STATE-MAKING IN SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND

Understanding War, Nationalism and State Trajectories as Processes of Institutional and Socio-Cognitive Standardization

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A thesis submitted to the Department of International Development of the London School of Economics (LSE) for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

September 2012
Declaration

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Abstract

Although the conundrums of why states falter, how they are reconstituted, and under what conditions war may be constitutive of state-making have received much scholarly attention, they are still hotly debated by academics and policy analysts. Advancing a novel conceptual framework and analysing diverse Somali state trajectories between 1960 and 2010, this thesis adds to those debates both theoretically and empirically. The core issues examined are why and how Somaliland managed to establish state-run structures of governance, how far its development paralleled or diverged from past Somali state trajectories, and under what conditions violent conflict advanced or abridged the polities’ varied state-making projects.

Drawing on diverse strands of literature on state-building, nationalism and warfare, the thesis develops an original analytical frame to better understand processes of state-making and state-breaking. It argues not only for the need of ‘bringing the nation back in’, but proposes to conceptualize state trajectories in terms of changing levels of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. Scrutinizing received wisdom, the empirical research presented finds, amongst others, that Somali state trajectories have been less unique than commonly claimed, and proposes that Somaliland’s alleged state-making success between 1991 and 2010 hinged at least as much on autocratic governance, top-down policies and coercive means as on frequently emphasized elements of grassroots peace-making, ‘traditional’ reconciliation and ‘home-grown’ democracy.

Conceptually, the project is located at the intersection of political-economy and historical and institutional approaches to state-making. Applying qualitative research framed in comparative case studies the thesis not only advances the theoretical debate surrounding issues of state fragility and state-making, but also offers novel insights into Somalia’s history and presents new empirical findings on the frequently romanticised case of Somaliland. Yet, the research results are significant beyond Somali boundaries as they provide relevant insights for our general understanding of state trajectories and the role of conflict in state-making and state-breaking.
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<td>Africa Contemporary Record</td>
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<td>APD</td>
<td>Academy for Peace and Development</td>
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<td>ASAD</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Director General</td>
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<td>EIU</td>
<td>Economist Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
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<td>USC/SNA</td>
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<td>United Somali Party</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
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<td>WSLF</td>
<td>Western Somali Liberation Front</td>
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<td>WSP</td>
<td>War-torn Societies Project</td>
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London, September 2012
1

Introduction

State fragility has been top of the agenda for practitioners and academics since the end of the Cold War, not least because “[f]rom a historical perspective, much of the developing world today is characterised by states in the process of formation” (CSRC 2005:2; Carothers 2002). While the ten years after 1991 saw attention chiefly focused on ‘weak’, ‘failed’, and ‘collapsed’ states, the post-2001 decade saw a shift to the more programmatic issue of ‘state-building’. Following an extensive period dominated by the Washington Consensus paradigm with its overly optimistic emphasis on the market (Milliken/Krause 2002:753), this interest in state-breaking and state-making signalled an incremental realization of the need for ‘bringing the state back in’ (Evans et al. 1985). Yet, as the post-2001 decade drew to a close, concepts of ‘hybrid political orders’ (Böge et al. 2008) and the ‘negotiated state’ (Menkhaus 2006/07) heralded a further rethinking of the state, in which earlier negative interpretations of non-state orders (Jackson 1990; Zartman 1995; Rotberg 2003; Bates 2008) came to be praised as autochthonous ways of state-building.

At least as long as states remain peaceful. For war, the orthodox dictum goes, constitutes “development in reverse” (World Bank 2003; Collier 2004), which often can only be stopped by outside intervention (Leander 2004:78; Weinstein 2004:11; Collier 2007). Yet,

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2 E.g. Ghani/Lockhart 2008; North et al. 2007; Brinkerhoff 2007; Röder 2007; Hehir/Robinson 2007; OECD 2008; Call/Wyeth 2008. This shift is partly rooted in the fact that the 1990s perceived state fragility largely as a regional problem, while later approaches frequently framed it as constituting a major challenge for international security (Wolff 2011:953ff.).
3 Berger 2008:1; Robinson 2007:11f.
5 Kaldor 1999; Herbst 2000; Leander 2004. While for the Somali context, this proposition is made by Ford et al. (2004), Bakonyi and Stuvøy (2005:359) counter that “war is not equal to the breakdown of societal order, but represents an alternative form of social order” (see also Kivimäki 2001:5).
given that, historically, war made states and states made war (Tilly 1992:67),\(^6\) this liberal perspective on violent conflict “may only be sustained by a form of historical amnesia” (Cramer 2006:9). The latter feeds into the frequent perception that countries emerging from war were ‘blank slates’ particularly suited for “radical policy reform” (Collier/Pradhan 1994:133), due to their alleged institutional *tabula rasa.*\(^7\) While commonly neglecting institutional trajectories, war-to-peace continuities, and, more generally, the “historicity of the state in Africa” (Bayart 1993:viii; Elias 1977), the general focus on institutions and institutional reform has come at the expense of an equally important component for state-making: the nation.\(^8\) Although nationalism continues to represent “the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson 1983:3; Comaroff/Stern 1995:3), the need for ‘bringing the nation back in’ has frequently been neglected (Helling 2009; Lemay-Hébert 2009).

In light of these debates, this thesis aims to explore and explain processes of state-building, their interrelation with nation-building, and the constitutive role war may play in state-making in the contemporary world.\(^9\) With divergent state-making developments in the Somali territories providing the arena of this analysis, the empirical core issue examined is *why* and *how* certain Somali state-making projects undertaken between 1960 and 2010 differed, and *under what condition* war was detrimental or beneficial to these endeavours. As well as setting out to develop an original analytical prism that combines insights from the too often unconnected literatures on state-building and nation-building to enhance our theoretical understanding of processes of state-making and state-breaking, this dissertation also sheds new light on the trajectories of the state in Somalia and Somaliland. Although both theoretical propositions and empirical findings partly challenge the established literature, the thesis generally seeks to advance rather than dismiss past accounts.

The project’s relevance lies in scrutinizing current conceptualizations of state-making and state-breaking, in advancing an alternative analytical approach that combines valuable insights from the literature on state-building, nation-building and warfare, and in addressing

\(^7\) Cf. Cramer (2006:255), who scrutinizes this idea.
\(^8\) While the concepts of state-building and nation-building have frequently been used interchangeably (Zaum 2007:1; Hippler 2004; Goldsmith 2007), they are treated as fundamentally different in this thesis.
\(^9\) State-building refers to the establishment of institutions and organizations of government. Nation-building addresses issues of identity rather than government and implies the creation of a nation. Finally, I use the term state-making as an umbrella term for processes that encompass state-building and nation-building. The term state-breaking is applied in juxtaposition, used to replace terms such as ‘state failure’ or ‘collapse’.
some of the central gaps in the existing theoretical as well as empirical literature. Its originality is grounded in the proposition that processes of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization – i.e. the homogenization of particular sets of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ – within a politically delineated and geographically defined society lie at the heart of state trajectories, and that it is central administration that provides a key tool for advancing such mechanisms of standardization. When war contains dynamics that catalyse processes of standardizing an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, it is constitutive of state-making. The empirical value of this research project lies in contributing to a deeper understanding of why Somalia’s state-making projects collapsed, and uncovering some of the underlying processes that informed the seemingly successful state-making endeavour of Somaliland – both of which remain under-researched to date.

To further develop these and other thoughts and frame the evolving theoretical propositions and empirical findings in a broader context, this introductory chapter proceeds as follows. The first section briefly presents the iterative process behind the research project and highlights its central propositions. Section two situates the thesis in the broader literature and depicts some of the chief theoretical and empirical gaps it aims to fill. After describing the methodology applied in carrying through this project in section three, a roadmap of the thesis is outlined in section four.

1.1 Presenting the Research Project

The Iterative Process

I set out on this PhD project in October 2007, intending to explore and explain the apparent success of Somaliland’s state-making project, which was supposedly not only unique (Hoyle 2000:85; Kaplan 2008b:148; Jhazbhay 2009:50), but had, in the absence of large-scale international development assistance, undertaken remarkable self-directed ‘autonomous recovery’ (Weinstein 2004; Bradbury 2008:4; Eubank 2010). My curiosity was heightened by the fact that I had just finished consulting with the World Bank on a project in Timor-Leste, a state that remained highly fragile despite – or, possibly, because of – the significant support and involvement of the international community (see e.g. Engel and Vieira 2011). What interested me in particular was why Somaliland’s state trajectory supposedly diverged so much from other (Somali) state-making endeavours and how the
general lack of international involvement had contributed to this alleged ‘success story’ (Jhazbhay 2007; Henwood 2007:168).

Embarking on my research, I was increasingly less convinced that Somaliland constituted such a triumph of modern state-making. Moreover, I started questioning its alleged uniqueness, not only because this claim turned out to have a long tradition in Somali studies, but also because I started seeing a number of parallels to other state-making endeavours within and outside Somali boundaries. Combined with a thorough re-reading of the literature on state-building, nation-building and the role war had historically played in these processes, I decided to shift the analytical focus of my research towards identifying the mechanisms that underlie processes of state-making and state-breaking, while still addressing the questions of why and how Somaliland might be different. I was eager to accord special attention to the role violent conflict played in these processes, aiming to disaggregate the ‘black box’ of war to uncover under what condition wars could unleash “dynamics that have the potential to help bring about progressive long-run change” (Cramer 2006:10).

A central motivation to study the Somali case lay in my endeavour to better understand the trajectory that has beset the Somali people who have endured so many decades of war and poverty. Thereby, my research was driven by the goal of finding out how to substitute which bellicose components that were constitutive of state-making, so as to achieve similar outcomes by non-violent means. In this sense, I was interested in following Gerschenkron’s (1962) idea of ‘catching-up’ and ‘burning stages of development’ for the context of state-making. After having undertaken a feasibility study in Somaliland in July and August 2008, the overarching theme of the research project developed into an exploration of common patterns and divergent processes of state trajectories in the past Republic of Somalia (1960-1991) and the self-styled Republic of Somaliland (1991-2010). I articulated a number of propositions, whose validity I aimed to establish by empirical research and data analysis in subsequent years. Of these propositions, the most central three are presented in the

10 Shinn 2002; Renders 2006; Eggers 2007; Othieno 2008; Bradbury 2008; Kaplan 2008b; Walls 2009a; Kibble/Walls 2010a; Harris/Foresti 2011.

11 E.g. Contini (1964:3) who presents the newly independent Somalia of the 1960s as ‘unique’ due to its “distinctive democratic process”, Sheikh-Abdi (1977:657), who depicts the Somali nation as “one of the most uniformly homogeneous populations of the continent”; Rotberg (2002), who singles Somalia out as the only state that did not stop at ‘failure’ but ‘collapsed’ to the fullest extent, and the Senlis Council (2008:9), according to which “Somalia is a state in name only.”
subsequent part, while a number of further ones are touched upon in section 1.2, which situates the thesis in the wider literature.

**Three Central Propositions**

The central purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the cogency of three main propositions that emerge through theoretical consideration and the examination of three case studies, one of them in extensive empirical detail.\(^{12}\) The project’s main proposition – and most original theoretical contribution – lies in conceptualizing state-making as a process of *institutional and socio-cognitive standardization*. *Institutional standardization* underlies state-building and is understood as a process whereby a single set of ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990; North et al. 2006) gains dominance within a given society – i.e. a condition in which all major role relationships are regularized by a preponderant organization. Likewise, *socio-cognitive standardization* underlies nation-building and is defined as a process whereby one common set of ‘rules of the mind’ – i.e. socio-cognitive elements such as language or mental maps – becomes dominant within a politically defined population. In order to refer to both of these processes I will apply the term of *regime standardization*.\(^{13}\)

The analytical understanding of state trajectories in terms of changing levels of *institutional and socio-cognitive standardization* is based on a reinterpretation of well-established arguments in the literature on state-building and nation-building respectively, and aims at reconstructing the common bonds between these sets of literature that were weakened in the 1980s (Eriksen 2006:1). Whereas classical accounts of state-building emphasize the creation and enforcement of a common institutional framework,\(^{14}\) also the literature on nation-building prominently features the element of *standardization*. Whether generated by industrialization (Gellner 2006), language or education (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1977:135), or warfare (Simmel 1964; Howard 1978; Tilly 1992), it is *socio-cognitive standardization* that constitutes the basic red line running through all of these explanations of

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12 See section 1.3 for the research methodology.

13 By ‘regime’, I refer to a historically rooted set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems shared by two or more individuals, which regulates the allocation and application of power. See Chapter 2 for definitions of ‘institutions’, ‘socio-cognitive systems’, and further key terms.

14 E.g. Hobbes 1651; Locke 1694; Rousseau 1763; Machiavelli 1513; Weber 1919; Tilly 1985; Mann 1986.
nationalism. While the analytical prism of ‘regime standardization’ does not establish causal explanations, this lens is to improve our understanding of state trajectories.\textsuperscript{15}

As its second key proposition, the thesis advances the ‘central administration thesis’. Following the established argument that administration, understood as the “management of public affairs” (OED 1989), is central to state-building,\textsuperscript{16} and combining it with the modernist perspective on nation-building that argues that “administrative organizations create meaning” (Anderson 1983:53),\textsuperscript{17} I advocate not only that state- and nation-building are inextricably interlinked, but also that significant changes in a society’s collective institutional and identity parameters are to be ascribed to modifications in their form of organization. Alterations in a society’s institutional structure generally go in tandem with modifications in its socio-cognitive configuration. Consequently, I suggest that it is central state administration that is key in driving processes of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. The fundamental hypothesis advanced here is that state trajectories are largely determined by the varying ability of ruling elites to build and/or exploit central and political administrative institutions and organizations.

The third main proposition I put forth is that war can foster and catalyse processes of state-making, under the condition that it promotes institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. This proposition leans on the bellicist tradition – with its emphasis on the importance of war for state-building and nationalism\textsuperscript{18} – but is distinct in that it treats large-scale organized violence ‘merely’ as an antecedent condition, rather than an all-defining independent variable. While challenging those who advocate that war was a daemon of decay that constituted nothing but “tragic vicious circles” (World Bank 2008; Collier 2004; Leander 2004) that amounted to “nothing less than doom” (Mohamoud 2006:15), the project similarly distances itself from those propagating war as an angel of order (Luttwack 1999). Rather, this thesis sets out to disaggregate the ‘black box’ of war, arguing that particular aspects of violent conflict may be constitutive of state-making.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{15} A further caveat of the regime thesis presented in this dissertation lies in the fact that the (causal) economic dimensions of state trajectories remain insufficiently explored, not least due to space constraints.


\textsuperscript{17} Bendix 1964:18; Smith 1983:38; Giddens 1985:116; Mann 1986:44; Gellner 2006:8; Breuilly 2006:xxv.


\textsuperscript{19} Cf. Rasler/Thompson 1989; Kestnbaum/Skocpol 1993:667; Deflem 1999; Bates et al. 2002; Kalyvas 2005; Taylor/Botea 2008. While my discussion of the role of war is similar to most other studies of war in that it
These propositions inherently challenge the frequently made argument that state-making projects are no longer on the agenda of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa (Kaplan 1994), which is plagued by violent disorder and state-breaking (Bayart et al. 1999; Chabal/Daloz 1999), and where “chances of success for state-building in the early 21st century are […] constrained, if not completely obsolete (Berger/Webber 2008:198). Subjecting this common view to critical scrutiny I suggest that despite superficial symptoms of decline, processes of state-making have not vanished from the African continent – if only because “[state] collapse is likely to inaugurate fresh or renewed processes of state formation” (Doornbos 2002b:798; Eisenstadt 1988). How the three main propositions and a number of minor ones develop throughout this thesis relate to the literature on state-building, nation-building and to Somalia and Somaliland is discussed subsequently.

1.2 Putting the Thesis into Context

The Literature on State-Building…

Being at the bottom of the global order, ‘weak’, ‘fragile’ and ‘failing’ states have become a key concern for the international community (Torres/Anderson 2004:5; DfID 2009; World Bank 2011a). When this research project started in late 2007, one tenth of the world’s states were considered to be ‘failing’ (Foreign Policy 2007; Böge et al. 2008:3), turning state-building into a central endeavour of the world community, because “weak or failed states are the source of many of the world’s most serious problems” (Fukuyama 2004:1). In a volte-face to earlier opinion which had seen the state as an obstacle to development in general and state-making more particularly in the 1980s and 1990s (Ferguson 1998:52), tends to posit war as something abstract, I concur with Reid (2007:41) that “this most psychologically traumatic and physically violent of human experiences can rarely be accurately represented by intellectualizing about it.”

20 For the counter-argument, see e.g. Renders 2007:439; Spears 2007:22.
21 See also World Bank (2002), which argues that “[c]ountries abandoned by the international development community show few signs of autonomous recovery” (cf. Weinstein 2004:2), and Fukuyama (2006:2) who suggests that “the underlying problems caused by failed states […] can only be solved through long-term efforts by outside powers” (cf. Meierhenrich 2004:162).
22 However, it should be noted that state fragility is not a new phenomenon (Yoffee/Cowgill 1988).
23 The widespread belief was that civil society could bring about democracy and development if only the state got out of the way (Diamond et al. 1988; Hyden/Bratton 1992; Harbeson et al. 1994; cf. Eriksen 2006:1). For the Somali case, see Leeson (2006:1), who suggests that “Somalis are better off under anarchy than they were under government” and that “anarchy has improved overall development” (ibid.:26).
scholars and policymakers alike realized the need for ‘Bringing the State Back In’ (Evans et al. 1985), not least because the state played an “extensive role in strengthening and safeguarding human capabilities” (Sen 1999:5). Ever since, largely liberal interpretations of state-building, democratization and governance have guided the international community’s handbooks on how to supposedly ‘fix’ fragile states (Ghani/Lockhart 2008).

Past conceptualizations of state-breaking can largely be classified into two groups, whereby both depart from neoclassical theory, according to which the state is an “organization which has the comparative advantage in violence” and is therefore “in the position to specify and enforce property rights” (North 1981:21). The first school of thought conceives of state failure in functional terms as the polities’ inability to provide certain services (e.g. Rotberg 2002, 2004; Zartman 1995). The second understands state failure in institutional terms as states’ incapacity to uphold their monopoly of violence (e.g. Jackson 1990; Krasner 1999; Ignatieff 2002). As both approaches take the Weberian ideal-type state as a benchmark, these approaches are not only normative and Eurocentric, but perceive state fragility in terms of a ‘lack’. Such an understanding of fragile states as a “flawed imitation of a mature Western form” (Hansen/Stepputat 2001:6) lies in the tradition of modernization theory, but does not contribute to an improved analytical insight into how and why states fail.

I argue that one of the reasons why our knowledge regarding processes of state-making remains not only fragmented and incomplete (Cramer 2006:276), but also “under-theorised” (Chandler 2006:189) is that the strands of literature on state-breaking on the one side, and state-making on the other, have largely lost sight of each other. Explanations of state-breaking have frequently resorted to variables such as poor economic performance (World Bank 2003), environmental scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1999; Fairhead 2000), resource curse (Collier/Höffler 1998, 2004), ethnic strife (Ignatieff 1998; Fearon/Laitin 2003) and greed and grievance (Berdal/Keen 1997). Yet, approaches to state-making appear generally disconnected from these debates, focusing by and large on ‘institution building’ (Eade 1997), good governance (Kauffmann et al. 1999), taxation (Moore 2004; Bräutigam et

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24 See also Baker 2007; Kaplan 2008a; Chesterman et al. 2005.
25 Even though Weber (1988:190) himself makes it perfectly clear that no state can do all that an ideal-type state is imagined to do.
al. 2008), security sector reform (Pouligny 2004), and elite bargains (CSRC 2005; Lindemann 2008). However, as state-breaking is an “unavoidable accompaniment of the state-making process” (Ayoob 2007:95) and because “[n]o state’s degree of fragility or failure is static” (Brinkerhoff 2007:3; Kulessa/Heinrich 2004:1), conceptualizing state trajectories as a continuum rather than in rigid dichotomies is analytically meaningful and promises to grasp the state-breaking-to-state-making continuities (CSRC 2005:1).

Consequently, the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) (2005) advanced the concept of ‘institutional multiplicity.’ Itself being based on a “framework that lies at the intersection between a Weberian understanding of the state and the political economy of state building” (ibid.:4), ‘institutional multiplicity’ valuably points out that a state’s degree of fragility or resilience largely hinges on the co-existence and frequently contradictory interrelationship of different sets of ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990) within a given territory. That institutional multiplicity poses a challenge to state-making is obvious in that it provides actors with the possibility to “[switch] strategically from one institutional universe to another” (CSRC 2005:8), thus defying the larger purpose of institutions, which is to “reduce uncertainty by providing a [clear] structure to everyday life” (North 1990:3). Despite this crucial insight and the conceptual value of this approach, its invariable reliance on ‘institutions’ reduces the process of state-making to state-building, thereby glossing over the equally crucial aspect of nation-building – a point to which we shall return later.

As the Weberian (1919) state concept has trouble dealing with cases where the lines between state and society, or formal and informal are blurred – a condition that applies to most cases of state-making – it fails to “anticipate new and diverse forms of state institutionalization” (Migdal/Schlichte 2005:3; Khan 2002:14). Aiming to overcome this limitation and the shortcoming that the Weberian state concept inherently supposes that the state constituted a rather homogenous entity with a monopoly on violence, Böge et al. (2008) introduce the concept of ‘hybrid political orders’ (HPOs). Whereas international state-building approaches suggest that locally derived political solutions are problematic (cf. Chandler 2007:71), the concept of HPOs counters that external efforts at state reconstruction suffer from a ‘nirvana fallacy’ (Coyne 2006:344) and that local solutions are

30 OECD 2008; Di John/Putzel 2009.
31 See also Tokpa (2000), who argues that state-making and state-breaking are two sides of the same coin.
32 See critique of North et al. 2007.
the only viable ones. Drawing on the concept of ‘institutional multiplicity’, and sharing significant similarities with the concepts of ‘twilight’ institutions (Lund 2006) and the ‘negotiated state’ (Menkhaus 2006/07), Böge et al. (2008) suggest that a hybridity of ‘political orders’ is desirable for the advancement of developing states.

Not only does this conceptualization of state trajectories neglect the crucial component of nation-building for processes of state-making, it also suffers from further fallacies. For one, the theoretical framework of HPOs remains inconclusive regarding the question under what conditions or what kinds of HPOs are constitutive of rather than inimical to state-making – where runs the line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘too little’ and ‘too much’ hybridity? For another, in taking the monolithic view of the state as its contentious starting point, the concept aims to “overcome the notion of the state as being the superior and ultimate form of political order per se”, in order to “[free] the debate from its current state-centric bias” (Böge et al. 2009a:88). Although some questioned whether the ‘state’ constituted an appropriate analytical tool for analysis (Foucault 2000:123), a proposition particularly made for sub-Saharan Africa, the state is far from being political ‘scrap-iron’. While it might not be as ‘autonomous’ as suggested by Weber (1947) and his followers, the state remains the foremost political actor in today’s world (Howard 2002:103). Because “[s]tate-making was essentially an internal undertaking” (Holsti 1996:44), the focus on the state is in order, as even in ‘stateless’ Somalia, “the coup of 1991 was more of an attack on a regime’s inequitable policies than a repudiation of the modern state” (Little 2003a:168).

Accordingly, I dispute the more general proposition that the state is obsolete in contemporary Africa. Ultimately, there is widespread understanding that the European experience of state- and nation-building was diffused to non-European societies through

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33 Cf. Lockwood (2005:68) who argues with reference to Poldiano (2001) and Götz (2005) that “most externally-led governance reforms have failed.”

34 This proposition is in line with Huntington (1968:20), who suggests that “[c]omplexity [of political systems] produces stability” and North (2005:42) who proposes that “[institutional] conformity can be costly in a world of uncertainty.”

35 See also world-system approaches put forth by Wallerstein (1974); Meyer/Hannan (1979), Models (1987), and Dunn (1995) who argue that the “territorial state was not at all the appropriate unit of analysis to understand social formations and change” (Migdal/Schlichte 2005:8).


37 E.g. Skocpol 1979; Collins 1986; Mann 1988; Tilly 1992.

38 See also Tilly (1992) Jackson (2001), Krasner (1999), and Picket (1996:15), who postulates that “[t]he only stable entity in the dynamic and changing constellations of existence is the state.”
colonialism. Despite superficial symptoms of decline, I suggest that processes of state formation have not vanished from the African continent and that “[state] collapse is likely to inaugurate fresh or renewed processes of state formation” (Doornbos 2002b:798; Eisenstadt 1988). While acknowledging that different politico-economic environments “affect, in a multitude of ways, the evolution of all these patterns across the economic and political terrains” (CSRC 2005:7), and additionally increase “political and economic expectations” (Khan 2002:4; Debiel 2002:5) towards states, the project explores the assertion that even the most vulnerable political entities do not merely float in the currents of globalization, but still have ‘room for manoeuvre’ (Clay/Schaffer 1984; Duffield 2001).

... Nation-Building...

A central problem with many approaches to state-making lies in their equation of the ‘state’ with ‘central government’. Almost invariably, this leads to an understanding of state-making as a process of strengthening institutional capacity (Khan 2004:165), and wrongly suggests that state-making is a purely scientific, technical and administrative process. Thus, it is not surprising that most approaches to state-making gloss over its inherent political nature (Chandler 2006:5f.; Ferguson 1994), reducing state-making to state-building, thus turning it into a form of ‘antipolitics’ (Jayasuriya/Hewison 2004). Yet, as “[g]overnance is about the relationship between the state and society” (Brinkerhoff 2007:18), and as “it is in the realm of ideas and sentiments that the fate of states is primarily determined” (Holsti 1996:84), I argue in a manner analogous to the dictum of Evans et al. (1985) on the state, for the need of ‘bringing the nation back in’. Consequently, I propose that state-making was not merely about ‘getting institutions right’, but also about the establishment of political identities, common mental models, and, more generally, socio-cognitive systems.

While the connection between the ‘state’ and the ‘nation’ was realized in the nineteenth century and encompassed by the term ‘nation-state’ (Giddens 1985:83-121; Navari 1981), this crucial link is absent from much of the current literature. One of the very few scholars to call for a re-unification of these concepts to better understand state trajectories is Lemay-Hébert (2009:22), who argues that “[t]o be effective, statebuilding has to take into account...
not just the rebuilding of state institutions, but also the complex nature of socio-political cohesion, or what some refer to as nation-building.” As “the creation of institutions has concrete repercussions on the nature of the socio-political cohesion” (ibid.:32) and as nation-ness still represents “the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson 1983:3), I propose that concepts of state-making and state-breaking have to incorporate the socio-cognitive issue of political identity into their analytical frameworks, in order to enhance our understanding of state trajectories. I, thus, challenge those scholars who assert that “the goal of nation-building should not be to impose common identities on deeply divided peoples but to organize states that can administer their territories and allow people to live together despite differences” (Ottaway 2002a:17), as this implies the questionable assumption that it is possible to ‘organize states’ while leaving the ‘identity’ of their populations untouched.

...Warfare...

This research project also speaks to the proposition that “war makes states, and vice versa” (Tilly 1992:67), which is hotly debated in academia. Although it is generally acknowledged that “the experience of warfare has played a central and indeed essential role in the process of state and nation formation in Europe” (Clapham 2001:1; Huntington 1968) and that “violence […] is an integral part of the processes of accumulation of power by the national state” (Cohen et al. 1981:901), the validity of this assertion is frequently called into question in the context of the contemporary world of developing states (Leander 2004; Herbst 2000). Although some accounts suggest that the ‘war makes states’ hypothesis holds not only for Europe, but also for Africa, and that the constitutive role of warfare can not only be observed for past, but also present state-making endeavours (Deflem 1999; Cramer 2006; Niemann 2007), the view of the ‘war makes states’-critics prevails. In the shadow of the ‘new wars’ literature (Kaldor 1999) and the proposition that “the European experience does not provide a template for state-making in other regions of the world” (Herbst 2000:22), scholars such as Leander (2004) cast doubt on Tilly’s dictum and propose

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44 See also Ogot (1972:3), who proposes that in African studies the impression has been created that “the Chaka wars were senseless and inhumane while the Thirty Years’ War was fought for a noble cause.”
that war is a “political retrovirus [...] about nothing at all” (Enzensberger 1994, as in Cramer 2006:77).  

Apart from the classical accounts on war and state-making in historic Europe, war has more recently been conceptualized as a rational economic strategy (Keen 1994, 1998; Reno 1995; Duffield 2001). These approaches suggest that “war may be a continuation of economics by other means” (Keen 2000:7), and, building on Foucault (2000), highlight the fact that wars might serve important (rational, economic) functions for some members of a society in conflict. Yet, by focusing on particular (groups of) individuals, they tell us little about the forms of social transformation that may occur during conflict (Bakonyi/Stuvøy 2005:363), even though it is acknowledged that “[i]nstitutions are altered by conflict” (Aron 2003:481; Schlichte 2003:33). Furthermore, concepts such as the rebel-centred models of Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) as well as Fearon and Laitin (2003) do not consider the question of why and how particular states come to be vulnerable to violent conflict in the first place. 

Based on the insight that “[not] all types of violent conflict are equivalent in their historical significance” (Cramer 2006:48), the debate has come to an impasse at which the inconclusive argument is made that “[t]he effects of contemporary wars on statehood are ambivalent” and that there is “no single unambiguous causal relation between states and wars” (Schlichte 2003:38).  

Although it is argued that one needs to differentiate between different kinds of war in order to assess its implication for state-making (Rasler/Thompson 1989; Kestnbaum/ Skocpol 1993:667), a central feature of the debate’s deadlock remains – namely that the considerable span in time and space that renders a sound comparison of the role war has played in state trajectories then and now, here and there, impossible. Indeed, Tilly’s ‘war makes states’ thesis is only partly applicable to the Somali case, for example, largely because the wars that can be considered constitutive of state-making have involved recurrent events that unfolded over centuries, rather than more isolated instances of war. Yet, rather than outright abandoning war as an explanatory variable, I propose that its context-specificity calls for the necessity to disaggregate its ‘black box’, in order to identify particular components that might be constitutive of state-making. The analytical framework presented in Chapter 2 aims at precisely this.

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48 van de Walle (2004:94) aptly remarks that “[e]very age constructs its [...] own types of war.”
... and the Scholarship on Somalia and Somaliland

The state trajectories of Somalia and Somaliland lend themselves to an investigation of the theoretical issues at stake for several reasons. Not only have the Somali territories seen numerous processes of state-making and state-breaking in their post-colonial era, but they are also particularly well-suited to study the relationship between war and state trajectories, because in the Horn of Africa this relationship has been “far more intensive, and of much longer duration, than elsewhere [in Africa]” (Clapham 2001:2). There already exists an extensive literature on Somalia, and scholarly work on Somaliland’s state-making project has also been growing, but despite this significant scholarship, notable gaps and inconsistencies remain.

One of the frequently made propositions this thesis subjects to critical scrutiny concerns the allegation that the state of Somalia was ‘unique’. Shortly after the British Protectorate of Somaliland and the Italian colony of Somalia gained independence in 1960 and decided to unify in the Somali Republic, the newly born country came to be celebrated as one of the rare authentic nations in Africa (Fitzgibbon 1982a:2). Based on their “burning sense of nationalism” (Legum/Lee 1977:31; Laitin 1977b:14) and “genuine democracy” (HRW 1990:14; Contini 1964:3; Pegg 1998:11), Somalis and their state-making endeavour were considered inimicable on the African continent. Although it is undeniable that the Somali state trajectory of the 1960s and thereafter constitutes a case of its own, I question the supposition that the Somali Republic in general and the processes that characterized its state trajectory were a “striking anomaly” (Lewis 1972:384; see also fn. 11). In highlighting the more general underlying patterns of state-making and state-breaking in Somalia, this

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49 See Section 1.3 for the research methodology.
50 Spanning from anthropological accounts of Lewis (1961) and Luling (1977) to works on state-making and state-breaking in Somalia (e.g. Laitin/Samatar 1987; S. S. Samatar 1991; A. Samatar 1992; Drysdale 2001; Menkhaus 2004; see also Gilkes 1994a; Bakonyi 2001; Little 2003a; Marchal 2004; Abdullahi 2007a; Adam 2008). For an abundant literature on the aspect of international intervention in Somalia see e.g. Marchal 1993b; Keen 1994; Lyons/Samatar 1995; Compagnon 1995; Prunier 1997a; Clarke/Herbst 1997.
54 Not least because Somalia was one of the few states in sub-Saharan Africa that was formed out of formerly distinct colonial entities.
thesis counters those arguing that “Somalis are so unique that systematic comparison can be of no benefit” (cf. Kapteijns 2001:15).

A second inconsistency addressed by this thesis regards the supposition that “the dismemberment of Somalia began right after the hasty and legally unconsummated union of Somaliland and Somalia in 1960” (Adan 1994), that the Somali state collapse started with the military coup of General Siyad Barre in 1969 (Abdullahi 2007a:43), and that “Somalia’s experience as an independent state was negative to say the least” (Battera 2004:6). While such accounts rightly emphasise that the disintegration of the Somali Republic did not occur overnight, but was marked by long-term undercurrents, they gloss over the notable processes of state-making that were pursued in the decades after independence – and also, and as I suggest, particularly so, under Barre’s dictatorial rule in the early to mid-1970s. In analysing the mechanisms underlying processes of state-making and state-breaking, this thesis challenges such oversimplifications, and suggests that divergent state trajectories hinged less on different types of government (e.g. democratic vs. autocratic), than on progression and regression regarding institutional and socio-cognitive standardization.

Apart from these issues, further gaps remain concerning the explanation of the Somali state trajectories. One largely unanswered question is why Somalia’s project of state-making in general and nation-building in particular started crumbling in the late 1970s, despite an inter-state war with Ethiopia, which enhanced national sentiments in a society that was already euphoric about irredentist ideas.

While some scholars suggest that it was the misfit between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of governance that caused the demise of the state (Mansur 1995:115; Lewis 1980, 1994), others point to its dire economic performance, which ultimately brought it to its knees (Markakis 1987:90ff.; Laitin 1993:125). Again other analysts locate the breaking of the Somali state and nation in international politics, blaming either the “black colonialists of Ethiopia” (Fitzgibbon 1982b:141) or “Soviet complicity” (Payton 1980). While all these accounts have a point, their underlying theoretical conceptualizations are, amongst other flaws, analytically unable to grasp the (dis-)
continuities between state-making and state-breaking. This thesis attempts to fill this void by pointing to deeper underlying patterns of state trajectories.

A central puzzle that the more recent Somali scholarship has found a hard nut to crack regards the question of how the significantly divergent state trajectories that occurred within the (former) Somali Republic in the post-1991 era could be explained. A common explanation to account for the difference between the Somaliland ‘wunderkind’ and the Somali ‘rapscallion’ suggests that the answer lies in the regions’ dissimilar colonial histories. While this proposition suffers from a number of empirical flaws, it is also analytically problematic in that it inherently assumes that socio-political structures were static. A related but alternative argument that has gained much currency in the scholarly literature – predominantly amongst proponents of the concept of HPOs – points towards the revival of ‘traditional institutions’ (Bryden/Farah 1996; Bradbury 1997, 2008) and argues that it was the ‘elders’ who were “responsible for the success of Somaliland today” (Leonard 2009:13; Flint 1994:36). Although the role of ‘traditional authorities’ in Somaliland’s state-making endeavour can and should not be dismissed, this thesis scrutinizes this proposition on empirical grounds. It furthermore advises that the role ‘traditional authorities’ played fell more into the realm of peace-building rather than state-building, which should not be confused analytically.

By means of rounding up this brief overview of some of the key literature on, and remaining gaps in, Somali scholarship, I touch upon a final proposition that has risen to prominence. Building on the ‘benevolent elders thesis’ much of the literature on the self-styled state of Somaliland is united in its, at times overly benign, portrayal of this state-making project. Once formally launched with the polity’s unilateral declaration of independence after the Somali civil war in 1991, this state-making endeavour has recurrently been depicted as ‘unique’ (Hoyle 2000:85; Kaplan 2008b:148; Jhazbhay 2009:50). Its alleged inimitability is not only rooted in its supposedly genuine process of ‘bottom-up’ peace-building (Farah/Lewis 1993; Bryden/Farah 1996), ‘traditional reconciliation’ (Brons 2001), and ‘grassroots’ democracy (Adam 1995; Terlinden/Debiel

59 See chapters 3 and 4.
but also in the circumstance that its state-making project was carried through in the absence of significant international financial assistance (Weinstein 2004; Bradbury 2008:4; Eubank 2010). Consequently, numerous analysts celebrate Somaliland as an impressive “African success story” (Henwood 2007:168) and represent it as “Africa’s Best Kept Secret” (Jhazbhay 2003).

This rather one-sided portrayal of Somaliland is partly due to the fact that it is frequently compared with the “quintessential failed state” of Somalia (Nenova/Harford 2004:1), which has remained caught in the “tragic vicious circle” (World Bank 2008) of a “bloody civil war” (Wahlers 2011:4). The strong emphasis on Somaliland’s peaceful state-making components however glosses over the fact that this polity was also embroiled in a number of civil wars – wars that were in part instigated by its political leadership in order to consolidate its power, and which ultimately lay at the heart of Somaliland’s state trajectory. Although Somaliland’s ability to ultimately replace violent means of conflict resolution by non-violent ones is as laudable as its progress in establishing structures of governance, this thesis questions the outright ‘success’ that Somaliland has frequently been accorded. In proposing that its state-making was decisively informed by shrewd politicians, top-down policies, and bellicose power politics, this work acts as a corrective to a number of established and emerging narratives on Somaliland’s state-making project, and shows that there has been a learning curve in Somali state-making endeavours since 1960.

### 1.3 Research Methodology

**Qualitative Case Study Method**

In order to investigate and empirically analyse these theoretical considerations, I undertake qualitative research along the lines of a “structured, focused comparison” (George/Bennett 2003; ICG 2003:34; Othieno 2008; Forti 2011:5; Shinn 2002; ICG 2003:10; Battera 2004:2, 17; World Bank 2005:19; Eggers 2007; Renders 2006; Jhazbhay 2007; Henwood 2007:168; Kaplan 2008a,b; Othieno 2008; Bradbury 2008; Leonard 2009:13; Walls 2009a:2; Kibble/Walls 2010a:14; Harris/Foresti 2011).

See also Angeloni (2009:755ff.), who argues that Somalia was an “anti-state”, Heyer (1997a:1), who suggests that Somalia was but a “temporary state”, Weber (2008:14), who postulates that Somalia as a state was neither fragile nor weak, but “simply nonexistent”, and Drysdale (2000:84), who advocates that “Somalia is the pioneering example of total state collapse.” See also Courrier International 2008. See also fn. 11.
2005; Gerring 2007) of a controllable number of case studies. This methodology was chosen, because, first, the study focuses on identifying processes and patterns, making such an approach appropriate (Ragin 1987; Cramer 2006:136). Second, many of the potentially decisive mechanisms entailed in state-making and state-breaking are hard to grasp without detailed investigation, which rules out statistical methods in favour of a small-N comparative analysis (Acemoglu et al. 2003:84). Third, the decision to investigate the role of war for state trajectories entails a small-N study, as it has convincingly been argued that “[m]ost theories of war are best tested by case-study methods” (van Evera 1997:30). Last, but not least, the decision to apply this approach was also based on the fact that while the rare process of ‘autonomous recovery’ as allegedly observed in Somaliland is not fit for statistical testing, it holds great potential for qualitative analysis and theory development.

A central advantage of the case study approach is that it does not run the risk of ‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori 1970, 1984), a problem frequently encountered by statistical studies that subject quite dissimilar cases to ‘one-size-fits-all’ analytical frameworks. Small-N studies allow for high levels of internal (or conceptual) validity in that they provide the researcher with the opportunity to identify and assess those indicators that best capture the underlying theoretical concepts. They also invite conceptual refinement largely characterized by a higher level of validity – however, over a more limited number of observations as compared to large-N studies. Moreover, in comparison to statistical studies, case studies dispose of the advantage that they are superior in accommodating multifaceted causal relations and equifinality (von Bertalanffy 1968). Yet, in order to leverage these advantages, a number of issues need to be taken into consideration when choosing cases.

According to orthodox procedure, the “fundamental problem of inference” (King et al. 1994:91) should be counteracted by ensuring variation in the independent variable (ibid.:140f.). Such a ‘controlled comparison’, however, is largely incompatible with social science research, for which case-selection on the dependent variable is a legitimate alternative as long as sufficient variation in the values of the dependent variable is ensured (Ragin 2004:7). Given the vastly diverging state trajectories the Somali territories have experienced, this condition is met. Apart from sufficient variation on the dependent variable, cases have to fulfil the demands of a ‘most similar research design’

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65 See also Bayart (1993) and Chabal (1991) who argue that “political analysis should be concerned with understanding processes over time – that is, the opposite of ‘snapshot’ explanations” (ibid.:52).

(Przeworski/Teune 1970:32f.)\(^{67}\) in order to not only facilitate the identification of the particular processes and patterns, but also to allow for their identification in the first place. The Somali cases clearly fulfil this precondition. Taking these aspects into consideration valuable insights can be gained from research that is rooted in “more pared down but detailed sets of comparisons and contrasts” (Cramer 2006:136).

The research presented in this thesis is comparative in time, comparing past processes of state-making in Somalia with the more recent one experienced by Somaliland. Such longitudinal studies ensure limited variation of background conditions, as many variables can be held constant, thereby facilitating the identification of processes and patterns responsible for diverging state-making outcomes. Moreover, the project is also comparative on an intra-case basis, as it compares processes of state-making and state-breaking amongst different geographical polities within the territorial confines of the former Republic of Somalia (a national comparative study). The division of the case into ‘sub-cases’ or ‘subunits’ along chronological and geographical lines, allows an increase in the number of observations, by “making many observations from few” (King et al. 1994:217ff.; Lijphart 1971), thereby confronting the problem of underdeterminacy of research design.

**Selection of Case Studies**

While the puzzles raised by the case of Somaliland constituted my starting point in the selection of case studies, I deployed a comparative approach to shed light on its trajectory. The Somali cases lend themselves to a comparative approach, not least because their state trajectories are marked by an interesting heterogeneity.\(^{68}\) First, there is the newly-independent democratic Somali state of the 1960s, which was perceived as constituting one of Africa’s rare real nation-states.\(^{69}\) Second, there is the autocratic Somali state of the 1970s and 1980s, which can itself be subdivided into two cases – one encompassing the period between 1969 and 1977, which largely witnessed processes indicative of state-making, and the other comprising the era from 1978 to 1991, which was generally marked by patterns of state-breaking. The years of 1977/78, which saw the Ogadeen War between Somalia and Ethiopia, “the most ferocious conflict in Africa since World War II” (Woodward

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\(^{67}\) Berg-Schlosser/Siegler 1990:156; Klugmann et al. 1999:11.

\(^{68}\) See Lemke (2003:6) who convincingly argues that “we cannot undertake analyses of arguments such as Tilly’s while only focusing on successful instances of state-making. […] If we are interested in the process of state-making, we have to include the failed as well as the successful cases.”

1977:281), are widely considered to be a watershed in the Somali state trajectory. Third, there is the Somalia of the 1990s onwards, which came to be known as probably the most “full-blown case of state collapse” (Milliken/Krause 2002:754). Fourth, and finally, there is the allegedly opposed case of Somaliland, which developed into “one of the most stable polities in the Horn [of Africa]” (Bradbury 2008:1; ICG 2003:10; World Bank 2005:19).

While a comparative study of contemporary state-making processes throughout the territory of Somalia would have been intriguing, especially juxtaposing the experience of Somaliland since 1991 with that of south-central Somalia during the same period, it was beyond the scope of the current study. It would have been impossible to replicate the primary research I undertook in Somaliland in south-central Somalia. Instead, I have had to confine the comparative dimension of the study to Somali state development between 1960 and 1991. It follows that what the thesis has to say about the wider dimensions of Somalia’s state trajectory in the post-1991 era is by implication rather than through primary research.

That said, due to their broad similarities in social, cultural, linguistic, and religious terms, the comparison between the state trajectory of Somaliland and past state-making endeavours in Somalia constitutes – despite important differences such as dissimilar colonial experiences and changing geopolitical environments – a loose approximation of a social scientific ‘natural experiment’. Particularly Somaliland appears to fit this characterization, leading other scholars to argue that “Somaliland seems like a perfect laboratory of statehood in Africa, providing numerous lessons about how the concept and the idea of statehood can be relevant and important in Africa today” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:723). Moreover, the Somali cases also lend themselves to test the ‘war makes states’-hypothesis. As argued above, the Horn of Africa has experienced a relationship between war and state formation that has been of longer duration and far more intensive than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa (Clapham 2001;2; Ahmed/Green 1999). This argument appears to be particularly true for the case of Somaliland, for which other scholars have already hinted at the formative role war played with regards to state-making (Jacquin-Berdal 2002; Huliaras 2002; Bakonyi 2009). Yet, although it is suggested that “Somaliland challenges the image of war”

(Bradbury 2008:2), and that the polity was "very much a product of war" (Spears 2004b:185), the Somali literature still lacks an account that fully develops this argument – a gap this research project tries to fill.

**Main Research Tools**

In order to conduct the research and gather the data required for this project, I used a number of research tools. First, I engaged in an extensive desk study, reviewing the existing literature, collecting secondary data, and engaging in archival research. In undertaking this exercise, I relied largely on the libraries of the London School of Economics and Political Science and the School of Oriental and African Studies, as well as the British Library, all of which provided valuable material. Furthermore, I assembled as much grey literature on Somalia and Somaliland from international development and non-governmental organizations as I could in order to enhance my knowledge of the empirical terrain, what is generally judged as constituting received wisdom, and identify existing knowledge and analytical gaps.

Second, I complemented this basic research by three research visits to Somaliland. The first took place immediately after my MPhil/PhD upgrade panel in the summer of 2008. Between July 15th and August 13th I carried out a feasibility study in this de facto state, familiarized myself with the environment and established first contacts that were to facilitate future research. I returned from January 27th to May 4th, 2010. While conducting my own doctoral research, I was also involved in a research project funded by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and carried through by the Stanhope Centre for Communications Policy Research. In the capacity of a research team leader I organized and conducted research into the information and communication ecology of Somaliland, which provided me with valuable insights into aspects of socio-cognitive standardization in Somaliland.74 The third and final period extended from June 8th to August 12th, 2011. For the greater part of June I consulted on a project with the Small Arms Survey (SAS) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on a ‘youth-at-risk’ project. Being based at the Somali Observatory for Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP), this exercise allowed me to enhance my insights into Somaliland’s state trajectory and to expand my network of informants. The subsequent section entitled ‘Challenges in Collecting and Assessing Oral Materials’ provides a fuller and more in-depth discussion of this research.

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74 Some of the insights gained during the consultancy with Stanhope feature in Chapter 7. The respective section is marked accordingly.
tool, which was instrumental and essential in rendering some of the original empirical contributions of this research.

Apart from carrying out interviews, I also collected documentary sources in Somaliland. While archival resources are especially useful for case study construction as they are stable, broad and exact (Yin 2003:86), such an ideal-type situation of archival resources does not exist for either Somalia or Somaliland. Written material and (consistent) statistical data is hard to come by – partly because the respective authorities have insufficient resources for data collection and partly because the region was poorly administered for many years and devastated by repeated conflict; the data I gathered enabled some additional and deeper insight into local and national government policy over time. While the collection of documentary sources and interviews enabled reconstruction of the recent past, primary observation, which constituted a further research tool, allowed for insights into the present.

Whereas the Somali language has a rich oral tradition, it did not gain an orthography until 1972. Therefore, and due to the fact that Somalia was colonized by different imperial powers, Somali spelling is varied. The country’s capital, for example, is spelled Mogadiscio by the Italians, Mogadishu by the English, and Muqdisho by the Somalis. Although having originally intended to standardise the spelling by using Somali spellings in every instance, this quickly became awkward and confusing. Thus, I compromised, using the Somali spelling whenever possible, but using the commonly known spelling for most names and locations. Some of the compromises I have chosen may irritate Somali scholars and language purists alike, and for that I apologize. When referring to Somali individuals, I will frequently refer to them by using their ‘official’ nickname, marked by guillemets. And when referring to Somali sub-clans and lineages, I will frequently situate them in the greater clan genealogy, so as to facilitate tracking (e.g. Isaaq/Habar Awal/Saad Muse/Jibril Abokor).

**Challenges in Collecting and Assessing Oral Materials**

Over the course of my research sojourns in Somaliland I conducted some 158 interviews, and, moreover, engaged in uncounted informal personal conversations with informants in Somaliland, Nairobi, London, Paris and Geneva. While those informal conversations were undertaken with individuals from a great diversity of professional backgrounds and social status, I conducted the formal interviews largely with key informants of Somaliland’s political, administrative, business and media elite. This approach was justified by the fact that key informant interviews allow the researcher to focus directly on the research question
(Yin 2003:86). Furthermore, the urban elite have higher educational levels, better knowledge of the English language, and generally wider expertise in Somali and Somaliland politics than, for example, most informants in the rural areas, making the former an obvious target group for the research I aimed to undertake. Hence, and due to the fact that Somaliland’s political, economic and intellectual elite are concentrated in the capital the majority of interviews took place in Hargeysa.

The secondary reason for why I focused my interviews on the urban elite in Hargeysa lay in the logistical and financial challenges of conducting research outside of the capital. Due to a fragile security situation, the carrying through of primary research beyond the confines of the capital comes with significant monetary costs, not least because the Somaliland government requires all foreigners to hire a minimum of two 4x4 vehicles and an armed escort consisting of members of the Special Protection Unit (SPU) when leaving Hargeysa for other destinations within the de facto country. Despite these constraints, I conducted a sizable number of interviews in Boroma, Berbera, Burco, and Erigavo. I had been keen to undertake research outside the capital, partly because primary observation on the progress of state-making throughout the Somaliland territory was to inform my research. Moreover, I wanted to guard myself against a ‘capital bias’ in my assessment of Somaliland’s state-making trajectory.

For most of the time, the interviews were ‘semi-structured’ in nature, as this formula not only facilitates a “consistent line of inquiry” (Yin 2003:89), but also allows for a free-flowing stream of questions and information. Consequently, this approach enhanced my chances of acquiring information from the informants’ perspective, rather than my own. Partly in order to ensure a triangulation of information across different interviews, I generally used interview guides that featured central questions pertaining to my key research interests. The further I progressed with my research and the more I immersed myself in the knowledge I had gathered, I adapted the catalogue of questions for the semi-structured interviews in order to cover additional ground and explore new narratives. While these interview guides evolved particularly in between my different research sojourns – i.e. during those phases of my research when I took stock of my empirical knowledge, analysed the

75 Per day, the costs for transportation and personal security alone can easily add up to about USD 250, depending on the destination of the research journey.
material collected to date, and readjusted and fine-tuned my research focus – these guides also evolved over the course of each research trip.

Whereas I recorded and subsequently transcribed the interviews at first, I soon came to realize that this practice restricted not only the number of my possible informants, but also significantly confined the range of information I would be able to gather. As numerous informants were not comfortable having our conversations recorded on tape due to the frequently politically sensitive nature of these discussions, I changed my method to taking notes during the course of the interview and producing protocols from memory thereafter. Although not all of the individuals I interviewed requested anonymity, and while I was reluctant to make all of my interview material anonymous at first, I ultimately opted to keep all interviews confidential, given that the implications of research and its publication are never foreseeable and could possibly impact on the informants’ careers and their lives more generally. Yet, by providing specific information about the profession and/or position of my interviewees in the ‘List of Interviews’ on pages 327-333, and by linking the information obtained in particular interviews with this list through a numerical system throughout this thesis, I hope to have restored some of the validity and transparency the oral materials have forfeited through the process of anonymization.

Although the research presented in this thesis relies on a variety of sources, primary oral materials constitute a central source. This is largely because it is only in interviews that I was able to uncover information and narratives that did not yet constitute part of the established knowledge and received wisdom on Somaliland’s state-making project. Since interview material provides the principle source of information for this thesis, I have had to confront a number of methodological challenges. Amongst them are the representativity of the interview sample, the reliability of informants’ information, the comparability of different interviews, and the degree of manipulation in the presentation and interpretation of the oral materials.

As regards the selection of informants, I aimed at selecting interviewees from different political and clan groupings within the different sectors I wanted to research, so as to guard against bias and allow for the triangulation of information. Thereby, I undertook special efforts to interview representatives of different ‘sides’ of a particular conflict or event wherever possible, in order to not only validate particular pieces of information, but also to gain a greater spectrum of narratives as well as achieve a greater level of objectivity. In practical terms, I started identifying my interviewees through my initial contacts at the
Academy for Peace and Development (APD) during the course of my first research sojourn in Somaliland. Given that the APD is probably the most respected local think tank in Somaliland – which has, moreover, been deeply involved in diverse political processes – and due to the circumstance that its researchers come from a wide range of political and kinship backgrounds, selection bias in favour of one or another group was limited. Once I had explored and engaged with the informants suggested to me by APD staff, I started applying a ‘snowball system’ to reach beyond the immediate contacts I had initially been provided with.

