observers in general were on the whole very positive (Africa News, 7 December 1999). In particular, the EU observation mission in its preliminary assessment considered that the polling had been conducted “in a free and fair manner, allowing the Mozambican people to express their will” (Africa News, 12 December 1999). Yet, the final results were only released on 22 December, after a delay due to technical problems, which raised suspicions among RENAMO and observers. While Chissano was re-elected president (but by a much smaller margin than in 1994), FRELIMO increased its parliamentary majority. RENAMO declared it would not accept the results and demanded a recount. On 23 December the Carter Centre issued a statement expressing concern about the degree of secrecy surrounding the final vote count. It also reported that while no serious irregularities were found that could affect the outcome, concrete steps should be taken to resolve doubts about the results (Associated Press, 23 December 1999). According to a Commission official, the statement by the Carter Center took European embassies in Maputo by surprise, who decided to react promptly, without seeking prior permission from their national capitals. The urgency appears to have been substantiated with the risk of instability that threatened to undermine the initial “success” of Mozambique’s post-war reconciliation and democratisation process (see Council of the European Union, 2000: 4). Against this backdrop, on 28 December the EU Presidency released a declaration considering the elections “broadly free and fair” (European Council, 1999a). Moreover, while stressing that the allegations of fraud should be resolved in accordance with the law it also noted that the overall

110 Lisbon held the EU Presidency in the first semester of 2000.
111 The EC contribution was €21 million.
112 The Carter Center mission was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and, interestingly enough, by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) (Carter Center, 2000: 3).
113 Interview with European Commission official, DG Development (n.º 5).
outcome was a “further step” in the democratic development of the country and “a firm foundation for continued cooperation” between the EU and Mozambique.

The pressure from European quarters on Mozambique became more conspicuous in the context of the presidential and legislative elections held in late 2004. Indeed, after the problems that emerged in the final stages of the 1999 electoral process, the EU started to press more openly for greater transparency in Mozambique’s elections. Accordingly, after being invited by Mozambique in February 2004 to observe the new round of elections later that year, the EU demanded greater transparency and access to the different steps of the election process. More precisely, the EU wanted the government and the CNE to sign a memorandum of understanding granting the observation mission more access to the final counting and tabulation. After protracted discussions, a memorandum was finally signed on 7 October, allowing the EOM to be deployed a few days later (AWEPA, 2004a: 9; European Commission, 2004a). Yet, no real agreement was reached about improved access for the observation mission. Mozambican authorities complained against what they saw as interference in the sovereignty of the state and accused the EU of forcing them to break the electoral law (European Union, 2004: 23-4). The issue was publicly raised by Mozambique’s President during his two-day official visit to Portugal in mid-October. Speaking at a press conference after meeting with Portuguese President, Jorge Sampaio, President Chissano supported the idea of transparent elections, but also added “what the European Union wants is to trample the law to satisfy its pretensions” (Associated Press, 14 October 2004). Again in this election, the EU EOM was the largest international presence, comprising 130 observers (a larger number than in 1999 and also including observers from Switzerland and Norway) led by a Spanish Member of the European Parliament (MEP). In a similar pattern, the EC contributed more than half of the entire election costs, but this time provided via direct budget support after a belated proposal made by the EC delegation (European Commission, 2006: 204). Repeating the precedent of the 2003 municipal elections in

114 In its assessment of the 2003 municipal elections in Mozambique the EU welcomed the conduct of the voting process, but also expressed concern over “certain shortcomings in the efficiency and transparency of the election administration”. As seen in Chapter 7, those questions started to be raised in the context of the EU political dialogue with the country (Council of the European Union, 2004: 70).

115 A delegation of 7 MEPs (from Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) headed by the British parliamentarian Glenys Kinnock was also present. Other international observers included the Carter Center, the Commonwealth, the African Union, and the SADC (European Union, 2004). In contrast with previous missions, the reference in official reports on Portugal’s contribution to the 2004 EU EOM only states that it included both long and short-term observers, without specifying their number (Portugal, 2005a: 242).

116 Interestingly enough, the EC Strategy Paper for Mozambique (2002-2007) did not include electoral assistance as a priority (European Commission, 2006: 204). After the 1999 elections the Head of the EC Delegation in Maputo stated openly that the EC would no longer provide financial support for elections (Tollenæs, 2006: 11). Yet,
Mozambique, the CPLP sent a small (six observers) and short-term (one week) observation mission, headed by a diplomat from São Tomé and Príncipe (NL, 27 Novembro 2004).

The 1-2 December poll gave the new FRELIMO candidate, Armando Guebuza, a landslide victory (about 64% of votes), while its party renewed a comfortable majority in parliament. The process was marked by more irregularities than in previous elections and RENAMO called for the ballot to be annulled (AWEPA, 2004b). On 4 December, the head of the EU EOM gave its initial reaction to the voting praising the general conduct of the election, but also highlighting many shortcomings. Moreover, he warned that the observation would not be complete unless observers had access to all stages of vote tabulation (Africa News, 4 December 2004). A less critical assessment was provided by the CPLP in a statement released in Lisbon the day immediately after the vote: “[t]he CPLP observation mission did not witness any incidents, having verified that the voting process occurred in a climate of normalcy and civility” (Agence France Press, 3 December 2004). In the end, the promises of greater openness and transparency did not materialise (AWEPA, 2004b). On 21 December, the same day the preliminary results of the election were published, the Dutch Presidency issued a declaration welcoming the “generally successful and peaceful” conduct of the elections and congratulating the people of Mozambique on their “commitment to democracy”. Moreover, while noting that some “irregularities” had taken place, the statement also pointed out that they “did not have an impact on the result of the elections”. Finally, the declaration included the formula of previous electoral processes considering the election a “further step” in the consolidation of democracy in the country and a basis for “continued cooperation” between the EU and Mozambique (European Council, 2004).

