The London School of Economics and Political Science

**Within Borders, Beyond Borders:**
The Bergama Movement at the Junction of Local, National and Transnational Practices

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A thesis submitted to the Department Sociology of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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London, January 2012
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Abstract

This thesis sets out to examine how local environmental movements mobilize to engage a new intertwined national and global context in which capitalist globalization has intensified major problems, in particular social and economic inequalities and ecological degradation. In their struggles, local movements mobilize beyond their local and/or national borders, inserting themselves into transnational networks. A representative of such struggles, as I argue in the thesis, is the Bergama movement.

The Bergama Movement, a local environmental movement struggling against a transnational gold-mining company in Western Turkey, is analyzed based on an extensive field research reflecting the geographical scope of and the diversity of actors involved in the movement. The research aims to understand the interrelated dimensions of a social movement such as initial mobilization, mobilizing structures, framing, identity construction, and political opportunities; embedding it in a new political and social context in which structures and practices at varying levels of politics become enmeshed. Thus, the thesis shows that making clear-cut distinctions between the local, the national and the global, is inadequate in understanding local movements which challenge actors of capitalist globalization. The contribution of this thesis lies in using the case of the Bergama movement to unpack the interrelated dynamics involved in enmeshed scales of doing politics.

In that regard, I show that national and transnational actors align themselves, as in the case of the state in Turkey and transnational mining corporations, in a pro-mine network, while the Bergama activists have formed an extensive movement network by forging links with global civil society actors, external political parties, supranational and international organizations and the media who challenge capitalist globalization. Witnessing that their national political context is being restructured under capitalist globalization, they extensively utilize transnational political opportunities and define themselves as part of a general anti-capitalist globalization struggle.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The last decade of the twentieth century has witnessed a plethora of mobilizations against capitalist globalization which have continued into the new century, spreading into new geographies and grievances. Groups as different as transnational activists in Seattle, Genoa, Prague, Washington D.C., indigenous populations in Chiapas, Indian peasants in the Narmada Valley, rubber tappers in Brazil, and Ogoni people in Nigeria contend capitalist globalization which has created major crises such as increasing inequalities, weakening democratic participation and degrading environment. Similarly, the Bergama peasants in Turkey have joined the heterogeneous coalition of local social movements, transnational networks, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs), and traditional organizations such as labour unions and farmer associations all of which is referred to as the Global Justice Movement (GJM) as a ‘movement of movements’, not withstanding its diverse structure (Smith and Johnston, 2002; Sklair, 2002; della Porta et al., 2006; della Porta, 2007; Rootes and Saunders, 2007; Smith, 2008).

Among these demonstrations, the Seattle protest against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999 is a significant turning point in terms of the emergence of a ‘new’ type of social movement – the transnational social movement. The crucial aspect of the Seattle protest is that it was the first time these diverse contentions were channelled and expressed in a single protest. Thus, the protest in Seattle was the organized action of an increasingly coordinated and powerful movement against neoliberal globalization rather than an isolated, spontaneous event (Khagram et. al, 2002; Smith, 2002). With the Seattle protest, new forms of repertoire, mobilization, and targets emerged. It is also significant in the sense that it raised and solidified the demands from below for involvement in the restructuring of world politics (Smith, 2002).

Subsequently, the movement networks intensified and extended at the transnational level, while at the same time reaching out to and establishing links with local movements.
Among these local movements, environmental conflicts have become prevalent as the ecological crisis deepened, in part due to the impact of capitalist globalization. In most environmental movements, the central actors are local people who are discontented with the degradation of their environment which they frame in terms of discontent with globalization. The main environmental issues that are contested in such movements are deforestation, dam projects, local rights to resources, pollution, toxic contamination of land and water, and mining. There are many examples of local environmental social movements all around the world such as the social movement against deforestation in Sarawak, Malaysia (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), resistance of Amungme and Kamoro people against copper and gold mines in Indonesia (Abrash, 2000), the anti-dam movement in Southern Brazil (Rothman and Oliver, 2002), the anti-mine movement in Thessaloniki, Greece (http://antigoldgreece.tripod.com/en/id6.htm), and anti-mine movements in Latin America (www.minewatch.org). The Bergama movement is also a local environmental movement against gold mining with cyanide leach method which has contested the mining TNCs on the grounds that they have attacked their livelihood and their right to a healthy life. It is reminiscent of environmental justice movements which perceive existing social organizations as the cause and the empowerment of the locals as the remedy for environmental injustice (Rootes, 2004). Yet it is more than a local environmental justice movement since it has become integrated into the transnational political sphere.

All of these local social movements plug themselves into a campaign, social movement and/or advocacy network at the global level. The degree of their involvement and the way they link themselves vary depending on the different political opportunities they face and the nature of the specific movement. Nevertheless, they are important actors in the global politics which is being restructured. As they take part in this restructuration, the political environment in which they are embedded changes, offering new political opportunity sets.
Hence, the analysis of these local social movements is crucial for understanding the restructuration of world politics.

**Theoretical Framework:**

The analysis of political contexts has been the contemporary dominant trend within the social movement literature. As its name implies, political opportunity structures (POS) analysis has been examining social movements by focusing on political structures in which social movements emerge and are sustained. These POS are national ones. On the other hand, general world politics as we know it has entered a period of restructuration as a result of the diffusion of the globalization process. The nation-state based model of doing politics has been changing in certain aspects as new actors emerge demanding inclusion into world politics such as INGOs, TSMOs, local movements and other transnational organizations (Held et al., 1999; Beck, 1999; Sklair, 2002; Sassen, 2003, Smith, 2004). The conflicts as well as their solutions are becoming more transnational. These new actors’ political targets revolve around similar sets of issues such as the environment, human rights, women’s rights and labour which go beyond borders. Moreover, the relations between different levels of politics -local, national, and transnational - have deepened, blurring distinctions among them. As Della Porta and Kriesi (2009: 4) claim, “…globalization implies an intensification in the cross-national spread of political conflicts, the transnational political relations, the role of international relations and supranational political institutions, and the relevance of international issues in national politics”. These developments have affected social movements as well. The implications of this change are twofold. First, there are newly emerging transnational social movements and thickening transnational advocacy networks. Second, the way in which both local and transnational social movements are formed has changed. Hence, it is absolutely crucial to integrate global opportunities in interaction with national and local opportunities.
into our understanding to analyze not only transnational movements but also local social movements.

Until recently, social movements have been studied from a nation-state perspective by the dominant approaches in the field—these being the Resource Mobilization Approach (RM), New Social Movements Theories (NSM), and Political Opportunity Structures (POS)/Political Process Theory (PPT). Among these approaches, it is the POS/PPT theory which has become prevalent in analyzing social movements which explains their emergence, continuation, and success based on political opportunities and/or constraints (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996; Diani and della Porta, 2006; Tarrow, 2011). The POS comprises of the political institutions and the political relations surrounding a social movement which either become opportunities or constraints by opening or closing avenues of contention for social movements. In its revised version, POS/PPT incorporates mobilizing structures and framing processes in addition to political structures. Repertoires of contention, organization/mobilizing structures, identity and political opportunities are interdependent according to the synthesis model. As such, it provides us with a more comprehensive model for social movement analysis compared to earlier approaches mentioned above. Yet, the analysis is to a large degree based on national contexts as it has been the national opportunities and constraints which have been the focus of study. Also, the synthesis model has remained state-centric since state is taken as the main political actor within a national political context. In its state-centric form, the synthesis/POS approach does not allow to make the links with macro social, economic, and political changes taking place under capitalist globalization outlined above which have an impact on national contexts. In other words, the state-centric and national context based version of POS/PPT is unable to incorporate globalization-related factors such as the rise of non-state actors and the prevalence of transnational practices. In that regard, the synthesis model fails to take into account the impact
of the enmeshed interactions between the local, national and transnational political spheres on
the mobilizing structures, framing processes and political opportunities.

More recently, studies which incorporate global opportunities have emerged (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Smith and Johnston, 2002; Sklair, 2002; della Porta et al., 2006; Smith, 2008). Other theorists put emphasis on international organizations as emerging political opportunities and study their relation with domestic opportunities, arguing that they are nested in each other (Meyer, 2003). In general, these theories focus on analyzing and formulating TSMOs and global networks in which local social movements are linked to one another. The general tendency in these studies is to describe global political context as a multi-level polity assuming that there is a hierarchy among these levels. However, theorists of capitalist globalization such as Sklair (2002), Sassen (2007), and Smith (2008) show that capitalist globalization is not a process taking place outside national boundaries which constrains political, economic and social structures and relations at the national level. Rather, some of the national and local actors carry out transnational practices enabling capitalist globalization. In that regard, capitalist globalization brings about a ‘multi-scalar’ political context in which different scales of politics are divided between proponents and challengers of capitalist globalization. However, there is still less focus on the impact of capitalist globalization which transcends and transforms national political contexts and evaluation of local movements with respect to the ‘multi-scalar’ nature of politics. In other words, the question of how global political opportunities enmeshed between local, national, and transnational operate for local social movements needs to be further explored. In order to address this gap, these global political opportunities and the way they affect and transform national and local political opportunities should be researched by examining the interweaving relations between global, national and local opportunities, which is precisely what this dissertation aims to do.
That said, two points should be clarified. First, these changes favourable to local and transnational social movements are not operating evenly across the globe. Second, emphasizing the need to understand how global opportunity structures are impacting and as a result transforming the local, national and global political contexts is not to argue that nation-states have lost all their significance. Instead, the power and ability of nation-states have been re-configured and reshaped under globalization. In relation to this, transnational opportunities/constraints do not exist and facilitate/hinder social movements on their own. The global opportunity set interacts with national opportunities since nation-states are still crucial actors. Opportunities like the composition of elites, the kinds of alliances they form, and states’ openness are affected by these actors’ position toward globalization and global forces. Just as crucial is the fact that framing processes are as indispensable to social movement formation as political opportunities since changes in the political context can become opportunities as long as they are framed as such by movement participants.

In this study, I utilize the political opportunity concept in its extended version which incorporates local, national, and transnational political opportunities. This will allow me to build the linkages between local, national and transnational political opportunities that are enmeshed together, creating a highly dynamic set of transnational practices with multiple and varying interactions. Hence, the main hypothesis is: as a result of global transformations, a) domestic political opportunities change; b) a new set of political opportunities, global political opportunities, emerge; and c) they interact with national and local opportunities creating an enmeshed political opportunities as a whole; and d) one of the likely responses to the changes in politics, economy, and culture is that locally based movements occur through continuous interpretations and framing of these political opportunities.
The case of Bergama:

The anti-gold mine mobilization centered at Bergama provides a good case to analyze the relationship between local movements and enmeshed local, national, and transnational opportunities. Bergama and its surrounding villages lie in Western Turkey, a fertile plain close to the ancient city of Pergamon, its geographical location making it an important region for both agriculture and tourism. The start of the conflict dates back to 1988 when Eurogold, a gold mining transnational company (TNC), made an agreement with the Turkish government in order to search for gold and silver in Turkey, which also included the rights to build and run a mine. Eurogold was aiming to extract approximately 24 tonnes of gold and 24 tonnes of silver in about 8 years (www.mta.gov.tr). The state in Turkey has made all decisions concerning the operation of the Ovacık goldmine and has granted all permissions without consulting with the local people. The controversy about mining in the region appeared because of the method the company would use, i.e. cyanide leach method. Gold mining has been a controversial issue all around the world which entails major risks for the environment and human health. These risks mainly arise from the cyanide-leach method, a.k.a. heap-leach method, used predominantly in the gold-mining industry to decompose gold from soil. It is estimated that in order to produce one ounce of gold 79 tonnes of waste is produced (Earthworks and Oxfam America, 2004). The major method used for eliminating waste in the mining industry is to dump waste in tailing ponds and leave them in open air to dissolve back into nature which is a prolonged process taking hundreds of years. Mining activities in Bergama started with the operations of Eurogold, in Ovacık, 10 kilometres away from the...
town of Bergama when it initiated the project of constructing a gold mine in Ovacık, Bergama. Apart from the direct presence of TNCs in Ovacık, other TNCs and international banks were also involved in the construction and running of the Ovacık gold mine either as financial supporters, indirect partners, or providers of substances and materials for mining operations such as Germany based Degusta, Ohio based INCO, Dresdnerbank, and Metall Mining Corporation (Arsel 2005; Taşkın, 1998).

Given the transnational character of the Ovacık gold mine, contention over the gold mining activities in Bergama was mainly directed towards the TNCs. The conflict in Bergama emerged gradually as the peasants became aware of the risks of cyanide leach method with the involvement of environmentalists and local political activists, especially the mayor of Bergama who played an indispensable role in initiating and later maintaining the mobilization. The Bergama movement activists claimed that cyanide leach method would have hazardous impacts on their environment, health, and livelihood. The aim of this growing movement was declared as preventing Eurogold from carrying out its mining activities in the region. They defined their struggle against the TNCs in two master frames of environmentalism and human rights.

They carried out their contention in four major areas: science, judiciary, grassroots, and institutional politics. The movement network also operated across local, national, and transnational political spheres. Thus, the mobilization spanned all four areas at all levels of politics which have in fact become enmeshed in capitalist globalization so as to interact with and shape each other in a multidirectional manner, as I illustrate with the case of Bergama. In the area of science, they have collected and used data provided by scientists and CSOs both in national and transnational spheres which they have used to boost their credibility and legitimacy as well as invalidate the claims of the TNCs. In the area of legal action, struggle continued throughout the movement with Bergama activists gaining favourable court
decisions repeatedly which were not implemented as a result of the lack of will of national governments to drive out the TNCs. Grassroots activism revolved around non-violent civil disobedience acts staged in innovative repertoires which proved crucial for warding off state repression, attracting the attention of the media and gaining the support of the public. Finally, the quest for allies at the national and transnational levels to use as political opportunities proved more fruitful at the transnational level while national politics remained relatively closed to the demands of the peasants. The participants of the movement were the peasants, members of the local elite, representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs), scientists and politicians at the national level, representatives of INGOs, external political parties and members of the European Parliament, scientists and journalists from abroad. Other groups such as unions, CSOs and individual environmentalists at the national level have been for the most part sporadic supporters, albeit with some exceptions. Concomitantly, the Bergama movement activists successfully carried their contention to the transnational sphere, involving renowned scientists working on the hazardous impact of the cyanide leach method, green members of the European Parliament, German Greens, representatives of INGOs, and journalists whose support for the movement increased its visibility, bringing it to the agenda of the transnational public and supranational political institutions which, in turn, intensified the pressure on the TNCs. Despite all these efforts which lasted for 9 years, the Bergama movement demobilized in 2003 without achieving its stated-goal of closing the Ovacık gold mine.

However, the Bergama movement cannot be dismissed as a complete failure. The Bergama movement exemplifies a local movement which successfully developed and sustained its mobilization, in addition to achieving unintended, indirect, and partial outcomes, despite its failure to realize its stated-goal. This success in mobilization occurred at a time of neo-liberalization which has been transforming the political and economic structures in
Turkey since the 1980s. More specifically, The Bergama movement was able to emerge when the domination of the pro-capitalist globalizers left little room for the locals who were suffering from the developments related to capitalist globalization in Turkey. Additionally, the local population in Bergama did not have any prior experience in activism including land-based conflicts. The land structure in the Bergama villages is based on small land-holdings owned by self-sufficient peasantry. On average, a household unit possesses 15 to 20 thousand square meters of land.4 The agricultural production is rich in terms of variety of products including exportable items.5 The prevalence of a market-oriented small peasantry and the application of populist-protective policies revolving around clientelistic relations particularly with the right-wing parties hindered the formation of peasant movements in the history of Turkey. Furthermore, even though Turkey has been going through a neo-liberalization process from the 1980s on, significant levels of structural adjustments in the rural sector arrived as late as in the aftermath of the 1999 economic crisis. Unchanged land structure and the continuation of protective measures until the late 1990s were the main reasons why peasant mobilizations found elsewhere were not widely found in Turkey.6 Therefore, the Bergama peasants lacked any movement networks or experiences which would have a spill-over effect for their movement. In combination with the unpromising national political context which is dominated by the pro-capitalist globalization actors, the absence of pre-existing movement networks of peasants made the conditions for mobilization unfavourable. Yet, the Bergama movement was capable of seizing opportunities simultaneously at the local, national, and

4There is a variation in the amount of land owned by peasants. The number of landless peasants is relatively small. The landless peasants earn their livelihood either by working on the land of others or by carrying out non-agricultural activities in the villages. Nevertheless, the differences in the amount of land owned are not significant enough to create land disputes.

5Please see Appendix C for the agricultural products of the region.

6It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to analyze peasant movements against capitalist globalization. Briefly, peasants mobilized against the adverse impacts of capitalist globalization in Central America, India, and Europe. Peasants organized locally against subsidy cuts, global trade policies, fiscal measures, genetically modified organisms, and environmental and health aspects of agriculture. These peasant and farmer organizations forged links at the regional and global levels among themselves. La Via Campesina is the most well-known transnational peasant network (Edelman, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Boras et al., 2008). Recently, Çiftçi-Sen, a confederation of farmers’ unions representing around 20 thousand farmers from Turkey, joined in the network.
transnational levels which led to the development and sustenance of a successful mobilization. Within the enmeshed scales of politics, the Bergama activists were able to overcome their disadvantages with respect to national level opportunities with the facilitative impact of transnational and local opportunities. This successful mobilization process was a true inspiration for local communities both at the national and transnational levels. In Turkey, the Bergama movement was followed by a wide range of local movements mobilizing over various issues such as mining, large dam constructions, hydroelectric, thermal, and nuclear power plant projects. These subsequent movements adopted many of the strategies and tactics innovated and introduced by the Bergama movement. In that sense, the Bergama movement ignited a series of rural based environmental movements combining environmental and human rights concerns. This spill-over effect reached out to the Halkidiki movement in Northern Greece. Once a scattered uprising using violence as the only means against the gold mining companies in their region, the Halkidiki movement activists started utilizing litigation processes and moving their contention to the transnational level with the influence of the Bergama activists. Therefore, the Bergama movement acted as a progenitor movement for other local mobilizations surrounding its area both inside and outside Turkey. In sum, it is a successful case in terms of developing and maintaining mobilization which deserves an in-depth analysis.

**Research Questions:**

My first analytic concern is to integrate macroeconomic, social and political changes that capitalist globalization brings into the political process theory in the social movements literature to achieve a better understanding of contentious politics. My second theoretical aim is to analyze a grassroots political response to the transforming local, national and transnational political spheres which have become enmeshed.
In that regard, the focus of my research is to analyze the emergence and sustenance of the Bergama mobilization under capitalist globalization which uses and furthers intertwined local, national, and transnational opportunities. Therefore my central research questions are:

a. How does a disadvantaged and deprived local population suffering from capitalist globalization mobilize and sustain that mobilization within a changing political context? What is the relevance of mobilizing structures, framing, and enmeshed political opportunities?

b. Why and how do strategies change throughout the mobilization in relation to the dynamic interplay of enmeshed political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes?

More specifically, the objectives of the study are:

1. to explore the ways in which the locals of Bergama interpret changing domestic political opportunities in relation to capitalist globalization and the emerging global political opportunity/constraint sets, and the interaction between the two;

2. to investigate the ways in which they try to manipulate these different levels of political opportunities and show that, in fact, rather than separate distinct levels, what exists is a nexus of local-national-global opportunity sets which are enmeshed together. Given this interwoven structure with multiple interactions, how do they transform their contention into collective action?

3. to analyze the ways they try to expand these opportunities through the social movement process. Thus, the main theoretical question of the study is: How do local people encounter, and interpret transnational practices that weave through so-called local, national, and global political opportunities, blurring their distinctions? In what ways are they likely to respond and become pro-active forces in the process?

Methodology:
In this section, I will explain what kinds of research methods I have chosen and why I find them appropriate for the study. I will also give a detailed account of the fieldwork including how the interviews were conducted, who was interviewed, the geographical scope of the fieldwork and the challenges encountered during the fieldwork.

As research strategy, a single case study is conducted. Since the research aim necessitates both exploratory and explanatory questions such as “How were the political opportunities interpreted and framed?” , “How did the contention turn into collective action?”, “Why did it occur?” and “As a continuing process, how can it be placed within the general political sphere?”, the case study is an appropriate research strategy for the purposes of this research (Yin, 1994). The main problem that has been posed for the case study approach is the question of generalization. However, the distinction between theoretical generalization and statistical generalization is drawn. Case studies involve theoretical generalization which aims “to expand and generalize theories” rather than statistical generalizations which aim “to enumerate frequencies” (Snow et al., 2002: 164). As such, the research is designed to achieve theoretical refinement, modifying certain aspects of the political opportunity theory by introducing a novel approach with new case material.

In the study, I have used qualitative research methods for data collection. The fieldwork consists of both in-depth interviews and participant observation as well as documentation analysis. The aim of qualitative interviewing is to understand and map out the values, relations, beliefs and attitudes in a social context from the social actor’s point of view (Gaskell, 2001). Thus, by using qualitative interviews, a thick description of participants’ interpretation and framing of the political opportunity structures as well as their motivations, expectations, and identity formation was obtained which will be interpreted and conceptualized in the data analysis process. Furthermore, qualitative interviews have provided detailed narratives of both the historical process of the Bergama movement, facts such as
responses to opportunity changes, and the means used for mobilization, strategies, and tactics. It is also important for the study to grasp the discourses of participants about citizenship, their positioning themselves in the political sphere, their understanding of the concepts of state and globalization to analyze the linkages of the Bergama movement to political opportunity structures. In short, I aim to understand the way in which movement participants construct the political sphere and how they situate themselves in that sphere with respect to different dimensions of local, national and global issues. Finally, data on the internal dynamics of the movement such as relations between the movement elite and the local people are obtained through interviews.

a. The fieldwork:

The data collection process consists of 3 dimensions. First, a desktop research was completed by reviewing all relevant literature as well as analyzing the documentation relevant to the Bergama movement. The latter includes reports of scientists, chambers (professional organizations), and civil society organizations, e-mails and internal correspondence between activists provided by the interviewees, the brochures of the TNCs and the Bergama municipality, court decisions and statements given in court. The desktop research was finalized with an analysis of local, national, and international newspapers as well as relevant websites.

Second, 72 in-depth interviews were conducted mainly between 2003 and 2005. The interviews are semi-structured. They are composed of open-ended questions in order to minimize any influences of my own prejudices. Moreover, interviewees feel more free and relaxed with open-ended questions, and this leads them to impart more. For each interviewee, the order of questions is changed depending on each respondent’s answers during the interview. The interviewees can be grouped into 3 categories: peasants who are the ‘carriers’ of the movement; urban segments of the Bergama movement network such as scientists,
representatives of civil society organizations, lawyers, local and national political party representatives, academics, and journalists in Turkey; and last but not least, people who are in the transnational networks connected to the movement such as European MPs, representatives of Greenpeace, FIAN, Minewatch, SOS-Pergamon, Halkidiki movement in Greece, scientists, journalists and activists who maintain local-transnational links. In addition to the period between 2003 and 2005 when the bulk of the fieldwork was conducted, I did follow-up research, making several trips back to the villages in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2011.

I have conducted most of the peasant interviews in Çamköy and Ovacık. There are several reasons for this. First, I established my initial contacts through the “elite” of the movement. They still had relatively strong relations within the Çamköy village even though the movement had entered a decline stage at the time of my fieldwork. Second, Çamköy is one of the three villages closest to the mine. In the case of Çamköy, some of the houses are adjacent to the wall of the mine. Thus, Çamköy is one of the villages which has been experiencing the direct effects of the operation of the mine. Third, Çamköy has been one of the most radical villages where the turnout in the protests was quite high. In addition to the interviews conducted in Çamköy and Ovacık, I have interviewed peasants from Tepeköy and Narlıca as well. Narlıca, like Çamköy, was one of the most active villages. Other interviews were conducted with the local elite of the movement, local politicians, representatives of national political parties and experts in various small towns along the Aegean coast of Turkey such as town of Bergama itself, Burhaniye, Altınoluk, Ören, and Çeşme. Interviews with the lawyers and the Elele platform which formed the scientific legal network of the Bergama movement were conducted mainly in İzmir while in İstanbul and Ankara, I talked to representatives of Greenpeace, scientists, journalists, activists, and academics. Exploring the

7 The interviews are cited throughout the text in two categories: E/E refers to the elite/expert interviews while P/A refers to peasant/activist interviews. Most of the interviews were conducted in Turkish and hence, translations appear in the thesis. Some interviews, on the other hand, were conducted in English such as those with European MPs, representatives of FIAN, Minewatch, Halkidiki movement in Greece, and scientists and journalists from Germany (E/E 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 32, 33).
transnational ties of the movement required travelling to Munich, Aachen, Brussels, and London. The geographical scope of the fieldwork reached even Malta, Greece, and Australia, albeit via the internet. In short, the fieldwork covered a wide ground both locally and transnationally, true to the spirit of the thesis.

21 of the in-depth interviews were conducted as group interviews. As a lot of interviews took place at the coffeehouses of the villages, peasants other than the particular individual I was interviewing would pass by or stop at the coffee house, inevitably joining in the conversation. On average, 3-4 villagers were involved in each group interview. Same respondents can be found in several interviews as well as first time respondents. These group interviews were extremely fruitful in the sense that not only the unscheduled talks with whoever happened to arrive in the coffee houses revealed rich, new information but also, it allowed me to observe firsthand the dynamics of the relations among peasants.

Third, the fieldwork also involved participant observation. The research plan had not included participant observation; however, the nature of village life was very conducive to such research. Talking to the villagers meant hanging out with them at the coffeehouses, going to their fields, travelling with them to nearby places to meet other participants of the movement, eating at their houses; in short, participating in their life. Once rapport was established, the peasants included me in their everyday life throughout our repeated encounters and interviews. The chance to do participant observation enriched my data in significant ways, allowing me to grasp the relations among peasants, as well as between peasants and the local elite. For instance, listening to the discussion of lawyers and local elite’s on what strategy to adopt or observing the kinds of responses given by the peasants to their portrayal in the media gave just this kind of insight.

b. Establishing rapport:
In the research, snow-ball sampling technique is used. I have established my first contact with one of the lawyers who supported the movement and represented the villagers in the legal process. Then, I contacted the two leaders of the movement. Through their connections, I established contacts in the villages and got to know other elites. Using connections through the journalists who follow the movement closely and getting in touch with the leading elite group who are still enthusiastic about the movement made gaining access relatively easy. However, the peasants were more reluctant to be interviewed even though the movement leader had established the connection with them for me. As I met with people, they seemed to be more confident about my position as a researcher. Gradually, peasants in Çamköy started introducing me to people from other villages such as Ovacık and Narlıca. On the other hand, it took a considerable amount of time to gain their confidence. Establishing rapport involved some challenges.

First, there were difficulties with respect to the timing of the study. By the time I started my research, the Bergama movement was in its decline stage. Thus, I was facing an exhausted crowd who were despondent and unmotivated. Their expectations were minimized and they did not hold any hopes for the outcome as well as the future of the movement. Hence, it was not easy to get people talk about their movement. Second, they were sceptical in the beginning about my presence as a sociologist. In some of the interviews, the respondents mentioned that the mining company sent anthropologists, sociologists, and researchers in order to analyze the social structure in the villages. According to these accounts, these researchers came to the villages and interviewed the villagers without stating that they worked for the company. The interviewees claimed, in this way, the company established its strategy for gaining supporters among the villagers by determining whom to approach and how. According to the accounts, this strategy was effective especially in one village, Narlıca, which was the most radical in the protests. The villagers claim that the head of the village and some
of the religious leaders were either hired or given money; and because the villagers are loyal to their leaders according to Alevi\(^8\) tradition, most of Narlica villagers followed them (P/A 2, 6; E/E 4).

One of the peasants told me that they had also thought that I was the secret police because I arrived in the village with different cars at different times. It was also a sensitive time for the peasants because they were questioned about their connections with foreign NGOs with the accusation of espionage by State Security Court (DGM) in March 2002.\(^9\) However the court acquitted them. Thus, it was a sensitive topic especially for the peasants since there was a possibility that they could be charged with espionage when I did the first part of my interviews. As pointed above, gaining their trust and overcoming their unwillingness to share information proved to be a gradual process that had to be carefully handled. Once I was able to overcome their distrust and hesitation, rich data could be obtained both through interviews and participant observation, as explained above. However, the challenges associated with establishing rapport resulted in a limitation of the study.

One limitation of the study is that one group relevant to analyzing the Bergama movement had to be excluded from the data collection process, namely the miners. As talking to employees or directors of the TNC(s) would jeopardize my trusted position as a researcher, I made talking to participants of the movement my priority. The fact that the atmosphere was highly charged did not help. The other group which had to be excluded from the data collection was the women. The traditional way of life in the villages with patriarchal practices made it difficult for a male researcher to talk to women. Women seldom appeared in public spaces. They were working either in the fields during summer or at home during winter. It is on the streets that they are publicly visible. They usually socialize with each other at home. They mingle with the village crowd very seldom at the wedding and circumcision ceremonies.

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\(^8\) Alevi is a sect in Islam, and Narlica is a Alevi village where almost everyone belongs to the Alevi sect.

\(^9\) As reported in the newspaper Radikal, 13/04/2002.
In the case of men, they regularly meet with each other the coffeehouses of the villages. These coffeehouses are the public spaces where most of the socializing took place through exchange of information, news and opinion among men. Women were mostly confined to the houses. They paid visits to each other and held some female based home meetings. Thus, even though women had an important role in the Bergama struggle, taking their place in the frontlines of the demonstrations and appearing in the media as much as the men, insisting on interviewing them would adversely affect the trust relations I had established. This limitation could partly be overcome by using the book by Reinart (2003), a participant of the movement and a female academic who published her interviews with the peasants, including women, verbatim.

**Organization of the Chapters:**

In Chapter 2, I review the social movements literature with a focus on political opportunity structures analysis and framing processes. It is argued that globalization is a necessary element for analyzing local movements since it creates a new set of political opportunities- transnational political opportunities. Social movements and civil society organizations are situated in the capitalist globalization by analyzing the relevant literature. In Chapter 3, I focus on the domestic political structure of Turkey and social movement history in Turkey. I discuss the historical context of state-society relations, the formation of citizenship, the transformations taking place in the Turkish political space as a result of the globalization, domestic political structures and their interaction with global opportunities.

In Chapters 4 to 7, I analyze the data on Bergama. In Chapter 4, an analysis of the organizational structure of the Bergama movement is presented, discussing mobilizing structures, collective identity formation and framing processes. Chapter 5 delves into framing processes of the Bergama movement, identifying master frames of environmentalism and human rights as well as analyzing the framing of capitalist globalization. In chapter 6, I examine political opportunities and the ways they were perceived and used at the local and
national levels. Chapter 7 turns to transnational links of the Bergama movement and discusses cross–border relations with external political parties and politicians; activities at supranational and transnational political and legal spaces, alliances with INGOs and social movements, and the responses of the Turkish state to transnational relations of the Bergama movement.
Chapter 2:
Social movements and civil society in a globalizing context

The concept of globalization has been a major focus of debate in the social science literature. Various theories of globalization compete with each other to explain the historical roots, nature, content, scope, and impacts of the concept.\(^1\) One of the main controversies among these theories revolves around the question of whether or not globalization exists as a novel and distinct process which transforms the world system based on the nation-state. The sceptic camp, mainly consisting of realists and orthodox Marxists, basically rejects the proposition that globalization really exists. The sceptics claim that globalization is a ‘myth’ and nation-states continue to be the primary actors in all sorts of activities and relations (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). By questioning the uniqueness of the globalization process and pointing to similar processes in the 19\(^{th}\) century (Hirst and Thompson, 1996), they describe globalization either as a new (neoliberal) ideological cover for imperialism (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2000) or enhanced internationalisation and/or regionalisation which means intensified links between national economies (Hirst and Thompson, 1996).\(^2\)

On the other hand, a wide range of theories commonly evaluate the contemporary developments in the world as signifying the existence of a globalization process which transforms the previous model of politics based on nation-states. Yet, even accounts which accept the novelty and transformative power of globalization vary among themselves in their explanations of globalization with regard to its causes, content and effects. Accordingly, globalization has been defined in numerous ways as: “time-distance variation” (Giddens,

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\(^1\) Globalization theories are classified in various ways with respect to the conceptualization of the process (Held et al. 1999), focus of studies (Sklair, 1999, 2002) and ‘domain questions’ of each theory (Robinson, 2007).

\(^2\) It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to engage in this debate. Very briefly they fail to account for the various qualitative and quantitative changes in the economy regarding extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact of economic practices at the global level which occurred especially in relation to the impact of technological advancements (Held et al., 1999; Sklair, 2002; Scholte, 2005).
1991), “time-space compression” (Harvey, 1989), the “widening, deepening and speeding up of global interconnectedness” (Held and McGrew, 2000, 2007), a “long-term upward trend” within the world system (Chase-Dunn, 1999), “glocalization” (Robertson, 1992), a “world in motion” (Appadurai, 1990), “world society” (Meyer et. al, 1997; Boli and Thomas, 1997), “network society” (Castells, 1997), a world with heightened “transplanetary” and “supraterrestrial” relations (Scholte, 2005), and “global capitalism” (Sklair, 2002; Robinson, 2004). Even though each account underlines either the economic, political or cultural level as the determining factor in their explanations, they all agree on three basic dimensions of globalization: ‘the transformation of dominant patterns of socio-economic organization’, ‘the transformation of the territorial principal’ and ‘the transformation of power’ (Held and McGrew, 2000: 7). This overlap implies the double meaning of the concept of globalization, referring both to a more generic process and to the contemporary form of that process. According to its generic meaning, globalization is the general shrinking and compression of spatio-temporal dimensions of social life which have been conditioned and constrained by the nation-state system until recently. With the reduction of the nation-states’ limitations on time and space, economic, political, and social spheres are being reshaped. The underlying cause is the spread of transnationalization of practices, relations, and social organizations throughout the world which transforms the primary role of states in social, economic and political terrains. Consequently, the distinction between internal and external imposed by national borders is being transcended. In other words, generic globalization refers to the creation of a new space transcending national boundaries with increased time-space compression and tightly bound networks of interactions between a variety of actors including social movements, interest groups, transnational corporations (TNCs), states, and individuals backed up by increased global flows of capital, goods, information, ideas, people, environmentally
and biologically relevant substances (Giddens, 1991; Scholte 2005; Held and McGrew, 2007; Sklair, 2008).³

On the other hand, globalization does not necessarily come into being in one form. Depending on the driving forces behind, globalization might take different shapes, notwithstanding the basic characteristics of generic globalization mentioned above.⁴ However, generic globalization and capitalist globalization are often being conflated. In that regard, the concept of globalization has been mostly equated with neoliberal capitalist globalization which dominates the contemporary global system as if it is the only viable form that can achieve a global order. (Evans, 2005; Sklair, 2008: 95). The fuzzy use of the concept which does not differentiate generic and capitalist globalization leads to the conclusion that problems and defects of the capitalist globalization are inherent and inevitable within the globalization process. However, a wide range of social movements both at the transnational and local levels are struggling against the detrimental impacts of capitalist globalization by advocating a more just global social order and proposing alternative globalization models without using nationalist rhetoric. Therefore it is crucial to elaborate the contemporary form of globalization in detail in order to situate the Bergama movement, which is an example of such struggles, in the context of globalization and the conflicts, opportunities and constraints it renders.

The contemporary global system is dominated by “the capitalist globalization”, as explained by the ‘global capitalism’ model (Sklair, 1995, 2001, 2002; Robinson, 2004). Since the 1960s onward, developments in communication, travel, and information technologies have facilitated the re-organization of capitalism. Consequently, the logic of capitalism has

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³ In addition to this development, described as the “moment of transnational social spaces” by Sklair, three other dimensions also contribute to the realization of generic globalization: the ‘electronic moment’, “the postcolonial moment”, and “qualitatively new forms of cosmopolitanism” (Sklair, 2008: 96).

⁴ Sklair (2002, 2008) argues that other forms of globalization such as a ‘socialist globalization’ based on a ‘human rights regime’ are possible. Held et al. (1999) also claim that different types of globalization have occurred throughout the world history with varying levels of extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact (Held, et. al, 1999: 444-452; Held, 2004).
changed, and activities of capitalist forces regarding production, management, and distribution have moved beyond national markets to global markets by turning the whole globe into the capitalist forces’ site of operations (Sklair, 2002). In addition to the dispersal of production related activities throughout the globe and the increase of transnational capital flows, financial capital has also globalized as a result of the removal of capital controls and state control over the value of currencies (Evans, 1997: 67). These developments in the economy led by the transnational practices (TNPs) of non-state actors constitute a striking difference in comparison to earlier periods because of unmatched qualitative and quantitative transformations (Held et al., 1999; Woods, 2000; Sklair, 2002; Scholte, 2005; Sassen, 2010).

Yet, TNPs do not merely take place in the economy, but also in politics and culture which makes contemporary globalization a process operating in all spheres of social life (Sklair, 2002; Woods, 2000; Held et al., 1999; Scholte, 2005). The acclaimed primacy of the nation-state in the economy, politics, and social life has been supplanted by transnational corporations (TNCs) in the economy, by the transnational capitalist class (TCC) in politics, and by the culture-ideology of consumerism in culture, each working as the dominating force within their terrain (Sklair, 1999: 157). However, the reconfiguration of power and restructuration of economy, politics and culture under globalization do not render nation-states redundant and powerless. On the contrary, as stated by numerous scholars, states continue to exist, but they are different in their use of power and authority (Evans, 1997; Held et al., 1999; Woods, 2000; Mann, 2001; Scholte, 2005; Held and McGrew, 2007). It is evident that with the globalization process, non-state actors connecting to each other across national borders have shaken the primacy of nation-states. The limitations on states are brought about by the entrance of transnational and local actors into the political arena which turn states into one of the actors among others in economy, politics and culture. These non-state actors

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5 In a similar vein, Robinson (2004, 2007) also points out a similar shift towards a global economy with the emergence of the TCC. However, Robinson claims that a “transnational state” in the making which is a network of supranational political and economic institutions as well as national state apparatuses (Robinson, 2007: 131).
comprise of transnational civil society actors such as INGOs and transnational social movements (TSMs) in global politics, economic and political supranational organizations and international organizations whose significance and impact have increased. Additionally, local actors at the sub-national level freed from control and cooptation of nation-states and national cultures, have started expressing their own cultural and political claims, mainly with respect to identity issues. Combined, these developments have led to the questioning of the salience of nation-states.6

However, these processes within globalization have not done away with the state. States continue to be a crucial entity with respect to transnational processes, even if not the most important one. This is because concepts of ‘territory’ and ‘place’ are not totally irrelevant under globalization. Rather, they are being re-invented and re-configured as Held and McGrew (2000) and Sassen (2007) have argued. In other words, a “new sovereignty regime” has come into shape in which the relationship between sovereignty, state power and territoriality is being redefined (Held and McGrew, 2007). States occupy a crucial role in the expansion of globalization with their entitlement to rule and capacity to select forms of political, economic and social development. (Held and McGrew, 2000: 9). As Sassen (2003, 2007) argues, states are indispensable components of the globalization process since many aspects of globalization are embedded in the national. In that regard, not all the practices and entities within the borders of a nation state are necessarily ‘national’ in the historically constructed meaning of the term. Rather, in addition to the processes taking place at the supranational level such as the global capital market, many transnational practices and dynamics related to globalization occur within sub-national localities such as global cities,

6 ‘Methodological nationalism’ in social sciences which takes nation-states as the unit of analysis has been criticized based on similar grounds that social, economic and political practices are no longer encased within nation-states (Sklair, 2002; Sassen, 2003; Beck, 2005).
leading to ‘localization of the global’. These transboundary relations between sub-national localities cut-across national states by shifting the global system from the older ‘hierarchies of scale’ model to a ‘multi-scalar’ one, transcending the centrality of the national level. However, direct connections between local and global enabled by the new information and communication technologies do not lead to the removal of nation-states or their territories. Rather, states enter into negotiations with the non-state actors in order to preserve their authority and sovereignty, and consequently, they attain a crucial role within the capitalist globalization, facilitating TNPs within their territories. At the same time, certain components of states become active providers of new ‘regulation’ which are necessary for the global market and global flows such as implementation of monetary, fiscal and trade policies and related legal arrangements. In terms of politics, states follow a similar path by adapting themselves to the capitalist globalization’s version of the human rights regime. Since national interests and goals are not explicit within these transformed regulatory activities of states, they signify a ‘de-nationalization’ process alongside the process of ‘re-territorialization’ (Sassen, 2003, 2007).

Yet, given its importance for globalization, nation-states do not have an inevitable role in enhancing globalization. The denationalization process is a partial one since only some highly specialized components of nation-states are pursuing such strategies in varying degrees which differs from one state to another (Sassen, 2003, 2007). Other parts of states both in bureaucracy and executive branches that are nationally oriented continue to stand still. Then, contemporary state under globalization is best conceived as a site in which globalizing and anti-globalization forces with nationalist tendencies and priorities compete with each other.

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7 As one of the most important nodes of global networks, global cities are sites where many TNPs of management, finance and services take place which happen to exist within certain national territories. All these global cities are linked to each other, constituting the basis of the global networks (Sassen, 2007).
8 According to the ‘hierarchies of scale’ model, scales of international, regional, national and local are ordered in a ‘nested’ structure so that the connections between each are conceived hierarchically. National scale, on the other hand, appears to have a key role of mediating and articulating among other scales (Sassen, 2003:6).
(Sklair, 2002). Therefore, universalized characteristics and attitudes cannot be identified for nation-states; rather, the practices and positions of different nation-states are largely determined by the interests and attitudes of the power holders, whether they are pro- or anti-globalization.

The competition taking place within and over states constitute one dimension of the larger conflictual context of capitalist globalization. As a result of TNP of the transnational capitalist class (TCC) whose main driving force is to seek profit, the world faces major crises including rising inequality at the global level and exacerbated levels of environmental degradation (Sklair, 2002; Held and Kaya, 2006). These problems interact with other long lasting conflicts produced by the nation-state system in relation to gender, ethnicity, human rights and democratic participation, and globalization produces a globalizing world full of contradictions and injustices for the majority of the world population. Accordingly, the contemporary global political sphere is shaped by the struggles between two ideal-typical competing transnational networks: the neoliberal network and the democratic globalization network (Smith, 2008).

The neoliberal network refers to states, organizations, groups and individuals which employ the neoliberal outlook and dominate capitalist globalization. The main force within the neoliberal network is the TCC, i.e. the “globalizing” ruling class. The TCC is composed of four interrelated and complementary, yet loosely connected, fractions: corporate fraction, state fraction, technical fraction, and the consumerist fraction. The corporate fraction consists of

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9 These long-enduring problems have been elevated during the capitalist globalization period to unprecedented levels. First, inequalities between different classes which are inherent in capitalism have grown under globalization by creating a “class polarization” throughout the world. Intrasate inequalities both in the global North and South have grown since the 1970s (Sklair, 2002; Wade, 2001; Pogge, 2007; Evans, 2008). Second, the ‘ecological crisis’ is caused not only by capitalism but also by industrialism since environment has been extensively exploited by the state-socialist systems. However, the degree of environmental exploitation exceeded any given period within modernity as a result of the domination of cultural-ideology of consumerism under capitalist globalization (Sklair, 2002).

10 Other studies also point at the emergence of a ‘global’ class, i.e. TCC (Robinson and Harris, 2000; Robinson, 2004; Sassen, 2007). Yet, in contrast to the more inclusive conceptualization of TCC by Sklair, these studies describe the TCC in narrower terms.
the transnational business elite who are either the owners and/or controllers of major
corporations ranging from executive and non-executive directors to major owners and their
affiliates (Sklair, 2001). The politicians and bureaucrats with neo-liberal orientations and
goals whose fundamental aim is to advance capitalist globalization constitute the state
fraction. The technical fraction is composed of the section of the skilled workforce such as
engineers, lawyers, economists and so on working for TNCs, i.e. globalizing professionals.
Lastly, the consumerist fraction is comprised of those consumerist elite actors such as the
media and merchants who aim to spread and sustain the consumerist ideology throughout
societies (Sklair, 2001: 17). In contrast to its locally- or nationally-oriented counterparts, the
TCC has some distinct features making it a transnational entity such as orientation toward
global markets, involvement in transnational practices, use of cultural-ideology of
consumerism to maintain its control and hegemony, sharing of similar tastes and consumption
patterns based on luxurious goods throughout the globe, sharing of similar educational
backgrounds, and construction of their identities as ‘world citizens’ (Sklair, 2001).
Discourses and activities of the TCC rest upon the neoliberal worldview as summarised in the
economic reform model of “Washington Consensus” which envisions a global system
organized on market principles. Their basic argument is that the global economy which is
described as inevitable and irresistible will generate economic growth which exceeds that of
the previous system of the nation-state, and subsequently, the liberalized global market would
remedy all the economic, social and political deprivations of human beings.

11 The “Washington Consensus” is a an economic model that advocates implementing measures of “free trade, capital market liberalization, flexible exchange rates, market-determined interest rates’ and ‘the transfer of assets from the public to the private sector, the tight focus of public expenditure on well-directed social targets, balanced budgets, tax reform, secure property rights and the protection of intellectual property rights” (Held and McGrew, 2007: 187-188). However, as a result of criticisms revolving around its failure to achieve development, economic growth and reduction of poverty at the targeted levels from the early 1990s on, a “post-Washington consensus” model has gained ascendancy among the proponents of the neo-liberal economy which asserts an institutionalist approach by proposing that the state in its transformed form is a necessity for the global market (Rodrik, 1997; Stiglitz, 2002).
However, the domination of the TCC and diffusion of their model do not occur automatically since hegemony requires conscious work of its bearers. Respectively, the TCC pursue strategic activities throughout the globe in order to maintain the capitalist global order based on market-centred values and to ensure its legitimacy as the ruling class. First, by discrediting the welfare state as inefficient and corrupt, they try to replace the ‘welfare state’ whose central tasks are regulation and redistribution with the ‘garrison state’ which facilitates the running of global market (Smith, 2008: 69-73). Second, the TCC intentionally acts to curb the power of the United Nations (UN) which is seen as an obstacle to the neoliberal global agenda by reducing the UN’s legitimacy as a global political institution. Third, as the role and effectiveness of the UN are minimized, multilateral economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank and IMF are being emphasized as the global economic institutions with extended power over the global economy. Fourth, the cultural-ideology of consumerism has been promoted extensively since consumerism ideology has been the essential pillar of capitalist globalization.

On the other hand, the majority of the world population does not benefit from the fruits of capitalist globalization and suffers from its negative impacts and outcomes. Despite high variation in their conditions, values, ideas, evaluations, and identity, ‘losers’ of globalization can be categorized as ‘the global class of disadvantaged’ (Sassen, 2007) as a loose class category based on shared ‘objective conditions’ and ‘subjective dynamics’ at the minimum level since sources of their diverse grievances are capitalist globalization and their

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12 As “peace, equality and human rights” are prioritized over “the promotion of global capitalism” in the UN charter, the UN has become a locus of demanding a “new international economic order” in the 1970s. (Smith, 2008: 74). In order to remove such a threat and turn it into a more pro-business organization, the TCC a) has attacked the UN and its agencies by mobilizing the elite opposition in the US; b) has put pressure on the UN to change its agenda and staff with the help of the US influence; and c) has started using the UN for private economic gains (Smith, 2008: 74).

13 According to Sklair’s (1997) typology, the first three strategies are carried out especially by the activities of two fractions of the TCC, the globalizing bureaucrats and politicians (state fraction). On the other hand, the promotion of the consumerist ideology is achieved through the practices of the TNC executives and the consumerist elite (Sklair, 2002).
positions within this process. Many groups belonging to the ‘global class of the disadvantaged’ have mobilized both at the transnational and local levels against capitalist globalization by forming the ‘network of democratizing globalizers’ (Smith, 2008).

The democratic globalizers’ network is organized in a similar way to its rival network: the organizational fraction consists of social movements and NGOs; the political fraction is constituted by politicians in national and sub-national governments as well as in international organizations that advocate humanized globalization against the market-driven globalization; the technical fraction is composed of think tanks, academics, and professionals such as engineers, lawyers, public servants; and the cultural fraction is a collection of civil society groups and individuals conveying the ideas and principles to bystanders throughout the globe (Smith, 2008: 24). Despite the similarities with respect to shapes of the networks, the democratic globalizers’ network has major disadvantages since its members have less economic power at their disposal, and their levels of political efficacy and access to decision making processes are much lower in comparison to their adversaries (Sklair, 1995).\textsuperscript{14}

Moreover, the democratic globalizers’ network is not as unified as its adversary. Even though human rights and democratization of the global order constitute the basic principles that actors of the democratic globalizers’ networks share, they vary among themselves in terms of their strategies and proposed solutions with respect to the implementation of these principles. In that regard, the democratic globalizers’ network mainly consists of: reformists who aim to ‘civilize’ the contemporary form of globalization by reforming the institutions including INGOs, international institutions, social movements and networks; radical critics and alternative globalizationists who opt-out of the current globalization order and create their own alternative social orders consisting of grass-roots movements, groups and networks; and resisters/rejectionists entailing groups both from the left and right that oppose economic

\textsuperscript{14} According to Sklair (1995), transnational labour movement failed to achieve success matching their adversary, transnational capital, due to lack of resources.
globalization, or additionally global rule of law and global political ordering (Anheier et al., 2001; Pianta, 2001; Pianta and Silva, 2003; Held and McGrew, 2007).

Kaldor et al. (2003) have revised their categorization of positions within GCS by adding the category of ‘regressive globalizers’. This position entails groups and individuals whose attitudes towards globalization are shaped by the criteria of benefiting the ones that they represent. In that regard, they are either for or against global policies of economy, technology, law, or flow of people depending on the impact of these policies on interests of their country or their group such as stakeholders, electoral groups, lobby groups and ethnic or religious groups (ibid.: 6-7). In fact, this is an in-between category whose members might also belong to the network of neoliberal globalizers since they pursue activities facilitating the operation of capitalist globalization through their practices. Regressive globalizers are also found among politicians and state bureaucrats who approximate the state fraction of the TCC.

In sum, the activities of the democratic globalizers can be best described as a dynamic process of finding ways to articulate their diversified demands and strategies under the master frame of humanized and democratic global order alongside their opposition to capitalist globalization. In doing that, many of the local components of the democratic globalizers utilize transnational networks that are part of global civil society. In that sense, it is important to understand global civil society, and its opportunities and problems which will be discussed in the next section.

Global Civil Society: The contested terrain of the democratic globalizers’ network

In the literature, civil society was overwhelmingly treated as a state-centric entity by various approaches regardless of differences in their views over actors, functions, and promises of civil society (Keane, 1988; Anheier et al., 2001; Kaldor, 2003a, 2003b). In that regard, civil society has been analyzed as part of national contexts, mainly modelled after European experiences, according to which the state is depicted as the main political actor.
From the state-centric point of view, the interactions between the state, domestic market and civil society are the determinant factors shaping civil society.

With the advance of capitalist globalization, the students of civil society started employing a ‘global’ approach in their analysis by questioning the formerly pre-dominant state-centric view. Accordingly, a burgeoning literature on global civil society (GCS) has emerged (Falk, 1997; Smith, 1998; Guidry et al., 2000; Scholte, 2000, 2004; Keane, 2001, 2003; Chandhoke, 2002, 2005; Anheier et al., 2001; Anheier and Themudo, 2002; Anheier and Katz, 2002; Kaldor, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Batliwala, 2002; Pianta and Silva, 2003; Batliwala and Brown, 2006a; Tarrow, 2007). These accounts generally converge on the idea that civil society has been released from its national boundaries with the impact of globalization in terms of its actors’ interests, concerns, activities and interactions. As constraints on time and space have been removed because of technological advancements in communication, information, and travel, infrastructural facilities have been set for the emergence of a ‘transnational public sphere’ beyond the borders of nation-states. Using these technological facilities, people from different states and regions as well as members of different transnational organizations have been engaging in extensive and intensified cross-border interactions and relations. Subsequently, “transnational networks” are established which enable global flows of resources, information, knowledge, influence and legitimacy among various non-state actors across the globe. Global problems exacerbated by capitalist globalization whose destructive effects are felt at both domestic and global levels are addressed by non-state actors through these transnational networks. Transnational networks have enabled transnational discourses, identities and practices to be disseminated by crossing over national boundaries. In sum, the “transnational public sphere” and “transnational networks” constitute the infrastructure of the emerging global civil society (GCS) (Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald, 2000: 6-8; Katz and Anheier, 2006: 240). Accordingly, in its basic form,
the GCS refers to the transnational sphere in which non-state actors forge transboundary links, establish networks, negotiate and exchange information and experiences, and stage their activities (Pianta and Silva, 2003; Kaldor, 2003a). Yet, GCS is not only restricted to the transnational level since it is an “interconnected and multilayered social space” where transnational, national and local issues and interests are brought forth by connecting countless organizations and ‘ways of life’ existing at each different level (Keane, 2001:23-4).

GCS can be conceptualized as a huge “network of networks” in which all sorts of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) as well as their national and local counterparts operate (Anheier and Katz, 2005). In other words, GCS is made up of a multiplicity of sub-networks; mainly transnational advocacy networks (TANs), social movements, and INGO networks. Within the overarching network of GCS, a wide range of groups and individuals exist with diverse interests, concerns and ideological orientations. Additionally, GCS actors are also diversified due to their purposes, strategic and tactical choices, and organizational structures (Anheier et al., 2001; Keane, 2001; Kaldor, 2003a).

Among civil society actors, INGOs come to the fore in that they occupy a dominant position as important nodes within the GCS network displaying centrality and brokerage roles (Kaldor, 2003: 79). In fact, one of the main signs for deepening of GCS is considered to be the growth in the number of NGOs/TSMOs (Smith, 1998; Anheier et al., 2001; Clark, 2003; Kaldor, 2003a). In Kaldor’s (2003a) terms, NGOs are inherently ‘value-driven’ social units of service provisioning or advocacy that are based on voluntary relations. In comparison to social movements, NGOs are the ‘tamed’ versions of NSMs in the sense that NGOs operate in the similar issue areas of NSMs, but they are more ‘institutional’ and mostly ‘professional’

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15 Centrality of a node within a network is measured by number of connections that particular node has with others. Brokerage, on the other hand, refers to the intermediary role of one node which establishes links among related but unconnected nodes.
Importance and effectiveness of NGOs and, especially, INGOs have escalated as a result of global opportunities such as the UN conferences, world summits, support of the global business, and the technological revolution facilitating the reduction of transaction costs. INGOs have been growing at unprecedented rates in terms of their numbers, membership basis, and location within global decision-making centres since the 1990s (Anheier et al., 2001; Anheier and Themudo, 2002: 194; Kaldor 2003a: 89). In addition, the links among INGOs and interconnections between INGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have intensified during the 1990s, producing a “thicker” GCS structure (Anheier et al., 2001: 4). Parallel to the ‘intensification’ trend, GCS has also become more extended since issue areas of INGOs has enlarged - entailing development, poverty, humanitarian aid and relief, service provision, human rights, peace, environment, and gender.

While working on these diverse issues by transcending national boundaries, INGOs face difficulties of operating in diversified political, economic, and cultural contexts. In response to the increasingly diversifying opportunities and constraints, NGOs are organized in various ways by combining different organizational characteristics of: formal or informal; hierarchical or participatory; centralized or decentralized (in the form of networks, federations or confederations); and membership based or board/trustee based governance (Kaldor, 2003a: 91; Clark, 2003: 112). Each organizational form contains its own strengths and weaknesses regarding efficiency, efficacy, participation, and legitimacy (Anheier and Themundo, 2002).

Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) appear as an important form within GCS, especially for domestic movements. TANs are issue-specific networks formed with the purposes of exchanging information and services and of sustaining communication on a voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal basis between by all types of GCS actors (Keck and
Sikkink, 1998: 8). Even though TANs cover a wide range of issues, they are more concentrated on three specific areas which are human rights, environment, and women’s rights. Mainly, TANs emerge: when channels between state and society are not open for resolving conflicts; when activists reckon their campaigns will be facilitated by networking; and when international contacts such as conferences provide grounds for forming/strengthening networks (ibid.: 12). In that regard, TANs exist as crucial channels for domestic social movements by facilitating local-global links through which they can bypass and pressure their non-responsive governments in their struggles – also known as the “boomerang effect” (ibid).

Although groups, organizations, and individuals challenging capitalist globalization constitute a major component of GCS, it would be misleading to assume that GCS comprises of the democratic globalizers’ network only. For many students of civil society, (global) civil society does not include business and profit making groups and their activities (Scholte, 2000; Anheier et al., 2001; Pianta, 2001; Kaldor, 2003a). Yet, as Keane (2001; 2003) indicates it is difficult to draw a clear-cut line between capitalist globalization and GCS. This is mainly due to the fact that capitalist globalization is the main driving force that has shaped the GCS. In other words, it is the capitalist globalization which has generated the conditions and infrastructures for GCS to develop. The TNPs of the global capital in its search for profit throughout the globe have created ‘global spaces’ such as electronic finance and communication networks crosscutting national borders. In order to maintain and enhance global flows, global capital has invested in and improved the communication and information technologies which enabled various groups to forge links among themselves across their national boundaries. Also, neo-liberal regulations which are being standardized throughout the world in order to facilitate capitalist globalization have provided the legal infrastructure

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16 The essential activity within TANs is information circulation and exchange. However, information disseminated by TANs is of a specific type of knowledge because it is not only the facts that are conveyed but also experiences and testimonies of people. In that regard, connections with grassroots are maintained.
for globalization. Simultaneous changes in the welfare state as part of the neoliberal agenda have been accompanied by the assertion of NGOs as the novel social service providers and contractors of development projects. Enhanced levels of influence of the international and supranational agencies have also opened the way for people to make their claims outside their national-states and territories (Keane, 2001, 2003; Scholte, 2000; Chandhoke, 2002). Given the symbiotic relationship between GCS and capitalist globalization, members of the TCC also take part in GCS through ‘elite social movement organizations’ (ESMOs) which are the NGOs and business associations established by the TCC. Their main objectives are to generate the social and political conditions necessary for the operation of the market-driven global order in which they can pursue their capitalist activities and maintain their dominant position and hegemony by advocating freedom and democracy in its liberal sense (Sklair, 1997, 2002; Kaldor, 2003a). As such, GCS exists as a complex and multifaceted terrain encompassing all sorts of conflictual relations and struggles alongside solidarity based relations in contrast to the normative conceptualizations of GCS as a terrain that is free of destructive and unequal impacts of the market (Keane, 2001). This is mainly due to the heterogeneity of GCS with respect to its actors whose interests might diverge and even clash.

Still, GCS has developed partly as a response to the crisis of representative democracy caused by a set of deficiencies of ideology, integrity, representation, reach, and sovereignty (Clark, 2003). Under these circumstances, GCS offers alternative ways of expressing demands through INGOS, social movements and other networks and channels of access to the decision-making centres. In accordance with the general promises of GCS, INGOs claim to materialize the democratization of the global power structure by acting as “system checks and balances”, voicing the demands of the ‘poor’ and ‘deprived’, and enhancing participation of the excluded sections of the world population in global decision-making processes. GCS actors have gained considerable achievements in terms of improving the working of the
global structure to a certain extent. First, GCS actors have contributed to the global agenda-setting. Through campaigns and other activities like lobbying, GCS actors help get issues of environmental degradation and inequalities onto the agenda of power holders by linking these problems to global policies. On the other hand, GCS actors also aim to raise public awareness about global problems and enable ordinary people to relate their local deprivation to the capitalist globalization. Second, GCS undertakes the role of promoting certain norms such as human rights which subsequently contributed to the formation of ‘human rights’ as a global norm. Third, activities of GCS pushed globalizing forces to be more accountable to the ‘people’ in their activities. In addition to pressuring TNCs and IGOs to be more transparent about their policies and operations, GCS actors undertake the role of monitoring the activities of IGOs, states and TNCs. They publicize those states which do not implement ratified international agreements and TNCs whose operations do not comply with human rights criteria or environmental standards. Furthermore, GCS actors unearth shortcomings, fallacies, and problems created by global policies. Also, from the perspective of the deprived and excluded masses, GCS provides channels of conveying their grievances and sounding their voices (Scholte, 2004).

However, GCS has various shortcomings mostly specific to INGOs. INGOs undermine the democratic principles that they advocate in their own organizational structures and practices which make them suffer from a set of internal democratic deficits. Major problems INGOs experience include low levels of participation and biased representation with respect to region, class, gender, and ethnicity; top-down managerial authoritarianism; prioritization of civil and political rights over social and economic rights; lack of accountability; and transparency shortcomings in financial statements or decisions over their issue agendas (Scholte, 2000; Chandhoke, 2002; Keane, 2001, 2003; Kaldor, 2003a).
Representativeness of INGOs is questionable due to their weak links with the grassroots groups who directly bear the costs of global problems. This problem is exacerbated by the North-South divide which refers to the unequal spread of INGOs and their organizational availability across the world due to the concentration of INGOs in Europe and North America. Furthermore, cities in these regions which host the headquarters of INGOs serve as ‘the NGO capitals of the world’ (Kaldor et al., 2003; Anheier and Katz, 2002). INGOs emphasize certain issues at the expense of others without representing all the ‘people’. Representativeness of INGOs is adversely affected also by the fact that resources necessary for engaging in GCS are unevenly distributed across the globe. Consequently, GCS is far from being a terrain in which disadvantaged people from all parts of the globe express their grievances to a full extent (Scholte, 2000). For instance, the new communication technologies have provided numerous benefits to the GCS such as increased access to information across distant geographies and the formation of ‘virtual communities’ with shared interests across the territories. Yet, these benefits are unevenly distributed because of the ‘digital divide’ which is evident between the North and South and across different classes (Chandhoke, 2002; Naughton, 2001).

Additionally, the scarcity of resources available to INGOs leads them to act as if they are market-actors in the sense that they enter competition with each other over resources. The major outcome of this competitive environment is that INGOs consider bureaucratization as a necessity which results in separation from grassroots since efficiency is the main criteria for the constituents that provide financial resources. In order to increase their resources, INGOs tend to focus on issues and concerns that resonate with their donors’ interests rather than beneficiaries’ (Anheier and Themudo, 2002: 205; Kaldor, 2003b: 21).
Under the “new public management” which is mainly supported by the reformers and supporters of the capitalist globalization, INGOs have been viewed as essential implementers of welfare, developmental and environmental policies and programmes. As a middle ground between market-led and state-led strategies, INGOs have taken over the service-provisioning once assumed to belong to the welfare state. Another trend is ‘corporatisation’ which refers to the INGOs’ cooperation with TNCs in their social responsibility programs of TNCs (Kaldor, 2003b: 22; Clark, 2003; Kaldor et al., 2003: 8-9). The ‘new public management system’ and ‘corporatisation’ trends turn INGOs into ‘sub-contractors’ of the state, IGOs, and TNCs by pushing INGOs to become more professionalized; by delinking INGOs from the grassroots interests; and, possibly, by co-opting them (Chandhoke, 2002). Furthermore, the lack of ‘accountability’ and ‘transparency’ minimizes the channels for correcting the democratic deficits of INGOs from inside the existing organizational structures unless they cultivate stronger links with grassroots. These shortcomings interact to render GCS an uneven and partial entity with respect to its promises since INGOs are considered to be the most influential visible actors within the GCS. Therefore, in sum, GCS reflects to a certain extent the structural imbalances and inequalities of the global system which it aims to change.

However, similar to its major catalyst, the globalization process, GCS is not a finished project. Rather, it is an ever changing terrain in which organizations, groups and individuals continuously try to find novel ways of mobilizing, articulating claims, making demands and influencing the global power structure. Therefore, instead of attributing core characteristics to GCS in an essentialist fashion, GCS should be assessed as a political and social space with constantly changing structure(s) and relations.

