The London School of Economics
and Political Science

Re-thinking the liberal peace: anti-colonial thought and post-war intervention in Mozambique

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Declaration

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Abstract

Whilst much of the world has been formally decolonised, the ways we think about international relations often remains Eurocentric. This is evident in the critical debate on the liberal peace, which problematises the politics of post-war intervention. In this debate, it is argued that donors conduct invasive liberal social transformations in the name of conflict management and good governance. Although insightful, these critiques have tended to ignore the target society as a subject of history and politics in its own right.

In response, the thesis turns to anti-colonial thought for strategies to reconstruct the target society as a subject of politics and source of critique. Drawing on the thinking of Césaire, Fanon and Cabral, these approaches offer philosophical re-orientations for how we understand the embodied subject, how we approach analysis, and how we think about political ethics. I use these insights to look at the liberal peace in Mozambique, one of intervention’s ‘success stories’.

First, ‘Mozambique’ is itself re-constituted as a subject of history, in which the liberal peace is contextualised within historical forms of rule. Second, political subjecthood is reconstructed through thinking about ‘double consciousness’ on issues of governance and corruption. Third, I look at forms of conscious transactionality and alienation in the material realities of the liberal peace. Finally, I explore the historically ambivalent relationship of the peasantry with the state, which highlights alternative responses to neoliberal policy.

The conclusions of the thesis suggest that the problem with the liberal peace is not so much that it is an alien form of rule which is culturally unsuitable but an alienating form of rule which is politically and economically exclusionary. The kind of critical ethical response that this demands is not based on the assumption of unbridgeable ‘difference’ between the West and its Others, but of the potential and actual connections between embodied political subjects who can listen to and hear each other.
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**Selected Acronyms**

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| AIM     | *Agência de Informação de Moçambique*  
Government news agency |
| CIP     | *Centro de Integridade Pública*  
Centre for Public Integrity |
| CMI     | Chr. Michelsen Institute |
| COMECON | Council for Mutual Economic Assistance |
| DfID    | Department for International Development |
| DPKO    | Department of Peacekeeping Operations |
| EEC     | European Economic Community |
| ESRC    | Economic and Social Research Council (UK) |
| Frelimo | *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*  
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique |
| G19     | Group of Like-Minded Donors |
| GA      | General Assembly (UN) |
| IESE    | *Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos*  
Institute for Social and Economic Studies |
<p>| IGOs    | Inter-governmental organisations |
| ILO     | International Labour Organisation |
| IMF     | International Monetary Fund |
| MDGs    | Millennium Development Goals |
| NATO    | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| ODAMOZ  | Database of Overseas Development Assistance in Mozambique |
| OECD    | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| OECD-DAC| OECD Development Assistance Committee |
| ONUMOZ  | Mission of the United Nations in Mozambique |
| OSCE    | Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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| PARP    | *Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza*  
Poverty Reduction Action Plan |
| PARPA   | *Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza*  
Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty |
| PROAGRI | National Agricultural Development Programme |
| PRSP    | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| Renamo  | *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*  
Mozambican National Resistance |
| SWAP    | Sector Wide Action Plan |
| UEM     | *Universidade Eduardo Mondlane*  
Eduardo Mondlane University |
| UNAC    | *União Nacional de Agricultores Camponeses*  
National Association of Peasant Farmers |
| UNAMIR  | UN Mission in Rwanda |
| UNRISD  | United Nations Research Institute for Social Development |
| USAID   | United States Agency for International Development |
| USIP    | United States Institute for Peace |
| WHO     | World Health Organisation |
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Introduction

Renewing the critical imagination in world politics

This thesis is written with a purpose in mind: to address a gap between a kind of anti-imperial, inclusive ethic that seems to motivate critical inquiry in the study of world politics, and the ways in which this inquiry is conceived and conducted that respond to the demands of this ethic. The core contention of the thesis is that projects which are serious about interrogating forms of domination, hegemony and imperialism in world politics need to take seriously the subjecthood of those who are targeted by these forms of rule. In doing so, it is necessary to articulate a position which is more coherently connected to a democratising, decolonising project of political engagement, and which can provide the resources for imagination and change. In this project, this position entails the ‘reconstruction of subjecthood’.

Such optimistic and generic ambitions however are best grounded in specific contexts and questions in order to make sense. The disciplinary site for this investigation is the critical debate around the ‘liberal peace’ that has been taking place amongst scholars studying world politics in various ways over the last ten to fifteen years. This debate is both significant and interesting, in and of itself and in terms of what it represents for contemporary global structures of power. The main intellectual resource for the critique mobilised in the thesis is twentieth century anti-colonial thought, a crucial inspiration for the world-shaking events of decolonisation in that century. This kind of thinking exposes the imaginative shortcomings and political blind spots in the ongoing discussion around the liberal peace. Finally, the illustrative reference point of the thesis is the geographical-historical space of Mozambique, through which these alternative ways of thinking are explored and illustrated. The introductory discussion will articulate the importance of these and other choices, in and of themselves, and in terms of the wider purpose of the project. As a whole, the project seeks to establish how a critique of intervention inspired by
anti-colonial thinking can analyse and interpret the experiences of Mozambique’s recent post-war interventions.

Although the project is focused on these specific areas, it is hoped that its concerns and preoccupations may resonate more broadly amongst readers, particularly those who share its general intuitions as to what the world might look like and to whom, and how we should try to think about it. In making the intellectual journey towards the completion of this project it has been particularly encouraging and inspiring to come into contact with many such people both within and beyond traditional academic communities, although no doubt such journeys are self-selecting in this way. Nonetheless, these encounters have led at least to a small personal sense that the thesis may also be working within a particular kind of political zeitgeist, in which the globally and locally unequal distributions of power and wealth are increasingly under active and visible contestation on the streets of the world, and more people are talking about different possible futures. As such, I hope the thesis may add in a small way to this growing conversation.

I. What is critique, and who are its subjects?

In this thesis, I understand ‘critique’ to mean the unpacking, challenging and contradicting of ways of thinking and knowing that assert social and political authority over a space or community. As may be indicated by the comments just made, ‘critique’ is something that can and does happen, and has happened, anywhere and everywhere, and is in no way the preserve of the academy. Academics may sometimes usefully challenge society’s common sense on various issues; yet more often than not they are also inclined or strongly encouraged to reproduce and reinforce it. As such, they are often not the vanguard of critical thinking but the trailing wagon. Critique is here understood as a normal practice within a political world full of plurality, unevenness and creativity.

There is however a more specific sense in which ‘critique’ is used here, and this relates to people who self-identify as ‘critical scholars’ or ‘critical theorists’, particularly within the discipline of International Relations, which has been the
intellectual base for the development of the thesis. This community has recently marked the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of two major articles which encouraged scholars studying world politics to unpack, challenge and contradict the common sense within the discipline, which had naturalised and reified a power-centric inter-state view of world order.\(^1\) As the history of such thought and its various trends is relatively well-known, I will not rehearse it here.\(^2\) Nonetheless, it is necessary to acknowledge that the thesis is a response to a particular debate that has come out of this community of critical IR scholars, and is mainly addressed to concerns raised within this particular site of conversation. Specifically, I have been interested in the promise within critical thinking to offer grounds for democratising and pluralising interpretations of world politics, and it is to this aspect that the project is oriented.

This site of conversation has over the years generated a lot of fascinating accounts of how to deal with ontological questions in the discipline, such as the primacy of the state over other units of analysis, or of material power rather than ideas or norms, or of the imaginary state of anarchy. It has generated epistemological questions over the stability of knowledge about the international and the power relations implicated in the production of this knowledge. Of course it has also raised ethical questions about the values embedded in particular kinds of knowledge, and in particular whether they can be assumed to be ‘universal’. As Hobson has provocatively argued in the context of a recent appraisal, however, many of the most popular approaches within critical IR, for which he takes Gramscian, postmodern and feminist scholarship as exemplars, have appeared to retain Eurocentric foundations in their accounts of world order.\(^3\)

Whilst his reading of the various authors may perhaps be too abrasive, what Hobson usefully gestures towards in this discussion is the placing of Europe as the


implicit reference point within the grammar of critical IR, either as embodying ‘enlightened’ values for the feminists he identifies, or as representing an inexorably powerful expression of advanced capitalism in world politics, as for the neo-Gramscians.\(^4\) Thus, the conversations tend use a particular articulation of so-called European experiences or ideologies as the central referent of critique, even if the goal is to challenge this dominance. Hobson’s provocation is thus a very important one in the context of critical projects that are self-consciously about challenging various forms of hierarchy in world politics.

Across the last ten years however, ‘decolonising’ approaches directed at some of the critical debates within International Relations have emerged in increasing numbers.\(^5\) Although diverse in their specific sites of inquiry, conceptual concerns and, often, conclusions, collectively they have, I have argued elsewhere, constituted a series of challenges to “the exclusionary premise of an imagined Western subject of world politics”.\(^6\) However, the idea of a ‘subject’ of politics is multi-faceted in social theory, and in decolonising thought this is reflected in the development of multiple strategies for challenging this exclusion. These include questioning the subject-object relations embedded in Orientalist political discourses, challenging Eurocentric historiographies and the imagined universal subjectivity of the post-Greek European man.\(^7\) Importantly, however, the project has not just comprised deconstructive elements. Rather, reflective and careful attempts at reconstruction have also been made in terms of alternative world historiographies, different accounts or visions of the political subject and different articulations of political rationality.\(^8\)

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\(^4\) Ibid, 93.
\(^6\) Sabaratnam, ‘IR in Dialogue’, 785.
\(^7\) Ibid., 785-6.
\(^8\) Ibid., 788-793.
This thesis articulates its own distinctive account of what a decolonising reconstruction needs to do in the context of the liberal peace debate, but is inspired and influenced by this range of decolonising intellectual strategies. The concern for ‘subjecthood’ in the debate in particular is central to this endeavour. In the thesis I hope to show that this mode of critical thinking is both productive and illuminating, not just for those with an expressed interest in dealing with the particular legacies of European colonialism but for thinking more generally about how to make conversations about world politics less narrow and more dialogical. In the next section, I discuss why the liberal peace debate is an important place to stage such a conversation.

II. The ‘liberal peace’ debate as intellectual terrain

If scholars often describe policy-oriented ‘problem-solving’ and emancipatory ‘critical’ scholars as existing in their respective ‘camps’, then the liberal peace debate can be metaphorically understood as an expansive terrain upon which many have pitched tents and which is relatively well-served by the amenities and infrastructure of large funding streams and wide political interest. Many dedicated conferences and journals serve as large and small campfires around which to passionately discuss points of view, share stories and to bond intellectually, although there are uneven patterns of attendance and inclusion at such events. Without wanting to stretch the metaphor too far, it is worth asking what all these people are doing here, and indeed if or why any more contributors might be needed.

The ‘liberal peace debate’ relates, broadly speaking, to a discussion of the theory and practice of intervention in poor post-war countries by international institutions, supported by or alongside wealthy Western governments and NGOs, in order to stabilise, develop and generally free them from the scourge of war. Such intervention includes everything from the deployment of peacekeeping forces, support for multi-party elections, economic liberalisation and development programmes, state and institution-building, governance reform, the promotion of particular legal arrangements, health and education provisions, justice and
reconciliation and other meliorative social programmes. As Chapter One will elaborate, these rapidly increased in size and complexity from relative quick election-holding missions in Central America to multi-year statebuilding operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.

For interveners in particular, the stakes are very high for getting this kind of intervention ‘right’ in the first place in terms of shared ambitions for preventing further violence and death amongst interveners and those targeted by intervention. Moreover, in terms of the monies spent on such interventions, interveners are under pressure to show ‘results’ in bureaucratic terms. Beyond this, however, there are political stakes in terms of the reputations of intervening countries and institutions who consistently claim expertise in getting this kind of social engineering right, and in generally knowing how to rule populations – to a certain extent the stability and hierarchy of the global distribution of authority is also at stake in the politics of intervention. As such, post-war intervention is a unique kind of mirror for important aspects of world politics, including the separation of countries into ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ agents, stabilising a statist world order whilst simultaneously involving non-sovereign forms of rule and management, and creating particular kinds of political and ethical relationships between interveners and those targeted by intervention.

On the surface, it is relatively easy to see why so many ‘problem-solving’ scholars are present in the camp set aside for such affairs, insofar as the issue of understanding how to carry out such interventions has been in great political vogue for at least twenty years now amongst these policymakers. This has created a popular intellectual market for work which reflects on how and why this has gone wrong and how to do it better.9 Much of this has been grounded in a sincere belief and faith in the broader validity of the ‘liberal peace’. As prominently re-articulated by Michael Doyle some years previously; this is the argument that polities based on liberal political and economic arrangements are less likely to go to war with each

other.\textsuperscript{10} As Chapter One will discuss further, these beliefs were consistently challenged by events that took place in the course of interventions, requiring an almost constant tweaking and contorting within ‘liberal peace’ thinking to make it better fit post-conflict environments, whilst leaving the core belief of the general validity of the ‘liberal peace’ untouched.

If it has been the self-declared vocation of ‘critical’ thinkers in IR and elsewhere to expose and disrupt the implicit violence embedded within various structures of power in the world, then their encampment on the terrain of the liberal peace debate is perhaps also unsurprising. After all, liberal peace interventions are extraordinary events which seemed to demonstrate and reinforce the power of Western liberal imperialism in its various faces, including the forced induction of countries into free market capitalism, the arrogant spread of liberal political values and the intrusive forms of social regulation. Over the last ten years an equally vigorous literature has sprung up around the ‘liberal peace’ developing these lines of argument.\textsuperscript{11} Many of these have leant on and contributed to the resources for critical thinking emerging from critical IR scholarship, including the use of neo-Gramscian and Foucaultian concepts to understand the nature and character of liberal peace operations. Many of the thinkers also self-identify as critical IR theorists and work at the intersection of the liberal peace debate and critical IR theory, such as Duffield, Pugh, Richmond and Chandler. I am therefore taking them to stand in for a debate with critical IR in general and representing many of its main conceptual frameworks. Chapter Two will focus in more detail on the kinds of critique these have given rise to and their contributions to re-thinking the politics of the liberal peace.

As such, the liberal peace debate, between and within these various camps, is an important terrain of contestation within the discipline around several connected


issues which have wider consequences for our understanding of world politics, but which tend to sharply divide ‘problem-solving’ from ‘critical’ scholars on several fronts. These include the nature and character of international intervention, its effects on societies affected by war, the values and legitimacy of its transformative agendas, and the ways in which these produce or reproduce forms of global order. Moreover, it is very much a live debate, pertaining to contemporary practices that are ongoing and often renewed. Thus it is expected that this would be a noisy terrain of discussion.

Yet, despite the noise, and perhaps as a result of excursions to other campsites, it has been impossible not to notice various kinds of silence in the discussions. This has been the silence if not the invisibility of those people who are targeted by such interventions. Discussions about the legitimacy, effectiveness or significance of intervention have in this sense only discussed and examined an extended Western subject of world politics. Whilst this might well be expected from those ‘problem-solving’ scholars who are principally occupied with the task of improving Western foreign policy, it is something of a surprise amongst those ‘critical scholars’ who are preoccupied with critiquing it and the kinds of political exclusions it instantiates. In the spirit of the new wave of decolonising critiques in the discipline, this thesis explores whether it is possible in some way for other forms of subjecthood to break through the enclosure of the camp and extend the discussion.

III. Anti-colonial thought as a resource for critique

To do this, however, we need some alternative intellectual resources for developing critique which can get us beyond the current frameworks. In the thesis I turn to a trio of thinkers who articulated some compelling indictments of colonialism which were closely bound up with particular anti-colonial struggles in the twentieth century. These are Frantz Fanon (1925-1961), Amílcar Cabral (1924-1973) and Aimé Césaire (1913-2008). In Chapter Three in particular I draw on a number of intellectual moves they made when articulating the demands of their anti-
colonial postures, and explore how these insights might generate alternative ways of thinking about the liberal peace.

In the first place, however, it is useful to think about why anti-colonial thinkers per se would have any bearing at all on the present debate and critique in IR more generally. In the main, this derives from sharing elements of the problématique around the nature and character of imperial power. It is fairly clear that the question of ‘retrieving the imperial’\textsuperscript{12} has had an increasingly prominent place in the controversies within the study of world politics more generally, and specifically within the liberal peace debate. In the former, the discussions and controversies around Hardt and Negri’s Empire were indicative of how critical theorists in IR were articulating responses to globalisation and to the ways that it had re-constituted the international.\textsuperscript{13} This discussion however extended well beyond the critical traditions of the Left – many other scholars had also begun to think ‘imperially’ about America’s place in the world in relation to its size, structure and whether it might be able to avoid the fate of other empires.\textsuperscript{14} The anti-colonial tradition of thought which was developed in the context of such other empires and their eventual collapse might well be pertinent to taking the discussion forward.

As noted in the previous section, within the liberal peace debate itself, the question of its ‘imperial’ character has also stimulated broad discussion in the context of the issues raised.\textsuperscript{15} Moreover, the debate has begun to draw many more direct analogies with not just imperial behaviour but colonial practices within interventions themselves. Whilst Paris has noted similarities to the ‘civilising missions’ of European colonialism, Richmond has described elements as being ‘colonial’ or ‘neocolonial’, and Duffield has argued that both liberal peace interventions and colonial Native Administrations have sought to exercise


biopolitical control over ‘under-developed’ populations. As such, anti-colonial thought might be understood as even more precisely relevant to developing a critical perspective on such practices, particularly if, as Chandler has argued, the present order is a derogation of norms of sovereignty and self-determination that were the outcome of decolonisation processes. The questions raised by anti-colonial thinkers around the legitimacy and operation of colonialism, seem, at least in the first place, highly relevant to the present critical debate on the liberal peace and its discussions around global re-ordering.

Whilst they are relevant, however, this is not where my discussion of anti-colonial thought ends. Taking this relevance as a point of departure, I suggest that anti-colonial thought is of most interest to the debate because of the types of philosophical re-orientations to the questions of social being that it endorsed, which underpinned its critiques of colonialism and its reconstructions of the colonised as human subjects. As such, I am reading the chosen thinkers not as prescient commentators on the present juncture, but as people forced to confront similar kinds of intellectual traps in the effort to get beyond and see through the colonial present. By thinking about their particular intellectual and political struggles, it is possible to think differently about how we critique the interventions understood as the liberal peace.

It is with this general orientation in mind that I have chosen to focus on these three thinkers in particular – Fanon, Cabral and Césaire – rather than some of the later thinkers often grouped together in the ‘post-colonial’ canon. Fanon, Cabral and Césaire on the other hand were not ‘post-colonial’ insofar as for the most part they were writing and thinking against contemporary practices of European colonialism in the period before and during decolonisation, and active participants in the political movements which took these aims forward. None of the three

17 Chandler, Empire in Denial, Chapter 1.
18 These canons can be read as brought into being through projects such as Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G., & Tiffin, H. (1995). The post-colonial studies reader: Burns & Oates.
actually lived to see the decolonisation of the territories in which their struggles were focused.\textsuperscript{19} As such, their thought was oriented towards the active unpicking of the intellectual foundations of colonialism as well as the attempt to develop a space for the subjecthood of colonised peoples within the context of a European Left which was threatening to smother or absorb it. It was thus incumbent upon these thinkers to begin to articulate some grounds for resistance and reconstruction in the decolonisation project as a whole.

Some of the later famous thinkers in the ‘post-colonial’ canon, such as Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak are perhaps less immediately relevant in this sense. Writing in the decades after decolonisation, with specific reference to the Indian and Middle Eastern contexts, and in the knowledge that things had not quite turned out as had been hoped, this later work tends to be somewhat more ambivalent and cautious towards the possibility of an anti-colonial reconstruction that is not itself potentially hegemonic and violent. I simplify enormously here, but I think this is one of the major differences.

Whilst there is not space to discuss and unpack the complex issues involved in the generational and philosophical shifts towards a more deconstructionist tendency in thinking about colonialism,\textsuperscript{20} I would argue that the use of the earlier generation of thinkers remains useful for this project on at least two counts. First, although it is useful to be appropriately cautious about the effects at reconstructive thinking, this does not in itself invalidate the possibilities of reconstruction but only how we understand the limits of this practice. Second, as I will argue further in Chapter Three, in pursuing a critique of the liberal peace along the question of the politics of recognition, a more reconstructive line is essentially required given the state of the present debate. Throughout however, I will use the terms ‘anti-colonial’ or ‘decolonising’ rather than ‘post-colonial’ to distinguish these aims. This is not a justification that may necessarily satisfy those sceptical of the value of anti-colonial thinking – particularly those that see its affirmative tendencies as smacking of

\textsuperscript{19} However, in Césaire’s case the situation was a little different; he did not actively and vigorously pursue a pro-independence line in Martinique in the later part of his lengthy political career.

romantic anachronism. For these readers, I can only plead patience to the point where these thinkers are used within the project, as to a judgement of their value to helping to understand the liberal peace.

One final note needs to be made regarding other anti-colonial thinkers who might equally have been included as being of a potentially similar generation and bent, such as CLR James. On this issue, I must defer in part to the space and time available for doing the research – James’ position is sufficiently complex and different from the concerns of the others that inclusion would not necessarily have helped complete my argument. This is not to say at all that Fanon, Cabral and Césaire did not have some major differences in their philosophical outlooks, and to a large extent their intellectual and political journeys were quite different. However, as I hope Chapter Three will demonstrate, there are some very interesting areas of legible overlap which can provide an inspirational basis for critically analysing intervention. I do not doubt that I might have reached a similar position using different thinkers altogether; although presently I am not in a position to say who these might have been, nor how this might have ended differently. Moreover, that would not have been as transparent a representation of the journey that has actually been made. However, I do hope that the arguments and discussions in the following chapters do at least define and illuminate some of the issues at stakes in a sufficiently interesting and useful manner to have made the journey worthwhile.

IV. Pursuing critique through an extended illustration

Whilst many of the core concerns in the thesis are established through the anti-colonial critique of the liberal peace debate and the philosophical reconstruction of subjecthood, an important aspect of this reconstruction is the single extended illustrative example of Mozambique and the experiences of intervention. In this section, I will briefly discuss why such an illustration is required and why Mozambique is an appropriate site for doing so.

The major point that will become clear through Chapters Two to Four is that the majority of the existing critiques of the liberal peace have systematically failed,
for various reasons, to engage the histories, views, experiences and political responses of those who are the targets of intervention. I suggest that this is both a problem for the politics of critique, which is in danger of reinforcing the primacy of the subjecthood of the West, and for its analytic assessment of intervention, which either focuses on interveners’ own assessments of what has taken place or assumes that intervention has broadly succeeded in its goals. It is difficult to see how such narratives can provide a basis for a radical critique of the liberal peace which recognises the target populations as political subjects and authoritative interpreters of the experiences of intervention. Such a critique is, I argue, more powerful in dislodging the claims to authority of intervention practices.

As such, an integral part of a critical alternative which argues for a reconstruction of subjecthood is to illustrate some of what this misses in political and analytic terms with reference to actual interventions. However, given the space constraints of the thesis and the need to engage as deeply as possible with the site in question, only one national site of intervention is used. This is consistent with the need articulated in the discussion in Chapters Three and Four to reflect on intervention from a necessarily situated rather than abstract perspective. This requires a certain amount of intellectual commitment and engagement which would have been difficult to divide between several sites in this project. Moreover, it is helpful in being able to explore the multiplicity of dimensions of both subjecthood and intervention in any one place.

Mozambique was initially selected on two related grounds. As a example selected to develop a critique of intervention, in the language of methodology texts it represented a ‘hard case’ in which to make the argument – one where the intervention of the international community has coincided with the cessation of

violent conflict, the holding of regular elections, the rebuilding of state institutions, impressive rates of economic growth and macroeconomic stabilisation, an increase in the numbers and sizes of civil society organisations, the attraction of foreign investment, the awarding of a ‘good governance’ prize to its former President, a sizeable fall in the level of absolute poverty and so on. It regularly gets cited within policy documents as a representation of precisely what can be achieved through the correct type of engagement, and for others can be seen to represent the ‘new African state’. Yet, Graham Harrison has argued that Mozambique is a ‘governance state’, meaning one with a constitutive penetration of the international institutions of neoliberalism in the state structure. Therefore, to engage with Mozambique as a place with its own history, forms of political consciousness and experience is to potentially upset the account of the liberal peace as a whole in terms of a key success story.

Other critics agree on this to the extent that for them, Mozambique is also representative of the wide-ranging power of the liberal peace. However, compared to a much larger number of books and articles dealing with Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia and East Timor, there are only a few examples of extended engagement with it within the literature which speaks to the debate. In one such example, Duffield reads Mozambique as a major site of the unfolding of the liberal peace, emphasising in particular the role of NGOs being part of the governmental process and the visions of the peasantry that these organisations relied upon. Cahen also provides a chapter in the Making States Work volume, and Paris provides a short analysis in At War’s End. Cahen, a specialist on Mozambique rather than

intervention, asked by the editors to provide an analysis of its success story for the volume, argues for an only qualified success with regard to societal involvement in reconstruction. In his treatment, Paris argues that given the shallow domestic roots of the war, it does not provide a basis for assessing the outcomes of liberal peacebuilding, although it can be considered largely successful in general terms. Finally, in the recent Whose Peace? volume, Cramer argues that its labour markets have been roundly neglected by intervention policies and the imaginaries of interveners.28 Collectively, these book chapters (or half-chapter for Paris) offer much in the way of comment and insight on liberal peace interventions in Mozambique but are necessarily short and specific in terms of their focus. As such, there appeared to be space in the literature for a more extended engagement. This provides a second reason for engaging with it in this thesis.

Putting the rationale thus, I am aware, makes it sound as if the illustrative effort with regard to Mozambique has been subordinate to, or worked in after, the conceptual work around the liberal peace. This is, however, not a true reflection of the genealogy of the ideas, nor of its role in the thesis. It was partly the strong sense of disjuncture between the existing literature and the site of intervention brought on by the first visit to Mozambique that shaped the critiques developed in Chapters Two and Three. As Chapter Four will elaborate further, the situations and peoples being researched have a tendency to push back against the researcher’s preconceptions and ideas. I have certainly felt this push from the material gathered in Mozambique as building pressure on the conceptual framework, which seemed to demand that the reconstruction of subjecthood occupy a central place. I have tried as far as possible to keep faith with this pressure in the writing process and in the argument of the thesis. In particular, the ways in which I reconstruct some different aspects of subjecthood within Mozambique reflect dimensions of the research that seemed to sit awkwardly with the narratives that had been developed in the critical literature thus far.

V. The central question and structure of the thesis

To return to the issues raised at the outset of this introduction, the central question of the thesis can be stated simply thus:

‘What can an anti-colonial perspective contribute to critiques of liberal peace interventions?’

The answer that I offer might be also be simply summarised as ‘A reconstruction of subjecthood in target societies’. These issues represent the primary preoccupations of the research. Over the course of the thesis, both the question and the answer are unpacked and developed into various subordinate questions and answers, both conceptually and empirically. The obvious subordinate questions will ask what critiques of liberal peace interventions consist of, what is missing from them, how one can define an anti-colonial perspective, and how this can be understood to relate to the liberal peace debate. In terms of the answers, I will seek to elaborate what subjecthood is and why it is important to an anti-colonial perspective, what its reconstruction involves, and what results from such reconstructions. I hope by the end of the thesis to have demonstrated the importance of both question and answer in terms of the liberal peace debate specifically, as well as to have explored issues relevant to how we think about world politics more generally. The main contribution of the work, I hope, is to articulate where the limits of the present critical imagination are and to offer a worked-out perspective as to how these limits might be exceeded. In the remainder of this introductory discussion, I will briefly cover the structure of the thesis which will provide a route map for the arguments to come.

The thesis begins with a brief history of recent Western thinking about practices of conflict management in the last two decades. The promised containment of violence and the bringing of peace fundamentally underpinned much of the political and ethical legitimacy that practices of intervention claimed around the world. In this first chapter I show how this ambitious agenda was informed by a range of different ideas which evolved over time to reflect a changing political environment, and which became manifested in a particular constellation of ideas and practices known as the liberal peace. The genealogy shows that this constellation
was not consistently a ‘liberal’ set of ideas but a particular combination of discourses of developmentalism, therapy, humanitarianism, securitisation and bureaucratisation, informed and influenced by contemporary political events.

The second chapter engages with important works in the critical debate on the ‘liberal peace’ that have problematized the liberal peace as a system of ideologically driven interventions seeking social transformation and domination over its intended subjects. In this chapter I seek to draw out some of the core conceptual wagers of the critical literature and explore its limitations and exclusions. Despite a strong anti-imperial and anti-hegemonic ethic emergent in this literature, I argue that it has systematically marginalised the societies targeted by the liberal peace as potential subjects of politics. As such, it has reproduced some of the Eurocentric tendencies of the intervention it critiques. Across the first two chapters, in laying out the debate around intervention, the ground is then prepared for thinking about what an anti-colonial approach might contribute.

In the third chapter, I offer a reading of insights from Fanon, Césaire and Cabral, noting in particular and how they responded to the conceptual Eurocentrism that underpinned previous critiques of imperialism. Specifically, these emphasise a distinctive understanding of the political subject as embodied, the need for multi-dimensional frameworks of analysis and a new humanist ethics that re-centre the subjects of domination themselves as a better point of departure for critical inquiry. These aspects speak to some of the problematic aspects of critique within the liberal peace, reframing some of the issues in hand.

In the fourth chapter, I develop more defined strategies for reconstructing subjecthood that emerge from the conceptual insights of Chapter Three. These are reconstructing historical presence, engaging with complex forms of political consciousness, and exploring concrete dimensions of material experience. This approach aims to re-position the target society of the liberal peace as the primary subject of analysis, which uses many different sources to develop a ‘situated’ understanding of social and political relations. In this chapter I also discuss the use of sources and confront some of the issues around interpretive research that may have inhibited other people working on the liberal peace from venturing too far into
it. The third and fourth chapters thus provide the conceptual grounding in anti-colonial thought as a philosophical orientation and as also providing specific strategies for reconstructing subjecthood in a study of liberal peace intervention.

The next four chapters of the thesis aim to reconstruct various dimensions of subjecthood in Mozambique with respect to its experiences of intervention. The fifth chapter is dedicated to a reconstruction of Mozambique’s historical presence, which I argue substantially undermines the a-historical narratives of both liberal peace interventions and the critiques of those interventions. Beyond the general importance of ‘decolonising Mozambique’s history’ and making this history visible, there are specifically interesting dimensions of continuity in aspects of political authority, public administration and political economy which can be read across different periods, and which undermine the claim that the liberal peace represented a radical agenda of social transformation. This historical chapter also provides a platform for the discussions in the following chapters.

The sixth chapter aims to reconstruct people in Mozambique as situated political subjects, and does so through elaborating an account of non-unitary political consciousnesses around the issue of corruption. I argue that in discussing questions of corruption, people draw creatively on a range of historical and contemporary ideas and resources for making political claims. These often ultimately exceed the boundaries of the debate established by interveners, and undermine the assumption in the critical liberal peace debate that they have been ‘co-opted’ by intervention. Rather, by actually engaging with what is expressed through different forms of political consciousness, we must re-think the ways in which critique sets up political divisions between the ‘liberal’ and its ‘locals’, and instead confront the substance of the political contestation.

In the seventh chapter, I reconstruct some of the dimensions of the concrete material experiences of the liberal peace as given through interviews and other forms of sustained engagement. Whilst the critical debate on the liberal peace has focused on the liberal peace intervention as a global promoter of neoliberal policy, here I focus on the consciousness of highly unequal material relations that underpins the negotiation of this policy and the industry supported by it. Through
reconstructing the subject experiences of these relations, I suggest that it is may be necessary to move towards a sharper critique of its underlying distributive dynamics and disturbing redistributive impacts, which are indicative of particular systems of entitlement within intervention.

The last empirical chapter reconstructs the concrete material experiences of the peasantry as subjects under intervention. Some of the critiques of the liberal peace have argued that ‘welfare’ or social insurance, implicitly or explicitly to be provided by the state, is what is missing under liberal peace interventions for the masses. However, in exploring the responses and strategies of the ‘non-insured’ populations in rural Mozambique there appears to be much ambivalence about what can be expected from the state and from interveners, based on the chequered history of such interventions. As such, a desired antidote to the neoliberal policies for agriculture may not be the construction of a welfare state but a de-centred understanding of political authority and autonomy, such as that elaborated via the ‘food sovereignty’ movement. Engaging the peasantry as a situated subject thus requires a reckoning with the ambivalent character of distant forms of power and authority.

In conclusion, the final chapter reflects and builds on the insights that an anti-colonial engagement with intervention contributes to the liberal peace debate through the reconstruction and rethinking of subjecthood. It argues that in reconstructing the subjecthood of societies targeted by interventions, it is possible to go beyond the introverted and Eurocentric discussion of its politics that has thus far characterised the debate, and get more directly into the specific forms of contestation, alienation, accumulation and distribution that intervention practices engender. Such an approach asks critics to think again and think harder about what is at stake when looking at relations between a wealthy set of countries and institutions, and the societies targeted by their improvement agendas. Such stakes also change the possibilities for solidaristic, humanist engagement on such issues, and open up a future-oriented agenda for critical thinking.
Chapter One

The liberal peace? A brief intellectual history of international conflict management, 1990-2010

The term ‘the liberal peace’ refers to the dominant intellectual framework currently applied to post-Cold War policies and practices of post-conflict intervention. As Heathershaw observes, its use within academic and policy analysis has sometimes tended, misleadingly, to claim that the liberal peace has had only a singular logic or set of assumptions. However, as both he and Call and Cousens note, there are gradations of this logic entailed in the ‘liberal peace’ most clearly evident in the shift between peacebuilding and state-building as modes of conflict management. Building on this theme, this chapter develops an alternative historical overview of the ways in which the ideas and practices of international conflict management evolved over the last twenty years within the policy communities of intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and wealthy governments. These shifts and expansions reflect something rather more complex, and perhaps more opaque, than a hardening or deepening of an obviously ‘liberal’ logic in intervention – rather they reveal a reflexive anxiety about the inadequacy of this logic to address seemingly intractable challenges of conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment. By tracking the recent evolution of these discourses and the critiques of the paradigm, this chapter unpacks the political and intellectual backstory to the ideas and practices of ‘the liberal peace’.

The chapter begins by exploring the intellectual and political climate of the early 1990s and the founding principles of ‘peacebuilding’ as articulated by the UN,
before showing how these were lost almost immediately in the mid-1990s to both unfolding global events and new discourses about the chaos and anarchy associated with failing states. This had important linkages with changing discourses in other aspects of institutional intervention, including the turn within the international financial institutions towards the question of ‘governance’. Connected to a resurgent interest in ‘grassroots’ and ‘bottom-up’ interventions, therapeutic discourses and practices dealing with trauma, healing and reconciliation became a strong element of discourses around peacebuilding. At this time an increasingly broad set of actors, including humanitarian and transitional justice agencies, became involved and the consolidation of ‘liberal peace’ practices was enabled. In the last ten years, however, renewed interest in the question of state fragility and the principles of state-building has become pervasive not just in responses to conflict but the governance of the global South more generally. In conclusion the chapter offers some reflections on the current historical juncture and how this might shape understandings of conflict management.

I. UN Peacebuilding, the early years: from social justice to state collapse

In the late 1980s, third-party post-war interventions were seen as the basic preserve of the UN. The end of the Cold War was a watershed moment for the organisation, and in particular for its Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Having been paralysed from all but minimal activity due to the exercise of Security Council vetoes, it found itself launching fourteen new operational missions between 1988 and 1992, compared to none in the previous ten years.\(^\text{32}\) Whilst some of these operations followed the logic of traditional peacekeeping – mainly ceasefire monitoring – others began to foreshadow the more comprehensive, multidimensional and transformative operations that would become the hallmark of post-conflict peacebuilding. Early apparent successes in Nicaragua (1990) and Namibia (1990), involving relatively light-touch and well-defined missions in already-post-conflict environments emboldened the UN to take a more proactive

stance in not just deterring violence but in shaping the nature of the peace to come, through shepherding elections and demobilisation.

It was in this context that Boutros-Ghali’s groundbreaking 1992 Agenda for Peace statement was delivered. Taken widely as the foundational text for the policy of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’, it defined it as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people”. 33 In this text could clearly be seen an understanding of conflict that was based on structural violence and social grievance as the generative causes, with economic development and political freedom intended as the appropriate remedies:

Our aims must be:

...;
- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;
- And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. 34

Indeed, Agenda for Peace was, in defining the term ‘peacebuilding,’ about re-envisioning a role for the UN as a progressive, autonomous agent of peace, development and global justice after years of marginalisation. This theme is reinforced in the text itself through an explicit connection of the peace agenda to the contemporaneous Rio Summit and the proposed World Forum for Social Development. Establishing ‘peacebuilding’ as a defined and distinctive activity grounded in the apparently universal aspiration of solving conflict was intended, perhaps successfully in the short-term, to channel the growing Western attention towards these issues into a blossoming multilateral progressive consensus for peacemaking, development and social justice.

34 Ibid., Section 15, emphasis added
However, this new mandate became almost immediately besieged by events which demonstrated the split between its transformative ambitions and the shape of political events. Even as Boutros-Ghali gave his speech in June 1992, the violence in Bosnia was accelerating, and five months later Savimbi would defect from the UN’s carefully-chaperoned electoral process in Angola, prompting extensive caution and delay in the Mozambique mission. In 1993, UN troops and humanitarian workers would be ambushed in Somalia, leading to the re-deployment of US troops and the Black Hawk Down incidents, resulting in the US withdrawal and little appetite to involve itself in international peacemaking. The tragic and egregious failures of UNAMIR in Rwanda in early 1994 seemed to underscore the gulf between Boutros-Ghali’s projections for building peace and the mood of the contributing states, whilst the massacre at Srebenica in 1995 seemed to call into question the point of UN peacekeeping altogether. In particular, cracks were beginning to show between the expanded mandate for peacekeeping forces and their ability to deliver humanitarian and political projects, which were clearly limited.

These peacekeeping failures had a knock-on effect on the ideas governing the expansion of peacebuilding, as the implications of a more ambitious peace operations agenda became clearer. Strangely, however, this did not produce a pull-back from the extended agenda, but a ramping-up of activity, ambition and response. More actors were involved, and asked to undertake a wider range of tasks. As reflected in the rather less exuberant Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, failures were rationalised through the perception that the nature of conflict was changing, from interstate to intrastate, and into chaotic, unmanageable situations where state institutions had collapsed:

Another feature of such conflicts is the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos. Not only are the functions of government suspended, its assets are destroyed or looted and experienced officials are killed or flee the country. This is rarely the case in inter-state wars. It means that international intervention must extend beyond military and humanitarian
tasks and must include the promotion of national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government. Nonetheless, Boutros-Ghali attempted to maintain and protect a traditional UN General Assembly discourse that these were necessary precursors to addressing the injustices that underlay conflict:

As I pointed out in "An Agenda for Development" (A/48/935), only sustained efforts to resolve underlying socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation.

As such, the ideological and political foundations for an altogether more comprehensive, wide-ranging and co-ordinated effort at the transformation of state and society through multilateral multi-dimensional peace operations were being laid, even at this early stage, in the political arena. What we see in the Supplement is Boutros-Ghali trying to maintain the GA’s Third Worldist vision whilst accepting this more pessimistic account of conflict dynamics, which produces the idea that intervention has been insufficient rather than overambitious. This movement towards a comprehensive reform agenda in post-conflict societies was noted at an early stage by academic commentators, who pointed out its potentially radical implications.

II. Managing Global Chaos? The emergence of a field

Simultaneously with this new departure in UN thinking, the silos that that had been established in academia between ‘peace studies’ and ‘security studies’ through the 1970s and 1980s had also begun to break down. In particular, peace studies was rescued from its political obscurity and engaged with in the service of this new international agenda for peace, in particular with theories of human need.

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36 Ibid., section 22, emphasis added
and social grievances informing these early, Third World-friendly readings of conflict held by multilateral organisations. These readings of conflict held out the promise of peaceful resolution of conflict along just and politically emancipatory lines. These were seen to correspond with the democracy and development agendas of the UN that underpinned the Agenda for Peace and provided a basic rationale for the how and why of peacebuilding envisaged as progressive social transformation.

Avenues of research based on broadening the intervention agenda along these lines also emerged from this tradition. They began to generate a comprehensive account of peace-related interventions that would be facilitated by this more expansive peacebuilding programme. Academic debates about conflict prevention and early warning, the management of mediation processes, the involvement of humanitarian actors, and the importance of human rights underpinned the increasingly comprehensive and holistic role peacebuilding practices were beginning to assume around conflict. Slowly, this set of concerns began to develop independent momentum as an industry, with various funding streams and research streams coalescing around this agenda. For example, large collaborations such as the UNRISD’s War-Torn Societies Project (1994-1998) and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1994-1999) were tasked with developing and bringing together work on conflict prevention and resolutions specifically to address what was seen as the worrying increase in the prevalence of intrastate conflict.

The substance of the first United States Institute for Peace collected volume Managing Global Chaos gives us an interesting snapshot of the moment and captures some of the core intellectual trends which supported this expansion of the notion of peacebuilding, as understood by the peace studies community. The

volume itself is divided into sections on the sources of conflict, with prominence given both to ‘structural’ explanations and social-psychological explanations, a large second section on traditional means of diplomacy, collective security, peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, a sizeable third section on conflict management via mediation, conflict prevention and problem-solving, and a final, briefer section on the consolidation of peace and the need for custodianship of the post-settlement phase. The drawing together of these questions in a single textbook volume announced assertively the presence of a coherent, professional and focused field of conflict analysis and peace-based interventions, and strongly echoed the political climate in which it was believed that improving knowledge of conflict and peace processes would enable a willing international community to resolve these problems. At the time, critique of the paradigm, such as it existed, was highly focused on the technical questions of sequencing and speed, albeit with some consciousness of its politics.44

However, even as the field began to cohere, the optimism of these approaches in foreign policy circles was also tested by the events of the 1990s. The intellectual and policy climate in Washington in on conflict and post-conflict situations grew darker, beginning to reflect a growing perception of global collapse and chaos. A parallel worldview began to emerge in this period, particularly from the security community during and after the problems of Somalia and Rwanda, in which it was argued that the UN apparatus was ill-equipped to deal with conflict. Publications in this vein included ex-US Government advisers Helman and Ratner’s influential and provocative Foreign Policy article on ‘Saving Failed States’,45 Robert Kaplan’s ‘The Coming Anarchy’,46 and Zartman’s edited volume Collapsed States: the disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority.47 Although arguing in different modes, they collectively signalled a belief in a world that was, outside the West, subject to deep disorder and spinning further adrift from the state

international conflict, United States Institute of Peace Press.
44 For example, see Fisher, R. J. (1993). The Potential for Peacebuilding: Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking. Peace & Change, 18(3), 247-266.
authority and order of the Cold War era. Rather, these states were seen as no longer ‘transitioning’ but ‘failed’ or ‘failing’, presenting a threat to regional and global security.

Although ostensibly coming from different places, these different intellectual traditions – peace studies and security studies respectively – nonetheless pushed international multilateral policy on conflict in a more or less consistent direction. Broadly speaking, it was a view that based on superior knowledge, deeper involvement, more commitment and the use of force where necessary, the international community could and should undertake more comprehensive and extensive interventions to secure global peace. This broad consensus became a basic truism of what came to be understood in later years as ‘the liberal peace’, based on an underlying faith in the links between ‘development’ and ‘security’.

III. Institutionalisation: the turn to governance

Whilst the new preoccupations with peacebuilding and state failure were beginning to animate the academic peace and security communities during the 1990s, the economic development community was also beginning to move in a similar direction. As Williams and Young note, in the early 1990s the international financial institutions, and particularly the World Bank, became quickly and deeply interested in questions of ‘good governance’, which it characterised as pertaining to the technical functional requirements of modern statehood, moving the institution towards a much more maximalist interpretation of its mandates for promoting ‘efficiency’.48 This allowed it, in the framework of articles forbidding involvement in non-economic affairs, to become involved in legal reforms, bureaucratic reforms within the state, the promotion of civil society and so on. These were significant departures in terms of both the ideas and practices of the Bank that underscored the end of an uncontrolled market orthodoxy and a shift towards a more regulatory approach. This shift precipitated a rapid expansion of sectoral activities and a much

deeper embedding in the governments of recipient states, such that they became perceived in some quarters as part of the permanent state apparatus itself.  

There were clear parallels between the expansion of this agenda and the expansion of the peace and security agendas, which connected the phenomena of conflict and underdevelopment to having their roots in a malfunctioning political society in need of detailed and externally-driven reform. Indeed, in practice these structures of external governance were deeply connected at the level of national missions, with powerful co-ordination mechanisms being established, such as the International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia, which brought together the peacekeeping mission structures with the international financial institutions and other donor governments’ agencies. Although in theory these mechanisms were subordinate to national governments, in practice they were often the centre of political decision-making in the post-war periods.

Connected with this practical merger between conflict management and economic reform was also the growth of international political discourses about sovereignty as responsibility, which sought to provide a legal-political orientation for the increasingly interventionist climate. A symptom of this new discourse was the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Apparently informed and justified by the need for 'no more Rwandas', this eminent group of lawyers and experts represented the attempt to find a way to square the problem of the norm of non-intervention with the apparent moral need to intervene, and as such provide a standing basis for humanitarian and other forms of intervention. These conceptual adjustments to the political status of sovereignty followed on from, amongst other events, the rapid growth of the de facto role of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia from 1995, which took on an increasing number of binding governmental powers as part of the Bonn Agreement in 1997.

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49 Harrison, The World Bank and Africa
The mandates for the presence in Kosovo and East Timor were unprecedented in terms of powers being comprehensively and indefinitely devolved to the UN SRSG until such time as self-government could be established.\textsuperscript{53} Yet they were continuous with – and perhaps the logical conclusion of – the discourses that had been developing over the previous years, both in terms of the primacy of the ‘governance’ agenda within the peace, security and development institutions and the notion of sovereignty as responsibility.

\textbf{IV. Turbulent Peace? Reconciliation and healing in the wake of conflict}

Whilst the lofty discourses of the duties of liberal internationalism and changing sovereignty norms took place on the stage of ‘high’ state politics\textsuperscript{54}, other themes of trauma, illness and healing informed a parallel and more doveish academic and practitioner discourse towards conflict emerging during the 1990s, which sought a more conciliatory, at times therapeutic, approach to intervention. Indeed, this discourse was also present in the \textit{Supplement}, which referred to the potential for peacebuilding for “healing the wounds after conflict has occurred”.\textsuperscript{55}

This began to inflect the core peacebuilding literature. For example, Krishna Kumar, writing from within the United States Agency for International Development, framed peacebuilding essentially as the political, economic and social ‘rehabilitation’ to address the needs of “countries shattered by war”, reflecting very much how certain kinds of practitioners saw their role.\textsuperscript{56}

The notion of ‘rehabilitation’ was consistent with the medicalisation of ‘war-torn societies’ as patients or wards of the international community, essentially incapacitated and unable to manage.\textsuperscript{57} In these discourses, the international

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Boutros-Ghali1996} Boutros-Ghali, \textit{Supplement}, section 49.
\bibitem{Hughes2005} Hughes, C. and V. Pupavac (2005). Framing Post-conflict Societies: international pathologisation
\end{thebibliography}
community’s presence was also viewed as curative and restorative in the wake of conflict – a position which resonated with the way that NGOs in particular had come to see their expanded presence in the global South. This conceptualised peacebuilding as being essentially continuous with humanitarian assistance, administered to the needy out of an ethic of care and based on a human security framework.\textsuperscript{58} This then became compatible with the tradition whereby peacebuilding, alongside humanitarian assistance and other forms of care work had roots in a sense of practical moral vocation as well as, or perhaps instead of, a political intervention. In many senses this was a substantive critique of the geopolitics that had determined Western assistance strategies in the past.

A cognate emphasis on reconciliation and healing also emerged from practitioners such as John Paul Lederach who had come from a Christian humanist background and worked at ‘grassroots’ levels in Central America. Lederach in particular advocated for a multi-modal and multi-level form of peacebuilding in which all levels of society, comprising the elites, mid-level and grassroots, would engage in different forms of peacebuilding and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{59} This kind of rationale was applied by many practitioners to their interpretations of Rwanda’s famous \textit{gacaca} trials, which could be seen as a form of community-level healing process.\textsuperscript{60} More generally, these kinds of discourses provided the basis for an increased role for transitional justice and human rights mechanisms under the umbrella notion of ‘sustainable peace’, which emphasised a need to remake social relations in a more just way in the wake of conflict, in a way which would deter future human rights abuses.\textsuperscript{61}

*Turbulent Peace* amended its last section to reflect this new focus, calling it “Peacebuilding: From Settlement to Reconciliation”, and included pieces from Lederach and others working on the reconciliation and rehabilitation paradigms.⁶² Although motivated by a distinctive view of conflict and the needs of post-conflict societies, these ideas of peacebuilding fit with existing deliberations on conflict management insofar as they tended to validate in a different way a need for third party involvement in post-conflict societies, whilst simultaneously emphasising the need for this to be a ‘grassroots’ affair. In this vision, third parties play the roles of counsellors or therapists, facilitating a process of self-knowledge, or of advocates in the search for justice. Importantly, this was not received in practice as intellectually or operationally incompatible with the existing views that third parties should be seen as experts in conflict management, governance and political order. Rather, the emphasis on holism underpinned a diversification of third party approaches and the expansion of opportunities for intervention. If *Managing Global Chaos* was a disciplinary intervention to reinforce the potential of conflict management strategies, *Turbulent Peace* seemed to demonstrate that approaches from different traditions might nonetheless be brought together under the same intellectual and practical umbrella. With the publication of the first edition of Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse’s *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* in 1999 we also see an affirmation of this as a multi-dimensional humanitarian agenda.⁶³

V. The consolidation of ‘liberal peace’ interventions

These various developments – a belief in the potential for conflict management through peacebuilding, an emphasis on reform of institutions and governance, an identification of sovereignty as responsibility, a belief in the interconnections between security and development, and the possibility of healing social divisions therapeutically – collectively constituted the intellectual foundations

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of the practices understood in the debate as ‘liberal peace interventions’ or the liberal ‘peacebuilding consensus’. As noted, in the earlier days of peacebuilding missions themselves, practices appeared limited to demobilisation, the relatively quick holding of elections and the monitoring of ceasefires, which ran alongside IFI activities to liberalise the economy. Paris argues that these were driven by a single ideological paradigm of liberal internationalism. Yet, as the agenda became rapidly more complex, flexible and politically prominent, a much wider set of activities were rolled into a very broad conception of conflict management in ‘fragile’ states, including more extensive governance reforms, more multi-dimensional development strategies, transitional justice mechanisms, legal reforms, strategies for grassroots empowerment and so on. While these retained a broad adherence to a ‘liberal internationalist’ agenda, they became much more diverse and flexible. Naturally, given the itinerant character of many personnel involved in intervention missions, these missions began more and more to resemble each other programmatical; it would not have been unusual to see programmes and strategies recycled more or less directly from one context to another. Thus the pursuit of the liberal peace maintained much practical as well as ideological cohesion in various missions across the world.

Importantly, such interventions and practices often became open-ended; missions in various countries such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Cambodia became basically permanently deployed and normalised into relations of co-operation between international institutions, Western donor agencies and host governments. These showed some evidence of a trend of what Paris endorsed as institutionalisation before liberalisation (IBL) – that is, a much greater emphasis on international stewardship of governance reform, although in practice this was before, during and after any relevant liberalisation processes. By the end of 1990s and the beginning of following decade, the practice and theory of liberal peace interventions had perhaps reached their most ambitious point, whereby conflict management was understood to be a complex task requiring very precise and expert-led sequencing of a wide set of reforms within state and society in order to prevent

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64 Richmond, The transformation of peace
66 Paris, At War's End
future violence. Even in those cases where the risk of renewed violence was not necessarily seen as immediate, such as in Mozambique for much of the 1990s, the occasional ‘scare’ over contested elections or public protests seemed to reinforce the need for further political and electoral reform.\textsuperscript{67} As such, there was little evidence of interventions diminishing in terms of ambition, even once the initial UN missions had apparently completed and wound up their missions. For example, the UN in Mozambique has maintained the presence of at least twenty distinctive agencies to the present day despite the end of mission in 1994.\textsuperscript{68}

**VI. Leashing the Dogs of War! 9/11 and state-building reloaded**

9/11 and the subsequent official securitisation of “failed states” in the US’s National Security Strategy 2002 had a definitive effect on the intellectual and political direction of the intervention debate. Whereas in the immediate run-up to this period, the conflict management field had taken a turn towards the conciliatory and holistic, in its aftermath there was an almost comprehensive turn towards the ideas of ‘state-building’. As shown earlier, concerns about ‘failed states’ had formed part of academic and institutional conflict management discourses since the mid 1990s and in this sense were not ‘new’. What was different in this period was their rapid ascendance to prominence through their clear integration in the interventionist policies of the United States in.\textsuperscript{69} Furthermore, this was now compounded through an apparent expansion of expertise in questions of governance amongst the IFIs. As such, discussion of ‘state-building’ as an independent object of concern greatly expanded. Although this change initially corresponded with a depiction of the regimes in pre-invasion Baghdad and Kabul as ‘failed’, it was the experience of suddenly disbanding Iraqi state personnel and watching the ensuing chaos that renewed interest in how to ‘fix’ failed states.


\textsuperscript{68} These can be viewed on UN Mozambique, (2011) Delivering as One, Retrieved 12\textsuperscript{th} December 2011 from \url{http://mz.one.un.org/eng}

This new focus on state-building and governance was pronounced amongst the policy community, with governmental agencies such as USAID and the UK’s Department for International Development both issuing new guidelines and frameworks about engaging with ‘fragile states’, which came to dominate their political activity across all cases of engagement and funding streams for research.\textsuperscript{70} The World Bank adopted ‘state-building’ as one of the principal objectives for the organisation, and also began to fund initiatives that would extend its competence in the area.\textsuperscript{71} In a move that symbolised the new hierarchy, the OECD began to define state-building as an overarching process of developing state-society relations which it needed to support beyond peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{72}

Quite suddenly, the field of conflict management became overwhelmed by rapidly proliferating literature on the question of state-building, state failure and its implications for potential interveners.\textsuperscript{73} In this literature, there was a general consensus that ‘state-building’ meant constructing “effective, legitimate institutions of governance”,\textsuperscript{74} though there were disagreements about the meaning of each of these terms, and what constructing them would entail. For example, Rotberg defined governance as “the effective provision of political goods to citizens”.\textsuperscript{75} Such a reading seemed to be at odds with standing definitions used in organisations such as the World Bank, which defined it as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised”.\textsuperscript{76} As the state-building debate continued, more sociologically-informed thinkers reacted to the co-optation of Weber’s definition of


the state into a more narrowly defined conception of legitimacy based on liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{77} This was perhaps unsurprising given the ongoing failures of the new regimes in Baghdad and Kabul to win popular support despite the widely-touted electoral processes.

Once more this change in intellectual direction in the field was reflected in USIP’s compendium on conflict management.\textsuperscript{78} In its content, this third volume, \textit{Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World}, somewhat echoed the turn that had been occurring intellectually and political regarding the preoccupation with state-building as the appropriate response to crises. The last section, entitled ‘The Uses and Limits of Governance in Conflict Management’ focused on the compromises between democracy, stability and sovereignty in dealing with failed states, and tellingly jettisoned any reference to ‘peace’ or ‘reconciliation’. Indeed, this turn away from ‘peace’ was a self-conscious one, according to the editors, based on the challenges of a new security environment characterised by “terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, rogue states and conflict”.\textsuperscript{79} In exploring these phenomena as primary drivers of conflict and pushing issues such as political grievances, resource scarcity and economic opportunities further down the list, the volume captured the mood of an intellectual climate that was altogether more focused on the perceived security threats to the West than the ‘resolution’ of conflict. Yet, on the other hand, competing texts such as the second edition of the Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse volume sought to preserve the more cosmopolitan agenda of conflict resolution against the political tide of neoconservative discourses of state-building.\textsuperscript{80}

This new framing of conflict management techniques and concerns had a clear knock-on effect for understandings of peacebuilding, where they still existed, which sought to maintain the historic discourse that had framed past actions, whilst

\textsuperscript{78} Crocker et al, \textit{Leashing the Dogs of War}.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 4.
keen to capture evolving understandings of conflict. This can be seen most clearly in the way in which the new UN Peacebuilding Commission (from 2005) framed its missions. Whilst on the one hand this body was the inheritor of the older doctrines of peacebuilding from Boutros-Ghali, its latest orientations show the changes in the intellectual environment. For example, in the strategy document for Burundi, one of its few selected cases for sustained activity, ‘good governance’ is the first listed priority for peacebuilding, coming above even the maintenance of the ceasefire, and above concern for economic and social reform to address political grievances. As Le Billon notes, concern to fight corruption in particular became mainstreamed in peacebuilding practices following high-profile arguments from the IFIs that linked governance, security and conflict. This was a key move in the concretisation of the new governance agenda and became a hallmark not just of peacebuilding operations but the developmental agenda more broadly.

Since 2001, the overt re-configuration of mainstream academic and political discourses and practices of conflict management away from peace and reconciliation towards governance and state-building has been substantial and systematic, in no small part catalysed by a new post-9/11 security agenda, the substantive political problems faced by the coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan, and changing political discourses about the origins of conflict. In this sense, earlier critical discussions of the security-development merger proved somewhat prescient of the trend which would come into fruition in state-building discourses, although they could not have anticipated the urgency with which this would accelerate. Historically speaking though, it is consistent with the trends in conflict management as a changing set of lenses through which international elite actors have sought to diagnose the sources of instability in the South.

Conclusions

What we have seen over the last twenty years has been a series of changing ideas and discourses about the liberal peace as conflict management, which have been premised on the basis of the global North bringing peace to the South through various modes of social and political transformation. Many analyses of these approaches have identified them in large part as ‘liberal’ in orientation, although as we have seen there has been a changing emphasis on what this means in practice. This chapter has shown that particular historical and intellectual junctures were influential in shaping both practices of conflict management and their critiques.

