The London School of Economics and Political Science

The Politics of Engendering the Policy Process: Case Studies of Two Campaigns in China - The Anti-Domestic Violence Campaign and Equal Retirement Age Campaign

Jie Du

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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The aim of my thesis is to investigate the politics of the civil society organizations in policy advocacy for gender equality in China. It adopts an agency-oriented approach to illustrate how women civil society organizations of various kinds actively negotiated gender interests in policy change within limited space and access. Through two advocacy activities, I seek to understand why the desired outcomes were different in these two cases by identifying the variables that either hindered or enhanced the realization of their goals. I focus on two policy issues, namely the equal retirement age in the development of the Civil Servant Law (2005) and domestic violence in the revision of the Marriage Law (2001) and the Women’s Law (2005). These two cases are of interest because the actors of the CSOs involved in advocating policy change met with different success in their efforts. In the case of domestic violence issues, the women’s organizations were able to bring about a change. In the case of the retirement age issue, however, the women’s federation was unable to bring about any desired change.

The assumed variables include legitimacy, leadership, organizational forms, organizational learning and sources of funds. These conditioning factors are drawn from previous scholarship in civil society, public policy and social movements. I integrate these factors into a pentagon shaped framework that serves as a road map to guide my discussion throughout the thesis.

The theoretical purpose of this study is to enrich understanding of the conditioning factors that are responsible for the results of CSO advocacy in China. On the other hand, it also contains a practical purpose, namely to provide implications for civil society actors seeking to influence policy process in China.
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Abbreviations

ACWF  The All-China Women’s Federation
ADVN  The Anti-Domestic Violence Network
CASS  China Academy of Social Sciences
CCP   Chinese Communist Party
CCYL  Chinese Communist Youth League
CLS   China Law Society
CPPCC China People’s Political Consultative Conference
FWCW  The Fourth World Conference on Women, UN
LPPDV The Law on the Prevention and Punishment of Domestic Violence
MACM  Multi-Agency Cooperative Model
MOCA  The Ministry of Civil Affairs
MOP   The Ministry of Personnel
NGO   Non-Governmental Organizations
NPC   The National People’s Congress
NSMT  New Social Movement Theory
NWCCW The National Working Committee on Children and Women
PAC   Project Administrative Council
POS   Political Opportunity Structure
RMT   Resource Mobilization Theory
SMOs  Social Movement Organizations
WMWN  Women Media Watch Network
WSIC  Women’s Studies Institute of China
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1. Introduction

Since the economic reforms started in 1978, China has been transforming from a state-planned economy to a market-oriented economy, which has led to a series of social changes. Among them, above all, is an increasing number of cases of civil society organizations (CSOs) seeking to influence policy change. Actors of CSOs have negotiated their concerns in the policy process of several sectors, such as poverty relief, environmental protection, anti HIV/AIDS epidemic, and gender equality. While some advocacy and campaign activities achieved their goals, many other attempts ended in failure. However, little is known about the reasons why they succeed or fail. This thesis seeks to search for and identify the conditioning factors that either enhance or hamper the policy advocacy of CSOs in China.

1.1 Problem Statement

1.11 The Background

China's economic reforms have brought about many changes in not only economic production but also social structures. Particularly, it ushered in the emergence and development of CSOs. Before the economic reform, there had been few social organizations apart from the mass organizations\(^1\) created by the Party/state\(^2\). However, all kinds of CSOs proliferated after reform and opening up began in 1978. This is partly

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\(^1\) Among them are the All-China Trade Unions, the China Youth League and the All-China Women’s Federations and their branches at local levels.

\(^2\) This thesis combines the party with the state to indicate the fusion where the CCP holds the supreme power of the whole nation and formulates the major national laws and policies. However, since the economic reform in 1978, gradual change has occurred in the power relations among the CCP, the State Council and the National People’s Congress. The State Council and the National People’s Congress have gained more autonomy in formulating laws and policies and making decisions over public administration. Thus, the thesis separates the party and the state in many other places to represent the change where necessary.
because with periods of advance and retreat of the Party/State, new interest groups have emerged as the market continues to create new sources of economic wealth and power that are independent of the state. For example, the creation of entrepreneurs, different types of workers such as migrants, unemployed, contractors, dispatchers, new types of farmers etc., gave rise to such diverse needs and interests that the Party/state was unable to moderate these with the pre-existing institutions. Thus, some new interests groups sought to protect their own rights during the economic reform in China. At the same time, the government began to transform some of the functions such as social service it performed in the economy and society before the economic reform. Considering the potential role of CSOs in providing social services to diverse groups, the Party/state loosened its control over CSOs and encouraged them to take on social responsibilities previously under the purview of the Party/state. In short, the market economy and the Party/state’s loosening control over social organizations led to changes in the structure of society that is marked by an increasing number of CSOs and their mounting influence. According to Yu Keping (2009 p.50), there were 1,600 national mass organizations and more than 200,000 local ones by 1989. Furthermore, research by the China Society Science Academy reports that there were 446,000 registered CSOs by 2010 in China (Huang and Cai 2012 p.2).

The economic reform has also seen changes in policy-making in China. Several scholars (Deng 2004; Deng 1997; Howell 2004; Li 1987; Li 1998; Qin 1999; Zhang 2003) have observed that the policy process in China has become increasingly open since the mid-1990s. Both the range of non-governmental actors consulted over policy and legislative change, as well as the spaces for discussing public policy issues have expanded. At the same time, the capabilities of CSOs in providing technical assistance to policy-making have also been increasing. As a result, there has been an increasing number of cases of CSOs' negotiating their interests in policy changes in several sectors in China. In gender equality polices, for instance, women CSOs have advocated around
several issues concerning women’s rights and interests such as anti-domestic violence\(^3\), equal retirement age\(^4\), quota for women in village elections etc. In short, the range of their participation and the depth of their involvement are conspicuous compared with the situation before the economic reform.

However, actors of the CSOs involved in advocating policy changes have achieved differing degrees of success. For instance, women’s organizations had effectively facilitated the inclusion of anti-domestic violence clauses in the revised *Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China* (referred to as the Marriage Law) in 2001 and the *Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women* (referred to as the Women’s Law) in 2005. However, civil society groups were unable to bring about their desired change for an equal retirement age for women and men civil servants in the *Civil Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China* (hereafter referred to as the Civil Servant Law) in 2005.

1.12 The Puzzle

Why were some advocacy efforts able to achieve their goals and others not? Previous studies tend to prioritize CSOs’ relations with the Party/state to account for the impact

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\(^3\) The anti-domestic violence campaign provides the first case for this study. In China, domestic violence issue had not become a public policy issue until the beginning of 21\(^{st}\) century. The women CSOs successfully pushed the integration of an article concerning anti-domestic violence in the revised Marriage Law (2001). Later on, the revised Women’s Law (2005) specified regulations and responsibility for combating domestic violence against women in China.

\(^4\) The enforced retirement age policy was introduced by the Chinese Government as one of the core elements of the administrative reform in 1980s. Early reform included the imposition of a mandatory retirement age (60 for men and 55 for women) for officials, although high-ranking individuals were exempt. Female civil servants identify the stipulation of an earlier retirement age for them as discrimination, which results in a negative impact on their career development and pension. The All-China Women's Federation has been campaigning for a unified retirement age for women and men since the 1980s, which provides the second case for this study.
of their policy advocacy. Indeed, in an authoritarian state such as China, good relation with the Party/state is crucial for CSOs to gain legal status and access to policy making. However, many cases show that a close connection to the Party/state is no longer a prerequisite. The Anti-Domestic Violence Network (ADVN) is only a CSO that is affiliated to a state authored institution – the China Law Society (CLS). It has less connection and access to the Party/state than the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), the protagonist of advocacy for equal retirement age. Yet the ADVN’s advocacy and campaign activities succeeded in incorporating anti-domestic violence into the Marriage Law (2001) and the Women’s Law (2005). The ACWF, however, despite being a mass organization authorized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to represent women’s interests, does, and still, encounter resistance from both the public and the state in their advocacy for an equal retirement age. This implies that it is not sufficient to solely investigate the relationship between CSOs and the Party/state to explain the conditioning factors for success in advocacy of CSOs.

Likewise, a limited focus on the nature of the issues proposed by CSOs is also insufficient to explain success or failure. Studies suggest that issues that follow existing policy frameworks are more likely to gain acceptance than those that are outside or even against the conventional framework (Stetson and Mazur 1995). However, CSO policy advocacy for anti-domestic violence is different: before the CSOs initiated advocacy activities, the issue of domestic violence was entrenched in people’s minds as a private matter common to family life. Indeed, it was barely recognized as an infringement of women’s rights by either the public or many policy-makers. During the preparation for,

5 In this thesis, the term “authoritarian” is used paradoxically. On the one hand, I use the term to indicate that political authority is concentrated in a small group of politicians within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China. On the other hand, however, I do not imply that social forces are in complete submission to the authority. While admitting that the political environment is still constrained, I suggest increased social spaces that are conducive to collective actions of CSOs. Thus, the term is comparable to “the semi-authoritarian” coined by Peter Ho in his analysis of Chinese activism. Ho, Peter, and Richard L. Edmonds (Eds.). 2008. *China’s Embedded Activism: Opportunities and Constraints of a Social Movement*. New York: Routledge. P. 1-31.
and the participation in the UN Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) held in Beijing in 1995, women activists were first exposed to the concept. Although the anti-domestic violence issue was outside the conventional policy framework, the ADVN effectively mobilized the issue for legislation and policy-making. In contrast, the topic of retirement age is certainly a women’s employment issue, and equality in employment was emphasized by the CCP as a precondition for women’s liberation in the socialist revolution. Indeed, gaining equal employment rights for women has been one of the major concerns of the Chinese women’s movement led by the CCP. However, the ACWF’s advocacy concerning women’s equal retirement age with men has encountered daunting challenges and strenuous objections. It has been reported that the ACWF has continually submitted bills to sessions of the National People’s Congress (NPC) over the past decades from 1990s to the turn of the century. However, all their efforts were of little avail as the policy of earlier retirement age for women who work in government agencies is still in place.

What accounts for the CSOs’ success or not in achieving their goals in policy change? The previous analyses that had focused on general factors such as the nature of the state and the public policy are insufficient to figure out the puzzle. Thus, this thesis seeks to shift attention away from macro political environment to the factors concerning the agency of individuals and organizations in influencing policy change in China.

1.13 Objectives of the Study

This study seeks to explore the conditioning factors that affect the effectiveness of CSOs’ advocacy campaigns in China. As the variables of CSOs’ policy campaigns in authoritarian states have yet to be researched systematically, I conduct case studies to analyze women CSOs’ campaigns on two policy issues, namely equal retirement age in the development of the Civil Servant Law (2005) and domestic violence in the revision of the Marriage Law (2001) and the Women’s Law (2005). These two cases are of interest because of the different outcomes. In the case of domestic violence issues, the CSOs were able to bring about a change in the Marriage Law (2001) and the Women’s
Law (2005). However, in the case of the retirement age issue, the ACWF was unable to bring about the desired change in the Civil Servant Law (2005). Through cases studies of the two policy campaigns, I seek to understand why the desired outcomes were different by analyzing the variables that either hindered or enhanced the realization of their goals.

The theoretical purpose of this study is to enrich our understanding of the conditioning factors that are responsible for the results of CSO advocacy in an authoritarian state that is undergoing rapid social and economic change. It also contains information and reflection that may be used as lessons for future campaigns.

1.2 Literature Review

1.21 Review of Literature on Policy Process in China

Scholars observed that since the economic reform in the 1980s, the public policy process of China has been gradually transformed from very much a closed top-down process in which the CCP played a dominant role into a more open process that is increasingly embracing the participation of various actors (Ho 2001; Howell 2003b; Yu 2009). Seeking to capture the dynamics of power in policy processes in China, some scholars adopt a stages approach to identify the process of policy-making and legislation (Chen 2005c; Liu 2011). They observe that the policy process in China has become formalized and gradually harnessed by the rule of law. After the economic reform started in the 1980s, the promulgation of the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (referred to as the Legislative Law) in 2000 heralded a new era in policy-making and legislation. Although far from mature and still filled with uncertainties, the policy process and legislation in China is progressing to a more diverse and transparent process. Tanner observed:

…O (o) ver the last 16 years, China’s lawmaking system has developed a politically sophisticated process that can no longer be considered as a unified, top-down policy-making system. Instead, it is better thought as a ‘multi-stage, multi-arena’ process. (Tanner 1995 p.39)
Other scholars pay attention to various actors and their interactions in the policy process (Tanner 1995; Wang 2006). They notice that the power distribution in policy-making is complex in China. At the macro level, some notice that the CCP gradually conceded power to the State Council and the NPC, and the latter two gained increasing power in policy-making in China (Ho and Edmonds 2008; Tanner 1995). Policy-making is no longer a top-down mobilization. Some experts, who had been outsiders of policy process, have participated in some stages of policy-making. The diverse groups and individuals interact with each other and negotiate their own pet proposals. All this points to the complexities of power relations in the policy process in current China. As Tanner observed:

Since 1978, the process by which legislative proposals break out of the pack to win a place on this overcrowded agenda have been opened to a far greater variety of political actors. For even though the policy proposals of some are undeniably far ‘more equal than other’, it is now the case that new ideas can emerge from anywhere – top leaders, career organizational bureaucrats, thin-tanks and even individual entrepreneurs….. (Tanner 1995 p.46)

In short, these studies reveal the fluid and permeable nature of the policy process in China, which implies potential opportunities for policy entrepreneurs⁶ to embark on advocacy.

1.22 Review of Literature on CSOs in China

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⁶ This thesis uses the term ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to indicate the actors who play an important role in shaping public policy. Kingdon argues for three streams in the modern policy process, namely problems, policies and politics. “They are largely independent of one another, and each develops according to its own dynamics and rules. But at some critical junctures the three streams are joined, and the greatest policy changes grow out of that coupling of problems, policy proposals, and politics” (p. 19). The actors whom he calls ‘policy entrepreneurs’ play an important role in create the critical conjunctures by actively seeking to put the issues they are interested onto the public agenda. As Kindon describes, they are ‘surfers waiting for the big wave’ (p. 225). In this thesis, the “policy entrepreneurs” refers to actors from both the government and the civil society. Kingdon, J.W. 1995a. Agendas, Alterantives and Public Policies. New York: Addison, Wesley, Longman.
Civil society in China has been a growing field of study since the 1980s. The 1989 student protest in China and the fall of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe kindled academic interest in civil society in China (Yang 2002). At the beginning, discussions centered on the nature of civil society. Many scholars queried whether an autonomous civil society in Western terms existed in China. Some scholars such as Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic (Brook and Frolic 1997) addressed the independence of CSOs and held the view that an autonomous civil society is barely seen in China. They use the term "state-led civil society" to indicate the CCP-State's dominance over civil society in the country. However, many other scholars such as Jude Howell (Howell 1995) and He Baogang (He 2003) suggest that a variety of public spaces exist in China and these dynamic spaces can function as civil society. He Baogang (ibid) uses the term "a nascent civil society" to indicate an emergence of civil society that is in progress. Howell goes further, suggesting that there are dynamic relations between the CCP-State and civil society organizations and identifies four degrees of autonomy enjoyed by CSOs from the CCP-State7. The debate implies that civil society in China is a fluctuating intermediate layer between private life and institutional politics, and the autonomy of CSOs is susceptible to shifting, vague and sometimes even blurred borders between civil society, the state, and the market.

Secondly, in line with the localization of the term in China, scholars have categorized CSOs in different ways in China. Frequently used terms and their meanings are given in the table below:

7 According to Howell’s classification, the Mass Organizations such as the ACWF have the closest ties to the Chinese Communist CCP and the state. Semi-official Organizations enjoy more autonomy than the Mass Organizations. Popular Organizations are more spontaneous, voluntary and autonomous and Unregistered Organizations, that in most cases have no permit to register with the government, have perhaps few ties with the CCP-State.
### Table 1 Chinese and English Terminology for CSOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English term</th>
<th>Chinese term</th>
<th>Examples of organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Organizations</td>
<td>Shehuituanti</td>
<td>A general term for registered member-serving associations and foundations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Organizations (19 at national level) (set up by the CCP-State)</td>
<td>Renmin tuanti</td>
<td>&quot;The eight big organizations&quot;, such as:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- All-China Federation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Chinese People's Friendship Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, and etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Organizations (set up by the Chinese Communist CCP)</td>
<td>Qunzhongzuzhi</td>
<td>Three major mass organizations that were set up by the Chinese Communist CCP, such as:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- All-China Federation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Chinese Communist Youth League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- All-China Women's Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Organizations</td>
<td>Minjianzuzhi</td>
<td>Semi-autonomous organizations, such as All-China General Chamber of Industry and Commerce and China International Chambers of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)</td>
<td>Fei zhengfuzuzhi</td>
<td>Usually referred to as foreign NGOs, but some Chinese NGOs adopt this term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs)</td>
<td>Feiyinglezhuzhi</td>
<td>New terms for Chinese social organizations and nongovernmental non-commercial enterprises such as the Maple Women's Psychological Counseling Center.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These categorizations include a diversity of institutional forms with various degrees of formality, autonomy and power, which also vary in their relations with the state, as well as the market. While the mass organizations have the closest relationship with the CCP and the State, NPOs seem to have close ties with the market. Some of the other CSOs,
particularly those newly emerged women’s networks or organizations, have less access to either the state or market. They depend largely on foreign donors. Moreover, the studies show that CSOs in China differ in both size and organizational forms. While mass organizations are more or less bureaucratic and hierarchical, some newly emerged networks are less so. In addition, different CSOs have distinct functions such as research, providing services or training. Most of them provide more or less services to their target groups. Only a few CSOs such as the ADVN concentrate on policy advocacy.

Thirdly, scholars pay much attention to the impact of the Party/state on the development of CSOs in China. They observe that the rise and fall of CSOs in China is largely determined by the changing political context (Howell and Pearce 2001; Jia 2003; Saich 1999; Yang 2002; Yu 2009; Zhang 2003). Jia Xijin and Zhang Ye identify various CSOs that emerged because of the many social factions and civil strife from 1911 to 1949. Most of the discussions, however, focus on the period after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. In the communist regime of China, CSOs' development was retarded due to the tight control of the CCP over society. After the CCP took power in 1949, it set up mass organizations such as the All-China Trade Union, the All-China Women's Federation and the All-China Youth League. Led by the CCP, these mass organizations served as a "transmission belt between the CCP and society" (Howell 1995). At the same time, the CCP brought an end to many other types of CSOs such as associations and religious organizations. Since 1978 CSOs have developed rapidly due to the looser social environment created by economic development and reform. Although there was a clampdown on the development of CSOs since the 1989 Student Movement, the range of CSOs' activities has been enlarging and their influence has been growing (Howell 1995; Howell 2004; Howell 2012; Howell 2005), although at a slow pace. Nevertheless, CSOs still face challenges as the strict legal framework for their registration and management and lack of funds impact their abilities to provide services and initiate campaigns (Brundenius 2005; Ho 2001; Howell 2003a; Lu 2003; Morton 2005; Saich 2004; Yu 2000; Zhang 2003). In
short, previous studies demonstrate that the ebb and flow of CSOs is largely determined by the Party/state’s policy concerning the administration of civil society.

1.23 Review of Literature on Policy Advocacy of CSOs in China

Many studies observe the growing importance of the role of CSOs in China's development since economic reforms began in the 1970s (Brundenius 2005; Deng 2000; Ding, Jiang and Qi 2003; He 2003; Ho 2001; Howell 2003a; Morton 2005; Saich 2004; Shi 1997; Sun 2000; Wang 2000; Yang 2005; Yu 2000; Zhang 2003). Firstly, scholars have identified several generations of advocacy since the economic reform in 1978. Yang Guobin (Yang 2002), Jude Howell (Howell 2004) and Tony Saich (Saich 1999) found that the first generation of advocacy activities addressed individual rights and freedom in the 1980s. Most of the advocates and campaigners were intellectual elites including professionals and students whose primary concerns were building a democratic political system in China. In the mid-1990s and onwards, many CSOs shifted their interests toward development issues and have influenced policy processes, particularly in the areas of environmental pollution, HIV/AIDS, unemployment, internal migration, poverty, and gender equality (Ding, Jiang and Qi 2003; Gries and Rosen 2004; Ho 2001; Howell 2004; Howell 2000; Howell 2003a; Lu 2003; Sun 2000; Wang 2000; Yang 2005; Zhang 2003). Compared with the comprehensive studies on policy advocacy for environmental protection and anti-HIV/AIDS, however, research on women’s CSOs in bringing about public policy change toward gender equality is sporadic and piecemeal. Apart from a few studies (Spakowski and Milwertz 2006; Zhang 2009; Zhang and Hsiung 2011) and a variety of reports contained in mass media.

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8. This is partly because it has been difficult for CSOs to address issues in relation to individual rights and freedom in the tightening political environment after 1989 (He 2003). It is also because the CSOs reoriented their focus toward meeting immediate needs generated from the deepening processes of social differentiation and class formation (Howell 2004).

9. Due to the word limit, this major review document will not detail the cases that have been collected by relevant scholars.
such as China Women’s News (http://www.china-woman.com) and the internet such as www.stopdv.org.cn, there is insufficient in-depth academic research on the participation of women’s organizations in policy process in China.

Secondly, several studies have initiated explorations on the agency of CSOs and individual activists in the policy process in China. They cover both formal and informal methods adopted by CSOs. In the agenda setting stage, for example, Wang Shaoguang (2006) observed that CSOs worked through both routine political channels, such as submitting proposals to parliament (the People’s Congress), and informal personal networks with governmental actors to get new issues or ideas onto the policy agenda. Furthermore, most of the advocacy adopts moderate methods in order to achieve their purpose. In China’s context, it is difficult for CSOs to initiate campaigns that violently target the government. Some confrontations, such as taking to the streets to demonstrate, will be regarded as too threatening by the government. In this respect, Zhang (2003 p.2) refers to the mild method whereby the CSOs' influence the policy-making processes as a 'quiet revolution'. However, how CSOs mobilize various resources to promote policy change within limited space is the least studied area by academics.

Thirdly, the impact of CSOs’ policy advocacy in China is often cast in doubt. There are different views on the effectiveness and influence of CSOs' advocacy and campaign activities as well as their services. Some scholars such as Yang Guobin (2002; Yang 2005), Sun Liping (2000), and Wang Ying (2000) hold an optimist’s view on CSOs' policy influence. In particular, Yang Guobing argues that environmental CSOs in China are a driving force in pushing the state to put sustainable development onto the policy agenda. He concludes that environmental CSOs in China are a catalyst in promoting democratization through their efforts in making the policy process on environmental protection transparent and holding the state accountable. Similarly, Sun Liping predicts that CSOs in China will be an important force in providing social welfare and implementing relevant laws and policies in China. Other scholars, however, are less optimistic about CSOs' role in policy change. Lu Yiyi (2003), for example, reveals the limits of non-governmental social welfare organizations in providing social
welfare services in China. She concludes that the effectiveness of these organizations is constrained by the institutional context in which general welfare provision is very low and private philanthropy is still underdeveloped (Lu 2003).

Lastly, one important issue that has escaped investigation in relation to CSOs’ influence policy change in China is what factors determine CSOs’ effectiveness in bringing about the desired policy outcome. Under what conditions can CSOs bring about effective results in policy change in China? This is the least answered question. The lack of analysis on the underlying factors that may affect the effectiveness of CSOs tends to give rise to misleading ideas on the role CSOs play in policy change in authoritarian states. While successful cases may lead to an over-optimistic point of view, the negative cases may lead to the opposite assessment. Neither is conducive to improving theoretical debates or practice concerning the politics of CSOs’ negotiating policy change. As there has been little in-depth exploration on this issue, this thesis takes it up for in-depth analysis and further investigation.

1.3 Concepts and Theoretical Frameworks

This thesis is about the politics of CSOs’ engendering policy process in China. As there are heated debates about the concepts of CSOs and distinct perspectives on policy process, I need to provide clear definitions of these major concepts that are to be used throughout the thesis.

1.3.1 Civil Society Organizations

I argue for a broad view and use the term Civil Society Organization (CSO) to refer to a wide range of organizations with distinct legal status, size, and organizational forms. Given the complex power relations in this sphere in China, this research adopts a flexible and fluid approach to view civil society in China as a fluctuating intermediate layer between private life and institutional politics, and the borders between civil society, the state, market and the family are vague and sometimes even blurred.
Furthermore, these organizations, networks and groups may have different functions, such as research, or providing services or training. Thus, appearing in my case studies are diverse women’s organizations with various degrees of formality, autonomy and power, all varying in their relations with the state, as well as the market. For example, the All-China Women’s Organization (ACWF) takes the form of a bureaucratic mass organization and maintains close ties with the Party/state, while the Anti-Domestic Violence Network (ADVN) is shaped as a non-hierarchical horizontal network and enjoys more autonomy than the ACWF.

Firstly, although I propose the autonomy of CSOs is a precondition of their existence and development, I recognize that it is hard to draw a clear line between civil society, the state and market. Indeed, the relationship between civil society and the state has drawn most of the attention of scholars throughout history (Purdue 2007). Writing in the early nineteenth century Germany, Hegel saw civil society as one side of a state-civil society dichotomy. Exploring democracy in America in the mid-nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville (1954) saw it as one part of a three-way division between state, economy and civil society. In the early 1990s, the concept of civil society re-emerged, in part because of the collapse of the statist Soviet system and an increasing NGO role in the transition to liberal democracy of former communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and in part because of the increasing role of non-profit or voluntary organizations in providing social services withdrawn by states in industrial countries (Howell and Pearce 2001). In short, civil society is defined in relation to the state for all times (Purdue 2007). Recently, scholars have introduced another parameter - the market - into the theorization. The independence of civil society from the market has been emphasized. A triad of the state, the market and civil society is increasingly viewed as a model of good governance of a democratic country.

However, many scholars note that in reality it is difficult to draw a clear line between state and civil society. John Keane argues that in ancient Greece the state and civil society were one and that it is only from the seventeenth century onwards in Europe that state and civil society become separated from each other both in practice
and as concepts. Howell and Lind (2009) argue that “in practice the boundaries between these spheres are blurred and interwoven to varying degrees” (Howell and Lind 2009 p.5). Likewise, Purdue argues that many institutions such as political parties straddle the divide: “Political parties bring together individuals into free associations in civil society, yet also participate in government within the state” (Purdue 2007 p.2). This is true in recent civil society in China, where some intellectuals from CSOs provide services to government, and some government officials participate in the activities of CSOs as well. In particular, as the CSOs in China are, by and large in a fledgling development stage, they have to depend on the state and market for further advancement. Thus, the autonomy of CSOs is flexible and contextual rather than absolute and unbounded. I perceive the independence of the women CSOs that appear in my case studies in relation to China’s unique political and social background.

Secondly, I use CSOs to denote diverse types of organizations in civil society in China. Today, there is a proliferation of language used to describe non-state actors in civil society (Edwards 2001; Howell and Pearce 2001; Lewis 2001; Najam 1996a; Najam 1996b; Wallace 1998). In practice, organizations in civil society take various shapes under assorted names, such as NGOs (Non-governmental Organizations), INGOs (International NGOs), QUANGOs (Quasi-NGOs), BONGOs (Business-Organized NGOs), RINGOs (Religious International NGOs), GONGOs (Government-Organized NGOs), CSOs (Civil Society Organizations), NPOs (Non-Profit Organizations), and many more (Weller 2005). Above all, NGOs is the most frequently used term, though it is one subset of organizations in civil society in part because of the promotion of development aid agencies, in part because of the promotion by the UN.

In China, too, there are various terms for social organizations such as Social Organizations, People's Organizations, Mass Organizations, Folk Organizations, Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (see Table 1). Some terms highlight the members or target groups they represent, such as the People's Organizations, Mass Organizations, Folk Organizations, others indicate their relations with the state and market such as Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs). None of them alone captures the wide variety of organizations in civil society in China. Thus, here I use the term of “civil society organizations (CSOs)” to refer to wide range of organizational types that are active in civil society.

1.32 Policy Process

For analytical convenience, first, I adopt a stages approach to view policy process as several normative stages, namely agenda-setting, formation and adoption, and implementation and evaluation. This thesis focuses on the agenda-setting stage which is the initial stage in the policy cycle. In this thesis, I break down agenda-setting stage into three interlinked sub-components: first, putting an issue onto public policy agenda; second, framing the issue in policy and law; and third, the adoption of final policies and laws (see Table 5).

The stages approach provides a heuristic tool for my investigation of CSOs in policy-making. To capture the complex political process of public policy, scholars propose various ‘life-cycles’ in ‘stages’ or ‘tracing the history of policy formation (Anderson 1974; Blumer 1971; Bossard 1941; Brewer 1983; Fuller and Myers 1941; Jones 1970; Lasswell 1971; Ripley 1985). The stages approach has been criticized for its assumption of a linear model of policy-making that does not exist in reality. For example, Vass (1986) indicates that the stage model is problematic because “social problems do not follow a path of constant or consistent velocity but, rather, they experience loops and temporary diversions and gaps called null periods, in their development” (cited in Parsons 1995 p.99). Nevertheless, the stages model is useful in its simplicity and direction for my research. Many scholars hold that although not empirically falsifiable, the stages model provides “an intuitive and practical means of conceptualizing and organizing the study of public policy” (Smith and Larimer 2009). For example, Sabatier views the stages model as a heuristic method for understanding the policy process (Sabatier 1999). This is true with a case study of China. Although far from formalized and transparent, the policy process in China is undergoing a reform
from a closed process to a series of stages that is guided by the rule of law. The National People’s Congress (NPC) has deliberated on specific procedures of legislation and issued some policies. Guided by the stages model I narrow down my focus to a particular policy stage – the agenda setting stage - for in-depth analyses. In addition, thinking of policy process as stages is helpful in that it stresses the fluid and permeable nature of the policy process in authoritarian states such as China, which implies potential opportunities for CSOs to embark on advocacy at specific stages.

Second, I adopt a power approach that views the policy agenda-setting as comprised of various actors and their interactions in the process whereby negotiation and bargaining takes place in various forms. According to public policy scholarship, agenda setting is an initial stage of the policy cycle. It is about the recognition of a problem as a public problem that deserves policy intervention (Cobb and Elder 1972; Kingdon 1884). Early inquiries took an objective view, seeing policy issues as an objective existence waiting to be recognized by governments (Howlett and Ramesh 2003). However, this functionalist approach has been challenged by later scholars. Many scholars of public policy focus on power relations in their studies of agenda setting (Gaventa 1980; Grindle and Thomas 1991; Hill 2005; John 1998; Parsons 1995). Seeing social problems as essentially subjective social constructions, the phenomenological approach tends to reveal the power residing in the process of constructing social problems in policy-making (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Some scholars indicate that the results of policy changes tend to favour those who are powerful and dominant in the processes, while others argue that this is not to say that power operates in a zero-sum way (Goffman 1974; Kingdon 1884; Parsons 1995; Schon and Rein 1994). As highlighted by the work of theorists of power, such as Lukes (1974), Clegg (1979) and Foucault (1980), as well as writers working on resistance, such as Scott (1985), “powerless people”, such as peasants, do have agency and are able to resist 'power over them' through the use of alternative discourses, practices and strategies. The power view of agenda-setting is illuminating in revealing the dynamics of CSOs in influencing policy change in China: This implies that, in authoritarian regimes where the policy process is far from open and transparent, powerless CSOs
may wield power to negotiate their interests to shape policy change through subtle cultural processes, such as using social myths, language and symbols, to frame policy discourse.

1.33 Gender Politics of Policy Process

Essentially, this study is about the politics of women CSOs negotiating policy change toward gender equality. This process involves the “articulation of a set of demands or positions in relation to policy” (Lewis 2001 p.124), and is often called “policy advocacy” by scholars in civil society and public policy. The term “gender politics” suggests the ways different actors wield power to negotiate policy-making toward gender equality.

Firstly, the “power” concept is used in two ways in this study. One is related to how women CSOs wield power to mobilize various resources to frame social problems into public policy issues, negotiate access to policy-making, and facilitate the acceptability of their proposals by policy-makers. In short, how do women CSOs exercise the power they possess in policy agenda-setting? Indeed, the study of policy ultimately is the “study of the exercise of power in the making of policy” (Hill 2005). Thus, at the heart of my study are such questions as: How did certain CSOs wield power? Why do anti-domestic violence issues appear on the governmental agenda for action and equal retirement age not? Who actually defines the problems that are worthy of public attention and government intervention? What contribute to policy change? These sorts of questions are crucial for the study of how gender equality policy is made.

To study power in agenda-setting, I focus on the dynamism of the negotiations in which power may be transferred discreetly from powerful to weak actors at particular stages under specific conditions. Thus, attention is paid not only to the actors in the limelight, but also to how both “visible” and “hidden cluster” actors (Kingdon 1995a p.199) wield power to influence public policy.

The second aspect of the concept of power that is used in this study is the degree of influence of CSOs in policy agenda-setting. Alternatively, how powerful are they in
setting the agenda for public policy in China? To assess the effectiveness and impact of the CSOs' campaigns, this study focuses on policy effectiveness to address immediate policy results. Thus, the success of advocacy in this study is defined as the CSOs effectively realizing their goals in terms of their advocacy and campaign activities. Specifically, it indicates the substantive outcomes, such as the clauses and articles introduced in the newly promulgated or revised laws or policies.

Secondly, gender politics is embodied by the process of “engendering” public policy. Integrating gender equality concerns into policies and laws is described as “gender mainstreaming” by the UN and women’s movements. However, many scholars in feminist and gender studies argue that previous theories on civil society, public policy and social movement are inadequate when accounting for women organizing for policy change (Banaszak 1996; Boneparth and Stoper 1988; Charles 2000; Gelb 1989; Howell and Mulligan 2005; Mazur 2002; McMillan 2007; West and Blumberg 1990). They point out that women’s organizations have participated in policy-making to represent women’s interests in public policies. In so doing, they have sought to integrate gender into the mainstream of policy analysis since the 1980s. Their most significant progress is the establishment of state machinery on gender equality issues whereby ‘state feminists’ produce gender policies effectively (Stetson 2001; Stetson and Mazur 1995). In China, too, women’s organizations have played a crucial role in bringing gender equality issues onto the public policy agenda, a topic which will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3. However, they are absent in the mainstream of academic studies on public policy and civil society in China. This thesis aims to bring their endeavors to light.

1.34 A Pentagon Shaped Framework

The above sub-section elaborates the basic concepts for the study and the thoughts embedded in them. However, to implement these concepts and ideas, an operational framework is needed for conducting analysis. Thus, I put forward several variables including legitimacy, leadership, organizational forms, learning and framing policy
issues, and sources of funds, to account for the success or not of advocacy activities. These conditioning factors are drawn from previous scholarship in civil society, public policy and social movement theory. I integrate these factors into a pentagon shaped framework (see Figure 1) to be explained in Chapter 2. The pentagon framework serves as a road map to guide my discussions throughout the thesis.

**Figure 1 A Pentagon Shaped Framework**

![Pentagon Shaped Framework](image)

Source: Developed by the author.

It is worth of mentioning that political opportunity is also important. Many scholars address the impact of macro level factors in public policy and social movements. Tarrow (1994; Tarrow 1996) proposes the political opportunity structure as a significant variable. He addresses the importance of the political opportunity structure in translating the potential for social movement into mobilization. Other scholars on policy reform and civil society, such as Grindle and Thomas (1991) and Van Rooy (Van Rooy 2004), also highlight the significance of political opportunities in introducing policy change. In this study, however, it is unnecessary to test whether political opportunity
facilitates or hinders the influence of the CSOs in terms of policy change, as the cases are in the same political context. Nevertheless, I will provide a political context to situate my case studies in Chapter 3.

**1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses**

**1.41 The Major Research Question and the Hypothesis**

The essential research question of this study is: what accounts for the success or otherwise of CSOs' policy campaigns concerning gender equality in China? As gender issues are mostly the concern of women’s organizations, the protagonists of the study are women activists and some women CSOs in China. Thus, the research question can be specified as under what conditions women CSOs are more likely to be successful in their campaigns in policy-making in China. Here, I adopt a constructivist view to perceive the “conditioning factors”. They are not so much static or fixed things to be dug out. Rather, they are the process of deliberately collecting and shaping relevant resources to CSOs’ advantage in the campaigns. Thus, the exploration intends to not only proposing the conditioning factors, but also demonstrating how women’s organizations wielded power to create favourable conditions for bringing about policy change in China where the policy process is neither wide open nor transparent.

I suggest that women CSOs are agents for making policy change toward gender equality in China. Although CSOs still encounter constraints and challenges in access to policy making, they deliberately make use of the limited organizational resources they possess and increase the power of them. It is because of their commitment and intention that individual activists of some CSOs managed to mobilize various recourses to negotiate their concerns in policy change. A dynamic of interaction and mobilization pervades the policy sector with regard to gender equality issues.

**1.42 The Sub-Research Questions and the Hypotheses**
To investigate the dynamism of women CSOs’ wielding power in policy change, I suggest the variables of legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning and sources of funds for investigation according to the pentagon framework (see Figure 1, to be elaborated in Chapter 2). Specifically, the discussion centers on how women CSOs construct these conditions and how these conditioning factors affect their campaigns. According to the pentagon framework of variables, I ask the following sub-questions and propose hypotheses to be discussed by the study:

**Legitimacy:** What kinds of legitimacy did the organizations attain? How did this affect the policy advocacy? In particular, I concentrate on questions concerning their legal status, alliances with state officials, expertise and knowledge, and explore the impacts of these factors on the effectiveness of the campaign. My hypothesis is that legitimacy is the most important precondition for CSOs to participate in the policy process. Registration status, above all, is indispensable because it signifies the state’s recognition of the CSOs. Alliances with important political forces such as the CCP can certainly add authority to CSOs in policy campaigning. In addition, expertise begins to play an important role in strengthening the authority of CSOs in negotiating policy change.

**Leadership:** What kinds of leadership styles were established by the organizations? How did they affect the policy advocacy? In particular, I investigate whether the leadership style is more or less democratic, bureaucratic or autocratic, and how specific leadership styles affect the effectiveness of the CSO’s campaign. My hypothesis is that leadership is crucial in directing the CSOs in policy advocacy. In particular, a democratic leadership style is conducive for uniting various kinds of organizations in concerted efforts. On the contrary, a bureaucratic leadership style is not as effective as the democratic one in mobilizing various social actors for sustained campaigns.

**Organizational structure:** What kinds of organizational structure were established by the organizations? Specifically, did they organize through a hierarchal bureaucracy, a multi-divisional coordination, or a network? Furthermore, how did
certain structure affect the advocacy? Explicitly, was a flat, federal structure more effective than a hierarchical one? In short, I examine forms of organizational structure and discuss their influence on the effectiveness of CSOs’ campaigns. My hypothesis is that organizational structure affects the effectiveness of the CSOs’ policy advocacy. A horizontal and federal network structure that is flexible and open, but at same time boasts good coordination, is more effective than a hierarchical one.

Learning: What kinds of learning were conducted by the organizations? How did they affect the policy advocacy particularly their capacity in framing policy issues? In particular, did the learning contain gender equality concepts and innovative methods for advocacy? Alternatively, did it simply indoctrinate conventional knowledge that can hardly sensitize gender awareness of the trainees? What kind of learning was more effective in elevating the capacity of CSOs for their campaigns concerning gender equality issues? My hypothesis is that learning is important to increase the capacity of CSOs in policy advocacy, particularly in framing public policy issues. In policy advocacy on gender equality, innovative learning that pays attention to absorbing new concepts of gender and methodologies, such as feminist policy analysis and advocacy approaches, is more effective than conventional learning that does not pay full attention to gender equality issues.

Sources of funds: Where did the funds enjoyed by the organizations come from? How did the sources of funds affect the policy advocacy? In particular, have they received any funds from the government, donations or charity, or international donors? Did funding from government add to CSOs’ authority for their advocacy, while fund from foreign donors only incurred more doubts and disbelief in the eyes of policy-makers? My hypothesis is that sources of funding are important in China, where the CCP and the State tend to suspect the purposes of foreign donors. Thus, government funds for particular policy advocacy activities may add authority to CSOs, while funds from foreign donors may lead to doubts and disbelief from the CCP and the State.

I argue that although often case-specific, these factors may increase or reduce CSOs’ power in their negotiation of policy change. This thesis does not attempt to test
these hypotheses. Rather, it aims to examine these factors to see whether they can be used to explain the CSO policy advocacy. The purpose is not so much to measure variables quantitatively as to generate hypotheses for future research.

1.5 Research Methodology and Methods

This research adopts a qualitative case study approach to investigate the conditioning factors that affect policy advocacy of women CSOs in China. Qualitative case study approach has strengths in exploring an area that is complex and about which little is known. It very suitable for my study as it is a first step in mapping out the multiple parameters that affect CSOs’ policy advocacy in China.

1.51 Qualitative Case Studies

The study is based on in-depth interviews and participatory observations of women CSOs and their related activities. To corroborate interview findings, the study refers extensively to documents from CSOs and government, newspaper articles and other online materials. Thus, the study is qualitative and empirical. For uncharted areas such as the survey of conditioning factors that affect women CSOs’ policy advocacy in China, qualitative research offers the advantage of exploring a phenomenon in depth, or a phenomenon that has yet been identified (Strauss 1998). As there not yet any systematic research on the conditioning factors that affect CSOs in policy making, qualitative research is particularly useful in generating hypotheses for unresearched areas (Mazur 2002). Moreover, qualitative research is better suited to understanding people’s perceptions and beliefs (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003). As the research is about the investigation of the process of advocacy and activists’ insights and schematic strategies, qualitative methods are the most appropriate. Auerbach and Silversein (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003) argue that:

Qualitative research is research that involves analyzing and interpreting texts and interviews in order to discover meaningful patterns descriptive of a particular phenomenon. p. 3
Similarly, case study is a research design that entails detailed and intensive analysis of one or more cases. The case study method enjoys the unique advantage of examining the characteristics of a particular phenomenon, a specific institution or a particular group of people in a given context (Yin 2003). It can provide "a richly detailed portrait of a particular social phenomenon" (Hakim 2000). In China, the historical, political and societal context of CSOs is quite different from those in other countries. Case studies can help the researcher to obtain a detailed picture of the CSOs' campaigns, and precisely explain the special challenges facing CSOs in the authoritarian state of China.

In conducting qualitative case studies, I first conduct a literature review and then identify the research issues. Through a review of research on civil society and public policy change in China, I identified that there was a lack of investigation as to what accounts for the success of CSOs’ campaigns in China. Thus, I located the research in this open and unclear area. I selected two contrasting cases in order to explain why different initiatives of CSOs meet with different results. The first case concerns the successful campaign to criminalize domestic violence against women in the revision of the Marriage Law (2001). The second relates to the unsuccessful advocacy work aimed at abolishing the unequal retirement age policy. While these two cases differ in results, they have important parallels and commonalities. First, they were both initiated by women’s organizations for the protection of women’s rights. Thus, they are in the same policy sector. Second, the activities of the two cases were in the same period, from 1995 to 2005, which implies that they have a similar political and social background. Third, my access to these cases is also taken into account. As I am familiar with the activists of both cases, my access for observation and interview was relatively easy or less challenging than would otherwise have been the case.

Using these cases offers an opportunity to illustrate the conditioning factors that affect the results of the policy advocacy, which is the major intellectual puzzle of this research. In designing the case studies, I pay attention to multiple levels, ranging from the macro political and economic context to the micro level of individuals' participation. On the macro level, I attempt to place the cases in their larger political and social
context. I pay particular attention to the policy environment of CSOs in China, the policy process concerning gender equality, and relevant campaigns, which are covered in Chapter 3. On the meso and micro levels, I refer to scholarship in civil society, public policy and social movement to draw inspiration from previous theorization of the determinants of CSOs’ policy advocacy success, and suggest five elements: legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning and sources of funds. In short, the multi-level analyses provide opportunities to generate rich materials presenting diverse roles, motives and behaviours of different actors in the processes of policy change in China.

1.52 The Methods of Data Collection and Analysis

To implement qualitative case studies, I carried out semi-structured interviews that provided a major source of evidence and insights. Compared with unstructured interviews, they offer the benefit of sticking to the foci of the study while giving enough leeway to the respondents. While structured interviews are rigid in limiting the answers of respondents, semi-structured interviews view the interviewees as important in explaining and understanding the events and activities. Understanding interviewees' point of view facilitates the study by providing depth and texture. Moreover, semi-structured interviews have the strengths of allowing respondents to raise points and areas relevant to the study that may otherwise be ignored by the researcher. This is very significant for my study on this rarely studied topic.

To carry out semi-structured interviews, I created an outline for the semi-structured interviews (See Appendix 2). The questions are based on my theoretical framework which focuses on five elements: legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning and funds. The outline serves as a guide for the interviewers to conduct the interviews, but the questions were not always followed in rigorous order in order to give leeway to the interviewees to raise new issues as the conversation progressed.

I used snowball sampling to identify interviewees. I first started with a few members of women’s organizations that I have identified as important informants.
These interviewees in turn recommended more informants for interview. I contacted selected interviewees and arranged interviews upon me return to China in August 2006. I recorded the interviews based on informed consent, and later transcribed them. The number of interviews I did depended on the "theoretical saturation point" (Mason 1996) when the data ceased to provide new information. I conducted 40 interviews with informants in CSOs engaged in advocacy activities in these two cases. For the case study on anti-domestic violence, I interviewed seven leaders either principal leaders of the ADVN who created the network, or project managers who led sub-projects of the ADVN (see Table 2). For some important informants, I did several follow-up interviews. I also interviewed eight participants in the ADVN’s campaign activities. They included cadres of women’s federations, journalists and scholars. For the case study concerning abolishing unequal retirement age policy, I interviewed four leaders who had been involved in planning and drafting proposals and submitting the proposals at the sessions of the NPC. I also interviewed five participants of the campaign who either participated in drafting proposals or helped with office work. Meanwhile, I also attended some important meetings for observation. I conducted my own observation of advocacy activities convened by the women organizations in my study (see Table 2).

Table 2 Types and Numbers of Interviews and Observations Carried Out

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case 1: Campaign for criminalizing domestic violence against women</th>
<th>Case 2: Campaign for abolishing unequal retirement age policy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interviews</strong></td>
<td><strong>Interviews</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Seven interviews with leaders;</td>
<td>● Four interviews with leaders;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Eight interviews with participants.</td>
<td>● Five interviews with participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observation (participatory)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Observation (participatory)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Three national conferences convened by the ADVN in 2008, 2009 and 2011 in Beijing;</td>
<td>● Four national forums; one was jointly convened by the ACWF and CASS in 2009, the other was jointly convened by the ACWF and International Labor Organization (ILO) in 2010;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● One international forum convened by the ADVN on building state mechanisms for preventing sexual</td>
<td>● Three consultation meetings concerning</td>
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</table>
Once the data was been collected, the interviews were transcribed. I read and reflected on them carefully in order to become familiar with them. A framework for coding was developed based on the analytical frameworks relating to legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning and sources of funds. According to this coding framework, the transcriptions were then coded in order to discover the features of the women’s organizations in the case studies, and examine the conditioning factors that I assumed to have affected the campaigns.

In theoretical analysis stage, I applied several strategies to interpret and synthesize the data into general theories. First, I woven relevant data (most of which are second hand) to illustrate CSOs' campaigns and advocacy activities in policy change in China. Tables, figures, and diagrams were used to illustrate changing contours of their engagement in policy changes after the economic reforms in 1970s. Second, after setting up the stage for my study, I turned to two specific campaigns selected for my cases studies, namely the policy campaigns for anti-domestic violence and equal retirement age respectively. Based on both first and second hand data, I first drew the contour of each campaign. Then, my analysis evolved along the pentagon framework of variables, namely legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning and sources of funds when exploring the conditioning factors of the two campaigns.

Third, I compared the two cases and provided predictive explanations for the conditioning factors of CSOs advocacy in policy change in the future in China. Then, I went further to theoretical implications of my case studies. I reflected on previous approaches and theories relating to the studies on advocacy and campaigns of CSOs in policy changes in China. The analytical assessments helped me identify my theoretical contributions by the case studies. Finally, I reflected on the limit of my research and suggested themes for further studies.
Although the qualitative case study approach has considerable strengths for my research, it also has several validity threats. As Hakim points out: "the principal weakness of case studies is that results can be shaped strongly by the interests and perspectives of the researchers" (Hakim 2000). In order to maintain academic rigor, I used several strategies to check the validity of the research. First, in the preparation and design of the research, I acquired detailed knowledge about the CSOs, public policy process and gender equality issues in China through compiling and processing information. My firm grasp of the issues is presented in Chapter 3, which allowed me to contextualize the case analyses within a comprehensive historical and social background. During the interviews or observations, I tried to reduce my impact on the participants. For example, I tried to make the interviewees feel at ease by choosing their favourite places and approaches for interviews. I also paid attention to potential biases in my interpretation of the data by referring to triangulations of a variety of data sources to confirm or corroborate the analysis. The following Table 3 illustrates the types of second hand written materials (published and unpublished) that were collected.

Table 3 Types of Second Hand Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of materials</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laws and regulations published by the CCP or the State</td>
<td>e.g., regulations on administration of CSOs, laws concerning legislation procedures, laws concerning anti-domestic violence and retirement age, including the Marriage Law, the Women’s Law, the Civil Servant Law, as well as administrative regulations issued by the State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal documents of the organizations studied</td>
<td>e.g., the documents issued by the ACWF and the ADVN concerning the charter of the organizations, regulations, working reports, etc. proposals for programmes or projects, progress reports and personal notes taken by the people who participated in the activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications produced by the organizations studied</td>
<td>e.g., brochures or CSOs' websites, such as <a href="http://www.stdv.org.cn">www.stdv.org.cn</a>, that provide organizational profiles and the structures of the campaigns; stories about the leaders of the campaigns in the case studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal or academic articles concerning the</td>
<td>material from the media, e.g. newspaper clippings and articles appearing in magazines, stories relating to the leaders of our case.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition, I paid attention to ethical issues in the study in line with LSE Research Ethical Policy and paid special attention to the following issues: I sought consent from the interviewees to record the interviews, kept transcriptions and reports securely and anonymised most of the references to interviewees in the final report. I also tried to be reflexive about my own position as both an employer of the Women’s Studies Institute of China, a research institute affiliating to the ACWF, and as a participant in advocacy activities, and the possible effects of this on the interview.

1.6 The Structure of the Thesis

This section outlines the structure of this thesis. In Chapter 2, I establish a theoretical framework for my case analysis. Drawing on previous scholarship on civil society, public policy and social movements, I synthesize the findings on the determinants of CSO advocacy into a five-fold analytical framework including such variables as legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning and source of financial resources. I then explain the definitions and dimensions of these elements and explain how I apply them in the case analyses of the thesis.

In Chapter 3, I delineate the development of women’s organizations and their past efforts in negotiating policy change since the economic reform started in 1978. First, I introduce the policy environment for CSOs in China to highlight the challenges facing women CSOs. Then I map women’s organizations and examine the contours of their development. I also review the changing environment for policy-making and legislation to highlight the rules and institutions that are important in policy-making on gender issues. Furthermore, I conduct a preliminary survey of past policy advocacy for gender equality to provide a broader context within which to situate the two selected cases for further analyses.
After setting the stage for the study, Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 focus on two specific campaigns selected as the case studies, namely the policy campaigns for anti-domestic violence and gaining equal retirement age respectively. For each case study, I first explain the characteristics of protagonist organizations in terms of the assumed variables, namely legitimacy, leadership, organizational forms, learning and sources of funds. Thus, Chapters 4 and 6 are devoted to such explanatory analyses of the ACWF and the ADVN respectively. I then look at the processes of the CSOs’ policy advocacy, and in particular, how the assumed variables affect the advocacy of anti-domestic violence and equal retirement age respectively, in Chapters 5 and 7.

In the final chapter, I summarize the findings of the two case studies to answer my research questions and discuss the propositions set at the beginning to see how well they can explain the cases in China. Then I discuss the theoretical implications of the case studies for studies on gender and CSOs in policy making in China. I also indicate the limits of my case studies that may serve as new entry points for future studies.
2. Analyzing the Conditioning Factors: A Pentagon Framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter establishes the theoretical framework for the case analysis in the following chapters. In so doing, I draw on elements of various theories to develop a framework that can best account for the situation in China. I argue that the agenda setting of public policy in China is increasingly permeable and porous allowing the participation of actors in society in raising problems and offering solutions. The CSOs’ policy influence in China tends to be contingent on both the political opportunity structure in which they are embedded, and the mobilizing structures that CSOs have at their disposal. Although admitting that the political opportunity structure is important, my study highlights the agency of CSOs in mobilizing various resources to introduce policy change. I argue that although a window of opportunity for policy change is crucial, there have to be actors who can seize that opportunity and mobilize the change. I identify several elements including legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning and framing strategy and financial resources, which together constitute the key elements of a pentagon framework that is used to guide the analysis of the case studies in the thesis.

The following sections are devoted to the review of scholarship on the power of CSOs in policy-making and the factors that affect relevant results. I start with a brief review of studies on the power of CSO in policy-making in the first section. Then, I discuss the conditioning factors that have been used to explain the success or failure of CSOs’ policy campaigns by scholars in different disciplines in Section 2. Although the review covers studies of civil society, public policy and social movements, the interdisciplinary study does not aim to provide a comprehensive review that exhausts all the findings. Rather, I discuss in what way each body of scholarship helps to answer my research questions about the conditions under which the policy advocacy activities of women’s organizations are able to achieve success. Based on these discussions, furthermore, I develop a framework in Section 3 to suggest a set of independent variables for guiding my case analysis throughout the thesis.
2.2 Theorizing the Power of CSOs in Policy-making

I review previous studies relating to the power of CSOs in policy-making in line with two dimensions. I begin with the first dimension concerning how powerful CSOs’ campaigns are. Various scholars addressed the importance of the role of CSO advocacy in policy change. Korten (1990) identifies advocacy as a future direction for CSOs' development. Young (1992) uses the term 'advocacy NGO' to distinguish those organizations that seek to change the status quo from those that simply provide service delivery to meet people's immediate needs. Indeed, a large body of literature was devoted to demonstration of the catalyst role of CSOs in policy change. Furthermore, I turn to the second dimension concerning how CSOs wield power to bring forth policy change. This is the least studied area in contrast to the first dimension.

2.2.1 The Influence of Policy Advocacy

According to Jenkins (1987), advocacy is "any attempt to influence the decision of any institutional elite on behalf of a collective interest" (p.267). Similarly, Bratton (1989) regards advocacy as not only making people’s voices heard, but also exerting an influence. Their definitions, above all, focus on the CSOs' catalytic role in policy change. Lewis (2001) synthesizes the different definitions, and proposes that advocacy is "an activity in which an NGO seeks changes in policy, and ultimately in the allocation of power, through political influence based on representing members' and supporters’ interests to policy makers" (p. 201).

Many studies point to the increasing role of CSOs in policy making at both country and global levels. For instance, DeMars (2005) observes the growing importance of CSOs characterized by a 'NGO bloom'(p.4; 23; 34) characterized by quantitative proliferation in areas such as human rights, grassroots development, humanitarian relief, environmental protection, and democratization, as well as a wide
geographical coverage and increasing capacity to create new issues and influence opinions. Atkinson & Scurrah (2009) argue that:

The last few decades have seen a remarkable growth in this type of activity – civil society organizations and networks challenging and influencing the policies and practices of governments, international institutions and even corporations. Some observers have maintained that this represents a whole new dynamic in national and international politics, a third force matching the power and influence of governments and business. p.2

Although there is varying assessment of CSOs’ influence in national policy-making in different countries, there seems considerable praise for CSOs in influencing global agenda setting. Global advocacy has been the focus of studies on CSOs’ policy influence for the past decade, providing substantive evidence of their advocacy success and failures in international policy advocacy (Atkinson et al. 2009; Bestill and Corell 2008; Cautney 2010; DeMars 2005; Dupuy and Vierucci 2008; Joachim and Locher 2009; Joachim 2007; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rugendyke 2007; Van Rooy 2004; Vedder et al. 2007).

In ‘Activism’s Bumper Decade’, Alison Van Rooy (2004 p.33-61) discovers CSOs’ growing influence in various major campaigns including environmental, peace, human rights, North-South cooperation, global finance, and globalization campaigns in 1990s. These advocacy activities have affected the policy agenda of the United Nations. For example, Volker Heins (2008) contends that international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have attempted to rewrite the rules worldwide. He compiled a list to indicate the way in which INGOs have attempted to (re)write the rules for international regulations. They include, to name a few, “the Rome Statute of the ICC (1998), the Mine Ban Treaty or Ottawa Convention (1997), the Biosafety Protocol to the Convention of Biological Diversity (2000), the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997), the campaign for amendments to the TRIPS Agreement with regard to essential medicines, and various initiatives on economic sanctions and trade embargoes against hostile or rights-violating countries” (ibid p. 91). Thus, Dupuy and Vierucci (2008 p.1) concluded that: “It is
today beyond doubt that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) play a prominent role in international law-relevant fields, from treaty making to rule implementation; from support to courts to aid delivery.”