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17 Rates of increases in the service related activities of INGOs between 1990 and 2000 are as follows: social service provisioning increased by 79%; health services by 50%; and education by 24% (Kaldor et al., 2003. 15-16).
Furthermore, GCS emerges as a multi-faceted transnational terrain consisting of various relations and networks among diverse non-state actors including INGOs, TANs, social movements, and individuals. The narrow definitions that equate GCS with INGOs overlook its complex and heterogeneous character and generalize the problems specific to INGOs to the whole of GCS (Kaldor, 2003a; Kaldor et al., 2003). This multifaceted and multi-actor terrain of GCS has both facilitative and disabling effects on its actors. Different components of GCS affect contemporary social movements by providing transnational opportunities, and sometimes constraints. Yet, it is not easy to interact with INGOs because of shortcomings on both sides. Moreover, links with GCS actors might also create problems for local movements since these relations are used by their adversaries against them which decrease their prestige and legitimacy. In that sense, GCS is a crucial heuristic tool, yet to be used cautiously as Keane underlines (2001; 2003) in the analysis of contemporary social movements.

Social Movements under Globalization and the Global Justice Movement

With respect to social movements considered as a sub-category of GCS, two developments have become prominent under the capitalist globalization: enhanced levels of transnational activism in the form of transnational social movements (TSMs) and transnational campaigns; and increasing rates of interconnectedness and cross-border activities and links of local/domestic movements (Smith, 2004a; Rucht, 2009). Accordingly, a shift away from the state-centric view is discerned within the social movement literature as well. The formation of transnational social movements and networks and the development of cross-border links of domestic movements which are interrelated processes have received ample attention from social movements’ scholars. Accordingly, transnational structures and relations have become the major locus of social movement analysis (Smith et al., 1997; Smith, 1998, 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Guidry et
Transnational activism against capitalist globalization has undergone several phases. In the first phase, numerous new social movements engaged in cross-national activism and participated in NGO and social movement gatherings either on the fringes of the UN conferences or in the self-organized international meetings against a common enemy, the capitalist globalization during the 1970s and 1980s. Through these movement events, they have built links between activists across the world and at the same time, raised public consciousness about global issues. Transnational activism against capitalist globalization became widespread throughout the world through the extension of their focus of issues in the form of separate transnational campaigns and protests against the IGOs and TNCs and meetings in parallel summits throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Sklair, 2002; Rucht, 2002; Pianta, 2007). With their enhanced binding power combined with public visibility through high levels of media attention, world summits including G7/8, the World Bank, IMF, and WTO meetings have been receiving ample reaction from social movements and other GCS actors that are critical of the capitalist globalization and the undemocratic process of these meetings (Pianta, 2001). Accordingly from the late 1980s on, social movements and GCS actors have been launching parallel summits on the fringes of world summits by combining street protests and conferences as well as transnational campaigns against TNCs.

The first phase of the transnational activism against capitalist globalization consisting of dispersed transnational campaigns and parallel summits has ended with the Seattle Protest in 1999 against the ministerial meeting of the WTO which constitutes a major turning point for transnational activism, displaying some novel features. Based on

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18World summits are the major global governance form used by the members of the capitalist globalizers’ network in which governments, supranational organizations, and IGOs meet for framing global issues, defining rules, and setting policy-guidelines for individual states.
the previously cultivated transnational ties such as the Direct Action Network (DAN) and previous campaigns, activists as well as non-movement organizations with various concerns such as the environment, human rights, trade imbalances, indigenous rights, inequalities, and labour issues both from the global South and North – mostly from the latter, though have joined together against an international target, the WTO. It is the first time a transnational mobilization has achieved widespread visibility in the eyes of the public and power holders at unprecedented levels mainly due to tremendous media coverage that the Seattle protest has received. In addition to the realization of North-South collaboration, the Seattle protest has boosted the feeling of efficacy among activists and has become a model for subsequent protests since Seattle protestors have achieved a solid success in disrupting the WTO meeting (Smith, 2002a; Rucht, 2002). In the following two years, other similar transnational street protests were staged during the world summits.19

Within this second phase, issues and strategies have started to become diffused, integrating separate mobilizations and street protests which have been heavily used as a dominant protest form (Pianta, 2007). In that sense, the Global Justice Movement (GJM) has emerged and become the most prominent strand of the TSM sector since the late 1990s (della Porta et al., 2006).

The third phase has started with the formation of the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Allegre in 2001. In the following years, subsequent world social forums were organized in various cities in the Global South. This was followed by the launch of social forums modelled after the WSF at regional, national, and local levels as well as thematic social forums. Social forums have the novel characteristics of being independent events of the GJM unattached to official summits, and of being organized in the Global South (ibid.)

19 In the following years, transnational protests have been staged during the official meetings of the TCC such as the IMF-World Bank conference in Washington in April 2000, the IMF-World Bank meeting in Prague in September 2000, the G20 meeting in Montreal in October 2000, the EU summit in Nice in December 2000, the meeting for creating the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the EU summit in Göteborg in June 2001, and the G8 summit in Genoa in July 2001 (Rucht, 2002).
With social forums, the GJM has attained a permanent infrastructural basis for debate, exchange of views and experiences, and deliberation of goals and alternative solutions which was absent during the former phases (Rucht, 2002). As a response to the mounting accusations of employing violence and acting in a reactive fashion both from their targets and the media, the GJM activists concentrate on the prognostic aspect of their struggles which refers to the processes of discussing alternatives to capitalist globalization and formulating their collective identity and strategies. Moreover, social forums themselves serve as a site for practicing the aspired participatory democracy model so that a wide range of groups and individuals with varying identities, concerns, aims, and strategies coexist and collaborate within the same terrain without dominating one another. In other words, social forums are the on-going, dynamic processes of networking, negotiating, exchanging experiences and information, formulating a permeable and tolerant collective identity of “being against the capitalist globalization which preserves pluralism and diversity” (Rucht, 2002; Glasius and Timms, 2005; della Porta et al., 2006; Pianta, 2007).

Hence, the GJM marks the development of a “movement of movements” which gathers together separate and fragmented mobilizations with common aims and concerns against capitalist globalization.

The GJM participants carry out a laborious work of formulating a permanent and consistent master frame which preserves the heterogeneity of frames and which resonates with the individual frames of the participant movements. Subsequently, the master frames of “social injustice” and “democratic global order” emerge (della Porta et al., 2006). Hence, without letting one movement dominate others, different cultures, concerns and identities are captured by the master frame of ‘global justice’ and the collective identity of being ‘ones against the capitalist globalization’. Tarrow argues that transnational activism is successful in ‘frame bridging’ but fails in ‘frame transformation,’ referring to the lack of
new values and reframing processes (Tarrow, 2005: 62). However, given their main aspiration of maintaining the diversity of values, identities, and frames, the GJM activists’ attempt to form a flexible, permeable, enduring, and interconnecting master frame can be defined as a new process of achieving frame interdependence.

Another novel aspect is bringing issues related to distribution back into contention. Within the GJM, class based inequalities and polarization have again become one of the major concerns in movement mobilization which points at the dynamic of combining ‘old’ conflicts with ‘new’ issues (Sklair, 2002; Kaldor, 2003a; della Porta, 2007b). Accordingly, the GJM activists put effort in bridging NSM frames of environment, gender, human rights, indigenous rights, and peace with labour movement frames which is evident in the mass participation of labour unions and labour related NGOs - ‘traditional’ or new- in streets protests and the Social Fora (Waterman and Timms, 2004; Waterman, 2005).

Finally, the GJM groups make use of a heterogeneous repertoire of action, tactics and strategies which are also subjected to debate and negotiation and which entail non-conventional protest forms on top of conventional ones, signifying a return from the trend of ‘normalization of protest’ (della Porta et al., 2006: 119). They also utilize some innovated forms of action such as counter-summits and parallel summits, global action days, and transnational campaigns and boycotts in their adapted forms which are all facilitated by the availability of the new media (della Porta et al., 2006: 119). In sum, the GJM has emerged

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20 The transnational labour movement has lagged behind its counterparts in terms of developing itself into a strong transnational movement against global capital, reminiscent of its initial ‘internationalist’ outlook, due to lack of resources and inappropriate framing of globalization (Sklair, 1997; Waterman and Timms, 2004; Evans, 2005). Yet, the ‘new’ labour associations with their non- hierarchical and less bureaucratized organizational structures, mainly originated in the Third World, emerge as the most promising branch of the labour movement to adapt itself to the master fame of global justice (Waterman, 2005; Waterman and Timms, 2004).

21 The use of violence is a major issue of debate for the GJM activists. For instance, groups of Black Bloc protestors staged violent acts in Seattle, Gothenburg, and Genoa, and these are attributed to the whole of street protests by the media. This has led to the stigmatization of the protests by the power holders.

22 Global days of action refer to demonstrations and protest events simultaneously staged in different cities throughout the world with a common goal and target(s) over a specific issue in order to mobilize and give voice
at a time when public interest and trust in conventional politics and its actors have been at minimum levels especially in the Global North. While the TCC’s hegemonic discourse of “There Is No Alternative” (TINA) dominates the global political context, the GJM activists come into the scene by questioning the validity of the consensus based liberal democracy model. In that regard, the GJM has started a new cycle of protest all around the world in which not only transnational campaigns and coalitions flourish under the master frame of ‘global justice’, but also national and local movements over issues related to global justice are mobilized at increasing rates and articulate themselves to the “movement of movements” (della Porta, 2007a: 11). There are many local environmental movements around the world, including but not limited to, the Chipko movement in India against the hazardous impacts of the industry on forest areas (Haynes, 1999), the Narmada movement in India against large dam constructions (Khagram, 2004), the Green Belt Movement in Kenya against the construction of a ‘world media center’ in Nairobi destructive to green parks (Haynes, 1999), rubber tapper’s movement against the logging industry in Brazil (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), the Ogoni’s movement against the operations of Shell resulting in enhanced levels of environmental destruction (Haynes, 1999; Bob, 2005), and . As it is evident in these nationally or locally oriented at first glance, local movements frame their issues in relation to capitalist globalization directly or indirectly and integrate themselves in the GJM through transnational networks. Put differently, they all forged links with transnational actors and defined their issues beyond environmentalism by incorporating aspects of human rights, democracy, and development (Haynes, 1999). Changes in the scope, content, and structure of social movements facing a new polity at the local, national, global levels.

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to people around the world as a ‘global public’ (Pianta, 2007: 12). The protests against Iraq with the participation of millions constitute a good example.
necessitate a revised approach to social movements analysis which is attempted in the following sections.

**Analyzing local movements challenging capitalist globalization:**

The civil rights and student movements of the 1960s which have spun-off other new social movements such as environmental movement, feminist movement, peace movement and identity movements have led to the invigoration of social movement studies. Since the 1960s, various approaches have emerged aiming to explain these movements as a form of political action staged by aggrieved individuals and groups in their pursuit of targeted goals. Despite their focus on different aspects of social movements, these approaches, notably Resource Mobilization (RM), New Social Movements approach (NSM), and Political Process Theory, commonly treated social movements in a state-centric fashion by taking national contexts as their unit of analysis. The American based RM theory which was popular in the 1960s and 1970s focused on the availability of resources to a social movement and the ways of mobilizing and managing those resources in their analysis of the 1960s movements (Zald and McCarthy, 1979). Put differently, RM theorists overwhelmingly focus on ‘how’ social movements are created with any kind of contention content by taking grievances as a constant factor. ²³ A central role is placed on social movement organizations (SMOs) that mobilize and manage material resources such as time, money, jobs, right to goods and services, and labour and non-material resources including faith, friendship, moral obligations, authority, skills, commitment and legitimacy (Olson, 1968; Oberschall, 1973; Zald and McCarthy, 1977; Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Accordingly, SMOs constantly try to convert bystanders into

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²³ In general, according to the RM approach, common grievances and beliefs about causes and remedies for the grievances would not lead automatically to the emergence of social movements since deprivations and grievances exist in many setting but social movements are not mobilized in each case (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).
adherents and adherents into constituents in order to develop a strong resource basis (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1220-1221).24

On the other hand, theorists of the European counterpart of the RM theory, the NSM approach, commonly aim to explain ‘why’ social movements come into existence in relation to macro-structural transformations, interlinking them to micro-level processes of identity building in their analysis. Marking the transition in industrial societies as ‘post-industrial’ or “programmed” (Touraine, 1985); “technocratic”, “late- capitalist” (Habermas, 1981; Offe, 1985) or “information” (Melucci, 1985, 1994, 1996) society, NSM theorists claim that a ‘new politics’ has emerged during the post-war period.25 The ‘new’ actors of this period consist of the new middle classes with high educational backgrounds and economic security who are mainly employed in personal and service based occupations; “peripheral”/ “decommodified” groups such as middle-class housewives, students, retired, and unemployed whose life chances and conditions are directly determined by bureaucratic and patriarchal institutions; and some elements of the old middle class whose interests are threatened (Offe, 1985: 833-834; Habermas, 1981). These actors resist the process of ‘colonialization of the life-world’ which is the intervention of the ‘steering mechanisms’, the state and the market, in the private life sphere by attempting to shape it along the rationality of growth (Habermas, 1981; Offe, 1985); and against the political and economic system and their institutions which are constituted according to “the rationality of production and control” which have inherently lost their capacity of self-correctiveness. Therefore, the terrain of the ‘new’ conflicts has become culture, including the processes of ‘cultural reproduction’, ‘social integration’ and ‘socialization’ which have replaced the ‘old’ conflicts overwhelmingly played out over

24 Adherents are those who share the goals of a social movement, but do not participate in a movement actively. Constituents refer to the ones who provide resources and maintain that constituency base. Bystanders are those people who do not oppose the goals and/or preferences of a SMO (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).
25 ‘Old politics’ whose primary actors are industrial classes, capitalists and workers is defined as politics revolving around issues of economy, social and military security (Melucci, 1994; Habermas, 1981; Touraine, 1985; Offe, 1985).
material production. In other words, new conflicts in the late-capitalist societies are not caused by “problems of distribution”, rather they are related to the “grammar of forms of life” (Habermas, 1981: 33). Revolving around these new conflicts, NSMs struggle over symbolic resources constantly construct and renegotiate identities (in order to cope with the high flows of information); and bring forth expressive and personal claims. While doing that, NSMs operate in the social domain, in other words at the level of everyday practices and culture (Melucci, 1984; 1992; 1994:102). In their mobilization, NSMs such as the feminist movements, the peace movement, the environmental movements, and identity movements employ loose, decentralized, and open organizational structures reflecting their ideal of participatory democracy, they utilize extra-parliamentary channels for achieving social transformation.  

Both approaches employ a nation-based view since their analysis are inevitably confined within a given national context either with respect to resources, SMOs, constituents and adherents or states, welfare regimes, and national markets. From the 1980s on, another theoretical approach, Political Opportunity analysis (PO)/ Political Process Theory (PPT) has become dominant within the field of social movements studies. The PPT approach puts an explicit emphasis on national political structures in which social movements are embedded. By employing national political contexts as their explanatory variables, the proponents of the PPT explain the variations in mobilizations, strategies and success of social movements either comparatively with respect to differences among national political structures (Kriesi, et al., 1995; Kitschelt, 1986) or longitudinally regarding changes in political opportunities within a

26 Even though RM and NSM approaches have been taken as competing theories, their focus on different features of social movements makes them rather complementary and compatible which have made valuable contributions to the contemporary social movement approaches (Canel, 1997).  

27 This approach was first called as the Political Opportunity Structures (POS) analysis which has implied a special emphasis on structures. However, after receiving criticisms of neglecting agency, processes, and non-structural political elements in their analysis of political contexts’ impact on social movements as discussed below, its proponents renamed their approach as Political Opportunity analysis or Political Process Theory (PPT) which will be used interchangeably throughout the dissertation.
national context over time (McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1995; Koopmans, 1993). In doing that, the PPT studies the social movements’ links with institutional politics, and in that regard, the state emerges as an important component in the analysis of social movements whose structure, behaviour and responses shape the dimensions of ‘opportunity-threat to challengers and facilitation-repression by authorities’ which are crucial conditions for social movement mobilization. In that regard, according to the students of the PPT, the state is both the target of contention and the fulcrum that mediates the struggle between two non-state opponents (Tilly 2004; Tarrow, 2011: 71-72).

The basic heuristic tool utilized in all the PPT studies is the political opportunities and constraints that either, respectively, facilitate or threaten social movements. Among various PPT approaches, Tarrow’s (1998, 2011) formulation has been accepted as the most comprehensive and full-fledged description of political opportunities. Tarrow claims that political factors and the developments in political contexts which have more weight in the emergence and development of contentious politics in comparison to social and economic factors can work either as opportunities or constraints. When these changing dimensions of political context encourage people to enter contentious politics, they become opportunities. On the other hand, if they discourage people from staging their grievances as social movements, they operate as constraints (Tarrow, 1998: 19-20).

According to Tarrow, political opportunities consist of five dynamic elements. Additionally, two long-lasting characteristics of a political context make up the stable

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28 Proponents of the PPT attribute a crucial role to the state in their analysis. They explain the historical development of social movements in direct relation to the historical formation of the centralized national states, the consolidation of national territories, and the formation of national political spheres as well as revolutions of print and associational life. Accordingly they claim newly emerging ‘citizens’ within a national territory direct their contentions towards the state and express their grievances at the national level based on a modern repertoire of action which is ‘cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous’ since the 19th century (Tilly, 1995: 45-46).

29 POS dimensions are defined in various ways by different POS theorists including McAdam (1982), Kitschelt (1986), Kriesi et al. (1992), Rucht (1996), Van der Heijden (1997), and Tarrow (1998). Yet, insertion of various variables led to a lack of clarity with respect to the dimensions of POS (Meyer, 2004; Rucht, 1996; McAdam, 1996; Meyer and Gamson, 1996; Rootes, 1999). Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275) claim that the concept of POS is “…in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement”.

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elements of political opportunities-constraints. Starting with the former set, the dynamic elements include:

1) The increasing access to the political system: When political participation channels are enhanced for the social movement actors, challengers are provided with some incentives, and they find better grounds for mobilization and efficacy (Tarrow, 2011: 165). Election periods are one instance, because power holders are more responsive to the claims of social movements as their potential voters (Tarrow, 1998: 77-78).

2) Shifting alignments: The instability of political alignments which is measured best by electoral instability appears as another dimension of opportunities. New coalitions, the changing prospects for governments and opposition parties lead to ‘uncertainties’ among supporters and increased hopes of influence and success among the challengers (Tarrow, 2011: 165). As for the undemocratic societies, any kind of political instability turns out to be an enabling factor for contentious politics since electoral competition is not well-grounded and regularized (Tarrow, 1998: 79).

3) Divided elite structure: The divisions among and within elites because of internal conflicts, first, encourage people who lack sufficient resources by providing incentives for taking more risks. Second, these divisions mobilize a section of the elite who are excluded from the power structure to take the side of the aggrieved people (Tarrow, 2011: 166).

4) Having influential allies: Allies with extended capabilities and power help social movements in their contention against power holders. Allies who “can act as friends in court, as guarantors against repression, or as acceptable negotiators on their behalf” encourage the excluded masses to mount collective action their claims (Tarrow, 2011: 166). Social movements have a wide array of potential allies including interest groups, other movements, elites, intellectuals and the media. Political parties, especially the ones on the left, exist as the ‘natural’ allies of social movements, especially in the democratic societies (Kriesi et al., 2003;
della Porta and Diani, 2006: 213-214). For instance, a split within the Left and the emergence of the New Left parties which have eventually become the ‘natural allies’ of the NSMs facilitate the NSM movements throughout Europe (Kriesi et al., 2003). Also certain movements have forged permanent alliances with specific political parties which appear as their ‘natural allies’ such socialist Parties for the labour movement. However, the alliance structures built between those ‘external groups’ and social movements do not only contain relations of solidarity, mutual support and cooperation in a monolithic manner as expected, but also competitive and conflictual relations which might undermine social movement activities (Rucht, 2004: 208-209).

5) Repression: It is the state which holds the monopoly of legitimate use of violence in modern political structures. In that regard, states appear as the major actor of controlling protest by using its police and military sources. Yet, the use of physical coercion to control social movements is not the only means used by the state. The state also utilizes precautionary methods to raise the costs for its challengers through non-physical means such as protest permission requirements, cutting funding, financial aid restrictions, and tax laws known as “channelling protest” (Earl, 2003). Furthermore, ‘protest control’ is not limited to the actions of the state, but non-state actors such as counter-movements might also employ coercive methods (Tarrow, 2011). Accordingly, a change in the level or kind of overall repression –mostly arriving from the state- operates as opportunity or threat for social movements (Tarrow, 2011).

These dynamic/volatile dimensions of POS do not exist separately, but rather they open the window of opportunities for social movements by interacting with each other. They are

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30 States employ different methods of exercising repression which is evident in the varying styles of ‘policing protest’. As an important aspect of state repression, ‘policing social protest’ is done in two major ways: ‘tough’ policing, which is diffused and applied to a large number of movements, aiming at rigid implementation of law with no room for bargaining, exhibiting low levels of toleration towards challengers by using massive amounts of force (even resorting to illegal tactics); and ‘soft’ policing which supports a tolerant attitude towards social movements selectively by using minimal amounts of force based on a more flexible implementation of law allowing for negotiations with social movement actors (della Porta and Fillieule, 2004: 218).
more open to change over a shorter period of time, and they depend on the immediate political context. Furthermore, when different social movements or even different sections of the same social movement are considered, the dynamic dimensions operate in varying ways (McAdam, 2003). The impacts of same opportunities might also change for the various stages of the same social movement (Meyer, 2004). These elements are dynamic in the sense that movement actors might expand or diminish opportunities for themselves, for other movements, for counter-movements, and for elites and political parties (Tarrow, 2011).

In addition to the dynamic/volatile dimensions, Tarrow also includes stable elements in his PO framework. The stable elements are related to the state structure and the characteristics of political relations between state and society which have been institutionalized in conjunction with the historical formation of states and which are long-enduring and difficult to change. First, state strength is the capability of states to implement policies, determined by the degree of centralization of state structures and the degree of separation of state powers of judiciary, legislative and executive. Depending on these variables, states are classified either as strong or weak in its ideal-typical sense (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., 2003; Tarrow, 2011). Second, the prevailing strategies are the informal procedures followed by the power holders when implementing some state policy which determines the states’ choices of response to challengers. Prevailing strategies bring in the agency factor which is absent in the state strength dimension and constitute the political culture of a given context. They develop over a long period of time and are internalized by political power structures, making political structure either inclusive or exclusive (Kriesi et al., 2003: 33-34; Tarrow, 2011: 177-178).31

In fact, despite its prevalence within the field of social movement studies, the PO analysis in its original version has been criticized because of some major shortcomings and

31 The prevailing strategies are described as “...the procedures typically employed by members of the political system when they are dealing with challengers” by Kriesi et al. (1995: 34). With respect to subcategories of prevailing strategies, on the one hand, integrative strategies consist of “facilitative”, “cooperative” and “assimilative” acts of states. On the other hand, exclusive strategies are state responses that are “repressive”, “confrontational”, and/or “polarizing” (Kriesi et al., 1995: 33-34).
biases such as lack of clarity with respect to its dimensions (Rucht, 1996; McAdam, 1996; Meyer and Gamson, 1996; Rootes, 1999; Meyer, 2004); over-emphasis on structures and neglect of the role of agency of social movement actors and cognitive structures which are essential for translating opportunities into action (Goodwin and Jaspers, 2004; Gamson and Meyer, 1996); its focus on movements with direct political orientations and claims neglecting movements depending on social and cultural factors (Rucht, 1996: 189; Goodwin and Jaspers, 2004); and its political reductionism which prioritizes the effects of political factors by disregarding cultural aspects such as the attitudes and behaviour of potential constituents, social aspects such as availability and characteristics of networks, general stratification, and class structures (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; McAdam, 1996).

Facing such criticisms, the students of the PPT have started reformulating their theories by incorporating in their analysis different movement aspects, namely mobilizing structures and framing (Klandermans and Tarrow, 1988; Diani 1992, 1996; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996a; Tarrow, 1998, 2011; della Porta and Diani, 2006). In these studies, opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes are taken not as independent, but rather as interacting factors that affect the development, mobilization and outcomes of social movements (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996a; Tarrow, 1998, 2011).

Framing refers to all the cognitive work carried out by social movement actors to interpret events and conditions surrounding them including political changes so that they can define the opportunities/constraints resulting in mobilization with enhanced levels of belief in efficacy; define their grievances which enable them to define sources and figure out solutions; construct their identity and identify their opponents; harmonize their personal values, beliefs, and ideas with movements’ goals, strategies and meaning systems; and, in short, to establish a

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32 Kriesi et al.’s (1995) analysis of NSMs in Europe with respect to POS exemplifies one of the few exceptions.
33 Mobilizing structures and framing processes are built on internal structures of organizational structures and resources emphasized by the RM approach and cultural features of a movement such as meaning and identity brought forth by the NSM approach, respectively.
meaning system for their activities (Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1992; Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow, 2004). In that regard, frames are “interpretive schemata that simplify and condenses the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding subjects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment” (Snow and Benford, 1992: 137).

Framing process is subdivided into three categories with respect to its ‘core’ tasks: diagnostic framing, through which issues are interpreted and problems are defined by naming what is wrong and why and by labelling the responsible; prognostic framing, through which solutions to the problems are presented and justifications for the choices of patterns of action, alliances, strategies and tactics are provided; and motivational framing, through which activists are endowed with reasons to stage their social movement actions (Snow and Benford, 2000; Noakes and Johnston, 2005). As pointed out by Gamson (1992), ‘injustice framing’ by which unjust events and conditions are defined is an indispensible component of framing process since all movements rely upon them.34

In order to be successful, movement frames should meet the criteria of ‘cultural resonance’ with respect to their target population and the cultural structures social movements are embedded in. A successful frame is, first, one which acquires a high credibility level by sustaining consistency in beliefs, claims, tactics and framing; by achieving empirical credibility regarding a solid match between social events and frames; and by finding frame articulators who are more credible in the eyes of the target population. Secondly, frames should occupy a central place for the targets of mobilization with respect to their beliefs and values (‘centrality’); have direct reflections in social reality (‘empirical fidelity’); and should resonate with the existing cultural narrations (narrative fidelity’) (Benford and Snow, 2000: 619-622). In that regard, frames link individuals and social movements. To maintain such

34 Even though Snow and Benford (2000:615) agree that ‘injustice frames’ are found in most of the movements, they argue that are not necessarily found in every movement since religious movements, self-help movements, and other identity oriented movements do not include an injustice component in their framing.
links, in other words mobilization of individuals, activists employ some specific strategies of ‘frame alignment’ described by Snow et al. (1986). First, *frame bridging* refers to the process of conjoining previously unconnected but ideologically relevant frames between social movements or social movements and individuals. Second, *frame amplification* is the process through which movement frames are clarified by underlying values and beliefs from a large pool so that individuals can relate their immediate situations with the social movements’ goals and values once ‘deception’, ‘indifference’, ‘ambiguities’ and ‘uncertainties’ of individuals are overcome. Third, *frame extension* is the enlargement of movement frames beyond their primary issues by including the values and interests of potential adherents. Fourth, *frame transformation* takes place when old meanings are discarded and new ones are formulated (Benford et. al, 1986).

All these processes of framing are achieved as a result of social interactions between social movement actors and extensive negotiations taking place over meanings. Hence, framing is an on-going and dynamic process which is shaped by the deliberate strategies of activists and which subsequently undergoes a constant change throughout the trajectory of a movement. Besides, framing is not only done among the social movement activists, but rather it goes beyond the control of social movement adherents since other actors including the media, the state, and counter-movements are also involved in the process by providing their own frames over the issues of movements (Noakes and Johnston, 2005; Noakes, 2005; Walgrave and Manssens, 2005; Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Empirical evidence shows that as their degree of inclusiveness and flexibility increases, frames appeal to a broader population and have more mobilization power (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992; Benford and Snow, 2000). Enhanced levels of flexibility and inclusiveness lead to the formation of ‘master frames’. A dominant frame overarches a whole movement and inspires sub-development of SMOs’ organizational frames (Benford and Snow, 2000).
A growing number of studies argue that POS and framing processes interact and operate mutually and in recurring patterns. In other words, movements are affected by political opportunities which are constantly being shaped and re-shaped by framing (Valocchi, 2005; Cadena-Roa, 2005; Walgrave and Manssen, 2005). Accordingly, framing has been introduced to POS theory as a crucial aspect since political changes are not opportunities unless social movement actors themselves perceive and interpret them as factors which will facilitate their activities and increase the chances of success. In other words, “[a]n opportunity unrecognized is no opportunity at all” (Gamson and Meyer, 1996: 283). By describing framing as a contentious process which takes place inside a movement, Gamson and Meyer (1996) claim that constant struggles between different groups belonging to the same movement occur over which meanings should be attributed to related events and political conditions.

Identity is another crucial component of social movements which is examined in relation to framing. Identity formation is described as an on-going, dynamic, and fluid process as a result of which boundaries with respect to values, beliefs, goals, and strategies of actors of a social movement are marked which distinguish social movement groups from their adversaries as well as from other groups of the same social movement. In this way, bonds between social movement actors are strengthened so that relations of solidarity, trust and commitment are maintained, and different experiences of collective action are connected to each other within an established meaning system. Subsequently, an intra-movement consciousness of “we-ness” is formed alongside their identification of “others” (Poletta and Jasper, 2001; Della Porta and Diani, 2006; Hunt and Benford, 2004). By developing common aspirations, values and beliefs of movement participants who have no direct and face-to-face relations with their comrades through building collective identities, channels of help, mutual support, and information circulation are enabled. Webs of solidarity increase the

35 Identity construction is not solely an ideational process. Instead, some contextual factors such as policymaking, interactions with authorities and already existing political cleavages within a political structure act as “sources of identity” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 111-113).
activists’ strength, motivation and encouragement to face risks while decreasing costs of 
social movement activity. Yet, collective identities of social movements are not homogeneous 
and rigid entities. Rather, individuals participating in a movement hold a multiplicity of 
identities stemming from social groups he/she belongs to such as class, gender, and ethnicity. 
In that regard, “movement identity” is, “in reality, largely a contingent product of negotiations 
between collective images produced by various actors and various organizations” (Della Porta 
and Diani, 2006: 99). Therefore, social movements form their collective identities mostly 
inclusively, articulating different positions and identities through negotiations and bargains.

On the other hand, mobilizing structures refer to all those forms of organization, 
tactical repertoires, modular tactical repertoires, and networks which enable initial social 
movement mobilization and its sustenance (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996b; McCarthy, 
1996; della Porta and Diani, 2006; Tarrow, 2011). Recent conceptualizations of 
organizational structures go beyond the narrow understanding of the RM approach which 
gives primacy to SMOs as the representative of a whole social movement. Rather, social 
movements are described as complex and heterogeneous networks composed of individuals, 
groups, and organizations in various forms and characteristics, sharing common underlying 
values, goals and collective identities (Rucht, 1996; McCarthy, 1996; Kriesi, 1996; Diani, 
2003; Clemens and Minkoff, 2004; Della Porta and Diani, 2006). In that regard, SMOs stand 
as important nodes among others, but they are far from dominating the whole social 
movement. Della Porta and Diani (2006) categorize SMOs as “professional movement 
organizations” and “participatory movement organizations.” The former refers to SMOs with 
full-time leadership, small or non-existent membership base or membership on paper. On the 
other hand, the latter entails SMOs that rely on grassroots and are shaped by participatory 
democracy ideals. This category is sub-divided into “mass-protest organizations” which 
combines their participatory democracy ideals with formal organizational structures and
“grassroots organizations” which are more horizontal, more localized and less structured organizations with fluid membership based on solidaristic and ideological incentives (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Accordingly, all other sorts of networks that operate either as locations of mobilization or as sources of solidarity and commitment are part of mobilizing structures including informal-non-movement networks of family, friendship, work, and neighbourhood; formal-non-movement organizations like unions, churches, and professional associations; and informal-movement organizations like activist networks, affinity groups and memory communities (McCarthy, 1996: 145). These components are linked to each other through ‘complex webs of exchanges, either direct or mediated’, so that nodes (groups, organizations, or other entities such as neighbourhoods) within a network are bound to each other by one or more types of relations (Diani and McAdam, 2003). Furthermore, with respect to initial recruitment and mobilization, social movements rely on already existing social ties and social settings as long as activists reformulate shared meanings and identities by reshaping them suitable for their struggle (McAdam, 2003).36

With respect to tactical choices, they are made by social movements in line with their general strategies in pursuit of their goals during their protest activities. Social movements choose their tactics based on some basic criteria of displaying their strength in numbers, making their potential for causing disruption/or damage visible, and strengthening their internal commitment to their objectives.37 Through their tactics, social movements convey messages both to power holders to take action along social movements’ claims; to bystanders and allies with the purpose of increasing their constituency bases; and to adherents in order to strengthen solidarity and commitment relations within a movement. In fact, choosing tactics is

36 Passy (2003) and McAdam (2003) define mechanisms respectively under different names as follows: a) structural-connection/recruitment attempt, connecting a potential activists to a recruitment effort in which individuals interpret frames, build their identities, and establish political consciousness; b) socialization/identity movement linkage, connecting the established identity to a movement opportunity and converting political consciousness into movement action; c) decision-shaping/positive influence attempts, influence of other individuals actions within the network.

37 Della Porta and Diani (2006) identify these criteria respectively as ‘the logic of numbers’, ‘the logic of damage’, and ‘the logic of bearing witness’.
a contested process which occurs as a result of social interactions among various movement actors including activists, opponents, and allies (McAdam, 1983; Della Porta, 2006). Within the repertoires of action, which comprise of ways of doing protest known to movement actors and expected by opponents and bystanders, there is a wide array of tactics for social movements which are basically categorized as conventional, disruptive and violent (Tarrow, 2011). The process of choosing which tactics is to be used is constrained by several factors both external and internal to a movement. First, certain political contexts are more conducive to certain types of tactics. In that regard, the openness of political opportunities and stable elements of POS are factors which affect the tactical choices of movements. Furthermore, different stages of a protest cycle influence tactical choices (della Porta, 2006: 189-190; Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 273-274; Tarrow, 2011). In addition, internal processes of social movements such as organizational structures, cultural frames, and the structural power of the participants are also decisive on movement tactics (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 274). Furthermore, social movements tend to make their choices with a proximity to previous movements adopting older forms of action in order to gain legitimacy through using ‘myths’ and heroes’ of the past (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 182).

Furthermore, social movements might borrow tactics from other movements through diffusion processes. Different social movements continuously interact, emulate, and borrow tactics from each other and adapt them to their case. Therefore, each time social movements start their protests and struggle, they “…do not have to reinvent the wheel at each place and in each conflict” (McAdam and Rucht, 1993: 58). The underlying mechanism in this process is

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38 The relationship between organizational structures and tactics is a debated question. One line of research indicates that as organizations’ presence increases, movement tactics become more conventional and social movements become more institutionalized (Piven and Cloward, 1979; Staggenborg, 1988; Kriesi et al. 1985). However, others argue that more confrontational tactics are also employed by social movements with formal organizations as in the cases of homeless people’s movement in the US (Cress and Snow, 1996, 2000) and Greenpeace (Wapner, 1995).

39 It is often observed that social movement actors with less power and resources within the social, political, and economic structures such as the unemployed, the homeless, or racially and ethnically excluded groups are more inclined to employ disruptive tactics (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 277).
diffusion. Diffusion refers to the spread of ideas and practices from one social movement to another across or within political and cultural contexts directly or indirectly (McAdam and Rucht, 1993; Chabot, 2002; Soule, 2004; Tarrow, 2005, 2011). In fact, diffusion does not only take place with respect to tactics, since frames as well as organizational structures also diffuse from one movement to another. There are four basic elements which are required for diffusion to take place: a transmitter, an adopter, an innovation, and channels of transmission (Soule, 2004: 295). When an innovated tactic is perceived to be resonant with the goals and frames of another movement, the latter one, i.e. the adopter, applies that tactic to its own situation. Snow and Benford (1999) define four types of diffusion, arguing that diffusion does not solely take place between similar contexts and that social movement participants are active agents within the diffusion process who strategically borrow and/or promote and frame ideas and practices. These types of diffusion are reciprocation, adaptation, accommodation, and, contagion (Snow and Benford, 1999). The diffusion of tactics points at the fact that another way of maintaining repertoires of action is through ‘learning’. It is either inherited from the past movements or modelled from other movements (della Porta and Diani, 2006).

However, it must be stated that social movements do not solely stick to the available repertoires of action inherited from the past. In order to draw the attention of public and the media and to take authorities and opponents by surprise, social movements try to innovate and

40 Direct diffusion is based on direct network relations and affiliations under which activists and groups directly interact and communicate with each other through personal linkages between transmitters and adopters. Diffusion might also take place in-between social movements with no linkages and affiliations in cases when there are no network ties, i.e. non-relational diffusion, through the channelling of the media (McAdam and Rucht: 1993). The diffusion of ‘shantytown protests’ throughout the American educational institutions as part of the Student Divestment Movement in the U.S. during the 1980s (Soule, 1997), and the use of sit-ins and nonviolence protest in the Civil Rights Movement which are adopted from India are two striking examples for the diffusion of movements tactics.

41 Snow and Benford (1999) define each diffusion type as follows: reciprocation, in which both transmitters and adopters are actively staging reciprocal efforts; adaptation, where adopters take an active role and import ideas and practices by modifying imported forms according to their own political and cultural contexts; accommodation, which occurs when transmitters are active agents who amplify their ideas and practices to resonate with a targeted group of adopters and their socio-cultural contexts; and, contagion, in which both transmitters and adopters are both as objects of diffusion travel from one movement to another unintentionally.
use new tactics and adapt older ones to new situations. Hence, repertoires of action have an innovative aspect as well (della Porta and Diani, 2006). Previous movements’ repertoires of action might affect tactical choices of a social movement in the opposite direction as in the case of the Bergama movement. Bergama activists adopted non-violent civil disobedience in contrast to the left movement groups using violence, and enriched it with innovative protest forms since they considered earlier forms inappropriate for their own situation in their fight against capitalist globalization.

As reviewed above, the social movement literature has come a long way with increasing number of studies combining multiple aspects crucial in the analysis of social movements, informed by the contribution of various traditions in the literature. In addition to the synthesis approach they have employed previously, three prominent scholars of social movements, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2002), have made further efforts at reaching a comprehensive theoretical framework that accounts for not only specific social movements but contentious politics in general. According to the Dynamics of Contention (DOC) analysis, basic components of social movements, i.e. opportunities/threats, mobilizing structures, framing and repertoires of action, stressed by the classical approaches are still relevant for the emergence and development of social movements. However, all these components of social movements are combined through recurring processes and mechanisms that work as “the connective fabric variables of interest to students of contentious politics” (Tarrow, 2011: 186). They justify labelling the basic components, respectively, as attribution of threat/opportunity, organizational appropriation, social construction, and innovative collective action, by claiming that this is mainly because all different stages and components of social movements rise on relations between different social actors and they are being produced and reproduced through the interactions among social movement actors, opponents and third parties.
In sum, the synthesis model which is built on the POS approach has been able to formulate a more comprehensive understanding of the social movement process in comparison to previous approaches. As such, it is relevant to analyzing certain aspects of the Bergama movement as shown throughout this section. Yet, it stops short of integrating all the significant aspects of contention in Bergama. That is because the transcendence of single-focus models is still insufficient with respect to its state-centrism. The synthesis model continues to take national contexts as its unit of analysis. Social movements under examination have been depicted as existing within some national political cultural structure which is the only factor that shapes all the movement processes. Furthermore, the nation-state has still taken as the main target and/or fulcrum of social movements, despite major transformations globalizing dynamics have produced. Although PPT relates social movements to political structures, they remain incomplete since the PPT studies fail to investigate the impacts of capitalist globalization on the formation of discontent and its translation into mobilization. Therefore, all this analysis should be extended to the local and transnational levels, taking into account changes in political contexts to analyze local movements under capitalist globalization such as the Bergama movement.

In fact, there have been a growing pool of studies analyzing the relationship between social movements and globalization (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, 1997; Smith and Johnston, 2002; Bandy and Smith, 2005a; Tarrow, 2005; della Porta and Tarrow, 2005a; della Porta, 2007c; Smith, 2008; ; della Porta, et al., 2009). Within this burgeoning literature, many scholars argue that activism against globalization predominantly takes place within domestic contexts, attributing a primacy to national contexts in the age of globalization (Meyer, 2003; Tarrow 2005; Rootes 2005; della Porta and Tarrow, 2005a; Imig and Tarrow, 2009). Additionally, it has also been stated that even if a local movement raises its
contention to the transnational level, its ‘strength’ remains local, regional, or national (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005).

In his analysis of causal links between globalization and social movements, Tarrow (2005) argues that the contemporary state of the world rests upon two simultaneous and yet separate processes which intersect at certain instances: ‘complex internationalism’ – “a dense, triangular structure of relations among states, nonstate actors, and international institutions, the opportunities and international institutions, and the opportunities this produces for actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this system” [italic in original] (Tarrow, 2005: 25); and ‘globalization’ which is narrowly defined as “increasing volume and speed of flows of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and forces that connect actors between countries” [italic in original] (ibid: 5). Based on his bifurcated model, Tarrow argues that the “complex internationalism” which refers to the growing ‘triangular’ interdependence between states, international institutions and non-state actors provides a ‘framework’, ‘a set of focal points’ and ‘structure of opportunity views’ for transnational social movements (ibid: 3). In other words, this bifurcated model suggests that while globalization is the source of new grievances and new actors, social movements are mobilized in venues created by “complex internationalism” in which social movement actors “congregate, cooperate, conflict, and frame their demands” (ibid: 5). Within ‘complex internationalism’, mobilization of local and transnational movements against neo-liberal globalization depends on six processes identified by Tarrow:

a) *global issue framing* (utilizing ‘international symbols in the framing of domestic contention),

b) *internalization* (contending against ‘external’ pressures within domestic contexts);

c) *diffusion* (adoption and adaptation of strategies, tactics, forms of contention, and framing from other settings),
d) *scale-shift* (changing the level of coordination of collective action);

e) *externalization* (bringing domestic issues and conflicts to ‘international’ sphere and making claims against ‘international’ institutions or ‘foreign actors in a vertical way)

f) *transnational coalition formation* (creation of horizontal networks among groups with similar concerns and demands) (Tarrow, 2005:32-33).

These processes realized through various mechanisms of frame bridging, brokerage, implementation, certification, and attribution of similarity are categorized into three groups along the domestic-international axes with respect to sites of activism and range of issues. In the case of a) and b), contentions remain domestic since no permanent cross-border links are established. Even though repertoires of contention are brought together with c) and d), being temporary and open to decreasing domestic militancy again precludes transnational contention. Lastly, it is the processes of e) and f) which create the conditions for durable transnational movement structures. According to the model of Tarrow which assumes differentiation of domestic and international levels, the state and its institutions continue to be the primary targets and fulcrums of social movement mobilization which leads Tarrow to be sceptical about the emergence of ‘truly’ transnational social movements (Tarrow, 2005; Imig and Tarrow, 2009).42 On the other hand, sporadically occurring transnational protests and activisms are the work of rooted cosmopolitans with flexible and multiple identities who link domestic claims to each other through their brokerage rather than a permanently available GCS (Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow and della Porta, 2005). In a similar vein, Rootes (2005) argues that even though transnational environmental movement networks have been formed as a result of increasing interest in environmental issues in the EU bodies, they are neither dense nor active. Also, national environmental SMOs are more inclined to entrench their struggles

42 In their analysis of the impact of the EU as a supranational political governance structure on European social movements, Imig and Tarrow (2001:17-18) claim that the European social movement actors overwhelmingly direct their protests at their national governments even if they frame their grievances in terms of European policies.
in local contexts, and they tend to direct their contention towards national authorities due to the scarcity of resources, the absence of a European public, recurring opening and closing of political opportunities at the national level, and familiarity of action forms at the national level (ibid: 25). Additionally, environmental protests are mostly staged at the local, regional, or national levels because of the relative ineffectiveness of the EU bodies in terms of implementation of policies and the lack of convergence of issues and concerns across Europe (Rootes, 2003). Therefore, in spite of a transnationalization trend among the national environmental SMOs, it is a ‘limited’ one since emerging transnational political opportunities have brought constraints such as unfamiliarity with transnational arenas and the lack of resources (Rootes, 2005).

Therefore, these analyses agree upon the view that transnational activism occurs in an episodic fashion without forming permanent organizational structures at the global level. Protests over globalization related issues, on the other hand, mostly occur in the form of domestic movements against their national states and its agencies (Imig and Tarrow, 2001, 2009; Tarrow, 2003, 2005; Rootes, 2004, 2005). True enough, many local groups suffering from the negative impacts of capitalist globalization choose to stage protests at the national level directing their contention towards their states. Yet, the question of whether it is the same national context under capitalist globalization remains unanswered.

In his analysis, Tarrow describes the current global system as a combination of globalization and ‘complex internationalization’ characterizing them as different but interrelated systems. Tarrow attributes a central role to states by claiming they are influential and powerful actors within IGOs which have been formed based on the ‘transgovernmental relations’ among states in the first place. In that sense, having a prominent role at the IGOs which are the main locus of decision-making regarding developments at the global level, states dominate the world polity as well as the triangular relationship between states, non-state
actors, and IGOs according to Tarrow’s model. Put differently, Tarrow fills in generic globalization by ascribing the state a prominent role and depicting a ‘political’ globalization process led by the states. Yet, technocratic bureaucrats who are detached from their national interests and other transnational non-state actors such as TNCs are also actively involved in decision-making and agenda-setting processes within IGOs whose policies go beyond the interests of individual states and reflect the interests of the TCC. As indicated by scholars such as Sklair (2002), Sassen (2007), and Smith (2008), TNP s take place within territorial units of states by de-nationalizing these contexts, making them integral to capitalist globalization. Therefore, states are one of the active carriers of capitalist globalization rather than passive bearers of the impacts of globalization. Local populations mobilized against capitalist globalization perceive states as such which is confirmed by the findings of this research. Hence, it is important to bring grievances back in the analysis of social movements by combining them with political contexts, mobilizing structures, and framing processes, in order to grasp how local movements relate themselves to the GJM.

With respect to opportunities at the transnational/global level, the necessity to adapt POS to the global level has been recognized in the context of increasing transnational practices. However, scholars who adapt POS to global politics posit either a ‘multi-level’ structure in which social movements shift their activities among different political levels (Sikkink, 2005; della Porta and Tarrow, 2005b; della Porta et al., 2009) or a “nested opportunity structure” in which local, national, and international structures form concentric circles (Rothman and Oliver, 2002; Lewis, 2002; Meyer, 2003). These accounts assert a hierarchy between different political levels. However, as Sassen (2007) argues, global political order can be best described as a ‘multi-scalar’ system that does not entail a hierarchical ordering of scales. Local movements are directly connected to each other by-passing national levels at enhanced degrees of magnitude, scope, and simultaneity so that they
are “...not confined to moving through a set of nested scales from the local to the national to the international but can access other local actors whether in the same country or across borders” (Sassen, 2007: 207-208). Multi-scalar politics is mainly enabled by information and communication technologies (ICTs) used on top of long-enduring utilization of the ‘traditional’ media. By exchanging information and strategies, local movements manage to engage in global politics directly while concomitantly remaining particularistic and domestic in their struggle (Sassen, 2007). As Rootes (1999) has pointed out, it is an imperative for local movements to raise themselves to national and transnational levels in order to be effective. Apart from resource based reasons, it is a necessity for local movements since their grievances are directly related to global structures and dynamics. In that regard, emergence of the GJM signifies a further step taken toward bringing local movements together as a solid movement since it is also the framing of problems, targets and identities that are shared in a loose, flexible, and dynamic fashion while preserving heterogeneity and diversity. In this manner, domestic movements are exposed to global opportunities and constraints as well as they are to their national opportunity structures

**Transnational/Global Opportunities:**

The global structure lacks a governance configuration equivalent to the state. Instead, numerous non-state actors including organizations, group, and individuals engaging in transboundary practices and relations as well as various economic (IGOs like the IMF, WB, WTO), political (the EU and the UN) and legal (the European Court of Human Rights - ECHR) institutions at transnational and supranational levels provide opportunities for both domestic and transnational movements. In that sense, it is necessary to extend the classical POS analysis to the transnational level in order to understand the global opportunities that
exist for local movements like the Bergama movement. Accordingly, I will apply Tarrow’s POS that is formulated at the national level to the transnational level.\footnote{I will combine stable elements and dynamic elements given the short history of supranational structures and their more dynamic institutional characteristics in comparison to nation-states.}

*Having access:* Having access to decision-making bodies is a crucial window of opportunity at the national level. However, the global political order which does not contain a political structure equivalent of the state lacks the most crucial mechanism of representative democracy – elections. This reduces the chances of gaining access to decision-making centres at the international and supranational levels. On the other hand, the global centres of decision-making such as IGOs, supranational governance structures, and particularly the UN provide some channels of access to social movements even if to a limited extent (Bandy and Smith, 2005b). From the 1990s on, UN conferences have become one of the main global sites for the non-state actors to convene (Smith, 2004b). Involvement of INGOs and social movements in these conferences endowed them with several opportunities such as interacting with actors influential in global decision-making; learning about global issues, policies, and rights granted by international treaties and agreements; and developing grounds for common understandings of global problems, identifying shared goals, formulating solutions to these problems, and networking among movement participants. Also, participation in UN conferences contributes to global-local linkages since participants convey conference decisions and contacts afterwards. Furthermore, the UN conferences operate as training grounds in that social movement groups get to observe how global decision-making mechanisms work and how a multiplicity of views and positions co-exist within the same terrain which subsequently serves as a template for their own events (Smith, 2004a). On the other hand, IGOs like the World Bank and the WTO are fairly closed structures providing either no representation or a symbolic one at best.\footnote{Please see Van der Heijden (2006) for a further discussion.}
With respect to supranational organizations, movements face very low levels of access to the EU—meaning SMOs have no institutional embeddedness, no formal access to information, and no participation in the decision-making processes, but they are allowed to lobby and negotiate with authorities as in the case of environmental movements (Rucht, 1997: 207; Rootes, 2005; della Porta and Kriesi, 2009: 15). As the findings of this research show, the EU has provided opportunities for the Bergama movement beyond its national borders. Even though Turkey is not a member state, the Bergama activists have brought their issue to European Parliament through the brokerage several influential allies.

*Having influential allies:* Under the capitalist globalization process, a new set of potential allies appear including GCS actors such as INGOs/TSMOs, ‘epistemic communities’, and members of supranational/transnational institutions such as the UN and the EU (Smith, 2004a; Bandy and Smith, 2005b; della Porta, 2009). Many INGOs/TSMOs are themselves part of TSMs, constituting crucial, yet not the sole or the most important, nodes within TSM networks. They carry out a variety of important roles in the formation of transnational campaigns and coalitions including linking individuals and (national or local) groups to each other and to global politics, coordinating activities, circulating information, and contributing to the maintenance and sustainability of collective identities and solidarity given the heterogeneity of TSM actors (Smith, 2004a). TSMOs are also vital allies at the transnational level for all kinds of local movements either trying to articulate themselves to the GJM or targeting their own states which makes them part of transnational networks. 45 TSMOs contribute to the process of bringing local social movements together in new network forms, and they assist local movements in relating local conflicts to their global

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45 A good example is the Narmada Valley Project movement which started as a local movement but was unable to achieve success. With the involvement of INGOs in their struggles in 1985, the local movement was turned into a transnational campaign which has led to the withdrawal of the World Bank form the project in 1993 (Khagram, 2004).
sources, which is a difficult task for local movements given the complexity of the global order.

Apart from linking local movements to transnational activism, TSMOs provide opportunities for local movements in their individual struggles. As a result of the “boomerang effect”\(^\text{46}\), TSMOs increase constraints and pressures on local movements’ targets by linking local or national-level conflicts to international law and global norms. Also, TSMOs provide substantial resources for local movements, mostly in the form of funding, strategies, technical knowledge, rights and policies stemming from signed and ratified international treaties/agreements, and information about other similar local mobilizations and issues in other parts of the world. Since TSMOs attend and monitor global negotiations in global summits, they disseminate knowledge about negotiations and decisions to local movements. Moreover, they bring local conflicts to the global agenda by informing the global elite about their issues (Smith, 1998). They also provide legitimacy and certification for local movements by enabling them to have access to transnational events and conferences through their links with global decision-making centres.

Nevertheless, building alliances with INGOs/TSMOs is not an easy task. First, there are structural constraints relating to the “the North-South divide” since INGOs/TSMOs are concentrated in the global North (Smith, 2004b). This divide is also evident in the sceptical views of the Southern activists who perceive Northern INGOs as representatives of their governments or in the biases of Northern INGOs stemming from different class, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds (Smith, 2002). Second, the overall process of transnational cooperation through INGOs is a competitive one. According to Bob (2005), “marketing of rebellion” occurs when local movements have to adjust themselves to the interests, agendas, framing, tactics and organizational structures of transnational actors in order to get the attention and

\(^{46}\) The “Boomerang Pattern” identified by Keck and Sikkink occurs when there is a blockage in the domestic political system. By forging links with allies outside their national contexts, local movements aim to increase pressure on their state through the transnational advocacy networks (TANs) (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 12).
support of INGOs/TSMOs. INGOs/TSMOs support local movements not only based on their philanthropy, but also in line with their own organizational interests. Given the limited number of INGOs/TSMOs and the scarcity of their resources, local movements might go unnoticed or ignored by INGOs/TSMOs unless issues, tactical choices, cultures, ethical basis, and organizational structures match (Bob, 2005). In that regard, organizational forms of INGOs/TSMOs with respect to the level of bureaucratization and the degree of connections with formal world politics also play a role in establishing alliances with local movements (della Porta and Rucht, 2002: 2).

Although IGOs are one of the main targets of the GJM, they might provide opportunities for TSMs as well (della Porta and Kriesi, 1999; Smith, 2004a). IGOs occasionally tend to support and coalesce with TSMOs. On the part of IGOs, the main reason for alliance with TSMOs is to attain two resources which they lack, knowledge and legitimacy. Meanwhile, TSMs are endowed with material and nonmaterial resources such as funding, certification, and information (Passy, 2009). Moreover, social movements require the essential standards of liberal democracy, even if they are critical of representative democracy in general, to achieve success within the contexts they are operating (Sklair, 1995). In that regard, domestic movements mobilized over global justice issues also aspire to democratize their political environment. IGOs are among the fulcrums that these domestic movements refer to, to put pressure on their governments in cases of democratization of authoritarian or pseudo-liberal regimes (della Porta and Kriesi, 2009).

Lastly, ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas 1992) which consist of transboundary networks of experts and scientists act as allies of local movements. Support of ‘epistemic communities’ mostly coming in the form of providing scientific information about technically complicated issues is important for resource poor local movements since they can make use of this information in their struggles against the TCC (della Porta and Kriesi, 1999).
*Divided elite:* Another global opportunity that exists for social movements is the fact that the global elite, mainly made up of the TCC, is not unified in their political views on the global order.\(^{47}\) Held and McGrew (2007) categorize the capitalist globalizers into four groups with respect to their political views: neoliberals, liberal internationalists, institutional reformers, and global transformers. The ‘cosmopolitan social democrats’ – an overarching label for the latter three- opt for a capitalist global order in which global governance structures are strengthened in varying degrees. According to their model, both global and domestic civil society actors occupy a central position in addressing local problems created by globalization and implementing policies accordingly. In this context, the global elite who express worries about the detrimental impacts of the capitalist globalization especially about rising inequalities and environmental destruction might serve as useful allies. Alliances between the critical elite and the GJM at all levels can be achieved over specific issues to attain short-term goals. Nevertheless, divisions within the global elite provide opportunities for social movements to exploit the vulnerabilities of the discourse of the capitalist globalization (Sklair, 2002: 284). Evidence from this research showed that divisions within the globalizing elite constitute an important opportunity utilized by the Bergama activists. There has been a rising concern about environmental issues in the EU (Rootes, 2005). As an institution complying with capitalist globalization, the EU’s environmental concerns and its specific sensitivity to the mining issue in Bergama has been used as leverage against the mining TNCs.

*Shifting alignments:* The model on which global policies are built has shifted over time from the “Washington Consensus” to the “Post-Washington consensus” as discussed above. The new model which underlines the importance of institutions for the proper working of the global market has gained ascendancy among the global elite. The new agenda also

\(^{47}\) Especially after the Asian crisis in 1997, several CEOs, businessmen, academics, and IGO members belonging to the capitalist globalizers’ network such as Bill Gates, George Soros, Joseph Stiglitz, Ravi Kanbur, and John Browne have raised criticisms to the neo-liberal form of the capitalist globalization by underlining inequalities, problems with finance, environmental destruction, and the Washington consensus in general (Sklair, 2002: 282).
increasingly includes GCS actors, especially INGOs, which enhances their access to resources as well as their role in the formation and application of global policies, albeit limited, as consultants and sub-contractors of globally applied policies (Chandhoke, 2002). The more welcoming global context increases the capability of INGOs, including the ones that take part in the GJM to carry global justice related local issues onto the global agenda. On the other hand, alignments within the network of democratic globalizers which lead to connect various issues together prepare the grounds for collaboration of various social movements.

Use of force: Since an overarching political authority corresponding to the state is absent at the global level, the monopoly of using force is still in the hands of individual states within the global order. Therefore, in their conflicts with local populations, the TCC use state forces and means in order to suppress movements which underscores a complete overlap between national and global opportunities.

On the other hand, the emergence of transnational political opportunities (TPO) does not amount to the disappearance or irrelevance of national POS since globalization is an ongoing process under which the world is globalizing, rather than globalized. Under these circumstances, national contexts and states still present political opportunities (and constraints). However, national POS should be used cautiously since national political contexts are being transformed and reshaped –mostly in the form of de-nationalization- as a result of TNPs that states themselves are a part of. Globalization sourced conflicts intersect with ‘older’ conflicts and structures within national political power structures. In other words, new political power structures mainly revolving around the rival networks of the capitalist globalization merge with ‘older’ conflicts and structures, producing transformed national POS which cannot be isolated from global processes. In that regard, national political spheres are not intact contexts operating solely as filtering mechanisms for global opportunities, but rather, local-national and global political levels are enmeshed together.
Impacts of globalization on national POS can be discerned in many instances. For instance, in national contexts of governments which are more involved in global politics in terms of membership in international organizations and the number of international treaties signed and ratified, there are higher levels of citizen participation in TSMOs which implies better connections with transnational networks (Smith and Wiest, 2005). Also, global processes and TNPs affect alliance structures in national contexts, reshaping relations between social movements and left-wing parties. Moderate left-wing parties in Europe and elsewhere which have traditionally been considered to be the best potential allies of social movements have lost their credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of movements since they mostly employ capitalist globalization-friendly views and policies. Concomitant trends of ‘professionalization’ and ‘bureaucratization’ of left-wing political parties are also factors that disrupt alliance possibilities. Centre-left political parties distrust the GJM and its national and local counterparts, perceiving them as a threat. Thus, emerging ideological positions and organizational structures of left-wing parties minimize the chances of cultivating alliances among these actors. Yet, this general trend plays out differently throughout European national-contexts depending on whether left politics is divided or united (della Porta, 2007b). On the other hand, Green Parties and radical left-wing political parties build alliances with the GJM(s) in order to expand their electoral basis in their competition with centre-left political parties (Sklair, 2002; della Porta, 2007b: 244).

Another indication that ‘inherited’ national structures and global dynamics enmesh together to produce globalizing national contexts is the cross-national variation of merging of ‘old’ issues of class and ‘new’ issues of identity, environment, anti-war and others. In that regard, national class structures play a role in shaping GJM in terms of the “degree of institutionalization of class cleavage”. It is more probable to have labour-NSM alliances where class conflicts are less tamed or institutionalized as in the Southern European
countries of Italy, France, and Spain in comparison to the Northern European countries where class conflicts are more institutionalized and ‘class discourse’ is marginalized (della Porta, 2007b). National elections still matter in the sense that governments that are threatened by the loss of their electoral support might side with movements against some global policies as in the case of the campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) (Sklair, 2002).

As the findings of this research confirm, as a local movement that framed its grievance in relation capitalist globalization, Bergama activists used three levels of polity simultaneously. Put differently, during their mobilization, the Bergama peasants carried out all movement activities such as framing, mobilizing, finding allies, exploiting vulnerabilities of their opponents and authorities at all levels without prioritizing one over another. As they considered themselves part of other mobilizations against capitalist globalization elsewhere around the world, they became an example of those local environmental movements which constitute the backbone of a global environmental movement which is yet to come in the future, as stated by Rootes (1999b). In order to understand the Bergama movement whose cause has been revolving around a new axis of capitalist globalization which cross-cuts all three levels, an analysis based on enmeshed political opportunities should be adopted.

In sum, the findings of this analysis confirm that local, national, and transnational scales of polity are interwoven as their boundaries are being transcended and interdependently reshaped. In chapter 3, the historical analysis of Turkish politics reveals that the Turkish political and economic structures have been transforming since the 1980s under the influence of capitalist globalization. The state-dominated modernization from above model has shifted towards a neo-liberal structure which culminated in increasing power and influence of non-state actors, formation of new alignments, rise of local actors and political agencies, and emergence of new issues in politics as shown in chapter 3. As such, the Turkish political
context revolves around a new political axis between proponents and challengers of capitalist globalization around which pre-existing conflicts still remain, albeit in their adapted forms. Yet, chapter 3 also shows that this is a process, and the political actors dominating the state structure since the 1980s act as ‘regressive globalizers’ facilitating capitalist globalization especially in the field of economy, while simultaneously putting a break on liberal democratic measures.

Chapter 4 delves into the analysis of how the Bergama activists mobilize with respect to their organizational structure which is assessed from a network perspective. The chapter confirms that it is organized as a decentralized, flexible, and multilayered network at the grassroots in which four sub-networks intertwine: pre-existing networks of friendship, kinship, and village(s) as well as civil society networks were used extensively while the movement elite and NGOs acted as nodes connecting various sub-networks which facilitated the expansion of the movement from local to transnational in reticulated form. In terms of movement strategies and tactics, chapter 4 also shows how the Bergama movement has re-interpreted pre-1980 repertoires of action, as well as how the Bergama activists have utilized innovative forms of action in a way that would not lead to alienation among its constituency and the general public.

According to the findings of this research, framing processes occupy a central place for the Bergama movement with respect to mobilization of peasants, utilization of political structures and processes, and building alliances with other actors. As shown in Chapter 5, the Bergama activists framed their struggle as an environmental as well as a human rights struggle in reference to injustices produced by capitalist globalization. In doing that, they articulated frames which resonated with values, beliefs, and norms of the Bergama peasants resulting in a successful mobilization. Additionally, the construction of flexible frames and the use of master frames which are shared by GJM activists elsewhere facilitated the
extension of their movement network. Also, the actions of state actors and opponents have been filtered through these frames which in turn affected their perceptions of political opportunities available to them. Moreover, they have employed master frames of environmentalism, human rights, and anti-globalization which are also used by the GJM activists. Finally, the collective identity process of the Bergama movement analyzed in chapter 5 confirms that social movements attempt to form their collective identities mostly inclusively, articulating different positions and identities through negotiations and bargains. Even though the community based ‘peasant’ identity was emphasized, it was not an exclusive identity since it was reconstructed along basic norms and values commonly shared by activists outside the villages which made it possible to maintain extended networks of support and solidarity despite internal conflicts and vulnerability.

As the literature indicates, national political opportunities are still indispensable to local mobilizations regardless of whether they are struggling against capitalist globalizing forces or not. As the findings in chapter 6 underline, the Bergama peasants interpreted various dimensions of their national political context as opportunities. In that regard, elections, shifting alignments, divisions among elite, and availability of allies at the national level were all perceived as opportunities. However, I show that that none of these national opportunities, including the availability of influential allies which has been the most effective of all, were sufficient. On other hand, the availability of local opportunities which compensated for the lack of widely open national opportunities facilitated the movement in terms of activity at the national and transnational levels.