The fourth USIP volume by Crocker, Hampson and Aall – *Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World*, indicates a lateral step away from the themes of the first three volumes.83 Whereas these set out analysis and policies premised on a global, Western-led form of conflict management and political transformation, the fourth volume sets out a more minimalist and fragmented set of regional security regimes. This may be an indication that the peacebuilding project has fallen out of political favour amongst Western policymakers as the international community feels increasingly unable to commit to its demands and objectives. Signs are that the US in particular feels itself in a mode of transition and is retrenching its prospects and priorities. Even the third edition of Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse recognises that the ‘liberal peace’ has undergone a substantial ‘backlash’ or battering over the last decade, and that their endorsement of cosmopolitan peacebuilding will have to operate in new realities and regional power structures.84

Despite the backlash, however, the ‘liberal peace’ as a set of practices has also proved itself tenacious and adaptable to various challenges – both to its general ideological precepts and to its implementation problems. In each instance, the retrenchment seemed to mandate ostensibly longer and deeper interventions into state-society relations, with a more extensive programme of reform activities being undertaken. The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a historical overview of

the emergence of the ‘liberal peace’ as an idea and set of practices. As discussed in the Introduction, it is perhaps unsurprising that such a set of activities has provoked much in the way of scholarly engagement, both from supportive and more deeply critical camps. The next chapter will focus in on the debates amongst the critical scholars, which have sought to expose and challenge the self-proclaimed ‘liberal’ politics of interventions.
Chapter Two

Critiquing the liberal peace: anti-imperialism and the non-entity of the non-Western subject

Over the last decade, critiques of the ‘liberal peace’ within International Relations have provided compelling – and in some cases damning – analyses of its political contours and significance. In stark contrast to the technical discussions of international policy makers and the reassuring tenor of their academic colleagues who research conflict management strategies, the critical literature has fundamentally called into question the political significance and legitimacy of the liberal peace as a form of global order. Drawing on a variety of ideas and framings from critical international relations theory, they have argued broadly against the unquestioning pursuit of liberal peace transformations by interveners. Rather they have tended to view the liberal peace as the problematic expression of a Western hegemony which aims to fundamentally transform political, social and economic structures in the non-West into its own image. These critiques have been suspicious of the various policy developments outlined in the last chapter, which imagine liberal peacebuilding strategies to be more technically knowledgeable, and efficient solutions to the linked problems of violent conflict, underdevelopment and state weakness.

It is perhaps so obvious that it is rarely acknowledged, but these critiques are fundamentally ‘anti-imperial’ in orientation and ethic; that is to say that they derive much of their intellectual significance from exposing the tensions between norms and ethics of self-determination and sovereignty, and the interventionist discourses and practices that constitute the liberal peace. The common charge within the critiques of ‘neocolonialism’ or ‘imperialism’ is thus understood as being very serious as it implies direct association with an illegitimate form of control and exploitation of other peoples which violates the basic political rights and norms of the international order. Of course, this is one indictment which defenders of the
liberal peace have felt the need to address urgently in their responses. For example, Paris argues that although there are similarities to be drawn between colonialism’s civilising mission and the promotion of ‘good governance’, the liberal peace is not equivalent to colonialism since it is not undertaken for the direct economic benefit of the intervening powers, and that it does more obviously seek to establish the conditions for self-government. Nonetheless, he and others such as Richard Caplan acknowledge that the liberal peace amounts in various cases to a form of trusteeship.

Needless to say, this has not put to rest critiques of the liberal peace and their suspicion of its neo-imperial agenda. Despite a recently growing interest in the resistance of the everyday local or subaltern, what the critiques have failed to engage with is the equally important analytic question of ‘Euro-centrism’ in how we frame and research the politics of the liberal peace. This chapter will explore the ways in which the critical literature on the liberal peace has thus far, albeit to different degrees, tended to reproduce the marginalisation of intervened-upon subjects in they it formulates its understanding of the character of political hegemony and the appropriate ‘emancipatory’ response to it. As such, although the critical literature’s perspectives are ‘post-colonial’ or ‘anti-imperial’ in a political sense, they could go further in trying to ‘decolonise’ the framework of analysis. In this sense, the primary concern in this thesis to decolonise critiques of the liberal peace can be seen as a sympathetic but critical extension of post-colonial concerns which are already immanent within this debate.

88 The literature critiquing the liberal peace has flourished rapidly and in many directions, and as such it is not possible to cover it comprehensively here, although my selection covers many of the most prominent within critical IR. Significant strands that I omit from this discussion include the sociological approaches to statebuilding inspired by Migdal, J. (1988) Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World, Princeton: Princeton University Press. For a more extensive overview see Goaetze, C., & Guzina, D. (2008) ‘Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, Nationbuilding–Turtles All the Way Down?’, Civil Wars, 10:4, 319-347.
This chapter leads off with an examination of the work of several authors whose mutually influencing works represent incisive and important contributions to the liberal peace critiques – Mark Duffield, Michael Pugh, Oliver Richmond and David Chandler. They are also selected because their contributions have a resonance beyond this narrower debate in that they reflect important contemporary turns in IR theory. As such this analysis of them may also be understood as an intervention in this broader debate on how to conceptualise and understand international political space. The discussion will focus on their contributions to the critical debates on the ‘liberal peace’ and ‘liberal peacebuilding’ and the ways in which their theoretical approaches are constructed and informed – in particular in the uses of Foucault, the interpretation of liberalism, the ethics of engagement, the question of hybridity and the significance of political economy factors. I will then build on the authors’ own concerns and preoccupations to develop a more progressive anti-imperial analysis by discussing the problem of Western-centrism in the existing critiques, which specifically manifests itself in the silence, invisibility or non-entity of people targeted by interventions. Whilst recent work by Roger Mac Ginty has gone some way to redressing some of these issues, it has simultaneously reproduced others. I argue that we can identify important blind-spots in how the debate has unfolded which creates space for a new kind of analytic framing of the problem.

I. The liberal peace: from discourse to technology of power

Although the term the ‘liberal peace’ had already had a long history in IR, specifically in the context of the neo-Kantian debates on the incidence of war amongst democracies,\textsuperscript{89} it was arguably Duffield’s 2001 book \textit{Global Governance and the New Wars} that gave it life as a framework for critically interrogating the form of power that had been established by a constellation of Western governments,

aid agencies, international financial institutions, security establishments and militaries over the global South.\textsuperscript{90}

The idea of liberal peace, for example, combines and conflates ‘liberal’ (as in contemporary liberal economic and political tenets) with ‘peace’ (the present policy predilection towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction). It reflects the existing consensus that conflict in the South is best approached through a number of connected, ameliorative, harmonising and, especially, transformational measures. While this can include the provision of immediate relief and rehabilitation assistance, liberal peace embodies a new or political humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and prevention, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, promoting the rule of law, and security sector reform in the context of a functioning market economy. In many respects, while contested and far from assured, liberal peace reflects a radical developmental agenda of social transformation. In this case however, this is an international responsibility and not that of an independent or single juridical state.\textsuperscript{91}

One of Duffield’s primary arguments is that under the impetus and mandate of conflict management strategies for ‘peace’, deep and wide-ranging social transformations which are broadly ‘liberal’ are undertaken and legitimised. Taken in isolation, there is not much in this argument with which defenders of the liberal peace could necessarily disagree – indeed, as noted in the previous chapter, the notion of ‘peacebuilding’ in its original formulation envisaged it as a project of social transformation to eliminate the structural causes of violence.\textsuperscript{92} What Duffield emphasises however is the specifically political and systemic character of this programme for transformation: ‘While the initiatives that make up liberal peace are usually understood as being a response to specific needs and requirements, liberal peace is a political project in its own right.’\textsuperscript{93} For Duffield, then, even though the structure of the liberal peace is disaggregated and its agents uncoordinated, it nonetheless represents a recognisable and radical political agenda for interventionary transformation.

Duffield’s complex unpacking of the content and nature of liberal peace as a particular kind of political project is what makes his critique especially compelling. He understands the liberal peace as an emerging strategic complex between different

\textsuperscript{90} Duffield, Global Governance.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 10-11, emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{92} Chapter One [of this thesis], 33.
\textsuperscript{93} Duffield, Global Governance, 11.
Western actors, including NGOs, multilateral organisations, donor governments, military establishments and multinational corporations, who interact and overlap with each other in different ways. In this complex, various agendas contribute to a merging of security and development concerns, the latter of which are themselves to be understood as continuous with humanitarian relief. This new strategic complex sees these actors’ mandates as becoming broader and more inter-connected in the context of this new consensus. These mandates and agendas are also subject to constant reinvention in the face of failures which are nonetheless projected as success. In this way, Duffield substantiates the vision of the liberal peace not just as a political project but a political project undertaken by a community of strategic agents who collectively define the broad space for intervention through a set of ever-evolving mandates.

These mandates reflect conceptual discourses which are themselves in flux. As Duffield argues, the meaning of development embedded within liberal peace changes the idea from involving a large-scale and state-led process of rapid modernisation, more historically prevalent amongst post-colonial governments in the Third World, into the promotion of a liberal model of self-management, appropriate to a vision of free-market integration. As such, previous and alternative visions of development are de-legitimised as political projects, and interveners increasingly tend to promote attitudinal and behavioural change in their actions. This is coupled with a changing vision of the concept of sovereignty, under which the nation state is increasingly seen as lacking the competence and capacity to carry out the duties of government, and a more politicised and developmental conception of humanitarianism. These discourses emerge in the context of a shared political analysis linking conflict and political violence in the global South to the problem of underdevelopment, which is a fundamental dysfunction in need of remedial liberal intervention. As such, the liberal peace does

94 Ibid., 44-75.
95 Ibid., 261.
96 Ibid, 30.
97 Ibid., 42.
98 Ibid., 87.
not tend to differentiate its prescriptions for analysis and intervention in conflict situations from developmental situations more broadly.\textsuperscript{99}

Within *Global Governance and the New Wars*, Duffield’s conceptual apparatus shows clear signs of influence from Foucaultian frameworks of analysis.\textsuperscript{100} Specifically, Duffield pays particular attention to the co-constitution, through discourse, of the regimes of power and regimes of knowledge that underpin the liberal peace. This is a particularly important theme in his conceptualisation of the liberal peace, and one which has been deeply influential on subsequent critiques including those to be discussed below – namely the idea that the *liberal peace is a global power-knowledge complex*, one which constitutes and incorporates particular actors, and enables them to command legitimacy, authority and competence in conflict and post-conflict spaces by dominating the discursive and epistemic terrain of engagement.\textsuperscript{101} This is an important shared starting point for all the other critiques discussed here, particularly those of Richmond and Pugh. This is one of the pillars of shared understanding within the critical debate that has allowed a discussion to take place.

Duffield also uses Foucaultian concepts to inform his account of the ‘paradox’ of liberalism that underpins the liberal peace.\textsuperscript{102} This understanding frames it as a form of rule which nonetheless must be carried out through the volition of the ruled – that it to say, it must work upon them as subjects. It is this which he believes distinguishes it from an imperial peace:

People in the South are no longer ordered what to do – they are now expected to do it *willingly* themselves. Compared to imperial peace, power in this form, while just as real and disruptive, is more nuanced, opaque and complex. Partnership and participation imply the mutual acceptance of shared normative

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 116-117.


\textsuperscript{101} Duffield, *Global Governance*, 249.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 192.
This theme of liberalism as a technology of self-regulation is extended further in Development, Security and Unending War, in which Duffield engages more closely with Foucault’s work to draw out an analysis of development as a form of biopolitics. Biopolitics is understood as a modern form of power that seeks to regulate life at the level of the population, using the mass instruments of demography, epidemiology and statistics. It is simultaneously an intimate and powerful form of regulation. This supports the reading of liberalism as “a technology of governance that supports freedom while governing people through the interconnected natural, social and economic processes that together sustain life.” Development is a way of dealing with the excess of freedom produced by liberalism which reinstates forms of trusteeship in the post-colonial world and operates through a biopolitical division of the world into insured and non-insured forms of life.

The understanding of liberalism that emerges in this later work makes a number of departures from that in Global Governance, where it is understood in more conventional terms as a set of ‘political and economic tenets’ that push towards free-market principles and individualism. By contrast in Development, Security, Duffield argues that liberalism is not to be understood as a ‘substantive doctrine’ but an ‘ethos of government which attempts to govern life through its freedom’, albeit one which is able to critique its own excesses of rule. This more governmental view of liberalism is complemented with a similar view of development as a ‘state-led technology of security’ embedded in culturally-encoded forms of racism. Again here Duffield is moving away from the views of liberalism and development as forms of ideology – i.e. ideas about how the world does or should work – and moving towards them as constituting technologies of power, that is, modes through which power is expressed or maintained.

103 Ibid., 34.
104 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, 10.
105 Ibid., 5-6.
106 Ibid., 6.
107 Ibid., 17.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., 188.
Underpinning this conceptual shift is a shift in who or what the central agents of power are – whereas in *Global Governance* the principal protagonists are the various actors who comprise the strategic complex of the liberal peace, in *Development, Security* these are present but not prominent. Indeed, *Development, Security* is remarkable for the seeming absence of identifiable protagonists of power, although analyses of power relations are everywhere. Where they do emerge they are much less specific and disembodied – the West/Western humanitarianism, liberalism itself and neoliberal capitalism for example are all associated with being the force behind the new configurations of rule.\(^{110}\) This expansion and diffusion in the conceptions of power and agency is also reflected by the absence of the ‘liberal peace’ framing in this later work. Indeed it is an important part of the framework that the biopolitical technologies of liberalism and development greatly exceed the boundaries of the conflict management strategic complex of the liberal peace and represent overarching structures of rule that are both increasingly internal to the West and to its external relationship with the global South. Duffield’s work has been significant in substantially challenging conventional understandings of the status of humanitarian and developmental interventions as particular instantiations of systemic power in the world rather than altruistic add-ons. His breadth of practical experience is used to support a sophisticated and compelling Foucaultian conceptual reading of international interventions’ discourses and practices – in many senses the work also represents a high point in post-structural theorising of contemporary world politics.

Yet, there are also important political economy aspects to the analysis, which seek to account for the persistence of poverty and inequalities at the level of the international system rather than as failures of development. The ‘uninsured’ ‘surplus populations’ which require the regulatory structures of the liberal peace are thus the product of predatory forms of capitalism. Duffield reads the structure of neoliberal predatory capitalism through David Harvey, who emphasises strongly the need for surplus populations within the system if capitalism is to reproduce itself, stabilise itself and overcome its crises.\(^{111}\) For Duffield, the difference between the way that surplus populations are dealt with in the global North and global South is through

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\(^{110}\) Ibid.

\(^{111}\) Ibid, 10-11.
systems of state-provided social insurance and welfare entitlements in the North, which provide more extensive support for human life. Whilst he never approaches the issue directly, Duffield’s deliberations concerning social insurance indicate sympathy for a greater role of state provision as a way to buffer the impact of global capitalism rather than the continued exposure of populations to its effects. Yet he also shows ambivalence towards social insurance itself as a ‘powerful instrument of governance within mass consumer society’.

Duffield’s contribution to the critical conceptualisation of the ‘liberal peace’ has been formidable. He comes as close as anyone to a complete account of global power that is driven by an overarching logic of political economy, and expressed in programmes of liberal reform and technologies of power. In connecting systemic trends and pressures to particular instances of control and regulation, in Sudan, Mozambique, Afghanistan and elsewhere, Duffield makes a series of coherent linkages between discourses and practices of intervention, as well as with some of the historical precedents of these practices. His theoretical contribution however emphasises the novelties of these modes of rule, which are seen to operate through their impact on volition and the shaping of a biopolitical governmental framework, which functions to support neoliberal forms of capitalism. As will be discussed later on, however, the emphasis on the diffusive and productive character of liberal power has tended to limit the ability to look beyond this endorsement of the ‘solidarity of the governed’.

II. The liberal peace, critical theory and life welfare

Michael Pugh’s work draws on Duffield’s analysis but integrates it within a Coxian critical theory account of world order. This defends and extends the case for seeing the liberal peace as the systemic expression of a dysfunctional neoliberal system seeking to contain its resulting disorders at the periphery. In developing a more emphatic political economy focus, Pugh argues that the component parts of the

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112 Ibid., 217.
113 Ibid., 218.
114 Ibid., 219.
115 Ibid..
liberal peace, including post-Washington consensus neoliberal economic policy, humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, amount to a form of ‘riot control’ to stabilise the international order in favour of global capitalism. This systemic orthodoxy is followed through in problem-solving theories of international relations which accept and seek to uphold the broad contours of the international system in terms of its state-centric and capitalist form. Critical theory, such as that of Cox, rejects these parameters for theorising and instead challenges the structural economic conditions that inhibit emancipation, understood as social and political transformation. Pugh’s account of the liberal peace consistently seeks to contextualise it in terms of this structural framework which is understood to account for its key characteristics.

Pugh’s critique emphasises the particular kinds of dysfunctions that result from the contemporary state of global capitalism. One of these is the current regime of trade subsidies and barriers that protects industries in the global North whilst exposing Southern economies to instability and unjust market conditions. Another is the prevailing economic orthodoxy that seeks to reduce the size of the state and spending on social benefits in the periphery. Collectively these factors tend to compound poverty in the global South. Although it is recognised that ‘Sachs 2’ revisionist development strategies such as the Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers have aimed to pay more attention to the specific alleviation of poverty and to issues such as participation, they are nonetheless constrained by their ultimately globalising and integrative economic logic. For Pugh, these economic models specifically militate against alternatives such as state-led development and welfare programmes which it is argued could otherwise redistribute spending more effectively in order to reduce inequalities. These are particularly important in ‘war-torn’ economies where jobs and other forms of economic survival have been destroyed, leaving populations vulnerable to both

117 Ibid., 41.
118 Ibid., 52.
120 Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and critical theory’, 52.
criminality and poverty. Pugh also invites us to read the informal economy as providing an important form of social insurance for those alienated by the neoliberal economic model, through informal employment and patronage.

In Pugh’s later writing, increasing attention has also been given to the political effects and dimensions of liberal peace projects. In a detailed engagement with the case of Bosnia, co-written with Boris Divjak, Pugh argues that the externally-imposed structural adjustment programmes have undermined the emergence of a liberal social contract between the state and citizenry, which reduces democratic accountability, promotes opportunities for corruption and enables clientelist politics. In addition to the economic failure of the neoliberal model to provide means of sustenance for the ‘surplus’ populations produced by capitalism, then, it also works against the kinds of social protections and rights that can be demanded under a liberal social contract. In particular, these include employment and labour rights, which Pugh argues have been downgraded in post-war environments by both formal and informal channels of employment, and are no longer well-supported by the ILO.

Although the structures of political economy within the liberal peace are the main focus of Pugh’s analysis, an emerging concern is also demonstrated for the ethics of engagement and the imagination of alternatives. This position takes up emerging concerns regarding the issue of alterity and Duffield’s invocation for ‘unscripted conversations’ which are for Duffield based on a form of ‘solidarity of the governed’:

There is a need, then, to develop a new, unsecuritised language and contemplate a paradigm that takes local voices seriously, rejects universalism in favour of heterodoxy, reconceptualises the abstract individual as a social being and limits damage to planetary life – in short, a ‘life welfare’ perspective. Such a perspective would lead to a two-fold paradigm shift: from the ‘liddism’

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126 Duffield, Development, Security, 234.
of liberal peace to political economies of life welfare; and from universalist panaceas (which result in dysfunctional hybrid forms of political economy) to engaging with heterogeneity.\textsuperscript{127}

In this analysis, joint with Mandy Turner and Neil Cooper, Pugh brings together neatly several important themes emerging from the critiques of the liberal peace: namely that it encourages and perpetuates forms of economic, political and social exclusion, and silences dissent and alternatives. The suggested ‘life welfare’ approach both argues for a new global orientation in political economy and in the treatment of ‘local voices’ and ‘heterogeneity’.\textsuperscript{128}

Pugh’s analysis is important in emphasising a structural interpretation of the apparent failings of the liberal peace, particularly with regard to its promises of development and the alleviation of poverty, which are to be met by an ethic of ‘life welfare’. Simultaneously however he emphasises the collusive elements of interventions in allowing public impoverishment and private corruption to flourish as part of neoliberal economic strategies.\textsuperscript{129} This account of the liberal peace seems to be grounded openly in an egalitarian and pluralist political ethics, and in this sense is less tentative than Duffield about the grounds for ethical engagement.

Yet, there are some emergent tensions between Pugh’s treatment of ‘universalism’ and ‘heterogeneity’. On the one hand, what Pugh’s analysis envisages for the post-conflict environments seems to be a re-engineering of social and economic conditions in line with those enjoyed by European countries in terms of state control of the economy, social protection, and a liberal social contract. This seems to point towards a particular kind of universalist response to the systemic problems caused by neoliberal economic policy. In more recent writing, however, Pugh has emphasised that ‘welfare’ should be understood as ‘well-being with roots in local societies’\textsuperscript{130}, and as such ‘heterogeneity’ is to be preferred to ‘universalism’. This tension manifests itself directly in Pugh’s account of ‘resistance’ in post-war

\textsuperscript{129} Divjak and Pugh, ‘Corruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina’
\textsuperscript{130} Pugh, ‘Towards life welfare’.
Both Pugh’s structuralist critique of the liberal peace and his more detailed work on the actual functioning of war and post-war economies have certainly articulated important shortcomings and dilemmas for liberal peacebuilders which undermine many of the policies promoted. Yet, at times they do not necessarily amount to a critique of liberal developmentalism as much as an invocation to do it better and with better respect for job creation and employment rights. Pugh seems to be aware of this, and in recent work has certainly placed rather greater emphasis on some reckoning with or acknowledgement of ‘local voices’, although to date he has not developed this at any length. Yet Pugh is keen that it be developed, a task which he indicates is becoming most pronounced in the work of Oliver Richmond. Richmond has certainly attempted to grapple at much greater length with the politics and ethics of engagement between the liberal peace and its recipients, and it is to his work that we now turn to explore the debate.

III. The ethics of liberal-local engagement and a post-liberal peace

The critique of the liberal peace’s structure and significance has also given rise to an important debate around the ethics of engaging in liberal peacebuilding, in which the work of Richmond has been particularly influential. Like Duffield, Richmond uses a conception of the liberal peace which, referencing Foucault, emphasises its epistemic contours, but also has a range of other conceptual influences which are brought to bear on the issue. As with Duffield, Richmond sees the liberal peace as involving a broad and complex range of actors, with distinct but connected ideas about the nature of peace, who exercise a broad hegemony in conflict and post-conflict spaces. Apart from establishing a genealogy of these hegemonic discourses, the key focus of Richmond’s research is the ethics and politics of the relationship between the liberal peace and ‘local’ communities. Particularly in his most recent work he has sought to understand, using a number of critical theoretical perspectives, how the liberal peace might be made less
hierarchical, less illegitimate and less fragile in its approaches to and practices of peacemaking. Unlike Duffield and Pugh, however, Richmond’s analysis does not seek to establish an ‘explanatory’ account of the liberal peace via an analysis of particular social forces, economic structures, actor-interests or specific historical dynamics continuous with colonialism. Rather, Richmond approaches the liberal peace through the contours of its main ideas and their origins with the aim of developing a less hegemonic, ‘post-liberal’ response.

Richmond bases some of his primary preoccupations on the way in which the notion of ‘peace’ has been dominated by particular traditions of thinking. In The Transformation of Peace, Richmond argues that the contemporary peacebuilding consensus – the liberal peace – derives from four aspects of European Enlightenment thinking: the victor’s peace, the institutional peace, the constitutional peace and the civil peace. These aspects correlate with a spectrum of theoretical approaches in approaches to peacemaking in International Relations. Thus the victor’s peace reflects orthodox realist thinking on peace as consisting principally of order and domination, the institutional peace speaks to realist and liberal concerns to institutionalise this order, the constitutional peace expresses liberal concerns over the nature of the internal political settlement and the civil peace relates to concerns for emancipatory political forms and agents beyond the state. These different strands coalesce as a hybrid form of liberal peace, which expresses itself differently in different contexts. For example, ultra-conservative versions of the liberal peace can be observed which are imposed by force, as initially in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo, whereas more orthodox forms can be observed in places where the liberal peace has become embedded and institutionalised over time, such as East Timor, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique.

Despite this complex genealogy, however, for Richmond the liberal peace is to be understood as a basic ideological and political consensus on the nature of post-conflict reforms, as requiring ‘democratization, the rule of law, human rights, free

131 As will be argued below, Richmond has made more references to colonialism in the context of the ethics of the liberal peace recently; however, this differs from a specific analysis of particular continuities. Rather the engagement with colonialism remains at a very broad conceptual level.
132 Richmond, Transformation of Peace
and globalized markets, and neoliberal development’. This has cohered around a 'specific ontology and methodology' which is peace-as-governance:

The liberal peace framework and its graduations converge on a notion of peace-as-governance. This is both biopolitical and governmentalising in the Foucaultian sense of these terms, reordering state and society via the alphabet soup of agencies, organisations, and institutions. The framework relies on the concepts of territorial statehood and sovereignty, and on dominant states in the international community. These assume that the epistemology, ontology, and methods associated with the liberal peace are on ethically firm ground.

Richmond sees liberal peace itself as an attempt to transform societies which is grounded in a sense of the epistemic authority and superiority of a liberal world order. The invocation of Foucault seems to point to a ubiquity of this power as opposed to anything more specific regarding the mechanisms of this power. Nonetheless, and importantly, this ‘top-down’ sensibility is viewed as ‘hubristic’ by Richmond, who argues that the liberal peace is more often ‘virtual’, meaning that “democratization, human rights, the rule of law, freedom of the press, development and economic reform are deferred for an uncertain period”. Part of the critique at least is that the liberal peace has not achieved its stated goals in post-conflict environments. Richmond makes this case most particularly with regard to case studies such as Cambodia and Kosovo.

Thus Richmond moves from a focus on the Enlightenment genealogy of the liberal peace towards a critique of its ethical and political structures, from which he aims to offer alternative approaches to peacebuilding. Broadly, he critiques the liberal peace for exercising forms of hegemony that suppress pluralism, depoliticise peace, undermine the liberal social contract and exercise a colonial gaze in its

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135 Ibid., 295.
137 Richmond and Franks, ‘Liberal Hubris?’, 30.
139 In this I would differ from Chandler’s reading of Richmond that there is a lack of alternatives offered, although there is clearly scope to talk about whether what Richmond specifically offers is a satisfactory alternative. See Chandler, D. (2010) ‘The uncritical critique of liberal peace’, Review of International Studies, 36(S1), 137-155, 153.
treatment of the subjects of the liberal peace.\textsuperscript{140} In view of these various aspects of failure, the liberal peace is characterised as ‘ethically bankrupt’\textsuperscript{141} and requiring re-evaluation.

The response to these kinds of problems, suggests Richmond, is to aim for an ‘everyday’, ‘post-liberal’ or ‘hybrid’ form of peace. This envisages a liberal-local relationship which is characterised by an everyday ethic of empathy and care, in which ‘everyday local agencies, rights, needs, custom and kinship are recognised as discursive ‘webs of meaning’\textsuperscript{,142} Although Richmond would probably resist this interpretation, his representation of the ‘local’ in his work seems to reflect an imagined communitarian space characterised by ‘context, custom, tradition and difference in its everyday setting’\textsuperscript{143}, which he sees as being marginalised or ignored by the practices of the liberal peace. Whilst Richmond argues that these should not be romanticised, as he argues the liberal peace does, he also uses this contrasting conceptualisation of the liberal/international and local/everyday as a means of informing his post-liberal ethics of peace, which even seem to require a much more involved and localised form of intervention than the liberal peace currently offers:

If the liberal peace is to be salvaged it would have to offer a more pluralist debate on its own alternatives, a via media between itself and them, and would also have to offer a technology of governance that is broadly representative of all actors at multiple levels, public and private, gendered and aged, and of multiple identities. This would mean it would adopt a hybrid localised identity to counterbalance its global or governmental metanarrative of cosmopolitanism, with commensurate implications for its claimed boundaries, rules, rights, freedoms, and norms. This might mean it would accrue more everyday legitimacy, which might be then formalised in governmental, institutional or constitutional structures and legal frameworks, which would rest primarily upon a ‘new’ social contract. This legitimacy would rest upon its provision of social, cultural, economic and political resources sufficient to meet the demands made upon it by its local, everyday, constituencies and an international community of which they should be a stakeholder. It would also rest upon an international social contract, while not displacing indigenous legitimacy with preponderant institutions that are inflexible and actually obscure the local and the everyday. But such a framework should not then be set in stone, but instead must be seen as an evolving form, focusing on an

\textsuperscript{140} Richmond, ‘A post-liberal peace’

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 558.


\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 669.
everyday peace, and the necessary emancipatory and empathetic structures and institutions this may require.  

Here, the ‘via media’ Richmond proposes pushes essentially for more balance between the liberal and the everyday, in a way that would render the outcome more legitimate, sustainable and ethically satisfactory. An international social contract is required that does not ‘obscure the local and everyday’, but does not seek to dominate it either. In this, Richmond’s account of alternatives to the liberal peace seems riven with a sense of tension between two seemingly conflicting ethical positions. It is this tension that underpins his conception of the post-liberal peace. On the one hand, he argues that ‘[i]t is difficult, from a liberal and critical position, to image [sic] this being achieved without some conception of democracy, law, human rights, and development or welfare support.’ In this and elsewhere, it is clear that he does not imagine that the alternative to the liberal peace to be an end to liberal peacebuilding, but rather one which institutionalises participation and ‘engages’ with issues such as welfare and culture in different ways. On the other hand, and in a more openly sceptical moment, Richmond also acknowledges that the liberal peace as derived from the Enlightenment may not be able to live up to contemporary ethical demands, although it is not clearly specified as to what these are. They seem to relate to the desire for ‘genuine self-determination’:

This requires that local academies and policymakers beyond the already liberal international community are enabled to develop theoretical approaches to understanding their own predicaments and situations, without these being tainted by Western, liberal, and developed world orthodoxies and interests. In other words, to gain an understanding of the ‘indigenous’ and everyday factors for the overall project of building peace, liberal or otherwise, a via media needs to be developed between emergent local knowledge and the orthodoxy of international prescriptions and assumptions about peace.

The argument that knowledge is ‘tainted’ strongly implies that the liberal peace is not an authentic and as such legitimate framework for ‘indigenous’ knowledge, which emerges from the ‘local’. Yet, for Richmond’s critical liberal position, frameworks such as ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ (which he sees as the inheritance of the Enlightenment) are necessary for a more emancipatory version of

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144 Richmond, ‘A post-liberal peace’, 567-8, emphasis added.
145 Ibid., 572.
146 Ibid., 566.
147 Ibid., 571, emphasis added.
the liberal peace. This is what presents itself as the key tension for which Richmond seeks a solution, via the notion of the ‘everyday’, and via relations of ‘empathy’ and ‘care’.

His most recent work on the ‘everyday’ however suggests that its significance as a site of ethical engagement is much more ambiguous:

Everyday life is both commensurate with, in opposition to and modifies colonial practices of government. In this terrain, a hybridity emerges which reflects cultural and social patterns, material inequalities and patterns of colonial power, disguise, timelag and blindspots – as Bhabha has so eloquently illustrated. It is a site of resistance, assimilation, adaption and of hidden agencies. It is also the site where power is often experienced in its most negative forms.

On this reading, which he links with postcolonial theory, it is rendered more doubtful that the everyday can in fact serve as a framework for a more emancipatory ethical relationship between the liberal peace and diverse ‘local’ entities. Rather, in this reading, the everyday should be seen as a site of researching and linking to ‘hidden everyday agencies’ which in various contexts moderate and resist the excesses of the structures of the liberal peace. Indeed, peacebuilding itself should be understood as resistance: ‘Peacebuilding as resistance may prioritise self-determination, community, agency, autonomy, sometimes democracy and a sense of nation, and sometimes the materiality of liberal states.’ It is not entirely clear what an understanding of peacebuilding as resistance would mean in a concrete sense. The conception here of resistance suggests a more agonistic and indeterminate relationship between the liberal and local in a reconfigured peacebuilding, one in which ‘pluralities… meet, interact, integrate, react, resist, mediate and negotiate.’ Such a vision ‘rescues and reunites the liberal and local’, providing a platform for a post-liberal peace.

To Richmond it is increasingly clear that conventional forms of studying IR through state-centric lenses are particularly inadequate for the investigation of the

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149 Ibid., 686.
150 Ibid., 688.
151 Ibid., 689.
‘everyday’; rather, he sees the discipline of anthropology and critical approaches to ethnography as providing more appropriate resources for this task. Although his account of this methodology is not developed very far, it is clear that it is meant to provide a counterpart to the various ethical and ontological interests in ‘enabling a clearer engagement with the local, with alterity and with the everyday in the name of emancipation’.152 It is such an engagement which provides the ethical alternative of the post-liberal peace.

Richmond’s central problematic of alterity – in which the liberal peace presents ethical questions in terms of how it deals with ‘the other’ – has been an important one in galvanising a critical research agenda in the liberal peace debate, as has the more recent acknowledgement that how such questions are researched are an important part of this.153 Indeed, it is an important issue for this project as well. However, it is unclear how his proposed modalities of engagement – empathy, care and the everyday – actually disrupt the variously problematic aspects of the liberal peace, or whether in practice they may even invite a more intimate form of regulation and monitoring. After all, Richmond has also argued that the post-liberal peace is already emerging in many post-conflict countries, from Afghanistan to Iraq, where ‘liberal-local hybrid’ forms of peace characterised by negotiation and resistance exist, in which he includes the use of the Tribal Liaison Council and the explosion in sectarian violence.154 But do these hold out the promise of a more emancipatory peace? Richmond argues that they represent the ‘hidden agencies of the everyday’155 yet it is never clear whether by virtue of their more implicitly ‘authentic’ status he prefers them to the liberal peace or whether they represent an ethically preferable alternative – the anticipated ‘post-liberal peace’156 in which the liberal and local are rescued and reunited.

152 Ibid., 679.
153 Ibid., 683.
154 Ibid., 689.
155 Ibid.
156 At the time of writing, Richmond’s book Richmond, O.P. (2011) A Post-Liberal Peace: the local Infrapolitics of Peacebuilding (London: Routledge) has just been released which may address the matter; however, it is not available for comment at the moment.
IV. The liberal peace as illiberal statebuilding

By contrast to Richmond’s focus on the ethics of liberal-local engagement as the key problem in intervention, David Chandler’s critique has come to focus on the illiberal and broadly hypocritical character of its practices. He sees ‘the liberal peace’ as the cultivation of unaccountable political structures which are ambitious in their transformative aims. In his more recent work, Chandler challenges many other critiques, arguing that what intervention in post-conflict societies produces is not a ‘liberal’ peace but an inversion or critique of the classical ideals of autonomy and social contract that liberal political theory endorses. 157 This is achieved through a radical re-interpretation of sovereignty away from its legal and political content towards a conception of sovereignty as governance capacity. 158 On the whole, Chandler’s contributions to the liberal peace debate have sought to highlight the space between its justifications and its practices, doing so from a position that can be understood as simultaneously ‘critical’, liberal and conservative in its assumptions. Yet its perceived radical scepticism towards the intentions of interveners have forced many to reckon with its strident criticisms of intervention missions. 159

In Faking Democracy after Dayton, published in 2000, and before the debate on the ‘liberal peace’ became particularly prominent, Chandler argued that the deal struck for peace and democratisation in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords had resulted in virtually all state functions being removed from the hands of Bosnians. 160 Despite the language of democratisation and the framework of rights being developed, Chandler argued that what resulted was an intimate form of regulation – a key theme in his work since then. As such, democratisation processes tended to produce precisely the opposite of democracy. It was noted that such logic was premised on the perceived inability of Bosnians to make the correct choices when governing themselves, making international supervision a responsibility for interveners analogous to the colonial White Man’s Burden. 161

157 Chandler, ‘The uncritical critique’.
158 Chandler, Empire in Denial, 26-47.
159 For example, Richard Caplan does so in Re-constructing War-torn Societies, 131-2.
160 Chandler, Bosnia: faking democracy after Dayton.
161 Ibid., 162.
One of the themes that emerges in *Faking Democracy* and comes to dominate Chandler’s later work is the origins of these dysfunctions in the changing character and environment of Western power. In *Faking Democracy*, Chandler argues that despite the ostensible failings of the Bosnia mission, critiques of it are generally lacking, which he attributes to the functions that Bosnia serves by legitimating the US role in NATO, the UN and the OSCE in the post-Cold War environment. As such, democratisation in Bosnia is understood as an externally-driven process fulfilling externally-relevant functions for more powerful international actors, in which the actual democratisation of Bosnia is of little importance.

In more recent work such as *Empire in Denial*, Chandler extends these lines of argument more broadly within the context of the liberal intervention debates. What results in countries subject to intervention is a deeply *illiberal* form of state-building, in which political decision-making is taken out of the hands of domestic actors and into the hands of internationals, who are themselves not accountable for their decisions. Within this policy architecture, however, domestic actors are still held responsible for failure through their purported unpreparedness for liberal reforms and lack of capacity. This externally constructed state is thus riven with political contradictions and weaknesses. More recently, Chandler has claimed that this weakness is not an unintended consequence of state-building programmes, which are not designed to produce independently-functioning states. Rather they are designed to create new structures of neoliberal – or what he terms ‘post-liberal’ – governance, through which autonomy is continually ‘managed’ by external agencies.

This move towards international statebuilding is connected to the rise of ‘ethical foreign policy’ in the West, in which values rather than interests are seen as

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162 Ibid., 181.
163 Ibid., 193.
164 Chandler, *Empire in Denial*.
165 Ibid., 71.
166 Ibid., ‘Conclusion’.
the primary determinant of foreign policy and the boundary between Self and Other is ostensibly dissolved.\textsuperscript{168} This prioritisation of an ethical approach to policy has the effect of driving an evasion of Western political responsibility for policies, as they are increasingly pursued in a regulatory space which blurs the lines between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ politics. Although these spaces increasingly trumpet that they are spaces for ‘participation’, ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’, they do not problematize the power relations and therefore have the effect of generally legitimising them.\textsuperscript{169} Moreover, drawing on the work of Graham Harrison on ‘governance states’, Chandler argues that these ‘post-conditionality’ arrangements also erode the accountability of a contractual structure for co-operation.\textsuperscript{170}

Yet for Chandler, in open contrast to Duffield and Pugh, this international order does not express congruence between the interests of Western capitalist powers and the discourses of the liberal peace but a disjuncture.\textsuperscript{171} In this sense, the post-Cold War era does not represent a triumph for the West but the crisis of its ideology and the loss of its political purpose, which has provoked more solipsism than globalism:

We are witnessing neither the interest-based projection of hegemonic power nor the value-led challenge to hegemony and traditional forms of power. Rather, idealised policy discourses and practices reflect today’s ‘hollow hegemony’ - the hollowing-out of the traditional frameworks of meaning which reflected and structured Western power.\textsuperscript{172}

For Chandler, the turn towards statebuilding thus represents a Western empire in denial – of its purpose, its ideology and its power. Fundamentally this is symptomatic of a kind of political crisis in the West, in which politics itself – contests over interests, ideologies and objectives – is increasingly absent and instead decisions are made in the framework of empty bureaucratic policy adjustment and regulation.\textsuperscript{173} The ‘liberal peace project’ identified by Duffield is thus understood not as a project with objectives but an evasive form of global ordering. Contra

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{168} Chandler, \textit{Empire in Denial}, ch. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 94-95.
\item \textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 86-7.
\item \textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 723.
\item \textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 719.
\end{itemize}
Richmond, the appropriate response is not a critique of its ideology and the pursuit of a ‘post-liberal’ form of engagement, as this is a fundamentally anti-political and unaccountable form of authority.

Chandler’s provocative engagement of both intervention and the critical debate has taken an ostensibly different line to those of Duffield, Pugh and Richmond, whose positions he has suggested are in danger of creating a kind of apology for liberal interventionism. ¹⁷⁴ This line of argument opens up a space for thinking about the different kinds of theoretical orientations behind these critiques, and specifically for interrogating the starting assumptions which inform their ‘critical’ accounts. This is not to deny the collective value of the existing critiques. They ask serious and important questions of intervention: as a system of global ordering, an ideology and technology of power and neoliberal capitalism, and a hybrid, unaccountable structure of political relations. There are many overlaps between these critiques, as well as important differences, which reflect different conceptual emphases and frameworks. Yet, as the next section will discuss, this seems to be a conversation that is Western-centric in its primary preoccupations and envisioning of alternatives, suggesting that its ambition for more pluralist ways of thinking is not yet realised.

V. Discussion: where are the subjects of the liberal peace?

In making their important contributions to the liberal peace debate, in terms of discourses, political relations and ethics, all of these authors have shown a preoccupation with deconstructing its resonances with imperialism and colonialism. Duffield for example seeks to recover the imperial and racist pasts of liberal and developmental thought as a means of contextualising more recent practices, whilst carefully unpicking the discursive constructions of the global South.¹⁷⁵ Richmond also argues that the liberal peace operates with a ‘colonial gaze’,¹⁷⁶ whilst Chandler overtly considers statebuilding a form of ‘empire’, or ‘white man’s burden’, albeit a

¹⁷⁵ Duffield, Development, Security, especially chapters 7 and 8.
¹⁷⁶ Richmond, ‘Resistance and the post-liberal peace’
different type to that of the past.\textsuperscript{177} All focus on ways in which the agents of the liberal peace tend to construct a form of epistemic superiority for themselves over the territories and populations in which they intervene, re-constituting relations of paternalism and trusteeship. Within this, Duffield and Chandler put particular emphasis on the re-interpretation of doctrines that were intended to support an anti-imperial world order post-1945: principally ‘sovereignty’, but also ‘development’ and ‘security’. As noted at the outset of this chapter, this is important in terms of establishing the analytic, political and ethical terrain of critique, and in demanding reflection on these problems from those who defend intervention from the charge of imperialism in a supposedly post-imperial world.

Yet despite this anti-imperialist ethic within the critiques, it is possible to argue that they themselves retain what might be understood as a set of quite ‘Eurocentric’ horizons. Hall and Hobson argue that in theorising about liberal imperialism, contemporary postcolonial writers have tended to conflate Eurocentrism with racism and imperialism. In fact, they argue, in looking at liberals of the past it is possible to discern a complex relationship of the three whereby it is possible to be \textit{neither pro-imperialist nor racist, yet still Eurocentric}.\textsuperscript{178} In this piece, they understand Eurocentric gazes as emphasising the \textit{distinctive} character of Western civilisation, despite comprising a set of diverse views on the relationship between Europe and the rest of the world. This however did not make them imperialists: the thinkers they survey had radically different views on the desirability and feasibility of the \textit{mission civilisatrice}, based on a range of theories from liberal institutionalism to racism and cosmopolitanism. Importantly, many of them were also anti-imperialist. Yet within all of these was the underlying assumption that various ideas and traditions were the particular preserve of Western civilisation.

Bhambra also notes, following Wallerstein, that Eurocentrism in social theory has multiple faces, including ‘its historiography, the parochiality of its universalism, its assumptions about (Western) civilisation, its Orientalism and its

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  \item \textsuperscript{177} Chandler, \textit{Empire in Denial}.
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attempts to impose a theory of progress’, but adds that it can also be understood as a ‘belief, implicit or otherwise, in the world historical significance of events believed to have developed endogenously in the cultural-geographic sphere of Europe’. The point is, then, that Eurocentrism is about one’s conceptual framework and analytic framing of a problem, not simply about a pro- or anti-imperialist attitude.

Despite being quite strongly anti-imperialist in ethic and political stance, I would argue that there are some cognate analytic tendencies within the critical debate on the liberal peace, whereby the almost exclusive focus on the distinctiveness of the discourses, agencies, interests and values of the ‘liberal’ ‘West’ has largely obscured, except as a cipher of ‘local’ alterity, the subjecthood of those whose political existence is supposedly shaped by it. Whilst this does not necessarily invalidate the importance of these critiques, they are nonetheless inhibited in their pursuit of a post-colonial politics through the use of these Western-centric lenses, albeit in different ways.

This issue is perhaps most obviously manifested in the work of Richmond, whose focus on the problematic of alterity and liberal-local relations puts him exactly in this kind of conscientious bind – that is how to engage with a subaltern ‘other’, delineated by him as reflecting ‘context, custom, tradition and difference in its everyday setting’ whilst holding onto an emancipatory or critical research agenda which might also reflect liberal values such as democracy or human rights. It is through this that a kind of uncertainty or anxiety emerges about the nature of a ‘post-liberal peace’, which is on the one hand to be welcomed as it might represent a via media between the international social contract and indigenous legitimacy, but on the other might represent a space of colonial domination. Chandler argues that Richmond is preoccupied with an ‘empathetic’ engagement rather than any attempt

180 Ibid., 5.
181 Richmond, ‘Resistance and the post-liberal peace’
to ‘know’ as this would entail a form of hegemony.\textsuperscript{182} Begby and Burgess also pick up Richmond’s qualms about the possibility of ‘knowing’ the ‘non-liberal other’.\textsuperscript{183}

In order for this tension to be a coherent one, and for the ethical solution suggested to be appropriate, Richmond must lean on the distinction between the liberal and local being assumed as mutually unintelligible and constituted by different ontologies – a Western ideological hegemonic universalising mission on the one hand, and a site of culture and resistance on the other. This is followed through in how Richmond represents the ‘local’. As discussed above, there is a sense in which it is understood as implying the need for some kind of authentic space where needs and rights are expressed, compared to the ‘Western-induced artifice’\textsuperscript{184} that ‘civil society’ often represents. Yet where Richmond does engage with particular cases, as he has done regularly, he nonetheless tends to do so in the context of evaluating the failure of the liberal peace to live up to or fulfil its own programmes, as in Cambodia and East Timor.\textsuperscript{185} Local actors appear here as only strategic, engaged in a non-political struggle for state power and inter-group dominance and not as articulating a meaningful set of ideas and objectives.

What is most interesting about Richmond’s framework perhaps is not so much an essentialisation of the ‘Other’, which he is increasingly conscious about and aims to avoid,\textsuperscript{186} but the ways in which the West is made distinctive, represented through its genealogical relationship with its endogenous Enlightenment traditions and the values of the liberal peace.\textsuperscript{187} In this sense, the Eurocentric logic of the analysis manifests itself more obviously via a kind of ‘Occidentalism’.\textsuperscript{188} In this sense, Richmond seems to be following Foucault closely in his fixing of

\textsuperscript{182} Chandler, ‘The uncritical critique’, 153.
\textsuperscript{184} Richmond, ‘Resistance’, 670.
\textsuperscript{186} See Richmond’s footnote 10, in Richmond ‘Resistance’, in which he states that ‘local’ also means diverse.
\textsuperscript{187} Richmond, \textit{The Transformation of Peace}
\textsuperscript{188} I use this phrase rhetorically to contrast with the discussions of ‘orientalism’ already at work in the debate; however, there is a growing and more substantive scholarship about ‘Occidentalism’. See for example Carrier, J.G., (ed) (1995) \textit{Occidentalism: Images of the West}, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
liberalism within the specific history of the West. Moreover, it is clear that Richmond regards such a framework and its freedoms as being in some sense indispensable in a peacebuilding framework, which is why a ‘post-liberal’ peace which balances these values with ‘indigenous legitimacy’ is required. Indeed, on Richmond’s logic, if one could conceive of an emancipatory politics outside the supposed confines of Western liberalism, then the justification for the liberal peace itself becomes decidedly weaker. But since it is the ‘Enlightenment ontology’ which is assumed to be the source of emancipatory as well as conservative politics, we must perpetually deal with this agonistic tension between the West and its Others.

This paradox of liberalism works itself out in a very different way in Duffield’s work. Also following Foucault, Duffield sees liberalism as a technology of government, and biopolitics as the modern attempt to regulate populations and their life chances, although liberalism also has resources to resist and criticise this. There is arguably a less sanitised history of Western political thought offered in Duffield’s account of its genealogy to that of Richmond; rather he argues that liberalism’s paradox has a long history in its violent encounters with non-European populations and is not simply an expression of the contemporary liberal peace. Rather it has always been one way of dealing with the ‘surplus populations’ produced by capitalism which are necessary for its own reproduction.

Darby argues that Duffield can be considered a ‘post-colonial’ thinker; indeed he can be read as being engaged in the Foucaultian project of what Pasha calls ‘provincialising the West’ in his deconstruction of the liberal peace project. In this sense his focus on the agencies, discourses and practices of ‘Western’ political subjects and the capitalist system can be seen as a ‘necessary’ kind of Western-centrism borne out by the shape of analysis. For Duffield, future paths of engagement should begin with ‘the solidarity of the governed’ which begins from an understanding of the similarities between people and their struggles against

neoliberalism.\textsuperscript{193} This is a necessarily thin and broad vision of a basis for solidarity, in which it is envisioned that the principles of ‘mutuality and interconnectedness’\textsuperscript{194} will deliver a new and radical form of citizenship.

Whilst Duffield’s vision is in many ways attractive, it seems somewhat unsatisfying as a response to the proto-imperial structures of the liberal peace. In particular, the ‘thinness’ of the radical alternative seems in some ways the result of the ‘thick’ analytic engagement with the liberal peace, and more particularly the paradox of liberalism. In this set-up, the idea of freedom as such is implicitly rendered – to borrow Elshtain’s phrase – ‘ontologically suspicious’ - as it is seen as only a paradox resulting from the governmental technologies of liberalism. But does this have to be the case? In one reading this logic seems to reproduce the narcissistic notion that human freedom is essentially a Western liberal idea, a logic strongly contested within anti-Eurocentric histories of political ideas.\textsuperscript{195} Without this particular logic, the supposed ‘paradox’ immanent to liberalism and freedom becomes infinitely weaker, since the counter-assumption of diverse existing and valid cosmologies of freedom undercuts the apparent necessity of the contradictions.\textsuperscript{196} Indeed, rather than a ‘paradox’, delivered by conceptual/logical/historical necessity, the problem begins to look more straightforwardly like a form of ‘hypocrisy’, in which interveners preach one thing and do another, perhaps along Chandler’s line of argument. Duffield himself recognises this pattern of unevenness in his conception of ‘insured’ and ‘uninsured’ forms of life. As such, perhaps the apparent paradox of liberalism can be dealt with in a more satisfying manner through de-emphasising the centrality of the Foucaultian conundrum. In this sense Pugh’s more assertive embrace of a ‘life welfare’ approach based on a more egalitarian political economy is one that seems untroubled by the supposed paradox of liberalism and more clearly affirms a particular interpretation of it based on social insurance and liberal social contract

\textsuperscript{193} Duffield, Development, Security, Ch. 8.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{195} Sabaratnam, ‘IR in Dialogue’, 791.
\textsuperscript{196} This is a point made in Shilliam, R. "Redemption from Development: Amartya Sen, Rastafari and Promises of Freedom" Paper presented at the British International Studies Association Conference 2, Leicester, 16th December 2009.
theory, \(^{197}\) although this does not necessarily sit well with the issue of heterogeneity and in particular its implications for alternative aspirations.

Chandler also seems to reject the paradox of liberalism in his response to the other critics – arguing that the liberal peace does not represent so much the contradictions of divergent strands of liberalism but the mutation of the classical form which emphasised autonomy into an essentially degraded ‘neoliberal’ form which critiques it. \(^{198}\) He argues that in critiquing liberal aspirations \(^{199}\) critics suggest that the non-liberal Other is not ready for them, and we might lose the capacity for what must be assumed to be more important projects:

There is a danger that liberalism is criticised not for its inability to universalise economic growth and overcome the problems of combined and uneven development, but for the aspirations of development itself. \(^{200}\)

Essentially Chandler is arguing that the baby has been thrown out with the bathwater in the other critiques, undermining the possibility of a progressive politics. Whilst it is never made totally explicit what kind of politics of engagement Chandler would advocate, and indeed it is not clear that he would advocate anything specific, it is clear that his preoccupations with autonomy, sovereignty and the virtual death of political ideologies in the West indicate a kind of re-founded pluralist liberalism in which ‘politics’ and ‘autonomy’ are themselves more highly valued as the foundation of a properly political project. Yet as Lee Jones has recently argued, this seems to depend upon an implicit defence of the ‘mythology’ (Chandler’s word) of unproblematic autonomy as the basis for political society and an evasion of the issues raised by the shaping of a *homo oeconomicus* under a particular social order. \(^{201}\) Whilst Chandler is difficult to pin down on the issue, in several places his critique of post-structuralist and cosmopolitan approaches refer to the loss of the ‘liberal right-bearing subject’ \(^{202}\) and the ‘transformative dynamic

\(^{197}\) Especially in Divjak and Pugh, ‘The Political Economy of Corruption’.

\(^{198}\) Chandler, ‘The uncritical critique’.

\(^{199}\) Ibid., 152.

\(^{200}\) Ibid., 152, emphasis added.


ontology of the universal rational subject.\textsuperscript{203} Chandler points to such a loss as a serious problem for critical thinkers, and implies at times that the loss of a bounded community and rights-bearing subject of politics is a loss of politics \textit{per se}. It would seem that a recovery of politics thus implies a return to such a subject.

Like the other authors discussed here, Chandler’s main object of critique is the West and its intervention practices, and in this sense the critique, like the others under discussion, is also ‘necessarily’ Western-centric. Unlike the others, however, Chandler’s critique implies a kind of positive value to this parochialism as a baseline for political accountability. In this sense the critique is not keen to anticipate any kind of ‘solidarity’ with the subjects of statebuilding but is nostalgic for the decolonising ethics of sovereignty and self-determination because they establish boundaries for political community. In some senses, Chandler’s work changes the main focus of the debate on peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions to a battle over the changing character and interpretation of Western liberalism.

Whilst of course this may be a valuable conversation to have for a number of reasons, what it does do is marginalise the supposed subjects of intervention from the analytic framework. For a research agenda ostensibly concerned with pluralism and problematizing Western domination, this is surely a problem. It is not that there is a lack of case research as such – indeed many of the writers here have spent considerable time researching existing sites of the liberal peace around the world, and particularly Bosnia. Moreover, several critiques such as those of Richmond and Pugh articulate a particular concern to include ‘local voices’. Yet there often seems to be little way to actualise this desired pluralism in the research.

Where Richmond does engage with case studies, for example, the dominant narrative is that \textit{the liberal peace has failed in its aims}, in sectors such as democratisation and good governance, rule of law and civil society building, with political actors simply instrumentalising the discourses of internationals to pursue

\textsuperscript{203} Chandler, ‘The uncritical critique’, 155.
mono-ethnic or power-based political strategies. Whilst the opinions of international bureaucrats are often represented, the views of e.g. the Kosovans who are being represented as co-opted or anti-pluralist are not. Nor are the histories of the cases engaged as ways in which the politics of Kosovans may be located. Although Richmond has recently advocated for an ‘ethnographic’ turn in research, which may indicate recognition of this issue of exclusion, it does not yet seem to have emerged in his own work which reproduces this marginalisation.

Chandler and Pugh also focus on particular cases within their critiques – most often Bosnia and Kosovo as representing some of the most extensive sites of intervention. For Chandler in particular, the emphasis of analysis seems to be squarely on the views of interveners and the ways in which they deny or evade responsibility for the decisions they take in various policy areas. There is virtually no sustained engagement with the citizens of these countries as political subjects, with meaningful political histories and agendas, rather than the countries themselves as zones of intervention. This is in keeping with both the tenor of the critique and its main focus. For example, in his writings on anti-corruption initiatives within Bosnia, he suggests that it is the anti-corruption campaigns around elections themselves that have promoted disillusionment, although he seems to have little in the way of public opinion or evidence to support this claim, other than the fact that people continue to vote for nationalist parties. Yet this could be an important part of Chandler’s argument – if we are to assume, contra the interveners, that people in post-conflict environments are capable of authorising their own politics, why not deal with their expressed views on these issues? This would be consistent with the critique of statebuilding that Chandler wishes to advance.

Pugh’s focus in case studies has been mostly connected to the political economy of post-conflict states and the impact of neoliberal economic reforms on the provision of state benefits and redistribution. In comparison to Richmond and Chandler for example, he has shown relatively little interest in theorising the

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205 Franks and Richmond, ‘Co-opting liberal peace-building’.
206 Chandler, Empire in Denial, 154-157.
representation of intervened-in societies. Yet methodologically he has actually engaged more deeply with ‘local voices’ than either of these authors, in particular in looking at how Bosnian activists, journalists and academics have responded to and represented national economic problems. By and large, these viewpoints have been integrated into and support Pugh’s own analysis of the situation rather in service of a type of ‘heterogeneity’ to be engaged. The question that this throws up is then to what extent ‘local voices’ are relevant to the discussion, given that most of the analytic weight is thrown behind a critique of neoliberal structural adjustment whose fundamentals do not change regardless of the revisionist tendencies in intervention. Although Pugh does not address this issue explicitly, recent work suggests more of a balance emerging between the global and localised levels of critique – a theme which will be picked up in Chapter Three.

Duffield’s analysis is, like Chandler’s, focused on deconstructing the contradictions and assumptions of Western policy in various sites of intervention, and as a result the majority of the case analysis is directed at the activities of the agents of the liberal peace. However, in his detailed analysis of cases such as Sudan and Mozambique there is a much greater sense of the intended recipients as existing in their own right – that is to say engaged in meaningful political activity and with a lifeworld and a history beyond the structures of Western power. Indeed, one of the strong critiques that Duffield makes is that aid agencies tend to see the populations amongst which they work as being undifferentiated.

Yet his own conceptual framework seems simultaneously to roll back and push against the significance of the subjecthood of the recipients. In viewing liberalism as a technology of an expanding Western frontier of government, which consolidates sovereign power through biopolitical control over the populations of the South, Duffield’s analysis seems to suggest that this is a successful attempt to dominate the global South, operating through the constitution or cultivation of a liberal subjectivity. This mechanism is an important aspect of the understanding of

208 See in particular Duffield Global Governance, 202-254, Duffield, Development, Security, 82-110.
209 Ibid, 96.
210 Ibid., 187-188.
power as productive and constitutive of subjects, although Duffield makes efforts to qualify this. As such, there is a kind of tension between the narrative of a powerful West regulating the global South through structures of global liberal governance and the emergence of the various political actors in the South as having significance in their own right.

Roger Mac Ginty’s recent work on ‘local resistance’ and hybrid peace\textsuperscript{211} has made an important contribution towards redressing the balance of analysis away from an almost exclusive focus on interveners and their liberal credentials, towards an appreciation of how actors targeted by interventions engage in “renegotiation, subversion, non-engagement, cherry-picking, and outright resistance.”\textsuperscript{212} In developing a heuristic framework for understanding how in each situation this produces a ‘hybrid’, Mac Ginty’s work does much to articulate some of the kinds of agency and presence that exist in post-war societies beyond the ambit of interveners. The analysis of hybrid peace proceeds through five case studies – Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Northern Ireland, in each of which a particular dimensions of the liberal peace is explored: security, constitution-building, economic restructuring, governance and civil society involvement. The levels of hybridisation vary, according to factors such as the compliance capacities of interveners, their incentivising powers, local abilities to resist or adapt, and the maintenance of alternative forms of peacemaking. In each case, it is shown how the plans of liberal peacebuilders are subverted by environments, events and agencies which are beyond their control and comprehension, and how the outcomes often bear little resemblance to the blueprint. Therefore, for example, liberal peacebuilders have been forced to rely on ‘warlords’ for security in Afghanistan,\textsuperscript{213} Iraq’s ‘neo-liberal’ economic policy has very Keynesian cash injections and anti-competitive tendering,\textsuperscript{214} and Bosnia’s ‘liberal’ constitution-building has had to reckon with the historical legacies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{215}

\textsuperscript{211} Mac Ginty, \textit{International Peacebuilding}.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid. 17.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid., 91-107.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid., 122.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., 145.
Despite the deeper and richer empirical account of interventions, it is unclear what the theoretical grounding of Mac Ginty’s critical position is – indeed if his position is even ‘critical’ in the way that has been understood thus far in the discussion – namely, a critique of the hierarchies of international power. Whilst for example, he objects to the ‘ethnocentrism’ of much research, and the over-emphasis on the power of liberal transformation, he does not articulate much in terms of either why this is specifically a problem, nor how the ‘hybrid peace’ framework might help break out of this paradigm. Indeed, in using ‘liberal’ and ‘local’ as broad categories for understanding action, albeit with caution, the analysis cannot help but indicate that this is the major fault-line of how we should understand subjects in the ‘post-liberal peace’. Moreover, it is also unclear whether the ‘locals’ are understood as political subjects with relevant political goals or simply as strategic actors aiming to exploit the internationals. Mac Ginty is however conscious of such issues, noting for example that many researchers may lack the requisite ‘antennae’ to pick up and interpret behaviour. Whilst this important work provides some empirical substance to help move away from the Eurocentric or liberal-centric tendency in critiques of the liberal peace, the conceptual grounding and political significance of such experiences leaves questions to be answered, particularly as to how this helps move away from an ‘ethnocentric’ paradigm of critique.

