The Changing Dynamics of Religion and National Identity: Greece and Ireland in a Comparative Perspective

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Thesis Submitted for obtaining the degree of PhD
European Institute
London School of Economics and Political Science
Declaration

I hereby declare that the work presented in the thesis is my own.

[Signature]

DAPHNE HALIKIOPOULOU
Abstract

It is widely accepted among secularisation theorists (Wilson 1966, 1982; Dobbelare, 1981; Berger 1981; Bruce, 1999, 2002) that the more modern a society becomes, the more likely it is to secularise – i.e. the social and political significance of religion will most likely diminish. At the opposite end of the theoretical debate, scholarly work seeking to explain the recent phenomenon of the re-affirmation of religious values argues that the consequence of modernisation is not secularisation but rather the resurgence of religion (Huntington, 1996; Kepel, 1994; Juergensmeyer, 1993, 2000). With religion gaining salience in some societies but losing ground in others, this ongoing debate appears more critical than ever. The cases of Ireland and Greece are pertinent examples: The Republic of Ireland is experiencing secularising tendencies and the legitimacy of the Church is being increasingly challenged, while in Greece the role of religion remains strong, if not strengthened in recent years, and the legitimacy of the Church is maintained.

For secularisation theorists, failure to secularise is likely in instances where there is an explicit link between religion and nationalism- ‘Cultural defence’ or the ‘nationalist pattern’ (Martin, 1978). But while both cases constitute instances of cultural defence, Ireland is now secularising. This is precisely the puzzle this thesis is concerned with: where traditionally religion, culture and politics are linked, under what circumstances does religion cease to play a politicised and mobilising role, and under what circumstances is this role retained or even strengthened?

This thesis argues that the answer can be found precisely in the nature of the nationalist pattern. Rather than being a monolithic model, there are significant variations within the pattern itself: religious based national identities, like all national identities, are fluid, not static. The dynamics of national identity change are dependent on two interlinked variables: (a) the degree to which a Church obstructs modernisation, and (b) external threat perceptions. This thesis will attempt to illustrate the inter-relationship between the above dynamics through a thematic comparison between Greece and Ireland. This model may be used to explain not only what accounts for the variations between the Greek and Irish cases, but also more generally to identify the conditions under which religion may remain or cease to be politically active and legitimate in societies where secularisation has been inhibited given a strong identification of religion with the nation.
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Needless to say, all the errors and misjudgements are entirely my own.
1. **Aim and Contribution of the Thesis**

There is no known human society according to Weber (Weber in Gerth and Mills, 1946) without belief in religion of some form. Belief in the supernatural is a universal human interest. Given cultural and historical differences, religions take various forms and characteristics. But regardless of doctrinal and organisational distinctions, at the core of every religious belief system lays an ideological framework with a vision of the world and of the divine element, and a set of rules to which the faithful must adhere. Despite differences in terms of their understanding of the divine and temporal worlds, and the blueprint of human conduct they put forward, from a functional point of view, all religions perform a similar purpose:

In reality there are no false religions. All are true in their fashion: all respond, if in different ways, to the given conditions of human existence...They answer the same needs, they play the same role, they issue from the same causes... It is indeed useful to know what a particular religion is about, yet it is far more important to discover what religion is in general. This is the problem that from time immemorial has piqued the curiosity of philosophers, and not without reason; it interests all of humanity (Durkheim, 2001:4-6).

Whether one chooses to endorse Durkheim's (2001) functional understanding,\(^1\) Berger's (1981) substantive definition of religion\(^2\), or Marx's (1844) infamous opiate for the people interpretation\(^3\), one will arrive at the conclusion that there is something profoundly social inherent within every religion; and by extension, something profoundly political. Religion is a form of ideology, and according to Apter (1964) ideology is both social and political because it 'refers to more than doctrine. It links particular actions and mundane practices with a wider set of meanings and, by doing so, lends a more honourable and dignified complexion to social conduct' (Apter, 1964:16). Those who believe religion is separable

---

1 Durkheim's famous definition of religion as a "unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden - beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church all those who adhere to them" (Durkheim 2001, 46)

2 as "the human enterprise by which the sacred cosmos is established"

3 "Religion is the general theory of the (social) world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritualistic point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its universal source of consolation and justification... it is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people." Karl Marx; Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 1844
from politics, Gandhi once famously remarked, understand neither one. Similarly, according to Gramsci (Fulton, 1991), religion is always a form of politics, as it has a direct impact on the struggle for power: ‘It is an active conception of the world, which prepares people for a political role in society’ (Gramsci quoted in Fulton, 1991: 22). However, clearly not all religions are politically active to the same extent; there are variations to this phenomenon. For example, it has been argued (Bruce 2002) that certain branches of Christianity—namely Protestantism and the pluralist, individualist conceptions it entails—are more prone to secularisation. This has been used to explain the decline of political religion in certain areas of Western Europe: religion and politics are to a significant degree disentangled and religion functions as a private matter. In many other regions, however, world-wide, including other areas of Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia, religion remains closely involved in politics, and is therefore seen largely as a collective function. Prominent examples include Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Iran, Malta, Poland, Croatia, Greece and the Republic of Ireland.

It is the political aspect of religion as an underlying common denominator that concerns this thesis. Namely, what it is that accounts for differences in the relationship between religion and politics; why in some societies religion is more actively involved in the functions of secular institutions than in others and why this involvement enjoys widespread popular legitimacy; and, most importantly, under what circumstances religion may remain or cease to be politically active and legitimate. More specifically, this thesis deals with the ways in which modernisation—economic, political and social—can affect the legitimacy and political role of religion.

Case Studies

Greece and Ireland constitute two cases which provide for a very interesting comparison from which we can hypothesise more generally about the relationship between religion and politics. The two countries exhibit a number of interesting similarities as they are both examples of cases where religion and politics have been closely associated since independent statehood and, at least until the early 1990’s, Church legitimacy enjoyed widespread support. According to Mavroghordatos, ‘Ireland is indeed the single non-Orthodox but Christian case that most resembles Greece’ (Mavroghordatos, 2003:130). For a number of scholars this phenomenon can be largely attributed to the identification of the nation with religion (Martin, 1978, 2005; Bruce, 1999, 2002, 2003): in other words, the
Church draws its legitimacy by virtue of its role as the principal carrier of national identity. Particular historical developments related to Empire and national self-determination have led to the creation and consolidation of this pattern in the two cases. Both Greece and Ireland were conquered by an Empire with a different religion; in both, religion became a symbol against the Empire; and in both the nation-building process became based on religion. Therefore, in both cases the nationalist element for a powerful role of the Church in politics. Greece and Ireland can be described as belonging to the 'nationalist pattern' (Martin 1978; 2005) where the development of the particular link between religion and politics is related to the link between religion and nationalism.

The consequences of modernisation however appear to affect this link in different ways in Greece and Ireland; indeed the two cases are particularly pertinent examples of the adverse effect of modernisation. While Ireland has entered a secularisation process in which the legitimacy of the Church is becoming increasingly challenged, in Greece the role of religion remains strong, if not strengthened in recent years, and the legitimacy of the Church is maintained.

The following tables summarise these important similarities, and differences, between Ireland and Greece pre and post 1970's. These will be analysed in greater detail, from a theoretical perspective in chapter 1 and from a historical perspective in chapter 2.

**Table I: Ireland and Greece- Similarities and Differences pre-1970’s**

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The purpose of this thesis is to establish a framework for conceptualising the contemporary role of religion in these two cases. It accepts that, until recently, the role of religion in both Greece and Ireland could be explained in terms of the 'nationalist pattern' (Martin 1978, 2005; Bruce 1999, 2002, 2003) i.e. the identification of the nation with religion, and therefore assumes that the current divergence between the two case studies can be found precisely in the relationship between religion and national identity. The thesis thus focuses on the dynamics of national identity change and the factors that influence such change. In order to do so, it adopts a multi-disciplinary approach that links theories of the sociology of religion and theories of nationalism. Drawing on the idea that one can identify patterns
given the particular historical, sociological and religious context of various cases (Martin, 1978; 2005) the thesis constitutes an effort to provide a viable account of how the interaction of certain internal and external processes may alter the dynamics of national identity re-production. It contributes to the ongoing debate by identifying the circumstances under which religion may cease to be a key part of national identity. It proposes an additional dimension to the secularisation paradigm by identifying variations within the 'cultural defence' or 'nationalist' pattern which explain how the brake that nationalism puts on secularisation can be gradually removed or cease to function.

As part of explaining their current divergence in terms of the role of religion, the thesis investigates the origins of the interactive relationship between religion, nationalism and national identity. However, the intent is to keep the focus on theoretical and contemporary considerations, and not primarily on historical ones, as the aim is to identify the ways in which contemporary developments may challenge or reinforce this relationship. Therefore only a selective historical account is used to support the plausibility of the comparison and help provide an overall understanding of how and why a religious-based national identity was consolidated in the two cases. It is necessary only to the extent that it allows pointing to key historical variations between the case studies which may have contributed to their current divergence.

2. The Puzzle

Arguably secularisation in Ireland is manifested in a rapid decline in Church attendance and vocations, a rise in the numbers of religiously non-affiliated, and most importantly an increasing support for separating certain areas of State policy and institutions from the Church. In other words, the authority of the Church is being challenged by an increasing number of people supporting- or lobbying for- removing certain areas of legislation from Church control. In Greece however, popular Church support remains largely unchallenged: Church attendance appears on the rise while attempts to separate certain State institutions from the Church have either failed or encountered mass popular mobilisation. This constitutes a puzzle, as, if one were to accept the above mentioned premise- namely that the identification of the nation with religion inhibits secularisation- then religion should remain highly political and enjoy widespread legitimacy in both cases. Following a brief overview of the diverging role of religion in contemporary Greece and Ireland, this thesis will then
proceed to propose a model for conceptualising this role, which is based on the dynamic relationship between religion and national identity.

The Irish Catholic Church: Loss of Legitimacy

Political legitimacy refers to ‘the belief in the rightfulness of a State, in its authority to issue commands, so that those commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed in some sense to have moral authority’ (Barker, 1990: 11). Church legitimacy, which is the focus here, can be understood along the same lines: justifiable obedience and the right of authority. Political legitimacy is a complex and multifaceted concept; an attempt for an all-rounded definition and in-depth analysis is not possible in such a limited space. For the purposes of this thesis, however, it should suffice to assume that there is a link between legitimate authority and popular consent.

Since independence, the Irish Catholic Church has exercised a highly influential political role, and its presence has been visible in every aspect of Irish social life, including education, health and welfare. As has been pointed out above what is most interesting about Ireland is not simply the extent of the power of the Church, but most importantly its widespread legitimacy, i.e. the fact that the vast majority of the Irish people have traditionally accepted and welcomed the extensive political role of the Irish Catholic Church. In a survey of political opinion carried out by Fr B. F. Biever in the early 1960’s in the Republic of Ireland, an extraordinary 88% of the sample responded that the Catholic Church was the greatest force for good in Ireland (Garvin, 2004: 200). Acknowledging this has inevitably entailed endorsing and legitimating the policies of a highly interventionist Church whose political role is rarely ever challenged.

In recent years however, certain developments have placed a question mark on this role. Two waves of secularisation, the first in the 1960’s and the second and most important in the 1990’s have resulted in the weakening of the Church’s legitimacy. Some analysts have observed a decline in the power of the Catholic Church and there is a growing debate on whether this is the beginning of a process towards a more secular Ireland (Girvin, 1994, 2002; Garvin, 2004; Inglis, 1998; Twomey, 2003, Fuller, 2004). According to Girvin, ‘Mary Robinson’s election as President in 1990, the outcome of the ‘X’ case on abortion, the decline in electoral support for Fianna Fail and Fine Gael and the outcome of the
referendums on abortion in November 1992 all seemed to herald the beginning of a new liberalising era in Irish politics’ (Girvin, 1994: 203).

It is debatable whether this liberalisation of Irish politics constitutes a trend towards secularisation. Certain scholars question the use of the term ‘secularisation’ to describe the situation in Ireland (Hornsby-Smith, 1994). The problem is foremost one of definition: if one associates secularisation with a belief in the existence of God, then it is hard to claim that such a development is occurring in Ireland. Indeed we are not witnessing the disappearance of religion altogether. For example, the percentage of people who believe in God remains a very high 98% (European Values Study, 1999-2000, in Fahey et al, 2006:50). In addition, there has also been a significant rise of sect membership in recent years. But Martin’s definition of secularisation as the decline of the role of religion in public and political life (Martin, 1978), or Berger’s definition as the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols (Berger, 1981) certainly shed some light to what is happening in Ireland. Recent developments concerning the social and political role of the Irish Catholic Church, whether these are identified as trends towards a more secular Ireland (Girvin, 1994; Inglis, 1997), ‘changing values’ (Hardiman and Whelan, 1998), trends towards the ‘liberalisation’ of Irish politics (Girvin, 1986, 1994), or trends towards a ‘declericalised’ society (Garvin, 2004: 212), undoubtedly indicate that a profound change is taking place in Ireland which is undermining that role. ‘While there can not be a direct translation of these findings into political behaviour, they do highlight the challenge to the Church’s authority in society, raising questions about its continued ability to influence policy (Girvin, 1994: 211).

Whether one chooses to examine Church attendance, the numbers of people entering priesthood, the significance of religious institutions for the operation and organisation of the social system, or the number of non -religiously affiliated as an indication of secularisation⁴, the result is the same: religion is in decline. As will be shown below, Church attendance figures have sharply declined within the past two decades, the number of vocations is also in decline, while most importantly gradually the separation of the religious and political spheres is taking place, however strenuous and difficult the process has proven to be. Although it is recognised that secularisation is an ambiguous concept, for

---

⁴ Secularisation theorists (for example Wilson 1966, 1982) agree that measuring secularisation is ambiguous and complex, but propose the above as useful measurements which in conjunction to one another help provide some indication of the decline of the role of religion in public life. A more in-depth analysis of the indices of secularisation is carried out in chapter 1.
the purposes of this thesis it will be taken foremost to refer to the loss of the Church’s legitimacy. The above mentioned indices are useful insofar as they shed light to trends towards the decline of the Church’s popular basis of support, and hence its legitimacy.

Decline in Church Attendance

Church attendance in Ireland—although still the highest in Western Europe—has declined rapidly, dropping from around 90% in the early 1970’s to 50% in 2003.

Figure 1: Trends in weekly Church Attendance in the Republic of Ireland, 1968-2003

![Graph showing trends in weekly Church Attendance in the Republic of Ireland, 1968-2003.](source)

The secularisation thesis expects traditional religious values to decline among the educated, affluent and upwardly mobile members of society, and also the ‘underprivileged urban poor, who are experiencing the sharpest social disadvantages’ (Hardiman and Whelan, 1998:70). In addition, men are expected to be less prone to attending Church than women. In support of the thesis, these predictions appear to be confirmed in Ireland. Church attendance levels are lower for people living in urban areas and those with higher education qualifications. There seems to be a correlation between Church attendance and age: the higher the age group, the higher the percentage of people attending Church. There is also a gender division as Church attendance levels are significantly higher among women. Finally, it appears that unemployment leads to a significant reduction in confidence in the Church.
Table 3: Weekly or More Frequent Church Attendance in 1994 by Sex, Age Group and Urban-Rural Location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Rural (%)</th>
<th>Urban (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-34</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4: Socio-Demographic Variation in Confidence in the Church

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-34</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Qualifications</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Levels</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outside Urban Centre</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Centre</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Poor households</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Households</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Tenure</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local authority Tenants</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Decline in Church attendance is a problem the Church is both aware of, and concerned about. According to Dr Diarmuid Martin, the Archbishop of Dublin, the degree to which
young people seem to have drifted away from active Church life is disturbing. 'I can go to parishes on a Sunday where I find no person in the congregations between the ages of 16 and 36. None at all... This has to be looked at in a situation where, anyhow, regular practice in a substantial number of parishes in Dublin is below 5 per cent' (Irish Times, February 24th 2006). This issue poses particular difficulties for the Irish Catholic Church, because Catholicism is especially legalistic, and therefore obeying its rules and regulations is essential. Indeed, one of the most important Church rules is mass attendance. As Inglis observes, 'of all the rules and regulations of the Catholic Church, the one which was central to maintaining the dominance of the institution was attending Mass on Sundays. Within legalist-orthodox religiosity, it became the litmus test as to whether someone was a practicing Catholic' (Inglis, 1998: 32). In this sense, decline in Church attendance levels in Ireland cannot be ignored as a significant indication that the people are drifting away from the Church’s control. According to Girvin, ‘although it would be a mistake to take Church attendance as the only indicator of secularisation, a change in its remarkably high levels most certainly reflects a change in a tradition which has characterised the society for a hundred and fifty years’ (Girvin, 1994: 206).

It is also important to note here that the rapid decline in mass attendance which occurred between 1995 and 1999 has coincided with the eruption of a series of sex scandals involving cases of systemic child abuse by members of the Irish Catholic Church that commenced in the early 1990’s. The scandals reached their peak in 1994 when it broke out in the media that Nobertine order priest Brendan Smyth had been accused of involvement in cases of paedophilia and while the hierarchy of the Catholic Church was aware of this, it had failed to take any action (Fuller, 2004: 251-252). A series of cases followed, involving priests and members of religious orders implicated in sex abuse cases, some going back as early as the 1960’s. The scandals implicitly raised the issue of legitimacy and democratic accountability of the Irish Catholic Church, least because the Church had failed to live up to the very moral standards it had itself so firmly set.

Decline in Vocations

The above-mentioned tendency of the people to disassociate with the Church and its regulations has also been accompanied by a sharp drop in those entering the priesthood and religious orders and, interestingly enough, the popularity of the Church is also declining.
For example, whereas 259 Irish Priests were ordained in 1970, only 124 were ordained in 1994 (Dillon, 2002: 57).

Congregations and Priests are ageing. According to Archbishop Martin, when he was 'ordained in the diocese of Dublin in 1969, there were 13 other ordinands. Last year [2003] there was one. Next year [2005] there will be none' (Economist, October 2004). This has significant implications for Irish Catholicism, in which the number of people entering priesthood plays a pivotal organisational role. The Irish Church's success has been largely dependent on the control over sectors such as education and health, run almost exclusively by nuns and brothers. A sharp decline in the numbers of people entering priesthood entails the Church's manpower is declining and thus its ability to control is shrinking.

Table 5: Changes in Human Resources of the Catholic Church in Ireland, 1970-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diocesan Clergy</td>
<td>3,944</td>
<td>3,762</td>
<td>3,659</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical Religious Orders</td>
<td>7,946</td>
<td>6,711</td>
<td>4,564</td>
<td>3,382</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters</td>
<td>18,662</td>
<td>14,878</td>
<td>12,104</td>
<td>6,558</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers</td>
<td>2,540</td>
<td>1,719</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>1,479</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33,092</td>
<td>27,070</td>
<td>21,388</td>
<td>11,704</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diocesan Clergy</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>79.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical Religious Orders</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>99.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,409</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1,292</td>
<td>92.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Growth of Religiously Non-Affiliated

Accompanying the above mentioned trends is a sharp growth in the number of the religiously non-affiliated, another indicator of secularisation according to Wilson (Bruce, 2002: 198). Again, coinciding with the sex scandals of the early 1990's, and the sharp
drops in Church attendance and the numbers entering priesthood, the number of religiously non-affiliated rose from approximately 2.5% in 1975 to 16% in 2003.

**Figure 2: The Growth of the Religiously non-Affiliated in the Republic of Ireland, 1975-2003**

Per cent non-affiliated

![Graph showing the growth of religiously non-affiliated individuals in Ireland from 1975 to 2003.](image)

Adapted from Conflict and Consensus, 2006: 37

**Separation of the Social, Political and Religious Spheres**

An equally striking indication pointing to a more secular Ireland is the apparent breakdown of the firm link between the social, political and religious spheres. Although formally separate institutions, Church and State in Ireland enjoy a consensual relationship. This relationship was institutionalised in the 1937 Constitution, ‘which effectively identified the Irish nation with the Catholic religion’ (Kissane, 2003: 77). Although the latter made clear that the State ‘would not endow or discriminate against any religion’, it also affirmed the ‘special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the faith professed by the greater majority of the citizens’ (Article 44:2 of the Irish Constitution, removed in 1972). The result was the institutionalisation of a powerful, highly politicised Church able to permeate every aspect of Irish social and political life. The Church developed an extensive network of control, and was enabled to influence the people through access to welfare, the family and the media. Receiving the sacraments regularly, following the rules and regulations of the Church and generally living ones life in accordance to the Church’s teaching has been throughout the 20th century, the prime
criterion for a good Catholic. Given the Church's extensive political role, it was also the
criterion for an entire good Catholic nation. And thus laws enacted by the secular authority
reflected this principle. This explains why, for example, contraception, divorce and
abortion have been so controversial in Ireland.

However, from as early as the 1970's, the hold of Catholicism over Irish society began to
experience a process of slow decline. In 1972, 84% of the Irish electorate voted to delete
the constitution's acknowledgement of the special position of the Catholic Church. In 1979
contraception was legalised for married couples. Favourable attitudes towards divorce rose
from 21% in 1971 to 53% in 1983. In 1990 the Irish elected President Mary Robinson, a 'feminist and liberal constitutional lawyer who had been one of the earliest advocates of
women's rights, the liberalisation of the contraception laws and the introduction of divorce' (Boyle, 1997: 347). In 1992 the 'X' case and a series of referendums that followed, resulted
in the liberalisation of abortion law. The right to travel abroad to obtain an abortion and the
right to receive information relating to abortion services abroad (in strictly limited
circumstances) were approved by voters in referenda in 1992. The Supreme Court
interpreted article 40.3.3 so as to allow for the possibility of legal abortion in very limited
circumstances (to save the 'life' as opposed to the 'health' of the mother). An attempt to
remove this possibility by referendum was narrowly defeated in a referendum in 2002. In
1993, homosexuality was legalised. And, in 1995, a marginal referendum vote legalised
divorce.

This process has been slow and this is primarily the reason that a debate is taking place
among academic circles on whether this evidence suggests that Ireland is now a secularised
society. Although secularisation itself may be debatable, declining Church attendance and
vocations, and most importantly the liberalisation of Irish politics and a degree of
separation between the social, political and religious spheres illustrate that a trend towards
changing values is most certainly taking place. Ultimately, the success of Irish Catholicism
has always been in its ability to be endorsed and legitimised by the vast majority of the
Irish people. With Church attendance and vocations on the decline, increasing support for
liberal and pluralist policies, and the gradual endorsement of referendums that challenge the
role of the Church, the legimacy of the Church is put to question. A process has
commenced 'whereby the State and other non-denominational agencies are replacing the
Church as the main provider welfare, educational and health services' (Girvin, 1994: 221)
and this has important implications for the political role of religion. A profound change is
taking place in terms of the Irish Catholic Church's legitimacy and support. The magnitude of its consequences can only be fully understood if one considers how powerful a role the Irish Catholic Church has traditionally played for centuries. This will be taken up in greater detail in chapter 2.

Greece: Counter-Secularisation and Maintenance of Church Legitimacy

Seeking to identify causal patterns and explanations for this phenomenon logically points towards the direction of a wider context. If modernisation is breeding secularisation in Ireland, then similar processes towards secularisation should become evident in other cases where religion has traditionally played an important political role, once the forces of modernisation have set in. But turning to Greece- a case very similar to Ireland in many respects- seems to suggest the reverse. Contrary to Ireland, Greece remains a country where the religious and the political spheres are closely interlinked. Attempts to secularise have not had a similarly profound impact, nor have secularising tendencies been as successful or as popular. Simply put, the legitimacy of the Greek Orthodox Church has not experienced a similar process of decline despite a series of Church-State confrontations and scandals in recent years. Attempts to separate the political and religious spheres have encountered fierce opposition from both Church and public. Although in Ireland such attempts also encountered opposition from the Church, the public and the intelligentsia have been in support of the changes rather than against them. This is not to say that there are no secularising forces in Greece. As Martin argues, the relationship between the religious and the secular is often complex and the distinction not so clear-cut: 'the varied profiles could be amplified, but it is only the broad profile that matters...secularising tendencies exist even in Poland and Greece' (Martin, 2005: 86). But the broader picture in Greece is one in which the political role of religion remains resilient.

If anything, the identity cards crisis- one of the most significant Church and State confrontations in Modern Greek history- can be interpreted as indicating an upsurge of religion. The latter began in May 2000 when, a reform initiative introduced by the then centre-left Simitis government provisioned the elimination of the religion field from Greek identity cards. Given direct opposition to these reforms on behalf of the clergy, and particularly Christodoulos, Archbishop of Athens and All of Greece, the identity cards issue assumed great proportions in the following months. Christodoulos' campaign to prevent the exclusion of religion from the identity cards became based largely on attempts
for popular mobilisation. It is very interesting to note that these attempts quickly assumed a nationalist role: removing religion from the identity cards was interpreted as a move aiming at undermining and ultimately eradicating Greek national identity. The Church proceeded to the organisation of mass rallies in Thessaloniki (June 14th 2000) and Athens (June 21st 2000). Nationalist mobilisation and the evocation of national symbols was the key feature, culminating in the Archbishop raising the Standard of Agia Lavra (the flag, which according to popular nationalist myth, was raised by Bishop Germanos in March 1821 in the monastery of Agia Lavra at Kalavryta to mark the commencement of the Greek independence movement from the Ottoman Empire) at the mass rally in Athens, thus fusing the need to uphold religion with the need to uphold 'Greekness' and Greek national identity. The Athens rally was attended by approximately 150,000 people, according to police estimates (Eleftherotypia, June 22nd 2000), waving Greek and Byzantine flags, holding banners inscribing 'Greece Means Orthodoxy', and the contradictory 'Hellas-Europe-Orthodoxy', and exclaiming logos such as 'The Youth Does Not Want the New ID Cards', 'Hands Off Democracy', 'No to the New Zion' and 'No to Atheism and Terrorism' (Vassilakis, 2006: 403-404).

The Church proceeded with an initiative to gather signatures from the Greek public approving the calling for a referendum to make the inclusion of the religion field in identity cards optional. By August, 3,008,901 signatures were gathered- amounting to 33.5% of the electorate ⁵ (Stavrakakis, 2002: 11). Although the motion for calling a referendum was declined by President Stephanopoulos, popular mobilisation in favour of the Church was striking. A survey conducted in 2001 in Newspaper Ta Nea, showed that 80% of respondents were in favour of the-compulsory or optional- inclusion of religion in identity cards; 56.5% considered the influence of the Church on political life greater than before; 68% considered the Church's influence on politics to be positive and important and, 74.8% considered the involvement of Archbishop Christodoulos in politics to be positive.

A more recent event illustrating the power of the Orthodox Church and its grip on Greek society is the huge controversy surrounding the introduction of a new primary school history textbook, which took place in 2007. The textbook was quite different from its predecessors as it effectively sought to undermine the role of the Orthodox Church in Greek history and thus challenged to an extent the existing view that Orthodoxy and the

⁵ According to the last census (2001) the population of Greece is 10,939,605 but the electorate, which excludes foreigners and children) in the last general elections (2000) was 8,976,135 (Stavrakakis, 2002: 11)
Greek nation are inseparable. The classical and secular sources of nationhood were stressed instead, putting forward an alternative version of Greek national identity in which religion is less relevant. The textbook became a highly controversial issue as it caused a huge reaction both from the political and academic worlds as well as the Church, and as a result, proved to be short-lived. In its initial reaction to the controversy, the Department of Education and Religious Affairs agreed to significantly amend the textbook in the following school year (2007-2008) to include the historical role of the Church in the maintenance and continuation of Greek national identity. Following further criticisms however, the textbook was finally withdrawn altogether in September 2007.

Further to this, an examination of the same indices of secularisation which were above applied to the Irish case, illustrates that secularisation is not enjoying a similar success in Greece. Levels of Church attendance are on the rise and the disassociation of religious and political institutions is not occurring. The number of people entering priesthood is in decline; however this is not as relevant in Orthodoxy as it is in Catholicism given the fact that sectors such as education and health were never dependent on Church manpower in Greece.

Church Attendance

**Table 7: Greece: Frequent Church Attendance Increase (1995-2000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995(MRB)</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 (V-PRC)</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>+6.4</td>
<td>+4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>High School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995(MRB)</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 (V-PRC)</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>+11.9</td>
<td>+2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Age Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995(MRB)</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 (V-PRC)</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>+2.5</td>
<td>+6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Public Opinion in Greece 2001

6 Church attendance levels are not as accurate as indication for orthodoxy as of Catholicism. The former does not place an implicit focus on adherence to Church rules or regulations, nor has a doctrinal rigidity similar to Catholicism. However, it is still interesting to see the rise of Church attendance in Greece, especially as it has coincided with the identity card crisis. This difference between Orthodoxy and Catholicism is examined in greater depth in chapters 3 and 4.
Popular support for the involvement of religion in political affairs during the identity cards crisis appears to have coincided with a general trend towards increasing religiosity and levels of Church attendance. Table 5 indicates that contrary to the predictions of the secularisation thesis, between 1995 and 2000 Church attendance rose for almost every group, including those most prone to secularisation such as men, younger people and those with higher education qualifications. For example, Church attendance among university graduates witnessed a notable increase of 11.8%. It should be noted here that this rise in Church attendance is also related to the Orthodox Church’s stance on the Yugoslavia wars in the late 1990s, which explicitly linked religion and national identity. Although the starting point of Church attendance levels between Greece and Ireland is indeed very different, what is of particular significance here is not actual numbers but trends. There is a rapid tendency for decline in Ireland contrasted by a rising trend in Greece.

Separation of the Social, Political and Religious Spheres

At the institutional level, the Church enjoys special status as a special branch of the State and the civil service which has not been challenged successfully. Church and State are formally bound as there is no constitutional separation between Church and State. Article 3 of the Constitution of Greece, revised in 2001, still recognises the Eastern Orthodox Church as the ‘prevailing religion in Greece’ (Constitution of Greece, including 2001 amendments).

The ‘special’ status of the Orthodox Church is pivotal for the role of religion in Greek politics. The issue of religious freedom or lack thereof is directly related to this. Although the Constitution (Article 13) guarantees freedom of religious belief and acknowledges that every known religion can be practiced ‘without hindrance’ (Article 13.2), in practice the religious freedom of the non-Orthodox citizens of Greece, which include Muslims, Catholics and Jews is to an extent restricted and compromised. Upon his visit to Greece in June 2002, Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, the European Commissioner for Human Rights, conducted a report in which he noted the problem regarding official places of worship in Greece. According to this report, under 1938 Greek legislation, ‘the building of any non-Orthodox place of worship is subject to approval by the ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs’ (Gil-Robles, 2002:6). Robles notes that the most disturbing development regarding the construction of non-Orthodox places of worship is that ‘the Ministry invariably requests an opinion, albeit not binding, from the local orthodox Bishop who
must reply within 20 days. The foundations of this consultative procedure, in a sphere that is strictly the responsibility of the State authorities, are not clearly discernible’ (Gil-Robles, 2002:6). Indeed, it has been the case since 1938 (Law 1363/1938) that a ‘special permit issued by the Ministry of education and Religion, and customarily by the local Orthodox Bishop, is required ‘for the establishment or operation of a Church belonging to any religious denomination whatsoever’ (Boyle, 1997: 336). In practice this has meant that permission for minority religions to set up places of worship is very difficult to obtain, and involves very long time delays. For example, while talks for the construction of a Mosque in Athens have been taking place since 1978, as of the time of writing there is still no official place of worship for the 200,000 Muslims who reside in Athens. In the summer of 2006 the Greek government, with the consultation of the Church finally decided on the Athens area of Elaionas, but as of October 2006 the construction process had not yet commenced. Rather, Muslims are forced to practice worship in areas which function informally as Mosques, such as garages and private flats. According to the 2005 Amnesty International Report on Greece, in 1997 Greece was found guilty of violating the provisions of ECHR because the stipulation of law 1363/1938’ (Amnesty International Report, 2005:61). Furthermore, in a similar discriminatory context, the Greek Catholic Church faces the problem of lack of legal recognition, an issue which is increasing in importance given the rise of the number of Catholics who reside in Athens- due to immigration and free labour mobility within the EU- to 100,000 (Eleftherotypia, April 4th 2006).

The problem of discrimination is also extended to the issue of conscientious objection against military service. Although since 1990, all ministers of religion including not only the dominant Orthodox group, but also Catholic, Protestant, Muslims and Jews and ‘other known religions’ have been exempt from military service, this has not applied to Jehovah’s Witnesses. The latter have had to serve prison sentences and according to a 1993 Amnesty International Report, between 1938 and 1992 ‘Witnesses had collectively spent more than 5,000 years in military and civil prisons’ where they were often ‘ill-treated’ (Boyle, 117:338).

Often Orthodox doctrine functions as State law applying for all Greek citizens, religious faith notwithstanding. One of the most notable examples is the- until 2006- inhibition of the cremation of the dead. (Mavrogordatos, 2003: 121-122) The latter was legalised on March 1st 2006 for those Greek citizens whose religion permits it and as an extension for Greek Orthodox citizens who have formally declared their wish to be cremated beforehand, and
have accepted to waive their right to a religious funeral. (Kathimerini, March 2nd, 2006) The religious/ethnic criteria of citizenship and inclusion in Greece were also made apparent in November 2006, when Parliament Vice-Chairman George Sourlas initiated a motion to remove retired Admiral Antonis Antoniadis from the post of Honorary Chief of the Greek Military Navy General Staff for publicly denouncing Orthodoxy on national television (Kathimerini, November 14th 2006). Mr Antoniadis described Christianity as 'the most bloodthirsty of religions' and in a further television interview broadcast on Alpha Channel on November 16th 2006 he claimed that when he held the post of Chief of the Greek Navy General Staff he was obliged to attend Church as part of the job requirements and recite hymns to St. Nicholas, patron saint of the Greek military navy, something which runs contrary to his own beliefs. The motion to remove him from his current post was supported by a number of retired admirals who in the past have held high ranking positions in the Greek Military Navy, among other Leonidas Vassilikopoulos (Adesmeytos Typos, November 17th 2006) who served as Chief of the Greek Navy General Staff during the 1980’s PASOK Administration and was Head of EYP- the Greek Secret Service- during the 1990’s PASOK administration.

While restricting the liberties of those not adhering to the Orthodox faith, the special constitutional position of the Orthodox Church guarantees certain privileges for the Orthodox clergy, the most important of which include the granting of a ‘productivity bonus’ (meant for civil servants) meaning that Orthodox priests are considered as civil servants, and their salaries are paid accordingly by the State. Moreover, there is often the granting of Head of State Honours to high ranking religious figures and religious symbols. Examples include the funeral of the former Archbishop of Athens, visits by the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Jerusalem and Alexandria, a visit of a Holy Icon from Mount Athos to Athens and the arrival of the ‘Holy Light’ on a chartered Olympic Airways flight from Jerusalem every Easter.

The institutional privileges of the Orthodox Church, and generally speaking the special status of the Orthodox faith, are also apparent in the Greek education system. The Church’s de facto position in the Greek ‘Ministry of Education and Religious affairs’ gives it an extensive role in education, because it has an important say in the content of the school curriculum and the number of hours religious education is taught. State policy in education clearly reflects this role: religious instruction is compulsory in Greek schools for all students unless their parents declare that they do not adhere to the Orthodox faith, in which
case the students are exempt. There is however no alternative provision for the teaching of other religions. In 1998 the ‘reduction in the hours of religious instruction- exclusively of the Orthodox faith- was ruled as unconstitutional’ (Mavrogordatos, 2003: 121). With the rising numbers of non-Orthodox students in Greek schools, this problem has become increasingly evident in recent years. The supremacy of Orthodoxy applies not only to students, but also teachers. Although legislation which required all teachers in primary schools to adhere to Orthodoxy was formally changed in 1988, religious minorities are informally excluded from educational posts, and particularly from teaching religious subjects. According to Boyle, ‘in one official letter sent to an applicant, a departmental circular was quoted in which it was stated that the reason for rejection of Witness and Baha’i applicants was that the purpose of elementary and secondary education is among other things to contribute towards and encourage students to cultivate faith in their country and in the genuine elements of the Greek Orthodox tradition’ (Boyle, 1997:337).

However, as close as the relationship between Church and State might be, the nature of Church-State relations is indeed particularly complex: although the two are inextricably linked, in fact the Church is subordinate to State authority. ‘Ever since 1833, the Orthodox Church of Greece continues to perform the primary function of a State Church: it is essential for the formal legitimisation of State authority. No regime and government ever did without religious ceremonies performed by the Orthodox clergy: oaths of office (typically administered by the Archbishop of Athens), masses celebrated in the Athens Cathedral and so on’ (Mavrogordatos, 2003:125).

Scandals in the Greek Church and Church-State Relations

Greece certainly is not immune to pressures for secularisation. In February 2005, the eruption of a series of scandals implicating high ranking members of the Church hierarchy in cases of embezzlement, trafficking in antiquities and bribing judicial officials highlighted the problems facing the Church and gave rise to pressures for separating the religious and political spheres. As an immediate response to the scandals, trust in the institution of the Church declined, and the popularity of the Archbishop suffered. Yet, in the long term figures do not appear ominous either for the link between Church-State or for the status of Archbishop Christodoulos. Although, according to a survey carried out by Kapa Research on behalf of the newspaper ‘To Vima’ on February 13th 2005 (a time when the scandals were at their peak) 65% viewed the separation of Church and State as positive
or rather positive, this figure had already dropped to 51.6% on March 6th 2005 (Survey carried out by opinion on behalf of newspaper ‘Eleftherotypia’ on March 6th 2005). According to a survey carried out by RASS on behalf of newspaper ‘To Paron’ on March 6th 2005, 74.4% agreed that the archbishop should have a say in matters of education, 70.7 believed the Archbishop should have a say in matters regarding health and social security, while 47.8% believed he should have a say in national affairs. Although the Archbishop’s popularity dropped in February 2005 to 43% from 68% percent in May 2004 (Survey carried out by VPRC for SKAI Radio, published in Newspaper ‘Kathimerini’ on February 11th 2005), a substantial 61.7% believed that the Archbishop should not resign because of the scandals, while 55.5% still had a positive view of the Archbishop (Survey carried out by RASS between March 1st and March 3rd, and published in newspaper ‘To Paron’ on March 6th 2005). Since the initial drop during the period when the scandals erupted, the Archbishop’s popularity has been steadily rising. A survey carried out by Metronanalysis placed positive attitudes towards Christodoulos at 56.2% in June 2006 and 63.4% in December 2006 (http://www.metronanalysis.gr/gr/polls/pub10110FORUM/index_files/frame.htm).

Although the government called upon the Church to cease its involvement in political affairs, it refused to bring forward any talks regarding the formal separation between Church and State. Notably, the Church agreed to adapt to State demands, by initiating a process of ‘self-cleansing’. ‘After all’, the minister of Education and Religious Affairs stated, ‘none of the two large political parties wished to bring the issue of separation forward in the recent constitutional review...Even if there were a formal constitutional separation, there would still be corruption’ (Minister Marietta Giannakou, quoted in ‘Kathimerini’, February 12th 2005). It is important to note here that during this period, attempts on behalf of politicians, and of the Church itself to defend the close link between Church and State have been carried out along nationalist lines; most involved some sort of mobilisation around matters regarding nationalism and national identity. The close link between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity was once again evoked, stressing the dangers for Hellenism and the ominous future of the Greek nation should Orthodoxy ever be separated from the State. Notably, according to the above-mentioned survey carried out by RASS, 48.5% believed that the revelations of the scandals involving the Church should be attributed to a ‘systematic attempt to harm the status of Orthodoxy and undermine its role’ (To Paron, March 6th 2005).

In September 2005, no more than seven months after the eruption of the scandals, the
government announced its intent to embark upon the establishment of Ecclesiastical Universities, and the upgrade of four existing Ecclesiastical schools to higher education status, thus giving them equal status to Greek universities (Kathimerini, September 23rd 2005). This development was aimed at enhancing the Church's role by increasing the numbers of those joining religious orders and ecclesiastical institutions. The policy became the target of fierce criticisms and claims that the New Democracy centre-right government was forging a special relationship with the Church.

However, both major parties have been opposed to the separation between Church and State in all instances where this has been suggested, which indicates that anti-clericalism remains very low and cuts across party lines. The support for the status quo of centre-left socialist PASOK and centre-right New Democracy, the two parties which together represent the majority of Greece's electorate and have dominated the Greek political scene since the consolidation of democracy in 1974, has been reflected to a great extent in policy-making. Even though certain members of the PASOK Party, (in government for most of the 1981-2004 period) members of left wing parties and, to a limited extent, the intelligentsia, especially those abroad, have engaged in a fierce criticism of the Greek Orthodox Church, in fact rhetoric against the so-called 'threat of living in the religious dark ages' (Kathimerini, September 23rd 2005) has had little resonance in terms of policy. For example, some important reforms- mostly social in scope- took place during the 1980's, including the legalisation of abortion and civil marriage. However, the most radical ones, especially regarding Church property proposed by the 1987 Tritsis Bill were rejected because according to then Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou 'the bond between Orthodoxy and the Greek Church should remain unaffected' (Prodromou, 2004: 475-476).

Despite the seriousness of the scandals, and despite a degree of anti-clerical rhetoric, the position of the Orthodox Church remains in essence largely unchallenged. In 1998, it was decided by an overwhelming parliamentary majority including both PASOK and New Democracy, to exclude the issue of the separation of Church and State from the then upcoming constitutional revision, which took place in 2001 (Mavrogordatos, 2003: 120). In March 2006 the majority of the Greek Parliament, assisted by large numbers of both New Democracy and Pasok MP's rejected a proposal put forward by KKE (the Communist Party

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7 In Greece's two party system the two major parties, the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy (ND) dominate the political scene. In the March 2004 election, the two parties together gathered 85.9% of the votes cast, occupying between them 282 out of the total 300 seats in the Greek Parliament. (Kathimerini, March 8th, 2004)
of Greece), Synaspismos (a centre-left party) and two independent MPs for the separation of Church and State. PASOK representatives denounced the proposal as not ‘mature for Greek society’ (Kathimerini, March 16th 2006). Nothing better illustrates that the foundations of the Church’s legitimacy which lie ultimately in its popular support are still firm. The consensus to accept the status quo position of the Church is very much related to this. As Greek Minister of Education and Religious Affairs Marietta Giannakou stated, ‘it’s not so much the official Church that opposes [the separation], but the people’ (Kathimerini, March 16th 2006). In order to gain popular support political parties are ultimately bound to reflect the will of the electorate.

As in other instances in the past, when during situations of crisis the Church showed flexibility and ability to change and adapt to the State, the Orthodox Church of Greece was able to overcome the huge challenge posed to it to a great extent. It is precisely this nature of Church-State relations, as well as the Church’s ability to act as the rallying point for Greek nationalism that has allowed for its resilience. There is no evidence to support that the 2005 developments regarding the scandals resulted in any drastic changes in the power of the Greek Church. The Greek people appear to believe that such phenomena of corruption are not uncommon.\(^8\) According to the Kapa Research survey published in newspaper ‘To Vima’ on February 13th 2005, 79.5% believed that such phenomena are common and will always exist.

### 3. Research Question

This thesis is concerned with the political relevance of religion, its legitimacy and underlying basis of popular support. Given the fact that both Ireland and Greece are two countries where religion, national identity and politics are linked, and until recently the political relevance of the Church in both countries has been of comparable importance and magnitude,

a) Why is the Church losing its legitimacy and political relevance in Ireland but not in Greece? More specifically, why is the trend to secularise much more accelerated and enjoying far greater popular support in Ireland and not Greece?

\(^8\) According to transparency international data published in October 2005, Greece was in 2005 the most corrupt country among EU-15 (showing an increase of 14% since 1996), and 3rd among the EU-25. (Transparency International, 2005). Corruption in the country is widespread and permeates all aspects of Greek society and political institutions.
And more generally,

b) In societies where traditionally religion, culture and politics are linked, under what circumstances does religion cease to play an increasingly politicised and mobilising role, and under what circumstances is this role retained or even strengthened?

4. Hypothesis

According to Martin (1978), secularisation is not an inevitable development, nor an irreversible process. Rather, it can be described as a trend: based on the specifics of each case in question different secularisation patterns may be discerned. There are instances where secularisation will be inhibited altogether. One such instance is the development of the 'nationalist' or 'cultural defence' pattern: secularisation is expected to be inhibited where the Church has traditionally played the role of cultural defence, and therefore there is a close link between religion and national identity (Martin, 1978, 2005; Bruce 2003). This pattern appears to have explained both the Greek and Irish cases until recently. However, Ireland has now entered a secularising process. In this sense it then constitutes a puzzle. Were we to accept the premise of the above-mentioned theoretical framework then we should expect the role of the Irish Catholic Church to remain largely unchallenged. The question then remains why Ireland is now exhibiting a secularising trend. The thesis accepts the 'cultural defence' paradigm, but attempts to add another dimension to the paradigm, namely the fluid nature of national identities and how this may affect the relationship between religion, national identity and politics.

Based on the premise that national identities are not static, but rather they evolve and become re-interpreted, this thesis identifies two different trends for Greece and Ireland as far as the relationship between religion and national identity is concerned.

a) Ireland is shifting away from the nationalist pattern; in short, Irish national identity is becoming increasingly less defined by Catholicism- or Catholicism is increasingly functioning as a civic rather than ethnic signifier of Irish national identity.

b) Greek national identity remains (perceived as) inextricably linked with Orthodoxy and is understood mostly in ethnic terms.
5. **A Model for Explanation**

The above hypothesis—namely that for societies where there has been an established core link between religion and national identity, secularisation processes are likely if the dynamics of national identity formation change—is dependent on the interaction of two processes, an internal and an external.

a) Internally, the degree to which a Church (in terms of doctrine, organisation and historical circumstances) obstructs the modernisation process—mainly economic and as a consequence, political

b) Externally, the degree to which a given society perceives itself to be under external threat.

This can be applied to Greece and Ireland as illustrated in Figure 3:

**Figure 3: The Dynamic Relationship between Religion and National Identity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National identity as a Dynamic Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Path 1: Greece- National Identity Remains identified with Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Low degree of Church obstruction of the modernisation process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) High External threat perceptions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Path 2: Ireland- National Identity becomes increasingly civic and less identified with religion |
| (a) High Degree of Church Obstruction of the modernisation process |
| (b) Declining External threat perceptions |

(a) The Degree to which the Church Obstructs Modernisation

For the purposes of this thesis, modernisation will be defined as a multi-faceted process of significant societal transformation. According to Huntington (1968), modernisation involves changes in 'all areas of human thought and activity' (Huntington, 1968:32). In this
respect it affects society at various levels, including the social, economic and political. The assumption here is that the Irish Catholic Church obstructs social, economic and political modernisation to a much greater extent than the Greek Church.

The Irish Catholic Church’s emphasis on morality and legalistic interpretations are clashing directly with the impetus for modernisation/liberalisation of Irish politics. The nature of Irish Church-State relations is crucial here: the very rigid nature of Irish Catholicism, monolithic and inflexible, means the Church cannot adapt to new conditions brought about by liberalisation and modernisation. Initially, the nationalist element allowed the Church to acquire its specifically strong political role in Irish society. But throughout the course of the 20th century the Church became associated with a strict framework of moral control, gradually basing its legitimacy on the laity’s adherence to Church rules and regulations rather than the bond between the Church and the Irish nation. The Church’s ‘moral monopoly’ (Inglis, 1998), applied to all aspects of Irish social life, has meant that for a long period of time the State would be adaptive to the Church. The history of the relationship between Church and State in modern Ireland has been one characterised by ‘peaceful coexistence’ (Inglis, 1998) each maintaining the power of the other. Since the 1960’s the State’s attempts for industrialisation and modernisation have led to the break down of this relationship (Inglis, 1998: 78). Attempts to break away from the Church’s monopoly have brought the State in direct confrontation with the Church. As a rational actor the Church has been pursuing its particularly moralistic policies as the only possible way of maintaining its survival.

Since independence, the Irish Catholic Church developed more as a moralistic-legalistic Church rather than the defender of national identity per se. The nationalist aspect of the Church’s discourse was confined to its association with a particular isolationist economic programme (De Valera) which failed to bring economic success to Ireland. The abandonment of this programme has meant that in effect economic modernisation is directly challenging the Church’s ‘moral monopoly’. The ‘all or nothing’ inflexible type of Church-State relations in Ireland have hence entailed frequent confrontations with the State, and because modernisation has meant rapidly changing values in terms of moral issues, the Church has lost its widespread support and legitimacy.

In Greece, on the other hand, economic (not as much as the Republic of Ireland), political and social progress brought about by recent modernisation initiatives has not been
explicitly linked to the Church. The Church is subordinate to the State and shows greater adaptability and ability to conform to the requirements of the State. Its ability to adapt to the secular authority- a remnant of the Byzantine tradition of Church- State relations- and its lack of focus on strict moral issues has meant that the Church is better able to adapt to pressures for change. The Church has not been discredited to a similar extent the Catholic Church has in Ireland, and its legitimacy is not being undermined. Confrontations between Church-State with significant implications have indeed been few, and mostly restricted not to strictly moral issues, but cases which directly threaten the perceived bond between the Church and Greek national identity, such as the identity cards crisis of 2000. And because the Greek Orthodox Church is successful in linking its discourse to the national identity question, it has been able to maintain its widespread basis of support.

(b) Levels of External Threat Perceptions

The focus here is on the paradigm according to which high external threat perceptions tend to have a cohesive effect (Smith, 1981). In Ireland, improving relations with Britain, the agreement on the Northern Ireland question, and economic success associated to a great extent with the EU have brought about a decline in external threat perceptions. This is assisted at the institutional level by Ireland’s decentralised education system and a highly influential revisionist historiography. At the popular level, the loss of faith in De Valera’s isolationist nationalism, which resulted in unsuccessful economic policies and brought poverty to Ireland, has resulted in the disassociation between religion and national identity least because it was explicitly identified with the Church. Low external threat perceptions entail that the Church is no longer successful in mobilising the people around nationalism, and therefore its legitimacy is being directly challenged.

In Greece on the other hand, external threat perceptions deriving from its geopolitical environment- namely unresolved territorial issues with Turkey, instability in the Balkan region, large waves of immigration from non-Orthodox countries and a perceived sense of isolation, in terms of identity, from the rest of EU- continue to be high. Hence, the consensus remains that Greece and its national identity are under threat. Survival of the Greek nation is perceived- and presented- to be dependent, to a great extent, on its association with Orthodoxy, one of the main determinants of its national identity which assisted its survival during the years of Ottoman rule. This perception of the need for the association between Greek national identity and religion is repeatedly institutionalised in
the educational system, official historiography, the media and an influential pro-Church intelligentsia. There is still a perceived need to link national identity with religion, and in this context the Church continues to enjoy legitimacy.

Table 8: A Model for Explanation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High External Threat Perceptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Obstructs Modernisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstructs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernisation</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the interaction of these two processes, the following two diverging paths have developed:
**Figure 4: The Development of the Irish and Greek Patterns**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Greece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Failure (Economic Programme Linked to Church View)</td>
<td>Economic Failure (Economic Programme Not Linked to Church View)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Policy Change in Popular Attitudes (Moral Issues)</td>
<td>Economic Policy Change in Popular Attitudes (Moral Issues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Popular Attitudes (Moral Issues)</td>
<td>Change in Popular Attitudes (Moral Issues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Clashes on Moral Issues</td>
<td>Church does not Clash on Moral Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low External Threat Perceptions</td>
<td>High External Threat Perceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church can Not use Nationalist Mobilisation /Rational to Oppose Moral Liberalisation</td>
<td>Church can Use Nationalist Mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Legitimacy Declines</td>
<td>Church Legitimacy Maintained</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Ireland, the political/nationalist role of the Catholic Church is losing its legitimacy because its religious-nationalist idealised vision of Irish society, rural, pious and Catholic, proved to be largely unsuccessful. It is interesting to note, that both secularisation waves in Ireland, 1960’s and 1990’s, were preceded by economic failure. Post-1922 conservative and defensive Irish Catholic nationalism was associated with a particular economic, social and political programme which has gradually become discredited, ultimately because it failed to bring about economic prosperity and success to Ireland. Irish nationalism is being gradually re-interpreted, changing focus and becoming more secular and more inclusive in order to adapt to the new conditions of a modern, economically successful and competitive Ireland. As a consequence, the signifiers of Irish national identity are shifting from ethnic, such as religion and language, to civic, such as citizenship and the legal framework. Declining external threat perceptions, the product of the Irish economic success within the European Union and the improvement of relations with Britain- mainly in the form of the settlement of the Northern Irish question and the Good Friday agreement- have contributed to the development of a less defensive and more inclusive Irish national identity. The fact that ‘Irishness’ is no longer perceived to be threatened makes justification for the old traditional Catholic nationalist pattern precarious. According to Smith, ‘should religion become petrified and antiquarian, failure of religious reform or petrified conservatism may turn the modes of ethnic self-renewal elsewhere’ (Smith, 1991:35). This is what is happening now in Ireland.

Because of the weakening link between Irish Catholicism and Irish national identity, the discourse of the Irish Catholic Church does not/ can not any longer use nationalism as a rallying point. Although scholars place Ireland in the ‘nationalist pattern’, relations between religion and national identity are not as clear-cut. The fact that the Irish Church developed into a moral monopoly meant its discourse gradually shifted away from national identity to moralistic issues. The Church is finding it difficult to mobilise the people around ‘Irish Catholic nationalism’ because:

- its discourse has been confined till now to a strictly legalistic and moralistic framework
- Irish Catholic nationalism has itself been discredited/weakened
Irish national identity and nationalism, no longer as defensive as in previous years, nor any longer perceived under threat, make it more difficult for the Church to evoke nationalism as a point of unity and stress the ethnic elements of Irish national identity.

In Greece, on the other hand, the Church has not been explicitly linked with a particular social, economic and political programme. National identity signifiers remain the same and are interpreted primarily along ethnic lines: i.e. religion and language. High external threat perceptions, deriving mainly from Greece’s geopolitical environment- the unstable Balkan region and problematic relations with Turkey- and reproduced through official State discourse, have contributed to the continuation of a highly defensive national identity in which the role of religion remains crucial. Greek nationalism, still largely defensive and perceived under threat allows for the Church to use it as its rallying point. In Greece, defence of the Church’s position stems not from references to a vision of a moral and pious society, but almost exclusively from mobilising nationalist sentiments; ‘reminding’ the people of the close link between Hellenism and Orthodoxy and of the impending danger for the future of Hellenism and of the Greek State itself should that link be broken.

6. Chapter Outline

This thesis consists of two parts. Part I is aimed at providing the necessary theoretical and historical setting of the link between religion and national identity in Greece and Ireland in order to justify the comparison between the two case studies, and provide the reader with a basic background of the Church-State-Nation nexus. Following a theoretical overview (Chapter 1), Part I focuses on the origins and consolidation of the ‘nationalist pattern’. Chapter 2 examines the era of imperial conquest and the post-independence nation-building process. Firstly, it attempts to demonstrate how conquest by an Empire of a different religion and the perceived threat of ethnic extinction this posed, served to unite both the Irish and the Greek under an umbrella of a religious national identity. By functioning as a symbol against the Empire, religion became the main force for the preservation of ‘Irish’ and ‘Greek’ identities. And secondly it seeks to analyse how the link between religion and national identity became institutionalised in the era following independence. It was mainly through institutions that this was achieved: the constitutional relationship between Church and State, and other State-run institutions such as the education system helped to legitimise the role of the Church and served to crystallise Irish and Greek religious national identities. This chapter is not meant to provide a full historical
overview; rather its purpose is to establish the link mentioned above between religion and national identity and the institutionalisation of this link and its manifestation in Church-State relations. Therefore the historical overview provided henceforth is selective, focusing only at specific points that are vital for the understanding of the current situation.

Part II deals with the modernisation process and its effects on the Church, State and national identity nexus. Chapter 3 is concerned with the degree to which the Church obstructs the modernisation process, and will attempt to illustrate the impact of economic modernisation on the inner workings of the Greek Orthodox and Irish Catholic Churches. Chapter 4 focuses on external threat perceptions, and illustrates the ways in which different levels of external threat perceptions in the two cases in question impact on the role of the Church. Chapters 5 and 6 are largely empirical and examine the ways in which the interrelationship between the above variables impacts on discourse. Chapter 5 examines official State discourse, including mainly education and historiography; and chapter 6 looks at the two very different Church discourses in Greece and Ireland, and the mobilising capacity of the respective Churches. The chapter will consider the extent to which popular support can be attributed to the ways in which the charismatic Archbishop makes use of high external threat perceptions in Greece, already institutionalised in official State discourse (education), and contrast with the Irish Catholic Church where declining external threat perceptions pose significant difficulties to the Church’s ability to link religion to the survival of the nation. By evoking the link between religion and national identity and utilising the perceived threats posed to Greece’s territorial integrity, national identity, and generally the future of Hellenism should Orthodoxy lose its power, the Greek Church is able to retain its high status. In Ireland, because the emphasis is on morality rather than a threatened national identity this is not possible. The chapter will also compare and contrast the Church scandals which have taken place in the Greek and Irish Churches and the way the two respective Churches attempted to defend their position. In its final section, the thesis concludes with an overview of the theoretical model that has been presented and establishes the link between the themes and findings of each individual chapter. In addition, it points to directions for future research, including a comparison with further cases, notably Cyprus, the new direction of Irish national identity and the role of charisma in religious-nationalist mobilisation.
7. **Time Frame, Methods and Sources**

The focus of this thesis is largely contemporary, seeking to explain events that have taken place within the past two decades in Greece and Ireland. It concentrates on the current resilience of religion in Greece—illustrated by events such as the 2000 identity Cards crisis and the 2007 history textbook case—and the contrasting move for secularisation in Ireland—manifested in events such as the abortion and divorce referendums (1992 and 1995 respectively). Inevitably the thesis contains a historical section which covers the era of imperial conquest and the achievement of national self-determination with a focus on national identity formation, consolidation and continuity, which is considered pivotal in understanding the contemporary situation in the two case studies and the distinctions between them.

The method used in the thesis is a thematic comparison between the Greek and Irish Cases. Using an interdisciplinary approach combining sociology of religion, modernisation and nationalism theories, the thesis puts forward a framework for understanding the role of religion in contemporary Greece and Ireland. Themes compared include the formation, consolidation and reproduction of a religious-based national identity in both cases; the evolution of Church-State relations, in view of identifying the similarities and most importantly the differences between the Greek and Irish examples; the role of external threat perceptions in the re-production of national identity; and the ways in which the role of religion is disseminated through official State institutions—most importantly the education system—and through the Church itself and its official discourse.