The 2004 national report on Portugal’s participation in the EU is very explicit describing the role Lisbon allegedly played in the developments above:

“Within the European Union, Portugal has always sought to convey a positive image of the democratic transition process in Mozambique, having played an important role in the decision of sending the election observation mission and in the content of the Declaration on the presidential and parliamentary elections in Mozambique” (Portugal, 2005a: 243).

In brief, the more coordinated approach of the EU in this electoral round increased the pressure on Mozambican authorities, producing the simultaneous need for Portugal to give more visibility to its own positions within the Union.

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subsequent changes made that from 2002 to 2005 the new Head of Delegation was a former Portuguese diplomat. A European Commission official noted that traditionally the head of political affairs of the EU delegation in Mozambique has been a “seconded official” coming from the Portuguese Foreign Ministry (interview n.º 27).
Summing up the main finding of the present section, it can be concluded that Portuguese foreign policy decisions concerning diplomatic relations with Mozambique exhibit some evidence of Europeanisation in its dimensions of adaptation and, especially, projection. Portuguese authorities gave a great importance to the adoption of a European approach, as indicated by the level of initiative, support and engagement displayed in general for the different EU election observation missions examined above. Lisbon’s pro-active stance was particularly evident during the 1994 elections when it proposed the adoption of a CFSP Joint Action for Mozambique, comprising electoral observers and substantial assistance. The emphasis put on coordination and in following a regional approach for delivering that support was also very telling from a European perspective, not least for getting the collaboration of Germany. Very significant too was the backing Portugal continued to provide for an EU EOM in 2004, when criticism and pressure over Mozambique’s authorities were very present. In view of the considerable means the Union can mobilise and the direct role Portugal can play in its mechanisms of decision, the fact that Lisbon was greatly involved in EU EOMs for Mozambique, in comparison with other (few) options, is not surprising. Yet, Portuguese foreign policy-makers did not adhere to EU objectives over national considerations and preferences. The deployment of a CPLP mission during the 2004 general elections illustrates the persistence of understandings and preferences defined in more national terms. Indeed, the context in which the mission was deployed, its main features (namely its duration and composition), as well as the timing and content of its preliminary statement after the vote, suggests it was essentially aimed at ensuring the presence and visibility of a Lusophone “voice” in the elections.

Rather than compromising its preferences through its engagement at the European level, Portugal was able to promote some of its national priorities using the EU in an instrumental way. From Mozambique’s perspective, EU EOMs have been very important both in terms of material support and legitimisation for its political institutions and process of democratisation in general. By actively pushing for that European support, Portugal tried to favour its position vis-à-vis its former colony. That strategy worked better once Maputo started to be more openly pressed through the EU even by some of its strongest and long-lasting supporters (e.g. some Nordic states). At least in part, that EU pressure also explains why Portugal needed to make its own stances in Brussels more visible and explicit. Other attempts of national projection revealed by the analysis above were more directed towards Europe. In effect, by promoting a European approach in Mozambique Portugal tried to influence the foreign policy of its EU partners, especially the largest ones also with special ties in the sub-region. The rejection of Portugal’s
1994 Joint Action proposal shows that those attempts have not always been an easy process. In that regard, the efforts for greater EU coordination (more in evidence in the 2004 elections) to an extent favoured Portugal’s position. On the other hand, since those moves in part put greater pressure on Maputo’s authorities, Lisbon had to balance its “greater sensibility” towards Mozambique with its goal of playing a valid role for African issues in Brussels. As explained by a senior Portuguese diplomat, “each time there is a ‘problem’ with one of the Lusophone countries, Portugal tries to mediate and smooth harsher approaches in Brussels. But this needs to be done carefully, in order to bring something positive and avoid putting at risk Portugal’s own position in the EU”.117

Conclusions

Policy projection is the main dimension of Europeanisation that comes out from the analysis of this chapter. In general terms, Lisbon pushed for “more Europe” in the domain of diplomatic relations with Mozambique. That is an outcome that also serves Portugal’s interests, as a small power, which has had a complex relationship with its former colony, located in a sub-region where other member states have special interests. In that sense, Lisbon was very active within the EU promoting closer relations between Brussels and Maputo, in an attempt to successfully combine the achievement of common European objectives with the attainment of its own national goals. Yet, that was not always an easy process for Lisbon’s diplomacy. Throughout the period analysed here, more significant results at exporting national preferences onto the EU level were only produced in the most recent stages. In effect, during the initial phase of Portugal’s EC membership the opportunities for its diplomacy to project its preferences were limited, particularly due to the low level of priority attached to sub-Saharan Africa in general within EPC and the weak policy instruments of this form of foreign policy cooperation. Moreover, Portugal’s relations with its ex-colony were at the time complicated by the negative influence of Portuguese interest groups, while concurrently Mozambique had established close links with other EC countries. In the subsequent phase examined in this chapter, Mozambique’s internal developments attracted more attention from the EU, at the same time as CFSP, particularly when backed by EC instruments (as it was the case for EOMs), offered new possibilities of joint action in the foreign policy domain. On the other hand, the gradual improvement of Lisbon’s bilateral relationship with Maputo reinforced Portugal’s position as a valid “interlocutor” in Brussels. Overall, the level of projection was smaller than in the other policy-areas examined for

117 Interview with Portuguese diplomat (n.º 37).
Mozambique (Chapters Six and Seven), where, among other reasons, EU competences and degree of activity have been stronger. It was also smaller than the scale of projection found for Angola (Chapter Five), particularly due to the weaker EU influence over that country and the close relations Lisbon has enjoyed with Luanda.