Collectively then, although the critiques work to unpick the imperial and hierarchical structures of the liberal peace, they have largely tended to obscure the people who are the objects of this domination through their accounts of the political subject. As such, the apparent paradox of liberalism – ruling people to make them free – remains intact in various forms, even if there are elements of heterodoxy in and around it. It is for this reason that despite its dysfunctions, the future envisioned by the critiques does not look like a break from the past, but only a ‘post-liberal peace’ where a transformative agenda is tempered by empathy and the solidarity of the governed, or a withdrawal to the bounds of the sovereign community for

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216 Ibid., 2.
217 In particular, this is the case in the account of Afghan ‘warlords’ in Chapter Four.
218 Ibid., 209-10.
Chandler. Yet, as the following chapters will show, it is possible to think beyond this Eurocentric paradox and re-formulate the problems in a more fundamental way.

Conclusions

The lively debate on the liberal peace has been a very important one for the discipline of International Relations as a whole in recent times, representing the conjuncture of its emerging critical theories over the last few decades and their application to ‘real world’ politics. As this chapter has shown, however, although this debate has been rich and productive in terms of analytic frames for thinking about the liberal peace, it has not so far – with the exception of Mac Ginty to a limited extent – embraced a particularly pluralist research agenda despite its anti-imperial critiques. It has thus far remained focused within a rather ‘West’-centric debate, in which the broad associations of the West with the Enlightenment, with liberalism, with ideological politics and modernity arguably allow defenders such as Roland Paris to see empire and trusteeship as an ongoing necessity.²¹⁹

The following chapters look to a different tradition of anti-imperial thought for inspiration in re-thinking the subject of politics in the face of imperial rule – what is variously called ‘decolonising’ or ‘anti-colonial’ thought. This school of thought begins with the fundamental rejection of the paradox of liberalism and the foundation of ‘modern’ ‘liberal’ subjectivity as the necessary foundation of a ‘progressive’ politics. Indeed, this assumption is rendered strange within the context of a decolonising project, which seeks to develop immanent and specific understandings of domination to inform relevant strategies of resistance. In recovering the importance of the dominated as a historical and political subject, and in rejecting the projected self-images of imperial powers, decolonising thought may help re-frame the stakes involved in evaluating and re-thinking the importance of the liberal peace.

²¹⁹ Paris, ‘Saving liberal peacebuilding’.
Chapter Three

Re-thinking the subject of politics: embodied being in anti-colonial thought

Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the great capitalist powers has been completed.220 [Lenin]

I saw folk die of hunger in Cape Verde and I saw folk die from flogging in Guiné (with beatings, kicks, forced labour), you understand? This is the entire reason for my revolt..221 [Cabral]

I sincerely believe that a subjective experience can be understood by others; and it would give me no pleasure to announce that the black problem is my problem and mine alone and that it is up to me to study it...Physically and affectively. I have not wished to be objective. Besides, that would be dishonest: It is not possible for me to be objective.222 [Fanon]

The previous chapter argued that the critiques of the liberal peace had developed various arguments against Western power in post-conflict environments without substantively engaging the people targeted by interventions as political subjects. As discussed, this in part related to a conceptual thinning of the political subject via the regulative production of subjectivity, an assumption of its broadly communitarian basis or a simple rejection that politics could take place outside an assumed liberal rights-bearing subject. All of these resulted in critiques of the imperial or colonial character of the liberal peace, but did not necessarily dislodge a Eurocentric account of the world.

In this chapter, I draw upon the thought of Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon and Amílcar Cabral, three figures actively engaged in bringing about resistance to

European colonialism in the mid-twentieth century. These thinkers offer a basis for re-thinking the political subject – specifically the colonised political subject – and offer alternative ways to critique imperial structures of power through a reconstruction of subjecthood itself. However, this necessitates some fundamental critiques of philosophical orientation within the underlying political theory that informs critiques of the liberal peace. In this chapter, I discuss these elements as comprising a different articulation of, first, the embodied political subject, second, of the multi-dimensional political environment and third, of a humanist political ethics.

Collectively, these re-orientations provide a basis for articulating a subject targeted by powerful interventions as a proper subject of politics – and indeed for re-thinking our understanding of political subjects more broadly as being situated, embodied and involved in a multi-dimensional political world. They also articulate a basis for a political ethics of engagement based on a non-rationalist and non-reductive humanism. As I hope to demonstrate in the remainder of the thesis, using this as a basis for re-orienting critical analysis helps get over some of the binds of Eurocentrism and provides a basis for a more substantive critical political engagement with the significance of liberal peace interventions.

I. The critique of imperialism in earlier political thought

In order to contextualise the contributions of the anti-colonial movement as approaches to critical theory, it is helpful to think about the intellectual climate that had dominated public terms of critique up until that point. Within the first decade of the twentieth century, two broadly influential anti-imperial texts had been produced within Europe which set the tone for much of the antipathy towards empire as it developed there in the early twentieth century. These were John A. Hobson’s *Imperialism: A Study* and Vladimir Lenin’s *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, influential statements of liberal and socialist critiques of imperialism respectively. Both texts contained different but powerful and detailed analyses of the character, dynamics and effects of imperialism, much of which might resonate with the character of the early twenty-first century world economy. Yet, they did
not seriously engage with imperialism as a fundamental problem of social and political exclusion, nor really challenge the Eurocentric, racist and paternalist foundations of its intellectual framework.

Hobson’s seminal 1902 work *Imperialism: A Study*, was deeply influential across the English-speaking academy, and played an important role in inspiring the later analyses of Lenin and other self-identified socialists.\(^{223}\) Hobson’s work is however more often considered part of the ‘liberal’ reformist canon.\(^ {224}\) The work itself seeks to systematically problematise the ‘social pathology’\(^ {225}\) of imperialism through challenging the economic, political, social and scientific character of its impact on Britain and its imperial possessions, which Hobson sees as largely retrograde.

Economically, he argues that imperialism, through its reliance on military and financial protection, is a form of costly protection that is not worth the gains made.\(^ {226}\) Rather he suggest that Britain has done the ‘hard work’ of opening up markets but should let other powers expend energies in controlling them. The economic argument from the perspective of free trade is a central pillar of his critique, which itself is clearly directed at his contemporary British intellectuals and decision-makers and targeted towards reworking a conception of the national interest.

Politically, he considered imperialism to have given up in its major task of potential value – that is the preparation of natives for self-government. He is deeply disparaging of the haphazard way in which the empire is governed and administered, citing a study describing Colonial Office policy in ruling West Africa as akin to ‘a coma accompanied by fits’.\(^ {227}\) This is in contrast to the policy of ‘colonialism’ as Hobson understood it: permanent nationalist outgrowths with British-style representative institutions of government, such as Australia and Canada. Hobson argued that, on the contrary,

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223 Lenin, ibid, 15.
224 See, for example, Hall and Hobson ‘Eurocentric but not always imperialist’.
226 Ibid., Chapter V.
227 Ibid., 121.
[o]ur other colonies are plainly representative of the spirit of Imperialism rather than of colonialism. No considerable proportion of the population consists of British settlers living with their families in conformity with the social and political customs and laws of their native land: in most instances they form a small minority wielding political or economic sway over a majority of alien and subject people, themselves under the despotic political control of the Imperial Government or its local nominees.228

Thus imperialism was understood as having largely failed in its possible transformation of the political society of other lands. Most seriously, Hobson argued, imperialism had become a substantial moral failure, largely characterised by hypocrisy in its appearance as the disinterested spread of Christianity and civilisation rather than the pursuit of self-interest and commercial gain.229

Hobson’s proposed solution to these problems of international politics was not, however, an end to the rule and transformation of tropical societies by European powers, but he saw potential for international institutions and forms of Commonwealth to better direct the practices of imperialism.230 As Long argues, this was due to an implicit conviction that the ‘lower races’ could not necessarily be trusted to defend themselves or manage natural resources appropriately.231 It was also combined with credence in the possibility of scientifically understood racial order being managed rationally by an internationalist policy:

Effective internationalism is the only sound basis of competition and rational selection among nations. In the cruder form of the human struggle, accident, or numbers, or some primitive force or cunning, may secure the success of a people whose “social efficiency” is of a low order, impermanent and unproductive, while it stamps out or checks the growth of a people whose latent powers of achievement and capacities of progress are far superior. Only in proportion as racial or national selection is rationally guided and determined does the world gain security against such wastes and calamities.232

Although Hobson’s standpoint had made him critical of the hypocrisies and wastes of imperialism as it was practiced at the turn of the century by the British, this

228 Ibid., 7.
229 Ibid., 198.
231 Ibid., 81.
232 Hobson, Imperialism, 193.
critique was completely devoid of an engagement with the ‘lower races’ as political beings except as likely to rebel if overly exploited. In his imaginary, the world should be, and was, dominated by the white nations and their traditions of political order. Yet it was also put into danger by the tendency of the white nations to allow the illusion of private economic gain to result in politically damaging and morally bankrupt forms of imperialism. Imperialism for Hobson thus represented the corruption of free trade and European rule.

Lenin’s text, on the other hand, articulated an account of imperialism as the highest form of monopoly capitalism. He borrowed extensively from Hobson’s analysis and empirical material but also reacted against it, reframing the process in more clearly Marxist terms of conflicting social forces, the concentration of production, the export of finance capital rather than goods and the consolidation of monopoly power within imperial ‘spheres of influence’. Imperialism in this stage of its historical development was both antagonistic and militaristic, resulting in the uneven development and exploitation of the rest of the world in order to continue the generation of profit for the capitalists.

Yet, for Lenin, what was important about imperialism was that historically speaking, it was the precursor to worldwide revolution, which was accelerated by the world being interlinked into a single capitalist monopoly of production. The monopolistic character of production relations were thus amenable to being subject to co-ordinated socialist control. Attempts to pull back from imperialism in favour of more peaceful co-operation, as apparently advocated by Hobson and, the bête noire of the essay, Kautsky, were thus bourgeois and reactionary in attempting to stave off the restive forces of struggle across the world by the workers.

The significance of colonialism in this historical process was principally in accelerating competition once the division of the world amongst the imperialists had been achieved. Lenin’s line in this sense clearly resonated with the writings of Marx, who had earlier written that India’s insertion into British colonialism had

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233 Ibid.
234 Lenin, Imperialism.
235 Ibid., chapter IX.
236 Ibid., 118-9.
many destructive effects but that it would be able to enter the bourgeois period of history which was necessary for social revolution.\textsuperscript{237} As such, imperialist colonialism was understood as a kind of necessary evil for the purposes of true social progress, albeit one which incurred broad exploitation and suffering.

The European left’s critical accounts of imperialism and colonialism in the early to mid 20\textsuperscript{th} century derived in a large number of ways from these two influential narratives, which, although widely illuminating and critical, characterised the phenomena in a way which was deeply Eurocentric.\textsuperscript{238} Hobson clearly regarded Europe and white nations in general as a standard for the best forms of government, culture and political order – while he expresses some mitigation and ambivalence in places about the extent to which the representatives of such countries live up to such a framing, it is nonetheless important in his understanding of imperialism and the relations with colonies in Africa and Asia. This Eurocentrism is clearly compounded by a failure to confront the racist tropes of his age, which he believes fall under the domains of science and rationalism.

Lenin’s analytic Eurocentrism is of a substantially different order, although with some curiously similar analytic outcomes in terms of the colonised countries. Lenin’s focus is basically exclusively centred on analysing the metropolitan countries and capitalists, with the subjects of this order mentioned only in passing as a broad mass of millions who are exploited by it. Otherwise they are substantially absent from the narrative. Their problem in Lenin’s framework is that colonial subjects – and a number of other lesser intellectuals – are largely ignorant of their conditions, or have leaders who are compromised by the reactionary bourgeois demand for national independence. Lenin’s analysis is thus produced as a form of disabusing the wider ignorance regarding the world historical significance of imperialism as presaging the beginning of the end of capitalism and the move to a higher form of production. The fate of colonial countries is to first be inserted into the system of global capitalism before it can be superseded. As such they are

\textsuperscript{237} Marx, K., (1853), ‘The Future Results of British Rule in India’, \textit{New York Tribune}, August 8\textsuperscript{th} 1853. Retrieved 8\textsuperscript{th} October 2011 at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/07/22.htm

\textsuperscript{238} This is not to deny the important role that particular members of the European left played in the decolonisation process as both activists and advocates within Europe for the end of empire.
understood as being developmentally backward and lacking in their own historical agency.

The analytic and prescriptive outcome for both Hobson and Lenin is a deferment in the short-term of freedom for the colonies, in favour of an improved colonialism which will accelerate the movement of societies towards European frameworks, understood as the only path of civilizational or historical progress. In this sense, they did not reserve any particular kind of critique for colonialism in and of itself – it was a subsidiary problem – or for Hobson not really a problem – in the broader framework of imperialism. In this, we can already begin to sense some analytic affinities with the paradox of liberalism elaborated in Chapter Two – there is an understanding that global imperial domination constitutes a problem, but there is an ambivalence about the character of the solution, which might itself in certain cases require a better adherence to the values of the ‘West’ or ‘Europe’, such as for Chandler. As with the critiques of the liberal peace, this is integrated into a serious and substantial critique of global power. Yet these are critiques in which the objects of domination are largely silent and not expected to make demands as political subjects.

Some of the anti-colonial thinkers, to which we now turn, derived much intellectually from both the Hobsonian and Leninist critiques of imperialism which framed important aspects of their critical theory – particularly their narratives of the global economic structures of imperialism. However, they understood them to be fundamentally inadequate as critical theories for people in the colonies – that is theories that would problematize power relations in a way which would more fully expose and challenge the modes of domination experienced. Yet, in order to do this, they found it necessary not just to challenge the tactical basis of anti-imperialist activity but the deeper philosophical understanding of social and political being upon which political activity was based.

In the following section, we will look at the work of Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral and Aimé Césaire as important exemplars of this intellectual and political tradition seeking to re-found the ‘subject’ of politics outside the delineations of colonial and imperial Europe. Whilst it is not possible to do justice to the
complexities of their positions here, what follows is a synthetic reading of their thought, which offers a platform for the kind of philosophical re-orientations needed to approach the ongoing question of Eurocentrism in the critical liberal peace debate, and indeed more widely in the study of world politics. Whilst there are significant differences between their standpoints which are important in considering them more holistically as thinkers, in what follows I will focus on some common areas of concern which are relevant to these issues.²³⁹

II. Anti-colonial activists as critical thinkers

The extraordinary context in which these thinkers operated is particularly important for an appreciation of the significance of their thought. Césaire and Fanon were brought up in Martinique under French assimilationist colonialism, working as professionals in Martinique but spending time in Paris for their higher education. The young Fanon however also studied in Martinique under Césaire, who was a deeply important influence on him. Cabral was brought up in Cape Verde but was educated in Lisbon during the Salazar regime. In this sense, they had unusual access to education and wealth compared to the vast majorities in their countries of birth. During these earlier decades of the twentieth century, the social networks formed in colonial capitals amongst black students from the colonies, including sympathisers amongst European thinkers and political movements, were very important as counter-hegemonic intellectual networks in which various ideas circulated. As such, they may be regarded as nodes in a broader historical political movement which was actively involved in bringing about – it is no exaggeration to say – worldwide political change.

The individual careers of the three thinkers were however also of relevance to the analyses they developed of colonialism. Césaire returned to Martinique in 1939, qualified to teach French literature, and was already a poet of some renown. Surrealist André Bréton was a close colleague who had taken up re-publishing his work for a wider audience – in particular the poem Notebook on Returning Home.

Césaire’s *Discourse on Colonialism* was written in 1950, shortly after his return to Martinique, and published in English three years afterwards. He went on to become much more active politically, joining the French Communist Party for a short time until he fell out with them over the Hungarian uprising in 1956. He continued to be active in Martinican politics as mayor of Fort-de-France and founder of the Martinican Progressive Party until the beginning of this century. All the while, however, Césaire also pursued his politics through his art in plays and poetry, including in biopics of Henri Christophe and Patrice Lumumba, and in a radical re-writing of *The Tempest*. As will be discussed further on, Césaire used his platform as a poet and politician to ask questions about the human and cultural dimensions of colonialism and racism, which was a fundamental grounding for his critique of colonial politics.

Fanon’s short career was in some ways more deeply interwoven with the colonial machine. After studying under Césaire in Martinique at the lycée, he served in the Free French Army, initially on the European front, for two years. Whilst studying medicine in Lyon, he began to write *Black Skin, White Masks*, which was published the year after he qualified as a doctor. In 1953, he accepted a post in a psychiatric hospital in Algeria, where he instituted ‘radical changes’ in the practice of colonial psychiatry. Yet, increasingly unwilling to treat the symptoms of the colonial situation rather than the cause, he resigned in 1956 and put his efforts into working with the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) both inside and outside Algeria, both writing its central publication *El Moujahid* and representing the FLN in various conferences abroad. However, by late 1960 his leukaemia had become apparent. He rushed to complete *The Wretched of the Earth* in 1961 in Tunis, before dying in Washington in December, and being smuggled in for burial in Algeria. Fanon’s intimate acquaintance with colonial psychology and psychiatry clearly left a deep impression on his writings, and in particular, as we will see, on the ways in which he understood the relationship between people and society.

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Cabral’s professional training and experience as an agronomist kept him in close contact with the land and the socio-economic issues of agriculture, which was to become a central pillar of his political response to colonialism. Born in colonial Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau) to Cape Verdean parents, Cabral earned a scholarship to study agronomy in Lisbon in 1945. Simultaneously, he became closely involved with the emerging lusophone African nationalist movements at the Casa dos Estudantes, organising and meeting regularly with fellow students. After graduating with high honours in 1951, he undertook a range of work for the Portuguese agricultural ministry, much of which involved closely surveying the soils in Portugal, Guinea, Cape Verde and Angola over a period of years. This travel allowed him to found the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde) in 1956, and also to reinforce and deepen the connections with other anti-colonial movements such as the MPLA (Movimento Popular da Liberação de Angola). It was during this time that Cabral also developed his distinctive analytic approach to the question of African liberation, which drew heavily on his own understanding of political economy and social order. Cabral led what was widely understood to be a highly successful peasant revolutionary war in Guinea-Bissau against the Portuguese. Although he was assassinated in 1973, politically the PAIGC had all but succeeded in its attempt to overthrow the colonial authority.\textsuperscript{242}

These three figures thus had quite different but connected lives, which we see implicated closely with the kind of political thought that they developed. The African independence movements were closely personally connected with each other, and to a lesser extent the other decolonisation movements from Asia and Latin America. Yet, at least as important as the general intellectual climate were their personal experiences as colonial subjects and as professionals at the ‘coalface’ of colonialism – particularly for Fanon and Cabral. This experience, combined with conviction that the colonial experience was of a distinctive kind,\textsuperscript{243} had substantially alienated them from the mainstream left in France and Portugal at the time, with Fanon and Cabral never joining the respective Communist Parties, and Césaire leaving the French Communist Party in 1956.

\textsuperscript{242} The information in this paragraph is drawn from Chabal, P. (2002). \textit{Amilcar Cabral: revolutionary leadership and people’s war}, London: Hurst & Company, Chapters 2 & 3.
This chapter will next explore are some specific ways in which the anti-colonial thinkers’ political departures from European movements were connected to and supported by specific philosophical departures in the nature and form of political critique. It is clearly impossible to do justice to the complexities and contradictions of these works with such an exercise in the context of the thesis; nonetheless it is possible to use them as a lamplight for more contemporary issues through this re-telling. Although they are influenced by the kinds of arguments that Hobson and Lenin use regarding the character of imperialism, they understand the objectives of critique and the character of colonial oppression quite differently. Towards the end of the chapter, we will reflect on how these philosophical departures can also help understand the conceptual limitations of the contemporary critical debate on the liberal peace.

III. Re-orientating political critique

As McCulloch argues, it is important to see Césaire, Fanon and Cabral as responding directly to their discomfort with Eurocentric or reductive accounts of political order and the colonial condition.244 This is very apparent where there is direct engagement of a particular thinker, such as between Fanon and Sartre,245 but can also be understood as directed towards the broad environment of imperial and anti-imperial thought, which were dominated by liberal and Leninist accounts of imperialism. This discomfort stemmed in part from the mismatch between the contemporary context of anti-colonial antagonism and revolt, and the failure of European political theory to comprehend its significance.

This is interesting to us now because of the problem-space laid out in Chapter Two in the critiques of the liberal peace, which I have suggested have tended to analytically marginalise or represent sparsely the experiences of intended beneficiaries, whilst strongly emphasising the distinctively Western or neoliberal

244 Ibid., 112.
character of hierarchical intervention. The philosophical departures of anti-colonialism however shine a light on other possible ways to think about the political subject and social relations in a way which is helpful for reframing the debate.

i. The embodied, situated subject of politics

In making demands for political recognition, equality and autonomous status in the context of the decolonising movement, anti-colonial thinkers realised they had to overturn the ways of thinking which insisted on deferring this for colonial subjects. These were connected to forms of scientific and cultural racism as well as to historically teleological accounts of political society. Such accounts, for which we have taken Hobson and Lenin as representatives, depended on ontologies of a human subject and political economy which were at their most advanced or free in white, civilised, capitalist Europe. Rejecting this understanding of the subject was therefore a critically important dimension of decolonising political thinking.

In the first place, anti-colonial thought critiqued the absence of the non-European political subject. Césaire’s work, emerging first chronologically amongst the three, recognised in colonial politics the denial of ‘African Presence’ – the title of an influential journal published and edited with Léopold Senghor. The denial of presence – understood in literary, historical, cultural terms – was, they argued, what allowed the justification that ‘civilisation’ was being brought by Europe to Africa. Césaire’s work was thus directed against the rejection of black civilisation that was both implicit and explicit in their discourses. The notion of ‘Négritude’, developed in the work of Senghor as well as Césaire, was a means of trying to identify and come to terms with the wrench in social, cultural and historical terms that slavery had meant for many people of African descent, as well as re-establish a deeper notion of being ‘black and proud’ through engaging with this.

Most famously, the Notebook on Returning Home / to the Native Land is a set of reflections on what blackness / ‘négritude’ meant both as a source of historical misery and possible strength for the future. This was clearly a crucial part of

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246 Léopold Sédar Senghor was a political activist and poet who later became the first President of independent Senegal in 1960.
247 Frutkin., op.cit, 18.
building up an understanding of people as subjects with political significance, historical presence, agency and the right to claim freedom. As such, Césaire is re-grounding the historical lineages of Caribbean blacks from the rivers of the Zambeze and Congo through the Haitian revolution. Yet it involved a complex re-evaluation of the historical consciousness of what ‘blackness’ represented, particularly for the diasporas of Martinique and the wider Caribbean. To reconstruct the embodied history of the diaspora was necessary intellectually; yet it was also to come to terms with the painful ambiguities of this history which was not like the victors’ history told of Europe. The sense of this task being nonetheless unavoidable is clear from Césaire’s work – to fail to reflect on Africa as an embodied historical subject is to render Europe’s presence within it as inevitable.

Going beyond the need to redress ‘absence’ per se, Fanon radicalises the understanding of the political subject as being fundamentally ‘embodied’ in the world, with what he labels a critique of ontology or Being. This can be understood in the context of Sartrean existential philosophy, with which he was a fellow traveller, which critiqued the transcendental subject as the basis for philosophy. For Fanon, most clearly in Black Skin, White Masks, there was no hope of understanding the black man through a transcendental subject of philosophy, which erased and negated both his experience of being and his subjecthood:

Ontology – once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside – does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For not only must the black man be black; he must also be black in relation to the white man…The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man.

Thus, a political philosophy based on the abstraction of ontology, disregarding the lived experience of racialised political life would be unable to analyse and address the alienating ‘massive psychoexistential complex’ that colonialism had produced. The transcendental subject of European philosophy was a canard

249 Ibid.,
251 Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks, 82-3.
252 Ibid., 5.
‘human’, to which the white man aspired, and to which the black man never could on white society’s terms. Fanon’s argument was thus that racialised subjecthood and political consciousness was instead to be understood largely ‘sociogenically’ – generated and invented through social relations. The attempt to make a transcendental subject the ‘proper’ subject of politics is thus the attempt to ignore the social relations and processes of recognition and identification which constitute and make possible human being.

Fanon’s critique is thus one which challenges the negation of the black subject as a human and a political subject, which is a negation produced by a combination of racial over-determination from the white gaze, as well as adherence to an implicitly white model transcendental subject of politics. These combined tendencies produce an empty mimicry as the only possible future for black political subjects in a racialised social order, in which one’s sense of self will always conflict with society’s interpretation of one’s misplacement or lesser status. Fanon argues that this is deeply alienating, and will ultimately end in defeat for the black subject:

Nevertheless with all my strength I refused to accept that amputation. I feel in myself a soul as immense as the world, truly a soul as deep as the deepest of rivers, my chest has the power to expand without limit. I am a master and I am advised to adopt the humility of the cripple. Yesterday, awakening to the world, I saw the sky turn upon itself utterly and wholly. I wanted to rise, but the disembowelled silence fell back upon me, its wings paralyzed. Without responsibility, straddling Nothingness and Infinity, I began to weep.

This powerful passage brings out precisely the existential dilemma that a racialised transcendental construction of subjecthood delivers for Fanon – it is a conceptual delimitation of the ways which he is allowed to exist and be present in the world; it is an ontological set-up that will always exclude him. The negation of embodiment required by an abstracted formulation of the human subject has produced a trap for the colonial, racialised subject. As I will discuss further on, this trap of abstraction resonates with the paradox of liberalism identified in Chapter Two. For Fanon, one
way out of this is through a recovering a phenomenological approach to the understanding of the social world, which focuses on subjectively and inter-subjectively experienced dimensions of being. A focus on embodied experience thus offers a potential for political critique that a transcendental or abstract conception of politics cannot: it is the path between ‘Nothingness and Infinity’ in which concrete liberating action must be understood.

If Césaire rejected the negation of cultural-historical presence, and Fanon the negation of embodied being, Cabral can be understood as rejecting the derogation of African subjecthood within the historical teleology of orthodox Marxism. In this Cabral was also a strong advocate of appreciating the essentially situated and specific nature of critique and struggle. Whilst he certainly did not reject the underlying theoretical premises of Marxism regarding the nature of capitalism, he considered them useless outside of a context in which they could be made relevant. As Chabal argues,

Cabral’s analysis shows that he was not concerned with a theoretical discussion of Marxism per se, but with its relevance to colonised societies. His historical specificity and his uncompromisingly African perspective were implicit criticisms of much orthodox European Marxism of the time, ‘Marxism is not a religion’, he once said, and Marx did not write about Africa.256

Thus critique meant not only specifying the experiential content of colonialism, but also being careful about the particularities of the Guinean-Cape Verdean context as opposed to other revolutionary contexts. One could not simply replicate, as he famously argued, the Cuban revolution, in Guinea, as Guinea had different geographical, economic, social, cultural and political structures.257 Historical specificity was important on two fronts for Cabral; firstly, it had strategic value in supporting the struggle for national liberation with which he was preoccupied, but secondly, it aligned with his broadly ‘people-centred’ approach to political philosophy. Chabal’s view is that this rendered Cabral a deeply pragmatic figure, who was simply sceptical in a broad sense about the value of theory alone. Indeed there is something sceptical in Cabral’s statements which confirms this, particularly in his

critique of Marxism and his characteristic humility around the implications of his own approach. It is a sentiment that resonates with Fanon’s sense of an embodied critique: ‘I do not come with timeless truths’, rather that his analysis speaks to ‘my century, my country, my existence… I belong irredicibly to my time’.258

However, McCulloch argues that the implications of Cabral’s thought are in fact themselves theoretically significant as an alternative African theory of imperialism.259 Indeed, he goes to some lengths to substantiate his approach around ‘the weapon of theory’ and the importance of engaging conceptually with each site of struggle.260 McCulloch argues that Cabral’s insistence on looking at class formation in pre-colonial Africa was a major departure from theories of imperialism which assumed that Africa had been classless and pre-historical before the arrival of the Europeans, as well as a critique of more essentialist writings on Négritude.261 Indeed, Cabral refused, politically and analytically, to ignore the historical experience of African societies. His subsequent theoretical focus on the mode of production as a key element of social structure was a means of getting to what he understood as the ‘reality of the land’ in Guinea and the particular impact that Portuguese imperialism had had on its productive use.262 Serequeberhan argues that for Cabral, there was a constant dialectical interplay between the conceptualisation of experience and the experience itself.263 As with Fanon, then, the need to begin with rather than exclude embodied experiences led to a fundamental re-appraisal of political theory.

To summarise, although it happens in quite different ways for these thinkers, we can interpret a common concern that decolonising political critique needed to be based on an ‘embodied’ subject. First, it needed to attack the somatic, racialised ordering of humanity which made African subjects non-entities in a political sense. Second, however, it needed to reclaim the embodied, rather than transcendental,

258 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 1, 6.
259 McCulloch, In the twilight of revolution, 114.
261 McCulloch, In the twilight of revolution, 116.
262 Ibid.
subject as a source and site of political critique. For Césaire, the negritude movement served more or less this purpose – it worked through a reframing of racial embodiment, being unable to escape it. In Fanon’s later writings, especially *The Wretched of the Earth*, political violence against colonialism became articulated as the *embodied* response to the political violence embedded within colonialism.264

The third sense in which the political subject needed to be ‘embodied’ in decolonising thought is in its historical specificity or timeliness. This is a further aspect of the decolonising critique of an abstract or transcendental subject of ideology; rather, ideologies are directed towards particular historical problems and have value insofar as they help imagine a future for the subjects of this period. As mentioned, Cabral is strongly associated with this position in his critique of Leninist revolutionary theory, which I have suggested derives from political as well as practical concerns. As Gordon argues, for Fanon, this is because ontology which is abstracted from its concrete, sociogenic conditions is precarious: if the world with which the text was consistent was disordered, the consistency of the text itself had nothing to recommend it.265 Clearly this is a understanding of the need for historical embedding in political thought which is distinct to that of Cabral, who sees the African peasantry has having a distinctive niche in history; nonetheless they share an understanding that political critique – in their time the project of national liberation – is necessarily grounded in its own situation. When interviewed in later life, Césaire made a similar point regarding thinking on Négritude – that it was a timely statement of blackness directed against the alienating conditions of racism.266

By contrast, looking back towards the critiques of the liberal peace discussed in the previous chapter, the notion of an embodied, situated subject of politics – in all three senses – is largely absent. This absence is most obvious in terms of the intended beneficiaries of the liberal peace, whose presence in the analysis is mostly non-existent. When intended beneficiaries are invoked, however, they are usually silent, their subjecthoods often compromised via co-optation or

governmentality, or else they are defined by a space outside liberal politics which is culturally authentic or communitarian in character. They may appear to be strategically engaged, but these strategies are cynical and have no political meaning. Alternatively, they may simply belong to the ‘surplus populations’ of capitalism. Yet, they are not understood to be proper subjects of politics.

In all of these analytic frameworks, one has a sense of the dispensability of the target subject, who is over-determined from without by the hegemonic power of the liberal peace and the paradox of liberalism. In response to recent critiques, authors have increasingly begun to talk about ‘resistance’, but even this takes place on the terrain of analysis already established between the liberal and local.267 There is thus no need to engage with the specific historical conditions, experiences or meanings given to social and political relations, or the distinctiveness of these in one case rather than another. Rather, the subject of intervention can be understood as either transcendently proto-liberal/welfarist, as in the case of Chandler and Pugh, or transcendently ‘local’, as in the case of Richmond. Yet, if we follow Fanon’s critique of the transcendental subject, this analytic set-up negates the necessarily embodied character of political subjecthood as well as the potential that embodied subjecthood offers as a basis of critique. I would add, however, that it also disembodies intervention and interveners, who become reduced to ciphers of ‘liberalism’ and the liberal political project in the analysis.

One of the aims of an alternative critical analysis of the liberal peace then might be to reconstruct an understanding of what an engagement with ‘embodied’ political subjects of the liberal peace would look like. Although there are snippets of such engagement within the existing debate, particularly in Mac Ginty’s work, these have been incidental rather than deliberate in terms of the analysis. The engagement with embodied subjecthood on the other hand is a guiding preoccupation and orientation for the rest of this thesis. Chapter Four reflects in further detail about what this would entail and how this can be achieved by a set of decolonising research strategies.

267 See, for example, Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace’ and Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*. 
ii. A multi-dimensional conception of politics

Related to the emphasis on the embodied character of the political subject, these three thinkers also insisted that colonial domination was of an essentially *multi-dimensional* nature, and that understanding all of these multiple dimensions was critical. This multiplicity comprised what can be understood as structural and experiential dimensions, involving historical, political, economic and other domains, which worked at levels which were personal, social and systemic, and these bases of domination were understood as being reciprocal and dependent on each other.268 In this then, one has an idea of the interconnected environment in which the colonised subject operates.

As implied by the previous discussion, theoretical reduction, purity and parsimony were not considered particularly helpful as foundations for political analysis for the anti-colonial thinkers. As Fanon put it, ‘Reality, for once, requires a total understanding. On the objective level as on the subjective level, a solution has to be supplied.’269 From the outset, it is the emphasis on *activism* – on finding a ‘solution’ to the *experience* of domination – which pushes critique towards a multi-dimensional account of politics that understands its lived dimensions.

For all three, this manifested as a continuous back-and-forth between the analyses of broad structures and the concrete manifestations in the lives of the colonised, although with variations in how they saw the relations between the levels. Importantly, however, all perceived that there were forms of *disjuncture* between the grand analytic diagnoses offered by European thinkers and the experiences of the colonised.

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268 As a note, I would mention that this conception of multi-dimensionality differs somewhat from the idea of ‘intersectionality’ in the later tradition of thought. Intersectionality, as I have understood it, relates to the overlapping of distinct and differentiated hierarchical social structures such as class, race and gender which produce distinctive forms of ‘double’ or indeed ‘triple’ oppression. Multi-dimensionality as I use it here however expressed different dimensions of domination working together which produce a particular environment for the political subject. For debates on intersectionality see Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). ‘Intersectionality and feminist politics’. *European Journal of Women’s Studies*, 13(3), 193-209.

269 Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 4.
Cabral’s account of the political economy is typically structured in this way, moving between a focus on the ‘reality’ of dispossession and violence in the colonies and a structuralist line which explores the global system of imperialist capitalism, as exemplified in the Havana speech. 270 Throughout his body of analysis however, runs the need to start from ‘the reality of the land’. 271 This is accentuated in his internal exhortations given to the audience of fellow activists in Guinea, where he consistently grounds his arguments in the specific details of colonial power. 272

Andrade argues that it was the conduct of the agricultural survey of Guinea in 1953 that gave Cabral the rooted and concrete analysis of ‘the basic, essential motivations for the struggle against colonial domination’. 273 The findings of this survey underpin Cabral’s writings on the ‘economic reality’ of Portuguese colonialism, which speak to the specifics of the Guinean and Cape Verdan economies, detailing his mother’s paltry and inconsistent wages at the fish-packing station, to the comparative weakness of the port infrastructure, the consistent shortages arising from agricultural practice. 274 His indictments in Portuguese Colonial Domination, one of the early liberation struggle pamphlets published in 1960, lists a number of economic complaints against colonialism, including the non-ownership of cultivated property, the forced acceptance of low prices, the driving of Africans off more profitable land and crop holdings, the high profits of the colonial companies, the ‘native tax’ on Africans and the spending of these revenues on Europeans. His last analogy is a visually and politically arresting one: ‘The setting up of each European family costs Angola one million escudos. For an African peasant family to earn that much money, it would have to live for a thousand years and work every year without stopping.’ 275

271 E.g. Blackey, ‘Fanon and Cabral’, but also Chabal, ‘The Social and political Thought of Amilcar Cabral’.
272 Davidson, B., (1979), 'Introduction', in Cabral, Unity and Struggle, x-xi.
273 Ibid., xxvi
274 Ibid., 52.
Davidson notes this was a particularly impressive skill or facility of Cabral as an educator and political thinker – the ability to see the linkages from theory and structure to the manifest reality of the world around him.\textsuperscript{276} I would however go further and suggest that this ‘double reading’ of the world was of very specific importance for anti-colonial political thinkers, who were openly conscious of the different directions in which experience and theory could pull, particularly where theory seemed to imagine itself distantly from the site of rule. Intimately linked to the recovery of the embodied subject, then, must be a form of analysis of experience that can flesh out this embodiment and make it live.

For Fanon’s conception of the embodied subject, for example, engaging with the phenomenological experiential content of social relations is fundamental, because, as we have noted, the racialised subject is sociogenically constituted. As Gibson puts it, racial difference ‘was grounded in a social and historical context and was the result of a lived experience not an ontological flaw: one is not born Black but becomes Black, to rephrase de Beauvoir’.\textsuperscript{277} As noted above, Fanon looked for solutions on ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ levels. It is on this front that Gibson takes exception to interpretations of Fanon that only take up his work from a psychoanalytic or textual-discursive angle – Fanon himself is clear from the outset in \textit{Black Skins} that there are concrete political and economic structures at work in the production of being.\textsuperscript{278}

Yet the content of the experience is such that it sometimes exceeds structural analysis dimensions which are nonetheless significant for the way that the world is – in terms of the alienation produced within violence, economic dispossession, sex, language and class hierarchies as obvious examples. This excess of manifestation does not stand outside what colonialism is; rather it is a constitutive part of the social whole and the relations between the people within it. Maintaining a multi-dimensional frame for analysis and moving between the different dimensions and different levels is thus necessary for understanding, and eventually changing, the realities of colonial social order.

\textsuperscript{276} Davidson, ‘Introduction’.
\textsuperscript{278} Gibson, N. C. (1999), ‘Fanon and the pitfalls of cultural studies’, in Alessandrini, \textit{Frantz Fanon: critical perspectives}. 105
In Césaire’s reading, analysing the manifest dimensions of colonialism has a more strategic rhetorical purpose. This reading allows him to mount a direct and stinging critique of the violent *hypocrisies* of rule which a reading of its capitalist economic structures alone would not necessarily facilitate:

In other words, the *essential thing here is to see clearly, to think clearly* – that is, dangerously – and to answer clearly the innocent first question: what, fundamentally, is colonization?\(^{279}\)

One of the most important intellectual strategies Césaire deployed in his visceral and pointed polemic *Discourse on Colonialism* was the critical *inversion* he performed on the claims of colonialism to ‘civilise’ the South; in fact, he argued, colonialism actively worked to de-civilise the coloniser through its use of violent and racist repression.\(^{280}\) Importantly, for Césaire these were not incidental or aberrant ‘implementation problems’ of colonialism but written into its degenerative logic of domination. As a strategy of public, political, anti-colonial critique its force was undeniable – the colonial emperor not only lacked clothing but was actually himself the barbarian at the gates, bringing not peace as he claimed, but violence.

*Importantly, Césaire performed this inversion by building up a phenomenological picture of the material realities of colonialism, which put into context its supposed achievements and intentions:*

They throw facts at my head, statistics, mileages of roads, canals, and railroad tracks.

*I am talking about thousands of men sacrificed to the Congo-Océan? I am talking about those who, as I write this, are digging the harbor of Abidjan by hand…*

They dazzle me with the tonnage of cotton or cocoa that has been exported, the acreage that has been planted with olive trees or grapevines.

*I am talking about natural economies that have been disrupted, harmonious and viable economies adapted to the indigenous population-- about food crops destroyed, malnutrition permanently introduced, agricultural development*

\(^{279}\) Césaire, *Discourse on colonialism*, 32, emphasis added.

\(^{280}\) Ibid., 35.
oriented solely toward the benefit of the metropolitan countries; about the looting of products, the looting of raw materials.\(^{281}\)

In this passage Césaire delivers an emerging sense of the physical world of colonialism – of how it implicates human labour and natural resources, and the resulting distributive impact of the system – in marked contrast with the abstract developmental accomplishments proclaimed by the colonisers. The way in which the world *materialises* is very important in understanding how and why it is to be criticised – indeed for Césaire this results in reality being the opposite of the world that the colonisers believe themselves to be living in:

The proof is that at present it is the indigenous peoples of Africa and Asia who are demanding schools, and colonialist Europe which refuses them; that it is the African who is asking for ports and roads, and colonialist Europe which is niggardly on this score; that it is the colonized man who wants to move forward, and the colonizer who holds things back.\(^{282}\)

Césaire’s phenomenological reading of the political economy of colonialism against the grain was thus aimed at producing a particular kind of truth through exposing contradictions – one that sought to *embarrass* power on its own terms as well as one that could be shared by those subject to it. Whilst the systemic and structural logic of capitalism provided an overall framework of analysis which he was content to use, it was fundamentally inadequate on its own as a political theory or framework. Here we might read the importance of phenomenological analysis in decolonising thought in the light of a more specific and embodied conception of political struggle outlined in the previous section. As Césaire declared upon resigning from the French Communist party, “I would say that no doctrine is worthwhile unless rethought by us, rethought for us, converted to us.” \(^{283}\)

We can see, then, that phenomenological analysis was associated with a kind of intellectual freedom in critique – the ability to break out of the mental frameworks imposed by abstract or theoretical analyses of the colonial situation and ‘see’ the question in a different way. For Cabral, the focus on the specific experiences of the global economy allowed him to re-articulate an alternative

\(^{281}\) Ibid., 43, emphasis in the original.
\(^{282}\) Ibid., 46.
understanding of imperialism; for Fanon, the phenomenological dimensions allowed
him to dissect and argue against racism, and for Césaire, looking at the experiences
of colonialism allowed him to counter its propaganda as a force for ‘civilisation’. 
What is important for this thesis is that this process of defining and re-defining the
problem through a phenomenological approach was itself an important kind of
‘critical theory’ – the attempt to change the terms of engagement through a re-
evaluation.

It is in this conception of the liberating potential of experience that ‘culture’
emerges as particularly important in anti-colonial critique as part of the framework
of existential struggle. Césaire, Fanon and Cabral are in some senses importantly
universalists, committed to anti-racism and humanism, as will be discussed below.
Yet all emphasise the need for developing national ‘culture’ to recover a political
subject that acts and does so on terms not determined by colonial power. For
Césaire, as we have noted, this is the point of the Négritude movement. Fanon notes
that colonial domination

is not satisfied merely with hiding a people in its grip and emptying the native’s
brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of
the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures and destroys it. This work of
devaluing pre-colonial history takes on a dialectical significance today…

The understanding of the colonised as properly historical and ‘cultured’
subjects is thus a necessary response to the tabula rasa presumptions of the colonial
powers: ‘The concept of Negro-ism [read: Négritude], for example, was the
emotional if not the logical antithesis of that insult which the white man flung at
humanity’. Cabral argues that ‘… whatever the material aspects of this
domination, it can be maintained only by the permanent, organized repression of the
cultural life of the people concerned.’ This is because for Cabral ‘culture is the
vigorouse manifestation on the ideological or idealist plane of the physical and
historical reality of the society that is dominated or to be dominated’. Although
Cabral’s definition of culture is never fully elaborated, it is clear that he regards

285 Ibid., 171.
286 Cabral, ‘National Liberation and Culture’, Unity and Struggle.
287 Ibid.
culture as being expressive of a people’s history, experience and the environment, which is the ‘reality’ of social life.\textsuperscript{288} As such, cultural domination represents not just an auxiliary means of control but the basic ontological violation of a people: ‘It attains the highest degree of absurdity in the Portuguese case, where Salazar affirmed that Africa does not exist.’\textsuperscript{289}

For both Fanon and Cabral, ‘culture’ is important because, as Cabral argues, different realms of domination are ‘reciprocal and dependent’ on one another, again reinforcing the multiplicity of dimensions of rule and struggle.\textsuperscript{290} Yet, ‘culture’ is not necessarily to be interpreted only in its historical/traditional dimensions but as relating to contemporary activity. For Fanon, for example, a ‘national culture is the whole body of efforts made by a people in the sphere of thought to describe, justify and praise the action through which that people has created itself and keeps itself in existence’\textsuperscript{.291} It is thus an affirmation of subjecthood made against its persistent denial. Culture thus broadly also encompasses deliberate action on this front that emerges from struggle itself: ‘if imperialist domination has the vital need to practise cultural oppression, national liberation is necessarily an act of culture’.\textsuperscript{292}

The emphasis on culture then speaks both to the attempt to recover or reconstruct an embodied and specific subject of politics, as well as the understanding that colonial domination and the struggle against it are inherently multi-faceted and multi-foundational. Social reality then must be apprehended through a framework which attempts to engage this complexity through a combination of both structural and phenomenological dynamics of analysis. Engaging with these dynamics is important for critical theory in terms of creating room for lateral re-thinking of the problems of domination, through attempting comprehension of the ‘excess’ that is produced in the experience of domination.

Going back once more to the liberal peace debate unpacked in Chapter Two, it becomes clearer most of its critics tend to fixate on what might be called

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{288} Davidson, ‘Introduction’, ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{289} Cabral, ‘National Liberation’, ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{290} Cabral, ‘National Liberation’, 54.
\item \textsuperscript{291} Fanon, \textit{The Wretched of the Earth}, 188.
\item \textsuperscript{292} Cabral, \textit{Unity and Struggle}, 143.
\end{itemize}
‘structural’ dynamics, be they the needs of capitalism, the logical implications of liberal political theory or the failures thereof, or a broader sense of West-Other global relations. ‘Experience’, in terms of the experiences of the intended targets of social transformation, is analysed only rarely, and then in many cases only as a failure of the structure rather than presenting its own phenomenological challenges which are in excess of the structural questions. One approach which begins to move in this direction are works such as that of Mac Ginty which emphasise the ‘hybrid’ character of the liberal peace in practice, and thus point to the distinctiveness of the concrete manifestation. Yet Mac Ginty maintains that this should not be seen something autonomous or in excess of the hybridisation dynamic. As I will argue later in the thesis along the lines of the anti-colonial framing, this is perhaps to miss important relations in order to maintain the liberal-local framing of the politics of intervention.

If, as argued in the previous section, however, it is useful to think about the embodied political subject as a subject for critique in intervention, it is also necessary to reflect on the phenomenological and experiential dimensions of intervention as part of the analysis alongside grand narratives of social structure. Anti-colonial thought used this strategy as a way of coming to terms with the simultaneously unified and differentiated character of social life; whilst commonalities, expressed as structures or abstractions, were important, they could not alone form the basis of a strategy of liberation. Moreover, they failed to understand domination as implicated in many aspects of human experience. In the latter half of the thesis, I attempt to develop a closer engagement with the concrete dimensions of intervention, in order to analyse the liberal peace from a critical perspective which is both more holistic and open to the excesses of experience.

iii. The ‘new humanism’ as ethical grounding

Although the thinkers under discussion were concerned with the particular embodiment of the subject, social and historical specificity and the necessities of

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293 Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding.*
294 Ibid., 8.
cultural expression, they were nonetheless committed universalists who affirmed the need for ‘humanism’ as a basis for political ethics. In mainstream European political theory such positions are thought to be contradictory, characterised as a debate between universalist cosmopolitan and particularist communitarian political philosophies.\textsuperscript{295} For the thinkers discussed here, however, I would suggest that the call to found a ‘new humanism’ is a distinctive and useful way of approaching the problems of racism, Eurocentrism and alienation that characterised the experience of colonialism, and complements rather than contradicts the analyses of human being as embodied and multi-foundational.

In the first place, then, humanism is a critique of racism, particularly for Césaire. In \textit{Discourse}, one of the key lines of argument is that colonialism, rather than ‘humanising’ or ‘civilising’ the colonies, has de-humanised both the coloniser and the colonised through putting them together in a relationship of violent and absolute negation. The logical conclusion of this violent mission for Césaire is fascism:

Yes, it would be worthwhile to study clinically, in detail, the steps taken by Hitler and Hitlerism and to reveal to the very distinguished, very humanistic, very Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century that without his being aware of it, he has a Hitler inside him, that Hitler inhabits him, that Hitler is his demon, that if he rails against him, he is being inconsistent and that, at bottom, \textit{what he cannot forgive Hitler for is not the crime in itself, the crime against man, it is not the humiliation of man as such, it is the crime against the white man}, the humiliation of the white man, and the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the "coolies" of India, and the "niggers" of Africa. And that is the great thing I hold against pseudo-humanism: that for too long it has diminished the rights of man, that its concept of those rights has been-and still is-narrow and fragmentary, incomplete and biased and, all things considered, sordidly racist.\textsuperscript{296}

Césaire here points out very clearly that the universalist values of humanism as they are preached by colonising powers are hollow – a ‘pseudo-humanism’ which until the Holocaust was only seen to be applied to whites. It is a powerful critique – particularly retrospectively – because it seems so obvious that racism and humanism should be contradictions of each other.

\textsuperscript{296} Césaire, \textit{Discourse on Colonialism}, 36-7, emphasis added.
Yet, the relationship is not that simple. As Shilliam argues, Kantian humanism was based on the predicated separation of the noumenal realm of Reason, from the phenomenal realm of the world. This allowed the dignity of human nature, the font of the categorical imperative, to be tied to a spatially and racially delimited idea of who ‘humans’ were in the real world based on a perception of the adequacy of their ethical faculties, even if in the noumenal realm human dignity was innate. Thus Kant was able to sustain a racist disdain for non-white peoples within his ethical scheme. Again, in this delimitation, we see something like the image of a transcendental subject performing the conceptual work of dividing the world into ‘proper’ subjects of humanism, who deserve to be treated as ends and not means, and as-yet-not-proper subjects of humanism, whose lack of ‘human’ faculties is itself threatening to humanism. As with the vision of the political subject, a transcendental ontology of humanism could be made consistent with the experience and practices of racial discrimination and violent ordering.

The ‘new humanism’ envisaged by anti-colonial thinkers therefore needed to be one which re-founded human relations on terms of engagement which were non-exclusionary and, I want to emphasise, non-transcendental. Rather, the grounds for humanism derived from sharing concrete dimensions of embodied human experience. Fanon articulates the fascist-colonial link then in a way which offers some ground for this new humanism for its victims: ‘The Jew and I: Since I was not satisfied to be racialized, by a lucky turn of fate I was humanized. I joined the Jew, my brother in misery.’ The notion of suffering as a basis for humanist solidarity is here very important. We see it also in Cabral, in the quote given at the beginning of the chapter: “I saw folk die of hunger in Cape Verde and I saw folk die from flogging in Guiné (with beatings, kicks, forced labour), you understand? This is the entire reason for my revolt.” Fanon here speaks to psychological suffering, and Cabral to physical suffering. Yet both find within this an ethical provocation...

298 Ibid., 655.
299 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 92.
301 Cabral, Unity and Struggle, 41.
and a platform for what they see as a new humanism, which offers the possibility for a more solidaristic and inclusive kind of politics.

This is particularly important for Fanon for overcoming two divisive tendencies immanent within colonialism. The first is the pervasive alienation produced in the ‘native’ by racism, dispossession, repression and violence, which is pathologised as a kind of mental disorder by the colonial authorities. It is in this context that Fanon is ‘lucky’ to be joined in misery with the Jew, because this act of joining together represents a possibility for escape. The second divisive tendency against which a new humanism is to be set is what is identified as Europe’s ‘increasingly obscene narcissism’, which Fanon understands as having ‘stifled almost the whole of humanity in the name of a so-called spiritual experience’. A new humanism thus needed to reconsider the question of cerebral reality and of the cerebral mass of all humanity, whose connections must be increased, whose channels must be diversified and whose messages must be re-humanized.

The new humanism is understood in the context of a historical dialectic of freedom, in which white supremacy and Négritude both could give way to a re-imagined universalism, and which is not exceptionalist and narcissistic but grounded in an understanding of human commonalities. Although Cabral was an advocate, as we have seen, for recovering a sense of national culture, he warned against over-glorifying African culture for its own uniqueness, reminding his followers wryly that others too ate with their hands and sat on the ground, and that ‘[t]he important thing is not to waste time in more or less hair-splitting debates on the specificity or non-specificity of African cultural values, but to look upon these values as a conquest by a part of mankind for the common heritage of all mankind’. In this he echoes Césaire’s sense of the relationship between cultural nationalism and humanism in anti-colonial thought, which must retain a critique of the universal subject as empty and transcendental:

302 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 253.
303 Ibid., 251.
304 Ibid., 253.
305 Frutkin, *Aimé Césaire*, 18.
306 Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, 150. See also Chabal, ‘Social and Political Thought of Amilcar Cabral’, 33.
Provincialism? Not at all. I am not burying myself in a narrow particularism. But neither do I want to lose myself in an emaciated universalism. There are two ways to lose oneself: walled segregation in the particular or dilution in the “universal.”

If a universalist humanism cannot be discovered through rationalist philosophy, as in a Kantian framework, how, then, is it to be known? I have suggested here already that for Fanon and Cabral, recognition of common human suffering and alienation provide a crucial starting point. What has not been elaborated though is the significance of this as a kind of poetic knowledge. According to Kelley, Césaire was explicit about the importance of poetry as a tool of creative revolutionary critique. It was important because, according to Césaire, it was a way of getting beyond the structural and into the excesses of the phenomenological: ‘What presides over the poem is not the most lucid intelligence, the sharpest sensibility or the subtlest feelings, but experience as a whole.’

Similarly, the sensibility towards humanism is not so much a rationalist one but a poetic one, born of a sense of aesthetic, empathetic and corporeal connection to a broader humanity. This sense of humanism is more contingent and fragile than one based on the logical dictates of a rationalist, transcendental – or indeed ideological – universalism; a sense of universal humanity is adopted not simply because it is right, but also because it is beautiful.

This does not render it a less important part of the overall philosophical schema of anti-colonialism. If human subjects are to be understood as embodied and situated in particular historical conditions, they are also constituted by their communications and social interactions with one another, in which language plays a crucial role. Language, especially poetic language, is a hermeneutic basis for generating common emotional understanding of particular and subjective experiences such as physical suffering that exceeds what little can be adequately specified and communicated in abstract or scientific terms. In this sense, a poetic sensibility becomes a pre-condition for an embodied humanist ethics which seeks to

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307 Césaire, ‘Letter to Maurice Thorez’.
309 Cited in Kelley, ibid., 18, emphasis added.
avoid the emptiness of the transcendental subject and develop bases for mutual recognition.

The embodied ethics of a ‘new humanism’ provides a further interesting point of departure when we look back at the formulations of political and ethical relations as emerging in the critiques of the liberal peace discussed in Chapter Two. There we see a persistent anxiety about the affirmation of a universalist ethical framework, particularly for Richmond, because it is seen as necessarily always collapsing into a hegemonic liberal project over other ‘local’ values. Somehow, then, it is necessary to develop a ‘post-liberal’ ethics which is simultaneously universalist but not, and this tension is not really resolved. In the light of the foregoing discussion however, it might be useful to think about whether an embodied, situated universalism helps un-think this trap. Insofar as human ethics are understood as inherently aesthetic and expressive rather than derived from the necessities of rationality, it is possible to imagine a space for a solidaristic universalist ethics which does not automatically dominate the landscape of the political through the generation of binding claims for political authority.

A similar point might also be directed towards Duffield, who calls finally for a ‘solidarity of the governed’ as an ethical orientation against the hegemony of the liberal project. In the light of the Foucaultian framework used, as Chandler argues, this emerges as a potentially content-less form of solidarity. If the political subject is however understood as necessarily embodied, and able to relate to others through poetic language amongst other forms of communication, then there is a possibility for humanist solidarity to become much more substantial and concrete in character without buying into the ‘liberal project’. This alternative account of ethical humanism coheres with the multi-foundational account of human being and human experience discussed in the previous section. This also replies to Chandler’s implicit insistence on the modern liberal subject as a necessary starting point for theorising politics and political ethics; this is not necessary if political ethics are understood as taking place between embodied subjects able to relate and communicate on the basis of human experience. In short, being a humanist does not

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310 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, ch. 9.
311 Chandler, ‘Critiquing liberal cosmopolitanism’, 64.
require one to buy into a transcendental account of universality which then translates into a mandate for forms of particular political interventions, or to reject non-bounded forms of political community.

IV. Critiquing the liberal peace from an anti-colonial perspective

In this thesis, I am proposing to apply similar kinds of intellectual strategies in order to think about the liberal peace debate. Contemporary critiques of the liberal peace defences and critiques have of course not been racist in the sense that J.A. Hobson was. As mentioned at the start of Chapter Two, one of the most distinctive hallmarks of their ‘post-colonial’ orientation is that they operate in and endorse an intellectual and political framework in which racism is de-legitimised as a justification for political rule. Nor are they historically teleological in the sense of Lenin; whilst many operate using Marxist categories, the understanding of capitalism as being historically progressive is remote from analysis.

Yet, when reflecting on the critiques in the light of anti-colonial thought, there is a sense of dissatisfaction with the understanding of the non-Western political subject as it is represented in the critical literature. Most often it is through a sense of emptiness or a cipher-like quality to Bosnian / Cambodian / Kosovan targeted recipients of the liberal peace, complemented by an ongoing sense of Western exceptionalism, even if the latter is understood as heavy-handed. This characterisation makes the intellectual maintenance of the ‘paradox of liberalism’ inevitable, in which ‘liberalism’ is critiqued for being hegemonic but also valued for being emancipatory, leading to all sorts of anxieties about how to deal with the liberal peace, and whether it would not be better if it was retained after all.

I have likened this to the trap of the transcendental subject as it is discussed by Fanon, which compounds the alienation of racialised subjects who are excluded from the possibility of transcendence by the socialised construction of them as racialised. Real politics in this construction is thus only the domain of the white or the liberal. For the anti-colonial thinkers, politics and political critique is always embodied in the experiences of human subjects and located in historical conditions.
These cannot be understood or adequately analysed from positions of abstraction or transcendence such as the model of a liberal self; rather a fuller understanding of embodied experience and subjecthood must form the starting point for critical thinking.

Reconstructing the embodied subject then becomes an intellectually liberating move, in which the existential crisis of the ‘authenticity’ of the liberal subject is partly solved by presupposing that embodied subjects are already an authentic basis for political engagement. In the re-articulation of humanist ethics, anti-colonial thought also suggested that there were bases for humanist solidarity which did not automatically translate to a rational logic of domination but could be a source of respectful engagement. In order to challenge the logic and practices of colonialism, the anti-colonial thinkers here discussed found it essential to articulate a different vision of human political subjecthood that could reject the various categories of person set up by colonialism and the visions of ‘proper’ politics that European political thought had created. Therefore, the reconstruction of subjecthood involved rethinking what it meant to be a political being, what the political world consisted of and how human political subjects could relate to each other under such pervasive structures of differentiation.

