The evil, poor, disliked and punished: Criminal stereotypes and the effects of their cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes on punitiveness toward crime

Carolyn Côté-Lussier

A thesis submitted to the Methodology Institute of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, August 2012
Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author.

I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 60,285 words.

Signed:

Carolyn Côté-Lussier
Abstract

Why does the public so staunchly support harsh criminal justice policies when the social, fiscal and political costs are so great? Individuals in countries such as Canada, the UK and USA continue to want criminal offenders to receive stiffer sentences despite growing prison populations and some indication of lower crime rates (Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000; Donohue, 2007; King, 2008; Raphael, 2009; Tseloni et al., 2010; Useem et al., 2003; Walmsley, 2009). Criminological research has identified cognitive and affective pathways that predict punitiveness toward crime, such as the judged wrongfulness and harmfulness of crime, and moral outrage (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). The overall contribution of the five papers presented in this thesis is to identify the cognitive, affective and behavioural pathways that link social perception of criminals to punitiveness toward crime. Working at the intersection of social psychology and criminology, the thesis applies theoretical frameworks such as the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002) and Behaviour from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes map (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007) to identify the functional relation between social perception and punitiveness. Using different methodologies and at different levels of analysis, this thesis provides strong evidence that the content of criminal stereotypes is associated with specific cognitive (e.g., perceiving crime as being more serious), affective (e.g., feeling anger and a lack of compassion) and behavioural (e.g., wanting to exclude and attack) responses. In turn, criminal stereotypes and their outcomes engender punitive intuitions, decisions and attitudes. These findings reconcile extant criminological research on punitiveness with social psychological research on the function of social stereotypes. This thesis also speaks more broadly to the association
between punitiveness toward crime and basic social psychological processes related to interpersonal perception and relations. In this respect, this thesis makes a significant contribution to the study of punitiveness toward crime and has important social policy implications.
## Contents

Declaration 2  
Abstract 3  
List of Figures 8  
List of Tables 9  
Acknowledgments 10  
Introduction 12  
  References 26  
Thesis Structure 37  
Thesis Materials 43  
Literature Review 44  

  *Determinants of Individuals’ Punitiveness* 47  
    Dispositions to Punish 48  
    Motivations to Punish 50  
    Punishment and Goals 52  
    Social and Cultural Factors 54  
    Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Punitiveness 56  
    Summary 59  

  *Punishment in the Broader Context of Social Life* 60  
    Fundamental Features of Social Life: Competition, Cooperation and Punishment 61  
    Punitive Intuitions: Cognition and Emotion 66  
    Summary 70  

  *New Directions in the Study of Public Punitiveness: The Stereotype Content Model and the Motivated Social Cognition Perspective* 71  
    Stereotyping as a Cognitive Process 72  
    Fundamental Dimensions of Interpersonal Perception: Warmth and Competence 77  
    Stereotypes About Criminals 82  
    Political Ideology, Stereotypes and Punitiveness: A Motivated Social Cognition Perspective 87  

  General Discussion 92  
  References 96

Paper 1  The evil, poor and disliked: Applying the Stereotype Content Model to study the content and social structural determinants of the criminal stereotype 117  

  *Stereotypes About Criminals* 120  

  *The Stereotype Content Model* 122  

  Overview of Three Studies 125  
    Study 1: The ‘Criminal’ Associative Network 125  
    Participants 126  
    Methodology and results 127  
    Discussion of Study 1 138  
    Study 2: The Content of the Criminal Stereotype and its Social Structural Determinants 139  
    Participants 139
Methodology 140
Measures 140
Results 141
Discussion of Study 2 142
Study 3: Replication and ‘Fine Tuning’ of the Criminal Stereotype 145
Participants 145
Methodology and measures 146
Results 148
Discussion of Study 3 154

General Discussion and Conclusion 156
References 159

From Stereotype Content to Affective, Behavioural and Attitudinal Outcomes 168

Paper 2  The ‘Big Two’ and public attitudes toward criminal punishment: Applying the Stereotype Content Model and Behavior from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes Map 170

Criminal Stereotypes and Punitiveness Toward Crime 173

The ‘Big Two’: The Stereotype Content Model and the BIAS map 175
Study 1: Applying the SCM and BIAS Map to Predict Punitive Attitudes 178
Participants 179
Measures 179
Results 183
Summary of Study 1 187
Study 2: The Role of Political Ideology in Shaping Perceptions and Responses to Criminals 188
Participants 190
Measures 190
Results 191
Summary of Study 2 196

Discussion and Conclusion 197
References 199

Pathways Linking Social Perception to Cognitive, Affective and Punitive Responses 211

Paper 3  A crime is only as bad as the person who commits it: The role of stereotypes and political ideology in shaping perceptions and punishment of crime 213

Cognitive and Emotional Predictors of Punitiveness Toward Crime 215
Decisions to Punish Crime 216
Political Ideology and Punitiveness Toward Crime 219

The Content of the Criminal Stereotype and its Emotional, Cognitive and Attitudinal Counterparts 220

Overview of Study 223
Participants 224
Methodology and measures 224
Results 227

General Discussion and Conclusion 241
References 245

On the Role of Criminal Stereotypes and Intuition in Generating Punitiveness Toward Crime 255

Paper 4  Kicking them while they’re down: The effects of perceived warmth and social status on punitive intuitions 257

Participants 260
On the Role of Affect and Intuition in Generating Punitiveness Toward Crime

Paper 5  Fight fire with fire: The effect of perceived anger on punitive intuitions

Perceived Emotion and Behavioural Responses

Method
Participants
Stimuli and measures
Procedure
Results
Discussion and Conclusion
References

Conclusion

References
List of Figures

Literature review
Figure 1 Process and content in two cognitive systems 69
Figure 2 Quadrants of social perception, emotional and behavioural responses according to the SCM and BIAS map 81

Paper 1
Figure 1 Alceste dendogram representing hierarchical classification of word classes (Study 1) 130
Figure 2 Structural Equation Model for Stereotype Content Model (Study 2) 142
Figure 3 Experimental design of Study 3 148

Paper 2
Figure 1 Quadrants of social perception, emotional and behavioural responses according to the SCM and BIAS map 176
Figure 2 Structural Equation Model estimating the SCM and BIAS map with punitiveness as a predicted attitudinal outcome 185
Figure 3 Structural Equation Model estimating the SCM and BIAS map with punitiveness, ideology and political orientation 192

Paper 3
Figure 1 Quadrants of social perception, emotional and behavioural responses according to the Stereotype Content Model and Behavior from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes map 222
Figure 2 Basic model of the effect of social perceptions of warmth and competence on punitiveness 224
Figure 3 Effects of the experimental manipulation on perceptions of warmth and competence 228
Figure 4 The effects of perceived warmth and competence on attributions for crime, perceived intent and remorse (Model 2) 230
Figure 5 Judged wrongfulness and harmfulness (Model 3) 235
Figure 6 Model 6 estimating the effect of stereotypes on decisions to punish and on the determinants of these decisions 237

Paper 4
Figure 1 Screenshot of target trial 263

Paper 5
Figure 1 Screenshot of target trial 282
Figure 2 Plotted regression lines for BlackXAnger interaction 287
List of Tables

**Paper 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Words occurring ≥10 times in total word sample (Study 1)</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>63 word categories (Study 1)</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Top ten word categories in participant responses (Study 1)</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Top ten word types in order of average occurrence (Study 1)</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Means and standard deviations of perceptions of pictures by experimental condition (Study 3)</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Multilevel regression models predicting perceived stereotypicality (Study 3)</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Multilevel regression models predicting perceived warmth and competence (Study 3)</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Paper 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bivariate correlations between emotional responses to criminals</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bivariate correlations between behavioural responses to criminals</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Paper 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Judged wrongfulness and harmfulness (Model 3 &amp; Model 4)</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Paper 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Means, range and bivariate correlations of perceptions of criminals</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Quantiles for prison and non-prison decision response time</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Binary logistic regression model predicting probabilities of giving a convicted criminal a prison as opposed to non-prison sentence</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Multilevel quantile regression model predicting speed of decision to give convicted criminals a prison sentence</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Paper 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Means, range and bivariate correlations of perceptions of criminals</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Multilevel quantile regression model predicting response times in assigning prison sentences to convicted criminals</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgments

Completing my doctoral thesis has been a longstanding ambition. Beginning in high school, I developed a fascination with all things related to crime and spent much of my time in the library, reading everything I could on the subject. It was a bit of a morbid obsession, but it spawned a deep curiosity about who the criminal is and about reactions to crime. Years later, during my bachelor’s degree, I worked with Dr. Michael Conway on studies of social stereotypes related to gender and status. These two elements motivated the current thesis and studies, which satisfied an enduring intellectual itch, so to speak. This undertaking was made possible in part by the support of my family and friends, who continuously encouraged me to keep pushing and succeed. I would like to express my love and appreciation to Michelle, Cynthia, Samantha, Evan, Catherine, Kevin, Gaël, Françoise, Caroline, Alexi, John, Cecilia, Abenaa, Kwabena, Benny, Kristine, Benoit, Maria, Akwasi, Machel, Tara, Chris, Pino, Katrin, Stavroula, Arnaud, Claudia, Nahid and Ben.

I would like to sincerely thank Dr. Jonathan Jackson for his supervision of this thesis. Our countless informal discussions and his undying curiosity, energy and dedication to quality research contributed greatly to this thesis. I would also like to extend thanks to the many professors who have supported and encouraged me throughout my studies, including Dr. Aaron Doyle (who first encouraged me to apply to the LSE), Dr. Michael Conway (who gave me invaluable research experience and who instigated my dedication to rigorous research methods), Dr. Anthony Doob, Dr. Ron Levi, Dr. Roberta Sinclair, Dr. Jouni Kuha, Dr. George Gaskell and Dr. Richard Ericson.
My time at LSE was academically invigorating, personally challenging and fulfilling. I thoroughly enjoyed the lunchtime music concerts in the Shaw library, being a member of the wine tasting society and assisting numerous lectures by leading academics. The Methodology Institute was a home away from home, and the entire faculty, staff and student body were a highlight in my many long days toiling away on the 8th floor of Columbia House. Regular Friday evening faculty and student get-togethers, with wine and chats, gave the MI a distinct convivial feel. I would like to express my pride, profound sense of belonging and thanks to the tremendous institution that is the London School of Economics and Political Science.

This doctoral research was supported by an LSE PhD Scholarship, a grant from the Santander Travel Research Fund and a grant from the University of London Central Research Fund. I thank all of these institutions for their financial support, which ensured the successful completion of this thesis. I would also like to thank all of the participants and research assistants who graciously donated their time to this research.
Introduction

Despite growing prison populations (Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000; Donohue, 2007; Walmsley, 2009; King, 2008) and some indication of decreasing crime rates (Tseloni et al., 2010; Raphael, 2009), individuals in countries such as Canada, the UK and USA continue to want criminal offenders to get stiffer sentences than they seem to be receiving (Useem et al., 2003; Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000). The public desire for increasing punitiveness stands in contrast to the tremendous fiscal, social and political costs of harsh criminal justice policies. In the UK, the prison service budget for 2009 was £4.7 billion, which is equivalent to roughly half the budget for housing development (£10.3 billion) and one fifth of the amount spent on primary education (£23.7 billion) (HM Treasury, 2010). In the USA, the prison service budget for 2009 was roughly six times that of the UK, a staggering $50.4USD billion (£30.2 billion), which is just slightly less than government spending on hospitals ($56.9USD billion or £34.1 billion) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).¹

In addition to fiscal costs, harsh criminal justice policies have devastating social and political costs. Spending some time in prison is associated with being exposed to serious violence and health risks (Roberts & Hough, 2005). Once released from prison, individuals face unemployment or low wages, family instability (Pettit & Western, 2004; Wakefield & Uggen, 2010), the breakdown of important social and political ties to the local community (Uggen, Manza & Thompson, 2006) and an increased chance of returning to prison in the future (Chen & Shapiro, 2007). The effect of increasingly harsh criminal justice policies has been felt most strongly by those in the margins of

¹The difference in prison service budgets between the UK and the USA is roughly proportional to the population size difference between the two countries.
society, for example the youth, the poor and ethnic minorities (Pettit & Western, 2004; Bazemore, 2007; Curry & Klumpp, 2009; Helms, 2009; Wakefield & Uggen, 2010).

Why does the public so staunchly support harsh criminal justice policies when the social, fiscal and political costs are so great? Some evidence suggests that public punitiveness partly reflects a retributive reaction that demarks typical responses to norm violations or crime. However, a number of individual-level factors also affect individuals’ punitiveness, including perceptions of crime, emotion, psychological needs, political orientation and ideology (Bazemore, 2007; Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000; King, 2008, Maruna & King, 2004; Roberts, 1992; Carlsmith, 2008; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Carroll, et al., 1987; Cullen, Cullen & Wozniak, 1988; Darley, Carlsmith & Robinson, 2000; McKee & Feather, 2008). This thesis extends the literature by considering the role of criminal stereotypes in engendering public punitiveness toward crime. Although a number of studies suggest that endorsing stereotypes about criminals is associated with expressing more support for harsh criminal justice policy (Roberts, 1992; Gordon & Anderson, 1995; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; Johnson, 2009), it is not clear why believing that criminals are, for example, poor and evil is associated with expressing a strong desire to punish crime.

The term ‘criminal stereotype’ is in itself a loaded term. The word ‘criminal’ clearly has stronger connotations than other terms such as ‘offender’ or ‘law-breaker’. Refering to ‘criminal stereotypes’ is purposeful as the aim of this research is to draw out stereotypes about those who are ascribed a ‘criminal’ label meant to designate the fact that they have broken the law and become involved with the criminal justice system. This thesis unpacks what is contained in the ‘criminal stereotype’ and
investigates how the endorsement of these particular stereotypes is associated with punitiveness toward crime.

Before moving on to discuss the theoretical and empirical motivations of this thesis, a brief discussion of what constitutes public punitiveness is warranted. This thesis treats punitiveness in *absolute* and *relative* terms. The decision to punish as opposed to not punish a specific crime represents punitiveness in the absolute sense, and can separate a punitive individual from a non-punitive other. For instance, if an individual believes that all crime should be punished, regardless of the circumstances, this individual could be said to demonstrate more punitiveness than an individual who thinks punishment should depend on the context (e.g., mitigating factors). Punitiveness can also be relative, to the extent that one person decides to punish a crime more harshly than another, or endorses more punitive policies than another. This thesis seeks to explain both what pushes individuals to make punitive decisions, and what leads to harsher punitive decisions or attitudes.

The nature and extent of public punitiveness is a question that many criminologists have considered, with some evidence suggesting that in fact, the public are not as punitive as public opinion polls would lead us to believe. In his review of the evidence, Roberts (1992) argued that ‘surveys in criminal justice have all too often reflected mass opinion rather than public judgment’ (p.109). Roberts argues that the evidence strongly suggests that survey items often over-simplify the question of whether individuals seek harsher punishment of crime, for instance by asking individuals whether they believe ‘the courts are too lenient’. The main problem is that answers to this question are assumed to result from individuals’ careful consideration of actual
sentencing practices, and of whether these sentences are appropriate. In reality, these types of measures may beckon rapid responses, perhaps based on recent media coverage of a case where the sentence was perceived as not being tough enough. These broad questions tend to overlook variation in punitiveness and public concerns about fairness and efficiency. These measures can also generate an inflated sense of public punitiveness, in part because of factors that affect superficial measures of public opinion and judgment such as limited public knowledge of the criminal justice system, the media’s role in shaping public knowledge about crime and psychological features of human knowledge acquisition and attitude formation.

The malleability of public punitiveness may suggest that punitive attitudes – as measured by support for harsh criminal justice policy – are unreflective of deeper-seated principles of justice or fairness, and variation in punitiveness toward crime. This thesis therefore addresses the question of how social perception relates to punitiveness toward crime at three levels: first, in terms of punitive attitudes, second with respect to punitive decisions and third by studying punitive intuitions.

This thesis argues that expressed punitive attitudes should be considered in tandem with individuals’ punitive intuitions and judgments (i.e., decisions to punish specific crimes). Punitive intuitions can be understood as the sudden appearance in consciousness of a desire to punish crime without any conscious awareness of having gone through the steps of searching, weighing evidence and inferring that crime should be punished.\(^2\) Individuals’ punitive intuitions and judgments should be front and centre for three reasons. First, punitive judgments often tend to reveal a less punitive public and are partly explained by the same factors that explain punitive attitudes (e.g.,

\(^2\) This definition of punitive intuitions is based on Haidt’s (2001) definition of moral intuition.
negative emotional responses) (Johnson, 2009; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Second, because of their top-of-the head nature, punitive intuitions may provide insight into punitive attitudes or into the mechanisms that very rapidly come to shape these attitudes. Lastly, punitive attitudes should remain an object of study in as long as they are used to justify or support the implementation of harsh criminal justice policies. For these reasons, this thesis will treat punitiveness as the explicit or implicit desire to inflict suffering or see to the punishment of specific crimes, and of crime more generally. To provide a comprehensive study of punitiveness toward crime, the following studies draw from theories and empirical evidence in the areas of expressed punitive attitudes, intuitions and judgments or decisions.

This thesis aims to show that individuals’ strong desire to see to the punishment of crime and firm belief that criminals *should* be punished emerge from a range of cognitive, affective and attitudinal factors that are partly explained by the widespread endorsement of particular criminal stereotypes. This research draws on criminological theories of punishment and social psychological theories of interpersonal and intergroup perception to study the relation between the endorsement of social stereotypes about criminals and punitiveness toward crime. The overarching argument of this thesis is two-part. First, it is argued that stereotypes about criminals reflect fundamental dimensions of social perception that are brought about by systematic cognitive and social structural processes. Second, stereotypes about criminals not only shape social perception of criminals (e.g., perceptions of the extent to which criminals have the intent to commit crime) but also engender strong cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses that contribute to public punitiveness toward crime.
Amongst the two dominant theoretical streams used to explain individuals’ punitiveness toward crime, the present research is more in line with moral as opposed to utilitarian theories. Utilitarian theories of punishment put forth by key thinkers of the Enlightenment such as John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria form part of the Positivist Revolution in criminology (Jenkins, 1984; Donohue, 2007). Utilitarianism is essentially a normative theory as to what punishment should accomplish, that is, cooperation and rule following. This instrumental and functional view of punishment is premised on the assumption that individuals are driven by rational choice, and that cooperation can be achieved through a careful balance of costs and benefits (i.e., through specific and general deterrence). Based on this view, individuals seek to punish others in order to deter future crime. Increases in crime rates or in the perceived risk of being a victim of crime should therefore engender more public punitiveness. Although some evidence suggests that individuals explicitly endorse deterrence goals, their punitive behaviour does not follow deterrence principles (Carroll et al., 1987; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Carlsmith, 2008). The absence of a positive association between crime rates and prison rates also suggests that the increased threat of crime, alone, does not explain increases in punitiveness (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001). Further, reviews of the deterrent effect of punishment on actual crime rates in the USA have led some to conclude that ‘punishment [is] ineffective, irrelevant, or even provocative with respect to crime’ (Fagan & Meares, 2008).

Moral theories of punishment are apparent in Durkheim’s theory of the function of punishment, that is, to engender social cohesion. According to Durkheim, punishment is the embodiment of society’s moral order and contributes chiefly to social solidarity
Punitiveness thus emerges from a moral imperative to reinforce shared and deeply held moral values, as unpunished infractions erode moral order and social cohesion. Research by Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) lends support to Durkheim’s view as it suggests that individuals tend to be more punitive when they perceive a lack of social cohesion. However, recent research recasts this finding, suggesting that political ideology partly explains the association between perceptions of social cohesion and punitiveness toward crime (Jackson, Gerber & Côté-Lussier, 2011).

Although it has adopted a decidedly less functional interpretation of punitiveness, current social psychological research on punitiveness provides some support for the moral view of punitiveness. Factors such as the judged wrongfulness and harmfulness of crime contribute to individuals’ moral outrage toward crime (Alter, Kernochan & Darley, 2007; Darley & Pittman, 2003). Moral outrage itself is part of a range of affective, cognitive and attitudinal factors (e.g., political ideology) that play an important role in engendering punitive responses to crime (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Jost et al., 2003). The present research is therefore most in line with contemporary social psychological or moral theories of punishment, as opposed to utilitarian theories of punishment. Still, this thesis does not make strong claims regarding the function of punishment. Rather, the interest is in investigating the processes that link the endorsement of stereotypes about criminals to individuals’ desire for harsh punishment of crime.

Where criminological theory and research on punishment of crime is less developed is in the area of interpersonal perception and behaviour. Moving away from the specificity of punishment in the criminological context, punishing behaviour itself is
an integral part of social life and has been linked to basic cooperative and competitive behaviour (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Masclet & Villeval, 2008; Price, Cosmides & Tooby, 2002; Trivers, 1971). Yet, much of the criminological research that considers the role of stereotypes in engendering punitiveness has stopped short of considering the interpersonal processes that link social perceptions to policy preferences. The theoretical argument made in this thesis is that punishment of crime should be situated within the broader framework of social behaviour. In studying individuals’ punitiveness, more attention should be given to the fundamental processes that affect social behaviour, such as person perception, cognition and affect.

Studying the interpersonal processes that link social perception to punitiveness can provide insight into what some have called individuals’ ‘intuitive’ desire to punish criminals. Robinson and Darley (2007) have argued that support for harsh criminal justice policy is likely to reflect rapid or intuitive punitive responses as opposed to careful consideration of the costs and benefits of sweeping harsh criminal justice policies. They partly base this claim on inconsistencies between individuals’ explicit and implicit punitive desires and behaviours. For instance, despite explicitly endorsing punishment goals such as deterrence, individuals tend to punish along retributive lines and place great importance on the judged wrongfulness and harmfulness of a crime (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Hoffman and Goldsmith (2004) have gone so far as to suggest that the urge to punish is biologically rooted and is modulated by a sense of fairness. The literature therefore suggests that emotional and other rapid cognitive processes, such as social perception and ideological preferences, are at the root of individuals’ intuition that criminals should be punished.
This thesis builds on criminological research on punishment of crime and on social psychological research on social perception. Specifically, this research focuses on the effect of stereotypes’ cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes on punitiveness toward crime. Early on Asch (1946), and later Rosenberg et al. (1968), recognized the ambivalent nature of person perception and impression formation, and the importance of situational or contextual factors in shaping social perception. This perspective suggests that rather than being univalent, perceptions of others are complex, multidimensional and dynamic. Research on person perception and stereotyping eventually moved away from these tenets and instead became interested in the processes that engender and support stereotyping, such as cognitive load and social power (Fiske, 1992). Fiske (1992) called for a return to a pragmatic view of social cognition, that is, one which takes into account the goals, motivations and cultural context of social perceivers (see also Abele & Wojciszke, 2007, on a functional perspective of social perception). This thesis adopts this pragmatic view of social perception and considers the function of criminal stereotypes in engendering punitiveness toward crime.

Current research on stereotypes has reached widespread consensus that, cross-culturally, stereotypes about social groups represent two fundamental dimensions of social perception: warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Cuddy et al., 2009; Judd et al., 2005; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008; Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Wiggins, 1979). These dimensions answer questions that are fundamental for survival and social relationships: What are this individual/group’s intentions (i.e., how warm are they)? How capable is this individual/group of carrying out their intentions (i.e., how competent are they)? Perceptions of others’ warmth are
especially important as they are fundamental to human survival, and inform basic approach and avoidance behaviour (Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998).

Concerning the etiology of stereotypes about others’ warmth and competence, the extant literature suggests that stereotypes are brought about both by systematic cognitive processes and by social structural determinants. Stereotyping is a cognitive process that results primarily from a basic tendency to engage in cognitive economy or demonstrate a preference for thinking that provides maximum information with the ‘least cognitive effort’ (Rosch, 1978; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). A tendency to commit fundamental attribution errors and other cognitive processes lead individuals to draw inferences from other groups’ competitiveness and social status to their dispositions and traits (Fiske et al., 1999; 2002; 2006; Fiske, 2009). For instance, a group seen as competing for resources or power will be inferred to be cold and uncaring, or in other words, as lacking warmth (e.g., immigrants) (Lee & Fiske, 2006). Perceptions of others’ competence and intelligence flow from the ubiquity of status hierarchies and from making basic inferences regarding the deservingness of others’ high (and low) social status (therefore supporting beliefs in a just world) (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007).

Stereotypes about others’ warmth and competence are especially important because of their interpersonal and intergroup functions. According to the Stereotype Content Model (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007) discrimination can be differentiated on the basis of its cognitive, affective and behavioural components. Based on perceptions of other groups, individuals experience a range of emotions that result from interpersonal comparisons. For example, upward assimilative comparisons engender admiration and pride, whereas downward contrastive comparisons elicit contempt (Cuddy, Fiske &
Emotions in turn are key in activating behaviour, but can also function to inform attitudes at an intuitive level (Frijda, 2010; Haidt, 2001; Roseman, West & Swartz, 1994). For instance, emotions such as anger may support aggressive behaviour but also a preference for aggressive social policies toward the object of anger (Skitka et al., 2006).

The central thesis of this research is that variance in the endorsement of criminal stereotypes can help explain variance in attitudes and responses toward crime. While it is clear that individuals’ reliance on stereotypes can differ according to personal ideology and circumstance, this research also implies that the content of criminal stereotypes can vary, for instance on dimensions of warmth and competence. The idea that a criminal could be perceived as being warm is certainly counterintuitive. However, it is important to bear in mind that criminal stereotypes can vary to the extent that individuals perceive certain criminals (e.g., mass murderers) as being more cruel than others (e.g., common thieves). Criminal stereotyping also implies overlooking the multidimensionality of convicted criminals. For instance, criminals may be perceived as being cold and incompetent because of their involvement in crime, but these perceptions could change if individuals are told that the criminal in question is a loving father, involved community member or successful businessman. It is in this context that the following research treats criminal stereotyping as variant and malleable.

This research addresses three key questions. First, studying the effect of criminal stereotypes on punitiveness requires a solid understanding of the content and predictors of criminal stereotypes. It is not enough to know that the public generally believe that criminals are poor, cruel, unattractive and social outcasts (Roberts, 1992; Reed & Reed,
What dimensions underlie these beliefs, and what function do these beliefs play in social perception and interpersonal relations? Studying the content of criminal stereotypes removes this area of inquiry from the criminological context and implants it firmly in the domain of interpersonal and intergroup perception. Stereotypes about criminals can then be understood as reflecting basic dimensions of social perception, and as coming into place as the result of social structural factors that are partly static (e.g., the perception that criminals compete against society), and partly dynamic (e.g., the perception that criminals have a low social status).

Next, this thesis addresses the cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes of criminal stereotypes. The questions addressed here concern the role of stereotypes and their outcomes in shaping individuals’ punitive intuitions, attitudes and decisions. Stereotypes form part of individuals’ implicit social cognition and can play an important role in shaping attitudes and social behaviour (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Attitudes themselves can be based on affective (e.g., emotion, drives) and cognitive factors (e.g., thoughts, judgments), and function to fulfil basic psychological needs (Edwards, 1990). The functionality of social stereotypes in guiding interpersonal relations suggest that increased attention should be paid to the effect of criminal stereotypes on the predictors of public punitiveness, such as emotions of anger or moral outrage.
Lastly, this research tests the effect of criminal stereotypes on individuals’ very rapid or intuitive desires to punish criminals harshly. This part of the thesis makes an important methodological and empirical contribution to the literature. Although a major debate in criminology regards the origin of public punitiveness – reasoned responses or rapid intuitive or affective responses – most of the methodologies used in previous research (e.g., paper and pencil questionnaires) are not designed to capture intuitive responses. The final part of this thesis addresses this gap in the literature by developing and applying a methodology that allows to experimentally test the effects of criminal stereotypes and affect on punitive intuitions. This part of the thesis also speaks directly to earlier claims regarding the importance of addressing the association between social perception and punitiveness in its different forms (e.g., attitudes, judgments and intuitions).

Of course, there is much more to public punitiveness than the endorsement of stereotypes. Although the present research cannot address the full range of social and cultural factors that influence individuals’ punitiveness, some consideration will be given to the direct and indirect effects of political ideology on punitiveness toward crime. Ideological positions such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) have both been linked to stereotyping, prejudice and punitiveness toward crime (Bassett, 2010; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duriez et al., 2005; Jost et al., 2003; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009; Kreindler, 2005; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). In times of economic strain and social insecurity, individuals generally tend to become more politically conservative and adopt more conservative ideologies such as RWA and SDO (Jost et al., 2003). The endorsement of
stereotypes and its effect on public punitiveness can therefore be shaped by dispositional and situational factors, such as ideology and social or existential threats, respectively (Bassett, 2010; Blasi & Jost, 2006; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). By broadening the scope of this research to consider political ideology, the aim is to explain some of the variance in individuals’ endorsement of stereotypes and punitiveness toward crime.

To summarize, one of the key aims of this research is to add to the body of evidence that suggests that the public’s desire for harsh criminal justice policy is partly based on the endorsement of criminal stereotypes. This thesis argues that criminals stereotypes, which are brought about by systematic cognitive processes and social structural determinants, influence individuals’ punitive intuitions, cognitive, emotional and attitudinal responses. By shaping the way individuals perceive and feel toward crime, stereotypes about criminals’ evilness or cruelty can have serious social, political and fiscal consequences.

An implication of this research is that harsh criminal justice policies put into place on the basis of public support could be detrimental not only to those caught up in the criminal justice system, but also to the social and political system. Recent evidence suggests that although individuals may explicitly endorse harsh punitive policies, they fail to support these policies when in practice they run counter to individuals’ intuitive sense of justice (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Notions of justice are deeply tied to concepts of fairness or equity (Hoffman & Goldsmith, 2004; Hsu, Anen & Quartz, 2008; Moll et al., 2005), one of the moral dimensions upon which individuals intuitively decide whether something is right or wrong (Haidt, 2001). Criminal justice policies implemented on the basis of public support but that go against the public’s deep seated
notions of justice and fairness – for example by disproportionately punishing the poor or young, or by imposing mandatory and lengthy prison sentences in cases where such sentences are deemed unnecessary – could have the effect of threatening the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Tyler, 1990). Soundings of public support for criminal justice policy should therefore consider the nature of individuals’ punitive intuitions and attitudes, and the role of interpersonal perception in shaping social and policy preferences.

References


of limits in the implementation of retributive policy. *Social Research, 74*(2), 651-62.


Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T. & Glick, P. (2007). The BIAS map: Behaviors from


Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P. & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed)
stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82(6), 878-902.


memory of a criminal act: the effects of stereotypes and cognitive load.


The substantive component of this thesis consists of five papers. Two of the papers have been submitted for publication to peer-reviewed journals, and the remaining three are ready for submission. This section will provide a brief overview of the structure of this thesis and the major contributions of each paper.

The first paper is entitled ‘The evil, poor and disliked: Applying the Stereotype Content Model to study the content and structural determinants of the criminal stereotype’ and was submitted to Law and Human Behavior. This paper systematically investigates individuals’ stereotypes about criminals as a social group. The overarching argument is that stereotypes about criminals reflect fundamental dimensions of social perception and are predicted by social structural determinants. In Study 1, participants were asked to freely list the words that come to mind when they think about who and what a ‘criminal’ is. Study 2 builds on the first study by looking at the content of criminal stereotypes and how they are predicted by social structural determinants of competition (e.g., for resources) and social status. The final study presented in this paper moves beyond the two previous correlational studies by experimentally instantiating the criminal stereotype and observing its effect on individuals’ perceptions of others (e.g., resemblance to the stereotypical criminal), distinguishing between street criminal and white-collar criminal stereotypes. Together, the results of this first paper suggest that when thinking about criminals, individuals spontaneously think of individuals who lack warmth and of society’s responses to these individuals. These findings are partly replicated in the experimental study, where being labelled a criminal leads individuals to be perceived as lacking warmth and as being lower on social status, particularly when
labelled as a street criminal. In line with predictions made by the Stereotype Content Model (SCM), the results suggest that criminal stereotypes are not haphazard nor derived solely on the basis of criminals’ behaviour. Rather, the stereotype that suggests that criminals’ lack warmth and competence is predicted by individuals’ perceptions of criminals’ competitiveness and social status.

The second paper of this thesis is entitled ‘Criminals as a social group: Applying the Stereotype Content Model to public attitudes toward punishment’ and was submitted to a special issue of Social Psychology dedicated to the ‘Big Two’ dimensions of social perception. This paper builds on the first paper by investigating the affective and behavioural outcomes of the criminal stereotype and their effects on punitive attitudes. In Model 1, the Stereotype Content Model and the Behaviour from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes map are applied using structural equation modelling in order to simultaneously estimate the paths linking stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth and competence to specific emotional, behavioural and punitive responses. In Model 2, the model is expanded by considering the role of political ideology in shaping social perception and responses to criminal stereotypes. The results suggest that endorsing stereotypes regarding criminals’ lack of warmth is associated with feeling more uneasiness and anger, and less compassion toward criminals. In turn, negative emotions of uneasiness and anger predict exclusionary and attacking behaviour. However, when controlling for individuals’ political ideology and negative emotional responses toward criminals (e.g., anger), a lack of compassion appears to be an important predictor of individuals’ punitive attitudes. This research is line with previous findings that suggest
that compassion is a key predictor of attitudinal and behavioural responses toward norm violators and criminals.

The third paper is entitled ‘A crime is only as bad as the person who commits it: The role of stereotypes and political ideology in shaping perceptions and punishment of crime’ and will likely be submitted to Experimental Social Psychology. This paper moves the level of analysis from punitive attitudes to punitive judgments and considers the effect of criminal stereotypes on social perception and cognition. Previous research suggests that perceptions and judgments of crime (e.g., about a crime’s wrongfulness) contribute to its perceived seriousness and emotions of moral outrage, and in turn to harsh punishment. This study experimentally manipulates the criminal stereotype and incrementally builds a full model of the cognitive and affective predictors of punishment decisions. The aim is to identify some of the pathways that link social perception to strong cognitive and emotional outcomes in the context of crime. The results suggest that perceiving criminals in stereotypical ways (i.e., as lacking warmth) is associated with attributing crime to internal (e.g., personality) as opposed to external (e.g., stress) factors and with judging crime as being more harmful and wrongful. The judged wrongfulness and harmfulness of a crime in turn contributes to moral outrage and judgments about a crime’s seriousness, the latter of which is a key factor in determining how severely a crime should be punished. This study also considers the role of political ideology in shaping social perception and punitive responses. Criminal stereotypes therefore shape not only the way individuals feel toward crime, as suggested by the second paper presented in this thesis, but also how individuals perceive crime. Moving away from perceptions of specific crimes and toward perceptions of crime in general,
the results could suggest that stereotypes about criminals also engender beliefs about the nature of crime more broadly (e.g., about crime’s seriousness). It remains an empirical question whether these beliefs in turn influence broader punitive attitudes toward crime.

The fourth paper of this thesis is a brief article to be submitted to *Cognition* entitled ‘*Kicking them while they’re down: The effect of low perceived warmth and social status on punitive intuitions*’. The fourth paper moves beyond paper-and-pencil methodologies and uses a response-time study to get at the effect of criminal stereotypes on individuals’ intuitive desire to punish crime. Although previous work has discussed punitive intuitions, they have not used methods that allow for the detection of intuitive or rapid punitive responses. By developing and using a methodology that allows for the measurement of individuals’ intuitive decisions to punish others, this paper makes an important methodological contribution to this stream of research. The paper also uses a method of analysis that has not yet been used to analyze response-time data in social psychology: multilevel quantile regression. This method is used in order to model the entire response time distribution while taking into account the clustered nature of the data. The results of binary logistic regression modeling suggest that participants were more likely to harshly punish convicted criminals who were low on perceived warmth. However, the results of multilevel quantile regression modeling reveal that perceived social status can be equally important in shaping intuitive punitive responses. This is the first paper presented in this thesis speaking directly to the role of intuition in generating punitiveness toward crime, and to the role of criminal stereotypes in shaping those intuitions.
The fifth and final paper is a research report to be submitted to *Psychological Science* entitled ‘*Fight fire with fire: The effects of perceived anger on punitive intuitions*’. This paper uses the same methodology as in the fourth paper to observe whether criminals’ perceived anger and sadness influence punitive intuitions. This research builds on cognitive research on the human capacity to identify, simulate and respond to the affective states of others, a process that neuroscientific research suggests is related to neural substrates called ‘mirror neurons’. The hypothesis tested in this paper is that perceiving anger in criminals generates an angry response in the observer and punitive intuitions. The opposing hypothesis is that perceiving sadness in criminals generates compassion in the observer and slows punitive intuitions. The results of multilevel quantile regression suggest that criminals’ perceived anger is associated with harsh punitive responses early on in the decision-making process. Perceived sadness on the other hand has a weaker but marginally significant slowing effect on rapid punitive responses. These results build on the findings of the second paper by demonstrating that anger is an affective response to criminals that engenders rapid or intuitive desires to punish crime harshly.

These five papers provide strong empirical evidence that, both at the individual and group-level, criminal stereotypes reflect fundamental dimensions of social perception and result from systematic cognitive and social structural factors. Moreover, this body of research suggests that criminal stereotypes engender specific cognitive, affective and behavioural responses that contribute to punitiveness toward crime. The fourth and fifth papers successfully address an important gap in the literature on punitive intuitions by demonstrating that the same cognitive and affective processes that shape
punitive attitudes and decisions also shape intuitive punitive responses. One key implication is that punitiveness toward crime results in part from intuitive processes, though both intuition and reasoning appear to be shaped by the endorsement of criminal stereotypes. The results are discussed in terms of the contributions this research makes to the criminological and interpersonal perception and relations literatures, as well as in terms of the social policy implications.
Thesis Materials

The thesis materials submitted herein are in line with the Methodology Institute’s paper-based thesis guidelines for a PhD. These thesis materials consist of an introductory chapter, a literature review chapter, five constituent papers of the thesis and linking materials between each paper, and a conclusion chapter. All papers presented here are single authored.

The reader will find that there is some repetition between each section. Because each paper is to stand-alone as a published paper, some repetition (particularly of major theoretical constructs and arguments) is inevitable. Because each paper is designed for publication, the papers presented herein reference each other.
The punishment of rule-breakers is a prominent feature of social and political life: It manifests early on in parent-child relations, in school, in work, in religious, as well as criminal justice settings (Garland, 1990; Ignatieff, 1981; Newman, 1978; Skinner, 1979). Punishment has been linked more generally to basic cooperative and competitive behaviour that makes up any functioning society (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Masclet & Villeval, 2008). Yet, there are widely held concerns about the extent to which society punishes law-breakers. Societies have long punished law-breakers. Indeed punishment is for all purposes qualitatively milder than it was only a few hundred years ago. But crime control policies have become increasingly harsh in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom in the final quarter of the 20th century.