As regards the level of national adaptation to the EU found in this chapter it was in general low. In most cases, Portugal followed its duty of broad consultation and coordination with its European partners, but without compromising its national preferences. The enduring intergovernmental nature of foreign policy cooperation at the EU level was a central factor in that regard. More specifically, with accession to the EC Portugal adapted to the *acquis politique*. But this was very limited and presented more advantages than disadvantages from the point of view of Portugal’s bilateral relationship with Mozambique. All through the initial period of Portugal’s EC membership, EPC continued to present few constraints for Lisbon’s diplomacy. Moreover, this coincided with a strong push by the centre-right governments of Cavaco Silva to play an active role in the peace process of its ex-colony. The post-Maastricht era produced greater efforts of coordination at the EU level, but this was generally welcomed in Portuguese quarters, particularly for Mozambique. Moreover, when more critical voices in Brussels pushed for greater pressure on Mozambican authorities (or perhaps also because of that) Portugal did not hesitate to express its own position publicly. By and large, the scale of national adaptation was smaller than the one found in Chapters Six and Seven (namely due to the stronger EU policy in Mozambique for trade and aid), but larger than in the Angolan case (Chapter Five), due in particular to weaker EU coordination in that country and the possibility for Portugal to remain more “outside”.

Finally, the level of socialisation was also low, with a European approach in Mozambique being valued essentially for instrumental reasons. Portuguese authorities played the “Brussels game”, but without relaxing fundamental positions or perspectives. Lisbon’s mediation in the Nkomati Accord signed in 1984 (one year before the end of its EC accession negotiations) was illustrative of the role Portugal wanted to preserve in relation to its former African colonies. That attachment was later reflected in the activism demonstrated by Portuguese foreign policy-makers, especially during the initial phase of Mozambique’s peace process. After failing to secure a leading mediating role, Portugal’s noteworthy involvement in the UN mission was to some measure an attempt to “recover ground”. In particular, the high priority Lisbon put in participating in the training of the new national army was often justified officially on the basis of a concern with the sovereignty, unity and national identity of Mozambique (see Gala, 1995: 189-95). Along those
lines, the adoption of a broader (regional) and coordinated European approach in Southern Africa, was also a way to preserve elements of a Lusophone identity in an essentially Anglophone area. Subsequently, the greater “sensibility” Portugal demonstrated in the appraisal of Mozambique’s democratic progress and the presence of a CPLP mission during the 2004 elections are additional elements that appear to support the assertion that more national understandings and considerations towards Mozambique continued to imbue Portugal’s decisions. Despite the difficulty in making this assessment, the level of socialisation on the whole is likely to have been even smaller than in the other examined policy-areas, where supranational elements are more present, issues are less sensitive, and the decision-making less centralised. Yet, it was probably higher than in the case of Angola (Chapter Five), due in particular to the stronger “emotional” ties between Portugal and that African country, which in general has also remained more closed to external influences than Mozambique.
Chapter 9

Conclusions: Between adaptation and projection

Introduction

This concluding chapter summarises the main findings of the empirical analysis and discusses its broader implications. Overall, the analysis yielded significant evidence of Europeanisation of Portugal’s foreign policy towards Angola and Mozambique, chiefly in its dimension of national projection. In other words, Portugal in many situations “Europeanised” what were previously national priorities in order to benefit from the new opportunities stemming from its EU membership. The changes in Portuguese foreign policy stemming from its EU participation were more the result of “strategic adaptation” to common mechanisms and instruments than of a deeper effect on national preferences and identity. As seen with greater detail in Chapter Two, after the collapse of the Caetano regime and decolonisation in the mid-1970s, Portugal’s main external focus shifted from Africa and the Atlantic to Europe. However, past priorities continued to occupy an important place in its foreign policy. In particular, Lisbon’s relationship with its former African colonies began to be seen as significant in itself, but also with respect to the value it could add to the other dimensions of Portuguese foreign policy, especially within Europe. For Portuguese foreign policy makers, the different sides of the equation are meant to be complementary: just as being a EU member values Lisbon’s position in Africa, Portugal’s special ties in Africa are expected to reinforce its position within the EU.

In order to pursue those Janus-faced objectives Portugal sought to reinforce the bilateral initiatives it had started to promote towards Angola and Mozambique after their independence, emphasising its Community member status but also its specificities vis-à-vis other European countries with a special interest in Africa. Within the EU, Lisbon put a great effort to build a role for itself as a “bridge” or “interlocutor” for Euro-African relations. That claim drew principally on Portugal’s historical and cultural ties in Africa, as well as on its special relationship with Lusophone countries. More generally, it also reflected Portugal’s weaknesses as a small power and its consequent need to concentrate resources in specific areas or “niches” where it has more competitive advantages. The special features of the EU context opened the possibility to
attenuate some of Portugal’s limitations as an international actor. In particular, Lisbon was able to form coalitions with other member states also interested in Africa, within a multilateral platform ruled by a “consensus culture”, and get the support of common institutions in order to act as an “agent” for the EU “principal” in Africa.