That critical theory has a purpose and politics, and that anti-colonial thinkers had a historically particular purpose and politics, is not a striking observation. What is interesting is the way that these thinkers responded to their particular purpose, which tells us something about the ways this purpose shaped them and their thinking. For these thinkers political critique is not abstract but necessarily embedded in both structural and experiential concerns that are a feature of that specific context. It must simultaneously engage and transcend the form of domination that it seeks to resist. If this form of domination appears to be not singular but plural and multi-modal, as seems the case in the analyses of imperialism and colonialism, then critical theories and strategies also need to deal with this diversity. This means that a historically purposive critical posture cannot be theoretically pure, although it can be substantively coherent in the context of its existence and purpose. Critique for these thinkers is the understanding of a set of contingent problems by developing explicit, relevant ontological and political
commitments, although the theoretical posture of principles is often articulated in response to a problem rather than vice versa.

These three elements in the thought of Césaire, Fanon and Cabral – situatedness, multiplicity and humanism – offer an attractive platform from which to think about current challenges in the liberal peace debate and world politics more generally. Whilst critical accounts of world politics have recently been concerned to develop big-picture accounts of imperial global power and specifically of neoliberalism, these principles invite a deeper engagement with and interrogation of the concrete attempts to resist and transform the political order that already exist. They also offer a kind of reply to the problems of anti-foundationalism and alterity that poststructuralist critique has been struggling with in its analytic and political interventions, which is a reflective and appropriately grounded multidimensionalism. As a platform for researching the nature of power in international politics, it reminds us of the need to engage in a sustained and renewed way with the situation of those who we regard as being dominated. In order to critique the liberal peace from a perspective of reconstructed subjecthood, it is necessary to imagine how to engage with and understand interventions from a position which uses these as working assumptions. This will be developed in the next chapter.

Conclusions

This chapter has shown how anti-colonial thought approached the problems of colonialism and imperialism, and how they dealt with the tensions emerging from trying to combine structural analysis with a humanist phenomenological orientation. The effect of these expansions was to create characterisations of these phenomena which were more experientially embedded and specific, explicitly ethically and politically motivated by the recovery/discovery of the political subject that colonialism sought to control, humanism, and which provided a basis for action and rejection of these structures. They were able to do this through employing theories which were diverse, eclectic, affectively challenging and faithful to the specificities of their contexts. I argue that this made them powerful and compelling as critical theories of social relations, intended to effect what they considered to be
emancipatory change through analysis and engagement with the purported problems. In the rest of the thesis, it is the philosophical orientation and intellectual strategies of engagement in these position that I am interested in taking forward as a platform for critique; that is, the re-conceptualisation of the subject, the development of a grounded, multi-dimensional framework and the engagement of an alternative humanist ethics of critique.

In response to the absence of the subject identified in Chapter Two, the next chapter goes to work on how subjecthood might be reconstructed in the liberal peace debate, informed by the broad philosophical orientations of anti-colonial thought as developed in this chapter. In order to do this, Chapter Four explores different specific intellectual and methodological strategies for engaging with embodied subjects who are the target of liberal peace transformations. This sets the stage for the reconstruction of the subjects of the liberal peace offered in the later chapters of the thesis.
Chapter Four
Reconstructing the subjects of analysis: alternative narrative strategies for the liberal peace debate

In the spirit of critical activism pursued by anti-colonial thinkers, the next stage for this thesis is to set out ways in which these alternative conceptual frameworks can help us to see the world differently. Specifically, the task of this chapter is to set out how the world of the liberal peace can be understood differently in the light of anti-colonial critique, and in particular to advance more specific strategies to this end. The following discussion reflects on the project of reconstructing the target societies of the liberal peace as embodied, situated and multi-dimensional subjects of analysis, in response to the present debate. 312 It does so in anticipation of the discussion of Mozambique which will occupy the latter part of the thesis.

In the discussion section of Chapter Two, it was argued that the existing critical accounts of the liberal peace have tended to exclude, abstract, obscure or marginalise the target society as a significant subject of politics within their analytic frameworks. Rather, analyses have tended to focus dominantly on the views, discourses and practices of a powerful, (neo)liberal, interventionist West as the major subject of analysis. Target societies, on the other hand, tend to be represented very briefly and schematically in ways which put them outside the realm of the analyst’s gaze or interest. We saw these exclusions or reductions happening in different ways, which were based in part on authors’ different accounts of the nature of the political subject – post-interventionary, culturally-circumscribed, modern and liberal or needs and welfare-oriented. 313 I argued that these tended to reinforce a Eurocentric ‘paradox of liberalism’, whereby despite the incisive critiques of the

312 For explicitly disaggregating different uses of the term ‘subject’ in social theory, I am indebted to Paul Kirby’s unpublished paper ‘The System Of Subjects: International Relations Theory and the Hard Problem of Subjectivity’, International Theory seminar at the LSE’s IR Department, 23rd November 2009, although his usages are not mine.
313 Chapter Two, 72-83.
social transformations effected by a (neo)liberal West, the alternatives suggested could not really picture a political future beyond liberal and/or Western circumscriptions. In this sense, in these narratives the liberal West and the liberal project retained an exceptionalist character in the narrative, albeit one which inspired suspicion.

The largely absent, irrelevant or heavily stylised character of the targeted political subject in the critiques of the liberal peace contrasts with the embodied, situated and multi-dimensional conception of the colonised political subject in anti-colonial thought. As argued in Chapter Three, anti-colonial thought determined to resist the Eurocentrisms embedded in critiques of imperialism by refusing the narrower abstractions of a racialised or historically determinist gaze. Rather, they employed alternative philosophical foundations for thinking about the social world which asserted the centrality of embodiment and experience in understanding the political subject. These foundations also emphasised that there were multiple related dimensions of being, and that humanist understanding was possible based on the shared character of social experience.

As Chapter Three indicated, there are several points on which anti-colonial readings of the political subject as embodied and situated can begin to offer an alternative framework of anti-imperial critique to those currently at work in the liberal peace debate. The first part of this chapter will seek to extend these initial points of entry into three more substantive strategies for re-thinking the liberal peace. These three strategies – broadly speaking, historical, political and material – are subsequently each developed by the last four chapters of the thesis, with the latter across two chapters. An understanding of ‘what’ is done however also necessarily begs a discussion of ‘how’ it is done. To address this, the second part of this chapter discusses three further issues of importance which underpin the development of the project: the sources used for the empirical research on Mozambique, the modes of reading of these sources, and the broader issue of interpretive research itself. Although the considerations of the chapter are principally aimed at the liberal peace debate and the place of this project within it, there are also ways in which this debate resonates with broader concerns within the field concerning the possibility and place of interpretive research in critical projects.
As such, the reflections within this chapter may also have a wider bearing in thinking about critique in IR.

I. Three strategies for reconstructing the subject

Before the subjects of colonialism in Africa and Asia could be liberated from European colonial rule, it had to be re-emphasised that they did in fact exist as proper subjects of history and politics. Anti-colonial thought had to overcome what it understood as existential negations upon which justifications for colonialism were built, which included mental incapacity, political ignorance, historical insignificance, cultural immaturity, spiritual backwardness, scientific inferiority and so on. These intellectual diminutions were effectively existential negations because they barred the colonised subject from being able to authorise and conduct political life on terms not already defined by the colonial powers. As has been mentioned, for Fanon, colonial ordering had declared that ‘the black [was] not a man’, and for Cabral it had declared ‘that Africa does not exist’. As such, the basic legitimacy of the colonial enterprise was in part substantiated through the premise that colonised societies had no relevant existence in the first place.

Analogously, I am arguing that the reductive representations and non-presence of the target societies of the liberal peace in the critical literature is a major problem for anti-imperial projects of critique, particularly insofar as they aim to challenge the justifications for hegemonic projects of world ordering. Although Paris’ recent defence of liberal peacebuilding from its critics is flawed in many respects, his claim that “nothing in the recent critical literature provides a convincing rationale for abandoning liberal peacebuilding or replacing it with a non-

315 Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks, 10.
316 Cabral, ‘National Liberation and Culture’ Unity and struggle, 140.
317 The gradations of colonial logic are relevant on this point, but cannot really be developed here – I am deliberately eliding the distinction between the ‘Other’ (lesser being) and the ‘Abject’ (non-being) as referred to Shilliam, R. (2011). What We (should have) Talked about at ISA: Poststructural and Postcolonial Thought. Retrieved on October 29th 2011 from http://thedisorderofthings.com/2011/04/24/what-we-should-have-talked-about-at-isa-poststructural-and-postcolonial-thought/
liberal or ‘post-liberal’ alternative" nonetheless resonates with the problem of the paradox of liberalism discussed earlier. In this, some form of ‘liberal peace’ is rendered inevitable by the invisibility of any ‘alternative’ ideas, agents and implementers of social order. Even if tweaks are made regarding wider participation, more emancipatory approaches and greater social equity, these are characterised by Paris as variations of liberalism. Even putting aside the very wide understanding of liberalism that Paris chooses to employ, he is perhaps right to query the extent to which the critiques are able to articulate and imagine alternatives. The present critical imaginary regarding the liberal peace specifically but arguably more broadly within international relations does not make space for itself to understand what a world of politics outside or beyond a liberal imaginary would entail.

The intellectual space must then be created within critique before such understandings can emerge. Using ideas from anti-colonial thought I below suggest distinct but connected strategies which enable the creation of a different space for understanding the significance of the liberal peace based on a series of engagements with the target society. Whilst these strategies are certainly not exhaustive of the ways in which the project of ‘decolonising’ research might take place in a broad sense, they do speak to specific forms of absence within the liberal peace debate as it stands.

i. Reconstructing historical presence

In anti-colonial thought, it was argued that the negation of a society’s historical presence was an important part of both colonial strategies of rule and of the Eurocentric political imaginary. As noted in the previous chapter, whilst Césaire directed this critique against French colonialism, and Cabral directed it against Leninist orthodoxies, both colonialists and Lenin regarded the histories of colonised societies as largely irrelevant to the political questions of the day and to the history of the world in general. Without a sense of ‘African presence’, of past cultures,

318 Paris, ‘Saving liberal peacebuilding’
319 Ibid., 354-357.
320 For others, see Sabaratnam, ‘IR in Dialogue’.
events and practices, the existential crisis which colonialism had produced could not be challenged or rejected. Although it often took a celebratory form, it did not have to be a history which relentlessly glorified a pre-colonial African agency or presence; indeed, as noted earlier, some of Césaire’s work can be interpreted as being about coming to terms with the painful historical miseries of slavery.\textsuperscript{321} The point was to bring attention to colonial subjects as having histories in order to challenge the idea that they were blank slates waiting to be civilised. As Chapter Three argued, anti-colonial thought re-emphasised the already-embodied and situated character of both colonised and colonising human subjects.

It is noteworthy that the major critiques of the liberal peace have almost completely failed to analyse the target societies of interventions as having histories which may be relevant to understanding the significance of intervention in the post-conflict period. Neither Chandler or Pugh regard the history of Bosnia as a useful part of their analyses of the post-Dayton period, Richmond has very little to say about pre-liberal peace Cambodia, Kosovo or East Timor, and Duffield mentions historical detail about Afghanistan, Mozambique and even Sudan in only a very limited way.\textsuperscript{322} Rather, these spaces are defined simply as being the non-liberal sites of interventionary post-war transformations, upon which projects of liberal governance are visited. Due to these sites lacking a historical presence, the attempted liberal transformations can only be evaluated in terms of general impressions created through ritualising a ‘liberal-local’ tension or a kind of Todorovian ‘new’ encounter.\textsuperscript{323} Colour is given via some mention of contemporary actors in target societies but they constitute at best a form of background canvas for the portrait of the liberal peace.

Developing the insights of anti-colonial thought with respect to the liberal peace requires us to advance an embodied and situated understanding of the subjects of intervention, which begins with an appreciation of their historical presence. History is, of course, invented rather than uncovered; as such, it is not enough to simply assert the need for ‘historical presence’ in the liberal peace debate, although

\textsuperscript{321} Chapter Three, 96.
\textsuperscript{322} Chapter Two, 79-81.
this is a crucial start. Taking cues from the principles of anti-colonial thought, it is further necessary to think, as David Scott has argued, about the ways in which specific types of historical negation beg particular kinds of response.  

Beyond the general denial of presence, there are at least two ways in which the failure to articulate the targets of liberal peacebuilding as historical entities in their own right has had implications for the analysis. In the first instance, it is generally assumed, but never actually demonstrated, that the liberal peace represents a novel form of governance-based liberal social transformation in post-conflict settings. Indeed, in particular cases such as that of Richmond, it is made to sound as if engagement with the liberal peace not only represents a novel encounter with liberalism but somehow with modernity in general as opposed to the world of local custom and tradition. As I will show in Chapter Five, this is not only an issue of ‘presence’ but also leads to analytic problems when trying to understand the origins and causes of particular practices within the liberal peace.

A corollary to this is the insinuation that the liberal peace is by default therefore an alien and inauthentic form of politics, which those who adhere to it as simply co-opted into its ideology via false consciousness. Whilst this may hypothetically be a useful interpretation in specific instances, to assume it in advance of an engagement with the specific political or social history of a society seems to assume some sort of ahistorical status to social difference. In this case, exploring the ways in which societies are long-inserted into global connections and conditions associated with modernity is highly relevant for a deeper appreciation of their historicity and historical presence, as well as the interpretation of contemporary political culture and consciousness.

Across the remaining four chapters of the thesis, I re-construct Mozambique as a historical subject within a set of related narratives on the liberal peace. The first of the four, Chapter Five, develops a historical narrative of different forms of rule within Mozambique over the last century or so, which explores points of continuity.

325 Chapter Two, 65.
and change across the late colonial, post-independence and post-war periods. In the first place, simply establishing it as a place and peoples with a significant history is important, in contrast to the general passing over of such history by interveners and many critics of intervention. Re-telling the history is thus a way of engaging with political subjects as already embodied and situated, as noted in Chapter Three.

This narrative locates and substantiates the territory of present-day Mozambique as being the subject of a series of different projects of modern rule and social organisation, of which I suggest the post-war era is a recent iteration. Whilst the remaining three chapters are focused on more contemporary dynamics, the issues which they address, including political consciousness, political economy and agency, are all located in historical understandings of these themes.

The strategy of reconstructing a historical subject of course carries its own risks. The most important of these is the problem of building analysis around the national boundaries of ‘Mozambique’, when these are themselves also a product of contested relations between state elites and populations in the territory. There is then perhaps a risk that the struggles and agendas of rulers come to stand in for the history of the country in general. This was a major preoccupation within postcolonial historiography as it developed amongst the Subaltern Studies scholars, who constructed social histories of particular subaltern groups as counter-narratives to their marginalisation from history.326

In order to deal with this, across the chapters I have endeavoured to tease out some different historical dynamics of groups, classes and regions across the country to indicate both the diversity of historical experience within Mozambique as well as the tensions that emerge from this. Whilst Chapter Five focuses on a kind of national history, Chapters Six and Seven extend the focus to historicise political consciousness amongst a broader public and public sector workers, with Chapter Eight offering a historical analysis of the political economy of some of the peasantry. In reconstructing Mozambique’s historical presence then, we can begin to forward a critique which is grounded in a consciousness of the diversity of

experiences and realities of those subject to intervention, but which recognises the incompleteness of any single endeavour. This kind of historical embodiment is necessary in the project to reclaim the negated subject from the zones of ‘Nothingness and Infinity’ that Fanon described.\textsuperscript{327} As will be discussed in Chapter Five, this speaks to concerns of the historical decolonising movement within Mozambique also.

ii. Engaging with political consciousness

If the critiques of the liberal peace have been happy to more or less ignore the historical presence and substance of target societies, they have been equally willing to disengage from the expressions of political consciousness that emerge around them within target societies, regarding them as either irrelevant to the question of the liberal peace’s legitimacy, or largely tainted or co-opted and thus unable to make authentic or relevant comment upon it. Echoing Fanon’s critique of colonial mentality, this over-determination within the analytic gaze means that the political consciousness of target societies can end up being understood as a form of empty mimicry without its own significance.\textsuperscript{328} This construction mirrors the ahistoricism of the analysis, in terms of denying presence and significance to people as proper subjects of politics. For some analyses this is the result of a focus on the constitutive character of liberal discourses of governance, which are thus understood as analytically prior to the political consciousness of people who discuss them.\textsuperscript{329} However, for others it seems to mark yet more distance between interveners, who are unproblematically authentic bearers of liberal peace consciousness and people in target societies who are not.

Getting away from these reductive representations of the political subject must then involve dealing with forms of political consciousness in a way which recognises and engages with it rather than discounting its relevance. In anti-colonial thought this act of engagement had two particular advantages. First, exploring with the ways in which the colonised understood their world helped articulate the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{327} Chapter Three, 98.
\item \textsuperscript{328} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{329} Chapter Two, 81.
\end{itemize}
embodied dimensions of colonialism, including its modalities of reproduction and the forms of suffering that it caused. Thus there was a kind of interpretive benefit to engaging political consciousness. Second, however, engagement was in its own right a decolonising act; it was a form of recognition to counter the de-recognition effected by colonialism. In terms of forwarding the ethics of humanism discussed in Chapter Three, mutual recognition of political consciousness carried its own importance in establishing shared bases of embodied humanity and changing the terms of debate.

In the remaining chapters of the thesis, most prominently in Chapter Six but also elsewhere, I engage with political consciousness in Mozambique around specific issues associated with intervention, and the general politics of co-operation. This strategy further draws out Mozambique as a substantive political subject rather than an empty cipher, and helps articulate important dimensions of the experience of the liberal peace. As will be shown later on, however, this strategy does not imply that political consciousness, in Mozambique or elsewhere, is unitary or straightforward, either within individuals or at a group level.

Rather, in reconstructing political consciousness in Mozambique, I lean on the insightful accounts of ‘double consciousness’ offered in anti-colonial thought as a way of dealing with the ways in which subjects often use different framings and identifications for understanding particular issues – in this sense they are ‘pluralistically’ conscious. Du Bois originally articulated the notion of ‘double consciousness’ to reflect the binds of black identity in America:

One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.\(^{330}\)

For Du Bois, writing in 1903, the imputed freedoms and liberation associated with being an American were consistently in contradiction with the situation and experience of being racially segregated, isolated and terrorised as a black. Blacks

were destined to see themselves through the eyes of others who defined them, yet were themselves aware that these images both defined and did not correspond to their sense of being and historical selves.

As such, ‘double consciousness’ of this sort produced intellectual contradictions, alienation and tensions within black identity. Yet within these tensions it was also possible for Du Bois to affirm the usefulness these could have in a concrete sense towards a redemptive form of self-realisation. Indeed, experiencing political consciousness as non-unitary was simultaneously a burden and a kind of ‘gift’ or ‘second sight’. It allowed black people to articulate forms of consciousness and identity outside those allotted by racist social orders.

For Fanon, ‘double consciousness’ took on a sharper complexion. As for Du Bois, consciousness of oneself as a black racialised subject and a human being produced this internal war of ideals, leading to a profound sense of alienation. Fanon similarly identified that this sense of alienation was sociogenic – produced by social constructions of race and racial value – rather than intrinsically a ‘black’ experience. Yet for him, any potential redemptive power of straightforward cultural reclamation was largely, although not entirely, blunted by its fetishisation, which had the power to maintain structures of racial objectification. Instead, disalienation had to come through one’s own repudiation of both racial stereotype and oppressive social structures – a re-appropriation of the terms upon which one would engage with the world. The split caused by double consciousness was thus a productive one.

The notion of double consciousness as developed in Du Bois and Fanon is useful in addressing some of the issues raised in Chapter Two regarding the exclusion of the political subject in contemporary critiques of the liberal peace. This is principally in understanding that political subjects in actuality are not of a single essence or dimension, but that that multiple images of the self and the group are

333 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks
common ways of making sense of the world. In particular, by establishing political consciousness and political subjecthood as plural, it gives us leverage for establishing a critique of the ‘authentic’ political subject imagined by Richmond as ‘local’ and Chandler as ‘liberal’. In Chapter Six, I use this framework as a way of making sense of the ways in which corruption is understood in contemporary Mozambique. Whilst this does not speak to the kinds of existential split that Du Bois and Fanon were driving at in using ‘double consciousness’ as a lens for understanding black identity under colonialism, it does speak to the ways in which appreciating plural forms of public political consciousness can help understand the content of political struggle.

Engaging with political consciousness also allows a more concrete discussion of particular forms of alienation that are experienced under the liberal peace, as covered in Chapter Seven. For anti-colonial thinkers, articulating the nature and character of social and political alienation under colonial rule was a very important element of critique for the heuristic and humanistic purposes already mentioned. It is one which forms an important part of the analysis here also. For the purposes of this thesis, I understand alienation in a mundane sense rather than the more technical sense of Fanon. For Fanon, alienation was specifically a product of the mental conflicts produced by black/white double consciousness and of the de-humanising character of racism. Whilst there are cognate dynamics at work within the experience of the liberal peace, my usage of the idea of alienation pertains in a more general sense to forms of discontent, disengagement and withdrawal from forms of authority. Clearly, alienation is not then limited in scope to the relations between intervening agencies and national citizens but has pervasive potential in relations throughout society. Whilst I will generally focus on dynamics of alienation surrounding relationships with interveners to discuss issues with the liberal peace, these are of course embedded in and interact with the broader social order.

I do not have the space here to extend the argument, but my instinct is that it is not just postcolonial or feminine political subjects that experience double/plural consciousness but political subjects in general – there is likely some excellent work to be done or being done on ‘double consciousness’ amongst intervener communities.

Clearly, the notion of alienation also has more specific meanings in Marxist and Durkheimian social theory, which I am not utilising here.
iii. Re-thinking material structures and experience

In addition to substantiating the target society as a historical and political entity in its own right, it is also important to appreciate how its material experiences may significantly exceed that which is covered by structural narratives of neoliberal expansion. As argued in Chapter Three, anti-colonial thinkers were often not content with Leninist analyses of imperialism – for Cabral, for example, it was disembedded from the social realities and histories of colonised spaces, and moreover suggested a lack of historical and political agency within them. For Fanon and Césaire colonial experience in both its bodily and economic dimensions exceeded its grand narratives in ways which were crucial for understanding the production of suffering and alienation, which was a central focus of analysis. What might be understood in another context as forms of phenomenological excess were thus important points of departure for different, more deeply connected and embodied forms of critique.

Insofar as the present critical debate engages with the material content of the liberal peace it does so generally through the particular lens of a structural critique of neoliberal economics and of the general associated depredations in social welfare or insurance. This has been the general thrust of Pugh’s critique, as discussed in Chapter Two. Moreover, some more recent contributions, such as those of Neil Cooper, have drawn out analysis in the context of particular industries and countries. While these point to important dynamics at play in the liberal peace, the framing of this problems tends to be within a critique of recent neoliberal economic policy, which itself is understood as a working out of tendencies within capitalism. This critique of its structural tendencies is an important strategy for understanding the commonalities between different situations and I am not suggesting that it should be abandoned.

However, in the spirit of understanding the political subject as always embodied, and understanding this embodiment as a central starting point for critique, it is important to get beyond a primarily structural interpretation of the

336 Chapter Three, 99-100.
337 Chapter Three, 96-99.
economic dynamics of the liberal peace. In Chapters Seven and Eight, I pursue more specific and situated analyses of the political economies of intervention as understood and experienced by different groups of people, including public sector workers, media commentators, government officials, donor representatives and farmers. Within these analyses emerge narratives of the liberal peace’s material impact that are too distinctive and/or long-standing to be contained under the more general framework of neoliberalism; rather they hint at questions emerging from more specific social relations of hierarchy, income and production which may not all be a product of IFI-endorsed neoliberal policy specifically but speak to more general principles of economic distribution and entitlement underpinning interventions.

Re-thinking the material dimensions of the liberal peace relationship opens up various different platforms for thinking critically around its practices. On the one hand, an appreciation of the details of its impact supports an understanding of types of multiplicity produced in social hierarchies, although these are not the main focus of the analysis. It is nonetheless important to recognise the widely differentiated impact that the liberal peace has had amongst different groups who operate at various degrees of distance from it. Chapters Seven and Eight for example offer different narratives of its impact across different sectors.

In addition, however, these more specific relations also give a context and meaning to forms of political agency and political consciousness that emerge in response to the liberal peace. A significant element of this is the ways in which the details of the political economy of the liberal peace also become reflective of a perceived moral economy. As will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight, exploring the actual distribution and allocation of resources and benefits within the liberal peace becomes an important element for evaluating its broader significance as a set of political relations. In Chapter Seven, various contradictions between the intended economic effect of the liberal peace and its actual material impact on the operation of the state are brought to the fore, whereas in Chapter Eight I look at the relative absence of effect in generating rural transformation for the peasantry.
This platform of critique exceeds a general account of neoliberalism’s structural impact through its embedding in lived experiences and forms of political consciousness. This is important in terms of generating an embodied conception of the political subject – through an exploration of the particular material conditions and structures instituted by the liberal peace, it is possible to understand political subjects as real agents making meaningful choices. As indicated in Chapter Three, however, it is also a platform from which to think more laterally and in a more localised and concrete way about political alternatives – as Chapters Seven and Eight will show, this is already partly underway in Mozambique.

As with the other strategies previously discussed, thinking about the material dimensions of the liberal peace in this more detailed way is a specific kind of response to the absence of lived experience within the present liberal peace debate, amongst both supporters and critics of intervention. Selected in this way, the narratives do not purport to offer anything like a systematic assessment of the economic impact of the liberal peace across the country. Rather, I focus on more detailed analysis of particular parts in order to illustrate tendencies which may be more widespread. In Chapter Seven, I explore political consciousness and agency in the context of large economic inequalities, both between Mozambique and the donors, and within the practices of the liberal peace. In Chapter Eight, I problematize the automatic desirability of a statist solution to the question of rural development through an engagement with historic peasant ambivalence towards the state and its contemporary form. Together they articulate differentiated but connected experiences of the political economies of the liberal peace, which point towards a deeper engagement with questions of wealth distribution and political control.

II. ‘Reading’ Mozambique

In Chapter Three, I argued that anti-colonial thinkers conceived of human existence as a necessarily multi-foundational and embodied affair, in which various concrete elements combined to produce the experiences of the subject. Thinking
critically about its politics – particularly in the service of a project for historical change – thus could not be done either transcendentally or through abstractions from other times and places. Rather, it needed to be done through an embedding in the multiple dimensions of existence and in reflection on how these interacted with each other, in terms of both structural and phenomenological dimensions.

In the chapters that follow, I aim as far as possible to sustain a multi-foundational approach to the analysis of Mozambique’s experience of the liberal peace, both within particular chapters, and in the arrangement of the chapters as a whole by combining the strategies outlined above. In general terms, Chapter Five focuses on reconstructing Mozambique as a historical presence, Chapter Six mainly engages with the question of political consciousness, and Chapters Seven and Eight look at the political economies of aid and agriculture. However, although each of the chapters places special emphasis on one or other particular strategy, elements of all of them are woven throughout the thesis. It is in the combination of these strategies that I aim to begin to re-construct Mozambique and its peoples as substantive subjects of analysis in the context of the liberal peace debate. In the spirit of anti-colonial critique, the experiences and evaluations of these subjects are not simply ‘relevant’ but central to this critical approach to the nature of intervention.

Yet, in this thesis, and in any interpretive project, these experiences are necessarily mediated by my own reading and representation of them through particular intellectual lenses and based on particular sources, and articulated in a dialogue with a particular audience. It is thus helpful to reflect on and discuss how the research strategy for reading Mozambique has proceeded over the course of the project, and the implications that this has for the kind of conclusions that can be reached.

i. Sources

A key concern for this project was to engage with a wide and detailed range of sources to inform its different strategies, in order to generate a rich general understanding of Mozambique through which more specific narratives pertinent to
the liberal peace debate could be developed. In the earlier stages of the project, the guiding principle for reading sources was more or less simple voracity and immersion in anything even slightly related to Mozambique; this eventually gave way to a more structured and selective reading of sources based on their relevance for the specific areas of interest. What follows is a summary of the range and types of sources engaged in the course of the project, which have both directly and indirectly informed the narratives. Whilst the details of formally published works are to be found in the bibliography of the thesis and in the footnotes of the empirical chapters, it may be helpful to articulate generally how these were used alongside others in developing the fuller picture of Mozambique ‘as a subject’.339

In the context of this project, I occasionally make some distinctions of convenience between ‘scholarly’ and other sources, but this is not to be understood as a distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources in the conventional sense, but a kind of self-identification of purpose, style and audience. Indeed, in the context of the assumptions of this project, the conventional dualistic distinction between ‘primary’ sources as principally points of data / information and ‘secondary’ sources as analytic’ makes no sense. This is particularly so in a place where the community of people who do scholarly work so obviously overspills boundaries of political involvement, public engagement, material interest, nationality, or any other subject-object distinction. It is in some senses difficult to argue that a detailed evaluation report co-written by British academics and Mozambican academics / consultants / activists for a European donor agency and/or the Government of Mozambique is either obviously ‘primary’ material or ‘secondary’ analysis.

More fundamentally, the distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ ceases to hold in a conceptual framework whereby the views and analyses of those involved in the area of interest are not simply data points to be processed but interpretations to be engaged and reckoned with. Allowing these interpretations to present significant challenges to the (non)/representations of politics in the liberal

339 Thanks to the funding structure of the ESRC +3 studentship, I was able to study Portuguese to a sufficiently good level which enabled me to read, write, speak and listen in the course of my reading and research. I have not distinguished the language of each individual source used in the project, and all translations are my own unless specified.
peace debate and in policy discussions is a basic concern for this research project. As will be discussed in the next sub-section on modes of reading, whilst it is not possible to discuss these without some form of mediation and evaluation, both encouraging other interpretations to emerge and treating them seriously are important aspects of reconstructing subjecthood. Again, this inhibits any attempt to understand them as falling into classes of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ material.

The sources for the elements of historical reconstruction were relatively varied, and included scholarship produced both within and outside Mozambique. Whilst the ‘big-book’ histories of Malyn Newitt and others were useful general references, particularly for understanding the pre-colonial and colonial periods, social and economic histories of the colonial period such as those of Allen and Barbara Isaacman, Leroy Vail and Landeg White, Judith Marshall and Bridget O’Laughlin enabled the development of a less elite-centred historical understanding. In turning to the more recent history of the independence struggle and post-independence politics, the work of Joseph Hanlon, Yussuf Adam, Bertil Egëro, João Paulo Borges de Coelho, Marc Wuyts, Lars Rudebeck, Barry Munslow, Michel Cahen, João Mosca and João Cabrita offered different and sometimes conflicting interpretations of the state of politics and the relations between the Frelimo regime, Renamo and the population. The Centre for African Studies within Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) has been an important base for many of these researchers at different times, and has published relevant volumes on the questions of Mozambican identity and economic development. Carolyn Nordstrom’s narrative of the war was also particularly important for offering an account of the effects of violence amongst the non-militarised population and their survival strategies. These were complemented by the use of a few other historical sources where available, which largely comprised the various reports of the Central Committee to the Frelimo Congress from independence until the early 1990s, some of the contemporary reports of USAID, the British Foreign Office and the IMF, but also included press cuttings and government propaganda made available through websites such as Mozambique History Net.

Reading scholarly literature to understand trends in post-war (1990 onwards) intervention in Mozambique has also been varied across sectors, subject areas and
types of research. Many of the authors mentioned writing on historical sources have continued in their analyses to cover the period after the peace deal with Renamo. Hanlon’s production of both books and more detailed periodic reports on the political process in the post-war period are important repositories of processes, events and interpretations of both government and donor activity in particular. Other relevant scholarly literature on changes in the political economy in the post-war period includes work by Anne Pitcher, Chris Cramer and Nicola Pontara, Carlos Castel-Branco and Carrie Manning amongst others. Detailed ethnographic studies of the transformation of rural governance include those of Harry West and Graham Harrison, who develop portraits of the impact of ‘democracy’ in the north of the country amongst communities who appear less immediately integrated into the apparatus of the state and donor interventions.

Another important set of sources about the nature and effects of intervention have come from research centres within Mozambique both working for and more independently of ‘liberal peace’ donor agencies. Thus, for example, the Michigan State University team working on agricultural policy on Mozambique and part-funded by USAID has produced a series of reports on the details of agricultural interventions, headed by David Tschirley. Other important research centres within Mozambique include the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE), Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP) and Cruzeiro do Sul, who work on a range of social and economic research problems and also undertake advocacy on particular issues. Indeed, many academics working within Mozambique tend to work within these research centres either instead of or alongside universities. As noted, many of these reports are both of interest as sources of information but are also to be considered as forming part of public political consciousness around particular issues; indeed, it is not uncommon for newspapers to pick up and editorialise reports of particular interest. A decent quantity of research from organisations from donor countries operating also outside Mozambique has shown similar intent and quality. For example, Norway’s Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) recently sponsored some excellent jointly written in-depth and multi-year qualitative studies about the character of poverty. Although it is necessary to be somewhat circumspect about the purposes and audiences for which such studies are written and produced, and as
such the overall purpose of the narratives, they are nonetheless very relevant both in terms of what they relate and what they represent.

Although not much of the detail will appear in the later chapters, a highly interesting and useful set of sources were donors’ own national and sectoral strategic plans, budgets, press statements and monitoring and evaluation reports. More recently, the details of much official aid funding, including the amount of money, the sub-contractors, the project aims and their MDG connections has been lodged in the ODAMOZ database,\textsuperscript{340} which was also used to track down some of the interviewees. In terms of getting an overall understanding of the recent quantities and distributions of some aid flows it has been useful, although its usage amongst various parties is quite uneven. More interestingly perhaps however is the light these reports shed on how the donors represent intervention both to themselves and to societies and governments targeted by reform.

On the government side, public records of activity, including election manifestos, planning documents and the Agência de Informação de Moçambique (AIM) fortnightly press archives have supplied a different set of sources relating to how the Government of Mozambique has acted and the representation of those actions to public audiences. Of particular interest within these sources are the changing representations of the relationship between the Government and its development partners, as well as the ways in which the prominence of particular policy agendas and trends have risen and fallen. Some of these are discussed briefly in Chapter Seven.

In the course of reading widely around the question of the liberal peace in Mozambique, it became increasingly clear that it would be impossible to deal with interventions across all sectors in sufficient detail for the project. As such, a decision was taken after an initial period of reading to focus the research around three important sectors of intervention activity: governance, health and agriculture. ‘Governance’, and particularly good governance, is a central theme in the liberal

\textsuperscript{340}‘ODAMOZ’ is a database funded by the EU since 2007 in which all overseas development assistance is meant to be logged, categorised by sector, donor, type of grant and so on. It is accessible at http://www.odamoz.org.mz, Retrieved 12th November 2011.
peace agenda, both in terms of what it purports to promote and in terms of the controversial question of compromising political sovereignty. This has become increasingly the case during the re-interpretation of peacebuilding as statebuilding, discussed in Chapter One, and reflects the general increased concern within development circles around the issue of ‘governance’ in recent years. That former President Chissano also received the first Mo Ibrahim Foundation Award was an indication that by and large Mozambique was perceived to have relatively ‘good governance’ compared to other countries in the continent, insofar as Chissano also did not seek a third term in office.341 Health is another central issue in the liberal peace debate. The health sector in Mozambique is, just in front of education, the largest public recipient sector of international aid in terms of recorded equivalent cash value. Given that one important aspect of some critiques of the liberal peace, such as that of Pugh, has been its failure to develop social welfare, the fate of the health sector is especially relevant for the discussion. Finally agriculture was also selected as the sector in which the livelihoods of the vast majority in Mozambique are based. As the analysis offered within this project aims to be more inclusive and grounded in the experiences of the population than the existing critiques, an engagement with agricultural policy and the rural economy beyond this is a useful way in. Furthermore, given the importance of poverty reduction and development as central contemporary legitimating discourses of intervention, understanding the particular impact of interventions on this sector is also of broader political importance.342

A significant proportion of the source material used for the analysis in the later chapters was gathered during visits to Mozambique in the summers of 2008 and 2009, totalling about four months. Research was undertaken based in the cities of Maputo, Beira and Nampula, and included visits to the districts of Nhamatanda, Lunga, Monapo, Namialo and Ilha de Moçambique. During this time I conducted a

341 The Mo Ibrahim Prize for Africa Leadership offers a substantial cash prize to former leaders who have shown good leadership, and essentially who have stepped down voluntarily at the end of their tenure. Further details are available at http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-prize, Retrieved 20th November 2011.
342 It has only been retrospectively that the resonance between these three sectors selected for focus and the occupations of the anti-colonial thinkers used in Chapter Three has become apparent; Césaire as a politician and statesman, Fanon a doctor, and Cabral an agronomist. I do not hang any of the analysis on this specific resonance, except perhaps that it may have consciously affected the choice to think about agriculture.
series of around sixty interviews with nationals and expatriates both working within and outside of ‘liberal peace’ structures, and across different levels of social and political hierarchies. These included a Government minister and opposition politicians, high level, mid level and former civil servants, people working for donor agencies, people working within the health service, former agricultural technicians, directors of national and provincially based NGOs, students working and volunteering for various NGOs, students not working or volunteering for NGOs, farmers working with development projects, journalists and other public intellectuals. In seeking people out for interviews, I used a rough grid to ensure coverage of different levels of engagement and power across the different sectors, which was largely successful, although the final distribution was somewhat uneven. Interviewees were often ‘cold-called’ following my own identification through reading project documentation, websites or newspapers but a significant number (around half) were also introduced or suggested by others. In all cases I explained who I was, where I was from, the general terms of the project and that I was interested in learning more about, and understanding the interviewee’s opinions on, various forms of international co-operation. By and large, I sensed that I was being received in a relatively open and comfortable manner by the interviewees. During my visits, I also took regular diary notes within workshop and project settings as well as more generally, recording events, statements, conversations and my own impressions.

Being in Mozambique itself also allowed me to immerse myself more generally in public discussion and debate that was being undertaken in the newspapers, on television and on the radio. After following these during my visits, I retrospectively went through the 2007-2009 online archives of three major newspapers – the (largely) government-controlled Noticias and the more independent MediaFax, Savana and O País – reading for commentary on development, co-operation and intervention. Unsurprisingly, the profile of the newspaper-buying public in Mozambique like anywhere reflects levels of income, literacy and time, all of which are in varying supply across the country; however, at

\footnote{Specific details of who was interviewed, where and when are given in a separate appendix for the purposes of examination as all interviews were conducted under the presumption of the interviewees not being publicly named.}
the time of the visit it was clear that there were resonances between what was being written in newspapers and urban gossip more generally, particularly around political scandals and crime reports.

Another increasingly interesting source of commentary within Mozambique is from the ‘blogosphere’; although the readership for this is likely even smaller than that of newspapers, it provides a uniquely legible space for commentary and discussion which is not as centrally controlled and publically contentious as the newspaper, television or radio. Although the President Armando Guebuza has also had his own blog since the 2009 election campaign, longer-running, more independent/oppositional blogs include sociologist Carlos Serra’s Oficina dum Sociólogo, Ideias Críticas, Voz da Revolução, Moçambique para todos, and that of former opposition politician Manuel de Araújo, as well as those publishing satirical cartoons. Again, these were read generally for impressions about international co-operation, the politics of aid and development, and commentary relevant to the particular sectors discussed. Finally, the provocative but popular music of rapper/scholar/politician Azagaia provided another source of interesting commentary on the political elite and its relation with international donors, seeming to relate to some of the opinions of the urban youth.

Engaging this range of sources, and a few others, for me simply strengthened the conviction that the critical debate on the liberal peace had thus far both conceptually and empirically excluded the subjecthood of societies targeted by the liberal peace. Rather than the silence or wordlessness of target societies which had echoed in the critiques of the liberal peace, in this range of sources there was rather a lot of noise regarding its impact, legitimacy and significance. This was not as irrelevant as existing critiques of the liberal peace had suggested it would be by their omissions – rather, it seemed the opposite. Although I was consistently conscious of the socioeconomic and demographic unevenness of these sources to which I had access as a whole, which undoubtedly produced particular kinds of narrative, it was clear that even so important things were being said.

However, both reading and reconstructing the ‘noise’ as alternative narratives of subjecthood is not a straightforward task; it opens out into various
important debates about the representation and interpretation of subjects that have preoccupied some scholars across interpretive disciplines for some time. In the context of this project, an important concern to deal with is perhaps whether the conditions of possibility even exist for an anti-colonial interpretive project which is neither self-defeating through its complicity with the colonial gaze nor incoherent. Unsurprisingly perhaps, I argue that they do, both in general and for this project in particular. Moreover, I will suggest that the ethics of humanism which emerge in anti-colonial thought can help counteract or assuage some of the anxieties that characterised postcolonial deconstructions of representation.

ii. Interpretive methodologies, authenticity and anti-colonial humanism

In Chapter Two, I noted that within the liberal peace debate, Chandler had lightly ribbed Richmond for his epistemic caution towards any attempt to ‘know’ the local as a form of hegemony. He is right to draw attention to Richmond’s anxiety on this front; however, this anxiety is not trivial, nor can it be satisfactorily resolved by Chandler’s simple withdrawal altogether from the political context of intervention. Richmond’s anxiety has a longer pedigree, particularly within deconstructionist thinking about the nature of representation and the political contexts of speech-acts. Moreover, some of his suggested moves in terms of a more ‘ethnographic’ engagement in his most recent work are not completely different to those that I am mobilising for this project. However, he is not actually reflecting on the practices of his own research so much as on the practical ethics of peacebuilding and intervention itself, in which he advocates a change towards a less hegemonic and more empathetic mode of engagement in a post-liberal peace. The possibility that a re-evaluation of his own critique – and its own articulations of difference – may also be necessary does not seem to enter the frame. So, ironically perhaps, the empirical studies that he offers of various ‘liberal peace transitions’ are in and of themselves not actually interpretively engaged at all with the societies in question. Mac Ginty’s project also engages minimally at an interpretive level with the societies discussed as part of ‘hybrid peace’ situations, with the exception of

344 Chapter Two, 74-75.
345 Richmond, ‘Resistance and the post-liberal peace’.
346 Richmond et al, Liberal Peace Transitions
Northern Ireland in which there is a deeper reading of the political movements and the meaning of their actions.  

 Whilst I characterise the present study as, broadly speaking, ‘interpretive’, I am not characterising it as ‘ethnographic’ as such; there are ongoing controversies within anthropology and related disciplines over the definition of ‘ethnography’ that I do not have any particular stakes in claiming a position within. However, various debates within ethnography are of relevance to the interpretive approach used in this project, which is the perception and reflection of conscious meaning, forms of agency and intentionality within human social relations.

 Ortner characterises the ‘ethnographic stance’ “as much an intellectual (and moral) positionality, a constructive and interpretive mode, as it is a bodily process in space and time.” This resonates with Jackson’s distinction between ethnographic ‘method’ (data-gathering techniques) and ‘methodology’ (ways in which philosophical premises are work out in research). In the first place, she argues, it is a commitment to what Geertz has called “thickness,” to producing understanding through richness, texture, and detail, rather than parsimony, refinement, and (in the sense used by mathematicians) elegance. Typically, ethnographies produced by trained cultural anthropologists involve ‘the bodily process in space and time’, that is, relatively lengthy stays in a particular location, deep training in language and research on culture, particular styles of participant-observation and interaction and so on.

 As regards the bodily process, the research undertaken for this project did not conform to such a method in specific ways. Some elements were certainly

present, including habits of observation, recording and the conduct of in-depth conversations and interviews. Language training was also undertaken; however this was only in one language of national administration, education and commerce (Portuguese), whereas many others are spoken across Mozambique and would have likely provided an entirely different register of discussion. Moreover, my research was generally ‘mobile’, moving from the capital to other cities and districts on a relatively regular basis. Whilst I developed some relationships in the capital across the duration of my two visits, this was not a lengthy engagement with a single community. These were conscious choices in order to allow a wider and more diverse range of engagement across different regions of the country, different social groups and different spheres of liberal peace interventions. I think these were the right choices given the context of the project and the debate into which it seeks to intervene.

As Ortner also stipulates however, ethnographies also involve particular kinds of intellectual and political commitments to the relevance and significance of human meaning and human agency within the analysis of societies in general, i.e. as a ‘methodology’. On this front, regarding the mode of reading and interpretation, I aimed to understand and see things as being part of, and making sense within, particular worlds of meaning, practice and consequence. In this sense, as far as intellectual and moral positionality and the spirit of interpretation go, this project shares some of the sensibilities outlined by Ortner for an ‘ethnographic stance’. These correspond to and reinforce the overall conceptual strategies articulated within Chapter Three with regard to seeing subjects as embodied and situated, and in social realities as being multi-dimensional.

There are a few further issues that need clarifying here though with regard to the project’s aim of ‘reconstructing the subjects’ in Mozambique, which also speak to tensions and controversies in the debates on ethnographic methodology. These are the questions of authenticity and representation, and the place of the researcher within the social context. Apart from very tangentially, these reflections are more or less absent from writing on the liberal peace – indeed, they can only arise in an intellectual framework where grounded interpretation and detailed engagement with those subject to power are seen as important to projects of critique. Although they
can only be dealt with relatively briefly here, they also connect to some of the theoretical orientations articulated in the previous chapter, and in particular the question of how interpretive engagement can offer better or different grounds for critique.

First, addressing the issue of ‘authenticity’ is important in terms of moving away from seeing subjects as inauthentically ‘co-opted’ by the liberal peace, which was challenged in Chapter Two. Such a move makes it easy to dismiss the articulated views or claims of various people as having any relevance to the critique of the grand vision of liberal/neoliberal power. Rather, the threat of inauthenticity in the politics of intervened-in societies is central in allowing the critical theorist to disengage from the contexts of intervention and to forward an external, un-co-opted and epistemically purer form of critique. For Richmond, it is also the basis for a call for ‘untainted’ knowledge to be developed within targeted societies.\(^{352}\) An anti-colonial position however has to articulate an alternative account of the status and nature of the self and of ‘authenticity’ if it is not to collapse into a similar position of critical escapism. Here, two sets of reflections are useful: Walley’s interrogation of the ‘authentic’ self, and Ortner’s critique of ‘ethnographic refusal’.

Christine Walley outlines a feminist, humanist case for questioning the implicit premise of a singular inner core as the authentic articulation of human being.\(^{353}\) In her discussion about the controversies of female genital operations, she explores her experiences of interacting in different settings with different young women who had undergone initiation procedures:

I began to recognize the naïveté of my search for “real” voices, for clearly the girls’ voices shifted according to context depending on whether they were at the ceremonies, with adults or peers, in mixed-sex settings or among female friends, or, I surmised, alone. Given the legacy of both Freud and Erving Goffman, it seems evident that each self has a public as well as a private side and many more layers within it, from the conscious to the deeply unconscious. What happens, however, when these apparent layers of the self contradict each other? Do these young women, and indeed all of us, have straightforward “best interests” or are our interests, on the contrary, multiple and contradictory? And, where would one locate the “authentic” self? In Western thought, we tend to

\(^{352}\) Chapter Two, 66.

privilege that which is most interior or private. Yet obviously, as critics of Freud’s universalism would emphasize, our unconscious is also a product of the times and places in which we exist, thus challenging the idea of a “layered” self that possesses an inner core untouched by our contemporary surroundings. Walley poses these problems as questions to be asked rather than resolved in any particular way within the context of this article. Yet even formulated as questions, these thoughts do present important challenges nonetheless to the assumptions in ‘Western thought’ about the ‘authentic’ self and how it is represented. This can be related more or less directly to the concerns articulated by anti-colonial thinkers such as Fanon to recognise and affirm the sociogenic and embodied dimensions of human subjectivity; that is, produced and articulated in the context of collective frames of meaning as well as socioeconomic conditions. Most obviously, it relates to the problematic of ‘double consciousness’ elaborated by Du Bois and then Fanon as the way in which racialised people have been forced to encounter themselves and their identities.

If the possibility of multiple selves and double/plural consciousness becomes a central assumption of the analysis, clearly both the stakes for claiming ‘authenticity’ and the grounds on which one might do so would change. The authenticity stakes are important in Walley’s context of a debate which frames female genital operations as either inauthentic/privately-despised/inherently-oppressive or authentic/privately-affirmed/legitimately-expressive, but not possibly both. Walley’s ethnographic work however challenges this as an adequate account of social reality, and as an adequate ‘humanist’ engagement. Rather, to engage in an interpretive project in good faith is to some extent to abandon a simple notion of a search for ‘inner’ authenticity in the voices of the people one is researching; indeed, in oneself and more generally also. As such, the act of interpretation is in some sense simply the attempt to make sense of how human behaviour expresses meaning and intentionality in particular frames and contexts, even when those frames and contexts may not be of their choosing.

Ortner makes the point more strongly in her critique of what she terms ‘ethnographic refusal’ in studies of resistance; that is the refusal of such studies to

354 Ibid., 412.
engage in substantial interpretive work on the grounds of doing violence to the
(mostly subaltern) subject of study, and in light of the recognised impossibility of
holistic or exhaustive representation. The result of such interpretive refusal is, she
argues, ultimately more threatening to an engagement with subjects than is the
attempt to interpret and engage with what is visible. This is because it leads to a
sanitised politics wherein the internal struggles of groups are left out, a thinning of
culture whereby actions are denied the meanings they have for the subjects, and
ultimately the dissolution of the subjects per se into a set of subject effects.
This is also to dodge the important relationship between frames of domination and
resistance, in which subjects do often both accept and creatively interpret particular
framings in order to forward alternative ideas or agendas. This point grounds the
orientation of much of the analysis in the following chapters, in which embodied
subjects are also understood as political agents developing particular strategies.

The anti-colonial critique of the subject articulated in Chapter Three can also
contribute to Walley’s and Ortner’s visions of research which must still engage in
interpretation, even long after the possibilities of innocent or unmediated
engagement have vanished and the possibility of ‘discovering’ or representing a
singular ‘authentic’ is long past. They can be understood as sharing a sense as to
what constitutes ‘authenticity’; that is a sense of conscious engagement in a form of
struggle or politics. But ‘authenticity’ in and of itself is not an expression of some
general validity in any particular political struggle. Nonetheless, it seems to generate
some kind of demands in terms of interpretive research. What is missing from
Walley’s, and indeed from Ortner’s, story of interpretation is an account of why a
‘humanist’ engagement would need to affirm the multiplicity of selves and
meanings which were present in a particular situation. For Walley, the content of
‘humanism’ is not fleshed out as such in this article; for Ortner, in order to conduct
interpretive work at all which engages with human subjects, one must assume a
certain authenticity and coherence to these subjects – it is in some senses a pre-
condition for the possibility of interpretive research. Whilst I would agree with
Ortner, she perhaps does not flesh out the problem enough.

355 Ortner, ‘Resistance’
356 Ibid., 176-187.
357 Ibid., 190.
Both of these approaches resonate with the views of the embodied understanding of the subject and of the ethics of engagement within anti-colonial thought that were laid out in the previous chapter. Yet, anti-colonial thought was also articulated and written as a kind of overtly political critical engagement with the practices of colonialism, rather than a guide to social theory and research. As such, it had the advantage of, first, being able to operate in a sphere where its ethical dimensions were already meaningful and relevant – one could make appeals based on human suffering, on injustices and indignities as these were ‘admissible’ in the context of the political appeal. This open coherence of purpose and analytic framing was important in the development of – and I think the strength of – these approaches – particularly as ‘humanist’ approaches. The second element of this is that these approaches openly endorsed a politics of recognition as part of their humanism. Looking back at Chapter Three, much of the dissatisfaction articulated with older critiques of imperialism was the failure to recognise people within the struggles first as people, and second, as having distinctive experiences of the world.

Clearly, such open coherence between a politics of recognition and the adoption of particular interpretive methodologies within the context of contemporary academia is more difficult to express; even if we accept that work is all ‘political’ in a broad sense and in the setting of the research questions, it has historically been expected to stand or fall, and to articulate its worthiness, outside of any particular politics. Nonetheless, it seems to me that it is difficult to address the various controversies in the interpretive stance as a methodology without understanding its deeper connection with a politics of recognition – not just as an orienting factor in research but also written into the logic of the methodology and what it prioritises i.e. the perception of meaning and intentionality. This does not resolve the important issues of ‘whom’ is recognised, nor what prominence they are given, but does make a strong claim in favour of the recognition of subjects per se within forms of critique.

As a further point of note, anti-colonial humanism can also help place the importance of the aesthetic within interpretive projects. Ethnographic writing is typically rich in what can be understood as aesthetic expression, that is, forms of
description which are evocative of the sensory dynamics and physical experiences of social interactions, as well as their emotional or poetic resonances with the author/reader. A reflected sense of physicality, pain, empathy and fun were all important elements for example of Walley’s account of initiation rituals. Indeed, without these aesthetic and poetic elements of experience, the account is greatly impoverished as a basis for reflection on the politics of female genital operations. Yet in the debates around the status of interpretive research, these aesthetic/poetic elements are often exempt from the consideration and reflexivity that is brought to the value of interpretive methods, not least because they are often conducted in contexts which deliberate on the extent of their conformity with other methods of data collection. Yet, within the context of the anti-colonial critique of the subject, spelled out in Chapter Three in Césaire’s poetics of humanism, these dimensions of the interpretive stance have in some senses a clearer purpose and mandate; they are necessary elements which make certain kinds of substantive solidarity and interpretation possible. In the context of this thesis I do not offer any poetic/aesthetic engagement of my own, although in the context of anti-colonial approaches in general these dimensions are an important grounding for humanist engagement. As the conclusions in Chapter Nine show, poetry can be a useful way of communicating the complex political ethics which the decolonising project demands.

What follows in terms of this thesis is a reconstruction of subjecthood in Mozambique – not just subjects in general, but subjecthood in related historical, political and economic dimensions, and from a stance which recognises both the possibility and the importance of interpretive engagement with in the service of a critical humanist project. I am not making the case that some form of pure interpretive engagement is possible/desirable; on the contrary, a variety of sources of information and modes of analysis are necessary and useful to help contextualise human agency and give behaviour meaning in the following chapters. In these


359 E.g. in Jackson, ‘Ethnographic Techniques’.
reconstructions of subjecthood, the authorial narrative and purpose also plays a deeply formative role in editorialising, authorising and shaping the accounts of subjecthood under discussion, which I have done with reference to the liberal peace debate in this project.

However, as Ortner argues, although the process is directed and constructed, it is not possible to give entirely fictional accounts of relationships and meaning. Not only are interpretations forced to reckon with the evidence of subjects, which ‘textual refusal’ pushes against textual violence, but they are also subject themselves to forms of interrogation and scrutiny from the context in which they are produced. 360 In the thesis, what emerged in these reconstructions are re-interpretations of social relations and power structures that I as the author found initially both surprising and to some extent counter-intuitive to my initial thinking on post-war interventions.361 It was only in the attempt to re-construct a sense of meaning and intentionality in actions and situations – that is to engage with the situations interpretively – that the alternative understandings could emerge of what the liberal peace represented for various parties and subjects within Mozambique. Whilst there is scope for debate on the ‘authenticity’ or completeness of such representations, I hope at least to have contributed to a pluralisation and opening up of the discussion via forms of interpretive engagement.

Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a methodological bridge, between the critical reading of the liberal peace debate elaborated in the previous two chapters on its exclusion of the subject, and the forms of reconstruction of the subject that follow in the rest of the thesis. It began with a discussion of what the reconstruction of the subject could involve in the context of this debate, responding

361 In the context of a more pragmatist/positivist account of qualitative inquiry, Gaskell and Bauer have argued that ‘surprise’ in empirical findings is generally a welcome sign in trying to produce good and publicly accountable research. Bauer, M. W., & Gaskell, G. (2000). Qualitative researching with text, image and sound: a practical handbook for social research. London: SAGE, 345.
to the marginalisation of historical presence, political consciousness and distinctive experiences of political economy in societies targeted by liberal peace reforms. The following chapters seek to begin to remedy these exclusions in various ways through empirical and interpretive reconstructions.

The second part of the chapter moved on to discuss the ways in which these reconstructions would and could take place. This first entailed a discussion of the range of sources of information chosen and used in the project, as well as the decision to focus on three particular areas of intervention. I then went on to discuss issues of representation and authenticity that have been explored in the ethnographic literature, and which seem to have been haunting some of the writers within the liberal peace debate. In this discussion, I noted that not only could some of these deliberations contribute to a type of anti-colonial methodology, but that the anti-colonial vision of humanism could also help substantiate the politics of interpretive research as a politics of recognition.

In the next chapter begins the work of the more grounded aspects of reconstruction, in a historical engagement with the territory now known as the Republic of Mozambique, star performer in the canon of international conflict management in the last two decades. Although both intervening parties and critics of the liberal peace have had little use, in general, for history, this is not necessarily the case for the societies targeted by intervention. Conscious adult memories are rather longer, and perhaps those elements memorialised in public narratives and socioeconomic dynamics make them longer still. In this context, the liberal peace can be understood as both disruptive of and continuous with particular practices, distributions of power and modes of thinking which have a longer heritage.
Chapter Five

Reconstructing historical presence: antecedent forms of rule, struggle and social transformation in Mozambique

One of the hallmarks of the ‘liberal peace’ as a form of interventionary conflict management was its generally de-historicising and non-historical treatment of societies in or just after an episode of conflict. Following on from the discussion in Chapter One, conflict was not to be understood as the manifestations of specific or particular political struggles grounded in particular distributions of power or competing ideological claims which needed to be addressed; rather it was understood that violent conflict stemmed from the general failures of liberal democratic governance to take hold and of human needs to be fulfilled. Since all conflicts had basically common causes, conflict management and conflict resolution could take a more-or-less common form via the introduction of multi-party electoral systems, liberalisation of the economy, endorsements of human rights principles and programmes of governance reform. This de-contextualised, universalist and technocratic response became the general modus operandi of the liberal peace.

Although critiques of the liberal peace have honed in on the formulaic character of its prescriptions, some, such as Richmond have framed this as a violation of unexplained cultural difference in target societies between the liberal and local, rather than of historical specificity. Even where this cultural focus is not so obviously the case, such as for Pugh, critiques of different types have continued to ignore the particular historical presence and character of societies which were the site of liberal peace interventions. As discussed in Chapter Two, this absence of substance in the analysis of target societies has tended to reproduce such societies as non-subjects of politics and in doing so has maintained the paradox of liberalism as a circular trap for critical thinking. One aspect of the paradox can be understood as a

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362 Chapter One, 42.
problem of recognition, whereby the failure to recognise the subjecthood of others re-produces the conditions of their marginalisation. Mac Ginty’s tends to be the exception, noting that critiques of the liberal peace have neglected the historical dimensions.

In Chapters Three and Four, it was argued that in order to respond to this problem, and recover such societies as ‘subjects’ in analysis, it would be necessary to attempt a multi-dimensional reconstruction of subjecthood. An important dimension of this would be the reconstruction of a historical presence within, and of, Mozambique. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this was also the conclusion reached by the post-independence Mozambican government after 1975. It supported a number of scholars, who have over the last thirty years or so produced a fascinating range of rich historical works in the general project of “decolonising Mozambique’s history”.