A variety of sources are used, including secondary and primary. In terms of the theoretical and historical sections, secondary sources are examined almost exclusively. In order to provide a theoretical background and a model for conceptualising the current divergence between the Greek and Irish cases, theories of secularisation, modernisation, nationalism and national identity are combined. For the historical sections, secondary sources which focus on the history of Greece and Ireland are used to examine, and compare, the history of conquest by an Empire of a different religion and the formation and consolidation of a religious-based national identity and also the history of Church-State relations in the two countries.
In sections which deal with the contemporary situation in the two cases a large number of primary sources are brought in. Data used in the thesis to back the divergence between the two case studies, including Church attendance, numbers of vocations, numbers of religiously affiliated, and numbers of religious personnel, are based on primary - statistical services, population censuses and Human Rights Reports- and secondary sources. Newspaper articles and internet sources are used to highlight recent developments that have made the headlines in Greece and Ireland, and show how they have been dealt with in the media. These developments include the Greek Identity Cards Case (2000), and more specifically the Athens and Thessaloniki Rallies, the introduction of the junior cycle history textbook case (2006), scandals implicating members of the Greek Orthodox Church (2005) and the Irish Catholic Church (1990'2), the controversial Irish Divorce (1995) and abortion (1992) cases. In terms of examining the dissemination of a religious-based national identity through official State institutions, and primarily the education system, the thesis focuses on an analytical comparison of school textbooks and syllabi in chapter 5. And, in its analysis of official Church discourse in chapter 6, the thesis focuses on interviews, speeches, publications and press releases from members of the Greek and Irish clergy.
Part I

Historical Background
Chapter 1

Theoretical Framework

1. Introduction

The following chapter provides a broad theoretical framework within which the main concepts this thesis is concerned with may be conceptualised. The starting point is the secularisation versus religious resurgence debate: although religion is gaining political salience in some contemporary societies, it is being marginalised in others. In order to illustrate the limitations in explaining current developments regarding the role of religion in contemporary societies which are inherent within the various existing interpretations, this chapter attempts to place the Greek and Irish cases within the confines of this debate. It commences with a short overview of the debate itself, and more specifically of theories which attempt to establish the circumstances under which the role of religion is likely to decline or increase, including an analysis of secularisation theories on the one hand, and theories which look at the 'return of religion' on the other. The chapter then proceeds to argue that the existing literature on either spectrum of the debate tackling the question of the role of religion in the social and political spheres fails to provide an adequate understanding of the Greek and Irish cases. By focusing on a theoretical perspective at the core of which lie nationalism and national identity, the chapter then attempts to add another dimension to the existing explanatory framework. The proposed model suggests that national identities are not static, but dynamic processes which become re-interpreted. It identifies two different patterns for the evolution of a religious-based national identity, each based on the interaction of two variables, namely the degree to which a Church obstructs modernisation and the degree to which a given nation perceives itself to be under threat. The latter framework is used as the theoretical 'spine' of the thesis, and is applied to the case studies in subsequent chapters, in an effort to provide a more adequate explanation of developments in Ireland and Greece.
2. Existing Explanations and their Limits

The Secularisation Thesis

According to the secularisation thesis, modernisation brings in its wake 'the diminution of the social significance of religion' (Bruce, 1999:11). Secularisation refers to the declining social power of religion (Wilson, 1966) and can be described as the 'diminishing role of religion in public life' (Martin, 1978). More specifically, Berger holds that social change weakens the hold of religious values and defines secularisation as 'the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the dominance of religious institutions and symbols' (Hardiman and Whelan, 1998: 70). Bruce goes further to define secularisation as 'a social condition manifest in (a) the declining importance of religion for the operation of non-religious roles and institutions such as those of the State and the economy, (b) a decline in the social standing of religious roles and institutions; and (c) a decline in the extent to which people engage in religious practices, display beliefs of a religious kind, and conduct other aspects of their lives in a manner informed by such beliefs' (Bruce, 2002:3).

In short, the secularisation paradigm holds that modernisation is accompanied by secularisation, as the transformations it entails serve to marginalise religion, disentangle it from its social and political functions and push it further into the private sphere. Modernisation brings significant changes at two levels, the structural, which refers to institutions and the ways in which they are organised, and the ideological/intellectual, meaning the introduction of novel ideas resulting in significant mind-set shifts. According to Wallis and Bruce (1999), it is three features of modernisation in particular that contribute to the development of secularisation. The first factor refers to the process of rationalisation which can be best described as resulting in a shift in beliefs and attitudes by freeing the way to empirical inquiry and scientific explanations of phenomena and allowing the emergence of secular visions of the world.

Rationalisation of thought was largely a product of the Reformation which served to 'demythologise the world, eliminate the ritual and sacramental manipulation of God, and restore the process of ethical rationalisation' (Bruce, 2002:6). Central to this is Weber's concept of the 'Protestant Ethic' (Weber, 1992) and in particular, the Calvinist ethic, which Weber argued contributed to the rise of capitalism by effectively influencing large numbers of people to work in the secular world, develop their own enterprises and engage in trade. Certain ideas, which were introduced by the Reformation and in particular the notion of the
‘calling’ and the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, favoured capitalist rationalisation by supplying the moral energy and drive for the capitalist entrepreneur. Therefore Christianity, and in particular Protestantism is more prone to rationalisation than other religions because it ‘allows empirical inquiry and a pragmatic treatment of explaining this world (Bruce, 2002: 6).

Rationalisation is also directly linked to the structural/institutional changes brought about by modernisation. According to Huntington, modernisation impacts on society at an intellectual level, as it involves an expansion and diffusion of knowledge ‘through increased literacy, mass communications and education’ (Huntington, 1968: 33). This in turn is connected to a second feature of modernisation which serves to undermine the social function of religion, namely ‘structural differentiation’, or ‘the fragmentation of social life as specialised roles and institutions are created to handle specific features or functions previously embodied in, or carried out by, one role or institution’(Bruce, 2002: 8). Structural Differentiation contributes to the rise of secularism because specialisation means that institutions and are no longer dominated by the Church but are instead run by specialist professionals. Structural differentiation is accompanied by social differentiation, which implies the distancing and separation of people, what they think and how they act. This entails that with modernisation people begin to think at an individual level, and hence results in the rise of pluralism in terms of intellectual thought. Social fragmentation, and the individualism it entails, inevitably results in the fragmentation of society’s vision of God. In short, social fragmentation favours the rise of a plurality of competing conceptions, and various belief systems rather than the existence of a single dominant one. In cases where the religious tradition is of an authoritarian, single truth nature, with modernisation society will fragment between those who support and those who oppose it. This is well applied to Catholic countries with sharp divisions between strong religious/conservative and strong secular/communist factions (Martin, 1978).

The third feature of modernism which challenges religion refers to the phenomenon of ‘societalisation’, a term coined by Wilson to describe ‘the process by which life is increasingly enmeshed and organised, not locally but societally’(Wilson, 1982: 154). This means that modernisation inevitably entails the demise of the small-scale community, and its eventual replacement by larger units such as modern States with bureaucracies and large urban centres(Bruce, 2002: 13). Religion, however is a collective force embedded in the community. The demise of small-scale community accompanied by increasing
urbanisation, i.e. the 'replacement of community by society', undermines this social function and thus marginalises religion to the private sphere. 'The plausibility of any single overarching moral and religious system declines, to be displaced by competing conceptions which have less connection to role performance in an anonymous and impersonal public domain and more to privatised, individual experience...thus, religion becomes privatised and is pushed to the margins of the social order' (Bruce, 2002:13).

A pivotal and equally difficult task is measuring secularisation. Proponents of the thesis agree that the indicators are somewhat elusive and secularisation is difficult to measure. According to Wilson (1966, 1982), indicators may include:

- Church attendance; although most scholars consult Church attendance patterns, they admit that these can often be misleading. Failure to attend Church does not necessarily refer to a rejection of traditional religious values. Attendance may vary for historical or doctrinal reasons. For example, attending Mass is a much more important requirement for a Catholic, as Catholicism is characterised by a legalistic adherence to rules and regulations, than it is for a Protestant or an Orthodox Christian. There may also be different motivations prompting Church attendance, including assertions of group solidarity or claims to social standing (Wilson in Bruce, 2002:196). Although Church attendance in itself may be considered a precarious indicator however, it can be useful in conjunction with other indicators in hinting that a transformation is taking place in terms of the role of religion. In addition, a comparison of Church attendance levels within the same society through time indicating a decline is significant in exemplifying a secularising trend.

- The rise in the number of the non-religiously affiliated; similarly to Church attendance levels this indicator does not necessarily imply that religion is losing its social and political salience. It does serve to indicate however popular attitudes towards traditional religious values may be changing.

- A Decline in the number of vocations and religious professionals; again, doctrinal considerations play a significant role here. A decline in the number of people entering Priesthood is much more important for Churches with a highly hierarchical organisation whose involvement in political and social institutions depends largely on religious professionals; For example, Ireland in the 1950's and 1960's where
important social sectors, such as education and health, where run almost exclusively by nuns and brothers. Still, a decline in the numbers of vocations accompanied by a decline in Church attendance levels and a rise in the number of religiously non-affiliated does indicate that social adherence to the Church is experiencing a downward trend.

- The most accurate indicators of secularising tendencies are those which illustrate the decline of the role of religion in terms of its significance for the operation and organisation of the social and political system. In other words, the separation of religious institutions from political ones. According to Wilson, the loss of the traditional roles which religion once performed, including ‘providing legitimacy for secular authority and endorsing or even sanctioning public policy, is the core of the secularisation thesis’ (Wilson in Bruce, 2002:200). However, according to some analysts (Stavrakakis, 2002) even the most formal institutional separation of the religious and the secular spheres- i.e. the constitutional separation between Church and State does not always indicate the establishment of a secularised society. For example, although the constitutional separation of Church and State is one of the founding pillars of the US, the politicisation of religion is even there to a degree prominent, perhaps more so than ever following the events of September 11th given the rise the rise of support for the Christian right. According to Stavrakakis, ‘although social differentiation is both a reality and a necessity for the reproduction of modern societies it does not entail the strict separation between specialised areas of the social...in that sense religion is interconnected with the other elements of society and culture in complex way’ (Stavrakakis, 2002: 20).

Despite the acknowledged difficulty of measuring secularisation, and most importantly the varying degrees to which contemporary societies exhibit secularising tendencies, generally speaking, according to Martin, broad tendencies towards secularisation in modern societies that have been established include:

(a) Religious institutions are adversely affected to the extent that an area is dominated by heavy industry; (b) they are the more adversely affected if the area concerned is homogeneously proletarian; (c) Religious practice declines proportionately with the size of an urban concentration; (d) Geographical and social mobility erodes stable religious communities organised on a territorial basis; it also contributes to a relativisation of perspectives through extended culture contact; (e) The Church becomes institutionally differentiated in response to
the differentiation of society, notably into pluriform denominations and sects; and (f) The Church becomes partially differentiated from other institutional spheres such as: justice, ideological legitimation, the State apparatus, social control, education and welfare. And this is paralleled compartmentalisation of an individual's religious role, which may encourage a role of variation in personal religion which contributes to institutional disintegration (Martin, 1978: 2-3).

This is not however inevitable which is why Martin argues he can be seen both as a critic and a theorist of secularisation: his approach has constituted an attempt to turn the theory from 'an inevitable trend into something that happened this way, or alternatively in that according to historical circumstances' (Martin, 2005: 20). Proponents of the paradigm do not claim that secularisation is an inevitable or universal trend, nor that religion will disappear in the modern world. It most certainly does not imply a decline of belief in God, or an end result in atheism but it does hold that modernisation results in the privatisation of religion. Secularisation is neither a linear, clear-cut nor necessarily long term process. Rather than being a 'grand theory' it refers to identifying 'tendencies which are to be observed in certain definable circumstances and not in others, and moreover these circumstances need to be seen as varying greatly according to historical context' (Martin, 2005: 17). It is generally held that secularisation theory can be better applied in Western Europe, which meets several of the conditions for secularisation, such as the rationality propensity of Christian thought, attitudes favouring individualism and pluralism and differentiated institutions.

The 'Revenge of God': The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism and the 'Clash of Civilisations'

Secularisation theory enjoyed widespread support during the 1950's and 1960's, as it was considered to provide a viable explanation of why religion was gradually losing its political and social salience in many Western societies at the time. Yet, contrary to its predictions, recent years have witnessed the opposite trend: a wave of popular religiosity and a return of religion in politics on a global scale. Although secularisation theory may have pointed to developments which took place in Western Europe, other areas world-wide appeared immune; and the paradigm became increasingly discredited. According to Huntington (1996), since the 1970's the phenomenon of secularisation has gone into reverse: a global resurgence of religion is occurring everywhere, in every religion and every civilisation. One of the best known examples is Iran: at a time when secularisation was perceived to be
the norm, the 1979 Islamic revolution surprised most scholars. It elevated a cleric class to ruling status and replaced a modernising secular monarchy for an Islamic Republic, in which supreme authority lies in the hands of a religious leader. One of the most interesting observations that can be made about the Iranian case is that the revolution occurred at a time when Iran was rapidly modernising. As a logical consequence of the secularisation paradigm, the processes of modernisation should have led to secularism; but on the contrary, Iran became a theocracy.

Although the case of Iran is unique in terms of the radical and revolutionary character of its religious movement, and also in that the movement succeeded in overthrowing the secular monarch and resulted in the establishment of a theocratic regime, this case can be understood as part of a broader trend of religious movements, which seek a return of religion in politics. Indeed popular support for the reaffirmation of religious values has proliferated since the mid-1970’s everywhere in the world. Whether of the world of Islam, Judaism or Christianity, regardless of region, technological advancement and economic development, this new trend of popular religiosity has manifested itself in every corner of the globe. According to Juergensmeyer (1993, 2000), recent years have witnessed a significant rise in religious violence, as religion is increasingly seen as the motive behind numerous acts of religious terrorism in the modern world. The destruction of the federal building at Oklahoma City in 1995, the explosion at the world trade centre in New York in 1993, numerous explosions in Jerusalem, Sri Lanka and Belfast, and explosions in the UK perpetrated by the IRA, the September 11th terrorist attack, and since then, a number of terrorist attacks against for example Bali, Egypt, Madrid and London have been carried out in the name of ‘holy war’. They are all instances of terror which share one common motivation and justification: religion. ‘In many of these cases, religion has supplied not only the ideology but also the motivation and the organisational structure for the perpetrators’ (Juergensmeyer, 2000:5). International religious terrorist groups have increased from 16 of the total 49 terrorist groups identified in 1994, to 26 of the total 56 terrorist groups identified in 1995, making ‘religion and ethnic identity one of the most important security challenges we face in the wake of the cold war’ (US Secretary of State Waren Christopher quoted in Juergensmeyer, 2000:6).

Perhaps one of the most interesting facts about the renaissance of religion is that it is not at all confined to the third world; rather, ‘it is present even in the centre of the secularised West, and in particular, the USA’(Stavrakakis, 2002: 18). These phenomena have probed
secularisation theorists to stress the non-monolithic character of the paradigm, or question what might perhaps be the exceptional feature of Western Europe and Christianity which is lacking in other cases (Berger, in Martin 1978:23).

A number of scholars seeking to explain this phenomenon attribute the re-affirmation of religious identity to the crisis of modernity: the latter and the ills of contemporary society which accompany it, are more likely to breed religious resurgence than secularism. For Juergensmeyer it is in fact secular nationalism rather than religion that has gone wrong, at least in the eyes of those who initiate or give popular support to religious movements. For them contemporary secular society brings but disenchantment, despair and corruption in the absence of a moral community. But expectations of a religious crusade can bring about radical hope of a new world. The rise of religious nationalism is therefore explained in terms of the failure of western models of nationhood. In this instance religion represents 'a hopeful alternative, a base for criticism and change' (Juergensmeyer, 1993:3). In this sense religious nationalism represents the failure of secular nationalism.

In his 'Clash of Civilisations', Huntington identifies social, economic and cultural modernisation as the underlying cause of this phenomenon, precisely because it has disrupted 'long-standing sources of identity and systems of authority' (Huntington, 1996:97). According to Huntington, 'the religious resurgence throughout the world is a reaction against secularism, moral relativism and self-indulgence and a reaffirmation of the values of order, discipline, work, mutual help and human solidarity' (Huntington, 1996:98). Stavrakakis contends that the incapacity of 'secular reason to resolve both practical and metaphysical questions (the so-called crisis of modernity), the collapse of the ideological imaginary of the cold war, and the various dislocations produced in the course of globalisation have led to ...the return of religion, a return that takes a variety of forms, from Islamic fundamentalism to New Age mysticism' (Stavrakakis, 2002:18).

Similarly, Haynes (1995) claims that the renaissance of religious traditions is to be found in the failure of modernism. Rather than secularisation, modernity has brought with it a deep sense of disenchantment and alienation which people have sought to counter by returning to religion. And Kepel, describes the 'revenge of God', as he aptly terms religious resurgence, as 'the undeniable evidence of a deep malaise in society' (Kepel, 1994:4). Movements seeking God's return in politics are 'true children of our time: unwanted children perhaps, bastards of computerisation and unemployment or of the population
explosion and increasing literacy' (Kepel, 1994:11). Kepel makes another observation worth noting. Popular support for religion and its political orientation is not confined to the more traditional and conservative elements of society. On the contrary, religious supporters include 'a high proportion of people, young or not so young, who have been through secular education' (Kepel, 1994:4). This observation comes in direct contrast with the secularisation paradigm which expects precisely such groups to become the driving secularising forces within society. Rather, religion appears to have a broad social base of mobilisation, cutting across class, region, age or sex. This is precisely because it functions as a replacement of the failed secular utopian ideologies, such as communism. The discrediting of what Kepel terms 'earthly utopias' has meant the return of god in political affairs: 'Like the workers' movements of yesteryear, today's religious movements have a singular capacity to reveal the ills of society, for which they have their own diagnosis' (Kepel, 1994:11). The demise of communism as a mobilising ideology leaves few alternatives: religion offers one such alternative to those for whom modernisation has failed or is in some way unattractive (Haynes, 1995:34).

'Cultural Defence' and the Development of the 'Nationalist Pattern'

It is puzzling that there is an element of truth on both sides of the debate. Modernisation has brought about the diminishing role of religion in public life in some instances, but it has also resulted in a religious revival, or maintenance of Church power in others. Ireland and Greece are pertinent examples of the adverse effect modernisation can have on the role of religion, and of the Church more specifically, in society. In Ireland, the result has been an intensifying tendency towards secularisation. Instead of discontent manifesting itself in some form of radical religiosity, the recent modernisation wave in Ireland has brought with it the decline of the role of the Catholic Church. On the other hand in Greece, the Church's legitimacy and the social/political role of religion have been altered very little. If anything, the Church is holding strong, retaining its status and basis of popular support.

Should one wish to research this adverse impact of modernisation, a more detailed examination of the particular patterns identified in the secularisation thesis is instructive. As it has already been pointed out, the secularisation paradigm is not at all intended to be a universal model (Bruce, 2002: 37). Martin insists that the secularisation thesis should not be treated as dogma: 'the thesis, points out processes not in the sense that they must happen, but in the sense that they tend to occur' other things being equal. In other words it
identifies tendencies given particular circumstances' (Martin, 1978:3). The impact of modernisation on the social significance of religion will not always be the same in every case and secularisation is likely to develop in different patterns depending on specific historical circumstances (Martin, 2005). Not all societies in the world are at the same level of their development, and therefore they do not experience the processes of modernisation at the same time. Depending on these variables, basic patterns of behaviour can be observed. Variations of outcome can be accounted for by differences in theology, Church-State relations, the relationship between religion and ethnicity, and of course, the status of the Church during the course of modernisation.

The paradigm allows not only for variations, but also for exceptions, cases where secularisation will be inhibited. According to Bruce, 'religion diminishes in social significance, become increasingly privatised and lose personal salience except where it finds work to do other than relating individuals to the supernatural. Such work can be described under two broad headings: 'cultural defence' and 'cultural transition' (Bruce, 2002:30). Therefore, an inextricable link between religion and national identity places limits to secularisation. 'Cultural defence' refers to situations where 'culture, identity, and sense of worth are challenged by a source promoting either an alien religion or rampant secularism and that source is negatively valued secularisation will be inhibited' (Bruce, 2002:30-31). In other words, when national identity is perceived to be threatened, religion (and Church) functions as an expression of protest and opposition to attempts which seek to 'impose alien cultural values and identities upon a reluctant populace' (Bruce, 2002:16), or to eradicate religious values altogether in the name of modernity. Religion will therefore not diminish in significance where it plays a historic role as guardian of culture and carrier of national identity. According to Martin in societies where religion has stood in for the State under conditions of external domination or external threat, the latter will be highly praised; 'An indissoluble union of Church and nation arises, in those situations where the Church has been the sole available vehicle of nationality against foreign domination. Examples of such cases include Greece, Poland, Belgium, Ireland and Croatia (Martin, 1978:107). In these case, religion is 'reinforced by the heightened self-consciousness of a threatened or dominated nation and ...there is the further reinforcement of proximity to a major religio-political border' (Martin, 2005:61). Bruce argues that 'all major cultural defence cases involve religion (or the Church), continuing to play a role as the embodiment of collective identity. None of them is an example of a religion acquiring this role after it has been lost' (Bruce, 2002:33).
This model can be applied to both post-independence Greece and Ireland. In both cases, national identity and religion are fused, and the latter is seen as the defender of the former. Irrespective of the fact that they belong to a different branch of Christianity, they share a very important feature: a religious based national identity. They can both be described as instances of cultural defence, where the traditional role of the Church is that of protecting national identity.

In the (Catholic) Irish case there is the role of nationalism in relation to alien governance and proximity to a rival protestant nationalism, as well as geopolitical position...Greece also presents ambiguous elements based on its dual role as heir to Byzantium at a major border with Islam and as progenitor to Western rationality and democracy. Its religious nationalism has been reinforced by the history of Ottoman domination and by the way in which it has both received a diaspora and created one (Martin, 2005: 60).

To summarise the above, when the Church plays the role of carrier of national identity, and becomes the focus of resistance to a conqueror, then secularisation does not occur or the process is delayed. ‘In short, in considering the State of religion one has to take into account how far it is or is not aligned with the national project and how united or divided the nation is with respect to what lies at the heart of that project’ (Martin, 2005:133). In situations, following independence, the case in question develops along the lines of a particular pattern of Church-State relations, what Martin terms ‘the nationalist pattern’. This involves a close relationship between Church and State, whether constitutionally formalised or not. Such societies tend to be highly monopolistic and represent an instance of extreme collusion between Church and State.

Table 1.1: The ‘Nationalist Pattern’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Nationalist Pattern</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Pluralism</td>
<td>Very low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Clericalism</td>
<td>Very low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical status</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultic Participation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal religious Conservatism</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectualism in Religion</td>
<td>High and low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of Democracy</td>
<td>Varied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Influence</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic political orientation</td>
<td>Mostly right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Religion</td>
<td>Pro-religious</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
National Identity and Nationalism

Should one accept the premises of this theoretical framework, they would arrive to the conclusion that although the Greek case is explained, Ireland still constitutes a paradox, because, although it can clearly be seen as belonging to the ‘nationalist pattern’, it is nevertheless exhibiting secularising tendencies. Proceeding to an inquiry into why this phenomenon is taking place and Greece and Ireland are beginning to differ in terms of Church power, requires—mainly for clarification and definitional purposes—a more detailed focus on the concepts of ‘national identity’ and ‘nationalism’ which are so central to the cultural defence paradigm.

Firstly, it is necessary to specify these terms, and more specifically, to contextualise national identity and identify the circumstances under which it is more likely to be religious based. According to Smith, national identity refers to ‘the maintenance and continuous reproduction of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations and the identification of individuals with that heritage and those values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions’ (Smith, 2000: 796). It is the ‘process whereby a nation is reconstructed over time’ (Zimmer, 2003: 173). National identity is largely based on each nation’s members’ perception of their nation. It refers thus to self categorisation— the ‘self’ referring to a group, meaning the nation. ‘Our’ national identity is perceived as unique and distinct from any other, and is thus understood largely in terms of what it is not, and who it is defined against; it is perceived as possessing exceptional traits, specific characteristics which distinguish ‘our’ national identity from that of the ‘other’.

The term ‘nation’ is key to understanding national identity, but it is equally, if not more, complex to define. Definitions of the nation are various and range from pre-modern to modern, organic or voluntary, primordial or imagined, ethnic or civic. Regardless of which definition one chooses to accept, from Renan’s ‘daily plebiscite’ (Renan in Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:17), Weber’s ‘community of sentiment’ (Weber in Hutchinson and Smith,
1994:22), to Smith’s ‘named human population occupying a historic territory, sharing common myths and memories, a mass public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members’ (Smith, 2000:796), the nation provides the best accepted way of group self identification in the modern world. National identity draws the nation together. In this sense it is a form of cohesion, a source of solidarity and unity. For Smith, the pattern of shared symbols, myths and memories ‘bind successive generations while demarcating them from outsiders’ (Smith, 1991:25). And as Billig suggests, it is a form of life, experienced on a daily basis, a constant reminder of nationhood, subtly reproduced and ‘found in the embodied habits of social life’ (Billig, 1995:8). One of the prime functions of national identity is to provide a social bond through the repertoire of shared values, symbols and traditions. ‘It is through the use of certain symbols, such as flags, coinage, anthems, uniforms, monuments and ceremonies that members are reminded of their common heritage and cultural kinship’ (Smith, 1991: 16).

Civic and Ethnic National Identities

The concepts of nation and national identity are instructive when trying to understand and appreciate the role of religion in cases such as Greece and Ireland. The classic distinction between two different concepts of the nation, Eastern and Western or Ethnic and Civic, is significant in conceptualising this role. According to Kohn, the consequences of the Renaissance and Reformation led to the establishment of very different types of nationalism: the Western type, rooted in politics and connected with liberty, rationality, and civic elements which arose in Western Europe, and the Eastern type, bonded not by will but ethnic descent and traditional types of kinship and status which developed in Germany (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:165). Smith’s model distinguishes between the civic-territorial and the ethnic- genealogical types of nation (Smith, 1991: 82). The former emphasises historic territory, legal political community and a civic culture, and is thus a voluntary, inclusive community; the latter places its emphasis on a community of birth and a native culture and is therefore an exclusive organic entity.

Zimmer (2003: 175-177) identifies three basic dichotomies between the civic and ethnic perceptions of national identity that are instructive. The first refers to the distinction between the voluntary nature of civic identity and by extension its inclusiveness and the pre-determined organic nature of ethnic identity and by extension its exclusiveness. Membership of civic nations is determined by voluntary will, a ‘daily plebiscite’ as Renan
has famously remarked. On the other hand, membership to ethnic nations is organic, determined by birth and ethnic descent and cannot be chosen. Zimmer's second dichotomy is that between the State-centeredness of a civic nation, deriving from an emphasis on institutional frameworks and political structures, and the culture-centredness of an ethnic nation related to shared cultural bonds such as language, religion and genealogical descent.

The former 'is expected to emerge where the State developed prior to or coincided with the emergence of nationalism, such as England or France', while the latter occurs 'where the realisation of a national State was protracted and contentious as was the case for example in Germany' (Zimmer, 2003:176). The final dichotomy Zimmer refers to is the one between the modernist conception of the nation Vs the conception which places an emphasis on a nation's pre-modern past. Civic nationalism is associated with a modernist outlook, mainly concerned with the development of the nation as a political and cultural community in the present whereas ethnic nationalism tends to stress the evolutionary development of nations through history.

Although the distinction between civic and ethnic national identities is not clear-cut in practice, it is helpful in appreciating the implications of this dichotomy for certain types of nationalism. Undoubtedly, both Greece and Ireland exhibit some civic elements. Indeed as Smith notes, their members are legal citizens, also defining themselves in territorial terms. But, citizenship and inclusion criteria are largely premised on religious/ethnic terms. For example in Greece, despite constitutional guarantees for minority religions (civic element), in practice non-Orthodox groups experience a degree of discrimination. Such examples of ethnic criteria of inclusion to the Greek nation, set out in the introduction, include the lack of formal places of worship for Muslims, exemption from military service for Jehovah's witnesses, discrimination against teachers who do not adhere to the orthodox faith in schools and generally exclusion from certain, especially high ranking professions. Greece and Ireland are better understood in terms of the ethnic-genealogical model, as ultimately 'the basis of their kind of national identity remains true to its demotic roots; the national identity created by intellectuals and intelligentsia among formerly vertical ethnics strives to stay close to its putative ethnic culture and boundaries' (Smith, 1991:129).

Both Ireland and Greece fulfil the criteria of ‘ethnic nations’. They constitute classic cases of ‘ethnic separatism’; their national self determination movements- whose concept of the nation was basically ethnic and genealogical- sought to secede from the Ottoman and British Empires and set up a new political ethno-nation in its place. Thus, ‘the liberty of the
nation and the freedom of its citizens are inextricably bound up with a sense of national mission and destiny that express the authentic national identity of the members of a national community' (Smith, 1999:334). Irish and Greek nationalisms- or rather the nationalisms of the dominant groups within the Irish and Greek nations- emphasise ties of common descent, customs, traditions and native culture expressed largely in terms of religion: in this sense they are exclusive types of nationalism. If one does not possess certain traits by birth, then it is highly unlikely that one will be accepted as a member of the Greek and Irish nations. As Smith puts it, in the ethnic model, one has no choice: ‘whether one emigrates or not, one remains organically a member of the community of his birth’ (Smith, A.D, 1991:1). In this sense, Smith’s proposition that national identity is drawn from pre-existing traditions which are crystallised in an extensive pattern of symbols, myths, rituals and representations through which they are then passed from one generation to the next provides a better framework for the understanding of Greek and Irish nationalisms. 'Modern nationalism in part can be seen as deriving from powerful external pre-modern traditions, symbols and myths which are then taken up and recast in the nationalist ideologies of national mission and destiny as these emerge in the crucible of modernisation' (Smith, 1999:332).

The Greek and the Irish perceive the cultural traditions from which their national identities are drawn to have existed before the attainment of their statehood. This is crucial because it gives national identity and the nation a prime role in these countries, and legitimises the role of religion as the main force for its preservation. Whether or not Greek and Irish nationalism is a modern phenomenon, made possible only by the technology and political structures of the modern world, their national identity is perceived to be deeply rooted by their members, and so its significance constitutes a reality in a sense. Above all, what is most important about national identity and nations is not whether they are pre-modern or modern phenomena, but how they are perceived by their members. According to Connor, ‘identity does not draw its sustenance from facts but from perceptions; not from chronological/factual history, but from sentient/ felt history’ (Connor, 2004: 45). For one thing, not many Greeks or Irish accept their nation to be a modern construction, nor do they believe their national identity has emerged from a vacuum.
Religion as an Ethnic Signifier of National Identities:  
Circumstances under which National Identity becomes fused with Religion

Scholarly work placed on the modernist side of the debate surrounding the emergence of nations considers religion and nationalism to often be mutually exclusive, as they are both seen as belonging to different chronological eras. According to this perspective, the term nationalism, whether an ideology, a movement or a collective emotional force has clear political connotations and is directly associated with the political structures brought about by modernity. Thus, one cannot talk of its existence in the pre-modern times; rather, nationalism belongs to the realm of the modern world which has substituted religion as a unifying, overarching ideology. For example, according to Anderson, 'in Western Europe the eighteenth century marks not only the dawn of the age of nationalism but the dusk of religious modes of thought' (Anderson, 1991:11). But still religion can inform nationalism; religion lends some of its characteristics to nationalism. A common interpretation is the secular replacement model, which argues that nationalism has replaced the religious traditions prevalent in previous social order but performs a similar function since both have the unique capacity to awaken in people powerful emotions of self-sacrifice. In order to explain the passion for sacrifice and violence that nationalism is able to generate, Anderson suggests that 'nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which-as well as against which- it came into being'- i.e. the religious community (Anderson, 1001:12). Religious discourse has specific qualities that can be used for nationalist purposes. For example, 'if the nation is something to die for, religion offers ways to understand sacrifice and to remember and deliberate those who have died for the nation' (Van Der Veer and Lehmann, 1999:8). According to Kedourie, nationalism is not just a secular ideology, but instead a kind of religion in a secularised form. Or rather, a 'secularised version of mediaeval millennialism... a form of Christian heterodoxy'(Smith, 2000:794): 'we may say in short that the mainspring of nationalism in Africa and Asia is the same secular millennialism which had its rise and development in Europe and in which society is subjected to the will of handful of visionaries who to achieve their vision must destroy all barriers between private and public' (Kedourie in Smith, 2000: 794).

However, as modern nationalisms around the globe illustrate, the relationship between religion and nationalism need not always be contradictory. Often, the latter draws from the former, not only in terms of an eschatological vision, or the attainment of statehood through
sacrifice; it can also be the case that religion provides an element on which the preservation and reproduction of national identity is based. Pre-modern ethnic signifiers, such as religion, transcend into the modern era as they have the unique capacity of drawing the nation together, mobilising its members and generating among them powerful emotions of belonging. Along with language, religion can constitute a powerful national identity signifier, and in this sense provide an inspiration and sense of cohesion for the nation. Although it is widely accepted that nationalism is a secular phenomenon, it has often been the case that modern mass nationalism has been defined by religion, for example in cases where the nation sees, and identifies itself in opposition to ‘a hostile neighbour or historical oppressor’ (Lieven, 2000: 125). According to Mavrogordatos,

Religion provides a primordial line of demarcation, which may be far superior to any other. It is certainly more readily identifiable, clear-cut, exclusive and impermeable than language, ancestry or any other relevant criterion. Occasional syncretism notwithstanding, it does not even make sense to say one is of mixed religion whereas many are bilingual or of mixed blood’ (Mavrogordatos, 2003: 117).

In this sense, religious traditions may potentially constitute sources of identity formation, maintenance and re-interpretation.

There are various ways in which a national identity can take a religious character. In his analysis, Smith identifies several means of promoting a religious-based national identity. One is through religious institutions; another is through ‘the powerful repertoire of myths of election which religion can provide’ (Smith, 2000: 796). Organised religion can be an important force for the preservation and maintenance of national identities, for a number of reasons. Firstly, ‘because very often the heroes of the ethnic community are also those of religious lore and tradition, for example founders of the ethnic community, as is Ireland’s St Patrick. In such heroes we can find the authentic qualities of the ‘nation’ ...what matters is the virtues and qualities they embody, and the message of hope they proclaim’ (Smith, 2003: 41) Secondly, a nation’s ‘golden past’ often associates the history of the nation with religion. This is also connected with the notion of a sacred homeland, the collective identification of territory with religion. Moreover, the liturgy and rites of the Church or community of the faithful supply the texts, prayers, chants, feasts, ceremonies and customs, sometimes even the scripts of distinctive ethnic communities, setting them apart from their neighbours. Priests and scribes becomes the ‘guardians of tradition’, who record, preserve and transmit the fund of ethnic myths, memories, symbols and values encased in sacred
A very important theme to consider here is religion's unifying function. In Durkheim's definition, religion refers to 'a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and surrounded by prohibitions—beliefs and practices that unite its adherents in a single moral community called a Church' (Durkheim, 2001:46). According to this functional understanding, all religions perform a similar function in society. They are the 'glue' that holds a society together through successive generations. Through time, religion becomes a symbol of societal cohesion and indeed a symbol of the society itself; its eradication could entail the demise of the community. In the ancient world, destruction of a State's or a community's gods and temples was seen as the means of destroying that community. The aim was the eradication of the group's culture rather than the group itself (Smith, 1991:25). Society has a 'tendency to create Gods, in order to 'remake itself periodically in a moral sense and thereby uphold its identity through rites and ceremonies' (Smith, 2000: 798). It will defend its Gods, in an instance of real or perceived threat, in order to retain its own distinct identity; it will seek to re-affirm its religious values in order to ensure its own survival. Organised religion can thus play a conserving role 'ensuring a high degree of formal continuity between generations and from community to community'(Smith, 1993: 34). For Durkheim it is precisely the element of the Church around which religion is organised which 'suggests that religion must be something eminently collective' (Durkheim, 2001: 46).

Old myths can be revived in order to modify historical processes. Memory is responsible for holding society together. The fusion of religious and national elements can be manifested in multiple forms, such as the transformation of traditional prophets into national heroes, of religious revelation into national shrines, of religious miracles into national epics. Such processes, which take place principally in the course of nation-building, aim at ensuring the perpetuation of the community through national identity. So although national identity is a modern phenomenon formed only in the era of nations and nationalism, it is only logical that it is based on some previous form of, potentially religious in context, identification of the community in question. As Smith argues 'the central categories of nationalist thought derive from older ethno-religious motifs and beliefs, which they have combined, redirected, and in varying degrees transformed for few political ends' (Smith, 2000:798)
Conquest, National Self Determination and the Concept of External Threat

Smith's older 'ethno-religious motifs', or forms of identification, are often created, maintained and/or reinforced in instances of threat which imperial conquest or a hostile geopolitical environment can create. Imperial domination, neighbour aggression or perceived 'great power imperialism' and the threat they pose serve to reinforce the distinction between 'us' and 'them'; and so defending one's God from an 'infidel' power becomes imperative for defending the community's own survival. Thus, religion and community potentially merge. For this reason the role of external threat posed in the past by imperial structures or in the present by great powers with perceived imperialist or expansionist tendencies is crucial to national identity; empires contribute largely to the self-identification of the peoples they conquered. Often national identity was in fact formed or 'constructed' during the period of imperial rule. The perceived threatening great powers of today serve as a way of reproducing the national identities of today's Nation-States in a similar fashion.

Empire

A critical element here is what Lieven refers to as the most crucial dilemma inherent in every empire: accommodating multi-ethnicity (Lieven, 2000). By definition, empires are vast, multi-ethnic polities, and this is exactly what imperial strategies of ethnic accommodation refer to: a way of bringing different ethnicities, peoples, institutions, religions, ideas and outlooks—needless to say often conflicting ones—under a single rule. This is the principal way in which empire affects religious identities: in the way that the State deals with institutions and people that worship a different religion. Historically, different empires have treated their minorities in different ways. But the policies they chose proved crucial for the very survival of the empire; once too often, such policies brought about the collapse of empire.

The consequences not only affected the imperial core, but also for the periphery: the 'conquered' peoples within the Empire. As far as religion and identity are concerned, the impact can be seen on two levels and their interaction. Firstly, the institutional level, i.e. the status and role of the Church during captivity; and secondly the symbolic level i.e. fear of loss of one's distinctive identity, with religion taking the form of reaction against imperial oppression. Institutionalisation of belief, especially rigid and intolerant belief, deepens the rift between 'us' and 'them' within an Empire as it may well entail excluding policies and
intolerant attitudes. Whenever a people feels threatened in its 'distinctive existence by the advance of a power committed to another religion, the political conflict is likely to have superimposed upon it a sense of religious conflict, almost crusade, so that national identity becomes fused with religious identity' (Lieven, D, 2000:190). As Hastings notes, on a symbolic level, external domination re-enforces the 'absolute duty of loyalty to the horizontal fellowship of 'us' and the moral gap separating us from the other, from the threat to our freedom, religion and laws that they constitute' (Hastings, A, 1997:191). It enhances solidarity, as it serves to unite various factions within society- often with conflicting outlooks- under one common cause.

**Nation-building**

The nation-building process which occurs following the attainment of independent statehood crystallises national identity by setting the political and institutional framework within which the new State will function (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1998; Smith, 1986; Hobsbawm, 2000). According to Hobsbawm, nation-building is an essential process, mainly aimed at ensuring citizen loyalty to and identification with the State and the ruling system (Hobsbawm, 1990:82). During the pre-modern era, means by which loyalty was ensured included religion and social hierarchy. With the increasing modernisation of the 19th and 20th centuries however, this was no longer possible. 'Obviously the democratisation of politics...both placed the question of the nation and the citizens feelings towards whatever he regarded as his nation, nationality or other centre of loyalty at the top of the political agenda' (Hobsbawm, 1990:83). Identification with a people or nation proved a good way of solving the problem of legitimacy: 'What else could legitimise the monarchies of States which had never previously existed, such as Greece' (Hobsbawm, 1990: 84)? Thus the purpose of the nation-building process is to ensure the cohesion of the nation by promoting a sense of common identity and ensuring that the nation possesses the attributes of an 'ethnie' (Smith, 1991). This includes an attempt to foster a myth of 'common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture and thus a sense of solidarity for significant sections of the population' (Smith, 1991: 26).

Seeing, however, the consolidation of national identity as complete manipulation from above is missing the wider picture. Hobsbawm admits that nation-building was most successful 'when they could build on already present unofficial nationalisms' (Hobsbawm,
1990: 92). 'The politicisation of an ethnic’s cultural heritage takes place through the cultivation of its poetic spaces and the commemoration of its golden ages' (Smith, 1991:127). This involves identifying a sacred territory that historically belonged to a particular community, turning the natural features of the homeland into historical ones and celebrating and commemorating the community’s historic past. This process delineates the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and reinforces the bond that hold the nation together. Thus, the nation-building process consolidates national identity and sets in motion the mechanisms which will allow for its reproduction. Such mechanisms are mostly State-generated, but non-State generated sources can assist the process as well. Mechanisms under the former category include the education system, official State-sponsored historiography and the institutionalisation of a political Church- for example, religious laws, sacraments etc. The arts can have a very important role in shaping national identity.

Who more than poets, musicians, painters and sculptors, could bring the national ideal to life and disseminate it among the people? In this respect a David, a Mickiewicz and a Sibelius were worth more than several battalions of Father Jahn’s Turnerschaften, and a Yeats as much as the hurling societies of the Gaelic association (Smith, 1991:92).

When the pre-statehood signifiers of national identity include religion, then a religious-based national identity will be reflected in the nation-building framework. The signifiers are carried through what constituted the main source of cohesion within the community and delineation from the ‘other’ during the era of empire, so religion becomes prime ethnic signifier. When external threat perceptions continue to be high, in terms of a fear of loss of territorial integrity, aggressive neighbours, and hostile powers, domestic actors are better able to foster a threatened national identity and make the prime signifiers- in this case religion- important. According to Hastings, the nation-building process is indeed significant for consolidating the role of religion in the nation. He argues that in fact every ethnicity is shaped significantly by religion, and the extent to which this has occurred directly affects the relationship between religion and nationalism. ‘The more influential religion was in the latter (nation-construction), the more it is likely also to influence every expression of the former (nationalism), whereas a nation whose basic construction owes little to religious factors is far less likely later to generate nationalism with a religious character to it’ (Hastings, 1997: 187). Christianity, more than any other religion, has contributed to national formation, and it has done so in seven ways. These include, ‘the sanctification of the origins; the mythologisation and commemoration of great threats to national identity; the social role of the clergy; the production of vernacular literature; the provision of a
biblical model for the nation; the autocephalous national Church; and, lastly, the discovery of a unique national destiny' (Hastings, 1997: 188). Internally, the nation-building process crystallises and institutionalises national identity.

3. An Additional Dimension: National Identity as a Dynamic Process

The Church-State Nexus and External Threat

This is how the nationalist pattern emerges: a religious based national identity, deriving from imperial conquest, consolidating through nation-building, perpetuated internally through the mechanisms of the national State and externally through high external threat perceptions which condition the members of a nation to unite in order to salvage their unique national traits against hostile powers. Nevertheless, national identities are not static, but rather they are part of an ever-evolving, dynamic process which causes them to constantly change through time. Change is as important to the preservation of national identities as is continuity, especially when traumatic developments—such as war, conquest, exile, enslavement, influx of immigrants and religious conversion—‘disturb the basic patterning of the cultural elements that make up the sense of continuity’ (Smith, 1991: 25).

The question then becomes, how is the role of institutionalised religion affected when national identity shifts focus. The ethnic/civic distinction and its role on the evolution of national identity is crucial here. According to Zimmer the classic dichotomy between civic and ethnic identities is problematic as it fails to understand the dynamic context within which identities operate. ‘Instead of abandoning the classic conception altogether, however, what is needed is a framework that can grasp the process-like nature of national identities’ (Zimmer, 2003: 178). In order to overcome this problem Zimmer suggests the formulation of a distinction ‘between the mechanisms which social actors use as they reconstruct the boundaries of national identity at a particular point in time; and on the other hand the symbolic resources upon which they draw when they reconstruct these boundaries’ (Zimmer, 2003: 178). He distinguishes between two types of boundary mechanisms, the voluntarist and the organic and identifies four symbolic resources—political values/institutions, culture, history and geography—which provide the ‘symbolic raw materials’ used for the definition of national identity. Depending on which boundary mechanisms is employed by social actors, ‘a different picture of national identity emerges’ (Zimmer, 2003: 180)
What matters with regard to the construction of national identities is less what resources political actors draw upon than how they put these resources to practical use: the voluntarist conception of nationhood processes the available resources in voluntaristic terms—as a product of human action; the organic conception of nationhood, by contrast processes the resources in deterministic terms— as manifestations of the communal organism called the nation. (Zimmer, 2003: 181)

Therefore, for example, certain signifiers of national identity such as language or religion can be perceived both in voluntarist and organic terms, depending on how they are used by social actors. Furthermore, the very way national identity is understood can change through different periods of time, depending on political priorities and geopolitical realities, while the same signifiers of national identity can function both as civic and as ethnic depending on time and context. According to Smith, there are internal- cultural and external- geopolitical factors at play that influence the way and the extent to which a national identity is re-shaped. Internally ‘the cultural resources and traditions which the community brings to the task of creating and sustaining itself as a nation provide the parameters for the development of its national identity and the ways in which that identity can be reinterpreted in successive generations’(Smith, 2000:796). Externally, territorial threat and warfare will play an important role in the way national identity is re-fashioned. The changing potential of national identities is significant in explaining the role religion plays in Greece and Ireland. Pivotal in this change is the interplay between internal and external circumstances, in this case the Church-State nexus on the one hand and the degree of external threat perceptions on the other.

4. Conclusion: Religious Nationalism in the Greek and Irish Cases

Both Greece and Ireland have had the particular historical experiences that render a close relationship between religion, national identity and politics. These include high external threat perceptions; conquest by a polity whose State religion is different; religion functioning as a symbol against the empire and ultimately playing a role in the national-self determination movement; and finally consolidation of a religious-based national identity during the nation-building process through which the Church gains legitimacy and widespread support. All the above have entailed the consolidation of the ‘cultural defence’ or ‘nationalist pattern’, according to which the institutionalisation of the link between religion and national identity inhibits secularisation from taking place.
However, neither Greek nor Irish national identities can be exempt from evolutionary processes. Zimmer's model illustrates how national identity signifiers such as language and religion can function in both civic and ethnic terms. Political considerations, such as the Church-State nexus, and geopolitical factors such as external threat are contributing to the continued understanding of Greek national identity along ethnic terms with religion at its helm. Significant changes in this context, however, as far as the Irish case is concerned, such as decline of external threat perceptions and their interaction with the relationship between Church and State is resulting in the re-definition of Irish national identity and its shift from a predominantly ethnic to an increasingly civic national identity. Or, in other words, the use of Irish identity signifiers is taking place more along the voluntarist, inclusive variety. This is causing a rupture in traditional identity perceptions and is challenging the role of religion-as the most important ethnic marker- in contemporary Irish society. In subsequent chapters, this thesis attempts to apply this theoretical formulation in greater detail to the Greek and Irish cases.
Chapter 2
The Origins and Consolidation of the 'Nationalist Pattern'

1. Introduction

Having examined the concept of national identity and its interaction with religion on a theoretical level, it is now necessary to provide a more detailed analysis of how such a framework can be applied to Greece and Ireland. This chapter examines the relationship between religion, politics and national identity in the two cases from a historical perspective. The chapter is divided into two main sections. First, it looks at the formation of Greek and Irish national identities during the period of imperial rule. It applies the theoretical framework provided in the previous chapter drawing from Smith’s formulation on the formation of a religious-based national identity at two levels: an institutional (i.e. the role of the Church) and a symbolic (the continuation of a ‘powerful repertoire of myths and memories’). And second, the chapter examines the consolidation of Greek and Irish national identities during the post-independence nation-building process. The aim here is to identify the important similarities between the two cases with regards to the Church-State-national identity nexus, which serve to justify the basis of a viable comparison; and most importantly, to point to certain key distinctions and therefore identify different patterns of historical development which play a significant role in the understanding of their contemporary divergence.

2. Origins: Imperial Rule and National Self-Determination

The Institutional Dimension: The Role of the Church in Fostering a Religious-Based National Identity

The historical origins of the ‘nationalist pattern’ in both Ireland and Greece can be traced to the era of imperial rule and the role of the Church during this period. In both cases the empire was governed by a different religion that could not infiltrate the Church- according to Bruce, ‘an unusual advantage over other institutions in a society threatened by an external alien force’ (Bruce, 2003:83). As a result the Church evolved into a very powerful institution which became inevitably involved in the political sphere. The main difference between the two cases is mostly organisational. On the one hand, in the Greek case the Orthodox Church was subjected to the Ottoman State and became
thus an institution of the Empire, owing its allegiance to it. Inevitably, like every institution its main priority was its own survival within the system, and thus its elites supported the empire and their status within it. Not surprisingly, the official policy of the Church always stood in opposition to claims and attempts for national self-determination. The Catholic Church of Ireland on the other hand always owed its allegiance to the Pope and never accepted the legitimacy of Protestant English rule. A large section of the history of the Catholic Church in Ireland is characterised by Persecution, and thus opposition to the empire. The eighteenth- nineteenth century alliance between Church and State came too late: the British State helped make the Catholic Church a very powerful institution without ever gaining its true loyalty. The Church instead serve to provide an alternative to imperial rule for the Irish people: it came to represent self-rule for Ireland. There is an important similarity between the two cases here too: the lower clergy became involved in the opposition against the empire, a factor that in both cases served to strengthen the consolidation of a religious-based national identity later on.

Colonisation versus Imperial Conquest

Established Irish historiography perceives the history of the country, and its relationship with England since the Norman invasion, to have been one of conquest, colonisation and war. Similarly in Greece, official discourse portrays the country’s relationship with Turkey (and previously, the Ottoman Empire), to be one governed by conquest and the threat of military expansion. One distinction between the two cases is that although the colonisation of Ireland was—at least initially—carried out through settlement, subjugation to the Ottoman Empire of the area that is now known as Greece occurred through military conquest. Until the sixteenth Century, English power was limited to the ‘Pale’, an English settlement around Dublin. However, by the mid sixteenth Century a process of systematic colonisation commenced. The era of the Tudor conquest and Henry VIII’s proclamation of himself as King of Ireland in 1541 signified the rise of English power and the establishment of a firm English government in Ireland. The situation with regards to the Ottoman conquest of Byzantium is somewhat different. When, on May 29th 1453 the forces of the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II the Conqueror entered the imperial capital of Constantinople, the Byzantine Empire collapsed. Rather than colonisation through ‘plantation’ and settlement, this was a case of one Empire conquering another, and thus bringing its territories under its direct jurisdiction. The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople effectively meant that a Christian Empire was
brought under the direct control of an Islamic State. The Emperor would no longer be the head of the Orthodox Church; the latter, a Christian institution was soon to become an integral part of the administration of the Ottoman Islamic State. This organisational issue constitutes one of the main distinctions between the Irish and Greek cases. During imperial rule the relationship between Church and State and the status of the former were very different. The fact that the Orthodox Church was an institution of the Ottoman Empire had significant implications, which became apparent in later years, as will be analysed below. The situation, however, also points to a striking similarity: in both cases, the dividing line between rulers and ruled was religion.

Institutional Arrangements in the British and Ottoman Empires:

'Plantation' and the Penal Laws versus the Millet System

In Ireland, this dividing line between Empire and colony was exacerbated by the English 'Plantation' policy, which commenced under Henry VIII and was intensified during Queen Elizabeth's rule. Plantation was an economically-oriented policy aiming at pursuing the interests of the Empire, effectively by removing the native population from the land and replacing them with colonists from Britain. Plantation brought waves of Protestant English settlers to Catholic Ireland, the most successful occurring in Ulster beginning in 1603. One of the most crucial Plantations took place following the 1641 Rebellion and 1652 Settlement Act, which essentially confiscated all Irish Catholic land except the province of Connaught and gave it to English and Scottish Protestant landowners.

The policy became a source of mass discontent. According to O'Farrell, it meant 'that the Irish would be deprived of both altar and hearth, twin centres of their lives; it bred desperation and rebellion' (O'Farrell, 1971: 37). In the Irish 'memory', the policy reinforces a sense of bitterness towards Protestant England and implies poverty, division, exclusion and deprivation, because it intentionally stripped Irish Catholics of their agriculturally valuable land and resulted in its re-allocation to the Protestant settlers. As Ferguson eloquently puts it, Plantation 'in reality meant what today is known as ethnic cleansing...nothing illustrated better the ethnic and religious segregation implicit this policy' (Ferguson, 2003: 56). Indeed Plantation served to reinforce the division between conquerors and colonised, and did so along religious
lines as it associated exploitation with the Protestant imperial core and deprivation with the Catholic Irish.

Plantation was institutionalised during the Penal Laws, a form of legal discrimination introduced to maintain this system and the position of the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy—the landowning settlers and their descendents—who had vested interests in it. The Penal Laws discriminated against Irish Catholics by, among other things, banning them from voting, excluding them from Parliament membership and most public offices and significantly restricting their ownership of land. ‘The laws, in addition to the land confiscations of the ‘Plantation’ policy resulted in a dramatic decrease of Catholic ownership of land, from 49% in 1541 to 14% in 1703’ (Inglis, 1998 :103). By reflecting Protestant interests, penalising Irish Catholics and contributing to their impoverishment by legally depriving them of land, the penal Laws served to further enforce the distinction between Catholics and Protestants despite their initial aim to curb the role of Catholicism in Ireland.

Nonetheless, religious discrimination per se proved unsuccessful. In fact one of the unintended consequences of the Penal Laws was, instead of weakening actually to confirm the strength of religion in Irish society. The English discriminated against the Irish not on the basis of Ireland’s weaknesses but on the basis of its strength. Inevitably the consequence was to confirm that religious strength, giving it meaning and coherence as the great cause in which the totality of Irish grievances might be subsumed’ (O’Farrell, 1972: 46).

Like Ireland, the religious traditions and ‘motifs’ on which Greek national identity is based can certainly be traced to the era of imperial rule. The organisation of the Ottoman State served to preserve these traditions throughout the years of captivity, as well as to retain the religious distinction between Orthodox subjects and the Islamic imperial core. The Ottoman Empire was organised under the principle of the ‘millet’, the latter being religious units under which religious minorities within the Empire were allowed to ‘govern their own affairs according to their own laws and customs’ (Runciman, 1968: 167). The millet system was based on the principles of autonomy and toleration. In effect this meant that the Orthodox subjects of the Empire, as well as all other religious minorities that the Ottomans regarded as ‘people of the book’ were allowed freedom of worship; the various religions within the Empire were allowed to retain their institutions and therefore survive throughout the duration of the Empire.
Religious minorities were also allowed to engage and prosper through commerce and industry. Orthodox Christians were among the most successful within the empire in terms of commerce, and precisely for this reason they enjoyed the support of the Ottoman State. 'By joining the Balkans, Asia Minor, the Near East and Egypt under a single rule, the Ottomans effectively drove the Venetians and Genoese from the Eastern Mediterranean and thus gave the capacity to Greek merchants from 1600-1650 onwards to fill that gap in trade. By the nineteenth century much of the Ottoman economy was dominated by Europeans and by Ottoman Christians' (Lieven 2000: 153).

As a result of these arrangements, Ottoman rule was not systematically contested and rejected as British rule was in Ireland, especially at the elite level. According to Lieven, Orthodox elites, including both the Phanariot Greek ruling class of the Danubian principalities and the hierarchy of the Greek Orthodox Church, 'had good reason to welcome and support Ottoman rule, of which they were major beneficiaries' (Lieven, 2000: 148). Alexander Mavrogordatos described the situation as follows: 'the interests of the Orthodox people can be served by the Ottoman empire. Despite the fact that voluntary slavery is a major evil, sometimes this evil can transform into a major benefit, which is synonymous with autonomy' (Koulouri, 2002: 83).

It should be pointed out however that despite these privileges, from which the elites mostly benefited, Orthodox Christians were undeniably 'second class citizens' within the empire which were discriminated against on the basis of religion. Firstly, not all Sultans were as accommodating to Christianity as Mehmet II. For example, the reign of the Sultans Selim I, Selim II and Murad III witnessed the conversion of a large number of Orthodox Churches into Mosques. Secondly, Christian subjects had no political rights; they were 'obliged to dress in distinctive costume and were not allowed to ride on horseback; they could not build new Churches, or repair old ones, without special permission, which was seldom granted. Even worse, some Christian families had to submit to the seizure of their sons, who were then converted to Islam and enrolled in the Janissary regiments. And finally all the rights and privileges of Christians were always dependent upon the good will of the Sultan' (Runciman, 1968: 179). These above arrangements had significant institutional implications for the relationship between religion, politics and national identity in what later became the Greek and the Irish independent Nation-States.
The Role of the Church: The Devotional Revolution in Ireland and the 'Hellenisation' of the Greek Orthodox Church

In Ireland, the history of the Catholic Church and its relationship with the British State has played a crucial role in the shaping of Irish national identity. The systematic process of Catholic persecution embedded in the Penal Laws proved unable to 'displace the natives from the Catholic Church' (Bruce, 2003: 83). On the contrary, and even as a result of systematic persecution, the Catholic Church survived, only to become a very powerful and influential institution. As Inglis argues, the way in which the British State sought to control the Irish population, including the Penal laws eventually gave rise to the Church's power. The origins of the power of the Catholic Church can be identified in terms of the 'failed attempt of the British State symbolically to dominate the Irish through legislation (the Penal Laws), religion (Protestant proselytism) and education (State-run schools), and the State's gradual acceptance of and surrender to the symbolic legitimation of the Church' (Inglis, 1998: 98).

By the mid-eighteenth century, the Protestant Ascendancy began to realise that persecution had failed to detach Catholic people from bishops and clergy.

Persecution will keep alive the foolish bigotry and superstition of any sect, as the experience of five thousand years have demonstrated. Persecution bound the Irish Catholic to his Priest, and the Priest to the Pope; the bond of union is drawn tighter by oppression, relaxation will undo it. The emancipation and liberal Irishman, like the emancipated and liberal Frenchman, may go to mass, and tell his beads; but neither the one nor the other will attend to the rusty and extinguished thunderbolts of the Vatican (Wolfe Tone, 1798 in Inglis, 1998: 114).

This signalled the beginning of a policy of relaxation and a power alliance between the British State and the Catholic Church. However, the years of Catholic persecution had already served to empower the Church greatly and had given rise to a new urban class, whose loyalty lay with the Catholic Church and not Britain. As the organisation and size of the Church grew, this alliance would serve to undermine the British State, not through violence but through 'democratic parliamentary procedures as a means of gaining both control of the land and Home Rule' (Inglis, 1998:117). Indeed, largely as a result of these institutional arrangements, during the nineteenth century the Irish
Catholic Church acquired its high levels of power and influence. During that period, the Church underwent a process of reform which resulted in its integration "psychologically, functionally, and historically into the Irish way of life, so, that it became one with the nation's identity" (Larkin, 1976: 1276). The 'Devotional Revolution', as Larkin has termed this movement of ecclesiastical reform was a process which resulted in making practising Catholics of the Irish people in a generation' (Larkin, 1976: 1244). For Garvin, the partnership between the Catholic Church and the British State which gave religious organisations the tasks of education, health and control of civic life, in effect made the Catholic Church in independent Ireland a powerful and autonomous agency operating like a second government or a State within a State (Garvin, 2004: 2-3).

The fall of Constantinople in 1453 signified not only the end of the Byzantine Empire but also the subjugation of the Eastern Orthodox Church to the Ottoman State. During the reign of the Christian Empire of Constantinople, Church and State were integrated. The Emperor was both head of State, and head of the Christian Oecumene. However, the new situation created by the conquest brought about some radical changes to the institutional position of the Orthodox Church. As Runciman explains:

Now the Church was divorced from the State. It became an association of second class citizens. Here again, as the only association that these second-class citizens were permitted to organise, its powers of discipline over its congregations were enhanced. But it lacked the ultimate sanction of freedom (Runciman, 1968:166).

The millet system effectively increased the power of the institutional Church because it obliged the Patriarchate to concern itself with a number of lay affairs. The Patriarch was elevated from religious leader to a political figure: he became the head of the entire Orthodox millet, the 'Ethnarch'. This made him to some extent 'the heir of the Emperor' as Runciman puts it, because in addition to being a religious figure he had to become a politician responsible for his people to the Sultan's government. These crucial prerogatives and privileges, coupled with the fact that Orthodox Christians were denied any political rights

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1 Leader of the 'ethnos'. Note that in Greek there is no distinct word for 'ethnic' and 'nation'. Both are translated as 'ethnos'.

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Thus, during Ottoman rule the Byzantine Church was granted new powers of jurisdiction, which it had never enjoyed in Byzantine times; the new pattern of things brought with it an involvement in political administration. Inevitably, however, this also made the situation of the Patriarch a precarious one, given his dependency on good relations with the Sultan. The position of the Patriarch therefore was highly dependent on the conduct of the Christians within the millet for whom he was ultimately responsible. Inevitably, the Patriarchate had become an institution of the Ottoman State and the Patriarch an Ottoman official; they would function as such in the years to come.

