Coca, Contention and Identity:
The Political Empowerment of the Cocaleros of Bolivia and Peru

URSULA DURAND OCHOA

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

LONDON
APRIL 2012
DECLARATION

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 75,474 words.
ABSTRACT

In April 2003, Peru’s cocaleros broke into the national spotlight by mobilising a six thousand-strong March of Sacrifice from their coca-producing valleys to the capital city of Lima. In 2006, cocalero leaders ascended to several political positions at the municipal and national level. However, their political impact has been limited and divisions amongst coca-producing valleys have prevented cocaleros from articulating a unified agenda on the coca issue itself, let alone on wider issues. The experience of Bolivia’s cocaleros presents a very different picture. In 2005, cocalero leader Evo Morales was elected president with the highest margin of victory in the country’s electoral history. He was re-elected in 2009 by a greater margin. Morales and his political party mobilised a broad coalition as they developed an identity of ‘excluded’ that challenged Bolivia’s unrepresentative democracy, neoliberal economic model and relationship with the United States.

How do we explain the political ascent of these unprecedented actors that stand on the border of illegality? Why has the empowerment and impact of these actors on their national political landscapes varied so significantly?

This work aims to explain the different experiences of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros in gaining political empowerment through contentious action that originated in defence of coca—an issue that is both de-legitimising and divisive. This work presents the political ascent of these actors as cases of identity-formation. It argues that their ability to construct identities that deterred disunity, legitimised their struggle and broadened their appeal determined their degree of political empowerment. Furthermore, it reveals how contentious interactions—bound by the context in which they unfolded—distinctly shaped each case’s identity-formation processes. In Peru, the imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’ weakened the identity of ‘cocalero’ and generated disunity, isolation and a limited political impact. In Bolivia, the identities of ‘syndicalist’ and ‘excluded’ strengthened the identity of ‘cocalero’ and engendered unity, alliance formation and a significant political impact.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge a number of individuals that contributed to the completion of this thesis. Specifically, I would like to thank those that assisted my field work in Lima, Peru and in La Paz, Cochabamba and Villa Tunari in Bolivia by allowing themselves to be interviewed, especially Jaime Antesana, Cesar Sara Sara, Paulino Guarachi and Dionicio, Núñez, whose first-hand accounts proved essential in putting together the stories of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros.

I am especially grateful to my supervisor George Philip, who provided important insights and advice, read various draft chapters and was always available for questions. I would also like to extend my gratitude to my advisor Francisco Panizza, who consistently encouraged my work. Their comments helped refine and improve various aspects of my theoretical framework as well as empirical research.

Lastly, I would like to thank the many individuals that read and provided insightful constructive criticisms throughout the progress of this work. I am especially thankful to David and Paco for their consistent support and willingness to proof-read, and to Tula and Paco for their unwavering example.
# Table of Contents

**Abstract** 3  
**Acknowledgements** 4  
**Table of contents** 5  
**Acronyms and abbreviations** 7  

## 1 Introduction 10  
1.1 Background and research question 10  
1.2 Case selection 11  
1.3 Theoretical framework 14  
1.4 Argument 24  
1.5 Methodology 32  
1.6 Main findings 34  
1.7 Chapter summaries 34  

## 2 The Criminalisation of Coca and Cocaine 36  
2.1 Polemic beginnings 36  
2.2 Coca: Coming of age 42  
2.3 Cocaine: Great expectations 45  
2.4 Criminalisation and the War on Drugs 49  
2.5 Conclusion 57  

## 3 Peru: Formation of a Social Movement—Crisis and Repression during the Transition(s) to Democracy 60  
3.1 The social crisis 61  
3.2 The political crisis 66  
3.3 Formation of a social movement 71  
3.4 Mechanisms 80  
3.5 Conclusion 84
4 Bolivia: Formation of a Social Movement—Crisis and Opportunity during the Transition to Democracy 87

4.1 The coca-cocaine dependency 88
4.2 The economic crisis 90
4.3 The political crisis 93
4.4 Formation of a social movement 98
4.5 Mechanisms 108
4.6 Conclusion 111

5 Peru: Transformation of a Social Movement—Radicalisation, Division and Demobilisation 114

5.1 The new democratic era 114
5.2 Division and radicalisation 121
5.3 De-legitimisation 126
5.4 Cocaleros as political actors 134
5.5 Mechanisms 140
5.6 Conclusion 143

6 Bolivia: Transformation of a Social Movement—Convergence and Diffusion 146

6.1 Democracy in crisis 146
6.2 Politicisation 157
6.3 Cocaleros as political actors 164
6.4 Mechanisms 174
6.5 Conclusion 178

7 Conclusion: The Cocaleros of Bolivia and Peru Compared 180

7.1 The argument revisited 181
7.2 Phase I: Bolivia and Peru compared 184
7.3 Phase II: Bolivia and Peru compared 189
7.4 Closing discussion 196

Bibliography 199
Appendices 218
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Bolivia

ANAPCOCA National Association of Coca Producers
AND Democratic Nationalist Action
ASP Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People
CIDOB Confederation of Indigenous People of Eastern Bolivia
COB Bolivian Workers’ Confederation
COFECAY Council of Federations of the Yungas of La Paz
COMIBOL Mining Corporation of Bolivia
CSCB Syndicalist Confederation of Bolivian Colonisers
CSUTCB Unified Syndicalist Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia
EGTK Túpac Katari Guerilla Army
FAMA Front of the Anti-Imperialist Masses
FETCTC Special Federation of Peasant Workers of the Tropic of Cochabamba
FINSA Arévalo Savings Society
FSTMB Syndicalist Federation of Mining Workers of Bolivia
IPSP Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People
IU United Left
MAS Movement toward Socialism
MAS-IPSP Movement toward Socialism -Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People
MBL Free Bolivia Movement
MIP Pachakuti Indigenous Movement
MIR Movement of the Revolutionary Left
MITKA Túpac Katari Indian Movement
MNR Revolutionary Nationalist Movement
MNRI Revolutionary Nationalist Movement of the Left
MRTK Túpac Katari Revolutionary Movement
NFR New Republican Force
NPE New Economic Plan
PCB Communist Party of Bolivia
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPY</td>
<td>Society of Landowners of the Yungas and Inquisivi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCS</td>
<td>Civic Solidarity Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>Popular and Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Peru**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAAHCPA</td>
<td>Association of Livestock and Coca Leaf Farmers of the Padre Abad Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDESH</td>
<td>Inter-ethnic Development Association of the Peruvian Jungle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRODEH</td>
<td>Pro Human Rights Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAOI</td>
<td>Andean Coordinator of Indigenous Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Peasant Confederation of Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENACOP</td>
<td>National Coca Agricultural Organisation of Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGTP</td>
<td>General Confederation of Workers of Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>National Agrarian Confederation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNT</td>
<td>National Confederation of Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODEDU</td>
<td>Committee of Development and Defence of Uchiza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODETO</td>
<td>Committee of Development and Defence of Tocache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COICA</td>
<td>Coordinator of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONACAMI</td>
<td>National Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAPA</td>
<td>National Coordinating Committee of Agricultural Producers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPACCP</td>
<td>National Confederation of Agricultural Producers of the Coca Valleys of Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPPIP</td>
<td>Permanent Coordinator of Indigenous Peoples of Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORAH</td>
<td>Upper Huallaga Special Project for the Control of Coca Crop Eradication and Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRPCLP-A</td>
<td>Regional Committee of Coca Producers of the Province of Leoncio Prado and Annexes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>Confederation of Workers of Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTRP</td>
<td>Centre of Workers of the Peruvian Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVR</td>
<td>Commission of Truth and Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESCO</td>
<td>Centre for the Study of Promotion and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVIDA</td>
<td>National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL 22095</td>
<td>Supreme Law 22095 (Law of Drugs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS 044</td>
<td>Supreme Decree 044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS 245</td>
<td>Supreme Decree 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDL</td>
<td>Institute of Legal Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENACO</td>
<td>National Enterprise of Coca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASMA</td>
<td>Agrarian Federation of the Maestra Jungle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FECVRA</td>
<td>Peasant Federation of the Valley and River Apurímac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEDECAH</td>
<td>Defence Front against the Eradication of Coca in the Upper Huallaga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FENDEPCO</td>
<td>National Front in Defence of the Producers of the Coca Leaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEPA-VRAE</td>
<td>Federation of Agricultural Producers of the Valley of the River Apurímac-Ene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEPCACYL</td>
<td>Federation of Peasant Producers of the La Convención, Yanatile and Lares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIDH</td>
<td>International Human Rights Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRTA</td>
<td>Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Communist Party of Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>Christian Democracy Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEAH</td>
<td>Special Project Upper Huallaga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIN</td>
<td>National Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUTEP</td>
<td>Unitary Syndicate of Education Workers of Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPP-PNP</td>
<td>Union for Peru-Peruvian Nationalist Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 Introduction

1.1 BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTION

The illicit drug problem, consisting of production, trafficking and consumption, bears significant costs to society. Depending on the degree and type of involvement of affected countries, it generates costs for health care, education, criminal justice, military, judicial and legislative systems. It also fosters political instability, facilitates corruption and weakens institutions. Governments of affected countries dedicate vast amounts of resources to containing the illicit drug problem. The struggle is of such proportion that it has been commonly referred to as the ‘War on Drugs’ since the 1970s.¹

In the Andean region, the War on Drugs primarily targets the production and trafficking of cocaine. Bolivia, Colombia and Peru (the main producers of coca—the raw material for cocaine) work with the main cocaine-consuming countries to form and implement policies that seek to reduce the cultivation of coca. These policies may include forced or cooperative eradication, alternative development and crop substitution programs.

Since their transitions to democracy in the 1980s and more poignantly in recent years, Bolivia and Peru have witnessed series of contentious actions by the peasant producers of coca, commonly referred to as cocaleros. These actors, illegitimated by their link to the illicit drug trade, aim to defend the production and cultural significance of coca and to have a role in the formation of national coca policies. The contentious actions they have undertaken for this purpose have had multiple and distinct effects on national coca policies and on their political empowerment. In Peru, cocaleros formed a social movement that in 2003 brought the state to the negotiating table and resulted in important policy change. However, the movement proved weak, fragmented and limited in its popular appeal. In contrast, Bolivian cocaleros formed a decidedly unified social movement that became the stronghold of a political party whose candidate won the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections with the highest margins of

¹ The term ‘War on Drugs’ was first used by United States President Richard Nixon in 1971. In 2009, the new head of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, Gil Kerlikowske, announced that the office would no longer use the term because the ‘bellicose analogy was a barrier to dealing with the nation’s drug issues’ (Fields 2009: [online]).
victory in the country’s electoral history. They significantly altered national coca policies along the way.

Within this context, the question guiding this work is: *What explains the differing abilities of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros to gain political empowerment?* In addressing this question, this work will analyse the transition of cocaleros in both cases from illegitimate actors to social actors through the formation of a social movement; in the case of Peru, the radicalisation, disunity, narrow appeal and limited political impact of its cocalero social movement; in the case of Bolivia, the consolidation of its cocalero social movement into a prominent political actor through its transformation into a political party with demonstrated mass electoral appeal.

1.2 CASE SELECTION
This work has selected the cases of the cocaleros of Peru and Bolivia for a paired comparative analysis due to their broad similarities and significant differences. Among the Latin American nations, Bolivia and Peru have amongst the highest percentage of indigenous people (see Table 1.1). Both countries have produced coca for traditional consumption since pre-colonial times and for illicit purposes in modern times. This stands in contrast to Colombia, which has only produced coca in modern times and has done so exclusively for illicit purposes. The links with the illicit drug trade have inevitably made cocaleros in both countries prominent actors in the War on Drugs. Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros have developed a stance with respect to the United States based on this circumstance, as well as the latter’s interventionist policies in other matters. The two countries have also experienced institutional failings since (and prior to) their respective democratic transitions, such as crises of representation, corruption and weak party systems (Gamarra 2003; Ledebur 2005; Mayorga 2002; Rojas 2005).

Alongside these similarities stand marked differences. Of the two countries, Bolivia has a higher percentage of indigenous people, a higher rate of poverty, a higher percentage of people employed in coca production and a higher per capita rate of traditional coca consumption (see Table 1.2).² Both countries engage in traditional and illicit coca production. In Peru, coca is grown in numerous, scattered and geographically remote valleys. In Bolivia,

² Bolivians consume twice as much coca than Peruvians (15 per cent versus 7 per cent); Bolivia contains a smaller absolute number (25,000 versus 50,000) but greater percentage of cocaleros than Peru (Cabieses 2003).
it is grown in two main areas (the Yungas and the Tropic of Cochabamba)—neither of which are remote or unfamiliar given their proximity to the cities of La Paz and Cochabamba, respectively (see Appendices A and B for maps of coca-producing valleys in Bolivia and Peru).

**TABLE 1.1 ESTIMATES OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN LATIN AMERICA (1978-1991)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESTIMATED % OF TOTAL POPULATION</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POPULATION OVER 10%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>60-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>45-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>38-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>30-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>12-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POPULATION BETWEEN 5-10%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>4-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>4-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POPULATION UNDER 5%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana, Surinam, Honduras, Paraguay</td>
<td>4-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador, Colombia, Nicaragua, Argentina, Venezuela, French Guyana, Costa Rica, Brazil and Uruguay</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 1.2 PER CENT LIVING IN POVERTY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BOLIVIA</th>
<th>PERU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-indigenous</td>
<td>Indigenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXTREME POVERTY</strong></td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POVERTY</strong></td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both countries have a history of interaction with the United States (to a large extent related to the War on Drugs). However, this has tended to be more conflictive in Bolivia than in Peru. Bolivia, for example, essentially became the testing ground in 1985 for the neoliberal shock therapy prescribed throughout the region in response to the 1980s debt crisis. It experienced one of the harshest stabilisation packages in Latin America, the severe social costs of which have not been forgotten. Peru also underwent neo-liberal shock therapy in the 1990s. Yet, the

---

3 Source: Yashar (2004) in Thorp, Caumartin and Gray-Molina (2006). According to the CIA World Factbook, the demographic of Bolivia and Peru, respectively, is as follows: ‘Amerindian’: 55 and 45 per cent; mestizo: 30 and 37 per cent; white: 15 and 15 per cent; other: 3 per cent (Peru) (CIA World Factbook 2012: [online]).

harsh reform package had more support (or less antagonism) than in Bolivia because Peru faced the growing threat of *Sendero Luminoso* (the Shining Path)\(^5\) alongside that of economic breakdown.

Additional differences stand out. First, indigenous movements, leaders and parties have had a far greater presence and influence in Bolivia than in Peru.\(^6\) Second, Bolivia did not suffer the vicious and socially debilitating effects of Peru’s war with the Shining Path. Third, Bolivia’s labour and peasant union sector—due in part to the legacy of the revolution of 1952—is more autonomous and better organised than its Peruvian counterpart. Bolivian cocalero organisations emerged within this union sector and eventually became its dominant force. The labour and peasant union sector in Peru has been historically characterised by partisanship and lack of cohesion. It has four main labour federations and two main peasant federations divided along party lines, as well as several semi-independent sectorial federations. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the presence of the Shining Path and a militarised state severely weakened labour and peasant federations. Cocalero organisations in Peru (with one exception) emerged independent of the union sector. They have since then remained autonomous and have not received significant union sector support in their mobilisations. Fourth, Bolivia was affected by United States drug policies in the 1980s and 1990s to a much greater extent than Peru. This occurred in part because the Shining Path made the War on Drugs in Peru a lesser priority. Fifth, Bolivia has had a far greater dependence on the coca-cocaine economy than Peru (or Colombia for that matter), especially during the economic crisis of the 1980s.

Given these differences, one could perhaps argue that the disparate political fortunes of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros are hardly surprising. However, such a conclusion would be giving too much credit to structural preconditions and not enough to the fact that the Peruvian cocaleros overcame the aforesaid obstacles and gave rise to a contentious episode with considerable impact. This is remarkable because the cocaleros of Peru managed to generate a contentious episode despite a weak history of union and indigenous organisation, despite

\(^5\) The Shining Path is a Peruvian terrorist organisation that was founded in the 1970s by Abimael Guzman, a philosophy professor with Maoist tendencies. The Shining Path declared war on the state in 1980 and was in large part defeated in 1992 after the capture of Guzman. It re-emerged in the early 2000s, but has principally occupied itself with activity related to the illicit drug trade (such as protecting cocaleros from state eradication efforts). For a detailed account of the Shining Path, see Degregori (1990); for a discussion of the re-emergence of the Shining Path, see Antesana (2011).

\(^6\) For an in-depth discussion, see Yashar (2005) and Albó (2008).
their formal criminalisation by the state in 1978 (ten years before Bolivia), despite their subjection to the Shining Path and state repression that followed under the Fujimori government, despite the tensions and rivalries between the interests and leaders of the numerous coca-producing valleys (which vary in terms of their degree of legality)\(^7\) and despite the substantial geographic and cultural distance between them and other groups in society. The Peruvian cocaleros managed to lead and highlight a struggle largely unknown or ignored by the rest of the country. At the height of their contentious episode, they mobilised two marches by thousands of cocaleros from the country’s coca-producing valleys to Lima. Their contentious actions compelled the state to conduct the first formal study of the legal demand for coca in 2004, which resulted in an update of the register of legal coca producers that had remained unchanged since 1978. They pressured the state to engage in dialogue and pass a law that made the policy of gradual and negotiated (as opposed to forced) eradication mandatory. In the end, Peru’s cocaleros brought about a renewed debate on an issue that had faded in prominence since the steep decline in the production of coca that took place in the mid-1990s. Yet, unlike the Bolivian cocaleros that managed to transition from mobilising as a social movement to challenging entrenched authorities as a political party, the Peruvian cocaleros have only achieved limited and individual political victories since the radicalisation and division of their social movement.

Given these considerations, this research takes into account the different social and political contexts of Peru and Bolivia discussed above, which encompass both structural preconditions and political opportunity structures. A review of the theoretical framework follows before detailing the argument that addresses the research question.

### 1.3 Theoretical Framework

This research is centred within the field of contentious politics. It focuses on the theoretical framework and research agenda developed by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001) in *Dynamics of Contention*, as the work provides a starting-point for analysing the emergence and political empowerment of the cocalero social movements of Bolivia and Peru. Its methods and analytic tools address the various limitations and critiques of theories within the field of contentious politics, both in general terms and in specific terms within the

\(^7\) The term ‘legal coca’ refers to coca that is produced for traditional consumption; the term ‘illegal coca’ refers to coca that is produced for the production of cocaine.
Latin American region. A brief review of the major debates within the field of contentious politics follows.

**From ‘old’ to ‘new’ social movements.** The study of contentious politics and social movements has evolved extensively since the mid-twentieth century. As Della Porta and Diani (2006) note:

> If, at the end of the 1940s, critics lamented the “crudely descriptive level of understanding and relative lack of theory” (Strauss 1947: 352), and in the 1960s complained that “in the study of social changes, social movements have received relatively little emphasis” (Killian 1964: 426), by the mid-1970s, research into collective action was considered “one of the most vigorous areas of sociology” (Marx and Wood 1975). At the end of the 1980s commentators talked of “an explosion, in the last ten years, of theoretical and empirical writings on social movements and collective action” (Morris and Herring 1987: 138; see also Rucht 1991a)... Today, the study of social movements is solidly established (1)

The most notable turning-point took place in the 1960s, when a new wave of academics rejected the traditional class-based collective action theories in favour of new approaches. Prior to this new cycle, studies of collective action centred on what Offe (1985) refers to as the ‘old paradigm’ of politics. The prominent issues of the ‘old paradigm’ include economic growth, distribution, military security, social security and social control. Its central actors include socioeconomic groups involved in distributive conflicts. These actors operate internally through formal organisations and externally through intermediation or political party competition (Offe 1985: 832). The 1960s—a decade witness to the United States civil rights movement, international students’ movements and the anti-nuclear movement amongst others—shifted the research agenda toward more informal forms of collective action taking place outside the system. The ‘new paradigm’ of politics predominant in the field has since then focused on issues that transcend those of traditional class-based actors. These issues may include the environment, human rights, gender, peace and so forth. The central actors of the ‘new paradigm’ include socioeconomic groups that act not as socioeconomic groups per se, but on behalf of ‘ascriptive collectivities’. They are organised informally and openly contest the state through protest (Offe 1985: 832). In short, under the new paradigm, class background does not determine collective identities; collective action does not limit itself to

---

8 This work chooses to use the term ‘contentious politics’ rather than ‘social movements’ in regard to: 1) The evolution of theories relating to social movements, as it acknowledges that a social movement is a form of contentious politics; 2) The empirical analysis of its cases as they involve forms of contentious politics beyond the social movement.
formal vertical organisations; and the target of collective action can extend beyond the economy or the state.

Research seeking to overcome the ‘old paradigm’ of politics developed along two different strands: the resource mobilisation (or strategy-oriented) approach and the new social movement (or identity-oriented) approach. The resource mobilisation approach contested the functionalist views of the ‘irrational and unorganised nature of collective action’ (Foweraker 1995: 16). In functionalist accounts, collective action results from irrational responses to change and has volatile goals and ‘crude’ forms of communication (Cohen 1985: 672). In the 1960s, collective action studies began to take on an alternative perspective that replaced the idea of the psychologically susceptible individual with the rational actor. Olson (1965), for example, takes a strictly utilitarian stance by arguing that collective action cannot result from the rational pursuit of common interests because the costs of engaging in such action often outweigh the benefits. Rational individuals will not necessarily devote resources to collective action given that they can benefit from the collective goods derived from such action without incurring the costs of engaging in it (a phenomenon known as the free-rider problem). Individuals choose to engage in collective action only after making a cost-benefit analysis based on the selective constraints and incentives imposed or made available to them (Olson 1965). Various resource mobilisation approaches have since then attempted to address the free-rider problem in accounting for cycles of contentious collective action. McCarthy and Zald (1977), for example, highlight the importance of available resources in explaining the disparity between the omnipresence of grievances versus the lack of corresponding omnipresence of collective action (1214-1415). Other approaches emphasise the importance of political opportunities (Tilly 1978) and pre-existing networks (McAdam 1982), the latter of which contests Olson’s (1965) assumption that those which become mobilised were initially unorganised individuals. Tilly’s (1985) political-interactive model also addresses Olson (1965) in arguing that frequent interaction can lead individual parties to acknowledge they can potentially reap benefits from collective cooperation. In effect, the resource mobilisation approach focuses on the strategic dimension (influenced by factors such as the availability of resources, political opportunity and pre-existing networks) of contentious collective action and its influence on how such action is born and sustained.

Critiques of the resource mobilisation approach largely focus on its ‘exclusive focus on strategic action’ (Cohen 1985: 690). Its emphasis on strategy is said to overlook the
‘normative and symbolic dimensions’ of social activity, thereby reducing collective action to mere social protest (Canel 1997). In other words, the resource mobilisation approach fails to explain why individuals choose to engage collectively—and effectively misses the meaning behind the collective action in which individuals choose to participate. This weakens its explanation of how collective action emerges and continues to mobilise, as it does not explain how an identity can transform a social group or how a social group can transform an identity.

The second approach to the study of contentious collective action—the new social movement approach—addresses the questions that the resource mobilisation approach has largely ignored. Whilst the new social movement approach ‘is actually too various to be represented by a single tendency’ (Tarrow 1988 qtd. in Foweraker 1995: 15), all of its tendencies seem to concur that since the 1960s contentious collective action has involved new actors struggling for control over ‘the process of meaning-production’ (Canel 1997: [online]). It rejects rational actor and utilitarian or neo-utilitarian notions in its analysis, because in its view contentious collective action involves more than political exchanges or strategic calculations between claim-makers and their opponents (Cohen 1985: 691). Instead, the new social movement approach looks at the deep structural, political and cultural changes that create new conflicts and new collective identities and gives strong emphasis to the symbolic dimensions of struggle. Proponents of the new social movement approach differ in the way they interpret how new contentious collective actors emerge and how they determine the links between these new actors and the political system. Touraine credits the arrival of post-industrial society, with a ‘new culture and field for new social conflicts’, for the rise of new actors (Touraine 1985: 781). In post-industrial societies, struggles do not arise over material goods or political concerns, but over the production of symbolic goods or what Touraine terms ‘historicity’ (Touraine 1985). He emphasises the social rather than the political realm by focusing on post-industrial conflicts that battle over the control of historicity. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) credit the emergence of new contentious collective actors to the availability of new democratic discourses following World War II. These emergent actors contest the new hegemonic formations of the post-World War II era and in doing so redefine the lines between the public and private realm (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Laclau and Mouffe place new conflicts in the political sphere as they see new contentious collective actors as transforming private issues into political ones (Canel 1997). Other theorists (Habermas 1981; Nash 2010: 108).
Offe 1985; Melucci 1985) place contentious politics in between civil society and the state, or in between the social and the political. Their differences aside, new social movement theorists seek to explain the struggle over the appropriation and production of meaning and actors aware of ‘their capacity to create identities and of power relations involved in their social construction’ (Cohen 1985: 694). In doing so, the strategic dimension of contentious politics loses its relevance as ‘the organisation is itself an integral component of the message’ (Canel 1997: [online]). Melucci (1985) for one asserts that ‘the medium... is the message’ and makes clear that for him the existence of these new forms of contentious collective action is a gain in itself (Melucci 1985 qtd. in Canel 1997: [online]).

The new social movement approach falters in that its emphasis on identity-formation and meaning appropriation can overlook political action and the dynamics of mobilisation. In other words, it fails to explain how contentious collective actors translate meaning into action and excludes the strategic dimension of action from its analysis. One can see the complimentary nature of the strengths and weaknesses of the new social movement and resource mobilisation approaches—each seems to answer the question that the other fails to address. Calls to enrich theory by ending the isolation of the two approaches developed early on. In a 1985 article, Cohen aimed to show that ‘these approaches are not necessarily incompatible’, whilst in 1988 Tarrow proposed a multidimensional approach in his work *Power in Movement*:

[I will not] press a particular theoretical perspective on the reader or attack others—a practice that has added more heat than light to the subject… Too often scholars have focused on particular theories or aspects of movements to the detriment of others. We need a broader framework with which to relate social movements to contentious politics and to politics in general (3)

A theoretical framework compatible with the two approaches would address one of the critiques made on the new research strategies of contentious collective action since the 1960s. The above quote by Tarrow makes reference to another critique—the need for a greater emphasis on the political dimension of contentious action. The political dimension includes the political interactions (as shaped by the social, political, cultural and economic environment) that affect the rise of contentious collective action, as well as the impact of such interactions on political institutions and the policy-making process. Additional critiques argue that the contentious politics literature is ethnocentric in its approach and assumptions, and thus limited in its ability to discuss the nature of contentious politics in the developing and/or

---

10 For an in-depth discussion, see Social Research (1985) 52 (4) and 53(1); Canel (1997) and Foweraker (1995).
non-western world (Davis 1999; Radcliffe and Westwood 1993). The following section will discuss the limitations of the ‘new’ research agenda of contentious collective action (from here on referred to as ‘contentious politics’) with specific reference to the Latin American region.

**Contentious politics in Latin America.** It is important to highlight certain issues when discussing contentious politics in Latin America. First, in economic terms, the region is part of the developing rather than developed world and (whilst not the poorest) is the most unequal (Palma 2006). Contentious politics in Latin America does not take place in the post-industrial or post-material setting that the literature assumes in analyses of the new waves of social protest that have prevailed in the western world since the 1960s. Conditions of contemporary Latin American society are such that material interests and demands remain at the centre of many of the varied and multiple instances of contentious action seen across the region. In other words, contentious politics in Latin America continues to display ‘old’ characteristics. Nevertheless, the lingering presence of ‘old’ politics within the region does not imply its contentious politics lacks novelty. On the contrary, contemporary contentious politics in Latin America has demonstrated a wealth of new forms of organisation, strategy and frames of meaning (Foweraker 1995; Alvarez and Escobar 1992; Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998). For example, whilst urban movements tend to mobilise around material demands such as access to public utilities, social services and water, they are not strictly defined by class and encompass a ‘catch-all’ category of heterogeneous popular initiatives (Foweraker 1995: 5; Castells 1977; Stokes 1995). A number of other studies highlight the overlap between ‘old’ and ‘new’ features in the region’s contentious politics. Lind (1992) shows how the struggle over basic needs by popular women’s organisations in Ecuador shifted notions of gender and patriarchy and of the established development model. Pozzi and Schneider (1994) look at the Argentine labour movement of the 1980s and 1990s and demonstrate that whilst economic restructuring resulted in a more heterogeneous workforce, the labour movement remained an important antagonist to capital. Pozzi and Schneider conclude that ‘despite the infusion of individualistic norms within the working class in the neoliberal era, material conditions exist for class solidarity and collective resistance to capitalist relations of production’ (Roberts 1997: 148). In a different account of the Argentine labour movement’s response to economic restructuring, Ranis (1995) argues that the political identities of workers are not necessarily linked to material conditions or class. Instead, their political identities have evolved alongside their multiple identities as consumers, producers
and citizens. He further contends that ‘social freedom and autonomy, competitiveness, consumerism, and love of leisure are not necessarily evidence of bourgeois cultural penetration but rather of universal desires’ (Ranis 1995 qtd. in Roberts 1997: 147). Class solidarity aside, the politicisation of the various identities of Argentine workers rests on material considerations. Edelman (1999) looks at the mobilisations of another important historical class actor in Latin America, the peasantry. In his study of the peasant mobilisations against globalisation in Costa Rica, Edelman voices his objection to the post-modern tendency to underemphasise the ‘day-to-day experience and aspirations of those who suffer by either ignoring their grinding poverty, carping about bureaucrats and social scientists who try to measure it’ (Edelman 1999 qtd. in Oxhorn 2001: 174). Edelman’s study acknowledges the overlap between class and identity. It takes a political-economy perspective that incorporates class interests and material needs, but does not overlook the role of identity politics. These examples make clear that in Latin America ‘class struggles can combine with cross-class aspects of gender, ethnic, generational and other struggles in important and potentially powerful ways’ (Chinchilla 1992: 45 qtd. in Foweraker 1995: 40). The prevalence of material demands and lingering class-identities raises another question: how ‘new’ are the new forms of contentious politics in Latin America?

Before addressing this question, it is necessary to discuss another matter regarding Latin America. This issue—which is related to its historical location in terms of economic development—is its historical location in terms of state formation. Mostly ruled by authoritarian regimes in the 1970s, the region began a period of transition to democracy at the end of the decade. Once the regional debt crisis ensued in the mid-1980s, democratic transitions went on alongside drastic conditional economic stabilisation and restructuring projects, followed by a near total acquiescence to the neoliberal policies promulgated by the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1990s, and more recently by the return of alternatives following the rise of a wide-ranging wave of leftist oriented parties and leaders in the 2000s (Panizza 2009; Panizza and Philip 2011). The state in Latin America—democratic or not—maintains characteristics that problematize the application of ‘generic’ theories of contentious politics. Generally speaking and with few exceptions, the state in Latin America tends to be highly centralised, clientelistic, exclusive and lacking institutional, constitutional and legal infrastructure. These features directly contest the assumptions of state formation and state-society relations of western models of contentious politics, and as such limit their ‘explanatory potential and scope’ within a Latin American context (Davis 1999: 585). On the
one hand, the new social movement approach views contentious actors as seeking autonomy and distance from the state (and its institutions) as it has failed to meet their demands, and considers the existence of alternative sources of politics as empowerment in itself. Davis (1999) argues that this is far from the case in the region:

In Latin America, however, it is distance that is the culprit, including the fact that the state functions more on the national than the local level. As such, social movements frequently desire access and proximity to the formal institutions of governance (Davis 1999: 612)

Whilst contentious actors in a western context aim to distance themselves from the state, the same actors within a Latin American context ‘may in fact be trying to bridge the distance between citizens and the state, not widen it’ (David 199: 609). As Foweraker (1995) contends, contentious actors in Latin America necessarily and strategically engage in direct interaction with the state as it is ‘the dispenser of scarce resources’ and manifests an ‘acute centralization of power and decision-making’ (26 and 29). For Foweraker, the proximity to the state in contentious interactions suggests that ‘resource-mobilisation theory can be useful in analysing the political trajectory of these movements’ (ibid: 26) and as such justifies the political-process approach undertaken in his various works. The debate between the strategy-oriented and the identity-oriented approaches as applied to Latin America will be touched upon in the following paragraphs. At this point, it is important to highlight Davis’ (1999) critique that, even within the democratic context assumed by western theories, the strategy-oriented approach regards democracy as having the conditions under which ‘relatively successful citizen claim-making against the state can be made’ (599). Again, this assumption does not always hold in Latin America as its citizens can be equally distant from the state under either democratic or non-democratic contexts, and within a range of distance that depends upon various forms of exclusion (geographic, institutional, class and cultural). The notion of distance is the foundation of Davis’ (1999) argument, which considers the extent of citizens’ distance from the state as determinant of the likelihood of participation in contentious action and of the characteristics and dynamics of such action (601).

The two issues discussed—the pervasiveness of material demands and proximity to the state—raises the question of whether it is appropriate to term contemporary contentious politics in Latin America as ‘new’. A wealth of identity-oriented studies of contentious politics in Latin America came forth in the 1980s, but ultimately received criticism for their initial enthusiasm. As Alvarez and Escobar (1992) assert: ‘Not only have ‘new identities’
been celebrated prematurely, the presence of old features within them has also been overlooked’ (5). Despite the apparent premature celebration of new identities, one cannot deny the that multitude and range of contentious collective organisations in the region have shown novelty in terms of strategy, organisation, causes, goals, identities as well as their relationships with the state and other political actors (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998). Women’s organisations alone provide several examples. As previously noted, women’s organisation in Ecuador mobilised around demands related to basic survival needs and at the same time symbolically challenged the social and developmental status quo. The trend of materially-based women’s organising is evident across the region, as women’s mobilisations have manifested themselves in urban neighbourhoods or community settings that place ‘basic provisions of collective consumption’ high on the agenda (Davis 1999: 618).\(^{11}\) Women’s organisations have played the leading role in setting up soup kitchens, milk programs and cooperatives. At the same time, however, women have mobilised around demands related to human rights and democracy, such as the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo\(^{12}\) against state terrorism in Argentina and the Bartolina Sisa organisation in response ‘in part to economic pressures, and in part to the experience of dictatorship and the necessity of defending democracy’ in Bolivia. The former example helped destroy the ‘myth of female submissiveness’ whilst the latter fomented the recovery of the ‘ethnic awareness of Aymara women’ (Foweraker 1995: 57-58). The example of women’s organisations is merely one case of contentious politics in Latin America that cannot be reduced to either solely material or expressive dimensions, as it clearly manifests aspect of both ‘new’ and ‘old’ politics. It also serves to highlight that questions regarding the ‘newness’ of contemporary contentious politics is not limited to those taking place in non-western settings. On the contrary, the question remains pervasive within the more general contentious politics debate, especially as a criticism to the identity-oriented (or new social movement) approach. According to Alvarez and Escobar (1992):

> As some put it, the “new” is really in the theorists’ minds. “Out there”, some would say, the practices have always been the same, multiple and heterogeneous’ it is only that theorists, burdened by paradigms, were unable to see them (7)

Even Touraine admits that the break from class-analysis in ‘new social movements’ is uncertain and that ‘it is impossible to give up the term classes to designate the social

\(^{11}\) Davis (1999) credits Castells for the term ‘basic provisions of collective consumption’.

\(^{12}\) The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo have also made economic demands throughout the history of their contentious actions. For an in-depth discussion of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, see Guzman Bouvard (1994).
categories referred to by organised social movements’ (Touraine 1988: 42 qtd. in Foweraker 1995: 37). Thus, both new and old characteristics of contentious politics can be seen in a general as well as in a Latin American context.

Lastly, it is necessary to discuss the impact of contentious politics in Latin America, an issue that brings us back to the debate between the identity and strategy-oriented approaches. One may recall that the latter focuses on more visible gains such as policy changes, whereas the former concerns itself with less visible gains such as the production of meaning or new cultural codes (Melucci 1988: 334). In short, one focuses on the instrumental whilst the other on the symbolic dimensions of the struggle. The relative lack of visible gains resulting from Latin American contentious action within the context of the neoliberalism of the 1990s had a sobering effect on the studies of contentious politics in the region. Collective mobilisations in many cases played an active role in bringing about democratic transitions, but they seemed to have a rather limited (or less than anticipated) impact on deepening the democratisation process (Haber 1996; Roberts 1997). This is important precisely because of the specificities of Latin American states and state-society relations—characterised by a distance between state and citizens in geographic, institutional, class and cultural terms. Ideally, contentious collective action should help bridge this distance and enrich the meaning and experience of democracy in the region. Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar (1998) propose a focus on ‘cultural politics’ as way to enhance our understanding of the ‘cultural and political stakes in the contemporary struggle over the fate of democracy in Latin America’ (2). They argue that ‘when evaluating the impact of social movements or larger processes of politico-cultural change, we must understand the reach of social movements as extending beyond their conspicuous constitutive parts and visible manifestations of protest’ (ibid: 15). They thus strongly emphasise the ‘frameworks of meaning’ (ibid: 14) evoked by the ‘cultural politics enacted...by all social movements and by examining the potential of this cultural politics for fostering social change’ (ibid: 2). Despite the critique of their theoretical assertions and fulfilment of proposed task, their work deepened the understanding of the impact of contentious politics in Latin America (Assies and Salman 1998).13 Oxhorn (2001) also gives testament to the non-visible impact of contentious politics in Latin America in a review of works that he sums up with the following statement:

13 Assies and Salman (1998) remark that the emphasis of Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar (1998) on the intersection between culture and politics is ‘not only not always convincing or as innovative as presaged, it also precludes a more systematic discussion of the contributions of, for example, the resource mobilisation/political process approach’ (305).
In their own particular ways, with their own specific dimensions and concerns, and with varying levels of success, the movements discussed here are trying to change what it means to be a citizen in their own countries. Emerging conceptualizations of citizenship reflect the distribution of power within democratic systems but may lead to a redistribution of power in accordance with the outcomes of specific struggles (180).

By contesting the meaning of citizenship, contentious actors engage in the hegemonic battles over their own construction, which as one may recall, Melucci considers a victory in its own right. Nevertheless, Haber (1996) aptly reminds us that ‘scholars must learn more about the details of changing political opportunity structures that include a state institutional dimension along with concerns about discourse, autonomy, and identity’ (186). Lastly and along with this proposed task, scholars of contentious politics in Latin America must account for the distinct setting in which they take place.

1.4 ARGUMENT

This research incorporates the various dimensions of the contentious politics debate in addressing its primary question: What explains the differing abilities of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros to gain political empowerment? The argument is broadly based on the research agenda put forth by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001) in their Dynamics of Contention and furthered by Tarrow and Tilly (2007) in their subsequent Contentious Politics. These authors aim to shelve the unfruitful debate between strategy and identity-oriented approaches and to give greater attention to the similar ‘mechanisms and processes’ at work amongst different forms of contentious politics, throughout time and across regions, in diverse arrays of political, economic, social and cultural settings. In their own words:

> In this study, a search for explanatory mechanisms and processes takes the place of a checklist of variables... We seek, for example, to lodge interpretive processes firmly in the give-and-take of social interaction rather than treating them as autonomous causal forces. Because of the urge to get causal connection right, we reject the effort to build general models of all contention or even of its varieties. Instead, within each major aspect of contention we search for robust, widely applicable causal mechanisms that explain crucial—but not all—features of contention (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 32)

Dynamics of Contention and Contentious Politics do not limit their study of contentious politics to social movements. They employ a definition of ‘contentious politics’¹⁴ that

---

¹⁴ The definition of contentious politics used by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) is as follows: ‘episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of
facilitates the inclusion of a wide variety and range of contentious episodes such as protest, social movements, nationalist movements, rebellions, civil wars or revolutions. It also facilitates the inclusion of transitions from one type of contentious episode to another, or from contention to more conventional forms of politics. In doing so, this broad definition recognises the scope and breadth as well as the dynamism of contentious politics.

The endeavour posited in Dynamics of Contention and more systematically addressed in Contentious Politics has not stood without criticism. Stanbridge (2006) cites the tendency of Contentious Politics to read as a methods text, as well as its ‘faintly authoritative tone’, as problematic. She nevertheless admits that:

There is something enticing about what [Tarrow and Tilly] have done here...If, by analysing episodes of contentious politics across time and space using common concept, we could produce a stock of knowledge from which the components of change might be drawn—well, what is wrong with that?’ (3)

In another review, Klandermas (2008) critiques the framework as ‘a grand scheme without much solid empirical confirmation’. However, he concludes:

Nonetheless, Contentious Politics is thought provoking; it is meant to encourage its readers to look critically to instances of contentious politics. If only it succeeds in this respect it was worth the effort’ (1857)

The framework developed in Dynamics of Contention and Contentious Politics presents a new perspective on the study of contentious politics and addresses the various issues raised in its past and present theoretical debates. Moreover, the task undertaken is one that has been demanded (at least indirectly) by researchers of contentious politics for some time. In a review essay of contentious politics in Latin America, Roberts (1997) concludes that ‘the contradictions of the new order that can generate novel forms of collective action are still poorly understood, as are the linkage mechanisms available to connect multiple loci of popular resistance’ (Roberts 1997: 151). In another review essay, Oxhorn (2001) claims that ‘the old, often simplistic dichotomies of dictatorship-democracy, Left-Right, strategy-identity, race-class, and even public-private no longer serve as useful guides for understanding Latin America’s social and political realities’ (180) and commends the works under review for attempting to understand ‘actual mobilisational experiences—warts and all’ (164). The framework proposed by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly explicitly focuses on the ‘poorly understood’ causal mechanisms and aims to systematise a way to understand ‘actual mobilisational experiences’ across various forms of contentious politics.

at least one set of the claimants’ (5).
**Political identities and why they matter.** Amongst the different groups of causal mechanisms detailed in *Dynamics of Contention*, one constitutes the broad process that McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly term ‘the constitution of new political actors and identities’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 314). This research shall henceforth refer to this broad process as the identity-formation process and employ the following definition of ‘identities’: ‘social relations and their representations, as seen from the perspective of one actor or another’ (ibid: 132). This research employs the concept of identity in the context in which an identity is political or becomes politicised. An identity can be considered political or politicised when it interacts and maintains relations with governments.

Political identities have an important role in the contentious political process. They are based on boundaries that differentiate social groups from one another—boundaries that separate ‘us’ from ‘them’. As such, they help define the main actors of contentious episodes (the claim-makers and the objects of claims). The boundaries on which political identities are based also represent the lines over which different groups interact with each other and the lines within which each group interacts with its collective (Tarrow and Tilly 2005: 13). Political identities thus delineate the terms of the struggle between and within the claim-makers and the objects of their claims. Furthermore, political identities have a distinctly relational dynamic. They do not belong to any one individual or one group—they exist in relation to the political identities of others. The political identities of claim-makers are shaped by their rejection of, reaction to and understanding of the political identities of the objects of their claims. In other words, by establishing an understanding of ‘who we are’, claim-makers simultaneously shape an understanding of ‘who they are’. Political identities can become crucial at certain points in episodes of contention—for example, points at which those not immediately involved in the struggle (the wider public) can, must or are made to cross over a boundary in defence of either the claim-makers or the objects of claims.

**How political identities are formed.** The political identities of actors are dynamic. They constantly evolve and do so in relation to the political identities of others. Actors engaged in contentious episodes continually and systematically create, highlight, modify or transform the political identities of themselves and their opponents. They do so by making claims, elaborating slogans, adopting symbols, forging strategic alliances, giving labels to their opponents and engaging in protest. Governments also influence the formation of political identities, as the actions that they undertake can lead to the politicisation and consequent
collective mobilisation of actors previously uninvolved in a political struggle. These actions include those that affect property rights, the economy and the rights of its citizens or particular groups of citizens (Tarrow and Tilly 2005: 9). Regime change or shifting political alignments likewise affect political identities. Depending on the type and degree of change or shift, they can propel the declaration of new political identities, enhance the mobilisational capacity of groups organised around existing political identities or diminish that of others.

**TABLE 1.3  IDENTITY-SHAPING MECHANISMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MECHANISM</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
<th>EFFECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. BROKERAGE</strong></td>
<td>The linking of two or more currently unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with each other and/or with another site</td>
<td>Reduces transaction costs of communication and coordination among sites, facilitates the combined use of resources located at different sites and creates new potential collective actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. CATEGORY FORMATION</strong></td>
<td>The creation of a set of sites that share a boundary distinguishing all of them from, and relating all of them to, at least one set of sites visibly excluded by the boundary</td>
<td>Creates identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. INVENTION</strong></td>
<td>Authoritative drawing of a boundary and prescription of relations across that boundary</td>
<td>Creates identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. BORROWING</strong></td>
<td>Importation of a boundary-cum-relations package already existing elsewhere and its installation in the local setting</td>
<td>Creates identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. ENCOUNTER</strong></td>
<td>Initial contact between previously separate (but internally well connected) networks</td>
<td>Creates identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. OBJECT SHIFT</strong></td>
<td>The alteration in relations between claim-makers and objects of claims</td>
<td>Activates new or different social relations and thus transforms available information, resources and interaction scripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. CERTIFICATION</strong></td>
<td>The validation of actors, their performances and their claims by external authorities</td>
<td>Establishes which political actors have rights to exist, act, make claims and/or draw on government-controlled resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 Source: McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001)
In their *Dynamics of Contention*, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly attempt to systematise the identity-formation process. They identify several identity-shaping mechanisms found in the process. These include brokerage, category formation (which can be broken down into three related mechanisms: invention, borrowing and encounter), object shift and certification (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 157-158). The following chapters detail how these mechanisms work and how they relate to our cases. For the time being, it is sufficient to highlight that these mechanisms come into play as result of the actions and interactions of claim-makers and the objects of their claims, and as a result of economic and demographic change. Table 1.3 provides a brief summary of these causal mechanisms and how they shape identities.

**Political identities in our two cases.** Returning to the research question at hand: *What explains the differing abilities of the Bolivian and cocaleros Peruvian to gain political empowerment?* How does one understand the electoral capacity of Evo Morales and the MAS in Bolivia, whose 2005 victory put him on the road to becoming ‘the president with the most legitimacy since the transition to democracy’ (Gamarra 2005). How does one compare the political successes of the Bolivian cocalero movement to the political shortcomings of the Peruvian cocalero movement, described by its former adviser as:

> [I]solated, subordinated to the general policies of the Peruvian government, uncoordinated, selfish, and unable to build a collective agenda to tackle the real problems of poverty, the environment, cultural issues, and the international political situation, particularly with the US (Soberón qtd. in Smith 2007)

This work presents the contentious episodes of the cocaleros of Peru and Bolivia as cases of identity-formation. It reveals how making claims based on *the defence of a good of questionable legitimacy* (coca) profoundly affected the identity-formation process. The defence of coca has a polarising effect on the internal and external dynamics of the cocalero social movements of Bolivia and Peru. On an internal level, the dual legal status of coca meant that different coca-producing areas developed different interests based on whether (and to what extent) each area produced legal or illegal coca. This threatened the viability of sustaining unity within cocalero social movements on a national scale. On an external level, the stigmas associated with coca made it difficult for cocaleros to attract allies and sympathisers. The claim-makers (cocaleros) leading the contentious episode from the outset were linked to activities such as drug trafficking and violence—an actuality which ascribed them with labels that they would need to cast off in order to construct a new and legitimising
identity. This affected the cocaleros’ ability to broaden the scope of their social movements and transition from social actors into political actors.

The identity-formation processes of the cocaleros of Peru and Bolivia have followed different paths and resulted in pointedly different contentious episodes. This work does not claim that the construction of political identities has a determinant impact in all instances and varieties of contention. It considers the role of political identities as critical to the analysis of its two cases and asserts that this stems from the fact the political identities of the claim-makers were from the outset tainted by the polemic nature of their claims. The identity-formation process is one of several processes at work in contentious politics. Our cases have presented an opportunity to study this process in depth and generate a more formal account of how unprecedented actors with low levels of legitimacy can become politically empowered and stimulate cultural and political change.

**The argument.** The author’s analysis of the political empowerment of the cocaleros of Bolivia and Peru integrates the cases’ social, economic and political contexts, which include both structural preconditions and political opportunity structures (that is, political opportunities and threats). It deems political opportunity structures as independent variables and structural preconditions as intervening variables. These variables determine how the identity-shaping mechanisms unfold, which together comprise the identity-formation process that shapes the characteristics and outcomes of the cases’ contentious episodes. This research thus rejects the tendency to label a set of variables as necessary and sufficient and aims to develop a better understanding of the identity-formation process (bound within a set of structural preconditions and structures of political opportunity).

In this sense, it is important to discuss the relationship between political opportunity structures and identity in contentious politics. Swidler (1995) highlights the relationship in the following statement:

---

*16 Tarrow defines political opportunities as ‘consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national—sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious politics. He defines threats as ‘those factors—repression, but also the capacity of authorities to present a solid front to insurgents—that discourage contention’ (Tarrow 2011: 32). Furthermore, he maintains that the term ‘political opportunity structure’ should be understood ‘not as an invariant model inevitably producing a social movement but as a set of clues for when contentious politics will emerge and will set in motion a chain of causation that may ultimately lead to sustained interaction with authorities and thence to social movements’ (ibid: 33).*
The cultures of social movements are shaped by the institutions the movements confront. Different regime types and different forms of repression generate different kinds of social movements with differing tactics and internal cultures… Institutions affect the formulation of social movement identities and objectives in more central ways (Swidler 1995 qtd. in Tarrow and Tilly 2005: 8)

Identities, key facets of social movement cultures, are inevitably linked to the (shifting) structures of political opportunity social movements face. As Tarrow and Tilly (2005) put it:

A focus on identities is not the obverse of a focus on “structures” but their complement. Structures of political opportunity and threat both constrain and empower identity work (18)

This ‘identity work’ (the identity-formation process) is composed of various identity-shaping mechanisms. These mechanisms are simply a classification of the varied contentious interactions continually taking place between claim-makers, the objects of their claims and the wider public—the ‘give-and-take’ of contentious politics. Contentious interactions may appear random or disorderly, but this is not the case. Contentious interactions are bound by a given set of political opportunity structures (the ‘playing field’ of a contentious episode). Moreover, they comprise the causal mechanisms that repeatedly arise across different contentious episodes.