The Centre for African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University has been most obviously at the centre of this research, driven by academics with much initial support from the government. As the years have passed, important contributions have also been made by scholars not based there. As such, a set of histories exist which have sought to recover or recognise a sense of historical presence for the various peoples within Mozambique.

This is not to say that the production of these histories was subject to the political control of the government, nor that they were meant to serve only as a validation of Frelimo’s right-to-rule. Of course, Frelimo did – and continues to – lean heavily on favourable interpretations of their role in Mozambique’s independence struggle as a central pillar for validating their political pre-eminence. Some of the historical work produced during this time also provided some kind of general support for Frelimo’s attempted revolutionary reforms in the

363 First, R. (1983). Black gold: the Mozambican miner, proletarian and peasant. Brighton: Harvester, 3. First’s assassination in 1982 was not motivated by her scholarship but her anti-apartheid political activity, and that of her husband Joe Slovo. Nonetheless, it is a useful reminder of how closely historical scholarship was intertwined with the politics of decolonisation and anti-racism in this period.

first decade of their rule. Hanlon’s *Revolution Under Fire* perhaps falls into this category.\(^{365}\)

But Hanlon, like many others, also experienced the kind of ‘textual refusal’ that Ortner raised – that is, the phenomenon of the author being forced to deal with awkward dimensions of social experience that do not necessarily conform to a particular narrative or ideological bent, and, indeed, being open-minded enough to understand this. A number of schisms in the scholarship suggest that there is neither a homogeneous intellectual line at work, nor consistency in the various forms of textual refusal that have presented themselves as scholars have tried to corroborate particular interpretations in different settings.

This empirical awkwardness has however also been a welcome element within the historical literature on Mozambique, as well as by parts of Frelimo. Beyond the recovery of a historical presence, it provides a further rationale for engaging with the historical presence of Mozambique; i.e. to support a kind of *analytic* critique of political economy and social relations. This was important to figures within the Mozambican scholarly community after independence. For example, Aquino de Bragança and Jacques Depelchin’s widely-circulated critique of John Saul and Hanlon points towards the importance of history as a resource for reflection and re-assessment as well as recognition and presence, and cautions against histories as confirmatory triumph for the socialist revolution.\(^{366}\)

The need to recover the dialogic functions of history as a way of reflecting on and contextualising present activity seemed to become clearer to many around Frelimo’s leadership as its grand projects were seen to be failing in the 1980s. It is also important for this thesis in terms of reflecting on the liberal peace as a post-war project of radical social transformation – a designation that the critiques have stressed. Clearly, without a substantive historical understanding from which to make this claim, it is difficult to sustain. Nonetheless this type of historically informed understanding is generally lacking in the critiques of the liberal peace, which tend to


presume that these interventions have been high impact in a general sense without reference to the pasts of target societies.

The purpose of the chapter is to re-construct Mozambique as an embodied, situated subject of modern history, and then to use this as a platform to ask alternative questions about the significance and impact of the liberal peace as a set of politically transformative strategies of intervention. In this sense, its general place in the thesis supports a recognition of presence and subjecthood, but the substance of the chapter is directed towards a kind of reflective analysis. To do this, I draw largely on the works produced in the post-independence context just described to sketch out changing forms of rule in the territory, their relations to issues of political economy, and elements of politically organised resistance that were activated along the way. Following the trajectory within the historical research just mentioned, I begin with pre-Portuguese political organisation, look at the impact of imperialism and colonialism, and go on to focus in more detail on the emergence of a unitary state authority in the twentieth century and its various forms of rule. I trace some forms of continuity into the contemporary era which present issues for thinking about the critique of the liberal peace.

Two brief but important points need to be made at the outset. Although very interesting, it is not possible within the context of this chapter to discuss more fully the relevant issues associated with whether it is possible to escape completely some form of ‘Eurocentrism’ in the practice of constructing a social and political history, given the modernist biases and presumptions of such a project.\textsuperscript{367} For this, Bhambra’s discussion of modernist historiography indicates some limits and problems to bear in mind for would-be decolonising approaches which use modernist categories of analysis, such as many of those within the tradition of historical sociology.\textsuperscript{368} Nonetheless, the analysis which I undertake here and in Chapter Eight is broadly informed by James C. Scott’s understanding of the modern state as a peculiar institution which seeks to project authority over peoples in particular ways through practices of ordering and making legible populations and


\textsuperscript{368} Bhambra, \textit{Rethinking modernity}, esp. the Introduction.
As such, although I will invoke some classically ‘modernist’ tropes in understanding for example the political economy, I would not want this to imply an uncritical affirmation of the universal validity of such lenses. Rather, Scott’s framing consolidates themes which have been long present in the works of post-colonial social history which constitute many of the sources for this chapter. As such, Scott gives us a handle on how to think about the history of political rule that does not naturalise authority but points to its location in contested relations. This approach resonates with the ways in which anti-colonial thinkers understood the historicity of colonised peoples.

The second related issue pertains to the question of positionality and the historian’s gaze in the reconstruction of historical presence and subjeckhood. Chakrabarty has developed a postcolonial critique of Eurocentric historiography which has been influential in stimulating thinking on this front. For reasons of space I cannot go into the details of this argument, but in summary, it should at least be clear that I am not offering a positivist defence of ‘objective’ historical analysis, but hope to present an engaged reflective reconstruction of historical being. Chapters Three and Four emphasised in particular the need to engage with situated accounts of political experience in order to understand and reflect on domination in a critically engaged way. The way I evoke ‘situatedness’ in this chapter however more heavily leans on a sensitivity to analysing dynamics of rule and struggle rather than presenting diverse subject interpretations of these struggles. This is important in terms of the context of the purpose of the chapter – namely, to establish bases of recognition and historical understanding in support of a less exclusionary engagement with Mozambique as a target society of the liberal peace within the present debate. The narrative offered here is however generally focused on more ‘organised’ struggles between groups for political-economic power, and thus has not fully emphasised the important ‘People’s Histories’ that have also emerged in this period. Chapter Eight takes up the historical political-economic experiences of the

370 Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe.
371 This is taken up in Chapters Six and Seven.
peasantry separately as a grounding for an assessment of the contemporary political economy of rural interventions. Many of the histories that I do use have themselves been constructed in part through the use of oral histories and testimony from non-elite sources, and as such do not only or necessarily represent the histories of the ‘big’ people. Nonetheless, this is not a ‘subaltern’ history in the sense of the Subaltern Studies scholarship, which elaborates a more fundamental critique of historiography. In terms of pursuing the demands of a decolonising project more generally within the study of world politics, a deeper engagement with, and recovery of, non-elite narratives of history would nonetheless be an important aspect of the wider project.

The chapter structures Mozambique’s history into unequal periods of ‘rule’ and resistance, with a central focus on the twentieth century including the emergence of the ‘liberal peace’. In response to a critical literature which has emphasised the foreignness/Westernness, novelty and transformative character of the liberal peace in its target societies, the chapter will argue that there have nonetheless been important continuities in forms of political authority, political economy and public administration, as well as recurrent forms of crisis, rebellion and resistance against that rule. It also elaborates various ways in which Africans have been political agents and subjects within this history, in contradistinction to narratives which have cast Mozambique as only a terrain for the working out of the histories of others: European colonialism, Cold War socialism, Western neoliberalism. In the last part of the chapter, there is a discussion of the implications of such historical patterns for critical evaluations of the liberal peace in Mozambique. Most of all, this closing discussion calls into question the extent to which the programme of the liberal peace can be interpreted, with a consciousness of historical presence and subjecthood, as a radical developmental agenda of social transformation.


5.1: The southern part of the East African coast around 1500, map produced in Britain, c. 1902, Copyright source: Wikimedia Commons
I. Southern East Africa before Berlin

To understand the current politics and political economy of Mozambique historically, as well as its constitution as a state, it is important to understand the significance of the legal political fiction that the 1884 Berlin Conference and subsequent Anglo-Portuguese treaties performed in recognising it as a bordered entity under Portuguese occupation. As the section after this one shows, it was not until three decades after Berlin that the Portuguese could claim military control of this massive territory. By contrast, the brief history recounted in this section shows that for the four centuries prior to this, social, political and economic life in these territories was organised around a variety of kingdoms, empires and lineage groups of varying power, trading networks, spiritual powers, patterns of settlement and migration. Importantly for our reflections on contemporary forms of political rule, there was a diverse and non-integrated set of economies in Mozambique, little in the way of military stability, and a succession of African and Afro-Portuguese leaderships dominated systems of political authority amongst the people. The arrival of Portuguese traders, soldiers, missionaries and some settlers had some impact in shaping and re-shaping the social and economic order in the region, especially the coast, and in the emergence of this powerful *mestizo* class, but by and large they did not dominate the lives of the majority within the region until much later on.375

Before the arrival of Vasco de Gama and other Portuguese travellers from 1498 onwards, the southern coast of East Africa was largely dominated by Arab-Swahili trading networks operating out of Kilwa in what is now Tanzania, Anoche, Quelimane, and Sofala (see Image 5.1). These were integrated into trading routes in the Indian Ocean which were linked by merchant ships carrying gold, ivory and cloth from the interior of the land to markets across Asia, reaching China and Italy. At this time, politically important figures included the Anoche sultans, the ruling families in Kilwa, and the territorial chiefs of Quelimane and, inland, Tete. Trade flourished alongside boat-building industries in the islands between Kilwa and Mozambique Island. The arrival of the Portuguese in increasing numbers, with arms, over the next few decades led to the establishment of permanent bases and

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captaincies at Mozambique and Sofala, and substantially re-oriented these trading networks as a result of their presence towards Portuguese imperial monopolies of trade. Patterns of control were however not uni-directional; although the Portuguese could and did make particular trading demands through the use of force, they often had to pay tribute in the other direction towards the African chieftancies. Moreover, their reliance on local food production for survival inside the barracks and factories tended to create demands for less hostile relations with the existing communities.

Further inland, there were larger African chieftancies organised via lineage and systems of tribute, and settlements which were connected to the coastal communities through networks of trade but were largely not part of the same political and social systems. One of the most famous of these at the time of the arrival of the Portuguese was the Monomotapa lineage, which they named and treated as an empire, and which claimed seniority over many other chiefly lines in the region (see Image 5.2). This lineage may have been the direct descendants of the rulers of Great Zimbabwe – a civilisation known through its vast and complex ruins inland, which had been settled for a thousand years prior to the Portuguese arrival but had disappeared. Monomotapa was to a great practical extent a significant ruling dynasty for the interior areas south of the Zambesi river, and collected tribute from many other Karanga chieftancies. Trade during this period, especially in gold, was conducted at fairs established in the interior, which would be taxed by the chieftancies, who also exercised powers of dispute resolution and punishment over traders. When the Portuguese attempted to gain access to these fairs, in some instances one of the conditions upon which they were permitted to do so was that they would police their traders under the name of the Monomotapa. These fairs were important loci of economic organisation for the region’s various groups, and were already integrated to a certain extent into the commercial systems of the Indian Ocean featuring Indians, Chinese, Persian, Venetian and Jewish traders. Nonetheless, the mainstay of wealth in the popular economy was the trade and use of cattle, in which trade the imperial powers did not participate. In the first instance, the arrival of the Portuguese did not present any immediate military challenges to the inland states and empires; however, their effect on the distributions of arms allowed some internal secessions from the Monomotapa regime. Over the next two
centuries, however, there were increasing incidents of military confrontation over the control of the gold trade, rather than the right to settle, in the Zambesi basin.
5.2: Map of south eastern Africa in 1780 made by Dutch explorers, indicating the presence of a reputedly large Monomotapa empire. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
The Portuguese remained largely based on the coast in the sixteenth century, on Mozambique and at Sofala, although increasingly departing from the barracks and marrying with the African populations. This led to the development of *muzungo* (Afro-Portuguese mestizo) classes who were integrated into African families and culture, connected to Indian commercial and capital networks, but also looked to Portugal for social and political recognition. It is argued by Newitt that it was these classes – the node in relations between Africans in the interior and the ‘outside’ world, largely prevented the consolidation either of a colonial state or an African monarchy in their areas of influence. Moreover, they were an important element in the strong resistance mounted to direct economic domination over these centuries.

A particular institution which illustrates the various limitations on the presence of official Portuguese control in the eighteenth century were the Zambesi *prazos*: large land estates often seized or purchased from Tonga chieftancies whose titles were in the gift of the Portuguese crown. They were largely controlled by *muzungo* families – often by women, in the pattern of the matrilineal practices of Tonga society – who identified themselves and their slaves as Christian, but who in practice were also integrated into the African cultures around them. In particular, spirit mediums and practices of spirituality held some sway over prazero society. Attempts were made to send white settler couples and poor women from rural Portugal to create a white colonial society, although these were limited and sporadic, with people often dying of disease. As a result, the ownership and culture of the nominally Portuguese prazos was distinctive to this area and this social group, neither of particular profit to the Portuguese crown, nor a useful instrument of colonial settlement. Many prazos collapsed as a result of their enthusiastic involvement in the profitable slave trade, which violated the agreements that had been made with the local Tonga populations regarding slavery, and had caused much death and suffering. This left the prazos and the surrounding area depopulated and debilitated, and vulnerable to takeover by the mid-nineteenth century. Much of this was propelled by the enslavement of the *achikunda*, traditionally the African military protectors of the prazeros, who finally revolted and deserted these estates.

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However, in the nineteenth century, the former owners of the prazos and their descendants continued to constitute an important force in Zambesian society as warriors and traders.

In thinking about the territory of present-day Mozambique during this time, it is important to stipulate just how geographically limited formal Portuguese presence was. The prazos represented the high point of Portuguese efforts to consolidate its authority and physical presence, and as we have seen, these were largely a failure in this respect. Further north than this, there was very little contact with the Makua sheikhs who had a consolidated predominance in the area which is now northern Nampula. South of Sofala, the area was home to a number of different groups who also had little contact with the Portuguese, who had managed to establish only a semi-permanent trading presence at Lourenço Marques which was frequently sacked.

An important group in terms of impact over the nineteenth and early twentieth century, now celebrated in Mozambican school books, was the Gaza kingdom, ruled by the Nguni, who did establish political relations with the Portuguese, including the exchange of ambassadors. The Nguni had migrated to the region from central southern Africa as part of the displacement from the Zulu wars, and established a much more organised militarised presence in the south of the country, gradually consolidating a more centralised form of authority and taxation over most of what is now south Mozambique. Led by Soshangane from the 1830s, later ruled by his son Uwzila and grandson Gungunhana, the powerful Gaza Empire at its height got as far north as the Zambesi prazos, taking over some forcibly and sending the tribute back to the Gazan capital. It became increasingly involved in the ivory and slave trades in Zambesi regions, capitalising on the drought and famine that had weakened many of its competitors. It also had military, commercial and political dealings with the British South Africa Company in Transvaal and Natal, who had urgent need of African labour from what is now southern Mozambique to grow the mining and sugar industries. Gungunhana sought to negotiate duties from the British for each contracted labourer. Although they did not succeed in this

particular effort, the involvement of centralised authorities in contracting labour for South Africa has been a lasting legacy in the political economy of Mozambique.

By the time of the Berlin Conference in 1884, Portugal’s presence in current Mozambique was highly scattered, and mainly concentrated on the coast. The British had begun to exercise increasing influence over Lourenço Marques in the south as key port for the Transvaal and Natal, and the Gaza Empire remained powerful. The Zambesi area, formerly in the gift of the Portugese crown, was the site of a range of new chiefly secondary states, including that of the Yao, the Tonga, the Makanga, and the Manganja, as well as former prazero warlords with Portuguese names.\footnote{Ibid., Chapter 6.} Many of these offered armed resistance to the establishment of Portuguese authority, both before and after the Berlin Conference. The interior of the north, and especially the Mueda plateau, had recently become populated by Makonde from Tanzania, but elsewhere was becoming largely converted to Islam and controlled by families allied to Indian merchant capital. The slave trade, the central point of interest and wealth creation for Portugal in terms of the trade with Brazil, Cuba and the United States, was rapidly collapsing as a result of a sudden drop in world sugar prices and the increasing enforcement of abolition treaties.
5.3: Famous portrayal of the capture of Gungunhana, installed in the colonial fort in Maputo, picture taken by the author, June 2008.

The recognition of Portugal’s ‘right to occupy’ Mozambique at Berlin thus represented a kind of performative aspiration rather than a concrete reality. Portugal, itself very poor, had difficulties mustering the resources that would allow it to successfully occupy, let alone politically organise Mozambique. Immediately after Berlin, and the signing of further border treaties with Britain, attempts were made to develop an administrative presence and more settled patterns of production and trade via the establishment of colonial concession companies, who were leased the land in return for pacification. These included the Niassa Company, the Mozambique Company, the Zambesia Company and the Mozambique Sugar Company, which later became Sena Sugar Estates. Work songs recorded by Vail and White about the infamous Paiva Raposo emphasised the suffering of the labourers and spread across different estates, resonating with the experience of
labourers across the region. However, these attempts to consolidate control and production, which often included the use of forced labour, were often resisted. Although Gungunhana was defeated eventually in 1895, (see Image 5.3) military rebellions still caused problems. In 1917, a substantial organised military rebellion against the Portuguese in Barue, involving thousands of fighters from a range of different lineages, exposed the relative frailty of the colonial order in Tete and the Zambesi. Isaacman and Isaacman argue that this was the first organised anti-colonial rebellion, in both form and collective intent, and in which there was long-term planning, open anti-colonial sentiment and strategic co-operation.

In this long period, very briefly sketched here, it is possible to draw out at least three issues which are relevant to contemporary reflections on the liberal peace. The first is the relatively non-integrated character of the political economy, which is oriented towards different modes of production, trade and labour exchange throughout the territory from north to south and from the inland areas to the coast. In this period, we see strong connections developing between the southern region and South African industrialisation, with the central regions developing a growing slave trade, large agricultural estates and the links with what became southern Zimbabwe, and in the north links are deepened with the networks connecting to Indian capital and Muslim traders. The second is the absence of any substantive monopoly of military force or political authority in this period, Portuguese or otherwise. Whilst Christian missionaries to some extent managed to maintain a marginally independent presence from the Portuguese crown, by and large the period reflected, a ‘civilising’ – i.e. culturally, socially and politically transformative – mission in name only. Third, the territory was dominated by a series of shifting and overlapping authorities of African and Afro-Portuguese leaders, some of whom were more organised and centralised than others who variously collaborated with and resisted imperial and colonial structures throughout the period. As such, there is a great extent to which they exercised significant agency and influence over the lives of the inhabitants – African and European – within the territories. The hierarchical tribute structures of these relations in political and economic terms was

380 Ibid., Chapter 7.
a central feature of the southern Gazan kingdoms in particular, although there is evidence of a greater degree of horizontal linkages and organisation in the centre and north as power was more broadly dispersed. Whilst it is not very useful to draw very direct connections between this and the impact of more recent attempts at transformation, it is indicative of the broader frailty of conquest and control upon which the twentieth century modern unitary state was built, as well as the dependence of the economy on the export of labour.

If future Mozambicans begin to be understood as subjects of history in this period, it is as groups of people, pluralistically constituted in terms of origins, who are not particularly compliant with attempts at imperial rule, but who use a wide range of political and economic strategies to manage their fates between different would-be rulers. This immediately begins to resonate with some of the issues surrounding the exclusion of subjecthood in accounts of the liberal peace, which have framed the encounter as a generic one between the ‘liberal’ and ‘local’, or have simply failed to contextualise target societies. By paying attention to the historic experiences of the peoples in a territory such as Mozambique, as told by ‘decolonising’ accounts of history, we can begin to think about the liberal peace not as being visited on a ‘blank slate’ of the ‘local’, but as a recent articulation of the complex historical relations both between shifting groups based permanently in the territory and those connected outside the territory. As I will discuss further in the final section of this chapter, a sense of historical presence and an understanding of historical dynamics opens up alternative ways of thinking about the liberal peace.

II. Mozambique and the New State (Novo Estado), 1928-74

A more substantive assertion of unitary colonial political rule over the sizable territory known now as Mozambique took place from the 1930s under the reforms of the New State (Novo Estado) in Portugal. The re-configurations of public administration, political authority and political economy undertaken in this recent period were substantial and in many senses long-lasting – as we will see in the years
afterwards, many legacies from the Salazar\textsuperscript{381} period continue to shape tropes of political authority and practices of public administration in what became the state, and the contours of the political economy thereafter. In this period however, we also see various forms of resistance to the state emerge more prominently. As such, the authority of the state remained fragile in various regions and dimensions, as indicated by the early successes of the independence movement.

The reforms of the New State were marked in particular by the promulgation of the Colonial Act of 1930, which declared the integration of overseas territories into the Portuguese state, and the Organic Charter of 1933, which was a kind of colonial constitution which reconfigured the relationship between Mozambique and Portugal.\textsuperscript{382} These changes in Portuguese policy were accelerated by a new government. A set of crises within the First Republic had resulted in a successful coup in 1928, with the new conservative nationalist dictatorships pledging to wipe out what it saw as disorder, economic crisis and corruption, both in Portugal and the lands it laid claim to overseas. Incidents such as the sustained Barue rebellion were seen as nationally embarrassing and demoralising; moreover, the colonial companies which were the proxy administrators of the territory after the Berlin Conference were manifestly failing in the job assigned to them of raising money, competing with other imperial producers and pacifying the African populations. In fact, they were mostly in a state of financial ruin.\textsuperscript{383}

\textsuperscript{381} António Salazar effectively ruled Portugal from 1932 when he became Prime Minister, until his death in 1968, at which time his close ally Caetano took over.
\textsuperscript{382} Newitt, \textit{A history of Mozambique}, 451.
\textsuperscript{383} Vail and White, \textit{Capitalism and colonialism}, 200-230.
5.4: Colonial administrative divisions, 1943. Map reproduced in Gengenbach, H., *Binding Memories*, Source: Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique

The Organic Charter of 1933 attempted to radically change the basis of public administration within Mozambique. Colonial Companies were disbanded, and passed into the control of the state, which installed state Administrative Posts throughout the country. The map above shows that the territory was marked out into
around 100 administrative divisions, which sometimes followed the boundaries of the old concession company territories. The enforcers of the colonial companies – the *cipais* – were recruited instead by the state as native police, and conscription into the colonial army increased. Another significant layer of native administration was created in the shape of *régulos*; these were ‘traditional leaders’ whom the state had chosen to recognise as the representatives of particular groups, as well as the instruments of their orders to these groups. Depending on the locality, these could be people who were recognised as having leadership roles within various communities previously, who thus became an institution of continuity between the colonial state and the population. However, it was also common for leaders who had been troublesome for the colonial powers to have other *régulos* recognised instead in their areas, and to thus be displaced by the new administration. *Régulos* were treated differently to the general population; exempted from various forms of taxation and labour themselves, they had some powers of compulsion over the community as a whole. Their authority could derive from multiple sources, including spiritual authority, lineage authority, political authority and the forms of patronage and privilege resulting from their position in the colonial order. Yet the role was very much a ‘modern’ confection, fulfilling the functions of an under-resourced colonial state. Under the *réguilo* system, the visible physical presence of the Portuguese state in the countryside was increased, with the raising of Portuguese flags, and physical construction of state property at each administrative post.

Also codified in the Organic Charter of 1933 was the *indígenato* system, formalising a division between subject ‘native’ *indígenas* and citizen ‘non-natives’ which had be first introduced in law in the 1899 Labour Law, which had in principle banned slavery. This attempted to consolidate a distinctive legal political status for the ‘citizens’ who could own property, move freely, participate in various public institutions and had no labour obligations, and the ‘natives’ who were excluded from colonial social and political life, and ‘morally’ compelled to work in various forms of contract labour. The former were subject to the laws of Portugal, the latter those of Mozambique, consolidating the performance of racial bifurcation

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within the system of colonial political authority. Under some pressure, a category of *assimilados* was created: the assimilated. These would be those natives who had sufficiently ‘advanced’ in their adoption of European culture and language to be treated under the same legal codes. In practice, these constituted a tiny minority of the population – perhaps 5,000 out of 8.2 million by Independence.\(^{386}\) Often, they had been educated in Catholic mission schools and took on petty administrative roles in the cities thereafter.

These *assimilados* were crucial in Portugal’s attempt to buttress its political authority in portraying its colonial possessions as part of a developmental, civilising multi-racial lusophone community to the outside world. Under increasing pressure from internal agitation and the civil rights movements in the 1960s, the legal category of ‘*indígena*’ was dropped, and public services such as schools and hospitals were extended in a limited way to the black population. Yet this was also a period in which mass Portuguese and Indian settlement was being encouraged, which directly undermined job opportunities for the *assimilados*, who became increasingly disgruntled under the openly racial discrimination practised in the cities. Many of those who settled in this period, particularly from Portugal, had equally come from backgrounds without formal education, giving a particular lie to the notion of their superior qualifications for the kind of work, status and property which they were given on arrival. As Amílcar Cabral had pointed out in his critique of Portuguese colonialism, the majority of Portuguese in Portugal at the time would not have met the criteria to be considered *assimilado*.\(^{387}\)

The patterns in political authority, and particularly the apparent attempt to establish a more open and egalitarian order including racial inclusiveness and ownership of one’s labour were nonetheless systematically undermined on two connected fronts. On the one hand, widespread racism was socially normalised and in this sense, day-to-day relations between Africans and Europeans were practically

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\(^{387}\) Cabral, ‘The facts about Portugal’s African Colonies’, *Unity and Struggle*, 20.
indistinguishable from earlier periods, and in some senses intensified by the new settler class who expected to have their ‘white’ status translate into social power.\textsuperscript{388}

On the other hand, the way in which the new dispensation was systematically undermined was by the labour requirements of the new drive for economic autarchy. The same Organic Charter which established the new forms of public administration and political authority also established a new vision for the economy based on the autarchic development of a Portuguese imperial system, in which Mozambique and other ‘overseas territories’ were to supply foreign exchange, taxes and raw materials for processes of industrialisation in Portugal. In principle, although native labour was free to contract where it chose, in practice, the laws were systematically flouted, either through a loophole which allowed authorities to compel ‘vagrants’ (those without employment cards) to forced labour as punishment, or that which required people to labour on ‘public works’, which were generously defined. These forms of forced labour were known as \textit{chibalo}, widely detested but enforced by the structures of decentralised public administration. Moreover, native taxes were vastly increased as a proportion of wages, meaning that many peasants were necessarily compelled to work in wage labour for at least half a year to cover this tax. Those natives who could not pay would be taken for \textit{chibalo}. This was convenient for the colonial companies’ estates, now owned and financially guaranteed by the state, whose production was relatively uncompetitive compared to commodities produced elsewhere. As will be further discussed in Chapter Eight, these practices led to widespread malnutrition and the disruption of food production. Yet for the colonial authority, these were justified as necessary for the ‘development’ of the colony, for the first time elaborated through a series of Five Year Plans by the colonial state. These set out targets for export and the construction of infrastructure, such as railways and roads to serve the investment projects, and schools and hospitals to serve the African populations. As resistance accumulated to the colonial state, its developmental necessity and rationale was re-affirmed both to external and internal audiences. However, the colonial administration was also forced to abandon \textit{chibalo} and the growing of forced crops as an official policy in 1961, although in practice it continued for some time after this.

The tensions between colonial attempts to reproduce sources of very cheap human labour whilst nominally making improvements in political status and access, whilst reassuring and encouraging white settlement, were both obvious and problematic. Many white settlers had an expectation of virtually free labour, and there was much complicity in terms of rule-interpretation by petty administrative structures to ensure this. Practices of chibalo were central to many of the dynamics that emerged from these tensions. Urban migration and industrial labour was one way of escaping chibalo, offering both higher wages than plantation work, and the possibility of protection through the patronage of a padrinho or godfather.\(^{389}\) This created a new set of identifications and class dynamics in the form of urban workers, who made efforts to agitate for better recognition and conditions in Lourenço Marques.\(^{390}\) It also furthered economic migration into the South African mines, where wages were higher and conditions slightly better. It also became a central focus of identification between the masses and the anti-colonial movement which was gathering a small amount of momentum in the 1950s.

Despite a much more deliberate attempt to exert direct control over the public administration and political economy of the territory, the colonial state did not last very long and it was brought down by a left-wing military coup in Portugal in 1974. This was in large part because the army was reluctant to continue fighting the colonial wars. The history of the Mozambican independence movement and the foundation of Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) in 1962 in Dar-es-Salaam is well covered, event by event, by the post-independence historical literature.\(^{391}\) The movement, headed by former UN official and anthropologist Eduardo Mondlane, received funding and arms from a wide range of sources, including the Kennedy administration, China, Nyerere, and the Soviet Union. Whilst there is some disagreement as to the role played by Frelimo militancy in driving out the colonial authority, it is clear that much of the discontent within Portugal

\(^{389}\) Ibid.


stemmed from the heavy burden that colonial counter-insurgency entailed on the army and the state in general, absorbing up to 8% of the entire national income.\footnote{Newitt, \textit{A history of Mozambique}, 537.}

Within Mozambique, this was because the anti-colonial movement was able to mobilise substantial parts of the population and to disrupt colonial authority in various regions through military and political activity. This was initially localised in the northern provinces such as Cabo Delgado, where both cross-border guerrilla activity and brutal counter-insurgency led to widespread Frelimo support. In particular, the massacre of unarmed protesting Makonde villagers at the administrative headquarters in Mueda in 1960 became emblematic of the brutality of the regime and helped radicalise people against it.\footnote{West, \textit{Kupilikula}, 135-6.} This radicalisation translated into practical support for the movement in its early days, particularly as one of its central promises was the full abolition of \textit{chibalo}. The relatively flimsy presence of the colonial state in many areas in the north receded quickly, which allowed Frelimo to set up ‘liberated zones’; areas of settlement which were re-organised towards collective production and self-sufficiency, with various new participatory administrative structures. These contrasted with the strategic villages (\textit{aldeamentos}) set up by the Portuguese as part of counter-insurgency vigilance.\footnote{Coelho, J. P. B. (1998). ‘State resettlement policies in post - colonial rural Mozambique: the impact of the ommunal village programme on Tete province, 1977–1982’. \textit{Journal of Southern African Studies}, 24(1), 61-91.}

In reconstructing the historical presence and dynamics of Mozambique, this period between the late 1920s and early 1970s was fundamental in laying the foundations of the contemporary state, physically and intellectually, in establishing the consolidation of a bordered territory understood as ‘Mozambique’, and in stimulating changing forms of national and class identification amongst urban and rural populations. Although, this was contested, and had to accommodate a variety of extant systems of authority through its forms of indirect rule in the provinces, these dynamics are nonetheless important in understanding the constitution of Mozambique as a particular kind of ‘collective’ historical subject in the present.
As was the case in the earlier period, the limited reach of the administrative structures across the country continued to pose problems for the colonial state’s attempt to control, instrumentalise and regulate the behaviour of the population. This became more acute in the face of the spread of more fundamental critiques of colonialism and calls for independence. As such, the authorities had to attempt to maintain supplies of labour in the face of discontent, leading to a retrenchment of public authority towards ostensibly ‘developmental’ objectives without a change in the basic orientation of the economy. Moreover, the dual and sometimes plural sources of social authority in communities more distant from the central control of the state continued to be a feature of the lives of many. As will be discussed in the final section, understanding the history – and the late colonial history in particular – of public administration, political economy and political struggles in Mozambique begins to render the rationales and activities of the liberal peace – as delineated in policy and the critiques – both less novel and perhaps more problematic than they have been portrayed thus far in the debate.

III. Independence, Socialist Revolution and Frelimo rule 1975-1989

The uncontested handover of state power to Frelimo upon independence in 1975 laid the platform for a renewed attempt at ambitious state-driven social and political programme for transformation in Mozambique, based around the dismantling of colonial power, the collectivist modernisation and development of rural society along socialist lines, and the forging of a new model of citizenry based on scientific socialism. Despite these radical intentions, within a decade the project of transformation was both failing and being unmade on several fronts, including through the violently destabilising force of Renamo, failures of management, vision, economic crisis and natural disaster amongst other factors. What did emerge however was a substantial fusion of the Frelimo party structure with the state, creating a new relatively cohesive ruling social group which was

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widely dispersed across the country and in many places integrated into existing structures of authority.\textsuperscript{396}

The economic basis of the new state was however fragile; much of the human capital, particularly in the sense of classes with secondary education, managerial and organisational capacity, had been evacuated through the flight of settlers and other privileged groups in the process of independence. Although sympathetic \textit{cooperantes} from Scandinavia, the UK and the Eastern bloc amongst others were sometimes used to fill these positions, their numbers, skills and experience did not always match the vacancies. During the first years following independence, those with any training or formal education at all were promoted rapidly and often worked in several posts simultaneously. This was especially the case in education and healthcare, which the government was keen to rapidly expand.

In terms of physical capital, often equipment and assets had been stripped, mined or simply destroyed to prevent further use. Trading networks and shops closed down and disappeared. The government’s programme of rapid nationalisation of industries and shop networks was in some sense the only logical reaction to this collapse.\textsuperscript{397} Simultaneously, the new government was attempting to industrialise rapidly and extensively imported heavy machinery from both the West and Eastern bloc countries. The agreements with South Africa regarding the use of Mozambican labour in the mines – a significant earner of state finance, household earnings in the south of the country and foreign exchange – were suspended given the anti-apartheid politics of the new regime and their supportive relationship with the ANC. Due to the imports and the loss of foreign exchange, Mozambique went quickly from having virtually no foreign debt in 1980 to becoming very heavily indebted by 1984 as a result of this policy. Crucially, it was as early as 1984 that its first economic agreements with the IMF were signed and, soon afterwards, moves to partially liberalise the economy were made. Chapter Seven explores in more detail

\textsuperscript{396} Harrison argues strongly for example that Frelimo \textit{estruturas} in rural Mecúfi district were peasant structures, which is also borne out by West’s discussion of healers in Mueda, although these districts are close by. Harrison, G. (2000). \textit{The politics of democratisation in rural Mozambique: grassroots governance in Mecúfi.} Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen; West, \textit{Kupilikula}, 196-7.

the importance of this period of economic crisis as a foundation for the relationship between the government and foreign government donors.

This is not to say that the government was not ideologically motivated; indeed there seemed to be coherence at the time just after independence between the vanguardist Marxism-Leninism that Frelimo had adopted, and the need for substantive intervention in the political economy. Frelimo also set about creating political structures throughout the country as a means of involving and connecting with the population, which Harrison argues were intimately connected with existing forms of social authority.\textsuperscript{398} A hierarchical network of Party cells became the central engine for the spread of its influence, which also became highly fused with the structures of the state. The charismatic authoritarianism of President Samora Machel lent a particular character to both politics and public administration in this period. For example, he believed that the vestiges of the bureaucracy that had operated with the colonial government were reactionary, and so sought to gradually co-opt and undermine them as an independent force, most notably in the anti-bureaucratic Presidential Offensive of 1980.\textsuperscript{399} Chapter Six will look at ways in which during this period there developed various discourses against corruption and self-interest in both public servants and the wider population.

At the centre of Frelimo’s ideological programme was, importantly, a fairly radical vision of the New Man (\textit{Homem Novo}) which all were expected to emulate – an image of an educated, healthy modern citizen with an understanding of socialist principles and a desire to devote himself to the national project, who eschewed feudalism and ‘traditional superstition’ (\textit{obscurantismo}) in favour of equal gender relations and scientific practices of production.\textsuperscript{400} To promote this, there were massive anti-illiteracy campaigns and substantial efforts at political ‘education’. The political agenda was strongly developmentalist and transformational in orientation. Machel declared 1980 the beginning of a Ten Year Plan for the Decade

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\item \textsuperscript{398} Harrison, \textit{The Politics of Democratisation}.
\item \textsuperscript{400} West, 152.
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of Mozambique’s Victory over Underdevelopment. There was also an effort to form mechanisms of direct popular participation in the political system. *Poder Popular* in Mozambique were seen as directly countering the legacies of colonialism – specifically political exclusion, denial of access to welfare provision and economic exclusion. Yet, simultaneously, and certainly in tension if not contradiction with the principles of *Poder Popular*, Frelimo had declared itself a vanguard party of the revolution in 1977, a designation which stood unmodified until the Fifth Congress in 1989.

What were the popular experiences of this period? Marshall’s account of the attempts to introduce literacy training into the CIM factories outside Maputo offers deep insight into the very limited ability of these transformation programmes to make definitive breaks with colonialist hierarchical social relations in the classroom and on the factory floor, to get to grips with the daily problems of workers such as the lack of food, to empower women, and more generally to use literacy as a tool for popular empowerment rather than for ‘development’. Rather, they tended to reinforce structures of authority in management and social class, make more onerous demands on workers’ time and reinforce the privileged status of Portuguese as the language of political participation. As such, literacy programmes – at the heart of the government’s vision for a modern population – often ended up establishing new forms of alienation amongst the population. As Chapter Eight will discuss further, other elements of the government’s new programme such as the creation of communal villages, co-operatives and collective production showed similar tendencies in terms of reinforcing various relations of hierarchy and being disconnected from the realities of those whom they sought to empower.

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This authoritarian tendency also manifested itself in a fairly heavy-handed treatment of dissidents or those that did not conform to the party line. For those labelled ‘enemies’ of the regime, there was also the option of ‘re-education’ at a punitive labour camp in a remote province. Yet it seemed relatively easy to become an ‘enemy’ of the state. For example, despite official state control of the economy, much of the population bought and sold their goods through *candonga*, the unofficial market. This parallel and often intersecting system of trade in the country was a relatively large proportion of economic activity, although it is of course unknown exactly how much.\(^\text{405}\) Seen as an enemy of the revolution, it was publicly punished, although Hanlon also reports that state enterprises themselves even relied on it for supplies of goods and materials.\(^\text{406}\) However, given the large levels of antipathy towards it from the Party, and in particular the President, this led to the deepening of divisions between the economic strategies of the state and those of the broader population, especially during periods of drought and famine in the early 1980s.

Compounding drought and famine in the early 1980s, economic and political sabotage was undertaken prominently, effectively and deliberately by the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo herein). The origins of this group of rebels is somewhat historically contested, although it is now broadly agreed that the Rhodesian security services and after 1980 the South African security services extensively funded, trained and supported the group of disgruntled ex-Frelimo leaders as part of a deliberate policy of destabilisation of the new Frelimo regime.\(^\text{407}\) At later stages, support was received from right-wing groups within the United States and Europe as part of a Cold War framework of opposing socialism. This group deliberately targeted infrastructure such as roads and railway lines, particularly those linking Southern Rhodesia to Mozambique in the Beira corridor and those supplying productive industries, as well as any symbols of state power, including communal villages, health and education posts, and bureaucratic


apparatus. The impact of the attacks on productive capacity were pervasive and substantial, both through the damage caused and the reduction in activity due to fear amongst civilians. Various witness accounts testify strongly to the brutality of the war, which produced massive displacement and caused many deaths and mutilations. The war itself also provoked forms of armed resistance within communities that were neither aligned to the government nor Renamo; for example, the Naparama soldiers who defended communities in Zambézia under the leadership of the spiritual healer Manuel António. Nonetheless, a substantial parallel war economy also flourished, based on logistical risk-bearing and mobile or migrant wage labour.

Despite the seemingly senseless character of some of the particular acts of violence, it is nonetheless hard to escape the conclusion that where Renamo did come to a *modus vivendi* with populations, it was sometimes tapping into a certain kind of alienation or distance between Frelimo’s projects of social and political transformation and the broader population, particularly in terms of spiritually-based social practices and hierarchies of power. Geffray’s study of the experience in Erati district in Nampula province notes that Renamo, although coercive and violent, emphasised dimensions of land restoration and respect for spiritual power, including religious institutions, and dealt largely through the chiefs of villages. This interpretation is supported by Hall, who emphasises the change over the course of the war in the character of Renamo as being also related to the government response of intensifying policies of forced villagisation of the peasantry. Yet, increasingly crippled by the war effort, the state could not make the villages function in the promised way, compounding the dire situation of the population, who were

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410 Nordstrom gives a compelling account of the fear that Renamo had of the Naparama / Parama, *Different Kind of War Story*, 57-62.
increasingly fleeing the country. In this sense, the outcome of Renamo’s violence exactly cohered with its intentions – to destabilise the state and make normal life unviable, and to challenge Frelimo’s attempts at ‘modernist’ social transformation.

In some senses, the post-independence period is the most critical to recognise, understand and re-construct, in order to put ‘liberal peace’ relations into conversation with an understanding of historical subjecthood. It is a period when a self-consciously ‘Mozambican’ state came into being, when the ideas underpinning the basis of colonial authority were openly challenged, and when sincere and ambitious designs to transform the lives of the population were pursued with enthusiasm. Yet, as will be discussed in the concluding section of this chapter, there are some strong elements of continuity between the colonial and socialist regimes, in terms of their modernising visions, labour-intensive political economies and hierarchical, authoritarian practices and structures of rule. Such continuities, which will be understood as also persisting into the post-war period of liberalisation, are important in understanding the kinds of political and social relations and struggles that have underpinned living memory, and in which the liberal peace is itself embodied.

IV. Liberalisation and the one-party state, 1989 to the historical present

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, many of the critiques of the liberal peace have emphasised its fundamentally transformational character. As noted in Chapter Two, for example, Duffield opens his discussion with the idea that the liberal peace represents a “radical developmental agenda of social transformation”\(^{414}\) which marries the politics of liberalisation to a concern for conflict resolution, thus overturning Third World alternatives. However, as the discussion in the chapter thus far has intimated, when engaging with and interpreting Mozambique as a historical entity, this may only tell half the story. In this section, I will briefly outline some of the reforms which happened in Mozambique that are understood within the liberal peace literature as ‘radical’,

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\(^{414}\) Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*, 10-11.
before pointing to how these reinforce some important elements of continuity as well as change in the relationship between state and society.

By the end of the 1980s, it had become clear that the condition for the end of the now unwinnable war with Renamo was political liberalisation and the move to a multi-party system. Anticipating this ahead of the Rome peace talks with Renamo, the Frelimo Fifth Congress removed references to Marxism-Leninism from its political rubric in 1989, and the Government made unilateral changes to the Constitution of Mozambique in 1990 allowing for contested multi-party elections. Following the General Peace Agreement signed in Rome, the subsequent electoral process in 1994, shepherded and closely scrutinised by the UN mission ONUMOZ, resulted in the formation of fourteen eligible parties, of whom three (Frelimo, Renamo and Udemo) won seats in the National Assembly. Subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections have been held regularly, if not entirely smoothly, every five years.

At the same time, and under heavy personal lobbying from the journalist community within Mozambique, it also legally wrote in provisions for freedom of the press and the right to information. Interestingly, the government had blocked recent attempts at press freedom fearing that these would result in greater criticism of Western donors, with whom it was building relations. Since 1990, the number of newspapers in circulation has greatly increased, with organs such as Savana and Zambeze able to pursue a line openly critical of the government. Whilst the harassment of such entities by the government has not entirely ceased, they are nonetheless able to operate. In recent years, an independent television network STV and its associated newspaper O País have become much more widely available.

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These two elements: multi-party elections and freedom of the press can be understood as representing significant departures from previous principles of rule enunciated throughout the socialist period within Mozambique and demonstrate that important elements of political liberalisation occurred.

Economic liberalisation can be dated from some years before this period, and appears no less substantial. In 1984, the government approved an Economic Rehabilitation Programme at the behest of the IMF in return for debt rescheduling. Official co-operation with the World Bank and EEC under the Lomé Convention also began. Although some measures to liberalise the economy had been taken even before this, this was the marker of significant upheavals in state involvement in the economy, including the removal of prices of production inputs and exchange controls on the currency. These measures also appeared to mark something of a significant shift from the state’s previous principles of a planned economy and as such a significant ideological re-orientation within the state, much to the dismay of some of the ‘hardline’ elements within Frelimo.

Equally if not more visible was a rapid influx of (mostly European and North American) bilateral aid agencies, multilateral aid agencies and NGOs, carrying out a massive range of humanitarian and developmental missions, often setting up parallel structures to those of the state and in competition with each other. This is what Richmond has called the ‘alphabet soup’ of agencies which are, according to the liberal peace, ‘reordering state and society’. They were seen to be vitally necessary. By 1989, the population was heavily reliant on food aid from donors, and by 1994, foreign aid counted for 60% of Gross National Income. Donations at this stage more than overwhelmed the public sector and thus naturally had to be administered to the population directly. Duffield argues that these practices challenged relations of sovereignty and articulated alternative ‘non-material’ visions of development. Again, this has been seen within the liberal peace literature as a radical departure from previous models of political sovereignty.

Closely linked to the changes in economic policy and to the influx in foreign aid were changes in the appearance of public administration – mostly clearly evident through the institutionalisation of various forms of ‘technical assistance’ to support the delivery of policies and state functions. These were people, either permanent staff or consultants who were seconded from foreign embassies or multilateral institutions to work inside the institutions of government. This has been argued by Harrison and Duffield amongst others to have heralded the beginning of ‘post-conditionality’; that is a fundamental shift away from the idea of a border between national and non-national state functions, and towards a ‘frontier’ interpretation of sovereignty. The far-reaching influence of western functionaries within institutions of public administration has been seen as a critical aspect of the liberal peace and symptomatic of its overall power for re-orienting government. The high point of these may be considered to be the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PARPAs in the Portuguese acronym) which the government now regularly produces under the initial guidance of the IFIs. These provide a framework which the donors may use to hold the government to account in terms of its performance on various economic measures, which correspond to international agendas such as the Millennium Development Goals and macroeconomic austerity. Pugh has been particularly critical of the ways in which this ‘post-Washington consensus’ agenda reinforces policies of structural adjustment and neoliberal ideology.421

The critiques of the liberal peace which have emphasised these reforms have done so with good reason – these interventions into the economic and political policies of the state and the nature of public administration, were unusual, deep, ideologically driven, have been largely unaccountable to politicians and the population in general, and in a number of cases made life worse on various fronts. Yet, the largely ahistorical character of the critiques has meant that they have tended to marginalise the past as a resource for reflection on the significance of such measures. This tends, perhaps bizarrely, to also de-politicise the stakes around intervention, and in particular how it has re-constituted or re-constructed the politics of rule within society. In the rest of this section, I will argue that there are also very important, and often visible, elements of political continuity between prior periods

421 Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory’.
and the recent post-war years, which call into question the claim that the liberal peace has ‘radically’ transformed it.

It is perhaps extraordinary to remember that, although much has happened over the last century, particular in terms of shifting ideologies, the state of Mozambique has been ruled by only two identifiably different elites since 1930: the Salazar-Caetano regime and the Frelimo Party. Whilst I would definitely not want to overdraw the similarities between the two, particularly ideologically, it is difficult not to see some interesting parallels when reflecting on a re-constructed history across the different regimes. These can be grouped under the chapter’s themes of political authority, public administration and political economy.

i. Political authority

Across this period, for example, political authority of regimes over the masses in Mozambique has been continuously constituted through ideologies of ‘development’. For the colonial regime, there was a combination of ideas of moral and spiritual development through the Catholic Church, coupled with the ‘progressive’ political and economic effects of colonialism on backward races. These provided important public rationales for both the necessity of the colonial state, and justifications for particularly strong exercises of its power. For Frelimo after independence, the core critique of colonialism was that it had led to underdevelopment and backwardness in Mozambique, thus requiring a very widescale programme of social, political and economic change, to be advised by those sufficiently knowledgeable and educated within the regime. Mahoney has comment in particular on the similarities between the colonial ‘New State’ and Frelimo’s ‘New Man’ authoritarian and modernising developmental ideologies. In the period since the end of the war, although apparently different policies have been pursued to secure development, it has continued to loom large as the basic rationale for the legitimate authority of the state, as well as for international co-operation

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insofar as it is able to do ‘capacity building’. This reinforces and maintains the basic didactic hierarchies established by development. The integration of Millennium Development Goals and other markers of ‘development’ into political activity is thus not necessarily a rupture from the basic rationale of the state, but an important continuation of colonial and post-colonial relations of political authority. Unsurprisingly, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, a primary instrument of liberalisation interventions, have been required to present themselves in ‘developmental’ terms to establish their credentials and authority, as well as increasingly to show ‘developmental’ outcomes such as reductions in poverty. Although the definitions of what constitutes ‘development’ have somewhat changed, the structure of the epistemic authority deriving from notions of development has not. Moreover, specific elements of the developmental visions, such as the undifferentiated subsistence character of a smallholder peasantry have not.\textsuperscript{423}

Neither is the retrenchment and reform of this developmental political authority via liberalisation a particularly novel aspect of state politics in the face of rebellion. If the colonial regime was forced in the 1960s to permit various kinds of reform to try to stay in power, such as the nominal abolition of the \textit{indígena} category and of \textit{chibalo}, Frelimo was required from the late 1980s to allow forms of political and economic liberalisation to contain the internal (Renamo) and external (donor) forces of opposition. Since the end of the war, the transition from the Chissano to the Guebuza government can also be seen as another such form of retrenchment, following a nearly-lost 1999 Presidential election.\textsuperscript{424} In substantive terms, however, none of these retrenchments resulted in forms of change within the core personnel of the regime, nor their ability to exercise power through the state. Yet on the surface these seemed to be signs of substantive political change; indeed, the feting of both the regularity of elections and Chissano’s ‘voluntary’ step-down have been seen to be signs of the health of Mozambique’s democracy.

\textsuperscript{423} Cramer, \textit{Civil War is not a stupid thing}, 261-2; Duffield, \textit{Development, Security}, Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{424} Hanlon, personal communication, Sumich, ‘Illegitimacy of Democracy’.
ii. Political economy

The persistence of the centrality of the state elite is made clearer when we consider the political economic relationship between the state and large companies in a historical perspective. Again, reading off the critiques of the liberal peace, we would expect the enforced liberalisation and privatisation of state enterprises to constitute a radical departure from forms of prior ownership, and further evidence of the deeply transformative character of interventions. Pitcher has argued that there are several elements worth unpicking on this front, which suggest that changes have not been quite as radical as all that, suggesting some continuities on the basic ground of co-operation between the state and large enterprises.\textsuperscript{425} The colonial state, as mentioned, sought first to operate through large colonial companies, before taking them over directly as instruments of the state under the New State. This was to secure monopolistic control of production which propped up the state and its political economy. The post-independence government’s policy was essentially one of continuation with this structure of ownership, in terms of investment coming from the state and profits being returned to the state. Whilst the state itself was much more oriented towards the needs of the population than the colonial regime, there were nonetheless continuities in the mutually supportive relationship between the state and large enterprise, which operated monopolistically.

Today, the processes of privatisation and liberalisation that have taken place in the post-independence period have not necessarily undermined some parts of this relationship and we see interesting elements of continuity, although importantly profits are now not returned to the state. Yet. almost all large enterprises now must have a fairly direct relationship with the regime via either the state, or via partnership with members of the Frelimo nomenklatura – a party elite who are highly fused with the state elite. Thus, for example, the President controls large stakes in the ‘privatised’ public utilities sector, the former President has significant interests in mining, and even the party itself has an investment arm.\textsuperscript{426} The laws

\textsuperscript{426} Hanlon, J. (2009). Mozambique's elite: finding its way in a globalised world and returning to old development models. \textit{Crisis States Research Centre Seminar}. LSE.
regarding ownership of large enterprises have meant that foreign investors are required to partner with a national investor, who is almost always directly connected with the Party in some way. This is more obviously true of the so-called ‘mega-projects’, such as Mozal (Mozambique Aluminium) which are half-owned by foreign investors and half-owned by the state. Monopolistic structures of industry also persist in many markets; although legally permitted, competition between the companies of the state-elite is generally minimal.

As Pitcher argues, this signals that privatisation in Mozambique has not been the wholesale re-orientation of public enterprise towards the private sector, but has contended with and reinforced structures of political power. I would further contend that this has in some sense always been the case. The recent re-emergence of colonial-era companies such as Sena Sugar Estates – this time co-owned by the state and Mauritian investors, and backed by World Bank guarantees rather than the colonial state – is perhaps a more obvious reminder of such continuities. This is particularly the case when thinking about the way that these large estates shape opportunities for wage labour in the central provinces where many operate, which often represent generational continuities for workers and their families. Although this is now not chibalo nor war labour, and workers are entitled to various minimum wages, these wages are often inadequate and strongly eroded by inflation. Such generational continuities are also obvious in the patterns of migrant labour to South Africa from the southern provinces, cash-cropping in the northern provinces, and the structure of Mozambican Indian ownership of businesses across the country. The significance of these forms of continuity is particularly important in problematizing the idea that the liberal peace has represented a ‘radical agenda of social transformation’, in light of the continued but mutating forms of collusion between the state elite and large enterprises, the patterns of wage labour and merchant class formation, and the contribution of this to reinforcing social and political hierarchies.

iii. Public administration

Public administration practices have also shown interesting forms of continuity as well as change. The story told by critiques of the liberal peace has emphasised that neoliberal policies have served to ‘hollow out’ the state, making it simply a regulatory agency rather than a substantive distributor and arbiter of political goods.\(^\text{428}\) Intuitively, the claim seems plausible, and fits with the general story about the character of liberal intervention’s overall aims to reduce the size of the state. Yet, the actual practices of public administration seem to have worked in some contrary ways. For example, both the colonial state and socialist state were marked by substantial planning architectures in order to integrate the political reach of the state with the desired economic outcomes concerning production and autarchy. Salazar’s Five Year Plan for Mozambique and Machel’s Ten Year (later Five Year) Plans for addressing developmental problems were thus a significant feature of rule. One would expect that liberalisation would thus reduce the size and scope of national planning architectures as the country was moved away from a planned economy.

However, the opposite seems to have happened; planning architectures and processes within Mozambique are now, perhaps more than ever, the central activity of politics and political life, across not just the state but a wide range of organisations and agencies. For example, the government continues to present its Five Year Plan (Plano Quinquenial do Governo), which is now the apparent basis for the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA), which fulfils the donor led PRSP planning requirements. Each sector is also required to develop a Sector –Wide Action Plan (SWAP), with implementing agencies also required to produce strategic plans at the level of the organisation. These plans are important because their negotiation is an important interface between government and donors, and perhaps because they represent a concrete output of co-operation. Although what is planned has to a substantial extent altered, from production targets to development targets, the bureaucratic culture, architecture and importance of planning has not diminished per se. Indeed, the establishment of a more powerful planning ministry in Mozambique – the Ministry for Planning and Development –

\(^{428}\) Richmond, ‘Resistance and the post-liberal peace’, 671;
indicates the centrality of this activity to the state under the liberal peace, as well as reflects the increasing desire of the Mozambican state to have as much influence over the outcome of planning processes as possible.\textsuperscript{429} Again, this points to a reconfiguration of state power via a reconfiguration of administrative mechanisms rather than its collapse.

Further recent trends in public administration, normally associated with liberal peace, have also been far less transformative than is normally implied. One of the more recent trends within the liberal peace agenda has specifically been an emphasis on ‘decentralised’ governance, which is articulated as countering the dysfunctional, centralised bureaucratic post-colonial state through local participatory mechanisms, including ‘traditional authorities’. Yet, as West and Kloeck-Jenson have showed, the internationally-sponsored decentralisation efforts have in places been greeted and treated as, variously, the re-invigoration of the colonial régulo system, the re-appointment of Frelimo Party representatives, the re-recognition of Renamo mambo representatives, or as the recognition of other diverse roles such as the mwene amongst the Makonde, or the tinganakana structures in Inhambane.\textsuperscript{430} In particular, some of the régulos who have been engaged have requested to have powers over local taxation and labour returned, as well as uniforms, flags and transport with which to project their authority. Although these latter requests have not been granted, the return of some of these figures to positions of recognised political authority, and exercising some authoritative functions, indicates once more that there are important continuities and resonances between the various episodes of the state attempting to exercise closer authority and influence over the population.

Moreover, in recent years, decentralisation processes have begun to involve the transfer of budgetary power down to the district level (created by the colonial administration), as in the ‘sete milhões’ initiative under Guebuza.\textsuperscript{431} As part of a

\textsuperscript{429} Interview with senior civil servant, Ministry for Planning and Development, Maputo, August 28\textsuperscript{th} 2009. (Appendix: 58)
\textsuperscript{431} The ‘sete milhões’ / ‘seven million’ refers to a quantity of meticais – around £150,000 – that is being given to each of the 128 administrative districts throughout the country for the creation of local jobs and enterprise. Districts are the administrative level below provinces, of which there are ten.
perceived national trend of the resurgence of the links between state and Party,\textsuperscript{432} this has also served to re-invigorate Frelimo networks in the rural areas in particular as a form of potential patronage. In the recent presidential campaigns for example, many complained that funds were being diverted towards the projects of people affiliated with the party or their relatives.\textsuperscript{433} From the historical understanding of a networked party elite substantially fused with the state and operating through its structures, such trends are perhaps unsurprising and resonate strongly with strategies of government in the past, who devolved power precisely in order to reinforce its longevity.

In a broad sense and with a consciousness of its history, it is possible to see that public administration has mutated rather than been rolled back, and that many of the apparent strategies of liberal reform have not necessarily succeeded in the pursuit of a radical agenda of social transformation as such. Indeed, flagship reforms of the liberal peace including decentralisation and planning already have a long tradition in projects of statehood in Mozambique. There are even resonances – perhaps more amusing than substantive – in the resurrection of the ‘villagisation’ idea via the Millennium Development Villages. A number of these have been constructed in recent years, including one in Chibuto, Gaza province, which Jeffrey Sachs ‘opened’, arriving with 500 mosquito nets, a plough and four yokes.\textsuperscript{434} In the colonial era, the peasantry were herded into ‘aldeamentos’ as part of the ‘development-security’ strategy of the colonial state in keeping them separated from the rebels. These promised access to water and other infrastructure within the context of counter-insurgency.\textsuperscript{435} Frelimo essentially repeated the strategy with the \textit{aldeias commmuais}, which served security functions during the Renamo conflict as well as developmental ones for the purposes of building the socialist vision. These are not remembered particularly fondly either, for reasons that are further elaborated

\textsuperscript{432} Sumich, ‘The Party and the State’
\textsuperscript{434} Agência de Informação de Moçambique, (2006), Millennium Villages to reach Millennium Goals, \textit{AIM Reports No. 323}, 4\textsuperscript{th} July 2006, Maputo. Retrieved 7\textsuperscript{th} December 2011 from \url{http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim323.html}
in Chapter Eight. Clearly, in the present day, there is a far lesser threat of widespread violence from either the state or an insurgency, and the population is not physically compelled to remain there. These are important differences. What is interesting however is the continuity in the administrative imagination, which gives rise to the enduring appeal of the model village as a vehicle for progress, development and better administration.\(^{436}\)

With a consciousness of the histories of political authority, political economy and public administration, it is difficult to sustain simplistically the critical interpretation that the liberal peace represents a ‘radical developmental agenda of social transformation’, which has been ‘reordering state and society’.\(^{437}\) Rather this historical reading of reform suggests that there is much in the way of continuity in this relationship, including in the discourses that govern political authority and legitimise the state, the ownership and orientation of the political economy, and the modalities and personnel in public administration. Clearly, this does not indicate that nothing has changed. As noted in this section, important changes include the diminution of widespread physical violence, compulsory free labour and the shift away from economic autarchy, which are important features both of everyday life and in the relationships between state and society. Yet these are not by and large as central to forms of rule as some of the elements discussed, which pertain to the issues concerning the claiming, distribution and structuring of political power, wealth and control. The next section will discuss the significance of this kind of historical reconstruction for wider reflection on the liberal peace and its critiques.