Frazee and Runciman note one important development which took place during the years of captivity; this Frazee terms as the process of the ‘Hellenisation’ of the Orthodox Church. The consequence of this process could only be to undermine the Oecumenicity inherent in the Byzantine Empire. According to Runciman:

The Byzantine Empire had been, in theory at least, Oecumenical, the Holy Empire of all Christians regardless of their race. Its decline had reduced it to an empire of the Greeks; and the Orthodox millet organised by the new Constitution was essentially a Greek millet. Its task as the Greeks saw it was to preserve Hellenism. But could Hellenism be combined with Oecumenicity (Runciman, 1968: 182)?

Other Balkan peoples, such as the Serbians and Bulgarians had long realised this fact and had put the claim of Patriarchal spiritual leadership over all Eastern Christians to the test ‘when they set up Patriarchates with one of their own race holding the position’ (Frazee: 1969: 6).

**Education in the British and Ottoman Empires**

The influence of religion in the perceptions of the Catholic Irish of their own national identity is closely associated with the Church’s control of education. The Irish viewed national education as ‘a giant impious conspiracy to destroy their faith; democracy appeared as a devilish device to undermine the hierarchies established to administer God’s will and order’ (O’Farrell, 1971: 4). Paul Cullen, appointed Archbishop of Armagh in 1849, played a crucial role in the ‘education question’, and more specifically
in modifying State control which he criticised as serving to ‘undermine Catholicity in the country’ (Cullen quoted in Larkin, 1976: 1258). When the British State, in its attempt to pacify the Irish, handed over much of its operational control of education to the Church, the battle was lost. ‘The fact that the State gradually conceded control of education to the Church was to prove decisive in the moralisation of the Irish population’ (Inglis, 1998: 128). Education is vital for the formation and reproduction of national identity; henceforth the Irish would become legalistically religious as the teachings of the Catholic Church were to become embedded in the Catholic mind.

For the Orthodox Church too, education was of prime importance. The fact that the millet was essentially dominated by Greeks meant that serious attempts were made to preserve the Greek language. Indeed, the Church played a major role in keeping the Greek language alive. Church schools made the use of the Greek language common throughout the Balkans. During the eighteenth century an intellectual movement which involved opening more colleges was championed by the Patriarchate; a number of Greek language colleges were introduced both within and outside the Ottoman Empire, including Constantinople, Ioannina, Thessaloniki, Adrianople, Philipoupolis, Mount Athos, Kastoria, Kozani and Serres (Frazee, 1969: 7). Therefore, although the Patriarchate was officially opposed to any movements for political independence, it did nonetheless play an important role in retaining Orthodoxy and the Greek language—the two prime determinants of Greek national identity.

**Religion as Symbolic Opposition against the Empire**

The above institutional arrangements had significant symbolic implications for the relationship between religion, politics and national identity. The legacy Empire bequeathed to Ireland and Greece is the fusion between religion and national identity as it is precisely during this period that Catholicism and Orthodoxy became the guardians of culture and the carriers of Irish and Greek identity respectively. The symbolic dimension should not be seen as separate from the institutional: the latter has played a crucial role in shaping the former.

**English Rule and Irish Catholicism**

In Ireland, social discontent, economic dislocation, and opposition to imperial policies created a need for the Irish to distinguish themselves from the Protestant ruling class;
therefore a need to retain their identity, their ‘Irishness’ and its defining feature: Catholicism. According to O’Farrell, all these historical experiences made Irish identity and self-consciousness dependent on an ‘anti-English understanding of history. The main problem England faced in governing Ireland was historical, and religious, and a problem of identity’ (O’Farrell, 1971:7). As Girvin argues, the question is ‘not whether the British State’s intentions were malign. The point is that the degree of neglect on the part of the State enabled Irish nationalists to blame Britain for its lack of concern (Girvin, 2002:15).

The beginning of the ‘us’-‘them’ distinction between Protestant England and Catholic Ireland along religious lines was signalled during the era of the Reformation as, from the Irish perspective, the English King’s rejection of Papal supremacy served to undermine the legitimacy of English (Protestant) rule of Ireland. This symbolic distinction was crystallised during the nineteenth century, when the increasingly powerful Church institutionalised Catholicism as the prime symbol of Irish identity. As the Catholic Church became more powerful, ‘it came to represent Irish identity in a profound way by rejecting English rule and providing a positive substitute: a spiritual self-government for Ireland’ (O’Farrell, 1971:12-13). During that period religiosity among the population rose rapidly; and with it grew the perception that Catholicism was the one distinguishing feature of Irishness.

The willingness to adhere closely to the Catholic Church was located in a desire to be and to be perceived as morally equal, if not superior, to their colonisers. In other words it is important to see the change in Irish Catholic religiosity...not just as an end in itself, not just as the fulfilment of some inherent natural allegiance to the Church, but as part of a struggle to attain religious, cultural and symbolic power’ (Inglis, 1998: 98-99).

Hence Catholicism became increasingly perceived not only as the main form of identification of Irishness but also the principal distinguishing feature between the Irish and the ruling Protestant English. During the years of the Union, it should not have come as a surprise, therefore, that it was the ‘Protestant character’ of the latter that ‘ensured Catholic Ireland would oppose it’, and the policies associated with it (O’Farrell, 1971: 76). See for example the words of Father Tom Burke:

Take an average Irishman...and you will find that the very first principle in his mind is “I am not an Englishman because I am a Catholic”. Take an Irishman wherever he is found all
over the earth and any casual observer will at once come to the conclusion "Oh he is an Irishman, he is a Catholic." The two go together (Father Tom Burke, 1872 quoted in Kearney, 1989: 184).

A number of historical events, as for example the struggle for Catholic Emancipation and the famine served to reinforce the interaction of external and internal, ideological and economic factors, and to give Catholicism a political orientation, as will be analysed below.

*Catholic Emancipation*

The 1801 Act of Union which merged Ireland with Great Britain institutionally and brought direct Irish representation at Westminster served as a further divisive issue. All in all, the years of the Union effectively linked 'Irishness' to Catholicism and to nationalism. Although the Catholic hierarchy was initially in favour of this arrangement, perceiving the Union as a means of achieving Catholic Emancipation, according to O'Farrell, the Union 'turned out to be a cheat; shorn of its supposed reform trimmings it now emerged as a bastion of Protestant Ascendancy' (O'Farrell, 1971: 73). In practice, Irish Catholics became excluded from membership of the House of Commons while the Protestant majority proved hostile to the Emancipation initiative. Not surprisingly this 'fuelled the flames of Constitutional agitation during the 1820's, and Catholic Emancipation was looked upon as the first step in the overthrow of the Constitution' (Kearney, 1989: 158).

Catholic Emancipation came to signify not only religious freedom, but most importantly became a symbol of independence from Empire and its oppression. In this context, Catholic values, such as equality, justice, and freedom from oppression became enshrined in the nationalist cause. According to O'Farrell, the anti-veto movement was a means of


Hence, during the Emancipation movement religion functioned as a prime symbol of opposition against the British Empire. Drawing its support from mass social discontent,
as the Irish came to associate Protestant rule their poverty and underprivileged conditions, it served to consolidate the belief the lifting of religious constraints would entail the end of their grievances. Therefore, the Emancipation struggle took on a national as well as religious character: fighting for religious emancipation became simultaneously a struggle for country and independence.

**The Famine**

The famine (1845-1849) is a cornerstone event in Irish history, and a significant development which shaped Anglo-Irish relations, served to enhance Irish opposition to the British Empire and deepened the dividing line between the colonised Irish Catholics and colonising English Protestants. In this context, its symbolic implications for the nationalist role of religion are paramount. The famine, which resulted in the loss of a quarter of the Irish population, either by emigration or by death, most heavily plagued the Catholic poor, and more specifically the Catholic farmers of the South and West who were heavily dependent upon potato crops. As a result, 'memory of the famine became part of the *mentalité* of Catholic culture...a memory which in due course provided an emotional reservoir for Irish Catholic nationalism' (Kearney, 1989: 163). According to Girvin, the famine changed the nature of Irish nationalist politics as it confirmed to the Catholic Irish that they were not British (Girvin, 2002: 15).

The symbolic dimension of the consequences of the events and policies which marked the English rule of Ireland is significant. According to O'Farrell, the English prevented the Irish from developing their own institutions; and by doing that it also prevented the change and growth of Irish identity. Failing however to destroy it, it provoked a reaction in which the Irish clung to the only identity they knew. And that was one defined by religion, because the history of Ireland apart from Britain's governmental contrivances was religious. Religion was its focal point, its identity and coherence. Catholicism was perceived as the only way for 'old Ireland to live on, not politically but historically, culturally and religiously' (O'Farrell, 1971:11-12). The gradual disappearance of the Irish language left the Catholic religion as the sole determinant of national identity. 'In Catholicism the Irish could find the form, means and organisation to preserve and develop their ancient separate identity, their meaning and ultimate integrity' (O'Farrell, 1971: 12). It is hardly surprising then that the legacy Empire bequeathed to Ireland was a national identity heavily informed by Catholicism. English power reinforced in the eyes of the Irish the need for a separation between 'us' and 'them'. Essentially, it
preserved the old order in Ireland by way of simple reaction (O'Farrell, 1971: 28). As Girvin argues, the obstacle to Anglicisation came from nationalism itself, and its close association with Catholicism (Girvin, 2002: 25). Ireland and Catholicism became seen as inseparable. In the words of Paul Dubois ‘her religion is in the blood of Ireland. It is a second nature, a hereditary and traditional instinct, which has no need to be reasoned in order to be profound (quoted in Girvin, 2002:26).

The Orthodox Church and the Preservation of Hellenism

As far as the Orthodox Church is concerned, under the Ottoman Empire, and perhaps because of the Ottoman Empire, Orthodox Christians lived, prospered and were allowed to retain their Church and faith. Yet, they were treated as a subject people which served to solidify their self-perception as Christian subjects to an infidel master. This helped retain the religious distinction between Orthodox Christianity and Islam, and that meant that inevitably the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire felt limited loyalty to the cause of Islamic Empire.

Perhaps the most crucial point of is that under Ottoman captivity Orthodoxy was allowed to survive, and its survival also entailed the preservation of the Greek language. It became not only the defining feature of the millet but also the principal element of distinction between the millet itself and the Islamic imperial core. In other words, self-governing of the Greek Orthodox millet during Ottoman rule served to

Preserve a sense of common ethnicity. The Church...in teaching the time-honoured Christian rites, the bible and the lives of the Saints to the Christian communities, it taught the Greek that he belonged to a nation, a chosen race whose trials and tribulations would one day pass, and which when God willed it would regain complete control of the holy city of Constantinople (Dakin in Clogg, 1973: 157).

The survival of Orthodoxy allowed the continuation of the Church’s cultural role; as Georgiadou notes, the Church ‘preserved and handed down the Greek language through the Centuries of foreign (Ottoman) domination and made a sizeable contribution to the continuation and unity of the scattered Greek nation’ (Georgiadou, 1995: 303).

Through its administration the Ottoman Empire in a way served to form Greek national identity. It did so by retaining the two distinctive features on which Greek identity is
now based: Orthodoxy and the Greek language. The Ottomans 'were never sufficiently alarmed by it to take measures that would have threatened its existence. Its secret spirit could survive. And so, the integrity of the Church had been preserved, and with it the integrity of the Greek people' (Runciman, 1968: 182).

Religion and language provided the sources, the 'ethno-religious motifs' upon which national identity would be formed, and which would inform the nation-building process post-independence. These sources became, then, the myths and memories of the Greek people. Religion became not only the defining feature of the Orthodox millet but also the principal element of distinction between the millet itself and the Islamic core. The survival of Orthodoxy allowed for the continuation of the Church's cultural role.

National Insurrections and the National Self-Determination Movements

In both cases, the role of the institutional Church in the independence movement is ambivalent. To a great extent it was in the Church's interest to maintain the status quo. For example in Ireland during the Easter Rising, priests attempted to break up the rebels, but with no success. In Greece, as the ideas of the Enlightenment, and the ideals of secularism and national self-determination penetrated the Christian community, opposition by the new nationalist intelligentsia grew, and was directed not only towards the Ottoman Empire, but also towards the old Orthodox hierarchy which, being effectively an institution of the Empire and its political administration was seen as reflecting its interests. The Greek representatives of the Enlightenment urged the people to revolt against the hierarchy of the Church:

You hierarchs of the Holy Synod of Constantinople, do you not know that tyranny is despised by God and by humans? How can you present it to Greeks as a benefit? You are neither shepherds nor leaders to the light; you are but wolves, you are nothing but the source of darkness. Liars and hypocrites that is what you are (Elliniki Nomarchia, quoted in Koulouri, 2002: 88).

The revolutionary movement, which broke out in 1821, emphasised nationality rather than religion; it had many of the elements of a modern, civic nationalist movement stressing political freedom and citizenship, based on the ideas of the enlightenment and the French revolution (Koulouri, 2002: 86). Not surprisingly, the struggle for independence was not aided by the Patriarchate. Indeed as the power of the Orthodox Church rose significantly since the Ottoman conquest, its scope became political as well
as ecclesiastical. For the Christian Orthodox hierarchy, the Catholics represented a much greater evil than the Ottomans. The latter may have even represented the good, since God sent them in order to save the Orthodox world from the Latins (Koulouri, 2002: 83). The Patriarch, as an Ottoman official, wished to preserve the status of his institution and least of all his own position within it, which would be severely threatened by an unsuccessful revolt. He was the one responsible to the Ottoman Sultan for the obedience of his millet. As a consequence, the Patriarchate condemned the potential eruption of an independence movement. In 1789 a document entitled *Paternal Teaching* and signed by Anthimos of Jerusalem officially warned against the ideal of political freedom. The latter is ‘contrary to the spiritual command to obey authority, and results in the impoverishment of the people; the Sultan is the Protector of Christian life in the Ottoman Empire; to oppose him is to oppose God’ (Paternal Teaching quoted in Frazee, 1969: 8). ‘God’, they wrote, ‘placed the kingdom of the Ottomans above the rest, on the one hand, in order to show that this Kingdom is the result of God’s will, rather than human power, and, on the other hand, to confirm that in this way He wishes to save his Chosen people’ (Koulouri, C, 2002: 84).

Once the revolution had commenced, the Patriarch anathematised and excommunicated the revolutionaries. The letter which authorised the excommunication and was signed by the Patriarch read:

> Michael Soutzos and Alexandros Ypsilandis have sinned with an audacity beyond example and have sent emissaries to seduce others, and to conduct them to the abyss of perdition; many have been so tempted to join an unlawful Etaeria and thought themselves bound by their oath to continue members, but an oath to commit a sin was itself a sin (Letter of April 4th, full text quoted in Frazee, 1969: 28).

However in both cases, given the role of religion as a delineating marker between rulers and ruled, religion and nationhood were fused in a profound way and this fusion was used symbolically by revolutionaries. For example, the Easter 1916 Proclamation of Independence links religion and nationalism in a profound way, proclaiming Ireland’s independence in the name of both God and nationalism: ‘In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland through us, summons her children to her and strikes for her freedom’. In Greece, despite the official opposition of the Patriarchate to the independence movement, lower members of the clergy had supported the revolution and even participated actively in it. This enhanced the symbolic role of Orthodoxy. According to Smith, the nationalism
which inspired the self-determination movement of the masses was more than anything religious-oriented:

More powerful than the classical ideals of a largely Diaspora intelligentsia was the sense of ethno-religious Byzantine Orthodox election. Only a deep-rooted belief such as this could galvanise and mobilise the majority of Greek speaking Orthodox men and women, and refashion Greece as the heir of the Byzantine empire whose lands and hegemony it sought to restore through a policy of Hellenic imperialism. This was the popular nationalism of the mass of the population, even though it was overlaid by the secular democratic ideals of an intelligentsia that sought in ancient Athens the legitimation of its modernising goals (Smith, 1999: 344).

As Smith argues, ‘the popular nationalism of the lower classes in Greece, under the tutelage of the lower clergy did not look back to the glories of ancient Athens, but to those of the Byzantine Empire and its Greek Orthodox community’ (Smith, 2003:16). Bishops were called upon to head military affairs; some were captured and killed. Later they become heroes and martyrs who died for the Greek cause. Greek history is replete with examples of heroes who are both national and religious, including Bishop of Patra Germanos, the Monk Samuel of Arkadi Monastery, Chrysostomos Bishop of Smyrna and many others. Religion per se acted as a symbol of inspiration, valour, pride and unity for the Greeks and distinction from the empire. Smith notes, ‘many of those who fought in the war of independence were fighting as Christian Orthodox against infidel Muslims. Some of the leaders of the revolt, i.e. bishop of Patra Germanos and his followers, were inspired by visions of Byzantine restoration’ (Smith, 1999: 344). Even among those revolutionaries who expressed the secular ideas of the Enlightenment, the wording among proclamations for independence, or their writings are redolent with religious connotations. For example, the proclamation for independence by Alexander Ypsilantis entitled: ‘Fight for faith and homeland’ (Sfyroeras, 1991: 156). Such sources are reproduced and quoted in both Greek official and unofficial historiography, such as museums, history textbooks and Church documents in order to stress the role of the clergy in the Greek insurrection.

The struggles for national self-determination in Greece and Ireland certainly owed much to the ideology of nationalism: they were modern and secular, similar to other nationalist struggles against empires throughout the world. But because in Greece and Ireland, during imperial rule the identification of the group was made in religious terms, the national identity that emerged during the era of nation-building was religious based.
In other words, the nation-building and State building processes of the post-independence years had to be based on ideas and institutions that would resonate on the people. In the case studies in question, what was already there was an identification of the subjected ‘us’ to the ruling ‘them’ in religious terms. Religion functioned as one of the pre-modern signifiers of group identification on which modern nationhood would be based.

3. Consolidation: Nation-Building and the Institutionalisation of the Role of Religion

The passage from Empire to independence marked a very important transition. It entailed that Greece (1829), and Ireland (1922) would function within a completely different institutional setting as new national realities. An integral part of this process would be nation-building - the task of forging cohesion and unity within the newly established independent Nation-States. Thus, the attainment of statehood entailed the consolidation and institutionalisation of national identity. Ultimately, the problems that arose were linked with precisely this: namely, what the signifiers of Greek and Irish national identity were and how cohesion within the newly formed independent Nation-States would be forged. In both cases, after independence, there were conflicting identities: secular and religious. But in both cases, the religious element prevailed largely because national identity took the form of pre-existing elements which functioned as ethnic signifiers. Simply placing emphasis on elite manipulation and/or fabrication in order to indoctrinate the masses fails to explain why national identity takes a particular form and only particular versions of the past have popular resonance (McBride, 2001: 9). Indeed every nation-building process involves a degree of fabrication. But surely national identity does not emerge in a vacuum. During nation-building elites were able to pin the process on these elements and thus ensure that it would resonate on the people. Tom Nairn’s famous paradigm is instructive here: ‘The middle class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation card had to written in a language they understood’ (Nairn, 1997:340). Post independence religion was treated as one of the defining features of national identity and became in this respect a crucial element of the nation-building process: both in terms of institutions and symbols, religion was promoted and entrenched as an integral part of Greekness and Irishness respectively. Undoubtedly both Greece and Ireland belong to the ‘nationalist pattern’, i.e. they constitute instances of cultural defence
where the Church has consolidated its political power by virtue of its role as a carrier of national identity.

*The Constitutional Setting*

In both cases the relationship between Church and State became institutionalised by the Constitution as the Church was granted special status precisely because of its role as the main defender of the nation and carrier of national identity. An important distinction is that in Ireland, the Constitution proclaims a formal separation between Church and State, whereas in Greece there is no constitutional separation. In practice however the two cases are similar as although Church and State are officially separate institutions in Ireland, in practice the relationship between the institutions is consensual and very close.

*Ireland*

This relationship has its origins in the nation-building process which commenced once Ireland gained its independence from Britain, and was explicitly institutionalised and consolidated in the 1937 De Valera Constitution. The latter set out the foundations of a very powerful role of the Irish Catholic Church in social and secular affairs, in an attempt ‘to reconcile Irish democracy with nationalism and Catholicism, while simultaneously creating a sovereign and Republican State’ (Girvin, 2002: 80). Since 1937 and at least until the 1970’s, both Church and State have ‘affirmed an Irish national identity grounded in Catholic moral and social teaching’ (Dillon in Jelen and Wilcox, 2002: 53). The Constitution did not clearly distinguish between the religious and political spheres. ‘In the Dail, on the radio, in the newspapers and in day-to-day business and social activity priest and people, the sacred and the secular not only met in a formal sense but also meshed and interconnected’ (Girvin, 2002: 82). In practice therefore, Church and State became fused, with Irish nationalism being the common denominator, the link that brought the two institutions together, and accounted as the main legitimating factor of the highly politicised role of the Irish Catholic Church.

The special status granted to Catholicism and by extension, to the Catholic Church, as well its supremacy to the secular authority is evident throughout the text. The privileged role of Catholicism in the Irish nation and State is firstly made explicit in the preamble:
In the name of the Holy trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred,

We, the people of Éire,

Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial,

Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful independence of our Nation,

And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations,

Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.

(Constitution of Ireland, enacted 1937, including constitutional amendments to 2002)

In addition, as initially drafted, Article 44.1 acknowledged the Catholic Church as 'the Church of Christ' and as 'the true religion' 'established by our Divine Lord'. Although the Constitution made clear that no religion would be discriminated against in the Republic of Ireland, at the same time Article 44.2, affirmed the 'special position of the holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens' (Constitution of Ireland enacted 1937 including constitutional amendments). Articles 41-44 regulated the family, education, property rights and religion. According to Girvin, the Constitution also 'reinforced the distinction between male and female spheres of activity and brought together both nationalist and Catholic conceptions of the good life (Article 45)' (Girvin, 2002: 83).

From these constitutional provisions two important conclusions can derived: Firstly, a clear link between religion and nationalism; and secondly, a sense of superiority of the religious authority over the secular one. Girvin notes that the most important feature of the new Constitution is that it gave normative effect to the core values of Irish nationalism. 'It achieved a synthesis between Catholic, nationalist and democratic values in a way that provided a stable basis for constitutional continuity for the next 40 years' (Girvin 2002: 83). In each case the official position of the Catholic Church was emphasised in the Constitution, especially in respect of the family as the core unit of society and the prohibition on divorce. 'By linking religion and nationalism in the

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2 The fifth amendment of the Constitution Act, 1972 removed the special position of the Catholic Church from the constitution, following a referendum in which 84% of the Irish electorate endorsed the move.
Constitution, the Irish presented themselves as God’s chosen peoples, claiming that their nationalism and religion made them special’ (Girvin 2002: 81).

Greece

In Greece, the connection between Church and State was also consolidated shortly after independence in a similar fashion. Modern Greek statehood has been from the beginning of its establishment intertwined with the Orthodox Church of Greece, in this case a formally close relationship which was institutionalised in 1822. As with the Irish case, the prevalent and privileged position of the Church was legitimated by nationalism and became institutionalised in the Constitution. Both Constitutions begin with reference to the ‘Holy and indivisible Trinity’ making explicit the link between Church-State and nation. The first Constitution of Greece, which came into being under the title ‘Temporary Constitution of Greece’ during the First National Assembly of Epidaurus in January 1822, declared the Orthodox Church as the State Church.

In the name of the holy and indivisible Trinity.

First paragraph: On religion

§ 1. The dominant/prevailing religion of the Greek State is the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. The Greek government tolerates every other religion; ceremonies and holy practices can be practiced without constraint (Temporary Constitution of Greece, or Provisional Constitution of Greece, adopted by the Epidavros Assembly, January 1st 1822).

This relationship remained largely unaltered in the subsequent Constitutions of 1827, 1844, 1864 and 1911:

In the name of the Holy, Consubstantial, and Indivisible Trinity

Concerning religion

Art. 1. The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. Every other known religion is tolerated, and the forms of its worship are carried out without hindrance under the protection of the laws, proselytism and all other interference with the established religion being prohibited.

Art. 2. The Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging for its head our Lord Jesus Christ, is indissolubly united in doctrine with the Great Church in Constantinople and with every other Church of Christ holding the same doctrines, steadfastly observing, as they do, the
holy apostolic and synodal canons and holy traditions: it is autocephalous, exercising its
sovereign rights independently of every other Church, and it is administered by a Holy
Synod of bishops. The ministers of all recognized religions are subjected to the same
superintendence on the part of the State as the ministers of the established religions
(Constitution of 1911, as revised by the 2nd Revisionary Parliament).

Following several constitutional amendments in 1975, and 1986, 2001 and 2005 the
Constitution of Greece as it stands in 2007 continues to describe the Orthodox Church
as the "prevailing religion" of Greece. According to Article 3.1:

The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. The
Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging our Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is
inseparably united in doctrine with the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and with
every other Church of Christ of the same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, as they do, the
holy apostolic and synodal canons and sacred traditions. It is autocephalous and is
administered by the Holy Synod of serving Bishops and the Permanent Holy Synod
originating thereof and assembled as specified by the Statutory Charter of the Church in
compliance with the provisions of the Patriarchal Tome of June 29, 1850 and the Synodal
Act of September 4, 1928 (Constitution of Greece, as revised by the Parliamentary
Resolution, April 6th, 2001).

As with the Irish case, discrimination against other religions is safeguarded in the
Constitution. Article 13 guarantees the freedom of religion or belief:

Article 13:

1. The freedom of religious consciousness is inviolable. The exercise of individual and
political rights is independent of one's religious conviction.
2. All known religions shall be free and their rites of worship shall be performed unhindered
and under the protection of the law. The practice of rites of worship is not allowed to
offend public order or the good usages. Proselytism is prohibited.
3. The Ministers of all known religions shall be subject to the same supervision by the State
and to the same obligations towards it as those of the prevailing religion.
4. No person shall be exempt from discharging his obligations to the State or may refuse to
comply with the laws by reason of his religious convictions.
5. No oath shall be imposed or administered except as specified by law and in the form
determined by law.

However, as in Ireland, despite such constitutional provisions, the protection of freedom
of belief is relative. As several examples in the introduction have illustrated, citizenship
and inclusion criteria have developed and remain largely ethnic rather than civic, based on religion. The official status of the Church confers special privileges and obligations.

**Nation: Legitimating the Church-State Nexus**

In both cases therefore, a similar pattern emerged: a close relationship between Church and State essentially legitimated by nationalism. Secular and religious institutions were brought together under one common denominator, i.e. the nation. The Constitution served to institutionalise the Church-State-nation nexus; and the nation served to legitimate the bond between Church and State which was formalised in the Constitution.

**Ireland**

In Ireland, by clearly setting out the role of the Irish Catholic Church in society, the Constitution confirmed what Girvin (2002) terms a triangular power structure between State, Church and nation: essentially a consensual relationship between Church and State legitimated by the ideology of nationalism. In other words, the special position of the Catholic Church rested on the consent of the Irish people. The power of the Church was not coercive, but rather based on the link between religion and nationalism. 'Irish Catholics willingly accepted Church authority on faith and morals. This was an illiberal community, but one which most Irish Catholics accepted willingly' (Girvin, 2002:132). In essence, nationalism legitimated the power of the Catholic Church. Ireland was not undemocratic because it was illiberal by choice as 'the strength of Irish Catholicism was its voluntary nature. The Church had little coercive power and depended on the loyalty of its members to secure its authority. While its institutional position was strong, the Church's success rested in its role in the moral community' (Girvin, 2002:135). As the Church expanded its power, it also developed the scope of its 'moral monopoly' (Inglis, 1998), an extensive network of control over Irish society based on moral principles and the strict adherence to Church and regulations. 'The very obvious piety of the Irish nation depended on the Church responding to the needs of the nation' (Girvin, 2002:19).

The anti-liberal element in Church policy was 'the consequence of the Catholic Church's opposition to modernism and Irish nationalism's hostility to Britain. Indeed, nationalist legitimation was mainly related to British rule. As Mair argues, 'the forces of clericalism and conservative nationalism had become legitimised after independence' as
a result of British occupation (Hornsby-Smith, 1992: 268). As a consequence, both Church and State shared a rejection of the liberal version of modernity, especially its individualism and secularism. The nationalist element gave legitimacy to isolationist policies and granted them widespread support. During the 1930’s, the economy became heavily protected by the State. Competition was very little, inefficiency high and incentive for export or investment almost non-existent. The result was a heavily protectionist, inward looking, isolationist Ireland. Irish neutrality during WWII, the result of a widespread consensus and supported by the Church, was clearly an assertion to be differentiated from Britain. During the 1950’s the Church-State relationship resulted in ‘that suffocating censorship, that muting of the critical intellectual voice, which the writers of the day argued was short-sighted, unhealthy and damaging... the emotional bonding of Church and Nation-State breeds conformism and fear, not only of unhealthy outside or foreign influences but also of the challenge of any independent thinker in its midst’ (Twomey, 2003: 33).

Throughout this period, Church involvement in Irish political affairs was reflected in the adoption of policies and laws advocated by the Church including divorce, abortion, and control of education. As in Greece, minorities’ views, such as Protestants, were not reflected as the criteria for inclusion in the Irish nation were religious/ethnic. By 1961 Ireland’s moral community had changed little since 1937. An informative study carried out by Biever in the 1960’s provides important evidence to support this view. ‘The picture that emerges from the survey is one where the Catholic Church is accorded status unchallenged by any other group or interest in society. Its teachings are widely endorsed as is its right to act and influence a wide range of areas in the State and society’ (Girvin, 2002:130). The majority of Irish citizens did not question Catholicism or nationalism during the 1960’s. The emergence of a new critical elite during that period however, and the rise of Irish revisionism did challenge some of the certainties and set in motion the mechanism which would serve to fundamentally undermine the Catholic Church.

Greece

A similar triangular power structure between Church, State and nation was also established in Greece. A similar concept of choseness was institutionalised in the post-independence period and informed the relationship between Church and State in Greece,
as well as consolidated the religious base of Greek nationalism. In its turn, Greek nationalism and Greek national identity were very much informed by its relationship with and perception of the former Ottoman imperial core, part of which became independent State in 1923. For example, according to Smith, the Megali Idea\(^3\) can be traced back to the sense of religious and ethnic superiority of the Orthodox millet over the Muslims through nearly four centuries of Ottoman rule. The sense of superiority towards non-Greeks was entrenched in the experiences of the Greek Orthodox community under Ottoman rule, but it was also a legacy of the latter stages of the beleaguered and straitened Byzantine empire, whose Greek-speaking Orthodox population despised both the Muslim Turks and the Catholic Latins. Its ultimate roots however lay in the sense of Greek Orthodox imperial chosenness which inspired the Greek speaking community of the Byzantine Empire (Smith, 1999:341).

The Church's association with nationalism extended from the Venizelos era, throughout the 1940's and 1950's and the Church's association with the military junta regime of 1967, the clashes with the PASOK government during the 1980's, the identity cards issue (2000) and into the present era. Undoubtedly, the institutionalisation of Greek Orthodoxy as the official State religion gives the Church a powerful voice in political policy making and the organisation of society. For example:

- Although, according to article 33.2 the Greek president is no longer required to be an Orthodox Christian, he or she is sworn in according to the rites of the Church. Article 33.2 specifies: 'Before assuming the exercise of his duties, the President of the Republic shall take the following oath before Parliament: “I do swear in the name of the Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity to safeguard the Constitution and the laws, to care for the faithful observance thereof, to defend the national independence and territorial integrity of the Country, to protect the rights and liberties of the Greeks and to serve the general interest and the progress of the Greek People” (Constitution of Greece, as revised by the Parliamentary Resolution, April 6\(^{th}\), 2001).

- Most high ranking positions in the military, the judiciary, and public schools are in reality restricted to Orthodox candidates.

\(^3\) A Greek irredentist foreign policy initiative of the early 1920, which aimed at recovering Greek speaking areas of Asia Minor. The Megali Idea will be analysed in greater depth in chapter 4.
• The right to proselytise is denied to other faiths

• The Church is subsidised by the State: the clergy are essentially civil servants whose salaries are paid by the State, which also administers Church property.

• The privileged role of the Orthodox Church in the Ministry of education and religious Affairs' gives it a primary role in Greek education. 'The involvement of the Greek Orthodox Church in areas of public life which come under State regulation has been institutionalised by means of the provision of article 2 of the Charter of the Church of Greece, which constitutes a law of the State. Its integrative function has been institutionalised through the Ministry of education and Religion, by which it exercises administrative control over all religious affairs in Greece'. (Boyle, page 333)

• According to Law 1363/1938, the construction of places of worship is dependent upon the approval of the local Orthodox Bishop

• Inconsistency in legal protection of legal minorities; the issue of contentious objection to military service, exemption from which applies to ministers of all religions but not Jehovah’s witnesses; issue of recognition of Catholic Church.

Variations within the Pattern

However, although in both cases the political relevance of religion was legitimated by nationalism, the examination of the evolution of the two Churches in greater detail points to significant distinctions. An attempt to apply the Greek and Irish cases on the 'nationalist pattern' (Chapter 1, Table 1.1), reveals that these distinctions are mainly related to the Church-State nexus, i.e. the pattern of Church-State relations, religious pluralism, anti-clericalism, and also the education system. Doctrinal and historical circumstances- as well other important geopolitical realities, led to the consolidation of two different varieties of the ‘nationalist pattern’ in the two cases in question. It is precisely these variations in the two cases which would prove crucial for the resilience and political relevance of religion once the process of modernisation set in.
Table 2.1: Variations within the Nationalist Pattern- Greece and Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Nationalist Pattern</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Pluralism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Very low/ non-legalistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Clericalism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Clerical status</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Cultic Participation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Internal religious Conservatism</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Intellectualism in Religion</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Stability of Democracy</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Communist Influence</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Political orientation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Church-State Nexus</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>School system</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligentsia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Parties</strong></td>
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1. Church and State Nexus: Autocephaly versus Universalism

Although in both cases the Church became fused with State, in Greece autocephaly meant subordination of Church to State, whereas in Ireland universalism entailed the reverse. The Greek Orthodox Church is nationalised, and therefore effectively an institution of the State. The Greek Orthodox Church became autocephalous, and thus a national Church, in 1833. The areas of the then independent Greek State came under the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Church once it became autocephalous in 1833. Certain areas which subsequently became part of the Greek State, such as Crete, Mount Athos and certain Aegean islands- notably the Dodecanese- fall under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Subordination to the State is a characteristic that the Greek Orthodox Church shares in common with the Protestant State Churches. According to Sherrard, following the establishment of the Modern Greek State, the Greek Orthodox Church became influenced by Protestantism and the ideas of the Reformation. The Constitution of the Church of Greece, drafted by Von Maurer, a German Protestant, became based on a non- Byzantine, but rather Protestant perspective. ‘The Greek form of Erastianism (the doctrine of the ascendancy of the State over the Church) established by the Church settlement of 1833 reduced the Church in Greece to a
Department of the State and its officers to little more than functionaries in the governmental bureaucracy' (Sherrard, 1995: 198). According to Ramet, Church-State relations in Greece can be said to belong to 'the co-optive pattern', 'characterised by a tendency of the government to view the Church as an agency of the State' (Ramet, 1988:11). Co-optation, 'the tendency of drawing the Church into a special co-operation relationship with the State' (Ramet, 1988:7) 'may at times be inverted, with the result that the Church exercises disproportionate influence in matters of government and policy' (Ramet, 1988:13).

Church-State relations therefore are best described by accommodation of Church to State. According to Mavrogordatos (2003), this development was not in effect new; the Orthodox Church has a history of subordination to secular institutions. In fact, the Byzantine tradition has always been characterised by the subordination of the Church to the State, and this has been the case in Byzantium, the Ottoman Empire and modern Greece. The subordination of the new autocephalous Church to the first King of Greece, a Bavarian Catholic, did not in fact represent an anomaly with respect to the Ottoman past, since it perpetuated Church subordination to the secular ruler...Ever since, the Orthodox Church of Greece continues to perform the primary function of a State Church...essential for the formal legitimation of State authority' (Mavrogordatos, 2003:125). The establishment of a State Church in 1833 was certainly in keeping with the Eastern Orthodox tradition, where 'God is Caesar's junior partner' (Huntington, 1996: 70). Thus, subordination of the Church to the State has always been a historical reality, one not incompatible with Orthodox theology. More specifically, during the Byzantine years, the relationship between Church and State in the Orthodox East was that of 'symphonia' or 'synallellia': the fusion of the religion and the secular elements. Known as Caesaropapism, because of its reference to the combination of the roles of Caesar and Pope, this system effectively came to entail the subordination of the Church to the Emperor. During the years of Ottoman conquest the Orthodox Church became an institution of the Ottoman State. Its status was, nonetheless, a privileged one. As a theocracy, the Ottoman Empire did not permit the survival of purely political institutions. It granted, therefore, the Orthodox Church certain crucial prerogatives and privileges, thus creating the conditions for Orthodox unity in the region and allowing for the primacy of the Patriarchate of Constantinople over all other institutional expressions of Orthodoxy in the Balkans. The Orthodox Church of Greece owes its flexibility to these historical circumstances. Mavrogordatos argues that, 'early
subordination to the State may have bred certain traits which have always helped the Orthodox Church maintain its collaboration with Caesar and thereby safeguard its position as a State Church. These include (a) ‘the lack of doctrinal rigidity and consistency’, and (b) ‘the lack of corporate solidarity and discipline. The Orthodox Church has never been as monolithic as the Catholic Church...consequently it has never experienced anything like the Reformation or the Counter-Reformation’ (Mavrogordatos, 2003: 125).

The Irish Catholic Church on the other hand is universal and therefore outside the control of the State. Church-State relations are best described either by accommodation of State to Church or confrontation. The Irish Catholic remained universal following Ireland’s independence, and therefore under the jurisdiction of international Catholicism. This distinction is also important for the development of religious nationalism. According to Hastings, the total ecclesiastical autonomy of a national Church is one of the strongest and most enduring factors in the encouragement of nationalism because ‘it vastly stimulates the urge to tie all that is strongest in God’s old testament predilection for one nation and New Testament predilection for one Church contemporaneously to one’s own Church and people’ (Hastings, 1997:196). The fact that the Catholic Church is a supranational, world-wide organisation means that the emphasis of religious nationalism here has a different orientation. Indeed Oecumenical Churches, not linked with one particular Nation-State pose a de facto problem for nationalism. Hastings does make an important distinction between the institutional level, on the one hand, and the personal, popular or communal level on the other. Despite the universalist aspect of Catholicism, it should be noted that at the personal, popular and communal levels the lower clergy could be more nationalist than the Bishops could, while the identification of the nation through religion was widespread. This helps explain the similarity between Greece and Ireland in terms of, for example, the role of the lower clergy in the independence movements. The distinction however between the subordination of Church to State in Greek case and the accommodation of State to Church in the Irish case is pivotal in explaining the contemporary divergence between them. Further analysis of the implications of this takes place in chapter 3.
2. Religious Pluralism:

In Ireland the Church developed into a moral monopoly, a legalistic interpretation of Catholic faith which permeated every aspect of Irish society. Although nationalism remained the underlying legitimating factor of the Church's power, it became secondary to the Church's moral monopoly. In Greece, although also not a religiously plural society, the Orthodox Church is less legalistic. We can distinguish between two types of intervention in social and political affairs due to the Church-State relationship: firstly, strictly social matters, such as abortion and divorce where the Church's opposition to modernising State policies has been minimal. And secondly, those matters directly affecting the link between Orthodoxy and nation, such as the Identity Cards issue or the construction of a Mosque in Athens where intervention has assumed great proportions and confrontations with the State have occurred. This issue is further examined in chapters 3 and 6.

3. Low Anti-Clericalism:

In both instances, anti-clericalism is low. In Ireland, although Fianna Fail is more closely aligned to the Catholic Church, all politicians and political actors maintain a respectful disposition toward the Church. In Greece although the Church is traditionally more aligned to the right, and hence closer to the New Democracy party, both the latter and PASOK have accepted the status quo Church position. Although PASOK introduced a number of reforms which compromised the Church's role during the 1980's, these reforms did not go very far given the interest not to compromise the relationship between Church and nation. There is an important distinction however, between the two cases. Given the Church-State relationship in Ireland, anti-clericalism is largely the result of the Church's dominance over the secular authority. In Greece power relations have the reverse relationship: the accommodationist nature of Greek Church-State relations, it is the Church hierarchy who by large collaborates with the State, not the other way round. As part of the Church-State nexus this is also further examined in chapter 3.
4. School System:

Although both Greece and Ireland are perceived as belonging to the ‘nationalist pattern’, and both Catholicism and Orthodoxy are monopoly religions, it is interesting that the relationship between religion and politics is manifested very different in the education system. This is largely a result of the different relationship between Church and State, but also a manifestation of the way external threat is perceived and institutionalised in the two cases. This issue deserves attention. Indeed in both case studies since the attainment of independent nationhood, the Church has exercised a close control on the educational field. Following the establishment of the Irish State in 1922, promoting Irish nationalism became imperative for the process of nation-building. The government planned to realise its aim of promoting cultural nationalism through education. This had two main components: the promotion of the Irish language and Catholicism as the driving forces of Irish national identity. The Catholic Church’s power, a remnant of 19th century Victorian ecclesiocracy, is paramount in the understanding of the development of the Irish education system post-independence. According to Akenson,

Certain theological precepts concentrated much of the Church’s great power on the school system and at the same time legitimated the exercise of that power... The encyclical of Pius XI, promulgated in 1929, emphasised that the role of the State in education was only to serve as an auxiliary to the family and to the Church. So consonant with Irish cultural values was this papal formulation that the same sonorities were written into the 1937 Constitution (Akenson, 1975:96-97).

It was De Valera’s 1937 Constitution that made the association between the nation, religion and education explicit. According to Williams the relationship between religion and ‘cultural self-understanding’ indeed comes with the 1937 Constitution, which ‘explicitly associated the nation with Christianity’ (Williams, 1999: 320). According to Lyons, Article 42 ‘clearly reflects Roman Catholic social teaching’ (Lyons, 1973: 545). Article 42.1, which remains unaltered, places a child’s education in the hands of the family and ‘guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to their means, for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children’ (Constitution of Ireland, 1937). In addition, according to Article 42.2, ‘Parents shall be free to provide this education in their homes, or in private schools or in schools recognised or established by the State’ (Constitution of Ireland, 1937). In the Constitution, the role specified for the State is to ensure free primary
education for all. Article 42.4 specified that 'the State shall provide for free primary education and shall endeavour to supplement and give reasonable aid to private and corporate educational initiative, and, when the public good requires it, provide other educational facilities or institutions with due regard, however, for the rights of parents, especially in the matter of religious and moral formation' (Constitution of Ireland, 1937).

Unlike Greece, whose Constitution guarantees all Greeks may obtain education, 'at all levels in State educational institutions' (Article 16.2 of the Constitution of Greece, including 2001 Amendments) in Ireland free secondary education was not introduced until 1968. The 1937 Constitution stressed that it was the family's right and duty to determine the education of their children, in an attempt to keep State interference in education minimal. As Akenson argues, the State is simply obliged to help parents provide education to their children (Akenson, 1975:95). Its role is therefore reduced to accepting, allowing and legitimating the Church's education policy. As a result the State funds and regulates education, but the Church controls it.

Later documents also reflect the Church's association with education. According to Williams, the 'Report of the Council of Education on the Function and the Curriculum of the Primary School' (1954) endorsed very emphatically the denominational and catechetical character of primary education. This document very strongly informs the treatment of the role of religion from 1965-1971 (Williams, 1999: 323). In addition, a 1971 version of 'The Primary School Curriculum: Teacher's Handbook', 'attributes a crucial role to religious education and promotes the integration between religious and secular instruction. Every subject is seen as helping the child achieve a proper relationship with God, his neighbour and the environment' (Williams, 1999: 324).

Although the Constitution also stresses no discrimination, and grants the right to withdraw from religious education, in practice education was and remains to an extent significantly dominated by the Catholic faith (Williams, 1999: 320). For example, during the 1950's and 1960's sending a child to a non-Catholic school was punishable by excommunication because as Inglis argues, doing so was considered a mortal sin (Inglis, 1998:58). The same punishment would also apply should one decide to attend Trinity college Dublin as opposed to University College Dublin (Garvin, 2004: 202). Although this is no longer the case, pressure still exists.

In Greece, it was the Constitution of 1911 which, for the first time provided for mandatory and free education for all, a provision which remains in the present day
Constitution. Although it is the State that is responsible for providing education in Greece, the education system is still closely linked with the Orthodox Church. According to article 16.2 of the Constitution, ‘education constitutes a basic mission of the State, and its purpose is the moral, spiritual, professional and physical education of the Greek people, the growth of their national and religious consciousness and their formation into free citizens’ (Greek Constitution, including 2001 Amendments). Given that according to article 3, Orthodoxy is the prevailing religion in Greece, thus ‘the growth of religious consciousnesses is to be pursued according to the doctrine of Orthodoxy (Sotirelis, 1998: 31). This effectively binds Church and State together in a common goal promoting the link between religion and national identity. According to Boyle, ‘the involvement of the Greek Orthodox Church in areas of public life which come under State regulation has been institutionalised by means of the provision of article 2 of the Charter of the Church of Greece, which constitutes a law of the State. Its integrative function has been institutionalised through the Ministry of education and Religion, by which it exercises administrative control over all religious affairs in Greece’ (Boyle, 1997: 333). Religious education is mandatory for Greek Orthodox children in public primary and secondary schools, and the State subsidises religious studies at institutions of higher learning.

Although in both cases education is controlled to a great extent by the Church, there are two important distinctions. Firstly, in Greece the emphasis on what is taught- not only in the subject of religion, but most importantly in history textbooks, is placed on the link between Orthodoxy and national identity. This is done with greater ease given the fact that the Greek education system is highly centralised: one single textbook per subject commissioned by the State. In Ireland on the other hand, the emphasis on what is taught is placed on legalistic Catholicism and the provision of a moral blueprint of what constitutes a good Catholic. The link between Catholicism and national identity is undermined also by the fact that the Irish education system is de-centralised- there is a lot of variation in what is taught by individual schools and teachers as there is no one single textbook commissioned by the State. This important distinction between the Irish and Greek education systems is largely a product of the different type of Church-State relations: in Ireland the Constitution made the State subservient to the Church in education: the Church would never have allowed the content to be centralised and

\[4\] In March 2007 the New Democracy Government passed a bill introducing several reforms to Article 16 of the Greek constitution, allowing the introduction of private universities. The amendment of the constitution is to follow.
determined by the State, so a various sources system was instead established. In Greece, the Church is subordinate to the State and thus the latter can, without too many obstacles, commission a syllabus and unified textbook according to its preferences. Given the Church and State both have the same goal, there is a consensus: as long as the State-commissioned content promotes link between Orthodoxy and nationalism the Church’s interests as also promoted. A detailed examination and comparison between the role of the Church in the Greek and Irish education systems takes place in chapter 5.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to trace the origins and consolidation of the religious character of Greek and Irish national identities. In both cases, during the era of Empire the institution of the Church was able to survive and carry religious customs and beliefs that were distinct from those of the imperial core through the centuries. In this sense, in both cases the Church assisted the retention of the distinctive features of collective identity which separated the subjects from the Empire. Essentially, the legacy of Empire to Greece and Ireland was the survival of an institution, which served to retain and reinforce all the symbols of collective identity. These symbols were largely religious because the distinction between subjects and Empire was religious: Catholic Irish versus Protestant English, Orthodox Greeks versus Islamic Ottomans.

Hence when independence was gained, and the new States of Greece and Ireland came into existence, it made sense to pin successful State and nation-building on Orthodoxy and Catholicism respectively. This made the institutionalisation of a religious-based national identity possible. In Greece for example, the twin factors of Orthodoxy and the Greek language, and their relationship provided the foundation of Greek national identity. In this sense it is understandable why, despite conflicting national images of a secular form, the Orthodox Church assumed the role of carrier of Greek national identity in post-independence Greece.

Both the Greek Orthodox and the Irish Catholic Churches derived their legitimacy and consolidated their power on the principles of nationalism and anti-colonialism, which gave them widespread popular acceptance. This explains why, despite doctrinal and institutional differences both Churches followed ‘the nationalist pattern’ (Martin 1978) whereby the Church remains a powerful institution by virtue of its role as a carrier and defender of national identity. In Ireland, the nationalist element allowed the Irish
Catholic Church to acquire a very powerful position in Irish society. This is one of the most important consequences of Empire that the Irish and Greek Churches share in common. In Greece too, the Church became powerful because it fostered a symbolic link between Orthodoxy and the Greek nation.

There are however important distinctions. The ‘nationalist pattern’ is far from monolithic. This fact is pivotal to the prime hypothesis of the thesis, namely that national identities are not static, but part of a dynamic process and prone to change. The significant institutional differences between the two cases related with the Church-State relationship discussed above constitute the ‘internal processes’ that can affect the evolution of national identity - the Church obstructs modernisation to a different degree depending on the Church-State nexus. The ‘external processes’, or triggers which also affect the evolution of national identity refer primarily to external threat perceptions. This thesis contends that when these internal and external processes combine, different patterns of development take place, and hence the divergence between Ireland and Greece. These distinctions, and their consequences, will be analysed in greater detail henceforth.
Part II

Contemporary Framework
Part II Introduction

National Identities as Dynamic Processes:
Social and Economic Change Linked to Modernisation

To παπανός
Herakleitos

But, if traditions can be translated, at least they don’t fossilise. That very flexibility which
was painfully achieved over the centuries underpins and explains our [Irish] current
prosperity, but may also give rise to new political and religious institutions. We may find it
hard to ditch long-serving leaders, from Dev to Bertie - unlike the British who ceremoniously
dumped Churchill in 1945 - but when it comes to discarding core values, we are the least
sentimental people on earth. No wonder that George Bernard Shaw recommended that every
English person be sent for a spell of "national service" in Ireland, in order to learn
"flexibility of mind".

Declan Kiberd, The Irish Times, October 3rd, 2006

'The Greek nation has and will always have a need for religion'
A. Papadiamantis in Stavrou, 1988: 185

1. Introduction

The following section focuses on contemporary Greek and Irish national identities and
their evolution in a time of vast social, political and geopolitical changes. To an extent,
national identity perceptions are evolving differently in Ireland and Greece, given the
impact of the processes that have marked their development in recent years. There are
important variations within the Greek and Irish 'nationalist patterns' which are accounting
for the current divergence between the two case studies. The argument is that in Ireland,
the factors which inhibited secularisation in the past are gradually disappearing. Or in
other words, Ireland is shifting away from the 'nationalist pattern' because Irish national
identity is undergoing major transformations. This development is twofold: Economic
modernisation, a process far more rapid than the one which has taken place in Greece, has
created vast domestic social changes in Ireland and thus has significantly altered the
needs of Irish society in ways that the Church can not meet or comply with. At the same
time, decline in external threat perceptions, especially from the former imperial power
(chapter 4) is challenging existing perceptions of Irish religious nationalism, and is leaving the Irish Church without a legitimising basis for its policies. Greek national identity on the other hand is less flexible, a factor which accounts for the Church's resilience. This can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, given the historical pattern of Church-State relations, the Church is subordinate to the State and therefore does not clash with its impetus for modernisation. And secondly, because of the ongoing defensive nature of Greek national identity due to high external threat perceptions, the Church continues to function as the rallying point for Greek nationalism, with a very successful discourse which ensures a large popular base for its legitimacy (chapter 6).

Table 3.1: Co-relation between Church and National Identity - Greece and Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Church</th>
<th>National Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Inflexible</td>
<td>Flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Flexible</td>
<td>Inflexible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Greece and Ireland: Perceptions of Nationalism and National Identity

According to Smith, national identities can last for millennia. Certain elements such as language, the preservation and reproduction of certain myths, memories and traditions, as well organised religion with its rituals, liturgy organisation and hierarchy can play a powerful conserving role, 'ensuring a high degree of formal continuity between generations and from community to community' (Smith, 1991: 27). Change however is also vital for the continuity of national identities. In order to last, they must constantly change, evolve and adapt to new circumstances. According to Fr O'Doherty, Professor of Logic and Psychology in University College Dublin, what he terms the 'pickling' of a culture, can only result to its death.

'Our society is in a highly mobile phase at present. In fact we are going through a deep and far-reaching cultural revolution... There is no way known to man whereby a culture can be preserved intact, while at the same time remaining a living thing... if there is one thing known with certainty by the social psychologist, it is simply this: that a culture is something lived, not pickled; and life means change... I mean far reaching changes in the self-image of our people, the transition from a horizontally un-stratified society to a highly stratified one, from a lived Christianity to a post-Christian society, the switch from national to international
interest, from conditions of no leisure in one generation to holidays abroad in the next, from acceptance of traditional values and beliefs to their total rejection as with Joyce, from subsistence farming to the affluent society, from a peasant structured and institutionalised society (as in Arensberg) to a middle class way of life, and all this on one or two generations' (O'Doherty quoted in Garvin, 2004: 210).

Nationalism is constantly challenged by modernisation and changing structures. According to Girvin, nationalism has to change in order to adapt, and it is precisely this capacity to change that ‘explains why nationalism remains a potent force both in Ireland and internationally in the 21st century’ (Girvin, 2002:201).

In this sense, national identities are not static. The extent to which they may transform is limited and determined both by external and internal factors. Externally, the geopolitical situation the nation finds itself in both limits the change its identity can undergo, but also determines to what extent the change is necessary. Internally ‘the cultural resources and traditions which the community brings to the task of creating and sustaining itself as a nation provide the parameters for the development of its national identity and the ways in which that identity can be reinterpreted in successive generations’ (Smith, 2000:796). For Smith, ‘changes to cultural identities refer to the degree to which traumatic developments disturb the basic patterning of the cultural elements that make up the sense of continuity’ (Smith, 1991:25). The role of memory is also important, meaning the ways in which the past is remembered and taken through to the present and from generation to generation. Memory is however selective and fallible; certain elements of the past are remembered while others are deliberately forgotten, and so a nation’s identity is shaped and reshaped through successive generations.

Greece and Ireland have been no different in this respect: a strong sense of national identity is highly persistent in both. But it owes this resilience as much to change as it does to continuity. Indeed, being Greek is perceived synonymous to being Orthodox and being Irish is perceived synonymous to being Catholic. This has been to a great extent the result of external circumstances, such as conquest and foreign rule, as well as internal circumstances, such as the role of the Church during that period. As in Greece, the Church in Ireland played an important symbolic role in the independence movement. Post-independence, the nation-building process, through education and other constitutional and institutional processes crystallised perceptions of a religious-based national identity and effectively merged the notions of nation and religion in the minds of the people.
However, despite their striking similarities, these two forms of nationalism are also
different at times on emphasis and scope. In Ireland, change is much more profound than
in Greece, not least because of differences between the internal and external – economic,
social and geopolitical – developments in these two countries. These developments have to
an extent altered the fundamental patterns of myth, symbol, memory and value that bind
successive generations thus entailing a shift in Irish nationalism and national identity.

Undoubtedly, both Greece and Ireland have undergone major changes in their social,
economic and geopolitical environments during the past decades, and especially since the
early 1990’s. Membership of the European Community, economic modernisation, socio­
political change and the collapse of the Soviet Union have constituted significant realities
which have transformed both Nation-States to a great extent. Ireland’s economic
modernisation has been rapid, turning Ireland from one of the poorest European countries
in the 1980’s to the ‘Celtic Tiger’- an economically thriving economy- in the 1990’s.
According to a special survey on Ireland published in the economist in 2004, Ireland is a
classic ‘rags to riches’ case:

The figures recording Ireland’s transition from Europe’s worst to its best performing
economy are remarkable. In 1987 Irish GDP per person was 69% of the EU average
(adjusted to the EU-15); by 2003, it had reached 136%. Unemployment fell from 17% in
1987 to 4% in 2003; and government debt shrunk from 112% of GDP to 33%. Annual GDP
growth in the decade of the 1990’s averaged a tigerish 6.9%; GNP growth, usually a more
appropriate measure for Ireland, only slightly less. (Economist, Tiger, Tiger, Burning Bright,
16/10/2004: 1).

Greece’s modernisation although hardly as impressive is also worth noting. Although
Greece still ranks high in terms of unemployment and inflation rates among EU members,
an impetus for modernisation, manifested in greater productivity, rapid improvement of
infra-structure and the carrying out of the successful Olympic games in 2004, has been
accompanied by satisfactory economic growth and rising living standards.

It is precisely developments associated with the modernisation process that have created
two different diverging patterns in terms of the politics, religion and nationalism nexus.
The particular pattern of Church-State relations in Greece, which allows for a Church
which adapts and conforms to the State, has meant that such transformations have been
less controversial, or at least less so than in Ireland. Given this situation, confrontations
have been few. The Church has been a crucial element of the institutions that serve to promote the reproduction of national identity, and hence the role of religion never ceases to be presented as vital. Perceptions of Greek national identity have changed little since the inception of the Modern Greek State in 1831. The defining elements of Greek nationalism, such as language or Orthodoxy have been represented and therefore reproduced in much the same pattern throughout the past century. According to Fragoudaki and Dragona for example, national representation in the Greek education system appears to be trapped within the context of 19th century nationalism (Fragoudaki and Dragona, 1997: 16). If anything, geopolitical realities, especially since the end of the cold war and the re-structuring of the international order have raised the sense of threat felt in Greece, given the max influx of refugees (often non-Orthodox) from Eastern Europe, instability in the Balkans, the re-negotiation of borders and names (FYROM) and the regional balance between Greece and Turkey. Increasing external threat perceptions created by such developments have strengthened the need for a cohesive and inspiring Greek national identity.

The discourse of the Church, as well as its close relationship with the institutions of the State have allowed it to call upon the link between Orthodoxy and Greek identity, and mobilise and unite the people around this link. The adaptability of the Church to the State has been the reason for its success both in retaining its central political role and also in helping preserve in Greek society as a whole the idea that Orthodoxy is inseparable form being Greek. Not only, as Mavrogordatos observes, does the Greek case demonstrate ‘that religious freedom cannot be achieved simply as a matter of conformity to constitutional and international norms as long as the linkage between a particular religion and a particular national identity remains active and vital for the latter’s self-preservation, in the minds of those concerned’ (Mavrogordatos, 2003:134). It demonstrates, perhaps more importantly, the critical role central institutions play in shaping such perceptions. Although there have been moves for improvement between Greek- Turkish relations in recent years, Greece has benefited largely from the EU and there have been significant benefits deriving from mass immigration to Greece, still Turkey is perceived as Greece’s greatest foe, the EU is seen as compromising Greek national identity and Greece remains

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1 One of the most significant cases of such a confrontation between Church and State in Greece was the identity cards issue. Precisely because of the direct link to national identity, the church was able to mobilise a significant section of the Greek population in its favour. More recently, in March 2005, the scandals surrounding the Orthodox Church in Greece were dealt somewhat differently. The Church was attempted to adapt to the State.

2 For example, the ministry of National Education and Religion.
one of the most xenophobic countries in Europe. Greek national identity is very much a defensive one, perceived and understood as being under threat. Orthodoxy still lies at its core and in this capacity it becomes its major rallying point.