Increasing punitiveness is seen most visibly in growing prison populations (Walmsley, 2009). In the United States alone, the prison population has risen six-fold in a quarter of a century, with estimates of the prison population in the early 2000s ranging from 1.2 million to 2 million (Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000; Donohue, 2007). In the United Kingdom, the prison population had reached its capacity of 80,000 in 2006 (King, 2008). In the USA, such increases in prison populations appear to reflect increases in the length, as opposed to the number, of prison sentences (Frost, 2008; Raphael, 2009). Lengthier prison sentences and growing prison populations are only part of the punitive trend. Other features include heavy-handed laws and policies (e.g., mandatory and indeterminate sentencing, harsh drug laws, three-strikes-and-you’re-out and zero-tolerance legislation, the removal of voting rights from prisoners in the USA, and Anti-Social Behaviour Orders in the UK).
The increasing harshness of criminal justice policy appears to be partly due to widespread public support for such policies, as evidenced in opinion polls and surveys of attitudes in Canada, the UK and the USA (Doob & Roberts, 1984; Hough & Roberts, 1999; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997). Popular desires to punish law-breakers may be reflective of deep-seated needs to punish norm violators, for instance in response to strong emotional responses such as anger (Hoffman & Goldsmith, 2004). There is mounting evidence that punishment of crime is an intuitive response that is retributive in nature, reflects perceptions of the seriousness of a crime, and is related to individuals’ moral outrage (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). But there are still variations in the degree to which individuals are willing to punish: not everyone unequivocally expresses harsh punitive preferences. Though evidence suggests that there is a high level of strong support for punishment of serious offenders, individuals’ punitive desires and behaviours are related to a range of factors including individual differences (e.g., political orientation), sentencing options and goals, beliefs about the function of punishment, and perceptions of the offence and offender (Bazemore, 2007; Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000; King, 2008, Maruna & King, 2004; Roberts, 1992).

The purpose of this research is to focus on the effect of criminal stereotypes, and their cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes, on punitiveness toward crime. The main hypothesis is that individuals’ punitiveness toward criminals is partly explained by the endorsement of stereotypes which suggest that criminals are essentially poor and evil. A secondary aim of this research is to contribute to the literature that suggests that punitiveness toward crime results from intuitive as opposed to reasoned processes. A key implication of this research is that basing criminal justice policies on public support
could lead to policies that, in practice, are both ineffectual and unreflective of individuals’ actual punitiveness. In Canada, for instance, public support has contributed to the recent decision to implement harsher policies and build more prisons, despite declining crime rates. One of the upshots of harsh criminal justice policies has also been their disproportionate effects on those in the margins of society (Bazemore, 2007; Curry & Klumpp, 2009; Helms, 2009; Pettit & Western, 2004). Yet it seems unlikely that individuals would knowingly support policies that disproportionately punish the youth, poor and ethnic minorities, given deep seated concerns for fairness. Responding to individuals’ seeming insatiable desire for harsh punishment, which appears to be shaped in part by the endorsement of criminal stereotypes and punitive intuitions, contributes to disproportionately punishing and marginalizing specific social groups. Putting into place such policies can additionally have the effect of placing a large social and fiscal burden on society.

This review roughly consists of three parts. First, findings that have emerged from the study of individuals’ punitiveness toward crime will be reviewed. Methodological issues in measuring punitiveness will also be discussed. Next, individuals’ punitiveness will be placed within the broader context of social life. The association between punishment and basic competitive and cooperative behaviour will be addressed from the perspective of human development and social cognition. The criminological audience will then be introduced to a growing literature on fundamental dimensions of social judgment and social stereotypes. In this section, stereotypes about criminals and features of person perception will be linked to the determinants of punitiveness. Lastly, variation in individuals’ punitiveness will be discussed in terms of
differences in political ideology. More than shaping voting behaviours, political ideology is associated with socio-cognitive differences and with strong emotional responses, both of which have a role in shaping public punitiveness toward crime.

Determinants of Individuals’ Punitiveness

In the past 30 years, individuals’ punitiveness has come to the fore, in part due to issues such as penal populism (i.e., the politicization of punishment) and the implementation of increasingly harsh criminal justice policies (Beckett, 1997; Bottoms, 1995; Doob & Roberts, 1984; Garland, 2001; Loader, 2009; Maruna & King, 2004; Pratt, 2007). Seemingly widespread support for harsh treatment of offenders and the mass incarceration of segments of the population have led criminologists to consider why such trends have emerged in countries such as the UK, Canada and the USA. Up until the 1990s, commentators argued that this punitive trend was indicative of a public who wanted more punishment and harsher treatment of criminals, in part due to widespread fear of crime, dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system and ignorance about actual crime rates and sentencing practices. Although there is a high level of public support for punishment of serious offenders, much of the evidence suggests that individuals’ punitive desires and behaviour are influenced by a number of social psychological factors.

The extant literature suggests that individuals’ punitive desires or attitudes are partly explained by a range of social, cultural, cognitive and emotional responses to crime and criminals. For instance, criminologists and social psychologists have considered the role of anger, fear of crime, political ideology, economic insecurity, perceptions of crime (e.g., seriousness) and the endorsement of criminal stereotypes in
engendering public punitiveness (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carroll et al., 1987; Johnson, 2009; King & Maruna, 2009; King & Wheelock, 2007; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Roberts, 1992; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). The following review is broken up into three parts in order to account for differences in individuals’ punitive dispositions, motivations and goals. By drawing distinctions between levels of analysis, the aim is to underscore the interrelatedness of predictors of punitiveness toward crime.

Dispositions to Punish

Punitiveness toward crime is related to a range of factors: People who are more punitive tend to be male, older, politically conservative, have lower education and income, although these patterns are at times inconsistent (across studies) and explain relatively little of the variance in punitiveness (Costelloe et al., 2002; King & Maruna, 2009; Shoepfer, Carmichael & Piquero, 2007). A major weakness of some of these findings is that they are often descriptive and lack theoretical grounding. In this section, some of these predictors will be considered in relation to dispositional factors that are associated with punitiveness toward crime.

Individuals’ disposition to punish relates fundamentally to differences in underlying social psychological processes. Punitiveness is associated with a range of personality and ideological differences (e.g., Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, dogmatism, political orientation), cognitive styles and psychological needs (e.g., attributional complexity, need for cognition, internal locus of control), social and moral values (e.g., vengefulness, benevolence) and social perception (e.g., perceived social cohesion, change and threat) (Tam, Leung & Chiu, 2008; Sargent,
2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008; McKee & Feather, 2008; King & Wheelock, 2007, Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997). All of these dispositional factors suggest a desire to preserve the status quo, and to achieve certainty, closure and predictability. According to the motivated social cognition perspective, the endorsement of specific ideologies, beliefs and attitudes is predicted by individuals’ psychological needs (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009). Punitiveness can therefore be understood as fulfilling needs which vary according to individuals’ dispositions.

Dispositional factors can also interact with each other and with higher level factors, such as motivations to punish (see also Methodological Issues). For instance, socio-cognitive motivations (e.g., need for cognition) may interact with personality differences (e.g., authoritarianism) to contribute to sophisticated arguments that justify punishing certain social groups (Tam, Leung & Chiu, 2008). Dispositions to punish also seem to mediate punitiveness through factors associated with motivations to punish such as attributing criminal behaviour to internal dispositions (Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008).

Lastly, evidence suggests that state and trait emotions such as fear, disgust, anger, empathy and vengefulness can influence punitive behaviour and attitudes directly and indirectly through moral judgment and behavioural attributions (Johnson, 2009; Jones & Fitness, 2008; Gault & Sabini, 2000). Emotional responses to crime can therefore engender and support cognitive processes that in turn increase individuals’ punitiveness toward crime.
Motivations to Punish

Motivations to punish crime are partly related to perceptions and judgments of the offence and the offender. Generally, the seriousness of a crime is a key determinant of how much people are motivated to punish it. Discrepancies in how much punishment offences typically receive reflect cultural consensus that, for example, violent crimes are more serious than white-collar crimes (e.g., embezzlement) (but see Cullen, Hartman & Jonson, 2009, for social and cultural features that may change perceptions of crime, and Roberts, 1992, for differences in ordinal and cardinal seriousness, and in consensus over seriousness). The determinants of seriousness are difficult to disentangle, however. Some evidence suggests that the perceived wrongfulness of crime, demarked by perceptions of intent or blameworthiness (e.g., offenders’ remorse or social motives), outweighs its harmfulness as a determinant of seriousness and punitiveness (Alter, Kernochan & Darley, 2007; Fragale et al., 2009). Other research suggests that the type of offence can shift the focus for assessments of seriousness, with wrongfulness being key in property offences and harmfulness in personal offences (Warr, 1989). Cushman (2008) further teases apart the harmfulness of an offence in terms of (a) the consequences of the offence and (b) the offender’s causal responsibility\(^3\), and the wrongfulness of an offence in terms of (c) the offender’s intent to harm and (d) belief that they would cause harm. He found that in assigning punishment, individuals pay comparable attention to whether the offender caused and intended to cause the harm, specifically in terms of the offender’s belief that they would cause harm. These findings

\(^3\) In Cushman’s (2008) operationalization, causal responsibility refers to whether the individual caused the harm, and not to whether their causal responsibility is attributed to internal dispositions.
point to the importance of social perceptions of the offence but also of the offender in
decisions to punish crime.

Perceptions of offenders’ intent and causal responsibility may therefore be key in
motivating punishment. Causes of crime can include individuals’ dispositions (e.g.,
laziness, evilness or callousness), social (e.g., drug use, criminal associates) and
economic factors (e.g., poverty, inequality). Individuals typically punish more harshly
when they perceive intent and attribute the causes of crime to individuals’ dispositions
(Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carroll et al., 1987; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986;
Roberts, 1992; see also Hauser et al., 2007, for similar findings in moral judgment).
Other features of the offender such as criminal record, Afrocentric features, social status
and social motives (i.e., self-concerned vs. other-concerned) are also associated with
punitiveness (Blair et al., 2004; Christopher, Marek & May, 2003; Kliemann et al.,
2008). The violation of social expectations can also lead to more punishment, for
instance when high-status offenders commit low-status offences (Christopher, Marek &
May, 2003).

The motivational link between perceptions and punitiveness is emotion. Features
of the offence and offender lead to increased moral outrage, an emotional response most
strongly associated with the emotion of anger (Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002;
Montada & Schneider, 1989; Batson et al., 2007; Hoffman, 1989). Strong negative
emotional responses such as moral outrage or anger in turn increase punitiveness toward
crime (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley &
Robinson, 2002).
To date, however, little research has considered dispositional factors that could affect individuals’ motivations to punish crime, such as personality and ideological differences (Carroll et al., 1987). For instance, people may pay more attention to certain features of the offence and offender (e.g., perceived intent) in order to justify their dispositional punitiveness. Later this review will consider some of the ideological positions that influence individuals’ endorsement of criminal stereotypes and punitiveness toward crime.

**Punishment and Goals**

Criminological theory and research on public punitiveness has focused in part on the role of punishment in fulfilling various social goals, such as instrumental goals of inducing cooperation and preventing future harms (e.g., deterrence, incapacitation) and moral goals of repairing harms (or restoring justice) (Carlsmith, 2008; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Carroll, et al., 1987; Cullen, Cullen & Wozniak, 1988; Darley, Carlsmith & Robinson, 2000; McKee & Feather, 2008). Though often framed in opposition, utilitarian and moral theories seem to be unified by their functional treatment of punishment.

Utilitarianism was put forth by key thinkers of the Enlightenment such as John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria and is part of the Positivist Revolution in criminology (Jenkins, 1984; Donohue, 2007). Utilitarianism’s appeal is two-part. First, it has as a central goal to ‘humanize’ punishment. Second, it has the added advantage of rendering the world a predictable, orderly place (Garland, 1990; Ignatieff, 1981; Kateb, 2007). Utilitarianism is essentially a normative theory as to what punishment should accomplish, that is, cooperation and rule following. This
instrumental and functional view of punishment is premised on the assumption that individuals are driven by rational choice, and that cooperation can be achieved through a careful balance of costs and benefits (i.e., through specific and general deterrence). Contemporary offshoots of this theory place an emphasis on the role of concerns about crime, rule-breaking and victimization in contributing to punitiveness (Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997).

Moral theories of punishment are perhaps most apparent in Durkheim’s analysis of the functions of punishment. Punishment is seen as the embodiment of society’s moral order and as contributing chiefly to social solidarity. Punitiveness thus emerges from a moral imperative to reinforce shared and deeply held moral values, as unpunished infractions run the risk of eroding moral order and social cohesion. The association between punishment and justice is also emphasized in other moral perspectives such as retributive theory (which argues that punishment equates justice) and just deserts theory (which argues that an offender should be punished in proportion to the harm committed).\(^4\) To the extent that punishment is seen as restoring shared values, repairing harm or achieving justice, moral theories can also be seen as adopting a functional or instrumental view of punishment. Moral theories, however, additionally underscore the emotional aspect of punishment and its association with deep-seated notions of justice.

Recent research has called into question the notion that individuals endorse and apply functional theories of punishment. Grounded in research which suggests that there is a disjuncture between why people punish and why they say they punish, a number of

\(^4\) Retributive and just deserts theory are often considered in tandem, but see Wenzel et al., 2008, on distinctions in retributive and restorative justice, and Tonry, 2007, for an opposing view.
social psychological studies explore the association between punitiveness and underlying goals of punishment. For instance, in experimental studies, deservingness (e.g., based on the perceived seriousness of the crime) and deterrence (e.g., based on the perceived likelihood of reoffending) factors are manipulated in order to assess the role of retributive versus utilitarian motives to punish, respectively (Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Carlsmith, 2008). In these and other studies the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that retributive factors are more predictive of punitiveness than utilitarian factors, suggesting that underlying goals of punishment are closer to just-deserts than to behaviour-control (e.g., deterrence, incapacitation) (Carlsmith, 2008; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002). Similar findings emerge in public goods studies, where punishment tends to be retributive in nature and is independent of expectations of future cooperation (Masclet & Villeval, 2008; Fehr & Gächter, 2000).

The discrepancy between individuals’ expressed endorsement of utilitarian goals but implicit endorsement of retributive goals lends support to the idea that people’s desire to punish is an intuitive, automatic response, premised on ideas of fairness and justice (Robinson & Darley, 2007).

Social and Cultural Factors

While social psychological factors are key in predicting punitiveness, these processes do not operate independently from individuals’ social and cultural setting. Support for harsh punitive policies is associated with broader factors such as economic insecurity, crime and victimization rates, racial composition of neighbourhoods, media coverage of crime and exposure to crime news, social perceptions of collective efficacy, trust and
generational anxiety (see Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; King & Wheelock, 2007; King & Maruna, 2009). Theoretical frameworks that link punitiveness to social and cultural factors suggest that punitiveness is associated with prejudice on the basis of class and racial divides, consumerism in the construction of attitudes that support punishment, cultural differences in the relative importance placed on honour (social status) and the cultural acceptance of vengeance as a response to perceived slights and threats (for example, in the Southern and Western United States) (Unnever, Benson & Cullen, 2008; Unnever & Cullen, 2007; Cochran & Chamlin, 2006; McKee & Feather, 2008; Loader, 2009). For instance, the ‘angry white male’ theory links punitiveness to dispositional factors such as being male, having a low education and income, but also to social factors such as experiencing economic insecurity (Costelloe, Chiricos & Gertz, 2009).

More broadly, the politicization of punishment, general anxieties about social change, economic insecurity and declining morality, and concern about crime are hypothesized to catalyze punitive responses, especially toward marginalized groups, due to factors such as the channelling of anxious insecurities and scapegoating (Hogan, Chiricos & Gertz, 2005; Soss, Langbein & Metelko, 2003; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Costelloe, Chiricos & Gertz, 2009). Though the present research does not take into account broader social and cultural factors, due to time and space constraints, these are issues that should be addressed in any comprehensive theory of punishment.
Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Punitiveness

Issues in measuring individuals’ punitiveness are closely tied to what it means to punish. At its core, punishment has three discernable components: deciding to punish, deciding on the appropriate punishment, and the meting out of punishment. In the context of criminal justice, measures of punitiveness can address not only individuals’ desire to punish and the degree to which they are willing to punish, but also beliefs about the role of the criminal justice system in administering punishment.

Punitiveness has been measured by investigating (a) the assignment of punitive sentences (e.g., jail term); (b) the endorsement of punishment goals (e.g., ‘More emphasis should be placed on keeping criminals behind bars’); (c) beliefs about the functions of punishment (e.g., ‘Capital punishment reduces crime in the long run’); (d) support for harsh punitive responses (e.g., ‘Making sentences more severe for all crimes’) and policies (e.g., ‘Taking away television and recreational privileges from prisoners’); and (e) support and trust in the criminal justice system (e.g., ‘The courts are too lenient with criminals’). There is some consistency in terms of what constitutes punitiveness in absolute terms as recurrent themes include measuring support for the death penalty, mandatory sentencing (e.g., three-strikes laws) and harsh treatment of juvenile offenders. However, there is often a failure to address the complexity and subjectivity of punitiveness, a tendency to conflate punitive components and a lack of standardization in measures of punitiveness.

First, not all studies measuring punitiveness allow for the measurement of individuals’ decision to punish. Indeed, certain studies bypass the decision to punish by forcing participants to assign a punitive sentence and circumventing responses other
than punishment. In measuring decisions of the appropriateness of various punishments, some studies, fail to address subjective understandings of what constitutes harsh punishment, and prohibit measurement of complex responses to crime by placing non-punitive preventative responses (e.g., investing in crime prevention efforts) at the end of a supposed punitive continuum. Some evidence suggests that individuals may adopt non-punitive preventative responses in addition to punitive responses, if given the opportunity, and that there is variation between individuals’ assessment of severity of punishment warranted and punishment assigned in absolute terms (e.g., length of jail term) (Cullen, Cullen & Wozniak, 1988; Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000).

A more widespread and troubling issue in measuring punitiveness is the frequent conflation of punitive dimensions. Both social psychologists and criminologists are guilty of using composite measures of punitiveness that consist of an assortment of components (b) to (e) described above. Moreover, single items designed to measure punitiveness often fail to discriminate between individuals’ desire to punish from their attitudes toward the criminal justice system. For instance, asking individuals to report the extent to which they agree with statements such as ‘people who break the law should be given stiffer sentences’ could generate agreement on the basis of beliefs that criminals should be given stiff sentences or on the basis that criminals do not currently receive stiff sentences. Though composite measures tend to converge, as suggested by moderate to high factor loadings in factor analyses, it is important to distinguish between the beliefs that people harbour about the function of punishment, and of the criminal justice system, from their punitive desires or attitudes. Indeed, evidence suggests that some individuals who harbour deterrence beliefs are unwilling to adopt
corresponding harsh punitive responses such as mandatory or determinate life sentences (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008).

Measures of punitiveness also tend to vary across researchers and research aims though some efforts have been made toward standardization. For instance, McKee and Feather (2008) developed the Sentencing Goals Scale, a 20-item questionnaire designed to assess agreement with sentencing goals such as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. Carlsmith, Darley and colleagues developed and used a 13-point sentencing scale ranging from *no punishment* to *life in prison* (with some variation) in many of their studies. Still, a lack of standardization and weak measures make it difficult to elucidate the complexity of punitiveness and of its determinants.

Most pertinent to this research is the failure to develop an adequate measure of individuals’ intuitive desires to punish criminals. In the past, researchers such as Robinson and Darley (2008) have argued that a discrepancy between explicit and implicit endorsement of punishment goals suggests that individuals rely on punitive intuitions as opposed to reasoning processes when expressing punitive desires or attitudes. However, previous research typically employs paper-and-pencil questionnaires that prohibit measurement of individuals’ intuitive or rapid punitive desires. It is likely that the effects of stereotypes and political ideology are most apparent in intuitive or rapid punitive desires. In the fourth and fifth papers of this thesis, this methodological gap is addressed by developing and applying a methodology that allows for the measurement of punitive intuitions.

The goal of this thesis is not to systematically address the methodological issues in measuring punitiveness. However, this thesis overcomes some of the aforementioned
limitations in two ways. First, this thesis investigates the association between criminal stereotypes and punitiveness by measuring punitiveness at different levels (e.g., attitudes, decisions, intuitions). By considering different types of punitiveness, the aim is to provide a comprehensive body of research demonstrating a robust association. Second, at each level of punitiveness, this research uses some of the best measures of punitiveness outlined in this section, and when necessary new measures were developed (i.e., a measure of punitive intuitions).

Summary

A review of the literature suggests that individuals’ punitiveness is partly explained by dispositional (e.g., being more punitive due to attributional complexity) and motivational factors (e.g., punishing based on a crime’s perceived seriousness), and that individuals are more likely to punish according to retributive than deterrence goals. An inconsistency between explicitly and implicitly endorsed punishment goals has led some to argue that punishment is an intuitive response to crime – that is, a response that is part of ‘judgments, solutions, and ideas that pop into consciousness without our being aware of the mental processes that led to them’ (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). However, current research has failed to adopt methodologies that allow for the measurement of individuals’ rapid or intuitive punitive desires and attitudes.

These findings cast doubt on the notion that individuals are categorically punitive toward crime and that public punitiveness is based on a careful consideration of crime trends and of the efficiency of the criminal justice system. At best, simple measures of individuals’ punitiveness may provide some indication of individuals’ punitive intuition and of an overall tendency to support harsh criminal justice policies,
but these measures do not address the complex nature of punishment nor the gamut of factors that influence individuals’ punitiveness toward crime.

**Punishment in the Broader Context of Social Life**

One of the aims of this thesis is to demonstrate that individuals’ punitiveness toward crime relates in important ways to basic interpersonal perception and behaviour. Placing punitiveness in its broader social context provides a rich backdrop upon which to understand punishment of crime. This section will therefore consider how punishment relates to basic competitive and cooperative behaviour, using theories from evolutionary social psychology and empirical findings on human development and social cognition. To be clear, this thesis does not apply evolutionary psychology frameworks, nor does it look at the effect of punishment on competitive and cooperative behaviour. However, these literatures are reviewed to provide the reader with a bigger picture of the origins and functions of punishment than that typically provided in the criminological literature.

This section will also reconcile theories and research on interpersonal behaviour with theories of punishment of crime emerging from social conflict, utilitarian and moral perspectives. Recent criminological advances on individuals’ punitive intuition will also be discussed in relation to the two processes that inform human behaviour: cognition and emotion.

Broadly, this section is a step away from the criminological literature before moving on to introduce the main theoretical frameworks applied in this thesis (i.e., the Stereotype Content Model and the Motivated Social Cognition Perspective). This is an important step as it suggests that punishment of crime is associated with universal and basic features of social life, and provides further theoretical and empirical grounds for
studying the role of social perception in engendering and supporting punitiveness toward crime.

*Fundamental Features of Social Life: Competition, Cooperation and Punishment*

Although this thesis does not measure punitiveness outside of the context of crime, a first step in situating punishment of crime in the broader context of social life is to consider punishment as it relates to human development, social behaviour and cognition. Again, as a reminder to the reader, the following theoretical and empirical questions are not tested directly in this thesis. This section is simply to broaden the theoretical scope typically discussed when studying punitiveness toward crime. Following this section, the reader will be introduced to the theoretical frameworks that will be applied in this thesis.

Evolutionary social psychological theory posits that many of the behaviours and psychological processes that can be observed here-and-now can be explained by insights about the complex genetic and neural substrates of such processes (i.e., the genetic and neurological structures that affect social cognition and interpersonal relationships). These substrates are hypothesized to be the result of a rich developmental history, shaped by the local environment, culture and opportunities in which humans evolved (Kenrick, Schaler & Simpson, 2006; Adolphs, 2009; see also Boyd & Richerson, 2006, on the rapidity of cultural as opposed to genetic evolution).

Although empirically it is impossible to test many evolutionary social psychological theories, studying the differences between humans and apes’ social cognition and brain structure provides some insight into the importance of the development of the prefrontal cortex in human social cognition. The prefrontal cortex is
involved in basic functions such as reward-based learning, the modulation of emotional responses, the acquisition of social and moral knowledge during development, in punishment (e.g., perceptions of the threat of social punishment, integrating the benefits and costs of punishing) and in more general competitive and cooperative social behaviour (Adolphs, 2009; Koenigs et al., 2007; Spitzer et al., 2007; de Quervain et al., 2004; Greene & Haidt, 2002). Other processes such as self-control, long-term planning and sensitivity, key features of modernity and of the ‘civilizing process’, are also attributed to the prefrontal cortex (Pinker, 2007). Neurobiological studies therefore suggest that in human social cognition, neural substrates related to punishment are shared with other processes such as the modulation of emotion, the acquisition of moral knowledge and basic social behaviour (e.g., cooperation and competition). It is against this backdrop that punishment will be considered in relation to basic competitive and cooperative human behaviour, and later to fundamental dimensions of social perception and ideological preferences.

It is tempting to consider punitiveness as reflecting a form of aggression or cruelty, particularly from an evolutionary or ontological perspective. From an evolutionary perspective it seems likely that both punitive and aggressive behaviours first evolved in small groups where intra- and inter-group competition and conflict appears to have been an important catalyst (Boyd & Richerson, 2006; Wenzel et al., 2008; but see Nell, 2006, for a discussion of the manifestation of aggression in earlier predatory and hunting behaviours). Ontologically, punishment, much like aggression, is used to appropriate resources, defend against attack, ascend hierarchies, control behaviour, and is defined by its retributive nature (Buss & Duntley, 2006; Carlsmit,
At a societal level, decreases in levels of violence (e.g., tribal and clan wars) have coincided with decreases in cruel forms of punishment (Pinker, 2007). Considering punishment as a form of aggression therefore suggests that punitiveness is intimately tied to competition and power.

Competition is a key theme of criminological theories that argue that punishment is a process related to power, often enacted by those with power against those with less power. Such a view draws on the Marxist tradition, but is also apparent in the work of other theorists such as Rusche and Kircheimer, Pashukanis, and Hay (Garland, 1990). These works discuss the specificity of penal methods and their relation to modes of production, the reflection of law and class struggle in punishment, and the ideological functions of punishment, respectively (Garland, 1990). This conflict perspective, which has gained prominence in criminological theory, coalesces with viewing punishment as a form of aggression that results from competition between groups.

Punishment is also a key feature of cooperation or reciprocal altruism (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Masclet & Villeval, 2008; Price, Cosmides & Tooby, 2002; Trivers, 1971). From an evolutionary and etiological perspective, punishment is seen as an important element in establishing cooperative norms or rules. For instance, cooperation can be induced by punishing non-cooperators and non-punishers of non-cooperators, by extending the impact of punishment through stigma, and through altruistic punishment by third-parties (Henrich & Henrich, 2006). In public goods studies, punishment has been shown to result from perceptions of inequality, which is thought to engender strong negative emotions and retributive punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Masclet &
Hoffman and Goldsmith (2004) have gone so far as to suggest that the urge to punish is biologically rooted and is modulated by a sense of fairness. Cross-cultural evidence suggests that fairness and reciprocity are in fact stable features of human behaviour (Henrich et al., 2005; but see Baron, 1997, on self-interest and cooperation), as is punishment of those who fail to act prosocially (although forms and degrees of punitiveness vary socially and culturally) (Gächter, Herrmann & Thöni, 2005; Hoffman & Goldsmith, 2004). Punishment is therefore associated with establishing and enforcing cooperative rules and norms, and is strongly related to perceptions of fairness and equality.

Criminological theories of punishment such as utilitarianism and social functional moral theories pick up on the importance of cooperation in social life. Both perspectives suggest that punishment accomplishes important social functions, notably rule following, social cohesion, order and justice. While utilitarian theories place the onus on individuals’ rational choice in achieving rule following, moral theories place the onus on groups and social solidarity. In line with research on interpersonal behaviour, moral theories emphasize that individuals are deeply concerned with fairness or justice, and that these concerns are at the heart of punitive desires or attitudes.

An alternative approach to situating punishment in the broader context of social life is to consider it as it relates to the life course of individuals. Studies of learning and the life course suggest that children learn early on that harming others is prescriptively and generalizably wrong, and that this rule is universal (i.e., independent of social setting and social constructions of appropriate behaviour and rules) (Smetana, 2006). The first developmental goal of an infant is in fact to achieve basic trust, which is
founded on a ‘friendly otherness’ (Erikson, 1959). While competition and hierarchy are important features of social life, these features appear to be secondary to the more central goal of cooperation. Cooperation and the formation of cooperative groups rest primarily on individuals’ expectation that others will also cooperate and reciprocate (Price, 2008).

Punishment is therefore tied to expectations of cooperation, notions of trust, empathy and equity, which are all important in social development. Some have argued that empathy is also a key component in perceptions of justice. For instance, Hoffman (1989) has outlined a comprehensive theory of justice which hinges on the importance of empathy in moral affect, judgment, behaviour and notions of justice. According to Hoffman, individuals feel sympathetic and empathetic distress toward victims, and empathic anger toward victimizers. Individuals are especially sensitive to information relating to whether others are empathetic or not, and are faster to process this information (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; see also Adolphs, 2009, on the neural substrates of empathy, and de Waal, 2008, on the continuity of these substrates with other species). These and other findings suggest that individuals learn early on that trust, empathy and equity are fundamental in social life. Perceptions of others’ empathetic dispositions engender emotional responses and inform basic help versus harm behavioural responses such as exclusion and persecution (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007; Harris & Fiske, 2006).

Adopting a broader perspective based in part on theories and evidence emerging from evolutionary psychology and neurobiology suggests that punishment of crime is related to basic competitive and cooperative behaviour. From a human development
perspective, neuroanatomical studies reveal that punishment processes share neural substrates with key features of human social cognition such as the acquisition of social and moral knowledge, and the modulation of emotion. In the context of social behaviour, punishment can be understood as being a form of aggressive behaviour emerging in competition, but also as a means to establish norms and achieve cooperation. Some of these themes are reflected in criminological social conflict, utilitarian and moral theories of punishment. From a lifecourse perspective, it becomes clear that a key developmental goal is to form empathic, trusting and cooperative relationships. Perceptions of others’ empathy and trustworthiness are therefore important in social cognition, emotion and cooperative behaviour, and are an important point of departure for the study of punitiveness toward crime.

*Punitive Intuitions: Cognition and Emotion*

The ubiquity of punishment and its relation to fundamental features of social life have led to the question of whether there is such a thing as an ‘intuition’ to punish (Robinson & Darley, 2007) and whether this intuition is biologically rooted (Hoffman & Goldsmith, 2004). Having punitive intuitions would suggest that the desire to punish is in a sense independent of explicitly endorsed goals, or as political theorist George Kateb (2007) prosaically stated, that ‘[t]he will to punish seems to precede any theory of punishment’. Evolutionary psychological theories posit that the intuition to punish could be tied to the coevolution of adaptations to defend against victimization (e.g., by recognizing likely victimization) due to a history demarked by conflict, or to pro-social intuitions due to desires to induce cooperation and mitigate competition (Boyd & Richerson, 2006; Duntley & Shackelford, 2008). Although it is impossible to test these
hypotheses, there are theoretical and empirical grounds to argue that the intuition to punish is related to the two psychological processes that inform human behaviour: cognition and emotion (Darley & Pittman, 2003).

From a cognitive perspective, the intuition to punish should relate to the way in which individuals make sense of others and of their social environment. An early proponent of the fundamental attribution error (i.e., the tendency to overweigh internal causes in attributing behaviour), Heider worked to draw theoretical links between causal attributions and the need to restore balance or order through punishment. Heider (1944) draws a close connection between attributions of causality and the desire to view people as absolute causal origins. Accordingly, viewing a person as the object of a ‘disturbing’ change and the act of revenge presents the opportunity to ‘transform irreversible changes into reversible ones’ (Heider, 1944, p. 361) (see also Shweder et al., 1997, on individuals’ ‘orders of reality’ and on the role of causal ontology in rendering suffering meaningful, and Callan, Ellard & Nicol, 2006, on order and immanent justice reasoning).

The tendency to attribute others’ behaviour to their internal dispositions in order to render the world a meaningful and predictable place may also help explain stereotypes that suggest that criminals do bad things because they are bad people. The association between individuals’ epistemic need for order (and fundamental attribution errors), criminal stereotypes and punishment is put succinctly in the following quote by sociologist Paul Fauconnet (1928):

It is easy to assume that persons are responsible who are not loved. In a general way, 'antipathy' arouses suspicion; and a special 'antipathy' arouses a special suspicion. Persons dreaded for their brutality are the first ones to be suspected of a violent crime; despised persons, of a mean act; and those who arouse disgust,
of an unclean act. People with bad reputations are accused and convicted on the basis of evidence which one would consider insufficient if an unfavorable prejudice did not relate them to the crime in advance. On the contrary, if the accused has won our favor we demand irrefutable proof before we impute to him the crime (as cited in Heider, 1944, p. 266).

The link between causal attributions and the need to restore order may help explain puzzling punitive behaviours such as the criminal prosecution and punishment of animal offenders (e.g., rats, oxen, pigs) from the later Middle Ages until the 18th century (Beirnes, 1994). The association between cognitive needs for order, stereotypes and punishment is further supported by evidence that suggests that making internal attributions for crime (i.e., believing that individuals commit crime because of their personality) is associated with increased punitiveness (see also Ideology) (Carroll et al., 1987; Jost et al., 2007; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Solloway, 2003; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Roberts, 1992).

While punishment is tied to cognition, it is also a decidedly emotionally laden response (De Haan & Loader, 2002; Karstedt, 2002). Indeed, there is increasing evidence that much of human cognition is affect laden, and automatic (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Robinson and Darley (2007) have argued that individuals’ ‘intuitions of justice’ are similar to the perceptual system (‘System 1’ in Figure 1) in that they are relatively automatic and effortless, and involve emotion. While there is little empirical research linking emotion to the intuition to punish, evidence emerging from studies on justice and morality in areas such as neuroanatomy and social cognition call attention to the importance of moral emotion (e.g., guilt, compassion, embarrassment, shame, pride, contempt, gratitude, disgust, awe, indignation, anger) in motivation and judgment (Haidt, 2008; but see Huebner, Dwyer & Hauser, 2009, on the primacy of cognition in
moral judgment). Moral emotions are elicited in response to violations or enforcements of social preferences and expectations, in which perceptions of fairness and equality play a key role (Moll et al., 2005). This evidence provides strong support for theories that suggest that punitive intuitions are associated with emotional responses, such as moral outrage (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Hoffman & Goldsmith, 2004; Moll et al., 2005). Moreover, this evidence suggests that the deontological principle that justice is rooted in a sense of fairness emerges from emotional, as opposed to reasoned processing (‘System 2’ in Figure 1) (Hsu, Anen & Quartz, 2008).

![Figure 1](image.png)

*Figure 1.* Process and content in two cognitive systems, adapted from Robinson & Darley (2007).

In this thesis, punitiveness is studied at both the reasoning and intuition level. In the second and third papers, individuals are given time to engage in controlled and effortful processing before expressing their punitive attitudes or making punitive
decisions. In the fourth and fifth papers, participants are asked to very quickly make punitive decisions, relying in part on social perception and emotion.

Summary

This thesis applies a theoretical framework emerging from the interpersonal perception and relations literature to study the association between criminal stereotypes and punitiveness toward crime. Before introducing the reader to this theoretical framework, a brief side-step was taken to consider punishment as it relates more broadly to social life. This section of the review therefore does not set out what will be tested in this thesis, rather it draws the reader’s attention to the very basic nature and function of punishment.

Evolutionary social psychological theories and neurobiological evidence suggest that punitiveness is a universal feature of human social cognition and behaviour. Punishment is manifested in many spheres of social life, notably in basic competitive and cooperative behaviour, and is associated with fundamental features of social life such as social perception of fairness, social status and power, and in the enforcement of norms and rules. Punishment is also tied to human empathy and trust, key developmental goals that begin early on in the lifecourse. Theories of punishment of crime put forth over the last two centuries such as utilitarian and moral theories incorporate some of these features of punishment and provide additional insight on the social, cultural and political aspects of punishment.

In situating punishment of crime in the broader context of social life, two overarching elements emerge. First, punishment is decidedly related to order, both in terms of its association with power or social status (hierarchy) and with the enforcement
of cooperative norms (rules). Second, punishment is tied to basic cognitive and emotional processes, and some have suggested that the desire to punish reflects an intuition or urge that arises out of the perception of injustice. Cognitively, punishment is associated with making internal attributions for others’ unjust behaviour. Emotionally, punishment is associated with feeling anger or a lack of empathy toward wrongdoers. These two overarching elements are expanded on in the following review of fundamental dimensions of social perception and political ideology.

New Directions in the Study of Public Punitiveness: The Stereotype Content Model and the Motivated Social Cognition Perspective

The first section of this literature review discussed the criminological study of punitiveness. In the context of crime, punitiveness is associated with individuals’ dispositions and motivations to punish (e.g., in response to the moral outrage individuals feel toward crime, based on a crime’s perceived seriousness, and on offender’s perceived intent and causal responsibility). In the second section, the review was broadened to consider how punishment is also a fundamental feature of social life that is related to a number of basic cognitive and emotional processes. For instance, punishment is related to notions of trust, empathy and equity, and may reflect an intuition or urge to respond to cognitive needs for order and emotional responses to perceived inequity.

The following section builds on the criminological and social psychological literature on punitiveness, and focuses in on the theoretical frameworks that will be applied in this thesis. This thesis considers the role of fundamental dimensions of social perception, warmth and competence, in engendering specific cognitive, affective and
punitive responses toward crime. Emerging findings in political psychology, such as the effect of political ideology and socio-cognitive motivations on the endorsement of criminal stereotypes and on punitiveness, are also considered. This section provides an overview of literatures on stereotyping, person perception, and political ideology, and presents some preliminary hypotheses.

**Stereotyping as a Cognitive Process**

Stereotyping is a cognitive process that results primarily from a basic tendency to engage in cognitive economy or demonstrate a preference for thinking that provides maximum information with the ‘least cognitive effort’ (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Rosch, 1978). Stereotypes about individuals and groups come into play in three steps (Casper et al., 2010). First, the individual or group is categorized (e.g., on the basis of age or sex) (Cloutier, Mason & Macrae, 2005). Second, a stereotype is activated automatically, and stereotypic expectations are formed. Finally, following the activation of a stereotype, others’ behaviour will be interpreted in stereotyped terms (Taylor et al., 1978). Stereotypes can also generate specific emotional and behavioural responses on the part of the observer (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007). Stereotypes can therefore be seen as ‘simplify[ing] perception, judgment and action’ (Macrae, Milne & Bodenhausen, 1994), although researchers are careful to draw distinctions between stereotype activation (which is automatic) and application (which can be controlled) (Monteith et al., 1998).

The ability to process new information using existing categories is a distinctly beneficial social cognition tool (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Monteith et al., 1998; Taylor et al., 1978). For instance, having access to stereotypes can free up cognitive resources, such as information processing and attention, in separate unrelated tasks (Macrae, Milne
& Bodenhausen, 1994). Perceiving others in terms of categories also streamlines processes associated with person perception such as decision making and memorial functioning (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Monteith and colleagues (2009) argue that four core motives underlie stereotyping: ‘the need to deal with cognitive overload and simplify complex information, to belong and be part of a group, to enhance and maintain feelings of self-worth, and to justify the status quo’ (p.212). For instance, endorsing complementary stereotypes such as ‘poor but happy’ and ‘rich but miserable’ can lead to increased perceptions that society is fair, and that inequality is legitimate (Kay & Jost, 2003). These core motives are not only interrelated, but also serve to support the use and maintenance of stereotypes.