V. Discussion: Implications of reconstructing a historical subject

In Chapter Two, I argued that the existing critiques of the liberal peace embraced an anti-imperial logic of critique, but persistently excluded the subjecthood of the target societies as worthy of inclusion or elaboration in any real sense. In Chapter Three, I argued that other anti-imperial traditions of thought – specifically anti-colonial thinking – had put forward both the urgency and

\(^{436}\) Scott’s discussion of the functions served by villagisation in Tanzania as providing a way of capturing the peasantry is relevant here. Scott, \textit{Seeing Like a State}, Chapter 7.

complexity of what it meant to reclaim the subject of politics, and in Chapter Four I elaborated some strategies for how reconstruction could proceed. In this chapter, I have suggested that the cultivation of a sense of historical subjecthood of some kind is essential to the attempt to ‘decolonise’ the grounds of discussion in critical research. This is necessary, both in terms recognising those people and societies targeted by the liberal peace and in terms of articulating a historical consciousness from which to reflect the particular issues raised by the liberal peace debate.

As the foregoing argument has begun to indicate, both of these elements are subversive, both to the liberal peace interventions themselves and for the critiques of the liberal peace. The first – the recognition of historical presence – is in some sense obviously uncomfortable for a number of actors who are now agents or supporters of the liberal peace, be they the governments of countries which pursued violent conquest and set up structures of political and economic exploitation within Mozambique, a century ago or less, such as Portugal, France or Britain, or who supported or funded the political violence of either the state or the rebels, such as the US, or who profited vastly from the slave trade such as Brazil or again the US. The altruistic, generic and pristine nature of ‘development aid’ in the context of liberal peace interventions is thus undermined by a counter-narrative which locates a longer term relation of debt or obligation stemming from a web of contested historical relations, which include much personal, political and economic violence. The re-articulation of historical presence of societies targeted by the liberal peace as already and deeply connected to the ‘developed’ or ‘secure’ world thus forces a re-engagement with the particular and embodied character of historical and political relations.

In terms of the second element of historical consciousness, this too is somewhat subversive of liberal peace policies, and in particular the elements of legitimacy that depend on its technical effectiveness, developmentally ‘innovative’ and democratising character. Yet, as the previous section has indicated, there has been little transformation in the bases of political authority, which remains a one-party-controlled hierarchical developmentalism. The wage economy, a central element of official, taxable ‘development’, is still fundamentally founded upon the cheap supply and export of labour, either to large enterprises which are supported by
the state, or to neighbouring countries. As Chapter Eight will discuss, many of the ideas from previous eras about how to develop agriculture have been re-activated in recent years. Public administration has counter-intuitively developed wider planning architectures than it could under either the colonial or socialist bureaucracies. These elements suggest either that the liberal peace is simply repeating policies of the past, or that it is only superficially changing them, or, I think the most compelling interpretation, that is in some sense fundamentally unwilling or unable to overcome some basic structures of rule and production that are articulated in the state structure and the relations between state and society. All of these conclusions however problematise the potential sources of legitimacy that it has often assumed politically.

For the critiques of the liberal peace, there are also subversive elements to the historical reconstruction developed in this chapter. As discussed in Chapter Two, the critical accounts of liberal intervention exclude at a conceptual level the recognition of meaningful presence for societies targeted by the liberal peace. This importantly extends to both the recognition of historical presence per se, and the critical engagement with such presence as a space for analytic reflection. Engaging with historical presence per se is disruptive insofar as it subverts the unchallenged authority of the critical voices in the debate, and forces a re-orientation of standpoint away from a distant assessment of liberal exceptionalism. In this case, acknowledging Mozambique as a historical presence, with a long-standing and deep integration into global modernity, is to offer a potential threat to the divisions and narratives implicit in the critiques of the liberal peace as an encounter between a global structure of liberal power and an unsuspecting local community.

More disruptive however is the substance of the historical reconstruction when it is used as grounds for critical reflection. For critiques of the liberal peace, as noted, the liberal peace often represents a powerful and ‘radical developmental agenda of social transformation’. However, at least for Mozambique, this is to miss the very anti-radical, socially and politically conservative dimensions of its effects on structures of power, wealth and authority in the country. This is different to Chandler’s line that intervention is itself illiberal and has brought nationalist elites to power in Bosnia, and different to Pugh’s line that it is neoliberalism that has caused suffering. It is a more like Mac Ginty’s line which allows for
accommodation and unexpected outcomes, although this still frames such outcomes as a process of ‘hybridisation’ rather than a *political* move or strategy. From a perspective which uses history as a terrain of reflection, reforms have allowed for a entrenchment of power and modalities of rule, whilst appearing to increase their contestability. In this sense, intervention has provided the background and means for the elite to retrench without being substantially disturbed – indeed with the increased possibility of cementing their position within society more generally. As such, it also presents a challenge to Duffield’s account that Third World alternatives were displaced. To some extent he is right in terms of what political *ideologies* have been permitted to govern, but in the historical perspective adopted here the *structures of power* in society may be as important. In this sense, the fixation on the changing meaning of ‘sovereignty’ is important but perhaps also misleading insofar as it emphasises only one dimension of the political.

This historical perspective allows us to see that dissent in Mozambique is not necessarily suppressed for long. There was substantial discontent with the election results of 1999, which triggered opposition demonstrations. The recent social unrest triggered by rises in food (February 2008) and fuel prices (September 2009) in major cities has demonstrated that there is an increasing sense of dissatisfaction with the government. This took it very much by surprise, and the government is trying desperately to respond through appeals to its historic mission and to the value of ‘peace’ in establishing ‘development’, thus re-articulating and re-asserting a longstanding rationale for government in Mozambique. Yet, it is unclear how long it will be able to maintain this under the present structures of power and wealth, which have sharpened inequality in Mozambique, as in many other places in the world.

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438 Frelimo (2008), ‘Paz Factor de Desenvolvimento’, Maputo. This was a ‘manual’ released after the February riots which was an interesting attempt to patiently reason with Mozambican society as to the continued necessity of social compliance with the ongoing development project.
Conclusions

Reconstructing a historical subject in this way is to have a sense of pasts, presents and futures, and a critical terrain from which to reflect on the present. In this particular reconstruction, developed in the context of the liberal peace debate, a sensitivity to the relationships of rule, particularly those within living memory, puts the novel radicalism of the liberal peace into doubt, and also begins to change the ways in which critique is mounted around the present regime of intervention. In particular, an understanding of the continuities and resonances of the present order with the historical past is to throw into doubt the narrative of radical change, articulating its many conservative elements.

It might be argued that such a reconstruction is also justifiable in more conventional analytic terms – after all, is it not good practice in the discussion of case studies to add a bit of historical background? Perhaps it could be argued that if the existing critiques of the liberal peace covered in Chapter Two had a bit more space, they could have added historical chapters or sections to their work and accomplished the same. As I have noted in the discussion in this chapter however, to take such historical narratives and presence seriously would be to disrupt the set-up whereby the liberal peace is the principal subject and focus of the conceptual set-up, with the critics themselves as the principal interlocutor. To try to reverse the marginalisation of the target society, it is necessary to reclaim a sense of past presence, which the anti-colonial thinkers discussed in Chapter Three well understood. Without a politics of recognition, forgetting past historical relations becomes easy, and allows both rule and critique to be projected through disembodied, transcendental tropes of justification. As noted in Chapter Three, this reproduces the paradox of liberalism in which critiques of the liberal peace but find it difficult to articulate grounds for alternative transcendental or theoretical foundations of being.

By engaging with historical presence, we begin to move discussion to the embodied dimensions of the relations between subjects, and can begin to see these relations in a more multi-dimensional and concrete manner. This opens up further
the ways in which historical consciousness can also become an important tool for immanent political critique and the reconfiguration of political consciousness in the present. Chapter Six shows how appreciating political consciousness in a non-unitary and reflexive way furthers the project of reconstructing the political subject as less bounded, more creative and more articulate than existing critiques have allowed for. As we move on through Chapters Seven and Eight, we will show how an appreciation of the material experiences of interventions from the perspectives of those targeted by it can also ground critique in a more relevant and engaged political stance.
Chapter Six

Reconstructing the political subject: double consciousness and the question of good governance

Reconstructing political subjecthood needs to be attempted, at least partly, via political consciousness. In some sense this follows from the logic of subjecthood – in a meaningful sense one cannot have subjecthood without the implicit assumption of consciousness. In moral philosophy, it is the presence of the capacity for self-reflection – conscience – that renders it possible to discuss action as having moral significance: without this it is difficult to ascribe moral agency as generally understood. Similarly, being able to appreciate a self as a political subject and imputing political meaning to his/her actions must assume a form of political consciousness. It is precisely this capacity for political consciousness and reflection that was routinely denied or deferred by colonial powers as a means of legitimating ongoing control and stewardship in colonial territories, and which a series of thinkers have sought to reclaim and re-assert as part of the decolonising project in social theory.

In Chapter Two I argued that the existing critical literature on the liberal peace had failed to treat people targeted by intervention as proper subjects of politics, either by excluding them altogether from discussions, or by including them only via reductive signifiers of cultural difference, political cynicism or some combination thereof. This tended to de-politicise subjecthood by emptying its content of specific meanings or intention. Mac Ginty’s work on local resistance in the ‘hybrid peace’ in some senses maintained this framing, although with some examples such as in Northern Ireland, there was a greater sense of interpretive engagement with the political significance of people’s behaviour. Nonetheless, this

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440 Although this of course assumes that morality is humanly, rather than divinely or spiritually, circumscribed.
was a relatively limited aspect of the framework, which was more targeted at an account of agency rather than intentionality as such.

In a preliminary sense, the justification for engaging with political subjecthood within anti-colonial critique shares some elements with the justification for reconstructing historical presence; that is the importance of simply recognising such presence is an important step away from Eurocentric modes of analysis in itself. As noted in Chapter Four, there are important ways in which interpretive methodologies are closely connected to a politics of recognition. Thus, the reconstruction of political subjecthood in different contexts is an important way of broadening the intellectual terrain of discussion and imagination.

In the context of the thesis, however, the reconstruction of political subjecthood has some more specific functions. In Chapters Three and Four, I mapped out ways in which an anti-colonial critique would emphasise the importance of political consciousness as a point of critical engagement and a source of political knowledge. In the first place, political consciousness is a reflection and expression of the embodied, situated subject of politics, which it was argued provided a better starting point for understanding the world than a transcendental political subject. To engage with political consciousness is thus to begin one’s critical engagement with the world on the terms in which it appears given and the realities that it presents.

However, as also noted in Chapter Three, and again in Chapter Four, subjects themselves can use aspects of political consciousness as forms of immanent criticality towards the political order. In Chapter Four, I noted how for Du Bois and Fanon, the framework of double consciousness was a source of critical power in terms of the way it highlighted the politics of race and racism, and also allowed the space for black political subjects to develop and maintain an alternative self-understanding to those encouraged by racism. In this chapter, I read plural forms of political consciousness around corruption as articulating different forms of critical consciousness, through traditions of thought from before the liberal peace as well as its recent discourses. In looking at the content of these discourses, it is possible to discern the broadening of anti-corruption discourse to incorporate anti-plutocratic elements as well.
The chapter begins by briefly reflecting back on the importance of the ‘governance’ agenda within the liberal peace, and the ways in which the existing critiques have articulated the political significance of ‘good governance’ programmes. The central section of the chapter looks at two contrasting forms of consciousness around corruption in Mozambique – that associated with the legacy of Samora Machel and that associated with the ‘good governance’ agenda, before exploring how they have been simultaneously deployed and why. Drawing on a range of contemporary and historical sources, texts and observations, I argue that corruption is a live issue in Mozambique not as an ideological artefact, imposition or interpellation of the liberal peace but deriving from reflexive forms of political consciousness and understood in a variety of ways. In particular, some elements of this consciousness link corruption specifically to the changes in politics and economy brought about by the liberal peace’s transformation agenda, although this is narrative interacts with other elements of political consciousness such as a specific moral narrative. The final section offers a discussion of the significance of non-unitary consciousness as a means of reconstructing political subjecthood in critique.

I. Governance and corruption in the liberal peace debate

In Chapter One, it was argued that the liberal peace has over the last twenty years become increasingly characterised by a concern with the nature of ‘governance’ in post-conflict spaces, as its focus has shifted from peacebuilding to statebuilding. It has become central to approaches to conflict, via the concept of ‘fragile states’ (such as in OECD/DAC guidelines), development through the ‘poverty reduction’ agenda (World Bank, DfID) and democratisation through ‘democracy and governance’ (USAID) programmes. There is considerable overlap between the various definitions, as well as divergences in definition that reflect divergent priorities between agencies. For example, the World Bank’s 2007 paper Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption defines governance as “the manner in which the state acquires and exercises its
authority to provide public goods and services”, broadly divided into ‘bureaucratic capacity’ and ‘accountability’.\textsuperscript{442} DfID’s 2006 White Paper, \textit{Making Governance Work for the Poor}, shies away from defining governance strictly but states that it is “about the use of power and authority and how a country manages its affairs”, broken down into questions of ‘capability’, ‘accountability’ and ‘responsiveness’.\textsuperscript{443} Unsurprisingly, there is considerable debate amongst the development community in the quality and value of current indicators of ‘governance’.\textsuperscript{444}

This said, in practice, the governance reform agenda has led donors to focus on a few primary areas to effect transformation. One of the most prominent of these has been in the area of anti-corruption, which has led to a proliferation of donor strategies based on “an international consensus [that] has now emerged that corruption and poor governance fuel state failure, deter foreign investment, and cripple economic growth and development.”\textsuperscript{445} Based on the power of this consensus, it has become one of the most prominent and well-funded aspects of the liberal peace, spawning a wide array of strategies, forums, conferences, grants, working groups, government agencies and advisers, and increasingly integrated as a form of conditionality into wider transformation efforts.\textsuperscript{446}

Existing perspectives on the liberal peace have engaged the specific question of corruption particularly well from critical political economy perspectives. As argued in Chapter Two, many have developed a compelling narrative explaining the causes of corruption under the liberal peace. Specifically, many of these narratives link the presence of corruption with the opportunities presented by economic liberalisation and structural adjustment policies encouraged by the international financial institutions and other donors. Divjak and Pugh for example argue that corruption in Bosnia can be explained by the legacy of war economies in the

absence of welfare strategies, liberalisation processes which dissolved the social contract between state and citizen, and the emergence of specific opportunities for corruption in non-transparent privatisation deals.\textsuperscript{447}

However, there has been a conspicuous absence of the politics of the anti-corruption agenda itself, despite the important questions the analysis raises. In particular, there is a kind of paradox or tension that arises within critiques that simultaneously argue \textit{against} the overly politically intrusive character of liberal peace interventions, largely characterised by ‘good governance’ reforms, and “sweeping liberal assumptions”\textsuperscript{448} but are simultaneously critical of the failure of these assumptions to effect change in a society apparently based on patronage. According to Richmond and Franks:

The hegemonic domination of political power underwrites the patronage system and allows networks to be constructed from the top down, based on loyalty and rewards…\textit{These are sweeping ontological claims to make about another political system}, but they help explain how the Cambodian polity is overlaid by a network comprised of a multidimensional clientelism and patronage that links individuals to power centres. From the perspective of international peacebuilders, such an analysis helps explain why local social, political and cultural dynamics are responsible for a lack of progress, rather than inadequacies in the liberal peacebuilding framework itself.\textsuperscript{449}

Richmond and Franks are right to note that these are sweeping ontological claims. However, they do not hesitate to base their own analysis on precisely such claims, preferring to shore up this undifferentiated, non-political view of (in this case Cambodian) society and its subjects. The only distinction made is for people engaged in civil society building programmes, who are summarily dismissed, without in any way being engaged:

Civil society is quite possibly an illusionary ‘virtual’ or ‘parallel’ society created by the presence and funding of the internationals, and mainly visible to international eyes. Far from aiding the development and

\textsuperscript{447} Divjak and Pugh, ‘The Political Economy of Corruption’
\textsuperscript{448} Richmond et al, ‘Liberal Hubris?’, emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{449} Ibid., 39.
sustainability of an indigenous civil society, it is representative of conditionality and dependency rather than local agency.\textsuperscript{450}

So, although any ultimate assessment “should rest on local voices”\textsuperscript{451}, they are also made analytically irrelevant in the framework offered.

As argued in Chapter Three, an ostensibly pluralist or pluralising research framing which fails to re-centre its analysis around different subjects and their experiences is in danger of falling short of its own critical and progressive objectives. Not only do these provide interesting and illuminating analytic points of entry into the structures being analysed, but they furnish grounds for a fuller and more inclusive political dialogue about the problems of power and legitimacy in international relations. As such, it is imperative to reconfigure the analytic imagination under the presupposition that the subjecthood of the non-West is already significant in world politics, and that our narratives of it should reflect this.

II. Political consciousness and corruption in Mozambique

This section elaborates the ways in which political consciousness around the issue of corruption is both non-unitary and reflexive, and can be translated as critical commentary on the shape of political structures being apparently transformed by the liberal peace. In important ways these commentaries both overlap and contrast with the ways in which donor agencies have themselves analysed and narrated the question of corruption, as well as the ways in which the target government itself deals with the issue. They reveal a contested, historically grounded and non-unitary political consciousness which needs to be engaged with seriously in understanding the significance of the liberal peace as a form of political order. Specifically, as will be discussed, this ‘double consciousness’ framework opens up the tensions and fluidities that characterise political subjecthood, and as such offers new questions of critics of the liberal peace.

\textsuperscript{450} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{451} Ibid., 28.
i. ‘Isso não acontecia se Samora estivesse vivo’- ‘This would not happen if Samora was alive’

A useful place to start in addressing contemporary political consciousness around corruption is in understanding the role it has played in Mozambique’s political past. One of the most potent and most common responses to contemporary public scandals is via unfavourable comparison to the political leadership under the first ten years of the post-independence government after 1975. Although the latter part of this is also commonly known as the *tempo de fome* (time of hunger), it is also memorialised in many circles as a time when public institutions functioned with a keen sense of purpose, transparency and enthusiasm.

With regard to corruption, the Frelimo government, and most particularly the President Samora Machel, was seen to vigorously attack, denounce and severely punish corruption in the public sphere as simultaneously colonialist, immoral and counter-revolutionary. Machel’s lengthy political discourses, broadcast nationally via the only television and radio channels, elaborated passionately and in detail the distinctions between a corrupt colonialism and the kind of society that Frelimo aimed to build:

That’s what colonialism means: bribery, corruption and immorality; robbery; nepotism, favouritism and patronage; individualism and ambition; servility and subservience… Destroying all this was the aim of the armed struggle for national liberation.

In particular, Machel’s presidency is remembered for the stringent and vigilant punishment of transgressions in public administration. One famous tactic involved personal unannounced spot checks on various parts of the state machinery across the country, including then state enterprises and farms. Irregularities of any sort would result in public castigation, which would be often followed by summary

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More serious criminal transgressions were punished much more severely, culminating in several public executions. One of the most high-profile of these cases was execution by firing squad of the prawn merchant Gulam Nabi who had been bribing customs officials. Moreover, it was made understood that Machel’s attitudes to corruption were widely shared – the suicide of Francisco Langa, a Frelimo cadre who had embezzled funds, was publicly attributed to very intense personal shame caused by the party making an example of him.

During the 1980s, government propaganda on the theme revolved around the image of ‘Xiconhoca’ (Image 6.1) – a character who was seen to collaborate with Portuguese secret agents in the independence struggle but pretended to support the new government, and who was lazy, drunk, corrupt and self-serving.

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455 Diary notes of conversation with young hostel worker, June 10th 2009; also, Hanlon, J (2005), Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 32 – 15 July 2005
456 Hanlon, Revolution under Fire, 208.
457 Ibid., 195.
6.1: Xiconhoca (c. 1979) “He’s a saboteur of the national economy, he has no class consciousness, he’s a dead weight in the office, to summarise, he’s a Xiconhoca”.

‘Xiconhoca’ was seen to embody a corruption which was as much moral and political as it was economic. In this sense, corruption was perceived as an active threat to the programme of radical revolutionary change which Frelimo aspired to bring about in this period. Much of this focused on, and indeed depended on, the

personal conduct of the citizens and their embrace of the ‘New Man’ ideology elaborated by the party’s ideologues. Public education, which rapidly expanded in the post-independence period, was tasked with the ongoing formation of ‘New Men’, who would be literate, technically proficient and morally dedicated to the construction of the Revolution. Those who were compromised by corrupt or anti-revolutionary behaviour were often dispatched to remote provinces to be ‘re-educated’ in drastic and violent ways.

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Samora Machel was killed in a plane crash in 1986 in suspicious circumstances, yet his figure looms large in contemporary political consciousness. I would argue that this has not been so much a continuous memorialisation but a particularly recent phenomenon, especially amongst younger generations, which has sought to critique the contemporary political environment through the recovered figure of Samora. This critique is increasingly invoked by different internal factions within Frelimo as well as, surprisingly, a large number of opposition and non-partisan figures. At the core of this consciousness is a narrative of moral rectitude, transparency and decisiveness which Samora is seen to embody.

This recovery itself needs situating politically in terms of what came after the death of Samora, namely the structural reform of the economy through IMF conditionality, the end of the war, and the vast influx in aid money both in response to famine and in the period after the war. Under Joaquim Chissano’s leadership, Mozambique was opened up economically and politically, and aid money was seen to have flooded in. For various reasons, including to do with the context of emergency and the lack of oversight, much of this money and these resources were never accounted for. Mozambique nonetheless became a prominent ‘donor darling’ on the international scene, broadly endorsed for its wise post-war political and economic choices and strong growth rates, forgiven much public debt and the recipient of one of the highest per-capita aid flows of Sub-Saharan Africa.

459 Sumich, ‘Illegitimacy of Democracy’
460 Interview with aid worker, European NGO, Beira (Appendix: 20)
461 Interview with former head of UNDP Mozambique, Maputo, June 19th 2009 (Appendix: 9).
This coincided with a visible change in the wealth of elites, particularly those in and connected to the Frelimo party. Many scholars, including Hanlon, Pitcher and Harrison have explored the role of donor money, privatisation and liberalisation in the emergence and distribution of this wealth.\textsuperscript{462} During this period, however, various corruption scandals emerged regarding thefts and embezzlements from formerly state enterprises, which were of widespread public knowledge and disquiet. The most notorious of these related to the banking sector, during the course of which the country’s leading investigative journalist Carlos Cardoso, and the interim director of banking supervision Siba-Siba Macuacua were murdered. Those implicated in the murder included a number of the Presidential Guard as well as Chissano’s son Nyimpine\textsuperscript{463}, whose testimonies in the trial were televised.\textsuperscript{464} This episode accelerated what had been an increasing level of political dissatisfaction with the perceived ‘deixa-andar’ (let it go) attitude of Chissano regarding the widespread criminality and corruption in the state at all levels. His famous response to this dissatisfaction seemed to encapsulate this attitude: “goats eat where they are tied”.\textsuperscript{465} Chissano’s decreasing public popularity could already be seen in the results of the 1999 Presidential Election, which resulted in only a narrow victory under rather dubious circumstances.

The reclamation of Machel’s political legacy as a form of political consciousness needs to be seen in this context – in response to this situation of visible corruption and increasing inequality. This recovery of a tradition of moral opposition to corruption has emerged on several different fronts, including within the ruling party, amongst public academic and political commentators in the press, in the opposition, amongst the urban youth and middle class, amongst the unions and within the blogosphere. As will be discussed later on, this is a consciousness that has become more publicly prominent and compelling as a means of combating


\textsuperscript{464} Sumich, op. cit., 15.

\textsuperscript{465} Interview, editor of independent newspaper, Nampula, August 5\textsuperscript{th} 2009 (Appendix: 34).
corruption than the liberal peace emphasis on good governance, although one which interacts with it at crucial junctures.

Within the Frelimo party this consciousness emerged from Guebuza’s faction, who were seen by themselves and others as inheritors of Machel’s mantle, claiming it in the run-up to the 2004 Presidential election, when Chissano’s administration was criticised for its ‘deixa andar’ attitudes on corruption. As Hanlon reports, Guebuza’s new populist administration from 2005 visibly re-activated many of the political discourses, practices and habits of Machel, including unannounced spot-checks in public institutions and services. Guebuza’s administration has also taken care to publicly celebrate Machel, including building new monuments to him and declaring 2011 Samora Machel Year. In the most recent presidential election campaign in 2009, Guebuza found himself on the receiving end of widespread public complaints and pressure about corruption in local government, to which he responded with vigorously moral imagery, as reported in the press:

The Mozambican President, Armando Guebuza, said that to promote corruption, in the State or in the private sector, is the same as “drinking or even sucking” the blood of a brother. Speaking today, in a grand public rally taking place in the municipality of Manica, Guebuza said that even now promoters of corruption spend a lot of time coveting the few means of those who sweat night and day to earn a living. Given a standing ovation by the people, the statesman highlighted that “to practice corruption is essentially the same as putting logs on a public way.” He explained that a road filled with logs will not let anyone pass.

It is important that this kind of moralistic tone around corruption emerged explicitly when the government was under the rare spectre of public pressure and disgust. Guebuza’s choice of imagery – the drinking of blood – not only elicits responses of horror but read another way resonates with historic beliefs in the practice of

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467 Hanlon, (2005), op.cit., 2.
469 O País, “Corrupção é mesmo que sugar o sangue de um irmão”, O País: Maputo, 3rd August 2009.
vampirism to gain advantage or fortune. However, the message is a clear one – corruption is not only an impediment to development, but deeply immoral.

Guebuza’s narrative of his own moral, Machel-like stand on corruption has been sold to, but not entirely bought by, a wide range of audiences, who have continued to use Samora and the socialist legacy as a political resource in critiquing corruption within contemporary Frelimo as well as the effects of Mozambique’s liberalisation. It is perhaps unremarkable to note that this has been a feature of internal Frelimo struggles, particularly in factions associated with Samora’s widow Graça Machel, who argue that honest people have been excluded from the government in order for corruption to continue.

But this line of argument has also been a feature of the more independent press. Even as Guebuza promised to restore a sense of morality in the state, he was accused of doing so only in speeches but not in practice by journalists such as Machado da Graça, who argued that Guebuza lacked the political will to do so, unlike Samora. Borges Nhamirre, a commentator on CanalMoz has also pointed out that under Samora the salaries of high-ranking state officials were fixed by law, were public knowledge and that perks of the job were not permitted, in clear distinction to today’s practices. These are commentators who occupy different parts of the political spectrum and speak outside the Frelimo party but who engage in the recovery of Samora as part of a critical and broadly salient form of political consciousness.

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470 Pimentel Teixiera, J. (2003), Ma-Tuga no mato: Imagens sobre os portugueses em discursos rurais moçambicanos, Lasotopie, 91-112. In northern areas of the country during colonial times, the Portuguese were considered to have the powers of vampires. West also discusses Makonde beliefs in forms of vampirism and cannibalism as ways of making sense the hidden powers of the wealthy. West, Kapitikala, 37-9.


Perhaps more surprising is the resurrection of Samora by more openly political opposition. In a recent TV debate on the political thought of Samora Machel – the holding of which is perhaps in and of itself revealing – Máximo Días, a former Renamo deputy, argued that if Samora were alive, many of today’s leaders would be in jail for their failure to uphold transparency.

According to him, “some have the understanding that ‘I have already liberated the country, and now I must liberate myself from myself’, and each takes his own decision to enrich himself.”

At this same debate, he asked for financial contributions for a Samora Machel Academy, which would be dedicated to “the promotion of the ideas of Samora Machel, namely: the fight against corruption, transparency, amongst other virtues the remains of which are in question today”. Whilst the sincerity of this resurrection by the opposition is questioned, particularly by a sceptical public spotting opportunism, it is clear that its political resonance in terms of public consciousness is real in terms of the critique of profiteering offered.

Yet perhaps most tellingly, the consciousness of Samora’s era as an uncorrupt one is particularly visible as a form of political consciousness amongst the urban youth who were not alive during his rule. As Sumich notes, this group, some of whom have taken to wearing t-shirts bearing Samora’s image, tend to speak favourably of this more equal, more honest time. Across my own discussions this was a repeated theme – that under Samora these sorts of transgressions did not occur, and that people used to work for the public good. This critique is also borne out in various aspects of popular culture. As an example, the popular MC Azagaia, Edson da Luz, has interspersed clips of Samora’s speeches against corruption into his music videos, in which his own lyrics condemn the ‘liberators’ i.e. Frelimo, as mere soldiers of fortune, enriching themselves, lacking ideology and

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475 Ibid.
476 Which the web comments to this particular article clearly show.
478 Diary notes of conversation with hostel worker, Maputo, 10th June 2009, Diary notes of conversation with musician, Maputo, 7th July 2008.
selling images of hunger to make a profit. In the closing frames of the video, Samora is shown giving a public address, saying “We cannot build happiness or well-being with bandits and thieves… Correct? But it must be you who dislodge the bandits and thieves. Denounce them. Kick them out.”

As a form of political consciousness which confronts the issue of corruption under the liberal peace, the recovery of Samora is both widespread and highly politicised. Given Samora’s iconic and heroic status as the leader who was seen to lead Mozambique to independence in the armed struggle against colonialism, it is also very powerful when deployed as a metric for judging the contemporary political situation, and in particular the perception that the ruling elite has become heavily corrupted. As the last examples, show, however, the popular images and discourses which recover Samora as an anti-corruption icon are importantly different to the elite versions insofar as they also make a strong link between corruption and self-enrichment as the same kind of moral failing, with the latter a form of corruption in and of itself. In this sense, as part of the resurrection of Samora, we see an emerging critique of neoliberal capitalism and the moral values which it has institutionalised, mocked neatly in Mia Couto’s phrase cabritalismo. This is one that spills into a broader critique of the liberal peace and its transformations – one which exceeds the horizons and lenses which have been employed thus far in the debate.

ii. ‘Africa, Mozambique without coherence will have no good governance’: ‘Good governance’ as a basis of radical critique?

However, nostalgia for Samora’s values are not the only form of political consciousness responding to the issues of corruption and governance. In this section it will be argued that good governance discourses themselves are also increasingly the foundation of a form of critical political consciousness on these issues, as well as

480 This is a mixing of ‘cabrittism’ – goat-like behaviour used to describe corruption, and ‘capitalismo’. See Harrison, ‘Corruption as boundary politics’, 548.
the structure and effects of the liberal peace. For many, these forms of political consciousness can and do run parallel to each other as modes of understanding the contemporary political situation, providing what might be well understood as a form of ‘double consciousness’ around questions of corruption and governance.

As already noted, the move towards the goal of ‘good governance’ in shaping international aid flows and development agendas as part of a ‘liberal’ transformation agenda has been in the gradual process of institutionalisation for around two decades. ‘Good governance’ demands are thus viewed in much of the critical literature as a key site of deep Western intrusion into the social and political orders of aid-recipient countries.\footnote{Williams, D. (2008) \textit{The World Bank and Social Transformation in International Politics}, London: Routledge.} One of the important questions for this argument is the extent to which this way of thinking resonates with or affects political consciousness in a way which shapes responses and action. For example Harrison has argued that states like Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique can be considered ‘governance states’ in which external and internal political agendas in the state are no longer distinct and where there is an institutionalisation of particular structures of international intervention within public administration. As such, in this framework of ‘post-conditionality’, the power of international institutions does not lie so much in their ability to impose various arrangements on recipient countries, but in the regularised embedding of these norms into the machine of government itself. Accordingly, this shrinks the array of political choices open to national politicians and publics to those which conform with the requirements of the bureaucracy, which is itself inter-woven with the international institutions.\footnote{Harrison, \textit{The World Bank in Africa}.}

Harrison’s analysis of these processes is sharp and lucid, and does much in and of itself to reconfigure the understanding of the ‘liberal’ and ‘local’ that underpins the liberal peace debate. In particular, it highlights this binary as in some senses anachronistic in the analysis of the bureaucratic spheres of governance states, where there seems to be a broad consensus on the need for ‘good governance’. In Harrison’s analysis, this framework is a limit or closure on political choices, which is a compelling and important point. However, I would argue that his analysis does
not capture the ways in which even working ostensibly \textit{within} the ‘good governance’ agenda, various subjects have also used and reconfigured the ideas as a form of immanent critical consciousness towards the existing political order. As will be evident, this is nowhere near as widespread a form of political consciousness as is the public recovery of Samora just discussed, but nonetheless it is an important one given the government’s attempts to articulate its own ‘good governance’ credentials.\textsuperscript{484}

This recovery is one which deals with the questions of the political power and legitimacy of both government and international interveners, in a way which attempts to change the terms of debate. Specifically, it has used the framework of ‘good governance’ to highlight not just the big corruption scandals and lower-level rent-seeking in public life, but also to critique the hegemony of the ruling party, the breaking of rules, and the impact of external aid as creating various political and economic disequilibria within the country as a whole. As such, it too provides a framework for an immanent critical political consciousness to emerge.

The case that the ‘good governance’ agenda may have critical potential despite its problematic origins in conditionality is one which various political commentators have picked up on. Noe Nhantumbo, a journalist working across various independent press outlets, argues for this passionately in a recent book:

\begin{quotation}
… the most important thing is that the political forces of civil society know how to take advantage of this genuine ‘external aid’, and make the ‘Good Governance’ question their own, taking in full and with all its consequences… To know how to take advantage of and use the small open windows for the evolution and growth of international political relations is a necessity… It is in this way that we must look at the issue of ‘Good Governance’. The risk that we currently run is to view this issue as being appropriated by politicians and leaders, to be later sold to the international community when they invite them.\textsuperscript{485}
\end{quotation}

Some outlets have been attempting to use these “small open windows” as a way to forge political consciousness, such as non-aligned think-tanks and research projects, often funded with donor money earmarked for ‘good governance’,

\textsuperscript{484} For example, in the 2004 and 2009 Guebuza Presidential election campaigns.\textsuperscript{485} Nhantumbo, \textit{Africa, Moçambique}, 100-101.
‘capacity building’ and ‘civil society’ support. The re-shaping of the political landscape in these directions is, of course, what the funding agencies might desire by and large. However, as will be shown below, this has also produced voices which question the roles these agencies play in political life.

By way of example, one of the currently most prominent and best-funded NGOs for ‘good governance’ in Mozambique is the Centro de Integridade Pública, (CIP) run by Marcelo Mosse, an investigative journalist and public commentator, and Adriano Nuvunga, a lecturer at Eduardo Mondlane University, and funded by Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, Norway, the Ford Foundation and International Budget Partnership. Much of the work of the Centre is given over to the monitoring and advocacy of corruption and governance issues, the provision of training and the evaluation of the effectiveness of government policy. As such it might be seen to function as an exemplar of a civil society organisation that operates to transplant or translate ‘liberal’ values in a post-conflict space – the kind of organisation seen as co-opted by the liberal peace through hybridisation in Mac Ginty’s framework. Indeed, many of the angles of analysis used to diagnose political problems and corruption seem to reproduce many aspects of donors’ analyses, including ‘weak accountability mechanisms’ and ‘lack of implementation of laws’. Yet in many cases, the quality of investigation and commitment to analyse various problems vastly exceeds efforts made by either government or development partners. Although outwardly concerned with ‘good governance’, it nonetheless retains a focus on the idea of ‘public integrity’ as a moral activity in important ways, which echo the tenor of debates on the post-socialist order just discussed.

However, and perhaps more pertinently, the members of CIP have also used the framework of what constitutes good governance to offer a more substantive critique of how the liberal peace operates at a structural level. Nuvunga, for example, has made it clear that in the governance of Mozambique:

486 Centro de Integridade Pública website; http://www.cip.org.mz Accessed May 27th 2011. It is of note though that as a guerrilla group Frelimo itself was also started with a grant from the Ford Foundation in the 1960s, solicited by Eduardo Mondlane.

Aid appears to have helped build, but also fragment, the State machinery and institutions. It appears that dependence on aid has created an incentive structure that makes civil servants reluctant to get involved and commit themselves to public duties unless there is a prospect of direct personal benefit in the form of perks.\footnote{Nuvunga, A. (2007) ‘Aid Dependence and Governance in Mozambique’, in Awortwi, N. and Nuvunga, A. (eds) Foreign Aid, Governance and Institutional Development in Mozambique, Maastricht: Shaker Publishing, 49-50.}

He goes on to argue that the movement towards central budget support has in fact led to perverse consequences for ‘governance’:

\[\ldots\text{donors not only control national policy through aid conditionality, they also control key institutions through their direct involvement. This has long-term consequences for institutional sustainability in the country.}\footnote{Ibid., 50.}\]

Although using the framework of ‘good governance’, Nuvunga clearly demonstrates a reflexive and critical engagement with it, which provides a platform for a gently stated if far-reaching structural critique of the role of aid in the political sphere of Mozambique, and one which is directed at the donors as well as the government. This is supplemented by a number of political commentaries co-published regularly with Joe Hanlon which interrogate the relationship between donors and government closely, and underscore the problems of political legitimacy and accountability with it.\footnote{See Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, also published at \url{http://www.cip.org.mz}} This interpretation of ‘good governance’ thus puts emphasis on the specifically \textit{democratic} rather than bureaucratic ways in which the term can be understood, opening up the political space for a different kind of critique. Indeed, donors’ own discourses of what constitutes ‘good governance’ in Mozambique appeared to have changed over the years as a result of arguments articulated by activists such as those in CIP, including regarding the dominance of Frelimo in political life. As Hanlon notes, for a long time there was a deep reluctance by the donors to engage with issues of governance in anything other than a technical fashion.\footnote{Hanlon, ‘Do donors promote corruption?’, 750.}

The idea that the structures of the liberal peace promote governance failure through its \textit{economics} is one advocated by Marcelo Mosse, who argues strongly

\footnote{\textit{\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots}}
from a good governance platform that cuts in public sector salaries imposed by structural adjustment policies were a major cause of corruption that both the government and donors wanted to ignore. Carlos Castel-Branco has also argued that the idea of ‘ownership’ as promoted through governance models is deeply inhibited by the structural conditions of multidimensional aid dependency. These critical investigations of the meaning of ‘good governance’ and the causes of failure are not simply repeating donor and government agendas but challenging them. In particular, Castel-Branco’s engagement forces discussion of governance towards an engagement with Mozambique’s broader economic situation, an issue which is often left out of discussion. Chapter Seven will look further at this as a dimension of critical consciousness towards intervention.

In this kind of re-appropriated ‘good governance’ consciousness, donors themselves are also accused of failing to uphold ‘good governance’ in their dealings with the government of Mozambique. Since the Paris Accords and movement towards aid harmonisation, the government itself has launched a number of audits of bureaucratic delays within the aid system. These have presented findings that the majority of delays in processes were attributable to delays at the World Bank or EU rather than the government, which has been since used to pressure the donors politically. Others have noted more ironically that despite pressing for legislative reform, donor agencies have undermined the ‘good governance’ they promote by not following these procurement and employment laws themselves in their own practices. This is supplemented by the idea that there has also been a failure of governance in donor countries, as noted by another public intellectual:

The other thing that needs to happen is that European citizens need to ask their governments where the money is going – what are you doing? Because it is going from the taxpayers of Europe – the working people – to the rich of Africa. [laughs] I was asked to give advice to a lady from a Finnish organisation who was working on a poster to raise funds for her

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492 Mosse, Breve Analise.
494 Interview with Vice-Minister of Planning and Development, Maputo, August 19th 2009 (Appendix: 8).
organisation. It was a poster of an African child who was hungry. I advised her to add a picture of the politician’s mansion across the road. She didn’t do it… but this is what I mean. You have your own internal mechanisms for monitoring… but you need to go and see.  

A political consciousness of ‘good governance’ in Mozambique can be understood as not one which simply reproduces a technocratic ideology of donor-led development (although it may also do this) but one which also looks at the structure of the political and economic order more broadly and critically through the lenses of inequality and unaccountability. For Nhantumbo, the idea of ‘good governance’ is amenable to be rescued from “the deceptive mires of the mouth” as the basis for a much more radical critique of the international order through a more widespread democratisation of power and resources. Yet, he argues, that this has implications that neither the politicians of Africa nor the West will embrace:

On both sides, in Africa and in the West, politicians are using or presenting a version of policy which is double-faced. They know that they need to keep ‘Good Governance’ as a continued factor and condition of cooperation but they are aware that to take it to its logical conclusions would infallibly destroy the bases on which their economies sit. From here we may gather that the politicians and governors will never sufficiently advance, in the implementation of the totality of this strategy or policy because this will contradict their interests in this domain. Only a change in the fundamental strategies between the partners is what can bring about an open and profound approach to the issue of ‘Good Governance’.  

Nhantumbo’s analysis is critical of the excessive structures of planning, workshops, aid dependence and passivity that the current relationship with international cooperation partners has involved. However, he does not advocates for a rejection of international assistance and cooperation but for a more radical reappraisal of how it is approached and whose interests it serves. This vision of how Africans might approach and use the idea of ‘good governance’ illustrates perfectly how a seemingly technocratic and politically innocuous discourse might itself be turned towards a more far-reaching critique of political leadership, the distribution of wealth and international interventions.

496 Interview with director of good governance NGO, Maputo, August 17th 2009 (Appendix: 51).
497 Nhantumbo, Africa, Moçambique, 103.
III. Double consciousness under the liberal peace

These two forms of political consciousness, the morality of Samora and ‘good governance’, run in parallel and are occasionally intertwined throughout discussions in Mozambique on the politics of governance and corruption under the liberal peace. On the opening of the new headquarters for the government’s new Gabinete Central de Combate a Corrupção (GCC), a key pillar of its good governance strategy, its director, Ana Maria Gemo, argued

…that Samora Machel fought corruption vehemently and advocated an equitable distribution of national wealth. “He dedicated his life to the building of a fair and transparent public administration, whether through creating legal instruments, or otherwise in his vigorous speeches, teaching Mozambicans to be determined and persistent regarding obstacles to any development of our young nation... in following the teachings of Samora, in this room, we will develop strategies for crime prevention, civic education, which are aimed at promoting citizenship, a culture of transparency, integrity and good governance. Strategies will be aligned to the establishment of trust in institutions of public administration and justice, because, after all, corruption is a challenge within our grasp.”

Here there are, seamlessly interspersed, two different forms of political consciousness, but both of which are very contemporary in character and significance. Clearly, as do all forms of political consciousness, they seek to establish or order particular kinds of relations between subjects past and present, and are directed towards a number of different audiences. In this sense they can also be understood as the kind of ‘strategic essentialism’ Spivak identifies as necessary for political action. Yet, their non-unitary character also expresses particular kinds of tensions and fluidities. The tensions seem to come from the contradiction of striving for the still-important idea of ‘self’-determination at the same time as striving for forms of internal political critique which are enabled by discourses originating from ‘outside’. The new and fluid nostalgia for Samora in particular speaks to the politcally disorientating and alienating effects of the post-war order,


characterised by economic shocks, political change and disillusionment. But crucially, given the legitimating strategies of those in power as former liberators and inheritors of Samora’s mantle, it is also an importantly immanent political weapon when used against the regime. Similarly, the use of, identification with and creative re-appropriation of the notion of ‘good governance’ reflects an ambivalent relation with ideas that contain somewhere the promise of a more democratic and progressive set of political relations but the practices of which can structurally inhibit their realisation.

In terms of understanding political subjecthood, the framework of double consciousness here illustrates several issues of relevance to the debate on the liberal peace and particularly with regards to corruption. As a preliminary point, it cuts through the insinuation that corruption is part of ‘traditional’ values in this African context. Harrison’s work makes the point very well, but it is worth repeating. This is especially so in the context that attribute the presence of corruption under the liberal peace to ‘endemic’ ‘feudal’ social relations or to culturally specific ‘patrimonial’ practices. These analyses are based on the underlying assumptions that political life in the non-West can be adequately analysed and characterised as a system of ‘patron-client’ relations which are a re-animation of pre-colonial or colonial social orders, and thus demand no contemporary political engagement with their substance. As argued in Chapter Three, these assumptions are problematic, not only in being descriptively lazy, but also in reproducing the non-West as a non-subject of politics.

In terms of the political economy critiques, such as those of Pugh and to an extent Duffield, such an engagement with political consciousness might help to advance and substantiate a comprehension of the specific experiences and political consciousnesses produced by the global economic order. Yet in order to do this,

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500 Harrison, ‘Corruption as boundary politics’, 542.
503 Jones, ibid.
there would have to first be a re-appraisal of the nature and importance of the political subject within analysis. As argued in Chapter Two, on some levels there is an unavoidable tension between analyses which locate the site of power at a structural level, in which human experiences and ideas although interesting are epiphenomenal, and those which presuppose a more multi-dimensional or differentiated framework of analysis. In Chapter Three, I argued that a move to the latter was significant in thinking about the specific experiences of domination and potential sources of political change. If one starts from the perspective that political consciousness can be, and often is, plural or non-unitary, then engaging with this consciousness substantively becomes an important way into articulating concrete responses to the effects of power structures. It is here where the epistemological move of the ‘double consciousness’ framework is significant insofar as it locates an important source of critique within the framework of lived political subjecthood. As such it is not incompatible with the basic idea that power is reproduced through a particular patterning of the global political economy. However, it does suggest that this is an inadequate method of critical analysis and engagement.

In fact, decolonising work on ‘double consciousness’ such as that of Du Bois both pre-dates and anticipates the debates between poststructuralism and structural Marxism on the question of the nature of ideology. Butler’s critique of Althusser argues that the process of ideological interpellation of subjects nonetheless requires as a prerequisite some sort of subject or conscience, which itself can be imagined not as intrinsically obedient but a site of potential for resistance. Yet where Butler seeks this in a largely abstract register, for decolonising approaches a sense of one’s own humanity is already a historically real aspect of political consciousness, lived and experienced under various conditions of socially differentiated domination. Its sociogenic approach can be seen to pre-empt Butler’s critique in beginning from a position of a historically-existing and self-aware double consciousness.

Related to this, the framework of a non-unitary political consciousness problematizes the attempt to represent the political subject through analytic simplification or reductionism. On the one hand, this challenges what Mac Ginty

identifies as a “‘last native syndrome’”\textsuperscript{505} in analyses of the liberal peace – that is, the search for a non-modern, culturally-defined subject who has not been polluted or co-opted by the liberal peace and who can speak authentically against it. As argued in Chapter Two, this tendency can be found within the work of Richmond who counterposes the liberal peace with non-liberal or local ‘custom’, ‘tradition’, ‘kinship’ and ‘community’.\textsuperscript{506} On the other hand, it also problematizes the portrayal of those engaging with the liberal peace as necessarily participating in a ‘Western-induced artifice’.\textsuperscript{507} The notion of an ‘artifice’ here strongly inscribes a sense that there is an otherwise ‘authentic’ and non-contemporary political space, which is implicitly more real. Both of these constructions of the political imply that true political consciousness amongst the recipients of the liberal peace is both unitary and non-Western. Yet the analysis here of historically meaningful, critical and strategically creative plural forms of consciousness also renders this move dubious. This analysis is based on the idea that there will likely be important differences of framing, content and perspective that emerge from the interaction of political subjects who are grounded in different kinds of experience, but not one which asserts what kinds of differences will be important prior to engagement.

In a different way, the analytic of hybridity in the liberal peace debate discussed in Chapter Two is also extended and subverted through the recognition of double consciousness. Although Mac Ginty recognises that various entities are always already ‘hybrid’ by virtue of contact, co-operation and co-existence over a long period of time, the analytic framework and dynamics proposed re-establish the conceptual separation between ‘liberal’ and ‘local’ as a means of understanding the dynamics between them.\textsuperscript{508} In this sense, the analyst’s gaze is conceived of as being lateral to the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ dynamics which characterise hybridity in the liberal peace. By contrast, a double consciousness approach can extend the recognition of ‘already-existing’ hybridity but relocate its epistemic perspective with regard to political consciousness, while also recognising that this multiplicity operates at various ‘levels’ and reflects ‘internal’ struggles as well as external ones.

\textsuperscript{506} Richmond, ‘Resistance and the post-liberal peace’.
\textsuperscript{507} Ibid., 670.
\textsuperscript{508} Mac Ginty, \textit{International Peacebuilding}, chapter 3.
It is with this question of struggle that the framework of double consciousness opens up the liberal peace as a site of living and lived political experience. For Du Bois and Fanon, it was the increasing awareness of contradictions between the ideas of humanity proclaimed by the West and the inhumanity of the colonial/racial order on which it depended that drove the desire for a different way of thinking and a form of revolt against those structures. In contemporary Mozambique what we see is an resurgent awareness of contradictions between the ideas of self-determination, development, democracy and good governance, and the ways in which domestic and international political arrangements may structurally inhibit this. In the next chapter, I will explore the material politics of the liberal peace as a means of engaging more concretely with its significance and effects.

Conclusions

Political consciousness is perhaps not only double but plural in significant ways. This chapter picks out two of these strands as a way of thinking through some of the implications of non-unitary subjecthood for critiques of the liberal peace. They are in no sense exhaustive of the kinds of issues and considerations that could be brought to bear on the topic of governance and corruption: not only are the various conversations much richer than could be captured in a single narrative, but it is also clear that the focus of this analysis has been on commentary by particularly visible commentators.509

Nonetheless, the framework of double consciousness and a re-centred subjecthood also makes critiquing the liberal peace in some senses much more difficult, insofar as commitments to a ‘critical’ agenda may pull in different directions and must deal with a plurality of live assenting and dissenting voices. It fragments the simpler narratives of West-capitalist-liberal-hegemonic against the non-Western-non-liberal-dependent-local-other that have guided much critical

509 For example, West’s discussion of sorcery as an interpretive framework for unexplained power amongst the Makonde, mentioned in the next chapter could have constituted another form of consciousness around corruption. See West, Kapilikula.
thinking on the liberal peace. In particular, it seems to highlight the very contemporary, rather than anachronistic, character of the tensions between various political ideals, as well as the exclusion hitherto of the moral space from critical deliberations.

But beyond this, the understanding of political consciousness as historically-embedded and non-unitary also calls into question the transcendental aims of both a liberal developmental end-state and an ‘authentic’ space beyond the liberal that are the underlying utopias of supporters and critics of the liberal peace respectively. Rather, it is the immediate and immanent character of political being and change that becomes the focus of analysis and concern. In Chapter Seven, a focus on the immediate and manifest dimensions of intervention offers a distinctive account of its experience, and in particular the political economy dimensions of this experience. In addressing such dimensions, we move towards a critique which is alive to important aspects of alienation within intervention, and the political and ethical questions these raise.
Chapter Seven

Consuming the liberal peace: situating accounts of the political economy of co-operation

Recovering an understanding of the experiences of those subject to the liberal peace is crucial in re-framing the terms of debate in an anti-colonial manner: that is, articulating political subjects as embodied and situated, developing a multi-dimensional account of the political and basing a critical response within an ethical humanism. The previous two chapters sought to recover a grounded understanding of Mozambique as a historically significant entity and as having plural forms of political consciousness. These chapters spoke to the implicit narrative in critiques that the ideas and discourses of the liberal peace were ‘Western’ and therefore ‘alien’ in a place like Mozambique. The next two chapters elaborate the experience of the liberal peace from the perspective of its material significance, emphasising the concrete ways in which highly unequal economic relations underpin and are reproduced by relations of intervention, leading to various forms of alienation. This contributes to the reconstruction of subjecthood through the reconstruction of its experiential dimensions.

In doing so, the approach further calls into question those approaches to the liberal peace that have attempted to deal with its political ethics only in a political-theoretical dimension, such as Richmond and Chandler. Although these thinkers may come to different conclusions regarding the nature of the political subject, methodologically, they both approach a critique of the politics of intervention via the ontological stakes that they have defined: for Richmond this is the liberal-local divide\(^{510}\) and for Chandler it is the necessity of something like a liberal modern subject.\(^ {511}\) For both these accounts, the relative economic position of the parties and the nature of these relations is totally epiphenomenal to how they judge the political ethics of intervention.

\(^{510}\) Chapter Two, 65.
\(^{511}\) Chapter Two, 79.
This is not the case for the approaches of Pugh and Duffield, who much more strongly emphasise the role that the liberal peace plays in supporting and stabilising a neoliberal capitalist world order – as such, the political economy of the relationship is brought much more into focus as a grounds for assessing and judging interventions. In particular, the distinction between ‘insured’ and ‘uninsured’ populations developed by Duffield is important in articulating this order as differentiated in crucial ways, an issue which will be discussed later in this chapter. Also important are Mac Ginty’s observations that economic policies in post-conflict environments may profess a free-market line of thought but rarely live up to such in practice.\footnote{Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, 120.} However, the ways in which these dynamics feed into the conscious experiences of intervention is largely bypassed in the narrative. By contrast, the approach outlined for this study will seek to re-ground critique in these dimensions of conscious experience.

In this re-grounding, the argument will look at the politics of consumption. Bayart has famously argued that the politics of the African state is the ‘politics of the belly’ – that is, the idea that access to and desire for political power is based on its close association with access to economic wealth on the continent, often derived from external connections.\footnote{Bayart, J-F.,(1993). The State in Africa: the politics of the belly, London / New York: Longman.} Mbembe’s contrasting but related understanding and use of ‘the belly’, along with the mouth and phallus, in framing the politics of the postcolony alternatively emphasises the significance of personal corporeality and eating in the banal and ubiquitous manifestations of power in public spaces.\footnote{Mbembe, A., (1992) ‘Provisional notes on the postcolony’, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 62(1), 3-37.}

In a rather different way, the World Bank and other donors are also concerned with the ‘bellies’ of Africa – in particular their status as they pertain to poverty reduction strategies and economic indices of household consumption of various goods. It is on such consumption-based statistics that economic policies seek to evaluate themselves and their successes. In particular, recent trends in international development policy around the issue of ‘food security’, involving a broad swathe of governments, IGOs and NGOs, can be framed as the latest
reflection of a long-standing humanitarian and developmental moral and political imperative to ‘feed the world’. As such, there is a large extent to which we can consider the international aid industry as also responding to a ‘politics of the belly’, albeit one which shifts between the politics of emergency and the politics of development.

In another context, West argues that the idiom of consumption is an important framework for making sense of social and political power amongst Makonde communities on the Muedan plateau in northern Mozambique. Here, powerful people are understood to use destructive sorcery to literally ‘feed on’ others, be they enemies whom they wish to destroy, or weaker people whose strength they want to absorb. In this sense, the powerful are often understood as very literally ‘predatory’, having a craving for power which is bound up with a physical appetite.515

‘Consumption’, then, must be understood as an importantly polysemic term for thinking about politics, or indeed political economy, in Africa, for a wide range of audiences.516 Whilst Bayart and Mbembe seek to refer principally to its internal politics via metaphors of resource capture, satiation, intimacy and appetite, there are clear ways in which aspects of its external politics are strongly shaped by images of famine and dearth as well as economistic assessments of ‘consumption’ in the creation of market demand. Moreover, consumption appears in vernacular conceptions of power to explain otherwise opaque disparities within it. Put simply, the logic of consumption and eating is variously understood in all these framings to be an important logic of social life itself.

In thinking about ‘who consumes’, or indeed ‘who can consume’, it is possible to move towards integrating the kinds of phenomenological analysis that Césaire stipulated in the *Discourse on Colonialism* into an understanding of the broader political economy of intervention. As discussed in Chapter Three, this kind of critique of the concrete experiences of colonialism, particularly in terms of its

515 West, *Kupilikula.*
516 Although I cannot explore the issue here, I do not mean to imply that the politics of consumption is particular to Africa, only that it has these particular public associations.
supposed goals and accomplishments, was a powerful analytic weapon which supported an ethical and political critique of the colonial order. It was able to do so by attempting to grasp some concrete dynamics of colonialism and show how these inverted its particular claims to be fostering development. Such inversions also supported a critique of colonialism as being hypocritical and anti-humanist, which changed the terms of debate regarding its justification. Chapter Four argued that an important strategy towards this kind of critique was a re-evaluation of material dimensions in society via an engagement with its experiential content.

In this chapter, building on widespread critiques made within Mozambique about the structures of international co-operation, and engaging with the liberal peace on an experiential level, it is possible to read the liberal peace as itself representing a ‘politics of the belly’ on three connected fronts. First, I read the engagement with the liberal peace in Mozambique as driven by conscious transactionality and informed by a widespread consciousness of dependency. Second, I argue that the liberal peace depletes rather than transforms the public sector through salary inequalities and aid resource expenditure. Finally, I argue that the high differentials between expatriate and national conditions drive a sense of social exclusion and alienation into the operation of the system as a whole. I argue that this reading of the concrete political economies of intervention both complements and exceeds the structural critiques of the neoliberal economic policy that have dominated the narratives of the political economy of peacebuilding. In doing so, such a picture emphasises the broader social implications of these dynamics and the ethical questions that these raise for critical engagement.

Chapter Three, 117-118.
Chapter Four, 131.
This chapter also derives inspiration from a play seen in Maputo in July 2009 called ‘The Politics of the Belly’. This self-penned satire followed the adventures of a teenager as he sought to tell the difference between lies and truth within contemporary Mozambican society. In a series of hilarious encounters with his father, the school, the police, some drunken army veterans, a nightclub owner and the national parliament, the young man’s naïve questions expose the hypocrisies at the heart of various claims to authority in social life. Teatro Luarte, (2009) The Politics of the Belly, Teatro Avenida, Maputo.
I. Conscious transactionality in the liberal peace

Césaire’s demand to ‘see clearly, think clearly’ about the nature of the system is an onerous one in the case of the liberal peace, and the closer one gets to its actual practices in a particular place, the more difficult it can be to do. As discussed in Chapter One, the ‘liberal peace’ is understood as a construct which comprises the activities of a wide range of Western or Northern organisations and their partners undertaking an array of projects and programmes to produce or fund the production of peace, statebuilding and development in the global South, through political, economic and social activities. There are many modalities through which this takes place – either through or around host government budgets, within bilateral or multilateral accords, and many without the authorisation or even knowledge of the host government. Programmes and projects vary hugely in scale, budget, scope, intention, execution and impact. They exist in every sector of public life – both governmental and non-governmental – exerting various levels of influence. For many of the critiques it is the accumulation of these interventions and programmes, transformative in intent and underpinned by a particular ideology, that represents ‘the liberal peace’. As noted earlier, they have by and large tended to understand the liberal peace at the level of its aggregate structure, which is understood as programmatic in character.