Furthermore, Keck and Sikkink (1998) developed a nuanced benchmark to differentiate the levels of achievements of CSOs in bringing about policy change. They include:

…(1) issues creation and agenda setting (2) influence on discursive positions of states and international organizations; (3) influence on institutional procedures; (4) influence on policy change in “target actors” which may be states, international organizations like the World Bank, or private actors like the Nestle Corporation; and (5) influence on state behavior. (ibid p. 25)

They provided an analysis of the effectiveness of CSO advocacy according to these benchmarks. For example, global networks promoted the UN’s theme years and decades, such as International Women’s Decades and the Year of Indigenous Peoples, to raise awareness of the issues. Likewise, global environmental networks shaped conference declarations at the 1992 “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro and pressured states to make more binding commitments. In addition, global CSOs have brought about procedural changes to develop regular contact with many key players. Above all, the UN agencies set up policies for consultation with CSOs. At the United Nations, from 41 NGOs granted consultative status by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1948, and 377 in 1968, the number of NGOs in consultative status has expanded to over 1,550 (Rugendyke 2007). Indeed, as the UN has realized the benefits of working with NGOs, “they have sought to strengthen their relationships with them”, and NGOs have ‘become increasingly incorporated into the UN system’ (Rugendyke 2007p.10).

In spite of the above commendations of CSOs in policy-making, however, there are also doubts and queries from scholars. Some doubt that if CSOs have a major influence at all. In welfare sectors, for example, some scholars (Hamilton 2003; Jobert 2008; Lu 2003) suggest that CSOs only passively provide voluntary services as auxiliaries to the state. For example, Jober and Kohler-Koch (2008 p.6-14) propose several models in their analysis of the role of CSOs in the policy process. In the tutelary
modernization model, an approach that prevailed a few decades ago, where government relied on professional elite and bureaucratic corporations for policy-making, CSOs just socialized and recruited activists into the welfare system. In the neo-conservative model, where welfare was blamed for the increasing dependence of welfare beneficiaries on the state, the CSOs’ role was strictly circumscribed as purely a watchdog of the public sector. In the transatlantic Third Way model, furthermore, the role of CSOs was recognized but mainly in terms of their role as service provider not as watchdogs of the state.

In development sectors, moreover, other scholars maintain that over the last fifteen years NGOs have failed in their attempt to promote an alternative to the neoliberalism that seized control of development in theory, policy and practice in the 1980s (Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin 2008). In international politics, furthermore, some scholars argue that CSOs have just implemented and enforced global norms that emanate from UN organs and multilateral agreements. DeMars argued that: “NGOs are wild cards in world politics; their form and influence are highly variable. The most important impact of NGOs and transnational networks is often an inadvertent consequence rather than either success or failure in achieving official NGO goals” (DeMars 2005 p.162). From this perspective, the so-called “NGO bloom” is based on “a tendency to extrapolate from extremely modest NGO achievements today to messianically ambitious political goals far in the future.” (ibid: 34)

In short, this subsection has demonstrated different views of CSOs’ influence in policy process, which implies the ambiguous role of CSOs in policy advocacy.

2.22 The Manoeuvre of Power

Although there are a limited number of studies on how CSOs wield power to negotiate policy change, there are some useful theoretical studies that focus on policy actors, in particular their power to mobilize policy change.
At the macro level, scholars in public policy have investigated power distributions among state institutions in policymaking. Hill (2005 p.26) develops a matrix with power distribution and power concentration as two cross axes. He identifies four power systems with different degrees of power distribution and concentration. The first type is the Representative Government where power is concentrated but distributed equally; the second, Pluralist Government where power is distributed equally but fragmented; the third, government where power is concentrated in the grip of small elites; and the fourth is where power is fragmented unequally. Hill’s typology reveals that policy-making is dynamic and contingent on the changes of power distribution and concentration. The more power is distributed in a relatively egalitarian way, the higher the likelihood of public participation. The third type of this typology matches the situation in China where power of decision-making in public policy is concentrated in the grip of small bureaucratic elites. As access to policy-making is limited, the participation of CSOs as well as other citizens is incomplete.

At the micro level, Cobb, Ross, and Ross (1976 cited in Howlett and Ramesh 2003 p.139-140) use the backgrounds of mobilizers as an axis for classification, which is more useful for my case studies in China. According to them, at one end of spectrum is the outside initiation model indicating that the policy change is catalyzed by actors from outside state and bureaucratic institutions; at the other end of spectrum is the mobilizations model, which mean that issues are simply placed on the formal agenda by the government with no necessary preliminary expansion from a publically recognized grievance; and in between is the insider initiation model indicating that the influential groups with special access to decision-makers initiate policies that they do not necessarily want expended and contested in public (Cobb, Ross and Ross 1976; Howlett and Ramesh 2003). Furthermore, they ascribed the three models to three distinct regimes: the outside institution model for liberal pluralist societies; the top-down mobilization model for totalitarian regimes; and the inside initiation model for corporatist regimes. Nevertheless, these three styles addressing agency of actors in influencing policy change, which is the focus of my study.
To explore the way of actors organizing for policy change, Heclo coined two important terms “issue networks” and “technopols” in his research on American policy-making (Heclo 1978). By “issue networks”, he proposed a notion of policy group that “tended to coalesce around certain issues to form autonomous policy sub-units that exerted considerable influence on the policy-making process” (Smith and Larimer 2009). By and large, these informal alliances are issue-oriented and highly fluid. Within these issue networks, furthermore, there are “technopols” who tend to wield the most power. According to Heclo, these “technopols” are highly specialized policy experts with exhaustive information about a particular issue. Expanding on Heclo’s concept of “technopols”, Baumgartner and Jones (1991), as well as Kingdon (1995a), develop a theory of “policy entrepreneur” to explore leadership in policy networks or groups. These concepts and detailed analyses at micro level herald an alternative approach to conventional scholarship that treated state organizations such as the congress and the bureaucracy as the central institutional actors in policy-making. Thus, the focus on informal alliance and individual activists that outside traditional state institutions offers a prospect for my analysis of advocacy activities of the CSOs in China.

In short, seeking to explain who (institutions or individuals) has actual power in defining policy issues, public policy scholarship focuses on formalized institutional actors. Although they pay attention to various actors in the “policy universe” coined by Howlett and Ramesh (2003), there is insufficient examination over how relevant actors interact with each other and how they use the power they possess to persuade and bargain with each other in pursuit of their interests.

In general, in theorizing power of CSOs in policy advocacy, scholars concentrated on scaling up CSOs’ activities. In their focusing on the catalytic role of CSOs, scholars are engaged in assessing the effectiveness of CSOs in their advocacy and campaign activities. Put it in other word, the investigation of the power of CSOs focuses more on how powerful CSOs’ campaigns are rather than on how CSOs wield power to bring forth policy change.
2.3 Theorizing the Conditioning Factors of Campaigns Waged by CSOs

Many scholars contend that the question of under what conditions NGOs can make effective change has generally remained a puzzle (Bestill and Corell 2008; Chandler 2004; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Indeed, despite mounting evidence of policy change influenced by CSOs, empirical studies on the conditioning factors of CSOs’ policy advocacy are lacking.

Nevertheless, previous studies in civil society, social movement and public policy have sought to explain determinants of CSO’s advocacy from various points of view. In particular, the curiosity of social movement scholarship brings forth inspiring frameworks for analyses. Seeking to understand the factors and processes that shape social movements, it questions under what conditions given types of movement can be expected, and what makes them successful or not. Some focus on the macro-level of political opportunities, others pay attention to the meso-level of organizational factors, whilst still others explore the micro-level of activists’ personal traits. Each of these conceptual approaches tries to offer an account of how and why certain factors determine whether the advocacy are more or less successful in shaping and defining policy agenda. I identify three major approaches of previous explorations as the following sub-sections indicate.

2.31 Structure Oriented Factors

One school of scholars addresses the macro level of political contexts that affect CSOs’ participation in policy-making. They argue for a crucial role of the state and political structure in shaping the opportunities and strategies of CSOs in policy-making. In their *NGO Diplomacy*, Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corel (2008) differentiate structural factors from agency factors. While agency factors refer to CSOs’ maneuvering power in policy advocacy, the structural facts refer to the specific political institutional contexts wherein CSOs’ campaigns were waged. In public policy studies, the state-centered approach addresses the state organizations as central institutional actors and focuses on the perceptions and interactions of decision-makers within the organizational
context of the state (Grindle and Thomas 1991). The most influential account on the state’s determinant role in social advocacy is the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) of social movement theory. This concept was developed by Eisinger (1972), Tilly (1978), McAdam (1982), Tarrow (1994), McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996). It focuses on the broader set of political constraints and opportunities within which social movements and revolutions are embedded. They argue that specific policy institutions and processes may either constrain or enhance the advocacy of CSOs. For example, the political opportunities open to social movements may increase when the state is opening up to give greater access to power or when divisions emerge between ruling elites (Tarrow 1994). Furthermore, they suggest that the POSs not only determine the emergence of social movements, but also affect the strategies adopted by actors. As the perceptions, interests, identities, and ideas of CSOs are constituted by the institutional context, their choices of actions for campaigns are certainly the results of deliberation over various conditioning factors (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996).

Although the structure oriented approach highlights the importance of context in explaining variation, there is no consensus on what should be considered as structural factors. At an early stage of public policy studies, state centered explanations focused on congress, bureaucracy, and special interest groups and argued for “an unbreakable triad” (Smith and Larimer 2009) in bringing policy change. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, scholars turned to informal alliances outside of the traditional state institutions, which include a variety of actors such as think-tank, research institutes, interest groups, and ordinary citizens (Smith and Larimer 2009).

Inspired by social movement scholars such as McAdam (1996), Gamson and Meyer (1996) suggest that it is “more useful to think of political opportunity structures as clusters of variables and to analyze whether and how specific aspects of the institutional context shape NGO opportunities for influence” (Bestill and Corell 2008 p.40). However, there is no consensus on what constitutes the political opportunity either. POS theorists have outlined different theoretical dimensions of opportunities which have produced distinct variables for their analyses. For example, Tarrow
synthesizes across various factors and proposes a list embracing such elements as opening up political access, unstable alignments, influential allies, and dividing elites (Tarrow 1996). Generally speaking, the previous discussions on elements have encompassed virtually all the conditions and circumstances of political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, political alliances, and policy shifts (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). Some scholars argued that the attempt to include all the conditions and circumstances will render the concept useless. As McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996 p.24) complain, the concept becomes “a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment”, it turns out to be too broad to explain anything.

Furthermore, not only have the structure oriented factors proposed by previous studies proved to be too diverse to handle in a single piece of research, this approach also risks paying so much attention to the role of state institutions in policy-making that it ignores the agency of civil society forces in maneuvering power in specific contexts. This is particularly important in relation to my case studies on CSOs in the policy process in China. In a political environment where control over CSOs is still tight and their access to policy making limited, a structure-oriented approach that focuses on the macro political context is unlikely to gain any insight on how CSOs strategically mobilize their resources to influence policy change.

Nevertheless, I will pay attention to structural elements that condition the prospects for advocacy and the forms of the campaigns. To avoid too broad an approach, scholars in civil society studies argue for emphasis on formal organizational or legal structures (Bestill and Corell 2008). Thus, to analyze the structural factors, I will not cover all the political milieus in which the cases were embedded. Instead, I focus specifically on the legal context of CSOs and the rule of law on policy process in China after the economic reforms of 1978, which will facilitate the understanding of tactical choices and strategies adopted by the CSOs in my case studies.

2.32 Agency Oriented Factors
Aware of the constraints of the structure-oriented approach in explaining the conditioning factors that affect the effectiveness of CSOs’ campaigns, many other scholars focus on the agency of CSOs in strategically mobilizing resources to influence policy change. In *NGO Diplomacy*, Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corel (2008 p.39) define the agent-based conditioning factors as NGOs’ ability to “…control their own destiny and can enhance their influence by adopting particular strategies and/or accumulating resources”. Their list includes, but is not limited to: professionalization - relating to mastery of technical language and procedures of multilateral negotiations, direct/insider tactics, coordination among non-state actors, and possession of key resources such as money and expertise (Biliouri 1999; Chatterjee and Finger. 1994.; Corell and Betsill. 2001; Dodds 2001.; Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson and Sasser 2001; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Newell 2000).

Similar to the structure oriented approach, scholars who argue for the agency-oriented approach have not yet reached consensus on what should be included in analyzing the agency of CSOs in their mobilizing resources. Nevertheless, two kinds of properties are conspicuous. One is the organizational resources that have been exhaustively deliberated in the resource mobilization theory (RMT) of social movement scholarship. In analyzing organizations, the RMT is particularly useful because of its strengths at meso-micro level analysis (Zald 1992). Scholars have studied the emergence, growth and decline of CSOs, and their relationships with social movements. They have also studied the diversity of organizational forms and relationships among different CSOs (Smith and Fetner 2007). Emerging in the 1970s, RMT argues that a social movement is largely the result of sustained mobilization of resources and energy toward social change. In the early stages, scholars emphasized the importance of formal organizational resources. McCarthy and Zald (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1973) defined these organizations as social movement organizations (SMOs). They are formal and professionally staffed organizations advocating for social change. Based on the phenomena of prevalent and professional social organizations, they argued that “social movements in the contemporary period have become professionalized” (Smith and Fetner 2007 p.30). Later, scholars paid attention to informal groups or networks and
other resources mobilized by social movements. In their seminal studies, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996 p.3) coined “mobilizing structure” to embrace a variety of “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action”. In so doing, they endeavored to include as many factors as possible - moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material resources (Edwards and McCarthy 2004).

However, the discourse on the mobilization of organizational resources has been criticized for overstating tangible material resources observable in social movements. This has given rise to a shift toward cultural and ideological analysis. The New Social Movement Theory (NSMT) steers away from materialist approaches towards the studies of symbolic, cultural and ideational factors (Buechler 2000; Melucci 1996). The new trend in cultural analysis brings to light the agency of CSOs in maneuvering power to mobilize policy change that has largely been ignored by structure-oriented analysis that focuses on formal political institutions.

In particular, framing has attracted the most attention of social movement studies of advocacy and campaigns. According to Zald (1996 p.262) “…frames are the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action”. David Snow and his colleagues (Snow and Benford 1988; Snow et al. 1986) were the first to systematically apply frame analysis directly to social movements. They developed a number of related concepts such as ‘master frames’, ‘diagnostic frames’, ‘prognostic frames’, and ‘frame alignment’ to show how activists shape ideologies and issues in social movements. According to Buecher (2000 p.42), the ‘master frames’ refer to general ideological trends at the macro-level of social order, “which influence the goads, tactics, strategies, coalitions, and resources and entire social movement industry”. According to Snow, Soule and Kriesi (2004 p.470), ‘diagnostic frames’ refer to the identification of problems, including establishing causal relations, while ‘prognostic frames’ suggest solutions and remedies. The ‘frame alignment’ indicates the processes of building consensus by “ask(ing) how activists and movement leaders
formulate and articulate claims, both to motivate adherents and influence the public” (ibid p.97). In short, the studies on collective identities, beliefs, symbols, frames, etc., have significantly enriched the understanding of dimensions of power relations in social movements (Snow and Benford 1988; Snow et al. 1986).

Although the agency oriented approach facilitates the understanding of the agency of CSOs in policy change, it has been criticized for its weakness in analyzing the macro level of class and gender structure (Buechler 2000). At the individual level, on the other hand, there is a lack of systematic empirical study on how individuals have wielded power to mobilize policy change, although public policy scholarship addresses the role of policy entrepreneurs and social movement scholarship does pay some attention to movement leaders.

Although there are some criticisms of the agency-oriented approach, it remains a sharp tool for studies of social movement organizations and CSOs. In particular, it is useful in revealing the dynamic process of resource mobilization in an authoritarian state like China, to illustrate how groups or individuals consciously mobilize various resources to bring about the desired social change. In any case, agency is embodied in both personal and collective action. Thus, it is important to look at how charismatic actors, most of whom have distinguished capabilities and insights, effectively mobilize various resources to bring about policy change. Furthermore, the agency-oriented approach also enables analysis of cultural repertoires and tool kits employed by activists. Through examining the process of CSOs’ framing of public policy issues, the case studies can best illustrate the agency of women’s organizations maneuvering power in the agenda setting stage of the policy process.

2.33 Synthesis Methods

Many scholars suggest a synthesis method to connect agent based and structural conditioning factors and situate these conditional factors in context. In their study of environmental campaigns of NGOs, Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corel (2008 p.37) identify eight factors for cross-case analysis: (1) NGO coordination, (2) rules of access,
(3) stage of the negotiations, (4) political stakes, (5) institutional overlap, (6) competition from other NGOs, (7) alliances with key states, and (8) level of contention. Similarly, in their study of NGOs’ involvement in international governance, Anton Vedder and co-authors (2007) identify political space, strategies, networks and alliances, and accountability as factors in explaining variation in NGOs’ influence across cases. Likewise, Keck and Sikkink (1998) take factors such as issue characteristics, actor characteristics, and framing into consideration.

Similarly, scholars of public policy studies have developed models to systematically combine various factors into a more accurate analysis of various influential factors of policy change. There are several models that synthesize different factors into frameworks. Paul Sabatier (1988) and his colleagues (1999) developed what became known as the “advocacy coalition framework” (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1999). Their framework identifies multiple participants from diverse backgrounds as actors who are able to wield power throughout the policy process. Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) developed the garbage can model to argue for a chaotic and unruly process of policy-making, where competing policy communities negotiate solutions to particular problems. Kingdon revised the garbage can model to include three separate “streams”: problems, policies, and politics. According to him, policy actors must first recognize that there is an existing problem, and then they generate policy alternatives to address emerging problems. Different actors and forces argue and bargain with each other, the process of which is identified as the ‘political stream’. According to Kingdon, only when the three streams converge, does a “policy window” appear which allows for rapid policy change (Kingdon 1995b).

Varying in theoretical argument, several scholars are all trying in different ways to combine structural and agency oriented factor for analyses. However, these frameworks are not without fault when they are applied to studies on gender equality and agenda-setting of public policy. Their weakness in analyzing gender equality and the public policy process lies in the neglect of gender power relations in the conventional disciplines of civil society, public policy and social movements. Jude
Howell (2005) argues that “civil society is discussed as though gender is irrelevant” (p. 3). Hoskyns (1996) and Lovenduski (2005) indicate a deficit in the studies of how male bias in public policy may disadvantage women from equal benefits with men. Kuuma (2001) indicates that the mainstream of social movement theories is limited in analyzing women’s movements as they were “developed and applied with the assumption of gender neutrality”. From the point of view of feminist scholars, in general, the sites of civil society, public policy and social movement all embody conventional gender power relations. For instance, Kuumba (2001) argues that:

Social movements are themselves microcosms of the types of gender processes, stratification, and structure evidence in the wider society. They simultaneously embody, employ, confront, and transform how women and men are positioned, as well as perceived, within a society. (ibid p. 21)

Likewise, feminist scholars argue that public policy is, by and large, made in male-dominated institutions where women’s interests and gender equality issues tend to be excluded (Hoskyns 1996; Lovenduski 2005). Welfare states, above all, practice discrimination against women by strengthening conventional gender stereotypes and reinforcing women’s subordination (Sainsbury 1999).

Aware of the constraints of the frameworks embedded in conventional scholarship, feminist scholars prioritize certain elements that are deemed important for the analysis of women organizations’ campaigns in policy change. First, the alliance of CSOs and state actors is addressed. In their examination of the determinants of the influence of women’s organizations on the state, Jude Howell and Diane Mulligan (2005) highlight the function of the alliance among “a combination of variables, such as the degree of public support on an issue, alliance with key political figures and state bureaucrats, the degree of institutionalized participation, and broader political context” (p. 12). In her study on the case in China, Howell (2005) observes that new women’s organizations forged strategic alliances with female cadres in order to influence state policy. Similarly, mass organizations such as the ACWF also built both formal and informal alliances with officials of both the government and the CCP and representatives of the NPCs. Likewise, Marlies Glasuis (2005) indicates the
effectiveness of the alliances established by global civil society actors and female state delegates for promoting gender issues onto the UN policy agenda. Still other scholars have studied various alliances between women’s organizations or groups with electoral and legislative cycles (Stevenson 2005). The focus of alliance of women CSOs with states facilitates the understanding of the complex relations between state and CSOs where conventional studies on civil society argue for a rigid divide.

Second, feminists emphasize strategies and tactics of women’s organizations. Kummba (2001) argues that the theory on POS does not take gender power relations into account when emphasizing larger social structural arrangements as it overstates the formal structural elements such as the constitutional feature and the openness of government, but ignores the agency of women’s organizations in negotiating their agenda. According to Lesley McMillan (2007), access to these formal institutions is “typically necessary for success, but alone it is not enough to determine success” (p. 55). Based on the criticisms of the conventional social movement theories, feminist scholars bring forth strategies and tactics adopted by women’s organizations in specific political context. They further distinguish approaches that women’s organizations meticulously adopt to cope with particular political opportunities. For example, sometimes they adopt a less confrontational approach, while at other times, however, they adopt a more militant strategy (McMillan 2007).

Third, feminist scholars have highlighted the informal way of organizing. Some scholars argue that the theory of RMT of social movement paid so much attention to officially recognized movement organizations that it effectively ignored informal groupings and networks (McCarthey and Zald 1977). For example, in her study of U.S. suffrage movement’s alliances, Lee Ann Banaszak (1996) identifies both formal and informal ways of women’s organizing. Thus, she argues for a re-definition of organizational resources to embrace diverse organizational forms.

Fourth, the interplay of different factors is also a big part of feminist analyses of women’s movements. Theorizing the influential factors of gender equality policies, Dahlerup (1987 p.121) stated [there is] ‘no single factor that can explain women’s
policy’ In Theorizing Feminist Policy, Mazur (2002) argues that the determinants of feminist policy formation are highly complex:

The literature on feminist policy identifies a dizzying number of determinants of effective woman-friendly policies: to name a few, women in the policy process, women's movements, women's policy offices, type of governing majority, parliamentary or presidential system, unitary or federal territorial distribution of power, structure of the bureaucracy, type of legal system, level of woman-friendliness in social policies, type of welfare state regime, level of women in the workforce, presence of strong social democratic parties, political culture, religion, gender consciousness in society, and type of state-society relations. (Mazur 2002 p.39)

Thus, she examines the interplay of these factors when theorizing the influential factors of gender equality policies. Her 27 case studies of feminist policy formation focus on factors including variation of policy sub-sectors, women-friendly politics, national/regional patterns in religion, political parties, policy styles, emergence of feminist advocacy coalitions, etc. (Mazur 2002 p.42-3). Although the framework facilitates the comparison of cases in industrial democratic countries, it cannot be applied wholesale to my case studies in China where the political context is in starkly difference. For example, China is not a multi-party democracy, thus the combination of factors will differ in China.

In general, the multi-disciplinary work on the determinants of CSOs and social movements on policy change show a dynamic and complex system of influential factors that involve actors and structures. Thus, a comprehensive framework is required to explain why CSOs’ policy advocacy succeeded or failed. To develop such a framework I integrated both structural and agency oriented factors, giving attention to the elements prioritized by feminist scholarship. Most important, I adapted these concepts to suit the analyses of the cases in a Chinese context. This is the focus of the following section.

2.4 A Pentagon Framework

Inspired by previous scholarship on civil society, public policy and social movement, in particular feminist critics, I argue that five specific aspects of such a framework are
important: (1) legitimacy; (2) leadership; (3) organizational structure; (4) learning, and (5) source of funds. I will explain the fivefold typology – a pentagon framework - in the following sections. In suggesting these independent variables, I provide definitions, specify the importance of the elements that have been addressed by previous studies, and classify them into several dimensions for comparative assessments.

Figure 2 A Pentagon Framework of the Determinants of CSOs’ Policy Advocacy

Source: Developed by the author.
2.4.1 Legitimacy

Legitimacy is central to the effectiveness of CSOs' advocacy work (Hudson 2000). According to Heywood (Heywood 2004), "legitimacy is the quality that transforms naked power into rightful authority; it confers upon an order of command an authoritative or binding character, ensuring that it is obeyed out of duty rather than because of fear" (p. 141).

There are multiple dimensions of legitimacy identified in the literature. Hudson (2000) classifies the dimensions of CSOs’ legitimacy in relation to their stakeholders such as officials, donors, and targeted groups. As Hudson observes, different stakeholders tend to question the CSOs' legitimacy in different ways. For example, governments are more likely to ask why and whether they should listen to the CSOs. If the government gives the CSO authority to represent particular groups, their proposals are more likely to be accepted by officials. At the same time, donors may question why they should fund particular CSOs and their activities; even the supposed beneficiaries may question whether the CSOs can or should represent them.

Other scholars focus on the conditioning factors that affect CSOs’ legitimacy. Alison Van Rooy (2004) identifies various “rules” that have affected CSOs’ legitimacy in global protests such as representation, rights-approach, expertise and moral authority. According to her, representation is the mostly frequently cited claim and the “hallmark” of legitimacy (p.63). It relates to the capability of CSOs to speak on behalf of the group they claim to represent. This in turn involves factors such as nature of membership and internal democracy. She also discussed a hidden set of factors - amateur professionalism, organizational austerity, leaders’ skills and charisma, CSOs’ marketing and media reputation, perception of political and financial independence (Van Rooy 2004).

Still other scholars address the function of CSOs in their analyses of their legitimacy. In his study on NGO involvement in international governance, Anton Vedder (2007) identifies three dimensions of legitimacy: social, regulatory and morally normative. According to him, “legitimacy is a matter of conformity to rules (regulatory aspect), justification in relation to moral norms and values (regulatory aspect), and
consent or representation of those involved or affected (social aspect)” (Vedder 2007 p.7).

In general, previous studies represent a trend of using multidimensional notions for analyzing legitimacy. They query such aspects as whether a CSO has a legal status under national law, whether its activity rests on consent, whether it is able to represent its members, whether it is transparent and accountable and so on. However, the rules of legitimacy are too complex to have universal criteria (Van Rooy 2004). The criteria of CSOs with national governments are different in distinct political contexts (Vedder 2007). To analyze the cases in China, therefore, I focus on legal status, political alliances, and expertise and tailor them to the context in China.

Legal status: First, I render the state’s acceptance as one of the most important conditions for CSOs to have a policy influence in China. The recognition process that allows a CSO to acquire a legal personality under the domestic law of a state is often called ‘registration’. In China, NGOs are ultimately obliged to register. Although many CSOs that have not registered function well in carrying out activities, they tend to gain less authority, if at all, than those CSOs that register with the state.

Alliances with state officials: This study identifies the alliances with state officials as the second important dimension of CSOs’ legitimacy in policymaking. As stated in the previous section, alliances with state officials or organs are one of the major foci of scholarships on CSOs in policy change (Howell and Mulligan 2005; Joachim 2007). While some argue for the positive impact of alliances with state officials (Joachim 2007), others perceive the closeness of CSOs with government officials as a negative factor that may undermine the representation of their target groups (Van Rooy 2004). This thesis focuses on positive side of this kind of alliance to see if the connection strengthens the authority of CSO policy advocacy.

Expertise and knowledge: This study assumes that expertise is an increasingly important element of legitimacy for CSOs’ policy advocacy. More and more scholars perceive expertise and knowledge as the ultimate resource of legitimacy possessed by CSOs in policy process. Cases of CSOs’ involvement in transnational environmental
advocacy, above all, illustrate that knowledge and expertise are crucial for CSOs to be viewed as valued participants in the agenda-setting process (Bestill and Corell 2008; Chandler 2004; Joachim and Locher 2009; Van Rooy 2004). Thus, CSOs that have specific knowledge and expertise in the sectors or areas of advocacy enjoy a comparative advantage over other actors. In China, too, there are increasing cases of the Party/state’s opening up policy processes by consulting experts in particular areas that are driven by technical knowledge. Various think-tanks at different levels have started to take an active role in providing consultation for the CCP or state organs in the formation of policies or laws. Among these think-tanks, there are a few CSOs that are viewed as legitimate mostly because they have specific technical expertise in areas such as economic development and environmental protection. These include both registered and unregistered CSOs.

2.42 Leadership

Recent research on CSOs' advocacy and social movements has started to pay attention to individual leaders of organizations. Grenier (2004) addresses the methodological significance of "giving account of human side of civil society and grounding it in the lives of individuals rather than issues" (p.122). She argues that this approach shifts the focus from issues toward human agency and action in civil society studies. Edwards (1999) and Lewis (2001) notice that charismatic leadership is a vital component of many NGOs, particularly in their early years, in order to guide the organization through crises and create a clear sense of direction. Likewise, social movement scholarship also calls for an adequate study of leadership. (Barker, Johnson and Lavalette; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1973; Morris and Staggenborg 2004; Tarrow 1996). For instance, Melucci (1996) identifies that leaders of social movements typically perform five main tasks: defining the movement’s objectives, providing the means for actions, maintaining structure and cohesion, mobilizing members’ support, and constructing identity. Oliver and Marwell (1992) dub the leaders as organizational entrepreneurs.
Having vision, charisma, and a wealth of organizing experience and connections, they play a pivotal role in facilitating collective action.

What kind of leadership is the most effective in leading CSOs to cope with challenges and achieve the desired goals of the advocacy? Charisma is the most frequently used term to indicate leaders’ capacity to influence followers. Proposed by Weber (1968) in his famous analysis of authority, the term “charisma” was initially associated with religious figures endowed with mysterious and unique qualifications. Since then, there have been heated debates on the concept from various academic disciplinarians such as sociology (Bryman 1992), industrial management (Bass 1990), politics (Nye 2008), social movement (Barker et al 2001) and gender power relations (Duerst-Lahti et al 1995). Some scholars have introduced new concepts such as transformational leadership, new leadership, and visionary leadership to replace charismatic leadership. In short, all these efforts try to activate the old term by redefining it to adapt to modern society. From different perspectives, scholars identify various traits of leaders, such as intelligence, creativity, achievement motivation, conscientiousness, oral/written communication, etc., as charisma in that these characteristics play an important role in influencing followers by articulating a compelling vision for the future, arousing commitment to organizational objectives.

Van Rooy (2004) points to criticisms of CSOs for their lack of internal democracy. Accusations such as CSOs having hierarchical and authoritarian organizational structures with dominant leaders who “behave as feudal lords” are leveled at some CSOs (ibid). In China, too, some CSO leaders are clearly charismatic individuals who give birth to their organizations and guide them through crises. Later on, some of these leaders adopt an authoritarian style of leadership, while others employ a more democratic approach.

In this thesis, I examine the impact of leadership style by focusing on three characteristics: democratic, bureaucracy, and autocratic.

**Democratic style:** The democratic leadership style is characterized by egalitarian relations between leaders and followers. Here, the term egalitarian refers to the internal
democracy of the organizations which is characterized by the election of leaders and participatory decision-making which is usually based on consultation and discussion. I believe that this leadership style is most effective in gaining cooperation and motivating various forces for sustained and concerted efforts for policy advocacy. As Ganz (2000) argues that effective strategy is usually the product of a “leadership team” rather than an individual, and that diverse leadership teams increase strategic capacity (cited in Snow, Soule and Kriesi 2004 p.190). According to Marx and Useem (1971), movements led by leadership teams comprising both insiders and outsiders of the campaign have the greatest chances of success because they attract leadership teams with diverse backgrounds, skills and viewpoints (cited in Snow, Soule and Kriesi 2004 p.177-89).

**Bureaucratic style:** Compared with a pluralist democratic leadership, the relationship between leaders and followers in a bureaucratic leadership is rigorous and hierarchical. Leaders may be nominated and decision-making is top-down. There is more consensus building than consultation, characterized by the leaders mobilizing consensus around their decisions. Nevertheless, there is a clear division of labour and tasks and transparency within the organizations. I suggest that although bureaucratic leadership may be effective for fulfilling some ad hoc tasks, it is not conducive for mobilizing various forces, particularly those outside the CSO.

**Autocratic style:** This type of leadership is characterized by absolute authority of one or a few leaders in an organization. Decision-making is centralized, top-down and non-transparent. The leaders are what are termed by Van Rooy, the “modern-day potentates”. According to Van Rooy (2004), leaders of many activist organizations are described as “modern-day potentates…a position rather like that command by medieval bishops” (p.72) because of their authoritarian rule of the organization. In China, too, many founders of CSOs acted as charismatic leaders who would navigate their organization through difficulties in order to make it survive and thrive. However, power and decision-making became increasingly concentrated in their hands. Indeed, their passion and talent, as well as their relentless efforts, made it possible for the establishment and development of their CSOs in the authoritarian state of China. As
time passed, however, some of them assumed more and more power and became reluctant to share it with other members of the organization. This was described by some scholars as “founders’ syndrome”, which later on resulted in organizational problems such as redistribution of power and succession of leadership, especially when the senior creators are reluctant to share power and refuse to retire. Thus, a feature of “the iron law of” oligarchy within organizations coined by Michels (1911) is conspicuous. I propose that this type of leadership is the least effective in mobilizing efforts to influence policy change, as it is less likely to have sustained followers either in their organization or for their advocacy activities.

2.43 Organizational Structure

Scholarship of both CSOs and social movement explores the organizational forms in relation to CSOs’ management and character and their influence on achievements. According to Anheier and Themudo (2002), past innovations include bureaucracy, the multi-divisional form, and network organization. Bureaucracy was first identified by Max Weber as the innovative tool of administration and production. He constructed an ideal type of bureaucracy with particular characteristics. The key to these characteristics are hierarchy of authority, written rules that govern the conduct of officials who are full-time and salaried, and material resources owned by the organization (Giddens 2001). Some theorists of social movements propose that the professional, bureaucratic social movement organizations are likely to be the most successful in achieving their goals (Charles 2000; McCarthy and Zald 1987).

Multi-divisional coordination is a fundamental shift from hierarchical bureaucracy (Chandler 1990). According to Anheier and Themudo (2002), although power is decentralized to allow parts of the organizations relative autonomy, such an organizational structure is less flexible than a network structure, being characterized by rigid division of responsibilities and hierarchies.

The concept of network is more and more popular with social movements and advocacy activities in CSOs. As Giddens (Giddens 2001) noted, a growing number of
organizations "are finding that their operations run more effectively when they are linked into a web of complex relationships with other organizations and companies" (p. 367). Likewise, recent studies on transnational networks favour a fluid and open organizational structure (Anheier and Themudo 2002; Castells 2000; Moghadam 2005). Similarly, Moghadam (2005) argues that the reason for feminists' favouring networks is that they can offer "valuable support, acquaintances, and information" (p.81). Scholars, such as Castells (2000), argue that networks are flexible and adaptable, allowing rapid change in the current era of globalization.

Theorists show that the structure of the CSOs affects the management and influence of their activities (Anheier and Themudo 2002; Lewis 2001). For example, Jubilee 2000 preferred to adopt a networking model with a decentralized management. This gave them great fluidity and the ability to grow. However, as it grew rapidly, it encountered a governance problem that reduced the effectiveness and legitimacy of the campaign (Anheier and Themudo 2002).

This study focuses on the three dimensions of organizational structure: networks, multi-divisional coordination and hierarchical bureaucracy.

Networks: This study suggests that the network organizational pattern is most effective in mobilizing policy advocacy because it links various forces in an open and flexible cooperation. The case of ADVN is characterized by decentralized and autonomous units that are coordinated by the advocacy activities around anti-domestic violence against women.

Multi-dimensional Coordination: The ACWF is a case in point. It contains bureaucratic hierarchy and rigid division of labour. Nevertheless, there are consultations and collaboration within the organization. This study suggests that although multi-dimensional coordination is sometimes efficient, it is not as effective as networks in connecting diverse forces for sustained advocacy, and its hierarchical bureaucratic structure makes it less effective than networks in mobilizing forces, in particular those outside the organization, for policy campaigns.
Hierarchical Bureaucracy: This type of organizational structure is normative. In reality, few CSOs are entirely hierarchical and authoritarian. Nevertheless, some CSOs may take on characteristics of centralized decision-making and dominated by particular leaders. This thesis assumes that this type of organization is the least effective in mobilizing diverse activists and resources for concerted efforts for policy campaigns.

2.44 Learning

Several studies of both CSOs’ management and public policy analyze organizational planning and policy-making as a process of learning. Brown and Covey (1987) argue that the nature of advocacy is to change the status quo and that new thinking and ideas are essential in bringing about change. CSOs that are devoted to advocacy need to build new knowledge and develop capacity through action. Thus, learning is the key to the effectiveness and influence of the CSOs' advocacy and campaigns (Korten 1980; Lewis, 2001).

However, there has been little systemic study on how learning has affected policy advocacy initiated by CSOs. After all, the dimensions of learning, ranging from the organizational environment such as opportunity and resources for learning, to personal elements such as motives and enthusiasm of individuals, are too broad to grasp in one study. In addition, building convincing relations between specific activities of learning and the overall results of policy advocacy is another difficulty.

This study initiates an investigation that centers on the diversity of learning content. I assume that both organizations in my case studies have somehow promoted learning within their organization. Indeed, the evidence collected by the case studies show that the leaders of both organizations had the motivation and opportunities to upgrade their knowledge and expertise. However, the content and approach of learning are quite different. I classify three types of learning for analytical convenience:

Innovative learning: Innovative learning addresses the importance of learning feminist theory and methods, which had yet been accepted by mainstream academia in
China at the time the advocacy was initiated. This is particularly important in my study, since the gender and domestic violence concepts that prevail in my cases were new terms in China. There is no equivalent term in Chinese for gender, which resulted in a misunderstanding of this term when it was introduced into China in the 1990s. This misunderstanding was that the term “gender” was seen to be the same as biological sex rather than it being a term to distinguish the social construction of femininity and masculinity from the biological definitions of female and male sex. Many of the CSOs, including those working on women’s issues, have yet to appreciate the full meaning of gender equality. Only those CSOs that are quick at learning comprehend the meaning and seize opportunities to initiate projects or programmes surrounding this issue. Similarly, the concept of domestic violence was also new to China in the late 1990s when the anti-domestic violence campaign was initiated.

Conventional learning: This study argues that learning is a two-edged sword that can both enhance the understanding of gender equality and boost the conventional gender ideology that discriminated against women. Conventional learning refers to the content of learning fitted into the conventional knowledge base that is either gender blind or contains discrimination against women.

Adaptive learning: In between innovative and conventional learning is adaptive learning where the content is mainly conventional but also embraces some alternative concepts and knowledge.

This study suggests that innovative learning that focuses on learning new concepts and ideas is the most effective in strengthening the capacity of CSOs in framing public policy issues concerning gender equality.

2.45 Sources of Funding

In this study, funding is the main type of ‘material resources' received by the CSOs from various sources for specific activities of the advocacy. Indeed, as many scholars suggest, material resources are one of the most indispensable yet often constraining elements for
CSOs in social movements. Some scholars endeavour to categorize typologies of resources according to their attributes and the ways of seeking resources. For example, Edwards and McCarthy (2004) identify fungible and proprietary dimensions of financial resources to assess whether they have a greater or lesser use-value at social movement organizations’ discretion. Oliver and Marwell (1992) focus on the ways of fund-raising and classify two groups depending on professionalized technologies and volunteer labour respectively. Others consider the complexities of fundraising, such as the method of allocation, level of administrative burden, continuity and necessary duration, and timeliness in disbursement, as well as the limitations imposed on the researcher in terms of time and access (Fowler 1997).

This study focuses on the sources of funds for CSOs' advocacy activities. The sources of funding are of great importance, as they are not only key to the survival of the CSOs but also affect their priorities and methods in their campaigns. The sources of funds that I will examine include those from the state, social (particularly the market and personal donation), and the foreign donors.

**Resources from Government:** This thesis suggests that funding from the state adds to a CSO’s authority in policy advocacy. State funds include direct funding from official aid as well intermediary funds that government departments receive from international donors. The government may directly allocate these funds or provide office space or salaries for particular CSOs. As a result, sometimes the CSOs' attention is directed to certain issues that are deemed urgent by the CCP/State. State support may also push a CSO to adopt a top-down method to lecture women about the CCP-state's doctrine.

**Funds from social source:** Here, social funds refer broadly to any material resources that come neither from the government nor from foreign donors. For example, service fees received by particular CSOs through their activities, as well as donations are all identified as social funds. Funds from the market include profit generated from the CSOs' direct economy activity or income generating investments. Labeled as 'gift economy', personal giving "is the technical term for funds given voluntarily by an
individual, group, civic organization or business" (Fowler 1997) p.135). Recent years have seen an emergence of the 'gift economy' in China, although it is still quite limited in scope and quantity. The government issued laws concerning donations and charity administration – the Law of Donation on Public Welfare (1999, see section 3.1 of Chapter 3), which opened new avenues for CSOs to access financial resources. I assume a social fund is the second most important for CSOs’ policy advocacy.

**Funds from International Donors:** Foreign donors comprise multi-lateral organizations, such as the UN, and bi-lateral organizations, such as DFID and CIDA, and international NGOs, such as the Ford Foundation and OXFAM. I agree with the observations of some scholars that the sources of funding may also affect the legitimacy of the CSOs' campaigns. For example, Clark (1994) notices a phenomenon that "an NGO's dependence on foreign sources of finance might foster the suspicion of governments and nationalistic political parties. Conversely, NGOs which are largely funded by their members have maximum authenticity" (p. 593).

In short, the five-fold framework posits five contributing factors at organizational and individual levels for demonstrating the agency of CSOs in policy advocacy. Nevertheless, the macro-level political environment also has to be taken into consideration (see Chapter 3).

### 2.5 Summary

In this chapter, I outlined the debates about the determinants of CSOs’ policy advocacy. In so doing, I reviewed relevant studies on civil society, public policy and social movement, and highlighted feminist theories of women’s organizations and the policy process. The purpose of this review is to draw the parameters for my case studies of China. Inspired by previous theoretical studies, I established a theoretical framework that embraces multiple parameters for my case analysis. I developed a five-angled analytical framework that comprises such variables as legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning and source of financial resources. For comparison and analyses, furthermore, I classified each parameter into different dimensions.
By setting up an analytical framework for my case studies, I argue for an agency-oriented approach that focuses on organizational and individual interactions. The purpose of detailing the conditioning factor into various dimensions is precisely for an in-depth analysis of CSOs’ maneuverings of power in agenda-setting stage of policy process in China.
3. Women’s Organizations and Gender Policy Process in China

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the macro-level context for the subsequent case studies. I concentrate on institutionalized political systems such as the policy environment for women CSOs’ development and their participation in policy-making. After setting up the background, I go on to review the development of women CSOs and their involvements in policy-making after the economic reforms began in the 1970s in China. Essentially, this chapter is about outlining the key institutions that are involved in making policy on gender/women’s issues, identifying the key stages in the policy process and the points at which women activists can intervene to influence policy.

Although women CSOs have developed since the economic reforms began in the 1970s, they did not flourish until the 1990s with the impetus of the UN Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing, China. At same time, China started to open up public administration in the 1990s whereby the policy process became increasingly open for public participation than before. I argue that although CSOs in China are still facing challenges concerning registration and development, they have made relentless efforts to bring gender equality issues into policy-making and legislation. However, their efforts have thus far not been systematically surveyed and analyzed.

Following this short introduction, the next section concentrates on the development of women’s organizations in China since the economic reform began in the 1970s. The third section examines the changing policy process and legislation in China, highlighting important stages and institutions; the fourth section reviews previous policy advocacy to situate my two cases for subsequent analysis. The last section summarizes main points presented in the chapter.
3.2 Women’s Organizations in China

This sub-section provides a brief introduction to the legal environment and development of women CSOs in China.

3.21 Legal Environment of Women’s Organizations

Yu Keping (2009) identifies five main elements in the core of China’s administrative regulations on CSOs, namely, the constitution, ordinary laws, administrative statutes, CCP policies, and other informal regulations. While the constitution simply provides broad guiding principles, ordinary laws only contain relevant clauses that are not directly concerned with CSOs. Although CCP policies have authority and validity, administrative statutes are the most crucial in supervising CSOs in China. As Yu Keping puts it:

China currently does not have any general laws concerning civil organizations, and therefore most of the government regulations regarding civil organizations (except for specific measures for implementing ordinary laws) are concerned with civil organizations’ nature, status, responsibilities, rights, and functions. Most of the government regulations concerning civil society originate from the central government, including its administrative bodies, or from local governments. Indeed …government regulations have constituted the largest part of the institutional environment of civil society. (Yu 2009 p.55)

According to Yu Keping, the regulations concerning administration of CSOs have undergone a reform since the Economic Reform in 1978. In the early stages of the economic reforms, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the State Council jointly issued the Notice on Strictly Limiting the Establishment of National Organizations in 1984. The spirit of this notice is to subject social associations at the national level to follow strict approval procedures and supervision. Facing challenges from the rapidly emerging civic organizations in 1980s, the State Council mandated the Ministry of Civil Affairs to draft the Regulations Concerning the Registration and Supervision of Social Associations. Yet it was not promulgated and implemented by the State Council until after the political turbulence in Beijing in 1989.
In the form of State Council Decree 43 in October 1989, the Chinese government promulgated the *Provisional Regulations Concerning the Registration and Supervision of Social Organizations* to require all mass organizations to undergo a process of reregistration and reapproval. After the Fan Lun Gong turbulence in 1997, furthermore, the Ministry of Civil Affairs again undertook a substantial revision of these rules. Thus, the *Regulations Concerning the Registration and Supervision of Social Organizations (1998)*, and a new set of regulations were promulgated in the form of State Council Decree 250 in 1998. By and large, the spirit of this notice is to strengthen supervision of all kinds of rapidly emerging civic organizations. Other administrative statutes concerning registration of CSOs include, *The Administrative Regulations of Foundations (1988)*, the *Provisional Regulations for Foreign Chamber of Commerce in China (1989)*, *Provisional Regulations for the Registration and Administration of Private Non-Enterprise Institutions (1989)*, and *Law of Donation on Public Welfare (1999)*. These sets of regulations have played a very important role in normalizing all kinds of CSOs in China.

According to the registration status, the Chinese non-profit sector currently includes three parts: “social organizations,” “foundations,” and “private non-enterprise institutions.” According to the definition of state regulations, social organizations are not-for-profit organizations formed by Chinese citizens on a voluntary basis to perform activities in accordance with their articles of association in order to meet the common goals of their members. The Private non-enterprise institutions refer to those organizations that are formed by private citizens or enterprises and other organizations, using non-state assets to conduct not-for-profit activities (e.g. schools, day-care centers).

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10 *Shehui Tuanti Dengji Guanli Tiaoli*, 《社会团体登记管理条例》.
11 *Jijinhui Guanli Banfa*, 《基金会管理办法》.
12 *Waiguo Shanghui Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli*, 《外国商会管理暂行规定》.
13 *Minban Feiqiye Danwei Dengji Guanli Tiaoli*, 《民办非企业单位登记管理暂行条例》.

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While state administrative regulations target the above CSOs, the regulations issued by the Chinese Communist CCP (CCP) supervise the mass organizations, which are directly led by the CCP. They include trade unions, the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), and the China Women’s Federation, as well as a small number of specialized organizations such as the China Disabled Persons’ Federation, the China Federation of Writers and Artists, and the China Association for Science and Technology. In accordance with the Notice of the Ministry of Civil Affairs on the Exemptions from Registration of Some Social Organizations promulgated in December 2000 by the MOCA (2000), these mass organizations are not required to apply for and go through registration procedures.

Scholars identify several policy constraints for the development of CSOs in China. Criticisms center on the stringent conditions for registration. One is about the amount of money a CSO must pay for registration. According to the Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Social Organizations issued in October 1998 (SC 1998), a national organization must have start-up funds of at least 100,000 RMB while regional organizations must have funds of at least 30,000 RMB (see Appendix 2). They must also find a professional management unit that will act as sponsor. The other policy constraint is the dual administration for CSOs. The Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) and local Civil Affairs departments at county level and above are the basic people’s government agencies for registration and management of social organizations (SC 1998). CSOs should register with MOCA at national level or at local branches. The agencies with whom they registered will serve as their administrative authorities. In addition, social organizations must get the approval of the authorized department of the state (zhuguan danwei) which serves as the relevant leading unit of the social organization. Both the administrative authority and the government-supervising agency are responsible for managing the CSOs. Thus, registered CSOs must accept dual

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14 Minzhengbu Guanyu dui Bufen Tuanti Mianyu Shetuan Dengji Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi.《民政部关于对部分团体免予社团登记有关问题的通知》.
leadership from both a government supervising body and a professional regulatory body of a civil affairs department, which is called "dual management system" or "two-fold administration system".

The stringent regulators conditions have invoked wide criticism from both CSOs and academy. Researchers have found that many CSOs are unable to register with the state because they cannot afford the required large sum of money. Moreover, it is hard for them to be affiliated to supervisory body as required by the regulation. Thus, many CSOs, although functioning well in civil society, are unable to register due to these strict conditions. They had to register as economic enterprises or establishing themselves as sub-organizations of other associations or academic institutes and universities. In short, the strict regulation for CSOs’ registration and administration has impeded growth of civil society in China (Yu 2000).

3.22 Mapping Women’s Organizations

In studies of CSOs in China, different schemes have been developed for classifying CSOs. In the initial stage of studies of Chinese civil society in the 1990s, the proximity of the CSOs to the CCP/state was the main criterion for developing a typology. Adopting this approach, scholars discussed three major types CSOs in China: 1) mass organizations that have an intimate relationship with the CCP/State, 2) the majority of registered organizations that are loosely controlled by the CCP/state, and 3) unregistered organizations that lay outside the grips of the CCP/state, a few of them even being against the state (Liu 2000; Xiao 2004; Zhang, Lv and Li 2005; Zhou 2004). The academic interests of these scholars, above all, lay in the autonomy of the CSOs, which was perceived as the ultimate indicator of a wholesome civil society.

The official Chinese classification, however, differentiates social organizations according to their functions. In line with this approach, the Ministry of Civil Affairs classifies social associations into four types: 1) academic groups, such as associations in the various natural and social sciences and in interdisciplinary fields, 2) trade organizations, whose members are entrepreneurs in the same field, such as female
entrepreneurs associations, 3) professional organizations, whose members have similar skills and special funds and are all engaged in the same line of work, such as female mayor associations, and 4) federations, such as trade unions, which are associations of groups of people (Yu 2009 p.43). The official classifications focus on how to supervise different CSOs distinctively.

As the research on civil society has deepened, scholars have developed a variety of classification schemes (Yu 2009). The School of Public Policy and Management of Tsinghua University, for instance, applied the International Classification of Non-profit Organizations developed at the Johns Hopkins University Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project. Others focus on the functions of China’s nationwide social associations and generate seventeen categories\(^\text{15}\). These classifications revealed scholars’ attempts to grasp characteristics of CSOs in China, but led to clumsy and complex categorizations since the features of CSOs are actually diverse. Therefore, Yu Keping (2009 p.46-7) suggests a simplification of classification by prioritizing historical developments and current situations in terms of both functions and their proximity with the Party/state. Basically, his classification includes mass organizations, self-governing groups, business and professional groups, academic groups, community groups, social associations and public welfare and charities foundations.

\(^\text{15}\) They include: the industrial sector (trade and management associations); social services and social welfare (foundations and charitable organizations); public affairs (associations of mayors and exchange associations); information and technical services (consulting organizations and consumer groups); health (medical service organizations); sports (athletic associations); education (all kinds of educational service organizations); culture and arts (film and music associations); press and publishing (radio and television associations); science and technology (scientific research associations and organizations that popularize science); humanities and social sciences (scholarly associations in the various fields); environment and energy resources (environmental associations); special kinds of commercial or industrial associations (trade organizations of enterprises under different forms of ownership); professional organizations (associations of professionals in the same field); community organizations (local associations); fellowships of individuals (fraternities and groups based on common interests); and other groups. Yu, Keping. 2009. Democracy is a Good Thing: Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture in Contemporary China. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. p. 44-45.
This study maps women’s organizations according to their registration status. In China, registration is not simply a process of acquiring a legal personality, but a powerful tool that enables states to prevent the operation of NGOs of which they disapprove. Thus, for most CSOs except for a few privileged mass organizations, registration status is an important indicator showing whether they have been legally accepted by the CCP/state. In addition, registration status is one of the critical independent variables of my study. I illustrate the diverse registration status of the women CSOs in China since the 1980s by Figure 3.

**Figure 3 Mapping Women’s Organizations in China in Relation to the CCP/state**

Unregistered: CSOs that have not registered with the state administration, e.g., the Gender Trainers’ Group.

Registered: CSOs that have been registered either as social organizations, privately-run non-enterprise unit, or foundation, e.g., the Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Center.

Unregistered: Mass organizations and some affiliate organizations, e.g. the ACWF.

Source: Developed by the author.

The arrow of the figure indicates the closeness of the relation among CSOs with the Party/state, in which the closest relation at right and the loosest relation at the left. First, the figure shows two types of unregistered women CSOs at two edges. At the far right are the mass organizations and some affiliate organizations, e.g. the ACWF. They are more or less authorized by the Party or the State. At the left side of the spectrum are CSOs with neither registration nor affiliation. They are not authorized by either the CCP
or the State. In the middle are the registered women CSOs as social organization, privately-run non-enterprise unit, or foundation. They enjoy formal legal status. We will discuss them in turn.

**Unregistered Women’s Organizations authorized by the Party/state:** The first type is the mass women’s organizations mainly made up of the All-China Women’s Federation and its branches, and the women’s departments at different levels of trade unions in China. Established by the CCP/state, these mass women’s organizations enjoy the privilege of exemption from registration with the MOCA. The salient feature of these organizations, as Yu Keping (2009 p.40) notices, is that they “are more like government organizations than like nongovernmental organizations”. Their leading bodies are equivalent to those of government bodies, and their divisions and branches are parallel to government administrative departments. As a rule, they have close relationships with the CCP or state organs.

The second type is affiliated organizations. A large number of the unregistered women organizations have sought affiliation with the CCP or the state authorized institutions. Among these organizations, above all, are research centers or institutions that mostly emerged at the end of last century when women’s studies was introduced into China. These women’s studies organizations are of various kinds and scales. Some of the women’s research institutes such as the Women’s Studies Institute being affiliated to the ACWF has more than forty regular staff, while others like women’s studies centers, for instance, the Women’s Studies Centre in Peking University, are affiliated to universities and depend mostly on voluntary staff. The leaders of these organizations are normally distinguished scholars who are also taking leading positions in their mother organizations - the universities or the academic institutes.

16 The women’s departments of the trade unions are embedded in the trade unions at different levels. Women workers' committees of trade unions in factories, mines and enterprises, and those at upper levels are all group members of the ACWF.
Unregistered Women’s Organizations not authorized by the Party/state: The third un-registered type of women’s organizations is those with neither registration nor affiliation status. This type of women’s organizations emerged rapidly in both rural and urban areas. In rural areas, to begin with, women have organized around their productive interests amid the booming of specialized associations in the rural market. It was estimated that by 1996 there were 1,500,000 farmers’ associations most of which were based on their professional interests. During the wave of farmers’ organizing, rural women also organized their own associations, such as marketing associations, prohibition of gambling associations, anti-drug-use associations, chicken-raising associations and so on. Diverse in scales, these organizations are invariably informal and voluntary. They seek to meet rural women’s immediate needs in economic and social development.

In urban areas, on the other hand, some women’s groups emerged based on projects sponsored mostly by international donor agencies. The number of these kinds of organizations is unknown because of their fluidity and informality. Without any kind of attachment to legal or bureaucratic authority, these women’s groups normally operate on a small scale with regular members who work in particular projects.


18 For example, the Gender Trainers’ Group was formed around the UNDP sponsored project on developing a gender training manual. Roughly six core members who took writing tasks of different chapters of the manual, were connected by the project. Working closely with each other over two years, they voluntarily maintained the collaboration after the completion of the project. They successfully drew other funds to conduct trainings of trainers (TOTs) and absorbed new members from the trainers who had received their training programmes. Around 20 members meet on a regular base and collaborate on various gender trainings. Although small in size and not stable, the Gender Trainers’ Group has played an important role in introducing the concept of gender into China.
Registered women’s organizations: As the conditions of registration as social organizations are quite hard to meet, only a few women’s organizations have registered as social organizations. Among them, above all, are professional women’s organizations that have a narrow focus and unitary targets, for example the Chinese Women Entrepreneurs Association, Women Judges Association, Female Prosecutors Association, Female Mayors Association, etc.

For many other women’s organizations, they had to register as non-profit organizations because of the harsh requirements for registration as social organizations. For example, Beijing Maple Women's Psychological Counseling Center registered as a Private Non-Enterprise Institution. By 2004, 7253 non-profit women’s organizations had registered with the MOCA (WSIC 2006 p.115).

There are only a few women’s organizations registered as foundations. Among them is Chinese Women's Development Foundation (CWDF) (November 21, 1988) that launched a special fund - "Love of the Earth Water Cellars for Mothers". Their areas of concerns center on women’s education, health care, poverty eradication, and disaster relief.