According to Gilbert and Hixon (1991) stereotypes are forms of information ‘stored in memory in a dormant state until they are activated for use’ (p. 509). Stereotypes are therefore consistently available in the cognitive repertoire and may be drawn upon given certain contextual factors (e.g., salience, cognitive resources). The strength of individuals’ stereotypic associations can also influence the tendency to use category-based impression formation (Gawronski et al., 2003). A distinction has, however, been drawn between individuals’ implicit stereotypes (i.e., that are active but not necessarily personally endorsed) and explicit stereotypes (i.e., that are personally endorsed). Based on data from 2.5 million tests of individuals’ implicit associations, Nosek and colleagues (2007) have established that implicit stereotypes are pervasive, and that although implicit and explicit stereotypes are related, they are distinct. The automaticity of stereotypes have lead Blair and Banaji (1996) to warn of the pitfalls of stereotyping, such as leading individuals to misattribute their stereotypic responses to
justifiable causes (e.g., attributes of the target). The automaticity of stereotypes and the human ability to introspect also means that individuals may be under the illusion that they can ‘control more about [themselves] and [their] universe than [they] actually do, and that [they] know what [their] preferences are and why [they] have them’ (Stanley, Phelps & Banaji, 2008, p. 164).

Although stereotyping can produce positive outcomes (e.g., freeing up cognitive resources), stereotyping can also have negative consequences, particularly for the stereotyped. Thinking in terms of categories can have the effect of maximizing the perceived differences between categories and minimizing the perceived differences within categories (Corneille et al., 2002; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; Taylor et al., 1978). Stereotypes can also influence the tacit inferences individuals make about individuating information (Dunning & Sherman, 1997), so that ‘good’ deeds done by stereotypically ‘bad’ groups can be easily dismissed. The fact that stereotypes can be semantically primed (Blair & Banaji, 1996) means that, for example, reading a sentence about a Black criminal as opposed to a Black politician can engender dramatically different stereotypes about Black people more generally. Stereotypes can therefore create a world in which individuals are pigeonholed into distinct categories, and where there is little room for mobility and variance.

Stereotypes are especially likely to come into play given specific contextual and individual level factors. Because automatic processes require less cognitive resources than controlled processes, stereotypes are more likely to be used when individuals are facing cognitive load or constraints (Blair & Banaji, 1996). Stereotypes may therefore come into play precisely when they can do the most damage, for instance when
individuals are making decisions about how to respond to a situation (and must consider many different factors), or when individuals very quickly formulate and express attitudes (e.g., about social policies). However, Gilbert and Hixon (1991) show that the activation of stereotypes may be less likely under conditions of cognitive load, although once activated, their application may be facilitated. And while high and low prejudiced people may show the same stereotype activation, personal standards can influence the application of stereotypes (Kawakami et al., 2002). There is therefore variance in individuals’ propensity to activate and apply stereotypes, and this variance is partly due to individuating but also to contextual factors.

Stereotypes themselves can change over time and in different contexts. Far from being rigid, stereotypes are thought of as being malleable and subject to contextual factors (e.g., priming) and personal experiences (e.g., diversity education, receiving instructions to change stereotypes) (Bosak & Diekman, 2010). For instance, stereotypes (e.g., about Arabs) may only become activated if specific contextual factors (e.g., in the context of an airport) are present (Casper et al., 2010). Stereotypes can also change on the basis of new or contradicting information, although this is likely to engender ‘subtyping’ so as not to make changes to the dominant stereotype (Weber & Crocker, 1983).

Stereotyping can also be countered when individuals intend and have the cognitive resources to do so (Blair & Banaji, 1996). Internal motivations to control stereotypes include feeling a moral obligation to control prejudice, while external motivations to control stereotypes include self-presentation concerns (Monteith et al., 2009). The use of stereotypes can be controlled using top-down processes (e.g., by searching for additional non-stereotypical information, or by consciously replacing
stereotypic associations with non-stereotypic associations), although these processes are more likely to have an effect in the *application* of stereotypes as opposed to the *activation* of stereotypes (Monteith et al., 2009). Bottom-up processes, such as the automatic detection of conflict between implicit and explicit beliefs, can also be effective in regulating the use of stereotypes (Monteith et al., 2009; Stanley, Phelps & Banaji, 2008). Perspective taking has also been shown to be an effective way to reduce the accessibility and application of stereotypes, in part because it increases the overlap between representations of self and of outgroups (Galinski & Moskowitz, 2000). Although some evidence suggests that stereotype suppression can engender a ‘rebound’ effect whereby stereotypes become more accessible, other evidence suggests that factors such as individuals’ personal prejudice and reprehension of specific stereotypes can result in successful stereotype application suppression (Monteith et al., 1998).

In summary, social psychologists generally agree that stereotypes are functional and are an inevitable feature of social cognition that favours placing new information into existing categories (Park, 1992; Taylor et al., 1978). The contentiousness of stereotyping, for many researchers, is therefore the content of stereotypes, how stereotypes come into being and their effects on attitudes and behaviour (Park, 1992). Against the adage that individuals engage in stereotyping because stereotypes ‘work’, Park (1992) argues, ‘the particular content of currently shared cultural stereotypes has tended to “work” for White men. Women, and most ethnic groups, would see it differently’ (p. 182). Such concerns have led some researchers to argue that the processes that generate stereotypes and the content of stereotypes should be studied
separately (Taylor et al., 1978). The following section turns to the content of stereotypes and their role in interpersonal relations.

**Fundamental Dimensions of Interpersonal Perception: Warmth and Competence**

One of the aims of this review is to introduce the criminological audience to an important stream of social psychological research on the two fundamental and universal dimensions of social judgment and person perception. Bakan (1966) first introduced the terms agency (competence) and communion (warmth), and argued that these are ‘two fundamental modalities in the existence of living forms, agency for the existence of an organism as an individual and communion for the participation of the individual in some larger organism of which the individual is part’ (p. 14–15). Competence refers to a competent and goal-directed independent orientation (e.g., competent, intelligent, assertive, ambitious and decided versus unintelligent, inefficient, passive, lazy and indecisive).\(^5\) Warmth refers to a warm interpersonal orientation (e.g., warm, kind, caring and sympathetic versus cold, cruel, egoistic and hardhearted). These two dimensions have come to be widely recognized as fundamental and universal dimensions of person perception (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). For the sake of parsimony, the person perception literature will be introduced summarily and its relation to crime and punishment will be discussed in more detail.

---

\(^5\) Those who study dimensions of warmth and competence draw a slight distinction in the features of competence. Some scholars, particularly those who study competence as it relates to the self or to individual level perceptions, focus on human agency and goal-directedness. On the other hand, those who study competence as it relates to intergroup perception focus on inferences drawn from social status and deservingness.
The two fundamental dimensions of social perception, competence and warmth, have been the object of study in personality and in judgments of the self, others and social groups (Abele, Cuddy, Judd & Yzerbyt, 2008). Some studies find that perceptions of warmth and competence account for as much as 82% of the variance in perceptions of others (Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998). Among the dimensions, warmth is considered of primary importance and, from a socio-functional perspective, as relevant in perceptions of others in every type of social relationship (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Cottrell, Neuberg & Li, 2007). From a relational standpoint, warmth signals the intentions of individuals, that is, to help versus harm or to cooperate versus compete, and is seen as a more stable feature of personhood (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Kenworthy & Tausch, 2008). From an ontological perspective, the concept of warmth is closely tied to the conception of personhood and, perhaps, by extension to what people expect from others (Conway, Côté-Lussier, Giannopoulos & Tabri, unpublished findings; Uchronski, 2008; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). Perceptions of warmth are also more affect-laden and related behaviours receive more extreme evaluations than competence behaviour (Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998). It is no surprise that traits associated with warmth are attended to and processed more quickly, that individuals are more sensitive to information relating to warmth and are more likely to heed to information that disconfirms rather than confirms warmth (i.e., to demonstrate a negativity bias) (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006).

Although warmth is perceived as being most important in perceptions of others, competence is most important for the self (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). For the other,

---

6 Note however that this study failed to control for other factors influencing global impressions of others, and failed to include traits other than warmth and competence traits.
competence is a valued feature and is closely associated with perceived social status, especially in individualistic cultures (Judd et al., 2005). The inference of competence from others’ high social status is partly due to the tendency to justify hierarchical systems and is even stronger amongst individuals with ideologies that include just-world and meritocratic beliefs (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). The inference of competence from social status may also be partly due to fundamental attribution errors, as individuals tend to attribute others’ behaviour or achievements to internal as opposed to external factors (Russell & Fiske, 2008). Wojciszke et al. (1998) found that in evaluating behaviours, warm people are liked more when they are higher on competence, than when they are low on competence. People low on perceived warmth, on the other hand, are disliked independent of competence.

For criminologists who study punishment, perceptions of others’ and social groups’ warmth and competence are of interest for three reasons: perceptions (a) are shaped by social structure, (b) they engender strong emotional responses and inform approach and avoidance, as well as help versus harm behaviour, and (c) they lead to differential causal inferences about behaviour. According to the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) inferences about others’ warmth and competence flow from social structural factors, with perceived competition (over power and resources) predicting perceptions of warmth, and perceived social status predicting perceptions of competence (Caprariello, Cuddy & Fiske, 2009; Fiske et al., 2002; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007; Russell & Fiske, 2008). Perceptions of these dimensions also fall along dimensions of age, gender, ethnicity, income and education (Conway et al., 1996; Jost & Banaji, 1994). Perceptions of warmth and competence functionally answer two crucial questions about
individuals’ and groups’ good or ill intentions, and their ability to carry out those intentions, respectively (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). Typically a positive correlation of perceived warmth and competence is found at the individual level (i.e., a halo effect), particularly for high-status or ingroup members, and a negative correlation is found at the group level (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Kervyn, Judd & Yzerbyt, 2009).

Perceptions of warmth and competence have cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes. First, perceptions of warmth and competence influence cognitive responses and inform expectations, evaluations and behavioural attributions (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). For instance, perceptions of a lack of warmth are diagnostic of individuals, such that corresponding behaviour is interpreted as being attributable to people’s dispositions as opposed to external factors (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). Social status also influences behavioural attributions as individuals tend to place insufficient attention on situational factors influencing the behaviour of low-status individuals, thus increasing the likelihood of making fundamental attribution errors (Conway et al., 1996). The formation of expectations, evaluation and attributions on the basis of social perception can partly be explained by the functional link between goals, motivation, cognition and attention. For instance, having the goal to avoid certain stimuli influences category activation and can lead to narrower conceptual frameworks (i.e., mental representations), thus increasing reliance on stereotypes (Forster et al., 2006). The effect of social stereotypes on cognitive responses is therefore also influenced by goals, motivation and socio-cognitive differences (e.g., attributional complexity) (Ford & Kruglanski, 1995).
According to Fiske and colleagues, perceptions of warmth and competence elicit functionally relevant emotions (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). For instance, perceiving a successful competitive outgroup would engender perceptions of competence, but a lack of warmth. These perceptions would in turn be expected to elicit emotions of envy, an ambivalent emotional response that can support taking action against this outgroup (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Combinations of perceived warmth and competence make up a 2 X 2 circumplex model that specifies specific emotional outcomes (see Figure 3).

![Figure 2. Quadrants of social perception, emotional and behavioural responses according to the SCM and BIAS map.](image)

For those perceived as high on competence, perceived high warmth leads to pride or admiration whereas perceived low warmth leads to envy. Those perceived as high on warmth and low on competence elicit pity, whereas those low on both elicit
contempt and disgust. Neuroimaging studies provide some support for the association between social perception and emotion, as brain areas corresponding to specific emotions are activated differentially depending on the perceived social group (Harris & Fiske, 2006). A summary review of the social perception literature suggests that people like warmth, and respect competence.

Emotional responses elicited by social perception are important in informing interpersonal behaviour, such as helping others actively (e.g., assisting, giving, promoting equality) or passively (e.g., affiliating with, hiring) and harming others actively (e.g., harassing, bullying, discriminating against) or passively (e.g., excluding, ignoring) (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007). According to Roseman, Wiest and Swartz (1994) emotions can be distinguished on the basis of their distinct action tendencies (i.e., the impulse or inclination to respond with a particular action) or the ‘emotivational’ goals that they elicit. For instance, emotions of fear are most strongly related to avoidance action tendencies such as wanting to run away and wanting to get to a safe place. On the other hand, emotions of anger are most strongly related to approach action tendencies such as wanting to take action, to be aggressive (e.g., lashing out, kicking) and to get back at someone (Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994). More broadly, this perspective suggests that emotion is key in motivating adaptive behaviour.

Stereotypes About Criminals

Now that the literatures on punishment and stereotyping have been introduced, the reader can be introduced to the criminal stereotype literature. By introducing the criminal stereotype literature here, after laying down much of the theoretical and
empirical groundwork, the aim is to identify some of the gaps in the literature and specify some of the hypotheses addressed in this thesis.

Stereotypes about criminals suggest that criminals are evil, poor and disliked (Carroll et al., 1987; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Reed & Reed, 1973; Roberts, 1992; Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008). In the eyes of the public, the image conjured up by the word ‘offender’ or ‘criminal’ is typically that of ‘an outsider, a young, lower-class male, physically unattractive who has been convicted of a crime involving violence’ (Roberts, 1992, p. 138). This general stereotype underscores the belief that crime is perpetrated by low-status individuals, but also that these individuals have ill intent toward others (i.e., to cause harm). However some evidence suggests that criminals’ social status can be inferred on the basis of crime type or on the basis of the social or occupational status of the offender (e.g., white-collar crimes) (Benson & Moore, 1992; Christopher, Marek & May, 2003). More broadly, criminals represent a heterogeneous group that includes individuals found guilty of petty crimes (e.g., theft), violent crimes (e.g., assault) and white-collar crimes (e.g., fraud). Stereotypes about specific types of criminals may therefore vary and interact with other features of the offender (e.g., social status, age, ethnicity, gender) and of the offence (e.g., crime type).

Where the criminal stereotype literature is limited, however, is in its consideration of the underlying dimensions of criminal stereotypes, and of the functional relation between various components of criminal stereotypes. Addressing this gap is a preliminary step in establishing the functional relation between criminal stereotypes and punitiveness toward crime.
H1. It is expected that criminals will be perceived as having a low social status and as being competitive toward society, which should engender perceptions of low competence and low warmth, respectively.

Although some have argued that endorsing stereotypes about criminals is associated with feeling specific emotions toward crime (e.g., anger) (Johnson, 2009) the association between the endorsement of stereotypes and emotional responses has yet to be established empirically. In previous research, deviant groups such as the homeless, drug users and undocumented migrants were found to be perceived as being stereotypically hostile and untrustworthy (i.e., low on warmth) and as stupid and unmotivated (i.e., low on competence), eliciting emotions such as contempt and disgust (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). More generally, groups perceived as violating normative or moral expectations, or outgroups, are perceived as lacking warmth and competence and tend to elicit dehumanizing prejudice (e.g., they are perceived as exhibiting less human-type emotions), less altruism and empathy, but more disgust and punishment (Harris & Fiske, 2006; Vaes, Paladino & Leyens, 2002; Wenzel et al., 2008). Criminological research suggests that crime elicits strong public responses such as anger and moral outrage (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Darley & Pittman, 2003; de Haan & Loader, 2002; Freiberg, 2001; Johnson, 2009) but also fear and worry (Jackson, 2004). It is likely that these emotions are tied not only to acts of crime, but also to the individuals who commit crime.
H2. Stereotypes about criminals are expected to be associated with emotions of contempt.

Perceiving groups as lacking warmth and competence and experiencing emotions such as contempt and disgust can motivate and justify harmful or punitive behaviour against these groups. For example, in the U.S., research on racial stereotypes about criminals suggests that the cognitive association between black people and apes can lead to justifying police brutality toward black people. Perceived threat and competition from black people also predicts punitiveness, while racism partly accounts for the divide in white and black people’s support for the death penalty in the USA (King & Wheelock, 2007; Unnever & Cullen, 2007). More broadly, emotions of anger and moral outrage predict desires to punish specific crimes as well as support for harsh criminal justice policy (Gault & Sabini, 2000; Graham, Weiner & Zucker, 1997; Johnson, 2009). Stereotypes about criminals may therefore engender strong emotional and behavioural responses that can engender and support punitiveness toward crime.

H3. Emotions of contempt are expected to be associated with behavioural intentions to exclude as well as attack criminals.

H4. Emotions of contempt (e.g., anger, moral outrage) and attacking behavioural intentions are expected to be associated with harsher punitive decisions and attitudes.
To date, the punishment literature has established some of the cognitive pathways that link perceptions of crime to desires for punishment. These pathways include judgments pertaining to the offender’s intent to commit the crime and attributions for crime, and judgments of the wrongfulness, harmfulness and seriousness of a crime. However the punishment literature has yet to consider the effect of criminal stereotypes on these perceptions and judgments. The primacy of perceptions of others’ warmth and competence in influencing inferences about others’ behaviour suggests that stereotypes about criminals will affect individuals’ perceptions and judgments of crime. For instance, the tendency to consider a lack of warmth as being a stable and dispositional feature of a person suggests that stereotypes about criminals will increase perceptions of intent and internal attributions for crime, and in turn influence judgments of a crime (e.g., wrongfulness, harmfulness, seriousness). Stereotypes about criminals may be especially important in considering aggravating and mitigating factors where it is hypothesized that punitive intuitions are most at play (Roberts, 2008; Blasi & Jost, 2006). For instance, the expression of remorse and more general indicators of empathy have been shown to be important mitigating factors in the eyes of the public and in sentencing, as underscored by Roberts (2008) in the following excerpt:

The classic case is the offender who saves another person from drowning or performs some other act of exceptional bravery shortly before or after conviction. It is unclear why this kind of action should be considered to justify leniency, yet sentencers may well be tempted to mitigate the sentence on this basis. Indeed, there is a very strong intuitive appeal to a policy of mitigating sentences for offenders who have a history of very creditable behaviour […] Most jurisdictions permit courts to recognise a mitigating factor that is unrelated to the principal theoretical orientation of sentencing.
Perceptions of competence have also been shown to increase punitiveness toward high-status individuals who commit low-status crimes such as tax fraud (Christopher, Marek & May, 2003; Fragale et al., 2009). This association may be explained in part by attributions of intent or causal responsibility, but also on the basis of violations of expectations of trust given to the perpetrator of the crime, particularly to those in positions of authority (Rebovich & Kane, 2004).

Because others’ warmth is a diagnostic feature of social perception, stereotypes about criminals may also lead to inferences that criminals are likely to recidivate. The perceived malleability of the very nature of a person therefore has clear policy implications in the context of crime, for instance in expressing support for indeterminate sentencing (Maruna & King, 2004).

H5. It is expected that perceptions of criminals’ low warmth is associated with increased perceived intent and attributions of dispositional causal responsibility, and lower perceptions of remorse.

H6. It is expected that perceptions of criminals’ low warmth is associated with an increase in the judged wrongfulness, harmfulness and seriousness of an offence, and in turn with more punitiveness toward crime.

Political Ideology, Stereotypes and Punitiveness: A Motivated Social Cognition Perspective

To date, this review has centred on the predictors of punitiveness, but not on predictors of the endorsement of stereotypes. Political ideology, which has been linked to
punitiveness toward crime, has also been linked to racial, sexual and gender based prejudice (Allport, 1929; Bassett, 2010; Bowers & Waltman, 1993; Christopher & Mull, 2006; Cohrs & Asbrook, 2009; Duriez et al., 2005; Feather et al., 2001; Herek, 2000; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1992; Jost et al., 2003; Jost & Banaji, 1994; King & Maruna, 2009; Kreindler, 2005; McCann, 2008; McKee & Feather, 2008; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997). A principle theoretical framework used to explain the association between ideological positions and social and political preferences is Jost and colleagues’ (2003) Motivated Social Cognition Perspective (MSCP). This theoretical framework suggests that individuals’ endorsement of stereotypes, political ideology and punitiveness can be partly explained by the elective affinity between psychological needs and ideology (Jost et al., 2003; Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009). The MSCP aims at developing a model of relational, epistemic and existential needs and preferences that underlie ideological outcomes, and to link socio-cognitive motives to the contents of specific political attitudes. It also identifies some of the dispositional and situational factors that are associated with different belief systems, and underscores the functionality of belief systems and ideology.

The MSCP is grounded in the premise that belief systems and ideologies are adhered to on the basis of dispositional and situational antecedents. Dispositional antecedents include psychological needs for order and closure, needs to manage uncertainty and minimize threat, openness to experience and change, cognitive and attributional complexity; while situational antecedents refer to specific threats (e.g., mortality salience or threats to the system, such as an economic crisis) (Jost, et al., 2003; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; van Hiel, Kossowska & Mervielde, 2000; van Hiel & Mervielde,
The basic assumption is that everyone is motivated to resolve uncertainty but that people vary in the extent to which they are aversive of uncertainty and that this is reflected in belief systems.

According to this framework, political orientation is related to two separate processes: (a) uncertainty avoidance (e.g., due to psychological needs for order, intolerance of ambiguity or lack of openness to experience) and (b) threat management (e.g., due to death anxiety, perceptions of a dangerous world or system threat) (Jost et al., 2007). Those who endorse right-wing ideologies therefore do so partly because ‘it serves to reduce fear, anxiety, and uncertainty; to avoid change, disruption, and ambiguity; and to explain, order, and justify inequality among groups and individuals’ (Jost et al., 2003, p. 340; Thorisdottir et al., 2007). Conversely, ideology also reinforces psychological needs and orientations toward the world (Carney et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2007).

More generally, people are motivated to perceive social arrangements as just, fair and legitimate. Ideologies and belief systems that provide rationalizations and justifications for existing social, economic and political arrangements therefore result in more subjective comfort with the status quo (Blasi & Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Burgess & Mosso, 2001; Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon & Sullivan, 2003; Wakslak et al., 2007).

Using this framework, it is possible to build a comprehensive model linking stereotypes about criminals, ideology and punitiveness toward crime. The crux of this model is to consider punishment and stereotypes’ relational, epistemic and existential components. First, from a relational perspective, theories of interpersonal behaviour and
evidence suggest that people are deeply attuned to the intentions of others, specifically to whether they intend to compete or cooperate. Endorsing stereotypes about criminals would therefore fulfil relational needs to predict others’ behaviour and engender punitive responses through the cognitive and emotional processes outlined above.

Second, from an epistemic perspective, endorsing stereotypes about criminals helps render the world a predictable and orderly place. Believing, for instance, that avoiding impoverished areas and unsavoury individuals could reduce the risk of victimization could increase subjective comfort (Jackson & Gray, 2010). Recall that people are also motivated to adopt stereotypes about warmth and competence, to the extent that such stereotypes justify inequality (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). Endorsing stereotypes and punishing crime can therefore help render the world an orderly and predictable place (Heider, 1944).

Lastly, from an existential perspective, violations of expectations have been shown to heighten physiological responses associated with uncertainty and perceived threat, particularly for individuals with high needs for uncertainty avoidance (Mendes et al., 2007). Existential threats (e.g., concern about crime, fear of crime, economic insecurity) themselves have been found to contribute to punitiveness toward crime (Costelloe, Chiricos & Gertz 2009). Stereotypes that suggest that criminals are not trustworthy or empathetic may therefore communicate existential threat and increase punitiveness toward crime.

In the context of punitiveness, political conservatism and two ideological systems have been found to robustly predict punishment of crime: right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). RWA is related to
political cultural conservatism and is defined as conventionalism (a preference for tradition and stability), authoritarian submission (a deference to authority) and authoritarian aggression (Altemeyer, 1981). RWA is strongly associated with punitiveness toward crime (Jost et al., 2003) and is positively correlated with feeling anger, which in itself can be associated with aggressive behaviours and support for aggressive policies (Skitka et al., 2006). SDO is related to political economic conservatism and is defined by a preference for hierarchical as opposed to equal intergroup relations, as well as a tendency to want one’s ingroup to be on top of that hierarchy (Pratto et al., 1994). SDO is also defined by a lack of empathy (Pratto et al., 1994; Van Hiel, Cornelis & Roets, 2007) which itself is associated with increased punitiveness toward crime (Costelloe et al., 2002; Weiner, 1993).

Punitiveness is also associated with the socio-cognitive motives that underlie these ideological positions such as psychological needs for order, predictability and control, a preference for authority and convention, and vindictiveness toward deviants (Jost et al., 2003). On the other hand, decreased punitiveness is associated with socio-cognitive motives such as needs for cognition and attributional complexity (Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008; Tam, Leung & Chiu, 2008).

Based on the MSCP and previous findings, it is possible to make specific predictions as to the association between certain socio-cognitive motivations, ideology, the endorsement of criminal stereotypes and punitiveness toward crime.

H7. It is expected that politically conservative individuals and/or individuals who are high on RWA, SDO or psychological needs for order will:
1. Be more likely to endorse stereotypes about criminals;
2. Perceive criminals as demonstrating more intent and causal responsibility;
3. Judge an offence as being more wrongful, harmful and serious;
4. Experience more moral outrage or anger toward crime and criminals;
5. Express more punitive desires and attitudes.

General Discussion

The central aim of this thesis is to provide evidence that individuals’ punitiveness toward crime relates to fundamental dimensions of social perception captured by criminal stereotypes, their cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes, and to political ideology. This review began by considering some of the key predictors of punitiveness toward crime such as individuals’ dispositions (e.g., cognitive styles), motivations and punishment goals. Many of these predictors interact with each other to help explain variance in punitive desires and attitudes. This section provided the criminological backbone upon which this thesis relies to test the importance of criminal stereotypes in shaping responses to crime.

Next, this review broadened the scope of the study of punitiveness toward crime by situating punishment in the broader context of social life. In this section, punishment was discussed as a component of basic competitive and cooperative behaviour, themes picked up on by criminological theories of punishment (e.g., conflict perspective, utilitarian and moral theories of punishment). This section provided the basis upon which it was argued that punitiveness, in the context of criminal justice, is related to processes that operate in other spheres of everyday life, such as social perception and
affect. In situating punishment of crime in the broader context of social life, the hope is to firmly implant the criminological study of punishment in the social cognition, interpersonal perception and behaviour literature. As outlined in this review, the study of public punitiveness toward crime can benefit greatly from being repositioned and considered as a form of interpersonal behaviour, subject to systematic cognitive and affective processes.

Finally, this review moved onto the key theoretical frameworks applied in this thesis; the Stereotype Content Model and the Motivated Social Cognition Perspective. Despite advancements in the study of social psychological processes that are associated with punitiveness toward crime, research on criminal stereotypes has largely been atheoretical and has failed to systematically measure the pathways that link social perception to punishment of crime. By borrowing from the intergroup perception and behaviour literature and applying the SCM and BIAS map, this thesis makes important contributions to the criminological study of punishment.

The SCM and BIAS map frameworks are applied in the first and second papers to identify the content and social structural determinants of criminal stereotypes, and their cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes. The third paper reconciles some of the extant criminological research on cognitive and affective predictors of punishment with the social stereotype and cognition literature. Specifically, the paper draws on criminological findings on the importance of attributions of intent and causal responsibility in generating judgments regarding the seriousness of crime, and strong affective responses such as moral outrage. Part of the motivation for considering the role of criminal stereotypes in shaping these perceptions and judgments emerge from
reviews of the neuroscientific and interpersonal perception and behaviour literature. Namely, these literatures draw attention to the cognitive importance of establishing order (e.g., by attributing intent and internal causal responsibility), and of moral emotions and concerns with fairness in punishment.

The fourth and fifth papers continue to address some of these broader questions regarding the nature of punitiveness – specifically, whether it takes form in punitive intuitions. These papers draw on literatures that suggest that punitiveness is a basic feature of social life that should be associated with systematic cognitive and affective processes. To test these hypotheses, and address some of the gaps in the criminological literature, a methodology that allows for the measurement of individuals’ intuitive desires to punish stereotypical criminals is developed. The association between strong affective responses (e.g., anger) and punitive intuitions is also tested.

The second and third papers also consider the role of political ideology in influencing the endorsement of criminal stereotypes and shaping punitiveness toward crime. This research contributes to the political psychology literature, by identifying some of the cognitive and affective pathways that link ideology to the endorsement of criminal stereotypes and punishment of crime.

As a whole, this thesis makes an important contribution to the social perception literature, where there has been relatively little work on criminal stereotypes. While the interpersonal perception literature has identified some of the behavioural outcomes of social stereotypes, studying criminal stereotypes provides the unique opportunity to observe the effect of social perception on state-sanctioned and publicly endorsed aggressive responses to a social group. To date, much of the research applying the SCM
has fallen short of considering the social and political consequences of the affective and behavioural outcomes of stereotypes. This thesis therefore addresses an important gap in the interpersonal perception and behaviour literature by observing the effect of criminal stereotypes on policy preferences.

One of the main contributions of this thesis is also to address some of the methodological limitations of measurements of punitiveness identified in the criminological literature. By measuring the association between criminal stereotypes and punitive decisions, attitudes and intuitions, this thesis aims to overcome some of the pitfalls of measuring punitive attitudes by asking individuals if ‘the courts are too lenient’. Previous research suggests that these overly simplistic measures can generate an inaccurate assessment of actual punitive desires (Doob & Roberts, 1984; Roberts, 1992). This thesis argues, in part, that simple measures of punitiveness are likely to engender responses on the basis of criminal stereotypes and punitive intuitions, as opposed to careful consideration of current punitive practices and of the implications of harsh criminal justice policies.

A key implication of this thesis is that punishment of crime results from systematic cognitive and affective processes that are influenced by criminal stereotypes. This research could help explain, for instance, punitive trends such as the tendency to punish low-status groups more-so than high-status groups, but also puzzling punitive trends such as the general tendency to punish small-scale property offences (i.e., theft) more often, and occasionally more harshly, than white-collar crime offences (i.e., crimes committed in the context of work for personal or institutional benefit) that have comparatively larger fiscal and social consequences (Curry & Klumpp, 2009; Helms,
From a policy perspective, this research suggests that criminal justice policies implemented on the basis of public opinion polls could be out of line with individuals’ actual punitive desires and concerns about fairness or equity. Such a misalignment between policies and preferences could threaten the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Tyler, 1990). More importantly, implementing increasingly harsh criminal justice policies will continue to have devastating effects on convicted criminals and have serious fiscal, social and political consequences for society more broadly.

References


Costelloe, M. T., Chiricos, T. & Gertz, M. (2009). Punitive attitudes toward criminals:


Cushman, F. (2008). Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and


dominance in Western and Eastern Europe: The importance of the sociopolitical context and of political interest and involvement. *Political Psychology, 26*(2), 299-320.


Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M. & Damasio,


Paper 1

The evil, poor and disliked: Applying the Stereotype Content Model to study the content and social structural determinants of the criminal stereotype

Ample research suggests that disadvantaged individuals are not treated equally under the law. Yet, little research considers the functional relation between criminals’ social status and perceptions and responses to crime. This paper applies the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) to study the content and social structural determinants of criminal stereotypes. Study 1 examines the criminal cognitive associative network. The results suggest that when thinking about a criminal, individuals spontaneously think about a cold, violent but competent criminal and about society's responses to criminals (e.g., in terms of punishment). Study 2 investigates the content and social structural determinants of group-level criminal stereotypes. The results suggest that criminals' perceived low social status and competitiveness against society partly explain perceptions of criminals' lack of warmth (e.g., kind, trustworthy) and lack of competence (e.g., intelligent, efficient). Study 3 uses an experimental methodology, replicating some of the key findings from Study 2, while also disentangling street-criminal and white-collar criminal stereotypes. The results provide support for the application of the SCM to study criminal stereotypes and attitudes toward crime. Findings are discussed in terms of the importance of social status in generating perceptions of a cold and cruel criminal, and the potential effects of criminal stereotypes on attitudes toward crime.
Keywords: criminal stereotypes, Stereotype Content Model, attitudes, criminal justice

What! Because we are poor, shall we be vicious? [...] Pray, what means have you to keep me from the galleys, or the gallows? – John Webster, The White Devil (1612)

In his review of crime in 18th to 20th century English society, Emsley (1996) identified social class as the lens through which criminality was understood. Fast forward to present times and we find a number of theoretical approaches and empirical studies that link poverty and social inequality to crime in Western and developing societies (Choe, 2008; Donohue, 2007; Rusche & Kirchheimer, 1939; Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997). The association between crime and poverty is not only the interest of academics, popular media and lay conceptions of criminality also draw links between poverty and crime (Davis, 1990; Roberts, 1992). Situating the crime problem among the poor has had important socio-political consequences, suggesting for instance that the poor use crime as a means to compete for power and resources. Principles of justice suggest that individuals should receive fair trials and be treated equally under the law. Yet the effects of harsh criminal justice policies are felt most strongly by those in the margins of society, such as the youth, the poor, the homeless, ethnic minorities and those with mental health problems (Bazemore, 2007; Bobo, 2004; Curry & Klumpp, 2009; Garland, 2001; Harcourt, 2007; Helms, 2009; James & Glaze, 2006; Pettit & Western, 2004; Robinson & Darley, 2007; Teplin, 1990).

But see Neumayer (2005) for a criticism of empirical evidence suggesting an income inequality-crime link.
This study explores whether there is an empirical link between thinking that crime is more prevalent among the poor, and believing that criminals are cold and cruel. This is an important question: if widely circulating representations present criminals as poor, disadvantaged and lacking in character; if people are quick to endorse these stereotypes; and if these stereotypes engender punitive sentiments and intuitions – then, the criminal justice system will feel pressure to be especially harsh in its punishment of law-breakers. The present research applies the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) (Fiske et al., 2006) – a theoretical framework designed to identify the social structural determinants and content of social stereotypes – to study criminal stereotypes and help explain attitudes toward crime and punishment. According to the SCM, the content of social stereotypes are important predictors of affective and behavioural responses to social groups and can help explain, for example, the dehumanization of social groups such as the homeless (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske, 2009). The SCM has a unique ability – when applied to attitudes towards crime, justice and punishment – to intervene in an important question for many modern societies: what drives popular punitive sentiment towards criminals?

Drawing together the findings of three studies, the present paper suggests that thinking about the ‘criminal’ social category activates thoughts related to criminals’ low socio-economic status and lack of warmth. These thoughts reflect a dislike of criminals but also thoughts relating to society’s response to criminals. In line with predictions made by the SCM, criminal stereotypes indicate a shared perception of criminals’ low social status and competitiveness against society, two key social structural determinants of criminals’ low perceived warmth and competence. The effect of the criminal label is
especially detrimental for street-criminals as opposed to white-collar criminals, given that the former group are perceived as having a decidedly lower social status. These findings also provide further evidence that perceived social status can influence inferences of warmth (see Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). The evidence suggests that criminals’ perceived cruelty results not only from their involvement in criminal behaviour but also from their perceived low economic, educational and career achievements. This role of perceived social status in shaping stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth is particularly meaningful as previous research suggests that perceptions of warmth motivate negative affective and behavioural responses, for example excluding and attacking others (Cuddy et al., 2007; Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998).

Stereotypes About Criminals

In the eyes of the public, the image conjured up by the word ‘offender’ or ‘criminal’ is typically that of ‘an outsider, a young, lower-class male, [who is] physically unattractive [and] who has been convicted of a crime involving violence’ (Roberts, 1992, p. 138). Criminals are stereotypically thought of as being uneducated, sloppy or dirty, a loner or a gang member, as being psychologically maladjusted and as being evil or mean (Reed & Reed, 1973). When picked apart, criminal stereotypes reflect three key components: (a) criminals’ low social status, (b) criminals’ cruel nature, and (c) the public’s dislike of criminals.

The first component of the criminal stereotype – a low social status – has been a predominant feature of criminological research. Emsley (1996) identified class as being the lens through which the crime problem was perceived in British society from the
middle of the 18th century up until the beginning of the 20th century. Today, things have changed very little as criminal stereotypes continue to fall along class dimensions, reflecting a traditional concern with the poor’s ‘immoral’ or ‘disorderly’ behaviour. For the past 20 years, much of the research on criminal stereotypes has emerged from the United States where a central issue is the association between crime and (young) Black males (see for example, Dixon & Maddox, 2005; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; Plant et al., 2005; Steen, Engen & Gainey, 2005). The racialization of criminal stereotypes in the United States is partly related to the association between crime and poverty or social inequality (see Pettit & Western, 2004).

The second component of the criminal stereotype relates to criminals’ perceived dispositional evilness or predatory nature. According to Chapman (1968), criminals are stereotypically thought to be ‘socially pathological persons [who] are physically, psychologically, or racially inferior, or – a recent variation – members of a cultural subgroup’ (p. 25). Chapman argues that there has been a shift from searching for physiological distinctions (e.g., in terms of phrenology or anthropometry) between criminals and non-criminals to demonstrating the ‘socially inferior’ qualities of the criminal. Indeed, there is a tendency to think about violent, recidivating criminals when thinking about crime (Roberts & White, 1986). More generally, individuals (particularly those who are more punitive) tend to endorse stereotypes which suggest that individuals commit crime because they are essentially evil or callous (Carroll et al., 1987; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008).
Criminals’ perceived low social status and cruel nature appear to be associated with the third component of the criminal stereotype: dislike. Previous findings, which suggest that criminals are stereotypically thought of as being unattractive, dirty and sloppy, may reflect a general dislike of this social group. Individuals demonstrate implicit associations between unattractiveness and negative evaluations (i.e., dislike) (McConnell et al., 2008). However, criminals can also be subject to the ‘Robin Hood’ stereotype (i.e., that of the smart and friendly criminal, see MacLin & Herrera, 2006; Steckmesser, 1966), suggesting some variation in endorsed criminal stereotypes.

However, despite the extant research on criminal stereotypes, the findings remain somewhat disparate, and have not yet been reconciled with current research and theory on interpersonal perception. The present research seeks to put content into otherwise seemingly amorphous criminal stereotypes, and draws upon social psychological theory on interpersonal and intergroup perception.

The Stereotype Content Model

Criminological research on criminal stereotypes remains for the most part atheoretical and has failed to draw meaningful links between components of criminal stereotypes. This is especially surprising since social psychological research on stereotypes has generated, over the past 30 years, a more comprehensive approach to study the cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes of social stereotypes. Widespread consensus amongst many social psychologists suggests that stereotypes reflect the ‘Big Two’ fundamental dimensions of social perception – that is, perceptions of warmth and competence (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). The
Stereotype Content Model has emerged as a leading theoretical framework to study stereotypes about social groups in various social and cultural settings (Fiske et al., 2002; 2006; Fiske, 2009). The SCM emphasizes the functionality of social stereotypes in interpersonal relations, suggesting that stereotypes are a predictable feature of any social system in which social groups must compete for resources and are varyingly successful in this task. Perceptions of warmth and competence answer questions that are fundamental for survival and social relationships: What are others’ intentions? How capable are others of carrying out their intentions?

Correlational and experimental studies suggest that at an intergroup level – where individuals are aware of a common group membership, and members of that group experience ‘group identification’ (Tajfel, 1982) – perceptions of these two dimensions are partly explained by social structural factors of competition and social status (Caprariello, Cuddy & Fiske, 2009). Perceived competition generates stereotypes about an outgroup’s warmth, as perceivers make inferences about others’ intentions toward the ingroup and attribute these intentions to inherent traits (Russell & Fiske, 2008; see also Esses et al., 2001, for the role of competition in generating prejudice). These attributions generate perceptions of low warmth and dislike. A group’s relative status and social standing is also attributed to dispositional as opposed to situational causes and generates corresponding perceptions of competence. Successful high-status groups are therefore perceived as being more competent than unsuccessful low-status groups (Conway et al., 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 1984). But, according to Oldmeadow and Fiske (2007), to the extent that warmth stereotypes also justify social inequalities, status
may also predict warmth, particularly among those with system-justifying beliefs (see Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004, on system justification theory).