In practice, EU membership contributed in great measure to improving and reinforcing the post-colonial dimension of Portugal’s foreign policy. The EU “cover” and scale were particularly valuable during an initial phase, when Portuguese foreign policy in general was weaker and its bilateral relationship with Angola and Mozambique more problematic. Briefly put, participation in the EU gave Portugal more credibility, visibility and the possibility to supplement its bilateral policy with common means. Simultaneously, by building on its links in Africa Portugal’s diplomacy gained more relevance in EU foreign policy-making related to that continent. This dimension of Portugal’s multi-sided strategy benefited from the gradual improvement of its bilateral relationship with its ex-colonies, as well as from the relative increase in EU activity and coordination in Africa from the early 1990s onwards. Accordingly, Portugal could contribute to common objectives, reinforcing its own position within the EU. Ultimately, those results served several of the general interests Portugal pursues through its African policy, in political, economic and even symbolic terms. In effect, Africa plays an important part in Portugal’s self perception of its role in the EU and in the world. This factor helps explain the absence of a “deeper Europeanisation” of Portugal’s policy towards its ex-colonies.

Notwithstanding this overall positive picture from Portugal’s point of view, the limits and challenges ahead for its African strategy in the EU context are not negligible. For instance, limited capability has been an enduring issue for Portugal, which was even aggravated since the early 2000s with the country’s economic downturn. Moreover, Lisbon’s African policy has traditionally lacked a clear definition and articulation of goals, instruments and mechanisms, with necessary repercussions in terms of its efficacy, but also credibility. Furthermore, Portugal’s presence in sub-Saharan Africa has been essentially confined to its former colonies. On a different but related level, developments in Africa could eventually lead to a gradual “dilution” of Portugal’s role in the continent, namely because of greater diversification of relations beyond Europe. It could be argued that, paradoxically, long civil conflicts in some of Portugal’s ex-colonies to an extent helped preserve the former colonial power’s rayonnement in those countries. Recent developments within the EU, namely in terms of its external priorities and instruments, also pose a challenge for Portugal’s African emphasis in Brussels. To illustrate, the
successive Eastern enlargements and the end of the rotating EU Council Presidency can diminish the extent of influence and visibility that Portugal has so far enjoyed related to African matters.

After having set the broad scene with this introduction, the chapter proceeds in three parts. Firstly, it summarises the key findings of the empirical analysis, making comparisons across the policy areas and country cases considered in this thesis. Secondly, the chapter discusses the conceptual implications of the findings, namely gauging the usefulness of the adopted Europeanisation approach and identifying future avenues of research. Finally, it presents some concluding remarks, pointing to the potential wider utility of this research project.

9.1 Empirical findings and implications

The main objective of the thesis was to provide a theoretically-informed assessment of the impact of EU membership on Portuguese foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. As seen in Chapter One, Magone (2000) and Vasconcelos (1996) produced general appraisals of the relationship between Portuguese foreign policy and the EU. While useful, by dealing with the whole of Portuguese foreign policy those contributions give little space or analytical depth to the question of the EU’s impact on Portugal’s relations with Africa. Neves (1996) wrote specifically on the interaction between Portuguese African policy and the country’s participation in the EU, but the analysis covers essentially EPC and the tone is rather descriptive. By analytically distinguishing between three dimensions of Europeanisation (adaptation, projection and identity formation) and making comparisons across three policy areas (trade, aid and diplomacy) and two African country cases (Angola and Mozambique) over a long time span (1978-2010), this theoretically-informed research project produced a more nuanced and detailed picture of the subject under analysis. As will be considered next, evidence of Europeanisation was found for all policy areas and country cases examined, in the sense of national adaptation and, chiefly, national projection. Moreover, it was in general terms more pronounced for the domain of trade and in the case of Mozambique. Over time the trend of Europeanisation was by and large an increasing one.
Summary of the main empirical findings

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Note: Adaptation (A), Projection (P), Identity Formation (IF).

With respect to the trade policy area, the analysis revealed evidence of Europeanisation both in the sense of national adaptation and, to a lesser extent, projection of national priorities. Through its EC accession Portugal transferred to the Community most of its powers in external trade matters. As a result, EC trade instruments became a central framework for Portugal’s commercial relations with Angola and Mozambique. In particular, the negotiation of new agreements involving trade dispositions with those countries were conducted exclusively by the European Commission, with Lisbon having to take into account the position of its EU partners in order to reach common objectives. Beyond this important adaptation outcome, by directly and actively participating in EU trade mechanisms Portugal was able to influence common decisions, as it was the case during the negotiations of the Cotonou agreement. Moreover, by openly expressing a “more generous” and “protective” stance within the EU (e.g., in the context of the Sugar Protocol and the EU-SADC EPA negotiations), Lisbon managed to differentiate itself and favour its own position vis-à-vis its former colonies. In view of the more dependent and open position of the Mozambican economy towards the EU when compared with the Angolan case, the Union’s influence on Portugal appears to have been relatively stronger in the former case. Overall, those findings show that the EU became an important tool for Portugal to manage its trade relations with its ex-colonies and mean that the national policy was Europeanised insofar as Community instruments and mechanisms were accorded a significant role in Portuguese decision-making. Thus, a Europeanisation outcome is confirmed for this policy domain: the considerable adaptation pressures and important projection opportunities produced a significant influence on national policy, which resulted in Portuguese authorities advocating a significant role for the EU.