Catholicism in Ireland has followed a different route. Following the creation of the Irish State, nationalism in Ireland was also defensive, conservative, Catholic and anti-British in orientation. Irish national identity was perceived under threat, mainly against Britain which the Ireland perceived sought to destroy its national distinctiveness. In this vein, policy in post-independence Ireland was expressed in terms of associating itself with everything Britain was not: traditional, rural, Catholic Ireland. Irish Catholic nationalism led to isolationist policies. This meant, as Girvin notes, that ‘De Valera’s form of nationalism, rigid and inflexible was linked to an economic policy, based on a foundation of ‘doctrinaire nationalism’ (Girvin, 2002: 202). For example, as Dillon observes, ‘committed to ensuring the continuity of an Irish Catholic nation, de Valera’s government prohibited the sale and import of artificial contraceptives, regulated dance halls and taxed foreign newspapers’ (Dillon, 2002:53). And as Larkin argues, capital that could have been invested in enterprises, was instead directed towards the Church (Inglis, 1998: 251). This Irish conservative nationalist ideology, ‘as interpreted by successive governments and endorsed by successive electorates, embraced protectionist policies that aimed to build a sovereign country that was independent not only politically but also economically and culturally’ (Dillon, 2002:53). According to Hannah and Cummins the rural fundamentalist ideology of the early Irish State was compatible with ‘Catholic social thought and espoused by Church leaders. It was also legitimated by the romantic claim that Ireland did not place as high a value on economic development as other countries did’ (Horsnby-Smith, 1994: 268). But as Irish economic performance remained poor, these values lost ground and became challenged by politicians and intellectuals alike. These values being the core of Irish nationalism, the form of nationalism itself became challenged. Economic modernisation in the 1950’s and 1960’s was linked to an attempt to ‘develop a modified nationalist political culture, still conservative in respect to traditional society and norms, but linked to moderate reform and economic success’ (Girvin, 2002:204). According to Girvin, a new phase of Irish history began in 1961, one in which nationalism remains important but somewhat changed in focus, now ‘turned to economic development, European integration and the consequences of social and political change’ (Girvin, 2002: 1). Irish national identity is no longer perceived to be under threat; Britain is seen as a trading partner who does not constitute a threat to Ireland’s territorial
integrity or to the continued existence of the Irish nation. The latter sees its identity much linked to the EU through which Ireland can follow a successful social and economic programme.

As Girvin argues, Catholicism took the form resistance against the modern and the British (Girvin, 2002: 25). The link between Catholicism and the old traditional and rural order which proved unsuccessful is challenging its role. In addition, the particularly inflexible nature of the Irish Catholic Church and its inability to adapt to the State, has led to important Church-State confrontations. As the Church loses ground it is precisely this inflexible nature, as well as its association with a particular type of nationalism and programme which became ultimately discredited which has led to the loosening of its grip. When eventually modernisation began to take place, and economic affluence and success followed, the old isolationist system, with which the Church was closely identified, gradually became questioned and discredited by increasing numbers of Irish people. A growing need for transparency and democratic processes has meant that the Church is finding itself on precarious ground. According to Garvin it is the 'the liberal democratic, individualist and even populist characteristics inherent in an authentic constitutional and free social order can eventually break down the top down, secretive and closed characteristics of any authoritarian organisation' (Garvin, 2004:229). The changes which Irish society is undergoing have created very different needs and priorities for the Irish electorate which the Church was no longer able to meet. Thus the legitimacy of the Catholic Church is being severely weakened. 'Even an apparently all powerful and historically beloved Church ensconced in power by a liberal democracy can be far more fragile than it appears to be as it too cannot drift too far from the concerns of the electorate' (Garvin, 2004:229).

But if Irish national identity is evolving, then the question is to what extent. In a study entitled ‘The end of Irish Catholicism?’ Twomey goes as far as to claim that in modern Celtic tiger Ireland, ‘to be Irish is no longer identified with being Catholic as well’ (Twomey, 2003:10). According to Kenny, ‘it is widely accepted that the Catholic Church means less to young people in Ireland today than it has ever done in the course of Christian history. The young Irish no longer see Catholicity as part of their identity’ (Kenny in Inglis, 1998: 5).

3 In Greece, on the contrary the view is widely held that Turkey might even pose a threat to the country’s territorial integrity- for example the case of Imia-Kardak.
Although to accept this preposition might be perhaps far-fetched, such perceptions do reveal a tendency towards a shifting Irish nationalism and national identity away from Catholicism. The impact on national identity of both internal and external processes, and their interaction with older structures, are analysed henceforth and compared to Greece. Namely, chapter 3 examines the implications of a very different pattern of Church-State relations and Chapter 4 focuses on external threat perceptions and how they affect national identity. Further, Chapters 5 and 6 examine the ways in which these developments are reflected in discourse. Chapter 5 focuses on official State discourse, mainly the education system, but also historiography and commemorative events, and examines how changes in external threat perceptions have affected this; Chapter 6 focuses on official Church discourse. More specifically it attempts to illustrate how the interaction of the two variables conditions the Church to follow a particular type of discourse which inevitably impacts on its capacity for popular mobilisation.
Chapter 3

Church-State Relations and Modernisation: Nationalist Legitimisation Vs ‘Moral Monopoly’

Given the deep spirituality of so many of our people, it may be safe to say that it is not religion which has declined in large sections of Tiger Ireland. What is dying, rather, is a Victorian ecclesiocracy in its institutional forms. The "underground" Church of local saints and popular devotionalism, a Church which celebrates ritual and life, may already be re-emerging to displace an autocratic institution based on external rule-keeping and social fear.

Declan Kiberd, The Irish Times, October 3rd 2006

1. Introduction

The following chapter attempts to illustrate the ways in which economic modernisation is linked to changes in the Church-State pattern in Greece and Ireland. More specifically it focuses on the effects of the modernisation process, and compares its impact on Church-State relations in the two case studies in question. Subsequently, the changing nature of national identities hypothesis is tested here through an examination of the Church-State nexus variable; namely, it is assumed that the degree to which the Church obstructs the modernisation process directly affects the political role of the Church in a modernising society. In other words, political and cultural modernisation, as the inevitable consequences of economic modernisation, can have significant impact on the inter-relationship between key institutions depending on existing institutional arrangements: when the Church functions as a rigid monolithic institution resisting social change, and as a consequence obstructs the modernisation process, then its rigid structure becomes fractured and its power declines rapidly. Ireland has entered such a process.

2. Conforming versus Non-Conforming Church: The ‘King’s Dilemma’

For the purposes of this thesis, modernisation can be best defined as a multi-faceted process of significant societal transformation. According to Huntington (1968), modernisation affects society at every level, including the psychological, intellectual, demographic, social, economic and political; thus, it has significant social, economic and political consequences. The following table summarises his argument:
### Table 3.2: The Effects of Modernisation at Various Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modernisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental shift in values, attitudes and expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion and diffusion of knowledge, through literacy, mass communications and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in life expectancy, increase in occupational, vertical and geographical mobility, increasing urbanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplementation of primary groups with organised secondary associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversification of activity; rising occupational skill levels; increasing capital to labour ratio; shift from subsistence to market agriculture; decline of agriculture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Huntington, 1968:32-36

In short, economic modernisation brings social, political and cultural modernisation. This can often have dire consequences for rigid political structures which obstruct or resist the modernisation process. Inflexible institutional arrangements are by definition not adaptable to new developments and are therefore expected to break down. On the one hand, traditional actors are conditioned to modernise in order to survive. On the other, because of their traditional and rigid character and the centralisation of power this entails, they clash directly with the modernising sectors, and become marginalised (Huntington’s ‘King’s Dilemma’, 1968). In other words, they are likely to bring about their own demise precisely because they are unwilling and/or unable to adapt to changing circumstances. More flexible structures, on the other hand, are more likely to be able to conform and evolve accordingly. Parallels can be drawn with very rigid political communities, as for example early 20th century Russia, or the former USSR in the 1990’s, which gradually came under increasing pressure for economic modernisation and greater transparency. Openness in the economy brought about the need for openness in the political system and society more generally, which ultimately proved incompatible with the rigid nature of Russian authoritarianism or Soviet communism and thus the respective States collapsed.

The secularisation thesis makes a similar preposition. Economic and technological modernisation gives rise to a process of cultural modernisation primarily because the former is accompanied by certain social and political developments which weaken the
hold of traditional norms and values. The religious world view, typical of traditional
societies, falls into decline and secularised moral values emerge (Hardiman and Whelan,
1998: 66). The Irish case confirms this preposition to a great extent. It is likely that the
Irish case is shifting from Martin’s ‘nationalist pattern’ towards the classic Catholic
monopoly pattern:

During modernisation, Catholicism remains dominant; a monolithic, organic ideology
supports the national elites resisting the rising forces of liberalism which through
confrontation generate strong opposing organic secularist ideologies with an anti-clerical
bent. Society is divided into two warring sides, a clerical and anti-clerical block’ (Bruce,

This is increasingly becoming an accurate description of Ireland, where a growing liberal
constituency is clashing with the more conservative and religious strands in society. If,
like in Tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union, the isolationist ideology of traditional Rural
Catholic Ireland is losing ground to an increasingly wealth- generating and more
transparent system on the one hand, and the prime players within the system are unable,
or unwilling, to comply with modernisation on the other, then the old system has little
chance of survival. The structure and organisation of the Irish Catholic Church plays a
crucial role therefore. The latter, a rigid, authoritarian institution is resisting
modernisation and is allowing for very little change primarily because it fears that the
openness that accompanies modernisation will undermine its authority. The problem is
that the Irish Catholic Church is so deeply embedded in the older social order, that these
changes disrupt its functions to the core. Ultimately, its inability to adapt and compromise
within a context of rapid modernisation is making the Church seem increasingly more
anachronistic and is undermining its power.

The Irish Catholic Church has acted in a self-destructive manner, precisely because it is
so fiercely resisting social change. Twomey argues that the Church’s institutional
instability and reflection of archaic moral standards is responsible for its demise in recent
years. ‘The obsessive equation of sin with sex was much less pronounced in popular pre-
Famine Irish traditions. It was partly imported from Victorian England...but the end
result of these mutually supportive developments was the kind of suffocating, often
dehumanising Catholic morality which was identified with traditional Irish Catholicism
and in turn gave rise to the moral revolution in Ireland in more recent decades (Twomey,
2003:54). Twomey is but one example of many Irish scholars who have noted this
phenomenon. As early back as the late 1960's, O'Faolain in ‘The Irish’ (1969) prophesised that ‘Catholic authoritarianism (Rule by command) so deeply entrenched in clerical culture, would wreck the Church in Ireland eventually (O'Faolain in Garvin, 2004: 207). In an article published in Irish Political studies, 1991, O’Carroll offered a similar interesting explanation for the Church’s ‘almost pathological inability to pay much attention to warnings’ (Garvin, 2004: 208). He argued that ‘the Irish clergy could not think in bargaining styles. Traditional Irish Catholic political and social thought was absolutist and there was only way of looking at the world: the right way’ (Garvin, 2004: 208).

The Church strongly opposed any initiative for modernisation, partly because it could see how its position would be endangered. As its power rested primarily on its extensive ecclesiocratic apparatus and its manpower control of key institutions such as education and health, losing control of these institutions would directly challenge its political and social power. For example, the Church’s refusal to loosen its control over education in Ireland can be understood in terms of the Church fearing the emergence of a highly educated stratum of men and women, ‘for the obvious reason that it would be uncontrollable by them’ (Garvin, 2004:228). Garvin (2004) argues that by allowing the Church to develop that kind of moral grip on the population, the Irish ‘prevented the future’: ‘One of the reasons for stasis was a dysfunctional propensity of power-holders to fear other power-holders. An intimidating ecclesiastical apparatus intensified this climate and served as a role model for similar authoritarian secular elites’ (Garvin, 2004: 3). The Church’s anti-modernist tendencies are to be blamed ‘for a series of non-decisions that were disastrous to the country’s development’ (Garvin, 2004:3). These anti-modernist tendencies were particularly wide-ranging, manifested not only in the advocating of an isolationist and protectionist economy, but also strict moral laws, as for example against abortion and divorce, a Church-controlled moralistic education system and general welfare and very strict censorship.

Simply put, in Ireland, because the Church- State relationship is one where the Church is not subordinate to the State (no flexibility), modernisation is creating a sharp confrontation between the two institutions, and is subsequently resulting in the sharp decline of the political role of the Church. The Irish Catholic Church, one of the most important political and social players in post-independent Ireland so based upon the rigid political structure of the De Valera era, is experiencing the consequences of
modernisation. Rapid modernisation has meant rapid changes. In post-independence Ireland, although the Church fashioned itself in an authoritarian and illiberal manner, its power did not undermine democracy primarily because it was endorsed by popular legitimacy (grounded on the link between religion and national identity). In the process of rapid modernisation however, the monolithic nature of the Church has meant the latter is failing to generate such popular support and is instead alienating its supporters. An increasingly large, highly educated, secularising class is challenging the Church’s dominance, while its authoritarian nature, and thus its resistance to change, makes it far more difficult to adapt to new circumstances. In Twomey’s words, ‘traditional Irish Catholic culture carried within it the seeds of its own decay despite its apparent power and splendour in days of yore. Those seeds were primarily of an intellectual, more specifically, of a theological nature, and their fruit is what amounts to a crisis of faith today’ (Twomey, 2003:12).

In Greece however, although again there is an intimate Church-State nexus, because the relationship between the two institutions is precisely the reverse- i.e. the Church is subordinate to the State, confrontations have been less frequent, confined mainly to instances where the link between religion and nationalism has been at stake. Greece is not in fact explained by the classic secularisation paradigm where the key modernising actors in society (secular authority) become engaged in a direct confrontation with the anti-modernising actors (Church). This is because of the long standing tradition of greater Church adaptability to the State. The Church is able to reconcile with modernising policies which is why the consequences of modernisation have not been nearly as profound. For one thing, the economic modernisation process itself in Greece has been much less rapid with a, thus, milder social and cultural effect. On the other hand, what is perhaps more important is that the Church has traditionally interacted with the State in a very different manner, following a more flexible and adaptable policy towards the secular authority and is as a result proving to be more resilient. This is not to say that clashes with the State, or attempts for secularisation have been non-existent or inconsequential. Such confrontations are analysed below in greater detail. They constitute, however, exceptions; aberrations which confirm rather than disprove the rule.
The Church-State Nexus

Nationalist Legitimisation versus ‘Moral Monopoly’

This distinction significantly informs the way the two Churches interacted with the modernisation process. Although still both linked to nationalism, post-independence the Irish Catholic Church and the Greek Orthodox Church followed a different discourse, and a different relationship with the State. This is related to the importance attached to religious practice by the Irish Catholic Church. Catholic doctrine and Church practice is much different to that of Greece. As Catholicism is supra-national, it is therefore bound to the teachings of the international Catholic Church. It is one that essentially places much greater emphasis on rules and regulations than Orthodoxy, making the Church more rigid and flexible. The Irish Catholic Church is a particular case which developed in a far more legalistic way than even the other Catholic Churches of Western Europe. According to Inglis, in Ireland obeying the Church’s rules and regulation is a vital indication of being a good Catholic. Legalistic-orthodox religiosity is characterised by a surrender of the self to the institution. (Inglis, 1998:32) The Church’s requirements of the faithful are numerous, including ‘hearing mass on Sundays and holy days of obligation; fasting and abstaining on the days appointed; confession at least once a year; receiving the Blessed Eucharist at Easter time; and contributing to the support of our pastor and observing the marriage laws of the Church’ (Inglis, 1998:32). Failing to conform not only questions the moral and religious standard of the individual but also his social status.

The maintenance of the Church’s power came to rely as much on nationalist legitimisation as on the establishment of a strictly legalistic and controlling ‘moral monopoly’ (Inglis, 1998), namely the attempt to control how people conduct their lives through a strict moral framework of rules and regulations maintained through an extensive organisational structure. In the course of the twentieth century, developing and expanding its ‘moral monopoly’ became for the Irish Catholic Church the strategy with which it would maintain the power it had acquired. Gradually, as the ‘moral monopoly’ expanded, reliance on nationalist legitimisation became overshadowed. As Dillon observes, Irish national identity is grounded in ‘Catholic moral and social teaching’. (Dillon, 2002:53) Irish Catholicism is understood in terms of ‘a dogmatic overemphasis on Catholic rules, duties and obligations...unlike in traditional Catholic countries such as Italy, Spain or Poland, many Irish Catholics find it hard to accept that one can be a good Catholic and yet disagree with Vatican teaching on contraception, divorce, women’s
ordination etc’ (Dillon, 2002:55). As early as 1962, a study by Biever on political opinion in Ireland shows that a tension between Catholicism and Irish nationalism was possible. Although a large percentage of respondents rejected ‘the claim that the State ought to be preferred to the Church in a situation of conflict, or that the Church was too involved in politics, showing an acceptance of the role of the Catholic Church, a large percentage of respondents also rejected the claim that Nation and Church in Ireland are inseparable (Girvin, 2002: 133).

Table 3.3: Irish Attitudes to Church and State Questions (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church cannot be compared to any other social institution</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State to be preferred to Church on hypothesis of conflict</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome control significant</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church too much involved in politics</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church usurping role of State</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Church a national Church: nation and Church inseparable</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church and State totally independent of each other</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church harms itself by political involvement</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church should be more involved in State matters than it is</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Biever, Religion, Culture and Values, in Girvin, 2002: 133

Especially as nationalist legitimation became increasingly weakened by declining external threat perceptions and improving relations with Britain (Chapter 4), the Church found it could maintain its power and best interest through an extensive network of moral control seeking to keep the people as closely associated with the Church as possible. Losing control would mean losing legitimacy and that it could not allow. Therefore, in practice the Church seeks to defend its status and role almost exclusively on moral grounds, along the lines of a worrying development of loss of morality and purity, and the danger of not going to heaven, as chapter 6 will demonstrate. Demise of the role Church is not met with a nationalist rhetoric that warns of the extinction of the Irish nation as is done in Greece.

The development of the Irish Catholic Church’s extensive moral control apparatus, in other words, the fact that the power of the Catholic Church in Ireland is grounded on moral control, does not only distinguish the Irish Catholic Church from the Greek
Orthodox Church, but also from other European Catholic Churches. There is a sharp contrast between the way Catholicism was practiced in Ireland and other European societies, say for example Germany or France. To an extent, Ireland may be seen as an aberration and this is because of its particular history of imperial domination and the nature of its self-determination movement. Imperial legacy and the role of the Church during that period have significantly shaped the relationship between nationalism, national identity and religion. As Mavrogordatos observes, 'it was primarily in Catholic countries that the separation of Church and State became a paramount and urgent issue' and 'it was also primarily in Catholic countries that strictly secular nationalism developed...Insofar as Catholic countries like Ireland remain exceptional or 'retarded' in this respect this is no doubt because of the protracted struggle for national liberation form non-Catholic oppressors' (Mavrogordatos, 2003: 119). This explains why Ireland did not secularise like other Catholic European countries. Nationalism served to initially legitimate the consolidation of the Catholic Church’s controlling ecclesiastic apparatus, which had emerged during the Victorian era. 'Instead of a shift towards principled ethics and a more secular ethic of individual responsibility which has taken place in other European societies, there is still in Ireland not only a persistence of magical practices, but also an adherence to the rules and regulations of the Church and a general acceptance of its definition of what is morally right or wrong. It was the Church’s institutional structure that allowed the development of this ‘moral monopoly’, and more specifically, ‘the organisational manpower and resources of the Church, its dominance in other social fields, and the role being a good Catholic has played in the struggle for symbolic, cultural and social capital’ (Inglis, 1998:17). Whelan and Hardiman also consent to the fact that it was institutional developments relating to education, healthcare, child services and farm inheritance that contributed to the consolidation of the Catholic Church’s role in Irish society (Hardiman and Whelan, 1998: 71), while according to Garvin, the Catholic Church’s power lies in its attempt, and success, ‘to control and in some way enslave the intellectual and emotional life of the entire country’ (Garvin, 2004:2-3). This control was made possible given the strength of the human and physical resources of the Church which enabled it to expand ‘beyond the religious field into the field of politics, economics, education, health, social welfare, the media and others’ (Inglis, 1998: 244-245).

Through its highly developed bureaucratic control apparatus, the Irish Catholic Church was able to maintain a high level of adherence to its rules and regulations, and more
specifically it developed a vast institutional network of Churches, schools, hospitals and homes, through which it could maintain its moral power and dominate every aspect of Irish social life (Inglis, 1998: 39). Of equally significant importance was also the Church’s control of Irish women and the family. Garvin argues that this is related to the Church’s ‘air of being essential’, to the fact that ‘Catholic priests tended to see themselves as a kind of alternative aristocracy with a God-given right to rule over a people not really capable of self-rule’ (Garvin, 2004: 227).

The more the Irish Catholic Church expanded its ‘moral monopoly’, the more the nationalist discourse which allowed it to consolidate its power in the first place became of secondary importance. The Church’s discourse became far more focused on adherence to strict rules and regulations rather than the relationship between Irish national identity and Catholicism. Equally, legitimisation of the Church’s political role became increasingly based on the acceptance of Catholic rules and regulations than nationalism. The powerful position of the Irish Catholic Church came to be identified with religious practice, the number of vocations and its ability to get people to adhere to the Church’s rule. In this sense, decline in all the above is now a significant indicator of the Catholic Church’s decline.

On the other hand, this was a development which did not take place in Greece. The Greek Orthodox Church was able to maintain its power through an extremely nationalist discourse which found appeal in the majority of the population. It has a long history of subordination of Church to State therefore strict legalistic interpretations are not the focus of its doctrine; it does not place too much emphasis on the adherence to rules and regulations. For example, Church attendance, although welcomed, is not a strict requirement and as a result does not constitute a significant criterion for being a good Orthodox in Greece. As a consequence of this the Church’s position and legitimacy is not closely associated to the ability to get people to adhere to these rules. ‘The Orthodox Church has never been as monolithic as the Catholic Church has always aspired to be under a single infallible leader’ (Mavrogordatos, 2003:125). In addition, high external threat perceptions in Greece, strenuous relations with Turkey, and a rising sense of xenophobia cause by large waves of immigration of non-Orthodox populations (see chapter 4) have made nationalist legitimation a far more appealing, and so far more successful, Church discourse in Greece. Orthodoxy is still very closely linked to the nationalist tradition. The implications for national identity are significant: as a result,
strict adherence to rules, including for example Church attendance, is not a defining feature of Greek national identity. There is no emphasis on morality; the focus is on the role of Orthodoxy in the preservation of the Greek nation. As Mavrogordatos makes clear, religious instruction in Greek schools, for example, is defended solely on ‘national grounds – and not on moral grounds’ (Mavrogordatos, 2003:134). Religious festivals and holidays are still celebrated, not because they are religious holidays per se, but because they are religious and national holidays. For example, people attend Church on Easter Sunday, not necessarily because they want to keep in line with theological rules but most importantly because they want to assert their Greekness. Equally national holidays are celebrated vigorously by the Church, and have a twofold religious and national character, for example March 25th which marks both the celebration of the annunciation of Our Lady and the anniversary of the Greek national independence movement from the Ottoman Empire.

Therefore, instead of adherence to rules, Orthodoxy serves as a symbol of the connection with the past, the relationship with Byzantium and the struggle for independence. At the same time, instead of being linked to a particular doctrine or dogma, it is described as connected with Greek people’s social activities and characteristics. Certain traits of the Greek national character which are perceived as perennial are indivisible from religion. These included for example the notions of self-sacrifice, resistance, valour and love for liberty, characteristics that all Greeks ‘have possessed’ through time. ‘Thus elements which are presumed to compose a stereotypical portrait of a Greek are attributed to religion’ (Askouni, 1997: 458). Closer to what Billig (1995) terms ‘banal nationalism’, these attributes, national and religious, are enmeshed within the Greek character. ‘The constant, but invisible presence of Orthodoxy reinforces its importance, as it is presumed to be self-understood, almost naturally incorporated in every day life’ (Askouni, 1997: 458).

Orthodox identification with the Greek State has allowed for representations of Orthodoxy as having particular Greek characteristics and created an easier link with nationalism. For example, in the selection of Greek literature texts taught at schools, few concentrate solely on Orthodoxy. ‘The religious element is present, either directly or indirectly, in texts whose themes include the defence of the homeland from Byzantium until WWII German occupation, presenting in this way a sense of a self-understood
fusion between Orthodoxy and the national self throughout Greek history’ (Askouni, 1997: 457).

3. **The Social and Cultural Impact of Economic Modernisation**

1. *State Law/ Constitution*

The implications of such different expressions of religiosity and identity are important. The fact that the nationalised Church in Greece is subordinate to the State entails that it is more likely to abide to the passing of secular laws. One important implication of this is that the Greek Orthodox Church allows for several freedoms that the Irish Catholic Church doesn't. For example in Greece, abortion and divorce are legal, and their legalisation did not generate much confrontation on behalf of the Church. In addition, the Greek Orthodox Church allows three valid marriages in a lifetime. This is not grounded in Orthodox doctrine but rather, it is the development of the Orthodox Church’s historical adaptability to the State. ‘At one time the Orthodox Church allowed up to four valid marriages, simply because the Byzantine emperor Leo VI wished it. Perhaps no other issue illustrates better the historic contrast with Catholicism. In a similar situation, the Pope was willing to risk a break with Henry VIII of England, with momentous consequences’ (Mavrogordatos, 2003: 126). The Oecumenical Catholic Church has the adverse relationship with the State and therefore it is more difficult to pass legislation that opposes the Church. The very legalistic form of Irish Catholic identity reinforces this. Hence, in Ireland divorce and abortion are such controversial issues with legal and political implications. Strict adherence to the rules of the Irish Catholic Church implies lack of flexibility, and exposes the difficulty the Church is facing in adapting to new conditions. This has been particularly true during the past decade, when economic modernisation, increasing affluence and Europeanization have combined to make the Church seem less relevant.

In the past, popular support for keeping abortion or divorce illegal stemmed from the bond between Catholicism and Irish nationalism. However, new conditions have challenged the role of Catholicism as the main symbol of Irish national identity. According to Dillon, ‘the symbols and meanings associated with Catholicism now mingle with and compete against other equally powerful secular symbols in the Irish public consumer culture’ (Dillon, 2002:58). Because Greece is less associated with adherence to rules and regulations, this clash is less profound. Urban, consumer culture is not
necessarily incompatible in Greek Orthodoxy as it is in Irish Catholicism. The fact that
the Catholic Church is a supra-national organisation and bound to the ideas and doctrines
of the international Catholic Church has two-fold implications. Firstly, that it must abide
to laws of regulations of the Vatican in respect to social and moral rules; and secondly,
that it has greater difficulty linking Catholicism to the nation.

Impact of Vatican II

According to Garvin, ‘the collapse of political Catholicism in Ireland was caused as much
by a crisis originating within international Catholicism as by any internal change in Irish
economy’ (Garvin, 2004: 214). The ‘crisis’ Garvin is referring to is Vatican II, a move for
modernising the Roman Catholic Church that took place in the mid 1960’s which
‘officially affirmed the autonomy of Church and State, recognised religious pluralism and
Catholic’s and other people’s freedom to follow the dictates of their conscience’ (Dillon,
2002: 58). Vatican II came at a time when the Roman Catholic Church was being
increasingly criticised for anachronistic policies which do not take into account the
mounting problems that face contemporary societies, such as mounting cultural diversity
and the rights of non Catholic groups. ‘Vatican II emphasised the political obligation to
recognise the rights of minority religious groups’, and although its intention was
‘primarily to safeguard the rights of Catholics where they are a minority’, it had the
unintended consequence of ‘greater public attention being given to the ways in which
Irish laws, on contraception for example, might contravene the Protestant minority
understanding of religious freedom’ (Dillon, 2002:58). The need for increasing openness
brought about by Vatican II, and exposure in the media over controversial issues such as
abortion have served to expose the undemocratic and authoritarian character of the Irish
Catholic Church and have urged it to justify its policies both at a national and a European
level.

Abortion:
The need for liberalisation created by Vatican II, combined with an growing need for
liberalisation and transparency created by modernisation within Ireland came in direct
confrontation with legislation set out in the Constitution, notably legislation on divorce
and abortion. The 1983 Irish constitutional referendum is a good example of the
emergence of secularising forces in Ireland in. The latter was characterised by an active
involvement of the Catholic Church in the campaign to tighten legislation against
abortion by amending the Constitution and adding a clause which acknowledges and
protects the right of the unborn. Amidst a growing controversy, the referendum was endorsed on September 7th 1983 by a two to one majority. The eighth amendment of the Irish Constitution ‘acknowledges the right to life of the unborn, with due regard to the equal right of the mother’ (Irish Constitution, including amendments 2002). However according to Girvin, ‘although the amendment was passed, the intervention of the Church has not been beneficial to it as an institution’ (Girvin, 1986: 61). The fact that the case proved to be so controversial, that opposition to the Church was for the first time this big and this systematic illustrated that this was a ‘Pyrrhic’ victory. It exposed the precarious ground on which the Church was standing and signalled the beginning of an era of decline in which the Church would become increasingly challenged in subsequent referendums, Church attendance would drop rapidly and a series of sex scandals would place a large question mark on the Church’s legitimacy.

This is well exemplified in the 1992 X-case. In 1992, a 14 year old rape victim initiated a huge controversy, known as the X-case, when she claimed the right to abort on the grounds that her life was endangered. During trial it was argued that the girl had suicidal tendencies and proceeding with the pregnancy could result in her taking her own life; however, the court granted an injunction preventing the girl from travelling to the UK to obtain an abortion. Following increasing exposure in the media, both within Ireland and abroad, the decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, and was overturned by a four to one majority. The X-case was very influential in Ireland and significantly damaged the Catholic Church as it attracted significant media attention. In November 1992, two referendums were passed endorsing the amendment of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution in order to include the protection of the right to information and travel:

The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.

This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and another State.

This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully available in another State (Constitution of Ireland).
In February 2002, Fianna Fail launched its abortion amendment campaign proposing:

'The referendum proposes to add two new sub-sections to Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution. It acknowledges the equal right to life of the mother and the unborn. A new Article 40.3.4 states: "In particular, the life of the unborn in the womb shall be protected in accordance with the provisions of the Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Act, 2002." A new Article 40.3.5 proposes that this Act cannot be changed unless it is approved by the people in a new referendum. The main provisions of the Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Bill are: The threat of suicide, based on the X case, will be removed as a ground for abortion; Abortion will be defined as the intentional destruction by any means of unborn human life after implantation in the womb. (This definition presumes that the IUD and the morning-after pill will have legal protection); A procedure carried out by a medical practitioner at an approved place - to be laid down by the Minister by regulation after the referendum - to prevent a real and substantial risk of the loss of a woman's life, other than by self-destruction, will not be regarded as an abortion; Anyone aiding or procuring an abortion will be liable for up to 12 years' imprisonment. The right to information and freedom to travel for an abortion are restated in the Bill.'

In March 2002 the government’s proposed Constitutional amendment was defeated with a 50.42 per cent No vote, against a 49.58 per cent Yes vote. Suicide was legally a threat to the mother’s life. It was the ‘first time that an alliance between the Fianna Fail party, the Catholic Church and the official pro-life movement was defeated in a referendum on abortion, suggesting that the liberal minority among the Irish electorate may one day become a majority’ (Kissane, 2003: 73). Although abortion remains illegal, the Catholic Church’s position in the matter has been directly challenged in recent years with the legalisation of the right to travel and the right to information for abortion services conducted abroad as well as the recognition of suicide as a cause of danger to the mother’s life.

Divorce:

In accordance to these secularising tendencies, the Church has also been defeated in other significant social matters. In 1995, a referendum was endorsed with a 50.28% ‘Yes’,
legalising divorce with certain provisions, including the requirements for the couple to have lived apart for the 4 of the previous 5 years. Divorce came into effect in 1997. According to an ‘Irish Times’ TNS mrbi opinion poll, conducted on January 29th and 30th 2007 and published on February 5th 2007, the number of people endorsing divorce has risen dramatically. ‘On the 10th anniversary of the introduction of divorce, 75 per cent of those polled said they would vote in favour of divorce if a referendum were held now, compared with just 16 per cent who said they would vote against and 9 per cent who had no opinion or didn’t know how they would vote’ (Irish Times, February 5th 2007). In addition, 64 % of the respondents do not believe that divorce has undermined the institution of marriage.

The results of this poll support the propositions made by the secularisation thesis: the strongest supporters of divorce are the younger members of society and those living in urban centres, mainly Dublin. Those aged between 18-23 support divorce at 83% while the over-65’s ranked among the lowest with a 53 ‘Yes’ vote intention. In Dublin, 81% responded they are in favour of divorce. Only 7% positioned themselves against it, while 11% responded they don’t know.

Indeed since the establishment of the independent Greek State the Church has pursued a policy of accommodation with the State. When, in 1981 the socialist PASOK government led by Andreas Papandreou was elected, it embarked upon a systematic reform programme which included the separation of Church and State. The reforms however were hardly as radical as the government had proposed. Legislation on social issues such as civil marriage and abortion was passed with minor controversies. However, issues which threatened to breach the bond between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity were highly contested.

**Civil Marriage (1983):**

Until 1983 only religious marriages were recognised by Church and State while the marriage between Orthodox with non-Orthodox was forbidden. PASOK’s initial proposal to legalise civil marriage, making it the only legally recognised form of marriage in Greece and retaining religious marriage only as optional was opposed by the Church. A compromise was reached between government and Church resulting in making both forms legal. Since that time, about 95 percent of marriages have occurred in the Church
illustrating perhaps the insistence of the Greek people to associate a religious ceremony with custom, tradition and culture.

Abortion (1986):

Although the Orthodox Church of Greece did protest against the legalisation of abortion, its reaction was hardly a zealous one. Indeed the Church did not condone abortion. But it did not put up a systematic fight against its legalisation. Amidst a minor controversy, the Church accepted the government’s decision and abortion was legalised in 1986.

Church Property:

The ownership of Church property was another controversial issue of the 1980s. The Pasok government put forward a proposal which included the transferring of farmland owned by the Church through a State agency to agricultural cooperatives for cultivation. In 1987 the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs, Antonis Tritsis, put forward this proposal purportedly not as an effort to weaken the connection between the Church and Greek nationhood, but to increase the Church's participation in civil society. Although large numbers of lay intellectuals and some Church officials supported the idea initially, the public and most of the Church hierarchy saw it as an attack on Church prerogatives. ‘Despite implementing several significant reforms during the early 1980’s affecting the role of the Church in civil society, the most radical reforms proposed under the Tritsis Bill (NS 1700), were emasculated because of then-Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou’s view that the administrative separation of Church and State should not affect the bonds between Church and nation’ (Prodromou, 2004: 475-476).

Cremation of the Dead:

The Church opposed it on the grounds that it is contrary to Orthodox doctrine. However, Church opposition was hardly as systematic or determined as the identity cards issue. Despite the Church having registered its opposition, the issue did not assume equal proportions and a Bill was passed in the Greek Parliament in March 2006, endorsed by a large majority, which permits the cremation of the dead for those non-orthodox Greek citizens whose religion allows it, such as Catholics. As an extension, it has been legalised for Orthodox Greeks to be cremated, under the condition that they will not receive an
Orthodox funeral. This illustrates that ultimately the Church is not prepared to challenge the secular authority unless the link between religion and national identity is at stake.

Identity Cards:

More recently however, as the then Prime Minister Simitis embarked on a project to eliminate religion from Greek identity cards, he was confronted by a systematically organised and determined Church opposition. Therefore, a distinction needs to be made between the Church intervention in matters with social/civil society implications and matters with implications for the link between Church and nation. The Church is more likely to be flexible (although not necessarily welcoming) and make concessions to any reforms with strictly social implications than it is to any reforms which affect its national role. This is not to say that Orthodox Churches approximate a plurality model. The Greek Orthodox Church is highly interventionist, political and monopolistic. It is only logical that the leaders of the Church will not always be prepared to sacrifice principles indiscriminately for the sake of political accommodation. Occasionally Church and State have been at odds. But such instances have been few, as the Greek State as a whole tends to be highly nationalistic. Most importantly, because the Greek Orthodox Church considers its survival to be much more dependent on the legitimating role of nationalism than religious practice, confrontations have been most likely to occur in cases where the State has threatened to break this link, i.e. identity cards issue, 2000. Indeed the Church-State confrontations of the Archbishop Christodoulos era are clear examples of this. The identity cards crisis of 2000 illustrates that although there are secular forces in Greece, the Church is prepared fight a bitter battle for its survival and privileged status as the carrier of Greek national identity. The Church’s reaction to the crisis and the Archbishop’s rhetoric are analysed in chapter 6 which is concerned with Church discourse.

History Textbook Reforms

The distinction between the Church’s stance on strictly social issues and issues with implications in the link with nationalism is also exemplified in the huge controversy that broke out in the spring of 2007 over the introduction of a new textbook for the 6th year of the primary junior cycle for the 2006/2007 academic year which, attempting to promote a more balanced account of Greek history, downplayed the role of religion in Greek national identity. The attempt initiated a huge controversy, much of which originated
from the Church. This move threatened the survival of the Church directly by challenging its role as carrier of Greek national identity and thus questioning its nationalist legitimation. Although the Church has proved more willing to compromise in the issue of religious practice in the Greek education system, for example non-Orthodox students may be exempt from religious education, it is far less willing to compromise the link between religion and Greek national identity.

The textbook constitutes an important change from its predecessors, as it is, generally speaking, a more balanced historical account written in a more impartial and factual manner, omitting highly emotional language and promoting the multi-cultural inclusive ideal as an alternative to exclusive, ethnic Greek national identity. It overlooks or downplays among other things the role of the Church during the Greek Revolution of 1821 and undermines the distinction between ‘us’ and the hostile Ottoman or Turkish ‘other’. The section on the Greek revolution, which is disproportionately large taking up 15 out of a total of 55 chapters, places a more extensive focus on the classical heritage of the Greek nation, rather than the Byzantine one. There is extensive mention of classical antiquity as an inspiration for the Greek independence movement. There is no mention of standard myths involving the clergy, such as bishop Germanos raising the flag of independence at Kalavryta to mark the commencement of the movement. Equally, the various version of the painting or lithograph depicting Bishop Germanos raise the flag is also missing. There is also no mention of the myth of the so-called ‘secret schools’

According to its critics, the book constitutes ‘genocide of memory’, a ‘historical dehydration’ and even a ‘submission to the Americans’ (Kathimerini, March 8th 2007). Critics argue that the book has the potential of deconstructing some of the cornerstone myths of the Greek nation which hold that Greek national identity and Orthodoxy as inseparable, and promote the notions of resistance and self-sacrifice as paramount traits of the Greek national character. As a result in March 2007 the Church embarked upon a programme of systematic opposition against the newly introduced textbook; the Archbishop Christodoulos who fiercely opposed the book, demanded its withdrawal on the grounds that it constitutes the ‘forging Greek history’ (www.in.gr, March 19th 2007). The Orthodox Church of Greece condemned the book as unconstitutional, on the grounds that according to Article 3 of the Greek Constitution, it is the duty of the Department of Education and Religious Affairs to cater for the ‘national and religious education of Greek children (Kathimerini, March 28th 2007). According to Metropolitan Paul of
Sisanio, in the new history textbook 'the Orthodox Church's national contribution has been erased and historical reality has been distorted in an effort eliminate facts that might annoy the Turks (Kathimerini, March 28th 2007). The State finally gave in to Church demands, by initially agreeing to significantly alter the textbook to include sections which promote the Church as defender of Greek national identity and as a force that significantly contributed to the survival of Hellenism during the bleakest years of its existence. As this failed to appease the controversy, the textbook was finally withdrawn in September 2007.

2. Civil Society

The increasing need for transparency brought about by modernisation has directly challenged the controlling role of the Catholic Church in Ireland. As controversial issues, such as the X-case, the sex abuse scandals that plagued the Church during the 1990’s and other scandal cases, such as the Magdalen laundries were brought to the forefront of media exposure, the Church came under scrutiny and pressure. The opening up of the media and the loosening up of censorship laws have seriously challenged the Church.

Censorship and the Media:

A good illustration of the Catholic Church’s moral rigidity is the exercise of strict censorship in Ireland in force since the 1920’s. The 1923 Censorship of Films Act empowered film censored to cut or refuse to licence films containing corrupting or secularisation influences; the 1929 Censorship of publications Act empowered the ban of any book with indecent contents (Fuller, 2004:37). The list of banned books was extensive. ‘As a result some of the most celebrated figures of modern literature featured on the list of banned authors- Steinbeck, Greene, Gide, Hemingway, Sartre, to name but a few, and of course many Irish writers, among them Frank O’Connor, Kate O’Brien and Sean O’Faolain’ (Fuller, 2004: 38).

The Church’s inability to deal with social change became increasingly evident as globalisation, further EU integration and the growth of communications media meant Ireland gradually became more open to outside influences. Foreign books, films, press publications, radio and television increasingly permeated Irish life in the 1950’s and 1960’s causing Irish bishops grave concern over ‘their influence on religious and moral life’ and the serious danger they constituted to members of the flock’ (Fuller, 2004: 38). According to Fuller, two of the most influences challenging Irish religious and moral life
included, firstly Radio Luxemburg, which began broadcasting in 1933, as ‘it gave the young generation growing up in the 1950’s in Ireland access to the rock and roll culture of America’ (Fuller, 2004: 39); and BBC television, showing women ‘immodestly dressed’ and broadcasting on taboo issues such as prostitution and homosexuality. The problem was that a whole new ethos, which ran to contrary to the Church’s teachings and regulations, was being imported from abroad via a very popular means of communication and the Church was unable to prevent it.

These developments served to undermine the Church’s position in a variety of ways. Firstly, ideas contradicting the Church and challenging ‘its single truth’ were being rapidly transmitted throughout the country.

The media gave publicity to intellectuals who were developing a new language, alternative to that of the Church, which people appropriated to read and interpret their lives. The language of these writers, doctors, psychologists, educationalists and programme makers was often at variance with the Church’s language... what was emphasised in this approach was the nobody had a monopoly on knowledge or truth and that there were different arguments and positions which had to be recognised and heard (Inglis, 1998: 232-233).

Secondly, the media exposure of certain cases, such as the X-case, the Magdalen laundries and the sex abuse scandals directly challenged the Church and brought forward the question of its accountability. Such cases also received extensive media coverage abroad, bringing Ireland to the spotlight given the authoritarian nature of its Church. Indeed, according to Inglis, Catholicism, especially the way it has evolved in Ireland, is doctrinally and inherently contradictory with the media, because the claim to divine truth creates a fear of liberal individualism and self- expression (Inglis, 1998: 237). Inglis claims that there may be a greater contradiction, not only with the media, but with democratic participation, pluralism and ethical relativism which are essential ingredients of civil society. This indeed raises the question of whether the Irish Catholic Church is inherently contradictory to and incompatible with civil society’ (Inglis, 1998: 237). The Church has been unable to combat the plurality of ideas and liberalisation brought about by the media, precisely because of its inherently rigid and authoritarian nature. This is why the sex abuse scandals for example have had such a profound impact in Ireland.

Censorship was also an issue in Greece, especially during the 1940’s and 1950’s and the period of the military Junta (1967-1974), although it did not reach the levels of Irish
censorship. Several books and films were received with enormous hostility by the Church, but given its subordination to the State, some were never legally banned. For example, although in 1955 Nikos Kazantzakis was excommunicated from the Greek Orthodox Church for his novel ‘The Last Temptation of Christ’, the book was never formally banned in Greece. Censorship remains a controversial issue. More recently, certain members of clergy have suggested banning certain ‘indecent’ works such as the film ‘The Passion of the Christ’ (2004), ‘The Da Vinci Code’, both film and book, (2006) as well as number of art exhibitions which allegedly ‘insult’ religious faith, but without success.

Although the Church does not necessarily condone it, generally, there is freedom of press and television, especially when it comes to sex. Some cases are problematic if they are seen to ‘insult the faith’ by for example linking sexual scenes to religious symbols but such cases are few. A notable example occurred in June 2005, when art curator Christos Ioakimidis was charged with “showering abuse on” and “mocking” the Eastern Orthodox Church by hanging Thierry de Cordier’s ‘Dry Sin’ in an exhibition in Athens in 2003. The painting, described as ‘indecent and despicable’ as well a ‘a creation of perverted artistic thought’, depicted male frontal nudity and a cross (Kathimerini, June 2nd 2005).

As far as media and new modes of communication go however, the Church has not suffered. Although Orthodoxy is, like Catholicism, a monopoly religion (Martin, 1978) the Greek Orthodox Church is dealing the problem posed by increasing civil society with a more successful discourse.

a) It does not emphasise so much on rules and regulations, thus increasing foreign influences and tendencies to liberalise sex do not challenge it in the same way as the Irish Catholic Church.

b) The Orthodox Church links its discourse not to morality but almost exclusively to nationalism which it can defend. In this context, it ‘uses’ high external threat perceptions and the Church’s perceived link to the Greek nation to defend its position.

c) In the past decade, this ‘defence process’ along nationalist lines been carried out mainly by Archbishop Christodoulos, whose charismatic presence ‘speaks the language of the media’: although on the one hand he maybe directly questioned and/or challenged by the increased transparency new modes of communication have
entailed, at the same time also uses the media to put forward his views, and defend the
Church-nation bond quite successfully. Indeed, the Orthodox Church’s nationalist
discourse, mainly put forward by Christodoulos is what has allowed it to win several
battles with the State, and remain popular and legitimate in the eyes of the people. For
example, during the 2000 Identity Cards crisis, the importance of television for the
Church was paramount. The entire setting of the Archbishop’s address to the
demonstrators was organized in view of how it would be covered by the media.
According to an article of newspaper Eleftherotypia, published a few hours before the
Athens rally took place and entitled ‘St. Hollywood’, the organising committee urged
the demonstrators to keep in mind that what matters most is ‘what will shown on
television’. The article continued, ‘there are podiums set everywhere, Syntagma
Square, Omonia, and the pillars of Olympic Zeus. Television screens will be filled
with...Greek-Orthodox identity’ 4(Eleftherotypia, June 21st 2000).

This is in sharp contrast to Ireland. According to Inglis, the main problem in Ireland is
that the Church’ is unable to produce clerical intellectuals who are able to speak
within the language of the media. It is a highly centralised, hierarchical institution that
claims to be divinely ordained, and this poses an inherent contradiction: the
necessities of preserving divine authority and developing free, open debate and
discussion. In other words the Church does not allow free discussion from within and
that is a self-hindering process’ (Inglis, 1997; 234). Lacking the high external threat
against which the Church could protect and salvage the Irish nation, its basis for
popular mobilisation is significantly challenged. This issue will be analysed in
greater depth in chapter 6 where the discourse of the two Churches and their
relationship with the media is examined.

**Modernisation, Church Organisation and Manpower**

Modernisation has directly affected the numbers of religious personnel in both Greece and
Ireland, which have both been in decline. In Ireland between 1970 and 1995, the number
of clerical religious orders dropped by 42%, the numbers of sisters by 35.1% and the
number of brothers by a significant 58.2% (Inglis, 1998: 212). This trend has had a much
more profound impact in the Irish Catholic Church, precisely because its range of social

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4 Εξέδρες παντού. Στο Σύνταγμα, στην Ομόνοια (φωτογραφία) στους στόλους του Ολυμπίων Διώς. Οι
ιθανές τηλεοράσεων θα γεμίσουν... ελληνορθόδοξη ταυτότητα
control has been based on an extensive bureaucratic network effectively run by religious personnel. As Inglis puts it, "when it came to moral matters, what really mattered was not so much "what will father say", as "what would the priest think?" But the maintenance of this moral control is dependent on having a reliable number of active, well-trained, vigilant religious personnel" (Inglis, 1998: 211).

Health and Education

Modernisation brought about specialisation in fields such as the health service and the education system. For example, as Inglis notes, the ‘proportion of religious as full-time teachers in secondary schools fell from 48% in 1965 to 9% in 1991 (Inglis, 1998: 225). The implications of this are significant, as these sectors were practically run by religious personnel in the past decades. In Greece on the other hand, this was not the case. The decline in the numbers of people entering religious orders has not damaged the Church in a similar manner. Very few schools were actually run by nuns and brothers, and hardly any hospitals. Church control of the education system relies not on the Irish priests imposing moral rules and regulations, but rather on a history curriculum which focuses on the bond between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity. The relationship between the Church and the education sector is analysed in greater depth in chapter 5, where the different ways of Church penetration in the Irish and Greek education systems is compared.

Women in the Work Force

The increase in the numbers of women entering the workforce has been a significant factor in Ireland’s unprecedented growth. According to special issue on the ‘Irish miracle’ published by the Economist in 2004, ‘the biggest contribution to the Irish miracle came from more people working. Until the 1980’s, women’s participation in the workforce was low by international standards; today it is above average’ (Economist, Tiger, Tiger Burning Bright, 2004:6). According to the secularisation paradigm, although women tend to be more religious and traditional in their moral values than men (Hardiman and Whelan, 1998:71), this tends to decline as women become more integrated into the labour force. Therefore, increasing numbers of women in the work force as a result of economic modernisation is highly likely to accelerate the secularisation process. Again, this is more evident in Ireland than in Greece, partly because Ireland has had a greater increase of
women in the workforce than Greece, and partly because of the extensive controlling role of the Irish Catholic Church over Irish women.

Ireland has witnessed a significant increase in the employment rate in recent years, from 60% in the 1980’s to almost 70% in 2004. There has also been a significant increase in the numbers of women, especially the number of married women, which according to Hornsby-Smith, rose from 1 in 20 in 1961 to 1 in 5 in 1987 (Hornsby-Smith, 1994: 269).

**Table 3.4: The Trend in Female Labour Force Participation (Ireland)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Women</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married Women</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hardiman and Whelan, 1998: 69

This trend has placed Ireland among the highest in the EU in terms of women labour force participation.

**Table 3.5: Women in the Labour Force %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU(25)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU(15)</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat
This social change has had profound consequences for the power of the Irish Catholic Church. Irish women are gradually abandoning the traditional role of the mother as constructed by the Church, by entering university education, getting divorced and having children outside marriage. The increase of the number of women entering the workforce has coincided with a rapid decline in the number of sisters in the Irish Catholic Church from 18,662 in 1970 to 6,558 in 1995, which amounts to a decrease of 35.1%. Similarly, the numbers of women in vocations has witnessed a massive 96.8% decrease in the years from 1966 to 1996 (Inglis, 1998:212). In addition, given the fact that the Irish mother has been detrimental in developing the Catholic Church’s ‘moral monopoly’, because she was the crucial link between the institutional structure and the religious devotion of each new generation of Irish Catholics, the change of the role of women in Ireland has significantly undermined the Church’s ability to control the Irish people. (Inglis, 1998:238-239).

The increase has not been as profound in Greece, as table 4 indicates. Between 1993 and 2004 the number of women in the labour force has increased 16.5%, compared to Ireland’s 21.7% during the same period. What is of greater importance however, and serves to explain why the Greek Orthodox Church has not suffered as greatly from increasing levels of labour force participation among women is that the Church was never as reliant on human resources as the Irish Church was. Given that the Orthodox Church odes not premise its power on a moral monopoly, the role of the ‘Greek mother’ is nowhere near as detrimental as in Ireland.
4. Conclusion

This chapter has used a variety of sources to illustrate that one important distinction between the two cases is that, although both Catholicism and Orthodoxy are considered to be monopoly religions, the Irish Catholic Church with its insistence on adherence to strict rules and its 'obsession' with sex and morality obstructs the modernisation process to a much greater degree than the Greek Orthodox Church which does not focus on morals and adherence to Church regulations, but rather places its emphasis almost exclusively on the bond between religion and nation. Perhaps the most significant point to make about modernisation and its impact on Ireland is that following the attainment of statehood, the Irish Catholic Church became closely associated with a social, political and economic order that was incompatible with modernisation. Irish social and economic policy failed to generate affluence and success, and with it failed the Church which was closely associated with it. This is mainly a product of the particular pattern of Church-State relations in Ireland, which developed in terms of a 'moral monopoly' because of historical and doctrinal reasons. This allowed for the rise of an authoritarian, illiberal and inflexible institution too closely associated with the old order, and unable to withstand social and economic change. The Church sought to maintain its power through an extensive apparatus of moral control, a 'moral monopoly', whose foundations are being challenged by a changing, modernising society.

On the other hand the Greek Orthodox Church, being subordinate to State authority and thus more flexible to it, has been better able to withstand the twin forces of modernisation/ secularisation. Its nationalist discourse and the continued existence of high external threat perceptions in Greece have assisted the Church to maintain its legitimacy to a much greater extent than in Ireland. This is not to say that there have not been secularising tendencies in Greece; to the contrary. But the Orthodox Church of Greece is simply more resilient towards these tendencies because, it remains on the 'nationalist pattern' on the one hand, and is much less resistant to the secular authority and certain secular laws on the other.

The rigidity of the Church and its refusal to compromise has meant little ground is left for moderate opposition originating both outside and from within the Church. 'The leading clergy did not want a new generation of independent-minded, highly educated and literate Catholic laymen quoting Pascal or Mauriac, who might ask awkward questions and undermine the people's unquestioning belief in their priests' (Twomey, 2003:50). This has
rendered ‘the emergent liberal consensus far more angry and even implacably anti-Catholic than it ever need have been’ (Garvin, 2004:209), thus making opposition to the Church much more profound and eliminating the possibility for gradual change. The liberal wing of the Church itself has also been limited. Those who ‘found a small voice in the wake of Vatican II were only a small minority and were rejected and persecuted by the traditionalist ecclesiastical establishment in Ireland’ (Garvin, 2004:211).

On the contrary, as a result of its doctrinal and institutional adaptability, the Greek Orthodox Church has been better able to conform to the modernisation process. In contrast with the Irish Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church of Greece is more accommodating to secular authority, and thus more flexible to State initiatives, partly because in most cases historically its survival has never depended on a strict imposition of inflexible religious laws. The fact that it places little emphasis on strict adherence to rules and regulations, or that relies little on an extensive bureaucratic control apparatus has meant that it is in a better position to bargain with other key actors. ‘The pattern that emerges from a brief examination of Church-State relations from 1923-1969 and for that matter to the present, is that the Church could stand to gain a great deal more by assuring those in authority of its loyalty than by any other method’(Stavrou, 1988: 196). In Mavrogordatos’ words:

The impression of immutable traditionalism usually associated with Orthodoxy may mask its malleability. Over the centuries there is not a single issue on which the Church has absolutely refused to compromise with the State accept one: their separation. Only in such an eventuality, when the Church would have nothing more to lose, would it risk a total break with the State. Otherwise the Church has been apparently willing to compromise on practically everything. (Mavrogordatos, 2003: 125)

In this sense, the Greek Orthodox Church seems to be in a better bargaining position than the Irish Catholic Church.
Chapter 4

External Threat Perceptions, National identity and Religion

1. Introduction

Chapter 3 has attempted to assess the impact of the Church-State nexus variable in Greece and Ireland: on the one hand, modernisation in Ireland has been much more profound than in Greece and on the other hand the Irish Catholic Church is less flexible to the State than the Greek Orthodox Church which has resulted in a sharper secularisation drive in Ireland. The following chapter attempts to illustrate the impact of the second variable: namely, the role of external threat perceptions in strengthening (Greece) or weakening (Ireland) the link between the Church and national identity. Based on this premise, the assumption in subsequent chapters is that because external threat perceptions in Ireland have declined, Irish national identity is shifting away from Catholicism as the need to unite and rally around the main carrier of the nation’s identity is no longer perceived as detrimental. This is assisted by the fact that the Catholic Church has become an increasingly discredited actor, given not only its association with an unsuccessful economic programme and the clashes on issues such as divorce and abortion but most importantly the scandals that plagued the Church during the 1990’s. In this sense, Irish nationalism and Ireland’s ethnic/exclusive national identity is shifting towards the civic/inclusive variety as it is forfeiting its religious element. This is in its turn reinforces a process which renders the Church less popular and less relevant, thus directly affecting its underlying basis for legitimacy.

2. Religion, National Identity and the Concept of External Threat

An important factor that serves to expose the growing inability of the Catholic Church to mobilise the people around Catholic nationalism is growing perception of decline of external threat in contemporary Ireland. National identity is a means of demarcating a community from outsiders. Conflict or fear of external threat can foster ethnic cohesion by exacerbating the need to secure this demarcation. According to the ‘cohesion’ thesis", "group solidarity is a product of external armed conflict or the imminent threat thereof" (Smith, 1981:378). Cohesion is a reaction to a common threat and threat

reinforces the community’s sense of ethnic individuality and history. According to Smith, war and the threat it poses moulds ethnic communities, primarily their formation but also the growth of their self-images and stereotypes. As Smith puts it, ‘in a crisis, in the heat of battle, old divisions are laid aside and the nationalist dream of ethnic fraternity becomes a momentary reality (Smith, 1981: 378). For example, many of the European States ‘have been beaten into national shape by the hammer of incessant wars, which have also endowed them with a great part of their ethnic cohesion and imagery’ (Smith, 1981:391). Conflict, or the threat of conflict, therefore, accentuate the cohesion of a group and also serve to mobilise its members. When national identity is religious-based, ethnic cohesion is perceived in terms of uniting around religion: ‘indeed wherever there is a threat and a border situation and the nation is pushed towards its historical faith’ (Martin, 1978: 107).

Threat can therefore be seen as an important element in the reproduction and evolution of national identity; and central to this is the representation of ‘us’ and the ‘other’. Collective identity is usually based on differentiation from the other, and a rejection of ‘alien’ elements, which are automatically assessed as negative, even dire, especially if they are attributed to a former foe or conqueror. Representation of the self and the other can be crystallised not only in the education system, which is one of the most crucial institutions for the maintenance and reproduction of national identity, but also in the media, museums and commemorative events, such as war remembrance days and national holidays. For one thing, war and the memory of war can be a significant force of mobilisation, providing a ‘chance of diffusing a sense of ethnic belonging identity through appropriate imagery (Smith, 1981:390). The propaganda of war can also be important fostering unity and national identity. Wars make their own propaganda myths. ‘They furnish epic legends on a grand scale which speak to the people and become subject for inspiring works of art, like ‘Delacroix’s Massacre at Chios; for later generations the war myths they embody will serve as exemplars of a peculiar ethnic virtue and heroism, as will the heroes they glorify’ (Smith, 1981: 391).

Chapter 2 has illustrated how in both case studies, the fear of external threat played a significant role in the creation and consolidation of national identity. Commencing under imperial rule, and consolidating during the nation-building process after independence, national identity in both Greece and Ireland was largely perceived in terms of opposition to a hostile ‘other’. Religion played a crucial part in this for both
cases: occupation by an Empire of a different religion meant that the threat of invasion and conquest would ultimately become inextricably linked with religion. Following independent nationhood, Orthodoxy and Catholicism became crucial in the way 'Greekness' and 'Irishness' respectively were perceived by members of the same 'nation', primarily because they were different from their former conquerors. Greek and Irish self-images and stereotypes can in this respect be understood terms of opposition to their enemies, Muslim Turkey and Protestant Britain respectively. Eradication of their religion, paraphrasing Durkheim, would entail the eradication of the nation itself; defending religion was paramount because it ultimately meant defending the nation.

Greece: A Nation under Threat?

In Greece this pattern is ongoing: current representations of the threat of national extinction are widespread. Perceptions of a defensive national identity are imperative in the understanding of how Greeks see themselves and their nation. Because Orthodoxy, and by extension the Greek Orthodox Church are considered to be the most significant forces that contributed to the preservation of Hellenism during Ottoman rule, defending Orthodoxy and the Church has become synonymous with defending the Greek nation as a whole. This is certainly why the Orthodox Church enjoys such widespread support, even after the recent scandals (2005) that at first appeared to shake the Orthodox Church. For example, Mavrogordatos sees the so-called 'Orthodox revival' in Greece 'not a revival of religion as such', but rather a 'revival of nationalism identified with Orthodoxy' (Mavrogordatos, 2003:130). The Archbishop Christodoulos' popularity is attributed not to his position as defender of the faith or morality, but rather to his role as 'outspoken guardian of national identity under imminent threat' (Mavrogordatos, 2003:130). The most common perception, along the lines of *should the Orthodox Church be weakened, Hellenism would face the challenge of extinction* is one put forward by the official institutions of the State (education system) and the Church itself. Mavrogordatos holds that Greece suffers from what he calls 'a siege mentality, bred not only by the immediate secular environment, but also by a historic consciousness of national uniqueness and solitude, which is grounded in a particular religion' (Mavrogordatos, 2003:133). Although Israel is, and Ireland was, similar, he notes that

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2 For a detailed analysis of the scandals which surfaced in February 2003 see the introduction of this thesis

3 The archbishop's popularity was very high before the scandals which affected the Greek Orthodox Church in February 2005. Although in February statistics showed that these figures temporarily dropped, by March 2005 they had already risen again. For specific data and figures see introduction

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'what may be specific to Orthodoxy is a traumatic and defensive historical consciousness reaching into a far more distant past than even in Ireland' (Mavrogordatos, 2003: 134).