In sum: political opportunities and threats shape causal mechanisms; structural preconditions are important but not deterministic; causal mechanisms constitute the broad processes of contentious episodes. An analysis of the identity-formation processes in Bolivia and Peru will clarify the formation of their cocalero social movements; the radicalisation and division of the Peruvian cocalero social movement; and the transformation of the Bolivian cocalero social movement into a political party with wide electoral success.

Figure 1.1 provides a succinct guide of the argument. Two distinct phases within the cases’ contentious episodes are identified: formation of a social movement and transformation of a social movement. Phase I—formation—comprises the emergence and consolidation of a cocalero social movement, which implies a transition by cocaleros from illegitimate actors to

---

17 The ‘structures’ that Tarrow refers to here are political opportunity structures.
18 It serves to recall that this is precisely what the Dynamics of Contention research agenda resolved to do—‘to lodge interpretive processes firmly in the give-and-take of social interaction rather than treating them as autonomous causal forces (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 32). ‘Object shift’, for example, denotes a change in the relations between claim-makers and the objects of their claims.
**Figure 1.1 Theoretical Framework**

### Phase I: Social Movement Formation

**Independent Variables**
- Political opportunities and threats
  - (external to claim-makers)

**Intervening Variables**
- Structural preconditions

**Mechanisms**
- Identity-shaping mechanisms

**Dependent Variables**
- Primary political identity
- Additional political identity

### Phase II: Social Movement Transformation

**Independent Variables**
- Political opportunities and threats
  - (external to claim-makers)
  - (created by claim-makers)

**Intervening Variables**
- Structural Preconditions

**Mechanisms**
- Identity-shaping mechanisms and Broader Mechanisms

**Dependent Variables**
- Primary political identity
- Additional political identity

STRENGTH OF SOCIAL ACTOR
- (social movement)

STRENGTH OF POLITICAL ACTOR
- (varied forms)
social actors. Phase II—transformation—comprises the demobilisation of a cocalero social movement. A social movement may demobilise because of exhaustion within its ranks, division within its ranks, a transition into a terrorist organisation, a transition into a civil society organisation or a transition into more institutionalised forms of politics (Tarrow 1998: 147-150). The latter prospect implies a transition by cocaleros from social actors to political actors. The manner by which these transitions (formation and transformation) take place, and the outcomes to which they lead, rests on the ‘identity-work’ undertaken by the actors of contentious episode. The identity-formation process led to different outcomes in both Phase I and in Phase II for the two cases. In Peru, Phase I yielded the following outcomes: a social movement with a collective political identity based on coca; a social movement with a weak capability as a social actor. Phase II yielded: no construction of broader political identities; division within the ranks of the social movement; limited individual cases of transition into institutional politics; overall weak capability as political actors. In Bolivia, Phase I yielded: a social movement with a political collective identity based on coca; a social movement with a strong capability as a social actor. Phase II yielded: construction of broader political identities; smooth transition into institutional politics through a political party; overall strong capability as political actors.

1.5  METHODOLOGY

The author proposed the following hypotheses to address the question leading this research:

1. The cocaleros of Bolivia and Peru made the transition from illegitimate actors to social by forming a social movement. Their ability to overcome coca’s questionable legitimacy affected the strength and viability of their social movements.

2. The cocaleros of Bolivia overcame the challenges posed by coca’s questionable legitimacy by legitimising the political identity of ‘cocalero’. The cocaleros of Peru did not overcome these challenges.

3. The differences in the strength of the cocalero social movements of Peru and Bolivia—based on their degrees of legitimacy—affected their transition from social to political actors and their capabilities as political actors.

4. The Bolivian cocaleros smoothly transitioned from a social movement and political party by forming multiple legitimising political identities.
The author approached these hypotheses through qualitative research methods. These methods are appropriate as it focuses on the dynamics behind human behaviour and can answer why and how decisions take place. Understanding the motivation of the various actors involved in the cocaleros’ contentious episodes and the opinion or response of mainstream society\textsuperscript{19} is key to understanding the transitions of the cocaleros from illegitimate to social and social to political actors. To address the hypotheses, the author gathered primary and secondary research material from a variety of sources. These sources included:

**Unstructured interviews.** The author conducted 39 unstructured interviews to gather primary material for this research. The interviews took place in Peru and Bolivia between 2004 and 2011. The author selected the interviewees based on their involvement in the cocaleros’ contentious episode (or in the political events that took place in the corresponding time period) of each case. The interviewees included former and current cocalero organisation leaders, cocalero organisations’ political advisors, former and current peasant organisation leaders, directors or officers of drug control institutions, former and current congressmen, former and current ministers, academics and members of civil society related to the research (NGO directors, journalists and opinion leaders). Appendix C provides a detailed list of the interviewees. The interviews involved a range of open-ended questions on a list of selected topics. The questions were phrased so that the interviewee did not feel there was a ‘correct’ answer. A free exchange followed to obtain more detail and additional topics to research.

**Documents.** The author conducted an extensive literature review to develop the hypotheses and theoretical framework of this research. Secondary research material was also used to develop an account of the political opportunities and threats faced by the cocaleros of Bolivia and Peru during their contentious episodes. The memoirs of relevant political actors proved especially useful in this endeavour. The author compiled and analysed various documents including policy papers, legislation, government accords with cocaleros, cocalero organisations’ meetings transcripts, cocalero organisations’ documents and speeches made by cocalero (or other social) organisations’ leaders. The author also compiled an archive of newspaper and magazine articles to develop a timeline of the Peruvian and Bolivian cocalero contentious episodes and to compare the reporting of certain events by different media sources or interviewees. This source of information was especially relevant for the Peruvian

\textsuperscript{19} The author uses the term ’mainstream society’ to refer to the dominant social groups within a given country.
case, as reliable published material over the cocaleros’ contentious episode at the time of the author’s fieldwork was scant. When available, public opinion polls were used to study the perceptions and reactions of the mainstream society to specific events.

1.6 MAIN FINDINGS

The main findings of this work are as follows:

First, contentious politics based on claims of questionable legitimacy (such as the defence of coca) poses significant challenges to claim-makers. Internally, such claims generate divisive tensions that inhibit social movement unity. Externally, they cast doubt upon the validity of the claim-makers and can limit the availability of allies and sympathisers.

Second, claim-makers can overcome these challenges by constructing political identities that transcend the divisive and de-legitimising dimensions of such claims.

Third, claim-makers’ ability to construct identities is dependent upon the context in which their contentious episodes take place—that is, the political opportunities and threats they face. Since political opportunities and threats constantly shift, claim-makers need to reinvent themselves to adapt to these shifts and sustain contention. They do this by creating new opportunities for themselves or by taking advantage of opportunities created by other contentious actors.

Fourth, political identities have important strategic and symbolic dimensions. Claim-makers deliberately accentuate certain identities, construct new ones and attempt to minimise debilitating ones to promote unity and attract support. The process of identity-formation thus entails strategic calculations by contentious actors to enhance their political empowerment. At the same time, identity-formation has important symbolic dimensions as it can result in the production or modification of meaning within a given culture, society and/or polity.

1.7 CHAPTER SUMMARIES

The chapters that follow provide empirical confirmation to the main findings of this work.

Chapter 2 provides an account of the historical process leading to the criminalisation of coca and cocaine in Peru and Bolivia. It demonstrates how the process shaped interactions (and
thus the identities and paired identities) between the actors involved in the coca-cocaine polemic: the state, society, consumers of coca and producers of coca. The criminalisation of coca in 1978 and 1988 in Peru and Bolivia, respectively, politicised these identities.

Chapter 3 details Phase I (formation) of the Peruvian cocalero social movement within a context of social, economic and political crisis during the transitions to democracy. The first democratic transition began in 1980 under the García government; the second began in 2000 under the transitional Paniagua government. The chapter discusses how the mechanisms that unfolded throughout this phase shaped the political identities of Peru’s cocaleros and their limited degree of empowerment as social actors.

Chapter 4 details Phase I (formation) of the Bolivian cocalero social movement within a context of political and economic crisis following the return of democracy in 1982 under the Paz Estenssoro government. It discusses how the mechanisms that unfolded throughout this phase shaped the political identities of Bolivia’s cocaleros and their high degree of empowerment as social actors.

Chapter 5 details Phase II (transformation) of the Peruvian cocalero social movement that took place in the new democratic era that followed the fall of the Fujimori government. The cocaleros’ transformation entailed their radicalisation, demobilisation and entry into conventional politics. The chapter discusses how the mechanisms that unfolded throughout this transformation shaped political identities that contributed to their limited impact and appeal as political actors.

Chapter 6 details Phase II (transformation) of the Bolivian cocalero social movement that took place as Bolivia’s ‘pacted democracy’ model fell into crisis. The cocaleros’ transformation entailed their diffusion across Bolivia and entry into conventional politics. The chapter discusses how the mechanisms that developed throughout this transformation shaped political identities that facilitated their diffusion, strength and broad appeal political actors.

Chapter 7 concludes this work by analysing the two cases’ formation and transformation in a comparative framework.
2 The Criminalisation of Coca and Cocaine

Since colonial times, debate regarding the use, production and criminalisation of coca and cocaine has dictated the terms of interaction between state, society, consumers of coca and producers of coca. Concern over the use of coca was central to the ‘indigenous question’ (cuestión indígena) of the colonial and early republican era, and became a marked point of interaction between the state and the indigenous population. It also affected the relationship between the indigenous population and society. The discovery of cocaine in the 1860s heightened the contentious nature of interactions between the state and producers of coca. These interactions culminated in the criminalisation of coca in Bolivia and Peru through national legislation. The cocaine boom and subsequent War on Drugs then dramatically altered the nature of interactions between Bolivia, Peru and the United States. They also changed national and international perceptions of coca, cocaine and those entangled in its production and trade.

This chapter demonstrates how the historical process leading to the criminalisation of coca and cocaine in Bolivia and Peru shaped interactions between the state, society, consumers of coca and producers of coca—and between the different states involved in this polemic. These interactions in turn shaped the identities of these actors in relation to one another (that is, their paired identities). The first section of the chapter details the traditional use of coca and the colonial societal debate surrounding it. The second section describes the early commercialisation of coca and its relationship with society in Peru and Bolivia. The third section discusses how the discovery of cocaine changed the coca debate and sparked the process of criminalisation of both products. The fourth section compares criminalisation of coca and cocaine in Bolivia and Peru, and the changing relationship between Bolivia, Peru and the United States as this process took place.

2.1 COCA: POLEMIC BEGINNINGS

Indigenous inhabitants of what now comprises Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, northern Chile and northern Argentina have consumed coca for thousands of years. This cultural practice of the Andean indigenous population became an issue of controversy almost immediately following the Spanish conquest. It grew increasingly contentious thereafter, especially after the
discovery of cocaine in the nineteenth century. The coca-cocaine debate has led to clashes between state, society and the consumers and producers of coca throughout its course. This section discusses the beginning of the coca-cocaine debate and the earliest interactions between its actors.

**Traditional consumption.** A brief survey of the history, myths and practices surrounding coca can help one understand its many uses. The literature on the presence of coca in indigenous Andean life, plentiful and diverse across time and academic discipline, evidences its long-standing cultural role (see Carter and Mamani 1986; Mayer 1993; Vidart 1991; Spedding 1994; Boville 2004). For example, archaeological findings of coca in tombs along the coast of Peru dating back to 1500 BC give insight into its religious significance (Carter and Mamani 1986: 24). Pre-Inca pottery showing wounded warriors using coca as an analgesic demonstrate its medicinal function. The varied locations of archaeological findings additionally show that a pre-Inca coca trade existed between the coast and the highlands, which highlights its economic significance (Gagliano 1994: 14).

In terms of religion, coca plays an important role in ceremonies and offerings, often in conjunction with other valued Andean goods such as chicha, llamas and guinea pigs (Boville 2004: 39). Its medicinal qualities have made the leaf a staple of daily life in the highlands. Indigenous people chew coca in order to release extracts that diminish the effects of hunger, fatigue, low temperatures and high altitudes (Mayer 1993: 143). One can also consume coca by brewing tea from the leaves or from commercial tea sachets. As for its social function, indigenous people have used coca as trueque, or product of exchange or payment of salary. The Spanish adopted the practice and often gave those working in mines part of their salaries in coca. The leaf continues to function as a means of exchange in remote areas of the Bolivian highlands that have virtually no demand for commercial products (Spedding 1994: 68). The act of chewing coca, known as coqueo, plays an essential social function as an act of friendship, inclusion and solidarity. In one of various studies undertaken on the subject, Carter and Mamani (1986) cite the following testimonial by an indigenous peasant: ‘People, when they care about each other, know how to offer a chew. First we chew a bit to thank each other and right after we start to chat’ (Alitanio Perez qtd. in Carter and Mamani 1986). Coca chewing also frequently takes place at work, as miners and peasants take breaks for brief sessions of coqueo. The practice is a social activity akin to having a tea or coffee in other societies (Spedding 1994: 69). Last but not least, coqueo carries an important symbolic value.
as an Andean indigenous practice. Boville (2004) points out that coqueo provides new indigenous community members ‘the most identity’ because it demonstrates that ‘among other things, he is a habitual coca consumer’ (39). Vidart (1991) also underscores the relationship between coqueo and indigenous identity. He states:

The Andean Indian chews coca because that is how he affirms his identity as the son as well as the owner of the earth that the Spaniard took from him yesterday and that the Creole landowners challenge today. To be Indian is to be coquero... He silently and obstinately defies the contemporary descendants of past encomenderos and even more ancient conquistadores (61)

To this day, coqueo is used as an act of self-identification and defiance. It has not been uncommon to see cocaleros and supporting spectators chewing coca during union meetings, marches and demonstrations as a way to signal their identity and solidarity.

**Colonial debate.** The long-established traditional use of coca in the Andean region has been a subject of disagreement. Not all scholars support the view that the traditional use of the leaf was prevalent among the pre-colonial indigenous population. One of the earliest controversies surrounding coca is the claim that the Inca elite placed strict restrictions on its use. Colonial prohibitionists were the first to argue that the pre-colonial use of coca was limited to religious Inca rituals and only became a widespread practice after the Spanish conquest. Opponents claim that prohibitionists developed this argument in order to vilify the practice, which they believed corrupted colonial society (Rostworowski 1977). They contest the prohibitionist stance by citing evidence of the following: pre-Inca coca chewing (Antonil 1978: 51), the existence of private coca fields (Spedding 1994: 49), coca chewing by Inca warriors and colonists in new Inca territories (Gagliano 1994: 19) and the use of coca as tribute payment throughout the Inca Empire (Boville 2004: 37). Scholars have yet to reach a consensus on this matter, but they do generally agree that the pattern of coca production and consumption changed decidedly after the Spanish conquest.

In pre-colonial times, coca was produced in the coast, jungle and valleys of present day Bolivia and Peru. The mining boom of the 1570s prompted a steep increase in the demand for coca, which led to the development of new coca fields in mining areas (Spedding 1994: 49). Silver mines in Potosi alone created ‘an almost insatiable market for coca’ and encouraged a long-distance coca trade as Potosi coca prices nearly doubled those of Cusco (Antonil 1978: 57). The Cusco-Potosi coca trade provided an effective way to make quick and rewarding profits. One could trade up to sixty thousand pounds of coca in a single shipment and make a
profit of about 7,500 pesos (or 34 kilos of gold). In the 1560s, that amount ‘would have been enough to retire comfortably for life’ (ibid). Coca trade between Cusco and Potosi, valued at 100,000 pesos in 1583, increased fivefold within a decade (Gagliano 1994: 43).

Despite its clear economic significance, the coca trade attracted harsh critics. Catholic clergymen and missionaries maintained the strictest opposition, and were divided into two groups (prohibitionists and humanitarians) as to the nature of their critique. Prohibitionists called for an end to the coca trade and advocated the complete eradication of coca, because they believed it corrupted the morality and Christianisation of the indigenous population (Cotler 1999: 73). Humanitarians condemned the coca trade on the grounds that coca workers, known as camayos, suffered inhumane working conditions, undernourishment, high rates of disease and untimely deaths. The most prominent humanitarian, Bartolome de las Casas, asserted that ‘there had never been a pestilence which killed more people than had died in the cultivation of coca’ (Gagliano 1963: 45). Humanitarians nevertheless acknowledged that camayos relied on coca as a stimulant and source of nutrients. As such, they advocated reforms to protect and improve camayo working conditions but did not call for an end to the coca trade.

In 1552, the First Council of Lima formally addressed the coca debate. Bishops advised the archbishop of Lima to discourage the indigenous population from making offerings to the ‘sun, earth and sea with coca, maize, water and any other thing’ in order to help Christianisation efforts (Gagliano 1994: 48). The Second Council of Lima in 1569 revisited the debate. Prohibitionists denounced coca as a ‘useless and pernicious leaf’ and asserted that the indigenous belief in its physical effects was an ‘illusion of the Devil’ (Madge 2001: 27). The Council, not swayed by prohibitionist views, recommended that the Crown discourage the use of coca in ‘superstitious practices’ and limit coca production, or at least prohibit forced indigenous labour in coca production (Gagliano 1994: 57).

These fairly moderate recommendations reflected the power of the colonial coca lobby, which confronted prohibitionist claims with a number of compelling arguments. Coca lobbyists presented their views to the Crown in a letter co-signed by judges including leading coca lobbyist Juan de Matienzo. Matienzo countered the claim that coca was ‘the fruit of the Devil’ by arguing that it was instead ‘a gift from God’ that provided stamina and nourishment to the indigenous population. He went as far as to claim that not consuming coca would cause
tooth decay, malnutrition and starvation amongst indigenous people—and ultimately lead to a significant decline in the available workforce. Matienzo appealed to humanitarians within the Church by suggesting that the Crown should implement stricter laws to protect camayos instead of attempting to eradicate the plant (Gagliano 1994: 58). Coca lobbyists benefited from the strong economic position of the coca trade, which involved approximately two thousand Spaniards throughout the viceroyalty and yielded over one million pesos in gross annual income (ibid: 34). Most of this income came from the mines of Potosi and other mining veins in the highlands. Matienzo summed up coca’s economic significance quite bluntly: ‘To attempt to prohibit coca is to not want a Peru…if coca was to be taken away, the Indians would not go to Potosi, they would not work and they would not extract silver’ (Matienzo qtd. in Cotler 1999: 73). In other words, the viceroyalty would not survive if it eliminated the coca trade.

King Philip II finally resolved the matter in 1569. Citing the financial interests of the Crown, he formally authorised coca production in the viceroyalty. The Crown and the administration of Viceroy Francisco de Toledo strengthened existing coca laws and enacted new ones to improve working conditions, prohibit forced labour and limit production quantities (Gagliano 1963: 46-58). However, these laws did not appease critics. At the Third Council of Lima (1582-1583), prohibitionist Francisco Falcon denounced coca merchants for not adhering to the laws of Viceroy Toledo or King Philip II. He also claimed that death rates among camayos remained high and argued that the time had come to slowly eradicate the use of coca. Prohibitionist views nevertheless once again failed to sway the opinion of the Council, which reiterated its 1579 position: discourage the use of coca in ‘superstitious practices’ and end forced labour in the coca trade (ibid: 60). Discussions at the Council of the Indies in the mid-seventeenth century cemented the defeat of prohibitionists as they resolved to tolerate the indigenous coca habit.

Coca and society: the coast and the highlands. The defence of coca production by elite circles and the Crown did not imply that the use of coca was widespread or even tolerated throughout the viceroyalty. Coqueo was considered a distinctly indigenous highland practice and was strongly discouraged in coastal areas (except in the case of its use by workers in sugar plantations). According to Gagliano (1994), only recently arrived indigenous people from the highlands chewed coca in Lima, and they would soon give up the practice (at least in public) in order to behave like ‘civilised Christians’ (83). Highland society had a higher
toleration for coca, but its toleration was nonetheless pragmatic. In his *Comentarios Reales de los Incas*, Garcilaso de la Vega discusses the increased use of coca by highland mestizos. Mestizos that admitted to using coca felt compelled to justify their habit as a necessity for work. Spaniards for their part continued to view *coqueo* as an indigenous practice ‘scorned when adopted those of other races and castes’ (87). Nevertheless, by the eighteenth century several commentators had taken note of the gradual spread of the coca habit to all racial groups in the highlands. Cosme Bueno wrote that ‘Spaniards of both sexes’ chewed coca in the highlands to improve respiration; Ignacio Flores notes that Spaniards and creoles frequently used the coca in Upper Peru (modern Bolivia) to cope with the altitude and temperatures of the highlands; Hipolito Unanue acknowledges these trends in his *Disertación*, but underscores that Spaniards and creoles admitted to the habit with reluctance and that they only took part in it when ‘adversity made it necessary’ (89).

Coastal Lima meanwhile continued to vehemently reject *coqueo*. Gagliano (1994) sums up this disparate development:

> While the creoles and Spaniards living in the sierra and altiplano successfully justified their use of coca, their Limeño counterparts were ostracised if they succumbed to a habit that had become firmly identified with the cultural baggage of the highland Indians... [C]reoles in Lima who revealed their habituation were often disowned by their disgraced families (89-90)

Unlike their highland peers, coastal creoles and Spaniards could not justify the use of coca on medicinal grounds because coastal temperatures and altitudes did not require it—and they would certainly not admit to consuming coca for any social or cultural reason. The only value coca held for the coastal elite was economic. As Gootenberg (2008) points out:

> Under Spanish rule, the growing of coca and its sale to working migrants became “commoditized”, to use an ungainly term, while coca’s everyday use value in highland villages became an affirmation of surviving Andean values. In cultural terms, use of coca in Peru’s highly segmented two-republics society was not creolized or “mestizo-ized” (as cacao quickly was in post-conquest Mexico) but, to dominant elites, became instead a defining, lasting marker of a degraded subaltern “Indian” caste (20)

Gootenberg (2008) brings together a number of points that underscore this highland-coastal disparity, which help clarify the attitudes in present day Bolivia and Peru toward coca and indigenous issues. First, many Lima elite economic interests relied on the coca trade and thus defended its production. The same could be said of elite economic interests in La Paz, the highland capital of what became Bolivia in 1825. Yet, Lima elites completely rejected coca on a cultural level whilst La Paz elites did not. On the contrary, ‘Bolivians of all walks of life
knew and embraced coca’ (ibid: 114). Bueno evidences this in his commentaries in citing that women in La Paz chewed coca similarly to how women in Mexico City smoked cigars (Gagliano 1994: 88). In Lima, such practices had grave social consequences.

These divergent attitudes developed in part for geographical reasons. Most of the coca plantations in Peru were located in the highlands or jungle areas far removed from the coastal capital. In contrast, the main coca producing area of Bolivia (the Yungas) was located right next to La Paz, situated in the midst of the Andes. The department of La Paz contained approximately one third of Bolivia’s population and was mostly comprised of indigenous people. Even by 1885, the city of La Paz remained nine tenth indigenous and the public use of coca was common (Gootenberg 2008: 114). Furthermore, residents of highland La Paz could justify the use of coca on medicinal grounds. In short, the cultural stigma surrounding coca that developed in Lima did not develop in La Paz. Coca was never remote or unknown to Bolivians, even amongst elites. These divergent attitudes on coca had an enduring impact on interactions between the state, society and the producers and consumers of coca in Bolivia and Peru.

2.2 COCA: COMING OF AGE

Unlike other novelties from the Americas, coca did not immediately provoke European enthusiasm due to its reputation as an addictive substance. These perceptions began to change in the eighteenth century after studies emerged citing coca’s medicinal and nutritional qualities (Cotler 1999: 73). Coca eventually overcame its reputation and gained some respect among Peruvian and European elites, but only after it became evident that its medicinal qualities could translate into commercial gain.

Coca mania. Angelo Mariani, a French chemist, led one of the first and most notable attempts to market coca. He created a beverage called Vin Mariani that appealed to the western palate by blending coca leaves and infusing them with Bordeaux wine. Vin Mariani became one of the most successful coca beverages and earned praise from the likes of the Prince of Wales, the Czars of Russia, Pope Leo XIII, Pope Pius X, President William McKinley and General Ulysses Grant. Composer and conductor John Philip Sousa wrote:

When worn out or after a long rehearsal or a performance, I find nothing so helpful as a glass of Vin Mariani. To brain workers and those who expend a great deal of nervous force it is invaluable (Sousa qtd. in Gagliano 1994: 113)
Mariani developed several other products made from coca and earned a reputation as a world coca expert (Madge 2001: 71). Dr. W. Golden Mortimer dedicated his famous book *On Coca* to Mariani in 1901, crediting him as the ‘recognised exponent of the Divine Plant’ and the first person to ‘render coca to the world’ (ibid: 68). Coca beverages and elixirs from competitors soon appeared. Like Mariani, they marketed their products by citing coca’s medicinal qualities. James Pemberton of Atlanta developed the United States version of Vin Mariani, Pemberton's Wine Coca. He renamed the beverage Coca-Cola after having to produce a non-alcoholic version following the alcohol prohibitions in Atlanta in 1886 (Spillane 2000: 24-25). The first advertisement for Coca-Cola, published in the *National Druggist* in 1896, celebrated coca’s virtues:

> It seems to be a law of nature that the more valuable and efficacious a drug is, the nastier and more unpleasant its taste. It is therefore quite a triumph over nature that the Coca-Cola Co. of Atlanta, Ga., have achieved in their success in robbing both coca leaves and the kola nut of the exceedingly nauseous and disagreeable taste while retaining their wonderful medicinal properties, and the power of restoring vitality and raising the spirits of the weary and debilitated (ibid: 76)

Coca gained widespread acceptance as a natural stimulant and generated frenzy amongst elites for its commercial potential. Medical and scientific enthusiasts in Europe, the United States and Peru relentlessly pursued experiments with coca in search of additional applications.

**Peruvian coca boom.** The Peruvian coca trade in the late nineteenth century boomed with the popularity of beverages and other products derived from coca. Coca exports grew from 7,955 kilos in 1877 (Gootenberg 2008: 44) to 942,900 kilos in 1903 (Gagliano 1994: 116). Peru’s virtual coca monopoly in the international market sustained the boom. Bolivia had not developed an international coca export market. Its trade remained circumscribed to a tight regional network within the national territory, northern Chile and Argentina, and it only supplied the traditional demand for coca by indigenous users, miners, and migrant workers. Gootenberg (2008) cites a number of possible reasons for Bolivia’s coca ‘involution’. To start, Bolivia’s geographical limitations made it difficult to generate a substantial coca surplus. The Yungas reached its productive limit by the mid nineteenth century, and creating new coca producing areas required costs and migrants infeasible at the time. New coca producing areas in Bolivia only opened up in the 1940s and 1950s with the colonisation of the Tropic of Cochabamba. Peru, on the other hand, had room for expansion in the jungle areas. Its capacity for coca production steadily increased alongside the growing demand for
the good (Gootenberg 2008: 116). The Bolivian coca trade was also limited by high transport costs. In 1885, the United States consul in Peru advised those engaged in the trade to continue purchasing Peruvian coca. He ensured that despite the excellent quality of Yungas coca and delays in Peruvian coca supply due to heavy rains and political instability, transport costs were ‘of less consideration from Lima than from the distant capital of Bolivia’ (Brent qtd. in Gagliano 1994: 115). The consequences of Bolivia’s late entry into the international coca market are discussed later in the chapter.

**Coca and society: Peru and Bolivia.** The discovery of cocaine in the 1860s prompted a sort of ‘scientific nationalism’ amongst Lima elites that elevated coca to the status of a national good (Gootenberg 2008: 42). Most of the new fervour for coca came from the medical and scientific community that professed its virtues to the nation and abroad. This new-found pride centred solely on coca’s medicinal qualities and commercial promise. Gootenberg (2008) provides a detailed account of the development of the distinct nature of Peru’s coca nationalism, but for the purpose of this chapter it suffices to cite the following:

> It was a paradoxical nationalism, practiced by cultural bi-nationals, the most cosmopolitan (and whitest) members of Peru’s coastal elite, one invoking a dialectic between the local and traditional (coca) and the universal and scientifically modern (cocaine) (44)

Again, despite the growing popularity of coca and cocaine, coca failed to gain any cultural recognition amongst non-indigenous Peruvian society.

After the 1883 defeat in the War of the Pacific, debates on nationhood and development sprung up that showed that disdainful attitudes of Peruvian elites toward coca lingered. These debates included the *cuestión indígena* and brought back concerns over *coqueo* (Cotler 1999: 76). Reformers called for a greater awareness of Peru’s highland indigenous population and chastised Lima elites for their ethnocentric attitudes. One group of reformers argued that coca should take on the status of ‘sacred plant’ and become a symbol of national identity for its millennial medical and cultural value (ibid: 79). Opponents argued that traditional customs prevented indigenous assimilation and that coca posed a major social problem because it contributed to the racial and moral degradation of the indigenous population (Gagliano 1994: 120).
In Bolivia, such discussions were not taking place. As one recalls, even within elite circles Bolivian society had never held coca in disregard. The Yungas coca trade involved important national elites with large plantations, small farmers and small indigenous communities. Coca thus held an important place across a variety of social sectors. As a result, ‘[i]n Bolivia, no upper-class medical movement was needed to resuscitate coca as a viable national good, because it already was one’ (Gootenberg 2008: 115). Much unlike Peru, Bolivia had neither a deep cultural elite-indigenous divide nor a socio-geographical divide over coca.

2.3 COCAINE: GREAT EXPECTATIONS

In 1860, German chemist Albert Nieman isolated a number of alkaloids from the coca leaf. One alkaloid in particular (cocaine) prompted a number of additional experiments on coca and its derivatives (Gagliano 1994: 107). In 1884, German doctor Karl Köller announced that he had successfully anaesthetised the surface of the human eye with cocaine hydrochloride. The event sparked surge of momentum in cocaine research. American and European researchers immediately intensified their medical investigations, resulting in the widespread use of cocaine as a surgical anaesthetic and treatment for addiction, alcoholism, depression and exhaustion in the United States and Europe (Spillane 1999: 22).

Cocaine and the United States. The United States became the main consumer of both coca and cocaine products by 1890. Coca products included mostly beverages and elixirs. Cocaine products fell into four main categories: topical anaesthetics for ailments such as tooth aches, haemorrhoids and corns; habit treatments for alcoholism, opium and tobacco; respiratory treatments for asthma or nasal catarrh; and pure cocaine marketed directly to consumers (ibid: 26). Concerns soon developed over the potential side-effects of cocaine. In 1886, United States doctor D.R. Brower published an article on the devastating results of the indiscriminate use of cocaine. Such reports generated a wave of opposition by physicians, boards of health and journalists in the United States that condemned the pharmaceutical industry for irresponsible cocaine marketing and demanded reforms of cocaine sales (ibid: 33). The United States attempted to regulate the sale and use of cocaine through the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 and of 1907, which proscribed the proper labelling of products containing cocaine, morphine, cannabis and chloral hydrate (Moeser 1994: [online]). However, the legislation only served to drive low potency cocaine products off the market and led to a rise in pure cocaine sales for recreational use.
Opium abuse was also on the rise in the United States, to the extent that many considered it to have greater opium problem than China (Madge 2001: 98). The pervasive use of opium within the national territory and its newly acquired colony (the Philippines) prompted the United States to convene the International Opium Commission in 1909. The event resulted in the International Opium Convention of 1912. The convention—the first international drug control treaty—aimed to limit the cultivation of opium poppy, and to control the manufacture and international trade of substances such as morphine and cocaine (Lema 1997: 103). United States Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, a leading prohibitionist, proposed a new domestic anti-narcotics law to comply with the 1912 treaty. The law, known as the Harrison Act of 1914, stipulated the following:

To provide for the registration of, with collectors of internal revenue, and to impose a special tax on all persons who produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or give away opium or coca leaves, their salts, derivatives, or preparations, and for other purposes

The Harrison Act served to regulate a previously unregulated trade, yet it did so with grave consequences because it did not prevent doctors from prescribing narcotics for various treatments on their own discretion (Madge 2001: 106). The law, which prohibited supplying narcotics to addicts, resulted in the ‘flocking of habitues to hospitals and sanatoriums’ and in the arrest of many doctors. Virtually no reduction in the production or abuse of narcotics took place (Brecher 1972: [online]). The first real limitations to cocaine manufacturing came into effect with the Jones-Miller Act of 1922, which posed a 5,000 USD fine and imprisonment for involvement in the narcotics trade. The law further stipulated that possession of narcotics provided sufficient evidence for conviction. The Harrison Act and the Jones-Miller Act marked the beginning of drug control in the United States. The boom in the narcotics trade later in the century dramatically changed drug control efforts, as well as the nature of the interactions between the United States and the coca-producing countries in the Andean region.

**Cocaine and Peru.** Coca gained a new respect amongst Peruvians in the late nineteenth century, but national sentiments over coca did not compare to the fervour that developed over cocaine. International interest in cocaine made the substance the new pride of Peruvian industry. Many considered its discovery as the coming of modernisation. The country’s most respectable families engaged in coca production for the production and export of cocaine. By 1905, Peru became the largest coca and cocaine supplier. Coca and cocaine never fell below
the top five Peruvian exports during cocaine’s first global boom period (Gootenberg 1999: 47). However, competition from Dutch producers with coca plantations in Java soon threatened Peru’s footing in the international coca and cocaine market. By 1914, the Netherlands surpassed Peru in cocaine exports due in large part to more efficient production technologies. The 1922 Jones-Miller Act then dealt another blow to the Peruvian cocaine trade, as it eliminated nearly all sales of Peruvian coca and cocaine to the United States. The Peruvian cocaine industry dwindled into a tightly controlled regional market and coca production returned to levels that solely met the demand for traditional consumption. The only exception to this pattern was production in the northern valleys that continued to supply coca exports for the production of Coca-Cola (ibid: 50).

Increased pressure to curb coca production came after World War I, as the United States influenced the League of Nations to enhance restrictions on drugs and narcotics production (Madge 2001: 108). Peru maintained a strong stand in defence of its national good and refused to participate in the Second Opium Commission organised by the League of Nations. It also refused to sign the resulting 1925 Geneva Opium Convention. It defended its position on the grounds that it would not sign any agreement that limited the supply of coca to domestic coca consumers or endangered the livelihood coca producers (Gagliano 1994: 123). Peru then refused to sign the 1931 Geneva Narcotics Manufacturing and Distribution Limitation Convention. Cotler (1999) contends that Peru did not comply with these international drug control measures because it still held the cocaine industry in high regard for its medicinal value, and because coca consumption remained widespread amongst the indigenous population (81).

Peru’s hesitation to fully cooperate with international drug control measures, a position very much influenced by the economic significance of coca and cocaine, did not imply that Peruvian society embraced coca. On the contrary, the prohibitionist movement resurged in the 1930s during the government of Benavides (1933-1939). Peruvian scientists, physicians, social scientists, political figures and even novelists that incorporated prohibitionist themes in their works formed part of the movement. Prohibitionists faced opposition from coca lobbyists that supported the trade on economic grounds, and from academics that disputed the notion of coca as a social vice that caused the degeneration of the indigenous population (Gagliano 1994: 133-139). Prohibitionists varied in their recommendations as to how to deal with coca, cocaine and the rising international efforts to restrict their production. Dr. Nicolas
Angulo denounced the defence of coca and cocaine on economics grounds. He called for an alliance of prohibitionists against the use of coca and other intoxicants, and urged the Benavides government to comply with the 1931 convention (ibid: 133). Another prohibitionist, Dr. Paz Soldán, vehemently defended cocaine yet condemned coca as a malicious indigenous habit. Like other prohibitionists, Soldán held the *indigenista* view born in the 1910s that regarded coca as a social vice that stunted the socio-economic development of the indigenous population. *Indigenistas* saw coca as a facilitator to the continued domination and exploitation of the indigenous population by white elites (Gootenberg 2008: 144). Soldán rejected cooperation with international drug control efforts and instead suggested the formation a state enterprise in charge of all coca and cocaine production in order to control the use of coca by the indigenous population and take over all cocaine manufacturing. He affirmed that modern cocaine factories could transform ‘the native and abundant coca of Andean valleys into noble products of medicine and industry’ (ibid: 170). The prohibitionist movement gained momentum as international drug control efforts progressed.

*Cocaine and Bolivia.* As previously noted, Bolivia failed to develop a significant international coca export industry. Its coca economy maintained a distinct national character protected from international market fluctuations. Moreover, it required no foreign investment and almost exclusively targeted an indigenous, peasant and mining population within its immediate regional area (Lema 1997: 102). At the height of the 1880s ‘coca mania’, Bolivia exported only five per cent of its coca to the United States and Europe, and the rest remained within its regional network (fifty-five per cent in Bolivia; fifteen per cent in Argentina; fifteen per cent in Chile; and ten per cent in Peru) (Spillane 1999: 45). It did not become a part of the international cocaine commodity chain that emerged in the late nineteenth century. In fact, Bolivia actually imported cocaine from Europe for medical purposes (approximately five kilos between 1904 and 1905) (Lema 1997: 102).

Bolivia society, which had never stigmatised coca, maintained a widespread and diverse coca culture. Yungas producers included large plantations owners, farmers and numerous coca-producing indigenous communities (Gootenberg 2008: 114). The large plantation owners, which included some of the most powerful families in the country, lobbied strongly in defence of coca through the *Sociedad de Propietarios de Yungas e Inquisivi* (Society of Landowners of the Yungas and Inquisivi—SPY). Since its establishment in 1830, the SPY
firmly defended coca as international drug control efforts sought to criminalise the plant. Two years prior to the Second Opium Commission, the SPY had already expressed concerns to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the League of Nations had mistakenly labelled coca as a narcotic. It asked the Bolivian state to provide an official response that denounced the ‘verbal aggression or slander’ toward coca and diffuse propaganda in its defence (Lema 1997: 105). The SPY argued that attacks on Bolivian coca were unwarranted because the country did not produce cocaine. Bolivia’s delegate at the Second Opium Commission in 1925 showed that the Bolivian state agreed with the SPY on this position. The delegate announced that the Bolivian state did not consider it necessary to restrict coca production because it viewed the plant as a mild stimulant that was consumed by its indigenous population in moderation. The delegate further argued that Bolivia did not need to restrict its coca production because it did not produce cocaine and did not participate in drug trafficking (Gagliano 1994: 124; Lema 1997: 104). In 1932, the Bolivian Congress passed a law that made Bolivia adhere to the 1925 Geneva Opium Convention. However, the law maintained the following reservations: Bolivia would not restrict the cultivation and production of coca; Bolivia would not prohibit the use of coca; and the Bolivian state would have sole control over the export of coca leaves (Lema 1997: 106). The 1932 law officialised the Bolivian state’s position in defence of coca. Gootenberg (2001) firmly underscores that whereas Peru simply ignored the League of Nations and other international pronouncements on drugs, Bolivia ‘spiritedly defended its indigenous coca use in international forums’ (21). Moreover, in stark contrast to the Peruvian prohibitionist movement that rallied to end traditional coca consumption, the topic of coqueo in Bolivia remained a non-issue. According to Lema (1997), ‘in the 1930s the consumption of coca was never seriously questioned by any major sector of the Bolivian population, including those who did not consume coca’ (107). This pattern nevertheless began to change as Bolivia slowly became involved in the international illicit drug trade.

2.4 CRIMINALISATION AND THE WAR ON DRUGS
As the international legal framework for the control of drug production and trade took shape, producer countries of criminalised substances faced increasing pressure from the main consumer countries to adhere to international legal proscriptions and establish drug control legislation of their own. Nevertheless, the illicit drug trade that sprung up alongside increased drug control efforts made it clear that legislation alone would not solve the drug dilemma. Changes in the nature of drug control efforts began to take place. United States President Nixon waged a campaign against drug use that directly linked drugs to crime. In 1969, he
declared that drug abuse posed a ‘serious national threat’ and urged new federal policies to confront the ‘growing menace to the general welfare of the United States’ (Nixon qtd. in Madge 2001: 144). When cocaine use did not decline and instead boomed in the 1970s, the United States heightened its counter-drug efforts. In 1982, the United States allowed the use of the federal army in drug control for the first time by passing the National Defence Authorization Act (Boville 2004: 127). The United States was not the only country to show a growing concern over effects of the illicit drug trade. In 1984, Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Colombia signed the Quito Declaration, which denounced drug trafficking as a ‘crime against humanity’. The Quito Declaration prompted the United Nations to adopt the Declaration on the Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse in December of that year. The declaration deepened the growing association between drugs and criminality, as it labelled drug trafficking as ‘an international criminal activity demanding urgent attention and maximum priority’ (United Nations General Assembly 1987: [online]). These initiatives, along with pressure from the United States, resulted in the United Nations Convention on Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Better known as the Cocaine Convention, the agreement formalised the fight against drugs as issue of universal concern (Boville 2004: 137). Countries that produced illicit drugs and their raw material soon felt the impact of this initiative. Most importantly, the War on Drugs had taken on a strong moral dimension and heightened the perceived threat posed by the illicit drug trade. Illicit drugs had become a ‘menace’, drug trafficking a ‘crime against humanity’ and drug abuse a ‘national threat’. These changes contributed to the further stigmatisation of the coca leaf—as well as its producers—both in international and domestic circles.

Peru: Illicit trade. World War II markedly altered the dynamics of drug control cooperation between the United States and Peru. According to unofficial records, Allied forces had used around three thousand kilos of cocaine by 1943 for the treatment of battle casualties. Coca imports by the United States rose from 67,000 kilos in 1939 to 207,408 kilos in 1943 (Gagliano 1994: 148). Still, the United States never officially recognised coca as a legitimate good and labelled all coca and cocaine trade with Germany or Japan (Peru’s most dependable market) as contraband. Peru slowly changed its stance on coca and cocaine in part because of its relationship with the Allies. In acts of solidarity, it cracked down cocaine production tied to Germany and Japan, expropriated properties, raided labs and in 1944 sent coca and cocaine statistics to the League of Nations for the first time (Gootenberg 2008: 66-67).
International pressure on drug control increased significantly after World War II. In 1947, Peru became a founding and permanent member of the United Nations Commission of Narcotic Drugs. That same year national media campaigns were released that for the first time spoke of coca as a ‘raw material’ of illicit drugs and a key aspect of drug control (ibid: 67). On its own motivation, Peru then asked the Commission to conduct a report on coca and the effects of coqueo. The report, published in 1950, concluded the following:

We believe that the everyday use [of coca] is not only damaging… but is the cause of the racial degeneration of many circles of the population… We hope to be able to present a rational plan of action… to achieve the absolute abolition of this pernicious habit (Cotler 1999: 81)

The Commission’s strong prohibitionist view was welcomed by the Lima elite, which included the Catholic Church, the military, politicians, private school teachers and Protestant parishes (ibid). It also received support from the government of General Odría (1948 to 1956), which held a pro-oligarchy, pro-business and anti-communist stance. General Odría stepped up efforts to comply with international coca and cocaine prohibitions, in part because of its conservative nature and because it needed international support to stimulate economic recovery after World War II (Gagliano 1994: 171). The Odría government also strengthened ties to the United States, the head of the international coca and cocaine prohibitionist agenda. In 1952, the Odría government signed a military assistance agreement with the United States, which ‘formalized the latter’s increasing involvement with the Peruvian military since World War II’ (Klarén 2000: 306). Military assistance to Peru increased from 100,000 USD in 1952 to 9.1 million USD by the end of the Odría government in 1956 (ibid).

In 1954, the representative for Peru at the United Nations Economic and Social Council declared that Peru recognised the use of coca as detrimental to the health and well-being of its citizens (ibid: 160). In 1961, Peru officially ended its ‘historic toleration’ of the coca habit by accepting the placement of coca alongside cocaine in the United Nations Schedule I of controlled substances. As a signatory to the accord, Peru committed itself to eradicating coca and cocaine production within twenty-five years. Cocaine, once considered a ‘noble product of medicine and industry’ (Gootenberg 2008: 58), thus became a national criminal—and coca a casualty in the struggle surrounding it.

Illicit markets for coca and cocaine emerged early on despite drug control efforts. The amount of cocaine confiscated in the United States rose from 2 ounces in 1944 to 210 ounces
in 1948. By 1949, the Harlem neighbourhood in the city of New York had an established cocaine market almost exclusively based on Peruvian sources. This early illicit trade was effectively contained by domestic control efforts, which counted on the cooperation of the Odría government in Peru. By 1957, the United Nations declared that illicit drug trade from Peru no longer warranted international concern (Cotler 1999: 84).

The illicit drug trade did not remain contained for long as the market for illegal cocaine skyrocketed in the 1970s. The new cocaine boom led to an increase in Peruvian coca production from approximately 18,000 hectares to over 200,000 hectares between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. This increase in production primarily took place in the valleys of the Upper Huallaga region, due in part to the migration of peasants to the region during the 1960s and 1970s (Rojas 2005: 188). The government of General Morales Bermúdez (1975-1980) undertook official measures to control the production of coca, largely ‘at the behest of the United States’ (Klarén 2000: 386). In 1978, the Morales government passed the Ley de Represión del Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas (Law of Repression of the Illicit Traffic of Drugs—DL 22095). The law aimed to ‘repress the traffic of drugs that generates dependence, prevent its inappropriate use, psychologically and physically rehabilitate addicts, and reduce coca production’ (Thoumi 2003: 4). First and foremost, the law made the production of illegal coca a criminal offense. It also gave the state sole authority over the commercialisation of coca. The state assigned this task to the National Enterprise of Coca (Empresa Nacional de la Coca—ENACO), the agency given control over all commercial coca activities in 1949. The agency maintains a registry of cocaleros that produce legal coca to control coca production levels. Unregistered cocaleros are automatically deemed as illegal coca producers. Registered cocaleros must sell their coca to ENACO. The agency buys coca from registered cocaleros and then re-sells it at traditional coca markets or to the Stepan Co. of the United States, which produces ‘speciality and intermediate chemicals used in consumer products and industrial applications’ (Pereira 2004). Stepan Co. is the only company with permission from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to import coca leaves and process its own coca extract. Stepan Co. sells this coca extract solely to the Coca-Cola Company (ibid). In addition to selling coca in its pure form, ENACO sells industrialised coca products. The agency produces a coca derivative of ninety-two per cent purity for pharmaceutical companies, such as McFarland Firms and Merk Laboratories of the United States. For national consumption, ENACO produces flavour extracts of coca that contain two per cent cocaine alkaloid to companies that develop energy drink products such as Vortex and K-Drink. It also produces
coca tea in commercial tea sachets (ibid). At the time of the passing of DL 22095 in 1978, ENACO's registry contained 25,148 cocaleros, which produced approximately 17,000 hectares. The registry remained unchanged until 2004.

In addition to changing the relationship between the state and cocaleros by the criminalisation of the latter, the DL 22095 altered the relationship between Peru and the United States. The law established the legal framework for various ‘US-inspired drug control policies’ put into place in Peru throughout the 1980s (Rojas 2005: 188). The Belaúnde government (1980-1985), for example, began the Special Coca Control and Eradication Project in the Upper Huallaga (Proyecto Especial de Control y Reducción de Cultivos de Coca en el Alto Huallaga—CORAH) as well as the Special Upper Huallaga Project (Proyecto Especial Alto Huallaga—PEAH) (Thoumi 2003: 130). The García government (1985-1990) proved even more aggressive in its drug control efforts, although it maintained tense relations with the United States. In the 1990s, an additional factor—the Shining Path—became increasingly influential in the development of drug control policies and relationship between cocaleros and the state. Chapter 3 discusses this dynamic in detail.

Bolivia: Coca and cocaine boom. Peruvian coca production declined sharply in the early twentieth century following the implementation of new United States anti-drug legislation. These laws, however, did not affect coca production in Bolivia because it did not have a significant export market. Changes in Bolivia’s coca production patterns began to take place in the 1940s as a result of domestic rather than international factors. The Bolivian state had begun to take measures to colonise lowland areas to relieve highland population pressures. Many of the colonisers took on coca production, which proved a fruitful endeavour given the lowland’s tropical climate and rich soil. The lowland valleys of the Tropic of Cochabamba yielded at least one more annual harvest of coca than the highland valleys of the Yungas. Coupled with the population growth of the Tropic of Cochabamba, which accelerated after the revolution of 1952, the high yield of lowland coca crops inverted Bolivia’s patterns of coca production. Whereas the Yungas produced ninety-seven per cent of Bolivia’s coca in 1937, the Tropic of Cochabamba produced ninety-five per cent by the mid-1970s (Painter 1994: 3).

The 1940s also witnessed a change in coca’s social acceptance in Bolivia. During this decade, Bolivian ‘modernisers’ for the first time questioned the effects of coca on the social
development of the indigenous population. These views were influenced by the rising international condemnation of coca and the Peruvian prohibitionist movement (Lema 1997: 109). Anti-coca sentiments of Bolivian modernisers nevertheless came ‘timidly’ and without major consequences (Gootenberg 2008: 144). The failure of anti-coca views to become widespread in society was due in part to the country’s continued lack of involvement in the illicit drug trade.

Bolivia began its transformation into a ‘major incubating site for illicit cocaine’ in the 1950s (ibid: 274). The suppression of Peru’s coca and cocaine trade between 1947 and 1950 meant that illicit traffickers had to look for new sources of coca and locations to process cocaine. Peruvian drug traffickers sent their chemists and other staff to Bolivia in anticipation of a major crackdown on Peruvian coca and cocaine. Moreover, Bolivian coca production that had been slowly increasing since the 1940s began to rapidly increase after the 1952 revolution. The revolution’s agrarian reform broke the back of the highland rural aristocracy, which rendered groups like the SPY powerless. It also accelerated the colonisation of lowland areas. Lastly, the weakness of the state following the revolution provided the perfect conditions for illicit activity (ibid).

The illicit drug trade that began to develop in Bolivia in the 1950s and 1960s grew unprecedentedly in the 1970s. Annual coca production increased from an average of 9,000 metric tons between 1963 and 1975 to 79,000 metric tons between 1976 and 1988 (Painter 1994: 4). The colonisation of the Tropic of Cochabamba also surged, which boasted 300,000 inhabitants by the 1980s—a figure that implied its population had risen by 240,000 in less than ten years (Malamud-Goti 1992: 9). The coca-cocaine trade became a significant part of the Bolivian national economy, especially once it was hit by the debt crisis of the 1980s.

