Zerbini, Antoine (2024) Essays in informational political economy. PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science.
Text
- Submitted Version
Restricted to Repository staff only until 3 September 2026. Download (22MB) |
Abstract
In this dissertation I study the strategic interactions between politicians, organized interest groups, and citizens, in democratic and non-democratic settings. All chapters focus on the citizens' problem of learning about the performance of their elected official, or of the current autocrat. In chapter 1, I evaluate the role of lobbying transparency laws in helping voters hold their politicians accountable and control the influence on policy-making by special interest groups. In chapter 2, I consider the problem of censorship in the internet-era for modern dictators. I argue that the internet may have entrenched authoritarian regimes because it gave more choice to citizens, thus making feasible a novel form of segmented access to information. In chapter 3, I contend that the existence of purely informational censorship incentives for authoritarian leaders hinges on the distribution of political preferences.
Item Type: | Thesis (PhD) |
---|---|
Additional Information: | © 2024 Antoine Zerbini |
Library of Congress subject classification: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
Sets: | Departments > Government |
Supervisor: | Dewan, Torun and Levy, Gilat |
URI: | http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4738 |
Actions (login required)
Record administration - authorised staff only |