As analyzed in Chapter 5 and 7, the Bergama activists identify their suffering as a result of the hazardous activities of the TNCs whose interests are in conflict with theirs. As such, the Bergama activists locate themselves within the ranks of the network of democratic globalizers in their struggle against the forces of capitalist globalization. Subsequently, they
forge links with other actors of the democratic globalizers network including INGOs, foreign politicians, epistemic communities, and transnational advocacy networks, much like other local movements struggling over the detrimental effects of capitalist globalization. These links, in return increased their capacity in terms of resources, support and pressure on their opponents. Also, they utilized supranational and international organizations such as the European Parliament and International Court of Human Rights all of which is discussed in chapter 7.
Chapter 3:

Social movements, civil society and political context in Turkey

Turkey has been undergoing major structural changes since the 1980s. Economic, political, and cultural terrains are being reshaped under the globalization process which alters traditional structures. One consequence of transformation is the emergence of new social movements (NSMs) and political actors involved in issues of environment, women’s rights, religious rights, and ethnic rights. However, this is not to say that the traditional cleavages and conflicts arising from the processes of modernization and capitalist development in Turkey are resolved. Rather, the impact of globalization including structural changes and emerging inequalities as well as new opportunities amalgamated with long-established contentions. Accordingly, the relations between the state and social movements are redefined and a new political context has come into being for social movements. In order to understand the Bergama movement which is one of the main purposes of this thesis and place it in this new context, it is necessary to provide a historical account of older social movements and the economic and political context of Turkey in which they were mobilized.

In this chapter I will evaluate the historical foundations of and the contemporary changes in the political context of Turkey in which the Bergama movement has emerged. To that end, a brief historical and sociological account of modernization and development processes of Turkey is called for to outline an overview of state society relations and relations between different social classes as well as their transformation under the globalization process. This will make for a better understanding of the formation of civil society actors and social movements in Turkey which provides a general setting for the analysis of the Bergama movement.

1923-1980 State Tutelage:

The Turkish nation state was founded in 1923 by the civilian and military elite under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. The republican elite’s ideological outlook was shaped by
nationalism and secularism influenced by the ideas of Enlightenment and positivism. The republic was a modernization project carried out by the republican elite from above who tried to differentiate itself from the Ottoman Empire. However, in reality, the formation of the modern nation-state was concomitantly a rupture and continuity with its Ottoman past. As a political and social modernization project, the Kemalist transformation was a radical break with the imperial-patrimonial empire whose basis of legitimacy was religion and its symbols. With the removal of personal rule, the formation of the republican Turkey meant a transition to a secular nation-state under an overwhelming modernization project. On the other hand, the republican regime displayed continuity with its Ottoman past with respect to its political power structure and centre-periphery relations. Therefore, Turkish modernization can be best described as a radical reorganization of the remaining parts of the Ottoman Empire under the rubric of a nation-state (Sunar and Sayarı, 1986: 168; Mardin, 1991: 65; Keyman, 2005).

In order to modernize the society and create a Turkish nation-state, the republican elite pursued a model of ‘state-centric modernity’ between 1923 and 1980 (İçduygu and Keyman, 2003; Keyman, 2005; Öniş and Keyman, 2007). The ‘state centric modernity’ consists of four basic interrelated parameters. First, the state occupies a central and dominant role as the active agent of the modernization project, controlling almost every aspect of politics and social life. Kemalism was a modernization project that aimed at creation of a rational ‘modern’ nation. Second, ‘national developmentalism’ constituted the economic pillar for the modernizing elite. Accordingly, the ‘developmental’ state regulated, directed and actively carried out capitalist development in a context of limited capital accumulation and insufficient industrialization.

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1 Centre-periphery conflict refers to the historical cultural, political and economic divide between the ruling class consisting of the sultan as well as military and civilian bureaucracy whose power increased with the 19th century on, and ruled masses that did not have any political power. Accordingly, the main ontological aim of the centre was to maintain power without letting any centrifugal powers appear to share its authority and power. Reforms imposed from above by the centre in order to restore its power widened this divide throughout the 19th century (Mardin, 1969).
Third, the Kemalist elite viewed society as an organic unity. Different class interests and individualistic claims were denied by the state elite (Keyder, 1989). In the ‘organic vision of society’ (Keyman 2005) society was designated to consist of different occupational groups with ‘duties and services to the state to reach the contemporary level of civilization’. Consistently, individual rights and liberties have not been taken into account and demands of participation, pluralism, and participation have been ignored by the Kemalist regime (Öniş and Keyman, 2007). Another parameter that complemented the ‘organic vision of society’ and maintained the sociological foundations of the state-centric modernization was the ‘republican model of citizenship’. The republican regime turned masses into ‘citizens’ by granting certain political rights. Yet, citizenship was defined in a specific way by disregarding basic civil and social rights, but instead with strong references to secular national identity and prioritization of “national interest over individual freedoms, duties over rights, and state sovereignty over individual autonomy” (Öniş and Keyman, 2007: 277).

During its early decades, the republicans ruled Turkey under ‘state-dominant mono-party authoritarianism’ (Sunar and Sayari, 1986: 70). The core of the republican elite consisted of a tripartite structure of civil bureaucracy, military bureaucracy and their party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). 2 The republican elite made up an extremely narrow core that excluded almost all groups under the motto of ‘despite people, for the people’. 3 The civilian and military bureaucracy had a prominent position within the political power structure maintaining control over all aspects of economic, social and political spheres.

As the mono-party regime became consolidated, any form of opposition stemming from the periphery was seen as a threat to the regime. The state allowed civil society organizations (CSOs) as long as they remained within the limits of the Kemalist ideology.

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2 In fact, there was a close link between the party and state. The state institutions and the party organization were officially declared to be congruent at the 1936 party congress (Zurcher, 2005).

3 Only a group of local notables were allowed to be a part of the RPP, but their role remained secondary and subordinate to the civilian and military elite (Sunar and Sayari, 1986: 70).
(Alkan, 1998). Under this restrictive rule of the CHP, numerous associations were closed throughout the 1930s, and social rights such as the rights to strike and lockout and right to unionize were prohibited.

With the introduction of multiparty democracy, the Democratic Party (DP) which emphasized economic and political liberalization as well as religious sentiments backed up by a coalition of commercial capital, market-oriented landholders and subordinate social classes such as the small peasantry, the urban poor and workers as well as religious groups came to power in the 1950 elections (Sunar, 2004; Keyder, 1990). However, despite the relative democratization and vibrancy of civil society experimented with during this period, the ‘Jacobin institutions of the mono-party regime’ were taken over by the DP and used for similar purposes of repressing the subordinate classes and civil society actors during the later stages of its rule (Sunar and Sayarı, 1986; Yücekök, 1998; Tosun, 2001).

CSOs such as public professional organizations, foundations, cooperatives, and associations existed since the early periods of the Republic. However, these CSOs acted as ‘the constitutive units of the organic vision of society’ and were seen as the activation sites of the top-down modernization of a backward society. Also by underlining duty-based citizenship, they emphasized ‘the moral primacy of the services to the state and nation over rights and freedoms’ and contributed to the reproduction of ‘the unity between the state and republican model of citizenship’ (Öniş and Keyman, 2007: 278). This structure of the civil society remained unchanged even after the introduction of multiparty politics.

1960s-1970s:

Still maintaining its power and prominent role within the political context, civilian and military bureaucracy coalesced with industrial capital and the Kemalist oriented intellectuals and university students against the DP which was considered to be ‘anti-revolutionary’ in a Kemalist sense’ (Sunar and Sayari, 1986; Keyder, 1989). The democratic order was
interrupted with the 1960 military coup supported by this coalition. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, a specific kind of national development model, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), was applied. The main purpose was to develop and support a strong national industry under the protection and coordination of the state (Keyder, 1994; Keyder, 1989). The ISI model which rested on a social consensus between the state, industrial capital and workers, since the short and mid-term interests of workers and the bureaucracy overlapped with the long term interests of the industrial capital (Keyder, 1989: 199). Accordingly, the civilian bureaucracy collaborating with the intelligentsia restructured the political and economic system by making the liberal flavoured 1961 constitution and establishing new political institutions which expanded individual rights, civil liberties and associative freedoms (Sunar and Sayarı, 1986; Zurcher, 1994).

The ‘liberalized’ political structure in the 1960s and 1970s vitalized civil society and social movements in Turkey. Combined with the structural changes following rapid migration and industrialization, associational life blossomed and many public professional associations, foundations, cooperatives and associations were formed between 1960 and 1980. Yet, the numerical increase in associational life and the apparent vibrancy of civil society do not represent any radical change with respect to the ‘state-centric modernization’. As such, civil society actors were not independent of the state. (Öniş and Keyman, 2007: 278).

In terms of social movements, student and workers’ movements were on the rise given the new political opportunities as well as structural changes throughout the 1960s and 1970s. As a result of rapid migration from rural to urban and fast pace of industrialization, the working class expanded in numbers. Extensive rights including rights to strike and collective bargaining were granted to the workers with the 1961 Constitution. At the same time, the ISI

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4 The industrial bourgeoisie was in need of a domestic market in which they could accumulate capital because it was too weak and fragile to compete with external market forces. For that purpose, state protection and interference was demanded by the industrial capital. On the other hand, they were also willing and, moreover, able to raise wages and give certain social rights to workers. Their main aspiration in doing that was maintaining a domestic market of consumers with a certain level of purchasing power (Keyder, 1989).
model provided suitable grounds for the improvement of the conditions of workers with respect to their wages. The favourable legal, political and economic conditions provided new political opportunities for the workers, and consequently labour initiated activism with the 1960s onward.

First, with the introduction of the bill of rights, a more liberal political context had come into being during the 1960s and the subsequent relaxation of state control over labour organizations provided opportunities for the workers movement. The number of unions and unionization rates increased which led to a diversified trade union structure. The establishment of the Union of Revolutionary/Progressive Workers Confederations (DİSK, Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu) in 1967 which followed a more militant and socialist line of unionism contributed to the invigoration of the workers’ movement in Turkey (Akkaya, 2003). On the other hand, even though they still lagged behind the DİSK in terms of labour action, the Türk-İş also became more inclined to stage labour movements during the 1970s, competing with the DİSK (Akkaya, 1996: 109).

Second, the multiparty political system itself provided workers the opportunities to access the political system through elections and acquire influential allies among political parties that competed with each other along the left-right axis. Third, the formation of the legal socialist party, the Turkish Workers Party (TİP), and its participation in elections was a turning point in Turkish politics since it accelerated the diffusion of socialist discourse and politics into the political context. ⁵ Despite the fact that the TİP remained a small party with limited electoral support and in the parliament only for a short term, it had major impacts both on the workers movement and the general political dynamics of the 1960s and 1970s. In the

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⁵ The Turkish Workers’ Party (TİP, Türkiye İşçi Partisi) was founded in 1961 by twelve union activists. In organizational terms, the TİP was similar to European social democratic parties, whereas its ideological outlook was Marxist, yet not Leninist (Belge, 1989: 41). The TİP got around 3% of the votes and won 15 seats in the parliament in the 1965 elections. The TİP’s electoral support mostly came from ‘progressive middle classes’ rather than workers in the urban centres and from ethnic and religious minorities, Kurds and Alevi in the rural sites (an Islamic sect) (Samim, 1981: 68-69).
years following the founding of TİP, the political axis in Turkey revolved around the Left-Right division. On the other hand, the TİP had a spill-over effect on trade unions since disagreements within the conservative union Türk-İş came to the surface in relation to TİP which led to the formation of radically oriented DİSK.

Additionally, fearing the loss of electoral support because of increasing popularity of left wing movements, the CHP announced a ‘left-of-center’ program in 1965 (Eroğul, 1987: 149). In the 1970s, the CHP shifted from the ambiguous ‘left-of centre’ approach to a better elaborated social democratic ideological stance. However, the transition in the ideological outlook of the CHP did not include a total rejection of its bureaucratic-elitist past. First of all, social democracy in Turkey did not originate from Marxism. Moreover, they adhered to Kemalist tenets by putting emphasis on its ‘populism’ and ‘statism’ ideas which were seen as essential components for achieving a more egalitarian society (S.T.M.A.: 2201). In fact, CHP’s take on social democracy referred to a radical version of populism according to which the CHP advocated a position of ‘being on the side of people’ against dominant power holders. The ideological shift resulted in the increase in the vote shares of the CHP. Within its electoral base, workers had a considerable share. As a result of all of these changes, the Turkish political scene witnessed an increasing level of labour activism throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

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6 In spite of acceptance of class inequalities, their program was not Marxist in the sense that it did not envision class struggle. Social justice, social security, and individual freedoms were the main components in the RPP’s social democracy. At the same time, private property and private entrepreneurship were specified as basic freedoms (Ayata, 1990, 1992).

7 The CHP did not criticize the bureaucratic reformism of Kemalism. Instead, the party re-interpreted and reformulated ideological premises of Kemalism like ‘populism’, ‘progressivism’ and ‘statism’ under a ‘democratic left’ discourse as they called it. (S.T.M.A., 1988: 2204; Erdogan, 2000: 28).

8 With the radicalization of the trade union movement and the political polarization of society, the traditional statist politics of the CHP was revitalized in an attempt to keep society together and to secure the existence of the state (Samim, 1981).

9 Despite increasing constraints on unions during the military intervention 1971, labour activism climbed to unprecedented levels between 1972 and 1980 due to the fact that political alliances and the ISI model remained the same (Akkaya, 1996).
Another major mobilization in Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s was the student movement that emerged before the 1960 military coup. With the extended liberties and rights under the 1961 constitution, university students were allowed to establish organizations and participate in political parties. Moreover, the military regime and its subsequent governments were more inclined to permit student mobilizations as long as they stuck to the Kemalist ideas and order. Accordingly, between 1960 and 1965, student organizations were formed at an increasing rate, and they overwhelmingly supported Kemalist principles and the 1960 regime.

From 1961 on, the student movement changed its course with the diffusion of socialist and Marxist ideas especially with the impact of the TİP (Belge, 1983; Alpay, 1988). The TİP became a platform through which socialist ideology diffused into the student movement and shaped the later discussions and fragmentations within the leftist movements (Samim, 1990). Yet shortly after, divisions occurred between the parliamentary socialist camp which advocated remaining within the existing legal structure and forming a mass workers party, and supporters of the ‘national democratic revolution’ (the MDD), which proposed discarding the feudal elements and struggling against the threat of imperialism (Alpay, 1988; Samim, 1990). On the other hand, the 1968 movements across Europe caused a spill-over effect in terms of galvanizing the student activism in Turkey as elsewhere. Subsequently, the first radical and extensive student protests took place in Istanbul and Ankara in 1968. From then on, different types of student and workers actions and protests were staged almost on a daily basis. The growth of student radicalization led to the emergence of many leftist extra-

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10 In contrast to the overist approach of democratic socialism which points to the workers as the vanguards of transition to socialism, The MDD approach advocated a revolutionary process to be started by a coalition of workers, peasants and the poor against feudalism and imperialism in Turkey under the leadership of workers and with the support of the military (Belge, 1990).

11 Students occupied universities in Istanbul and Ankara demanding university reforms in June 1968. Another major event was the protests against the visit by the 6th fleet of the U.S. navy (STMA, 1988; Belge, 2007: 36). The student movement accelerated and numerous demonstrations and boycotts were staged with the ignition of these events.
parliamentary socialist groups who were impatient with the low electoral support of the TİP. The TİP started losing all its popularity and became fragmented (Samim, 1990).

The student movement became more inclined to radicalize and use violence at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. After the military intervention in 1971, numerous leftist/student activists subscribing to different versions of Marxism spun off from the MDD group (Samim, 1990). Throughout the 1970s, the left/student movement was shaped by violence and armed struggles with the ultra-nationalist anti-communist counter-movements as well as among the different fractions of the Left which culminated to the level of civil war (Belge, 1983: 1962).

In comparison to the movements of the 1960s elsewhere in the world, the student activists in Turkey discovered the ‘old’ left rather than the ‘new’ left throughout their struggles in the 1960s. Student/left activists, in their struggle with authority and power, did not bring a genuine critique to the Kemalist ideology to a full extent. Instead, by doing frame bridging (Snow et al., 1986), they interpreted the basic tenets of Kemalism, i.e. ‘statism’, ‘progressivism’, ‘populism’, ‘republicanism’, ‘secularism’ nationalism’ as being compatible with their anti-imperialist and national developmentalist rhetoric (Belge, 2007: 45-46). Without questioning the Kemalist ideology’s self-attributed transformative ‘will’ in their actions, they tried to take over the leading role in the transformation of society with similar methods since their grassroots support remained limited.

In sum, there was an explosion of workers’, left/student, and reactionary ultranationalist movements in Turkey throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Certain changes both in the political and economic structures facilitated the emergence of these social movements and led to a cycle of contention. However, the impact of these movements on the political context in general was limited since these social movements did not alter the fundamentals of the state-centric modernization and state-society relations in Turkey radically. Instead, it
reproduced the authoritarian elements by producing ideological polarization and fragmentation as well as violence at the horizontal level within the society. As Göle has suggested, the utopias of the left/student movements were detached from ideology that is in direct relation with reality, and they suffered from the ‘single-actor syndrome’ so as to deny diversified identities and horizontal relations (Göle, 1994: 216-217). CSOs as the potential participants of social movements remained under the strict control of the state as a result of ‘use of civil society’ by the state. During the 1960s and 1970s, associational life was also affected by the division along the left-right axis. Most of the CSOs held ideological aspirations, sharing the utopian visions of achieving control of the power structure and transforming the society. They could not themselves transform into structures independent of the state.

**Post-1980: Neoliberal agenda and adaptation to capitalist globalization**

Post 1980 Turkey has undergone vast political, economic and social change under the influence of capitalist globalization. The turning point was the military coup in 1980 which aimed to restore the power of the state and restructure the social and political order along the traditional Kemalist ideology. The new military regime carried out unprecedented levels of destruction of Turkish political and civic life. Most of the existing political and civil society organizations were dismantled with the aim of restructuring the political context on a *tabula rasa*. The military regime’s repression occurred in the form of closing of all the pre-1980 political parties; suspending the activities of radical union confederations such as DİŞK; banning the majority of associations and unions; arresting people both from the right and, overwhelmingly, from the left including politicians, unionists, students, professors and
journalists\textsuperscript{12}; putting pressure on universities and the media; and violating human rights through the use of torture (Ahmad, 1994).

However, unintentionally, the brutal and repressive military regime led to the radical transformation of the inward-looking and state-centric social, economic and political actors. In contrast to the 1923-1980 period, the trajectory of Turkish modernization as well as the role of the state and its perception by the society was immensely altered as a result of transnational economic and political dynamics. Hence in this section I will argue that: 1) from the 1980s on, the developments in the political, social and economic spheres in which social movements rise and mobilize constitute a turning point in Turkey and 2) capitalist globalization, transnational relations and supranational political structures such as the European Union (EU) are decisive on the post-1980 social transformation so as to situate social change in Turkey at the intersection of global, national, and local dynamics.

During the post 1980 period, the dominant role of the state in the economy and its national developmentalist approach had come to an end. The ISI model, no longer a viable choice for development either for the state or for the large industrial bourgeoisie, was abandoned in favour of neo-liberalism which had become the hegemonic ideology throughout the global economy since the 1970s. The big industrial capital that has been nurtured under the auspices of the state until then, wanted to free itself from state tutelage and its arbitrary nature, integrate with the global markets and act beyond the domestic market (Keyder, 1997: 47).

Under these circumstances, the economy shifted towards an export-oriented free market model. Due to the main objective of establishing open financial and trade policy regimes in the post-1980 period, neoliberal adjustment and stabilization programs were undertaken by the military regime and the following civilian governments. These policies

\textsuperscript{12} By the end of 1980, around 30 thousand people had been arrested. After one year, 122,600 arrests were made (Zurcher, 2005: 279-280).
mainly consist of liberalization of trade and foreign currency regimes, shifting state investments from manufacturing to infrastructural development, relaxation of import policies by eliminating import quotas, and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) (Öniş, 1998: 460-461).

The outcome was the rapid integration of the Turkish economy into global markets throughout the 1980s and the 1990s (Toprak, 1994; Keyder, 1997; Öniş, 1998; Sunar, 2004). State interventionism at the micro-economic level was minimized, and considerable levels of financial liberalization, deregulation and export promotion were achieved through subsidies and tax-cuts in congruence with the programs. Global economic transformations and its impacts on Turkey have been one of the major factors that triggered the questioning of ‘state-centric modernity’ and caused the crisis of the strong state tradition in Turkey. These economic transformations were accompanied by further transformations within the political and social context. Particularly, the European Union (EU) as part of the political globalization process stands out as a great influence over the transformation in the social and political context in the post 1980 period.

**Turkey-EU relations and its impact:**

Turkey first applied formally for Associate Membership of the European Economic Community in 1959. However, there were no major advancements in the relations between Turkey and Europe until the mid 1980s due to economic and political reasons (Öniş, 2003). By the second half of the 1980s, the relations had been re-established with the efforts of the liberal government of the Motherland Party (ANAP). The first change came in the economic terrain with the entrance of Turkey into the Customs Union in 1995. The next significant development is the European Council Summit meeting in Helsinki in 1999 in which Turkey was offered the candidacy status it was denied only 2 years ago.
Since the announced aim of Turkey’s accession in the mid 1980s, the EU’s shadow has been on the Turkish political and social life with respect to democratization and liberalization. The reform process starting with the candidacy status in 1999 resulted in major constitutional reforms, several legislative packages, a new Civil Code and a new Penal Code. A National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis was adopted. Further reforms were carried out at the institutional level in terms of democratizing the state structure and adapting to civilian-based politics. The solid impact of the EU was discerned as Turkey embarked on a major reform process starting in 2002 when the Bergama movement was already in decline. Yet, the EU was perceived as an opportunity by the Bergama activists since Turkey aspired to join the EU during the peak times of their mobilization. In that regard, they approached the European Parliament (EP), asking them to put pressure on the Turkish state and the TNCs. Another European institution, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) existed as an opportunity at the transnational level through which the Bergama activists could further prove their cause legally.

**The erosion of ‘state-centric modernity’:**

The aim of the 1980 coup was to restore the Kemalist order by preventing ideological polarization and fragmentation. It attempted to restructure the society by controlling the politically mobilized social actors caused by the ‘liberal’ political and legal framework in the 1960 and the 1970s. (Özbudun, 2007: 179). The repressive military intervention and its constitution curbed the power of civil society and social movements to a large extent. However, the restructuration of the political context by the military produced some unintended consequences in the subsequent years (Toprak, 1994; Göle, 1994, 2000). During the 1980s, civil society actors started gaining their autonomy from state control, and paradoxically, the military intervention acted as a ‘catharsis’ for this development by redefining state-society relations (Göle, 1994: 217). As Toprak notes, “[p]aradoxically the
coup which set out to destroy the institutions of civil society helped to strengthen the commitment to civilian politics, consensus-building, civil rights and issue-oriented associational activity” (Toprak, 1994: 95). Combined with the impact of globalization, the vibrancy of civil society has contributed to “the emerging legitimacy and representation crisis for the state and its state driven modernity” (Keyder, 1997: 47).

This paradoxical situation was caused by the interaction of the responses to the repressive military regime and impacts of globalization which resulted in the questioning of state-centric modernization in Turkey. First, diffusion of the capitalist globalization in Turkey has shaken the centrality of the state in economic issues which faced representation and legitimacy problems (Öniş, 1997; Öniş and Keyman, 2007). The state could no longer uphold national developmentalism as an ideological instrument since globalization of the Turkish economy “reduced significantly the power and legitimacy of national developmentalism as an effective ideological device of the strong state to dictate the rules of the economic sphere in its regulation of economy” (Öniş and Keyman, 2007: 279-280). With the neoliberal agenda pursued in the economy, there was a discursive and normative shift in the society. Liberal notions of individualism, entrepreneurship, and pragmatism were sounded altering socio-political values. Accordingly, individuals tried to carve up independent economic spaces distinct from the state. This has led to increasing calls for democratization of state-society relations and individual rights and freedoms (Göle, 1994; Özbudun and Keyman, 2002; Öniş and Keyman, 2007).

Second, the ‘legitimacy’ and ‘representation’ crisis of the state deepened especially with the 1990s on as new identity claims of the Islamic and Kurdish movements have become prevalent (Toprak, 1994; Keyder, 1997; Keyman, 2005; Keyman and Öniş, 2007). Political-cultural Islamic and Kurdish identities have released themselves from the republican definition of citizenship and acted as centrifugal forces, making demands and claiming
recognition after a long period of suppression. The revival of Islamic and Kurdish identities emphasizes other sources of identity in effect dismantling the ‘organic vision of society’. In that regard, the meaning of modernity has changed since ‘alternative modernities’ emerged based on an emphasis of democratization (Göle, 2000; Keyman, 2005). The globalization process in general has contributed to the legitimacy crisis of the state by displacing its prominent role in politics since it provided a “global point of reference in politics which has begun to be utilized by these new actors at the global-local nexus” (İçduygu and Keyman, 2003). Therefore, the state is no longer perceived as the ‘primary political context’ in which civil society actors were included in a limited and controlled manner. New social actors who operated at the global-local nexus transcended the boundaries of national politics as well as inserting culture and civil society into the political sphere as prominent elements (Keyman, 2005). In that regard, the EU which is seen as part of the globalization process acted as a catalyst. The accession process to the EU has led to the questioning of the supremacy of the state. With the EU related reforms, new opportunities emerged for new political actors. Also, the EU provided a supranational terrain where political and cultural demands could be made. Accordingly, all the political once repressed found an opportunity window to escape from the state tutelage.

**Revival of Civil Society and Social Movements:**

Given these changes, the political context took an utterly different shape in the post-1980 period. As neoliberal discourses came to prevail, policy oriented politics predominated, and undermined class based revolutionary action. This has led to the emergence of alternative mechanisms of resistance and political expression such as NSMs and civil society action. Consequently, the post-1980 period witnessed the emergence of a vibrant civil society in Turkey. During the 1983-1989 period, in the context of neoliberal policies carried out by the neoliberal ANAP and the overwhelming discourse of minimizing the economic role of the
state and bureaucracy, the concept of civil society has been associated with liberalism in the sense that it is viewed as a replacement for the state in certain fields (Tosun, 2001). NSMs organized by new actors revolve around new issues such as human rights, the environment, women’s rights, gay/lesbian rights, ethnicity (the Kurdish movement) and religion (Islam) which have increasingly become concerns for many civil society actors.

The prevalence of civil society in the post-1980 period was accompanied by a quantitative increase in CSOs during the 1990s. The number of associations reached an unprecedented level. In comparison to the pre-1980 period, the new organizations of the 1990s have been more inclined to remain issue-oriented (Toprak, 1994: 104). This quantitative improvement has occurred alongside a legal liberalization which started in the mid-1990s. Several articles of the 1982 constitution regarding civil society were amended in 1995. Further amendment packages were implemented in 2001 and 2004 with the impact of the EU (Özbudun, 2007: 195). The gradual legal liberalization provided a more open political context.

The links between civil society actors including NGOs, voluntary associations, and grass-root groups started to strengthen with the civil society symposiums organized among civil society organizations during the 1990s. Furthermore, the second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (HABITAT II) conference held in Istanbul in 1996 enabled forging links among approximately 1500 CSOs during the preparation stage of the conference, and it also contributed to the formation of transnational links between Turkish and foreign NGOs (Uğur, 1998: 221-222). Furthermore, several campaigns were launched that mainly revolved around citizenship rights and democratization. These campaigns

13 In 1995, extensive amendments were made in Article 33 which is about freedom of associations. The bans on the political activities of civil society organizations were removed. CSOs attained the right to collaborate with political parties and other CSOs (Özbudun, 2007: 185).

14 The most successful campaigns are: ‘A million signature for peace’ (Barış İçin Bir Milyon İmza), One Minute of Darkness for Permanent Enlightenment’ (Sürekli Aydınlık İçin Bir Dakika Karanlık) (Tekay, 2003) and the Initiative for a Civilian Constitution (Mahçupyan, 2003)
mobilized large masses and brought together a wide range of CSOs and individuals with
diverse ideological orientations.

In fact, civil society has been evaluated in Turkey as the harbinger of democratization in
the sense that it proposes alternative channels for overcoming the legitimacy crisis of
representative democracy and the state (Bora and Çağlar, 2002). It has been widely maintained in
the academic and public life that civil society has challenged and transformed the top-down, state-
centric political sphere in Turkey. These arguments are valid to a large extent, but despite its
positive impact, civil society’s contribution to democratization remained limited. The recent
formation of Kemalist CSOs exemplifies the ‘boundary problems of civil society’. As the
state-centric modernity and the Kemalist project underwent a crisis in the 1980s and 1990s,
numerous Kemalist-oriented CSOs, the Association of Kemalist Ideology (ADD, Atatürkçü
Düşünce Derneği) and Association in Support for the Contemporary Living (ÇYDD, Çağdaş
Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği) being the most prominent, were formed. These civil initiatives
frame their concerns by claiming that the national and secular identity, the sovereignty of the
state and the Kemalist ideal of ‘will to civilization’ are under threat with the extension of
‘anti-revolutionary’ forces made up of pro-globalizers, liberals and Kurdish and Islamic
movements. In a reactionary and defensive attitude, they demand the restoration of Kemalist
principles by strengthening nationalist and secularist premises while attempting to increase
the hegemony of Kemalism by creating its mobilization in the society (Erdoğan, 2001). In this
way, even though they remain outside the state, their ‘civicness’ is debatable since they have
‘strong normative and ideological ties with the state power’ (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003:
229). Also, identity claims and ideological orientations created cleavages within civil society
which complicated the formation of networks (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003).
Similar to other NSMs, environmental activism emerged as an effective and full-fledged movement only with the 1980s on. Starting with the mid-1980s on, numerous environmental initiatives took place. In fact, together with the women’s movement, the environmental movement became the harbinger of NSMs in Turkey. This was mainly due to the fact that the environmental movement had favourable political opportunities since power holders perceived environmentalism as an apolitical and non-ideological movement which would not pose a threat to the political and economic order. Additionally, the application of the free market model based on economic growth brought a significant burden on the environment through large-scale infrastructural projects. The Turkish state made decisions of such economic investments without taking local population’s opinions and environmental concerns into account (Cerit-Mazlum, 2011). Resultantly, various rural as well as urban based environmental mobilizations occurred in the mid-1980s and 1990s throughout Turkey. These mobilizations mainly focused on issues of locally-unwanted-land-use (LULUs) especially regarding energy, tourism and urban planning projects which threatened green areas.

Starting with the mid-1990s on, it is possible to observe the ‘institutionalization’ and ‘professionalization’ of the environmental movement alongside the local environmental mobilizations. Numerous environmental organizations with formal organizational structures using diversified resource channels including funding from formal institutions were formed, and they started emphasizing activities such as building environmental expertise, awareness,

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15 Before 1980, a nascent form of environmental activism existed revolving around a small number of environmental organizations. These organizations overwhelmingly upheld preservationist approaches and lacked grassroots basis. They remained as elite-based organizations whose members consisted of middle class professionals (Adem, 2005) The two exceptional events were the villagers’ demonstrations in Samsun against a copper plant in 1975 and another demonstration staged by fishermen in order to protest water pollution in the İzmit Bay in 1978 (Adem, 2005; Cerit-Mazlum, 2011).

16 The campaign against the project of Gökova thermal power plant, the campaign against the Project of Aliaga thermal power plant, the campaign against the construction of touristic sites in the natural habitat of the Carretta-Carrettas, and campaign against the anti-nuclear power plant Project in Akkuyu, Mersin are among the most-well-known and successful, either in terms of stopping the projects or raising consciousness, (Keskin, 2003; Adem, 2005; Cerit-Mazlum, 2006)

fund-raising and research (Adem, 2005: 78). The institutionalization process culminated in ‘internationalization’ during the 2000s in which environmental organizations steered their wheels towards involvement in international projects and utilization of international funding resources.

In sum, civil society in Turkey has flourished in the context of ‘relative autonomization of economic activities, societal groups, and cultural identities’, and consequently, the primary axis of doing politics has shifted from state to society (Göle, 1994; Keyman and İçduygu, 2003). In that regard, NSMs with new claims and issues replaced the ‘old’ social movements of the pre-1980 period that aimed for central political power and ‘total rejection of the system itself’ (Göle, 1994: 214-215). Horizontal relations improved within society through the establishment of networks and new opportunities which provided the basis for formation of social movements with the mobilization of different organizations and individuals. However, as I have shown, it would be misleading to treat civil society as a monolithic entity. In that respect, certain aspects of civil society render it vulnerable to the ‘uses and abuses of civil society’ by the state and other political/social actors. The globalization process has also had a major impact on the shaping of civil society. The further impacts of globalization in terms of restructuring the political context in Turkey and civil society will be discussed in the last section.

**Further impacts of globalization:**

Capitalist globalization has transformed the political context by producing new political divisions and alliance structures in Turkey. The traditional centre-periphery divide has been redefined as the political and economic interests of social actors are being reshaped along the capitalist globalization. The social actors determine their positions vis-a-vis capitalist globalization, as pro- or con-, depending on their interpretation of the globalization process as an opportunity and/or obstacle for their economic and political interests which are
still influenced by the traditional centre-periphery divide. Accordingly, parameters such as relations with the state, adaptation to the global markets, expression of cultural identities, and demands for democratization are decisive for social actors’ novel political positions. The traditional formulation of ‘Westernizing’ and ‘modernizing’ centre versus ‘reactionary’ and ‘traditional’ periphery is no longer valid since the general political positions of pro-globalization and anti-globalization have emerged both within the groups at the centre and the periphery. In other words, globalization and traditional cleavages of centre-periphery have interacted and rendered a new political cleavage structure in Turkey revolving around the capitalist globalization axis. The restructuring of the political sphere bears some important consequences for social movements in the sense that new alliance structures and political opportunities have arisen with respect to political and social actors.

Political parties which are one of the main allies of social movements have been affected by these changes. Until the end of the 1990s, it was a transition period of repositioning in the political sphere. The neo-liberal party ANAP that remained in power between 1983 and 1989 focused on the economic aspect of globalization and applied policies for restructuring the economy with the aim of integration into global markets. From the end of the 1990s on, direct impacts of globalization can be discerned more concretely. As political actors have entered the process of redefining their ideological stances with respect to the globalization process through their political articulations, its conflicts crystallized in party politics and civil society, creating a major cleavage between proponents and opponents of capitalist globalization. The Turkish political parties of the centre-right adapted themselves to capitalist globalization by integrating their populist outlook and conservative concerns into capitalist globalization, emphasizing the economic necessities of economic growth by redefining cleavages within society (DeLeon et al., 2009). On the other hand, liberal democracy and basic rights were less
of a concern, either attached to particularistic concerns or neglected due to national sovereignty concerns. In that sense, the centre-right moved closer to the network of neoliberal globalizers by reformulating their ideological positions as ‘regressive globalizers’. On the other hand, the centre left party, the CHP had a more ambivalent political articulation. Prioritizing ‘territorial unity’ and secularism, CHP had a more negative view of capitalist globalization. Yet, as indicated in Chapter 6, the CHP employed a nationalist and state-centric approach in their opposition to capitalist globalization rather than a multicultural, pluralist and democratization oriented approach. On the other hand, its national developmentalist approach remained intact. Given its sceptical and ambivalent attitude towards EU accession based on fears of losing sovereignty (Öniş and Keyman, 2007: 220), CHP relied on a unique approach of ‘Westernization despite the West’, based on anti-imperialism, nationalism, and strict secularism (Yerasimos, 2001).

This dichotomous political structure that revolves around globalization changed the political context for social movements. As discussed above, globalization has fostered civil society in Turkey during the 1990s both indirectly, through eroding the centrality of the state, and directly, through the expansion of global civil society and its normative and institutional contributions such as the global language of human rights. By starting to act along the global-local nexus, “…civil society organizations find for themselves ‘a space to do politics’ between the failure of the nation-state and transnationalization of politics and democracy...” (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003: 226).

However, civil society actors have diversifying views on globalization. As Özbudun and Keyman (2002) indicate, a majority of civil society actors either employ a ‘strong scepticism’ as a result of which they evaluate globalization as a new form of imperialism; or ‘mild scepticism’ according to which globalization is considered as a process with both

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18 Please see Chapter 2 for a detailed account of ‘regressive globalizers’.
positive and negative impacts, the former in terms of challenging state power and protecting civil rights globally, and the latter in terms of destructive consequences of liberalism and free market ideology.

In this context, those civil society actors that are under the influence of the ‘old’ left as well as the ones with Kemalist orientations that remain closer to the state have accused pro-EU civil society actors as ‘compradors’ that collaborate with the ‘imperialist West and Europe’ (Bora and Çağlar, 2002: 344-345). Transnational actors are framed as ‘foreign forces’ that aim to destroy the national integrity of Turkey, when they forge links with civil society actors that keep their distance from the state (and Kemalism) such as Islamic and Kurdish groups as well as the Bergama peasants (Seçkinelgin, 2004: 178). The Bergama movement also had to contend with such a framing when the Bergama peasants were accused of ‘fraternizing with the enemy’ in relation to their transnational links. The Bergama movement has emerged in the changing political context of Turkey discussed at length above. The movement constituted by the mobilizing structures, frames, domestic and transnational political opportunities, is a perfect case of the intersection of local, national and transnational practices as will be shown in the next 4 chapters.
Chapter 4: The Bergama Movement

In this chapter, I will analyze the internal structure, dynamics and mechanisms of the Bergama movement. In order to do that, I will discuss the mobilizing structures, collective identity formation and framing processes of the Bergama movement, underlining its significant and unique characteristics as a local movement. More specifically, first, I will describe the initial mobilization process by focusing on the initial efforts of the movement elite and activities of the Bergama peasants. Second, I will show peasants’ mobilization which marks the second stage of the movement. Third, I will explain the movement’s organizational structures, tactics and strategies.\(^1\)

The gold-mining issue which set the the grievance of the Bergama Movement dated back to the late 1980s and early 1990s when mining was privatized and opened to transnational corporations in Turkey. After being founded as a joint venture in 1988, Eurogold found gold reserves in Ovacık-Bergama, and it obtained the permissions and licences from the related Turkish ministries to run a gold mine in the region until 1994. As Eurogold launched its publicity activities and preparations for constructing the mine, discontent with gold-mining began to emerge which turned into the protracted struggle of the local population against the Ovacık gold mine.

The Bergama movement occurred in three stages.\(^2\) In the first stage of 1994-1996, as the mayor of Bergama, Sefa Taşkın gathered information about the detrimental impacts of cyanide based gold mining with the help of scientists, CSOs in İzmir, and Greenpeace, he engaged in forming an anti-gold movement network in the region. The level of discontent among the local population of Bergama villages was not high initially. As a result of consciousness raising activities carried out by Taşkın and scientists based on the hazards of the cyanide-leach method at the villages, the number of peasants opposing the gold mine

\(^1\) Please see Appendix D for a chronology of events.
\(^2\) Please see Appendix E for the periodization of the Bergama movement.
increased at an accelerating pace. In order to halt the Ovacık gold mine project, 652 Bergama peasants and Senih Özay, the attorney of the peasants who carried out the litigation process throughout the movement filed three lawsuits requesting annulment of the licence granted by the Ministry of Environment in 1994. The rejection of the peasants’ petition by the local court in 1996 marked the start of the prolonged legal struggle against the Ovacık gold mine and transnational mining companies. The date of November 15th, 1996 was a turning point for the Bergama Movement because the Bergama peasants staged their first protest which took in the form of a sit-in, blocking the highway between İzmir-Çanakkale for 6 hours in response to the cutting down of trees as part of the mine construction. During this second stage, anti-goldmine protests escalated under the leadership of Oktay Konyar between 1996 and 1997 which transforming the intial responses into a full-fledged movement. The Bergama movement network was further extended with the participation of CSOs, scientists and environmentalists outside the İzmir region and sub-networks comprised of various actors from Bergama, İzmir, İstanbul, and Ankara. All these sub-networks operated in collaboration with each other complementing each other’s activities. Simultaneously, in order to increase pressure on the Turkish government and the mining TNCs the Bergama activists moved their struggle beyond their national boundaries extending and intensifying links with scientists, NGOs, advocacy network, journalists and politicians outside Turkey which were already forged during the first stage. Under the adept leadership of an environmental activist, Birsel Lemke, the Bergama activists’ claims were voiced at the European Parliament, the International Human Rights Court, and anti-mine/environmental networks outside Turkey. In spite of the successful mobilization in terms of the immense media and public attention the protests received, legal victories, and international notice, the Turkish government remained non-responsive to the demands of the Bergama Movement, and the TNCs continue to extract gold to this day. The Bergama Movement entered a decline period in the early 2000s, which sets the third stage.
After their last protest in 2004 with the participation of a small number of peasants in İstanbul, the movement demobilized. Factors such as the exhaustion of the peasants because of escalating costs due to the long endurance of the movement, emerging conflicts between the spokespersons/leaders of the movement, and stigmatization efforts of their opponents led to the end of this mobilization.

Throughout the mobilization, the involvement of the local elite who worked as spokespersons/leaders was crucial given the unpromising conditions for such a mobilization. Those movement elite such as Sefa Taşkın, Oktay Konyar, Birsel Lemke, and Senih Özay who were educated middle class members with environmental concerns did not only act as local allies. Rather, they became a part of the Bergama movement as ‘de facto’ leaders under a coalitional leadership model. They performed extremely crucial functions such as public representation, coordination, framing, brokerage, resource provision, and strategy setting. In that regard, the crucial role of movement ‘leaders’ should be taken into account in each component of the Bergama movement, be it framing processes, organizational formation, tactics and strategies, and evaluation and utilization of political opportunities, which will be analyzed in the following chapters.

Building Mobilization: Initial works of scientific contention, networking, and publicity in Bergama

The movement against mining TNC(s) did not start immediately after the first appearance of Eurogold in the region. On the contrary, most of the Bergama villagers supported the mine project. Their optimism stemmed from the idea that the mine would bring development, prosperity and new job opportunities to their region (P/A 2). In a similar vein, the local government of Bergama welcomed the company since the gold mine was believed to create considerable economic input and job opportunities for the region (E/E 3).

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3 Please Appendix F for the personal biographies of the spokespersons/leaders.
The initial confrontation with Eurogold started with the efforts of a local social democrat politician, Sefa Taşkın, who served as the elected mayor of Bergama between 1989 and 1999. Taşkın’s first contact with Eurogold was at a meeting with Eurogold’s representatives in 1989 which was called by Eurogold with the objective of informing the local government about their activities and the gold mine planned to be built 10 kilometres away from the town of Bergama. The meeting was part of the promotional effort of the TNC to get the support of a local political figure for their project. As a civil engineer capable of dealing with highly detailed technical information, Taşkın was not satisfied with Eurogold’s accounts of the project. He started inquiries about the gold extraction process with the cyanide-leach method and tried to get technical information from sources other than Eurogold.

“I watched a documentary on TRT (Turkish Television and Radio Organization) [the Turkish public television channel] about gold mine accidents a few days before our meeting Eurogold. Then, some questions popped up into my mind” (E/E 3).

Taşkın first called upon various chambers of engineers in İzmir to conduct research on the issue of gold mining, and subsequently, two civil society organizations, the chamber of civil engineers and the chamber of mechanical engineers, prepared separate reports on gold mining with cyanide leach method which documented all the risks it entailed. Additionally, scientists from İzmir and İstanbul sympathizing with Taşkın’s opposition and criticizing the cyanide leach method also joined in the work of collecting scientific evidence about the risks of the cyanide-leach method. As Taşkın indicates, the preliminary scientific work done is the essential building block for the later success of the mobilization since they were armoured with highly technical knowledge and not dependent on the information by Eurogold (E/E 3). Furthermore, it helped them to substantiate their claims against Eurogold which had supported the viability of the mine project by relying on scientific arguments made by some pro-mine scientists.
“The man we faced was a professor from Ege University who worked for the company. I am seen as a mayor who is trying to make a showcase. Who would believe in us? We had to beat them scientifically. And we did it. There are also patriotic scientists like İsmail Duman from Istanbul, the ones in Izmir. Also Prof. Korte worked really hard in Germany. We have beaten them scientifically. Does it damage the environment? Yes, it does. Nobody can say gold mining with cyanide leach method does not destroy the environment. If we did not achieve this, neither the villagers nor the public in general would have been convinced” (P/A 1).

Based on the mounting evidence about the hazards of cyanide leach method and scientists’ warnings, Taşkın extended their anti-gold mine opposition to wider circles. At this point, he confronted not only Eurogold, but also pro-mine scientists, organizations, and politicians who defended the project as both beneficial and harmless. For instance, in a public meeting, Taşkın defied the pro-gold mine scientists by claiming that the Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIAR) that they prepared was misleading since all the risks in relation to cyanide leach method were overlooked in the report (E/E 3). Throughout his struggle with Eurogold and its affiliates, Taşkın extended the work of scientific data collection. For that purpose, a subdivision working on the subject was launched within the Bergama municipality. This subdivision collected data about gold mining both from Turkey and around the world. In order to elevate the level of contention against the gold mine project, Taşkın decided to bring the issue to the public’s attention. From then on, Taşkın frequently appeared in debates especially on local television channels. He also organized several press conferences in order to voice their rejections and doubts about gold mining in Bergama. In sum, all these efforts were carried out in order to bring the issue onto the agenda of the public and power holders and subsequently to widen their public support (E/E 3).

Meanwhile, several local politicians, environmental activists and lawyers both in Bergama and İzmir joined in Taşkın’s efforts. Birol Engel, the head of a local environmental organization named Çev-Der, supported Taşkın in his confrontation with Eurogold. In fact, Çev-Der was among the first to provide aid by participating in the activities of gathering information about the issue (E/E 3). On the other hand, several lawyers with environmentalist concerns who had been working as members of the Commission of Environment under the
İzmir Bar Association departed from the commission by criticizing the rigidity of the Bar association. With the aim of being more active in local environmental issues, they formed the İzmir Lawyers for the Environment group which was informally organized without any links with formal bureaucratic structures. After being informed about the issue in one of their meetings, they got in touch with Taşkı̈n and participated in the movement which was in the making (Özay, 2006; E/E 1). Senih Özay, one of the İzmir Environmentalist Lawyers, volunteered to become the legal representative of the Bergama peasants and carried out the legal process of the movement as well as supervising other lawyers supporting the movement.

In sum, during its initial phase, the Bergama network’s activities mostly revolved around collecting scientific information, building the local component of their network, and publicizing the incident at the local/national level. On the other hand, grassroots mobilization and protest activities remained very limited and weak. Galvanization of mass mobilization and creation of a full-fledged movement was possible during the second stage when different strategies and frames were used.

**Initial Mobilization of the villagers:**

As described above, during the initial stages of the Bergama movement, actors like Sefa Taşkı̈n, Senih Özay, and Birol Engel overwhelmingly decided on the shape of the confrontation with Eurogold. Peasants remained at the fringes of these efforts even if they were not totally absent. In fact, while Taşkı̈n tried to raise public awareness and draw the attention of authorities during the initial phase, he concomitantly addressed the villages neighbouring the Ovacık mine. In order to recruit peasants living in the villages near the mine to the resistance, he occasionally met with the *muhtars* (elected heads of villages), and a committee of *muhtars* were formed in order to build relations with the villagers (SefaTaşkı̈n in Reinart, 2003: 41-42). Furthermore, several panels on the cyanide issue and gold mines were organized in the villages such as the “Farewell to Gold” panel in Çamköy on 15.03.1994.
with the participation of around 1000 people (Kuzey Ege, 1-15.03.1994). Yet, the efforts of Taşkın and his friends achieved limited success since mobilizations of villagers remained erratic and small in numbers. Some villagers from each village who were sceptical from the start took the side of Taşkın and his friends, and only a small group from the villages attended panels, conferences, and meetings in Bergama and İzmir (P/A 9, 16). This was partly due to the initial strategies of the elite which mainly revolved around alerting the general public and getting the support of influential allies such as scientists and NGOs. Activities were mostly located in the town of Bergama and city of İzmir, and only a limited number of peasants participated in these events as contributors to Taşkın’s efforts (E/E 3; P/A 11). In other words, in its initial phase, the Bergama movement remained elite- and urban- based in which peasants who would be the people directly affected by the detrimental effects of the mine were located at the periphery of the mobilization efforts.

In fact, the invisibility of peasants during the initial stage displayed a contrast to the Küçükdere-Havran mobilization, another anti-gold mine mobilization in the nearby Edremit Bay region which achieved success in terms of stopping the project in a very short period of time. As noted by the spokesperson of GÜMÇED (Southern Marmara Environment and Protection and Association), a regional environmental civil society organization which has been prominent in the Küçükdere-Havran movement, the quick success of the Küçükdere-Havran mobilization was partially due to the incorporation of the whole population in the region into a widespread mobilization just before the gold mine project had been implemented. As one of the interviewees from GÜMÇED who was involved in the Bergama movement as a supporter claimed,

“In the beginning, the Bergama movement was centred at the Bergama municipality. Sefa Taşkın has been accused of using the issue as political material for his own benefit which is not true. He was not ill-intentioned at all. We learned many things from him [about the cyanide leach method and its hazards]…The main problem is that they should not have organized the panels in Bergama, but in the Ovacık village. In Küçükdere, we have carried out all our activities at villages. GÜMÇED meetings were held in the villages by opening stands. Villagers have kept listening to what we have discussed as they continued with their daily lives. Moreover, you need to have independent and strong environmental organizations. Otherwise, when the opposition is pegged to the civil government, you cannot separate it from party politics. When Sefa Taşkın is involved, others from..."
different political parties do not participate. Sefa Taşkın should have been one of the components of the movement rather than a leading figure” (E/E 13).

Besides, even if it had been intended by Taşkın and his friends, it would have been a difficult task to convince and mobilize peasants in the first place in the case of Bergama (E/E 3). When it was first announced, the majority of peasants were content about the fact that a gold mine would be opened in their region and responded positively to the project. Many of the peasants who possessed land in the location either sold or were willing to sell their lands to Eurogold since the corporation offered them prices above market land values (P/A 1, 6, 9, 10). Additionally, peasants expected the opening of new job opportunities as well as invigoration of trade activities in the region with the arrival of Eurogold. Therefore, since most of the peasants were hoping to achieve immediate economic gains from Eurogold, the number of villagers actively participating in the anti-gold mine panels and talks remained as low as 10 to 15 per village (E/E 3; P/A 9, 11).

In 1996, Sefa Taşkın and Çev-Der made a change in their strategy and decided to focus more on mobilization of villagers. The main reasons for such a strategy shift are threefold. First, the elite’s initial efforts were far from reaching a solid result since the mine project continued to be put into effect. Second, the required legalistic and scientific infrastructures which would provide solid grounds for a successful mass mobilization were established (E/E 3). Third, grassroots mobilization would have provided legitimacy for their legal and political initiatives which would in return strengthen their resistance. According to the environmentalist lawyers who were part of the movement, legal successes were largely dependent on grassroots protests (E/E 1). One good case which exemplified the interrelation between legal and grassroots aspects of the Bergama movement was the protest in Ankara in May 1997 to influence the court when the Supreme Court was in the process of making a

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4 Even some of the villagers who participated in the forefronts of the struggle later on sold their lands when the company first arrived (P/A 1).
Based on these premises, empowerment of the local population was seen as the next necessary step to be taken in the resistance against the gold mine. The first action Sefa Taşkın and his friends took was to inform the villagers more extensively about the dangers of the cyanide leach method. For that purpose, visits of professors and scientists from İstanbul and İzmir to the Bergama villages took place with greater frequency. The main objective of the informative meetings was to warn villagers and increase awareness about the risks they faced if the mine ever were to start operating (P/A 2, 30). Additionally, documentaries about gold mining were shown, and open public discussions were organized at the coffeehouses in each village (P/A 5). Consequently, there was a shift in the mood and attitude of peasants, and the number of people supporting the anti-gold mine resistance began to increase steadily. From then on, peasants claimed the Bergama movement as their own, and they were positioned as the central subjects both by themselves and other activists within the Bergama movement network in their discourses and practices.

“What happened after 1996 was that the local population started to claim their own problems and come to realize that all the word and authority belonged to them” (P/A 4).

“We went to the highway on foot – this was our first protest, and we blocked the highway. I was so frightened when we were on our way to the highway! Trees were still being cut down; we could hear the machines working. Construction [of the mine] had not started back then. There was a huge crowd. ...Previously, when the gendarmerie had arrived to collect taxes, peasants had been so afraid that they went into hiding. We confronted the sub-governor. Women were so furious...Men said “Don’t do it, he is the sub-governor”. [We said] “What if he is. We will express our concerns”” (Ozyaylalı in Reinart, 2003: 52).

The first massive peasant response occurred just after Eurogold started constructing the mine site in 1996. It was the critical point when the gold mine project started to materialize in the eyes of the peasants who had already began to develop scepticism about the...
project. With the cutting down of approximately 3,000 pine trees and 1,500 olive trees in the field of the mine as part of the construction, mass protests were triggered (E/E 1, 3; P/A 15).

The detrimental effects of the mine became clear for peasants who were disappointed and furious about the striking physical change in their environment.

“They called me in the evening saying that they [miners] were cutting the trees. They were asking me what to do. They [peasants] were the ones who did not believe what I have been telling them and who were saying that I was trying to become famous on my way to being a MP. I told them at that time of the day, there is nothing to be done and they should wait for the next morning. In the morning at 8 o’clock, there were almost 500 people waiting for me...They asked me what to do. I told them that I would call the Ministry of Forestry. However, I also told them ‘But even if they make it stop just to avoid any upheavals, they will eventually continue’” (E/E 3).

As soon as villagers realized the mine would cause a permanent destruction of their environment, the first mass mobilized protest took place. Villagers staged a sit-in protest and blocked the İzmir-Çanakkale road for 6 hours on November 15th, 1996 (P/A 9). From then on, villagers from 16 villages located within the Bakırçay plain where agriculture and the environment is threatened by the gold mine conjoined to resist against it which constituted a turning point in the opposition to the gold mine. Peasants living in the region mobilized and started to protest at increasing rates.5

However, mobilization varied across villages. Rates of participation were the highest in the villages neighbouring the gold mine, namely Çamköy and Narlıca. In fact, villagers from these two villages were also the most active in terms of visibility, participation, and involvement in different stages of the mobilization including preliminary work, panels, and protest activities which continued even during the decline period of the movement. Vibrancy and commitment achieved in Çamköy and Narlıca were mainly due to the spatial proximity of

5 Since the beginning of the mass mobilization, the Bergama activists claimed that 17 villages in the region participated in the movement However, throughout the process, some of those villages dropped out from the movement. It was even stated in some of the accounts that one village did not participate in the movement at all (P/A 1). Yet, the Bergama activists continued to speak on behalf of 17 villages. That was also evident in the “Epigraph of 17 Villages” which was erected in Çamköy in 1997 as the monumental manifestation of the Bergama movement. Even though it was named after 17 villages, only 15 villages – Çamköy, Narlıca, Pınarköy, Ovacık, Tepeköy, Süleymanlı, Kurfali, Bozköy, Sarıdere, Eğrigöl, Çaltibahçe, Yalnızce, Kıcıkayaya, Süleymanlı, Aşağıkırıklar – were mentioned in the narrative (see Appendix G). That was due to the inclusiveness of the movement since activists claimed that they were their ‘people’ and they were under threat whether they were mobilized or not (E/E 2). Furthermore, the enunciation of drop-out villages would show the movement as a vulnerable and weak one.
these villages to the mine site since their village borders were adjacent to the mine’s. First, the place where trees were cut down which ignited the first protest was the property of Çamköy. Additionally, part of the mine site which was bought from the peasants was either former property of Çamköy villagers or state owned land put into the use of Çamköy residents.

Second, Narlıca faced contamination of their water resources during the construction of the mine for which the mine was held responsible by the villagers (P/A 15). Accordingly, it was s in Çamköy and Narlıca that the immediate and visible impacts of the gold mine were felt most directly. In that respect, ‘spatial proximity’ is one of the determinant factors of the attitudes of activists in peasant mobilizations against mines since the level of radicalization increases among peasants residing closer to mines (Snow and Soule, 2010: 107).

Yet, the “spatial proximity” factor only partially explains the higher mobilization rates in Çamköy and Narlıca. Another village, Ovacık, is even closer to the mine in comparison with the other two villages since the walls of many houses were adjacent to the mine pit. However, rates of mobilization and participation in Ovacık did not reach the levels achieved in Çamköy and Narlıca. Ovacık is the closest village to the part of the mine pit where explosives are used. In addition to the sound pollution created, dynamite use just underneath the village caused severe visible damages to many houses such as cracks on the walls (P/A 12, 20). Even though the detrimental impacts of the mine were felt directly and extensively, mobilization of the Ovacık villagers remained sporadic, and only approximately half of the Ovacık population participated in the resistance against the mine. The limited mobilization in the Ovacık mine was mainly caused by the differences in peasants’ approach and attachment to land and their environment. According to the peasants’ accounts from Çamköy, Narlıca, and Ovacık, Ovacık villagers were not enthusiastic about joining the movement because

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6 Similarly, “…those peasants who were ecologically proximate to the mining municipalities became the most radical because of increased exposure to the miners’ leadership and ideology” (Snow and Soule, 2010: 107).
residents of Ovacık village mostly consisted of immigrants who had arrived from Bulgaria in the 1950s. On top of the late settlement of its residents, the Ovacık village was removed from its original location in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake in 1939 and re-settled in today’s location. It is commonly indicated by the interviewees that as a consequence of these factors, residents of Ovacık village have less attachment to their land which is reflected in the lower mobilization rates in Ovacık.

“Çamköy was established long before in comparison to ours [the Ovacık village]. Here, about 70-80% of the village population migrated from Bulgaria. The state granted them 1 to 2,5 acre piece of land for each….5 acres of land for 4 people. 1 acre for each. For instance when one married and moved to İzmir, he sold his land. But others couldn’t buy it…They do not have any possessions. But they have needs, so most of them... [the Ovacık villagers] wanted the gold mine” (P/A 20).

According to the interviewees, divided structure in Ovacık with respect to peasants’ stances towards the mine was caused by the fact that migrants who settled relatively late in the region were more used to the idea that their village can be removed somewhere else if they faced a cyanide related disaster (P/A 18). In contrast, in Çamköy and Narlıca villagers had been living in their villages for a couple of centuries which was also underlined in their frames as part of their collective identity. Also, higher turn-out rates from Çamköy and Narlıca were seen as an effect of higher levels of land possession by villagers on an individual basis which, in return, increased their claim on their land (E/E 10).

In sum, the second phase of the movement started with the mass mobilization of the peasants. In this phase, prior anti-mine efforts which revolved mainly around informing villagers and forming general public awareness was turned into a full-fledged movement based on various grassroots forms of protest, the process of forming a collective identity, and strengthening solidarity relations. Protests based on civil disobedience acts and related mobilization efforts which became an indispensable and central component of the Bergama movement during the second phase will be further analyzed in the following sections.
Mobilizing Structures

a. Organizational structure:

The Bergama movement was organized as an informal and flexible network consisting of multiple and heterogeneous actors in terms of class, ethnicity, religion, and gender. The network mainly included peasants from 17 villages neighbouring the Ovacık gold mine as well as politicians, scientists, environmental activists, and civil society organizations at the local, national, and transnational level. The overall movement network was highly decentralized since there is no one single social movement organization (SMO) which dominated the whole network. In 1995, a quasi-SMO was formed under the name of the Committee of Environmental Execution (Çevre Yürütme Kurulu-ÇYK) consisting of civil society organizations, village committees, and local activists in Bergama specifically coordinating resistance against Eurogold in Bergama (P/A 15). Yet, ÇYK never became a central social movement organization which made all the decisions and controlled every activity within the movement. On the contrary, the committee had a limited coordination role, and this role of the committee phased out after a short while since coordination activities were mainly carried out through personal contacts in a highly informal manner. These personal contacts were sufficiently intense, permanent and efficient which led separate sub-networks to work in an interdependent and coordinated fashion throughout the movement.

The Bergama movement network has concentrated on four major sub-fields: legal action and science; political initiatives and relations; transnational activities; and grassroots based protests. Activities within each sub-field have been mainly carried out by three sub-networks which can be classified as follows:

a) the grassroots sub-network based in Bergama concentrating on the protest activities;
b) the legal-scientific sub-network mainly organized in İzmir carrying out the legal and scientific aspects of the mobilization; and
c) the transnational sub-network forging links with transnational actors and carrying the anti-mine activities to the transnational level.

A separate sub-network did not develop in relation to the political relations subfield. Instead, all the sub-networks were engaged in the bargains and negotiations held with the power holders and political allies by utilizing personal contacts of various prominent actors from each sub-network. In fact, none of the specialized sub-networks acted in an independent or isolated fashion. Rather, they were all interlinked and worked in collaboration with each other by cross-fertilising their activities. With the intricate structure of the sub-networks, a continuous information flow and support among the sub-networks were maintained facilitating their actions. For instance, the prolonged legal action regarding the Ovacık mine would not have succeeded unless it was backed up by protest activities, which indicates coordination between the Bergama protestors and lawyers. As one of the lawyers of the movement states: “However it is … the persistent grassroots activities of the peasants and their altruism which made it happen [achieving court decisions in favour] rather than our technical skills” (Özkan, 2004: 6). In fact, the Bergama peasants were prioritized by all the sub-networks who rested their legitimacy on the peasants by presenting themselves as advocates of the “peasants’ contention” (E/E 5, 17, 18). However, even though peasants were described as the real owners of the Bergama movement, all the sub-networks kept their ‘relative autonomy’ during their activities. In other words, none of the sub-networks including the grassroots sub-network dominated or controlled the activities or decision-making processes.

Within this horizontal and interwoven structure, several individuals -both from the elite and peasant sections of the movement- within each network achieved prominent positions due to their knowledge, skills, connections with other networks and influential allies throughout the process. Yet, individuals who stuck out were not considered as “leaders”. 

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Instead, from the viewpoint of interviewees, these prominent actors were seen as the ‘spokespersons’ of the movement exercising the roles of coordination and management of activities. In other words, these prominent actors are not considered as the formal leaders of the movement since a single leadership model was not adopted in contrast to hierarchical organizational structures. As one of the peasant respondents pointed out: “There is no leader here. Everyone is a leader” (P/A 11). By rejecting a formal leadership structure, they intended to convey the message that the Bergama movement genuinely belonged to the peasants living in the region. In this way, they could ward off any unfavourable counter-framings of the movement and pre-empt any stigmatizations based on depiction of their movement as manipulation of ‘ignorant’ peasants by ‘ill-intentioned’ leaders. Also, the aim was to inhibit any possibility of interests of individuals or an SMO to overshadow peasants which would have made the latter’s claims secondary. Lastly, they wanted to apply a participatory democracy model in their movement as much as possible since democratization and empowerment of ‘people’ were their master frames.

The decentralized and flexible character of the overall Bergama network enabled its components to act and organize autonomously. Each network employed distinct forms of organizational structures which will be assessed in the next section.

*a.1: Organizational Structure of the Grassroots Sub-network*

In the absence of a formal SMO overarching the whole movement by cross-cutting different movement sections, the grassroots sub-network was organized in a highly informal and horizontal way. Grassroots activities in relation to tactics, strategies, framing, and management of resources were carried out through webs of interpersonal links between villagers. The closest organizational model to a formal SMO which was used in the villages was ‘villager committees’. These committees were formed in each village and were composed of a number of prominent villagers with distinct characteristics due to their ages, skills, and
influence within their communities as well as the officially elected heads of villages (muhtar). Members of the committees were chosen by the villagers themselves on a consensual basis in each village. Yet, villager committees did not function as organizations which make decisions in the name of peasants. Rather, village committees moved with the objective of ensuring villagers’ choices and views and participation in general decisions-making (E/E 2). Secondly, they also coordinated villagers during their protest activities. Additionally, frequently held open meetings at each village in which every villager had the chance to express his/her views complemented the work of the committees to render a democratic movement process.