The influence of the coca and cocaine trade soon spread beyond the economic realm. The various military governments that ruled in the 1970s and 1980s maintained strong links to the illicit drug trade. The Bánzer government (1971-1978) faced numerous corruption scandals. Allegations against the Bánzer government went as far as to suggest that its ministers explicitly promoted the development of the coca-cocaine economy (Laserna 1994: 4). The García Meza government (1980-1981) came to power through what became known as the ‘cocaine coup’, and is regarded as the most extreme case of corruption in Bolivia (ibid: 5). Testimonies of high-ranking generals during judicial proceedings on the García Meza
government supported allegations of the high incidence of coca-cocaine dollars in its functions. One general described the government as ‘a political system funded by the delinquent narco-trafficking apparatus’ (General Arnez qtd. in Laserna 1994: 5). Another general went further and testified that ‘the truly responsible and guilty people of this criminal and illicit activity—who protected it, fostered it and concealed it in exchange for millions of dollars—were members of our own government’ (Coronel Coca qtd. in Laserna 1994: 5). The García Meza scandal brought to light the extent of corruption related to the illicit drug trade. It also changed the relationship between the United States and Bolivia, which became ‘basically defined in terms of the drug issue’ in the 1980s (Painter 1994: 25). This shift in relations, in turn, dramatically altered Bolivia’s historical toleration and spirited defence of coca.

Bolivia had begun to cooperate with international drug control efforts after signing the 1961 Geneva Convention. In 1962, it passed a law banning new coca crops. However, the law proved largely ineffective. The military governments in power in the 1960s and 1970s passed various laws in order to demonstrate commitment to the international fight against illicit drugs. In 1973, the Bánzer government passed the National Law of Control of Dangerous Substances; in 1979, the Padilla government passed a new Law of Dangerous Substances; and in 1981 the Torrelio government passed the Law of Control and Fight against Dangerous Substances (Laserna 1994: 7). These laws for the most part served a symbolic purpose in order to give faith to Bolivia’s commitment to drug control. The military governments also used repression to reinforce their show of commitment. However, given their need to appease public opinion, repression often proved ‘disorderly, ill-planned, abusive and for the most part limited to minor offenders and innocent people’ (ibid). The trend of symbolic drug control legislation continued after the transition to democracy in the 1980s. Illicit activity surged during this time and was fuelled by the economic crisis that accompanied the transition. The Siles Suazo government (1982-1985), rendered nearly powerless in the face of political and economic crises, passed a new drug control law shortly before its premature end. Again, the law was largely symbolic and was passed in an attempt to redeem the discredited government (ibid: 9).

In 1988, the Paz Estenssoro government (1985-1989) criminalised the production of coca by passing the Ley 1008 (Law 1008). The law completely altered the state’s relationship with coca, cocaine and all actors involved in their production and trade. In contrast to the passing
of the DL 22095 in Peru, the passing of the *Ley 1008* in Bolivia prompted a strong reaction from society. Opponents viewed it as a direct imposition of the United States. In an interview with the author, the president of the ‘political instrument’²⁰ of one of the six coca union federations in the Trópico described the law in the following way:

> The law is anti-Bolivian. It was imposed by the United States. People say it was written at the United States embassy and then translated into Spanish before it was passed by our Congress. Journalists said that each congressman got 10,000 USD to vote in favour of the law (Gonzales, interview, 20.1.2010)

Hearsay aside, pressure by the United States no doubt contributed to the passing of *Ley 1008*. Bolivia was recovering from a severe economic crisis and was almost completely dependent on the financial support of the United States and international institutions at the time. The law changed the relationship between the United States and Bolivia in terms of economic assistance as it altered the legal framework for aid provision. From then on, aid from the United States depended on Bolivia’s adherence to eradication and interdiction targets (Painter 1994: 85). In other words, economic assistance would be contingent upon Bolivia’s cooperation with the War on Drugs. The law sparked major protests from cocalero unions because it criminalised coca and its producers. It also legally divided cocaleros into legal and illegal coca producers as it established three different areas of coca production. The three areas comprise the following: 1) a traditional production area for domestic consumption, which mostly encompasses the coca of the Yungas of La Paz and cannot exceed 12,000 hectares; 2) a transitional production area, which mostly encompasses the coca of the Tropic of Cochabamba at 1988 levels, and is subject to gradual eradication and alternative development programs; 3) illegal coca production areas, which includes all coca outside the traditional and transitional areas, and is subject to immediate eradication. The *Ley 1008* also put in place a separate justice system for narcotics offenders, sped up the prosecution of narcotics offenses, made pre-trial incarceration automatic, denied the possibility of bail and removed almost all discretion by judges and prosecutors of narcotics offenders. These proscriptions have received strong criticisms, and in some cases have even been denounced as unconstitutional and as facilitators of human rights abuses (Hallums 1997: 5). In an interview with the author, the general secretary of Bolivia’s national peasant confederation²¹

²⁰ The cocaleros of the Tropic of Cochabamba established the ‘political instrument’, the political arm of their union system in the early 1990s. This political instrument eventually became the MAS-IPSP party (*Movimiento al Socialismo-Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos*). Its formation is discussed in Chapter 6.

²¹ Bolivia’s main peasant confederation is the Unified Syndicalist Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (*Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia*—CSUTCB). Further chapters will discuss the CSUTCB at length.
between 1992 and 1994 described the law as such:

Among other things they say that this is a draconian law. Because whoever is detained, incarcerated… what he has to do in order to be set free is to prove that he is not a drug trafficker, to prove that he is innocent. Usually before you put someone in jail you have to prove that he is guilty. These are two different ideas then aren’t they? That is why it was denominated as a draconian law, and as a law that is against the poor people and not so much against the white collar drug traffickers (Guarachi 2008)

Painter (1994) contends that the Ley 1008 ‘was probably the most sensitive and difficult piece of legislation on coca ever passed’ (79). The resentment toward the law lingers to this day.

2.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has traced the historical debates and controversies surrounding coca and cocaine in Bolivia and Peru. It has shed light on the interactions between the actors involved in the polemic, and how these interactions have shaped the relationships between them at the domestic and international level. At the domestic level in Bolivia and Peru, these interactions have taken place between the state, society, consumers of coca and producers of coca. At the international level, these interactions have taken place between the governments of Bolivia, Peru and the United States.

Important differences stand out when comparing the cases of Bolivia and Peru in terms of the relationships between the actors involved in the coca and cocaine polemic. First, an unfriendly relationship developed early on between mainstream society and the consumers and producers of coca in Peru. This mutual disdain can be traced as far back as the colonial period, during which time a divide began to form between the coast and the highlands over the practice of coqueo. Coastal dwellers firmly rejected coqueo as an indigenous vice, whilst highland dwellers of all races accepted the habit to varying degrees as a cultural practice and because of coca’s medicinal qualities. During the first coca boom and discovery of cocaine in the late 19th century, a degree of respect for coca’s medicinal and commercial value began to develop in coastal capital city of Lima. The practice of coqueo nonetheless remained highly stigmatised by mainstream society. When the first international drug control measures began to take shape in the early 20th century, the Peruvian state refused to comply with them because of the economic significance of coca. Nevertheless, mainstream society continued to hold firm to its denial of the cultural value of coca.
Bolivian mainstream society, on the other hand, never strongly stigmatised the coca trade or *coqueo*. *Coqueo* had been a common practice in the highland capital city of La Paz since colonial times. Whilst Peruvian coca-producing elites had to defend coca against prohibitionists during the late 19th century coca boom, Bolivian coca-producing elites had no need to defend it because no prohibitionist movement existed. In the 1930s, as Peru’s prohibitionist movement was experiencing a strong revival, in Bolivia ‘the consumption of coca was never seriously questioned by any major sector of the Bolivian population’ (Lema 1997: 107). Thus, whereas in Peru coca generated sharp divisions that were exacerbated by the vast cultural and geographical distance between coca consumers, coca producers and mainstream society, in Bolivia it did not foster any major social division, and the cultural and geographical distance between these actors was essentially nil.

A second important point of comparison is the stance of the Bolivian and Peruvian states toward international drug control efforts. The Peruvian state largely ignored early drug control measures at the beginning of the 20th century because of the economic significance of coca and cocaine. After WWII, it took an increasingly prohibitionist stance toward coca production and strengthened ties with the United States. In 1978, in the midst of the 1970s cocaine boom, the Peruvian state criminalised coca production largely at the behest of the United States.

Bolivia, which did not have a coca export market and did not engage in cocaine production until the 1940s (and even then did so to a very limited extent), went far beyond Peru’s strategy of non-compliance against early drug control measures. The state ‘spiritedly defended’ the production of coca and the indigenous practice of *coqueo* in the international arena in the early 20th century. It only began to pass drug control measures in the 1960s, as by then Bolivia was developing an illicit drug market. Nevertheless, these measures were largely symbolic and for the most part ignored by the various (and notoriously corrupt) military governments in power until the transition to democracy in 1982. The Bolivian state only criminalised coca under intense pressure from the United States (and in a context of economic hardship) in 1988—ten years after its Peruvian counterpart. In short, compared to the Peruvian state, the Bolivian state demonstrated more resistance toward international drug control efforts, and its interactions with the actors engaged in international drug control efforts have been of a more contentious nature.
Lastly, the criminalisation of coca—which signalled the ultimate triumph of prohibitionist forces in the coca and cocaine debates—radically altered the relationship between coca producers and the state in Peru and Bolivia. Cocaleros were henceforth regarded as illegitimate actors under the law, an actuality that had an important political consequence: it limited their channels of access to the state and the manner by which they could act in defence of their livelihood.
Peru: Formation of a Social Movement—Crisis and Repression during the Transition(s) to Democracy

Cocalero organisations in Peru have sought to challenge the state since the military government of General Morales Bermúdez criminalised coca in 1978 with DL 22095. As in Bolivia, the criminalisation of coca deemed cocaleros as illegitimate actors and imposed the grievance around which they would form a social movement.

Peru returned to democratic rule in 1980, two years after the criminalisation of coca. The democratic opening did not facilitate the rise of a cocalero social movement because the country immediately became immersed in a deep social conflict with the Shining Path. This conflict presented a fierce repressive threat to the peasant sector, which was caught in the middle of the state-Shining Path struggle. Cocalero peasants faced a particularly dire situation because they also found themselves entangled in the War on Drugs, and isolated as Peru’s main peasant and labour confederations did not support their claims. At the same time, Peru was facing the worst economic crisis of the century.22

The transition to democracy thus unfolded alongside intense social and economic turmoil. In 1990, Peruvians elected Alberto Fujimori as president with hopes that he would restore order. The Fujimori government (1990-2000) managed to fulfil its pledge to bring about social and economic stability, but did so at the cost of democracy and human rights. Following the political crisis that led to the fall of the Fujimori government in 2000, Peru commenced another democratic transition and entered a period free from state repression. For Peru’s cocaleros, the dynamics of the two attempts at democratisation (1980 and 2000) presented a distinct set of political opportunities and threats that stalled the formation of their social movement until 2003—nearly twenty-five years after the criminalisation of coca.

22 At the beginning of the economic recession in 1977, labour unions mobilised against austerity measures and anti-labour legislation. As the crisis deepened and the war against the Shining Path escalated, social organisations grew considerably weak due to the effects of the crisis and state repression. General Morales Bermúdez began the trend of implementing austerity measures with the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and repressing popular protest. This trend intensified in the 1990s under Fujimori (Poole and Rénique 1992: 13-19).
This chapter traces the formation of the Peruvian cocalero social movement within a context of social, economic and political crisis during the transitions to democracy. The first section discusses the social crisis that ensued during the state-Shining Path struggle with respect to its impact on cocalero interests. The second section discusses the political crisis that developed in the midst of social and economic crises with respect to its impact on cocalero interests. The third section details the formation of the cocalero social movement within a distinct set of political opportunities and threats. The fifth section analyses the identity-shaping mechanisms at work during the formation of the cocalero social movement.

3.1 THE SOCIAL CRISIS

Peru held presidential elections in 1980 after twelve years of military rule under General Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) and General Morales Bermúdez (1975-1980). The Shining Path declared war on the state the day before the elections by burning ballot boxes in the Andean town of Chushi (Gorriti 1999: 17). The act marked the beginning of a struggle between the state and the Shining Path characterised by violence and repression on both sides, the brunt of which fell upon indigenous peasants in the highlands. Hundreds of thousands of indigenous peasants suffered torture, rape, death, disappearance and displacement at the hands of both the guerrillas and the armed forces in what Mealy and Austad (2010) have described as a ‘wave of near genocidal violence’ (5). For many years, urban Peruvians treated the distant and impoverished regions most affected by the violence with indifference—and even when the violence reached urban areas ‘it was difficult to unite the experiences and memory of violence of such different worlds’ (CVR 2003: 156). Cocalero peasants were amongst those caught in the depths of the violence. Like most other peasant communities, the state-Shining Path war essentially destroyed their social fabric. The social costs of the war spread beyond the highlands. Peru’s labour confederations became as defenceless as the peasant confederations during the struggle, and both became increasingly inactive as social actors (Poole and Rénique, 1992: 71-73). The war also fostered deep

23 Peru’s main labour confederations:
1. The General Confederation of Workers of Peru (Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú—CGTP), which was founded in 1929 and is affiliated with the Communist Party of Peru (Partido Comunista Peruano—PCP). The CGTP is Peru’s strongest union confederation.
2. The Confederation of Workers of Peru (Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú—CTP), which was founded in 1944 and is affiliated with the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana—APRA). It is strong in some sectors only (such as textiles)
3. The Centre of Workers of the Peruvian Revolution (Central de Trabajadores de la Revolución Peruana—CTRP), which was founded in 1972 by the military government of General Velasco Alvarado. The CTRP faded after Velasco Alvarado was ousted.
internal divisions amongst the subordinate classes as the Shining Path systematically targeted left-wing parties and urban popular organisations (ibid: 28-29).

**Cocalero organisations before the war.** The first organisation to take on cocalero claims formed in Cusco in 1958. The original claims of the Federation of Peasant Producers of La Convención, Yanatile and Lares (*Federación de Productores Campesinos de La Convención, Yanatile y Lares*—FEPCACYL) centred on the defence of land rights, but later included other peasant claims such as the defence of traditional coca production. FEPCACYL stepped up its defence of cocalero interests after the criminalisation of coca in 1978 (Antesana, interview, 27.8.2004). It organised the First Provincial Convention for the Defence of Coca in Quillabamba and played leading role in the First National Congress in Defence of the Coca Leaf in Cusco in 1979. The latter event gave rise to the National Front in Defence of the Producers of the Coca Leaf (*Frente Nacional de Defensa de los Productores de la Hoja de Coca*—FENDEPCO), which united cocaleros from the valleys of Cusco, Sandia, Upper Huallaga, and Apurímac-Ene under the aim of abolishing DL 22095 (Cabieses, interview, 12.8.2004).

In the Upper Huallaga, organisations representing cocalero interests first formed in 1964 when the state enacted Supreme Decree 254 (*Decreto Supremo* 254—DS 254), which limited coca production to certain districts in the departments of Cusco, Huánuco, La Libertad and San Martin. It gave other areas two years to substitute coca production. This prompted the creation of the Committee of Coca Producers of Tingo María (a city in the department of Huánuco). Cocaleros then formed the Regional Committee of Coca Producers of the Province of Leoncio Prado and Annexes (*Comité Regional de Productores de Coca de la Provincia de Leoncio Prado y Anexos*—CRPCLP-A), after the state criminalised coca with DL 22095. The CRPCLP-A led a series of strikes and demonstrations between 1979 and 1982 in response to United States-backed drug control projects including operations Verde Mar I and II and

---

4. The National Confederation of Workers (*Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores*—CNT), which was founded in 1955 and was affiliated with the Christian Democracy Party (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*—PDC). The CNT is a smaller organisation.

Peru’s main peasant confederations:
1. The Peasant Confederation of Peru (*Confederación Campesina del Peru*—CCP), which was founded in 1947 and affiliated first with the PCP and then with other leftist organisations.
2. The National Agrarian Confederation (*Confederación Nacional Agraria*—CNA), which was founded in 1972 by the military government of General Velasco Alvarado. The CNA faded after Velasco Alvarado was ousted.
Neither FENDEPCO nor CRPCLP-A succeeded in curbing state drug control actions and they quickly lost momentum with the onset of the state-Shining Path war.

**Cocaleros and the Shining Path.** The areas most distant from the state, including the coca-producing valleys, experienced the most violence and repression during the war. Shining Path guerrillas systematically subordinated cocaleros, yet at the same time offered protection from state eradication efforts and drug traffickers’ abuse. Illicit coca production expanded during this turbulent period. Coca had become an important source of employment and helped mitigate the effects of the 1980s economic crisis and stabilisation measures (Klarén 2000: 386). Huallaga valleys experienced a boom in coca production as peasants migrated to the area in search of a better life. Production then spread from old cultivations in the Upper Huallaga to new ones in Middle and Lower Huallaga as cocaleros migrated deeper within the jungle to avoid forced eradication. In the Apurímac and Ene valleys, originally areas of traditional coca production, illicit coca production rapidly expanded in the 1990s because of dramatic drops in agricultural prices (Rojas 2005: 188-189).

The Shining Path infiltrated the Upper Huallaga and Apurímac-Ene valleys in the early to mid-1980s. Income from the illicit drug trade helped finance domestic operations, legal costs, guerrilla salaries and support for the families of ‘fallen heroes’ (Palmer 1994: 183). The guerrillas made demands that drug traffickers could not avoid. Colombian drug traffickers dealt directly with the Shining Path when determining the price of coca paste and cocaine base (Clawson and Lee 1996: 182). The Shining Path at one point controlled as many as 120 landing strips in the Huallaga valleys and charged Colombian drug traffickers between 3,000 and 15,000 USD per flight. Estimates of annual revenues ranged from 10 million to 100 million USD (Palmer 1994: 182). In 1993, authorities seized a document entitled ‘Economic Balance of the Shining Path’ that detailed information on drug-related finances and guerrilla involvement in air strip control. In 1994, renowned drug trafficker Demetrio Chávez Peñaherrera (alias Vaticano) testified that he would pay 5,000 USD per flight plus 3 USD per kilo of paste or 6 USD per kilo of base carried in the aircraft. The Shining Path competed for control of the Huallaga valleys with the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru—MRTA). Reports in 1994 showed that the MRTA earned about 225,000 USD a week from drug trafficking (Clawson and Lee 1996: 180-181). The Shining Path overpowered the MRTA by the late 1980s and held its position until its downfall in the early 1990s (Palmer 1994: 182).
The coca-cocaine economy not only generated a viable source of income, but also helped the Shining Path gain allies. Economic activity related to coca production provided the main source of income for the Upper Huallaga’s 300,000 peasants (ibid: 181). Between sixty-five and seventy-five per cent of the economically active population relied directly on coca production; others relied on it indirectly through corollary activities. Overall activities related to the coca-cocaine economy accounted for eighty-five to ninety-five per cent of the Upper Huallaga’s income (Clawson and Lee 1996: 192). The Shining Path co-opted Huallaga peasants by offering protection from drug trafficking violence and financial abuse. It essentially became the middleman between drug traffickers and cocaleros. Moreover, it protected cocaleros from interdiction and eradication efforts that came into full force in 1983. Guerrillas systematically threatened and killed police and eradication officers and built a political and military stronghold in the Upper Huallaga (Rojas 2005: 189).

In contrast to peasants in the Huallaga, peasants in the Apurímac-Ene did not depend as much on the coca-cocaine economy. Furthermore, they were not recent immigrants to the valley and had firmly established organisations representing a variety of agricultural interests. The most important organisation in the area, the Peasant Federation of the Valley and River Apurímac (Federación Campesina del Valle del Rio Apurímac—FECVRA), represented small and medium scale agricultural producers. It worked to commercialise products, build medical posts and schools and help producers in trouble with drug traffickers or the police. Apurímac-Ene peasants were thus less vulnerable than those of the Huallaga, which meant that the Shining Path had to resort to coercive methods to establish its presence. The Shining Path targeted the FECVRA directly by attacking and arresting its leaders and burning its vehicles (Degregori, Del Pino and Starn 1996: 132-133). It repressed peasants into submission and imposed its middlemen services. In an interview with the author, a peasant who lived in the Apurímac-Ene at the time of the war recounted the following:

The relationship was not ‘You produce [coca] and I protect you.’ The Shining Path would say ‘they are paying you less than they should’… and they would take care of that. The peasants had to be under the control of the Shining Path. They had to go to their meetings where attendance was taken; they had to take their children into the service… It was an obligation (Gutiérrez, interview, 5.8.2004)

Whether by forced submission or co-optation, cocalero organisations in the Apurímac Ene and Huallaga valleys grew weak and subordinate to the Shining Path.
**Cocaleros and the state.** By the late 1980s states of emergency had been declared in over half of the national territory. Peasants in the Apurímac-Ene began to take charge of the struggle against the Shining Path in 1984 by forming self-defence committees, known as rondas campesinas. Since peasants relied on the coca-cocaine economy to purchase weapons when the state did not provide them, these committees also took on the role of monitoring coca prices and transactions (Degregori, Del Pino and Starn 1996: 134).

Huallaga peasants faced a different situation. Their strong tie of convenience with the Shining Path posed a significant threat to state interests. In April 1989, General Arciniega took over military operations in the Huallaga. Upon arriving, he quickly realised that ‘if we repress 50,000 coca farmers, we create 50,000 recruits or collaborators for the Shining Path’ (Arciniega qtd. in Clawson and Lee 1996: 182). He concluded that the state could not ‘combat two enemies at one time’ and prioritised the Shining Path threat over that of the illicit drug trade (Arciniega qtd. in Investigative Commission on Cases of Corruption in the Decade 1990-2000 2001: 39). From that moment the Peruvian military suppressed, limited and even barred eradication campaigns in the area in an attempt to gain the support of cocaleros and prevent them from collaborating with the Shining Path (Clawson and Lee 1996: 182). The United States was aware Peru’s change in priorities, as evidenced by a 1989 DEA document reporting that Peruvian officials recognised that the country could ‘live with the problem of narco-trafficking for the next fifty years, but it cannot survive the next two years if the problem of… subversion is not resolved now’ (Cotler 1999: 173). Arciniega expelled Shining Path forces from most of the Upper Huallaga within seven months by maintaining a strong military presence and gaining the support of cocaleros (Palmer 1994: 184). However, the state relieved him of his post in December 1989 and reassigned him to Lima for political reasons. The United States had pressured the state for his removal because it maintained (though never proved) that Arciniega received funds from drug traffickers to subsidise personal and military activities. Moreover, the police (a long-time rival of the military) opposed Arciniega because he refused to re-open a police post destroyed by the Shining Path in Uchiza after local peasants accused the police of harassment (Clawson and Lee 1996: 182).

**Implications for political opportunity structures.** The war between the state and the Shining Path generated a devastating social crisis for the most part localised in the country’s highland and jungle areas. Peasant communities and organisations in these areas experienced extensive
penetration by the Shining Path and became very weak (Thoumi 2003: 131). Cocalero communities and organisations proved especially vulnerable given their ties to the illicit drug trade. The Shining Path imposed its presence in coca-producing areas by repression and/or co-optation. Organisations representing cocalero interests remained dormant or broke apart, and lacked the capacity to challenge the state in defence of coca. Cocaleros nevertheless posed a viable threat to the state given their co-existence with the Shining Path. The state consequently ceased eradication campaigns and presented itself as an ally rather than as an enemy—a standing acquired when it passed DL 22095.

3.2 THE POLITICAL CRISIS

By the early 1990s, Peru faced a desperate situation: the economic crisis had generated a surge in inflation (peaking at 6,932 per cent in January 1991) and the war with the Shining Path had claimed over twenty-five thousand lives (Trading Economics 2012: [online]; UNHCR 2004: [online]). In this context, the newly elected Fujimori government implemented a drastic neoliberal stabilisation plan known as ‘Fuji-shock’. The plan restored macroeconomic stability and prompted sustained economic growth, yet levied a high social cost (Stokes 2001). None of the union confederations (not even the CGTP) had the strength to resist the application of anti-labour measures. With a situation of near social collapse in the highlands and rising violence in Lima, the Fujimori government’s severe economic stabilisation and anti-terrorist measures met with high approval. To quote novelist and 1990 presidential candidate Mario Vargas Llosa: ‘Fujimori was very popular. Though dirty things were going on—torture, killings and corruption—his image was of a strongman who would defend people against terrorists’ (Vargas Llosa qtd. in McMillan and Zoido 2004: 4). In 1992, Fujimori orchestrated an autogolpe (self-coup) that shut down Congress and suspended the constitution in order to end a congressional stalemate and push through anti-terrorism laws (Conaghan 1995: 236). Despite its clear anti-democratic implications, mainstream society approved the move. Cameron (2012) writes:

And so the paradox of the autogolpe was that it was an event that occurred within a functioning, albeit battered and badly discredited democracy, and it occurred with widespread backing from a beleaguered public; and yet it created a monstrous system in which fundamental rights and freedoms were abrogated and the abuse of power ran rampant, a regime that undermined the most basic principles upon which democracy rests ([online])
In addition to changes in economic and anti-terrorist policies, the government made significant changes to its drug control strategy. These changes pointedly altered the relationship between cocaleros and the state.

_The Fujimori Doctrine_. In 1990, the Fujimori government named economist Hernando de Soto the head of Peruvian drug control policy. De Soto adopted Arciniega’s policies and drafted what became commonly known as the Fujimori Doctrine, a strategy that aimed to integrate cocaleros into the formal economy by providing land titles and credit for crop substitution (Rojas 2005: 191). He also encouraged the new government to reject a drug control agreement with the United States worth 36 million USD because he believed its harsh measures would alienate cocaleros. In 1991, the Fujimori government de-criminalised illegal coca crops and declared cocaleros as valid interlocutors—essentially terminating cocalero needs for Shining Path protection. By that time, cocaleros had become disillusioned with the Shining Path’s extreme dogmatism, violence and coercion (Thoumi 2003: 10). Huallaga peasants created 175 self-defence committees organised under the Defence Front against the Eradication of Coca in the Upper Huallaga (Frente de Defensa Contra la Erradicación de la Coca en el Alto Huallaga—FEDECAH) and the Agrarian Federation of the Maestra Jungle (Federación Agraria de la Selva Maestra—FASMA). These self-defence committees played an important role in defeating the Shining Path. They confronted and defended themselves against the guerrillas, often with direct support from the state (ibid: 11). The state captured the head of the Shining Path (Abimael Guzman) and most of the organisation’s top leadership in September 1992, and catalysed a rapid end to the war. Only two small (and weak) units of the Shining Path continued the armed struggle in the coca valleys of the Huallaga and Apurímac-Ene. These units resurfaced in the early 2000s (see Chapter 5).

_The State: Friend or Foe?_ As the Shining Path struggle came to an end, concerns over the co-optation or collaboration between cocaleros and guerrillas diminished and efforts intensified (at least officially) to combat the War on Drugs. The Fujimori government issued a decree in late 1991 that enhanced the power of the military in the coca valleys. The move disillusioned De Soto, who advocated alternative development programs over more repressive measures. The state’s wavering policies prompted him to resign in January 1992. According to Rojas (2005), the more repressive stance toward drug control stemmed in part from United States pressure:
The militarization of the state and of drug control, with Montesinos as the principal operator, together with the Peruvian government’s need for U.S. political support, led to the abandonment of the initial priority given to alternative development for coca farmers (192).

The rise in United States drug control assistance also made the state more receptive to drug control demands. This culminated in 1996 with an agreement that led to the re-commencement of forced eradication in August of that year (ibid: 199).

Peru’s commitment to drug control, however, was severely hampered by the extensive and systematic corruption within the Fujimori government. Vladimiro Montesinos, the president’s chief advisor and head of the National Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional—SIN), directed Peru’s drug control and anti-terrorist operations. He used his position to develop a network of informers that he employed to limit potential threats to the president (through bribery, blackmail or even violence) and to enhance relationships with anyone that could prove useful. Information comprised the foundation of his power. In his words: ‘Here you feel the need for information… We live on information. I need information’ (Montesinos qtd. in McMillan and Zoido 2004: 18). Information came at a high price. The SIN budget increased by 50 or 60 times between 1990 and 2000. Montesinos also received unofficial funds from the Ministry of the Interior and the military, took money from state contracts and received contributions from his ‘accomplices’ in arms deal and other illegal businesses including drug trafficking (ibid: 6). His association with drug trafficking meant that Peru was effectively playing a double game when it game to drug control. A declassified cable from Michael McKinley, the United States ambassador to Peru between 2007 and 2010, declared the following:

Former President Alberto Fujimori’s (1990-2000) intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos, for example, collaborated with top army and other security officials to develop a web of protection for favoured drug traffickers while cooperating with U.S. officials to combat others. To many observers, that was Peru’s “heyday” of narco-corruption—a time when the Government of Peru verged on becoming a kind of “narco-state” in which those who controlled the main criminal trafficking networks were in fact high government officials (McKinley 2009).

Evidence shows that the United States knew of Montesinos’ links with drug trafficking. A declassified DEA document from August 1996 indicates that United States officials were ‘aware of allegations that Montesinos and the chairman of Peru’s joint chiefs of staff, General Nicolás Hermoza Ríos, also in jail now, were taking protection money from drug traffickers’ (The Miami Herald 3.8.2001). Nevertheless, the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) continually provided the SIN funding for drug control efforts—one million USD per
year between 1990 and 2000. The CIA’s blind eye with respect to the various allegations against Montesinos was due in part to the fall in Peruvian coca production that began in the mid-1990s (The Miami Herald 3.8.2001; Bowen and Holligan 2003: 210-215).

Coca production had begun to drop dramatically before forced eradication re-commenced in 1996 due to a collapse in coca prices as of 1995 and the spread of a fungus (Fusarium oxysporum) that damaged over 12,000 hectares in the Upper Huallaga. Production fell from 129,100 hectares in 1992 to 38,700 hectares in 1999 (see Appendices D and E). Rojas (2005) claims that low coca prices and the consequent abandonment of crops presented a great opportunity to promote alternative development over eradication. According to a United States embassy document, cocaleros in the Huallaga had shown a solid will to switch to other crops (ibid: 212). In an interview with the author, cocalero leader Nancy Obregón echoed this sentiment in affirming that ‘cocaleros had learned a lesson. After the [price] crisis we no longer relied solely on coca. We still grow coca, but other products as well’ (Obregón, interview, 17.8.2004). Still, the state chose forced eradication over alternative development.

Cocaleros faced a situation of low coca prices, damaged crops, limited funding for alternative development, renewed forced eradication and a repressive state. Within this context, a group of cocaleros formed the first national cocalero organisation, the National Coordinating Committee of Agricultural Producers (Coordinadora Nacional de Productores Agrícolas—CONAPA) in 1998. The organisation brought together eight federations and associations amounting to 56,000 cocaleros (Cabieses 2004: 17). In 1999, cocaleros mobilised against extensive eradication efforts that took out 13,800 hectares in the Upper Huallaga and Padre Abad valleys alone (Rojas 2005: 213). These eradications were marked by violent confrontations between cocaleros and the police. In negotiations held with Peru’s main drug control agency, the National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs (Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas—DEVIDA) in 2002, Obregón described the eradications as brutal and recalled how one campaign left numerous cocaleros injured and led to seven suicides following the loss of crops (Obregón qtd. in Rojas 2005: 212). In a 2004 interview she commented the following:

When the eradication began, it was so strong and unjust that we stood up. I saw many men cry, they would kneel down in front of the police, they begged… This may not affect people in the capital, but for us, who live in a backward place with no roads or bridges, everything is very different. We feel desperate because we never had the presence of the state (Obregón qtd. in El Comercio 8.5.2004)
Despite the forceful state response, mobilisations continued in the cocalero valleys.

After the protests of 1999, cocaleros in the Monzón valley organised mobilisations in early 2000 that led to the prohibition of chemical fumigations. Protests mounted in October when cocaleros of the Monzón, Upper Huallaga and Padre Abad valleys joined forces to engage in the largest mobilisation in twenty years. On November 9th 2000, the state capitulated and agreed to establish a dialogue table (Rojas 2005: 213). The dialogue table did not meet as often as stipulated by initial agreements and held its last formal meeting in October 2001.

The return of democracy. The Fujimori government broke down amidst allegations of pervasive corruption and a controversial (and allegedly fraudulent) third presidential election victory near the end of 2000 (see McMillan and Zoido 2004). President Fujimori left Peru on November 13th to attend a conference in Brunei. On November 17th he travelled to Japan and faxed his resignation. Valentín Paniagua was named interim president until the presidential elections of April 2001, which brought Alejandro Toledo to power. Forced eradications continued during the Paniagua and Toledo governments in order to meet eradication targets set by the United States. New protests erupted in May 2001 in Aguaytía that led to the prohibition of eradication in protected ecological areas. Negotiations attempts in October 2001 and March 2002 faltered and forced eradication continued throughout the valleys (ibid: 216). In June 2002, cocaleros from the Monzón began a march toward Lima. The mobilisation was soon joined by cocaleros from the Upper Huallaga and Apurimac-Ene—a remarkable occurrence given that the Apurimac-Ene had not been affected by eradication (Cabieses 2004: 17). The mobilisation represented the first large scale act of solidarity: all of the major valleys had joined the Monzón protests. On July 13th 2002, cocaleros signed an accord with DEVIDA agreeing to gradual manual reduction of crops in exchange for support in transitioning to alternative crops (La República 18.4.2003). The pilot project would take place in Aguaytía under the collaboration of USAID (United States Agency for International Development), DEVIDA and Aguaytía’s Association of Livestock and Coca Leaf Farmers of the Padre Abad Province (Asociación de Agricultores Agropecuarios y de la Hoja de Coca de la Provincia de Padre Abad—AAAHCPCA).

Implications for political opportunity structures. The Fujimori government dealt strategically with Peru’s cocaleros, first naming them valid interlocutors in an effort to limit their relationship with the Shining Path and then re-criminalising them after the insurgent
threat dissipated. The strongest implication of the state’s wavering behaviour was that it taught cocaleros that they could not trust the state as an ally. As cocalero leader Obregón affirmed, cocaleros had learned that they ‘only get something from the state in exchange for something else’ (Obregón, interview, 17.8.2004). The corruption and drug trafficking links amongst state and military official deepened cocaleros’ mistrust in the state. Cocaleros saw that the state did not honour its drug control agreements with the United States. Thus, they did not expect it to honour its agreements with them. The pronounced mistrust and overall disillusionment helped mark the state as the common enemy against which cocaleros would wage their contentious episode.

Another implication of the polemic political situation brought about by the Fujimori government regards the timing of cocalero mobilisations. Despite the formal democratic setting, the presence of a highly militarised and repressive state—coupled with the socially debilitating legacy of the war and their isolation from other social actors—made it difficult for Peru’s cocaleros to mobilise immediately after the return of forced eradication in the mid-1990s. Explaining why it took two years after renewed forced eradication to form the CONAPA, Obregón recounted: ‘We had just come out of the confrontation between the military and terrorists when all of this happened. We were scared to raise our voices in protest’ (Obregón qtd. in El Comercio 8.5.2004). Even so, the CONAPA proved weak and did not lead to any major mobilisations. Peru’s cocaleros managed to sustain continuous mobilisations only after the return of democracy in 2000.

3.3 FORMATION OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Gradual and concerted eradication. The July 13th 2002 accords signalled a new period of cooperation under the compromise strategy of gradual and concerted eradication. This promising outlook began to fade before the first pilot project in Aguaytía commenced. The AAAHCPA and DEVIDA developed the project’s technical proposal, but before it took off DEVIDA revised it after consulting with USAID. Leaders of the AAAHCPA rejected the revised proposal on the grounds that it eliminated a credit scheme, payments for reforestation and food allowances. In a radio interview on October 2003, AAAHCPA president Flavio Sánchez Moreno clarified the cocaleros’ claims: ‘We are not paupers who need donations of food and small social works. We are farmers who need credit and markets for new products’ (Moreno qtd. in Cabieses 2004: 18). The project went forth and cocaleros voluntarily eradicated 1,200 hectares between October and December 2003. While the experience
succeeded in promoting supervised voluntary eradication, it disappointed cocalero leaders that had sought increased cooperation between their organisations and the state.

Other valleys also became frustrated because DEVIDA had not complied with the accords of July 13th 2002. In some cases DEVIDA even failed to set up the technical commissions between cocaleros and the state as stipulated by the accords. Cocaleros denounced that DEVIDA had not included them in the formulation of voluntary eradication projects and that in some cases it completely disregarded the terms of the accords (Cabieses 2004: 19). Cocalero leaders became increasingly intent on gaining recognition for their organisations and further uniting the valleys. One leader in particular began to take the initiative toward reaching these objectives.

**Nelson Palomino.** In early 2002, Nelson Palomino began to gain influence among peasants in the Apurímac-Ene valley through a radio program called *La Voz del Campesino* (The Voice of the Peasant). He quickly grew in popularity and assumed the position of Secretary of Defence and Organisation of the Federation of Agricultural Producers of the Valley of the River Apurímac-Ene (*Federación de Productores Agropecuarios del Valle del Río Apurímac-Ene*—FEPA-VRAE) (FEPA-VRAE 2005). Though not a coca producer himself, Palomino criticised state coca policies and vehemently proclaimed that the Toledo government would soon undertake forced eradication in the valley. He organised road blocks and strikes that culminated in accords with DEVIDA and the Ministry of Agriculture on August 4th 2002. The accords agreed to gradual and concerted eradication and diminished the imminent fear of forced eradication that Palomino had spread (Antesana, interview, 27.8.2004).

While peasants throughout the Apurímac-Ene and other valleys heralded Palomino as a great leader, he also received criticisms and accusations. In an interview with the author, former Minister of the Interior Fernando Rospigliosi described Palomino as a ‘bully’ who maintained control of the masses through violence and intimidation (Rospigliosi, interview, 23.8.2004). Antonio Cárdenas Torre, coordinator of the Apurímac-Ene self-defence committees, claimed that Palomino would ‘threaten other leaders with losing their posts if they did not support him’ (Cárdenas Torre qtd. in Correo 23.2.2003). He maintains that Palomino’s acts of intimidation instilled fears in the population and enhanced his political power.
Ten days after the August 4th 2002 accords Palomino suddenly announced that he never signed them and denounced those who had (including the mayor) as traitors. In his radio program he posed a question to Peru’s cocaleros: ‘Who would want to take out their coca voluntarily?’ (Antesana, interview, 28.8.2004). According to Antesana:\footnote{Jaime Antesana is a sociologist specialised in the link between cocaleros, drug trafficking and the Shining Path and consultant for DAI. He attended several of the events that took place throughout the emergence of the Peruvian cocalero social movement.}

I knew Palomino did not want gradual reduction. I myself had heard him say he would defend coca with his life. That is why I was puzzled when I first heard of the accords… But even after denying he signed them, Palomino insisted that they be upheld. He was simply not coherent (interview, 27.8.2004)

From August onwards, Palomino advocated the defence of all coca and warned cocaleros of a future struggle in which they would have to defend their coca with their lives. In October, Antesana witnessed Palomino making a speech in the city of Iquicha, Ayacucho, in which he called for cocaleros to make 20,000 *huaracas* (slings) to ‘defend our sacred coca in a struggle in which two thousand peasants will die... And I will be the first’. Antesana commented:

He spoke in Quechua, played with the language and mastered the crowd. I had never seen such jubilation in this town… And then I asked myself—after all of those accords—against what forced eradication is he speaking of? (interview, 28.8.2004)

Palomino had begun to spread the idea of *coca o muerte* (coca or death) in the Apurímac-Ene. In early September, Palomino attended an international indigenous gathering in Andahuylas, Ayacucho. The event gave him an opportunity to make contacts with other cocalero leaders. On September 11th, thirty-five leaders from the Apurímac-Ene, Upper Huallaga and Aguaytia valleys met to discuss the possibility of a new national cocalero organisation and agreed to hold a national meeting in Lima on January 20th and 21st 2003. Before the meeting, Palomino initiated another strike in the Apurímac-Ene valley. He sent a letter to DEVIDA on November 3rd announcing an indefinite strike if the agency did not adhere to a list of claims within three days. The claims included the withdrawal of DEVIDA, all NGOs and all alternative development organisations from the Apurímac-Ene valley (Antesana, interview, 28.8.2004). In short, he made claims that the state could not meet and that would lead to an inevitable clash. According to Rospiglisi, Palomino ‘purposely wanted to incite violence to forge solidarity’ (Rospiglisi, interview, 23.8.2004).

The state did not comply with the claims, prompting one thousand of Palomino’s supporters to initiate protests on November 7th. They threatened to destroy the offices of the Quinacho Coffee Cooperative and the Coffee Cooperative of the Apurímac Valley, both of which had
recently received a number of vehicles from an alternative development organisation. Antesana contends that Palomino called the strike in order to give material gains to his supporters and enhance their loyalty (Antesana, interview, 27.8.2004). Palomino called an end to the strike as soon as the state resolved the dispute surrounding the vehicles. The resulting accord made no mention of any other claim. One day later, denouncing the state’s lack of compromise over (unfeasible) claims, Palomino made a public broadcast calling for a boycott of the upcoming municipal elections. This action prompted the state to begin monitoring him as a potential subversive threat (ibid).

Palomino thus strengthened his leadership in the Apurímac-Ene valley, spread the notion of *coca o muerte* and forged ties with leaders of other valleys. His influence over the valley bordered on absolute control. Rospigliosi (interview, 23.8.2004) recounted:

> During this time, no military, no police, no mayor or self-defence leader would speak out against Palomino. He used extortion, threats and even sequestered two people. He had established total domination with no opposition. It was the *modus operandi* of the Shining Path.

In agreement with the former minister, Antesana maintains that Palomino reproduced Shining Path tactics. However, he asserts that although Palomino employed its tactics and the Shining Path recognised him as a leader in the valley, he had no further involvement with the group (Antesana, interview, 27.8.2004). Given the noted resurgence of the Shining Path since 2000, Palomino’s use of its tactics and its acceptance of his leadership provoked state concern. Reports spread in Lima of a Shining Path comeback that employed non-violent tactics with the peasants and heightened links with drug trafficking (*El Comercio* 28.8.2001). Both factors prompted the state to closely monitor potential cooperation between the insurgents and cocaleros.

**The CONPACCP.** On January 20th and 21st 2003, 1,210 cocalero delegates gathered in Lima and formed the National Confederation of Agricultural Producers of the Coca Valleys of Peru (*Confederación Nacional de Productores Agropecuarios de las Cuencas Cocaleras del Perú*—CONPACCP). The confederation brought together approximately 25,500 cocaleros from the following valleys: Apurímac-Ene (11,000), Upper Huallaga-Uchiza (2,000), Upper Huallaga-Puerto Pizana (1,500), Upper Huallaga-Aucayacu (3,000), Upper Huallaga-Tingo María (3,000), Aguaytía (1,200), Pichis-Palcazu (1,000), Monzón (2,500) and Jaen San Ignacio (260). FEPCACYL (representing 12,000 cocaleros) did not officially join the
CONPACCP given its established history, but it nevertheless pledged its full support and solidarity. The CONPACCP board of directors, with Palomino as general secretary, formulated a list of claims and signed a statement calling for a national strike and March of Sacrifice in the event of any instance of forced eradication (Cabieses 2004: 20). Palomino’s discourse of *coca o muerte* influenced the organisation and began to filter to other valleys through their leaders. Antesana asserts that leaders such as Obregón of Tocache, Sánchez Moreno of Aguaytía and Elsa Malpartida of Tingo María initially supported gradual and concerted eradication, but changed their stance after joining the CONPACCP (Antesana, interview, 28.8.2004). Rospigliosi also recounted the change in cocalero discourse: ‘A few years ago they supported self-eradication, but their demands increasingly called for no eradication’ (interview, 23.8.2004). The state’s lack of compliance with the accords on gradual and concerted eradication of July 2002 contributed to the change in discourse, whilst Palomino’s influence played a decisive role.

*The return of forced eradication.* On February 14th 2003, the state forcibly eradicated coca crops in the town of Shambillo, Aguaytía. Sánchez Moreno, head of the AAAHCPA, claimed that state agents had eradicated legal coca—and that they had ENACO membership cards and receipts to prove it (*La República* 18.2.2003). Head of DEVIDA Nils Ericsson later admitted the error during a personal conversation with Hugo Cabieses, an economist who worked at DEVIDA under Ericsson in 2002 (Cabieses 2004: 20).

A violent confrontation broke out resulting in the injury of five cocaleros and three state agents. Police forces arrested the lieutenant governor of Shambillo after he interceded on the cocaleros’ behalf (*El Comercio* 18.2.2003). Sánchez Moreno first organised peaceful demonstrations, but after receiving no response from the state the AAAHCPA initiated an indefinite strike on February 18th. The strike brought together ten thousand cocaleros from the towns of Padre-Abad and Shambillo in the Aguaytía valley (*La República* 18.2.2003). They occupied the main highway and monitored the circulation of vehicles in the area. They also denied eradication agents an exit from the town. DEVIDA responded by declaring that such acts of protest would only ‘create an ideal condition for the development of drug trafficking and terrorism’ (*El Comercio* 19.2.2003).

Cocaleros from other valleys declared their solidarity. On February 20th, cocaleros from the Upper Huallaga announced that the entire valley would commence an indefinite strike in
solidarity with Aguaytía (*El Comercio* 20.2.2003). On February 21st, cocaleros from Huánuco, the Apurímac-Ene, the Monzón (which primarily produces illegal coca) and La Convención (which primarily produces legal coca) announced they would join the strike (*El Comercio* 21.2.2003). The AAAHCPA agreed to end the indefinite strike only when the state conceded to the following:

- End of forced and voluntary eradication, immediate cancellation of CORAH and DEVIDA projects, and retirement of all NGOs from the province
- Temporary suspension of DL 22095
- Formation of an agrarian bank and university for Aguaytía
- Increase in the price of bananas, pineapples, cotton, cacao and coffee
- Granting of land titles and provision of electricity in all towns (*El Comercio* 20.2.2003)

The claim for the temporary suspension of DL 22095 signalled Palomino’s influence within the CONPACCP. Moreover, the protest and the state’s response brought unprecedented attention to the coca struggle. The state did not forcibly intervene, but responded aggressively through various declarations. Ericsson announced that he believed ‘strange people’ had influenced the strikes:

> This strike does not stem from true cocaleros—it has been induced by other people. I have information that points to the arrival of trucks filled with strange people in the area. I believe we are seeing the work of drug traffickers (Ericsson qtd. in *La República* 21.2.2003)

Luis Solari, president of the Council of Ministers, claimed that cocaleros knew that suspending DL 22095 was not feasible and that they must have had ties to ‘narco-terrorists’ (Solari qtd. in *Expreso* 21.2.2003). It serves to highlight that these declarations were made in response to a strike that had yet to elicit a major confrontation. Cocaleros soon came to the forefront of national attention. Editorials in Peru’s prominent newspapers demonstrated the varying degrees of sympathy for the cocalero struggle. *El Comercio* opined: ‘Cocaleros have taken a dangerous step toward delinquency. We must impose authority’ (*El Comercio* 23.2.2003); *La República* opined: ‘While [the strike] may involve methods we reject, this does not make Palomino a terrorist’ (*La República* 23.2.2003); *Correo* opined: ‘There are two radical positions: that of the cocaleros who want to legalise coca and that of the United States that pressures Peru for complete and immediate eradication’ (*Correo* 23.2.2003). To the cocaleros, the broad range of response from the media simply meant that the country was listening.
A number of prominent figures and political leaders called for a resolution to the struggle. Edwin Vasquez Lopez, president of the Ucayali region, proposed a suspension of eradication activities for thirty days to establish dialogue. The mayor of Shambillo, José Luis Maguiña, travelled to Lima to ask the state to dialogue with the cocaleros (Expreso 23.2.2003). Monsignor Luis Bambarén, the archbishop of Chimbote, and first lady Elian Karp offered to form a part of a dialogue commission to resolve the problem (El Comercio 28.2.2003). Cocalero leaders in Aguaytía expressed a desire to negotiate, but the state refused. As clarified by Solari: ‘The state can dialogue with police, society, labour and business forces—but it is not good for democracy to dialogue with a pistol at your chest’ (Solari qtd. in Expreso 28.2.2003). President Toledo affirmed that he personally did not consider the cocaleros drug traffickers, but the state could not dialogue under the ‘blackmail’ of violence (La República 28.2.2003). Tensions and confrontations escalated. On February 27th, the police used helicopters to throw tear gas grenades at protesters, and transport workers clashed with protesters in Tingo María (Expreso 28.2.2003). The following day journalist Roger Rumrrill warned about repression and argued that the state could soon carry out a large scale military intervention (Rumrrill qtd. in Correo 28.2.2003).

On March 1st CONPACCP leaders agreed to end the strike for three days to dialogue with the state (Correo 1.3.2003). Solari announced that the state would not bring a commission to evaluate the situation until the regions returned to their normal functions. After refusing to dialogue, Solari began to meet individually with political leaders in the valleys. He met with the president of the Huánuco region and the mayors of Leoncio Prado, Monzón, Tocache and Uchiza. Meetings with the leaders in the Huánuco and Monzón proved futile, but those with the leaders in Tocache and Uchiza resulted in an agreement to diminish coca crops by seventy-five per cent with the help of the state (El Comercio 2.3.2003). In the meantime, two thousand cocaleros gathered in the main plaza of Tingo María as the end to the three days approached. After an open debate, CONPACCP leaders announced that despite Solari’s refusal to negotiate they would extend the deadline by another twenty days (La República 4.3.2003). If the state did not dialogue with its leaders, the CONPACCP would initiate a March of Sacrifice toward Lima to demand talks with the president.

The March of Sacrifice. On February 22nd, the state arrested Palomino under the accusation of ‘support of terrorism’ (Expreso 22.2.2003). Carlos Rivera Paz, coordinator of the legal area of the Institute of Legal Defence (Instituto de Defensa Legal—IDL), declared to the press
that Palomino should be liberated. He found it suspicious that the crime of ‘support of terrorism’ had once again become law on the day of the arrest after having been declared unconstitutional by a tribunal on January 3rd (Expreso 23.2.2003). The Ministry of the Interior admitted its mistake in accusing Palomino of terrorism on March 15th, but kept him in custody as he awaited trial for other accusations (La República 15.3.2003). Rospigliosi, who led the investigation against Palomino after resuming the post of Minister of the Interior in June of 2003, maintained the following:

Palomino committed various crimes. He tried to block the municipal elections in November 2002 through extortion. This is a crime. Usually, he would have been thrown in prison—you know Peru—but the Ministry of the Interior actually did an investigation and eventually tried him (Rospigliosi, interview, 23.8.2003)

Palomino underwent trial and was sentenced to 10 years in prison in May 2004.