As regards the area of aid, the analysis yielded some signs of Europeanisation, both as adaptation and, to a larger degree, as projection. In general, Portugal gave great importance to Community aid mechanisms and adhered to common objectives in that specific domain. Yet, the level of national adaptation was smaller than in the realm of trade, as Lisbon did not have to compromise
its national preferences in order to accommodate the use of EC aid instruments. The “shared”
competences in the domain of development assistance meant that Portugal could retain its
national aid programme. In effect, over the years the bulk of Portugal’s aid was distributed
bilaterally and kept highly concentrated in Lusophone countries (including in Angola and
Mozambique). Since the EU has been a stronger actor for aid matters in Mozambique than in
Angola, the pressure for national adaptation appears to have been comparatively higher in the
former country case. In terms of the second dimension of Europeanisation, by actively and
openly mobilising economic support for Angola and Mozambique within the EU, Portugal was
able to improve its status vis-à-vis its ex-colonies. Those initiatives in Brussels also aimed at
reinforcing Lisbon’s own standing among its European peers, as a “specialist” for African
matters. The considerable level of EC activity in Mozambique opened more opportunities to
pursue national priorities in that country than in Angola. Yet, Portugal’s possibilities (especially
initially) were constrained by enduring difficulties in its bilateral relationship with Maputo and
by the support Mozambique could get from other EU member states. In the case of Angola, the
possibility for Portugal to project its preferences onto the EU worked better during an initial
phase, when its former colony was more in need of international assistance. Even if the density
of EU norms and ideas was perhaps stronger in this domain (especially for Mozambique) than in
any of the two other policy areas considered, also in this realm Portuguese decision-makers
continued to emphasise the specificities of Portugal’s position in initiatives related to its ex-
colonies (e.g. a “more sensible” approach towards conditionality in Mozambique). Those
elements reveal a mixed outcome. While the EU had no exclusive powers to deal with aid
matters, common tools were important for Portugal, not least as an “amplifier” for its national
policy towards Angola and Mozambique. In that sense, a Europeanisation outcome is only
partially confirmed: the generally low adaptation pressures, on the one hand, and the important
projection opportunities, on the other, produced a mixed influence on national policy, which
resulted in Portuguese authorities advocating a role for the EU only in some cases.

Finally, in the policy area of diplomacy Portugal’s decisions revealed some evidence of
Europeanisation, essentially in its dimension of national projection. With accession to the EC
Portugal adopted the accquis politque applicable to Angola and Mozambique, but this was very
limited and it did not develop much more afterwards. In effect, intergovernmentalism remained a
defining feature of this policy domain, where the level of national adaptation produced was even
lower than in the area of development aid. In view of EPC/CFSP limitations, the importance
given by Portuguese decision-makers to other foreign policy initiatives and instruments during
the peace and transition processes in Angola and Mozambique was not wholly surprising. But even in those circumstances the important level of national activity “outside” was not kept completely separated from the EU. Portugal’s motivation for conducting its foreign policy “more inside” the EU was stronger in the case of Mozambique than in Angola, particularly due to Lisbon’s weaker position vis-à-vis the first country. Portugal’s pro-active and overt role mustering EU support for the peace and democratisation processes of Angola and Mozambique was also a way to favour its own relations with its ex-colonies. Moreover, by bringing its close links with its former colonies into the EU Portugal tried to influence the foreign policy of its European partners and reinforce its own position within the group. Those forms of national projection were more effective in the case of Angola, namely due to the stronger involvement and ties Lisbon kept with Luanda. In particular, by capitalising on its central role in the Angolan peace process Portugal was better positioned to subsequently adopt a “leading” stance for matters related to that country within the EU. Those findings show that despite the limited competences of the EU in the foreign policy domain, in some situations Portugal sought to bring into the EU its “special interests” in order to promote its own preferences and boost its position. Thus, also in this case, a Europeanisation outcome is only partially confirmed: the low adaptation pressures and the available projection opportunities produced a mixed influence on national policy, which resulted in Portugal advocating a role for the EU only in some situations.

**Empirical implications**

Taken together, the main insights that came out from the empirical analysis are threefold. First, evidence of Europeanisation of Portuguese decisions was found across all policy areas and country cases in the sense of national adaptation and, chiefly, national projection. After Portugal’s EC accession, its foreign policy towards its ex-colonies started to be conducted more through Community channels and took into consideration European interests and objectives. This element of adaptation comes close to general views present in the literature on the foreign policy of EU member states emphasising that smaller countries or member states with less extensive networks of foreign relations tend to work more through the EU (Manners and Whitman, 2000a: 263; Tonra, 2001: 263). This dimension is congruent with domestic structures approaches and perspectives underscoring international sources of domestic change (Gourevitch, 1978). Yet, evidence also showed that in that process of national adaptation Lisbon, more often than not, made an instrumental use of common mechanisms and programmes to simultaneously pursue national objectives. This “strategic adaptation” is in line with the generic conclusions put forward.
by some of the main contributions in the literature on Portuguese foreign policy stressing the overall limited and positive impact of the EU on Portugal’s relations with its former African colonies. According to those views, EU membership proved a strengthening factor for Portugal’s policy (Magone, 2000: 173-5; Neves, 1996: 162; Vasconcelos, 1996: 271). Scholarship on European foreign policy has pointed out that member states can embrace some EU adaptation as a means to overcome their past, namely the legacies of a colonial experience (Manners and Whitman, 2000a: 246-7). Portugal’s post-colonial relations are an example of a “special issue” to which Lisbon has tried to attach special importance and, under certain circumstances, “Europeanise” (ibid.: 266-8). Echoing more intergovernmental perspectives, the projection of its “special relations” to the European level represented a way for Portugal to “rescue” and “add value” to its foreign policy (Allen, 1996). The changes that took place in Portugal’s national policy were translated more into an adjustment to EU mechanisms and instruments than into a transformation in national identity and preferences, as social constructivists would have it (Wendt, 1994). In most situations Portugal “played the European game”, but without relaxing fundamental national understandings and objectives. This outcome is consistent with analyses pointing to the important place Africa continues to occupy in the national mythology and identity of Portugal (Alexandre, 1995; Cravinho, 2005).