Evidence from diverse cases of social movements suggests that interpersonal and organizational network ties pre-dating social movement mobilization constitute the basis for the initial participation of individuals in movements. These network structures are crucial since they connect two or more individuals and organizations to each other that enable information flow. Through these links, individuals learn about causes, goals, frames, and tactics of a movement, and in that sense, individuals’ decisions to participate in a movement largely depend on these interpersonal connections. In a similar vein, pre-existing interpersonal links nested in the intra- and inter-village networks provided the basis for villagers’ engagement in the anti-mine movement. The Bergama peasants already had bonds of trust and solidarity among themselves based on the built-in relations of friendship and kinship. Also, collectivist practices and work-based aid exchange among peasants in agricultural production to maintain their livelihood had operated as additional factors strengthening village based solidarity relations. Hence, previously established solidarity and trust relations provided a social infrastructure for grassroots mobilization, and they facilitated the spread of anti-gold mine ideas and sentiments as well as rapid mobilization of peasants throughout villages once peasants were brought to the centre of the struggle during the second phase of the movement.

7 Kinship plays an important role in the Bergama villages. Each village was composed of a couple of families which were connected to each other through marriage. On the other hand, bonds of kinship are not prevalent at the inter-village level.
On the other hand, inter-village relations and networks were not as dense as the intra-village ones. Villagers shared the same plain for earning their livelihood which led to shared concerns among villages. Additionally, the villages were in contact with each other through shared celebrative events like weddings and individual acquaintances. More importantly, there were no significant conflicts between villages based on land or any other issue.

Apart from their facilitative impact on the initial mobilization, village based networks were utilized extensively at other stages of the movement, especially in terms of sustenance of the peasant mobilization. For instance, kinship relations were brought forth occasionally in order to ensure individuals continued to adhere to the movement especially at the possibility of changing sides when the movement entered stagnation periods.

The pre-existing village networks were adapted to the movement ideals and goals. In that regard, village public spaces where interpersonal relations are traditionally reproduced such as coffeehouses were turned into anti-mine sites. Traditionally, coffeehouses found in every village in Turkey are central locations which connect village residents to each other. They are mostly found at the centre of villages. This physical centrality of coffeehouses entails a symbolic importance in the sense that they are the main public spaces where peasants meet and interact with each other during their leisure times. Accordingly, coffeehouses are the public spaces where villagers share and transmit information regarding their community relations, daily lives and work. This was also the case in the Bergama villages since peasants met to exchange and circulate information about events and people in their own villages, neighbour villages, Bergama, İzmir, and Turkey in general. Coffeehouses are also political spaces since they are the sites where most of the discussions about local and national political developments take place.

Given this centrality of coffeehouses in the village community life, they have been crucial for the Bergama mobilization in several ways. First, since coffeehouses are spatial
gates opening to the outside world, efforts of scientists, lawyers and environmental activists mainly took place at coffeehouses. Informative meetings were held, and documentaries and information films were shown, opening the issue to discussion among peasants especially during the initial mobilization efforts (P/A 7). Second, coffeehouses remained as the main meeting spots when high levels of mobilization were achieved. They served as loci where post-protest discussions were held with the purpose of assessing their protest activities, responses of the police, tactical pitfalls and the media accounts. Those are the places where television is watched and newspapers are read collectively which enable them to discuss the media accounts about their struggle. Third, coffeehouses were also significant spaces for convincing or enforcing individuals to mobilize. Exerting peer pressure stood out as one of the most effective mechanisms used by villagers, and it was at the coffeehouses where community pressure on individuals was strongly exercised in order to enhance mobilization among peasants. Especially during the peak of their mobilization, the pro-mine villagers were excluded from the coffeehouses which meant their communities were excluding the peasants who were in favour of the gold mine project.

As a result of the re-organization of relations within coffeehouses in the context of the anti-mine movement, traditional relations revolving around coffeehouses were radically transformed. As the links with non-villagers supporting the movement intensified coffeehouses became more ‘friendly’ and inclusive spaces, and ‘strangers’ were welcomed to participate in talks and debates.

However, deliberative activities of peasants taking place at coffeehouses have been limited due to the fact that coffeehouses are exclusively male dominated spaces where women are traditionally excluded. The lives of women who occupied a crucial role in the movement were mostly confined to the private sphere. They appeared in public on the streets or when they participated in festive events such as weddings. In fact, coffeehouses were not formally
closed to the women, but it was not a social habit for them to go to the coffeehouses. In comparison to urban sites, public space and social life is characterized by unequal access of women in these villages despite a relatively relaxed approach to women’s appearance in the public sphere compared to other rural areas in Turkey.

The mobilization for Bergama changed these circumstances to a certain extent as female villagers became politicized and constituted a second village based network in addition to coffeehouse based networks of male villagers. Lacking a public space of their own equivalent to coffeehouses, women socialize and interact with each other mostly at meetings at houses or during their work on the field. These two separate networks are mainly linked through households in which men and women bring in and exchange information from their own network (P/A 9, 15). With the start of the grassroots mobilization, gold mine issue became a major point of debate in the women’s networks during their meetings at homes. Gradually, women started joining in meetings at coffeehouses, and they became more publicly visible. Besides, women who refrained from socializing with men in public got involved in protests shoulder to shoulder with men. In other words, conventional distinctions between male-female and private-public sphere were transcended (P/A 5, 15).

Transgression of gender distinctions constitute an important turn for the Bergama movement. Not only had the women appeared more in public by taking part in a struggle concerning their community and contributed to the increased the numbers and diversity of protestors, they also performed an important role in terms of general mobilization of the villagers. From the start, female villagers were keener on resisting against the gold mine, and acted as vanguards in terms of mobilizing villagers as a whole (E/E 6; P/A 28). In fact, according the social roles attributed to women, they were in charge of child-care, and the health of household members as well as contributing to livelihood maintenance activities. According to the male peasant activists, women were seen as more concerned with and
sensitive to the risks associated with human life due to this traditional household division of labour, (P/A 5, 28).

Female villagers took over the important task of extending resistance against the gold mine throughout villages. In order to mobilize the male villagers on a wider scale, female villagers went on a ‘sexual strike’ for about six months in order to mobilize men of the village who were not participating fully. Women held that they would refrain from sexual activities unless men are fully involved in the movement (P/A 4; Yeni Yüzyıl, 17.05.1997). Furthermore, prominent female peasants such as Sabahat Gökçeoğlu who led the female villagers’ sub-network became publicly well-known figures. Gökçeoğlu’s frequent appearance in the media as one of the spokesperson of the Bergama movement conveyed the message to the public that their movement was beyond gender differences (Cumhuriyet, 20.07.1997; Yeni Asır, 01.10.1997).

In terms of movement resources which are crucial for sustaining a successful movement, the grassroots sub-network proved to have an erratic resource configuration. Peasants were endowed with rich immaterial resources such as solidarity, commitment, and comradeship. This is because all these relations of trust and reciprocity were already present in their previous village networks which were extensively utilized during their struggle as described above. However, they had difficulties in terms of maintaining material resources. In terms of financial resources, money was needed in order to meet direct costs such as travel expenses and accommodation during protests away from Bergama or when peasants go to distant cities to participate in panels and seminars. For those purposes, peasants collected money among themselves to cover the expenses (P/A 11, 15, 27). Yet, even though the Bergama villagers are prosperous compared to villagers from other rural parts of Turkey, financial contributions they made burdened them since their income was just above subsistence levels (P/A 8, 11). Also, money collected among peasants could meet protest
expenses partially. Therefore, additional financial support was required, and consequently the grassroots sub-network relied on some external financial sources. Many supporting groups and individuals outside of the villages brought in material, as well as symbolic, resources. The Bergama municipality when Taşkın was in office became the major financial and technical supporter of the Bergama activists. All sorts of municipality facilities such as vehicles, computers, telephones, and faxes were put into the use of the Bergama peasants during their protests. The municipality was crucial in terms of providing financial resources since funding required for protests arrived both from the municipality itself and secondary actors through its business relations.

Besides, civil society organizations, neighbouring local governments, and sympathizers living outside Bergama made occasional contributions to the Bergama peasants by providing accommodation, food, and travel facilities during peasants’ protests in their region. For instance, during their 8-day long protest march to Çanakkale which was about 300 kilometres away from Bergama, food and accommodation needs of peasant activists were met by supporting municipalities, civil society organizations, and individuals in towns that the Bergama peasants passed through (P/A 9, 14, 21).

Other material resources like labour and time required for the protest activities seemed to be abundant at first glance. Involvement of the majority of peasants from 17 villages surrounding the Ovacık mine meant thousands of peasants were ready to devote their time and labour prepare and perform protests. However, peasants had to bear considerable levels of direct and indirect costs in relation to protest activities. Apart from direct costs like state repression, peasants faced major indirect costs in relation to their livelihood as they participated in protests. Nearly all villagers in Bergama depended on agriculture for their livelihood. During the peak of their movement when protest activities were frequent, peasants’ agricultural activities were disrupted. According to the accounts of interviewees, in
the year the number of protests peaked, they staged 88 events, in total around 370 for the overall movement. The number of protests was as high as 2 per week during the peak of their movement in 1997 and 1998 (P/A 26, 27). When the preliminary and aftermath stages were taken into account, a protest event took a minimum 3 days (P/A 26). They had to spend their time in protest sites instead of working on their field which endangered their harvests. Frequent participation in protests bears detrimental impacts on the peasants’ livelihood since agricultural work is tightly scheduled and is dependent on seasonal conditions, not giving peasants the option of postponing their work.

In order to overcome these indirect costs, peasants employed several strategies. First, a household based division of labour was created throughout villages. Each household member took turns in participating in protests. Accordingly, when one or two household members went to protests, the remaining household members carried out the agricultural work on the field (P/A 9).

“We are small farmers who are working on land. It is us who are doing the work but no one else. Each family is responsible for its own piece of land. And if there is no farming done, we are hungry. Hence, we have arranged schedules. If I were to go for a demonstration, my wife would have stayed and worked on land. But, we still have lost too much” (P/A 11).

Another mechanism which villagers utilized in order to overcome indirect costs of protest was imece, a traditional village based practice. In its conventional use, imece refers to collective work done in a village for the collective good of the village. Villagers adopted this traditional practice in their movement according to which peasants who stayed at villages during protest provided help in their agricultural work for their neighbours who attended protests (P/A 11). Additionally, the protest schedule was arranged by taking the workload of farms into account. Unless there was urgency, the number of protests was kept low during plantation and harvest times when peasants were busier with their agricultural activities. If it was inevitable to organize a protest during those busy times due to circumstances, the ones who had more work to do were allowed not to participate (E/E 2; P/A 15).
a.2: The Legal and Scientific Sub-network: The Elele Platform and others

While the grassroots based protest activities were mainly carried out by the Bergama villagers, scientific work and legal activities were mainly concentrated in the city of İzmir to which Bergama is administratively linked. The proponents of anti-gold mine movement including scientists, university professors, lawyers and civil society organizations with environmental concerns in İzmir organized themselves as a network under the name of İzmir-Bergama İçin Elele Hareketi Platformu (İzmir Hand-in-hand for Bergama Movement Platform; hereafter the Elele Platform) in order to support the Bergama peasants. The initial support came from several professional chambers of engineering and medicine in response to Taşkın’s efforts to extend their resistance to İzmir. The supporting chambers formed their own ‘gold commissions’ in order to make research and collect data about gold mining related issues such as risks of contamination of underground waters, tailing pond standards, earthquake related risks, and general risk evaluation of gold mines (E/E 17, 18). Yet, these activities remained scattered and uncoordinated until several professional chambers and academicians supporting the movement decided to conjoin in 1992. Subsequently, the gold commissions of various chambers were combined together which constitute the backbone of the Elele Platform (E/E 17).

Concomitantly, several lawyers from the İzmir Environmentalist Lawyers group including the prominent actors of the legal process, Senih Özay and Arif Ali Cangi, as well as the head of the İzmir Bar Association at the time being, Noyan Özkan, joined the newly forming Elele Platform. These lawyers, who undertook the role of being legal representatives of the Bergama peasants during their struggle, worked in collaboration with the scientific flank. In this way, legal action over the Bergama movement was substantiated since legal cases were backed up by scientific and technical information on gold mining.
Overall, the *Elele Platform* was organized as a relatively decentralized and loose organization with the participation of 22 chambers and 25 other types of NGOs including environmentalist associations and trade unions as well as the İzmir Lawyers for Environment. Still, the *Elele Platform* acted like a quasi-SMO by displaying formalized structural characteristics in some ways. They held regular meetings on a monthly basis to discuss and decide on strategies and legal and scientific actions. In terms of the management of organizational resources, they maintained a financial resource base through the fees paid by its member organizations. There was an elected spokesperson and secretariat of the platform. Yet, these positions rotated annually and each member organization took over the spokesperson role in turn in order to share the workload. In this way, they aimed to avoid the effect of ‘the iron law of oligarchy’ which is often faced by formalized and hierarchical organizational structures. They also intended to prevent any groups or individuals from moving ahead of the Bergama peasants. In that regard, none of the participant groups dominated the SMO. Additionally, a horizontally built egalitarian and democratic structure was encouraged (E/E 14, 17, 18).

Even though the Elele Platform was initially established to support the anti-gold mine movement in Bergama, they eventually extended their focus to other environmental disputes and contentions in the nearby regions of İzmir as well. They followed the developments over similar gold mine projects in Eşme-Uşak and Efemçukuru-İzmir and provided legal and scientific assistance aiming to spread resistance to those regions.

The *Elele* network’s endeavours of providing scientific evidence and carrying out legal action against the mine continued alongside grassroots activities and in collaboration with peasants, Oktay Konyar, and Sefa Taşkıncı (E/E 14, 16, 17, 18). As one of the movement barristers, Noyan Özkan, states: “However it is … the persistent grassroots activities of the peasants and their altruism which made it happen [court decisions in favour] rather than our
technical skills” (Özkan, 2004: 6). Thus, the legal and grassroots dimensions overlapped throughout the movement. Moreover, the grassroots activities became the most influential force in terms of even affecting the court decisions and keeping the movement alive.

However, despite the constant information flow between the Elele network and the Bergama peasants, members of the Elele network did not actively participate in civil disobedience actions of the peasants. Rather, as one its members underline, they focused on scientific and legalistic activities emphasizing that scientific objectivity they pursue was their ontological characteristic as scientists and legal people:

“We never actively contributed to the civil disobedience acts. We haven’t participated in the protests either. Chambers have clear positions. We acted according to the principle of scientific objectivity and our responsibility of informing the public with impartiality. All our work is up to scientific standards. For example, against the reports which were prepared by the government in 1999, we encouraged TMMOB to write a critical report in 2001 which has not been challenged yet” (E/E 18).

a.3: The Transnational Sub-network

The Bergama activists also moved their contention beyond their national borders. In their struggle against some transnational actors, they tried to get the support of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), foreign politicians, and the general public outside their national territories. In doing that, their main objective was to confront TNCs and put further pressure on them as well as the Turkish state at the transnational level. The transnational dimension of the Bergama movement was made possible through the activities of the transnational sub-network which was composed of a variety of actors including INGOs, foreign politicians, members of green parties in Germany and the European Parliament, and individual activists. In terms of its organizational structure, the transnational sub-network organized in a highly decentralized and non-hierarchical form in parallel with the other segments of the movement network. The prominent figure who coordinated the transnational dimension of the Bergama movement was Birsel Lemke, an environmentalist who resided half of the year in Germany. Through her personal contacts in Germany, Birsel Lemke made
the Bergama movement known to several parliament members, scientists, journalists, and NGOs with whom she already had contacts. Furthermore, other links were utilized to bring the issue to the European Parliament. In addition, another stream of transnational links was forged in Australia through the work of another Turkish originated Australian, Emet Değirmenci, who launched a campaign against the Australian originated TNC, Normandy. Moreover, links were maintained with several INGOs and advocacy groups such as Minewatch, Mineral Policy Centre, and Mineral Policy Institute. All these transnational links were managed through the brokerage of individuals with extensive relations. In that regard, the lack of a formal organizational structure was partly due to the insufficiency of resources on the side of the Bergama activists in Turkey. Apart from Üstün Bilge-Reinart, an academic who managed communication with actors outside Turkey at the later stages of the movement, and Taşkin, there were few activists with good foreign language knowledge and technical skills required for the Internet use, even among the university educated activists. As Bilge-Reinart stated:

“Energy in Turkey is very limited. People direct their efforts in their own specialized fields. For instance, lawyers are working hard. I admire A.A.C. [one of the environmentalist lawyers], but foreign language becomes a problem. He does not know any English, German or French. Then, [transnational] links cannot be furthered. I happily accept to make translations and I do it in many cases. However, there is a limited number of people with limited energy. Priority [of activists in Turkey] is their own specific struggle [hereby referring to the local contention]. Then, efforts put into transnational links are seen unnecessary” (E/E 34).

These resource based difficulties either inhibited or delayed possible transnational links with similar movements elsewhere. For instance, Greek activists mobilizing against a gold mine project in Halkidiki, Thessaloniki (Greece) had difficulties when they tried to contact and interact with the Bergama activists. An elite participant of the Halkidiki movement described their difficulties in contacting the Bergama activists as follows:

“[U]ntil we met with Üstün we had a communication problem because we couldn’t find anyone. I couldn’t find anyone who spoke English. Üstün was not involved in the Bergama until lately because she was in Canada. When she got back to Turkey, she was a new blood to the movement. So she helped us by maintaining communication with Konyar who had absolutely no contacts until then. They had helped to make the story known to Greece” (E/E 33).
The Bergama movement used a rich repertoire of action containing various protest forms ranging from conventional protests to non-conventional disruptive actions. All the protest forms utilized were formulated and staged based on their underlying strategy of non-violent civil disobedience (E/E 2). Basically, civil disobedience refers to “...a strategy based on the limited breach of rules and aimed at rendering protest as visible as possible, grabbing media attention to highlight the activists’ cause through the intensity of their commitment” (della Porta et al., 2006: 149). In other words, through civil disobedience acts, activists push the limits of legality and disobey existing rules and laws by referring to their general citizenship rights in a peaceful manner with the aim of conveying their demands and messages to the public and authorities, especially with the help of the media.

At the root of civil disobedience lie the ideas and ideals of Gandhi. Throughout his ‘experiments’ with activism in South Africa and India, Gandhi formulated the concept of ‘satyagraha’ which combines satya, literally meaning truth, and agraha, referring to ‘force’. Based on the concept of ‘satyagraha’, Gandhi proposed a set of activism guidelines through his books, articles, letters, speeches, and telegraphs in order to overthrow British rule and achieve self-governance in India. According to Gandhi, violence is the weapon of the weak and ‘cowards’. Instead, activists should behave in a non-violent fashion without attacking or insulting their opponents. In order to achieve that, movements should be organized under a code of discipline according to which obeying movement leaders is crucial. Activists should be self-reliant, open to communication and be ready to face opponents’ repressive measures of being taken into custody or being arrested. The essential stages of the Gandhian activism is formulated as continuous negotiations and arbitration with authorities, creation of publicity over issues at stake and preparing the masses for participating in direct actions such as

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8 **Satyagraha** is defined by Gandhi in his own words as: “Truth (Satya) implies love, and firmness (agraha) engenders and therefore serves as a synonym for force…. [Satyagraha is] the Force which is born of Truth and Love or non-violence...” (Gandhi 1928: 102 cited in Chabot, 2000).
demonstrations, economic boycotts, non-cooperation and civil disobedience (CWG www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/VOL019.pdf; Chabot, 2000). In that regard, Gandhi proposes an active type of civil disobedience by rejecting passive resistance. In fact, protest forms used by Gandhi such as strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts have already been used by modern social movements. Yet, Gandhi has added a new meaning to these forms by coming up with a new code of discipline (Chabot, 2000, 2002). Starting with the American Civil Rights Movement and student movements of the 1960s, numerous movements from all around the world including most of the branches of the Global Justice Movement used the Gandhian civil disobedience by adopting it to their own contention and contexts (Chabot, 2000).

In a similar vein to many contemporary movements against capitalist globalization, the Bergama movement participants opted for non-violent disruptive civil disobedience being under the influence of Gandhi’s ideas and activism (E/E 2). Yet, the Bergama peasants did not have any specific and detailed prior knowledge about Gandhi. In fact, civil disobedience in general has not been a well known and widely employed protest form in Turkey, let alone using Gandhi’s principles in movement repertoires, even though it is a widespread strategy which has diffused into many diverse contexts and is practiced by various social movements all around the world since the mid 20th century. Gandhi’s principles entered the Bergama movement’s repertoire of action through the brokerage of Konyar who stood out as the main decision-maker with respect to protest strategies and tactics. He developed his knowledge of Gandhi and civil disobedience by reading Gandhi’s translated work. By reformulating Gandhi’s principles through adding traditional symbols and cultural codes, Konyar set the idea of civil disobedience as the master strategy of the Bergama movement.

“I am an admirer of Gandhi. I have read about Gandhi for many years. I value him immensely. One of the most respectful ways of resistance under the new world order, within the fallacy of globalization is for citizens to participate in decisions regarding their lives without resorting to violence. People should learn not to act violently. That is what Gandhi did. This is civil disobedience. I have applied Gandhi’s ideology to my country during the 2000s in such a disciplined, almost academic manner as to become exemplary for all civil society organizations, trade unions, political parties, and the people” (E/E 2).
In spite of the lack of historical, culture or contention-wise proximity with the Indian Independence Movement, the Bergama activists chose and adopted non-violence strategy because according to their evaluations it was the most viable path to follow which ensured their legitimacy and the acceptance of their movement in the eyes of the public and power holders. In other words, they commonly agreed upon the idea that not resorting to violence was the best means to make their claims by achieving support of bystanders. Furthermore, they also intended to avoid stigmatization by their opponents by presenting themselves as a genuinely new movement distinct from older movements which resort to violence in their protests:

“Since the 1960s, our country has witnessed a lot of violence. Violence is not approved. People suffer many losses. As a result of pressure from the IMF policies, WTO, and the World Bank, the country has inclined toward right-wing politics. What is to be done? A new understanding fostering a unity which is non-violent but resistant, non-violent but organized, and non-violent but influential is required. DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions], KESK [Confederation of Public Workers’ Unions], or other civil society organizations could not achieve that. Leaving aside the fact that they are not radical [innovative], these organizations are not even trusted by the society or the workers because of their worldviews, their relations with the capital, and their general position”(Konyar in Reinart, 2003: 59).

With the goal of displaying worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment, i.e. WUNC, of their contention (Tilly, 2004), the Bergama activists employed a multiplicity of protest elements and forms which were all shaped by their master strategy of non-violent civil disobedience. Many of these protest forms had already been used by other movements, and the Bergama activists borrowed them, adapting them to their own situation. In fact, the multi-form action repertoire of the Bergama movement resembled the GJM activists’ repertoire. By slightly adapting Smith’s (2002) categorization of protest action in the Seattle Protest, the repertoire of action of the Bergama movement can be analyzed under three headings: scientific research and education; disruptive action and mobilization; and symbolic mobilization.
b.1: Scientific and Educational Activities

Educational activities constitute a crucial part of the Bergama movement’s repertoire of action. These educational activities consist of all types of training, panels, meetings and discussions held either by the supporting scientists or lawyers through whom the Bergama peasants have acquired various sorts of valuable information, skills, and knowledge. In a way, educational activities make up the infrastructural backbone of the protest activities since skills, knowledge, and information were used at different stages of the movement. Educational activities took place in two major forms: *training on nonviolent action* and *scientific education*.

*Training on nonviolent action*: Throughout the movement, peasants acquired skills and knowledge about staging direct action and public demonstrations in a non-violent fashion. Training regarding non-violent protest action is handled in two parts: *legal training* and *protest training*. Since the early phases of the movement, peasants went through a detailed *legal training*. Lawyers from the İzmir Lawyers for Environment group continuously informed peasants about their constitutional rights as citizens. The first aim was to empower the Bergama peasants as citizens and to strengthen their belief in their efficacy by reminding them of their citizenship rights which, in turn, had the impact of fostering participation of peasants. The second aim was to enable peasants to develop full-fledged knowledge about their citizenship rights, who could then defend themselves legally and justify their actions by referring to their constitutional rights when they were put under custody or when they were brought to court. Using the thorough knowledge they accumulated on citizenship rights, peasants even stepped in during their cases in the courts and pointed out misapplications of legal procedures by the state forces during their protests as if they were the attorneys:

“After 1980, the law on Meetings and Demonstrations was implemented in order to repress activities of making collective demands and to hinder civil movements with the purpose of creating a tamed society. According to this law, state forces should make an announcement of ‘You are violating the law no. 2911. You are acting against the law. Disperse’. Only then crime occurs. In our training sessions, we learned about this. But the police usually did not make the announcement even though they should have. In one of the trials, the judge asked an
The old female peasant who attended one of the marches whether she was aware of the existence of the law no. 2911. She said she was and added ‘The ones protesting know about it’. The judge continued by saying ‘Then, you violated the law’. The old peasant responded, ‘No, we did not. The gendarmerie did not make the announcement with a megaphone’. After this, gendarmerie brought 20 megaphones to each protest” (E/E 2).

The other part of civil disobedience training was the protest training regarding the behaviour and strategies of peasants during protests. This type of training was carried out under the supervision of Konyar in order to provide peasants who overwhelmingly lacked any previous protest experience with non-violent protest skills. For these purposes, they organized regular training sessions among themselves in villages in which techniques of non-violent protest were discussed, learned, and practised. Paradoxically, though, these training sessions over non-violent protest were managed in a way that much resembled military-training. This was mainly due to the objective of maintaining discipline throughout protests which was adapted from Ghandi’s principles. Peasants who were first-time activists practiced sit-ins and marches. Another purpose of these trainings was to provide peasants some level of physical training in order to increase their stamina during protests which required physical fitness (E/E 2). They have also acquired knowledge about how to act during their confrontations with the state forces without resorting to violence or when they were put under custody which was essential to keeping the integrity of their non-violent civil disobedience acts.

Scientific education: Alongside protest training, the Bergama activists went through an intense and extensive scientific education which enabled peasants to attain information on the highly technical issue of gold mining. As Rootes (1999) states, knowledge on environmental issues is positively correlated with increased efficacy levels of individuals. As people are more knowledgeable about the environmental risks they face, environmental concerns are expressed less as ‘personal complaints’, and there is a greater chance of redressing those issues through political actions (Rootes, 1999). On the other hand, given the complexity of environmental issues and the mass media’s tendency to report ‘events’ rather than ‘processes’ with respect to environmental issues, people mostly rely on limited
information which easily lead to confusion, anxiety, and panic (ibid). In that sense scientific educational activities of scientists and experts were highly valuable which enabled the Bergama peasants to recognize the global aspect of their problem and led them to take action. Accordingly, scientists from İzmir and İstanbul occasionally visited villages and informed the peasants about the hazards of the cyanide leach method by presenting them with data about gold mining. Scientific training also entailed exemplification of gold mining accidents from all around the world, summarizing scientific reports about the risks of the cyanide-leach method, and the geographical characteristics of the Bergama region with special emphasis on underground waters, earthquake risks, and fertility of their land which was threatened with the mine (P/A 28).

Peasants’ access to information over the highly technical issue of gold mining facilitated the movement in three major ways. First, scientific education raised awareness about the possible detrimental impacts of gold mining. This, in return, accelerated the initial mobilization of the peasants. Furthermore, through scientific education, peasants were able to make their diagnostic and prognostic framing of the issue on a more solid basis by widely using the scientific data about gold mining.

Second, peasants who were endowed with the knowledge of operation of gold mines and potential risks continuously monitored activities in the mine and reported any abnormal developments to the scientists and authorities. As one of the scientist interviewees points outs, peasants observed and reported the release of waste water into a creek running alongside the mine. (E/E 17) In that sense, peasants provided valuable information from the mine site which was put into the service of the research section of the scientific network.

Third, as peasants developed a full-fledged understanding of the risks of gold-mining, they appeared as conscious citizens in the media. Consequently, peasants whose previous knowledge about gold mining was very limited became quasi-‘experts’ who discussed
technical issues even with scientists and experts. When they conveyed their messages to the public and authorities through the media, peasants cited academic material and use the same wording of scientists in their speeches (E/E 9). In this way, peasants could present themselves to the public as well-informed activists rather than ignorant and manipulated peasants. Moreover, some of the movement elite themselves turned into ‘experts’ over the issue of gold mining who conducted research on the cyanide leach method on their own. For instance, Taşkı̇n actively contributed to the scientific research by publishing a book on gold mining and the cyanide leach method (Taşkı̇n, 1998). In his book, he analyzes the structures and configuration of mining TNCs all around the globe by defining their links with the Ovacık mine and enlists various cyanide leach method related accidents and disasters from all over the world with the purpose of raising consciousness about the risks of gold mining in Bergama. Overall, technical scientific work was crucial, since the Bergama activists could ward off the pro-mine camp’s accusations which imply that peasants’ resistance was simply caused by lack of knowledge and ignorance.

Another set of activities that was performed by the Bergama activists in relation to education was witnessing acts. Groups representing the movement including Bergama peasants as well as Konyar and Taşkı̇n visited places outside their region with mine-related environmental damage. In one of these witnessing acts, the Bergama activists went to see the abandoned copper mine in Lefke, Cyprus on 29.01.1997 to observe the long term impacts of cyanide use on the environment (Milliyet, 30.01.1997; P/A 6, 9, 16). Another witnessing act was performed on July 9th, 1997 when around 300 peasants headed by Konyar and Taşkı̇n tried to visit the old lead mine in Balya, Balı̇kesir in order to observe the environmental

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9 Copper and minerals mine in Lefke has been run by Cyprus Mining Corporation (CMC), an American mining company based in Cyprus, now owned by AMAX. The mine was closed in 1974 due to intervention of the Turkish army and alleged exhaustion of ores. Since then, wastes containing dangerous arsenic compounds have been unmonitored, and trenches keeping waste have not been restored which resulted in severe degradation of the environment (http://www.cyprusaction.org/humanrights/environment/lefke/, access on 15.09.2011).
damages created by the mine. However, the Bergama activists met with gendarmerie obstruction and they were not allowed to complete their visit. In the following months, the Bergama peasants repeated their visit to Balya, and this time, they were able to enter the mine site (Radikal, 11.09.1997; P/A 9). All these witnessing acts served mainly two purposes. First, peasants who went to these polluted sites talked about their observations when they were back in their villages.

“When we were back, we told everyone what we saw. They got cancer, they got blind. Balya is lost” (P/A 9).

In this way, they raised consciousness among peasants about the risks they faced. Second, they intended to draw the attention of the public and authorities by providing proof for their rightful cause justness. For that purpose, activists also complemented their witnessing acts with colourful protests in order to make sure their visits would appear on the news.

b.2: Public Demonstrations and Direct Action

The second set of protest actions of the Bergama movement was composed of various direct action forms formulated along the general strategies of non-violence and civil disobedience. Throughout the movement, the Bergama activists staged numerous contained and disruptive protest forms ranging from public demonstrations and marches to sit-ins, invasion and symbolic acts.

Contained protest forms such as public demonstrations, marches, meetings, and petitioning had already existed in the repertoires the ‘old’ movements of the working class and student movements in Turkey. In other words, as is the case in the liberal democratic

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10 Mining activities in Balya started as early as 1839. The lead mine at Balya was handed over to a French company called «Société des mines de Balya-Karaaydın», and it ran the Balya mine until 1939-1940 when the it was closed by the Turkish government. Remaining waste in tailing ponds containing high levels of lead, zinc, and arsenic have caused immense environmental damage since it is estimated that around 2.1 million tons of waste spilled as a result of rains and floods. Balya is still under the threat of severe environmental damage (Öngür, 2003; Cumhuriyet, 28.05.2011).

11 For instance, they staged a sit-in protest with banners on the plane to Lefke in order to present a colourful scene for the journalists on the plane (Yeni TV, 05.03.1997).
societies, these protest forms had previously become routine, and considered as part of ‘normal’ ways of doing politics, even if in a limited and restricted way, by power holders in Turkey. Even though the Bergama activists recurrently employed contained protest forms, they mostly staged these protest forms in distinct ways. The reasons for that are twofold. First, the Bergama activists tried to differentiate themselves from the ‘older’ movements. In that regard, the Bergama activists questioned the effectiveness of the ‘old’ movements’ repertoires of contention since earlier repertoires of action contained occasional use of violence in their anti-American and anti-imperialistic struggles. By underlining the novelty of their movement, the Bergama activists brought forth the view that employing ‘older’ repertoires exactly is useless and old-fashioned in the times of the capitalist globalization.

“There are also democratic ways of resisting. In the old times, when I was young, the car of the American Ambassador was burnt. We used to say “Yankee go home!” I think these kinds of protests are outdated. ..... In order to challenge a global power, you need to have an organized resistance. This should be done without committing crimes, without violence, without being provoked; based on citizenship identity and in a free manner...” (O. Konyar in Reinart, 2003: 59).

In this way, they aimed to remain legitimate in the eyes of the power holders by stating that they were not a simple continuation of old movements which were associated with political turmoil during the pre-1980 period.

Secondly, they aspired to receive the attention of the mass media and the public by signalling distinct features as a movement. Given the mass media’s tendency to highlight violence-oriented protests which is a part of its “newsworthiness” criteria, it was crucial for the Bergama activists to discover novel and striking ways of doing peaceful protests in order to find themselves place in the news.

“We staged interesting protests in order to draw the attention of the public. In this way, we were able to tell about our demands. Otherwise, you take a megaphone and walk on the streets. That type of protest does not grab the attention of people. But if you stage events which have not been done before and which people are not accustomed to, people pay more attention. Unconventional protests can find room in the media- especially for grabbing attention of the media and the public. Almost all of our protests have been reported by the media” (P/A 15).

“During when a group travelled to İstanbul [for the Bosphorous Bridge protest], a small bunch of us went to İzmir for another protest. There were around 25 people. We staged two different protests simultaneously. In İzmir, we interrupted a concert at the İzmir Fair. .....One MP there recognized us. He gave us support. And then everyone applauded us. Those types of protests were really effective. Protest does not happen only by walking” (P/A 8).
With these objectives, they stuck to non-violence as an indispensible feature of their actions during their struggle against global powers. The Bergama activists deliberately and meticulously tried to refute violence throughout their protests.

“We had to find new methods which would dominate the police without agitating them. We had to be sympathetic and gentle....I was fascinated by Gandhi as I read his work. He drove them [the imperialist forces] crazy. We are doing that as well. It is uncertain when or where we do become visible. Or when we appear....Where we walk....What we will do suddenly....”(Konyar in Reinart, 2003: 59).

Conventional protest forms such as public marches and demonstrations constituted the bulk of the Bergama peasants’ protest activities which led them to achieve public visibility and recognition. They adapted these conventional forms to their own situation by introducing various innovative features. Accordingly, the Bergama activists shaped many of their demonstrations, especially the larger scale ones that intended to receive attention of the national and international media and public outside their region, around specific themes.

“We were thinking and deliberating what to do about protests...The main objective was to remain on the public agenda. If newspapers and television covered our protests, we would not be off agenda. However, if you appear with the same sort of protest every day, no one takes you into account. If protests are innovative, the media attention continues. They always come. Otherwise, they won’t. That’s why we tried to stage different protests” (P/A 20).

Innovative forms of protest were shaped around specific themes underlining a certain aspect of the Bergama contention and the peasants named many of their demonstrations along these themes. One of the most well-known thematic demonstrations was the “Yeti Gari!” (a local expression meaning ‘enough is enough’). On December 23rd, 1996, several hundred peasants from the Bergama villages staged this public demonstration marching half-naked only with their underwear on the streets of Bergama, and they distributed pamphlets to the public during the protests which was defined by a peasant activist as “an event which would never be staged by any peasant normally” (P/A 9). With ‘nudity’, the Bergama peasants intended to convey the message that peasants were about to lose everything they possessed including their bodies and were ready to do anything to stop the gold mine. Indeed, it was one
of the most successful events of the Bergama peasants since the protest received a wide media coverage which aided the escalation of public awareness about the Bergama movement. Additionally, the nudity protest which was exclusively staged by male peasants upheld a symbolic significance with respect to the internal relations of the movement. It was a ‘transformative’ act on the part of the Bergama villagers since they collectively practiced a socially unacceptable behaviour for a common goal.

“We gathered in Bergama on Sunday in front of the CHP building. First, he [Konyar] got half-naked. We were surprised. He said “Get naked”. We stared each other. We have never gotten naked [in public] before. It is shameful behaviour. You are breaking a taboo there...Eventually, the majority of the crowd got naked and rushed into the street. This protest dubbed the “nudity protest” received wide media coverage which led the public hear about the Bergama movement. After stepping out the door, there was no more shame or fear. We walked through Bergama and distributed pamphlets. We toured around. We were out of our shells. And the rest followed. If you tell me to get naked now, I will do it right here” (Tahsin Sezer in Reinart, 2003:61).

As implied in the words of the peasant interviewee, this protest event based on the collective act of breaching traditional customs and social codes enabled peasants to create new ties along the lines of their contention based on their already existing solidarity as members of the same community. In other words, through the nudity protest, traditional village based relations were being revitalized and reformulated in such a way that new types of bonds of commitment and solidarity developed among peasants which were essential for the sustainability of the movement. The ‘nudity protest’ was the symbolic display of the peasants’ commitment to their cause not only for the general public, but for themselves as well. In that sense, the “nudity protest” signified a turning point for the movement in which peasants overcame barriers of shame, taboo, and social pressure which eventually led to increased levels of commitment and participation in the subsequent protest events.

“We even walked half naked only with our underwear on the streets in order to protest. For us, it was unacceptable [to appear half naked in public]. However, it was Konyar who got naked first and then we did it. Now it is not a big deal for me. In order to protest, I can even do it here” (P/A 11).

Later on, the Bergama activists occasionally repeated the “nudity protest” outside Bergama. Around 200 activists walked [half]-naked in Istanbul on February 14th, 1998 which was forestalled by the police, and in response it was turned into a sit-in (Milliyet, 15.02.1998).
They protested the International Arbitration Treaty again half-naked in Ankara on July 16th, 1999 and 43 peasants were arrested (Radikal, 17.07.1999). On 24.12.1999, the Bergama peasants made another ‘nudity’ protest outside the Ministry of Energy in Ankara, this time protesting the nuclear energy plans of the government (Milliyet, 25.12.1999). When supporting the mobilization against the Ilısu Dam which would submerge the historical town of Hasankeyf underwater, the Bergama peasants went to Hasankeyf in the South-Eastern part of Turkey under the leadership of Konyar and protested against the dam project with their clothes off on December 5th, 2002 (Bianet, 06.12.2002). Even during the decline phase of the movement when the rate of protests dropped sharply, the Bergama peasants continued demonstrating half-naked as in the example of a demonstration in Istanbul staged by about 50 Bergama peasants on September 14th, 2004 (Milliyet, 15.09.2004). As correctly identified by a peasant activist, “nudity protest” was an innovative protest form practiced first by the Bergama activists, and it became modular and entered the repertoire of action of other social movements elsewhere in Turkey (P/A 15).

The anti-mine activists staged other thematic demonstrations throughout their movement. On November 25th, 1996, the “coffin demonstration” was organized in Bergama with the participation of around 3000 demonstrators during which 2 coffins were carried with Chopin’s funeral march playing at the background which symbolically pointed at the fact that they were facing a fatal risk (Cumhuriyet, 26.11.1996). Another demonstration was staged in the İzmir Adnan Menderes Airport when the peasants sent Taşkın off to Belgium in order to contact the European Parliament members for support. This time the peasants took off their shoes and held them up in the air saying “Miners have taken everything from us but our shoes” (Radikal, 12.02.1997).

12 Various mobilizations including workers of the public enterprise of İstanbul Electricity, Tramway, and Tunnel Organization (İETT) claiming their wage differences, peasants from Manisa protesting against the construction of a large-scale waste disposal facility, and unions opposing privatization of a state-owned aluminium factory in Seydisehir, borrowed and staged “nudity protests” (Radikal, 18.11.2008; Milliyet, 19.11.2006; Bianet, 11.06.2001).
On May 28th, 1997, peasants made a protest called the “Apache Walk” by dressing up like American Indians and putting on face paint as reminiscent of the American Indians’ traditional war-paint. They declared a ‘symbolic war’ against the gold mine (Milliyet, 29.05.1997). With this protest, they referred to the American Indians in history in a different social context, and they intended to draw attention to the fact that similar attacks have been taking place elsewhere in the world by comparing their condition with that of the American Indians whose land was taken by Europeans a few centuries ago. They staged a demonstration called the “Cap and Tie March” on June 8th, 1997 in İzmir, during which traditional caps were worn to symbolize their peasant identity as well as ties which expressed that they were concomitantly “civilized” citizens entitled to all citizenship rights. At the end of their demonstration, they delivered their petition to the governor of İzmir (P/A 9; http://www.reocities.com/siyanurlealtin/duyuru.html, last access on 10.09.2011). Another thematic demonstration was “March With Donkeys” during which peasants walked with their animals to the sub-governor’s office in Bergama. Showing that all species are defending their right to live, they underlined that lives of all the species were under threat because of the gold mine (Evrensel, 17.02.2000; P/A 9).

However, not all public demonstrations were organized exclusively as thematic demonstrations. There were numerous conventional demonstrations during which activists simply gathered and marched with banners and slogans, mostly during the locally staged protests. Rather than targeting the general public and media attention, the Bergama peasants aimed to strengthen intra-movement bonds, keep mobilization alive, to display their determination, and show that their opposition continues to the TNC(s) with these locally oriented demonstrations (E/E 2).

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13 These demonstrations were described as “smaller scale protests” and “hit and run protests” by one of the peasant activists (P/A 9).
All these public demonstrations were held in combination with disruptive actions. Disruptive actions were symbolic expression of peasants’ discontent about the misapplication of rules and laws by the state. They challenged the state authorities by conveying the message that they were refraining from their citizenship duties unless the Turkish state exercised its own duties towards its citizens rather than siding with the TNC(s). In other words, the Bergama activists underlined the violation of rule-of-law principle and their previously achieved citizenship rights which were supposed to be under the protection of the state. In order to underline the “unlawfulness” of their situation, they practiced a series of disruptive civil obedience acts which are defined by the Bergama activists as occurring at the ‘borders of law’.

“We did not clash with the police. We tried to do our protests in sympathetic way for the public. These protests were not legal, but they were not illegal either. Lawyers were defining those borders for us” (P/A 11).

With disruptive protests, the Bergama activists basically aimed to interrupt the daily life of the general public, the usual practices of the state, and operations of the mine in order to display their determination. With that purpose, the Bergama peasants staged numerous sit-ins at public spaces and either closed or slowed down traffic in Bergama, İzmir, İstanbul, and Ankara. In one of their most well-known acts, a group of Bergama peasants chained themselves to the fences of the Bosporus Bridge in İstanbul on August 26th, 1997 which was closed to pedestrians (Sabah, 27.08.1997; Yeni Yüzyıl, 27.08.1997). During this protest which caused a major interruption of the already troublesome İstanbul traffic, they presented themselves in such colourful ways using banners and slogans that they managed to draw immense media and public attention at the national level (P/A 8, 9, 11, 27). Later on, they repeated the Bosphorous Bridge protest on March 25th, 2002 with the participation of 36 peasants who were then taken into custody for making an “illegal” protest by disrupting the traffic (Radikal, 26.03.2002). Other locations frequently used for sit-ins were highways. In August 1997, the peasants marched towards Çeşme, a touristic town 88 kilometres west of
İzmir, in order to meet with several ministers who were attending a meeting organized by the Aegean Association of Industrialists and Businessmen. However, the peasants were not allowed to enter Çeşme by the state security forces, and they were kept waiting on the İzmir-Çeşme highway. In response, peasants staged a sit-in protest and closed the highway to traffic for a couple of hours (Milliyet, 03.08.1997). Similarly, İzmir-Çanakkale highway which is one of the busiest transit routes which lies next to the mine pit and villages were closed to traffic numerous times by the peasants. On 27 May 2001, around 300 peasants dressed up in commando camouflage to escape from the gendarmeries that were protecting the mine site. Their aim was to threaten the mine administration with burning themselves in front of the mine as a protest with the fuel oil that they brought with them. However, as a result of the intrusion of the police, there were clashes and Konyar was taken into custody. Peasants organized a sit-in by closing the İzmir-Çanakkale road which lasted until Konyar was released (Milliyet, 28.05.2001).

The Bergama activists also intended to disrupt regular administrative activities of the Turkish state with their protests. On November 30th, 1997, the majority of peasants in 7 villages- Pınarköy, Çamköy, Narlıca, Ovacık, Yalnızız, Tepeköy, Süleymanlı and Aşağı Kırıklar- surrounding the Ovacık gold mine did not participate in the population census which was legally required (Yeni Asır, 01.12.1997; Reinart, 2003: 109). In this protest, peasants used a word play in their framing, based on the double meaning of the word ‘count’ in Turkish which refers to both ‘to be counted at a census’ and “to show respect”. In doing that, they intended to send power holders the message of “we will not be counted by the state which does not count us” (P/A 1, 2, 28). In other words, they indicated that they would not practice their citizenship duties unless the state in Turkey fulfilled its responsibilities towards its citizens.

“We did not participate in the census. We did it as a protest. It was a communal act. It was a conscious act. We do not let the state count us if that state is not taking into account what we say” (P/A 5).
Last, but not the least, the interruption of the operation of the mine was among the major objectives of the Bergama peasants. For this purpose, they employed various tactics including invading the mine pit, putting the mine pit under siege, and disrupting their public relations activities. The mine pit was occupied by the Bergama activists twice throughout the movement. In April, 1997, thousands of villagers accompanied by some activists from the town of Bergama entered the mine site with their tractors and occupied the mine pit for about 12 hours. Activists demanded to meet with either the President of Turkish Republic or the Minister of Environment in order to get the promise of indefinite closure of the mine. As a result of the negotiations held with the state authorities, the governor promised to close the mine temporarily based on his authority to maintain public order (Cumhuriyet, 23.04.1997; Radikal, 23.04.1997; P/A 9, 11).

The second invasion event took place during when feelings of discontent and tension escalated among peasants about the continuing mine construction despite the decision of the high court to the contrary. With the spread of rumours that the cyanide was being transported to the mine site, a large group of peasants blocked the roads going to the mine pit area on June 30th, 1997. During this protest, several intrusions into the mine took place (Cumhuriyet, 02.07.1997; P/A 8).

Similar to the road-blocking protest, the mine area was put under siege numerous times by the Bergama activists. By forming a human chain which was a common protest form of the peace movement in general and staging a sit-in, the Bergama peasants blockaded the mine pit in order to prevent the arrival of 18tons of cyanide (Hürriyet, 24.03.1999). In July 2001, around 500 peasants waited outside the fences of the mine pit each night and monitored the mine with their flashlights from 11:00 p.m. until 4:00 a.m. in order to prevent an illegal operation of the mine despite the decision of the Izmir Administrative Court to close the mine (P/A 10; Bianet, 17.07.2001).
With respect to the disruption of the public relations work of the TNC(s), on June 21st, 1996, the Bergama peasants intruded on the press meeting of the Australian ambassador David W. Evans who advocated cyanide leach method by claiming that the method did not entail any risks. With their banners and slogans, the Bergama peasants who were led by Konyar did not allow the press conference to end by harassing the Australian ambassador during his speech, and they took over that meeting and turned it into their own press conference (Cumhuriyet, 22.06.1997; Yeni Yüzyıl, 22.06.1997; P/A 9; P/A 27).

Despite the fact that CSOs and environmentalists supported the Bergama peasants, their forms of protest were more contained, as they rarely staged acts of disruptive protest. On February 15th, 1997, around 15 protestors interrupted the meeting of Eurogold with journalists in Istanbul to draw attention to the illegality of the mine project based on the court ruling which was disregarded (Radikal, 16.05.1997).

In addition to the non-violent disruptive protests, conventional protest forms like petitioning and press conferences were also utilized. There was a distinction between conventional and unconventional sets of protests with respect to their participants. Demonstrations, whether thematic or conventional, were overwhelmingly dominated by peasants. When other activists were allowed to participate, they appeared only as ‘secondary’ participants who were incorporated into the demonstrations as supporters of the peasants.

“They [civil society organizations, environmentalists] also joined us during our demonstrations. However, they had to be like us. For instance, they could not open their own banners or state their organizations’ names. They could participate as if they were peasants. Still, differences could be discerned. Therefore, we [peasants] were always in the lead, and they followed us” (P/A 20).

Apart from the intention of displaying the Bergama mobilization as a peasants’ movement without being overshadowed by other civil society organizations, political parties or other movements, there were instrumental reasons for such a separation. The main
aspiration was to be able to control the protesting mass to avoid intrusion of ‘external’ actors leading to provocations or manipulations.

“The thing we were careful about was that everyone should know every other person who appeared in the protest site. Every villager should be able to recognize people from their own villages. The aim was to prevent infiltration of provocateurs or terrorist groups. For example, someone might throw a stone at police or punch a soldier. They are people as well. They respond. Protest becomes provoked. Then prosecutors, the state won’t allow protests. They won’t let us march on the streets” (P/A 15).

On the other hand, petitioning campaigns have been launched in a more inclusionary fashion containing all supporters from Bergama, İzmir, and the rest of Turkey. In fact, petitioning campaigns were mostly organized by the civil society organizations supporting the Bergama movement in İzmir and Bergama, and the names of supporting civil society organizations and groups were openly declared. One of the major petitioning campaigns initiated by civil society organizations was called “Call from the Bergama People; Cyanide Gold Mine Should Be Closed”. It was launched with the objective of calling on state departments to implement the court decisions and the signatures were handed to the Turkish president, prime minister, and the Ministry of Environment in November, 1997 (Yeni Yüzyıl, 15.11.1997). This was mainly due to the fact that petitioning was a more controlled way of displaying numbers since messages were clearly set in a narrative beforehand and it was not possible to diverge from these narratives. On the other hand, controlling masses during a march was a harder task. Therefore, the objective of displaying numbers was exceeded by concerns about keeping the movement intact during demonstrations.

b.3: Symbolic events:

Throughout their movement, the Bergama activists mobilized symbolic resources and made extensive use of them in their protests. Symbols were used mainly in two ways. First, they were incorporated in protests and utilized as part of their disruptive acts as stated above. In that regard, in many of their demonstrations, marches, and sit-ins, the Bergama activists made use of various elements such as nudity, shoes, torches, chains, animals, and outfits. Secondly, the Bergama activists organized distinct symbolic protests in order to draw the
attention of the media and the public. In these symbolic protests, traditional cultural codes are used frequently, albeit in their adapted forms. In doing that, the Bergama activists aimed to eliminate the possibility of alienation of the villagers from protests activities, and they conveyed their messages to the general public in familiar codes. For instance, wedding ceremonies which are the one of the major celebratory occasions bringing the whole village community together were used as part of the protests by the Bergama activists. Village weddings also appear as festive events which strengthen relations between villages since friends and relatives from neighbouring villages also participate. As part of celebration custom, it is common to use gold and golden jewellery as wedding gifts to the hosts of the wedding which entail symbolic and economic significance in terms of displaying the generosity and status of the ones giving gifts to marrying couples. Accordingly, the wedding celebration of Konyar’s daughter which was held in two villages, Çamköy and Narlıca, in September, 1997 turned into an anti-gold mine protest in which banners against the mine were carried and gold-made wedding presents were forbidden in order to convey the message that gold is not an inevitable part of people’s daily lives. Another related symbolic protest regarding the daily use of gold was a campaign launched under the name of “Donate Your Gold Bracelets to the State” which was launched in January 2001. The aim was to collect one gold bracelet from each household in the Bergama villages and give the collected amount to the state which was calculated to meet the annual gains of the state from the mine. (www.ntvmsnbc.com, 29.01.2001).

The Bergama peasants held a picnic on May 18th, 1997 with the participation of thousands including peasants as well as anti-gold mine environmentalists, scientists, NGOs and politicians from different parts of Turkey. The purpose of this event dubbed “Before Cyanide Contaminated Its Waters” was to show symbolically what their life had been like in

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14 In fact, the bride said “NO” in the actual ceremony symbolizing the no to the mine. Fortunately, it did not prevent the marriage.
relation to the environment before the gold mine appeared in their region. During the picnic, a monument of “Epigraph of 17 Villages” was erected in Çamköy on which a summary of history of their struggle, environmental features of their region, and damage done to the environment was engraved (P/A 9; Radikal, 19.05.1997; Cumhuriyet, 19.05.1997).  

Additionally, the Bergama activists frequently resorted to stage symbolic acts resembling street theatres which belonged in the repertoires of action of feminist movement, peace movements and the Global Justice Movement in general. During these symbolic performances, they employed traditional cultural symbols as well as historical symbols and acts specific to Western societies. For instance, the Bergama peasants staged a street theatrical act by performing the symbolic act of putting tar and feathers on Eurogold executive manager Jack Testard, portrayed as a cowboy and chased out of their region (Kuzey Ege, 24.02.1997). In this protest, the Bergama activists borrowed the act of tarring and feathering which was perceived to be a part of their opponents’ cultural heritage since it originated in feudal Europe and American colonies.

Popular culture was used as a source for their themes and symbols. One striking example is the diffusion of a comic character as one of the symbols of the movement. In their accounts of the Bergama movement, the media attributed the name Obelix, a character from the French comic book called Asterix, to one of the Bergama activists showing him as one of the symbol of the movement (Hürriyet, 16.07.1999). Apart from the physical similarity of Bayram Çavuş, the storyline of the comic book revolving around the underlying theme of

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15 Please see Appendix G for the whole text.
16 The analogy drawn between Bayram Cavuş, a leading peasant activist, and the cartoon character Obelix was mainly caused by physical likeness, since Bayram Cavus, a moustached and overweight peasant wearing striped pyjamas during nudity protests, looked quite like Obelix. The media which is generally fond of using catchy and popular symbols in its framing, employed this analogy frequently and used ‘Obelix’ interchangeably with the Bergama peasants in many of their story headings such as “Obelix has worn his pyjamas” to indicate that the Bergama peasants have reinvigorated their protests (Sabah, 31.10.2000) and “Obelix from Bergama is Against Arbitration” to indicate the Bergama peasants resistance against the International Arbitration (Hurriyet, 17.07.1999). In a similar vein, Konyar was dubbed Asterix again because of his physical appearance and oppositional attitude.
resistance of a small village against the invasion of the Roman Empire was found to be parallel to the Bergama movement which was agreed by activists as well.

“It is the story of resistance of a small village in Galia against a huge power, the Roman Empire. There is [describing Obelix] the foolish looking, but strong hero” (P/A 15).

Discovering that it was found sympathetic by the public, the Bergama activists did not refute this media framing. On the contrary, Bayram Çavuş was brought to the frontlines of their protests. In fact, the use of a popular culture element, ‘Obelix’ as a symbol was not a strategic move of the Bergama activists calculated beforehand. Rather, it was a contingent development which was then seen as beneficiary for the movement (E/E 29). On the other hand, the use of popular culture has led to internal debates within the movement. For instance, one activist criticized Bayram Çavuş - Obelix analogy by saying that it led to reputation loss for the movement when peasants were likened to comic characters because it was diluting the significance of their cause (E/E 3).

On the other hand, they frequently used traditional cultural symbols in order not to alienate peasants and the general public form protests. In another street theatre protest, they performed the act of planting a fig tree as a symbol of demolishing the gold mine. They referred to the proverbial saying of “planting a fig tree at their home” which can be roughly translated as “we will destroy the homes of those who destroy ours” (Kuzey Ege, 24.02.1997). In May 1997, the peasants who wanted to display their faith in the success of their movement staged the “tin protest”. By playing tins as if they were drums, they symbolically celebrated the future departure of the TNC(s) and closure of the mine making a reference to the Turkish proverb of “playing tins after his/her departure” that means showing joy after someone is displaced or enforced to leave a position (Yeni Asır, 26.05.1997). In another performance act, peasants symbolically presented 17 types of zucchini which were produced in their region and

17 Obelix became a modular protest symbol which diffused to other movements in Turkey. The administrative head of Karasu village of Bartın in the north of Turkey appeared in the similar clothing and employed the name Obelix to convey the message that they would confront the planned fuel-oil power energy plant construction in Bartın like the Bergama peasants (Sabah, 09.04.2001).
sent it to İmren Aykut, former Minister of Environment, who said she was exhausted with the protests of the Bergama peasants by using proverbial saying “Bergama peasants gave the taste of zucchini” (P/A 27, 28; Milliyet, 28.07.1997; Reinart, 2003: 92-93). Overall, in comparison to more structured movements with SMOs, the Bergama movement’s repertoire of action was not always strategically established and controlled. As happened in the case of using Obelix as a symbol, coincidences and contingencies also played a part.

**Counter strategies of the pro-mine camp:**

**a. The TNCs in Bergama: Eurogold/Normandy/Newmont**

Eurogold was established as a joint venture on August 29th, 1989. Eurogold has a complex configuration of partners and shareholders. Initially, Eurogold was formed based on the partnership of two mining TNCs, namely Normandy-Poseidon and Metall Mining Corporation, respectively possessing 66.67% and 33.33% of the shares. The latter company is owned by Metallgesellschaft, a gigantic mining corporation originally based in Germany (Taşkın, 1998). The mining sector displays a very complex web-like structure at the global level in which numerous companies are affiliated with each other.\(^{18}\)

Throughout the process, shareholders of Eurogold themselves as well as partners’ shares in the joint venture have changed due to the changing trends in the global markets, Eurogold handing over to Normandy Poseidon which then turned over to Newmont Mining Corp.\(^{19}\) Finally, a Turkish company, Koza, has bought all the shares of the Ovacik mine from the world's largest gold producer Newmont Mining Corp for $44.5 million. Establishing a gold mining company called the Koza Altın Limited, the Turkish company has been producing gold and silver in the mine to this date.

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\(^{18}\) For instance, Posedion Gold (POSGOLD) is a unit of Normandy Mining. Other two minor partners in POSGOLD are AMP and Minorcor.

\(^{19}\) In 1994, shares changed hands altering the partnership structure of Eurogold. Between the year of 1994 and 1999, Normandy Poseidon/BRGM held 67% of the shares, and the remaining 33% of the shares belonged to Inmet Mining Corporation. In March 1999, Normandy bought the shares of Inmet Mining Corp, and the name of the operating company was changed to Normandy in 2000 (TMMOB, 2003; Taşkın, 2003). In February 2001, Normandy has sold the mine to Newmont Mining Corp. After running the mining related activities for 4 years, Newmont ended its operations in Ovacik and sold the mine to Koza.
Cyanide leach method is considered to be the most economically feasible method by the gold industry. Based on this method, first, ores are brought to the surface and crushed. Then crushed soil is put into heaps and washed with cyanide. The chemical solution is collected at the bottom of heaps and sent to a mill where gold and silver are separated. However, it is not only the gold which is decomposed as a result of this process, but heavy metals found in soil including lead, zinc, arsenic, copper, and others are also released. Combined with the large amounts of cyanide used, these heavy metal complexes constitute the waste sludge produced by the cyanide leach method.

b. Strategies and activities of the pro-mine network:

“If it is a chess game, we are one of the players. We know how to play chess. We might not be as strong. Still, we know our strength” (E/E 3).

As stated by one of the Bergama activists, movements are like a chess game in which activists and their opponents on each side determine their strategies, envisage their adversaries’, and make moves and countermoves. In other words, they are strategy based incidents in which moves of each set of actors are interdependent. The Bergama activists set their strategies and decided on tactics with the aim of forestalling the gold mine. On the other hand, they adapted their actions to the changing circumstances which were partly shaped by the acts of their opponents. Therefore, it is crucial to understand which tactics and strategies TNC(s) followed throughout the process.

The pro-mine camp consisting of the mining TNC(s) as well as journalists, scientists, civil society organizations, and politicians endeavoured to prove that the gold mine was risk free and, subsequently, to undermine the anti-mine movement. As the major actor of this camp, the TNC(s) employed various tactics ranging from more conventional acts revolving around building good relations with locals and gaining the trust of the general public to more specific acts such as staging symbolic acts, distributing incentives and organizing a counter-movement. Starting with the latter set of activities, the strategy of convincing the local
population through providing benefits occupied a central position within the TNC(s)’ repertoires of action. For that purpose, Eurogold’s initial activities were concentrated on building good relations with the peasants through implementing social responsibility projects which would benefit all the villagers. Eurogold renovated village mosques, built facilities for public use like wedding houses, and improved sewage and water supply systems (P/A 9, 11). In doing that, miners targeted the villagers as a whole community and tried to convince them that living standards would be improved with the operation of the gold mine. Additionally, temporary incentives were also offered by the mining company. Building on peasants’ traditional/religious values, Eurogold organized large dinners during fasting times (Ramadan) and provided sacrificial animals for cheaper prices during the religious holiday of sacrifice (P/A 5, 15, 27; Kuzey Ege, 05.01.1998, 19.01.1998, 02.02.1998).

Eurogold recognized the importance of coffeehouses and placed them at the centre of its public relations efforts. For instance, in order to promote their mine project and get the consent of the villagers, Eurogold proposed to repair and improve coffeehouses. As part of their promotional strategy, the corporation constructed a modern wedding house just within the perimeters of the garden of the village coffeehouse at Çamköy. However, the villagers interpreted the act as a form of ‘charity’ and, moreover, as bribery through which Eurogold intended to ‘buy’ them.

“One day the executive manager of Eurogold came here….He told us that they wanted to build a mosque…They made a promise of building our roads…I asked “Why do you plan to do it here? What is our significance?” We already had our drinking water. However, Bozköy which is across that hill did not. I said “If you are doing a favour, go and do it over there. They need it”. Or Alacalı [another village] needed a new mosque. He talked about job opportunities and school. I said “Go to the South East [of Turkey]. They have none of these”. It was a give and take relationship. He said “we have business with you”. After that incident, I completely lost my trust in the miners” (P/A 11).
As a response, the Çamköy villagers used the building for the wedding house for their own purposes in relation to their struggle against the gold mine, and they turned the building into a library where they stored their documents and archives (P/A 5, 11).

As a result of the escalation of the anti-mine movement, Eurogold made a tactical change which was furthered by successive TNC(s). They began to approach peasants on an individual basis rather than treating them as a community. The mining company offered jobs and money to individuals who were perceived as influential key figures in their villages (P/A 1, 11, 30). Furthermore, TNC(s) put some peasants on payroll even though they did not work in the mine (P/A 8, 15, 28).

“Narlıca [village] was the focal point. They [the miners] called their muhtar and told him that it was over… They gave him a job in the mine. They also employed 35-40 men close to him. Then, Narlıca broke up” (P/A 15).

Interviewees commonly considered TNC(s)’ acts of distributing selective incentives as effective in terms of achieving the goal of undermining their movement. Divisions were created among peasants starting with Narlıca village which was one of the most active in protests. In that sense, it was the beginning of the end (P/A 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 28).

In a similar vein, TNC(s) played on the political preferences of villagers in order to create cleavages within the movement. For that purpose, the TNC(s) formed an executive board consisting of people with left wing orientations after figuring out that most of the Alevi villagers were politically left-leaning.

“They came to me and said ‘You are a social democrat. We are as well. Let us give you money and work together in collaboration. Let’s take your men from your village, too’” (P/A 15).