In the context of crime and punishment, the SCM also has important socio-political implications, notably that policies that strip criminals of their social status (e.g., by further isolating them from society through imprisonment) can have the effect of contributing to stereotypical perceptions of criminals (see Pettit & Western, 2004, on the detrimental effects of imprisonment). Previous research also suggests that stereotypes are functional in that they have been linked to basic approach and avoidance behaviour (Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998) as well as to specific affective and behavioural outcomes (Cuddy et al., 2007). These findings may help explain why endorsing criminal stereotypes has been identified as an important predictor of public support for harsh criminal justice policy (Dixon & Maddox, 2005; Correll et al., 2007; Gordon & Anderson, 1995; Graham & Lowery, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; Johnson, 2009; Roberts, 1992; Tam, Leung & Chiu, 2008).

This paper argues that criminal stereotypes reflect fundamental dimensions of social perception – warmth and competence. By applying the SCM, this paper hypothesizes that criminal stereotypes are affected not only by direct experiences with crime or by indirect knowledge of crime (e.g., through news reports), but also by social structural determinants that are partly static (e.g., based on the perception that criminals compete against society, presumably a stable feature of engaging in criminal activity), and partly dynamic (e.g., based on the perception that criminals have a low social status, a feature of criminals that is variant). Given previous findings, one would expect criminals to be perceived as being particularly low on warmth but also low on
competence: criminals are often described and perceived as having bad intentions toward society (Carroll et al., 1987) and as having a low social status (Roberts, 1992).

Overview of Three Studies

Study 1 identifies the concepts that are relevant in individuals’ construal of the ‘criminal’. Study 2 then applies the SCM, testing the hypothesis that criminal stereotypes reflect fundamental dimensions of social perception and are shaped by social structural factors. Finally, Study 3 gives consideration to variation in criminal stereotypes (on the basis of the type of crime a criminal has committed); some of the findings from Study 2 are replicated using an experimental methodology.

Study 1: The ‘Criminal’ Associative Network

Previous studies have identified some of the key constructs associated with the criminal stereotype, such as notions of poverty and cruelty. This study aims to replicate these findings using a methodology that steers away from imposing a theoretical framework or specific constructs (e.g., warmth, competence, age, ethnicity) on individuals’ stereotypes about criminals. Exploring individuals’ cognitive associations with the ‘criminal’ social construct is helpful in addressing issues of accessibility (i.e., the most quickly recalled concepts), priming (i.e., the activation of constructs based on conceptual or semantic links) and salience (i.e., the prevalence of concepts in the associative network) (Collins & Loftus, 1975).

The methods of analysis used in this study operate at two levels. A first analysis takes participants’ words at their ‘face value’, observing the occurrence of constructs and the associations between constructs in the ‘criminal’ associative network. A
problem with this method is that one fails to recognize concepts that are semantically or conceptually related, but that are used differentially across individuals. For instance, person A may think of ‘murderer’ and immediately think of ‘wrong’, while person B may think of ‘killer’ and immediately think of ‘bad’. Substantively, these conceptual links are virtually identical. But the constructs representing these links are different.

The second method of analysis abstracts from the specific words used by participants to identify the broader conceptual constructs that these words represent. This is accomplished by using a coding scheme to systematically categorize participants’ responses and observe the association between these broader categories. Together, these methods overcome some of the pitfalls associated with analyzing open-ended data – including the failure to identify context and underlying concepts (e.g., by using quantitative word-based analyses) and the imposition of meaning onto participants’ responses (e.g., by using researcher-generated coding schemes) (Jackson & Trochim, 2002).

Participants

Participants (N = 169)⁸ were university students in London who filled out a survey at a booth located on campus for the chance to win one of several cash prizes (ranging from £25 or $37.50USD, to £200 or $300USD) and/or a £2.50 ($3.75USD) voucher for university catering services. For the 165 participants who reported their age, mean age was 21.93 (SD = 4.72) (min = 18, max = 56). The sample consisted of 103 men, and 64 women (two participants did not report their gender). Sixty percent of the sample reported spending most of their youth in the United Kingdom. White British students

⁸ Four participants were excluded from the analyses as they failed to provide responses.
made up 32% of the sample, while 18% were White students from a non-British background. The remainder of the study was 27% Asian British (e.g., Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani), 4% British African or Caribbean and 19% were from other ethnic categories (e.g., Chinese British and non-British, Mixed or Other). The sample was equally distributed in terms of social class, with 30% reporting being from the working-class or lower-middle class, 39% from the middle-class and 31% from upper-middle and upper class.

Methodology and results

Participants filled out a larger survey (containing measures that are not presented here) containing the following instructions on the first page: “write down as many words that come to mind when you think about a criminal, in the order that they come to mind, using the [20] spaces provided below” [emphasis in original text]. Participants generated approximately 700 different words or word-segments (i.e., 2-5 words describing a single idea). On average, participants wrote down approximately 12 words (M = 11.55, SD = 4.63), with a minimum of 1 word and a maximum of 20 words. Words occurring most frequently included thief (n = 37), prison (n = 34), bad (n = 30), violen(t/ce) (n = 28), police (n = 27) and murder (n = 25) (see Table 1).

Alceste analysis. A first analysis was conducted on the actual words participants wrote. This analysis was conducted using Alceste, which is a software program designed to analyze qualitative data using quantitative methods that combine correspondence analysis and descending hierarchical classification. Alceste substitutes meaning by treating each word stem (e.g., ‘ang*’ for anger, angry, angered) as an object and looking
for other objects which tend to occur nearby. It then observes whether identified co-
occurrents tend to be present across bodies or segments of text. The underlying idea is

Table 1

*Words Occurring ≥10 Times in Total Word Sample (Study 1)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thief</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Wrong</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent(t/ce)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Murderer</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desperate</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Dangerous</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Court</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Burglar</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jail</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Thug</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Rapist</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfish</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Knife</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evil</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that speech co-occurrences reflect meaningful ways of thinking about a given topic. Alceste’s main weakness is its inability to find meaning between words that are semantically related but do not appear within close proximity of each other in a body of text. For instance, Alceste would not ‘know’ – so to speak – that the word ‘killer’ and ‘murderer’ are two instances of the same construct (i.e., a person who commits homicide).

To generate classes of words that reflect ways of thinking about a given topic, Alceste first generates larger classes of words that tend to co-occur together and then uses descending hierarchical classification to create final word classes that are most distinct from each other (i.e., representing separate themes), using a chi-square criterion. The total number of classes of words and their contents reflect the themes present in a body of text, and a hierarchy of these themes. In order to use Alceste, the body of text to be analyzed must show thematic coherence and be sufficiently large, so as to produce stable and meaningful analyses.

Alceste was able to classify approximately 75% of participants’ responses into one of the three classes of words representing individuals’ thinking about criminals. The dendogram produced by Alceste (to be read from right to left) suggests that Alceste first distinguished between two classes of words, and later pulled apart two further classes within a broader class (see Figure 1). The largest class of words (44%), which will be referred to as the criminal features class, reflected three themes: (a) a lack of warmth (e.g., ‘evil’, ‘inconsiderate’, ‘selfish’, ‘cruel’), (b) a disturbed or violent nature (e.g., ‘dangerous’, ‘dark’, ‘disturbed’, ‘violent’, ‘angry’), and (c) a certain level of cold-
competence (e.g., ‘clever’, ‘sly’). This class signals not only the type of person that criminals are, but also the threat that they represent.

The crime and justice class (19%) and crime features class (37%) dealt with issues related to crime and justice more broadly and to crime types and features of crime, respectively. Words most representative of the crime and justice class include ‘justice’, ‘judge’, ‘crime’, and ‘victim’. Words most representative of the crime features class include ‘rape’, ‘murder’, ‘violence’, ‘robber’, ‘police’, ‘thief’ and ‘burglar’. Words linking the two classes represent the criminal justice systems’ responses to criminals such as ‘convict’ and ‘prison’.

Figure 1

*Alceste Dendogram Representing Hierarchical Classification of Word Classes (Study 1)*

These results suggest that when the ‘criminal’ social category was activated, much of individuals’ spontaneous thoughts related to criminals’ lack of warmth, cold-competence, and about the threat that criminals represent. Individuals also
spontaneously thought of notions related to justice, to society’s legal response to criminals in terms of the social institutions that deal with criminals (e.g., judges, police), and to different types of criminal behaviour (e.g., robbery, theft, rape).

Latent class analysis. A second analysis was conducted using a coding scheme to categorize participants’ responses into broader concepts.⁹ By using a coding scheme it is possible to move away from the specificity of words (e.g., ‘murderer’, ‘rapist’) and observe patterns in the broader concepts (e.g., violent crime) reflected in individuals’ thoughts about criminals. In total 63 codes were developed to capture the word categories reflected in participants’ responses (see Table 2). The results suggest that the top ten word categories accounted for nearly half (48%) of participants’ responses and included words relating to criminals’ lack of warmth and poverty, crime type (e.g., violent crime, property crime), law and legal responses (e.g., criminal designations, prison) and the wrongfulness of crime (see Table 3).

Using information about the order in which words appeared in participants’ responses, it is possible to observe how ‘early’ (on average) concepts enter individuals’ stream of consciousness when they think of the word ‘criminal’. In this respect, the open-ended method is well suited for establishing order or priming patterns in cognitive associations. The mean order of the top ten word categories reveals that when thinking about criminals, individuals were most quickly drawn to notions of property crime and wrongfulness (see Table 4).

⁹ This coding scheme was developed based on a subsample of participants’ responses with the help of the same research assistant who coded all participants’ responses.
### Table 2

**63 Word Categories (Study 1)**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Crime type - Violent (e.g., murder, robber)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Crime type - Property (e.g., thief, steal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Crime type - White-collar (e.g., fraud, hacker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Crime type - Drugs (e.g., drugs, high)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Crime type - Alcohol (e.g., drunk, alcoholic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Crime type - Vandalism (e.g., vandalism, graffiti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Crime type - Nuisance (e.g., nuisance, loitering)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Crime type - Organized (e.g., gang, thug)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Crime type - Terrorism (e.g., terrorist, terrorism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Crime type - Sex crimes (e.g., pedophile, pimp)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Violence (e.g., violent, rough)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Emotions Positive (e.g., happy, joyful)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Emotions Negative (e.g., angry, sad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Harm (e.g., harm, pain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Justice (e.g., justice, unfair)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Authority (e.g., respect, authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Loyalty (e.g., betray, tradition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Purity (e.g., disgusting, dirty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Wrong (e.g., wrong, not right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Legal response – Police (e.g., police, arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Legal response - Law/Legal (e.g., law, criminal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Legal response – Courts (e.g., court, guilty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Punishment – Punishment (e.g., punish, punishment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Punishment – Prison (e.g., prison, jail)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Punishment – Other (e.g., rehabilitation, sentence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Society (e.g., society, community)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Disorder - Positive (e.g., controlled, composed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Disorder – Negative (e.g., disorder, reckless)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Warmth – Positive (e.g., warm, kind)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Warmth – Negative (e.g., cold, cruel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Competence - Positive (e.g., competent, clever)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Competence – Negative (e.g., stupid, unaware)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Agency – Positive (e.g., determined, forceful)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Agency – Negative (e.g., lazy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Competent-cold (e.g., sly, manipulative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Social category/occupation (e.g., anarchist, vagabond)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Media (e.g., film, Bobby Sands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Threat (e.g., danger, fear)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Weapon (e.g., weapon, knife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Victim (e.g., victim, victimization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Dark/night (e.g., darkness, night)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Motivation (e.g., power, rush)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Money (e.g., money, rich)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Poor/disadvantage (e.g., poor, lack of education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Hopeless (e.g., hopeless, loss)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Outcast (e.g., outcast, isolated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Mental health (e.g., insane, psycho)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Area/location (e.g., streets, East End)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Government (e.g., ministers, politicians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Necessity (e.g., forced, need)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Circumstance (e.g., unfortunate, inequalities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Family (e.g., background, childhood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Idleness (e.g., bored, aimless)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Moral judgment (e.g., immoral, ethics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Antisocial (e.g., antisocial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Physical Descriptor - Positive (e.g., handsome)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Physical Descriptor – Negative (e.g., ugly, smelly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Physical Descriptor – Neutral (e.g., fat, young)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>General Descriptor - Positive (e.g., cool, romantic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>General Descriptor – Negative (e.g., weak, disgraceful)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>General Descriptor – Neutral (e.g., secretive, enigmatic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Other (e.g., why, psychology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Education (e.g., uneducated, education)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3

*Top Ten Word Categories in Participant Responses (Study 1)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word category</th>
<th>Word occurrences</th>
<th>% of total words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of warmth (e.g., cold, cruel, dishonest)</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent crime (e.g., murder, assault, rapist)</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property crime (e.g., theft, stealing, burglary)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and legal responses (e.g., law, unlawful, crime)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison (e.g., jail, guard, locked up)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral physical characteristics (e.g., fat, young, adult)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong (e.g., wrongful, not right, bad)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor/disadvantaged (e.g., homeless, deprived area, lack of education)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts (e.g., lawyer, conviction, guilty)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence (e.g., violent, aggressive, brutal)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* The category ‘Other’ (which includes words such as ‘why’, ‘psychology,’ ‘surprise’) and represented 4.9% of words in the total sample was excluded from the above table.
Table 4

*Top Ten Word Types in Order of Average Occurrence (Study 1)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word type</th>
<th>Mean order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property crime</td>
<td>3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong</td>
<td>3.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor/disadvantaged</td>
<td>5.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and legal responses</td>
<td>5.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent crime</td>
<td>5.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of warmth</td>
<td>5.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral physical characteristics</td>
<td>5.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison</td>
<td>6.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>6.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following thoughts about wrongfulness were thoughts about the types of crimes criminals commit, society’s response to criminals and who the criminal is as a person (e.g., evil, poor). Although previous findings suggest individuals stereotypically think of violent criminals when thinking about crime (see Roberts, 1992), thoughts related to property crimes tended to occur sooner than those about violent crimes or violence in general. Thoughts relating to criminals’ lack of warmth, poverty and legal responses to crime tended to occur closely together, as did thoughts about violent crime and violence.

In line with previous findings, these results suggest that stereotypes about criminals’ poverty and lack of warmth featured prominently in the criminal cognitive
associative network. However, even before thinking about what type of person a criminal is, individuals thought about the crimes they commit and make normative judgments about the wrongfulness of crime. Other concepts activated by the criminal associative network included legal and punitive responses to crime. Although the SCM suggests that fundamental dimensions of social perception form the content of stereotypes, it is clear that stereotypes about criminals were associated with broader concepts relating to the wrongfulness of crime and to society’s response to crime.

The next step in the analysis is to identify latent or unobserved variables that help explain the relationships among observed word categories using Latent Class Analysis (LCA) (Hagenaars & McCutcheon, 2002). In this case, the unobserved variables reflect different ‘classes’ of individuals or ways in which individuals think about criminals. Because the current interest is in the content of criminal stereotypes, the LCA was performed on the 24 word categories related to the type of person a criminal is, the criminal features class identified by Alceste, and excluded categories unrelated to the type of person a criminal is (e.g., crime type, weapons, media depictions) as well as broad and less substantively meaningful categories (e.g., physical descriptors). The LCA was conducted using binary variables where participants were given a value of ‘1’ if at least one of their responses represented this category, and a value of ‘0’ if none of their responses represented the category.

A three cluster solution provided the most meaningful results and best fit (AIC = 581.18), compared to a two (AIC = 587.19) or four (AIC = 591.71) cluster solution. According to this cluster solution, the majority of respondents, who fall in the threatening criminal cluster (63%), think about criminals in terms of being individuals
who are poor, outcasts, who lack warmth and are immoral. What sets this cluster apart from the remaining two is thinking about criminals as being threatening, violent and antisocial. Individuals in this cluster tend to also link criminals’ behaviour to family factors (e.g., a broken home) and to a lack of education.

While individuals in the second biggest cluster, the *bad criminal cluster* (24%) also thought about criminals in terms of their lack of warmth, they additionally think about criminals’ incompetence, mental or psychological instability (e.g., ‘insane’, ‘psycho’) and to a lesser extent about their outcast status (e.g., ‘isolated’, ‘loner’) and poor background. Individuals in this cluster were most distinct from those in the first cluster in two respects. First, they tended to have more thoughts relating to moral judgments about criminals (e.g., ‘immoral’, ‘morality’), and less about the threat that criminals represent. Second, they link criminals’ behaviour to a broad spectrum of factors including internal motivation (e.g., ‘power’, ‘rush’), necessity (e.g., ‘forced’, ‘need’) or circumstance (e.g., ‘unfortunate’, ‘mistake’), family factors and idleness (e.g., ‘aimless’, ‘bored’). Individuals in the final *complex criminal cluster* (13%) thought about criminals in a somewhat more multifaceted way. For instance, while like other individuals they think about criminals’ lack of warmth, incompetence, poverty and outcast status, they also thought about criminals’ positive features (e.g., ‘charming’, ‘suave’), competence (e.g., ‘intelligent’, ‘resourceful’) and cold-competence (e.g., ‘sly’, ‘manipulative’). For these individuals, criminals evoked thoughts of hopelessness (e.g., ‘loss’, ‘failure’, ‘pitiful’) and disorder (e.g., ‘reckless’, ‘out of control’), in addition to less central thoughts relating to criminals’ violent and antisocial features.

---

10 Although they do think about these features, they do so to a lesser extent than individuals in the *threatening criminal cluster* and *bad criminal cluster*.
Discussion of Study 1

This study investigated individuals’ associative network with the criminal construct. The results suggest that there is a great deal of consistency in how individuals think about criminals as a social group, with the top ten word categories reflected in participants’ spontaneous thoughts about criminals accounting for nearly 50% of all responses. However, there are also some important differences in thinking about criminals. The results of latent class analysis suggest that most individuals perceive criminals as lacking warmth, with a large subsample of this group additionally perceiving criminals as being particularly threatening. On the other hand, a smaller proportion of individuals perceive criminals as not being all bad, but instead as being complex and multifaceted individuals. More broadly, the results suggest that when thinking about criminals, individuals’ thoughts are not limited to the question of what type of person a criminal is or what type of crime they committed. Rather, individuals also make normative judgments about the wrongfulness of crime, and think about how society responds to criminals. In other words, tangled into thoughts about ‘who is a criminal’ are thoughts about ‘what do we and what should we do to criminals’.

In line with previous findings, the present findings suggest that stereotypical beliefs about criminals’ lack of warmth and low socio-economic status are a prevalent feature of individuals’ criminal associative network. Hypotheses specified by the SCM, specifically regarding the associations between social structural determinants and fundamental dimensions of social perception, will be addressed in the following study.
Study 2: The Content of the Criminal Stereotype and its Social Structural Determinants

According to the Stereotype Content Model, stereotypes about social groups reflect fundamental dimensions of social perception – warmth and competence – and are shaped by social structural determinants such as social status and competitiveness (Fiske et al., 2002). The SCM hypothesizes that perceptions of a high social status lead to inferences of competence (in line with meritocratic beliefs), while a group’s perceived competitiveness against (or lack of cooperation with) society is hypothesized to be a key predictor of how warm a group is inferred to be. The first study suggested that criminals’ lack of warmth and low social status were key features of the criminal stereotype. Study 2 study tests the association between perceptions of criminals’ lack of warmth and social status by using structural-equation modeling to simultaneously estimate the measurement and structural paths specified by the SCM.

Participants

Participants (N= 271) were university students in the city of London who completed an online survey for the chance to win one of 8 cash prizes (ranging from £20 or $30USD, to £150 or $225USD). Participants were recruited by posting advertisements on campus billboards and online social groups, distributing advertisements directly to students on campus and through departmental e-mails. Participants’ mean age was 23.37 (min = 18, max = 63). The sample consisted of 95 men and 176 women. Of the 258 participants who reported their ethnicity, White British students made up 31% of the sample, while 30% were White students from a non-British background. The remainder

11 The study had a 49% completion rate, with 28% of the sample dropping out within a minute or two of beginning the survey. This means that amongst the 72% of participants who made it past the first minute or so, 68% completed the survey.
of the study was 11% Asian British (e.g., Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani), 5% British African or Caribbean and 23% were from other ethnic categories (e.g., Chinese British and non-British, Mixed or Other). The sample was equally distributed in terms of social class, with 32% reporting being from the working-class or lower-middle class, 38% from the middle-class and 30% from upper-middle and upper class.

Methodology

Participants were asked to rate criminals as a social group on dimensions of competitiveness, social status, warmth and competence. In an effort to reduce social desirability effects and tap into cultural stereotypes about criminals, participants were asked to rate criminals on the basis of how society views criminals as a social group.

Measures

Competitiveness and social status. Criminals’ perceived competitiveness (e.g., for power, resources and privileges) and social status (e.g., economic, educational and employment achievements) were measured by 3 items each on a scale that ranged from 1 to 7 (taken from Fiske et al., 2002). A confirmatory factor analysis suggested an adequate fit for dimensions of competitiveness and social status ($\chi^2 (8, N = 271) = 32.38, p \leq .001, \chi^2/df = 4.05, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .11$), with each item loading

---

12 In the first part of the survey, participants were randomly assigned into an experimental condition. The results presented here are comparable to results that control for the experimental factor, and so the presented results exclude this factor from the analyses.

13 If the item measuring criminals’ perceived economic success is removed from the model, the fit indices improve substantially (Chi-square $p \geq .05, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .05$). This item’s lower factor loading may be due to individuals’ differential understanding of the question, that is, if answers should be based on gainful employment or on actual economic success. Still, this item was kept in the analyses in order to take into account criminal’s perceived financial success.

14 These fit statistics are more reflective of the measurement models as none of the structural paths are constrained. A CFI close to .95 and RMSEA close to .06 suggest a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). A CFI
highly and statistically significantly on its respective factor ($p$’s ≤ .001). Items did not
cross load. Competitiveness and status correlated negatively and significantly ($r = -.36, p ≤ .001$).

*Competence and warmth.* Criminals as a group were rated on 3 competence (i.e.,
*competent, efficient, intelligent*) and 4 warmth (i.e., *warm, trustworthy, good-natured, sincere*) traits on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely). Criminals are perceived as
being low, in absolute terms, on both competence ($M = 3.24, SD = 1.20$) and warmth ($M = 1.98, SD = 0.81$). Perceptions of criminals fall into the ‘successful competitor’
category as they are perceived as being significantly higher on competence than on
warmth ($t = 16.91, df = 270, p ≤ .001$). Confirmatory factor analysis suggested an
adequate fit for dimensions of competence and warmth ($\chi^2$ (13, $N = 271$) = 39.89, $p \leq .001$, $\chi^2 /df = 3.07, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .09$) with each item loading highly and
statistically significantly on its respective factor ($p$’s ≤ .001). Items did not cross load.

Competence and warmth correlated significantly and positively ($r = .41, p ≤ .001$).

Results

Structural equation modeling (using MPLUS 5.21) was used in order to estimate the
measurement and structural paths specified by the SCM. Paths were estimated from
competition and social status to perceived warmth and competence (see Figure 2). The
model suggests a marginally good or adequate fit ($\chi^2$ (59, $N = 271$) = 165.16, $p \leq .001$,
\(\chi^2/df = 2.80, \ CFI = .88, \ RMSEA = .08\).\(^{15}\) Results for the measurement parts of the model are similar to those found in the separate confirmatory factor analyses.

Figure 2

*Structural Equation Model for Stereotype Content Model (Study 2)*

Note. Regression coefficients are standardized. Ovals represent latent variables, rectangles represent manifest variables. *\(p \leq .05\). **\(p \leq .01\). ***\(p \leq .001\).

As expected, the results suggest that criminals’ perceived warmth is associated with their perceived competitiveness (\(\beta = -.42, \ p \leq .001\)), but also with their perceived social status (\(\beta = .53, \ p \leq .001\)). On the other hand, criminals’ perceived competence is

\(^{15}\) Participants’ gender, age and socio-economic status were not predictive of perceived warmth and competence, except for gender which marginally predicted perceived warmth. The presented results therefore exclude participant socio-demographics from the analyses.
strongly associated with their perceived social status ($\beta = .78, p \leq .001$), and to a lesser extent with their perceived competitiveness ($\beta = .18, p \leq .05$). In other words, perceiving criminals as having a low social status engenders low perceptions of warmth and competence, while criminals’ perceived competitiveness is especially important in predicting low perceptions of warmth.

Discussion of Study 2

The present findings largely support the Stereotype Content Model. Although criminals were perceived as being low on both competence and warmth, they were perceived as being significantly more competent, efficient and intelligent than warm, trustworthy and good-natured. Perceptions of criminals’ warmth and competence were positively correlated such that endorsing stereotypes about criminals as being cold and untrustworthy was associated with also believing that they are incompetent and unintelligent.

As predicted by the SCM, criminal stereotypes are partly explained by social structural factors of competition and social status. The results suggest that, controlling for criminals’ perceived social status, to the extent that criminals are perceived as competing against society (for power and resources), they will also be perceived as being lower on warmth and higher on perceived competence. Therefore, if two individuals (let us call them individuals A and B) share the same stereotype about criminals’ low social status, but individual A also believes that criminals are particularly competitive against society, individual A is more likely to also perceive criminals as being especially cold and untrustworthy, but more competent, and perhaps therefore as more threatening. On the other hand, controlling for criminals’ perceived
competitiveness, perceiving criminals as having a low social status was associated with perceptions of low competence and low warmth. In other words, if two individuals share the same stereotype about criminals’ competitiveness against society, but individual B believes that criminals have a particularly low social status, individual B is also more likely to perceive criminals as being especially incompetent and untrustworthy.

Stereotypes that suggest that criminals are evil or cruel, but also generally stupid and useless, are therefore intimately tied to perceptions of criminals’ social rank. This finding is novel. It is tempting to believe that individuals harbor stereotypes about criminals’ evilness or cruelty on the basis of their criminal actions. Yet, the present findings suggest that stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth are partly explained by criminals’ perceived low social status.

A weakness of the present study is that it is correlational in nature. The design precludes establishing causal associations between social structural determinants and stereotypes about criminals. However, previous research by Caprariello, Cuddy and Fiske (2009) has experimentally established the link between social structural factors and stereotypes about immigrants. There is thus evidence that social structural factors can have causal effects on social stereotypes. Still, future research may seek to experimentally manipulate criminals’ perceived competitiveness and social status in order to observe the effects on criminal stereotypes.

The present study also asked individuals to think abstractly about how society perceives criminals as a social group – a method that some may argue is adequate to capture cultural level stereotypes but perhaps less suited for capturing individuals’ personal stereotypes about criminals. Furthermore, the present study treats criminals as a
homogeneous group, when in fact the criminal social category encompasses individuals who have committed crimes ranging from tax evasion to burglary and murder. The following study seeks to experimentally instantiate individuals’ personal stereotypes about criminals and to distinguish between stereotypes about street criminals from those about white-collar criminals.

Study 3: Replication and 'Fine Tuning' of the Criminal Stereotype

This final study experimentally tests the effect of the criminal label on perceptions of warmth and competence at the individual as opposed to group level. This study uses a methodology that differs from the usual paper-and-pencil questionnaire: participants were presented pictures of suspected or wanted criminals taken from police websites; and the criminal status of pictured individuals was experimentally manipulated.\(^\text{16}\) Previous findings suggest that, when provided with the ‘criminal’ label, people encode facial attributes differently than when provided the same face under a different label (e.g., ‘lifeboat captain’) (Shepherd et al., 1978; as cited in Hills, 2008). This study first considers the impact of the broader criminal label, and then moves toward disentangling stereotypes associated with street criminals from those associated with white-collar criminals.

Participants

Participants (N= 271) were the same as those used for Study 2. They completed this task before moving onto the second part of the study (described in Study 2). Participants

\(^{16}\) Pictures were found on police, prison and probation websites based primarily in the USA and UK. Pictures were selected on the basis of their visual quality and size. Each picture was color corrected and modified so that the background color was grey. A disclosure indicating that it was unknown whether any of the pictured individuals were actually found guilty of any crime was accessible by clicking on a link present at the very bottom of the welcome page that participants first visited.
completed the study online and were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in which they were asked to rate pictures of others and to answer questions about themselves. In the street-crime condition, participants (N = 145) were told that the pictures were of men who were found guilty of committing a street-crime (e.g., theft, minor assault). In the white-collar crime condition, participants (N = 65) were told that the pictures were of men who were found guilty of committing a white-collar crime (e.g., fraud, embezzlement).¹⁷ The remaining participants (N = 61) were in a control condition and were given no crime-related information.

Methodology and measures

Participants first rated each picture on socio-demographics (i.e., age, ethnicity, socio-economic status), attractiveness, babyfacedness and on how much the person looked like the stereotypical criminal (see Table 5).¹⁸ Previous findings suggest that babyfaced individuals elicit more approach and helping behaviour (Keating et al., 2003) while attractive individuals elicit more positive evaluations (Rudman et al., 2002). Next, each picture was rated on 10 personality traits that reflected dimensions of competence (*competent, intelligent, capable, confident*) and warmth (*warm, trustworthy, friendly, good-natured*), and included two filler items. Factor scores for dimensions of warmth and competence were used in all analyses. Warmth and competence were positively and significantly correlated (*r* = .48, *p* ≤ .001).

---

¹⁷ More participants were randomly assigned to the street-crime condition as measures obtained under this condition have been used for additional analyses that are not discussed here.

¹⁸ In the control condition, participants were also asked how much the person looked like the stereotypical ‘businessman’ and ‘working-class man’ so as to mask the true interest in criminal stereotypicality.
### Table 5

**Means and Standard Deviations of Perceptions of Pictures by Experimental Condition (Study 3)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Street-crime condition</th>
<th>White-collar crime condition</th>
<th>Control condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resemblance to</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stereotypical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>criminal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social status</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractiveness</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babyfacedness</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Warmth is measured by taking the mean of participants’ ratings for warm, trustworthy, friendly and good-natured. Competence is measured by taking the mean of participants’ ratings for competent, intelligent, capable and confident.

Each participant rated a subset of 10 pictures (selected from a pool of 80 pictures). To avoid systematic bias, the 10 rated pictures were randomly selected from subsets of pictures so as to provide an equal number of pictures that were rated (in a pilot study) as higher than average on perceived warmth (HW) (n = 5) and as lower than average (LW) (n = 5). Perceived warmth is a key feature of the criminal stereotype and so it was important to provide an equal number of HW and LW pictures to participants.
Pictures were presented in a structured randomized order such that each block of 5 pictures contained either 2 HW and 3 LW pictures or 3 HW and 2 LW pictures. For each experimental condition, two versions of blocks of 10 pictures were created, resulting in 16 versions of the survey for each of the 3 conditions (see Figure 3). Each participant was randomly sent to one of the 48 versions, using a random-url link generator.

Figure 3

*Experimental Design of Study 3*

Note. Each participant was randomly sent to one of 48 versions. Each experimental condition contains 2 sets of versions, each of which contained 10 pictures of criminals selected from a pool of 80 pictures.

Results

The analyses consist of estimating a set of multilevel regression models (using Stata 10) in order to observe the effects of a criminal label on social perception. All of the following multilevel models control for the variance (unaccounted for by explanatory
variables) that is induced by the fact that each participant rated more than one picture (thus creating a ‘participant factor’) and because each picture was rated more than once (thus creating a ‘picture factor’). Using multilevel regression to control for the clustered nature of the data and residual variance is also important because it provides better estimates of the standard errors for the explanatory variables.

The results suggest that the experimental manipulation was successful. Controlling for individual level variables (i.e., participants’ age, gender, socio-economic status and ethnicity) and picture level variables (i.e., perceptions of pictured individuals’ age, attractiveness, babyfacedness, ethnicity and social status) (Model 1, see Table 6), when presented in a crime condition ($\beta = .22, p \leq .05$), pictures of the same individuals are rated as looking more like the stereotypical criminal than when presented in the control condition. The extent to which individuals are perceived as being similar to ‘the stereotypical criminal’ is also negatively predicted by attractiveness ($\beta = -.25, p \leq .001$), social status ($\beta = -.58, p \leq .001$), babyfacedness ($\beta = -.08, p \leq .05$), though weakly, and by ethnicity. Compared to White individuals, individuals are perceived as being more similar to the stereotypical criminal if they are Latin ($\beta = .20, p \leq .05$) or of a different non-White ethnic background ($\beta = .32, p \leq .01$), but only marginally more stereotypical if they are Black ($\beta = .24, p = .08$) (although this effect becomes significant in Model 2) and not more stereotypical if they are Asian ($\beta = -.07, p \geq .05$).

Adding perceived warmth and competence to the model (Model 2, see Table 6) reveals that the warmer ($\beta = -.59, p \leq .001$) an individual is perceived as being the less he is seen as being similar to the stereotypical criminal, while competence is not
Table 6

*Multilevel Regression Models Predicting Perceived Stereotypicality (Study 3)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime condition</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived age</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived attractiveness</td>
<td>-.25***</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.16***</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived babyfacedness</td>
<td>-.08***</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.05*</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived status</td>
<td>-.58***</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.49***</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ethnicity - Black</td>
<td>.24⁴</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.28*</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ethnicity – Asian</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ethnicity – Latin</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ethnicity - Other</td>
<td>.32*</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived warmth</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.59***</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived competence</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Random effects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>σ² Picture</th>
<th>.55</th>
<th>.04</th>
<th>.61</th>
<th>.04</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>σ² Participant</td>
<td></td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σ² Residual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

σ² Residual | 1.30 | .02 | 1.23 | .02 |

*Note.* These models controlled for the clustering of picture ratings by individual and by picture. These models also controlled for participants’ gender, age, ethnicity and socio-economic status. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001. ¹ p = .08.
significantly associated with stereotypicality.\footnote{The non-significant effect of perceived competence on perceived stereotypicality is partly due to shared variance with perceived social status. Removing social status from the model reveals that perceived competence has a small negative effect ($\beta = -.08, p \leq .05$) on perceived stereotypicality, while the effect of warmth is slightly strengthened ($\beta = .63, p \leq .001$).}

On the other hand, controlling for perceived warmth and competence renders the effect of the experimental manipulation on perceived stereotypicality non-significant ($\beta = -.07, p \geq .05$), partly because of its shared variance with perceived warmth and social status, which have comparatively stronger effects.

The second set of analyses estimate the direct effect of the experimental manipulation on perceptions of individuals’ warmth and competence. Controlling for perceived age, social status, attractiveness and babyfacedness, and participants’ socio-demographics, when presented in the crime condition, pictures of the same individuals are rated as being significantly less warm than when presented in the control condition ($\beta = -.20, p \leq .01$) (see Table 7). Perceptions of warmth are also associated with perceived attractiveness ($\beta = .17, p \leq .001$), social status ($\beta = .18, p \leq .001$), and though more weakly, with babyfacedness ($\beta = .06, p \leq .001$) and only marginally with age ($\beta = .04, p = .06$).

A second model – replacing the dependent variable of warmth with competence – reveals that the experimental manipulation did not have a significant effect on perceptions of competence ($\beta = -.02, p \geq .05$). Perceptions of competence are, however, associated with perceived attractiveness ($\beta = .18, p \leq .001$), social status ($\beta = .26, p \leq .001$) and with ethnicity. Individuals perceived as being Black ($\beta = .12, p \leq .05$), Asian ($\beta = .22, p \leq .001$) or as being another non-White ethnicity ($\beta = .18, p \leq .01$) are perceived as being more competent than White individuals. This finding raises the
Table 7

*Multilevel Regression Models Predicting Perceived Warmth and Competence (Study 3)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed effects</th>
<th>Warmth</th>
<th>Competence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime condition</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived age</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived attractiveness</td>
<td>.17***</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived babyfacedness</td>
<td>.06***</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived status</td>
<td>.18***</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ethnicity - Black</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ethnicity – Asian</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ethnicity – Latin</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ethnicity - Other</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Random effects                |        |            |        |            |
|                               | σ² Picture | .31      | .03    | .13      | .02 |
|                               | σ² Participant | .38     | .02    | .39    | .02 |
|                               | σ² e Residual | .68    | .01    | .69    | .01 |

*Note.* These models controlled for the clustering of picture ratings by individual and by picture. These models also controlled for participants’ gender, age, ethnicity and socio-economic status. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
question of whether these types of criminals are also perceived as being more threatening given that perceived competence may suggest an increased ability to carry out bad intentions. Perceptions of competence are only weakly associated with age (β = .04, p ≤ .001) and babyfacedness (β = -.03, p ≤ .001).

The results support the hypothesis that the criminal stereotype engenders lower perceptions of warmth, although the effect of the experimental manipulation on perceived warmth is relatively small. Because pictured individuals reflected a particular subsample of the criminal population, they may have already reflected (in some sense) the ‘stereotypical’ criminal. Therefore, the effect of the experimental manipulation may have had a smaller effect than if participants had been presented pictures of a random sample of the general population. Still, it is a weakness of this study that the effect sizes of the experimental manipulation were not greater. The next step is to further investigate stereotypes about criminals by distinguishing between stereotypes about street-criminals from those about white-collar criminals.

**Street criminal vs. white-collar criminal stereotypes.** The following analyses distinguish between criminal stereotypes by entering separate dummy variables for the street-crime and white-collar crime conditions. The results suggest that controlling for pictured individuals’ perceived social status, age, attractiveness, babyfacedness, ethnicity and participants’ socio-demographics, compared to the control condition, individuals are perceived as being more like the stereotypical criminal when presented in the white-collar crime condition (β = .34, p ≤ .01), but not when presented in the street-crime condition (β = .17, p = .11). Further analyses suggest that the non-significant effect of the street-crime condition on perceived stereotypicality is due to
shared variance with perceived social status. Once social status is removed from the model, individuals presented in the street-crime condition are perceived as being significantly more like the stereotypical criminal ($\beta = .27, p \leq .05$) than in the control condition. In other words, controlling for the same factors as above, the results suggest that compared to the control condition, individuals are perceived as having a lower social status when presented in the street-crime condition ($\beta = -.16, p \leq .05$) but not when presented in the white-collar crime condition ($\beta = -.07, p \geq .05$).

Replacing perceived stereotypicality with perceived warmth – and controlling for the same factors as above – suggests that compared to the control condition individuals are perceived as being less warm when presented in the street-crime condition ($\beta = -1.16, p \leq .05$) and when presented in the white-collar crime condition ($\beta = -.30, p \leq .001$). Moreover, individuals in the white-collar crime condition are perceived as being less warm than those in the street-crime condition. Replacing perceived warmth with perceived competence reveals that, compared to the control condition, individuals were not perceived as being less competent in the street-crime condition ($\beta = .01, p \geq .05$) nor in the white-collar crime condition ($\beta = -.10, p \geq .05$).

Discussion of Study 3

This study experimentally instantiated the criminal stereotype in order to observe its causal effect on individuals’ perceptions of others and to replicate some findings emerging from Study 2. The results suggest that being labeled a criminal increases the extent to which individuals’ are perceived as resembling the stereotypical criminal, but lowers perceptions of warmth and social status, even when controlling for physical features of an individual’s appearance (e.g., age, ethnicity, attractiveness,
babyfacedness). As in Study 2, perceived social status was most strongly associated with perceived competence, although it was also associated with perceived warmth, particularly for street-criminals. The fact that a key difference between the street-criminal stereotype and the white-collar criminal stereotype is perceived social status is nontrivial. Perceived social status was key in predicting how much participants believed pictured individuals resembled the stereotypical criminal: when controlling for social status, the effect of the street-criminal label on perceived stereotypicality was nearly halved. Perceived social status was also found to be an important predictor of perceived warmth and competence.