Second, the degree of Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy decisions varied across policy-areas and country cases. The evidence gathered demonstrated that the EU’s impact was stronger in the trade area (followed by aid and diplomacy), while in terms of countries it was more significant in Mozambique. This outcome lends support to the work of Larsen (2005), who differently from other authors does not assume that the role of the EU in national foreign policy is the same across different areas. As seen in Chapter One, Larsen’s starting point was that this role varies according to the “fit” between the strength of EU policy and the national agency in relation to particular areas. This approach proved fruitful for this thesis allowing for more nuanced results. In particular, it was possible to go beyond the general assertion that “Portuguese special relationships are no longer conducted without the EU” (Magone, 2000: 174-5). As described with greater detail above, the strong EU policy in the domain of trade had an important influence on Portugal’s actions in this area, especially in the case of Mozambique. In effect, the EU became the main framework for Portuguese trade policy. Simultaneously, the significance Portugal has given to its post-colonial relations meant that national authorities were active “within” the EU, seeking to influence trade decisions related to its ex-colonies. Yet, the EU’s influence on Portuguese policy was comparatively weaker in the domain of aid, particularly in
the case of Angola. In view of the substantial Community means and “shared competences” in this area, Portuguese authorities engaged in common activities, but in a selective way. Indeed, in its relations with Angola and Mozambique Portugal continued to give great importance to its own bilateral aid programme. The EU’s impact on Portuguese decisions was still weaker in the area of diplomacy, principally in the Angolan case. In general, Portugal pushed for greater EU coordination in Southern Africa and tried to play a central role in Brussels for matters related to Angola and Mozambique. In some situations the European foreign policy framework represented a useful “cover” and “amplifier” for Portugal’s positions, but in many others it offered no solutions and Lisbon worked through other multilateral and bilateral channels.

Third, the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy decisions towards Angola and Mozambique increased over time. The gradual and relative increase of EU coordination and activity in general for the two country cases examined had mixed consequences. On the one hand, it augmented the adaptational pressure on Portuguese policy, and on the other it improved the opportunities for Portugal to export its national priorities. In a parallel but related process, Portugal’s foreign policy in general and towards its former African colonies in particular was largely reinforced over the period considered. Among other factors, better political and economic conditions in Portugal from the second half of the 1980s as well as the end of the Cold War, generally favoured Lisbon’s relationship with Angola and Mozambique. Since Lisbon remained interested in linking its post-colonial relations to the EU, the combination of those two trends (in EU and Portuguese policy) ultimately benefited the possibility for Lisbon to project its national preferences. This potential did not always materialise. But attending to the multi-sided features of that linkage, failures in one dimension could still be offset with gains in another. To illustrate, even when Portugal was not fully successful in its pro-Africa advocacy endeavours at the EU level, those efforts could still pay off vis-à-vis its former African colonies. In turn, improved relations between Portugal and its ex-colonies had feedback effects within the EU, namely favouring Lisbon’s bridging role in the relationship with Africa. The need to adequately capture these complex dynamics between distinct levels gives credit to the approach adopted in this research project. In contrast, the presence of different relevant factors both at the domestic and international level (others than the EU), points to the limits of Europeanisation. The analytical implications of those empirical findings are the focus of the next section of this chapter.
9.2 Analytical implications

Apart from an important empirical component, this thesis also had a more general theoretical concern consisting in ascertaining the usefulness of a Europeanisation approach for assessing the impact of EU membership on a member state’s foreign policy. As mentioned in Chapter One, in recent years “Europeanisation” became a very popular term in the academic literature to study the impact of European integration on national foreign policies, but its added value remained contested particularly in view of the challenges raised by its definition and applicability. Despite starting from a broad understanding of Europeanisation, the unpacking of the concept into three different analytical dimensions and its operationalisation through a set of indicators proved useful for the main purposes of this thesis. The application of this approach highlighted the influence of the EU on Portuguese foreign policy, even if with variations across the policy areas and country cases considered. Different domestic and international variables influenced Portugal’s foreign policy towards Angola and Mozambique, but the EU was an important factor among them. The fact that the approach in itself did not provide an explanation to the EU’s influence on Portugal’s policy, in turn underscores the conceptual limits of the Europeanisation framework. Those different points are examined with greater detail next.

The adoption of a Europeanisation approach was useful to describe the specific European dynamics that influence and shape national foreign policy. As seen above, this approach was of use for all policy areas, but in accordance with initial expectations it yielded more results in the domain of trade. In the trade area the adaptation pressures on Portuguese policy were more significant than in the other domains, namely due to the strong EU competences and well established mechanisms for commercial matters. Differently, in the aid area the EU has only benefited from “shared powers” and, therefore, the pressure on national policy was necessarily lower than for trade aspects. It was even weaker for political-diplomatic matters attending to the essentially intergovernmental features of that policy domain. Apart from that “top-down” pressure, the fact that the EU has been a powerful trading bloc in the world (including in Africa) signified that the opportunities for Portugal to project its national preferences using the Union as a means were important. The Community has also been a major aid actor in general and in sub-Saharan Africa in particular, which opened good chances of national projection in this domain too. For political-diplomatic matters the EU has been far less of an actor (especially in Africa), but still presented some advantages for Portugal, not least in terms of visibility. In projecting its preferences onto the European level, Portugal “Europeanised” what were previously national
priorities. Finally, for any of the three areas considered, processes of “socialisation” and “social learning” leading to a transformation in Portuguese attitudes and preferences received scarce support in the empirical analysis. Apart from differences among policy areas, the analysis also revealed some variance of Europeanisation evidence across the country cases examined. As mentioned above, in all policy areas in general the degree of national adaptation was more significant for Mozambique, while specifically in the domain of diplomacy there was more evidence of policy projection in the case of Angola. Those differences indicate that other factors, beyond the EU, were relevant for the final outcome. That, simultaneously, points to the limits of the Europeanisation framework applied in this thesis.