These registered women’s organizations have several characteristics. First, they take on distinct features compared with the women mass organizations. The scale of these registered women’s organizations is much smaller than that of the ACWF. Their structure is unsophisticated, rarely having established branches at local levels, because extending organizations to local level is not allowed according to the 1989 and 1998 regulations of social organizations. The management usually resembles the administration of a small company. Nevertheless, they possess certain social capital and material resources that are basic for operating a CSO in China. The amount of resources,

19 More financial resources are needed to register as a social organization than a private Non-Enterprise Institution. Thus, women SOs enjoy more social, personal and financial capital than Private Non-Enterprise Institutions.
in particular financial resources, varies among social organizations and Private Non-Enterprise Institutions.

Secondly, their functions are wide-ranging. For example, occupational women’s organizations provide information and opportunities for career development among female professionals. Some of these are national-level organizations, such as The China Women Mayors Association and the Chinese Women’s Association for Science and Technology, whilst others are local, such as the Capital Women Journalists’ Association and the Shanghai Women’s Engineers Federation. In addition, service-oriented women’s organizations take interests in specific target groups. One women’s group, in January 1993, created a national monthly magazine with the title of Rural Women Knowing All, which provided a diversity of services to rural women in China such as a Migrant Women Workers’ Club in Beijing, a Rural Women’s Practical Skills School, literacy classes and micro-finance training projects (Tan 2007). Similarly, the Women’s Hotline, initiated by the Women’s Research Institute, opened in Beijing in September 1992, offering Counseling services for women to help them to improve their quality of life. These service-oriented women’s organizations tend to offer professional services that the state could not provide.

Relations with the CCP/state: It is worth noting that registration status is not a determinant factor concerning the closeness of the CSOs with the CCP/State. As the figure shows, the ACWF has close proximity with the CCP/State but has not yet registered. On the other hand, many other unregistered women’s groups either enjoy relatively close connections with the CCP or State organs by affiliation status, or are situated at the far end of the spectrum. The registered CSOs, furthermore, are in the middle, which means that though gaining legal status is crucial for CSOs, it is insufficient to guarantee their relationship with the CCP/state. This typology sets up a road map for my further analyses concerning how the proximity with the Party/state affects the legitimacy and authority of CSOs in their campaigns.

3.23 Development of Women’s Organizations after economic reforms began in 1970s
This section sketches the development of women CSOs in China since the economic reforms in 1978. The overview aims to set the historical scene for the cases studies in the following chapters.

Before the economic reforms in the 1970s, there was a unified system of CSOs authorized by the CCP/State. The All- China Women’s Federation and its branches, as well as women’s committees of the All-China Trade Union (ACFTU) at various levels, constituted the majority of women’s organizations. Since 1978, the economic reform has brought about great changes in society in China. CSOs have developed rapidly due to the loose social environment created by economic development and reform. As Yu Keping argues, the development of CSOs in China after the economic reforms is not only the increased numbers, but also the transformation of forms and functions. Furthermore, the UN Fourth World Conference held in Beijing in 1995 served as a catalyst for the flourishing of women’s organizations in China. The number of women’s organizations has increased since then. Prior to and during the UN Fourth World Conference, there were 5,800 women’s social organizations; by 2004 that figure had grown to over 10,000 (WSIC 2006 p.109-118). Several changes took place concerning the development of women’s organizations.

First, mass organizations such as the ACWF initiated internal reforms to change their working methods in order to keep pace with social change. Since the 1980s, the ACWF has endeavoured to broaden its organizational coverage by creating branches in the CCP and the state organs as well in academies. Before 1978, the ACWF’s branches were mainly in the suburbs and countryside. To meet the changing needs of women in different social strata, the ACWF promoted the setting up of Women’s Committees in some ministries and departments of the CCP/state. By 2006, 87 Women’s Committees had been set up in institutions of the CCP or the state at national level, 1129 at provincial level, 10509 at municipal level, and 4,7064 at county level (WSIC 2006 p.109). At the same time, the ACWF set up the Women’s Research Institute (WSIC) in
1990 and the Chinese Women’s Research Society\textsuperscript{21} (CWRS) in 1999 to coordinate other women’s studies centers such as the Women’s Studies Center in Peking University. As well as extending organizational overage and influence, the ACWF also initiated internal reforms to change their working methods in order to keep pace with the social change. It increasingly shifted its course from assisting the CCP to mobilize women in socialist construction to protecting the rights and interests of women. The ACWF is increasingly effective as an advocate for women’s rights and gender equality. In this and other ways, the Federation is increasingly acting as a channel for policy and legislative advocacy. Although in some ways functioning as a quasi-governmental agency – and circumscribed to a certain extent by its close association with the government – the ACWF remained a major stakeholder on women’s issues in the country in the early stage of the reform period.

Likewise, the women’s committees of the ACFTU have also extended their reach to women workers since the economic reform in the 1980s. In 1995, the ACFTU had 181,462 women’s committees. The number increased to 587,372 in 2004 (WSIC 2006 p.113).

Second, the affiliated women’s organizations have flourished since the 1990s, especially those in non-state owned enterprises, the so-called ‘new economic entities’. Embedded in various economic associations at different levels, these women’s committees, being affiliated to the ACWF, the ACFTU, local authority, or even independent, connected women workers and entrepreneurs outside state-owned enterprises. By 2004, there were 5145 women’s committees in associations of private enterprises and 21,536 in various private-owned enterprises (WSIC 2006 p.113). However, the functions of these women’s committees are unknown as there has been little documentation of them.

Another major force of the newly emerged women’s organizations with affiliation status is the women’s studies organizations. Ever since the first women

\textsuperscript{21} Their websites addresses are at http://www.wsic.ac.cn and http://www.cwrs.ac.cn, respectively
studies center set up by Li Xiaojiang in Hebei Province in 1987, an increasing number of women’s studies organizations have emerged. It was during the preparation for and convening of the Fourth World Conference in Beijing that a large number of women research organizations have emerged. Many famous universities and academic establishments, such as Hangzhou University, Peking University, Tianjin Normal University, the Central Party School, the China Academy of Social Science (CASS), and women’s federations at different levels, established women’s studies institutions under their authority. By 2001, more than forty universities and colleges, and ten social sciences academies had set up women’s or gender research centers which now form a multi-disciplinary network that covers a wide range of thematic and geographic areas, conducting investigations over a wide range of thematic issues including poverty alleviation and reducing women’s illiteracy, anti-domestic violence against women, trafficking of women and children, women’s labour rights, and the re-employment of laid-off workers.

Still another type of affiliated women’s organizations is in the form of networks: the Women’s Studies Institute of China (WSIC) set up the China Women’s Studies Association in order to bring together these different institutional strands in December 1999. It serves as an extensive network of institutions and organizations devoted to

22 According to Tan Lin, the women’s studies organizations came from four major institutional strands. The first is located in universities or colleges and makes up the majority of women’s studies organizations. By the end of 1999, there were more than eighty women’s studies organizations, among them thirty-six women’s studies centers in universities and colleges. The second strand is within the academies, particularly social research institutes. For example, the social science academies of Sichuan (1994), Yunnan (1994), Hebei (1995), the China Academy of Social Sciences (1995), Shanghai (1995), Jiangsu (1997), Beijing (1999), and Shandong have all set up institutions on women’s studies. The third strand is embedded within the CCP School system. The fourth strand is authorized by the ACWF and its branches at local levels. Women’s federations also established their own women’s studies establishments. In 1991, the ACWF set up the Women’s Studies Institute of China, which is primarily concerned with theoretical research. There are also women’s studies institutes at the provincial level, such as Heilongjiang Women’s Studies Institute (1986), Jiangsu Women’s Studies Institute (1990), and Sichuan Women’s Studies Institute (1994). Tan, Lin (Ed.). 2007. Theory and Practice of China Women Organizations (Zhongguo funv zuzhi fazhan de lilun yu shijian). Beijing: Scientific and Technical Documentation Press.
women and gender studies. As of 2004, it had 109 group member organizations constituting women’s research centers or institutes from all around the country (WSIC 2006 p.114-5). Another example, the ADVN, a network organization, was established by gender activists to bring together various kinds of women’s organizations and individuals working on combatting domestic violence against women. Affiliated to the China Law Society (CLS), it has 71 member organizations ranging from mass organizations of women’s federations at different levels and women’s studies organizations, to non-profit organizations such as the Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Center.

Third, there are also increasing numbers of the new women’s groups functioning without registration and affiliation such as the Gender and Development Coordinators Working Group and Gender Trainers Group. Since the 1980s, there have been many unregistered CSOs. In 2009 Yu Keping estimated that there were 40,000 unregistered social associations and 250,000 unregistered Private Non-Enterprise Institutions23 (Yu 2009:51). These new types of CSOs that are more autonomous and spontaneous than state sponsored mass organizations emerged and played an important role in meeting the immediate needs of people (Howell and Pearce 2001; He 2003).

Another type of neither registered nor affiliated women’s organizations is voluntary rural organizations. However, as national data on these voluntary rural organizations is lacking, it is hard to get a whole picture of this new type of women organizing. Nevertheless, some data at local level show a dynamic of rural women organizing. For example, Chifeng City in Inner Mongolia boasted 12 women’s mutual help organizations at county level, 3,330 at township level, and 4,165 at village level. Likewise, in Liaoning province by 2005, more than 4,500 various kinds of rural women’s associations or groups had been set up (WSIC 2006 p.116). These rural women’s organizations, according to research by the WSIC, have filled the vacuums left

23 Considering CSOs both registered and unregistered, he suggested that by 2009 in China, the number of civil society organizations was to have been more than 3 million (Yu 2009:51).
by the demise of the communes where people used to work collectively on rural production. Indeed, according to some scholars, these voluntary organizations have more or less helped enhance rural development by providing various services relating to poverty reduction, illiteracy among women, and women’s participation in rural development (WSIC 2006 p.117).

Fourth, the number of registered social organizations has increased dramatically since China’s policy of reform and opening began in 1978. Before the Cultural Revolution in 1965, there were less than 100 national social organizations in existence; in 1999, there were 1,600 such organizations. At the end of 2003, China had 142,000 registered social associations (Yu 2009). Women CSOs, too, emerged and increased at a considerable speed. The following table indicates the increase of women CSOs from 2002 to 2004.

Table 4 Women’s Organizations Registered with the MOCA (2002-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Women’s organizations registered as Social Organizations with the MOCA</th>
<th>Women’s organizations registered as Private Non-Enterprise Institutions with the MOCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>4488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>4488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1762</td>
<td>7253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed by the author based on (WSIC 2006 p.116)

The table shows that more women CSOs registered as Private Non-Enterprise Institutions than as Social Organizations with the MOCA. In 2004, the number Private Non-Enterprise Institutions of women was almost twice as much as that of 2002 (see Table 4).

Fifth, foundations have emerged and increased considerably. There were no foundations during the 30-year period of the planned system in China. After the
economic reform, the first foundation in China, the Children and Teenagers’ Fund was created in 1981. Since then, about 1,800 foundations have emerged across the country. Among them, less than 100 are at a national level. Foundations and other non-profit organizations have made significant contribution to the development of philanthropy in China. However due to the lack of data, the portion of foundations majoring in women’s rights and development is unknown.

The flourishing of women CSOs in China since the economic reforms in 1978 were accompanied by challenges for the development of women’s organizations remain. Different types of women CSOs face different challenges. For mass organizations like the ACWF, above all, the main challenge identified by scholars is its autonomy in representing women’s interests. Scholars query whether the state sponsored mass organizations can play an essential role in meeting the immediate needs of women (Gong 2006; Huang 2011). For women CSOs with registration status, furthermore, the lack of funds and access to policy-making are underlined by many activists (Gao and Xie 2009; Guo 2000). Moreover, for women’s networks or groups without any authorization from the state, the major challenges identified by scholars include the strict legal framework for CSOs’ registration and management, and the capabilities of CSOs in providing services and initiating campaigns (Huang and Liu 2010).

In general, the women’s organizations involved in my case studies are of various types with different characteristics. Their situations are varied, ranging from the All-China Women’s Federation, one of the mass organizations set up by the Party/state in China, to small groups that have not been permitted to register. The functions of these CSOs are also diverse, ranging from research institutes to service oriented centers. Thus, a typology of the women’s organizations studied in this research is a necessity.

3.3 The Gender Equality Policy Process in China

While the previous section focused on the policy environment for, and development of, women’s organizations, this section is concerned with the major steps and institutions in formulating or revising laws and policies. I focus on agenda-setting stage and suggest
three main normative phases (see Table 5). I also highlight important gender institutions of the state, the National People's Congress (NPC) and the China People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

3.3 Phases of Agenda-Setting

I dissect the agenda-setting of policy process into three normative phases, namely putting an issue onto public policy agenda, framing the issue in relevant policy or law, and adoption of final policy or law. Within each phase, furthermore, I classify further steps for analytical convenience as the following table shows.

Table 5 Three Interlinked Sub-components of Agenda-setting Stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages</th>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>Authorized Agents by the Law(^24)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Putting an issue onto public policy agenda</td>
<td>1) Developing proposals/bills, which include identifying emergence of a problem and phrasing the proposal in the bill</td>
<td>Not specified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Submission to and Acceptance by the NPC.</td>
<td>NPC &amp; Standing NPC accept legislative bills;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Certain state organs and groups of legislators may officially propose legislative bills, which include:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• the Standing Committee of the NPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• the State Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• the Central Military Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• the Supreme People's Court</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^24\) The agents that are defined by the Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China (2000).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framing the issue in relevant policy or law</th>
<th>1) Drafting the laws or the policies by experts groups;</th>
<th>The legislative or policy-making offices in the NPC or the SC would coordinate an expert team to draft the law or the regulation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Deliberations: may include inter-agency review and public consultations;</td>
<td>Inter-agency consultations will take place among government agencies; public can participate in relevant discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) NPC debates and passing the law or policy: Definition of suitable and acceptable solutions to the problems.</td>
<td>NPC debates and reviews the bills;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of final policy or law</td>
<td>1) Relevant policies or laws have been formulated and promulgated; 2) Translating the written tasks and regulations into reality.</td>
<td>The Standing Committee of the NPC finally decides the passing of the legislative bills.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed by the author.

**Putting an issue onto public policy agenda:** In public policy studies, agenda-setting is identified as the first step of a policy process, when various actors seek to highlight the issues they are concerned with and try to put them onto the agenda. For a proposal to be set on the policy agenda, it undergoes a track of development starting from a social
issue and then being elevated into a policy issue. However, not all public issues are automatically formulated as policy issues. Especially since the economic reform, many social problems emerged amid the rapid transition from a state-planned to a market oriented economic system. The government constantly faces a stream of problems, some of which are viewed as urgent or ripe for solution at any given time, and others which go largely ignored for long periods. Women’s issues, such as domestic violence against women, have seldom been considered as serious problems that require intense policy intervention. Framing social problems into public policy issues, therefore, is vital. The issues must be phrased as legislative bills and handed to the people’s congresses or relevant government organs.

Second, according to the Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China (2000), two major organs formally accept legislative bills. One is the National People's Congress; the other is the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

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25 Article 12 the Presidium of the National People’s Congress may submit to the National People’s Congress legislative bills, which shall be deliberated by the session of the National People’s Congress. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the special committees of the National People’s Congress may submit to the National People’s Congress legislative bills, which shall be put on the agenda of a session by decision of the Presidium.

Article 13 A delegation or a group of thirty or more deputies may submit a legislative bill to the National People’s Congress. The Presidium shall decide whether or not to put it on the agenda of the session, or shall refer do so after referring the bill to a relevant special committee for deliberation and for making a proposal as to whether to put it on the agenda. When the special committee holds a meeting to deliberate the bill, it may invite the sponsoring person to attend the meeting and express opinions.

Article 14 A legislative bill to be submitted to the National People's Congress may be submitted first to the Standing Committee when the National People's Congress is not in session, and after the Standing Committee has deliberated on it at its meetings in accordance with the procedures stipulated in Section 3 of Chapter II of this Law and decides to submit it to the National People's Congress for deliberation, the Standing Committee or the sponsor shall make explanations to a plenary meeting of the session.

26 Article 24 The Council of Chairmen may submit legislative bills to a meeting of the Standing Committee for deliberation. The State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate or a special committee of the National People's
Only certain state organs and groups of legislators may officially propose legislative bills, which include the Standing Committee of the NPC, the State Council (SC), the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate or a special committee of the National People's Congress are entitled to submission of legislative bills. In addition, the Presidium of the NPC and a delegation or a group of thirty or more deputies may submit legislative bills when the NPC is in session.

Third, to enter formally onto the NPC legislative agenda, the legislative bills have to be approved by the Council of Chairmen, which decides whether to put it on the agenda of a meeting of the Standing Committee or to refer it first to a relevant special committee (Article 25). The entering on to the agenda of the meetings of the Standing Committee normally implies success on the formal legislative agenda of the NPC. If a legislative bill is delivered to any special committee, it means that the proposal still needs investigation and deliberation. It may enter the meetings of the agenda of the

Congress may submit a legislative bill to the Standing Committee, and the Council of Chairmen shall decide whether to put it on the agenda of a meeting of the Standing Committee or to refer it first to the relevant special committee for deliberation before deciding whether to put it on the agenda of a meeting of the Standing Committee in light of the report submitted by the relevant special committee. If the Council of Chairmen believes that the legislative bill contains major questions calling for further study, it may advise the sponsor of the bill to revise and improve the bill before submitting it to the Standing Committee.

Article 25 Ten or more of the members of the Standing Committee may jointly submit a legislative bill to the Standing Committee, and the Council of Chairmen shall decide whether to put it on the agenda of a meeting of the Standing Committee, or to refer it first to the relevant special committee for deliberation before deciding whether to put it on the agenda of a meeting of the Standing Committee in light of the suggestions as to whether to put it on the agenda submitted by the relevant special committee. If the Council of Chairmen decides not to put the legislative bill on the agenda of a meeting of the Standing Committee, it shall report the matter to a meeting of the Standing Committee or give an explanation to the sponsor. When a special committee holds a meeting to deliberate on a bill, the sponsor may be invited to attend the meeting and express opinions.
Standing Committee after passing the investigation and deliberation, or just fail to enter the legislative agenda. A higher stage on the agenda is reached when the State Council or the NPC Standing Committee officially approves a drafting group for the law. When it is included on the Legislation Bureau's or the Legislative Affairs Work Committee’s annual legislative plan, it has probably reached the most active stage, and inclusion suggests a serious effort is under way to finalize and promulgate the law within the next 12 to 18 months (Tanner 1995 p.45-6). Apparently, the Council of Chairmen and the special committees possess power in deciding whether a bill is to enter the formal legislative agenda.

Framing the issue in policies and laws: After a legislative bill enters the legislative agenda of the NPC, it undergoes three major subsequent processes. First, the experts take the lead in shaping the draft policies or laws. The legislative or policy-making offices in the NPC or the State Council coordinate an expert team to draft the law or the regulation. At this point, the experts are critical as they directly shape the approaches and define the suitable and acceptable solutions to the problems. At the same time, relevant public consultations are held. The legal experts, above all, play the most important role in drafting policies or laws and providing suggestions.

Second, once the draft is completed, it is submitted to the consultation stage that is composed of two steps. In the first, inter-agency consultations take place among government agencies. At this stage, according to Tanner’s observation, bureaucrats in the key ministries play an important role. They argue according to their organizational missions and interests. Tanner observes “endless lobbying, compromise, consultation,

27 Article 57 The drafting of administrative regulations shall be arranged by the State Council. Where a relevant department under the State Council considers it necessary to formulate administrative regulations to govern a matter, it shall apply to the State Council for including the matter in its legislation list.

28 Article 58 In drafting administrative regulations, opinions from relevant organs, organizations and citizens shall be widely listened to, and forums, seminars, hearings, etc. may be held for the purpose.
negotiation” and the “state council usually becomes the dominant arena” whereby many policy proposals “dying in the state council” (Tanner 1995 p.55). The relevant departments try to limit the participation of diverse social groups. Only much later does access expand gradually in ever-wider concentric circles, incorporating departments that are more central, localities, and other less-directly concerned groups and units. The ACWF, for instance, can only participate in inter-agency review in the later stage of some policies such as retirement age.

In the second phase, before a draft law is handed over to the SC or the CCP Centre for a decision, the process expands still further to include consultation with selected mass groups, localities, and basic level units (such as factories and other workplaces). Advocates and opponents of a law try to marshal their evidence, set up highly publicized meetings among like-minded mass groups, and conduct public opinion polls in order to build sympathetic public opinion and sway the views of the SC, Politburo and other Central leaders (Tanner 1995 p.55-6).

Third, after the deliberation stage, the legislative bill enters the adoption phase that is mainly composed of NPC debates and reviews and the approval at the sessions of the NPC. There are normally three rounds of deliberation meetings before a legislative

29 Article 27 As a rule, a legislative bill placed on the agenda of a meeting of the Standing Committee shall be put to vote after deliberations at three meetings of the Standing Committee. When the Standing Committee is to deliberate on a legislative bill for the first time, it shall hear the explanation made by the sponsor at a plenary meeting, and then preliminary deliberation shall be conducted at group meetings. When the Standing Committee is to deliberate on a legislative bill for the second time, it shall hear the report made by the Law Committee on the revision of the draft and the main problems thereof at a plenary meeting, and then further deliberation shall be conducted at group meetings. When the Standing Committee is to deliberate on a legislative bill for the third time, it shall hear the report made by the Law Committee on the result of its deliberation on the draft at a plenary meeting, and then the revised draft of the legislative bill be deliberated on at group meetings. When the Standing Committee is to deliberate on a legislative bill, it may, according to needs, convene joint group meetings or plenary meetings to discuss the main questions contained in the draft.

Article 28 If the various quarters have a consensus in the main on a legislative bill placed on the agenda of a meeting of the Standing Committee, the bill may be put to vote after deliberation at
bill is voted on by the NPC review. The significance of the NPC debates and reviews has been growing since the rule of law reform initiated in 1980s. As observed by Tanner (1995 p.57):

The most significant change in the lawmaking process since 1979 is unquestionably that the stage of NPC debate and review is no longer a perfunctory look or a simple public show of socialist democracy….few if any laws pass through NPC review without substantive amendment, and many have had their contents significantly altered.

Indeed, an increasing number of laws have been suspended or had their passage postponed because of difficulties in reaching a consensus. For example, the debate on the draft of the Property Law (2007) lasted for nearly a decade from 1990 to the turn of the century because it encountered serious opposition in the NPC. The NPC withheld the law from a vote while insisting on significant revisions.

Nevertheless, the NPC debates provide an open terrain for legislators to promote their pet proposals or block others. It is noticeable that female representatives of the NPC, most of who are from the ACWF, have made efforts to promote women’s rights and interests in these debates. In spring 2008, for example, when the draft of Property Law was submitted to the NPC for public discussion, many groups, including women’s federations, seized the opportunity to propose numerous amendments.

Adoption of final policy and law: After the relevant policies or laws have been formulated and promulgated, the subsequent process is not simply a passive

two meetings of the Standing Committee; if the various quarters have a consensus in the main on a legislative bill concerning partial amendment of a law, the bill may be put to vote after deliberated at one meeting only.

Article 29 When group meetings of the Standing Committee are held to deliberate on a legislative bill, the sponsor shall send people to listen to opinions and answer inquires. When group meetings of the Standing Committee are held to deliberate on a legislative bill, the relevant organ or organization shall, at the request of any group, send people to give briefings thereof.
implementation and monitoring process. Rather, it is still another site of struggle. The key actors make various efforts to translate the written tasks and regulations into reality, which involves turning a law into a clearer set of guidelines. During this process, actors may also promote their pet proposals by insisting on particular interpretations. For example, some local women’s federations urge local people’s congresses or department governments to advance regulations to combat domestic violence. Thus, the formal adoption of a law does not necessarily signal the end of the policy-making process. This may follow by interpretation of laws or policies by local people’s congress or government for developing local implementing regulations.

Implications for CSOs’ policy advocacy: In general, the public administration and legal reform launched since the economic reforms in the 1970s has tended to widen channels for public participation in policy-making, which makes it possible for social organizations and experts to propose items of public policy concerns. Previous advocacy work reveals that several opportunities may open up to CSOs’ participation, as the following Figure 4 shows. First, the agenda-setting stage tends to provide a fertile ground for CSOs to exploit opportunities. For example, CSOs may participate in shaping social problems and framing policy proposals through providing consultations or initiating discussions on websites. They may provide alternative diagnostic frames other than government agencies by analysing causes from unique perspectives. They may also provide prognostic frames that specify strategies and methods for particular public problems to represent certain groups of people. Women’s organizations consciously seized opportunities to shape various issues concerning women’s right and interests, such as laid-off women workers in previously state-owned enterprises, rural women’s land rights, women’s retirement age, domestic violence against women, etc., into urgent public policy issues.
Second, the submitting of bills depends on the access of CSOs to the authorized agents specified by the law (see Table 5). A few mass organizations such as the ACWF and the ADVN have the opportunity to facilitate the integration of their proposals into the legislative or policy-making annual plans.

Third, CSOs tend to have less access to the drafting of legislation compared with the first phase of agenda-setting stage whereby CSOs are active in framing policy issues. According to the law, the NPC or the ministries of the State Council nominate distinguished legal experts to form the draft team. However, the experts of the ADVN have participated in the drafting group for the revision of the Marriage Law (2001) and the Women’s Law (2005).

Fourth, in the deliberation stage, while the public consultation makes it possible...

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30 The example is perhaps unusual in China. After all, only a few distinguished CSOs boast personnel of such a high calibre.
for social organizations to advocate for their own interests, the inter-agency review which is dominated by ministries provides little opportunity, if at all, for CSOs’ participation. CSOs have little opportunity in inter-agency review, but can voice concerns through limited access in the public consultations. Previous evidence shows that gender quality issues, such as equal retirement age for women, tend to be organized out at this particular stage if they have not had forceful champions; this will be elaborated upon in the case studies chapters.

Finally, although the final stage is more open to public participation then before, the technocrats have a great deal of influence on strategies and approaches, whereby they negotiate and bargain according to their own organizational missions. Thus, the final stage of passing laws or policies remains a closed, incremental and bureaucracy-dominated political battleground. A legislative bill may encounter difficulties to advance steadily without strong champions among the legislators.

3.32 Institutions and Actors

This section provides background information on state agencies concerned with gender equality in China. The focus is on both the organizational establishments and the descriptive representation of women. In China, the formal gender institutions include the National Working Committee on Children and Women (NWCCW) under the State Council and the Office of Workers, Youth and Women Committee (OWYW) in Internal and Judicial Affairs (IJA) of the National People's Congress (NPC). At same time, the All China Women's Federation has also played an important role in national women’s affairs. Although gender champions include men who support and advocate gender equality, it was difficult for this study to locate them. Therefore, this thesis mainly

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31 In gender and policy-making studies, Lovenduski identifies two kinds of representations of women in public policy, namely the descriptive and substantive representations. The descriptive representation is about “electing and appointing more women to public office, that is, descriptive representation”, the substantive representation is about “incorporating women’s concerns into the policy process”. Lovenduski, J. 2005. Feminizing Politics Cambridge: Polity Press, p.5.
concentrates on women’s presence in the NPC, the State Council and the CPPCC, as women representatives are more likely to advocate for gender concerns compared with their male counterparts.

**Legislative bodies on women’s rights:** The NPC is an increasingly important venue for bringing women’s concerns into public policy given its increasingly important role in legislation and monitoring the implementation of laws and regulations since the 1980s judicial reform in China. The Standing Committee of the NPC established the Office for Workers, Youth and Women (OWYW) in Internal and Judicial Affairs (IJA) at central level NPC in 1994, a special office to handle matters concerning women and children in the standing committees (China 1994). In its daily work, it is responsible for contacting the government departments and NGOs concerned with the problems of guaranteeing the rights and interests of women and children. The main responsibilities include: to carry out research and draft terms of the legislation on women, children and juveniles and do the preparatory work before the discussion of the law cases; to undertake the drafting of the opinion documents discussed by the presidium of the NPC; to check on the status of the implementation of the laws and the records of local statutes on women, children and juveniles; and to deal with the letters from the masses about them.

It is worth noting that although the Constitution empowers the NPC with the rights of legislation, decision, supervision, election and removal, it did not exert great influence on public policy-making until the initiation of the rule of law reform in the 1980s. The NPC is very gradually gaining a larger role in the political system in China. In recent years, the NPC has been responsible for reforms to make the Chinese legislative process more representative and transparent. As observed by Tanner, the NPC delegates have developed impressive legislative skills in influencing legislation in China (Tanner 1995 p.59).

It is also worth mentioning that the growing importance of the NPC is accompanied by low descriptive representation of women. At deputy level, the increasing importance of the NPC in politics in China is accompanied by a decreasing
numerical presence of women deputies. The percentage of women deputies of the eleventh NPC (2008-2013) is 21.4% (NBS 2010 p.56)\(^{32}\) Only 11.1 percent were women in the top legislature working body in the Tenth NPC Congress (NBS 2008 p.90).

**Governmental institutions on women’s issues:** The State Council\(^{33}\) is the state’s central administrative organ of the PRC. In 1992, the government created the National Working Committee on Children and Women (NWCCW) under the State Council, which serves as a coordination agency in charge of women and children's work. The membership units have increased from the original 17 in 1992 to 33 in 1995, composed of 28 government ministries and commissions and 5 CSOs\(^{34}\). Each member unit identifies a leader at the vice-minister level to be a council member, and appoints a liaison person who is in charge of routine work. NWCCW has an operational office with eight full-time staff that is now situated at the All-China Women’s Federation. The local government has established a local working committee on women and children, with special officer under it and full-time staff, thus forming a network linking all the government organizations and departments.

The NWCCW is tasked with responsibilities including coordinating and promoting relevant government departments to implement laws and regulations and policy-related measures concerning women and children. Its most important and substantial mandate is perhaps its significant role in drafting, promulgation of and monitoring the two national programmes for Women and Children’s Development, and

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\(^{32}\) The NPC was proud of the increase in the number of women deputies in the Ninth National People’s Congress (NPC) at 21.8 percent in 1998, 0.8 percent over the Eighth session in 1993. However, the number of women deputies in the Tenth NPC Congress (2003-2008) showed a decrease of 1.6 percent (604 women out of 2381).

\(^{33}\) In 2002, the State Council underwent a reform of its structure from its last session. It is now composed of the General Affairs Offices, 28 Ministries and commissions (including People’s Bank of China and the National Auditing Office). Local administrative organs are local people’s governments at four levels: the provinces (autonomous regions and centrally administered municipalities), cities and prefectures, counties, and townships.

its function to encourage relevant government departments to seriously implement the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on Rights of the Child and other international conventions on protecting women and children’s rights and interests. In 1994 and 1999, the NWCCW organized the drafting of two women’s development programmes covering the periods 1995-2000 and 2001-2010. During the implementation and monitoring process, it calls on line ministries to report on their implementation of the Programme. In order to strengthen the coordination, the NWCCW would call together a plenary session or a liaison person meeting, and when necessary, organize seminars, to exchange information, lessons learned, and to plan initiatives on burning issues. It also runs an internal journal called “Messages on the Two Programmes” and sends it directly to the relevant department of the State Council, social groups and local governments at different levels.

However, like many national machineries for women in development, the NWCCW has constraints concerning its location, resources, and staffing. In particular, some local governments in poor economic situations are not able to set aside enough funds for women’s development. In general, there is still a gap between the state’s financial inputs and the actual demands of the development of women.

Apart from the NWCCW, other governmental departments that specifically deal with women's affairs include the Department of Community Health and Maternal & Child Health at the Ministry of Health and Department of Medical Insurance and Department of Labor & Wages at the Ministry of Labor & Social Security.

The low descriptive representation of women in government agencies is also worthy of attention. Very few of them were in principal decision-making positions: female officials constituted 11% of ministerial rank officials, 13.7% of prefecture level officials.

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officials (similar to Director General Level) and 16.6% of county and section level officials in 2010. The percentage of women as first leaders is 7.3% at ministerial and provincial level, 10.4 at prefecture and Director General level, and 14.8 at county and section level (NBS 2010 p.58), displaying a characteristic of a lower female ratio in decision-making. The figures are still far from the required quota of 30 percent of women in decision-making at different levels, which was proposed by the UN 1995 Beijing Platform for Action.

Gender institutions and actors within the CPPCC: The China People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is the multi-party and political consultation in China, which comprises various other political parties, mass organizations and personages of different social circles, which serve as the political consultation of the state. Thirty-four units - took part in the Tenth CPPCC National Committee, including eight political parties and eight mass organizations which included the All-China Federation of Trade Union, the Communist Youth League of China and the All China Women’s Federation. The members of the CPPCC participate in national economic and social development planning, monitoring and evaluation of implementation of laws/regulations, drafting of major national laws, major issues involving people’s livelihood, etc., through plenary sessions, standing committees and meetings of the chairpersons of the National Committee of the CPPCC. The proportion of women deputies in the CPPCC rose from 15.5% of the ninth session (1998-2003) to 16.8% of the tenth (2003-2008).

In 1988, the National Committee of the People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) also set up the Working Group of Women and Children (WGWC). It listens to reports about protecting women and children’s rights and studies on gender issues. However, the WGWC has the same organizational constraints as the NWCCW.

37 A women’s grouping is comprised of 30 or CPPCC representatives. The ACWF takes the lead of this women’s group.
mainly in resources and staffing problems\textsuperscript{38}.

### 3.4 Advocacy for Gender Equality in Policies and Laws since the 1980s

In the last three decades, women’s organizations have initiated several surges of policy advocacy. The advocacy for integrations of gender equality has been targeted at different levels of policy sectors, ranging from blueprint policies, the women’s law, and other specific laws or regulations. Furthermore, these advocacy activities have not only strived to introduce substantive changes of particular regulations, but also aimed to transform social norms and ways of thinking amongst the public on relevant gender issues. This section highlights the previous policy advocacy on gender equalities through a brief survey.

#### 3.4.1 Advocating Gender Blueprint Policies

The term ‘blueprint’ is used here to indicate the overarching framework of gender equality at the national level. In China, the blueprint policies consist of the range of constitutional provisions, national basic policies on gender, gender equality development plans, and the state gender equality machinery. Some of the blueprints such as the constitution and the national basic policies on gender equality are quite symbolic; others such as the national women’s development plans are fairly pragmatic.

**Statements in the Constitution and of the State:** To begin with, the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China has established equal rights for women and men in such areas as political, economic, social, cultural and family life. In the Constitution adopted in 1982, Article 48 states that: “Women in the People’s Republic of China enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life, in political, economic, cultural, social

\textsuperscript{38}In particular in the recent administration reform, the government’s reconstruction has not yet paid sufficient attention to strengthening the NWCCW, the OWYWC and the WGWC, since the reform is only concerned about reducing staff and institutions covered by the state’s budget.
and family life. The State protects the rights and interests of women, applies the principle of equal pay for equal work to men and women alike and trains and selects cadres from among women.” At the same time, Article 49 stipulates that: “Marriage, the family and mother and child are protected by the State. Both husband and wife have the duty to practice family planning…violation of the freedom of marriage is prohibited. Maltreatment of old people, women and children is prohibited”. During the Second Session of the 10th National People’s Congress in 2004, the clause specifying that “the state respects and safeguards human rights” was added into the Constitution; this has been hailed by many scholars including the groups majoring in women and gender issues, as these have been perceived as entry points to enshrine women’s human rights in legal and policy framework. Although principles of equality between men and women and anti-discrimination are often included in the constitution, they are more statements that have little, if any, binding force over the infringement of women’s rights in reality.

The state president made another national statement outside of the constitutional arena. In 1995, previous President Jiang Zemin stated at the Fourth World Conference for Women in Beijing: “Attaching great importance to the development and advancement of women, we in China have made gender equality a basic state policy in promoting social development. We are resolutely against any forms of discrimination against women and have taken concrete steps to maintain and protect the equal status and rights of women in the country’s political, economic and social life.”

Although there is a lack of concrete framework for the enforcement of state policy, gender advocates and women’s organizations in China have exploited it to mobilize gender equality in many ways. The ACWF, for example, is initiating a campaign of publicizing the ‘basic state policy on men and women’ nation-wide. It announced 2004 as the ‘Basic State Policy Publication Year’ and designed a series of lectures and training for cadres at different levels.

National Women’s Development Plans and Institution: The 1975 United Nations International Women's Year Conference called for countries to establish their ‘own national plan of action and specify individual objectives and priorities in conjunction with the international plan of actions’. However, there had been no such a formal public administration in China before 1995. Although the ACWF performs the function of the national machinery on gender equality most of the time, it is just a mass organization outside the system of public administration. Its capability has been constrained by its conventional role of mobilizing women without substantive resources to serve women’s dynamic needs and interests. The ACWF seized the opportunity of the preparing the Fourth World Conference on Women to propose the creation of a gender equality mechanism within the State Council. In response to a proposal from the ACWF, the Chinese government set up the National Working Committee on Women and Children (NWCWC) in 1995 and has continued to strengthen it. The inclusion of the ACWF into the national policy machinery is highly significant. In this way, the ACWF has developed links to national policy-makers and has been able to exert greater influence in gender planning. For example, the ACWF has promoted and participated in the process of drafting “The Program for the Development of Chinese Women”. As a member of the NWCWC, the ACWF also participated in the implementation, supervision, and evaluation of this programme.

Endorsed in May 2001 by the State Council, the development of the Programme (2001-2010) was based on a review of the Programme (1995-2000). The new Programme set general and major objectives that covered areas of concern of both international developments. It refers to the 12 critical areas of concern set out by the Platform for Action 1995 and the 8 goals of MDGs officially established following the Millennium Summit in 2000. The 2001-10 Programme identifies six critical areas that

40The six areas include: 1) women and the economy, 2) women in decision-making and management, 3) education of women, 4) women and health, 5) women and law, and 6) women and the environment, with the promotion of women's development as the main theme throughout the document.
were further broken down into 34 major goals and 100 policy proposals for the development of Chinese women in the first ten years of the 21st century. These objectives and responsibilities were allocated among 34 government and non-government institutions through relevant monitoring and evaluation systems with statistical indicators. At the same time, 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities formulated local programmes for implementing the national women’s development programme in the light of the particular conditions and needs of women in those areas.


National Five Year Development Plan: The National Five Year Development Plan serves as a substantive blueprint for national development. In 2000, ‘phased employment’ (Jieduan Jiuye) was included in the ‘Proposal for Drafting the 10th Five Year Plan (2001-05)’. Such a kind of proposal came onto the agenda largely because the government was facing an increasing number of laid-off workers during the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This meant that female employees would be encouraged to leave their work for a period to undertake vocational training or for
reasons of pregnancy, without payment or welfare. The ACWF and other women’s organizations strongly resisted this proposal on the ground that it seriously endangered the employment rights of women. During the open discussions, the ACWF put forward a proposal to omit the term ‘phased employment’. It lobbied both female and male representatives of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference to sign its proposal and raise the issue at the conference. In the final draft of the national plan, the idea of ‘phased employment’ was omitted, suggesting that the ACWF successfully used its official position in the National People’s Congress and the CCP Central Committee to influence the decision-making process.

3.42 Advocating Gender Equality in Legal Reform

China’s legal system, seriously undermined during the “Cultural Revolution” (1966-76), was restored in the late 1970s after the economic reforms, and its development has accelerated in recent years. Ever since the strategy of “the rule of law” was written into the Constitution in its latest amendment in 1999, China has been continuously transforming itself from a country that had few laws into one with a comprehensive legal system. In 2002, furthermore, the 16th National Congress of the Communist CCP of China (CCP) set a grand goal of making all-round efforts to build a well-off society with the goals of setting up “a socialist legal system of laws with Chinese characteristics by the year 2010” 41. According to the State Council of the PRC, “by the end of August 2011, the Chinese legislature had enacted 240 effective laws including the current Constitution, 706 administrative regulations, and over 8,600 local regulations.”(Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China October 27, 2011).

By and large, the drafting or revising of laws and policy bring about opportunities for advocacy for women’s rights and interests, which create several surges of advocacy. Each time when a new law is to be made or current laws to be revised, women’s organizations have actively promoted relevant proposals and suggestions. Their advocacy activities have not been restricted only to women-specific law, namely the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women, but also included other ordinary laws and regulations that concern women’s lives, crossing different sectors and areas such as the Marriage Law (2000) and the Employment Promotion Law (2008).

**Women Specific Policies/Laws:** The milestone of the legislation on women’s rights and interests was the promulgation of the Women’s Law in 1992, which reflected China’s commitment to fulfill its obligations under the CEDAW. It is the first of its kind in China to focus on women’s legal rights and interests in a comprehensive and systematic manner. However, many Chinese gender and women’s studies scholars, as well as the CEDAW Expert Group Committee, were concerned with its failure to enshrine the spirit of anti-discrimination endorsed by the CEDAW. Their criticism focused on the fact that the strategies and approaches adopted by the Women’s Law were heavily concentrated on the protection of women whereby women have been seen as merely victims of development rather than agents of change (Rangita, 2003a).

After over ten years of practice, the Women’s Law was revised to adapt to the new requirements for the protection of women’s rights and interests in 2005. This was a significant event in the protection of women’s rights and interests, providing a good opportunity for women’s organizations to incorporate gender equality, in particular the comments of the CEDAW, into legislation. The All-China Women’s Federation took the leading role in organizing its revision. It led an expert group in completing the draft amendments and successfully convened several influential meetings and forums to

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42It sets six prime and basic rights for women. The widespread ramifications of women’s rights include 1) political rights, 2) rights and interests relating to culture and education, 3) rights and interests relating to work, 4) rights and interests relating to property, 5) rights relating to the person, and 6) rights and interests relating to marriage and family.
invite comments and suggestions from the public. In 2005, the 17th session of the 10th NPC Standing Committee passed the draft amendment of the 1992 Women’s Law.

The progress of the draft amendment in securing women’s rights include: 1) adding the national policy of gender equality as one of the General Principles; 2) addressing the responsibility of the State in promulgating the National Women’s Development Program and promoting its integration into the overall national economic and social development program; 3) clarifying and reinforcing the responsibilities of governmental departments in fulfillment of women’s rights protection, and standardizing the function of the ACWF; 4) reaffirming the improvement of representation of women in government, addressing women’s educational, work and personal rights; 5) clearly forbidding domestic violence and sexual harassment against women, and introducing important supplements to women’s rights in labor, social security and contracting land.

Many officials and scholars have hailed the provision as a great step forward toward gender equality in legislation. At the same time, however, the shortcomings of the revisions have aroused the attention of some legislators and scholars who are concerned that the provision just gives a general guideline rather than any specific measures. For example, it does not give any specific quota for women’s entry into top-level decision-making positions. Similarly, although the amendment makes sexual harassment unlawful, the definition is not clear and the content is quite vague (Tan and Du 2008; Tan and Jiang 2007)

Thematic Policies/Laws: During the legal reform since the 1970s, apart from the Constitution and the women-special law, women’s organizations have made efforts to promote relevant clauses relating to women’s interests and rights to be integrated into the following laws and regulations: the Inheritance Law (1985), the Civil Law (1986), the Compulsory Education Law (1986), the Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (1989), the Law on Adoption (1991), the Law for the Protection of Minors (1991), the Maternal and Child Care Law (1994), the Labor Law (1994), the Election Law (1995), the Criminal Procedural Law (1996), the Criminal Law (1997),
the Organic Law of the Urban Residents’ Committees (1998), the Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees (1998), the Marriage Law (revised in 2001), the Population and Family Planning Law (2001), the Trade Union Law (2001), the Law on Rural Land Contracts (2003), the Civil Service Law (2005), the Property Law (2007), and the Employment Promotion Law (2008). Although their advocacy activities have met with different responses and achieved different results, these laws have integrated gender equality to different extents.

Two particularly successful examples were the campaign for a quota for women in politics and decision-making which resulted in the creation of a clause to suggest an appropriate proportion of female leaders in the village committees in the Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees (1998), and the advocacy for the protection of property rights of women in divorce and prohibition of domestic violence against women which affected the revision of the Marriage Law in 2000. Whether successful or not, these two advocacy campaigns stimulated several debates in policy-making. The following table provides a list of several surges of women’s advocacy on gender issues since the economic reforms in the 1980s.

Table 6 Some of the Policy Advocacy Initiated by Women’s Organizations since the 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Proposals &amp; Years</th>
<th>Targeted Policies/Laws</th>
<th>Targeted Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political participation</td>
<td>Quotas for women leaders in governments or CCP organs</td>
<td>The regulations of promoting leaders since 1978</td>
<td>The Organizational Department of the Central CCP Committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Quotas for women in the NPC</td>
<td>The Election Law (1995)</td>
<td>The NPC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Labor protection for women workers</td>
<td>For creation of the Special Rules on the Labor Protection of Female Employees (2012)</td>
<td>The State Council (Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal rights</td>
<td>Anti-trafficking in women</td>
<td>For the creation of new policy since 1995</td>
<td>The Ministry of Public Police.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed by the author.

The table is by no means an exhaustive list of all influential advocacy. This thesis only focuses on national level advocacy campaigns although there have been relentless efforts at local levels as well. Nevertheless, the mapping by the type of laws and policies illustrates the dynamics of the various advocacy efforts and show the wide range of thematic issues addressed. The results are also different: while some proposals have been fully integrated into policies and laws, others have not been accepted at all. The policy proposal for the same retirement age for female civil servants with their male counterparts is a case in point. However, there have been insufficient studies to investigate the process. For example, which CSO(s) initiated the advocacy? How did they gain access to policymakers? How did they build coalitions with each other and with other
interest groups, if at all? How did they persuade office-holders to represent women’s interests and build credibility? In this thesis, I initiate an exploration by scrutinizing two cases in subsequent chapters.

**Raising Gender Awareness:** After the 1990s, a new trend in women’s organizing around policy change was seen in gender awareness raising in China. New women’s groups have been very effective in this novel area. While the traditional mass women’s organization, the ACWF, focuses on conventional access to policy-making, the new women’s organizations are trying to transform the social norms in society at large. For example, the Gender Trainers’ Group based in Beijing has run several training courses, which have proved effective in raising gender awareness amongst project managers. Participants include rural women, women cadres in the Women’s Federations at different levels, government officials, police officers, judges, and people from different walks of life. Similarly, the Capital Association of Women Journalists, the first of its kind in the country, has monitored gender issues in the media and given training to employees in the media industry. Their work has positively influenced the mass media. They have helped to initiate discussions on many gender sensitive issues such as women’s rights in land tenure and domestic violence against women in the newspaper, ‘China Women’s News’. Likewise, the Anti-Domestic Violence Network (ADVN) is one of the most influential networks in Chinese society. It played an important role in raising the issue of domestic violence and collaborated with other women’s organizations and groups, such as the ACWF, and the Gender Training Group, to place the issue into the Marriage Law and to raise people’s awareness through gender training.

In general, previous advocacy efforts by women’s organizations have targeted various laws and policies, ranging from national blueprint policies to laws or policies in specific areas. In the early stages of economic reforms, the ACWF outshone other types of women’s organizations as the major actor. In recent years, however, new types of women’s organizations have been increasingly involved in the process. In addition, emerging collaboration among officials, mass women’s organizations and new women’s organizations have unified different forces converging around common interests and
concerns. However, numerous obstacles continue to impede women’s groups from moving into the political system.

3.5. Summary

In this chapter, I provided an overview of the political context of policy making to situate my two case studies. By examining the state’s regulations on civil society and legislation, I argued that during the last two decades, the policy environment for CSOs in China remains closed for wide-ranging participation. However, the policy process in particular legislation by the NPC in China is increasingly directed by the rule of law that provides more opportunities for CSOs’ participation than before the Economic Reform. Nevertheless, some CSOs have better opportunity than others do to access the policy process.

Surveying previous efforts of gender policy advocacy initiated by women’s organizations, I argued that gender activists in various women’s organizations wielded power they possessed to influence policy change. Their advocacy efforts have not only targeted blueprint national polices, but also specific policy sectors, and have met with different results. However, there is a lack of comprehensive survey and in-depth analyses of previous policy campaigns initiated by women’s organizations to understand how exactly this was done. In the next chapter, I go on to analyze the first case study, namely the ADVN’s advocacy for integrating anti-domestic violence issue into Marriage Law (2001) and Women’s Law (2005).
4. The Anti-Domestic Violence Network

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter and the one that follows, the focus shifts from broader issues of theory and background to the first case analysis of policy advocacy on anti-domestic violence against women led by the Anti-Domestic Violence Network (ADVN).

In 2000, some feminist activists and scholars established the Anti-Domestic Violence Network (ADVN) in Beijing. It was the first multi-field and multi-sector organization that specialized in combating domestic violence against women in China. Initially, it was a small network that connected several women’s organization such as the Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Center, Women’s Legal Research and Service Center and the Beijing Rural Women’s Center for Culture and Development, as well some gender activists. Since its establishment in 2000, it has developed into a wide network comprised of 121 individual members and 71 member groups or organizations, which covers 28 municipalities, provinces, and autonomous regions in China (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(b) 2010; Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(c) 2010).

This chapter examines the conditioning factors that are assumed to have influenced the advocacy, namely its legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning and source of fund. I argue that the legitimacy of the ADVN is largely based on its outstanding expertise that serves as a foundation for its affiliation and policy access. The leadership style of the ADVN is democratic and its organizational structure is wheel-shaped, characterized by heterogeneity and flexibility. Furthermore, the ADVN initiated innovative learning that centers on introducing new concepts of gender and feminist policy analyses. In addition, the lion’s share of its funding comes from foreign donors. The following sections explain each character.
4.2 Legitimacy Based on Expertise

I argue that it is mainly through its expertise that the ADVN gained its legitimacy for both organizational survival and policy advocacy. First, the ADVN enjoys a diverse expertise with high credentials. Second, it is through their academic expertise that the key body of leaders built alliances with policy-makers, particularly the leaders of the China Law Society (CLS)\(^4\). This in turn provided the foundation for ADVN’s affiliation with the CLS, which serves as a source of legitimacy for its organizational development and policy campaign.

4.2.1 Expertise

The ADVN enjoys advanced expertise, which includes both technical knowledge and practical experience. It attracted a team of experts in various academic disciplines. Most of them enjoy excellent academic credentials with advanced professional titles such as professors/senior researchers (Interview/Case1/01/08092007), and come from various academic backgrounds including jurisprudence and legal studies, sociology, social work, psychology, criminology, media studies, etc. The following table illustrates the distribution of subjects and academies.

\(^4\) The CLS has become one of the most influential mass organizations and provides advice to legal reform in China. In the case of the anti-domestic violence campaign, it provided a platform for the ADVN to mobilize various resources.
### Table 7 Backgrounds of Expertise Possessed by Members of the ADVN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>Academies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisprudence and legal studies</td>
<td>Scholars from Legal Institute of the CASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology Social Work</td>
<td>Scholars from the China Women’s College and the Beijing Social Science Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>Professor from Psychology Research Department in Hebei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media studies</td>
<td>Scholars from the Media Studies Institute of CASS; Journalists from the newspapers such as the China Women’s News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminology</td>
<td>Scholars in Public Security Bureaus in Beijing, Qingdao etc. Senior Judge, Beijing High Court</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed by the author.

However, not every subject has been treated equally in the process. In the process of revising the Marriage Law, legal expertise was highly valued and weighted over the expertise of other scholars. Thus, the key founder of ADVN was one of the few distinguished scholars in marriage law in China. She had been enrolled in the drafting group of the Marriage Law before joining the ADVN. However, other scholars particularly those in gender studies noticed a hegemony in the process. They complained that the procedure tended to exclude scholars without a legal background from defining the discourse around domestic violence and other gender issues in the Marriage Law, which was heavily dominated by ‘law elites’ including some scholars in the ADVN. From the perspectives of the legal expert, however, the Marriage Law was too technical and specific for scholars outside law to speak on (Interview/Case2/03/08052010). Apparently, the drafting of the Marriage Law conferred academic legitimacy more readily to those had been formally trained in the discipline of law.
It is worth noting that expertise on domestic violence has been a highly contested concept. In China, “experts” normally refers to those who have received advanced education and training in specific areas in the state authorized standard universities or colleges, and have built up credentials in a given discipline. However, the identification of experts on issues of violence against women is quite tricky. To begin with, violence against women, particularly domestic violence has been perceived as a ‘women’s issue’. Women and gender studies have yet to be legitimatized in mainstream academia. So unlike experts in finance and economics who enjoy an established academic reputation, scholars researching domestic violence are still struggling to establish women and gender studies as a valid academic discipline. Academic status affects which research establishments and scholars are identified as ‘think tanks’ for the government and the CCP\textsuperscript{44}. To draw serious attention from both policy-makers and academies, the experts of the ADVN established domestic violence issues in such traditional disciplines as legal studies and sociology.

Another challenge to the standing of experts in domestic violence is the weight of practical experience. Neither experts in the ADVN nor the legislators have queried how well they could really represent women victims because, after all, few of them had experienced domestic violence, if at all. Although the ADVN and other organizations like the Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Center had collected stories from women victims, they were seen as simply objects for study rather than actors for changing policy. The tendency of ignoring practical experiences represents a trend of elite-oriented policy-making in China, where a rational model labeled as “scientific decision-making” is addressed. While the proposals of experts are seen as more convincing, practical experiences tend to be viewed as non-scientific and subjective. However, practical experience was once highly valued before the economic reforms in

\textsuperscript{44}Chinese government identified 10 ‘think tanks’ which include the Research Centre on Reform and Development of the State Council, the CASS, etc. None of the ‘think tanks’ has a gender component.
1978 in policy-making when grassroots workers and peasants were enrolled in decision-making at various levels.

4.22 Alliances with the CCP/State officials

Through professional links and personal relations, the ADVN enjoys several alliances with CCP/state officials, though the connection is quite loose and temporary. First, most of the connections were built through their professions before they became involved with the ADVN. The Confucian tradition of respect for teachers means that teachers’ influence continues even after the formal teacher-student relationship ends. For example, the key leader of the ADVN was a teacher of law some of whose students went on to become leaders of the China Law Society. The case of another ADVN leader also validates the supposition. She was once a professor at the China Police College; some of her students who became leaders of public security bureaus at different levels and championed the ADVN due to her influence.

Second, the dual role of the key leader played an important role in building alliances with technocrats in legislation and jurisprudence. The key leader of the ADVN also accepted the post of vice president of the Marriage Law Research Association that affiliated to the CLS at the same time. Thus, she was in fact an insider of the CLS and had a prestigious status as one of a few distinguished experts in marriage law in China.

In short, the leaders of the ADVN built alliances with a few CCP/State officials not because of the formal institutional access that opened to all CSOs’ in policy-making, but because of their social relations limited within the same epistemic community where they shared a common language and a focus on a specific issue.

4.23 Legal Status

Affected by the stringent conditions for registration, the ADVN consciously sought affiliation with the China Law Society (CLS), not only to provide legitimacy for its organizational development but also potential access to legislation.
First, the key leaders were fully aware of potential difficulties in applying for registration as a CSO. As stated in Chapter 3, registration requires CSOs to meet stringent conditions such as having a supervisory agency guaranteed by the CCP or the State, over 50 individual members or over 30 institutional ones, adequate financial resources with a minimum of operational funds of 100,000 Yuan, etc. In particular, the state tightened its control over CSOs by shutting down and dissolving the organizations that were seen as politically threatening after repressing the Fan Lun Gong in 1997. As the key leader put it:

…since the environment was not friendly, and even worse, NGOs were seen as anti-government…so we didn’t look for the government for registration…” (Interview/Case1/01/08092007)

Another obstacle lay in the registration regulation that discourages the formation of civil organizations that bridge provinces and sectors. The Regulation stipulates that there can only be one civil organization in a “same [xiang tong] or similar [xiangsi] area of work” (Article 13). Given the existence of All-China Women’s Federation, a national women’s organization that is tasked by the CCP/State with a gender equality portfolio that implicitly should include anti-domestic violence, the establishment of another organization such as the ADVN that focused on similar issues was unlikely to be approved. Given all this, the founders/initiators of the ADVN shunned registration as a

45Strict policies were issued to guide the examination and liquidation of suspect CSOs in China, which included the Notice of the Ministry of Civil Affairs Concerning Investigating and Dealing with Illegal Social Associations (1997) (Minzhengbu guanyu chachu feifa shetuan zuzhi de tongzhi, 《民政部关于查处非法社团组织的通知》), the Notice of the Ministry of Civil Affairs Concerning Issues Pertaining to the Work of Straightening Out, Rectifying and Approving Social Associations (1999)(Minzhenbu guanyu shehui tuanti qingli zhending gongzuo youguan wenti de tongzhi 《民政部关于社会团体清理整顿审定工作有关问题的通知》), and Interim Measure for Suppressing Illegal Civil Society Organizations (2000)(Qudi feifa minjian zuzhi zanxing banfa, 《取缔非法民间组织暂行办法》). Thus the already complex procedure was made even more so. See Yu, Keping. 2009. Democracy is a Good Thing: Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture in Contemporary China. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
way of avoiding potential constraints and decided to seek affiliation with the CLS.  

Secondly, the ADVN gained affiliation to the CLS because of its leaders’ alliances with the CLS. As explained in the previous section, the leaders of the ADVN built various connections with the leaders of the CLS mostly through their professional careers. Indeed, the alliance was critical for their being accepted by the CLS.