During my second and third research sojourns in Somaliland I commenced identifying my informants in a similar manner, however, from different institutional bases, amongst them the Observatory for Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP). Again, I first approached the OCVP staff, subsequently turning towards their own private and professional primary contacts, incrementally making ever more distant connections accessible by applying the ‘snowball system’. Moreover, the longer I stayed in Hargeysa and the more often I returned to the Republic of Somaliland, I increasingly got to know a more random variety of individuals, ranging from hotel staff to parliamentarians, through whom I sought to gain further access to additional informants. The more I learned about Somaliland’s state trajectory and the central actors behind it, the easier I found it to identify and target informants that I deemed particularly relevant or interesting.

Apart from ensuring a balanced interview sample, another central challenge that arises when relying on key informant interviews as the primary source of research lies in the fact that particularly initial interviews run the risk of bias, both on behalf of the interviewee and the interviewer (Yin 2003:86). The fact that my own assessment of Somaliland’s state-making progress changed during the course of my research helped me to keep my own bias in check. Also, some of the prepossession I encountered on the part of some of my informants seemed to diminish over time – either because I had gained sufficient knowledge so as not to readily ‘buy in’ to certain narratives offered by particular interviewees, or because I had managed to establish a level of trust with the respective informant. While I had frequently been provided with what appeared to fall into the ‘standard narrative’ of Somaliland’s state-making trajectory during initial interviews – thus, rendering some of the early interviews not useful beyond acting as formal introductions –

76 See earlier section entitled ‘The Iterative Process’.
later interviews seemingly brought to the fore more sophisticated answers from my informants. Thus, where possible, I attempted to repeat interviews, or at least return to the same research question(s) in later sessions with the same informant.

Nevertheless, during the course of my research I was presented with a cacophony of divergent narratives on the question of how Somaliland’s state-making process had evolved. Consequently, I faced the challenge of assessing the validity of my informants’ information and making judgements as to whom and what to believe. According to Thompson (2000:272-274) there are a number of principles that must be followed in order to ensure a certain level of validity of oral histories collected. First, each interview must be reviewed for internal consistency and with a view to discerning the general thrust of the narrative being presented. Second, the researcher must cross-check and triangulate the information provided with a variety of sources. And third, the interview must be reviewed in the context of the researcher’s own understanding of the wider context in which particular events took place. While I tried to adhere to all these requirements, my main strategy in ensuring the reliability of my informants’ information lay, as mentioned before, in cross-referencing and triangulating information with other sources of information from different types of kinship groups, gender, and professional background wherever possible.

While interview informants recalled particular events with reasonable consistency in terms of what happened, explanations for why these events unfolded and who was responsible for setting them in motion, for example, tended to differ significantly. Three factors played into these inconsistencies. First, the interviewees themselves entertained a subjective perspective on certain events and had an interest in according themselves a particular role. Second, it seemed to be apparent that particular political or kinship groups had derived a shared understanding of a particular historical event. Third, there seemed to be an ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ account of past processes and developments – with the ‘official’ one frequently being offered during the early phase of my research in Somaliland, and the ‘unofficial’ one generally being provided once I had established myself as a researcher. Similarly, I found that issues discussed with interviewees and the kind of explanations and responses given by them in the morning seemed to sometimes differ from what I was told in more informal settings in the afternoon.

Because of this and the fact that I was presented with different narratives on Somaliland’s state-making trajectory, I was confronted with the question of whom and what to ultimately believe. This question was particularly pertinent in cases in which the triangulation of
information manifested rather than diminished the cacophony of narratives. In certain cases, the question of whom and what to believe presented itself as being relatively straightforward, however. This was, for example, the case when an informant presented a highly political, contested and ambiguous issue in a simplistic manner, glossing over important factors I knew had influenced the aspect under discussion. Similarly, I became suspicious of informants’ accounts, if their narratives fell too neatly in line with their clan’s history – which is why I always tried to gather a good deal of background information on the individual I planned to interview. Consequently, I tended to lend my ear more to those informants, who confronted me with accounts that gave proof of higher levels of reflection, scrutiny and complexity.

Apart from conducting interviews in a formal manner during the morning hours, and applying a generally slightly less formal setting in the afternoon hours, I also collected parts of my research during very informal khat chewing sessions. During the afternoon hours, men tend to sit with their colleagues and friends in a room of a public or private building, in order to socialize and engulf in the consumption of the light stimulant khat leaves. However, while some researchers have found it valuable to attend these chewing sessions in order to obtain information, I myself did not find them as valuable, after all. This had largely to do with the fact that these afternoon meetings were always held in Somali, leaving me either excluded from the conversation or with an uncomfortable feeling of intrusion, when trying to switch the discussion to English. Moreover, I found my attendance at these sessions to constitute an ineffective use of my time, as it frequently took hours to extract some sparse information or clues. Having said that, some of the khat sessions proved to provide a useful context for gaining additional information or leads, not least because people tended to be more talkative, but also because they often provided an opportunity to immediately triangulate information.

1.4 Organization of the Dissertation

The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical considerations underlying this thesis. Therein, I suggest conceiving of the state as one of several socio-political regimes within a society and propose that state-making was ultimately about the standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’
within a geographically defined population. Accordingly, I claim that trends of state-making and state-breaking can be understood as processes of changing levels in institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. The chapter furthermore contends that the standardization and survival of institutions and socio-cognitive systems largely hinges on central administration. The fundamental hypothesis I advance is that outcomes of regime standardization are greatly determined by the varying ability of ruling elites to build and/or exploit administrative structures. I also maintain a number of further arguments. First, I suggest that periods of regime change, which are characteristic of state-making endeavours, are inherently crisis prone, as a modification of the ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ that structure a society goes in tandem with shifts in power. Second, I argue that processes of regime change are generally driven by elites, as it is largely this social stratum that holds the capacity for regime negotiation and standardization. Furthermore, I postulate that war can be conducive to state-making under the condition that it contributes to the standardization of a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’.

Chapter 3 applies the analytical prism of regime standardization to the Somali state trajectories of the 1960s and early- to mid-1970s. The chapter’s first part addresses the puzzle of why the previously promising state-making endeavour of the 1960s came to falter. After tracing some of the most prominent historical developments in early-independent Somalia the section highlights some of the challenges that came with the unification of the British and Italian Somali territories. Against this background, the chapter argues that, after an initial increase in regime standardization on the part of the state, the 1960s were largely characterized by a pluralization of regimes. The chapter’s second part considers the coup d’état of 1969, the installation of a military dictatorship, and its implications for state-making. Thereby, the section speaks to the question of why Somalia was able to experience a phase of progressive state-making under Barre’s early rule and how this was undertaken. Essentially, the section suggests that with the takeover of the military government trends in favour of the standardization of an authoritative set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems started to set in.

A first analysis of the role war played for Somali state trajectories is undertaken in Chapter 4. The chapter addresses the questions of how the Ogaden War of 1977/78 and the insurgency war led by the Somali National Movement (SNM) in north-west Somalia in the 1980s impacted the subsequent state trajectories, and why they had such differential effects on processes of state (un)making. I propose that the Ogaden War heralded a situation in
which Barre was increasingly bereft of his ability to conduct institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, thus leading to the unmaking of the Somali state. With regards to the civil war, it is, however, less clear as to how much it contributed to an enhancement of particular ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ that would lend themselves to explaining the alleged state-making success of Somaliland. While it seems as if the war did not lead to outright regime standardization, the chapter uncovers certain developments that were constitutive of state-making.

Subsequent to this historical application of the regime standardization prism, the thesis delves into analysing Somaliland’s state-making project. Contesting established paradigms, Chapter 5 shows that the polity’s state-making process was neither as unique nor as peaceful as generally claimed. While showing that Somaliland’s state-making endeavour has numerous parallels to earlier state-making projects within and outside of Somali territories, the chapter furthermore contests that it was the legendary ‘traditional authorities’ with their inclination towards ‘grassroots democracy’ that lay at the heart of the polity’s development. Based on empirical findings I claim that Somaliland owes its trajectory largely to the shrewd and authoritarian politics of President Egal, who did not even balk at instigating civil war in order to consolidate his power and reconstruct a previously deconstructed state. The chapter illustrates that whereas the 1991-1993 period was marked by processes of state-breaking, the subsequent years were largely characterized by a fortification of processes of regime standardization, the foundations of which had already partly been laid during the course of the civil war of the 1980s.

Chapter 6 continues to analyse Somaliland’s state-making trajectory, scrutinizing the common propositions that democratization and decentralization were not only thoroughly beneficial for its development, but also genuine. Drawing upon empirical evidence, I propose that the process of democratization was flawed, turning it into little more than a continuation of Egal’s authoritarian politics ‘by other means’. Moreover, the effect of democratization on state-making appears to have been ambivalent, not least because it heralded a process of political decentralization, which impeded the maintenance of regime standardization during the 2000s. In light of these developments the chapter argues that, from the state-making point of view, both democratization and decentralization took place prematurely, putting significant brakes on the broadcasting and implementation of a single authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’.
The analysis of Somaliland’s state trajectory between the early-1990s and the late-2000s is completed by an investigation of the degree of state-making it had achieved by the end of its first two decades. Examining developments in its administrative architecture, security apparatus, resource mobilization patterns and media landscape, amongst others, Chapter 7 puts the overly optimistic representation of Somaliland commonly found in the literature into question, proposing not only that the republic’s state-making endeavour was far from concluded by 2012, but also that the consolidation of this state remained limited. A central finding is that regime standardization was – to the extent that it occurred – largely confined to the Hargeysa-Berbera-Bruco ‘heartland’ of the Isaaq clan and remained mostly absent from the ‘hinterland’. Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, summarizes some of the key findings and discusses their implications for theory, policy and future research on Somalia and Somaliland.
State-Making as Regime Standardization

International efforts aimed at ‘fixing failed states’ (Ghani/Lockhart 2008) in the 21st century have been guided by ‘pragmatic neo-liberalism’ (Eyoh/Sandbrook 2001; Wolfensohn 1999). Accordingly, the promotion of human rights, civil society and pluralist values has taken centre-stage in contexts of fragility (Chandler 2010:33). While Western diplomats press political adversaries in (post-)conflict societies to enter into ‘power-sharing agreements’ (Sisk 1996; Hartzell/Hoddie 2003) and to establish ‘inclusive political systems’ (OECD 2011:2), international development experts advise that an adherence to liberal pluralism must be observed, if fragility is to be replaced by stability (e.g. OECD 2011:2, cf. Levene 2000:20f.). Thus, democratization and decentralization have not merely been seen as ends in themselves, but as important means to safeguard political tolerance, ethnic diversity, religious freedom, and linguistic non-discrimination. Carrying these liberal notions to extremes, neo-pluralist concepts, such as ‘hybrid political orders’ (HPOs) (Böge et al. 2008), suggest that ‘hybridity’ and pluralism constitute not only a goal, but, in fact the very nature of modern states.

Such conceptualizations of, and policy prescriptions for, states ‘in the making’ contrast strongly with classical accounts. Social contract theorists such as Hobbes (1651), Locke (1694), and Rousseau (1763) suggest that the natural state of violent competition and anarchy can only be overcome, if the plurality of players agree to delegate some of their powers to a supreme primus inter pares, the Leviathan, who can promote a more peaceful coexistence by enforcing particular ‘rules of the game’. Building on these long-standing

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77 Kaplan 2008a; Chesterman et al. 2005.
79 Neo-pluralist concepts emphasize problems of allocation rather than ones of rule and control, see Nordlinger 1981; Lindblom 1977.
insights and scrutinizing the fashionable quest for pluralism, Schwartz (1995) reminds us that the West’s general understanding of the modern state was built on a ‘diversity myth’. Similarly, Levene (2000:21) argues that states did not exist to promote diversity, but, “on the contrary, their role is to streamline, make homogeneous, organize people to be uniform in some sense.” According to this understanding, the consolidated state is less an object of plurality, but more uniformity, and state-making is less about diversification than ‘standardization’.

This train of thought constitutes one key pillar of the analytical prism developed in this chapter, which also addresses some other central debates on state-making. Building on insights gained from the literature on state-building and nation-building I argue that the social construct of the state can meaningfully be understood as one of several socio-political *regimes* within a given society, and that state trajectories can valuably be conceptualized as changing levels of *institutional* and *socio-cognitive standardization*. Understanding a ‘regime’ to be a set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems shared by two or more individuals, which regulates the allocation and application of power, I propose that state-making is ultimately about the negotiation and standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ amongst a territorially defined population.

In an attempt to analytically not only combine the insights of the *state-* and *nation-*building literature, but also bridge the gap between existing approaches to state-*making* and state-*breaking*, the theoretical framework presented here furthermore proposes that processes of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization are largely a function of central administration. Building on the realization that both ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ are significantly shaped by the administrative architecture of a socio-political organization, the fundamental hypothesis advanced here is that state trajectories are greatly determined by the varying ability of ruling elites to build and/or exploit central administrative structures. The chapter also contains a number of further arguments.

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80 Schwartz (1995) shows that the United States of America “was characterized by ethnic dominance, not ethnic pluralism” and that “‘Americanization’ was a process of coercive conformity according to which the United States was a melting pot, not a tapestry.” Thus, he concludes that while Americans preached an adherence to liberal pluralism throughout the world, their own state and national unity was not founded on pluralism, diversity and tolerance, but homogeneity and conformity.

81 See also Anderson 1983; Connor 1994:92; Conversi 2007:372.

82 See also Scott 2007:4.
First, I suggest in line with established scholarship that periods of *regime change*, which are inherent to processes of state-(un)making, are inevitably crisis prone (cf. Dogan/Higley 1998). This is because alterations to existing sets of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ that regulate role relationships within a given society are political in nature, as they go in tandem with shifts in the allocation of power. Second, I propose that such processes of regime change are, generally, driven by elites, as it is largely those individuals “who make or shape the main political and economic decisions” (Hossain/Moore 2002; Reinhart 1996) that hold the capacity for regime innovation, negotiation and standardization. Third, I argue in line with other scholars that war *can* be constitutive of state-making. Whereas scholars such as Cramer (2006) highlight rational and political economy aspects or (civil) wars, I propose to understand their functionality in even broader terms, suggesting that wars positively affect state-making *under the condition* that they enhance processes of regime standardization.

In order to develop the analytical prism of ‘regime standardization’, section one sets the theoretical foundation by introducing concepts such as the ‘state’, ‘nation’, ‘institutions’ and ‘socio-cognitive systems’. This is followed by the presentation of the regime prism in section two, and the argument that state trajectories can be understood in terms of ‘regime (de-)standardization’ in section three. Section four analyses the role of elites, administration and warfare in standardizing a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, before turning towards discussing certain indicators of regime standardization in section five. An interim conclusion summarizes the main argument.

### 2.1 States and Institutions, Nations and Socio-Cognitive Systems

*The State…*

Although much has been theorized about the state, conceptually it has ultimately been declared a “messy concept” (Mann 1988:4). Having been called into question as an appropriate analytical tool (Foucault 2000:123), particularly for understanding polities and

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83 Alike, Jessop (2006:111) claims that “no single theory can fully capture and explain its complexities.”
their trajectories in non-OECD countries (Linklater 1995:178ff.), some scholars have celebrated the weakening of the state in favour of either a more global or local vision of politics (Held 1995, 1997; Rosenau 1990, 1997). A central critique commonly levelled against Weberian conceptualizations of the state is that they perceive it as a largely static, autonomous and homogeneous entity. In particular, those scholars who have conducted empirical analyses of state trajectories in sub-Saharan Africa have criticised such approaches as being inadequate to capture the ‘realities on the ground’, as the concepts had trouble dealing with cases where the lines between state and society, formal and informal are blurred (Migdal/Schlichte 2005:2). Marxist and functional understandings alike, which interpret the state as the necessary fulfilment of certain ends (Marx 1848; Zartman 1995; Rotberg 2004), have frequently been dismissed for failing “to anticipate the new and diverse forms of state institutionalization” (Migdal/Schlichte 2005:3; Khan 2002:14).

This debate has come to a point at which the ‘statist’ school, which argues that states remain the “most important institutions of political life” (Röder 2007:4) and need to be understood in their own right (cf. Krasner 1999; Jackson 2001), is seemingly irreconcilable with the ‘pluralist’ camp, which counters this claim by voicing the need to “[free] the debate from its current state-centric bias” (Böge et al. 2009a:88). However, despite their antagonism, the two intellectual strands are not inherently incompatible – at least not when understanding their divergences in methodological rather than political terms. Whereas statists take the (full-blown) state and its theoretically assigned criteria as their analytical point of departure, pluralists make the (partial) state-in-the-making and its empirically observable characteristics their point of reference. While statists thus focus on what ought to be, or rather on what is not, pluralists emphasize what is – at the cost of suggesting potential directions of development out of fear of being normative.

84 Heyer 1997a:11; Migdal/Schlichte 2005:3.
86 Renders/Terlinden (2010:726) similarly argue that “[o]ne cannot neatly separate spheres into formal and informal, or classify actors as state versus non-state actors.”
88 See also Spears (2007:22), who suggests that “whether for the purpose of ensuring human security or advancing economic development, we need to dispense with the idea that we do not need states. The problem is not the state per se but states as they are currently constructed in Africa.”
89 One could also argue that pluralist and non-hierarchical conceptualizations of the state, such as the concept of HPOs, are misleading in that they neglect the fact that the state is always a social project, thus confusing the ‘state’ with a ‘state-in-the-making’.
One solution to bridge this divide is offered by new institutional economics (Coase 1960; North 1990), which points to ‘institutions’ as the thread connecting all forms of social organization, including all varieties of states. Although its own conceptualization of the state, which pictures it as a set of institutions that sanctions the creation, enforcement and change in property rights, is problematic in that it ignores the factors that allow the state to achieve these goals, valuable insights can be derived from this approach. A key realization is to conceive of the state neither in static, autonomous, nor homogeneous terms, but rather as a dynamic and complex combination of institutions that are interrelated with a given society’s sets of ‘rules of the game’. Along these lines it has been suggested that states should be understood in terms of their ‘institutional arrangements’ (CSRC 2005:8), and it be acknowledged that states are not wholly independent actors, but that “bureaucratic, customary, religious and kinship institutions often coexist, each providing particular norms and procedures for managing public affairs and organising collectivities” (Hagman/Höhne 2009:44, referring to Bierschenk/de Sardan 2003).

… and the Framework of Institutions

This institutional understanding of the state builds on the common insight that “institutions matter” (Bardhan 2000:245) as they “are critical to all levels of human interaction” (Wunsch 2000:489; Knight 1992:1). Thereby, institutions are generally understood to comprise formal rules and informal constraints as well as the enforcement characteristics of both (North 1995:23). Because institutions not only enhance information flows but also “reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life” (ibid. 1990:3), they can be efficient. Yet, “[i]nstitutions are not created to be efficient, but to serve the interest of those with bargaining power to create new rules” (North 1994:360). Thus, institutions are not static but inherently inert, and given that they are configured by past processes and circumstances, they are never in full accord with the requirements of the present (Beall et al. 2004, referring to Veblen 1902). Building on North’s (1995) understanding, Harriss (2002) and Putzel (1999) propose a conceptual modification, arguing that institutions are not

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90 As Migdal et al. (1994:2) point out, “[s]tates may help mold, but they are also continually molded by, the societies within which they are embedded” (cf. Call 2008a:11).

91 See also Migdal 1988; Böge et al. 2008.

92 See also Knight (1992:2f.) who similarly understands institutions to be a set of shared rules which structure an interaction. Slightly differently, Cook (2000:xii) does not regard rules themselves as institutions, but the patterns of behaviour that follow such rules, defining institutions as “patterned interaction of at least two human beings following at least one shared, normative rule.”
merely “constraints that structure human interaction” (North 1995:23, my italics), but can also play an enabling role. Accordingly, I understand institutions to be

humanly devised, recognized and enforceable ‘rules of the game’ that govern the behaviour, rights and obligations of two or more individuals by creating regularised role relationships.

Understanding the state in an institutional framework has the benefit of entailing “a dynamic vision of statehood as an entity which is constantly being constructed and reconstructed” (Biró 2007:10). While there is broad consensus about the relevance of institutions and their central role in shaping state trajectories, the literature disagrees regarding the question of what kinds of institutional arrangements lead to state-making and state-breaking respectively. Some argue that ‘stable’ states are characterized by institutional arrangements dominated by statutory institutions (CSRC 2006:4), thus pointing towards the need for a hierarchical organization of different sets of ‘rules of the game’. Others, however, suggest that the hybridity of ‘political orders’ lies at the heart of modern African states (Böge et al. 2008:10), and that the multiplicity of institutions needs to be embraced rather than rejected. Thus, while taking the debate over the most appropriate conceptualization of states to the next level, the institutional approach does not solve the dilemma of how to best conceive of states – either in terms of how they ought to be, or in terms of how they are.

Reverting to classical accounts of states and state-making can prove valuable in this regard. Social contract theory, as developed by Hobbes (1651), Locke (1694), and Rousseau (1763), describes a situation in which societies experiences a situation of *homo homini lupus*. The philosophers hypothesise that this situation, in which competition among equals causes anarchy, can only be overcome if the rivals cooperate rather than oppose each other, and delegate parts of their powers to a supreme *primus inter pares*, the *Leviathan*. The same logic is applied by pragmatist-realist informed approaches to state-making, even though Machiavelli (1513) postulates that state-making results more from defection and competition than cooperation and social contracts. Though starting from different origins, both accounts share the argument that states are characterized by and evolved through a process, in which some actors establish a preponderant power position – a proposition mirrored in the works of Weber (1919), Huntington (1968), and Mann (1986), amongst others.

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93 I.e. a situation in which ‘man is a wolf to [his fellow] man’.

What emerges is the realization that while states comprise diverse and even conflictive sets of institutions, they are characterized neither by the equal status of all institutions, nor by an equal power of those organizations that create and enforce particular ‘rules of the game’. While I will return to this point shortly, there is another issue that is raised by this discussion. The ubiquitous focus on institutions characteristic of recent scholarship on state trajectories glosses over another critical aspect of state-making: the nation. In light of social contract theories and the more recent scholarship that draws our attention to the inherent links between the state and society (Katzenstein 1985; Crone 1988; Migdal 2001), there seems to be an urgent need for ‘bringing the nation back in’, as “simply putting in place the formal rules is a recipe for disappointment, not to say disaster” (North 2005:161).

**The Nation…**

While the state is considered a ‘messy concept’, “[t]he concept of the nation is one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon” (Tilly 1975:6) and considered “one of the [most] difficult areas of social science” (Bereketeab 2000:15). This is reflected in the multitude of definitions, which range from those that emphasize the nations’ “distinct ethnic identity and history” (Mann 1993:215) to ones that characterize them as ‘imagined political communities’ (Anderson 1983:6). The reason why the scholarly field cannot agree on a universal definition for ‘nation’ as a unit of analysis (Smith 1998:211) lies partly in the concept’s inherent paradoxes. Moreover, the numerous and conflicting approaches emanate from different schools of thought. While primordialists suggest a nation-to-state-sequence, modernists counter by arguing that the nation is a “construct dependent upon the state for its force and meaning” (Tilly 1992, as in Smith 1998:76).
The ambiguities inherent in the concept of the nation, and those surrounding the debate about it do not, however, justify its neglect in debates on state-making. Even though the dawn of a ‘postnational era’ has long been prophesised (Hannerz 1996; Appadurai 1999; Bernal 2004:4), nation-ness still represents “the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson 1983:3; Comaroff/Stern 1995:3). Moreover, both primordialists and modernists demonstrate, in their own ways, that there is a close interrelationship between the state and the nation and that they develop dialectically. Moreover, it is acknowledged that aspects of ‘soft power’ need to be considered when explaining processes of state-making (Mann 1988:10). Similarly, others postulate that “[m]odern state formation critically relies […] on the creation not just of effective bureaucracies, but of the common identities or ‘imagined communities’” (Clapham 2001:14, cf. Anderson 1983), as “within a homogeneous population, ordinary people were more likely to identify with their rulers” (Tilly 1992:107).

Consequently, I am in good company when challenging those who suggest that nation-building is only specific to post-colonial situations (Chesterman 2004) and that state-building and nation-building are ‘opposing forces’ (Ottaway 1999). Rather, I argue that state-building and nation-building are dialectic processes, and propose in a manner analogous to the dictum of Evans et al. (1985) on the state, the need of ‘bringing the nation back in’, if we are to better understand and theoretically grasp state trajectories. In order to do so, and in an attempt to find a common denominator that unites the scholarly field on nationalism to the question of how patterns of (group) identity are being created, the analytical prism I present in this chapter builds on another concept put forth by neo-institutionalists: the concept of shared mental models.

… and the Framework of Socio-Cognitive Systems

Cognitive psychology understands that, interacting with their environment, people form internal, mental models of themselves and the things with which they interact. As these cognitive constructs help individuals to make sense of their environment, mental models provide them with predictive and explanatory abilities to understand these interactions.
While institutions are the “external (to the mind) mechanisms individuals create to structure and order the environment”, mental models are understood to be the “internal representations that individual cognitive systems create to interpret the environment” (Denzau/North 1994:4). Thereby, these naturally evolving ‘mental models’ – or ‘cognitive systems’ (Holland et al. 1986), or ‘belief systems’ (Linz 2000:160) – are not necessarily accurate reflections of the environment, but are functional in that they allow people to make sense of their surroundings and interact with them accordingly. Logically, individuals with common (cultural, religious, etc.) backgrounds and experiences not only share reasonably convergent mental models (Denzau/North 1994:3f.), but also find it easier to communicate – due to their similarity in interpreting and understanding the world.

While shared mental models\(^{103}\) form a significant part of individual and group identities, cognition does not constitute their only source. As numerous scholars on nationalism have distilled, identities are also the result of common (imagined) experiences and shared patterns of social interaction. The argument that social tools such as a common language provide identity goes back to Herder (1772) and Fichte (1807) and is now well-established.\(^{104}\) Similarly, social processes entailed in communication (Deutsch/Foltz 1963),\(^{105}\) industrialization (Hechter 1975),\(^{106}\) and warfare (Tilly 1992)\(^{107}\) have all been credited with important roles in building identities. So, when theorizing about nation-building, the concept of ‘shared mental models’ with its focus on cognitive elements needs to be expanded to incorporate social aspects of identity formation. Thus, I suggest defining these identity-creating social and cognitive elements as socio-cognitive systems, understanding them to be humanly devised ‘rules of the mind’ that are created by individuals to interpret the environment and envision potential alternatives, and which give rise to socio-cognitive patterns that are shared by two or more individuals.

Although building on the definition of ‘shared mental models’ (Denzau/North 1994), this conceptualization departs from it in two respects. First, it does not share these scholars’ endeavour to use this concept to fill the ‘black box of the rationality assumption’ used in economics and rational choice models. Second, the concept of ‘socio-cognitive systems’

\(^{103}\) Mental models are developed in relation to issues such as entertaining a shared idea of who is a human or member of a particular community, a shared understanding of norms, etc.


\(^{106}\) Guibernau 1996; Gellner 2006.

goes beyond the *cognitive components* – such as mental maps and belief systems – created by individuals to interpret the environment, and incorporates *socio-cognitive patterns* – such as language, (political) ideologies and (cultural) norms – that are characteristic of a relationship between two or more individuals. A further observation is in order before moving the discussion forward: as socio-cognitive systems share with institutions the circumstance that they are unstable, dynamic, and can change over time (cf. Norman 1983:8), the question emerges what else they have in common?

### 2.2 The Regime Prism

*‘Socio-Cognitive Institutions’?*

As the previous discussion indicated, institutions and socio-cognitive systems do not merely coexist, but interdepend. As Denzau and North (1993:4) state, mental models constitute the individuals’ internal perception with which they interpret their environment – an environment which is significantly shaped by institutions. Hence, the ‘rules of the game’ that structure individuals’ external, social environment constitute the general framework of their ‘rules of the mind’. This proposition does not only appear to be sensible theoretically, but has also found empirical validation with regards to the formation of ethnic (Barth 1969) and national identities (Anderson 1983; Mann 1986; Breuilly 1993). However, the interdependence between institutions and socio-cognitive systems is not unidirectional.

Douglas (1986), for example, sees institutions becoming socially embedded by way of iterative cognitive processes. Given that, per definition, socio-cognitive systems do not merely ‘interpret the environment’ but also ‘envisage potential alternatives’, they are not merely a reactionary interpretation of the *current* setting, but also constitute the cognitive basis for its *future* shaping. This argument appears to be particularly salient if understanding institutions as tools with which individuals try to shape the external, social world in such ways as to achieve conversion with the particular mental model(s) they entertain (Denzau/North 1994:4). Thus, the ‘rules of the mind’ that shape our internal understanding of the environment may be the birth certificates of the ‘rules of the game’, with which individuals try to structure their external environment.

From this close interdependence of institutions and socio-cognitive systems it can be derived theoretically that, on the one hand, a common set of ‘rules of the game’ shared by
(groups of) individuals entails converging ‘rules of the mind’, and that, on the other, shared socio-cognitive patterns result in the convergence of sets of institutions, time permitting. Similarly, increasing discrepancy in socio-cognitive systems within a society will lead to the formation of divergent sets of institutions; and an increasing dissimilarity of sets of ‘rules of the game’ culminates, if sustained over time, in different ‘rules of the mind’. Moreover, it can be inferred that socio-cognitive systems are unlikely to endure without institutions, and the ‘rules of the game’ without the ‘rules of the mind’ that legitimize the structuring of individual behaviour and inter-individual relationships. Due to this apparently non-negligible role of socio-cognitive systems in the formation and functioning of institutions, it is sensible to argue that analytical concepts that try to grasp social change in general, and state trajectories in particular, need to account for the insight that ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ come and go in tandem.

**Understanding Regimes…**

In light of these general observations on institutions, socio-cognitive systems, and their inter-relationship every society or social group is defined by a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. Whether an Aztec nuclear family or an Asian nation, Guinean ethnos or German workers’ union, historic church congregation or contemporary state – all are characterized by a commonly shared set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ that create regularised role relationships, meaning and identity. Henceforth, I refer to those sets of institutions and their concomitant socio-cognitive systems that structure and characterize a particular social organization as ‘regimes’. The notion of ‘regime’ has found wide and diverse application in scholarship,\(^{108}\) and even though it has generally come to be used derogatively to denote autocratic governments (cf. Linz 2000), there have been other usages of the term that make its application expedient for the analytical framework developed here.

Hewison et al. (1993:5) understand a ‘regime’ to be “a particular type of organisation of the state apparatus which may take a variety of forms” from liberal democracy to totalitarianism, and stress the aspect of *continuity* inherent to regimes, which may outlive the rise and fall of particular governments. Others define the term as the “set of rules,
procedures, and understandings that formulate the relationship between the governors and the governed” (Macridis 1986:2), thus emphasizing that regimes are not restricted to the ‘organization of the state apparatus’, but that they reach beyond its confines, building an important bridge between the state and society. Bevir (2007:800) takes this thought a step further, suggesting that “[t]he concept of regime evokes a system of social control.” Ultimately, Higley and Burton (1989:78) define regimes as “basic patterns in the organization, exercise, and transfer of government decision-making power.” Building on these aspects and borrowing from Mann’s (1993:18) definition of a regime as “an alliance of dominant ideological, economic, and military power actors, coordinated by the rulers of the state”, I understand a regime to be a historically rooted set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems shared by two or more individuals, which regulates the allocation and application of power.

While stripping Mann’s conceptualization of its actor focus, my definition concurs with his understanding insofar as it perceives a regime to encompass not only the formal and informal institutions, but also the ‘ideological powers’ or, in slightly different terms, the ‘rules of the mind’. Furthermore, my conceptualization of ‘regime’ deviates from other definitions inasmuch as it is not confined to the arena of the state. Rather, in its sociological orientation, this definition seeks to lay the basis for the argument that the state is only one amongst numerous social organizations that issues rules within a given society. And in suggesting that the state is structurally comparable with other (pre-state) organizations, this conceptualization hopes to contribute to our understanding about the processes that underlie the making and unmaking of states.

Before returning to the ‘state’, however, the important question of how regimes differ needs to be addressed. If all social organizations can be conceived of as ‘regimes’, what makes the regime of a nuclear family distinct from that of an ethnosc or workers’ union? Among the many differences – ranging from the (self-)selection of members to the regimes’ dissimilarities in relying on a particular balance of ‘rules of the game’ and/or ‘rules of the mind’ to maintain themselves – a key distinction lies in their respective complexity. Whereas a regime regulating relationships within a family consists of one single shared set of institutions and socio-cognitive patterns, the regime of an ethnic group not only contains

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109 Petras (1989:29) suggests the opposite given his understanding of regime changes as being “almost totally divorced from any profound changes in the totality of society.”

110 Henceforth, I frequently use the term ‘rules’ as shorthand to refer to ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’.
hundreds and thousands of such family regimes, but also additional sets of rules that regulate, amongst others, interactions between these different families. Said differently, more complex social organizations (e.g. ethnicities) contain, apart from the authoritative set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems that are shared by all members of this organization, numerous less complex social groups with similar, yet own defining sets of rules (e.g. families).

Figuratively speaking, complex social organizations resemble a set of Russian dolls and can be conceived of as ‘regime ecologies’. Crudely speaking, the regime ecologies of complex social organizations are made up of two types of regimes. First, the one authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ that is shared by all its members and thus constitutes the defining characteristic of this particular organization. Second, the numerous sets of institutions and socio-cognitive systems, which are shared only by certain members of the overall organization and which can thus be referred to as ‘sub-regimes’.

Consequently, ‘regime ecologies’ are characterized by hierarchies, not only because sociological phenomena generally show a “hierarchy of relationships” (Simmel 1964:25), but also because “[t]here are no complex, civilized societies without any centre of binding rule-making authority, however limited its scope” (Mann 1984:195). Furthermore, hierarchies are nothing but the logical extension of institutions, as both provide a means to ‘regularize role relationships’ and “structure human interaction” (North 1995:23).

… and Reconceptualising the State and the Nation

Thus far, I have established the argument that states can valuably be conceptualized in an institutional framework, and that institutions and socio-cognitive systems are concomitant. While this led me to demonstrate that states can be understood as one of several regimes within a given society, what else can be said about the state? It is generally accepted that states are characterized by four main elements. First, a differentiated set of institutions; second, centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from the centre; third, a territorially-demarcated area; and fourth, a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the legitimate means of physical violence (cf. Mann 1984:188).

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111 While e.g. an ethnic group contains different sub-regimes that regulate family life, warriorship, and religious practices, and provide concomitant identities as family members, warriors, or believers, the ethnic group is ultimately defined by the one authoritative set of rules that is shared amongst all its members.

112 Mann himself refers to Eisenstadt 1969; MacIver 1926:22; Tilly 1975:27; Weber 1968a:64. Unfortunately, and to the detriment of the other aspects entailed in Weber’s conceptualization of the state, his definition...
While the first aspect has already been covered by perceiving the state as having a particular set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems, and while I will go into the second aspect of ‘centrality’ in a later section, let us briefly focus on points three and four to take the discussion forward.

A central characteristic of the state is that the purview in which it asserts a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ is territorially demarcated. Unlike those regimes that characterize social organizations such as ethnic groups or epistemic communities, state regimes are confined geographically, which implies that the question of who is subjected to its authoritarian ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ is decided by territorial rather than individual disposition. Thus, already by definition, states cannot tolerate regime dissenters; in order to be effective and secure their survival, states have to ensure that the vast majority of individuals living within their claimed territory adhere to its set of authoritative ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ – by coercion if necessary. Partly as a consequence of their territorial dependency, states claim to be the highest and ultimate instance of rule-making for the populations that reside in their territories. State regimes thus champion the task of hierarchically organizing all alternative sets of institutions in such a way as to preside over them. In line with these considerations I understand the state to be

a hierarchically organized and centrally administered regime that claims authority over the ‘rules of the game’ to regulate role relationships within a territorially defined population.\footnote{113}

One benefit of perceiving the state in regime terms is that it allows for ‘bringing the nation back in’. As sets of institutions go hand in hand with socio-cognitive systems, the nation is, in fact, inseparable from the state. Yet, given the bidirectional relationship connecting ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, the regime framework, unfortunately, does not answer the question of which came first, the state or the nation.\footnote{114} What the regime prism can address, however, is the general problem that conceptualizations of ‘nation’ do not take agency or action into account (Breuilly 2006:xliii), which renders them “not adequate for

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\footnote{113}{I concur with Hewison, Rodan and Robison (1993:5) in setting the ‘state’ apart from ‘state apparatus’ and ‘government’, which they define as “the real, existing institutional forms of state power, namely the coercive, judicial and bureaucratic arms of the state”, and “the legislative and executive branches of the state apparatus and those officials, parties or individuals who control them.”}

\footnote{114}{While primordialists argue that a national identity gives rise to the state (Geertz 1965; van den Berghe 1981; Greenfeld 1992; Kohn 1994), modernists argue that the nation is a “construct dependent upon the state for its force and meaning” (Tilly 1992, cited in Smith 1998:76; see also Anderson 1983; Giddens 1985; Mann 1986:44; Tilly 1992:116; Chasteen 2003:xx; Breuilly 2006:xxv).}
explaining the more particular form of cohesion as a *nation*” (Marx 2003:16, my italics). How do national identities differ from other identities?

Just as states are not the only rule-making organizations, but rather one of numerous regimes that issues sets of institutions within a given society, nations are not the sole identity-providing socio-cognitive system. As individuals operate within different regimes on different social levels they use different identities as members of a particular family, religion, or ethnicity. Yet, what makes the national ‘rules of the mind’ distinct from others is that “[n]ationalism is primarily a political principle” (Gellner 2006:1), and that it is dependent on “the modern state as a new kind of power container” (Breuilly 2006:xxxii). Consequently, any explanation of nationalism needs to take political institutions into account, as otherwise nationalism “would remain too vague a subject of analysis” (Marx 2003:7). Hence, I define the nation to be

an imagined, yet politically organised community that is characterized by a shared and state-related socio-cognitive framework.

This definition shifts the focus from the frequently applied cultural explanation, towards an institutional explanation of nationalism, uniting those who argue that the state is instrumental in the formation of nations (Anderson 1983; Mann 1986; Breuilly 1993; Gellner 2006). I suggest that (political) identities are formed and shaped by way of political organization – i.e. that, generally speaking, socio-cognitive systems are contingent upon institutional structures. This proposition is in line with the modernists and supported by scholars who argue that “[a] state […] propagates an idea or ideology that serves to bind population, territory and institutions” (Brons 2001:158), and that subjective collective sentiments or identity claims coincide with or refer to existing or emergent institutionalised state power (Marx 2003:6).¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ It is to be noted that this claim does not contradict the earlier proposition that states claim authority over rule-making.

¹¹⁶ See also Hass 1997:23; Hobsbawm 1990:5ff.; Calhoun 1997:4. It has to be acknowledged, that the framework of regime standardization cannot unambiguously account for the formation and existence of ‘multinational states’ – an analysis that would also surpass the framework of this thesis. What the regime standardization prism would, however, suggest in relation to ‘multinational states’ is that such formations will always be contested, as can be seen in the cases of Canada and Belgium, for example.
2.3 State-Making as Regime Standardization

On the Approach...

From the insight that societies consist of multiple, interconnected regimes, it is only a short step to conceptualize societal change as an alteration of their ‘regime ecology’. While such alteration may come about due to modification of existing ‘rules of the game’ or ‘rules of the mind’, it can also stem from the dismissal of old or the introduction of new institutions and socio-cognitive systems – a change that might affect only parts of the population or its entirety. Accordingly, state-making endeavours can be understood as attempts to change an existing regime ecology in order to enforce an authoritative set of rules upon a population that resides within a certain territory. State-making is a process during the course of which members of a territorially delineated population come to share – voluntarily or by force – a common set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems that are hierarchically organized and centrally administered. The underlying mechanism is one I term ‘institutional and socio-cognitive standardization’, cum ‘regime standardization’.

Along these lines, state-building can be understood as a process in which a set of ‘rules of the game’ that claims authority over other institutions comes to be shared and adhered to by a population that resides within a given territory. This process can be accomplished by either standardizing a set of the rules, which had already been exercised by parts of the population, across the entirety of that population; or by introducing a new, authoritative set of institutions across the whole populace – as has happened in instances of conquest and colonization. Either way, state-building is essentially about achieving institutional standardization. Although original, this conceptualization is compatible with and draws on former approaches to state-building. Whether classical, Weberian, or libertarian interpretations of state-building, they all emphasise the need to concentrate rule-making in the hands of the few (i.e. ‘hierarchization’) and to enforce the respective rules across the board (i.e. ‘standardization’). In institutional terms, this translates into a process in which ‘institutional multiplicity’ is replaced by institutional hierarchy, domination and standardization.

This conceptualization sheds new light on the debate between those who argue that ‘institutional multiplicity’ was generally detrimental to states’ stability (CSRC 2006:4) and those who suggest that the ‘hybridity’ of ‘political orders’ was beneficial for state-making (Böge et al. 2008:10). Although it is undeniable that processes of state-making are commonly characterized by ‘hybrid political orders’, the ultimate goal of any state-making
project lies in the attainment of regime domination by way of standardizing an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. This process of implementing a common and overriding set of institutions and mental models is what also lies at the heart of historical events such as religious crusades, ethnic cleansings and the introduction of particular ideologies. The prosecution and repression of minorities, displacement and elimination of opponents, as well as political assimilation and propaganda are, after all, geared towards achieving regime standardization.

Similarly, nation-building can be understood as a process in which a common, state-related socio-cognitive system comes to be shared by a territorially defined population. This process can be nurtured by spreading and standardizing an existing socio-cognitive system,\(^\text{117}\) or by introducing a new set of ‘rules of the mind’ across the whole population,\(^\text{118}\) amongst others. That nation-building is eventually about socio-cognitive standardization, is contained in numerous previous accounts of nationalism.\(^\text{119}\) Hence, Conversi (2007:372) and Levene (2000:21) postulate that ‘homogenization’ played a central role in nation-building, and Connor (1994:92) understands a nation to be a “social group that shares […] a sense of homogeneity.” Thus, whether brought about by linguistic unification (Anderson 1983; Laitin 2007), media and education (Hobsbawm 1977; Anderson 1983), industrialization (Gellner 2006), urbanization (Szilagyi-Gal 2001) or warfare (Tilly 1992), the common denominator of these accounts of nationalism lies in the convergence of a society’s ‘rules of the mind’, i.e. socio-cognitive standardization.\(^\text{120}\)

Despite the fact that, or possibly rather because, there are numerous indications that nation-building is fundamentally about socio-cognitive standardization, contemporary frameworks of state-making have not only ignored, but virtually shunned this component. From a neo-liberal, pluralist, and human rights perspective, Ottaway (1999), for one, claims that “[a]ttempts at ‘homogenising’ a state from an ethnic perspective are not appropriate” (quoted in Scott 2007:5).\(^\text{121}\) Yet, by dismissing the importance of ‘homogenising’ or

\(^{117}\) E.g. by declaring one vernacular as the official language.

\(^{118}\) E.g. by announcing a (new) political ideology.

\(^{119}\) Anderson (1983), for one, shows that while the prevalence of multiple vernaculars reaching from ‘holy’ Latin to ‘barbarian’ Bavarian anticipated the emergence of an ‘imagined community’, their sacrifice for a standardized language was central in seeing nationalism evolve. And by sharing the same news, celebrating the same holidays, and visiting the same memorials and museums, people start having common imaginations of their environment and values.

\(^{120}\) Something that Deutsch (1953) might call ‘assimilation’.

\(^{121}\) See also Ottaway 2002a:17.
‘standardising’ a particular set of ‘rules of the mind’ one not only prevents nation-building, but also risks the overall state-making endeavour. In this line of thought, Lemay-Hébert (2009:23) recognizes that “statebuilding without nation-building is unlikely to succeed”, as states whose societies have “no consensus on the cultural traditions, customs, symbols, rituals, and historical experience” suffer from the phenomenon of nation failure (von Bogdandy/Wolfrum 2005:585).

Thereby, it has to be acknowledged that the process of ‘homogenising’ does, with regards to aspects of ethnicity, for example, neither necessitate the cleansing of ethnic minorities, nor cleaning the minorities of their ethnicity (Schwartz 1995). In fact, such efforts can seriously backfire on state-making endeavours, as they are likely to elicit an affirmation of sub-national identities, rather than allowing for the construction of an overarching socio-cognitive system. While, the elimination of ethnic, religious, etc. minorities has historically constituted a common means to arrive at regime standardization, the latter has also frequently resulted from adding another, overarching set of ‘rules of the mind’, such as a national identity, to a society’s regime ecology. Such a procedure could not only counter a society’s potentially perceived need for ethnic standardization – a process likely to be violent due to the rather rigid and exclusionary nature of ethnic identities – but could also provide the basis for a better social integration of ethnic minorities.

… and Its Benefits

Conceiving of state-making as a process of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization has numerous advantages. First, the framework allows the combination of insights from different schools of thought on state-building. While concurring with the statists that the state constitutes the most important political organization in the contemporary world, it accommodates the pluralists’ proposition that states “are [not] the only centres of power within society” (Hewison et al. 1993:5), and pays tribute to the fact that states are heterogeneous and dynamic entities that are closely interrelated with society. Simultaneously, it takes on board one of the key benefits of the institutional approach,

122 Conversely, Bogdandy and Wolfrum (2005:584) articulate that the allied reconstruction efforts in Western Germany and Japan following World War II, and the state-making processes in Cambodia and post-communist Poland were only successful, because “[t]he feature common to them all is their underlying and stabilizing sense of national identity which has never been disputed.”
namely to think of state trajectories on a continuum rather than in rigid dichotomies. This lays the basis for the framework’s second major benefit, namely to bridge the analytical gap between approaches of state-making and state-breaking. Rather than rejecting previous explanations for state-(un-)making, the regime prism seeks to elaborate on these lines of explanation, acknowledging their applicability in some cases, but providing a broader framework for analysis.

Third, the regime prism has the benefit of not being normative, but still providing a lead for state development. While it does not suggest which particular components a state needs to contain,\textsuperscript{126} or what functions and services it ought to fulfil,\textsuperscript{127} it shifts attention to underlying \textit{processes} of state-making and argues that the key is to be found in standardization. In focusing on \textit{patterns} of state-making, it also lays the basis for better understanding the role of war and to identify potential means for its replacement. Fourth, in investigating the general mechanisms of state-making, the regime standardization framework leaves ample room to account for case-to-case diversity, and can accommodate new, yet unknown roots of, and routes to, state-making. While one state may have relied on the standardization of a specific institution in order to initiate its state-making project, the ‘regime prism’ suggests that other states are likely to follow other formulas.

This leads to the fifth benefit, namely that the framework allows comparing state trajectories not only over time, but also over space, as it is largely independent of the different states’ cultural contexts.\textsuperscript{128} While public executions in 17\textsuperscript{th} century Europe vastly differ from cricket matches in contemporary India, both have contributed to socio-cognitive standardization, which, when feeding into the state’s authoritative regime, contribute to nation-building. Similarly, the framework allows assessing the extent to which, for instance, historic colonialism or economic liberalization were beneficial or detrimental to state-making. Sixth, and finally, the regime prism outperforms other approaches to analysing processes of state-making and state-breaking in that it allows for ‘bringing the nation back in’ and accounts for the role of socio-cognitive elements in determining state trajectories. However, a central question that remains unanswered so far is how the regime prism conceives of the ‘wicked problem’ (Menkhaus 2010) of state fragility – and resilience.

\textsuperscript{126} See Weberian interpretations of the state.
\textsuperscript{127} See Marxist and functional interpretations of the state.
\textsuperscript{128} This is, however, not to suggest that cultural context does not matter. On the contrary, the ‘regime prism’ argues very strongly in favour of cultural specificities of socio-political processes, including state-making.
From Fragility to Resilience

Following a considerable scholarly debate about what constitutes a ‘weak’ or ‘collapsed’ state, there have been numerous attempts to measure ‘state fragility’. While the analytical prism of ‘regime standardization’ does not lend itself to measuring the degree of stateness – partly because the ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ largely evade quantitative operationalization and recording – the framework is well-suited to identify trends of state trajectories. If processes characterized by the standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ can be understood to be indicative of state-making, it follows that state-breaking is an incidence during which such tendencies are reversed, i.e. an occurrence that shows signs of regime de-standardization. This brings us back to the earlier question of what kinds of institutional arrangements were constitutive of state-making – was ‘institutional multiplicity’ a boon or were ‘hybrid political orders’ a bane for state development?

While the chapter has recurrently indicated that processes of state-making were aimed at the hierarchization, standardization and, thus, mitigation of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, this argument deserves additional scrutiny due to its centrality to the analytical prism of ‘regime standardization’. Furthermore, it is not only the fashionable framework of HPOs that suggest the contrary, but eminent scholars also argue that institutional diversity was desirable, as it enhanced resilience by providing alternative institutional frameworks (e.g. North 2005:42). Similarly, the CSRC (2005:8), which sees ‘institutional multiplicity’ as a central characteristic of state fragility, acknowledges that situations of ‘institutional multiplicity’ also offer “the possibility of switching strategically from one institutional universe to another.” However, Putzel and Di John (2012) have, in line with the argument presented here, come to acknowledge that it was institutional hegemony of the state that underpinned state resilience, and that state institutions needed to either marginalize or subsume rival institutions. In what follows, I expand on these insights that have emerged from different theorizing and argue that the devil is in the detail, as not all situations of ‘institutional multiplicity’ are alike.

130 See e.g. the ‘Failed States Index’ (Foreign Policy), the ‘World Governance Indicators’ (World Bank; cf. Kaufmann et al. 2006), the ‘Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility’ (Marshall/Goldstone 2007), and the ‘Index of African Governance’ (Harvard Kennedy School). See also Rice/Patrick 2008; Mata/Ziaja 2009; Naudé et al. 2011; Gutiérrez et al. 2011.
Conceding that institutional multiplicity per se was not necessarily a problem for state-making, I argue that it can even be beneficial to it. Particularly in states-in-the-making, in which the state’s set of ‘rules of the game’ is not yet fully developed, weakly enforced and prone to renegotiation, institutional complexity is an add-on, as it opens up alternatives. For governments in emerging states, for example, it can be vital to rely on and instrumentalize alternative institutions, such as traditional ‘rules of the game’, in order to control and mobilize resources so long as the respective government does not possess the necessary capacity to enforce the state’s own institutions. What also speaks in favour of the fact that the plurality of sets of institutions and socio-cognitive systems as such is not antagonistic to state-making is that the state itself is, after all, an entity that consists of a complex ‘regime ecology’ marked by the coexistence of diverse sets of institutions and socio-cognitive systems, rather than a monopoly over rule-making.

However, I argue that although such plural regime ecologies can be effective and efficient means of governance, they are inherently fragile, if their sub-regimes are treated as political orders in their own right – as the framework of HPOs propagates (cf. Lambach/Kraushaar 2009). The regime prism rather proposes that the multiplicity of institutions, the hybridity of political orders, or the plurality of regimes – all of which connote a co-existence of equally strong and competing ‘rules of the game’ and/or ‘rules of the mind’ – are not to be confused with their complexity. While the former are largely inimical to state-making and characteristic of state fragility due to the implied lack of an authoritative set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems, the latter denotes an attribute of all social organizations. This goes in line with the CSRC’s proposition (2005:4), which suggests that fragility occurs in situations in which “statutory institutional arrangements are vulnerable to challenges by rival institutional systems.” In this sense, state fragility can be conceived of as an expression of common uncertainties about which set of rules ultimately apply. The uncertainty that prevails in situations of regime plurality can be reduced by structuring the different sub-regimes hierarchically, as hierarchies are institutions by other means.

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131 See also Higley and Burton (1989:20), who argue that regimes can be categorized as stable or unstable, depending on the extent to which the state may be subject to “irregular seizures, attempted seizures, or widely expected seizures by force” (cf. Case 1995:3).

132 In this sense, it is to be briefly noted that state-making as understood in the framework of the regime prism does not only result from the standardization of a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, but, by extension, also necessitates the prevention of other actors from standardizing the institutions and socio-cognitive systems that they favour.
Hierarchies not only contribute to the goal of reducing uncertainty (cf. North 2005:1), but also provide interrelation and consistency. This is reflected in Mann’s proposition that the resilience of regimes hinges on their cohesion (ibid. 1993:19). With a view to the ‘rules of the mind’, North (2005:27) makes a similar argument, suggesting that states need to develop and maintain a shared socio-cognitive framework as “a means of reducing the divergent mental models that people in a society possess and constitute the means for […] unifying perceptions.” Just as “[t]he powerful influence of myths, superstitions, and religions in shaping early societies came from their role in establishing order and conformity”, so nationalism to this day is “a major force in reducing the costs of maintaining order” (North 2005:42, my italics). Thus, state resilience is achieved by means of standardizing the ‘rules of the game’ and the ‘rules of the mind’. But who are the key actors behind the processes of regime change, and how difficult are they to accomplish?