The arrest of Palomino showed the state’s concern for his rising influence as the leader of the CONPACCP. His record as a cocalero leader in the Apurímac-Ene revealed his tendency to provoke confrontation, ability to mobilise the masses and ability to disseminate the coca o muerte slogan (despite making public declarations in favour of gradual and concerted coca reduction) (La República 17.2.2003). The state sought to hinder Palomino’s leadership and popularity—especially since the latest incidence of forced eradication legitimised his claims—but his arrest had the opposite effect. On February 23rd cocaleros in the Apurímac-Ene led by Marisela Guillén of FEPA-VRAE mobilised four thousand cocaleros to march to the city of Huamanga, Ayacucho in defence of their leader. Other Apurímac-Ene peasants joined the march, including the association of potato producers and the Defence Front of Apurímac and of Huamanga (Expreso 22.2.2003). In the Upper Huallaga, Sánchez Moreno announced that the AAAHCPA would only dialogue with the state under the condition of Palomino’s release, which he described as their leader (Expreso 22.2.2003). The strike in Aguaytía meanwhile continued and the CONPACCP added the release of Palomino to its list of claims.

Cocaleros began the March of Sacrifice toward Lima in early April based on two main claims: the state’s refusal to dialogue with the CONPACCP to resolve the Aguaytía strike and the arrest of Palomino. The cocaleros reached the capital in two groups. One came from the valleys along the Apurímac and Ene rivers and arrived to the south of Lima on April 21st; the other came from the valleys along the Upper Huallaga, Monzón, Aguaytía and Uchiza rivers
and arrived to the north of Lima on April 22nd (La República 22.4.2003). Both groups had travelled for over two weeks in buses, in trucks and on foot, and in relative peace as the state had not undertaken any major act of repression. Two groups of approximately three thousand cocaleros each began marching toward each other once the second group arrived. The press documented their arrival with varying degrees of objectivity. El Comercio reported:

Faces covered in sweat, feet sweltering at every step and jaws moving in unison with an eternal chacchar. The March of Sacrifice of the cocaleros has begun to honour its name. …Although the cocaleros are saying they have no food to eat, most of them are sporting over-valued t-shirts with the slogan ‘Free Nelson.’ …The good amount of police force has served to limit disorder and has protected both protesters and observers (22.4.2003)

La República reported:

They marched in discipline, chanting slogans and holding the Peruvian flag and signs stating their claims. The agriculturists were exhausted from the long march to Lima. …When the two groups met, they gave each other emotional hugs, greetings and well-wishes. …Among them were elderly people, youths, children and pregnant women. …As they walked they shouted ‘We are not terrorists, we are peasants!’

After meeting, both groups marched to the Palace of Justice to demand the release of Palomino. Obregón and Malpartida, the two women in command of the CONPACCP after Palomino’s arrest, demanded dialogue with President Toledo (ibid).

On April 23rd, President Toledo, Solari and the heads of DEVIDIA and ENACO met with a delegation of thirty-two cocaleros at the presidential palace. When the meeting ended, President Toledo announced that the state had ‘made a compromise with the poor, not with narco-trafficking’ (Expreso 24.4.2003). The meeting prompted the formulation of a new law, Supreme Decree 044 (Decreto Supremo 044—DS 044), which approved the following:

- The policy of gradual and concerted reduction of coca cultivation
- The use of CORAH only for the destruction of maceration pits and new coca cultivations not registered under ENACO
- A study and report of the legal demand of coca in Peru by DEVIDA
- The update of the legal coca registries of ENACO
- A study of coca production chain by the Ministry of Agriculture
- The suspension of laws opposing DS 044
- The endorsement of DS 044 by the President of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of the Interior (El Peruano: Diario Oficial 24.4.2003)

The leaders of CONPACCP seemed to have shelved the discourse of coca o muerte that Palomino had advocated in favour of gradual and concerted eradication. After the signing of
the accord, Obregón testified that the CONPACCP would study the final version of DS 044 to ‘avoid surprises’ and continue to appeal to the judicial system for the release of Palomino (*La República* 24.4.2003).

### 3.4 MECHANISMS

According to Tarrow (1998), a social movement contains the following five characteristics: collective challenge; common purpose; solidarity and collective identity; and sustained interaction. The 2003 March of Sacrifice signalled the formation of Peru’s cocalero social movement, and (as such) the transition of cocaleros from illegitimate actors to social actors. Nearly twenty-five years after their criminalisation, cocaleros from different valleys came together to wage a collective challenge against the state. They did so own their own—without the support of other peasant, labour or popular organisations—under the common purpose of defending their livelihood, the production of coca. Their sense of collective identity developed alongside Peru’s tumultuous history with coca. Peru’s cocaleros, both legal and illegal, share an identity as peasant producers of coca. Just as coca has endured varying levels of criminalisation, cocaleros have faced wavering degrees of condemnation for their livelihood. The inevitable association with drug trafficking and the Shining Path imposed upon them an illegitimate identity that they deeply resent. Cocaleros thus have two identities.

Their primary identity is their own (internal) collective identity as peasant producers of coca (‘cocaleros’). Their secondary identity is an (external) identity of ‘illegitimate’ that stems from the nature of their livelihood (both identities became politicised with the criminalisation of coca). The consolidation of their collective identity as coca producers prompted a rise in solidarity between the valleys as the movement took shape. By 2002, the cocaleros had begun to mobilise at the inter-valley level and engaged in sustained interactions with the state that culminated in the 2003 March of Sacrifice.

The cocaleros’ formation of a social movement and their transition from illegitimate actors to social actors involved two key elements: first, consolidating their collective identity; second, actively rejecting their imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’. As discussed in Chapter 1, the various interactions sustained between claim-makers, their opponents and other involved actors constitute the causal mechanisms of contentious episodes. The discussion below details the identity-shaping mechanisms that unfolded during the cocaleros’ contentious episode and their role in the formation of the cocalero social movement.
**Category formation.** Category formation creates identities by establishing ‘a set of sites that share a boundary distinguishing all of them from and relating all of them to at least one set of sites visibly excluded by the boundary’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 143). This mechanism works through three different sub-mechanisms: invention, encounter and borrowing. *Invention* is the authoritative drawing of a boundary and the relations within and across that boundary (ibid). In 1978, the Peruvian state passed a law that criminalised the production of coca and determined which cocaleros constituted legal producers and which constituted illegal producers. The law created a boundary between cocaleros and other peasant producers as it associated the former with a criminalised activity. This contributed to the mainstream society’s view of cocaleros as illegitimate actors, a view generally shared by other social actors. The law also created boundaries between legal and illegal cocaleros. This made it difficult for cocaleros to forge a strong collective identity, given that different valleys maintained different interests depending on their legal status.

*Encounter* entails contact between separate groups. In the process, the groups interact, compete for resources and create new boundaries and relations (ibid). Encounter between cocaleros and the Shining Path resulted in a submissive relationship in which guerrillas either coerced or co-opted cocaleros. Cocalero organisations lost their capacity to mobilise and in many cases lost their leaders to violence. Furthermore, the relationship between the two groups, and the association of both groups with the illicit drug trade, generated new labels and paired categories—namely, narco-peasant and narco-guerrilla (and sometimes narco-guerrilla-peasant). Encounter thus further contributed to the development of the cocaleros’ illegitimate identity and to mainstream society’s view of cocaleros as illegitimate actors. This was facilitated by the geographic and cultural distance of the Shining Path-cocalero encounter from mainstream society.

*Borrowing* involves the adoption of previously existing boundary and cross-boundary relations within a local setting (ibid). Borrowing took place across Peru’s different coca-producing valleys in the time following the establishment of the CONPACCP up to the 2003 March of Sacrifice. Mobilisations spread from valley to valley in solidarity with protests over eradication that had taken place in Aguaytía in February 2003. The different valleys adopted the claims pronounced by the AAAHCPA and the CONACCP in the process, the most important of which included the end to all eradication efforts, suspension of DL 22095 and release of Palomino. This further defined the boundary within which cocaleros stood together
and boundary across which stood their opponent, the state. In short, borrowing helped strengthen cocaleros’ collective identity.

**Object shift.** Object shift is a change in relations between claim-makers and their opponents. It usually takes place in the short-run strategic interactions between actors in contentious episodes. A group can escalate conflict by targeting its opponent at a higher level—for example, the central rather than a local government or the military rather than the police. It can also escalate conflict by widening its network of alliances or list of opponents. Object shift changes boundaries and social relations, and as such changes paired identities and the relevance and effectiveness of claims (ibid: 144). In Peru, the acute insurgent threat prompted the state to curb the alliance between cocaleros and the Shining Path by de-criminalising coca and naming cocaleros valid interlocutors in the early 1990s. Since coca was decriminalised, the shift in relations between cocaleros and the state rendered any claim by cocaleros based on the defence of coca null. It also changed the paired identity between the state and cocaleros as the state could no longer be regarded as an opponent after certifying cocaleros and decriminalising their crops. A second shift in relations took place when the Shining Path no longer proved a significant threat to the state, after which the state re-criminalised coca. Cocaleros viewed this as an act of betrayal behalf of state and reinforced their convictions to wage a collective challenge against it. Their mistrust was furthered by the pervasive corruption and drug trafficking links of the Fujimori government, which effectively ran a ‘narco state’ despite its drug control agreements with the United States. The act effectively implied that cocaleros could once again identify the state as their common enemy.

**Certification.** Certification is the validation of actors, their actions and their claims by external certifying agents. Decertification involves the withdrawal of such validation (ibid: 158). Cocaleros have experienced certification and decertification at the hands of the state, foreign states, the media and elite groups. The earliest and most significant decertification took place in 1961 with the UN’s Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. It criminalised coca as the raw material of cocaine and placed it on the UN Schedule I of controlled substances. The convention criminalised coca (and its producers) on an international level and put pressure on the governments of coca-producing countries to pass similar national legislation. The passing of DL 22095 in 1978 decertified cocaleros, deemed them as illegitimate actors and contributed to their illegitimate identity. In the early 1990s, the state certified the cocaleros as valid interlocutors at the height of the war with the Shining Path and then
decertified them once again when the insurgent threat receded. The state’s certification and decertification affected mainstream society’s perception of cocaleros’ identity and also affected the cocaleros’ perception of the state. The state’s wavering actions taught the cocaleros that they could not trust the state and solidified their determination to wage a contentious challenge against it.

**Brokerage.** Brokerage involves the linking of two or more unconnected groups by a broker that mediates their relations with each other and/or with another group (ibid: 143). Cocaleros first attempted to connect their valleys and coordinate their contentious actions through the CONAPA. This broker proved short-lived and was eventually replaced by the CONPACCP. The CONPACCP effectively mediated relations between the different valleys and acted as the representative of the cocalero social movement in interactions with the state. Through its leadership, cocaleros from different valleys came together in the 2003 March of Sacrifice—the largest cocalero mobilisation to date. The mobilisation led to dialogue between the CONPACCP and the state that resulted in making the policy of gradual and concerted eradication into law through DS 044.

This section has outlined the identity-shaping mechanisms that make up the identity-formation process set in motion by the criminalisation of coca in 1978. The interactions between cocaleros, the state and mainstream society prior to coca’s criminalisation—in fact, since colonial times—laid the groundwork for the formation of cocaleros’ illegitimate identity. The criminalisation of coca simply officialised cocaleros as illegitimate actors. Between 1978 and 2000, the economic, social and ultimately political crisis that plagued the first democratic transition presented cocaleros with an unfavourable set of political opportunities and threats. The identity-shaping mechanisms at work within that setting contributed to the formation of the cocaleros’ illegitimate identity and caused difficulties for the formation of a cocalero collective identity. The set of political opportunities and threats shifted during the second democratic transition, which commenced with the fall of the Fujimori government in 2000. The end of the Fujimori government meant that cocaleros faced a more open, less corrupt and less intimidating political atmosphere. In this new setting, identity-shaping mechanisms facilitated cocaleros’ formation of the (internal) collective identity of ‘cocaleros’, based on the defence of coca production. Accordingly, it was during the second democratic transition that cocaleros finally managed to wage a sustained contentious episode that culminated in the formation of a social movement. This provided a
platform from which to denounce their imposed (external) identity of ‘illegitimate’, which lingered as the state, the media and elites continued to link cocaleros with drug trafficking, criminality and the resurfaced factions of the Shining Path in the Huallaga and Apurímac-Ene valleys. In spite of these limitations, the Toledo government recognised the CONPACC as the representative of the cocalero social movement and negotiated with its leaders over a law that banned forced eradication during the 2003 March of Sacrifice. This signalled the certification of cocaleros by the state and their transition from illegitimate actors to social actors. Nevertheless, cocaleros still faced an uphill battle in terms of gaining widespread legitimacy.

3.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has traced the transition of Peru’s cocaleros from illegitimate actors to social actors through the formation of a social movement. Two points stand out in the formation of the Peruvian cocaleros’ social movement. First, it occurred twenty-five years after the state imposed its main grievance (the criminalisation of coca). Second, it resulted in a social movement with notable weaknesses.

Regarding the first point, one can attribute the timing of the formation of a social movement to political opportunity structures. Simply put, social movements unfold when political opportunities widen and/or threats narrow. The state criminalised coca production in 1978. Two years later, Peru returned to democratic rule. The advent of democracy is usually associated with a widening of political opportunity. However, Peru’s democratic transition took place alongside an economic and social crisis that later facilitated widespread state corruption, the breakdown of democracy and a political crisis that precipitated the fall of the Fujimori government. This had significant consequences for Peru’s cocaleros. First, the social crisis brought on by the state-Shining Path war virtually destroyed the social fabric of cocalero communities and organisations as they experienced repression at the hands of both the state and the Shining Path. Second, the pressing situation generated by the economic and social crises prompted the Fujimori government to de-criminalise coca crops in order to limit relations between cocaleros and the Shining Path. Whilst this may appear as a narrowing of political threats, it in fact proved problematic. De-criminalisation rendered cocalero claims based on the defence of their crops null and made the state more of an ally rather than an enemy. Third, the state re-criminalised coca crops and instigated forced eradication campaigns when the insurgent threat dissipated. The state’s wavering actions cemented
cocaleros’ views of the state as their common enemy. Furthermore, the repressive and corrupt nature of the state at the time (coupled with severely weakened cocalero organisations) stalled the initiation of a sustained contentious episode. Cocaleros only managed to recover and commence their contentious episode with the return of democracy at the end of 2000. By 2003, cocalero organisations had consolidated into a social movement and negotiated with the state over a law that did away with forced eradication and promulgated gradual and concerted eradication.

Regarding the second point, the social movement formed by Peru’s cocaleros showed considerable weaknesses. As noted by the national media during the 2003 March of Sacrifice, cocaleros did not receive support from other peasant, labour or popular organisations or political parties. Sociologist and political analyst Santiago Pedraglio expressed the following:

There are issues in the polity over which politicians would rather not comment... No party or politician has spoken a word, as if they cannot come up with any option for the families that cultivate coca... other than repression. It seems as though the opposition would more or less do the same as the current government if it were in power: classify the peasants as suspected narco-traffickers and not dare to elaborate a national debate for fear of reprisal from the north (Perú 21 20.4.2003)

The fact that no prominent politician had made a declaration or voiced an opinion on the coca issue showed the delicate nature of the cocaleros’ claims. The Toledo government at the time of the 2003 March of Sacrifice did not have the highest approval rating. Opposition forces had taken sides in various other protests that had plagued the Toledo government, but did not do so on the issue of coca. Coca was too controversial. Cocaleros also did not receive support from peasant, labour or popular organisations, in stark contrast to their counterparts in Bolivia. The cocaleros’ difficulty in attracting allies and supporters stemmed from their imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’. As discussed in Chapter 2, controversy has plagued coca throughout its history in terms of its production, trade and uses. Moreover, traditional coca consumption widespread in the Andean region for religious, medicinal and social purposes was and still is largely unfamiliar in Peru’s mainstream society. Class, institutional, geographic and cultural distance between cocaleros and mainstream society has limited their relations and interactions. Cocaleros and their grievances were largely unknown or seemed distant to the majority of Peru’s citizens. Over time the known association between coca, illegality, drug trafficking and the Shining Path imposed an illegitimate identity upon cocaleros, which was cemented by DL 22095. Cocaleros have struggled to rid themselves of this illegitimate identity that has provided them with labels such as narco-peasant or even
narco-terrorist. This explains why during the 2003 March of Sacrifice the cocaleros would chant slogans such as ‘We are not terrorists!’ alongside slogans declaring their grievances.

Before concluding, it serves to highlight the significance of the 2003 March of Sacrifice. First, the march demonstrated the solidarity and conviction of cocaleros from different valleys based on their collective identity as ‘cocaleros’. Second, it brought the claims and struggle of cocaleros to the attention of mainstream society. Third, it marked the transition of cocaleros from illegitimate to social actors. The march marked a turning point in the cocaleros’ contentious episode and presented cocaleros with an opportunity to build upon their newly acquired status as social actors to continue to chip away at their imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’. In short, despite its late arrival and notable weakness, in 2003 Peru’s cocalero social movement stood a fair chance in its struggle for its claims.
Organisations representing cocalero interests first formed in Bolivia in the late 1950s and early 1960s within the country’s comprehensive union system. Like other peasant unions, coca unions lost power and autonomy with the onset of military rule in 1964 and only began to recuperate with the transition to democracy that began in 1978.²⁵

Bolivia’s democratic transition unfolded alongside acute political and economic crises that caused substantial social upheaval. The debt crisis that hit Latin America in the 1980s brought Bolivia to the brink of economic collapse. The severity of the economic crisis²⁶ contributed a mounting political crisis, which prompted an abrupt end to the Siles Suazo government in 1985. For cocaleros, the dynamics of the democratic transition presented a distinct set of political opportunities and threats that boosted their political empowerment, both in absolute terms and in relation to other peasant and labour sectors. By the time the state criminalised coca in 1988, Bolivia’s cocaleros had firmly established organisational networks and a strong sense of collective identity. The passing of the law that criminalised coca (Ley 1008) decertified cocaleros as social actors and turned them into illegitimate actors. In doing so, it imposed the grievance that incited the powerful coca unions to form a social movement.

This chapter traces the formation of the cocalero social movement in Bolivia within a context of political and economic crisis during the transition to democracy. The first section discusses Bolivia’s economic dependence on the coca-cocaine economy. The second section details Bolivia’s experience with the economic crisis with respect to its impact on cocalero interests. The third section discusses the political crisis that struck Bolivia throughout the period of democratic transition and economic crisis with respect to its impact on cocalero interests. The fourth section details the formation of the cocalero social movement within a distinct set of political opportunities and threats. The fifth section analyses the identity-shaping mechanisms at work during the formation of the cocalero social movement.

²⁵ Military rule ended in 1978, after which Bolivia entered a period of political instability that lasted until Siles Suazo assumed the presidency in 1982.

²⁶ According to Sachs (1987), Bolivia maintained the highest rate of inflation in Latin American history (and one of the highest in world history) between 1984 and 1985. Prices rose 20,000 per cent between August of 1984 and August 1985—60,000 per cent between May and August 1985 alone (279).
4.1 THE COCA-COCAINE DEPENDENCY

As discussed in Chapter 2, coca gained an important place in the Bolivian economy by the middle of the 20th century and rapidly increased in significance thereafter. The covert nature of the illicit drug trade makes it difficult to determine the extent of its impact on the national economy. Precise figures on income, hard currency or employment generated by the illicit drug trade are hard to come by, as are estimates of corollary effects such as the decline in traditional agricultural production or the cost of law enforcement. One can only state with certainty that the coca-cocaine economy has had a far greater influence in Bolivia than in Peru or Colombia, due in part to the smaller absolute size and less developed nature of the Bolivian national economy.

Production figures. The difficulty of estimating figures related to the coca-cocaine economy increases given that the data collection methods used by the Bolivian state and by other states, international organisations and non-governmental organisations often differ. In addition to differences in methodology, figures vary due to differences in interests. Painter (1994) notes that Bolivia tends to overestimate while the United States tends to underestimate the production level of coca when using the figure to determine the provision of aid. Conversely, the United States has often overestimated such figures when using them to justify repressive or military based strategies (Painter 1994: 35). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) set up the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme with the approval of member states in 1999 in an effort to improve data on illicit crops. The monitoring scheme combines satellite imagining techniques (which are approximately ninety per cent accurate) with census and sampling surveys to estimate production figures. Surveys are also used to estimate pricing and crop yield figures (World Drug Report 2007: 259). Efforts to standardise data collection methods have not led to uniform figures. To cite one example, in 2005 the United States reported a moderate increase in coca cultivation in Bolivia whilst the UNODC cited an eight per cent decrease. Whilst the estimates demonstrated opposite growth tendencies, the absolute figures of the United States and the UN remained close in absolute terms (differing by approximately 1,000 hectares) and have tended to be ‘roughly similar’ since the UN began surveying coca production in Bolivia (Ledebur and Youngers 2006).

The value of the coca-cocaine economy in Bolivia during the 1980s ranged from 300 million to 5.7 billion USD. Early estimates of such figures came from the ‘Errors and Omissions’ column of the current account balance of the Bolivian central bank. As figures on prices and
production became more available, statisticians enhanced their estimates by making calculations at the different stages of cocaine production (Painter 1994: 36). Precise employment figures are also elusive. In the 1980s about sixty thousand peasants cultivated coca or worked as hired labourers. Employment in the coca-cocaine economy also involves pickers, stompers, carriers and buyers of coca and/or coca paste, as well as providers of chemical materials and owners of transport. Employment figures vary as workers often double or triple up on jobs. According to Painter (1994), estimates for 1989 and 1990 reveal that the coca-cocaine economy employed between 120,000 and 243,000 workers—more than ten per cent of the population. The figure is startling, especially when compared to employment figures for agriculture (36 per cent), mining (1.6 per cent), petroleum (0.4 per cent), manufacturing (9.2 per cent) and construction (4.3 per cent). Estimates do not take into account employment generated by the supply of food and other goods for workers, financial services, crop protection or personal security services (41).

The value-added of the coca-cocaine economy also helps assess its economic impact. A 1986 article cites the average annual earnings of the illicit drug trade during the ‘recent period’ at 1 billion USD, while a 1994 article cites it at 1.6 billion USD (Dunkerley 1986: 144; Estellano and Nava-Ragazzi 1994: 40). The latter article also reports that of the 1.6 billion USD, approximately 600 million USD entered Bolivian economy ‘through various means’ (Estellano and Nava-Ragazzi 1994: 40). A 1988 article in The Economist reports Bolivian export earnings from the illicit drug trade as falling between 200 and 400 million USD—whereas legal export earnings accounted for 469 million USD (Healy 1988: 106). Looking at it from another angle, estimates indicate that in 1990 the coca-cocaine economy accounted for an alarmingly significant percentage of Bolivia’s GDP (between 5.7 and 11 per cent). Only legal agricultural production accounted for a greater amount (18.1 per cent) (Painter 1994).

**A comparative view.** The coca-cocaine economy of Bolivia (and the national economy as a whole) is smaller than that of its neighbours’ in absolute terms. It is precisely the smaller size of the Bolivian national economy that has made the effects of the coca-cocaine economy more relevant in comparison. An article published in 1988, at a time when Bolivia was producing twenty-five to thirty per cent of the world’s coca, reports that the percentage of the labour force involved in the coca-cocaine economy in Bolivia was ‘significantly higher’ than in Colombia or Peru (Healy 1988: 106). Cocaine revenue estimates revealed that while they
accounted for thirteen and fourteen per cent of legal exports in Colombia and Peru, respectively, they accounted for up to seventy-five per cent of legal exports in Bolivia (ibid). Painter (1994) quotes a former Bolivian minister of the economy in 1991 as stating that eradicating fifty thousand hectares of coca would ‘cause a loss in GDP of 4 billion USD, a loss of 200 million USD in foreign exchange and reduce employment by 175,000’ (Torrico qtd. in Painter 1994: 42). As Healy (1988) puts it: ‘In short, unlike the other two nations, the coca-cocaine industry and trade has somewhat of a stranglehold over Bolivia’s national economy’ (106). The influence of the coca-cocaine economy in Bolivia becomes more significant when considering that it peaked during a period of acute economic crisis and recovery.

4.2 THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

Dimensions of the crisis. The debt crisis that hit Latin America in the 1980s all but destroyed the Bolivian economy. Its external debt of 4.8 billion USD paled in comparison to that of Mexico or Brazil (which exceeded 100 billion USD), but it represented the highest external debt in proportion to population in the region. The debt amounted to 552 USD per capita at a time when annual income was 288 USD per capita (Nash 1992: 276). Between 1980 and 1984, Bolivia experienced a sixteen per cent fall in national production, a twenty-five per cent fall in disposable income, a sixty per cent fall in imports and a seventy-five per cent fall in investment (Dunkerley 1986: 143). Inflation ran rampant. The inflation rate reached 328 per cent in 1983—an insignificant figure compared to the fifty thousand per cent reached in the spring of 1985. Soon after, the state stopped making debt payments and implemented a harsh stabilisation plan. If the country lingered on ‘the verge of collapse’ in 1983, it went well over the edge in the years that followed (Ibáñez Rojo 2000: 188). As Dunkerley (1986) put it: ‘Bolivia has consolidated its position as the poorest country in the western hemisphere with the exception of Haiti’ (143).

The country became increasingly dependent on the coca-cocaine economy in the midst of the economic crisis and the harsh stabilisation measures that came with it. The illicit economy provided much needed employment following the 1985 collapse of tin prices and subsequent closure of state-owned mines, as well as the unemployment that came along with general structural adjustment policies (Leons and Sanabria 1997: 14). Thousands migrated to the

---

27 Bolivia faced especially harsh terms of repayment compared to the rest of the region (Dunkerley 1986: 145).
Tropic of Cochabamba in search of jobs and better wages. One could earn up to ten times the average wage by harvesting, treading or transporting coca (Dunkerley 1986: 144). Coca cultivations nearly doubled during this time. According to Leons and Sanabria (1997):

The creation of employment in the drug trade and its multiplier effects throughout the entire economy [was] one of the most critical factors that cushioned the effect of the economic contraction (14)

The hard currency generated by the coca-cocaine economy also aided economic recovery. In 1985 bank deposits held less than 100 million USD—by 1992 they held 1.2 billion USD. Foreign aid funds accounted for a large portion of this dramatic increase, but the bulk of it came from coca-cocaine dollars (ibid: 9). Still, it is difficult to make precise estimates of coca-cocaine dollar deposits given that banking policies at the time did not question the source of bank deposits.

High rates of investment in real estate, commercial activities and luxury goods at a time when per capita income had decreased by almost one third provides further evidence of the weight of the coca-cocaine economy. The excessive increase in non-productive spending brought on by coca-cocaine dollars deteriorated Bolivia’s industrial sector and productivity, as evidenced by the drop in the ratio of gross productive investment to GDP from eleven to five between 1980 and 1987 (Estellano and Nava-Ragazzi 1994: 39). Coca-cocaine dollars also contributed to the over-valuation of the Boliviano, which made exports less competitive and led to a rise in imports. The reduction of the size of the industrial sector relative to GDP throughout the 1980s clearly demonstrates the effects of over-valuation on domestic industries (Painter 1994: 61). Another effect of the coca-cocaine economy was a rise in financial speculation brought on by money laundering operations. One of the most prominent speculation cases was that of a savings society in Cochabamba (Firma Integral de Servicios Arévalo—FINSA) that shut down in 1991 after authorities revealed its illicit links. The thousands of people that invested in FINSA (including a number of top politicians, police chiefs and about twenty thousand coca producers with small deposits) lost their savings. It is believed that the incident caused Cochabamba to fall into a recession (ibid: 63).

The coca-cocaine economy undeniably had adverse effects, but it also sustained the Bolivian economy through the crisis by mitigating the effects of inflation and austerity measures, and by bolstering employment and hard currency reserves. Several accounts of the crisis during the period in discussion hold this view. Healy (1988) writes: ‘No doubt Bolivia’s economic
crisis would deepen to an even greater degree without the inflow of drug dollars’ (123). Nash (1992) writes: ‘Without drug traffic, which is estimated to bring in 5 million USD a day, the Bolivian people could not survive’ (290). Estellano and Nava-Ragazzi (1994) write: ‘The supposed success of the Bolivian experiment in containing inflation is in fact dependent upon the coca economy’ (41). There is thus a general consensus on the critical role of the coca-cocaine economy during the crisis and recovery period.

**Implications for political opportunity structures.** The impact of the coca-cocaine economy extended beyond the economic arena. One highly visible socio-political effect was the widespread corruption that permeated the state and its institutions at all levels. The government of García Meza, which came to power in 1980 through a coup allegedly financed by drug traffickers, provides the most notorious example (Healy 1986: 106-107). The government’s involvement was such that it used the military for protection and the vaults in the Central Bank of La Paz as storage facilities to facilitate its own illicit activities (Painter 1994: 27). Corruption severely compromised drug control efforts. A report by the House Committee on Government Operations of the United States Congress noted that the United States and host government officials viewed drug corruption as ‘the single most significant obstacle to U.S. counter-narcotic efforts’ (ibid: 70). Corruption thus added to the economic crisis as it further weakened and de-legitimised the state.

Another socio-political effect of the coca-cocaine economy was the weakening of repressive policies against cocaleros due to the lack of political incentives and will for implementation. Bolivia elected its first civilian government since 1964 after the fall of the García Meza government in 1981. The new centre-left coalition government was led by an umbrella political party—Popular and Democratic Union (*Unidad Popular y Democrática*—UDP). With Siles Suazo as president, the new government came into power thanks in part to the support of labour and peasant sectors. Siles Suazo faced formidable challenges. Not only did he have to hold a coalition government together during the turbulent transition to democracy, he needed to do so in the midst of Bolivia’s most severe economic crisis. Siles Suazo proved reluctant to take on strong anti-coca legislation during his presidency. Healy (1988) writes:

[Siles Suazo’s] predisposition to respond to peasant union pressure-group tactics with new decrees, resources allocation, and favourable program changes, was evident throughout Bolivia during this re-democratisation period (111)

He evidently recognised the importance of the peasant sector as a constituent of the UDP
coalition and of the coca-cocaine economy in sustaining the country during the crisis. Cocaleros also recognised the significance of the coca-cocaine economy. Leaders of the coca unions of the Tropic of Cochabamba began to present their claims in support of coca in the early 1980s ‘in terms of economics benefits, within the context of a national recession’ (Healy 1991: 95). In doing so they aimed to bolster their legitimacy and gain the support other sectors within the national peasant confederation, many of which maintained links to the coca-cocaine supply chain in some way.

4.3 THE POLITICAL CRISIS

The Siles Suazo government. Bolivia returned to democracy in 1982 under the UDP centre-left coalition led by Siles Suazo. Expectations ran high as the era of military rule came to an end. However, as Ibáñez Rojo (2000) writes:

> With the benefit of hindsight it is quite apparent that the tremendous expectations created by the introduction of a participatory democracy in Bolivia at the end of 1982 were completely unrealistic (175)

Two factors help explain the political crisis of the Siles Suazo government. First, sustaining the UDP coalition depended on the support of Bolivia’s labour sector organised under the Bolivian Workers’ Confederation (Central Obrera Boliviana—COB). Second, the government came to power during disastrous economic conditions.

Founded by the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario—MNR) party after the 1952 revolution, the COB represents all of Bolivia’s rural and urban labour sectors. It is considered one of the most militant and powerful labour organisations in Latin America and has represented Bolivia’s labour sector since its inception. Although the MNR intended for the COB to play a subordinate role in politics, the confederation became increasingly independent from the party as workers pressed for co-management (Healy 1991: 100). Its power escalated to the extent that the MNR relied on the military to keep COB militias under control. When the country succumbed to military rule in 1964, the COB faced intense repression and was outlawed by the government of General Bánzer between 1971 and 1978. The confederation proved its lasting influence and resilience when it re-surfaced as ‘the only institution able to represent the interests of the working class’ after the military called for elections in 1978 (Gamarra 1989: [online]).
The COB’s ability to sustain the support of its constituents distinguished it from other political institutions during the intense political crisis. Between 1978 and 1980, no political party acquired plurality in three national elections and no coalitions formed to break the political stalemate. After a series of short-lived interim presidencies and a number of coups, General García Meza secured power in 1980. His government soon acquired a reputation as the most corrupt and abusive in the Bolivia’s history. Internal divisions and international condemnation brought on by notorious corruption prompted the military to step down in September of 1982 when a national strike nearly escalated into civil war (ibid). The COB’s fierce and organised opposition to the military regime played a crucial role in the return to democracy. According to Ibáñez Rojo (2000), the labour movement ‘always appeared, in stark contrast with the political elites, to be fully committed to democracy’ (177). After eighteen years of military rule and political deadlock, the COB was the only political institution ‘to have survived intact’ (ibid: 178). The government to follow that of García Meza needed to acknowledge the power and win the support of the COB to ensure its political survival.

The 1980 Congress re-convened in October of 1982 and upheld the results of the 1980 elections, bringing Siles Suazo and his UDP centre-left coalition to power. The UDP, composed of the leftist faction of the MNR (the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement of the Left [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda—MNRI]) and the two leading leftist parties (the Communist Party of Bolivia [Partido Comunista de Bolivia—PCB] and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left [Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR]), faced a considerable political challenge. The weakness of Bolivia’s political institutions after eighteen years of military rule posed as great a threat as the fact that the UDP coalition did not have a parliamentary majority. The government could crumble under the weight of a political confrontation. The COB presented the only viable political threat at the time, as organised labour was distinct in its unity, strength and reputation for having a true commitment to democracy. Siles Suazo had ‘no choice but to work with the COB’, not only because he could not afford to confront organised labour, but because doing so could also strengthen and legitimise his fragile UDP coalition (ibid).

However, a major conflict of interest made the seemingly harmonious UDP-COB alliance a recipe for self-destruction: Bolivia faced imminent economic breakdown, and managing crisis of such dimensions required a harsh stabilisation plan. The government urgently needed
to implement fiscal austerity and deflationary measures in order to keep the economy from spiralling further out of control. The COB strictly opposed such plans and exercised its position in a way that resulted in dramatic price index increases. The COB had the power to bring the country to a virtual standstill with national strikes. Between 1984 and 1985, Bolivia experienced six long-standing national strikes and numerous road blockades (Dunkerley 1986: 147). As Ibáñez Rojo (2000) writes, the government’s ‘surprisingly and irrationally benign’ response to the economic crisis made it clear that the COB essentially had veto power when it came to economic policy (178). Coupled with a naïveté of the dimensions of the crisis, the government’s feeble stabilisation response failed to restrain and in fact furthered the crisis.

Bolivia faced a political standstill: the COB could not coalesce to the government and lose legitimacy with its constituents and the government could not undertake the necessary measures to stabilise the economy, respond to social demands or guarantee social order (Sanabria 1999: 537). As the country plunged deeper into crisis and inflation exploded, the legitimacy of both the UDP government and the COB suffered a lethal blow.

The Paz Estenssoro government. The severity of the economic and political crisis led to an abrupt ending to the UDP government and decision to hold early elections. The results of the 1985 national election demonstrated the extent to which the left and the labour sector had lost credibility. General Bánzer, leader of the right wing Democratic Nationalist Action (Acción Democrática Nacionalista—ADN) won 29 per cent of the national vote. MNR leader Paz Estenssoro won 26 per cent of the vote, but secured the presidency after forming a last minute alliance with old factions of the MNR, left-wing deputies and Indian parties (Dunkerley 1986: 139). Electoral support for the ADN signified a condemnation of the Siles Suazo government and the leaders of the COB, which had failed to provide alternatives beyond protest. As Dunkerley (1986) writes: ‘It is undoubtedly the case that many who participated in these strikes and consider themselves faithful militants of the COB voted for Bánzer’ (140). The Paz Estenssoro government thus faced the dual task of restoring economic order and ending the class stalemate that threatened social order.

The MNR took swift action with a neoliberal stabilisation plan known as the New Economic Plan (Nuevo Plan Económico—NPE). The plan addressed Bolivia’s political crisis alongside its economic crisis given the urgent need to restore confidence in the state’s capacity to
Minister of Planning Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada clearly denoted the far-reaching objectives of the NPE:

Rather than a strictly economic program the NPE is a political plan that aims at re-establishing principles that are fundamental to the functioning of the Republic and without which we run a grave risk of following a path of national state disintegration (Sánchez de Lozada qtd. in Sanabria 1999: 63)

The MNR made a case for the NPE at the expense of the left and the ‘revolutionary nationalism’ of the past. It criticised the UDP for the ‘populist’ policies that allowed inflation to spiral out of control and adamantly defended capitalism in an attempt to gain support for neoliberalism (Estellano and Nava-Ragazzi 1994: 37). Rather than resort to iron rule (mano dura) the state centred on winning an ideological battle to restore order. Along with the realisation that the country stood on the brink of collapse, the MNR message engendered support for the NPE. As Sanabria (1999) affirms: ‘In an unprecedented consensus, Bolivia’s military, various traditionally rival political parties and key business interests have joined together to consistently support the neoliberal agenda’ (537). The consensus finally afforded the state the capacity to enforce a plan for economic stabilisation.

The NPE achieved economic stabilisation at a great social cost. Described as ‘one of the most draconian economic and social engineering initiatives launched in any Latin American country’, it implemented shock therapy to contain inflation and transform the economy (Berry 2004: 198). The state froze real wages, ended subsidies, repealed progressive labour legislation, privatised or closed down state-owned companies and shut down state-owned social institutions (Strobele-Gregor, Hoffman and Holmes 1994: 111). Inflation came under control, but alongside a drastic fall in real income and rise in unemployment (21 per cent of the economically active population) (Estellano and Nava-Ragazzi 1994: 38). The mining sector was dealt a particularly harsh blow, the repercussions of which would exacerbate the political crisis.

The collapse of mining. At first glance, the collapse of mining seemed like a natural casualty of structural adjustment. The government passed Decree 21060 to ease the debt burden soon after the 1985 national elections. The decree dictated the closure of marginal mines, the shift to cooperatives of other mines and the privatisation of the most profitable ones (Nash 1992: 277). This initiated the fall of the mining sector, and the sharp drop in the price of tin in October 1985 accelerated the fall. Soon after, thirty-five thousand miners and their families
had lost their main source of income (Stroble-Gregor, Hoffman and Holmes 1994: 111).

While economic factors played an important role in mining’s decline, it appears that the state actively sought to break the mining sector as part of a larger political agenda. Sanabria (2000) claims that the state ‘moved decisively’ against Bolivia’s mining union, the Syndicalist Federation of Mining Workers of Bolivia (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia—FSTMB), as a part of a comprehensive plan to consolidate state power and the neoliberal economic model. Elites and the state viewed the FSTMB as a ‘potent political threat’ (Sanabria 1999: 542). The state and miners, renowned for their aggressive oppositional culture, had been engaged in a vicious battle since the creation of the FSTMB in 1944. Sanabria (1999) argues that the collapse of the price of tin and the potential threat of large-scale mining mobilisations prompted Bolivia’s elites to solve the mining ‘problem’ as a matter of extreme urgency. Breaking the FSTMB resistance would finally rid the country of the mining ‘parasites’ and facilitate a steady transition from the state-capitalist model put in place by the 1952 revolution to a neoliberal model (544).

The state took various actions to break the resistance of miners. First, it lifted subsidies on basic goods and caused massive price increases and food shortages in company stores on which mining towns depended. The anticipated protests from miners met with fierce repression. The response to claims regarding miner’s income and job security proved equally harsh. The state forced aged miners to retire and provided enticements and promises of job ‘relocations’ to younger miners that volunteered to resign. Those refusing to voluntarily give up their jobs faced a prompt dismissal. The state also shut down mines led by the union’s strongest factions and prioritised the dismissal of underground miners—the most militant given their role in the most productive part of mining (Sanabria 2000: 66). Miners had become acutely aware of the state’s intentions by the time it announced the massive layoffs in the state mining company, the Mining Corporation of Bolivia (Corporación Minera de Bolivia—COMIBOL). Filemón Escóbar, who assumed leadership of the FSTMB in 1987, described the closure of COMIBOL as an assault on Bolivia’s labour sector:

The moment has come when the government intends to liquidate COMIBOL in order to liquidate the working class and in particular the Federation, because these are the major obstacles [to the government’s plan for privatisation]. We have workers’ control. The managers of free enterprise, especially the international private firms, view COMIBOL as an obstacle to gaining complete control over the working class (Escóbar qtd. in Nash 1992: 285)
The miners undertook one final act of defiance in 1986. Miners in Oruro went on strike on August 4th, followed by miners in Potosi on August 18th. Two days later, a group eight thousand miners and their families commenced a march toward La Paz in protest of the closure of state-owned mines (El País 30.8.1986). The protesters named the act the *Marcha por la Vida* (March for Life). After eight days, the government of Paz Estenssoro declared a state of siege and broke up the protest. Over one hundred and sixty people were arrested, including three university rectors, leaders of the COB, two pastors and three journalists (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1986: [online]). The FSTMB did not have capacity to confront the determined and newly empowered state and called upon the protesters to voluntarily disperse. By the end of 1986, more than 80 per cent of COMIBOL miners had lost their jobs and the membership of the Association of Relocated Miners exceeded that of the FSTMB (Sanabria 2000: 67).

**Implications for political opportunity structures.** Like the economic crisis, the political crisis that followed Bolivia’s transition to democracy changed the set of political opportunities and threats faced by cocalero organisations. The politically weak and COB-dependent Siles Suazo government did not take strong repressive actions against cocaleros (or any labour and peasant sector for that matter). The state could not afford a political confrontation given that the COB remained the only political institution with the credibility and power to mobilise constituents. This situation changed with the election of the MNR government, which embarked on a far reaching plan to re-arm a nearly obsolete state and restore socio-political and economic order. As the following section details, the MNR government proved far more willing to take repressive and legislative action against cocaleros. The MNR government also indirectly aided cocaleros’ by breaking down the powerful FSTMB, which historically dominated the COB. The unions of the Tropic of Cochabamba effectively filled the void left by the mining sector.

### 4.4 FORMATION OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

The distinct set of political opportunities and threats that developed within the context of economic and political crisis after the transition to democracy facilitated the emergence of a cocalero social movement in Bolivia.

**Beginnings.** The origins of the cocalero social movement (and empowerment of the Bolivian peasantry in general) can be traced to the back to the reforms of the 1952 revolution led by
the MNR. The Agrarian Reform Act of 1953 changed the structure of land ownership and lifted various legal restrictions on voting, which for the first time guaranteed universal suffrage. The MNR encouraged the peasantry to become organised through unions. These new peasant organisations aided the making of new land claims, establishment of schools and formation of alliances with other groups, including the labour sector. However, the existence of these new organisations also facilitated the co-optation of the peasantry by the MNR, which needed to secure support for its reforms (Healy 1988: 107). The MNR attempted to mobilise the peasantry by ‘parading’ them at rallies and by pressuring community leaders to back certain policies (Gamarra 1989: [online]). Such tactics have led some to argue that in actuality the MNR did little to change the pattern of peasant subjugation and manipulation for political gain (Strobele-Gregor, Hoffman and Holmes 1994: 108).

The MNR lost its influence over the peasant sector when the military came to power in 1964. The military government of General Bánzer established the Peasant-Military Pact in order to ensure its dominance in the countryside. The pact provided peasants with protection over new land claims in exchange for political support. The military government also manipulated unions to limit opposition to unpopular agrarian policies and promote divisions between the peasant and labour sector (Healy 1988: 107). In short, the period of military rule severely undermined the autonomy of Bolivia’s peasant sector.

By the late 1960s, peasant leaders came forth that rejected the pattern of dominance by the military and political parties. These leaders organised movements based on their indigenous identity and desire for autonomy. The most renowned movement was Katarismo. Kataristas formed two political parties: the Túpac Katari Indian Movement (Movimiento Indio Túpac Katari—MITKA) and the union-oriented Túpac Katari Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Katari—MRTK). The latter created Bolivia’s first autonomous peasant confederation (Unified Syndicalist Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia [Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia—CSUTCB]) during the early stages of the democratic transition in 1979 (Van Cott 2003a: 226). In an interview with the author, Paulino Guarachi, who held the position of general secretary of the CSUTCB between 1992 and 1994, described the formation of the confederation:

> When the CSUTCB was born in 1979, it was born under the principle of independence from the state. In the past we had lived a period of co-optation, within the framework of the Peasant-Military Pact. That period ended in 1979, when we formed an independent confederation with a plurality of political expressions. We
have Kataristas, Indigenistas, left-wingers… even some right-wingers!—but all in all the confederation is independent with respect to the state (interview, 27.8. 2008)

The formation of the CSUTCB signalled an empowerment of the peasant sector. Still, the confederation did not have much influence as an independent pressure group until the return of democracy in 1982 (Healy 1988: 108).

In the Tropic of Cochabamba, the first peasant unions formed in the 1960s. The area had undergone a rapid and largely spontaneous colonisation, and had a very limited state presence. Its unions demonstrated an exceptional ability for organisation and mobilisation early on, and became essential as a form of community self-government and community development. According to Saul Lara, Minister of the Interior during the Carlos Mesa government:

In institutional terms, there was almost an absolute absence of the state in this newly colonised area… to the extent that even land was administered by the unions. The absence of the state extended to decision-making in the administration of justice, in the provision of services, in education, in transportation, in public works and so forth. In this context, we begin to see a rise in decision-making and organising by the unions in all aspects of community life (Lara, interview, 29.8.2008)

The unions maintained a firm hold over their role as a sort of parallel government, and also demonstrated a remarkable ability to mobilise their members, which became known as ‘some of the most conscientious, dues-paying members’ within Bolivia’s union system (Healy 1991: 90). When the Bolivian state finally began to establish a presence in years to come—and almost exclusively to limit the production of what would become the primary crop of the area (coca)—the unions coalesced with ease to contest what they viewed as an unjust imposition.

Growth. The restoration of democracy and civil liberties in 1982 generated a burst of activism across Bolivia’s peasant unions and enhanced their prominence as independent pressure groups. The coca unions of the Tropic of Cochabamba grew particularly strong (especially vis-à-vis other peasant and labour unions) and soon acquired a reputation as Bolivia’s ‘most effectively, consistently active peasant group’ (Healy 1991: 91). However, the 1980s also brought economic turmoil. Peasants faced plummeting prices for agricultural products and wage labourers experienced mass unemployment. Cocaleros faced a better situation. Unlike wage labourers, they were largely self-sufficient and not dependent on a salaried income. Unlike other peasants, they counted on relatively stable prices and a guaranteed market for their product. Furthermore, given the importance of the coca-cocaine
The state was not strictly enforcing coca eradication policies. This pattern continued until the beginning of the restoration of economic order in the latter half of the decade. 

The coca unions took advantage of the weakened capacity and declining activism of other unions. Former congressman Alfonso Alem\textsuperscript{28} recounts:

\begin{quote}
Along came the crisis, structural adjustment, and the worst defeat in the history of Bolivia’s organised labour. And here is when the coca union step in. They lifted their heads at a moment when the Bolivian popular movement—with its long history of confrontation and glory—was in absolute in ruin (Alem, interview, 28.1.2010)
\end{quote}

The most prominent coca union in the early 1980s was the Special Federation of Peasant Workers of the Tropic of Cochabamba (\textit{Federación Especial de Trabajadores Campesinos del Trópico de Cochabamba}—FETCTC). The FETCTC worked to enhance the power of coca unions, first within the CSUTCB and then within the COB. Essentially unknown at the beginning of the decade, by 1985 the FETCTC managed to overtake Bolivia’s most active peasant sector, the Aymara Katarista federation (Healy 1991: 92). In 1987, it successfully lobbied the CSUTCB to create a Coca Commission to serve as a platform for cocalero claims. The commission aimed to encourage coca consumers to protect the cultural value and traditional uses of the coca leaf. Representatives of the coca unions put forth the idea that protecting the coca leaf was synonymous with protecting Bolivia’s Andean cultures and way of life (ibid: 93-94). The aim was to broaden the cocalero-specific claim into a claim that appealed to all peasants. Cocaleros thus presented the defence of coca not only in terms of protecting the right to produce it, but also in terms of protecting its traditional uses and cultural value. The FETCTC also framed its claims in terms of the economic importance of coca within the context of crisis by highlighting its role in generating employment and controlling inflation. These claims not only helped win the support of small coca-producing areas outside of the Tropic of Cochabamba, but also demonstrated the FETCTC’s bargaining potential against the state to the CSUTCB.

After becoming a decisive force within the CSUTCB, the coca unions sought to enhance the CSUTCB’s position in the COB. The CSUTCB had always occupied a low rank in the COB. As stated by one peasant leader: ‘We are the spare tire, rather than one of the four main wheels of the COB’ (ibid: 100). In an interview with the author, cocalero leader Dionicio

\textsuperscript{28} Congressman (Chamber of Deputies) for the Department of La Paz (1989 and 1993) (Free Bolivia Movement [\textit{Movimiento Bolivia Libre}—MBL]).
Núñez recounted the following:

Before, the power structure was: first, the miners; second, the factory workers; and third, the rest. In the COB, the first in command was without a doubt a miner, and the second in command was without a doubt a factory worker. And what about the peasants and the indigenous people? We did not exist. Let me give you an example. One time Genaro Flores of the CSUTCB was at a COB meeting, when all of a sudden Juan Lechín [the head of the COB] decided he needed cigarettes—and he sent Genaro Flores to buy them! So we were discriminated against not only by the state, but by the union system as well (Núñez, interview, 15.1.2010)

The consequences of the economic and political crises facilitated the coca unions’ quest to change the historical power structure of the labour-dominated COB—especially the decline of the mining sector. The militant activism of the mining unions had played a major role in boosting the COB’s national profile and political power. Their decline benefited the coca unions in two ways. First, thousands of unemployed miners seeking financial stability migrated to the Tropic of Cochabamba and began to produce coca. This considerably increasing coca union membership—and with members that brought with them the syndicalist tradition of Bolivia’s historically strongest and most militant sector. Second, the fall of mining weakened the COB to the extent of becoming ‘somewhat moribund’ (Healy 1991: 101-102). In this context, the COB began to ‘take a new interest in the mobilised, and apparently radicalising, peasantry’ of the Tropic of Cochabamba and increasingly incorporated the peasant claims alongside those of labour (ibid).