In interviews, major leaders expressed their perception of the affiliation, in particular why they preferred the CLS for their supervisory agency. According to them, the CLS is a state authorized organization that has significant influence in legislation. Like the ACWF, the CLS is one of the ministerial level mass organizations set up by the Chinese Communist CCP in 1949. Over the past fifty years, it has promoted legal reform in China, and has provided powerful theoretical support for the formation of a set of principles for ruling the country by law.

Another favourable condition that the CLS could provide was its wide networks that might help the ADVN gain access to influence legal and judicial system. The CLS has become the most influential legal organization in China with more than 100,000 members who are high-level judges, prosecutors and attorneys (CSL: http://www.chinalawsociety.org.cn). As an umbrella organization for 32 member organizations (tuantihuiyuan), 279 law societies and 26 legal research associations, the CLS has established an extensive network across departments of the CCP and the government, legislative and judicial bodies, colleges/universities and research institutes, as well as many other entities (shiyedanwei) and enterprises in China. It has also built

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46It is noticeable that the ADVN was not alone in behaving this way. Also, as I explained in Chapter 3, many other newly emerged CSOs also sought affiliation.

47In the name of the “New Law Society” at early stage, it included more than 2000 noble characters including then Premier Zhou Enlai. Although it was drawn to a halt during the “Cultural Revolution” from 1966 to 1978, it was revived after the reform in 1978.

48Thirty-two of them are based at provincial level, 15 at municipal level, 160 located at prefectures and 86 at counties.
up connections with relevant international legal organizations in more than 40 countries (ibid).

Yet another attraction of the CLS was its openness to embracing a women’s network like the ADVN. According to a key leader, the top official of the CLS was supportive to anti-domestic violence discourse, and supported the operation of the ADVN programme. This was partly because the key leader utilized her relationship with some leaders of the CSL as she was once their teacher and partly because many leaders of the CLS had received training on gender and violence against women and raised awareness of the issue before the key leader of the ADVN approached them⁴⁹.

…they (the CLS) enjoy a wide network at different levels…they are resourceful and influential… and above all, they are open minded…they were open to gender issues particularly the issue of violence against women. They gave us freedom to run our network and promised not to interfere in our operations…

…they (CSL) are inside the system, but we are NGOs. It is true that we are affiliated to them, but we made it very clear that we were not going to be administered by them apart from our subscription for administrative fees to them. We attached to them only after they agreed with our requirements… (Interview/Case1/01/08092007)

At same time, they remain cautious of potential interference by the CLS in their project while providing them with a protective umbrella. Hence, they bargained with the CLS for autonomy:

…their acceptance of us does not mean we obey them. We still need to maintain our independence. This is to say that we need to be very clear and definite about our autonomous principle of autonomy, what we are going to do etc. Nevertheless, we need to collaborate with them. This is a kind of strategy. This strategy means that we collaborate with the government but not by losing our own perspective …to generate an interaction and reciprocity. The

⁴⁹According to a key leader, the British Council sponsored a symposium convened by the China Law Society on domestic violence against women in 1995. Many cadres in the China Law Society attended and the symposium was considered very successful Interview/Case1/01/08092007.
government also needs some social forces us to do certain work on anti-domestic...; we need the government to support us...
(Interview/Case1/01/08092007)

In short, the ADVN has no legal registration status. The activists who initiated the ADVN deliberately avoided registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Instead, they purposely sought links (guakao) with other state authorized organizations, considering that affiliation was the most convenient and tactical strategy. In so doing, the ADVN could not only avoid stringent censorship when applying for registration, but also seize the opportunity to seek an alignment with authorized state organs. From their view, becoming a second-level affiliated organization to some powerful institutions would no doubt increase their potential in policy influence.

4.3 Democratic Leadership

The leadership style of the ADVN is democratic in several aspects as the following:

4.31 Collective Leadership

The ADVN is led by a team of enthusiastic feminist experts. This is apparent through its emergence, the reform of the leading body, and the decision-making within the network.

The emergence: The ADVN was created by a group of inspiring leaders. One day in 2001, a group of Chinese scholars and activists were gathering at a meeting room in the UNDP office in Liang Ma He, Beijing. One of the two would-be coordinators of the ADVN convened the meeting. This was their second meeting to brainstorm on initiating programmes or projects on anti-violence against women in China, trying to translate the ideas suggested in a previous meeting into concrete action plans. The meeting adopted a participatory method; each participant had equal opportunity to propose any ideas or plans. Around 20 attendees presented proposals, covering 15 projects ranging from research and surveys on domestic violence against women to interventional services for women victims. These projects were encapsulated into a
programme – the ADVN – that marked the emergence of the ADVN and thus the collective leadership body.

The reform of the leading body: The collective leading body has changed since its inception in 2001. Initially, from 2001-2003, this leading group was known as the “Program Administrative Committee” (Xiangmu Guanli Weiyuanhui). Two conveners of the roundtable meetings were spontaneously made the coordinators\(^{30}\) of the ADVN. Their roles were to supervise project management and coordinate different sections of the programme by mediating project managers. In 2003, the title changed to the “Board of Directors” (Lishihui), partly at the behest of some of their donor agencies. Some donors such as the Ford Foundation perceived establishing Board Committees as an effective way to avoid oligarchy and to promote pluralism with newly emerged NGOs and to ensure a ‘good governance’ structure. They tasked various international capacity-building organizations such as Winrock to provide training workshops to guide their recipient NGOs to set up board committees to dilute the supreme power of the founders of NGOs by separating decision-making over organizational development from project management\(^{51}\). The main difference between the board and the PAC was that the members of the Board were not allowed to lead any sub-project, while members of the PAC were invariably the leaders of sub-projects.

Decision-making within the network: Through the leadership transformation, power and decision-making were redistributed and readjusted within the network. The role and tasks of the top manager were further clarified and regulated. According to the new rules, the Board Committee (Lishihui) was mandated with responsibilities for fundraising, decision making over organizational development, and supervising project implementation. However, new regulations prohibited Lishihui members’ involvement

\(^{30}\)As one coordinator is soon to pursue studies in a US university, the other has in fact acted as a director for the ADVN.

\(^{51}\)On 8 November 2003, Winrock conducted such a training workshop for the ADVN, since when a transformation of the leading body has taken place. A Board of Committee replaced the previous Project Administrative Council (PAC, Guanli Weiyuanhui).
in project administration. Thus, by defining the roles and responsibilities of the Board Committee its members were distanced from concrete administration of the programme and projects. The leaders acted as directors who set the goals and defined the road map for organizational development; the coordinators functioned as mediating leaders who sustained the organization. At the executive level, the leaders were similar to project managers who dealt with implementation of project activities. Thus, power was diluted further among the ADVN.

4.32 Characteristics of Leaders

There are, of course, variations in personalities and qualifications of individual leaders in the ADVN. The case study identifies a greater divergence in leadership behaviour among leaders at different levels and positions. The following analysis is based on interviews of leaders at decision-making and coordinating levels, who played a major role in organizational development and the advocacy.

Personal backgrounds: A preliminary analysis based on the brief website CVs and interview transcriptions indicates some socio-demographic characteristics of these leaders. To begin with, the sex of these leaders is unanimously female, which indicates the almost total absence of men. Most were over 30 - two in their thirties and the rest in their late forties or fifties. They all had a high level of college and university education, with more than half having postgraduate degrees. Compared with the majority of the population in China, they can be classified as ‘middle class’ in the sense that they all have stable and decent well-paid work in government agencies or academic institutions. Their vocations mainly include academia, development officers and journalists. Most of them hold positions above middle level: examples include a then senior editor of the


53 At the first stage of the ADVN, however, these were concentrated on members of the Board Committee.
China Women’s News, a senior fellow in the Law Institute of the CASS, a senior editor of a distinguished academic journal of the CASS, and a vice principal of the China Women’s College. Proficient researchers and experts are from fields of law, sociology, social work, medical science, philosophy, psychology and so on. As the coordinator commented on the group leaders with pride:

“\[\text{I consider the average capacity of members in culture and education, ideology, political sensitivity and mastering of public policy is quite high. I am not boasting about us…Overall, the leaders of our network are above associate professor level…many of advisors like you hold MA or PhD degree…}\]

(Interview/Case1/02/03102009).

Second, the research found heterogeneity of backgrounds amongst the ADVN leaders. The coordinators and members of executive committees came from different sectors with different areas of concern. One of them had gained good knowledge about donor agencies in China, which helped her identify some donors with a keen interest in supporting anti-violence initiatives and funding such kinds of activities in China. She was once a project officer of an international development agency and had a relatively long history in working with donor agencies compared with her counterparts in the network. As a graduate from the Beijing Foreign Languages University in the late 1980s, she gained a good command of English, which allowed her to work in the offices of the Ford Foundation and the UNDP. The other initiator was a prominent expert in marriage law who participated in the revision of the Marriage Law. A member of the CSL, the ADVN’s supervisory mass organization, she had wide connections with scholars and policy makers. As the following table shows, scholars in sociology, women studies and social work were involved. In addition, journalists were also included in the leading body.

\[
\textbf{Table 8 Members of the Project Administrative Committee (PAC) in 2002}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

129
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GuoYanqiu/CaiYiping</td>
<td>• Member of the PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Editor of China Women’s News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coordinator of the Women Media Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Mingxia</td>
<td>• Coordinator of the PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Vice Chairperson of the China Marriage Law Research Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Professor of the Legal Studies Institute of the China Academy of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Sciences (CASS),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ge Youli</td>
<td>• Member of the PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Then was the Project Officer of the UNDP Director of Global Workers’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Lie</td>
<td>• Member of the PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Vice Director&amp; editor of translation of the Global Law Review of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Hongtao</td>
<td>• Member of the PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Professor and Director of the Social Work Department of the China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women’s College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rong Weiyi</td>
<td>• Member of the PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Associate Professor of the China Police College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Lixi</td>
<td>• Member of the PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Professor &amp; Vice Principal of the China Women’s College</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed by the author based on (Rong and Song 2002 p.13)

**Gender awareness:** Most of them have a deep understanding of gender inequalities in China and strong commitments to change them. Concerned with women’s rights issues in China, and particularly violence against women, they felt an urgent need to do something to stop it. Thus strong commitment and passion to fight gender inequalities specifically violence against women characterized this group of activists. As one respondent said:
“a strong commitment to devote to the cause and a keen sense of great responsibility are critical … what characterizes our leaders and make them distinguish is that they have strong commitment and sense of responsibility. Otherwise we cannot make it under current context with so many barriers and hardships…So I feel the commitment and sense of duty is of the utmost importance…”

(Interview/Case1/04/05092007)

From their narrative personal stories, we can trace their involvement in the gender equality course as most of them had been involved in activities related to the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. Some report that their acceptance of the concept of gender has changed their personal attitudes as well as their work. Gender analysis frameworks help them to realize profound institutional barriers that constrain women’s development.

Consensus on feminist organizing principles: Most of the core leaders of the ADVN held feminist organizational principles that addressed equality and democracy in organizing. Feminist organizational theories were committed to non-hierarchy in order to promote a culture and principles of consensual decision making within women’s organizations (Ianmello, 1992). I will touch on this issue in further detail in the section on mobilizing structure. I found that it was more or less the hope of building an egalitarian CSO that gave rise to the emergence of the ADVN. Participants in the ADVN saw democracy, participatory, transparency and sharing information and resources as the “spirit of NGOs”. They joined the network not because they wanted to follow particular charismatic leaders, but rather, they cherished the hope of joining hands with like-minded peers for common endeavours. They were very conscious of patriarchal ways of organizing built on hierarchies and authority. As one of them stated:

I think if you build an organization to mobilize women into anti violence movement, but you use patriarchal way, namely the male way, to organize…that is nonsense! In that case, what will you really oppose? At this stage, I perceived the means and the ends were of equivalent significance. That is to say, means had to be viewed to be as important as ends. Organizing is a means. We need to do two things at once: namely to fight against violence against women through an established feminist NGO. These two things must be dealt with at same time; no one can be ignored, since they are the two legs
to be balanced. Otherwise, our means will be against our ends…..So I was clear and fully convinced. Only have we clarified these issues then we set out to plot… (Interview/Case1/03/02092007)

Clearly, feminist activists in this case perceived that their anti-domestic violence goal could only be realized by adopting feminist organizing approaches. Then, what is the meaning of feminist organizing approach? Since the creators of the ADVN focused on internal hegemony of some new type of women’s CSOs and groups at that time, they prioritized democracy (minzhu), transparency (touming de) and broad participation (guangfan canyu) in the hope of building an alternative women’s organization. These guiding principles were epitomized by the notion of “feminist approach”. As one initiator explained:

…our process of organizing, even the relations, should be feminist. In particular, they (relations) should be equal, which means that everyone is entitled to participate and has equal right in discourse …We need to follow these three principles (Interview/Case1/03/02092007)

The awareness of feminist organizing greatly influenced the consensus building within the ADVN and their seeking an alternative organizing approach:

“I am gratified to have a cohort of comrades who have similar beliefs and aspirations in the same camp, all of whom cherish equality and democracy and identify these principles as essence of civil society to enhance democratization in China. It is because we have consensus and a common goal that we can reach agreement unanimously with such a consistent even after wrangles…So I consider it is the happiest aspect…” (Interview/Case1/02/03102009)

These feminist activists perceived hegemony within organizations as patriarchal tradition in which hierarchies and dominance were legitimized by bureaucratic administration. In their eyes, such kinds of organizational structure could not only strengthen existing unequal power relations, but were more likely to exclude many women from participation. Thus, the exploration of an alternative organizational culture was the first task to be fulfilled by the feminists in this case. As the key creator said:

“….just then, some women’s NGOs had displayed male organizational culture, which infected their structure and relations among staff. This prompted me to think what a feminist organization
might look like......What are feminist NGOs? What is feminist organizational theory? I started to mull over these questions. … The consideration was sparked by my concerns in embodying feminist organizational theory.” (Interview/Case1/03/02092007)

The perceptions and principles have been propped up by other activists. As one of them explained:

From my experience and observation, the most important thing for NGOs is the ‘institution’. It is important to have an institution that endorses principles including democracy, participatory sharing resources, transparency and publicity, which can be called the “spirit of NGOs”. These need to be shared by many participants. Without this spirit, people might devote themselves with enthusiasm for women’s cause at the beginning, but later on there might be violation of personal rights if there is a lack of good mechanism. (Interview/Case1/05/08102007)

Chinese activists in the case of ADVN made their own interpretation of the notion of a feminist organizing approach. They instilled their hopes of seeking an alternative organizing culture into the notion, which indicates their efforts to break from mainstream organizing approaches imbued with patriarchal traditions. Specifically, their concerns were directed at how to avoid group of individuals dominating decision-making and financial management within their own organization.

Organizing experience and social relations: Some of the key leaders enjoyed extensive social networks. They retained various personal connections with state policymaking institutions, media, other NGOs and donor agencies, whereby they built effective networks that were indispensable to their campaign. The following networks constitute essential sources for group leadership. In their connections with policymaking institutions, above all, dual status was a conspicuous phenomenon. Many leaders of the ADVN also held positions within state institutions. For example, one founder of the ADVN was then also a senior scholar in the Law Research Institute of the CASS as well as being a member of the China Law Society (CLS). More than half of the members of the Board Committee were officially working with organizations affiliated to the All China Women’s Federation as senior staff or leaders. These
affiliates include the China Women’s College and China Women’s Newspaper, as well as local women’s federations.

Apart from connections with some policy-making institutions, some of the leaders also had links with other CSOs. In fact, many of them took an active role in other women’s CSOs as either founders or core members. For example, one of the coordinators was the convener of the women’s group called “East-meets-West Women’s Group” which was transfigured into two women’s NGOs, namely the Gender and Development Group (GAD) and Beijing Lesbian Group respectively. Likewise, the journalists on the Board Committee of the ADVN were at same time the conveners of the Capital Female Journalists’ Association. Two members of the Board Committee were also members from the Gender Trainers’ Group in China. Thus, most of them had served in more than one women’s NGOs simultaneously, which implies that “dual status” was also common amongst the leaders of the ADVN in terms of their relations with other NGO. While it makes it convenient for them to pool other NGOs’ resources into the network campaign, a small elite group of activists had more resources and opportunities.

Still another important connection was with international donor agencies. As I mentioned in early sections, one of the coordinators had a strong connection with donor agencies. No doubt, she brought her personal relations with donor agencies to the ADVN at the beginning. As the first stage programme achieved great influence, the ADVN won trust among their sponsors. Thus, personal relationships turned into institutional networks through successful programme implementation.

Additional qualifications of the key coordinator: The case study found that the coordinator possessed additional further qualities. A further analysis of her leadership character reveals another dimension of leadership, different from that of the group mentioned in the above section. When asked why she had been made the coordinating director of the network, she answered:

…Perhaps they think I am not dominating. Perhaps they think that I am in a prestige status…Or perhaps because I have resource and accomplishments in the related subjects. Besides, I am conscientious
and painstaking. Anyway, they may consider that I am not autocratic…I am quite democratic…I am good at learning…I am not narrow-minded. They may consider me as an amiable, good-natured, and easy-going person…I think these may be the explanations…

(The Interview/Case1/02/03102009)

The features highlighted by her were: 1) democratic character seems to be the chief ways of describing her qualifications. The respondent uses laudable traits such as “amiable”, “good-natured”, and “easy-going”. Furthermore, she also utilized derogatory terms such as “dominating” and “autocratic” to accentuate the importance of democracy from the opposite viewpoint. 2) Being capable of “learning” and “openness” was also addressed in the interview. Again, she utilized derogatory terms such as “narrow-minded” to highlight how she was perceived as different. 3) Other traits such as “conscientious and painstaking”, “prestige status”, and “have resource and accomplishments” seem to indicate her faithfulness and loyalty to her career and her consequent achievements and social status. I will look closer at the first two features, namely being democratic and open.

What does “democracy” mean to an advocacy oriented network leader? In the interview with the coordinating director, I observed the reiteration of the idea of “tolerance” that always follows “democracy” leadership.

…there are some qualities that very important for leaders. They are the quality of being democratic, tolerant, and magnanimous. … As a Chinese saying goes: ‘a great person is large-hearted or magnanimous’ (or: A prime minister’s mind should be broad enough for poling a boat). We NGO leaders… should have a tolerant heart, which means we have to see things through other people’s eyes… One of my great achievements from this network is that I am more tolerant than before. To use a metaphor, I have to learn how to be a garbage can/dustbin…sometimes I even feel happy to be a garbage can/dustbin. I understand that some lose their temper at me only insofar as they trust me and are willing to communicate with me…

(The Interview/Case1/02/03102009)

She also says:

“We should respect differences and reach consensus on our major course of anti-domestic violence… when some of our invited members let themselves go and said something angry on the website,
I am not furious...I feel happy to be a dustbin to let their temper go. Just let them speak out. We are growing to maturity during the process. Then our NGO will grow up...”
(Interview/Case1/02/03102009)

According to her account, a coordinating leader needs to have special attributes to ensure democracy within the ADVN. So to be “democratic”, a network NGO leader is no less than being a “dustbin” that can absorb whatever differences and complaints be they reasonable or unreasonable. Here, the metaphor “dustbin” implies that the ability to listen and endure misunderstanding is very important for an advocacy based network NGO leader. As member organizations come from different fields and backgrounds, each has their own interests and mandates which may sometimes conflict and so getting them into concerted action demands patience and tolerance.

Furthermore, the respondent felt that “honesty” and “respect” were the means to realize democracy within an advocacy oriented network:

...We should respect every one, to be sincere and respectful to them...no matter what thoughts and ideologies they hold...For the purpose of strategy, we need to unite others...I consider honesty is the most important...it should adopted as a strategy for organizing...I consider that everyone should be respected....for example, we need to respect the women’s federation though we disagree with their working methods...we can help them improve themselves gradually... (Interview/Case1/02/03102009)

Based on the above examinations, I argue that the personal characteristics of the leaders, in particular their views on feminist organizing, are crucial in fostering a democratic leadership style of the network.

In short, I argue that the leadership style of the ADVN is ‘democratic’ on the grounds of the collective leadership in decision-making, the consensus of members on feminist organizational principles, and a shared consciousness of avoiding hegemony within the network. The personal traits of leaders and members made a considerable impact on the leadership style they adopted.
4.4 Network Structure

I argue that the ADVN features a network pattern that is characterized by a decentralized structure and a web of complex relationships. In particular, the network is flexible and open to absorb as many partners as possible for concerted efforts.

4.4.1 Decentralized Structure

When asked for her perception of the network and its effectiveness in campaigning, an interviewee answered:

> I perceive it as a crisscross and intertwining network without any echelons and hierarchies… I do not know who is at the center.…there seems to be no real center. It is … accessible from all directions… That is to say, we know whom to approach if we need particular assistance and resources, or if we are going to do something. (Interview/Case1/07/20102007)

This description provides a picture of a crisscross pattern of network structure in which different components intertwine and interlace with each other. The network takes the shape of a wheel that aggregates various forces into a circle. While the administrative office at the middle serves as an axle, the sub-projects surrounding it serve as a rim. In such a kind of wheel shaped network, actors are connected directly though intense, direct and reciprocal ties. Essentially, it was the assembly of multi-institutional cooperation, that made the ADVN distinct from other women’s organizations and groups (see Figure 5).
In this network, power was decentralized to the project level. The programme was composed of 15 sub-projects managed by different member organizations. At sub-project level, power relations were more flexible. For example, the Centre for Gender and Law Studies of the CASS had undertaken two subprojects on oral history of victims of domestic violence and the international instruments on anti-domestic violence against women. Since these studies required different academic backgrounds and technical proficiencies, the researchers formed two project groups with their own centers of administration. At the same time, hierarchies and power relations were always changing in these professional organizations. If the proficiency of a staff member advanced, or if

Source: Developed by the author.
there new and different research topics required different academic backgrounds, the previous hierarchies would be broken into a new pattern and power relations would change accordingly. In general, these kinds of organizations did have centers and hierarchies, but they were more flexible and the power relations were more equal than those of bureaucratic organizations were\textsuperscript{54}.

As Anheier and Katz (2002) observed, the network structure enables making connections and establishing coalitions between various kinds of NGOs. My study substantiates their argument and argues that such a synthesized organizational structure proved to be quite effective in mobilizing resources into concerted actions in the anti-domestic violence campaign. The ADVN has successfully mobilized over 60 organizations and hundreds of individuals all over the country to form a wide network that has outclassed any counterpart network on women or gender issues in terms of range and size, as well as influence.

\textit{4.42 The Web of Relationships}

The study finds that the programme had multifaceted connections. In terms of administration, the ADVN was comprised of several echelons (see Appendix 3). At the top was the supervision organization – the China Law Society (International Liaison Department and Research Department) from which the ADVN gained legitimacy with the state. Under this was the elected Executive Council\textsuperscript{55} (EC) that served as the core decision-making body of the network. Below that, the Operational Office comprised one director and two deputy directors, all of whom were full time staff. They were

\textsuperscript{54} Basically, there was no one group or organization that was entirely decentralized. As power relations always exist and manifest in different ways within groups and organizations, no collective entities can escape wholly the hegemony that prevails and functions to varying extents. Accordingly, we use decentralization in a relative way, addressing the relatively equal distribution of power among members/actors within a given group or organization in comparison with others.

\textsuperscript{55} At the first phase of the project (2001-2003), the members of the Executive Council were at same time the coordinators/leaders of sub-projects.
responsible for coordination with member organizations and operated two information bases: the information center that physically served as an open library and reference center, and a website at www.stopdv.org.cn. The facilities provided services for sub-projects that constituted the foundation of the network.

In terms of sectors of activities, the program was composed of four sections, namely Maintenance, Investigation and Research, Public Awareness Raising and Interventions as the four boxes in Figure 6 illustrate. Under each section were sub-projects that were specified inside four smaller boxes. The breaking-down of the program into various projects with specific foci indicated a fine and meticulous division of roles and labour that addressed professional proficiency.

**Figure 6 Connections through Sections and Sub-projects**

![Diagram](image)

Source: Developed by the author.

However, such a kind of comprehensive program like the ADVN risked segmentation and separation of sub-projects and member organizations. To avoid fragmentation, the ADVN built up links by strengthening communications between sub-projects that belonged to the same sectors. Each specialized in a certain area or topic and formed
associations through the thematic sections of the program. However, there was no such kind of position as section chief that was tasked with coordinating sub-projects. The general office played an important role to coordinate sections and the sub-projects under certain sectors. Essentially, member organizations and individuals working on similar issues could associate with each other freely. This made ADVN’s multi-institutional cooperation approach both professional and reciprocal. For example, several projects under the Investigation and Research Section complemented each other in producing a comprehensive description of frequency and sequence of domestic violence as well as in-depth theoretical explorations about the root cause of domestic violence in China. In short, the links made it possible for member organizations to work cooperatively with a due division of tasks.

4.23 Heterogeneous Clusters

The ADVN glued together dynamic and heterogeneous institutional clusters such as legislatures, public security organs, government agencies, mass organizations, and various kinds of CSOs in Chinese society. Four clusters of institutions, above all, were prominent in the network (see Figure 7).

![Figure 7 Four Major Clusters of the ADVN](image)

Source: Developed by the author.

The upper left-hand cluster refers to the ADVN’s coordinating cluster for various CSOs working on violence against women: Before the establishment of the ADVN, several organizations had been addressing anti-violence against women in
Chinese society. They included: 1) the All China Women’s Federation, especially its local branches, 2) the Women’s Legal Service Centre, Council of Women Health and Development, China Association of Psychology and Health, 3) Women’s Legal Research and Service Centre, Law College of Peking University, 4) the Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Center Counseling, 5) Shanxi Women’s Legal Research and Service Centre, 6) Qianxi Women’s Legal Service Centre, and 7) Female Counseling and Development Centre of the China Women’s College. (China Working Group against Domestic Violence, 2000). In June 1999, these organizations jointly initiated a “Working Group against Domestic Violence” in memory of the Beijing Conference held in 1995. Simultaneously, women’s media, in particular the China Women’s Newspaper, opened influential columns for the public to discuss domestic violence. These efforts no doubt provided a legacy for the initiators of the ADVC to embark on new actions.

The upper right-hand cluster indicates that the ADVN has successfully coordinated the women’s federations: Women’s federations at different levels were the second important force with which the ADVC sought collaboration. These federations enjoyed formal connections with policy-making institutions that were and are the envy of other women’s organizations and groups. By the time the ADVC was established in 2000, some local women’s federations such as Women’s Federation in Changsha of Hunan province had successfully promoted the promulgations of regulations or documents relating to anti-violence against women (Xiao 2012). However, most of the regulations were at a lower level in the policy hierarchy, which meant a lack of authority and enforcement in general. Nevertheless, these initiatives showed the concerns of local women’s federations about domestic violence. The creators of the

ADVN were fully aware of the important role, and capabilities of women’s federations in coordinating policy change in China. As one creator said:

We need to collaborate with women’s federations, the most reliable organizations of the CCP/state on women’s issues. Above all, the CCP/State entirely trusts women’s federations. Therefore, we should collaborate with women’s federations. Moreover, it may be difficult to ask the government to do our program, but women’s federations are much easier. (Interview/Case1/01/08092007)

In addition, we are a technical network. Neither are we going to replace women’s federations, nor compete or override them…So we thought of approaching women’s federations from the beginning. (Interview/Case1/01/08092007)

It was clear that the creator of the ADVC perceived the alliance with women’s federations not only as their potential entry point into the policy process but also as a way of collaborating with women’s federations in providing technical assistance.

The lower left-hand cluster indicates the ADVN’s cluster for coordinating governmental agencies: In China, governmental agencies may find it easy to seek assistance from NGOs, but the reverse is not true. Normally, government departments associate themselves with institutions that are considered insiders of the state system (tizhinei) such as the ACWF and CLS. Yet, this does not mean that there is little room for CSOs to seek links with governmental agencies. In the case of the ADVN, the process of approaching state agencies showed the strategic tactics of Chinese CSOs in seeking collaboration with the state in an authoritarian regime.

One way of approaching state agencies was through personal relations (siren guanxi). As one ADVC member stated:

The acquaintance with the Police Station was built by XX. I also got to know somebody in some sections in the Police Station. What I want to say is that I am not the only one to use personal relations. Others had also tried their personal relations. For instance, we had known YYY in the ACWF, and I knew the director of the department. That is why we could get the ACWF in. (Interview/Case1/01/08092007)
Moreover, a combined way characterized by adding formal introduction to personal relations proved to be more effective in our case studies:

Ordinarily, I went to the law, public security organs, procuratorial organs and people’s court in person. I brought a Reference Letter of China Law Society (CLS). Secondly, I looked for my acquaintances. Thus, I managed to invite representatives from public security organ, procuratorial organs, the Female Procurators Association, the High Procuratorial Organ, and the People’s Court. We used both personal and public resources. Once we get them in, the personal is no longer personal; it turns into public resources for our organization. Since their units (danwei) become your member, they will send someone to your activities. (Interview/Case1/01/08092007)

The illustration of the interviewee raises an interesting point in turning personal relations into public ones by institutionalizing them through organizing. The approach proved to be quite effective for the ADVN in accumulating social capital and expanding connections with state agencies. Using mediators was still another effective way to draw state agencies. In this regard, women’s federations served as a bridge between the newly emerged women’s NGOs and government agencies.

It was not we who got immediate cooperation with the Police Station. We only cooperated with local women’s federation, and they went to seek collaboration with local police station. That is the relationship. We did not collaborate immediately with the police station. (Interview/Case1/06/09102007)

The ADVN has not only made use of the networks of women’s federations for indirect cooperation with state agencies, but also built up links with government agencies through involvement in relevant activities convened by women’s federations. These acquaintances helped activists of the ADVN collect social capital in their later networking. When one of the members of the ADVN reflected how she got to know the local police station and later turned the acquaintance into cooperation, she said:

Once, we conducted training for the Liaoning Police Station…It was for the project of the ACWF. They were cooperating on an Australian project on anti-domestic violence in Liaoning province. They invited us as two experts. (Interview/Case1/06/09102007)

Approaching champions who advocated for anti-violence against women in government agencies was an immediate way of building up cooperation. However, as there were not
many ready-made champions within governmental agencies, the ADVC used gender training as a strategy to cultivate champions purposely within them. For instance, an officer in a local police station became an active agent in initiating anti-domestic violence projects with the ADVC after she had received gender training convened by the project (Rong 244). Similarly, women’s organizations advocating for other gender issues such as quotas for women in village elections and equal employment opportunities, cultivated gender champions who subsequently provided enormous support to relevant campaigns. This approach has proved effective in gaining support from within the governmental institutions.

The lower right-hand cluster indicating the ADVN’s cluster for coordinating the media: The media in China is playing an increasing role in influencing public life. Feminist organizations and groups were more concerned about the abuses of women in the mass media, characterized by depicting them as objects of commercial consumption since the economic reform in 1970s. They have always aspired to reform the media into a means of raising public awareness on violence against women and gender issues. Accordingly, the ADVN attached great importance to collaboration with the media.

ADVN’s connection with the media was achieved through its member organization, namely the Women Media Watch Network (WMWN). Established in the process of preparing for the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, the WMWN has played an important role in decrying gender discriminations and inequalities since it came into life in 1996. As the only non-governmental women’s organization in China focusing on monitoring the media, it boasted more than one hundred media women, scholars of gender and media studies, as well as women writers in the late 1990s (Interview/Case1/04/05092007).

The link brought about reciprocal effects. On the one hand, the ADVN extended its network through WMWN to media people. On the other hand, the WMWN managed to extend connections from its previous cohorts of individual media people to media institutions. After all, the relation with a mechanism was more stable than with
individual journalists who were inevitably in a state of flux. As the coordinator who was in charge of the media project of the ADVN stated:

The partners of the media project are … the cohort of journalists and editors and mechanics of media, for instance, the programs of TV stations and columns of some newspapers. Journalists are always changing. If you have the whole assembly to collaborate with you, you will not worry that some reporters may leave because other journalists will come. (Interview/Case1/04/05092007)

In general, the ADVN had successfully coordinated four forces, namely the new type of women’s organizations and groups, women’s federations at different levels, state agencies including the public security and procuratorial organs, and the mass media (see Figure 7). As one of the participants wrote, the network has drawn numerous activists with diverse backgrounds into the network. They include “researchers and teachers of law, sociology, studies of women, social work, medical science, philosophy, journalism, psychology, and woman activists, lawyers and experts form the People’s Congress and organ of public security, procuratorate and judiciary…” (Huang and Rong 2005 p.278).

Noticeably, the course of the coordination was essentially a manifestation of the NGOs’ tactical manoeuvres of existing relationships and spaces. The procedure facilitated the move of this new type of women’s NGOs and groups from the margin to center in policy processes concerning gender issues in China.

4.5 Innovative Learning

This study found that the ADVN initiated innovative learning that concentrated on accepting new concepts and methods in dealing with domestic violence issues. As the notion of “gender” and “violence against women” were both new to China at the time, the learning process was important for advocacy based on this new thinking and ideas. As one interviewee commented:

…There are two ways of learning, one is to inherit previous knowledge, and the other is to break the conventional tradition. I have academic background in law studies overwhelmed with traditions. The feminist jurisprudence is a breakthrough in
conventional law studies. It is a fundamental revolution. Therefore, it is not easy to master it. Therefore, when our Gender and Law Research Centre was established, many male colleagues including our male director asked us: ‘what exactly do you women want?’ Such a harsh question was raised by male scholars. It is too hard to overturn their conventional ideologies. They were reluctant to learn, after all. (Interview/Case1/02/03102009)

The ADVN initiated learning activities through three major channels, notably learning through training, through exploring and through practice.

4.51 Gender Training

The ADVN adopted a gender perspective in their cause of fighting against domestic violence. Gender concepts and theories constituted the very foundation of the programme and the projects, in that they provided guiding principles whereby the members reached consensus over organizational development and initiated concerted actions. In order to integrate the domestic violence issue into the mainstream of public policy, the ADVN perceived gender sensitivity and analytical skills as essential capacities for those members involved in project activities. As a leader of the ADVN stated:

The goal of our network is gender mainstreaming in the area of violence against women…. Our staff’s capacities in gender mainstreaming are the personnel guarantee… (Interview/Case1/02/03102009)

The ADVN established mechanisms and provided various opportunities for its members to absorb new knowledge and develop critical thinking. Apart from ordinary technical training that aimed to improve the performance of staff to enhance the efficacy of projects, popularizing gender training was a unique characteristic of the ADVN’s organizational learning. Upon its creation, the ADVN made a rule that all members of the programme and projects should receive gender awareness training to master the new concepts and skills. In order to ensure coverage and quality of the training, the ADVN set up a training section and issued it with a mandate to raising gender awareness and enhancing the capacity of its staff to integrate gender concerns into their projects.
“…Thus, the project places gender training in a special position, not only as a sub-project, but also as an important component for capacity building and the guarantee for the successful implementation of the project”. (Feng 2005 p.202)

Hence, gender training was not perceived as professional training simply to upgrade knowledge and skills of personnel, but was distinguished as a “stand point” (Feng, 2005: 202) meant to guide all the project activities. Identified as part of the struggle of combating domestic violence, gender training was utilized as a catalyst for change. It aimed to help “all project participants use gender as a lever to make a difference in the struggle against violence against women” (Feng 2005 p.202).

However, to conduct gender training for a Chinese audience was not an easy task. Since the notion of “gender” did not exist in Chinese, couching the notion in the language and culture was the first challenge for the trainers. Similarly, the gender training workshops adopted a participatory method that seemed “alien” to many Chinese audiences. Used to rote learning and accepting ready-made answers and following authoritative lecturing, many trainees would feel uneasy in participating in debates and discussions in such innovative kinds of training workshops at the beginning.

The trainers’ group coped with these challenges by carefully designing the agenda of gender training. They tailored content for different audiences. Nevertheless, the syllabus normally contained three main sections that aimed to combine personal\(^\text{57}\), professional\(^\text{58}\) and political\(^\text{59}\) ingredients into the training courses.

\(^{57}\)In the personal dimension, the training facilitated trainees’ reflections on how gender norms and rules shaped their personal development and formed their very ideologies and behaviour. By introducing gender concepts through several carefully designed activities, the trainers facilitated the trainees view of the underprivileged situation of women from a social perspective, directed at unequal power relations between men and women. While it was popular to perceive the personal weakness of women as the primary cause of their suffering from domestic violence, the orientation toward social power relations brought about a shift in viewing the issue. Thus many people who had received gender training learned to adopt a gender perspective to identify the root cause of violence against women. Huang, Xiaoyong, and Liqiang Cai. 2012. "China's Civil Organizations at Stage of Overall Breakthrough: Project Group of "Research on Civil Organizations and Public Management", 148
From 2000-2003, the gender training section of the ADVN conducted about 50 training workshops with 1000 trainees. Participants included project managers, selected staff of sub-projects, and members of the provincial network of anti-violence against women. It was reported that these training workshops had enhanced participants’ gender awareness and helped them change their attitudes toward violence against women. They also helped participants integrate gender perspective and methods in the whole process of the project (Huang and Cai 2012).

To sum up, the gender training of the ADVN introduced new concepts and skills that were conductive to critical thinking. By strategically designed training agendas that combined acquisition of skill, enhancing of personal awareness, and challenging of gender power relationships, the training workshops tried to stimulate personal change, professional proficiency and political transformation concurrently. In this regard,

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58 At the professional level, the training workshops delivered analytical skills which helped trainees to integrate gender perspectives and methods into the whole process of the project. Gender analysis helped the trainees not only obtain a good understanding of the relationships between gender and violence against women, but also build a connection between the cause of combating gender violence and their daily work. For example, the workshops tried to help medical personnel in community hospitals to identify abused women when they visited their offices, and record their situation or evidence if necessary. Police officers improved their understanding of their responsibilities to deal with domestic violence by linking anti-domestic violence with their work.

59 In the political dimension, the training workshops helped to mobilize trainees to develop strategies and interventions targeted at institutional change. Based on previous training, trainers would guide the trainees to plan future actions based on the results of their analyses. By and large, the proposed actions were oriented toward transforming the gender power relations in existence. The proposed changes might include equalizing spousal relations in one’s personal life, improving services for battered women in one’s daily work, and modifying regulations and policies and so on. In common, all these proposals developed at training workshops were centered on “facilitating positive change through intervention with gender sensitivity”. Feng, Yuan. 2005. "Gender Training: Exploring the Strongpoint of Intervention." Pp. 200-13 in Combating Domestic Violence against Women: China in Action, edited by Lie Huang and Wei Yi Rong. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. p. 212
“training is a mean of empowering women” which was expected to accelerate changes. (Huang and Cai 2012 p.210)

4.52 Study Tours

As there were no ready guidelines or examples of anti-domestic violence intervention in China, exploration was inevitable. The ADVN’s explorations had two dimensions, notably exploitation of experiences and good practice from abroad and examining the situations and cases in China.

Thanks to the financial support of international donor agencies, the ADVN made plenty of study tours abroad to countries including Canada, the USA, Australia, the UK, Sweden and Denmark. Distinguished scholars and activists from overseas were invited to give public lectures for the project members on specific issues and the project also commissioned literature reviews of policies and laws extant in many other countries.

There were abundant opportunities for members of ADVN to attend activities overseas in the first two years of the program. The breadth and scale of their communications with overseas institutions and individuals was unthinkable for women’s federations given their constraints on budgets and opportunities. These visits and communications have no doubt helped broaden their horizons and advanced their knowledge about experiences and practices of the world.

However, a predisposition of learning from developed countries concentrated on America and Western European countries represented a typical way of learning from abroad since China’s economic reform and opening up in the late 1970s. It might be because the majority of donors came from these industrialized modern countries and/or because the scholars of the ADVN associated anti-domestic violence with modernization represented by advanced industrial countries. Indeed, there has been an inherent bias against other developing countries in policy learning assuming that these countries did not seem to offer anything new or modern to learn.
4.53 Learning through Exploration

This section demonstrates how the ADVN absorbed new concepts and accumulated experience through policy advocacy. The respondent stated that learning was not so much a demonstration of possessed expertise as a process of acquiring up-to-date knowledge to accept new concepts and ideology in order to be innovative. Thus, learning was an act of constant exploration. She viewed “being open” as a prerequisite. After all, one can only absorb new ideas and concepts insofar as one opens her/himself to the changing world. The key leader discovered her capacity to upgrade knowledge and skills, challenge existing norms and accept innovations:

I consider that one has to possess certain qualifications in order to be a coordinator. For example, you must have your own subject areas, your own qualifications and knowledge. ... For example, you must have knowledge of law if you deal with anti-domestic violence issue. Moreover, you will face new issues constantly, and you will mediate with organizations varying according different sections and areas including both national and international agencies. Of course, you have to learn certain knowhow to deal with complex situation. Therefore, a leader of a network must be a person of immense erudition … (Interview/Case1/02/03102009)

For experts of the ADVN, while receiving formal education has built their sound academic foundation, qualifications such as “openness” and “capable of learning” were crucial for acquiring the cognitive capacity to master new thoughts and perspectives.

4.6 Funding by International Donors

This study found that the sources of funds for the ADVN’s activities were mainly foreign donors. However, they have also drawn financial support from companies in China, though the amount was almost negligible. What have been constantly ignored were the intangible funds from government as most of the members of the ADVN were on the government pay roll.

4.61 Funds from Foreign Donors
The lion’s share of funds acquired by the ADVN came from four major foreign donors, namely the Ford Foundation, the NOVIB of the Netherlands, the SIDA of Sweden, and the Norwegian Human Rights Centre based in Oslo University in Norway.

The Ford Foundation, above all, played a key role in funding the ADVN. My findings corroborate those of Zhang Lu (2009) on the critical role of the Ford Foundation in creating the ADVN. Zhang Lu elaborated on how the enthusiastic program officers of the Ford Foundation actively negotiated funds both internally within the organization and externally among donor agencies based in Beijing, for anti-violence in China as early as the 1990s when the topic was novel even to most foreign donors working on human rights issues. They successfully mobilized several meaningful activities that directly facilitated the establishment of the ADVN. One such initiative was its selection and sponsorship of six women activists in Beijing to attend a regional conference on violence against women in India in the late 1990s. Several key ADVN’s inceptors were in the group. Both of them related how they had been inspired by the practices of other countries in combating domestic violence. Therefore, the case of the ADVN shows that the transfer and exchange of ideas, knowledge and practices can be more effective with financial provision that enables international exchange.

However, I argue that though international donors played a critical role in providing funds, the program officers of these foreign donors, in particular the Ford Foundation, were also within the alliances of the ADVN. The main leaders of the ADVN saw the enthusiastic program officers of the Ford Foundation as participants of their anti-domestic violence course rather than simply a patron that provided money for their projects. This alliance was built through close ties amongst them. The program officers of the Ford Foundation had been in contact with the activists of the ADVN ever since the preparations of the activists for the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) and its NGOs Forum. They supported to the attendance of some at international or regional meetings. In addition, my interviews show that local activists, in particular feminist scholars in the ADVN, played an important role in shaping the program.
4.62 Funds from Business

Although it is still quite difficult to draw funds from society, the ADVN successfully raised money from a Chinese company for a public advertisement in December 2005. Hainan White Horse Ashel Co., Ltd. Beijing Branch, a prominent local advertisement company, sponsored a set of advertisement posters with images of the two ambassadors, Mr. Wang Xuebing and Ms. Wang Tong, to publicize anti-domestic violence and the ADVN. Those posters were located at bus stations along the main streets of Beijing. Twenty-two light box advertisements were erected in Beijing advocating anti-DV (Huang & Rong, 2005). They read: “Stay away from domestic violence”.

4.63 Funds from government

Most of the activists of the ADVN had formal jobs in state-owned institutions. Some worked in mass organizations, others as professors or researchers in universities or research institutes. They had salaries from the state. For the majority of them, the ADVN was a part-time job, though not officially mandated as such. This is important to note because the blurring of boundaries between the state and civil society is generally seen as problematic. However, here we can see how activists were able to manipulate this fusion or blurring of boundaries to their advantage.

4.7 Summary

This chapter explained the characteristics of the ADVN in terms of the variables that potentially condition success or failure, namely legitimacy, leadership, organizational forms, learning and sources of funds. Figure 8 shows the status and characteristics of the ADVN in term of these variables.
I argued that the legitimacy of the ADVN was largely based on its unique expertise. The leadership was democratic in that a group of feminist scholars who endorsed feminist egalitarian principles in organizing led the ADVN. The power among these members was distributed amongst several elites rather than controlled by a single leader. A wheel-shaped network features a wide web of connections with government agencies, police stations, women’s federations, media, universities, academic research institutions, etc. Such a network was unique among CSOs in China. Furthermore, the learning
initiated by the ADVN was also distinctive, in that it facilitated the acceptance of new concepts and methods of gender for understanding violence against women in China. Finally, the majority of its funds come from foreign donors. The Ford Foundation, in particular, was above all the donor that had provided the financial support for the ADVN. Indeed, the support was not just about funds in terms of financial resources. It was also about opportunities that are opened up through the connections of the Ford Foundation and other donors such as the British Council, the NOVIB of the Netherlands, the SIDA of Sweden, and the Norwegian Human Rights Centre based in Oslo University in Norway.
5. Analyzing Policy Advocacy of the Anti-Domestic Violence

5.1 Introduction

This chapter investigated the influence of the ADVN in policy-making concerning domestic violence in China. In the last decade, the ADVN has done a tremendous job in shaping the domestic violence discourse and made a significant contribution to the placement of domestic violence on the policy agenda in China. During the revisions of the Marriage Law (2001) and Women’s Law (2005), women’s organizations strived to integrate anti-domestic clauses into the legislatures. The results were encouraging in that both the Marriage Law (2001) and Women’s Law (2005) contain clauses concerning anti-domestic violence. After realizing these aims, furthermore, women’s organizations, led by the ADVN, proposed a special law against domestic violence at the national level. Although the proposal has yet to be formally accepted by the NPC legislative plan, the advocacy has successfully promoted the creation of a comprehensive policy at national level\(^6\). At the same time, numerous local regulations against domestic violence have been adopted and implemented in 27 provinces and municipalities. Apart from influencing law-making, the policy advocacy also endeavoured to change the mindsets of policy-makers, police and judges, as well the public. To influence public opinion, the ADVN adeptly employed various means such as media campaigns, gender training, using popular actors and actresses as public ambassadors, producing documentaries and participating in the development of a TV soap, etc. These approaches together have changed the mindsets of many policy-makers and implementers as well as the public.

\(^6\) In 2008, the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist CCP of China, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of Health and All-China Women's Federation Jointly adopted a document entitled Several Opinions on Preventing and Stopping Domestic Violence.
In discussing the policy advocacy, I explore how the identified conditioning factors such as legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning, and financial support of the ADVN worked. I argue that different factors interacted with each other to exert a complex effect. Among these factors, above all, the expertise and network structure were noticeable in gaining the ADVN legitimacy and widening its access to influencing policy. At the same time, there were also certain factors that underlay these prominent conditioning factors. Above all, democratic leadership prepared the organization to be an open and embracing network, while innovative learning has strengthened the intellectual capacity of the ADVN in shaping discourses. In addition, the funds drawn from foreign donors had not made the ADVN an immediate object of suspicion of the officials as I assumed for this study.

This chapter contains two major sections. In the first, I investigate how the ADVN mobilized various resources to shape anti-domestic violence discourse and elevate it to the policy agenda. In so doing, I focus on the efforts of the ADVN in mobilizing consensus, identifying problems, establishing causal relations and suggesting solutions and remedies, which demonstrates the politics of CSOs shaping domestic violence discourse in China. In the second section, I analyze how the assumed conditioning factors of legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning and financial support affected the process and results.

5.2 Negotiating Anti-Domestic Violence in Legislation

The study found that the ADVN adopted strategic approaches and employed various instruments to confront conventional powerful discourses that pervaded society. Members of the ADVN developed diagnostic frames with a clear identification of problems, including the seriousness of domestic violence against women and the major causes of the issues in China. They also established prognostic frames to suggest feminist solutions and remedies. In so doing, they persuaded the public and relevant policy-makers that domestic violence was an urgent public issue that demanded policy interventions. The advocacy not only successfully facilitated a new understanding of
domestic violence, but also pushed forward the integration of domestic violence issues into legislation in China.

5.2.1 Framing the Issue

In China, as in many other parts of the world, domestic violence tended to be viewed as natural and justifiable. A lack of consensus that violence against women was wrong was conspicuous in some popular proverbial expressions. One view was that domestic violence was a private family issue and people outside the family should not intrude into it. Others considered the women rather than the men involved in domestic violence to blame for “finding fault with their husbands”. Even worse, some others considered physical violence between spouses as a common way of showing love and affection. In short, such attitudes illustrated an uncritical and partly unconscious way in which people perceived domestic violence as natural and justifiable, which pointed to an entrenched ‘common sense’ in the understanding of violence against women (Pickup, Williams and Sweetman 2001). To reverse the “common sense” understanding of domestic violence was a very challenging project. It involved transforming people’s minds and sensitizing them to see violence as criminal and intolerable. The study found that the ADVN wielded its power of knowledge and expertise to influence the public and press.

Collecting data: International women’s movements identify a lack of official statistical data in most countries on the prevalence of violence against women and its impacts on economic and social well-being (Pickup, Williams and Sweetman 2001). In

61 As the saying goes, “Domestic violence is a family matter; do not wash dirty linen in public (jiachoubuke waiyang, 家庭暴力是家务事，家丑不可外扬。).”

62 As it is often said: “Domestic violence takes two to tango (jiating baoli shi yige bazhang paibuxiang, 家庭暴力是一个巴掌拍不响)!”.

63 According to this point of view, “scolding wife demonstrates the love from the husband, while physical hitting amounts to dear love (dashing, mashie, 打是疼，骂是爱).
China, too, state organs do not always produce accurate statistics due to widespread lack of acknowledgement of violence against women as a crime, which is reflected in under-recording by police, health workers, and other officials. Although the 1990 national survey\textsuperscript{64} contained some quantitative data concerning violence against women, it did not indicate the seriousness of domestic violence nationwide. In particular, it contained no in-depth analysis of the impact on women victims, not to mention their needs.

To inform the public and policy makers of the seriousness of the issue, the ADVN initiated nine empirical investigations and surveys, published nine research reports and six books. The findings of these studies advanced the understanding of domestic violence in China in several respects:

First, from February to December 2000, the National Domestic Violence Survey sub-project was conducted in three provinces and nine cities/counties, including Zhejiang, Hunan, Gansu and Beijing. The results of this large-scale survey were published as “Research on Domestic Violence in China.” It depicted the occurrence and prevalence of domestic violence against women in China. In particular, it detailed how women lived with domestic violence. According to Liu and Zhang’s nationwide survey in 2000, most women victims dealt with domestic violence by themselves, employing one or more of the following: 36.3% of victims stayed at home, 26.3% went to work, 26.1% visited their friends, 20.1% stayed in bed feeling sick, 19.6% went to parents’ home, 9.9% went out drinking, 5% do a lot of shopping, 4.5% call friends and relatives, 3.2% went to parent-in-law’s family. Only a few of them sought public help by either reporting to the heads of their husband’s work units (1.2% ) or calling the police (0.3%) (Hester 2000 p.133).

\textsuperscript{64}One of the most authoritative statistics is the 1990 Annual Social Survey conducted jointly by the ACWF and the National Statistics Bureau. The survey was conducted in 21 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. The survey reported that 0.9% female respondents suffered regular beatings, 8.2% were sometimes beaten and 20.1% occasionally beaten. In short, the result inferred that 29% of women were subjected to domestic violence in varying degrees (Wang Xingjuan 2004).
Second, the impact of domestic violence on women was discussed for the first time. Xue Ninglan, a scholar from the Institute of Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), conducted research on 28 cases of abused women by taking oral accounts and analyzing these (Xue 2005b). Similarly, Liu Yunrong, Zhang Liying and Chang Yongjie, a group of scholars in population and health studies, initiated an investigation on these links between gynecological diseases and male violence, a topic tended to be ignored by scholars from both the health sectors and gender based violence studies (Liu, Zhang and Chang 2005). Likewise, Liu Meng & Zhang Lixi, professors from the China Women’s College, investigated the forms, nature, features, causes and harms of domestic violence in China through a comprehensive national survey (Liu and Zhang 2005). In addition, several women’s federations such as those in Jiangxi and Ningxia provinces also conducted surveys on domestic violence in their areas.

Third, the research specified the needs of women victims (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network(a) 2009). A survey was conducted under the Joint Advocacy Initiative for Female Victims of Domestic Violence, a joint project supported by the ADVN of the China Law Society and the ABA Rule of Law Initiative China Project Office. It contained a sample of 473 samples of women respondents that covered a wide range of areas including Beijing, Liaoning, Xiaogan City (Hubei), Qingdao City (Shandong), Luohe City (Henan), Qinglong County (Hebei), and Xuzhou City (Jiangsu). The survey showed the diverse needs of women victims of domestic violence depending on the different geographical areas and individuals’ backgrounds such as age and rural-urban divide. It identified a lack of agencies to meet the needs of and provide services for female victims of domestic violence.

Fourth, they introduced the theory of “battered women’s syndrome” (Wei 2005). In ‘The Application of “Battered Women Syndrome” in Cases of Fighting Violence with Violence’, Wei Liu, a lawyer in the Center for Women’s Law Studies and Legal Services, Peking University, explained how she succeeded in applying the ‘battered women syndrome’ concept to defend a woman who killed her violent husband. It was the first case of judicial practice in China when the sentence was mitigated in light of the
‘battered women syndrome’ concept. Before, abused women criminals had often been sentenced to capital punishment. The case attracted a lot of attention after it was reported in the media, public and government ministries including public security and civil affairs departments. (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(b) 2010) p46.

In short, the data and theories generated from several research projects initiated by the ADVN provided evidence of domestic violence in China, which was crucial in focusing public attention on the subject.

Engaging with the mainstream media: The ADVN’s capacity to mobilize the mass media was unique: members of the ADVN actively engaged with the mainstream of the mass media to help improve reporting on domestic violence. They first conducted a critical investigation to assess the performance of mass media on the issue of domestic violence. According to research by Guo Yanqiu and Cai Yiping analyzing newspaper reporting of domestic violence between 1991 and 1998, attitude problems in reporting domestic violence were:

“… a) denying the existence of domestic violence is a common problem, so the reporting usually is not able to report the issue in a fair and object way; b) exaggerating or dramatizing domestic violence stories; c) blaming women victims…Domestic violence is seen as a ‘domestic issue’ or ‘private issue’ rather than a gender based public issue and, the issue, therefore, rarely appears on the front page of the newspapers. ... However, if it is reported by the newspaper, it is depicted as an extreme situation of utter brutality, implying that it is an extremely uncommon situation that occurs only to some individuals; or women victims should be blamed or held responsible for the consequences of domestic violence. This kind of practice makes it hard for domestic violence to enter public agenda. It

As she stated: “The concept of battered women syndrome has fully illustrated the helplessness of the battered women who experienced long years of violence. Their killing of abusive husbands, therefore, may be justifiable, particularly when they were overwhelmed with fear. From their own suffering, they can tell that deadly injury is to come. Only by killing the abusive husbands can they protect themselves. Otherwise, they would but suffer from endless abuses by their husbands”. Wei, Liu. 2005. "The Application of ‘Battered Women Syndrom’ in Cases of Fighting Violence with Violence." Pp. 158-69 in Combating Domestic Violence against Women: China in Action, edited by Huang Lie and Weiyi Rong. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. p167.
also reinforces the belief that domestic violence is a private matter.”
(Huang and Rong 2005 p.184-5)

To improve the reporting of domestic violence in China, the Network arranged for journalists, including newcomers to the mass media business, to participate in gender awareness and anti-domestic violence training, dialogue meetings, special functions for volunteers, and expedition trips to the project pilot sites, as well as forums. In particular, they tried to influence mainstream media such as the Xinhua News Agency, China Daily, Legal Daily, China Women’s News, ‘Telling the Truth’ and ‘Half of the Sky’ programs at China Central Television, ‘Wisdom of China’ at Xilu.com, and the Women’s Channel at 163.com (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(b) 2010 p.54). According to the ADVN’s internal report, since 1995, the China Women’s News, a newspaper established by the ACWF, has begun to pay attention to domestic violence cases and anti-domestic violence measures. A specific “Anti Domestic Violence Column” resulted in a rise in the anti-domestic violence movement in both China and abroad 66.