2.4 Elites, Crises, and Warfare

The Role of Elites

Even though the theoretical considerations undertaken thus far have largely dispensed with an actor-analysis, institutions and mental models are ‘humanly devised’. Constructed by and for individuals and groups in order to ‘govern the behaviour, rights and obligations of two or more individuals by creating regularized role relationships’, they are tools to allocate and regulate power. Thereby, the proposition that institutions are created “to serve the interest of those with bargaining power to create new rules” (North 1990:260f.) points towards a central role of elites in shaping regime ecologies which are the outcome of a political process that involves institutional and socio-cognitive engineering (cf. Cleaver 2002). That elites are central to state-making is a well-established argument, also beyond the institutional literature. They are considered key actors in effecting social transitions (Field/Higley 1985:8; Huntington 1990; cf. Case 1995:4) and are generally understood to be “those who are in a position to strongly and regularly influence the exercise of political power

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133 On their role for state-building, see e.g. Plato’s Republic (Richards 1966); Mosca 1896; Schumpeter 1942; Tilly 1992; Dogan/Higley 1998. On their role for nation-building, see e.g. Nairn 1977; Hobsbawm 1977; Anderson 1983; Posen 1995. Also for cases of externally led state-making endeavours it is acknowledged that “[t]he issue of elite engagement in statebuilding processes is significant” (Scott 2007:6, referring to Chesterman 2004; Morales-Gamboa/Baranyi 2005; Barnett/Zürcher 2006).
(Bottomore 1964:7) and/or those who “represent certain social or political groups within societies” (Tudor 2010:36).

Accounting for the pivotal role of elites in socio-political processes, the regime prism proposes that a society’s ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ are advanced, negotiated and implemented first and foremost by elites. This is not only because elites depend on the prevalence of particular institutions and socio-cognitive systems for their power, but also because it is they who control – by virtue of being elites – the necessary bargaining power to create and standardize rules. Henceforth, I understand elites to be

a minority of individuals in a population that possess, by virtue of their strategic position in a social group, the power and capacity to create, alter and promote particular ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ within a social group.

In light of the fact that more complex social groups have numerous sets of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, this definition implies that there are different elites within society – one per each (sub-)regime. Patriarchs, priests and government officials share the fact that they preside over a particular (sub-)regime, exercising leverage over the particular set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems that defines a nuclear family, religious denomination, or state respectively. It follows that elites who operate within a particular regime ecology are anything but a homogenous group of actors. As they derive their powers from different institutional structures, elites rather tend to compete with one another. Particularly in cases where socio-political hierarchies are shallow, ill-defined or weakly enforced – e.g. in conditions of state fragility – elites compete over the question of which ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ are the authoritative ones and, thus, who should preside over them.

Bates’ (1995) proposition that this process of negotiating a political settlement amongst elites plays an important role in the modification of old and creation of new institutions gave rise to a still growing literature on the nexus between elites and state trajectories. The bottom-line of the scholarship on ‘elite settlements’, ‘political settlements’, and ‘elite

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134 In this respect, my definition of elites, which partly draws on Field and Higley (1985), departs from their conceptualization of ‘elite’ in that it is not restricted to those elites that ‘affect national political outcomes’ (ibid:8). In line with my understanding of regimes, my understanding of elites is more sociological than political, and not restricted to the state. In this I follow Jessop (2006:111), who suggests that “there can be no adequate theory of the state without a wider theory of society.”

135 See also e.g. Turton (1997:1), who similarly argues that elites manipulate ethnicity to consolidate power.

bargains’, which builds on the literature on power-sharing, is that elite bargains need to be inclusive rather than exclusionary in order to be constitutive of peace-building and state-making. Although there is some truth to this reasoning, I argue that inclusive elite bargains were neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for state-making. They are not a necessary condition, because the underlying assumption that inclusiveness was required in order to prevent a situation of regime plurality and enforce an authoritative regime does not necessarily hold. The existence and persistence of dictatorships and authoritarian governments, which by definition exclude certain elites, constitute forceful empirical evidence against this assumption.

Neither are inclusive elite bargains a sufficient condition for state-making. While inclusiveness evades the blatant regime contestation that exclusionary elite bargains are likely to experience, it does not overcome the challenge of regime plurality by itself. Although inclusive elite bargains might generate a ‘reciprocal assimilation of elites’ (Bayart 1993), this is by no means guaranteed. It is just as likely that such inclusive elite bargains not only legitimize the co-existence of different sub-regimes, but even cement the prevailing regime plurality. Thus, by means of accommodating diverse elites and their respective claims to entertain particular sets of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, inclusive elite bargains can, in fact, inhibit regime standardization.

Having scrutinized the analytical framework of ‘elite bargains’, it has to be acknowledged that inclusive elite bargains are not futile. Particularly in situations in which none of the existing elites has the necessary power and capacity to enforce an authoritative set of rules across all sub-regimes, inclusive elite bargains are probably the only (promising) option in order to move towards a greater standardization of a particular set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems. Under such conditions, inclusive elite bargains can create a minimum of consensus allowing a group of elites to preside over the overall regime ecology, and permitting them to implement particular ‘rules of the game’ and broadcast certain ‘rules of the mind’ by drawing on the sub-regime each elite presides over.

139 E.g. OECD 2011: 2.
140 By the ‘reciprocal assimilation of elites’ Bayart means the fusion of potentially competing elites to form a single dominant class – in other words an assimilation in the sense of increasingly converging ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, i.e. regime standardization.
Thus, while not disputing the benefits of, and potential need for, inclusive elite bargains, the regime prism highlights the fact that they are but a first step on the road to state-making. Consequently, it can be proposed that the fragility or resilience of a state hinges less on the nature of the elite bargain, but more on the condition whether it allows for the standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. Thereby, this argument is in line with the proposition that elites need to possess a ‘consensual unity’ (Higley/Burton 1989:18f.; Burton et al. 1992:11), ‘elite solidarity’ (Putnam 1976:121f.), or ‘elite coalescence’ (Nordlinger 1972:54), in order to be effective. Elites themselves, however, do have an interest in standardizing particular rules, not only because it increases their powers, but also because “within a homogeneous population, ordinary people were more likely to identify with their rulers, communication could run more efficiently, and an administrative innovation that worked in one segment was likely to work elsewhere as well” (Tilly 1992:107).

State-Making as Crisis-Prone Undertaking

While Dogan and Higley (1998:3) rightly argue that “[c]rises are the birth certificates of regimes”, it is similarly true that situations of regime change are inherently crisis-prone. Principally, this is because alterations in regime ecologies go in tandem with changes in the allocation and distribution of institutions and socio-cognitive systems that convey power. As existing (sub-)regimes are altered and new institutions and socio-cognitive systems introduced, negotiated and implemented, the elite profiting from the new setup is not necessarily congruent with the one that benefited from the former situation. Thus, elite competition about which rules and rulers acquire authoritative status is likely to turn into elite contestation and crisis.  

Situations of elite contestation are periods of crises. Such situations enhance uncertainty for all individuals involved about which ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ apply. They also entail the very probable risk of a fragmentation of the existing regime ecology, with the consequence that the elites presiding over respective sub-regimes no longer share an overarching set of authoritative institutions and socio-cognitive systems. Thus, the fracturing of regime ecologies and the (partial) dissolution of hierarchical order not only increases uncertainty about the applicability of authoritative ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’,

141 Abdi I. Samatar (1994:66) makes the valid point that states in the process of dissolution do not face a crisis, but “a multitude of crises.”
but also invites elites to strengthen their respective sub-regimes in order to enhance their bargaining power. Yet, as sub-regimes delineate each other and contest supremacy, they invite violent struggle as an ultimate ratio to prevail vis-à-vis other sub-regimes.

On this basis it can be theorized that (sub-)regime changes that occur quickly (e.g. revolutions) contain a larger potential for violent conflict in the aftermath of change than alterations of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ that proceed incrementally. The rationale behind this argument is that individuals, as well as elites of (sub-)regimes, have less time to respond to such changes – by adaptation, mitigation or opposition – thus rapidly enhancing uncertainty and insecurity. Unless such quickly evolving changes in the institutions and socio-cognitive systems can be enforced authoritatively by those who are in charge of the respective alterations, such situations have a high potential for crisis, violent opposition, and war.

\textit{Warfare: An Independent Variable?}

As shown in Chapter 1, the role of war in state-making is hotly debated. In order to shed additional light on the current discussion, I argue in the tradition of Rasler and Thompson (1989), Kestnbaum and Skocpol (1993:667) and Cramer (2006:48) that we need to disaggregate the ‘black box’ of warfare and understand under what conditions, how and what kinds of wars may be constitutive to state-making.\footnote{Cf. Bates et al. (2002:599) and Kalyvas (2005:92), who similarly argue that it is not the presence or magnitude of war, but rather its structure and form that are decisive for its impact on state-making.} Consequently, this thesis seeks to go beyond the current understanding that the ‘state-creating wars’ are “those that had an external orientation and a territorial nature” (Biró 2007:12), and that, conversely, the ‘state-destroying wars’ are internally oriented (Sorensen 2001b:345-347).\footnote{See also Kaldor (1999), Herbst (2000) and Leander (2004:69), who argues that ‘new wars’ “do not make states, but rather unravel them.”} Thus, I refrain from pigeon-holing wars according to superficial categories such as ‘old’ and ‘new’ (Kaldor 1999), or ‘inter-state’ and ‘intra-state’, because the relevance of such categories can be seriously questioned, e.g. in contexts where state borders have been considered ‘artificial’ and ‘superficial’ in the first place.\footnote{Moreover, Ayoob (2000:150) rightly concludes that “what we now call internal war contributed to state-making equally, if not more than interstate war” as the [c]onstruction and imposition of political order is, by necessity, more a domestic than an international activity.” See also Holsti (1996:44), who argues that “[s]tate-making was essentially an internal undertaking.”}
In order to uncover the role of war in processes of state-making, I depart from the proposition that violent conflicts are ‘political distortions’ or ‘social deviations’.\(^{145}\) Constituting a “continuation of policy by other means” (von Clausewitz 1976:87), wars can rather be understood as one of many forms of social action. Consequently, they can be scrutinized with the regime prism to investigate whether or what kind of wars foster institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, thus contributing to state-making. This conceptualization comes with numerous benefits. First, rather than restricting the analysis to the aggregate level of different types of war, the regime prism allows analysing which components of war might exert effects that contribute to state-making. This not only accommodates the fact that both inter- and intra-state wars can exhibit elements that are constitutive of regime standardization, but also allows investigating how these bellicose tools of regime standardization can possibly be substituted by non-violent means. Second, by not rooting the analysis of the role of war for state-making in variables that significantly vary over time,\(^{146}\) but by putting social processes at centre-point, the regime prism allows a comparative analysis of wars and their impact on state trajectories over time and space.

In line with the theoretical argument presented so far, I propose that wars – or rather certain components thereof – are constitutive of state-making under the condition that they contribute to the standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ amongst a population that forms, or will form, the state’s populace. Hence, wars may contribute to regime standardization in numerous ways, for example by eliminating alternative and competing sets of rules. Whether achieved by the displacement or elimination of populations who share such sub-regimes, or by destroying or suppressing the practice of the latter,\(^{147}\) the effect is a reduction of ‘regime plurality’. This proposition not only goes in line with the concept of ‘institutional multiplicity’ (CSRC 2005), but also with one of the most robust findings of the war termination literature – namely that outright military victory is associated with a more stable and durable peace.\(^{148}\)

Wars can, however, not only realize their potential to enhance regime standardization based on their (victorious) outcome, but can also fortify institutional and socio-cognitive

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\(^{145}\) Cf. Gamst 1986:147, fn. 2.

\(^{146}\) See e.g. Kaldor (1999), who differentiates ‘old’ from ‘new’ wars on the basis of differences in terms of numbers of casualties, types of weapons, sources of resources, etc.

\(^{147}\) Cf. Ropp (1959:13), who understands war as “an act of force to compel our adversary to our will” (cf. Nathan/Lamb 2000:9).

\(^{148}\) Licklider 1993; Toft 2003; Fortna 2003; Luttwak 1999.
standardization within the warring groups during the course of war. Social groups engaged in bellicose activities experience a situation in which there is less room to deviate from a particular set of rules than during peacetime. For example, soldiers and rebels are subjected to much stricter ‘rules of the game’ than civilians, and emergency laws confine the space of interpretation. It is in this sense that Simmel (1964:92) suggests that “[a] state of conflict […] pulls the members so tightly together and subjects them to such a uniform impulse that they either must completely get along with, or completely repel, one another” (my italics). While he goes on to show that war leads to “the formation of an organ of the strictest efficiency” (ibid.:87f.), i.e. the army, other scholars have noted that “[h]istorically, improvements in state administrative capacity are associated with warfare” (Goldsmith 2007:34). All of these indicators point towards the beneficial effects war may have on institutional standardization.

Yet, the role of war is not restricted to institutional standardization, but also affects socio-cognitive standardization. In the European historical context it is acknowledged that “military factors are vital in shaping the emergence and course of modern nationalism” (Mann 1986)\(^{149}\) and according to Renan (1882), Turton/Fuki (1979), Ferguson (1984), Holsti (1996), and others it was “very difficult to create national self-consciousness without war” (Howard 1979:108). Similarly, “[s]cholars of colonialism suggest that the most important factor in the formation of national consciousness in colonised societies is the resistance to foreign domination” (Bereketeab 2000:181).\(^{150}\) Starting with the army’s consistent uniforms that turn every individual into a uniform soldier and ending with the sheer unitary play-back of ideologies among military personnel, warfare can significantly contribute to the standardization of an (‘imagined’) community.\(^{151}\) Accordingly, Jacquin-Berdal (2002:41) states for the context of the Horn of Africa that “[…] the role that war plays in spreading national identity among individuals who until then had only a vague understanding of the meaning and implications of their national belonging, cannot be overlooked.”\(^{152}\) Just as

\(^{149}\) Quoted in Smith 1998:80.

\(^{150}\) Hodgkin 1956; Emerson 1960; Leonard 1982; Smith 1983; Anderson 1983.

\(^{151}\) See also Conversi (2007:372) who proposes that “the broader relationship between homogenization and war should be reconsidered as a key feature in the historical development of nationalism”, whereby he defines ‘homogenization’ as “the sociopolitical process of deliberately fostering cultural homogeneity.”

The argument that military service and war can contribute to nation-building is, however, disputed by Krebs (2004).

\(^{152}\) Cf. Clapham (2010:11), who argues that the war of 1998/99 helped Eritrea to “consolidate a sense of Eritrean nationalism”, and Ottaway (2002b:1013), who shows that war and military victory were the first step towards (re-)constituting the state in Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea.
states are clearly more than mere ‘war machines’,\textsuperscript{153} “the armed forces do much more than make war” (Pereira 2003:394; Davis 2003:18) – they significantly contribute to regime standardization.\textsuperscript{154}

However, war is “paradoxical in that it can both facilitate the creation of states […] and also bring about their demise” (Ropp 1959:13). While there is theoretical and empirical evidence that suggests that certain of its elements can foster institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, war does not invariably exercise this function. In historical perspective it is probably safe to argue that at least as many wars unmade as made states. Wars can, for example, create immense insecurities amongst the populations involved, leading them to fall back on more stable and trustworthy sub-regimes in order to have their lives protected and needs met – a danger particularly in young nations, in which the authoritative rules are looser. Wars can also result in such economic and administrative stretching of the state that its leadership cannot maintain processes of regime standardization across the entire territory and its population. It is in these and other ways that wars can lead to institutional and socio-cognitive de-standardization, cum state-unmaking.

As wars do not make states in and of themselves, they should conceptually be treated as an antecedent condition, i.e. “a phenomenon whose presence activates or magnifies the action of a […] hypothesis” (van Evera 1997:10). This is what Taylor and Botea (2008:28) hint at when stating that “for war to strengthen contemporary developing world states, before major war they must have at least some degree of the political and national coherence that was created as a consequence of war in modern Europe.” Yet, despite the possible catalyst effects war may generate, it has to be clearly stated that, just as with inclusive elite bargains, war is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for state-making. Moreover, I want to caution against these insights leading us to view “warlords as an alternative form of governance in the ‘Westphalian periphery’” (Biró 2007). Rather than being ends in themselves, wars are brutish expressions of deep, transitory crises aimed at the establishment of authoritative ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’.

\textsuperscript{153} Cf. Schlichte (2003:38), criticizing that “[s]tates are not simple war machines and warfare does not automatically lead to a strengthening or weakening of the state.”

\textsuperscript{154} I discussed the role of war on regime standardization in greater detail in Helling (2009).
2.5 On Administration and Indicators of Standardization

Having established the argument that state-making can valuably be conceived of in terms of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, and that elites play a central role in this process, the question is how the standardization of a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ is brought about and what indicators lend themselves to investigate trends of regime standardization. Based on a broad and varied literature, I advance the ‘central administration thesis’, proposing that changes in a society’s rules hinge on modifications to its form of organization. Hence, while elite bargains largely determine who plays the ‘game’, central administration sets the framework of how the ‘game’ is played. Returning to the earlier proposition that state-building and nation-building are interlinked, I suggest that alterations in a society’s institutional structure generally go hand in hand with modifications to its socio-cognitive configuration. In this respect, I argue that it is central state administration that is the prime driver for processes of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization and that the organization of areas such as security, resource mobilization and communications, provides indicators for trends in state trajectories.

Administration

The functioning of a specific social group and its identification as such hinges on the fact that its members adhere to a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. Yet, as these institutions and socio-cognitive systems primarily serve a certain social strata within that group, namely the elite (North 1990:260f.), compliance with the rules by all individuals is by no means assured – particularly in situations in which different elites strive to implement dissimilar regimes. Consequently, and in order to assure regime continuity, the authoritative set of rules need to be managed and enforced. In order to do so, elites presiding over social organizations rely on a more or less complex network of individuals and organizations, i.e. an administration. That such administrative organizations are key for state-making is commonly argued, not only because they “provide a basis for statehood (Röder 2007:335), but also because they “create meaning” (Anderson 1983:53).

Having been set up to maintain standing armies, collect revenues, and assure internal order (Tilly 1992, cf. Lynn 2006:20), central government administration is generally understood as

“the administrative machine that is established to assist those who exercise supreme political authority within a given state” (Adamolekun 1999:17, cf. Evans 2005:192), or, simply, as the “management of public affairs” (OED 1989). While every social organization depends on administration to accomplish its goals (Marx 1946:4), larger social organizations, such as states, are particularly dependent on central administration, because the enforcement of rules on an inter-personal level is unfeasible. According to Huntington (1968:9) “[t]he more complex and heterogeneous the society, the more the achievement and maintenance of political stability becomes dependent upon the working of political organization.”

Yet, the importance of administration for regime standardization transcends the sphere of ‘institutional capacity building’. Also with regards to the formation of group identities, administration plays a key role (Giddens 1985:116). Along these lines, Barth (1969) shows that the sharing of a common culture was less the definitional characteristic of an ethnicity, but rather an ‘implication of result’ of its organization, and Anderson (1983:53) stresses that “administrative organizations create meaning.” Giddens (1985:116) attributes such significance to administration that he includes “unitary administration” in his definition of a nation, and others have also convincingly argued that state administrations have been a primary source of nationalism. One reason for the importance of administration in identity-creation is that the spatial borders created by administration are much firmer than the more fluid ones of language, history or culture. In this train of thought, Mayall (2006:553) states that it was the bureaucratic, colonial state in Africa that “pulverised traditional society and laid the foundations for an imagined modern community.”

I prefer the concept of ‘administration’ over ‘bureaucracy’ – which is generally understood as either the “most highly developed and complex type of formal organization and administrative system,” (DSS 2002) or “a system of government in which most of the important decisions are taken by state officials rather than by elected representatives” (ODE 2005; see also Andreski 1984) – for a number of reasons. First, the notion of bureaucracy carries connotations of ‘rationality’ and ‘efficiency’, and is, thus, less suited for the ‘regime prism’, which (a) does not solely concentrate on ‘high-end’ administrations that are in most instances reserved to ‘open access orders’ (North et al. 2007), and in which (b) political-economic implications of (state) administrations are not ignored. While administration is, per se, technical, it is not apolitical, as the way power is distributed and exercised is inherently contentious. Second, the term ‘bureaucracy’ is largely reserved to refer to state administration and given the rather sociological approach of the ‘regime prism’, which does not solely focus on the state, the notion ‘administration’ appears to be more apt.


See also Smith 1983:56.
Acknowledging the importance of central administration for state-making endeavours and understanding central administration in a broad sense to range from the ability to use coercive measures in a targeted way to the ability to carry through propaganda, I define central state administration to be a

hierarchically structured network of official organizations that serves an acknowledged political elite to implement an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and concomitant ‘rules of the mind’ designed to control individuals within a claimed territory.

From this understanding of central state administration it is clear that states depend on it for their survival (Lynn 2006:20), as in its absence it is impossible to enforce a certain set of rules within a large, dispersed and complexly structured population that commonly characterise states. Most contemporary states are, however, neither characterized by a full-blown and totally operational central administration nor by a complete absence thereof. Fragile states, for example, generally have only a modicum of central administration, supplementing a lack in administrative capacity with coercive means and/or elite bargains to ensure the sharing of and adhering to certain rules across a geographically defined population. Yet, the less rulers (can) rely on central administration to implement a certain regime, the greater the risk of regime plurality, which not only results from the rulers’ inability to subject individuals to an authoritative regime, but also flows from allowing elites of sub-regimes to fill the void by making use of their own organizational capacity. Hence, Migdal (1988) suggests that alternative forces within society challenge the state, if the latter is unable to carry out its duties.

Given the centrality accorded to administration for processes of state- and nation-building – as well as social organization more generally – it seems to be questionable to wholly neglect this central component in analytical frameworks aimed at understanding state trajectories. This is particularly the case in light of the fact that central administration has been found to be inextricably linked to political structure (Marx 1957:9) and to (not) affect every individual of a given state in one way or another – from the collection of taxes and distribution of rationing cards, to the issuing of passports and registration of license plates.

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159 See also Devlin and Moguillansky (2011) who suggest that “a professional and motivated state bureaucracy” was the core ingredient of high state capacity. Similarly, Tilly (1985:45), Jackson (1990:23), and Herbst (2000:124) acknowledge that, prior to 1945, states with only weak administrative structures and divided populations were swallowed up by stronger powers (cf. Spears 2004c:15).


161 See e.g. the concept of HPOs (Böge et al. 2008) or of the ‘negotiated state’ (Menkhaus 2006/2007).
In line with Smith (1991:59) who proposes that “activities of taxation, conscription and administration endowed the population within its jurisdiction with a sense of their corporate identity and civic loyalty”, I argue that the provision of security, implementation of taxation and nature of communication are three key indicators of a state’s administrative capacity, which allow for assessing trends in regime standardization.

**Security, Taxation, and Communication**

Although the importance of the state’s territorial aspect has been called into question, the provision of security across a claimed territory remains a central component for state-making, not least because a state’s *raison d’être* is the containment of violence within its territory (Brons 2001:27). While “a complete monopoly of violence by the state occurred relatively rarely in history” (Giustozzi 2008:1), the nature of a state’s provision of security gives important clues to its capacity to administer and standardize an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. If, for example a state has a coherent national army and an effective police force it can be assumed to be in a better position to enforce regime standardization than one that relies primarily on a diversity of scattered and locally coordinated vigilante groups – not to mention a state that is challenged in the realm of security provision by other actors.

Yet, even if possessing a national police force, states exhibit important differences in their ability to standardize certain institutions and socio-cognitive systems, depending on, for example, the composition of the security forces and the extent to which members of these security-providing organizations are transferred from one region to another, rather than being locally rooted. Thus, analyses of the nature of police forces, the organization of their chain of command, and their ‘autonomy’ from rules issued by sub-regimes provide important insights into the question of how well-positioned a central government is to carry through institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. The way a state mobilizes resources also provides important clues regarding its capacity to administer and standardize certain institutions and socio-cognitive systems, as the monopolization of the use of

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162 Discussions abound about the “end of territoriality” (Badie 1995; Ruggie 1993), “the rise of the virtual state” (Rossetance 1999), and “debordering the world of states” (Albert/Brock 2000), particularly for sub-Saharan Africa, where the states’ administrations have generally not penetrated the polities’ territories (Herbst 2000; Ortaway 2002b; Zaum 2007).

physical force is “inextricably linked to the development of a monopoly of taxation” (Migdal/Schlichte 2005:16).

The importance of taxation for state-making has long been realized and resurfaces in current approaches to analyse state trajectories, after having gone “missing from the new scholarship on state-building” (Bräutigam 2008a:2). Taxation informs state-building, as “[m]uch of the institutional apparatus of modern government and economic management has its origins in this compulsion to finance wars” (Cramer 2006:178; Moore 2004). Additionally, it also benefits nation-building, partly because “[t]he experience of being taxed engages citizens in the political process” (Moore 2008:35). As taxation is contested between state and society and thus demands enhanced state capacity in terms of (central) administration and enforcement mechanisms, “[t]here is no better measure of a state’s reach than its ability to collect taxes” (Herbst 2000:113). Thereby, it can be theorized that states that mobilize resources largely through customs revenues not only possess less administrative capacity, but also have less potential to carry through regime standardization amongst their populations compared to states that largely rely on domestic revenues.

A third clue regarding a state’s ability to foster regime standardization lies in its ability to (literally) ‘broadcast’ power. In the process of nation-building the importance of “communicat[ing] with one another on matters of common interest” (Touval 1963:25, my italics; Metzger 1977:4) has frequently been stressed. Thus, of importance is not only linguistic standardization (Anderson 1983), but also topical standardization, as it is important for a community’s ‘imaginability’ to share issues of common concern, fear and joy and to have a common pool of information. As suggested by neo-institutionalists “no two individuals have exactly the same experiences and accordingly each individual has to some degree

167 These theoretical considerations are supported by empirical observations of e.g. Azam and Mesnard (2003:456) in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, for which they argue that “Houphouët-Boigny, […] tried explicitly to build national unity by taxing his own ethnic group, the Akan cocoa and coffee growers, in order to fund visible public investments in infrastructure in the other regions of this ethnically divided country, and some other redistributive public expenditures, with evident success until his death.”
unique perceptions of the world”, so that “their mental models would tend to diverge for this reason if there were not ongoing communication with other individuals” (Denzau/North 1994:14ff).

Gellner (2006:121f.) argues that “it is the media themselves, the pervasiveness and importance of abstract, centralized, standardized, one of the many communications, which itself automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism”, and Deutsch and Foltz (1963) point out that “nations could be constructed by political elites with adequate means of communication for nation building.” Thus, a state’s ability to communicate matters of common interest and legal concerns as well as the population’s (voluntary) absorption of such information via (state-owned) media provides important clues about the state’s potential to achieve socio-cognitive standardization. For analyses of state trajectories it is thus of interest, to investigate the nature of a country’s media and communication landscape. In a nutshell, states with a strong media apparatus and potentially a dominant position within the media landscape can be expected to be better positioned to carry through socio-cognitive standardization compared to those in which diverse media outlets are largely loyal to particular sub-groups, such as ethnicities.

2.6 Interim Conclusion

This chapter has developed the idea that social change in general and state trajectories more particularly canvaluably be conceptualized in terms of alterations in ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. Consequently, state-making has been understood as a process in which an authoritative set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems is standardized amongst a population residing in a geographically delineated territory. In line with this reasoning the chapter proposed that state fragility can be captured analytically as a situation characterized by regime plurality and contestation amongst different sub-regimes for domination. Furthermore, it was suggested that central administration was a key component for establishing and maintaining a regime, as it constituted the primary tool to carry through standardization.

Based on these theoretical findings, the chapter shed light on a number of debates surrounding the issue of state-making. One major conclusion that emerged from the

development of the analytical prism of ‘regime standardization’ is that states continue to matter and that they represent more than mere containers of ‘hybrid political orders’. Rather they can be understood as projects aimed at arresting ‘hybridity’ by providing an overarching set of authoritative ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. Another key conclusion is that state-making is less about the establishment of a particular form of government such as ‘liberal democracy’, or the provision of specific services, but much more about achieving a situation in which all members of the state’s population share a particular set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems.

More particularly, the analytical framework developed throughout this chapter provides a particularly apt tool for investigating and understanding the rise and fall of diverse Somali state-making endeavours. The Somali territories in the Horn of Africa have not only seen a variety of state-making projects since the end of colonialism in 1960, but have also experienced numerous terrible wars – wars that were, however, not always detrimental to its state-making attempts. Applying the prism of regime standardization to the cases of Somalia and Somaliland it will be seen that alterations in the overall regime ecology are, as a rule, brought about by elites, intertwined with crises, and accompanied by changes in state trajectories. What this analytical tool will also shed light on is the question of why and how the Somali state trajectories differed – a question to which we now turn.
State-Making Trajectories in Somalia

On July 1st, 1960, the sovereign Republic of Somalia was formed as a merger of the British Protectorate of Somaliland and the Italian-governed Trust Territory of Somalia. The Republic was perceived as constituting a particularly promising case of state-making in sub-Saharan Africa (Lewis 2002:205; Ake 1996:6), largely because it was allegedly free of the multifaceted societal fragmentation that other newly independent African countries faced. Scholars characterized Somalia as being marked by ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious homogeneity (Castagno 1959:340; Martin 1966:2), and suggested that Somalis formed one of the rare true nations on sub-Saharan African soil (Fitzgibbon 1982a:2; Laitin/Samatar 1987:xiv). These suppositions of Somali exceptionality gained currency in the early 1960s, as Somalia was seen to embark on “distinctive democratic processes” (Contini 1964:3) that culminated in a “genuine democracy” (Africa Watch 1990:14). The newborn country at the Horn of Africa appeared to have set foot on the highway to state-making.

Yet, by the mid-1960s, this highway already seemed to have turned into a meander, as Somalia’s political system degenerated into an “artificial democracy” (Adam 1999:262),

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172 See e.g. Omar (1996:ix), who states that Somalia had an “unenviable advantage over other African countries” due to its “ethnically homogeneous population” at the time of independence.

173 For this ‘homogeneity thesis’ see also Touval 1963; Martin 1966:2; Farer 1976:50, 1976:70; Sheikh-Abdi 1977:657; Woodward 1977:281; Porter 1984:186; Africa Watch 1990:1; Hashim 1997a; Warsame 2001; Lewis 2002:1; Arab 2004. While some suggest that Somalis were ‘mono cultural’ (Bekalo et al. 2003:461), others go so far as to speak of the “homogeneity of Somali clance” (Legum/Lee 1977:31, my italics). However, this position is contested by again others (e.g. Mukhtar 2007; Adam 1995; Adan 1994; Besteman 1996b; Osman 2007), who contend that “[c]lannism is the Somali version of the generic problem of ethnicity or tribalism” (Adam 1993:2) and that “Somali is a nation that binds together people of distinct cultures, customs, traditions, languages, values, as well as destinies” (Eno 2007b:132; Interview 1).


“democracy gone mad” (Mansur 1995:114; Abdullahi 2007a:43) and “commercialized anarchy” (Lewis 2002:206). The largely free and fair elections of the early 1960s, which had been contested by a handful of nationalist parties, gradually lapsed into a “semi-anarchy” of dozens of clan-based camps (Adam 2008:1). Simultaneously, Somalia was confronted with a steadily deteriorating economic situation (Markakis 1987:90), a ramshackle infrastructure (Lewis 2002:171), and an appalling administrative apparatus (Fitzgibbon 1982b:141). Having experienced the first attempted coup d’état in Africa only one year into its existence (Adam 2008:190), the decade’s history peaked in the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke on October 15th, 1969. Five days later, a bloodless coup d’état followed.

Having taken power, Major-General Mohammed Siyad Barre dissolved the civilian government and promised to re-establish order and eradicate the inefficiency and corruption that had become endemic (ACR 1969/70:B175; Lewis 2002:207). As the majority of the population had been dissatisfied with the increasingly clannist and nepotistic politics of the 1960s, Barre’s coup and military clampdown gained immediate popular support (Fitzgibbon 1982b:141; Gassem 1994:23; Interviews 19, 21, 55, 121). In line with revolutionary propaganda, international observers judged that the military takeover had been ‘inevitable’ (Lewis 2002:206), and that “[t]he military intervened in 1969 only after the civilian institutions collapsed under the weight of their own talk” (Laitin 1977b:7, my italics). Hence, the military agents were perceived as heroes who “rescued the Somali nation from imminent collapse” (Dool 1998:85) and who led the Somali state back onto the road of state-making given an “improved economic performance, expanding social services and a better culture of governance” (Abdullahi 2007a:43; Interview 66).

Why had Somalia’s democratic state-making project of the 1960s ultimately faltered, and how did Barre rescue the Somali nation from ‘imminent collapse’? The Somali literature presents several arguments to address these questions. While Somalia’s early achievements in state-making were attributed to its unique social homogeneity, fierce nationalism, and vibrant

176 Cf. Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:77, fn. 3; see Bradbury 2008:34. The country’s unemployment rate, for example, was ten times higher in 1967 than in 1960 (Butani 1973:3).


178 ACR 1969/70:B174ff.; Barre 1969; Laitin 1979a:175; HRW 1990:15; Ahmed I. Samatar 1993:85. While acknowledging that such narratives have been common justifications for military involvement in political affairs across the globe, this chapter shows that the civilian-led governments had, indeed, come to face stagnation regarding its state-making project prior to the military coup.

democracy (e.g. Farer 1965), its demise in the second half of the 1960s was seen to lay in archaic clan-politics and nepotism (e.g. Lewis 2002). Alternatively, it has been suggested that it was bad economic performance (Markakis 1987:90f.; Laitin 1993:125), the colonial legacy (Issa-Salwe 1994), and the misfit between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of governance that were to be blamed for state-unmaking (Mansur 1995:115; Abdullahi 2007a:43; Lewis 1980). A different set of scholars locates the collapse of the Somali state in international politics, holding either the “black colonialists of Ethiopia” (Fitzgibbon 1982b:141) or “Soviet complicity” (Payton 1980) accountable. Simultaneously, the greater progress achieved under early military rule is generally attributed to the “strong rule of a new type [which] was urgently required if the country was to be rescued from the morass of poverty, insecurity and inefficiency into which it had sunk” (Lewis 2002:206, referring to Farah 1976).

Although all of these explanations contribute to our understanding of Somalia’s tumultuous state trajectory between 1960 and the mid-1970s, I argue that the current underlying state-making and state-breaking in Somalia was one of changing levels of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. Furthermore, I argue, first, that the Somali state and nation were much less ‘homogeneous’ at the time of independence than generally suggested. Second, I postulate that the commonly underestimated scale of state-making was considerable due to the regime plurality the young state inherited from colonialism. Third, while the political elite of the 1960s ultimately failed to carry through regime standardization, I show that the military coup d’état was accompanied by a marked change regarding the overall regime ecology, which saw an increased standardization of the authoritative ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. Thus, the major difference that can be observed between the civilian and military governments concerns the breadth and depth of their institutions.

Addressing these issues, this chapter compares the “order that the military brought to Somali politics” with the “disorder that had discredited and deadlocked the previous parliamentary system” (Spears 2010:134). While it cannot provide an encompassing account of the state’s social, economic and political development, it primarily aims to display the theoretical validity and analytical value of the regime standardization prism. Section one provides a snapshot of the colonial years prior to independence, scrutinizes the ‘national

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180 See also Ghalib (1995:141) and Comini (1969:11), who suggests that “[i]n order to counteract divisive tendencies it was necessary and urgent to build a truly unitary state by integrating the laws and institutions of the Northern and Southern Regions.”
narrative’ of Somali unification, and, in suggesting a ‘rational narrative’ shows how fragmented the newly independent country was in institutional and socio-cognitive terms. Section two analyses the state trajectory of the 1960s, depicting how regime plurality was perpetuated during civilian rule. The third section moves to the military takeover of 1969, suggesting that the subsequent era was characterized by increasing, yet shallow, processes of regime standardization. An interim conclusion compares the two state-making endeavours and sums up the key findings.

3.1 The Pre-Independence Era: ‘Nation in Search of a State’?181

After the Horn of Africa gained particular geostrategic importance with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, diverse colonial powers secured territory along Cape Guardafui. Britain established the Protectorate of British Somaliland in 1887, which was paralleled by the foundation of the Protectorate of French Somaliland in 1885, and the Italian Colony of Somalia along the cape’s southern shores in 1889.182 Witnessing the territories it considered part of its historical empire being partitioned among European powers, Ethiopia also asserted its regional presence in the Somali-inhabited Ogaden.183 With the British-controlled Northern Frontier District (NFD) of British East Africa184 forming the last tile in the colonial mosaic, Somalis found themselves administered by five different powers at the turn of the century.185

Sixty years later, the Somali flag was solemnly hoisted in a blaze of glory in Mogadishu. After the imperial and territorially divisive ‘Scramble for Africa’, the unification of British Somaliland and the Italian-governed trust territory of Somalia constituted a first step in creating a single state for all Somalis (Interview 43). A white, five-pointed star on a light-blue background, the Somali flag was testament to the republic’s objective to also

182 Henceforth, I refer to these entities as ‘British Somaliland’, ‘French Somalia’ and ‘Italian Somalia’ respectively.
183 I use the term ‘Ogaden’ to refer to the geographic region, while ‘Ogaden’ denotes the population. The Ogaden roughly corresponds to the following Ethiopian zones: Dhagabhor, Fiq, Wardheer, Korabhe, Gode, Afdar and Liben. See Appendix, Map 1.
184 Later known as Kenya’s North Eastern Province. See Appendix, Map 1.
185 See Appendix, Map 2. For more detailed accounts of Somalia’s colonial history, see e.g. Brown (1956:250ff.), Galbraith (1970), Muhammad (1972:8), and Said Samatar (1993:10ff).
incorporate the NFD, the Ogadeen, and French Somalia into its jurisdiction. Given this territorial fragmentation and the common claim that Somalis formed a true nation, they quickly earned the widely accepted sobriquet of being a ‘nation in search of a state’ (Laitin/Samatar 1987). How far was this characterization adequate?

Although it cannot wholly be dismissed, I argue that it tends to be misleading. Being generally based on the ‘homogeneity thesis’ and suggesting that unification in 1960 was driven by national aspects, the characterization of Somalis as constituting a ‘nation in search of a state’ overestimates the cohesion provided by Somali national identity at the time. I propose that nationalism was only one of numerous competing socio-cognitive systems, that it was gradually trumped by other ‘rules of the mind’, and that it was not deeply rooted in society – partly because it lacked a common institutional framework across the diverse Somali polities, which could have aided its perpetuation. By clarifying that Somalia was characterized by regime plurality at independence, the subsequent section provides the backdrop against which the state trajectories of the 1960s and 1970s are analysed.

Unification as Expression of Nationalism?

Although anthropological accounts asserted that Somalis identified primarily with their respective kinship groups (Lewis 2002), the pertinent scholarship quickly established consensus that Somalis shared a common national identity, rooted in the population’s ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious homogeneity. Other scholars traced Somali nationalism back to figures such as Ahmed Gran (1506-1543) and Sayid Hassan (1856-1920). While the latter suggestion can be scrutinized on empirical grounds, the former is doubtful in

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186 See e.g. art. 1, §1 and art. 6, §4 of the Somali Constitution, and the 1959 speech of Prime Minister Abdillahi Iise (cf. Lewis 2002:161). Moreover, the creation of the United Liberation of Western Somali group in 1960 (Henze 1985:30), the formation of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in 1963 (Issa-Salwe 1994:38), and the four-year Somali insurgency in the NFD (known as the ‘shifta war’) subsequent to Britain’s decision to grant Kenya independence on December 12th, 1963 (Lewis 2002:201; Bradbury 2008:34f.) are testament to Somalia’s irredentist objectives. See also Massey 1994:126.

187 See fn. 173.

188 See fn. 173 and 174.


190 While e.g. «Guray» was frequently portrayed as the “father of modern Somali nationalism” (Laitin 1979b:95f.; Muhammad 1972:8; Said Samatar 1879:1ff.), evidence suggests that his support was confined to the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans (Spears 2010:166, fn. 11), while being opposed by the Issaq, who
theoretical terms, as it fails to acknowledge that “[n]ationalism is primarily a political principle” (Gellner 2006:1, my italics). Moreover, even if accepting the underlying allegation that “the distinction between ‘nation’ and ‘tribe’ is only one of size” (Lewis 1967a:105), it remains debatable whether the Somali were as homogeneous and united as commonly suggested (Martin 1966:2).

Until the 1970s, a dearth of comparative studies of Somali society quickened the ‘homogeneity thesis’ which Somalis were eager to exploit, as it provided a strong basis for their political claim for a single state. Yet, some scholars point towards “important social and economic cleavages” within Somali society (Casanelli 1996:14), and others call the steadfastness of Somali nationalism into question. Luling (1997:290), for example, wonders how far the “enthusiasm for national unity […] carried beyond the intellectual elite”, and an Ethiopian observer remarked immediately after Somali unification that “[t]he hard truth is probably that they have not yet formed any clear feelings of nationality” (cf. Spears 2010:128). Yet, if not Somali homogeneity, what were the roots of the national sentiments that surfaced from the 1940s onwards (Muhammad 1972:130), and why were they so volatile?

While the evolution of Somali nationalism cannot be explained monicausally, a key source seems to lay in alterations of institutional patterns. This is supported by Lewis (2002:105), who observes that public interest in the national objective hinged on a “burning cause to command attention.” One such ‘burning cause’ that brought about a change in the overarching ‘rules of the game’ occurred between 1941 and 1950, when Britain established the British Military Administration (BMA) over British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, and the Ogadeen after having defeated Italian forces. Stimulated by the fact that diverse Somali territories were, for the first time, under a single political umbrella (Compagnon 1995:45f.), Somalis in the former Italian colony founded their first political party with British support. Proclaimed in Mogadishu on May 13th, 1943, the Somali Youth Club (SYC) expanded rapidly, levelling out at about 25,000 members in 1946 (Said Samatar 1993:17).

aligned themselves with the British (Touval 1963:52; Laitin 1979b:96). Moreover, Gilkes (1993:4) argues that «Guray»s» appeal was rooted more in Islam than political nationalism.

The potential for intra-Somali comparison emerged, by and large, only when the anthropological work of Lewis (1961, 1982a, 1988) on the northern, nomadic clans, was complemented by the work of Luling (1972, 1977, 1984, 1989) on the southern, agricultural communities.

The looming threat that British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin might fail to consolidate the amalgamation of the three largest Somali-inhabited territories to form a single trusteeship – a policy goal objected to by Russia, the USA and Ethiopia (Touval 1963:79f.)\(^{194}\) – boosted Somali nationalism. Party membership of the SYC – renamed the Somali Youth League (SYL) in 1947 – increased, as the latter opened offices throughout the BMA and NFD. When, under considerable pressure by major powers, Britain returned the Ogaden to Ethiopia in 1948, massive protests occurred (Said Samatar 1993:17ff.; Barnes 2007), and SYL-membership soared to 93,000 by early 1948 (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:53).\(^{195}\) And when, six years later, Britain announced that it had also irrevocably ceded the Haud and the Reserved Areas to Ethiopian rule in a treaty dated November 29\(^{th}\), 1954, Somalis (largely from the north) formed the National United Front (NUF), in order to regain the ‘lost territories’ (Lewis 2002:151).\(^{196}\)

Again, it was changes in the institutional framework that triggered alterations in the socio-cognitive sphere, as it was only after the Haud fiasco that “the political parties [in British Somaliland] began actively to consider the possibilities of eventual union with Somalia” (Lewis 2002:153). This is affirmed by Mohamed (1992:5) and numerous interviewees who suggest that it was the return of the Haud and the Reserved Areas that revived Somali nationalism throughout the territories, particularly in the north (Interviews 24, 30, 121, 135). In this sense, prominent Somali advocate Michael Marino saw the good in the bad and declared in February 1956 that the “great calamity” of colonial partition could emerge as Somalia’s “greatest blessing” (cf. Spears 2010:125), as it invigorated a Somali national consciousness and (rational) desire for unity (cf. Mohamed 1992:5).

Thus, the politico-territorial integration and accompanying changes in the authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ that occurred between 1941 and 1950 can be understood as having strongly impacted on the emergence of an ‘imagined community’ in the Somali territories (cf. Lewis 1967a:104). This ‘imagined community’ not only flowed from the foundation of ‘national’ political parties (Compagnon 1995:45f.), but also from the establishment of closer

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\(^{195}\) Lewis 2002:130; Mohamed 1992:5; Said Samatar 1993:19. In the meantime, the SYL entertained 79 branches outside the capital and was supported by one hundred full-time staff and about 300,000 supporters (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:53).

\(^{196}\) Castagno 1964:542; Eshete 1991:9; Said Samatar 1993:24; Barnes 2007. ‘Haud’ is Somali for ‘south’ (Markakis 1987:55) and depicts a territory of rich pastureland to the south of British Somaliland. The *Reserved Areas* refer to a territorial strip between the north-western part of the Haud and Djibouti, today corresponding to parts of the administrative entity of Jijiga and Shinile – see Appendix, Map 1.
economic ties, amongst others (Markakis 1987:52). As Geshekter (1983:27) observes, the rise of nationalism in British Somaliland first appeared within “an emergent class linked to international demands for livestock and its by-products, and inter-territorial transportation opportunities in the eastern Horn.” Yet, as could be observed during the 1960s, these national sentiments were ephemeral, and unification appears to have been based as much on rational calculations as national sentiments.

**Unification as Rational Strategy**

Between 1954 and 1960 the Somaliland community of British Somaliland remained unsuccessful in gaining back the ‘lost territories’ – territory which was particularly vital for maintaining their pastoral livelihoods (Markakis 1987:55). In the absence of the necessary political leverage the population of British Somaliland “was convinced that the only way to retrieve the Haud and Reserved Area was to join forces with the South” (Mohamed 1992:5; Interview 135). Unification with Italian Somalia would enhance their chances of regaining control of these areas, as an alleged ‘nation’ could hardly be deprived of its right to self-determination – particularly in the wake of the United Nation’s 1945 declaration of the right to national self-determination. Hence, it was functional and rational for Somaliland’s political elite to embark on a national rhetoric, as this was an essential step in achieving their aim (Bradbury 2008:32; Spears 2010:129).

Given this it seems obvious why it was particularly the populace of British Somaliland that pushed for immediate union (Jama 2000) and why the union came to be challenged by the very same population shortly after its consummation, when the expected returns – i.e. the re-appropriation of the ‘lost territories’ – did not materialise (Interviews 113, 135). To explain both instances, the ‘rational narrative’ seems to be better placed than the ‘national’ one, a train of thought strongly reinforced by Ghalib (1995:28f.), who argued that “had it not been for the handing over of those territories, so vital to the transhumantic life pattern of herdsmen and herds alike, there would hardly have been the emotional desire for an immediate union with the South, nor even the demand for immediate independence” (see also Interviews 135, 113).  

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198 Omar Arteh Ghalib from the Isaaq clan-family became Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs under Barre. See also Spears (2010:129) and Touval (1963:107), who felt that even though the SNL’s protests had been expressed in national terms, its objectives were parochial, being prompted by “immediate and vital interests in the grazing areas… rather than nationalist ideals” (cf. Markakis 1987:56).
for immediate unification was not shared by all Somalis, as, for example, the political elite in the south was divided along tribal lines and not prepared to share government privileges with its northern brethren at any cost.

Also, the agricultural Sab communities in south-central Somalia were cautious about unification. United in the Hizbia Digil-Mirifle Somali (HDMS), the Sab communities lobbied during the 1950s for a federal formula for the new state of the post-colonial era (Compagnon 1995:225) – a proposition that partly originated in the circumstance that about 85 per cent of the administrative and police posts had been taken by members of the dominant pastoral Samaale communities (Castagno 1959:359). The HDMS went so far as to lobby the UN to prolong the decade-long trusteeship period that the former Italian colony of Somalia had been subjected to after the BMA terminated in 1950 (Marchal 2002:220). They advocated the creation of a separate Digil-Mirifle state and expressed sympathy towards Ethiopia, which had made overtures to the Somali people by proposing that they were part of the ‘Great Ethiopian family’ (Lewis 2002:157).

That the national ‘rules of the mind’ were trumped by other socio-cognitive systems was also true for the population of French Somalia, which shared a political vision distinct from the propagated Somali national one. Lewis (2002:136f.) remarks that the isolation and insulation the French colony had experienced under imperial rule strengthened the particularism of the Somali that hailed from the Ise clan and their conformity with Franco-Ethiopian co-operation:

“As in other French territories, this canalization of political activity towards the metropolitan country, profoundly affected the later development of political parties, serving to insulate political movements in French Somaliland from those in other parts of Somaliland. The general effect of French policy was thus the isolation of the Côte from the tenor of Somali advancement elsewhere.”

Similarly, the different set of authoritative ‘rules of the game’ that the Ogaden Somalis had been subjected to during colonialism triggered the moulding of a distinct set of ‘rules of the

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199 Founded with Italian support on March 25th, 1947, this party represented largely members of the Sab communities (Rahenweyne and Digil clans), the Bantu peoples of the inter-riverine region, and some of the local Arab community (Issa-Salwe 1994:33f.; Said Samatar 1993:18).

Some of its communities were pleased by the fact that the Haud and the Reserved Areas had stayed with Ethiopia – as this lessened their competition with the pastoralists of British Somaliland over valuable grazing land and even appealed to the Ethiopian government to seal the border (Spears 2010:122). As “the Ogaden themselves […] do not move their herds outside their territory” (Markakis 1987:173) this demand was sensible for Ogaden Somalis, and revealed that they were “less influenced by Somali nationalism” than other communities (Touval 1963:134; Lewis 1958b:350, cf. Markakis 1987:56, 173). Multiple other examples could be cited to scrutinize the orthodox ‘national narrative’ of Somali unification and display in contrast, how the Somali population entertained not one, but plural socio-cognitive systems. These partly opposing sets of ‘rules of the mind’ existed alongside the socio-cognitive system of the clan, which continued to be a strong underlying identity pattern (Lewis 2002:147) that did not stop at ‘national parties’ (Markakis 1987:54; Castagno 1962:513). Acknowledging the plurality of sets of ‘rules of the mind’, Massey (1994:125) talks of “Somali nationalities” (my italics), and even Lewis (2002:138) suggests that Somali nationalist activities largely focused “upon local issues in British Somaliland and Somalia, while elsewhere it was suppressed and condemned to a clandestine existence.” The fact that the NUF, the first political organization that united delegates from all parties and political groups from northern and southern parts of the Somali territories, was only established in 1959 (Lewis 2002:155), supports this argument.

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201 The Ogaden constitute one of the biggest Darod sub-clans and represent some 40-50 per cent of all Somalis living in Ethiopia (HRW 2008:13).


203 Even in light of the Ogaden War of 1977/78 it was observed that “[s]trong pro-Mogadishu feelings among Oromo were rare” (Henze 1985:54) and that “Somalis in the Ogaden will alternately use Ethiopian or Somali identities depending on the stakes” (Hashim 1997).

204 See e.g. the comportment of the Somali Progressive League (SPL), which presented a petition to the Four Powers Commission – a committee of representatives from Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the USA, which was established to decide Somalia’s future and visited the country in 1948 – to have Somalia ruled by Italian Trusteeship for another thirty years (Compagnon 1995:179). Interestingly, later Somali President Barre was a member of the SPL and characterized as “not qualifying for a great nationalist” (Compagnon 1995:179).

205 See also Lewis (2002:147), who elaborates e.g. on the cleavages between the Darod and Hawiye clan families within the SYL.

206 The NUF had been created as a political platform of the SYL and the Somali National League (SNL), the predominant ‘national’ party in British Somaliland. Interestingly, however, the SNL made no effort to extend its activities among the Ogaden across the border. And while there is no record of protest by the SNL against the return of the Ogadeen to Ethiopia, “there was a good deal of it after the return of the Haud” (Markakis 1987:56).
Somalia at Independence: Marked by Regime Plurality

As well as enhancing our understanding of the reasons leading to unification, the ‘rational narrative’ points out two important issues. First, it shows that neither the Somali state nor nation were marked by ‘homogeneity’ at the time of independence. Unsurprisingly, colonialism rather left the Somali territories marked by a plurality of institutions and concomitant socio-cognitive systems. The diverse colonies had differed regarding their administrative systems\(^{207}\) and had carried out separate elections;\(^{208}\) their economic structures varied as much as their official languages, legal traditions, and security architecture;\(^{209}\) and they had been marked by the disparate state traditions and visions of their colonial masters.\(^{210}\)

Second, the preceding discussion shows that it was changes in the institutional realm that triggered alterations in the socio-cognitive sphere; i.e. patterns of identity, such as nationalism, largely hinged on particular ‘rules of the game’. Yet, as these institutions were not well-established, national sentiments were also anything but deeply rooted in society, as became apparent shortly after the Republic of Somalia was proclaimed in 1960. This lack of an overarching institutional framework was also reflected in the party landscape, with the absence of a truly ‘national’ party. While the SYL and HDMS enjoyed popular support particularly in the south, the principal parties in British Somaliland were the Somali National League (SNL) and the United Somali Party (USP) (Said Samatar 1993:18).\(^{211}\) Furthermore, Lewis (2002:138) remarks with regard to the institutional fragmentation of Somalia at the time of independence that “the divisive effects of the nineteenth-century partition of Somaliland, particularly in respect of Ethiopia’s portion, had now become more

\(^{207}\) Even under the BMA, “[n]o integrated administrative structure for the Somali areas was established” (Said Samatar 1993:16, fn. 20) and British Somaliland retained its own separate administration (Lewis 2002:117).