The coca unions benefited from the minimal degree of state repression during the first half of the 1980s. The García Meza government did not act against cocaleros, but (given its links with the illicit drug market) heightened control over coca production by setting up distribution coca centres and licensing private merchants (Healy 1988: 111). Cocaleros decried these centres for their low coca prices and notorious corruption, yet found it difficult to contest them under the authoritarian García Meza government. After the restoration of democracy, cocaleros found it easier to mobilise and pressured the Siles Suazo government to re-establish the free market of coca. The weakness of the Siles Suazo government was such that at one point it even allowed the open sale of coca paste at outdoor markets in the Tropic of Cochabamba. Dr. Alfonso Camacho Peña, Minister of Education and Culture during the Siles Suazo government, stated the following in an interview with the author:

Bolivia had up to 65 thousand hectares of coca when Siles was in office. I remember that coca—illegal coca—would be sold out in the open in the plaza of Shinaota.

---

29 General Secretary of the COFECAY (2000 and 2003) and congressman (Chamber of Deputies) for the Department of La Paz (2002-2005)
During Siles’ time is when the country had the greatest rise in coca production (Camacho Peña, interview, 27.1.2010)

The pattern of weakness and leniency with respect to the coca unions changed under the Paz Estenssoro government, which reasserted the authority of the state vis-à-vis the union system.

Criminalisation. Bolivia had carried out eradication programs since 1961, but neither planned nor implemented them in a systematic fashion. In 1986, the Paz Estenssoro government imposed Bolivia’s first real attempt to control coca production with the Plan Trienal de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico. The Plan Trienal aimed to eradicate illegal coca production through various means, including voluntary eradication and crop substitution. It declared the Tropic of Cochabamba as a ‘military zone’ and stipulated that any illegal coca that remained in place after the period of voluntary eradication would be subject to forced eradication (García Linera 2008: 287). Around the same time, rumours began to circulate that the government would soon pass a law criminalising the production of coca.

The implementation of the Plan Trienal signalled Bolivia’s capitulation to United States drug control pressures. Coca henceforth dictated relations between the two countries. According to former congressman Alem: ‘Coca became the issue for the United States in terms of its relationship with Bolivia. The communist threat had passed and it needed something else to legitimise its presence. So coca became the issue. Hydrocarbons, gas, water… none of that mattered then. Coca was the issue’ (interview, 28.1.2010). Coca producers in the Tropic of Cochabamba for the first time felt the presence of the state—and it soon became an unwelcome presence. In an interview with the author, Saul Lara related the implementation of the first eradication programs in the area:

Here we have two important factors. First, the state all of a sudden appears, but only to impose eradication policies—that is, to repress cocaleros and to force them to eradicate and substitute their crops. Second, the state appears with an important and significant United States presence—with United States technocrats, United States weapons, United States helicopters, United States intelligence. And let me tell you one thing: Evo Morales would not exist as the figure he is today had it not been for the United States… had it not been for the resistance to the United States presence in the coca producing areas (interview, 29.8.2008)

The eradication policies prompted the first large scale mobilisations by the coca unions. A cocalero by the name of Evo Morales had begun to consolidate his leadership amongst the coca unions at this time. In 1982 he was elected head of the Sindicato San Francisco, his sindicato de base (base union); in 1985 he was elected head of the Central 2 de agosto, his
central (sub-federation); and in 1988 he was elected head of the FETCTC, his federación (federation) (Sivak 2008: 69). On May 26th 1987, more than ten thousand cocaleros coalesced to block the main road to Cochabamba. They demanded that the state allow them to analyse Plan Trienal, review the forthcoming Ley 1008, and decried the presence of United States in the area. The Secretary of Foreign Relations branded the mobilisation as a ‘narco-trafficking counter-offensive’ (Bedregal qtd. in García Linera 2008: 396). The state responded by calling on police and military forces to disperse the road blocks, resulting in the death of eight cocaleros and five hundred arrests (Los Tiempos, 28.5.1987). The mobilisation empowered the coca unions. In the words of Alvaro García Linera, vice-president of Bolivia:

> Around the time of the first eradication, the coca unions, which previously had a relaxed existence mostly related to domestic issues, began to take shape as a mobilising force against the state—or rather (at least for the time being) against the drug control policies of the state (García Linera 2008: 396)

The coca unions also became increasingly resentful of the United States, which put pressure the Paz Estenssoro government to hold firm to the new drug control policies. García Linera (2008) further affirms:

> From that moment until today, the anti-North Americanism of the cocalero movement would become a central component of its identity because… the state, in its actions and acts of repression, showed itself to be the simple implementing arm of a series of political decisions elaborated by the North American government and its diplomatic delegation (396)

In short, the mobilisations against the Plan Trienal helped unite the coca unions in their struggle against the state, articulate their grievances and identify their common enemies.

The cocalero social movement that had begun to take shape counted on important allies given their prominent role in the union system. The extent of their influence became evident as the mobilisations over the Plan Trienal and imminent Ley 1008 continued. As voiced by Guarachi:

> The CSUTCB counted on the support of the coca unions, and vice versa. Any mobilisation that they undertook, the CSUTCB would make it its own. We would declare ourselves in the road blocks; we would participate in the hunger strikes. You see, the general idea of the people of the highlands is that the coca leaf is a sacred symbol, and that when they were trying to make it disappear—because that was the idea behind those eradication programs you know—they were also trying to make our ancestral cultures disappear. This feeling was very strong. So the CSUTCB permanently supported the cocaleros. They have never been alone in their struggle. They have had the support of all peasants in their pronouncements (interview, 27.8.2008)

The COB also supported the cocaleros. In early 1988 it participated in a hunger strike
alongside coca unions to the demand the approval of the Ley General de la Coca (General Coca Law), an alternative proposal to Ley 1008 (García Linera 2008: 397). The COB also defended coca unions in the aftermath of the repression against a march in Villa Tunari on June 27th 1988. The march had taken place to protest the imminent approval of the Ley 1008, to reject use of herbicides in eradication and to demand the exit of United States officials from the Tropic of Cochabamba. The confrontation between cocaleros and the state resulted in the death of eleven cocaleros, prompting the event to become known as the Villa Tunari Massacre (Sivak 2008: 70). In one account of the confrontation, a group of protestors surrounded and overtook a police post, leading eradication agents to disperse them with machine guns and tear gas. This version was refuted by an investigative commission composed of the political parties of the opposition, the COB and the Catholic Church. In the cocaleros’ account, United States soldiers clashed with protesters and engaged in repressive acts alongside Bolivian police forces. They claimed that the repression spread throughout Villa Tunari, even within home and markets, and that it targeted union leaders in particular (García Linera 2008: 398). In 1989, Morales gave a speech to mark the one year anniversary of the Villa Tunari Massacre. The following day eradication agents beat him and left him for dead (Sivak 2008: 70). By that time, he had acquired a reputation as the head of the FETCTC and had decided to dedicate himself to union politics and leave aside other projects, such as the Front of the Anti-Imperialist Masses (Frente Amplio de Masas Anti-Imperialista—FAMA) he had established with a group of cocaleros (ibid).

On December 20th 1988, the government of Paz Estenssoro passed the Ley 1008. The coca unions managed to push for the inclusion of an article that prohibited the use of aerial spraying and herbicides (Healy 1991: 96). This proved a small victory in light of the law’s far-reaching repercussions. The Ley 1008 stipulated three areas of coca production: traditional, transitional and illicit.30 It deemed the production of coca outside of the traditional area a criminal offense. Previously regarded as any other peasants under the law, the vast majority of Bolivia’s cocaleros immediately became illegitimate actors.

La Coordinadora de las Seis Federaciones del Trópico de Cochabamba. The Ley 1008 both united and divided Bolivia’s cocaleros. As discussed in Chapter 2, Bolivia has two main coca-producing areas: the highland valleys of the Yungas and the lowland valleys of the Tropic of

30 See Chapter 2 for details on the legal framework surrounding the three areas of coca production.
Cochabamba. The coca unions of the Yungas, like those of the Tropic of Cochabamba, began to take action in defence of coca in the 1980s. The first mobilisations by the cocaleros of the Yungas took place in 1982 against the policies of the Siles Suazo government that placed restrictions on the marketing of coca. The next mobilisations took place in 1985 against the implementation of the Plan Trienal and formulation of the Ley 1008. According to Yungas cocalero leader Núñez: ‘Around 1985, we began to hear about the War on Drugs… before that, we had not realised they wanted to eliminate coca. That was when we began to mobilise’ (interview, 15.1.2010). In 1985, cocaleros of the Yungas and Tropic of Cochabamba stood equally under the law. In 1988, the latter group became illegitimate actors and subject to incarceration for their livelihood. Núñez recounted the effects of the Ley 1008 in an interview with the author:

In the past, all of Bolivia’s cocaleros were together under one national structure, ANAPCOCA. There was not an urgent need to act, but we were still organised. Then the United States made Bolivia’s congress approve the Ley 1008. That law divided us. From then on, the repression was mostly directed in the Tropic of Cochabamba, the illegal zone (interview, 15.1.2010)

The coca unions of the Yungas nonetheless protested the Ley 1008 because it posed a threat as it only regarded 12,000 hectares as legal. They also contested the state on matters regarding the sale and commercialisation of legal coca. In September 1994, Yungas coca unions organised a march and reached accord with the state on the regulation of the commercialisation of coca. However, United States troops soon after arrived in the Yungas, prompting the coca unions of the Yungas to participate in a march and hunger strike with the coca unions of the Tropic of Cochabamba (García Linera 2008: 467). Núñez (2010) noted that the march and hunger strike marked the ‘first time the cocaleros of the Yungas and of the Tropic of Cochabamba acted together since the passing of the Ley 1008’ (interview, 15.1.2010). In November 1994, the Yungas cocaleros created the Council of Federations of the Yungas of La Paz (Consejo de Federaciones de los Yungas de La Paz—COFECAY). The COFECAY united the Yungas coca unions under one coordinating council. Núñez affirms the significance of the COFECAY as such:

Before, we organised individually, since there are six federations, sometimes each federation would negotiate alone, there were divergent positions. Ever since we faced the need to undertake a united struggle, the COFECAY was organised... So the mobilisations led by the Yungas are a product of the governments that have not heard our demands, in the sense that coca had to be respected and that they should

---

31 The National Association of Coca Producers (Asociación Nacional de Productores de Coca—ANAPCOCA) was formed in the early 1980s. The organisation brought together cocaleros from the Yungas and the Tropic of Cochabamba into one national structure. Its main objectives included the industrialisation and sale of coca. However, the organisation did not manage to consolidate into one national structure (García Linera 2008: 465).
The need to form a united front was even more pressing in the Tropic of Cochabamba, as the claims of coca unions in that area went far beyond those related to the sale and commercialisation of coca.

The *Ley 1008* galvanised the struggle of the coca unions of the Tropic of Cochabamba. According to Guarachi: ‘The *Ley 1008* made cocaleros realise that mobilising together would be the best way to contest the state’ (interview, 27.8.2008). The unions were organised into six federations: the FETCTC, the *Federación Mamore*, the *Federación Centrales Unidas*, the *Federación Carrasco Tropical*, the *Federación Yungas del Chapare* and the *Federación Chimore*. The first three federations were affiliated with the CSUTCB and the latter three with the Syndicalist Confederation of Bolivian Colonisers (*Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia—CSCB*). The CSUTCB and the CSCB represent the six federations in the COB. The six federations came together to form one coordinating council, the Coordinator of the Six Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba (*La Coordinadora de las Seis Federaciones del Trópico de Cochabamba*), soon after the approval of the *Ley 1008*. Carlos Hoffman, director of the *Control Social de la Hoja de Coca* (Social Control of the Coca Leaf) project of the European Union, related the process in an interview with the author:

We entered the area with the European Union in 1988. We tried to generate a new concept of alternative development that was sustainable, voluntary, participative and without conditions. In that sense the European Union strengthened the coca unions. At the time, I was an adviser to the coca unions. And I remember, with Filemón Escobar, when we said to them ‘You must establish a *coordinadora* of the six federations’… and so the *Coordinadora* was formed (interview, 17.1.2010)

Guarachi also affirmed:

Yes, in the face of the *Ley 1008* is when the coca unions formed the *Coordinadora*, which meant the coming together of the six federations. You see, before the unions did not have an articulating force. But that law united them. After that it didn’t matter if a federation was affiliated with the CSUTCB or the CSCB, because the *Coordinadora* represents the coca unions directly in the COB (interview, 27.8.2008)

The *Coordinadora* was first proposed as a project in 1988, and formally came into being at a convention in Shinahota in 1992. In the interim, coordinating committees assumed its role (García Linera 2008: 392). Ever since the establishment of the *Coordinadora*, the six federations of coca unions of the Tropic of Cochabamba have acted as one unified force. They contest the state with one set of claims, which representatives agree upon at
conventions, and undertake join mobilisations. A federation cannot carry out a mobilisation without first having gone through the Coordinadora, and once a mobilisation is approved all six federations take part in it without exception.

4.5 MECHANISMS

By 1988, the cocaleros of the Tropic of Cochabamba had coalesced into a social movement: they manifested a collective challenge, common purpose, solidarity and collective identity, and engaged in sustained interaction with their opponent. After ascending the ranks of Bolivia’s union system, the six federations of coca unions of the Tropic of Cochabamba came together under the Coordinadora to wage a collective challenge against the state with the common purpose of defending their livelihood, the production of coca. Cocaleros in the Tropic of Cochabamba developed two political identities: an (internal) collective identity as peasant producers of coca (‘cocaleros’) that constituted their primary political identity; and an (internal) collective identity as members of Bolivia’s union system (‘syndicalists’) that constituted their secondary political identity. This secondary political identity was strengthened by an external factor: the large influx of displaced miners that settled in the Tropic of Cochabamba. At this stage in their contentious episode, solidarity amongst cocaleros rested on these two identities, and the sustained interactions between cocaleros and the state rested solely on the common purpose of defending the production of coca.

The formation of the cocalero social movement involved a key element: criminalisation. The cocaleros of the Trópico had already developed a common purpose, a sense of collective identity and solidarity, and had interacted with the state as a unionised peasant sector before the criminalisation of coca and establishment of the Coordinadora. Criminalisation, which deemed cocaleros illegitimate actors, made their common purpose more pressing, deepened their sense of collective identity and solidarity and changed the nature of their interactions with the state. It also cemented the state’s position as the common enemy—and cocaleros formed the Coordinadora to wage a collective challenge against it. From that point on, the coca unions of the Tropic of Cochabamba acted as a collective force. It short, the establishment of the Coordinadora signified the formation of the cocalero social movement.

The discussion below details the identity-shaping mechanisms that unfolded during the cocaleros’ contentious episode, and their role in the formation of the cocalero social movement.
**Category formation.** *Invention.* The Bolivian state criminalised the production of coca in 1988. In doing so, it created new boundaries between cocaleros and other actors. These included: one separating cocaleros (as producers of a criminalised good) from other peasants; one separating illegal cocaleros (mostly located in the Tropic of Cochabamba) from legal cocaleros (mostly located in the Yungas); and one separating cocaleros (as a whole) from the state (as their common enemy). One must note that by the time these boundaries were imposed under *Ley 1008*, the coca unions of the Tropic of Cochabamba were already a powerful unionised peasant sector and had a firmly established primary political identity as ‘cocaleros’ and a secondary political identity as ‘syndicalists’.

**Encounter.** Encounter took place between cocaleros of the Tropic of Cochabamba and miners that migrated to the area following their massive displacement as a result of the neoliberal policies of the NPE that shut down COMIBOL. Thousands of miners and their families began to engage in coca production. In other words, they became cocaleros and henceforth rested within the boundary that encompassed the identity of ‘cocalero’. The new relations between cocaleros and miners also reinforced the ‘syndicalist’ identity present in the Tropic of Cochabamba. Miners brought with them the syndicalist tactics, culture and historical memory that developed from their multiple and turbulent interactions with the state. Moreover, their presence helped refine the boundaries delineating the political identities of ‘cocalero’ and ‘syndicalist’. Mining unions maintained an ideology that held strong to two antis: anti-imperialism and anti-neoliberalism. Both antis were linked to a rejection of United States influence in Bolivia. These antis echoed with cocaleros given the perceived role of the United States in the rising assault on coca. In short, it became very clear that the United States (along with the Bolivian state) stood opposite the boundaries that encompassed ‘cocalero’ and ‘syndicalist’.

The new boundaries and relations stemming from the cocalero-miner encounter had an empowering effect on the coca unions of the Tropic of Cochabamba. First, the coca unions, which were rising in numbers and stepping up their activism, became more prominent within the CSUTCB. Second, the COB increased its defence of peasant claims as it began to take notice of the rising influence of coca unions. Both the CSUTCB and the COB actively supported the cocalero social movement once it formally took shape.
**Borrowing.** Borrowing occurred in the Tropic of Cochabamba throughout its colonisation. Early colonisers established new communities that reinvented the forms of organisation, regulation and protection of interests of Bolivian peasant communities (García Linera 2008: 395). This reinvention of community and syndicate know-how allowed new peasant communities to address the needs and challenges of migrating to an area with limited state presence. Organised through unions, peasant communities took charge of activities that traditionally fall under the realm of the state. These included land titling, health, education, infrastructure and even community justice. Unions in the Tropic of Cochabamba have a greater influence in community life than unions in the original peasant communities of these migrants. Thus, the adoption and adaptation of pre-existing community relations within a new local setting contributed to a distinct culture of the Tropic of Cochabamba, which is characterised by a high degree of community organisation that is centred on unions. Peasants in the Tropic of Cochabamba thus have a firm identification as ‘syndicalists’.

**Object shift.** Object shift took place when the MNR government of Paz Estenssoro passed Decree 21060, which led to the massive lay-offs in COMIBOL. Bolivian miners viewed this as an assault on the labour sector and as an act of betrayal on behalf of the politicians that they had voted into office in 1985. In the words of mining leader Filemón Escóbar (2008):

> We let ourselves be fooled, with the most deceitful rhetoric… The dramatic *Marcha por la Vida* of the miners was a defensive action in the face of the grave error we had committed in May of 1985: to have voted for the political parties that represented the neoliberal economic model… With our vote we had helped dismantle the mines of COMIBOL, and with that, the destruction of the mining proletariat and the complete weakening of the glorious Mining Federation (190)

The betrayal de-legitimised traditional politicians in the eyes of the mining unions, which had always been at the forefront of the labour sector. Along with their union know-how, miners carried the memory of this betrayal to the Tropic of Cochabamba when they re-settled there in search of a new livelihood. Furthermore, they had the same opponents as the coca unions (the state and the United States). The ex-mining syndicalists that migrated to the Tropic of Cochabamba thus stepped within the boundary encompassing ‘cocaleros’ with ease.

**Certification.** The first major act of decertification took place in 1961 when the UN’s Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs criminalised coca as the raw material of cocaine. This decertified cocaleros on an international level. In 1988, the Bolivian state decertified cocaleros at the national level by criminalising coca under *Ley 1008*, which turned cocaleros...
into illegitimate actors. The act defined the state as the cocaleros’ common enemy. It also contributed to increased antagonism toward the United States (given the active role of the United States in the development of Bolivia’s anti-drug strategy) and defined the United States an additional common enemy.

**Brokerage.** Bolivia’s coca unions formed the *Coordinadora* to act as a broker between the different coca unions and the state. The *Coordinadora* also facilitates coordination between the coca unions, the CSUTCB and the COB, as it maintains a special position whereby it directly represents the interests of the coca unions of the Tropic of Cochabamba as a whole in the two confederations. Lastly, the *Coordinadora* allows the coca unions to articulate unified claims and undertake joint mobilisations (often with support of the CSUTCB and the COB) against the state.

This section has outlined the identity-shaping mechanisms that make up the identity-formation process that took place from the beginning of the transition to democracy in 1978 to the establishment of the *Coordinadora* in 1988. During this time, economic and political crises presented cocaleros with a favourable set of political opportunities and threats. The identity-shaping mechanisms at work within that setting helped form the cocaleros’ primary and secondary political identities of ‘cocaleros’ and ‘syndicalists’, respectively. Cocaleros began to experience systematic state repression for the first time during the Paz Estenssoro government, prompting series of contentious interactions between the two actors. In 1988, the state criminalised coca, turning cocaleros into illegitimate actors. However, criminalisation at the same time galvanised the burgeoning cocalero social movement to coalesce into the *Coordinadora*. This act culminated the formation of the cocalero social movement and re-established cocaleros as social actors. The Bolivian cocaleros’ experience as illegitimate actors was thus remarkably short lived.

### 4.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has detailed the formation phase of the Bolivian cocalero social movement, which encompasses the coca unions of the Tropic of Cochabamba. Two key points stand out regarding the movement’s formation. First, its members were powerful social actors with established identities before the criminalisation of coca politicised their identities, deemed them illegitimate actors and prompted the consolidation of their social movement. Second, the social movement demonstrated notable strengths. Both points stand in stark contrast to the
The first point gives insight into the timing and ease of the Bolivian cocaleros’ transition from illegitimate actors to social actors. The transition proved rapid and rendered their experience as illegitimate actors exceptionally brief. One can attribute the ease of the transition to the existence of a ‘cocalero’ identity early on. Colonisers that migrated to the area throughout different waves of colonisation (the most recent being the one prompted by the economic crisis of the 1980s) composed a large part of the Trópico’s population. They came from a range of diverse socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds, including rural, urban, labour, peasant, Aymara, Quechua, mestizo and so forth. Despite their varied backgrounds, these colonisers coalesced around the ‘cocalero’ identity after migrating to the Trópico and adopting the livelihood of coca production. The ‘cocalero’ identity linked them to a new livelihood and helped them integrate as members of a new community. The cocaleros of the Trópico also maintained a secondary identity as ‘syndicalists’. Due to the lack of state presence in the area, unions played a far greater role in community planning and daily life than in other parts of the country. This secondary identity reinforced the unity and sense of community amongst cocaleros. Together, these firmly ingrained identities allowed the coca unions of the Trópico to consolidate into a social movement after the state deemed them as illegitimate actors (and politicised their identities) by criminalising coca in 1988.

One must also highlight that Bolivia’s cocaleros consolidated their social movement within months of the 1988 criminalisation of coca—as opposed to their Peruvian counterparts, which did so twenty-five years after the 1978 criminalisation of coca. Bolivian cocaleros thus spent less than a year as illegitimate actors, whereas Peruvian cocaleros did so for twenty-five years. This gap is due to late criminalisation of coca in Bolivia in comparison to Peru, and to the late formation of the Peruvian cocalero social movement. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Bolivian state was historically more defiant of international drug control efforts than the Peruvian state. During the period of military rule that commenced in 1964, several governments became involved in the illicit drug trade to varying degrees. When democracy returned in the 1980s, it did so alongside a debilitating economic crisis. The economic significance of coca at the time meant that the state engaged in minimal (if any) drug control or repressive measures against cocaleros. Bolivia only began to enforce drug control policies and capitulated to the criminalisation of coca under the Paz Estenssoro government, which sought to consolidate the neoliberal economic model—a task which necessitated an amicable
relationship with the United States.

The second point that stands out is the remarkable strength of the cocaleros as social actors. The cocaleros of the Trópico demonstrated a level of cohesion, unity and power well beyond the cocaleros of Peru and other social actors in Bolivia. This strength stemmed in part from the economic significance of coca during the economic crisis of the 1980s, which allowed cocaleros to thrive economically and evade state repression at a time when other peasant and labour sectors grew very weak. This was especially true for the labour sector (in particular mining), as the government of Paz Estenssoro sought to debilitate it in the quest to restore social order, implement the NPE and consolidate the neoliberal economic model.

After the criminalisation of coca, the six coca union federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba established the Coordinadora in order to articulate a common agenda, undertake joint mobilisations and together press their demands on the state. The Coordinadora benefitted from the union system in several ways. To start, cocaleros counted on the know-how, discipline and historical memory of its large contingent of ex-miners. Cocaleros also counted on the support of the CSUTCB and the COB in their mobilisations. In part, the CSUTCB and COB supported cocaleros because cocaleros were the only social actors with the capacity to contest the state at the time. However, they also lent their support because cocaleros framed their struggle not just as the defence of the production of coca, but as the defence of the culture value and uses of the plant—and most of the members of the CSUTCB and COB were habitual coca consumers. The support of the peasant and labour sector in the Bolivian case stands in contrast to the Peruvian case, where cocaleros remained isolated even after they transitioned from illegitimate to social actors. The isolation and even stigmatisation of the Peruvian cocaleros resulted from their imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’.

Lastly, it is important to note that the Bolivian cocalero social movement encompassed only those cocaleros that the Ley 1008 labelled as illegal producers. Legal cocaleros of the Yungas expressed their support for the illegal cocaleros of the Trópico, but they rarely undertook joint actions. Still, as Chapter 6 demonstrates, the cocaleros of the Trópico eventually brought the cocaleros of the Yungas under a common agenda—but one that transcended the issue (and inherently divisive nature) of coca.
Peru: Transformation of a Social Movement—Radicalisation, Division and Demobilisation

The Peruvian cocalero social movement revealed significant weaknesses during the March of Sacrifice of 2003, such as its inability to attract sympathisers or prominent allies. This weakness stemmed from the political identity of ‘illegitimate’ imposed on cocaleros by their links to the illicit drug trade, association with the Shining Path and mainstream society’s perception of coca. Nonetheless, the March of Sacrifice of 2003 validated cocaleros as social actors and brought their claims to the national spotlight. It also presented them with an opportunity to continue to strengthen their collective identity of ‘cocalero’, denounce their imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’ and construct additional identities to legitimise and broaden the appeal of their claims. Peru’s cocaleros did not seize this opportunity. Instead, their social movement underwent a rapid radicalisation and division, which de-legitimised the standing they had acquired as social actors capable of affecting the national agenda and negotiating with the state.

As discussed in Chapter 1, various outcomes can follow the formation of a social movement. These include, but are not limited to, demobilization (for reasons such as repression or facilitation by the state, achievement of goals or exhaustion), establishment of a civil society organization or entry into formal politics. The Peruvian cocalero social movement underwent a transformation that involved its demobilisation and entry into formal politics. Peru’s cocaleros transitioned from social actors to political actors during this transformation. However, they did so in large part as individuals and on a local or regional scale—rather than as a collective on a national scale.

This chapter examines the transformation of the Peruvian cocalero social movement following the 2003 March of Sacrifice. It discusses the transition of Peru’s cocaleros from social actors to political actors, and highlights the factors behind their weaknesses and limited appeal as political actors. The first section details the context of the transformation, in relation to the political opportunities and threats it presented. The second section accounts for the division and radicalisation of the social movement. The third section looks at the de-

32 For an in-depth discussion of social movement outcomes, see Tarrow (2011).
legitimisation of Peru’s cocaleros. The fourth section discusses the cocaleros’ actions as political actors. The fifth section analyses the identity-shaping mechanisms and broad mechanisms at work during the transformation of the social movement.

5.1 THE NEW DEMOCRATIC ERA

The formation of a social movement requires a favourable set of political opportunities and threats (that is, context). Since context continually changes, a social movement must reinvent itself to sustain contention. It does this by interacting with its opponent, which generates new forms of collective action, master frames and mobilising structures that create new opportunities for the social movement, its opponents and other contentious actors (Tarrow 2011: 167). These new opportunities become crucial when existing opportunities fade and/or new threats emerge.

Paniagua. Chapter 3 discussed Peru’s prolonged period of repression during the Fujimori government. Along with the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, this repression severely weakened social organisations. To quote Arce (2006):

[Peru] has been often held out as a prime example both of the draconian imposition of neoliberal reform and of the widespread disintegration of representative institutions and other societal groups (28)

The long-standing peasant and labour confederations were especially hard hit, particularly the CGTP. Democracy returned in November 2000 under the provisional government of Valentín Paniagua, which created an opening for conventional and contentious political action. As political parties and leaders prepared for the general elections of May 2001, subordinate social groups flooded the provisional government with petitions and mobilisations. The nature of their petitions and mobilisations revealed that these groups held predominantly local claims and that they lacked organisation at the national level. In effect, the legacy of the political repression under Fujimori and the prevalence of neoliberal economic policies circumscribed contentious action to the regional arena in the new democratic era.

Toledo. In May 2001, Peruvians elected Alejandro Toledo as president. He promised to eliminate poverty, fight corruption, guarantee political freedoms and maintain the neoliberal economic model. In July 2001, the Toledo government commenced the process of decentralisation by announcing that regional and municipal elections would take place in November 2002. Decentralisation created regional governments composed of an executive, a
legislature and a coordinating council that aimed to function as a space for dialogue and interaction with civil society (Azpur 2004: 117). By adding the regional dimension, decentralisation created a three-tier political system: municipal, regional and national.

Contentious actors continued to surface in this context, yet maintained a local profile. In particular, Frentes de Defensa Regionales (Regional Defence Fronts) sprung up across the country. The Frentes de Defensa Regionales bring together the various urban, rural and other social organisations of a particular region. They emerged and rapidly multiplied with the return to democracy in 2000 and the decentralisation that commenced in 2001. The Frentes de Defensa Regionales have played prominent roles in the conflicts between social actors and the state on many issues, such as education, mining projects, privatisation, water rights and the environment.

The most important social conflict under Toledo involved a Frente de Defensa Regional. The conflict emerged in the city of Arequipa, where Mayor Juan Manuel Guillén strongly supported local organisations. In early 2002, Minister of the Economy and Finance Pedro Pablo Kuczynski announced that the state intended to privatised a local energy company called Egasa in May of that year. Tractebel, a Belgian corporation, was set to take over the company. The announcement signalled the Toledo government’s intention to follow the neoliberal economic model put in place in the 1990s. Uceda (2011) relates:

As much as he had spoken against the Fujimori government, Toledo continued his economic model. …The privatisation of Egasa and Egesur did not give rise to differences [within the government]. It was the continuation of an inconclusive reform process ([online])

Local organisations strongly opposed the privatisation plan and formed the Frente Amplio Cívico de Arequipa to oppose it. The Frente immediately called for six large-scale mobilisations and Mayor Guillén commenced a hunger strike in solidarity with the protesters. The mobilisations spread to neighbouring provinces in Tacna and Moquegua, where privatisation also threatened the local energy company Egesur. The state countered the widespread mobilisations with repression, which led to clashes in which two hundred people were wounded, and declared a state of emergency in the Arequipa region (Schvarz 2002: [online]). The protests eventually led to the resignation of Minister of the Economy and Finance Kuczynski and Minister of the Interior Rospigliosi. The case of Arequipa highlights the regional nature of contentious politics in the new democratic era. Whilst the CGTP and
left leaning political parties spoke out against privatisations on many occasions, in the end it was a regional movement that succeeded (at least temporarily) in halting one of the most salient neoliberal projects at the time.

Indigenous organisations also materialised during the Toledo government. Historically, indigenous movements in Peru have been limited and weak. Landa (2006) relates:

The examples of neighbouring countries enthuses us and makes us dream about the possibility of a great movement, given that we have similar characteristics and a greater number of indigenous people in our territory. Yet, when we awaken, we realize that there is no such movement… This ‘inexistence’ of a contemporary indigenous movement in Peru has been denoted in different ways—the ‘Peruvian exception’ (Montoya 2006) or the ‘inhibition of the movement’ (Del Alamo 2005 and Escarzaga 2005)—and explained by various causes (129)

The indigenous organisations that contested the Toledo government did not profess purely indigenous or ethnic discourses, claims or identities (ibid: 131). The National Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining (Confederación Nacional de Comunidades del Perú Afectadas por la Minería—CONACAMI) provides one example. Andean communities formed CONACAMI in the late 1990s to defend land made vulnerable to mining companies by Fujimori’s neoliberal natural resource policies (Green 2006: 348). Whilst not purely indigenous in nature, CONACAMI represents Peru in the Andean Coordinator of Indigenous Organisation (Coordinadora Andina de Organizaciones Indígenas—CAOI). Miguel Palacín, founder of CONACAMI, has acknowledged the absence of a strong indigenous identity in the organisation, but at the same time expresses hope for the future. In his words: ‘The indigenous movement or Andean thought in Peru has not died. It is sleeping and will awaken’ (Palacín qtd. in Green 2006: 348). Indigenous groups in the Amazon region formed the Inter-ethnic Development Association of the Peruvian Jungle (Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana—AIDESEP) in 1980. AIDESEP took the lead amongst indigenous organisations in challenging the state during the Toledo government, with the support of international NGOs and other tribal organisations. Nevertheless, as Landa (2006) points out, its actions focused more on promoting development projects than on seeking ‘ethnic recognition’ (131). AIDESEP is a member of the Coordinator of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin (Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica—COICA), an international network of sister organisations and NGOs critical of extractive industries. Pressed by land timber, gas, oil and mining concessions, and new investment projects that threatened access to water and contamination, indigenous organisations petitioned the state to stand by the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO)
Convention No. 169, which Peru ratified in 1994. The convention addresses the rights of indigenous people along the lines of the principle of consultation and participation. According to the ILO:

The spirit of consultation and participation constitutes the cornerstone of Convention No. 169 on which all its provisions are based. The Convention requires that indigenous and tribal peoples are consulted on issues that affect them. It also requires that these peoples are able to engage in free, prior and informed participation in policy and development processes that affect them (ILO 1989: [online])

Both Andean and Amazonian indigenous organisations pressured the Toledo government to introduce the principle of consulta previa (prior consultation) in matters affecting their communities.

Indigenous organisations became increasingly engaged in contentious politics during the Toledo government. However, they did not manage to form alliances or become close with peasant or labour confederations like the CCP and the GCTP, nor establish a strong national profile. In 2004, AIDESEP, CONACAMI and COPPIP\(^\text{33}\) organised a national event to discuss the situation of indigenous peoples in Peru. They extended an invitation to Peru’s main peasant and labour confederations. However, the confederations chose not to participate (Green 2006: 352).

In sum, social conflict became common in the context of re-democratisation in the 2000s, yet was isolated and circumscribed to the local or regional arena. Van Dun (2009) relates that the CGTP, SUTEP\(^\text{34}\) and CCP ‘all organised protests directed against Toledo’s government but no coordination existed between the different groups’ (226). Pizarro, Trelles and Toche (2004) recount that whilst a wide range of subordinate groups undertook mobilisations and made demands during the Toledo government, none ‘sought to articulate with other sectors or broaden the scope of social protest’ (39). They conclude:

[I]t would be difficult to affirm that we are facing social movements that question the status quo and are pressuring to change the rules of the game. Instead, it seems as though we have a succession of small explosions, which sometimes acquire important connotations, but that do not transcend nor generate impact other than in limited dimensions (39)

\(^{33}\) The Permanent Coordinator of Indigenous Peoples of Peru (Coordinadora Permanente de Pueblos Indígenas del Perú—COPPIP) was founded in 1997 with the aim of uniting Andean and Amazonian communities under an indigenous banner. However, Amazonian and Andean communities have struggled to form a united front.

\(^{34}\) The Unitary Syndicate of Education Workers of Peru (Sindicato Unitario de Trabajadores en la Educación del Perú—SUTEP)
Despite their limited impact and scale, the Toledo government took increasingly repressive measures in response to these social conflicts. In February 2002, the Council of Ministers approved a law that increased the sentence for those that violated the constitutional right to free transit—a measure taken to combat the strategy of roadblocks commonly undertaken by protesters. In February 2003, an ordinance by the Municipality of Lima prohibited the entry of demonstrators into the historic downtown area. In May 2004, the state passed DL 28222, which modified the criteria for calling on the armed forces to quell acts of terrorism, violence, armed attacks against public or private entities, and to supress situations where evidence indicated real or imminent danger. The Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman) also began to monitor social conflicts in 2004 (Monge, Portocarrero, Viale and García 2008). The trend of using repression to address social conflict led Pizarro, Trelles and Toche (2004) to assert:

In general, there was hope that the new government would have enough capacity to form spaces of compromise and channels for social demands, as a way to strengthen democracy. Nevertheless, the balance indicates that without a doubt there was no such capacity (57)

The neoliberal economic model, especially vis-à-vis the contentious actors that mobilised against it, thus prevailed during the Toledo government.

**García.** Alan García won the presidency in the national elections of 2006. Contentious challenges by subordinate actors against the state over extractive industries intensified as the new president emphasised private investment and dismissed social protests. The number of conflicts at the beginning of his term in July 2004 was eighty-four. By the end of his term in May 2011, the number had risen to 277 (García 2011: 196). Socio-environmental conflicts in particular became more pronounced, rising from thirty-six per cent of all conflicts in April 2007 to fifty-one per cent in July 2008 (Monge, Portocarrero, Viale and García 2008: 118). García proved unwavering in his stance in favour of extractive industries. He defended his position on oil extraction in an editorial for *El Comercio*:

They have created the figure of the ‘disconnected’ Amazonian native; that is, unknown but assumed, for which millions of hectares must not be explored, and for which Peruvian oil should remain below ground whilst in the world they pay 90 USD per barrel. It is preferable to them that Peru continues to import and become more impoverished (García 2007: [online])

In June 2010, García vetoed the Law on Prior Consultation, which required the Peruvian state to uphold the ILO’s Convention No. 169. García argued that law’s broad definition of ‘indigenous’ could inhibit policy-making (Burt 2011: 9). His decision to veto the law went in
line with his overall aggressive stance with respect to labour and peasant organisations (APRODEH 2007).

The most notable social conflict during the García government took place in the province of Bagua (located in the Amazonian region) in early 2009. Protesters led by AIDESEP demanded the recognition of the principle of consulta previa. They decried a series of decrees that facilitated transportation, mining, logging and drilling projects in the Amazon by giving concessions without first consulting communities. Protesters began to mobilise in April 2009 by blocking roads and seizing oil installations, effectively interrupting the regional oil trade. In early June, the national police stepped in to remove protestors from a road block. A violent clash ensued in which eleven police officers and twenty-five indigenous protestors were killed (New York Times 5.6.2009). Commonly referred as the ‘Baguazo’, the event prompted the resignation of Prime Minister Simon Yehude and the rest of the Cabinet. Congress also agreed to support the Law on Prior Consultation (which President García then vetoed).

Despite mobilising significant contentious challenges, indigenous movements faced difficulty in uniting their communities and remained disconnected from other labour and peasant organisations during the García government. Pajuelo (2010) relates:

Organisations like CONACAMI and CAOI are determined to construct a political movement of indigenous peoples, but they are still far off from representing them in an effective manner (318)

The García government also continued the practice of using repression in response to social conflict. In 2006, the International Human Rights Federation (Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos—FIDH) expressed concern over the human rights situation in Peru. In 2007, the Pro Human Rights Association (Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos—APRODEH) declared that the human rights situation had grown worse compared to the previous year (Van Dun 2009: 285).

**Implications for political opportunity.** Democracy and decentralisation efforts offered new venues for political action. A flurry of contentious challenges hit the Toledo and García governments. However, they had a limited impact, as both governments showed a consistent disposition to attend to the demands of upper and middle class residents of Lima rather than to the demands of the various social actors that challenged them (APRODEH 2007). Durand (2010) asserts:
In the neoliberal era, civil society has not been able to flourish in a way that it can present a counterweight to the enormous accumulated power in the hands of the great corporations, and the state technocrats and civil servants that support economic interests (210).

Neoliberalism thus prevailed in the post-Fujimori era.

The governments of Toledo and García at the same time became subject to intense pressure from the United States to continue with eradication and alternative development policies. Along with the democratic opening, this prompted cocaleros to contest the state. Cocaleros became one of the few, if not only, social movements to coalesce at the national level and impact policy-making. However, their cohesion as a unified force proved short-lived and they were eventually remanded to the regional level. This proved especially true after the demobilisation of their social movement and transition to political actors. Peru’s cocaleros thus followed the trend of regionalised and isolated social conflict in the new democratic era. The chapter proceeds to discuss the transformation of the cocalero social movement in detail, commencing with the events immediately following the 2003 March of Sacrifice.

5.2 DIVISION AND RADICALISATION

We have been deceived. ‘If Marisela Guillén had returned to the Apurímac-Ene supporting DS 044 the people would have lynched her’ (Antesana, interview, 27.8.2004). The cocaleros of the Apurímac-Ene valley maintained a strong allegiance to Palomino and his discourse of coca o muerte. Guillén, who had replaced Palomino as the Apurímac-Ene’s main leader, went to the 2003 March of Sacrifice negotiations aware of her valley’s commitment to Palomino’s radical discourse. She walked out of the negotiations and then voiced her opposition to the consensus reached over DS 044 immediately after the state released details of the decree. In her words: ‘We have read [the decree] carefully and it does not recognise a single point in the platform of our struggle’ (El Comercio 29.4.2003). Guillén then called on Peru’s cocaleros to hold the CONPACCP’s main leaders accountable for capitulating to the state.

CONPACCP leaders Malpartida, Obregón and Sánchez Moreno faced a difficult situation. They could not afford to lose the support of the Apurímac-Ene’s FEPA-VRAE, which represented 13,000 cocaleros—nearly half of the CONPACCP’s membership. On April 26th, Malpartida, Obregón and Sánchez Moreno sent a letter to President Toledo that voiced their disapproval of certain aspects of DS 044, such as the participation of DEVIDA and NGOs in
the implementation of eradication programs. Still, the letter gave no indication that the CONPACCP opposed the policy of gradual and concerted eradication. The CONPACCP leadership thus made a cautious move that protected their legitimacy with the state and mainstream society (Antesana, interview, 27.8.2004).

The CONPACCP’s response did not appease the cocaleros of the Apurímac-Ene. The confederation split into two factions in the months that followed. The Apurímac-Ene, Monzón, La Convención and Lares valleys formed one faction; the Upper Huallaga and Aguaytía valleys formed the other. These groupings at first glance appear contradictory. Why would the cocaleros of La Convención and Lares valleys (who produce mostly legal coca) ally with those of the Monzón valley (who primarily produce illegal coca) and with those of the Apurímac-Ene (who produce both legal and illegal coca)? The following paragraphs shed light on this puzzling alliance.

Cocaleros of the Apurímac-Ene valley fully ascribed to the coca o muerte discourse. To understand their radical position, it is important to note the rise in coca production in the valley since the late 1990s. By 2003, it surpassed the Upper Huallaga as the largest coca-producing valley. At that point, it accounted for 32 per cent of Peru’s total coca production (UNODC 2004: 21). The amount of coca destined for illicit means also increased, as well as the number of maceration pits for the production of basic cocaine paste. A top USAID official confirmed this in an interview with the author (Estela, interview, 10.8.2004). Antesana also recounted this pattern:

As an Ayacucho native, I have several cocalero friends in the Apurímac-Ene valley and they know my work. More of them have begun to produce basic paste… and those that have no longer speak to me, because they know I consider that crossing the line (interview, 28.8.2004)

Guillén nevertheless denied the rise of illicit production in the valley and declared that the FEPA-VRAE did not oppose the destruction of maceration pits (El Comercio 24.4.2003).

The Monzón valley exemplifies an extreme case of illicit coca production. In 2003, it accounted for seventy-eight per cent of the coca in the Upper Huallaga, which tends to produce approximately thirty per cent of the national total (UNODC 2004: 14). The valley has a tropical climate that contributes to the superior productivity of its coca bushes, which yield five harvests per year in comparison to three per year in other valleys. Its remote
location and the lack of state presence facilitated spread illegal activities and have made state interference difficult. According to one DEVIDA official:

Nobody goes into the Monzón; the state does not exist there. The only institution that has been able to enter is the PEAH [Special Project Upper Huallaga], which began water and sewage works—and this took place only with the permission of cocalero leaders (La República 18.2.2004)

In 2003, the Monzón accounted for fifty per cent of Peru’s total illicit coca production (La República 20.2.2004). It sold only one per cent of its production to ENACO, which purchased coca at around 56 soles per arroba (La República 18.2.2004). Drug traffickers, in contrast, paid an average of 93 soles per arroba (FONAFE 2005). Cocalero leaders of the Monzón do not deny that the bulk of production goes toward drug trafficking. They argue that coca production has destroyed the soil and made it inadequate for the production of other crops such as corn, potatoes or coffee. They adamantly oppose any form of eradication and have asked the state to help in their efforts to commercialise coca. Salvador Arcayo Céspedes, for example, affirmed that, ‘for the people of the Monzón the true alternative development is in coca itself’ (La República 18.2.2004). His fellow cocalero leader Iburcio Morales expressed the same position: ‘Nothing can substitute the coca leaf… and no one will pull out a single bush of coca in this valley’ (El Comercio 17.2.2004). Cocaleros of the Monzón asked the state to declare the valley a coca sanctuary, allow them to freely plant their crops and develop ways to commercialise coca—they even asked the state to install a coca-processing factory. Should the state fulfil these demands, they affirmed that then ‘we would certainly no longer fight’ (La República 18.2.2004).

La Convención and Lares valleys alongside the Quillabamba River produce coca almost exclusively for traditional consumption. Its cocaleros fall under the representation of FEPCACYL, the oldest organisation to promote cocalero interests. In 2003, these valleys produced approximately twenty-eight per cent of Peru’s total coca cultivation (UNODC 2004: 21) and sold eighty per cent of their output to ENACO (Expreso 7.3.2003). FEPCACYL leaders have chastised ENACO for purchasing their coca at low prices and then re-selling it in markets for traditional use at inflated prices. For this reason, twenty per cent of coca production of La Convención and Lares valleys ends up in the black market for traditional consumption. The black market purchases coca at higher prices and sells it at lower prices than ENACO (FONAFE 2005). Cocaleros of La Convención and Lares have asked the state to declare the valleys areas of traditional production (El Comercio 21.2.2003).
When the rest of the valleys mobilised in March 2003 over the forced eradication in Aguaytía, La Convención and Lares valleys staged their own protests in Quillabamba in demand of full legality (Expreso 7.3.2003). The mobilisations brought together ten thousand cocaleros and received backing from the Cusco regional government, which called for advancements in the commercialisation of coca to stimulate more coca purchases by the state (Expreso 24.2.2003). In the months after the 2003 March of Sacrifice, representatives of FEPCACYL joined those of the Apurímac-Ene and Monzón valley in denouncing DS 044. In their view, the policy of gradual and concerted eradication conflicted with their demand of allowing free coca production. The three valleys thus came together in support of the discourse of *coca o muerte* and rejected all forms of eradication.

*A movement divided.* Between April and August of 2003, the leaders of the Apurímac-Ene and Monzón valleys maintained no contact with those of the Upper Huallaga and Aguaytía valleys. In September, Palomino sent out a message urging the valleys to re-unite. The leaders obliged and held a meeting in November, at which time they resolved to hold the second national congress of the CONPACCP in Lima the following February.

A pre-congress meeting took place on January 11th 2004. The event gave cocalero leaders an opportunity to recount the situation of the valleys, cite grievances and update their list of claims. In the opening speech, Malpartida condemned the state for not fulfilling DS 044. She also condemned the state for failing to consult valley representatives before enacting voluntary eradication schemes, update the official registrar of ENACO and carry out the study of the demand for traditional coca. She closed the speech with the following words: ‘Cocalero, an honest Peruvian like you: neither terrorist nor narco-trafficker!’ (Malpartida, speech, 11.1.2004). The CONPACCP leaders then presented a list of new claims: the establishment of a Law of Coca and a new Law of Drugs, a revaluation of the coca leaf as a part of national patrimony and the immediate release of Palomino. With this platform, the CONPACCP hoped to re-group with the Apurímac-Ene and Monzón valleys in the upcoming second national congress.

The Apurímac-Ene valley announced a boycott of the event a few days before it was due to commence. Guillén claimed that her people did not trust the CONPACCP because its leaders had failed to represent their interests (Antesana, interview, 28.8.2004). The CONPACCP convened in Lima on February 15th as planned. On the first day of the congress, Iburcio
Morales announced that the representatives of the Monzón had decided to leave. He chastised the CONPACCP for not attracting representatives from all of the valleys and questioned its trustworthiness after negotiating with the state (La República 15.2.2004). The actions of the Apurímac-Ene and Monzón representatives threatened the unity and leadership of the CONPACCP and compelled Malpartida and Obregón to produce a quick response. The two leaders anticipated that Guillén would again challenge their leadership at an upcoming cocalero encounter in Cusco organised by FEPCACYL. They also realised that continuing to support DS 044 could cause a permanent break in the CONPACCP. In order to demonstrate that the CONPACCP remained committed primarily to the cocalero cause and second to its negotiations with the state, the two leaders chose to radicalise their claims. Obregón and Malpartida declared that the CONPACCP would not tolerate any form of eradication and announced a second March of Sacrifice to Lima to take place at the end of April 2004 in defence of the new platform (Antesana, interview, 28.8.2004).

FEPCACYL’s Sixth Extraordinary Congress of Producers and Consumers of the Coca Leaf convened in Cusco between the 4th and 6th of March 2004. The governor of La Convención gave the opening speech, in which she condemned the association of the coca leaf with drug addiction and expressed support for the removal of DEVIDA from the valleys. In her words, DEVIDA ‘had only worked to cause division among the cocaleros’ (Castro Melgarejo qtd. in El Diario del Cusco 8.3.2004). The congress resulted in the unanimous approval of the slogan ‘Coca o muerte... venceremos’ (‘Coca or death... we shall overcome’) alongside the official platform of ‘No to eradication, no to the substitution of coca in any of its forms, defending it even with our life!’ (Expreso 8.3.2004). It also produced an agenda that rejected DL 22095, DS 044, all forms of eradication, DEVIDA and ENACO. At that moment, backing down to a moderate agenda by any cocalero leader meant risking alienation from other cocaleros leaders as well as their own legitimacy. Cocalero leaders of all valleys finally stood united—and on a new radical platform.

The turn toward unity proved short-lived. On the last day of the congress Guillén announced that the Apurímac-Ene, Monzón, La Convención and Lares valley leaders would not support the CONPACCP’s second March of Sacrifice and would instead meet in Lima on April 25th to establish a new organisation, the National Junta of Agricultural Producers and Cocaleros (Junta Nacional de Productores Agropecuarios y Cocaleros). Guillén invited the leaders of the CONPACCP to join the Junta. The CONPACCP leadership refused the invitation and left
All of the valleys remained committed to the same radical platform despite their disunity. Still, they differed in how they presented it. The *Junta* defended the cultural value of coca, declared it a *hoja sagrada* (sacred leaf) and condemned its association with cocaine. It also blurred the line between legality and illegality by affirming the following: ‘There is no such thing as two cocas, there is only one coca and we will defend it all’ (ibid). Obregón and Malpartida presented the CONPACCP’s new radical position with less forceful language. Whilst they did not proffer the slogan of *coca o muerte* per se, they effectively adopted a platform in defence of all coca by adopting the five points set forth at the Cusco congress.