From the interviews, I found that the ADVN’s mainstream strategy proved to be very effective in influencing the public. A case in point was the making of a documentary on women prisoners in Hebei province; a collection of filmed interviews of several women who had been victims of serious domestic violence before they killed their violent husbands. The documentary was aired on the Central TV cable and subsequently used in many gender-training workshops. According to the author’s

66 Since December 2002, the Procuratorial Daily (检察日报) (not sure what has happened here) opened the second “Anti DV Column” to reinforce the anti-DV campaign and popularize notions of anti-DV among procurators From 2001 -2002, Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报), China Women’s News, Huaxia News and China Daily had edited several thematic pages(do you mean editorials?) devoted to anti-DV. Through effective networking, the ADVN also mobilized other major newspapers to report on relevant issues. These newspapers include China Workers’ Daily (工人日报), China Youth Newspaper (中国青年报), Legality Daily (法制日报), Beijing Evening (北京晚报), Procuratory Daily (you’ve already mentioned this one above) (检察日报), China News Agency (新华社). (ADVN Newsletter, 18).
observation in a gender-training workshop for local officials in Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province in 2008:

“...the accounts given by the women in the documentary caused a major shift in attitudes of officials toward building asylums for victims of domestic violence. At the beginning of the training workshop, whilst officials had been willing to accept the concept of domestic violence they were reluctant to agree any budget for setting up asylums for women victims. After watching the documentary, however, the officials were so deeply touched by the miserable lives of women victims of domestic violence that they fell silent for a while. An official broke the silence by a passionately exclamation: “Certainly we should do something for our sisters who are suffering domestic violence....If we don’t help our sisters, our work is meaningless... ”. The attendees of the workshop quickly came to a consensus that local governments should be obliged to build asylums for women victims of domestic violence."

(Observation/Case1/01/14092008)

Another case was the ADVN’s participation in the development of the popular TV series: Do Not Speak to Strangers, the first such on domestic violence against women in China. ADVN staff participated in the series’ outline planning and introduced the writers to the concepts of domestic violence, methods of gender analysis, related laws and social resources. When the series was due to be transmitted, the website staff did an on-the-spot interview and wrote an article to publicize it. The series was extremely successful and resulted in considerable discussion67. According to reports from China Women’s News, post-transmission, the Beijing Maple Hotline received many more phone calls concerning domestic violence. It can be said that the showing and popularity of the TV series raised the public’s awareness of anti-domestic violence.

67 According to Bu, on August 20, 2002, Wu Han Morning News published an article entitled “Don’t Speak to Strangers’ was on in Wu Han: A College Teacher Beating His Wife”. The article quoted from an actual domestic violence survivor “my life is exactly like that described in the TV play. If I speak with strange men, I will be beaten by my husband.” On May 10 2002, the Beijing Youth published an article “Live Version of Don’t Speak to Strangers: Brutal Husband Stabbed Wife 17 Times”. Jiang Xing Daily (March 30, 2002) reported that the great impact the programme had on society can be attributed to the widespread discussions of domestic violence issues. It also shows that as a social issue, domestic violence has manifested itself and caught the attention of society as a whole.
nationwide. One of the show’s leading actors, Wang Xuebing, and an actress, Wang Tong, became ambassadors for the campaign against domestic violence in China.

Still another influential activity that stirred public interest was the internet signature petition initiated by the ADVN in December 2007. The ADVN and the Women’s Channel of NetEase co-sponsored the “Love Harmoniously without Violence” internet petition, successfully collecting over 125,000 signatures and presenting them to the United Nations Development Fund for Women. It was the first time that the ADVN had collaborated with Internet media and the campaign was effectively publicized. The event attracted a large number of people and had an extensive influence on society. (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(b) 2010) p27

Establishing feminist alternative media: The ADVN had consciously adopted a feminist media strategy that addressed the importance of developing independent alternative feminist media products. According to an interviewee:

“… the alternative media is defined as a media system, which is advocated and managed by social activists or NGOs for exchanges of information concerning marginalized or vulnerable groups with objectives to empower marginalized groups and to encourage their participation in the media.” (Bu 2005 p.174).

According to her, starting in 1995, Chinese women NGOs and women activists started to set up their own alternative media. For example, the Center for Women’s Law Studies and Legal Services, Peking University and Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Center both published books on domestic violence (CWLSLS(Center-for-Women’s-Law-Studies-and-Legal-Services) 1998; MWPCC(Maple-Women's-

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68 For example, one woman said that before watching the programme, she had no idea what domestic violence was and she did not realize that being beaten by family members could constitute a form of domestic violence. The programme gave rise to widespread discussions on DV issues in society according to Jiang Xing Daily, March 30, 2002. Apart from the TV soaps, several TV stations such as CCTV (中央电视台) and BJTV (北京电台) made special programmes on DV. (ADVN Newsletter, 18)
Psychological-Counselling-Center) 1998). She identified the following cultural products as the fruits of the feminist alternative approach.

First, the website of the ADVN played an important role in supplying information to support gender equality and women’s human rights in China. At the beginning of 2000, women’s CSOs in China started to build their own websites. Under this background, the “Stop Domestic Violence” website at www.stopdv.org.cn was created by the ADVN in 2000. It serves as a platform of information exchange in several ways: 1) providing systematic information on gender based domestic violence at home and abroad, 2) providing in an intensive and systematic manner an interpretation of domestic violence based on feminist and gender theories, 3) establishing and spreading independent voices and 4) through interaction with its users, the website has helped form a network of anti-domestic violence. According to Bu (2005 p.170-99), the website “provides the public with a different perspective of domestic violence by offering interpretations of the issue based on feminist and gender theories.” (ibid p.185).

By December 2002, the website had already received 25,600 visits. Disseminating information widely and promptly, the ADVN’s website “informed and encouraged...”

69 These included the Chinese Women’s Legal Aid website (www.woman-legalaid.org.cn) run by the Center for Women’s Law Studies and Legal Services, Peking University; the Gender and Development website (www.chinagad.org) established by the National Gender and Development Network; China Gender Media Watch website (www.genderwatchchina.org) run by Women’s Media Monitoring Network; and Rural Women’s website (www.country-woman.net) run by the Practical Skills Training Center for Rural Women.

70 As Bu contended, at the beginning, the ADVN just intended to construct an “information platform”, but had a clear vision of the role of the website. However, with the deepening of their work, they “came to the realization that the Stop Domestic Violence website is not only a platform for information exchange, it should also be a form of alternative media run by the Project which is devoted to empowering women”. Bu, Wei. 2005. “The Interaction of Alterantive Website and Mass Media in China: Case Study of "www.stopdv.org.cn".” Pp. 170-99 in Combating Domestic Violence against Women: China in Action, edited by Huang Lie and Weiyi Rong. Beijing: China Social Science Press. p183-4.

71 As a sub-project, the website reflects updated information against domestic violence. The staffs have been closely involved in important events held by the network such as the International Human Rights Day and the National Seminar on Domestic Violence that discussed the localization of anti-
journalists to use the website information, discussed the value of certain information with reporters and fostered their sense of social responsibility to help broadcast NGOs voice” (Bu 2005 p.194-5).

Second, the ADVN issued a bi-monthly publication, the Newsletter. It included news, exchange of working experiences, theoretical thoughts, legal study, international exchange, suggestions and feedback. From 2000 -2003, it issued 17 volumes (all can be downloaded from the ADVN’s website at www.stopdv.org.cn, Newsletter 4 & 16). Third, the ADVN set up an information center called “Domestic Violence Reference Centre” as one sub-project. By 2005, it had a collection of over a thousand books and other materials in Chinese and foreign languages (Huang and Rong 2005). From 2000 -2003, the center served over 630 borrowers from different backgrounds. It also translated materials to facilitate the learning of the projects and program (Newsletter, 18).

Fourth, the ADVN introduced the play “The Vagina Monologues” to break the taboo in China. It was first performed in Shanghai on 2 March 2002 to collect funds for the anti-domestic violence network. The event focused public attention on sexual violence against women. However, many media outlets dared not to publish it in full for fear of being accused of ‘pornography’. Nonetheless, the ADVN’s media person wrote a commentary entitled “Listening to The Vagina Monologues” which was published

domestic violence theories, as well as project evaluation meetings. The reports also cover visits and seminars in which the projects members or website staff participated. For example, the representatives of the website attended the Fourth NGOs Forum; and the Dialogue between NGOs and mass media. Project members visited Denmark, Norway and other countries to study how police address incidences of DV. Project members also attended the NGO forum and the Asia-Europe Summit Meeting held in 2002, which was reported on the website ibid.

72 Initially, the Newsletter was around 20,000 words long and 150 copies circulated. Due to greater demand, it is now longer and circulation has increased to 450.

73 The play was produced by an American NGO seeking to fight against violence against women. By saying the word “vagina” aloud - a word that more often than not brought about anxiety, humiliation, contempt and disgust - the play meant to break the silence covering up violence against women. The Vagina Monologues was performed around the world every Valentine’s Day to mark anti-DV.
online to introduce on Valentine’s Day the content of the play, the performance, interviews with the actors and performances in other countries. It took the lead in breaking down the shame and fears of mentioning the word ‘vagina’ in the article. However, it caused controversy in the mass media, as the writer reflected:

“The publication of the article stirred considerable social response. The writer got calls from Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou wishing to publish the article in mass media outlets. However, because ‘vagina’ appears in the article, many media outlets dared not publish it in full context for fear of ‘pornography’. In this case, the alternative media’s advantage was obvious. Within several days, the number of visitors to the website increased dramatically. …San Lian Life Weekly first interviewed the writer and reported the news on 6 April 2002. China Women News published two thirds of the article on 10 September 2002, as well as a commentary entitled ‘Be Ourselves’. Then China Women and Public Health also published an excerpt of the article. Through mass media, the ‘private’ topic successfully became a public one, highlighting women’s human rights.” (Bu 2005 p.196).

In short, these feminist media products created a space for voicing feminist concerns about domestic violence against women. Their vantage points were quite challenging to the mainstream media and society. This demonstrated that the ADVN tactically adopted a two-way strategy to both collaborate with the mainstream and at the same time initiate an autonomous movement.

**Mass popular education and training:** The ADVN initiated publicity and educational activities in communities in rural and urban areas. An urban pilot project successfully mobilized large-scale anti-DV publicity in the community:

“The 85 units in the community and more than 400 people carried out publicity activities on the streets, exhibiting 35 posters, 27 streamers and distributing 16,000 publicity materials. The residents began to understand that wife abuse and elderly abuse are illegal and everybody has the responsibility to intervene with domestic violence. (Qi, Li and Zhu 2005a p.237)

However, in rural areas with vast expanses of land and a sparse population, such kinds of concentrated publicity events were difficult to arrange. Hence, the rural pilot project
initiated innovative ways that suit rural characteristics and environment in their public campaign:

“…we paid attention to using vivid, lively and audio-visual methods, such as television and broadcast and produced performances shown at the golden time. We also made posters and exhibited them in the town, advocating the benefit of combating domestic violence. Based on the DV cases that occurred in the area, we compiled them into short plays, ‘pingju’ opera (a form of local opera), clapper talk and songs which local people love. We wrote and performed these plays by ourselves, giving mobile performances…. A film on combating domestic violence in Yanqing County was shot and shown at the TV station. From the progress of the project, these activities are geared to local characteristic and are welcomed by villagers, thus producing a great impact. According to a recent survey, beneficiaries of various publicities in the county are over 90% and local people’s domestic violence awareness has been raised in general”\textsuperscript{74}. (Zhao and Tian 2005 p.231-232)

Although varying in format and approach in rural and urban areas, these public campaigns had similar features: they centered on everyday activities and aimed at changing attitudes by various means and challenging assumptions. The activities were performed in public areas that were closely attached to people’s daily life, such as residents’ streets and villages. The campaign utilized local cultural products such as local opera, as well as mass media such as TV, to address DV issues.

The ADVN also conducted intensive gender awareness raising activities through gender training. Since June 2000, the Network had run more than 30 training sessions involving over 7,900 participants of which 2,350 (30%) were men. The training targets included members of the Management Committee, medical workers, office staff, police, youth, male psychologists, and women victims (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(b) 2010) p51. At the same time, the ADVN facilitated the publication of a series of

\textsuperscript{74} It is unclear how the survey concluded that over 90% beneficiaries.
training manuals\textsuperscript{75} that had been compiled for lawmakers, judges, police, lawyers, social workers, medical workers, and the abused (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(b) 2010). (Newsletter, 17)

Scenarios and story lines: Why were these media products so powerful? By using shocking images and pitiful storylines of women suffering domestic violence, the ADVN aroused great sympathy toward victims of domestic violence in the public. First, the image of women brutally treated by their husbands on TV shattered the belief that domestic conflicts were somehow a way of showing affection. The bleeding scars on the bodies of brutalised wives in the documentary and the TV shows destroyed the stereotypes of romanticized conflicts among couples, and led to the public’s utter disgust with the perpetrators and sympathy for the victims.

The study found that the story-lines of the narratives were effective in exciting public emotion. The scenarios of these stories were usually in such sequences as: 1) the violent husband beat his wife; 2) the wife sought help from society ranging from friends, her natal family, to women’s federations; 3) with limited help from both families and society, the victim had to cope with the violent husband on her own; 4) various endings included the following: remain in the violent relationship and develop a “battered women’s syndrome”; continue to seek help; choose to leave the husbands by means of divorce or even commit suicide or homicide. In addition, the plots often involved despairing and anxious parents-in-law and helpless children who lived in the shadow of the violence. For example, the documentary on several women who killed their violent husbands vividly illustrated how the domestic violence and subsequent murder of their

husbands adversely affected their family lives, in particular, their helpless and often scared children. In a Confucian culture like China, where family life is treasured and harmonious relationships within families greatly valued, and such a portrayal of the damaging impact of domestic violence on family life won much sympathy and arouse great public concerns on the issue.

Similarly, the storyline of the TV series “Don't Speak to Strangers” was also thought-provoking. While the plots were similar, what was unique was that the perpetrator of the domestic violence was a middle-class surgeon working in a modern hospital in a big city. The storyline radically challenged the popular belief that domestic violence only existed in ‘uncivilized’ populations in rural areas, where the perpetrators had received little, if any, education.

To sum up, the ADVN had successfully mobilized various media and produced a variety of cultural products. Comments from both in and outside the ADVN acknowledged that its media campaign was responsible for raising public awareness of anti-domestic violence in China (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network 2006; Harkness and Yu 2006; Zhang 2001). As an interviewee commented:

I think the ADVN is extremely successful in turning a previous taboo, that is to say the issue of wife battery, into a public issue…a public issue to which great importance has been attached…in such a short period of time. This is a great achievement of the ADVN in that it was able to draw serious attention on women’s right issue with such a highly consensus in such a short period…. Therefore, it is a fantastic accomplishment! (Interview/Case1/09/17112007)

Indeed, ADVN’s media campaign had covered wide areas and reached audiences with the most influential campaign of any run by CSOs, which indicated its strengths in manoeuvring various media and cultural institutions in the anti-domestic violence campaign and its remarkable capacity to influence public opinion and reshape the public discourse concerning domestic violence.
5.22 Reframing Policy Discourse

To persuade policy-makers that a multi-agency approach should be taken to solve the problem of domestic violence, the ADVN mobilized various resources to shape the diagnostic frame from a gender perspective and at the same time initiated experimental pilot projects. Based on the experiments and causal analyses it also proposed prognostic frames that specified detailed methods and proposals for preventing and combating domestic violence.

Establishing Diagnostic Frames: Unlike the conventional way of addressing domestic violence that had unanimously focused on women as objects of examination, the ADVN initiated studies on the institutional barriers of policy environment, public opinion and perpetuators of violence (most whom were men as husbands).

First, they pointed out that social attitudes matter. The ADVN initiated a sub-project entitled “The Survey of Legal Intervention on Domestic Violence against Women” in June 2000; over a period of two years, it collected and compared data from Beijing, three cities, and three counties in Liaoning Province. Xia Yinlan, a professor from the University of Political Science and Law, led a survey on the understanding of DV among cadres and officials in provincial people’s congresses, courts, procuratorates, public security organs and judicial administrative bodies. Her study identified a high extent of symbolic recognition among judicial workers of violence against women. However, there was an inadequate understanding of and sometimes even confusion over the nature of domestic violence, as well as a lack of comprehension of the importance of combating it (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-b 2010). Xia’s research provided answers as to why local agencies seldom had the momentum to explore effective means of combating domestic violence under existing policy and legislation frameworks. Thus, she called for tailored training and education among judicial workers (Xia, 2005).

Second, they pointed out that the mass media also matters. The ADVN initiated a study of five major newspapers in China (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network(b) 2009). Through comprehensive content and textual analysis, the study found that most violence is unreported. Reports of violence accounted for only 0.72% of the total number of
reports. The existing reports were all concentrated in the week of ‘International Women’s Day’ on March 8 or ‘International Elimination of Violence against Women Day’ on November 25. There was no concentration of reports on sexual violence outside of these dates. Apart from the deficiency in in-depth reports on violence, the mass media perpetuated the myth of acceptable violence by emphasizing various rationales, such as the inflictor had lost a job, was drunk, impatience over trivial matters, or other ‘objective’ excuses. A few reports also interpreted the reasons for violence as ‘emotion’, ‘love’, and even intimate relationships. There were even negative descriptions of victims by suggesting that inappropriate behaviour or their appearance were the causes of violence against them (ibid).

Third, they highlighted the negative impacts of loopholes in the Chinese legislature. Guo Huimin, a gender activist and scholar in the Centre for Women’s Development and Rights and Interests of the Northwest Industrial University based in Shanxi in China, identified legal obstacles for victims of violence in the existing legislature based on her seminal analysis on the text of relevant policies and laws (Guo 2005). In her Obstacles to Legal Treatment of Violence against Women and Response, she indicated that the revised Marriage Law (2001), though a break-through in terms of legislative response to domestic violence, still left many obstacles in the way of using the law to handle cases under the existing legal framework. The provision relating to the prohibition of domestic violence and legal response contained in the Marriage Law (2001), however, was only in principle, thus leading to difficulties in identifying the issue of violence in judicial practice. Furthermore, there was a lack of a crime definition in the Criminal Law (2009), inadequate civil sanction and remedy, problems in the Lawsuits, etc. (Interview/Case1/12/12122008).

Fourthly, they pinpointed the lack of a social support system and the constraints of previous approaches for victims of domestic violence. Chen Xiaoyan, an activist from the Marriage and Family Research Center in Shanxi Province, indicated in her research that previous misleading approaches tended to disempower women victims. According to her, there were two approaches to combat domestic violence, namely the
“family-oriented” and the ‘women-oriented’ methods. The family oriented method personalized the issue of abuse of women, attributing it to a person’s failure to adapt to societal expectations and sometimes even rationalizing the unequal gender relationship. It aimed to increase women’s ability, yet still confined them in traditional gender roles. The women oriented method considered domestic violence as a social problem. It placed women’s needs, their rights, interests and choices in the forefront and aims to change the social structure of gender inequality. She addressed ‘women-oriented’ methods that were oriented toward empowering women based on their innovative project in Shanxi (Chen 2005b).

Lastly but not exhaustingly, perpetrators, most of whom were men, were scrutinized. This was the primary concern of Tao Laiheng, a scholar in the Psychological Health Research Department of Xiaoazhuang Institute in Hebei Province. His psychological analysis of male abusers was the first study of its kind in China. Though it was quite hard to find the subjects for their study, the project managed to form a group for 14 abusers from Beijing under the title of ‘happy family growth group’, whereby they strategically combined research with counseling and therapy and changed the abusers through their research (Tao 2005).

To sum up, the ADVN has coordinated a systemic analysis of the causes of domestic violence through an interdisciplinary approach. Their analyses of the causes extended the conventional view that narrowly focused on women per se. Instead, they targeted broad social factors that included social attitudes, legislation, mass media, etc., which built a sound foundation for their proposal of a multi-agency cooperation model to cope with domestic violence against women.

Experimental pilot projects: The ADVN initiated projects for experimental innovations that aimed to create models for future interventions. The intervention trial included four components - community intervention, medical intervention, public security intervention and legal aid.

First, the community interventions aimed to integrate all social sectors in the intervention process. The ADVN was fully aware of the widening gap between rural
and urban development since the economic reform initiated in the 1978\textsuperscript{76}. It set up two pilot projects in rural and urban areas respectively, namely the Pilot Spot of Intervention against Domestic Violence in Rural Community in Yanqing County\textsuperscript{77} in Beijing and the Pilot Spot of Intervention against Domestic Violence in Urban Community in You An Men Neighborhood in Beijing\textsuperscript{79}. From the pilot project, the ADVN developed a Multi-Agency Cooperation Model (MACM) \textsuperscript{80}. This model indicated that gaining

\textsuperscript{76} The rural population constitutes 90\% of the total population. The social and economic development level in rural areas is much lower than that of urban areas, and traditional gender stereotypes and discrimination against women are more prevalent than in urban areas. Compared with urban areas, rural victims do not have access to convenient and professional law support, thus making them feel alone and helpless; some have to remain in violent relationships and their legitimate rights and interests are not protected (Huang & Rong, 2005). In general, domestic violence against women in rural areas was more serious. The rural-urban divide implied that a homogenous and unified model was inconceivable.

\textsuperscript{77} Yanqing County is situated in northeast Beijing and has a population of 300,000. It is a mountainous agricultural county with a medium level of economic development. The mountainous area over 72.8\% of the county’s total areas, with an agricultural population of 78\%. The area is perceived as typical of general counties in rural areas in China, which means that the experience of the county can be popularized in other similar areas. (219)

\textsuperscript{78} The project was implemented by the departments and bureaus of local government, judicial bodies and medical institutions. See the article \textit{Creating a Rural Model with Chinese characteristics in Combating Domestic Violence}, by Zhao Shuhua, China Women’s College, in Huang Lie & Rong Weiyi (ed.) \textit{Combating Violence against Women: China in Action}, Social Sciences Press Beijing. (2005) p.217-233.


\textsuperscript{80} The model takes on several characteristics. Horizontally, the network made it easy for once separated agencies to keep frequent and close contact with each other, to cooperate effectively when cases of domestic violence occur, and solve the matter in a coordinated way. Vertically, under the leading group directed by the local CCP branch and government, the domestic violence offices at rural county and urban community levels took on substantial administrative management, which supervised the anti-domestic violence stations in the village and town in rural and neighborhoods in urban areas. These networks ensured concerted action of multi-organization and the ability to control violence effectively with joint efforts and intervention. In the urban pilot project in You An men, for
support from local CCP branches and collaborate with local government and judicial agencies including public security, procuratorate, law and judicial bodies, departments of publicity, education and public health hygiene, especially women’s federation, was essential in combating domestic violence against women. These agencies had power and resources that were important to the ADVN. Their work and general goals are fundamentally consistent with the project’s goal. Most important, the relative jurisdictions within their grasp were crucial for dealing cases of domestic violence.

However, to get these local agencies into a unified and concrete work system was not easy. As one of the baseline studies noticed:

“These departments are shouldering a heavy workload, coupled with all sorts of routine duties. Their staff members are not clear about the importance of anti-DV work, its relation with their own daily responsibility, what each department needs to do and what they actually do”. (Zhao and Tian 2005 p.223)

Thus, the ADVN assisted the local agencies in setting up the Local Domestic Violence Intervention Network Leading Group to connect existing organizations into a network. The following graph demonstrates the framework of the local multi-agency cooperation networks:

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example, a corresponding community domestic violence intervention network was established in You An Men neighborhood with the participation of the police station, community hospital, administrative department of industry and commerce and legal aid station, with the neighborhood CCP work committee taking the lead. Likewise, with the rural pilot project in Yanqing, the public security, procuratorate, law and judicial bodies, department of publicity, education and public health hygiene, especially the women’s federation, had been integrated into a multi-cooperation network.
Inspired by the success of the community intervention pilot project, group members of the Network, such as those in Human, Hebei, Shanghai, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning and other regions also carried out multi-agency cooperative interventions in their local communities, and accumulated rich and varied experience with local characteristics (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(b) 2010 p.40).

Second, medical interventions were set up to provide battered women with medical aid and services in the public health system. The ADVN chose the Tie Ying Hospital in Fengtai District of Beijing as the first pilot hospital of medical intervention on domestic violence in China, and successfully developed the “Tie Ying” Model (2002). Afterwards, the ADVN promoted this model in other member regions including Zhangjiakou City and Xiaogan City. For a decade since the initiation of the medical intervention, the ADVN has endeavoured to lobby decision-makers in the public health system. As well as many training sessions that have enhanced awareness and the skills of medical personnel in aiding battered women, the work “Advice on Providing the Victims of Domestic Violence with Medical Diagnosis and Aids in Medical Institutions” was drafted by the ADVN and was submitted to the 11th session of the National People’s Congress (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(b) 2010 p.50).
The third intervention was related to police stations. A pilot project conducted by the Pinganlu Police Station in Qingdao Municipality, Shandong Province trialed a series of methods to cope with domestic violence. According to Hua Meiqing, the main approaches had two aspects: the local police investigated the community regularly to identify potential domestic violence and tried to prevent it, but if it did occur, they responded quickly, made follow up visits and provided further services (Hua 2005 p.264). The model of the policy intervention created by Pinganlu Police Station was endorsed by the Ministry of Public Security which honoured the station as one of the outstanding police stations in China (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network 2006)

The fourth intervention was based on the legal aid project by the Women’s Legal Research and Service Centre at the Law College of Peking University. Initiated in August 2000, the project dealt with 15 legal aid cases for women victims, which included lawsuits brought by women against abuse by husbands, as well as litigation over divorce due to domestic violence. These two kinds of cases accounted for a large proportion of the litigation. The Women’s Legal Research and Service Centre initiated experiments on how to make the public security organs (police stations) and court treat the injury caused by domestic violence properly. The project also enabled the judiciary to accept cases and help victims collect evidence of violence, etc. In divorce litigation the project explored ways of compensating women for the domestic violence as well as property divisions that favoured the victims. In addition, the third type, though fewer in number, consisted of the most serious criminal cases where a battered woman had killed her husband. The Women’s Legal Research and Service Centre had used the "battered woman syndrome" theory to defend women victims.

In short, the ADVN initiated a series of pilot projects to set up models for interventions against domestic violence in China. Its multi-agency cooperative intervention model has had great impacts in raising awareness of anti-domestic violence and gender equality, reducing the frequency of domestic violence when it happened.

**Establishing Prognostic Frames**: Based on the diagnostic frame and the experiment, the ADVN proposed prognostic frames to specify directions and contents
for policy change. However, the study found that the prognostic frame they proposed was not fixed and had undergone changes over time. At the turn of the century, members of the ADVN proposed integration of anti-domestic violence clauses into the revised Marriage Law and Women’s Law. Their aim was to regulate domestic violence with existing legislation.

To persuade policy-makers that there was a need to have a special law, the ADVN initiated policy analysis to show that although there were clauses in the Marriage Law (2001) and the Women’s Law (2005), they were not strong enough to protect women from domestic violence. They pointed out that the provisions of Marriage Law amendment concerning domestic violence were too abstract to be implemented in practice. In particular, it did not contain a clear definition of the concept of domestic violence, nor did it specify legal remedies for victims, which inevitably resulted in ineffectiveness in implementation (Xue, 129). In addition, they highlighted that while the integration of anti-domestic violence clauses indicated a positive attitude

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81 According to ADVN experts, “…The amendment of the Marriage Law in 2001 integrates the domestic violence issue into the national legislation for the first time. It made several breakthroughs such as: 1) The General Chapter endorses prohibiting domestic violence legislative principles, which embodies the principles of protection of marriage, family, mothers and children in the Constitution. It has also become a guiding principle for legislation at the national level. 2) ‘Domestic violence or, maltreatment and desertion of one family member by another’ (Article 32 (2)) is made one of the conditions for judge to grant divorce…3) The chapter concerning Succour Measures and Legal Liability (Chapter V) specifies relief measures for victims of domestic violence and the civil liability of the perpetrators (Articles 43, 44, and 46) … “Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network (Ed.). 2006. Studies on the Models of Interventions on Domestic Violence (Jia Ting Bao Li Gan Yu Mo Shi Yan Jiu). Beijing: Research Group of the Anti-Domestic Violence Against Women. p129-130

82 According to ADVN experts, “Compared with the Marriage Law, the Women’s Law made three progress to advance anti-domestic violence legislation: 1) compared with the Marriage Law, it emphasizes that the prevention and prohibition of domestic violence is primarily the responsibility of the state; 2) It specifies that ‘the public security, civil affairs, judicial administrative departments, the urban and rural grassroots self-governing organizations, and social organization shall, according to their respective functions, prevent and stop family violence and help the women victims’ (Article 46). It adopts a multi-agency cooperation to prevent and combat domestic violence that has not been covered by the Marriage Law; 3) It specifies the liability of domestic violence that has not been specified by the Marriage Law…” ibid. p129-130
of the state to resolutely put a stop to domestic violence, they were only effective in raising public awareness and providing a guiding principle for relevant works. Both the Marriage Law and the Women’s Law had limits to their ability to curb and control domestic violence. Moreover, the current General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (1987), Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Penalties for Public Security (amended 1994), and the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (Amendment VIII, 2011) did not differentiate between domestic violence and violence in society at large. They did not consider domestic violence a criminal act that required special legal regulations (Xue 2005a). Thus, they suggested that:

“…preventing and punishing domestic violence is a systematic enterprise of the whole society concerning interventions of communities, administration, judiciary, and so forth. It is not an issue exclusively relating to civil law, nor an issue simply relating to administrative and criminal laws. It requires a special law to regulate the interventions comprehensively…” (ibid p.130)

The prognostic frame proposed by the ADVN was included in the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Punishment of Domestic Violence (the LPPDV, a proposal drafted by the ADVN), a comprehensive special law on domestic violence against women. The Proposed Draft consisted of eight chapters: General Provisions, Administrative Intervention, Social Intervention, Civil Law Intervention, Criminal Law Intervention, Evidence, Legal Responsibility and Supplementary Provisions (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(a) 2010). The LPPDV was the first policy draft developed uniquely by CSOs.

83 They argued that the Marriage Law mediated domestic violence through a mediating approach rather than punishing the violent abuser. Although domestic violence occurred between family members, it was a criminal act. Thus, the Marriage Law alone could not solve the problem. Likewise, the Women’s Law was also insufficient, as it was mostly a declaration that served as the constitutional guarantee of the protection of the rights and interests of women. It did not specify concrete interventions and treatment, which were to be specified in other civil, administrative and criminal laws.
It is noteworthy that ADVN’s prognostic frame was heavily influenced by international instruments concerning violence against women. The draft of the LPPDV referred to A Framework for Model Legislation on Domestic Violence (ESC 1996) drafted by Radhika Coomaraswamy, a Special Rapporteur on female violence for United Nations Human Rights Commission. The ADVN had the model framework translated into Chinese and presented to its drafting group. They also introduced and made references to laws of other countries\(^8\) to prove that establishing a special law was not only a necessity but also attainable (Chen 2005b; Xue 2005b).

The ADVN’s draft specified basic principles of prevention and punishment of domestic violence that embody advanced legislative ideas.

“… The Proposed Draft establishes the following five principles from the perspective of human rights theory and gender perspective: (1) the principle of prohibition of all forms of domestic violence. …; (2) the principle of establishing a government-guided multi-agency cooperation system. …; (3) the principle of early intervention and putting prevention first. …; (4) the principle of putting the victim first. …; (5) the principle of combining education and correction with punishment. …”(Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(a) 2010 p.49).

Secondly, the acceptance of the UN definition was prominent. The ADVN’s proposed definition of domestic violence was consistent with the definitions contained in the UN treaties. According to Xue Ninglan, the coordinator of the sub-project on policy advocacy, the definition in the Marriage Law was vague. However, the UN’s definition of domestic violence “covers various forms of bodily, sexual, spiritual and economic harms so as to bring it in conformity with the relevant international conventions signed

\(^8\) They used practices in other countries to show the necessity of a special law on domestic violence, arguing that 60 countries had developed special laws against domestic violence. For instance, in 2002, Japan issued a law on the prevention and treatment of victims of domestic violence. The measures included protecting victims, prohibiting stalking, etc. In 1998, Korea implemented the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Victim Protection Act and Special Act for the Punishment of Domestic Violence. These laws specified the regulations for reporting domestic violence, asylum systems at different levels, and procedures for criminalizing domestic violence.
or ratified by China and maximize the protection of the interests of the victims of domestic violence”. (ibid p.50)

Third, to create a multi-agency cooperation, the law proposed by the ADVN elaborates the major responsibilities of the government in establishing anti-domestic violence committees to coordinate the multi-agency cooperation mechanism. Fourthly, the draft specified the components of the social interventions and the roles of various agencies such as Residents’ Committees and Village Committees (Article 27), the Work Units (Article 28), the Trade Union, Communist Youth Leagues, Women’s Federations, Associations of Disabled Persons and other organizations (Article 29), Correspondence and Visitation Departments at various levels (Article 30), Educational Institutions (Article 31), medical institutions (Article 32), mass media (Article 33), legal aid and legal service agencies (Article 34), and NGOs (Article 35). Fifth, the draft specified the concrete procedures of civil (Chapter 4) and criminal (Chapter 5) interventions and collecting evidence (Chapter 6), as well as legal responsibility (Chapter 7). Some provisions, such as civil protection orders and the rules of evidence pertaining to the concept of battered woman syndrome were fairly innovative in jurisprudence in China. In particular, its clarifications of legal responsibilities regarding domestic violence became so all-embracing that it “integrates the administrative, civil and criminal responsibilities for domestic violence and endeavours to ensure the unification and dovetailing of such arrangement with the existing legal provisions. For example, in the part on criminal responsibilities, the Proposed Draft makes a typological treatment of the crime of domestic violence in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Law by categorizing and integrating various crimes relating to domestic violence and puts them under a single provision on the 'crime of domestic violence', thereby establishing a comprehensive and systematic legal basis for the relevant judicial practice.” (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(a) 2010 p.53-4).

In short, I argue that the ADVN has adeptly wielded the power of discourse in policy advocacy. Their tactics and strategies included establishing diagnostic frames, pilot projects, prognostic frames, all of which positively contributed to the outcomes.
5.23 Developing and Submitting Policy Proposals

This study found that the ADVN employed its technical expertise in drafting policy proposals and utilized various channels to submit them.

Drafting the Proposal: The development of the LPPDV had four major steps as the following figure shows.

Figure 10 Stages of Drafting ADVN Proposal: Time and Academic Disciplinary

First, from June 2000 to June 2002, the ADVN initiated a series of surveys and interviews (see Section 5.21 of this chapter) (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network 2006) p132. The results of the survey were integrated into the volume Research on the Foundational Construction of the Law on Domestic Violence Prevention and
Determent” (Liu 2011). At this stage, scholars in sociology and social work played an important role, although some scholars in legal studies conducted part of the research.

The second stage began in early 2002. The ADVN created an expert group for drafting the policy proposal. Composed of members of the ADVN and legal experts invited from major legal research institutes and universities in Beijing, their backgrounds covered a wide range of expertise including studies on the constitution, criminal law, civil law, procedural law, etc. The expert group developed a framework of the LPPDV in collaboration with scholars who had conducted the survey.

The information center of the ADVN collected and translated copies of relevant laws regarding domestic violence from other countries. In particular, they translated A Framework for Model Legislation on Domestic Violence (ESC 1996), drafted by Radhika Coomaraswamy, a Special Rapporteur on female violence for United Nations Human Rights Commission. The center also collected local laws and policy documents on domestic violence developed by the end of 2001. All of these references provided important background material for the expert group drafting the proposal.

From mid-September 2002, a new focus group was formed after the draft of the LPPDV was first completed. Led by Professor Chen Mingxia from the Law Studies Center of the CASS, a group of four comprising Professor Xia Yinlan (China Political and Law University), Professor Li Mingshun (China Women’s College), and researcher Xue Ninglan (Law Studies Center of the CASS) focused on modifying the draft. This was a rather closed stage where distinguished legal experts took the lead.

Stage 4 began at the end of 2002 and consisted of consultations and revisions. Professor Chen Mingxia presented the main points of the draft at the “International Conference on Anti-Domestic Violence against Women” held on 15-16 November 2002 and the ADVN solicited comments and suggestions from participants. Engaged in anti-

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85 In April 2010, this book won the First Prize of the Outstanding Achievements of Women’s Studies in China, awarded by the All-China Women’s Federation and Chinese Women’s Research Association.
domestic violence courses, these participants included members of the ADVN, scholars of various disciplines, legislators, and officials working in judicial or proracurate organs.

On 20 January and 9 February 2003, the draft group convened two consultation meetings where the ADVN invited legal experts to comment and advise on the structure, style settings, chapters and provisions, and technical issues of legislation and jurisprudence.

In 2003, the proposed Law on Prevention and Determent of Domestic Violence was ready for submission to the session of NPC and the CPPCC. On 26 February 2003, the seventh draft of the proposed Law on the Prevention and Punishment of Domestic Violence was completed. On 28 February, the Explanation of the LPPDV was accomplished.

In 2006, the ADVN organized a new expert group and took three-year efforts to make delicate amendments to the first draft of the domestic violence law. In 2006, the ADVN reformed the expert group to amend the draft. Led by Xia Yinlan, the expert group was composed of law experts and professors such as Chen Mingxia and Li Mingshun. It conducted three major investigations and convened six specialized seminars. After seven revisions, the expert group had accomplished the comprehensive revision of the draft by the end of 2003. By the 2010, the ADVN had conducted three surveys and held six seminars specifically for the revision of the LPPDV that had been revised for seven times (ibid).

Submitting proposals: Since its establishment, the ADVN has organized eight policy proposal submissions as the following table shows.
Table 9 Policy Proposals/Bills Submitted by the ADVN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Proposals/Bills</th>
<th>Access/channels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>March 2003</td>
<td>LPPDV</td>
<td>30 NPC representatives submitted it at the first session of the tenth assembly of the NPC. Hong Tianhui organized the submission. The NPC formally accepted the motion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To the first session of the tenth assembly of the CPPCC through representatives of the CPPCC. Cao Suying organized the submission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Second half of 2003</td>
<td>Suggestions based on the LPPDV</td>
<td>To the draft group for the revision of the Women’s Law (2005) through members of the drafting group. These members are also ADVN experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>March 2006</td>
<td>LPPDV (amended)</td>
<td>To the NPC and the CPPCC through their deputies and members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>“Provisions on the Cognizance of the Court of Sexual Harassment Cases”</td>
<td>To the Eleventh NPC and CPPCC sessions through their deputies and members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td>“Suggestions on Judicial Interpretations of Habeas Corpus Ruling” and</td>
<td>To the Eleventh NPC and CPPCC sessions through their deputies and members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td>“Regulations on Police Intervention in Domestic Violence”</td>
<td>To the Eleventh NPC and CPPCC sessions through their deputies and members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td>“Suggestions to Medical Care Institutions to Identify and Rescue Domestic Violence Victims”</td>
<td>To the Eleventh NPC and CPPCC sessions through their deputies and members, particularly Prof. Wei Zhongmin and 20 other NPC and CPPCC representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td>LPPDV (This draft was a revision of the proposal of 2003)</td>
<td>To the Eleventh NPC and CPPCC sessions through their deputies and members.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed by the author.
In 2003, through an alliance with one of her former students who was working in the NPC (according to my interview), the key ADVN leader gained knowledge of potential champions who would help submit their proposal. Hong Tianhui, then the President of the Jiangsu Women’s Federation, and later a vice president of the ACWF, organized the submission. Over 30 NPC representatives jointly submitted the proposed law to the NPC at the first session of the tenth assembly of the NPC that formally accepted the motion. At the same time, the network also submitted the proposed law to the first session of the tenth assembly of the CPPCC through representatives of the CPPCC. Cao Suying, a representative of the CPPCC and the then president of Hebei Women’s Federation, organized the submission (Liu 2011 p.5).

In the second half of 2003, members of the ADVN proposed suggestions based on the LPPDV to the draft group for the revision of the Women’s Law (2005). The ACWF led the revision of the Women’s Law. The legislative team absorbed members of the ADVN such as Chen Mingxia, Xia Yinlan and Li Mingshun. They suggested the integration of special provisions prohibiting domestic violence against women and administrative and legal responsibilities. These suggestions were accepted and written into the revised Women’s Law (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network 2006 p.137).

In March 2006, Chen Mingxia, Xia Yinlan, Li Mingshun and Xue Ninglan presented the work of the draft group to the principal leaders of the China Law Society. After seeking agreement with the leaders, the ADVN submitted bills and proposals to the NPC and CPPCC sessions in 2006 in the name of the China Law Society (ibid p.133-4).

In March 2008, the ADVN submitted the expert proposal of the judicial interpretations on “Provision on the Cognizance of the Court of Sexual Harassment Cases” through the NPC and CPPCC representatives to the Eleventh NPC and CPPCC session. The proposal was the result of the “Seminar on the Achievements of Anti-Sexual Harassment in the Workplace and the Judicial Interpretations” co-sponsored by the ADVN, the Center for Gender and Law Studies of the Institute of Juridical Studies of Chinese Academy of Social Science, and the Research Group of Anti-Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace, held on 29 February 2008. At the seminar, participants issued an expert proposal of the judicial interpretations on the “Provisions on the Cognizance of the Court of Sexual Harassment Cases” (ibid p.28).

In March 2009, the ADVN submitted “Suggestions on Judicial Interpretations of Habeas Corpus Ruling” and “Regulations on Police Intervention in Domestic Violence” through the NPC and CPPCC representatives to the Eleventh NPC and CPPCC session. (ibid p. 29). This was followed in March 2010 by “Suggestions to Medical Care Institutions to Identify and Rescue Domestic Violence Victims” through Prof. Wei Zhongmin and other over 20 NPC and CPPCC representatives, to the Eleventh NPC and CPPCC session. (ibid p. 31); the Network also submitted the amended LPPDV through the NPC and CPPCC representatives to the Eleventh NPC and CPPCC session again. This draft was a revision of the proposal of 2003 (ibid p.31).

Acceptance by the NPC and local people’s congresses: The ADVN’s policy advocacy had influence at both national and local levels. Their proposals were accepted by relevant state agencies concerning violence against women. The LPPDV has been accepted by the NPC and is expected to enter legislature plan this year (2012). Their suggestions on domestic violence articles were accepted by the Women’s Law (2005) and their proposals such as the “Provisions on the Cognizance of the Court of Sexual Harassment Cases” (2008), “Suggestions on Judicial Interpretations of Habeas Corpus Ruling” (2009), “Regulations on Police Intervention in Domestic Violence” (2009), and “Suggestions to Medical Care Institutions to Identify and Rescue Domestic Violence Victims” (2010) have been accepted by relevant state agencies to different extents (Interview/Case1/15/11112011).

The ADVN’s policy advocacy made even more achievements at local level. The first local regulation on preventing and curbing domestic violence against women was issued in January 1996 by the municipal city of Changsha in Hunan province. Although the ADVN had not participated in the process, it was responsible for the successive promulgations of local policies and legislations concerning anti-domestic violence in Sichuan, Ningxia, Jiangxi, Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Shanxi, Anhui, Shandong.
Hebei, Liaoning, Guangxi, Hainan, Qinghai. The draft of LPPDV developed by the ADVN provided a model for legislation at provincial and other local levels (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network 2006).

Apart from providing legislative models, the ADVN also provided assistance directly to local legislation. The ADVN experts helped review and revise drafts and made recommendations (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network 2006 p.137). For example, the following pieces of local legislation received the ADVN’s direct assistance:

On 25 July 2003, the Standing Committee of the Hubei People’s Congress passed the Resolutions on the Prevention and Punishment of Domestic Violence;

On 22 July 2004, the Standing Committee of the Hebei People’s Congress passed the Decisions on the Prevention and Punishment of Domestic Violence;

On 28 May 2005, the tenth Standing Committee of the nineteenth assembly of the Liaoning People’s Congress passed the Regulations on the Prevention and Punishment of Domestic Violence in Liaoning Province;

On 28 September 2005, the third Standing Committee of the nineteenth assembly of the Hainan People’s Congress passed Regulations on the Prevention and Punishment of Domestic Violence in Hainan Province.

On July 2, 2009, with the joint effort of the ADVN and the UN Development Fund for Women, the Hunan People’s High Court issued the “Guidelines on Reinforcing Judicial Protection of Women Victims of Domestic Violence”. These were the first guidelines specifically for judicial hearings of domestic violence issued by a provincial court. (ibid p. 30)

However, the experts of the ADVN felt constraints on their influence. A proposed law drafted by a CSO, had no binding effect. Thus, it was limited in directing the formulation of the relevant regulations at local levels. For example, the proposed law drafted by the ADVN defined violence broadly including physical, mental, sexual, and economic in reference to relevant international instruments. However, in February 2002, the Supreme People’s Court issued a judicial interpretation to narrow the
definition of domestic violence only to physical and mental dimensions. This interpretation directly influenced local legislation in defining violence against women and thus many local regulations excluded sexual violence from the definitions (ibid.138-9).

5.24 Influencing Policy Deliberation and Adoption

The ADVN’s policy proposal of LPPDV has yet to be formally put on the legislative agenda of the NPC. Thus, I am unable to provide an analysis on the ADVN’s influence on policy deliberation and adoption of the specific law at national level. In order to understand the role of the ADVN, nevertheless, I will discuss their role in the revision of the Marriage Law (2001) and the Women’s Law (2005). Thus, in the following discussions, I shift the focus from the LPPDV to their previous campaigns for integration of anti-domestic violence into the Marriage Law (2000) and the Women’s Law (2005).

Participating in drafting the laws: The study found that some of the ADVN legal experts had been nominated as experts of the drafting groups of the Marriage Law (2000) and the Women’s Law (2005). It was through their participation in drafting the laws that the integration of anti-domestic violence had been facilitated (Chen 2005a). As a leader of the ADVN revealed, some of the experts, who were also ADVN members, participated directly in the revision of the Marriage Law and the Women’s Law and had pushed the integration of the anti-domestic violence clauses into these laws. Clearly, while the state was capitalizing on their technical expertise, these scholars were seizing the opportunity to push the anti-domestic clause to enter the laws consciously.

However, they have been invited, not as representatives of their network, but as individual scholars due to their distinguished expertise. Although some may argue that their participation cannot be counted as ADVN’s influence, nevertheless, I suggest that they had been supported by the ADVN that had prepared them with gender perspectives and international references through various project activities. Thus, although they
participated as individual experts, their capacity and influence were closely related to that of the ADVN.

**Interagency Reviews and Public Consultations:** The ADVN seems to have little, if at all, fast access to the interagency reviews of laws and policies. For example, the key agencies involved in the inter-agency review of the draft of the Marriage Law (2001) included the Ministry of Justice, Supreme People's Court and the National People's Congress, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the National Federation and the Communist Youth League Central Committee, as well as the All-China Women's Federation. However, in the public consultation, the ADVN experts were frequently interviewed by the media, which made them quite popular in the public.

**The NPC Review and the Adoption:** There is even less opportunity for CSOs like the ADVN to participate in this final stage. However, I suggest that the ADVN’s accomplishments in raising public awareness had paved the way for the passing of relevant clauses at the final stage. According to Wu Changzhen, a distinguished experts in marriage law, there was little objection, if any, to the integration of anti-domestic violence into the Marriage Law and the Women’s Law. She noted a consensus among representatives of the NPC on the issue (Wu 2001).

### 5.3 Analysis of Conditioning Factors

The ADVN’s advocacy has mobilized such dynamic forces and exerted such a profound influence over public opinion and the legislation that puts other CSOs to shame. In China, where the policy environment is far from conducive to CSOs’ development, how was it that the ADVN, a newly emerged CSO, was able to wield such power and influence? This section embarks on an analytical exploration of how the assumed conditioning factors affected the success of ADVN’s policy advocacy.
5.31 Impacts of Expertise

I argue that expertise served as a foundation for other dimensions of legitimacy. It was precisely the advanced expertise possessed by the members of the ADVN that helped it gain affiliation with the CLS that provided the legitimacy for the network operation. This extensive expertise also facilitated the ADVN in gaining authority in policy campaigns concerning anti-domestic violence.

Three Major Types of Expertise: The study found that the expertise of the ADVN was extensive. Among the interdisciplinary expertise, above all, three disciplines stood out: sociology and social work, jurisprudence and legal studies, and media studies or journalism. Academics or practitioners in these areas contributed considerably to the results of the advocacy.

The sociologists were responsible for the in-depth studies on the prevalence and seriousness of violence against women in society. Indeed, as the CCP/state emphasized the importance of scientific decision-making, technical expertise was increasingly viewed as a required condition for participation in policymaking. Therefore, the information they collected about the prevalence of domestic violence against women was seen to be valid largely because the researchers undertaking the project had sound backgrounds in sociology. The quantitative and qualitative methods used in data collection, the interpretation and the analysis of the data were all deemed to have been well implemented (Huang and Rong 2005).

Likewise, the scholars of jurisprudence and legal studies utilized their knowledge and expertise to influence legislation either through their participation in the policy consultation or involvement in a group for drafting laws or policies. It was because they were experts in family law and gender issues, their “academic reputation” [xue shu xin yu] that made their proposals more convincing. For example, a representative of the CPPCC admitted that one of the reasons she agreed to help the ADVN deliver the bills was that the activist who initiated the bill was a distinguished scholar from the CASS, whom she respected and trusted. Furthermore, their policy proposals were perceived as scientific and persuasive because they were written in
technical legal terms [fa yan fa yu]. In comparison, the proposals submitted by the
ACWF have been questioned by some legislators regarding their accuracy and rigour, as
they are usually drafted by staffs that have no legal training. Although well intentioned,
the relevant departments of the ACWF are not properly versed in rigorous research
methods or law, nor do they have distinctive expertise in law or knowledge of policies
in specific areas. This lack of expertise affects their influence in legislation. It was also
because of the ADVN’s expertise in family law that they were invited to join the
drafting group for the revision of the Family Law.

The third type of important expertise was research and practice in media. As the
last section saw, the ADVN had effectively initiated cooperation with mass media that
contributed to attitudes changing in society. Leading these activities were distinguished
researchers on media studies and journalists, most of whom were members of the
“Women Media Monitoring Network”86. They not only helped the ADVN produce
sound reporting on domestic violence, but also strengthened the liaison and
communication between it and the media. (Bu 2005)

Expertise extends the channels and access to legislation of the ADVN:
According to the key leader of the ADVN, it was through her profession as an advanced
legal expert that her organization was able to link with policy-makers and build
alliances with them:

“…then I was the vice president of the Marriage Law Research
Association under that CLS…I have kept good terms with the
CLS…I enjoy high prestige [weixin] within the CLS…and I know
Mr. Fang Xiang very well, he was responsible for research within the

86 The “Women Media Monitor Network” was established in 1996 with a mission to promote gender
equality through monitoring and bringing changes to gender-biased reporting. Members include over
30 individuals from 26 mass media groups such as journalists from the Procuratory Daily (检察日报),
Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报), China Women’s News, China Workers’ Daily (工人日报),
China Youth Newspaper (中国青年报), Legality Daily (法制日报), Beijing Evening (北京晚报),
Procuratory Daily (检察日报), China News Agency (新华社), China Daily (中国日报), Beijing
Youth Daily (北京青年报), etc. (Newsletter, 18).
CSL…under these circumstances, it is easy to communicate with them…” (Interview/Case1/01/08092007)

The expertise provided a foundation for the ADVN’s alliance with relevant policy makers. The key leader acknowledged that their affiliation to the CLS had affected the campaigns in several ways: First, it provided them with an umbrella under which the ADVN gained safety and authority for approaching different government departments. As the key leader stated:

“First, the CLS is our big banner. Second, we can connect public security organs, procuratorial organs and people’s courts. Third, we can popularize our successful experiences through it, delivering them among security and procuratorial organs and people’s court…and we can ask them to help us contact other people. Thus in the way it can push forward our work a lot…” (Interview/Case1/01/08092007)

“…in this way you are able to link with other functional departments or organizations…it (the status of affiliation) does help us. In addition, there is a banner which can keep out wind and rain for you…it’s better than registering as a non-governmental/folk (minjian) organization free of tax…” (Interview/Case1/01/08092007)

“…they help us bear on risks, and they help us to publicize (our project). Because of them we got approval from the government…” (Interview/Case1/01/08092007)

Second, the affiliation status provided them with more access to the relevant Party/state organs for submitting their policy proposals. As the CLS was mandated by the CCP and the State Council with coordinating participation in the framing, drafting, revising and debating of legislation, the ADVN could benefit from its access to legislation and policy-making. For example, the Marriage Law Research Association, one of the CLS’s affiliates, had been involved in the revision of the Marriage Law in 2000. Some of its distinguished scholars such as Wu Changzhen and Cheng Mingxia were in the drafting group. Chen Mingxia was a coordinator of the ADVN at the same time. Acting in her capacity as a member of the drafting group and the coordinator of the ADVN, she was able to put forward the proposals of the ADVN for integrating domestic violence clauses into the Marriage Law (2001). Affiliation under the CLS helped scholars involved in the ADVN acquire ‘insider’ status, which increased their chances of being invited by government agencies to provide policy advice on marriage issues.
Third, the affiliation status helped ADVN to link up with public security organs, procuratorial organs and people’s courts at local level. These local organs were the local agencies involved in supervising the implementation of the ADVN’s projects. For example, Fengtai District in Beijing set up a network committee which included leaders of the district women’s federation, police bureau, legal and procuratorial bureau, court, health care bureau etc., These agencies had played an important role in supporting and supervising the Youanmen (Right Peace Gate) Community Project, one of ADVN’s interventional sub-projects. The legitimacy gained by the ADVN among these local agencies largely depended on the wide network already enjoyed by the CLS with judges, prosecutors and attorneys, many of whom were members.

In short, the ADVN wielded its power of expertise to gain authority for their policy proposals and extend their access to legislation and policy-making.

5.32 Impact of Organizational Structure

The case of the ADVN revealed that its network structure was conducive in forging cooperation among dynamic forces. In particular, the heterogeneity and flexibility of the network was conducive to ensuring complementary amongst the different organizations. As we mentioned before, there were four major forces in the ADVC. These actors possessed different strengths and weaknesses in policy process concerning gender issues. To begin with, the new types of women’s CSOs and groups were well informed about gender concepts and theory, as well as innovative methods they had learned from colleagues in international NGOs. However, they had little access to policy making which was still a quite closed process. Women’s federations, however, enjoyed more access to policy process than new types of women’s organizations. With their chairpersons serving in the People’s Congress and Political Consultative Committees, women’s federations could put forward proposals to initiate new laws or policies. As a rule, legislature and government agencies need to invite comments and suggestions from women’s federations once a law or policy is to be enacted or revised. However, most women’s federations were not as knowledgeable as the new type of women’s
organizations or groups about new concepts and methods. In addition, many local women’s federations lacked funds due to the ongoing administrative reform that aimed to reduce the size and budget of local governments. In the government agencies, furthermore, many policy makers or implementers lacked gender sensitivity as well. Accordingly, they were blind to domestic violence as a public issue, and thus seldom treated relevant cases seriously, not to mention fairly. Moreover, many media persons were as gender blind as many governmental officials, if not more so. The multi-cooperation structure created by the ADVC significantly enhanced complementarity amongst its different member organizations, which promoted sharing resources among different actors in the following ways:

**Sharing access to policy-making:** In particular, the network enhanced sharing access to policy making among member organizations. It extended the breath of participation and improved the quality of proposals in politicizing domestic violence. New types of women’s CSOs and groups with little access to policymaking could avail themselves of the channels enjoyed by mass organizations such as those of women’s federations. For instance, the LPPDV initiated by the ADVN was submitted to the NPC and the CPPCC through chairpersons of provincial women’s federations as well as top leaders in the ACWF, who were members of these political institutions. Otherwise, it would have been difficult for a network like the ADVN with no formal registration to submit policy proposals to the state legislature.

**Enhancing the quality of policy proposals:** By joining forces in proposing policy change, the ADVN with its diverse membership, was able to enhance the quality of policy proposals. For example, some women’s federations such as those in Hubei, Hebei and Liaoning provinces (see Section 5.23) felt relieved in that they no longer needed to worry about their lack of technical proficiency in drafting proposals. With the assistance of professionals in law and public policy, they improved the quality of proposals by using the appropriate technical terms. Nowadays, the employment of technical terms has increasingly become an essential indicator of the quality of the proposal. As many cadres working in women’s federations had not received specialized
training in law and public policy, their lack of proficiency tended to compromise their influence in policy-making. The technical assistance they received from the ADVN no doubt helped them enhance their policy influence.

**Sharing Financial Resources:** As domestic violence had never been put on the policy agenda, there were hardly any funds to initiate relevant activities such as research and establishing services for victims. Sharing financial resources provided by donors was no doubt valuable for not only the new types of women’s NGOs and groups but also women’s federations at different levels. Moreover, such sharing of resources was highly unusual as many CSOs see themselves in competition with each other for donor funds. For women’s federations in particular, the financial support made it possible to conduct many meaningful projects. As mentioned before, the lack of financial resources was one of the major constraints in local women’s federations initiating activities. Now the new type of women CSOs and groups not only got funds from donors, but could also utilize state salaried staff at women’s federations and some governmental agencies to work on relevant projects.

In this process, above all, the exchange of resources was particularly noteworthy. The resources of insiders and outsiders were transferred in two ways. Those leaders who had dual identities both inside the ADVN and outside it, for instance, in state-owned agencies, transferred their social capital gained from inside state agencies to the CSOs. For example, the Changsha Women’s Federation introduced their access to local policy making to the ADVN. In return, the ADVN introduced and made use of the knowledge and expertise, which included new concepts or working methods they learned, to enhance the daily work of the women’s federations. This implies that the heterogeneity of the network can not only increase the influence of ADVN as a whole, but also intensify the impact of their member organizations.