\(^{208}\) While ‘national’ elections were held in Italian Somalia in 1956, ‘national’ elections for the legislative council were held in British Somaliland in 1960 (Lewis 2002:146, 154).


\(^{210}\) Britain had been a major world power with a long tradition of ruling overseas territories, whereas Italy itself had unified only in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century (Metz 1993:11). It should, however, be noted that colonialism led to a plural regime ecology not only due to the introduction of new rules, but also because it amplified existing ones (see e.g. Lewis 1982a:282). On the institutional differences, see also Contini (1969:11).

\(^{211}\) In contrast to the SYL that had been created by the British in order to strengthen the links with the United Kingdom, the SNL evolved from the people (Interviews 119, 135). While the SNL was mainly associated with the Isaaq clan-family, the USP enjoyed most support among the Dir (Gadabursi and Iise) and Daarood (Dulbahante and Warsangeli) clan-families.
firmly entrenched than before” and that this “inevitably strengthened the barriers opposing Somali nationalist endeavour and consolidated the colonial legacy of fragmentation.”

3.2 From Independence to Incapacitation: The State Trajectory of the 1960s

Shortly after British Somaliland and Italian Somalia unified on July 1st, 1960, the Somali Republic faced serious challenges – one being that the northern population was soon disenchanted with the coalition (Ahmed/Green 1999:116; Lewis 2002:172; Interviews 30, 113). Unification had not resulted in the re-appropriation of the ‘lost territories’ and northern political, administrative and commercial elites lamented about southern domination (Said Samatar 1993:27). That northerners in general and Isaaq in particular began to lose faith in the union (Bradbury 2008:33) became particularly obvious on June 20th, 1961, when more than fifty per cent of the northern population voted against the joint act of union and provisional constitution (Drysdale 2001:133). Only a few months later, in December 1961, Somalia experienced the first attempted military coup d’état in sub-Saharan Africa (Adam 2008:190), when Sandhurst-trained soldiers tried to take over major northern towns (Ahmed Samatar 1993:83). While the immediate cause for the revolt lay in the fact that southern police officers came to command northern units (Interview 135), the coup leaders “urged a separation of north and south” (Said Samatar 1993:33, 27).

What seems to be a conundrum when viewed through the lens of the ‘national narrative’ and ‘homogeneity thesis’ appears to be less astounding when regarded through the regime prism. As established previously, the ‘dual colonial heritage’ (Bradbury 2008:32; Gassim 2002:vii) had left the Republic of Somalia marked by a plural regime ecology at the time of independence – a plurality that was likely to exert divisive effects. In this train of thought

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212 In Ethiopia, for example, “[n]o party political activity was permitted and any overt expression of Somalia nationalist sentiment was firmly dealt with” (Lewis 2002:182).
213 In the words of one informant, the north was ‘swallowed’ by the south (Interview 121).
214 Lewis 2002:172; Compagnon 1995:527; Touval 1963:120ff.. The reasons for this outcome of the referendum are contested, with some scholars suggesting that the rejection of the constitution did not result from popular dissatisfaction, but was the outcome of a campaign by dissatisfied northern politicians (Abdi Samatar/Ahmed Samatar 2006:23).
215 On the argument that the coup “clearly had secessionist objectives” (Huliaras 2002:158), see also Adam (1994:25f.). For the coup’s significance see Lewis (2002:173ff.) and Ghalib (1995:123ff.). Interestingly, Barre was to rely for his coup in 1969 on five officers from the north (Compagnon 1995:308).
Markakis (1987:87) proposes that “[t]he many problems attending the administrative and economic integration of the two regions, the cause of considerable political friction in the following years, constituted an additional hindrance to political cohesiveness.” Whereas enthusiasm about unification had been high (Africa Watch 1990:13), little to no attention was given to the mechanics of integrating these two territories and amalgamating their thoroughly distinct institutions (Ahmed Samatar 1988:48; Adam 1994), as well as socio-cognitive systems. As unification proceeded “without any serious negotiations about important political and economic issues, beyond a division of Cabinet seats” (Africa Watch 1990:13; Lewis 2002:162), the “very extensive differences” that existed between the two territories with respect to “almost all aspects of government” were “left to sort themselves out afterwards” (Lewis 2002:162).

While there was to be one flag, one president, one parliament, and one government, it was decided that the two territories would continue to function separately with regard to their administrative, judicial, and economic systems until they could be fully integrated (Lewis 2002:163). Regime plurality was, thus, cemented in the new state, posing significant challenges to state-making. Having proposed understanding state-making as a process in which an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ comes to be shared by a particular population, the questions of when the different institutions became ‘fully integrated’ and how Somalia’s prevailing regime ecology developed throughout the 1960s arise. Were developments geared towards institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, i.e. state-making, or rather towards the fragmentation of rules, i.e. state-breaking?

**The Persistence of Legal Plurality**

The plurality of ‘rules of the game’ that characterized the Somali Republic showed prominently in the judicial proceedings following the abortive coup d’état of 1961. Having been put on trial in Mogadishu, the coup plotters were acquitted “on the basis that, in the absence of an Act of Union, the court had no jurisdiction over Somaliland” (Rajagopal/Carroll, 1992:14, cf. Adam 2008:190). While those rejecting the union took this
as a vindication of their case (Bradbury 2008:33), the decision cemented the co-existence of the five legal traditions Somalia had inherited – Italian law, British common law, the Indian Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes, Islamic shari’a, and Somali customary law (Battera/Campo 2001:6; Interviews 60, 82). Thus, apart from the judicial challenge posed by the absence of a legally valid Act of Union, the young state faced defiance due to the divergences of its legal systems.

This plurality of ‘rules of the game’ was even institutionalized by law no. 5 of January 31st, 1961, which provided for the continuation of the diverse legal systems until de facto unification was effected. Although in January 1962 the National Assembly began the process of amalgamating the organization of the judiciary by delegating powers to the government to prepare a law on the binding advice of a special commission, it was not until some years later that the judicial systems in northern and southern Somalia were unified. After several deferrals, the final text of the Criminal Procedure Code was approved by legislative decree no. 1 of June 1st, 1963, and came into force in the entirety of the state’s territory on August 1st, 1965 (Singh/Said 1973:vi). While the unification of the different court systems had been effected by legislative decree on June 12th, 1962 (Cotran 1963:1017), “the judicial practice of lower courts in Somaliland continued to follow the English Common Law model” (Battera/Campo 2001:7). Thus, although some progress had been made regarding the unification and administration of justice (Contini 1969:43f.), numerous problems remained unresolved seven years after unification (Battera/Campo 2001:7).

One of these remaining legal challenges lay in the fact that some vital aspects of the economy, such as contracts, companies, copyright, patents, and trademarks, were left unintegrated – a flaw that remained until the early 1970s (Muhammad 1972:300). A key reason why the legal landscape remained fragmented was the country’s continued linguistic plurality. In order to circumvent the problem of translating and linguistically harmonizing different legal traditions and laws, it was decided that both Italian and English were to

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218 In strict legal terms, “[t]he Somalia Act of Union was approved “in principle” but not enacted into law” (Muhammed 1972:133).
220 Cf. Muhammad (1972:226), who argues that the new organization of the judiciary came into effect on September 1st, 1962 in the northern regions and on October 1st, 1963 in the southern regions.
remain official languages of the court system (Battera/ Campo 2001:7) – but this left the judicial system linguistically, and, consequently, judicially divided.221

Taking Linguistic Fragmentation Lightly

Although the first party programme of the SYL, which dated from 1947, had spelled out the goal “to develop a Somali language” (Sheikh-Abdi 1977:661, cf. Lewis 1963:150f.; Ware 1965:175), and despite the cabinet of the young state agreeing on October 18th, 1960 to establish a committee to investigate the literacy problem, the government failed to linguistically unify the country. While most Somalis spoke Afmay, written correspondence took place in English in the north and Italian in the south of Somalia, as the Somali tongue remained scriptless. Part of the problem was that policymakers could not agree on certain controversies encompassing the linguistic question involving technical, religious and political quarrels, and they also faced strong and irreconcilable lobbies from different sides of the population (Warsame 2001:341ff.). Hence, “English, Italian and Arabic were all used as official languages in a haphazard manner” (Adam 1994:26), resulting in what was described as “babelian bureaucracy” (Laitin 1977a:114; Contini 1963:15).

Although this “linguistic chaos” (Warsame 2001:346) inhibited Somalia’s state-making trajectory, it is questionable as to how far it was in the immediate interest of the political elite to carry through linguistic standardization. According to Laitin (1976:455f.), “[t]heir inability to agree upon a national script ensured that the ruling élite would be small,” as the regulation that knowledge of at least one of the three official languages – i.e. Arabic, Italian, or English – was required for recruitment into the civil service meant that those individuals and groups who had been favoured by the colonial regimes would continue to dominate the state apparatus. Whether it was by error of commission or omission, the inability to implement a script for the Somali language was seen to symbolize the state’s more general paralysis (Adam 2008:1), and exemplified its inability to conduct institutional and socio-cognitive standardization.

The linguistic rift not only created obstacles to efficient jurisdiction and administration (Adam 1983:33), but also entailed further challenges to the Somali union and its state-making project. As English increasingly supplanted Italian and Arabic as the predominant

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221 For a comprehensive account of the legal (dis-)integration, see Contini 1963.
official language by the late 1960s (Laitin 1976:464), northerners were suddenly advantaged when it came to employment in the government sector and beyond (Laitin 1977a:126f.). This fostered the fortification of separate identities amongst English-speaking northern Somalis and non-English speaking southern Somalis. “By the late 1960s a ‘Southern Identity’ was beginning to form and Somalis became increasingly aware that Northerners were migrating to the South and getting the best jobs” (Laitin 1976:464) – an observation which led to resentments (Lewis 1967b:276). Thus, it was judged that “[t]he regional imbalance is closely related to the linguistic situation” (Laitin 1976:466).

The Challenge of Administrative Plurality

Regime plurality in the Somalia of the 1960s surpassed, however, the legal and linguistic spheres. The administrative apparatus was also characterized by discrepancies between north and south. The resulting problems were compounded by the fact that the administrative machinery remained “in an extremely rudimentary state” (ICPE 1983:49), leading Galaydh (1986:131) to argue that “an effective and responsive administrative machinery was palpably missing.” While the government employed some 16,000 individuals (Potholm 1970:211f.), it lacked “institutions designed to insure [sic] that the desires of the government are superimposed on society” (Potholm 1970:212), resulting in a situation in which the state’s political institutions did not penetrate the populace (Brons 2001:165). Thus, central administration “ventured into rural areas only during elections” (Adam 1995:70), which is why “[t]he majority of the Somali population remained detached from the modern state framework” (Brons 2001:165).

Compagnon (1995) and others scrutinize the latter proposition, suggesting that society was not detached, but (too) closely attached to the modern state. It was argued that the administrative apparatus could be understood as a “consortium of rival lineages and clan interests which people regard in terms of the number of kinsmen they can count in its ranks” (Labahn 1982:139, as quoted in Lewis 1961:282), and adds that “[e]ach ministry thus

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222 One example of this is provided by the Criminal Procedure Code, which was published on December 31st, 1964 in Italian and on November 6th, 1965 in English. “However, by Article 8 of Law No. 1 of February 17th, 1968, it is specifically provided that where there is a conflict between the Italian text and the English text, the latter shall prevail” (Singh/Said 1973:vi).
resembled a clan-dominated empire” (my translation). However, no matter how one conceives of these state-society relations, the effect on Somalia’s state trajectory remained the same: the state’s central administration was unable to enforce a single authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ across the territory. As this meant that institutional standardization was not carried through and that different sets of rules applied in different regions, state-making was hamstrung. Along these lines Labahn (1982:139) shows that “[t]he administration constituted a mirror image of the traditional social structure and could contribute little to a speedy social transformation” (my translation).

Yet, it would be misleading to deny that some progress was made regarding regime standardization. Although the Somali union experienced “serious difficulties in amalgamating different administrative, judicial, and economic systems” during the “first five years or so” (Adam 2008:191), improvements were made towards the latter half of the decade. While Lewis (2002:178) suggests in one source that administrative integration had largely been accomplished by the end of 1963, he asserts elsewhere that this was not an accepted fact before Mohamed Ibrahim Egal became Prime Minister in 1967 (Lewis 1993b:29, cf. Bradbury 2008:34). But even by the late 1960s, full harmonization of the different ‘rules of the game’ had not been achieved. Taxation was one case in point. When, as late as 1968, the higher taxation rates of the south were imposed on the north, Somaliland’s population incited a tax revolt. Some protestors were left dead (Adan 1994) and many others abandoned their settlements in order to avoid taxation (Interview 135). Thus, the fact that at independence the state lacked the “administrative capacity to collect taxes from subsistence herders and farmers” (Laitin 1993:125) remained largely unchanged a decade later. Thus, Dool (1993:245) argues that “[t]here was nothing wrong with the unity, but the Somalis as a whole have failed to administer themselves.”

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223 See also Laitin (1976:452), who similarly proposes that between 1960 and 1969 “[p]olitical appointments were made constantly to enhance ‘clan’ power, and different ministries became straws for different clans. What had started out as a putative nation was being torn apart at the seams through clan ‘tribalism’.”

224 On administrative challenges, see also Issa-Salwe 1994:50. The speedy unification of the different administrative structures was also hampered by British and Italian expatriate officials, who had remained in the country after independence. As they were naturally strongly attached to their respective systems of administration, they tended to hinder rather than facilitate administrative integration (Lewis 2002:171).

225 March 1962 saw e.g. the ratification of the Civil Service Law, and in August 1963 the regulations governing municipal and rural district councils were harmonized. Furthermore, in May 1963, the Assembly passed legislation extending the existing southern pattern of universal suffrage to the north, and one month later, Article 29 of the Constitution was revised to prohibit proselytization except by Muslims, thus standardizing the previous British Protectorate practice throughout the Republic.
**Between Elite Competition and Elite Bargain**

While Egal declared in 1968 that since the establishment of the first Somali parties in the 1940s the “once arrogant, overpowering influence of tribal loyalties” had been “replaced by national political consciousness” (Egal 1968:222, as quoted in Höhne 2006a:10), reality was much less clear cut. The new political elite was systematically trying to marginalize the ‘traditional authorities’ and dispense with the clan regime, which they considered divisive, antiquated, in the way of modernization, and a vestige of colonial imperialism (Castagno 1962:9; Lewis 1988:43). On the eve of independence, on March 2nd, 1960, the legislators of the Somali Republic abolished the status of clan by law no. 13 which included the replacement of collective punishment by individual penalties in order to weaken clan solidarity (Lewis 2002:156; Hoben 1988:205f.). As even “public disclosure of clan affiliation was prosecuted” (Hoben 1988:206), “tribalism was officially buried by the government” (Gassem 1994:25). Hoping to replace the emerging void with state institutions, this repudiation of the clan regime was a classic state-making endeavour.

However, the government could not wholly neglect the traditional authorities. In the absence of an effectively functioning central administrative apparatus that could broadcast and implement the state’s ‘rules of the game’, the government relied on them and the set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems they presided over to manage the population. Thus, while officially denouncing the traditional leaders, the civilian governments of the 1960s generally incorporated them into the administrative architecture and paid them a stipend (Said Samatar 1993:39) – just as the British had done during colonial times (Fox 1999:21). The co-opted traditional authorities thus acted as a substitute for the missing state administration to implement at least a modicum of the state’s ‘rules of the game’. Even Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, leader of the SYL and later President of the Somali Republic, who sternly opposed ‘tribalism’ (Potholm 1970:2010), could not dispense with the

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227 This endeavour was also shown in the decision of the SYC and SNL to confine party membership to young men between the ages of fifteen and thirty in order to exclude from the party “reactionary elders who did not understand modern requirements” (Castagno 1964:521). Also see Ware (1965:175f.), according to whom the SYL advocated the elimination of tribal and communal friction.

228 Yet, the ‘anti-clannism law’ “was not generally implemented, for the new regime had no more effective control over tribal areas than had the colonial government” (Hoben 1988:206).

229 Having similarly realized the fact that the new political elite could not wholly dispense with the traditional authorities, but needed them as an important link to the general public, the SYL had extended its age limit of party members to sixty in March 1947 (Castagno 1964:521). According to one informant, the political elite also drew on the traditional authorities, because the former were wholly ignorant of the mechanisms of their society, but needed to be able to instrumentalise the traditional system if they wanted to govern the country (Interview 135).
traditional authorities and judiciously applied the much maligned principle of ‘ethnic balance’ when forming several governments between 1960 and 1964. For him as for any other Somali politician, it would have been politically suicidal to disrespect the clan when it came to policy making, the distribution of political offices, and the mobilization of (political) support.230

Thus, from an analytical perspective it could be argued that an elite bargain emerged between the old and the new political leadership, as this constituted the only means to exercise at least some degree of control over the population. Yet, it seems as if the inclusive elite bargains of the 1960s (Compagnon 1995:193) exacerbated, rather than mitigated, the state-making challenge in the medium term, as the elite came to be too inclusive. While in 1960 only a handful of parties had competed for parliamentary seats, by 1964, there were 21 parties with 973 candidates contesting a mere 123 seats (Potholm 1970:202). The situation worsened in 1969 (CRD 2004:12), when more than 1,000 candidates were put forth by over 60 parties for the same 123 seats (Samatar 1994c:115; Lewis 2002:204).231 The constant fragmentation of parties constituted a true bonanza of clan politics and was testament to the plurality of regimes that existed alongside the ‘national regime’, posing a key obstacle to state-making in Somalia.

“In these early years [of independence in 1960], Somalia’s multiparty politics degenerated into greed and corruption” (Adam 1995:69). Somalia’s parliament, once a symbol of democracy, had turned into a “sordid marketplace where deputies traded their votes for personal rewards with scant regard for the interests of their constituents” (Lewis 1972:399).232 Thereby, the irresponsible and greedy behaviour of the politicians severely impacted the administration, as the rent-seeking performance of the political elite trickled

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230 Cf. Laitin 1977a:81, referring to Castagno 1964. Numerous other examples of increasing clan clientelism and the accommodation of traditional authorities in the state apparatus can be found in the literature. See e.g. the election of Abdirisak Haji Hussein to parliament that hinged solely on his clan’s support (Compagnon 1995:192) – in contrast to the election of Abdullahi Iise in 1956, who was elected on a national rather than clan basis; or see the immediate post-election time in March 1964, when President Osman selected his council of ministers more on merit rather than clan, thus failing to gain the vote of confidence from the National Assembly (Said Samatar 1993:32f).

231 Cf. Markakis 1987:54; Castagno 1962:513. CRD (2005:5) even talks of “[m]ore than 80 clan-based political parties” that competed in the 1969 elections, and Potholm (1970:204) asserts that there must have been over 130 registered parties shortly before the coup.

232 Lewis 2002:205f.; Compagnon 1995:195. President Egal, for example, felt the need to spend as much as USD 1.25 million to buy off members of parliament in 1969, in a country with a budget of only USD 30 million (Samatar/Samatar 1987:683). “In addition, the government openly raided the national treasury (to the tune of $5 million) to buy public votes” (Ahmed I. Samatar 1993:84).
down to the bureaucracy (Laitin 1976:453). The elite bargains and politics of the 1960s had resulted in so little regime standardization that coercive means were the only ones left to the government to enforce a certain set of ‘rules of the game’. Thus, shortly before the elections of 1969, the government “pressured the chief of the National Police Force (General M. A. Musa) to put his troops and logistics at the disposal of SYL party faithful” (Ahmed I. Samatar 1993:84).

A State Marked by Regime Plurality

Regime plurality and institutional and socio-cognitive fragmentation transcended the administrative, legal, and linguistic spheres. “The legal codes, administrative procedures, currencies, working languages, civilian and military grades of the two territories all differed” (CRD 2004:19). The northern and southern regions of the Somali Republic also utilized diverse fiscal and accounting procedures, were marked by dissimilar legal and tariff systems, and their civil servants were paid through different payrolls (Lewis 1967b:272). Said Samatar (1993:27) adds that “[p]olice, taxes, and the exchange rates of their respective currencies also differed” and that “[t]heir educated elites had divergent interests, and [that] economic contacts between the two regions were virtually non-existent.” The latter could mainly be traced back to the fact that infrastructural integration was a long time coming and the distance between the north and the capital in Mogadishu was hard to overcome (Bradbury 2008:33). While the mid to late 1960s saw an incremental advancement of institutional standardization, alternative regimes – such as clan or regional ones – continued to carry major weight.

That socio-cognitive systems apart from the national one remained powerful is shown by Lewis (2002:169), who argues that

“the possibility of sharp regional cleavages between north and south could not be ruled out. For despite the underlying cultural unity of the Republic as a whole and the all-pervasive character of clan ties, the long experience of two distinct colonial traditions had left quite different imprints in north and south, to a greater extent indeed than was immediately apparent.”


234 See Lewis (2002:171), who also states that “[t]here was no direct telephone link between Hargeisa and Mogadishu”, and Issa-Salwe (1994:50), who argues that “[i]n the rainy season the capital sometimes remained completely incomunicado with the rest of the country.” Drysdale (1964:165) concludes that this lack of infrastructure prohibited “true national integration.”

235 See e.g. Mohamed (1992:6), who argues that “the political system […] was geared to create regionalism.”
Different colonial ‘rules of the game’ had thus left a legacy of different ‘rules of the mind’. Yet, this observation transcends the colonial framework, as different sets of institutions that existed within Somali culture also resulted in the development of diverse socio-cognitive systems. Even though the agricultural communities in southern Somalia “are a mixture of many different clan elements, and include large numbers of people of Darod and Hawiye origin” they “possess a strong sense of separate identity” (Lewis 2002:159). Thus, Spears (2010:128) rightly points out that “while Somalis may have felt a certain cohesiveness in their common identity, there were other political, physical, and developmental barriers that worked against the realization of a sentimental nationalism.” One aspect that worked against the civilian regimes, for example, was their relinquishment of a (political) ideology, to which the population could have ‘tuned in’ and unified – a tool Barre was to make significant use of. Consequently, state-making in the 1960s was impeded by the fact that the cultural, administrative, language and mentality differences between north and south Somalia were just too big, resulting in a situation in the pre-1969 era in which there was “one country, but two nations” (Interview 1).

3.3 From Demise to Resurrection: Somalia’s Trajectory of the 1970s

Five days after the assassination of President Shermarke,²³⁶ the army carried out a bloodless coup d’état on October 21st, 1969.²³⁷ Having occupied strategic locations within Mogadishu, coup leader Mohamed Siyad Barre immediately moved to dissolve the institutions of civilian government.²³⁸ While he suspended the National Assembly and the Supreme Court, abolished all political parties, and abrogated the constitution within hours of the coup, Barre announced the drafting of a new constitution and the ruling of the country by decree in the interim (ACR 1969/70:B175; Lewis 2002:207). Subsequent months saw the creation of an “institutional tabula rasa” (Compagnon 1995:305f.), followed by several institutional

²³⁶ An action allegedly motivated by personal rather than political motives (ACR 1969/70:B174).
²³⁷ The coup was not the first attempt to jettison civilian rule. On the eve of elections in March 1969, a plot by senior army officers was only narrowly avoided (ACR 1969/70:B177, cf. Payton 1980:501).
²³⁸ Born in 1919 to a pastoralist family of the Marehan clan in the Ogadeen, Barre was educated as police officer, rising to the highest possible rank of the colonial police force during the BMA. Upon independence in 1960, Barre became vice commander of the Somali army. By 1966, he held the rank of major-general and had become commander in chief.
and administrative alterations (ICPE 1983:28ff.). Having hoped for a commencement of better politics and an end to bribery, corruption and nepotism, the population initially benefited from “improved economic performance, expanding social services and a better culture of governance” (Abdullahi 2007a:43; Lewis 2002:208). What was the underlying current of the post-1969 state trajectory and how did the military government put the Somali Democratic Republic on the track of state-making in the early 1970s?

I argue that the coup was accompanied by a marked change in the prevailing regime ecology. Quite in contrast to civilian rule, which had largely witnessed an exacerbation of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, military reign constituted a first serious attempt in Somali history to dispose of regime plurality and carry through institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. While alternative regimes were either banned (clan regimes), co-opted (regional), or subdued (religious), the state’s rules were broadcast through an elaborate administrative infrastructure and with military precision. Hence, I disagree with those scholars who postulate that the Somali ‘state collapse’ started with the drift towards one party rule in 1969 (Abdullahi 2007a:43). And in light of the fact that the military takeover enjoyed popular support during the early years, I similarly scrutinize the argument that, starting from 1970, Barre’s government was only concerned with political survival (Compagnon 1995:428). Although a number of sympathetic accounts about some of Barre’s policies are scattered throughout the literature, there is a dearth of analytical investigations into the dictator’s state-making efforts in the early to mid-1970s – a gap this section aims to reduce.

240 On the newly instilled discipline in the administrative apparatus, see also Interview 19. On the improved economic performance, see Laitin (1982:61, 1993:129) and Abdi Samatar (1994:71) who shows that due to Saudi Arabia’s booming oil exports, the prices of sheep/goats, cattle and camels increased from USD8, USD30, and USD40 in 1960 to USD44, USD195, and USD278 in 1978 – a development from which Somalia profited particularly during the early years of Barre’s reign. However, it has to be noted that the development plans of 1971-1973 and 1974-1978 were more than 80 per cent financed by bilateral and multilateral loans (Marchal 1996:1). See also Interview 66.
241 After the coup, the ‘Somali Republic’ was renamed the ‘Somali Democratic Republic’.
242 That the military coup was largely welcome can also be inferred from the fact that “things were so peaceful in the northern town of Hargeisa […] that [unlike in the south] there was not even a curfew in force” (Africa Confidential 1969:8, cf. Spears 2010:170).
243 Yet, it is true that Barre was careful to fortify his own position while ensuring that no other individual could build up a power base (see e.g. Lewis 2002:207; Said Samatar 1993:40; Compagnon 1992:9).
244 For a favourable account of the literacy programme, see e.g. Adam 1980; Ahmed Samatar (1988:103) and Laitin (1977a). Lewis (1972) and others praise the efficacy of the new order (see Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:3). Davidson (1975a/b, cf. Payton 1980:494) lauds the military regime’s accomplishments regarding democratization and ‘scientific socialism’. For a more general laudation on Barre’s accomplishments, see Pestalozza 1974.
Streamlining the Administration

Institutional and administrative alterations lay at the heart of the shift from civilian to military government. At the central level, Barre replaced the cabinet and the National Assembly with the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), which consisted of twenty-five high-ranking members of the security forces and ruled, in the form of an executive committee, along the institutional and ideological framework set out in the First Charter of the Revolution of 1969. The SRC was complemented by a subordinate Council of the Secretaries of State (CSS), which comprised fourteen, mainly civilian secretaries who were responsible for the day-to-day government operations (Said Samatar 1993:38). While the SRC “embarked on an energetic revitalization of the country’s government, economy and social services” (Lewis 2002:208), the organizational alterations were mirrored on lower administrative echelons.

The regional governors and district commissioners, which had existed more in name than in practice under civilian rule (Lewis 1979:23), were replaced with more effective regional and district revolutionary councils (SDR 1972:1; Issa-Salwe 1994:49). By law no. 9 on local government reform of August 9th, 1972, “[l]ocal councils, composed of military administrators and representatives appointed by the SRC, were established under the Ministry of Interior at the regional, district, and village levels to advise the government on local conditions and to expedite its directives” (Said Samatar 1993:39). Whether the SRC’s proclamation was eyed with suspicion as a tool to enhance “control of the masses” (Laitin 1979a:178) or rather as genuine attempt to bring governance closer to the people (Davidson 1975b:29, cf. Spears 2010:134), this move significantly increased the administrative penetration of Somali society (Lewis 1982b:18; Laitin 1979a:178).

That the military government enhanced the state’s administrative grip also showed in the territorial reorganization that it effected in later years. The 8 regions and 47 districts that

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245 With the exception of police commissioner Major-General Jama Ali Korshel, who was put in charge of Internal Affairs in addition to being vice-president of the SRC, the other thirteen secretaries of state were “youngish civilian technocrats” (ACR 1969/70:B177). Their appointment was allegedly marked by “an attempt at subordinating ethnic considerations to individual talent” (ACR 1969/70:B177; Lewis 2002:208; Compagnon 1995:324). More generally, Laitin (1999:147) comments on the “relatively meritocratic assignment of jobs” that characterized staffing in the public sector under Barre, and the fact that “Siyad’s first cabinet was clearly chosen on merit and not by ascriptive criteria” (ibid. 1976:456; Spears 2010:134). Yet, until 1974, most ministries were presided over by the military members of the SRC (Lewis 1979:21).


had existed during civilian rule were reconstituted by the decentralization law of 1974 to 15 regions and 78 districts (Lewis 1979:23), thus enhancing the possibility to effect a greater institutionalization of the authoritative ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’: the new regions and districts were designed in such a way as to cut across traditional clan boundaries and were, where necessary, renamed so as to exclude tribal or clan names, placing emphasis instead on the settlement (digma) as the basic unit of association and identification in an effort to extirpate lingering lineage loyalties (Lewis 1989:573).

The immediate “battle for the renewal of the administration” (Pestalozza 1974:81) enabled the SRC to transmit its power throughout the country (Compagnon 1995:334; Laitin 1979a:178). Consequently, different observers spoke of a “bureaucratization of public life” (Samatar/Samatar 1987:683) and a “fantastic expansion of the bureaucracy” (Lewis 1982b:18; Interviews 19, 116, 137), which “brought about internal discipline” (Omar 1996:xiv; Interview 121). The latter was rooted partly in changed recruitment patterns for administrative personnel, which further fostered standardization. Civil servants were now nominated on meritocratic rather than clan parameters (Lewis 2002:208) and the civilian administrators of the previous government were either replaced by young police and army officers (Issa-Salwe 1994:53; Interview 19), or required to undergo military training and political education, as ideological conviction was considered “an indispensable quality” (SDR 1972:2). During a three- to six-month military course at Camp Halane (Adam 2008:45f.), participants also attended a daily three-hour administrative course (ACR 1970/71:B160). As “those found to be incompetent or politically unreliable were fired” (Said Samatar 1993:38), the state machinery newly comprised a unified and sworn in class of administrative technocrats with military obedience. Coupled with the expansion and

248 Adam (1983:36) counts 16 regions and 81 districts.
249 See also Laitin (1976:454f.) and Gorman (1981:40), who also stress the discipline among civil servants.
253 ACR 1969/70:B177, 1970/71:B160; Pestalozza 1974:94f.; HRW 1990:25; Adam 2008:45f.. Camp Halane had been a military academy on the outskirts of Mogadishu, but was converted into a training centre for Somalia’s civil servants (Lewis 2002:212).
254 The institutional and socio-cognitive standardization of civil servants was expanded to all students who had completed four years of secondary education and who were to undertake a six- to nine-month placement as ‘national volunteer teachers’ (Hughes 1977:44; Lewis 1979:22; ICPE 1983:52ff.; Adam 2008:47).
overstaffing of the civil service (Slottved 1980:219), regime standardization could be realized on a broad level.

Given that “[t]he military, both before and after the coup, has respected lines of authority, and its members have adhered closely to their rôles” (Laitin 1976:452), the militarization of the administrative apparatus served the important function of making it more effective and efficient. Furthermore, it provided the state with so much control over the population that even skirmishes among Somali nomads in the hinterland were effectively stopped and disputants were coerced to bring their conflict to the central government (Laitin 1976:456, 1979:183; Interviews 116, 135).

Lewis (1979:21) emphasizes that “[t]he command structure of the Somali army thus forms the backbone of the state”, and Compagnon (1995:334) observes that, by the mid-1970s, the administrative architecture reflected the tight control that the SRC maintained on all levels of administration via its military intermediary.

**Boosting Control and Coercion**

In tandem with rendering the administrative apparatus more effective, Barre also strengthened the state’s ability to control and coerce. Not only had the reforms “impressed on the public the supremacy of the military” (Bradbury 2008:37), Somalis also witnessed the appearance of a growing number of organs of ‘thought control’. In its mildest form, they took the shape of ‘orientation centres’, which were established in every permanent

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255 “As of 1976 it was estimated that approximately 72,000 Somalis, out of a paid work force of 167,000, worked for government salaries” (Laitin/Samatar 1987:107).

256 For the militarization of the administration see e.g. the regional revolutionary councils, which were “presided over by the military governor acting as ‘chairman’ (guudoonshiiye) and assisted by the local military and police commanders, the regional NSS [National Security Service] chief, and the representative of the President’s political office whose main task is to see that the local Orientation centre (hanuunin) is properly organized and well attended” (Lewis 1979:23). Another example can be found in the militarization of the police force (Interview 42; Ofcansky 1993:215). See also ACR 1969/70:B177; Compagnon 1995:334.

257 Yet, this judgment is disputed by Lewis (2002:214) who argues that “[d]espite its elaborate and heavy-handed character, however, this essentially autocratic pattern of government still touched the nomadic majority of the population relatively lightly.”

258 That the army constituted a key tool for regime standardization can also be deduced from the observation that already by the late 1960s, “most Somalis believed that the SNA was less influenced by clan divisions and corruption than the civilian sector” and that “[t]he military also had succeeded in integrating British- and Italian-trained units more rapidly than had civilian institutions” (Ofcansky 1993:201). This success is partly attributed to the military commander-in-chief Barre who “had followed a policy of mixing recruits from different parts of the country in order to cultivate nationalism among the solders” in the 1960s (ibid.:206).
settlement in the countryside, no matter how small (Lewis 1979:23f.; Interview 116), and the nomadic population was also encouraged “to regard the orientation centre at a regularly frequented water point as the hub of social and political activities” (Lewis 2002:214). These ‘indoctrination centres’ – as they are referred to by Greenfield (1991:15) – were the loci where public lectures on ‘scientific socialism’ were held, and also hosted other social events that had originally taken place in the traditional framework of the clan, such as wedding ceremonies and funerals. Consequently Dool (1993:18) argues that “[t]he centres penetrated into the heart of the society.”

The orientation centres “were reinforced by other agencies which checked deviations from official policy” (Lewis 2002:212; Interview 42). Prominent amongst these were the National Security Service (NSS) and the National Security Courts (NSC), which jointly dealt with a wide range of ‘political’ offences including nepotism and tribalism, as well as with such charges as ‘lack of revolutionary zeal’ and treason (Lewis 2002:212). The internalization of revolutionary fervour was further assured by members of the people’s vigilantes, called the ‘Victory Pioneers’ who were mainly recruited from amongst the unemployed (Lewis 1979:22, 2002:11). Soon after its formation in the summer of 1972, this organ counted some 20,000 members and was feared among the population, as it collaborated closely with the revolutionary councils that could – according to decree no. 1 of January 10th, 1970 – arrest anyone suspected of subverting the revolutionary regime (Compagnon 1995:344). While vigilantes’ surveillance was supported by the military intelligence units, they also acted as initiators of self-help schemes (Laïtin 1979a:178).

This increase in control and coercion not only contributed to institutional and socio-cognitive standardization among the population, but also reinforced the establishment of a more effective civil service. “Members of the public services were kept under surveillance and N.S.S. reports played an important part in promotion and demotion” (Lewis 2002:212). Furthermore, “[i]n monitoring and seeking to control public opinion, considerable use was also made of agents provocateurs” (Lewis 2002:212; Interview 19). The organizations that comprised the security apparatus thereby “not only facilitated political order but they also

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259 Lewis 1989:573, 2002:211; Dool 1993:18. Towns such as Hargeysa and Burco had an average of four orientation centres, whereas settlements such as Odweyne and Gabiley about two (Interview 137).

260 While the NSC was founded on January 3rd, 1970, the NSS was established on February 15th, 1970.

allowed Siad Barre […] to build and secure a power base from which he could exercise control and domination” (Spears 2010:138). All of this surveillance and coercion thus helped in establishing a unified and standardized administrative apparatus and a population with an enhanced degree of socio-cognitive homogeneity – albeit an unnatural one.

**Confronting Clannism**

The reorganization of the administrative architecture had been carried on a flood of anti-tribalism and anti-nepotism (ACR 1969/70:B177; Lewis 2002:207). Just as the nationalist parties before independence and the civilian governments of the 1960s had sought to eliminate clannism in pursuit of unity, the military dictatorship “saw the destruction of tribal society as a necessary step toward the creation of a new social, political, and economic order based on ‘scientific socialism’” (Hoben 1988:205). Aiming to eradicate “the divisive force of tribalism and clan rivalry” (Lewis 1982b:18) and to arrest trends of social stratification (Sheikh-Abdi 1977:662), the military government embarked on a “war on tribalism” (HRW 1990:23) destined to “create a stable sense of national identity” (Lewis 1982b:18). Compared to his predecessors, Barre progressed further in this endeavour, at least in the medium term. Condemning ‘tribalism’ as the “most serious impediment to national unity” (Said Samatar 1993:39), Barre stated in a menacing address to regional judges that

“[t]ribalism and nationalism cannot go hand in hand… It is unfortunate that our nation is rather too clannish; if all Somalis are to go to Hell, tribalism will be their vehicle to reach there” (cf. Lewis 2002:222).

Thus, Barre banned the use of specific terms that carried a clannish connotation, replacing, for example, the traditional Somali term of address ‘cousin’ (ina’adeer) with the socialist notion ‘comrade’ (jaalle) and renaming local lineage headmen (akils) ‘peace-seekers’ (nabad-doon) (Lewis 2002:209f.; Interview 137).

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262 Interestingly, «Guray» (see fn. 189, 190) had also tried to abolish clannism. Using the Salahiya order of Islam as the ideological base of his twenty-one-year jihad against Ethiopian and European rule (1899-1920), “he imposed on his followers a ban against the use of clan names” (Castagno 1964:518). Yet, as with later Somali leaders, «Guray» failed to overcome clannism and had to resort to it in order to wage his war (Castagno 1964:518).

263 Even in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the first paramilitary opposition movements formed, they were cautious not to be perceived as being ‘tribalist’, as this would likely have limited their chances of success (cf. Spears 2010:142).


265 Across the globe, such standardization of greetings has been used to effect everyday identification with a particular regime (see e.g. the raised arm in Nazi Germany, the raised fist in communist societies, etc.).
clan elders, the *aqils*, were placed under increased state control” (Brons 2001:173), as was evidenced in the fact that the establishment of the Regional Courts of Appeal on March 11th, 1971 was accompanied by a Supreme Court ruling that sharia practitioners and *akils* could not represent litigants in the Supreme Court (ACR 1971/72:B188). Furthermore, the dictator confronted clannism by decreeing that social events were to be held in the orientation centres, rather than within the traditional context of clan families. Barre’s repression of the clan regime also entailed the replacement of traditional blood-compensation (*diya*) given by one clan to another by the death sentence for the perpetrator in cases of murder (Lewis 1979:24, 2002:208).266

The national campaign against tribalism culminated in early 1971, when effigies representing ‘tribalism, corruption, nepotism and misrule’ were symbolically burnt or buried in the Republic’s main centres (Lewis 2002:209). As “[t]he intense clan factionalism that characterised the political life at the end of the 1960s was still fresh in memory” (Compagnon 1995:210, my translation), the population largely welcomed the rigorous policy (Interviews 30, 55), and “Somali nationalism had reached its peak” (Adam 2008:192; Interviews 114, 156). No matter if motivated by a personal agenda for political survival,267 or a broader ideological vision, the displacement of plural (clan) mental models with a singular (state) mental model contributed to socio-cognitive standardization.

**Building an ‘Imagined Community’**

The ‘war on tribalism’ was substantiated with a “crash programme of nation-building” (Sheikh-Abdi 1977:662; Laitin 1976:455f.). Central to the latter was the advent of the country’s overarching ideology of ‘scientific socialism’, which was announced on the first anniversary of the revolution on October 21st, 1970.268 While the civilian regimes had played the non-alignment card during the Cold War, Barre “adopted ‘Scientific Socialism’ to unite the nation and eradicate its ancient clan divisions” (Lewis 1989:573).269 Succinctly, this was

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266 Brons (2001:173) argues more generally that “[c]lanism was officially banned and punished by death.”

267 Laitin (1982:60), for example, proposes that Barre had a personal interest in minimizing clan as a basis for advancement due to the fact that he hailed from a minority clan.

268 In Somali, ‘scientific socialism’ translated literally into ‘sharing wealth based on wisdom’. See also Guadagni 1974:38.

269 This was followed by the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Somalia and the USSR on July 11th, 1974. It should be noted that ‘African socialism’ had become very prominent with the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which captured Nyerere’s desire to “establish a more egalitarian society by narrowing the gap between government and party officials and the mass of the people” (Ahluwalia 2001:57f.).
stated in the slogan ‘tribalism divides where Socialism unites’ (Lewis 2002:209). While some argue that ‘scientific socialism’ was “a political instrument to repress the civil rights and freedom of the citizens” (Gassem 1994:24), others point out that this ideology was more a ‘bluff’ than a ‘good hand’ (Laitin 1977b:11). In any case, this ideology and the government’s emphasis on the “need for the entire population to undergo political indoctrination” (HRW 1990:24) was highly significant for the creation of national identity and unity (Sheikh-Abdi 1977:662), which “mobilized and excited Somali citizens” (Laitin 1982:63).

The long-desired introduction of a Somali script was another tool Barre used to enhance national identity. As the Somali language was “the most powerful sign of their nationality” (Warsame 2001:343; Laitin 1977a:25) and played “a crucial role in the formulation of Somali identity” (Adam 1983:31), it came to be a key criteria for Somali citizenship (Laitin 1977a; Markakis 1998:126). In line with the proposition that Somalis constituted not only a ‘nation in search of a state’ (Laitin/Samatar 1987), but also a “nation of poets in search of an alphabet” (Contini 1964), the leadership realized the importance of not only being able to speak but also read and write the same language. Hence, on the third anniversary of the revolution, Barre announced the SRC’s decision to utilize Roman characters for writing Somali (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:102), and, in a speech on March 8th, 1974, postulated that alphabetization “will be the weapon to eradicate social balkanization and fragmentation into tribes and sects. It will bring about an absolute unity” (cf. Lewis 2002:217, 1979:28).

And, indeed, “[t]he conscious attempt to link nationalist sentiment and modernization by creating an ‘imagined community’ of people who could speak, read, and write the same language could not be more clear” (Besteman 1996a:588). Once the Somali script was adopted, replacing English, Italian and Arabic as the official tongues, the government wasted no time in introducing its blanket implementation within the administration (ACR 1972/73:B230) and in all schools (Dool 1993:55; Warsame 2001:350ff.). Partly due to the introduction of a common script and the fact that “[b]ooks on every subject were

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270 See also Hughes (1977:41) who points out that ‘scientific socialism’ did not include antireligious propaganda, and Lewis (2002:116) who argues that the economy barely exhibited any particular traces of socialism. See also Compagnon 1995:299; Interviews 116, 135.

271 See Gellner (1983) and other theorists of modern nationalism, for whom literacy is a decisive ingredient in national self-consciousness (cf. Lewis 1989:574).

272 Since 1963, Latin had been considered the most suitable orthography for the Somali language (Warsame 2001:346; Laitin 1977a). The army and police had used the Roman script for the formation of their conscripts since 1964 (Compagnon 1995:241) – a fact that surely played into Barre’s orthographic decision. For contributions on the orthographic question, see Contini 1963; Laitin 1977a; Geshekter 1979; A.H. Mohamed 1980; Saeed 1982; Adam 1983; Abuhamdia 1995; Warsame 2001.
immediately translated into Somali and introduced into the schools with military precision” (Dool 1993:55), Somalia acquired, for the first time in its history, a “standardized educational system” (Warsame 2001:349). The latter was further standardized with law no. 61 of July 23rd, 1972, which ruled that all private schools were to be integrated into the public system (Warsame 2001:350; ACR 1972/73:B2300; ICPE 1983:76). Barre abolished school fees in 1971 (ACR 1971/72:B189) and “as a result of the new emphasis on literacy and language, new schools were built, even in some of the most remote areas” (Ahmed Samatar 1994:116), increasing levels of education.

Six months after Barre’s announcement introducing a common script, a National Literacy Campaign was launched on March 8th, 1973. Both the Urban Literacy Campaign (1973/74) and the Rural Development and Literacy Campaign (1974/75) were considered “highly successful” (Lewis 2002:216); they boosted adult literacy rates from 7-10 per cent in the late 1960s to 60-65 per cent a decade later (Slottved 1980:218).

Another aspect of this success could be found in the political realm. According to Laitin (1977a:129)

“The new rulers have not faced regional fission, and their use of authoritarian control only partly explains why they have not. Their attempt to build a Somali nationality in the Somali language rather than one in the English language is, it seems to me, part of that explanation. Somalia’s regions were united on a domestic issue, and common external enemies were no longer necessary to maintain Somali unity.”

Similarly, Lewis (1979:28) proposes that the “literacy campaign has quickened sentiments of national identity and self-awareness”, and Pestalozza (1974:17f.) argues that the literacy effort changed the entire country.

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274 See also Ahmed Samatar (1988:103). According to official statistics, some 1.5 million individuals followed the literacy classes, and some 800,000 passed the final literacy test (see Compagnon 1995:369; Adam 1983:37f). Yet, despite the successes with regard to the literacy campaign, it should be borne in mind that the literacy programmes were much less successful than is commonly claimed. For example, as late as the early 1980s, Italian remained the language of instruction at university level (ICPE 1983:24f.) – which might have been partly due to the fact that Somali did not lend itself to teaching scientific subjects. For detailed accounts of the literacy programme, see Andrzejewski (1974, 1977), Mohamed (1975), Compagnon (1995:369), Warsame (2001:356) and Lewis (2002:116). For an interesting analysis of the political implications of adopting written Somali see Laitin (1977a).

275 While the introduction of the Somali script had the positive short-term effect of boosting nationalism, it also came at a cost for the elite, as knowledge of either Italian or English was no longer a prerequisite to enter highly-rated positions. On this discussion, see Laitin (1977a:10) and Marchal (2002:220f.).
One of these changes concerned the fact that the introduction of the Somali script “opened the possibility of popular control of citizens and workers over the state bureaucracy” (Laitin 1979a:179), while another one lay in an alteration of the media landscape as the Barre government sought to disseminate its ideology. The introduction of a Somali script implied that the foreign language newspapers were subjected to competition, a competition that the authoritarian political climate quickly decided in favour of Somali newspapers. In fact, the two daily newspapers at that time, the Arabic Najmat October and the Italian Stella d'Ottobre and the weekly English paper Dawn closed down on January 21st, 1973 (Warsame 2001:357; ACR 1973/74:B247), being replaced with the government’s daily newspaper Xiddiga Oktoobar (October Star).276 The latter not only provided the population with news, the latest achievements of the government, and information about ‘scientific socialism’, but also supplied its readers with a ‘thought for the day’ (Lewis 1979:18) in general pursuit of ideological hegemony.

Furthermore, Barre vastly increased radio propaganda (Lewis 1979:23), with which he was said to “establish his oppressive grip over Somali society” and which he turned into a massive “propaganda machinery” (Adam 2001:viii).277 During the 1970s, a network of loudspeakers was installed in every city quarter and each orientation centre, diffusing the song Guulwaadde Siyaad, which opened and closed the daily radio transmissions. This song, which was part of Barre’s personal cult and had started being broadcasted after the arrest of General Gaveire in 1971, was listened to and sung by civil servants, pupils, urban blue-collar workers, and others at least once a day (Compagnon 1995:355). With the exception of the Somali Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation, the state had a “monopoly of the media of communication, and plays, songs and poems were widely used to convey the message of the revolution to the illiterate masses” (Markakis 1987:219). While the ICPE (1983) judged that Somalia’s communication outside the main cities remained ‘primitive’ even during the reign of the military regime, Markakis (1987:219) assesses that the Public Relations Office (PRO) “grew octopus-like into a multifaceted organisation whose tentacles reached every corner of Somali society.”

276 Xiddiga Oktoobar had a daily circulation of about 10,000 copies, compared to the combined print run of the foreign language newspapers of approximately 6,000 copies per day (Warsame 2001:357; ACR 1973/74:B247).

277 See also Lewis 1979:23; ACR 1971/72:B190; Bennett 1997:10. The expansion of the propaganda machinery also showed in the fact that the Ministry of Information was given a portfolio on ‘Public Guidance’ (Lewis 2002:208), and that a full-time “six-man Censorship Board was appointed in March [1971]” (ACR 1971/72:B190), in order to tailor information to SRC guidelines (Said Samatar 1993:39).
A State Marked by Regime Standardization

While regime standardization had significantly increased during Barre’s early rule, numerous ‘building sites’ remained. One example can be found in the clan regime with its long-established institutions and socio-cognitive systems, which still played an important role in society.278 Hence, Gorman (1981:41) points out that “[t]here were still clan differences, especially among the nomadic sections of the population, and there was still some resistance to the assertion of central and hierarchical governmental authority over the highly individualistic Somali.”279 Another, antithetic building site lay with the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), an organization without roots in history, which failed to instil significant participation of the population in the fortunes of the state, even though the party’s administrative penetration was allegedly far-reaching (ICPE 1983:101).280 Also other policies designed to enhance state control failed,281 thus missing out on enhancing levels of standardization.

Some policies not only failed, but led to a reduction of levels of standardization. One of these was the introduction of the Family Law of 1975. In a speech to mark the United Nations’ (UN) decision to make 1975 a year to improve the place of women in society, on January 11th, 1975 Barre announced that the inheritance law was to be extended to female members of society (ACR 1974/75:B266), thus meddling with religious institutions. While most religious leaders did not rebuff the law, “some traditionalist religious leaders in the north [saw it] as further evidence of their belief that the SRC was trying to undermine the old structure of Islamic society” (ACR 1974/75:B271).282 Although none of the Somali Islamist movements283 was strong enough to credibly challenge the rule of Barre (Marchal 2004:4),

278 “Although tribalism was legally abolished some years ago, persistence of clan-consciousness has continued to be a major concern of the modernizing élite. The SRSP programme emphasizes the need to uproot tribalism as inimical to national reconstruction” (ACR 1976/77:B327).

279 In this regard, Gorman (1981:41) refers to the fact that “an attempt by the junta soon after the coup to levy taxes met stiff resistance throughout the country and had to be abandoned.”

280 The SRSP was founded between June 26th and July 1st, 1976, with 74 members – 19 of whom had formerly belonged to the SRC (ACR 1976/77:B326) – and had roughly 12,000 at the end of 1976 (Hughes 1977:49) increasing to only 20,000 two years after its creation (Lewis 2002:223).

281 For instance, Barre’s policy goal of sedentarization after the 1974-75 drought, which was to enhance administrative control over the elusive nomadic population (ACR 1975/76:B305; Bradbury 2008:40).

282 See also Greenfield (1991:15f.), who states that there was “widespread revolution” against the execution of the religious leaders, and that Barre’s ‘revolution’ “had reached the zenith of its popularity.”

283 Inspired by similar movements in Saudi Arabia (Wahabiyya) and Egypt (Ikwaan al Muslimun), small religious groups had started to emerge in the early 1970s. These Islamist movements actively promoted a regime that was founded on strict sharia rule. Furthermore, several other Islamist organizations were founded.
ten of the religious leaders were sentenced to death (ACR 1975/76:B305). The government’s rash response shocked many Somalis and the incident served to radicalise Islamic groups in Somalia, some of whom were to resurface in new Islamic movements in the civil war three decades later (Le Sage 2004; Marchal 2004; cf. Bradbury 2008:37). As Abdullahi (2007a:44) has it, this clash between the military government and religious leaders gradually led the two forces of Islamism and clannism to “unite in favour of regime change.” By the mid-1970s, however, other divisions emerged, corroding regime standardization.

Overall, the years prior to the Ogadeen War “could be described as successful” (Omar 1996:73). While Omar justifies this ‘success’ with the fact that Barre “enhanced the country’s image abroad” (ibid.), there are good reasons to argue that some progress was also achieved on an internal level. Viewed through the regime standardization prism, the early to mid-1970s were characterized by the standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. In this sense, other observers considered that “Barre elicited a higher degree of societal cohesion in Somalia than had previously existed” (Gorman 1981:41), and that “[w]e may take the years 1974-76 as the high tide of the Somali state system” (Rawson 1994:151). Having used strong state organs to build nationalism (Interview 156), the Somali state appeared to have reached – despite certain shortcomings – a level of standardization of its institutions and socio-cognitive systems as never before.