Another tactic used by TNC(s) was to stage performative acts to dispense with doubts about the hazardous risks of the mine. Several managers including the chief executive of Normandy drank the water taken from the tailing pond at a press conference in order to prove

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20 By the time interviews were conducted, the building was emptied and was not being used due to internal conflicts within the movement. Documents and archives were taken by one of the peasant activists and displayed at his house.

21 Peasants blamed the company for sending researchers who worked for the company allegedly in order to analyze the social and economic structure of villages. With the data obtained, influential individuals like muhtars, religious leaders, and other people with high status were identified, and they became the key targets of the TNC(s) (P/A 4, 9).
the cleanness of waste water and the effectiveness of the filtration system. Furthermore, during the same event, a couple of peasants who were working at the mine swam in the tailing pond to display that it was harmless to human health (Radikal, 13.07.2001; Radikal, 14.07.2001). Also, ducks were brought to the mine to settle in the tailing pond to show that there was no harm to living species around the mine pit.

Another move of the TNC(s) was to organize and support a pro-mine mobilization among the Bergama peasants. On the same day that the Bergama peasants were staging their protests on the Bosporus Bridge for the second time, about 360 peasants who were working at the mine and their families marched on the streets of Bergama demanding that the mine should not be closed. The demonstration which was organized by a conservative mining workers’ trade union, Maden-İş, was named as ‘The Most Environmentally Friendly Gold Mine Should Continue Operating’. Pro-mine peasants, mostly activists in the Bergama movement previously, indicated that they were after their livelihood and wanted to contribute to the economy of the country by continuing to extract gold (Radikal, 26.03.1997; Milliyet, 27.03.1997). When the mine was closed temporarily in 2004 (at the time owned by Normandy), workers from the mine formed a short-lived counter-movement. Calling themselves “Matrix miners”, pro-mine peasants staged several protests and met with the Bergama movement’s lawyers. They claimed that the mine was closed as a result of Lemke, Konyar and Özay’s complaints. In their protests, they aimed to convey the message that not all peasants in Bergama were against the mine, and some of them became the victims of the anti-mine movement since they lost their jobs (Milliyet, 01.09.2004; Radikal, 01.09.2004; Hurriyet, 02.09.2004; Kuzey Ege, 04.10.2004).

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22 Two of these peasants were diagnosed with cancer in the following years. The Bergama peasants took cancer cases as a proof for the hazards of the gold mine waste.
23 The Bergama activists questioned the “duck operation” by saying that the ducks were the species most resistant to the impacts of cyanide (E/E 3; P/A 5, 9).
24 In order to show their grievance symbolically, counter-movement activists shaved their heads and wore black sun-glasses provided by the mine for security purposes at work. They claimed they employed those black glasses as their symbol like it was used by the characters in the movie “Matrix” which implied that they were living in a similar condition of distorted reality as depicted in the film (Hurriyet, 02.09.2004).
Additionally, TNC(s) pursued a wide range of regular public relations activities to gain trust and legitimacy. These TNC activities consisted of issuing press releases, giving ads to newspapers, and organizing conferences and symposiums over gold mining. The main objective in these events was to show the safety of gold mining and the economic benefits it would have brought. The underlined themes consisted of the legal status of the Ovacık gold mine based on permits and approvals of the Turkish government ministries, minimized risks associated with cyanide leach method and its widespread use around the world, and their respect for local population’s concerns and demands (Turkish Daily News, 27.04.1997).

Diversions from the main strategy of non-violence:

Protests of the Bergama activists achieved high levels of success in terms of obtaining the attention of the media and the public. Their repertoire of contention was enriched with innovative elements which were harmoniously combined with conventional elements. Furthermore, the Bergama activists achieved consistency over the strategies of non-violent civil disobedience. Yet, there have been a small number of incidents in which violence was used by some sections among the activists. First, the peasants were accused of using acts of ludditism and vandalism by entering the mine and overturning two trucks, burning an ambulance, and breaking computers and furniture belonging to Eurogold when they put the mine pit under siege in order to prevent the arrival of cyanide tanks (Turkish Daily News, 03.07.1997). However, there was no clear evidence that it was the peasants who practiced vandalism, and the peasants continuously rejected the alleged vandalism acts claiming it was a ‘provocative’ set up organized by Eurogold.  

Second, a public relations office of Eurogold was bombed in İzmir on July 19th, 1997, which caused physical damage, but no casualties (Milliyet, 20.07.1997). Eurogold authorities

25 In the end, 7 villagers were taken into custody by the gendarmerie. In their defence, they claimed that they neither damaged any property of the mine nor clashed with the police forces. They argued that the law was on their side in any case and there was no need for any violence. The villagers argued that they were only protesting the continuing activities of the mine. Moreover, they claimed the process of custody was ‘one-sided’ and ‘arbitrary’.

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accused the Bergama activists, claiming that illegal radical left-wing groups infiltrated the movement and, furthermore, that some activists were deliberately collaborating with them. However, the Bergama peasants rejected the claims, as stated in the words of Taşkın in a press conference:

“The Bergama people are utterly against violence. However, the just cause of Bergama movement is being stigmatized by provocations which we believe are circulated by Eurogold. We condemn the bombing incident regardless of whoever did it. We perceive it as an act of provocation. We find the suggestion that the Bergama peasant movement is being infiltrated by some underground organizations absurd” (Sabah, 21.09.1997).

In order to ward off accusations and symbolically clarify their absolute preference for non-violence, the Bergama peasants visited the Eurogold Office in İzmir and brought flowers to Eurogold to condemn the attack. Yet, concomitantly, they did not refrain from protesting Eurogold by staging a picket in front of the Eurogold office during their visit (Sabah, 21.09.1997).

However, these violent acts were relatively minor considering the duration and scope of the movement. Protest activities such as invasion, blockades, and demonstrations which meant physical confrontation with opponents are usually open to such diversions in strategies. However, violence was continuously rejected as a consequence of discussions among themselves as well as Konyar’s efforts.

“When we invaded the mine site as thousands, we had fuel-oil tins in our hands. We said “Chief, let’s burn the place down” [to Oktay Konyar]. He said “No!”. We, as thousands, could have torn down the mine. But we trusted law and we did not” (Kurhan in Reinart 2003:70).

Also, the Bergama activists were highly meticulous about how far they breached laws during their protests. As part of their civil disobedience strategy, they violated certain laws, but these acts did not have permanent impacts, and they did not give physical damage to public or private property or endanger any lives. Rather, they opted for disrupting public life and state practices temporarily. The acts of violating laws were used as specific means to direct attention to the legal and political injustices that they were living through. Hence, they
lingered at the borders of legality - breaching laws to a certain extent, but also basing their actions on their constitutional rights and, in that sense, not completely shedding legality. Their demonstrations had an illegal aspect since they usually did not attain permissions for their demonstrations needed for the protests to be ‘legal’ according to the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations, as stated above. On the other hand, apart from disrupting the public life shortly, they did not resort to any illegal acts during the protests. Training provided by the lawyers form Izmir was a crucial enabling factor for the peasants to keep their actions within the boundaries of non-violent disobedience since the lawyers lectured the peasants about the loopholes in the law. The “Kuvay-ı Milliye march” to Çanakkale exemplifies how the Bergama peasants deliberately and strategically chose to violate laws when they found it necessary. In November, 2000, 62 Bergama peasants marched to the city of Çanakkale, about 300 kilometres away from Bergama, which took 8 days. The main goal of this particular march was to visit the martyrdom in Çanakkale and symbolically draw attention to their action of defending their land. During the march, they solely walked on the safety lane in a disciplined way without blocking the vehicle traffic in order to undermine any interventions of state forces (P/A 26).

When the general course of the protest activities are evaluated, thematic demonstrations occurred as large scale demonstrations with the participation of large numbers of peasants displaying Tilly’s (2004) concept of WUNC (worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment) strikingly. However, throughout the movement, numbers of demonstrators started declining. Rather, more unconventional protest forms were staged on more frequent basis. The eventual decline of peasants’ participation in protests is perceived to have some detrimental effects on the course of the movement. According to a number of interviewees, the decrease in numbers has resulted in loss of their legitimacy and effectiveness in the eyes of the public and authorities. This was mainly due to the belief that the decrease in numbers of
villagers led the public to think that the Bergama movement was a marginalized action of the few:

“With the gradual shrinking of protests from many buses full of peasants to one bus events, credibility of the movement declined... Also peasants are directed to take part in all sorts of protests which are not related to our cause. In principle, we support those local populations all. But, why do you actively go to Muğla and engage in a protest against road construction in Muğla?” (E/E 3).

Yet, it would be misleading to treat organizational structures and repertoires of contention as static elements. They were all affected by framing processes and interpretations of changing political opportunities. Due to changes in their opponents’ strategies and counter-framing as well as alterations in opportunities, organizational structures and movement strategies and tactics underwent changes which will be discussed in the following chapters.
Chapter 5: Framing of the Bergama Movement

As in all social movements, framing processes through which social movement actors formulate and set their shared meaning over their grievance constitute a crucial place in the Bergama movement. Accordingly, the Bergama movement activists were continuously engaged in the work of framing, defining the causes of their aggrieved issue, finding solutions to problems at stake, and generating discourses to convince people to mobilize. In doing that, they aimed to construct a coherent and convincing set of values and meanings for themselves as well as for bystanders and opponents. In this way, movement activists were able to “construct a discourse oriented towards convincing citizens of their legitimate reasons for protest” (della Porta and Piazza, 2008: 58). In the mean time, the Bergama activists also constructed their identity and that of their adversaries through these discourses. All these different dimensions of framing done by the activists affected other aspects of their movement, so that mobilization, evaluation of opportunities, and choice of strategies and tactics were being shaped in direct relation to established frames. On the other hand, the Bergama activists’ opponents, i.e. the TNC(s) and the state, as well as bystanders and the media also rendered their own frames about the contended issue of gold mining. Each set of actors tried to accentuate their own frame which resulted in a fierce frame competition. As the Bergama activists were faced with counter-frames and counter-strategies of their opponents, they constantly adjusted, adopted, and modified their own frames throughout the movement which was also reflected in the corresponding changes in their organizational structures, strategies and tactics. In addition to the competition with their opponents, the Bergama peasants went through an intense process of deliberation over their frames among themselves which sometimes led to intra-movement conflicts. Therefore, framing processes of the Bergama movement played out in a highly competitive, interactive and, resultantly, dynamic fashion in which discursive, strategic, and contended framing processes identified by framing
theory transpired as movement participants deliberated on who they were, what they opposed, and what they wanted through various framing strategies such as frame amplification and frame bridging. In the following pages, I present an analysis of the Bergama movement’s collective identity construction and framing processes by discussing diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames produced by the activists. I also examine the framing of capitalist globalization of the Bergama activists separately in order to understand how local contention was linked to macro-structural processes.

Collective Identities of the Bergama Activists:

Identity construction was a difficult matter for the Bergama movement given the highly complex structure of the extensive Bergama network which contained a multiplicity of actors from diversified social, economic and political backgrounds. In order to maintain a coherent collective identity, values and concerns of each participant had to become congruent. It was one of the major concerns of the activists to construct an inclusive collective identity which would allow a wide participation. In order to achieve that, peasants were brought to the centre of the movement as the victims who would be adversely affected by the gold mine, and the movement was referred to as a ‘peasant’s movement’ by all activists participating in the network. Apart from the discursively prevalent ‘peasant’ identity, activists coming from outside the Bergama villages commonly identified themselves as environmentalists – of any kind- which was also constituent in the construction of peasant activists’ collective identity. Hence, the collective identity of the Bergama movement was composed of a multiplicity of identities built on some shared values such as environmentalism and democracy.

The initial step was to differentiate adherents and opponents of the movement, i.e. the process of naming “us” vs. “them”. Basically, peasants identified themselves as a local community whose land, environment and, hence, health and livelihood were endangered. More specifically, they presented themselves as peasants who were defending their land and
environment against the attacks of some external intruders, i.e. TNC(s). Therefore, they emphasized communitarian and territorial aspects of their struggle in their definitions of who they were.

As in the case of many local movements, communitarian-based collective identities usually transcend cleavages of class, gender, ethnicity, or religion (della Porta and Piazza, 2008: 59). This general trend was also relevant in the Bergama movement. Accordingly, strong local communitarian commitments overcame social cleavages of religion, ethnicity, and gender. With respect to their ethnic backgrounds, villagers were highly diversified, consisting of second or third generation immigrants from Bulgaria (Pomaks), the former Yugoslavia (Boşnaks), Albania, and Salonika as well as nomadic Turks (Yörük) who had been settled in the region centuries ago (P/A 24, 27; Taşkın in Reinart, 2003: 53). Peasants’ religious backgrounds were similarly diverse. Even though villagers were overwhelmingly Muslim, they were divided into two sects of Islam as Alevi and Sunnis. Alevi and Sunni populations have been spatially divided since members of each sect resided in the separate villages established as either Sunni or Alevi villages. Out of all the villages participated in the movement, 3 of them - Narlıca, Tepeköy, and Pınarköy- were exclusively Alevi villages where community life has been predominantly organized along Alevi beliefs, ideas, values and teachings (P/A 9, 11, 15). ¹ In fact, when the general political and social structures of Turkey with respect to Alevi-Sunni relations are considered, there are certain historically rooted political and cultural impediments against Sunni-Alevi collaboration. As a community with distinct traits and social organizations, Alevi had been involved in various struggles against the domination of Sunni rule in history. Cultural differences remained the same during the secular republican rule which worked as a source of unrest and conflict between Sunnis

¹ Alevism is a different sect in Islam. It is a branch of heterodox Islam which combines Islam with the nomadic Turkish culture in the 16th century. The Ottoman state, considering the Alevi population a deviation from Islam, tried to control and suppresses it constantly. The Alevi population became advocates of the Kemalist regime and secular order since they are seen as safety check mechanisms against Sunni Islamic rule. Today, the Alevi population makes up 15-20% of the general population in Turkey (Yavuz, 2005: 96-100).
and Alevis throughout Turkey. However, in the case of the Bergama movement, the Alevi villagers participated in the mobilization against the mine shoulder to shoulder with the Sunni villagers. It was commonly agreed that the peasants from three Alevi villages were the most active and radical protestors - both by Alevi peasants and their fellow Sunni activists (E/E 2, 11; P/A 11, 17, 22, 24, 25).

Firstly, the absence of prior conflicts between different ethnic and religious groups in the region facilitated the unification of Sunni and Alevi villagers over the same cause.

“It [the movement] improved solidarity and friendship relations among peasants. Pınarköy, Tepeköy and Narlıca are Alevi villages. Camköy, Sağancı, Aşağıkirkızlar, Ovacık, Süleymanlı are Sunni villages. Until that point [when the movement started], there was no soreness between those villages. Yet, on top of that, those [good] relations became stronger” (P/A 15).

Secondly, the issue of environment itself cut across any social cleavages. As a result of Taşkıın’s and his friends’ initial efforts of informing the peasants about the environmental risks of gold mining, the peasants who had deep connections with land and agriculture arrived at the conclusion that their soil, water, and, subsequently, their livelihood were under threat. Since it was a matter which concerned all villagers regardless of religious sect or ethnicity, these social cleavages were easily transcended. One of the interviewees described this transcendental character of their contention by saying “When it is a matter of life and death, there is no Alevism or Sunnism. The mine will affect us all” (P/A 15).

2 From a historical point of view, Alevis in general have been marginalized and dominated by the Sunni rule which resulted in major social and political tensions and struggles both during the Ottoman Empire, and the Turkish Republican period. Accordingly, the contemporary Alevi identity is constructed by referring to numerous Alevi uprisings in history. There have been two violent public outbursts against the Alevis during the 1990s. A Sunni group set a hotel on fire where famous Alevi intellectuals were staying in Sivas in 1993 and 37 people were killed. Another major clash occurred between police forces and inhabitants of Alevi neighbourhood, Gazi mahalles, in İstanbul in 1995.

3 It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the reasons for the lack of a legacy of religious based conflicts in the region.

4 Konyar’s familial background with both Sunni and Alevi lineages was also a factor which facilitated coalition building among Sunnis and Alevis. As underlined by one of the Greenpeace activists involved in the movement, having both Alevi-Kurdish and Sunni-Turkish origins made it easier for Konyar who was an influential figure for the mobilization of the villagers to approach peasants from different ethnic and religious origins equally even though he had an exclusively secular attitude throughout the movement (E/E 29).
On the other hand, collective identity is a strategically reconstructed phenomenon contingent upon the circumstances that activists face (Griggs and Howarth, 2002). As such, the already existing ‘peasant’ identity was reshaped based on the conditions of mobilization, along the lines of environmentalism. By highlighting their close relation with the environment, the peasants described themselves as inhabitants of the land, living in peace with nature and depending on soil and water for their livelihood. They also attributed themselves agency in protecting their land and environment as their genuine owners (P/A 3, 8, 11). Additionally, they claimed to be the guardians of historically significant region Pergamon, Bergama’s ancient antecedent. By referring to the great contributions made to humanity in Pergamon such as paper produced by Alexandrians, they emphasized that they were peasants who were defending a legacy of humanity instead of being backward minded locals rejecting modern technology (see Appendix G).

They also specifically described themselves as “peaceful” in order to indicate that they were the victims of external attacks (by the TNCs) rather than troublemakers (see Appendix G). The transformation of the “peasant” identity could be discerned in the way they attributed negative characteristics to their pre-movement peasant identity. They described their pre-mobilization selves as submissive, ignorant, and coward villagers. However, in their redefined peasant identity, they were fellow citizens entitled to citizenship rights and confident in their efficacy in influencing political decisions (P/A 5, 7, 11).

On the other hand, they identified their opponents as anyone who supported gold mining with the cyanide leach method. They saw the TNC(s) as their major opponent as the primary source of their grievance. Additionally, sections of the state which facilitated TNC(s) as well as pro-mine scientists, journalists, and engineers who supported the Ovacik gold mine project were defined as their opponents. Overall, profit-orientation with no regard to the costs
to the environment and human life was highlighted as the main point of divergence between opponents and themselves:

“Worldviews are different. They chose making money. And we chose life” (P/A 15).

Collective identity is directly related to the interests and values of a social movement group since identities are built on and shaped by the interests and values of participants. The Bergama activists’ interests were transformed due to changing conditions. As indicated in the previous chapter, the Bergama peasants overwhelmingly believed that gold mining would serve their material interests since they were expecting economic gains. However, as a result of interactions with the anti-mine activists like Taşkin, scientists, environmentalists and lawyers, they took a contrary position by prioritizing cyanide related risks over economic gains from the mine. This time, they advocated that the closing of mine would serve their interests. Hence, the collective interest(s) of the Bergama activists was redefined due to changing circumstances – such as becoming better informed at this particular instant.

Bergama peasants attributed uniqueness to their movement and identity when comparing themselves with peasant movements in general. Notwithstanding the explicitly enunciated peasant character of their movement, they made clear distinctions between themselves and other peasant movements such as the long duration of their movement, the sustainability of their mobilization, the multiplicity of their issues, and the universalistic approach that they upheld. Accordingly, one peasant activist stated that:

“The Bergama movement lasted for 13 years [setting the starting date as 1989 when Eurogold first arrived in the region]. Maybe you can’t find that anywhere around the world. It lasted long. I think it is a success.....No protest lasted for 13 years. Peasants are the most ignorant sections of a society. They are the last ones to march. There is usually no consciousness among peasants. So, it takes courage to attain that consciousness and stage protests” (P/A 11).
In a similar vein, one of spokesperson of the movement underlined their differences form other peasant movements elsewhere:

“There are many differences between us and other peasant movements. First, they are not widespread. They have conflicts over land issues or agricultural controversies with their governments. In terms of the way they do their movements, those movements do not last long. They protest for a couple of times” (E/E 2).

Local environmental movements entail characteristics which make them more prone to becoming Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) movements since their interests and orientations might easily be formulated along parochial and egoistical lines (Della Porta and Piazza, 2008; Snow and Soule, 2010). In other words, local environmental resistances which are mobilized over issues of Locally-Unwanted-Land-Use (LULUs), mostly reject large development projects in order to protect their own territory instead of pursuing universal principles of environmentalism that extend to similar projects elsewhere. Yet, despite its communitarian approach, the Bergama movement did not turn into a NIMBY movement. In their goals which were clear, specific and coherent, the Bergama activists aspired to close down the gold mine in their region in order to protect their territory and community. However, they did not remain parochial in terms of their goals and interests as the focus of the movement included local, national and global levels in congruence with the enmeshment of these spheres under the capitalist globalization.\(^5\) They frequently announced that they opposed similar projects which were planned in other parts of Turkey as well as the world.

Besides, they did not restrict their contention solely to the issue of gold-mining. The Bergama peasants staged protests and gave support to other movements over numerous issues. They participated in the peace movement network formed at the national level in Turkey against the war on Iraq, taking part in the peace demonstrations (Bianet, 11.04.2003; Bianet, 10.11.2004). Concerned about the controversial development projects in the South-eastern part of Turkey, they forged solidarity links with the mobilization against the Ilısu dam

\(^5\) Please see chapter 2.
construction which would submerge the ancient town of Hasankeyf in the South-eastern part of Turkey. They supported the activists from Munzur, Tunceli in the opposition of the latter to dam constructions and gold mining exploration work (Bianet, 05.06.2001). They also joined forces with anti-nuclear activists resisting the nuclear power plant project planned in Akkuyu, Mersin, participating in anti-nuclear demonstrations (Sabah, 29.03.1998). On October 16th, 1997, the Bergama peasants and Konyar visited one of the villages of İzmir, Efemçukuru, where another gold mine project was planned. The purpose of this visit was to inform and warn the peasants about the hazards and risks of gold mining and to initiate an anti-gold mine mobilization in Efemçukuru as well (Yeni Asır, 17.10.1997; Gazete Ege, 17.10.1997). A group of Bergama peasants were among the marchers in the May 1st celebrations of year 2002 in Istanbul (Radikal, 02.05.2002). Bergama peasants also showed solidarity with anti-gold-mine movements outside their national territories such as the anti-mine contention in Salonika, Greece. Therefore, even though they preserved their identity as a community, they also linked their struggle to various contentions taking place outside their local territory. In that sense, they did not limit themselves to their local and immediate interests, but expanded their contention to other issues and geographies. The Bergama activists were able to link themselves to a greater collective ‘we’ of a general environmental movement and anti-capitalist globalization. In doing that they shifted the scale of their movement to national and transnational levels and addressed a multiplicity of issues.

6 In a demonstration organized by the People of Tunceli Association in Istanbul, a group of Bergama peasants protested together with the Munzur activists in Istanbul, and they jointly sent a fax to the Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, demanding the cancellation of the dam projects in the Munzur Valley. During the protest, Konyar stated: “We are the real owners of this country…. Only Munzur or Bergama is not sufficient. We should multiply. We should claim lands and freedom of this country” (Bianet, 11.06.2001). In turn, activists in Dersim also supported the Bergama movement in their own protests by expressing their opposition to the Ovacık gold mine project (Cumhuriyet, 06.02.2005).

7 In the speech he made during their visit to Efemçukuru, Konyar said: “Until now, we staged over 80 protests just for Bergama. However, from now on, we will extend our protests to other places that are contaminated with cyanide, and we will raise consciousness among the people living in those places. We will enlighten people about the issue of cyanide” (Yeni Asır, 17.10.1997).

8 Diani (2003) indicates that social movements as networks differ from campaign coalitions and more particularistic NIMBY movements based on their construction of their shared and meaningful collective identities. In that regard, social movement actors renounce their particularities and link themselves to a broader
This transcendental aspect of their contention also enabled them to connect to other activists outside villages. In this way, the Bergama was able to become a huge network of networks entailing social movement actors from the urban segments of civil society who were predominantly university educated middle class people advocating ecological concerns in and criticizing the capitalist globalization. These sub-networks were connected to each other through several underlying themes and values such as environmentalism, democratization, and criticism of capitalist globalization. Based on these shared interests and values, a multiplicity of identities became articulated to each other. In other words, actors with various identities were gathered under an inclusive general collective “we”, which revolved around environmentalism, democratization and opposition to the capitalist globalization and served as a common denominator within the Bergama movement.

Opponents’ framing: What the TNCs say

When the Ovacık gold mine project was first announced, gold mining was an alien topic for the local population in Bergama. Eurogold, the TNC which initiated the project, came along with its own description of gold mining and its meaning for the region, producing the primary frames over the Ovacık gold mine. Therefore, issues of cyanide-based gold mining was introduced to the Bergama people through the frames of Eurogold. It was only then that the Bergama activists started developing their own frames in opposition to their opponents’. Hence we start with the analysis of frames of TNCs.

From the beginning, Eurogold tried to convince and get the support of the local population in order to pre-empt any resistance to their project. With that purpose, they intended to create a positive impression of the gold mine among the locals. Accordingly, TNC(s) defined the Ovacık gold mine as a ‘beneficial’ project in economic terms without collective ‘we’. In this way, “[e]vents which could otherwise be the result of ad hoc coalitions and expressions of NIMBY orientations would then acquire a new meaning and be perceived as part of a larger, and longer-term, collective effort” (Diani, 2003: 303).
having any harms to the environment. These promises and claims were repeatedly expressed by the successive TNCs. TNCs repeatedly emphasized their frames through ads, press releases, brochures and conferences with the objective of undermining the emerging anti-mine movement. Other actors of the pro-mine camp including the members of the government, politicians, miners’ associations, and pro-mine journalists, engineers, and scientists also shared and expressed the frames of the TNCs.

In the accounts of TNCs, three major issues were predominantly stressed: the prospects for economic development, the environmental safety of the gold mine and services to the community. First, according to the claims TNCs, gold mining would bring considerable economic prosperity to Bergama and Turkey in general. The economic contribution by the Ovacık gold mine was proposed as high as 415 million dollars locally and 675 million dollars to the national economy, including the value added (Normandy, 2000: 7). Apart from the general contributions to the local and national economy, the TNCs as well as other proponents of the Ovacık gold mine recurrently stressed immediate economic gains for the local population. In their press releases and advertisements, the TNC(s) the gold mine promised new job opportunities for the local population which would resultantly decrease the unemployment rates in the region. It was argued that the Ovacık gold mine was already beneficial for the local economy since 340 people were employed during the initial construction and all the construction work of the mine site and related facilities was carried out by local and regional contractors. They promised at least 240 job opportunities at least 80% of which would be allocated to the locals when the mine started its operations. Additionally, they argued that four additional jobs would be created for one job opening with the ‘flow-on effects” according to their estimations (Normandy, 2000: 7).

Second, TNCs also underlined the harmlessness of the cyanide leach method to the environment. The argument of ‘environmentally-friendly mining’ was not among the initial
frames of TNCs (E/E 3). However, with the rise of scientific challenges put together by the efforts of Taşkın, chambers, and scientists, Eurogold and its successors incorporated ‘environmentally-friendly’ gold mining into their framing as opposition to the gold mine project mounted. Executives of the companies and other members of the pro-mine camp argued that as long as advanced technologies were used, risks were minimized with respect to environmental and human health. More specifically, they claimed that the risks of cyanide and waste leakages were minimized with the impermeable layer; wastes would contain minimum amounts of heavy metals; and there was a low risk of contamination of underground waters. Also, they added that the levels of dust produced during blasting, excavation, and transportation, noise pollution, and any damages during an earthquake were minimized with the available technology. In that sense, TNCs argued that the environmental and agricultural activities would not be damaged, with the further promise to rehabilitate the mine site after the closure of the mine (Normandy, 2000).

Finally, the third set of claims revolved around proposed services which would be made available to the local community such as health care and housing provided by the TNCs (Normandy, 2000). In sum, throughout the process, it was recurrently argued by the TNCs that cyanide leach method which was used worldwide had no alternatives, and its risks to environmental and human health were minimized with the introduction of state-of-the-art technologies.

In order to make these claims more valid and reliable, they got support from various pro-mine actors such as politicians, scientists, and civil society organizations. For instance, former Australian Environment Minister, Ross Kelly, announced that “[t]his [the Ovacık gold mine] will be the Rolls Royce of mines- the best in the world” with respect to the environment in a press interview in Istanbul (Turkish Daily News, 16.05.1997). At the same time, pro-mine CSOs carried active roles in terms of promoting the cyanide-based gold mining. The Turkish
Mining Development Foundation (YMGV) organized a seminar with the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs Division for Economic and Social Development and Natural Resources Management, Natural Resources, and Environment Branch in İzmir in 1997. It was indicated by the YMGV that the seminar was for “consultation” purposes over the topic of gold mining which had until then been discussed without “scientific and technological basis” in their invitation letter sent to Taşkın (YMGV, 1997). This conference was seen as an attempt to convey pro-mine frames in order to convince the Turkish government and the UN that local people would not be harmed throughout the gold mining process in Ovacık. All these efforts were complemented with the ‘legality’ argument. TNC authorities constantly claimed that their activities were legal, and they complied with Turkish laws and democratic procedures in their operations (Cumhuriyet, 21.12.1996; Kuzey Ege, 15.04.1996).

The TNC(s) extensively used the local and national media in order to voice their frames. One of the methods used by TNC(s) for that purpose was to place advertisements in newspapers. Within these ads, various symbols and cultural codes were employed in order to make their frames resonant with the Bergama peasants’ values and beliefs. This was evidently discerned in the Eurogold advertisements placed in the local newspapers at the earlier stages of the process. The objectives in placing these ads were to build better relations with the local population and to prevent the transformation of growing discontent about the mine into a massive resistance. In the ads, the commonly used advertisement slogan was “Now is the harvest time for gold”. With this slogan, Eurogold referred to cultural values and traits of peasants and made an analogy between agriculture and gold production. By using familiar cultural symbols, Eurogold tried to make their interpretation of gold mining resonant with the peasants’ cognitive understanding. Eurogold stated that peasants would collect the economic

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9 In a press release, Jack Testard, the executive manager of Eurogold, underlined the fact that the operation of the mine was permitted by 7 governments and 11 ministries in Turkey giving approval with 700 signatures (Kuzey Ege, 15.04.1996).
gains from the gold mine as if they were in a harvest, but this time more economic value would be created.

More specifically, in one of Eurogold’s ads, they showed two drawings of the location of the mine portraying before and after images in order to underline these economic benefits. In the pre-mine drawing, there was a hill surrounded only by trees and the pastoral life pursued by the peasants around the hill was depicted. In the image representing the aftermath of the construction of the mine, the hill was missing. The phrase read “That hill no longer exists. It turned into evil eye bead (*nazark*) for our babies, bracelets for our girls, job opportunities for our boys, food for households, and economic gain for our country” (Kuzey Ege, 15.08.1995). In doing that, Eurogold claimed that production of gold by consuming the hill on which the gold mine is built increases local welfare more than pastoral life, and it leads to economic prosperity and development of the region as symbolized by the houses built in the second drawing. In a similar vein, the TNC(s) enriched their argument by claiming that the operation of the Ovacık gold mine would mean development of the region and Turkey, i.e. sustainable development, by bringing forth the idea of the “catching-up” thesis. In one of their ads, the Eurogold asserted that that the prosperity and welfare of developed countries which rested upon gold could also be achieved in Turkey by using ‘advanced’ gold mining technologies which would not risk human health or the environment (Kuzey Ege, 01.09.1995).

In another advertisement, coining the phrase “[c]ontrolled use of pesticides for a good harvest will not harm human health”, Eurogold attempted to convey the message that the careful use of cyanide in the mine would prevent detrimental impacts, while bringing prosperity (Kuzey Ege, 01.08.1995). TNCs also used symbols of nationalism such as Turkish flags and pictures of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in order to gain the sympathy of the Bergama peasants and the general public, thereby indicating that their activities were in the interests of
the nation. Yet, these acts of TNC(s) were evaluated as deceptions by the Bergama peasants (P/A 5).

Overall, when asserting their own interpretation of the Ovacık gold mine, TNCs viewed the Bergama movement as the mobilization of ‘ignorant’ peasants who were misinformed and misdirected by several ‘ill-intentioned’ local politicians pursuing their own interests (E/E 3). On the other hand, the Bergama activists were involved in the intense work of producing their own frames in order to invalidate the claims of TNCs about gold mining and their movement.

**Master-frames of environmentalism and human rights:**

Throughout the Bergama movement, activists employed two master frames, ‘environmentalism’ and ‘human rights’ on which they constructed their diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames. Primary frames of the Bergama activists revolved around environmentalism since they were concerned about the risks of environmental degradation. Yet, they did not use environmentalism in its conservationist sense. Rather than aspiring only to protect the environment, they struggled over how the environment should be used without disturbing the ecological system.

Bergama activists described themselves as a part of the ecological system whose livelihood and lives depended on nature. Accordingly, any disruptions and interventions in nature would have endangered their lives as well as other species’ (P/A 1, 9, 11; Kurhan in Reinart, 2003: 195; Yoldaş in Reinart, 2003: 191).

I was born in Ovacık [one of the Bergama villages]. I grew up in Ovacık. In winter times, we were cold and freezing, but we did not cut even one branch of these pine trees. We ran out of money. We didn’t cut. We did not let any others cut them. We guarded those trees. Pine tree means life; it provides air [oxygen]. [However] they [miners] cut off thousands of them” (Ümaç in Reinart, 2003: 45).

As this quotation reveals, peasants’ material interests rested upon the ecological system, and as such, their environmentalism was shaped by the urge to prevent any intervention which would threaten the ecological habitat. Also, the Bergama activists constantly referred to some
non-material values as well. They emphasized the intrinsic value of life of every species—regardless of their use value, the protection of lands inherited from their ancestors, and the obligation to future generations to preserve nature.

“If we lose this land, it means we lose our children and grandchildren. Which baby can grow up breathing poison? They say “we are going to produce gold here”; and we say “no, you cannot”….You can do it only by stepping over so many people. It is not an easy thing” (a peasant activist, Sabah, 31.10.2000).

In that sense, they transcended the alleged divide between material and post-material values showing both sets of values might co-exist within the same environmental mobilization.  

Given the clearly environmental dimension of their aggrieved issue, the Bergama movement was often classified by the media and bystanders merely as an environmental movement. Yet, the Bergama activists did not limit their contention to environmentalism only, but constantly emphasized that their struggle had a human rights aspect as well. When defying opponents’ frames and legitimizing their own causes, they claimed that their environmental conflict was intertwined with human rights issues. Hence, they attached their contention to human rights violations by bridging master frames of environmental injustice and human rights. In fact, environmentally hazardous projects carried out by TNCs and/or governments also cause devastating human rights violations across the globe. In any event, local populations’ rights to clean air, land, water, and healthy environment are infringed on by these projects, violating articles 3, 17, and 25 of the U.N.’s Universal Declaration (Adeola, 2001: 53). Opposition by locals whose well-being, livelihood, lives, and cultures are endangered by development projects have been meeting with various sorts of repression and human rights transgressions. Issues of environmental degradation and transgression of human rights have been perceived as intertwined by various movements such as the Ogoni People’s movement in Nigeria (Bob, 2005), the rubber tapper’s movement in Brasil (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), the Chipko movement in India (Haynes, 1999), the Narmada movement in India (Khagram, 10 Doyle (2002) argues that there is a clear dichotomy between environmentalisms of the post-industrial and Third World societies in his study of anti-mine movements in Australia and Philippines. He reaches the conclusion that while Australian campaigners act on-post material interests, environmental actors in Philippines overwhelmingly have materialistic concerns and values.
Similarly, frame bridging between those two master frames was also evident in the Bergama movement. They claimed their human right to life was taken away from them.

“The Bergama movement rests upon the universal declaration of human rights. It is all about our rights to live and about our future” (E/E 2).

The emphasis on human rights was presented by the Bergama activists as a unique feature of their movement in order to raise the significance of their mobilization in the eyes of participants, sympathizers, and the general public which was seen crucial for maintaining participation and legitimacy. The Bergama activists stated that the Bergama movement was the first to relate gold-mining to human rights. According to the activists’ accounts, frame bridging in-between human rights and environmentalism in relation to gold mining diffused to other movements in other parts of the world as a result of their contention.

“Now it [resistance against gold mining] goes hand in hand with human rights. This is a result of one of the court decisions we achieved in Turkey. People’s right to live. Article 56 [referring to the Turkish constitutional article on which the court based its decision]We incorporated this type of resistance to the agenda of human rights groups. Before, it was only the environmentalists who were putting the effort. Yet, this is not merely an environmental issue, but also a part of human rights. According to my humanist way of thinking, I am advocating rights of children, the elderly, flowers, and insects which cannot talk or vote. Therefore, environmental rights, human rights, and rights of the environment to blossom are the same” (E/E 5).

**Diagnostic and prognostic frames:**

By using these master frames and values as constitutive grounds, the Bergama activists meticulously produced their own diagnostic and prognostic frames throughout their network. In their diagnostic frame, they identified their grievances and formulated what their contention was about, which was the first step required for a successful mobilization. Besides, in order to gain credibility for their struggle in the eyes of bystanders, sympathizers, and opponents, they tried to provide solutions about their contended issues through the process of

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11 Ken Saro-Wiva, the leader of the Ogoni people in Nigeria, resisting against oil production in the Niger-River Delta by the Shell Petroleum Development Company sponsored by the Nigerian government, explicitly defined environmental rights as part of human rights in his statement to Ogoni Civil Disturbances Tribunal: “The environment is man's first right. Without a safe environment, man cannot exist to claim other rights be they social, political or economic. The fact is that the very existence of Ogoni is seriously threatened, not being in control of their environment” ([http://www.ratical.org/corporations/KSWstnt.html](http://www.ratical.org/corporations/KSWstnt.html), accessed on 12.09.2011).
prognostic framing which went hand-in-hand with diagnostic framing. Through these framing processes, the Bergama activists defined various sets of risks which were raised by the Ovacık gold mine. Concomitantly, they proposed ways of compensating for the defects created by the gold mine project. When naming and defining what their contention was about, activists underlined four types of risks with environmental, social/cultural, economic, and political implications.

First, environmental risks posed by the gold mine constituted the backbone of the Bergama activists’ diagnostic frames. Based on the scientific data provided by scientists, chambers, and INGOs, the Bergama activists highlighted several existing, as well as future, environmental hazards introduced by the activities of TNC(s). Basically, they described the environmental risks that they faced in two categories, namely problems during the construction of the mine and risks during the operation of the mine. In terms of the former set of problems, the Bergama activists argued that every stage of gold mining, regardless of whether cyanide was being used or not had detrimental effects on the environment. In other words, they argued that the Ovacık gold mine started to destroy their environment from the very beginning of the process when the mining complex and the mine pit were being constructed. Accordingly, they underlined the immediate impacts of mine construction such as deforestation as a result of the cutting down of many pine and olive trees in the construction site (P/A 1, 28; Bektaş in Reinart, 2003: 39). The Bergama peasants stated that they had personal attachment to the hill on which the mine pit was built.

“We grew up in poverty. We know about poverty. We grew up on that land toiling. I know many things about that land....We, peasants, used to cut only one old pine tree once in a while to use it for warming ourselves. Then, Eurogold brought many machines, and they were cutting those pine trees. We used to like the environment, but we weren’t aware of it. When trees on that hill were being cut, I felt like committing suicide” (Gökçeoğlu in Reinart 53-54).

On the other hand, they also drew attention to their economic loss since they would not be able to use products of the trees (P/A 28). Additionally, they mentioned the loss of species living in the area by perceiving it as destruction of their natural habitat in their frames
Another revealed issue related to the mine construction was the sound pollution created with the dynamite blasts when the mine pit was being opened. Besides accentuating how blasts interrupted their daily lives by creating disturbance and fear at extreme rates, the Bergama peasants also claimed that dynamite use put their properties under threat since many of houses in the Ovacık village had cracks on their walls (P/A 12, 18).

Even though these immediate impacts were consistently emphasized in their frames, the bulk of the Bergama movements’ diagnostic frames concentrated on devastating impacts that would be produced when the mine was open to production. The Bergama activists had deep concerns about the cyanide used during the gold production process, the preservation and control of wastes and last but not least, the over-exploitation of underground water resources. In their criticisms to the Ovacık gold mine, the Bergama activists initially questioned technological aspects of the safety of the Ovacık gold mine. During the initial stage of the mobilization, activists of the Bergama movement led by Taşkınc indicated that there were major environmental risks specific to the Ovacık gold mine due to the backwardness of the technologies used by the Eurogold. These technical deficiencies were identified as the absence of a detoxification system and the substandard construction of the tailing pond (E/E 3). Indeed, Eurogold did not initially intend to place an impermeable membrane at the bottom of the tailing pond which would prevent leakage of waste into soil (E/E 10). However, facing the opposition of Taşkınc and his friends, Eurogold was forced to change its plans, and the company took some safety measures by covering the bottom of the tailing pond with an impermeable layer. Taşkınc felt dissatisfied with the measures taken by the gold mine company, and the Bergama activists pressured Eurogold and the Turkish state to place a detoxification system in the mine (E/E 3).

“They came to us saying that they put layers at the bottom of the tailing pond...Then I asserted that we wanted a detoxification system. There is cyanide, and it is unacceptable if it is not detoxified. It harms the environment.... I did not know if there was such a system. However, we started the rumour that there was, and there was indeed. I insisted for the detoxification system. And the public got to my side as well” (E/E 3).
Facing a growing opposition, Eurogold applied a detoxification system called INCO/SO2. However, Prof. Friedhelm Korte, a worldly-known, respected German ecological chemistry scientist was invited to Bergama to investigate the detoxification system in the Ovacık gold mine, and subsequently, he revealed in his expert opinion that the implemented system was not sufficient to reduce the risks (E/E 23). Supported by that expert opinion, Taşkın continued his opposition.

“A new executive manager, J.A., called me from the airport on his arrival to Turkey... He said that he had good news for us. They would build a detoxification system. I said let’s see....They changed their strategy. We were playing chess, and we cornered them....But they are building the detoxification system. What were we supposed to do? We started searching detoxification systems...We asked the whole world. Information was flowing in. We discovered that it was bogus. We contacted the executive manager of the company which developed this strategy....[after summarizing the defects of the detoxification system concluding that heavy metal wastes would remain intact even though cyanide was detoxified and new pollutants such as ammoniac would be released]. We happened to learn these. It is chess. Let them say we were inconsistent. New information arrived. We learned about the matter. We changed our strategy. We did not want detoxification anymore” (E/E 3).

Bergama activists demanded from Eurogold to make improvements in the technology of the mine through negotiations. However, the Bergama activists continuously changed their prognostic frames during this stage even if their demands were met by Eurogold. Reasons for such diversions were threefold. First, Taşkın and friends lacked a thorough knowledge about the issue of gold mining. As they accumulated detailed information, they demanded new solutions from Eurogold dropping the old ones. Secondly, Taşkın and his friends intended to detain the operations of Eurogold which would buy time for them to obtain more knowledge and expand their contention. Third, in their initial confrontation, they did not want be perceived as ‘total’ rejectionists. By offering technology based solutions, they wanted to increase their credibility and prove their “good-intention” (E/E 3).

As the process unfolded, the Bergama activists stopped demanding solutions of technology improvement. Instead, they focused on underlining the environmental problems that gold mining caused and asking first for the annulment of the project and then, for the closure of the mine. Dissatisfied with Eurogold’s moves, the anti-gold mine camp argued that, in spite of the safety mechanisms introduced, the gold mine continued to present major
environmental risks. The underlined risks could be classified into three main categories such as: the continuation of problems specific to the Ovacık gold mine, the general characteristics of their region, and the general problems associated with gold mining.

First, Bergama activists interpreted the safety mechanisms as a deception on the part of Eurogold. Both anti-gold mine scientists and activists who relied on their accounts claimed that the filter system could only eliminate cyanide in the liquid parts of the tailing pond. Additionally, they claimed that the impermeable layer was insufficient to remove risks of contamination because the layer still did not meet the tailings dam construction criteria stated in the regulation of the Ministry of Environment, and it was interpreted as a ‘Potemkin village’ to ward off criticisms (E/E 3; P/A 28). In other words, as one of the professors of metallurgy who was engaged in the Bergama movement network stated, the detoxification system was insufficient to remove the risks since cyanide and other heavy metals complexes in the form of solid waste precipitated at the bottom of the pond would remain untouched, and, on top of that, other threatening complexes would be produced during the detoxification process (E/E 9). Another criticism to the filter system was that it would be useless in terms of preventing acid rains and the evaporation of the waste water. Second, Bergama activists had doubts about the safety of the tailing pond after the departure of the TNC(s) from the region. Indicating that the TNC(s) did not undertake any responsibility for the waste ponds after the mine was completely exploited and became redundant due to their contract with the Turkish state, the Bergama activists argued that that wastes would be left utterly unattended. In claiming that, the Bergama activists displayed mistrust of the Turkish state by giving the example of environmental degradation in Balya, the copper mine in Western Anatolia which was closed down in the 1930s and questioned its capacity to control, monitor, and eliminate the risks of an environmental disaster since the state would become the de facto maintainer of the tailing pond (P/A 4, 28). Third, another rejection of the Ovacık gold mine stemmed from
the fact that tailing pond was built very close to the surrounding villages - only 150-200
meters away from Ovacık, 100-150 meters from Çamköy, and 200-250 meters from Narlıca
breaching the regulation of mines regarding human health as expressed in the TMMOB report
(2003). Fourth, in terms of underground waters, the Bergama activists insisted on the fact that
the gold mine would dry wells and lower the levels of underground waters because of the
excessive use of water resources during the mining process which, in turn, would harm their
agricultural activities (P/A 14, 27).

Another component of their diagnostic frames revolved around the geographical
characteristics of their region. The Bergama activists stated that Bergama and Bakırçay plain
was not a suitable place to build a gold mine regardless of technologies used. First, they
underlined the fact that the region laid in a first degree earthquake zone which makes the risks
of cyanide leakages and spills higher (E/E 2, 3; P/A 25, 28). Second, it was pointed at the fact
that the possibility of floods and high rates of evaporation due to the climate of their region
posed dangers of contaminating air, soil, and underground and surface waters (E/E 9; P/A 9).

All these claims were backed up by evidence and data about the problems of gold
mining around the world. By using examples of cyanide-related cases from elsewhere, generic
technological inadequacies of the gold mine sector were highlighted. In that regard, the gold
mine industry which runs mines around the globe despite its major technological deficiencies
was portrayed as a “heartless” and “ruthless” industrial sector which disregarded the
environment and human life (E/E 2).

Another important theme in the Bergama activists’ diagnostic frames was the
unfavourable economic impact of the Ovacık gold mine. In fact, the problems in the economic
field in relation to the gold mine were underlined mostly in order to undermine the economic
promises made by the TNC(s) which in return would increase rates of peasant mobilization
and defy the accusations that their movement contradicted national economic interests of
Turkey. In that regard, first, the activists aimed to challenge pro-mine actors’ promises of immediate economic benefits at the local level such as job opportunities. For that purpose, they stated that even if there were any possible improvements in employment rates, it would be temporary since job opportunities would have been available for the duration of the operation of the mine. However, after the gold ores were fully exploited and the Ovacık gold mine subsequently became redundant, there would be no more job opportunities provided by the gold mine (P/A 11). They also questioned the extent of economic improvement in their region even when the gold mine was in operation. The activists pointed out the fact that only a limited number of positions were offered which would have a marginal effect on the local economy (P/A 11). Additionally, the opponents of the mine argued that the TNC(s) deliberately inflated the number of their employees as high as 600 and made many workers redundant in a short while in order to convey the message that the mine provided economic prosperity and job opportunities to the local population even though the initial plan was to hire around 300 people given the workload at the mine (P/A 9, 28). Therefore, the Bergama peasants perceived it as a strategic act of the TNC(s) to buy peasants and to undermine their movement. Yet, the swollen number of job positions was still miniscule when approximately 10 thousand villagers residing in the nearby villages were considered (P/A 6). Also, the Bergama peasants argued that TNCs were pursuing a strategy of dividing the villagers by trying to hire one worker from each household (P/A 9, 27; E/E 10). According to the claims of the Bergama activists, working conditions and salaries at the mine were unsatisfactory in any case (P/A 11; E/E 10).

The Bergama activists also drew attention to the questionable economic non-feasibility of the gold mine when the possibility of an accident was taken into account. As one of the anti-mine scientists pointed out, any possible cyanide and/or waste spills would create incalculable amounts of economic and environmental damages. According to his estimations,
the costs that had to be covered in the case of an accident would have exceeded the economic value produced by the mine (E/E 8).

Another theme which was underlined with respect to local economic gains was the unsustainability of the wealth acquired by peasants by selling their land. Peasants who sold their land to the TNC(s) moved to towns or cities like Bergama or İzmir. However, according to the interviewees, even though they received considerable amounts of money, the peasants who migrated ran out of money within a short span of time. By defining themselves as peasants who had been overwhelmingly involved in agricultural work only, they claimed that none of the peasants who emigrated had the know-how or entrepreneurship skills to start a business. Hence, after a short period of prosperity, peasants fell below their previous levels of wealth.

“If you sell your field, money quickly drains. We [peasants] do not have a mind for investment” (P/A 11).

Moreover, the Bergama activists stressed that that gold mine would deteriorate the local economy rather than bring prosperity. The Bergama activists asserted that the touristic and agricultural uses of their territory would diminish with the huge tailing pond containing cyanide and heavy metals (P/A 1, 9, 28). As on one of the Bergama peasants said,

“No one will buy our products on the market once they hear they are coming from Bergama. They will label them as cyanide vegetables or cotton” (P/A 1).

Furthermore, in addition to the already existing tourism activities centred around the ruins of the ancient city of Pergamon, the Bergama activists proposed alternative touristic uses of their land. Underlining the fact that the Bakırçay plain was rich in terms of thermal water resources, the Bergama peasants argued that their region could be improved as a tourism centre by building thermal spas, a prospect never to be realized because of contamination of air and water (P/A 26).
Another line of argument in the diagnostic frames with respect to economical problems caused by the Ovacık gold mine revolved around gold mining activities’ impacts on the national economy. According to the activists’ frames, the national economic gains propagated by the TNC(s) were misleading and exaggerated. It was argued that the declaration of the amount of gold to be produced from the ores was made by the TNC(s) themselves (P/A 11; E/E 9). Additionally, the fact that gold produced at the Ovacık gold mine would be processed abroad was interpreted as another setback to the national economy. Activists claimed the bulk of the exchange value produced would be sent off elsewhere without being introduced in the Turkish economy contrary to what the TNCs claimed. Therefore, the Bergama activists argued that the TNC(s) would exploit and transfer their natural resources which meant there would be no considerable additional economic value created for the national economy.

In their third set of diagnostic frames, the Bergama peasants referred to the negative impacts of the gold mine on their social and cultural lives. The gold mining sector in general was defined by Lemke, a leading figure within the Bergama movement network, as a force which destroyed and negatively transformed social relations in places where they operated.

“There is also the social contamination. Until so far we talked about cyanide and trees. However, there is also the social contamination. Cultural spoil. Workers are being brought. Peasants are being removed. Thousands of peasants are displaced when a dam is constructed. Then they form ghettos. Brothels [appear], all sorts of drugs [are used]…That is the case in Colombia” (E/E 5).

In a similar vein, peasants perceived that their community life which was described as harmonious and peaceful previously was threatened by the gold mine. Impacts on the community life were mostly seen as a problem during the later stages of the struggle. Even though peasants were unified in solidarity at the beginning, they emphasized intra-community conflicts and disputes among “themselves” which emerged as a result of divisive strategies of mining TNCs. According to these claims, the gold mining companies sent some sociologists and anthropologists to do research in the villages. In this way, the Bergama peasants said, the
company analyzed the religious and ethnic composition of the villages and acted upon these differences (P/A 2, 4, 9; E/E 10, 13). For instance, the village of Narlıca which was an Alevi village used to be the most radical group during the protests. The interviewees claimed that the company figured out that Alevi villages were organized hierarchically, and they tried to get the muhtar (the elected head of the village) and the dedes (religious leaders) of Narlıca on their side by offering jobs and money in order to weaken the anti-mine mobilization. As others followed, Narlıca was divided into two camps, even refusing to share the same coffeehouse (P/A 1, 11, 12). Other similar splits between pro-mine and anti-mine peasants occurred in the other villages among friends and relatives which damaged overall communal relations (P/A 2, 6, 9, 11, 16).

Last but not least, the Bergama activists highlighted political problems in relation to democracy in their frames. They argued that the gold mine project led to major democratic shortcomings by undermining its mechanisms. They recurrently emphasized that the gold mine project was put into effect without the consent of the local population. On the other hand, Eurogold initially insisted on the claim that their operations were continuing with the approval of the local population (P/A 5, 25). However, the Bergama peasants harshly rejected these assertions as indicated in the words of a peasant activist:

“When the mining company first arrived, it collected signatures, most of them forged [in support of the mine]. They gave signature on behalf of others. Even the dead appeared on the list. The ones who migrated to Tracea. Muhtar [administrative head of the village] approved that. Company claims local people want the mine [showing signatures as a proof]. We disagreed, but there was no result” (P/A 25).

For their views to be taken into account by the decision-makers, the peasants demanded a referendum to be held in the Bergama villages. The referendum demand was based on their right to participate in decisions over development projects as local inhabitants according to the Bergen Treaty signed and ratified by the Turkish state in 1988 (E/E 3; P/A 9). However, their referendum demand was denied. Subsequently, the Bergama peasants launched an unofficial symbolic referendum on their own to display the scale of opposition in
On January 12th, 1997, the referendum was held with the participation of peasants from eight villages. As a result of the referendum, all 2866 participant voted “No” to the Ovacık gold mine (P/A 9, 28; Reinart, 2003: 66; Kuzey Ege, 13.01.1997). In fact, according to a survey conducted for Eurogold in 1997 which leaked to the public later on, 87% of the peasants living in the Bergama region were against the operation of the gold mine and 75% of the peasants believed that operation of the mine would do damages to them (Yeni Asır, 18.09.1997).\(^\text{12}\)

Continuous refusal of their demands by the state was perceived by the Bergama peasants as exclusion of the people from decision-making processes over an issue which was directly affecting their lives. Hence, they depicted the TNC(s) and governments as agents of ‘non-democracy’ who overlooked democratic practices and principles. In that regard, they criticized the working of democracy arguing the people’s demands were not reflected on the decision-making processes in Turkey.

“Democracy is not fully implemented in Turkey... [System] does not operate along the demands of voters. Rather, it has its way of functioning” (P/A 6).

Moreover, governments overlooked court decisions favouring the peasants, and they found loopholes to circumvent those court decisions. These acts were interpreted as a violation of the principle of the rule of law. According to the peasants, rule-of-law was unevenly applied only for the rich in Turkey, and when it came down to poor people like themselves, the law was violated (P/A 5, 11).

Through all of these framing processes and identity construction, a coherent and resonant set of meanings was produced for the Bergama movement. These frames were produced and accepted by all the actors throughout the Bergama network. Diagnostic and

\(^{12}\) According to the same survey, 59% of the participants believed underground waters would be depleted as a result of the operation of the mine. 79% thought wastes would pose risks to the environment after the closure of the mine, and 60% reckoned that the mining corporation would leave the tailing pond unsafe after its departure (Yeni Asır, 18.09.1997).
prognostic frames relied heavily on the technical information provided by the scientists and CSOs, which were then accepted and incorporated by the peasants. In their frames, there was a marked emphasis on science to enhance their frames’ reliability and validity. With respect to frame resonance, frame consistency was achieved because all the scientists, CSOs, peasants and other actors who participated in the Bergama network commonly agreed upon these frames complementing each other’s work. On top of that, having credible names like professors and CSOs within their network made their frames more persuasive. Additionally, the centrality of environmental frames was maintained by framing their environmental grievance as a life or death matter.

Also, the experiences of the peasants during their struggle transformed their understandings of politics and democracy. Once confident in the rightness of their cause and the subsequent inevitable success of their mobilization backed up by scientific evidence and legal decisions, the Bergama peasants started to alter their perceptions of democratic conditions as they met with various sorts of repression and the Ovacık gold mine remained open. Consequently, they attached further meaning to their struggle such as fighting for democracy and justice. One of the previous spokespersons of the Bergama indicated that there was a gradual change in the attitudes of peasants towards the working of democracy in Turkey, and they developed negative perceptions as they realized that what they saw as political opportunities were shallow:

“While they were saying if this government comes things get better, they have come to the understanding that all of them were in the same circle. They started questioning the system, military, governments, police. At the end, they have understood that there is no democracy in Turkey. They have realized that democracy can occur through their struggle” (E/E 11).

Overall, all of these frames were articulated, produced, and expressed through the joint work of the Bergama peasants and their spokespersons as well as scientists, CSOs and environmental activists who did not only give support from outside, but became a part of the movement network. Through their frames, they continuously pointed to the injustice created
by the TNCs and the state with respect to environmental and human rights. In other words, the Bergama peasants participated in the movement in order to fight the unjust conditions they had to face in their individual lives. The ones who did not were labelled as ‘traitors’ who sold out their community, country, and more implicitly, humanity as discussed in the previous chapter. At the same time, while producing their injustice frames, the Bergama activists linked their conditions to the macro structural dynamics, such as capitalist globalization, as discussed below.

**Framing Capitalist Globalization:**

When bridging the master frames of “environmentalism” and “human rights”, the Bergama peasants made use of another master frame - “opposition to neoliberal globalization” as their underlying theme. Accordingly, instead of treating the injustices they faced as specific to their own situation, they perceived environmental problems and democratic deficits as part of a more general structural process. More specifically, they claimed that their grievances were caused and exacerbated by the forces of capitalist globalization (E/E 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 19, 22, 29, 36, 40; P/A 9, 10, 11, 15, 17). In other words, the Bergama activists reached a consensus throughout their network over the interpretation of capitalist globalization as a system generating negative impacts like environmental degradation, inequalities and human rights violations. Yet, even though they related their grievance to the present form of the global system, there was no commonly accepted understanding of the term globalization throughout the network. Based on previous political views and positions, activists’ views on the content of globalization were diversified.

Peasant activists mostly associated globalization with invasion of external forces (P/A 1, 3, 5, 17, 26). In that sense, they claimed that their situation resembled the conditions the War of Liberation at the time of which the remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire were invaded by the Allies’ forces just after the First World War. Therefore, globalization was
equated with imperialism, those terms used interchangeably by the peasants. Additionally, they had a more state-centric interpretation of globalization in the sense that they commonly attributed a decisive role to the First World states such the United States in terms of political and economic development (P/A 5, 11, 26). A nationalist rhetoric was noticeably present in the peasant activists’ frames of globalization regardless of their political stances. In fact, the political configuration of villages was diversified. Three Alevi villages -Narlıca, Tepeköy, and Pınarköy- were overwhelmingly social democratic while the majority of peasants in other villages were more inclined to the political right (E/E 3; P/A 15, 19). Yet, the aforementioned nationalist discourse was shared by all of the peasants.

Also, nationalist symbols and narratives were extensively employed by the Bergama peasants in their protests. In addition to the utilization of Turkish flags in many demonstrations, heroic stories from the War of Liberation circulated throughout their network. “I can still remember Bayram Cavus [“Obelix”] telling stories from the War of Liberation. The enemy was on that hill, and our soldiers were at this point ready to beat them [talking about a protest site near villages]” (P/A 9).

Fighting against TNCs was seen as a duty to be fulfilled for the sake of their ancestors who gave their lives for their land (P/A 1). In the same spirit, references to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his victories against ‘foreign invaders’ were constantly made (P/A 2, 5, 9, 11). Their village committees were likened to the underground committees of the War of Liberation (P/A 28). Also, they claimed that it was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who had ordered closing of the environmentally hazardous copper mine Balya, Balıkesir back in the 1930s (P/A 9, 16). The use of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a symbol was also evident in the discourses of their spokesperson, Konyar who stressed that their movement was also about anti-imperialism, rather than gold-mining per se. When a court case was filed against Konyar and several other Bergama activists for being involved in espionage activities, Konyar announced in a press

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13 The issue of Iraq invasion was constantly brought up during the interviews with the peasant activists. They argued that the war on Iraq was a proof of the U.S. domination throughout the world.
release that the leader of their alleged ‘underground organization’ was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the Bergama peasants would not permit plundering of their country (Hurriyet, 04.11.2000).

The Bergama peasants also staged demonstrations revolving around themes of nationalism and independence. In September 2000, the Bergama peasants organized a picket in front of the old parliament building which was used during the early stages of the Turkish Republic. Holding Turkish flags and pictures of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, peasant activists said: “Our organization is the old Grand National Assembly of Turkey; our leader is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk [italic added]” (Hürriyet, 24.09.2000) in order to criticize present-day political leaders, parliament members, and governments in Turkey for not being responsive to the people’s demands.

Another thematic demonstration was the “Kuvvay-Milliye” march in November 2000. In this event, 62 peasant activists and Konyar walked on foot for about 300 kilometres to the city of Çanakkale within a week (P/A 9). Çanakkale had a symbolic importance in the nationalist discourse. Its significance stems from the fact that the Dardanelles of Çanakkale hosted one of the major battles between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies’ forces during the First World War. With this march, the Bergama demonstrators symbolically referred to the Independence War at the beginning of the 20th century claiming that they are defending their land just like their ancestors.

“After he landed in Samsun [where the Turkish Independence War was officially initiated], Mustafa Kemal gave responsibility to all the youngsters and elders of this country. He said, “Mobilize against imperialism if it ever puts the country under siege. Do not surrender”. Accordingly, we launched this march against the contamination of our land, the suffering of our people, and the antidemocratic practices in this country. We are walking to Çanakkale which symbolizes the defeat of imperialism in our country. We gave many martyrs there. We will show them and all others that we will not hand in our country to foreigners. If you follow us, we will walk with pride, courage, and respect. I call on the whole country to mobilize. With my respects” (Konyar addressing the gendarmerie, in Reinart, 2003: 132).

14 Kuvvay-i Milliye is the name given to the militia forces during the Turkish War of Independence in 1919-1922 which formed the basis for the centralized Turkish army later on.
15 Even though the Dardanelles Battle was fought by the Ottoman Empire against the Allies, it was portrayed as part of the nationalist struggle in 1919-1922 which resulted in the formation of the Turkish nation-state. The Dardanelles War is used as a crucial symbolic event attributing to it an anti-imperialist dimension.
Themes of independence and anti-imperialism with an explicit nationalism flavour were important for maintaining the narrative fidelity which made their frames resonant. Emphasis on similarities between the Bergama movement and the Independence War, called attention to the inherited identities of ‘grandsons’ of those who had fought against the “occupiers” and “colonialists” during the Independence War were emphasized. These identities were adapted to their own situation. The Bergama villagers themselves associate themselves with their ancestors rejecting a foreign force which tried to “occupy” their land, this time a foreign company (P/A 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17). In doing that, the peasants had the idea of fighting for a larger cause, and they felt that they were a part of the historical struggle of which they heard as they grew up which served as a motivational frame.

Moreover, the nationalist elements employed in their discourses were also useful as a shield for deflecting accusations of betraying their country. By underlining those themes, the Bergama peasants tried to defy stigmatization of working against national interests of their country by opposing to gold mining.

However, it would be misleading to define the Bergama movement as a purely nationalist movement. One symbolic indicator for this is the Bergama peasants’ visit to martyrdoms at the end of the ‘Kuvvay-ı Milliye’ march of both Turkish and Australian soldiers who died during the Çanakkale Battle (Duran in Reinart, 2003: 137-138). When they made their complaints about the Australian –based TNC, Normandy to the Australian martyrs symbolically, they were conveying the message that it was the TNCs which they were opposing, not the Australians in general.

In fact, the nationalist framing was contingent on the fact that it was the TNCs which owned the Ovacık gold mine at the time. According to the accounts of the Bergama peasants, they would have also opposed cyanide-based gold mining even if the mine was operated by a

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16 According to Johnston and Noakes (2006: 12), narrative fidelity is achieved when “…resonant frames tend to mesh, draw upon, and synchronize with the dominant culture of the target, its narratives, myths, and basic assumptions”.