87 Some respondents reported that that the annual fund for conducting activities for a county women’s federation was less than 3,000 Yuan RMB, which, it was said, was not enough for a single ceremony for the 8th March International Women’s Day.
Sharing organizational networks at local levels: The network makes it possible for the ADVN to reach the organizational resources of the ACWF at local levels. One route is through conventional legal consulting organs (xinfang) that were set up in county level women’s federations. These organs provide women with consulting services and help them file lawsuits, thus supporting women victims of domestic violence. Another path is through women’s committees at local levels, in particular through street community in urban areas and villages in rural areas. These women’s committees play an important role in mediating family conflicts including domestic violence against women.

Synergies in Action: The network proved conducive to concerted actions at both project level and program level. At project level, any member organization was able to interact with another through project activities. For example, the Gender Trainers’ Group used gender-training workshops to connect with actors involved in different sub-projects and the Women’s College collaborated with local government organizations in their research on intervention in rural and urban areas.

The platforms for action, which included cooperation on projects and ad hoc activities such as national and international conferences, the celebration of international anti-DV days in November every year, and other events, were made possible by the crisscrossing structure that was essentially a platform for members to exchange information and develop concerted collaboration. The purpose of these conferences was made clear in a monograph edited by the ADVN:

1) to present and exchange achievements made in anti-domestic violence in China and experiences gained in intervention process; 2) to better our understandings of obligation, measures taking by the government and the role played by NGOs at national, regional and international levels; 3) to explore and address main obstacles and countermeasures in China; and 4) to raise masses’ domestic violence awareness, enhance sensitivity of decision-making and governments at various levels, so to stress. (Huang and Rong 2005 p.1)

Furthermore, the network facilitated the drafting and submitting of proposals through concerted action among different member organizations. The process of developing the LPPDV was essentially the product of cooperation of different components of the
In general, the case of ADVN revealed a dynamic organizational structure with a diverse and hybrid format. At the national level, the member organizations were connected through a flexible and close network that functioned as a multi-divisional coordination. The nature of the ADVN’s mobilizing structure was essentially a multi-divisional coordination. The democracy, transparency and openness of the network enhanced participation of its members and collaborations among them. It attracted different forces to join efforts leading to synergies at different levels.

5.33 Impact of Leadership

As stated in previous chapters, the ADVN has linked together a dynamic set of actors and administered a diversity of sub-projects. It is worth noting that it enjoyed perhaps the most wide-ranging network compared with other women’s CSOs or even other social organizations in China. Behind this impressive network and its remarkable performance, though, was a visionary, tactical and democratic leadership. It is unthinkable that such a network could have had so many achievements without a strong leadership. As most of these traits such as vision, passion, tactical awareness, etc., are

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88 First, one of the subprojects conducted the survey in judicial intervention on domestic violence and drafted the framework that put forward basic concepts and clauses. Based on the framework, the legislation group and some invited experts completed a preliminary draft. Several consultative meetings followed, both inside and outside the network. Then the ADVC organized several debating meetings as the LPPDV had aroused great public attention. After many rounds of debating and revisions, the final draft was agreed. Afterwards, the ADVC disseminated it widely and utilized many channels such as the women’s federations and the experts who had been invited to consultancy groups for policy making to facilitate the submission. Meanwhile, the network also mandated the media to initiate media campaigns through TV programmes and newspapers columns. Thus, the wide network built by the ADVN made it possible to mobilize many forces for concerted actions. During this process, the website at www.stopdv.org.cn served as an effective media and platform to coordinate concerted actions. It served as both vehicle for exchanging information and raising public awareness.
indispensable for the flourishing and sustaining of CSOs, I focus analysis on the uniqueness of the leadership of the ADVN, namely the democratic leadership mediating capacities style, for a deeper analysis. The case of the ADVN showed that the democratic leadership style affected the advocacy work in several ways:

Egalitarian leadership attracted enthusiastic individual activists: For most individual activists, the equal distribution of power and pluralist decision-making of the ADVN leading body was very attractive. Indeed, many activists were drawn to the network precisely because of its egalitarian organizational culture and principle. For example, several of my interviewees admitted that it was due to the collective nature of and transparency in decision-making that drew them to the ADVN. In the late 1990s when the ADVN was founded, its creators consciously drew lessons from earlier women’s organizations. The lack of transparency in financial administration and centralization of decision-making were serious problems that threatened the development of some new women’s CSOs. One interviewee, who once worked in such a CSO, complained that: “We didn’t know how the organizational money was spent. It often went without any trace”. A few organizations functioned almost as a family enterprise with the decision-making and financial resources under exclusive control of the leaders. Working in such kinds of organizations made many activists feel like a “tool being simply used by the organization” (Interview/Case1/05/08102007). It was not surprising that many gender activists who had high hopes of working in a feminist organization felt disappointed with those women’s organizations and turned to the ADVN.

Broadminded leadership was conducive to forging alliances among other CSOs: It was largely because of the tolerance and the outstanding mediating capacity of its leaders that the ADVN was able to connect with so many other women’s organizations for such an extensive alliance. It was noteworthy that many founders of newly emerged women’s organizations had strong characteristics. They were without doubt leaders with outstanding capacities, but some of them were quite self-centered and forming a long-term collaboration with them was not an easy task. Nevertheless, the leaders of the
ADVN had successfully cemented these leaders into a network. When asked the secret of the success, the key leader described herself as a “dustbin” that was always ready to accept complaints and criticisms\(^\text{89}\) dumped by members of the ADVN.

Within the ADVN, however, the leaders’ authority was based on their capacity for communication and tolerance, which shows the importance of “soft” power, mostly characterized by persuasion and communication. As there were few formal bonds between the ADVN and its member organizations, the tolerance of the leaders seems more important than in those leaders in bureaucratic organizations where hierarchical divisions of responsibilities play an important role in sustaining authority. Indeed, the leaders of the ADVN needed to accept the various leaders of their member organizations ranging from assertive founders of CSOs to bureaucratic leaders of mass organizations and government. As such, the personal characteristics of the coordinating director were important in attracting different organizations through her inclusiveness and democratic leadership. Leaders with assertive and dominant characters were less likely to construct successful collaborative networks.

Mediating capacity helped strengthen various partnerships: While the heterogeneity of the network is conducive for collaboration among dynamic forces, it could also make partnerships complex understandings for the leaders of the ADVN. Mediating different partners was an onerous task for ADVN leaders. As elaborated in Chapter 4, the ADVN has coordinated four major forces, namely the women’s federations, other CSOs\(^\text{90}\), governmental agencies, and the media. The study found that the outstanding mediating capacity of the ADVN leaders is key to mobilizing and sustaining such a remarkable network. Acting as a glue, the coordinator successfully

\(^{89}\) She recalled how a distinguished leader of a new type of CSO reprimanded her openly in front of many other members of the ADVN and made her feel embarrassed. However, she remained kind to the emotional leader.

\(^{90}\) The women’s NGOs and groups that were incorporated into the network included the Women’s Legal Research and Service Centre, Law College of Peking University, The Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Centre, Shanxi Women Legal Research and Service Centre, China Women’s College, Women Media Watch, and the Gender Trainers Group.
cemented different members together to form an institution with democracy and transparency. The key coordinator of the ADVN identified mediating leadership in two dimensions:

…if you are to be a leader for a large network NGO … you should have ability in mediation. You should have methods and tactics. For example, when something happens, you should not panic; you should have ways to deal with it. You should be calm and firm…Nevertheless, the ability of mediation/coordination is very important. It has two aspects. On the one hand, it refers to the ability of socializing and communicating with others. On the other hand, it refers to the skill of ‘playing the piano’, which means you can generate enthusiasms of different people and deal with several tasks at same time. For example, I have 15 sub-projects. I have to get everything in good order and well arranged. … These two capacities are very important. You have at least to have these capacities…

(Appoint/Cae1/02/03102009)

Apparently, my respondent’s view of mediation ability had two dimensions, namely the ethical level of camaraderie and the practical level of administration. In the ethical dimension, the mediation ability was close to mutual trust, liking and respect in the relationship between themselves and their subordinates, or themselves and their partners. In the administrative dimension, furthermore, it was the ability to implement the ethos of camaraderie into daily management work.

5.34 Impact of Learning

The case of the ADVN showed that the members of the ADVN had engaged in various learning process that eventually brought about enhanced capacities in reframing public and policy discourse concerning domestic violence. However, the impacts of learning were not as obvious as other factors such as expertise and network structure. After all, learning was virtually an adaptive process that was more likely to result in gradual change. Thus, it was quite hard to claim that any individual training workshop or study tour was responsible for particular changes. Nevertheless, the importance of learning in their advocacy was stressed by leaders of the ADVN in my interviews as well in
ADVN’s organizational publications. As I observed, learning has facilitated the ADVN’s advocacy in the following respects:

Enhanced awareness among constituents of the network. As argued in previous chapters, before the ADVN was initiated, it was commonplace to think that domestic violence was a private issue. Most, officials, judicial workers, medical staff, etc., tended to think that domestic violence was a private issue unworthy of public attention, not to mention intervention (Huang & Rong, 2005). Although some recognized a need to curb domestic violence, they normally relegated it to a business of women’s organizations. Facing such blindness about the domestic violence issue, the ADVN utilized various means to raise the awareness of the participants of its sub-projects. Intensive gender training, above all, was the most effective way of facilitating attitudinal change.

One of the features of the ADVN is using gender as a starting point. Gender sensitization became an approach to guarantee the capacity of the member organizations…..It is illustrated in our organizational map. Only have we ensured the capacity of the participants when we embark on relevant projects. (Interview/Case1/01/08092007)

As showed in previous sections, this gender awareness and anti-domestic violence training covered a wide range of audiences in local areas⁹¹. The result of the training was obvious. As the urban pilot project report revealed:

“…we have conducted training on gender and combating domestic violence in a rolling, consecutive form at multi-levels. The training has helped change old concepts in the minds of social workers, women federation staff, police, judges and medical workers. The awareness of gender and DV intervention has been gradually raised

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⁹¹ They reached all the members of the multi-cooperation network such as the office and station, grassroots women’s federation cadres, police officers, court, and procuratorate personnel and women cadres of the trade union, etc. For example, the urban pilot project carried out 16 training courses for over 1,000 participants, including staff members from the community network’s various organizations, officials from the district, neighborhood, town level women’s federation and residents’ committee, community activists, as well as family members where violence had occurred Qi, Xiaoyu, Hongtao Li, and Dongwu Zhu. 2005b. "Exploring of An Urban Community Model of Intervention against Domestic Violence." Pp. 234-51 in Combating Domestic Violence against Women: China in Action, edited by Lie Huang and Wei Rong. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press.
and people began to get involved consciously in anti-DV work in their respective work units”. (Qi, Li and Zhu 2005b p.241)

It is worth noting that the raising of consciousness helped improve the understanding of the nature of domestic violence. Reports show that gender training helped the participants come to realize the root of women’s subordination, as this training had focused on the analysis of the operating mechanism of the gender system and the unequal power structure and relationships. Thus, before the training, some participants “thought that domestic violence was an internal affair, but now they realized that it was a violation of women’s human rights” (Feng 2005 p.202).

The learning initiated by the ADVN brought about personal change at various levels and sectors. The women’s federations involved in the network were exposed to gender concepts in gender training sessions. Compared to their counterpart women’s federations in other areas, they were more capable of using new concepts to advocate for eliminating violence against women. As one of the coordinators of the ADVN stated:

We can change women’s federations. The fact is they have changed. For example, these women’s federations dispense with traditional ways and learn to try innovative methods...They draw insights and gain information from this network that has changed their working methods and mindsets... (Interview/Case1/01/08092007)

Stories of awareness raising also came from other members such as police officers92, medical personnel 93, cadres in rural pilot projects, and researchers 94

92 The report also shows that the tailored training for police officers helped them change their conventional thinking that police should not interfere in family disputes. Trained police officers learned to understand their responsibilities in dealing with domestic violence as well as the victims’ calls for help. They started to realize that “police should avoid such things like delay and indifference in handling domestic violence cases, and blaming the abuser and the abused without any distinction”. Feng, Yuan. Ibid."Gender Training: Exploring the Strongpoint of Intervention.” Pp. 200-13.

93 According to Feng Yuan: “medical personnel and community workers no longer treat abused wives just as ‘ordinary patients’”. Ibid.
(Interview/Case1/05/08102007)(Huang and Rong 2005). Some argue that the gender training has not only brought about awareness rising but also resulted in new local policies. The Yanqing rural pilot project enhanced the incorporation of the multi-agency cooperation model of combating domestic violence into its Tenth Five-Year Plan of Women’s Development, based on training on gender awareness and anti-domestic violence for local policy makers. The local governor issued the *Opinion on the Implementation of Combating Domestic Violence against Women and Intervention through Multi-agency Cooperation*, which requires every work unit to strive to create “Zero Domestic Violence Demonstration Town (work unit)” (Zhao 2005).

**Enhanced ability in gender analysis of domestic violence:** Gender perspectives cultivated through gender training workshops and other related project activities helped them reorient the interpretation of the causes of domestic violence. Conventionally, mainstream policy makers had focused on “poor quality” and suggesting “inappropriate behaviour” of women as triggers of domestic violence. Contrary to this conventional thinking, gender perspectives guided the activists and scholars of the ADVN toward external institutional factors such as social power relations, the existing legal provisions, lack of social support, etc., which increased the wealth of studies on domestic violence. These in turn provided theories and methods for ADVN’s diagnostic and prognostic framing of the domestic violence issues.

**Application of international definitions:** The definition of domestic violence against women in the ADVN’s policy proposal was the result of their acceptance of the international definition. Learning from the world, the activists of the ADVN cultivated a comparative perspective to identify gaps in legislation in China. They found that the definition of the domestic violence in China was very narrowly interpreted compared

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94 It was reported that the colleagues from the sub-project of oral history sharpened their perspectives in identifying suffering from DV as a trigger of women’s crimes. After being equipped with a gender perspective, when they went to court to select cases from piles of files, “they were able to find the hidden connection between the crimes committed by females and domestic violence, although all the files only recorded the fact of women killing their husbands and so on “. Ibid.
with the international standard. The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1993, identified three main categories of violence against women, namely physical, sexual, and psychological violence occurring within the family, within the community, and perpetrated or condoned by the State (Article 2). Yet currently in China, psychological and sexual violence are barely covered by the law. Thus, broadening the definition of domestic violence based on the international standard, therefore, was one of priorities of researchers on the anti-domestic violence project, in order to provide victims of domestic violence with a comprehensive and effective legal protection. In their suggestion of the definition in LPPDV, they made extensive reference to international laws and statutes such as the CEDAW and the UN Declaration on Elimination of Violence against Women (1993) to address a comprehensive definition embracing physical, psychological, sexual and economical aspects (Huang and Rong 2005).

Another example was their advocacy for a multi-cooperational model in combating domestic violence against women. Both the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women and the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action set out a comprehensive approach for intervention on domestic violence. Exposed to international instruments and approaches, the activists identified the gaps in laws and social services. They were unsatisfied with the conventional approach of women’s federations that often focused on raising women’s capacity to enhance self-protection epitomized in the “four-selves slogans” for women (self-respect, self-reliance, self-

95 Article 4 outlines the measures that the State should take to address violence against women. For example, states should implement policies that include counseling, health and social services, and general preventative, punitive, and remedial measures.

96 For example, the states should make efforts to take active steps to punish and redress such violence, including passing legislation; ratifying international human rights instruments; providing women who are subject to violence with access to mechanisms of justice; raising awareness about violence against women; and providing training for judicial, legal, medical, social, educational, police, and immigration personnel on how to respond to violence. The Platform for Action also demands that states report on the measures that they take against violence against women, and that they cooperate with UN human rights monitoring bodies (Chapter IV, paragraph. 4.9).
confidence, and self-improvement) (Hester 2000). Instead, they advocated for widening government responsibilities and extending collaboration among various actors in the society, which was crystallized in their multi-agency cooperation model.

Similarly, the introduction and application of the “battered women syndrome” to China was still another example of how ADVN’s learning enriched their ideologies and approaches. As stated in previous chapters, the ADVN activists successfully used this concept to protect women victims in lawsuits (Huang and Rong, 2005). In the policy proposal draft by the ADVN, furthermore, battered woman syndrome\(^\text{97}\) was introduced into the rules of evidence for mitigating the legal responsibilities of a victim of domestic violence (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(a) 2010).

To sum up, the organizational learning was responsible for the strengthening of the capacity of ADVN in “discursive politics”. Their struggle over the meaning of policy discourse was backed up by what they had learned through various training and study tours organized by the ADVN. The enhanced awareness facilitated consensus and commitment among the participants, which in turn facilitated the smooth progress of the ADVN’s sub-projects.

\(^{97}\) Battered woman syndrome is a special behavioural pattern of inability to take action to stop the perpetrator from committing violence, namely a condition of psychological paralysis characterized by passiveness, submission, and helplessness, that appears in women who have been subjected to violent abuse by their husband or boyfriend for an extended period of time in a marital or cohabitation relationship. Such victims are often unable to get any help and find themselves in a condition of isolation, helplessness and extreme fear for an extended period. Once they take self-relief action and "meet violence with violence", they face severe punishment for violation of the Criminal Law. By introducing the concept of battered woman syndrome into the rules of evidence, the Proposed Draft changes this unfair judicial reality, reduces the legal responsibility of victims of domestic violence by taking into consideration the factors that lead to a crime, and provides those who meet violence with violence with a legal remedy. Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network-(a). 2010. "Law of People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Punishment of Domestic Violence." Anti-Domestic Violence Network of China Law Society. p53.
5.35 Impact of Sources of Funds

As explained in the previous chapter, the majority of the ADVN’s funding came from foreign donors. When asked whether it affected the authority of the ADVN in policy advocacy, the leaders felt that they had faced little distrust because of their funds coming from foreign donors (Interview/Case1/01/08092007). As a respondent explained, this was mostly because the ADVN was affiliated to the China Law Society (CLS), which served as a protector. However, other women’s organizations without any such protectors were more likely to incur suspicions if they receive funds from foreign donors.

5.4 Summary

The ADVN launched such a systematic and sustainable campaign that it lasted for over a decade. The process of the CSOs’ policy advocacy demonstrated a politics of shaping domestic violence discourse. The ADVN successfully wielded its power of expertise and network to shape the issue of domestic violence as a policy issue. The general principles of the revised Marriage Law (2001) clarified that “domestic violence was prohibited” and corresponding relief measures were stipulated in the chapter of legal liabilities. Likewise, the revised Women’s Law (2005) also addressed the issue by containing relevant measures. Furthermore, compared with pre-1990s attitudes, when the public perceived wife battering as natural and a private affair, the issue of domestic violence attracted more and more public attention, and the damage caused by domestic violence was increasingly understood by the public. No doubt, the advocacy efforts initiated by the ADVN played an important role in breaking the silence and made it attract wide public and policy attention. In this process, the employment of various narrative tactics such as images and story lines marked the distinctive capacity of the ADVN to influence policy change through discourse politics.
In general, the case of the ADVN illustrates the complexity of CSOs working in policy processes in China. Indeed, not one single element such as legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning or source of financial support can fully explain the phenomena. The case study shows that these factors interacted with each other and affected the outcomes of the CSOs’ policy advocacy as a whole. However, I argue that in the case of the ADVN, the professional expertise and network structure were the most important conditioning factors that were responsible for the ADVN’s legitimacy and authoritative capacity to combat domestic violence. Furthermore, I suggest that the open and flexible network was shaped by the democratic leadership style. Indeed, the characteristics of leadership style and the structure of organization were strongly interrelated, as demonstrated in the case study. While these three factors stand out, organizational learning was also a critical factor that is often unobserved unless deliberately paid due attention. The case of the ADVN suggests that innovative learning significantly contributed to its unique capacity in shaping public discourse and policy proposals. In addition, contrary to my assumption that the source of funding might affect the authority of the ADVN in negotiating domestic violence in policy, the foreign donors’ financial support seemed not to have resulted in any suspicion or doubt among policy-makers about the legitimacy of the ADVN in their policy advocacy.
6. The All-China Women’s Federation

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines how the suggested conditioning factors, namely legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning and source of funds, feature the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), the key actor in the equal retirement age campaign for women since the 1980s in China. Founded in April 1949, the ACWF is a mass organization led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). According to its Charter, it serves as a "transmission belt between the CCP and society". In the early years of the PRC, the ACWF served the CCP to mobilize women in socialist development. During the Cultural Revolution, it ceased to exist and the cadres were sent to the grassroots. After the economic reforms, the ACWF resumed its work and has played an active role in promoting women’s rights ever since. It has advocated for many gender issues to be integrated into public policies and laws: the campaign for a unified retirement age for men and women civil servants and technical experts is one of them.

Explaining the features of the ACWF, I argue that it enjoys political legitimacy because of its alliance with key political actors in China. The CCP endows it with legitimacy in representing women’s rights and interests in policy-making. The leadership and organizational structure of the ACWF is essentially bureaucratic, as the source of authority comes from hierarchical divisions of positions. Although the ACWF attaches great importance to learning, the subjects are conventional in that it centers on mainstream scholarship. Funding mainly comes from the government, although it has also received project funding from international donors. The following sections discuss these features in turn.

6.2 Political Legitimacy

In this section, I argue that the basis for the ACWF’s authority to influence policy is its alliances and its structural position as a transmission belt organization to the CCP.
Through its alliance with the CCP, it gains organizational legitimacy without needing to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA). Through its alliance with the State Council and the NPC, it gains access to policy making to represent women’s interests. The expertise of the ACWF is based on its “women’s-work” coined by Davin (1976) in her comprehensive study on history of women’s federations. This kind of expertise is principally grounded in practical knowledge.

6.21 Alliances with the CCP and the State

The ACWF enjoys a unique position that boasts extensive and valuable connections with, and access to, the CCP and the state, as well as other political organs such as the NPC and the CPPCC. The following sections examine this in greater depth.

Alliance with the CCP: The CCP endows the major mass organizations with decision-making power over public affairs in several ways, which have been regularized in the blueprint policy, namely the "Announcement on Enhancing and Improving the Leadership of the CCP over the Trade Unions, the Communist Youth Leagues, and the Women’s Federations" (CCP 1989) in December, 1989 (referred to as the Announcement 1989). First, the CCP includes key leaders of major mass organizations in its system, major leaders of the mass organizations being members of CCP Committees at various levels. At the national level, for example, presidents of the ACWF are members of the CCP Central Committee. The vice president/first Secretary of the Secretariat was made a member of the delegation at the CCP congress. Thus, the Announcement 1989 requires that: “The leaders of the trade unions, Communist Youth Leagues and the Women’s Federations should be shortlisted in the nomination of the members of the CCP Committee of the region” (Chapter 2, Announcement 1989).

98 The recent president Mme. Chen Zhili is a Member of the 17th CCP Central Committee.

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Second, the CCP holds regular meetings with major mass organizations as a way of enhancing its connections with them. According to the Announcement 1989: “… In order to enhance the leadership of the CCP, CCP committees at all levels should establish and perfect the necessary work systems, and timely study the issues brought to the CCP committee by trade unions, Communist Youth Leagues, Women’s Federations; CCP committees should convene meetings that address to the issues raised by these major mass organizations not less than twice a year…” (Chapter 2, Announcement 1989).

In the case of the ACWF, the CCP may mandate the ACWF to convene ad hoc meetings centering on women’s issues. Another approach is to invite major leaders of mass organizations to meetings convened by the CCP. The Announcement 1989 requires that “the related meetings of CCP committees should invite leaders of trade unions, Communist Youth League, women's federations to participate or observe.” (Chapter 2, Announcement 1989).

Thus, women’s federations at various levels gain access to CCP committees where they can help define major issues concerning women and children. Their regular meetings with CCP committees are important because they not only encourage women’s federations to work closely with the CCP committees and gain their support, but also build channels for women’s federations to approach other political organs.

Third, the CCP integrates the work of major mass organizations such as the ACWF as a component of CCP work. The Announcement 1989 calls CCP Committees at different levels to “support Trade Unions, Communist Youth League, Women's Federations to work independently in accordance with the law and their respective statutes” (Chapter 3), and “support Trade Unions, Communist Youth Leagues, Women's Federations in protecting specific interests and defending the respective group of people they represent, when at same time safeguarding the overall interests of people across the country…” (Chapter 4)

The CCP’s authority over the ACWF’s causes some scholars to question the ACWF’s autonomy and representation of women’s interests. A number of them argue
that the ACWF “remains an integral part of the Party/state apparatus” which make unlikely to prioritize women’s interests (China Brief, 2003-07-1). From the case of the ACWF, however, we can see its relation with the CCP entails both subordination and empowerment. On the one hand, the ACWF has to accede to the CCP’s leadership. The CCP has a decisive role in the leadership formation and organizational development of the ACWF and has shaped its direction in terms of organizational function in different eras according to distinct priorities of national development\textsuperscript{99}. On the other hand, the ACWF gains legitimate access to decision-making in public affairs in the interests of women and children. The CCP has had in fact to cede power to these mass organizations in order that they are able to play an effective role in Chinese society. Thus, the strategies of controlling and empowering the major mass organizations coexist in the CCP’s policy, as crystalized in the Announcement 1989. The ACWF’s subjection to the CCP and its attainment of authority occur simultaneously.

\textbf{Alliances with the NPC and CPPCC:} The National People’s Congress (NPC) plays an increasingly important role in contemporary Chinese political life. Routinely, chairpersons of the ACWF will serve as one of the vice chairpersons of the Standing Committee of the NPC\textsuperscript{100}. As vice chairpersons of the NPC Standing Committee, the top leaders of the ACWF attend meetings of the Standing Committee that enjoy power in legislation, supervision and decision-making over major issues. They are also tasked with assessing and appraising draft laws and policies.

\textsuperscript{99} At the beginning of the PRC, for instance, the CCP made the ACWF a kind of front line to unite women from all walks of life and mobilize them in socialist construction. Later on, in the process of building the modern bureaucratic system, the CCP facilitated the ACWF in its transformation into ministerial level state machinery on women and children’s affairs.

\textsuperscript{100} For example, Peng Peiyun was the Vice Chairperson of the ninth Standing Committee of the NPC from 1997 to 2003 when she served as the President of the ACWF (1998-2003). Likewise, Gu Xiulian was one of the vice chairpersons of the 10th Standing Committee of the NPC when she served as the Chairperson of the ACWF from 2003 to 2008. The current chairperson of the ACWF Chen Zhili is one of the Vice Chairpersons of the 11th Standing Committee of the NPC.
The ACWF’s access to the NPC is also channeled via the NPC’s Office of Workers, Youth and Women, an ad-hoc working committee led by the Internal and Judicial Affairs of the NPC. In its daily work, it is responsible for contacting the government departments and NGOs concerned with the rights and interests of women and children. Among them, the ACWF plays an important role.

In addition to its access to the NPC, the ACWF has an even closer involvement with the CPPCC. The CPPCC is tasked with political consultation, democratic supervision and participation in the deliberation and administration of state affairs in China. The National Committee of the CPPCC is composed of representatives from the CCP, all democratic parties, personages without CCP affiliation, mass organizations, all ethnic groups, various sectors of society, etc. In this political institution, the ACWF has comparatively more seats than it has in the more powerful NPC. Normally, one of the vice chairpersons of the ACWF will be nominated as a member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC, and other members of the Secretariat may also be made members of the CPPCC. The ACWF also has the privilege of leading the Circle of the All-China Women’s Federation, one of the 30 or so circles at the conference. Thus, it is able to organize training workshops or briefings for members of CPPCC of the ACWF’s circle before the conference. It encourages the members of Fulianjie to support the bills proposed by women’s federations at the conferences. In short, as members of the CPPCC, particularly the leaders of the Fulianjie, it can coordinate concerted campaigns for maximum effect.

Access to the state: The ACWF’s role in public policy making with the state is specified by the CCP in the Announcement 1989. This comprehensive document devotes a whole section to how the various levels of government should promote the

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101 In China’s political context, the CPPCC is less powerful than the CNPC in policymaking. Although representatives of the CPPCC provide comments on drafts of laws and policies, they are much less influential than NPC representatives are. The higher ratio of women in the CPPCC than the NPC demonstrates the gender hierarchy in top-level politics in China.

102 Fulianjie, 妇联届.
catalyst role of major mass organizations in democratic participation to supervise and
monitor state and social affairs. Under Section Six, *To Bring the Trade Unions, the CYL and the Women's Federations into Full Play in the Democratic Participation in and Supervision over the State and Social Affairs*, the Announcement 1989 calls on CCP
committees of local government to establish institutions to improve democratic
participation by the major mass organizations in government administration. It requires:

1) The Government and its relevant departments should invite representatives of trade union, the youth league and the women federation at the same when making policies concerning economic and social development, education, employment and labor, wages, social security and other related issues that concerning the immediate interests of workers, youth, and women. Only after fully listening to their views can the decisions are made.

2) Governments at different levels should invite representatives of the trade union to join ad hoc working committees concerning wage and price that related to immediate interests of workers. Based on needs, Governments at different levels should invited representatives of the trade union, the youth league, and the women’s federation to work as formal members when setting up other relevant ad hoc working committees

3) Governments at different levels, as well as related departments, need to issue relevant documents concerning major issues of immediate or vital interests of masses jointly with the same level trade unions, Communist Youth League, Women's Federation, or promulgate document separately.

4) Governments at various levels specify a responsible officer to enhance the connection with Trade unions, Communist Youth League, women's federations to help them solve some specific problems. Trade unions, Communist Youth League, women's federations need to report relevant problems to the governments to seek supports.

5) On a regular base, or from time to time, governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and cities may hold joint conferences, forums, as well as other forms of meetings, to report some government policies, regulations and important work plans and arrangements, and at same time, study and solve issues concerning immediate interests of workers, which are reflected by the trade unions. (CCP 1989)
The above five articles specify when, where, and how governments at various levels must consult and collaborate with three major mass organizations on policy-making. The section concludes by reiterating the importance of integrating the major mass organizations in decision-making:

Governments at all levels should support the trade unions, Communist Youth League, women's federations and give full play to their role of democratic supervision, listen to their views and recommendations on improving the government's work frequently, take seriously their reports concerning cases of lawlessness, abuse of power and serious acts of bureaucracy, etc., of the related state organs or staff, and enroll them in the investigations concerning economic cases and other related. (CCP 1989)

The CCP’s Announcement 1989 sanctions the ACWF’s legitimacy with the government in policy making concerning women and children. In practice, according to my observation, the ACWF’s participation in policymaking covers several stages. Initially, at drafting stage, some government organs will invite the ACWF, or ask it to recommend representatives to join relevant meetings and discussions. Once the draft is formulated, several rounds of consultation involve stakeholders among whom the ACWF is considered the most relevant if women and children’s issues are concerned. Moreover, before the promulgation goes to the next stage of formal inviting for comments and suggestions, which generally take the form of formal document consultation, the ACWF’s views will be sought if the policies or laws concern women and children’s issues. Thus, the ACWF serves as one of the major stakeholder mass organizations for the government in policy-making affairs concerning women and children.

At the same time, the ACWF is connected with ministries through the National Working Committee on Children and Women (NWCCW), which serves as a platform to ensure the ACWF’s collaboration with other ministries. The ACWF has overlapping leadership with the State Council National Working Committee on Women and Children, and thus a direct line to policy-making and legislation (currently the Vice President of ACWF is the Director General of NWCWC, and the NWCWC’s secretariat is located within the ACWF). Founded in 1990 under the promotion of the ACWF, the
NWCCW is tasked with the responsibility of urging government departments to carry out various laws, policies, statutes and measures involving children and women and developing their cause. The ACWF also plays an important role in its daily administration. Normally, the vice chairperson and first secretary of the Secretariat serves as one of the three vice chairpersons of the NWCCW. For example, the current vice chairperson and first secretary of the Secretariat is the vice chairperson of the NWCCW. In addition, the NWCCW’s offices are situated at various women’s federations.

In general, the ACWF enjoys multiple access routes to policy making that are envied by other women’s organizations. Its particular bonds with the CCP, and its role as a mass organization, give it a unique legitimate authority in policymaking. In this view, the legitimacy of the ACWF is not so much legal as political.

6.22 Legal Status

Unlike other CSOs that need to seek registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA), the ACWF enjoys a natural legal legitimacy as a mass organization set up by the CCP.

Exemption from registration with MOCA: While many CSOs have had to find different ways to negotiate registration (Saich, 2000; Yu, 2006) or even bypass the constraints of policies in China, the ACWF has not needed to do so. As a mass organization set up by the CCP, the ACWF is exempt from registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA). According to the MOCA Announcement on Exemption of Some Mass Organizations103, mass organizations such as ACFTU, CYL and the ACWF that have seats in the CPPCC need not register.

103 Minzhengbu guanyu duibufen tuanti mianyushetuan dengji youguan wenti de tongzhi, 民政部关于对部分团体免予社团登记有关问题的通知, 2000年12月1日民政部民发（2000）256号.
Exemption does not mean that these organizations can act completely freely though. While it is true that these mass organizations can bypass the strict registration conditions that have prevented many CSOs from forming, it is also true that they are subject to much more rigorous supervision and monitoring of their political and financial management than ordinary CSOs.

Administratively, the State supervises the financial administration and personnel management of these mass organizations through several functional organs: it is mainly through the establishment quota system\textsuperscript{104} that the State Council is able to define the size, number of staff, and budget of mass organizations. Different from the nomenklatura list, bianzhi is

“… a list of the authorized number of personnel and defines their duties and functions in government administrative organs (guanli jiguan), state enterprises (guoying qiye), and service organizations (shiye danwei). The bianzhi covers all those employed in these organizations, while nomenklatura only applies to leadership positions. According to recent statistics (2004), the bianzhi system amounts to 33.76 million personnel!” (Shambaugh 2008 p.141)

For major mass organizations, the bianzhi determines not only the budget received from the State Council but also the size their organizations are allowed to take. The personnel administration of these mass organizations has to follow relevant regulations issued by the CCP and the state and, since the state owns the assets of these organizations and distributes the budget to maintain them, it mandates its organs such as the Anti-Corruption Ministry, Audit Ministry and Department of the Management of the Social Organizations of MOCA, to regularly check their expenses and audit the financial management of these major mass organizations.

In short, the legitimacy of the ACWF in the eyes of the CCP is not determined by its legal registration with the state organs. Instead, it gains legitimate authority automatically as one of the mass organizations situated at the ministerial level in the

\textsuperscript{104} Bianzhi, 编制.
bureaucratic echelon in China’s political system. Nevertheless, it has less authority than a ministry as it is not equivalent to a ministry in status.

6.23 Practical Knowledge and Technical Expertise

Whilst in the pre-reform period the ACWF’s authority in the eyes of the CCP rested in its political status and expertise derived from practical knowledge, in the post-reform context the basis of its authority has changed to include not only political status and practice-derived expertise but also technical expertise based on both practice and analysis. Thus, facing the withering away of the practical knowledge that once served as the basis of its authority in policy making during the communist revolution and in the early stage of socialist construction, the ACWF had to develop its technical expertise in economic reform period. This expertise has become increasingly perceived as more valid than practical knowledge in policy making in contemporary China.

Legacy of practical knowledge: To the women’s federations, practical knowledge was largely associated with “women-work”, a mandate by the CCP to the women’s federations to work with the mass of women. Field investigation used to be the most important channel for acquiring practical knowledge. According to Peng Peiyun (1999), pioneering ACWF leaders like Deng Yingchao and Cai Chang, invariably attached great importance to field investigation. They actively organized and were personally involved in all sorts of field investigations in many geographic areas on various issues concerning women. The “go in-depth to the reality and get close to women’s lives” approach was made a guiding principle of the women-work. In order to ensure that women cadres went deep into field investigation, leaders of the ACWF required cadres of women’s federations to stay for a long length of time, preferably four months of a year, to “sink” into the field. They believed that only through close

105 The Chinese origin is “Shenru shiji, tiejin funv shenghua (深入实际，贴近妇女生活)”.  
106 Chenxiaqu, 沉下去.
attachment with women and personal participation in their activities, could cadres of the women’s federations listen to women’s demands and comprehend their situation. A case on point is from Luo Qiong’s narrative (2000) of a team of cadres dispatched by the ACWF to stay in a far-remote area in south border Guangxi province of China in the 1950s. Tasked with the responsibility of facilitating land reform in rural areas, the investigation team stayed in villages for half of a year to participate in the land reform.  

In general, practical knowledge, a part of the women-work, constituted the foundation for the ACWF’s legitimacy in policymaking. Heavily influenced by the practically oriented epistemology adopted by the CCP during the Communist Revolution and socialist construction, the ACWF used fieldwork investigation to collect personal experience and first hand data. Cadres of the ACWF were encouraged to gain practical knowledge through their practical work and exposure to women’s issues. This process had a strong tendency toward solving problems facing women rather than building academic studies.

Although this approach won women’s federations’ legitimate authority in policy-making, it also revealed shortcomings, for example, their fieldwork data collection methods were generally not as rigorous as those of sociological scholars were. Thus, they were largely limited to providing anecdotal pictures of the issues challenging women.

Shifting from practical knowledge to technical expertise: The legacy of practical knowledge inherited from the CCP during the communist revolution has been increasingly challenged in the economic reform period. Among the factors that have

\[\text{\textsuperscript{107}}\] According to Luo, these cadres, who were mostly intellectuals with hardly any knowledge of land reform and rural development, felt that field investigation was valuable experience because “it not only helped transform the objective world, but also the subjective world,” namely their mindsets. To this end, Luo concludes that such a field practice as the participation in the land reform is “indispensable and compulsory training for cadres particularly those with intellectual backgrounds.” (Luo, 2000).
contributed to the undermining of the status of practical knowledge in policy-making, and thus the ACWF’s decision to prioritize the acquisition of technical expertise, were the CCP and the state’s call for “scientific decision-making” to improve the efficiency of the economy. The emphasis of this approach was on the role of competent knowledge obtained through formal academic training. The policy issues, in this view, were increasingly posed in technical language that could only be comprehended by experts with systematic training. Although the use of scientific decision-making did not altogether reject or exclude practical knowledge, technical expertise definitely carried more weight. In the eyes of policy-makers, especially legislators, for instance, it seemed that proposals or bills that contained formal legal terms and concepts were more plausible than those without. Commenting on the new approach of decision-making and its influence on the ACWF, Wang Zheng (1998 p.3) said:

“ In the post Mao pursuit of scientific knowledge and methods, theoretical research (which connotes a scholarly approach and scientific methods), instead of a Maoist mass movement, was seen as the correct approach to finding solutions to women’s problems.”

Indeed, this trend has exerted not only great influence on the ACWF but also significant pressure on its policy advocacy. To integrate women’s concerns into policies and laws, the leaders of the ACWF began to notice that findings from field investigations were no longer sufficient for policy proposals. A sense of urgency can be seen prominent in Peng Peiyun’s speech:

Only through a serious and careful analysis on reality and women's needs and a convincing scientific argument, can we have a powerful influence on legislation and policy-making processes, as well as the to establish the scientific basis for promulgation of national laws and policies. (Peng 1999 p.222)

Yet like most citizens, they were not familiar with the technical language used, which was completely alien to the average citizen. Distressed by this, the ACWF felt an urgent

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108 Fayan fayu, 法言法语.
need to advance and transcend practical knowledge and cultivate technical expertise in order to build up its competency and consolidate its role in public decision-making.

6.3 Bureaucratic Leadership

Although the backgrounds of the leaders of the ACWF have changed considerably through history, the source of their authority remains stable. It is chiefly bureaucratic hierarchies that endow them with positional power over followers. However, its leading style is by no means exclusively autocratic. There is a dynamic of power relations between the leaders and the staff below them.

6.3.1 Official Leadership

Unlike the collective nature of the ADVN leadership, the ACWF’s official leadership is characterized by several features (see Figure 11). First, the emergence of its leaders has largely been determined by a dual system. On the one hand, the creation of leaders and leading bodies are determined by the CCP’s personnel management - the cadre system. Once selected as candidates, they have to pass strict screening and assessment processes by organizational departments of the CCP/State. Once approved as capable and meeting the criteria, they can then seek election. On the other hand, the ACWF Charter defines the procedures for the election of the leaders and leading body at the national congress that is held every five years. The election is not entirely freely competitive. The candidates are those who have been nominated and passed the serious screening and rigorous assessments guided by the Organizational Department of the CCP. Furthermore, the number of candidates is limited, only slightly outnumbering the posts to be elected. The method, known as competitive election\(^\text{109}\), was initiated by the Organizational Departments of the CCP, replacing the previous confidential closed decision-making by a few top leaders. Though ensuring competition in the election, the

\(^{109}\) Cha’e Xuanju, 差额选举.
policy still restricts the wider participation of more accomplished candidates outside the remit of the Organizational Department’s nominations.

Figure 11 Top Leading Bodies of the ACWF

Second, the management of leaders is mainly done by the CCP. It is able to direct and supervise the general development of these mass organizations by directly managing the top leaders of mass organizations including the ACWF, which is known as a nomenklatura system\textsuperscript{110}. As Shambaugh explained:

“The nomenklatura system was inherited by the Soviet Communist CCP. It is a list of positions for approximately 2,500 CCP secretaries in China’s thirty-one provinces and four centrally administered municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing), and an additional 39,000 officials at the bureau level whose appointment must be reported to the Central Committee. Within the nomenklatura

\textsuperscript{110} Dang guan gan bu, 党管干部.
list, there is a more selected group (truly the elite within the elite) known as the Zhongyang Ganbu Mulu (Central Cadres List), which in 2003 included about 1,000 in total.” (Shambaugh, 2008: 141)

Being in the Central Cadres List, the top leaders of major mass organizations are largely nominated by the CCP after careful selection and investigation. Thus, the CCP plays an important role in the formation of the leading bodies of the major mass organizations including the ACWF. These top leaders are subject to rigorous scrutiny and assessment by the CCP, which ensures they implement the CCP’s line. At the same time, however, they are able to gain favourable access to political organs that are essential in policy making which otherwise would be impossible.

6.32 Structure of Leadership

The ACWF’s leadership style is similar to what Max Weber (1947) described as bureaucratic leadership, characterized by formal roles and hierarchy as the major source of authority. However, unlike some classic sites of bureaucratic movement leadership, for example within labour organizations (Barker, 2001), where the decision-making process is concentrated at the top and commands flow down, there are two directions of power flow in decision making within the ACWF group working on the equal retirement age campaign.

Within the ACWF, as in other ordinary bureaus, leaders are empowered via the office they hold. By and large, staff obey leaders not because they share the same values, or they are charismatic, as in the case of the ADVN, but mostly because their authority is inherent as part of their position in the organization. Hence, the top leaders

111 The Bureaucratic Leadership Style was one of three leadership styles described by Max Weber. According to Weber, the other two are charismatic and traditional. Later on, scholars introduced the concept into management and social movement studies. For example, management studies identify autocratic and democratic leadership in addition to bureaucratic. http://www.leadership-expert.co.uk/leadership-styles/
of the ACWF led the campaign mostly due to their positions at the top echelon of the hierarchy rather than their personal characteristics that are paramount for charismatic leadership.

Ostensibly, in the ACWF, the higher the echelon of hierarchy, the more powerful the leader (see Figure 11). There are several echelons within the organization, namely ministerial, departmental and sectional. At the highest level is the secretary of the secretariat of the ACWF, which are composed of around seven top leaders, with the equivalent of ministerial level rank (bu ji). Chairpersons and the secretary of secretariat at the top is the most powerful. Next is the middle echelon that consists of a range of functional departments and is equal to the bureau level (ju ji) of public administration in China. Under this is the section (chu ji) level where various specific offices take on concrete work, supervised and monitored by chiefs of functional departments. Power relations are sustained through formal officialdom. The most significant item that makes the leaders powerful is personnel management. They have the final say on appointments and promotions through an Organizational Department under their strict control. Routine regulations and procedures are used to issue orders to, and discipline, lower rank staff and frequent checks made through regular briefings and debriefings.

The two-way power flow in leadership is characterized by the interchange of bottom up and top down approaches. In the beginning of decision-making, the cadres were situated in the lower rank that identified problems and reported it to the top. Leaders then issued instructions for further action (see the next section for detail). This was then repeated, whereby issues collected from the bottom up were submitted to the top again. During this process, relevant organs at different echelons contributed to the decision-making by the division of the tasks during the process. Leaders at different levels took different action: while low-level staff initiated the campaign and shaped the issue, the mid-level leaders transformed the information, and the top-level determined campaign approaches and had the final say. Since different levels of offices were allocated specific tasks and portfolios, no one single leader could dictate the campaign absolutely.
The flow of power indicates that in bureaucratic mass organizations such as the ACWF, the positional authority of the top leaders by no means endows them with absolute power. Instead, due to the division of tasks, the power is divided and conditioned by roles and mandates prescribed at different levels, departments and sections. Charged with guiding the overall direction of the ACWF’s development, top leaders had to depend on departmental chiefs to propose suggestions for concrete issues, as they themselves not have the time and energy, and for some not even the knowledge and expertise, to go into detail. Furthermore, departmental chiefs in turn depend on section staff to provide preliminary proposals for further discussion and comments of leaders at higher levels. It is perhaps this inter-dependent relationship in operating daily work that has precisely given rise to the channels of communication breaking through the rigid hierarchical division within the organization. Moreover, it allows space for low-level staff to participate in decision-making on specific issues.

6.33 Personal Traits

Personal traits and personalities of ACWF leaders have changed dramatically over time. Following the transformation of the CCP’s leadership112, the leading bodies of the ACWF have also undergone changes. Different generations of leaders have had distinct characteristics, which is largely the result of the modifications to the CCP’s cadre system and organizational transformation of the ACWF.

The first generation of leaders was mostly composed of women revolutionaries who had joined the revolution side by side with their male counterparts. In the period before the founding of the PRC in 1949, the backgrounds of leaders show that most of

112 Generally, the CCP leadership can be classified into four generations: the first (1949-1976) was composed of mainly communist revolutionaries led by Chairman Mao (Mao Zetong); the second (1976-1992) was led by Deng Xiaoping characterized by initiating Economic Reform; the third (1992-2003) was led by Jiang Zemin, and the fourth (2003-2012) is led by Hu-Wen, the current top leaders of China.
them were revolutionaries and full partners of their husbands. After 1949, the female revolutionaries remained in leadership roles, complemented by newly recruited cadres most of whom were peasants and workers. During the Cultural Revolution in the (1966-1976), the leading group was dismissed as the ACWF ceased to function. The ACWF top leader group was replaced by revolutionaries’ committees, the popular governance style common to many ministries and bureaus from the 1960s to 1970s.

After the Cultural Revolution, the ACWF was reinstated by the CCP. Accompanying the personnel reform in the 1980s, senior revolutionary leaders were quickly replaced by a cohort of modern bureaucrats that largely changed the composition of the leading body of the ACWF. Since then, the characteristics of leaders have changed dramatically from the original revolutionary characteristics to the recent more bureaucratic elitist style. Above all, three types of leadership, namely technocratic-oriented, women work oriented and intellectual oriented are prominent. In general, they were the products of not only the CCP/State’s cadre reform, but also the functional changes of the ACWF from a CCP branch at the beginning, to a united front line after the founding of the PRC, to part of the bureaucratic machinery on women and children’s issues after the economic reform.

The new generation of leaders is different from their predecessors in several ways. First, they are relatively young, usually in their 50s, when promoted to leading positions. Most joined the CCP after the establishment of the PRC in 1949, except Chen Muhua and Peng Peiyun who had joined in the 1940s. Second, they are a better educated than their predecessors, the majority at college level or above. Third, through years of working as administrators of government departments or bureaus, they have gained precious experience in public administration and have built close connections with government officials at various levels.

Unlike their predecessors who were homogenous for the most part, post-reform leaders exhibited distinct positions on gender issues according to their comprehension of gender equality, policy preferences and working methods. Above all, three types of
leaders, namely the technocratic-oriented, women work-oriented, and intellectual oriented, are prominent in all four leading bodies of the ACWF (see Table 10).

Table 10 Three Major Types of Leaders of the ACWF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Comprehension of gender equality</th>
<th>Policy preferences</th>
<th>Working methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technocrat -oriented</td>
<td>Tended to pay less attention to ideology issues.</td>
<td>Women’s economic development and their entry into public administration.</td>
<td>Cooperative approach with government agencies through wide networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women work-oriented</td>
<td>Influenced by Marxism and Maoism in women’s liberation; but not very keen in theory.</td>
<td>Tended to prioritize women’s legal rights protection, family harmony and children’s welfare.</td>
<td>Inclined to adopt bottom-up methods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual-oriented</td>
<td>Paid attention to theories; Senior intellectuals are more critical; Younger intellectuals are more acceptable to new perspectives and concepts.</td>
<td>Focused on influencing revision or formulation of policies and laws that covered a wide range of areas of concerns.</td>
<td>Initiated advocacy-oriented research programmes and projects, and setting up establishments on women and gender studies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed by the author.

The technocrats are perhaps the most influential force in the ACWF’s decision-making, as the majority of the top leaders were more or less engaged with public administration before they became ACWF leaders. For example, Chen Muhua was once a chief of China Commercial Bank. Gu Xiulian was the deputy director of the State Planning Commission from 1973 to 1982 and the Ministry of Chemical Industry from 1989 to 1998. It is worth mentioning that most of the first secretaries of the different sessions of Secretariats had previously served in provincial public administration. Zhang Guoying
(The First Secretary from 1983-1990) spent much of her career as a governor in Guangdong at county, prefectural and provincial levels, before her post in the ACWF. Huang Qizao (The First Secretary from 1990-2003) had served as the Secretary of the Government in Sichuan Province. Gu Xiulian (The First Secretary from 2003-2007) was governor of Jiangsu Province from 1973 to 1997. The current first secretary Huang Qingyi (The First Secretary 2007 to present) was governor of Henan Province from 1996-2002.

Their long-term service in various leading government positions affected their understanding of gender issues, policy preferences and working methods. First, technocratic oriented leaders were not keen on ideological issues. Though they mentioned some terms when required, they seemed disinterested in the distinctions between such terms as gender equality or Marxist theory on women’s liberation. Instead, they focused on pragmatic issues such as women’s poverty. Second, they put the primary focus on women’s economic development and their entry into public administration, which, they felt, was critical in trying to achieve gender equality. Third, well informed and with knowledge of the Chinese bureaucratic administration and policy process, they preferred a cooperative approach with government agencies through the networks they had built before they came to the ACWF.

The second most influential force is the leaders who had engaged with women work that mostly related to women and children’s affairs. The majority of ACWF’s cadres have worked in these areas long term, some even for their whole career. However, only a few have been elevated to the top level. In the reform period, none of the presidents or first secretaries of the Secretariat have come strictly from women-work, although more than half of the Secretariat members had relevant work experience. This was partly because the majority of top leaders came from government or academic institutions at a higher bureaucratic echelon than that of the ACWF. Thus, most of cadres experienced in women work were in the mid and lower hierarchies. It is noteworthy that most of the directors of the functional departments had strong background of women work. Their insights are reflected in preliminary reports and
documents drafted by their departments. Most of the reports and documents built the foundation for top-level decision-making in the ACWF.

Long-term service in women work had shaped their comprehension of gender equality, policy preference and working methods. Although influenced by the leaders in the pre-reform era who upheld Marxism and Maoism in women’s liberation, they attached less importance to theory than the intellectual oriented leaders: they also tended to prioritize women’s legal rights protection, family harmony and children’s welfare, the missions given by the CCP/state to the ACWF when it was founded. Third, cadres experienced in women-work were also inclined to adopt bottom-up methods as advocated by the pre-reform leaders, who were deeply influenced by the Maoist mass line approach which addressed listening and learning from the masses. At the same time, like their revolutionary predecessors, they were familiar with the approaches of mobilizing mass activities, such as honoring women models as good examples of workers, peasants, housewives, etc.

The number of the third type of leaders has been rising and their influence, though not yet as crucial as that of technocrats and leaders of women work, has been increasing. Thanks to the cadre system reform, intellectuals, most of them highly educated professionals, have been increasingly drawn into the ACWF at various levels. Peng Peiyun (ACWF President, 1998-2003) is a representative; she graduated in sociology from Qinghua University in 1949 and then spent almost 30 years in CCP leadership positions at Tsinghua and Beida, China's most prestigious universities. In 1988, she became vice-minister of the Ministry of Education. She also served for ten years as a member of the State Council. Peng was also actively involved in various national societies and state council committees that deal with women's and disabilities issues. Although rare at the top leading body, the mid and especially lower levels are swamped with postgraduates who entered the ACWF through the national civil servant entrance exams in recent years. These intellectually oriented leaders and cadres have distinct characteristics compared to the technocrats and women work leaders.
First, they pay due attention to theories relating to women and gender equality, albeit from differing perspectives. Senior intellectuals like Peng Peiyun have advocated for a critical perspective on Western feminist theories and concepts, in particular on gender terms. She seems to be mostly occupied with the theorization of relations between Marxist theory on women’s liberation and gender equality, and called for criticism and evaluation in order to develop a theory with Chinese characteristics. The younger intellectuals, however, seem more ready to accept new terms and perspectives. Second, the intellectually oriented leaders have concentrated on influencing the revision or formulation of policies and laws that covered a wide range of areas of concerns. Third, they are more interested in initiating advocacy-oriented research programmes and projects to influence policies and laws. For instance, in 2000, Peng Peiyun successfully campaigned for the China Social Science Academy to set up a special fund for a study on women’s political participation in China, the results of which were used to influence the cadre’s systematic reform of policies of the Organizational Department of the CCP. In order to institutionalize research, they founded the Women’s Studies Institute of China in 1990 and the Women’s Studies Society of China in 2001 both affiliated to the ACWF. Intellectually oriented leaders have worked ceaselessly to make the ACWF a base for women’s studies in China.

However, the categories illustrated in Table 10 are by no means exhaustible. After all, many leaders have taken on multi-characteristics at the same time. For example, some leaders like Peng Peiyun, are both technocratic and intellectual. Moreover, some technocrats developed interests in intellectual approaches in influencing policy after they came to the ACWF. For example, Gu Xiulian, originally technocrat oriented, encouraged the CASS and the CCP School to set up women and gender studies research centers during the later phase of her career as one of the ACWF leaders. Hence, the above classification (see Table 10) simply serves as an ideal typical for understanding the traits and characteristics of top leaders of the ACWF.

6.4 Bureaucratic Structure
In general, the ACWF and its local branches have retained a vertically centralized and hierarchical structure. However, facing challenges as to how to build a sound working institution, the ACWF has constantly initiated internal reform in order to broaden its collaboration and networks with other governmental organs to join forces on specific gender issues.

6.4 Constituents

At the national level, the highest organ of power in the ACWF is the National Women’s Congress (NWC), which is convened once every five years. When the National Congress of Women is not in session, the Executive Committee implements its resolutions and discusses and decides on the major issues concerning work on women and personnel arrangement. The plenary session of the Executive Committee elects a President, a number of Vice-Presidents and other members to form a Standing Committee, which is the leading body when the Executive Committee is not in session. A Secretariat is set up under the Standing Committee to handle the daily work of ACWF, with its First Member and several other members recommended and elected by the Standing Committee.

As Table 11 shows, the constituents of the ACWF at national level include seven major functional departments and eleven major affiliations:
Table 11 Major Departments and Affiliations of the ACWF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Major departments</strong></th>
<th><strong>Major ACWF Affiliations</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Office</td>
<td>China Women’s Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resource and Liaison Department</td>
<td>Women of China magazine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicity Department</td>
<td>China National Children’s Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Liaison Department</td>
<td>China Women's Publishing House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban and Rural Work Department</td>
<td>Chinese Women's News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Department</td>
<td>Women of China Women of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s Welfare Department</td>
<td>(an English monthly on women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese Women's Travel Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China Women’s College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China Women's Activity Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China Fund for Children and Teenager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese Women’s Development Fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Figure 12 shows that the ACWF practices an organizational system of local women's federations and group members. Local Women's Federations are set up according to state administrative divisions: women workers’ committees of grass-root trade unions in factories, mines and enterprises, and those at upper levels are all group members of Women's Federations. National or local women's organizations that have registered with the departments of civil affairs and are willing to apply for affiliation...
with the federations may become members of ACWF once approved by ACWF or local Women's Federations. ACWF has about 60,000 grass-roots organizations above township and neighborhood committee levels across China, and more than 980,000 women's representatives' committees and women's committees at grass-roots level. There are 18 national group members and about 5,800 local group members at various levels throughout the country (Anti-Domestic-Violence-Network(a) 2009 p.106-7). By 2006, 87 women’s committees were set up in institutions of the CCP or the State at national level, 1129 at provincial, 10,509 at municipal, and 47064 at county level (WSIC 2006 p.109-118).

Figure 12 The Organizational System and Membership of the ACWF

![Organizational System and Membership of the ACWF](image)

Group members of women’s federations at:
- National level;
- Provincial, autonomous regional, municipal levels;
- Prefectural and city levels.

Including:
Women’s workers’ committee of trade unions at all levels and all social groups mainly made up of women.

6.42 Organizational Pattern

The Figure 13 shows that the organizational structure of the ACWF at national level is characterized by a vertical hierarchy of authority, the written rules that govern the conduct of officials or staff who are full-time and salaried, and the material resources owned by the organization (see Figure 13). In such kinds of organizational structures, decision-making is normally centered at the top of the bureaucratic echelon where a group of chairpersons plays a crucial role. In addition, homogeneity in thinking is observable because the structure is quite closed.