This study provides further evidence that criminal stereotypes engender low perceived warmth and social status. The criminal label did not, however, have a significant effect on perceived competence but, rather, it had the effect of lowering street-criminals’ perceived social status. These findings suggest that the criminal stereotype may have indirect effects on perceived competence through social status. And while white-collar criminals were not perceived as having a low social status, they were perceived as being more similar to the stereotypical criminal and to be less warm than street-criminals. These findings may suggest that different processes are at play in perceptions of white-collar criminals.

The findings do face some limitations, notably in terms of the relatively small effect sizes. It may be that the use of pictures of suspected and wanted criminals inadvertently reduced the effect of the criminal stereotype on social perception.
General Discussion and Conclusion

Studies of criminal stereotypes often construct a ‘laundry list’ of features and traits that are part of individuals’ representations of who a criminal is. A review of the literature suggests that there are three overarching themes in criminal stereotypes: poverty, cruelty and dislike. This paper moves beyond studying amorphous criminal stereotypes (e.g., in terms of physical descriptors or crime type) by applying the Stereotype Content Model to investigate the content and social structural determinants of these stereotypes. According to the intergroup and interpersonal perception literature, perceptions of others and of social groups fall along two fundamental dimensions: warmth and competence (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). Perceptions of these dimensions have been linked to basic approach and avoidance behaviour, as well as to specific affective and behavioural outcomes (Cuddy et al., 2007; Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998).

The present findings demonstrate that criminal stereotypes reflect fundamental dimensions of social perception that are key in shaping interpersonal relations. Although criminals are stereotypically believed to be low on both competence and warmth, they appear to fit the ‘successful competitor’ stereotype as they are perceived as being significantly lower on warmth than on competence. Criminals are thought of partly in terms of their cold-competence, as sly and cunning individuals. Instantiating the criminal stereotype did not, however, have a direct causal effect on perceptions of competence. Stereotypes about criminals’ incompetence may therefore be closely tied to perceptions of their low social status. As a result, street-criminals may be perceived as
being especially incompetent and unintelligent, due to their lower perceived social status.

In line with predictions made by the SCM, the results suggest that criminals’ perceived competitiveness negatively predicts criminals’ perceived warmth, while criminals’ perceived social status was found to positively predict criminals’ perceived competence and warmth. The results therefore contribute to a growing body of research that suggests that perceptions of a group’s social status can influence inferences regarding a group’s warmth (see Brambilla et al., 2010, on the malleability of the relationship between status and stereotype content). From a theoretical perspective, the SCM framework and the present studies are limited, however, in that they do not address criminals’ perceived competitiveness against society’s norms and values. Criminals may represent a particularly competitive group for individuals who value social order or hierarchy (e.g., see Pratto et al., 1994, on Social Dominance Orientation) or who value respect for authority and tradition (e.g., see Altemeyer, 1981, on Right-Wing Authoritarianism). The present findings suggest that notions of morality and moral judgment feature in individuals’ criminal cognitive associative network. Future studies should therefore incorporate criminals’ perceived competitiveness against norms and values into criminals’ perceived competitiveness against society.

Looking more closely at distinctions between criminal stereotypes, some of the findings suggest that the processes that generate stereotypes about street-criminals are different from those that generate stereotypes about white-collar criminals. For instance, although white-collar criminals were not perceived as having a lower social status, they were perceived as being less warm than street-criminals. It is therefore unclear whether
the white-collar criminal stereotype is as detrimental as the street-criminal stereotype. Future research could investigate the relative harmfulness of street criminal and white-collar criminal stereotypes by considering their effects on affective and behavioural responses to each group.

Although this research largely supports the application of the SCM to study criminal stereotypes and attitudes toward crime and punishment, the findings are limited in some ways. For instance, some of the studies revealed relatively small effect sizes. Moreover, the present findings would have benefited from experimentally replicating the observed negative association between perceived competitiveness and perceptions of warmth. Still, previous research provides some empirical evidence of the causal effect of perceived competitiveness on perceived warmth (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007), while the present research provides correlational evidence in the context of criminal stereotypes.

One of the main aims of this research was to develop a better understanding of the association between components of the criminal stereotype. A secondary aim was to explain some of the consequences of situating the crime problem among the poor. These studies demonstrate that stereotypes about criminals’ evilness or cruelty are not arrived at strictly on the basis of criminals’ behaviour or competitiveness against society. The belief that criminals are uneducated, economically unsuccessful and do not hold prestigious jobs is associated with the belief that criminals are cold and untrustworthy. According to Oldmeadow and Fiske (2007), perceptions of warmth may be positively associated with perceptions of social status to the extent that these perceptions justify a group’s low social status. In the context of crime, social class is seen as the key lens through which criminality is understood, evidenced in part by society’s longstanding
concern with the ‘immorality’ of the lower classes (Emsley, 1996). The association between social status and a perceived lack of warmth suggests that criminals are not merely perceived as being the ‘needy’ poor, rather they are perceived as being the untrustworthy poor. Situating the crime problem among the poor could engender an implicit justification of their harsh treatment under the law, to the extent that criminals’ perceived low social status contributes to their perceived lack of warmth.

This research also brings to the fore broader questions regarding the role of social policy and cultural narratives in shaping stereotypes about criminals. If stereotypes are affected by social structural factors such as competition and social status, what happens when the crime problem is framed in ways which lower criminals’ perceived social status or increase their perceived competitiveness? Will situating the crime problem amongst immigrants, youth or organized crime have the same impact on criminal stereotypes? Do policies such as increased policing in impoverished areas strengthen the apparent link between social status and crime (see Davis, 1990)? These questions should be addressed in future research about the unequal treatment of the disadvantaged under the law and in research about the effects of criminal stereotypes on individuals’ attitudes toward crime.

References


Donohue, J. J. III (2007). Economic models of crime and punishment. *Social Research,


detainees: Comparison with the Epidemiologic Catchment Area program.

American Journal of Public Health, 80(6), 663-69.


From Stereotype Content to Affective, Behavioural and Attitudinal Outcomes

The first paper presented in this thesis accomplished two goals. First, it systematically measured the criminal stereotype. By using three different methodologies and measuring criminal stereotypes both at the group and individual level, this paper provided strong evidence of consistency in criminal stereotypes. By beginning inductively, and not imposing a theoretical framework on participants, this paper used a non-constrictive method of measuring individuals’ stereotypes about criminals. The results suggested that embedded in stereotypes about the type of crime criminals commit are thoughts related to criminals’ lack of warmth and to legal and punitive responses to crime. These findings provided empirical support for applying the Stereotype Content Model (SCM), a theoretical framework that identifies the underlying dimensions of stereotypes (warmth and competence), their social structural determinants, and affective and behavioural outcomes.

Next, this first paper identified the content of criminal stereotypes and their social structural determinants. Social status was found to predict not only stereotypes about criminals’ lack of competence, but also about their lack of warmth. Criminals’ perceived competitiveness against society (e.g., for resources) was also found to partly explain their low perceived warmth. The results suggested that the criminal stereotype is particularly damaging for street criminals, as opposed to white-collar criminals, who are perceived as being particularly low on social status.

This paper addressed some of the key issues discussed in the literature review, namely by identifying the content of otherwise seemingly amorphous criminal stereotypes. This was an important first step as it suggests that the processes that engender criminal stereotypes are associated with basic social psychological processes that engender social stereotypes more generally, such as making inferences of intent and causal attributions for behaviour. Moreover, this paper implants the study of criminal stereotypes firmly in the domain of interpersonal perception and relations.

The following paper takes findings from the first paper as a point of departure in order to investigate the affective and behavioural outcomes of criminal stereotypes, and their effects on punitive attitudes. This second paper applies both the Stereotype Content Model and the Behaviour from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes Map in order to
predict individuals’ support for harsh criminal justice policies. Moreover, individuals’ ideological positions are used to predict perceptions and responses to criminals. The second paper therefore makes headway in identifying the effects of stereotypes on affect and behaviour; it seeks to develop a full model of the key social psychological predictors linking social perception to punitiveness toward crime.
The seemingly insatiable public desire for punishment of crime has led some to compare support for harsh criminal justice policies to a practice of excess, much like craving ice cream (Loader, 2009). But what drives the public appetite for punishment? This study considers associations between the ‘Big Two’ dimensions of social perception and affective, behavioural and attitudinal responses to criminals. Results suggest, first, that perceiving criminals as lacking warmth is associated with feeling more anger and less compassion toward criminals. Second, these emotions are in turn associated with expressing support for harsh criminal justice policies. Third, political ideology is also key in understanding variation in perceptions and responses to the ‘Big Two’. Attitudes and policy preferences are therefore intimately tied to stereotyping, affect and ideology.

Keywords: Big Two, criminal stereotypes, punitiveness, political ideology

While punishment of crime is for all intents and purposes qualitatively milder than it was only a few hundred years ago (Foucault, 1975), the latter half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century has seen increasingly harsh criminal justice policies in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, evidenced most visibly in growing prison populations.
In the United States alone, the prison population has risen six-fold in a quarter of a century, with estimates of the prison population in the early 2000s ranging from 1.2 million to 2 million (Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000; Donohue, 2007). In the United Kingdom, the prison population had reached its capacity of 80,000 by 2006 (King, 2008).

The devastating effect of these policies has been felt most strongly by those in the margins of society – for example the youth, the poor, the homeless, ethnic minorities and those with mental health problems – whom tend to be overrepresented in the criminal justice system (Bazemore, 2007; Bobo, 2004; Curry & Klumpp, 2009; Garland, 2001; Harcourt, 2007; Helms, 2009; James & Glaze, 2006; Pettit & Western, 2004; Robinson & Darley, 2007; Teplin, 1990). Such policies are often justified on the basis of public opinion polls indicating a widespread belief that court sentences are too lenient and that harsher sentences are needed (Bottoms, 1995; Casey & Mohr, 2005; Garland, 2001; Loader, 2009; Useem et al., 2003).

This paper explores variation in public attitudes toward the punishment of law-breakers. Prior research has shown that public support for punishment of serious offenders does vary – despite being high on average – and that this variation depends on individuals’ perceptions of the criminal justice system (e.g., perceptions of sentencing and prison trends) (Doob & Roberts, 1984; Roberts, 1992; Roberts & Hough, 2005) and a range of individuating factors such as political ideology, sentencing goals, beliefs about the function of punishment and perceptions of the offence and offender (Bazemore, 2007; Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000; King, 2008; Maruna & King, 2004; Roberts, 1992).
The purpose of the current article is to consider whether variation in the endorsement of criminal stereotypes helps explain variation in affective, behavioural and attitudinal responses to crime. Importantly, this is the first time that the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) (Fiske et al., 2002) has been applied to public attitudes toward the punishment of criminals. Two studies test an integrative theoretical account of stereotyping on an important socio-political phenomenon of our time. Public discourse about crime and punishment is fraught with language that suggests that criminals are ‘evil’ ‘cruel’ ‘monsters’ and ‘bad’, that we should adopt ‘harsher’ or ‘stiffer’ laws and sentences, and that society and its institutions should engage in a ‘war’ or ‘get tough’ on crime. Two studies link perceptions and responses to the ‘Big Two’ dimensions of social perception – warmth and competence – to punitive attitudes. The studies apply Fiske and colleagues’ (2002) SCM as well as Cuddy and colleagues’ (2007) Behavior from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes (BIAS) map. The studies depart from the ways in which the SCM and BIAS map are typically employed by looking at heterogeneous perceptions of a single social group (i.e., criminals) and differences in attitudinal responses to these perceptions.

Findings suggest that controlling for political ideology, endorsing stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth (i.e., as not being nice, good-natured or trustworthy) is associated with experiencing fewer emotions of compassion, which in turn is associated with greater punitiveness. In line with the SCM, the findings suggest that criminal stereotypes are explained by shared perceptions of social structural factors which suggest that criminals have a low social status and compete against society. At a socio-political level, the findings suggest that harsh criminal justice policies and political
discourses, which have the effect of lowering criminals’ social status or implying that criminals are worthless or cruel, may contribute to feeling a lack of compassion toward criminals, and in turn to widespread punitiveness toward crime.

Criminal Stereotypes and Punitiveness Toward Crime

The criminal stereotype literature suggests that (a) criminals are perceived as being evil and poor, and (b) that criminals are generally disliked (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carroll et al., 1987; Chapman, 1968; Dixon & Maddox, 2005; Emsley, 1996; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Plant et al., 2005; Reed & Reed, 1973; Roberts, 1992; Roberts & White, 1986; Sargent, 2004; Steen, Engen & Gainey, 2005; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008; Van Knippenberg et al., 1999). These beliefs often co-occur, leading Roberts (1992) to conclude that the image of the ‘criminal’ is typically that of ‘an outsider, a young, lower-class male, [who is] physically unattractive [and] who has been convicted of a crime involving violence’ (p. 138).

Endorsing criminal stereotypes seems to be associated with making more punitive decisions and expressing more punitive attitudes (Correll et al., 2007; Dixon & Maddox, 2005; Gordon & Anderson, 1995; Graham & Lowery, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; Johnson, 2009; Roberts, 1992). For example, believing that ‘most criminals commit crimes because they are basically selfish people, unconcerned about the feelings of other people’ is associated with endorsing statements such as ‘criminals should be punished to make the criminals suffer, as the victims of the crimes suffered’ (Tam et al., 2008). Perceptions of offenders’ intent and causal responsibility can also motivate punishment of specific crimes and engender support for harsh criminal justice policies. Perceived causes of crime include individuals’ dispositions (e.g., laziness,
evilness or callousness), social (e.g., drug use, criminal associates) and economic factors (e.g., poverty, inequality). Indeed, individuals tend to be especially punitive when they perceive intent and attribute the causes of crime to individuals’ dispositions (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carroll et al., 1987; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Roberts, 1992; Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008; see also Hauser et al., 2007, for similar findings in moral judgment). Punitiveness is also associated with features of the offender such as criminal record, afrocentric features, social status and social motives (i.e., self-concerned vs. other-concerned) (Blair et al., 2004; Christopher, Marek & May, 2003; Kliemann et al., 2008). Moreover, individuals’ political ideology can come to shape perceptions of criminals and therefore have direct as well as indirect effects on punitiveness (Jost et al., 2003; see Tam et al., 2008, on the role of authoritarianism in shaping attributions for crime and punitiveness). The associations between political ideology, stereotyping and punitiveness will be more fully discussed later (see Study 2).

In short, beliefs about who and what a criminal is are intimately tied to beliefs about how society should respond to criminals – that is, with punishment. Yet, no study has explored in any detail the structure of criminal stereotypes and the links between endorsing particular stereotypes and the affective and attitudinal responses that these engender. Recent research suggests that criminal stereotypes are in fact reflective of the ‘Big Two’ fundamental dimensions of social perception (warmth and competence), with criminals stereotypically perceived as being incompetent and unintelligent, but also as being cold and untrustworthy (Côté-Lussier, 2012). Social psychological research on intergroup perception and relations suggests that these dimensions influence individuals’ affective and behavioural responses to social groups (Cuddy et al., 2007). The present
research aims to build on existing criminological research by identifying the paths that link criminal stereotypes to punitiveness toward crime.

The ‘Big Two’: The Stereotype Content Model and the BIAS map

For the past 30 years the interpersonal perception literature has demonstrated that perceptions of others and of social groups fall along two fundamental dimensions: warmth (i.e., kind, trustworthy, understanding) and competence (i.e., intelligent, efficient, skilful) (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). Correlational and experimental studies show – at an intergroup level – that perceptions of warmth and competence can be partly explained by social structural factors of competition and social status, respectively (Caprariello, Cuddy & Fiske, 2009). But, according to Oldmeadow and Fiske (2007), status can also function to inform perceptions of warmth, to the extent that warmth stereotypes justify social inequalities, and that individuals adopt system-justifying beliefs.

According to the SCM (Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske et al., 2002) and BIAS map (Cuddy et al., 2007), social perceptions of others generate appraisals and interpersonal comparisons that engender specific affective and behavioural responses (see Figure 1). For example, upward assimilative comparisons engender admiration and pride – a univalent positive emotion – whereas downward contrastive comparisons elicit contempt (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007). Emotions related to contempt are disgust and resentment, which have moral overtones and contribute to the formation of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). Emotions of anger may especially be elicited in response to
indignation and behaviour thought to be illegitimate and competitive in a zero-sum sense (Fiske et al., 2002).

**Figure 1.** Quadrants of social perception, affective and behavioural responses according to the SCM and BIAS map.

![Quadrants of social perception](image)

*Note.* Adapted from Cuddy, Fiske & Glick (2007).

Groups perceived as being more competent than warm should elicit emotions of envy, which is an ambivalent emotion engendered by the perception that a group is doing well for itself but is concerned only with furthering its own goals (i.e., lacking positive intent toward the ingroup). Envy can result not only in admiration but also in resentment and exclusion (Fiske et al., 2002). Indeed, envy can also engender feelings of injustice (in outcomes) and anger, especially toward groups perceived as being parasitic (Fiske et al., 2002). Groups perceived as being more warm than competent are expected to elicit pity, an ambivalent emotion that is related in part to a group’s perceived uncontrollable negative outcomes (i.e., due to a lack of competence). Pity can also elicit
paternalism and the justification of subordination, especially toward outgroups (Fiske et al., 2002). According to Fiske et al. (2002) envy and pity are functional emotions. They maintain the status quo and defend the position of ingroups by acknowledging the positive aspect of a social group (i.e., warmth for pity, and competence for envy) and simultaneously denigrating the group (i.e., as lacking competence for pity, and as lacking warmth for envy).

Emotions, in turn, are key in activating behaviour and can function to inform attitudes at an intuitive level (Adolphs, 2009; Frijda, 2010; Haidt, 2001; Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994). Affective responses to social perception are thus functionally relevant in that they motivate interpersonal behaviour and engender action tendencies (Cuddy et al., 2007). Broadly speaking, social behaviour can aim toward facilitation or harm, and can be active or passive. According to the BIAS map (Cuddy et al., 2007), helping behaviour (active facilitation) is predicted by admiration but also pity, while associating behaviour (passive facilitation) is predicted by admiration and envy. Attacking behaviour (active harm) is predicted by envy and contempt, while excluding behaviour (passive harm) is predicted by pity and contempt.

Previous findings suggest that punitiveness toward criminals is associated with affective responses to crime. Evidence links punitiveness to negative emotions such as anger, while reduced punitiveness is linked to positive emotions such as sympathy (Gault & Sabini, 2000; Johnson, 2009; Xiao, Houser & Smith, 2005). Yet little research has linked criminal stereotypes to affective responses that are predictive of punitiveness toward crime. It is hypothesized that criminal stereotypes engender negative affective and harmful behavioural responses, thus motivating specific attitudinal responses, such
as support for harsh criminal justice policy. Previous findings provide some support for this hypothesis; endorsing stereotypes about Black criminals has been associated with experiencing emotional discomfort (Dixon & Maddox, 2005), aggressive behaviour (Correll et al., 2007) and more punitive responses (Graham & Lowery, 2004).

The following studies apply two theoretical frameworks from the interpersonal and intergroup relations literature – the SCM and BIAS map – to identify the pathways that link social perception to punitive responses to crime. Study 1 tests the main hypotheses of the SCM and BIAS map with punitive attitudes added as a final outcome. Study 2 builds on the first study by additionally considering the role of political ideology in shaping perceptions and responses to law-breakers. Considering the associations between political ideology and criminal stereotypes proves to be an important step in understanding the functional relation between affect and punitive attitudes.

*Study 1: Applying the SCM and BIAS Map to Predict Punitive Attitudes*

This study addresses the question of what drives the public appetite for harsh punishment of law-breakers. Structural equation modeling is used to simultaneously estimate the associations between components of the SCM, BIAS map and support for tough criminal justice policy. One hypothesis is that criminal stereotypes engender negative affective and behavioural responses to criminals. A second hypothesis is that these responses are associated with expressing more punitive attitudes toward crime.
Participants

Participants (N = 172) were London (UK) students who filled out a survey at a booth located on campus for the chance to win one of several cash prizes (ranging from £25 or $37.50USD, to £200 or $300USD) and/or a £2.50 ($3.75USD) voucher for university catering services. Participants’ mean age was 21.93 (min = 18, max = 56). The sample consisted of 106 men, and 66 women. Sixty per cent of the sample reported spending most of their youth in the United Kingdom. White British students made up 32% of the sample, while 19% were White students from a non-British background. The remainder of the study was 26% Asian British (e.g., Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani), 6% British African or Caribbean and 16% were from other ethnic categories (e.g., Chinese British and non-British, Mixed or Other). The sample was equally distributed in terms of social class, with 30% reporting being from the working-class or lower-middle class, 40% from the middle-class and 30% from upper-middle and upper class.

Measures

*Competitiveness and social status.* Criminals’ perceived competitiveness (M = 4.95, SD = 1.27) and social status (M = 2.64, SD = 1.02) were measured by 3 items each on a scale that ranged from 1 to 7 (taken from Fiske et al., 2002). A confirmatory factor analysis suggested a good fit for dimensions of competitiveness and social status ($\chi^2$ (8, N = 172) = 7.8, $p > .05$, $\chi^2/d$ = .97, $CFI = 1$, $RMSEA \leq .001$). Each item loaded highly and statistically significantly on its respective factor ($p$’s $\leq .001$). Items did not cross load. Competitiveness and status did not correlate significantly.
Competence and warmth. Criminals were rated on 5 competence (i.e., competent, skilful, efficient, intelligent, goal-oriented) and 5 warmth (i.e., warm, nice, well-intentioned, trustworthy, good-natured) traits on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely). Although criminals are perceived as being low on both competence and warmth, perceptions of criminals fall into the ‘successful competitor’ category as they are perceived as being higher on competence ($M = 3.46$, $SD = 1.18$) than on warmth ($M = 1.79$, $SD = 0.81$) ($t (171) = 19.11, p \leq .001$). Confirmatory factor analysis suggested a good fit for the two dimensions of competence and warmth ($\chi^2 (21, N = 172) = 45.31, p \leq .01$, $\chi^2/df = 2.16$, $CFI = .97$, $RMSEA = .08$) with each item loading highly and statistically significantly on its respective factor ($p$’s $\leq .001$). Items did not cross load. Competence and warmth correlated positively ($r = .57, p \leq .001$).

Emotional responses to criminals as a social group. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which society feels 24 emotional responses toward criminals as a social group on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely) (taken from Fiske et al., 2002). On average, emotions most likely to be felt toward criminals as a group were, in order, angry ($M = 5.87$, $SD = 1.30$), fearful ($M = 5.69$, $SD = 1.45$), uneasy ($M = 5.60$, $SD = 1.42$), disgusted ($M = 5.53$, $SD = 1.47$), hateful ($M = 5.40$, $SD = 1.31$), frustrated ($M = 5.38$, $SD = 1.49$) and tense ($M = 5.23$, $SD = 1.40$). Emotions least likely to be felt toward criminals were secure ($M = 1.68$, $SD = 1.01$), fond ($M = 1.70$, $SD = 1.10$), proud ($M = 1.71$, $SD = 1.20$), respectful ($M = 1.73$, $SD = 1.14$), comfortable ($M = 1.75$, $SD = 1.16$) and admiring ($M = 1.92$, $SD = 1.30$). Reliability analyses suggested that emotional responses specified by the SCM, that is, envy (envious, jealous, $a = .75$), admiration (e.g., respectful, proud, admiring, inspired, fond, $a = .74$) and contempt (e.g., frustrated,
hateful, disgusted, angry, uneasy, resentful, contemptuous, ashamed, $a = .72$) were adequate, except for pity (e.g., pitying, sympathetic, compassionate, $a = .45$).

Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of emotional responses suggested a somewhat different 4 factor solution ($\chi^2 (53, N = 172) = 111.69, p \leq .001, \chi^2 / df = 2.11, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .08$) than that suggested by Fiske et al. (2002).\(^{20}\) The first two factors split contempt into negative emotions suggesting Anger (e.g., angry, disgusted, hateful) and a weaker and more diffuse negative emotion suggesting Uneasiness (e.g., uneasy, tense, anxious, fearful). The third factor of Envy was a mixture of envy and admiration (e.g., envious, jealous, admiring, inspired), and the last factor Compassion was a mixture of pity and admiration (e.g., compassionate, fond, secure). All items loaded on their respective factors statistically significantly ($p$’s $\leq 0.01$). Certain emotions loaded significantly on more than one factor: fearful loaded significantly on Uneasy and Angry; uneasy loaded significantly and positively on Uneasy, but negatively on Envy; admiring and inspired loaded significantly on Compassion but also on Envy. These cross-loadings suggest that Envy was associated with positive evaluations and partly explains the correlation between Envy and Compassion (see Table 1 for bivariate correlations between emotions).

**Behavioural responses to criminals as a social group.** Participants were asked to rate the extent to which society is likely to demonstrate 8 behavioural types toward criminals as a social group on a scale of 1 (Not at all likely) to 7 (Very likely). Behaviours most likely to occur toward criminals as a group were, in order, to exclude ($M = 4.28, SD = 1.34$), demean ($M = 3.92, SD = 1.43$), fight ($M = 3.32, SD = 1.39$) and

\(^{20}\) Emotions ‘disappointed’, ‘proud’ and ‘resentful’ loaded poorly on factors and were dropped from the analysis.
Table 1

*Bivariate Correlations Between Emotional Responses to Criminals*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Uneasiness</th>
<th>Envy</th>
<th>Compassion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>-46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uneasiness</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-24**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.53***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Correlations are between latent variables and were obtained using confirmatory factor analysis in MPLUS. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.*

Behaviours least likely to occur were to *protect* (*M* = 1.90, *SD* = 1.05) and *associate* with (*M* = 2.04, *SD* = 1.01). Correlational analyses suggest moderate correlations between items for Help behaviour (*help* and *protect, r* = .48), Associate behaviour (*cooperate* and *associate, r* = .45), Attack behaviour (*fight* and *attack, r* = .35) and Exclude behaviour (*exclude* and *demean, r* = .49). In each case, correlations were highest between items meant to reflect each behavioural type, except for *attack* which correlated slightly more highly with *exclude (r* = .37). Means of behaviour responses were used in all analyses (see Table 2 for bivariate correlations between behavioural responses).
Table 2

*Bivariate Correlations Between Behavioural Responses to Criminals*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exclude</th>
<th>Associate</th>
<th>Help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclude</td>
<td>-.25***</td>
<td>-.24***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.48***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Correlations are between means of behavioural items and were obtained in MPLUS. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.

**Punitiveness.** Participants rated the extent of their agreement on a scale of 1 (Disagree strongly) to 7 (Agree strongly) with statements: ‘People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences’, ‘Offences against laws and norms in our society should be punished as severely as possible’, and ‘The use of harsh punishment should be avoided whenever possible’. A latent variable was estimated to represent punitiveness toward crime.

**Results**

Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to test the measurement and structural parts of the SCM and BIAS map with punitiveness added as an attitudinal outcome. Latent variables were estimated for perceived competence and warmth, affective responses and punitiveness, while means were used for perceived competitiveness and social status, and for behavioural responses. The estimated SEM can be thought of as being composed of 4 steps or components. The first step links social structure to social perception. The second step links social perception to affect. The third step links affect to behaviour. The final step links social perception, affect and behaviour to punitiveness.

---

21 Means were used to limit the number of estimated parameters due to the small sample size.
Components of each step (e.g., affective responses) were allowed to correlate with each other.

The results suggest an adequate fit for the full SEM (see Figure 3) \( \chi^2 (86, N = 172) = 177.94, \ p \leq .001, \ \chi^2/df = 2.07, \ CFI = .89, \ RMSEA = .08 \).\(^{22}\) While competitiveness only significantly predicts warmth (\( \beta = -.32 \)),\(^{23}\) social status positively predicts warmth (\( \beta = .50 \)) and competence (\( \beta = .46 \)) (\( p \)'s \( \leq .01 \)). The results partly support the hypothesized SCM pathways, however the positive association between social status and warmth was unexpected given that one would expect warmth to be functionally related to social status (i.e., more successful criminals are less warm). These findings may suggest a ‘halo effect’ such that more successful criminals are seen as being more competent and more warm (Conway et al., 1996), but also that criminals’ low warmth justifies criminals’ social inequality (i.e., criminals’ low social status is due to their low warmth) (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007).

Paths were estimated from perceived competence and warmth to each affective response, and from affective responses to behavioural responses. Warmth was found to significantly and negatively predict Uneasiness (\( \beta = -.53 \)) and Anger (\( \beta = -.42 \)), and positively predict Compassion (\( \beta = .50 \)) (\( p \)'s \( \leq .001 \)). Competence was found to strongly positively predicted Envy (\( \beta = .64, \ p \leq .001 \)), positively, but more weakly, predict

\(^{22}\) The fit statistics suggest a marginally good or fair fit. According to Hu and Bentler (1999) a CFI close to .95 and RMSEA close to .06 suggest a good fit. However, Marsh et al. (2004) warn against overgeneralizing Hu and Bentler’s recommendations which do not apply to all models. Previous researchers have suggested that a CFI > .90 suggests a reasonable model-data fit (c.f. Marsh et al., 2004), and that a RMSEA between .05 and .08 suggests a fair fit, while a value greater than .1 indicates a poor fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1992). Chi-square measures on the other hand are sensitive to sample size and violations of distributional assumptions (Bentler, 1990). Wheaton et al. (1977) therefore suggest using a Chi-square/degrees of freedom ratio to compensate for sample size, a ratio of less than 5 is typically considered to demonstrate an acceptable fit.

\(^{23}\) All regression coefficients are standardized.
Figure 2. Structural equation model estimating the SCM and BIAS Map with punitiveness as a predicted attitudinal outcome.

Note. Ovals represent latent variables, rectangles represent manifest variables. Significant pathways are bolded, non-significant pathways are in dark grey. For visual clarity, non-significant paths to Punitiveness are not shown. The non-significant effect of emotions on Punitiveness are as follows Envy $\beta = .11$, Uneasiness $\beta = .11$, Compassion $\beta = .13$. The non-significant effects of social perception on Punitiveness are Warmth $\beta = .29$, Competence $\beta = .22$. The residual correlation between competitiveness and social status is $r = .04$ (ns), and between warmth and competence is $r = .57***$. Residual correlations between emotions are as follows: Anger and Compassion $r = -.36***$, Anger and Uneasiness $r = .17*$, Anger and Envy $r = -.17(p = .08)$, Compassion and Envy $r = .52***$, Compassion and Uneasiness $r = -.07$ (ns), Envy and Uneasiness $r = -.02$ (ns). Residual correlations between behaviors are as follows: Exclude and Attack $r = .30***$, Attack and Help $r = .06$ (ns), Envy and Associate $r = -.08$ (ns), Help and Associate $r = .39***$, Associate and Exclude $r = -.20*$, Exclude and Help $r = .20*$. * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$. 
Uneasiness ($\beta = .33, p \leq .05$) and marginally positively predict Anger ($\beta = .20, p = .06$). The results suggest that although competence is crucial in predicting envy, it is less important than warmth in predicting anger, uneasiness and compassion. Stereotypes about criminals’ warmth are therefore particularly important in predicting strong negative affective responses to criminals.

Because confirmatory factor analyses distinguished between feelings of Anger and Uneasiness (rather than the umbrella emotion of contempt) paths linking Anger to behavioural outcomes were also estimated for Uneasiness. Attack behaviour is positively predicted by Anger ($\beta = .20, p \leq .05$), but not by Uneasiness or Envy. Exclude behaviour is positively predicted by Uneasiness ($\beta = .27, p \leq .001$) and marginally predicted by Anger ($\beta = .24, p = .052$), but not by Compassion. Recall that in this case Compassion was a mixture of emotions of pity and admiration, the latter of which is unlikely to elicit exclusion. Help behaviour is positively predicted by Compassion ($\beta = .38, p \leq .001$) but not by Envy. Associate behaviour is positively predicted by Compassion ($\beta = .41, p \leq .001$) but not by Envy.

As expected, anger predicts harmful behavioural responses such as attacking and excluding, while uneasiness only predicts excluding behaviour. These findings suggest that in considering affective responses to criminals, there is a distinction between feeling uneasy and angry. Though both emotions are predicted by stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth, uneasiness predicts a desire to exclude and demean criminals, while anger predicts a desire to exclude and demean, as well as fight and attack criminals. On the other hand, helping and associating behaviour is expectedly predicted by compassion which combined emotions of pity and admiration, specified by the SCM.
This model also regresses punitiveness on three components of the SCM and BIAS map: social perception, affective and behavioural responses. Punitiveness was negatively predicted by Exclusion behaviour ($\beta = -.22, p \leq .01$) and positively predicted by Anger ($\beta = .39, p \leq .001$). All other paths were non-significant and had considerably smaller effect sizes. Social perceptions and responses to these perceptions accounted for 28% of the variance in punitiveness.

Summary of Study 1

These results build on previous findings that link anger to punitiveness. They suggest that endorsing stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth and untrustworthiness is associated with feeling angry, disgusted and hateful toward criminals. The finding that exclusion negatively predicts punitiveness is unexpected, in part because exclusion behaviour is positively predicted by negative emotions of uneasiness. But, moreover, this finding would suggest that individuals draw a clear distinction between punishing and excluding criminals.

In other words, the findings suggest that while individuals who feel uneasy (and to some extent, angry) toward criminals may want to exclude criminals, they do not want to punish them harshly. This seems unlikely given that exclusion is a key component of punishment in the context of criminal justice, whether punishment is thought of in terms of a concrete sentence (e.g., prison) or in terms of its social implications (e.g., being labeled as a convicted criminal). This finding suggests that there may have been methodological problems in the measurement of individuals’ social perceptions and responses to criminals and that a more careful analysis and interpretation of individuals’ responses is warranted. On the other hand, this finding may
also suggest that an omitted variable may explain the negative association between exclusion and punitiveness. One potential missing variable in this model is individuals’ political orientation and ideology, which previous research suggest can influence social perception and punitive responses (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007; Jost et al., 2003). The following study therefore additionally takes into account the role of political orientation and ideology in shaping perceptions and responses to criminals.

Study 2: The Role of Political Ideology in Shaping Perceptions and Responses to Criminals

Much of the research applying the SCM and BIAS map has tended to consider cultural or group-level perceptions and responses to various social groups (e.g., feminists, rich people, the homeless). But theoretical approaches and empirical evidence in the area of political psychology point to the importance of ideology in predicting prejudice (e.g., racial, sexual and gender based) and political attitudes such as punitiveness toward crime (Allport, 1929; Bassett, 2010; Christopher & Mull, 2006; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duriez et al., 2005; Herek, 2000; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1992; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Kreindler, 2005; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). Political ideology predicts punitiveness at both the individual (e.g., in terms of expressed attitudes) and societal level (e.g., in terms of actual sentencing practices) (Bowers & Waltman, 1993; Feather et al., 2001; Jost et al., 2003; King & Maruna, 2009; McCann, 2008; McKee & Feather, 2008; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997).

Political conservatism – a key predictor of punitiveness – is defined by two dimensions: cultural and economic conservatism. Cultural conservatism is traditionalism (or resistance to change) while economic conservatism is the acceptance (or preference)
Political conservatism itself is predicted by two main ideological positions: Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Right-wing authoritarianism is related to cultural conservatism and is defined as conventionalism (a preference for tradition and stability), authoritarian submission (deference to authority) and authoritarian aggression (Altemeyer, 1981). RWA is particularly associated with punitiveness toward crime (Jost et al., 2003), with authoritarian aggression being measured by individuals’ endorsement of the need to ‘crack down harder on deviant groups’ and the belief that ‘physical punishment is still one of the best ways to make people behave properly’ (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). Evidence suggests that RWA is positively correlated with anger, which in itself can be associated with aggressive behaviours and support for aggressive policies (Skitka et al., 2006).

Social dominance orientation is related to economic conservatism and is defined by a preference for hierarchical as opposed to equal intergroup relations, and a tendency to want one’s ingroup to be on top of that hierarchy (Pratto et al., 1994). People high on SDO are more likely to endorse meritocratic beliefs and hierarchy-legitimizing stereotypes (Caricati, 2007; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007) and to favour hierarchy-enhancing policies (Pratto et al., 1994). More generally, SDO is defined by a lack of empathy (Pratto et al., 1994; Van Hiel, Cornelis & Roets, 2007) which itself is a key cause of sympathy and motivates individuals to help others (Adolphs, 2009).

Previous research has established some links between political ideology and the inferences individuals draw from social structure to traits (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). In Study 2, individuals’ political orientation and ideology are incorporated into the SCM
and BIAS map model to consider their effect on punitiveness toward crime. In addition, separate SEMs are estimated to observe the effect of political ideology on each component of the SCM and BIAS map. It is hypothesized, for instance, that people high on SDO should perceive criminals as being more competitive because of, first, a belief that the social world is unequal and that groups must compete for power and, second, a desire for unequal outcomes (Esses et al., 2001). Perceiving criminals as being more competitive should be associated with lower perceptions of warmth, and in turn with expressing more anger and less compassion toward criminals. On the other hand, RWA should be associated with expressing more anger toward criminals and with expressing more punitiveness toward crime.

Participants

Participants were the same as in Study 1.

Measures

Measures for the SCM, BIAS map and punitiveness were the same as in Study 1.

Right-wing authoritarianism. RWA was measured by 4 items. Participants rated the extent of their agreement on a scale of 1 (Disagree strongly) to 7 (Agree strongly) with statements: ‘Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should learn’, ‘Strong force is necessary against threatening groups’, ‘Traditions are the foundation of a healthy society and should be respected’ and ‘It is necessary to use force against people who are a threat to authority’. Confirmatory factor analysis suggested a good fit ($\chi^2 (2, N = 172) = 2.46, p > .05, \chi^2 /df = 1.23, CFI = 1, RMSEA = .04$). RWA factor scores were used in all analyses.
Social dominance orientation. SDO was measured by 5 items adopted from Pratto et al.’s (1994) scale. Participants rated the extent of their agreement on a scale of 1 (Disagree strongly) to 7 (Agree strongly) with statements: ‘It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom’, ‘Group equality should be our ideal’, ‘Increased social equality’, ‘If certain groups of people stayed in their place we would have fewer problems’ and ‘We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups’. Confirmatory factor analysis suggested a good fit ($\chi^2(5, N = 172) = 8.73, p > .05$, $\chi^2/df = 1.75$, $CFI = .98$, $RMSEA = .07$). SDO factor scores were used in all analyses.

Left-right political placement. Participants were asked to rate their political views or affiliation on a scale of 1 (Very liberal) to 7 (Very conservative).