Gauging Europeanisation within a broader FPA approach proved particularly helpful to identify other relevant variables and, subsequently, check the EU’s influence against those other factors. Briefly summarised, significant Portuguese economic interests, global trends of trade liberalisation, and the leading economic role of South Africa in the region, are some important factors that appear to have pushed Portugal towards a more active involvement at the EU level in trade matters. As regards development aid aspects, the views of Portuguese decision-makers and officials, as well as the role of the OECD, UN and other international initiatives for aid coordination (particularly in Mozambique) seem to have had a concurrent influence on the sort of participation and positions Portugal adopted within the EU. Finally, in the area of diplomacy, Portuguese foreign policy-makers’ attitudes, the end of the Cold War, successive EU enlargements, developments in Africa, the general evolution of Portugal’s relationship with its ex-colonies, as well as Lisbon’s Atlanticist leanings were equally important in determining the sort of involvement the country had at the EU level. Despite the obvious difficulty in closely delineating Europeanisation from those numerous intertwined determinants of foreign policy (both endogenous and exogenous), it was clear from the analysis that whenever the EU had a policy in place or a role to play in a specific situation it occupied an important position in Portuguese considerations. While the role of those other causes varied according to the circumstances, in general they tended to work more as a complement or a gradation to the EU’s influence than as stark alternatives. In that sense, there was no need to formulate any additional framework to deal expressly with those other factors and systematically test the EU’s influence against them. Eventually, deepening the analysis of those concurrent variables can represent an area for future research, particularly for endogenous factors which so far have received scarce attention in the (limited) scholarship on Portuguese foreign policy (see Freire and Brito, 2010: 176-7).
Addressing the debate on whether a new “transformational FPA” for EU member states is needed, the results of this research project give support to Larsen’s argument contending that the adoption of a modified FPA approach depends on the extent to which a state conducts foreign policy in a particular issue area within the EU (see Larsen, 2005, 2009; Manners and Whitman, 2000c). In view of the important role the EU played in all domains of Portuguese foreign policy examined here, the analysis confirmed the need to pay special attention to the specificities of the European context. Yet, since in all cases Portugal’s agency kept a national element, this thesis does not back the need to replace more traditional FPA with a new foreign policy model across the board. The case of trade policy is the one which came closer to the analytical lens of “transformed FPA”, put forward by Larsen (2009: 556-7). In this domain, national foreign policy takes place in a highly institutionalised context and consists mainly in influencing EU foreign policy. In that sense, according to the same author, the characteristics of the EU decision-making system are central in analysing national foreign policy in this area. As regards the case of aid, the results gathered in this thesis rather suggest the adequacy of the “postmodern FPA” lens proposed by Larsen (ibid.: 557-8). The empirical analysis indicated that there was significant bilateral action and that the EU was the most important multilateral framework for Portugal’s aid, but not the only one. Still following the same author, this would be a situation where drawing on means of analysis from both traditional and transformed FPA would be useful. Finally, the findings for the domain of diplomacy give a less stark result, but this is clearly the domain where the tools of a “traditional FPA” lens would be of most use, especially in the case of Angola. A significant amount of national policy was conducted bilaterally outside the EU and in other multilateral frameworks, which offers justification for a more traditional approach (ibid.: 557-8). But despite its weaknesses in this area, the EU still represented an important platform for Portuguese foreign policy, namely in terms of visibility. In that sense, elements of a transformed FPA would still be valuable.

An important conceptual limitation to the Europeanisation framework applied in this thesis is the fact that it does not provide a theoretical explanation. In other words, the conceptualisation was useful to document processes of Europeanisation in Portuguese foreign policy, but in itself does not explain the origin of those processes. Even if developing a theoretical argument is beyond the objectives of this research project, it still presents some interest here to briefly discuss the central findings of this study against the main theories of European integration. The significant evidence of policy projection is consistent with intergovernmental perspectives emphasising the central
role of member states and governments in the EU context. More specifically, Portugal’s general support for collective action in its ex-colonies echoes insights from a realist version of intergovernmentalism. In effect, Lisbon’s special ties in Africa were purposefully used within the EU as a means of reinforcing its national influence and autonomy. Yet Portugal’s issue-specific societal preferences and bargaining power in the foreign economic areas examined (aid and trade), are better accounted for by a liberal variant of intergovernmentalism. Simultaneously, the elements of national adaptation uncovered by the analysis lend some credit to more supranational approaches, highlighting the role of EU institutions and transnational societal actors. In particular, the activism displayed by the European Commission - principally in the trade and, to a lesser extent, aid areas - reflects in part the logic of institutionalisation and path dependence underlined by rationalist supranationalism. However, this explanatory value is qualified by the enduring intergovernmental features of Lomé and Cotonou (as “mixed” agreements, funded mainly through EDF). Finally, the limited evidence of identity formation gives little support to social constructivist explanations. Political actors’ identification with EU norms appears to have been more significant in general, than specifically in matters related to Portugal’s former African colonies. In the latter case, national understandings remained strong. While European and national ideas are likely to have coexisted in many cases, variation in emphasis (reflecting domestic differences) is expected to have produced inconsistent results. This suggests that an instrumental logic, rather than the internalisation of EU norms according to the “logic of appropriateness”, was predominant.