**Figure 13 Hierarchies of Personnel within the ACWF at National Level**

![Hierarchies of Personnel within the ACWF at National Level](image)

Source: Developed by author.
Finding that organizational constraints were limiting its influence on many newly emerging women’s rights issues, the ACWF initiated internal reform in order to build a sound working institution and a perfect work mechanism. It has continually broadened its collaboration and network by establishing ad hoc networks on particular gender issues. Varying in size and reach, some of these working committees are temporary, while others are quite permanent and stable. Among them, the ACWF’s Coordinating Group on Protecting Women's Rights and Interests113, "Double Learning and Double Emulation" Activity Leading Committee 114 and "Women Making Achievements" Activity Leading Committee115 have been the most influential on the state. (See Table 13)

113 Quanguo fulian funv ertong quanyi xietiaozu, 全国妇联妇女儿童权益协调组
114 Shuangxue shuangbi huodong lingdao xiaozu, “双学双比”活动领导小组.
115 Jinguo jiangong huodong lingdao xiaozu, “巾帼建功”活动领导小组.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title &amp; Year of Establishment</th>
<th>Number of Line Ministries</th>
<th>Areas of Concerns and Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating Group on Protecting Women's Rights and Interests, 2001</td>
<td>By the end of 2004, there were 19 line ministries including: the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the Legislative Affairs Office of the state Council, etc.</td>
<td>To provide legal education and rights protection services for women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| "Women Making Achievements" Activity Leading Committee, 1991 | In 1991 ACWF launched the "Women Making Achievements" Campaign in urban China with Ministry of Education of People's Republic of China and 11 other ministries. Presently, 25 ministries are involved in the campaign. | -To provide social services to encourage women workers, self-employed women and laid-off women in urban areas to take part in studies and professional competitions. 
-For 15 years, more than 40 million women have participated in the campaign. Some 30 million women have received either certificate or professional training. |
| "Double Learning and Double Emulation" Activity Leading Committee, 1989 | In the spring of 1989, the ACWF, with 14 ministries, including the Ministry of Agriculture, State Forestry Administration, the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Education, initiated the committee. By now, there were 19 line ministries. | -To promote women in rural economic development; 
-Since the implementation of these programs, more than 120 million rural women have participated, and nearly 100 million women have mastered 1-2 practical skills. A large number of excellent, talented women went on to run and manage enterprises |

Source: Developed by the author.
The ACWF’s top leaders generally lead the ad hoc committees. For example, the then president of the ACWF, Peng Peiyun, directly promoted the creation of the Coordinating Group on Protecting Women’s Rights and Interests in 2001 and served as the Group Leader. Likewise, the "Double Learning and Double Emulation" Activity Leading Committee and the "Women Making Achievements" Activity Leading Committee have been chaired by ACWF’s leaders since their creations. Mme. Gu Xiulian was the head of the leaders group for Chinese Women's Achievements in Their Work when she was the president of the All-China Women's Federation and vice-chairperson of the National People's Congress Standing Committee. Currently, the Vice-President and First Member of the ACWF Secretariat, Mm. Huang Qingyi, is the Head of the leadership group for the Double Learning and Double Emulation Activity.

Strategically, these ad hoc committees address national development concerns such as rural and urban development, as well as the building of the rule of law. Working within the overall framework of the CCP and the state, which also guides the government, the ACWF strategically builds links with functional governmental organs that have resources important for activities initiated by the ACWF. Through the works of these committees, the ACWF has not only been able to make concerted efforts on specific gender and women’s issues, but also been able to strengthen institutional relations with the line ministries.

It is also noteworthy that the ACWF has found ways to extend its influence at the international level: it has been actively engaged in international multilateral exchanges. The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women and the NGO Forum on Women were held in Beijing in September 1995, and the All-China Women’s Federation was a member of China's Organizing Committee. In July 1995, the All-

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116 In 1974, the All-China Women’s Federation began participating in activities under the United Nations system. In 1980 China became a member of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), and since 1982, experts from the All-China Women’s Federation have been elected as members of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
China Women’s Federation obtained special status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). In September 1996, the All-China Women’s Federation became a member of the Conference on Non-governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the United Nations. Representatives of the All-China Women’s Federation have participated in a number of meetings in the United Nations system, such as the sessions of the Commission on the Status of Women and on Human Rights, the World Conference on Human Rights, International Conference on Population and Development, World Summit for Social Development, and the Conference on Habitat.

In short, the organizational structure of the ACWF featured a muti-coordination character. Primarily, vertical hierarchy characterized the bureaucratic organization where power in decision-making concentrated at the top level. Nevertheless, lower level staff had more or less access to decision-making through providing technical service in their divisions and sections that majored in specific topics. Furthermore, the increasing horizontal ad hoc networks on particular gender issues herald a new trend of the organizational structure of the ACWF.

6.5 Adaptive Learning

The study found that learning within the women’s federation system is seen as a way to strengthen the organizational capacity. Through training or self-learning, capacity building becomes a key part of the portfolio of women’s federations at different levels. Yet the training methods are largely conventional and the training content is more related to integrating women-work into the mainstream of CCP-work and public administration of the state. Although they pay attention to women’s rights issues, the introduction of new concepts such as gender, as well as innovative women-work approaches has rarely been seen as crucial.
6.51 Purposes of Learning

My research found that the purpose of learning was significant in defining the approaches and the content of learning. In the case of the ACWF, both the external call for the CCP and the internal demands of organizational building and personal needs prompted the ACWF to initiate a series of organizational learning activities.

First, the CCP mandated the ACWF to enhance its capacity. Ever since its establishment, capacity building has been a permanent concern of the CCP during the course of both the communist revolution and the period of socialist construction. There are three basic components of CCP capacity building: improvement of working style, advancing administrative skills, and the broadening of perspectives and knowledge to comprehend the changing world. Different aspects of capacity building have been addressed at different times over the course of revolution or national development. For example, before and at the initial stage of the PRC, the focus was on improving working style and advancing literacy levels. Mao’s works, ‘Reform Our Study’ (1941) and ‘Rectify the CCP’s Style of Work’ (1942), served as overall guiding principles. This learning style, which continued up to 1978 in Deng’s era, started to shift its attention from improving working style to advancing administrative skills. For the ACWF, therefore, strengthening capacity to improve its governance work and engagement with the mass of women, and to upgrade its knowledge to catch up with contemporary society were the major concerns.

Second, the ACWF felt the need to enhance its capacity to keep up with the rapid economic and social change that has occurred in the reform period. In 2005, the ACWF coined the phrase "Double 5 Ability" to promote this capacity building. The five include abilities in 1) mobilizing and uniting women to participate in economic development, 2) safeguarding the rights and interests of women and children in accordance with the laws, 3) leading women to participate in the construction of socialist advanced culture, 4) carrying out exchanges and cooperation among women, and 5) self-innovation and development of capacity. Apart from these five points, the ACWF called on women cadres within the federation to earnestly strengthen service
capacity in 1) serving the overall situation, 2) serving women; 3) learning, 4) innovation, and 5) coordination\textsuperscript{117}. These were addressed in several five-year training plans issues by the ACWF since 2001.

6.52 Approaches

This research found that lecturing was the most frequently used approach. There are various approaches of training. For example, Training Schools for Women Cadres or Women Cadre Management Schools are frequently used in the conventional approach. According to the ACWF’s 2001-2005 National Cadre Education and Training Plan (2001), on-the-job training on women-work is mandatory and normally covers three months every five years. The Women Cadre Management Schools (funu ganbu guanli xuexiao) is the main venue for regular and rotational training for women’s federation cadres and the course are administered by local women’s federations.

Second, recent years have seen an increase in lecturing by distinguished universities such as Beijing University, Qinghua University and Fudan University. These kinds of external training are mostly on public administration. For example, the ACWF organized a training workshop on leadership in the training centre of the Central Organization Department in 2002, three training workshops in the Central CCP School for the leaders of women’s federations at provincial level, and a training workshop on public administration in Qinghua University (Chen 2005c p.607).

Third, apart from training, the ACWF Study has organized numerous study tours both within China and abroad. However, data for these are scattered and sometimes inaccessible, thus, it is quite difficult to map the frequency, purpose and outcomes of these.

\textsuperscript{117} \url{http://www.keqgy.cn/xinxi/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=380}. Accessed 1/18/2010.[are you using UK or US date conventions as a norm? just asking as this is US]
In addition, my research also found that self-study was the most heavily promoted option by top leaders to federation staff. Indeed, to some extent, self-learning has become a legacy of the ACWF. For example, the stories of Kang Keqing (Wang 2006 p.64-66) and Gu Xiulian (Zhou 2004 p.29-39) are very popular within the women’s federation. Starting from only a basic education, both of them gained all the requirements to be leader through self-study. Other cases such as Huang Qizao (Zhou 2004 p.61) and Peng Peiyun, who already held degrees before coming to the ACWF, show the importance of continuing study to upgrade knowledge and expertise to keep up with social change.

6.53 Content of Learning

My analysis of interviews and secondary data found that the academic content of the learning of the ACWF was linked to the CCP’s ideals, particularly in its aspirations for being good managers and advancing women-work. Thus, the content was instable in that it changed quickly according to the political and social environment. The main topic included the introduction of social and economic development, the main points of the reports of the CCP or the State, administrative management, leadership skills, and approaches to women-work. The training programmes had the following features:

First, they tended to focus on broad issues that were addressed by mainstream public administration. Lecturing in administration and management was highlighted as the CCP had called for scientific decision-making and the promotion of public administration. For example, the majority of participants of the seminar at Qinghua University in 2006 felt that they had not previously studied systems of public management. In the training class, they had the opportunity to study systematically the core of public administration theory (basic concepts, basic principles, and basic skills) (Chen, 2006). However, it was difficult to see how the courses in Qinghua were specifically relevant to women-work. It seemed that in the eyes of most federation cadres, women-work was only given credibility, through studying a major course on
public administration in a famous university, even if the majority of the training was not directly relevant.

Second, the ACWF always tried to integrate women’s issues into the curriculum. According to the ACWF’s 2001-2005 National Cadre Education and Training Plan (2001), for example, the training for women’s federation cadres should arrange courses on the thoughts of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin to better their understanding of theoretical knowledge on women’s liberation. However, in practice, these courses only serve as blueprints and guiding principles. Not one specific theme such as domestic violence or equality in retirement age was explored in-depth and as such rarely resulted in innovative methods to improve the women-work of the ACWF.

Third, leadership training has been problematic in the eyes of gender specialists, who feel that the gender aspect is all but ignored by the majority of conveners and trainers of such kinds of training workshops. A lack of gender sensitivity is one thing, but fostering traditional gender roles that somehow result in discrimination against female leaders is another. My examination of training courses showed that some training for leadership in female cadres even promoted the very gender roles and concepts that feminist and gender scholars are fighting against. For example, the workshop in Beijing University taught female leaders to display more femininity by dressing up and improving their appearance.

In general, the impetuses for organizational learning for the ACWF seem to be to first to fulfill the expectations of the CCP; second, to catch up with the contemporary trends in the mainstream bureaucracy; and third to make the organization more powerful in dealing with social problems emerging in the new era.

6.6 Sources of Financial Support
The ACWF is sponsored by the state; staff salaries are paid by the state and consequently the ACWF has always been ranked as a state organ. However, since the
introduction of public administration reform aiming to reduce the size and budget of local governments, the lack of financial resources became a major constraint for local women’s federations. As indicated in the previous chapter, some county women’s federations have less than 3,000 Yuan RMB for operation annually.

Since 1979, the All-China Women’s Federation has cooperated over 1,000 projects in a variety of projects with United Nations organizations and bodies such as UNICEF, UNDP, UNIFEM, UNIDO, IFAD and United Nations University. Concurrently, the All-China Women’s Federation also implemented projects in cooperation with governmental institutions or NGOs in Canada, Australia, Japan, Sweden, Norway, Israel, Holland, Switzerland, the United States, and the European Union, covering such topics as poverty elimination, education, health, women's interests and rights and other related areas. To date, over 1000 projects have been completed, mainly scattered in ethnic group areas and poor mountainous regions throughout China's 31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. Around one million people are directly involved in these projects and over ten million have benefited indirectly. Although the total funding has not been made public, it is likely that funding form donors has been a significant portion of the ACWF’s total revenue for its programmes.

6.7 Summary

This chapter highlighted the key characteristics of the ACWF in terms of legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning and framing, and financial resource (see Figure 14).
First, the ACWF boasts various kinds of alliances with state officials in the CCP, the State and the NPC. The legitimacy of the ACWF depends on these alliances rather than legal registration. However, its authority has been challenged by the increasing diversification of women’s interests in the reform era. Second, the leadership and organizational structure of the ACWF are bureaucratic. Though technocratic operations in a hierarchical structure govern the organization, there are nevertheless a diversity of leadership styles and dynamic power relations. Moreover, the learning organized by the ACWF for its staff tends to be confined to traditional content and approaches, although in recent years there has been more training on new concepts of gender at the local level. Finally, as the ACWF is basically reliant on the government for its funding, it is often perceived as a governmental agency.

Source: Developed by author.
7. Analyzing Advocacy for the Equal Retirement Age

7.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates how the conditioning factors proposed by my analytical framework affect the process of the ACWF’s negotiations on an equal retirement age since the 1980s. In particular, I focus on how the ACWF’s campaign shaped policy discourse around gender and the retirement age, how it organized the development proposals and bills and how it submitted them via its access to the CCP, the state and the NPC. I also analyze how the assumed conditioning factors affected the outcomes of its advocacy work.

In so doing, I argue that the basis for the ACWF’s ability to influence CCP policy-making has changed along with the process of the separation of CCP and state powers; this has created new challenges for the ACWF in trying to retain their policy influence. The ACWF has struggled to wield the same influence over state organs that it had over the CCP. Its authority to speak in the interests of `women’ has been challenged by the increasing diversification of women’s interests since the reforms and the increasingly differentiated work experiences of workers and cadres. In response, the ACWF has tried to bolster its scientific credentials by drawing upon more rigorous research conducted by academics from different disciplines. Although this has strengthened the evidence base for ACWF’s arguments in influencing both Party/state and public opinion, it still has not been sufficient to change retirement policies that are increasingly becoming the responsibility of state rather than CCP organs. Furthermore, the bureaucratic leadership and organizational structure, as well as the adaptive learning have all constrained the ACWF’s capacity to mobilize a wide network for sustained policy campaigns.

This chapter first reviews the process of the ACWF’s policy advocacy. In Section 2, I will analyze the proposed conditioning factors to see their impact on advocacy. The last section summarizes the main arguments of the chapter.
7.2 Negotiating Equal Retirement Age in Policy Processes

7.21 Collecting Grievances

Initially, practical knowledge played an important role in gathering grievances and complaints among women victims of the earlier retirement policy: it was through daily management of the ACWF that the issue was identified. Within the ACWF system, there were two channels that women retirees could use. One was the Petition Receiving Office (信访处 xinfangchu) under the direction of the Rights and Interests Department\(^\text{118}\). According to the section chief of the Petition Centre of the ACWF:

“… the retirement age issue has been a hot issue of the Women’s Petition Office; … the issue raised is relatively common, covering different regions, classes, vocational; third, the issue of complaints, although the quantity is not the lion’s share of all complaints - we can all see only 1-2% - but we think that this issue involves a deep-seated problems… Therefore, our concern has been regarded as an area. We believe that it should be properly studied and solved. (Interview/Case 2/03/12022009)

The other department involved in advocacy was the Organization Section of the Organization Department. Since the early 1980s, the Petition Receiving Office and the Organizational Section have received visits and letters from women cadres and intellectuals complaining of their forced earlier retirement than their male counterparts (Interview/Case2/01/10032008). Thus, they wrote letters to the ACWF to complain and call for an equal retirement age. Women cadres working within women’s federations

\(^\text{118}\) Receiving women’s petitions and providing legal service to them is a part of the portfolio of women-work. Within the ACWF and its branches at local levels, there are special sections or offices that function as centers to receive complaints through either letters or personal visits.
had the same problem, which was that women had to retire at 55 years whilst men could retire at 60\textsuperscript{119}. Thus, the personal experience of cadres in the ACWF and intellectuals and cadres outside the ACWF constituted the major component of its knowledge of gender and retirement age at the beginning of the campaign.

It was not sufficient to have only a collection of grievance letters to submit in support of a new policy proposal. To make a convincing argument, the Organizational Department of the ACWF initiated a survey among 44 institutional establishments in Beijing, involving 17 ministries and commissions, 4 cultural establishments, 2 research institutes, 5 colleges and universities, 11 primary and secondary schools and 4 hospitals. The targets were female intellectuals and cadres over the age of 45. They were either working in academic establishments or administration services of the CCP and the government. Nearly 60\% of the 808 returned questionnaires indicated strong support for an equal retirement age for men and women at 60 and this was included in the report that the ACWF submitted (Interview/Case2/01/10032008).

In short, practical knowledge seemed to have played a significant role. The daily involvement with women masses through practical women-work helped the women’s federation to grasp the situation of the victims. Furthermore, cadres in women’s federations were facing the same earlier retirement age. The originality and freshness of their knowledge on women’s earlier retirement seemed adequate to policy-makers to support the validity of their proposals.

7.22 Framing the Policy Discourse on Gender and Retirement Age

Unlike the domestic violence issue whereby women had a unified interest and a clear target – the perpetrators of violence against women - the retirement age issue in China is complex as both gender and class issues are involved. Accordingly, the shaping of

\textsuperscript{119} For example, the cadre in her fifties who had played a major role in collecting grievance letters and drafting proposals was facing retirement imminently. However, she felt herself full of vigour and vitality, loved her work in the ACWF and hoped to continue working.
policy discourse on an equal retirement age for women inevitably encounters challenges from both gender and class. This section first reviews how class and gender are intertwined in the retirement age issue, and then investigates how the advocacy work addresses these complexities in framing policy discourse.

**Transformation of power in retirement administration of the state:** Five main elements constitute the core of China’s current administrative regulations concerning retirement age, namely, the constitution, ordinary laws, administrative statutes, CCP policies and other informal regulations. Although not directly regulating retirement age, the Constitution ensures equality between men and women citizens in employment and welfare. Among ordinary laws, the Civil Servant Law (2005) is the major law covering retirement of civil servants. Others such as the Women’s Law (2005) also address women’s equal right in retirement. As well as laws, administrative statutes and government regulations such as decrees, directives, and ordinances are issued by government administrative bodies on retirement age. Furthermore, local government regulations have specific measures designed to implement central authorities’ documents and state regulations.

In China’s political system, both the Organizational Department of the CCP and the Ministry of Personnel are charged with cadre administration concerning retirement age. While the Organizational Development of the CCP concentrates on nomination and election of cadres above middle rank, the Ministry of Personnel takes care of most of the human resource management concerning the welfare of cadres and experts. Because of this division of labour, the Organizational Department is more political and the Ministry of Personnel is relatively administrative. At the early stage of the PRC, the Organizational Department took a more important role in identifying and nominating cadres. After the economic reforms began in 1978, however, the Ministry of Personnel

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120 Basically, local government regulations on retirement are found at three levels: the provincial level (including municipalities directly under the central government and autonomous regions); regional (including prefectural cities and municipal districts); and county (including county-level cities) or the working unit level.
came more to the fore, tasked as it was, with building an advanced civil service system. The current administrative system is the result of the transformation of the nomenklatura system. In the pre-reform era, the CCP drew up regulations regarding cadres’ retirement. The State Council’s power, on the other hand, was limited to the administration of workers, including intellectuals. The State Council developed retirement policies for workers as early as the 1950s, which was conclusively embodied in the Provisional Regulations of the State Council on the Retirement and Resignation of Workers (GF No. 104 [1978]).

After 1978, however, public administration reform was initiated. The CCP transferred more and more cadre management power to the state Council in order to change the cadres’ cohort into a civil servant system in the modern sense. Three major policy changes illustrate the separation of power between the CCP and the State. The first, the Provisional Measures of the State Council on the Resettlement of Sick, Venerable, Senior and Handicapped Cadres (GF No. 104 [1978]), implied the inception of the power transfer from the CCP to the State Council in cadre administration. The second regulation, the Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants (1993) issued by the State Council, was very different. It was a comprehensive policy stating systematically specific measures, rules, and instructions concerning all cadres and provided guidelines for regulating retirement before the Civil Servant Law came into use. The Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants heralded a new phase of retirement age administration in that it was essentially a trial version of the Civil Servant Law (2005). After ten years of implementation of the provisional regulations, the Civil Servant Law (2005) was enacted, which signified the completion of power transformation from the CCP to the State in personnel administration in China.

One of the first modifications introduced by the State Council at the initial stages of public administration reform was the enforced retirement age policy for cadres. In the 1980s, the government recognized that the then current cadre system was not able to effectively serve the development of a market economy. Early reform in 1980s included the imposition of a mandatory retirement age (60 for men and 55 for women).
for officials of middle rank bureaucracy or the rank below in the Government Civil Servant Regulation. Officials of high rank, however, were exempt. This enforced retirement policy considerably “lowered the average age of government officials from 1981 to 1998, and the number of senior officials aged 60 or older dropped from 81 percent to 54 percent” (ADB, 2002: 33). At the same time, the Ministry of Personnel issued the No. 141, No. 142 and No. 153 documents (1983 GF: No. 141, 142, 153) requiring a deferred retirement age of high-level experts irrespective of whether they were men or women to 65 or 70 years old. These policies were to deal with the shortage of intellectual human resources that were badly needed in the undertaking of economic reform. The CCP also made policies on retirement: in 1982, the Central CCP Committee issued No. 13 Provision (1982) which introduced a veteran retirement policy framework to reduce the average age of cadres.

Gender issues in retirement age: Gender issues are embedded in class interests in the retirement age issue. In the Provisional Regulations of the State Council on the Retirement and Resignation of Workers (GF No. 104 [1978]), the retirement age of enterprise employees was set at 60 for men, 50 for female workers and 55 for female cadres. The State Council’s Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants (1993) promulgated 60 for men and 55 for women as the ages for mandatory retirement, which institutionalized the practice of different retirement ages for men and women.

Although the first document was promulgated in the same year as the economic reforms started, these documents were based on employment regulations implemented in the centralized socialist state before the reform, where physical workers and cadres were treated equally. Although the monetary amount was very little, the distribution of welfare, for instance, the pension, was quite even. On the other hand, working conditions for physical workers were normally harsh due to the low level of industrial development. Thus, the early retirement age for female workers and cadres, according to some scholars (Wang 2008), had not resulted in serious grievances and differentials between women workers and cadres, if at all.

However, the Central CCP Committee’s No. 13 Provision (1982) introduction of
a veteran retirement policy framework to reduce the average age of cadres aroused controversy, in particular among women cadres. According to this provision, female cadres had to retire five years earlier than their male peers did. At the same time, the Ministry of Personnel issued the No. 141, No. 142 and No. 153 documents (1983 GF: No. 141, 142, 153) which required high-level experts to defer their retirement in order to deal with the shortage of intellectual human resources. Although age differentials were not contained in the document, female experts tended to be decriminalized in the implementation.

In the 1990s, the State Council pushed forward another round of public administrative reform. The Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants (1993) introduced and consolidated the five-year difference in retirement ages for women and men which seriously undermined the previous efforts of women’s organizations, in particular the ACWF, gender champions in the CCP and the State, as well as the vast number of women victims of earlier retirement.

Recently, the privatization of public service institutions (Shiye Danwei) such as research institutes affiliating to the state heralds another new round of highly controversial public service reform. However, it had to be halted as an increasing number of complaints emerged from many walks of life. Yet the separation of tasks between the CCP and the state organs is continuing, which means the State Council has more power in policy-making and the NPC and the CPPCC in legislation. The CCP seems to enjoy less authority in many areas since it has shifted power to these organs.

In general, the retirement age issued by the State Council during the public administration reform brought about a more negative impact on women cadres and intellectuals. Apart from their losses in pension after retirement, the enforced retirement age policy had a negative impact on women entering decision-making bodies at different levels, particularly at high-level politics. It proved to be discriminatory against female cadres by shortening the duration of their participation in social and public affairs administration, thus putting them at a disadvantage when being considered for
promotion to higher levels of administrative posts. When women cadres reached a certain age, they were seen as not worth being invested in for further promotion. They had to leave the posts for promising “young, well educated, professional, and revolutionary” cadres who were preferred by the personnel departments of the CCP and governmental organizations. This partly explains why there have been so few women at high politics in China, especially after the reform.

Class issues in retirement: At the same time, as the economic reforms went deepened, several fundamental changes occurred concerning class differentiations in China. While the situation of intellectuals rose dramatically from the bottom of society to the top that of cadres remained at best a status quo, if not less privileged. That of the workers, however, changed adversely from the once glorious owners of the socialist country and the vanguard class to the very bottom of society. Many workers were laid-off from state-owned enterprises and their benefits and the impact of retirement, changed as well. There are diverse interests in retirement. First, the cadres and intellectuals who have a stable job are guaranteed welfare commensurate to their position and years of service. For them, earlier retirement means a great loss. As some scholars estimate, five years earlier could result in tens of thousands Yuan RMB’s loss, in part because of economic inflation. The impact of this was less for workers, in particular those employed in dilapidated state-owned enterprises actively hoping to retire earlier. For them, leaving unhealthy working conditions and getting their pension earlier seemed to be the most convenient strategy to cope with the precarious situation caused largely by the reform of state-owned enterprises.

Female workers, concentrated in poorly paid sectors with poor working conditions, hoped to retire earlier even more fervently than male workers who were usually in better working conditions. In addition, more female workers were made laid-off.

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121 This happens presumably because to be promoted at higher levels, a cadre needs a certain number of years of experience at different ranks and experience in certain positions. Therefore, when women get to this point, they are near to retirement and the ladder is taken away from under their feet.
off than male workers. Although their pensions might be paltry, they were more than the monthly fees received as redundancy compensation. While intellectuals and cadres wished to remain in post as long as they could, most workers preferred retirement. Thus, the interests of female workers and female cadres or intellectuals clashed along class lines.

Establishing diagnostic frames: The advocacy strategy developed by the ACWF challenged the retirement policy per se and proposed a replacement of the current regulation on retirement age. Thus, the ACWF’s advocacy strategy was more challenging to the state than that of the ADVN122.

However, the ACWF simplified the framing process by mostly relying on statements, as compared to the ADVN whose activists shaped the domestic violence issue by using data, vivid personal stories, and arguments based on gender analyses. One frequently used statement was that the earlier retirement age was an infringement of women’s rights in employment. The other often used argument was that women’s enforced earlier retirement results in loss of experienced personnel to both the working unit and the country; this implied that the regulation was wrong not only for women but also for social development.

Recently, scholars have used international human right treaties to argue for an equal retirement age for women (Liu, Guo and Hao 2011). They often referred to international instruments including the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)123; the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (China became a signatory in 1997), and the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)

122 It is a formidable task to persuade policy-makers to accept that the regulation of earlier retirement age for women is wrong. Many policy-makers think such a policy is actually to women’s advantage and allows them to retire from tedious work earlier. Others think that at a stringent time of employment in a tense labour market, it is natural for women to leave posts earlier to make way for young and promising candidates.

123 China became a signatory in 1980.
*Convention 1958, (No. 111)* (ratified by the Chinese government in 2006)). The main argument they made was that “mandatory provisions for different retirement ages based on gender shall be viewed as unequal, as discrimination against women and as a violation of women’s human rights” (Liu, Guo and Hao 2011 p.10). For instance, scholars of demographic and labour economy argued that earlier retirement would result in much less pension for women after their retirement compared with men. The argument was reiterated by Wang Naikun, one of the top leaders of the ACWF, in her speech at the NPC in 2008:

… According to China's current pension regulation that is based on length of years of service, women’s five years earlier retirement suggests that they will receive a lower pension than men will. By the current pension disbursement approach, only those who have worked for at least 35 years are entitled to get 88% of full capacity pensions. According to an estimation of experts, the number of years of employment of those who graduated as an undergraduate is 31.6 years for women on average, and 39.3 years for men. As follows, the longer time women spend working for degrees, the less time they can contribute to society. Indeed, the fault exists from a vantage point of social justice …” [http://www.china.com.cn/2008lianghui/2008-03/13/content_12493399.htm](http://www.china.com.cn/2008lianghui/2008-03/13/content_12493399.htm). Assessed on 15 October 2010.

Later on, facing seriousness challenges from both the government and public, the ACWF mobilized academic research to make their proposal more scientific. The interdisciplinary research programmes and forums helped the ACWF validate the narratives of proposals submitted to the NPC. Compared with the previous framing that narrowed the analyses of impacts of the earlier retirement age on women’s career fulfillment, the new advocacy strategy extended the analysis to encompass national human resource management, an aging society, pension reforms, etc. According to (Interview/Case2/01/10032008), the research provided substantial materials and essential view of the proposal which included: 1) arguing that there was a sound social environment that rendered women’s equal retirement age with men possible; 2) arguing that an unequal retirement age for women was detrimental to their career development and financial interests; 3) shouting that women’s earlier retirement incurred enormous
human resource waste; and 4) providing good practice from other countries for reference. (Interview/Case2/01/10032008)

However, the influence of academic research was limited. Statements about the concept of social justice and fundamental human rights and international treaties seemed too insubstantial to result in a substantive change in attitudes and the birth of a new ‘common sense’.

**The ACWF’s prognostic frame:** It seemed that the ACWF’s complete attention was devoted exclusively to the retirement age of civil servants, though gender in retirement is, in fact, a complex matter. The simplification of the issue revealed an underlying assumption that introducing a unified retirement age would also solve all gender inequalities in retirement. Thus, it was understandable that the ACWF would advocate for a unified retirement age for women and men cadres and intellectuals for over a decade.

Initially, the ACWF’s advocacy chiefly focused on an equal retirement age for female cadres and intellectuals. ACWF representatives negotiated relentlessly with the Organizational Department of the Central CCP Committee and the Ministry of the Personnel, focusing almost exclusively on the negative impact of women’s earlier retirement on female cadres’ presence in top-level politics. Articles published in the 1980s frequently argued, "China’s small number of top-level women is partly due to the early retirement age for women". In short, arguments for revisions of existing early retirement age regulations were largely based on women’s rights to career development and political engagement.

In respond to grievances and the advocacy led by the ACWF, both the CCP and government agencies issued several administrative and CCP regulations to delay retirement age for female cadres in the 1990s. To curb discrimination in retirement for female cadres, furthermore, the Organizational Department of the Central CCP Committee and the Ministry of Personnel jointly issued the *Notice on the Age of*
Retirement/Retreat of Female Cadres (1987 No. 2)\textsuperscript{124} and the Announcement on the Age of Retirement/Retreat of Female Cadres at the County or Sectional Level (Zong Tong Zi [1992] No. 22)\textsuperscript{125} respectively. These documents suggested different retirement ages for female cadres at different levels with that of female professionals extended to 60 years in accordance with a set of circulars issued by government agencies.

The new policy discourse focused on reducing gender gaps in retirement between male and female cadres and intellectuals: the interests of female manual workers were largely ignored. However, the disagreements between different groups of women were not exposed until the state issued a universal retirement age for women in the \textit{Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants} in 1993. It was then that the ACWF began to encounter intensified objections from both policy-makers in the State Council and the public in the name of “women workers”. In particular, female workers expressed their objections through mass media such as discussion forums and websites. Secondly, female workers’ objections were used as an excuse by policy-makers to block the ACWF’s proposal, stating that "the majority of women do not agree to the same retirement age for both sexes," and this was also a common statement in related debates across the mass media.

My research based on interviews and documentary research revealed a shift of the ACWF’s advocacy strategy from addressing purely women cadres and intellectuals’ interests to speaking for different groups of women in retirement from the 2000 onwards. Faced with so many objections to its proposed equal retirement age for male and female civil servants and technical intellectuals, the ACWF started to re-shape its arguments and proposals. The aim shifted from a unified retirement age for all civil

\textsuperscript{124} Zhongyang zuzhibu, laodong renshibu guanyu nuganbu lixiu tuixiu nianling wenti de tongzhi, No.2,Laorenlao,1987,《 中央组织部、劳动人事部关于女干部离休退休年龄问题的通知》(劳人老（1987）2号).

\textsuperscript{125} Zhonggong zhangyang zuzhibu, renshibu guanyu xian (chu) ji nuganbu tui(li)xiu nianling wenti de tongzhi, No.22, Zutongzi, 1992,《 中共中央组织部、人事部关于县（处）级女干部退（离）休年龄问题的通知》(组通字[1992]22号).
servants to a flexible retirement policy: that "the statutory retirement age for male and female cadres (including technical professionals) shall be 60, with the freedom to choose an early retirement under the premise of a certain length of service (25 or 30 years)." They also suggested that a moderately flexible retirement age policy for male and female workers should be implemented, setting "the retirement age at 60 for male workers and at 55 for female workers, with the freedom for both sexes to choose early retirement under the premise of a certain length of service" and stipulating that "the retirement age is determined based on the type of work and the degree of labor intensity" (Interview/Case2/04/12022009).

Apparently, the new proposal considered the current complex economic and social situation in China, where women’s interests had become more and more diverse. While continuing to advocate for an equal retirement age for female cadres and intellectuals, the ACWF’s proposals began to pay attention to female workers’ interests. An ILO report stated: “Such a provision not only ensures the equal rights of men and women at work but also gives them an equal right to choose, meeting the requirements for equality in employment, including the demands of those who prefer to continue working and those who wish to retire early rather than continue their job” (Liu, Guo and Hao 2011 p.20).

In general, the ACWF mobilized various resources to frame the policy discourse on retirement age by providing analyses and proposals. At the initial stage in the 1980s, the policy advocacy focused on women cadres and experts. The process of advocacy was closed within a small circle of cadres in women’s federation. Since the turn of the century, however, the advocacy paid attention to diverse interests of different groups of women in retirement. The frameworks they developed extended their narrow interests in elite women’s working years to a wide range topics that touched both gender and class equalities of the retirement issues.
7.23 Drafting and Submitting Proposals

This research identified two phases of proposal development. In the first phase in the 1990s, the extended retirement age proposals drafted by internal departments of the ACWF targeted party policies and administrative regulations. Thus, the recipients were the Organizational Department of the CCP and the Ministry of Personnel. The second phase began with the promulgation of the Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants (1993) and continued through to 2000s. During this period, the aim was to include a uniform retirement age for women and men in the Civil Servant Law and the revised Women’s Law in 2005. The targeted recipients were mainly the NPC and the State Council.

Furthermore, my research showed that the drafting of bills or proposals was a dynamic policy issue process. There were two major approaches in the drafting: the closed-door approach was allowed only a few departments within the ACWF to be involved in the drafting, and its focus was confined exclusively to women’s self-development. The open-door method embraced wide participation and multi foci centers on both women’s development and structural issues. The perspectives, capabilities and preferences of leaders and organizational structures affected the approaches and frameworks adopted in the proposals. I analyze each phase as it follows.

Technocrat oriented approach: In the first phase, the ACWF adopted a closed-door approach to draft proposals for extending the retirement age for female cadres and intellectuals. The cadres in the Organizational Section generalized the main points based on the mounting letters of grievance, and then submitted them to their departmental chiefs for assessment. They then would be submitted to the top leaders of the Secretariat, the ACWF, who would issue instructions for further action. For example, one of the early influential proposals of the 1980s was the result of internal drafting and deliberating through several bureaucratic procedures. Finally, the ACWF formally integrated the issue into a comprehensive report produced at the Sixth National Congress on Women held in 1988. Along with some other outstanding problems
identified by the congress representatives, the report was submitted to the Centre CCP Committee in the same year.

In the initial stage, furthermore, the targeted institutions for accepting the proposals were in particular the Ministry of Personnel and the Organizational Department of the CCP. The main content of the proposal was to extend the retirement age for female cadres and senior experts exclusively. I was, however, unable to access the relevant documents for a specific analysis of the details. Nevertheless, I observed mixed results of both failure and success. On the one hand, the hierarchical structure of the organization limited participation and deliberation. The shaping of the equal retirement issue betrayed the characteristics of a bureaucratic decision-making style in the ACWF over policy advocacy. This process was in marked contrast to the case of the ADVN, where the activists directly organized around the issue that they proposed to advocate.

The closed-door approach seemed quite effective in producing new regulations, which gave rise to the *Announcement on the Age of Retirement/Retreat of Female Cadres* (1987 No. 2)\(^ {126} \) and the *Announcement on the Age of Retirement/Retreat of Female Cadres at the County or Sectional Level* (Zong Tong Zi [1992] No. 22)\(^ {127} \) These documents specified that the retirement age of county/division-level female cadres and female professionals be extended to 60 years in accordance with a set of circulars issued by government agencies. It is worth noting that in these closed processes, the face-to-face meetings among cadres of the ACWF, the Ministry of Personnel, and the Organizational Department of the CCP were more crucial than the format of proposals. It was at these meetings where consensus was reached and decisions were made, in part because the policy-making of administrative regulations was more closed than the legislation.

\(^{126}\) See note 124.

\(^{127}\) See note 125.
However, at the turn of the century, the legislation in China had developed significantly. The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China was promulgated in 2000, which introduced formalized legislation procedures. Gradually, the CCP had withdrawn itself from legislation commissioned it to the NPC. At the same time, the leadership of the ACWF had changed. Peng Peiyun went to the ACWF as the president in 1998. An intellectual-oriented leader, Peng had worked in various institutions of the CCP, the government and academy. Apart from her rich experience in leadership, she had a deep understanding of women’s issues and a vision for policy change concerning women’s rights. She adopted an open-door approach to wage a new campaign for integrating the retirement age issue into the Civil Servant Law and the Women’s Law.

The advocacy proposals were facing strenuous objections from both policy-makers and the public. Policy-makers had been objecting to a uniform retirement age for women and men ever since the initiation of the public administration reform after the economic reforms started in 1978. Setting up retirement regulations to build a cohort of civil servants who were young and equipped with advanced knowledge and expertise, was one of the major tasks mandated from the state to the Ministry of Personnel. To ask women to retire earlier in government agencies or state-owned public service units in some way served as one of the strategies to reduce the size of the public servant cohort, which was a goal for the public administration. Women’s earlier retirement seemed to be a quite acceptable scheme for most policy-makers. Furthermore, some maintained that leaving posts earlier was about protecting and caring for women, since they would go through physical and psychological transformations in their fifties, which was perceived as having a negative impact on their capabilities to cope with the demands of their jobs.

**Engaging academic experts:** With the formidable task of persuading policy-makers and the public to change their opinions, the ACWF’s leaders like Peng Peiyun felt an earnest need to strengthen the knowledge base for the campaign to cope the blended thoughts and opinions. However, unlike the case of the ADVN whereby the activists themselves were scholars who were armed with the expertise necessary for the
campaign, most of the ACWF leaders and cadres were bureaucrats with little academic or legal expertise except on retirement age. Aware of this shortcoming, the campaign started to integrate academic expertise from different subjects outside of the ACWF. The Women’s Studies Institute of China (WSIC), a national research institute set up by the ACWF in 1992, was tasked with organizing work under the top leaders of the ACWF, above all, Mm. Peng Peiyun.

The WSIC convened a series of workshops and forums to attract scholars from different subjects to build extensive expertise. It was also mandated by the ACWF leader Peng Peiyun to organize the development of several drafts of proposals and bills, which were invariably based on close collaboration with scholars from different institutions and subjects. Three important forums in the first decade of twenty first century were highly influential for the ACWF’s proposals submitted to the NPC and the CPPCC. The first workshop was held on 7 November 2003 where more than ten distinguished scholars and several famous newspaper journalists attended the discussion. The note of the discussion was published widely in several newspapers as well as the Collection of Women’s Studies in China. The second forum was held in 2004. Thanks to Li Qiufang’s position as a leader of the CASS (China Academy of Social Sciences), the forum was able to attract many distinguished scholars to participate (Interview/Case2/05/10112006). The most significant outcome of this forum was that it began to make the retirement age issue a formal academic one that transcended traditional women-work. An interdisciplinary approach was adopted to extend the investigation to many academic subjects such as politics, law/constitution studies, demography, labour economy, and social welfare (see Attachment 2). The third influential forum was held on 2 February in 2009, characterized also by an interdisciplinary and inter-sectional approach. At this forum, moreover, it is worth mentioning that international organizations, above all the ILO, played an active role in providing financial supports as well as presenting experiences from outside China.

The integration of interdisciplinary academic expertise attracted various academic subjects, which include women/gender studies, sociology, law and
jurisprudence, politics, demography, labour economy, social welfare, human resource development, and finance. Apparently, gender and women’s studies remains a major constituency of the expertise for the advocacy for retirement age. The second important subject of expertise is law studies (see Table 13).

Table 13 Distribution of Subjects of Expertise in the Equal Retirement Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>Forum in 2003</th>
<th>Forum in 2004</th>
<th>Forum in 2009</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women/Gender Studies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demography &amp; Labour economy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour &amp; Human Resource</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed by the author.

In general, the interdisciplinary research programme and forums helped the ACWF validate the narratives of proposals submitted to the NPC. Compared with the previous framing that narrowed the analysis of impact of earlier retirement age on women’s career fulfillment, the new form advocacy frame extended them to encompass various aspects such as national human resource management, aging society and pension reforms.
Submitting Bills/Proposals: The ACWF campaigned for an equal retirement age for women for nearly 20 years. Since 2000, the China Women's Federation has repeatedly presented bills and motions through the NPC deputies and CPPCC members to the National People's Congress, CPPCC. According to the China Women's Research Society (2009), the number of relevant bills or proposals collected by the NPC and the CPPCC conferences has amounted to over a thousand since the late 1980s. These include 150 suggestions submitted by the members and representatives from the ACWF system over the past decade (Interview/Case2/04/09112006).

The ACWF’s applications of different alliances with the CCP, the government and the NPC at different stages. In the early stage in the 1980s, when the retirement age had not yet been put on the legislation agenda, the technocrat-oriented leaders used their personal networks with policy-makers mostly concentrated in the national Personnel Ministry and the Organization Department of the CCP to negotiate equal retirement age regulations for women cadres and technical experts. Instead of making unequal retirement age a public issue, they treated it as a specific public administration issue and the targeted audience of the advocacy was strictly those policy-makers who had a close involvement in developing the policies. The results of the campaigns met with partial success. Although the narrow and closed-door approach of the campaign adopted by technocrats put constraints on the wider participation of the public, it successfully promoted the promulgation of the Announcement on the Age of Retirement/Retreat of Senior Experts128 ([1990] No. 9) by the State Personnel Ministry in 1990 and the Announcement on the Age of Retirement/Retreat of Female Cadres at the County or Sectional Level (Zong Tong Zi [1992] No. 22) by the Organization Department of the Central CCP Committee in 1992. However, the State Council’s unequal retirement policy Document No. 104 (1978) was still in use and some places and units refused to implement the new policy that favoured women experts and cadres in advanced

positions. This then gave rise to complaints from female experts and cadres who demanded equal treatment in retirement and prompted the ACWF for further action.

In 1993, the State Council issued the controversial Interim Regulations of Civil Servants (hereafter referred to as the Regulations 1993) which stipulates the provision of distinct retirement ages for men at 60 and women at 55, blatantly ignoring the positive articles scattered in several policies in existence (Interview/Case2/09/12022009). Bills and proposals kept on flocking to the NPC and CPPCC congresses to address the gender inequalities in retirement and to call for policy change. Thus, as a pre-emptive legislature of the Civil Servant Law, the Regulations 1993 attracted a lot of criticism from women cadres and experts in their bills and proposals to the NPC and the CPPCC. The new phase of the advocacy focused on an alliance with the NPC and the CPPCC, using this access to voice the issue:

…A year later in 1989, Guan Tao, the member of the Secretariat of the ACWF, made an open remark to criticize the negative response of some state institutes to equal retirement provisions at the Second Session of the Seventh National People's Political Consultative Conference. Furthermore, the representatives of the People’s Congress from Jiangsu province proposed a bill for equal retirement age for men and women at the National People’s Congress in 1990. These two proceedings marked the formal campaign at the NPC and the CPPCC at national level. Since then, the ACWF and local federations submitted bills every year, which were afterwards circulated by the NPC and CPPCC to the State Personnel Ministry to answer back to the proposers. According to the State Personnel Department, they have responded to more than 1000 such kind bills during fifteen years since 1990. (Interview/Case2/01/10032008)

Nevertheless, the criticisms and suggestions contained in the bills and proposals were put aside during the formation of the Civil Servant Law in 2000, which stimulated another surge of submitting bills and proposals. At the same time, the Women’s Law was set to be revised, which was perceived by the ACWF as an important opportunity to address women’s rights including equal treatment in retirement. Morale was high among representatives of the NPC and the CPPCC who hoped to achieve their goal of integrating equal retirement age clause into these two laws. Toward this end, the arguments of the proposals invariably focused on introducing clauses to ensure equal
retirement ages. The first submission, made by NPC representatives from Jiangsu, formally proposed an equal retirement age policy motion at the NPC Congress in 1990 (Interview/Case2/09/12022009). The most influential submission, organized by the ACWF, was perhaps the proposal signed by 66 members of the CPPCC in 2003 to call for an amendment of the 1993 Regulation to delete unequal retirement clauses, in order to pave the way for integrating a unified retirement age in the formulation of the Civil Servant Law (Interview/Case2/09/12022009).

After the failure of these proposals to be accepted in either the Civil Servant Law (2005) or the Women’s Law (2005), the ACWF renewed their efforts. Fully aware of the backlash of the newly promulgated Civil Servant Law and its negative implications for women’s retirement, as well as the infeasibility of introducing an equal retirement age for women in the near future, from 2005 onwards the ACWF started to change to a more pragmatic and prudent approach in addressing gender equality of retirement issues. Its leaders felt that protecting women’s interests in welfare such as pension and housing benefit was both urgent and expedient in the given context. The subsequent submission to the NPC and the CPPCC conferences used a welfare approach in that it temporarily shifted from addressing an equal retirement age for women in the near future, from 2005 onwards the ACWF started to change to a more pragmatic and prudent approach in addressing gender equality of retirement issues. Its leaders felt that protecting women’s interests in welfare such as pension and housing benefit was both urgent and expedient in the given context. The subsequent submission to the NPC and the CPPCC conferences used a welfare approach in that it temporarily shifted from addressing an equal retirement age to enhancing the welfare of women upon retirement. The strong welfare tendency of the proposals submitted in 2006 and afterwards, was articulated in the ACWF’s proposal in name of Wang Naikun, one of its top leaders.

In 2008, Wang Naikun, the then member of the Secretariat of the ACWF and deputy of the CPPCC, submitted the ACWF’s proposal entitled “About protection of senior female technical staff and county (division) level female cadres according to the provisions of the retirement age: Criticisms and suggestions on the Age of Retirement/Retreat of Female Cadres and Technical Experts”129, which won wide support among CPPCC members. While continuing to address the implementation of

129 Guny baozhang gaoji nv jishu renyuan he xian (chu) ji nvganbu anguiding nianling tuixiu de pipingjianyi, 《关于保障高级女技术人员和县（处）级女干部按规定年龄退休的批评建议》.
extant regulations concerning the extension of retirement age for women cadres and technical experts, it also called for particular attention by personnel departments to safeguard women’s rights and interests in pensions and public housing funds if they were to retire earlier than men (Interview/Case2/09/12022009). The proposal was submitted as a joint proposal that received more than 30 signatures from CPPCC members in the press and publication industry. When interviewed by a journalist, she said:”…we will not stop submitting proposals until this issue is solved” (Interview/Case2/01/10032008). To her expectation, many male members of the CPPCC also supported the proposal, which indicated that it had gone beyond a single women’s issue.

In short, the ACWF has used its various channel of access to propose the issue of equal retirement age since 1989. In particular, its alliance with the CCP played an important role in the initial stage of the campaign. However, its alliance with the government and the NPC seemed less effective. Although they tried hard to be heard in the "two sessions" (the National People’s Congress - NPC and the Communist CCP People’s Congress – CPPCC), the issue met with more challenge than acquiescence. Neither the National People's Congress nor the relevant government departments had accepted this proposal, nor had they taken any remedial action.

7.24 Influencing Policy Deliberations and Adoption

This section discusses what conditioning factors affected the ACWF’s advocacy activities in the deliberation and adoption stage. I analyze these factors with regard to the drafting stage, interagency reviews, and negotiations with the government organs, public consultations, and adoption, as discussed in Chapter 3.

Drafting stage: First, it was found that the ACWF was not involved in drafting the either the interim policy or the Civil Servant Law. The drafting process was a closed process dominated by a small group of technocrats and experts nominated mostly by the Ministry of Human Resources. Second, the ACWF had no champions in the drafting group. Thus, it was quite hard for the ACWF to influence it.
The gender consciousness of those involved in drafting the law was crucial. However, I was not able to arrange interviews with all the relevant resource persons, as a key informant passed away many years ago. Thus, several questions remain unanswered: Had the drafting group referred to a series of documents issued by the CCP to protect women’s equal rights in retirement? How could the drafting group ignore the relevant regulations? After all, the legislation had been led by the CCP.

Interagency Reviews: The NPC and the CPPCC are increasingly playing an important role in policy-making and legislation in China’s contemporary political life. Access to these organs is no doubt a valuable resource in policymaking, which makes it possible for the ACWF to campaign for women’s retirement rights at the conferences. As claimed by a current member of the Secretariat of the ACWF:

"…In the People’s Congress at national and local levels, we – women’s federations at various levels, have seats in the standing committees. … our veteran leader, Peng Peiyun, has always taken this issue seriously and made unremitting efforts to push forward the progress (of gaining equal retirement age for women) when she was the vice chairperson of the Standing Committee of the NPC or was the honorable chairperson of the ACWF, …” (China Women’s Research Society, CWRS Bulletin No.1, 2009)

Indeed, since the 1980s, ACWF’s deputies and representatives of the NPC and the CPPCC have worked closely with colleagues from various sectors and areas to wage a series of campaigns at the conferences to raise women’s retirement issues. In so doing, they gave prominence to these issues on several occasions.

Negotiating with government organs: Government organs received proposals from the ACWF mainly through two channels. First, according to the CCP’s policy in 1989, governmental functional departments had to consult the ACWF regarding policymaking concerning the interests and rights of women and children. The process of drafting the Civil Servant Law led by the Ministry of Personnel was no exception. It is exactly through the many rounds of consultations that the ACWF proposed a uniform retirement age issue to the drafting group led by the Ministry. Second, the government organ received relevant bills/proposals transferred from the NPC and the CPPCC
conferences. According to ACWF staff, the Ministry of Personnel received more than a thousand bills/proposals from 1990 to 2005 (Interview/Case2/09/12022009).

How did the government respond to the ACWF’s proposals? With limited data available, however, I could not provide details of the responses. Nevertheless, their negative attitudes are revealed by their action. To the ACWF’s great despair, the Ministry of the Personnel always rejected its proposals on equal retirement age for women. For instance, the Interim Regulations (1993) utterly ignored the proposals of the ACWF when it introduced differing retirement ages for women and men cadres. Likewise, the Civil Servant Law intended to maintain the status quo of the 1993 pre-emption in spite of fierce criticism from the ACWF. They further frustrated the ACWF’s hope for extending women’s retirement age in future policy-making by arguing that:

\[\text{… we should fully consider the likely impact of the adjustments of female civil servants to other groups of people…If we single out female civil servants to adjust their retirement age; it will trigger a series of contradictions and problems (Interview/Case2/09/12022009) }\]

\[“\text{we must take full account of all walks of life working women of different demands on the retirement age to respect the interests and aspirations of the majority of workers”}. (Interview/Case2/09/12022009)\]

Apparently, the decision-makers in the Ministry of Personnel refused to consider an equal retirement age for female civil servants and experts using as an excuse the different interests and gaps extant among women. It is true that some women workers objected to the proposal of a uniform retirement age, hoping to leave dangerous manual work earlier. However, using the women workers’ demand to refuse women cadres’ demands was not so much protecting workers’ rights as about the focus of the debate. The rhetoric hides the fact that the government did not consider equal retirement age to be a serious issue. Thus, it seems to them rational to ignore the ACWF’s, as well as other women’s organizations’ proposals.

Nevertheless, the ACWF’s continuing campaign for the welfare of women in retirement had some influence. As mentioned in previous paragraphs, after the
promulgation of the Civil Servant Law in 2005, the ACWF shifted the focus of its campaign from advocating for a uniform retirement age to calling on the state organ to maintain the policies and regulations of 1978 and 1992 that were favourable to women’s retirement, and at the same time to pay attention to the welfare of women who retired earlier than men. In response to the ACWF’s proposal submitted in 2006, the Ministry of Personnel agreed to apply documents in 1990 and 1992, and to look at the welfare of earlier retired women. They admitted previous positive measures scattered in several documents (especially No.5 in 1990 and No.22 in 1992) were still valid and committed to enhancing supervision over the implementation of these measures. They also admitted the existence of negative impacts and unequal treatments of women cadres and experts as they retired earlier than men did, and promised to consider these issues together with the pension reform of the State organs (Interview/Case2/09/12022009).

Never losing hope, the ACWF continued its campaign by reiterating its submission to the 2006 sessions of the NPC and CPPCC, but to no avail (Interview/Case2/09/12022009). Sometimes, the ACWF’s leaders even went so far as to criticize the government openly, a rare event in political life in China. When talking about the government’s treatment of their proposal, one of the ACWF leaders stated during an interview with the China Women’s News during the sessions of the NPC and the CPPCC conferences:

“…In the response of the Ministry of Personnel to the proposals put forward by CPPCC representative in 2007, the Ministry of Personnel promised to strictly implement the spirit of the two (positive) documents (especially No.5 in 1990 and No.22 in 1992 that contain positive measures for extending the retirement age for female experts and cadres in advanced positions)... However, in practice, the situation of women has not been improved. Not only have the two policies not been implemented... In the same provinces, some departments or bureaus forced women cadres and experts with senior titles at high levels to retire earlier with the excuses of institutional reform, reducing the size of the department as well as making cadres’ cohort younger...” (Interview/Case2/01/10032008)

What prompted the decision-makers to decline the ACWF’s equal retirement age proposal? There have been many explanations from different angles, one of which is
their “traditional way of thinking”. As the Women’s Watch-China, a new type of women’s organization set up in 1995, explains:

“…this national policy has a clear connection with the traditional way of thinking that ‘women take care of housework and men take of the outside world.’ In Chinese society, women without a job are acceptable, but men who stay at home will be laughed at.” (WWC 2008p.44)

The limit of the ACWF’s influence with government organs in policymaking was apparent. Although it enjoyed access to State organs in policymaking and was blessed by authority with the CCP, it could not transform them into policy influence with government agencies.

Public Consultation: The public has expressed a negative view toward extending retirement age for female cadres and experts in the public media and on the internet: almost every piece of article or news relating to extending the retirement age for female cadre and experts met with a negative response. Those using the traditional gender ideologies that address women’s role in providing cares in families claimed that if women retired earlier, they would not only open a valuable employment opportunity to young people, but also have more time to take care of their families. Female manual workers, as mentioned earlier, in particular those working in dilapidated state-owned enterprises were also against the proposal.

Adoption: NPC Review: the ACWF also initiated speeches at the NPC and the CPPCC congresses to make full use of these platforms. As early as 1989, for example, Guan Tao, the then Member of the Secretariat of the ACWF and member of the CPPCC, made a speech at the assembly of the Second Session of the Seventh CPPCC National Committee. She criticized some who failed the implementation of the state’s retirement extension policies that were in favour of female experts. Likewise, in 2001, when the Civil Servant Law was set to be formulated and the Women’s Law to be revised, Liu Hairong, then member of both the CPPCC and the Secretariat of the ACWF, made a speech at the assembly of the Fourth Conference of Ninth Session of the CPPCC to
argue the negative impacts of an earlier retirement age on women professors for their career development (Interview/Case2/09/12022009).

Thirdly, the ACWF made use of its leadership among the Circle of Women’s Federations Fulianjie) during the CPPCC conferences to mobilize more than 70 members, who came from different fronts of organizations, to speak for an equal retirement age for women. In the 2002 CPPCC conference, the ACWF gathered members of the CPPCC who belonged to the Circle of Women’s Federations to brief them about the issue. The then president of the ACWF, Mm. Peng Peiyun, made a comprehensive speech on women’s issues that needed to be addressed. The earlier retirement age for women, above all, was the focus. She required the female representatives to work together closely and make concerted efforts to promote an equitable solution to this problem during the formulation of the Civil Servant Law (Peng 2002). From then on, the ACWF organized similar briefings at sessions of the NPC and the CPPC annually. The ACWF perceives the circle as their major mouthpiece at the conference.

However, the ACWF’s efforts at targeting the NPC and the CPPCC conferences met with differing results. The ACWF seems quite influential in the CPPCC in their advocacy for a uniform retirement age for men and women, and won support from them. However, it gained less support from the NPC conferences, where it was received coldly by the male dominant representatives. Mr. He Chunlin, then one of the leaders of the Internal Legal Affairs Committee of the NPC Standing Committee, responded to the proposals of the ACWF during the drafting of the Civil Servant Law and the revision of the Women’s Law “… Given the different opinions of various forces, the Internal Legal Affairs Committee does not propose legislation of a uniform retirement age between men and women…” (Interview/Case2/09/12022009). Without the NPC’s backup, it was difficult for the ACWF to make a breakthrough in the new legislatures.