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national company or the Turkish state since hazardous impacts of gold mining would have remained (P/A 1, 2, 9, 11). One of the peasant-activists expressed his views in the following way:

“The only difference between the two is that state expropriates land, and TNCs buy land” (P/A 2).

In addition to their emphasis on imperialism, they perceived capitalist globalization as a system which renders class polarizations so that subordinate classes suffer from the negative impacts of capitalist globalization throughout the world such as environmental degradation.

“There are always poles in the world...Before, there was the bogeyman of communism [he refers to the bipolarized world during the Cold War]. Now, globalization is also creating poles in the world between the rich and the poor. It is not only the rich who live in this world. There are poor people and they are not alone” (P/A 5).

They specifically situated TNC(s) at the centre of their criticisms, relating their local grievance to the ‘attacks’ of TNC(s) for profit and describing them as the essential global actors pursuing global interests (E/E 2, 3, 5, 15). In other words, they brought forth the fact that mining companies pursuing global interests led to environmental destruction in other parts of the world (E/E 2, 3, 5; P/A 5). Being disappointed with their own nation-state, they described states as part of capitalist globalization because the state was working together with TNC(s) instead of protecting them. In that sense, they indicated that TNC(s) and states joined forces, described by one of the peasant activists as “Company, state, nation-state. It means corporate-state” (P/A 5).

Describing the central motive of the TNCs as profit-making, the Bergama peasants set their priorities as their livelihood, health and environment which is explicitly stated in the following words of one peasant activist: “they prefer money whereas we prefer life” (P/A 15). Based on this clearly put dichotomy between two sets of interests, the Bergama activists

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17 The Ovacık gold mine was taken over by a Turkish company called Koza Altın Ltd in 2004. In fact, apart from a small number of demonstrations, protests were not sustained against the Koza Altın Ltd. Yet, it was because the Bergama movement was already in a decline stage due to intra-movement conflicts, exhaustion of peasants and the closing window of political opportunities. On the other hand, negative views towards the mine were still prevalent throughout the villages. As for its economic contributions, activists were still sceptical about the economic returns to the Turkish national economy since the Turkish company was accused of acting similarly to the TNC(s) in terms of their tax payments and declaration of gold amounts produced.
positioned themselves on the ‘losers’ side since they bore the injustices produced by the capitalist globalization.

“Honestly, as far as I can see, globalization is not something which benefits the poor. It seems more like the integration of the rich. I do not think it will provide benefits for the underclass” (P/A 11).

They extended their criticisms to capitalist globalization by expressing their discontent about the ways in which democracy was (mis)applied under capitalist globalization. According to the Bergama activists, the impact of capitalist globalization aggravates the lack of state responsiveness to the citizens of Turkey. Moreover rule of law was being undermined as laws were being adapted to the interests of capitalist globalization.

“Everyone has a right to live and right to live freely in this world. They confiscate the right of workers to unionize. All the laws, legal structures, and democracy are now in their interests….They have written their constitutions and [built] their democracies for themselves” (P/A 5).

Urban segments of the Bergama network including spokespersons, lawyers, CSOs, and scientists, were composed of a multiplicity of actors with diverse political views. Activists from outside the Bergama villages overwhelmingly upheld a variety of left-wing political views including social democracy, new left, orthodox Marxism and Kemalist-left with nationalist tendencies as well as green politics. This heterogeneity in political views was reflected in their approaches to capitalist globalization. In spite of the general consensus over the interpretation of capitalist globalization as a detrimental process in its current form, views diverged over the content, shape and future of capitalist globalization.

In terms of views over whether capitalist globalization was beneficial or not, activists diverged. For instance, one of the spokespersons of the movement with social democratic views argued that capitalism and globalization might be beneficial as long as its deficiencies were corrected:

“I believe ...the new capital [referring to global capital] is harming people and societies all around the world. People, on the other hand, resist it as in the case of Bergama or Porto Alegre. They are rightfully reacting against it, and they should. This is the case when we look at the historical development of humanity. Capitalism had beneficiary results for humanity for sure. But societies struggled against its harms as well. Class struggle developed. Even if production has increased in certain places as a consequence of global spread of capitalism, humanity should still fight against its detrimental impacts collectively. Workers were working for 12 hours a
day, but at the same time automobiles were produced. Distances which could be travelled in 2 days now take only 2 hours. However, concomitantly, working hours are reduced down to eight. We should do the same thing here. In other words, we should collectively resist against this type of globalism which is fuelled by corporations’ greed for more profit” (E/E 3).

Another prominent figure within the Bergama movement who was in charge of managing transnational relations also saw globalization as a process which might have beneficial sides. Coming from a green politics stance, she drew attention to the environmental dimensions and claimed globalization to be beneficial as long as transnational business activities were reconciled with protecting the environment:

“Personally I am not against globalization. Let them globalize olive oil [instead of gold mining]. Let them take care of oil trees. However, I do not want them to ruin everything with chemicals. It undermines my dignity especially in the name of olive trees” (E/E 3).

On the other hand, another social democratic spokesperson remained more sceptical and negative about capitalist globalizations’ positive sides:

“Globalization is an enormity. It is a fallacy. It is a system which is imposed on undeveloped countries destroying the labour of their workers, intensifying the violation of human rights, and opening land to multinational corporations. It is the same old imperialism we know from the Independence War. In those times, there were canons and rifles. Now they have their own power. They possess their own universities, the World Trade Organization, money, rent, planes. More specifically, they have their sanctions and quotas” (E/E 2).

In their definitions of capitalist globalization, urban-based activists were divided into groups of reformist and rejectionist according to the typology of political positions towards capitalist globalization. Yet, it must also be stated that these categorizations were not crystal clear. There were recurring shifts between positions in the discourses of the activists. For example, while describing capitalist globalization as a process with possible beneficial impacts, Taşkın also remarked that it was imposed on countries like Turkey which moved him closer to the arguments of rejectionists with nationalist or old-left orientations.

“They pushed Africa below the poverty line. They have taken all of their gold, silver and mines. They destroyed their democracy. It is the same thing here. Nothing changes. That’s why globalization is the marker of catastrophe for countries like us. I believe these countries should be well-protected. We should become a producing country. Yet, we have become a consumerist country. We consume all the time. Purchasing power has decreased. Liberties are constrained. Democracy is crippled” (E/E 3).
Similarly, activists with ‘old left’ stances closer to orthodox Marxist views made a more state-centric reading of capitalist globalization, saying that it was another label for imperialism dominated and directed by the First World countries. They were utterly critical of capitalism and described it as an inherently destructive system of exploitation with no promising features (E/E 12, 13, 14).

What united these actors with diverging, yet close views within the same struggle was their reading of globalization as a form of attack by external capitalist forces. In that regard, they equated globalization with imperialism in general. It was partly the spill-over effect of the pre-1980 Leftist student movements. One of the protests, in fact, symbolically exemplified this spill-over effect. In 1967, the sixth fleet of the U.S. navy had visited Istanbul, Turkey. The left wing student groups gathered and demonstrated against the sixth fleet by associating the presence of the U.S. navy in Turkey with American imperialism they were fighting against. It was a significant event in the sense that it symbolically pointed at the escalation of the left wing student movement in 1960s and 1970s. One banner used in the demonstration became one of the symbols of the student movement in the 1960s. On the banner, it was written “6’ncı Filo defol” which literally meant ‘The 6th fleet, get out’. By drawing on the same slogan, the Bergama activists used the same banner with a play on words. In Turkish água has a double meaning: ‘sixth’ and ‘the ones opting for gold’. Nevertheless, even though imperialism was a recurrent theme in their discourses, each actor attached different meanings to capitalism and imperialism. State-centric thinking was prevalent in the discourses of the urban-based activists ranging from social democratic reformists to rejectionist ‘old’ Marxists, though in varying degrees.
Be they rejectionist or reformist, they all pinpointed the cultural-ideology of consumerism as the main pillar of capitalist globalization which was applied predominantly throughout the world:

“Ideologues of capitalism might say all these developments are beneficial for humanity. Everyone drinks Coca Cola so that something enters their stomach. People eat hamburgers... However, if corporations’ benefits exceed people’s, this is not right” (E/E 3).

Consumerism was also seen relevant to their specific aggrieved issue, and the interpretation of capitalist globalization as prioritizing consumerism was applied to their contention. As several prominent figures of the Bergama movement pointed out, gold was the least used metal in industrial production. It was mainly used as a consumer good in the form of jewellery or for its exchange value. Accordingly, they argued that since gold was not mainly used for primary needs, there was no need for gold production (E/E 1, 5).

Another converging point in their frames of capitalist globalization was about what was to be done with respect to preventing detrimental impacts of capitalist globalization. In spite of their state-centric view, the majority of the urban-based activists advocated joining their forces with other movements and actors that were opposing capitalist globalization beyond their borders. In other words, the Bergama movement should be and was a part of the resistance against capitalist globalization according to movement participants. This was because capitalist globalization and more specifically, mining TNCs were creating similar detrimental impacts on local populations and the environment in different parts of the world (E/E 2, 3, 5; Özay, 1995).

“Even though this movement is predominantly portrayed as an environmentalist movement, it is rather against imperialism and what multinational corporations are doing to my country in the name of sustainable development. In addition to our environmental and cultural heritage, we are trying to save our dignity. Today it is gold mining. But in the future it can be over a nuclear power plant or any other sort of imperialist attack. Therefore, one should see this movement as a resistance to globalization and global attacks” (E/E 2).
When they announced that they would provide support for the anti-mine activists in Greece and the Czech Republic who asked for help, Konyar and Taşkın explicitly declared their global perspective:

“Our responsibility does not end with Bergama. We saved our own land, next is others’ land. First, we will struggle against the poison of cyanide in Turkey. We will organize people in Efemçukuru, Kaymaz, Gümüşhane, and we will support their struggle. Then, we will help anyone asking help from all around the world” (Konyar’s statement in Yeni Asır 20.10.1997).

“The decision of the [Turkish] State of Council is a first of its kind. We will translate it into different languages and it will set a precedent. Other than that, we will provide aid in the form of information as long as we can” (Taşkın’s statement in Yeni Asır, 20.10.1997)

Also, Lemke explicitly mentioned the transnational aspect of contention over gold mining at the Alternative Nobel Prize ceremony in 2000 when she received the award. She finished her speech by saying “Hayır [No] to cyanide gold mining in Türkiye; Hayır [No] to cyanide gold mining in Greece; and Hayır [No] to cyanide gold mining in the world”. She acknowledged and commended all actors involved in the Bergama movement including transnational ones in the same speech:

“It is very important to stress here that strong friendships were forged between all people involved in our movement- of national and international origin” (Lemke, 2000).

Moreover, some of the activists with New Left views openly expressed that there had to be an alternative kind of globalization in order to challenge the TNCs, which implied a global resistance:

“There is a need for global governance. The company is a multinational. It is a partnership or monopoly of a world capital. If we could have managed it [a global struggle], things would have been different. These corporations use the advantage of being a world monopoly when they are building relations with the state. If they were a small company, they wouldn’t have lasted so long” (E/E 11).

Despite several objections within the network to cooperation with ‘foreign” actors like INGOs stated by the rejectionist old-left actors, these views of the urban-based activists
juxtaposed with those of the peasant activists. Peasant-activists were predominantly willing to participate in transnational networks and collaborate with INGOs, scientists, and social movements outside Turkey, considering these links as beneficial for their struggle (P/A 2, 5, 9, 11). Besides, peasant-activists viewed supranational political structures such as the EU, and legal institutions like the European Court of Human Rights as opportunities beyond their national borders which could make a major contribution for them (P/A 9, 11, 23, 25). As a result, the Bergama activists conjoined forces with actors beyond their borders and acted as part of a global resistance to capitalist globalization.

Apart from their transnational links, another indicator for the global aspect of the Bergama movement was the protests they staged for specifically opposing capitalist globalization. While the Bergama activists contested capitalist globalization through their own struggle, they also organized anti-capitalist globalization protests over issues such as MAI talks and against actors of capitalist globalization in general. For that purpose, they demonstrated in İzmir, in support with the global justice movement activists protesting the capitalist globalization during the IMF and the World Bank summit in Prague in September, 2000. Shouting anti-capitalist globalization slogans such as “Bergama, Prague, İzmir hand in hand against IMF!”, the Bergama peasants directly associated their movement with those of the global justice movement. In the press release of the same event, Konyar expressed the Bergama peasants’ views on capitalist globalization as:

“We say no to the wild new colonialism created by IMF and the World Bank under the name of globalization in collaboration with all the international resisters in Prague. IMF and the World bank are the main supporters of cyanide gold [mining]” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, 26September, 2000).

In another event, around 40 Bergama peasants and Konyar formed a picket line in front of the building of the Ministry of Forestry in order to protest talks on International Arbitration at the Parliament (Hurriyet, 17.07.1999). They perceived international arbitration
as a process which would lead to confiscation of their established rights (E/E 2; P/A 5).

Furthermore, they utilized transnational spaces such as the European Social Forum and forged links with like-minded activists, INGOs, and social movements in their struggle against capitalist globalization. Therefore, even though nationalist elements such as sentiments and discourses were present in their frames, the Bergama movement was much more than a nationalist opposition to capitalist globalization.

Finally, it is important to point out that, the Bergama activists also criticized the Global Justice Movement activists with respect violence used during the transnational protests in Prague, Seattle, and Genoa. Influenced by the media accounts of these protests in which violent actions of some protestors were brought forth, Konyar claimed:

“Our resistance against globalization is different. I believe it comes up with new projects and aims against globalization and we should resist in this way. Whereas, in Genoa, Prague and Seattle, the way they oppose is violent. The anti-globalization resistance is the Bergama Movement itself. I mean, through civil disobedience. Without plundering the stores, throwing stones at people, and letting the police beat you, we can find ways to make them miserable” (E/E 2).

Also, Konyar also points at differences between the socio-economic backgrounds of the protesters and the Bergama activists. As he described the GJM protestors as people from the First World, Konyar saw the Bergama movement as the movement of the people who were the real sufferers of capitalist globalization (E/E 2). On the other hand, Taşkı̇n had more positive views about the GJM protestors praising their resistance to capitalist globalization and considering them as part of the same struggle that the Bergama movement was engaged in. This opinion differences mostly stemmed from variations in the ideological orientations of Konyar and Taşkı̇n which was reflected on the course of the Bergama movement.

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18 Please see chapter 8 for a detailed analysis.
Chapter 6: Political Opportunities at the Local and National Levels

The Bergama peasants were both fortunate and unfortunate when they started their movement. They faced unfavourable conditions because national decision-makers opted for neo-liberal economic policies in continuation of the restructuration process since the 1980s. The introduction of neo-liberal market policies had a direct impact on the Bergama peasants since the mining sector, the source of their aggrieved issue, was also a part of the restructuration process.

Until the 1980s, the mining sector in Turkey was controlled and coordinated by the state, and mining activities were overwhelmingly carried out by related state institutions. After the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies, the state relinquished its direct involvement in mining and instead, concentrated on supporting private sector to engage in the mining. State-run mining establishments were privatized. Additionally, policies aspiring to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) which facilitated global investment in the mining sector in Turkey were put into force. With the introduction of two laws in 1985 and 1994, the Turkish mining sector was opened to operations of mining TNCs (www.mta.gov.tr, accessed 15.09.2011). As a result of these legal changes, the gold mining industry started to flourish with the activities of TNCs in Turkey. Overall, the transformations taking place in the field of mining provided the structural basis of the Bergama movement’s struggle.

On the other hand, Turkish politics was also undergoing a change starting with the late 1980s. By the 1990s, the repercussions of the repressive and brutal military regime of the 1980s started to subside, if not disappear completely. Political life was reinvigorated with the

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1 Please see chapter 4 for a detailed analysis.
2 One of the major state institutions in relation to mining was the Mineral Research & Exploration General Directorate (Maden Tektik ve Arama Genel Müdürlüğü) which was founded by the state in 1935 for conducting scientific and technological research regarding mineral exploration and geology (http://www.mta.gov.tr/v2.0/eng/). Another mining related institution, Etibank, as a state-owned bank, was founded again in 1935 with the aim of, first, providing raw materials and mines to meet industrial needs and, second, of maintaining all sorts of capital needed for related activities. In 1985, Etibank’s role was lessened to granting mining licenses to private enterprises. The bank was privatized in 1998 and closed down in 2001.
gradual revival of political parties, CSOs, and new social movements. Several constitutional amendments were introduced which relatively softened the undemocratic features of the military regime of the 1980s. The gradual democratization process was accompanied by Turkey’s aspiration to enter the European Union. Negotiations were on track with the EU, yet half-heartedly on both sides (E/E 27).

It was a subdued process which culminated in the rejection of candidacy of Turkey in 1997. There was a surprising turn around in 1999 and Turkey’s candidacy was accepted. By 2000, the process was revitalized. From then on, Turkey was in the process of connecting itself to the global political structure which had major implications for the process of democratization.

Given these circumstances, the Bergama peasants were fortunate in terms of expressing their contention as a movement. In comparison to the suppressed political conditions of the 1980s, many actors of civil society and political parties were available for them to build alliances with both at the local, national, and transnational levels. Likewise, because of the relative heterogeneity of political actors, the Bergama peasants were able to forge links with different actors with various political standings and views which allowed them to build an extensive anti-mine network. In other words, there was both a quantitative and qualitative increase in the availability of allies for the Bergama movement in comparison to the previous periods.

Equally important was the increasing state tolerance towards new social movements during the 1990s in comparison to earlier periods. Even though there were no major changes in its general characteristics of exclusiveness and non-responsiveness, the Turkish state selectively allowed social movements to continue their activities and protests. The

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3 Please see chapter 4 for a detailed analysis.
4 In fact, the ‘modus operandi’ of Turkish modernizers consisted of application of European based structures and practices to the Turkish context in order to transform Turkey into a civilized country. In that regard, joining the EU meant the fulfillment of the modernization aspiration of the Kemalist regime. Yet, a concomitant reluctance also emerged among the Turkish power holders since participation in a supranational political structure would erode sovereignty of the state.
democratization process remained impartial and uneven. Limitations of the democratization process were apparent in emerging new identity claims with respect to religion and ethnicity. The Turkish authorities perceived identity claims of Kurds and Islamists as a threat to the secular ideals of the Kemalist regime and the unity of the state and nation, a perception shared by mass parties of the left and the right. In accordance with this perception, the state did not alter its exclusionist and repressive attitude completely, and applied excessive measures of repression, increasing the costs for those movements throughout the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s. On the other hand, the Bergama activists had a comparative advantage to identity based movement in terms levels of repression exerted by the state. The new social movements that emerged since the mid-1980s such as environmental and feminist movements were seen as ‘harmless’ which led the state to take a milder attitude towards these mobilizations. In sum, by the time Bergama activists started their movement, they found fertile ground in terms of political opportunities such as the democratization process in the aftermath of the military regime; the availability of influential allies like political parties and CSOs; and mild state repression towards new social movements which was selectively carried out.

**National Political Opportunities**

**a. Legal institutions as an opportunity:**

The Bergama movement was once described by a spokesperson as a battle against the mining TNCs fought on many fronts such as science, judiciary, institutional politics, and grassroots (E/E3). Among these, the legal struggle occupied a crucial place. Through legal actions and subsequent victories, the Bergama activists aimed to push the Turkish government(s) to close the mine and called on the Turkish state to act on behalf of its citizens. Furthermore, favourable court decisions gave impetus to grassroots mobilization throughout the movement since they strengthened the peasants’ belief that they were struggling for a

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5 Please see chapter 2 for a detailed analysis.
righteous cause. Accordingly, the Bergama activists primarily referred to the principle of rule of law and citizenship rights guaranteed by the constitution which was embodied in their legal actions. In that regard, believing that court decisions would have binding impact on the political decision-making processes, legal structure and practices were evaluated as opportunities by the Bergama activists.

The prolonged legal struggle over the Ovacık gold mine which set off at the very beginning of the movement was supervised and carried out throughout the struggle by a group of lawyers from İzmir who were already specialized in environmental issues. Senih Özay who was one of the founding members of the first Turkish Green Party founded in 1988 acted as the main legal representative of the Bergama peasants throughout the movement. He carried out the legal process in collaboration with Noyan Özkân, the then-president of the İzmir Bar Association, and lawyers from the Environmental Lawyers group in İzmir. The legal struggle consisted of two main components: lawsuits launched for the closure of the Ovacık gold mine; and the legal defence of various Bergama activists who were charged with being involved in illegal activities during their protests.

The Bergama activists started their legal contention over the Ovacık gold mine shortly after the initial opposition of Taşkıın and his friends in order to corner governments and Eurogold. Under the supervision of Senih Özay, 652 Bergama peasants brought the issue to court on November 8th, 1994. In 3 lawsuits filed against the Eurogold, the Bergama activists demanded the annulment of permissions granted by the Ministry of Environment since the gold mine would have detrimental impacts on their environment and health. Their claims were based on the scientific data provided by Taşkıın, scientists, and CSOs regarding the serious risks that cyanide-leach method entailed. However, the local court dismissed the case. In response, the Bergama activists appealed to the higher court, the Council of State (Danıştay). On 13.05.1997, the Council of State ruled in favour of the peasants and dismissed
the decision given by the lower court. Based on the 17th and 56th articles of the Turkish Constitution regarding the right to life and the right to live in a healthy environment respectively, the Council of State decided that the operation of the Ovacık gold mine should be stopped since it did not benefit the ‘public good’. Through press releases and official appeals addressed to the state authorities, the lawyers and the Bergama activists constantly pressured the Ministry of Environment and the İzmir governor to implement the high court decision. However, state officials refrained from taking any action claiming that the legal decision was not finalized yet. The ruling of the Council of State was finalized on October 15th 1997, when the İzmir 1st Administrative Court decided to cancel the permit to extract gold with cyanide leach method referring to the “right to live in a healthy environment” (Cangı, 2003; Özkan, 2004;E/E 1, 16). Evaluating the court’s ruling as a decisive victory, the Bergama activists celebrated the closure of the mine by organizing a festival in one of the villages during which Özay addressed the Bergama peasants by stating:

“From now on, none of the presidents, prime ministers, or governors can resist against this decision. It is over now. I do not believe anyone can resist against your claims anymore” (Cumhuriyet, 18.10.1997).

Despite the optimistic mood of the Bergama activists, the Turkish government decided to re-evaluate all the permits and licences of the mine instead of closing it. Based on the investigations conducted as a result of the appeal of the Bergama Municipality and Bergama peasants, the Bergama Regional Court officially confirmed that the operations in the Ovacık gold mine still continued on December 12th, 1997. As part of its strategy to circumvent the court decision, Eurogold presented a report to the Ministry of Environment claiming that additional precautions were taken at the mine while continuing construction. The Bergama activists, on the other hand, carried on protesting and monitoring with the aim of drawing
attention to the lack of implementation of court decisions and keeping the issue on the agenda.\(^6\)

On March 8\(^{th}\) 1999, the Turkish Prime Ministry ordered The Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK), the national research organization, to form a commission of experts to investigate whether risks in Bergama mine were as significant as voiced in the juridical decisions and if so, to determine whether these risks could be avoided with additional precautions. In October 1999, TÜBİTAK issued a controversial report and declared that the company had constructed the mine according to proper safety standards and had also installed further precautions (TÜBİTAK-YDABÇAG evaluation report, 1999). \(^7\)

Based on the report of TÜBİTAK, on April 5\(^{th}\), 2000, the under-Secretariat of Prime Ministry instructed six related ministries- Ministries of Domestic Affairs, Health, Public Works, Energy and Natural Resources, Forestry and Environment- to authorize the operation of the mine by granting new licences based on the fact that the risks that the Council of State had specified no longer existed (Hürriyet, 13.06. 2000; Çoban, 2002; Reinart, 2003; Özkan, 2004).

In contradiction to the binding court decisions, the ministries issued the new permits and licenses to the mine allowing its operations. Additionally, the Ministry of Health issued one-year test run permission to Normandy, the successor company of Eurogold, and the mine went into trial production in May 2001. A group of villagers and the İzmir Bar Association filed a case demanding the cancellation of the “illegal instruction” given by the Prime Ministry in August 2000, and resultantly, on June 1, 2001, the 1\(^{st}\) Administrative Court of İzmir decided

\(^6\) For instance, in March 1999, the Bergama peasants staged a protest by forming a human chain around the mine pit when cyanide was brought in. As a consequence, Eurogold had to move cyanide to another mining area in Kütahya away from the region. The Bergama activists traced the location of cyanide stocks of Eurogold, and they staged another protest in Kütahya (Reinart, 2003: 117).

\(^7\) In the report, the necessary technologies implemented are listed as a Ferric Sulphate unit, a carbonate barrier, a gas differentiator to the chimney, an additional reservoir, two additional measurement units and an additional wall to strengthen the waste pool. Also against the claims of an earthquake risk, the scientists in the commission argued that the fault line did not pass under the mine (TÜBİTAK- YDABÇAG evaluation report, 1999). However, all these arguments were challenged by anti-gold mine scientists CSOs s who claimed that the risks were deliberately overlooked or minimized in the TÜBİTAK-YDABÇAG report (TMMOB, 2003; Reinart, 2003).
that the permits given to the mine were illegal and the commission of the Prime Ministry was incompatible with the principle of rule of law (Cangı, 2003).

In January 2002, the İzmir 3rd Administrative Court, and consecutively the Council of State, decided to cancel the mine’s licence of one-year trial production granted by the Ministry of Health. The court decision stated that the detrimental consequences likely to arise due to the hazards of cyanide leach method could not be compensated, was and ordered the Ovacık gold mine to be closed within a month (Cangı, 2003). In April 2, 2002, the mine was closed by the İzmir Governor after the İzmir Bar’s appeal to the Ministry of Health and the governor of İzmir to implement the decision. However, only one day after the closure, the mine was re-opened based on the Council of Ministers’ in-principle-decision on March 29th, 2002 which stressed that the operation of the gold mine was a necessity for the economic welfare of Turkey. This decision also opened the way for full production of the mine. The İzmir Bar Association and its lawyers criticised the decision of the Council of Ministers by emphasizing the government’s ‘secret’ decision to be an action breaching the ‘rule of law’ principle. The State of Council reversed the principle decision of the Council of Ministers on June 23nd, 2004. Newmont Mining Corporation, the then-owner of the Ovacık gold mine, applied to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, presenting a new environmental impact assessment (EIA) report. On 27 August, 2004, the ministry announced that the operation of the mine did not entail any risks any longer based on the renewed report (Cangı, 2005). The 1st Administrative Court of İzmir suspended the validity of the EIA based licence issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry on 14 March, 2005. The 4th Administrative Court of İzmir annulled the building scheme permit of the mine on 24 January, 2006. The Council of

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8 Right after the closure decision of the court, Normandy appealed to the government based on their contract which stated that company had the right to file for a compensation of 300 million USD in case the rights for the operation of the mine were cancelled (Milliyet, 06.01.2001).

9 Noyan Özkan who was then the head of the İzmir Bar Association and also a participant in the Bergama movement network, pointed out that the decision ruling was not ratified by the president, nor had it been published in the Official Gazette, thus giving the decision a secret status (www.ntvmsnbc.com, 18.06.2002).
State approved the local court’s decision to cancel the gold mine’s permits about the use of forest areas (Hürriyet, 25.07.2006). On December 30th, 2008, the Council of State approved the annulment of the permit issued for the mine based on the 2004 EIA report, and with the serving of the high court decision to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, the legal basis of the Ovacık gold mine was undermined once more. In February 2009, another EIA report which stated that there were no impediments for the operation of the Ovacık gold mine was released. Attorneys of the Bergama peasants with the support of TMMOB launched a lawsuit for the annulment of the last EIA.

In short, even though the Bergama activists attained numerous victories in their prolonged legal struggle, the Ovacık mine continued to operate even though necessary and valid legal licenses and permits were annulled by court decisions. The mining TNC(s) circumvented court decisions with the facilitation of the Turkish governments throughout the process. In other words, the governments either found loopholes in the legal system or simply neglected the court decisions which enabled the mine to operate.10

b. State responsiveness:

Throughout the Bergama movement, the Turkish state and its various institutions acted in a non-responsive and exclusionist fashion, perceived as such by the Bergama activists. First, even though the Turkish state had been undergoing a structural change as a result of the economic and political transformations since the 1980s, various parts of the state did not want to lose their grip on society (İnsel, 1996). Resultantly, the state’s priorities of territorial integrity and security impeded the inclusion of civil society actors into decision-making processes, especially because of rising identity claims (Keyman, 2005). Second, developmentalism continued to be the basic premise of Turkish politics and source of state

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10 According the TMMOB’s report (2003b), Newmont lacked official permits or licences which were required to operate the Ovacık gold mine such as the Emission Licence and Sanitary Law permit from the Ministry of Health, Land Zone Plans, Local Land Zone Plans, Construction Licences, and Building Usage Licences from the Ministry of Public Works. Other permits such as the Temporary Mine Operation and Plant Selection Licences, and Site Selection Permission required from the Ministry of Health were expired.
legitimacy even under the neoliberal model. In congruence with the Kemalist tenet of the ‘catching-up’ idea\textsuperscript{11}, economic growth and development were seen as the remedy for societal problems and the central component of modernization under the neoliberal economic model (Adaman and Arsel, 2005b; Arsel, 2005). Accordingly, integration into the global market and investments of TNCs were seen as indispensible components of economic growth and development which made the state an ally of TNCs. In that regard, the Turkish state acted as a “regressive globalizationist” which applied the economic requirements of capitalist globalization, but remained reluctant about introducing political liberalism.

These factors culminated in the negligence of societal demands by the state with respect to environmental issues. The Turkish state neither informed locals nor asked their opinions about the Ovacık gold mine project during its preliminary stage. The state overlooked the demands and claims of the Bergama peasants after the project was put into practice as well. Governments either did not interfere in the process or facilitated the work of the mining TNCs. Without exception, all governments were unwilling in applying the court decisions and closing the mine which was perceived as the main indicator for the non-responsiveness of the state by the Bergama activists (P/A 5, 6, 9, 11). In fact, several ministers from various Turkish governments made supportive remarks about the Bergama movement throughout the process. In these statements, the government members promised to make the issue a part of government agenda in order to resolve the conflict and underlined the binding power of the court decisions. Furthermore, some government members even called on Eurogold to stop its operations until the final decision was made (Yeni Yüzyıl, 11.05.1997; Yeni Asr, 03.07.1997; Yeni Asr, 05.07.1997; Yeni Asr, 11.07.1997; Radikal, 13.07.1997; Radikal, 23.07.1997; Radikal, 21.08.1997; Cumhuriyet 29.08.1997; Kuzey Ege, 08.09.1997; Gazete Ege, 11.10.1997; Cumhuriyet, 21.10.1997; Kuzey Ege, 07.04.2003). Yet, the support

\textsuperscript{11} See Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis.
of government members was tentative and inconsistent. For instance, shortly after her statements that the court decisions would be implemented and Eurogold would be asked to stop its operations, the then-Environmental Minister, İmren Aykut accused the Bergama peasants of ‘pushing the limits’ and claimed that the court decisions were not ordering the company to shut the mine down completely (Sabah, 13.07.1997; Milliyet, 23.07.1997; Kuzey Ege, Cumhuriyet, 29.07.1997; 20.10.1997). Similarly, although the then-State Minister in Charge of Mining, Kazım Yücelen, stated that Eurogold should comply with the court decisions, he concomitantly said that the Bergama movement went ‘beyond limits of tolerance’ (Yeni Asır, 11.07.1997; Sabah, 13.07.1997). On the other hand, other members of different governments predominantly made overt declarations for the working of the mine. In his defence of the Ovacık gold mine, the then-Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Recai Kutan, claimed that cyanide gold mining did not ever cause any accidents leading to human life loss, and it would not have any permanent impacts on the environment (Radikal, 28.03.1997). The then-State Minister in Charge of Mining, Teoman Rıza Güneri, depicted the Bergama movement as a ‘political show’ in which ‘ignorant’ peasants were manipulated (Zaman, 27.04.1997). The then-Health Minister, Osman Durmuş who had declined the Bergama activists’ request for a meeting in Ankara in 2001, claimed that the Bergama peasants were misled by forces which tried to harm the Turkish economy when justifying the controversial decision of the Council of Ministers in 2002 (Reinart, 2003: 145; Radikal, 05.04.2002). Overall, these governments commonly brought forth three sets of economic factors for allowing the operation of the mine. First, they argued that closing the mine would bring along a huge burden on the national economy since the state would be forced to pay compensation for violating their agreements with TNC(s). Second, it was claimed that the Turkish economy would fail to receive a considerable amount of input expected from the working of the mine. Third, governments also referred to the alleged risks of scaring foreign
investors away from Turkey which were claimed to be detrimental for the mining sector as well as other sectors (Cumhuriyet, 21.10.1997). In fact, these claims were backed up by the other sections of the pro-mine camp in general including journalists and miners’ associations (Sabah, 11.09.2001; Sabah, 05.04.2005). Moreover, similar evaluations were expressed by the actors of the neo-liberal network at the transnational level. In the World Development Report 2003, the World Bank gave the Bergama movement as an exemplar of local resistances interrupting ‘extractive industries operations’ which brought high direct costs to ‘the private sector, the public sector, and everyone else’ (The World Development Report, 2003: 78). Describing extractive industries as a necessary means to overcome poverty and achieve development, the World Bank advocated a more inclusionary project implementation process which would incorporate local populations and pre-empt any possible grievances. All the governments in power throughout the Bergama movement employed the same approach as that of the transnational capitalist class, summarized best in the words of the then Environmental Minister Ziyaettin Tokar: “We cannot be the poor guardians of rich resources” (Cumhuriyet, 29.05.1997).

A similar attitude existed in the approaches of state institutions other than governments. The Bergama activists sent letters to the president of Turkey at the time, Süleyman Demirel, in order to get his support (Yeni Asrır, 26.05.1997, 07.06.1997). However, even though Demirel said “[w]e cannot allow things which will put public health in danger” referring to the Ovacık gold mine (Milliyet, 03.08.1997), he assured the Eurogold executives that the Turkish state would comply with the previously signed agreements (Zaman, 29.06.1997). Likewise, civilian and military bureaucracy espoused the operations of the mining TNC(s). On October 27th, 2002, several top rank military officers visited the Ovacık gold mine plant and presented a plaque to the Normandy authorities, which was interpreted by the Bergama activists as an open display of military’s support for the gold mine (Radikal,
With respect to the civilian bureaucracy, governors and sub-governors in charge were constantly accused of not exercising their authority to shut the mine down based on the court decisions or forestalling the work of scientists who wanted to monitor the health standards in the region (Yeni Asır, 03.07.1997; E/E 2, 3, 17).

General mistrust towards the state mounted gradually throughout the process (E/E 2; P/A 4, 28). In the initial stages of the movement, the peasants had high hopes with respect to their state. For instance, each election period and changes in the composition of governments were perceived as a political opportunity for winning their cause (E/E 9; P/A 6, 15). In addition to expressing their escalating hopes in ‘new’ governments, they put on hold their protests in order to see new governments’ approach (Yeni Asır, 29.06.1997, 01.07.1997). However, rising expectations with shifting alignments in the governmental structure declined throughout the process, since none of the governments took action against the mining TNCs (P/A 3, 6, 11).

Overall, the state denied its own citizens’ rights in return for benefits from globalization such as FDI. As perceived by the Bergama activists, the state institutions and actors including governments, presidents, civilian and military bureaucracy were the allies of the mining TNCs looking out for their interests. Put differently, state authorities and institutions were more open to the TNCs in comparison to citizens. This was summarized in the words of one of the movement elite as follows:

“They [Eurogold] even thought of giving a gold bar as a gift to President Demirel. However, they withheld this move because they feared public reaction. Then, the court decisions were applied for a short while. They were involved in lobbying activities at Ankara very strongly. They engaged ambassadors as well. They can easily get appointments from the prime minister and ministers. There has been an intense level of propaganda for gold extraction” (E/E 16).

According to the villagers, what used to be nation-state was becoming the ‘company-state’ under the globalization process which referred to the transfer of power of the state to the...
transnational companies (P/A 5). In the initial stages of the project, Eurogold offered infrastructural improvements in the villages by building schools, mosques, and public fountains as part of its strategy to convince the locals and pre-empt any possible anti-mine opposition. However, peasants were sceptical about these offers since the company offered what the community already had rather than what they needed. Besides, the company targeted villages surrounding the mine plant rather than other villagers in the region which were in need (P/A 9, 11). As described by one of the movement elite, the peasants were puzzled with the fact that company was taking over the duties of their state by building roads, mosques, sewages, and schools:

“To the company they say you are not the state. But, [they see that] the company does what the state is supposed to do” (E/E 5).

Therefore, globalization exacerbated the traditional exclusionary character of the Turkish state since universalistic duties of the state were taken over by TNCs, and the state was reduced to protecting the company’s rights instead of its own citizens’ (E/E 6).

On the other hand, the state was not a unified structure in the eyes of the villagers (P/A 4, 10; E/E 2). They claimed that the judiciary was fulfilling its role of acting according to the constitution and legal codes, which set it apart from other state institutions. Facing a fragmented state structure, the Bergama peasants believed that they could benefit from the divisions within the state. In that sense, the Bergama activists viewed legal institutions as an opportunity to overcome the general non-responsive and exclusionary character of the state (E/E 2, 3). In that regard, they sued the government members at the time and deputy governor of İzmir, claiming that they acted against the constitution by failing to enforce the Council of State decision within the indicated 30-days time in 1997. On September 25, 2001, the 4th Division of Court of Appeal sentenced the then prime minister, 3 ministers, and İzmir governor to pay damages to the peasants for allowing the mine to run in violation of the court decision and the principle of rule-of-law.
c. Political Allies at the National Level

The Bergama activists were engaged in a laborious effort to find allies both at the national and local levels in order to widen and strengthen their movement network which in turn increase their effectiveness. Among the major supporters of the Bergama movement at the national level were NGOs, politicians, scientists, and journalists. With the support of these allies, the Bergama activists aimed to get the support of the general public and influence the national political decision-making centres to achieve favourable policy changes.

The Bergama movement was first mobilized in the early 1990s when the environmental movement was expanding with more and new actors engaging in multiple issues. The timing of the Bergama movement meant that various environmental organizations and groups were available as allies. However, as Kousis (1999) indicates the presence of local movements and widespread environmental concerns does not necessarily lead to the formation of networks among environmental movement organizations (EMOs) at the national level. For instance, in Southern European countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal there have been a considerable number of environmental local movements that continue to exist as local initiatives without having any network ties. This is because environmental activism at the national level faced obstacles such as unfavourable political structures, lack of resources, and low levels of environmental commitment and consciousness in those countries (Kousis, 1999). In a similar way, even though environmental activism escalated with respect to the number of environmental organizations and their areas of specialization, environmental initiatives failed to create an extensive and intensified environmental movement network. First, environmental groups failed to reach out to masses which meant that a grassroots basis could not be maintained. Secondly, although organizations were specialized in specific environmental issues, links among themselves continued to be weak. Rather, co-operation and
collaboration among environmental movement actors remained sporadic. Therefore, in spite of several successful campaigns launched against thermal and nuclear power plants, environmental movement actors remained scattered and isolated without a sustained area of convergence.\textsuperscript{12} Hence, the Bergama movement could not rely on a well-functioning and extensive environmental network at the national level. Instead, they received support from several environmental groups and organizations on a tentative and limited basis.

The Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and for the Protection of Natural Habitats (TEMA) was one of the national environmental CSOs which provided support for the Bergama movement. TEMA is an environmental NGO with a preservationist outlook which in general refrains from taking a critical stand, engaging mostly in legal struggles and lobbying.\textsuperscript{13} In fact, it was hesitant about giving support to the movement initially. It was only after the industrious efforts of one of the committed scientists, who was also on the TEMA’s board of advisors, that the link was established. Even though TEMA first indicated that gold mining with cyanide was not among their priority issues, the organization was convinced to give support as a result of successful framing of the movement elite. Accordingly, it was pinpointed that the violation of laws with respect to the Bergama case had a transcendental character beyond the issue of gold mining which had to do with the lack of implementation of the law in environmental issues:

“TEMA initially gave support to the movement as a result of my efforts. I drew their attention by telling them about what was really going on in Bergama. They said “We are not involved in industry related contentions”. I replied them by saying ‘What does it mean industrial? It has a legal dimension. You cannot refrain from acting” (E/E 9).

In order to support the Bergama activists, TEMA released several press statements in which the pro-mine scientists and governments were criticized for not behaving as principles

\textsuperscript{12} Please see chapter 4 for a more detailed analysis of environmental activism in Turkey.
\textsuperscript{13} TEMA was founded in 1992 by several leading business persons and industrialists with the objective of combating soil erosion and deforestation in Turkey. As one of the most-well known environmental organizations in Turkey with a vast number of voluntary representative local chapters, TEMA mainly engaged in public awareness about environmental issues through campaigns and lobbying (Adem, 2005; Kalaycıoğlu and Gönel, 2005).
and ethics of law and science required (Hürriyet, 15.06.2000; Hürriyet, 21.06.2000; Milliyet, 23.06.2000). Moreover, TEMA also filed a lawsuit against the Council of State for shutting down the mine by claiming that running the mine without licences meant violation of laws (Milliyet, 23.06.2000). Another major event of TEMA for raising public consciousness about the hazards of gold-mining with cyanide was the conference which was organized with the participation of scientists in June 2000. Additionally, TEMA placed campaign advertisements in the newspapers (E/E 9). Yet, TEMA’s support was sustained only for a short span of time. Especially after the espionage case according to which the Bergama activists were accused of working for the interests of ‘external’ forces\textsuperscript{14}, TEMA withdrew itself from the movement (E/E 9; Özkan, 2004).\textsuperscript{15}

Also, other national and local environmental organizations and platforms such as the Protection and Promotion of the Environment and Cultural Heritage (ÇEKÜL), Friends of the World Association, Environmental Passengers Without Borders, the SOS Environmental Platform of İstanbul, the East Mediterranean Environment Platform, and the Adana Association of Environmental Volunteers displayed their solidarity with the Bergama activists through demonstrations and press releases (Cumhuriyet, 23.02, 1997). Involvement of these environmental organizations in the Bergama network contributed mostly to bringing the issue to the national public agenda. On the other hand, the Bergama movement facilitated environmental organizations to share the same platform.

With respect to the wider circle of civil society, numerous NGOs specialized over a wide array of issues such as human rights, law, occupational interests, tourism, and globalization as well as several universities backed the Bergama movement. Main supportive civil society actors at the national level consisted of the Civil Platform Against the

\textsuperscript{14} Please see chapter 8 for detailed analysis.

\textsuperscript{15} Later on, Hayrettin Karaca, the founder and honorary president of TEMA, stated that gold should be extracted, yet, without damaging the environment since gold was a precious natural resource to be exploited for the national economy (Milliyet, 27.04.2008). Being an industrialist himself, Karaca’s statement was in contradiction with the Bergama activists who questioned the developmentalist logic.
Impositions of Chemical Engineering Industry (KİMDASKİ), the Anti-MAI Coalition in Turkey, the Progressive Lawyers Association, the Human Rights Association (İHD), the Association of Turkish Travel Agencies (TURSAB), the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) and its various member chambers, the Turkish Medical Association (TTB), Association for Support of Contemporary Living (ÇYDD), various Bar Associations, professors from Istanbul Technical University (İTÜ), Middle Eastern Technical University (ODTÜ), Aegean University, İstanbul University, and September 9 University (E/E 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 40; P/A 9, 11, 15). Among them, TTB, TMMOB and its member chambers stood out as the crucial allies that remained within the Bergama movement network throughout the process. First, they provided scientific information and expertise to the Bergama peasants which were mainly used during the legal cases. Furthermore, TMMOB released its own scientific reports criticizing the arguments of the TNC(s), governments, and pro-mine scientists (TMMOB report, 2001, 2003; TTB report, 2001). In that regard, criticisms of TMMOB and TTB were important resources for the Bergama activists to object to the controversial TÜBİTAK-YDABÇAG evaluation report on scientific grounds (Reinart, 2003: 125-129; TMMOB report, 2001). Secondly, TTB, TMMOB and its member chambers released individual or joint press statements criticising governments publicly (Kuzey Ege, 09.07.2001; Bianet, 03.04, 2002; Radikal 13.08.2003). Third, they staged protests in support of the Bergama activists (Yeni Asır, 05.10.1997; Yeni Yüzyıl, 16.10.1997). Fourth, they either filed lawsuits or appeared as supporters in courts. Additionally, TTB conferred the Bergama peasants its annual award for contributions to public health with the aim of increasing the visibility of the Bergama movement (Hürriyet, 05.11.1997).

Other civil society actors’ support came in the forms of providing resources for protests and legitimacy. For instance, TURSAB provided the Bergama peasants with buses to
travel and places for accommodation during their protests (P/A 15). Scientists and academics organized scientific meetings and conferences about the gold mining issue. Also, through press releases, meetings, and demonstrations, CSOs lent their names and reputation to the Bergama movement which increased its legitimacy. Additionally, many CSOs acted as friends at courts providing solidarity with the Bergama activists. For example, during the court hearing over the espionage case, representatives of the İHD, the EU Agency of Turkey, the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, TMMOB, and Human Rights Foundation were present among the audience (Radikal, 27.12.2002). Moreover, CSO allies also tried to protect the Bergama activists against state repression. Drawing attention to the human rights aspect of the struggle, İHD made calls for the release of the protestors whenever they were arrested during their protests and kept it on the public agenda as it aimed to do with a press release when Konyar was in custody for 7 days in April, 2002 (İHD Press Release, 2002).

Among all these civil society actors, the Civil Platform Against the Impositions of Chemical Engineering Industry (KİMDASKİ) and the Anti-MAI Coalition occupied important roles since not only did they provide resources and connections, but they were also involved in framing processes with respect to globalization. KİMDASKİ was a national advocacy network working on the issue of cyanide based gold mining. The main objective of KİMDASKİ is to contest the spread of gold mining projects with cyanide throughout Turkey. In that regard, they warn locals and the general public about the gold mining projects and their possible hazardous impacts on environment. To that end, they carried out activities like translating documents on gold mining and participating in conferences to provide scientific information. KİMDASKİ activists organized informative meetings in the Bergama villages through which they tried to raise consciousness among the Bergama peasants about capitalist

16 Bergama’s historical value as a touristic site and its proximity to the touristic sites of İzmir and its surrounding worked as an advantage for the Bergama movement in terms of getting the support of TURSAB.
17 In 2003, the Bergama protesters including Sefa Taşkın, Oktay Konyar, Birsel Lemke, and peasants were accused of engaging in acts against the national interests of Turkey in cooperation with the German NGOs. This case created a detrimental impact on the Bergama movement which will be discussed in the next chapter.
globalization. In other words, they indicated that the grievances of the Bergama peasants were
directly linked to capitalist globalization and the struggle against gold mining should not be
confined within the limits of Bergama. Additionally, they underlined that similar processes of
gold mining were taking place in other parts of Turkey in congruence with global level
developments. KIMDASKI took over the role of establishing links between the Bergama
peasants and other localities in Turkey which were under similar gold mining threats in the
second half of the 1990s (E/E 40).

At the same time, the Bergama movement activists coalesced with the Turkish leg of
the anti-MAI movement, the Anti-MAI Coalition. The Anti-MAI Coalition was established in
June 1998 as a network consisting of several trade unions, political groups, environmental
organizations and other critical CSOs from all over Turkey. In fact, the Anti-MAI Coalition
was affiliated with KIMDASKI since founders of these two groups took part in both
networks. The initial contacts of the Anti-MAI Coalition with the Bergama Movement
occurred through KIMDASKI. Even though KIMDASKI had a transnational approach
attempting to forge links with actors outside Turkey, none of its participants were fluent in
any foreign languages. Gaye Yılmaz, one of the founders of the Anti-MAI Coalition and an
academic doing research for trade unions and, assisted KIMDASKI in translating documents
and maintaining KIMDASKI’s transnational links. She got in touch with the Bergama
movement for the first time in 1996 through her work in KIMDASKI. Based on that link, the
Anti-MAI Coalition activists developed dense relations with the Bergama movement activists
when the coalition was formed in 1998. Alliance with the Anti-MAI Coalition served two
purposes. First, the Bergama movement activists obtained information about capitalist
globalization in relation to gold mining since the anti-MAI activists were involved in the work
of accumulating general information on capitalist globalization.

“....the ones who were leading the movement asked me for help about understanding political-economy aspect of
the process and its links with globalization and international institutions which are my fields of expertise” (E/E
40).
Secondly, the Anti-MAI Coalition also played an important role in sounding the claims of the Bergama movement outside the borders of Turkey throughout the global networks of anti-capitalist globalization. In October 1998, the representatives of the Turkish anti-MAI group communicated the contentions of the Bergama movement in a speech during the protests against negotiations over the MAI treaty among the OECD countries in Paris. Anti-MAI activists were also involved in the preparation meeting for the Seattle Protest in Geneva where they informed groups from different parts of the world about what was happening in Bergama with respect to the anti-mine movement. Additionally, the Anti-MAI Coalition activists distributed pamphlets about the Bergama movement to the environmental and agricultural groups during the Seattle Protests in 1999. Since Yılmaz, the spokesperson of the Anti-MAI Coalition, was also a prominent trade unionist, she had the chance to bring the Bergama movement to the agenda of international trade union meetings in which she participated.

Overall, according to the framing of the anti-MAI movement activists, contention in Bergama was caused by the global system. They viewed cyanide-leach method based gold mining similar to the several problems of the capitalist globalization such as privatization of public services, commodification of nature, attacks on labour and other problems sourced by capitalism. Criticizing national perspectives, they related the Bergama contention to similar struggles taking place elsewhere both in Turkey and around the world. In this way, the anti-MAI activists aimed to integrate Bergama movement in the broader resistance at the global level against the capitalist globalization.

Lastly, even though many of the elite of the Bergama movement who maintained links with allies belonged to the political left tradition, the Bergama movement’s relations with trade unions remained weak. Leaving aside tentative and temporary support coming in the form of a few press releases and participation in several petition signing campaigns, trade
unions did not lend an open and solid support for the Bergama activists. This was mainly due to the structural fact that labour and environmental conflicts were treated as two separate issues both by trade unions and environmental groups in Turkey in general. As one of the prominent academics who worked for trade unions pointed out:

“Trade unions were quite reluctant to support to the Bergama movement. This is because environmental problems are not perceived as class-based, structural or systemic issues in Turkey. It is not only labour organizations, but also pro-labour political parties and purely environmental organizations share this point of view. Both labour organizations and environmentalist groups have a sectarian approach to the issue, and they all lack sufficient knowledge about its political economy aspect. According to the unions, environmentalism is the domain of environmentalists solely. As for the environmentalist organizations, the environment is too important to mix with labour politics” (E/E 40).

Overall, civil society actors at the national level were evaluated as crucial and effective allies by the Bergama activists. Yet, apart from TTB, TMMOB and its member chambers, the support of civil society actors at the national level fluctuated. At the peak of the protests, higher levels of support from the civil society actors were achieved. However, there was a decrease in the overall participation of civil society actors at the national level in the beginning of 2000s. This is due to several factors. First, the aforementioned structural problems of civil society in Turkey such as the inadequacy of resources, the lack of sustained networks, cleavages, and state tutelage inhibited a more coherent and sustained form of civil society support. Second, there were differences between the Bergama activists and civil society actors with respect to strategic and tactical preferences. This divergence sharpened after Konyar’s influence increased within the grassroots sub-network. In this period, the Bergama peasants opted for non-conventional, sudden, and expressive forms of protest which did not fit with more bureaucratically organized CSOs. One spokesperson of the Bergama peasants claimed civil society organizations did not have any grassroots basis, and CSOs were inflexible and formal when taking decisions (E/E 2). Third, as many peasant activists claim, the strategy of keeping non-peasants at a distance which was employed during the later stages of the movement, led to the decline in the civil society support.

18 Please see chapter 4 for a detailed analysis.
Political parties were one of the main targets to forge alliances with the Bergama activists. Nevertheless, the Bergama activists strategically framed their movement as ‘beyond political party politics’ (P/A 2, 8, 15, 27, 28; E/E 2, 3, 7, 9, 11). First, they aimed to preserve their grassroots position without being incorporated by any political party organization. Accordingly, they constantly emphasized that the Bergama movement was an environmental movement of peasants dissociated from particularistic interests of any political parties. In that sense, it was important not to be mentioned together with specific political parties which would have damaged the image they intended to convey. In other words, they aimed to ward off potential accusations of being manipulated by a specific political party or a political group. Second, it was also important for the Bergama activists to get wider public and political support and sympathy as much as possible. In that sense, they intended to transcend existing political cleavages in order to widen their support base. Third, peasants and other activists within the Bergama movement were not monolithic in their political views. Accordingly, affiliation to a specific political movement would have decreased levels of peasant participation in the movement. There was also the risk of losing non-peasant activists with varying political views. Finally, they did not want their aggrieved issue either to be used by politicians for their own political purposes or to be overshadowed by other issues (E/E 2, 3, 7; P/A 5, 8, 9, 11, 27).

Yet, as the POS analysis underlines, political parties are important allies of social movements that provide resources, take issues to the formal political institutions, sometimes act as a shield against state repression, and provide legitimacy. Seeing political parties as potential allies, the Bergama activists constantly put effort in getting political parties as their allies. Yet, the general political party composition in Turkey turned this search into a difficult task for the Bergama peasants. This was mainly due to the fact that environmental concerns

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19 Please see chapter 2 for a detailed analysis of Political Process Theory.
and issues were not among the priority issues of any of the political parties including ‘social
democratic parties’ pursuing a developmentalist agenda apart from several individual
politicians and MPs.

At first glance, Green Parties might be assumed to be another natural ally for
environmental movements, given their shared concerns. Even though Green Parties appear as
one of the means of influencing policy for environmental activists when and where Greens
enter the parliament, the relationship between the two is uneasy. Green Parties are not
consistently part of the environmental movement nor do they directly reflect the demands and
interests of the environmental movement. Environmental movements strictly concentrate on
environmental concerns. On the other hand, as parties contending in elections, Green Parties
extend their agenda to other issues in order to ward off accusations of being ‘single-issue’
parties which creates a discrepancy between the agendas and concerns of environmental
movements and the Greens (Rootes, 1997, 2004). In political contexts where they do not
achieve electoral success, Green Parties move closer to environmental movements and they
tend to ‘represent themselves as part of the environmental movement’ (Rootes, 2004. 624). The Bergama movement was deprived of even such a potential ally which would voice their struggle within the formal political circles.

In fact, the Green Party of Turkey was founded in 1988 in the aftermath of the military
coup, its foundation paradoxically facilitated by the political context in which all pre-existing
political parties as well as political activity of CSOs were banned, since the incipient
environmental movement was considered to be harmless and tolerated. The foundation of the
Green Party in Turkey emerged out of the search for an organization that would bring the
scattered environmental CSOs together (Ergen, 1994). In the short-lived phase until the party
was closed, the Greens were active in organizing protests and campaigns for environmental
problems together with the locals affected, cooperating with environmental organizations,
raising environmental awareness through the organization of conferences, meetings and seminars, and establishing networks with international environmental organizations and other green parties (Duru, 2002). In short, the Greens acted as an organization which is part of the environmental movement, rather than as a political party working to expand its electorate (ibid). Within a short span of time, conflicts within the party emerged, grouped around two main axes. One group argued that environmental problems could be resolved by improving the existing system while another group proposed radical change which involved the transformation of daily practices as well as the political system. The latter (İzmir Greens) argued that the party should engage more effectively with issues such as human rights, Kurdish rights, feminism, and anti-war struggles. They also approached sustainable development more critically (ibid: 11). These internal divisions culminated in a party congress in which all members decided to dissolve the congress, effectively ending the party in 1994. Even though the Green Party did not exist by the time Bergama activists mobilized, its legacy was crucial. Many of the former members of Greens took active roles in the formation of the Bergama movement as local influential allies. The networks established among the local Green Party members in İzmir were still intact. These networks among various CSOs and individual activists were extensively utilized especially during the initial mobilization period of the Bergama movement, when an anti-gold mining network was being formed beyond limits of villages.

Lacking such as a potential ally, the Bergama peasants continuously tried to forge links with politicians from the mainstream political parties which had seats in the parliament. For that purpose, the Bergama peasants visited MPs and various political party representatives in the parliament (E/E 3; P/A 9, 10). Their aim was to convince these potential influential allies of the injustice of their situation with the intention of making an impact on decision-

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20 The Green party was recently revived in 2008.
making processes. On April 24th 1996, a delegation of Bergama activists including muhtars of 16 villages, Taşkın, and several politicians and environmentalists visited the Parliament and got in touch with MPs (Kuzey Ege, 29.04.1997) A second visit was made to Ankara on May 7th, 1997 during which around one thousand Bergama villagers accompanied by Konyar and Taşkın visited the government members, MPs and other politicians (E/E 3; P/A 9; Cumhuriyet, 08.05.1997; Cumhuriyet, 09.05.1997).

During the second visit to Ankara, the Bergama peasants managed to get acquainted with an MP from the centre-right Motherland Party (ANAP) who acted as one of their main supporters in the parliament (P/A 5, 9, 10, 22, 27, 28). Işın Çelebi, who had already acquired information about the hazards of the cyanide leach method and the Ovacık gold mine, forged good relations with the Bergama peasants as an MP from the İzmir district (E/E 31). On August 2nd, 1997, the Bergama peasants travelled to Çeşme, İzmir where the ESIAD (Aegean Industrialist and Businessmen) Meeting was held in order to meet with the ministers. After being obstructed by the state forces, only 15 peasants and Konyar were allowed to meet with the ministers. In the aftermath of the meeting, Çelebi who had become a state minister by that time, visited the rest of the villagers waiting about a hundred kilometres away, and promised them to apply the legal decisions (E/E 31; Milliyet, 03.08.1997; Gazete Ege, 03.08.1997).

Çelebi’s support continued in the form of making speeches, visiting Bergama and the villages, bringing the issue to the agenda of the parliament and the council of ministers during his term first as an MP and then as a minister (E/E 31; Hürriyet, 01.08.1997; Gazete Ege, 14.09.1997).

However, Çelebi constituted an exceptional case within the ranks of the centre right wing parties including quasi-liberal Motherland Party (ANAP) and True Path Party (DYP). Even though ANAP had a more positive attitude towards the Bergama peasants when in opposition, it took a pro-mine position when it came to power (E/E 3; Cumhuriyet, 09.05.1997). The other centre right party, DYP, as well as the other major political parties of
the right, the nationalist National Action Party (MHP) and the religious Welfare Party (RP), either remained indifferent when in opposition or sided with the TNC(s) when in government, advocating the view that the operation of the mine was beneficial for the national economy (Radikal, 28.03.1997; Yeni Yüzyıl 09.05.1997; 2002; Sabah 04.04.2002).

On the other hand, the Bergama activists had high expectations from the parliamentary left parties as social democratic parties have been one of the major allies of new social movements and worker’s movements in general. However, links with the social democratic parties at the national level remained limited and were only based on alliances forged with several individual MPs from the People’s Republican Party (CHP). These MPs, mostly from the İzmir district, gave their support to the Bergama activists by carrying the issue to the parliament through numerous parliamentary inquiries and speeches (TBMM Report, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998); making statements to the media against the operation of the mine and in support of the Bergama movement (Kuzey Ege, 09.12.1996; Yeni Yüzyıl, 05.07.1997; Cumhuriyet, 15.07.1997); and visiting villages in order to display their support (Kuzey Ege, 07.07.1997, 21.07.1997; Hürriyet 20.10.1997). As a result of such actions, certain CHP MPs were seen as ‘sincere’ and ‘genuine’ allies by the Bergama peasants (P/A 14, 26, 27). Yet, the Bergama peasants found the support of CHP insufficient in advocating their cause.

“Why didn’t Baykal [the then leader] come here? He sent Adnan Keskin [the then general secretary of CHP] instead. He should have come. There is a vote potential for his party here. We wouldn’t have eaten him alive (P/A 9).

“We do not trust politicians anymore. I think we should not believe in the words of any political parties including my party [CHP]” – from the statement of Konyar when he was the Bergama County Chairman of CHP (Gazete Ege, 14.09.1997).

Politicians from the other major social democratic party Democratic Left Party (DSP) remained more distant from the Bergama movement whether in opposition or in government. Only a few MPs showed occasional interest to the Bergama movement (Yeni Yüzyıl 05.07.1997; Cumhuriyet 15 07.1997; Milliyet 30.03.2002). On the other hand, several MPs
from the DSP overtly defended the operation of the mine claiming it was a necessity for the national economy and accusing the Bergama peasants of acting in the interests of ‘foreign’ powers (Cevizoğlu, 2008; Kuzey Ege 29.01.2001). In fact, the controversial re-opening of the gold mine based on the TÜBİTAK report and the principle decision of the Council of Ministers were taken by the coalition government led by DSP which contributed to the growing mistrust for the leader of DSP, Bülent Ecevit (P/A 6, 10).

On the other hand, smaller and marginal parties of the Left, mainly socialists and communists, were in support of and willing to coalesce with the Bergama movement. In fact, smaller left-wing political parties which are outside the parliament are more prone to build alliances with social movements in general, in addition to existing ideological proximities in-between the two. For the smaller political parties of the left, social movements appear as opportunities to expand their electorate basis and promote their parties in their competition with centre-left wing parties which mostly act like mass parties and may or may not lend their support to social movements (Kriesi et al., 2003; della Porta and Diani, 2006). That was also the case in Bergama since marginal left-wing political parties like the Labour Party (EMEP), Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖDP), and Workers Party (İP) were in support of the Bergama movement from the start (P/A 5, 6, 9, 11, 27; Kuzey Ege 09.07.2001). However, the Bergama peasants distanced themselves from these parties in spite of the availability of willing allies. Accordingly, the small left-wing parties were not allowed to take part in the protests visibly or speak on behalf of the Bergama peasants. In that sense, these parties remained as supporters only rather than becoming an integral part of the movement network. This strategic choice of the Bergama activists was in congruence with their general strategy of remaining autonomous from political parties. At the same time, the Bergama activists tried to prevent any perceptions of their movement as ‘marginal’ in the public eye and avoid any stigmatization of belonging to a certain political camp (E/E 2; P/A 27, 28).
According to the peasant activists, even though some alliances were forged with political parties especially when they were in opposition, these alliances were not sustained when political parties came to power. Having encountered 13 coalition governments throughout their movement, the Bergama peasants perceived election periods as an opportunity to get their claims accepted. However, when they suffered 13 disappointments, they changed their perceptions of political parties at the national level as opportunities. This was mainly due to the political articulations done by the political parties under the process of globalization. As De Leon et al. (2009) have argued, political parties do not simply rest themselves on pre-existing cleavages within society. Rather, they engage in the work of ‘political articulation’ which is reminiscent of framing processes of social movements. Political parties redefine and reconstruct grievances. Through the ‘process of interpellation of subjects’, social groups are brought together as part of a coherent ideological-political practice based on reconstructed grievances (De Leon et al., 2009: 198). Accordingly, centre-right with populist stances and the Islamic political camp with a national-communitarian and developmentalist approach gradually adopted globalization in their articulations, integrating neo-liberalism based on open-market reforms and FDI with conservatism (De Leon et al., 2009). On the other hand, political parties of the centre-left underwent a ‘localized’ crisis in addition to the global crisis of the left throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Excepting a short-lived attempt to bring forth leftist tendencies, the Kemalist tenets haunted the CHP which constructed its ideological framework on the backbone of secularism throughout the 1990s at the expense of its leftist inclinations (Kahraman, 2000; De Leon, et al., 2009). With respect to economic globalization, the CHP upheld a critical stance towards FDI stemming from its

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21 Please see Appendix H.
22 The Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP), a spin-off party from the pre-1980 CHP, had a more or less European type social democratic program, and it stood out as an exceptional case. SHP advocated pro-democratic ideas with respect to the Kurdish issue. During the 1994 elections, SHP coalesced with the pro-Kurdish party HEP and enabled Kurdish politicians to enter the parliament.
nationalist and statist aspects of its political articulation. Yet, towards the end of the 1990s, the globalizationist Third Way approach was attempted which soon failed due to contradictions with its Kemalist premises, leaving CHP in an ambivalent position.