### 3.4 Interim Conclusion

Even though both the civilian and the military state-making endeavours ultimately faltered, they significantly differed with respect to the breadth and depth of their respective regime standardization. While the state-making project of the 1960s failed to overcome the regime plurality inherited from colonialism, that of the early to mid-1970s was characterized by increasing institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. As Laitin (1976:463, 466) has it, the emergent social stratification based on urban-rural, regional, and linguistic differentials that became recognizable by the late 1960s was discarded by the military government.” Thus, rather than being solely marked by processes of ‘state collapse’ (Abdullahi 2007a: 43),

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during the course of the 1970s, notably an-Nahda and al-Abdi (Abdullahi 2001; cf. Renders 2006:146), and were implicated in the protest against the promulgation of the 1975 Family Law.

Barre’s early rule brought about an enhancement of state-making. By means of banning clannism, revitalizing nationalism, and introducing scientific socialism, amongst others, the dictator propelled the sharing of common, national ‘rules of the mind’ and “Somalia experienced for the first time the establishment of an efficient state” (Gorman 1981:40).

However, the common argument that the differences in state trajectories stemmed from divergent institutions and policies (Lewis 2002:206; Farah 1976; Ghalib 1995:141) can be scrutinized on the basis that there has been a considerable continuity with regard to policies and concomitant rules from the civilian to the military leadership. Both governments, for example, aspired to acquit themselves of clannism, had a similar take on traditional authorities, tried to ensure a particular clan balance, attempted more or less successfully to introduce a script for the Somali language, and tried to stimulate national sentiments. Thus, this chapter proposed that the major difference between the two state-making endeavours lay less with different policies rather than with the degree to which the respective leadership was successful in bringing about regime standardization – which was partly a function of the state apparatuses’ divergent organization and administration. As Lewis (1972:406) remarks with regard to the policies of the military government: “These ambitions and slogans are not new; and dissatisfaction with the previous civilian leaders centred not on their aims, but on their failure to implement them effectively and sincerely.”

Yet, the euphoria with which the SRC had been welcomed began to wane in the mid-1970s (Ahmed I. Samatar 1993:85; Interview 19), seeing the socialist ideology running out of steam (Laitin 1982:63). “After about eight years of relatively meritocratic assignment of jobs and successful economic reform, along with a state ideology of scientific socialism” (Laitin 1999a:147), Barre embarked on a war to reclaim the Ogadeen of eastern Ethiopia, which was to herald a change in Somalia’s state trajectory. It is to this perennial issue of long-standing Somali irredentism and the second phase of his rule to which we now turn.


286 Compare e.g. Castagno (1960:9) and Lewis (2002:156) for the civilian governments with Compagnon (1995:213) and Brons (2001:173) for the military government.

287 Castagno (1970:27), Lewis (1979:35), Laitin (1982:60), Bakonyi/Shuvoy (2005:364) and Adam (2008:1) observe that Barre was careful not to overly disturb clan balance at the central political level. See also Compagnon (1995:215). However, it is true that “[a]fter Siyad’s rise to power in 1969 the interriverine clans were underrepresented in the ministry and in regional and district positions of leadership” (Besteman 1996a:583).
War and State-(Un)Making

The policy of détente towards Ethiopia that Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal had heralded in 1967 was continued by Siyad Barre. Although he sustained his primarily diplomatic strategy to re-appropriate the Ogadeen even after Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassi was overthrown on September 12th, 1974 (Henze 1985:32), ‘war clouds’ gathered over the Horn of Africa (Farer 1976), ultimately discharging into one of the most ferocious conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa (Woodward 1977:281; Tareke 2000:635). Although the war sparked national fervour, it resulted in a U-turn of the progressive state-making project Barre had initiated (Mohamed 1992:6; Bryden 1999b:3; Tripodi 1999a:1). During the 1980s Somalia’s economy plunged (Laitin 1993:130ff.; Compagnon 1990:281; Kivimäki 2001:12), its politics came to be marked by ‘bad governance’, nepotism and clan politics (Sheik-Abdi 1981:163; Tripodi 1999a:1), and the country witnessed a massive weapons overflow (Luckham/Bekele 1984a/b). Moreover, parts of the population experienced relative deprivation, which aggravated existing grievances (Africa Watch 1990:1). Thus, the war is frequently perceived as a “milestone on the road to the collapse” (Abdullahi 2007a:45).288

Yet, the Ogaden War was not the only conflict Somalia experienced between 1977 and 1991. Following the Somali defeat in 1978, armed resistance against Barre’s rule took root. Officially pronounced in London on April 6th, 1981, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was one of the first rebel groups to form. After moving its headquarters to the Haud shortly after its formation, the Isaaq-based SNM waged a guerrilla struggle against the Somali government in the country’s north-west. In alliance with other militias that formed throughout the decade, the rebel movement aimed to overthrow and replace Barre. In light of his defeat and particular developments unfolding in 1991, the SNM decided to abrogate

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the union of 1960 and declared the Republic of Somaliland an independent state. Although Somaliland has not been internationally recognized, this alleged ‘success story’\(^{289}\) that has also been considered to be “very much a product of war” (Spears 2004b:185), survived as a *de facto* polity for the subsequent two decades.

One puzzle emerging from those two war trajectories is why the former led to state-*breaking* while the latter resulted in state-*making*? This question arises particularly in light of received wisdom which holds that particularly civil wars are destined to break rather than make states (see e.g. Kaldor 1999; Rotberg 2002). While some regional analysts acknowledge that war has played an important role in state-making processes in the Horn of Africa in general (Ahmed/Green 1999; Clapham 2001) and Somaliland more particularly (Jacquin-Berdal 2002),\(^{290}\) the conundrum of why the two wars led to divergent state-making outcomes largely remains. There is a dearth of structural comparison of these two wars and their impact on the respective state trajectories, and the few existing explanations that illuminate the role violent conflict exercised on Somali state trajectories lack a common denominator.

The variables that accrued from the Ogadeen War and allegedly contributed to the unmaking of the Somali state differ in nature from those warring factors that supposedly led to the ‘success’ of Somaliland’s state-making project.\(^{291}\) While, for example, the economic decline Somalia experienced throughout the 1980s goes a long way towards explaining the state’s demise,\(^{292}\) Somaliland’s state-making endeavour can hardly be explained in terms of economic prosperity. Furthermore, most accounts of Somaliland’s state-making endeavour suppress the crucial role of the decade-long insurgency altogether, suggesting that the polity’s post-war reconstruction started “from scratch” (APD 2002b:19; Bradbury 2008:4), principally ‘based’ on an institutional ‘tabula rasa’ after 1991. Yet, by neglecting the role of the civil war in Somaliland’s state-making endeavour, these accounts not only gloss over war-to-peace continuities, but also dismiss the hypothesis that war may be constitutive of state-making.

\(^{289}\) On the characterization of Somaliland as ‘success’, see subsequent chapters.
\(^{290}\) Huliaras 2002; Spears 2004b:185; Bradbury 2008:2; Bakonyi 2009.
\(^{291}\) While the factors that are thought to have contributed to the unmaking of the Somali state were mentioned before, the positive effect of the civil war in northern Somalia is, if considered at all, found to largely lie in the abolition of dictatorial rule (see e.g. Bradbury 2008:50).
\(^{292}\) The amount of US military and economic aid Somalia received dwindled from USD 34 million in 1984 to USD 8.7 million in 1987 – a fraction of the government’s requested USD 47 million (Said S. Samatar 1993:46).
Applying the regime prism to the Ogadeen War of 1977/78 and analysing the Somali civil war of the 1980s, I aim to shed light on their divergent impact on the respective state-making projects. While being well aware of the caveat that the first war constituted an interstate war, whereas the latter constituted an intra-state conflict, I argue that they are comparable when viewed through the regime standardization prism. As proposed in Chapter 2, both types of war can either contribute to or abrogate processes of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, thus being either constitutive or obstructive to state-making. In the case of the Ogadeen War, I suggest that the prosecution of the war undermined the state’s ability to conduct institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. The civil war instigated by the SNM, however, had more complex influences on the enhancement of particular ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. While the SNM-led war resulted in the emergence of an alternative and dominant power centre in the north-west that had significant leverage over the choice and implementation of a particular set of rules, and although it contained developments that were constitutive of state-making, it did not lead to outright regime standardization.

While the role of war in processes of state-making will be taken up again in Chapter 5, this chapter begins to deconstruct the ‘black box’ of war. Section One sets out by providing a brief historical background to the Ogadeen War and its evolution before delving into an analysis of how the war effort affected institutional and socio-cognitive standardization both during the war years and throughout the 1980s. I suggest that although some of the emergent fissures had already existed in an embryonic form prior to the Ogadeen War, the unfolding drama of institutional and socio-cognitive de-standardization stood in stark contrast to the state trajectory of the 1970s. Section Two provides a brief overview of the SNM’s anti-government war in the country’s north-west, and investigates how this civil war contributed to the state-making endeavour that culminated in the formation of the Republic of Somaliland. An interim conclusion sums up the chapter’s findings.

4.1 The Ogadeen War and its Effect on State-Breaking

The eighteen month Ogadeen War between early 1977 and mid-1978 was embedded in a long conflictive history (Clapham 2001; Gamst 1986:133). ‘Western Somalia’, which includes the Ogadeen, the Haud, and the Reserved Areas, had already been home to the

Around the time that Somalia gained independence, Ethiopia was trying to enhance its control over the Ogadeen – an objective that can be read as attempt to increase institutional and socio-cognitive standardization on the part of the Ethiopian leadership – which sparked further conflict. Ogaden rebels turned to Mogadishu, where they harvested weapons and encouragement to form liberation movements (Henze 1985:30). After the Somali-backed insurgency activities peaked in 1963 (Henze 1985:30), Ethiopian and Somali troops clashed along their common border in early 1964.

Overpowered by Ethiopian forces, Somalia engaged in peace negotiations in April 1964, halted its support for the rebel movements (Nkaisserry 1997:10), and slowly commenced a policy of appeasement (Henze 2000:262ff.). Nevertheless, unrest among the Ogaden and Oromo population continued, accompanied by rising nationalist sentiments (HRW 2008:16). Thus, in 1966, Ethiopia declared martial law in ‘Western Somalia’ (Henze 1985:31) and it took the leadership in Addis Ababa until 1971 to pacify the region (Matthies 1977:422ff.). Yet, when the Ethiopian Emperor was overthrown in September 1974, plunging the country into civil war, Somalis within and outside of ‘Western Somalia’ saw a historic window of opportunity (Farer 1979:120) and felt an “irresistible temptation” (Markakis 1998:131) to finally re-appropriate the ‘lost territories’.

This objective was promising due to political changes not only in the region, but also in the prevailing international environment. The military support Somalia had secured from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1963 expanded significantly after Barre’s coup d’etat in 1969, his embrace of socialism in 1970, and the signing of a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1974. Although Ethiopia had received military backing from the United States of America (USA) from 1953 onwards, Somalia started closing the

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293 See Chapter 3, particularly fn. 189, 190.
294 After having neglected ‘Western Somalia’ for several decades, Ethiopia strengthened its regional presence in the 1950s in anticipation of Somali irredentist claims (Gorman 1981:30, cf. Lockyer 2006:4). Ethiopia promoted national integration e.g. by establishing schools in the Ogadeen from 1957 onwards and introducing Amharic – a language barely known in the region – as medium of instruction. Moreover, it fortified its provincial bureaucratic structures and started levying a head tax in 1963 (Markakis 1998:128) – measures that were all indicative of regime standardization.
gap and soon claimed one of the finest military forces in sub-Saharan Africa. By 1970, it had a military manpower of 20,000, which ranked it among Africa’s top five, and by 1973 the military balance in the Horn of Africa shifted in favour of the Somalis for the first time in recorded history (Legum/Lee 1977:32).

Yet, Somalia’s military window of opportunity started closing again, when the newly empowered Ethiopian military junta of the Dergue hoisted the socialist flag, striking a USD 380 million arms supply deal with the USSR in December 1976 (IISS 1978). Disgruntled Somalia re-evaluated its options and three months after the USA had promised military aid to Somalia in July 1977 (Ofcansky 1993:183; Weiss 1980:11) officially renounced the 1974 Soviet-Somali treaty. While this completed the phenomenal great powers switch, the USA ultimately refused to supply weaponry to Somalia, largely because the latter continued to pursue its irredentist policy, leaving Egypt and Saudi Arabia as sole funders of military aid to Somalia.

Although bolstering his military, Barre refrained from seeking an outright military solution to the Ogaden dispute (Matthies 1987:239f.; Lewis 2002:227f.). In order not to have his diplomatic options torpedoed, he brought the United Front (UF) – an umbrella organization of numerous Ethiopian-based Somali guerrilla movements that had been established in 1973 – under strict government control (Interview 141). By 1975 the UF came to be so strongly controlled, organized and equipped by Mogadishu, that it was considered “an arm of the Somali army” (Gilkes 1994b:722). In January 1976, the movement was split for logistical and propaganda reasons into the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and the Abo-Somali Liberation Front (ASLF) (Compagnon...
1995:378). Aiming to keep militancy on either side of the Somali-Ethiopian border at bay, Barre not only restricted the WSLF’s activities (Gilkes 1994b:722), but even avoided mentioning their existence to the Somali population (Markakis 1987:227; Lockyer 2006:5).

Instead, Barre sent emissaries to Addis Ababa to negotiate autonomy for the Ogadeen (Lewis 2002:232). Yet, when the respective regional and international-level negotiations failed, Barre availed himself of the Somali guerrillas (Laitin 1979b:112). Throughout 1976, the WSLF developed into “one of the largest and most capable insurgent movements in Africa” (Lockyer 2006:6), starting to move west in early 1977 (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:133; Markakis 1998:31). By spring, the ASLF controlled most of the countryside in Bale (Lewis 2002:233), by June the WSLF had conquered 60 per cent of the Ogaden, and by the end of July, Ethiopia had conceded control of its eastern territories, except for the cities of Jigjiga, Harar, and Dire Dawa (Ofcansky 1993:185). Only then, on July 13th, 1977, did Barre officially commit his regular troops to the war (Nkaiserry 1997:15), reinforcing some 6,000-15,000 WSLF fighters with 35,000 soldiers (Lockyer 2006:9, referring to Marcus 1994:196f.; Matthies 1987:241f.). Thus, “the Somali irredentist dream of national reunification with one of the lost territories was about to be realized” (Nkaiserry 1997:16).

After a swift military advance, the tables turned in 1978 (Weiss 1980:8). Due to massive military support, which had been airlifted together with some 1,500 Soviet military advisors and about 15,000 Cuban troops to Ethiopia in late 1977 (Henze 1985:56; Ofcansky 1993:183; Urban 1983:44), the Somali attacks on Dire Dawa and Harar failed. When the

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303 Legum/Lee 1977:33; Markakis 1998:131. While the WSLF represented the interests of the Somalis in ‘Western Somalia’ and voiced historical claims to autonomy, the ASLF acted in the name of the Oromo and Arsi in the Ethiopian regions of Bale and southern Sidamo and was considered less nationalist in orientation (Markakis 1987:226). Representing a minority in the territory it claimed, the ASLF had mainly been established for strategic reasons – to multiply regional opposition groups within Ethiopia (Compagnon 1995:378), conciliate Oromo sensibilities, and counteract the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an ethno-nationalist movement, mainly based in the Bale and Hararghe provinces, whose territorial claims overlapped with those of the Somali state (Tareke 2000:639).


306 On the Somali invasion, see also Porter (1984:182, fn. 2), Legum/Lee (1977:88), Weiss (1980:8). Although Barre steadfastly maintained until February 1978 that the SNA was not involved in combat operations (ACR 1977-78:B374; Legum/Lee 1977:88), evidence suggests that some 1,500 Somali regulars had already started operating in Ethiopia in early 1977 (Ottaway/Ottaway 1978:209; Lockyer 2006:7). What the Somali leadership admitted, however, was that regular troops ‘on leave’ had been allowed to ‘volunteer’ for the guerrilla forces from early 1977 onwards (ACR 1977-78:B374; Legum/Lee 1977:88).
Ethiopian-Cuban-Soviet counter-offensive resulted in the fall of Jigjiga on March 5th, 1978, Somali defeat was inevitable (Compagnon 1995:384). Barre recalled the Somali National Army (SNA), which had lost some 8,000 men, three-quarters of its armoured units, and half of the Somali Air Forces on March 9th, 1978 (Ofcansky 1993:183).

While various reasons can be put forward as having sparked the conflict over ‘Western Somalia’, it appears that it was the decision of French Somalia to declare independence on June 27th, 1977 that ultimately sparked the military invasion a few weeks later (Interview 135). This dealt a decisive blow to the idea of ‘Somali nationalism’ as well as the ideal of ‘Somali nationness’, and needed to be countered by a clear demonstration that Somalis belonged together – before the existing regime plurality among the diverse Somali territories led to further fragmentation. How did the war affect the lurking pluralization of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, and what was its impact on the Somali state trajectory?

Socio-Cognitive (De-)Standardization

Along the lines of the ‘war-is-development-in-reverse’-thesis, the Ogadeen War is usually held responsible for the breakdown of the Somali state. Yet, if viewed through the regime prism, a slightly more nuanced picture emerges. Although it is indisputable that the war had significant repercussions on Somalia’s state-making project throughout the 1980s, it appears that the impact of the war per se on levels of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization was less clear cut. In fact, the war effort seems to have led, overall, to an increase in regime standardization, as mass conscription into the army and fierce national sentiments augmented the sharing of a common set of rules. While the war triggered processes of regime de-standardization that set in subsequent to the violent conflict, some of these could probably have been circumvented had the political leadership chosen other policies in the war’s aftermath. The subsequent paragraphs illustrate how the inter-state war influenced the standardization of particular rules during and after the war.

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308 See fn. 288.
Strengthening Common ‘Rules of the Mind’

By the mid-1970s, nationalist sentiments had started to wane, partly due to Barre’s increasingly repressive policies, his denunciation of Islam, and the population’s growing objection to ‘scientific socialism’ (Interviews 113, 19). Yet, the prospects of ultimately ‘liberating’ the ‘lost territories’ not only led to a skyrocketing of nationalism (Farer 1979:126), but turned into a “national obsession” (Lewis 2002:236) that resulted in increasing popular demands to invade Ethiopia (Laitin 1979b:112). Widespread enthusiasm about decisive military action and general discontent with Barre’s inert and inconsiderate policy led to “considerable unrest in the capital city” (Laitin 1979b:112). Students in Mogadishu launched protests and spurred nationalist agitation to force the government’s hand (Markakis 1998:131), leading General Wako Guto to advise Barre to immediately advance military steps, “if serious domestic upheavals were to be avoided” (Lewis 2002:232; Compagnon 1995:377; Laitin 1979b:112).

However, as Barre did not want to move beyond increasing the government’s support for various Ethiopian-based guerrilla movements (Markakis 1998:131), he had several hundred students and numerous leading rebel leaders arrested (Markakis 1987:224ff.), which resulted in the formation of an organized opposition to the military government (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:140; Ododa 1985:285; Lewis 2002:238). In order to keep internal turmoil at bay and re-direct the mounting aggression of the Somali people, Barre finally decided to commit the SNA to war (Lewis 2002:232; Interview 113), not least because this war constituted an important source of legitimacy for Barre. Additional impetus for Somali nationalism was provided by the termination of Somali-Russian relations in 1977, “as the population was impressed by the historical significance of the hour, and the damaging ‘betrayal’ by ideological comrades” (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:134ff.). Moreover, the general mobilization Barre announced on February 9th, 1978 “made for unity” (Greenfield 1991:16; Lewis 2002:238; Ododa 1985:285) and hardened the “ideological cement” (Compagnon 1995:428, my translation), resulting in the war marking “the high point of Somali nationalist fervour in recent Somali history” (Lewis 1989:573; Interviews 55, 113).
Searching for the Internal Enemy

Yet, military defeat “produced a national mood of depression” (S. S. Samatar 1993:45) and was followed by vehement accusations against the military government (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:137; Gassem 1994:31). In public discourse, defeat was blamed on Barre’s greediness and hubris, as it was believed that Ethiopia would have signed a peace agreement in September 1977, ceding the desired territories to Somalia (Spears 2010:139). 314 In order to smooth the waves of disgruntlement and discuss outstanding military challenges and opportunities, Barre met with numerous generals and officers in Hargeysa. Although the soldiery was encouraged to speak their minds, six of the most critical were executed, which was interpreted as “major evidence that Siyaad had insufficient respect for his army” (Laitin 1979b:113). 315 Only one month after the military defeat, some soldiers responded by mounting an abortive coup d’état on April 9th, 1978 (Tareke 2000:66; Ododa 1985:285), 316 making it plain to Barre that he could no longer rely on the military, the organ that had constituted his primary tool for regime standardization, or state-making, prior to the war.

Finding itself cornered, the government came to join the divisive search for culprits. As the attempted overthrow of Barre had largely been executed by officers of the Majerteen clan (Laitin 1979a:96), 317 they were summarily accused of high treason. While the blame soon shifted to the Isaaq clan, who had formed one of the earliest and most persistent opposition movements that did not falter like the SSDF, the conceptualization of scapegoats in clan terms “ended any sense of national unity” (Bradbury 1997:7). Similarly, Abdullahi (2007a:56) suggests that the military defeat and the fact that Barre spurned his own army in the war’s aftermath “was indeed the beginning of the downfall of the very idea the army was found[ed] upon: Somali nationalism.” Instead, it “quickly led to widespread public demoralization and to an upsurge of ‘tribalism’” (Lewis 1989:575).

314 See also Compagnon 1995:430. Yet, this assumption is not supported by evidence (cf. Jackson 2010:31).
316 The attempted coup was led by Mohamed Sheikh Usman «Irro» and Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, amongst others. For further details, see e.g. Africa Research Bulletin 1978 (cf. Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:138). While the coup failed, it led to the formation of the first anti-government guerrilla movement, the Somali Salvation Front (SSF). In October 1981 the SSF renamed itself the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), regrouping the SSF, the Somali Workers’ Party (SWP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia (DFLS) (cf. Pérouse de Montclos 2001:3).
317 Lewis 1980:246; Compagnon 1995:432; Sheik-Abdi 1981:171. Note: the Majerteen had held the key to power throughout most of the civilian era (Laitin 1982:61).
From Nationalism to Clannism

While it is hard to establish when the re-tribalization of Somali society set in, it is indisputable that an incremental revival of clan consciousness surfaced after the Ogadeen War (Adam 2008:192; Gassim 2002:vii; Interviews 55, 121). Suddenly, “it became possible for clan names once again to be publicly mentioned” (Greenfield 1991:16) and clannism “infiltrated the regime, bureaucracy and population at large” (Abdullahi 2007a:44). As well as the divisive search for a culprit for the Ogadeen debacle, Barre’s over-swift promotion of Marehan and (ex-WSLF) Ogaden officers within the SNA contributed to the clannisation of society, given that their promotion strengthened the dictator’s clannish power base due to his family links to these two clans (Brons 2001:184). These developments were enhanced by the increasing urbanization Somalia had experienced after the drought of 1974/75 and the Ogadeen War of 1977/78, which marked one of the most rapid processes of urbanization in Africa (Cassanelli 1996:20). Largely settling with their own kin, the inflowing population revived clannism into a strategy of survival (Compagnon 1995:504), thus heralding a clannisation of urban areas unseen until then (Marchal 2002:222f.).

Nationalism gave way to clannism also as a result of the inflow of some 700,000 Ogaden Somali refugees, who feared Ethiopian reprisals. The burden of what the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) described as “the most serious refugee problem in the world” (Fitzgibbon 1982a:62), was mainly borne by Somalia’s north-west, where about half of them arrived (Lewis 1989:575, 2002:246f.; Spears 2010:139). Attracting above-average international aid, being encouraged by Mogadishu to settle in the northern region, and receiving land titles and arms from Barre to repel a potential Ethiopian invasion, the refugees created resentment among the Isaaq population (Omaar 1992:232; Abukar 1992:109-37, 181-185; cf. Abdullahi 2007:44, Gilkes 1994a:47; Compagnon 1990:278).

While Mogadishu had about fifty thousand inhabitants in 1960, it had grown to over one million by the mid-1980s. Concurrently, Somalia’s urban annual growth rate rose from around 5.0-5.3 per cent between 1950-1975 to 9.9 per cent for the 1975-1980 era (UNDESA 2012).

Abdi Samatar (1992a:625) quotes a peasant in Jowhar stating the following in spring 1990: “Son, the tribalism business is the work of the urban people. They cook it there and then serve it to us.” While NGOs put the number of refugees at 500,000, Somali authorities claimed double the number (Compagnon 1995:420), and Mohamed (1992:6) even speaks of 1.5 million refugees. Similarly, Moseley (1980:A1) suggests that while some 700,000 Ogaden lived in refugee camps, a further 600,000 resided elsewhere in Somalia (cf. Lockyer 2006:12). The official figure ultimately agreed upon was 700,000. See Ahmed I. Samatar (1988:139), Lewis (1989:575).
Apart from causing "considerable disruption in the country’s internal structures" (ION 1985:2), the refugees’ arrival sparked a Somalia-wide discussion about Somali (national) identity. Although it had been convenient to declare a large population living beyond the borders of ‘Somalia proper’ as constituting Somali citizens as long as an irredentist policy was pursued (cf. Markakis 1998:126), opinion soon turned once this populace infiltrated Somalia and put pressure on its dwindling resources.

Once the fragmentation of the national identity was set in motion, the vicious circle of socio-cognitive de-standardization could seemingly not be reversed. The more fragile Barre’s position got, the more he resorted to ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics to keep the clans opposed to his rule in check. Thus, he instrumentalized the Ogaden and other clans in the north-west to suppress the challenge arising from the Isaaq. And the more Barre drew on the clans to which he was closely related – the Marehan, Ogaden, and Dhulbahante – the more the opposition reverted to its own respective clan structures, as trust was increasingly confined to kinship ties (Markakis 1998:132; Adam 1995:76). Although the opposition had been at pains not to form along clan lines after the aborted coup d’état of 1978 in order to emphasize the national character of their opposition (Compagnon 1995:441), the political landscape quickly turned into a “purely tribal confrontation” (Sheik-Abdi 1981:171). While Compagnon (1995:441) observes that “[t]he opposition became clannish only later in the 1980s” (my translation), Lewis (1961) attests that the upsurge of tribalism constituted “the traditional divisive response to extreme political and economic insecurity” (as quoted in Markakis 1987:233).

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323 See also Interview 55, in which it is suggested that the Ogaden people that were armed by Barre “came here, to Hargeysa, as an occupation force”, and Interview 113, according to which looting soldiers that returned from the Ogaden also created resentments amongst the Isaaq.

324 Henze (1982a:55) thus concludes that “[s]ince his defeat in the Ogaden […] he has retreated into reliance on his own clan links. His earlier vision of a Somalia rising above tribalism has faded into invisibility.”

325 Barre mainly relied on the Gadabursi, Isse, Dhulbahante, and Warsangeli, but also the Majerteen, once he had won them over after their attempted coup d’état (Adam 1995:76). For a clan genealogy, see Annex, Chart 1.

326 See e.g. the formation of Somali Democratic Action Front (SODAF), founded by former Minister of Justice Osman Nur Ali in Rome in 1976 (Ofcansky 1993:190), which constituted a trans-clan movement (Compagnon 1995:507). Just as the largely Majerteen-based SSF had Mustafa Haji Nuur from the Isaaq clan as its first general-secretary, SODAF had a non-Majerteen leader in 1979, namely the former mayor of Mogadishu Omar Hassan Mohamoud «Istarliin» from the Hawiye clan (Roobdoon Forum 2009).

327 See e.g. Gassem (1994:43f.) who describes the development of the SSDF from a national to a clan movement dominated by the Majerteen. Similar claims can be made for the SNM – see later sections.

328 See also Ahmed I. Samatar (1988:138) and Omaar (2004:91), who point out that “[i]n an impoverished country where life is a struggle for basic survival, and there is no public service ethos, dependence on family and clan is a necessity, not a choice.” See also Interviews 24, 156, according to which peoples’ reliance on the clan is a function of a governments’ (in)ability to provide basic services.
Losing the Regime Standardization Tool of Ideology

Barre’s ability to continue broadcasting an overarching set of ‘rules of the mind’ in the manner characteristic of his rule prior to the Ogaden War was further impeded by the loss of ‘scientific socialism’ as a common ideological framework. While popular enthusiasm for the revolution had allegedly dissipated by the mid-1970s (Laitin 1993:130; Interview 19), it became downright obsolete in the post-war era (Labahn 1990:160). Somalia’s switch in superpower affiliation not only prevented it from officially perpetuating ‘scientific socialism’ as a guiding ideology, but also “undermined whatever legitimacy state sponsored and managed economic projects had previously acquired” (Abdi I. Samatar 1993:32). This political dogma no longer had the support of the population, which rephrased the various slogans so as to ridicule Barre, ultimately leading the government to abolish all ideologically motivated songs (Compagnon 1995:356).\footnote{Barre also came to target other elements characteristic of ‘scientific socialism’, such as self-help schemes. For example, despite constituting a crucial part of his nation-building project of the early 1970s, he repressed an Isaaq self-help project designed to improve the war-ridden public (health) infrastructure in December 1981, as he perceived this initiative to be related to SNM (Bakonyi 2001:83).}

Thereby, the ideological shortfall not only impeded the carrying through of socio-cognitive standardization, but also had repercussions on the ability to maintain the standardization of common ‘rules of the game’, as the loss of ‘scientific socialism’ called the existence of the orientation centres and party offices into question. With these administrative structures being rejected by the population, Barre increasingly relied on coercive measures to maintain compliance with the state’s regime. In contrast to Numeiri in Sudan, Barre did not resort to Islam upon abandoning socialism (Adam 2008:11), even though religion constituted another ‘natural’ umbrella of the Somali people that could possibly bridge the divisive forces of clannism – as the Derwish movement of the early 20th century as well as the SNM, whose fighters came to call themselves ‘mujahedeen’, had done.\footnote{For a theoretical argument, see Londsdale (1981), who emphasizes the importance of the Christian religion for state- and nation-building in Europe due to its universalistic character (cf. Schlichte 1996:118; Bakonyi 2001:67). See also Souare (2007b:209).} This was probably because after having seriously challenged Islam during the mid-1970s, later resorting to it was not a valid option, not least because parts of Barre’s opposition had captured the religious terrain (cf. Rawson 1994:157). Thus, after the Somali leaders had abandoned the ‘scientific socialism’ on which they had relied for “ideological and organisational coercion and cohesion of their ruling Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, government institutions and the society as a whole were without a compass to guide them” (Elmi 1992:14).
Institutional (De-)Standardization

While socio-cognitive standardization appears to have increased prior to and during the course of war before plunging throughout the 1980s, the trajectory of institutional standardization is more difficult to establish. In part, this is due to the scarcity of reliable data and documentation when it comes to the Ogaden War. Nevertheless, there are indications of the state’s inability to maintain the processes of institutional standardization it had exercised prior to the war, such as the dissipation of its monopoly over the means of violence, the evolution of administrative plurality, and its decreasing ability to strike inclusive elite bargains largely due to the country’s economic malaise and subjection to measures of austerity at the hands of the Bretton Woods Institutions.

Ambivalent Warring Effects on the ‘Rules of the Game’

While information indicating institutional (de-)standardization for ‘Somalia proper’ during the war years is scarce, there are clues that institutional standardization was enhanced in the newly gained territories. For example, the Somali government “quickly set about imposing central control, brushing aside an attempt by WSLF cadres to form a civil administration” (Markakis 1987:230). Barre barred WSLF Central Committee members from entering the Ogaden and appointed two extraordinary commissioners to administer the liberated areas instead. Also on the lower administrative echelon, those individuals who had initially led the rebel movement were immediately removed from the scene, filling the posts of district governors with army officers true to party lines. As the new administrators were alien to their respective regions they were supported by a number of traditional authorities that acted as intermediaries with the local population. Simultaneously, Ogaden army officers and members of the Ogaden intelligentsia were posted in other parts of Somalia (Markakis 1987:230).

Reflecting very much the British system of indirect rule, this administrative set-up not only prevented the Ogaden in general and the WSLF more particularly from broadcasting an own regime, but also facilitated Barre to implement the set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules

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331 Two of the three most substantive accounts of the Ogaden War are almost solely based on Somali oral testimonies (Markakis 1987; Gilkes 1994b), and the third major account is constructed mainly from secondary and a few unnamed primary sources (Porter 1984) (cf. Tareke 2000:635).
332 Major Abdirizak Mohamed Abokor (Darod/Majerteen) was appointed to administer the Ogaden, while Colonel Mohamed Omar Jess (Darod/Ogaden) was to administer Bale and Sidamo (Compagnon 1995:313).
of the mind’ he favoured. This was particularly important in light of the fact that the WSLF wavered between a future marked by full independence, autonomy within a federal Somalia, and integration into the Somali state (Gamst 1986:143; Tareke 2000:639; Markakis 1987:228). Yet, while the first steps were being taken to establish an administrative structure in the Ogadeen, the occupied territory was far from seeing a significant administrative penetration and build-up of infrastructure (Lockyer 2006:9) – a fact largely owed to the brevity of the Somali state’s presence in the Ogadeen.

A Crumbling Army

A similarly mixed picture regarding regime standardization emerges for the armed forces that pressed into Ethiopia. Although the general mobilization of early 1978 points towards institutional and socio-cognitive standardization within the military, such processes did not extend to the Ogaden-based guerrilla units, who were dealt with in a distinct manner. Not only were they treated as military spearhead and cannon fodder (Interview 141), but they also remained without pay and depended on donations of regular SNA soldiers for basic needs such as food, water, and ammunition (Markakis 1987:230). Thus, while the army did not differentiate between different clans during the course of the war (Interview 141) – a fact that indicates regime standardization – different ‘rules of the game’ existed for those who were uniformed and those who were not.

Subsequent to the war, however, the once unified army started to fragment. Disapproval of Barre’s conduct of the war and his uncompromising dealings with the army in its aftermath led to an abortive coup d’état by a number of high-ranking officers on April 9th, 1978 (Tareke 2000:66; Ododa 1985:285) and a mutiny in the ranks of some military units – during the suppression of which some five hundred soldiers reportedly died at the hands of forces loyal to Barre (Lewis 2002:245). When six months after the attempted coup seventeen of the officers involved were executed (Sheik-Abdi 1981:171), another army mutiny occurred in the north (Markakis 1987:233). These developments “crystallised the deep divisions within the armed forces” after the lost Ogaden War (Laitin 1979b:95).

333 While the WSLF aimed for separation of the Ogaden from Ethiopia, it came to be “cool on union with Somalia and its increasingly despotic regime” (Gamst 1986:143). In a public statement, a WSLF spokesman maintained that the movement sought “self-determination for the people of the Ogaden, not merger with Somalia” (Henze 1982a:56).


From being the “backbone of the state” (Lewis 1979:21), the army had become fragmented (Abdullahi 2007a:45). These divisions were to proliferate, as neither the failed coup nor the mutinies were to be the last of their sort (Ododa 1985:285).

Despite Barre drafting increasing numbers into the army, the military also suffered from regime de-standardization. While the army’s ranks swelled from about 23,000 troops in the mid-1970s to some 50,000 by 1981 and an alleged 65,000 by 1990 (Ofcansky 1993:181), the military no longer had the considerable prestige it had enjoyed prior to the war (Ofcansky 1993:202). Rather, the army had to rely on forced conscription (Gassem 1994:35) and increasingly depended on Barre’s related Marehan, Ogaden and Dhulbahante clans. From only four Marehan military officers in 1969, two decades later their numbers had increased to a disproportionate 50 per cent (Labahn 1990:174). Hence, “[b]y the end of the 1980s the command structure [of the army] had collapsed, largely as a result of the over-swift promotion of untrained Marehan” (Gilkes 1994a:47).

The army’s low morale, the fact that its leadership could no longer resort to either the ideology of ‘scientific socialism’ or the dream of ‘Greater Somalia’, and the military’s command structure “had lost its independence and professionalism, becoming an inseparable part of the party” (Abdullahi 2007a:45; S.S. Samatar 1993a:49) further contributed to its de-standardization. And as Barre came to understand after the attempted coup that the army could be dangerous to him, he “systematically began to dismantle the cadres and the leadership”, destroying the army and with it the state (Anonymous 2005:136; Compagnon 1992:9). Furthermore, as the SNA suffered approximately 7-8,000 casualties (Tareke 2000:665), this not only diminished military prowess, but also constituted a significant loss of an ideologically standardized group. Thus, it was judged that “[t]he SNA never recovered from its defeat in the Ogaden War” (Library of Congress 1993:116), and

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337 By late 1977, there had allegedly been some 35,000 SNA and an additional 15,000 WSLF combatants (Tareke 2000:638; Adam 2008:53, 1994:27).
339 The great loss of personnel devoted to ‘scientific socialism’ as well as the accelerated ‘Marehanisation’ of politics and administration resulted in “exasperating the systematic purge of talent that had been going on for some time” (Sheik-Abdi 1981:167).
340 The same argument is made for the Somali Police Forces, Interview 42.
came to be hardly distinguishable from the insurgency groups in regard to its organization and procedure (Bakonyi/Stuvøy 2005:366).

**Dissolving Power Monopoly**

The fragmentation of the military went in tandem with a loss of the state’s power monopoly (Bakonyi/Stuvøy 2005:365). Due to “considerable anxiety in Somalia that the Ethiopian advance would not stop at the border but would press on into the Republic” (Lewis 2002:239), Barre issued significant quantities of arms to the civilian population in the north, particularly to the Ogaden refugees (ibid.). The dissolution of the state’s monopoly over the means of violence accelerated once Barre faced military opposition to his rule, as the dictator organized paramilitary units and encouraged the creation of clan militias – particularly amongst the Darod – which were trained and financed by the state (Ofcansky 1993:207). Especially in combination with a resurfacing clannisation, the dissipation of the state’s power monopoly impeded the maintenance of an overarching set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’.

“Finally, Barre was in deeper trouble in the provinces than even he realized; his security machinery had lost its ability to intimidate and coerce” (Rawson 1994:157). Thus, skirmishes over land titles re-occurred between nomads; Islamic fundamentalists, who claimed SSDF affiliation, briefly took over the town of Las Aanod; and a clash between Ogaden and Marehan groups put the town of Kismayo under mob siege for a week (ibid.). The state’s monopoly of violence had diminished to such an extent that Barre could no longer prevent a “sudden increase in criminal violence” in the Mogadishu of the late 1980s (Kivimäki 2001:3, referring to Simons 1994:819), and it was not long before the vanishing power monopoly was replaced by a power plurality (Compagnon 1995:428) that was incrementally occupied by opposition movements.

**Administrative Turmoil and Decline**

Indications of institutional de-standardization can also be detected in the administrative sphere, which came to be beset with bureaucratic mismanagement (Abdi I. Samatar 1993:28, referring to World Bank 1981). Following the parliamentary elections on December 30th, 1979, which largely resulted from Western countries pressuring the

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342 Fitzgibbon (1982a:72) even states that “Somalia has actually been invaded.” For a Somali government account of the 1983 border transgression by Ethiopia, see Somalia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1983).
government into liberalizing the economy and political life, Barre reshuffled the cabinet and abolished the position of his three vice-presidents. While the fact that the newly elected ‘People’s Parliament’ consisted only of individuals that belonged to the government party (S.S. Samatar 1993a:46) and the swift reinstallation of the SRC in October 1980 point towards regime maintenance, Barre’s repeated political reshuffling throughout the 1980s led to an institutional plurality that was detrimental to state-making.

While rulers frequently rotate officeholders “to regulate and control rent seeking, to prevent rivals from developing their own power base, and to demonstrate their power” (Bratton/van de Walle 1994:463, cf. Hagmann 2005a:9), such tactics resulted in weakening of Somali state. After having declared a state of emergency on October 21st, 1980 (Compagnon 1995:438), the state disposed of three parallel and overlapping executive structures: the party’s politburo with its Central Committee, the CSS, and the SRC (Ottaway 1982:119ff.; Lewis 2002:249). Each of these executive organizations was given its day in the sun, “only to be quickly superseded by another political constellation” (Rawson 1994:155). While this comportment neutralized political opponents and left processes of decision-making solely in the hands of Barre (Said S. Samatar 1993a:46), it also paralyzed the state’s administration and undermined state organizations and institutions (Rawson 1994:155).

The state’s ability to maintain its administration and, thus, central tool for regime standardization was also diminished by the macroeconomic policy agreements that Barre struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in February 1980, July 1981 and July 1982. Not only did these contracts force the Somali state to cease acting as the last resort employer of all secondary school graduates (Interview 55), they also led to a significant downsizing of its administrative apparatus – by 1985, the Somali government had dismissed some 5,000 civil servants (Laitin 1993:132f.). In order to maintain cohesion amongst the remaining administrators, Barre increased military domination by reappointing loyal military officers to administer most of the country’s districts and regions (Compagnon 1995:438). Furthermore, he consigned “the director-generals of all ministries to a five months’ stint in

343 Only six months after it was reinstated, Barre expelled 10 of the SRC’s 17 members (Henze 1982a:55).
344 The state of emergency as well as the SRC were disbanded again in March 1982, just before Barre paid his first official visit to the USA (Ododa 1985:288; Lewis 2002:249).
the national orientation centre in Mogadishu”, in order to bring “all the country’s top civil servants under close military control” (Lewis 2002:246).

Yet, despite these efforts to create a coherent and effective administrative structure, the administrative apparatus was increasingly self-absorbed, retreating from its actual task of governing the population (A.S. Mohamed 1980:205). The “absence of all representative institutions and the transformation of state institutions into instruments of oppression meant that clan was the only safe retreat and the only means with which to organize and mobilize opposition to the regime” (Spears 2010:141, referring to I.M. Samatar 1997:40) – thus perpetuating regime de-standardization. Barre added fuel to the fire when he resorted to his last option in trying to run the country, reinstalling the elders as a ‘traditional’ network of administrators (Osman-Shuke 2004:149; Elmi 1992:14). Barre either tried to appease them,347 or aimed at “destroying the cohesion of the community, leaving it bereft of its respected and experienced leaders” (Africa Watch 1990:123; Greenfield 1991:26). Either way, the traditional authorities increasingly acquired power over politics and the military, which provided a smooth transition into the important role they played in numerous rebel movements.348

4.2 Civil War and its Effect on State-Making

Whereas the Ogadeen War resulted in the unmaking of the Somali state, the ensuing civil war led to the formation of a new political entity: the Republic of Somaliland. Although it is argued that Somaliland “challenges the image of war” (Bradbury 2008:2) and that this polity

346 While Barre relied on the traditional authorities after the mass dismissal of civil servants in 1974 (Interview 135), which had been dictated largely by economic pressures (S.S. Samatar 1993:38), and partly used them to mobilize human and material resources for the Ogadeen War (Marchal 2002:220f.; Interview 135), his reliance on them was never as pronounced as in the second half of the 1980s (Interview 137).

347 In 1981, for example, “he distributed money to the elders of the Majerteen clan, which had been a victim of his barbaric repression since 1979, in order to buy them back in” (Compagnon 1995:500, my translation), and applied similar tactics to the Isaaq clan (Compagnon 1995:470, 500, referring to Laitin/Samatar 1987:159; Gilkes 1989:57).

348 The SSDF, for example, atrophied not only due to a heavy reliance on foreign funding from Libya, but also Barre’s ability to divide the Majerteen. Publicizing defections through the official media and appointing some SSDF defectors to prominent positions, Barre rendered the SSDF almost defunct (Ghalib 1995:184; Adam 1995:76).

349 See Compagnon (1990:280) who proposes that, by the late 1980s, the army’s loyalty depended more on clan elders than the état-major.
was “very much a product of war” (Spears 2004b:185), the war’s role in Somaliland’s state-making project remains understudied. While scholars such as Prunier (1990/91), Compagnon (1990a, 1998), Marchal (1992, 1997a), de Waal (1994), Bakonyi (2009), and Spears (2010) have significantly contributed to our understanding of the early organization of violence and the dynamics of war in Somalia and Somaliland, the connection between the civil war and Somaliland’s state-making endeavour is frequently not subjected to any greater scrutiny. Instead, most accounts of Somaliland’s state-making commence their analysis with the unilateral declaration of independence of 1991 at the very earliest. Yet, neglecting the bellicose decade preceding Somaliland’s formal creation is not only problematic empirically, but also conceptually, as this leaves the World Bank’s (2003) disputable proposition that war constituted nothing but ‘development in reverse’ unquestioned.

Scrutinizing prevailing accounts the following section addresses the questions if and how the civil war affected Somaliland’s state-making project. Aiming to go beyond the argument that the war’s central contribution lay in the de-construction of the oppressive Somali state, the following analysis contributes to existing knowledge on the civil war and the state-making endeavour. Although the war was not uniformly constitutive of Somaliland’s state-making and does not serve as a clear-cut counter-example to the Ogadeen War as regards bellicose effects on state trajectories, I posit that some of Somaliland’s central foundations as a de facto state arise from the anti-government war. While the war was neither part of an intentional state-making project, nor can it be said as having resulted in comprehensive processes of regime standardization, it nevertheless shaped the subsequent rise of an embryonic state in Somaliland.

The SNM, Its Struggle, and Secession

Founded by a group of Isaaq émigrés living in Jedda h, Saudi Arabia, in April 1981, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was announced shortly thereafter in London on 18th May. Created by an intellectual elite with the objective of overthrowing Barre’s dictatorial

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350 In fact, it is generally argued that the 1991-1993 period was characterized by peace-building and that state-building did not set in until 1993 (Bradbury 2008:77; Ali/Walls 2008). Along these lines Battera (2004:7) suggests that “[t]he Burco Congress represents the beginning of the state-building process in Somaliland” (see also Battera/Campo 2001:8). Pham (2012:19) even suggests that state-building in Somaliland did not start before 2001. A notable exception is I.M. Samatar (1997).
government the organization soon transferred its headquarters to the Ethiopian border region next to north-western Somalia and launched guerrilla attacks on government installations within Somalia in early 1982. Facing increasing rebel activities in Somalia and Ethiopia, Barre and Mengistu Haile Mariam signed a joint communiqué on April 3rd, 1988, agreeing to cease their support for insurgents operating in each other’s territories. Losing its Ethiopian sanctuary (Compagnon 1990b:266), the SNM’s survival was at stake, leading the rebels to launch a daredevil attack on Somalia’s north-west. Given its success in establishing a presence in the rural areas and increasingly gaining popular support, Barre had the northern cities of Hargeysa and Burco bombed to rubble in 1988, in order to retaliate against the Isaaq’s support of the SNM. Yet, this and similar measures “only served to accelerate the transformation of the SNM guerrilla war into a conventional one” (Aideed 2004:196). The movement’s exponential growth from about 1,200 to up to 50,000 fighters (Flint 1994:37) led Prunier to conclude that there was no SNM, but “simply the Isaaq people up in arms” (ibid. 1990/91:109).

Throughout the struggle, the SNM tried to establish ties with other rebel movements, and aided the formation of the largely Hawiye-affiliated United Somali Congress (USC) in order to increase military pressures on the government (Interview 72). Yet the bonds with the movements that mainly emerged in the late 1980s remained spurious. By January 1991, the SNM controlled large parts of former British Somaliland, and expanded its military control from the rural to the urban areas. As the latter had largely been abandoned by the civilian population and SNA soldiers alike (Interviews 7, 121), the SNM took control over Hargeysa, Burco and other settlements without decisive battles (Interviews 121, 141). This military advance was paralleled by the USC’s achievement in driving Barre out of Mog-

351 One informant argues that the reason for the anti-government war lay at least partly in Barre’s inability to regain the Haud and the Reserved Areas, as well as his adherence to socialism, which was not well-perceived amongst the Isaaq businessmen who counted amongst the country’s wealthiest entrepreneurs (Interviews 99, 113).

352 Prunier 1994:62; Bryden 1994:38; Adam 2008:193; Bakonyi 2009:437. However, other sources attest that the SNM numbered ‘only’ some 3,500-5,000 regular fighters, while the vast majority of its force was made up of spontaneous, clan-based warriors (Interviews 7, 24, 75, 4).

353 The USC was founded in May 1989, but soon split into two factions headed by Mohamed Farah Hassan «Aideed» and Ali Mahdi Mohamed respectively. This was followed by the establishment of the Ogaden-affiliated Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in August of the same year. The United Somali Front (USF) was launched in November 1989 by the Issa clan, as was the Harti-affiliated United Somali Party (USP). Numerous other rebel groups and changing alliances were forged in the years around the fall of Barre (see e.g. Adam 2008:16f.).

354 The informant estimates that the population of Hargeysa, for example, dropped from about 500,000 in 1988 to some 5,000 by 1991.
dishu on January 27th, 1991. Ignoring prior agreements between the diverse rebel movements, the USC unilaterally proclaimed Ali Mahdi Mohamed President of Somalia, leading to a renewed feeling of marginalization in the north and subsequent abrogation of the 1960 consummated union between British Somaliland and Italian Somalia (Adam 2008:17).

While the general literature on Somaliland suggests that “secession had never been a stated aim of the SNM” (Bradbury 1997:18; Interview 112) and that it was a spontaneous act from the ‘grassroots’ (Drysdale 1992b),355 there is also evidence to the contrary. According to Gilkes and others, the debate over secession was present within the SNM as early as 1981 (ibid. 1993:6; Interviews 34, 72, 113),356 and “[o]nly a small group of intellectuals believed that Somalia would remain unified” (cf. Bryden 1994b:37). That the idea of abrogating the union of 1960 circulated amongst the Isaaq is evidenced by the fact that the Isaaq-based dissident group Ufo (‘hurricane’) also alluded to it, when it secretly gathered on June 26th, 1981 – the anniversary of Somaliland’s independence from British rule – and hoisted a Somali flag that featured only one of the star’s five spikes (Bryden 1994b:37). Yet, the SNM refrained from voicing the goal of independence publicly out of fear of potential political repercussions (Interviews 34, 113).357

Ultimately, the Somaliland leadership declared independence, a decision the literature commonly explains with reference to long-standing grievances on the part of the Isaaq, which “have made it impossible to keep alive the dream of unity” (Africa Watch 1990:1).358 This reason has rightly been called into question (Bakonyi 2009:435),359 partly because grievances were not a unique feature of the Isaaq community. Moreover, not all Isaaq – let alone all northern communities – welcomed secession.360 At the same time, alternative

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356 I.M. Samatar 1997:46f.; Spears 2010:139. According to one informant, first thoughts of secession and independence surfaced after the Ogadeen War, triggered by the fact that the Somalis were incapable of regaining the lost territories of the Haud and the Reserved Areas (Interview 135).
357 According to some, the SNM feared broad-based opposition at the hands of other clans and their militias (Interview 34), while others point towards the fact that the announcement of this objective could have led the international community to prematurely reject this endeavour (Interview 113). Again others emphasize Ethiopia’s objection to independence (see Bryden 1994b:37), arguing that “[t]he Ethiopians were pressing our [SNM] leadership to unite with SSDF. And we were refusing because our policies were different” (Interviews 34, 1).
359 See also Adam (2008:192), who states that the element of grievances has frequently been overstated.
360 For one, Isaaqs had major land holdings in Mogadishu (Laitin 1999a:147) and numerous northern businessmen held a strong stake in Somalia’s economy (Compagnon 1993:11). For another, in the years following the declaration of independence, different parties of Somaliland’s minority clans such as the
explanations have been advanced, among them a rational narrative that largely points towards economic deprivation in the north as the key motivation for secession.\footnote{In this sense, it has been argued that “the material imperatives of pastoralism took precedence over and made a mockery of nationalist ideals” (Markakis 1987:234).} In any case, it appears that a separate socio-cognitive system had formed in the north. Whether it was due to the distinct colonial experiences, grievances, and/or rational considerations, “[t]he majority of the people of Somaliland have developed a sense of identity distinct from the rest of Somalis” (Huliaras 2002:157). While this was expressed with the announcement of independence on May 18th, 1991, the latter should not be confounded with the separation between north and south Somalia, which had incrementally turned into a political reality long before (I.M. Samatar 1997:46). Although Bradbury (2008:50) argues that the “particular nature of the SNM as a politico-military movement […] influenced the form of polity that emerged in Somaliland after the war”, it remains unclear how the anti-government war further affected the the formation of the new polity—either in terms of institutional and/or socio-cognitive standardization or otherwise.