5.3 DE-LEGITIMISATION

**Preludes to the 2004 March of Sacrifice.** Protests broke out against alternative development programs in Aguaytía and Tingo María in mid-March 2004. Local cocalero leaders claimed that the state had not coordinated with them in planning voluntary eradication schemes. They announced that—as members of the CONPACCP—they would march to Lima if the state did not address their claims by April 20th. The state ignored their declarations.

The impending 2004 March of Sacrifice quickly took on a radical tone. Prior to the CONPACCP’s arrival in Lima, media reports surfaced linking cocaleros to the Shining Path. Shining Path guerrillas had been re-organising and accruing resources in the Huallaga and Apurímac-Ene valleys (areas of extensive illicit coca production) since the early 2000s. Their leaders, Alipio of the Apurímac-Ene and Artemio of the Huallaga, previously voiced their support for the cocaleros. In February, Artemio announced that the cocaleros could ‘count on our direct support and, if we should come to actively participate in their demands, we are prepared to defend them with arms’ (*El Comercio* 19.2.2004). These declarations proved worrying, as income from illicit drug-related activities had allowed the guerrillas to build a new relationship with cocaleros in the two valleys. The Shining Path did not threaten and coerce peasants. Instead, it went to the valleys to purchase food and even give loans to peasants that lost their land during the war (*La República* 20.7.2003). Peasants have affirmed that the Shining Path has apologised for the past and promised it would no longer resort to violence. Guerrillas have told peasants: ‘We have made mistakes in the past... we are not going to kill you’ (Antesana, interview, *El Comercio* 28.8.2001). Despite the evidence to suggest the existence of a relationship of non-aggression and even cooperation between the
valleys and the Shining Path, there was no indication of a deeper affiliation at the time. When confronted with allegations of links with the Shining Path, Malpartida declared the following: ‘We will not accept any support from the Shining Path because we want our development and our legality’ (Correo 21.4.2004).

Media reports also took note of the presence of certain political figures at the CONPACCP’s pre-congress meeting in January, such as that of businessman and attorney Ricardo Noriega Salaverry. Salaverry ran for president in 2001 under the independent group Despertar Nacional (National Awakening) and had a questionable reputation due to links with the Fujimori government. He attended the pre-congress of the CONPACCP as a keynote speaker, volunteered to act as Palomino’s attorney and allegedly helped fund the 2004 March of Sacrifice (Correo 22.1.2004). Also present at the pre-congress was Olmedo Auris of Patria Roja (the Communist Party of Peru) and Antauro Humala of the Peruvian Nationalist Movement. Both spoke of the possibility of a ‘Bolivianazo’ in Peru.35 In the words of Humala:

A Bolivianazo in Peru would be beautiful… Every person has a right to insurgency. For this I applaud the cocaleros and ask other citizens to join their protests’ (Correo 22.1.2004)

Minister of the Interior Rospigliosi denounced the presence of these figures at the pre-congress as evidence of political manipulation of the cocalero movement. Malpartida responded by stating that the pre-congress was open to any political group and that cocaleros accepted Noriega as Palomino’s attorney despite his reputation because ‘no one else would defend us’(Agencia Perú 22.1.2004). She also claimed that while Patria Roja defended their struggle, the cocaleros had no official ties with the party (Cabieses, interview, 12.8.2004). The leanings of those that had voiced their support showed the CONPACCP’s difficulty in forming alliances with groups with a high degree of legitimacy.

Meanwhile, Minister of the Interior Rospigliosi had pre-emptively declared the mobilisations a failure after Guillén announced that the FEPA-VRAE did not support the CONPACCP’s march (La República 21.4.2004). He warned the public that Peru ran the risk of becoming a ‘narco-state’ if it ceded to the cocaleros’ demands. He directed the following words to Malpartida: ‘If the lady does not want to follow the path of Nelson Palomino, she should

35 The term ‘Bolivianazo’ refers to the fall of Bolivia’s Sánchez de Lozada government in October 2003 after protests over the privatisation of natural gas.
come to her senses and talk with the state’ *(Expreso 22.4.2004)*. Rospigliosi and President of the Council of Ministers further warned that the state would refuse to negotiate with the CONPACCP in the event of any disruption *(La República 25.4.2004)*.

To add to the CONPACCP’s troubles, the meeting of the Junta in Lima on April 25th confirmed speculations of disunity. Representatives from the Apurimac-Ene, Monzón, La Convención and Lares valleys officialised the new confederation and their break with the CONPACCP. Guillén proclaimed:

> We are in disagreement with the CONPACCP’s mobilisations because its leaders did not consult with all of the valleys… We do not oppose the organisation, but its leaders who agreed to voluntary and forced eradication and now say they oppose it (Guillén qtd. in *La República 26.4.2004*)

The division of the cocalero social movement thus became public.

**The arrival of the CONPACCP.** Between the 28th and 30th of April, three thousand CONPACCP cocaleros arrived in Lima. Obregón dismissed the lack of support from Guillén and Iburcio Morales: ‘They think they are the last Coca-Cola in the desert, but we are not going to give them any importance’ *(Obregón qtd. in Expreso 30.4.2004)*. Malpartida made clear that the CONPACCP no longer supported gradual and concerted eradication when she expressed hope that the state would ‘resolve our claims which propose to eliminate the forceful or voluntary eradication of our coca crops’ *(El Comercio 1.5.2004)*. She insisted that these claims did not make cocaleros delinquents because they had asked for the registration of their crops, not *coca libre* (liberated coca) *(Perú 21 1.5.2004)*. Obregón and Malpartida justified the new platform by arguing that past voluntary eradication programs had not been truly voluntary, but conditional. In the words of Obregón:

> There has never been voluntary and concerted eradication in my area. Now [the state] says it wants this, but the people say ‘no’. They come to build a road, to build a school and to eradicate coca. We have ministries of education and transport for such things. What I believe is that before [eradication] we must have the presence of the state *(El Comercio 8.5.2004)*

Obregón reaffirmed her disdain for these programs in an interview with the author:

> We do not want any USAID programs because they only give us public works in exchange for eradication of our crops. I have more trust in coca than I do in them and in the state. Coca allowed us to buy weapons to fight against the Shining Path, and it has put food on our tables (interview, 17.8.2004)

She maintained that the CONPACCP opposed any form of eradication for these reasons and demanded the removal of organisations in charge of carrying out eradication programs. The
CONPACC compiled a list of claims, which included the five points adopted at the March gathering in Cusco (the rejection of DL 22095, DS 044, all forms of eradication, DEVIDA and ENACO) and the release of Palomino. Lastly, CONPACC leaders announced that since the CONPACC represented peasants—not criminals—they would only dialogue with the Minister of Agriculture and refuse to dialogue with the Minister of the Interior.

On the morning of May 3rd, the CONPACC’s cocaleros marched to Congress and held talks with congressional representatives. The representatives agreed to form a commission to look for solutions to the cocaleros’ demands (La República 4.5.2004). Later that evening, cocaleros settled in front of the Palace of Justice in protest of Palomino’s continued detainment. The protest escalated into the first major confrontation between the CONPACC and the state. Trouble began when Minister of the Interior Rospigliosi ordered the removal of the cocaleros from the palace. In an interview with the author, Obregón recounted that she informed the police that CONPACC protesters intended to remain at the Palace of Justice until 4 a.m., because they needed to rest before walking back to their camp. When police forces arrived at the scene around 1 a.m., Obregón called Congressman Victor Valdez, representative of the Ucayali region. Valdez assured the cocalero leader that nothing would happen. A few minutes later, ‘because of Rospigliosi, the police hit us with tear gas and forced us to leave’ (Obregón, interview, 17.8.2004). Rospigliosi also recounted the incident in an interview with the author:

Congress let them in, but President Toledo had refused to dialogue… they were defeated and they knew it. So they went to the Palace of Justice in search of violence and martyrs. We took them out of there. We used many police officers to prevent an outbreak of violence and sent them back to [their camp in] Santa Anita (interview, 23.8.2004)

The next day, the CONPACC demanded an apology from Rospigliosi and asked to meet with the Minister of Agriculture. The CONPACC vowed to set up roadblocks in Lima if it did not receive an apology. On May 4th, Minister of Agriculture Jose León met with CONPACC leaders in an attempt to scale down the conflict and agreed to dialogue on the following day to discuss possible ‘technical’ solutions to the situation (El Comercio 5.5.2004). The next day Obregón and Malpartida announced that they would not dialogue with the commission because it included representatives from the Ministry of the Interior. On May 6th, Rospigliosi resigned his post after Congress censured him for his handling of an unrelated incident in the town of Ilave. In an interview with the author, Obregón revealed her role in the censorship vote:
On the day of the vote [in Congress] I spent hours on the phone calling our representatives to vote against Rospigliosi. We encouraged five congressmen that would have abstained to vote against. There were not only celebrations in Ilave that day, we cocaleros also rejoiced at his exit (interview, 17.8.2004)

The exit of Rospigliosi from the political scene did not improve relations between the state and the CONPACCP, whose leaders and members remained in Lima until early June.

Obregón insisted on an apology from the new Minister of the Interior for the ‘rude acts’ committed on behalf of the ministry, and asked for his removal from the congressional commission (La República 9.5.2004). The commission refused and asked for a 30-day period to work through the cocaleros’ demands. The CONPACCP announced that this was unacceptable. The Ministry of the Interior then released the following statement: ‘This is a decision of the Executive and no threats of any kind will be allowed’ (El Comercio 12.5.2004). Furthermore, the President of the Council of Ministers decided not to take part in the commission arguing that it contained sufficient government representatives (La República 12.5.2004). The CONPACCP leadership (excluding Obregón, who had begun a hunger strike) met with the commission headed by León on May 12th.

The meeting did not lead to a resolution. Malpartida insisted that the CONPACCP would not make a decision without consulting its constituents—an indication of the lessons of the March of Sacrifice of 2003 (El Comercio 13.5.2004). León, who had demonstrated a strong inclination for resolution throughout the ordeal, began to lose patience. He commented to the press: ‘They think they can demand government attention to claims that are impossible to resolve’ (La República 13.5.2004). The CONPACCP refused to budge on any of its demands.

The wavering actions of the CONPACCP leadership began to cost them credibility with mainstream society. Furthermore, their claims had lost validity after the release of the DEVIDA report on the demand for traditional coca in Peru. The report estimated that only 9,000 metric tons out of the 52,700 metric tons of coca produced satisfied the demand for traditional consumption. In other words, 43,700 metric tons—eighty-three per cent—of coca production ended up in the illicit drug trade (DEVIDA 2004). Following the release of the report, one editorial commented that the figures merited the claims of the CONPACCP as ‘extreme radicalism’ that could not serve as a base for dialogue (La República 13.5.2004). The CONPACCP showed no signs of abating. Obregón declared: ‘We have taken on a radical
profile. If [the state] does not want to completely stop eradication, then why does it want to dialogue?" (*El Comercio* 16.5.2004). Almost three weeks had passed since the arrival of the CONPACCP in Lima. The possibility of a mutual understanding was fading.

Two weeks after the CONPACCP walked out of the meeting with the congressional commission, protests re-emerged and escalated throughout the Upper Huallaga and Aguaytía valleys. Clashes took place between protesters and people attempting to use roads, and police forces twice failed to remove roadblocks. The state demanded that Obregón and Malpartida call off the protests. The two leaders responded by saying that they could not control the protestors, who were acting on their own in response to the unwillingness of the state to hear their demands (*Perú 21* 21.5.2004). President Toledo faced increasing calls for order as protests, strikes and roadblocks continued. He finally took action and announced: ‘It’s over… The time has come for a tough response’ (*La República* 28.5.2004). On May 27th, he sent a proposal to Congress for a law that increased the penalty for organising and inciting public disturbances from three to eight years in prison (*Expreso* 28.5.2004). The next day, Obregón announced that the CONPACCP had decided to leave Lima since no dialogue would take place with the state (*El Comercio* 28.5.2004).

León made a final attempt to promote dialogue. He organised a meeting with a commission that included the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of the Interior, DEVIDA, ENACO and the CONPACCP to discuss updating ENACO’s registry of legal coca producers. An update would benefit both the state and cocaleros. DEVIDA’s report on the demand for traditional coca showed that ENACO only purchased 3,000 metric tons of the 9,000 metric tons annually consumed for traditional consumption. Unlike other points of contention, the update of the registry would legalise a number of cocaleros in a way that benefited the state. After the meeting, León announced that the commission had reached a verbal agreement with the CONPACCP. The agreement stipulated an update of the ENACO registry of legal coca producers with the cooperation of the state and cocaleros, a reorganisation of DEVIDA—indicating that cocaleros no longer demanded its deactivation—and a proposal for a new Law of Coca (*La República* 30.5.2004). León described the verbal agreement as a ‘step forward in reaching an understanding with the cocaleros’. Malpartida spoke to the press after the meeting and declared that while the state had not agreed to the cocaleros’ principal demands, they had made a move toward resolution (*El Comercio* 30.5.2004).
The following day, Obregón and Malpartida gave a press conference that unravelled the progress toward dialogue. Obregón, who had not attended the meeting due to her hunger strike, declared that Malpartida had met with the commission only to voice the concerns of cocaleros. She denounced León’s statements as a ‘smoke screen’ to create positive public opinion for the state and affirmed that cocaleros would not ‘be subjected to’ registration under ENACO until the state passed a Law of Coca separate from a Law of Drugs (Correo 31.5.2004). Malpartida also spoke and denied making a verbal agreement with the commission (La República 31.5.2004). On June 1st, Obregón announced that the CONPACCP forces would leave Lima. Denying defeat, she affirmed:

This does not imply a truce with the government, we are only going back to consult with all the bases, evaluate our mobilisation and decide what action to take for the government to attend to our demands (Obregón qtd. in La República 1.6.2004)

The members of CONPACCP returned to their valleys after nearly a month of failed attempts at dialogue. They had not made progress toward any point on their radical agenda, they had lost credibility with the mainstream society and they remained isolated from the Junta.

The behaviour of the CONPACCP’s leaders throughout April indicated that they had gone to Lima with no intention to make accords with the state. The CONPACCP had made demands that the state could not meet: the suspension all forms of eradication while the state made a Law of Coca and a new Law of Drugs, and the re-organisation of all agencies related to the coca issue. Accepting these demands implied a virtual legalisation of all coca for a number of years. Obregón and Malpartida made it clear from the beginning that the CONPACCP would not budge on its agenda. They twice refused to reach resolutions claiming that they first had to consult with their bases and other valleys. The CONPACCP leaders had made the choice to protect their legitimacy with their constituents above all else. One could even claim that CONPACCP undertook the 2004 March of Sacrifice only to demonstrate its commitment to cocalero claims, and that it never intended to dialogue with the state.

**The aftermath.** The adoption of a zero eradication platform, as well as the behaviour of the CONPACCP leadership during the 2004 March of Sacrifice, cost cocaleros their legitimacy with mainstream society. The events of the 2004 March of Sacrifice showed that cocaleros had no desire to break free from their dependency on coca. The release of DEVIDA’s report on the demand for legal coca also weakened their legitimacy. Lastly, the reports linking cocaleros to the Shining Path, Patria Roja and the Peruvian Nationalist Movement also
proved damaging. All of these factors contributed to the de-legitimisation of Peru’s cocaleros after the 2004 March of Sacrifice. Table 5.1 compares public opinion surveys taken in Lima in 2003 and 2004. It presents the results as the percentage of positive responses to a particular statement involving coca, cocaleros and/or drug trafficking. The surveys demonstrate notable changes in the public’s perception of cocaleros. For example, the percentage of positive responses to the statement ‘Cocalero peasants are part of the drug trafficking chain’ increased from forty-eight per cent to fifty-five per cent (if asked if they agreed) and from six per cent to twelve per cent (if asked if they strongly agreed). The percentage of positive responses to the statement ‘Responsibility of cocalero peasants for the problem of drug trafficking’ decreased from thirty-four per cent to twenty-two per cent (if asked if cocaleros had some responsibility) and increased from fourteen per cent to twenty-four per cent (if asked if cocaleros had great responsibility).

**Table 5.1 Public Opinion Survey: Coca and Cocaleros**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Lima 2003</th>
<th>Lima 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coca production is destined to drug trafficking in its:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great majority</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocalero peasants are part of the drug trafficking chain:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug trafficking has an influence in the organisations of cocalero peasants:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility of cocalero peasants for the problem of drug trafficking:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some responsibility</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great responsibility</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CONPACCP’s attempt to maintain unity by radicalising its agenda came at a high cost. It heightened the overall radical nature of the movement, tarnished the legitimacy cocaleros gained during the 2003 March of Sacrifice and pushed away possible allies and sympathisers within the state and mainstream society.

5.4 COCALEROS AS POLITICAL ACTORS

Perú’s cocaleros have yet to recover from disunity that erupted after the 2003 March of Sacrifice. Since the establishment of the Junta, cocalero mobilisations have not gone beyond regional roadblocks and demonstrations. No mobilisation has compared to the March of Sacrifice of 2003 or 2004 in terms of participants and national media coverage.

Reunification? Cocalero leaders from the Upper Huallaga, Apurímac-Ene and La Convención and Lares valleys met for the first time since the 2004 March of Sacrifice at the First International Festival of the Coca Leaf, which took place in La Convención in August 2005. Malpartida tried to amend the discord that developed over DS 044 by relating her account of what took place during the negotiations. In her words:

We were in the Palace and we didn’t have advisors on our side, so we asked ourselves, ‘Will this be all right?’ Everybody said it would be all right. Not just Elsa Malpartida and Nancy Obregón. Everybody said it would be fine and the others just listened and said nothing. Now my question is: Why should we only blame this on Nancy and Elsa? Anybody could have said something that day. Mrs. Marisela Guillén could have said: No Mr. President, I don’t like this and I don’t want to sign it’. Clearly, without any doubt only Nancy and Elsa are traitors’ (Malpartida qtd. in Van Dun 2009: 242)

Malpartida and Obregón listened to accusations and offered explanations to the festival attendees. According to Van Dun (2009), who was amongst the attendees:

After their explanations and emotional confessions, the majority of FEPA-VRAE’s cocaleros were convinced that CONPACCP’s national leaders had made these mistakes because of their inexperience. But the cocaleros of FEPCACYL, the legal producers with a long-standing tradition of protests, still mistrusted them and didn’t totally align themselves with CONPACCP (243)

Their efforts paid off. The CONPACCP held its fourth national congress the following month, at which time the FEPA-VRAE officially re-aligned itself with the organisation. Antesana contends that the FEPA-VRAE took this decision in large part at the behest of Palomino, who continued to lead the FEPA-VRAE from prison (interview, 3.2.2011).
The reunification of the CONPACCP broke down the Junta and left the Monzón valley standing alone. The leaders of the Monzón formed another organisation to counterweight the CONPACCP, the National Coca Agricultural Organisation of Peru (Central Nacional Agropecuaria Cocalera del Perú—CENACOP). The valleys aligned with the CENACOP included the Monzón and three small valleys in the Upper Huallaga (Aucayacu, Leoncio Prado and Yanajanca). Together they articulated the most radical cocalero platform, which called for the implementation of a comprehensive development plan for the area and the immediate cessation of all eradication programs. The CENACOP acquired a high profile due to its radical agenda and suspicions of cooperation with the Shining Path. Nevertheless, it has not undertaken sustained large-scale mobilisations and has experienced internal disputes. The CENACOP undertook its most significant mobilisation in April and May of 2007, which consisted of an indefinite strike in Tingo María. The strike sought to pressure the state to cease all eradication programs in the valleys aligned with the CENACOP (La República 17.4.2007). The protest compelled the state to form a dialogue table between the leaders of the CENACOP and the Council of Ministers. The dialogue table resulted in the Council of Ministers’ agreement to form a working group to evaluate the cocaleros’ situation and elaborate a development plan for the Huánuco region with a pledge of 132 million soles. The CENACOP consequently agreed to stop the indefinite strike (Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros 2007). The working group met only a few times and did not develop a concrete plan of action. Furthermore, the leaders of the Monzón valley made a deal with the state that included a promise to stop eradication efforts in the valley. This caused to a fracture within the CENACOP as eradication continued in Aucayacu (Antesana, interview, 3.2.2011).

From the time of the reunification of the CONPACCP up to the writing of this thesis, Peru’s two main cocalero confederations (aside from FEPCACYL) have remained the CONPACCP and the CENACOP. Neither has demonstrated a strong capacity to mobilise its bases, nor presented a significant challenge to the state.

**Regional politics.** Cocaleros have made a notable impact on the polity despite their effective demobilisation as a social movement. This impact stems from the actions of individual or small factions of cocaleros that transitioned from social to political actors, and has tended to be on a regional (rather than national) scale. Three points merit mention regarding the activities of cocaleros as political actors.
First, Obregón won a seat in Congress representing the San Martín region and Malpartida won a seat in the Andean Parliament in the national elections of 2006. The two leaders made an alliance with presidential candidate Ollanta Humala’s Union for Peru-Peruvian Nationalist Party (*Unión por el Perú-Partido Nacionalista Peruano*—UPP-PNP) after resigning their positions in the CONPACCP in August 2005. Their resignation, along with the disputes with other cocalero leaders, cost Obregón and Malpartida a loss of local support. Nevertheless, they remained the most prominent cocalero leaders at the national scale. Cocaleros initially accused the two leaders of using the CONPACCP to gain visibility and launch their political career, but as the election neared cocaleros put aside their differences to support Peru’s first national cocalero candidates. Even Palomino, who at first openly criticised the alliance with the UPP-PN, called on Peru’s cocaleros to lend their unconditional support to Obregón, Malpartida and Ollanta Humala (Van Dun 2009: 270).

Second, the García government conditionally released Palomino with a presidential pardon in June 2006. After his release, Palomino began to travel to the different valleys proclaiming his leadership and asserting that he was the one and only leader of Peru’s cocaleros (Antesana, interview, 9.2.2006). His had three main objectives: first, form a political party to replace the UPP-PNP as the political party of the highlands; second, re-assume his position of leadership within the FEPA-VRAE; third, re-form the CONPACCP and consolidate the influence of the FEPA-VRAE within it (Antesana, interview, 9.2.2006).

Palomino launched his political party, *Kuska Perú*, at the end of June. This proved troublesome for Obregón and Malpartida, because they formed part of the UPP-PNP. The two leaders publicly recognised Palomino as the general secretary of the CONPACCP, yet upheld their allegiance to the UPP-PNP (Durand 2006). Palomino meanwhile remained determined to unify Peru’s cocaleros under *Kuska Perú*, which he described as a ‘pluralist’ party. A few days after its establishment he declared:

> We cocaleros are united, and we are going to have a general meeting. The political question has caused disequilibrium amongst many… But we are going to reposition ourselves politically, in a democratic way’ (La República 25.6.2006)

*Kuska Perú* won seven mayoral contests in the Apurímac-Ene valley in the municipal elections of November 2006. The only contest lost was that of Palomino himself in the municipality of San Francisco. Palomino did not manage to launch *Kuska Perú* in any other valley, but several other cocalero associations put forth their own candidates in the elections.
Palomino re-assumed his position as the general secretary of the CONPACCP during the organisation’s fifth national congress in late September 2006. His also regained his reputation as a bully, because he disrespected other cocalero leaders and took over the allocation of resources and all decisions with respect to mobilisations. The CONPACCP’s sub-secretaries began to complain over the lack of communication and coordination. All of these factors contributed to ‘widespread demoralisation’ within the CONPACCP (Van Dun 2009: 279). Cocaleros then grew suspicious after Palomino failed to organise any sort of local, regional or national mobilisation against the forced eradications taking place under the García government. He was especially criticised after failing to speak out after a new round of forced eradications commenced in the Upper Huallaga in 2007 (Antesana, interview, 3.2.2011). Palomino lost hold of the CONPACCP’s leadership at the organisation’s sixth national congress in September 2007. Aware of his faltering support, Palomino tried to subvert the congress by accusing its organisers of corruption and refusing to participate. The congress took place as anticipated. Palomino arrived two days late and other cocalero leaders largely ignored his presence. The congress concluded by electing a new generation of leaders. Palomino never recovered from his fall at the sixth national congress. It later surfaced that he had held secret meetings with the Council of Ministers, DEVIDA, ENACO and the United States Embassy on several occasions. In an interview with the author, Antesana maintains that Palomino approached the García government in early 2007 for ‘talks’ in which the government ‘bought him out’ (Antesana, interview, 3.2.2011). Former Minister of the Interior Rospigliosi coincided with this postulation in another interview with the author: ‘Palomino got out and the cocaleros mobilisations stopped. The cocaleros are nothing now. That guy has been bought’ (Rospigliosi, interview, 22.8.2008). The CONPACCP survived the fall of Palomino and continues to assert itself as the representative of Peru’s cocalero social movement.

Third, cocaleros succeeded in encouraging certain regional governments to pass ordinances on coca and coca production (see Table 5.2). The regional government of Cusco unanimously approved an ordinance recognising valleys of La Convención, Yanatile and Qosnipata as area of traditional coca production in June 2005. The regional government of Huánuco passed a similar ordinance in July 2005. A constitutional tribunal then declared these ordinances unconstitutional in September 2005 (see Table 5.3). Lastly, in February 2008, the regional
### TABLE 5.2 REGIONAL LEGISLATION ON COCA AND COCA PRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LEGISLATION</th>
<th>CONTENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HUANUCO</td>
<td>17 Jul 04</td>
<td>Ordinance 015-2004-CR-GRH</td>
<td>Recognises the coca leaf as cultural patrimony and a part of food security of Huánuco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 May 05</td>
<td>Ordinance 09-05-E-CR-GRH</td>
<td>Institutes the Coca Leaf Festival and recognises the nutritional and medicinal value of the coca leaf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 Jul 05</td>
<td>Ordinance 027-05-E-CR-GRH</td>
<td>Incorporates and article to Ordinance 015-2004-CR-GRH that recognises the legality of coca production in Huánuco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUSCO</td>
<td>29 Jun 05</td>
<td>Ordinance 031-05-GRC/CRC</td>
<td>Declares the coca leaf as regional, natural, biological, cultural and historical patrimony and recognises areas of traditional production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CUSCO/PR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUNO</td>
<td>28 Feb 08</td>
<td>Ordinance 22-07</td>
<td>Recognises the coca leaf as regional, cultural, immaterial, ethno-botanical, sociological, historical, medicinal and industrial patrimony, and as a symbol of the Quechua and Aymara people of Puno.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5.3 CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL RULING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLAIMANT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>SENTENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC</td>
<td>27 Sep 05</td>
<td>To declare Ordinance 031-05-GRC/CRC of the regional government of Cusco, and Ordinances 015-2004-CR-GRH and 027-2005-E-CR-GRH of the regional government of Huánuco as unconstitutional</td>
<td>Declares the regional ordinances as unconstitutional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

government of Puno passed an ordinance recognising the coca leaf for its cultural, historical and medicinal qualities and as a symbol of the Quechua and Aymara people. The majority of these ordinances were declared unconstitutional, but their passing demonstrated that cocalero organisations and the coca issue had grown politically relevant at the regional level.

---

37 Source for Table 5.2 and 5.3: Chirinos (2011).
A ‘political instrument’? The localised instances of political empowerment have not helped cocaleros grow as a collective political force on a national scale. Nevertheless, the CONPACCP has not given up on this mission. At the seventh national cocalero congress held in Puno in November 2008, the CONPACCP made a call to form a ‘political instrument’ similar to that constituted by cocaleros in Bolivia. In an interview with the author, Obregón affirmed that cocaleros intend for the political instrument to become a political party that ‘unites the races and is not just a coca party’. Through this instrument, cocaleros would ‘change history and establish a new constitution, because Peru has never had a constitution that really represents its people’ (Obregón, interview, 26.3.2009). The CONPACCP reaffirmed its intention to form a political instrument at the eighth national cocalero congress held in Aguaytía in January 2010. However, cocaleros continued to show signs of weakness. Iburcio Morales, for example, refused to attend and the person sent in his place to represent the Monzón valley left soon after the congress commenced. Obregón maintained that the idea of the political instrument was still in its early stages and thus could not play a role in the 2011 national elections. She also affirmed that cocaleros would soon benefit from a new generation of leaders, as some of their youth had been able to attend university (ibid). Indeed, a new round of leadership appears to already be taking hold of the organisation. A young cocalero leader from the Ucayali region beat both Obregón and Malpartida in an internal election held during the eighth congress over the position in charge of the formation of the political instrument.

The CONPACCP has maintained a united front since its reunification in 2005, but has shown an almost absolute inability to carry mobilisations. It has ‘organisational unity, but over constituents that have no solidarity’ (Antesana, interview, 3.2.2011). This standstill with respect to mobilisations is due in part to the fact cocaleros have consistently challenged the state over eradications since the return of democracy in 2000, yet eradication efforts have showed no signs of abating. To use Tarrow’s (2011) terminology, Peru’s cocaleros have fallen subject to exhaustion. Another factor to consider is the resurgence of the Shining Path since the early 2000s. Both factions of the Shining Path are deeply involved in drug trafficking. In fact, IHS Global Insight reported that neither faction represents a significant threat to the state given their almost exclusive focus on ‘protecting their drug-trafficking assets’ (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2011: [online]). Reports have also given evidence of collusion between the Shining Path and cocaleros. The most notorious was a video recording of a meeting between Artemio, the head of the Shining Path Huallaga faction, and local cocalero
leaders. Evidence also indicates links between army officers and the Shining Path. A report by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2011) cites a declassified cable and an interview with an unnamed ‘Assistant Professor’ in reference to the matter:

The same cable also states that army commanders posted in the [Apurímac Ene] region ‘receive lucrative payoffs’, work with Shining Path militants and do not ‘fight hard’ to disrupt the drug trafficking networks… The Assistant Professor similarly stated that the effectiveness of police and military forces to address Shining Path's activities ‘may also be limited by corruption’ and that ‘[s]everal national and international observers have alleged that members of Peru's military have cooperated with drug traffickers’ ([online])

Whilst questions remain about the extent of the relationship between the Shining Path, the military and cocaleros in the Huallaga and Apurímac Ene, it is certain that the Shining Path actively protects the illicit drug trade. This has rendered cocalero mobilisations largely irrelevant. According to Antesana: ‘Cocaleros don’t have to mobilise anymore because the guerrillas protect their coca’ (interview, 3.2.2011). Thus, Peru’s cocalero social movement, though formally united, is in effect demobilised—and the impact of the few cocaleros that transitioned to political actors has been limited.

5.5 MECHANISMS

The transformation of the Peruvian cocalero social movement was two-fold. First, the social movement represented by the CONPACCP demobilised after suffering a dramatic and public division. Second, individual cocaleros or small groups of cocaleros made the transition from social actors to political actors. The discussion below details the mechanisms that took place throughout this transformation. Two of the mechanisms, invention and brokerage, are identity-shaping mechanisms. The other mechanism, radicalisation, is a broader mechanism—yet nonetheless waged a significant impact on the identity-formation process.

Invention. When Marisela Guillén of the Apurímac-Ene denounced the leaders of the CONPACCP as traitors for negotiating with the state over DS 044, she effectively drew a boundary between the cocaleros of her valley and the cocaleros of the other valleys represented by the CONPACCP (see Figure 5.1). This boundary stood within the boundary encompassing the political identity of ‘cocalero’, and it prescribed a set of relations between the actors standing on either side of it. These relations could be characterised as contentious and competitive—if not outright antagonistic. As the cocaleros’ contentious episode progressed, the cocaleros of the Monzón and La Convención and Lares valleys stepped across the new boundary to join the cocaleros of the Apurímac-Ene. These three valleys formed the
*Junta.* The *Junta*, however, proved short-lived as the Apurímac-Ene re-joined the CONPACCP in an attempt to take control of the organisation in 2006. Later, the Monzón formed another organisation, CENACOP, which to date represents the most radical of Peru’s cocalero organisations.

The side-taking that has taken place within the overall boundary encompassing the political identity of ‘cocalero’ has affected the understanding of that identity by the state and mainstream society. Does ‘cocalero’ represent a social actor willing to reach an accord with the state, or does it represent a social actor that refuses to participate in finding viable solutions to the illicit drug problem? Are the claims made by ‘cocaleros’ valid? The confusion over the meaning of ‘cocalero’ by the state and mainstream society also stems from the emergence of organisations (such as the *Junta* and the CENACOP) that rivalled the CONPACCP as the main representative of Peru’s cocaleros. This has made it even more difficult for Peru’s cocaleros to gain mainstream sympathisers and allies, which helps to explain their limited appeal outside of the regional political arena.

**FIGURE 5.1  INVENTION OF A BOUNDARY WITHIN A BOUNDARY**

*Radicalisation.* Tarrow (2011) defines radicalisation as ‘a shift in ideological commitments toward the extremes and/or the adoption of more disruptive and violent forms of contention’ (207). Radicalisation can result from ideological conflicts, from competition for space within an organisation or from conflicts between leaders that take place during a contentious episode (ibid). The cocalero social movement of Peru became radicalised in the period between the March of Sacrifice of 2003 and the March of Sacrifice of 2004. The accord reached between the state and cocaleros during the March of Sacrifice of 2003 over DS 044 indicated that the CONPACCP had acquiesced to the moderate line of gradual and concerted eradication. The accord also provoked a challenge to the CONPACCP’s leadership by the representative of the Apurímac-Ene, a valley with more radical tendencies.
Understanding the CONPACCP’s response to this challenge requires a look at previous interactions between cocaleros and the state. Cocaleros had taken a significant step in dismantling their imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’ by undertaking the 2003 March of Sacrifice and negotiating with the state over DS 044. In order to address the accusations of the Apurímac-Ene’s representative without damaging their new credibility with the state and mainstream society, the leadership of the CONPACCP sent a letter to President Toledo that—without fully rejecting the law—voiced disagreement with certain aspects of DS 044. This did not appease the Apurímac-Ene, which meant that the CONPACCP risked a break within its ranks. In order to prevent the division of the social movement, the CONPACCP adopted the radical agenda of the Sixth Extraordinary Congress of Producers and Consumers of the Coca Leaf in March 2004. The CONPACCP thus chose to protect its credibility with a radical faction of cocaleros over its credibility with the state and mainstream society. It seems plausible that the CONPACCP could have continued to enhance its legitimacy and challenge the state without the support of the more radical valleys. However, previous interactions had taught the CONPACCP that the state could not be trusted. As discussed in Chapter 3, the state had repeatedly broken accords in the past and it betrayed cocaleros by re-criminalising them after they helped defeat the Shining Path. Furthermore, cocaleros had witnessed the double-game played by the state as it was heavily involved in drug-trafficking and corruption during the Fujimori government and at the same time cooperated with the United States on drug control policies.

Peru’s cocaleros remained divided despite the CONPACCP’s efforts. Coupled with their radicalisation, their division contributed to the loss of legitimacy and ultimate failure to purge their imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’.

*Brokerage.* After the Apurímac-Ene valley left the CONPACCP, it established the *Junta*, which brought together the Monzón valley (which had also left the CONPACCP) and La Convención and Lares valleys (which FEPCACYL had always represented). The existence of the *Junta*, the broker for the three valleys, formalised the division of the Peruvian cocalero social movement into two factions with the same radical agenda. After the Apurímac-Ene rejoined the CONPACCP, the Monzón valley formed the CENACOP to counterweight the CONPACCP. The CENACOP brought together cocaleros from the valleys that maintained the most radical positions. Its existence as the formal broker of this radical faction signified that the Peruvian cocalero social movement remained divided.
The brokerage that took place amongst Peru’s cocaleros accentuated their divisions rather than united them. The presence of competing organisations at the national level publicised the cocaleros’ disunity, which as discussed previously diminished their ability to attract allies and sympathisers. Mainstream society’s opinion of cocaleros significantly decreased between 2003 and 2004, as evidenced by Table 5.1. The presence of competing organisations that seem to form, disband and regroup at will only exacerbated the cocaleros’ difficulty in broadening their appeal. In contrast, as the Chapter 6 demonstrates, Bolivia’s Coordinadora effectively brokered the six federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba and made formal alliances with other peasant, labour and urban organisations when it formed a political party at the national scale.

5.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed the transformation of Peru’s cocalero social movement. Several cocaleros transitioned from social to political actors throughout this transformation. They have had an impact mainly on a local scale, sometimes with the support of regional governments that made pronouncements in their favour. A few cocaleros won mayoralties through municipal elections. Only Obregón and Malpartida ascended national positions, but they did not make significant advances on cocalero or other peasant issues. In short, the cocaleros’ empowerment and impact has been limited.

The cocaleros’ weakness as political actors stems in part from the radicalisation of their social movement, which tarnished the ground they gained as social actors. Radicalisation tainted the political identity of ‘cocalero’ in the eyes of their opponents, potential allies and mainstream society and furthered the propagation of their imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’. It is important to highlight that the radicalisation of the CONPACCP resulted from a decision by its leaders in response to a challenge from the Apurímac-Ene valley’s leadership. The CONPACCP leaders made the decision to radicalise based on the lessons of past contentious interactions with the state. The most significant lesson was the betrayal of the state when it re-criminalised cocaleros and commenced the harshest period of eradication after the end of the war with the Shining Path—a struggle that the cocaleros helped overcome with their rondas campesinas. This fostered disillusionment and mistrust in the state. The cocaleros’ mistrust in the state was furthered by the Fujimori government’s pervasive corruption and double-game with the United States with respect to drug control. Bearing this in mind, the decision of the leaders of the CONPACCP to radicalise rather than protect their legitimacy
with the state and mainstream society becomes clearer. Choosing to maintain their relationship with the state may or may not have cost them the support of their constituents, which were less radical than Apurímac-Ene’s. Yet, if the CONPACCP did not profit from maintaining its relationship with the state and suffered another betrayal, the confederation and its leaders could have experienced an absolute loss of support. The CONPACCP leadership thus chose radicalisation when faced with the challenge of the Apurímac-Ene’s leadership.

The decision to radicalise came at a high cost. Cocaleros had tried to frame their claims in a way that differentiated coca from cocaine, rejected the stigma associated with the illicit drug trade and highlighted the symbolic value of the coca leaf (Yashar 2005: 185). However, their attempts proved largely futile even during the peak of their social movement during the 2003 March of Sacrifice, as they did not manage to garner the support of either conventional or contentious social and political actors. The adoption of a radical agenda that defended all coca as a ‘sacred leaf’ cast ever more doubt on their claims. Van Cott (2005) relates that ethnic claims do not resonate with the majority of Peruvians. Cocaleros’ claims did not even resonate with likely allies, such as the indigenous sector. Alberto Pizango, the leader of AIDESEP and figurehead of the Bagua contentious episode, reportedly stated: ‘For us, the coca has leaf has no cultural or symbolic value’ (Eguren, interview, 21.12.2011). According to Fernando Eguren, president of the Peruvian Centre for Social Studies (Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales—CEPES), the indigenous and peasant sectors have not established relationships or alliances with cocaleros due to the latter’s—real or perceived—association with the illicit drug trade and the Shining Path. The following statement by Cesar Sara Sara, former president of the Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (Confederación de Nacionalidades Amazónicas del Perú—CONAP), supports this view:

The prejudice over coca cultivation is so strong that the idea to form a party of those who farm it, from my personal stand point, is not viable. It will fade away and will be quickly forgotten (Sara Sara, interview, 16.1.2011)

Labour and other popular organisations have also kept their distance and have not extended their support. Malpartida has expressed frustration at this generalised lack of support:

Other sectors have not supported us… When we were in Lima the CGTP and other organisations offered their support, but it was all very declarative and it was never real support like fighting together side by side, despite the fact that they come and give speeches, there is no real support, even the financing is our own (Malpartida qtd. in Durand 2005: 20)
It serves to note that social organisations in Peru as a whole were severely debilitated during the repressive Fujimori government. As the present chapter has discussed, social actors since the fall of Fujimori have been mostly confined within a local arena and have had few victories when challenging the neoliberal policies of the state. Establishing links with a sector of questionable legitimacy could hardly be considered a potentially empowering move.

Despite their weaknesses, cocaleros stand amongst the few social actors that have made an effective mobilisation on a national scale since Peru’s second transition to democracy. However, since their second national mobilisation (the 2004 March of Sacrifice), their actions have been circumscribed to the local and regional arena, they have remained effectively demobilised in spite of their present organisational unity and those that have ascended political positions have failed to incorporate demands that extend beyond the issues related to coca.
6 Bolivia: Transformation of a Social Movement—Convergence and Diffusion

The coca unions of the Tropic of Cochabamba consolidated into a social movement under the Coordinadora after the criminalisation of coca in 1988. The social movement demonstrated unwavering unity, solidarity and a strong capacity for mobilisation early on, thanks in part to the firm adherence of its members to the political identities of ‘cocalero’ and ‘syndicalist’.

As its Peruvian counterpart, the Bolivian cocalero social movement underwent a transformation as it continued to interact with the state. Its transformation involved the creation of a political instrument through which cocaleros transitioned from social actors to political actors. Yet, in contrast to Peru’s cocaleros, Bolivia’s cocaleros made this transition without experiencing division or radicalisation. They demonstrated a broad appeal, an affinity for making alliances and made a significant impact as political actors. Furthermore, they constructed the political identity of ‘excluded’ in the process. The identity of ‘excluded’ generated solidarity for their political instrument as it resonated with the generalised and growing discontent with Bolivia’s political elites and neoliberal economic model.

This chapter examines the transformation of the Bolivian cocalero social movement within a context of political crisis. It highlights the social movement’s transition from a social actor to a political actor with a high degree of political empowerment through the establishment of a political instrument with solid electoral appeal. The first section discusses the context of the transformation, with respect to the political opportunity and threats it presented. The second section details the rising politicisation of the cocaleros of the Trópico. The third section analyses Bolivia’s cocaleros as political actors. The fourth section discusses the identity-shaping and broad mechanisms at work during the transformation.

6.1 DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS

As various works have addressed the crisis of Bolivia’s democracy (see Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Crabtree and Whitehead 2008; Llanos 2010; Philip and Panizza 2010), this section avoids a detailed account of its development and instead focuses on the political opportunities and threats presented to Bolivia’s cocaleros throughout.
Paz Zamora. The 1989 national elections resulted in a coalition government comprising Jaime Paz Zamora’s MIR and Hugo Bánzer’s ADN with Paz Zamora as president. The power-sharing arrangement was formed because none of three main candidates attained the fifty per cent majority required secure the presidency.\(^{38}\) This type of arrangement became the norm rather than the exception in Bolivia’s new democratic era, as the country’s fragmented party system struggled to address the ‘basic political problem of concerting enough power to govern’ (Grindle 2000: 110). Whilst the pacted democracy model provided political stability, it also generated tensions as it often denied the presidency to the candidate with a plurality of the vote and tended to centralise power in the executive, block smaller parties from representation and give larger parties disproportionate representation.

The arrangement between the MIR and ADN, known as the *Acuerdo Patriótico* (Patriotic Accord), required the government to continue the policies of the NPE. This prevented President Paz Zamora from fulfilling campaign pledges to roll back neoliberal policies. It also rendered congressional involvement in economic policy-making to ‘approving the plans of the executive’ (ibid). Still, Paz Zamora held true to his campaign pledge to promote ‘coca diplomacy’, which aimed to diffuse the idea that ‘coca is not cocaine’ and opposed the complete eradication of the coca leaf (Lehman 2006: 133). The Paz Zamora government implemented voluntary eradication and alternative development schemes that paid up 2,500 USD per hectare of eradicated coca. A cocalero from the Trópico related his account of voluntary eradication schemes:

> Alternative development programs begin with Paz Estenssoro and Paz Zamora. That began to limit the production of coca. The government offered 600 USD per hectare, which meant that they would measure how much you eradicated and pay you accordingly—but you also had to promise not to grow any more coca. That was the government’s first offer, but it met with resistance. So then it raised its offer to 2,500 USD per hectare. That was the final offer, and a lot of people took it. But then eventually they grew more coca, because no other crop compares. No other crop can give you three, four or even five harvests a year (Cocalero A, interview, 19.1.2010)

Many of those that participated in voluntary eradication usually eradicated old crops with low yields and/or replaced eradicated crops in new locations (García Linera 2008: 388). The United States government at first proved lenient with the Paz Zamora government’s rather relaxed approach to drug control because of ‘the risk of de-stabilising the young democracy’ (Gambóa 2008: 74). Nevertheless, President Paz Zamora succumbed to United States

---

\(^{38}\) In the 1989 national elections, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (MNR), Hugo Bánzer (ADN) and Jaime Paz Zamora (MIR) obtained 25.6, 25.2 and 21.8 per cent of the vote, respectively. As Bánzer had recently broken with the MNR, his party formed a coalition government with the MIR.
pressure in 1990 when he signed a secret annex to an assistance package that permitted the use of the Bolivian Armed Forces in the drug control efforts (Lehman 2006: 134).

Indigenous rights comprised another prominent issue during Paz Zamora government. The Confederation of Indigenous People of Eastern Bolivia (Confederación de Indígenas del Oriente de Bolivia—CIDOB) organised the March for Territory and Dignity (Marcha por Territorio y Dignidad) in 1990.39 Thousands of indigenous people marched seven hundred miles from the lowlands to the highlands of Bolivia in protest of the rise in lowland settlements (Grey Postero 2000: 4). The CIDOB demanded the state to recognise the ‘territories’ of the twelve indigenous communities it represented. This marked the first time an indigenous community or organisation presented a demand of that nature (Albó 2008: 41). The CIDOB also called for a ‘broader and deeper meaning of citizenship’ and for the establishment of ‘cultural rights’ for Bolivia’s indigenous people (Larson 2008: 11). Former congressman Alem reflected on the March for Territory and Dignity in an interview with the author:

In 1990, we witnessed the lowland Amazonians become protagonists in the March for Territory and Dignity. It was completely unexpected! They managed to capture the attention of the nation, and there was no racist or negative reaction. On the contrary, Bolivian society appeared to be moved. The media reported day by day where the demonstrators arrived, and people sent food and clothing. It was truly impressive! They marched for more than a month toward La Paz, and as they made their way other communities joined them. Thousands arrived in the city. At the time, the public (you know—not the experts) knew of the Quechuas and the Aymaras…but not of much else. All of a sudden you heard people speak of the Chiquitanos, Ayoreos, Guarayos and Guaraníes. You would hear people marvel: ‘So we still have indians in Bolivia!’ It was turning point in Bolivia’s modern history. And you know what, the syndicalist peasant society—dominated by Quechuas and Aymaras—came out in solidarity to welcome their lowland Amazonians brothers. Not as equals, mind you, but as brothers (interview, 1.9.2008)

Larson (2008) similarly describes the encounter between the leaders of the CIDOB and their Aymara and Quechua counterparts as a ‘moving ritualized encounter of unity and solidarity in struggle’ (11). President Paz Zamora, along with several ministers and congressmen, met with the leaders of the twelve communities represented by the CIDOB and soon afterward passed decrees that recognised five indigenous or inter-ethnic territories encompassing 1.5 million hectares. The Bolivian congress also subsequently ratified the Convention 169 of the ILO (Albó 2008: 42).

The March for Territory and Dignity proved significant on many fronts. First, the event brought indigenous demands to the national spotlight and enhanced awareness of Bolivian’s indigenous identity. The celebrated and unexpected march re-vitalised the country’s long-standing indigenous movement, both externally and internally. Externally, mainstream society for the first time gained knowledge of the conditions and claims of lowland indigenous people, which until then had maintained a low profile. Internally, the march generated a heightened awareness amongst certain Bolivians of their condition as indigenous or originarios (original peoples). According to Alem:

The march was symbolic for the indigenous people in the sense of re-affirming their identity. Since the revolution of 1952, the majority of Bolivians have maintained an identity of campesino [peasant]… but more and more the population self-identifies itself as indigenous (interview, 1.9.2008)

Second, the March for Territory and Dignity facilitated an encounter between highland and lowland indigenous leaders. As Larson (2008) affirms:

Perhaps this was a political spectacle, but the encounter opened the compass of political possibility and hope under an inter-ethnic indigenous coalition of unprecedented scope and ambition (11)

The encounter set in motion a process of alliance formation that culminated more than a decade later in the Pacto de Unidad (Pact of Unity) between various indigenous, syndicalist and urban popular organisations. It also prompted the formation of the Asamblea de Nacionalidades (Assembly of Nationalities), an idea first proposed by the CSUTCB in 1988 to mark the five hundred years of resistance to the ‘colonial invasion’ to recover ‘the historical memory, thought, identity, institutionality and territory’ of Bolivia’s indigenous people (Guarachi 2006: 4). Highland and lowland indigenous leaders officially inaugurated the Asamblea de Nacionalidades in 1992 after a series of demonstrations and marches marking the five hundred years of resistance. The leaders intended for the assembly to function as an indigenous parliament. Although the idea faded, it set the precedent for the demands that surged in 2002 over the formation of an Asamblea Constituyente (Constituent Assembly) to bring forth constitutional change recognising the rights of Bolivia’s indigenous communities (Albó 2008: 45).

Sánchez de Lozada. Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada secured the presidency in the 1993 national elections with a plurality of the vote. His government made significant changes to drug control policies and implemented a series of reforms intended to deepen and spread the benefits of the neoliberal model he had helped put in place as Minister of the Economy
during the Paz Estenssoro government. The reform plan, known as the *Plan de Todos* (Plan for All), contained three basic pillars: first, the capitalisation of state-owned assets to combat unemployment, low salaries and corruption; second, social distribution and welfare (with a special focus on education) that utilised some of the funds generated by capitalisation; third, ‘Popular Participation’ schemes designed to help communities pursue their own development plans (Grindle and Domingo 2003: 330).

The first pillar, capitalisation, focused on boosting the hydrocarbon sector by offering 30-year operating contracts that encouraged private foreign investment and gas exploration. The capitalisation scheme resulted in a nearly five-fold increase in gas reserves by 2000 and in over 500 million USD a year in royalties for the Bolivian state (Library of Congress 2006: 5). The second pillar of the *Plan de Todos* involved significant reforms to education. This included the introduction of bilingual and multicultural education to a system that had previously maintained one national school, one national language and one national curriculum. Many of the reform’s goals were strongly opposed by teachers’ unions in the country for this reason (Grindle and Domingo 2003: 333). The third pillar of reforms involved the Popular Participation Law, which passed in 1994. The central aspect of the law involved creating autonomous municipal governments in rural areas; decentralising key responsibilities to municipal governments; distributing resources to municipal governments; introducing participatory planning; recognising community and traditional indigenous organisations; and establishing citizen control mechanisms (Ticehurst 1998: 359). The first municipal elections under the new model took place in December 1995. Of the 1,624 elected as municipal council members, 465 (approximately twenty-six per cent) were indigenous or peasant leaders (ibid: 361).