Ultimately, the dimension of socialisation just mentioned is a point that could be further explored in future research. In effect, the long-term perspective adopted in this thesis involved a necessary trade-off. On the one hand, it opened the possibility to better examine potential changes over time. In particular, the decision to consider the period of Portugal’s accession negotiations to the EC proved fruitful, as it allowed examining dynamics that continued during the phase of Portugal’s full membership. Thus, it was possible to analyse how Portugal envisaged its participation in the EU and, therefore, identify potential areas of interest and resistance to the Union’s influence. Moreover, as expected the need to adopt the *acquis communautaire* was an important factor producing adaptation in Portugal’s policy, perhaps stronger than any other pressure or influence stemming from the EU during the post-accession phase. On the other hand, the time-frame chosen for this research required covering more events and, therefore, collecting and examining a large amount of data, not always easily accessible. For instance, very often Portugal did not have an articulated or clear policy position. Moreover, decision-makers and
officials for older events were sometimes difficult to contact. To an extent, those practical aspects were compounded by the methodological challenges of a social constructivist research agenda (e.g. exploring socialisation effects through interviews for politically sensitive aspects, as many are in the triangle Portugal-EU-Africa). In any case, the analysis of the influence of EU ideas and norms on Portuguese foreign policy can be deepened in the future by gathering more data, namely through the analysis of official statements and the conduction of further interviews with key foreign policy makers. Role theory (Aggestam, 2004; Walker, 1987), in particular, could help orientate the analysis by focusing on national identity and foreign policy role conceptions.

**Conclusion**

The results of the analysis have shown that the adoption of a Europeanisation approach in this thesis helped uncover specific European dynamics that influence and shape national foreign policy. More specifically, the analysis demonstrated that new opportunities and constraints resulting from the European integration process had an impact on Portuguese foreign policy towards Angola and Mozambique. According to the conceptualisation applied in this thesis, the dimension of Europeanisation which received more support from evidence was national projection, followed by the dimension of national adaptation. EU ideas and norms had limited impact on Portuguese self-understandings towards its former African colonies. Put in a different way, the changes produced on Portuguese foreign policy were due more to Portugal’s willingness to benefit from the new opportunities, than from the adaptation pressure and influence of norms stemming from the EU. The analysis also showed that the EU’s impact varied across the policy areas and country cases examined, according to the specific “fit” between the strength of EU and national agency. Correspondingly, the EU’s influence on Portuguese foreign policy was more significant in the trade area (followed by aid and diplomacy), while in terms of countries it was more significant in Mozambique than in the Angolan case. A further qualification was that the EU represented just one factor among others (albeit a very important one) influencing Portuguese foreign policy.

As other studies have pointed out, the different dynamics between the national and EU level were not separate. They rather overlapped and interacted in a dialectical way (Major, 2005: 187; Wong, 2005: 152). Moreover, even if Portugal’s agency was a central feature, the influence of more structural elements also received significant backing from the analysis. Furthermore, while
material considerations appear to have been the main driving factor behind the interactions between Portugal and the EU, more ideational influences were not completely absent, especially in the sense of preventing or hindering change in national policy. In view of that, the “middle path” approach allowed by the concept of Europeanisation proved more useful than conventional European integration theories in capturing and bridging the influence of those different elements (Wong, 2007: 323-4). Ultimately, the approach followed in this research project produced a more in-depth and nuanced understanding of the EU’s impact on Portuguese foreign policy. Simultaneously, this study provided an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of a Europeanisation approach in the foreign policy realm. Thus, this thesis makes a valuable contribution to the literature on Portuguese foreign policy and on Europeanisation of national foreign policy.

Looking beyond the scope of this thesis, its insights could have a wider utility in at least three different ways. Firstly, the empirical findings resulting from this research project could be of some use for a better understanding of the role of EU member states in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly regarding their attempts of cooperation (or lack thereof) in that continent. The literature on the subject has unsurprisingly tended to emphasise the role of the larger former colonial powers, Britain and France (e.g. Chafer and Cumming, 2011; Taylor and Williams, 2004). But the EU appears to have opened some more room for an otherwise minor actor in Africa, such as Portugal. Secondly, the analytical framework adopted in this thesis could be fruitfully applied to other areas of Portugal’s foreign relations, eventually following a comparative methodology. In particular, future studies could extend the present analysis to Portugal’s relationship with its smaller former colonies in Africa (i.e. Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe), which are likely to yield results close to those obtained for the case of Mozambique. Other policy areas presenting interest in that sense could be, on the one hand, Portugal’s relations with East-Timor, Brazil, Macao and the United States/NATO (where attempts at “policy projection” are likely to be important), and on the other, its relationship with Spain and matters related to the Maghreb, Balkans and the defence domain (where “national adaptation” features are expected to be significant). Finally, and more generally, insightful parallels can be drawn between the experience of Portugal’s participation in the EU and other smaller member states, also with less extensive foreign relations and “special issues” or “niches”. Those comparisons can be particularly enlightening in the case of some of the post-Soviet European countries, which accession to the EU was also driven by the intention of overcoming an authoritarian past, economic backwardness and international isolationism (Royo, 2003: 310).
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