Greek national identity is perceived by the majority of Greeks to be under threat, stemming mainly from Greece's geopolitical environment, and in particular its 'eternal' foe, Turkey, and the newly formed independent Balkan States. Often the forces of globalisation, the US and the EU are also perceived as hostile. Such representations of the aggressive 'other' are forged not only by State institutions, such as the education system, but can also be traced in the details of every day life, from the media, to art, to all the seemingly trivial ways that national identities are maintained and represented. In all such representations, the hostile 'other', seek to destroy the distinctiveness of the Greek nation and thus threaten Greekness with extinction. The Orthodox Church and the Greek language constitute the carriers of Greek national identity; if they live on, so will the Greek nation.

Ireland: In search of a New National Narrative?

On the other hand, important geopolitical changes have entailed the decline of external threat perceptions in Ireland. According to Boyce, controlling the transmission of the past is used in order to stabilise the present. Memory is being directed towards the significance of pluralist thinking for political reasons mainly, including the necessity to foster good relations with the UK and the peace process in Northern Ireland (Boyce in McBride, 2001: 270). All this has signified the need to modify nationalism and to an extent depart from its traditional focus: Catholic, rural, traditional and anti-British Ireland. An influential revisionist historiography and intellectual movement have reinforced this trend. The link in this respect between defending the Catholic Church and defending Irishness itself is becoming more tenuous. There is no significant threat posed by the UK against which the Irish should mobilise; there is no fear of extinction posed by Britain. On the contrary, a successful future can be achieved from within Europe and through good relations, trade and economic co-operation with the UK.
The Persistence of the Ethnic Dimension versus a Shift from Ethnic towards an increasingly Civic Identity

The criteria for inclusion in the Greek nation remain largely based on ethnic premises, i.e. religion and language. Discrimination against non-Orthodox citizens has already been examined in previous chapters. Irish nationalism on the other hand is being increasingly characterised by a conciliatory tone celebrating reconciliation, peace and inclusion, especially re the Northern Ireland question. A European Values Survey, conducted in 1999-2000 indicates that among respondents, civic national identity traits appear to predominate from ethnic ones. Feeling Irish is considered very important by 47% of Irish Catholic respondents, Irish citizenship is very important to 62% and respect for institutions is supported by 45%. ‘Despite’ however, ‘the long association between Catholicism and nationalism, less than 30% regard being a Catholic as very important for being truly Irish’ as Fahey et al note (Fahey et al, 2006: 69-70).

Table 4.1: Religious identification and Perceptions of the Foundations of Irish Identity in the Republic of Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question: Some people say that the following things are important for being truly Irish. Others say that they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? (Percent who say ‘very Important’)</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Non-Affiliated</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Dimension</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be a Catholic</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able to Speak Irish</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civic Dimension</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel Irish</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Citizenship</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect Ireland’s Political Institutions and Laws</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Military Expenditure

The level of external threat perceptions is reflected in military spending. According to the European Union Institute of Security Studies, in 2003 military spending in Greece was a very high 4.1% of GDP, indeed the highest in the EU. By contrast, military expenditure in Ireland in the same year was a low 0.5% of GDP, the lowest among the EU25. In this context it is also important to note that Greece is still among the very few European countries which have a conscripted army; countries with conscripted armies are most commonly ones which perceive themselves to be in hostile regional environments, facing high external threats from a close proximity to their borders and fearing for their territorial integrity, such as Cyprus and Israel.

Table 4.2: Defence Expenditure in the EU-25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Defence Expenditure (Percentage of GDP)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
External threat perceptions and nationalism are also linked with xenophobic tendencies. According to a report published by the EUMC (European monitoring centre on Racism and Xenophobia) in March 2005 entitled: ‘A summary report on Majority Attitudes towards Migrants and Minorities: Key findings from the Euro-barometer and the European Social Survey’, Greece is the most xenophobic country among the EU-15. On the other hand, Ireland’s levels of xenophobia are amongst the lowest. According to Figure 4.1, resistance to immigration is as high as 87.48%, in contrast with a 35.7 in Ireland. In addition, as Figure 4.2 illustrates, 84.73% in Greece consider immigrants to be a collective threat, while a much lower 54.36% consider the same in Ireland. Finally (Figure 4.3), Greece is the highest in terms of resistance to multi-cultural society at 59% while only a 16.9% concede to the perils of multi-culturalism in Ireland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1.7</th>
<th>1.9</th>
<th>1.9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISS (European Union Institute for Security Studies)
**Figure 4.1: Resistance to Immigration**

![Graph showing resistance to immigration by country](image)

**Figure 4.2: Immigrants as Perceived Collective Threat**

![Graph showing perceived collective threat by country](image)
This chapter will henceforth proceed to the analysis of three sets of perceived threats and their implications for Greek and Irish national identity: those emanating from the former Empire, those emanating from Europe, and those emanating from immigration.

1. Perceptions of the ‘Other’: The Former Empire

Perceptions of a hostile other enhance mobilisation around the principal carriers of national identity. When the latter in religious based, then this mobilisation takes place around religion and its prime institution, the Church. In Greece, memories of the ‘Turkish yoke’ reinforce the way that Turkey is perceived as a hostile ‘other’ even if relations between the two countries are somewhat slowly improving.

According to Millas, both Greece and Turkey

Conceive the ‘other’ as a prospective threat or as a challenge to its identity and interpret each of the other’s actions accordingly, creating a vicious circle where the national perceptions and the negative images concerning the other dictate the vigilant attitudes of ours and which in turn also aggravates the attitude of the other (Millas, 2004:53)
According to Clogg, ‘even if a rapprochement between the two governments is achieved, it would be a much more difficult and arduous process to overcome the mistrust between two peoples, mutual stereotypes, and fears that are fundamental for existing confrontation’ (Clogg in Aydin and Ifantis, 2004: 23-24). Indeed, Greece still perceives Turkey to constitute a threat to its territorial integrity which reinforces the need for cohesion of the nation.

On the other hand, Irish perceptions of Britain have significantly altered through time; the notion of threat is no longer a defining feature of Irish national identity. Because of several developments, mostly related to Irish membership of the EEC (and later EU), economic co-operation and bilateral trade relations with Britain, and the peace process in Northern Ireland, Irish perceptions of the UK have changed. As Renan famously remarked, forgetting or getting its history wrong is equally important for a nation as remembering. Irish history is being re-interpreted.

**Symbols of Sacred Territory and Irredentism**

In Greece, perceptions of Turkey as a hostile entity can be traced to the period of imperial rule. Attachment to territory, especially territory that links the nation with its imperial past, has significant nationalist connotations (Smith, 2003). Certain symbols, whether historical events or monuments and the way they are presented are crucial for the regeneration of popular perceptions of the national self. Here we can see that defensive elements in such symbolism relating to the former imperial core are obvious in Greece but not in Ireland. When considering the symbolism of the glorious past and its connection with territory the most famous example that comes to mind is Istanbul -or Constantinople as the Greeks prefer it- the holy city, the centre of Byzantium and the cradle of Greek civilisation. The symbol of Constantinople itself is the Church of Agia Sofia, one of the most important (or the most important) Orthodox Churches. In 1453 Agia Sofia was converted into a Mosque, and functioned as one until 1934 when Ataturk decided to convert it to a museum. It is an irony perhaps that one of the most renowned beacons of Hellenism is now situated in modern Turkey. Here it is important to also recall how this came to be: conquest came with defeat of the Byzantine Empire, and the sacking of its capital, Constantinople. Conquest signalled the beginning of the ‘dark years of the Turkish yoke’ (Sfyroeras, 1991) and of captivity. But for the Greeks the Holy City can not- and will not- be easily forgotten. The fact that the Holy city now
lies within Turkey's internationally recognised borders and is thus an integral part of the modern Turkish State not only strengthens the 'us'- 'them' dichotomy between Greeks and Turks and reinforces in the minds of the Greek people the view that Turkey is the conqueror and thus a viable threat to the Greek nation and Greece's territorial integrity, but also stresses the special religious element of Greek national identity.

The special place 'Constantinople' occupies in the Greek nationalist mind, and its capacity to mobilise the Greek people can be seen in early 20th century Greek policy initiatives such as the 'Megali Idea' (Great idea): an irredentist policy aiming at the expansion of the modern Greek State in at attempt to restore the old Byzantine empire with Constantinople at its helm. The vision of the Megali Idea, first coined by Ioannis Colettis ended in a bitter conflict with the Turkish side which resulted in the devastation of Smyrna and the massacre of some 30,000 Greek and Armenian Christians' (Clogg, 2002: 97). For ideological and practical reasons the Church supported the Megali idea. According to Smith, its ultimate roots 'lay in the sense of Greek Orthodox imperial chosenness which inspired the Greek speaking community of the Byzantine Empire (Smith, 1999: 344-345). Although such policies have long been abandoned, as a result of Greece's defeat in the war with Turkey and the devastating results of the exchange of populations and what is known in Greece as 'the Asia Minor Catastrophe', perceptions of the Holy City as the cradle of Hellenism which should be Greek remain widespread.

The notion of territory and all the sacred/nationalist connotations accompanied with it is different in Ireland. Having been colonised by English settlers, rather than defeated in a devastating siege, there is no 'Holy City' to be re-conquered, no monument epitomising the glories of Irish civilisations and its sacred dimension. As such threat perceptions from the former imperial core are less profound. Ireland was never an Empire itself (or, the Irish do not perceive it to ever have been), nor does it claim cultural or ethnic affinity with any former imperial core. Greece, on the other hand sees itself as the direct descendant of the Byzantine Empire and its civilisation. Although it could be argued that any claims of Byzantium being a Greek Empire are indeed debatable at best, again what matters is popular perception on how these symbols are used to regenerate this perception over and over again. Undoubtedly, Byzantine civilisation was very similar to the Greek in terms of language and religion and this where such perceptions draw their support from. Indeed such perceptions are widespread in Greece.
The end of the cold war and the transformations this created in the Balkan region altered Greece’s geopolitical environment and raised external threat perceptions. ‘It is widely believed that with the end of bipolarity the post-war security arrangements in the Balkan region have been rapidly replaced by the emergence of local national rivalries and disputes. Greece and Turkey are two of the major players in the current unstable strategic environment of the Balkans’ (Moustakis, 2003: 49).

1. Turkey

Romantic visions of the Greek/Byzantine Empire (the two are synonymous in the nationalist Greek mind) contribute to the reproduction of a defensive Greek national identity. This is reflected in the history of Greek-Turkish relations from Greek independence until the present day. Although a rapprochement in 1999 and what is popularly known ‘earthquake diplomacy’ has been followed by some positive developments, including Greece’s removal of its veto of Turkey’s EU accession, disputes between the two countries remain unresolved. Greece still perceives Turkey to constitute the main threat to its territorial integrity, a trend that is reinforced by Turkey’s refusal to withdraw its _casus belli_ threat- Turkey’s threat of retaliation in the event that Greece expands he coastal waters from 6 to 12 miles.

The last time Greece and Turkey were engaged in direct armed confrontation with one another was in 1922. (The 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus is not considered an armed conflict between Turkey and Greece) Yet, for most of the period between 1922 and 1999 Greek-Turkish relations have been strenuous, and there have been quite a few instances when the two countries came to the brink of war- notably during the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, the 1976 Sismik crisis, the 1987 crisis over oil exploration in the Aegean and the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis. The latter, a dispute over the sovereignty a small uninhabited island, situated between Kalymnos and Turkey invoked strong nationalistic feelings among the Greeks and confirmed their fears that Turkey is indeed the ‘aggressor’ and constitutes a real threat to Greece’s territorial integrity. According to Greece, Imia, as well as other uninhabited islets in the Aegean, are indisputably Greek as they constitute part of the wider Dodecanese islands’ chain which was ceded by Italy to Greece with the 1947 treaty of Paris. According to Turkey however these islets
constitute grey zones as the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which initially ceded the islands from Turkey to Italy did not individually name them. The dispute was only diffused through the direct involvement of the US. At the time of writing the legal status of Imia/Kardak remains unresolved, while since, Turkey has also made claims to other larger uninhabited islets in the Aegean. Within a week after the dispute Turkish Prime Minister at the time- Ciller- stated that 'Ankara would re-examine the status of one thousand islets and threatened Greece with war over the issue' (Moustakis, 2003: 50). According to Greece, the Imia/Kardak crisis brought a disturbing new element into its tense relations with Turkey: namely, for the first time, Turkey questioned Greek sovereignty over a portion of its territory (Moustakis, 2003: 50).

The above mentioned disputes, including the Imia/Kardak crisis, constitute part of the wider Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey which remains unresolved. This includes, the demilitarisation of the Aegean islands, which according to Turkey is in breach of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and the 1947 Paris Treaty which recognised Greek sovereignty over the islands provided they were demilitarised; Greece’s theoretical right to extend the limit of her coastal waters from 6 to 12 miles, which Turkey has identified as *casus belli* fearing it would turn the Aegean into a ‘Greek Lake’; and the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf and control of the air space between the territorial waters (Aydin in Aydin and Ifantis, 2004: 27). Other disputes between the two countries include the treatment of minorities (Turkish minority in Western Thrace and Greek population in Istanbul) and the Cyprus issue. The *casus belli* threat is still a thorn between Greece and Turkey, and verifies claims- in the minds of the Greeks- that Turkey constitutes a threat to its territory, and could potentially invade Greece. More recent minor disputes include the frequent violations of each other’s air space; in May 2006 the collision of Greek and Turkish military jets over Karpathos created a row in Greece while in late May 2006 Turkey was accused of illegally violating Greek airspace in order to photograph Suda Bay military Base in Crete in late May 2006. All in all 'since 1974 (the year that marked the Turkish invasion and continuing occupation of Northern Cyprus) all Greece’s political parties have considered Turkey as posing a major threat to Greece’s territorial integrity in the Aegean and Western Thrace' (Moustakis, 2003: 45).

According to a survey carried out by VPRC on behalf of Skairadio, published in the newspaper Kathimerini on June 8th 2006: 48% responded that they believe Greek-
Turkish relations had deteriorated within a year, while 42% believed they had remained the same. According to the same survey, 62% of the sample believed that the Aegean disputes constitute the greatest problem between Greek and Turkish relations. Although a total of 72% considered the possibility of a war between Greece and Turkey unlikely, 40% responded that the problems between Greece and Turkey cannot be resolved, 66% were opposed to Turkey’s EU accession and 63% favoured Greece vetoing Turkey’s accession should Cyprus were to do the same (Survey carried out by VPRC, published in Kathimerini, June 8th 2006). According to another survey, carried out by Kapa research on behalf of the newspaper ‘To Vima’, and published by the latter on June 11th 2006: To the question ‘regardless of what has occurred in the past, do you believe that Turkey is following a expansionist policy against Greece’, 62,6% responded yes and 22,1% probably yes. Only an 8,6% responded no, and 6,2% probably not. In addition, according to a survey conducted by Kapa research as part of a wider project on national consciousness carried out by Bilgi University of Istanbul and published in Elefthrotypia on June 10th 2007, 77% of respondents consider Turkey to pose the most significant threat to Greece. In addition, 75% believe that certain areas belonging to Turkey constitute ‘occupied homelands’, including mainly the North of Cyprus (Elefthrotypia, June 10th 2007).

2. The Balkan Region

Threat is also perceived to stem from other areas of the former Ottoman Empire, notably the Balkan region. The collapse of the cold war and the re-structuring of borders in close proximity to Greece has altered the latter’s geopolitical environment, raising the new question of new potential threats and vulnerabilities. The main problem derives from Macedonia or FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) as it is preferred in Greece. Since its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, FYROM has entered into a dispute with Greece over the use of the name ‘Macedonia’. Greece opposes FYROM’s use of the name Macedonia on the grounds that FYROM is effectively asserting a territorial claim to Macedonia in Greece. In 1992 Greece demanded that FYROM stop using the name ‘Macedonia’, while in 1994 it imposed an economic blockade demanding FYROM to change its flag and constitution in which it used the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’. In 1995 the two countries signed an interim accord under which they agreed to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Although bilateral agreements and protocols,
including the Interim Agreement, have been signed between Greece and FYROM, they are still pending ratification due to the unresolved issue of the name. US acknowledgement of FYROM’s right to use the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’ in November 2004 tested Greek patience and attracted strong opposition from Athens. However, Greece has no counteractive recourse aside from the threat to veto Macedonia’s EU accession.

Since 1995 relations between the two countries have been smooth, although contention over the name ‘Macedonia’ remains unresolved and thus perceived in Greece as a potential source of threat. Greece considers FYROM to pose a threat not only to its territorial integrity, but most importantly to its national identity and national heritage. The area of Macedonia is very important for Greek nationalism. In antiquity, Macedonia was the Kingdom of Alexander the Great, claimed in Greece as a national hero. Not surprisingly, FYROM’s claims to Alexander, and the naming of Skopje airport ‘Alexander the Great’ in early January 2007 infuriated Greeks and increased the belief in the need to assert Greece’s national identity more strongly. There is no question of both Macedonia and Alexander being Greek and of the Greek nation being perennial. According to a statement of foreign Minister, Dora Bakogianni, upon the hearing of the decision to rename Skopje airport, ‘Alexander the Great was a leading personality of international standards. By spreading the Greek civilization to the then known world, the Greek warrior was established in history. With their declaration today, Skopje is once more seeking false foundations in the past. History, 2,300 years later can neither be altered nor forged4 (Greek News online, January 1st 2007).

Ireland: Declining Threat Perceptions, Relations with Britain and the Good Friday Agreement

Irish-British Relations

As opposed to Greco-Turkish relations, Anglo-Irish relations have improved significantly in the course of the twentieth century. A series of trade agreements in 1938,

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4 Ο Μέγας Αλέξανδρος είναι μία ιστορική προσωπικότητα παγκόσμιας εμβέλειας. Διαδίδοντας τον ελληνικό πολιτισμό σε όλο τον τότε γνωστό κόσμο, ο Έλληνας στρατηγός καθετάθηκε στην Ιστορία. Με την σημερινή τους δήλωση, τα Σκόπια, για μία ακόμη φορά, αναζητούν ελλατά στηρίγματα στο παρελθόν. Η Ιστορία, 2.300 χρόνια μετά, ούτε αλλάζει ούτε παραμορφώνεται.
1948, and 1960, culminated in the Free Trade Agreement of 1965; both countries joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973; territorial disputes were to a great extent confined to the Northern Ireland question which, remained, until the late 1990's, the greatest thorn between Anglo-Irish relations.

The 1922 Anglo-Irish Treaty, which ended Ireland's war of independence from Britain, established the Irish Free State in the south, and effectively partitioned Ireland as the North chose to remain part of the United Kingdom. As a response to the proclamation of the Republic of Ireland in 1948, the 1949 Ireland Act guaranteed that Northern Ireland would remain within the United Kingdom unless the majority of its citizens decided otherwise.

Since Irish independence the Northern Ireland question has been paramount in Ireland, and the main cause of friction in its relations with Britain. 'The objective of Irish political nationalism during most of the twentieth century-since 1922- has been what is called the reunification of the national territory by which is meant extinction of Northern Ireland as a distinct political entity, and the incorporation of its territory in a united Ireland' (O'Brien, 1994: 89) According to O'Brien, the objective, both nationalist and Catholic is much responsible for the convergence of Catholicism and nationalism in Ireland for much of the twentieth century.

The dispute over Northern Ireland is therefore a dispute over territory between Catholics and Protestant. This is where the convergence comes in. Irish Catholic nationalists relate to the dispute in both their capacities. As nationalists they resent Northern Ireland as an alien intrusion. As Catholics they resent Protestant power in what was once Catholic territory. As Catholic nationalists they resent both (O'Brien, 1994: 89-90).

The role of the Catholic Church is instrumental here: it supported the reunification campaign, asserting its role both as a defender of the Catholic faith, and as a defender of the Irish nation.

The change brought about by the removal of the Northern Irish question is pivotal. The Northern Ireland Process culminating in the Good Friday Agreement significantly improved relations between Ireland and Britain. The 1998 'Good Friday Agreement' between the governments of Ireland and Britain in which both governments 'recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the
Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland' (Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Irish Parliament, http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20files/NIPeaceAgreement.pdf) was signed on April 10th 1998. It was ratified in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland by referendums on May 22nd 1998 (Fahey et al, 2006: 97).

**Table 4.3: The Result of the Referendum, May 22nd 1998, Republic of Ireland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you approve the proposal to amend the constitution contained in the undermentioned Bill, the nineteenth amendment of the constitution Bill, 1998?</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1,442,583</td>
<td>94.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>85,748</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fahey et al, 2006: 112

The nineteenth constitutional amendment of June 3rd 1998 removed the claim of the "Irish nation" to sovereignty over the whole of Ireland (article 2). The amended Articles 2 and 3, acknowledge that the status of Northern Ireland depends on the consent of the majority of voters in Northern Ireland. According to Article 3.1

*It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognizing that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed in both jurisdictions of the island (Constitution of Ireland, including constitutional amendments, 2002).*

**Table 4.4: Support for the Elements of the Good Friday Agreement in the Republic of Ireland**

Percent support strongly or support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Consensus Items</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Non-Affiliated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decommissioning</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI Remain Part of the UK</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish an Assembly</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing Executive</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Divisive Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reform of RUC</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create North-South Bodies</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove Republic’s constitutional Claim</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Negative Consensus item

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Release of prisoners</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With the removal of the Northern Irish question, and of Irish claims to Northern Ireland in the Irish constitution, Britain no longer constitutes a threat to Irish territorial integrity. The Church’s support of an anti-English form of nationalism, ‘a fiercely anglophobic form of religious nationalism’ according to O’Brien (O’Brien, 1995:118) appears outdated. Instead, a form of unifying, civic nationalism is put forward given declining external threat perceptions.

The parallels and contrast with Cyprus and its significance for Greece are instrumental here: The Cyprus issue is a significant item in Greece’s foreign policy agenda, and one of the major disputes between Greece and Turkey. Since the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relations have been placed under strain, also intensified by several other crises in the Aegean. Although the Greek government decided to remain neutral in the Cyprus 2004 referendum, Greece perceives Turkey’s recognition of the Republic of Cyprus to be crucial, and as negotiations for Turkey’s accession unfold, the issue is likely to promote tensions.

Turkey invaded Northern Cyprus and consequently occupied the northern part of the island in 1974, following a coup assisted by the Greek junta regime to overthrow President Makarios of Cyprus. In 1983 the North declared the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which however has only been recognised by Turkey. Since then, a number of attempts by the international community to reach a compromise have all ended in stalemate. One of the latest attempts to unify the island was the third Annan plan, which however failed to take into effect following the rejection by the Greek -Cypriot side of a referendum held in April 2004. Although
64.9% of Turkish-Cypriots voted in support of the plan, the latter was rejected in the South, with a 75.8% ‘No’ majority. On May 1st 2004 Cyprus joined the EU. Although under the terms of accession the whole island is considered to be an EU member, in practice EU laws and benefits have been suspended in the north. The perception of a Turkish threat in Greece is reinforced by the Turkish occupation of Cyprus; inability to provide a solution to the Cyprus question is exacerbating tensions with Turkey, while the Church, and especially the Archbishop is able to ‘use’ the Cyprus issue in order to illustrate Turkey’s expansionist, violent traits.

4. Perceptions of the ‘Other’: European Integration

A second set of perceived threats, emanating from Europe, is posed to Greece but not Ireland. Although Greece realises the need- mainly for economic reasons- to remain a member of the European Union and support further political as well as economic integration, at the same time it portrays itself as isolated from the rest of the EU members. In addition, high inflation, unemployment and rising prices have challenged the view that joining the Euro was a profitable move. This is not the case for Ireland however, which now among the richest of the EU-25 is enjoying prosperity and increasing wealth from its EU membership. As Mavrogordatos observes, Karamanlis had hoped that Greek membership of the EEC would terminate Greece’s siege mentality. And it would have done so, Mavrogordatos believes, had Greek national identity been constructed exclusively with reference to classical antiquity because such an identity would be secure in the context of EU integration and globalisation.

As it happened, however, this identity was constructed primarily with reference to Orthodoxy, that is the Byzantine and Ottoman legacy. Consequently EU membership, where Greece is the only Orthodox country has actually worked in the opposite direction.... has exacerbated insecurity and even alienation from the West (Mavrogordatos, 2003:133).

The anadelphon (without siblings) Greek nation sticks out in the EU. Now, Archbishop Christodoulos can promote the Greek Church as the arc of Greek national identity threatened by the forces of European integration and globalisation. The defence of Greek national identity in terms of religion reinforces Greece’s ‘siege mentality’.

According to Fragoudaki and Dragona, (1997:80-85) the Greek stance towards Europe is ambiguous and often conflicting: at the same time Europe is respected and also
perceived as a threat. On the one hand, technological achievements and economic growth are seen as Europe's positive elements; on the other hand, Europe, which is equated with the powerful north-western nations, places civilisational pressures and creates all sorts of dependencies which are considered negative because they threaten the national 'self' (Fragoudaki and Dragona, 1997:62). Although Greeks are linked to Europe, they are also Mediterranean, Balkan and Orthodox. When these identities are conflicted, the Orthodox elements become the most important. As Mavrogordatos notes, 'insofar as the Greek national consciousness has been shaped by Orthodoxy, it still carries the trauma of 1204 and the spirit of 1453' (Mavrogordatos, 2003:133). And to the extent that this is true, religion can be invoked against the mainly non-orthodox European Union, or NATO, as for example during the crisis in former Yugoslavia, where Greek public opinion supported Serbia, a 'sister' Orthodox nation.

As with Turkey, the Greek education system promotes xenophobia and a sense of a vulnerable and threatened national identity against the EU. This explains to an extent the difficulty of adapting to new conditions of EU membership and immigration. At the same time however Greece believes that it also benefits from EU integration.

Europe is perceived as much less of a threat to Ireland than it is to Greece. Irish and European identity is not a zero-sum game. One can be both Irish and European at the same time. Ireland sees itself as an ancient European nation, benefiting within Europe. As Martin informs,

...historically Ireland has been an embattled periphery of England seeking alliances with Catholic France and Spain (and now pursuing close ties with the EU) while Greece retains irredentist ambitions connected with being a broken-off fragment of imperial Byzantium, and allies itself to Orthodox Serbia and Russia, for example in the war over Kosovo. Greece has felt doubly threatened by the historic intrusion of the Western powers, like France and Venice, and by Turkey, though in the nineteenth century Greece enjoyed the 'love affair' pursued by Britain, France and Germany' (Martin, 2005:61).

According to Girvin, the new phase in Irish nationalism commenced with the Irish government's decision to apply for EEC membership in 1961. By then, Irish conservative nationalism had been exhausted; joining Europe presented new opportunities and a new challenge for Ireland which was to shift the focus of its nationalism and national identity away from its Catholic, traditional, rural scope.
towards economic affluence and a strong place in Europe. Effectively, membership of the EU freed Ireland from Britain and the threat it posed. By doing so, it removed the main threat against which Ireland and Irish national identity mobilised. This has entailed a shift from the conservative character of Irish nationalism which was so closely associated to Catholicism. This form of Irish nationalism (and its link to religion) was largely formed by the perceptions of threat posed by Britain. Ireland had to define itself in these terms: moral, religious, rural; these were the cultural markers. Ireland was everything Britain was not. With the threat removed, Irish nationalism is changing focus, and becoming more Europeanised- the latter term in this sense, can be seen as an attempt to escape self-definition and narrowness of national identity.

5. Immigration

*Immigration: Greece and Ireland in Comparative Perspective*

Homogeneity as the ultimate national value may promote xenophobia and totalitarian attitudes (Fragoudaki and Dragona, 1997: 96). In this sense, large waves of immigration may serve to raise perceptions of threat to a nation’s identity and raise the levels of xenophobia. In Greece, this has indeed been the case. The shift towards being a migrant nation, accelerated in the period since 1995, has been highly traumatic. Indeed, Ireland has also experienced high levels of immigration. However there is a significant difference, namely that that Ireland’s foreign population is largely the product of labour mobility within the EU. According to the 2002 Irish census the largest group of non-Irish population is British. The most recent waves of Polish immigrants, following Poland’s EU membership in 2004, which are not indicated in the census, do not raise threats to Ireland’s national identity as they are also Catholic. By contrast, Greece’s foreign population is by the larger part Albanian which entails a large increase in Greece’s Muslim population. This again is seen as a threat to ‘our’ distinct Orthodox identity, and increases the need to assert this identity and rally around its main defender: the Orthodox Church.

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5 As of March 2007 detailed data from the more recent 2006 had not yet been published. According to the Irish Central Statistics office, detailed data on the composition of the Irish population from the 2006 census is expected to be published in May 2007.
### Table 4.5: Greece, Total Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Permanent Population</th>
<th>Total Greek</th>
<th>Total Non-Greek</th>
<th>Non-Greek as % of Total Permanent Population</th>
<th>Greek as % of Total permanent population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.934.097</td>
<td>10.171.906</td>
<td>762.191</td>
<td>7.00 (6.97)</td>
<td>93.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Greek Census 2001, adapted from National Statistical Service of Greece

### Table 4.6: Greek Census, 2001: Population by Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>Of which</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
<th>Of which</th>
<th>% of Total Foreign Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>10.934.097</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>10.171.906</td>
<td>93.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Greek</td>
<td>762.191</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe, Balkans and Former USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>438.036</td>
<td>57.47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>35.104</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>22.875</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>21.994</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>17.535</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>13.616</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Eastern European, Balkan and Former USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>12.831</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>Source: Greek Census 2001, adapted from National Statistical Service of Greece</td>
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**Figure 4.4: Greece Total Population (%)**

**Figure 4.5: Composition of Greece’s Non-Greek Population (%)**

Total Non-Greek Population: 762,191

Total Non-Greek Population (%): 6.97
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<th>% of Total Foreign Population</th>
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<td>Total Irish</td>
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<td>%</td>
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Source: Central Statistics Office, Ireland, 2002 Census

Figure 4.6: Ireland Total Population (%)
Observations

1. According to Kathimerini (September 27th 2005), Greece has faced the greater changes to its population due to immigration among all EU countries. Between 1991 and 2001 immigrants increased Greece’s population by 7%. Most groups intend to live and work in Greece permanently. 39% of non-Greek residents have been living and working in Greece for more than 5 years, while 42% between 1 and 5 years.

2. The bulk of Greece’s immigrant population is from Albania (at 57.47% of Greece’s non-Greek population). This implies a large Muslim presence which enhances the perceived threat posed to Greek orthodox identity and reinforces the need for a defensive national identity. The bulk of Ireland’s foreign population on the other hand is from the UK and the rest of the EU (Just below 60%). Recent waves of immigration from Eastern Europe, and especially Poland do not threaten Irish identity in a similar fashion, as this population is Christian and indeed mainly Catholic.
6. Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the role external threat perceptions play in the ongoing process of national identity reproduction. As national identity fulfills a cohesive function, high external threat perceptions foster a greater need for rallying around the principal carriers of national identity—in this case, religion. Low external threat perceptions on the other hand downplay this need. Through the analysis of three separate sets of threats—namely, those emanating from the former imperial core, those emanating from the EU and those emanating from immigration—this chapter has shown that in all instances external threat perceptions are high in Greece but low in Ireland. In effect this entails that domestic actors are able to utilise these perceptions in favour of the Church in Greece—as principal carrier of national identity and therefore essential for the continuation of the Greek nation and its distinct national traits—but not Ireland. The following two chapters will illustrate how this process is carried out, and how, combined with the variable analyzed in chapter 3, i.e. the degree to which the Church obstructs the modernisation process, this leads to a different outcome in the two cases in question. Chapter 5 is concerned with official historiography, and more specifically the way the Church is presented as pivotal for the survival of the Greek nation but not the Irish nation, in State sponsored institutions, such as the education system and commemorations. Chapter 6 will then focus on the Church itself and its discourse, and more specifically on the way it portrays itself as a cornerstone institution seeking to preserve national identity in Greece in contrast with the discourse of the Irish Church, which given low external threat perceptions and a high degree of obstruction of the modernisation process, is more concerned with adherence to strict Catholic rules and regulations, but puts forward a more inclusive narrative as far as national identity is concerned.
Chapter 5

Official Discourse and National Identity Reproduction:
National Memory in Education, Historiography and Commemoration

1. Introduction

This far it has been argued that Irish national identity is becoming reinterpreted towards a more civic direction and shifting away from its ethnic signifiers, such as Catholicism, while Greek national identity continues to be defined in ethnic terms by signifiers such as language and religion. This accounts for the resilience of religion in Greece and its loss of legitimacy in Ireland. This development has been the product of the inter-relationship between two variables, i.e. the degree to which a Church obstructs modernisation and the level of external threat perceptions. This chapter provides evidence to support the hypothesis. It examines the impact of the inter-relationship between these two variables discussed in chapters 3 and 4 respectively, on official discourse. For the purposes of this thesis, this includes the education system and also official historiography and the commemoration of key historical events. The chapter focuses on the key distinctions between Ireland and Greece in terms of the ways in which popular perceptions of national identity and images of religion and the hostile ‘other’ are sustained, reproduced and even mirrored in official discourse.

It is argued that modernisation has not had too much of a disruptive effect on the Church in Greece, because the strength of the Orthodox Church lies not in strictly moralistic elements which inevitably become challenged by modernising processes and the specialisation they entail. Rather, its resilience is grounded on its ability to mobilise along nationalist lines, which remains largely unchallenged. Official historiography is highly nationalistic and this is reflected in school textbooks, museums, and the commemoration of important historical events in Greek history. The Orthodox Church stands at the helm of such nationalist representations, as religion and nation are officially portrayed as inseparable. ‘The genealogical myth that they invoke has classical antiquity as its cornerstone and Byzantine Orthodoxy as a key component as the assertion of linear continuity. Through a variety of mechanisms, including language and education, as well as the everyday “banal” circulation of images, national ideology is generated and reproduced’ (Brown and Hamilakis, 2003: 7-
This is largely the result of high external threat perceptions, which in turn are stressed by official discourse to create a perpetual vicious circle of a defensive national identity.

In Ireland on the other hand, modernisation has placed a large question mark on the Church’s moralistic control. As the Church’s control can effectively be attributed to the numbers of religious personnel, specialisation has signalled its inevitable decline. At the same time, declining external threat perceptions, and the Northern Ireland peace process have paved the way for a more inclusive, conciliatory and pluralistic tone in official discourse, hence the evident rise of revisionist historiography. As the Church cannot, because of these circumstances cling to the Catholic nationalist myth, it is left without a legitimising basis for support and is thus experiencing a rapid decline.

2. Church, Nation and Education

Memory and identity are two terms which are closely interlinked and often used in conjunction to one another. According to Gillis, ‘the parallel lives of these two terms alert us to the fact that the notion of identity depends on the idea of memory and vice versa’ (Gillis, 1994: 3). In a way, national identity is constructed and re-constructed through memory. In Gillis’ words, ‘national memory is shared by people who have never seen or heard of one another, yet who regard themselves as having a common history. They are bound together as much by forgetting as by remembering, for modern memory was born at a moment when Americans and Europeans launched a massive effort to reject the past and construct a radically new future’ (Gillis, 1994: 7). The education system is one of the most important institutions responsible for the promotion of an officially accepted version of ‘national memory’, and hence the re-production of national identities from generation to generation. Through education, national identity perceptions are constructed, crystallised, legitimised and institutionalised, and thus the education system is one of the most important elements of the nation-building process. The nationalised education system is connected with the formation of the modern Nation-State within the past two hundred years. According to Smith, it is through compulsory, standardised public mass education systems that ‘State authorities hope to inculcate national devotion and a distinctive homogeneous culture, an activity that most regimes pursue with considerable energy under the influence of nationalist ideals of cultural authenticity and unity’ (Smith, 1991: 16).
The more centralised the education system, the more successful the promotion of nationalism is likely to be. Curricula and school books are not only significant indicators of the levels of ethnocentrism in an education system but also of the way societies perceive other nations. It is the subjects of language, history and geography in particular which promote the homogeneity of the nation more than any other. History is particularly significant as the national narrative it creates is centred on the concept of national continuity and homogeneity and promotes the sense of national uniqueness (Fragoudaki and Dragona, 1997: 37). According to Koulouri however, this does not necessarily refer to elite to elite manipulation and propaganda. Essentially ‘education mirrors the society which has produced it’ (Koulouri, 2002: 31).

3. The Structure of the Irish and Greek Education Systems

In Ireland education is compulsory between the ages of 6 and 16. Although compulsory primary education commences at the age of 6, it is customary that an increasing number of children enter school at the age of 4. Compulsory secondary education commences at the age of 12, in the junior cycle. This is followed by an optional transition year, and two years of senior cycle, also optional. Non-compulsory secondary education also comprises of vocational strands. According to the Irish department of education and science, secondary schools are privately owned and managed. The trustees of the majority of these schools are religious communities or Boards of Governors’ (http://www.education.ie). The Irish education system is particularly de-centralised, similarly to the British system. There is one syllabus, commissioned by the Department of Education and Science and effectively controlled by the Church, which identifies which topics ought to be studied. However, the position is that, with the exception of certain works mainly for languages (prescribed poems, etc.) the choice of textbooks is a matter for individual schools (this information derives from the author’s correspondence with the Irish Department of Education and Science). There is no one single textbook per subject, published by the State like in Greece. Rather, students are encouraged to look at various sources and a lot is left to the discretion of schools and teachers.
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Infant Class</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Greece, education is compulsory from ages of 6 to 15. Primary education consists of 6 years, and secondary education of 3 years which are compulsory (Gymnasium). Non-compulsory secondary education is divided into two strands- general or Lyceum (3 years) and technical, or vocation schools. According to Fragoudaki and Dragona, the Greek education system was and remains particularly centralised, perhaps the most centralised in Europe as it 'not only bases education on one syllabus per subject, but also strictly enforces the conditions of its production and content' (Fragoudaki and Dragona, 1997:39). A special law determines all aspects of the production, content and distribution of school books; there is one syllabus per subject and one textbook, published by the National Office for the Publication of Textbooks, a State office dependent on the ministry of education (Koulouri, 2002: 487). The content and conditions of production of all schoolbooks are therefore strictly enforced by the State.
Table 5.2 The Structure of the Greek Education System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Compulsory Education</th>
<th>Higher Secondary (Senior Cycle): Lyceum Or technical Schools</th>
<th>Compulsory Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>Level 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Level 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Level 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Level 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Level 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Level 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. 'Moral Monopoly’ versus Nationalism

The significant distinction in regards with the level of centralisation of the Greek and Irish education systems is closely associated with the role of the Church in education and has important consequences for the promotion of the religion-nation link. In Ireland, Church power is premised on emphasising the adherence to Catholic rules and regulations. Emphasis is on religious instruction and control of the system by the religious, but not much emphasis is placed on the historical link between religion and national identity. This in effect undermines the role of education as the prime institution linking Catholicism to Irishness. The fact that there is no single textbook commissioned by the State in Ireland further undermines the promotion of a religious-based national identity. Although there is a preferred textbook specified by the department of education, various other sources are also used meaning that the content, region and/or historical period studied varies to a degree according to individual schools and there is hence no unified, cross-country account of history teaching in the same way as this takes place in Greece. Irish education therefore does not promote a comparable level of ethnocentrism to the Greek system.

Religion is an integral part of the Irish education system, however not so much in terms of promoting an ethnocentric national identity through for example the teaching of history, but
rather as a vehicle for the promotion of moral standards and religious values. Since the establishment of independent Ireland, religious instruction has been one of the most important subjects, and the one through which the Church could assert its influence and power. According to a section of the 1925/1926 Second National Programme Conference, quoted in Williams,

Of all the parts of a school curriculum, religious instruction is by far the most important, as its subject matter, God’s honour and service, includes the proper use of all man’s faculties and affords the most powerful inducements to their proper use. We assume, therefore, that religious instruction is a fundamental part of the school course (Williams, 1999: 319).

In terms of manpower, the Church’s control of education was- and still is to a great extent- carried out through priests, nuns and brothers disciplining, moralising and caring for Irish Catholics.

Most Irish secondary schools were operated by diocesan authorities, by religious orders or by religious brotherhoods, and most teachers in these religiously-run schools were themselves in holy orders. As a result of their pervasive influence, the clergy as a profession reproduced themselves through the secondary schools at a remarkable rate....For example, in the years 1956-60, of 5,428 final year students in diocesan colleges and secondary schools surveyed, 1,346 professed religious vocations (Akenson, 1975:99).

As the numbers of vocations increased, and so did the extensive network of control of the Church over Irish society. As a result, the Catholic Church became the prime institution responsible for the education of Irish Catholics.

Table 5.3: People/Priest Ratio, Republic of Ireland, 1911-1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Priests</th>
<th>People per Priest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>3,689</td>
<td>879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>3,836</td>
<td>827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>3,823</td>
<td>838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>5,004</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>5,135</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>5,723</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Akenson, 1975:99

Through the education system, the Catholic Church ensured that the people remained loyal to the Church. Instruction of the young Irish, took place "through a rigid system of moral discipline at the centre of which is an inculcation of the Church’s doctrine and ritual
practices’ (Inglis, 1998:57). As Garvin puts it, ‘the Church did not provide education out of the goodness of its collective heart...it supplied education because it wished to recruit faithful servants, ‘soldiers of Christ’, missionaries to the English speaking world, and Catholic leaders to a Catholic people’ (Garvin, 2004: 202). The development of the Church’s ‘moral monopoly’ effectively entailed that education became a vehicle for maintaining and expanding the Church’s control on moral issues. Emphasis was consistently placed on this, rather than the promotion of the link between Irishness and Catholicism. The main aims of the Catholic Church’s control of the education system are ‘to maintain recruitment to the ranks; to maintain an influence and moral control over the future dominant class and political elite and to indoctrinate, or to ‘create a loyal Catholic laity’ (Inglis, 1997:61).

Education is very important to the secularisation paradigm. It is those with higher levels of education that are expected to diverge more from traditional values and behaviour because of the rationalising and individualising associated with education (Hardiman and Whelan, 1998: 71). According to Inglis, when the Catholic Church loses this type of control of education adherence to institutional Catholicism in Ireland will decline’ (Inglis, 1998:52). Indeed, its decline in the education field has significantly damaged the Catholic Church’s position of power in Irish society. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly because Church power in the educational field because is based on a strict adherence of Catholic rules and regulations which is now being challenged. A tendency is occurring to make Irish education more religiously liberal. The current and ongoing debate on education reflects an attempt to ‘reconcile the claims of religious and secular versions of human self-understanding’ (Williams, 1999: 328). As Garvin argues, ‘the real motor for change in Ireland appears to have been the synergy between education and economic development, as with modernisation education began to encourage a greater psychic individualism and a decreasing willingness to adhere to rules and moral standards set from above without some prior argument’ (Garvin, 2004: 213). Modernisation entailed ‘changing its purpose from one of constructing a religious community to one of producing skilled and productive members of an economy. Increased wealth led to increasing individualism and independence (Garvin, 2004: 213) and a decreasing willingness to adhere to the strict moral rules imposed by the Church which constituted the cornerstone of Irish religious identity.

Thus the main opposition to ecclesiastical power arose from the newly emergent educated class in the eyes of which the extensive political power of the Church came to be seen as
illegitimate in a modernising highly educated society. This class, which would challenge the Church in a profound way, began to emerge in the 1960’s. In a study of Irish society carried out by Biever in 1962, there was already ‘ferment disillusionment among the intellectuals as to the efficacy of the Church in the performance of her social functions’ (Garvin, 2004: 203). For example, to the question ‘Do you think the Church is the greatest force of good in Ireland, one respondent replied:

No, I don’t think the church is the greatest force of good here. You know why? She doesn’t let us speak here... the clergy make all the decisions, and all we have to do is obey... I am sick and tired at being looked upon with suspicion simply because I have an education. Priests aren’t the only ones with brains you know although you couldn’t tell it to hear them speak or see them act... The Church censors the press, it censors the magazines, it censors the television... what doesn’t it censor?... Is this the greatest force for good? Not to me it isn’t! It seems to me that the Church is more interested in keeping a strangle-hold on the people than in making us better as a nation and that I don’t buy... (Garvin, 2004:204)

Such a response would have been unprecedented in Ireland a few years before. According to Biever,

They resent clerical dogmatism and authoritarian motivation which in their opinion becomes vulnerable in areas in which the Church has no special competence. They openly question Church influence in areas of social concern and call into question the advisability of Church monopoly in education. (Garvin, p.203)

Table 5.4: Opposition to Divorce, Abortion and Homosexuality by Age and Education in the Republic of Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Incomplete Second Level</th>
<th>Third Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divorce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 and over</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 45</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 and over</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 45</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 and over</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second reason why secularisation is affecting the educational field in Ireland so profoundly is the fact that the Church's power is based on an extensive network of religious personnel which is now declining. The Church's extensive control apparatus is based on manpower: brothers, priests, nuns in the welfare system. With increasing education, came different specialisations and a decline in vocations, severely damaging the Church's network of control. Inglis informs that the proportion of religious as full time teachers in secondary schools declined from 48% in 1965 to 9% in 1991 (Inglis, 1998: 225). In this sense, the strong grip of the Catholic Church is being loosened; its role is now experiencing a slow yes, but gradual decline. Overall, Inglis observes that, the Church has not been able prevent an erosion of the religious atmosphere in Irish schools (Inglis, 1998:224).

However, the Orthodox Church's control of the Greek education system has a very different focus than the Irish. The Church's de facto position in the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs gives it a privileged role in education. Control however is not centred on manpower, i.e. an extensive apparatus of priests, nuns and brothers moralising the Greek people, but rather control of the content of the curriculum, and the compulsory State-sponsored textbooks (not existing in Ireland). The teaching of religion is compulsory for all Orthodox pupils (those not adhering to the Orthodox faith are exempt). But the role of religion in Greek education is by no means restricted to the religious curriculum, nor does it prioritise the teaching of moral values; as Zambeta notes, 'Orthodoxy is being reproduced not only through the religious curriculum, but also through the manner in which school knowledge is framed. The most revealing example is the history curriculum' (Zambeta, 2000:150). Indeed, the pervasiveness of religion goes far beyond religious instruction, mainly in the content of history textbooks, and also Greek literature textbooks and their emphasis on the role of Orthodoxy in Greek national identity and the longue duree of the Greek nation. Church power is primarily maintained through the teaching of the close association between religion and national identity, mainly through the subject of history. This serves to strengthen the perception of the close link between Orthodoxy and 'Greekness'. Precisely because the Church's stronghold does not depend on the dissemination of moral rules or on the numbers of religious personnel, increasing pressures to change the religion curriculum, criticisms of the denominational aspect of Greek education, and the fact that the number of ecclesiastical schools and vocations has declined in recent years, have not posed a problem equal to that in Ireland. These are far from the dominant source of Church legitimacy in Greek education. The Church does not rely on the religion curriculum nor on an extensive control apparatus manned by religious and
therefore is not directly threatened by a decline in their numbers. The lack of emphasis on adherence to moral laws and regulations has meant that the Church has been able to compromise with the State in areas of religious education (given increasing pressures from the EU due to immigration of non-Orthodox in Greece), but State and Church have a parallel interest in promoting a religious type of nationalism. And thus the educated opposition to the Church in Greece has been much smaller than in Ireland. It is more common to challenge the Church's control in the field of education: i.e. school visits to attend religious ceremonies, prayer each day before classes begin and the presence of an Orthodox icon in every classroom (these are being increasingly challenged because of large numbers of non-orthodox immigrants, EU legislation on religious diversity and tolerance in schools). But the promotion of the Orthodox Church as the carrier of national identity, which still forms the underlying thesis of history textbooks goes unchallenged, largely because of the status religion enjoys as safeguard of the nation.

5. History Teaching: Irish and Greek Syllabi in a Comparative Perspective

As it has been argued above, this thesis assumes that it is through the teaching of history that the link between religion and nationalism is mainly maintained and reproduced through the education system. Henceforth the chapter attempts to show the consequences of this distinction through an analysis and systematic comparison of the Irish and Greek history curricula and textbooks. The aim is to show that the teaching of history in Greece is particularly ethnocentric and assists the view Greek national identity is under threat, that Turkey is Greece's main enemy and that the Church is pivotal for the survival of the Greek nation. The Church therefore draws its power from nationalism and not from a legalistic interpretation of Orthodoxy which requires the adherence of the laity in order to maintain its power. On the other side of the spectrum, Irish history teaching is less nationalistic and highly influenced by a successful revisionist historiography which does not portray the Irish nation as threatened or imperilled from Britain. The Church attempts to draw its power from the adherence to strict Catholic rules, and as this becomes contested by increasing modernisation, so is the Church's legitimacy being challenged at its core.

In Ireland, history is compulsory until the age of 15 - i.e. the end of the junior cycle. In the past years, the Church has mainly lost ground in its control over the curriculum: for one thing, the system is becoming even less centralised, with much now depending on individual schools. During the 'Irish Cultural Revolution (1960-1975) literacy in the classical languages was replaced by a concern with practical skills and modern languages.
History came under siege in favour of subjects such as economics, accountancy and business organisation. Technical education flourished as never before' (Garvin, 2004:7). Especially since the 1970's Arms crisis and the need to downplay the nationalist element because of the Northern Ireland question, the history curriculum has become increasingly less ethnocentric and the focus on the link between religion and Irish national identity has decreased dramatically. A more profound change in the attitude to the religious dimension occurred however in the 1990's with the introduction of the Green and white papers on education. Williams argues there is evidence in of 'a desire to distance the State from a direct role in reinforcing the religious dimensions of cultural identity' (Williams, 1999: 317).

The fact that Irish Catholicism tends to be identified with a strict adherence to rules and doctrine does reinforce this view. As the notion of tolerance emerges as a defining element in Irish education, and the endorsement of the secular values of liberal democracy becomes a reality, traditional Catholic structures are weakened, and the identification of Irishness with Catholicism in schools becomes less of an impetus. This is illustrated, for example, in the 1992 Green paper where the previous emphasis on the relationship between religion and a cultural self-understanding is gone. Although the 1995 white paper exhibits a more positive view of religion, it still refrains from endorsing any link between religion and national identity in modern Ireland (Williams, 1999: 327).

The Irish history curriculum is currently much more diverse and less ethnocentric than the Greek one. According to the Irish department of Education and Science, 'at junior cycle History should introduce young people to the job of the historian, and to the sources and techniques which historians use to find out about the past. It should also provide young people with a wide tapestry of past events, issues, people and ways of life through which they can come to perceive patterns such as consequence, change and continuity' (Junior certificate History syllabus, p.1). Given the fact that the Irish education system is decentralised, the primary, and both the junior and senior cycle curricula are very wide ranging. Students may choose their topics of study, and a much wider ranging variety of topics is offered for selection, including international and European history in greater details. Students may choose to study the history of European, Asian, American and Australasian peoples, as well as events such as WWI and WWII. Various aspects of Irish history are, of course not surprisingly, also on offer, but the level of ethnocentrism is much lower, as they are taught in conjunction with a much wider-ranging historical perspective.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infant classes 1&amp;2</th>
<th>Myself and my family; change and continuity; story</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Levels 1&amp;2</td>
<td>Myself and my family; change and continuity; story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels 3&amp;4</td>
<td>Local Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2 choices from):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>My family; homes; my school; games and pastimes in the past; feasts and festivals in the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stories from the lives of people in the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Early people and ancient societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2 choices from):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stone age people; Bronze age people; early societies of the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys; Egyptians; Greeks; Romans; Celts; early Christian Ireland; Vikings; Central and south American peoples; Asian peoples; African peoples; North American peoples; Australasian peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life, society, work and culture in the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2 choices from):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life in Norman Ireland; life in medieval towns and countryside in Ireland and Europe; Life in 18th century; Life in 19th century; Life in WWII; Life in Ireland since the 1950’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continuity and change over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2 choices from):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food and farming; clothes; homes and houses; transport; communications; shops and fairs; schools and education; caring for the sick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels 5&amp;6</td>
<td>Local Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2 choices from):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>homes; schools; games and pastimes in the past; feasts and festivals in the past; building, sites or ruins in my locality; my locality through the ages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stories from the lives of people in the past; myths and legends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Early people and ancient societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2 choices from):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stone age people; Bronze age people; early societies of the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys; Egyptians; Greeks; Romans; Celts; Early Christian Ireland; Vikings; Central and south American people; Asian peoples; African peoples; North American peoples; Australasian peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life, society, work and culture in the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2 choices from):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life in Norman Ireland; life in medieval towns and countryside in Ireland and Europe; life in 18th century; life in 19th century; life in WWII; life in Ireland since the 1950’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eras of change conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2 choices from):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Renaissance; Reformation; trade, explorers and colonizers from Europe; the Great Famine; the industrial revolution; changing land ownership in 19th century Ireland; changing roles of women in the 19th and 20th centuries; WWII; modern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politics, conflict and society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2 choices from):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16th and 17th century Ireland; revolution and change in America, France and Ireland; O’Connell and Catholic emancipation; 1916 and the foundation of the State; Northern Ireland; Ireland, Europe and the world, 1960 to the present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continuity and change over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2 choices from):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Homes, housing and urban development; Nomadism; food and farming; clothes; transport; communications; energy and power; workshops and factories; schools and education; literature, arts, crafts and culture; caring for the sick; barter, trade and money</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5.6 Junior Certificate History Syllabus, Republic of Ireland

(http://www.education.ie/servlet/blobservlet/jc_history_sy.pdf?language=EN)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section 1: How we find out about the past</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>A study of the job of the Historian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Our roots in ancient civilisation</td>
<td>A study of the following in pre-Christian and early Christian Ireland and one other ancient civilisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Houses, food and family life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Work, art, crafts and tools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Burial customs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castle, Church and City</td>
<td>• Medieval society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The medieval city and manor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The medieval castle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The medieval monastery and parish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renaissance</td>
<td>A study of the following in various countries across Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Art</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Architecture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Printing and learning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploration</td>
<td>• Why people wanted new sea routes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What made the voyages possible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The main consequences of these voyages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformation</td>
<td>• Why the Reformation occurred</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How different people went about reform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The main consequences of the Reformation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantation in Ireland</td>
<td>• Why the land changed hands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How the land changed hands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Main consequences, immediate and long term, of the change in land ownership- e.g. politics, culture, religion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Movements</td>
<td>• Background: sources of discontent in pre-revolutionary America, France and Ireland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Revolutionary movements in America, France and Ireland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Consequences of these Revolutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Farm to Factory</td>
<td>• Background: Agricultural society in the 18th century</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Factors which made the agricultural and industrial revolutions possible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Effects of changes in industry and agriculture on people’s lives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Development in Ireland in the late 19th century and 20th century</td>
<td>• Overview of the main political events which influenced contemporary Ireland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Change in the 20th century</td>
<td>• Changing lifestyles in Ireland from c1900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Changing lifestyles in a contrasting society (USA or USSR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relations in the 20th century</td>
<td>• 1920-1945 Peace and War in Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1945-present: The rise of the superpowers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Moves towards European Unity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• African and Asian Nationalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Students studying history at ordinary level are instructed to take two of the section 3 topics. Students studying the syllabus at higher levels are instructed to take all three.

Table 5.7 Leaving Certificate History Syllabus, Republic of Ireland
(http://www.education.ie/servlet/blobservlet/lc_history_sy.pdf?language=EN)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics for Study</th>
<th>Early Modern Field of Study 1492-1815</th>
<th>Later Modern Field of Study 1815-1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish History 1494-1815</td>
<td>1. Reform and Reformation in Tudor Ireland, 1494-1815</td>
<td>Or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Rebellion and conquest in Elizabethan Ireland, 1558-1603</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Kingdom versus colony- the struggle for mastery in Ireland, 1603-1660</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. establishing a Colonial ascendency, 1660-1715</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Europe and the wider World, 1492-1815</td>
<td>1. Europe from Renaissance to Reformation, 1492-1815</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Religion and power- politics in the later 16th century, 1567-1609</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Establishing Empires, 1715-1775</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Greek history curriculum on the other hand concentrates almost exclusively on Greek history. According to the Greek history curriculum, commissioned by the Department of Education and Religious Affairs, the prime task of the teaching of history in junior secondary education (Gymnasium) ‘is for pupils to become acquainted with the historical course of Hellenism from antiquity until the present, with reference to the history of the wider world’ (History Syllabus, Pedagogical Institute, Greek Department of Education and Religious Affairs www.p-i.schools.gr). The introduction to the level three, junior cycle history textbook, published in 1991 and still in use in the 2006/2007 school year also stresses this ethnocentric outlook:

The content of this book, despite its ambitious title specified by the analytical curriculum, is confined especially in its first part to Europe. Our continent, the ‘old continent’ as it is usually called is particularly important because the developments which took place there during the past centuries have important developments in other continents.

It is within the geographical space and historical period under scrutiny here that the history of modern Hellenism after the fall of Constantinople was formed. Under unfavourable circumstances the Greek people managed to survive and to observe other peoples’ social, cultural and political rise. Hellenism’s attempt towards this direction is presented here more analytically, not only because it is directly relevant for the Greek student, but also because it reveals the obstacles which had to be overcome, in order for us to attain the status demanded by our national tradition and history (Sfyroeras, 1991:6).

Teaching of the history of non-European peoples is very limited (apart from a section of ancient history dealing with the Persian civilisation). Although a restricted amount of European history is present in the syllabus, including the Renaissance, the Reformation and the French revolution, these only take up a few pages of the book, and are often overlooked by the teachers. Since there is no option for pupils to choose their subjects and everything

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1 Να γνωρίσουν οι μαθητές την ιστορική πορεία του Ελληνισμού από την αρχαιότητα μέχρι σήμερα, με αναφορές στην ευρύτερη παγκόσμια ιστορία.

2 Το περιεχόμενο του βιβλίου, παρά το φυλοδοξό τίτλο του, οποίο αυτός καθορίζεται από το αναλυτικό πρόγραμμα, περιορίζεται ιδιαίτερα στο πρώτο μέρος του, κυρίως στον Ευρωπαϊκό χώρο. Η περίοδος μας, η γηραιότερη περίοδος, οποία συνήθως αναφέρεται, περιορίζεται ιδιαίτερα ενθάδερες, επειδή οι εξέλιξες που σημειώθηκαν σ’ αυτή τους τελευταίους αιώνες επηρέασαν και τις εξέλιξες στις άλλες περιόδους.

Στο χώρο αυτό και στη χρονική περίοδο που εξασκήθηκε, διαμορφώθηκε η ιστορία του νέου Ελληνισμού μετά την πτώση της Βυζαντινής Αυτοκρατορίας. Μέσω από δυσκολές συνήθεις ο Ελληνικός λαός καταφέρθηκε να επιβιώσει, αλλά και να παρακολουθήσει τους αλλούς λαούς στην κοινωνία, την πολιτική και την πολιτική τους ανάδοση. Η προσανατολισμένη του Ελληνισμού προς την κατεύθυνση αυτή παραχωρούντα ενθάδερες, η μονό επικαλέστηκε αμέσως τον Ελληνικό μαθητή, αλλά και διέθετε αποκλειστικά τα εμπόδια που επηρέαζαν να ζευγαρούν, γα να φθάσουμε στη θέση που επιβάλλει η εθνική μας περάσιση και ιστορία.

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specified in the syllabus is expected to be covered, teachers place extensive emphasis on Greek history and towards the end of the year very quickly and briefly cover a selective amount of European and international events. The main task of history teaching is to disseminate to students the knowledge of Greek identity, and as Orthodoxy is considered to lay at its core, ethnocentric education has become inevitably a religious-centric education.