Major changes to drug control policy also took place under the Sánchez de Lozada government, although not by its initiative. The president gave precedence to the *Plan de Todos* reform package over coca eradication, as he considered coca eradication to be ‘a secondary objective until enough dynamism had been brought to the economy to give coca producers true alternatives’ (Lehman 2006: 134). However, coca eradication ascended on the political agenda in early 1995 after the United States decertified Bolivia for failing to comply with eradication targets set forth in the Ley 1008. Decertification meant that Bolivia could not qualify for assistance from the United States, which posed a risk to the president’s ambitious reform package. The United States granted Bolivia an exemption from decertification with a
national interest waiver under the condition that it would meet eradication targets by mid-1995. This prompted the first large-scale round of forced eradication in the Tropic of Cochabamba, which effectively militarised the area as it heavily involved the Bolivian military.

**Bánzer.** The 1997 national elections brought Hugo Bánzer to the presidency. Bánzer sustained the neoliberal economic policies of the NPE and the forced eradication policies that commenced under Sánchez de Lozada. The Bánzer government swiftly demonstrated its commitment to drug control by implementing *Plan Dignidad* (Plan Dignity) in 1998. *Plan Dignidad* aimed to eliminate all coca production deemed illegal under *Ley 1008* within five years. It phased out monetary compensation for voluntary eradication, but still offered monetary support to cocaleros that eradicated their coca crops and sought to produce alternative crops (Lehman 2006: 135). The plan primarily focused on an aggressive forced eradication campaign that involved the formation of the Joint Task Force, a special military and police eradication unit. The Joint Task Force performed its task effectively—by 2001 it nearly reached the goal of zero coca in the Tropic of Cochabamba—but also heavily militarised and aggravated social conflict in the area (Ledebur 2005: 154).

*Plan Dignidad* achieved the largest net eradication of illegal coca in Bolivia’s history (11,600 hectares in 1998 and 17,000 in 1999). In 2001, the Bolivian government announced that only 600 hectares of illegal coca remained in the Tropic of Cochabamba (Lehman 2006: 136). Still, the Bánzer government’s achievement came at a high cost. First, *Plan Dignidad* contributed to a rise in rural poverty due in part to the limited support that eradicated cocaleros received to produce alternative crops (Library of Congress 2006: 6). A 2001 report by the State Department of the United States described Bolivia as the ‘model for coca eradication in the region’, yet noted that ‘the aggressive eradication program of 1999 and 2000 outpaced the counternarcotics alternative development programs in the Chapare by a wide margin’ (United States Department of State 2001: [online]). Aside from receiving limited support, alternative development programs were hindered by external factors such as the Argentine and Brazilian crises and a fall in international coffee prices (Frias-Navarrete and Thoumi 2005: 10).

Second, *Plan Dignidad* caused conflict and tension within the Bolivian military. The plan heavily militarised the Tropic of Cochabamba, giving the area the highest per capita military
and police presence in Bolivia (Farthing and Ledebur 2004: 36). This militarisation contributed to the widespread and systematic use of repression (and the associated human rights violations) in carrying out drug control policies. In an interview with the author, a cocalero from the Tropic of Cochabamba described the Bánzer government as ‘the most brutal’ and likened the forced eradication campaigns that took place under Plan Dignidad to a massacre (Cocalero B, interview, 20.1.2010). The Joint Task Force, acclaimed for its role in reducing illegal coca, was extensively criticised for the human rights violations that took place in carrying out its task (Ledebur 2005: 156). Tensions also stemmed from a general disillusionment and growing resentment amongst Bolivian military officers over the influence of the United States in domestic affairs. According to Ledebur (2005):

Bolivian military personnel involved in the counterdrug mission, as well as retired officers, expressed growing disenchantment with the institution’s role. There was increasing realisation in military circles that participation in drug control programs had a high price in terms of national sovereignty. Officers became increasingly uncomfortable with direct U.S. dictates to drug control officials, which often circumvented civilian authorities and the military’s national command structure (156)

The tension over the use of repression and United States involvement in military affairs transcended the Bolivian military, and became manifest in the intense social conflict that hit the Bánzer government near the end of its term.

Lastly, Plan Dignidad provoked social unrest in the Tropic of Cochabamba. Between 1997 and 2004, clashes stemming from various mobilisations organised by the Coordinadora led to the deaths of thirty-three cocaleros and twenty-seven military and police officers, and to the injury of 567 cocaleros and 135 military and police officers (Youngers 2005: 348). Extensive forced eradication efforts also prompted the re-articulation of Comités de Autodefensa (Self-Defence Committees), which had first formed in the early 1990s. These committees operated to protect coca from eradication by maintaining vigilance and obstructing of roads leading to crops. García Linera (2008) affirms that despite speculation of the ‘clandestine’ nature of these committees, in actuality they were composed of ‘young and brave people from the peasant unions’ and, in some cases, day labourers subordinated to the coca unions (399). Cocaleros became increasing defiant throughout this period as they faced the most extensive coca eradication campaign to date. This empowered and raised the prominence of the Coordinadora. According to García Linera (2008), by the end of the 1990s the Coordinadora

---

40 For a detailed account of the human rights violations that resulted from Plan Dignidad see Navarrete-Frías and Thoumi (2005).
had become the ‘epicentre of social mobilisations and confrontations with troops’ (400). The extent of its influence became evident in 2000 when it coalesced with other social actors in Bolivia’s ‘Water War’, one of the most successful global examples of mobilisation against water privatisation.

Protests overwhelmed the city of Cochabamba in April 2000 over plans to privatise drinking water and sanitation services. The privatisation plans stemmed from the Bánzer’s government granting of a forty-year concession to the company Aguas del Tunari to run these services. The Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida (Coordinator for the Defence of Water and Life) first organised protests in January 2000 after Aguas del Tunari raised water rates in December 1999. Aguas del Tunari claimed that rates increased by thirty-five per cent, but government sources later showed that in actuality they rose by as much as two hundred per cent (Lobina 2000: 3). As the protests escalated, the Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida joined forces with the cocaleros’ Coordinadora and other local organisations. In early April 2000, the government declared a state of emergency as the social unrest was ‘such as [Bolivia] had not seen for several decades’ (Assies 2003: 14). On April 8th, outrage spread across Bolivia after a military officer shot and killed a seventeen year-old boy after firing into a crowd of protestors. The discontent compelled police forces in La Paz and Santa Cruz ‘angry at the army’s insertion into the affair and protesting low wages’ to mutiny and join the protests (Lehman 2006: 145). The government soon capitulated and revoked the concession given to Aguas del Tunari. The Water War gained national and international prominence as the first major conflict in which Bolivia’s popular sectors emerged victorious after fifteen years of neoliberal policies.41

Bánzer resigned the presidency in May 2001 citing health reasons. Vice President Quiroga served as president until the end of Bánzer’s term in 2002. The Quiroga government continued with the forced eradication policies of Plan Dignidad and commenced the process of closing legal coca markets.

**Sánchez de Lozada.** Sánchez de Lozada won the national elections of May 2002 by a slim margin. He obtained 22.5 per cent of the vote—only slightly higher than the 20.9 per cent

---

41 For more information on the Water War, see Assies (2003), Lobina (2000), Shultz (2003) and Perreault (2006).
obtained by Evo Morales, the candidate for the MAS-IPSP\textsuperscript{42} and head of the cocaleros’ Coordinadora. Sánchez de Lozada formed a coalition government that included the MNR, the MIR and the UCS because he did not obtain fifty per cent majority of the vote. The MAS-IPSP did not form part of the coalition government because Morales announced early on that the MAS-IPSP would not enter a power-sharing arrangement. Bolivia once again found itself under a government led by a president that had fallen drastically short of obtaining fifty per cent of the vote. As Singer and Morrison (2004) point: ‘it was apparent from the beginning of Goni’s term that many Bolivians felt unrepresented by their government’ (182). The effects of this underrepresentation soon became visible.

On the day of Sánchez de Lozada’s inauguration in August 2002, labour, peasant, teacher and medical professional national union confederations took to the streets in protest. In February 2003, protests once again surged in response to a proposal over a new income tax (Singer and Morrison 2003: 181). In September 2003, a violent string of protests erupted over a proposal to export gas to the United States through Chile. Although the proposal was the immediate cause of the conflict, its origins derived from ‘the social costs of the application of orthodox neoliberal economic policies, the control of strategic sectors of the economy by transnational capital, and the loss of legitimacy of the nation’s democratic political institutions’ (Arce and Rice 2009: 92). Bolivians had become deeply disenchanted with the country’s unrepresentative pacted democracy, which since 1985 imposed policies that engendered high costs to its popular sectors and routinely responded to dissent with repression.\textsuperscript{43} As elaborated by Alem:

\begin{quote}
The people had enough. It was not just that the Sánchez de Lozada government had made a mistake by trying to export the gas through Chile. It was the accumulation of grievances endured throughout the incessant implementation of neoliberal policies since the government of Paz Estenssoro. And the people were absolutely exhausted… but they managed to come together to literally kick Sánchez de Lozada out of office (interview, 28.1.2010)
\end{quote}

Paulino Guarachi, general secretary of the CSUTCB between 1992 and 1994, confirms these sentiments: ‘We waited for years for capitalisation to give to back the people, but it never did. And then they announced they wanted to sell our gas! It was the last straw’ (interview, 27.8.2008). Bolivia’s national union confederations, social movements and other various

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{42} The MAS-IPSP party (Movimiento al Socialismo-Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos) was formed by the cocaleros of the Trópico. The process of its formation is detailed later in the chapter.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{43} Between 1985 and 2003, Bolivians that engaged in protests suffered approximately 280 deaths, 700 injuries and 10,000 illegal detentions (Perreault 2006: 164).}
popular organisations converged in a general national strike. They employed the strategy of road blocks to cut off La Paz from food, gas, propane and traffic. The state’s repressive response resulted in nearly seventy civilian deaths by the end of the conflict, which became known as the Gas War (Arce and Rice 2009: 92). Protestors escalated their demands from calls for ‘Gas por Perú’ (‘Gas through Peru’) to calls for a rejection of the proposal and recovery and industrialisation of Bolivia’s gas reserves (Perreault 2006: 163). President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada resigned his office and left the country on October 17th in the face of strict condemnation by civil society and loss of legitimacy of his government. 44

Carlos Mesa. Vice President Carlos Mesa assumed the presidency on the 17th of October 2003. He began his inaugural speech with the following words:

I am overcome by three emotions that come from my heart: pain, hope and strength. My first obligation, compatriots, is to pronounce my deepest and most heart-felt homage to the women and men of Bolivia that in these days gave their life for the country, for democracy for the future and for life (Mesa 2008: 110)

President Mesa promised to fulfil the demands set forth in what became known as the October Agenda, which included carrying out a referendum on the governance and export of natural gas, passing a revised natural gas law and forming an Asamblea Constituyente to rewrite the constitution (Perreault 2006: 164). Indigenous groups and social movements had made a formal call on the state to effect constitutional change, an idea that had begun to take shape during the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity, at the 2002 March for Popular Sovereignty, Territory and Natural Resources. The state consequently passed the Law of Necessity of Reforms to the Constitution on August 1st 2002 (San Martin Arzabe 2004: 369). President Mesa at first opposed the idea of forming a constituent assembly. However, once he ascended the presidency he pushed through congressional reforms that recognised the assembly as a form of participation and representation, and as the only means by which constitutional reform could take place (Carrasco Alurralde and Albó 2009: 1). President Mesa explained his change in stance over the issue with the following words:

Why did I change such strong convictions? For 67 reasons, simply stated. The 67 people that died in October left a very strong message. The bases of our relationship as a society were in question. One cannot stop emphasising that October 2003 brought to the surface a grave crisis of the state (Mesa 2008: 111)

Despite the steps taken toward constitutional reform, protests once again broke out over the role of foreign private investment in the gas sector. President Mesa deferred the gas issue to a

referendum in July 2004. The referendum results approved the export of natural gas, but under a high degree of state control. Protests broke out in early 2005 due to the government’s failure to act upon the results of the referendum, which effectively called for the nationalisation of Bolivia’s energy resources (Rochlin 2007: 1330). A regional conflict also broke out in the Department of Santa Cruz over calls by the Civic Committee of Santa Cruz (Comité Cívico de Santa Cruz), a group business and professional organisations, for autonomy (Gustafson 2006: 354). The agricultural and industrial elite of Santa Cruz, which leads Bolivia in GDP, exports and standards of living, had been developing regionalist tendencies for some time (Gustafson 2006; Rochlin 2007). The protests led President Mesa to submit his resignation to Congress in March 2005. Congress rejected his request. In June 2005, a new wave of protests that paralyzed transport at fifty-five strategic locations throughout Bolivia forced President Mesa to offer his resignation once again. Congress approved the request and named the president of the Supreme Court as interim president. The interim president called for a special election to take place in December 2005 immediately after he was sworn in on June 10th, 2005.

Implications for political opportunity. Contentious actors faced a set of shifting political opportunities and threats throughout the establishment and breakdown of Bolivia’s pacted democracy. As discussed in Chapter 4, the economic crisis and the neoliberal stabilisation and reform package that accompanied it essentially crushed the labour and peasant sector, yet enhanced the power of the Trópico’s coca unions. The governments that followed the Paz Estenssoro government firmly adhered to the continuation of the neoliberal economic model. Neoliberalism thus prevailed in the new democratic era, but under a highly unrepresentative system that increasingly lost legitimacy as it failed to deliver gains to the majority of the Bolivian people. Repressive drug control policies also prevailed, culminating with the Bánzer government’s Plan Dignidad. The United States played a significant role in Bolivia’s near

45 The referendum included the following questions:
1. Do you agree that the Hydrocarbons Law (No. 1689), enacted by Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, should be repealed?
2. Do you agree that the Bolivian State should recover ownership over all hydrocarbons at the wellhead?
3. Do you agree that Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (the state-owned oil company privatised under Sánchez de Lozada) should be re-established, reclaiming state ownership of the Bolivian people’s stakes in the part-privatised oil companies, so that it can take part in all stages of the hydrocarbon production chain?
4. Do you agree with President Carlos Mesa’s policy of using gas as a strategic recourse to achieve a sovereign and viable route of access to the Pacific Ocean?
5. Do you or do you not agree that Bolivia should export gas as part of a national policy framework that ensures the gas needs of Bolivians; encourages the industrialisation of gas in the nation’s territory; levies taxes and/or royalties of up to 50% of the production value of oil and gas on oil companies, for the nation’s benefit; and earmarks revenues from the export and industrialisation of gas mainly for education, health, roads, and jobs?
dogmatic devotion to its neoliberal economic policies and drug control policies.

At the same time, new institutional venues and discourses for political action became available. The March for Territory and Dignity of 1990 propelled indigenous rights onto the national political agenda, which diffused the indigenous rights discourse and raised awareness of Bolivia’s indigenous peoples amongst mainstream society. Furthermore, the march galvanised Bolivia’s indigenous movement by spurring an encounter and solidarity between lowland and highland indigenous organisations. While these organisations gained a new voice during the Paz Zamora government, they gained new channels of access to the political system during the Sánchez de Lozada government. The Plan de Todos included decentralisation measures like the Popular Participation Law, which enhanced representation by creating autonomous municipal governments and recognising indigenous and community organisations. Indigenous or peasant leaders comprised approximately twenty-six per cent of municipal council members in the first municipal elections in December 1995.

Decentralisation policies also presented a viable political opportunity for the cocaleros of the Trópico, which at the time were transitioning from social to political actors. In addition, the unrepresentative nature of the state meant that its repressive dimension presented a political opportunity, rather than a threat, to the cocaleros. The Coordinadora became increasingly empowered as it confronted the state—and it confronted it not only in defence of coca, but also in defence of indigenous rights and in rejection to the neoliberal economic model. The Coordinadora enveloped these issues and took a prominent role in the polity’s generalised discontent. It managed to do this not just because of the economic significance and organisational strength of the coca sector, but because it placed the struggle for coca under the same banner as the struggle for indigenous rights and the struggle against the neoliberal economic model—and that banner was sovereignty. The following sections relate how the cocaleros of the Trópico, as they transitioned from social actors to political actors, united all those that supported the banner of sovereignty by constructing the political identity of ‘excluded’.

6.2 POLITICISATION

The Bolivian cocalero social movement’s transformation proved a rapid process that entailed the establishment of a political instrument that eventually acquired the name Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People (Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los
The IPSP, which functioned as the political arm of the Coordinadora, developed a classist ideology that stemmed from the influence of ex-miners and Bolivia’s left-wing political parties, both of which recognised the political potential of the cocaleros. The political instrument complemented its classist ideology with a strong line of support for the recognition and rights of Bolivia’s indigenous people, a sector that stood within the political identity of ‘excluded’ alongside the labour and peasant sector.

The miners. The migration of unemployed miners to the Trópico in the mid-1980s empowered the coca unions. The impact of this sector became more pronounced as the coca unions consolidated into a social movement and demonstrated their capacity for mobilisation. Former leader of the FSTMB Filemón Escóbar saw that, ‘since the revolution could not come from the mines, it would come from the coca fields’ (Escóbar, interview, 18.1.2010). He and other union leaders went to the Trópico in the early 1990s with the backing of the COB to give political formation seminars that conveyed the historical memory and ideology of organised labour to the coca unions.

The primary theme of the seminars involved encouraging participation in elections. The idea was to present and vote for candidates that came directly from the communities. The seminars avowed that voting for traditional political parties had led to the election of governments that deepened the neoliberal economic model and repressive drug control policies. In an interview with the author, Escóbar professed the following:

> I would tell them that neoliberalism had dominated the country since 1985 thanks to our own votes, and that we had to change this. I had to convince the people of the Trópico that we could do this by electoral politics—by ending the pattern of voting for the empty promises of the traditional parties and beginning to vote for our own candidates (interview, 18.1.2010)

Complementary to the theme of presenting and voting for their candidates was the theme of abandoning the idea of engaging in an armed struggle to defend coca. Cocaleros organised Comités de Autodefensa to defend their crops from eradication, but ideas had surged of organising guerrillas that would go beyond that purpose. The seminars emphasised that the best way to defend coca was to come to power through the electoral path. Escóbar (2008) recounts:

> This was the arsenal to convince our little fire-starters in the Trópico, the urgency of participating in national and municipal elections, as the most effective weapon to defend the coca leaf. They would be told, in the hundreds of seminars that we organised, that the struggle for the coca leaf was above all else a political struggle.
That we would not win with an armed struggle. And that the political struggle would have to move to the electoral battlefield (195)

Support for a political instrument took hold in the Trópico, but the idea of forming a guerrilla unit lingered. Escóbar relates that the most difficult theme to push through was that of abandoning all notions of an armed struggle. In his words:

In the sindicatos of the Trópico, at every hour, at every minute, one had to explain and battle for them not to abandon the electoral path. We had to confront positions of carrying ‘underneath the poncho the electoral hand and in the other hand a rifle’ (ibid: 202)

The last set of themes involved the tools that the political instrument would use to win the electoral battle, which included affirming Bolivia’s Andean and Amazon culture amongst both the labour and peasant sectors. The seminars stressed the commonality of these sectors’ Andean and Amazonian culture in order to forge unity as they often found themselves at odds. They also highlighted the value of the coca leaf as a symbol of Bolivia’s indigenous culture and as a symbol of the loss of Bolivia’s sovereignty to the United States (ibid: 192-195).

The left. The cocaleros of the Trópico began to form a relationship with Bolivia’s left-wing political parties in the mid-1980s. Cocaleros shared the left’s strong anti-imperialist stance, as evidenced by the slogan of the cocalero struggle: ‘Causachun coca, wañuchun yanki!’ (‘Long live coca, death to the yankees!’). The increasingly hostile nature of the War on Drugs, seen as a United States imposition, heightened this sentiment. The left saw the cocaleros of the Trópico as potential powerful allies. As of the 1980s, teams of left-wing technocrats went to the Trópico to give political formation seminars, the content of which strongly influenced the ideology of the IPSP. Hilarión Gonzales, president of the IPSP of the Federación Carrasco Tropical, recounts:

They came here in the 1980s, before the Ley 1008, and they gave courses where they taught us who the enemies were, who we were and where we needed to be. The number one enemy was the United States embassy: it would infiltrate us and cause divisions because it wanted to divide and conquer the sindicatos. The courses took off our blindfolds... Izquierda Unida [United Left] came here because they knew their reality, that we had the power and that they could not do it alone. In the past, we all belonged to different parties—even if we belonged to the same federation—but eventually we decided to come together and support Izquierda Unida (interview, 20.1.2010)

United Left (Izquierda Unida—IU) launched as a coalition of left-wing parties in anticipation of the national elections of 1989. The MBL, which formed part of Izquierda Unida, invited the cocaleros of the Trópico to join the coalition in the Cochabamba department. In an
interview with the author, a founding member of the MBL related the experience:

The MBL invited the people of the Trópico to join Izquierda Unida. I believe this was the first time the coca organisations became formally involved in a political project. We offered Evo [Morales] a position for the department of Cochabamba, but he said ‘yes’ too late and we gave it to another leader. We did well in the elections, but the coalition did not consolidate and broke down soon after. Still, the MBL kept a link with the coca organisations—not in an organised way, but with their leaders (Minister A, interview, 5.9.2008)

The elections gave cocaleros a glimpse into their political potential. It also led them to conclude that it did not benefit them to remain in a coalition with the left, because cocaleros had brought in a large proportion of the votes. The Coordinadora effectively dictated the votes of its members because of its syndicalist discipline: once the Coordinadora determined ‘how its members should vote’, its members complied without question (Quiroga, interview, 5.9.2008). The leaders of the Coordinadora decided the following:

First, we would no longer divide our votes amongst different parties. We would vote as one unit. Second, we would not give our votes away. We would form our own party and vote for ourselves. We would do what the miners had not been able to do (Gonzales, interview, 20.1.2010)

Plans to form a political instrument began three years later.

**NGOs and civil society.** NGOs and civil society sympathetic to the cocalero struggle also played a role in the formation the political instrument. One key influence was the Proyecto Nina, a non-governmental leadership program headed by Aymara intellectual David Choquehuanca. The program, which commenced in the late 1980s, primarily targeted peasants and consisted of seminars that professed the recovery of indigenous culture and provided a critique national legislation (Healey 2009: 85). Over a period of fifteen years, Proyecto Nina helped shape peasant and indigenous leaders across Bolivia. This generation of leaders decided that they needed to form their own political party because the left did not truly represent Bolivia’s indigenous population (Urioste, interview, 13.1.2010).

NGOs, religious organisations, human rights organisations, academics and journalists also influenced the development of the IPSP by lending their support to the cocalero struggle. According to Miguel Urioste, former congressman and director of the NGO Fundación Tierra, such sectors sympathised with cocaleros because they associated the coca issue with ‘solidarity, the rejection of imperialism, the lack of human rights and poverty’ (Urioste, interview, 28.8.2008). Even the fact that the majority of Bolivia’s coca entered the cocaine production chain did not deter their sympathy for the cocaleros’ anti-imperialist and cultural
discourse (Van Cott 2003c: 762). The solidarity of NGOs and civil society varied in its expression. It included declarations of support, writing of academic or media articles and provision of courses such as those of Proyecto Nina.

**The Political Instrument.** The first formal discussions regarding the formation of a political instrument took place at a CSUTCB meeting in 1992. Lowland indigenous organisations had also considered forming a political instrument in the early 1990s, but never managed to reach a consensus on the issue (Van Cott 2003c: 766). According to Gonzales:

> Groups in the lowlands and in the highlands had tried to form a ‘political instrument’, but they were not able to do it. But the cocaleros did. Why? Because we were in an area where there was no state presence, where the only thing the state did was repress us. So we pushed for the political instrument for the following reasons: First, coca; second, health; third, coca; fourth, education; fifth, coca; sixth: food; seventh: coca. So when the option came up of forming a political instrument, we rose up! It was the way (above all else) to defend our coca, and to obtain all the things that the state never provided (interview, 20.1.2010)

Cocaleros had increased their dominance of the CSUTCB throughout the 1980s and seized control of the organisation by 1992. As head of the Coordinadora, Morales maintained a strong influence on the CSUTCB, but did not lead the organisation. Cocalero and other peasant leaders resolved that alliances with traditional political parties had not proven useful, and that they should form a political party to complement the contentious actions undertaken in resistance to coca eradication and other grievances. Still, the CSUTCB temporarily shelved the idea of the political instrument. Guarachi recounted decision in an interview with the author:

> In 1992, when it was my turn to lead the CSUTCB, we developed the idea to put together an assembly in charge of creating a political instrument. But there was a debate over whether to do it immediately, or to do it as a slower process. I thought (and this may have been a personal error) that it should not be immediate and that we should only take the initial steps. I thought it was impossible to complete the process in time for the upcoming elections. I remember that Evo [Morales] was amongst those that thought we should do it immediately. Either way, that is when we began the process of forming a political instrument. And, although cocaleros dominated the CSUTCB and the process of its formation, the political instrument did not just belong to the cocaleros. It belonged to all of Bolivia’s peasantry (interview, 27.8.2008)

The CSUTCB approved the formation of the political instrument at a meeting three years later, at which time plans commenced to participate in Bolivia’s first municipal elections in December 1995.
Registration problems meant that the political instrument, which had been named Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People (*Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos*—ASP), used the registration of IU. The political instrument thus ran as the ASP-IU party. Gonzales described this move as ‘borrowing a horse in order to cross the river’ and assured that despite the link with established political parties, the candidates were chosen by an open vote in which the established political parties had no influence (interview, 20.1.2010). The ASP-IU fared well in the 1995 municipal elections, winning ten mayoralties, forty-nine municipal council seats and six departmental *consejeros* in the department of Cochabamba, and five municipal council seats in other highland departments. In the 1997 national elections, the ASP-IU won four uninominal congressional seats, 17.5 per cent of proportional votes in the department of Cochabamba and 3.7 per cent nationwide (Van Cott 2003c: 763). Morales, head of the *Coordinadora*, won one of the four uninominal congressional seats and was the highest voted candidate amongst all districts. The election convinced him to abandon the idea of an armed struggle and fully commit to the electoral path. Escobar (2008) affirms: ‘That is how the defeat of our guerrilleros in the Trópico was consummated, including that of our current president, who had rejected the electoral path for several years’ (201). The political instrument suffered a split in 1998. Alejo Véliz led the original ASP faction and Morales led the new IPSP faction, which became dominant. In the 1999 municipal elections, the ASP, which had registered under the Communist Party of Bolivia (*Partido Comunista de Bolivia*—PCB), won five mayoralties and twenty-eight municipal council seats in the department of Cochabamba, and 1.12 per cent of the vote nationwide. The IPSP registered under the Movement toward Socialism party (*Movimiento al Socialismo*—MAS) due to registration problems. The MAS-IPSP won seventy-nine municipal council seats across seven departments and 3.27 per cent of the vote nationwide (Van Cott 2003b: 32).

In 2002, the MAS-IPSP presented its ideology in anticipation of the 2002 national elections in a document entitled ‘Our Ideological Principles’. The content of the document gives evidence of the variety of views that influenced the MAS-IPSP. The first section of the document denotes the failure of ‘internal colonialism’ and ‘western culture’ to modernise Bolivia, and criticises ‘industrialised societies’ for their excessive wealth. It declares:

> Only the countries of the North are industrialised, where nearly one billion people live, they are one billion PRIVILEGED people that take 66 per cent of the food of the world, 75 per cent of the metals and 85 per cent of the timber… In contrast, there are more than one billion people that walk bare-footed, that do not have running water or electricity, that cannot read or write, whose income is less than a dollar a day and that only obtain 1.4 per cent of global wealth… Then there are the
remaining three billion that already live in disequilibrium and these are the middle classes that are pre-destined to approximate the tragedy of the excluded one billion (MAS-IPSP 2002)

The second section adds a cultural dimension to the classist critique of ‘industrialised societies’. It affirms that Bolivia’s Andean and Amazonian cultures, which maintain a symbiotic relationship with nature, have triumphed over western culture:

The symbiotic principle of the Pachamama of living with and for the earth, is also the principle of equilibrium with nature, which is the only path we have left to preserve life on earth. This stands in contrast to the principles of western society that will continue to destroy life on earth (ibid)

Given this triumph, the document concludes, the MAS-IPSP has based its ideology on Bolivia’s Andean and Amazonian culture. Furthermore, the MAS-IPSP will challenge western culture because ‘persisting at this day and age with the infinite growth of the North through globalisation and the market economy will accelerate the present ecological disequilibrium’. In sum, the way to address the problems of Bolivia, which stem from its exploitation by industrialised society, is to displace western culture and govern by the principles of Bolivia’s Andean and Amazonian cultures.

The MAS-IPSP’s ‘Our Ideological Principles’ sheds light on certain factors. First, it contains both the classist discourse of the left and the miners, and the indigenous rights discourse of NGOs, civil society and the CSUTCB. The MAS-IPSP strategically complemented its syndicalist discourse with a cultural and ethnic discourse that had been growing in prominence and demonstrated a strong resonance in the national and international arena since the early 1990s. The adoption of the indigenous rights discourse took place with ease given the ethnic background of its constituents and symbolic value of the source of its struggle—the coca leaf. Second, the document defined the constituents and the enemies of the MAS-IPSP based on its classist and indigenous rights discourse. The labour and peasant sectors, due to their position as marginal classes and originarios, comprised the ‘excluded’ and the constituents of the MAS-IPSP. The ‘North’ and those that espoused western culture in Bolivia comprised the politically and economically ‘privileged’ and the enemies of the MAS-IPSP. In essence, it presents the MAS-IPSP’s struggle as one based on class and ethnicity. In an interview with the author, Hugo Fernandez, the Vice Minister of Foreign Relations during the first Morales government, highlights this point:

Cocaleros fused various ideologies and interests. First they talk about the proletariat and the poor of Bolivia. Then they bring about this talk of ‘whites against indigenous’, which intensifies as the IPSP takes shape. What it did was place the
indigenous vision of Bolivia against the non-indigenous vision of Bolivia. I wouldn’t say it had a pure *indigenista* discourse, because its analysis was also based on class, but it did specify a political project that placed indigenous against whites. Why? Because we saw that when an indigenous person was in a white political party, he would be subordinated. And whites are the minority, so we did not see that as fair. We thought it was not possible that in a democratic Bolivia, if whites are the minority, they should keep ruling (interview, 28.8.2008)

The following section discusses how the cocaleros of the Trópico won the support of the sectors that comprise Bolivia’s ‘excluded’ and put the political project of the MAS-IPSP into practice.

### 6.3 Cocaleros as Political Actors

The cocaleros of the Trópico enhanced their visibility and political empowerment throughout the cycle of protest that hit Bolivia beginning with the Water War in 2000 and culminating with the resignation of President Carlos Mesa in 2005. Cocaleros promulgated the MAS-IPSP’s classist and ethnic discourse as they rose to the forefront of this cycle. Both discourses brandished the banner of sovereignty, as those identified by class and/or ethnicity rejected the United States’ economic and cultural imposition throughout Bolivia’s history.

*Protest and politics.* As elaborated previously, the policies of the Bánzer government provoked significant popular discontent. In the Trópico, the repression and economic hardship brought on by the policies of *Plan Dignidad* fuelled cocaleros’ commitment to their political instrument. Their rise in prominence on a national scale, however, was powered by the leading role they took in the Water War of 2000. At first glance it may seem that the struggle over water privatisation and the struggle over coca production lack commonalities: water and coca differ in terms of their source, production and provision, consumption and legality. Nevertheless, both have evoked passionate protests because of the effect that curtailing the ability to consume or produce these goods has on one’s livelihood or capacity for survival. The slogans used in these struggles highlight this point. In the case water: ‘*Agua es Vida*’ (Water is Life); in the case of coca, ‘*Coca o Muerte*’ (Coca or Death). In addition, both struggles brandished the banner of sovereignty as both held anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist sentiments. The water privatisation scheme that prompted the Water War resulted from an imposed neoliberal policy that served to benefit a foreign corporation at a high cost to the people of Cochabamba. *Plan Dignidad* and the increasingly repressive nature of drug control policies were largely seen as an imposition from the United States. Moreover, a significant contingent of cocaleros began to produce coca in the 1980s as a direct result of the
economic hardship provoked by the neoliberal stabilisation package.

The Water War afforded cocaleros an opportunity to link their struggle for coca with the broader struggles against neoliberalism and imperialism that swept the country. As expressed by Lehman (2006), ‘the Water War brought neoliberal economic policy into direct conflict with grassroots democracy and mobilisation’ (145). Whilst these mobilisations took place on a regional scale, the role that cocaleros’ played in this ‘direct conflict’ gained them recognition as political actors on a national scale. Morales’ position as a congressman for the Cochabamba department since the 1997 municipal elections aided this development. As protests continued to overwhelm the country, mainstream society began to take sides between those that contested the neoliberal economic model and those that imposed and benefitted from it (otherwise known as the ‘vende patrias’). The outcome of this side-taking became visible at the 2002 national elections.

In January 2002, six months prior to the elections, Congress expelled Morales for leading a series of protests against forced eradication in the Trópico. The expulsion generated outrage amongst Bolivians, in part because it ‘appeared to be orchestrated by the United States government’ and in part because of Morales’ position as a prominent peasant leader (Van Cott 2003c: 772). Support for Morales surged, especially within the peasant and indigenous sectors. Van Cott (2003c) affirms:

Perhaps the most important impact of the expulsion was the universal rejection it inspired among the fractured peasant movement, which closed ranks around Morales and organised roadblocks, hunger strikes and demonstrations to demand his reinstatement (772)

Dionicio Núñez, general secretary of the COFECAY at the time of the expulsion, confirmed Van Cott’s (2003c) affirmation in an interview with the author:

The United States ambassador had Evo Morales kicked out of congress, and we all reacted against it. We all went to the plaza to protest and there were roadblocks all over Bolivia. As a leader of a peasant confederation, I reacted because it brought to the table the issue of imperialism (Núñez, interview, 15.1.2010)

In short, the expulsion spurred solidarity amongst Bolivia’s marginal sectors for the leader of the MAS-IPSP and prompted them to side with him in the elections of June 2002. They stood even more firmly on Morales’ side when United States ambassador Manuel Rocha implored Bolivians not to vote for him. In Rocha’s words:

46 The term vendepatria (country-seller or sell-out) developed during the first government of Sánchez de Lozada to refer to those that benefitted from its various privatisation schemes (Schultz 2003, p. 35)
I want to remind the Bolivian electorate that if they vote for those who want Bolivia to return to exporting cocaine, that will seriously jeopardise any future aid to Bolivia from the United States (Rocha qtd. in Van Cott 2003c: 773)

Similar the expulsion from the Congress, the announcement provoked resentment and further elevated Morales as a leading political figure in the struggle against neoliberalism and imperialism. Hoffman related in an interview with the author:

I would say the best propaganda for Evo came from the United States ambassador. When he gave the message not to vote for Evo, everyone—not just the cocaleros—condemned him. The anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal message worked well for the cocaleros, especially since the United States helped Evo become the symbol of that message (interview, 17.1.2010)

Morales’ expulsion and Rocha’s announcement also raised awareness of the corrupt nature of Bolivia’s pacted democracy. After all, the Congress had expelled its most-voted member, and in large part at the behest of the United States. This awareness accentuated Bolivian’s distaste for traditional political parties.

The results of national elections of 2002 demonstrated the loss of confidence in the traditional political parties and the neoliberal economic model they espoused. For the first time in fifteen years, non-traditional parties (the MAS-IPSP, the Pachakuti Indigenous Movement [Movimiento Indigena Pachakuti—MIP] and the New Republican Force [Nueva Fuerza Republicana—NFR]) together attained a greater percentage of the vote than the traditional political parties. Felipe Quispe, one of Bolivia’s most prominent indigenous figures, organised road blocks in the department of La Paz in April 2000 (and regularly thereafter) in the name of peasant and indigenous demands. He founded the MIP party in November 2001 to participate in the 2002 national elections (Assies 2004: 41). The MNR obtained a plurality of the vote by a slight margin, but the MIP and the MAS-IPSP emerged as victors as their electoral performance exceeded expectations. Political analysts had given the MIP little chance of success due to the narrow appeal of its political agenda that primarily targeted

---

47 The NFR was founded by Manfred Reyes Villa, the mayor of Cochabamba from 1993 to 2002. Originally a local party, it became a national party for the elections of 2002. The MIP was founded by Aymara leader Felipe Quispe in 2000. Both parties criticised the traditional party system and called for a review of the political and economic model put in place in 1985 (Singer and Morrison 2004).

48 Felipe Quispe is an indigenous leader with Aymara nationalist views. He founded the Túpac Katari Indian Movement (Movimiento Indio Túpac Katari—MITKA) in 1971. He founded the Ayllus Rojos in 1984, which maintained ‘a thesis that proposed a revolutionary path in the face of centuries of systematic ethnocide and genocide by the white-mestizo state: the armed struggle’ (Quispe 2005:[online]). In 1990 he founded the Túpac Katari Guerilla Army (Ejército Guerrillero Túpac Katari—EGTK), which disbanded in 1992 following his arrest by the Paz Zamora government. One year after his release in 1998 he ascended the position of General Secretary of the CSUTCB. He founded the MIP in 2000, whilst maintaining his position as General Secretary of the CSUTCB (ibid).
Aymaras. However, the party managed to attain 6.1 per cent of the vote and five seats in the lower house of the Congress (Van Cott 2003: 771; Cyr 2005: 19). The MAS-IPSP attained 20.9 per cent of the vote won thirteen seats in the lower house of Congress. Together, the MAS-IPSP and the MIP accounted for close to thirty per cent of the Congress, which afforded them veto power as a bloc. According to Cyr (2005)

Representing in many ways the demands of the social movements that had dominated the streets after 2000, their congressional victory meant that, for the first time, these informal political forces would have an institutional voice in government (19)

Whilst non-traditional parties managed to gain significant institutional political power, the executive remained in the hands of traditional political parties. The MNR, which had obtained plurality with 22.5 per cent of the vote, formed a coalition government with the MIR and the Civic Solidarity Union (Unidad Cívica Solidaridad—UCS) with Sánchez de Lozada as president.

**Ethnicity and politics.** Morales took on a prominent position throughout the wave of protests that struck the Sánchez de Lozada government, both in the institutional and contentious political realm. In the institutional realm, Morales headed the congressional opposition bloc. In December 2002, he presented a list of fourteen issues to Congress, which responded that Morales should limit himself to the coca issue (Assies 2004: 41). In the contentious realm, he acted as the leader of Bolivia’s marginal and historically excluded sectors. Morales had become the victim of the state, neoliberalism and imperialism with the repression experienced under the Bánzer government, the expulsion from the Congress and the words of the United States ambassador. Furthermore, he had displaced Quispe as Bolivia’s leading indigenous figure after demonstrating significantly more electoral strength than the Aymara leader.

In the period between the 2002 and 2005 national elections, MAS-IPSP enhanced its political capital by creating and strengthening alliances with different sectors and accentuating its indigenous identity. The Gas War of 2003 presented an opportunity to bolster the alliance-formation process. The main opposition parties, the MAS-IPSP and the NFR proposed a referendum to address the gas issue. At the same time, a regional movement in defence of gas developed in the Department of Tarija, which accounts for eighty-five per cent of Bolivia’s gas reserves. Opposition parties gained momentum when they won the support of the COB,
which no longer remained under the control of the MIR (part of the governing coalition) after a change in leadership. The MAS-IPSP declared the Gas War in mid-August 2003, arguing that the government’s refusal to attend to the proposals of the opposition had forced it to adopt a strategy of ‘protests with proposals’ (Assies 2004: 30). Like the Water War, the Gas War powered anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal sentiments and heightened calls for sovereignty. As related by Perrault (2006):

> Gas came to symbolize the kind of exploitative practices that Bolivians know so well—the theft of national wealth—that enrich a few foreign and national elites while further impoverishing those who labour for them (166)

The Water War and the Gas War allowed the sectors of Bolivian society that had long suffered political and economic exclusion an opportunity to engage in joint contentious action to challenge and make demands on the state. Discontent and protests over the gas issue spread quickly and precipitated the loss of confidence in the government, which at the time had an approval rating of nine per cent. President Sánchez de Lozada resigned his office in October 2003.

In addition to the issue of natural resources, the calls for sovereignty that came forth during Bolivia’s latest protest cycle brought the issue of constitutional reform to the political agenda. The demands for an Asamblea Constituyente had surged during the Water War and then re-emerged with great force during the crisis triggered by the Gas War (Assies 2004: 36). Peasant and indigenous organisations were the main proponents behind these demands, as they sought to enhance the recognition and rights of Bolivia’s indigenous people. One of the aims of the constitutional reform included re-founding Bolivia as a ‘plurinational state’ that recognised the country’s multi-ethnic condition. Given the role of the CSUTCB in the development of the political instrument, the MAS-IPSP incorporated indigenous demands into its political agenda early on. It enhanced its ethnic discourse and formalised ties with indigenous organisations as ethnicity became increasingly politicised in Bolivia. The culmination of the process of alliance formation between the MAS-IPSP and indigenous organisations took place in 2004 with the establishment of the Pacto de Unidad (Pact of Unity). Bolivia’s main peasant and indigenous organisations formed the Pacto de Unidad in order to support the formation of an Asamblea Constituyente and to ensure the representation of peasant and indigenous people in the assembly following its establishment (Zuazo 2010). The organisations that joined the Pacto de Unidad supported Morales’ presidential bid in the
special presidential election of 2005. Morales won the special election of 2005 with fifty-four per cent of the vote, the highest percentage attained by any candidate since Bolivia’s return to democracy.

Before concluding this section, it is important to highlight that the politicisation of ethnicity took place not only in terms of the rights and recognition of indigenous people and territories, but also as the marker or identity of those at the margins of Bolivian society. Strobele-Gregor, Hoffman and Holmes (1994) highlight this point:

The rural and urban poor in particular, whose living conditions have increasingly deteriorated since the economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s and who are cruelly affected by neoliberal economic policy, express their frustration, resignation, and political disillusionment with the dominant political parties more and more in ethnic terms (121)

By becoming the most prominent political figure of the anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist protest cycle that hit Bolivia, Morales in effect became the leader of those that expressed their various disillusionments in ethnic terms. To quote Urioste: ‘Morales discovered the power of the indigenous identity and transformed himself into an indigenous figure that represents the indigenous of Bolivia’ (interview, 13.1.2010). Some hold the view that the use of ethnicity by the MAS-IPSP and Morales resulted from a strategic calculation to gain allies and sympathisers (Stefanoni 2003; Do Alto and Stefanoni 2006). When questioned over the strategic use the ethnic and indigenous discourse, Vice-president García Linera declared the following:

The ethnic identity, whilst always present, has not always been politicised in Bolivia. It is one thing for it to be present in everyday life and another thing for it to be a political banner. [The latter] is a more recent construction, and it has had cycles. The cycle of Tupac Katari; the cycle of Zarate Vilca... I would say the latest cycle is that of the Kataristas and Indianistas of the 1970s to the present, who gradually politicised (that is, turn into a banner of unity and mobilisation) the ethnic identity. And President Evo is a product of that, of that shift from the syndicalist-peasant to the ethnic. Look at Fausto Reinaga, the father of all us Indianistas. In his first phase he had nothing of an Indianista... and then he gradually began to construct it. Even the peasant confederations: in the 1970s, if you look at their discourse, there is nothing ethnic or cultural—only peasant; in the 1980s, somewhat ethnic; in the 1990s, the ethnic become radicalised and the peasant becomes less prominent. Evo is the result of the process of making ethnicity as a political demand. So it should come as no surprise that at some points he has accentuated more the syndicalist-peasant dimension, and at other times the ethnic dimension. That is what has happened across the entire indigenous movement (García Linera, lecture, 11.11.2010)

49 Whilst the Pacto de Unidad did not openly pronounce the endorsement, the existence of an alliance was made clear when the Morales government presented the Pacto de Unidad’s proposal for the Asamblea Constituyente to Congress once it came to power.
García Linera therefore acknowledges that the incorporation of the indigenous and ethnic discourse took place in the latter stages of the MAS-IPSP’ political trajectory, yet affirms that it resulted from a natural progression rather than a strategic calculation. In either case, it is difficult to deny that the MAS-IPSP has enhanced the rights and representation of those that identify as indigenous in Bolivia (Harten 2011). Furthermore, as discussed below, the support afforded to the MAS-IPSP by various marginal sectors also involved a strategic calculation.

**The MAS-IPSP and the people.** Former advisor to the Coordinadora Carlos Hoffman stated the following in an interview with the author: ‘Evo Morales did not unite Bolivia’s cocaleros, but he united the country’ (interview, 17.1.2010). This statement succinctly points out what set apart Bolivia’s cocalero social movement from its Peruvian counterpart. As in Peru, two categories of cocaleros exist in Bolivia: those that produce coca for traditional consumption (legal cocaleros) and those that produce coca for the production of cocaine (illegal cocaleros). Although instances of solidarity and joint contentious action between the two categories of cocaleros have taken place, neither the Peruvian nor the Bolivian cocalero social movements have managed to unite legal and illegal cocaleros in a struggle over the defence of coca. This is because legal and illegal cocaleros maintain different (and often conflicting) interests due to the nature of their relationship with coca. Still, after undergoing its transformation, Bolivia’s cocalero social movement incorporated legal cocaleros (as well as several other sectors) into its political instrument. It accomplished this by articulating a political agenda with broad demands that transcended the differences between historically competing sectors such as legal and illegal cocaleros, rural and urban and peasant and labour.

In an interview with the author, Núñez, current general secretary of the Federación Sunta of the Yungas (and former general secretary of the COFECAY), discussed the Yungas valleys’ support for Morales as the presidential candidate of the MAS-IPSP despite the differences with the illegal cocaleros of the Trópico. He affirmed:

> This is our mentality: We are the only ones that produce traditional coca and we should be the only ones allowed to produce coca in Bolivia. We defend coca because of its ancestral value; the cocaleros of the Trópico defend it because of money. In 2004, when we staged road blocks in the Yungas, we declared Evo a persona non grata because he is the leader of illegal cocaleros. But we vote for him in the national elections. Why? For political reasons. Because the coca issue is important, but it is not the only issue (interview, 15.1.2010)

---

50 For a discussion on how the MAS-IPSP attracted urban supporters between the 2002 and 2005 national elections, see Do Alto (2006) and Zuazo (2010).
One of the issues that appealed to the cocaleros of the Yungas, who are predominantly Aymara, was that of the recognition and rights of indigenous people. As Aymaras, Núñez related: ‘We were more linked to the Katarista discourse of Felipe Quispe’. However, he continued:

The vision of Felipe Quispe of an Aymara nation was too radical and exclusive. We knew that it would not stick with different sectors. So in practice we supported the vision of the MAS-IPSP, which included different sectors: not just the cocaleros or the indigenous people, but all people—even city people. Because even if we are Aymara, we know that there are many types of Bolivians. That is why we supported the idea of the plurinational state and not of the Aymara nation (ibid)

Alongside indigenous rights and recognition rested the issue of sovereignty. The cocaleros of the Yungas viewed the United States as responsible for Bolivia’s increasingly repressive drug control policies, which had begun to affect the Yungas with the onset of Plan Dignidad. Fears lingered that forced eradication could eventually spread to their valleys. The cocaleros of the Yungas also shared the general sentiment of Bolivia’s underrepresented sectors that the country’s pacted democracy served the interests of an elite few, including the United States. Núñez highlighted this point in discussing his constituents’ support for Morales and the MAS-IPSP:

With the United States you have the issue of imperialism and sovereignty. Who are they to expel Evo from Congress? Who are they to rule our coca politics? Why can they sell Coca-Cola all over the world and we cannot sell mate de coca all over the world? The DEA introduced the most violent methods of eradication in the Trópico, and it angered us as Bolivians—even if it was not taking place in our valleys. There has always been a deep resentment toward the United States. To keep voting for the parties of the past would have meant losing more sovereignty: Bolivia’s sovereignty to the United States; the people’s sovereignty to the elites. So we voted for Evo because it meant that we were voting for ourselves. It meant that we would become the government. Because Evo is the same as us; he has the vision of the common people; he is not like the rest. And we must keep supporting him, because we must show that we can govern Bolivia (ibid)

Legal cocaleros in Bolivia thus supported the MAS-IPSP not as cocaleros, but as yet another group of excluded Bolivians seeking to break the pattern of rule under an unrepresentative pacted democracy.

The indigenous and peasant sector also firmly supported the MAS-IPSP. The CSUTCB had long advocated the formation of a political instrument. Once the process of the formation political instrument began, cocaleros easily dominated it as the strongest peasant sector within the CSUTCB. The CSUTCB also sought constitutional reform in order to promote the recognition and rights of indigenous people. It pursued this in conjunction with other
indigenous organisations after the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity, which prompted a process of alliance formation between indigenous communities and organisations. The process culminated in 2004 when the *Pacto de Unidad* was signed in support of the impending *Asamblea Constituyente*. Bolivia’s indigenous organisations lent their support to the MAS-IPSP because it incorporated their demands in its political agenda—the most important of which included re-founding Bolivia under a new constitution and as a plurinational state. Guarachi voiced this support at a meeting in 2007 entitled ‘From Colonialism to De-Colonisation: The Political Accumulation of Indigenous, Originario and Peasant Communities’ that took place two years after Morales won the presidency in the 2005 special elections:

I want to begin by saying that we all known that the process we are currently living is what our grandparents and forefathers dreamed of, which is to govern ourselves… The process Bolivia is living with President Evo Morales (Aymara and cocalero) and the MAS is a long one. We are neither at the end nor at the beginning. Hopefully all will go well for him, because the continuation, obstruction or failure of this process depends on his success or failure. This process is ours, it belongs to the Indianistas, to the Kataristas, to Genaro Flores, to Felipe Quispe, to me, to Victor Hugo Cardenas and the rest of the fighters; it does not just belong to Evo and the MAS, they are only a part of the process. Because of this, we have the obligation to take care of him and protect him… so that never again will the indians, the women and men of indigenous communities, the originarios or the peasants be ignored, used or excluded in the exercise of political power (Guarachi 2007:1)

Guarachi’s words emphasise a number of points. He makes clear that he considers the government of Morales as one that belongs to the people; that to have Morales as president signifies that Bolivians—the originarios, the peasants, the indigenous, the excluded—are governing themselves. He also underscores that Bolivia’s indigenous organisations should support the government of Morales to continue the process of empowering traditionally excluded sectors. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that Guarachi does not consider Morales fundamentally indigenous. He affirmed the following:

I do not see Evo as indigenous, other than that his face is indigenous and that he was born in an Aymara community. His struggle for coca was a union struggle and had a classist conception. But he saw that coca belonged to the Aymaras; to his culture. So he eventually incorporated the indigenous discourse to his classist discourse. Regardless, he represents us, his government represents us and he holds the position of Bolivia’s first indigenous president (interview, 27.8.2008)

Bolivia’s indigenous leaders thus acknowledge that Morales is not intrinsically an indigenous leader and that his origin as a social and political leader comes from the struggle for coca and that he led that struggle from a classist perspective. They also recognise that the cocaleros’ social movement and political instrument strategically adopted an indigenous discourse. Yet,
they support the Morales government as an essential part of the process of empowerment of Bolivia’s indigenous people. Guarachi again emphasised this view at an international symposium in 2006:

The intellectuals of the Aymara, Quechua, Guarani and other indigenous communities cannot de-legitimise [the president] from the outset because he may not have enough proposals for the indigenous communities, because he may not guarantee de-colonisation, because he may not represent indigenous people because of his strong background of class discourse or because he may be influenced by the left…

The pacha obliges us to reflex in a positive light, to halt and make proposals that put aside prejudices and extremist or fundamentalist conceptions. We should not expect everything from Evo’s government… It is also not the time to make immediate demands; rather we should propose what we can do in this new political scenario (Guarachi 2006: 7)

Regardless of the source or depth of his indigenous identity, Bolivia’s indigenous sector sees Morales as representative of its interests and maintains a sense of ownership over his government. This marks a turning point in Bolivia’s modern history—and indigenous leaders such as Guarachi support the present government to sustain what they consider an important process of change.