Results

Structural equation modeling was used to estimate the same SCM and BIAS map paths as in Study 1, while additionally regressing punitiveness on ideology and political orientation (i.e., RWA, SDO and left-right placement) ($\chi^2(94, N = 172) = 192.44, p \leq .001$, $\chi^2/df = 2.05$, $CFI = .88$, $RMSEA = .08$) (see Figure 3). The paths between social structural variables, social perception, affect and behaviour are consistent with Study 1 and remain statistically significant. However, ideology and political orientation weaken the association between punitiveness and Exclude behaviour ($\beta = -.08$, ns), and Anger ($\beta = .11$, ns). When controlling for ideology and political orientation, however, Compassion significantly negatively predicts punitiveness ($\beta = -.28$, $p \leq .05$). RWA is the strongest predictor of punitiveness ($\beta = .60$, $p \leq .001$) with political orientation.
Figure 3. Structural equation model estimating the SCM and BIAS map with punitiveness, ideology and political orientation

Note. Ovals represent latent variables, rectangles represent manifest variables. Significant pathways are bolded, non-significant pathways are in dark grey. For visual clarity, non-significant paths to Punitiveness are not shown. The non-significant effects of emotions on Punitiveness are as follows: Envy β = .02, Uneasiness β = .00. The non-significant effects of social perception on Punitiveness are Warmth β = .23, Competence β = -.17. The residual correlation between Competitiveness and Status is r = .06 (ns), and between Warmth and Competence is r = .58***. Residual correlations between emotions are as follows: Anger and Compassion r = -.40***, Anger and Uneasiness r = .22*, Anger and Envy r = -.13 (ns), Compassion and Envy r = .52***, Compassion and Uneasiness r = -.06 (ns), Envy and Uneasiness r = -.05 (ns). Residual correlations between behaviors are as follows: Exclude and Attack r = .29***, Attack and Help r = .06 (ns), Attack and Associate r = .08(ns), Help and Associate r = .37***, Associate and Exclude r = -.18*, Exclude and Help r = -.16 (ns). *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .001.
having a smaller but significant effect ($\beta = .15$, $p \leq .05$). SDO on the other hand does not have a significant direct effect on punitiveness, rather its effect is mediated by left-right placement. Left-right placement itself is significantly positively predicted by RWA ($\beta = .35$) and SDO ($\beta = .33$) ($p$’s ≤ .001). Together with social perception, affective and behavioural responses, ideology and political orientation accounted for 61% of the variance in punitiveness.

The results are in line with previous findings and give some indication that political ideology is associated with responses to criminals. Separate SEMs were therefore estimated for each of the components of the SCM and BIAS map to test for the associations between social structure and social perception, social perception and affect, and affect and behaviour while simultaneously regressing dependent variables on ideology and political orientation, and controlling for participants’ socio-demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status).

A first SEM estimated only the measurement and structural paths between social structural variables and social perception, regressing perceived competitiveness, social status, warmth and competence on ideology and left-right placement while controlling for socio-demographic variables ($\chi^2 (74, \ N = 172) = 121.23, \ p \leq .001, \ \chi^2 / df = 1.64, \ CFI = .90, \ RMSEA = .06$). SDO significantly positively predicts perceived warmth ($\beta = .12, \ p \leq .05$). Ideology and political orientation do not predict perceptions of competence, nor do they predict perceptions of competition and social status. Otherwise, paths remain consistent with Study 1.

A second SEM estimated only the measurement and structural paths between social perception and affect, regressing affect on ideology and left-right placement while
controlling for socio-demographic variables ($\chi^2 (104, N = 172) = 182.41, p \leq .001$, $\chi^2 / df = 1.75, CFI = .89, RMSEA = .07$). RWA significantly positively predicts Anger ($\beta = .23, p \leq .05$) while SDO significantly negatively predicts Anger ($\beta = -.21, p \leq .05$). Compassion on the other hand is significantly positively predicted by SDO ($\beta = .20, p \leq .05$) and significantly negatively predicted by political orientation ($\beta = -.22, p \leq .05$). Otherwise, paths remain consistent with Study 1.

A third SEM estimated only the measurement and structural paths between affect and behavioural responses, regressing behaviour on ideology and political orientation while controlling for socio-demographic variables ($\chi^2 (88, N = 172) = 156.89, p \leq .001$, $\chi^2 / df = 1.78, CFI = .87, RMSEA = .07$). Findings suggest that controlling for the effect of ideology and political orientation weakened the effect of Anger on Attack behaviour ($\beta = .16, p = .07$) and rendered the effect of Envy on Attack behaviour statistically significant ($\beta = .16, p \leq .05$). Help behaviour is significantly and positively predicted by left-right placement ($\beta = .25, p \leq .001$), while Exclude behaviour is marginally negatively predicted by RWA ($\beta = -.17, p = .08$). Otherwise, paths remain consistent with Study 1.

These results are at times as expected and at times counterintuitive. While RWA expectedly positively predicts anger, it unexpectedly marginally negatively predicts exclusion behaviour. Also, unexpectedly, SDO positively predicts compassion and negatively predicts anger. Political conservatism on the other hand surprisingly positively predicts helping behaviour. One interpretation of the results is to consider the

---

24 A separate analysis estimating the measurement model for emotional responses and regressing Anger on Compassion and Envy revealed that when controlling for Compassion, Envy positively predicts Anger. This partial association helps explain the positive effect of Envy on Attack behavior, which is consistent with the SCM.
measurement problems inherent in using projective measures, and in this case, asking respondents to answer based on how they believe society is likely to respond to criminals. The findings suggest that respondents partly reported their own perceptions, affective and behavioural responses, but also at times positioned their answers in relation to how they believe society perceives and responds to criminals. This positioning appears to have been influenced by ideology and political orientation. That is, people high on RWA seemed to think that society does not exclude criminals enough and tended to say that it was unlikely that society would exclude criminals. Political positioning one’s answers explains the negative association between RWA and exclusion, and the finding that controlling for RWA weakens the negative association between exclusion behaviour and punitiveness. On the other hand, people high on SDO seemed to think that society perceives criminals as being too warm, feels too much compassion and not enough anger toward criminals. Lastly, politically conservative people seemed to think society helps criminals too much.

Anger, however, was expectedly positively associated with RWA and with punitiveness, although controlling for RWA weakened the association between anger and punitiveness. This finding could suggest that the association between anger and punitiveness is completely mediated by ideology, and that once RWA is taken into account there is no longer a statistically significant association between anger and punitiveness. However, ample evidence suggests that anger is a robust predictor of punitiveness (Xiao, Houser & Smith, 2005; Seip et al., 2009; Johnson, 2009). It is therefore possible that the small sample size could have affected the statistical
significance of the association between anger and punitiveness, when controlling for the ideological component of anger.

Summary of Study 2

The results of Study 1 revealed that feeling uneasy and angry was associated with wanting to exclude criminals but not punish them harshly. This finding suggested that this study faced measurement issues or that important explanatory variables were omitted from the model. In Study 2, separate structural equation models testing each step of the SCM and BIAS map revealed that controlling for political ideology explained the unexpected findings reported in Study 1. Moreover, Study 2 demonstrates that even after controlling for political orientation and ideology, the pathways specified by the SCM and BIAS map between social structure, perception, affect and behaviour remained significant. Still, future research applying the SCM and BIAS map to the study of criminal stereotypes should control for political ideology and use projective questions that do not allow for politically positioning one’s answers.

In summary, the findings largely support the SCM and BIAS map and identify some of the pathways that link criminal stereotypes to punitiveness toward crime. Though anger expectedly predicted punitiveness, controlling for ideology and political orientation weakened this association and revealed that endorsing stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth is associated with feeling less compassion toward criminals and with expressing more support for harsh criminal justice policies. This finding is in line with other studies which find that sympathy is an important negative predictor of punishment (Graham et al., 1997; Feather et al., 2001). However, the strongest predictor of punitiveness was political ideology, specifically RWA.
Discussion and Conclusion

This research aimed in part to explain the public’s seemingly insatiable desire for the harsh punishment of law-breakers (Loader, 2009). Despite growing prison populations and having little knowledge of actual crime and sentencing trends, individuals in the UK, USA and Canada tend to support harsh criminal justice policies (Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000; Doob & Roberts, 1984; King, 2008; Roberts, 1992; Roberts & Hough, 2005). A review of the criminological evidence suggests that the endorsement of criminal stereotypes may help explain individuals’ punitive attitudes, although it is unclear why believing that criminals are, for example, poor and cruel would engender strong desires to punish crime.

This paper applied the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002) and BIAS map (Cuddy et al., 2007), and argued that stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth and competence are likely to engender negative affective and behavioural responses, including desires to attack and exclude criminals. It was also hypothesized that criminal stereotypes and their outcomes may help explain public punitiveness toward crime. The findings largely supported the SCM and BIAS map. The results suggested that stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth are particularly powerful as they engender strong affective responses such as anger and disgust, but also fear and uneasiness. While previous research suggests that anger is a strong predictor of support for harsh criminal justice policies, the present findings suggested that the effect of anger on punitiveness is weakened when controlling for Right-Wing Authoritarianism. However, controlling for political ideology also revealed that individuals who endorse stereotypes about criminals’ cruelty or callousness were less likely to feel compassion toward criminals.
and more likely to support harsh criminal justice policy. These findings may partly explain why people are likely to say that offenders should get stiffer sentences, despite knowing little about actual sentencing practices. That is, answers to this question are partly based on social stereotypes about criminals, strong affective responses and ideological positions.

This study contributes to research on the ‘Big Two’ by demonstrating that perceptions of warmth and competence can come to shape socio-political attitudes, through affective responses. The findings also suggested that in order to better understand individuals’ perceptions and responses to the ‘Big Two’, it is sometimes necessary to take into account individuals’ political ideology. Though it has been established that political ideology is associated with the endorsement of stereotypes and punitiveness, the present study is novel in that it revealed that affective responses to the ‘Big Two’ have an ideological component. In the context of crime and punishment, controlling for the ideological component of anger revealed that criminal stereotypes can have an indirect effect on punitiveness through compassion.

One of the limitations of this study is the inability to make strong causal claims about the directionality of the observed effects. To the extent that affect influences cognition, the directionality of the social perception and affect association could be reversed, such that affective responses also influence social perception (and, potentially, perceived competitiveness and social status). Indeed, some evidence suggests that perceptions of injustice can engender anger, which in turn leads to aggressive behaviour and blaming cognitions (Jones & Fitness, 2008). The directionality of the social
perception and affect association should therefore be tested experimentally in future research.

By taking into account the content of criminal stereotypes and the effects of the ‘Big Two’ on affective and behavioural responses, this research provides a strong theoretical framework linking criminal stereotypes to punitiveness toward crime. The findings have important policy implications. They suggest that reducing stereotypical perceptions of criminals and increasing compassion toward criminals could have the effect of making society less punitive. For instance, even if individuals are politically conservative and feel angry toward crime, increasing perspective taking (i.e., considering how the other would perceive or respond to a given situation) could reduce punitiveness toward crime (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). On the other hand, political platforms which insist that criminals are worthless and cruel may contribute to a growing punitive public by decreasing compassion toward this social group.

The findings also suggest that criminal justice policies which have the effect of lowering criminals’ social status could contribute to negative stereotypes about criminals’ warmth and competence. These effects may especially be harmful for social groups already in the margins of society, and justify their exclusion and punishment. The main contribution of this research is, then, to demonstrate the functionality of the ‘Big Two’ in engendering specific socio-political attitudes. Policy makers should take into account the role of social stereotypes in generating support for social policies, and the role of policies in generating social stereotypes.

References


*Psychology of Women Quarterly, 30*(2), 223-30.

Cohrs, J. C. & Asbrock, F. (2009). Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and prejudice against threatening and competitive ethnic groups. 


Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P. & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed)
stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82*(6), 878-902.


Pathways Linking Social Perception to Cognitive, Affective and Punitive Responses

The second paper focused on group-level criminal stereotypes and built a full model linking these stereotypes to support for harsh criminal justice policy. The results also replicated some of the findings from the first paper, where criminal stereotypes were found to be predicted by social structural determinants. This paper moved beyond the first paper by applying the Behaviour from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes (BIAS) Map in order to identify the affective and behavioural outcomes of criminal stereotypes. The results largely supported both the SCM and BIAS map.

Although the SCM suggests that criminal stereotypes should engender contempt, the results suggested that negative emotional responses to criminals were more nuanced. Stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth engendered angry and disgusted responses, but also distinct uneasy and fearful responses. However, it was individuals’ angry responses that were more strongly associated with desires to attack and punish criminals. Endorsing criminal stereotypes was also found to be associated with expressing a lack of empathy toward criminals. Further analyses revealed that controlling for individuals’ political ideology weakened the association between anger and supporting harsh criminal justice policy, while feeling a lack of empathy toward criminals emerged as an important predictor of punitive attitudes. It therefore appears as though there is an ideological component to feeling angry toward criminals. Indeed, the results suggested that individuals’ political ideology influenced how they perceived society’s perceptions and responses to criminals.
The results speak more broadly to the role of emotion in motivating behavioural intentions and policy preferences. Anger itself is a strong negative emotional response that motivates approach and harmful behaviour toward others. On the other hand, a lack of empathy would attenuate desires to approach and help others. Support for harsh criminal justice policy therefore emerges in part from individuals’ belief that criminals are stereotypically cold and untrustworthy, and from a failure to feel empathy toward these stereotypical criminals.

More generally, this paper addressed some of the issues raised in the literature review regarding the processes associated with punishment in the broader context of social life. Namely the results support the argument that perceived warmth is key in social cognition, and that emotions of anger and a lack of empathy play an important role in motivating social behaviour, including punitiveness toward crime. Although this paper did not address whether these cognitive and affective processes occurred intuitively or through slower controlled reasoning processes, some of these issues will be addressed in the fourth and fifth papers.

In moving forward, the third paper aims to identify some of the pathways that link stereotypes about criminals to strong cognitive, affective and punitive responses. Individuals routinely come to form judgments about crime, for example about its harmfulness and wrongfulness, when expressing moral outrage or punitiveness toward crime. This paper moves the level of analysis from group-level to individual-level criminal stereotypes in order to observe the direct effect of stereotypes on cognitive, affective and punitive responses to specific crimes.
Paper 3

A crime is only as bad as the person who commits it:

The role of stereotypes and political ideology in shaping perceptions and punishment of crime

The way in which individuals think society should respond to criminals, for example by adopting harsher criminal justice policies, is intimately tied to how individuals think and feel about criminals. While previous research demonstrates that perceiving criminals in stereotypical ways is associated with feeling specific negative emotions toward crime (e.g., anger) (Côté-Lussier, 2012a), it is unclear whether stereotypes shape the way in which individuals perceive crime. This research considers the effect of criminal stereotypes on perceptions and punishment of specific crimes. The results suggest that crimes committed by stereotypical criminals are perceived as being more wrongful, harmful, and serious, and engender more moral outrage. Cognitive and emotional responses to crime are also partly explained by ideological positions and political orientation. The findings contribute to social psychological research on interpersonal and intergroup relations by demonstrating the cognitive links between stereotypes and moral outrage, in the context of crime. The paper concludes with a discussion of the complex links between ideology, stereotyping and public attitudes towards crime and punishment.

Keywords: social stereotypes, criminals, punitiveness, political ideology
Why does crime engender an angry and punitive response? Theorists, such as Durkheim, have argued that crimes are moral outrages that shock ‘healthy consciences’ and motivate social responses such as punishment (Garland, 1990). According to Batson and colleagues (2007) ‘[m]oral outrage can be defined as anger provoked by the perception that a moral standard—usually a standard of fairness or justice—has been violated’ (p.1272). Similarly, cognitive linguist George Lakoff has argued that anger is most clearly conceptualized as constituting a response to some form of injustice, most strongly reflected in the common saying: ‘don’t get mad, get even’ (emphasis in original text, Lakoff & Kövecses, 1987). In the criminological literature, moral outrage toward a specific crime is found to be partly explained by a crime’s perceived wrongfulness and harmfulness (Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002). Feeling angry toward crime and criminals more generally is also partly explained by the endorsement of stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth (Côté-Lussier, 2012a) and by other factors such as political ideology (Bowers & Waltman, 1993; Feather et al., 2001; Jost et al., 2003; King & Maruna, 2009; McCann, 2008; McKee & Feather, 2008; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997). According to the interpersonal and intergroup relations literature, anger is a functional emotion that is elicited in response to a group’s perceived lack of competence and warmth (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007) and can become part of an affective attitude toward specific social groups (Tapias et al., 2007). But what cognitive processes link stereotypes about criminals to anger or moral outrage and to a strong desire to punish crime?

The aim of this research is to show that stereotypes about criminals affect not only the way individuals feel about crime, but also how individuals perceive and judge
specific crimes. The following study bridges research on stereotypes and emotion to research on the cognitive pathways that engender moral outrage in the context of crime. This research addresses key questions including whether crimes committed by an evil and cruel individual are perceived as being as wrongful as those committed by a kind and remorseful individual, and whether these crimes should be punished to the same degree. The results suggest that crimes perpetrated by stereotypical criminals are perceived as more wrongful, harmful and serious, which in turn is associated with experiencing more moral outrage and making more punitive decisions. Politically conservative individuals are also more likely to perceive crime as being serious and to experience moral outrage. These results suggest that thinking about criminals in stereotypical ways and being politically conservative may generate an inflated sense of the seriousness of crime and strong emotional responses that support a punitive stance toward crime, such as anger and moral outrage.

Cognitive and Emotional Predictors of Punitiveness Toward Crime

Punitiveness toward crime is typically operationalized as public support for harsh criminal justice policy (Carroll et al., 1987; Costelloe et al., 2002; Gault & Sabini, 2000; King & Maruna, 2009; Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997) or as the decision to punish specific (hypothetical) crimes in a harsh manner (Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley, Robinson, 2002; Christopher et al., 2003; Miller et al., 1986; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009). While support for harsh criminal justice policy has clear social and political implications, most individuals will rarely be asked to punish crime in everyday life. Studying the determinants of decisions to punish a specific crime does, however, provide insight into the cognitive pathways
that link social perceptions and judgments of crime to strong desires to punish crime. In particular, by manipulating stereotypes about criminals at the individual level, we can observe their effect on basic social perception and responses to crime.

*Decisions to Punish Crime*

Decisions to punish specific crimes are associated with a range of emotional and cognitive factors, and are most strongly related to principles of retribution. Carlsmith and Darley (2008) argue that retributive justice addresses the question of ‘how people who have intentionally committed known, morally wrong actions that either directly or indirectly harm others, should be punished for their misdeeds’ (p. 194). This definition of retributive justice is supported by evidence that suggests that a key motivating factor in punitiveness is the perceived seriousness, or moral severity, of a crime (Darley & Pittman, 2003).

According to Warr (1989) judging a crime to be serious involves making a normative statement about the perceived wrongfulness and/or harmfulness of a crime. Discrepancies in how much punishment offences typically receive reflect cultural consensus that, for example, violent crimes are more serious than white-collar crimes (e.g., embezzlement) (but see Cullen, Hartman & Jonson, 2009, for social and cultural features that may change perceptions of crime, and Roberts, 1992, for differences in ordinal and cardinal seriousness, and in consensus over seriousness). The determinants of seriousness are difficult to disentangle. However, some evidence suggests that the wrongfulness of crime, demarked by intent or blameworthiness (e.g., offenders’ remorse or social motives), outweighs its harmfulness as a determinant of seriousness and punitiveness (Alter, Kernochan & Darley, 2007; Fragale et al., 2009). Other research
suggests that the type of offence can shift the focus for assessments of seriousness, with wrongfulness being key in property offences and harmfulness in personal offences (Warr, 1989). Cushman (2008) further teases apart the harmfulness of an offence in terms of (a) the consequences of the offence and (b) the offender’s causal responsibility, and the wrongfulness of an offence in terms of (c) the offender’s intent to harm and (d) the belief that they would cause harm. He found that in assigning punishment, individuals pay comparable attention to whether the offender caused and intended to cause the harm, specifically in terms of the offender’s belief that they would cause harm.

These findings point to the importance of social perceptions of the offence and offender in decisions to punish crime. For instance, individuals typically punish more harshly when they perceive intent and attribute the causes of crime to individuals’ dispositions (e.g., laziness, evilness or callousness) as opposed to external social (e.g., drug use, criminal associates) or economic factors (e.g., poverty, inequality) (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carroll et al., 1987; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Roberts, 1992; Vidmar & Miller, 1980; see also Hauser et al., 2007, for similar findings in moral judgment). According to Alter and colleagues (2007), intent is especially important in perceptions of the wrongfulness of a criminal act, particularly in Anglo-American criminal legal doctrine. Vidmar and Miller (1980) argue that attribution of causal responsibility is a two-way process. On one hand, individuals tend to feel more anger and to be more punitive when they perceive others as purposefully inflicting harm onto their victims. On the other hand, individuals also need to justify feelings of punitiveness.

---

25 In Cushman’s (2008) operationalization, causal responsibility refers to whether the individual caused the harm, and not to whether their causal responsibility is attributed to internal dispositions.
– to establish order and stability – and to predict severe harm or injustice, by attributing causal responsibility (see also Heider, 1944, on the desire to view others as absolute causal origins). Punitiveness is also associated with features that would stereotypically suggest an underlying disposition or tendency to commit crime, such as criminal record, afrocentric features, social status and social motives (i.e., self-concerned vs. other-concerned) (Blair et al., 2004; Christopher, Marek & May, 2003; Kliemann et al., 2008).

The link between perceptions of crime, criminals and punitiveness is moral outrage. Controlling for the seriousness of a crime, features of the offence and offender tend to lead to increased moral outrage, which in turn tends to increase punitiveness (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003). According to Carlsmith and Darley (2008), moral outrage is a feeling that represents the ‘conscious registration of the intuitive reaction to instances of moral wrong-doing’ (p. 212). A substantial body of evidence suggests that moral outrage is most strongly associated with the emotion of anger (sometimes referred to as ‘empathic anger’) (Batson et al., 2007; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Hoffman, 1989; Montada & Schneider, 1989).

In summary, it appears as though there are three cognitive layers that link perceptions of crime to a desire to punish crime. First, there are perceptions of the offender (e.g., perceived intent, remorse, attributions for crime). Second there are higher order judgments (e.g., wrongfulness and harmfulness) which are influenced by perceptions of the offender and of the crime. Finally, these judgments generate perceptions of seriousness and affective responses such as moral outrage, which motivate individuals to punish a crime. These cognitive and affective processes,
however, are unlikely to be uni-directional and are likely to involve two-way processes (Vidmar and Miller, 1980). Moreover, motivations to punish are related to personality and ideological differences and so people may pay more attention to certain features of the offence in order to justify their punitiveness or punishment goals (Carroll et al., 1987).

**Political Ideology and Punitiveness Toward Crime**

Although little research considers the role of political orientation in shaping punitive decisions, previous research suggests it is a robust predictor of individual and societal level punitiveness toward criminals (e.g., politically conservative states in the USA tend to be more punitive) (Bowers & Waltman, 1993; Feather et al., 2001; Jost et al., 2003; King & Maruna, 2009; McCann, 2008; McKee & Feather, 2008; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997). Two ideological systems are consistently found to be associated with punitiveness toward crime: Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). RWA consists of three interrelated features: conventionalism (i.e., preferring tradition and stability), authoritarian submission (i.e., showing deference to authority) and authoritarian aggression (Altemeyer, 1981). RWA is particularly associated with cultural conservatism, tends to be strongly predictive of punitiveness toward crime (Jost et al., 2003); and is positively correlated with feeling anger, which can contribute to support for aggressive policies (Skitka et al., 2006). SDO is associated with preferring hierarchical as opposed to equal intergroup relations and with wanting one’s ingroup to be on top of that hierarchy (Pratto et al., 1994). SDO is most closely associated with economic conservatism and is often associated with expressing a lack of empathy toward outgroups (Pratto et al., 1994; Van Hiel, Cornelis & Roets, 2007) which
itself is associated with punitiveness toward crime (Costelloe et al., 2002; Côté-Lussier, 2012a; Weiner, 1993). Although punitiveness toward crime is often associated with political ideology, it is considered to be a peripheral ideological issue (Jost et al., 2003).

The present research addresses the remaining question of whether criminal stereotypes and political ideology can alter perceptions and judgments of crime. Judging a crime to be ‘wrongful’ or ‘harmful’ is in itself associated with a range of cognitive beliefs and emotional responses, such as increased perceived seriousness and moral outrage. The following section discusses the role of social stereotypes in engendering cognitive, emotional and attitudinal responses and specifies the hypotheses of the current research.

The Content of the Criminal Stereotype and its Emotional, Cognitive and Attitudinal Counterparts

Stereotypes about criminals suggest that criminals are evil, poor and disliked (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carroll et al., 1987; Côté-Lussier, 2012; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Roberts, 1992; Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008). Recent research suggests that these stereotypes reflect two fundamental dimensions of social perception: warmth and competence (Côté-Lussier, 2012). The interpersonal and intergroup perception literature suggests that these dimensions underlie stereotypes about various social groups and inform emotional responses as well as basic approach and avoidance behaviour (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008; Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998). Crucially, perceptions of warmth and competence are functional in that they answer two fundamental questions that facilitate
interpersonal relationships: What are others’ intentions? How capable are others of carrying out their intentions?

According to the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 1999; 2002; 2006), perceptions of warmth and competence are partly explained, at an intergroup level, by social structural factors of competition and social status. Stereotypes link a group’s perceived competitiveness against society (e.g., for power and resources) and social status (e.g., in terms of educational and economic attainment) to internal traits such as warmth and competence, respectively. In line with predictions made by the SCM, Côté-Lussier (2012, 2012a) found that perceiving criminals as competing against society partly explained criminals’ low perceived warmth, while criminals’ low perceived social status partly explained criminals’ low perceived competence and warmth.

Specific combinations of perceived warmth and competence in turn elicit functionally relevant, distinct emotions and behaviours (see Figure 1) (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007). Stereotypes about criminals’ low warmth, and to a lesser degree about their low competence, are associated with feeling emotions of anger, disgust and hate which in turn are associated with behavioural intentions that suggest a desire to fight and attack as well as exclude and demean criminals (Côté-Lussier, 2012a). Feeling angry and a lack of compassion toward criminals is also associated with expressing more support for harsh criminal justice policy (Côté-Lussier, 2012a).
Figure 1. Quadrants of social perception, emotional and behavioural responses according to the Stereotype Content Model and Behavior from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes map

The present study considers whether stereotypes about criminals influence the very way in which individuals perceive crime. Previous research on interpersonal perception suggests that stereotypes about others’ warmth are diagnostic, such that corresponding behaviour is interpreted as being attributable to people’s dispositions as opposed to external factors (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). One would therefore expect a strong association between stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth and attributing crime to internal as opposed to external factors (H1), as well as perceiving more intent and less remorse when a crime is committed by a stereotypical criminal (H2). Because of the role of attributions and perceived intent in generating judgments of the harmfulness and wrongfulness of a crime, it is also expected that crimes perpetrated by
stereotypical criminals would be judged as being more harmful and wrongful (H3). In turn, crimes committed by stereotypical criminals should be perceived as being more serious (H4), should generate more moral outrage (H5) and should be punished more harshly (H6). Lastly, political ideology is expected to be associated with perceptions of criminals and with making more stern judgments about crime (e.g., about its seriousness) in part because of the threat that crime represents to politically conservative ideologies (H7). The following study incrementally tests these hypotheses in order to build a final full but parsimonious model that links stereotypes about criminals to perceptions and judgments of crime, moral outrage and punitiveness.

Overview of Study

In order to test the hypotheses that criminal stereotypes influence perceptions, higher order judgments and responses to crime (see Figure 2), participants are provided with information about a crime and about the criminal, and are asked to decide how severely the crime should be punished. The criminal stereotype is instantiated by describing a criminal as being stereotypically cold and unkind and as having a low social status, as opposed to being warm and kind and as having a high social status. In the analyses, crime type and features of the offender are treated as lower order variables that influence higher order perceptions of intent, remorse and attributions for crime. Normative judgments about the harmfulness and wrongfulness of crimes are treated as higher order judgments which in turn influence the key determinants of punitiveness: perceived seriousness and expressed moral outrage. A series of structural equation models are used to test the hypotheses (H1 – H7).
Figure 2. Basic model of the effect of social perceptions of warmth and competence on punitiveness.

Participants

Participants (N = 223) were students recruited on campus from City University, Goldsmiths University and Queen Mary University in London (UK). Participants filled out a survey at a booth located on campus for the chance to win one of several cash prizes (ranging from 25GBP to 200GBP) and/or a 2.50GBP voucher for university catering services. For the 221 participants who reported their age and gender, mean age was 22.42 (min = 18, max = 58) and the sample consisted of 87 men, and 134 women. White British students made up 35% of the sample, while 17% were White students from a non-British background. The remainder of the sample was 23% Asian British (e.g., Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani), 5% British African or Caribbean and 20% were from other ethnic categories (e.g., Chinese British and non-British, Mixed or Other). In terms of social class, 41% reported being from the working or lower-middle class, 41% from the middle-class and 18% from upper-middle and upper-class.

Methodology and measures

Vignette. Participants were first asked to read a vignette describing a crime and to decide how severely the crime should be punished. Each vignette manipulated social
status (high vs. low), warmth (high vs. low) and crime type (assault vs. theft vs. fraud), in a 2 X 2 X 3 counterbalanced between-subject design (see Appendix I). For example, a participant would have read:

David is a customer service representative at a phone company but occasionally has a hard time making ends meet. He is kind and is willing to take the time to be there for friends. He enjoys being able to help people and often sympathizes with their problems. He is generally a warm person. Last month, David was found guilty of fraud. He was found to have made personal gain by using inside information he learned about before the information was made public. He bought stocks in a company for his personal account knowing that the stock price would go up when the information was made public. The profits amounted to £50,000.

Severity of punishment. Next participants were asked to rate how severe a punishment the crime should receive on a scale of 1 (Not severe at all) to 7 (Extremely severe).

Seriousness and moral outrage. Participants rated how serious the crime was on a scale of 1 (Not at all serious) to 5 (Very serious) and reported the degree to which they were morally outraged by the crime on a scale of 1 (Not at all outraged) to 5 (Very outraged).

Wrongfulness and harmfulness. Participants rated how wrong the offender’s behaviour was on a scale of 1 (Not at all wrong) to 5 (Very wrong) and how harmful the offender’s behaviour was on a scale of 1 (Not at all harmful) to 5 (Very harmful).

Intent and remorse. Participants rated how likely it is that the offender had the intention to commit the crime and how likely it is that the offender was sorry for having committed the crime on a scale of 1 (Not at all likely) to 5 (Very likely).

Attributions for crime. Participants rated the extent to which stress and the offender’s personality were responsible for his crime on a scale of 1 (Not at all responsible) to 5 (Very responsible).
**Social status.** Offenders’ social status was instantiated by occupation and income (see Appendix I). Participants’ perception of offenders’ social status was measured by asking participants to rate offenders on a scale from 1 (Working class) to 5 (Upper class). A manipulation check suggests that the experimental manipulation was successful.

**Warmth and competence.** Warmth was instantiated by describing the offender as either being kind, sympathetic and warm, or as being unkind, unsympathetic and cold. Participants rated the extent to which personality traits reflecting dimensions of warmth and competence, and filler items, described the offender on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely). Warmth was measured by *warm, nice, friendly* and *good-natured.* Competence was measured by *intelligent, capable, skilful, goal-oriented* and *assertive.* A confirmatory factor analysis suggests a good fit ($\chi^2 = 15.36, df = 10, p \geq .05, \chi^2/df = 1.54, CFI = 1, RMSEA = .05$) for dimensions of warmth and competence.

**Left-right placement.** Participants were asked to rate their political views or affiliation on a scale of 1 (Very liberal) to 7 (Very conservative).

**Social dominance orientation.** SDO was operationalized as preference for inequality and measured by 4 items. Participants rated the extent of their agreement on a scale of 1 (Disagree strongly) to 5 (Agree strongly) with statements: ‘Group equality should be our ideal’, ‘All groups should be given an equal chance in life’, ‘We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups’ and ‘Increased social equality’. A latent variable representing SDO was used in all analyses ($\chi^2 = 4.42, df = 2, p > .05, \chi^2/df = 2.21, CFI = 1, RMSEA = .07$).
Right-wing authoritarianism. RWA was measured by 10 items. Participants rated the extent of their agreement on a scale of 1 (Disagree strongly) to 5 (Agree strongly) with statements reflecting dimensions of authoritarian submission (e.g., ‘We should believe what our leaders tell us’), conventionalism (e.g., ‘Traditions are the foundation of a healthy society and should be respected’) and aggression (e.g., ‘Strong force is necessary against threatening groups’). Hierarchical confirmatory factor analysis was used to measure the three subscales of RWA and the overarching second order factor of RWA, the latter of which was used in all analyses ($\chi^2 = 65.53$, $df = 32$, $p \leq .001$, $\chi^2/df = 2.05$, $CFI = .91$, $RMSEA = .07$).

Results

A series of structural equation models were estimated in order to observe the effects of social perception on punitiveness and on the determinants of punitiveness. These models were also used to select a final parsimonious model that will simultaneously estimate the direct and indirect effects of the most robust predictors on punitiveness.

A first step is to ensure that the experimental manipulation was successful in influencing perceptions of warmth, competence and social status. Controlling for social status and crime type, and participants’ socio-demographics (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status), criminals described as being warm were more likely to be perceived as being warm ($\beta = 1.73$, $p \leq .001$) and slightly more competent ($\beta = .52$, $p \leq .001$) (see Figure 3). Criminals who committed crimes of theft ($\beta = -.47$, $p \leq .01$) and assault ($\beta = -.36$, $p \leq .05$) were seen as being significantly less competent than criminals who committed fraud. Crime type had no effect on perceptions of warmth. Perceptions of warmth and competence correlated positively ($r = .37$, $p \leq .001$). The status
Manipulation was successful in increasing perceptions of social status ($\beta = .86, p \leq .001$), which in turn increased perceptions of competence ($\beta = .37, p \leq .001$), but not perceptions of warmth. The influence of social status on perceptions of competence is in line with predictions made by the SCM and suggests that social perception flows from social structural determinants such as competition and social status. The warmth and crime type manipulations did not statistically significantly influence perceptions of social status.

**Figure 3.** Effects of the experimental manipulations on perceptions of warmth and competence.

Note. Regression coefficients are standardized. Ovals represent latent variables, rectangles represent manifest variables. The model also controlled for crime type and participants’ socio-demographics. *$p \leq .05$, **$p \leq .01$, ***$p \leq .001$.

In the following analyses, criminals’ perceived social status, warmth and competence will be used to predict social perception and judgment as opposed to dummy variables reflecting the experimental manipulations. Taking into account
individuals’ perceptions of criminals is beneficial in large part because it allows for the measurement of variance in social perception and to explain this variance using other variables, such as individuals’ political ideology.

Step 1. The first step consists in observing whether social perceptions of criminals’ warmth and competence have direct effects on punitiveness. Based on previous findings and theory (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007; Johnson, 2009; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008), it is expected that perceptions of warmth will be especially important in predicting punitiveness. A structural equation model regressing punishment on perceptions of warmth and competence, controlling for crime type, perceived social status and participants’ socio-demographic variables ($\chi^2 = 73.67, df = 37, p \leq .001$, $\chi^2/df = 1.99$, $CFI = .99$, $RMSEA = .07$), suggests that perceptions of offenders’ warmth have a statistically significant negative effect on punishment ($\beta = -.20, p \leq .01$). That is, criminals who are perceived as being warm are also perceived as deserving less severe punishment. On the other hand, perceptions of competence have no effect on severity of punishment ($\beta = .02, p > .05$). However, this model explains only 11% of the variance in punitiveness, suggesting that a relatively large proportion of the variance remains unexplained and that other factors also explain individuals’ punitiveness. The next steps will be to (a) establish the pathways that link social perceptions and judgments to punitiveness and (b) develop a model that explains more of the variance in punitiveness.

Step 2 (H1 and H2). Previous findings suggest that attributions for crime and perceptions of offenders’ intent and remorse are important in predicting punitive responses (Cushman, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Vidmar & Miller, 1980; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carroll et al., 1987; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986;
Roberts, 1992; see also Hauser et al., 2007, for similar findings in moral judgment). The next step is to link these determinants of punitiveness to perceptions of warmth and competence. In Model 1, perceived intent and remorse are regressed on attributions for crime, controlling for crime type, social status and participants’ socio-demographic variables. This first model is nested within Model 2, which additionally regresses perceptions of intent, remorse and attributions for crime on perceptions of warmth and competence (see Figure 4). In Model 1, attributing crime to internal causes (i.e.,

Figure 4. The effects of perceived warmth and competence on attributions for crime, perceived intent and remorse (Model 2).

Note. Coefficients are standardized. Coefficients in parentheses are from Model 1. Variables controlled for but not shown are crime type, social status and participants’ socio-demographics. Criminals described as having a high social status were perceived as demonstrating marginally more intent (β = .28, p = .08) and less remorse (β = -.40, p ≤ .01), and as committing crime less due to external causes (β = -.45, p ≤ .01), though no difference was observed for internal attributions (β = .18, p = .24). Those who committed crimes of fraud were seen as demonstrating more intent than those who committed theft (β = .13, p ≤ .01) or assault (β = -.57, p ≤ .001), but as showing comparable remorse (Theft: β = .22, p = .20, Assault: β = .26, p = .18). Crime type did not influence attributions for crimes, as those who committed fraud elicited comparable attributions to internal and external dispositions than those who committed theft (Internal: β = -.28, p = .13, External: β = -.06, p = .76) or assault (Internal: β = -.29, p = .11, External: β = .11, p = .59). * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001
personality) positively predicts perceptions of intent (β = .19, p ≤ .001) and negatively predicts perceptions of remorse (β = -.25, p ≤ .001), while attributing crime to external causes (i.e., stress) positively predicts perceptions of remorse (β = .21, p ≤ .001).

In Model 2 (χ² = 73.41, df = 43, p ≤ .05, χ²/df = 1.70, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .06), the effects of attribution on perceived intent and remorse are nearly halved when controlling for perceptions of warmth and competence. As expected, describing criminals in stereotypical ways influenced individuals’ perceptions of the causes of crime, as well as perceptions of individuals’ intent to commit crime and remorse for having committed a crime.

Controlling for the type of crime an offender has committed and his social status, the results suggest that a criminal’s perceived warmth generates more attributions of crime to external causes (i.e., to stress) (β = .28, p ≤ .001) and less to internal causes (i.e., to personality) (β = -.44, p ≤ .001), and more perceptions of remorse (β = .52, p ≤ .001). Criminals’ perceived warmth also has a direct negative effect on perceived intent (β -.14, p = .053), and a smaller indirect effect through internal attributions for crime. That is, an offender who is perceived as lacking warmth is perceived as committing crime due to his personality, and in turn as demonstrating the intent to commit a crime. Perceived intent is also partly explained by the type of crime an offender has committed; offenders who commit crimes such as fraud are perceived as demonstrating comparatively more intent than those who commit crimes such as theft (β = -1.13, p ≤ .001) and assault (β = -1.57, p ≤ .001). Although one may have expected more aggressive crimes (e.g., assault) to generate lower perceptions of warmth, the results do not support this hypothesis. This finding may be due to the fact that in this study, crimes
of assault and theft were described in ways that could suggest that the crime had occurred due to chance or opportunity (see Appendix I). On the other hand, the fraud scenario suggested that the criminal had taken purposeful steps to complete their crime (i.e., by buying stocks before the price was raised).

Perceptions of criminals’ competence did not have significant effects on perceptions of intent or remorse, nor on attributions for crime. However, criminals who have a high social status are perceived as demonstrating less remorse ($\beta = -0.40, p \leq 0.01$), marginally more intent ($\beta = 0.28, p = 0.08$), and are perceived as committing crime less due to external causes ($\beta = -0.45, p \leq 0.01$). The results therefore seem to suggest that a criminal’s social status was more important than his perceived competence in explaining causes of crime, intent and remorse. Individuals may therefore believe that high status others should ‘know better’ and in turn allocate more internal causality.