**Effects of the Civil War on State-Making**\footnote{This section draws on an article published by the author, see Helling 2010.}

**Establishing Military Domination**

The monopoly over the means of coercion that had evaporated throughout the 1980s was increasingly appropriated by the SNM. Controlling ever greater parts of the country’s north-west, the rebel movement expelled any remaining SNA soldiers from the region and

\footnote{USP argued vociferously against the *de facto* secession (Bryden 1994b:40; Samatar 1994c:123). Moreover, the Isaaq sub-clan confederation of the Garhajis entertained, under the leadership of «Tuur», close relations with «Aideed» (USC) and favoured renewed union with the south (Interview 112). In fact, the Saudi Arabian livestock import ban of 1983 hit northern livestock herders particularly hard. Moreover, *khat*-traders were also deprived of their livelihoods in the same year (Klein 2007:54), after Barre captured the lucrative business and suppressed Isaaq activity there (HRW 1990:85; Hansen 2010:3; referring to Simons 1995:76 and Samatar 1985:55ff.; see also Dool 1998:47) – not least to disrupt the channel of communication it provided between the Isaaq living in north-west Somalia and the SNM, which operated out of Ethiopia where *khat* is cultivated (Interview 135). See also Brons (2001:190). On the cultivation of *khat* in Ethiopia, see Anderson et al. 2007.}

\footnote{Reno 2003a; Zierau 2003; Elmi/Barise 2006:33. That the war was not only fought for political, but also economic reasons, showed for example in the fact that the SNM repeatedly attacked the port of Zeyla, the town of Looyacadde and some other smaller places including Luqayr (for details see, Africa Confidential 1989) in order to “prevent control of the lucrative trade between Northern Somali towns and Djibouti passing out of the hands of the Isaaqs and into those of the Gadabursis” (Marchal 1996:81).}
continued fighting the regional clan-based pro-Barre militias, which soon succumbed to the SNM’s “overwhelming military power” (Renders 2006:196; Interview 4). Although the SNM has frequently been mocked for constituting a “weak, inexperienced, decentralized, clan-based” organization, which was “unable to provide capable national leadership and vision” (Adam 1995:78), it achieved what no other Somali insurgency movement had— to emerge from war unappealingly in military terms. Yet, although the SNM constituted the “most powerful military force in the north-west” (Bradbury 2008:79) and had a “legitimate claim to exercise power” (Compagnon 1998:82), it neither had nor could establish a fully-fledged monopoly over the means of violence in the area it claimed.

Allegedly, this was rooted in the SNM’s doctrine of ‘clan self-determination’, according to which “one clan cannot ‘liberate’ another, or by extension subjugate it” (Adam 1994:31). Hence, the SNM generally refrained from annihilating armed opposition fronts, subduing their respective population and attempting to militarily control the corresponding territory. While adherence to such a policy was facilitated by the relative coherent clan settlement pattern in Somaliland and reduced the fighters’ potential to commit atrocities that would have fueled inter-clan grievances, this idealizing view of the SNM as a guerrilla movement that respected ‘clan self-determination’ is challenged by empirical evidence. On different occasions the SNM did retaliate against clans supportive of the Barre government (Interviews 141, 4) – particularly in areas, which had historically been contested by different clans (Bradbury 2008:79; Compagnon 1990b:266). The doctrine also appears to

364 Bradbury 2008:79; Walls 2009a:8. The SNM's military prowess was also projected off-shore, as the movement “seized an oil tanker and two other ships off the coast, and issued warnings to international shippers not to deal with the “dying Somalia regime”” (Anderson 2009:6).

365 Prunier 1990/91:112; Abdullahi 2007:45; Bryden 1994:37. However, Dool (1998:242) puts these judgments into perspective, arguing that “[o]f all the Somali political movements, the SNM was undoubtedly the most organized and efficient.”

366 See Interview 4, in which it is pointed out that the different outcomes of the civil war in north and south Somalia with regards to the power monopoly was decisive in the subsequent state trajectory.

367 Walls 2009a:8; Adam 1994:36.


369 Also other authors have noted that “the SNM shot Isaak civilians on the basis that they were apparently government spies” (Africa Watch 1990:193), that it committed human rights violations (Gersony 1990), and that some of the captured SNA soldiers were subjected to summary trials and executions for alleged ‘war crimes’ (ICG 2003, cf. Bradbury 2008:79).

370 In early August 1990, for example, the SNM infiltrated the Gadabursi town of Boroma, which resulted in 200 dead and 5,000 displaced persons (Compagnon 1990:266; Interview 141) and also attacked the Warsangeli settlement of Hadafimo in eastern Sanaag, which produced further streams of refugees (Bradbury 2008:78). See also the incidences in the settlements of Dilla, Aynabo, and Erigavo. For a detailed study on the war’s effect on settlement patterns in Erigavo, see Yusuf (2010). However, it should
have evolved as much out of necessity as noble principle, as the SNM hardly had the military prowess to control non-Isaaq territory (Compagnon 1993:13; Bradbury 2008:79; Interview 28). Ultimately, it can also be argued that the SNM refrained from violently subduing non-Isaaq communities, because this could have resulted in the formation of an anti-Isaaq clan confederation (Interview 34).

Yet, although the SNM did not have an outright monopoly over the means of violence across the territory that was to become Somaliland, it can be considered as having a quasi-monopoly over the means of coercion, as its military clout and predominant power position allowed it to indirectly control the evolving political developments (Höhne 2010:178). Posing a serious and credible threat to all non-Isaaq communities, “cooperation with the Isaaq was inevitable” (Renders 2006:196), leaving non-Isaaq clans no “viable alternative” (Terlinden/Ibrahim 2008a:2f.) than to engage in ceasefire and peace negotiations (Compagnon 1990b:266; Renders/Terlinden 2010:737). In this sense, the process of reconciliation and peace-making that is generally considered central for Somaliland’s state-making project “was helped by the military supremacy of the SNM” (Omaar 2004:87).

Hence, Somaliland’s experience is roughly in line with Luttwak’s (1999) logic of ‘letting wars burn out’, as the military predominance of the SNM created relatively clear hierarchies amongst the different clan-based militias within the evolving polity. This provided an environment that facilitated the introduction of one particular set of rules, even though the absence of a monopoly over the means of violence inhibited the outright enforcement of a particular regime. While the war thus contributed to Somaliland’s state-making endeavour, this should not, however, lead to the conclusion that the SNM itself was fully standardized in institutional and socio-cognitive terms. As became apparent in the post-1991 era, the guerrilla movement that appeared to be cohesive during the course of the war was marked by internal fragmentation.

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371 See the declaration of independence, which was allegedly supported by all clans’ delegates assembled in Burco in 1991 (Gilkes 1992:43; Compagnon 1993:13, 1998:82; cf. Huliaras 2002:160). Yet, it is unclear as to how far the non-Isaaq clans’ support for independence constituted a genuinely free decision, as the SNM’s military predominance restricted these clans’ freedom of choice. That the decision in favour of independence had not found strong support beyond the Isaaq clan can be inferred from the later Awdal declaration of independence in 1995, the formation of the Makhir State of Somalia in 2007, and the separatist movement of the Sool, Sanag and Cayn (SSC) in the late 2000s.

372 Menkhaus 1997:11; Compagnon 1990:266.
Adapting to Economic Self-Reliance

Arguably, “[m]aking money is an important […] aim in warfare” (Keen 2000:3), partly because war is expensive and needs to be financed. The close connection between ‘making money’, organizing warfare, and state-making has been uncovered by historians in the case of European war- and state-making (Tilly 1992).\textsuperscript{373} In the Somali case the nature of war financing also seems to have impacted the subsequent state trajectories. While rebel movements in south-central Somalia generally had easy access to large amounts of capital to finance their operations (Reno 2003a:18f.; Leonard 2009:8), the SNM had to establish internal mechanisms to fund its struggle. Having been established some eight years prior to most other guerrilla movements, the SNM faced a highly uncertain outcome, preventing major Somali(land) entrepreneurs from readily switching from the government’s to the insurgency’s side to have their assets protected – a decision that came to be much more self-evident during the later years of the war.

Furthermore, potential external funders, such as Libya or Ethiopia, were not ready to grant the SNM financial assistance in the early 1980s (Adam 1995:76; Cliffe 1999:91; Interview 72). Although some observers have overstated the situation by arguing that the SNM was self-reliant in terms of arms, money and resources (Interview 36), the literature generally agrees that apart from some “token contributions” in the form of fuel and ammunition (I.M. Samatar 1997:42), the SNM did not receive “any substantial external aid” (Compagnon 1998:79; Adam 2008:194; Interviews 34, 65).\textsuperscript{374} Consequently, the rebel movement needed to rely on its own resources and ability to fundraise (I.M. Samatar 1997:43; Interview 24). This financial autonomy not only came with the benefit of providing the SNM with more freedom than most other militias, such as the SSDF, enjoyed,\textsuperscript{375} but is also thought to have strengthened the insurgency movement (Cliffe 1999:91).

\textsuperscript{373} Hintze 1906; Elias 1977; Howard 1978; Weber 1985; Mann 1986.

\textsuperscript{374} Other authors, however, argue that the SNM received not inconsiderable support from Ethiopia (Cliffe 1999:91; Gilkes 1989:54). According to one informant, the biggest provision of arms the SNM received from Ethiopia was 500 AKs and 6 technicals (Interview 121). However, the SNM also received some initial support from the PDRY in order to “break the discriminatory sanction on it” (Elmi 1992:22f.; see also Drysdale 2001:137).

\textsuperscript{375} For example, former US chargé-d’affaires in Addis Ababa described the SSDF as “practically a creation of the Ethiopian and Libyan Governments” (cf. Korn 1986:76; see also Rawson 1994:163). According to a former member of the SSDF, this rebel group received USD 50 million and 300 pieces of artillery from Libya alone (Interview 107).
At its inception, the SNM raised resources mainly among the Isaaq diaspora (Adam 1995:76; Interview 4) by what was judged to be a “highly evolved fund-raising structure” (Bryden/Farah 1996:8). However, this fund-raising architecture was less elaborate by far than that of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) (Ahmed/Green 1999) and ultimately “collapsed almost as soon as victory was realized” (Bryden/Farah 1996:8). Thus, this branch of the SNM’s resource mobilization does not seem to have been constitutive to the Somaliland state-making endeavour beyond the immediate financial support it provided, even though the resources flowing from the diaspora could have been used to establish a sustainable system of taxing remittances, as was the case in Eritrea. While, during its early days, the SNM was not only politically, but also financially “more representative of Somaliland’s exile communities than of its local population” (Jacquin-Berdal 2002:173), this soon changed, not least because the diaspora provided only an irregular and insufficient financial resource (Compagnon 1998:79f.).

The SNM started to “raise funds through deals with commercial intermediaries within the abban system constructed outside of Barre’s control” (Reno 2003a:24).376 The Isaaq-based rebel movement also started to raise domestic resources – either drawing further on the business community or the population at large. After Barre banned the production and trading of khat377 in 1983 (Brons 2001:190; Abdi I. Samatar 1988:27; Anderson et al. 2007:77), for example, SNM leaders met with prominent Isaaq merchants in the sector, negotiating with the provision of 17 vehicles, which were turned into so-called technicals (Interview 121).378 The SNM supposedly also drew on the khat traders’ resources by taxing the khat imported at So.Sh. 100/kilogram (ca. USD 0.60) (Interview 141). Both the reliance on business tycoons and the taxation of khat featured prominently with regard to war-to-peace transitions, as both sources of income were maintained in the successively evolving state-making project.

Subsequent to the SNM’s expulsion from its Ethiopian sanctuary in April 1988, and in the wake of the bombardment of Hargeysa and Burco the next month, the rebel movement’s

376 Abban are clan-based credit systems with a long history in nomadic Somali society (Lewis 1994:114f.), which were revived under Barre during the 1970s in order to protect assets from the government’s nationalization policies. Abban enabled businessmen to tap into locally organized informal remittance systems, which used customary clan authorities to guarantee contracts and protection, and to adjudicate on disputes.

377 Khat/qaat, is a mild amphetamine-like stimulant, consumed by largely male Somalis, which had become a viable cash crop in the Northwest in the late 1970s.

378 Technicals are pick-up trucks with (heavy) weapon-mounting capabilities.
ranks expanded exponentially, requiring the organization to raise further resources. Consequently, the SNM came to “develop a popular support base among the Isaaq” (Bradbury 2008:82) in order to maintain its struggle (Interview 4).\(^\text{379}\) One implication was that the movement became more decentralized, leading the SNM Central Committee to delegate the task of fund-raising to the different Isaaq sub-clans, who mobilized resources for their particular units (Bradbury 2008:70; I.M. Samatar 1997:43; Interviews 34, 72). Moreover, the population was soon subjected to compulsory tributes (Compagnon 1998:80), obliging each household to not only second a male member to the SNM, but also make payment of one sheep (or its equivalent in cash) at least once a year – rules that were strictly applied during the course of war (Interviews 36, 78). Although the emergency laws enacted by the SNM guurti\(^\text{380}\) during the later war years substituted the traditional system of diya (‘blood money’) payment with a rudimentary system of taxation (Ahmed/Green 1999:120), this never advanced to a state where it could be continued post-war and lead to the fortification of the subsequent state-making endeavour à la Tilly (1975).

Nevertheless, the SNM’s economic self-reliance was “unique among liberation movements, past and present” (I.M. Samatar 1997:42; Compagnon 1998:80; Interview 24),\(^\text{381}\) and had the positive effect that it “enhanced accountability to its numerous supporters” (Adam 1995:76, 2008:194; Interview 34). Moreover, it also meant that the majority of the Issaq population came to be accomplices of the SNM, thus turning the guerrilla war into a people’s war. Last, but by no means least, the reliance on their own population discouraged the SNM fighters from looting and preying upon communities that “provided critical income from remittances and which were the bases of the commercial organizations essential to the militia’s continued survival” (Reno 2003a:24f.). Tapping into local resources and mechanisms to finance the war effort thus not only put brakes on the emergence of warlords, but also led to an incrementally enhancing entanglement of rebel movement and population. The latter showed particularly in the fact that the community elders, who controlled many of the resources, gained in political importance over the years (Reno 2003a:24; Compagnon 1998:84).\(^\text{382}\)

\(^{379}\) Bryden 1999b:8; Brons 2001:204.

\(^{380}\) See subsequent section.

\(^{381}\) For a comparison of the SNM with the USC on this issue, see Bakonyi 2009:435.

\(^{382}\) Although some similarly argue that “[a]ll the resources that the SNM needed had to go through the clan elders” (Interview 36), other informants suggest that while the elders were in Addis Ababa, amongst
Politico-Institutional Legacies

Much scholarly work on Somaliland revolves around the role played by traditional authorities in processes of peace and state-making (Farah 2001; Renders 2006). Generally concentrating on the traditional authorities’ institutionalized forum of the guurti, the argument is frequently sustained that it was the marriage of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of governance – or, in more fashionable jargon, the ‘hybridity’ of ‘political orders’ – that lay at the heart of Somaliland’s alleged success. While I scrutinize this proposition in Chapter 5, I want to point out here that the guurti in its form of a permanent council of elders is much less ‘traditional’ than commonly suggested (Compagnon 1993:19; Interview 55). Rather than having existed since time immemorial, the guurti is a creation of the SNM struggle (Interviews 4, 34, 36, 75, 103).

While, in the early years, it had been the rank and file of the SNM who organized human and material resources by approaching the Isaaq population for support themselves (Interview 34), this changed when the movement grew in numbers and decentralized (Interview 7). Particularly after 1988, when Barre’s scorched-earth policy pushed large numbers of the Isaaq across the border into refugee camps in Ethiopia, “[c]lan and religious elders played crucial roles, distributing food aid and other relief, adjudicating disputes, and even recruiting fighters for the SNM” (Adam 1995:82; Interview 4). The elders’ ability to mobilize resources and adjudicate disputes was harnessed by the guerrilla movement, when it realized that it could no longer maintain its struggle without the traditional authorities’ cooperation (Interview 36). On an experimental basis, the SNM leadership established an advisory body of self-selected Isaaq elders who represented their respective sub-clans (Renders/Terlinden 2010:728) and who increasingly took over the task of mobilizing resources (Interviews 4, 55). The creation of the guurti in the mid-1980s had largely to do with the fact that the young officers who had deserted the SNA for the SNM had very little idea about how the clan system worked (Interviews 103, 113, 135). Having

383 Hagman 2005c; Höhne 2006a; Glavitza 2008; Moe 2009a; Richards 2009.
384 Permanent council of elders.
385 “In the eight months between May 1988 and January 1989, an estimated 300,000-500,000 Somali refugees had arrived in eastern Ethiopia from northern Somalia, sometimes at the rate of 4,000 a day” (Gersony 1990:5).
386 Compagnon 1993:12; Brons 2001:204.
387 While some date the formation of the guurti to 1984 (Interviews 4, 113), others argue that its creation took place in 1986 (Interview 34).
been educated in urban centres within Somalia and abroad, and exposed to waves of nationalism and ‘scientific socialism’, they had very little knowledge when it came to clan issues and relied on the traditional authorities to exert leverage over rural communities. 

Given that communal support was essential to their struggle (Compagnon 1998:77), the SNM incrementally incorporated the elders into its structure (Bradbury 2008:97). Bryden (1999b:8) proposes that “[i]n order to survive, the SNM cadre had no choice but to lead through persuasion and consensus, and in the later years of the struggle even went so far as to incorporate the Isaaq elders into its formal membership.” However, this inclusion of the traditional authorities appears not to have been by choice. According to a former high-ranking militia fighter, the elders were a “nuisance” to the SNM, in part because their mode of operation constantly created frictions (Interview 113). Even though the guurti was a creation of the SNM (Interviews 4, 34), which officially held the reins (Interviews 75, 113), the rebel movement’s military and political leadership soon saw itself being taken hostage by the elders (Interview 113). Together with their command over resources (Adam 2008:201), the elders’ political clout had increased significantly (Renders/Terlinden 2010:728).

Within the guerrilla movement, the guurti came to be equal in importance with the Central Committee, the legislative organ of the SNM (L.M. Samatar 1997:44), largely because it allowed the SNM to expand in such a way as to include all of Somaliland’s clans and to create a broader constituency (Bradbury 2008:97). While Bradbury (2008:69) maintains that the evolution of the guurti can be explained with reference to the “objectives of the SNM’s political manifesto to meld traditional and modern forms of political organization”, it seems as if the council of elders was created out of necessity and was much more an unintended product of the civil war. Nonetheless, it had a major impact on Somaliland’s state-making project and is frequently argued as having constituted a key difference regarding the divergent state trajectories in north and south Somalia (Interview 4).

388 Simultaneously, the traditional authorities are said not to have had any idea about modern governance and democracy. Hence, the SNM leadership needed to rule through the elders and instruct them what decisions to take. In the words of one informant, “[t]he elders couldn’t read nor write, and most of them didn’t believe that the earth was a globe… It was very difficult” (Interview 113).

389 The informant further argues that “the guurti was our problem, is our problem, and will be our problem.”

390 Yet, it was not until after the war that the guurti was established as a national platform, including traditional authorities of other regions and clans (Interview 103).

391 However, as pointed out before, the formation of councils of elders was not restricted to north-western Somalia (see e.g. Gundel 2006). Thus, one informant postulated that the proposition that north-west Somalia had better elders than south-central Somalia was “nonsense”. Instead the informant explains the divergent state trajectories partly with reference to the fact that, in contrast to all other rebel movements,
Democratization

One of the rare connections the existing literature makes between war-making and state-making in the case of Somaliland concerns the continuity of democratic governance. It is generally acknowledged that Somaliland’s democratic structures of governance were a legacy of the war, as the SNM had allegedly already been marked by democracy (Adam 1995:76; Bryden 1999b:9; Interview 28). Not only had all but one of the SNM’s six chairmen between 1981 and 1991 been civilian, rather than military (Adam 1999:270), but these recurrent changes in leadership are commonly interpreted as having brought about an institutionalization rather than personalization of power (I.M. Samatar 1997:33). According to observers close to the ‘cultural diversity narrative’, these democratic practices were rooted in the culture of ‘pastoral democracy’ (see Lewis 1961) and resulted from the apparent traditional shunning of ‘charismatic leaders’ in Somali society (Adam 2008:198).

However, there are also alternative explanations, such as external factors, why dictatorial tendencies were generally prevented from taking root in the rebel movement. According to Reno (2003a:24, referring to Adam 1993:10) “Mengistu also interfered in SNM’s internal affairs, and had early leaders arrested to hinder the SNM’s utility as a vehicle for personal ambitions of political entrepreneurs” (see also Interviews 1, 34). The increasingly broad participation the SNM experienced was also a function of the movement’s particular funding mechanism, which gave community elders an increasing stake in political decisions. Membership of the SNM Central Committee increased from eight in 1981 to 99 in 1990. Also the fact that the SNM leadership featured members of different Isaaq sub-clans hints at democratic elements within the movement, although it remains unclear how democratic its decision-making processes really were.

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392 The original civilian leadership under Ahmed Mohamed Gulaid «Jimaleh» (Habar Awal) was replaced in 1982 by the religious leader Yusuf Sheikh Ali Sheikh Madar (Habar Awal), who gave way to a military wing under former SNA officer Abdulkadir Kosar Abdi (Habar Yonis) in 1983. With the fourth SNM Congress in July 1984, the civilian leadership regained control of the movement, seeing Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud «Silanyo» (Habar Jalo) filling the position of SNM Chairman until 1990, when Abdirahman Ahmed Ali «Tuuru» (Habar Yonis) took over.

393 However, it has to be acknowledged that «Silanyo», who became President of the Republic of Somaliland in 2010, held the post of SNM chairman for six years, between 1984 and 1990. Moreover, Spears (2010:145) assesses the impact of such irregular leadership more critically, suggesting that it not only prolonged the SNM’s struggle, but also resulted in internal divisions.
Similarly ambiguous is the proposition that the guerrilla movement’s democratic practices expanded into Somaliland’s state-making project. As will be shown in Chapter 5, politics in the young Republic of Somaliland were, in fact, anything but democratic. Although not unexpected, particularly the early years of the newly-formed *de facto* state exhibited few traces of democratic governance. This showed, for example, in the unsurprising fact that the transitional government that ruled Somaliland between 1991 and 1993 was a one-to-one copy of the organizational structure of the rebel movement – and thus little representative of non-Isaaq communities. The chairman and vice-chairman of the SNM assumed the offices of president and vice-president respectively and almost all the executive members of the SNM came to be in charge of a cabinet post (Warsame/Brons 1994:20). Indeed, “the SNM’s leadership structure was transferred virtually intact to the government of the new state” (Bryden/Farah 1996:8).

**Developing a Common Identity**

The war between the SNM and the Barre government catalysed the fragmentation of a national socio-cognitive system into clan-based identities, which increasingly came to the fore throughout the 1980s. While the country was politically divided into two only in 1991, a division into different identities had incrementally taken place long before (I.M. Samatar 1997:46; cf. Spears 2010:151f.), and was fortified through the war experience. First, the fact that Barre singled out the Isaaq clan for punishment reinforced the formation of an alternative socio-cognitive system among that part of the population. Second, the war pushed the SNM fighters out of a national and into alternative identities. Most obviously, members of the SNM identified as members of the Isaaq clan. However, the clan was not the only institution that issued a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’.

When at the second SNM Congress in 1982 leadership changed to Sheikh Madar, who descended from the religious family that founded Hargeysa in the nineteenth century and who belonged to the Saudi-based group of the SNM, the rebel movement committed itself to sharia law and instructed its fighters in Islamic teaching and practice (Bradbury 2008:64). Apart from thus tightening a particular set of ‘rules of the game’, the guerrilla force also decided to rename its fighters *mujahedeen* (‘holy warriors’). This introduction of a new identity was judged “good for morale” (Adam 2008:209). Another contributory factor to
the emergence of a new identity among communities in north-west Somalia was the fact that the narrative of ‘colonial difference’ as well as ‘cultural difference’ was maintained.\(^{394}\)

Although the ‘colonial difference’ and ‘cultural difference’ theses fall short of explaining – in institutional terms – the divergent state trajectories in post-1991 Somalia, they support the proposition that different socio-cognitive systems had formed in northern and southern Somalia. In this train of thought Huliaras (2002:174) concludes that “unlike most other African countries, warfare has played a crucial role in the formation of a strong sense of identity – at least for the majority of its population.”\(^{395}\) He continues to argue that

“In sum, as happened in the case of medieval Europe (Tilly 1990; McNeill 1982; van Creveld 1991), warfare had played a central and indeed essential role in the process of nation-formation in Somaliland. War shaped the ‘imagined community’ that later proved essential in providing a government apparatus with the moral basis needed to ensure the willing participation and often self-sacrifice of its citizens” (ibid.:159).

Similarly, Omaar (1994:234) suggests that the SNM-led guerrilla war “reinforced the bonds” among the Somalilanders, and Höhne (2006b:398) argues that

“As a result of the civil war and certain developments in northern Somalia, new identities have formed on the ground. These identities are not new in the sense that they are invented from scratch, but they combine existing identity markers in a way that is particularly meaningful in the current political context.”

Although a certain level of socio-cognitive standardization had thus been reached by the end of the civil war, it would be misleading to conclude that the Somaliland polity emerged from war with one single identity. While it is obvious that non-Isaaq communities entertained ‘rules of the mind’ that diverged from those of the Isaaq, also within the SNM not all ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ were commonly shared.\(^{396}\) Thus, at the time that the SNM called for the Berbera and Burco conferences in the early 1990s, the population did not share the same set of institutions or mental models.

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\(^{394}\) The colonial era created a difference in perception between North and South and this contributed to the creation of Somaliland (Interview 55).

\(^{395}\) Once the war was won, the SNM radio station, which could broadcast as far as Arabia, transmitted for one hour per night (Interview 4).

\(^{396}\) For one, the SNM did not have a coherent ideology or political vision that transcended the objective of removing Barre from power. For another, the fact that the SNM had beaten about the bush with regard to possibly declaring independence if they were military victorious contributed to the maintenance of regime diversity. For these and other reasons little changed from the SNM’s initial composition as a fairly heterogeneous collection of Isaaq politicians and intellectuals (Renders 2006:202f.). Hence, Somaliland’s regime ecology was characterized by the parallel existence of numerous regimes that were structured along (sub-)clan lines (e.g. Isaaq, Gadabursi, Dhulbahante), political lines (e.g. unionists, federalists), or ideological lines (e.g. SNM military wing, SNM civilian wing).
4.3 Interim Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the two wars Somalia experienced between the late 1970s and early 1990s exercised important influences on the subsequent state trajectories. It suggested that even though the Ogaden War did have an ambivalent effect on the state’s regime ecology, it set in motion or catalysed a number of developments that contributed to the demise of the state throughout the subsequent decade. While the regime prism does not provide a causal explanation for the breakdown of the Somali state, it reveals how war contributed to processes of institutional and socio-cognitive de-standardization. Exemplary for the fragmentation of the formerly authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ is the reintroduction of Arabic as official second language in 1979, returning Somalia into a bi-orthographic polity (Abuhamdia 1995:49).\(^{397}\)

Yet, as shown, such processes of de-standardization occurred across the institutional and socio-cognitive spheres. The fact that processes of regime de-standardization erupted largely in the post-war era seem to indicate that it was not the war per se, but rather the policies implemented by the military junta subsequent to the war that contributed to the unravelling of the state. While it is clear that it was not solely Barre who fell back onto increasingly smaller common institutional and socio-cognitive denominators in the face of decreasing regime homogeneity – thus setting in motion a ‘vicious circle’ of regime de-standardization – it was first and foremost the military leadership that could have counteracted this trend. Had Barre handled the military defeat in the Ogaden differently, or had he resigned from his position as head of state, the downward spiral of institutional and socio-cognitive de-standardization could possibly have been prevented. Yet, it has to be acknowledged, too, that Barre’s room for manoeuvre was restricted, not least in light of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) imposed upon Somalia by the Bretton Woods Institutions, which deprived him of a large administrative apparatus and drained him of necessary economic resources to buy in groups to the state-making project, amongst others.\(^{398}\)

\(^{397}\) Interestingly, the linguistic heterogeneity and resulting challenges to nation-building in south-central Somalia was exacerbated in the early 2000s, as the constitution that followed the election of Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed as president of the Transition Federal Government “accepts the existence of two languages, Maay and Mahaa, as official languages in the country” (Osman 2007a:127).

\(^{398}\) The first SAPs were promulgated in 1981, when Barre opened the profitable banana industry to Italian investors (A.I. Samatar 1993:78).
Thus, the “profound economic, political and social consequences” (Africa Watch 1990:8) of the Ogadeen War\(^{399}\) were aggravated by the fact that the state could no longer rely on institutional hegemony. Along these lines, Marchal (2002:227) argues that “the state produced no norm: to the contrary, one has to say, it multiplied them in order to better subvert them itself” (my translation). With regard to the de-standardization of particular ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ the developments of the 1980s resembled those of the mid to late-1960s, revealing the fact that processes of state-unmaking are marked by regime pluralization, i.e. institutional and socio-cognitive fragmentation. In this train of thought Ahmed Samatar (1994a:12) proposes that “the Somali state has died three times – as a regime, as an apparatus, and as an idea of group consciousness, or what Ibn Khaldun calls asabiyah.”

The chapter also showed that the civil war of the 1980s played an important role in the formation of Somaliland. While it has to be acknowledged that Somaliland’s state-making project was not intentional, and that the war was neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for this state to be established,\(^{400}\) it appears to have been instrumental in state-making in Somaliland. Although the SNM-led struggle did not culminate in a full-blown institutional and socio-cognitive standardization of the population across the territory that was to become Somaliland, it laid important foundations for the later introduction of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. The war had arguably been “formative in creating a ‘political community’ of shared interests” (Bradbury 2008:50), and served as a “cruel university in the arts of political mobilisation and popular leadership, preparing the SNM better than most for the challenges of peacetime leadership” (Bryden 1999a:137).\(^{401}\) While it has to be accorded that Somaliland’s achievements cannot, of course, only be attributed to its ability to conduct war, it appears to be true that “[i]n sum, as happened in the case of medieval Europe […] warfare had played a central and indeed essential role in the process of nation-formation in Somaliland” (Huliaras 2002:159).

\(^{399}\) The costs of the Ogadeen War for Somalia were estimated as approximately USD 2 million per day (cf. Matthies 1987:246).

\(^{400}\) See e.g. the case of Puntland, which “was unaffected by the civil strife that accompanied the collapse of the Somali state” (Battera 2003:230), but nevertheless formed a similar polity. Yet, in line with the regime standardization thesis it is widely acknowledged that Puntland “enjoyed better ‘ethnic’ starting conditions” as “[m]ost of its population belongs to the same clan federation – Majerten/Harti” (Battera 2003:230).

\(^{401}\) Yet, Bryden’s assessment is challenged by the fact that, in its early years, Somaliland far from enjoyed such qualified leadership. Having survived the war, the coalition of the main Isaaq clans started competing among themselves in the post-1991 era, as prophetically anticipated by Ghalib (1995:219; cf. Spears 2010:151). See Chapter 5.
Somaliland’s state-making process has been labelled ‘unique’, ‘peaceful’, ‘democratic’, and ‘bottom-up’. Diverse authors not only argue that Somaliland was ‘Africa’s best kept secret’ (Jhazbhay 2003) and constituted an inimitable state-making project (Hoyle 2000:85), but also that its state trajectory has largely been characterized by processes of ‘traditional’ reconciliation and ‘grassroots’ democracy (Adam 1995). These popular readings of its state-making endeavour not only led to a characterization of Somaliland’s trajectory as having been ‘peaceful’ (Othieno 2008), but culminated in truly amnestic assertions such as the proposition that during its process of state-making “[n]o civil war occurred” (Sufi 2003:285). While authority has been added to this interpretation of Somaliland constituting a sui generis by portraying south-central Somalia as a diametrically opposed case of state failure, the stereotypical image of Somaliland’s alleged uniqueness has been fired by the literature’s strong, and partly romanticizing, emphasis on traits of ‘traditional governance’.

One of the most recent attempts to theoretically corroborate Somaliland’s supposedly unprecedented state-making process has seen the application of the framework of ‘hybrid...
political orders’ (HPOs) (cf. Böge et al. 2008; Kibble/Walls 2010b). It is suggested that Somaliland’s formula for success lay in the prevalence of a political landscape characterized by HPOs, which “allowed for a healthy adaptation of statehood to local needs” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:723). Yet, as these scholars simultaneously acknowledge that the very same HPOs have come to “threaten to undermine the polity’s stability” (ibid.), this theoretical framework remains inconclusive with regard to the question of under what conditions or what kinds of HPOs are conducive rather than inimical to state-making. Analysing Somaliland’s state trajectory in the post-1991 decade, this chapter aims to shed light on these questions and contributes to a better understanding of how its state-making process unfolded in the aftermath of the SNM struggle.

Contesting established paradigms, I firstly argue that Somaliland’s state-making process has not been as unique as generally claimed. Although clearly constituting a case of its own, Somaliland’s trajectory has numerous important parallels to earlier state-making endeavours within and outside of Somali territories. In line with this reasoning I secondly contest the position that the legendary ‘traditional authorities’ with their inclination towards ‘grassroots democracy’ lay at the heart of Somaliland state-making. My empirical research findings rather suggest that Somaliland owes its trajectory largely to shrewd and authoritarian elite politics. In fact, President Egal stopped at nothing, not even from instigating civil war in order to consolidate his power and reconstruct a previously deconstructed state. Thus, Somaliland’s civil wars were conducive to and constitutive for state-making.

With regard to the theoretical realm the chapter suggests that the usefulness of the concept of HPOs is questionable when analysing state-making projects, as it falls short of accounting for divergent development paths. Applying the ‘regime prism’ to Somaliland’s state-making endeavour, the chapter shows that the defining criteria of any political ‘order’ to support processes of state-making lies in the influence this ‘order’ can exert on levels of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. While state regime consolidation in Somaliland was in its infancy throughout the 1990s, implying that mechanisms of

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406 This argument stands in close intellectual relationship with the proposition that past Somali state-making endeavours did not work because “Somali represents one of the greatest mismatches between conventional state structures and indigenous institutions among postcolonial countries in Africa” (Kaplan 2008a:115; Renders 2007:440). At its extremes, it is argued that given the state’s alien nature, Somalis were ‘better off stateless’ (Leeson 2006). Yet, these reservations against the state and concomitant embrace of ‘traditional institutions’ neglect – amongst others – the fact that the institutions of the ‘suldaans’, ‘aqiils’ and other ‘traditional authorities’ were introduced by the Egyptians, reinvented by the Arabs, and utilized by the colonizers (Gundel 2006).
standardization could only be rudimentary, the chapter shows how the foundations for standardization that had been laid during the war were bolstered from the early 1990s onwards. Overall, I suggest that the polity’s trajectory of initial fragility and subsequently enhanced resilience has been characterized by fluctuating, but ultimately increasing, levels of state regime domination and standardization.

The chapter sets out to show that, and scrutinize why, Somaliland did not experience a process of state-making in the two years after its declaration of independence in 1991. The section argues that this era was, in the absence of sufficient state regime capacity in terms of financial, military, and administrative aptitude on the part of the interim government, characterized by a retreat from the embryonic state-making trajectory set in motion during the civil war. Section two looks at Somaliland’s second state-making endeavour under the aegis of President Egal between 1993 and 1996. Despite numerous parallels with the previous era, the period saw, nevertheless, the advancement of the state-making project, leading me to ask why this difference occurred and how it could be explained. An interim conclusion sums up the chapter’s findings.407

5.1 Tried Reconstruction, Implied Deconstruction (1991-93)408

The bilateral truce and reconciliation meetings between the SNM and the non-Isaaq clans of north-western Somaliland that had accompanied the progressive military victories of the SNM intensified in early 1991409 and were followed by a ‘national’ conference in Burco. The latter culminated in an announcement of independence that was accompanied by a wave of enthusiasm and optimism (Bradbury 2008:81; Omaar 2004:87). Yet, the atmosphere turned

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407 For a cartographic presentation of the Somaliland polity and the geographic location of its clans and sub-clans, see Appendix, Map 3 and Map 4.

408 In a modified version, this chapter is forthcoming in a special issue of the Journal of Eastern African Studies; see Balthasar 2013.

409 In March 1991, the Gadabursi/Reer Nuur and Habar Awal/Saad Muse/Jibril Abokor started peace negotiations, and in June and October representatives of the Isaaq/Habar Yonis and Harti/Warsangeli met in Yubbe (Sanaag region), agreeing on the cessation of hostilities, sharing of pasture and water, and exchange of prisoners. Similar meetings occurred, amongst others, in (1) Oog (Sool region) between the Isaaq/Habar Yonis, Isaaq/Habar Jalo and Harti/Dhulbahante in October 1991; (2) El Qohle (Sanaag region) between Isaaq/Habar Yonis and Harti/Warsangeli in December 1990; (3) Ool (Sanaag region) between the SNM and Dhulbahante in February 1991; (4) Yagoori (Sool region) between the Isaaq/Habar Jalo and Harti/Dhulbahante in February 1991; and (5) Dilla (Awdal region) between the SNM and Gadabursi in February 1991 (cf. Renders 2006:196; APD 2008).
sour shortly thereafter\textsuperscript{410} and 1992 saw dwindling support for the government and the splintering of the SNM. Between January and October 1992 heavy fighting between the interim government and an SNM faction occurred in Burco and Berbera over the allocation of political power and economic resources, which led the young polity to the brink of all-out civil war and almost resulted in the overthrow of the transitional government headed by Abdirahman Ahmed Ali «Tuur». By 1993, Somaliland far from resembled any kind of statehood, but instead its path appeared to be mirroring that of south-central Somalia. What had happened to the state-making project that had taken its first steps during the anti-regime war, and why did «Tuur’s» attempts to consolidate the polity result in an unmaking of the nascent state? 

**Berbera, Burco, and the Declaration of Independence**

The first multi-clan meeting in north-western Somalia arranged by the SNM took place in the port town of Berbera, the region’s most important economic hub. Held from February 15\textsuperscript{th}–27\textsuperscript{th}, 1991, the *Shirka Walaalaynta Beelaha Waaqooyiga* (‘Brotherhood Meeting of Northern Clans’) was significant in two ways. First, it sought to restore trust and confidence between the Isaaq and non-Isaaq clans (APD 2002b:19), as not only had they taken different sides during the war (Interview 7), but also because the SNM’s military takeover had not been entirely peaceful (Compagnon 1990b:266; Interview 141).\textsuperscript{411} Secondly, it was agreed that all sea and airports constituted national assets, rather than clan property.\textsuperscript{412} Although these were significant accords, the conference was overshadowed in importance by the subsequent conference in Burco.

The *Shirweynaha Beelaha Waaqooyiga* (‘Grand Conference of Northern Clans’), which took place between April 27\textsuperscript{th} and May 18\textsuperscript{th}, 1991, is generally considered the first major ‘national’ conference. The meeting occurred in parallel with the SNM Central Committee meeting, and was attended by the SNM leadership, prominent northern ‘traditional

\textsuperscript{410} According to some, the tide had already turned with the Burco conference itself (Interview 8).

\textsuperscript{411} See also Drysdale 1992b:32; ICG 2003; Bradbury 2008:78. Of the approximately 3 million Somalilanders in 1997, 66 per cent were believed to be Isaaq, about 19 per cent Harti, and 15 per cent Dir (Mesfin 2009:1; Interviews 99, 155).

\textsuperscript{412} Arguably, SNM chairman «Tuur» (Isaaq/Habar Yonis) had a vested interest in this, being loathe leaving, in particular, the economically most important port of Berbera under the control of the Isaaq/Habar Awal/Iisa Muse. Furthermore, «Tuur» had agreed with Mohamed Farah Aideed (USC/SNA) and Ahmed Omar Jess (SPM) in the Mustahil meeting of 1990 that their movements were to take control of the ports of Berbera, Mogadishu and Kismayo respectively, in order to secure the economic foundations for a post-Barre polity (Interviews 149, 111).
authorities’, and numerous intellectuals, militia commanders, religious leaders, and businessmen, amongst others. The conference’s aim was to further reconcile the antagonistic factions as well as to delineate the region’s political destiny. Although secession had not been on the agenda of the SNM central committee (Bradbury 2008:80; Interviews 36, 111), it ultimately announced the withdrawal of the former British Protectorate of Somaliland from the 1960 union with the ex-Italian Colony of Somalia and unilaterally declared independence on May 18th, 1991 (Drysdale 1992b:24).413

According to prevailing analysis, the declaration of independence was very much a spontaneous decision, which was rooted in ‘popular pressures’ from the ‘grassroots’ and enjoyed the support of all constituencies (Bradbury 2008:81f.; Interview 144). Although many of the SNM leadership were, indeed, reluctant to secede from south-central Somalia (Interview 36)414 and even sent a delegation to Mogadishu to negotiate a political way forward with southern faction leaders (Interview 8), it seems that factors other than ‘the peoples’ voice’ crucially affected the decision to declare sovereignty.415 In general, the SNM’s prospects of significantly shaping the political developments in Mogadishu were undone when Ali Mahdi Mohamed (USC/SSA), rather than Mohamed Farah Aideed (USC/SNA), with whom the SNM had entertained close relationships, took over the presidential seat in Mogadishu in early 1991 (Stevenson 1993:142; Interview 112). Moreover, «Tuur»’s chance of obtaining an important political post in Mogadishu was ruined by the fact that the position of prime minister in Somalia was already taken by another prominent Somaliland politician, Omar Arteh Ghalib (Interview 114). «Tuur» and the SNM leadership thus defaulted to sticking with Somaliland, at least temporarily.

Under the aegis of SNM vice-chairman Hassan Iise Jama the conference delegates drafted a provisional National Charter (Interview 128), which mandated the SNM to form a transitional national government and run the newly-formed polity for an interim two year

413 Renders (2006:198) states that the preceding Berbera meeting had already seen the SNM publicly considering the revision of union with south-central Somalia. This is, however, disputed (Drysdale 1992b:24; Interview 128), although talk of revising the 1960 act of union may have alluded to a future federal constitution (Bradbury 2008:80). Yet, it appears that the SNM leadership held an informal meeting on the question of secession in Hargeysa shortly before the Burco conference (Interview 128).

414 SNM chairman «Tuur», for example, favoured a unified Somalia (Interview 75), which he voiced in a speech at Hargeysa’s Independence Garden prior to the Burco conference – affirming, however, that he would bow to public will (Interviews 128, 142).

415 According to received wisdom, it was the general population that pressured the SNM leadership into announcing separation, thus supporting the overall argument that the formation of Somaliland came about by means of a truly ‘bottom-up’, ‘grassroots’ process (see Bryden e.g. 2003; Bradbury 2008:81f).
period. As the SNM leadership had no ready-made plans for a post-war administration (Compagnon 1998:77; Bradbury 2008:85), its governance structure was largely copied over: the insurgency movement’s executive committee became the government, its chairman and vice-chairman president and vice-president respectively, and the enlarged SNM Central Committee of 99 members functioning as a national council or preliminary parliament (Brons 2001:247). As interim president, «Tuur», presented his 19 member cabinet, which had been carefully selected in order to forge an all-inclusive elite bargain (Bradbury 2008:85; Interview 108), on June 4th, 1991 (WSP 2005:61).

As the interim government was clearly dominated by the victorious Isaaq, the «Tuur» administration was considered a “continuation of the SNM” (Interviews 36, 78; ACR 1990-92:B371) as, with the exception of those from the non-Isaaq clans, all members of the council of ministers were SNM veterans (Interviews 28, 128). Yet, it was not the preponderance of the Isaaq-dominated SNM vis-à-vis other clans and their militias that turned out to be problematic. While the multiple inter-clan conferences that occurred prior to the Berbera and Burco summit had restored a semblance of trust between the Isaaq and their neighbours, they had done little to address the rivalry that had been smouldering between different factions within the SNM for many years (APD 1999:20; Interview 156).

The decade-long liberation struggle had seen the emergence of two wings within the SNM – one ‘civilian’, one ‘military’. Whereas the former was mainly comprised of intellectuals who had proclaimed the formation of the SNM in London and Jeddah in 1981, the latter largely encompassed militarists who had started the armed resistance on the ground (Interview 113). «Tuur» enjoyed the backing of the ‘civilian wing’, but he was eyed with suspicion by the more hardline military elements within the rebel movement, referred to as

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416 This lack of preparedness for the post-war period not only distinguished the SNM liberation struggle from the one led by the Eritrean EPLF (Bradbury 2008:85), but has frequently been quoted in support of the argument that the declaration of independence had not been a long-term objective of the SNM (Interview 1).

417 Renders 2006:202; Bradbury 2008:85. SNM cadres did, however, not only take over the new government, but also other administrative positions. The SNM veteran Mohamed Hashi Elmi – who was appointed Minister of Finance in 2010 – became first mayor of Hargeysa (Interview 96).

418 According to WSP (2005:61) «Tuur» established a cabinet of 18 ministers.

419 While the cabinet featured three representatives of each of the four Isaaq clans (Habar Awal, Habar Jalo, Garhajis, Arap), plus one extra representative from the president’s Garhajis/Habar Yonis clan, it included ‘only’ two Gadabursi, two Dhulbahante, and one Issa (ACR 1990-92:B371; Drysdale 1992b:8).
Calan Cas. While the President included some members of the Calan Cas in his government – mainly because they were in charge of the most potent SNM militias – «Tuur» increasingly distanced himself from them. Not only did he feel challenged by these hardline elements, but he also wanted to avoid alienating non-Isaaq clans, who were already nervous about an Isaaq-dominated Somaliland (Renders 2006:10). The ensuing power struggles between «Tuur» and the Calan Cas were to determine politics throughout the transitional period and lay at the heart of why the interim government’s attempt for state reconstruction resulted in its deconstruction.

From Attempted Reconstruction to Effective Deconstruction

The tasks faced by the government were daunting. Within two years, the interim administration had not only to establish security, jump-start the economy, and restore basic services, but also to draft a constitution as a basis for the country’s first envisaged democratic elections. While the overall environment, characterized by a decentralized patchwork of militias, ramshackle infrastructure, roofless cities and uprooted populations (WSP 2005:61; Bradbury 2008:77), was anything but conducive to fulfilling these tasks and establishing a new state, the true challenges came from the split within the government.

Scant Security and the First Civil War

At the time that the interim government was installed, the security situation was precarious. The country was awash with arms, and even though many SNM mujahedeen demobilized voluntarily, numerous militias remained effectively organized or emerged from scratch in the context of physical and political insecurity (Interview 8).

These militias frequently turned to extortion and banditry (WSP 2005:61; Bradbury 2008:88), but also provided a certain level of safety to their communities. While the decentralized structure of the SNM

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420 It is commonly argued that the Calan Cas (‘Red Flag’) faction had a socialist inclination (e.g. Renders 2006:202f.). However, most of its members were almost a-political, had little political vision, and were no more leftist than the ‘civilian wing’. While the name of Calan Cas has been used pejoratively to tag diverse opposition groups since the early 1960s, its origin dates back to 1962. Back then, the SDU was founded and, due to its socialist inclination, referred to as Calan Cas. This cognomen appeared to be particularly apt to label the SNM’s ‘military wing’ as the founder of the SDU and the leader of the ‘military wing’ were one and the same – Saleebaan «Gaal» (Interview 143).

421 After the 1988 aerial bombings of Hargeysa and Burco, most houses were without roofs (Interview 147). Although it is frequently argued that Somaliland did not experience the ‘warlord phenomenon’ – partly due to the SNM’s military hegemony (Interview 4) and the region’s scarce resources (Interview 63) – numerous militias emerged following the defeat of the SNA (Interview 8). This was partly due to the “premature voluntary demobilisation of many of the SNM guerrillas, which allowed clan militia forces to emerge” (Brickhill 1994:8).
had been advantageous during the guerrilla struggle, the absence of a binding, centralized command posed a huge problem for regulating security in the war’s aftermath. Military control over the territory was exercised by locally dominant militias with very little control by central government. The government’s authority was, thus, confined to Hargeysa (Gilkes 1993), and rested on those armed units under command of individuals belonging to the new government (Reno 2003a:26).

Establishing control over roaming militias and expanding state authority by instituting a monopoly over the means of violence constituted a central state-making objective for «Tuur». The President aimed at unifying the diverse clan militias and transforming them into national security forces under central state command (Drysdale 1992b:30; Renders 2006:202f., cf. ICD 1997:12). Yet, «Tuur’s» attempt to establish state-owned security forces provoked tensions within and outside of his administration. The government-critical Calan Cas, who still controlled much of the SNM’s military might, did not want to readily cede their power to «Tuur» – partly because he belonged to the ‘civilian wing’, and partly because the Calan Cas felt increasingly sidelined. The first power struggle ensued, when «Tuur» moved to create an integrated police force.

«Tuur» and Vice-President Jama wanted the police under the direct control of the presidency but were opposed by the Minister of Defence, Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, who argued that it should be under the command of his ministry (Renders 2006:202f.). The tug-of-war between «Tuur» and Kahin was perpetuated when it came to the question of whom to appoint as commander of Somaliland’s national army. Although they concurred that the

423 Similarly, yet over benevolently, Spears (2010:155) argues that the administration’s writ did “not convincingly extend throughout Somaliland.”

424 Although the President and his representative had been appointed “as administrators who were supposed to work within the political programme of SNM” (Renders 2006:202, quoting Boobe Yusuf Ducale) «Tuur» “disregarded the political objectives agreed upon at the 1990 [SNM] Congress” (Renders 2006:210). Feeling constrained by the insurgency movement and its modus operandi, and knowing that his powers derived more from his presidency than his SNM chairmanship, he disdained the movement (cf. Renders 2006:202, 210). Given that «Tuur» had not provided members of the Calan Cas with any of the 26 new directorates within the Ministry of Defense – which he allocated to junior officers, instead – the complaint of the Calan Cas that they had not been sufficiently rewarded for their role played during the struggle was not unfounded (Renders 2006:205f.).

425 A former colonel in the SNA, Kahin belonged to the Calan Cas faction. Other key members of the ‘military wing’, who entered into Somaliland politics in the post-1991 era, were Col. Muse Behi Abdi, Habib Diriye Noor, Col. Ibrahim Abdullahi Degaweyne, and Dahib Mohamed «Gurey», most of whom had been military officers under Barre (Interviews 121, 116).
commander should hail from the Habar Awal clan,\footnote{Given that the president was from the Habar Yonis, and the Minister of Defense from the Habar Jalo, it was obvious to all involved that, according to the unwritten law of clan balance, a Habar Awal was to be chosen (Interview 128).} they disagreed as to whom. While Kahin suggested his \textit{Calan Cas} companion Muse Behi Abdi, «Tuur» opted for Hassan Yonis Habane, who was more loyal to «Tuur» despite his \textit{Calan Cas} affiliation (Interview 128).

The rift within the government widened, when «Tuur» wanted to seize control of the militias’ heavy weapons and ordered that all clan forces were to immediately join the ‘national’ army. Again, the President was confronted by Kahin, who advocated striking a careful consensus among the different SNM colonels as well as between them and other militia leaders. Therefore, it has to be acknowledged that Kahin’s position was not only rooted in the fact that he took the antagonistic environment that prevailed in Somaliland into account (Compagnon 1993:15), but was also based on the fact that «Tuur’s» high demands regarding demobilization threatened to cripple the power of the \textit{Calan Cas}. Given Kahin’s caution and refusal to toe the party line, «Tuur» sacked his minister, handed the latter’s portfolio to Jama (ION 1991; Renders 2006:203), and proceeded with his plans to create an integrated national army, “by force if necessary” (Bryden/Farah 1996:8).

The political brawl over power and resources quickly translated into a clan confrontation, as the elites of both sides resorted to clan mobilization to strengthen their positions (Interviews 33, 36, 55, 135).\footnote{Bryden and Farah (1996:13) similarly argue that “the choice of violent confrontation seems not to have involved clans at all, but remained instead the prerogative of a narrow politico-military elite in both camps,” and that “political leaders deftly manipulated clan loyalties in order to broaden support for the conflict.” Although they further suggest that clan solidarity overruled the political disarray within the clans, there is evidence to the contrary. The Habar Awal, for example, were split along ideological lines. One prominent case can be made for Habane, who supported «Tuur» in the Berbera war, even though his adversary, «Degaweyne», also hailed from the Habar Awal (Interview 110). Conversely, while «Gaal» and «Tuur» both were Habar Yonis, they adhered to opposing political factions.} While «Tuur» could largely count on the support of the Garhajis, Kahin greatly relied on his Habar Jalo clan and its militia, of which he was in charge (Interview 108). The situation smouldered and then ignited in a “bloody power struggle” (Bryden 2003, cf. Renders 2006:212) in January 1992, when the Habar Yonis and Habar Jalo clashed in Burco – a town traditionally shared by the two clans. The week-long fighting led to some 300 dead, highlighting the weakness of the new government and undermining the population’s confidence in the new polity (Bradbury 2008:89). A conflagration set in, when Kahin approached the Dhu lbahante for support (ION 29.02.1992), and «Tuur» responded by sacking the only two Dhulbahante ministers. The
opposition easily increased its support base, particularly, as its resistance was candidly supported by a leading member of the SNM Central Committee – Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud «Silanyo».

Thus, «Tuur» had failed to establish an integrated security force, a fact that was partly ascribed to his continued entertainment of the idea of revoking the declaration of independence and rejoining south-central Somalia (Interview 38). Increasingly in danger of being toppled, losing ever more control over the hard-line elements of the SNM in particular, and the situation in Somaliland more generally, «Tuur» reshuffled his cabinet in December 1992. Security continued to deteriorate (Flint 1994:37), as every clan established its own militia (Interview 63). By 1993, Hargeysa had become more insecure than Mogadishu (Interview 108), and competing SNM factions associated with different clans started clashing over control of resources throughout the country (Renders/Terlinden 2010:730, cf. Jimcaale 2005:61).