The illegal cocalero sector supported Morales as the candidate of the MAS-IPSP for two principle reasons. The first reason related to their association with the political identity of ‘cocalero’; the second related to their association with the political identity of ‘excluded’. Cocaleros in the Trópico have fought in defence of coca production since the process of its criminalisation commenced in the mid-1980s. As a consequence, they have suffered the highest rate of militarisation in Bolivia and the harshest incidences of repression on behalf of the state. When the idea of the political instrument arose, the cocaleros of the Trópico supported it primarily because it would allow them to triumph in the struggle for coca, and do so by peaceful means. As voiced by one cocalero of Valle Ivirza, Cochabamba:

Yes I voted for Evo and I will vote for him again because I want to have a better life. Now my coca is protected. Now, instead of being massacred, my comrades and I can count on some help from the state and we will be able to live in peace (Cocalero B, interview, 20.1.2010)

Isaac Molina Salazar, general secretary of the Central Valle Ivirza, gave a similar account of his community’s support for Morales and the MAS-IPSP:

If it wasn’t for coca, Evo would not be president. Evo needed our support and he got our support, because coca is something that allows us to live. And we will keep supporting him as long as there is coca. And he knows that, and that is why he listens to us (Molina Salazar, interview, 19.1.2010)
Whilst the coca issue plays a significant (if not determinant) role in the illegal cocalero sector’s support for Morales, it is not the only issue. The cocaleros of the Trópico also sought to defend broader issues linked to the political identity of ‘excluded’, such as the rejection of the neoliberal economic model, the political party system and the influence of the United States. Like other sectors at the margins of Bolivian society, cocaleros in the Trópico grew frustrated with the unrepresentative nature and lack of accountability of Bolivia’s pacte democracy. For them, the election of Morales to the presidency marked the end to that exclusionary system. As affirmed by Gonzales:

Evo is a comrade of our class, he has our skin colour, he has an innocent memory, he is part of the community and we know that he will do what we ask, what we put on the agenda. That is why he comes back here to Trópico: to meet with the Coordinadora so that we can tell him our demands (interview, 20.1.2010)

In short, for historically excluded Bolivians, the results of the 2005 election meant that ‘one of us’ was now the president and that ‘we’ were now the government. As declared by Urioste: ‘There is now a sense of ownership over the state by the people that we used to lack. And let me say “Well done” that this has been accomplished’ (interview, 13.1.2010). This sense of ownership was shared even across sectors that had been at odds in the past. The MAS-IPSP accomplished this by bringing these sectors together within one boundary that separates ‘us’ (the historically marginal sectors) from ‘them’ (the political and economic elite).

6.4 MECHANISMS

This section discusses the identity-shaping and broad mechanisms at work throughout the transformation of the Bolivian cocalero social movement into a political party with mass appeal. These mechanisms resulted in the construction of the political identity of ‘excluded’, which enhanced the ability of the cocaleros’ political instrument (MAS-IPSP) to form alliances and gain support across different sectors.

**Encounter.** Encounter took place between lowland and highland indigenous and peasant organisations early in the cocalero social movement’s transformation during the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity. Lowland and highland organisations had no prior history of engaging in joint political action and lacked unity given their cultural and socio-economic differences. This was exacerbated by the attitude of superiority of highland Aymara and Quechua organisations and the corresponding mistrust of their lowland counterparts. Furthermore, the two groups held different grievances: highland organisations demanded a
creation of a multicultural and plurinational state; lowland organisations demanded recognition and autonomy for their territories (Strobele-Gregor, Hoffman and Holmes 1994: 114-115). The 1990 March of Territory and Dignity prompted such a response that highland organisations did not miss the opportunity to welcome their lowland counterparts upon their arrival to La Paz. In doing so, they opened the doors for joint political action. Strobele-Gregor, Hoffman and Holmes (1994) stated the following:

Since the march, political declarations and public statements by the CSUTCB and by local or regional campesino organisations and ethnic communities have increasingly emphasised the unifying aspects: social marginalization, increasing destruction of their economic foundations, and criticism of the current parliamentary democracy, perverted by the criollo minority, which makes it impossible for them to defend their interests (117)

Moreover, Strobele-Gregor, Hoffman and Holmes (1994) emphasise that the increasingly ethnic discourse of indigenous organisations, which highlights their ethnic diversity, helped to unify, rather than further alienate them:

Though it may seem paradoxical, the new Indian self-consciousness stressing cultural and ethnic identity and therefore the differences between ethnic or language groups in its turn creates unifying elements among them. This is the case because it is linked with an increasingly critical attitude toward the normal and values of criollo society and the recognition of the variety of autonomous political cultures that differ from the ‘official’ political culture dominated by the criollo minority (ibid)

The encounter between the lowland and highland indigenous organisations in 1990 thus paved the way for joint (contentious) political action based on their criticism of the ‘official’ political culture that stifled their varied cultures and ethnicities. The Pacto de Unidad of 2004, undertaken in defence of the Asamblea Constituyente, officialised this unity. Moreover, the Pacto de Unidad empowered the cocaleros’ MAS-IPSP party as it supported its ‘indigenous versus non-indigenous’ political project.

**Convergence.** Convergence, a broad mechanism, refers to the coming together of less extreme political actors into closer alliances due to increasing contradictions at the extremes of a political continuum (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 162). In the Peruvian case, contradictions between radical and moderate factions of the cocalero social movement led to the radicalisation of social movement in its entirety, which limited its capacity as a social and later political actor. In the Bolivian case, the rise of radical factions—both within the cocalero social movement and within the general polity—had a different effect. In 1989, the CSUTCB firmly rejected the proposal of Quispe’s Ayllus Rojos for an armed struggle. In the 2002
national elections, at which time he held the post of general secretary of the CSUTCB, Quispe ran for president as the candidate of the MIP. Despite his long-held position as an indigenous leader and the fact that indigenous issues had become highly politicised, Quispe obtained 6.1 per cent of the vote. Morales obtained 20.9 per cent. According to Guarachi, Quispe did not garner more support because ‘his radical discourse was too ethnocentric and went against the idea of the plurinational state’ (interview, 27.8.2008). Rather than support Quispe’s political project of constructing an Aymara nation, the CSUTCB joined the Pacto de Unidad along with other indigenous and peasant organisations in support of the plurinational state. Similarly, the legal cocaleros of the Yungas—which are predominantly Aymara—chose to support the MAS-IPSP rather than the MIP. Núñez affirmed the following:

Most of the cocaleros from the Trópico are colonisers, they migrated to the area. A large part came from Quechua communities, some from Aymara and other communities. They are first and foremost cocaleros. We are first and foremost Aymaras. We harvest coca one leaf at a time; we have ceremonies at the end of a harvest. They do not. But we put aside those differences and voted for the leader of the illegal cocaleros [Evo Morales] instead of the leader of Bolivia’s Aymaras [Felipe Quispe] because the greater good of the country was at stake. We still differ with Evo in terms of coca policy, but we are one hundred per cent behind him in his plans to change Bolivia (interview, 15.1.2010).

The radical nature of Quispe’s proposal thus prompted those that strongly identified as indigenous to support the MAS-IPSP, which professed the recognition of indigenous rights whilst maintaining a more moderate line.

Radical tendencies in the Trópico that advocated an armed struggle to defend coca also had a limited appeal. Even Morales, one of its strongest supporters, capitulated to the idea of taking power through the electoral path thanks to his electoral success in the 1997 municipal elections and to the constant encouragement of the various political advisors that entered the Trópico. Rather than narrow its appeal by undertaking an armed struggle, the cocaleros’ political instrument broadened its appeal by incorporating grievances shared by different sectors. In the end, a broad range of sectors made alliances or reinforced pre-existing ones in support of the MAS-IPSP’s bid to take power through the electoral path.

**Diffusion.** Diffusion is a broad mechanism that refers to the transfer of information along existing lines of communication. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) emphasise that the term refers to transfers ‘in the same or similar shape of forms and claims of contention’ across space or sectors and ideological divides (68). Diffusion and brokerage work through an
additional mechanism, ‘attribution of similarity’, defined as ‘the mutual identification of actors in different sites as being sufficiently similar to justify common action’. Attribution of similarity can result from deliberate brokerage attempts, in which potential brokers frame claims and construct identities of different actors as sufficiently similar to bring them together in formal alliances or encourage joint contentious action (ibid).

Diffusion took place in Bolivia throughout the protest cycle that commenced with the Water War of 2000 and culminated in the resignation of Carlos Mesa in 2005. The Water War and the Gas War in particular provided opportunities for actors to identify their similarities, engage in joint contentious action and transfer information through such action. Perrault (2006) discusses this occurrence in his study of popular protest in Bolivia:

> These struggles, which in other instances may have remained localized contests over resource management, transcended the local and quickly gained national and international importance. In making this scalar jump, protest over water and gas became venues for the expression of manifold frustration on the part of a people with a long history of colonial and neocolonial exploitation, marginalization and poverty (151)

In addition, these struggles provided a venue for the MAS-IPSP to propagate its political agenda. This agenda, elaborated in a classist and ethnic discourse, brought together anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal sentiments under the banner of sovereignty. Sovereignty came to be understood as freedom from the economic, political and cultural imposition of national and international actors. Those that engaged in the struggle for sovereignty through venues such as the Water War and the Gas War came to acquire a joint understanding of their position as ‘excluded’ vis-à-vis those national and international actors.

Certain events enhanced the diffusion mechanism at work throughout the protest cycle. The expulsion of Morales from the Congress and the plea by United States Ambassador Rocha not to vote for Morales helped transform the presidential candidate of the MAS-IPSP into the leader of those that identified as ‘excluded’. Morales became the victim of the state, imperialism and the corrupt nature of Bolivia’s pacted democracy. Polling data indicates that Morales’ campaign was boosted by the expulsion and Ambassador Rocha’s words. At the start of his campaign in January 2002, Morales’ approval rating peaked at three per cent. By June 2002, he polled between nine and twelve per cent. Given that he polled about fourteen per cent immediately before the Ambassador Rocha’s plea, which occurred four days before the election, analysts estimate that the statements provided approximately a five per cent
Brokerage. Brokerage is less common and has a greater impact in the spread of contention than diffusion because it creates formal ties between different and previously disconnected actors. Brokerage took place on two occasions in the transformation phase of the Bolivian cocalero social movement. The first instance occurred in 1995 with the establishment of the political instrument that would act as the political arm of the Coordinadora. Although it was dominated by the cocaleros of the Trópico, the political instrument brought together different actors with grievances that transcended the boundaries between them. The second instance took place with the establishment of the Pacto de Unidad in 2004, which formalised a process of alliance formation that commenced at the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity. The pact brought together indigenous and peasant organisations in support of constitutional reform—and in support of the MAS-IPSP, which had incorporated their demands into its political agenda.

6.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed the transformation of the social movement of Bolivia’s cocaleros, which involved their transition from social to political actors. The transformation took place with ease and resulted in highly empowered political actors. This was enabled by the construction the political identity of ‘excluded’.

The political identity of ‘excluded’ facilitated the transition and strength of cocaleros as political actors in two ways. First, it helped to broaden the support for the cocaleros’ political instrument (the MAS-IPSP) by incorporating a range of issues that extended beyond the issue of coca. The political identity of ‘excluded’ appealed to the anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal sentiments that erupted across Bolivia as frustration with the country’s pacted democracy escalated. The MAS-IPSP effectively employed a classist and ethnic discourse to bring together the sectors that expressed those sentiments: the classist element related to anti-neoliberalism; the ethnic element appealed to anti-imperialism. In the process, the political party of the cocaleros of the Trópico became the political party of Bolivia’s ‘excluded’.

Second, the political identity of ‘excluded’ helped legitimise and give a moral gloss to a political project that began as the struggle for coca. The MAS-IPSP effectively employed the ethnic dimension of its discourse in this endeavour. ‘Indigenous’ in Bolivia is associated with
cultural, societal, political and economic exclusion and marginalisation—in short, the most poignant representation of the political identity of ‘excluded’. Furthermore, the issue of indigenous rights experienced an ‘explosion in the past few decades’ on a local and transnational scale (Hodgson 2002: 1040). The MAS-IPSP thus enhanced the ethnic dimension of its discourse as it gained prominence as a political actor (markedly so after the 2002 national elections). Still, this did not imply a departure from its classist roots. Morales’ inaugural speech of his first term as president in January 2006 demonstrates this point:

We are here to say [we have had] enough of resistance, of the 500 years of resistance to the takeover of power, to the 500 years of resistance of indigenous, workers, of all sectors, to bring an end to injustice, to end inequality, to put an end to discrimination, and oppression to which we have been submitted as Aymaras, Quechuas, and Guaranis (Morales, speech, 22.1.2006)

In short, Morales directly referred to the ‘500 years of resistance’ of Bolivia’s indigenous people, yet made clear that the resistance referred to all ‘all sectors’.

In closing, it is important to emphasise that the set of political opportunities and threats faced by the MAS-IPSP facilitated the construction and enhanced the appeal of the political identity of ‘excluded’. Gonzales underscores the importance of context (which encompasses the set of political opportunities and threats) when recounting the development of the MAS-IPSP:

The plan was to govern ourselves first at the local level, then at the departmental level and lastly at the national level. But the Water War and the Gas War and all of the indigenous marches… all that commotion helped us skip the second step (interview, 20.1.2010)

Context additionally shaped contentious interactions with the state and other opponents that proved significant. The most notable include the expulsion of Morales from Congress and the plea by United States ambassador Rocha to the Bolivian people to not vote for Morales in the 2002 national elections. Both galvanised the MAS-IPSP as Morales came to be viewed as a victim of the repression, imperialism and the unrepresentative nature of Bolivia’s pacted democracy. Morales became the symbol of the sovereignty banner that encapsulated Bolivia’s anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist sentiments, an actuality that aided his ascent as Bolivia’s most empowered political actor. He thus won the 2005 special elections with fifty-four per cent of the popular vote in the first round of the election (and was re-elected in the 2009 with sixty-four per cent of the popular vote).
7 Conclusion: The cocaleros of Bolivia and Peru compared

The political landscape of Bolivia and Peru has been impacted by the emergence of cocaleros as political actors. Cocaleros first gained visibility by waging contentious challenges on the state in defence of their livelihood, the production of coca. They formed social movements through which they transitioned from illegitimate actors to social actors. Their social movements then underwent transformations through which cocaleros transitioned from social actors to political actors.

Throughout these processes, the experience of the cocaleros of Bolivia and Peru proved strikingly different. Their paths, empowerment and impact have varied significantly in scope and intensity. In Bolivia, the Tropico’s coca unions—virtually unknown in the early 1980s—formed a social movement, launched a political party and brought together a broad coalition that resulted in the election of their main leader as Bolivia’s first indigenous (and arguably most legitimate) president. Bolivian cocaleros transformed themselves from producers of a good of questionable legitimacy to the defenders of Bolivia’s sovereignty, indigenous cultures and the historically excluded. In Peru, cocaleros formed a social movement in spite of serious obstacles, but then failed to articulate and act upon a unified political agenda on the coca issue—much less broader issues that appealed to other sectors. Individual cocalero leaders ascended political positions, but their impact and their legitimacy proved limited.

In examining these experiences, this work has highlighted the role of the cocaleros’ political identities in regard to their ability to gain empowerment, and how the defence of coca affected the process of identity-formation. Cocaleros reinforced or redefined existing identities, created new ones and tried to understate debilitating ones in their efforts to gain political empowerment. The dynamics and outcome of their ‘identity work’ depended on the contexts in which their contentious episodes took place and on the interactions shaped by those contexts.

This chapter concludes this work by summarising the formation and transformation of the cocalero social movements of Bolivia and Peru through a comparative framework. The first section revisits the argument presented in Chapter 1; the second section compares the
formation phase of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros; the third section compares the transformation phase of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros; the fourth section is devoted to the closing discussion.

7.1 THE ARGUMENT REVISITED

This work has presented the contentious episodes of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros as cases of identity-formation in answering the question guiding this research: *What explains the differing abilities of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros to gain political empowerment?* Identities play an important role in contentious politics as their boundaries define the main actors of contentious episodes (the claim-makers and the objects of claims) and delineate the terms of the struggles between and within these actors.

The identity-formation process is composed of various mechanisms that operate to classify the interactions continually taking place between actors throughout contentious episodes. The criminalisation of coca changed the relationship between cocaleros (the claim-makers) and the state (the object of claims) as it politicised the former; between legal and illegal cocaleros as each formed different interests depending on their legal status; and between cocaleros and mainstream society as it stigmatised the former. Whilst similar mechanisms arose in both cases, they unfolded in different ways and yielded different outcomes depending on the context in which they took place.

Context entails both structural preconditions and political opportunities and threats. This work has integrated the two cases’ social, economic and political contexts in its analysis. Political opportunities and threats are deemed as independent variables and structural preconditions are deemed as intervening variables. These variables determine how the identity-shaping mechanisms unfold, and together these mechanisms comprise the identity-formation process that ultimately shaped the characteristics and outcomes of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros’ contentious episodes. The following sections compare Phase I (formation) and Phase II (transformation) of the two cases’ contentious episodes (for Phase I see Figures 7.1. and 7.2; for Phase II see Figures 7.3 and 7.4).
**Figure 7.1 Bolivia Phase I**

**Social Movement Formation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Intervening Variables</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political opportunities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Structural Preconditions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Identity-shaping mechanisms</strong></td>
<td><strong>Primary political identity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased access to participation (Siles S. and Paz E.)</td>
<td>Two main areas of coca production</td>
<td>Invention</td>
<td>‘Cocalero’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High alliance potential (Siles S. and Paz E.)</td>
<td>Geographical proximity of coca valleys to cities</td>
<td>Encounter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite division (Siles S.)</td>
<td>Higher rate of traditional coca consumption</td>
<td>Borrowing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite unity (Paz E.)</td>
<td>Richer history of indigenous movements</td>
<td>Object Shift</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threats</strong></td>
<td>Higher percentage of people employed by coca-cocaine economy</td>
<td>Certification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low state will to repress (Siles S. and Paz E.)</td>
<td>Higher percentage of indigenous people</td>
<td>Brokerage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak state (Siles S.)</td>
<td>Richer history of indigenous movements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong state (Paz E.)</td>
<td>More autonomous and organised union sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminalisation of coca (Paz E.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Strength of Social Actor**

- Strong Social Movement
- ‘SYNDICALIST’
**Social Movement Formation**

**Independent Variables**
- Political opportunities
  - Low alliance potential (throughout)
  - Diminished access to participation (Fujimori and Shining P.)
  - Increased access to participation (Paniagua and Toledo)

**Threats**
- Criminalisation of coca (throughout)
- High state and non-state will to repress (Fujimori, Shining Path)
- Low state and non-state will to repress (Paniagua and Toledo)

**Intervening Variables**
- Structural Preconditions
  - Multiple areas of coca production
  - Geographical distance of coca valleys to cities
  - Lower rate of traditional coca consumption
  - Lower percentage of people employed by coca-cocaine economy
  - Lower percentage of indigenous people
  - Weak history of indigenous movements
  - Partisan and non-cohesive union sector

**Identity-shaping mechanisms**
- Invention
- Encounter
- Borrowing
- Object Shift
- Certification
- Brokerage

**Dependent Variables**
- Primary political identity
  - ‘COCALERO’
- Additional political identity
  - ‘ILLEGITIMATE’

**Strength of Social Actor**
- Weak Social Movement
Phase I comprises the emergence and consolidation of the cocalero social movements, which implies a transition by cocaleros from illegitimate actors to social actors. Political opportunities and threats provide the most important ‘set of clues’ for when such an emergence takes place. Political opportunities refer to ‘the perceived probability that social protest actions will lead to success in achieving a desired outcome’ (Goldstone and Tilly 2001: 182); threats refer to the ‘risks and costs of action, rather than the prospect of success’ (Tarrow 2011: 160). Claim-makers that face high costs for engaging in contentious action may nevertheless choose to undertake such action if their perceived chances of success are high. Conversely, they may avoid even minimal costs if their perceived chances of success are low.

This work follows Tarrow’s (2011) example in limiting the concept of political opportunity to the factors that ‘visibly and proximately open up the prospect of success’. The most important include: increasing access to participation; instability in alignments in the polity; availability of allies; and divisions within elites (164-165). The concept of threat is limited to the capacity or will of the state to repress or restrict dissent. Whilst these factors comprise the unstable or fluctuating dimensions of political opportunities and threats, more stable factors are also considered. These include state strength, the degree of state centralisation (or decentralisation) and the state’s strategy toward protest (ibid: 175).

**Political opportunities and threats.** The criminalisation of coca is central to this work’s analysis as it imposed the cocaleros’ main grievance. It also presented a threat, given that it increased the likelihood of future repressive action by the state. A close look at the two cases’ set of political opportunities and threats helps to clarify the different responses of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros to this grievance—in particular the timing of the emergence and consolidation of their social movements.

In Bolivia, cocaleros emerged as contentious actors prior to the 1988 criminalisation of coca as the issue of drug control had been rising in prominence in the national and international arena for some time. The 1978 criminalisation of coca in Peru especially raised Bolivian cocaleros’ expectations of a future threat. Like other peasant sectors, the prospects for social organisation and mobilisation increased when Bolivia began its transition to democracy and finally returned to democratic rule in 1982. By the time the state criminalised coca in 1988,
cocaleros were sufficiently empowered to consolidate into a social movement within months.

First, Bolivia’s democratic opening increased access to participation. The dynamics of the economic and political crisis that accompanied the democratic transition—in particular the strength and significance of the coca-cocaine economy—enhanced cocaleros’ participatory capacity vis-à-vis other sectors. They thus thrived amongst labour and peasant sectors and began to ascend the ranks of the CSUTCB.

Second, cocaleros’ privileged economic position afforded them a high alliance potential. Other sectors found it advantageous to form a relationship with cocaleros, which had a higher capacity to contest the state. Cocaleros also strategically framed their claims in terms of the economic significance of coca during the crisis and as the defence of traditional coca consumption—a widespread practice amongst Bolivian peasants as well as other sectors.

Third, elite divisions and state weakness fostered a political crisis that led to the early termination of the Siles Suazo government. This led to elite unity and state strength during the Paz Estenssoro government, which needed to restore social and economic order. This shift in opportunities and threats debilitated other sectors (especially mining), but significantly empowered cocaleros. In particular, the ‘defeat’ of labour created a power vacuum within the union sector that cocaleros filled with ease and allowed them to ascend the ranks of the COB.

Lastly, the economic significance of coca engendered a low state will to repress cocaleros. Repression remained limited even after the criminalisation of coca. Serious efforts to limit coca production did not commence until Sánchez de Lozada’s first government.

In Peru, criminalisation took place in 1978—ten years prior to Bolivia. Although Peru returned to democratic rule in 1980, cocaleros did not emerge as contentious actors until the second democratic transition that commenced in 2000. They consolidated into a social movement in 2003—twenty-five years after the imposition of their main grievance and fifteen years after their Bolivian counterparts. A look at the political opportunities and threats they faced throughout this period helps clarify this time lag.

First, the presence of a non-state actor (the Shining Path) in the geographically distant coca-producing regions diminished access to participation in the 1980s despite the democratic
opening. Access to participation further diminished in the 1990s as Peru reverted to authoritarianism under the Fujimori government.

Second, cocalero organisations were weakened by the *high state and non-state will to repress* during the course of the state-Shining Path struggle. The Fujimori government maintained and even escalated repression after the Shining Path threat largely receded in 1992.

Third, cocaleros only emerged as contentious actors after the return to democracy in 2000. Beginning with the provisional government Paniagua, cocaleros benefitted from *increased access to participation* and *minimal state will to repress*. This allowed them to initiate contention and finally consolidate into a social movement in 2003.

Lastly, cocaleros faced *low availability of allies* preceding and throughout their contentious episode. This actuality stemmed from their inevitable association to the illicit drug trade and the Shining Path.

In addition to political opportunities and threats, this work has considered variations in the structural preconditions of the two cases. These include: Bolivia’s higher percentage of indigenous people; higher rate of traditional coca consumption; higher percentage of people employed by coca-cocaine economy; richer history of indigenous movements; more autonomous and organised union sector; and the geographical proximity of its two-coca producing valleys to important cities (as opposed to Peru’s numerous, scattered and geographically distant coca-producing valleys). These structural preconditions comprise intervening variables—they may facilitate contention, but not guarantee or inhibit it. This is evidenced by the fact that Peruvian cocaleros overcame the limitations presented by these structural preconditions (as well as the unfavourable political opportunities and threats they faced at the time of their criminalisation) and managed to initiate a contentious episode and establish a social movement with considerable impact.

*Mechanisms.* Similar mechanisms sprung up throughout the contentious episodes of Bolivia and Peru. They produced decidedly distinct social movements as they unfolded in different contexts.
**Invention.** Invention took place in both cases with the criminalisation of coca. Criminalisation made the formation of a ‘cocalero’ collective identity difficult because it generated a new boundary (and henceforth different interests) between legal and illegal cocaleros. Bolivian cocaleros averted this difficulty because they were already highly empowered and had firmly established identities as ‘cocaleros’ and ‘syndicalists’ by the time the state criminalised coca in 1988.

**Encounter.** Encounter took place in Peru between cocaleros and the Shining Path. The Shining Path weakened cocaleros’ capacity to mobilise and reinforced their imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’. In Bolivia, encounter took place between the Trópico’s cocaleros and miners displaced by the NPE. Miners increased the number of those identified as ‘cocaleros’ and the strengthened and refined the ‘cocalero’ and ‘syndicalist’ identities through their mining know-how and ideological views. Their anti-imperialist and anti-liberal sentiments echoed amongst cocaleros and revealed that the two groups had a common enemy in addition to the state—the United States.

**Borrowing.** Borrowing took place in Peru when the valleys associated with the CONPACCP universally adopted a set of claims that included the cessation of state eradication efforts and suspension of DL 22095. The mechanism thus strengthened the cocaleros’ collective identity as ‘cocaleros’. Borrowing took place in Bolivia throughout the Tropic of Cochabamba’s colonisation. Colonisers reinvented their original community and syndicate know-how to meet the challenges of living in an area with limited state presence. Eventually, the new unions of the Trópico acquired a greater role in community life than other unions across Bolivia. Borrowing thus facilitated the formation of the Trópico’s ‘syndicalist’ identity.

**Object shift.** Object shift took place in Peru as a result of the state’s de-criminalisation and re-criminalisation of cocaleros in response to the cocalero-Shining Path encounter. The mechanism altered the relations between cocaleros and the state, temporarily making them allies. The betrayal of re-criminalisation generated mistrust towards the state. The pervasive corruption and repressive nature of the Fujimori government exacerbated this sentiment. Object shift took place in Bolivia when the Paz Estenssoro government dismissed thousands of miners by implementing Decree 21060. Miners considered the act a betrayal on behalf of a government they had helped vote into office in 1985. Miners carried the memory of this betrayal to the Tropic of Cochabamba—along with a resolve to stop lending their votes to
traditional political parties and to one day ‘vote for ourselves’.

Certification. Decertification ensued in 1961 when the UN criminalised coca as the raw material of cocaine. On a national level, decertification took place in Peru when the state criminalised coca in 1978 with DL 22095. The act deemed cocaleros as illegitimate actors and contributed to their imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’. It did not immediately generate a contentious episode because cocaleros were caught in the state-Shining Path struggle. Decertification occurred in Bolivia in 1988 with Ley 1008. The act consolidated the formation of the cocalero social movement as it took place when the Trópico’s cocaleros were already organised and empowered.

Brokerage. Brokerage first took place in Peru with the establishment of the CONAPA, which proved short-lived, and then with the establishment of the CONPACCP. The CONPACCP represented the cocalero social movement, mediated with the state and mobilised the 2003 March of Sacrifice. Brokerage occurred in Bolivia with the establishment of the Coordinadora, which mediated relations between cocaleros and the state, and between cocaleros, the CSUTCB and the COB. In both the Bolivian and Peruvian cases, brokerage help consolidate social movements around the primarily political identity of ‘cocalero’.

Outcomes. The similar mechanisms seen across the contentious episodes of the two cases yielded social movements and social actors with varying degrees of empowerment. In Bolivia, mechanisms facilitated the formation of two political identities: ‘cocalero’ and ‘syndicalist’. The ‘cocalero’ identity forged solidarity and unity amongst the cocaleros of the Trópico, which came from a range of socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds. The ‘cocalero’ identity linked colonisers to a new livelihood and facilitated their integration into new communities. The ‘syndicalist’ identity enhanced unity as it linked cocaleros to Bolivia’s historically significant and long-standing union system. It also helped them build ties with other sectors and ascend the ranks of the CSUTCB and the COB. These two firmly established identities helped the coca unions of the Trópico coalesce into a social movement characterised by a high level of cohesion, unity and empowerment. In Peru, mechanisms resulted in the formation of two political identities: ‘cocalero’ and ‘illegitimate’. The latter identity, imposed on cocaleros by their association with the illicit drug trade and the Shining Path, hindered the formation of their social movement and rendered it weak once it finally coalesced. The CONPACCP failed to attract support from other social or political actors.
contrast to their Bolivian counterparts, Peruvian cocaleros remained isolated even after transitioning from illegitimate to social actors.

7.3 **PHASE II: BOLIVIA AND PERU COMPARED**

Both the Bolivian and Peruvian cocalero social movements underwent a transformation through which they transitioned from social to political actors (see Figures 7.3 and 7.4 on the following pages). The transformations took place through different paths and resulted in even more disparate degrees of empowerment.

Cocaleros faced shifting political opportunities and threats throughout their contentious episodes, which meant that favourable circumstances for contentious action could quickly become less favourable. They thus had to reinvent themselves in order to sustain contention and adapt to new threats or fading opportunities. Interactions between claim-makers and the object of their claims can generate new forms of collective action, master frames and mobilising structures that produce new opportunities. Claim-makers can thus reinvent themselves by creating new opportunities or by taking advantage of new opportunities created by other contentious actors. The interactions of other contentious actors can also reveal state weakness, boost alliance prospects and put issues on the agenda that others can identify with or build upon (Tarrow 2011: 167).

**Political opportunities and threats.** Marginal sectors steadily lost faith in Bolivia’s pacted democracy and neoliberal economic model, which fostered underrepresentation and economic exclusion. The cocalero sector faced the additional burden of more repressive drug control policies. Opportunities nonetheless became available within this context.

First, the decentralising reforms of the Sánchez de Lozada government increased access to participation. The Popular Participation Law created autonomous municipal governments and recognised indigenous and community organisations. Cocaleros presented their own candidates in the model of municipal elections once they established the political arm of their Coordinadora, the MAS-IPSP.

Second, mobilisations by other actors revealed a high availability of master frames as well as a high availability of potential allies. The 1990 March for Territory and Dignity brought to light the wide resonance of indigenous rights issues; the Water War of 2000 and Gas War of 2003 highlighted the broad appeal of claims based on anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL MOVEMENT TRANSFORMATION</th>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERVENING VARIABLES</th>
<th>MECHANISMS</th>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political opportunities</td>
<td>Structural preconditions</td>
<td>Identity-shaping mechanisms</td>
<td>Primary political identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased access to participation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Encounter</td>
<td>‘COCALERO’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High availability of master frames</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brokerage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High alliance potential</td>
<td></td>
<td>Broad Mechanisms</td>
<td>Additional political identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threats</td>
<td></td>
<td>Convergence</td>
<td>‘SYNDICALIST’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Repressive state strategy toward protest</td>
<td></td>
<td>Diffusion</td>
<td>‘EXCLUDED’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak state (revealed by other contentious actors)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 7.3 BOLIVIA PHASE II

STRENGTH OF POLITICAL ACTOR

STRONG
NATIONAL
POLITICAL PARTY
FIGURE 7.4  PERU PHASE II

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Political opportunities
- Increased access to participation
- Low availability of master frames
- Low alliance potential

Threats
- Repressive state strategies toward protest
- Strong state

INTERVENING VARIABLES

Structural preconditions
- Unchanged

MECHANISMS

Identity-shaping mechanisms
- Invention
- Brokerage
- Broad mechanisms
- Radicalisation

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Primary political identity
- ‘COCALERO’

Additional political identity
- ‘ILLEGITIMATE’

STRENGTH OF POLITICAL ACTOR

WEAK
REGIONAL
INDIVIDUAL POSITIONS
discourses. The MAS-IPSP effectively enveloped the indigenous rights master frame, the anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal discourse and the struggle for coca under the banner of sovereignty. In the process, it united Bolivia’s marginal sectors under the political identity of ‘excluded’.

Third, mobilisations by other actors revealed state weakness. The Water War forced the Bánzer government to revoke the concession given to Aguas del Tunari; the Gas War forced President Sánchez de Lozada to resign from office.

Lastly, other mobilisations (in particular the Gas War) highlighted the state’s repressive strategy toward protest. The repressive strategies, which included expelling Morales from Congress for his role in protest activity, galvanised mobilisations and further de-legitimised the pacted democracy model. The overall combination of political opportunities and threats allowed the MAS-IPSP to take on a leading role in the polity’s crisis, culminating in the ascent of Morales to the presidency in 2005 (and again in 2009).

Peru returned to democratic rule in 2000, which enhanced possibilities for contentious action. However, the complete set of political opportunities and threats meant that social protest had a limited impact and was for the most part circumscribed to the local or regional arena.

First, the decentralisation efforts of the Toledo government offered increased access to participation. Individual cocalero leaders ascended various positions in the 2006 national and municipal elections, but cocaleros as a whole failed to launch a united political front on the national level. Numerous Frentes de Defensa Regionales also emerged and led notable mobilisations within this context, but remained regional and isolated.

Second, the mobilisations that challenged the Toledo and García governments revealed the state’s strength vis-à-vis contentious actors as well as the state’s repressive strategy toward protest. This included legislation that increased the penalties for protest and allowed the use of the armed forces in responding to protest, as well outright violations of human rights. Challenges by contentious actors failed to engender significant threats to the various policies of the neoliberal economic model they contested.
Lastly, mobilisations by other actors did not disclose potential master frames or possibilities for alliances. The indigenous mobilisations that surfaced in Peru largely centred on grievances over economic and development issues rather than on ethnic recognition—indigenous rights thus did not materialise as a master frame. And whilst protests that centred on anti-neoliberal grievances were common, they were localised and met with the state’s resolute repression.

Cocaleros and other actors’ interactions with the state thus failed to generate new political opportunities or reveal state weakness. Cocaleros did manage to lead one of the few national-level mobilisations and impact policy-making, but they were plagued by disunity, an inability to make alliances and failure to incorporate issues that extended beyond the defence of coca.

**Mechanisms.** The transformation phase of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocalero social movements encompassed a combination of identity-shaping and broader mechanisms.

*Encounter.* Encounter took place in Bolivia during the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity between lowland and highland indigenous and peasant organisations. The encounter paved the way for joint political action and sparked a process of alliance formation that culminated in 2004 with the *Pacto de Unidad.* It also revealed the high resonance of the indigenous rights master frame. The MAS-IPSP incorporated indigenous demands in its efforts to unite Bolivia’s marginal actors through the political identity of ‘excluded’. The *Pacto de Unidad* thus supported Morales’ candidacy in the 2005 special elections.

*Invention.* In Peru, invention took place when the leaders of the Apurímac-Ene denounced leaders of the CONPACCP as traitors for agreeing to DS 044. This created a boundary within the boundary encompassing ‘cocalero’ and generated divisive tensions within the cocalero social movement. Additionally, the side-taking that took place over the new boundary caused confusion for the state and mainstream society over the meaning of ‘cocalero’. This made it even more difficult for cocaleros to enhance their legitimacy and gain sympathisers and allies.

*Radicalisation.* The broad mechanism of radicalisation took place in Peru in interplay with two identity-shaping mechanisms—invention and object shift. The divisive tensions sparked by the invention mechanism required action on behalf of the CONPACCP’s leaders: they had
to choose whether to remain loyal to the state and the agreement over DS 044, or to attempt to regain the trust of more radical splinter valleys by radicalising the CONPACCP’s agenda. This choice was made based on past interactions—particularly the object shift during the Fujimori government that generated cocaleros’ deep mistrust in the state. The CONPACCP thus chose radicalisation over loyalty to the state. The act failed to prevent cocaleros’ disunity, cost them the legitimacy gained during the 2003 March of Sacrifice and reinforced their imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’.

**Convergence.** Radical tendencies in Bolivia resulted in convergence rather than radicalisation. In the 2002 national elections, Quispe gained significantly less votes than Morales due in part to his polarising Aymara nationalist views. Indigenous sectors preferred the vision of the plurinational state espoused by the *Pacto de Unidad* and the MAS-IPSP. Even the cocaleros of the Yungas, which never coalesced with the cocaleros of the Trópico on the coca issue, converged with the MAS-IPSP over the plurinational state and other issues linked to the identity of ‘excluded’. Radical tendencies in the Trópico advocating an armed struggle to defend coca also had a limited appeal. Rather than narrow their appeal by undertaking an armed struggle, the cocaleros of the Trópico broadened their appeal by forming a political instrument that incorporated grievances shared by different sectors. Former miners that carried the memory of the state’s betrayal and that stood firm in their resolve to ‘vote for ourselves’ played an important role in promoting the electoral path over an armed struggle.

**Diffusion.** The Water War and the Gas War facilitated diffusion in Bolivia as they provided opportunities for actors to identify their similarities, transfer information and engage in joint contentious action. They also provided a venue for the MAS-IPSP to propagate its political agenda, which brought together anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal sentiments under the banner of sovereignty. Those that engaged in the struggle for sovereignty through venues such as the Water War and the Gas War acquired a joint understanding of their position as ‘excluded’. The expulsion of Morales from the Congress and the plea by United States Ambassador Rocha not to vote for Morales furthered this diffusion as it helped transform the presidential candidate of the MAS-IPSP into the leader of those that identified as ‘excluded’.

**Brokerage.** The brokerage mechanism resurfaced in the transformation phase of both cases. In Peru, brokerage took place with the formation of the *Junta* and the formation of the
CENACOP. The presence of competing organisations at the national level heightened and publicised the cocaleros’ disunity. In Bolivia, brokerage also took place on two occasions: in 1995 with the formation of the political instrument and in 2004 with the formation of the Pacto de Unidad. Both brokers facilitated the ascent of Bolivia’s cocaleros, decidedly so when the Pacto de Unidad lent its support to the MAS-IPSP in the 2005 special elections. In short, brokerage in Peru exacerbated cocaleros’ disunity and difficulty in attracting allies, whereas in Bolivia it facilitated the formation of the MAS-IPSP and important alliances at the national level.

Outcomes. The mechanisms that took place during the transformation of the cocalero social movements yielded distinct outcomes. In Peru, the disunity engendered by invention blurred the meaning of the identity of ‘cocalero’ and prevented cocaleros from presenting a clear understanding of ‘who we are’ to mainstream society and potential allies. How could cocaleros gain wider support when it was unclear what their claims were or what they stood for? The radicalisation of their social movement proved even more debilitating. The adoption of a radical platform reversed the steps they had taken as social actors toward casting off the imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’, which set them even further apart from potential sympathisers and allies. Cocaleros thus proved weak and isolated as political actors, and their impact was for the most part restricted to the local arena.

In contrast, Bolivian cocaleros proved adept at articulating and broadening their claims by affirming identities in addition to the identity of ‘cocalero’. The convergence and diffusion mechanisms facilitated the construction and propagation of the identity of ‘syndicalist’ and ‘excluded’. Cocaleros made effective use of these identities to incorporate other sectors into their struggle—in other words, to widen the boundary encompassing ‘who we are’. At the same time, they widened the understanding of ‘who they are’, to include all those that traditionally ruled Bolivia: economic elites, traditional political parties and the United States. In addition to bringing together Bolivia’s historically marginalised sectors, the identity of ‘excluded’ attracted support from mainstream society as it gave a moral gloss to the MAS-IPSP’s platform. Bolivian cocaleros thus demonstrated a remarkable capacity to incorporate broad issues, form coalitions, gain legitimacy and ultimately reach the highest level of political office.
7.4 CLOSING DISCUSSION

**Identity-formation and illegitimacy.** This work has enriched our understanding of contentious politics by examining the impact of illegitimacy on the identity-formation process. The cases of Bolivia and Peru have shown that the construction of political identities that are unifying (internally) and legitimising (externally) is especially significant for contentious struggles based on claims of questionable legitimacy. The defence of coca introduced difficulties as it gave rise to questions over the legitimacy of cocalero struggles as a result of its dual legal status (given that Bolivia and Peru have both legal and illegal coca-producing valleys) and its link with the illicit drug trade. Its dual legal status meant that different valleys maintained different interests, which made unity amongst them difficult to achieve and sustain. Bolivian cocaleros overcame this challenge by constructing political identities in addition to that of ‘cocalero’ to foster unity and attract allies. The link with the illicit drug trade generated further difficulties, as it meant that cocaleros had to legitimise their struggle to their external audience (mainstream society). Bolivian cocaleros met this challenge by linking their struggle to issues beyond coca through the wider and more legitimate identities of ‘syndicalist’ and, in particular, ‘excluded’. As they extended their struggle, Bolivian cocaleros turned the coca leaf into a prominent national symbol: coca became the symbol of opposition to those that stood opposite the identities of ‘cocalero’, ‘syndicalist’ and ‘excluded’—that is, economic elites, traditional political parties and the United States. Peruvian cocaleros, in contrast, did not surpass the challenges posed by the defence of coca. Despite the gains of the 2003 March of Sacrifice, their recurring disunity diminished their legitimacy and limited their empowerment. It is possible that Peru’s cocaleros could one day enhance their empowerment if they manage to construct identities that incorporate issues that go beyond those that prompted their division and that transcend the identity of ‘cocalero’. Whether or not they do remains to be seen.

**Contentious politics and identities.** This work has given insight on certain aspects of the general debate concerning contentious politics through its account of how claim-makers with low levels of legitimacy become empowered and stimulate cultural and political change.

First, it has shed light on the intersection of the identity and strategy-oriented approaches. Cocaleros deliberately employed identities throughout their contentious episodes. They accentuated, attenuated, redefined and constructed identities in strategic calculations to promote unity and attract support. Identities thus have important symbolic and instrumental
dimensions and are essential in determining both why and how claim-makers come together to wage a contentious challenge on an opponent based on common purposes.

Second, it has given further evidence to the point that ‘new’ social movements continue to display characteristics of the ‘old’ paradigm of politics, especially in non-western settings. The contentious episodes of the two cases emerged as a result of the imposition of a grievance that affected the claim-makers’ livelihood—a material grievance. At the same time, claim-makers employed symbolic discourses in their struggles as they sought to legitimise their initial grievances and incorporate new ones to sustain and broaden their appeal. The two cases thus incorporate dimensions of ‘old’ struggles over material gains as well as ‘new’ struggles over symbolic gains, such as the production or modification of meaning within a given culture, society and/or polity.

Third, it has contributed to a wider understanding of how claim-makers adapt to and make use of political opportunities and threats. Claim-makers are constrained by political opportunities and threats (especially those pertaining to the capacity and strategy of the state toward protest), but they are also active agents in creating new opportunities by tapping into grievances, discourses and identities that resonate in (and at key moments within) a given polity. This work thus responds to Haber’s (1996) call to ‘learn more about the details of changing political opportunity structures that include a state institutional dimension along with concerns about discourse, autonomy, and identity’ (186).

Lastly, it provides yet another example of the questions that arise in evaluating the impact of contentious politics. The identity and strategy-oriented approaches differ in that the latter concerns itself with visible gains, such as policy change, and the former with less visible gains, such as the production or appropriation of meaning. Both approaches would credit the Bolivian case with having a considerable impact. The impact of the Peruvian case would fall subject to debate.

**Further research.** This work has given insight on the effects of illegitimacy on contentious politics. Research regarding the empowerment of ‘illegitimate’ claim-makers is limited, and further study on the matter could deepen our understanding of these unprecedented actors. One research possibility that comes to mind is that of the cocaleros of Colombia. The case is a perfect fit with the analytic framework developed in this work, as it contains many
similarities with the Bolivian and Peruvian cases. Colombia is an Andean country; Colombia is one of the main coca-producing countries; Colombia is subject to the effects of the illicit drug trade on the state, state institutions and mainstream society. In contrast to Bolivia (but similar to Peru), the illicit drug problem in Colombia has been compounded by the presence of guerrillas (and paramilitary organizations) that at times have had control over the vast majority of the country’s coca-producing areas. An important difference with respect to both Bolivia and Peru is that coca is not native to Colombia. Coca production began as a backward linkage of the cocaine trade, steadily increasing during the 1980s and 1990s, and is used exclusively for cocaine production. This point is key to understanding the case of the Colombian cocaleros, as it makes the task of legitimising claims made on the defence of coca especially challenging. The limited attempts by Colombian cocaleros to influence coca policies have taken place under guerrilla and paramilitary guidance. To date, the only significant activity has been a guerrilla-organized march in 1996 that led to policy changes regarding aerial fumigation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Laserna, Roberto (1994). *Las Drogas y el Ajuste en Bolivia: Economía Clandestina y Políticas Públicas. La Paz, CEDLA.*


Philip, George and Panizza, Francisco (2011). *The Triumph of Politics: The Return of the Left*


APPENDIX A: COCA CULTIVATION IN THE ANDEAN REGION

Source: UNODC (2008)
APPENDIX B: COCA CULTIVATION IN PERU

Source: Cabieses (2004)
APPENDIX C: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Bolivia

Albó, Javier - Anthropologist specialised in Latin American indigenous groups, linguist and Jesuit priest - 29.8.2008 - La Paz

Alem, Alfonso - Congressman (Chamber of Deputies) for the Department of La Paz (1989-1993) (MBL) - 1.9.2008; 28.1.2010 - La Paz


Cocalero A - Cocalero that wished to remain anonymous - 19.1.2010 - Valle Ipirza

Cocalero B - Cocalero that wished to remain anonymous - 20.1.2010 - Valle Ipirza

Decker Marquez, Jose - Vice Minister of Alternative Development (1997-2001) - 18.1.2010 - Cochabamba

Escóbar, Filemón - General Secretary of the FSTMB (1987-??) and founder of the MAS-IPSP - 18.1.2010 - Cochabamba


Gonzales, Hilarión - President of the IPSP of the Federación Carrasco Tropical - 20.1.2010 - Valle Ipirza

Guarachi, Paulino - General Secretary of the CSUTCB (1992-1994) and researcher at the Fundación TIERRA - 27.8.2008 - La Paz
Hoffman, Carlos - Director of the Control Social de la Hoja de Coca project of the European Union and former advisor to the Coordinadora de las Seis Federaciones del Trópico de Cochabamba - 17.1.2010 - La Paz


Llanós, David - Economist and researcher at PIBE (Programa de Investigación Estratégica en Bolivia) - 29.8.2008 - La Paz

Mansilla, H. C. Felipe - Political scientist and author - 27.8.2008 - La Paz

Minister A - Former Minister of Government and founding member of the MBL party that wished to remain anonymous - 5.9.2008 - La Paz

Molina Salazar, Isaac - General Secretary of the Central Valle Ivirza - 19.1.2010 - Valle Ivirza

Núñez, Dionicio - General Secretary of the COFECAY (2000-2003), Congressman (Chamber of Deputies) for the Department of La Paz (2002-2005) and General Secretary of the Federación Sunta - 15.1.2010 - La Paz

Quiroga, Jose Antonio - Political analyst and director of Plural Editores - 5.9.2008 - La Paz

Soruco, Ximena - Sociologist and researcher at the Fundación TIERRA - 28.8.2008 - La Paz

Urioste, Miguel - Sociologist and Director of the Fundación TIERRA - 28.8.2008; 13.1.2010 - La Paz

**Peru**


Chacón, Ramiro - Assistant to Congressman Oswaldo Luizar (Department of Cusco) (2006-2011) - 24.11.2008 - Lima

Chirinos, Luis - Lawyer and researcher at DESCO (Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo) and consultant for Revenue Watch Institute - 10.1.2011 - Lima

Eguren, Fernando - President of CEPES (Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales) - 21.12.2011 - Lima

Estela, Manuel - Economist, former manager and advisor to the Presidency for the Central Federal Reserve Bank of Peru and consultant for USAID - 10.8.2004 - Lima

Gutierrez, Alberto - Peasant and resident of Apurímac-Ene valley during the 1990s Shining Path occupation - 5.8.2005 - Lima


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>COCA CULTIVATION (HECTARES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>129,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>108,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>108,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>115,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>94,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>68,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>38,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>42,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>46,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>46,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>44,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

3 Source: UNODC (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PRICE OF COCA (USD PER KILO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: La República (17.5.2005)