In sum, from the 1990s on, the political parties in Turkey all complied with neo-liberalism, even if to varying degrees. Political parties both on left and right underlined the importance of FDI in their party programs. In that regard, both centre right and centre left acted as ‘recessive globalizers’, seeking economic benefit from capitalist globalization but overlooking the liberal version of human rights and the principle of rule of law. The environment was not a prioritized issue in their programs. In that respect, they kept finding loopholes in the legal system to facilitate the work of the activities of the, in effect becoming a part of the TCC As a result, there was a misfit between the frames of the Bergama activists and political articulations of parties which hindered the process of building sustained alliances.

d. Repression

The Turkish state has a long history of repression towards social movements. It raises costs, sometimes excessively high in the form of military coups, for social movement participants by using various coercive means. Nevertheless, the state has treated social movements selectively in terms of using repression since the beginning of the 1990s. Facing a plethora of mobilizations over diverse issues with the rise of new social the movements since the 1980s, the form of state response and the level of repression has depended on the content of grievances. As long as a movement is not perceived as a ‘threat’ to itself and to the economic and political system, the Turkish state approaches it relatively mildly. For instance, while the Kurdish movement which has been defined as a ‘threat’ to national integrity met

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23 None of the political parties put an emphasis on environmental issues in their election manifestos during the 1991 and 1995 elections (Adaman, 1997).
with harsh and brutal repressive measures (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997) the use of repression does not escalate to the same levels in the case of environmental movements.

Therefore, the Bergama movement had a comparative advantage in terms of repression by the state. Moreover, the repertoires of action which were exclusively based on non-violent civil disobedience protests was an additional factor for being subjected to relatively less repression and brutality. Still, the Bergama activists could not escape police brutality, arrests, or custodies. Rather, the state utilized a mixture of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policing styles against the Bergama movement activists which led to a neither stable nor uniform type of state behaviour. For instance, the required permits for the aforementioned Kuvvay-ı Milliye march were not acquired from state authorities, making it an ‘illegal’ protest. Yet, the gendarmerie allowed the protest march from Bergama to Çanakkale. During the protests, the Bergama activists were also extremely vigilant and meticulous about remaining at the fringes of the legal-illegal divide, and not provoking state forces. This was mainly due to the training provided by their local allies such as lawyers.

“They told us that it was a legal action as long as we walked just next to the road lines. If we were to walk one step inside those lines, it was illegal” (P/A 26).

In fact, the innovative protest forms were effective in preventing higher levels of police force brutality. Since the police and gendarmerie were not accustomed to such civil disobedience protests before, they were caught by surprise as they witnessed Bergama activists acting in surprising ways.

“The police force has established a new section to learn what civil disobedience is. The police who have been trained to suppress movements by using force were surprised. In one of the incidents, we formed a line up composed of 7-8 thousand people because the cyanide tanks were being brought. We started our protest. It was really hot. The police and the soldiers waiting for us were sweating. The village women gave their tissues, water and food to them. They were surprised. That is because they are not trained for such behaviour. The villagers see them as their sons and the soldiers see the villagers as their mothers. The soldiers are themselves mostly from villages. So the police have changed tactics. They started provoking. That’s what they want. In order to prevent that you cannot find a single stranger in our protests” (E/E 2).
Still, the state forces did not refrain from exercising pre-emptive measures in order to deter the Bergama peasants. For example, in October 1994, gendarmerie did not allow the press meeting of the Bergama activists in Çamköy to take place outdoors as it was originally scheduled, but indoors, in order to limit participation and prevent any post hoc demonstrations (Kuzey Ege, 15.10.1994). Also, just before the visit of the then-President of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel, to Bergama, the İzmir governor imposed a ‘protest ban’ on Bergama activists by stating that Taşkın would be held responsible for any sort of protest (Kuzey Ege, 15.11.1994).

As the number of protests mounted, the methods of the police and the gendarmerie became diversified. A police force squad with a police panzer was entrenched on the mine plant in order to provide protection (Kuzey Ege, 17.03.1997). There were regular identity checks by state forces on the peasants’ way to their fields (P/A 8, 15). A commando squad was settled in the mine with the claim of preventing any clashes (Kuzey Ege, 21.07.1997). The Bergama peasants interpreted the deployment of the commando squad and their training in and around the villages as acts of psychological intimidation. In fact, it was a crucial incident which made the Bergama peasants reconsider their views of the state. According to the peasant activists, their own state was using military forces against them to protect the mining TNC (E/E 2; P/A 11; Konyar in Reinart 2003: 85).

Apart from interventions of the state forces into the daily lives of peasants, demonstrations were interrupted by the police forces and the gendarmerie regularly. When a group of women from the Bergama villages marched to Bergama in order to present the sub-governor of Bergama with a petition regarding unpermitted dynamite use within the mine pit, the police did not let them reach the district building and kept protestors on the streets (Kuzey Ege, 17.03.1997). Similarly, fearing that they were at risk of getting sick with silicosiderosis because of the mine wastes, the Bergama peasants staged a protest in order to call on the sub-
governor to take pre-cautions. However, the gendarmerie did not let them travel from villages to Bergama with their vehicles. Instead, they walked for 10 kilometres to Bergama, and a delegation of 15 peasants was allowed to meet with the sub-governor.

Arrests and detentions in custody were also among the commonly used means of repression by state forces to which numerous peasant activists as well as spokespersons were subjected (E/E 2, 3; P/A 9, 11, 16, 25). Throughout the movement, Konyar, Taşkın, and the Bergama peasants were arrested and put on trial many times during their contention (E/E 2, 3; P/A 8, 9, 11, 15, 17). Furthermore, investigations were conducted and lawsuits were filed especially about spokespersons based on various charges. For instance, 81 activists including Taşkın, Engel, and Konyar were accused of forming an illegal organization, violating the 171th element of the Turkish Criminal Code. According to the accusations of the Bergama Administrative District, the village committees and Çev-Der were receiving financial support from several violent Marxist guerrilla groups and furthermore, they were acting under the direct influence of the extremist left-wing groups (E/E 3). On the other hand, Taşkın was charged with putting public resources of the Bergama municipality to the use of the movement, for instance by providing fuel used in peasants’ travels to protest sites. The State Security Court ruled out the case by saying there was no solid evidence supporting the accusations (E/E 3; P/A 11). In August 1997, he was again brought to trial for his involvement in protest activities as an elected mayor (Kuzey Ege, 25.08.1997). Konyar underwent several trials and was sentenced for conducting illegal protests. (Kuzey Ege, 05.10.2001). 58 activists were put on trial for their roles in the invasion of the mine in August 1997 (Kuzey Ege, 18.08.1997).

Against all of these repressive measures by the state, Konyar and the peasants developed unique practices and special codes among themselves to be used during their protest events. Through these codes and practices which worked as safety mechanisms, they
were able to communicate among themselves during protests without letting the police or gendarmerie know what they were about to do. For instance, various kinds of whistles numbered in different ways referred to different protest behaviour such as ‘march’, ‘sit-in’, ‘disperse’, and ‘gather’. In this way, they were able to detect infiltrators in their protest (E/E 2). Besides, women were usually lined in front of the marching masses during their demonstrations.

“Women had an advantage. If men walk in the frontlines, police and gendarmerie are more inclined to use physical force. That’s why women stood at the front when we marched. Our intention was to avoid fights and commotion” (P/A 20).

Also the gold mine area was occupied on 22 April, 1997, when all the police forces and gendarmerie were in the town of Bergama taking precautions for the national holiday parade. Seeing the absence of the state forces as an opportunity to stage their protest, peasants occupied the gold mine building tents on site and organizing a picnic inside (P/A 15).

On the other hand, concerns about avoiding repression led to changes in organizational structures which had a negative impact on the participatory democracy ideal of the Bergama movement (E/E 3, 11). The initial participatory organizational model was discarded and the movement’s decision-making processes became non-participatory. This was mainly due to state forces’ increasing capacity to take precautions for their protests as protest decisions were leaked. Instead, one of the spokesperson of the Bergama movement started deciding on protests and declared their action plans just before the protests took place only by letting a few “trustworthy” villagers in beforehand (E/E 2).

“In these types of grassroots movements, democracy does not work well. I tried it a lot. We made a decision and said “we will stage a protest today. We won’t send our kids to school”. On the same night, we suffer a raid by the gendarmerie. The sub-governor comes. The governor comes. They convince people....In any case they avert protests. However, when I come in at the last minute and knock on windows, or when I gather people and put them on a bus, no one knows anything. One day the peasants gave decision among themselves and said to me: ‘We talk about it [protest plans] because of our enthusiasm. Word spreads when we make preparations. You won’t tell us anything. You will come, and knock on our door...There is no more democracy [within the movement]. People participated in protests. However, there was no more a public decision-making process” (E/E 2).
Despite all these repressive measures used against them, the Bergama movement did not stop protesting. When they went on a witnessing trip to the abandoned copper mine in Balya- Balıkesir gendarmerie forces intervened by beating the activists during the sit-in organized when the activists learned that they were not allowed to enter Balya. According to the accounts of the peasant activists and spokespersons, it was one of the most brutal moments in the movement (P/A 8, 9, 11, 16, 22).

“When the peasants were beaten, they became even more determined....They showed an incredible response. They were over-excited. We came back to the village with Sefa Taşkın. There was a huge crowd, everyone was gathered waiting for us. I thought everyone was afraid and we would have problems for the next protest. But we were learning new things. Even if peasants do not respond to violence with violence, they got more ready for struggle, and they behave in a more organized way. After the Balya incident, we staged many protests. I think the Balya incident explains the determination of the peasants” (Konyar in Reinart, 2003: 107).

The participation of peasant activists in demonstrations remained high even in the aftermath of the Balya beating or similar incidents when excessive police brutality was used. In that sense, police brutality did not work as a constraint with a negative impact on the mobilization of the peasants. First, the level of overall repression directed at the Bergama movement was relatively lower in comparison to other movements which were seen as a threat to the state, secular order, and land integrity. Secondly, the Bergama activists’ insistence on non-violent protest forms led police forces to refrain from exerting more repression as well since using massive force against peaceful protestors would have undermined the legitimacy of the state. However, police brutality had a cumulative impact in the long run causing the exhaustion of peasants, in combination with other forms of repression such as legal investigations and stigmatization acts, which eventually led to decrease in the mobilization rates of the Bergama peasants.

**Political Opportunities at the Local Level**

As discussed above, political opportunities were not widely open for the Bergama peasants at the national level. In contrast, the local political context presented more opportunities for them. Throughout their movement, the Bergama peasants built alliances with
various politicians and civil society actors at the local level. In fact, many of these actors became committed activists. They joined the Bergama peasants in their struggle and constituted the Bergama movement network sharing the values, frames, interests and collective identity of the movement as discussed in the previous chapters. Furthermore, they took an active role and contributed to the formation of various elements of the Bergama movement such as strategies, frames, and protests. More specifically, the support of CSOs, scientists, and lawyers arrived mainly in the form of providing scientific information and legal aid. Additionally, they were engaged in protest activities, launching petition campaigns and staging demonstrations. They also connected the Bergama peasants with other supporters. The efforts of the local elite were valuable contributions for the Bergama peasants since they achieved credibility as well as resources. Furthermore, several local elite engaged in the movement as leaders/spokespersons. Thus, the line between allies and participants were transcended between the Bergama peasants and local civil society actors and politicians.

From the start, the local political opportunities have been largely open for the Bergama movement. Initially, the local branches of each national political party, either left of right, gave support to Taşkın in his opposition to Eurogold, leaving aside their ideological differences. In that sense, local politicians acted independently of national political parties. Yet the coalition of local politicians did not last long. Due to the Bergama activists’ strategy to keep political parties at bay and the disapproval of their party headquarters, the majority of the local politicians stepped back and withdrew their support. On the other hand, the Bergama peasants were fortunate to keep two of their most influential allies on their side throughout the movement.

One of these allies was Sefa Taşkın who was a social democratic local politician from the CHP and the elected mayor of Bergama between the years 1989-1999 during when mobilization was at its peak. As discussed before, Taşkın himself had initiated the Bergama
movement and stayed active within the Bergama movement network as one of the most important nodes. Taşkın’s permanent support facilitated the Bergama peasants in many respects. First, Taşkın provided legitimacy for the Bergama movement in the eyes of the public and within conventional political circles as the mayor of Bergama representing the Bergama peasants. Second, Taşkın utilized his political connections with national level politicians, MPs, civil society actors and scientists in order to bring the issue to the national political agenda. According to the peasant-activists, he acted as a gatekeeper forging links with MPs and politicians at the national level (P/A 9, 11, 27). Taşkın tried to bring the issue onto the agenda of all the parties even though he was as a member of the social democratic CHP (E/E 3). Still, since he had close and intense ties with the MPs from his own party, his work of building alliances mostly concentrated on CHP for practical reasons. Concomitantly, he effectively used his official position as the mayor of Bergama to forge links with civil society actors in İzmir, İstanbul, and Ankara.

“Because he [Taşkın] has a wider social and political circle we have been able to forge links with professors. We have gotten in touch with the lawyers for the first time with his help. He sent us to people. With his reference we found people who could help us. Otherwise, we wouldn’t have been able to” (P/A 9).

Third, he was the leading actor who was making speeches and press statements representing the Bergama peasants in the public. In this way, he became the ‘public’ face of the Bergama peasants in the media whose views and ideas were covered extensively (P/A 5, 6, 9, 15, 27). However, as indicated in chapter 2, elites within a movement are constrained by their official positions since their existence in a movement is legitimated through the institutions they represent, and they feel the urge to amplify their behaviour (Caniglia, 2001). In a similar vein, Taşkın refrained from taking place in the disruptive civil obedience protests due to his position as the elected mayor of Bergama since quasi-legal actions during the protests could undermine his legitimacy which could in turn undermine the Bergama movement. Instead, he tried to convey the image that he was a mayor supporting the cause of
the Bergama movement. Otherwise, his credibility could be reduced and his commitment to the movement could lead to accusations of using the Bergama peasants for his own career (E/E 3). Hence, in spite of his close involvement in the movement, Taşkın also tried to remain outside protest activities (E/E 9; P/A 9, 15, 28).

Fourth, Taşkın also acted as the major fund raiser. As the elected mayor of Bergama, Taşkın had extensive connections with businesses working together with the Bergama municipality, and Taşkın used his influence to get their support and opened channels of raising funds for their protests (E/E 3; P/A 11, 15). Also, Taşkın put the Bergama municipality’s resources such as vehicles, computers, and faxes to the use of the Bergama peasants. In order to pre-empt any possible accusations that could rise because of his official role, he brought the issue of gold mine opposition to the agenda of the elected municipality council in October 1994. As a result of the vote, he obtained full authority for dealing with the mine, contesting it through legal means, and other opposition activities. In this way, Taşkın achieved a legal and legitimate basis for his involvement in the anti-mine movement (E/E 3).

Oktay Konyar was another influential ally who became one of the spokespersons of grassroots sub-network of the Bergama movement. When he joined the movement, Konyar was the deputy chairman of CHP. As a left-wing politician, he had been concerned about the detrimental impacts of the capitalist globalization. He saw the Bergama peasants’ contention as a good opportunity to oppose globalization actively and to create a substantial anti-capitalist globalization resistance (E/E 2). Konyar got involved actively during the later stages of the Bergama mobilization. He became the spokesperson after he was elected the chairman of Çev-Der, a SMO-like network founded specifically about the Bergama resistance in 1996. He was an adept ‘leader’ in terms of strengthening solidarity ties and maintaining commitment among villagers mainly through the speeches he addressed to the villagers. Perceived as a ‘militant’ who did not abstain from bold protests, Konyar directed and
coordinated the protests as well. He also formulated innovative ideas about staging protest and direct action throughout the movement. Furthermore, he practiced the important role of managing relations with state forces when villagers confront them during their protests (E/E 2, 9, 13; P/A 5, 6, 11, 15).

With respect to the civil society scene, the İzmir district had a vibrant civic life which had a facilitative effect on the Bergama movement.24 In terms of civil society intensity, İzmir ranked as the third city in overall Turkey in 1995 (Erdoğan-Tosun, 2006). The vibrancy of civil society in İzmir was discerned by the Bergama activists as well (E/E 2). As explained in chapter 4, Taşkın referred to universities and civil society actors in his opposition to Eurogold. Several occupational chambers and university professors with environmentalist concerns were ready to aid Taşkın in collecting scientific data on gold mining with cyanide. Additionally, the İzmir Environmental Lawyers conjoined their forces with Taşkın which provided the means for extending the struggle to the legal field. The Elele Platform which was formed by CSOs, lawyers, unions, and professors acted as the scientific and legal flank of the Bergama movement network.25 The Elele Platform’s work mostly revolved around providing resources such as information, legitimacy, and legal expertise.

Yet, there were limitations to building alliances with CSOs in İzmir. Even though the Bergama movement activists aspired to connect with transnational networks outside their national territory as part of their strategies, the majority of civil society actors in İzmir were not involved in these efforts. Structurally speaking, CSOs in İzmir were overwhelmingly locally-oriented, and their connections with their counterparts operating at the national and/or transnational levels were weak (Erdoğan-Tosun, 2006). In fact, two committed lawyers, Senih Özay and Noyan Özkan, made laborious efforts to move the Bergama struggle to the transnational level by maintaining connections with Greenpeace, filing a lawsuit at the

24 In fact, the historical formation of civil society initiatives and organizations dates back to the 18th century, and the vibrancy of civil society in İzmir continued throughout the 19th and 20th centuries (Erdoğan-Tosun, 2006).
25 Please see chapter 5 for a detailed analysis.
European Court of Human Rights, and referring to international conventions signed by Turkey during the court hearings (E/E 1, 16). However, structural constraints consisting of legal impediments and insufficient resources appeared as obstacles for CSOs to develop relations with actors abroad. Resource incapacities mainly consisted of lack of foreign languages and the absence of pre-established transnational links (E/E 15). In terms of legal impediments, the İzmir CSOs suffered from a general problem. According to the law, civil society actors had to get permission either from the Ministry of Internal Affairs or from the Turkish government in order to engage in transnational activities or build links with actors outside Turkey. Getting official permissions was a complicated and long enduring process which appeared as an exhausting hurdle. (Erdoğan-Tosun, 2006: 75). Put differently, all types of civil society relations beyond national borders had to go through the filter of the state bureaucracy which curbed the CSOs’ drive to link with transnational networks. Additionally, nationalist/anti-imperialist views which prevailed among civil society actors in general prevented them from making further contributions to forging transnational links which led to internal tensions within the Elele Platform (E/E 14, 15, 16, 18).

In addition to the İzmir civil society actors, support arrived from an environmental SMO located in the Edremit Bay region, the Southern Marmara Organization for Protection of Environment and Culture (GÜMÇED). GÜMÇED acted as one of the main allies of the Bergama movement in terms of support, information, resources, and sharing of experiences (E/E 12, 13, P/A 9, 11, 26). GÜMÇED was part of a wider network of the Küçükdere-Havran movement which was a local mobilization against another gold mine in Küçükdere-Havran located in the Edremit Bay region, about 100 km. in the north of Bergama and which emerged around the same time with the Bergama movement. In Küçükdere, a company named TÜPRAG, owned by one of the major gold mining TNCs, Eldorado, planned to operate a

26 Please see chapters 4 and 7 for resource incapacities such as lack of a sufficient number of activists with foreign language skills. Also, please see chapter 5 for the predomination of anti-imperialist frames.
mine in Küçükdere-Havran in the first half of the 1990s. Locals including 14 mayors of different cities in the region, local peasants and environmentalists both from İzmir and the Edremit region launched a campaign against TÜPRAG, and they succeeded in stopping the project in its initial stage before the gold mine plant was built. For the Bergama activists, having links with the Küçükdere-Havran network meant sharing already existing experiences, networks, and resources (E/E 5, 30, 31; P/A 9, 11, 26).

One of the movement elite, Senih Özay occupied a crucial position with respect to links with civil society actors at the local level. Özay, who was also the main legal representative of the Bergama peasants, contributed to the movement as a ‘broker’ who forged links with different environmentalists. Özay was among the founders of the first Green Party in Turkey. He had already actively participated in local environmental mobilizations around İzmir, and he had been working as the lawyer of several environmental organizations including Greenpeace. All these connections with the local environmentalist circles made Özay a valuable node within the Bergama network in terms of maintaining relations outside the villages and Bergama at the local and transnational levels. First, the Bergama movement’s efforts to find supporters and allies in the nearby regions and cities were facilitated by Özay since he voiced the claims of the Bergama movement within the environmentalist circles in İzmir and nearby localities like Küçükdere-Havran and took the first step to integrate them into the Bergama network. Second, activists mobilized within the Küçükdere-Havran movement network got also involved in the Bergama mobilization through the brokerage of Senih Özay who had himself actively participated in the Küçükdere-Havran struggle. The SMOs and individuals from the Küçükdere network provided constant support to the Bergama movement.

Also, Özkan’s brokerage role as a local ally is crucial for the transnational dimension of the movement since he introduced Birsel Lemke to the Bergama movement who carried
out the transnational activities of the movement based on her connections abroad. Lemke, an environmentalist activist, had been involved in the Küçükderere mobilization. As a fluent speaker of English and German residing in Germany half of the year, Lemke had well-established relations with politicians, scientists, journalists, and NGOs in Germany. After joining in the Bergama network, she became a prominent actor organizing the transnational aspect of the movement in terms of forging links with transnational actors and maintaining transnational relations of the movement (E/E 1, 5).

Local politicians, i.e. the local ‘elite’, were discursively defined as ‘spokespersons’ in the accounts of peasant activists which was approved by Konyar and Taşkın as well (E/E 2, 3; P/A 5, 11). However, they often acted as ‘leaders’ in practice since they took the roles of directing the peasants during protests, inventing new protest forms, and shaping the general path and character of the resistance. One of the main reasons for the de facto leadership of the elite was to achieve mass mobilization in villages. As one of the peasant interviewees describe, villagers were not accustomed to mobilizing and staging protests on their own unless some elite led them do so (P/A 11). Furthermore, leadership positions incidentally emerged as a result of certain advantages the movement elite had based on their ‘privileged backgrounds’. In terms of the social composition of ‘spokespersons’, all of them were well-educated in contrast to the peasants, and they were from prominent middle class families within the region. Konyar, on the other hand, followed another path in terms of presenting himself, and he constantly expressed his peasant origins by describing himself as a ‘peasant kid’. It was a deliberate strategic act for building rapport and trust with the peasants since among all the movement elite, he was the one who remained closest to the peasants as the designer and manager of protests.

Evidently, advantages attached to the ‘privileged’ backgrounds of the movement elite confer an inevitable leadership in terms of framing grievances, formulating ideologies,
writing, debating, conducting relations with the media, and arranging relations between internal and external actors (Morris and Staggenborg, 2004: 175). In combination with their educational and class advantages, the fact that the movement elite had activism background and experience prior to the Bergama movement provided grounds for taking over leadership positions. Overwhelmingly, the movement elite all came from left-wing ideological stances ranging from social democracy to socialism. Personal biographies of the movement elite which are shaped by leftist politics and activism provided useful inputs for the Bergama movement. Based on their prior activism and active political backgrounds, they brought in valuable political connections as well as knowledge about protest making. In that sense, they created a spill-over effect by enabling the diffusion of many tactics, strategies, and framing belonging to the left movement into the Bergama movement. Diffusion done by the movement elite is an important step for mobilizing the peasants, given the fact that a majority of the peasants, save a handful who had previously participated in leftist movements, lacked any prior activism experience.

Within this multiple leadership structure, each spokesperson concentrated their activities within specific fields based on their skills, capabilities, and connections. Accordingly, there was a de facto division of labour. Taşkın concentrated more on the political dimension of the movement since he was the formal political figure with well-established links with local, national, and transnational political actors. On the other hand, Konyar mainly focused on the grassroots, organizing protests and the mobilization of peasants. This division of labour was in congruence with the expectations of peasants from their ‘spokespersons’ which was to complement each other’s actions:

“We asked them to split the roles. We wanted Sefa Taşkın to be our minister of external affairs and Oktay Konyar to be our minister of domestic affairs. That is because Sefa Taşkın is an excellent speaker who manages to communicate with the media and the politicians or who knows how to speak effectively in a panel. On the other hand, Oktay Konyar is a brilliant activist who goes into every kind of protest with us. That is one thing Sefa Taşkın could not do” (P/A 9).

“Sefa Taşkın is an official political figure with good relations with the media and politicians. In that sense, he had a responsibility. He knew how to approach to the media and government in a subtle way, and he contributed
to our movement a great deal. However, Oktay [Konyar] is a fighter. He was on the roads with us, beaten and arrested with us. That was something Sefa [Taşkin] could not do” (P/A 5).

However, it would be misleading to say that they were exclusively engaged in those fields. In fact, as the initiator of the movement, Taşkin was involved in every aspect of the movement from the beginning, and he did not totally isolate himself from other sub-networks since he continuously collaborated with the groups carrying out scientific and legal activities. In a similar vein, he was a crucial decision-maker about the protest events and lobbying activities abroad, as he was actively involved in many transnational events regarding the Bergama movement.

The collaboration of Konyar and Taşkin eventually fell apart during the later stages. The two ‘spokespersons’ had diverging views about strategies, organizational structures, and ideological preferences which affected the frames of the movement. With respect to strategies, tensions among the elite over whether to concentrate their activities on extra-institutional or institutional channels are likely to emerge within social movements. Gamson and Meyer argue that it is related to different ways of framing the political opportunities and deciding which strategy will open opportunities further, and the evidence from Bergama supports this view (Gamson and Meyer, 1996: 284). Such discrepancies emerged as Konyar’s influence increased within the movement. Taşkin preferred using more conventional means such as conferences, panels, and press conferences as well as less risky demonstrations. On the other hand, Konyar employed extra-parliamentary methods and introduced civil disobedience acts into the movement mostly confronting state forces. In contrast to the rising ‘militancy’ of protest activities, democratic and participatory organizational structure of the movement deteriorated (E/E 2, 3, 11; P/A 9, 11, 18). Also, anti-imperialist and nationalist themes started to gain ascendancy within the frames of the movement with respect to globalization (E/E 11, 40). Additionally, according to the peasant activists, emerging power struggles among the elite contributed to the crumbling of the cohesion of the movement elite.
(P/A 1, 5, 9, 11, 27). In other words, tensions among the movement elite pointed at the closing of the local opportunities.

As one of the peasant interviewees retrospectively claimed, conflicts among the movement ‘leaders’ was seen as one of the major factors which led to the decline of the movement. During the decline stage of the movement, peasants self-critically claimed that they could not create ‘spokespersons’ among themselves. The fact that ‘leaders’ were overwhelmingly from outside was considered as one of the factors which led to the dissolution of the movement since internal struggles between different spokespersons had detrimental impacts on the movement (P/A 11).27

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27 Morris and Staggenborg argue: “Although members of the challenging groups usually provide the majority of leaders for their movements, it is not unusual for members of privileged outside groups to function in leadership positions within movements of oppressed groups” (Morris and Staggenborg, 2004: 177).
Chapter 7: Transnational Contention of the Bergama Movement

In addition to their struggle against the mining TNC(s) at the local and national levels, the Bergama activists carried their contention outside their national boundaries both by using transnational political spaces and by allying with various transnational actors and organizations. Reasons for such a transnational move were threefold: First, in their fight against TNC(s), the Bergama activists perceived having influential allies and getting the support of public beyond their national borders as a necessary and crucial strategy in order to put pressure on mining TNC(s) from outside Turkey.

“If you are going to contend at the world level, you have to learn who these companies are. If they are from Germany, France or Australia, you have to fight with them in those places as well. There is no line defence, but territorial defence [A famous quote expressed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the War of Liberation]” (E/E 3).

Second, non-responsive and exclusionary attitude of the Turkish state, mostly in the forms of unwillingness to implement the national court decisions and the use of repressive practices made moving their grievance outside their borders more vital. In doing that, the Bergama activists aimed to corner and pressure the Turkish state to act in the lines of rule of law and democracy.

“These international organizations help us because we ask them, [they do not act] not on their own accord. Why was this needed? ...... [T]here was a favourable court decision for Bergama, and these court decisions were not implemented.” (Taşkın, in Ceviz Kabuğu, 2001)

Third, the information exchange maintained through transnational links supported the Bergama activists by giving access to valuable information about the gold mining sector and mining TNC(s) which consequently strengthened their movement. Moreover, ideas as well as strategies and tactics diffused between movements and actors mobilized over the same cause. In this way, they were able to be a part of the globalizing resistance against capitalist globalization. As one of the spokespersons of the Bergama peasants underlined, transnational connections were significant for their movement in terms of getting information support, exchanging tactics, and most importantly, challenging globalization.
“Bergama villagers marched and protested in Paris and Berlin even before these talks about MAI have started. We had connections with people from India and Brazil. I am going to meet with Zapatistas as well [which did not happen]. We organized a press conference with Jose Bove. We learn something from his knowledge. He said he is learning from our tactics. We are gradually building networks with them” (E/E 2).

Hence, transnational activities and links of the Bergama movement network constituted a crucial place within the course of the Bergama movement. In fact, one of the main arguments of this thesis, as spelled out before, is that transnational, national, and local political levels have become enmeshed under capitalist globalization. Transnational activities bear impact on the practices and developments at the local and national levels while local movements link and interact with transnational networks. In this chapter, I will analyze the use of transnational networks by the Bergama movement with respect to first, initial attempts of forging transnational links; second, cross–border relations with external political parties and politicians; third, the activities in supranational and transnational political and legal spaces; fourth, the alliances with INGOs and social movements; and finally, the responses of the Turkish state to transnational relations of the Bergama movement. The chapter ends with the evaluation of the Bergama movement in the general context of transnational activism.

Initial Attempts of Forging Transnational Links:

First contacts of the Bergama movement with transnational actors were made in 1992 when the Greenpeace activist ship, Sirius, visited Izmir. Taşkı̇n met with Greenpeace members in order to introduce their cause to one of the most well-known environmental INGOs across the world hoping to get information about gold mining in general. Even before this first attempt of building alliances with a transnational actor, the name of Bergama was expressed in the transnational space between Turkey and Germany. The name of Bergama was first heard in Europe before the Bergama movement took off. In 1989, the Bergama mayor Sefa Taşkı̇n launched a campaign to bring back the remains of the Zeus Altar from the Berlin Museum where it was located since the mid-19th century to its original location,
Bergama. During the campaign “Zeus Altar belongs to Bergama, we want it back”, two protests were staged at the Pergamon Museum in Berlin (Milliyet, 08.07.1990; Cumhuriyet, 03.08.1995; Milliyet, 09.08.1995). As a result of the wide coverage on the Zeus Altar campaign by the German media, the German public became familiar with the name of Bergama. Consequently, when the Bergama movement reached out to Germany, Bergama was already known by the German media, public and politicians making it easier to grab attention for their local contention (E/E 3, 6; Milliyet, 08.07.1990b). Taşkın and members of the Bergama municipal council made a strategic move, staging a protest against Dresdner Bank on August 7th, 1995, which was providing financial support for the Ovacık gold mine project when they were already in Germany for the second protest for the Pergamon Altar. During the protest in front of the Dresdner Bank building in Berlin, they hung a banner saying “Do not poison the ancient city of the Aegean with cyanide” in order to link their contention over cyanide gold mining with the Pergamon Altar and the ancient history of Bergama (Cumhuriyet, 08.08.1995).

“But the interesting point was that the Bergama movement was called Bergama, and it was made public... Nobody in the world was interested in the Küçükdere movement. You can’t sell it. The marketing would never be successful. Because you can sell the word Bergama-Pergamon much better than Küçükdere in the international world. Otherwise, no one will listen. ‘Where are you from?’ ‘From Küçükdere. It [gold mine] will damage Küçükdere.’ ‘Really, uh I am sorry’. But if you say, it will damage Pergamon even though the mine is 30 km away from Pergamon. But you have to give a name to things” (E/E 22).

While Taşkın’s initial attempts of shifting the scale of their opposition continued, another mobilization was taking place in Küçükdere-Havran against Tüprag, which was formed by the German originated mining corporation Preussag AG. Activists of the Küçükdere-Havran mobilization consisting of mayors and villagers of the Edremit Bay as well as environmentalists and local CSOs directly launched a transnational campaign with the aim of stopping operation of the German originated mining corporation, Preussag, and its

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1 Taşkın, members of the Bergama municipal council, and their families organized a protest in front of the Pergamon Museum in Berlin in July 1990 (08.07.1990a). Another similar protest took place just in front of the Pergamon Altar with the participation of Taşkın and 200 protestors in 1995 (Milliyet, 09.08.1995).
2 The campaign over the Zeus Altar continued until the mid 1990s and ended without achieving success.
financial supporters such as Dresdner Bank. In that sense, they prioritized the transnational aspect of their contention over its local and national aspects. They forged links with credible scientists from Germany and asked them to prepare a report about the hazards of the gold mine project in order to undermine the claims of the mining company. On top of that, they staged innovative protest actions such as signing applications for asylum seeking to Germany in the name of 300 thousand residents in the region which was staged with the presence of the German ARD channel on March 23rd, 1995 (Cumhuriyet, 24.03.1995) and the presentation of the refusal of insurance companies when they wanted to insure themselves and their possessions against a possible cyanide related accident (Cumhuriyet, 15.04.1993). When Bergama movement started to take shape, one attorney-activist from the Izmir Environmentalist Lawyers, brought the issue of the Ovacik gold mine to the attention of the Küçükdere-Havran activists (Özay, 1995). Recognizing the similarities in their causes, those two mobilizations were considered as ‘twin movements’, and the Bergama movement was added into the already existing transnational efforts for the Küçükdere-Havran movement. Therefore, those two cases of cyanide-based gold-mining were presented to the allies - scientists, INGOs, political parties- outside Turkey as one, and the political spheres like the European Parliament were utilized for both movements. In the aftermath of the victory in Küçükdere-Havran, Birsel Lemke and Senih Özay who had already become a part of the Bergama movement network continued to unite their energy with Sefa Taşkınpınar, and they all maintained transnational links for the opposition to the Ovacik gold mine.

Throughout the movement, transnational links were forged and sustained by several key actors within the network living both abroad and in Turkey. In fact, all these relations continued to build in a snow-balling fashion mostly through informal interpersonal relations.

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3 It must be noted that the support of one of the Turkish MPs had a tremendous impact on the decision of cancelling the gold mine project in Küçükdere-Havran as discussed in the previous chapter. Even though building alliances with a politician at the national level was determinant for the course of the mobilization, the protest actions of Küçükdere-Havran activists were mostly concentrated on Europe.
An SMO named Pergamon & Adramitteion (P&A) was founded for instrumental reasons such as having a fixed address and phone numbers with an official name which would make contacts easier and maintain transnational relations on a regular basis. Yet, the P&A consisting of only a few individuals never turned into a formal SMO with an organizational bureaucracy and hierarchy. P&A was never brought forth by the activists as a central SMO with formalized relations and a decisive role in making decisions about strategies (E/E 22). Rather, transnational links and relations were forged based on individual activists and their personal networking. Among those few activists with brokerage roles, Birsel Lemke stood out. She was a Turkish trilingual, university-educated environmentalist residing in Germany who was involved in the formation of the first Green Party in Turkey and the mobilization of the Küşükder-Havran mobilization (Lemke, 2002b; Taşkın in Reinart, 2003: 47). She worked in collaboration with other actors from Bergama sub-networks such as lawyers and spokespersons, and she successfully carried the Bergama movement beyond the borders of Turkey, especially concentrating her activities in Germany and Europe. In that regard, she used all her personal contacts and built an informal network between Bergama and Germany/Europe by forging links with scientists, European Parliament members, politicians, INGOs like FIAN and other activists outside Turkey. On the other hand, individual activists from other places such as Australia also joined in the network, extending the transnational space of the Bergama movement. As a result, the Bergama movement was integrated into the global anti-mining network composed of various INGOs and social movements.

One of the first steps taken in terms of transnational practices was finding scientists and academics from abroad as allies. As discussed in Chapter 4, scientific research constituted one of the foundational pillars of the Bergama movement which fostered mobilization in several ways. On the other hand, the pro-mine camp, specifically the representatives of the TNC(s), argued that gold mining was a novel issue for the Turkish scientists and academics,
and that they lacked expertise over the topic. In order to ward off these criticisms, the Küçükdere activists contacted Prof. Friedhelm Korte who was described as the ‘founder’ of ecological chemistry (Özay, 1995: 27; Lemke, 2002a: 9). Korte visited the region in 1993, and 13 district mayors from the region asked him to write a report. Korte prepared an ecological chemical manuscript which was used both for the Bergama and Küçükdere-Havran movements. This report constituted the backbone of the scientific struggle against gold mining with cyanide which was frequently cited by other scientists as well as activists which the TNCs and pro-mine scientists could not disprove despite all their efforts to the contrary (E/E 3, 5, 22). Prof. Korte released another report in which he revealed his observations on the Ovacık gold mine only. Throughout his studies, he indicated that cyanide-based gold mining could not be considered a regular mining activity, but rather it should be treated as a chemical process which required rules and standards of chemical industry to be applied which was employed by the Bergama activists in their frames (Korte, 1999; Korte, Spiteller and Coulston, 2000; Lemke, 2000; E/E 3, 5, 16).

In 1994, Prof. Korte was invited to Bergama by Taşkın, and he visited the region to investigate the newly introduced INCO-SO2 detoxification system by Eurogold. Korte’s conclusion, stated in a letter to Taşkın, was that even though it would detoxify cyanide, with the detoxification process, other types of pollutants would be released. In that sense, as he repeatedly emphasized later on, despite some improvements achieved, INCO-SO2 was an insufficient system (Korte and Coulston, 1998; Lemke, 2002a; Lemke, 2002b). As Taşkın indicated in an interview, based on Korte’s findings, the Bergama activists declared that they were unsatisfied with the precautions taken by Eurogold, and they continued with their contention (Sabah 15.06.1997).

Korte’s work continued in collaboration with other scientists both from Germany and Turkey. They organized symposia and conferences over the subject of cyanide leach

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4 When the Bergama activists applied to the European Court of Human Rights, the contended TNC(s) were referred to as ‘chemistry companies’. 251
method. Apart from introducing the case of Ovacık gold mine into the academic literature, two declarations which were crucial for the advance of the Bergama movement were announced throughout the scientists’ work. On June 26th and 27th, 1997, a symposium on the subject of “the proven consequences of the planned gold extraction (using cyanide) in Turkey” was organized with the participation of 50 German and Turkish scientists at İstanbul Technical University in Turkey. At the end of the final discussion of the symposium, Prof. Talınlı, Prof. Duman, Prof. Klein, Prof., Henden, Prof. Korte and Prof. Mueller (the chairman) announced the ‘Pergamon Declaration’ which stated "[b]ased on current evidence, including the technologies involved and a knowledge of the natural and cultural environment, the planned extraction of gold in the Bergama region is not acceptable" (Pergamon Declaration, 1997).

In 1999, a follow-up conference was organized in Ören, Balıkesir, with the participation of Prof. Korte, other German professors, INGO members, and several leading actors from the Bergama movement. In the enunciated Conventus ’99 declaration, it was said that despite risk assessment reports produced on behalf of Eurogold such as the report by Golder Association, and the alleged precautions taken at the mine, conditions in the Ovacık gold mine did not change since the time of Pergamon Declaration. Additionally, it was claimed that Eurogold was hoping for Turkey’s entrance into the MAI process and the acceptance of arbitration laws for its business interests. Also, the Turkish state was called on to put the court decisions into force, and it was declared that gold mining would not lead to regional development (Conventus ’99 Declaration, 1999; Cumhuriyet, 27.07.1999).

All the work done by Korte and others over the subject of cyanide-based gold mining in Bergama, Küçükdere-Havran and other locations provided valuable scientific information for the Bergama activists on which to rest their arguments during their legal and political struggles. Besides, through having an internationally well-known scientist on their side as
their supporter, the Bergama activists gained credibility and legitimacy in the public eye and their opponents. Moreover, having a well-respected supporter encouraged peasants and strengthened their beliefs in their cause.\(^5\) Prof. Korte was also important in terms of confronting the sections of the German mining industry involved in the Ovacık gold mine project and bringing the case to the agenda of the European political institutions (Lemke, 2002a).\(^6\)

“My environmental advisor was Prof. Korte. Who is Korte?.....He is the advisor of the German President. Founder of the eco-chemistry [sub-discipline]. There is no other person as good as he is on this issue in Germany....He is a powerful figure who can stand up to German lobbies like CEFIC and CERN. He did it. He is a very respected man. Then Preussag withdrew [referring to Prof. Korte’s contribution to the success of the Küçükdere-Havran movement]” (E/E 3).

**Political Spaces and Actors Beyond National Borders:**

a. **Transnational politics**

During their struggle against the mining TNCs and their state, the Bergama activists utilized supranational political institutions and built alliances with political actors and parties in Europe. They forged links with the German Green Party and the Green members of the European Parliament (EP) perceiving availability of links these political actors and political spheres as opportunities to exploit. Through their alliances with these political parties and politicians, they approached the European Parliament and sub-national level parliaments in Germany (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2005).

Allied foreign politicians and political parties facilitated the movement in several ways. First, supporting government members and MPs were frequently in face-to-face

\(^5\) Also, Prof. Korte solidly gave support to peasant activists in their protests. Together with Petra Sauerland of Food Information and Action Network (FIAN), they sent a support letter to the peasants during their “Kuvvay-i Milliye” march letting them know that they backed their protests (Radikal, 17.11.1997).

\(^6\) As a response to continuation of Preussag AG’s operations in Turkey, Korte approached the President of the EU Commission on August 18th, 1999 in order to give information about the situation in Bergama (Korte, Spiteller, and Couston, 2000).
contact with the Turkish state authorities at official meetings. Such allies drew the attention of Turkish power holders when they brought up the aggrieved issue of Bergama during these meetings. In this way, the activists believed that they could bypass obstacles to accessing Turkish state authorities and bring their grievance onto the national political agenda.

“If it is an international gold mining platform [we are facing], I you have to find an international platform within it...When they go to Brussels, [let’s say] a Turkish minister or the president goes to Brussels, somebody from the Greens asks “What about your gold mining?” You never have the chance to ask it but somebody, a friend of yours in the parliament asks it... All of a sudden the prime minister asks his assistant “What did he mean?” [Assistant says] “Yeah, we have this problem with gold mining”. [Prime minister asks] “Is it so big?” [Assistant responds] “Yeah, of course, it is big. Everybody heard about it.” [Prime minister says] “Uhh-uh, never heard of it!” (E/E 22).

Similarly, foreign parliament members, political party members, and state authorities could approach Turkish authorities by using their official positions through other means—sending letters and contacting Turkish authorities directly. In their letters, transnational political allies demanded the Turkish authorities to comply with court decisions favouring the peasants. For instance, Halo Saibold, then Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Tourism in Germany/member of the Alliance 90/Green Party, sent a message to the Izmir governor when 37 Bergama activists were under custody in the aftermath of the occupation of the mine pit, and she asked the mayor for easy treatment of the activists under custody (Cumhuriyet, 24.04.1997). Saibold, this time together with Cem Özdemir, who was a Green member of the EP, sent a support letter to Taşkin to congratulate the court decision against the gold mine in May 1997 (Sabah, 18.05.1997). In another occasion, supportive MPs in Germany mobilized tour operators and other tourism companies in Germany to protest Eurogold’s activities in Bergama. As part of that initiative, important sectors of the German tourism industry such as TUI, the Association of German Travel Bureaus, the Union of Reisebusunternehmer (travel and coach operators), and Studiosus stated that they would cancel tours to Turkey if the gold mine started operating. Besides, the MPs themselves also joined the campaign individually and sent several letters to Turkish Ministries, stating that
Turkish tourism sector would be badly affected if the mine continued to operate (Hürriyet Daily News, 08.06.1997; Lemke, 2002a).  

Also, supportive politicians from abroad made visits to the region. During their visits, these influential allies displayed their support for the Bergama activists to the general public and state authorities. These support visits were important for the peasants since they saw that they were backed up by influential people with credible names: “We happened to realize we were not alone in this huge sea” (P/A 9). At the same time, they contacted Turkish authorities asking them to comply with the rule-of-law and close the mine. Several Green and Social Democratic MPs, mostly from Germany, participated in the environmental tour to Bergama, Ida Mountain, and Ephesus on May 30th- June 9th, 1997. The aim of the trip was to raise public consciousness in Germany about the controversial issue of Ovacık gold mine and to show their support to the Bergama activists (Hürriyet, 15.04.1997; Lemke, 2002a). Furthermore, Özdemir and Saibold personally met with the İzmir governor and requested the implementation of the court ruling and the closure of the Ovacık mine. They also underlined the importance of the local populations’ preferences and their inclusion in decision-making processes (Yeni Asır, 29.05.1997). Also, a delegate of German officials led by the Nürnberg governor met with Taşkıń and gave their support to the movement in Bergama (Gazete Ege, 08.10.1997).

Secondly, foreign politicians aimed to compel the TNCs and their affiliates to stop their operations in Bergama through lobbying and pressuring. Wolfgang von Nostitz, a prominent attorney specialized in environmental issues and a former member of the EP, was introduced with the Ovacık gold mine through the personal contacts of Lemke. After visiting the region, he took action against the involvement of Germany-based corporations and banks

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7 A similar act was staged by Karl Born, the chair of TUI, one of the major tour operators in Germany, who sent letters to the Tourism Ministry and the governor of İzmir, indicating that touristic trips to Bergama and its nearby locations would be cancelled if the gold mining with toxic cyanide took place in the region (Der Spiegel, 1997/04/14; Hürriyet, 1997/04/18).
in the gold mine project. He sent letters to Degussa which was claimed to provide cyanide to the Ovacık gold mine and to Dresdner Bank which was one of the financial supporters of the gold mining TNCs in Bergama. In the letters, he asked them to withdraw from the project based on the observations that the gold mine project did not meet the standards for protecting human life and environment. The ex-European Parliament member specifically demanded from Dresdner Bank to end its involvement in the project by referring to the agreement between the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and Dresdner Bank which stated that the bank could make investments abroad as long as standards in Germany were applied in the investment area (Lemke, 2002b: 2). Additionally, Karin Hagemann, the Head of the Economic Commission at the Parliament of Hessen State in Germany, contacted Dresdner Bank about its involvement in the Ovacık gold mine project (Lemke, 2002a: 14).

As a consequence, Dresdner Bank withdrew from the project. Intensifying conflicts in the region played a part in their decision of withdrawal according to the vice president of the Dresdner Bank Project Finance Department (Milliyet-The Wall Street Journal, 05.05.1997). Additionally, burgeoning pressure in Germany was another factor for the withdrawal decision of Dresdner Bank as Reimer Hammann, the Green Party spokesperson from the Hassen State, stated during his support visit to the Bergama villages with Petra Sauerland of FIAN in June 1997 (Cumhuriyet, 04.06.1997; Yeni Asır, 04.06.1997). The pressures exerted on Dresdner Bank were not turned into a campaign. However, in combination with political pressures by the Green politicians in Germany at the European Parliament, the media coverage over the Bergama issue made an impact (E/E 24, 27, 30). In fact, Lemke informed several journalists about the issues of Bergama and gold mining with cyanide. There was a news coverage of Dresdner Banks’ involvement in a controversial mine project in Turkey on one of the most well known German news agencies just before the decision of the bank. In that sense, the

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8 Among other financial supporters, there were Chase Manhattan Bank, Barclay’s Bank, Royal bank of Scotland, Manhattan Bank, and Barclay’s Bank.
timing of the decision strengthened the perception that the bank feared publicity of its involvement (E/E 30).

The EP was another channel used by the Bergama activists in their transnational activities. Based on the candidacy status of Turkey, the EU and its institutions were regarded as opportunities to be exploited believing that the EU interference would put Turkish governments in a difficult position. In fact, the EP is not the most effective body of the EU in terms of being decisive on member or candidate states. Personal links were available with MPs at the EP, and through using these informal links, the Bergama activists established alliances with MPs especially from the Green Party (E/E 24, 27). On the other hand, having access to the EP was not a guarantee for passing resolutions. Since it is a big organization composed of many members with various political views, it is difficult to get the support of the majority of the members. However, the fact that Bergama movement was a grassroots movement made it easier:

“At official institutions like the European Parliament, it is not an easy thing to find a majority for a social movement. In other words, we cannot pass every resolution. If there is an issue backed up by a grassroots movement, and if that issue is already widely known, it is much easier to pass resolutions. And the media is the most important means for that” (E/E 27).

The first EP resolution regarding the use of cyanide leach method came on November 17th, 1994. In the resolution, the Turkish state was called on to annul gold mining projects in Bergama and Küçükdere-Havran due to environmental risks. It was also stated that Turkey was obliged to protect the Mediterranean and its historic sites. Furthermore, Dresdner Bank’s involvement in the projects was also enunciated in the resolution (European Parliament, 1994). Even though the EP was seen as relatively ineffective, the impact of their resolution could be discerned in the activities of mining TNCs.

“European Parliament is not a very influential institution, yet interestingly enough, it created an impact on companies in chemical and mining industries. The fact that their lobbies came to the parliament and engaged in informative work shows that parliament resolutions are not so ineffective” (E/E 27).
Furthermore, the fact that the EP put the Bergama issue on its agenda affected the European Commission as well (E/E 27). Accordingly, Bergama-Ovacık gold mine and the villagers became an issue in various EU progress reports on Turkey.

Green members of the EP continued their support through other means as well. With the invitation of Claudia Roth, the then president of the European Parliament Greens Group, Sefa Taşkın made a speech at the EP addressing its members and asking them to pressure the European based companies such as Metallgesellschaft and Degussa to stop their activities in Turkey since their activities have caused major environmental disasters in different parts of the world (Sabah, 13.02.1997). Additionally, the EP members visited the region and gave their support by stating the mine in Bergama should be closed down and suggested to bring the issue to the UN Human Rights Commission (Sabah, 13.02.1997; E/E 3).

Transnational political allies also facilitated the Bergama movement in ways other than lobbying and pressuring TNCs and the Turkish government. Birsel Lemke received a highly prestigious award, Right Livelihood Award, a.k.a. the Alternative Nobel Prize, in 2000 for her role in the environmental struggle against the hazards of cyanide-based gold-mining. Indeed, these sorts of alternative awards are significant for social movements. As Bob (2005) indicates, prize committees have become part of the social movement networks operating at the transnational level. Seeing the Right Livelihood Award as an opportunity for voicing their contention to wider circles across Europe, the transnational political allies of the Bergama movement deliberately worked for Lemke to get this award.

“We worked together with X [former member of EP] for Birsel to receive the Alternative Nobel Prize for the movement to be heard across Europe...Mrs. Birsel has been a muscular contender. This movement has become a symbol with her personality with this award. I believe it has been the first time such a thing has happened in Turkey” (E/E 27).  

Even though the Bergama movement’s name reached a wider audience, and received immense attention, the award created problems among the leading activists of the Bergama movement stemming from disagreements about how to use the award money (Özay, 2003).
Efforts to find support from Europe continued even after the Bergama movement entered a decline period. In October 2004, the Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament (Greens/EFA) organized a meeting on the issues of environment and agriculture in Turkey and the EU in İstanbul. Senih Özyay and the representatives of the Bergama peasants who attended the meeting made a call to the members of the Greens/EFA to ask for support in their cause (BBC, 10.04.2004)

b. Supranational Legal Institutions

Despite all the court decisions in favour of the Bergama movement, the legal aspect of the mobilization entered a deadlock after the decision of the Turkish Council of the State in 1997. Without exception, all the Turkish governments in power breached the principle of rule of law by ignoring court decisions and/or finding legal loopholes in order to continue the operation of the Ovacik gold mine. Having exploited all the national legal channels, attorneys of the Bergama activists decided to make another move, and carry their case beyond their national borders (E/E 1, 16). Subsequently, they brought their case to a supranational juridical institution, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In 1998, 10 Bergama activists, including the then mayor Sefa Taşkıń, appealed to the ECHR claiming that the Turkish government did not implement the court decisions, thereby breaching the principle of rule of law by violating the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights (CPHRFR). Yet, because of the delays in the Turkish government’s defence which were viewed by the lawyers and peasants as a purposeful act to block the process, the court decision was belated (E/E 1, 16; P/A 11). On 10 November, 2004, the ECHR gave its decision in favour of the Bergama activists concluding that the CPHRFR’s article 6 (right to fair trial) and 8 (right to respect for private and family life) were being violated by the Turkish state.
Accordingly, the Turkish state was found guilty and sentenced to pay a compensation of 30 thousand Euros to the applicants (ECHR decision, 2004). \(^\text{10}\) In 2006, the ECHR punished the Turkish state a second time, this time to pay 3,000 Euros to each of the 315 applicants based on the same violations (www.arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/366903.asp). \(^\text{11}\)

For the Bergama peasants, the importance of the ECHR decisions was not receiving compensation. They viewed ECHR as terrain where their cause would be proved once more. In fact, they believed that favourable ECHR decisions could make an impact on the policy of the state (P/A 9, 25). However, the Turkish government did not comply with the judgment of the ECHR and did not implement the necessary measures within the time limit set by the court which was three months. Ignoring the decisions of the ECHR and all the domestic courts, the Turkish Government issued a new permit to the mining company on 25 May 2005. One of the peasant activists summarized their opinion about this matter as:

“It is important. However, what can the European Court of Human Rights do? Will they imprison the state?” (P/A 5).

**INGOs as Allies:**

**a. Greenpeace**

The activities of Greenpeace in Turkey dates back to 1992 when the Greenpeace activist ship, Sirius, arrived in Turkey for the first time. The purpose of the visit was to get in touch with the local population of İzmir in order to raise consciousness on environmental problems.

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\(^\text{10}\) In the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights which was ratified by Turkey in 1954, Article 6 is about the “right to a fair trial”, and Article 8 concerns “right to respect for private and family life” (http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG).

\(^\text{11}\) ECHR’s decision in 2006, i.e. “Öçkan and others v. Turkey, 46771/99 [2006] (28-03-2006)” is summarized as: “The case concerns the granting of permits to operate a goldmine. The applicants, and other inhabitants of Bergama, asked for the permit to be set aside, citing the dangers of the cyanidation process used by the operating company, the health risks and the risks of pollution of the underlying aquifers and destruction of the local ecosystem. The Court concluded a violation of Articles 6-1 (right to a fair trial) and 8 (right to respect for private and family life); it was not necessary to examine separately the complaints under Articles 2 (right to life) and 13 (right to an effective remedy).” (http://www.righttoenvironment.org/default.asp?pid=91, last access on 24.09.2011).
matters. In the following years, Greenpeace launched several campaigns in Turkey in the fields of hazardous ship breaking industry and sea pollution (http://www.greenpeace.org/turkey/tr/about/faq/). In 1997, Istanbul office of Greenpeace Mediterranean was opened making the presence of Greenpeace in Turkey permanent.\(^\text{12}\) Greenpeace Mediterranean grew at an incredibly fast pace, reaching from two activists to 100 volunteers and 6500 supporters in Turkey general within 5 years after it was formed (Keskin, 2003). Yet, due to resource-based difficulties as well as organizational priorities, the Istanbul office of Greenpeace acted selectively with respect to its campaign issues focusing on the issues of toxic substances, toxic waste trade, energy, ship breaking, and peace (Greenpeace website, (http://www.greenpeace.org/turkey/about/faq/genel-bilgi, 23.09.2011). With considerable successes achieved in Turkey as a result of their campaigns, Greenpeace attained credibility and trust in the eyes of the public, and strengthened its benchmark stance for the environmental movement in Turkey.\(^\text{13}\) In that regard, various local mobilizations approached Greenpeace asking for support and aid (E/E 29).

The Bergama activists were among those groups demanding support from Greenpeace. In fact, they made their first move before the permanent Greenpeace Office was opened in Turkey. The first contact between Greenpeace and Bergama activists occurred during the first visit of Greenpeace to Turkey. Sefa Taşkın accompanied by muhtars of 15 Bergama villages visited the Greenpeace ship, Sirius, in İzmir on September 9th, 1992, demanding support for their contention against Eurogold. Greenpeace activists responded positively and promised to

\(^{12}\) The Mediterranean Office of the Greenpeace which was founded in 1995 after the Mediterranean campaign run by the Greenpeace International in the prior ten years. The office works in countries like Turkey, Malta, Lebanon, and Israel where there was no official branch of the organization previously (Keskin, 2003: 100-101).

\(^{13}\) In Turkey, there have been several positive developments in some issues with respect to environment over which Greenpeace Mediterranean launched campaigns in Turkey. Greenpeace allegedly define them as their own success, yet no detailed analysis of the impact level of Greenpeace has been done so far. Some of these successes include but are not limited to: the cancellation of the nuclear energy bid in 2000 as a result of the joint campaign with the anti-nuclear platform; the removal and return of Spanish ship MV-ULLA’s waste to Spain in 2005; the prevention of the arrival in Turkey of ships containing hazardous waste materials; the contribution to the enactment of Renewable Energy Law in 2005 through lobbying activities and the release of a report on wind energy. For further actions please see Greenpeace Mediterranean website, http://www.greenpeace.org/turkey/tr/about/history/ba-ar-lar/.
provide information and mobilize other international organizations in support for the Bergama activists (Milliyet, 10.09.1992).

“It was in 1991 or 1992. The Greenpeace’s research ship arrived in at İzmir. We went to İzmir with the Bergama peasants by two buses. When we arrived, Eurogold representatives were already there. They were surprised. Greenpeace agreed to talk to us. We told about our confrontation. A female Greenpeace activist from New Zealand sent us a full sack of documents later on. We did not know anything about the issue back then. One Greenpeace activists gave us the address of Minewatch. Then, we asked for further information from them” (E/E 3).

Later on, lawyers from the İzmir Environmentalist Lawyers group who already had previous contacts approached Greenpeace activists asking for support. Ex-toxic campaign manager of the Greenpeace office in Istanbul was acquainted with the leading figures of the Bergama movement, Konyar, Engel, and Taşkın. He collected detailed information about the organizational mapping of Eurogold displaying all its partner corporations with the help of Greenpeace International and Greenpeace Germany, and he brought the issue to the attention of the executive director of Greenpeace Mediterranean. Local Greenpeace activists also documented these corporations’ involvement in accidents and illegal activities across the world. Besides passing this information to the Bergama activists, the Greenpeace Mediterranean activists produced an action plan consisting of doing further research on gold mining with respect to EU mining standards and actions of mining TNCs outside Europe, building a strategy of demonizing funders of the Ovacık gold mine project in order to cut off Eurogold’s financial support, and taking public action in support of the Bergama peasants (E/E 29). This action plan was offered to the higher echelons of the Greenpeace bureaucracy to be put into effect by the local Greenpeace activists. Concomitantly, Bergama activists sent letters to Greenpeace International, summarizing the Bergama movement and its legal situation, and underlining the urgency of the issue in Bergama. However, the answer of Greenpeace International was negative since they decided not to get involved in the Bergama movement officially or launch an official campaign under the name of Greenpeace since gold mining was not among their priority issues and they were not specialized on the topic (E/E 21, 29).
“Later on, Greenpeace told us that gold mining was not part of their global agenda by adding that they were mostly concerned with nuclear waste issues” (E/E 3).

On top of that Greenpeace activists worried about the ‘burn-out’ syndrome which might have occurred when their insufficient resources were directed to more campaigns than they could handle (E/E 29). At the same time, there was some scepticism among the activists about Greenpeace’s involvement in their movement. This scepticism stemmed from the fact that Greenpeace had a formal and bureaucratic structure which would not fit with their activism, and that it had become a brand name which could swallow the grassroots aspect of the Bergama movement as expressed by a Greenpeace activist (E/E 5, 29):

“I didn’t want Greenpeace to be involved in our movement. Their brand name would overshadow our movement” (E/E 5).

Yet, Greenpeace did not pull back from the Bergama contention completely. Greenpeace International continued to share valuable information and their scientific observations on gold mining with the Bergama activists. More specifically, Greenpeace Austria was carrying out a campaign on the cyanide spill accident in Baia Mare, Romania, and Greenpeace activists sent findings and observations about the incident to the Bergama activists, thinking that the campaigns might be joined (E/E 21) Additionally, the local Greenpeace activists remained in contact with the Bergama movement and gave their support in terms of providing logistics, helping activists in their relations with the media during their protests, and participating in symposiums and panels. Moreover, through personal contacts, they discussed and exchanged views about tactics and strategies (E/E 21, 29). Accordingly, a limited level of mutual influence between the local Greenpeace and the Bergama activists was realized especially with respect to the general characteristics of their tactics, even if not in terms of individual tactics. An ex-Greenpeace activist underlined this point by saying:

“Oktay [Konyar] was a direct action activist, and he led peasants to direct action. Just like Greenpeace, he organized protests which were planned by a very limited number of people and which were announced to the media at the very last minute. Meaning, their tactics were very similar to Greenpeace’s. And they have taken a very right decision. They moved out of Bergama. They did not limit themselves to one place only. If a nuclear
power plant is to be built in Akkuyu, Greenpeace has not contended in Akkuyu. It contended in Ankara and Istanbul. The Bergama people also moved out of Bergama and went to İzmir [to protest]. These people, who had never seen Istanbul or set foot on the Bosporus Bridge, appeared there. They made a picnic in the Sultanahmet Park [hereby, referring to the protest picnic organized in a park in Istanbul in the aftermath of the nudity protest on the Bosporus Bridge in 1997] And they diffused this. In other words, tactics-wise, they were similar. But, it is not a one to one similarity of individual tactics. Yet, in terms of their general approaches, their civil obedience understanding, and their knowledge about how to behave towards the police when they staged civil disobedience acts, they were similar” (E/E 29).

Another contribution made by the local Greenpeace activists was to facilitate the Bergama activists to express their grievance outside the borders of Turkey. With that purpose, they helped the Bergama activists appear in an international conference in order to voice their demands. The Bergama activists and the Greenpeace activists perceived the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) Convention held Johannesburg, South Africa in December 2000 as an opportunity, even though cyanide was not among the toxic materials which would be discussed at the convention. Still, it was an effective place to convey their messages to the world. However, since the Bergama peasants lacked the financial resources required for travelling all the way to Johannesburg, the Bergama activists could not participate in the negotiations in person. Instead, with the technological assistance provided by the local Greenpeace activists, they sent a petition signed electronically via the Internet which was shown on a large screen during the meetings. In this way, they conveyed their messages of “No to gold processed with cyanide” to the representatives of over 100 states by linking up to the meeting through using the ICTs (Hurriyet, 05, 12.2005; Milliyet, 05.12.2000; E/E 29).

In sum, Greenpeace was not involved directly in the Bergama movement. Rather, its support arrived unofficially that mostly took the shape of information exchange. In other words, even though its support was crucial, it was still not what it could have achieved as the

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14 Yet, some of the tactics were reminiscent of each other. Greenpeace activists hang a banner at the Bosporus Bridge saying “Cumhur Ersümer Stop Akkuyu” in order to call on the Minister of Energy to stop nuclear power plant plans at Akkuyu, Turkey in 1999. Also, Senih Ozay bought shares of Dresdner Bank in order to have a word to say about the bank’s involvement in the Ovacık gold mine project which reminded of Greenpeace’s act of buying shares of Shell with similar aims (Özay, 1995; http://corpwatch.org/article.php?id=246, 24.09.2011).
most well-known environmental NGO all around the world. On the other hand, it was enough for the Bergama peasants to consider Greenpeace as a major contributor. For instance, Greenpeace activists went to the Bergama villages as part of their “Clean Production Tour” in 2001 and stayed for two days (E/E 21). Even such a small-scale event left positive impressions in the minds of the Bergama activists who said that Greenpeace made great contributions to their movement:

“Greenpeace came here a couple of times. They arrived with a bus full of people. They supported us. They opened their banners and distributed pamphlets. They supported us a lot (P/A 9).

b. FIAN

Foodfirst Information and Action Network International (FIAN International), and especially, its national branch in Germany were among the key allies of the Bergama movement. FIAN was an INGO operating for the protection of people’s rights to access food. (www.fian.org, 23.09.2011).¹⁵ In their combat with hunger and efforts to prevent unjust practices causing hunger, FIAN employs a wide range of practices throughout the world including monitoring related states policies, exposing any unjust practices, lobbying, sending Urgent Action letters, and empowering local groups through information campaigns and other educational activities (ibid).