### Table 5.8: History Curriculum, Greece

The teaching of history is compulsory for all years of school education. The following table summarises the history curriculum for the 2006/2007 school year:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Compulsory Education</th>
<th>Higher Secondary: Lyceum</th>
<th>Compulsory Education</th>
<th>Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>Level 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modern Greek history from the Vienna Convention until the present day</td>
<td>Medieval and modern world history from the era of Justinian until the Vienna Convention</td>
<td>Modern Greek history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Level 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ancient world history until the era of Justinian</td>
<td>Ancient Greek history till the Classical Ages, focusing on Roman and Hellenistic times until 300 A.D</td>
<td>Roman and Byzantine history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Level 4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ancient Greek history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Level 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Introductory, including Greek mythology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Level 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Introductory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Level 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Introductory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from History Education Syllabus, Greek pedagogical institute, Department of education, http://www.pi-schools.gr/lessons/history/

An excellent example illustrating the ethnocentrism of the Greek education system is the lower secondary, level three history curriculum for the 2006/2007 school year, which is dedicated almost exclusively to the teaching of Greek history. Although the syllabus is supposed to cover 600 years of Greek history, as the table indicates, a disproportionately large section of the syllabus is dedicated to the Greek struggle of independence. In the respective textbook, out of a total of 385 pages, 105 are dedicated to the period of Ottoman

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3 From author's own experience of the Greek education system
rule and the Greek independence movement (Sfyroeras, 1991). Certain international and European events are covered only to the extent that they shed light to developments in Greece, such as the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Vienna Convention, the treaties of Lausanne and Sevres, the first and second world wars and a brief mention on the cold war.

Table 5.9: Lower Secondary, Level 3 history Curriculum, ‘Modern and Contemporary Greek History (1453-20th Century)’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sections</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Hellenism under foreign Rule (Turkish Rule-Latin rule)</td>
<td>Renaissance; Reformation; science and art in the 15th and 16th centuries; the Enlightenment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Europe and the world from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment</td>
<td>The Organisation of the Ottoman State; Islamisation and Forced Children Recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Foreign Rule in the Greek Territorial Space</td>
<td>The Church and its privileges; the Phanariots; the education of the Genos; diaspora Hellenism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Forces contributing to the maintenance and survival of Hellenism</td>
<td>The elephfts; Souli and Mani; liberation movements prior to 1821; the Turn to Russia; Lampros Katsonis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hellenism and Armed Resistance</td>
<td>Social and economic organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Society and Economy</td>
<td>Science, arts and humanities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Civilisation and Intellectual Life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Greek Struggle for Independence</td>
<td>The American Declaration of Independence; the Vienna Convention; the reaction of European peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The French Revolution and the Spread of liberal Ideas</td>
<td>Preparations; the Filiki Etaisia; Alexander Ypsilantis and the revolution in the Danubian principalities; the Commencement of the Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Declaration of the Greek Revolution</td>
<td>First year operations (Sacking of Tripolitsa, Valtetsi, Alamana, Gravia); Kolokotronis; 1822: Dramalits and the first siege of Messolongi; Kanaris and Botsaris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Break-out of the Revolutionary Struggle (1821-1823)</td>
<td>Egypt’s Mehmset Ali and the Porte; the subjugation of Crete and Kasos, and the destruction of Psarra; Andreas Miaoulis and the Naval Battles of Mikali and Gerontas; Ibrahim, Papaflessas and the battle at Maniaki; the first siege of Messolongi; operation in eastern mainland Greece. Georgios Karaiskakis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Revolutionary Struggle in Crisis (1825-1827)</td>
<td>The Kalentzi Assembly; Local Organisations of mainland Greece; the First and Second National Assemblies; The civil war; The Third National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Political Organisation at the Time of the Struggle</td>
<td>The Conventions of Laybach and Verona; The philhellene movement; the naval battle of Navarino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The Governments of the Great powers and the European Peoples towards the Greek Revolution (1821-1827)</td>
<td>Kapodistrias; economy, military, education and justice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### III. Greece from independence to WWI

| 1. Europe and the World in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century | Ideological confrontations in Europe; the industrial revolution; colonisation; the American continent; civilisation, arts and humanities |
| 2. Otto's rule | The selection of Otto; the period of absolute monarchy (1835-1843); the revolution of September 3<sup>rd</sup> 1843; Parliamentarism; The Great Idea; Hellenism and the Crimean War (1853-1857) |
| 3. The Road to Parliamentarism | The expulsion of Otto and the ascendency of George 1<sup>st</sup> to the throne; the constitution of 1864; Harilaos Trikoupis and his contribution to the prevalence of Parliamentarism |
| 4. Hellenism and Irredentist Claims | The Incorporation of the Ionian islands; the Cretan Revolution (1866-1869); the annexation of Ipirus and Thessaly (1881); the new Cretan revolt and the Greco-Turkish war of 1897; Crete gains autonomy; the Macedonian question and the armed Macedonian struggle; Hellenism in Minor Asia and Constantinople |
| 5. Venizelos in Power. The Balkan Wars | The movement at Goudi (1909); Venizelos ascendency; The Constitution of 1911; The Balkan Wars (1912-1913); the Treaty of Bucharest |

### IV. Greece in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century

| 1. Greece during WWI (1914-1918) | The Greek stance; Venizelos and the National schism |
| 2. Greece and the Final Phase of the Eastern Question (1919-1923) | The dissolution of the Ottoman empire; Greece's territorial claims; the treaty of Sevres; the Turkish nationalist movement and the war in Asia Minor; the exodus from Asia Minor; the treaty of Lausanne and the new Greece |
| 3. The Inter-War Period (1919-1939) | Greece in the international context; reforms and political developments; the consequences of the international economic crisis; the dictatorship of August 4<sup>th</sup> |
| 4. The Second World War | Greece in WWII; the Italian attack; Greece's struggle; the Nazi invasion; Occupation, resistance, Middle East; The Liberation of Greece; the annexation of the Dodecanese |
| 5. Greece in the post-War Period | The international community in the post-war period; the cold war; the Greek civil war; the restoration of peace and the evolution of political life; economic improvement; dictatorship; the restoration of democracy and consolidation of democratic institutions |
| 6. The Road to the EU | The idea of a united Europe; Greece's gradual involvement in the European community; the end of the bi-polar international system |
| 7. Humanities, Arts and Sciences in Greece | |

Source: Adapted from: http://www.pi-schools.gr/lessons/history/

### 6. Content: Greek and Irish History Textbooks in a Comparative Perspective

In terms of content, Greek textbooks remain largely ethnocentric, confrontational and defensive, placing great emphasis on the Greek nation and its principal signifiers, such as Orthodoxy and the Greek language. Irish textbooks on the other hand are much more
inclusive and conciliatory in tone, promoting civic ideals such as inclusion, citizenship and multiculturalism. The promotion of a sense of national unity played a central role in the Greek education system during the nation-building process and this has changed little in recent years: promoting nationalism remains one of education’s prime tasks, and Orthodoxy is at the core of this nationalist project. Millas agrees that even after recent changes in textbooks, mainly in the phraseology, under which the negative attributes of the other have been reduced, ‘the general approach with respect to the past and to the other has not changed’ (Millas, 2004: 56). Although in history textbooks between 1946 and 2004, the language has become a little milder, omitting certain provocative phrases, such as ‘the hated conquerors’ or the spelling of the word ‘Nation’ with a capital ‘N’, Greek textbooks still recreate a negative image of the Turks, as the enemy who seeks to destroy the Greek nation. The national self is still portrayed in a constant State of insecurity and weakness and Greek national identity is presented fragile, threatened from extinction and thus in need of defence (Fragoudaki and Dragona, 1997:18). There is still extensive use of terms such as ‘the Turkish yoke’, ‘enslaved Hellenism’, ‘dark years of slavery’, ‘desire for liberty’ ‘soul of the Genos’, ‘national awakening’ and the ‘Greek nation’. Textbooks are written in a highly emotional language. Orthodoxy is portrayed as an integral part of Greek identity throughout the centuries. Indeed it is put forward as the main carrier of Greekness, effectively responsible for its survival throughout the ‘dark years’ of conquest and rule. It is therefore placed at the core of the representation of the distinction between ‘us’-the Greeks and the ‘other’- the Turks. It is portrayed as having remained the main, along with the Greek language, delineator between Greeks and the ‘hostile others’ which seek to destroy Hellenism, and annihilate Greece.

Examples of how Greece and Turkey have been portrayed throughout 20th century Greek history textbooks are replete with such a portrayal of Orthodoxy, and provide a very ethnocentric account of Greek history. A good example is the way the way the Greek independence movement and the conditions leading to it are portrayed. Note for example the passage below extracted from a 1966 history textbook. The text is written in a highly emotional language, and there is an evident promotion of hatred for the ‘conquerors’ and sense of superiority of Orthodox ‘us’ to the Muslim ‘other’:

The enslaved had a clear consciousness not only of their common descent, religion and language, but also of the supremacy of Orthodoxy against Islam. These traditions from generation to generation fashioned their national sentiment and moulded the soul of the Genos with a desire for the moment of liberation. And the desire was so strong, and the hatred
towards the conqueror so powerful that even when occasional revolts failed our ancestors were not disappointed. Belief in liberation fed the sweet consolation of expectation and patience in their wounded souls. The death of the last Emperor remained a live tradition in the mind of our people. The ‘marble king‘ was not dead but he slept, and would awaken the day of the resurrection of the Nation to pursue with his sword in his hand the hated tyrants to the depths of Asia (Modern History, 1966:89).

Another passage, from 1977, illustrates the attempt to forge a distinction between ‘us’ and the Turkish ‘other‘- who is no doubt responsible for the dire faith of ‘our’ nation.

The greatest catastrophe befell the Greek nation with the Turkish conquest. The honour, life and property of the Greeks were surrendered to the judgement of those arrogant warriors who considered the defeated ‘Ragia’ to be the most unimportant thing on earth (Modern Greek and European History, 1977:165).

There are similar connotations in textbooks used for the 2006/2007 school year, as for example the history textbook for the last year of the secondary junior cycle (Gymnasium). The extract below constitutes an interesting account of the period of Ottoman rule and the initial stages of the struggle for independence. Although use of phrases such as ‘hated tyrants’ is omitted, Greeks are still referred to as ‘the enslaved’, Greek history as perennial and the Ottoman Empire as the ‘Turkish yoke’.

The period of Tourkokratia (Turkish Rule) was undoubtedly the most crucial in the long Greek history. The Ottoman invasion of the Byzantine Minor-Asian lands in the 13th century, the occupation of Callipoli in Thrace in 1354 and finally, the dissolution of the Byzantine Empire in 1453 constituted the beginning of an era which threatened the existence of the Greek nation.

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4 Here the passage is referring to Constantine Palaiologos, the last King of Byzantium. A well-known legend has it that Constantine, the so-called ‘Marble King’ who was killed by the Ottomans during the sacking of Constantinople in 1453 would awaken the day that the Greek nation would regain its independence to fight the Turks.

5 ‘Ου υπάρχουσα είχαν σωφρονιστήσει περί της κοινωνίας των καταγωγών, δημοκρατίας και γλώσσας, αλλά και περί της ιδεολογικής προορισμού της Οθωνοδοξίας από του Ισλάμ. Αυτοί οι παραδόσεις από γενεάς σε γενεάς εφαρμόστηκαν εκείνων το εθνικό πνεύμα και εγκαθίστανε την ψυχή του Γενόσεως με τον καθό το τοπίο του λυτροκομίου. Και προς το άλλο δύναμες το πολιτικό και τον αστικό τοπικό το μισό εναντίον του κατακτητή, επειτά και στους απειληθέντες από κατα καρπούς εξέγερσες σχε μόνον δεν κατέληξαν τους υποδοτούς προγόνους μας απογοητεύσεις, αλλά η πιστικής της επαναθεωρούμενης εστάλαξε στην τροποποιημένην ψυχή των γλώσσα το βασάνον της προορισμού και της υπομονής. Ο θανάτος του τελεστού αυτοκρατορά το είχε γίνεται προασπίζοντας και ετοιμότατος το αγωνία προς τον λαό μας. Ο «Μιμαραμμένος Βασιλιάς», ο οποίος δεν εκάλεσε, «αλλ' εκσυμπλόκηθε, θα εξελίσσε την ημέρα της αναστασιού του Εθνούς (note the Capital E in the word Ethnos, i.e Nation) και με το στοιχείο στο χέρια διευθύνε θυσίες, τως αυξώνος προφοράς έως το βάθος της Ασίας, την Κοινή νησίων» (κυρίως της Φρωτής).

6 ‘Με την Τουρκική κατακτηση επέστρεψε στον Ελληνικό ιθαγένη η παλαμή συμφορά. Η τμήμα η ζωή και η περιοχή του παραδοτικού στον κόσμο των αλλαζονικώς πελάμιων, που θεωρούσαν τον νεκρό κόσμο σεισμό το στις δευτερευοντές προερχόμενο του κοσμού'
At a time when Western Europe was moving fast towards the establishment of new political and ecclesiastical institutions, and while during the Renaissance, literature, sciences and arts were thriving, Hellenism was fighting for its survival. Whereas, however, the establishment of Ottoman rule in the Greek lands had severe consequences, the enslaved people showed remarkable resistance and under the most ominous of circumstances were able to preserve all the elements of their ethnicity and move towards their own renaissance. Material disasters, Islamisation, devshirme, heavy taxation and several other pressures did not deter them. Uniting under the Ecumenical Patriarchate and generally the Church, especially during the first two centuries of the **Tourkokratia**, later under the organisation in communities, the **Clephts**, the development of education, helped to maintain intact the hope of the enslaved people for the overthrow of the Turkish yoke.

The darkness of the years of the sacking [of Constantinople] was succeeded by light which, faint at times but bright more often, was transmitted from the captive Patriarchate, the Greek intellectuals, the Greek printing houses of the West, the hideouts of the **Clephts** and the liberal national-awakening movement of the Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment⁷ (Sfyroeras, 1991: 99).

The text is far from impartial and the choice of language reinforces this. There is tendency to portray the ‘enslaved’ Greeks as heroic, stressing their valour and bravery as constant national traits, while the national consciousness and the desire for national self-determination are shown as linear processes which no doubt were there since the initial days of the fall of Byzantium.

The heroic spirit of the final days of Byzantium, the songs that mourned the loss of the ‘City’ which told the story of the destruction of the capital of the empire, but also envisaged the

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⁷ Η περίοδος της Τουρκοκρατίας υπήρξε αναμφίβολη η κρίσιμη εποχή στην μακραίων Ελληνική ιστορία. Η ορμητική ανάβαση των Οθωμανών στο Βουλγαρικό Μικρασιατικό εδάφος στο τέλος του 13ου αιώνα, η καταλήψη της Κωνσταντινούπολης στη θρακική από το 1354 και τέλος η κατάληψη της Βασιλεία των Αυτοκρατορίων το 1453 υπήρξαν ασφαλή δόντια που απέλαφαν την υπαρξή του έλληνικού εθνικού.

Σε μια εποχή που η Δυτική Ευρώπη προχωρούσε με αλμάτα στη διαμορφώση νέων θεωριών, πολιτικών και εκσυγχρονιστικών, και μετά από το πνεύμα της Αναγέννησης σημειούσαν καταλληλική πρόοδο το γραφικό, οι επιστήμες και οι τεχνές, ο Ελληνισμός αγωνίστηκε για την επιβίωσή του. Ένας ομοιός χαρακτήρας της κυριαρχίας των Οθωμανών στον Ελληνικό χώρο εκεί οδώντρες συνέπεσε, οι υποδοχές είδαν εξιδρωμένη αντίθεση και κατακόρυφα υπό διαμειστές συνθήκες να διατηρήσουν ολά τα στοιχεία της εθνικής τους υπόστασης και να προχωρήσουν προς τη δική τους Αναγέννηση. Οι ύλικες καταστροφές, οι εξαπλώσεις, το παιδαγωγείο, οι οικιακές φορές, οι πολίτες πεζός δεν εκπαιδεύουν το πλέον τους. Η διαφανοποίηση γρήγορο έγκαιρο το Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο και την εξάπατο της Εκκλησίας, ιδίως στην δύο πρώτη ανάγκη της Τουρκοκρατίας, η οργάνωση σε κοινοτίτες αγορές, η δράση των κλάσεων, η αναπόληση της παιδείας, διατηρήθηκαν ασβεστείς την έλευση των υποδοχών για την αποκατάσταση του χώρου.

Το ζωτικό σκοπό των χρονών της Αλίκης διαδόθηκε το ως που, αμφότερο κατεύθυνση, ψυχή συγκεκριμένη, σχετικά από το ανθρώπινο Πατριαρχείο, από τους Ελλήνες λόγους και τα Ελληνικά παπούτσια της Δυστης, από τα λόγια των κλαστών και από το φωτεινό και εθνικοποιημένο πνεύμα του νεοελληνικού διαφωτισμού.
resurrection of the Genos and the widespread prophesies which predicted the overthrow of the yoke warmed the hopes of the enslaved (Sfyroeras, 1991: 123-124).

The Orthodox Church is presented as one of the crucial elements for the maintenance of Hellenism during the period of Tourkokratia. Because of the fear of the threat of extinction, the Greeks must unite under the most important elements of their own distinct identity; language is one, Orthodoxy is the other. In this sense Greek history textbooks highlight the need to preserve the forces that are important for the continuation of Hellenism, i.e. language and religion. Orthodoxy, which helped preserve the Greek nation during the ‘dark centuries’ of Turkish rule continues to serve as such a symbol of Greek national identity. It is a source of unity, a rallying point without which the Greek nation itself will be eradicated. Defending and preserving Orthodoxy therefore becomes synonymous with preserving and defending the Greek nation.

The role of the Church during the Greek independence movement is distorted and the distinction between the lower clergy who did aid the movement, and the patriarchate that did not is overlooked. Under the sub-heading ‘Forces that contributed to the preservation of Hellenism’, the 1991 junior cycle history textbook makes explicit that the Patriarchate and the privileges granted to the Patriarch by the Ottoman Sultan allowed the Church to preserve its influential role throughout the period of the conquest and ‘were determinative for the course of enslaved Hellenism’ (Sfyroeras, 1991:122). Attempts on behalf of the Patriarch to halt the independence movement are not overlooked but they are presented as innocent attempts on behalf of the Patriarch to save his people. They were simply a response to the Sultan’s threats. The excommunication of the revolutionaries is presented as the Patriarch’s necessary response to the Sultan’s threat that, failure to comply would result in the annihilation of the Greek population of Istanbul.

At that time, news of the ex-communication of Ypsilantis and Soutsos by Gregorios 5th arrived at Bucharest (23 March). [The Patriarch] was obliged to publish it when the sultan threatened to, in case of the patriarch’s failure to comply, authorise the Turkish army and mob to annihilate the Greek population of Constantinople and other towns (Sfyroeras, 1991: 159).

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8 Τα πρωτόκολλα των τελευταίων ημερών του Βυζαντίου, οι θρήνοι για το πάρηγμα της Πόλης και διεκρητικοί για την καταστροφή της πραγματικής της αυτοκρατορίας άλλων και οργανοποιήσεις την ανάδεση του Ισλάμ, της προηγημένης και κυκλοφορίας ευρήματα και συμβόλαια των επιστημών και των πολιτών.

9 Συνέχεια καταγέφτησε στο Βουκουρέστι ο αρχηγός του Υπηρεσίας και του Μηχανισμού Συστηματικής Συναγωγής (στις 23 Μαρτίου) σε το Ιανουάριο, που υποχρεωθήκε να τον εκδίδει, στον Σουλτάνο από την περιηγημένη περίπτωση του Πατριάρχη της τουρκικής σύναξης και ο στρατός θα εξανεμίζει τον ελληνικό πληθυσμό της Κωνσταντινούπολης και άλλων πόλεων.
There is also an attempt to link Greek revolutionaries influenced by the secular ideas of the Enlightenment, such as Ypsilantis, Tsakalof, Skoufas and other members of the Filiki Etairia, with the Orthodox Church. There were a number of clergymen initiated in the Filiki Etairia, such as Papaflessas and the Archbishop of Cyprus Kyprianos (Sfyroeras, 1991: 155). In addition, the Painting by Dionysios Tsokos, ‘The Oath of the Members of the Filiki Etairia’ is depicted on page 154, as well as Ypsilantis declaration of independence entitle ‘Fight for Faith and Fatherland’.

From her analysis of a 1998 history textbook entitled ‘The Cultural offer of Hellenism from Antiquity to Renaissance’, Zambeta draws a number of conclusions regarding the way Orthodoxy is presented in Greek history teaching. More specifically she concludes that the portrayal includes:

(a) Greek identity...has been continuous from antiquity to the present times.
(b) The continuity from antiquity to the present passes through Byzantium, which is defined as the Greek medieval empire.
(c) Christianity and Hellenism are inseparable, due to a cultural osmosis that has taken place since the 3rd century.
(d) The cultural identity of Byzantium lies in the synthesis of the ancient Greek culture, Roman political and legal tradition and Christianity.
(e) This synthesis is the cultural achievement of Byzantium. It is also the cultural legacy that Hellenism has left to the world and especially to Europe (Zambeta, 2000: 150-151).

It is also interesting to note how the 1922 ‘Asia Minor Catastrophe’ is portrayed in history textbooks. The latter is a highly traumatic event in Modern Greek history, and its story, albeit mostly one-sided, is often retold in the education system. In many such representations ‘the destruction of Smyrna’ has come to symbolise modern Greek perceptions of Turkey as characterised by hatred, violence, backwardness and dishonesty. Such perceptions reinforce Greece’s defensive national identity and stress the enormity of the Turkish threat: ‘if they did it once, they’ll do it again’. Greece’s part in the war is never questioned, Greek motives never doubted while atrocities perpetrated by the Greek side are hardly ever cited: romantic ideas of creating a greater Greece where the Byzantine Empire are enough justification. Note for example how the destruction of Smyrna is cited in the 1991 history textbook:
The Minor Asia Catastrophe constitutes the greatest national disaster in the history of modern Hellenism. Minor Asia was bitterly tried during the operations. Hundreds of thousands unarmed Greeks were extinguished in the summer of 1922, and a large number of soldiers and unarmed people were dragged to war camps. Villages and towns where the Greek element was dominant were destroyed and within a climate of madness, waves of refugees were abandoning the ancient homes of Hellenism in order to be saved in mainland Greece. Lament for the lost motherlands spread everywhere (Sfyroeras, 1991: 232).

Another example worth lingering on here illustrates how Agia Sofia is portrayed. ‘Τῆς Άγια-Σοφιάς’ (Of Agia Sofia) is a Greek folk poem lamenting the sacking of Constantinople, and predicting its re-capture by the Greeks sometime in the future. Its last two lines which can be roughly translated as ‘don’t cry lady and be sure, all this (territorial reference) will be ours again in due time’ are popular among Greeks, as is the exact date of the capture of the ‘City’, which is commemorated annually in Greece on May 29th (Modern History, 1966:88-89).

10. Μικρασιατική καταστροφή αποτελεί τη μεγάλυτερη εθνική σύμφωνα στην ιστορία του νεοτέρου ελληνισμού. Ο μικρασιατικός ελληνισμός δοκιμάστηκε σκληρά κατά τη διάρκεια των επιχειρήσεων. Εκατοντάδες χιλιάδες άμεσοι ελληνες εξοντωθηκαν το καλοκαίρι του 1922 και μεγάλος αριθμός στρατιώτων και αστυνομικών σφάλλον σε στρατοπέδια ασχολιών. Χώρα και πόλεις με σκληρό ελληνικό στοιχείο καταστραφήκαν και κυριαρχία κρουσμάτων μετα σε κλίμα αλλοφροσύνης εγκατέλειψαν τις πανάρχαιες εστίες του Ελληνισμού για να σωθούν στην Ελλάδα. Ο «θρήνος για τις χαμένες πατρίδες» απλωθήκε παντού.
This pattern is not confined to representations of Greek national identity during the war of independence (1821) or the Asia Minor disaster (1922). As textbooks mould the perceptions of Greek generations throughout the years, they thus mirror the way national identity is perceived by Greeks today. Its most crucial elements remain the continuity and perennial nature of the Greek nation and its preservation throughout the centuries; the link between nation and religion, and the crucial role of the latter in the maintenance of ‘Greekness’ during the ‘dark ages of foreign rule’; and the focus on the glorious past and the ‘heroic’ traits of all Greeks which ultimately gain them liberty. There is a general tendency in textbooks to promote ideals such as continuity, preservation and homogeneity, struggle against oppression and value for freedom and national self-determination achieved through the constant resistance to external threats. Thus it is quite clear that ‘Greekness’ is to a great degree presented, and perceived as, in opposition to a hostile ‘other’. The narrative stresses the importance of Greek resistance, sacrifice and mobilisation against an ‘aggressive enemy’ and the achievement of the preservation of Hellenism and all its ‘ethnic traits’ throughout the centuries.

By doing so, they reproduce a perception of Greekness as being under the perpetual peril of extinction. In other words, this narrative underlines and reproduces the defensive element of Greek national identity, evident in all school texts.

History serves as a guarantee for the necessity of the defensive dimension: it witnesses and retells the repetition of the threat, ‘whether from direct conquest of lesser civilisations, such as the Turks, or from the indirect conquest of the more civilised, superior Europeans. By exhibiting the patriotism and heroic acts of our ancestors, they establish the need for resistance to the threats. National homogeneity is the ultimate value, a precondition of preservation of the nation. The nation is presented as a natural, unified, perennial and un-eroded entity (Fragoudaki and Dragona, 1997:59).

The need for defending national identity is not only promoted in textbooks, but also in the particular way students are taught and in the language and phraseology teachers use, the commemoration of national holidays in schools, visits to museums and the narratives that go with them, to name but a few. Fragoudaki and Dragona, in their extensive study of Greek national identity and the education system, derive to the conclusion that teachers are equally, if not more, important as textbooks in shaping the image of national Greekness in
the students minds. Reinforcing what is written in textbooks, teachers present Greek national identity as underestimated and vulnerable. Greek identity is under threat and hooked on the past; it is disappointed from the present and uncertain about the future; it views the 'others' with scepticism and hostility, rejecting difference and is afraid of change (Fragoudaki and Dragona, 1997:70). It is also important to note that is general practice to require students to memorise large chunks of the text in the official State printed textbook and reproduce it in writing during examinations which largely undermines the potential for critical thinking and/or the consultation of a plurality of sources on the same topic.

Current Irish history textbooks are much less nationalistic on the other hand. The choice of language is mild and less emotional, and there is an attempt to be more descriptive and less biased. Their account of the role of religion in Irish national identity is less prevalent, and there is a mention of a plurality of opinions. There is hardly a promotion of an 'us' and 'them' dichotomy between Ireland and Britain and no promotion of a current external threat posed by Britain or the need for a defensive national identity. Irish textbooks do not ‘demonise’ the British, nor do they portray the Irish as purely innocent- they do recognise atrocities perpetrated by both sides during times of war as opposed to Greek books which stress brutalities perpetrated by the Turks but deny any reference to looting, plundering and killing perpetrated by the Greek side, for example during the ‘Asia Minor disaster’ of 1922.

Note for example the balanced and non-emotional account of the 1916 Easter Rising in the 2004 history textbook. The passage below, entitled ‘The Legacy of 1916’ constitutes an attempt to present the facts and illustrate the controversies surrounding them. Contrary to the Greek accounts of rebellions against the Ottomans, nationalist connotations are few, while there is little in the text promoting a sense of an English threat, an inferiority of the English and the Protestant faith, or the role of Catholicism as main carrier of Irish national identity. Clearly, the need to put forward a more conciliatory tone towards the UK and towards Protestants is reflected, especially since the Northern Ireland peace process.

The 1916 Rising was undoubtedly one of the most controversial events in Irish history. Unionists and many supporters of Home Rule condemned it. Home Rulers argued that Ireland already had democratically elected MP’s and that even the delay in granting Home Rule did not justify violence. The also pointed out that a tiny minority in the IRB decided on the rising without any mandate from the people. Later revisionist historians supported these viewpoints.
In a famous article published in 1972, the Jesuit Priest, Fr Shaw strongly criticised the 1916 Rising and especially the attempts by Patrick Pearse to link it with the Christian faith. Fr Shaw objected strongly for example to the connection between Christ rising from the dead at Easter and the Irish people rising in rebellion in search of freedom. Another factor that led to a revision of attitudes to 1916 was the violence in Northern Ireland from 1968 onwards. Certain commentators believed that the central message of 1916 has been the glorification of violence for political ends.

The supporters of the 1916 rising on the other hand argued that Irish people were entitled to take up arms in a struggle for freedom. They pointed to the fact that Home Rule was effectively killed off by the unionists and the Ulster Volunteers. Echoing Patrick Pearse's beliefs, they argued that Home Rule was inadequate; that only a fully independent republic was desirable; and that this could never be achieved without violence.

As history students, we are entitled to examine and consider all the various viewpoints. However, in studying the 1916 Rising, we must always ensure that we study it in the context of the time. For example, during WWI, the notion of dying for one's country had a different meaning from the same concept today. Above all, we must avoid allowing present day ideas to distort our vision of the past. When guided by sound historical principles, the 1916 rising can be a good test of the student's ability to be objective about past events (Brockie and Walsh, 2004:134).

Similarly, the Irish war of independence is presented in a mild, non-emotional tone. Notably, the role of religion and/or the Church is absent from both accounts.

The war of independence (1919-1921) is undoubtedly one of the most controversial episodes in Irish history. The ruthlesslessness of the targeting of civilians by both sides and the widespread intimidation suppressed critical voices at the time. The treatment of the minority Protestant community by sections of the IRA in many parts of the country led to a widespread departure for England. The vague relationship between Dáil Éireann and individual IRA units for most of the war led to questions concerning the legitimate use of force. The ill-treatment and shooting of hostages, prisoners and informers by both sides was a marked feature of the struggle.

Until the 1960's, historical discussion in the Republic of Ireland was largely favourable to the republican side in the War of Independence. The war was seen as a necessary fight in the struggle for independence. However, from the mid-1970s onwards, partly because of the violence in Northern Ireland, historians began to re-examine the issues. Certain revisionist historians have argued that Irish nationalists have achieved freedom by peaceful means within the British parliament.

When discussing the war of independence, it is important to assess people and events by the standards and values of the time and not by those of later generations. Whatever position one
adopts having considered the evidence, it is hard to deny that the truce of July 1921 was an important turning point in the country’s development towards full independence (Brockie and Walsh, 2004: 151).

The Irish textbooks’ general account of the role of the Church and Catholicism in Ireland is conducted in a much more impartial manner than the Greek textbooks’ account.

Before the granting of independence in 1922, the Catholic Church had become quite powerful under the British administration. As the power of landlords declined, the local priests became more powerful throughout the country. At a time when only one person in every ten went beyond primary school, people often depended on priests for guidance to a far greater degree than in modern times. Unlike in most countries in Europe where the Catholic bishops had been associated with the rich and powerful, in Ireland they had been far closer to the ordinary people. The leaders of the Church had usually been sympathetic to nationalist movements, as long as these did not involve violence.

Through the extensive involvement of Catholic priests and religious orders in health care and education from the 1850’s onwards, the Church catered for people who often were not provided for by the State. The Church’s control over education, in particular, gave it a powerful influence in turning the minds of future generations in its favour. With the widespread decline of the Irish language, many people valued their Catholic religion as one of the main signs of their Irish identity. In this way, being Catholic and being Irish were often closely connected, and this linkage was encouraged by the Catholic bishops. With the rising number of priests, brothers and nuns and the high numbers of Catholics attending Church regularly, the Irish bishops frequently declared that Ireland was one of the most Catholic countries in the world.

Between 1916 and 1922 the Catholic bishops had to balance condemnation of IRA violence with denunciations of British atrocities. However, after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921), they spoke out decisively in favour of the Free State. During the civil war they condemned those fighting on the republican side and excommunicated them. Once peace was restored in 1923, the bishops confidently expected to be highly influential in the new State, with its predominantly Catholic population (Brockie and Walsh, 2004:189).

Heroes and Martyrs

These conclusions are also evident in the way history textbooks present national heroes and their ‘ethno- martyrs’. In Greece, interestingly enough a large number of national heroes are also religious figures. There are numerous examples cited in history textbooks of clergymen involved in various ‘Greek’ struggles for independence. Those who died fighting the Ottomans are presented as ethno martyrs- giving martyrdom a national
element, and highlighting resistance and self-sacrifice as Greek national traits. Such figures are mythologised through education and their status as ethno martyrs is continuously perpetuated in the collective memory of the Greek nation. Again, there is an emphasis on the continuity of the Greek nation from antiquity, and national consciousness is assumed linear throughout the years of Ottoman rule; Orthodoxy and as a result Orthodox clergymen are seen as defenders of the faith and the nation, which in turn are portrayed as inseparable; and the ‘Turk’ is portrayed as the perennial enemy the delineating between which and the Greek is of course, religion. It is interesting to note that the portrayal of national-religious heroes in Greek history education is in complete agreement with the way these portrayed by the Orthodox Church, as chapter 6 illustrates in detail. Church discourse therefore coincides perfectly with official State discourse in this respect, thus making reinforcing the promotion and perpetuation of defensive, confrontational and strongly religious Greek national identity.

Examples of religious/national heroes and ethno-martyrs are numerous and their mention in Greek history textbooks does not appear to have changed much throughout the 20th century. A notable example is the Metropolitan of Larissa, Dionysius the ‘philosopher’, who on September 11th 1612 initiated a revolt against the Ottomans in Giannena. The revolt was crushed while Dionysius was captured being accused of treason was put to death. The following passage is an extract from the 1965 junior cycle Greek history textbook:

In September 1612 he gathered around 800 peasants from the mountains of Paramythia, Souli and Pindos, armed them with pastoral sticks and commenced his forceful attack against the Ottomans. He eliminated many, and at midnight on September 11th he marched into Giannena, slaughtered many and torched the House of the Turkish magistrate. As was to be expected, the movement failed. Dionysius escaped to a cave under the Church of St. John. He was discovered however, and after being handed to the Turkish authorities he was brutally murdered. The people named him skylolosofos (ascetic philosopher) a name which indicates their pain for the sad results of his attempt but also their admiration for his bravery (Modern History, 1965: 322).

11 Τον Σεπτεμβρίου του 1612 συνελέξεν 800 περίπου χωρικούς απο τα ορθή της Παραμύθης, του Σουλίου και της Πίνδου, ύπαλεν αυτών με ποιμενικούς ράβδους, επειδή ελέειν τα σπώλη, και πρήξαν ορμητικήν επιθέσιν κατά τον Μουσουλμάνον. Εξεντόσεσε πόλλους εις τα χωρια και τα μεσάνυχτα της 11ης Σεπτεμβρίου εσπήλαξεν εις τα Ιωαννινα, οπου κατέσφαξε πόλλους και ευρύσκεσε το μεγαρόν του Τούρκου δικαστού. Το κίνημα αυτο εκ του συνικο απέτυχε. Ο Διανυσιος εγρή γεις αντι τον νομο εν τον ναον του Άγιον Ιωάννου εν τον ορθομόν. Ανεκαλύφθη ομιός, παρεδόθη αις τους Τούρκικας αρχάς και εφοντικής αγιώς. Ο λαος ονομασεν αυτων Σκυλοσοφον, το οποιο εκθίλονταν τον πανον του δια τα οκτα αποτελέσματα της παράλογου αποσχετος του, αλλα συγχρόνως τον θαυμασμόν δια την τολμή του.
Although in the more recent textbook the language is milder, the essence remains the same in portraying Dionysius as a national and religious revolutionary hero:

In the evening of September 11\textsuperscript{th} he torched the house of the town’s Pasha, but the with Turkish counter-attack the revolutionaries dispersed and Dionysius who was betrayed and captured was put to death in conditions of terrible martyrdom. The awful persecutions that followed, the slaughters and the suspension of the privileges that had been granted to Giannena in 1430 were the consequences of the failure of the revolutionary metropolitan’s brave act\textsuperscript{12} (Sfyroeras, 1991: 124).

Other heroes presented as having suffered martyrdom and having died for their faith and motherland include Papaflessas, a cleric who was initiated in the Filiki Etaireia, fought in the Greek independence movement and fell fighting the Turks in Maniaki, in 1825. A lithograph, currently located in the Benaki museum in Athens, depicting the battle at Maniaki is included in the book, underneath the section on Papaflessas’ heroic death. According to the textbook, the lithograph first appeared in Paris with the inscription: ‘The Battle at Maniaki in which Gregory Papaflessas, fighting heroically, fell like a new Leonidas on May 19\textsuperscript{th} 1825’ (Sfyroeras, 1991: 176).\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, the monk Gabriel, who after torching the besieged Arkadi monastery, died a hero of the 1866 Cretan revolt. When the Turks demolished the Western side of the monastery wall, in order not to be arrested the besieged torpedoed the arsenal (November 9\textsuperscript{th}) and many building were turned into ruins. This act which shook Hellenism as a whole also shocked European public opinion and revived the Philhellene spirit. (Sfyroeras, 1991: 266)\textsuperscript{14} And also, the Orthodox Patriarch Gregorious 5\textsuperscript{th}, who was hanged when the Greek revolt broke out, and Chrysostomos, the Metropolitan of Smyrna, the ‘ethno martyr’ who was brutally murdered by the Turks in during the 1922 Asia Minor disaster (Sfyroeras, 1991: 323). Other examples of religious/national heroes include the Metropolitan of Patra, Germanos, who is known in Greece for blessing the fighters and the revolutionary flag thus marking the commencement

\textsuperscript{12} Τη νύχτα της 11 Σεπτεμβρίου πυροπόλησε το διώκτητρι του παπά της πόλης, με την αντιπαθία ομοιος των Τούρκων οι επαναστάτες διαλύθηκαν και ο Διονύσιος που πέθανε από μυϊκό στιγμά, θανατήθηκε με φυσικό μαρτύριο. Οι τρομεροί διεγόμοντος ακολούθησαν, οι σφαγές και η καταγγελία των προνοούν που είχαν δοθεί στο Ισλάμ στο 1430, σφόγνιζαν την αποτυχία της παραπόλιν ζωής του επαναστήτη μπροστάλτη.

\textsuperscript{13} Η εν Μανιακώ η Πόλις μαχη, καθ’ ην Γρηγοριός Παπαφλέσσας, προσκυνομένος, επέσε εφ’ υπός Λεωνίδας την 19ο το 1825.

\textsuperscript{14} Όταν τα Τούρκικα τρόμοδια φτάσαν στη δυτική άκρα του περιφερειακού του μοίχου, οι κυκλοφορούν για να μην συλληφθούν αναπτύξαν την επιτυχία (9 Νοεμβρίου) και κόλλη κτισμάτα μεταφόρθηκαν σε έξοχα. Η πράξη αυτή συγκρούσε αλληλεπίδραση τον Ελληνισμό, αλλά και την ευρωπαϊκή κοινή γνώμη και ξαναφτάσανε το ρεμία του φιλελεύθερου.
of the revolution on March 25th 1821 in the square of St. George, Patra (Sfyroeras, 1001:161); Kosmas Aitolos, who endorsed the ideas of the enlightenment and the French revolution; and the Archbishop of Cyprus Kyprianos.

The portrayal of Irish heroes on the other hand is carried out in a more conciliatory and inclusive tone towards religion. The role of Catholicism is downplayed and reference to Catholic Priests or clergymen as ethno-martyrs is avoided, as is any support or promotion for partisan and denominational politics. A number of Irish nationalist heroes in fact presented in the textbooks are actually Protestant, notably Wolfe Tone and Charles Stuart Parnell.

A pertinent example is the portrayal of the 1798 Rising in the junior certificate history textbook. Emphasis is placed on the role of Wolfe Tone, an Anglican inspired by the secular ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Tone’s nationalism is linked to the secular value of national self-determination, while the notions of conciliation, pluralism and unity among all Ireland’s religious factions are presented as the supreme value of the Irish cause.

Tone was regarded as the Father of Irish Republicanism. He believed that Britain was the never-ending source of all Ireland’s troubles. He wanted to create an Irish Republic based on the unity of all Irishmen, whether Catholic, Protestant or Dissenter. He provided inspiration for the later revolutionary leaders who followed his beliefs. In particular, Tone’s example helped to inspire the Young Ireland rising in 1848, the Fenian rising in 1867 and the 1916 Rising (Lucey, 2002:207).

The role of Catholic clergymen in the rebellion is downplayed. For example, Father John Murphy, a Catholic priest who led the Wexford rebellion, and was subsequently captured, tortured and killed, is only briefly mentioned in one line. There is no description of Father Murphy as an ethno martyr or national hero. Instead, there is a focus on the pillage and plunder carried out by the revolutionaries against the Protestants in Co. Wexford. ‘As they swept through Co. Wexford, the rebel forces burned 200 Protestants in a barn in Scullabogue and killed nearly 100 in Wexford town’ (Lucey, 2002:207). This constitutes a sharp contrast to the Greek case, where, as shown above, religious figures who led revolutionary movements are mythologised and presented as national heroes and martyrs; and where, there is hardly any mention of atrocities carried out by the Greek side.
Further, the senior cycle textbook provides an interesting account of Parnell, the son of a Protestant land owner, who fought for Home Rule. Two elements are important here: firstly, the promotion of non-violent means for the achievement of nationalist causes; and secondly, a conciliatory attitude towards Northern Ireland and the protestant faith.

Despite certain hints in his early speeches and in his statements after the party split, Parnell distanced himself from the Fenians and would never have countenanced the withdrawal of Irish MP's from the British Parliament. As a superb parliamentarian, he used the House of Commons to great effect to gain concessions for the Irish people.

Like many Irish nationalists both before and after, he failed to understand the depth of unionist, especially Ulster Unionist, attachment to the full Union with Great Britain. When he claimed, in his argument against the exclusion of Ulster from the Home Rule Bill, that he could not afford to lose a single Irishman, was he perhaps denying many of his fellow Protestant the right to be fully British (Brockie and Walsh, 2004: 49)?

Finally, the same book provides a notable account of Patrick Pearse:

Although Pearse initially supported the cause of Home rule, he soon became disillusioned with Parliamentary politics and believed that full Irish independence could only be achieved by armed rebellion. The Gaelic league played an important part in Pearse’s path to extreme nationalism. He became a founder member of the Irish volunteers in 1913. Shortly afterwards, he joined the IRB and became a member of the Military Council, which planned the Easter Rising of 1916.

As a revolutionary, Pearse was an idealist and a visionary. In his writings he blended nationalist and Christian imagery: just as Christ had died on Calvary to save mankind, he believed his own martyrdom would advance the cause of Irish freedom. Pearse believed in ‘blood sacrifice’ - the view that the spilling of blood for the cause of freedom was a necessary and cleansing act.

Pearse commanded the Easter Rising of 1916 from his headquarters in the GPO and read the Proclamation of the Irish Republic from its steps. He surrendered on 28 April because of the high number of civilian casualties. Pearse - revolutionary, educationist and poet - was executed on May 3 1916 (Brockie and Walsh, 2004: 134-135).

Although the book’s account of Pearse does put forward the link between Irish nationalism and the Christian faith, the tone is nowhere as dramatic or tragic as the
one in Greek textbooks. There is also no reference to the British reference as conquerors and no negative attributes to the Protestant faith.

7. Education and Revisionist Historiography

Greek historiography comes to reinforce what is taught in schools. Textbooks differ little from official historiography; as Millas observes, the ‘textbook is a simple version of a more detailed history thesis or, inversely, historiography is an extended version of a text that appeared first in a textbook’ (Millas, 2004: 56). It is important to note here that revisionist historiography is by no means non-existent. On the contrary, there is a number of Marxist or liberal academics whose writings challenge traditional perceptions of nationalism and national identity in Greece. This trend originated from Greek academics abroad, such as L.S Stavrianos’s *The Balkans since 1453* (1958) a study that treats Greek nationalism as a political ideology rather than millenarian movement (Kitroeff, A, 1990:144). Marxist or neo-Marxist Greek historiography commences in the 1950’s with Svoronos’s ‘*Histoire de la Grece moderne*’ (1953), and includes among others Tsoukalas’s *The Greek Tragedy* (1969), Mouzelis’s core/periphery approach in *modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment* (1978). Liberal approaches to Greek history and Greek nationalism originated mainly in England and were widespread among Greek or English scholars living and working there. Examples of such interpretations include Campbell and Sherrard’s *Modern Greece: a Short History* (1968), Dakin’s *The Unification of Greece 1770-1923* (1972) and Clogg’s ‘*A short History of Modern Greece*’ (1979).

Revisionist historiography has attempted to promote an alternative view of Greek nationalism, focusing on the problems posed by the theory of national continuity from antiquity to the present and the difficulty in reconciling the Greek ancient past with the Byzantine Orthodox tradition in Greek national identity. Among others to address the non-supportive role played by the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the Greek War of independence, to refute the idea that the Church aided the revolutionaries and thus challenge the traditional view that Greek nationalism is grounded on Orthodoxy is Kitromilides in works such as ‘To Telos tis Ethnarhikhhs Paradoshhs’ in *Amitos Stin Mnimi tou Foti Apostolopoulou* (1984) and more recently *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy* (1994).
Despite this evolution of Greek historiography in the past 20 years however, these works have not been successful in resonating with the majority of people, as they do not constitute a part of the official school curriculum. Although they may be studied at university level, this is much more specialised and by no means does it reach the majority of Greek society. Thus, alternative national narratives of the Greek past have not been appealing and do not enjoy a wide audience. As Millas notes, such works are far from constituting the main trend in Greek historiography. According to Fragoudaki and Draga, this is because rather than historical knowledge, Greek audiences seek reassurance (Fragoudaki and Draga, 1997:71). Whether or not there is truth in such views is not the issue here. What is important however is the extent to which perceptions of Greek nationalism and national identity as perennial, ancient and Orthodox are deeply ingrained in the hearts and minds of the Greek people. Closer to what Billig called ‘banal nationalism’ such perceptions are formed in schools and later reinforced in every day representations. Whether real, imagined or indeed imaginary, the link between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity is deeply rooted and strongly felt by the Greeks, lived and re-lived in all aspects of their every day lives.

This is exemplified in a survey conducted by VPRC for a Special section on the Greek independence movement published in Kathimerini newspaper on March 24th, the eve of the anniversary of the Greek revolution. The survey well illustrates the prevalent version of history and popular attitudes towards Greek national identity and religion. According to the survey, a total 98% of the sample are proud (very proud at 76% and rather proud at 22%) of the revolution. Indeed, the independence movement and the period of Ottoman rule are the most popular historical periods at 48%, followed by Greek antiquity at a much lower 16%. Popular attitudes towards the role of religion are overwhelmingly positive. A total 77% believe the role of the lower clergy in the movement to have been positive (very positive at 52% and rather positive at 25%), 67% of the respondents perceive the role of the Patriarchate to have been positive and 84% responded that the role of the monasteries in the revolt was positive. It is also interesting to note that certain ‘national’ myths which promote the Church as carrier of Greek national identity and present it as a force which served to maintain the distinctive features of Greekness throughout the period of Tourkokratia (Turkish Rule), are also prevalent among popular attitudes. Notably, a total 88% believes that the ‘secret schools’15 - a prominent and infamous ‘national/religious’ myth which

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15 The myth of the secret schools (kryfa sxoleia) holds that during the period of Ottoman rule, when and where education in the Greek language and/or of the Orthodox faith was forbidden, the Church organised
symbolises the resilience of Greek national identity throughout the years, the value of resistance and the role of the Church as main carrier of Greekness - existed. The school system appears to be considered the main moulding source of popular attitudes; 64% of the sample responded that their knowledge of the events of 1821 derives from school, and 17% derive their knowledge both from school and other sources, leaving only a 19% to respond that their knowledge is mainly the product of sources not associated with the school system (Kathimerini, March 24th 2007).

Indicative of the solid grounding established historiography enjoys in Greece is also the example of the 2006/2007 educational reforms and more specifically the huge controversy surrounding the attempt to introduce a new textbook for the 6th year of the primary education with a more impartial attitude towards Greek history (analysed in chapter 3). Firstly this reform is limited as it has not been accompanied by reforms at the secondary level of education as of the time of writing nor has the government announced any intentions of such a move, and therefore pupils are still taught by the highly ethnocentric textbooks at later stages. Secondly, and most importantly, the reform proved short lived and highly unsuccessful in challenging established historiography. The systematic opposition on behalf of the Church and members of the Greek intelligentsia to the reformed textbook 16 forced the Department of Education and Religious Affairs to submit the book at the Athens Academy for review and evaluation. In May 2007 the Athens Academy issued it's formal report, according to which the textbook ought to be withdrawn or significantly altered given that it fails to forge the 'Greek collective historical memory' by omitting significant information about Greek history, such as the role of the Church in the maintenance of Hellenism during the Greek independence movement, a detailed account of Greece's involvement in World War II and of the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus (Kathimerini, May 4th 2007). As a result of the Academy review, the Greek Pedagogical Institute (which drafts and publishes textbooks on behalf the Department of Education and Religious Affairs) agreed to make a large number of significant amendments in the coming school year (2007-2008) to include, among other things, the contribution of the Church in the Greek independence and more broadly the survival of the Greek nation (Kathimerini, March 8th 2007). Although the Department had initially refused to withdraw the book, Mr Andreas Karamanos the General Secretary of the Department of Education announced in

underground school sessions, often at night and secretly from Ottoman officials in order to educate Greek-speaking children.

16 According to Kathimerini newspaper, the demand for the withdrawal of the book is significant, rising from 2,600 signatures in February 2007 to 4,720 signatures in March 2007 (Kathimerini, March 8th 2007)
late March 2007 that ‘should the revisions to the textbook be unsatisfactory, anything [including its withdrawal] could be possible’ (Kathimerini, March 28th 2007). According to the Greek press, in order to address the problem in the short term, the Pedagogical Institute sent schools special CD-ROMS containing information omitted by the book, for example about the role of the Church and the heroes of 1821, the destruction of Smyrna and the ‘Greek epic of 1940’ (in.gr, March 28th 2007).

In addition, even though highly criticised, the reformed textbook still retains certain strong nationalist elements such as a portrayal of the unique traits of Greek national identity, a perception of the existence of the Greek nation since time immemorial and a portrayal of Turkey as the hostile ‘other’. Although the language is less emotional than some of the books discussed above, the gist is still the same: the Greeks are enabled to retain the distinct features of their national identity by ‘retaining their customs, religion and language, retaining that is, their identity’17 (Repousi et al, 2006: 36). There remains thus a presentation of the Greek nation as perennial. Resistance movements against the Empire are termed as ‘liberation visions’ and the Greeks under Ottoman rule as still termed as ‘the enslaved’18 (Repousi et al, 2006: 36). This maintains to a certain degree the ‘us’-‘them’ distinction between the Greeks and the Turkish conquerors and help promote the Turks as a threat to Greek national identity. The connection with land is retained, especially the right of the Greek nation to Constantinople, therefore portraying irredentism as an ideal of liberty and equality: ‘They [liberation visions] are contained in the legends and the laments for the sacking of Constantinople and its retrieval. At the end of the 18th Century, these visions become more specific and are connected with the ideas of liberty and human equality’19 (Repousi, et al, 2006: 34). The Greek revolution of 1821 is termed as the ‘Great Revolution’ and the ‘Struggle for liberation’. The role of the Church in the movement is not omitted altogether. It is stressed that the ‘enslaved Greeks’ are enabled to retain their language and religion because largely because of the privileged position of the Patriarchate (Repousi et al, 2006: 36); and that Clerics were among those who played a role in the independence movement, Bishop Germanos included and his portrait is depicted on page 50. The negative role played by the Patriarchate during the revolution is also omitted, leaving a gap which can be filled either by history textbooks at later stages which have not

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17 Κατά την περίοδο της ζενής κυριαρχίας οι ιτοδούλοι ελληνικοί πληθυσμοί διατηρούσαν πόλα απο τη ηθική και τα εθήμα, τη θρησκεία και τη γλώσσα τους, διατηρούσαν δηλαδή την ταυτότητά τους.
18 Ιτοδούλοι
19 Περιέχοντας κυρίως στους Θρησκούς και στους Θρησκούς για την αλώση της Κωνσταντινουπολίτης και την επανάσταση της. Στα τέλη του 18ου αιώνα, τα οράματα αυτά γίνονται πιο συγκεκριμένα και συνδέονται με τις ιδέες της ελευθερίας και της ισότητας των ανθρώπων.
been reformed, or by the teachers and parents, who having been educated by the previous system will still transmit those values to their children/pupils. Finally, the link between religion and the newly established Greek State is retained. Among various extracts from important primary sources, is the declaration and first Constitution of the Greek State at Epidaurus on January 1st 1822:

\[
\text{In the name of the Holy and indivisible Trinity}
\]

\[
The \text{Greek Nation, which has been under horrid Ottoman rule, witnessed by its legal representatives who have gathered herein a national committee, before god and men, proclaims today its political existence and independence}^{20}\ (\text{Repousi, et al, 2006: 49})
\]

The Irish case provides an interesting contrast in regards to revisionist historiography and its resonance. Having completed his study of political opinion in Ireland in the early 1960’s, Biever concluded that ‘we have indicated our own hypothesis that the power struggle in Irish Catholicism is not found between clergy and laity but between clergy and laity against the intellectual ‘new breed’. In our opinion they represent the greatest challenge which Irish Catholicism will have to face in the next decade’ (Biever quoted in Garvin, 2004: 203).

Garvin believes Biever to be a ‘modern day Cassandra’; indeed forty years later the bulk of Irish historiography is revisionist, challenging traditional perceptions of Irish nationalism and the role of the Catholic Church. A consensus is emerging to leave behind De Valera’s Ireland and commit to pluralism, something which stands in sharp contrast to the inflexible character of Irish Catholicism.

Titles such as V. Twomey’s *The End of Irish Catholicism?* (2003), or L. Fuller’s *Irish Catholicism since the 1950’s: The undoing of a Culture* (2004), observing the decline of the power and role of the Catholic Church are particularly influential in contemporary Ireland. There is a widespread tendency in historiography to question the Church and the power of Irish Catholicism and talk about an impending secularisation of Irish politics. ‘Is Ireland secularising?’ is a common question with which academics working on Ireland are preoccupied. Works such as B. Girvin’s *From Union to Union: Nationalism, Democracy and Religion in Ireland* (2002), T. Inglis’ *Moral Monopoly: The Rise and Fall of the Catholic Church in Modern Ireland* (1997) and T. Garvin’s *Preventing the Future: Why

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20 Εν ονοματί της θείας και αδαρετού τριάδος. Τό Ελληνικόν Εθνός, τό η ύπο φθιγμή Οθωμανικήν δυναστείαν, [...] κηρύσσει ομοιόν διά των νομίμων παραστάτων του, εάν εκκλησίαν συντήρησεν συνέλευσιν, ενών Θεόν και ανθρώπων την πολιτική αυτού υπαρξήν και ενεργίαν.
Ireland was so poor for so long (2004) deal with the modernisation process Ireland has undergone and analyse the declining role of the Church in this new context. In Greece there is no similar successful historiography. The ‘end of Greek Orthodoxy’ is simply an unheard of phenomenon.

8. **Commemorations: Memories of War and Key Historical Events**

National identity could not live on without remembering. As McBride makes clear, memory is vital for the preservation of national identity. But memory is not infallible; it can be selective, interpret history in its own way, and to paraphrase McBride, memory can make history itself. 21 In effect, ‘what we choose to remember is dictated by our contemporary concerns’ (McBride, 2001: 6).

The official narrative reproduced in the educational field which perceives national identity and religion as inseparable is very much in line with the discourse promoted in other State-sponsored institutions, such as museums, and also the official discourse of the Orthodox Church of Greece. For example, upon entering the war museum of Athens, one is immediately encountered by a massive painting depicting the Bishop of Patra Germanos blessing the commencement of the revolutionary movement. The same painting features in the 1991 Greek history textbook (Sfyroeras, 1991:161). The prominent image of overwhelming size is impossible to miss. And the imagery it puts forward is very important. ‘Modern memory’, as Nora observes, ‘is above all archival. It relies entirely on the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the image’ (Gillis quoting Nora, 1994: 15). The fact that this is situated at the entrance of the war museum effectively links Greece’s defence to religion and Orthodox priests reinforcing the view that the maintenance of Orthodoxy is paramount for the survival of the Greek nation especially during times of threat and war.

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21 According to McBride for example, the anniversaries in the republic of Ireland recently have an uncanny way of making history themselves (McBride, 2001:4)
The National History Museum reinforces a similar narrative. According to the museum's official website,

The period after the breakdown of the Byzantine Empire and the progressive subordination of all Greeks to foreign rule comprises a harsh and trying period, but also signals the beginning of Modern Greek History.... The first two centuries of Turkish occupation (16th-17th) during which the Franks and Venetians fought with the Ottoman Empire for rule of the Greek area, were crucial to the Greek nation.... From the middle of the 18th century till the end of the pre-
Revolutionary years, the subjugated Greek nation, bound together by religion, language and tradition, managed to survive (http://www.culture.gr/4/42/421/42103/42103e/42103e3.html).

Also note the opening passage, entitled ‘The History of the Greek flag’, in a book entitled ‘Flags of Liberty’, written by I.K Mazarakis-Ainian and published by the ‘Historical and National Company of Greece’ in 1996 on behalf of the National Historical Museum of Athens, and is on sale at the museum shop at the time of writing (April 2007). The passage is rich in bibliographical references from distinguished Greek historians. It confirms exactly what is written in the school textbooks.

The history of the Greek flag commences in the years of the sacking [of Constantinople] together with desires of enslaved Hellenism for liberty, is formulated during the years of revolution and continues to the present day. One of our first folk songs, ‘The Lament for Constantinople’, which expresses popular sentiments, makes reference to the flag as the symbol of the struggle for liberation from the yoke. “Σημαδί μεγά φλαμπουρο, Σταυρον τον του Κυριου, και τοτε να συγκλίνατι οι εσω με τους εξω, να γινει μουρτος μοχθήρος, ως οι πολλοι το λεγουν.” It only takes one flag with the symbol of the cross to be raised, and all will unite with revolutionary force for the attainment of liberty. In the saddest hours of its existence Hellenism envisaged the resurrection of the Genos and within its hours of sombre slavery the thought of the enslaved turned to the Cross and it is with the cross that the anonymous poet envisaged the revolutionary flag of the nation (Mazarakis-Ainian, 1996: VII- VIII).

It is interesting that non-State sponsored museums, such as the Benaki museum also tell the same story. According to the ‘Guide to the Benaki Museum’, by Angelos Delivorrias, for sale in the museum, shop in 2006 ‘In 1821, after 400 years of subjugation and repeated ill-fated insurrections, the Greeks tried once again to cast off the Ottoman yoke...The heroic deeds of the Greek war of independence enriched the history of mankind with remarkable examples of self-sacrifice, self awareness and self-respect’ (Delivorrias, 2006: 174).
In Ireland, the commemoration of key historical events has been marked by a profound change. According to McBride, ‘Our understanding of such key moments as the 1798 rebellion, the Famine and the Great War is not static, but has been shaped by a complex interaction of individual actors, cultural patterns, social forces and technological developments.’ (McBride, 2001:4) The Catholic element is absent in the commemorations of the 1916 Easter rising and the war of independence in Irish museums. Nationalism is portrayed largely a secular force, while the conciliatory tone is evident. The pictures and paintings on display are secular and there is no emphasis on the role of clergy or religious symbols in the independence struggle. In its account of the Easter Rising, ‘The Road to Freedom’ published in 1993 on behalf of the National Museum of Ireland, depicts pictures such as a British Army Barricade in Dublin, the Famous ‘Birth of the Republic’ by Walter Paget and the surrender of Patrick Pearse. The same applies to the portrayal of the war of independence: pictures do not depict religious figures fighting for Irish emancipation. They mainly include photographs showing the presence of British troops in Dublin. Although Britain is presented as a colonial power, and independence is portrayed as supreme value, there is no hostile narrative demonising Britain in a manner similar to Greece’s hostility towards Turkey. The terminology used to describe British Rule does not include words such as ‘slavery’ or ‘dark ages’ nor are the Irish under Britain described as the ‘enslaved’

All commemoration is tainted by politics, as Fitzpatrick notes (Fitzpatrick in McBride, 2001:203) Commemorations have to meet political realities and reconciliation; thus partisan commemoration is being seen as largely problematic in Ireland, especially as Fitzpatrick puts it ‘no event or hero seemed capable of incorporating all factions in common veneration’ (Fitzpatrick in McBride, 2001:187). Recent commemorations of past events with nationalist connotations in Ireland have reflected a process which Boyce refers to as ‘burying Ireland’s ghosts’ (Boyce in McBride, 2001:270). This phenomenon is a reflection of the fact that Irish nationalism is changing its focus: nationalist aspirations have not disappeared; they have evolved. Nationalism has different goals and different priorities. As Girvin notes, ‘large proportions of Irish public opinion consider themselves to be nationalists and believed that Irish unity is something to hope for (Girvin quoted in McBride, 2001: 268).