Normally, this liberal project is understood as being propagated through either ‘conditionality’, or, for Harrison and Duffield’s later work, ‘post-conditionality’. Both narratives emphasise the power and effectiveness of liberal transformations and Western agencies, either through the imposition of strict macroeconomic frameworks or through the broadening of the sovereign frontier to incorporate liberal governance into the structures of the state. For Duffield (2001),

Liberal peace is a system of carrots and sticks where cooperation paves the way for development assistance and access to the wider networks of global governance, while non-cooperation risks varying degrees of conditionality and isolation. 520

520 Duffield, Global Governance, 34.
For Harrison, the post-conditionality regime is very similar to conditionality, but less coercive and more diffuse:

Donor-state relations within the post-conditionality regime are not defined by conditionality in its directly coercive sense: ‘do what the IFIs say because the costs of doing so are not as great as the costs of not doing so’. Rather, IFIs employ the disbursement of funds to promote further changes – mainly to state institutions through administrative reform programmes. Post-conditionality politics requires more carrots than sticks.\(^{521}\)

There is much truth to both of these important narratives, and they capture important aspects of the ways in which aid operates in practice. But it is here where particular dynamics of the experience can be obscured in service of the grand narrative of the (neo)liberal project. Yet, as Césaire made clear understanding the experience of interventions is particularly important from the perspective and experience of those inhabiting its structure. This is especially the case where those experiences emphasise different aspects to the narratives offered by the political structures.

This section will argue that in its concrete manifestations and effects in Mozambique, the liberal peace is usefully interpreted as a system of conscious transactionality based on a very conscious appreciation of economic needs. When looking at the various ways in which people who are the targets of intervention understand their motives and options when engaging with interveners, there is a widespread understanding of what dependency means and entails. As such, on this reading, the liberal peace may have its primary significance in Mozambique as a source of income and resources for diverse objectives, for the government and for others including public sector workers and expatriate aid workers. Within this, various ideological themes and directions are somewhat evident but not necessarily coherently or robustly pursued. As such, the exposure or preparation of subjects for either the global market or liberal governmentality seems to be heavily mediated through the reproduction of a particular transactional hierarchy of finance, compensation, power and privilege which has its own logic. Whilst this does not necessarily undermine the broad usefulness of the structural analysis of

neoliberalism, it concretises it in a way which connects with the experience and consciousness of being subject to transformation, as well as pointing to other factors which are themselves under political control.

However, it is first worthwhile demonstrating the salience of a transactional interpretation of the liberal peace in Mozambique as a crucial dynamic of its politics and political economy. This is an important theme which was in evidence across the interviews and observations which were conducted for this project as well as in a wider set of analyses and commentaries about international co-operation. It is also an interpretation which fits well with the behaviour of the donors, government and other aid-receiving bodies. Prima facie it may seem like an obvious point but it is one that perhaps has important consequences for how we think about the system as a whole, particularly regarding the ethics of engagement, empowerment, ‘ownership’ and so forth, and particularly from the perspective of significantly less wealthy participants in the relationship. I will argue below that we can see that at each level at which the liberal peace operates, it is made substantive precisely only at the point at which it can be realised transactionally.522

Since 1978, Mozambique has received an estimated $36bn in official development aid from OECD countries, 523 and much more via non-official donations. As mentioned in Chapter Five, Mozambique’s economic experiences during the 1980s are an important grounding for its present situation vis-à-vis the donors. Yussuf Adam, academic and former Frelimo intellectual, has argued that the combination of war, destabilisation, emergency and the debt crisis were all contributing factors in forcing the decision to seek more external aid.524 However, its traditional partners in the COMECON bloc had decided to turn down its application for membership in 1981, which led to its eventual applications to join the Bretton Woods Institutions, which were accepted in 1984.525 It became

522 Harrison emphasises that much of the World Bank’s power over other donors results from its comparatively larger funds. See Harrison, G. The World Bank, 91.
increasingly clear over this time that the urgently needed financial support would be dependent on Mozambique undertaking a programme of rapid structural adjustment, which it eventually did in 1987.\textsuperscript{526} The stringent structural adjustment policies laid out in the Economic Rehabilitation Programme were clearly to have a large impact on public expenditure and incomes, as is well discussed in the literature.\textsuperscript{527} There was a wide consensus at the time, which is to some extent ongoing, that Mozambique had ceded important aspects of its ability to determine its own social and economic policies in this deal and thereafter.

Yet, in this deal, the government had also made concrete gains of another kind. Official aid from DAC countries virtually doubled in response from $698m in 1986 to $1.01bn in 1987 (2007 prices).\textsuperscript{528} At its peak in 1988, foreign aid constituted 81.2\% of GDP, and has continued to constitute a major proportion of government income.\textsuperscript{529} From the outset of its post-independence economic trajectory then, the government consciously understood itself to be in a position of trading and bargaining for financial support, whilst trying to resist particular political pressures such as the devaluation of the currency and the depression of minimum wages.\textsuperscript{530} The intense economic pressure it was under at the time of the turn to the IFIs for aid was very apparent to its political leadership at the time. It was also publicly obvious. As Bertil Egëro describes, from the beginning of the 1980s there was widespread malnutrition and even a lack of clothing for many people.\textsuperscript{531} By the end of the decade up to three million people had been displaced by war,\textsuperscript{532} which had also deliberately destroyed much of the state infrastructure. This had also virtually paralysed economic activity within the country, with agricultural and industrial production at extremely low levels. A deep consciousness of this collapse is evident from Frelimo’s Central Committee report to the Fifth Congress in 1989.

\textsuperscript{526} Ibid., 248. Indeed Hanlon reports a donor strike in 1986 on this issue.
\textsuperscript{528} Hanlon, ‘Aid to Mozambique, selected sectors’
\textsuperscript{529} Plank, ‘Aid, debt, and the end of sovereignty’, 408.
\textsuperscript{530} Adam, \textit{Foreign Aid}, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{531} Egëro, \textit{Mozambique : a dream undone}, 86.
in which a frank, sober and arresting analysis of the economic and social situation explains and justifies the introduction of reforms to central aspects of economic policy.533

What happened resulted in a high influx of aid and a substantive rescheduling of public debt. In the short term, this allowed more imports of food aid and other emergency assistance upon which the survival of many rested. As such, the adoption of structural adjustment policies can be understood as a conscious trade-off made by the Mozambican government under the pressure of a growing and long-term economic crisis, in return for specific forms of assistance to the state. However, it was articulated and pursued in terms of the government’s historic developmental mission, which included the expansion of public services such as education and health, and a promotion of the central role of the Frelimo party in political life. The Fifth Congress Report of the Central Committee, entitled ‘For the Normalisation of Life’ understands the reforms as the necessary price for the continuation of the government’s own project.534

Therefore, when ONUMOZ, the official peacebuilding mission of the UN – one of Roland Paris’ ‘successful’ agents of liberal peacebuilding535 – arrived in October 1992, Mozambique’s political elite across party lines had already been engaged in a complex game of transactional politics with ‘new’ Western donors for some time. This was to alleviate the emergency, which had involved acceding to various aspects of structural adjustment. The negotiation of the Rome Accords from 1989-1992 followed this logic remarkably closely, with Renamo in particular using the talks to elicit concrete flows of cash and equipment in return for running for election.536 ONUMOZ itself relied on continuing this strategy of direct bargaining for particular concessions and forms of co-operation with both Renamo and Frelimo, and paid out large sums of money throughout the process of electoral preparation in order to keep its momentum going. This involved a $16m trust fund

534 Ibid., and Munslow, ‘Mozambique: Marxism-Leninism in reverse’.
for Renamo and other parties.\textsuperscript{537} This is not to say that there was not a genuine
desire for peace from within political parties, but rather that they used their
interactions with third party donors as means of securing a financial package to
support the installation of a multiparty electoral system. Ajello, head of the UN
mission, quite openly endorsed the idea that people would essentially have to be
bought off in order for multiparty elections to take place.\textsuperscript{538} Fifteen years on,
wrangling over the question of elections between the government and donors, such
as over the general election in 2009, have only been brought to a head by more
donor strikes on disbursing central government funding. This has again reinforced
the centrality of the financial aspect of the relationship, even around the basic
question of elections in a liberal peace framework.\textsuperscript{539} Despite the move to a
multiparty electoral system, however, the government has managed to successfully
contain any political challenges to Frelimo dominance and has increasingly
instituted what Luis de Brito has called an ‘elected single-party state’.\textsuperscript{540}

Successive and continued negotiations over the implementation of the
‘liberal peace’ via financial aid and fiscal policy over the next years can also be
interpreted as being substantially transactional in character from the perspective of
the government. For example, it is clear that the production of the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PARPAs in the Portuguese acronym) – understood by
many as a primary contemporary instrument of neoliberal economic transformation
– was first undertaken specifically in order to qualify for over a billion dollars of
debt relief.\textsuperscript{541} Furthermore, it continues to be renewed in order for new tranches of
money to be forthcoming from both the IFIs and the European donors. One

1994. The figure of $16m is from Barnes, S., (1998) Humanitarian aid coordination during war and
peace in Mozambique, 1985-1995, Studies on Emergency and Disaster Relief No. 7, (Uppsala:
Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency / Nordic Africa Institute)

\textsuperscript{538} Ibid., Indeed, it is argued that one of the reasons for the relative success of Mozambique’s DDR
programme was the length of commitment to ex-combatant salaries, which provided a sufficient time
to bridge back towards agricultural or other income. Alden, C. (2002), ‘Making Old Soldiers Fade
Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique’, Security Dialogue,
33:3, 341-356, 347.


Through the Mozambican Civil War’, Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, WP No. 23,
London: London School of Economics.

\textsuperscript{541} Interview with Vice Minister, Ministry for Planning and Development, Maputo, 11th July 2008
(Appendix: 8)
interviewee described it as a “cut-and-paste” by the government\textsuperscript{542}, although more recent iterations have been understood to more closely follow the government’s own political programme in its Five Year Plans.\textsuperscript{543} The PRSP is now a substantial political centrepiece of the relationship with important implications for policy. However, even this has stemmed from the foundation of a large financial transaction with the donors which resulted in substantial immediate and tangible financial benefits, as noted by economist José Negrão.\textsuperscript{544}

Tellingly, sources within government and donors are of the view that although the PRSP is elaborated and worked on extensively with the multilateral donors, it may actually have a relatively limited impact on concrete sectoral policy. For example, one government source noted:

There is an issue between the PARPA and the sectoral strategies – the link is weak. PARPA was really a fund-raising document; the donors needed it. But the sectors don’t really follow PARPA – it’s quite vague anyway. It’s all done according to the sectoral plan and policies, but the links between plans, budgets and policies is also weak.\textsuperscript{545}

The PARPA is now associated with an extensive ‘participatory’ policy structure, comprising a wide range of planning and monitoring activities undertaken by a large number of institutional participants – for many it is the hallmark of a progressive and inclusive aid architecture. As such, the admission that it has a relatively limited impact on sectoral policy is a very interesting one. What it suggests is that the successive PRSPs do not necessarily represent a commitment on the part of the government to its specific content, nor the clear ability of the donors to impose a particular programme of policies upon the government. Rather, if this is the case, its significance appears more symbolic and politically functional for managing the co-operation process than as the platform for a committed programme of ideological or political transformation. Where it does seem to have a clear and continuing effect is

\textsuperscript{542} Interview with director of a community development NGO, Nampula, 13\textsuperscript{th} August 2009 (Appendix: 45)

\textsuperscript{543} These are known as the PQG in the Portuguese acronym: Plano Quinquenial do Governo.


\textsuperscript{545} Interview with consultant, Ministry of Planning and Development, Maputo, August 19\textsuperscript{th} 2009 Appendix: 54)., emphasis added.
in the limitation of public expenditure via macroeconomic policy, although there are signs of emerging IFI flexibility on this front. 546 This is an issue which will be returned to below.

The consciously transactional reading of the liberal peace at the governmental level is also supported by looking at its longstanding practices of ‘donor shopping’ for aspects of policy considered risky, unimportant or counter-productive by powerful multilateral donors such as the World Bank or IMF. This largely involves looking around for a donor willing to support projects or policies that others will not, or to step in when others pull out. The director of a national civil society fund also noted that this tended to make attempts at co-ordinated conditionality much weaker: ‘anyway, if one goes, there will be another to fill their place – Swiss, American, Dutch – there is no common agenda. It is all an industry of competition.’ 547

Amongst numerous examples of this over recent years is the launching of a national development bank for private sector credit, which the government were unable to persuade the large multilateral donors to underwrite. 548 However, in the following years, they signed accords with the Portuguese government 549 to do precisely this for US$500m. 550 This move importantly undercut an apparent plank of neoliberal economic orthodoxy which sought to liberalise the financial industry and allow the market to set interest rates and repayment schedules. Instead, it offers subsidised interest rates for longer term investments. This is understood in the light of a more recent general trend in increased co-operation with Brazil, India and


547 Interview with Director of national civil society organisation, Maputo, August 17th 2009 (Appendix: 51)

548 Interview with consultant, Ministry of Planning and Development, Maputo, August 19th 2009 (Appendix: 54).


China where much larger sums of investment funding have been made available for the government’s projects than that from the World Bank. This greatly accelerated the ability of the government to make choices about the character of transactions:

One of the reasons is the rise of other sources of finance e.g. India – access is much easier…We will go for that with or without World Bank permission. The Bank has to reform itself – that will give some fresh air.\textsuperscript{551}

From the perspective of the government, it might be said that co-operation with various interventions extends generally as far as they are tied to significant sources of funding, and even then that commitment may not be very strong in practice. A large part of the reason why the IFIs have had such influence in Mozambique has precisely been the large proportion of funds that they control and the leadership that they can exercise over the bilateral donors’ disbursements. The formation of the Group of Like-Minded Donors, now the G19 – a co-ordinated grouping of donors from primarily European countries – has tried to offset the power of the IFIs and the US government through the institution of a common policy dialogue and disbursement mechanism to pool funds. To some extent this has succeeded, as suggested in recent cables released through Wikileaks.\textsuperscript{552} On the other hand, the UN’s influence has been increasingly waning over the last two decades as its budget has shrunk relative to those of other donors and organisations.\textsuperscript{553}

This line of interpretation suggests that it is the \textit{money} that the liberal peace has historically brought with it which has been its principal force in Mozambique. Although this ability to choose between funding sources has been accentuated much more recently with alternative sources of foreign finance, the transactional quality of aid has been evident from the beginnings of dealings with multilateral and bilateral

\textsuperscript{551} Interview with Vice Minister of Planning and Development, Maputo, July 11\textsuperscript{th} 2008 (Appendix: 8), emphasis added.


\textsuperscript{553} Interview with former head of UNDP Mozambique, Maputo, June 19\textsuperscript{th} 2009 (Appendix: 9).
This dynamic is mirrored in the relationships with national NGOs, who also seem to approach the relationship transactionally. One director argued that:

It works like this: In this sphere, partners enter everywhere. Normally each partner has an agenda. They don’t impose it, but to get help, it’s necessary to align with their agendas. We have some who say they want to do HIV/AIDS, if you want our money, it’s A+B, even if it is nonsense… the influence is subtle, that comes with money.

Whilst this conclusion is not exactly surprising, it is nonetheless interesting how prominent the question of funding was in discussions with governmental and non-governmental organisations, and how perspectives towards the liberal peace were strongly conditioned by a strategic approach. In Mozambique, this seemed to stem from a very broad and publicly shared consciousness of economic dependency, which was deeply ingrained as a feature of political life. The following are excerpts selected from the interviews which reflect this underlying narrative, which was more broadly present in the sources used from the media:

First, Mozambique alone cannot do anything. It is not a financially viable state. This concept of sustainability must be thought through in terms of system over the years. Mozambique cannot live without help. Being in that position, you cannot do whatever you want: if you borrow from a bank, you have responsibilities.

Mozambique is sovereign because it has laws, it makes laws, but it is economically dependent on others. NGOs are very influential – they influence decision-making. This is because we are a poor country.

Of course, they [the partners] have a big influence. We are a very poor country, where 50-60% of the budget is paid for by them. It’s indisputable – they always put conditions.

554 A note on the Scandinavian donors, who have been present and relatively generous since independence as part of the solidarity / cooperante movement, but are now ostensibly harmonised with the other European and North American donors. Interestingly it is now they who seem to exercise the most commitment to withdrawing or reducing aid in the face of government inaction, as Sweden did following the Cardoso and Macuacua assassinations. In terms of the ‘liberal peace’ debate regarding Mozambique they occupy an interesting political location through being aligned with both the socialist government and now to an extent with the ‘liberal’ West.

555 Interview with head of national community development NGO, Maputo, August 21st 2009 (Appendix: 56).

556 Interview with former Ministry of Health official, Maputo, June 17th 2009 (Appendix: 13).

557 Interview with high school teacher, Maputo, June 17th 2009 (Appendix: 14).

558 Interview with newspaper editor, Beira, July 6th 2009 (Appendix: 24).
The partners at the moment have a heavy weight in Mozambique. This derives from the financial aid to the budget of the state – I don’t know exactly how much it is. But it gives them a great power, from those that give a small amount, to a big amount – it gives them disproportionate weight. But Mozambique, during many years Mozambique has lived off this. It has created a certain dependency – like a drug addict, it does not think whether it can live without the drug or with less of the drug.\textsuperscript{559}

These interviewees were from quite different walks of life, based in different sectors, jobs and cities. Although they had different ideas about what was entailed by Mozambique’s position as a ‘poor country’, it was an article of basic common sense that its economic and social situation was still defined first and foremost by its permanent lack of resources and the perceived need to get external funding. As such, this involved various kinds of responsibilities and conditionalities which would qualify it for this financial assistance. Seen in this light and from this perspective, the liberal peace’s biggest significance in concrete terms remains as a source of hard money in a context defined by a lack of money. It is this reality of financial dependency that weighs heavily and openly on the conscious experience of the liberal peace in Mozambique.

This reality poses interesting questions to the liberal peace literature, which has perhaps not seriously considered this as a fundamental aspect of the experience. Firstly, it raises questions as to whether the liberal peace has in fact mainly operated through the regulation of subjectivity and conduct, as suggested in Foucaultian interpretations of the relationship.\textsuperscript{560} From the interviews, it seemed relatively obvious that both political elites and others outside this elite were conscious of the strategic and transactional quality of many of the relationships, engendered first and foremost by the relations of economic inequality. Whilst the subtlety of the influence and its constraints were acknowledged, as noted, the very act of conscious acknowledgement seemed to demarcate the limits of this power, which was nonetheless ebbing.

Secondly, it also seemed to raise questions for the diagnosis of ‘post-conditionality’ that Harrison and others have made about ‘governance states’ such

\textsuperscript{559} Interview with head of national civil society organisation, Maputo, August 21\textsuperscript{st} 2009 (Appendix: 56).
\textsuperscript{560} Chapter Two, 55.
as Mozambique. In this narrative, as Duffield notes, states have essentially internalised and taken on the pursuit of the liberal project by themselves. Yet, as suggested by this closer narrative engagement, there is not just ‘post’-conditionality but often plain ‘old-fashioned’ explicit conditionality on many key issues – the donor strike over the elections in 2009 representing an important case in point. It may be that the conversation after the Paris Accords has become more respectful, and is undertaken through the idioms of ‘partnership’ and ‘co-operation’, but the relationship is not necessarily less contested than in the past.

Thirdly, the accusation of ‘co-optation’ that underpins Richmond’s and Chandler’s approach to ‘civil society’ in particular seems to require re-thinking in the light of what would constitute an ‘authentic’ political relationship in this context. There is evidence of creative and strategic alignment around funding sources – but in the context of relative economic disempowerment, are there other options? At very least to make this kind of judgement, it would be necessary to reflect on the plural nature of political consciousness as argued in the previous chapter, and to make a case for how more ‘authentic’ political goals should be articulated or pursued.

The inversion of perspective in the narrative of the transactionality of the liberal peace is therefore an important corrective to the Euro- and Western-centric terms of debate that have been established so far which tend to overstate the ideological irresistibility of a ‘Western’ political and economic paradigm under conditions of globalisation. Such a perspective makes sense only when our understanding of politics is disembedded from its material expressions and lived experience. From the perspective of a widespread consciousness of national poverty and insecure finance on the other hand, the liberal peace has been engaged primarily as a way of meeting economic needs whilst also resonating with some general political preoccupations.

II. Salary inequalities and capacity un-building

Where the last section dealt with transactionality at the level of the grand bargains struck between Mozambican political entities and international donors, this
section suggests that transactionality is also significant at personal and operational levels. Within the lived realities of the liberal peace, the inequalities of salaries, resourcing and compensation are of key importance in understanding the dynamics of its impact and significance. Here there are strong, marked differentials between those who work within the orbit of the aid industry and those who do not. Put crudely, salaries and benefits are both absolutely and relatively high when working for donor governments, multilateral organisations, their various agencies and projects. However, they are comparatively and absolutely low within the public sector, including central government and within society more broadly, where many who work with projects and programmes are volunteers who incur personal costs. This persistent disequilibrium results in a number of problems such as the ‘brain drain’, short-termism, insularity and fragmentation, as well as wider problems of divisiveness, demoralisation and alienation within public service. This disequilibrium means that there is a revolving door of skills and money across the public sector which prevents the accumulation of either within it, and in fact contributes to the overall dispossession of these resources. This aspect of the experience of intervention exceeds the structural account of neoliberal marketization that has dominated the critical accounts of the political economy of the liberal peace, but is nonetheless worthy of critical attention in the judgement and evaluation of intervention.

These dynamics can be illustrated effectively with reference to Mozambique’s health sector over the last twenty years or so. Public health is a particularly totemic aspect of the liberal peace’s development platform, seemingly representing the most urgent and ‘least political’ site of international aid interventions in the post-colonial world. It is one around which much fundraising and awareness raising takes place, and one which seems to transcend the messy politics of choosing between ideologies or interest groups. Rather, public health is understood to be a universal right and a key element of human welfare, an element emphasised as lacking in critiques such as that of Pugh. For Foucaultian critiques, public health is one of the most important instruments of biopower, which in modern society is the capacity to regulate life chances and bodies at the level of the
masses. In the context of understanding the character and significance of the liberal peace then, its effect on public health is of keen importance.

The health sector in Mozambique is also understood as one of its biggest areas of need which is associated with its poverty. The WHO reports that

The country’s burden of disease is largely a consequence of the high levels of poverty and a result of infectious and communicable diseases. Poor access to primary health care facilities has made it difficult for government efforts to deal effectively with the health situation. According to the Mozambique Poverty Reduction Strategic Program (PARPAII), only 36% of people have access to a health facility within 30 minutes of their homes. About 30% of the population are not able to access health services and only 50% have access to an acceptable level of health care.

Accordingly, the health sector is one of the biggest targets of aid across all channels, including bilateral and multilateral aid, NGO funding and large vertical funds, such as the President’s Emergency Plan For Aids Relief (PEPFAR), the President’s Malaria Initiative, the Clinton Foundation and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (hereafter, the Global Fund). An estimated 73% of the health budget is provided by foreign partners. Whilst the state is a major deliverer of core and primary services, various other providers also exist, often funded by charitable donations or vertical funds for organisations working outside government, such as ICAP, a US-based provider of HIV/AIDS-specific treatment.

At the same time, however, the health sector has been exposed to heavy fiscal tightening in the wake of Mozambique’s structural adjustment programme, with one study arguing that government spending on the health sector was halved in real terms between 1980 and 1990. Similar commitments to “prudent” macroeconomic policy have been maintained through Mozambique’s PARPAs (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers). In real terms, this has meant a fall in salaries for doctors and nurses working for the public sector, and a lack of investment in

563 Ibid.
university capacity to train more doctors.\textsuperscript{565} At the same time, however, the growth of other, better remunerated programmes and projects has attracted health workers out of the sector or away from their core duties, which has the effect of precisely inverting the stated goals of ‘capacity building’. An old joke told within government in Mozambique capturing this practice goes as follows:

The Minister of Health says, I was walking in the hospital, and one of my doctors says to me ‘do you have a secretary’s position’? I ask ‘do you need one’, and the doctor says ‘I would like to apply’.\textsuperscript{566}

In the joke, which presumably rings true for those familiar with the system, it is suggested that even secretaries in Ministries are better paid than doctors. This is due to a combination of public spending tightening within sectors and the relatively privileged position of those who work alongside international co-operation, which creates perverse incentives and absurd outcomes. The respondent who told it to me did so stating that the inability to pay salaries of staff was ‘corrupting the system’.\textsuperscript{567} This reading is corroborated by Pavignani and Durão, both former senior health sector workers, who have argued that the inability to pay salaries is one of the most critical weaknesses of the Mozambican health system.\textsuperscript{568} Former civil servants and doctors who had walked away from their government jobs to jobs in European development agencies and donor programmes argued, implicitly in their defence, that they were ultimately doing their same jobs but with another organisation, with better conditions.\textsuperscript{569} More alarmingly, large numbers of doctors have also left the country altogether in search of better salaries, with one estimate putting this rate at 75% of all doctors for Mozambique in the years 1999-2001.\textsuperscript{570}

\textsuperscript{566} Interview with Vice Minister of Planning and Development, Maputo, 19\textsuperscript{th} August 2009 (Appendix: 8).
\textsuperscript{567} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{569} Interview with doctor, US-government sponsored HIV/AIDS program, Nampula, 6\textsuperscript{th} August 2009, (Appendix: 38); Interview with agricultural specialist, European development agency, Maputo, 20\textsuperscript{th} August 2009, (Appendix: 55).
Pfeiffer’s ethnographic study on the impact of international co-operation in the health sector in central Mozambique illustrates the interaction dynamics in greater detail. He argues that due to the tightening of state health budgets, and the willingness of external projects to set up broad systems of incentives, including per diem payments and other benefits for participation well in excess of standard salaries, the provincial health system became significantly fragmented and incoherent, whilst remaining understaffed. This fragmentation led to public servants spending a high volume of their time managing co-operation programmes and projects or being at workshops, rather than managing the affairs of the health service, for those who stayed within it. For health professionals who managed to leave and join an NGO, however, Pfeiffer calculates that the value of the salary and benefits could be up to twenty times what could be earned within the state, meaning that even this short term work could easily become more attractive than long-term work with job security in the state. Although many donors signed up to the ‘Kaya Kwanga’ commitments promising to align remuneration with the state and not hire qualified people out of the Ministry in 2000, this practice was still widespread in 2009 at the time of the author’s visits, when in one instance eight senior people were hired simultaneously out of the Ministry of Health by a single donor to run a new health programme.

Similar dynamics could also be seen in the agricultural sector, where a large proportion of the staff who had been trained with donors’ pooled funding under the first capacity-building ProAgri scheme subsequently left the Ministry to work for donor programmes or in the Ministry of Planning and Development. As such, any benefit or subsidy which had arisen out of Ministry staff being better trained was often soon transferred out of the Ministry, and towards the donor agencies, as it had

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572 Ibid., 730.  
573 Ibid., 732.  
574 Ibid., 734.  
575 Interview with head of co-operation, European Development agency, August 22nd 2011 (Appendix: 57).  
576 This is pooled funding for the Ministry, the majority of which was earmarked for 'capacity building' of Ministry personnel, but which also pays for agricultural staff in the provinces as well as supplies for farmers.  
577 Interview with agricultural specialist, European development agency, 20th August 2009 (Appendix: 55)
been in health. Good technicians also found work better remunerated with the regional offices of development agencies.\textsuperscript{578} These dynamics suggest that despite seeming to successfully spend money on ‘capacity building’ within the state, donor agencies and state employees were simultaneously transferring this capacity away from the state once ‘built’.

This is to assume that ‘capacity building’ exercises are successful in building capacity, around which there is a reasonable degree of scepticism both within government and outside it. In particular, concerns are articulated over the imbalances between ‘training’ and actually carrying out any work. A recent Minister of Health, known for his combative attitude with donors as well as his populist politics, tapped into this scepticism when he effectively banned Ministry officials from participating in various donor seminars and workshops as part of a broader crackdown on corruption in the sector.\textsuperscript{579} The student who reported this argued that these workshops did not have any benefit but ‘they were just happening to pay the teachers, to pay the organisers, to buy some water, but they didn’t add anything’.\textsuperscript{580} This reading particularly resonated with my own interpretation of a five-day health leadership training workshop in Maputo funded by USAID which I attended part of, in which religious leaders from around the country were taught how to prioritise activities using a flipchart by American management scientists, as part of leadership skills which could be used to spread messages about malaria. As part of this workshop, a short video of a dog walking with only two legs appearing on The Oprah Winfrey Show was used to convey the idea that problems were simply ‘challenges’ to be understood and overcome with the right approach.\textsuperscript{581} Yet when I followed up with one of the leaders who attended in the weeks after the programme in their home town in another province, it emerged that the lack of basic transport

\textsuperscript{578} I interviewed at least three former government agricultural technicians who had moved into working with donor agencies (Appendix: 26, 33, 55).
\textsuperscript{579} Diary notes, June 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2009. This was reported by a young student who reads the press but I have not been able to verify it elsewhere. It is however in keeping with Garrido’s style and reputation as someone who was keen to stamp out graft in the Ministry. A blog post from last year I believe reflects broad public (not collegial) attitudes about him, acknowledging that he is a deeply divisive character: Castande, J. B. A. (2010). Paulo Ivo Garrido. Reflectindo sobre Mocambique
\textsuperscript{580} Diary notes, June 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2009.
\textsuperscript{581} Observation notes, Hotel Turismo, Maputo June 8\textsuperscript{th} 2009. More information about the programme can be found at Management Sciences for Health. The Challenge Model:
for their network of priests was a major factor preventing the spreading of anti-malaria messages, let alone distributing mosquito nets, which was not provided for in the programme.\textsuperscript{582} The priest wryly noted that he might use the ‘challenge model’ to re-deploy some of the training funds accordingly. In Maputo, another leader of a governance-focused NGO also problematized the value of capacity building workshops more generally, arguing:

So of course, when they do the evaluations of these projects and programmes, everyone is satisfied… Everyone talks about doing ‘capacitação’ – but what have they done in the last 20-30 years? People that come to deliver this are not appropriate – can you imagine taking a Mozambican to the UK to teach them? This is not capacity… And still people lack the resources to implement the programmes.\textsuperscript{583}

Whilst it is difficult to generalise definitively about the value that is added by the multiple and different ‘knowledge transfer’ programmes which are laid on by the liberal peace, there are clear examples of them being perceived and experienced at times as resource intensive, under-implemented and not always necessarily appropriate. In particular, the weighting given to resources for conducting the training rather than actually carrying out the work seemed particularly mysterious to many. Similar questions were raised about the value of scoping studies:

I feel that donors don’t really want to reduce poverty. We started with PROAGRI in 1995. There were millions spent on consultant studies – four studies, but if you see how much is going to the farmer, it’s just 25% - I say why? Each donor wants to do the study, and to use the money of PROAGRI. And the amount of money they pay for the study is unacceptable. They always want the evaluation, and they contract out – and how much do they support? But the support for the farmers itself, they are not getting a lot. With one study, you can buy ten tractors, can really solve some problems.\textsuperscript{584}

The inequalities in salaries, the dubious character of many capacity building mechanisms and the lack of implementation resources are particularly interesting in terms of reflecting on the liberal peace as a supposed vector of social and political

\textsuperscript{582} Interview with priest from anti-malaria network, Nampula, August 6\textsuperscript{th} 2009 (Appendix: 39)
\textsuperscript{583} Interview with director of national civil society organisation, August 17\textsuperscript{th} 2009 (Appendix: 51)
\textsuperscript{584} Interview with senior agricultural technician, Beira, July 7\textsuperscript{th} 2009 (Appendix: 26).
transformation, or ‘mission civilisatrice’.\textsuperscript{585} In particular, they indicate the ultimate fragility of these transformation endeavours – rather than leading to the accumulation of human resources, they can lead to their depletion, of course necessitating further capacity building. This dynamic of competition between interveners and the host state not just for personnel and their time but for aid resource spending power means that in practice ‘transformation’ is itself deferred infinitely into the future. In Césaire’s frame of reference, colonialism’s tendencies towards inhuman behaviour in the name of humanity was a key characteristic of its alienating nature. Analogously, the active depletion of human resources by a liberal peace which legitimates itself in the name of improving them can be seen as a source of alienation in Mozambique.

III. Consumption and alienation

Of the money that does arrive with the liberal peace, however, it is clear that a significant quantity of it is consumed within the boundaries of the expatriate community itself.\textsuperscript{586} Although this is in many ways an obvious point to make, these patterns of consumption are important in thinking about the way in which the liberal peace is experienced and its effect on the politics of intervention, particularly if, as I have suggested, the liberal peace is characterised by conscious transactionality in significant ways. It matters if academic supporters of the liberal peace, such as Paris, contend that an important aspect of it is that resources flow from rich countries to poor ones. It is also important from the perspective of thinking about the liberal peace’s own legitimating narratives of benefiting the poorest and improving the quality of their government in order to secure the future. In terms of thinking about the experiential dimensions of the political economy then, these are crucial dynamics for critique to consider.

It is difficult to measure the quantitative extent of this ‘internal’ industry consumption in any accurate way for a number of reasons. In the first place, these

\textsuperscript{585} Paris, ‘International peacebuilding and the mission civilisatrice’
\textsuperscript{586} The question of extravagance is a long-standing critique about the aid industry, a version of which was popularised by Graham Hancock’s polemic investigation Lords of Poverty: Hancock, G., (1989), Lords of Poverty, London: Mandarin.
issues are rarely addressed by the industry, even within the range of monitoring and evaluation reports produced to assess the effectiveness of programmes and projects. It seems to be a starting assumption that whatever is spent within the context of the programme does in fact contribute to achieving its objectives, although when this expenditure is broken down even slightly it is less clearly the case.\textsuperscript{587} There seems to be a substantial degree of variation in internal consumption rates as a proportion of the resource, as well as the proportion which is ‘tied’ explicitly to the use of goods or services from donor countries. It is also a subject which can be socially awkward to bring up in the context of an environment where personal compensation and lifestyles are acutely implicated in the discussion. Furthermore, there is a common interest of donors and recipients to avoid critical public discussion on this front, even if that only consists in protecting co-operation funding in general rather than particular careers and organisations.

High expatriate staff costs and salaries feature heavily in the landscape of the liberal peace in Mozambique. Indeed, they are now a highly visible and universal cultural cliché of the contemporary aid environment, although they are rarely interpreted in terms of their impact on the system as a whole. Pfeiffer offers a neat example of conditions in the health sector in Mozambique for many expatriates:

With the exception of two agencies, expatriates were paid from US$1000 to US$6000 per month, usually tax-free. Most agencies provided housing, private access to project cars, and funding for personal vacations. One engineer working for a European agency calculated that at the end of his four-year contract he would have saved nearly US$300,000.\textsuperscript{588}

\textsuperscript{587} As an example, all running costs associated with DFID Mozambique, including salaries, housing costs, office space etc are counted as programme expenditure and part of the aid given by Britain to Mozambique rather than DFID’s own administrative expenditure. See National Audit Office (2010) ‘The work of the Department for International Development in 2009-10 and its priorities for reform’, Briefing for the House of Commons International Development Committee, London: NAO. The philosophical and accounting difficulties which arise from trying to separate strictly these costs from others are covered in McWha, I., (2011), ‘The roles of, and relationships between, expatriates, volunteers, and local development workers’, Development in Practice, 21:1, 29-40

\textsuperscript{588} Pfeiffer, ‘International NGOs and primary health care’, 730.
Of course, there are important variations in this package between permanent, consultant and volunteer staff,\(^{589}\) the ability of various organisations to pay salaries, and there is increasing awareness within the aid community about the use of project or programme funds as personal subsidies. Nonetheless, there is a relatively common standard of remuneration, and of living, which is likely in excess of what these workers would be able to achieve in their countries of origin. In project-based assistance, costs associated with supporting expatriates through salaries, housing and transport can consume up to 50% of the budget, although in programme aid it is likely to be less. Rentals in the neighbourhoods in Maputo where expatriate workers generally live are high, pushed up by the large numbers of aid workers and their respective housing allowances.\(^{590}\) As an example, the US State Department’s published 2011 housing allowance for each worker based in Maputo is between $28700 and $39500 per year.\(^{591}\) For temporary visiting staff in Mozambique, there is a per diem allowance of up to $238 for hotels and accommodation in Maputo and $220 elsewhere.\(^{592}\) Salaries, beginning at $27431, rising to $129517, are also subject to a 25% hardship boost and a 35% cost of living allowance.\(^{593}\) Published data on UN pay scales indicates similar levels of pay and benefits.\(^{594}\) This compares to a 2010 national average annual income of $410 USD in Mozambique, or $34 per month.\(^{595}\) The average annual income in Maputo City can however be over ten times higher ($1,109) than in the poorest provinces ($96), where the majority are well below the international poverty line.\(^{596}\) A doctor working for the government can expect to receive $330 per month which works out as $3960 per year.\(^{597}\) As noted

\(^{589}\) McWha, ‘The roles of, and relationships between, expatriates, volunteers, and local development workers’.


above, Mozambican nationals who work within the aid industry can earn much more than their governmental counterparts, although nowhere near as much as their expatriate counterparts. Pfeiffer notes that in various locations in Mozambique, these economic disparities are physically manifested by the construction of housing and social compounds for aid workers which keep them separated from host societies.

One effect of the vast differentials in rewards, beyond the obvious constraints it puts on project and programme resources, is the demoralisation and alienation experienced by workers within and others outside the aid industry in response to this. This was made explicit in a number of the interviews conducted for this study, although was not discussed in others. In many cases, these sharp and seemingly arbitrary inequalities were treated as part of the unspoken social and visual landscape – the terrain upon which aid relationships simply occurred. Yet elsewhere it is articulated. One of the more open indications of this alienation emerged in discussion with a well-qualified and experienced technician working for a European development agency in Sofala province:

Another thing is that local workers and international workers for an organisation have a big difference in contractual conditions. They treat people as nationals and internationals – and what is the justification? They say we base the pay on what is in Europe, and of course there are differences between the European countries, but that is nothing compared to the difference here… they treat people differently[…]

MS: Do you sense any resentment amongst national workers for this differentiation?

[Interviewee]: No. What happens… well, yes, they do give a lot of money… I just want them to justify it, to give clear rules about roles, boundaries. When basic needs are met, it’s ok… of course I am going to do my job, but if I ask, between me and you, what’s the difference?

And then, that is the way that [my employer] looks at me, but then my other colleagues elsewhere are also looking at me to see what benefits they can get from me… but this distances me from other colleagues.

They only want to work with me for benefits, for trips… to Europe, they ask…

Another interviewee within an NGO reflected

on the meaning of corruption. As an example, he talks about the costs spent on assistance projects in keeping workers in cars and houses. He says he knew a Norwegian project, which was something like 3.5 million euros, which had ten cars. As another example, he says that he knows a couple, who run an HIV/AIDS organisation in Maputo, whose place is worth 7000 per month. *So what is corruption*, he asks. *Who are the criminals?* He says that the problem of wasted money is a very big one – people are buying the most expensive models when lesser ones would do.

In a recent long-term research project sponsored by DfID and the ESRC, organisational psychologists Carr, McWha, MacLachlan and Furnham explored the impact of the dual pay structure within the aid industry in six different international locations, finding that the socially unacceptable discrepancies between expatriate and national staff in aid organisations led to a sense of injustice and demotivation, which could lead to high staff turnover and emigration. In terms of capacity building, they interpret this as an inhibitor to capacity development, although it might also be interpreted as an active drain on organisational capacity when it is understood that aid resources are poured into training these staff. From the above discussion, it is suggested that the demotivation emerging from the dual pay structure is just one aspect of the deeper dynamics of alienation relating to the workings of the liberal peace.

These expenditure patterns, which seem to indicate how the aid industry values itself in comparison to its host society, reflect the very opposite of the stated intentions of international aid as being in favour of poverty reduction and democratisation. The expatriate-local distinction maintained in pay and conditions

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600 Interview with agricultural specialist, European development agency, Beira, 16th July 2009 (Appendix: 33)
601 Verbatim diary notes recording conversation with senior industrial technician, NGO, Nampula, August 10th 2009 (Appendix: 41), emphasis added.
602 Defined by ‘shared norms of acceptability’.
maintain a boundary of social exclusion and alienation, which is strongly policed on
grounds of nationality, which in this context often corresponds to race. On these
terms and conditions, expatriates are reckoned to be worth around fifty or more
times as much as national workers to the success of the liberal peace project. This
sharp division in entitlements and reward clearly reinforces rather than undermines a
differentiated understanding of human life in the practices of intervention – what
Duffield calls the ‘insured’ and ‘uninsured’ populations. Yet these are differences
which are not necessarily considered legitimate by those deemed ‘uninsured’.
Indeed they are a cause for resentment amongst those who know themselves – as
professionals and as humans – to be the equals of those who are instituted as their
superiors. In line with Césaire’s critique of colonialism, this very obvious kind of
hypocrisy needs to be articulated as a key part of an anti-colonial critical project.

IV. Public responses to dependency

Reflecting on the changing donor environment, journalist Marcelo Mosse
has written an open letter to the Chinese President, in which the meaning of
Mozambique’s financial situation are spelled out:

We are poor but we are not blind, and we like ourselves! Because of this,
over the years, we have criticized the Western donors for the negative
aspects that their "cooperation" implied; we criticized the destruction of
the cashew industry; the re-indebtedness of ‘technical assistance’; the
excessively rigorous controls on public spending; the (disastrous)
imposed privatisations; inappropriate technologies; the so-called "tied
aid" (which China promotes today); the project implementation units;
the disempowerment of the state, the inefficient and unending capacity
building etc…

A lot of money, credit and donations have been spent on these processes.
We could be better, of course. We’re not. However, the country has
changed its face, we have more schools, hospitals, better
communications, roads, maturing institutions, etc.. In short, despite the
negative aspects of such cooperation, there are many visible gains. Yet
despite this, we remain dependent.604

August 30th 2011.
Returning to Césaire’s critique of colonialism, which emphasised the ways in which the colonial world *materialises for the colonised*, in Mosse’s letter we see emergent in the experience of the liberal peace an acute sense of both the structural conditions of poverty which set the terrain of engagement, as well as the various disjunctures between propaganda and practice which produce forms of alienation from the system. In particular, the patterns of incentives and remuneration around which the system is built appear to encourage the exact opposite of donors’ own discourses of sustainable development and social change; instead encouraging waste, introspection and capacity removal in the public sector. A central dynamic underpinning this is a hierarchy of how people and their labour are valued in terms of the central ideas, projects and living conditions between expatriate and national workers.

The consciousness of unequal transactionality that underpins the engagement of Mozambique with its donors open up the issue of the political significance of the liberal peace to a deeper re-examination. In the critical debates thus far, the principal framings have focused on the character of Western ideology, engagement with its cultural ‘others’, the issue of state sovereignty and the structures of development. These centre the political questions around the extent to which intervened societies do or do not match up to ‘European’ expectations of politics – specifically whether it represents an ideological transformation, the denial of sovereignty, a form of neo-imperialism or liberal governmentality.

Carlos Castel-Branco observes that this kind of preoccupation has given rise to a debate about the ‘ownership’ of development, which he argues could mean one of a number of things, from the formulation of policy to the predictability of finance. Yet, as he notes, none of the conceptions of ‘ownership’ – or, for our purposes, ‘sovereignty’ in the liberal peace debate – sufficiently engage with historical realities nor the political economy of multi-dimensional aid dependency. 605 These conditions foreground the myriad relations of long-term debt, dispossession and historical inequality that underpin relations between Mozambique

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and the rest of the world. On this reading, it is not so much that sovereignty is now ‘re-interpreted’ under neoliberal doctrine – it is perhaps that it was always problematic under these extremes of material inequality. These are the limits of the political-theory approaches of Richmond and Chandler which try to recapture interpersonal ‘empathy’ or inter-state ‘sovereignty’ without attention to the material grounds of these relations. Yet these grounds are abundantly obvious from the perspective of those who operate within them from the less wealthy side of the relationship. They are also grounds which critiques need to reflect on seriously in terms of thinking about the ethics of the global distributions of wealth.

This is not to suggest a materially deterministic account of the politics of the liberal peace. It is to re-assert the usefulness of the material context of engagement as a basis for critical understanding, and in particular to highlight the political strategies that might be pursued under these conditions. That said, it also asks us to re-evaluate the ways in which the wealthy also participate politically and attempt to manage the epistemic terrain of engagement, particularly regarding what are understood as the ‘appropriate expectations’ of reward and regard for Africans and Europeans respectively.

Further, the chapter highlights the precariousness of the ‘ethics’ of the liberal peace under conditions of personal enrichment and state capacity evacuation: that is, the hypocrisy and counter-productive character of practices. This allows us to take a step back from the emptiness of technical policy discussions about governance, as well as the debate about ‘Westernisation’, when it is obvious that rules and norms may not really apply. This is not to say that discourse is merely cynical – indeed this is not at all the case as many interveners are themselves convinced of its value. But it suggests that there is an alternative level upon which we can make ethical judgements about intervention which are not conditioned by an acceptance of its initial set-up or frame of reference.

Taken together these are levels upon which indignation and even anger – important dimensions of anti-colonial critique – are part of the appropriate critical responses to intervention. To avoid talking about these dysfunctional aspects of intervention in favour of cultural difference or the production of liberal subjectivity
is to miss some central critical dynamics of the human experiences of intervention as well as its structural dysfunctions – it is perhaps analogous to a discussion of colonialism without racism. To reconstruct subjecthood is precisely to bring the discussion of intervention towards the experiences of its subjects, and to make it legitimate to ask these kinds of questions and raise these kinds of objections. That they have been raised more broadly, and in a variety of times and places including in donor-requested and funded project evaluations does not diminish their importance from an anti-colonial perspective. Again, analogously, many colonial administrators themselves made notes about the various dysfunctions of colonialism, including the negative effects of its policies and disciplinary practices. In reconstructing the subjecthood of the colonised as a site of political engagement however, anti-colonial thought argued that these were forms of violation that should be appropriate grounds for critical anger. In reconstructing subjecthood in the critiques of contemporary interventions, albeit around issues that have been long-acknowledged as problems, it is possible to argue that these issues of vastly differentiated distributions and entitlements of wealth are legitimate grounds for questioning.

Conclusions

Césaire’s framework underpins the importance of identifying and articulating hypocrisy in the world system as a means of deconstructing problematic forms of authority and order, and reconstructing subjecthood. In looking at the stark contradictions embedded in the liberal peace – for example between health service provision and the suppression of public sector wages – critics are able to challenge not just its status as a ‘liberal’ or ‘Western’ project but its undeserving claim to superior bureaucratic and political functioning. From the perspective of economic activity in Mozambique, much of this dysfunctionality seems to be facilitated by the personal and institutional conditions of economic and political

606 There is a strange kind of appropriateness in reflecting on Césaire’s powerful Discourse on Colonialism in the present day, in 2011. Just as he argued that Europe only reacted to fascism when it was on its doorstep, having tolerated its practice in the colonies for so long, if he were alive today, watching the indignados in Greece and Spain, he might have argued that Europe was only now reacting to the effects of inequality and anti-sovereign neoliberal austerity on its doorstep, having tolerated it in former colonies for decades.
inequality that shapes the experience of the liberal peace, which naturalises and routinizes repetition, overlap, insularity; particular forms of accumulation and auto-consumption, and the differentiation between types of human worth. The multi-dimensional and situated approach to critique pursued here exposes these issues particularly clearly and articulates them as sites of alienation.

In the next chapter, the question of ‘who consumes’, in a literal sense will be posed again to think about the realities of agriculture and food production under the liberal peace, where peasant farmers and their representatives have aimed to endorse and maintain multiple strategies for protecting the production of foodstuffs, against the vicissitudes of agricultural policies of both donors and government. As such, an account of the distinctive historical, political and economic relations of the peasantry points towards the potential inadequacy of social insurance responses to the problems of the liberal peace.
Chapter Eight

Peasant ambivalence and the liberal peace

The politics of the belly takes on a different focus when we turn to looking at the lives of the peasantry under the liberal peace, for the majority of whom consumption *qua* eating has not been made much easier. For critiques of the liberal peace that attach blame to neoliberal economic policy, this is of course to be expected as the result of the predatory capitalism it promotes. In particular, this is blamed for disrupting the interventions of the developmental state in the Third World. 607

At the root of these approaches is the insight that the liberal peace is systemic in impact and structural in its origins, being closely bound up with the smoother functioning of capitalism as a whole. For critical approaches such as those of Duffield and Pugh, one of the systemic failures associated with neoliberalism is identified as the general failure to provide social insurance, welfare and safety nets for the masses of the poor. 608 Duffield argues that as a result in many cases NGOs have been sub-contracted and governmentalized to represent the interests of donors, as in northern Mozambique. 609 In their projects, Duffield argues that these NGOs maintain a framing of the African peasantry as being undifferentiated and self-reliant. By seeming to operate at the level of population, they are thus understood to ‘render it visible’ for capture by the global market. 610 This fits with the idea of the liberal peace as a political ‘project’ with particular ends, and driven to meet the needs of a broader capitalist system. 611 For Pugh, the liberal peace also represents the attempt to extend and integrate poorer economies into the system of global capitalism, underpinned by the neoliberal orthodoxy of the Washington and post-

608 Chapter Two, 57-58.
610 Ibid., 91.
611 Chapter Two, 57.
Washington consensuses.\textsuperscript{612} He builds on Duffield’s argument that the liberal peace is a particular system of trusteeship for containing and regulating the ‘surplus’ populations that capitalism produces in order to reproduce itself.\textsuperscript{613} Importantly, both argue – Pugh explicitly and Duffield implicitly – that forms of social insurance provided by the state are the primary alternative on offer to neoliberalism.

Whilst these approaches are highly insightful, the structural critique of the liberal peace as the instrument of neoliberalism nonetheless misses several important parts of the picture, which would be important to capture when developing an anti-colonial critique. In the first place, as discussed in Chapter Three, the framing tends to exclude, by narrative omission, consideration of those ‘governed’ as subjects with historical experience, particular social conditions and agency. As such it sustains a Eurocentric framing of world politics which, as previously argued, is a problematic analytic and ethical platform for anti-imperial critical approaches to adopt. Second, it obscures what might emerge from these experiences to complement and/or disrupt our understanding of political order under the liberal peace. In the previous chapter, an engagement with the details of the political economy of the liberal peace pointed towards a different kind of understanding of the politics of intervention – one which appreciated the conscious but alienating character of the transactional relationship.

Looking back to the discussion in Chapter Three, whereas Césaire pursued a strategy of political inversion to discredit and challenge the grand narratives of colonialism, Cabral emphasised the need to look beyond this and towards the experiences of society as a whole, in order to grasp the most important aspects of the colonial political economy.\textsuperscript{614} This chapter pursues a situated engagement with the historical experiences of the peasantry in Mozambique as a means of exploring the significance of the liberal peace for living conditions and political engagement amongst the majority. As such, this is a way of reconstructing the subjecthood of the peasantry within our discussions. The narrative suggests that many of the issues relating to the strategies and conditions of the peasantry have a longer tradition than

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{612} Pugh, ‘The political economy of peacebuilding’
\bibitem{613} Duffield, Development, Security, 9-10.
\bibitem{614} Chapter Three, 104.
\end{thebibliography}
the advent of neoliberal economic policy – to some extent they revolve around more basic contestations of political authority and well-being. The reminder then that the liberal peace is a particular mode of governance embedded in longer-standing relationships is useful for reflection on its overall significance when reconstructing the peasantry as historical and political subjects. Most critically, this problematizes the imagination of a more interventionist state as the necessary response to the liberal peace given its contested history in Mozambique. As will be discussed towards the end of the chapter, peasant representatives have themselves articulated alternative visions of political and market relations which are more closely connected to their experiences of political being and conditions of production. These may constitute a better point of departure for a critical alternative.

In the chapter, much of the primary research and some of the other sources on which I draw relate to the northern province of Nampula, which contains a sizeable proportion of the country’s rural smallholders, although relevant secondary sources relating to other parts of the country are also used. As such, although the analysis is broadly relevant to rural experiences within Mozambique, it has been impossible to capture the full diversity of this experience, both regionally and in terms of socioeconomic differentiation within the peasantry. What follows is still a useful illustration of some of the relations between peasants and the state in terms of the overall argument, but with an acknowledgement that some of the specific details may not resonate everywhere. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of why an account of the peasantry has been an important site of debate in the politics of intervention. I then go on to explore aspects of the pre- and post-war rural political economy and discuss the ways in which these reflect ambivalent relations between the state and peasantry, expressed recently in the ‘food sovereignty’ movement. Finally, the relevance of this discussion for the critical debate on the liberal peace is further elaborated.
I. The significance of the peasantry in political debate

The majority of people in Mozambique – around 70-80% – are defined academically and administratively as being ‘rural’ populations. Of this population, 99% are defined as being agricultural ‘smallholders’ in state surveys, meaning they own less than ten hectares of land, ten cattle, fifty goats, pigs or sheep, and 5000 chickens. Whilst any substantive account of social and political life in Mozambique must, surely, somehow account for the fate of the camponeses/peasantry, a decolonising account of the same must emphasise the distinctive quantitative and qualitative significance of this for our understanding of the system as a totality. Quantitatively, the peasantry constitute a majority in Mozambique in terms of the overall population and citizenry, and as such their significance should not be understood as marginal but fundamental to the societal experience of the liberal peace.

In reflecting on the liberal peace in Mozambique in particular, the tense and complex history between the modernising state elites over time and the peasantry must problematise any nostalgia for a ‘return’ to the statist paradigm as implied in critiques of the liberal peace such as those of Duffield and Pugh. Moreover, this form of provision has itself often been contradictory in its practices and effects. As discussed in Chapter Five, there are important continuities as well as changes in the structures of rule from the colonial through to the present period. For the peasantry, these have given rise over time to diverse strategies of organisation, production and being, some of which involve and implicate the representatives of the liberal peace. Indeed, like previous forms of rule, the state in the liberal peace has also shown some limited signs of responsiveness (or retrenchment) when faced with the realities of trying to actually effect particular kinds of social transformation. Yet, an often overlooked feature of the relationship are the tensions associated with its interventions into the rural economy, as well as its tendencies to reinforce particular distributions of wealth and power, without which the responses and strategies that

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616 However, an important issue of note is limits of relevance of the category of ‘peasant’ under conditions where emigration and return is a common phenomenon, either to cities or to neighbouring countries, seasonally or over the course of many years.
have emerged cannot be well understood. As will be expanded upon below, these are well-documented in the various social histories and ethnographic studies of rural populations in Mozambique over the years.617

Before this, it is worth noting that the peasantry in Mozambique are of broad and substantial political importance to many parties within the liberal peace debate. Mozambique’s major political ‘success’ with the donor community is often represented through the ubiquitously-cited statistic showing a fall in absolute poverty from 69% to 54% from 1996-7 to 2003-4.618 This number became emblematic of the potential of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers as a ‘post-Washington’ policy instrument to a much wider global audience, re-legitimising the role of the IFIs, UN organisations and European/North American donors both within sub-Saharan Africa and further afield after criticisms had been levelled at the impact of development policy.619

In addition, recent moves towards providing aid as direct Budget Support to the Government and away from project aid have been closely tied to the successful implementation of the PRSP, which is summarised by the statistical drop in absolute poverty. Furthermore, the statistics on absolute poverty reduction have been an increasingly important part of the Government’s own electoral manifesto in recent years as its post-independence and post-war popularity has started to wane.620 Constituting the majority of the ‘absolutely poor’, the fate of the peasantry in Mozambique is thus intimately tied to the political standing of the post-war aid architecture and government ‘performance’ as a whole. This is not least because recent studies have suggested that much of Mozambique’s feted growth and poverty

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617 Many of these studies have been influenced by Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven; London, Yale University Press.


620 This can be seen in the 2009 Frelimo manifesto, amongst other places. Retrieved on September 5th 2011 from http://www.frelimo-online.org
reduction in the post-war period has been revealed to be the result of increased consumption and production in rural areas.\textsuperscript{621}

On the other hand, the experience of rural populations has also played an important role in galvanising and generating much opposition to the liberal peace in general and the IFIs in particular. This mainly emerged around the notorious World Bank intervention into the cashew processing industry in the late 1990s, which led to the losses of thousands of jobs on the basis of a weakly formulated but heavily enforced policy of raw cashew export liberalisation.\textsuperscript{622} The episode became a ‘cause célèbre’ in the campaign against the enforcement of neoliberal ideology on the international stage. It also became an important episode in the ongoing national debate within Mozambique about economic policy and the role of the IFIs in the country as a whole, which had a clear influence on the bilateral and multilateral relationships between donors and government.\textsuperscript{623} In these global debates, Mozambican peasants have been repeatedly invoked as silent witnesses to the strengths and weakness of neoliberal policy.

However, these headlines have not always lent themselves to a wider appreciation of how Mozambican peasants over time have seen and managed their embedded relationships within the state and the market, and what the implications are of this for thinking about the liberal peace. In particular, the various contradictions, accommodations and conflicts surrounding the politics of agriculture suggest that a more interventionist state is not the only or obvious answer to the problems laid at the door of the liberal peace. Below I will suggest that there are important historic dynamics of alienation which put into context the ways in which the peasantry have responded to the liberal peace, with a mixture of enthusiasm,


ambivalence and instrumentalisation, as well as with alternative possible responses to the problems of risk and reward.

II. Who eats? Historical relations between peasants and the state

The complex and tense relations between rural people and the colonial state are well explored in Isaacman’s detailed social history of cotton production. In colonial times, the regime forced large numbers of peasants – officially 750,000, but likely involving more – to cultivate quotas of cotton for the large concessionary companies to feed the Portuguese textiles industry. This regime was policed by colonial officials, company officials and native policemen (sipais), as well as senior members of various communities wishing to avoid punishment. Although all forms of colonial labour relations encountered some degree of resistance, cotton production was particularly unpopular with much the peasantry for a number of reasons. In the first place, it was a non-edible monocrop, meaning that land could not be simultaneously used for food or other crop production. Secondly, it was deeply labour intensive, requiring around 140-180 days per year per hectare. Sowing and harvesting periods often clashed with food production cycles, leading to widespread famine and food insecurity in many regions. In order to deal with this, many began to switch their food sources to manioc (cassava), which required less tending but was less nutritious. Eventually, some colonial officials required peasants to grow manioc in order to allow them to survive long enough to grow cotton. Other forms of wage labour were also disrupted. Beyond these particular issues, more general problems prevailed: prices to African producers were persistently depressed at the market compared to settler producers and the land on which it was to be grown was often far from homes and food-growing plots. Nonetheless, in many cases further economic differentiation occurred as a result of the colonial structures of labour and exchange, and as such a small minority of farmers who had

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625 Ibid., 1.
626 Ibid., 6.
627 Ibid., 168.
628 Ibid., 165-166.
629 Ibid., 112.
630 Ibid., 54.
escaped forced labour and accumulated capital abroad were able to run relatively successful cotton and other enterprises on their return.\textsuperscript{631} Yet, for the majority, argues Isaacman, cotton was “the mother of poverty”.\textsuperscript{632}

Despite the pressing needs of the metropolitan economy, and the attempts to police the production of cotton closely with law readily backed up by physical force in both fields and markets, many peasants sought and found strategies of evading the forced production of cotton at all its stages. These included simulating poor soils by roasting the cotton seeds so they would not grow, delaying planting and sowing to reduce yield, refusing to sow, throwing the crop away once harvested, selling it over the border for higher prices, adding foreign objects to the marketed bags, temporarily hiding, migrating out of the country and so on.\textsuperscript{633} This risky sabotage was often carried out collectively and collaboratively amongst communities, constituting deliberate strategies of subversion. Isaacman argues that it is likely that these acts of defiance were an important factor in bringing down the forced cotton regime in 1961.\textsuperscript{634} These were acts which from the perspectives of the peasants were ways both of minimising the disruption that cotton growing caused to personal survival and social life, and of more broadly disrupting and rejecting the role of the Portuguese and their representatives in their lives. However, there is no way of accurately measuring or estimating the extent of such resistance as much would have gone unreported. Nonetheless, he argues that the marked difference in productivity levels between cotton production in Mozambique and elsewhere in the region may be an indication of this.\textsuperscript{635}

Isaacman’s fascinating study, drawn from a range of non-elite life histories and colonial documents, is particularly important in terms of developing an understanding of the experience of governance of rural populations through the agricultural economy. The core tension in the political economy, between producing crops for food or producing non-food surpluses for exchange is an important theme. Cotton’s disruption of the food supply was a major cause of peasant resistance. Yet

\textsuperscript{631} Ibid., 181-184.
\textsuperscript{632} Ibid., 243.
\textsuperscript{633} Ibid., 205-237.
\textsuperscript{634} Ibid., 242.
\textsuperscript{635} Ibid.,
also important is the discussion of peasants’ consciousness of the nature of their exploitation, made explicit through subversive songs sung in front of colonial agents who could not understand them. Within these songs are shared accounts of the effect of cotton growing on one’s life, including the loneliness brought on by cotton-related desertion or the migration of a spouse for wage labour.