Deficient Resources and the Second Civil War

Apart from establishing control over the means of violence, mobilizing resources was another exigency for the «Tuur» government. As the funds provided by the Somaliland diaspora dried up with the victory of the SNM (Bryden/Farah 1996:8; Bradbury 2008:86), and given that international recognition and aid were not materializing for the self-styled republic, the interim government needed to establish and secure its own revenue streams. In light of the manifesting rifts within the government and costly civil war, the undertaking of resource mobilization became ever more acute – but also increasingly unrealistic. The more clan militias captured revenue-generating assets, the more the government was drained of resources.

«Silanyo» (Isaaq/Habar Jalo) had been the longest-standing SNM chairman, before he was replaced by «Tuur», in 1990. «Silanyo» had lobbied for «Tuur» as his successor, as he believed that «Tuur» would be easier to defeat politically than any other candidate – such as e.g. Mohamed Hashi Elmi from the Habar Awal – once the anti-government war was won (Interviews 103, 110). According to other accounts, «Tuur» was brought in by the Calan Cas, because the Habar Yonis had felt sidelined within the SNM (Interviews 108, 111). The support «Silanyo» lent to the Calan Cas in the early 1990s was also based on a grudge he had against the President, as well as Vice-President, who had been long-standing personal rivals (Renders 2006:205).

Designed to revive some credibility, «Tuur» appointed a new cabinet, which saw the replacement of all ministers apart from the Vice President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new government was, therefore, predominantly composed of newcomers (Renders 2006:211).

This was, for example, the case in Erigavo, where the Habar Yonis and Habar Jalo clashed over competing interests (Interview 63).
The polity’s greatest economic asset, and the one that could theoretically be most easily controlled and profited from, was the port of Berbera. Having sensibly been declared a national asset during the Berbera Conference in February 1991, the state of affairs was no longer as straightforward roughly one year later, when the Calan Cas were at daggers drawn with the government. Due to irregularities concerning the resources generated at the port, «Tuur» accused different individuals of the Iisa Muse clan, in whose territory Berbera lay, of withholding revenues and decided to confront them. Yet, in the midst of this turmoil, «Tuur» left the country for a diplomatic voyage and delegated the operation to Vice-President Jama – “like a hand grenade with the pin already removed” (Bryden 2003:345). History repeated itself when Jama sacked the individuals suspected, amongst them Minister of Interior, Suleiman Mohamed Adan «Gaab» (Bryden/Farah 1996:8).

The dismissal of «Gaab» added to the grievances voiced by the Calan Cas as well as the Habar Jalo clan, as he was related to both groups. The hard-liners did not fail to exploit this headstart and quickly nurtured the argument that «Tuur» tried to fortify the political, economic, and military power of the Habar Yonis vis-à-vis other clans. As after the dismissal of Kahin, the Iisa Muse now joined the lament already voiced by the Habar Jalo and Dhulbahante – namely that the «Tuur» administration was Garhajis dominated (Bradbury 1997:26), thus stripping it of any ‘national’ legitimacy. Consequently, former SNM commander and member of the Calan Cas faction Colonel Ibrahim «Dagaweyne» pulled the plug on the government’s revenues from the port and brought it under the control of his Iisa Muse militia. This clearly challenged the government’s authority and deprived it of the means to raise revenue and create an army (Bradbury 2008:89).

In a desperate attempt to stave off financial collapse, the government tried to secure the port militarily (Interview 110). History seemed to repeat itself once more, when this sparked

431 «Gaab» was alleged to have been indulgent towards a group of organized racketeers, who levied a small sum on imports without paying taxes to the treasury (Renders 2006:204). Interestingly, Jama’s comportment not only mirrored the action taken by «Tuur» vis-à-vis Kahin, but also the behaviour of Barre’s family during the period that the dictator was hospitalized after his car accident in May 1986. In all cases, strict clan politics replaced more nuanced decision-making processes.

432 While it is true that most politicians who were relieved of their posts came from the Habar Jalo clan (Bryden/Farah 1996:8), ministers of other clans were also sacked, such as Abdirahman Aw Ali Fara «Tool Laawi», Minister of Education, of the Gadabursi (see Renders 2006:205).

433 Also «Degaweyne» played the card of clan mobilization, inciting the Iisa Muse against the Habar Yonis (Brons 2001:248). It is widely acknowledged that while these and subsequent conflicts were rooted primarily in political and/or economic interests of certain elites, the elites mobilized their respective clans for support, thus putting a clannish spin on the wars (Interviews 30, 33, 55).
fighting in Berbera in March 1992. The ‘national’ army was challenged by the Isa Muse headed by «Degaweyne» (Interview 108), who bogged down «Tuur’s» attack at Darburuuk, about half-way between Hargeysa and Berbera (Renders 2006:205, cf. Horn of Africa Bulletin, 3/92). After some eight months of “extensive death and destruction” (Renders 2006:207, cf. Farah/Lewis 1993:51), «Degaweyne» gained control of the port in August 1992, and successfully pressed on to Hargeysa, thirty miles north of which his advance was stopped by government forces.434 Even if the government had managed to avoid military defeat,435 it was economically in dire straits, as alternative revenue streams also ebbed.

This was, for example, the case for the khat trade, the second most profitable revenue stream; «Tuur» was unable to secure this resource for reasons similar to those that had lost him control of the port of Berbera. Just as the Isa Muse controlled the port, it was the Saad Muse (related to the Isa Muse by descent via Habar Awal) who had the greatest leverage over the khat business. Although the Saad Muse were not wholly in charge of the khat per se, it was their militias who largely controlled the Kalabaydh-Hargeysa corridor.436 While Kalabaydh was under the authority of the Saad Muse lineage of the Jibril Abokor, commanded by Haybe Omar, Hargeysa was largely controlled by the Saad Muse lineage of Hussein Abokor (Interview 118). Their antagonistic attitude towards the government lay largely in the fact that the militia leader of the Hussein Abokor was none other than Colonel Muse Behi Abdi – another SNM hardliner, who colluded with Kahin, «Dagaweyne», and other Calan Cas individuals.437 Hence, «Tuur» came out of the frying pan into the fire when also the Saad Muse largely turned against him (Gardner/el Bushra 2004:145ff.).

Bereft of these two key economic resources and in face of the paucity of international aid, the interim government was unable to conduct programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and provide security (ACT 1990-92:B371). «Tuur’s» financial situation came to be so tenuous that his ‘national’ army even reverted to stealing vehicles from INGOs in order to convert them into ‘technicals’ and send them to the fighting zone (ION 05/1992; Interviews 8, 108). Having failed to develop a revenue base to finance state activities (Bradbury 1997:19; Interview 36), the government became more and more

434 Degaweyne was a brilliant infantryman and is said to never have lost a single battle (Interview 110).
435 Yet, the Berbera war is believed to have cost «Tuur» his presidency in the medium term (Interview 153).
436 Kalabaydh is a town close to the border to Ethiopia and a centre for khat imports from Ethiopia.
437 Behi had, in fact, been a key SNM figure and evolved into the most important warlord between 1991 and 1993 (Interview 108).
ineffectual. By October 1992, the situation in Somaliland had deteriorated so much that President «Tuur» and UN special envoy to Somalia, Mohammed Sahnoun, agreed to deploy 350 peacekeepers to Somalia’s north-west (Renders 2006:206). While the troops were, ultimately, not dispatched as Sahnoun resigned from his post and Somaliland managed to broker a peace by itself, it shows that the young republic had hit rock bottom.\footnote{Although the fact that Somaliland did not see UN peacekeepers fits well with the ‘difference thesis’, the republic is also in this regard less unique than commonly argued. For the town of Luc at the shores of the Juba river in southern Somalia, for example, Doyle (1993:40f.) provides a similar narrative.}

**Flimsy Administration and Administrative Fragmentation**

Dwindling government resources were not only inadequate for financing a coercive apparatus, undertaking disarmament, and possibly offering spoils to members of the opposition, but also significantly weakened «Tuur’s» ability to set up and maintain a functioning administration. Several observers assert that during its two-year tenure, the government was “without coherent administrative structures” (Omaar 1994:234; Interview 17) – either at the central or local level (Bradbury 2008:86; Interview 18). Similar to the trajectories of security provision and resource mobilization, administration also came to be deeply decentralized, weakening the central government.

Once the Barre government had been overthrown, analysts were quick to point out that “as the civil war ‘rolled back’ the Somali state, it produced a situation of extreme decentralisation rather than anarchy” (Lewis et al. 1995; Menkhaus/Prendergast 1995b). Within the Somaliland territory, the numerous ad hoc created ‘councils of elders’ that had formed in response to particular local crises were an example of this. In Boroma, a guurti was formed to control the clan militia and to mediate with the SNM (Gilkes 1993:40); in Burco, in the wake of the city’s violent conflicts; in Erigavo, to replace the local Isaaq-dominated SNM administration that lacked cross-clan support in the Sanaag region;\footnote{Sanaag was characterized by political deadlock and it took a series of 16 peace conferences to handle the past conflict and improve inter-clan relations (see Renders/Terlinden 2010:739).} and in Las Anood, in reaction to security incidents involving foreign aid deliveries (Bradbury 1994a:75).\footnote{This observation reaffirms the argument advanced in Chapter 4 that the guurti were a product of war. The formation of ‘councils of elders’ also occurred in different forms in southern Somalia, but the fluid military situation there prevented local councils from becoming well established (Gilkes 1992; Gundel 2006:iv; Menkhaus 1999).}

These councils differed from one district and region to another (Farah/Lewis 1993:18), but had in common that, in the absence of an operational central state administration, they
“took on the functions of local quasi-administrations, managing militias, mediating disputes, administering justice, interacting with international agencies and raising local revenue” (Bradbury 2008:86; Spears 2010:155). The Gadabursi guurti, for example, went so far as to appoint a local governor and to establish a commercial tax, which financed the militia, the hospital, primary schools, and the urban electricity supply. Similar actions were taken by the guurti in Erigavo which also set up a sub-committee to liaise with international NGOs working in the region (Bradbury 1994b). In Bocane, near Las Anood an administrative council was set up by Dhulbahante elders from Sool, Sanaag and the Haud in February 1993, whose task it was to administer security, law, and order, and to manage social and economic development (Bradbury 2008:86, 1994a).

Thus, the role of the ‘traditional authorities’ was not restricted to peacemaking and reconciliation (Brons 2001:248, referring to Farah/Lewis 1993). Although they generally recognised that government administration was not their responsibility, they provided the seeds of local government in the absence of effective central authority (Bradbury 2008:87). However, for the state that was to be built, the formation of such decentralized local-level administrative bodies was highly problematic as the government lacked both the authority and resources to appropriate these structures and connect them to the central administration. As, significantly, «Tuur» “did nothing to either support or to challenge these local processes” (Bradbury 2008:87), the government came to be increasingly limited in the control it could exercise over the different regions. Hence, rather than being forged together during those early years, the young state was characterized by (administrative) fragmentation, which provided a ‘highway’ for the revival of regime plurality.

State-Breaking in the Absence of Regime Domination

Given the dismal performance of the «Tuur» administration Gilkes (1993) argues that the era of the interim government constituted “two wasted years.” Viewed through the regime prism this allegation is an understatement. Rather than simply having come ‘full circle’ or

441 Overall, the Gadabursi guurti played a role similar in function to the council that had advised the Gadabursi ngaa (i.e. highest traditional leader) during the colonial period (Farah/Lewis 1993:23).

442 Two things are particularly interesting here. First, the timing of the establishment of the guurti in the Sool region is noteworthy, as it indicates that by February 1993 the state did still not reach into the hinterland. Second, this administrative council was named khussusi, according to the advisory council of «Guray» (the ‘Mad Mullah’) (Bradbury 2008:86). This fact supports the allegation that 1991-1993 saw a multiplication of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, or a pluralization of the regime ecology, within Somaliland. Indeed, civil wars are formative periods with regard to identity, and the Dhulbahante can be said to have partly reverted to their historical identity under the ‘Mad Mullah’.
‘back to square one’, the «Tuur» era saw a withdrawal from the state-making project that had taken off during the anti-Barre war. The one step forward achieved regarding the formal establishment of a nascent state was followed by two steps back with regard to institutional and socio-cognitive standardization.

The declaration of independence created a mental model that claimed a dominant position and “called for a national identity across clan lines” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:730) and was nurtured by reference to the former British Protectorate, with whom it shared the same territorial delineation. Apart from the colonial history, the image of cultural distinctiveness from other parts of Somalia was furthered (Spears 2003:93f.), and the fresh spirit of reconciliation, which emerged from diverse peacebuilding initiatives, also “contributed to a ‘sense of difference’ from war-torn Southern Somalia” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:730). Yet, «Tuur» himself did little to cultivate a sense of Somaliland nationalism (Bradbury 2008:87): to the contrary, “[t]he ferocity of the fighting damaged public confidence in the new Somaliland” (Bradbury 2008:89). By 1993, political organizations representing the Iise (United Somali Front, USF), Gadabursi (Somali Democratic Front, SDF) and Harti (United Somali Party, USP) publicly signalled their interest in reuniting with Somalia by participating in Somalia-wide peace conferences in Djibouti (Bradbury 2008:90). Thus, socio-cognitive standardization followed a downward rather than upward slope.

Institutional standardization followed a similar trajectory. Although the formation of an interim government marked the onset of new ‘rules of the game’ to which all communities were formally bound to adhere, «Tuur» was unable to enforce the new institutions. Lacking the political, administrative and military tools to enforce the new ‘rules of the game’, «Tuur» was – in the absence of fiscal and military capabilities – increasingly condemned to observe the incremental administrative fragmentation of the political entity. The new state regime was outrun by the Calan Cas and ‘traditional authorities’ when it came to making the ‘rules of the game’, a situation that resulted in institutional multiplicity. State-making, an undertaking that hinges on the introduction and standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, did not occur during «Tuur’s» presidency. Somaliland’s plural regime ecology actually increased in the post-1991 years, for which three reasons can be identified.

First, the «Tuur» government lacked the necessary material, human, and organizational resources to enact the newly formed ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. The interim leadership failed to access and mobilize resources to finance the establishment of both a
monopoly over the means of violence and the central administrative apparatus needed to
broadcast the new state regime. Rather than the state, it was the Calan Cas and ‘traditional
authorities’ who presided over the military, economic and administrative spheres (Interview
36). Second, without sufficient regime capacity to dominate let alone standardize the state
regime, it also failed to incorporate, co-opt and control those regimes that had those
capacities. «Tuur» not only gambled away the fragile support of the fragmented SNM, but
also lost the support of the ‘traditional authorities’. Although in both cases it was rational
to keep these power centres at arm’s length, this further constrained «Tuur’s» ability to
broadcast the state’s institutions and mental model. Third, it is questionable how far «Tuur»
really was committed to building a Somaliland polity in the first place. How could this
standoff be resolved?

5.2 Shrewd Politics, Civil Wars, and Good Luck (1993-96)

At the beginning of 1993, Somaliland was further from resembling any kind of statehood
than had been the case when independence was declared. Somaliland’s proclaimed status as
a sovereign state was seriously questioned from within and outside, not least because
important centres of power were contemplating reuniting with the south, the transitional
government found itself largely incapable of action, and it had barely advanced the
country’s economy and its citizens’ livelihoods. Moreover, contests over military, political,
and economic assets had resulted in violent conflicts, which not only contributed to the

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443 Contributing to this was the fact that «Tuur» chose not to arrange for meetings of the SNM Central
Committee – which had been transformed into a parliamentary-style national council – throughout 1992,
even though it was legally bound to meet once every six months (Gilkes 1993). Part of the reason lay in
disagreements over the clan allocation of seats, a lack of resources, and concerns about a coup (Bradbury

444 On November 12th, 1992, «Tuur» and Ibrahim Megag Samatar, Secretary-General of the SNM, met with
elders in the Ministry of Interior and agreed that all powers which belonged to the SNM Central
Committee would be handed over to the guurti. This move had been engineered by «Tuur», and it implied
that the next president would not be decided at the SNM conference, but in the framework of the clan
conference in Boromo. Given «Tuur’s» highly fragile stand within the fragmented SNM he thus hoped for
a better chance of being elected for a second term. Yet, «Tuur» was not the only one trying to manipulate
the ‘traditional authorities’ who, ultimately, appeased everyone and pursued their own agenda (Renders
2006:211).

445 Numerous informants alluded to the fact that «Tuur» was not wholly committed to the idea of an
independent Somaliland and wanted to rejoin south-central Somalia (Interviews 38, 108). This is also
evident in the fact that he did not work out a National Charter or Constitution (Interview 112). See also
fn. 414.
country’s further devastation, but also shattered hopes for a more peaceful and stable future within the new polity. As in 1991, conferences were held to cease hostilities, re-negotiate the allocation of power and discuss the future of the state. Hatchets were officially buried, wide allegiance to Somaliland officially reaffirmed, and a new (form of) government installed. By mid-1993 the situation once again looked promising.

Indeed, preliminary processes indicative of state-making took place. Newly appointed President Egal reappropriated the means of violence, acquired control over major economic resources, and expanded the government’s administrative apparatus. Nascent institutional standardization was accompanied by burgeoning attempts at socio-cognitive standardization, such as a newly introduced flag and currency served as a constant reminder of Somaliland’s ‘imagined community’. Nonetheless, this phase was also “difficult and not without violence” (WSP 2005:49). While some argue that “[t]he political system adopted at Boroma […] guarded against the re-emergence of authoritarian rule” (Bradbury et al. 2003:462), I show that the new President embarked on shrewd authoritarian politics to carry through processes of state-making, despite the political consensus crafted at the 1993 Boroma conference being overtly rejected by some constituencies and the following two years being characterized by civil war, bringing Somaliland to the verge of collapse. Why did the government emerge from conflict in a position of strength, consolidating the young state, and how did this state trajectory differ from the previous one?

**Sheikh, Boroma, and Shuffling the Deck**

The conflicts in Burco and Berbera in 1992 over the allocation of political, military and economic power led to nine months of inconclusive fighting, which led to a “situation like [in] Mogadishu” (Interview 76). These disputes were addressed at the Tawfiq (‘Understanding’) conference in Sheikh between October 28th and November 11th, 1992. Although the conference led to important agreements on essential aspects of internal

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446. While the prevailing literature suggests that ceasefires, peace, and reconciliation were negotiated by ‘traditional authorities’ (Prunier 1994:2; Renders 2006:195f.; Bradbury 2008:79), there is evidence that SNM cadres and politicians also played a significant role in this regard (Interview 121).


448. The Sheikh conference was embedded in a series of peace and reconciliation meetings in 1992/93. One of the most important and successful ones took place in Erigavo and led to reconciliation between the Habar Yonis, Habar Jalo, Dulbahante and Warsangeli (cf. Bradbury 1994a, 1997:22; Farah/Lewis 1993; Yusuf 1996). While the conference took place between August and November 1993, the peace-making process continued up to 1995/96 (Interview 156).
security provision and resource allocation, and Brons (2001:250) argues that it was “a first step toward the formulation of a Somaliland state”, it did little to resolve the underlying political contestation. The latter was addressed in Boroma, where the second major ‘national’ conference was held (Renders 2006:212).

The Shirweynaba Guurtida Beelaha Soomaaliland (‘Conference of Elders of the Communities of Somaliland’) took place in parallel with the seventh SNM Congress, which had been scheduled to mark the ending of the transitional two-year period. Between late January and mid-May 1993, members of the warring factions, ‘traditional authorities’, and hundreds of official observers, advisors and others met in order to find a consensus regarding questions of security, resource mobilization, and the political future of Somaliland (Brons 2001:250; Bradbury 2008:98). The conference largely manifested the status quo with regard to the patchwork of the different ‘clanistans’ Somaliland had evolved into, as the ‘traditional authorities’ asserted their authority and reaffirmed the polity’s decentralized character. Ultimately, every clan would have its own local administration (Interview 35).

Comparable in importance to Burco 1991 for Somaliland’s state-making project, Boroma also evolved into a political thriller, which kept Somaliland on its toes in the years to come. This thriller started with the selection of ‘Tuur’s’ successor – a process largely neglected by the existing literature, even though it set the stage for numerous political manoeuvres throughout the 1990s. While the prevailing literature suggests that the new political leadership was chosen in a swift, uncontested and largely harmonious process by the ‘traditional authorities’, the underlying dynamics were much more conflictual. This was not surprising given the prevailing plural regime ecology and the fact that power was claimed by a minimum of two equipollent factions, rather than just one reasonably coherent

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450 The conference was held under the chairmanship of Sheikh Ibrahim Sheikh Yusuf Sheikh Madar, who was part of a prominent religious family (Bradbury 2008:98) and had been chairman of the guurti under the aegis of the SNM (Interview 108). The prevailing reading of Somaliland’s peace conferences, which suggests that their success derived partly from the fact that the conference participants had ‘all the time in the world’ to settle disputes, as “in time-honoured Somali fashion time was elastic” (Bradbury 2008:98), glosses over the fact that in Somaliland the warring factions also had a staunch interest in resolving the conflicts as quickly as possible – in part because the factions had to compensate the conference’s host for their expenses for food, shelter, etc. (Interview 88).
451 In the absence of sufficient state capacity, Sanaag, for example, was governed by a self-appointed governor between 1991 and 1997 (Interview 63).
452 See e.g. Bradbury (2008:100), who leaves it at stating that “[i]n June 1993, the 150-member Guurti selected Mohamed Ibrahim Egal as Somaliland’s new President, with Colonel Abdirahman Aw Ali as his Vice-President”, thus glossing over the selection process per se as well as its highly political nature.
and uncontested player – as had been the case in 1991. The politics underpinning the negotiations over the allocation of political, economic and military power came to resemble the continuation of (civil) war by other means. Although the ‘elders’ in general and the Gadabursi guurti more particularly have, time and again, been credited for this “watershed event in Somaliland” (Bradbury 2008:98), the conference’s political outcome was largely the result of a tug-of-war amongst the political elite.453

The fight over political power principally pitched «Tuur» and the ‘civilian wing’ against the Calan Cas. The latter featured Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, an enigmatic figure in Somali politics, as presidential candidate. While Egal had held numerous positions during the civilian era in the 1960s,454 it was also he who had dismantled the Somali National League (SNL) in 1962, stripping the former British Protectorate of Somaliland of its only significant political party.455 Moreover, after having served as ambassador to India (1976-78) and having been released from a ten-year prison term in 1989,456 Egal sided with the Barre regime and “heavily criticised the [SNM] movement, actively denouncing it, and even supported Barre’s repressive policies in the Northwest” (Renders 2006:216). When the SNM declared independence in 1991, Egal denounced this move as well (Bryden 2003),457 and accepted an invitation from the Djiboutian government to take part in the July 1991 peace talks, which aimed to restore a national government in Somalia (Renders 2006:216).458

Against this background, the Calan Cas’ choice of Egal as candidate was anything but obvious, but made sense for a number of reasons. First, Egal’s critical stand on the SNM

453 Numerous informants affirmed that it was not the ‘traditional authorities’, but the political, economic and military elite who were in charge of the negotiations in Boroma as well as other conferences (Interview 55), and that the elders were frequently instrumentalized by the respective elites (Interviews 12, 19, 113), thus contradicting the prevailing reading (e.g. Renders 2006:196).

454 Egal originated from one of the wealthiest families in the region (Interviews 12, 104), had been Minister of Defense (1960-62) and education (1962-63) before being elected the fourth Prime Minister of Somalia (1967-1969). It was under his premiership that corruption and nepotism peaked, contributing to the dismantling of the Somali state and the military coup d’état.

455 The reason why Egal had been chosen as a secretary general of the SNL was that the Habar Yonis wanted the Habar Awal to join their party in order to enhance its power. As Egal originated from one of the wealthiest families in Somaliland and had some leverage over the Habar Awal, the Habar Yonis settled for him. Yet, once incorporated into the SNL, Egal quickly took over. Out of career considerations, Egal later left the SNL and took numerous key figures with him into the southern-based SYL (Interview 153).

456 Egal had been interned for political reasons.


458 See also Spears (2010:157), who refers to the ICG (2003:10). Indeed, Egal’s stand on secession was not entirely clear. Although his hidden agenda appears to have aimed at a unification of north and south Somalia, he could hardly advertise this position as this would have been politically suicidal for a potential career in Somaliland (Interviews 14, 72, 88).
and the fact that he had never been involved in the rebel organization gave him an aura of neutrality, which made him acceptable to communities that were not aligned with the SNM. Second, he was from the Isaaq clan of Habar Awal, a clan that not only featured prominently amongst the Calan Cas, but also amongst the Isaaq business community. Third, and most important for his backers, Egal appeared to be, despite his political weight, one of the weakest of all candidates as he was not supported by a specific group from within Somaliland. Thus, Egal had not been selected by the guurti simply because he was a seasoned politician, who entertained good connections to the international community (Interview 113) and owed Somaliland its independence (Bradbury 2008:100f.), but he was also favoured by the Calan Cas as they thought that they could easily manipulate and rule through him (Interviews 14, 143).

Besides being propped up militarily, Egal’s presidential campaign was also buttressed economically: his candidacy was largely financed by the money collected at the port of Berbera, which the Calan Cas controlled (Interview 153). He could draw on the financial support of numerous Habar Awal businessmen. Thus, the fact that Egal had greater authority than «Tuur» did not solely derive from his “recognised statesmanship and charisma” (Bradbury 2008:115), but also from his strong military and economic backing. Ultimately, and after a process that came to be considered unfair by some conference participants, Egal was declared President on May 5th, 1993, with a member of the Calan Cas faction, Abdirahman Aw Ali, Vice-President (Bradbury 1997:22). Besides a change in power – which did not see a ‘civilization’ (Walls 2008:1), but, with the ascendance of the Calan Cas rather a ‘militarization’ of power – the Boroma conference also witnessed a structural change, which was to have important repercussions on the state-making trajectory.

In a nutshell, the governance structure of the 1991-93 era was changed to a presidential system, an alteration driven by the Calan Cas, as they desired a strong executive which they

459 Importantly, Egal had good relations with the British.
460 One of Egal’s key financers was Muse «Fin» (nicknamed after the French tobacco company), who controlled the cigarette business at that time. Just like Egal, «Fin» was also from the Habar Awal clan (though from the Saad Muse sub-clan) and was connected to Egal through marriage on his wife’s side. The cigarette business is highly profitable and individuals controlling it generally control impressive amounts of cash (Interview 153). Another key financier was Mohamed Haji Abdillahi Abusita, owner of Daallo Airlines (Interview 87).
461 In light of this observation, it is questionable how far the conflicts of the early 1990s did, in fact, drastically alter the balance of power against the SNM, as Renders and Terlinden (2010:730), amongst others, have it. It rather appears that the hardline members of the SNM emerged from conflict as winners (Interview 153).
could manipulate and its separation from the legislature (Interviews 36, 113). The ‘traditional authorities’ also emerged from the conference considerably strengthened (Interview 153). Having evolved into key protagonists on the sub-national level with regard to political and military aspects, the ‘traditional authorities’ were institutionalized in the form of a national guurti (Interview 36). Besides creating a House of Elders, the National Charter agreed in Boroma established a House of Representatives as the second component of a bicameral legislative body, as well as an independent judiciary (APD 2002b:23). Acknowledging the clan as the basic organizing principle of society, a beel system of governance was chosen for the allocation of seats in the House of Representatives.\footnote{This guurti came to be the highest organ of the new state, the final arbiter in institutional and political conflicts, and the most prominent and formalized element of its ‘hybrid political order’ (Jimcaale 2005:74; see also Renders 2006:213, cf. Farah/Lewis 1993:7). Its seats were “proportionally allocated to clans, according to a formula that had been devised at the 1990 Balgubadleh SNM Congress for allocating seats in the organization’s central committee, and expanded to include non-Isaaq and minority clans” (Bradbury 2008:99; Mesfin 2009:5), itself based on records of the British colonial administration (see Adam 1999:270). During the interim period of 1991/92, the guurti did not constitute a standing committee, but acted solely on an ad-hoc basis (Interview 103). Yet, while fortifying the guurti’s influence on processes of state-making, the new governance structure also foreshadowed the beginning of the political displacement of the ‘traditional authorities’ as independent actors within Somaliland (Renders/Terlinden 2010:731).}

Enhancing Regime Capacity through Shrewd Power Politics

Once renegotiated, the new state regime needed to be implemented. Yet, the tasks that Egal had to shoulder were no less daunting than those that had confronted «Tuur» two years earlier, largely because of the still prevailing plural regime ecology. While Egal had the benefit of siding with, rather than fighting against, the militarily and economically powerful Calan Cas, it was, simultaneously, a doubtful benefit. Not only did the Calan Cas’ predominance in the new government evoke the formation of a strong opposition, but also the politically victorious hardliners restricted Egal’s scope of action, leaving the latter to complain that he was held hostage by the Calan Cas (Interview 142). Despite these challenges, the new President made some headway in subsequent years, particularly with regard to security, resource mobilization and administration (Bradbury 2008:109).

\footnote{In essence, the beel system has been described as a ‘dynamic hybrid of Western form and traditional substance’ (Jimcaale 2005) and established a power-sharing coalition of Somaliland’s main clans. The allocation of seats was based on principles of proportional representation, pluralism and ‘autonomy’, which also gave smaller and minority clans a better representation (APD 2002:23). Originally intended as a transitional arrangement for two years only, it lasted a decade. For a full description of this see Lewis et al. 1995. However, these clan-based political arrangements were to generate new problems, as factionalism along clan lines took on the age-old character of clan competition (Bradbury 2008:100).}
Increasing Resource Mobilization

Upon taking power, one of Egal’s priorities lay in the mobilization of revenues to finance the state-making project. Until he could establish a steady revenue stream, he drew on alternative sources in order to keep the government’s day-to-day operations going and initiate first policies. Having already secured the support of important Isaaq businessmen at the Boroma conference, Egal called on Mohamed Omar Tani «Mullah», whom he asked to organize a multi-million US dollar loan,\(^{464}\) assuring the entrepreneur that the financiers would get their money back within six months. Supplied by mainly Djibouti-based businessmen (Interviews 99, 153), Egal paid them back through tax exemptions. The tradesmen furthermore gained in that they practically monopolized the trade between Berbera, Hargeysa, Ethiopia, and Djibouti (Bradbury 2008:112), and created a tool of long-term market control (Renders/Terlinden 2010:732). Egal thus attracted the business community to invest in Somaliland.\(^{465}\)

A second major resource stream originated from the introduction of a proper currency, the Somaliland Shilling, in October 1994. While the adoption of a new currency had already been envisaged under the «Tuur» administration, it was only realized with further financial input from the Habar Awal traders (Renders/Terlinden 2010:731). The benefit of the Somaliland Shilling lay not only in the government’s ability to better manage the country’s economy and fiscal household, but it also produced a considerable financial windfall for the government (Bradbury 2008:112).\(^{466}\) At the same time, it came to cost numerous

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\(^{464}\) The exact amount of the loan is unknown, but believed to be between two million (Interview 153) and seven million US dollars (Bradbury 2008:112). See also Interview 99.

\(^{465}\) Even though Egal was a skillful and well-connected politician, it has to be acknowledged that he was also lucky. When he took power, the Isaaq business community found itself under intense political pressure from Hassan Guleed, President of Djibouti. Similarly, Isaaq living in the Kenyan NFD suffered from discrimination, particularly after Daniel Arap Moi came to power with the help of Somali Oromos. With Somaliland having regained a certain level of stability, the Isaaq businessmen opted for investing there, rather than Djibouti or Kenya. Furthermore, the Habar Awal community was very much united in 1993, as they perceived Somaliland to be their project (Interview 153).

\(^{466}\) The introduction of the Somaliland Shilling has been labelled “the biggest robbery in the 20th century” (Interviews 24, 30; Bradbury 1997:24ff.) and brought about the bankruptcy of thousands of small, middle-class businesses. Given that the Saad Muse constituted the power base of the Egal government, it is interesting to note that the vast majority of those who fell victim to the introduction of the Somaliland Shilling were Saad Muse (Interview 149). The new legal tender was largely confined in its acceptance to Hargeysa and Berbera, partly because one of Somaliland’s tycoons, Indah Dheero, strongly objected to the new currency as it negatively affected his livestock business with south-central Somalia. Together with former SNM chairman «Silanyo» and former chairman of the guurti, Saleban, he advised his Habar Jalo clansmen in Burco not to accept the Somaliland Shilling, as they feared that it would have disastrous effects on the business community (Interviews 36, 104, 149). However, other businessmen, such as Musa
businessmen dearly and the inequality the introduction of the new currency produced was a key reason for the outbreak of civil strife shortly thereafter (Interview 36).

Thirdly, Egal reverted to his sub-clan network in order to access further resources. As the main revenue generating assets were under the control of the Habar Awal and/or key Calan Cas militia leaders, Egal found it much easier to access the state’s most profitable revenue streams compared to his predecessor (Interview 118). At the same time, regional developments played, once more, into the hands of Egal. First, as the southern ports of Kismayo and Mogadishu closed down due to conflict, Berbera ascended to probably the most important Somali port (Interview 114). Second, Egal was lucky in that Somaliland’s economy benefited from the revival of the livestock export trade when the Saudi Arabian market reopened to Somali meat. In order to draw on the port’s resources, Egal created the Berbera Port Authority in 1993, setting it up in such a way that part of the revenues flowed directly into the President’s office, eluding political control by the legislature. While this provided Egal with an immediate revenue stream of approximately USD 10-15 million per year, it led to accusations of corruption and impeachment hearings later in the 1990s (Bradbury 2008:111).

Egal also tapped the khat trade. Customs generated from khat constituted not only the second most profitable source of revenue, but were also a reasonably easy tax to levy, as most of the mild stimulant passes through the town of Kalabeydh close to the Ethiopian-Somaliland border. Given that this town and its environs fell largely under the control of the Habar Awal militias, Egal could relatively easily establish a number of checkpoints and revenue offices to collect charges from the traders. Despite the levy put on the narcotic leaf by the government, its cost actually fell as the Egal administration eliminated the militia

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467 See Zierau (2003:60) who depicts how the Somaliland state largely came to be captured by a small Habar Awal elite, which “completely privatized” the state, as “[t]hey obviously want a weak state” (Prunier 1992, cf. WSP 1999:37f; Interview 12).

468 While custom duties levied on the import and export of goods fell to the Ministry of Finance, the revenues generated from service charges came under the presidency. This way, Egal could assure his Habar Awal/Iisa Muse clansmen that ‘their’ revenue remained under their clan control (Interview 118).

469 “According to the director of Somaliland’s customs, Hassan Ahmed ‘Embassy’, in the first ten days of government control, the revenue collected from the port of Berbera amounted to 500 million Somali Shillings (US$150,000)” (Warsame/Brons 1994:25). These figures are supported by Mubarak (1997:2040), who states that the Berbera port revenue was estimated to be around USD 30,000 daily.

470 This has largely to do with the fact that khat needs to be consumed quickly after it has been harvested, as it is “largely ineffective on the human body after 48 hours” (Hansen 2009:24). Thus, khat traders choose to import the substance via Kalabeydh, as this constitutes the quickest route into Somaliland.
extortion that had kept prices relatively high during «Tuur’s» reign (Flint 1994:38; Interview 109). In fact, the government generated roughly ten per cent of its income from taxing the khat trade – in the early 1990s this was estimated to be worth USD 137 million in Hargeysa alone and USD 250 million for Somaliland as a whole (Gilkes 1995, cf. Bradbury 2008:112).

Although Egal could generate resources in Berbera and Kalabeydh, he despised the fact that his revenue streams were dependent on the respective clans and their militiamen. Consequently, he tried to cut out the middlemen and establish more direct control, starting by reshuffling the individuals in charge. After having left the customs checkpoint in Kalabeydh under the control of the militia of Habib Diriye Noor, an Calan Cas of the Habar Awal/Saad Muse/Jibril Abokor, for about six months, he transferred Habib’s friendly head of customs to Berbera and that of Berbera to Kalabeydh.471 While not stripping them of their positions, Egal had started to undermine the control each sub-clan had over the revenues generated. From then on, Egal practiced the reshuffling of administrators.

Although Egal’s astuteness of approach was key to his success, his efforts to bring these revenues under his control was facilitated by the fact that the Garhajis, who had largely supported «Tuur», took a hostile position towards the new government and refused to relinquish their control over Hargeysa airport and its customs to Egal. This attitude was very much a tit-for-tat response to the Calan Cas’ denial in 1992/93 to allow «Tuur» access to the resources in Berbera and beyond. Consequently, the Habar Awal clan in general, and the Calan Cas in particular, responded to this challenge of the opposition by giving their President full support for his policies – hence allowing him to also draw amply on the resources of the Kalabeydh checkpoint in order to defeat the Garhajis (Interview 118).

Consequently, Bryden and Farah (1996:8) judge that “tax collection is carried out effectively in areas that come under the sway of ‘Igal’s administration.” For September 1996 it was estimated that government revenue amounted to USD 10 million, rising towards USD 15 million, thus having largely improved compared to previous years (Bradbury 1997:24).

Usurping the Means of Violence

Conference deliberations on security had culminated in the Axdiga Nabadgalayada ee Beelaba Soomaaliland (‘Somaliland Communities Peace Charter’), which laid down provisions for

471 Also the Isa Muse militia that controlled the port of Berbera was given an extra six months (June to December 1993) to take revenue from the port, before it was to become a national asset (Interview 132).
peace agreements that were to be mediated by a national multi-clan guurti (Bradbury 2008:98; Renders 2006:213, referring to APD 2002:23). Having identified the ‘traditional authorities’ as those actors who were ultimately responsible for controlling the clan militias (Interview 16), they were also given the obligation to remove them from major towns, dissolve existing roadblocks, form local police forces and settle outstanding disputes (Renders 2006:213; Bradbury 2008:99). With regard to the removal of clan-based checkpoints, Egal put particular emphasis on removing the roadblocks between Kalabeydh, Hargeysa and Berbera, the country’s main economic corridor. Although some of the militias initially objected to government authority, going so far as an attempt on the Finance Minister’s (Abdullahi Mohamed Duale) life, they finally gave in (Interview 132).

In the wake of the Sheikh Conference, which brought the conflict over Berbera to an end in October 1992, Somaliland’s first police forces were established in Hargeysa, Gabiley, and Boroma (Bradbury 2008:97). This was the result of a consultation between the Ministry of Interior, and militia leaders, as well as the ‘elders’, who had a major say in selecting those individuals who were to participate in the formation of the national police force (Interview 35). The different actors agreed that the Somaliland Police Forces were to be made up of some 60 per cent militia clan forces, 30 per cent police officers that had served in the former Somalia Police Forces under Barre, while the remaining ten per cent were to be allocated to civilians and members of certain clans (Interviews 15, 35). In the end, the new police force was mainly recruited among former militia fighters, as they not only constituted the most potent, but also most dangerous population group (Interview 42). Thus, the nascent and rather self-styled ‘police force’ of some 320 policemen that had existed under the «Tuur» administration in 1991 was enlarged to such an extent that by the early 1990s around 4,000 policemen had been registered.

As the Boroma conference had led to provisions for a localized approach to establishing peace and security, and because Egal did not want to upset either the ‘traditional authorities’

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472 The influential role of the traditional authorities on the clan militias appears to continue to the present. According to a member of the NDC there are monthly meetings between the traditional authorities and other state organs – namely the ministries of defense, interior and justice – in order to advance the DDR process (Interview 6). It is also interesting to note that the Somaliland Peace Charter of 1993 stated in Art. IX, Para. 2 that “[i]t is incumbent upon every community to wage a relentless war against the armed bandits operating in its own locality and to secure and preserve its own security and stability”, thus disclosing that state-making was as much about using force as negotiating peace.

473 According to a Somaliland National Police Law Enforcement Advisor, the Somaliland police force was established in 1993 (Interview 35).

474 All of these policemen originated from Hargeysa (Interview 45).
nor the *Calan Cas* at an early stage, he initially announced that he had no intentions to centralize control over security forces or to form a national army. Yet, once Egal had established himself in office and secured sources of revenue, he launched efforts to take control over the coercive means. To this effect, he engaged in a major programme of DDR, but approached this delicate matter in a manner different from «Tuur». Not only did Egal pay off the owners of the technical (Interview 12), but he also bargained to assemble the clan militias in cantonment sites in order to retrain and absorb them into Somaliland’s new security forces, or provide them with skills for civilian life instead (Bradbury 2008:113). Most of the young polity’s first revenue was thus largely used to finance the DDR effort (Warsame/Brons 1994:25), and Egal, once again, committed businessmen to financially support this endeavour (Bradbury 1997:23).

Acknowledging the highly political nature of demobilization, Egal used politics rather than blunt pressure to commit the diverse clans and their militias to the project. Having officially declared that DDR should be voluntary (Interview 107), the President approached the Isaaq clan of the Arap to demobilize first (Interviews 118, 141). The rationale for having this particular clan setting the process of demobilization in motion lay in the fact that the Arap had a clear interest in shifting control over coercive capacity from the clan to the state. Inhabiting a particularly resource-poor area, they had little to fight for and were in no position to defy other clan militias. In order to establish a level playing field as quickly as possible, Sultan Mohamed Farah agreed to lead the process of demobilization. This created pressure on other clans to follow suit, and, in early 1994, a well-staged ceremony was held in the Hargeysa football stadium, in which some clans publicly handed over their weapons to the government, which constituted an “important symbolic event in the process of consolidating the Somaliland state” (Bradbury 2008:114; Interviews 107, 114).

Apart from skilfully engineering demobilization, Egal also oversaw the establishment of the National Demobilisation Commission (NDC) in 1993 (Brickhill 1994:2). The NDC was chaired by Somaliland’s Vice-President, «Tool Laawi», and the government appointed Ali Mohamed Yusuf «Gurey», another *Calan Cas* of the Habar Awal clan, as executive director.

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475 At the same time, it is to be noted that the Boroma conference had ruled that all heavy weapons were to be handed over to the state (Interview 8).
476 Had Egal alternatively approached e.g. the Habar Awal to demobilize first, other Isaaq clans would probably have thought that Egal simply wanted to turn the Habar Awal militias into his new army, and would probably have rejected joining the demobilization effort (Interview 118).
477 Back then the NDC was called the Technical Committee on Security and Demobilization.
Although it has been claimed that Somaliland constituted a case of ‘autonomous recovery’ (Weinstein 2005a), it did receive important support from the international community: Egal’s DDR programme benefited from some Zimbabwean advisors (Interview 8) and the salaries of the NDC, for example, were paid by the UN through the Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction at least through to 2008 (Interviews 3, 6). Having commenced on February 1st, 1994, the NDC soon claimed that it had acquired three-quarters of the heavy weapons from five brigades in Hargeysa and western Somaliland, and that as many as 5,000 militia members had already been demobilized (Bradbury 2008:114, referring to Nyathi 1995:27). Although DDR and the formation of a national army had proceeded apace, the process was not uncontested.

It was not before long that those opposed to the new government in general, and the Calan Cas in particular, accused Egal of having gone against the Peace Charter, which laid out decentralized security provisions. Thus, the Garhajis sub-clans who had supported «Tuur» rejected demobilization, rendering the NDC unacceptable in areas they controlled (Interviews 7, 38). Demobilization also had little success around Burco and did not take place in Sool or eastern Sanaag (Bradbury 2008:114). As alluded to before, two Garhajis units tightened their military control over Hargeysa airport, which lies in the territory of the Garhajis lineage of the Eidagalle, mirroring the earlier stance of certain Habar Awal militias under «Tuur» (Interview 8). Their non-compliance with Egal’s policies was likely to spark renewed conflict – an issue to which we shall return shortly.

478 However, there are allegations that the Ministry of Resettlement, Reintegration and Reconstruction was not effectively overseeing the work of the NDC, which largely explains the NDC’s ineffectiveness (Interview 3). Yet, it should not be forgotten that the NDC had only 36 members of staff throughout Somaliland, and that it always relied on the collaboration of local NGOs to carry out its mandate (Interview 6).

479 In the early 1990s, Somaliland leaders anticipated substantial assistance for DDR from UNOSOM, which had a mandate and a USD 18 million budget (Bradbury 1994a:82). However, the USD 25,000 per month requested by the Somaliland government to carry out DDR never materialized (cf. Flint 1994:37). In its absence, the German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, CARE, Oxfam and the Swiss Group supported the state’s DDR efforts (Bradbury 1997:23; Interview 8).

480 On the DDR process, see also Brickhill (1994).

481 Similarly to the attitude of the Calan Cas two years earlier, the Garhajis objected to demobilization, as their military prowess constituted their only political leverage, given that they had been politically displaced during the Boroma conference. Demobilization thus would have amounted to complete political defeat (Interview 14).

482 Part of the reason why the Dhulbahante never disarmed lay in an agreement struck by Egal and Colonel Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed, who became President of the semi-autonomous Puntland State of Somalia, which foresaw that neither one of them would extend their authority to Las Anood, in order to avoid conflict between Somaliland and Puntland and a destabilization of the region (Interview 141).
By March 1994, the 1st Brigade of the new national army was operative, and eighteen months later, estimates put the number of uniformed and armed soldiers as high as 15,000 (Bradbury 1997:23). While the military forces had been centralized, the police forces established in early 1994 remained decentralized for several years, and the 300 member strong police force under the command of Colonel Jirif of the Habar Awal/Saad Muse/Jibril Abokor was confined to Hargeysa (Interview 118). In Gabiley, Berbera and Burco, separate police forces of roughly 70, 100 and 200 officers respectively were established (Interview 141). Whereas the army quickly saw a mixing of different clans, the police units remained largely homogeneous in terms of clan composition for a long time (Interview 141). Nevertheless, DDR fell short of being a total success. In early 1995, an informed estimate suggested that some 10,000 militia members remained to be demobilised (Gilkes 1995, cf. Bradbury 1997:23), and efforts to do so were set back by the outbreak of war in late 1994, which led to a remobilization along clan lines (Bradbury 2008:115).

Centralizing Administration

Rapid progress was also made regarding the establishment of the state’s administrative architecture. Just as the advances in resource mobilization and security had been mutually dependent, the enhancement of central administration was similarly interlinked with these two issues. This was partly because Egal used civil service positions as bait for demobilization, as not only security personnel, but also civil servants were largely drafted from the ranks of the SNM militias. Although this meant that the administrative apparatus consisted of a majority of generally untrained and unskilled individuals (Interview 18), it significantly contributed to the provision of security. In the words of one member of staff of the Civil Service Institute (CSI), “[c]ivil service recruitment was part of the process of peace building, of rehabilitation and demobilisation of militias” (Interview 131; see also Interview 12). As civil servant positions were awarded to those who disarmed first, the civil service was quickly captured by the Isaaq (Interview 138).

Even though Egal managed to appoint customs officers and establish a number of offices (Bradbury 1997:23), the government’s writ was still largely confined to western Somaliland.

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483 The creation of the military and police forces was a true demobilization process. “The soldiers were hired if they had a big gun […] Anyone with no gun wasn’t registered as national army soldier” (Interview 78).

484 It is worth noting that the salaries of the 300 strong police force in Hargeysa were paid for by UNOSOM (Interview 141).

485 Yet, it remains questionable to what extent the Habar Yonis and Eidagalle clans formed part of this new ‘national’ army.
Therefore, and because the state could not afford to entertain a fully-fledged administrative apparatus stretching throughout Somaliland, the government started to develop functional local government structures, with responsibilities for revenue collection and municipal administration (Bradbury 2008:111).\textsuperscript{486} In order to establish a legal basis for a stronger relationship between the centre and the regions, the government attempted to redraft Article 21 of the National Charter in early 1995. This, however, was blocked by parliament, as the parties could not agree on issues of political representation and financial responsibilities. While local councils were happy to receive financial support from the central government for services including the police and education, they also wanted to retain their rights to make local government appointments without central government involvement. Eventually, backed by much financial and military capacity, Egal was able to make appointments centrally (Bradbury 2008:120).

In his attempt to bring administration under the aegis of the central government, the President also aimed at removing elders’ initiatives, which had taken care of matters locally regarding administration and governance (see above).\textsuperscript{487} While ‘traditional authorities’ in Boroma, for example, had set up social services in co-operation with NGOs and negotiated development projects with international agents on their own, Egal emphasized that the state administration should deal with such things. Hence, international NGOs were required to move their headquarters to the capital of Somaliland or lose their permit to work within the polity’s borders (Renders/Terlinden 2010:733).\textsuperscript{488}

Apart from trying to capture local administration, Egal also started building a professional administrative apparatus at the central state level.\textsuperscript{489} In 1993, the President oversaw the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{486} This decentralized approach to administrative reform occurred not only out of necessity, but was also stipulated by the fact that a constitution, which would have regulated the relationship between the national and regional levels, had not yet been adopted.
\item \textsuperscript{487} A particular case in point concerns the regional administration of Erigavo. The Erigavo Peace Charter entailed provisions for the formation of a regional government – partly because the national state administration was much too weak to broadcast its power to Erigavo, and partly because the Habar Yonis (the dominant clan in Erigavo, which forms part of the Garbins confederation) opposed the rule of President Egal. Thus, administrative power remained with the local elites beyond central state control. It was not until 1997 that the central government established some nascent control over Erigavo, which remained, however, largely under the control of the local administration, making it very difficult for Egal to (profoundly) influence the situation in Sanaag (Interview 156).
\item \textsuperscript{488} Amongst the first INGOs on the ground in Somaliland were Save the Children (UK) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (Interview 43). Egal’s effort to take control of such localized approaches to development mirror, to some extent, Barre’s demands towards the Ufo group in the 1980s.
\item \textsuperscript{489} The recruitment of civil servants by competitive examination was, however, hindered by imminent civil strife in Hargeysa in 1993. Thus, rather than having civil servants recruited centrally through the Civil
establishment of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), through which some 800 civil servants were employed (Interviews 41, 138). In the sphere of administration, Bradbury (2008:111) makes the following assessment:

“During the first two years of Egal’s premiership, government ministries were revitalised, offices were refurbished, morning and afternoon work hours were instituted, and a Civil Service Commission was created. Ministerial and civil service staff (which numbered about 2,500 in 1995) received regular salaries, as did MPs, the police and the army […] A judicial system of regional and district courts was put in place, utilising the 1960 penal code.”

Thus, it was judged that “Egal’s achievements in creating a functioning administration were considerable” (ibid. 1997:22). Similarly, others argue that while the period of the interim government was chaotic, law and order were established during Egal’s reign (Interview 78).

Yet, the conflicts that were to erupt in subsequent months inhibited the further development of an administrative apparatus, particularly one that would have managed to reach out into and administratively incorporate the country’s eastern regions. This would have been particularly important given that the inhabitants of Sool and Sanaag felt largely marginalized in the Somaliland state, particularly after «Tuur» had been ousted. As a result, many Habar Yonis politicians ‘opted out’ of the central government, and the Habar Yonis militia clashed with government-aligned Habar Jalo troops in the neighbouring Togdheer region, blocking government access to the eastern regions for years (Gilkes 1995:11f.; Peace Committee for Somaliland 1995:6).

**War as State-Making by Other Means**

While euphoria had followed the successful conclusion of the Boroma conference (Bradbury 2008:109) and Egal managed to bolster his position and advance the state-making project by securing revenues, improving security and building a nascent administration, the new polity remained fragile (Bradbury 2008:115). One of the challenges accrued from the fact that

“the benefits of sovereign statehood that were expected to flow from the declaration – the ability to receive foreign aid, the ability to defend itself from external threats (most notably a desire of the south to reassert their authority),
and the ability to preserve the unity of the northern people – were not immediately forthcoming” (Spears 2010:151).

Somaliland’s state-making project was, in fact, torpedoed from within and without. Due to the protracted internal struggles Somaliland experienced, UNOSOM, for example, did not recognize the legitimacy of the Boroma conference, sponsoring instead alternative leaderships, which contributed directly to the destructive round of civil strife in 1994-96 (APD 1999:21). Of more immediate significance, however, was that the Egal government also stood on shaky grounds ‘nationally’.

A key structural challenge for the young polity and its potential to carry through nationwide processes of regime standardization arose from the decentralized character Somaliland had taken during the 1991-93 period, which was corroborated at the Boroma conference. While Egal managed to consolidate state authority in Somaliland’s ‘heartland’, he struggled to render it meaningful in the ‘hinterland’. When the government tried to establish control over Zeyla to set up tax checkpoints, for example, sporadic clashes with the Iisa militia occurred. It was only in August 1995 that Egal asserted his power in the west (Bradbury 2008:116). Similar problems arose in the east, as the Harti clans remained critical of political developments: even though one of their members had been appointed Speaker of Parliament, they felt politically alienated (Bradbury 2008:100).

Although problematic, this structural challenge was overshadowed by two political challenges from within the Isaaq clan family.