A good example is the 200 year anniversary of the 1798 Rebellion. According to Foster, 1798 was repackaged to reflect the demands of the current political scene including the
need to forge better relations with Britain and secure the peace process with Northern Ireland. As a result, Foster notes, ‘instead of stridently remembering ’98 as a festival of faith and fatherland (one faith one fatherland), the Irish were enjoined to embrace ’98 as a confluence of traditions in a pluralist, secular space’ (Foster in McBride, 2001: 85). Foster quotes a number of Irish politicians during the mid-1990’s to illustrate that such attempts constitute a consensus widely accepted by Irish political actors. For example, Avril Doyle, a Fine Gael Minister declared in 1995: ‘Firstly we must discard the now discredited sectarian version of ’98 which was merely a polemical post-rebellion falsification. Secondly we must stress the modernity of the United Irish project, its forward looking, democratic dimension, and abandon the outdated agrarian or peasant interpretation. Thirdly, we must emphasise the essential unity of the 1798 insurrection. What happened in Wexford was a piece of what happened in Antrim and Down (Doyle quoted in Foster in McBride, 2001: 88). A few years later, a Fianna Fail politician delivered an almost identical speech. The message is the same therefore, regardless of the party: it is in Ireland’s best interest to put forward a programme of negotiation and reconciliation. And in order to achieve this, it is necessary to eliminate references and images of sectarianism in commemorative events. The past is re-shaped to reflect these priorities. Hence, as foster argues, in the 200 year anniversary of 1798 a different picture was presented, one according to which ‘the united Irishmen were trying to negotiate a political structure here and with Britain, capable of representing Irish people in all their inherited complexities and allegiances; the peace process today is trying to do the same thing’ (Foster in McBride, 2001: 85). According to Twomey, ‘there is little popular devotion either to the beatified martyrs or the rest of the 259 men and women who gave their lives for the faith in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries at those places associated with their lives and their heroic deaths. There are few visible memorials to recall the long period of the persecutions, apart from the Mass-rocks and holy wells, which today are often neglected. While impressive monuments to the Great Famine now grace the public spaces of our cities, there is nothing comparable to recall the heroic Christian witness of the Irish martyrs’ (Twomey, 2003: 45).

Similarly, the 2006 commemoration of the Easter Rising lacked a religious element. As Kibedr argues,
Somme as well as that of Easter 1916. Some day soon, they may commemorate both events at a single ceremony. Arch-traditionalists may feel scandalised by this national genius for adaptation; and it may well be that many communities are now as traumatised by the loss of religious practice as once they were by the loss of the social codings that went with being Irish’ (Declan Kiberd, Irish times, October 3rd, 2006).

9. Conclusion: Assessing the Impact of Modernisation and Levels of External Threat Perceptions on Official Discourse

The main focus of this chapter has been on the ways in which the Church and religion are portrayed through official State discourse with prime emphasis placed on the education system but also on commemoration. The chapter has illustrated that, as a result of the interaction between a high degree of Church obstruction of the modernisation process on the one hand, and declining external threat perceptions on the other, the Catholic Church is losing its control over the education field in Ireland. Precisely because this control has been based on the maintenance of strict Catholic rules and regulations, this control is being increasingly and more fiercely resisted. In addition, because of the necessity to forge good relations with Britain, Irish textbooks have adopted a more conciliatory content that does not stress the role of Catholicism in the maintenance of Irish national identity. In Greece however, the more flexible Orthodox Church which places little emphasis on rules and regulations, combined with high external threat perceptions has been able to maintain its status as principal carrier of Greek national identity, mainly through the content of history school textbooks and not religious education per se. The discourse put forward in terms of the way key historical events are commemorated is also crucial in the understanding of the important distinction between the Greek and Irish cases. Declining external threat perceptions on the one hand, and a discredited moralising Church on the other have resulted in, generally speaking, a much more conciliatory type of commemoration in Ireland. But in Greece, high external threat perceptions and the image of the Church as main defender of national identity permit the continuation of a far more religiously nationalistic narrative in commemoration.
Chapter 6
Church Discourse and Nationalist Mobilisation

What is it that makes a religious leader more popular than all other famous Greeks-politicians, artists, athletes? It is simply the fact that he is not religious.¹


1. Introduction

Chapter 5 has focused on official State discourse and the narrative it puts forward in terms of Church, State and nation. The following chapter focuses on Church discourse, and the ways modernisation on the one hand and threat perceptions on the other shape the narrative put forward by the official Church. It is through its discourse that a Church attempts to ensure legitimacy and popular support, and responds to secularising tendencies in order to safeguard its political salience. According to Dobbelaere, secularisation is not a mechanical process, but rather allows for religious groups to react (Hornsby-Smith, 1994: 267). This chapter will seek to identify the ways in which the dominant Church is reacting against secularising processes in Greece and Ireland and establish the reasons why the former is proving much more successful than the latter in this task.

It intends to argue that the Greek Orthodox Church has been more successful than the Irish Church for two reasons. Firstly, because it has been more flexible and adaptable as the modernisation process has developed. Although the Church's discourse does contain certain conservative elements on issues of morality, for example homosexuality, it is not so adamant on these as far as State policy or the law are concerned. Secondly, it links religion primarily to the nation thus directly appealing to the Greek's sense of national belonging. With its less strict focus on morality it is better able to use high external threat perceptions in its favour by linking its discourse explicitly to the bond between Greek national identity and Orthodoxy. The aim is to ensure that even those who are not particularly religious or moralistic would support the Church out of fear of their nation losing its distinct identity. The Greek Church's subordination to the State assists its position: rather than in direct confrontation - like the Irish Church- the Greek Orthodox

¹ Τι είναι αυτό που κάνει εναν θρησκευτικό ηγέτη να ξεπερνάει σε δημοτικότητα όλως τους διαστήμους ελληνες - πολιτικούς, αθλητές, καλλιτεχνες; Μα απλούστατα το γέγονος ότι δεν είναι θρησκευτικός.
Church complies to the demands of the State so scandals and cases of corruption in the Church have less long-term significant consequences. Official Church discourse, disseminated in publications, speeches of clergy members and most importantly of its charismatic Archbishop, relies very heavily on the link between Orthodoxy and the Greek nation and constantly stresses the perils of extinction facing the Greek nation, should the latter lose its bond with the Orthodox faith. In any political discussion which challenges the role of the Church, the latter tends to defend itself and its position by warning that the Greek nation will soon perish without Orthodoxy, the prime guardian of its identity.

The Irish Catholic Church on the other hand, because of its strict legalistic emphasis on morality has alienated a large proportion of its popular support. Given the low external threat perceptions in Ireland, and the Church’s identification with a particular type of isolationist nationalism which is now largely discredited, it is unable to evoke and mobilise the people around the link between Irishness and Catholicism. The need to encourage the peace process in Northern Ireland exacerbates this result. Its discourse remains therefore largely based on a religious/moralistic rather than nationalist context. Official Church discourse emphasises the need to be a good Catholic in order to be a moral member of society and specifies a particular framework of rules on how to attain a moral and virtuous life. It relies primarily on morality and virtue, and although Catholicism and Irish national identity are perceived by the Irish to be interlinked, Church discourse seldom relies on this to defend its position in times of crisis or otherwise.

By comparing the discourses of the two Churches this chapter attempts to assess the above proposition, with particular focus on publications, speeches from members of the clergy, interviews and newspaper articles. In this context, it will attempt to compare the way in which the two Churches have reacted to periods of crises and confrontation with the State, including the Church scandals that broke out in Ireland (early 1990’s) and Greece (2005). In the case of the Greek Church, through the pursuit of a highly nationalist, populist discourse which puts forward an ethnic election myth narrative, the Charismatic personality of Archbishop Christodoulos is utilising Greece’s high external threat perceptions to evoke a sense of ‘choseness’ of the Greek people. Through this it is proving better able to successfully mobilise the population in its favour and overcome the consequences of such crises, which could otherwise prove dire for the Church. The
Irish Church on the other hand, given the supra-national character of Irish Catholicism, declining external threat perceptions and related the fact that its discourse is grounded primarily on an extensive apparatus of moral control, is failing to mobilise the people around its cause and is losing ground at times of crises and confrontations with the State.

2. **Greece: Church, Nation and National Destiny**

Greece's high levels of external threat perceptions lie at the core of the Church's discourse as they assist its presentation of the Greek nation and its core defining values as imperilled and vulnerable to erosion from hostile external forces. The Church heightens such fears. As Smith argues, 'times of crisis when national independence appears to be under threat...produce more aggressive and chiliastic assertions of the national mission and evoke more powerful images of national exclusiveness and ethnic election' (Smith, 1999:348). Support is attempted through 'an emphasis on the national mission as the common, unified interest of the people especially at times of threat or crisis, for example, when a nation is under direct military threat' (Canovan, 1981: 263).

Smith identifies four aspects of these election myths which are relevant to their relationships with intense nationalisms:

a) Confer on the chosen a sense of their moral superiority over outsiders, reinforcing their ethnocentrism. Religious myths of ethnic election heighten that sense of superiority. Belief in inward superiority underpins the capacity for endurance and self-renewal.

b) Doctrine of spiritual liberation: the community's special destiny will see a radical reversal of its hitherto lowly or marginal status.

c) Help draw and reinforce a strict boundary between the ethno-religious community and its neighbours (or conquerors). They help segregate the chosen community from a profane and alien world thereby turning the elect in upon themselves and forcing them to rely even more fully on their own spiritual resources.

d) Mobilisation: leaders and movements ought to tap the energies that lie within. All the people who make up the community are equally required to engage in the sacred task and obey the divine laws, lest the communal mission fail and its elect status be withdrawn (Smith, 1999: 336).

Smith's four aspects of election myths are central to the way the Greek Orthodox Church and the members of its hierarchy portray the Greek nation. There is constant
reference to the superiority of the Greek nation in terms of outsiders, especially Greece’s neighbours (i.e. Turkey, the Balkans and the EU). There is also systematic emphasis on Greece’s special destiny: Greece is weak at the moment because it is being exploited by alien exploitative powers, such as the US, Turkey and the EU, but it is expected to attain greatness again, as in the past, through its resistance to these powers. There is a profound reinforcement of the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, especially in regards to Turkey towards which in particular the Archbishop discourse is hostile and polemical. And there is an attempt for populist mobilisation. According to Stavrakakis (2002), the Greek Orthodox Church justifies its political involvement through constant reference to the people and its unity and is thus premised on a particular understanding of the Church’s role within society which is essentially binding. But as the Church, and especially Christodoulou, equates the people with the nation, these populist elements are grounded on a highly nationalistic narrative which in turn stresses notions of ethnic election and national destiny. Simply put, the primary interest of the whole of the Greek people is to assert and maintain its distinct religious identity.

This is particularly true since the election of Christodoulou to the post of Archbishop of Athens and all of Greece, a period which has often been characterised as the return of the Church. Christodoulou was elected by the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece in 1998. His leadership commenced with the announcement of his intentions to follow a reformist policy and modernise the Church as well as improve relations with other Orthodox groupings. The period of his ecclesiastical leadership has been characterised by a series of crises and confrontations, including the identity cards issue (2000-2001), disagreements surrounding the pope’s visit to Greece (2001), the dispute between the Orthodox Church of Greece and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople over the jurisdiction of new lands² and the scandals surrounding the Greek Orthodox Church which broke out in February 2005. This period has also been characterised by a strengthening of the political position of the Orthodox Church of Greece, an increase in Church attendance (see introduction), increasing popularity of the archbishop in the polls (excluding a short period following the February 2005 scandals) and mass popular mobilisations during the Identity Cards Issue.

As Dimou argues,

² A term used to describe those areas which became part of the Greek State in 1913 and which, unlike the rest of Greece fall under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, including Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace and the Northern Aegean islands.
The Archbishop is evidently taking advantage of one of the particularities of the Greek people: namely, the fact the fact that they do not see their religion as an approach towards the divine element, not even as a system of moral rules. They see it mainly as an element of their national identity. Metaphysical, theological and moral elements lose ground in the consciousness of most [Greeks] to tradition and history. This is why it is possible to encounter individuals who have fought for Orthodoxy but who are atheists or agnostics in their personal lives...it is this 'national' religion- and not the Christian one- that Archbishop Christodoulos represents. His sermons deal far more with national than religious matters. It is evident that his role model is not the humble shepherd but the ethnarch\footnote{Nikos Dimou quoted in Vassilakis, 2006: 23-24}.

According to Stavrakakis, what is characteristic about Christodoulos’ discourse is his constant emphasis on the Greek people as ‘chosen, the people of God’ (Stavrakakis, 2002:29). The populist aspect of his discourse is evident in his use of language and vocabulary, specifically his highly emotional choice of linguistic expression and style; and more broadly, in his wider mode of expression, including speech, writing, behaviour, movement and gestures.

The hierarchy of the Greek Orthodox Church appears particularly organised and active in its attempts to mobilise the people in its favour by putting forward this particular type of nationalistic narrative which stresses ethnic election and places a systematic emphasis on the link between nation and Orthodoxy. The Church not only perceives its role to be one of safeguarding the nation in addition to being purely religious, but through a systematic organisation attempts to spread this role.

Firstly, it is very much in line with the official discourse put forward in the education system, relying primarily on the link between religion and national identity. In addition, large numbers of Christodoulos sermons and speeches are easily spread among the people as they are broadcast on national television and printed in newspapers; the
Athens and Thessaloniki rallies on the identity cards issue in June 2000 were attended by thousands of people and speech delivered by the Archbishop was broadcasted live. Christodoulos is the most popular Greek personality; according to a poll by metronanalysis, in December 2006 his popularity ranked 63.4%, higher than any Greek political leader. The narrative is also put forward through the Orthodox Church of Greece’s Department of Cultural Projects and the Internet (www.artopos.gr) which maintains various websites, publishes books and two news-letters and organises seminars, exhibitions and conferences, all centred around the inter-relation between Greek culture and Orthodoxy. In addition, the ‘official website of the Church of Greece’ (www.ecclesia.gr) which not only provides a vast amount of information on the Church, such as information on the Holy Synod, the Archbishop and the Archdioceses, but is also replete with references on the Church’s historical role as the carrier of Greek national identity, especially through posting online the Archbishop’s speeches and sermons. A further inter-related website (www.myriobiblos.gr) serves as an online library and includes a variety of academic collections, literature, art all centred around Orthodoxy.

The following section examines the narrative and the ethnic election myths it puts forward through an analysis of articles, speeches and publications, especially by Christodoulos. The discourse has both a historical and contemporary focus. Historically, there is an emphasis on events and people whose role is considered to be pivotal in the history of the Greek nation, including the Greek independence movement, Orthodox ethno-martyrs, the double character of religious and national days, and the Asia Minor disaster. In terms of contemporary events, emphasis is placed on the threats facing Greek national identity today, including Europe, the US, globalisation, Israel and Turkey.

1. **Historical Focus**

The Greek Struggle for Independence

Under the ‘homage’ sub-section of the Church’s online library (www.myriobiblos.gr) is a section entitled ‘25 March 1821’ which focuses on the Greek national self-determination movement and the role played Orthodoxy. By drawing together the works of prominent Greek writers, such as Aristotelis Valaoritis and also the memoirs of various revolutionary leaders, such as Kolokotronis, Ypsilantis and Botsaris, this section
constitutes an attempt to widen public knowledge of the role of religion in the Greek struggle for independence and tackle the issue of an emerging secularising trend in Greek academic historiography. Publishing such works on the internet essentially entails targeting wider audiences and bringing to light more obscure academic works which are difficult for the public to access.

Titles are indicative: 'Religious Sentiment as the Source of the Struggle' by Ainianos, the Revolutionary Declaration by Botsaris and Tzavellas entitled ‘The Holy Flag of the Cross is Waving’, A Revolutionary Declaration entitled ‘A Flag of Liberty and a Symbol of the Cross’, the Independence Declaration of the 3rd National Assembly of the independent Greek State entitled ‘Ahead with the Cross’, ‘The Holy Clergy never Ceased its Contribution’ by Kastorhis, and the famous poem ‘Free Besieged’ by Dionysios Solomos whose ‘Hymn to Liberty’ is the Greek national anthem. Through this, the Church is also tackling the question of whether the nationalism which inspired the Greek national self-determination movement was a secular one, based on the ideas of the Enlightenment rather than the Byzantine tradition. By bringing to light works by revolutionary leaders who according to some academics (Kitromilides, 1994) were secular nationalists, and for this reason came into conflict with the Patriarchate, the Church is attempting to illustrate that Greek nationalism at the time was informed by Orthodoxy and this is why there is clear reference to the religious element in these works, i.e. reference to the Cross, priests’ role in the movement, linking cross -religious symbol- and flag- symbol of secular nationalism and the independence of Greece. The homage section on the Greek independence movement also includes a special tribute section entitled ‘1821- The presence of Faith in the paintings of the Period of National Insurrection’. The aim of this sub-section is identical to the one mention above, only with reference to art. It brings together a large collection of paintings, the originals of which are currently situated in various museums in Greece and abroad, illustrating the role of Orthodoxy in the Greek struggle for independence.

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4 Το θρησκευτικόν αίσθημα πηγή του ογκώνος
5 Η ιερά σημαία του Σταυρού κυματίζει
6 Σημαία Ελευθερίας και Σύμβολον Τύμιον Σταυρού
7 Με τον Σταυρόν εμπρός
8 δεν ελέγχει προσφέρον πάντοτε ο ιερός κλήρος
9 Ελεύθεροι πολυορκημένοι
10 1821 – Η παρουσία της πίστης στη ζωγραφική της Εθνικότητας.
Clockwise, Image 6.1: A Lithograph of L. Lipparini's 'Bishop of Patra Germanos Raises the Flag of Independence at Kalavryta' (Benaki Museum, copy at Athens war Museum as shown in chapter 5). A lithograph depicting the exact same subject is also printed in the 2004 junior Greek history textbook (Sfyroeras, 1991:161); Image 6.2: 'The Oath at Agia Lavra', by T. Vryzakis (Benaki Museum); Image 6.3: 'The Martyrdom of Patriarch Gregorios 5th'.
The presence of religion is strikingly obvious in all the above depictions: for example 'The Oath at Agia Lavra' and 'Bishop of Patra Germanos Raises the Flag of Independence at Kalavryta' are clear references to the popular narrative whereby the Bishop of Patra, Germanos signalled the commencement of the Greek insurrection on March 25th 1821 by raising and blessing the flag of independence surrounded by armed warriors. Bishop Germanos is significant in Greek nationalist myths as his role is twofold, both as a religious figure and a prominent hero of the revolution.

There is a clear fusion between religion and nationalism in 'The oath of the members of the Filiki Etaeria' and 'Alexander Ypsilantis Raises the Flag of Revolution'. Most members of the Filiki Etaeria were revolutionary figures inspired and influenced by the secular ideas of Western European Enlightenment. Ypsilantis in particular came into direct confrontation with the patriarchate when the struggle for independence commenced, only to be excommunicated by Patriarch Gregory 5th. By including this painting in the collection the Church aims at illustrating that Orthodoxy remained integral to Greek nationalism and all heroes of the revolution. The overall picture presented here is that religion and Greek independence were inseparable: the movement emanated from religious and secular figures alike, members of the clergy were prominent revolutionaries.

The Greek revolution is often cited by members of the Greek Orthodox Church as the event which not only marks a cornerstone in Greek history, but also epitomises the spirit of the Greek people, characterised by religion, bravery, valour and a longing for freedom. In this vein, secular values such as liberty and national self-determination are fused with religion. An extract of a speech delivered by the Archbishop on July 1st, 2001, during a pilgrimage at the island of Psarra is indicative. Parts of the speech were broadcast on Greek television, while the entire text is published on the Church’s website:

Psarra is not [only] an island in the Aegean, it is a shrine of Hellenism. A shrine, on whose dark surface Liberty has found refuge, remembering the brave young men and decorating their hair with wreaths of glory.11 Here, the great religious figure is Konstantinos Kanaris12 from Psarra, who expressed the entire essence of the Greek spirit throughout the centuries

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11 Here the Archbishop is making explicit reference to Solomos’s poem “The Destruction of Psarra”, in which the personification of Glory wonders around the burned land studying the bodies of brave young men (“Pallikaria”) who fought and died in battle.
12 A hero of the Greek independence movement originating from the island of Psarra
in one single sentence, when he overcame his own fears about the future by telling himself, “you will die anyway” and making the sign of the cross marched to incinerate the Turkish presence in the Aegean. 13 (“What does 1821 mean for us today?” www.ecclesia.gr/greek/archbishop/ellinismos/psarra.html )

Note how, in the same speech, the symbol of the cross is often portrayed as representing not only Orthodox Christianity, but most importantly Greekness, freedom, independence and struggle against the ‘unjust yoke’ and ‘slavery’.

The great Sailor of Hydra, Andreas Miaoulis, commenced his every raid in the name of the Holy Cross. On his ‘Mars’ he had placed a large engraved wooden cross; the vertical inscription wrote: This Cross is the horror of the enemy; the horizontal inscription wrote: This Cross is a pillar for the faithful. 14 (“What does 1821 mean for us today?” www.ecclesia.gr/greek/archbishop/ellinismos/psarra.html , July 1st, 2001, during pilgrimage at the island of Psarra)

Ethno-Martyrs

The Church places extensive emphasis on the members of the lower clergy who fought and sometimes died in the Greek independence struggle. As in Greek history textbooks, such figures are as ethno-martyrs who fought and died for faith and fatherland:

Common clerics gathered the armed rebels in their parishes became their leaders and actively took part in the revolution. Some of them perished in the honourable battlefield, while others became martyrs in the hands of the Turks. And those who survived became impoverished after having donated all their assets to the Revolution. In the National Library Fighters Archives numerous works are saved that witness the contribution of the Orthodox clergy in ’21 and bear the signature of many prominent leaders. The ex Metropolitan of Limnos, Vasiliou Atesis, numbers 14 religious ethno-martyrs in the period 1821-1869’. And who can forget the brave men of our freedom, Athanasios Diakos (Alamana), Gregorios Dikaios-Papaflessas (Maniaki), the Monk Samuel (Kougi). And the large number of priests who actively took part in the Holy Struggle of our Nation, like Theodoritos, Bishop of Vrestheni, Porfyrios, Bishop of Arta, Theofilos, Bishop of Athens, Anthimos, Bishop of...
Elos, Isiah, Bishop of Salona, Joseph Bishop of Roga etc, who took part in the various phases of the Revolution. The Armed rebels of Ahaia, sworn by Bishop of Patra Germanos. The first wave of ethno-martyr priests includes ex-Bishop of Constantinople Cyrill, Gregory, Bishop of Derka, Eugene, Bishop of Aghialos, Archbishop of Cyprus Cyprian and the Bishops of Pafos, Kitio, Kyrmia. Usually they were beheaded or hanged' 15[www.i-m-patron.gr/news2/pros_to_laob 29.html].

In the same context of portraying religious figures as national heroes and ethno-martyrs, Archbishop Christodoulos' account of the Asia Minor catastrophe and the martyrdom of St. Chrysostomos of Smyrna is a pertinent example. It is interesting how the 'superiority' of the Greeks is contrasted against the 'inferiority' of the Turks (i.e. 'Parthenons they could not themselves build') and how the delineating marker between the virtuous and victimised 'us' and the expansionist, indiscriminately violent 'them' is projected:

The swords of Tsetes, Turkish soldiers, and the mob fiercely took it out on anything Greek. They burned down towns and villages, they pillaged their neighbours and friends, they tried to acquire by looting what they couldn't acquire with their minds and toil, and they incinerated the Parthenons they could not themselves build. And while the terror spread above the once cosmopolitan nymph of Ionia, Smyrna, and the political authorities deserted it, and while refugees left it without having a destination, the clergy of Ionia remained loyal to the bloody tradition of the Greek clergy. Priests and despotis were sacrificed as neo-martyrs. They remained, till the final moment, the good shepherds of a people that were deserted by all at their most crucial hour'.16

15 οι απλοί κληρικοί συγκροτήρισαν στις ενορίες τους δύσπις σώματα, τέθηκαν επίκεφαλής τους και έλαβαν ενεργό μέρος στην εξέγερση. Αλλά από αυτούς άρχισαν την τελευταία τους ποιη στο πεδίο της τιμής και άλλοι μαρτύρησαν στα χέρια των Τούρκων. Κι όσοι επιδίωκαν πέταγαν έχοντα δώσει όλη την περιουσία τους στην Επανάσταση. Στο Αρχείο Αγιωσπάντα της Εθνικής Βιβλιοθήκης σαύριζονται πολλά έργα που μαρτυρούν τη συμβολή του Ορθόδοξου κληρου και μοναχοσμού στο Εκκοσένα και υπογράφονται από κορυφαίους και άλλους οπλαρχηγούς. Σε 14 άρθροι ο Μητροπολίτης πρώτη Άρην Βασίλειος Γ. Ατέστη τους εθνομαρτύρες αρχηγείς της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος από το 1821-1869. Και ποιος μπορεί να λημονήσει τα προσωπικά της λειτουργίας μας, τον Αθανασίο Διάκο (Αλαμάνα), τον Γρηγόριο Δικαιο - Παταψέλλας (Μανάκι), τον καλότερο Σαμουήλ (Κουλάκι). Και ακόμη πλήθος άριστων ερωμενών που έδρασαν στον Ιερό Αγάνα του Εθνικού μας, όπως ο Βρεσθένης Θεοδάτης, ο Αρτης Πορφύριος, ο Αθηνάν Θεόδωρος, ο Ξένων Ανθός, ο Σαλαίος Χατζής, ο Ρουγάν Ιωσήφ κ.α., οι οποίοι έλαβαν μέρος στις διάφορες φάσεις της Επανάστασης. Τους οπλαρχηγούς της Αχαίας άρχισε ο Παύλους Πατρόν Γερμανός. Στην πρώτη ομάδα εθνομαρτύρων αρχηγείς ανήκε το πρώτο Κονσταντινουπόλεως Κυριλλός, ο Δέρκαν Γρηγόριος, ο Αγγελός Ευάγγελος, ο Αρχιπαστώρος Κύπρου Κυριακός, ο επίκοπος Πάφου, Κίδιου, Κυπριανός, οι αποκεφαλίστηκαν ή τους κρέμασαν.

16 Τα έργα των Τσετσών και των Τούρκων στρατιωτικών άλλα και του διάχων έφεσαν με άγριότητα πάνω στο κάθε το Ελληνικό. Καίνε τις πόλεις και τα χωριά, διασπορεύοντας τους έκανε χάθες γητόνες και ψυχίσς τους, βγάζαν τα άκωδημένα τους, προσπαθούν να κερδίσουν διαρροώντας δ.τ.δεν μπόρεσαν να κερδίσουν με τα μυκα και τον ιδρότα τους πυρπολούντας τους νέους Παρθένους που πότε δεν μπόρεσαν οι ίδιοι να κτίσουν. Και ενώ ο τρόμος από τις δυσιστοίς φήμες επλήνεται πάνω από την έλλειπο κοσμοπολιτική νόμιμη της Ιανίας, τη Σμύρνη, κι ενώ οι πολιτικές αρχές την έχουν εγκαταλείψει, κι ενώ τα καρδαβιά των προσφόγγων ήλμο και καταφαίνοντας χωρίς προορισμό, το ράσο της Ιανίας μένει πιστό.
old Chrysostomos Kalafatis, the Messiah of Asia Minor Hellenism, the charismatic evangelist of faith and salvation witnessed the worst of deaths. At the time of the slaughter, Chrysostomos refused the allies' suggestions to leave and save himself. His sacred Greek soul prompted him to remain till the end close to the people he loved 24 (To Μαρτύριον του Άγιου Χρυσοστόμου Σιμόνης, 1/1/2001, http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/archbishop/default.asp?id=52&what_main=1&what_sub=4&lang=gr&archbishop_heading=Ελληνισμός).

The Legacy of the Greek Struggle for Independence: Nation and Orthodoxy

In our ‘Our Lady of Faith and of Greece’ 18, a speech delivered by the Archbishop on March 24th 2001, the latter points to the link between Orthodoxy and the Greek nation as a legacy of the Greek independence struggle. He does so through an explicit reference to the religious and national character of the annual commemorations held on March 25th, which is the date marking both the Annunciation of Our Lady and the anniversary of the commencement of the Greek national self-determination movement:

With its familiar twofold character this grand celebration of the Annunciation of our Lady and the anniversary of the re-birth of our Nation has closed tonight. Therefore, the character of our celebration tonight is both religious and national and this is how all Greeks understand it as Orthodox Greece is celebrating its religious and national commemoration....But, what happened there, at Agia Lavra in Kalavryta 19 was without exaggeration a miracle of those people’s faith. They carried their arms in one hand and the Cross on the other, and they carried within their hearts their unshaken faith in the right of their struggle and the help of God. Theodores Kolotronis 20, the pillar of our liberty, was correct in saying that God sealed the liberty of Greece with His signature and will not take His signature back. He [Kolokotronis], also expressing the views of other fighters, told school children in Plaka after our liberation: ‘when we lifted our arms we exclaimed firstly

στη ματωμένη παράδοση του ἕλληνικού ράσου. Ιερείς καὶ δεσποτάδες θυσίαζονται ως νεκράρτυρες. Παραμένουν, ως την τελευταία στιγμή, οί καλοί ποιμένες ένος λαού, πού έγκαταλείφθηκαν ἀπ' ολίους, την κρίσιμη òρα. 24 Τέλος, ὁ Μητροπολίτης Σιμόνης, ὁ σφαγεντικὸς Χρυσόστομος Καλαφάτης, ὁ Μεσσιάς τοῦ Μικρασιατικοῦ Ἕλληνισμοῦ, ὁ χαρονομητικός ἐκκλησίας Εὐαγγελιστὴς τῆς Πίστεως καὶ τῆς Λάομετος, καὶ ὁ άκαθάρτος του εἶναι ὁ φιλοτέτορος òραν. Την òρα τῆς σφαγής ὁ Χρυσόστομος ἀπαντᾷ ἄριστα στίς νοθείας τῶν συμμάχων, νά οὔτε καί νά γλείτσει. Η άγια ἕλληνική ψυχή του, τὸν παρωθεῖ νά παραμένει, ως τὸ τέλος, κοντά στὸ λαό πού ἀγάπησε.

17 Η Παναγία τῆς πίστεως καὶ τῆς Ελλάδος
18 Here the Archbishop is making reference to the event that allegedly marked the beginning of the Greek independence movement, namely the raising and blessing of the Greek flag by Bishop of Patra Germanos at the monastery of Agia Lavra on March 25th 1821
20 A hero of the Greek Independence movement, to which here the Archbishop is attributing both national and religious significance
The interrelatedness between Orthodoxy and the Greek national identity as a legacy of Ottoman rule and the self-determination movement is also stressed in a website maintained by the Diocese of Patra (www.i-m-patron.gr). Under a section entitled ‘To the People’ and written in bold capital letters, is an article ‘Our Greek Orthodox Identity and the 1821 Revolution’ (www.i-m-patron.gr/news2/pros_to_lao_29.html). Written in a highly emotional language, but at the same time quoting academic and well-regarded references, the article clearly contains election myths, linking religion to Greek national identity and stressing the perennial nature of the Greek nation and its special destiny. This article, which commences with the fall of Constantinople in 1204 by the Franks and ends with the Greek national self-determination movement of 1821, is a historical description of what it considers to constitute Hellenism in captivity. There is a common theme of stressing the role of Orthodoxy throughout those years, by describing the role of the clergy in educating the people, the role of members of the clergy in various independence movements which broke out during the period 1585-1821, and finally the role of members of the clergy in the 1821 revolution. So, when the Nation was liberated and its Constitutions were drafted, they all began, as indeed the current one, in the Name of the holy and Indivisible Trinity. This was, and this is, the faith and the power of the Greek people, Orthodoxy, the ark of its salvation and saviour of the Genos, a private factor in the majority of Greek people’s lives and a significant element of their consciousness and identity. As the late Fotis Kontoglou wrote:

In this land, Orthodoxy and Greece go together (www.i-m-patron.gr/news2/pros_to_lao_29.html).

21 Με το γνωστό, διπλά της χαρακτήρα, ανεξάλειπτο υπόψει και ευχέται και αύριο, αγαπητοί Χριστιανοί, η μεγάλη εορτή και επέτειος του Ευαγγελισμού της Θεοτόκου και της εθνικής μας παλινγενεσίας. Θρησκευτικές, λοιπόν, και εθνικός ο χαρακτήρας της αποφυγής εορτής και έτσι τον θέαμα γνωρίζει ο κοινός εσθήτας καθώς η Ορθόδοξη Ελλάδα εορτάζει και την θρησκευτική και την εθνική αυτή πανήγυρη....Αλλά, όμως, εκείνο το σπέρμα εκεί, στην Άγια Λαόδη του Καλαβρύτου, κατά την 25η Μαρτίου του 1821, χορεύει υπερβολή, νομιστά ένα θαύμα της πίστεως των ανθρώπων εκείνων. Εκκινήσαν και πήραν τα όπλα με το ένα χέρι, κρατώντας με το άλλο χέρι τον Τίμιο Σταυρό και έχοντας μέσα στην κορδέλα τους ακράδαντη την πίστη για το δίκαιο του αγώνα τους και για την βοήθειά τους εκ μέρους της Θεοτόκου. Είχε δίκιο ο μεγάλος πρόμαχος της ελευθερίας μας, ο Θεόδωρος Κολοκοτρώνης, με την θυμολογία απέκρυψε τον, να λέει ότι ο Θεός υπέγραψε την ελευθερία της Ελλάδος και δεν παίρνει πίσω την υπογραφή Του. Αυτός ο ιδίως, εκφράζοντας και άλλους αγανακτές, έλεγε στα σκάλια του Γυμνασίου της Πλάκας μετά από την εθνική μας απελευθέρωση: "Εμείς ήταν πάντα τα όπλα, είσαι πρώτα Υπέρ Πιστευώς και επίσης Υπέρ Πατρίδος".

22 Ετσι, όταν το Εθνός απελευθερώθηκε και συντάχθηκαν τα Συντάγματά του, χρησίμαθα άλλα, όπως άλλωστε και το σημερινό, με επίκληση της Αγίας και Αδιαίρετου και Ομοούσιου Τριάδος. Αυτή υπήρξε
The use of a highly emotional language is interesting here, as are the populist elements in the reference to the Greek people, and the capitalisation of the word ‘Nation’.

20th Century Ottoman Empire and the Asia Minor Disaster

An excellent example of Archbishop Christodoulos’ nationalistic, highly emotional and polemic rhetoric attempting to evoke nationalistic sentiments against not only hostile Turkey, but also the ‘inferior’ Western powers is his description of Ottoman rule in Smyrna and the ‘Asia Minor Disaster’.

When we were children, we never read fairy tales with evil witches and terrible dragons, good fairies and brave princes. Our heroine mothers, deep in their tears, and their pain of refuge would narrate instead tragic stories and tales. For us, the evil witches and terrible dragons were the Tsetes, Kemal, the Germans, and Von Sanders, the English, the Italians, and Stergiadis. The good Fairies were Greece. Brave princes were Kara-Seitan, Plastiras-the legendary black rider, Saint Chrysostomos of Smyrna and Venizelos, the good Shepperd who was sacrificed for his sheep 23( ‘The Martyrdom of St. Chrysostomos of Smyrna’, 1/1/2001, http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/archbishop/default.asp?id=53&what_main=1&what_sub=4&lang=gr&archbishop_heading=Ελληνισμός).

Not only does the Archbishop blatantly attack foreign powers (by comparing them with ‘evil witches’!) He also puts forward an image of Greece as victimised but nonetheless morally superior, which has suffered a huge injustice. His portrayal of the Asia Minor Catastrophe and the role played by foreign powers fits Smith’s election myths model well, as there is a clear attempt to reinforce the boundary between the ethno-religious community and its neighbours and thus segregate the chosen community- in this case Greece- from a ‘profane and alien world’.

23 ‘Οταν ήμουσαν μικρά παιδιά δεν άκούσαμε ποτέ παραμύθια με κακές μάγισσες και οσφερούς δράκους, με κάλες νεράιδες και γεννιά πρυγκάπουλα. Οι ήρειδες μάνες μας, βουτιγμένες στο δάκρυ και στον πόνο της προφητείας, μάς δημιύριζαν ιστορίες και περίπετες τραγικές. Κακές μάγισσες και φοβεροί δράκοι για μάς ήταν τότε οι Τσέτες, ο Κεμάλ, ο Γερμανοί, ο φών Σαντέρ, οι Εγγέλες και οι Ιταλοί, ο Στεφανά. Καλές νεράιδες ήταν η Ελλάδα. Γεννιά πρυγκάπουλα ήταν ο Καρά-Σειτάν, ο θριλικός Μαύρος Καβαλλάρης, διότι ελέγαν τον Πλατήρα, ο Άγιος Χρυσόστομος Σιμώνης, ο ποιμήν ο καλός, που θυσίασθηκε υπέρ των προβάτων ο Βενίζέλος.
These stories nurtured our dreams, turned them into visions of life, lifted our hopes and gave meaning to our lives. It took us long to understand history and how it happens that civilised humanity justifies the wrongdoers, and does injustice to truth, in this case personified by Greece, a country that has fought, offered and sacrificed itself for human ideals’ 24 (‘The Martyrdom of St. Chrysostomos of Smyrna’, 1/1/2001, http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/archbishop/default.asp?id=53&what_main=1&what_sub=4&lang=gr&archbishop_heading=Ευαγγελιστής).  

2. Contemporary Focus

Perils Facing the Contemporary Greek Nation/ National identity

According to Smith ‘the pursuit of a national mission and the assumption of a national destiny are fundamental to any nation’s continued existence and recognition as a separate community. It becomes the task of successive generations of the community’s members to preserve, renew and freely express the community’s unique culture and ethno-history’ (Smith, 1999:443). For Archbishop Christodoulos, the survival of Greece’s ‘unique culture and ethno-history’ is largely dependent on the bond between Church and nation. His narrative constantly portrays the unique elements of ‘our’ identity, and thus its very existence, as ominously imperilled. ‘Our identity and our continuation’ are in grave danger. Only the Church can offer a way to combat the forces that threaten Greece and Hellenism with elimination. Europe, the US and the West in general, globalisation, Israel, Turkey, Islam, and Greece’s revisionist intellectuals constitute some of the ‘forces of darkness’ or ‘forces of evil’ which according to the Archbishop have set out to annihilate Hellenism. His portrayal of all the above is hostile and defensive, a constant reference to is made to them as threats, but they are also portrayed as inferior to Greece.

In utilising this perceived external threat posed to Greek national identity, as Stavrakakis informs, ‘instead of discussing strictly religious, theological or even moral issues, it is clear that he [Christodoulos] is mostly interested ‘in what he calls the great national issues’ (Stavrakakis, 2002: 14).

24 ...Αὐτὲς οἱ ἱστορίες ἔθρηκαν τὰ ὀνειρὰ μας, τὰ μετέτρεψαν σὲ ὀράματα ζωής, πυργωσαν μέσα μας τις ἐκλίθες, ἐδώσαν νόημα στὴ ζωή μας. ...Ἀργήσαμε νὰ καταλάβουμε τὴν Ἱστορία καὶ πῶς γίνεται ἡ πολιτισμικὴ ἀνθρωπότητα νὰ δικαιοῦνε ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ἀνομία καὶ νὰ ἀδικεῖ, πάλιν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, τὴν ἀλήθεια στὸ πρόσωπο τῆς Ἑλλάδος, μιὰς χόρας ποὺ κολέμησε, ποὺ προσέφερε καὶ ποὺ θυσίασθηκε γιὰ τὰ πανανθρώπινα ἰδιαίτερα.
I am concerned with our national issues, because I see that certain plans are being promoted which contradict what we understand to be our national interests... We, the Greeks, earned our freedom with sacrifice and blood, and we liberated the lands of the so-called benighted Hellenism. We cannot lose them today, simply because this is what the powerful of this earth want. In such an instance, us Greeks will be united, like a fist to reject any imposition which will challenge our national dignity and our national integrity.\(^{(25)}\) (Christodoulos, July 2006, interview for the newspaper ‘World of the Investor’ (Kόσμος του Επενδυτή).

The story Christodoulos tells and re-tells is more or less the same in differing versions. Note the ‘election myths’ inherent within it: Greece is a chosen land, a special one. The historical role of the Church in this has been pivotal. A great injustice has been carried out however against Greece, whose grandeur is now in the past. With the help of the Orthodox Church, the Greek nation will be able to overcome the threat posed to it by the hostile alien powers that seek to demolish it, and will rise to greatness once again.

(a) Europe

The Archbishop’s portrayal of Europe is ambiguous; although accepting to an extent Greece’s membership to the EU, he constantly stresses Greece’s superiority to other European nations: ‘When our ancestors were giving us the lights of civilization, they [the Europeans] were still on trees’\(^{(26)}\) (Eleftherotypia, April 25\(^{th}\) 2006). In addition, his speeches are redolent with warning against the threat posed by Europe. Note for example an extract from his speech on May 29\(^{th}\) 2003, a date that commemorates the sacking of Constantinople: ‘It is a lesson of history that the Europeans are the ones who always wanted to harm us. Long before the sacking of Constantinople Greekness had experienced the Franks of the West and their desire to annihilate it at any cost’\(^{(27)}\) (Eleftherotypia, April 25\(^{th}\) 2006). According to Prodromou, ‘Christodoulos’ public rhetoric since his enthronement has been replete with warnings about the tragic consequences for ‘Hellenism and Orthodoxy’ associated with EU pressures for the full

\(^{25}\) Ανησυχούμε για τα εθνικά μας θέματα, γιατί βλέπω ότι προωθούνται σχέδια τα οποία έρχονται σε αντίθεση με τα καλός νοούμενα εθνικά μας συμφέροντα. Οι Έλληνες κερδίσαμε με θυσίες και με αίμα την ελευθερία μας, και απελευθερώσαμε τα μέρη του λεγόμενου αλώπεχου Ελλησπόντου. Δεν μπορούμε να τα χάσουμε σήμερα, επειδή έτσι έχει οριστεί στους ισχυρούς της Γης. Όλοι οι Έλληνες, σε μια τέτοια απεικόνιση περίπτωση, θα είμαστε ενοχλημένοι, η μόνη γραθή, να απειθήσουμε κάθε επιβουλή, η οποία θα στρέφεται εναντίον της εθνικής μας αξιοπρέπειας και της εθνικής μας ακεραιότητας.

\(^{26}\) Άλλοι οι πρόγονοι μας έδωσαν τα φώτα του πολιτισμού, αυτοί ήταν ανεξαρτημένοι στα δέντρα (σ.σ. οι Ευρωπαίοι).

\(^{27}\) Η ιστορία διδάσκει πως αυτοί οι ιδιοί οι Ευρωπαίοι ήταν εκείνοι που πάντα ήθελαν το κακό μας. Πολύ πριν από την άλωση της Κωνσταντινουπόλεως η ρωμαϊκή είχε δοκιμάσει τη ορικτή εμπειρία των φράκτων της Δώσεως που με κάθε τρόπο επεδίωκεν τον αραισμό της.
disestablishment of Orthodoxy from the State in Greece, and he has aimed to position
the Church as the voice of the Greek people concerned with the salvation of Hellenism
within the cultural melting pot of the EU' (Prodromou, 2004: 479).

(b) The US, the West and Globalisation

The European threat does not come alone however. In a rhetoric reminiscent to that of
the Ayatollah Khomeini's, some 30 years before him, the Archbishop's story has the
'lesser Satan', i.e Europe being lead by the 'Great Satan', i.e. the United States. On the
bombing of Serbia in 2000, the Archbishop exclaimed: 'I have heard that the Western
Christian powers bombed Orthodox monasteries which constituted the pillars of Serb
Orthodoxy. They were like the monasteries of Agion Oros. They didn't even respect
the monasteries because they nurture hatred towards the Orthodoxy. Anything Orthodox
makes their skin crawl. Because the Orthodox are not easy pray for subjugation to
foreign will (Antoniadou, To Vima, December 18th 2005) Western policies are part of
the wider process of globalisation whose aim in none other but to bring about the
destruction of the Greek nation and everything it stands for. During one of his addresses
to school children in October 2002, he asked some students: 'what would you rather be,
meat or mince meat? Foreigners wish to turn us into mince meat, whereas meat is a
solid thing (Elefherotypia, April 25th 2006). In 2004 he famously criticised
globalisation as a 'bulldozer that is out to demolish everything, on account of those who
want to rule the world without resistance or obstacles' (Elefherotypia, April 25th 2006).
And on April 5th 2004 he declared that 'globalisation is attempting to turn us into
batter, soup, sheep, or rather, turkeys, so that someone can lead us with a stick
(Elefherotypia, April 25th 2006). A further problem posed by globalisation and EU
membership resulting in the death of the Greek nation is immigration. 'Today they are
about one million [immigrants], in a few years they will be more than three. Combined
with the demographic problem in Greece, and despite the fact that our civilization and
our religion do not allow us to reclaim 'foreigners out', on the other hand you do

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28 Είχα να σε σε κατέληξε η θέση ή κι η μάση: Μόνο οι τύποι μας κανένας να μας
cαταστοιχήσει, και πράγματι αυτοί ή αυτή η κατάσταση ή τον ρόλο της
eκρατούσα ο πληθωρισμός ή οι περιοχές ή η θέση του πολιτισμού.

29 Είχα να σε κατάληξε η θέση. Και πράγματι αυτό τον ρόλο της θέσης
ο αποτέλεσμα ή τον κανόνα. Είναι συνεπής η κατάσταση ή τον ρόλο
eκρατούσα ο πληθωρισμός ή οι περιοχές ή η θέση του πολιτισμού.

30 Η ροή της μετανάστευσης θα μπορούσε να μας κάνει χωλό, και πράγματι ή
μάλλον γαλοπούλες, διότι κάποιος να μας καταδικάζει με το καλόμα.

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appreciate the danger of us being turned, in a while, to refugees in our own motherland\textsuperscript{31}(Eleftherotypia, April 25\textsuperscript{th} 2006)?

\textit{(c) Israel/ ‘International Zionism’}

In addition to Christodoulos’ open verbal attack against Western powers, there is also a blatant hostility towards Israel. In an infamous speech, at the Church of St. Spyridon on December 5\textsuperscript{th} 2005 Christodoulos declared: ‘We are heading towards Israel…or rather towards Hell… The forces of evil are undermining this land and are attempting to de-Christianise Greece, to create a new order of things in our society, so that in a few years time no one will remember God and the Church’ \textsuperscript{32}(Antoniadou, To Vima, December 18\textsuperscript{th} 2005 ). According to the Archbishop the destruction of Hellenism and Christianity as a whole is part of an international plot lead by Israel. ‘International Zionism wishes to demolish all that is Christian in the world’ \textsuperscript{33} (Antoniadou, To Vima, December 18\textsuperscript{th} 2005).

\textit{(d) Turkey}

One of the greatest threats however to the Greek nation and its territorial integrity is posed by Turkey, Greece’s traditional enemy and the West’s traditional ally. In December 2003 Christodoulos openly provoked Turkey by declaring the latter’s EU accession as undesirable because the Turks are ‘barbarians’ who simply should not be allowed to join: ‘St. Seraphim was accused of being involved with revolutionary activities and this is why he was burned at the stake. Just as Athanasios Diakos was burned at the stake by those who, today, wish to enter the European Union. This is the reason we are resisting. These barbarians can not enter the family of Christians, because we can not live together’ \textsuperscript{34}(Antoniadou, To Vima, December 18\textsuperscript{th} 2005). The external threat posed by Turkey is presented as constant, perennial, and unaffected by changing

\textsuperscript{31} Σήμερα είναι περί το ένα εκατομμύριο (σ.σ. οι μετανάστες), σε λίγα χρόνια θα υπερβαίνουν τα τρία. Σε συνδυασμό με το δημογραφικό πρόβλημα των Ελλήνων και παράτε μας το επερείπε ο πολιτισμός μας και η θρησκεία μας να πούμε "έξω οι ξένοι", από την άλλη αντιλαμβάνεσθε τον κίνδυνο που ελλογεί να μετατραπούμε, ύστερα από λίγο, σε πρόσφυγες στην ίδια μας την πατρίδα;

\textsuperscript{32} πάμε κατά Ισραήλ, μάλλον κατά διαβόλον … δυνάμεις του κακού δροσού υπονομευτικά σε αυτόν τον τόπο και προσπαθούν να αποχωριστοκοπήσουν την Ελλάδα, να δημιουργήσουν μία νέα τάξη πραγμάτων στην κοινωνία μας, ώστε ύστερα από μερικά χρόνια κανείς να μη δημιουργήσει το Θεό και την Εκκλησία.

\textsuperscript{33} Η διαθήκη Σώα θέλει να γκρεμίσει οποιοσδήποτε χριστιανικό υπάρχει στον κόσμο

\textsuperscript{34} Ο Λύκος Στεφανίδη στο Φυσαρί στην Καρδίτσα κατηγορήθηκε ότι ήταν αναμευμένος σε επανάσταση, γι’ αυτό τον επιβίβασαν. Όπως συζήτησαν τον Αθανάσιο Διάκο αυτοί που θέλουν σήμερα να μπουν στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Γι’ αυτό αντιστέκομαι. Δεν μπορούν οι βάρβαροι να ελθουν μέσα στην οικογένεια των χριστιανών, διότι δεν μπορούμε να ζήσουμε μαζί.
circumstances: having sacked Constantinople in 1453, now they’re attempting to invade the European Union, not with arms but with the size of their population (Antoniadou, To Vima, and December 18th 2005). High external threat perception enables the Church to explicitly link its discourse with the Turkish threat, and illustrate how important it is to the survival of the Greek nation facing Turkey, its main perennial enemy.

Another clear example used by the Archbishop is the Imia/Kardak crisis: he appears to be using a highly emotional, nationalistic and provocative language, while urging the Greek State to following an irredentist, confrontational policy involving violent means. ‘The true dilemma is and was: peace or liberty, peace or national humiliation. And in this dilemma, the Greek historical choice cannot be peace’ (Vassilakis, 2006: 303). On August 15 1998, the second anniversary of the crisis and a significant religious holiday in Greece, the Archbishop exclaimed: ‘Let us say one more time that we are willing to repeat ‘Molon Lave’ (come and get it) and to make clear to every direction that Greeks are not easily invaded (Eleftherotypia, April 25th 2006). His rhetoric is a highly polemic one, in which he urges the people to confront the Turkish threat: ‘We believe in peace, but we are willing to give our blessing to the sacred arms when the times demand it’ (Eleftherotypia, April 25th 2006).

(e) Revisionist Historiography

Greece’s revisionist intellectuals are equally threatening. Their attempts to initiate discussions on the separation between Church and State and to reduce the Church’s political role are portrayed as a direct attack on the Greek nation. On May 27th, 1998, the Archbishop declared: ‘You here and thousands of others are true Greek patriots, not simply people nostalgic of the past. But there exist some ‘little Greeks’ who desire the shrinking of the Church because they know the nation owes its survival to it.'

35 ορθό το 1453 κατέλαβαν την Κωνσταντινούπολη, τώρα επιδιώκουν να εισέλθουν στην ΕΕ όχι πλέον διά των όπλων, αλλά διά του όγκου των οποίων διαθέτουν είς τον πληθυσμόν».
36 Το αληθινό δήλημα ήταν και είναι ευρήνη η ελευθερία, ευρήνη η εθική ταπεινοσύ. Και σε αυτό το δήλημα η ακραίφυς ελληνική ιστορική επιλογή δεν μπορεί να είναι ευρήνη.
37 Reference to the ancient Spartan leader Leonidas and his 300 warriors, who in their refusal to surrender exclaimed the famous ‘Molon Lave’ and entered into a battle in which they eventually all died. In Greece this is a renowned reference to bravery and valour, traits which are believed to characterise the Greek nation and its members.
38 Να πούμε και πόλι ποις είμαστε διατεθημένοι να επαναλάβουμε το "Μολόν λαβέ" και να διατηρούμε προς πάσα κατεύθυνση ότι δεν είναι εύκολος του Ελλήνα ο τρόχηλος.
39 Δεόμεθα υπέρ της ευρήνης, αλλά ευλογούμε τα όπλα τα υερά, όταν η στιγμή το επιτάσσει και οι καιροί το επιβάλλουν.
But equally he has launched his own attack on those who have termed him a ‘nationalist’, with all the negative connotations of the word. ‘The word nation has been ostracised from our vocabulary because some people fuse it with nationalism. Patriots are not nationalists. Some of us romantics are under attack for our views’ (Eleftherotypia, April 25th 2006).

3. **Ireland: Religious Values, Conciliation and Inclusion: A Civic Discourse**

### 1. Nationalism

Contrary to Greece and given declining external threat perceptions, the Irish Catholic Church’s official discourse, at least in the past decade, has been characterised by a conciliatory tone with regard to nationalism. The contrast with Greece, in terms of the way the survival of the nation and its link with religion is portrayed in official Church discourse is striking. Equally striking is the way the former imperial core, and contested territories as a result of the break up of Empire, are presented.

#### a) Northern Ireland

Declining external threat perceptions have been explicitly linked with the question of Northern Ireland and therefore the current narrative put forward by the Church can be understood within the context of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. For example, according to the Northern Ireland section of the ‘Irish Bishops Conference Annual Report and Directory’, 2005-2006:

On 28th July 2005 Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of all Ireland, Dr Brady welcomed the declared commitment of the provisional IRA to end its armed campaign. Archbishop Brady suggested that along with the historic declaration should come ‘the kind of actions that will build trust, inspire confidence and encourage a positive response from others. Were that to happen I am convinced that [the IRA declaration is] a unique opportunity to enhance the progress of recent years and to construct a shared and secure future for all, built on new relationships of respect and understanding (Irish Bishops Conference Annual Report and Directory, 2005-2006: 9).
Archbishop Brady’s response to the IRA declaration on July 28th 2005, is articulated in similar vein: the tone is conciliatory, he is condemning violence and promoting peaceful means of negotiation and conflict resolution. The contrast with Archbishop Christodoulos’ discourse is sharp: there is no provocative, emotional nationalistic language, nor any justification for violence in any way.

Every word and deed that helps to foster peace is to be welcomed. In that spirit I warmly welcome today’s very clear and significant statement by the IRA. I hope that the IRA will not only deliver on its declared commitment to end its armed campaign but also accompany this historic declaration with the kind of actions that will build trust, inspire confidence and encourage a positive response from others...Peace is never achieved once and for all but has to be constantly fostered by everyone in our society. I hope that today will encourage everyone to continue that search for a lasting peace (http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/Pressrel/28-july-2005.html, July 28th, 2005).

Furthermore, Dr Brady’s address at Ethelburga’s Centre for Peace and Reconciliation, in London, on the topic ‘Faith and Identity – a Catholic Perspective on Northern Ireland’ on May 5th 2004, illustrates very well the ways in which official Church discourse voiced by the archbishop is attempting to put forward the resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict. According to the Archbishop, the main obstacle between the two communities is distrust; and it follows that resolution of the problem requires the building of trust, on both behalf of both sides:

Northern Ireland is a society pervaded with distrust... As long as we distrust each other we live defensive lives and define our identity in exclusive and excluding ways. What we are discovering more and more in Northern Ireland, is that for reconciliation to be possible, and for lasting peace to take hold, people must do all that is within their power to remove fear and to build trust....And here again I suggest, it is the vocabulary of faith which has something important to offer in terms of moving our community beyond the debilitating cycle of fear and distrust, which lies at the heart of our current impasse. It is found in the specifically Christian concept of supererogation - the duty to go the extra mile, to do more than is reasonable or justified in our own terms, for the sake of the common or greater good (http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/Pressrel/5-may-2004.html, May 5th 2004).

In his pursuit of conciliation, Archbishop Brady proceeds to dismiss violence, urging the Catholic community to let go. ‘The Catholic community should remove itself totally from the legacy of violence as an expression of our own self-confidence, confidence in our own ability to pursue issues through political means, to construct a new Ireland in a
peaceful and constructive manner through discussion, dialogue and debate' (http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/Pressrel/5-may-2004.html, May 5th 2004). This type of rhetoric comes in direct contrast with Christodoulos’ polemic language against Turkey, and his claims that sometimes violence is necessary— for example his ‘molon lave' philosophy during the Imia/Kardak crisis.

Archbishop Brady’s discourse is promoting a civic form of inclusiveness and unity. Religion is not used to encourage a sense of divisive nationalism, arouse nationalistic emotions or create a barrier between different communities, like it is in Greece. ‘The Spirit has come...The Spirit comes with different languages to undo the confusion of Babel and to unite what had been divided and separated’ (http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/Pressrel/5-may-2005.html, May 5th 2005).

There is no reference to a sense of choseness, the need to restore greatness or to acquire lands that are rightly ours. Smith’s election myths, including a sense of moral superiority over outsiders, doctrine of spiritual liberation, boundary between the ethno-religious community and its neighbours (or conquerors) and mobilisation are not relevant here. Instead, the Catholic Church's discourse uses religion as a force of conciliation, and a doctrine of trust which ought to bring people together and create a common ground of belonging.

But Northern Ireland's present is testimony to the healing, restoring power of those who believe to bring about a new approach to conflict rooted in the values of forgiveness, reconciliation and justice. The key to which of these prevails lies in the religious language we choose to emphasize within our own tradition at any given time...In the end, the relationship between faith and identity is always a struggle between the language of dominance, exclusion and superiority and the language of mutual liberation, interdependence and acts of trust. The Anglican Croatian theologian Miroslav Volf captures this choice in the powerful metaphor of exclusion and embrace. Let me end with his words: There can be no justice, no resolution to conflict, without the will to embrace...My point is simple: to create justice you must, [like the persons of the Trinity] make space in yourself for the other, in order to make that space, you need to want to embrace the other. If you insist that others do not belong to you and you to them, or that you will have your justice and they will have theirs; your justices will clash and there will be no peace between you. The key to peace, therefore, is the will to embrace (http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/Pressrel/5-may-2005.html, May 5th 2005).
(b) Immigration and Inclusion

Equally interesting on the issue of nationalism (or lack of) is Archbishop Brady's St. Patrick's Day message delivered on March 16th 2006. Here, he is linking this religious and national day with the need to promote multi-culturalism, tolerance, and inclusive attitudes towards people from various ethnic backgrounds. In this way he could be seen as compromising Ireland's ethnic inclusion criteria for the promotion of a more civic identity of inclusion and citizenship. St. Patrick is portrayed as both a national symbol and a symbol of multi-cultural unity. 'Patrick was one for breaking down barriers...Though borders were ever transient in fifth century Europe, Patrick's message is one of pushing back frontiers'(http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/Pressrel/16-march-2006.html, March 16th 2006). Furthermore, a distinction is suggested between his national and religious symbolic significance. This is very different from Greece where the Archbishop strives to convince that the religious and national symbolic significance of certain historical figures is congruent.