The analysis of peasant strategies and agency is especially revealing. In particular, the narrative emphasises the fact that many of these strategies of coping and subversion were made possible through the sheer absence, lack of knowledge and under-resourcing of the colonial administration in the vast countryside, even with a system of more knowledgeable sipais and some authoritative régulos undertaking the actual work of enforcement. As such, even forced labour relations and political structures were necessarily embedded in and constrained by the physical terrain of the environment and its sparse infrastructure, which to a certain extent limited the ability of central structures to project their authority and will. This was simultaneously a political and a practical problem for the state brought on by distance and ‘illegibility’, as well as the creative agency of the peasantry. This distance was well understood by both the peasantry and by the state, who had increasingly sought to bring rural figures of authority onto the payroll.

The attempts of the Frelimo state to govern and produce in the countryside in the post-independence period (1975-) suggested that they had both learned and not learned from the colonial experience. As mentioned in Chapter Five, in the later years of the colonial regime, officials had attempted to villagise the rural populations in order to frustrate the pro-independence guerrillas and govern the recalcitrant peasants more closely – a tactic also used by the colonial government during the war for independence. Frelimo’s mass programmes of post-independence villagisation suggested that they had also understood the need to render the peasantry governable in order to make it produce the surpluses necessary to gain foreign exchange, as well as to ‘modernise’ living conditions through

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636 These songs are discussed in Vail, L and White, L., Capitalism and colonialism, 340-358.
637 Ibid., 350.
638 Isaacman, Cotton is the mother of poverty, 60-1.
639 Coelho, ‘State resettlement policies’. 
providing local health and education facilities.\footnote{Ibid.} This need for control and visibility was of course heightened by the war and fear of peasant infiltration by Renamo rebels. However, it also played into the grand visions discussed in Chapter Five of the ‘New Man’ projected by Frelimo as the model citizen – literate, productive, healthy, and unencumbered by backward superstition and sorcery.\footnote{West, Kupilikula, 152.} Producer and consumer co-operatives were also widely encouraged and established in order to collectivise production.\footnote{Bowen, M. L. (2000). \textit{The state against the peasantry : rural struggles in colonial and postcolonial Mozambique}. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.} This was matched by a hierarchical and ‘gigantist’\footnote{Cahen, M. (1987). \textit{Mozambique, la révolution implosée : études sur 12 ans d'indépendance (1975-1987)}. Paris: L'Harmattan, 53-55.} approach to agricultural planning which operated through the setting of ambitious mass production targets for designated products to be produced on collective farms as cash crops. This most often (but not always) required forced resettlement of the peasantry on land selected by administrative convenience and that was less valuable to the state, often severing the links between people and ancestral land, as well as patterns of food production and social order. This was highly disruptive to the régulos in particular as they were vilified and de-recognised in the first waves of collectivisation for being colonial collaborators.

Yet, the state was, ultimately, simply unable to impose its large political and economic programme onto the peasantry in a coherent and consistent way, despite having won considerable support for the campaign against the colonial regime, and despite a number of ‘successes’ in the modernisation programme. Whilst understandably there are some controversies about the extent, causes and character of peasant alienation and resistance to collectivisation in this period, there is nonetheless consensus that it was relatively widespread across different regions and amongst different groups, and resulted in the broad undermining of the popularity and legitimacy of the Frelimo government in rural areas.\footnote{For an account of the controversies in the literature, see Bowen, \textit{The State Against the Peasantry}., 11-17. Despite the controversies, writers from different parts of the spectrum all note the serious problems that developed between Frelimo and the peasantry over the collectivisation programme.} This was not least because in many cases, the ‘socialist’ modes and directives of production were sometimes not particularly different to the colonial ones: peasants were also forced to move to strategic villages, produce particular crops and sell them at fixed low prices.
prices, yet needed to produce their own food for which there was little support. Machel himself ordered the production of cotton and cashew as a state duty.\textsuperscript{645} Perhaps ironically, given the various critiques of colonialism, this was undertaken against the discursive backdrop of an assumed homogenous subsistent peasantry, whose prior production relations were themselves de-historicised. The collapse in food production that resulted from these policies, along with war and drought, has led to this time being popularly remembered as \textit{o tempo de fome} (the time of hunger).\textsuperscript{646}

Cahen’s reading of the relationship between the state and the peasantry after independence perhaps emphasises this alienation the most, noting that in many cases peasants quietly neglected or deserted collective villages and state farms in order to tend their own fields and sell to the rapidly expanding black market.\textsuperscript{647} This was often simply in order to avoid starvation in the face of a lack of food on collective farms. Beyond the longer established traditions of migrating out of the reach of the government, such as into Malawi or more often South Africa, Hermele further notes that in cases in Gaza workers would themselves destroy the government’s costly imported equipment as an act of resistance to forms of production for which no benefit could be realised.\textsuperscript{648} This was an expression of resentment and disappointment, particularly by the middle peasantry who were asked to give up animals and tools for the purposes of collective production, which totally negated the meaning of independence for them.\textsuperscript{649} The collapse of the government’s grand visions for collective production was thus not simply the result of poor planning, mismanagement and lack of technical skills and Renamo disruption, as is often suggested,\textsuperscript{650} but also included the active alienation of the peasantry from the new structures of production and their maintenance of alternative sources of sustenance where possible.

\textsuperscript{645} Bowen, ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{646} Sumich, ‘Illegitimacy of democracy’, 12.
\textsuperscript{647} Cahen, op.cit., 49.
\textsuperscript{648} Reported in Bowen, op.cit., 14.
Under this pressure, the state began to devolve more autonomy to collective enterprises and private farmers from the early 1980s onwards. It also began to involve European donors and agencies more extensively in this period, beginning with short-lived intervention projects sponsored by the Nordic donors to support co-operatives at the provincial level. Where this supported projects in realising tangible goods for rural populations, this improved their general viability. For example, Bowen’s study of co-operatives on Ilha Josina Machel argues that the peasantry engaged with them in the main as a means of accessing equipment, consumer goods and other subsidies which were not available to them otherwise. However, this co-operation and legitimacy was fragile, and ebbed away once benefits were less forthcoming. Moreover, this equipment was often forthcoming from wealthier peasants via the state rather than the state itself. Although it may be dangerous to generalise overly on this point, studies suggest that the complex relationship between the state and peasantry was often closely related to the extent to which the structures of governance could be responsive to the demands of the peasantry, and in particular the extent to which they helped meet, or at least did not overly hinder meeting, family production needs. Cahen argues strongly on this point that the peasantry was not reactionary and conservative for the sake of it – it might be added that neither was it a particularly revolutionary force; rather it did not follow policies and processes which were actively inimical to the diversity of its sources of income and survival. In this sense, the wartime sabotage tactics of Renamo were not mindless but deliberately targeted the ability of the state to win the loyalty of the peasantry via the delivery of material gains, social goods and improved consumption.

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653 Ibid., 151-152.
654 To this extent, Geffray’s narrative of a strongly ‘traditionalist’ community in Erati antagonised by an aggressively modernising Frelimo state is something of an outlier in the interpretation of state-peasantry relations, although perhaps not one which can be discounted totally; Geffray, *La cause des armes*.
655 Cahen, *Mozambique, La Révolution Implosée*., 53.
656 Ibid., 44.
III. The peasantry and the liberal peace: post-war relations

In the wake of the war and the peace accords after 1992, and the ongoing emergence of the ‘liberal peace’, the social relations between the state and the peasantry show elements of both continuity and change with the past, although the continuities are often under-emphasised by some critics of neoliberalism. Importantly, there are similarities in experience, including dynamics of peasant negotiation, engagement and alienation in evidence with later interventions. Taken together these points indicate the inadequacy of a statist conception of social insurance for the majority in the particular historical conditions of Mozambique. Finally, the particular dynamics of rising food and fuel prices have crucially accelerated points of antagonism between state strategies and the general population, expressed through the rise in peasant farmer demands for ‘food sovereignty’ and urban riots.

The major ostensible shift in agricultural policy in this period was towards encouraging smallholder production and participation in the market, involving, as Duffield notes, many interventions by NGOs working directly at the level of the population for the first time.657 This involved a wide range of programmes, including agricultural extension, the promotion of irrigation and roads, health and education and so on. At the same time, there were policy commitments by the government to the general privatisation of state farms, a number of which became joint ventures between former colonial companies and the state, and others which became more or less entirely private. State subsidies to the agricultural sector were increasingly restricted overall in agreements with the international financial institutions, and it was anticipated that motivated by market prices, smallholder producers would improve their incomes.

Yet, as Pitcher strongly argues, the narrative of the break between the socialist and post-socialist periods in the recent political history of Mozambique has often been overdrawn.658 In particular, she notes that the socialist period was itself characterised by shifting and contradictory policies, with many of the trends in

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657 Duffield, Development, Security, 87.
658 Pitcher, Transforming Mozambique, 182.
privatisation and liberalisation already underway in the early and mid-1980s as noted in Chapter Five. These moves were not simply under the direct pressure of the IFIs but reflected decisions made by the Frelimo leadership who were beginning to respond to the production crises of the early 1980s. Furthermore, she argues, this mix of strategies has been continued into the neoliberal period. The significant difference is that more of the large enterprises are now in the possession of a narrow group of Frelimo-connected elites partnered with international companies and domestic investors than owned by colonial companies or the state. In this, she argues that state power is better understood as having been reconstituted and re-configured rather than simply eroded in the post-war period. Certainly the state has not completely liberalised agricultural commodity prices either, and in recent years more minimum prices for crops have become a more frequent feature of the market.

I suggest that we can extend Pitcher’s interpretations of state policy to thinking about the situation of the peasantry in the post-war period, particularly in the light of the tensions discussed in the earlier periods. From the point of view of the living conditions and survival strategies in rural areas, it was not the different directions in policy and emphasis but the end of the war itself that had the biggest impact on peasant livelihoods. The war had forced many to migrate to cities and towns for protection from the violence, leaving fields untended and often landmined. Although some attempted to maintain connections with land and tend it for an hour or two in the daytime, this was highly risky. Given that state services and employees in rural areas had been targets during the war, in many areas of heavy violence these became virtually, but not totally, absent.

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659 Although it cannot be dealt with here at all, the ‘Indian’ community in Mozambique have been a substantial economic presence from colonial times and continue to hold a diverse network of business interests in the country, including those which provide capital in partnership with well-connected Frelimo people. They occupy a socially segregated but important position in relation to the society, economy and the political elite. See Sumich, J. (2009) Urban politics, conspiracy and reform in Nampula, Mozambique. Crisis States Research Centre working papers series 2, 60. LSE: Crisis States Research Centre, 660 Pitcher, Transforming Mozambique, 157-162. 661 World Trade Organisation, (2009) Trade Policy Review 2009, Mozambique. Report of the Secretariat, Section IV.
Yet the simple fact of being able to plant and harvest again without the immediate threat of violence was enough to bring back people in large numbers who had fled to the cities, in mostly spontaneous and self-organised forms of rural repatriation.\textsuperscript{662} Hanlon argues that the growth in rural income seen after the end of the war can largely be attributed to the re-opening up of fallow land and increases in volumes of commercialisation, although not necessarily because of productivity increases brought about by developmental interventions.\textsuperscript{663} A widescale quantitative study by the Ministry of Agriculture, supported by Michigan State University, based on national surveys from 1995-6 and 2001-2 supports this conclusion that productivity has not shown significant changes during the post-war era. It further argues that much of the apparent income growth has come about through a growth in real prices for staple foods including maize. This is problematic for the majority of peasants who are net buyers rather than producers of staple foods, indicating a net loss in welfare and a rise in inequality.\textsuperscript{664} Later studies about the character of rural poverty reduction have thrown into question the appropriateness of the ‘success statistic’ cited between the two Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, noting that the consumption metrics are based on a less nutritious basket of goods because the poorest had switched away from maize consumption towards cassava.\textsuperscript{665}

The broad lack of change in ‘productivity’, defined as crop yield per acreage, is a particularly important one in terms of reading the liberal peace and the responses of the peasantry. In the previous section, we also noted that Isaacman read low peasant productivity in the cotton industry as part of a strategy of resistance to colonial state targets. Given the stated strategies of the state and donor agencies over the last twenty years to promote smallholder agriculture, and the

\textsuperscript{662} Clearly, however, many also remained in the cities for a number of reasons, constituting new social classes and dynamics. Since the war, many families consist of rural-urban networks in which people migrate over the course of their lives. Tvedten, I., Paulo, M., & Rosário, C. (2006). "Opitanha": Social Relations of Rural Poverty in Northern Mozambique: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 55.


myriad project-based interventions that have taken place in Mozambique, one might have expected productivity to increase over this period of time in general. This is, after all, the added-value of external ‘expertise’ in the agricultural sector – the knowledge of how to fertilise, sow, tend and harvest in such a way and with such equipment as to render higher yields. Since independence, this has been the task for the Ministry of Agriculture’s extensionists and technicians, as well as numerous interventions sponsored by a wide range of donor agencies. Yet the uptake of more efficient technologies and techniques has remained absolutely and proportionately low across Mozambique. The result is that despite the numerous interventions into the agricultural sector, for many, techniques of crop production have not changed very much over decades. Rather, the principal modes of improving earnings are through use of wage labour markets, either in South Africa as is common in southern provinces, or in the informal sectors in Mozambique.

Using surveys of northern Mozambique, Bozzoli and Brück have argued that this is because household consumption (as opposed to income) is not significantly affected by participation in the market in the way that subsistence farming is, and as such the peasant requirements for increased productivity are not particularly high. In fact, farming more productively for the market is a decidedly riskier strategy, with some cash crops such as cotton having an overall negative impact on household welfare. This corresponded with farmers’ own accounts of their market situation:

This year, we tried to do cotton – we were being told by everyone that this is ‘white gold’, so we all were making, planting, harvesting… but for this ‘white gold’, we were getting 6MT per kilo! We couldn’t buy anything.

The basic insecurity of the market is one that the peasantry in Mozambique have chosen to negotiate in a number of different ways, including working with ‘partner’ NGOs to form savings and credit associations. In Nampula province, this has been

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666 Boughton et al., Changes in Rural Household Income Patterns, 31. 
669 Interview with farmers saving and credit association, Monapo District, Nampula, August 7th 2009 (Appendix: 40).
supported for a few groups with a more substantial collectivisation of marketing through Ikuru, a fair trade co-operative for cashew and peanuts subsidised by a number of US-sponsored NGOs.\(^{670}\) The ability to consistently pay a fixed higher price for crops has made it popular amongst producers, although technicians have their own doubts about its sustainability, noting that co-operatives under socialism faced many of these problems.\(^{671}\) Yet this is a minority strategy amongst those that have managed to collect the resources to build their own infrastructure for safely keeping money\(^{672}\) – the vast majority of those in Nampula and elsewhere in Mozambique have not formed associations.\(^{673}\)

Part of the risk involved with investment in such strategies is because the different parties working in agriculture over the last two decades have been pursuing distinct and contradictory strategies simultaneously. For example, a recent European-funded multi-year project in the district of Búzi sought to promote the growth and sale of sesame as a cash crop, with interventions along the entire supply chain from growing to marketing. In the short term, incomes increased, the price of sesame was rising and farmers were able to collectively purchase and save, although productivity slowed once pests arrived. However, a short time after the project ended, for standard bureaucratic reasons, the state allowed a colonial-era sugar company to re-assert control over land in the district that it had abandoned three decades earlier. Farmers were forced to either grow sugar for the company at fixed prices or give up the land. As the land had to be used for sugar growing, women and children were often displaced to other, distant land in order to produce food for themselves. This had led to considerable despair and disgruntlement amongst the community, who felt let down and disempowered.\(^{674}\) These dynamics are not entirely dissimilar to the contradictions experienced under the socialist government of the 1980s – although importantly without the elements of openly violent compulsion. The economic imperative to produce to external demands at the expense of one’s well-being is however comparable. For others, whereas the

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670 Hanlon and Smart, *Do Bicycles Equal Development?*, 21-2.
671 Interview with senior agricultural technician, Nampula, August 14th 2009 (Appendix: 41).
672 Interview with farmers saving and credit association, August 7th 2009 (Appendix: 40).
673 Hanlon and Smart, *Do Bicycles Equal Development?*, 23.
674 Interview with agricultural specialist, European development agency, Beira, July 7th 2009 (Appendix: 26).
colonial or postcolonial state used to depress prices for export crops, now it was the result of monopsony power of traders in collusion with the state.675

Reading between the lines, it is in the contribution to immediate income where NGO interventions at the level of the population may have their most important, albeit inadvertent, impact in rural populations under the liberal peace: as a source of irregular wage income, either through direct employment of people, distribution of goods or through the *per diem* system of benefits for participation in various programmes. It was a frequent complaint in the research amongst the NGOs themselves that it was impossible to run programmes anywhere without offering a *per diem* to participants,676 or that populations were easily swayed by the offers of t-shirts and caps. NGOs tended to interpret the insistence upon the per diem as a sign of cynical engagement by populations, some explicitly arguing that it was systematic: “Now the foundation of the country is the *per diem*”.677

However, an alternative way of understanding this trend is as a kind of commentary on the perceived value of development projects to participants – more specifically, that at least for some people their primary value is as a source of income, with the long-term objectives of the project itself as being of less importance. Indeed, one project employee in a sparsely populated district in Nampula province, when asked what he thought of the project he was working on, responded quite openly and simply, “Well, it’s my job”, venturing nothing more, and indicating that there was nothing more to be said.678 The realisation of concrete benefits in the actual conduct of the project clearly became a key incentive for participation. This resonates with recent findings in a CMI study elsewhere in the province, where people on low incomes claimed that their horizons were necessarily short-termist when it came to economic issues.679 Participating in development

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675 Ibid.
676 Interview with director of large USAID-funded NGO, Maputo, June 23rd 2009 (Appendix: 17); Interview with Italian NGO staff, Beira, July 3rd 2009 (Appendix: 20); Diary notes of conversation with Brazilian development worker, Beira, July 11th 2009.
677 Interview with Italian NGO staff, Beira, July 3rd 2009 (Appendix: 20).
678 Diary notes of conversation with junior project employee, natural disaster management project, Lunga, August 9th 2009.
projects also incurred costs of time, labour and transport, and as such was often not open to the poorest.\textsuperscript{680}

Yet, peasants have been able to modify, instrumentalise or creatively re-use intervention projects to further ends of risk spreading and income generation. In particular, projects initially designed to promote non-edible cash crops have been asked and agreed to promote vegetables and horticulture, in order to diversify food sources and have something useful if it is unsold.\textsuperscript{681} In this sense, peasants have been able to demand modified terms of engagement with the market. Perhaps more laterally, insecticide-treated malaria nets – distributed with great cost, training and expertise – are now regularly used for fishing in communities on the coast.\textsuperscript{682} For project designers, these immediate and instrumental uses directly counteract the ‘developmental’ purposes for which they are intended. On the other hand, for the peasantry this feeds into a logic of managing needs, well-being and risk according to what is present and available, in the knowledge that external attempts to meet these are historically fragile and extraverted.

\textbf{IV. Alternative responses to neoliberalism?}

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, many existing critiques of the liberal peace, including those of Duffield and Pugh, have suggested that social insurance supplied by the state constitutes the major alternative to neoliberal exposure to the global market. However, as this chapter has shown, interventions by the state in the rural economy have often exacerbated the instability and insecurity faced by peasant producers. In this section, we will look at the alternatives suggested by peasant representatives and discuss the significance of these issues for critiques of the liberal peace.

Looking at the historical relations between the state and the peasantry, we might say that these strategies of survival and disengagement with the ends of ‘development’ on the part of the peasantry are vindicated by the experiences of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{680} Ibid, 61.
  \item \textsuperscript{681} Interview with manager, international NGO, Maputo, June 24\textsuperscript{th} 2009, (Appendix: 19).
  \item \textsuperscript{682} Diary notes, 9\textsuperscript{th} August 2009.
\end{itemize}
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being courted and ruled in contradictory and sometimes damaging ways by wielders of official authority. In the light of the frequent historical tendencies of planners to focus on generating long-term surpluses to feed into global markets, with little respect or comprehension for more immediate needs for food supplies, it is perhaps unsurprising that peasants in Mozambique have not enthusiastically embraced strategies of economic extraversion via higher productivity. Whilst the liberal peace, through the endorsement of various forms of economic liberalisation, has contributed to reinforcing and modifying these dynamics, it is important to stipulate that they have long characterised the contested relationship between the peasantry and forms of central authority in Mozambique. Throughout this period, it has been the access to land which represents the primary form of social insurance for the majority in Mozambique, and for many Frelimo supporters represented a primary gain of political independence from the Portuguese. The government, recognising this, have consistently blocked any attempt to privatise land by the donors, which is a central symbolic political link to the peasantry. In substantive terms, this means that the availability of land essentially acts as a buffer against the risks of marketization strategies as well as the fallout from land re-appropriation by the state.

The ‘food sovereignty’ campaign endorsed by the National Union of Peasant Farmers (UNAC) in Mozambique articulates more clearly the connections between the central endorsement of particular production strategies in agriculture and the exclusion of the peasantry from their formulation. In particular, UNAC and other coalition partners attack politically fashionable plans such as the Green Revolution for Africa, publicly endorsed by the President as a means of ensuring ‘food security’, for the failure to engage with the existing modes of production and needs of peasant farmers. They argue that these would be better served by a more supportive market for locally produced goods rather than imports, and more attention to land access.

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683 Tvedten, Opitanha, 35; Interview with farmers’ association, Monapo, Nampula, August 7th 2009 (Appendix: 40).
684 Interview, consultant, Ministry of Planning and Development, August 19th 2009 (Appendix: 54).
Within this ‘food sovereignty’ campaign is an alternative articulation of how Mozambique should engage with the world, and how the state should engage with the peasantry. In short, they call for a substantial re-orientation of Mozambique’s development strategies around consumer and producer meetings, community co-ordination and non-intensive agriculture as ways of connecting peasant autonomy with economic survival. As UNAC argue, rising food prices in particular have contributed not just to rural poverty but broader patterns of alienation in Mozambique’s cities. In particular, a reliance on wheat imports has rendered urban populations susceptible to world food price and currency fluctuations, contributing, along with fuel prices, to increased social unrest and rioting in recent years. It is perhaps therefore not a little ironic that some of the money that funds development interventions in Mozambique derives directly from the sale of US wheat surpluses into this market.

Although the food sovereignty movement is currently politically marginal in Mozambique, it is interesting as a way of reframing the problems of the contemporary economic system through lenses which speak to the economic strategies and needs of the majority. As noted in CMI’s studies of rural poverty, these strategies very rarely depend on the state or NGOs for income or social insurance. Although the food sovereignty movement does not rule out a role for state intervention, the vision of the state is not one based on historic European models of social welfare but rather more decentralised in a way which would reflect extant modes of social organisation. This system is not envisaged as being dependent on maximising productivity and surpluses, or on providing guaranteed safety nets but on more fundamentally reconfiguring the relations between people, the state and the market. This constitutes a different critical alternative to those

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689 Tvedten, Opitanha.
articulated in the critiques of the liberal peace, and one which is more specifically connected to peasant ways of living.

However, the recently-released PARPA III (2011-2014), the third Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper released by the government to continue the flow of donor funds, re-affirms the state’s historic preoccupation with improving peasant productivity as its main economic priority.690 This seemingly wilful refusal to engage with and comprehend both the extensive research and the political messages about the well-being and aspirations of the majority poorer peasantry may be seen as connected with the social and political disengagement of the state (and of many donors) from the substance of personal and communal well-being, in favour of deferred promises of development and improvement. Returning to Cabral’s emphasis on the need to approach social change from an embedded and situated understanding of the nature of the problems facing the majority, this strategy of occlusion, disengagement and deferral on the part of the state and other agents of ‘development’ is particularly worrying.

V. Discussion

In his critiques, Cabral’s emphasis on the tangible and concrete effects of dispossession, and the specific and distinctive conditions of the African peasantry was a useful way of articulating a more democratic and more specific critical project. In pursuing this framework with regards to the liberal peace in Mozambique, this chapter has aimed to articulate better the conditions of the majority, and as such to think about the problems of liberal intervention from a more historical, political economy perspective. In this section, I will further elaborate on what such a perspective contributes to an anti-colonial critique of the liberal peace, and how this departs in content and perspective from existing accounts of the political economy.

Duffield’s incisive analysis of the interveners’ conception of the Mozambican peasantry in Zambezia is compelling. In particular, he argues that in terms of the gaze of interveners, the peasantry were widely understood and represented as undifferentiated, culturally and historical dislocated bare life – and as such ideally prepared for developmental trusteeship. The cleansing fire of war created the blank slate upon which interveners could write and experiment upon. However, he simultaneously argues that this is supported by an image of the population as ‘self-reliant’, thus excusing government and interveners from the need to provide social security. He seems to take exception to the view of the peasantry as ‘self-reliant’, criticising interveners for not challenging the feasibility of this paradigm.

In the terms of the critique I am developing here, I have much sympathy with Duffield’s reading, and would broadly agree that from the perspective of interveners, greater ignorance about the communities in which they aim to intervene certainly facilitates intervention and lowers levels of responsibility for failure. However, through the historical engagement with peasant survival strategies and political projects detailed above, it would seem that ‘self-reliance’ has been an important part of peasant reality for a long time, and in particular in managing the vicissitudes of the market and the state under conditions of instability and unevenness. Whilst there is certainly scope to argue about whether this should have been the case or whether people would have had preferences for different relations with the state, it is similarly difficult to dismiss this aspect of life. Duffield argues that the ‘natural economy’ model has replaced the ‘political economy’ model of liberation, and as such has de-politicised North-South relations. Whilst there is much truth to this, I would also note that such a model also regarded the peasantry as ‘backward’ and caused much hardship in the attempt to forcibly integrate it into more ‘advanced’ modes of production. By contrast, in the ‘food sovereignty’ movement, we see an attempt to preserve some of the autonomy that has been developed within peasant life rather than develop a more comprehensive system of social security and market integration.

691 Duffield, Development, Security, 96.
692 Ibid.,
693 Ibid., 105.
Importantly, unless the analytic gaze deliberately attempts to reconstruct the subjecthood of the majority – in this case the peasantry – through an even partial engagement with their specific historical experiences and political protests, we are stuck in the critical paradigm whereby European experiences of social democracy serve as the appropriate benchmark for thinking about the failings of intervention. Whilst this can tell us many important and useful things about the ways in which intervention operates, it does not articulate or engage with alternative visions of well-being which might resonate more deeply with the particular situation. As noted in the Introduction, the critical perspective developed in this thesis aims to be more inclusive through beginning with such experiences and perspectives.

Conclusions

The ambiguous legacy of the developmental state in Mozambique as a guarantor of well-being for the majority poses genuinely difficult questions for critiques of the liberal peace, which have overwhelmingly pointed the finger at Bretton Woods-endorsed neoliberalism as the primary cause of poverty and hardship in post-war environments. On the one hand, the argument that economic liberalisation has exposed poorer countries to particular forms of economic risk and insecurity is certainly an important one and not to be dismissed or denied. However, the longer-term situation of the Mozambican peasantry suggests that at least some of the problematic relations which inhibit survival and well-being relate to unresolved tensions of the legacies of modern colonialism – most obviously the extraverted character of the economy and the dynamics of dispossession that these continue to entail. However, they also include the legacies of the political mindset of authorities which seek to simultaneously ‘improve’ and control populations according to templates derived from a particular image of the world. As this chapter has endeavoured to show, these conceptions of production and political being are not necessarily shared by the majority who live under them. Furthermore, the proposed remedies in line with a more interventionist social security state do not necessarily reflect the aspirations or living conditions of the peasantry.
In the previous chapter it was argued that in reflecting on the realities of the liberal peace, we could not ignore the inequalities of wealth and consumption which underpinned relations of dependency and produced various forms of alienation amongst those within the system. In looking at the conditions of the peasantry, we might say that complex dimensions of economic inequality and structures of production also interact with political problems of distant authority and different priorities. These are historically embedded in relations that cannot be reduced to the effect of a particular neoliberal ideology of state but are in some sense more long-standing problems of rule. Clearly, these shorthands cannot capture the complexities of social and political relations that need to be understood in a more representative account of the liberal peace. Yet, they provoke greater reflection on the relationship between democracy, autonomy, production and consumption, and specifically the possible drivers of alienation in these circumstances. For anti-colonial approaches to analysis, these reflections are indispensable. In the concluding chapter, we will explore further how the reconstruction of subjecthood in this thesis has contributed to developing an anti-colonial mode of critical thought, and what this means for our understanding of liberal peace interventions and the study of world politics more broadly.
Conclusions: From alien to alienating forms of rule

Brother from the West -
(How can we explain that you are our brother?)
the world does not end at the threshold of your house
nor at the stream which marks the border of your country
nor in the sea
in whose vastness you sometimes think
that you have discovered the meaning of the infinite.
Beyond your threshold, beyond the sea
the great struggle continues.
Men with warm eyes and hands as hard as the earth
at night embrace their children
and depart before the dawn.
Many will not return.
What does it matter?
We are men tired of shackles. For us
freedom is worth more than life.

From you, brother, we expect
and to you we offer
not the hand of charity
which misleads and humiliates
but the hand of comradeship
committed, conscious,
How can you refuse, brother from the West?

Poetry was an important weapon of the African anti-colonial movements. Largely lacking the material firepower and wealth of their colonial counterparts, the political movement for change courted and cultivated international political consciousness on the issue, understanding that its objectives would need to be achieved through a widespread change in mentality towards colonialism and the colonised. This desired change in mentality was not however only instrumental; it was constitutive of the aspiration for a new kind of post-colonial world order based on a sense of equality of human regard. This poem, from Frelimo’s pre-independence canon, captures these aspirations neatly, yet simultaneously contains

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within it a set of rebukes to some of its would-be allies. Indeed, it is impossible not
to detect a sense of frustration, despondency and exasperation in its tone.

Its first two lines affirm both the unity and differentiation of human
existence, and yet carefully note that a consciousness of this unity may be lacking,
inhibiting the realisation of deeper relations (“How can we explain that you are our
brother?”). The interpellation of the reader as a ‘Brother’ pointedly undermines the
assumption of Otherness that underpinned divisive colonial thought. Its next lines
attack the closure and exclusion within the mental horizons of the imagined Brother
from the West, who sees only Europe’s own borders, or else the infinity of abstract
thinking. He does not see the real live political tumult taking place further off,
which is suggestively connected to a broader battle for human freedom (“the great
struggle”) in which he is no doubt implicated. This is a rebuke to his blinkered
vision that excludes the significance of the world beyond his shores; indeed there is
a suggestion that this is a sting at his intellectual narcissism (“beyond the sea // in
whose vastness you sometimes think // that you have discovered the meaning of the
infinite”).

The poem asks the Brother to see and to relate to this world beyond the sea,
which is populated by people he would recognise as fellow humans – men with
‘warm eyes’ and children – who take themselves off to fight out of weariness and
desperation, with the probable result of death.695 The Brother is not asked to fix the
problem, or to come and fight in the struggle, nor for a charitable gaze. Rather, the
poem asks the Brother for something less tangible – a relationship of mutual
reciprocity which is ‘committed’ and ‘conscious’. The elements of reciprocity and
mutuality are important – they demand and expect an equality of regard rather than
the gaze of condescension. Yet the last line ambiguously suggests this solicitation
may yet be futile – the question ‘how can you refuse?’ being not necessarily
optimistic and forward-looking, but perhaps reflecting disappointment or disillusion

695 The androcentric character of much anti-colonial thought and visions is not insignificant and
deserves more than a footnote, although I cannot give it more in the thesis. Whilst there are some
clear resonances with the perspectives engaged and feminist thought in terms of pursuing a more
inclusive agenda for critical thinking, there are other dimensions of subjectivity, material experience
and political consciousness relevant to women’s lives that I have not explored here. For an important
articulation of the crossing-points, see Harding, S. G. (2008). Sciences from below : feminisms,
at the likely limits of solidarity. The poem nicely captures the tendency for ‘refusal’ in contemporary modes of critical thinking that have often ignored the subjecthood and humanity of those otherwise understood as disempowered in world politics.

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The central goal of this thesis has been to contribute to and take forward the project of decolonising critical thought in IR, via a detailed engagement with the liberal peace debate, answering the question set in the Introduction, ‘what can an anti-colonial perspective contribute to critiques of the liberal peace?’ In this concluding discussion, I will re-state and discuss the ways in which the perspective developed disrupts and re-draws the fault-lines for critiques of intervention, and impels a different kind of ethical engagement.

It is first important to remind ourselves how and why the liberal peace debate, both the technical and the critical, has been so important both in world-political terms and in the disciplinary conversations of International Relations and the wider academy. As Chapter One argued, the ascendance of the ‘liberal peace’ reflected a particular epoch in recent history where a broad coalition of warmakers and peacemakers from North America, Europe and other regions were able to collectively envision and go about the world promoting particular models of peace, development and security that were highly interlinked and mutually supportive. Politically, it was enabled through a unique kind of consensus between left and right politics in the North about doing what was both right and necessary for the Third World, which was, providentially, also right and necessary for the First World. Thus was the liberal peace consolidated as a framework for intervention with a set of common discursive cornerstones, through the merging of development and security.\(^{696}\)

One side of the academic debate on the liberal peace followed one of the supposed ‘founding aims’ of IR as an academic discipline in the British and American academies – namely, the question of war and how to avoid it. Yet the

\(^{696}\) Duffield, *Global Governance.*
other debates – at least some realist and critical strands – moved in the other
tradition of thinking about power and how it was exercised. These strands were fully
conscious that the practices of liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding reflected a
complex instantiation of world political power, in which the hegemonic West had
sought to institutionalise particular ideological norms in ostensibly global and
universal frameworks. If the technical debate was concerned with the promotion of
‘peace’, then, the critical debate was concerned with the conduct of its ‘politics’.

Yet, as Robert Vitalis and others have convincingly argued, these were not
the only founding traditions of the discipline of International Relations. Although
the history has been ‘gracefully’ disappeared from the textbooks, IR and other
modern social sciences such as anthropology were founded as colonial disciplines,
intended to help civilised nations understand how they were to rule over less
civilised ones.697 Thus some important re-labelling was done across the study of
world politics as colonialism became increasingly de-legitimised early in the
twentieth century – realism edged away from social Darwinism,698 the Journal of
Race Development became Foreign Affairs, and Colonial Administration was
dropped as a branch of political science as defined by APSA.699 Yet its legacies
have perhaps not all been overturned.

As Hobson nearly pointed out,700 critical theory has in general failed to
grapple with the Eurocentric origins of the discipline. Thus, in the development of
its framings, it continued to operate under imaginaries which underscored Western
historical and ideological exceptionalism as well as Western agency, even if it was
vocally critical of the politics to which imperial practices gave rise. In Shilliam’s

American International Relations. Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 29(2), 331-356;
international relations: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
January 2011, Retrieved 3rd November 2011 from http://thedisorderofthings.com/2011/01/04/the-
racial-empire-of-international-relations/
700 Hobson, ‘Is critical theory always for the white West?’. Hobson argues that Gramscian and
Foucaultian approaches maintain Eurocentric framings, but does not connect this tendency to the
buried colonial origins of the discipline as suggested here.
phrase, a form of ‘institutional narcissism’ has remained in the academy.\footnote{Shilliam, R. (2011), ‘Decolonising the grounds of ethical inquiry: A Dialogue between Kant, Foucault and Glissant’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 39:3, 649-665.} In Chapter Two, I argued that in some cases this had left critical responses to the liberal peace trapped within very Eurocentric horizons. In these critiques, the ‘liberal peace’ project is to be condemned for being imposed, imperious, culturally insensitive or hypocritical, yet the more supposedly emancipatory alternatives to the liberal peace seem either to reinforce a West/Other divide (Richmond), imply a ‘return’ to sovereignty-as-self-determination (Chandler), the honouring of a liberal social contract (Pugh) or a system of state-provided social insurance (Duffield). Largely missing from these accounts are substantive engagements with the subjects and intended beneficiaries of the liberal peace. Although endorsing a critical anti-imperial politics, these critiques do so in a way which echoes the blinkered vision of Frelimo’s ‘Brother from the West’. Indeed, the ‘refusal’ discussed in the poem seems to resonate with Ortner’s articulation of interpretive ‘refusal’ outlined in Chapter Four – an extreme hesitation to offer some concrete engagement in the fear that it may itself perform interpretive violence.

Historically, the twentieth century anti-colonial project was intellectually committed to recovering a sense of subjecthood for non-Western peoples, which it understood as a constitutive part of an anti-imperial politics.\footnote{Shilliam, R.,(ed.) (2010) International Relations and Non-Western Thought, London: Routledge, especially Shilliam, R. ‘The perilous but unavoidable terrain of the non-West’, chapter 2.} It was not simply about criticising Western domination – it was about understanding the deeper connections between the ontological, epistemological and ethical aspects of a Eurocentric gaze, and aiming to effect a repositioning of that viewpoint. In Chapter Three, these conceptual links were explored and developed more substantively as an orientation for political thought and analysis in the context of an emerging decolonising approach within the discipline of International Relations. Overall, this turn and this approach has sought ways of bringing alternative ‘subjects’ of world politics to the forefront of analysis. Yet in order to realise this orientation more coherently within research, different concrete analytic strategies for articulating and engaging with non-Western subjecthood were needed. As elaborated in Chapter Four, these strategies lead to a different kind of engagement with the practices of the liberal peace as a form of international relations by refracting it through the
historical narratives, consciousnesses and strategies of its intended subjects. These narratives aim to reconstruct people in Mozambique as the major protagonists or subjects of the story of intervention.

I. Re-thinking subjecthood in critique

It is not unusual, within IR or other branches of the study of politics, to be asked what the ‘policy implications’ of one’s work are. This is such a standard question that many pieces of research will routinely finish with a summary of ‘policy recommendations’. Moreover, many pieces of research will be specifically designed to produce ‘policy recommendations’ of some form or another. Underpinning this widespread practice is a set of unspoken shared understandings about the identity of the agent or subject of ‘policy’ – wealthy North American or European governments, the multilateral agencies with which they identify or support, and some other bodies. One is rarely asked or asks for whom these policy recommendations are generated, or why they are so: rather it is assumed that one naturally identifies with or works within the framework of this official, regional and state-focused subject-position, even if in the nominally independent framework of the public academy.

One of the major contributions of post-Coxian critical theory within IR over the last thirty years has been to de-naturalise this policy-focused orientation in research and to question the purposes that our theoretical gazes serve. In the 1980s and 1990s this played out via largely theoretical attacks on positivism, rationalism, realism, and variants thereof. Important statements were made regarding the character of knowledge, the role of values and norms, and the structure of capitalism, all of which disrupted the security of a state-centric, policy-oriented gaze. These nonetheless had a limited impact in terms of really pluralising the understanding of world politics and engaging with it via other subjects. In part, this related to the nature of scepticism about the character of discursively-rendered knowledge and the perceived danger of essentialising or colonising the non-Western Other through one’s engagement or representations. Thus the conversation
continued to focus on the Western subjects of politics – governments and their affiliates – although the conversation contained more dissidence than previously.

Feminist and decolonising approaches in many senses continue to present more radical and democratic challenges to IR than many forms of critical theory, asking not only about the stability of knowledge but more bluntly questioning the general exclusion of most of the world’s population from the study of politics. A crucial part of this broader project has been not simply about critique but a reflexive reconstruction of non-state, non-male, and/or non-European subjects as historical and contemporary protagonists of, agents in and commentators on world politics. These approaches seek to pluralise the points of departure for understanding the world, in order to reflect, articulate and bring into being this more plural world. The analytic and epistemological circumscription performed by a fixation on hegemonic forms of subjecthood is thus challenged in the name of a more democratic and inclusive account of world politics, which began from the starting point of needing to recognise and reckon with humanity as more broadly understood.

II. Reconstructing subjecthood in the liberal peace debate

In the context of the thesis, the decolonising approach adopted pushes against the analytic circumscription of relations in the liberal peace as being mainly concerned with the behaviour and agency of interveners, through engaging and articulating forms of subjecthood in Mozambique. In the empirical chapters, this cashes out as a narrative reconstruction of Mozambican society as a historical subject, and its people as politically conscious, purposeful and strategic subjects of social relations. In this story, the ‘encounter’ staged by recent intervention in post-conflict countries is not a ‘new’ meeting between the liberal West on one hand and silent ciphers of difference, overwhelmed by the novel wonders of market capitalism and democracy on the other. Rather, these relations are embedded in the connected histories of colonialism, anti-colonialism and post-colonialism that have linked Europe and southern Africa for centuries. In this light, it is possible to revisit some of the themes that have characterised the liberal peace debate, and ask what the reconstruction of Mozambique as a subject brings to the discussion.
In the first place, it breaks open the ‘paradox of liberalism’, in which the struggle for political freedom, equality or empowerment is implicitly understood as the historical intellectual property of the liberal West and part of the promise of the liberal peace. Mozambique’s recent histories of political freedom through the anti-colonial struggle is one in which Western and Eastern powers and intellectuals played important supporting roles, but the primary agents of it were from Mozambique and working within a pan-African idiom, often against the interests of wealthier governments. The point is not to argue that post-colonial freedom or emancipatory ideas are ‘really’ African – this is a reversal of the same problem. It is simply to point out that historically speaking, and particularly in recent history in southern Africa, struggles for political freedom or empowerment have not been a gift of the liberal West, and there is little point in understanding them as such in thinking about the last five hundred years of history, and even within the last two decades.

Indeed, adopting a situated and contextualist approach to political analysis, as advocated by the theoretical approach of the thesis, suggests that finding out the genealogical origins of the ideas themselves are not intrinsic to determining their validity – rather it is the contexts and ends towards which they have been directed. In this spirit, the issue with the critiques of the liberal peace as they stand is not that because they depend on ostensibly European traditions of thought that these are therefore invalid ways of engaging with post-war and post-colonial contexts. The issue is that they are insufficiently engaged with or alive to the particular pluralities of political consciousness and contestation, and specifically the content of this politics. In particular, in Mozambique many of these relate to the position of the central party-state elite and their control over much of the economy, as well as historical patterns of dispossession and economic sabotage. As such, the ‘new’ discursive framework of the liberal peace did not really enable these problems to be addressed, and enabled a kind of retrenchment of power. However, as shown, it has been possible to mobilise and subvert various aspects of it in order to develop deeper critiques of the power structures it enables.
Within these pluralities of contestation, lines of political, social and economic cohesion do not, largely, run along the international-local axis upon which much of the critique turns. What we see are a combination of different forms of solidarity that are not static and bounded constituencies for a particular political programme. Rather, they tend to be dynamic and reconstitute themselves around different issues areas in ways which reflect political claims, interests, funding and political pressure. In this sense, perhaps all political agencies under the liberal peace are ‘opportunistic’ – as much those of rich donor governments and NGOs as the civil society groups which accept their funding. Yet this does not mean that they are therefore not ‘political’ subjects with political consciousness – such a view could only be coherent if ‘politics’ was the preserve of only the financially independent and economically indifferent, which is clearly not the case. Whilst political framings are influenced by aspects of financing, this may be less the case with the substance of contestation.

One of the reasons that the ‘liberal-local’ understanding of political dynamics has endured in the debate is due to the understanding of the political subject as being constituted in particular ways. Chandler’s critique of Duffield’s Foucaultian approach is that it lacks a clear account of an autonomous liberal modern rights-bearing political subject and a political process which connects the subject to a bounded community. For Chandler, contemporary liberal democratic politics is only possible under the presupposition of an autonomous liberal subject. For Richmond, the problem is precisely that the liberal peace cannot presume and will into being the existence of a modern liberal subject, which is why he endorses an approach based on empathy, for fear of doing violence to a culturally diverse local, non-liberal subject.

The plural consciousness analysis developed in Chapter Six exposes the limitations of these unitary approaches to political subjecthood as a basis for political theory and political analysis. Chandler’s conceptualisation of politics proper as requiring an autonomous modern liberal rights-bearing subject seems to require that in the absence of this, contemporary politics does not really exist. Yet,

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703 Chandler, ‘Critiquing liberal cosmopolitanism’
under the double consciousness problematic, one’s sense of one’s being in the world as a human *is* the basis for politics. One’s subjecthood is necessarily prior to the granting of substantive rights, which may be deferred by whichever external authority, *and* which is not necessarily unitary, depending on the socio-historical conditions of one’s existence. Chandler’s vision of politics is one that does not bear much relationship to the lived experience of political struggle nor the constitution of political subjects, both in the postcolony and elsewhere.

Richmond’s analysis, on the other hand, seems to derive its conception of non-liberal subjecthood from an archetype of a speechless and culturally illegible subaltern rather than the complex, articulate and pluralistically conscious embodied anti-colonial subject. In researching the effects of post-war intervention in such a contemporary setting, it seems strange to do this, given the many possibilities for communication, discussion and hermeneutic engagement, which would immediately problematise such assumptions. To the extent that caution should always be exercised in interpretive research, and in particular where it is produced under inequalities of wealth, power and status between researcher and subject, Richmond is right to be wary. But this might be as true of conducting interpretive research in the boroughs of inner London or the Ministry of Defence – all require forms of respect and care.

This characterisation of subjecthood as unitary, abstract or culturally bounded is not however a minor methodological problem – it feeds into the Occidentalist shaping of the entire debate as being between the Western advocates of a project of liberal transformation and the non-Western targets of this transformation without really engaging with the concrete qualities, effects, points of contestation and perceived injustices within the relationship. Not least, this tends to re-affirm the dubious self-image of the West as being liberal and democratic when the actual practices of intervention can run directly in the other direction, as Chandler has pointed out. On the other hand the double/plural consciousness problematic forces a more careful engagement with the specificities of contestation, emancipation and dispossession engendered by various interventions.

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704 Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton*
The re-conceptualisation of subjecthood as pluralistically constituted also makes a contribution to the discussions around the ‘post-intervention’ environment as articulated by Graham Harrison, and the ‘hybrid peace’ as developed by Roger Mac Ginty. Harrison’s analysis makes a series of important points about the distinctive aspects of bureaucratic influence, shaping and convergence in states which receive high amounts of IFI aid through budget support, as do Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda. Mac Ginty’s analysis also highlights the elements of strategic and ideological crossover that emerge in intervention, noting that the combined agency of ‘liberals’ and ‘locals’ produces hybrid forms of order which vary from context to context. An understanding of the pluralistic constitution of political subjecthood helps interpret the emergence of these political forms and order – not as violations of the pristine autonomous subject of rights and thus inauthentic, as they might be in Chandler’s formulation – but as a substantive expression of the particular dynamics and fluidities of politics and political consciousness in the contemporary world.

Chapters Seven and Eight reconstruct subjecthood by exploring conscious contestations and strategies in more depth and detail, and in doing so ask more difficult questions of critics. In Chapter Seven the interpretive engagement with the intimate political economy of interventions articulates the issues of a consciousness of extreme impoverishment and dependency as key factors of importance in underpinning the decisions to begin and to continue relationships with donors, but notes how racialised systems of differential entitlement within intervention can be divisive and alienating. In the chapter, I suggest that if we are to take the experiences of intervention seriously then these are legitimate grounds for critical engagement and anger which are more relevant than the difference problematic or the production of liberal subjectivity.

To put the point more sharply, following the conclusions of Chapters Seven and Eight, perhaps there should also be more open critical contestation of the ways in which societies targeted by intervention are treated as a kind of experimentation ground for ill-informed and under-specified vanity projects by many donors, in sectors which are important to the lives and livelihoods of many people. If we
understand subjecthood as multi-dimensional, embodied, and ultimately deserving of recognition and respect, then the character of many conflict and post-conflict interventions is an important transgression of this ethic. But such a line of analysis seems to cross over into the polemical, and to lose the distant tenor in which existing critiques have discussed violations of sovereignty and cultural autonomy as the main problems with intervention. Whilst Duffield occasionally mentions such issues, they generally take a back-seat to the account of neoliberal governmentality. Yet, for the critical perspective developed here, it is important to keep in mind the concrete human experiences of intervention and to articulate these as also political in their own right. Chapter Eight particularly concluded that critics need to maintain an open mind and a spirit of engagement with the peoples targeted by intervention in order to think about the issues raised and the imagination of possible futures.

One ultimate consequence, perhaps, of fully re-thinking the liberal peace debate by re-thinking the ‘subject’ in analysis, is that it may be desirable to put aside the liberal peace framework itself as it exists for the moment, and to pursue different frames of analysis for understanding social and political relations between interveners and targets of intervention. In the following part of this discussion, I look at two themes which have been particularly relevant to the anti-colonial critique developed, which might usefully serve as organising devices for critical thinking more generally. These themes are ‘alienation’ and ‘accumulation’.

III. Alienation and accumulation in decolonising critique

Although political consciousness is fluid and pluralistic, this does not mean that it is constituted in an arbitrary manner. Rather, as the analysis of the thesis has suggested, it is connected to concrete dynamics of alienation and accumulation within political order which do not always fit neatly into structural narratives and remedies. In this section I will sketch out how these can be useful concepts around which to organise our understanding of the social world in a way which is multi-foundational, humanist and situated in shared experiences of it.

705 People targeted by intervention do also raise these issues – they are clearly not irrelevant in this sense.
As the previous discussion has implied, political consciousness is not exogenous to social relations but endogenous to them – that is to say that forms of political consciousness express and help constitute relations of power and status. Yet people are also reflexive about these relations and often become aware of disjunctures between particular values and practices. This is particularly the case where these disjunctures become very stark. The empirical chapters of the thesis have all tended to concentrate on and deliberately draw out the experiences of these disjunctures as forms of alienation, expressed through conscious critique, irritation, apathy and withdrawal. I have not intended to suggest that the liberal peace is only constituted by relations of alienation – rather that recognising alienation is intrinsically and instrumentally important in an anti-colonial account of politics.

Alienation becomes instrumentally important in analysis because it speaks to the limits of the collective frames in which social and political life grounds and interpellates people. Indeed, it is significant that many of the first sociologists were fixated by this phenomenon. Yet the reasons for being concerned with alienation often spoke to the interests of states and ruling classes – early criminologists for example were tasked with understanding alienation in order to make society function more smoothly and with fewer infringements of its rules. In anti-colonial critique on the other hand, alienation is a productive force insofar as it pertains to the rejection of ideas and practices that negatively impact or violate one’s sense of self and well-being, or one’s ideas of justice. Political struggles can thus be read as strategies of disalienation – the attempt to overcome the disjuncture between conflicting social realities. Understanding and engaging with the character of alienation is one way of better understanding forms of social fragmentation and conflict – in short with dimensions of human plurality in the world.

However, for an anti-colonial analytic there is also an intrinsic value to analysing alienation which derives from its explicitly ‘humanist’ framework. Insofar as alienation is often intimately linked to concrete forms of human suffering brought about by various structures / agents, it is a major point of concern. This is not to

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706 Of course, Durkheim, but also Weber and Marx.
argue that all forms of alienation are intrinsically of interest to decolonising analyses, nor to argue that analysis should limit itself thus – after all, solidarity has been an interesting frame for decolonising thought as well. Yet it is to note that there are particular ethical and political drivers for looking at alienation which do not derive from its instrumental purposes.

In the narrative of the thesis, one of the major drivers of alienation has been patterns and processes of wealth accumulation. In terms of understanding the political subject as embodied in particular historical and social relations, as well as the actual human body, the relationship of the subject to forms of accumulation is a critical part of its political being. The framing of ‘accumulation’ here is greatly preferred to ‘development’, which implies a more stagist trajectory of wealth accumulation over time, which has long been understood as problematic. Rather, in the thesis the liberal peace can be understood as a particular set of accumulation processes, or ‘politics of the belly’. Alienation often results from the concentration of such accumulation processes, and indeed the role of ‘poverty reduction’ in accelerating and consolidating such processes. Looking at the forms of critique and alienation discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, these are often associated with the dynamics of profit from the intervention regime and the concrete unevenness it itself generates. In terms of Mozambique as a polity, for some time now the disjunctures between the post-independence egalitarian rhetoric of the ruling elites and the very visible, embodied manifestation of their wealth has been a cause of increasing disaffectedness and resentment, as indicated in this recent caricature:

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McCarthy, *Race, Empire*. 707
9.1: “Where were you, father, when the other fathers went to the armed struggle?” (2010) 708

This emphasis on accumulation is not to suggest a reductive ontology of politics; as argued in Chapter Three the domains of political being are not reducible to one

another. Yet, it is to argue that neither can these be ignored in a decolonising account, particularly in contexts where political rule by both national and international actors is persistently legitimised by recourse to an apparent economic competence in the generation of development, macroeconomic stability and poverty reduction. Yet a focus on the accumulation processes actually engendered by this political arrangement is an important critical tool within anti-colonial critique. This would also highlight the structures of differential expectation and treatment outlined in Chapter Seven, which itself reflects and reproduces wealth distributions at a global level.

Moreover, an appreciation of the deep economic crisis during which the ‘liberal peace’ was introduced in Mozambique helps explain its apparent ‘success’ as a case of intervention, in terms of both its adherence to various reform programmes, and its apparently high GDP growth rates. A growth rate of 9%, as Mozambique had through much of the late 1990s, was not a great deal in absolute terms given the starting point. Yet in terms of the donor metrics of ‘success’ it has been important, validating the intervention. These initial conditions of impoverishment are crucial in understanding the ‘success’ of its ‘progress’. They also illuminate what a senior IFI official may have meant by the comment that the problem with Angola was that the government had ‘too much money’ - insulating the government from the need to co-operate with the donors in the same way.

The dynamics of accumulation and alienation are offered as useful groundings for a decolonising account of world politics. With a humanist and pluralist impulse, they provide us with ways for re-focusing analysis around the embodied subjecthood of figures otherwise marginalised by Occidentalist frames of reference. They are doubtlessly ‘biased’ in this way towards such dynamics. I certainly cannot suggest that my presentation of Mozambique as a subject of politics and history is anything other than located within these concerns and problems. In this sense, the project of reconstructing subjecthood is always unstable and open to challenge. It does not argue that it is how people in Mozambique all see themselves and their relations to contemporary donors, and other narratives could certainly be

709 Interview with senior IFI official, Maputo, 8th July 2008 (Appendix: 5).
developed – indeed, they must be developed in order to deepen the engagement with the experiences and intended subjects of intervention. Yet, it makes some important steps in establishing a less restrictive basis for the analytic imagination.

**Closing thoughts and questions**

Many things remain unsaid, and some of these things are very important. One of the expected questions for this ‘anti-colonial’ analytic framework is its potential association with romanticisation and nostalgia – much anti-colonial thought is now regarded, not least in the postcolony itself, as utopian and unrealistic. Moreover, it has been characterised as conveniently backward-looking; overly fixated with a totalising vision of colonialism and too inclined to blame imperialism for contemporary problems – the Mugabe effect, as it were. The use of anti-colonial thought in the thesis has endeavoured to avoid these effects – most of all it endorses using the ideas of the thinkers as *intellectual strategies* for thinking about the present state of world politics rather than an anachronistic diagnosis of the same. Indeed, if it is to be effective as a way of seeing through and identifying alternatives to the discursive frameworks of established power, critical theory must be consistently forward looking and contemporaneously engaged. David Scott puts the point well in arguing that for the purposes of anti-colonial critique “reconceiving alternatives depends in significant part on reconceiving the object of discontent”.\(^{710}\) This is not to suggest that sentimentality or ‘romance’ is altogether dispensable – as Chapter Three argued, research which is humanistically and democratically oriented cannot do without a sense of affect and connection, particularly insofar as this asks us to listen to and understand experiences of alienation. I understand this to be a kind of necessary ‘romance’ – not for the subaltern or Other but for a notion of a broader humanity that is the general subject of scholarly work such as this.

Returning to some of the initial concerns of the liberal peace debate, then, new ethical and political questions emerge when the object of discontent is re-conceived through the lenses of alienation and accumulation and the subjects of intervention. First, as argued in Chapter Two, critics of the liberal peace raised

concerns about the extent to which its forms of intervention could be understood to be politically and ethically legitimate. Looking at the ways in which intervention in Mozambique is shaped under such vast inequalities of wealth and entitlement, however, one might well ask whether any kinds of ethical and political relations could not be highly uneven and strained under such conditions, given that they effect and institutionalise a particularly undemocratic hierarchy. In this sense, the underlying global distribution of wealth seems inseparable from being able to understand dynamics of legitimacy and alienation in world political relations. This kind of analytic question seems rather more pertinent than the question of mediating relations between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’ as defined by culture or ideology.

Secondly, the epistemological terrain of the liberal peace is seen to be crucially bound up with other imaginaries of ‘modern’ statehood, which for contemporary sub-Saharan Africa is frequently lensed as ‘development’. Increasingly, it seems that to really engage with the political dynamics of post-colonial international relations, critical approaches need to tackle the discursive construction of ‘development’ urgently and in its many manifestations across research and policy. This bigger question is very intimately tied to the exercise of power and ultimately facilitates the activities of the liberal peace. However, as a different literature has begun to argue, it is a historically peculiar discourse bound up with a de-politicising colonial and racial imaginary regarding the character of human progress. As such, it is an important dimension of global power that has generally been left out of the recent discussions in critical international relations about liberal imperialism and its continuities.

Ultimately, however, reconstructing the ‘subject’ of inquiry in IR is a long process which will raise many more questions about the purposes and conduct of research, which will hopefully both prompt humility about the limits of research, as well as more ambition in terms of the possible directions of its critical consciousness. These new avenues are opened up and reflected in the changing patterns of world politics, but substantive engagement needs critical scholars to

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leave their desks more often and try to see the world differently. Whilst decolonisation is often understood as a historical project of the past, it might otherwise be understood as an intellectual project for the future.
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