**Step 3 (H3).** The third step consists of estimating the effect of perceptions of the offender on judgments of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of a crime. In previous studies, crime type and intent have been found to influence the judged wrongfulness and harmfulness of a crime. The following models test whether stereotypes about criminals influence judgments of wrongfulness and harmfulness and mediate the effect of attributions, intent and remorse on these judgments. This step consisted of estimating two structural equation models. The first model (Model 3) excludes perceptions of warmth and competence (there are no fit statistics because the model is saturated), and is nested in the second full model (Model 4) which additionally simultaneously regresses attributions, perceived intent, remorse, judged wrongfulness and harmfulness on perceptions of warmth and competence ($\chi^2 = 72.32, df = 44, p \leq 0.05$, $\chi^2 / df = 1.64$, CFI
Table 1

Judged Wrongfulness and Harmfulness (Model 3 & Model 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internal attribution</th>
<th>External attribution</th>
<th>Intent</th>
<th>Remorse</th>
<th>Wrongfulness</th>
<th>Harmfulness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-1.15***</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.61**</td>
<td>.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-1.58***</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.37^c</td>
<td>1.53***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attributions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>-.26***</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceptions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of offender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remorse</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.12^b</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R^2</strong></td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-1.19***</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>.45*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-1.65***</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>1.63***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attributions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.14^*</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceptions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of offender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remorse</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth</td>
<td>-.46***</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td>-.22*</td>
<td>-.33***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.13^a</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R^2</strong></td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Regression coefficients are standardized. The models also controlled for participants’ socio-demographics. For Model 1, residual correlations between are intent and remorse are $r = -.22^{***}$, between internal and external attributions are $r = -.15^{**}$, between wrongfulness and harmfulness are $r = .49^{***}$. For Model 2, residual correlations between perceived warmth and competence are $r = .34^{***}$, between intent and remorse are $r = -.19^{**}$, between internal and external attributions are $r = .00$, between wrongfulness and harmfulness $r = .46^{***}$. *$p \leq .05$. **$p \leq .01$. ***$p \leq .001$. ^a $p = .06$. ^b $p = .09$. ^c $p = .10$. 
In Model 3, the results suggest that the judged wrongfulness of a crime is marginally negatively predicted by perceiving a criminal as feeling remorse (\( \beta = -0.12, p = 0.10 \)) and positively predicted by attributing crime to internal causes (\( \beta = 0.14, p \leq 0.05 \)) (see Figure 5). The judged harmfulness of a crime is positively predicted by perceived intent (\( \beta = 0.22, p \leq 0.01 \)).

Model 4 suggests that criminals’ perceived warmth influences normative judgments about the harmfulness and wrongfulness of a crime. Specifically, crimes committed by stereotypical criminals were judged as being more wrongful (\( \beta = -0.28, p \leq 0.01 \)) and particularly more harmful (\( \beta = -0.42, p \leq 0.001 \)). The effects of perceived remorse (\( \beta = -0.03, ns \)) and internal attributions (\( \beta = 0.10, ns \)) on wrongfulness were weakened when controlling for perceptions of warmth, however, the effect of intent on the perceived harmfulness of a crime is only slightly weakened (\( \beta = 0.20, p \leq 0.01 \)) by perceptions of warmth. Previous research suggested that perceptions of intent would be key in influencing judgments of wrongfulness, however the present findings suggest that perceptions of criminals’ intent to commit a crime and their perceived lack of warmth were most strongly associated with judgments of harmfulness. The effect of perceived intent and of stereotypes on judgments of harmfulness may be partly due to the importance that individuals place on others’ empathy (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). In other words, perceived intent and a lack of perceived warmth are seen as being especially harmful in social behaviour such as crime. Crime type also influenced normative judgments, with crimes of theft and assault being perceived as being more harmful (Theft: \( \beta = 0.55, p \leq 0.01 \), Assault: \( \beta = 1.54, p \leq 0.001 \)) and wrongful (Theft: \( \beta = 0.65, p \leq 0.01 \), Assault: \( \beta = 0.37, p \leq 0.10 \)) than fraud.
Figure 5. Judged wrongfulness and harmfulness (Model 3).

Note. There are no fit statistics because the model is saturated. Regression coefficients are standardized. Rectangles represent manifest variables. The model also controlled for crime type and participants’ socio-demographics. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001

Step 4 (H4 and H5). The fourth step is to observe the direct effects of perceptions of offenders on the perceived seriousness and moral outrage felt toward a crime, key determinants of punishment. A structural equation model (Model 5) estimating the effects of perceived warmth and competence on seriousness and moral outrage suggests that, controlling for crime type, perceived social status and participants’ socio-demographic variables, perceiving criminals as being warm leads to lower perceptions of seriousness (β = -.16, p ≤ .05) and to less moral outrage (β = -.38, p ≤ .001) (χ² = 75.04, df = 54, p ≤ .05, χ² / df = 1.39, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .04).

Perceptions of competence on the other hand have a positive effect on moral outrage (β = .13, p ≤ .05) and a smaller but marginally significant negative effect on perceived seriousness (β = -.11, p = .09). Crimes of assault and theft lead to comparable levels of moral outrage while fraud engendered less moral outrage than theft (β = -.40, p ≤ .05).
Theft, in turn, was seen as being less serious than assault ($\beta = .41, p \leq .05$) or fraud ($\beta = .59, p \leq .01$).

Together, the results from steps 1 – 4 suggest that perceptions of offenders’ warmth have direct effects on punitiveness, but also influence causal attributions, perceptions of offenders’ intent and remorse, judgments about a crime’s wrongfulness and harmfulness, as well as the perceived seriousness and moral outrage elicited by a crime. The results also suggest that perceptions of warmth and competence weaken the effects of attributions for crime on perceived intent and remorse, and the effects of remorse and intent on the judged wrongfulness and harmfulness of a crime. Still, intent continues to have a separate and significant effect on the judged harmfulness of a crime. The final model will therefore retain perceptions of warmth, competence, and intent, and simultaneously estimate their effects on judgments of wrongfulness and harmfulness, on the key determinants of punitiveness (i.e., seriousness and moral outrage) and on punitiveness itself.

**Step 5.** The final full model (Model 6) distinguishes between lower and higher order variables expected to influence punitiveness, but allows perceptions of offenders’ warmth, competence and intent to have effects on lower- and higher-order variables ($\chi^2 = 48.91, df = 42, p > .05, \chi^2 / df = 1.16, CFI = 1, RMSEA = .03$) (see Figure 6). Paths were also estimated from wrongfulness and harmfulness to seriousness and moral outrage, which in turn were used to predict punitiveness. Lastly, all dependent variables were regressed on crime type and participants’ socio-demographic variables.

Controlling for higher-order variables, perceptions of criminals’ warmth ($\beta = -.06, ns$) and competence ($\beta = .05, ns$) do not have significant direct effects on
Figure 6. Model 6 Estimating the effect of stereotypes on decisions to punish and on the determinants of these decisions

Chi-square = 48.91
df = 42, p > .05,
CFI = 1
RMSEA = .03

Note. Ovals represent latent variables, rectangles represent manifest variables. Significant pathways are bolded, non-significant pathways are in dark grey. For visual clarity, paths from socio-demographic variables and crime type to dependent variables are not shown. Crime type did not significantly predict punishment or moral outrage. Crimes of theft (β = -.95, p ≤ .001) and assault were seen as significantly less serious than crimes of fraud (β = -.97, p ≤ .001). Crimes of theft were seen as more wrongful (β = .57, p ≤ .01) and harmful (β = .46, p ≤ .05) than fraud, while assault was seen as more harmful (β = 1.48, p ≤ .001) but not more wrongful (β = .30, ns) than fraud. Offenders who committed theft (β = -1.20, p ≤ .001) or assault (β = -1.65, p ≤ .001) were seen as demonstrating less intent than those who committed fraud. The residual correlation between Warmth and Competence is (r = .31, p ≤ .001), between Wrongfulness and Harmfulness is (r = .44, p ≤ .001), and between Moral outrage and Seriousness is r = .30, p ≤ .001). *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
punitiveness. Rather, the perceived seriousness of a crime is the key determinant of how much it is punished ($\beta = .54$, $p \leq .001$). Controlling for perceived seriousness, individuals’ expressed moral outrage ($\beta = .11$, $ns$) and crime type fail to have significant effects on punishment.

The perceived seriousness of a crime is associated with its perceived harmfulness ($\beta = .58$, $p \leq .001$), wrongfulness ($\beta = .31$, $p \leq .001$) and with crime type. Fraud was perceived as being significantly more serious than theft ($\beta = -.95$, $p \leq .001$) and assault ($\beta = -.97$, $p \leq .01$), but did not elicit more moral outrage (theft: $\beta = .26$, $p \geq .05$, assault: $\beta = .15$, $p \geq .05$). This result is not entirely surprising in part because in earlier models, those who committed fraud were perceived as being more competent and as demonstrating more intent than those who committed theft or assault. Previous research suggests that the perceived seriousness of white-collar crime is partly associated with the social status and trust given to the perpetrator of the crime, particularly to those in positions of authority (Rebovich & Kane, 2002). Perceptions of competence, on the other hand, can increase punitiveness for high-status individuals who commit low-status crimes such as tax fraud (Christopher, Marek & May, 2003; Fragale et al., 2009). In this study, the results of the final full model suggest that the effect of fraud on perceived seriousness is not mediated by other factors such as perceived intent, competence or social status. The results may suggest that while white-collar crimes such as fraud do not elicit the same cognitive judgments and emotional responses as street crimes, individuals believe that these crimes are serious and should be punished.
When controlling for the judged wrongfulness and harmfulness of a crime, perceived warmth was unexpectedly found to have a significant positive effect on the perceived seriousness of a crime ($\beta = .14, p \leq .05$), while perceived competence has a significant negative effect on perceived seriousness ($\beta = -.18, p \leq .001$). The residual positive effect of perceived warmth on seriousness is surprising, as it would suggest that the warmer a criminal is perceived as being, the more serious the crime. However, separate analyses reveal that this residual effect arises solely when controlling for crime type, wrongfulness and harmfulness. When either crime type or wrongfulness and harmfulness are removed from the regression model, perceived warmth has no effect or a negative effect on seriousness, respectively, which is in line with analyses in Step 4. Otherwise, findings were similar to previous analyses in that perceptions of warmth had significant negative effects on judged wrongfulness ($\beta = -.31, p \leq .001$), harmfulness ($\beta = -.29, p \leq .001$) and on perceived intent ($\beta = -.23, p \leq .001$), while perceived intent was positively associated with the judged harmfulness of a crime ($\beta = .17, p \leq .05$).

The final full model demonstrates that when other cognitive and emotional factors are taken into account, perceptions of warmth and competence do not have a direct effect on decisions to punish a crime. Punitiveness was found to be most strongly associated with a crime’s perceived seriousness, while moral outrage failed to have a significant separate effect. Both perceived seriousness and moral outrage were predicted by higher-order variables of judged wrongfulness and harmfulness.

The fact that the effect of perceived seriousness outweighed the effect of moral outrage on punitiveness is worth a brief discussion. Based on previous findings, one would expect there to be a strong association between emotions of moral outrage, or
anger, and punitiveness (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Johnson, 2009). Perceived seriousness, however, is a key factor in retributiveness as it serves as a cognitive marker of how much a crime should be punished. To say that a crime is serious is in a sense a cognitive assessment of how morally outraged an individual feels and a normative judgment about the nature of a crime. In these analyses, it would have been feasible to not allow perceived seriousness to have a direct effect on punishment, but rather to indirectly affect punishment through moral outrage, as Carlsmith and Darley (2008) have done. However, the present results suggest that individuals’ beliefs about the nature of a crime can be equally if not more important than how they feel toward crime.

Step 6 (H7). Additional analyses were conducted to observe the effects of political orientation and ideology on punitiveness and the determinants of punitiveness. The final full model was re-estimated while additionally regressing dependent variables on political orientation, which in turn was regressed on RWA and SDO (Model 7) ($\chi^2 = 187.11, df = 118, p \leq .001, \chi^2/df = 1.58, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .05$). Political orientation was positively predicted by RWA ($\beta = .68, p \leq .001$), however SDO failed to have a significant separate effect ($\beta = .05, p \geq .05$), which may be due to its operationalization as preference for inequality. The results suggest that those who self-identify as being politically conservative are more likely to perceive a crime as being serious ($\beta = .17, p \leq .05$) and to express more moral outrage ($\beta = .12, p \leq .05$). Taking into account political ideology increased the amount of variance explained in perceived seriousness by 3% (from 61% to 64%) and in moral outrage by 4% (from 53% to 57%). However, political orientation did not have direct effects on punitiveness, social perceptions of warmth,

26 A set of two additional analyses estimating the full final model and regressing dependent variables solely on RWA (Model 8) and solely on SDO (Model 9) reveal similar findings.
competence and intent, nor on judgments of wrongfulness and harmfulness (all $p$’s $\geq .05$). Otherwise, paths remained consistent with the full model.

**General Discussion and Conclusion**

The present research addressed the question of whether criminal stereotypes affect not only the way individuals feel about criminals, but also how individuals perceive and judge crime. The interpersonal and intergroup perception literature suggests that the underlying dimensions of stereotypes, warmth and competence, inform emotional responses, basic approach and avoidance behaviour and the inferences individuals make about the causes of others’ behaviour (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008; Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998). Previous research on criminal stereotypes suggests that criminals are stereotypically perceived as being low on competence (e.g., unintelligent, inefficient) and warmth (e.g., unkind, untrustworthy) (Côté-Lussier, 2012), and that perceptions of criminals’ lack of warmth are key in predicting emotions of anger and compassion, and in turn support for harsh criminal justice policy (Côté-Lussier, 2012a).

The present study expanded on previous findings by considering the role of stereotypes in shaping perceptions of crime. Participants were presented a crime scenario in which criminal stereotypes were experimentally manipulated. For some participants, the criminal was described as having a low social status and as being stereotypically cold, unkind and unsympathetic. For others, the criminal was described as having a high social status and as being warm, kind and sympathetic. In this study, stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth were found to have indirect effects on
punishment by influencing the judged harmfulness, wrongfulness and seriousness of crime. The perceived seriousness of crime was in turn a key predictor of how much individuals believed a crime should be punished.

The findings of this research have two key implications. First, the present findings suggest that predictors of punitiveness – such as criminals’ perceived intent, lack of remorse and causal responsibility – are partly explained by stereotypical perceptions of criminals’ lack of warmth. These findings support previous research which suggests that perceptions of others’ warmth are diagnostic when making attributions for others’ behaviour (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). However, criminal stereotypes have the added effect of contributing to judgments about the wrongfulness and harmfulness of a crime, key predictors of a crime’s perceived seriousness.

The results also suggest that endorsing stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth could generate an inflated sense of the seriousness of crime, and in turn more support for harsh criminal justice policy. In this and other research, the perceived seriousness of crime is a key predictor of how much individuals want a specific crime to be punished (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Crime’s perceived seriousness also predicts how morally outraged or angry individuals are about crime, a key predictor of support for harsh criminal justice policy (Côté-Lussier, 2012a; Gault & Sabini, 2000; Graham, Weiner & Zucker, 1997; Johnson, 2009). Future research should therefore test the effect of criminal stereotypes on broader beliefs about the seriousness of crime.

Still, criminal stereotypes only partly explained normative judgments about the seriousness of crime and expressed moral outrage. Previous findings suggest that ideological positions are also strongly associated with adopting a punitive stance toward
crime (Bowers & Waltman, 1993; Feather et al., 2001; Jost et al., 2003; King & Maruna, 2009; McCann, 2008; McKee & Feather, 2008; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997), with right-wing authoritarianism often being a key predictor of support for aggressive policies (Skitka et al., 2006). The present findings suggested that although politically conservative individuals perceived crime as being more serious and expressed more moral outrage toward crime, the processes which engendered these responses did not differ between politically liberal and conservative individuals. Politically conservative individuals may therefore consider additional factors when judging the seriousness of crime and expressing moral outrage. Haidt, Graham and Joseph (2009) have found that in addition to considering the perceived wrongfulness (or injustice) and harmfulness of an event, politically conservative individuals also consider whether an event violates moral dimensions related to authority, loyalty and purity. Future research looking at the cognitive pathways between political ideology, social perception and punitiveness may therefore seek to consider these additional dimensions.

Although the present findings make headway in linking fundamental dimensions of social perception to perceptions of crime and punitiveness, they are limited in several ways. First, previous research suggests that politically conservative individuals are more likely to endorse stereotypes about threatening groups such as criminals (Bassett, 2010; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duriez et al., 2005; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Kreindler, 2005; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). However, in this research, politically liberal and conservative individuals did not differ in their perceptions of stereotypical criminals. The failure to observe an effect on social perception may be related to a reduced reliance on stereotypes due to the individuating nature of the task (Gawronski et al., 2003) or to
the described crime type’s failure to elicit politically charged responses. Second, the residual positive effect of criminals’ perceived warmth on perceptions of the seriousness of a crime did not support the hypothesis that crimes committed by stereotypical criminals are perceived as being more serious. However, this residual effect was found to only emerge when controlling for normative judgments about the harmfulness and wrongfulness of a crime, which were themselves predicted by perceptions of a lack of warmth, making this finding substantively difficult to interpret.

Still, this research has important theoretical and policy implications. First, the present findings suggest a cognitive pathway that links stereotypes to anger. According to Batson and colleagues (2007) anger or moral outrage is elicited when a moral standard related to justice is violated. The present findings demonstrate that when a criminal act is committed by a stereotypical criminal (i.e., a low warmth individual), this act is judged as being more wrongful or unjust. Anger toward low warmth and low competence groups may therefore be elicited partly on the basis of inferences about the types of wrongful or unjust acts that these groups are likely to commit. Indeed, in the USA, other low warmth and low competence groups who may be judged as engaging in wrongful or unjust behaviour include welfare recipients, the homeless and feminists (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006).

Second, from a policy perspective, the results support the view that public punitiveness toward crime is partly explained by subjective perceptions of crime. The role of stereotypes and political ideology in shaping cognitive, emotional and attitudinal responses to crime runs counter to theories and evidence which suggest that individuals
rationally seek to punish crime in order to deter future crime or in response to the courts’ perceived leniency.

The present and other findings suggest that increasing the harshness of criminal justice policies may be ineffective in quelling public desires for harsh punishment, to the extent that these desires result from cognitive and affective responses to criminal stereotypes. Policy makers should therefore take seriously the role of criminal stereotypes and political ideology in shaping perceptions and judgments of crime.

References


Côté-Lussier, C. (2012). The evil, poor and disliked: Applying the Stereotype Content Model to study the content and structural determinants of the criminal stereotype. *Submitted for publication*.


Assignment of punishment as a function of the severity and consequences of the

Montada, L. & Schneider, A. (1989). Justice and emotional reactions to the

values following a transgression: Value consensus through symbolic labelling

status=competence stereotypes: Roles for belief in a just world and social

Orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes.

public attitude toward white collar crime and punishment. *Journal of Economic
Crime Management, 1*(2).

99-180.

Sargent, M. J. (2004). Less thought, more punishment: Need for cognition predicts
support for punitive responses to crime. *Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 30*(11), 1485-93.


Appendix I

Crime vignettes

Status
High: Paul (or David, or Mark) earns good money as an analyst-programmer at a major phone company.

OR

Low: Paul (or David, or Mark) is a customer service representative at a phone company but occasionally has a hard time making ends meet.

Warmth
High: He is kind and is willing to take the time to be there for friends. He enjoys being able to help people and often sympathizes with their problems. He is generally a warm person.

OR

Low: He is unkind and rarely there for friends. He does not enjoy having to help people and is unsympathetic to their problems. He is generally a cold person.

Crime type
Assault: Last month, on his way home from work, he got into an altercation with a stranger. He punched the other person in the face several times and threw them to the ground. The victim sustained some cuts and bruises to their face, shoulder and hands. The police were called and [name] was arrested. He was later found guilty of assault.

OR

Theft: Last month, on his way home from work, he walked into an open office door where a laptop had been left on a desk. He took the laptop and hid it under his jacket. He looked around the office to see if there was anything else he could take before walking away with the laptop. The police were called and [name] was arrested. He was later found guilty of theft.

OR

Fraud: Last month, [name] was found guilty of fraud. He was found to have made personal gain by using inside information he learned about before the information was made public. He bought stocks in a company for his personal account knowing that the stock price would go up when the information was made public. The profits amounted to £50,000.
On the Role of Criminal Stereotypes and Intuition in Generating Punitiveness Toward Crime

The first three papers of this thesis worked toward establishing the content, cognitive, affective, behavioural and attitudinal outcomes of criminal stereotypes. Some of the theoretical frameworks applied in these papers, and discussed in the literature review, suggest that punitiveness is likely the result of intuitive as opposed to reasoned processes. A renewed interest in the role of intuition has gained momentum in research on social judgments, particularly in the area of moral judgment. Research on the role of intuition in social judgment is in line with neuro-psychological research which suggests that neural substrates underpin and link processes related to social cognition and behaviour, such as punishment. A general consensus in the literature suggests that social judgment results from a dual-process model that involves slower controlled (or reasoning) processes, and rapid automatic (or intuitive) processes.

Although research on punitiveness has identified intuition as an important determinant of public attitudes toward crime, little of this research has used a methodology that allows for the measurement of individuals’ rapid or intuitive responses to crime. This paper therefore makes an important methodological contribution to this stream of research by developing and using a methodology that allows for the measurement of individuals’ punitive intuitions.

In this thesis, punitive intuitions are defined as the sudden appearance in consciousness of a desire to punish crime harshly without any conscious awareness of having gone through the steps of searching, weighing evidence and inferring that a specific crime should be punished. This definition suggests that individuals’ punitive
desires are likely to occur even before individuals have taken the time to consider the origin and nature of their responses toward crime. In order to measure these punitive intuitions, the next study uses a response-time measure and multilevel quantile regression modelling to observe the processes that – very early on – come to shape punitive decisions. This method of analysis has yet to be used in social psychological research on rapid social judgments, and proves to be a useful approach to studying intuitive responses.

In summary, the previous papers considered the effects of the content of criminal stereotypes – warmth and competence – on explicitly expressed punitive attitudes and decisions to punish specific crimes. In these studies, participants had ample time to reflect on their attitudes and decisions, and still criminal stereotypes were found to affect responses to crime. A remaining question, addressed in the following paper, is whether criminal stereotypes can shape punitive intuitions – that is, the decision to punish crime before individuals are even aware of having gone through the steps of establishing why a criminal should be punished. This study will address questions with important political implications; whether public punitiveness partly reflects a deep-seated intuitive desire to see to the punishment of crime, and whether this desire is shaped by criminal stereotypes.
Kicking them while they’re down: The effects of perceived warmth and social status on punitive intuitions

Carolyn Côté-Lussier
Methodology Institute and Mannheim Centre for Criminology
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

Affect has been shown to be a good predictor of individuals’ intuitive social judgments. The current research tests the hypothesis that perception of others’ warmth and competence, fundamental dimensions of social perception, can also come to shape intuition. The results suggest that participants were more likely to rapidly harshly punish pictured criminals who were low on perceived warmth. However, the results of multilevel quantile regression modelling reveals that perceived social status can be equally important in shaping punitive intuitions. The findings shed light on the role of fundamental dimensions of social perception in engendering intuitive responses to others.

Keywords: intuition, cognition, affect, fundamental dimensions of social perception

Current social psychological and cognitive neuroscience research has spawned renewed interest in the role of intuition in forming social judgments. Social judgment, for the most part, is discussed in terms of a dual-process model that involves two interrelated processes. The first process consists of slower controlled (or reasoning) processes, while the second rapid automatic (or intuitive) processes are argued to be more in line with
emotional responses (Adolphs, 2009; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Pretz & Totz, 2007; but see Greene et al., 2004, on conflicting cognitive and emotional processes). In the context of moral judgment, for instance, intuition is argued to originate from strong emotional responses to deep seated moral principles that are the result of evolutionary, social and cultural influences (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; but see Huebner, Dwyer & Hauser, 2008, on causal-intentional appraisals and moral intuition).

An area receiving less attention is the association between social perception and intuitive responses to others. From an interpersonal relations perspective, intuitive responses to others should be related to the two fundamental dimensions of social perception: warmth (e.g., kind, trustworthy) and competence (e.g., intelligent, skilful) (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Conway et al., 1996; Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979). These dimensions answer questions that are fundamental for human survival: What are others’ intentions? What are others’ abilities to carry out those intentions (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006)? Inferences regarding others’ warmth and competence flow in part from social structural determinants: perceived competition for resources and power leads to inferences of low warmth, while perceived high social status leads to inferences of high competence (Fiske et al., 2002). Individuals are capable of very quickly forming impressions of others’ warmth and competence, and perceptions of these dimensions are functionally related to affective and behavioural responses (Cuddy et al., 2007). For instance, Todorov et al. (2005) found that individuals’ impressions of politicians’ competence based on a 1-second exposure to a picture of their face was sufficient to predict subsequent voting behaviour.
The present study considers whether criminals’ perceived warmth, competence and social status affect punitive intuitions. Punitive intuitions are the sudden appearance in consciousness of a desire to punish crime harshly without any conscious awareness of having gone through the steps of searching, weighing evidence and inferring that a specific crime should be punished.\textsuperscript{27} Individuals’ seeming intuitive punitive desires have received growing attention in social psychological and criminological research on punitiveness toward crime (Ham et al., 2009; Jones & Fitness, 2008; Robinson & Darley, 2007; Salerno & Bottoms, 2009). The interest in punitive intuitions stems in part from evidence that suggests a discrepancy between individuals’ expressed and implicitly endorsed punitive goals (Carlsmith, 2008). The association between anger and decreased reasoning processes also suggests that intuition is likely to shape responses to incidents that elicit anger, such as crime or moral violations (Goldberg, Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). However, extant research on punitive intuitions has fallen short of using methodologies that allow for the measurement of intuitive or rapid decisions to punish crime. It is therefore unclear what factors come to shape or instigate punitive intuitions.

In previous research, perceptions of criminals’ lack of warmth were found to be important in predicting functionally relevant affective responses to criminals such as anger, uneasiness and a lack of compassion (Côté-Lussier, 2012). These emotions in turn were key in predicting behavioural intentions to attack and exclude criminals, as well as the extent to which individuals expressed support for harsh criminal justice policy. Perceptions of criminals’ lack of warmth also inform causal attributions for

\textsuperscript{27} This definition of punitive intuitions is based on Haidt’s (2001) definition of moral intuition.
crime, perceptions of intent and remorse, and punitive responses to specific crimes (Côté-Lussier, 2012a).

In the present study, participants were presented pictures of purported convicted criminals and were asked to very quickly decide whether each criminal should receive a prison or non-prison sentence. The present study focused participants’ attention strictly on deciding how much a criminal should be punished in order to measure individuals’ intuitive desire to punish criminals harshly. The main hypothesis is that criminals’ low perceived warmth will lead to a higher probability of giving convicted criminals harsh sentences, and will lead to quicker decisions to punish harshly.

Participants

Participants (N = 60), were university students in the city of London (UK) who completed the study in a lab setting for £10 ($15USD). Participants were recruited through previous studies and by distributing advertisements directly to students through departmental e-mails. Only 58 participants reported demographic information. For these 25 men and 33 women, mean age was 23.52 (min = 18, max = 47). White British students made up 23% of the sample, while 21% were White students from a non-British background. The remainder of the participants were 22% Asian British (e.g., Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani), 3% British African or Caribbean and 31% were from other ethnic categories (e.g., Chinese British and non-British, Mixed or Other). In terms of social class, 35% reported being from the working-class or lower-middle class, 41% from the middle-class and 24% from upper-middle and upper class. For the 58 participants who reported handedness, 86% were right-handed and 14% left-handed.
Stimuli

Pictures (N = 52) were of wanted or suspected criminals’ faces, however participants were told that the pictures were of men who were found guilty of committing a street-crime (e.g., theft, minor assault).\(^2\)\(^8\) In a separate study, university students (N = 145) in the city of London (UK) completed an online survey in which they rated the same pictures on a range of dimensions including age, ethnicity, warmth, competence and social status (see Table 1). Completion of the study gave participants the chance to win one of 8 cash prizes (ranging from £20, $30USD, to £150, $225USD). Participants each rated a subset of 10 pictures drawn from a total pool of 80 pictures, and these ratings were used to select the final 52 pictures.

Because the main hypothesis was that low perceived warmth would generate more punitive intuitions, mean ratings of warmth were used to create two groups of pictures: a low perceived warmth group (LW) (N = 26) (M = 2.87) and a high perceived warmth group (HW) (N = 26) (M = 3.47) (\(p \leq .001\)). The LW and HW groups do not differ on perceived competence (\(p = .99\)) nor on perceived social status (\(p = .41\)).

Procedure

Participants were told that we were interested in their gut reactions to people who have

---

\(^2\)\(^8\) Pictures of real suspected or wanted criminals were used as opposed to staged pictures in order to provide pictures with some external validity. Pictures were found on police, prison and probation websites based primarily in the USA and UK. A disclosure indicating that it was unknown whether any of the pictured individuals were actually found guilty of any crime was accessible by clicking on a link present at the very bottom of the website welcome page that participants first visited. Only pictured individuals in frontal head-shots with neutral expressions were selected. Pictures were also selected on the basis of their visual quality (i.e., pictures with a high Dots Per Inch [DPI] resolution were preferentially selected) and size (i.e., larger pictures were preferentially selected). A graphic designer color corrected each picture (e.g., adjusting brightness and contrast) and modified all of the pictures so that the background color was grey, and so that the face of each criminal appeared approximately in the same location.
committed a crime. They were asked to decide, very quickly, whether to send people convicted of either ‘minor assault, property theft, tax evasion, drug dealing, vandalism, drunk driving, fraud or burglary’ to prison or to give them a non-prison sentence. If a participant decided to sentence an offender to prison, this meant that the offender would receive the typical prison sentence length for the type of offence they committed (ranging from 2 months to 5 years in prison), although participants were not told which crime each offender committed. If they decided that an offender should receive a non-prison sentence, this meant that the offender would receive a sentence that is typical for the type of offence they committed, such as probation or community service, but would not be sent to prison.

Pictures of offenders (see Figure 1) were presented in a structured-randomized order, such that each of the 13 blocks of 4 pictures contained pictures of 2 HW and 2 LW criminals. Participants responded to a total of 52 target trials, completed a short practice task beforehand in order to become familiar with the Direct RT computer
software (i.e., they identified fruits and vegetables), and completed a survey at the end of the study. Participants pressed either the ‘F’ or ‘J’ key to provide their punishment decisions; a slip of paper indicating which key represented each response type was located on the table in front of the keyboard. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 4 conditions that varied the assignment of keys and order of presentation of ‘prison’ and ‘non-prison’ sentence options, in a counterbalanced design.

Figure 1. Screenshot of target trial.

Analytical Strategy

The first set of analyses uses binary logistic regression modelling to estimate the probability of sending criminals to prison. This first step establishes whether stereotypical criminals are more likely to be punished, before moving on to identifying when in the decision making process criminal stereotypes come to shape punitive decisions.

The second set of analyses uses multilevel quantile regression modelling to estimate the speed with which individuals decided to send criminals to prison.
Multilevel quantile regression modelling was used for two reasons: first, to take into account issues with analyzing response time data, and second, to take into account the clustered nature of the data. Response time (RT) distributions are not normally distributed and typically take an ex-Gaussian distribution (Heathcote et al., 1991). The positive skewness of the data can either be due to the process of interest, which requires taking into account the shape of the distribution in analyses, or due to nuisance variables (e.g., a lapse of attention, an eye blink) which can be removed using data trimming methods or rescaling response times. Response time is additionally influenced by learning curves, such that responses tend to be slower in the beginning, speed up and then plateau (Logan, 1992). Quantile regression modelling allows for the analysis of non-normal distributions and to model entire distributions rather than simply modeling the mean, which in the case of RT data can be heavily influenced by outlier responses. Multilevel regression modelling takes into account the clustered nature of a given data set by estimating parameters for correlations induced by the repeated measures nature of the data. Multilevel modeling provides better estimates of the standard errors and improves inferences about the observed effects. Multilevel quantile regression modelling therefore allows for modeling the entire response time distribution while controlling for the clustered nature of the data, providing insight into the importance of explanatory variables at different stages of decision-making.

Results

On average, participants were more likely to give convicted criminals prison (N = 1708) as opposed to non-prison (N = 1412) sentences, and were quicker to decide to send a convicted criminal to prison (M = 1524.25, SD = 1005.04) than to give criminals a non-
prison \( (M = 1729.48, \ SD = 1174.36) \) sentence \( (t = 5.26, \ p \leq .001) \). The median harsh punishment decision was made in 1182ms (see Table 2). Approximately 30% of harsh punishment decisions were made under 1-second, with approximately 23% of punishment decisions taking over 2-seconds to make. Response times therefore varied quite substantially and suggest that different factors may have come to shape decision-making processes.

Table 2

*Quantiles for Prison and Non-Prison Decision Response Time*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantiles</th>
<th>RT Prison</th>
<th>RT Non-Prison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>712.80</td>
<td>840.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>832.80</td>
<td>985.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>941.70</td>
<td>1096.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>1046.00</td>
<td>1238.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>1182.00</td>
<td>1386.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>1375.40</td>
<td>1619.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>1641.00</td>
<td>1865.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>2042.40</td>
<td>2227.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>2768.70</td>
<td>2968.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controlling for criminals’ perceived ethnicity and age, the results of the first binary logistic regression model (Model 1, Table 3) suggest that individuals are less likely to send HW criminals to prison compared to LW criminals \( (\exp(\beta) = .18, \ p \leq .001) \). Because perceived social status is an important component of criminal stereotypes that influences perceptions of criminals’ warmth and competence (Côté-Lussier, 2012b), criminals’ perceived social status was added as a potential predictor of punitive decisions in Model 2. When taking into account criminals’ perceived social status, the results remain comparable to Model 1 with social status having no measurable impact.
on the probability of giving convicted criminals a prison as opposed to a non-prison sentence. In other words, the effect of warmth on rapid harsh punitive decisions is not weakened by social status.

Table 3

*Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting Probability of Giving a Convicted Criminal a Prison as Opposed to Non-Prison Sentence*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warmth</td>
<td>.18***</td>
<td>.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.47***</td>
<td>1.47***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1.50*</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.10**</td>
<td>1.95*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σ Picture</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σ Participant</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.

The next step is to test whether the observed effect of warmth on punitive intuitions appears early on in the decision-making process. The second set of analyses consist of two multilevel quantile regression models predicting the speed with which individuals decided to give criminals prison sentences, with the second model additionally taking into account criminals’ perceived social status. The estimated quantiles were picked based on previous research on facial processing and decision-making response times. Evidence suggests that facial recognition can take as little as

29 The same models were estimated while controlling for participants’ age, gender and handedness. The results were comparable and so these participant-level controls were removed from the final models due to the small sample size and for the sake of parsimony.
50ms, with brain activity suggesting identification or categorization occurring at roughly
150ms and actual identification (e.g., through button-release) occurring around 300ms
(VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001). Higher order decisions such as identifying famous among
unfamiliar faces takes approximately 700ms-800ms (Bentin & McCarthy, 1994) and
distinguish male from female faces takes approximately 1,300ms (O’Toole et al., 1998).
The estimated quantiles were therefore the 20\textsuperscript{th} (~800ms), 40\textsuperscript{th} (~1,000ms), 60\textsuperscript{th}
(~1,400ms) and 80\textsuperscript{th} (~2,000ms) quantiles.

In the first multilevel quantile regression model (Model 3, Table 4) the results
suggest that perceptions of criminals’ warmth have an effect on harsh punitive decisions
early on in the decision making process and taper off when participants take longer to
respond (~1,500ms). In the second model (Model 4), criminals’ perceived social status
was found to weaken the effect of perceived warmth on intuitive punitive decisions and
was a comparatively stronger predictor of individuals’ rapid decisions to punish
criminals harshly. The effect of social status remained significant even when intuitive
processes were less at play, suggesting a robust effect. Criminals’ perceived competence
also emerged as a significant predictor in participants’ slower punitive decisions,
although this effect is difficult to interpret as it was not significant across quantiles.

The results suggest that in general, low warmth criminals are more likely to be
punished harshly. However, the results also seem to suggest that criminals’ perceived
social status weakens the effect of warmth by slowing punitive intuitions. When
individuals perceive a low status and low warmth criminal, they very quickly decide that
this person should be sent to prison. However, when they perceive a higher status
Table 4

*Multilevel Quantile Regression Models Predicting Speed of Decisions to Give Convicted Criminals a Prison Sentence.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th percentile</td>
<td>875.95</td>
<td>(118.98)</td>
<td>1046.18</td>
<td>(127.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth</td>
<td>58.17*</td>
<td>(25.77)</td>
<td>20.55</td>
<td>(29.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>11.15</td>
<td>(26.82)</td>
<td>-56.05</td>
<td>(49.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-16.96</td>
<td>(17.17)</td>
<td>-10.05</td>
<td>(17.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-154.66***</td>
<td>(27.66)</td>
<td>-113.92***</td>
<td>(34.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>10.47</td>
<td>(29.97)</td>
<td>32.48</td>
<td>(49.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-60.41**</td>
<td>(45.96)</td>
<td>-30.73</td>
<td>(29.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-80.17*</td>
<td>(38.03)</td>
<td>-48.82</td>
<td>(43.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>88.78*</td>
<td>(43.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th percentile</td>
<td>896.94</td>
<td>(125.86)</td>
<td>988.29</td>
<td>(159.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth</td>
<td>62.11*</td>
<td>(30.89)</td>
<td>27.43</td>
<td>(32.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>48.07</td>
<td>(27.22)</td>
<td>-25.65</td>
<td>(52.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-25.07</td>
<td>(18.14)</td>
<td>-16.79</td>
<td>(20.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-155.61***</td>
<td>(34.17)</td>
<td>-72.57*</td>
<td>(36.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-64.29</td>
<td>(68.24)</td>
<td>-32.34</td>
<td>(82.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-63.23*</td>
<td>(45.96)</td>
<td>-10.06</td>
<td>(31.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-85.94*</td>
<td>(44.21)</td>
<td>-31.96</td>
<td>(48.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>131.04*</td>
<td>(65.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th percentile</td>
<td>1082.46</td>
<td>(237.95)</td>
<td>1500.37</td>
<td>(278.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth</td>
<td>110.63*</td>
<td>(53.08)</td>
<td>-1.26</td>
<td>(53.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>32.33</td>
<td>(51.75)</td>
<td>-163.99</td>
<td>(93.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-30.76</td>
<td>(30.87)</td>
<td>-16.01</td>
<td>(31.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-184.29***</td>
<td>(55.30)</td>
<td>-64.02</td>
<td>(52.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-86.10</td>
<td>(140.86)</td>
<td>-36.51</td>
<td>(150.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-148.46**</td>
<td>(53.58)</td>
<td>-74.87</td>
<td>(53.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-185.02**</td>
<td>(75.03)</td>
<td>-53.75</td>
<td>(101.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>310.33**</td>
<td>(121.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80th percentile</td>
<td>1473.20</td>
<td>(571.47)</td>
<td>2440.09</td>
<td>(597.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth</td>
<td>56.82</td>
<td>(129.34)</td>
<td>-118.07</td>
<td>(137.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>93.33</td>
<td>(113.51)</td>
<td>-391.91*</td>
<td>(171.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-9.78</td>
<td>(66.11)</td>
<td>22.90</td>
<td>(64.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-283.82*</td>
<td>(129.29)</td>
<td>-72.41</td>
<td>(146.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-143.04</td>
<td>(298.37)</td>
<td>-108.75</td>
<td>(265.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-144.80</td>
<td>(121.66)</td>
<td>-55.49</td>
<td>(136.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-144.23</td>
<td>(150.81)</td>
<td>129.84</td>
<td>(184.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>670.12**</td>
<td>(239.75)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* This model allowed for random effects for each participant. * * * $p \leq .001$. ** $p \leq .01$. * $p \leq .05$. 


individual, their responses are slowed down and they take into consideration how warm the individual appears to be before deciding to sentence them to prison. So while perceptions of warmth ultimately determine the likelihood of punishing criminals harshly, criminals’ social status can slow this intuitive punitive response.