St. Patrick's Day unites Irish people all over the world. For Patrick has become at once a symbol of Irish history and of Irish heritage. But simply to reduce Patrick to a symbol of that kind, worthy as it may be, without any reference to his own Christian faith distorts the truth and in no way does justice to the real stature of the man. Patrick was a migrant, not once but twice, to our land. Despite his rather scary first experience, amazingly Patrick did return but he himself makes it quite clear why he did so. "Before God and His holy angels I solemnly and gladly swear that I had never any motive other than the Gospel and its promises to go back to that nation from which previously I had only barely escaped" ...Next week, Intercultural Week is being celebrated...The week will focus on encouraging a greater involvement and a greater sense of belonging for people from minority ethnic backgrounds. The civil law lays down the basic standards but something more is needed to build a society that is truly inclusive, a society that is welcoming and respectful of people of different cultures, languages and traditions. I would venture to suggest that what is really needed is the proclamation and the living of the truth of Christ — a truth brought by Patrick to our land — the truth of Christ who educates consciences and teaches the authentic dignity of every human person. The golden rule from Christ was: 'treat others as you wish them to treat you'. Is there any better recipe for building an inclusive society? (http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/Pressrel/16-march-2006.html, March 16th 2006)

In his speech at St. Ethelburga's Centre for Peace and Reconciliation in May 2004, Dr Brady offered a similar portrayal of St. Patrick as a pioneer for multi-culturalism.
In this regard, the renewed emphasis on the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, such a dominant theme in the life of St. Patrick, must be a source of hope and confidence for all those who see the relationship between unity in diversity as a critical issue for the future of the world, indeed of this very society. This most fundamental conviction of the Christian tradition provides the ultimate motive and model for living constructively with difference. It enables us to see difference as an opportunity for mutual enrichment rather than an obstacle. It calls Christians to a sense of mutuality and inter-dependence, themes which are becoming increasingly important in our increasingly diverse, yet interdependent world (http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/Pressrel/5-may-2004.html. May 5th 2004).

Irish Catholic official Church discourse also directly contrasts with that of the Greek Orthodox Church in terms of immigration. Catholic Church attitudes are more tolerant and inclusive towards Catholic and non-Catholic immigrants to Ireland, while talk of the annihilation of the Irish nation, or fears of ‘becoming immigrants in their own land’ (Christodoulos) should immigration rise further are non-existent. This is a much the result of the distinction between a national and a supra-national Church, as it is the consequence of low external threat perceptions and low levels of xenophobia in Ireland. As shown in chapter 4, Greece ranks amongst the highest among the EU-25. Immigration is seen as a serious threat to Greek national identity, and given high external threat perceptions, the church can use this to mobilise people around it. This is not the case in Ireland. A good example is the Standing Committee of the Irish Catholic Bishops’ suggestion re the proposal to amend article 9 of the Constitution regarding the constitutional right of people born in the island of Ireland to Irish citizenship:

This subject is one with serious moral and social, as well as legal, implications and it is important that voters are fully informed of the implications and are aware of the consequences of their choice. Above all, it is important to ensure that all people who find themselves in Ireland, children and adults, whether citizens or not, enjoy full protection of their fundamental human rights, without discrimination on the basis of race or origin. As human beings, they possess such rights independently of citizenship. This must always be the clear hallmark of the future constitutional and legal framework. Any vote cast with the intention of weakening or denying this principle would be morally wrong...The referendum renders even more urgent the provision of a comprehensive, fair and transparent immigration policy. This is an important challenge to Ireland today. Without such a policy there is a real risk that the rights of refugees and the fundamentally important legal institution of asylum will be undermined (http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/Pressrel/4-june-2004.html. June 4th 2004).
2. Secularisation: Loss of Faith/ Decline of Church Practice

Unlike in Greece, Church discourse in Ireland does not attempt to tackle secularising trends with a populist, nationalistic discourse which gives emphasis to choseness and stresses the need to maintain the link between religion and nation in order to avert the annihilation of the latter. In fact, in speeches and declarations on behalf of the hierarchy regarding the decline of religious values in Ireland, there is hardly ever any mention of the national character of Catholicism or its importance for the continuation of the Irish nation. Note for example, a speech by Archbishop Brady on June 8th 2004. In response to increasing secularisation trends, including ‘worrying signs that our reputation for hospitality and neighbourliness is in danger of being reduced to a commercial facade, a mask we wear for the tourists, an essential part of the ‘Irish brand’, he called on Irish people to ‘switch off their TVs and mobile phones once a week’. His discourse has a religious and social dimension; but not a national one. There is no attempt for nationalist mobilisation or blaming the decline of religious practice to hostile imperial powers such as the Greek case. On the contrary, defending the Church stems from an attempt to show that people distancing them from it are become alienated, sometimes taking ‘the form of self-harm or ultimately suicide’. He is linking religion to society, but not to the nation.

3. The Commemoration of Religious- National Days

Church discourse in Ireland does not stress the potential link between the religious and national dimensions of Easter, i.e. the symbolic implications of Easter 1916, which witnessed the seizure of the general Post Office (GPO) and other surrounding sites in Dublin by rebels in an attempt to overthrow British rule. Their portrayal of Easter is only as a religious holiday, and a time to promote good relations/ link with Christianity. Again, this may be sharply contrasted to Greece where linking religious with national commemoration dates and placing emphasis on their twofold religious/nationalist character, such as March 25th, is of paramount significance in the Archbishop’s nationalist narrative.

The Mass Prefaces over the Easter season contain the words: “The joy of the Resurrection renews the whole world”. But in the whole world there is so much evil, so much suffering, so much fear. Where is the joy? Has the Resurrection made any difference in this world? Were the Marxists right? Is Christian faith only “pie in the sky when you die”? The Resurrection is the bedrock truth of our faith, the truth on which everything else depends.
Without it, St. Paul said, “Our preaching is useless and your believing is useless”. But the Resurrection is very much a reality of history; even if its full meaning reaches beyond history. Let us think of the incalculable goodness, truth, beauty, love, brought into the world by Christianity. All this is due to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. [Link](http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/easter2002/cardinaldaly-easter2002.html). March 24th 2002).

4. Church Discourse at Times of Crisis

The Identity Cards Crisis: Nationalist Mobilisation

On June 21st 2000, in Athens, amongst sixty Bishops and hundreds of thousands of people holding up banners inscribing ‘Orthodoxy or Death’, ‘Hands off Democracy’, ‘Greece means Orthodoxy’ and plenty others in similar vein, the Archbishop Christodoulos exclaiming ‘let the laws sleep’, lifted the standard which in 1821 Bishop Germanos had lifted in the monastery of Agia Lavra to mark the commencement of the Greek struggle of independence (Vassilakis, 2006: 403-410). The occasion was the Athens rally, a protest organised by the Church against the Simitis government’s initiative to remove the religion field from the Greek identity cards. The latter, preceded by a rally in Thessaloniki on June 14th 2000, was part of the Archbishop’s fierce campaign against the government’s initiative which also included an attempt to gather signatures asking for a referendum on the Identity Cards issue. The use of nationalist symbols was anything but subtle. Christodoulos addressed the demonstrators in a setting combining religious and nationalist symbols very explicitly: the Bishops, the Greek flag, the Byzantine flag and the flag of Greek independence-1821 (See photos below).

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Raising the flag of independence at the end of his speech was a highly symbolic act. It was an attempt to show that the protest should not be reduced to a Church act of defiance of the State. This was a ‘national’ act of defiance, a ‘national revolution’, initiated by the Church, the prime carrier of Greek national identity, just as the national revolution that had broken out in 1821. His discourse was thus extremely nationalistic and one focusing on the connection with the past: ‘The people do not want to lose their Greek-Orthodox tradition, like they didn’t, no matter what the temptation was, want to become Turkish or Franc in past times’ (Vassilakis, 2006: 459).

The Archbishop portrayed those who sought to remove religion from the Greek identity cards as the enemies of the nation who sought to demolish its foundations and annihilate Hellenism; this was the obvious aim of the removal of religion from the ID cards. He proclaimed in March 2002:

> Those who seek to demolish the ethnic foundations of this nation and do not have to answer to anyone, should know that they are undermining the nation. They are the fake progressive culturalists who accuse us of being nationalists and need to be put in their place. The people are not following them, and the three million signatures are a lesson for the nation. They are voices that no one is powerful enough to violate 42 (Eleftherotypia, April 25th 2006).

In late August 2001, the Church announced that it had managed to gather 3,008,901 signatures asking for a referendum. The following day however, President Stephanopoulos issued a statement according to which the conditions for a referendum had not been met and therefore the new law remained unchallenged. Although the Church’s campaign proved unsuccessful in changing the law passed by the Simitis government, the Identity Cards issue remains one of the greatest controversies between Church and State in independent Greece. The crisis illustrated not only that the a large percentage of the Greek population is prepared to ally itself with the Church over the State in times of crisis, but most importantly, that the Church, despite its long history of accommodation to the State, is not prepared to compromise when it comes to ‘national matters’. Although Church discourse usually accommodates with the State- if with mild

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42 Αυτοί που γκρεμίζουν τα εθνικά θεμέλια αυτοί του έθνους και δεν δίνουν λόγο σε κανέναν, πρέπει να γνωρίζουν ότι υπονοούνε το έθνος. Είναι οι ψευδοκοιλοποιημένες που μας κατηγορούν για εθνικιστές και πρέπει να μπουν στη θέση τους. Ο λογός δεν τους ακολουθεί και τα τρία εκκαθαρισμα των υπογραφών είναι μάθημα για το έθνος. Είναι φανές που καινείς δεν έχει το ανάστημα να τις παραιτησώ.
disagreement— as for example in cases such as abortion, civil marriage and the most recent cremation of the dead, it is not prepared to compromise in situations which it believes imperil the link between orthodoxy and the Greek nation. It is not prepared to accommodate any legislation that will potentially directly threaten the bond between Church and nation.

Church Scandals

a) Greece: Nationalist Mobilisation

In late January 2005, what the newspaper Kathimerini has labelled ‘the greatest scandal’ ever to touch the administration of the Church was exposed in the media. The scandals, linked with the judicial system, embezzlement, drug abuse and money lauding erupted when Iakovos Giosakis, a Greek archimandrite was charged for trafficking in antiquities and bribing high ranking judges in order to change the outcome of trials. Soon, accusations involving bribery, drug dealing, money laundering, espionage, and sexual favours implicated a large number of the Greek religious clergy. According to Nikos Dimou, the scandals exposed the Greek Orthodox Church ‘for what it is: a completely amoral and unethical multinational company’ (Observer, March 20th 2005).

The Archbishop himself became implicated in the scandals when, despite his systematic denial of the fact, the media set out to prove that he was personally closely related with archimandrite Giosakis. On February 6th 2005 the media exposed an unpublished reference letter written by the Archbishop in 1987 for Apostolos Vavylis a priest wanted by Interpol after having being indicted in 1991 to a 13 years prison sentence for smuggling heroin from Italy. According to Christodoulos’ reference letter, Vavylis ‘came from a good family with Christian and Hellenic values’. The newspaper To Vima further revealed that Vavylis, together with a former policeman and an archimandrite, following the Archbishop’s instructions, had travelled to Jerusalem in 2001 to support the election of Irinaios to the position of Patriarch of Jerusalem. According to the Greek media, and other religious clergy members, Christodoulos viewed the election of the patriarch of Jerusalem as a ‘national matter’ and needed to ensure that the person elected to this position would be one favouring Greek-Orthodox interests (Vassilakis, 2006:576). It soon emerged that Vavylis and the Archbishop were closely acquainted, while Christodoulos himself systematically denied that he had instructed Vavylis to travel to Jerusalem in order to assist the election of Greek-oriented Irinaios as Patriarch. On February 23rd 2005 the spokesman for the Patriarchate of Jerusalem to Athens
confirmed that Vavylis (also known as Fokas) had been sent by Christodoulos to Jerusalem in 2001; the Greek Church formally continued to deny it. On the same day, MEGA Channel, a Greek private television station broadcasted a photograph which depicted Archbishop Christodoulos during the reception for the celebration of the election of Patriarch Irinaios in 2001 at King David Hotel in Jerusalem, sitting next to newly elected Patriarch Irinaios and Vavylis embracing the Patriarch in order to congratulate him for his success. Although Christodoulos initially denied his implication in this, he later attempted to defend it along nationalist lines: ‘They’re even concerned with the Patriarchates of the East which have a national character for Greece, since, as we all know they need our motherland’s support in order to remain in Greek hands’ (Archbishop’s Sermon, Holy church of All Saints, Kallithea, Avriani, Monday Feb 28th 2005).

The scandals soon assumed massive proportions. In February 2005 Metropolitan of Attica Panteleimon was suspended by the Church hierarchy for a period of six months as an illustration of the Church’s attempt to subject itself to process of self-catharsis. Since, a number of religious figures and also lawyers, judges and other members of the Greek administration have been brought to justice. The scandals also triggered anew the discussions for separating Church and State in Greece. However, the row was short-lived and the problems posed for the Church proved only to be short-term. Polls showed that the Archbishop’s popularity bounced back not long after the eruption of the scandals, while a large proportion of the Greek population still believed he, and the Church should remain involved in issues such as education, public administration and foreign policy (See Introduction). Despite suggestions, mainly from the opposition, to bring the institutional separation between Church and State forward, the government refused to add the issue into the list of those to be discussed at the upcoming constitutional review. The constitutional position of the Church therefore remained unaffected.

Divisions within the Church did arise, and certain members of its administration aligned themselves against the Archbishop demanding his resignation. They were however few, and such motions were defeated. More specifically, on February 19th 2005, a motion of no confidence against the Archbishop put forward by Bishop Germanos, was defeated with a clear majority of 67 votes. On Friday, February 25th, in a television interview the Archbishop declared his refusal to resign: ‘I don’t believe that I am part of the problem,
but I am the one who is now called upon to lead the entire Church to catharsis' (To Vima, February 27\textsuperscript{th} 2005). On Sunday November 27\textsuperscript{th}, Christodoulos’ refusal to resign became more confrontational: 'Enough. I am sick of it. While I stand on my two legs, I will fight. Those who think that I will resign and stop talking the way I talk are hugely misled' (Archbishop’s sermon, ieros Naos Agiwn Pantwn Kallitheas, Avriani, February 28\textsuperscript{th} 2005).

The Church’s discourse during the scandals exhibited two main characteristics: Firstly, subordination to the State and an acceptance to compromise its demands; in this case, the demand for the Church to ‘cleanse itself’. On February 13\textsuperscript{th}, Christodoulos stated: ‘the demand for cleansing, or rather, self-cleansing in the Church is necessary. For this reason, I first declared to all the Greek people my final decision to be the guarantor of this cleansing process’ (Archbishop Christodoulos, in Kathimerini, February 13\textsuperscript{th} 2005).

Rev. Epifanios Economou, spokesman for the Greek Church, and himself later implicated in the scandals declared on February 7\textsuperscript{th}, ‘this is no doubt the worst crisis in decades. We are determined, however, to act fast and decisively. Our greatest priority at this point is to restore faith and trust in the Church, not to see people losing it’ (Greek News online, February 7\textsuperscript{th}, 2005).

Secondly, the Church’s- and most importantly the Archbishop’s- discourse was a highly nationalist one, replete with appeals to the national mission and attempts to defend the close link between Church and State have been along nationalist lines. The Archbishop was fast to attribute the scandals to a conspiracy by the ‘forces of darkness’ or ‘forces of evil’ (Vassilakis, 2006: 566).

Dark forces are fighting the Church: they can not tolerate that Greece is a Christian, Orthodox country by 98\%, and that the people believe in God. They can not stand to watch people attend Church, they can not stand to watch people believing. These are unprecedented things. The forces of darkness can not tolerate them. And for this reason they wish to decapitate them (Archbishop’s sermon at the Church of St. George in Kypseli, printed in Avriani, May 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 2005).

On a television interview for Alpha channel with Nikos Hatzinikolaou on February 25\textsuperscript{th} 2005, Christodoulos implied that the Israeli, Turkish and U.S secret services were

\[\text{\footnotesize 43 To aπίθμια για κάθαρση ή μάλλον για αυτοκάθαρση στον χώρο των ανθρώπων της Εκκλησίας είναι επιτακτικό. Γι' αυτό και πρώτος εγώ διεκδίκησα προς όλους τους Ελλήνες την αμετακίνητη απόφασή μου να είμαι ο εγγυητής αυτής της καθάρσεως.} \]

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behind the scandals in an attempt to undermine his position thus indirectly attacking the existence Greek nation. The programme was the second highest viewed programme broadcasted that day, gathering a 31.1% share of the day’s total television viewings. It was viewed by 1,219 people, a 13.2% of the population (AGB, http://www.agb.gr/gr/data/20050225/stage3.shtm?index=713).

-Hatzinikolaou: Tell me, Your Eminence, do you believe there is an international plot behind all these attacks that have been directed against you? We have heard numerous politicians and certain Metropolitans asking you to resign. We have also heard that foreign intelligence agencies like Israel’s Mosad, Turkey’s MIT, and even the CIA, are unhappy with the positions you have adopted on various issues and, as such, have decided to remove you from your position. Do you lend credibility to any of these possibilities?

-Christodoulos: My answer to you is that, since none of them are secrets and have been on the front pages of almost every newspaper in recent days44, the Greek people are intelligent enough to evaluate all these things that you mentioned. I don’t want to go into any further details on this matter.

Implicitly or explicitly, Christodoulos attributed an international dimension to the scandals, linking them to Europe, globalisation and the US: ‘It bothers them that Greek people, as was revealed in recent data, are the most faithful within the EU...which is why everything needs to be ridiculed and those who raise the flag must get out of the way’ (Archbishop’s sermon, Ieros Naos Agiwn Pantwn Kallitheas, Avriani, Monday Feb 28th 2005). Referring to circumstances surrounding the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem 45, Archbishop Christodoulos identified them as having huge national consequences that might lead to a fatal outcome for both Orthodoxy and Hellenism (To Vima, February 27th 2005). ‘The cost for our motherland and our Genos will be grave’ he said (To Vima, February 27th 2005). The close link between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity is once again evoked stressing the dangers for Hellenism and the ominous future of the Greek nation should Orthodoxy ever be separated from the State.

‘Those who create scandals seek to ridicule everything so to eliminate those who lift the Standard at Agia Lavra46 and believe in ideals and in the teachings of Christ, because globalisation must occur here too (Greece), and there must be

44 Here Christodoulos was referring to right-wing newspaper Avriani, which published an article claiming that American, Israeli and Turkish secret services are attempting to overthrow Christodoulos’ (Vassilakis, 2006: 595-596).
45 Implying the need for a pro-Greece policy oriented Patriarch of Jerusalem.
46 Clear reference to the link between Orthodoxy and Hellenism. Here Christodoulos is referring to members of the Church, such as himself, who are prepared to challenge the State in order to defend the religious elements of Greek national identity and by extension the status of the Orthodox Church.
nothing to react to this demolition (Archbishop’s sermon Ieros Naos Agiwn Pantwn Kallitheas, Avriani, February 28th 2005).

b) Ireland: Challenge of Morality and Lack of Nationalist Mobilisation

The Irish Catholic Church suffered profoundly during the scandals of the mid-1990’s. Indeed, a number of scholars attribute the decline of the role of the Church to these events to a large extent (Fuller, 2004; Inglis, 1998; Garvin, 2004). Indeed, in an interview for Time Europe, Archbishop Martin agreed that ‘people’s confidence in the Church has suffered greatly’ because of the sex abuse scandals (TIME, May 28th 2006). The scandals broke out in 1992, when it was revealed in the media that Bishop Casey had a teenage son living in the United States. They assumed massive proportions however in 1994, with the revelation of a series of sex abuse cases involving members of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. In 1994, it was revealed in the media that Nobertine order priest Brendan Smyth had been accused of involvement in cases of paedophilia and while the hierarchy of the Catholic Church was aware of this, it had failed to take any action (Fuller, 2004: 251-252). A series of cases followed, involving priests and members of religious orders implicated in sex abuse cases, some going back as early as the 1960’s. In April 2002, Brendan Cominskey, Bishop of the diocese of Ferns resigned following charges that he had failed to take any action regarding allegations that several clergy members in his diocese has been involved in children sex abuse cases. In 2005, the diocese of Ferns published a report according to which between 1962 and 2002, there had been more than one hundred sex abuse cases by priests (Ferns Report, 2005). In the late 1990’s and early 2000,

Dozens of elderly clerics were jailed for offences committed 20 or 30 years previously in a pattern of State intervention in ecclesiastical affairs that would have been utterly unimaginable 10 years earlier. A Church that had behaved almost as a government without parliamentary supervision, with power and without real responsibility was suddenly shorn of that power. The past wreaked a terrible revenge (Garvin, 2004: 218).

Another dimension of the scandals included the so-called ‘Magdalen Laundries’. Magdalen Asylums had been introduced in 19th century Ireland as shelters for prostitutes. They took on a different character however in the mid twentieth century as convents, in which women were essentially ‘imprisoned’, for violating the Church’s moral code having been accused of sins of the flesh, such as giving birth to children outside marriage. Women were often kept in the convents against their will were
required to engage in hard physical labour, such as laundry work, the symbolic action of 'washing away their sins'. The exact numbers of women sent to Magdalen asylums remain unknown as religious orders have refused to reveal this information, but estimates approximate 30,000 and since the closing down of the last Magdalen Asylum in 1996, dozens of cases have come to light (BBC, May 6th 2004). Church scandals had a much more profound impact in Ireland, precisely because of the inability of the Church to mobilise the people along nationalist lines. They explicitly raised the issue of legitimacy and democratic accountability of the Irish Catholic Church, which had failed to live up to the very moral standards it had itself so firmly set. According to Garvin, 'the most damning fact to emerge was not the nature of the abuses and assaults but the undeniable proposition that senior clerics including archbishops had actually shielded the wrong doers and protected them from investigation by the secular authorities (Garvin, 2004: 217). As morality has been the main source of the Church's legitimacy throughout the 20th century, the scandals challenged the Church to its core.

Because of declining external threat perceptions and the Church's moralistic focus, Church defence was carried out on religious rather than nationalist grounds. Church discourse was characterised mainly by an apologetic rhetoric, fully recognising and acknowledging the implications of the scandals. For the first time, the Church appeared willing to conform to the State and give up a degree of its powers. But there was no nationalist threat against which it could mobilise in its defence, marking a huge difference from the Greek case. Following the publication of the Ferns Report, Dr Brady agreed that the Church would have to let go some of its institutional power. But then he went on to explicitly link his defence of the Church with the problems of alienation which plague contemporary society. Decline in religious practice is leading people to desperation, often manifesting itself in suicide. Although the Church had done serious harm for which it was sorry, it would be wrong for people to distance themselves from the Church, as that would leave them distraught, desperate and without a sense of belonging. His discourse therefore was one of appealing to people's despair and show need for religion. Nowhere do we see an appeal in term of saving the Irish nation from extinction.

The second element is humility and a highly apologetic tone. For example, Archbishop Seán Brady and Desmond Cardinal Connell's statement in April 1st 2002:
The sexual abuse of children by priests is an especially grave and repugnant evil. To all victims of such abuse, to their families and to their parish communities, we again offer our profound apologies...We realise that the whole Church in Ireland is suffering at this time from the scandal caused by this evil and the manner in which it was dealt with at times. It is a scandal which has evoked entirely justified outrage. The sexual abuse of children by priests is totally in conflict with the Church’s mission and with Christ’s compassion and care for the young... We realise that the events of recent weeks have also caused great distress and anxiety to the faithful throughout Ireland, particularly those of the diocese of Ferns and the parishes affected. Not only has trust in the Catholic Church been damaged, but so too has the faith of the people and the morale of clergy. In this Easter Season we pray that the Risen Lord will inspire all of us to bring new life and healing to victims of child sexual abuse and that He will give us the courage to renew our efforts to bring about reconciliation and peace regarding this painful issue (http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/Pressrel/l-april-2002.html. April 1st 2002).

On October 25th 2005, Archbishop Martin made a statement on the publication of the Ferns report. His statement, apologetic and to the point provided a clear recognition of the wrongdoings.

This report is vital in bringing into the open the detail surrounding years of sexual abuse by priests which caused horrendous damage to so many people and their families. We must do what we can to ensure it never happens again. It is now clear that many children would not have suffered abuse had those with knowledge acted upon it. This was unforgivable. It is a reminder to all of us that we must be vigilant and speak up for children. As Archbishop of Dublin, I join with others in the Church in Ireland in saying sorry to those who have been abused. Sexual abuse by priests has devastated the lives of those abused and their families. It has also resulted in enormous damage to people’s faith, not only in the Church but in God. It has distressed priests who find it hard to believe that their fellow clerics could cause so much harm. Many priests have been subject to public attack and ridicule while continuing to serve in parishes and different ministries. Priests have traditionally enjoyed very privileged levels of trust in their communities. It is clear that in many cases that trust has been betrayed by those priests who abused and by the failure of Church authorities to act when they should have (http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/Pressrel/25d-october-2005.html. October 25th 2005).

On the same day, Archbishop Brady declared:

I am deeply shocked and saddened by the findings of the inquiry into child sexual abuse by priests in the Diocese of Ferns. The revelations make for very uncomfortable reading. The pages retelling the pain experienced by those who have suffered, are especially heartbreaking. I apologise to all those people who have suffered lasting hurt at the hands of
abusers in the Church. As priests they should have been protecting and nurturing the talents of these young people. The betrayal of trust is horrendous. Today the Church is ashamed of its past failings regarding child protection. I pray for the abused and their families that they will be able to achieve healing and peace in their lives. I pray that those who have abused will realise the terrible harm they have done and will seek pardon for their sins. Actions, as well as words, are now required to show our seriousness on this issue. We are committed to ensuring that the Church at all times sets an example of best practice in this area....No one who is a danger to children is permitted to minister in the Church (http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/Pressrel/25b-october-2005.html, October 25th 2005).

The media played a significant role during the time of the scandals, which effectively served to undermine the role of the Irish Catholic Church. According to Inglis it was through the media, and particularly television, the Church lost its power ‘over peoples minds’ (Inglis, 1998: 231-236). There is also an important distinction with Greece here. Indeed the Greek Orthodox Church was also damaged by the media, as it was through the latter that the scandals were exposed, for example through the publication of photographs directly implicating the Archbishop, or the broadcasting of video tapes showing clergy members involved in sex scandals. But there was another dimension to that: the media also provided an important vehicle through which the charismatic personality of Archbishop Christodoulos could put forward his nationalist/ populist discourse. In the Greek case therefore, the media provided not only a challenge, but most importantly a significant opportunity for disseminating and publicising the Archbishop nationalist narrative. Since his election to the post of Archbishop he has appeared on television numerous times. The media was also utilised in a similar way during the 2000 Identity Cards crisis: Christodoulos act of nationalist defiance symbolised by his raising the flag of Greek independence, could have hardly had a similar impact had it not been broadcast live on national television or printed in every Greek newspaper published the following day. Indeed the Church hierarchy relied on the media portrayal of the rallies: the organisers gave clear instructions in the previous days. What matters most is what people will watch on the television screens47 (Eleftherotypia, June 21st, 2000).

47 Οι οργανωτές έχουν δώσει σφαιρές εντολές όλες τις προηγούμενες ημέρες. Εκείνο που μετράει περισσότερο είναι αυτό που θα δει ο κόσμος από τις τηλεοράσεις.
5. Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the ways in which the inter-relation between modernisation and changing external threat perceptions have impacted on official Church discourse in the two case studies. In Greece, the narrative put forward by the Church is an almost exclusively nationalist one. According to Dimou, ‘Greeks are not particularly religious, but the Church is like the Greek flag, a symbol of their identity’ (Eleftherotypia, April 25th 2006). There is very little focus on morality, and thus no reliance on the population’s adherence to strictly religious rules. The Church legitimises its actions on the basis of the bond between Greece and Orthodoxy, one which they maintain is grounded in the deep past. The Archbishops role is paramount in disseminating this sort of narrative as he, in a way, is seen to epitomise the concept of a religious/national leader. According to Bishop Amvrosios of Kalavryta, ‘Christrodoulos incarnates the vision of an integral religious leader and at the same time of an Ethnarch! He comes to the throne at difficult times; he comes as a gift from God, not only for the Church but for Greece’ (Vasilakis, 2006: 29). This is why the scandals which plagued the Church, although more recent than the Irish, have had less severe implications for the Greek Church. The latter suffered less primarily because of its ability to mobilise the people around Orthodoxy as carrier of Greek national identity.

In Ireland, on the hand, declining external threat perceptions and the need for a conciliatory tone because of the Northern Ireland question have rendered the Church unable to mobilise along nationalist lines. As a result, Church discourse in the past decade has been one characterised by conciliation. On the other hand, precisely because the Catholic Church’s grip on the population has been grounded on moral issues, as it prescribed a rigid moral framework and demanded the people to adhere to it, the Church’s power lay primarily in its capacity to maintain people’s adherence to moral values. For this reason the Church’s legitimacy and popularity have suffered profoundly from the scandals.
1. Introduction

The impetus for researching this project originated from observing the events which took place during the Athens rally in the summer of 2000: facing the demonstrators, with his back turned to the Greek Parliament, the Archbishop of Athens and all of Greece Christodoulos exclaimed 'let the laws sleep' and raised the Standard of the 1821 Greek independence movement. His act of defiance was cheered by an audience of thousands. In a secularising Europe, why were such events taking place? And most importantly, why were the Archbishop's actions so popular with the Greek people? The image of Christodoulos, surrounded by clerics, directly challenging the authority of the secular State by evoking nationalist symbols seemed to place a large question mark on the idea that modern societies tend to become increasingly secular. Clearly, religion was not diminishing in social and political importance; instead, it appeared, it was making a come-back.

As these events dominated the headlines, commentators attributed the phenomenon which was taking place in Greece to the wider context of a world-wide religious resurgence. Despite however the re-affirmation of religious values in certain areas of the globe, and limitedly in Greece, there were also counter-cases: in Ireland, another European country displaying some points of similarity with Greece, a series of on-going scandals since the mid-1990's implicating the Church, including cases of child abuse and the well known 'Magdalen Laundries' were significantly undermining the role of religion. Church attendance was declining dramatically, while the Church began to lose one battle after another in its attempt to maintain the status quo.

If the social and political significance of religion was on the rise in Greece, then why was it being so fiercely and successfully contested in Ireland? Within this context, Greece and Ireland seemed to illustrate very well the limitations inherent within the secularisation versus the 'return of God' debate, as each case lies on the opposite end of this spectrum. For this reason it appeared fascinating for one interested in the study of politics and religion to examine in greater depth why Greece was witnessing a religious resurgence, while in Ireland the legitimacy of the Church was being so significantly undermined.
2. **Findings**

The central concepts this thesis has been concerned with are religion and national identity, and more specifically the circumstances under which the latter emerges and becomes consolidated around the former and the circumstances under which this inter-relationship may be strengthened or weakened. Its principal hypothesis is that in societies where there has been an established core link between religion and national identity, secularisation processes are likely if the dynamics of national identity formation change and if there is a declining sense of an external threat.

1. **Greece and Ireland explained in terms of the ‘Nationalist Pattern’**

As scholarly work on the subject points out, it makes sense for religion to have a strong political relevance in Greece and Ireland, as both their national identities are inextricably linked to religion (Bruce, 2002; Martin 1978, 2005). The ‘nationalist pattern’ describes cases where religion remains salient because of its link to nationalism. Examining this premise through a historical analysis of the role of religion in Greece and Ireland (chapter 2) this thesis found that until recently nationalism indeed lay at the core of their political religion. These were two similar cases, where historical and geopolitical circumstances allowed for a powerful political Church whose role is legitimised and endorsed by the vast majority of the population. In both cases religion constituted a national identity signifier and provided a sense of cohesion for the nation. The religious element of national identity derived from the era of imperial rule when the ‘us’ and ‘them’ lines of demarcation were formed around religion. A religious-based national identity was later consolidated during the nation-building process and became perpetuated internally through the mechanisms of the national State and their ‘utilisation’ of external threat perceptions aiming at prompting the people to rally around religion in order to salvage their ‘unique national traits’ against hostile powers. In this respect, the link between religion and national identity is crucial not only for the understanding of the role of religion in Greek and Irish politics, but also its legitimacy, popular endorsement and underlying basis for support.
2. National Identities as Dynamic Processes

The logical question that followed from this is, if this premise is correct and the political role of religion in Greece and Ireland is contingent on national identity, what then accounts for their current divergence?

An inquiry into the historical and cultural make-up of the two cases in chapter 2 pointed to the fact that the ‘nationalist pattern’ is neither monolithic, nor irreversible or static. Indeed, its key principle is that national identity is inextricably linked to religion. It is therefore based on perceptions of a people’s national identity which itself is not static, but ever-evolving. Religion may cease to be- or to be portrayed as- the carrier of national identity or may begin to function as an inclusive, civic signifier rather than exclusive ethnic one given appropriate conditions. Ultimately national identity preservation requires flexibility and self-renewal. As one of the main determinants of a national identity, religion may serve to preserve a common sense of ethnicity; but in certain instances, the opposite may take place. According to Smith,

Religion may become petrified and antiquarian, as did for example the Assyrian State religion; in that case it contributes nothing to the chances of ethnic survival. Unless new movements and currents stir the spirit within the religious framework, its very conservatism may deaden the ‘ethnie’ or it may become a shell for an attenuated identity. Failure of religious reform or petrified conservatism may turn the modes of ethnic self-renewal elsewhere (Smith, 1991:35).

In such instances, religious reform becomes a mechanism of national or ethnic self-renewal. At this point, the Church may lose its ability to mobilise the people around national identity. Given this premise, namely that national identities are not static but change through time, the thesis found that the divergence between the two case studies is linked with the changing nature of national identity in Ireland (as this was the case exhibiting a change) and the particularities of the Irish version of the Church-State-Nation nexus which are absent or different in the Greek case. The elements in the historical relationship between Church, State and Nation in the two case studies requiring further examination therefore are not so much the commonalities, but most importantly the differences.
**Variations within the ‘Nationalist Pattern’:**

Chapter 2 and further analysis in chapter 3 illustrated that there are indeed significant variations within the pattern as far as the Greek and Irish cases are concerned. As table 1 below indicates, the interaction between Church and State is different, entailing that religious pluralism, anti-clericalism and the education system, although linked to the Church, are also of different character.

**Table 1: Variations within the Nationalist Pattern**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Church-State Nexus</strong></td>
<td>Intimate: nationalised/Church subordinate to State</td>
<td>Intimate: universal/Church not subordinate to State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Pluralism</strong></td>
<td>Very low/ non-legalistic</td>
<td>Very low/ legalistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Clericalism</strong></td>
<td>Very low/accommodation</td>
<td>Very low/ coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School System</strong></td>
<td>Strong religious influence with focus on nationalism/highly centralised</td>
<td>Strong religious influence with focus on religious instruction/decentralised</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main conclusion that may be drawn from table 1 is that the most significant distinction between the two cases is in the fact that the Church is an institution subordinate to the State in Greece but not in Ireland. Although the Church-State nexus is intimate in both cases, the relationship is in fact the reverse: in Greece the Church is nationalised, and therefore subordinate to the State, while in Ireland the Church is universal and therefore outside of the control of the State. As a result, the Irish Catholic Church developed into a far more legalistic, authoritarian and inflexible institution than the Greek Orthodox Church. Through its ‘moral monopoly’ i.e. its highly developed bureaucratic control apparatus, the Irish Catholic Church was able to maintain a high level of adherence to its rules and regulations, and more specifically it developed a vast institutional network of Churches, schools, hospitals and homes, through which it could maintain its moral power and dominate every aspect of Irish social life (Inglis, 1998: 39). The impact of differentiation processes in Ireland is important, not only because it brought about the separation between the social and religious spheres, but ultimately because it undermined the link between Catholicism and nationalism, something which has not taken place in Greece. The historical
subordination of the Greek Orthodox Church renders it far more flexible in terms of rules and regulations and therefore more adaptable to modernising policies, such as divorce and abortion.

The Irish pattern therefore is characterised by institutions, such as the Church and the legal and education systems, which place extensive emphasis on Catholic rules and regulations and whose principal policies aim at ensuring the laity's adherence to these rules. Nationalism functioned as the Church's initial source of legitimacy, however, the expansion of Church power and its relationship with other institutions of the State is not premised on nationalist legitimation but rather on forging a particularly legalistic form of Catholicism on the Irish population. On the other hand, the Greek pattern is characterised by institutions which place emphasis on the link between Orthodoxy and national identity rather than adherence to specific rules and regulations. Nationalist legitimation was, and continues to be, the prime source of Church power. In addition, an crucially, the thesis found that this internal development, i.e. the relationship between the Church and the institutions of the State, has been strengthened by external developments- i.e. the extent to which the geopolitical environment may be perceived as posing a serious set of threats. As national identity performs a cohesive function, high external threat perceptions foster the need to rally around the principal carriers of national identity- in this case religion- while low external threat perceptions downplay this need. In other words, in Ireland, the Church's inflexibility has rendered it more susceptible to rapid decline since its main source of legitimacy- defending Irish national identity against a hostile external power- is no longer necessary. In Greece on the other hand, high external threat perceptions have served to sustain the Church as a powerful institution as its main source of legitimacy, i.e. defending Greek national identity remains intact. Not only has the Church's legitimacy not been undermined domestically, as the Church rarely clashes with the modernisation impetus, but it has also been strengthened by the external geopolitical environment. The latter instability and perceived hostility from Greece's 'near abroad' have enabled domestic actors to utilise high external threat perceptions in order to promote a heavily defensive understanding of national identity which needs religion (and by extension the Greek Orthodox Church) to ensure its survival.
3. **Ireland is shifting away from the Nationalist pattern while Greece is not:**

**Confrontation Versus Co-Optation**

These developments confirm that the divergence between the Irish and Greek cases is contingent on the interaction of two factors, one internal and one external: (a) the degree to which the Church clashes with the modernisation process - the internal factor - and (b) the level of external threat perceptions - the external factor. As a result of the interaction of these internal and external processes, Irish national identity is becoming re-interpreted while its Catholic element is being undermined. On the other hand, Greek national identity remains religious-based and thus ethnically defined.

An examination into the evolution of Irish national identity (chapters 3 and 4), particularly since the early 1990's pointed to major transformations resulting in a shift away from the 'nationalist pattern'. Irish national identity has had to respond to a rapidly changing external and internal environment, and as a result of adapting to new circumstances it has distanced itself from Catholicism. Irish Catholicism has developed in very strict legalistic terms and the Church in Ireland has a history of overpowering the State. The rigid and inflexible Catholic Church in Ireland is incapable of reflecting modern developments in its policies. It cannot easily adapt to an increasingly modernising Irish society. Set in direct confrontation with certain modernising elements of society, such as the liberals, its ability to mobilise the people around religion is being increasingly weakened. Irish nationalism is changing its focus to reflect this. Ireland is seeking ethnic self-renewal elsewhere; this 'elsewhere' is centred in Europe and economic prosperity. In this sense Irish nationalism and Irish national identity are evolving to meet the challenges of modernity and are thus becoming more inclusive, linked to Europeanization and economic progress. In other words, this thesis arrived at the conclusion that by presenting itself as an institution asserting pre-modern values, the Irish Catholic Church has confronted the modern nation; this has effectively undermined its role in shaping national identity.

Greek national identity on the other remains largely religious-based. Where the Church is flexible and adaptable to the secular authority it is better able to secure its position and mobilise the people under the umbrella of a common religious national identity. Greek national identity is portrayed and perceived as vulnerable, under threat and in need of defence. The Greek Orthodox Church draws its power from utilising popular perceptions of
a Greek national identity under threat. This enables it to mobilise the people on national matters; as long as the Church in Greece shows flexibility and ability to change and adapt, its power remains, because above all it functions as a rallying point for Greek nationalism. This explains the Church’s resilience and ongoing status as defender of Greek national identity. In other words, the Greek Orthodox Church has co-opted the modern secular nation rather than confronting it by continuing to present itself as an institution asserting pre-modern values and forms of order. As a result, the Orthodox element of Greek national identity is being enhanced.

See for example Image 1: The Metropolis, Athens.

This image appears on the front page of the Greek Orthodox Church’s website. It captures perfectly the essence of the Church’s self-image, and by extension the way it attempts to project this image as an integral part of the longue durée of Hellenism. The message it attempts to transmit is that the Church is inseparable from the Greek nation and this bond has enjoyed a perfect continuity through time. This discourse therefore merges- in perfect continuity and synchrony- the classical and Byzantine narratives of the Greek nation into a single narrative.

The thesis therefore has identified two different patterns of development with regard to the Greek and Irish cases, as illustrated in Figure 1 below:
4. **Official Discourse**

Chapter 5 examined the interaction of these internal (modernisation) and external (threat perceptions) processes on official discourse—particularly education. The results are striking, as they seem to challenge the view that both Greece and Ireland remain two religious nationalist countries of a very similar type. Especially since the 1990’s, the way religion is portrayed through official discourse is vastly different in the two cases.

Indeed, the nationalist element of Catholicism is profoundly downplayed in Irish education. By and large, the promotion of religion takes the form of a ‘moral monopoly’, focusing on
the adherence to strict Catholic rules and regulations. Education relies on a vast apparatus of religious personnel teaching Catholic values to the Irish people. This teaching of Catholic values is confined to the religious education curriculum, and not other subjects, such as history. The system is particularly decentralised, as there is no single textbook commissioned by the State compulsory for all schools across the country. In addition, proposed history textbooks are hardly nationalistic, while the role of Catholicism in shaping Irish national identity is not at all stressed. As a result, the curriculum fails to promote a Catholic-based Irish national identity, while at the same time the Church’s control of the education system has suffered profoundly given the decline in the numbers of vocations and religious personnel. In addition, declining external threat perceptions have reduced the need to rally around an exclusive, ethnic national identity. Instead, the need for conciliation emphasised by developments such as the Good Friday agreement have put forward a portrayal of religion as an inclusive force and hence there is a shift towards the presentation of a civic version of Irish national identity, rather than a religious, ethnic and exclusive one.

In Greece, on the other hand, the education system focuses extensively on the promotion of Greek Orthodox identity. The teaching of religion relies not on the religious education curriculum or a vast apparatus of religious personnel, but on a highly centralised history curriculum which portrays Greek history, the Greek nation and Orthodoxy as inseparable. Therefore, a decline in the numbers of vocations and religious personnel have hardly affected the Church’s control of the education system, while high external threat perceptions deriving form Greece’s geopolitical environment strengthen the need to portray Greek national identity as vulnerable, and present Orthodoxy as pivotal for the survival and continuation of the nation. Hence, a religious, ethnic and exclusive form of national identity is re-produced by the Greek education system.

5. Church Discourse

An analysis of Church discourse in the two case studies in chapter 6 derived a similar conclusion: Church narratives reflect official narratives, i.e. those put forward by State institutions, such as the school system. The discourses of the Greek and Irish Churches respectively are vastly different. On the one hand, the Greek Orthodox Church bases its discourse and self-defence almost exclusively on the link between Orthodoxy and the nation. The emphasis is historical, premised on the link between Greek national identity and religion throughout the centuries. By utilising Greece’s high external threat
perceptions, the Church puts forward a nationalistic narrative according to which the Greek nation is under a perpetual threat of extinction, and the Orthodox Church, as one of the principal carriers of Hellenism, is pivotal in keeping the nation alive. Should the power of the Orthodox Church decline, the Greek nation will perish. This highly nationalistic narrative helps maintain the status quo of the reproduction of an ethnic, exclusive and religious Greek national identity. The Irish Catholic Church on the other hand places its focus extensively on a strict adherence to Catholic rules and regulations, but little on a nationalist narrative that stresses the link between Catholicism and Irish national identity. At times of crisis, the Church attempts to defend itself on religious and doctrinal grounds, not nationalist. Declining external threat perceptions have served to reduce the ability of the Church to portray itself as the principal carrier of a threatened and vulnerable Irish national identity. If anything, improving relations with Britain and the need to maintain the Northern Ireland peace process have enhanced the need to put forward a conciliatory repertoire which stresses values such as inclusivity and multi-culturalism.

3. A Note on the Potential for Reversal of the Patterns

The thesis presented here does not claim that the patterns identified are necessarily irreversible or static. The model proposed is neither deterministic, linear nor universal. The very fact that the relationship between religion and politics in Greece and Ireland is dependent to a great extent on national identity and the fact that the re-interpretation of national identity is itself a dynamic process implies that the patterns identified are susceptible to change. Such change is contingent on a shift in either of the two variables—that is, the degree to which the Church obstructs the modernisation process and external threat perceptions—which the thesis has identified as crucial in national identity reproduction for cases where religion and nationalism are inextricably linked. In other words, this thesis argues that the conditions under which a case enters and remains in the 'nationalist pattern' may shift, and as a result secularisation processes may become more likely. It should be noted however that the thesis also argues that once the relationship between national identity and religion is weakened it is highly unlikely it will be restored. In agreement with Bruce,

It is important to note that all major cultural defence cases involve religion (or the Church) continuing to play a role as the embodiment of collective identity. None of them is an example of religion acquiring this role after it has been lost. Where Church has become separated from State, or religion has become privatised (to put it more generally) because of the press of
Therefore a reversal of the Greek pattern is considered likely, while a reversal of the Irish pattern is considered unlikely.

Neither of the two variables identified above affecting the bond between religion and national identity in Ireland are likely to change in a way so as to restore the relationship between religion and national identity. As far as the degree to which the Church obstructs the modernisation process is concerned, although the Church could become more willing to shift to a more flexible discourse, and hence shift away from its intense focus on the maintenance of strict Catholic rules and regulations, it has few choices. As illustrated in chapter 3, the Irish Catholic Church finds itself in a similar situation to what Huntington (1968) has termed ‘The King’s dilemma’: Given the fact that it has long asserted itself and premised its power on a high degree of conservatism in order to maintain its status, and even to modernise, a centralisation of power is required. But, this centralisation ‘makes difficult or impossible the expansion of the power of the traditional polity and the assimilation into it of the new groups produced by modernisation’ (Huntington, 1968: 177) In other words, a liberalising policy would serve to alienate the Church from its remaining sources of support while it would not restore support where it has already been lost, i.e. among liberalising sectors of society. Maintaining its highly conservative discourse on the other hand would only continue to alienate it from these increasingly popular liberal forces and contribute to a further decline in its legitimacy. A third option would be pursuing a more nationalistic discourse, but that is also limited for the Irish Catholic Church given the lack of external threat perceptions. This option is becoming increasingly difficult as external threat perceptions are likely to remain low given Irish and British membership of the EU, Irish economic success and most importantly the removal of the most important obstacle of Anglo-Irish relations, i.e. the Northern Irish question.

With respect to Greece however, a reversal of the pattern is more likely, especially in terms of a shift in the level of external threat perceptions and the consequences this would entail for the ways in which domestic actors can use these threats.
A Potential Decline in External Threat Perceptions:

A gradual improvement in the relations with Greece's neighbours, including Turkey and the Balkans, especially in the form of economic co-operation may result in a decline in Greece's external threat perceptions. Indeed at least at the elite level, Greece's bilateral relationship with Turkey and the Balkans is improving. Greece is pursuing a foreign direct investment policy, mainly concentrated in infrastructure, utilities and public works, cement and tobacco, food and beverages, mining and marble extraction, banking and commerce and the energy sector. For example, in March 2002, Greece and Turkey signed a bilateral agreement to connect their electricity grids via a transmission line linking Filippí in Greece with Hamidabad in Turkey; in October 2004, Bulgaria, Russia, Turkey and Greece signed an energy cooperation programme to boost Russian gas transit across Bulgaria to Turkey, Greece, Serbia and Macedonia; in July 2005 Turkey and Greece agreed to build a 186-mile pipeline transporting natural gas from the Caspian region and Central Asia, and linking Karacabey in Turkey to Komotini; and in the summer of 2006 Greece bought a Turkish bank. In addition, the removal of the Greek veto on Turkey's EU accession and the possibility of a future Turkish EU membership also have the potential to improve relations between the two countries and decrease the Greek sense of a Turkish threat both to its identity and territorial integrity. Turkey's EU entry is contingent on solving a series of territorial disputes between Turkey and Greece, something which could potentially significantly improve relations between the two countries.

Educational Reforms:

The formulation of the content of the textbooks is to an extent dependent on Greece's geopolitical environment. A decline in external threat perceptions in the form of improving relations with Greece's neighbours may be reflected in Greek education in the same way as improving relations with Britain and the solution of the Northern Irish question are being reflected in Irish education and condition the Church to pursue a more inclusive conciliatory discourse. As has been shown in chapter 5, official State discourse, and more specifically the education system, is instrumental in the consolidation, maintenance and reproduction of national identity. It is through the education system, and in particular the content of history textbooks, that the State and/or the Church attempts to forge a sense of vulnerable and imperilled national identity which requires high levels of mobilisation around its principal signifiers (in this case religion) in order to survive. In this context,
domestic actors can ‘utilise’ external threat perceptions by stressing the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and emphasising the pivotal role of the principal carriers of national identity in the survival, both past and present, of the nation and its distinctive national features. Chapter 5 illustrated that as opposed to Ireland where the education system no longer focuses on the role of Catholicism in the emergence, formation, consolidation and survival of the Irish nation, in Greece history textbooks are characterised by a highly nationalistic repertoire which relies greatly on portraying the Orthodox Church as essential to the survival of the Greek nation. Given that education has been identified in this thesis as a significant tool through which the utilisation of external threat perceptions can take place to favour the position of the Church, educational reforms could reverse this phenomenon.

As has already been mentioned in chapters 3 and 5, a series of reforms regarding the content of a primary school history textbook, introduced in September 2006 have thus far been significantly contested and failed to alter the status quo. The fact however that such reforms were made possible in the first place does indicate that a degree (even a very low degree) of change is taking place. Despite the fact that these reforms did not succeed, they did initiate a debate which is ongoing within media and academic circles. The existence of this debate highlights the fact that secularisation forces exist in Greece. A more successful drive for educational reforms has the potential of significantly undermining the role of the Church, as the education system is one of the principal institutions responsible for the dissemination of a religious-based national identity in Greece.

The likelihood of such developments, however, at least in the short run should not be overestimated. Turkey’s EU membership remains a long-term project, while a number of disputes between the two countries, including among others the Cyprus question, the status of the Muslim minority in Thrace and the Aegean continental shelf remain serious issues of contention between the two countries and continue to generate a high sense of threat in Greece. In addition, high external threat perceptions on which domestic actors such as the Church can base their mobilising attempts are not confined to Turkey and the Balkans as Greece’s enemies and threatening ‘national others’. As has been shown in chapter 6, the Church has a broad set of threats to draw on which also include the forces of globalisation, the US, international Zionism, and the large numbers of immigrants that have entered Greece in the past decade.
4. The Contribution of the Thesis and Directions for Future Research

The Contribution of the Thesis to the Study of Greece and Ireland and Directions for Future Research

The relevance of the thesis is both case-specific and broader. As a starting point, the thesis has contributed to the specific study of the role of religion (and by extension, the Church) in Greece and Ireland respectively. It has contributed to the understanding of the continuing relevance and legitimacy of the Orthodox Church in Greece and the ways this is linked to the mechanisms of national identity reproduction. It has also contributed to the development of an explanatory framework of the Irish case by linking the decline of the legitimacy and political relevance of the Irish Catholic Church to national identity reproduction and re-interpretation. In doing so it has compared and contrasted a number of themes which are associated with the relationship between religion and national identity in the two case studies. Given the confines of space however, it has not been possible to provide an in-depth analysis of all the concepts presented here. This concluding section provides an excellent opportunity to point to directions for future research in the study of the relationship between religion and national identity in Greece and Ireland.

One issue deserving greater attention with respect to the two specific cases is the role of charisma in Church mobilisation. The thesis has shown the ways in which the charismatic personality of Archbishop Christodoulos is able to play on high external threat perceptions in order to successfully mobilise the people in favour of the Church. Chapter 6 hinted at the question of whether charismatic authority is more significant for Orthodoxy whereas Catholicism relies more on traditional moral leadership. The focus here however has been on high external threat perceptions and how they enable domestic actors to utilise them in their favour. Further research could broaden the debate by exploring in greater detail and shedding new light on the more general relationship between the charismatic personality and Church mobilisation or leadership styles more generally.

In addition the thesis has analysed the rapid transformation Ireland is undergoing on a political, economic and social level which have served to weaken the legitimacy of the Irish Catholic Church. The weakening of the bond between the Catholic Church and Irish society however is being reflected far more greatly in popular opinion, for example in the rapid decline of religious practice and a significant shift in the attitudes and choices of the Irish people, but less on an institutional level, most importantly the constitution. In other words,
although several amendments of De Valera’s 1937 constitution since the 1970’s (on issues such as abortion, divorce and the removal of Article 44.2) are pivotal in illustrating the fact that the power of the Irish Catholic Church is in decline- given precisely the importance of the Church’s control of Irish society on these issues- the sharp process of ‘changing values’ has not been equally reflected in the constitution. This opens new avenues for research; an inquiry into why the constitutional reflection of the changing relationship between organised religion and Irish society is taking place at a slower pace than social attitudes, could pave the way for drawing conclusions, both specifically about the Irish case and more generally, regarding the relationship between social attitudes and political institutions.

Finally, the thesis has highlighted the fact the Irish national identity is taking a new direction. The focus, however, has been on organised religion as an ethnic element of Irish national identity and on the causes behind the recent shift of Irish national identity from a predominately ethnic to an increasingly civic interpretation and the consequences of this development for religion and by extension for the role of the Catholic Church in Irish society. It would be interesting to research further into the new direction of Irish national identity in its civic form: its new components and signifiers, and the dynamics of national identity reproduction. In this context, it would also be of great significance to examine the phenomenon of the privatisation of religion and the rise of new sects and underground Churches and analyse the role such interpretations of religion could play in the new direction of Irish national identity.

The Broader Contribution of the Thesis and Directions for Future Research

The relevance of the thesis is, most importantly, broader. Whilst it has not meant to provide an all-inclusive, universal explanatory framework, it has shown that Greece and Ireland constitute cases from which we might hypothesise more generally about the relationship between religion and politics. For one thing, Ireland is a very interesting case precisely because confirms the secularisation paradigm to a great extent. It is exhibiting a rapid decline in religious practice mainly among young, educated male city-dwellers, a sharp drop in the numbers of vocations and a significant drive for separating the social, religious and political spheres. Given the recent waves of religious resurgence in certain areas of the globe, it is currently widely accepted among academic circles that the secularisation paradigm is erroneous, and that modernity is instead resulting in a world-wide reaffirmation of religious values. Despite the admittedly large number of examples of this phenomenon
however, which tend to attract most media attention and make the headlines, Ireland serves as a reminder that counter cases do exist and are significant. Most importantly it is an interesting case because it constitutes an example of an increasingly successful drive for secularisation where the latter was considered least likely; a case where the inextricable link between religion and national identity was expected to safeguard the political relevance and popular endorsement of the Church preventing secularisation forces from succeeding. Hence a comparison with Greece, also a case where secularisation is expected least likely given the bond between nation and religion, is instructive as it highlights the extent to which the secularisation versus the ‘return of God’ debate is critical in the contemporary world. As part of contributing to this debate, this thesis has suggested an additional dimension to the secularisation paradigm which identifies the conditions under which secularising processes may or may not become likely in cases where secularisation has initially been inhibited given a strong identification of the nation with religion. By doing so, it has provided a starting point which opens up possibilities for future research on the more general topic of the contemporary role of religion in modernising societies.

Wider Applicability of the Model:

The cases of Ireland and Greece were chosen and analysed in detail precisely because they constitute pertinent examples of the adverse effect of modernisation in societies where initially religion has functioned as one of the principal sources of national self-identification. Although the proposed model is by no means universal, a further comparison with other cases could be instrumental in illustrating its wider applicability. A number of other cases may apply to the model. It is particularly instructive to consider other cases identified as belonging to the ‘nationalist pattern’, including Israel, Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Poland (Martin 1978, 2005; Bruce 2002).

Cyprus for example is particularly interesting. It constitutes a case where secularisation has been inhibited given the close link between religion and national identity. In other words, it is an instance of the ‘cultural defence’ or ‘nationalist pattern’. Important distinctions with the Irish and Greek cases- namely the division and occupation of the North-notwithstanding, it exhibits important similarities including the formation of a religious-based national identity during the era of imperial rule when religion was the demarcating line between ‘us’ and the imperial ‘other’, and its consolidation during the nation-building process. High external threat perceptions deriving mainly from the former imperial core,
Turkey, have served to strengthen the role of the Church as the principal carrier of national identity and as a result the Church has been able to maintain its status quo position and legitimacy. The threat posed by Turkey and its occupation of the North of the island enable the Church to mobilise the people around Orthodox Cypriot identity and against the Turkish 'national other'. This is well illustrated by the 2004 referendum, an attempt to unite the island of Cyprus which was rejected by 74% of the Greek-Cypriot population, effectively on the basis of an exclusive and ethnically/religiously defined Greek-Cypriot national identity. Cyprus therefore may be explained similarly to Greece as a case where secularisation is failing to take place given the perpetuation of a religiously-ethnically based national identity, as illustrated in table 2. Further research into Cypriot example and other cultural defence cases would illustrate the strengths and limitations of the model proposed here. An examination into the relationship between religion and the dynamics of national identity change in other cases belonging to the nationalist pattern and more specifically the extent to which the conditions under which the legitimacy of the Church is strengthened or weakened are related to the interaction between the degree to which the Church obstructs the modernisation process and external threat perceptions will address the issue of the wider applicability of the model thus furthering the debate to a greater extent.

Table 2: Wider applicability of the Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Threat</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Obstructs Modernisation</td>
<td>Greece&lt;br&gt;Israel&lt;br&gt;Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Conclusion

On this significant Saturday, with the Cross of St George flying alongside the Ulster flag and Irish Tricolour, England came to Croke Park to play a non-Gaelic game. There was tension in the air. And now, here we were, minutes away from a rendition of God Save the Queen ... The Hogan stand, named in memory of the young Tipperary footballer killed in that massacre ... Hill 16, built on the rubble taken from O'Connell Street after the Easter Rising ... Oh, passions were high alright. But only about the game. But, why? The Ireland-England rugby match at Croke Park will go down in history as the day that we demonstrated a confidence amongst ourselves as a nation, a generous sense of Irishness, a belief in our sovereignty as an independent State, a pride in our achievements in the Celtic Tiger years and, above all, a national affirmation that we are in command of our destiny. British occupation is a thing of the distant past' (Irish Times Editorial page, Monday, February 26th 2007).

Croke Park Stadium is a cornerstone symbol of the anti-British element of Irish national identity. Named in honour of Archbishop Thomas Croke, it epitomises the struggle against Britain during the Irish national self-determination movement, and Ireland’s fight for liberty. Partly built from the rubble of the 1916 Easter Rising, the stadium witnessed the shooting of fourteen Irish people—thirteen spectators and the Tipperary Captain Michael Hogan in whose honour the Hogan stand is named—by British forces during a match in 1920. Given its status as a symbol of the struggle for independence, foreign games such as rugby were banned until recently. The events that took place at Croke Park Stadium on February 24th 2007 illustrate perfectly Ireland’s shift towards a more tolerant, inclusive, non-defensive and non-vulnerable national identity; they constitute an example of a shift towards an increasingly civic manifestation of Irishness.

This thesis has arrived at the conclusion that the shift in Irish national identity is a core explanation for the declining role of the Irish Catholic Church. It has identified a key difference between the Irish and Greek cases precisely in the connecting thread between secularisation and national identity. In short, within an increasingly more civic understanding of Irishness the role of religion is changing dramatically and by extension the power and legitimacy of the Catholic Church in Irish society is declining. In contrast, Greek national identity continues to be defined along ethnic/religious lines, a fact which
has entailed the perpetuation of the ‘nationalist pattern’ and maintained the bond between nation and religion.

More generally therefore, in cases where religion has been salient given its strong identification with the nation, the circumstances under which religion may remain or cease to be politically active and legitimate are contingent on the dynamics of national identity change and the factors that influence such change. The brake that nationalism puts on secularisation may be gradually removed where there is a high degree of Church obstruction of the modernisation process on the one hand, and a declining sense of external threat on the other. It is unlikely it will cease to function however in cases where there is a low degree of Church obstruction of the modernisation process combined with a high sense of external threat. The question of whether the model generated from this thesis through the contrast between the cases of Greece and Ireland has a wider applicability is one that needs to be addressed. But precisely by pointing to new angles and opening up directions for future research, the thesis has contributed to the debate on the contemporary relationship between national identity, religion and politics.
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The Athens Rally, Athens City Centre, June 21st 2000, Courtesy of the Athens News Agency Photo Archives Department

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