In general, the ACWF has fought unremittingly for the equal retirement age policy at the NPC and the CPPCC conferences. Their main approach included submitting bills and proposals and delivering speeches at plenary or group meetings.
These efforts won popular support at the CPPCC conferences. I argue that in the policy deliberation, the ACWF’s connections with and access to the drafting groups or key departments in charge of organizing the drafting and consultation were crucial. The capability of top leaders as members of the standing committees of both the NPC and CPPCC was important. Indeed, the seats in the NPC and CPPCC ensured that the ACWF top leaders had direct access to policy making in these political organs, which otherwise would have been impossible. However, the ability that the ACWF showed in gaining public support was limited, which minimized its policy influence in the public consultation stage.

7.3 Analyzing Conditioning Factors

As a mass organization working on women’s issues, the ACWF is authorized by the CCP to represent women’s interests and rights in policy-making. It enjoys various connections with the CCP, the government, the NPC and other state agencies. The equal retirement age that it advocated is identified as an important aspect of women’s development by conventional official ideology of women’s liberation. Then, why has the ACWF’s advocacy for equal retirement age not succeeded?

Various factors have contributed to this. For example, the retirement issue is a complex topic that has touched many chords such as class conflicts, redistribution of power among the CCP, the state and the NPC in China, equal opportunities and welfare benefits in public administration reform, etc. However, this thesis focused on the meso level of organizational factors for analysis. Thus, the following sections examine how the suggested conditioning factors - legitimacy, the leadership, the organizational structure, the learning and the sources of funds - affected the process and result.

7.31 Impact of Political Legitimacy

I argue that the registration status was not applicable in analyzing the ACWF’s legitimacy, as its legitimacy with the Party/state as political rather than legal. The
ACWF enjoys various alliances with key political actors that have provided the access and legitimacy for them to represent women in policy-making. However, the basis for the ACWF’s authority to influence policy-making has changed along with broader changes in the political, economic and social context. In particular, their practical oriented expertise has become insufficient in an era of “scientific decision-making” promoted by the CCP and the State.

Alliances and authority: First, the power of the ACWF’s political alliance with the CCP cannot immediately be translated into authority in negotiating policy change with the NPC and the government organs after the reform. Conventionally, the CCP had served as a major champion of women’s issues for the ACWF. This partly explains why, at the beginning of the public administration reform, the ACWF was able to promote required policies through their historical alliance with the CCP. In the initial stage of public administration reform, when legislation and policy making was heavily influenced by the CCP, the ACWF could conveniently use their alliance with the CCP organs to exert impact on some policy-making processes.

However, as the public administration reform has deepened, the CCP has consciously withdrawn itself from the legislation process. Since the 1990s, when the division of power in policy-making between the CCP, the state and the NPC started to speed up, there have been no joint documents issued by the CCP and the State organs to amend the gender gap in retirement age stipulated by interim Civil Servant Regulation in 1993. The ACWF had lost an eminent champion for policy-making. The CCP continued to increase the leeway for functional governmental departments to deal with women’s retirement cases instead of direct instructions to address gender equality. Its support for the ACWF now seems more elusive and less powerful.

Secondly, the redistribution of power and division of tasks among the CCP, the state, and NPC as well as other political organs has rendered the power in policy making diffuse and dispersed. This implies that the ACWF has to cultivate new champions and develop new strategies in order to cope with these challenges in policymaking. Indeed, the ACWF has made efforts to strengthen connections with the
state and the NPC, as mentioned in previous chapters, specifically setting up the National Working Committee on Women and Children, the women’s units within the NPC and the CPPCC. However, these establishments seemed not to have played any important role in negotiating equal retirement age policy. This is partly due to a lack of champions, in particular, those who support equal retirement age and are at the same time powerful decision-makers. For example, although a few female deputies in the NPC were active in submitting bills and presenting the issue at conferences, the majority of NPC deputies were not interested in women’s retirement age issues, and many of them even held negative attitudes towards the equal retirement age clause. While there are more female representatives of the CPPCC who support this issue, the CPPCC is less powerful than the NPC in policy-making and legislation.

In short, though the decentralization and distribution of power may enhance democratization in China, the CCP’s retreat from power and policy making poses new challenges for the AWCF, not only because its close ties with the CCP may not bring it the same legitimate authority in policy-making, but also because it has had to cultivate more champions outside the CCP system, which is a formidable task. ACWF is still struggling to wield the same influence over state organs that it has had over the CCP.

**Expertise and authority:** First, the grievances collected were mostly based on practical knowledge and this seemed to have added little authority to the ACWF’s legitimacy in policy making concerning women’s retirement at the initial stage. In response, the ACWF has tried to bolster its scientific credentials by drawing upon more rigorous research conducted by academics from different disciplines. The integration of interdisciplinary academic expertise attracted a cross-section of academics into promoting the issue. Although this has strengthened the evidence base for ACWF’s arguments in influencing both Party/state and public opinion, this still has not been sufficient to change policies on retirement that are increasingly becoming the responsibility of state rather than CCP organs.
7.32 Impact of Bureaucratic Leadership and Structure

The bureaucratic leadership and structure affected the campaign in several ways. First, the leading style of the ACWF has largely shaped the formation of issues and strategies adopted. The bureaucratic leading style affected the way in which equal retirement age issues were put forward and later, transformed into a policy issue. It is worth noting that complaints about the earlier retirement age of women emerged as early as beginning of the 1980s. However, it was not until the end of the 1980s that the issue was formally put forward by the ACWF. Why did it not become a focus in the early 1980s? One factor was that leaders’ understanding of the issue was very influential factor in determining whether women’s earlier retirement age should be designated as an urgent policy issue. Indeed, the 1980s had seen an increasing number of technocrats drawn into the ACWF leading body chiefly at the fifth and sixth congresses. As argued in the previous section, the technocrat-oriented leaders stressed women’s political and economic participation. The unequal retirement of female cadres was largely perceived by them as an infringement not only on women’s rights in work but also having a negative impact on their promotion to high-level positions. Certainly, the issue aroused their great attention.

Secondly, the ACWF was relatively a closed bureaucratic organization. The leaders led mostly through positional power, characterized by bureaucratic hierarchies and rigid division of tasks within the system. Staff and leaders at different echelons of hierarchies participated in and led specific activities at particular stages. Their understanding of the issue and their methodological preference significantly shaped the campaign. There was homogeneity of thinking and a lack of diverse perspectives. Although the leaders were aware of these constraints and made efforts to embrace scholars and other women’s organizations and the ad hoc conferences, this still was not sufficient to change the policies.

130 The then top leaders, like Chen Muhua, were most concerned about the reducing percentage of women cadres at national administrative positions at high level. For them, the earlier retirement age policies implied that fewer women cadres would reach high decision making bodies at national level.
Thirdly, the bureaucratic organizational structure was not conducive to the creation of an open and flexible issue-based network that was able to concentrate on the issue continually. Although there was intensive action, most of the efforts were concentrated when the NPC and the CPPCC were in session, or when laws were in revision. Thus, the endeavours were merely temporary and provisional. When compared with the advocacy of the ADVN, the lack of a deliberately designed strategy and action was prominent.

7.33 Impact of Adaptive Learning and Framing

Apparently, the content of the training convened by the ACWF for its cadres was of little use in the equal retirement campaign. First, the training was normally too generalized to include specific gender and retirement issues for discussion and gender issues were often disregarded in the course designs, particularly in the university lectures. As gender issues had yet to be mainstreamed in public administration courses in higher education in China, there was a lack of teaching resources on this issue. Thus, while the ACWF and its branches sent the cadres to learn in these universities, they could only familiarize themselves with mainstream terms and theories, but could not be armed with the theories and methods of gender analysis in policy.

Secondly, the conventional learning style not only constrained the ACWF’s ability in gender analysis, but also affected its ability to be reflective and responsive to the increasing diversification of women’s interests since the reforms. As mentioned in previous chapters, the ACWF’s campaigns tended to focus on the interests of elite women and simplified the complex issue of retirement and gender to a single parameter of age. As a result, the regulations tended to single out the women elite and made their rights and interests more privileged than other women. However, the lectures have not prepared the cadres of the ACWF to analyze such issues.

Thirdly, the learning style that was an improvement on the conventional learning, that is the adaptive learning, failed to introduce innovative methods of policy advocacy. We can see from the ACWF’s campaign that it depended heavily on the traditional
approach characterized by using dogma and statements to persuade policy-makers and the public. There were no carefully designed framing strategies such as the employment of images, symbols, or story lines, etc. that were applied in the ADVN’s advocacy to win wide support.

7.34 Impact of Funding

From observations and interviews, the study found that government funding had not added more authority to the ACWF’s campaign. Neither did the embeddedness of the ACWF in the CCP hierarchy help much. Peter Ho argues that environmental activists have been able to influence policy because they are embedded in state institutions – i.e. they had good links and champions in the state (Ho and Edmonds 2008). However, my study of the ACWF provides an interesting counter-argument – the ACWF was very well embedded but its benefits of embeddedness are limited.

7.4 Summary

This chapter examined the process of the ACWF’s negotiations on gender and retirement age in public policy to analyze how the assumed variables affect advocacy. I argued that the ACWF participated attentively in the policy process concerning retirement age and advocated persistently for a unified retirement age for female cadres and experts for over a decade. Although at the beginning the advocacy was often a closed process that met with some success, it faced more challenges from policymakers and public opinion. Although it shifted the focus and mobilized external expertise to bolster the scientific credentials of its proposals, it was not able to have the proposal integrated into laws such as the Civil Servant Law (2005) and the Women’s Law (2005).

As with the case of the ADVN, I suggest a complexity of interactions of various elements in analyzing the effects of conditioning factors. In this thesis, however, I propose several prominent factors that may have exerted an immediate influence. The political alliances, above all, were conspicuous in opening access for ACWF’s
participation in policy-making. However, the case of the ACWF shows that straight access to policy-making is not a guarantee of success. The mounting public complaints in the mass media against an equal retirement age policy for women indicated a lack of public awareness-raising concerning the issue. Furthermore, the bureaucratic organizational structure of the ACWF constrained its sustained efforts in mobilizing various forces for concerted actions on a single issue. In line with its organizational structure, the official leadership was mostly based on rigid division of labour and hierarchical authority, which is not conducive to drawing in heterogeneous external actors for collaboration on an equal footing. Although some enthusiastic leaders of the ACWF spoke out forcefully at NPC and the CPPCC conferences, the concepts and theories underlying their arguments tended be old-fashioned, as most of the proposals continued to single out elite women for favourable policies amid amounting conflicts and increasing gaps between classes. Concerned chiefly with stability in transition, the officials were reluctant to act on the proposals, in part because of the fear that introducing an equal retirement age might incur more grievances against the government. This implied that the learning initiated by the ACWF was of little help in providing tactics and theory in framing the gender and retirement issue. In short, I argue that the ACWF’s strength lies in its possession of various channels of accesses to policy-making and its favoured position in representing women as legitimized by the CCP. However, to make policy changes, it still needs to change its leadership style into a democratic and egalitarian one in order to collaborate broadly with other women’s organizations and gender experts on the same footing. It also needs to cultivate a flexible network with various government organs as well other women’s CSOs and mass media to work specifically on the retirement issue. In particular, it needs to initiate innovative learning to enhance its capacity in framing public policy issues.
8. Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

These two case studies on women organizations’ campaigns on anti-domestic violence and equal retirement age shed light on the highly complex area of conditioning factors in CSOs’ policy advocacy in China. At the core of the puzzle is the question of what is responsible for CSOs’ success in influencing policy change in China. Inspired by scholarships in civil society, public policy and social movement, this thesis mapped out the parameters through selecting variables from previous studies. By identifying and analyzing the parameters, I developed a pentagon framework and broke down each parameter into different dimensions according to my assumptions. Guided by the pentagon framework, I analyzed to what extent each parameter affected advocacy work in the two case studies.

This chapter now turns to the comparisons and conclusions. This chapter first compares the participation of the ACWF and the ADVN in the policy processes in which they engaged. I argue that the two advocacy campaigns resulted in different effects at different stages of the policy process. Then, I turn to my research question and the hypotheses. I first discuss the general hypothesis by comparing the two types of policy advocacy at different stages. Following that, I present the findings from a comparative view by discussing how the factors played out across the two cases. I then discuss the relations among these factors by weighing their importance and investigating the inter-play among them. Finally, I highlight the theoretical contributions and practical implications of my case studies.

8.2 Key Findings: Comparisons of Two Cases of Policy Advocacy

This section shows how the general proposition below is supported by the comparative analysis of the findings of the two case analyses.
**General Hypothesis:** I suggest that women CSOs are agents for making policy change toward gender equality in China. Although CSOs still encounter constraints and challenges in access to policy making, they deliberately make use of the limited organizational resources they possess and increase the power of them. It is because of their commitment and intention that individual activists in some CSOs manage to mobilize various resources to negotiate their concerns in policy change. A dynamic of networking and mobilization pervades the policy sector with regard to gender equality issues.

In both policy advocacy cases, women’s organizations have negotiated for gender equality concerns through all stages of the policy formulation. In the case of the ADVN, the women’s network is a newly emerged women’s organization that is active in civil society in China. Although possessing less formal access to policy-making, it has successfully mobilized mass media to shape public and policy discourse of the anti-domestic violence issue. Furthermore, it coordinated various forces to forge alliances that eventually exerted influence on the revision of Marriage Law (2001) and the Women’s Law (2005). In comparison, the ACWF was set up by, and has a close relationship with, the Party/state. It enjoys more access to policy-making than any other women’s CSO in China. Because the ACWF is better resourced and supported by the state, we might expect it to have greater opportunities for, and greater success in, advocating changes in policy around gender issues. However, my case studies indicate a very different outcome. In spite of their relentless efforts to integrate an equal retirement age into the Public Servant Law (2005), their endeavours have been to little avail. The following is a further comparison of the two cases at different stages of policy-making that is divided by this thesis into agenda setting, deliberation and adoption. The comparison shows that the advocacy at different stages generated different results, which indicates the dynamics of CSOs’ wielding power to negotiate policy change toward gender equality in China.
8.2.1 Agenda-setting

First, in the early stage of policy development, women’s organizations shaped policy issues, developing bills and proposals, and mobilizing various accesses to submit policy suggestions to the NPC. In this process, however, there are differences in the two cases. While the ACWF depended mostly on practical knowledge to collect grievances, the ADVN convened various kinds of academic research including social surveys on the prevalence and seriousness of domestic violence, the response of state agencies and availability of public services, as well as gender analyses of loopholes of existing laws and policies. All of these data were perceived more convincing and comprehensive than the casual cases collected by the ACWF through its legal service system.

Secondly, the ADVN mobilized mass media to raise public awareness about domestic violence. It deliberately designed projects to engage the mass media and to create alternative feminist media products. In projecting domestic violence as a criminal conduct against women, the ADVN employed various narratives including images, symbols, story lines etc., which greatly raised public awareness. The ACWF’s advocacy on a unified retirement age for women and men, however, encountered controversies in the mass media. With no coherent media strategy, the campaign depended largely on statements that were more or less abstract and boring to the public.

Thirdly, the ADVN used its expertise to develop high quality bills and proposals framed in legal terms, which appeared more professional than the ACWF’s proposals. At the beginning of the advocacy for equal retirement age, the ACWF did not make much use of technical expertise, although this changed over time as they realized the importance of mobilizing relevant experts to develop high quality proposals.

Despite this, the ACWF is more likely to have a bill or proposal shortlisted by the NPC annual legislation plan due to their leaders building alliances with the NPC.
8.22 Deliberation and adoption

Compared with the agenda-setting stage, the opportunity for women’s organizations to participate lessened at this stage. At the drafting stage, legal experts had more opportunities than other women activists did to be invited to take part in the expert-drafting group. For example, several distinguished legal experts, also members of the ADVN, were invited to join the experts group for drafting the Marriage Law (2001) and the Women’s Law (2005). They are also more likely to be invited to join the expert group drafting specific law concerning combating domestic violence. In comparison, cadres of the ACWF have seldom been involved in expert groups, unless a member is the organizer of a particular drafting group, as happened with the Women’s Law.

In the consultation stage, furthermore, neither the ACWF nor the newly emerged CSOs such as the ADVN can fully participate in the closed-door discussions organized by ministry departments. The consultation over the Civil Servant Law (2005) is a case in point. Although mass organizations such as the ACWF are routinely invited to provide comments and suggestions, their opinions on laws and policies are not guaranteed to be taken into account. However, public consultation is beginning to provide more opportunities for the public to comment on particular policy drafts. Recently, the internet has played an important role in collecting public opinion in policy-making. Official websites such as www.people.com.cn and www.xinhuanet.com have set up forums inviting public opinion on specific laws and policies. The ADVN experts made full use of these opportunities to influence the public: they organized discussions on websites during the public consultations of the Marriage Law (2001) and the Women’s Law (2005). The ACWF, however, seemed not to have taken advantage of these opportunities; in the public consultations on the Civil Servant Law (2005) and the Women’s Law, they failed to organize any systematic media campaign on women’s retirement issues.

Finally, there seems even less opportunity for CSOs to influence the adoption of laws than at the deliberations stage. Customarily, most laws are finalized at this stage and there is little room for change, unless there is fierce opposition as happened with the
Property Law. Because of fierce opposition from both scholars and members of the standing committee, its passage was postponed several times. There are only a few women members in the Standing Committee of the NPC who can participate in the final stage of the NPC review of laws and policies. Although these female members may have contacts with the ACWF or other women’s organizations, and may as individuals support gender equality, their presence is almost invisible and their influence tends to be negligible. A notable exception was Peng Peiyun who played an important role in influencing the standing committee of the NPC in the process of drafting and passing the Marriage Law (2001).

In short, the policy process in China is still undergoing reform. Different stages of policy making present different opportunities for CSOs’ participation. While the agenda-setting stage tends to be open for wider participation, the ministry deliberation and adoption stage permits little opportunity for women’s organizations to exert any influence. Nevertheless, the two cases show that women’s organizations do wield the power they possess and seize opportunities to negotiate gender equality in policy-making. Several factors such as alliances with political forces, expertise, organizational structure, learning, etc., affect the advocacy activities differently throughout different stages. The determinants of successful CSOs’ policy advocacy are thus complex and dynamic.

8.3 Key Findings: The Determinants of Policy Advocacy by CSOs

To answer my research question on what accounts for the success of CSO’s policy advocacy, I developed a model that contains five parameters in Chapter 2. Here, I present it again in the following figure with designations of comparisons of the two case studies. This section shows how the five propositions listed below are supported by the comparative analysis of the findings of the two case analyses. It serves as a road map to guide the comparative discussion of the policy cases and the examination of the original hypotheses for this study. The following list of propositions summarizes the
comparative analysis of the two cases in terms of the various hypothesized analytical relationships of the model.

Figure 15 Comparisons of the Determinants of the Two Cases of Policy Advocacy

Source: Developed by the author.

8.31 Findings for the Hypothesis on Legitimacy

**Hypothesis 1.** Legitimacy is the most important precondition for CSOs to participate effectively in policy process. Registration status is above all indispensable because it signifies the state’s recognition. Alliances with important political forces such as the CCP can certainly add to the authority of CSOs in policy campaigning. In addition, expertise begins to play an important role in strengthening their authority in negotiating policy change.
The two cases present different models of legitimacy. It is worth noting that neither the ACWF nor the ADVN registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, as required of many other ordinary CSOs. While the ACWF enjoys the special privilege of being a mass organization with political legitimacy without legal registration, the ADVN chose affiliation to the Chinese Law Society rather than legal registration. The ACWF enjoys various alliances with the CCP, the State and the NPC, while the ADVN only has alliances with legislators. However, the ADVN boasts strong expertise that is the envy of many other CSOs. Although the ACWF is starting to develop expertise to bolster its authority in policy-making, its cannot compete with that of the ADVN in terms of levels and quality.

First, the case analyses show that legal registration is not a precondition for CSO’s participation in policy-making. Theoretically, acquisition of legal personality can make NGOs legitimate in the eyes of states (Vedder et al. 2007). In China, registration status is an important indicator showing whether the CCP/state has legally accepted the CSOs. However, as this study indicates, many CSOs have not registered because of the stringent requirements and yet some of them function very effectively. A few, such as the ADVN, have even have had a considerable influence in policy-making.

Secondly, alliances are more important than legal registration in two case studies. While mass organizations enjoy various alliances with the CCP or state organs, many other CSOs have few formal connections with them. For example, the ACWF was set up by the CCP and is closely linked with the latter. The CCP nominates state personnel to lead this mass organization to ensure that it works in line with the CCP/State. Furthermore, leaders of the ACWF hold positions in state agencies, including in the National People's Congress (NPC) and the China Political Consultative Committee (CCPC). This kind of alliance allows these mass organizations more power in influencing policy.

The “dual supervision” of CSOs from both a government supervising body and a professional regulatory body of a civil affairs department forms a hierarchical relation between the CSO and its supervising body. Theoretically, the supervising body acts
only as an authority above the CSO but not as a collaborative partner. Rarely does a supervising body delegate its authority concerning policy-making to its inferior. For example, the ACWF may commission its affiliates to conduct research on particular issues for purpose of policy advocacy, but it will not allow them to present the findings at NPC conferences. Moreover, some officials treat CSOs with caution for fear that they may turn into political opponents someday (Yu 2009). However, this does not imply that they are completely powerless in influencing public policy as this study shows. This is partly because the bases of alliances have been changing. As the separation of power in policy making among the CCP, the State and the NPC deepened, the ACWF’s historical alliance with the CCP no long endowed it with the same authority. At same time, the transition of legislative power to the NPC opens new opportunities for the ADVN, as it enjoys close ties with legislators.

Thirdly, technical expertise is increasingly a crucial conditioning factor in gaining authority in policy-making. As policy-makers pay increasing attention to social surveys and legal analyses, expertise in sociology and legal studies are more important than in other disciplines in policy advocacy concerning gender issues. In the case of the ADVN, the evidence of domestic violence collected through sociological surveys proved to be more rigorous and scientific than the ad hoc cases gathered by the ACWF through its legal services. Moreover, the ADVN gender analyses that revealed loopholes in domestic violence legislation seemed more convincing than the statements of the ACWF for equal retirement age for women with men. In addition, policy proposals drafted by the ADVN’s legal experts in technical language appeared more formal and professional than those drafted by the ACWF on the unified retirement age.

In short, the findings only partially substantiate my hypothesis about legitimacy of CSOs in policy-making. The importance of legal registration is not as critical as I assumed before the study. However, the significance of expertise of CSOs in their gaining access to policy-making substantiates my assumption. The alliance seems to have played a much more crucial role than expected.
8.32 Findings for the Hypothesis on Leadership

**Hypothesis 2.** Leadership is crucial in directing the CSOs in policy advocacy. In particular, democratic leadership style is conducive to uniting various kinds of organizations in concerted efforts. On the contrary, bureaucratic leadership style is not as effective in mobilizing various social actors for sustained campaigns.

The two cases show different styles of leadership. Leadership in the ACWF is bureaucratic, while that in the ADVN is quite democratic. Nevertheless, leaders in both organizations are dynamic. They have various backgrounds and different orientations in policy advocacy. However, most of them are concerned with gender inequalities in society and are passionate about changing the situation.

The styles of leadership tend to influence the methods adopted by the organizations. Bureaucratic leadership tends to prefer a narrow focus and closed-door method. In the case of the ACWF, it adopted a closed-door approach in negotiating with the CCP and State organs for a unified age for women and men in retirement at the initial stage. Although this successfully led to several regulations at the initial stage of the Economic Reform, it faced more challenges from both the state and society at the turn of the century, which prompted it to change its approach. In comparison, the democratic leadership of the ADVN helped it win wide support from various individual actors and member organizations. Democratic leaders are more willingly to give members freedom for creative thinking and innovations. They also help to create a transparency within the network and equality among members. It was partly because of the democratic leadership culture of the ADVN that collaborations among various members were sustained effectively for a decade. The profound impact of the ADVN on the anti-domestic violence issue in China would be unthinkable without such a wide and effective network.

Thus, the findings support my assumption that the democratic leadership style is more effective than bureaucratic leadership in uniting various kinds of organizations for concerted efforts, a foundation for successful policy advocacy.
Hypothesis 3. Organizational structure affects the capacity of the CSOs’ policy advocacy. A flat and federal network structure that is flexible and open, but at the same time boasts good coordination, is more effective than a hierarchical one.

There are distinct organizational structures in the two cases. The ACWF is a fully developed bureaucratic organization that has clear hierarchies and rigid divisions within the organization. Each department has a clear mandate and often operates separately. In contrast, the ADVN boasts a flat and federal structure in which hierarchies are not prominent. Although there are divisions of tasks, mostly in forms of sub-projects, the general office operation and sub-projects have no bureaucratic hierarchal relations. Instead, the general office and the coordinator functions mostly as the hub of a wheel, transferring information and communicating with constituents, rather than as a commander of an army.

The study also found that leadership style and organizational structure are actually inter-related. The bureaucratic organizational structure tends to have a rigid officious leadership, while the flat and federal network tends to produce egalitarian leaders. Others may argue that the leaders affect the organizational structure, not vice versa. However, this thesis does not focus on the relationship between the leadership styles and the organizational structure, but rather on their impact on the policy advocacy initiated by these CSOs.

The findings substantiate my assumption that a network is more effective in influencing the public as well as policy-makers in policy campaigns. The successful example of the ADVN demonstrates the importance of the network structure in mobilizing various resources in policy campaigns. In the domestic violence campaign, the ADVN faced challenges from both the public and policy-makers. To raise public awareness and persuade policy-makers, the ADVN had to mobilize various forces for concerted actions, which called for an effective network. Indeed, no single organization
could accomplish such a formidable task. It was through the effective network that the ADVN connected with various actors in state agencies, public security, lawyers, local women’s federations and many distinguished and capable scholars. Together they made a great leap forward in combating domestic violence in China.

In comparison, the failure of the ACWF also points to the importance of network building. The advocacy for equal retirement was carried out within the bureaucratic organization and there were only a few departments involved in relevant activities. Collecting evidence, drafting proposals and submitting bills become routine official work. The issue was often treated temporarily and hazily because the functional office was not able to concentrate on a single policy, as there were other tasks to be arranged. Lacking a sustained issue-oriented network on gender retirement, the ACWF was unable to develop a comprehensive strategy and mobilize concerted action among various forces. Thus, the leaders of the ACWF voiced almost the same statements at the “two sessions” every year, and encountered almost the same challenges every time.

8.34 Findings for the Hypothesis on Learning

**Hypothesis 4.** Learning is important in increasing the capacity of CSOs in policy advocacy, in particular in framing public policy issues. In policy advocacy on gender equality, innovative learning that pays attention to absorbing new concepts of gender and methodologies of feminist policy analysis and advocacy is more effective than conventional learning that is unable to challenge gender blind policy agenda.

The two organizations adopted different approaches to learning. While the ACWF sent their cadres to attend lectures in famous universities, it did not pay full attention to new concepts and approaches concerning gender and public policy issues. As gender and women’s studies have rarely been a formal issue in most public administration courses, it meant that ACWF members effectively were unable to enhance their knowledge of gender analyses on public policy as well as innovative ways of advocacy. In comparison, the ADVN addressed the importance of gender training to focus on absorbing new
concepts of gender as well as international regulations and experiences on combating domestic violence.

The cases studies substantiate my assumption that innovative learning was more effective in strengthening CSO capacity in policy advocacy. The case of the ACWF shows that adaptive learning could not provide any immediate remedies for their advocating for gender equality in retirement whereas the innovative learning of the ADVN armed its members with new concepts and analytical approaches that greatly enhanced its capacity in advocacy.

8.35 Findings for the Hypothesis on Sources of Funding

Hypothesis 5. Sources of funds are sensitive in authoritarian states such as China, where the motives of foreign donors tend to be suspected by the CCP and the State. Thus, government funds for particular policy advocacy activities may add authority to CSOs, while funds from foreign donors may lead to doubts and suspicion from the CCP and the State in policy advocacy.

The sources of funds of the ADVN and the ACWF were very different. While the ACWF was funded by the CCP and the state, the ADVN was mainly been funded by foreign donors.

If my assumption about sources of funds were true, the ACWF would have gained more authority in its campaign, while the ADVN would barely be acknowledged by any of the state agencies. However, the case studies do not support my hypothesis inasmuch as the sources of funds seem not to have affected the policy advocacy.

8.4 Key Findings: Linking Parameters

Based on the comparison of how the two case studies support my assumed parameters, this section initiates a further discussion about relations among multiple parameters. I first try to map an order of parameters based on my pentagon shape framework to
distinguish the more important factors among the five parameters. I then discuss the inter-relations of multiple parameters.

8.41 Weighing Parameters

As the above discussion of propositions shows, some of the original hypotheses are confirmed by the comparison of the two cases, while others are partially confirmed or refuted. Based on these analyses, I initiate a rank order of conditioning factors that may affect policy advocacy of CSOs in the contemporary context of China.

1. **Legitimacy**: I propose that legitimacy remains primarily important because the political environment for CSOs’ development and their participation in policy-making is still stringent. The legitimacy is in turn is also composed of multiple parameters. I propose political alliances and technical expertise as the two top conditions.

2. **Organizational Structure**: I suggest that a network structure that is issue-based, flat and federal is important for CSOs to mobilize campaigns on specific issues. However, aware that only a few privileged CSOs possess enough capital to initiate such a kind of network, I suggest several other factors such as alliances, expertise, strong leadership and funding as underlining conditions. Without these supporting factors, it is hard to mobilize an effective network.

3. **Democratic Leadership**: My actor-oriented approach directs my attention to the agency of actors in which leaders and leadership styles are the most important. Both social movement and public policy studies are beginning to address leaders or policy entrepreneurs in seizing opportunity and mobilizing various recourses. My case studies underline the importance of this factor. Particularly in China, where the policy process is relatively closed and opaque, strong leadership that is visionary, embracing diversity is most important for CSOs to mobilize policy change.

Thus, I expect a CSO that has at least these three characteristics to be more likely to gain success in policy advocacy. However, I am fully aware of the danger of
simplifying complex conditioning factors by only addressing a single line-up of determinants that surfaced in these cases. The particular combination of determinants proposed here may not exert the same influence in other policy sectors.

8.42 Inter-relations among Multiple Parameters

Although for the purpose of analysis, I treat the multiple determinants separately in this thesis, they are actually intertwined and interdependent. In the case of the policy advocacy for an equal retirement age, for example, the bureaucratic leadership and the organizational structure are inter-related. In the anti-domestic violence advocacy, the ADVN’s expertise and alliances with legislators are closely related. In what ways the combinations of different variables affect the outcomes of CSOs’ policy advocacy is a topic that requires further research.

8.5 Theoretical Contributions

The analysis of the propositions by comparing two cases has implications for both the theoretical study of CSOs in gender policy change and for practice. This section discusses on theoretical contribution made by these studies in relation to CSOs and women’s movements in decision-making in public policy in China.

8.51 Studies of Civil Society

First, the detailed empirical studies of two specific attempts by CSOs to change policy have added to the literature on both civil society and policy processes in China. There is relatively little in-depth research on CSOs in policy processes in China as indicated in my literature review. Furthermore, extant studies on CSOs’ policy advocacy have largely focused on campaigns for environmental protection and controlling the HIV/AIDS epidemic. There are very few systematic studies on policy campaigns related
to gender equality. Thus, my empirical case studies have added to the literature on CSOs’ policy influence in the policy sectors relating to gender equality.

Secondly, the development of the ‘pentagon framework’ provides practical guidance for analysis of CSOs’ policy influence in China. I selected five elements namely legitimacy, leadership, organizational structure, learning, the framing process, and the sources of funds to form a comprehensive framework that wove different factors for analysis. As there has been little systematic analysis of CSOs’ participation in and their influence on policy-making in China, the framework suggests one comprehensive way of conducting an analysis. There may be other approaches, but this pentagon framework provides a starting point for further studies.

The analysis based on the pentagon framework has yielded illuminating insights. For instance, in analyzing how CSOs wield power to negotiate legitimacy for gaining access to policy making, the case study of the ADVN reveals that in authoritarian contexts, civil society organizations operate dynamically to find ways around the system. Though China’s corporatist regulatory framework governing CSOs does not allow branch organization – i.e. horizontal coordination, the state is unable to completely control civil society and civil society actors find alternative ways of organizing. In particular, faster communications and the internet have made networking much easier and facilitated the development of organizational networks. The case of the ADVN provided a detailed study of such a network. It presents an alternative way for women CSOs’ development in China, where newly emerged feminist networks have increasing influence. Women’s organizations can apply a network approach to cement CSOs into a united front for policy change. It is worth noting that the newly emerged women’s networks have not only collaborated with other CSOs, but have also created alliances with government agencies and mass women’s organizations. In so doing, the new types of women CSOs has significantly increased their influence.

Thirdly, the study of the agency of CSOs in framing public and policy issues through analyzing their tactics and strategies demonstrates a discourse politics whereby the weak wield discursive power to influence policy discourse. Armed with excellent
expertise, the newly emerged ADVN has adeptly used the media and developed compelling narratives that have effectively changed the mindsets of the public and policy-makers, which in turn paved the way for policy-making regarding anti-domestic violence. The ACWF, however, seemed very much unprepared for the discourse politics in the agenda-setting stage in its campaign for equal retirement age for women. Related to this contribution, my thesis has also added to the literature on how the internet and media has altered civil society organizing. There has been a growing literature in general, and specifically on China, on how new media and the internet have affected citizen activism. However, there are few studies on how feminist organizations use the internet to negotiate policy change. My thesis adds to this based on both first and second-hand materials.

In addition, in analyzing dynamic power relations within CSOs, my thesis confirms some observations that the civil society involvement in policy processes is elite-led (Howell, 2004). While bureaucratic elites flood to the ACWF, intellectual elites assemble in the ADVN. Essentially, they are all elite women’s organizations in some way and possess resources that other women’s organizations or groups can only dream of. While the ACWF has more resources and access to policy-making, the ADVN boasts intellectual and technical resources that are envied by many much smaller, ordinary CSOs. Moreover, my case studies show that not only civil society is elite-led, so too is the policy process in China. The government has increasingly invited experts to provide technical support in policy-making, which opens access for intellectual and technical elites. The engagement of scholars from the ADVN in revising the Marriage Law and the Women’s Law lies just in this background. Thus, the participation ADVN in policy-making is in some way a part of elite politics in China. It is largely because of the elite-led policy-making that women elites in CSOs were able to wield their expertise as legitimacy to participate in the deliberation of legislation in China. Thus, my case studies reveal that opportunities for CSOs’ participation in policy-making is unequal; some social organizations have more opportunities and resources whilst many others still face barriers to participate in policy-making.
8.52 Studies of Policy-making

First, my detailed case analysis of policy influence related to gender strengthens the field of gender and policy studies in China. Relevant studies are mainly devoted to the analysis of particular issues concerning women’s development to provide policy suggestions for intervention. Rarely is there meticulous attention paid to the process of integrating gender concerns in policy process. For example, who advocates on gender issues in policymaking? How do they advocate for change? Who participates in relevant policy-making? How is the decision made? Who had the final say? Put simply, gender and public policy studies in China are largely studies “for policy” rather the studies “of policy”. The politics of gender policy processes has not yet aroused sufficient attention amongst scholars in gender and women’s studies. Thus, the case analysis of CSOs’ policy influence relating to gender strengthens the field of politics of gender and policy studies in China.

Secondly, the thesis shows in detail how the CCP is liberalizing political spaces to allow greater citizen engagement and how well organized CSO groups are taking up this opportunity, which illustrates changing nature of the public policy process in China. Since 1978, the policy process has increasingly changed from the original relatively closed process towards a more standardized and legalized process in which the rule of law has begun to regulate the process. It has gradually progressed toward greater participation and transparency whereby it opens up more opportunities and channels for participation by social organizations. Apparently, the process of institutional adaptation that is occurring in China, in which the Party/state liberalizes political spaces by ceding some power, not only creates new opportunities for citizen participation but also creates the necessary conditions for political liberalization. Andrew Nathan perceives the adaptation as ‘authoritarian resilience’ that implies that authoritarian regimes are
initiating institutional adaptation to survive the potential collapses that have occurred in Eastern Europe and the USSR. However, from the political reform perspective of some Chinese scholars, such adaptation largely implies extending opportunities for public deliberation over public policy in a one-party system (Wang 2006; Yu 2009). This may, some contend, herald an alternative model of democratic policy-making under the one-party system.

Thirdly, the thesis shows that CSOs’ proximity to the state or embeddedness in the state (Ho and Edmonds 2008) is not sufficient by itself to ensure policy influence. In a context of political administrative reform, for example, the CCP delegating more powers to the administration (e.g. the NPC), led to a relocation of policy influence among different kinds of women’s organizations. On the one hand, the process of the separation of CCP and state powers created new challenges for the ACWF in policy influence. In particular, it has struggled to wield the same influence over state organs that it had over the CCP. Moreover, the ACWF’s authority to speak in the interests of ‘women’ has been challenged by the increasing diversification of women’s interests since the reforms, and the increasingly differentiated work experiences of workers and cadres. On the other hand, some CSOs such as the ADVN, which boasts strong expertise and alliances with legislators, have found new venues to use their influence. Thus, while many CSOs in other countries seek to have better relations with the state so they can influence policy, factors like technical and legal expertise and media strategy have become more important in enabling policy influence in China, which sheds light on the understanding of potential links between the change of policy-making and policy influence of CSOs in China.

8.53 Studies of Women’s Movements

Firstly, the policy advocacy activities of women’s organizations demonstrate a current tendency in the women’s movement in China towards policy change. A trend of collaborating with the CCP, the State and the NPC indicates a cooperative approach by women’s movements. Apart from traditional co-operation between the ACWF and the
CCP/State, new women organizations have woven their own networks and alliances with state agencies via expertise and other kinds of social capitals they possess. In the case of the anti-domestic violence advocacy, the ADVN tried to change the mindsets of the public and officials. In this regard, the campaign amounts to an innovative cultural revolution.

Secondly, my case studies contribute to knowledge of social movement by showing how changes in the political administrative context create opportunities and threats for different CSOs. Sidney Tarrow uses the language of ‘political opportunity structure’ to refer to major sudden changes in context. However, this thesis shows how slower and more subtle changes in context similarly create opportunities for policy influence. My case studies show that the redistribution of power in policy making among the CCP, the State and the NPC has brought about difference in impacts for different women’s organizations in policy-making. The gradual policy change has created policy windows for the newly emerged ADVN. While the ACWF was grappling with the change in the process of policy-making, the ADVN members readily gained access to the legislation process in the NPC through their alliances with peers who were engaged in legislation. These alliances opened new channels for the network to participate in the policy process. This shows that change in power relations among state political forces may open up new opportunities for CSOs in particular policy sectors.

Thirdly, the thesis adds to the literature by showing that different factors in social movements have differing importance at different times. It is interesting to note that the two cases take on different forms of social movement models. The ACWF’s advocacy for gender equality in retirement is reminiscent of the Resource Mobilization model in social movement theory. It is characterized by bureaucratic organizing and focusing on labour rights and welfare. On the other hand, the ADVN’s campaign is comparable to the New Social Movement model. It features a flexible network and attention being paid to changing ideologies. It is interesting to note that in the same period and in the same policy sector, different modes of women’s movement co-existed.
8.6 Limitation of the Case Studies

In this section, I discuss some of the limitations of the case studies. First, the two cases that I selected for analysis may have contained constrictions for providing a valid comparative study as they were quite different in many ways. For example, the policy processes governing the issues of retirement age and domestic violence are quite different. While CSOs’ participation is increasing in the policy making concerning social welfare such as domestic violence with the National People’s Congress, their access to policy making concerning public administration such as retirement age of civil servants with the State Council remains constrained. It might thus be the case that the distinct nature of policy processes involved in these two cases had affected the type of advocacy that was possible. For another instance, the issues were different. The retirement age issue has far more consequences for other administrative policies and institutions such as employment and pension policies and promotion procedures than the anti-domestic violence issue, which mainly has ramifications for the law and policing policies and practice. The domestic violence issue has a clear focus and does not touch on substantial interests of the elites, while the retirement age issue is more complicated and affects diverse interests in society. It is perhaps because the issue of equal retirement is completely different from that of domestic violence against women that the advocacy strategies deployed met with different results. In short, the dynamic contexts of these two cases which include (but are not limited to) such factors as the complications of policy change and nature of the themes embedded in policy sectors make their comparable study academically challenging.

Second, in terms of the factors that influence policy change in China, the study may have presented insufficient account on broader issues by focusing primarily on the agency of the various CSOs in the case studies. In comparing the two case studies in line with my research questions, I examined those factors concerned with agency and, in particular, how actors negotiated access and space for policy influence. The focus on primarily organizational and individual factors is not supposed to preclude the impact of broader issues such as historical and political-economic factors at national and international levels. For example, the changing relations among the Party, the State and
the NPC may have influenced the outcomes of the policy campaigns initiated by the CSOs. Particularly over the last three decades, the growing role of the NPC has increased the need for information, knowledge and expertise. As a result, it has become more open and willing to accept new parliamentary motions and to cooperate with different social forces. This study remained alert to this as a key dimension of the policy environment but focused more on how different actors used this increasing openness to their advantage.

Third, the adoption of a linear model of policy making\textsuperscript{131} tends to simplify the dynamics and complex reality of power relations in concrete and unruly policy process in China. For example, different sectors and institutions may vary in their degree of openness. Legislation concerning social affairs such as domestic violence against women is within the NPC’s portfolio, which is more open to newly emerged CSOs - such as the ADVN - to present its policy proposals. In contrast, the State Council is the main relevant administrative policy-making body for issues concerning retirement age, and it has been less open to the views of different social forces. This may partly explain why the anti-domestic violence issue has been more easily accepted than the equal retirement age issue. For another example, different stages of policy process may present different major challenges for women’s organizations to advocate for gender equality issues. The anti-domestic violence campaign encountered many social prejudices and stigmas such as ideas that ‘women deserve to be beaten’ at a very early stage of policy-making, when private issues have to be crafted into social issues for them to get onto the policy agenda. In contrast, the equal retirement age issue, without doubt a policy issue in the eyes of both policy-makers and the public, encountered serious objections at the deliberation stage after the proposal had entered policy agenda for discussions among ministries. Nevertheless, the linear model is designed to assist the analyses of various controversies of the two policy campaigns in this thesis.

\textsuperscript{131} I divided policy making process into several abstract and normative stages such as the agenda setting, deliberation and adoption stages in the thesis. Please see Chapter 3.
Fourth, the study may have provided insufficient analysis on such issues as class differentials, differences over the relative merits of communist projects for women’s liberation, and the retreat of state promotion and protection of women in the marketplace. These factors may have straightly affected the contrasting outcomes of the two campaigns where the anti-domestic violence campaign represented a relatively successful case and the equal retirement age campaign represented a relatively unsuccessful case. For example, the conflicting class interests in equal retirement age may have complicated the policy-making processes as policy-makers were afraid of igniting clashes within society, whilst anti-domestic violence evokes less prominent class issues and so made it easier to change legislation.

Fifth, the above questions indicate that the Pentagon Framework (introduced in Chapter 2 and used as an analytical guideline through my case studies) may have to some extent simplified the complexity of factors that contribute to CSOs’ influence in policy-making in China. The proposed five factors, which constitute the “Pentagon Framework”, are by no means exclusive. Aware of the danger of over-simplification, the author broke these factors down into different dimensions. For example, the framework further divides the notion of legitimacy into legal registration, alliances and technical expertise; in-depth analysis of these elements sought to capture the complexity of these factors contributing to policy change in China, in particular how their different dimensions affected the outcomes of the campaigns differently. Nevertheless, the author is aware of the limits of these analyses in comprehending the complex and changing nature of policy-making in China. There may be explanations other than the pentagon variables that account for success or failure of these campaigns. Moreover, the framework may have limitations when applied in comparative analyses of cases that cross sectors and countries.

Sixth, I am aware of the limitations of the interviews. Most interviewees were from women’s organizations. More activists of new women’s organizations were interviewed than from the traditional women’s federations. Thus, the analysis is largely based on their perspectives and does not address issues such as: ‘What do the officials and legislators think?’, ‘How do they perceive and respond to challenges from women’s
organizations?’ These are interesting questions that are worthy of further investigation. Moreover, the relative sensitivity of certain questions also affected the depth of findings. For example, the funding of CSOs proved to be a sensitive topic. By and large, the interviewees would change the subject when asked about the source and amount of funds for particular activities. The author tried to compensate for this by searching the websites of CSOs and their donors for information. Nevertheless, the lack of available information affected the analysis on funding, one of the five major causal factors.

Finally, my own interests and privileged access and participation in these cases may also affect the findings. As an insider, I am an ardent supporter of legislation on both anti-domestic violence against women and the equal retirement age. I have participated in some of the activities organized by the ADVN and the ACWF. On the one hand, my privileged access provided me with a unique opportunity to observe the process and gain access to important leaders. On the other, however, my acquaintance with them, particularly my sympathy with the campaigns and the actors, might affect the impartialness of the analysis of the role and the processes of their campaigns. For instance, for the ADVN’s campaign against domestic violence to achieve its goal of introducing legislation, it needed the support and participation of the ACWF and state organs. The role of the ADVN might not thus be as significant as suggested, though it is clear that without it, it is unlikely that the ACWF and state organs would have pursued this alone. In a second example, I may have under-reported the influence of the ACWF in bringing gender equality issues to the policy agenda in China because I was keen to show how the ACWF could learn from the successful story of the anti-domestic violence campaign in order to improve its campaign of the equal retirement age. Thus, due to my enthusiasm and high expectations for the ADVN campaign, and my keen interests in bringing to light their strategies and tactics that can be deployed by future campaigns, I may have unconsciously understated the influence of the ACWF in the ADVN’s campaign.

In short, I address a number of limitations in this study in terms of comparability of cases, identification of contributing factors, methodology of investigation and theorization. To overcome potential bias, I adopted triangulation and other means. In
selecting cases and setting up the analytical framework, I read as much as possible on
policy process, social movements, and civil society in China. I synthesized the
information in Chapter 2 and 3 to present a complex background and a framework for
the micro-level analyses. In investigating and comparing the cases, I triangulated
information by reading other comments on the organizations and their activities for
analytical explanation. I also interviewed individuals who held different opinions from
me to overcome any possibility of bias. Despite these limitations, nevertheless, I hope
the thesis fulfills its key purpose in identifying strategies and tactics of the CSOs that
may then be deployed by future campaigners. Furthermore, this reflection on the
limitations of the thesis can help signal the direction of future research and studies.

8.7 Theoretical and Practical Implications

Theoretically, first, there is a need for more empirical studies of contrasting cases of
policy advocacy across different policy sectors. In particular, there is a need to compare
various campaigns mobilized by CSOs in policy sectors such as environment and health
where CSOs have played a part.

Secondly, we may need to look at a contrasting gender-related case where the
ACWF was successful but others CSOs failed. The cases selected by this thesis are
somewhat atypical. While the ACWF’s advocacy for equal retirement age was little to
avail, the ADVN’s campaign for anti-domestic violence ended in success. By and large,
however, the ACWF’s policy campaigns tend to have more chance of success than
those mobilized by other CSOs.

Thirdly, we have a hunch about how important the different factors are, but a
quantitative study based on surveys of people’s perceptions might shed light on this.
Quantitative study may help us build models that can accurately explain the interplay of
various factors that affect the effectiveness of campaigns of CSOs.

Fourthly, it would be interesting to have some detailed case studies of policy
influence for countries such as Vietnam. There are only a few remaining ‘socialist’
states – Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba, which are labeled as “authoritarian states”. Internal change is occurring, in particular in China and Vietnam. What do these changes bring for CSOs and their policy influence concerning gender equality? How can the failure or success of their policy advocacy be explained? From an exploration of CSOs either through qualitative case studies or quantitative survey, we could then deepen the understanding of the complexity of such kinds of political regimes.

Finally, perhaps a comparison among developing countries of different political contexts is also worthwhile. With roughly similar economic development levels, what are the differences in CSOs’ policy campaigns concerning gender equality in various countries? Findings of these investigations could no doubt deepen understanding about the effectiveness of CSO advocacy campaigns and the factors that either limit or enhance their initiatives.

Practically, CSOs can draw lessons from the case studies presented by this thesis. For ordinary CSOs, it raises issues around how they can best perform policy advocacy. The tactics and strategies applied in CSOs’ policy campaigns may provide references for future action. In particular, CSOs can learn from previous campaigns about how to negotiate legitimacy, build leadership, cultivate coordination and alliances, shape public and policy discourse, mobilize funds, and so on. For the ACWF, furthermore, it raises issues about the future direction of organization in effectively coordinating state and society to represent women’s interests in policy change. For both types of organization, moreover, it raises the issue of how to join forces for concerted efforts for policy change toward gender equality.

Finally, this study is somewhat specific in that the cases are not only in a single country but also purposively selected. Thus, this qualitative case study does not intend to generalize from a few limited examples. The theoretical reflection on China may be too bounded to explain cases in other countries. Likewise, conditioning factors affecting CSOs’ policy campaigns may vary in different policy sectors.

Nevertheless, this study illuminates a previously unknown area where systematic studies have yet to been conducted. Through detailed case analyses, the
study reveals the dynamics of power relations in policy-making in China where CSOs maneuvered opportunity and resources to negotiate gender equality issues. As stated in the research methods section, the strength of qualitative research is not so much in measuring situations than in providing propositions. This was precisely the intention of this study – to shed light highly on complex policy process in a context of rapidly changing state-society relations.
9. References


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Appendix 1 Guidelines for Interviews

1. Interview with the leaders of CSOs

1.1 Background of the CSO and its advocacy

Could you provide a brief introduction of the CSO (establishment, members, and etc.)?

For example:

– When and why was the CSO established?
– Why do people join?
– What are the beliefs of the CSO?
– How is it structured?
– How do you seek fund? How do you register?

1.2. Participation and assessment

How do you participate in policy change and what are your comments on its impacts?

– What kinds of campaigns/activities have you initiated or joined, if at all? When and where? Why did you initiate or join them?
– How did you mobilize resources such as political opportunity, networks with actors from government, symbolic culture and donors’ support?
– To what extent did your organization participate in relevant policy processes? Did you engage as core actors who had participated directly into policy-making or as activists who had been involved only marginally in the processes? Have you served as “think tanks” or provided services to join the implementation?
– How do you see the results and outcomes? What do you think the main difference your organization have help made? And Why? How do you see your role/impact in policy change in China generally?

1.3. Main conditioning factors:
– What do you think are the main factors that affect your effectiveness? For example:
  ✓ How do you see the legitimacy contribute to the results, and why?
  ✓ How do you see the impact of leadership, and why?
  ✓ How do you see the impact of organizational structure, and why?
  ✓ How do you see the impacts of organizational learning, and why?
  ✓ How do you see the impact of source of fund, and why?
  ✓ Would you suggest other factors, and why do you think they are important?

1.4. Main lessons learned and future prospects

– What do you think the main lessons learned from the initiatives?
– How do you see the role of your organization engendering policy change in China in the future?

2. Interview with individual actors

2.1. Personal background

Could you briefly introduce yourself? (age, educational background, vocation, interests, and etc.)

– What kinds of campaigns/initiatives have you initiated or joined, if at all? When and where? Why did you initiate or join them?
– How do you understand the issue to which you devote? Why is it important?
– Does the issue you address relate to your work?

2.2. Participation and assessment

How did you participate in policy change and what are your comments on the impacts?

– To what extent did you participate in relevant policy processes? Did you engage either as a core actor who had participated directly into policy-making, or as an activist who had been evolved only marginally in the processes? Were you invited as a member of “think tanks” such as a consultant in the policy-making? What’s your role in policy implementation, if at all?
– How do you see the results and outcomes? What do you think the main difference the initiatives have help made? And Why?
  ✓ Do you think your ideas have been put onto the agenda?
Were your proposals fully integrated into the promulgated policies or laws?
How do you see the structural impacts of the initiatives? For example, has any institutions such as asylum for domestic violence victims been set up? How do you see the influence of the initiatives in changing people’s mindsets?

2.3. Main conditioning factors:

- What do you think are the main factors that affect your effectiveness? For example:
  - How do you see the legitimacy contribute to the results, and why?
  - How do you see the impact of leadership, and why?
  - How do you see the impact of organizational structure, and why?
  - How do you see the impacts of organizational learning, and why?
  - How do you see the impact of source of fund, and why?
  - Would you suggest other factors, and why do you think they are important?

2.4 Main lessons learned and future prospects

- What do you think the main lessons learned from the campaign?
- What do you think you can do to enhance CSOs’ role in engendering policy change in China in the future?
## Appendix 2 Descriptions of Major CSOs and Basic Requirements for Registrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Laws</th>
<th>Descriptions</th>
<th>Conditions for registration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulations for Registration and Administration of Social Organizations 《社会团体登记管理条例》</td>
<td>Social organization (shehuituanti). In accordance with Administrative Regulations Concerning Registration of Social Organizations, a social organization is an NPO that is established on a voluntary basis to pursue the common goals of its membership. All its activities are subject to what is set out in its charter. It may take the form of a charity organization, an industrial association, a research institute, an academic society, etc.</td>
<td>1) There must be over 50 individual members or over 30 institutional ones. The total number of members must be no less than 50 where there are both individual and institutional members; 2) The SO must have an appropriate name and organizational structure; 3) The SO must have a permanent place of business; 4) The SO must have personnel qualified to carry out its activities; 5) The SO must have adequate financial resources to carry out its activities. Specifically, a nationwide social organization must have a minimum operational fund of 100,000 Yuan, while a local one must have 30,000 Yuan; 6) The SO must be able to shoulder civil responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Regulations for the Registration and Administration of Private Non-Enterprise Institutions 《民办非企业单位登记管理条例》</td>
<td>Privately-run non-enterprise unit (minbanfeiqiyedanwei). In accordance with Provisional Administrative Regulations Concerning Registration of Privately-run Non-Enterprise Units, “privately-run non-enterprise unit” refers to not-for-profit social service organizations that are established with non-state-owned assets mobilized by not-for-profit government institutions, social organizations, social entities, and individual citizens. They include privately-run schools, hospitals, museums, and scientific research institutes.</td>
<td>1) It must be approved by the appropriate competent authority; 2) The PNU must have an appropriate name and organizational structure; 3) The PNU must have personnel qualified to carry out the activities stated in its charter. 4) The PNU must have legitimate assets appropriate for carrying out its activities; and 5) The PNU must have a permanent establishment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Foundation (jijinhui). In the</td>
<td>1) The establishment of the foundation</td>
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Administrative Regulations of Foundations
《基金会管理办法》

Administrative Regulations of Foundations, a foundation is defined as a non-government organization that is set up with funds donated by either domestic or overseas organizations or individuals. They typically promote scientific research, cultural education, social welfare, and other social development activities.

must be for a particular public benefit purpose;

2) A national public foundation must have a registered endowment of a minimum of 8,000,000 Yuan, a local public foundation must have a registered endowment of at least 4,000,000 Yuan, and a private foundation must have a registered endowment of at least 2,000,000 Yuan. The original funds must be in cash or cash equivalents;

3) Each foundation must have an appropriate charter, organizational structure and qualified financial personnel;

4) Each foundation must have a permanent place of business;

5) Each foundation must be able to shoulder civil responsibility.

### Appendix 3 ADVN Program, Sections and Projects: A Typology

<table>
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<th>Sub-Projects</th>
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<td>ADVN Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Website</td>
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<td>Conducting survey in domestic violence against women: national survey on frequency and occurrence of DV in Beijing and three other provinces: personal experiences and public attitudes</td>
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<td>Public awareness raising: Building societal support</td>
<td>Media Project website</td>
<td>Organizing media advocacy: Responsible for the publicity of the work of combating domestic violence and the Network, promoting gender sensitivity and consciousness of the public Professor from the Institution of Journalism and Communication Chinese Academy of Social Sciences managing <a href="http://www.stopdv.org.cn">www.stopdv.org.cn</a> as an alternative website.</td>
<td>Women’s Media Watch Network</td>
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<td>Oral Accounts</td>
<td>Documenting oral accounts by</td>
<td>Centre for Gender and</td>
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<th>Providing legal aid to victims: application of “battered women syndrome” in the cases of fighting violence with violence</th>
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<td>Creating a Rural Model with Chinese Characteristics in Combating DV Law Department, Beijing Women’s Federation</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<td>Controlling Domestic through Active Coordination and Joint Efforts</td>
<td>Hebei Women’s Federation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Combating DV: A call for Mainstream Work Model Led by the Government</td>
<td>The People’s Government of Furong District, Changsha City, Hunan Province</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difficulties and Countermeasures for Intervention against DV by Police</td>
<td>Pinganlu Police Substation, Sifang Branch Bureau, Qingdao City Public Security Bureau</td>
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(Source: Rong & Song, 2002: 13)