Discussion and Conclusions

The findings are the first empirical evidence that fundamental dimensions of social perception can engender intuitive punitive responses. The present research aimed to expand on research about the role of intuition in shaping social judgment by considering the effects of social perception on intuition. Previous research suggests that perceptions of fundamental dimensions of social perception elicit affective responses that motivate functionally relevant behaviour (Cuddy et al., 2007). The present findings contribute to research on the functional role of these dimensions by revealing that they can have direct effects on intuitive responses to others.

The results suggest that individuals are more likely to very quickly – in approximately 1.5 seconds – decide to punish others harshly if they are perceived as lacking warmth, although punitive intuitions are slowed when cues suggest that a criminal has a high social status. In previous research, a high social status has been found to be positively associated with criminals’ warmth and competence, which can elicit fondness and admiration. These positive emotions may conflict with negative emotions associated with low warmth such as anger and hate (Côté-Lussier, 2012; Cuddy et al., 2007).

The findings provide evidence that punitive intuitions are associated with criminals’ perceived lack of warmth but also with their low perceived social status, key
features of criminal stereotypes (Côté-Lussier, 2012b). These findings are important as they suggest that a complex social construct such as social status – which is related to individuals’ economic, educational and employment achievements – can be judged very quickly, and that this judgment informs intuition. Thus, this research suggests that the tendency to punish those in the margins of society more harshly – a trend noted by theorists such as Marx, Rusche and Kirchheimer, and evidenced for instance by the propensity to convict poorer criminals with less evidence (Curry & Klumpp, 2009) – takes root in individuals’ punitive intuitions. In this sense, intuitive social judgments are intimately tied to socio-political factors in addition to being associated with affective responses and fundamental dimensions of social perception.

References


Côté-Lussier, C. (2012a). A crime is only as bad as the person who commits it: The role of stereotypes and political ideology in shaping perceptions and punishment of crime. *Submitted for publication.*


dimensions of social judgment: Understanding the relations between judgments of competence and warmth. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 89(6), 899-913.


On the Role of Affect and Intuition in Generating Punitiveness Toward Crime

The previous paper built on the results of the third paper, which suggested that crimes committed by stereotypical criminals were perceived as being more harmful, wrongful and serious, and tended to engender harsher punitive responses. The results of the fourth paper suggested that stereotypical criminals were punished more harshly even before individuals had the time to formulate justifications for why these individuals should be punished more harshly. Individuals demonstrated an intuitive desire to punish a criminal harshly simply on the basis of facial cues which suggested that they resembled the stereotypical low status, low warmth criminal.

These results are important as they are the first to demonstrate that criminals’ low perceived warmth, a key feature of criminal stereotypes, generates punitive intuitions. Surprisingly, the findings suggested that criminals’ low social status can also directly shape punitiveness by slowing the intuition that criminals should be punished harshly. This study has interesting policy implications, notably that improving criminal’s actual or perceived social status could have the effect of reducing public punitiveness toward crime.

The following study addresses an important gap in the literature and fourth paper, that is, the failure to identify some of the affective pathways linking criminal stereotypes to punitive intuitions. In the second paper, the results suggested that punitive attitudes are associated with affective responses such as anger and a lack of compassion. This final paper expands on findings from the second paper by identifying which affective responses are most important in shaping punitive intuitions – anger or sadness/empathy. This study uses measures of criminals’ perceived emotion to predict
individuals’ punitive decisions. The idea is that perceiving criminals as being angry should elicit an angry response in the observer, whereas perceiving criminals as being sad should elicit compassion.

This paper draws on theory and research discussed in the literature review where it was argued that, in the broader context of social life, punishment is associated with interpersonal and intergroup competition and cooperation. In this context, individuals are especially sensitive to information relating to whether others are empathetic or not, and are faster to process this information (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). Some research in cognitive neuroscience suggests that individuals very rapidly identify others’ emotional states based on facial cues, in order to draw inferences regarding their intent and to simulate these emotional responses (e.g., to experience empathy) (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). The following study does not directly test the hypothesis that perceiving criminals as being angry, for instance, elicits anger in the individual. Rather, punitive decisions are considered to be a behavioural outcome that results from functionally relevant affective responses (e.g., anger, lack of compassion). In other words, it is hypothesized that perceiving angry criminals elicits a punitive intuition in the individual, in part because experiencing anger and a lack of compassion motivates punitive responses.
The ability to mind-read is important in human social interactions, for instance to predict others’ behaviour and to experience empathy (Adolphs, 2009). Cognitive neuroscientists have made strides in explaining individuals’ ability to ‘read’ the minds and attribute intent and goals to others. Individuals pay particular attention to whether others are empathetic or not, and experience specific affective responses and behavioural
motivations based on perceptions of others’ warmth, kindness and trustworthiness (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; see also Adolphs, 2009, and de Waal, 2008, on the neural substrates of empathy in humans and other species).

The present research investigates individuals’ rapid or intuitive punitive responses to perceived affect. This study takes as its starting point individuals’ ability to very rapidly identify others’ facial emotional displays and simulate these emotions in the self. The hypothesis is that, in the context of crime, perceiving anger in others engenders angry responses in the self, and in turn leads to intuitive punitive responses. Previous research on punitiveness toward crime suggests that emotions of anger (or moral outrage) tend to increase punitiveness (Côté-Lussier, 2012; Gault & Sabini, 2000; Johnson, 2009; Xiao, Houser & Smith, 2005), while emotions of compassion tend to decrease punitiveness (Côté-Lussier, 2012a; Feather et al., 2001; Graham et al., 1997). However, to date there is no research investigating the association between affect and intuitive punitive responses – that is, the sudden appearance in consciousness of a desire to punish crime harshly without being consciously aware of inferring that a specific crime should be punished (e.g., on the basis of searching and weighing evidence).  

In this study participants were presented faces of convicted criminals and were asked to very quickly decide whether the pictured individual should receive a prison or non-prison sentence. The results suggest that individuals are faster in making harsh punitive decisions (i.e., giving criminals a prison sentence) when a convicted criminal is perceived as being angry. The findings are discussed in terms of behavioural responses.

---

30 This definition of punitive intuitions is based on Haidt’s (2001) definition of moral intuition.
to perceived affect, the role of affect in shaping punitive responses and in terms of the social policy implications.

Perceived Emotion and Behavioural Responses

Individuals are apt at perceiving emotions of anger, happiness, sadness, surprise, fear and disgust (Adolphs, 2002). Some evidence suggests that separate neural systems exist strictly to recognize and identify facial expressions of emotional states (Fox et al., 2000). Over the past twenty years, research has investigated what is being called ‘mirror neurons’, a set of neuronal substrates hypothesized to aid with learning by imitation and ‘mind-reading’ or representing the specific mental states of others (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Mirror neurons are argued to be the link providing continuity between human cognition and that of other species (Gallese, 2001). Dysfunction in the mirror neuron system, for instance among children with autism spectrum disorders, has been linked with deficits in imitation, theory of mind and social communication (Dapretto et al., 2006)

Facial recognition of emotion involves both identifying the geometric configuration of facial features and recognizing the emotional meaning of a stimulus, with coarse recognition of emotion occurring after ~100ms (Adolphs, 2002). Within facial expressions, individuals pay particular attention to threatening or angry faces which tend to ‘pop out’ in visual searches (Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Pinkham et al., 2010). Recognizing emotion in facial features is associated with the activation of emotional responses in the observer through simulation processes or through the generation of a somatosensory image of the body state (Adolphs, 2002). More generally, reactions to affective stimuli can be relatively automatic (Zajonc, 1980).
Perceived emotions in others elicit specific behavioural responses in the self. Evidence suggests that perceiving others as being angry is sufficient to elicit very rapid – under 500ms – angry facial reactions in the observer (Dimberg, Thunberg & Elmehed, 2000). Anger is perceived as being an emotion over which individuals have control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and is more likely to occur as an affective response in the observer when individuals are perceived as having control over the anger-inducing situation (Weiner, Graham & Chandler, 1982). Anger itself is a strong negative emotional reaction that has been linked to reduced cognitive functioning (Lerner, Goldberg & Tetlock, 1998) and increased reliance on intuitive as opposed to reasoning processes (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Anger is an active emotion that motivates harmful approaching behaviour such as attacking and excluding (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007; Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994). It is therefore hypothesized that perceived anger in criminals will generate punitive intuitions.

In the context of crime, criminals’ perceived sadness is also likely to be an important predictor of punitiveness as it can signal remorse. Sadness is an emotion in which individuals perceive little control and is more likely to be attributed to situational factors (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Perceiving sadness in others, for instance based on dilated pupils, is a good predictor of empathetic responses by the observer (Harrison et al., 2007). While sadness is a passive emotion (Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994), sympathy or pity can elicit helpful approaching behaviour (e.g., helping) (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007). It is therefore hypothesized that perceiving an offender’s sadness will elicit compassion and diminish harmful approaching behaviour, having the effect of reducing punitive intuitions.
The following study simultaneously estimates the effect of perceived anger and sadness on rapid punitive responses in order to test whether individuals’ anger or compassion is more important in shaping intuitive punitive responses.

Method

Participants

Students (N = 60) from London (UK) universities completed the study in a lab setting for £10 ($15USD). Only 25 men and 33 women reported demographic information, for these participants mean age was 23.52 (min = 18, max = 47), 86% were right-handed and 14% left-handed. White British students made up 23% of the sample, while 21% were White students from a non-British background. The remainder of participants were 22% Asian British (e.g., Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani), 3% British African or Caribbean and 31% were from other ethnic categories (e.g., Chinese British and non-British, Mixed or Other). In terms of social class, 35% reported being from the working-class or lower-middle class, 41% from the middle-class and 24% from upper-middle and upper class.

Stimuli and measures

Participants were presented pictures (N = 52) of criminals’ faces who were said to be found guilty of committing a crime (see Figure 1). In a separate pilot study, London (UK) university students (N = 145) completed an online survey in which they each rated 10 of 80 pictures of criminals on a range of dimensions, including perceived emotion, for the chance to win one of 8 cash prizes (ranging from £20 or $30USD, to £150 or
$225USD).\textsuperscript{31,32} Participants rated pictured criminals on age, attractiveness,\textsuperscript{33} general emotions such as happiness, sadness and anger, and emotions more pertinent to the context of crime such as remorse, shame and tension.

\textit{Figure 1.} Screenshot of target trial.

In the present study, mean ratings obtained from the pilot study were used to predict punitive intuitions. Because of high correlations between emotions of remorse, shame and sadness, only the more basic emotion of sadness will be used in the analyses (see Table 1). Because of high correlations between happiness and tension, tension will also be excluded from the analyses. The analyses will therefore take into account how

\textsuperscript{31} Pictures were found on police, prison and probation websites based primarily in the USA and UK. A disclosure indicating that it was unknown whether any of the pictured individuals were actually found guilty of any crime was accessible by clicking on a link present at the very bottom of the welcome page that participants first visited. Only pictured individuals in frontal-head shots with neutral expressions were selected. Pictures were also selected on the basis of their visual quality and size. Each picture was color corrected and modified so that the background color was grey, and so that the face of each criminal appeared approximately in the same location.

\textsuperscript{32} Of the 80 pictures, 52 were retained on the basis of their representation of stereotypical (N = 26) and atypical (N = 26) criminals. See Côté-Lussier (2012b) for more on the selection procedure.

\textsuperscript{33} Evidence suggests that attractiveness can influence response times, and so this variable was entered as a statistical control (Imhoff et al., 2010; van Hooff, Crawford & van Vugt, 2011).
perceived emotions of happiness, sadness and anger influence rapid decisions to punish criminals harshly.

Table 1

**Means, Range and Bivariate Correlations of Perceptions of Criminals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Happy</th>
<th>Sad</th>
<th>Remorseful</th>
<th>Ashamed</th>
<th>Angry</th>
<th>Tense</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Happy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.57**</td>
<td>-.31**</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
<td>-.50**</td>
<td>-.77**</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>1.61-4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>-.82**</td>
<td>.84**</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>.55**</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>2.26-4.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remorseful</td>
<td>-.91**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>2.00-4.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashamed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.44**</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>2.06-4.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>2.23-5.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tense</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>2.66-5.29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1.53-4.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01.

Procedure

Participants began by completing a short practice task in order to become familiar with the Direct RT computer software (i.e., they identified fruits and vegetables), next they responded to a total of 52 target trials in which pictures of criminals’ faces were presented in a structured-randomized order, and lastly they completed a survey.34 During the target trials, participants were asked to very quickly decide whether to send people convicted of either ‘minor assault, property theft, tax evasion, drug dealing,
vandalism, drunk driving, fraud or burglary’ to prison or to give them a non-prison sentence. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 4 conditions that varied the key used to assign a prison sentence (‘F’ or ‘J’) and order of presentation of ‘prison’ and ‘non-prison’ sentence options, in a counterbalanced design.

Offenders sent to prison were said to receive the typical prison sentence length for the type of offence they committed (ranging from 2 months to 5 years in prison). Offenders receiving a non-prison sentence were said to receive a sentence that is typical for the type of offence they committed, such as probation or community service, but would not be sent to prison. In this study, decisions to send criminals to prison will be treated as a harsh punitive decision and response times to make these decisions will be used as the dependent variable.

Results

The analysis consists of a multilevel quantile regression model estimating the effect of perceived emotion on the speed with which individuals decided to punish criminals harshly. Multilevel quantile regression modelling estimates the effect of perceived emotion on the entire response time distribution while adjusting standard errors based on the clustered nature of the data (i.e., to account for a participant effect). This method of analysis provides insight into the importance of explanatory variables at different stages of the decision-making process (Côté-Lussier, 2012).

Preliminary analyses revealed that perceived happiness had no significant effect on punitive intuitions and so it was removed from the final model (all p’s > 0.50). Results are comparable when happiness is included in the model. Preliminary analyses also suggested that the only ethnic category that had a reliable effect on punitiveness
was whether a criminal was Black or not. The model therefore compares Black to non-Black criminals.

Punitive response times were regressed on criminals’ perceived anger, sadness, age, attractiveness, ethnicity (Black compared to non-Black) and a BlackXAnger interaction term (see below). The results suggest that perceived anger was a robust predictor of punitive intuitions, with no variables having a significant effect on participants’ slower punitive responses. Early on in the decision-making process, participants were faster to harshly punish criminals perceived as being angry (20th percentile: $\beta = -58.78, p \leq .01$), with a comparable effect observed in the 40th and 60th quantiles (see Table 2). The results also suggest that criminals’ perceived sadness had a smaller positive but significant effect on punitive decisions (20th percentile: $\beta = 37.13, p \leq .05$). The findings suggest that criminals’ perceived anger is a better predictor of punitive intuitions than criminals’ perceived sadness, which has a comparatively smaller effect size.

Criminals who were Black were punished much more quickly (20th percentile: $\beta = -338.76, p \leq .01$) than non-Black criminals. Separate analyses revealed that Black criminals were perceived as being angrier than White criminals, an interaction term between being Black and appearing angry was therefore included in the model. Marginally significant BlackXAnger interactions emerged in the 20th and 60th percentiles, with a significant effect emerging in the 40th quantile ($\beta = 79.59, p \leq .05$). The interaction effect suggests that while being Black significantly predicts rapid punitive responses, the effect of being Black is weakened when a criminal is perceived

---

$^{35}$ The same model was estimated while controlling for participants’ age, gender and handedness. The results were comparable and so these participant-level controls were removed from the final model due to the small sample size and for the sake of parsimony.
Table 2

*Multilevel Quantile Regression Model Predicting Response Times in Assigning Prison Sentences to Convicted Criminals*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20th percentile</td>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>1046.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>16.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-358.76**</td>
<td>135.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive</td>
<td>25.89</td>
<td>19.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>37.13*</td>
<td>17.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>-58.78**</td>
<td>22.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackXAngry</td>
<td>60.51a</td>
<td>34.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th percentile</td>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>1107.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>13.92</td>
<td>16.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-395.84**</td>
<td>147.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive</td>
<td>40.40</td>
<td>25.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>33.87</td>
<td>21.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>-53.36*</td>
<td>26.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackXAngry</td>
<td>79.59*</td>
<td>38.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th percentile</td>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>1324.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>35.12</td>
<td>27.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-551.37*</td>
<td>280.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive</td>
<td>59.12</td>
<td>42.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>63.39b</td>
<td>34.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>-108.19*</td>
<td>54.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackXAngry</td>
<td>118.06c</td>
<td>71.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80th percentile</td>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>1899.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>32.91</td>
<td>57.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-1066.29</td>
<td>676.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive</td>
<td>81.72</td>
<td>91.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>107.77</td>
<td>69.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>-165.37</td>
<td>128.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackXAngry</td>
<td>210.45</td>
<td>183.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* This model allowed for random effects for each participant. *p ≤ .05.* **p ≤ .01.* a = .08. b = .06. c = .10.
as being high on anger (see Figure 2). In other words, the effect of anger trumps the effect of ethnicity at high levels of perceived anger.

Figure 2

*Plotted Regression Lines for BlackXAnger Interaction*

*Note.* Plot is for a right handed 22 year old man, with values for perceived age, attractiveness and sadness held at the median.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

The pattern of results found across the reaction time distribution suggested that perceiving anger in criminals’ faces was associated with a rapid harsh punitive response. The results provided evidence that behavioural responses to perceived affect occur relatively quickly and that intuitive punitiveness, in the context of crime, was associated with the emotion of anger.
How can perceiving anger elicit a rapid or intuitive punitive response in the observer? The ability to recognize, simulate and experience emotional responses is a key feature of human cognition. The presence of neural substrates dubbed ‘mirror neurons’ appear to aid in representing the mental states of others, such as anger (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Appraisals of anger and experienced anger are key motivators of hostile aggression and have been linked to action tendencies related to moving against others (e.g., assault, attacking, kicking) (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007; Fridja, Kuipers & ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994; Rule & Nesdale, 1976).

Similarly, in the context of punishment of crime, anger has been found to be a robust predictor of support for harsh criminal justice policy and punishment of specific crimes (Côté-Lussier, 2012; Côté-Lussier, 2012a; Gault & Sabini, 2000; Johnson, 2009; Xiao, Houser & Smith, 2005). The present findings are the first to demonstrate that appraisals of anger are sufficient to elicit an intuitive punitive response toward crime. The implications of this research are important. First, the findings suggest that the experience of anger is strongly associated with punitive intuitions. The tendency to drum up anger against crime, for instance by suggesting that criminals are not punished harshly enough or by suggesting that crime is on the rise, may contribute to strong public punitive intuitions. Second, the results suggest that to the extent that individuals perceive criminals as committing crime with a certain degree of callousness or anger, individuals’ mirrored anger could contribute to punitive intuitions.

The findings are in line with cognitive neuroscience research which suggests that individuals are apt at rapidly identifying others’ emotional states and tend to simulate
these emotional states themselves. This research contributes to a growing body of research the role of affect in generating intuitive behavioural responses, and provides some credence to the adage ‘fight fire with fire’ as criminals’ perceived anger is met with an intuitive desire to punish criminals harshly.

References


Côté-Lussier, C. (2012). A crime is only as bad as the person who commits it: The role of stereotypes and political ideology in shaping perceptions and punishment of crime.


Conclusion

Growing prison populations and staunch public support for harsh criminal justice policies has spawned renewed interest in explaining public punitiveness toward crime (King & Maruna, 2009; Loader, 2009; Roberts & Hough, 2005; Tonry, 2009). This punitive tendency stands in contrast to earlier 18th century movements to reform punishment of crime and more modern rehabilitative and liberal movements that dominated the USA political landscape throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Ignatieff, 1981; Tonry, 2007). Support for harsher criminal justice policies also stands in contrast to evidence of falling crime rates in countries such as Canada, the USA and UK. The interest in explaining punitiveness toward crime has a longstanding history as evidenced by 18th century utilitarian (e.g., in the works of John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria) (Donohue, 2007; Jenkins, 1984) and moral theories (e.g., in the works of Durkheim and Kant) (Garland, 1990; Oswald et al., 2002) of punishment. Contemporary theories of punishment of crime remain, for the most part, in line with these two main theoretical streams and work toward explaining both national level punitive trends (McCann, 2008), as well as individuals’ punitiveness toward crime (Carlsmith, 2008). This thesis is most in line with moral theories of punishment but makes no functional claim regarding punishment of crime. The aim of this thesis was to identify some of the key predictors of individuals’ strong desire to punish wrongdoers, which Kateb (2007) argues precedes any theory of punishment.

This thesis sought to answer a key question: How do criminal stereotypes come to shape individuals’ punitive response to crime? Criminological research on punitiveness has identified several cognitive and affective pathways that predict punitive
responses, such as the judged wrongfulness and harmfulness of crime, and moral outrage (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Yet it was unclear how criminal stereotypes could come to shape these perceptions, judgments and responses. Moreover, research on criminal stereotypes was largely atheoretical and had not caught up with current social psychological research on social stereotypes, intergroup perception and relations. The present research relied heavily on leading social psychological theories in the area of social and intergroup perception and relations – namely the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002), the Behaviour from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes (BIAS) Map (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007) and the Motivated Social Cognition Perspective (Jost et al., 2003) – to identify the cognitive, affective and behavioural pathways that link social perception to punishment in the context of crime.

The SCM suggests that criminal stereotypes are not arrived at simply on the basis of criminals’ behaviour, but rather that these stereotypes are derived on the basis of criminals’ perceived competitiveness against society (e.g., for power and resources) and low social status (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). A key implication of the SCM is that social structural changes, such as economic recessions, social and criminal justice policies, can have the effect of shaping how the public perceive criminals. The first aim of this thesis was to establish the origins and underlying dimensions of criminal stereotypes, which have both social psychological as well as socio-political implications.

According to the SCM and BIAS map, social stereotypes reflect two fundamental dimensions of social perception – warmth and competence – that answer questions necessary for survival (i.e., what are others’ intentions and can they carry out those intentions) (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009;
Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). Perceptions of these fundamental dimensions of social perception elicit functionally relevant emotions that motivate specific behavioural responses, such as desires to exclude disliked social groups (e.g., the homeless). Yet the SCM and BIAS map have rarely been applied to study broader attitudes captured by social policy preferences. Studying the content of criminal stereotypes can provide unique insights as criminals are one of the few social groups that are routinely targeted by aggressive social policies and laws.

By identifying the dimensions underlying criminal stereotypes, this research brings a broad criminological literature on criminal stereotypes in line with social psychological research on social and intergroup perception. In doing so, this thesis has two related aims. First, the aim is to make a broader theoretical argument regarding the nature of punishment of crime and its association with basic cognitive and affective processes. Second, the aim is to broaden the scope of the study of criminal stereotypes and punitiveness toward crime, for instance, by considering evidence and theories emerging from literatures on intergroup relations, developmental psychology, neuropsychology and evolutionary psychology. Some evidence emerging from the study of neural substrates suggests that the prefrontal cortex, a defining feature of the human brain, is associated with key features of punishment such as the acquisition of social and moral knowledge, and with basic cooperative and competitive social behaviour (Adolphs, 2009; de Quervain et al., 2004; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Koenigs et al., 2007; Spitzer et al., 2007). By referring to these literatures, the present research speaks more directly to the association between basic cognitive and affective processes reflected in
the punishment of crime. The study of public punitiveness is therefore not strictly a criminological area of inquiry, but also one with important social psychological bases and implications.

The five papers presented in this thesis provide a comprehensive study of the predictors and content of criminal stereotypes, and of the associations between criminal stereotypes and their outcomes with punitiveness toward crime. The findings suggested that although individuals’ stereotypes about criminals include thoughts relating to the types of crime criminals commit, these stereotypes also reflected dimensions of warmth and competence, the same dimensions underlying stereotypes about various social groups such as the rich, Asians and feminists (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy & Glick, 1999). Thinking that criminals are cold, unkind and untrustworthy was found to be related not only to criminals’ perceived competitiveness against society (e.g., for power) but also to their perceived low social status. Criminals’ low perceived competence, intelligence and skillfulness were also predicted by their perceived low social status. And although criminals were perceived as being both low on warmth and competence, their perceived warmth was significantly lower and was a defining feature of the criminal stereotype. These results are therefore the first to demonstrate that inferences regarding criminals’ internal traits relate not only to their criminal behaviour, but also to their position in society. According to Oldmeadow and Fiske (2007), a functional relation can develop between perceived social status and warmth, to the extent that these stereotypes justify a group’s social exclusion. The present findings supported this functional relation between stereotypes about warmth and social status, and have important socio-political implications that will be discussed in more detail below.
At a cognitive level, the results presented in this thesis suggest that stereotypes about criminals influenced not only the attributions individuals made about the causes of crime, but also normative judgments, for example, pertaining to the wrongfulness, harmfulness and seriousness of crime. In turn, these judgments were associated with the degree to which individuals expressed moral outrage and sought to punish specific crimes. These findings bridge criminological research and the interpersonal perception and relations literature by identifying the pathways that link criminal stereotypes to strong cognitive and affective responses toward crime. Criminal stereotypes can therefore have the effect of shaping perceptions of the very nature of crime, and in turn engender strong affective and punitive responses.

At affective and behavioural levels, criminal stereotypes were found to partly explain individuals’ angry, uneasy and lack of empathetic responses toward criminals. These functionally relevant emotions were in turn found to motivate behavioural tendencies such as exclusion and attacking. However, affective responses to criminals were found to be more important in predicting punitive attitudes than cognitive or behavioural factors. Specifically, individuals’ lack of empathy toward criminals was a key predictor of support for harsh criminal justice policy, along with political ideology. These findings support previous criminological research that suggests that punitiveness is associated with negative emotions such as anger, and contributes to findings which suggest that positive emotions such as empathy are key in reducing punitiveness toward crime (Gault & Sabini, 2000; Johnson, 2009; Xiao, Houser & Smith, 2005).

Where the criminological research was weaker, however, was in measuring individuals’ intuitive punitive desire – that is, the sudden appearance in consciousness of
a desire to punish crime without any conscious awareness of having gone through the steps of inferring that crime should be punished. The criminological interest in punitive intuitions is in line with recent psychological research that has turned toward studying intuition as a main determinant of social judgment (e.g., moral judgment) (Haidt, 2001). Although it has been argued that punitiveness toward crime reflects an automatic or intuitive retributive desire to punish crime (McKee & Feather, 2008; Robinson & Darley, 2007), little research has used a methodology that allowed for the measurement of individuals’ rapid punitive responses. By using a methodology suited for capturing rapid decision-making, this thesis provided evidence that criminal stereotypes and affective responses are key in engendering punitive intuitions. Before individuals even had time to consciously process why a criminal should be punished, they tended to be more punitive toward criminals who fit the criminal stereotype (i.e., who were low on perceived warmth and social status). Some of the evidence also suggested that the key affective pathway to punitive intuitions was anger. Together these findings suggest that the processes that engender punitive decisions and attitudes take origin in individuals’ intuitive punitive responses.

This research is therefore the first to provide empirical evidence that punitive intuitions are associated with criminal stereotypes, and the affective responses that these stereotypes engender. Although this thesis makes no claim about the functionality of punishment, these findings support research which suggests that punitiveness toward crime reflects a rapid retributive response to crime. The results suggested that even before individuals had time to think about why they should punish, they showed retributive tendencies. The findings therefore lend strong support to Robinson and
Darley’s (2007) claim that the discrepancy between explicitly endorsing utilitarian goals but implicitly endorsing retributive goals is associated with an intuitive, automatic response to crime. This thesis provides evidence that this intuitive punitive response is associated with criminal stereotypes and strong affective responses.

This thesis also considered political ideology as a dispositional factor that shapes both the endorsement of criminal stereotypes and individuals’ affective, behavioural and attitudinal responses to these stereotypes. Political and ideological positions such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) are important predictors of both stereotyping and public punitiveness (Bassett, 2010; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duriez et al., 2005; Jost et al., 2003; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009; Kreindler, 2005; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). By simultaneously estimating the effects of ideology, cognition, affect and behaviour on punitiveness, this research was able to tease apart the ideological component of these responses. For instance, when controlling for RWA, angry responses toward criminals were found to no longer have a significant effect on punitive attitudes. Rather, a lack of compassion emerged as a significant predictor of support for harsh criminal justice policies. However, political ideology had only small effects on social perception of criminals at both the group and individual level. The failure to observe strong effects of political ideology on the endorsement of social stereotypes could be due to several factors, including the somewhat apolitical and individuating nature of some of the studies.

Together these findings make several contributions to the social stereotype and criminological literatures, as summarised below. First, this research contributes to the
overall finding that perceptions of warmth are more important than perceptions of competence in influencing diagnostic attributions for behaviour and strong affective responses to stereotypes (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). When thinking about who and what a criminal is, individuals spontaneously thought about criminals’ perceived lack of warmth, a defining feature of the criminal stereotype. In turn, criminals’ low perceived warmth was key in predicting strong emotional responses such as hate, anger and disgust. Perceptions of criminals’ lack of warmth were also found to have direct effects on individuals’ punitive decisions. And although perceptions of competence were found to have some impact on cognition and affect, these responses were not found to have significant effects on punitiveness.

A second key contribution to the social and intergroup perception literature is the finding that negative emotional responses toward a social group can be more nuanced than the umbrella emotion of contempt identified by the SCM. The findings of this research suggest that negative stereotypes about a group’s lack of warmth and competence can lead to feelings of anger, hate and disgust, but also to feeling uneasy and fearful. In this thesis, the distinguishing element that set apart angry and uneasy emotional responses appeared to be criminals’ perceived competence. When criminals were perceived as being low on both warmth and competence, but slightly higher on competence, they elicited emotions of uneasiness and fear. When criminals were perceived as being similarly low on both dimensions, they elicited strong negative emotional responses such as anger and disgust, and more punitive attitudes. It remains an empirical question whether distinguishing between emotions of anger and fear is
helpful in explaining behavioural responses to other negatively stereotyped social groups.

This thesis also made important methodological contributions by moving beyond the methodologies typically used to apply the SCM, and studying the effects of criminal stereotypes and affect on perceptions of faces, punitive intuitions and social policy preferences. This thesis also made a methodological advancement by using multi-level quantile regression to address issues with the analysis of response-time data and study the predictors of intuitive responses. In doing so, this research makes a strong contribution to the criminological literature on punitiveness, as well as to the social psychological literature on interpersonal relations and behaviour. The present findings build on research on the effect of stereotypes on rapid decision-making and impression formation (Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998; Ybarra et al., 2008) by demonstrating that stereotypes can shape intuitive and attitudinal responses. This thesis suggests that the same social psychological processes that predict support for harsh criminal justice (i.e., perceptions of criminals’ lack of warmth and negative affective responses) also predict individuals’ intuition that a crime should be punished harshly. The findings therefore provided evidence that punitiveness toward crime was associated with very rapid punitive intuitions, as opposed to resulting from a strict reliance on a careful consideration of the merits of punitiveness toward crime.

One of this thesis’ major contributions to the criminological literature is the finding that criminals’ perceived social status plays an important role in shaping stereotypes about criminals. Since the 19th century, criminologists have argued that punishment of crime is done through the lens of social class (Chapman, 1968; Foucault,
Discourse analyses, but also a simple assessment of the empirical data, suggest that the poor and disadvantaged have historically been overrepresented in criminal justice systems in countries such as the UK, USA and Canada (Bazemore, 2007; Curry & Klumpp, 2009; Helms, 2009; Pettit & Western, 2004). Theories of punishment have also emphasized the role of those in power in targeting the disadvantaged with unfair criminal justice policies (e.g., Marx, Foucault) (Garland, 1990).

The evidence presented here suggests that the social processes observed by criminologists, that is, the tendency to punish low status others, also hold at the cognitive, affective and intuitive level in the individual. The results suggested that criminals’ low social status is a defining feature of individuals’ stereotypes about criminals. The results also suggested that inferences regarding criminals’ evil or cruel nature resulted in part from perceptions of their low social status. In other words, criminals are not perceived as being bad people simply because they commit crime – rather, individuals who think criminals are bad also tend to think that they are poor, uneducated and unsuccessful. Crucially, some of the evidence presented here suggests that criminals’ low perceived social status can engender intuitive desires to punish criminals harshly. Criminals’ perceived low social status therefore has direct and indirect effects through stereotypes on strong cognitive, affective and punitive responses to crime.

A criticism of this thesis could be that individuals are correct in inferring that criminals are generally not very kind or warm, and that harsh punishment is the appropriate response to crime. The aim of this thesis was to demonstrate that there is variance in the extent to which individuals seek to punish crime, and that this variance is...
partly explained by the endorsement of criminal stereotypes. The main argument presented in this thesis is that making a categorical and generalized inference that all criminals are cold, cruel, unintelligent and incompetent is the result of systematic cognitive and social structural processes. These same processes are responsible for generating stereotypes about various social groups (e.g., women, the elderly, immigrants) and help explain prejudice and the social exclusion of groups. The present findings help explain why the public continues to support increasingly harsh criminal justice policies despite their social, political and fiscal costs.

This thesis faces some limitations. Namely, because all of the research was conducted on student samples based in the UK it is difficult to generalize the findings to broader populations in the UK, Canada and the USA. Much of experimental social psychological research must contend with such sampling limitations. It is therefore important to bear in mind that the key object of study in this and other research are basic social psychological processes, with the idea being that many of these processes are stable features of social cognition and are comparable across populations. For instance, the association between fundamental dimensions of social perception and social structural determinants has been observed across 10 non-US nations (Cuddy et al., 2009). The findings presented in this thesis can therefore provide some insight into the association between criminal stereotypes and specific cognitive, affective and attitudinal outcomes in broader populations in countries such as the UK, Canada and USA. Indeed, previous research using representative samples have already established that the endorsement of criminal stereotypes is linked to public punitiveness (Roberts, 1992).
This research also relied strictly on quantitative research methods. The aim of this research was to provide empirical evidence in support of specific testable hypotheses. The use of methods such as surveys and social psychological experiments allowed testing of these hypotheses. A limitation of this research is that participants’ responses were limited by the specific questions that they were asked in each study. The present studies therefore do not provide participants with the opportunity to explain their beliefs or attitudes toward criminals. Future research could, for instance, use open ended questions to explore individuals’ beliefs about the association between endorsing criminal stereotypes and supporting harsh criminal justice policy.

Overall, however, the findings provide strong evidence that stereotypes about criminals contribute to punitiveness toward crime. This thesis suggests that criminal stereotypes and punitiveness toward crime do not result from strictly reasoned cognitive processes. Contrary to the belief that individuals form perceptions of criminals on the basis of criminals’ behaviour, the present findings demonstrate that criminal stereotypes are influenced by systematic cognitive and social structural determinants. These stereotypes in turn engender punitive intuitions, strong negative affective responses and the desire to exclude, attack and punish criminals. However, the present findings also suggest that public punitiveness toward crime is malleable and depends on a range of factors including the endorsement of criminal stereotypes, affective responses to crime, beliefs about the nature of crime (e.g., seriousness) and political ideology.

Using different methodologies, and at different levels of analysis, the findings converge to demonstrate that criminal stereotypes affect individuals’ cognitive, affective and behavioural responses to specific crimes and toward crime more generally. This
thesis worked to systematically address the association between criminal stereotypes and punitiveness in terms of explicitly endorsed attitudes, decision-making and intuition. In doing so, this thesis provides robust evidence that endorsing criminal stereotypes is associated with being more punitive toward crime. As a whole, this thesis reconciles a great deal of the criminological literature on punitiveness with the social psychological literature on interpersonal perception and relations.

On a methodological note, this thesis does not claim that asking people to express their punitive attitudes or make punitive decisions provides a wholly inaccurate picture of public punitiveness toward crime. But in drawing conclusions from measures of expressed punitive attitudes, for the purpose of putting into place criminal justice policy, politicians should be aware of what processes come into play and what these measures actually reflect. Researchers and politicians should be especially careful in using measures that not only conflate punitive dimensions (e.g., by asking individuals if ‘court sentences are too lenient’ which conflates actual punitiveness with assessments of the criminal justice system), but also when using measures that facilitate intuitive punitiveness, for instance by appealing to rapid, affect-laden responses.

The broader issue at stake is of course whether public endorsement of criminal stereotypes has a measurable impact on the implementation of harsh criminal justice policies and actual punishment of crime. Previous research suggests that politicians play on individuals’ ‘knee jerk’ reactions to crime and turn to public opinion to support the implementation of harsh criminal justice policies (Hutton, 2005). In handing down sentences, judges consider the public’s reaction and attempt to match sentences to the public’s perceived desire for harsher sentences (Hutton, 2005). By identifying some of
the social psychological processes that contribute to punitive attitudes, the present findings help explain why the government’s reliance on public opinion can lead to the implementation of harsh criminal justice policies despite decreasing crime rates (e.g., in countries such as Canada) (Statistics Canada, 2010). That is, the public will continue to demand harsher punishment so as long as they endorse stereotypes which suggest that criminals have a low social status, and are cold and untrustworthy.

In moving forward, the present findings and theoretical framework could be expanded by considering the potential ‘ratchet effect’ that the adoption of harsh criminal justice policies could have on public punitiveness. Some evidence suggests that public punitiveness can be amplified by politicians’ and the media’s tendency to expound the evil nature of criminals and law-and-order rhetoric (see Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001, for a review). Little research has, in contrast, considered the effect of criminal justice policies on shaping public perceptions of criminals. Yet policy firmly establishes accepted behavioural, affective and social responses to criminals. Because stereotypes flow from social structural factors, criminal justice policies can play an important role in shaping individuals’ stereotypes about criminals, and in turn public punitiveness toward crime. For instance, increasing spending to build prisons could suggest that there is a growing need to detain dangerous violent criminals, and therefore that criminals are increasingly threatening (or competitive). But also, criminal justice policies that systematically disenfranchise and disadvantage convicted criminals could have the effect of lowering criminals’ perceived social status and in turn increase stereotypical perceptions of criminals.
A more troubling conclusion of this thesis is that it is not clear when individuals will feel that criminals are punished harshly enough given the seemingly intuitive desire to punish crime and the strong affective responses that criminal stereotypes engender. Current punitive trends and the effects of criminal stereotypes on responses to crime could have the devastating outcome of contributing to the increasingly harsh treatment of criminal offenders. The trouble with relying on simple measures of public punitiveness is that these measures will favour people’s rapid responses to the stereotypical evil, poor and disliked criminal. These responses may in practice run counter to the distinctions individuals make between the severity of crimes, the acceptability of punishments and deep-seated notions of fairness and justice (Carlsmith, 2008; Cushman, 2008). The findings presented in this thesis suggest that great care should be exercised when using public opinion as the basis for implementing aggressive social policies against groups that are marginalized and disliked, such as criminals.

References


Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P. & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed)
stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived
status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82*(6),
878-902.

Fiske, S. T., Xu, J., Cuddy, A. C. & Glick, P. (1999). (Dis)respecting versus (Dis)liking:
Status and interdependence predict ambivalent stereotypes of competence and

Books.

Oxford University Press.

Cognitive Sciences, 6*(12), 517-23.

analysis of ‘law in action’ in criminal sentencing. *Journal of Criminal Justice,
37*(1), 10-20.


Jacobs, D. & Carmichael, J. T. (2001). The politics of punishment across time and