FIAN’s involvement in the Bergama movement started with the personal interest of Petra Sauerland, the chairman of FIAN Germany between 1993 and 2001. After learning about the contentions over gold mining in Küçükdere-Havran and Bergama by reading it in German newspaper, Tageszeitung, in 1993, Sauerland visited the region with her Turkish husband and met with the Bergama activists in 1994 for the first time (E/E 28; Lemke, 2002). She told the Bergama activists about FIAN and offered support for their cause. Sauerland’s

¹⁵ FIAN International has been founded as an international membership based organization in 1986. Having 45 national sections run by volunteers, FIAN International encompasses around 3,600 members in more than 50 countries by 2011 (http://www.fian.org/, 23.09.2011).
motivation was “...to support people fighting for their food. Farmers would lose their land” (E/E 28). Subsequently, Lemke who acted as the main coordinator of transnational relations of the Bergama movement, called Sauerland asking help for putting through a resolution that was co-produced by Lemke and the spokesperson of the EU Greens Group to the emergency meeting of the EP in November 1994. However, FIAN International was unwilling to take action since they considered Turkey as a relatively prosperous country where peasants were wealthier than the peasants of poor countries (Lemke, 2002a). Sauerland personally convinced FIAN International and launched a campaign by releasing the first Urgent Action letter on October 18th, 1994 (Lemke, 2002a). In the Urgent Action letter, the background of contentions in Küçükdere-Havran and Bergama were told, and FIAN’s interest in the issue was described as “FIAN is deeply worried about an imminent breach of the social and economic human rights of Küçükdere, Bergama, and other affected communities [referring to the Greek island of Lesbos which was in the range of affected territory]” (FIAN, 1994). The proposed action plan was to launch a letter-campaign targeting the Turkish Ministry of Environment since it was the only ministry left which had not granted permits to the mine yet. They asked the Minister of Environment to resist the pressures of Eurogold (FIAN, 1994). FIAN’s involvement was seen as an opportunity by the Bergama activists on the premises that they could enhance their credibility by stressing an INGO that was registered at the UN was also opposing the project. They reckoned that FIAN’s support would facilitate them to bring their cause to the agenda of the EP. By presenting the Urgent Action letter of FIAN to the EP, the Bergama activists were able to put their resolution to the emergency meeting which passed on November 17th, 1994.

“When you say Bergama only, it does not mean anything, but FIAN is an international organization. That’s why I have consciously added FIAN’s perspective in our resolution” (E/E 27).

On the other hand, FIAN International was still hesitant about taking action over the issue of gold mining in Bergama since gold mining did not directly overlap with the issues of
FIAN International. The basic criterion for FIAN International to get involved in a contention is the existence of threats to agricultural lands in a region. To convince FIAN International to launch a bigger campaign over Bergama, Lemke and Sauerland pointed out the risks that cyanide leach method would bring to the fertile lands in Bergama which would violate peasants’ right to food in return. In other words, the Bergama activists extended their frames to the issue of rights to food. In fact, the master frame of human rights had already been used by the Bergama activists, and they emphasize done element of human rights, the right to food, more in their frames in order to get FIAN International’s support permanently (Lemke, 2002a).

“FIAN is a human rights organization and supports people who demand their rights. Gold mining companies first say they will follow the law, but then they push people from their land..... Water and land are poisoned after they leave. There is no clean food left. They never pay compensation. They destroy houses” (E/E 28).

From then on, FIAN International placed the issue of gold mining on its global agenda, and they started launching campaigns over gold mining with cyanide in various parts of the world. Furthermore, with the brokerage of Lemke, FIAN participated in the meeting of Global Mining Campaign in the U.S. in November 2001, entering the preparation committee (Lemke, 2002a). FIAN took over the role of extending the work against gold mining with cyanide to other organizations. For that purpose, FIAN organized a seminar over the issue of gold mining for German NGOs in Essen in 1997 in which Lemke and Taşkın gave speeches about developments in Bergama (Cumhuriyet, 17.02.1997).

“FIAN invited many NGOs to a meeting in Essen (1997), and Sefa Taşkın and I lectured German NGOs, including Greenpeace about cyanide gold. In other words, we can say, with pride, that we happened to instruct them about a very important issue” (Lemke, 2002: 8).

In that regard, the Bergama activists did not only receive support from INGOs, but they also actively contributed to the expansion of the transnational network of anti-gold mining.

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Throughout the Bergama movement, FIAN’s support continued in various ways. They contacted German originated banks and companies which were involved in the Ovacık gold mine such as Dresdner Bank, Degussa, and Metallgesellschaft as well as TUPRAG, the subsidiary of Preussag AG. FIAN put pressure on these companies and banks to withdraw from the gold mine project in Bergama and Küçükdere-Havran (E/E 28). On the other hand, they pressed the Turkish government to implement the court decisions and end the operation of the Ovacık gold mine through letter campaigns targeting Turkish Prime Ministry and various other Ministries (FIAN, 1997a; FIAN, 1997b). In their letters, FIAN specifically drew attention to the fact that operation of the mine would mean “more than the devastation of a scenic beauty- but could destroy the livelihoods of the current and future residents in the area” (FIAN, 1997a). Therefore, FIAN insisted on the fact their concerns revolved around livelihood matters and human rights rather than a conservationist aspiration. In addition to these activities, FIAN also provided aid to the Bergama peasants by channelling information over gold mining, maintaining relations with foreign scientific circles, and organizing conferences, seminars, and meetings. They also made support visits in order to increase the morale of the Bergama peasants (Lemke, 2002a).

c. SOS-Pergamon

Australia was one of the contexts where the Bergama activists forged transnational links. This was because there were two Australian based mining companies, Normandy Resources and Posedion Gold, first as partners in the conglomeration of Eurogold, and then as the owner of the Ovacık gold mine (Taşkın, 1998). As a response to the Australian involvement in the Ovacık gold mine in Bergama, a group called SOS-Bergama was established in 1998 by several Turkish origin Australian citizens residing in Australia. The main purpose of SOS-Bergama was to bring the case of Bergama to the attention of Australian public and government in order to put pressure on the Australia originated mining
company, Normandy. The group described the goal of their campaign as “to thwart Eurogold’s attempts to expand their mining operations throughout Turkey”. The SOS-Bergama group organized and run the campaign on the Bergama issue by getting the help of the Mineral Policy Institute (MPI), an affiliated member of Friends of the Earth (FoE) International. The links with the MPI were maintained through the brokerage of the (FoE) Australia. In fact, FoE Australia was called on for help through the personal contacts of the founder of SOS-Pergamon who was a member of FoE Australia at the same time (E/E 36). The MPI supported the campaign by using its already existing connections to convey their messages and spreading information about the campaign. Additionally, the MPI followed the case of Bergama and put each development on its web site, providing a constant flow of information about Bergama.

SOS-Bergama participated in the protest against the World Economic Forum in Melbourne in 2000. During the protest, they stood as a separate group with their own name though acting together with other environmentalist, ecologist, green and anti-globalization groups which drew the attention of the Australian media and public. One week later, they also organized a picket line during the World Miners Congress meeting in Melbourne wearing traditional Turkish outfits to draw attention. As described by one of the prominent activists in SOS-Bergama, that protest was the peak of their activities in the sense that the Australian public learned about the issue of gold mining in Bergama, and they started receiving public support at increasing rates (E/E 36). 17 During the protests, they also launched a petition signing campaign. They collected around 7,000 signatures and sent them to the Australian Democrat Party, which was concerned about immigrant rights and environmental issues, to be presented at the Australian Federal Parliament. With the petition, the activists told about the hazards of Normandy’s gold mining activities in Turkey and asked the Australian government

17 During marches and the protest some of the slogans used by the SOS-Bergama group on their banners were: “No to goldmine with cyanide in Turkey” and “Third World is not the garbage of the developed countries” (Milliyet, 08.10.2000).
and MPs to compel the Normandy Mining to stop its gold mining project in Bergama. Also, they demanded the parliament to enact a law prohibiting the use of cyanide by the gold mining sector (E/E 36).

The SOS-Bergama group also carried out activities in relation to human rights and democracy regarding the Bergama movement. A second major petition about the Bergama movement was launched in Australia when the spokesperson of the Bergama movement, Oktay Konyar, was arrested on 12 April 2001. This time the SOS-Bergama group acted together with the MPI. In the petition, an “urgent international support for Bergama Villagers” was requested from the Australian public. Through the internet, the petition was also sent all around the world asking for support (E/E 36). In the circulated sample message, which was to be forwarded to the Turkish government members and representatives of Normandy Mining, it was requested from the Turkish government to release the ‘leader’ of the Bergama Villagers, Oktay Konyar. The SOS-Bergama also conducted a joint press conference together with MPI in order to pressure the Turkish government from outside concerning the arrest of Oktay Konyar.

To increase the effectiveness of their campaign and reach out to a wider audience, the SOS-Bergama group made contacts with the Australian media. When the group was formed initially, they contacted journalists from state-owned SBS radio who broadcast the initial statements of the SOS-Bergama. Then, articles on the Bergama movement were published in the nation-wide newspapers the Age, and the Australian and in the magazine Green Left Weekly. Also, a documentary was shot in Bergama and broadcast in Australia by the Australian-Dateline program which received a lot of attention. The ‘Kuvvay-ı Milliye’ march in which the Bergama peasants visited the Australian soldiers’ martyrdom in Çanakkale received immense attention from the Australian public (E/E 36). Through the use of the media, the Australian public became aware of the Bergama peasants’ protests. These
grassroots activities fostered the effectiveness of the SOS-Pergamon groups’ campaign (E/E 34, 36). The Australian leg of the Bergama movement ended when Normandy handed over the Ovacik gold mine to the American based mining TNC, Newmont.

d. Transnational Anti-Mining Networks

Transnational links of the Bergama movement were not limited to their relations with Greenpeace, FIAN, and SOS-Pergamon. The activists got in touch with other INGOs and advocacy groups within the transnational anti-mining network. Mineral Policy Center (US), Mineral Policy Institute (Australia), and Minewatch (UK) were the main networks/organizations that gave support to the Bergama movement. Relations basically revolved around sharing information and making the issue of the Bergama movement known to the world.

Minewatch is a campaigning group launched in 1990 for connecting local populations and other groups that were struggling over mining issues. After doing substantial work in terms of linking local struggles to each other and spreading information about mining TNCs that they monitored, the group ended its activities to due to resource insufficiencies in 1995 (E/E 32). The Bergama activists heard of Minewatch initially through the brokerage of Greenpeace. Greenpeace activists provided contact information of Minewatch to Taşkın and the peasants during their visit to the activist ship, Sirius (E/E 3; Taşkın in Reinart, 2003). Later on, Lemke approached Minewatch asking them to support their struggle. With the involvement of another activist with a crucial role in terms of maintaining cross-border relations of the Bergama movement, information exchange was extended (E/E 32). Later, Minewatch mostly provided information about Newmont whose activities it had been monitoring all over the world. Concomitantly, they disseminated information about the progress of the Bergama movement on their web site for the purpose of letting the public

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18 Formerly, the same group of people that formed Minewatch organized under the name of Partizan back in the late 1970s. Their purpose was to scrutinize the activities of the mining giant Rio Tinto and to give support to the Australian aboriginals who bore the impacts of mining in Australia (E/E 32).
know about ‘community pressure’ exerted on mining TNCs (E/E 32). Yet, the Bergama activists demanded further support from Minewatch such as maintaining links with other groups, visiting their region, and doing more detailed research on their aggrieved issue. However, Minewatch which overwhelmingly relied on information sent to them from activists from all over the world could not meet these demands due to its limited capacity in terms of financial resources and human power (E/E 32).

The second international anti-mining group which gave support to the Bergama movement was the Mineral Policy Institute (MPI), an environmental INGO based in Australia. The MPI was formed in 1995 in response to the Australian based mining companies’ overseas activities and their negative impacts on the environment and local populations. The MPI which was also an affiliate member of the Friends of the Earth (FoE) International was specialized in campaigning, advocacy, and research over mining, mineral, and energy projects with environmentally hazardous effects. For that purpose, they gave support to local groups in Europe, Africa, Australia, Asia, and the Pacific by providing information and helping them in their struggles (http://www.foe.org.au/groups/affiliates/australian-affiliate-members-of-foe-international/the-mineral-policy-institute-mpi/; http://www.mpi.org.au/about-mpi.aspx). The MPI which was specialized on the overseas activities of Australian based mining companies provided help by giving information about Normandy. On top of that, the MPI was also actively involved in the campaign launched by the SOS-Pergamon against Normandy in Australia as described above.

Mineral Policy Center (MPC) is another INGO based in Washington, US, which works on mining and its hazardous environmental impacts. As a result of Lemke’s efforts, MPC (Earthworks since 2004) was engaged in the Bergama movement. The basic support arrived from MPC in the form of sharing information about mining TNCs’ activities (E/E 5, 22). It was a mutual relationship in the sense that MPC also referred to informative research
done by the Bergama activists. The book of Sefa Taşkın, *Cyanide Octopus*, was translated into English and placed in the essential reading list for mining activists (Minewire, 1999). In addition, they publicized the Bergama movement in their newsletters (MPC newsletter, 2000). Steven D’Esposito, then president of MPC, was among the ones who signed the aforementioned Conventus 99 declaration (Conventus 99). Even though the support of MPC was found extremely helpful by the Bergama activists, relations were kept limited due to the differences in organizational structures and approaches. Underlining its bureaucratic and hierarchical structure, one of the Bergama activists found MPC inflexible and formal as stated below:

“They first gave us information…. Because they work a little bit like NGOs, with a president, second president, secretary...[When you call, they say] “Hello. Can I help you?” They are not as flexible as we were. ..... First we took information from the Mineral Policy Center. Later, the Mineral Policy Center took Turkey as an example.” (E/E 22).

On the other hand, relations with less formal groups like Minewatch could not be extended to higher level either. This time, it was the unavailability of resources such as money and staff which prevented further collaboration (E/E 32). Nevertheless, by joining these networks, the Bergama activists obtained valuable information about their opponent TNCs and gold mining in general. At the same time, the Bergama activists were sending them information about their struggle and mining TNCs which they obtained from elsewhere.

“Minewatch helped us a lot. American [Mineral] Policy Centre helped us a lot....They provided help in the form of information. Also, we were also giving information to them. They were disseminating it to the world” (E/E 3).

In that sense, the Bergama movement was not a passive recipient of support from transnational anti-mining activism networks. Rather, their exchange was mutual which indicated that the Bergama movement was also involved in the formation of transnational activism networks by providing input and linking different networks to each other.
Links with other movements and actors:

The controversy over gold mining in the Halkidiki Peninsula, in northern Greece, dated back to 1985 when a 20 year-old lead-zinc mine, Olympia mine, was planned to be turned into a gold mine. The peasants of Olympia village who had already been living with the environmental degradation in their region caused by the lead-zinc mine vehemently opposed this project thinking that gold mining would bring additional burden to their environment, and the Olympia mine remained closed until 1995 (E/E 33). In 1995, the Canadian based mining TNC, TVX GOLD, bought the gold mine, and the Greek government, which was in total support of gold mining, issued necessary licences which initiated the struggles of the Olympia peasants. During the first years of the contention, struggles took a violent form such as clashing with the police, burning equipments and violent demonstrations (www.mmpindia.org/greece.PDF). At the end of 1997, a group of environmental activists outside Olympia stepped in, and they decided to use legal procedures such as filing lawsuits and appealing to the Council of State, thereby changing the course of contention. Also, they aimed at putting pressure on the funders of TVX GOLD by contacting reporters, TVX shareholders, and market analysts. Subsequently, the story of the Olympia gold mine appeared in the international media. They called on the EU Commission to cut its subsidy for TVX GOLD, and they made their claims at the annual meeting of Deutsche Bank in 2000 for cutting off its financial support to the project. In 2001, the Greek State of Council gave a decision in favour of the activists and cancelled the Olympia gold mining project based on the “precautionary principle and the principle of sustainable development” (E/E 33). The mine has been closed since then, along with another gold mine project in the same region.

The Halkidiki movement in Greece and the Bergama movement shared several common characteristics. First, they forged transnational links among themselves and
exchanged views, strategies, tactics, and information. As a result of Greek activists’ demand for help, links were established, and the Bergama activists sent “bags full of documents” received from elsewhere (E/E 3, 33). Also, Konyar visited several villages opposing the mine in Greece and contacted peasants and mayors exchanging views in 2003. During this visit in which the Bergama peasants were supposed to participate, but couldn’t because of financial difficulties, Konyar shared their experiences of struggle as well as their strategies and organizational structures with the Greek anti-mine peasants and mayors (E/E 2). Moreover, prominent scientists who became a part of the Bergama movement network provided scientific support the Halkidiki movement. Prof. Duman prepared an Environmental Impact assessment report on the Greek case which was presented to the State of Council by the Halkidiki activists (E/E 9, 33; Milliyet 12.09.2000; Milliyet, 14.04.2001). Prof. Korte and Prof. Duman participated in an international conference of ‘Exploration of Gold Deposits in Thrace-International Meeting’ in the city of Komotini, Greece, in October 2000 (E/E 9, 33).

Second, they used the same transnational networks in their opposition to TNCs. Through the brokerage of the Bergama activists who had already forged their transnational links, the Greek anti-mine activists engaged with the MPC, Minewatch, and FIAN Germany establishing similar relations of information exchange (E/E 28, 32, 33). Third, the Bergama movement’s activities bore impact on the Halkidiki movement, even if indirectly. The Greek Council of State referred to the decision of the Turkish Council of State when ruling against the operation of the Olympidia mine. In that sense, legal and grassroots struggles of the Bergama activists that won favourable court decisions contributed significantly to the favourable decision of the court of Greece and subsequently to the victory of the Halkidiki movement. This connection between national courts beyond borders exemplifies the central argument of the thesis on how the local, national, and global nexus interactively enmeshed together, rather than constituting separate and distinct levels (E/E 1, 3, 33).
Even though these two movements were mobilized over the same issue and displayed many similarities, there were some diverging aspects as well. First, in terms of their grassroots activism, mass mobilization among villagers in Greece was not as extensive as in Bergama. In spite of the fact that villages of Stratoniki and Olympidia were only about 10 kilometres away from each other, they did not act together in their struggles (E/E 3, 33). Also, violent acts were extensively resorted by the peasant activists in Greece whereas the Bergama peasants preserved their non-violent civil disobedience strategy throughout their movement (E/E 3, 33). It was with the spill-over effect of the Bergama movement that the Greek anti-mine activists adopted the strategy of pursuing a legal struggle and the strategy of activism beyond borders as indicated by a spokesperson of the Halkidiki movement who said that that they learned a lot form the Bergama movement (E/E 33). Moreover, the national political opportunities were mostly closed for the Greek activists since the Greek governments and centre mass political parties were in favour of gold mining similar to the situation in Turkey. However, being an EU member state made a difference in the strategies of the Greek activists. Instead of pressuring their own government(s) directly, they approached the EU Commission which was a much more influential EU body (E/E 33). Finally, the Greek state used intense levels of coercion on the Greek peasant activists even exceeding the levels of repression used by the Turkish state.

Clash between national and transnational:

While all these transnational pursuits of the Bergama activists continued, a book entitled *German NGOs and the Bergama Case* (Hablemitoğlu, 2001) was published which marked a turning point in the Bergama movement. In the book, it was argued that the Bergama movement was organized by German foundations operating in Turkey with the directions of the German state. This argument was based on the claim that the German state possessed the largest gold reservoirs in the world, and gold production in Turkey was not in
the national interests of Germany since it would have lowered gold prices on the markets. Allegations continued by pointing out that, with the orders of the German state and German political parties, German NGOs such as FIAN and German foundations such as Heinrich Böll Foundation, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung Foundation provoked and funded the resistance in Bergama (Hablemitoğlu, 2001). The evidence brought forth for such accusations were mainly the transnational links that the Bergama activists forged with political parties and INGOs from Germany. The conclusion of the book was that NGOs and foundations were the ‘agents’ of the West and acted upon the imperialistic ideals of Western countries with a ‘hidden agenda’ of weakening the nation-state in order to pave the way for the global capital. Accordingly peasants were ‘collaborators’ (Hablemitoğlu, 2001).

Based on these claims in the Hablemitoğlu book, the Bergama activists were accused of engaging in espionage activities and working against the national interests of Turkey together with ‘foreigners’. Subsequently, a lawsuit was filed against 15 Bergama activists involving spokespersons and peasant activists. Additionally the representatives of German foundations and Petra Sauerland, then president of FIAN Germany, were also included in the lawsuit as suspects. In the indictment, it was claimed that: “In places in which classical diplomacy does not have any influence, these foundations carry out activities and penetrate all important fields of politics and society” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, 31.01.2003). In the mean time, the transnational support of the European Parliament, the European Commission, Green politicians, and INGOs for the Bergama activists continued through statements and references to the lawsuit on ‘espionage’ in the Turkey progress reports (Turkey Progress report, 2002).

“We contested the lawsuit opened by the State Security Court. I think the pressure exerted form Europe played a large role in the decision of the State Security Court. It was not only us, Germany, other states, the EU Commission all contested State Security Court’s handling of the issue. The EP did a lot” (E/E 27).

Also, Cem Özdemir, a member of the European Parliament and an ally, stated in his support of the defendants that ideas and approaches are not state-centric anymore as in the Cold War
period. Cem Özdemir criticized the state-centric view of the Turkish state and underlined environmentalism was an issue which transcended national borders by saying:

“Within the contemporary world, there are no homogeneous Turkish, American or German based approaches. Rather, there is a variety of diversified approaches in Turkey which is also the case in Germany or the US. The ones who do not want to see that live in the old world” (C. Özdemir, Kuzey Ege 04.03.2002).

“I can say this. I am an environmentalist. Environmentalists operate at the international level. This means environmentalists do not have a nationality or borders. Environmental movements are international movements. Turkey should get used to this fact. For example, Greenpeace organized a series of protests in Germany like it did in Turkey. We welcomed this. We saw it as enrichment. They showed us our faults” (Kuzey Ege, 2002).

In a similar vein, one of the spokespersons evaluated the lawsuit as a nationalist and state-centric act of the Turkish state:

“Government always misunderstood the case. They perceived it negatively. They interpreted it as an intrusion into our internal affairs. They thought that they [actors outside Turkey] are compelling us...” (E/E 3).

After a prolonged legal process in the Court of State Security, the defendants were acquitted of charges on March 5th, 2003. However, even though the activists as well as the representatives of German foundations and INGOs were found not guilty in the court, this case did immense damage to the movement. First, wider public support achieved throughout Turkey deteriorated. Second, within the movement, the villagers started questioning themselves. “They were confused and they started saying ‘weren’t we doing something good for the country?’” (P/A 2) Therefore, the connections being built with the global civil society were damaged as a result of this act of the state.

Overall, gold mining in Greece came to an end whereas it continued in Turkey. Their strategies and tactics resembled each other’s. Furthermore, they built alliances with same set of actors beyond their national borders. Besides, the Bergama movement had a comparative advantage to their Greek counterparts in terms of achieving transnational support of INGOs and advocacy groups since they remained a non-violent mobilization. As Bob (2005) suggests, INGOs and advocacy network actors are more open to supporting groups which employ non-violence as their strategy. In that sense, it was more likely for the Bergama
activists to get support at the transnational level. However, several obstacles created the
difference in the outcomes. First, the Bergama peasants did not have sufficient resources to
reach out beyond their borders. Language was a problem in the first place because there were
only a small number of people who spoke English even among the university educated
members of the Bergama movement network (E/E 15, 34).

“We could not move out of our shell here. If we have managed something in terms of forging links with others, it
remained at the level of some representatives. Birsel Lemke received an international award. We contacted the
press and environmentalist NGOs abroad. However, if we could have moved our contention to the global level, it
would have been more meaningful” (E/E 11).

Second, the anti-imperialism discourse which was prevalent throughout the movement acted
as an impediment to furthering transnational links and building alliances with ‘foreign’ actors.
Even though the Bergama peasants were overwhelmingly willing to build further relations at
the transnational level, some urban-based sections of the Bergama movement were sceptical
about getting into alliances with actors, organizations, and institutions outside Turkey
believing that it was against national interests (E/E 15, 16, 18). As a result, transnational
contacts depended on only a few individuals, and the espionage case exacerbated this
scepticism. Third, combating the Turkish state’s unresponsiveness was a more difficult task
for the Bergama peasants. Compared to Greece, Turkey is more isolated from the global
political structures since it is only a candidate state but not an EU member. As such, Turkish
authorities and politicians were able to act as ‘regressive globalizers’- applying the necessities
for the economic aspects of capitalist globalization and not complying with the principles of
liberal democracy. In sum, despite all these problems and impediments, the Bergama
movement has been able to integrate itself into the transnational activism networks and
proven that politics is taking place within a globalizing nexus in which different levels of
local, national, and transnational are enmeshed.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

Capitalist globalization has increasingly become hegemonic. As Sklair (2002) has argued, the transnational capitalist class (TCC) dominates the current form of global system through its transnational practices. As a crucial fraction of the TCC, transnational corporations (TNCs) detach themselves from national interests and structures and pursue their own interests at the global level seeing the whole world as one giant market. Yet, the globalization process is not confined to the world economy but rather, it embraces the spheres of politics and culture as well. As a result, the conventional world order based on the primacy of nation-states is being transformed with the activities of the TCC whose members are diffused throughout the world.

These transformations came with major costs: the ecological crisis, class polarization, and a democratic deficit. First, due to the globally pursued neo-liberal economic model based on growth, the exploitation of world resources reached unprecedented levels. Second, inequalities exacerbated both within societies and globally. Third, decision-making processes have been exclusively dominated by the members of the TCC which leaves the majority of the world population no control over political and economic decisions that directly affect their daily lives. Combined with the already existing gender, ethnic, religious inequalities and democratic shortcomings, capitalist globalization has presented an ‘unjust’ global system.

Opposition to capitalist globalization has also been on the rise since the 1980s. Sufferers of the crises inherent in capitalist globalization constitute the “network of democratic globalizers”. Various groups, organizations, and individuals opposing the activities of the ‘network of neo-liberal globalizers’ mainly consisting of the TCC are mobilized under the Global Justice movement (GJM) using the infrastructure of global civil society. The GJM, an umbrella movement network entailing a plethora of groups, organizations, and individuals focuses on a variety of issues in connection to capitalist
globalization. Despite the extreme heterogeneity of its participants with varying political agendas and views, the GJM activists challenge their commonly defined adversary, capitalist globalization, and, they demand a more ‘just’ world with respect to the environment, labour, human rights, democratic participation, gender equality, and welfare programs. Opposition to capitalist globalization occurs mainly in two forms: first, transnational social movements (TSMs) which rest upon a wide network of transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and transnational advocacy networks (TANs) staging transnational protests in Seattle, Genoa, Washington, Prague, Quebec and elsewhere against international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization; and second, local movements launched by populations who are directly exposed to the hazards of capitalist globalization, linking themselves to transnational networks such as the Zapatista movement in Mexico, the Ogonis’ movement in Nigeria, anti-large dam mobilizations in India, and rubber tappers’ movement in Brazil.

The Bergama movement exemplifies the latter strand in the GJM. In their struggle against the environmentally hazardous Ovacık gold mine project, the Bergama peasants and other activists formed a movement network and contended mining TNC(s) and the state. In fact, the cause of the Bergama movement is not unique since similar projects with detrimental impacts are implemented in various locations all over the world. Yet, not all the local populations exposed to such hazards mobilize or, even if they do, many of those cannot turn their mobilizations into long-lasting and visible movements. Hence, grievances do not automatically lead to the formation of social movements. Rather, successful mobilizations that become sustained struggles are contingent on their framing of capitalist globalization, the availability of political opportunities at local, national, and global levels, and appropriate mobilizing structures.
As indicated in Chapter 5, the locals identified themselves as peasants of the Ovacık plain whose livelihood and lives are threatened regardless of their religious or ethnic differences. In that sense, they transcended previously existing social cleavages. Peasants belonging to different sects of Islam coalesced within the same movement leaving their historical tensions aside. Yet, in spite of the regional aspect of their identity, they did not limit their identity to their immediate locality. Instead, they constructed a more inclusive identity which allowed them to connect with other sufferers of the same process of capitalist globalization encountered in Turkey and elsewhere in the world. Even though the peasantry occupied a central place within the collective identity of the Bergama movement, other urban actors critical of capitalist globalization were involved as well since peasant identity was reconstructed in relation to capitalist globalization. In other words, the Bergama peasants portrayed themselves as one of the many groups experiencing destructive impacts of capitalist globalization. In this way, they were able to extend their movement network to national and transnational levels which increased their capacity to mobilize. At the same time, they were able to interact with actors facing similar conditions outside their regional and national territories such as the Halkidiki movement in Greece.

All of this was achieved through the framing processes employed by the Bergama activists. The Bergama peasants based their frames on two master frames: “environmentalism” and “human rights”. Accordingly, not only did they express their concerns about environmental degradation, but they also drew attention to the human rights aspect of their contention since their rights to land, water, food, and life were being violated. More specifically, against the TNCs’ framing of gold mining as a means to develop a region, they claimed that the operation of the Ovacık gold mine with the use the environmentally hazardous cyanide leach method displayed the TNCs’ disregard for the environment and human life in their pursuit for profit. Additionally, they also emphasized that the Ovacık gold
mine would have negative impacts on the local economy and community life contrary to what was claimed by the TNCs and the state. In order to defy the claims of the TNCs and the state, the Bergama peasants proposed alternative uses of their land. In constructing these frames, they depicted their situation as part of a global process—globalization. Views over the content, dynamics, and prospects of capitalist globalization varied such as whether capitalist globalization had novel characteristics in comparison to imperialism or not, whether it could be tamed or not, and whether it offered benefits such as transnational opportunities or not. Nevertheless, there was a general consensus on the negative impacts of capitalist globalization such as environmental degradation, inequalities and human rights violations. In that sense, it was generally agreed that their grievances were mainly caused by the capitalist globalization process much like those of other local communities across the world.

In that regard, the Bergama activists adopted a post-national approach in their norms and values by prioritizing human life and ecological justice over economic growth and profit, a perspective shared by the GJM activists all over the world. Concomitantly, they continued to express their communal and specific interests, without being exclusionary. Evidently, their collaboration with other movements in Turkey and across their national territories as well as their engagement in protests against other issues related to capitalist globalization such as the multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) or the Iraq War over which GJM activists mobilize displayed their commitment to a general opposition to capitalist globalization. In that sense, in spite of being a locally-unwanted-land-use (LULU) movement, the Bergama activists avoided acting as a Not-In-My-Backyard movement (NIMBY) with purely particularistic territorial interests. Instead, they located their particularism within a heterogeneous global agenda.

The Bergama movement mobilized within a transforming political context. As shown in chapters 6 and 7, the Bergama activists had various political opportunities at the local,
national, and global levels, each of which they tried to make use as a local mobilization. At
the local level, they forged links with civil society actors including CSOs, lawyers, and
university professors who provided valuable support in the form of legal assistance, collection
of scientific information, and lending legitimacy and prestige in eyes of the public and the
power holders. In fact, these local allies became an integral part of the Bergama network and
acted as committed intellectuals. Among these local elite, four of them acted as
‘spokespersons’ of the movement maintaining relations between different sections of the
Bergama movement network. As shown in this research, permanent support of local
governments for local movements like the Bergama movement is crucial for its mobilization
and sustainability. The fact that the local mayor, Sefa Taşkıın, acted as a movement participant
provided the locals with enhanced levels of legitimacy and prestige, access to political
institutions, material resources and links with civil society actors. A former local politician,
Oktay Konyar, maintained, managed, and coordinated protest activities, which was a
significant contribution for the Bergama peasants who had never participated in a social
movement before. Furthermore, Konyar set the non-violent civil disobedience as the main
theme of their repertoires of action which marked the diffusion of such a strategy from other
movements outside Turkey since civil disobedience was not utilized by social movements in
Turkey before. With the innovative tactics and protest forms Konyar formulated, the Bergama
movement received attention of the media, the public, and the power holders. Local elite’s
support was not limited to various material and non-material resources to the Bergama
peasants. They were also crucial frame articulators which enabled the Bergama peasants to
relate their immediate grievance to global dynamics.

National level opportunities were not as favourable as the local ones. In fact, the
Bergama activists faced a national political context which was being reshaped by capitalist
globalization. Even though political actors including political parties and civil society actors
had become diversified in the post-military regime period, the Bergama activists had difficulties in terms of finding allies or having access to decision-making processes. This was mainly due to, first, the absence of political parties which would support their claims save marginal left-wing parties which were considered to be ineffective by the Bergama activists. In their political articulations, both centre-right and centre-left disregarded the environment and prioritized economic growth either by referring to capitalist globalization or national developmentalism. Also, the absence of a Green Party or a New Left party left the Bergama peasants without potential allies at the national level. Second, even though there was support from civil society actors, it was erratic and fluctuating because of the lack of previously established advocacy networks at the national level. Third, despite the gradual democratization process Turkey was going through, the state apparatus consisting of governments, civil and military bureaucracy retained its exclusive and non-responsive characteristics. Although the judiciary was perceived as an opportunity, legal decisions in favour of the Bergama movement were not implemented which led the Bergama activists to question the working of democracy and the principle of rule of law.

The Bergama activists also moved their contention to the transnational level. By forging links with political parties, INGOs, scientists, and journalists abroad, they attempted to put pressure on TNCs and their states as well. The findings of this research confirm that local, national and global levels of polity are intertwined. In fact, the brokerage role of the local elite facilitated such alliances. The local elite under the leadership of Birsel Lemke brought their issue to the agendas of the transnational public and supranational political institutions such as the European Parliament. However, contrary to the facilitative role of local actors, the pro-mine camp consisting of governments, scientists, and miners’ associations were able to inhibit the continuation of such transnational relations. As the Bergama activists were accused of working against the national interests of Turkey in
collaboration with foreigners, the transnational opportunities started to diminish. In short, local and national political dynamics were determinant factors in the opening and closing of transnational opportunities.

Various studies show that many of the social movements mobilized against capitalist globalization take place within national contexts by taking nation-states as their main target and fulcrum since there are no democratic political structures at the global level equivalent to the nation-state (Rootes, 2004; Tarrow, 2005; Johnston, 2011). The findings of my research on the Bergama movement confirm these theoretical accounts, yet partially. Even though the Bergama activists demanded their state to take action in their favour and shut the Ovacık gold mine down, the Turkish state was neither the only target nor the only fulcrum they had chosen. They have campaigned against the TNCs at the local, national and transnational levels. Also, they have approached political and legal institutions beyond their nation-state. One of the underlying motives for applying to supranational and transnational political bodies was to create a ‘boomerang effect’ to increase pressure on their nation-state. However, they also aimed to stop TNCs which were carrying out detrimental practices. Therefore, in the practices of the Bergama activists, nation-states were only one of the targets and fulcrums.

Also, national political contexts should be treated cautiously in the age of capitalist globalization since they are undergoing a structural change. Capitalist globalization has not rendered a fully globalized world yet. Instead, it is a globalizing world which rests upon transnational practices. In that regard, national actors and structures are inherent components of capitalist globalization rather than entities subject to the levelling forces of an external process that is globalization. In other words, although the portrayal of local, national, and global structures and relations as nested within each other and surrounded by a larger context captures to a certain extent the nature of capitalist globalization, in the light of the present research on the Bergama movement, I argue that the interaction between local, national and
global levels can better be understood as intertwined. As a result of intensification, extension, and acceleration of transnational practices, national borders are being transcended within such a globalizing world. Carriers of these transnational practices constituting capitalist globalization are the same actors that are used to be confined within the limits of their national territories and labelled as ‘national’ Through their policies, national political actors have become active agents of capitalist globalization, carrying out facilitative roles for the transnational practices to transpire. In that regard, even though the nation-state still appears to be one of the most important constitutive units within the contemporary global order, its content and role has been transformed to a large extent. As part of the TCC, governments and national political parties share the same interests and concerns with those of other fractions of the TCC. Still, the manifestations of this transformation vary across different contexts since previous cleavages combine with transnational practices producing multivariate political conjunctures. These new political conjunctures determine the direction of change created under capitalist globalization. Nevertheless, local, national, and global structures and relations are not located within each other, existing separately surrounded by a larger context. Rather, capitalist globalization renders an enmeshed political context in which local, national and global levels of polity are intertwined. Therefore, even if local social movements contend their own nation-states in their opposition to capitalist globalization, they still challenge one of the actors of capitalist globalization. As this study has made clear, the analysis of local social movements can be made only by taking into account the interaction between the local, national and transnational spheres in an enmeshed global structure which in turn interacts with framing processes and mobilizing structures, all of which is not possible solely by a state-centric approach.

In Turkey, national political actors became active agents of capitalist globalization enabling transnational practices to transpire. Governments and national political parties
facilitated the practices of the mining TNCs despite their citizens’ opposition. The Turkish power holders and state officials defended the operation of the Ovacık gold mine in the name of the ‘national economy’. Yet, these actors were aspiring to integrate Turkey into the global market by introducing major structural adjustments in the field of mining allowing the practices of the TNCs rather than building tentative alignments with capitalist globalization.

Their objectives of becoming a part of economic globalization were discerned in their framing of the Bergama movement as a threat to the existence of TNCs in Turkey. On the other hand, members of the neo-liberal globalization network do not always act as ‘pure’ globalizers since globalization is a fluid process. In other words, pro-globalizing political actors which control the state might, and usually do, oscillate between nationalist and globalizationist stances varying across contexts. In the case of Turkey, state’s exclusionist and non-responsive character continued towards ‘its’ citizens through the governments’ use of the repressive capacity of the state and application of ‘illiberal’ measures. Put differently, without adopting the prevalent features of liberal democracy as part of capitalist globalization, state actors behaved as ‘regressive globalizers’ prioritizing the economic aspect of capitalist globalization.

Similarly, most political parties opted for capitalist globalization to varying degrees in their ideological preferences which shaped their political articulations. The major social democratic party in Turkey tried to reproduce its nationalist and secularist position without making a precise reading of capitalist globalization which resulted in a failed political articulation. The Bergama peasants found their political party allies beyond national borders. Support arrived from the members of the Green Party at the European Parliament and in Germany. In that regard, the case of the Bergama movement points to the emergence of a new political axis revolving around capitalist globalization which cross-cuts local, national and transnational political levels within an enmeshed global framework.
Diminishing political opportunities was one of the main factors which had an impact on the decline of the movement. The Bergama activists lost their transnational allies as a result of the Turkish state’s move of ‘espionage case’. At the local level, the support of the local elite diminished because of divergences over ideological and strategic preferences as well as personal power struggles between the leaders. In fact, the informal movement-network structure based on coalitional leadership provided flexibility and fluidity enabling them to act at the local, national, and transnational scales simultaneously. However, conflicts surfaced among the movement elite, vulnerabilities of this network emerged which became one of the main causes of demobilization. Additionally, the Bergama peasants became exhausted as a result of their prolonged activism which lasted for almost 10 years. As a result, many peasant activists dropped out -either sold their land to the TNCs or started working at the mine- which created splits at the grassroots.

One question still remains: What is the impact created by the Bergama movement as a successfully developed and sustained mobilization? In fact, the focus of this study is the development and sustenance of mobilization. An analysis of movement outcomes requires a different research design. This is mainly due to the fact that evaluation of social movement outcomes is a complicated matter. As it is argued in the burgeoning literature on social movements, variables such as changes in public opinion, interest groups, political parties, and behaviours of governments and administrators as well as the impact of other social movements should also be incorporated in the analysis in order to single out the level of influence by each (della Porta and Diani, 2006; Kolb, 2007; Tarrow, 2011). Otherwise, it is misleading to attribute an automatic credit to social movements for political and/or cultural changes regarding their issues. Keeping this methodological caveat in mind, some preliminary points on the outcomes of the Bergama movement can be made.
At first glance, the Bergama movement is not a successful mobilization in terms of reaching its consistently stated goal of closing the Ovacık gold mine. True enough, apart from the continuing litigation process carried out by several lawyers and CSOs, the Bergama movement has been defunct since 2003, and the Ovacık gold mine remains open to this day.¹ However, the classical approach of Gamson (1990) evaluating social movement success with respect to achievement of stated-goals and having access to decision-making processes has major shortcomings. First, defining success with respect to achievement of stated-goals leads to a conceptual shortcoming because of varying definitions of stated-goals within a single social movement network (Giugni, 1999); changes in stated-goals throughout mobilizations (Kolb, 2007); and varying perceptions and evaluation of consequences of a movement among various internal and external actors (Giugni, 1999). Resultantly, the concept of ‘success’ is replaced with other concepts such as ‘outcomes’, ‘impacts’, ‘effects’, or ‘consequences’ in the social movements literature (Giugni, 1999; Amenta and Caren, 2004; della Porta and Diani, 2006; Kolb, 2007; Tarrow, 2011). Yet, despite the conceptual clarification, there are still challenges in relation to causality. Factors such as time-lag between political outcomes and movement mobilizations, the durability of changes associated with movements, the general impact of a protest cycle on political and/or cultural outcomes rather than a single movement complicate the analysis of social movement outcomes (della Porta and Diani, 2006; Tarrow, 2011). On the other hand, Kolb (2007) claims that the success of movements with clear and constant stated-goals can still be evaluated by comparing them with similar movements in other contexts. Based on such a relational approach, the Bergama movement appears as a failed case when compared to the Halkidiki movement which managed to stop a gold mine project in their region. Yet, the relational approach to movement success still suffers from factors reviewed above. For instance, it appears that the Halkidiki movement’s success was

¹ The Ovacık gold mine is now owned by a Turkish mining company, Koza. The decline of the Bergama movement coincided with the placement of ownership to a Turkish company. However, Koza’s ownership had no impact since the movement was already in decline.
temporary since gold-mining activities have recently backlashed in the Halkidiki peninsula bringing to mind the point about durability of movement outcomes. Moreover, given the fact that various actors and agencies try to influence a movement issue, differences of political contexts between Greece and Turkey should be analyzed in order to compare these two movements since the enmeshed local, national, and transnational political scales produce different political relations and structures. More specifically, the impact of the fact that Greece is a member of the European Union on the gold mine in Halkidiki should also be unpacked in order to single out the Halkidiki movement’s effect which in turn will allow us to identify the Bergama movement as a failure in this relational approach. The Bergama activists were able to push the TNCs to apply some precautions and safety mechanisms such as the impermeable layer in the waste pond. Additionally, the Bergama movement might be one of the factors which led to deference of the Turkish state’s project of opening other areas in Turkey to mining TNCs, since. In that respect, a ‘partial success’ perspective which refers to certain levels of achievement in the issue at stake such as amendments in policies and projects will provide a better understanding of the Bergama movement’s outcomes.

Additionally, social movement outcomes are not limited to their stated-goals. Even if social movements fail to achieve their identified goals, they most often produce ‘unintended consequences’ which are collective goods unrelated to their immediate demands (Giugni, 1999; Amenta and Caren, 1999; Snow and Soule, 2010). One such unintended consequence is the change that can be discerned in the values, beliefs, and attitudes of peasants. First, peasants turned into empowered citizens aware of their rights in relation to the environment, human rights and democracy. Second, activist peasants started developing more sympathetic and ‘understanding’ feelings toward protestors elsewhere which can be an indicator of

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continuing proclivity to activism. Third, women’s lives underwent a change as they became politicized and started taking active roles in the public sphere. Agency of the women also culminated in partial transgression of gender relations which points at a possible cultural impact of the Bergama movement. Yet, the durability and the trajectory of these personal life changes are unknown which would require further longitudinal research.

Agenda-setting impact is described as the most easily achieved outcome by social movements (Kolb, 2007). That was also the case for the Bergama movement. In a national political context where environment was not among the top priorities of political parties, the state, or the media, the Bergama activists managed to place their issue on the public agenda for almost a decade. This might have several consequences. First, it might have contributed to a cultural change with respect to environmental issues in: a) the values, beliefs, and opinions and beliefs of the public; b) the discourses and media presentations; and c) collective identities and subcultures of similar local communities by altering their relation with the environment.\(^3\) In that regard, Bergama movement’s contribution to the possible growth of environmental awareness of the public at the national level necessitates further research based on longitudinal data on the level of environmental concerns among the public before and after the Bergama movement.

Finally, the Bergama movement became a template for the successive local environmental movements in Turkey which modelled themselves after the Bergama peasants. Since the end of the 1990s, local struggles in Turkey against gold mining, large dams, hydroelectric, thermal, and nuclear power plant projects have multiplied in the face of manifestations of an increasingly aggressive capitalist globalization. The Bergama movement has been a true inspiration for the struggles against industrial projects. In that regard, the Bergama movement is the initiator of the grassroots based environmental activism in Turkey.

\(^3\)Categories are adapted from the Earl’s (2004) review of the cultural impacts of social movements.
with a particularly strong spill-over effect in terms of its frames, tactics, repertoires of action, organizational forms, and issues. Diffusion of the strategies of the Bergama movement occurred in two ways. Firstly, after the demobilization of the Bergama movement, Oktay Konyar personally engaged in the mobilizations of the Develi- Kabazlı peasant movements in Manisa against the construction of a waste disposal facility and the anti-dam movements in Munzur and Hasankeyf in the eastern part of Turkey, as the movement leader in the former and as an influential ally in the latter. In the Develi-Kabazlı mobilization, all the practices of non-violent civil disobedience and innovative tactics used in the Bergama movement were applied in their slightly changed forms, and the movement was framed as a peasant-based environmental movement in a similar vein to the Bergama movement. In that sense, it was a direct diffusion of strategies, tactics, and organizational structures through the work of Oktay Konyar. Secondly, other local movements including mobilizations against the construction of a thermal power station in Bursa, gold-mining projects in the area surrounding the Ida mountain in the Western Turkey nearby Bergama, a gold mine in Eşme, and the construction of small and medium scale hydro-electrical power stations (HES) all across Turkey, followed the footsteps of the Bergama movement. These mobilizations commonly employed non-violent civil disobedience protest strategies, utilized the litigation process as one of their main means, and made use of technical-scientific knowledge in order to defy their opponents. In that sense, they have utilized the repertoire of contention innovatively expanded by the Bergama movement. Hence, tactics and strategies of the Bergama movement diffused mostly through indirect channels such as the media. However, none of these mobilizations were able to establish an extensive network structure built on inclusive collective identities in which various sub-networks complement each other as successfully as the Bergama movement. Moreover, the transnational aspect of these mobilizations are either weak or absent, excepting anti-dam movements in Munzur and Hasankeyf which combined environmentalism with
human rights concerns regarding the Kurdish identity. Besides variations in framing and
identity construction, immobility of subsequent mobilizations at the transnational level may
be due to changes in the enmeshed political opportunities given the time-lag between the
Bergama and other movements. More specifically, the Bergama movement might have also
produced negative impacts in relation to its opponents’ stigmatization of its transnational links
which was one of the factors for the demobilization of the movement. Also, as discussed
throughout this study, even if local movements are embedded in the same national context,
the available set of opportunities might be different. In other words, variations in the local
opportunities culminate in specific political conditions which might change the trajectory of a
mobilization. All these points underline prospects for a future comparative analysis of the
Bergama movement and other local movements. A further direction of research would be to
analyze similar movements in the framework of enmeshed political structures constructed in
Bergama.
Appendix A

Interview List:

E/E: Elite/Expert interview

P/A: Peasant interview

E/E 1: attorney/activist, 10.09.2002, İzmir


P/A 1: peasant activists (group interview) 12.09.2002, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey

E/E 3: movement elite/ local politician, 10.01.2003; 18.08.2003 Bergama

P/A 2: peasant activists (group interview) 19.08.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey

P/A 3: peasant activist, 21.08.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey

P/A 4: peasant activists, 21.08.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey

P/A 5: peasant activist, 31.08.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey


P/A 8: peasant activists (group interview), 01.09.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey


P/A 10: peasant activists (group interview), 02.09.2003, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey


P/A 12: peasant activists (group interview), 04.09.2003, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey

P/A 13: peasant activist, 06.09.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey
E/E 5: movement elite/environmental activists, 06.09.2003, Ören, Turkey; 28.02.2005 Munich, Germany
E/E 6: expert/academic, 09.10.2003, İstanbul
E/E 7: elite/activist, 09.10.2003, İstanbul
E/E 8: expert/academic, 25.10.2003, İstanbul
P/A 14: peasant activists (group interview), 08.02.2004, Narlıca, Bergama, Turkey
P/A 15: peasant activist (group interview), 09.02.2004; 10.02.2004, Tepeköy, Bergama, Turkey
P/A 16: peasant activists (group interview), 10.02.2004, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey
E/E 10: expert, 10.02.2004, Dikili, Turkey
P/A 17: peasant activists (group interview), 12.02.2004, Narlıca, Bergama, Turkey.
P/A 18: peasant activists (group interview), 14.02.2004, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey.
E/E 13: activist/CSO member, 14.02.2004, Altunoluk, Turkey
P/A 19: peasant activists (group interview), 15.02.2004, Narlıca, Bergama, Turkey.
P/A 20: peasant activist, 15.02.2004, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey.
P/A 21: peasant activists (group interview), Kerim, TS, ND, 25.08.2004, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey
P/A 22: peasant activist, 30.08.2004, Narlıca, Turkey, Bergama, Turkey
P/A 23: peasant activists (group interview), 31.08.2004, Tepeköy, Bergama, Turkey
P/A 24: peasant activists (group interview), 31.08.2004, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey.
P/A 25: peasant activists, (group interview), 01.09.2004, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey
E/E 14: expert/activist/CSO member, 03.09.2004, Dikili, İzmir.
P/A 26: peasant activists (group interview), 04.09.2004, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey
P/A 27: peasant activists (group interview), 05.09.2004, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey
E/E 15: attorney/CSO member, 05.09.2004, İzmir, Turkey.
E/E 16: attorney/CSO member, 05.09.2004, İzmir, Turkey
E/E 17: expert/CSO member, 06.09.2004, İzmir, Turkey.
E/E 18: expert /CSO member, 06.09.2004, İzmir, Turkey.
P/A 28: peasant activists (group interview), 07.09.2004, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey
P/A 29: peasant activist, 07.09.2004, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey
E/E 23: expert, 27.02.2005, Munich, Turkey
E/E 24: politician, 28.02.2005, Munich, Germany
E/E 25: activist, 01.03.2005, Munich, Germany
E/E 26: journalist, 01.03.2005, Munich, Germany.
E/E 27: politician, 03.03.2005, Brussels, Belgium.
E/E 28: NGO member/activist, 04.03.2005, Aachen, Germany.
E/E 29: environmental activist, 02.06.2005 Malta (via the Internet)
E/E 31: politician, 03.08.2005 Çeşme, İzmir.
E/E 33: activist, 13.11.2005, Salonika, Greece (e-mail interview)
E/E 34: movement elite/expert, 23.11.2005, Ankara, Turkey
E/E 35: journalist, 16.05.2006, Istanbul, Turkey

E/E 36: activist/ movement elite, 18.06.2006, New Zealand (via the Internet)


E/E 38: journalist, 15.02.2007, Istanbul, Turkey

E/E 39: expert, 16.03.2008, Istanbul, Turkey

E/E 40: activists/ expert, 26.02.2011, Istanbul, Turkey (e-mail interview)

P/A 30: peasant activists (group interview), 22.08.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey

P/A 31: peasant activists, (group interview), 22.08.2003, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey

P/A 32: peasant activists (group interview), 05.09.2003, Ovacık Bergama, Turkey
Appendix B

Maps

Bergama:

(https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=tr&q=bergama+google+map&ie=UTF8&hq=&hnear=Bergama%2FIzmir&gl=tr&ll=39.108219,27.128334&spn=0.078589,0.215607&t=m&z=12&vpsrc=6&ei=OhFPUMihEZOC8gPxioD4AQ&pw=2, 11.09.2012)
The Bergama villages

(https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=tr&q=bergama+google+map&ie=UTF8&hq=&hnear=Bergama%2FIzmir&gl=tr&ll=39.108219,27.128334&spn=0.078589,0.215607&t=m&z=12&vpsrc=6&ei=OhFPUMihEZOC8gPxioD4AQ&pw=2. 11.09.2012)
Appendix C

**Annual Agricultural Production in the Area Surrounding the Bergama-Ovacık Gold Mine by Dokuz Eylül University (1995)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Olive</td>
<td>391,560/trees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pine nut</td>
<td>1,000/trees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit</td>
<td>203,700/trees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poplar</td>
<td>77,900/trees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grapes</td>
<td>4,000/grapevines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>22,452/tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>16,600/tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yonca</td>
<td>7,195/tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>6,450/tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower</td>
<td>475/tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>724/tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>6,430/tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trifolium Pratense L.</td>
<td>15/tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watermelon</td>
<td>15/tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melon</td>
<td>10/tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle meat</td>
<td>3715/tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small cattle meat</td>
<td>6980/tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (TMMOB report, 2001,
Appendix D:

Chronology of events

1988: Formation of Eurogold as a joint venture of transnational mining corporations

1992: Operation licence for the Ovacık gold mine granted by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources.


8 November 1994: Lawsuit filed by 652 Bergama peasants and Senih Özay for the annulment of the licence granted by the Ministry of Environment.

18 October 1994: FIAN’s first urgent action letter.


1994-1996: Initial mobilization efforts by Sefa Taşkıın; first links with civil society organizations, scientists, lawyers, and environmental activists in İzmir; collection of scientific information about the hazards of gold mining with cyanide use.

1996: Appeal to the higher court by the Bergama peasants in response to the refusal of their case at the local court.

15 November 1996: First protest event of the Bergama peasants blocking the highway between İzmir-Çanakkale for 6 hours.

1996-1997: Oktay Konyar’s participation in the movement network; escalation of civil disobedience acts and protests; further extension of the movement network with the participation of civil society organizations, scientists and environmentalists outside the İzmir region.

January 1997: Unofficial referendum launched by the Bergama peasants.

22 April 1997: The Bergama peasants’ occupation of the mine field.

August 1997: The first protest on the Bosphorous Bridge in İstanbul.

September 1997: Visit of Sefa Taşkıın, Oktay Konyar, and the Bergama peasants to an old mine site at Balya-Balıkesir in order to witness the detrimental impacts of mining

1999: Normandy’s take over of the Ovacık gold mine.


1998: Appeal of Sefa Taşkıın and 10 peasant/activists the Euroean court of Human Rights
October 1999: TÜBİTAK’s report approving the operation of the Ovacık gold mine.

5 April 2000: Turkish Prime Ministry’s decree that allows the operation of the gold mine

November 2000: The Kuvay-Milliye march from Bergama to Çanakkale.

8 December 2000: The reception of the Right livelihood Award by Birsel Lemke.

April 2001: Start of the ‘trial production’ at the Ovacık gold mine.

1 June 2001: The decision of the local court stating that the decree of the Prime Ministry was a violation of law.

25 September 2001: The decision of the Supreme Court ordering damages to the peasants by the then-officials.

February 2001: Cancellation of the trial production permission by the local court.

25 March 2002: The second protest on the Bosphorous bridge in İstanbul.

2 April 2002: Closure of the Ovacık gold mine.

3 April 2002: Re-opening of the Ovacık gold mine based on a confidential legal decision of the Council of Ministers

October-December 2003: Charges to the Bergama peasants and their spokespersons for forming an illegal organization, allying with German NGOs, and performing espionage activities against the interests of Turkey.


14 September 2004: The last protest of the Bergama peasants.

10 November 2004: The decision of the ECHR in favour of the Bergama activists

28 March 2006: The second decision of the ECHR about the Bergama Movement in favour of 315 peasants who had brought their case to the court.
## Appendix E
### Periodization of the Bergama movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1st stage: Initial Mobilization | 1994-1996 | - Initial efforts of publicizing, consciousness raising, and building a movement network by SefaTaşkın;  
- First connections with scientists, lawyers, and environmentalists in Izmir;  
- Scientific data collection;  
- First contacts with transnational actors (INGOs, foreign politicians and scientists);  
- First lawsuit against Eurogold;  
- Formation of the *Elele Platform* by scientists, lawyers, and CSOs in İzmir  
- Consciousness raising in the villages |
| 2nd stage: Sustenance of mobilization | 1996-2002 | - Participation of Oktay Konyar;  
- Start of the mass mobilization;  
- Civil disobedience protests;  
- Efforts to build links with political actors at the national level mainly carried under the leadership and of Taşkin;  
- Scientific conferences and seminars  
- Lawsuits against the mining TNCs and the Turkish state agencies/authorities;  
- Transnational campaigns in Germany and Australia under the management of Birsel Lemke;  
- Links with transnational mining advocacy networks |
| 3rd stage: Decline            | 2002-2004 | - Conflicts among the movement elite;  
- Espionage charges against the Bergama activists;  
- Decreasing numbers of participants at the protests;  
- Further lawsuits  
- Continuation of the mining activities at the mine |
Appendix F
Leaders/Spokespersons of the Bergama Movement:

Sefa Taşkın: Sefa Taşkın was born in Bergama in 1950. He graduated from the Middle Eastern Technical University in Ankara. During his university years, he participated in the left-wing student movement. In 1989, he was elected the mayor of Bergama from the ranks of the Social Democratic Populist Party. He was re-elected for the same position, this time as a member of the social democratic People’s Republican Party. During his term as the mayor of Bergama, he launched a transnational campaign in order to bring back the Zeus Altar from Germany to its original location in Bergama. Coming from a family whose origins went back to Crete, he also forged links with the mayors of several Greek Islands in order to consolidate cordial relations between the Greek and Turkish people. He received the national Abdi İpekçi Peace Award in 1996 for his efforts to maintain peaceful relations with Greece. His main contribution as an activist-mayor was to start the anti-gold mine movement. In addition to his initiator role, he became the official face of the Bergama movement who was also influential on its strategies, media relations, funding, relations with formal politics, and the management of the Bergama network. He was unable to win the elections in 1999. Taşkın also wrote 8 books including a research about the configuration of gold mining and transnational mining companies and their operations around the world. He is fluent in English.

Oktay Konyar: Oktay Konyar was born in 1943. He is a high-school graduate. After working as a vice-manager at a bank, he became a farmer. His political activism dates back to the pre-1980 period when he actively engaged in socialist politics. He served as the Bergama Deputy Chairman of the Social Democratic Populist Party and the People’s Republican Party for many years. He joined the Bergama Movement in 1996 and took on a crucial leadership role. After the decline of Bergama movement, he continued activism in Manisa, nearby İzmir where he organized local peasants of Develi and Kabazlı against the construction of a waste facility in the region. He also made contributions to the anti-dam movements in Munzur and Hasankeyf.

Senih Özay: Senih Özay was born in 1951. He studied law at the Ankara University. He has been working as a lawyer in İzmir. During the late 1980s, he opted for green politics, and he was one of the co-founders of the first Green Party in Turkey. In his career as a lawyer, he specialized in environmental and human rights law, and he gave legal support to many environmental struggles. He is also the founder of the environmental lawyers group.

Birsel Lemke: Birsel Lemke was born in 1950. She studied political science at Ankara University and in the United States. During her studies at the Ankara University, she got acquainted with the prominent left-wing student activists. She lived and worked in Germany between the years 1975 and 1985. In 1986, she started running her own holiday resort in Ören-Balıkesir which was about 100 kilometres away from Bergama. Initially coming from left-wing politics, she joined the first Green Party in Turkey. Lemke participated in the Küçükdere-Havran mobilization against a gold mine project and contributed to the mobilization by maintaining links with foreign scientists and politicians as well as some national politicians. Lemke played a crucial role in taking the Bergama movement beyond its local borders into the world, and she built the movement’s transnational connections and shaped its strategies at the transnational level. Lemke received the prestigious Right Livelihood Award, a.k.a Alternative Nobel Prize, for her contributions to environmental struggles. She is fluent in English and German.
Appendix G

The epigraph of 17 villages

The land you stand on belongs to the peasants of Pınarköy, Kurfalı, Bozköy, Sarıdere, Eğrigöl, Ovacık, Çaltıbahçe, Narlıca, Çamköy, Tepeköy, Yalnizev, Küçükçayaya, Süleymanlı and Aşağıkıkırlar. This land is plentiful. In its plains, cotton like snow, wheat like gold, tobacco like amber stretch out. In its mountains, proud pine and oak trees stand and its rivers are cooled by the shadows of plane trees. The olive trees on the skirts of its mountains are perennial. You cannot get enough of its pomegranates and grapes; do not leave without a taste.

Should you put your foot down forcefully, gushing water would spurt out. It heals the body and the mind. Hit the ground a little more forcefully and a variety of minerals scatter onto the earth. It is rich. Cleopatra owes something of her beauty to the mud of this land. The paper of Pergamon is a native. It has passed through the hands of kings, sealed agreements, carried words of love and was kept in silver chests. Alexandrians have read for centuries in their library and mused on their sculptures, sculptors and theaters. The residents of Bergama are honest, hard-working people. They do not covet other lands. They are hospitable. They do not discriminate against religion, language, race, gender and nation. They forget neither friends nor enemies. They are peaceful.

They have only now heard what the greedy Europeans have done to American natives for gold. They bid farewell each night to their land, animals, trees and each other before going to bed but they cannot sleep. They despise greedy Europeans who prefer gold to life. They do not consider them guests but consider the rest of the Westerners as fellow men and women. They knew about gold but they just found out about cyanide. Once they learned about cyanide, they threw away the gold they wore with care. They know that their wheat,
sunflower and tobacco are yellow gold, that their cotton is white gold and that their olive is black gold.

They do not want to leave and disappear or stay and die. They are furious nowadays. They are enraged nowadays. They are indignant in the face of the indifference of merchants of political hope. They are sensitive nowadays. They can tell apart friend from foe in an instant. If you come as a friend, meet them, listen to them and talk to them. If you are no friend, leave immediately. These people love life and nature, which is life to them. They know that the dead do not wear gold. This is how we saw these people, how we knew these people, how we understood these people and how we wrote about these people”.

18 May 1997
Appendix H

List of major political parties in government and opposition during the movement

ANAP (liberal) (9 November 1989-23 June 1991)
ANAP (liberal) (23 July 1991-20 November 1991)
DYP (centre right)-SHP (centre left) coalition (20 November 1991-25 June 1993)
DYP (center right)-SHP (centre left) (25 June 1993-15 October 1995)
DYP (centre right)-minority government (15 October 1995-5 November 1995)
DYP (center right)-CHP (centre left) (5 November 1995-12 March 1996)
ANAP (centre right)- DYP (centre right) (12 March 1996-08 July 1996)
RP (Islamic right) - DYP (centre right) (08 July 1996 - 30 June 1997)
ANAP (centre right) – DSP (centre left)-DTP (centre right) (30 June 1997 -11 January 1999)
DSP (centre left) minority government (11 January 1999-28 May 1999)
DSP (centre left) - MHP (nationalist right) - ANAP (centre right) (28 May 1999-18 November 2002)
AKP (centre right) (18 November 2002-11 March 2003)
AKP (centre right) (14 March 2003 - 5 September 2007)
AKP (centre right) (5 September 2007 – 6 July 2011)
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