In the wake of the Boroma conference, the supporters of the previous administration went into an opposition equally as strong as that the Calan Cas had posed to «Tuur». The Garhajis claimed that the process that had propelled Egal to power had been unfair. They were, however, additionally aggrieved by Egal’s choice of ministers, which not only fell short of Garhaji representatives, but also featured individuals that had violently challenged the «Tuur» government in 1992 (Bradbury 2008:101; Spears 2010:156; Interview 149).

490 The ‘heartland’ is conceived of comprising the Kalabeydh-Hargeysa-Berbera corridor.
491 Zeyla is a coastal town on the border with Djibouti and the third most important customs point in Somaliland (Interview 44).
492 The Iisa militia received backing from Djibouti and Gadabursi from Ethiopia’s Somali Region.
493 It should be acknowledged that the Harti were the second most powerful clan confederation after the Isaaq until 1993, which is when they were replaced in importance by the Gadabursi – partly signified by a Gadabursi and not a Harti becoming vice-president (Interviews 103, 108).
494 “For the Garhajis the beel system adopted at Borama had not resolved the issue of power-sharing, and their objections to it highlighted the complexities of a system of proportional representation based upon
Furthermore, in light of the fact that Egal had started to centralize control over financial and military capacity, they claimed his government violated the National Charter (Bradbury 2008:116). Consequently, only one month after the inauguration of the Egal government, the political consensus reached in Boroma was in shatters and the scuffle between different Issaq and SNM-factions continued, manifesting in the Habar Yonis and friendly Warsangeli leaders refusing the two ministerial posts offered to them.  

In July 1993, the fragile political situation grew more acute, when a number of Habar Yonis leaders gathered in Burco. At the meeting known as the ‘Liiban Congress’ they also decided not to take up their seats in Parliament, and announced that they were not bound by the laws of Somaliland (Bradbury 2008:116). They withdrew their support for and cooperation with the Egal administration and, a year later, even declared Somaliland’s government illegitimate (Spears 2010:156; Garowe Online 2007). Their objection to the new government went so far that General Jama Mohamed Ghalib «Yare» and «Tuur» announced their preference for a renewed federation with Somalia (Interviews 2, 142), which led to the restoration of their relationship with the southern faction leader Aideed, which had initially been formed during the struggle against Barre (Spears 2010:156).

The ‘War Project’

In order to express their opposition to the Egal-led government in more than words, two Garhajis militias under the leadership of «Yare» tightened their control over the airport of Hargeysa in the summer of 1994 (Interview 149). They justified their claim not only by arguing that the airport fell into their clan territory, but also by making reference to the National Charter, which stipulated local security arrangements. In defiance of the government, they demanded extortionate landing fees and other charges from Somali and international travellers. “Even the efforts of ‘Iidagale elders to persuade the militia to...”

lineages” (Bradbury 2008:117). Amongst the central Calan Cas figures Egal accommodated in his cabinet was the notorious warlord Muse Behi Abdi, Dayib Mohamed Gurey, as well as former Minister of Interior, «Gaab», whom «Tuur» had sacked for having withheld revenues of the port of Berbera.

495 The Iidagalle sub-clan of the Garhajis was only offered one ministerial post, the perceived distinctly unimportant Ministry of Religion (Interview 108).

496 Having been chief of the Somali police forces and occupied diverse posts under Barre, «Yare» is a prominent Iidagalle politician. He opposed Somaliland’s independence and has participated in several governments formed in Mogadishu.

497 To be precise it was the Kood Bur (Iidagalle) and Saddexaad (Habar Yonis) militias. However, it should also be noted that these wars did not originate from clan antagonism, but that certain elites mobilized their respective clan networks to gather support. In the words of one interviewee, “[i]t is the elite who needs the tribe” (Interviews 24, 30, 33).
surrender the airport to government control failed to elicit co-operation, confirming allegations that they received support and encouragement from members of the federalist group” (Bryden/Farah 1996:9).

Although political issues lay at the heart of the dispute, it also carried economic connotations (Interviews 19, 36). Historically, the Habar Awal were prominent businessmen, who resided in urban areas, had well-established links with Djibouti, and engaged in commodity trade. The Habar Yonis, for their part, have historically been more prominent in government, and the Garhajis and Habar Jalo generally dominated the livestock trade. Hence, by taxing and harassing commercial and aid flights, the Garhajis militia interfered in the business of the Habar Awal entrepreneurs living in Hargeysa, who were crucial to Egal’s ability to establish and maintain government capacity (Bradbury 2008:119). Thus, in many ways, the challenges Egal faced resembled the conflict «Tuur» had fought in Berbera two years earlier.

What ultimately sparked the fighting is open to debate. While some cite the introduction of the Somaliland currency as the last straw (Interview 36), others argue that the conflict was elicited by the recruitment of Gadaaburi militias into the ‘national’ army (Bradbury 1997:25), or their resistance to the Egal’s disarmament efforts (Interview 7). In any case, the prevailing literature suggests that the violence that erupted in November 1994 was solely aimed at breaking the Garhajis opposition and advancing the government’s authority in the name of its state-making project. Restricted to this aspect, however, the dominant interpretation not only neglects that the war also allowed Egal to dispense with certain members of the government, but also fails to realize that it was willingly engaged in by the President.

Challenging the government’s authority, the Garhajis were a political thorn in the flesh of Egal, from which he wanted to liberate himself. This is, however, only part of the story,

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498 It was, however, once again not only the ‘traditional authorities’ who were engaged in negotiations with the Garhajis. Organizations such as the SNM-veteran association Sooyaal also sent members to the Garhajis in order to find a solution to the conflict (Interview 8). Sooyaal had been established in August 1991, not only to support ex-SNM combatants and their dependents, but also to “keep the SNM spirit alive” (Interviews 8, 75).

499 “The livestock export was dominated mostly by Garhajis traders, especially Habr Yonis/Isaxaaq and Ciidagale/Yonis” (Marchal 1996:84).

500 Again others hold the view that these civil wars were instigated by Barre, who wanted to destabilize Somaliland (Interview 75).

501 Part of the reason why Egal wanted to liberate himself from the Garhajis opposition was that they were led by a number of very prominent politicians, including «Tuur» and «Yare», whom Egal needed to
as Egal also wanted to free himself of the grip of the *Calan Cas*. As alluded to before, the President felt hostage to the *Calan Cas*, leading one observer to argue that “[i]n 1993, Egal was not a leader, he was a guest” (Interview 142). Having been sponsored by the SNM military hardliners during the Boroma conference, Egal initially could not confront, but had to accommodate them. Being well aware of the historical tensions between the *Calan Cas* and the Garhajis, Egal accommodated the SNM hardliners e.g. in terms of ministerial posts at the expense of the Garhajis (Interview 95), thus fuelling the friction. Yet, once Egal felt more secure by increasingly acquiring control over the military and economic spheres, and gaining the support of an alternative power by closing ranks with the *guurti*, it became easier to dispose of the militia commanders. The undiplomatic behaviour of the Garhajis provided Egal with a great chance to kill two birds with one stone. Thus, Egal fuelled the war in order to weaken both the *Calan Cas* and the Garhajis (Interview 14).

Being militarily challenged by «Yare» in light of his militias’ occupation of Hargeysa airport, Egal had a legitimate excuse to unleash his eager and self-satisfied military officers onto the opposition. In November 1994, government troops moved to take the airport by force. Having secured this objective, the government forces led by Minister of Interior, Muse Behi Abdi, and Vice-President and Minister of Defense, Abdirahman Aw Ali, proceeded to attack Toon, an Eidagalle village (Interview 108). Although this act of aggression rallied the Garhajis even more against the government (Bradbury 2008:117), it was functional for Egal in that it politically delegitimized the *Calan Cas*, who thus dug their own political grave.

After having defeated the Eidagalle in Hargeysa, attention shifted to Burco, a historical Habar Yonis stronghold. As Egal was related to the Habar Yonis through his maternal lineage, attacking Burco was a much more delicate matter. However, wanting to politically eliminate the opposition around «Tuur» and assert his authority in eastern Somaliland, Egal needed to push on. Giving the military leaders plenty of rope and portraying the war effort neutralize politically as they threatened his position. Given the historical enmity between Egal and «Yare», which dated back to the 1950s/60s, the conflict also carried personal connotations, adding fuel to the conflict (Interview 142).

502 In the imminent civil war, the Garhajis were, indeed, fighting at least as much against the *Calan Cas* as against Egal. While some Eidagalle were opposed to Egal, most of them perceived the *Calan Cas* as their main opponent, as the latter appeared to have pushed the Garhajis out of government (cf. Spears 2010:157).

503 According to one informant, Egal purposefully provoked the Garhajis, prompting «Yare» into challenging Egal militarily (Interview 142).

504 The argument that Egal picked the war against the Garhajis is corroborated by the fact that he rejected calls for another national conference to resolve outstanding issues (Bradbury 2008:117).
as a ‘Calan Cas project’, the President managed to wash his hands of responsibility (Interview 14). When Egal sent ‘his’ troops to take control of checkpoints in the vicinity of Burco in March 1995, violence erupted. The resulting war sparked the heaviest fighting since the anti-Barre struggle. As many as 4,000 people are estimated to have lost their lives in Burco alone, up to 180,000 took refuge in Ethiopia (Bradbury 2008:116f.), and international NGOs left Somaliland (Interview 8).

Although military supremacy on the part of the government troops constituted an important element in deciding the conflict’s outcome, Egal did not leave it solely to the military to defeat the opposition. First, having acquired the financial backing of a number of tycoons to finance the costly war effort, the President bribed certain Garhaji leaders into abandoning their opposition, undermining their solidarity (Interviews 107, 108). He thus earned the questionable fame of having encouraged a culture of corruption – just as had been the case during his prime ministership in the late 1960s (Interviews 132, 135). Second, Egal successfully labelled the warring parties in order to (de-)legitimize them. While portraying the opposition as struggling for re-unification with the south, he placed himself firmly in the independence camp, thereby claiming the moral high ground.

Depicting the war as one that pitched ‘nationalists’ and ‘federalists’ against each other, he rejected calls for an inter-clan dialogue to resolve the conflict (Bradbury 2008:118; Spears 2010:157), thus refraining from ceding control over the situation to other actors, such as the guurti. Fighting such an ideological war, Egal managed to defeat his opponents politically “without resorting to undue amounts of force” (Spears 2010:158, referring to Bryden 1995:2). Aideed’s death on August 2nd, 1996 further assisted Egal’s victory, as external support for the ‘federalists’ diminished thereafter (Bradbury 2008:123). 507

505 Some major financiers of Egal’s wars were Ibrahim Dheere, a Djiboutian-based Habar Awal, Indha Dheero, who all allegedly contributed USD 3 million, and Mohamed Omar Tani «Mullah», a Djiboutian-based hotelier. In total, about ten to twenty major financiers supported Egal (Interviews 99, 107).

506 For historical, geographical, and political reasons, the Garhajis were, indeed, largely in favour of unification, which was, however, politically suicidal (Interviews 14, 75). The portrayal of the opposition as pro-unionists gained credence when «Tuur», his former Finance Minister Ismail Hurre «Buba» and General «Yare» all accepted positions in Aideed’s government in Mogadishu. Given that these prominent leaders also took with them all senior politicians of the Garhajis, this Isaaq clan lost any say in Somaliland politics (Interview 142) – much like Egal had taken most prominent northern politicians with him when he crossed the aisle from the SNL to the SYL in the early 1960s, thus completely dismantling the SNL and depriving the northern Somali population of their political voice. Similarly, Dr. Ali Khalif Galayd, who had been part of the Dhuulbahante delegation in Burco, also abandoned the Somaliland state-making project and became the first Prime Minister of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2000 (Bradbury 2008:82).

507 Aideed had publicly pronounced that he was fighting Egal’s administration (Bradbury 2008:118, 1997:25). See also URL: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/HAB395_SML.html.
While Somaliland was in shatters, Egal emerged from these wars not only as winner, but in a strengthened position. As well as having eliminated the Garhajis opposition, Egal had also got rid of the *Calan Cas*, who had politically outmanoeuvred themselves (Interviews 14, 116). Incrementally, the President sacked the *Calan Cas* from their ministerial positions, a process he had started during the conflict, replacing them either with individuals from smaller clans, ‘traditional leaders’, and/or members of the Garhajis (Interviews 14, 95). At the same time, he assured himself of the support of the *guurti*, whom he convinced that the *Calan Cas* constituted a threat to peace in Somaliland (Interview 112). In order to deprive the *Calan Cas* of the ability to militarily protest against his actions, Egal accommodated their rank and file by turning them into presidential guards. This not only served the purpose of removing their support base from the *Calan Cas* elite, but also to show other militias throughout Somaliland that it paid to belong to the state (Interview 108).

While disposing of the *Calan Cas*, Egal simultaneously accommodated the aggrieved and defeated Garhajis (Interview 7). “Although the war had threatened to foreshorten Somaliland’s existence, in the end it served to consolidate public support for the territory’s independence and to strengthen central government” (Bradbury 2008:123). For Egal, the wars had constituted a ‘project’ and central tool for state-making, leading some to argue that “Egal intentionally ignited the conflict – it was really obvious” (Interview 142; see also Interviews 14, 149).

### Establishing Regime Hegemony

Viewed through the regime prism, the 1993-96 period had seen a number of alterations compared to the 1991-93 era. Whereas the «Tuur» administration had largely been marked by institutional and socio-cognitive pluralization, i.e. processes indicative of state-breaking, Egal’s reign was characterized by a slow but steady resurrection of state regime domination. That such a shift would occur was anything but obvious at the 1993 Boroma conference. While the change from a parliamentary to a presidential system suggested that the state regime would grow stronger, most other developments pointed in the opposite direction. The ‘Conference of Elders of the Communities of Somaliland’ principally cemented the

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508 Egal’s instrumental (ab)use of the *Calan Cas* constitutes a further parallel to Barre’s politics. Just as Barre had used the Isaaq to suppress the Majerteen (who consequently perceived the Isaaq rather than the dictator as the aggressor), Egal used the *Calan Cas* to suppress the Garhajis (who, similarly, perceived the *Calan Cas* rather than Egal as the aggressor) (Interview 30).

509 On top of accommodating them politically, Egal helped some 20 to 25 Habar Yonis to restart their businesses after the war, by providing them with money to restart their enterprises (Interview 108).
decentralized character that the new polity had taken under «Tuur», thereby bolstering the clan regimes spearheaded by the ‘traditional authorities’ vis-à-vis the state. Even though the new political arrangements reaffirmed the legitimacy of Somaliland and were judged to have “signalled the birth of something like a Somaliland consciousness, some national identity with a sense of statehood” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:731), Somaliland constituted *de facto* little more than the sum of its parts.

The subsequent years under Egal were characterized by a return to state-making. On the one hand, “President Egal masterfully nurtured and instrumentalized the embryonic popular sense of nationhood and statehood initiated at Borama” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:731). On the other, even though he was unable to carry through outright institutional standardization, he managed to incrementally establish a basis for it. In clear contradiction to the «Tuur» administration, Egal succeeded in asserting state power beyond his own clan base, thus laying the seeds for the standardization of an authoritative set of rules, for which mainly two factors account.

First, and in contrast to «Tuur», Egal incorporated those regimes with the necessary economic, military and/or administrative capacity to carry through processes of institutional and/or socio-cognitive standardization. Being well aware of the economic and military capacities of the *Calan Cas* and acknowledging the *de facto* – and since the Boroma conference also *de jure* – powers of the ‘traditional authorities’, Egal integrated them into the state. This not only restricted their ability to broadcast ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ independently of the state regime, but also allowed Egal to draw on their capacities to broadcast the state’s institutions and mental models. Thus, “[w]hile claiming superiority, the state effectively outsourced much of the security and judicial affairs to the elders” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:734) – a state-making approach that is far from unique to Somaliland. The President, however, did not leave it at this, but even enhanced the position of the ‘traditional authorities’ (Interview 103) and the *Calan Cas*, thereby creating ample opportunities to manipulate and instrumentalize them (Interview 108).

Second, once Egal had incorporated the alternative regimes, deprived them of much of their capacity, and transferred the latter to the state, he embarked on a process of alienating and eliminating them. He drew the ‘traditional authorities’ so close to the power centre that they ultimately lost their neutrality and became partisan to the state, thus losing their political clout (Bradbury 2008:121; Interviews 10, 36, 94, 95). Regarding the *Calan Cas*, Egal increasingly sidelined its representatives in the government, replaced them with other
individuals, and used their own tactics to delegitimize them within society. The opposition, he crushed in political, military as well as financial terms. During the course of this process the boundaries between the state and the clan regime had softened, giving the government the option to interfere in cases where political stakes were high. This system of ‘mediated statehood’ (Menkhaus 2006/07:5) became part and parcel of statehood in Somaliland (Renders/Terlinden 2010:734).

5.3 Interim Conclusion

Although Somaliland had, by 1996, still not broken the back of its state-making endeavour as numerous further challenges remained in the years to come, it is indisputable that the young polity had come a long way during Egal’s reign. Considering the similar state-making challenges that both «Tuur» and Egal faced, the divergence in performance is, indeed, astonishing. While both leaders and their respective administrations had to come to terms with poor resource bases, abundant military fragmentation, staunch political opposition and, overall, a highly delicate landscape of plural regime ecologies, the state trajectories could hardly have been more distinct, stretching from state-breaking (1991-93) to state-making (1993-96). Comparing these two phases numerous conclusions can be drawn, amongst which are the following.

The first peculiarity that emerges in light of this narrative is that Somaliland’s state-making project appears to have been quite ‘ordinary’. Rather than having been purposefully driven by the ‘grassroots’ in a ‘bottom-up’ manner (Jhazbhay 2006:24; Adam 1995; Terlinden/Debiel 2003), Somaliland’s state trajectories were much more the by-product of ‘top-down’ elitist power politics. Particularly Egal advanced the young polity’s state-making endeavour neither by resorting to (pastoral) democracy nor ceding the political steering wheel to the ‘traditional authorities’, but by applying shrewd politics and autocratic leadership.

Moreover, while Somaliland’s state-making endeavour shared a culture of bribery with the democratic period of Somali state-making in the late 1960s, the way Egal acted as ‘master manipulator’ of clans (Interview 151) was totally consistent with Barre’s tactics of playing off one clan against another. Numerous further parallels with earlier state-making projects can be drawn that fly in the face of assertions regarding Somaliland’s ‘uniqueness’ – parallels that also transcend Somali borders.
One of the commonalities the Somaliland state-making project shares with other state-making endeavours around the globe goes in tandem with the second conclusion this chapter draws: “war makes states” (Tilly 1992:67). The processes Somaliland went through to arrive at a nascent state regime by late 1996 were anything but peaceful, and featured a minimum of four distinct violent conflicts during the first six years of the polity’s existence. While it is indisputable that these civil wars were brutal and had a negative impact on the lives of thousands of people, and while there might have been alternatives to violent conflict in order to achieve the desired outcomes, the civil wars fought in the mid-1990s were clearly constitutive of Somaliland’s state-making. Thus, violent conflict is not necessarily “development in reverse” (Collier 2004; Leander 2004), even if the respective war occurs today and in the form of a civil war. In the case of Somaliland, the civil wars Egal pitched not only enhanced state regime hegemony in institutional terms, but have been judged that “as in so many other instances, the notion of statehood was nurtured during the course of war” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:732, referring to Renders 2006:271, 279).

A third and, here, final conclusion concerns the theoretical framework of HPOs. Even in the context of Somaliland, which constitutes one of the key empirical cases in relation to which this theoretical lens has been developed, the HPO framework lacks analytical power to explain processes of state-making and state-breaking. Given that both the «Tuur» and the Egal administrations were distinctly marked by a blending of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of governance, the theoretical framework of HPOs cannot answer the question of what kind of ‘hybridity’ was constitutive rather than detrimental to state-making. Rather than providing a powerful analytical tool to unveil and better understand state trajectories, the HPO lens seems to emanate in an historically unfounded and largely normative celebration of pluralism. In light of the fact that differences in the two post-1991 state trajectories in Somaliland can be identified with regard to the degree of state regime domination and (rudimentary) standardization, the analytical prism introduced here is likely to be better placed to provide further insights, instead. Moreover, the ‘regime thesis’ also seems to have the edge over the HPO framework in terms of assessing trends and may provide valuable insights into future lines of fragmentation and conflict in Somaliland.

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510 See also Farah (1999) who points out that “Somaliland’s experience in peacekeeping and governance had been relatively violent (yet constructive).”
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Democratization and Its Perils for State Consolidation

Somaliland’s case of state-making is frequently portrayed as constituting an impressive ‘success story’ (Shinn 2002; Jhazbhay 2007; Harris/Foresti 2011). Besides having allegedly undergone a process of “autonomous recovery” (Weinstein 2005a), the young polity is generally lauded for having developed “home-grown democratic institutions” (Azam 2010), a “vibrant democracy” (Forti 2011:5), and “a far better democratic track record than any of its neighbors” (Kaplan 2008b:148). These observations are generally made against the background of the SNM’s purported democratic legacy, the allegedly benevolent role ‘traditional authorities’ played in the process of state-making, and the numerous elections held during the 2000s, which have commonly been declared ‘reasonably free and fair’ by international observers (Abokor et al. 2002, 2006; Walls/Kibble 2011). Thereby, the Hargeysa conference of 1996/97 is frequently identified as the origin of Somaliland’s process of democratization (Ali/Walls 2008:16).

While democratization has taken centre stage when it comes to praising and explaining Somaliland’s ostensible ‘success’, decentralization has been accredited a similarly important role. Agreed upon during the 1993 Boroma conference, the framework for decentralization was reaffirmed at the 1996/97 Hargeysa symposium and inscribed into the arising

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515 Hansen/Lindeman 2003; Sarrouh 2003; Kibble 2007; Kaplan 2008a/b; Terlinden/Ibrahim 2008b; SONSEA 2011. As well as the constitutional referendum in 2001, there have also been local government elections (2002), presidential elections (2003, 2010), and parliamentary elections (2005).
constitution (APD 2002b:48; Bryden 2000). The calls for decentralization voiced by Somalilanders have been echoed by representatives of the international community (Jama 2003:7; WB/UNDP 2006:20), who perceive decentralization as a key policy for enabling and enhancing ‘good governance’ in developing countries (e.g. WB 1997; Lake/Rothchild 2005:1). In Somaliland, decentralization supposedly led, amongst other factors, to local government accountability (Eubank 2010), thus (mis-)leading some to assume that there was no need for a strong, centralized administration for state-making (Jhazbhay 2009:19).

Scrutinizing overly positive views of democratization and decentralization and their (supposed) benefit for Somaliland’s state-making trajectory, I argue that both processes were ambiguous and highlighted the difficulties of state-making. Moreover, while much attention has focused on electoral processes and their purported freedom and fairness, I stress a number of other aspects. First, this chapter points out that democratization did not arise from the ‘grassroots’, but was largely driven by the power struggle between Egal and his political opponents – an insight that is barely surprising in historical perspective, yet one that hardly features in the pertinent literature. Second, I propose that a central peril of Somaliland’s state-making trajectory lay in the inability of political actors to rise above clan politics – a restraint that was arguably perpetuated rather than abated by the polity’s democratization and decentralization, as this had repercussions on processes of regime standardization.

Proposing that Somaliland’s state-making progress was ambiguous in the decade following the 1996/97 Hargeysa conference I stipulate that, from a state-making perspective, both processes of democratization and decentralization occurred prematurely. One central element of this argument is that – in the absence of alternative identity-providing groups such as social classes or labour unions, for example – evolving political parties were not only likely but destined to mobilize their constituencies along clan lines rather than political programmes, which, invariably, led to a strengthening of the clan regime at the cost of state-issued rules. This argument is in line with the general proposition that “[e]thnicity provides a level of institutional identification to fall back on in times of contestation of the state” (Englebert 2000:67). Overall, the chapter suggests that the processes of democratization and decentralization aided and abetted regime fragmentation – as was

516 See fn. 515.
poignantly exemplified with the proclamation of the Makhir State of Somalia in 2007 and the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) State of Somalia in 2010 – ultimately rendering Somaliland into little more than a conglomeration of different ‘clanistans’ (Interviews 142, 144, 156).

Concentrating on the proceedings of the 1996/97 Hargeysa summit, the first section of this chapter investigates how this event shaped Somaliland’s state trajectory. I show that Egal’s continued application of shrewd politics had quite ambiguous effects on the overall state-making project – while it seems that the President could consolidate the state-making endeavour at its centre, there are clear signs that the same policies also led to an unmaking of the state in parts of its periphery. Section two is dedicated to the polity’s process of democratization, showing that it harboured particular challenges for the consolidation of the Somaliland state. Casting a closer look at some aspects of administrative decentralization and political fragmentation, section three proposes that Egal had good reasons for stalling decentralization, as it appears to have weakened rather than strengthened the Somaliland state once it took root. An interim conclusion sums up the chapter’s findings.

6.1 Hargeysa and the Perils of State Consolidation

The violent conflicts that had ensued between 1994 and 1996 were, once again, concluded with a ‘national’ conference. Taking place in the capital between October 1996 and February 1997, the Hargeysa symposium re-established peace between the warring parties and aimed to address the conflict over the allocation and exertion of political power. Whereas the Garhajis reconciled with the President, the Habar Jalo and Harti clans of eastern Somaliland went into opposition. Ensuing developments forestalled a broad political settlement and nearly culminated in yet another round of civil war. But, for a number of reasons, Egal exchanged bullets for ballots and slowly embarked on a process of democratization – at least on the surface. Although the Hargeysa conference is commonly considered a success (APD 1999:21; Walls 2011) it also sowed seeds of enduring fragmentation (Interview 149).

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518 It was a ‘success’ only in the sense that it was not followed by further civil war (Interview 8).
Traits of State-Making...

The Hargeysa conference signalled the formal conclusion of the 1994-96 civil wars (WSP 2005:66). As had been the case for the ‘national’ conferences in Burco (1991) and Boroma (1993), the Hargeysa symposium was also preceded by a number of intra- and inter-clan peace meetings. Importantly, these informal encounters evolved principally along two fronts – one in the west between the Eidagalle and Habar Awal designed to resolve the conflict over Hargeysa airport, and another in the east between the Habar Jalo and Habar Yonis envisioned to address the tensions that had erupted in Burco (Bradbury 1997:31). Thereby, the reconciliation amongst the eastern constituencies that had started in May 1996 (Bradbury 2008:123) went far beyond a peace settlement, and led the antagonistic clans to political unification. Arguing that they had been side-lined in the political set-up of the mid-1990s, the political leadership of the Habar Jalo and Habar Yonis decided to conspire against President Egal and his dominant Habar Awal (Interview 14).  

Under the aegis of their most prominent politicians – such as Suleiman Mohamoud Adan «Gaal», Abdirahman Ali «Tuur», Mohamed Mohamoud «Silanyo», and Ahmed Abdi Habsade – the Habar Jalo, Habar Yonis, Dhulbahante and Warsangeli formed a political block. This ‘Eastern Alliance’ posed a formidable opposition, particularly because the parliamentary representatives of these clans only needed an additional four votes to achieve a majority, with which government policies could be vetoed (Bradbury 2008:134; Interview 142). Facing this broad-based and well-positioned opposition, Egal played a number of cards prior to and during the course of the Hargeysa conference to dispatch his rivals and secure his political survival. First, he hamstrung the involvement of traditional authorities in the inter-clan negotiations prior to the Hargeysa summit and positioned himself at the...

519 While the Habar Yonis were disgruntled by the fact that they had lost the presidency in 1993, the Habar Jalo had yet to have one of their own in the president’s office (Bryden 1996b).
520 Isaaq/Habar Jalo; «Gaal» was Minister of the Interior in the «Tuur» government (1991-93) and became Minister of Education in Egal’s first cabinet (1993-1996).
521 Isaaq/Habar Yonis; «Tuur» had been SNM Chairman (1990-91) and interim President of Somaliland (1991-93).
522 Isaaq/Habar Jalo; «Silanyo» became a member of Barre’s SRSP (1976), held the post of SNM chairman (1984-90), was appointed Minister of Finance by Egal (1997), and came to be President of Somaliland in 2010.
523 Harti/Dhulbahante; Habsade had been Barre’s last Minister of Foreign Affairs, became speaker of the House of Representatives (1993), Minister of the Interior of Puntland (1998), and – after he had fallen out with President of Puntland Mohamud Muse Hersi in 2007 – Minister of Information in Somaliland (2010).
centre of all negotiations (Renders/Terlinden 2010:732f.; Interview 112).\textsuperscript{524} The President justified this by arguing that the civil wars had constituted \textit{political} rather than \textit{clan} conflicts, thus rendering the involvement of the polity’s legitimate government essential.

Second, Egal weakened the opposition by interrupting their negotiations in the village of Yarowe,\textsuperscript{525} which was about to turn into Somaliland’s new political centre as it hosted a political opposition that continuously grew in strength. Simply by advancing the date of the envisaged national summit at short notice, the President left the Eastern Alliance practically no time to complete their composition of a coherent road map to defy him. This act, which was expressed in the catchphrase at the time that “no one would be waited for” (\textit{la-issy-joojin-maayo}) (Hashi 2005:18), put the Eastern Alliance under increased pressure. It also meant that its hardline elements would either be late for the imminent negotiations in the capital, leaving Egal enough time to manipulate and win over some of the politically undecided clans in the absence of a well-organized opposition, or miss the summit altogether (Interviews 14, 142). Ultimately, the government convened the conference “although some clans were absent or not genuinely represented, and determined the clan quotas and candidates to the two Houses according to its political suit” (Hashi 2005:20).

Third, to further weaken the opposition, Egal offered political posts and spoils to its members (Bryden 2003:13; Renders/Terlinden 2010:732f.; Interview 12). Having already started to sack the \textit{Calan Cas} during the course of the conflicts, Egal continued to redistribute their positions amongst the opposition (Interview 108). The co-optation of «Silanyo», whom Egal secretly pledged to appoint Minister of Finance subsequent to the summit, is a prominent example, as it dealt a decisive blow to the Eastern Alliance. Not only did it effectively split the powerful Habar Jalo clan between their two most enigmatic leaders «Silanyo» and «Gaal» but «Silanyo’s» defection led several other opposition politicians to cross the aisle in his shadow (Interview 142).\textsuperscript{526} Simultaneously, Egal allegedly disbursed envelopes containing up to USD 30,000 and threatened to politically isolate all individuals who refused to join his side (Spears 2010:157; Interview 14). Consequently, numerous politicians and traditional authorities abandoned the opposition stronghold in

\textsuperscript{524} By and large, Egal simply suppressed the participation of the elders of his own Habar Awal clan, thus depriving the other clans’ elders of their equipollent negotiation party and bringing the talks to a halt.

\textsuperscript{525} Located about ten kilometres south-east of Burco.

\textsuperscript{526} These developments show clear parallels to the politics of the 1960s, particularly the developments that unfolded in the spring of 1962, when Egal dismantled his opposition party by abandoning the SNL for the politically dominant SYL out of career considerations (Interview 153). See fn. 455.
Yarowe in favour of the upcoming conference in Hargeysa (Bryden 2003:13; Bradbury 2008:125; Interview 142).

Once the conference got underway, Egal influenced its outcome by taking firm control of the proceedings. While the summit had officially been organized by the House of Elders, the latter was steadfastly controlled by Egal (Renders/Terlinden 2010:733). Furthermore, Egal exercised additional leverage over the conference on the basis that it was largely financed by the government – a novelty in Somaliland’s track-record of summits (Jimcaale 2005:66f.; APD 2008). Moreover, the President had not only selected a conference presidium and secretariat already prior to the meeting’s onset, but had also handpicked roughly half of the 315 delegates (Interview 142). This led a group of seventy-nine prominent individuals to sign a petition in which they called for the appointment of a neutral guurti to ensure fair conference proceedings (Interview 112). While the government refused to tolerate any debate, going so far as to dismiss ministers suspected of not readily toeing the party line (Bradbury 2008:125), the House of Elders rejected the petition, incrementally becoming partisan to the government.

As Egal’s co-optation of the traditional authorities (Hashi 2005:2) re-affirmed patronage as a central element of politics (ICG 2003:12), it allowed him not only to extend his political lead, but also to advance the state-making project. The suppression of the elders’ involvement in parts of the negotiations leading up to the Hargeysa summit transferred the queries on peace and politics from the clan into the purview of the state regime. Also, the President’s influence over the conference choked the credibility of the guurti, which increasingly lost its vital reputation as an independent actor the closer it was drawn to the executive (Interviews 5, 10, 112). Viewed through the prism of regime standardization, these elements of the Hargeysa conference signalled the demise of the clan regime. Making use of rather shrewd political tactics, Egal seemed to further advance Somaliland’s state-making project – at least if understanding state-making as a process of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization.

The Hargeysa conference numbered about twice as many voting delegates as the Boroma conference, because Egal insisted on supplementing the traditional authorities by an equal number of parliamentarian delegates (ICG 2003:12; APD 2008). While he justified this modification by arguing that the legislature should have a say in national matters, this alteration lay largely in the President’s goal to maximise his chances of emerging from the conference as political victor. On a more general note, it can be observed that the incremental increase of conference participants mirrored the political trajectory of the 1960s, which had similarly seen an increasing buy-in of politicians in the absence of a strong executive.

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One of the central conference objectives concerned the selection of a head of state. Although Egal had announced in early 1996 that he would not run for president again, the conference was, quite apparently, designed to consolidate his power and deliver a new government as per his plans (Renders/Terlinden 2010:733). While, by December 1996, eleven further individuals had announced their candidatures, the conference participants re-elected Egal by a landslide of 223 out of 315 votes. Given that Egal had forfeited much of his support prior to the conference, “everyone in Hargeisa believes that he owed his re-election as president […] to simply buying votes” (ION 1997:765). According to the same source, conference delegates had received between USD 1,500 and 5,000 per person for their electoral loyalty to Egal. Having won the election, the government’s tenure in office was extended for the third time, in this instance by an initial four years (Bradbury et al. 2003:461).

While some observers have, nonetheless, concluded that the Hargeysa conference marked the beginning of Somaliland’s democratic trajectory (Ali/Walls 2008:16), others judge that the manipulation of the political system as displayed at the summit lay at the heart of the polity’s continuously limping democracy in subsequent years (Interview 142). Although it is questionable to what extent the 1996/97 symposium brought about a change in governance (Bradbury et al. 2003:458; Ali/Walls 2008:16), it certainly heralded modifications in government. Not only did the conference seal the political future of the Calan Cas, but the subsequent government reshuffle saw the ascendancy of a new league of young politicians and technocrats, most of whom hailed from the Garhajis clan and the Eastern Alliance.

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528 Amongst Egal’s challengers were «Gaab», who received 90 votes, and the mayor of Hargeysa and prominent SNM veteran Mohamed Hashi Elmi (Isaaq/Habar Awal/Saad Muse), who got two votes (ION 1997:755).

529 Originally appointed in 1993 to serve a two-year term, Egal had, with reference to the disruptive civil war, demanded a two-year extension for his government in May 1995. In September 1995, when the civil wars were still going on, parliament granted him an eighteen month extension which legitimized Egal’s rule up to the Hargeysa conference. The extension granted at the 1996/97 summit authorised Egal’s reign until March 2001. Shortly before his mandate ran out, the President demanded another extension, as the envisaged constitutional referendum and presidential elections were still outstanding. Thereupon, parliament granted him one last extension of twelve months to fulfill his mandate and avoid a potential political crisis (ICG 2003:13), leading some analysts to denounce his ‘politics of extension’ (Interview 103) – politics that were mirrored by his successor, who managed to postpone the presidential elections that were envisioned for 2007 for three years.
6 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS PERILS FOR STATE CONSOLIDATION

While the Habar Yonis gained four cabinet posts and several assistant ministerial positions, they also received an additional five seats in parliament (Interview 7). Egal also allocated nine seats in parliament to minority clans, who had not been represented at the Boroma conference (APD 2002b:25; Interview 61).

Yet, the take-over of civilians and bureaucrats from the former SNM cadres also meant that it was largely (Isaaq) politicians who had served in Barre’s administration before, who came to power in Somaliland (Höhne 2011:320).

The ‘civilization’ of government, which some analysts believe to have observed at the Boroma conference (Walls 2008:2), was ultimately realized at the Hargeysa summit.

Overall, Egal’s authoritative selection of new ministers indicated that he was no longer the ‘political guest’ he had been in 1993, but had turned into a veritable ‘ruler’ (Interview 142). Yet, although he had managed to consolidate his position as head of state, Egal’s rule stood on shaky grounds. While some propose that “[t]he agreements reached at the 1997 Hargeysa conference ushered in six years of uninterrupted stability” (Bradbury 2008:127), thus promoting that the summit constituted an outright success (APD 1999:21; Walls 2011; Interview 8), the late-1990s were rife with hefty power struggles and unambiguous traits of state-breaking. Whereas the opposition Egal came to face on the part of disgruntled Calan Cas, who were headed by the prominent «Degaweyne» (Interview 142), constituted little more than a classic power struggle among political contestants, the challenges of the Harti clan family not only menaced his position but Somaliland’s overall state-making project.

Somaliland was dealt a decisive blow when leaders of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans who felt consistently sidelined by Egal withdrew their support for the Somaliland state-making endeavour (Interviews 142, 149). During the course of the Hargeysa conference, the President allegedly alienated all the prominent figures of the Harti clan confederation such as the politician Habsade and the respected traditional leader Garad Abdulkani Garad Jama, who had been moderately pro-Somaliland prior to the Hargeysa symposium (Höhne 2011:319). Egal sacked the former as Speaker of the House of Representative during the course of the Hargeysa conference, and rebuffed the latter who made his and his clan’s acceptance of the symposium’s outcome conditional on the fulfilment of at least one of his demands: either to have a say in the selection of those individuals who were to represent the Dhulbahante clan in parliament, or to reinstate Habsade as the body’s speaker. Rejecting these demands, Egal snubbed Abdulkani in particular and the Harti community more generally, particularly as those who gained key
ministerial posts, became army and police commanders as well as Supreme Court Chief Justice all hailed from the Isaaq clan (Interview 103).

While some suggest that Egal deliberately alienated the Harti politicians in a short-term and self-interested political calculation (Interview 142), others claim that Egal sacrificed the Harti clans to gain the unanimous support of the Gadabursi and to consolidate the state-making efforts in central and western Somaliland (Interview 156). Although the former proposition appears to be sensible, the latter appeals to a political economy analysis in that the Gadabursi-inhabited Awdal region is, with its fertile soils and custom checkpoints for lucrative khat imports, economically much more profitable than the scarcer environments of Sool and Sanaag. Moreover, western Somaliland is also politically of significant importance, not only because it is slightly more populous than the eastern region, but also because it connects Hargeysa with the highly important centre of Djibouti. Thus, Egal appears to not having had much of an alternative than prioritising the Issa over the Harti clan family. Moreover, Egal’s political affronts were seemingly more directed against particular Harti individuals rather than the entire clan confederation – after all, Egal had tried to appease the Harti throughout 1997 by appointing Badane, a Dhulbahante from Buuhoodle, Speaker of Parliament, making Mahmoud Mohamed Saleh «Fagadeh» (Dhulbahante) Minister of Foreign Affairs, and announcing Mohamed Said Mohamed «Gees» (Warsangeli) Minister of National Planning and Coordination (Interviews 103, 108, 110, 156).

Nevertheless, the Hargeysa summit led Harti politicians to turn their backs on the Somaliland state-making project, which implied that “roughly 30 per cent of the territory and 20 per cent of the population of the polity were not integrated” (Höhne 2011:322f.).

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532 According to this assessment, Egal predicted that he would not win the allegiance of the Harti clan family for the Somaliland project, not least because numerous Dhulbahante and Warsangeli politicians had joined the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu, thus leading him to focus his energies on securing the support of the Gadabursi (Interview 156).

533 Although it is true that the eastern regions are home to most of the profitable livestock business, its value creation largely takes place in Berbera, where the state taxes livestock exports.

534 This reflected, for example, in the fact that over 60 per cent of all votes cast in elections originated from the west (Abokor et al. 2006).

535 It is important to note that the Harti abandoned Somaliland not only because some of their leaders were alienated and sidelined by Egal, but also because the leaders of their allied Habar Jalo, such as «Silanyo», had not only failed to openly challenge Egal, but even started to side with him (Interview 142). Moreover, the Harti decision to abandon Somaliland had a longer history. Already during the 1993 Boroma conference, the Harti political elite, including Ali Khalif Galaydh, had proposed a formula for power sharing between the presidency and the premiership. Yet, the Isaaq-based SNM pushed for a strong central presidency, gaining the support of the Gadabursi, who ultimately took the vice-presidency. Politically defeated, Galaydh abandoned the Somaliland state-making project and became the first Prime.
Consequently, Abdulqani, Habsade and other Harti figures not only backed the formation of the Puntland State of Somalia in 1998 (Bryden 1999a; Bradbury 2008:126f.), but actively propelled the formation of this polity (Interview 149). Given that Puntland was a project of the Majerteen, with whom the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli are related by descent from the Harti clan family, the latter clans hoped for a greater accommodation of their demands in this polity. From then onwards, Puntland presented a competing ‘political bidder’ for the Harti population in eastern Sool and Sanaag, challenging the Somaliland state both in terms of identity and statehood (Renders 2006:362; Höhne 2009; Renders/Terlinden 2010:740).

**Centralizing the Former, ‘Peripheralizing’ the Latter**

Viewed through the regime standardization prism, the Hargeysa conference appears to have been less of a crystal-clear success (APD 1999:21; Bradbury 2008:127; Walls 2011; Interview 8) – it rather had an ambivalent effect on state-making. Although the symposium importantly advanced state-making, inasmuch as it comprised a number of elements that indicated a fortification of the state regime, having portrayed the civil strife as political rather than clan wars and repelled the traditional authorities during the course of the peace and power negotiations of 1996/97 (Interview 95), the President had successfully removed politics as the preserve of the clan and firmly embedded it in the purview of the state. This was reaffirmed with the adoption of a draft constitution, which drove another nail in the coffin of the clan regime, as it provided a roadmap for the substitution of the beel system of governance with a multi-party democracy, leading Battera (2005:305) to conclude that “the Hargeysa conference of 1996-1997 […] undoubtedly strengthened the central government.” That it was, henceforth, the task of the state rather than clan to determine the ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ was clearly signalled by Egal, when he had a new national flag adopted on October 14th, 1996.

What also fostered the state-making endeavour was the way Egal incorporated many of the traditional authorities, of whom he could not yet dispense with, into the state apparatus. In the wake of the Hargeysa conference, the central government increasingly employed traditional authorities in its ranks (Interview 95). As the President provided them with posts, for example as director generals (Bradbury 2008:124), he not only moved the traditional elders from a political to a more administrative sphere, but also from the clan

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Minister of Somalia in the Transitional National Government (TNG) that was established in Djibouti in April/May 2000 (Hashi 2005:17f.).
into the state regime. While this co-optation brought the traditional authorities under the purview of Egal, it entailed the risk that the elders could penetrate and undermine the state’s institutions and socio-cognitive system, if not kept on a short leash – a development that seemed to increasingly unfold under the later rule of President Mohamed Rihale Kahin.

Yet, the progress in state-making that could be established at the state’s centre seemingly came at the cost of state-unmaking in the periphery. In contrast to the political displacement of the rather politically organized Calan Cas, which Egal had undertaken after he had largely deprived them of their powers and popular support, the alienation of Abdulqani and other Harti leaders took place before they were politically neutralized. Although Egal dabbled in damage limitation by co-opting other members of the Harti clan, he could not prevent the Somaliland state-making project from crumbling at its edges. During subsequent years, regime standardization was effectively restricted to the polity’s economic lifeline from Berbera to Hargeysa and Boroma, failing to extend effectively into the ‘periphery’. This was also reflected in the voting patterns in the upcoming constitutional referendum, to which the chapter now turns.

6.2 Democratization and Its Challenges for State-Making

Despite the fact that Egal had won the presidency again and was mandated to rule for another four years, he did not emerge from the Hargeysa conference as undisputed leader or in a position of unquestioned strength. Rather, his reign was seriously contested from different angles (Interview 142) – challenges that nearly ousted him from power a number of times in subsequent years. As had been the case under his premiership in the late 1960s, part of the population’s dissatisfaction derived from his shrewd power politics and the increase in corruption and patronage (ION 1997:792). Consequently, participants of the Hargeysa conference amplified their demands for the ratification of a constitution – officially to set the country on track for democratization, but also to confine the President’s sheer political omnipotence and create alternative mechanisms to eventually replace him (Interview 149).

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536 See also Höhne (2011:322) who similarly argues that the state-making process “concerned only a portion of the country”, thus countering Bradbury’s (2008) presentation of the process of “becoming Somaliland”, which sweeps aside regional dissimilarities in Somaliland’s history and politics.
Although a draft constitution was adopted at the conference’s end in February 1997, it took another four years until its final version underwent plebiscite, paving the way for democratic elections. While some claim that Somaliland’s democracy was brought about by the ‘grassroots’ in a ‘bottom-up’ process (Jhazbhay 2006: 24; Adam 1995; Terlinden/Debiel 2003) and owed its introduction to Egal’s readiness to “break with the corrupt and unrepresentative practices of the past” (Bradbury et al. 2003: 458), the evidence is less clear cut. For one, the process of democratization was less driven by the ‘grassroots’ than by the imperative of the President to stay in power. For another, the first years of democratization appeared to be marked by a continuation, rather than conclusion, of Egal’s ‘corrupt and unrepresentative practises’ – practices that not only secured his position at the helm of the state, but that also initially advanced Somaliland’s state-making project.

Constitutional Manoeuvres

While Egal had to give in to the opposition’s request to finally adopt a constitution, he was at odds with the parliament over the question of who should draft it. Ultimately, both sides came up with their own versions, which were combined into a single document to break the stalemate. However, the President was dissatisfied with this interim constitution and it took until the year 2000 before a mutually acceptable draft was produced. Thus, as had been the case after the 1993 Boroma symposium, the wake of the Hargeysa conference saw the President stalling the process of adopting a constitution (Bradbury 2008: 131). This changed radically in August 1999, when Egal brought some urgency to the matter – an urgency that took the country by surprise and angered the opposition on the grounds that “there was no public and opposition consultation as promised before putting the constitution for popular endorsement” (Ibrahim 2007: 223f.; ICG 2003: 30).

Justifying his aboutface by proclaiming that the international community would not recognize Somaliland’s independence “unless it installed a constitutionally based, appropriately elected and authentically democratic government” (Mesfin 2009: 6), Egal portrayed himself as a stern reformer dedicated to introducing democracy. Yet, his sudden promotion of the constitutional process was driven by at least two further considerations. First, Somaliland’s existence was challenged by both the formation of Puntland in August 1998 and the Mogadishu-based TNG in Arta, Djibouti, in May 2000, not least because the

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537 Unsurprisingly, parliament had favoured a strong legislative branch, whereas Egal wanted to assign greater powers to the executive.
two polities laid claim to (parts of) Somaliland’s territory (Mesfin 2009:5; Abokor et al. 2003). These regional developments were so alarming that Egal not only pressed for the effective introduction of the Somaliland police force in Erigavo in 1998/99 (Interview 66), but also introduced new public order laws in August 2000, decreed the unconstitutional creation of a National Security Committee (NSC), suspended habeas corpus, and banned public rallies. As “[t]he emergency laws were used to detain several Somaliland citizens for attending and voicing opinion in support of the Arta conference, as well as for questioning the government’s contracts with foreign commercial companies” (Bradbury 2008:132, referring to UNDP 2001:177), Egal might not have showcased the democratic character of his reign, but he certainly restricted the potential for regime fragmentation, by tightening state-issued rules.

Second, Egal had an interest in advancing the constitutional process so as to carry through popular elections – elections that were more likely to assure his political survival than another clan conference that the opposition pushed for. «Gaal», who was one of the few remaining figureheads of the Eastern Alliance that maintained their opposition to the President, argued that the process of democratization should not move forward until still outstanding basic points of contention had been dealt with. While «Gaal» could garner significant support for the idea of holding another clan conference to re-evaluate the allocation of political power, Egal dreaded defeat if another summit was held (Interview 142). Cunningly, the President presented himself as a modernizer, postulating that political power should no longer be contested in the framework of clan conferences, but national elections. As «Gaal» and the traditional authorities who supported him did not immediately concede, the President had them – Barre-style – arrested under the pretence of plotting to sabotage the constitutional referendum (Bradbury 2008:134), taking Somaliland to the brink of another war (ICG 2003:13; Bradbury et al. 2003:463; Ibrahim 2007:224).

By late 2000, a 45-member committee, which had been jointly nominated by the executive and the legislature, produced a mutually accepted constitution pending endorsement by

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538 The NSC is considered by some a remnant of Barre’s National Security Service (Interview 5).
539 While Egal had co-opted «Silanyo», individulas such as «Tuur», Habsade, and Abdulkâni had turned their backs on the Somaliland project.
540 The unconstitutional formation of the NSC, the introduction of emergency laws, accusations of corruption, etc. provided «Gaal» with enough material that he could challenge Egal.
general referendum. While parliament had been given additional powers of financial oversight and increased co-determination regarding the approval of administrative appointments, the presidency retained most of the executive powers sought by Egal (ICG 2003:12; Interview 142). Given the prevailing political climate, however, it was unclear whether the population would approve the document, particularly as many were apprehensive about the President’s rushed introduction of multiparty politics and felt that he could not be trusted to establish a level playing field for electoral competition (ICG 2003:13). Ingeniously, Egal thus tied the vote on the constitution to a vote on Somaliland’s status of independence, which was reaffirmed in the constitution’s first article (ICG 2003:12; Abokor et al. 2003). This assured the President of an overall ‘yes’ vote (Jirdeh 2004:94).

The constitutional plebiscite took place on May 31st, 2001, almost exactly one decade after the unilateral declaration of independence. According to the government, some 1.18 million people participated in the vote on the constitution, of which 97.9 per cent allegedly approved it. In light of the fact that the later parliamentary election of September 29th, 2005 numbered ‘only’ a total of 670,320 valid votes – which was, however, 182,000 more than were counted in the presidential elections of April 14th, 2003 (Abokor et al. 2006) – and given that the referendum was boycotted in parts of eastern Sanaag, Sool, and Awdal (Bradbury 2008:133), the figure of 1.18 million voters appears to be doubtful. Moreover, even if discounting the vote of the Harti clan families, the near unanimous approval of the constitution seemed questionable, as numerous constituencies had not renounced the idea of a re-unified Somalia once and for all. In any case, the “[a]pproval of the new constitution paved the way for multiparty elections” (ICG 2003:13).

**Electoral Tactics**

The constitution foresaw the replacement of the *beel* system of governance with a modern form of a restricted multi-party democracy in which the head of state, legislature and district
councils were to be elected by secret public ballot. Although few disagreed that the beel system of power-sharing had been but a transitional framework for governance, the population feared that the freshly won stability could be undone by the introduction of competitive multi-party democracy (ICG 2003:13; Interview 150). Still, local and presidential elections were scheduled for 2001 and 2002 respectively (APD 2002b:27), and the government passed a law that legalized the formation of political organizations. Immediately, Egal announced the establishment of the country’s first political organization – the Democratic United Peoples’ Movement (UDUB).

The President’s swift move led “a powerful group of clan sultans with strong backing in the east” to call for “UDUB to be dismantled and for a shir beeleed [clan conference] to be held to decide on the future of the country” (Bradbury et al. 2003:463), as they perceived Egal as not having established a level playing field for the formation of political organizations. Indeed, the law allowing for the establishment of political organizations only came into force on August 6th, 2001, a couple of months after UDUB had been established (ION 2002). Practically simultaneously, Parliament tabled a vote of no-confidence in the President, when the management of port revenues and the government’s handling of a contract given to the French oil company Total Mer Rouge came under parliamentary scrutiny (Bradbury 2008:134, referring to IRIN 2001). Having survived this motion of impeachment by just one vote (Bradbury et al. 2003:463; Ibrahim 2007:224), and facing a strong opposition spearheaded by «Gaal» (Interview 36), Egal continued to push forth the democratization process in order to renew his legitimacy.

543 The multi-party democracy was ‘restricted’ in the sense that the number of political parties able to contest national elections was constitutionally limited to three in order to avoid a political fragmentation along kinship lines as had occurred in the 1960s. In order to become an accredited party, political organizations that contested district council elections had to gain a minimum of 20 per cent of the votes in at least four of Somaliland’s six regions (Bradbury et al. 2003:463). However, as no political association reached the 20 per cent threshold, the three strongest ones were ultimately accepted as the three constitutional parties. Egal was, however, against the constitutional limitation of the number of parties (Jama 2009:17) – most likely because this impeded his divide and rule tactics.

544 The beel system established at the Boroma conference in 1993, had come to be perceived as an impediment to effective government – particularly in view of the manipulation it had experienced during the Hargeysa summit, which exhibited its weakness as a mechanism for political change (Bradbury 2008:131).

545 Part of the reason why there was so much opposition to the contract struck between Egal and Total Mer Rouge was that it created a monopoly position for the international oil company – a decisive market advantage that was against the country’s new constitution (Interview 100). Interestingly, one of Egal’s sons later worked for Total Mer Rouge (Interview 149).
By the end of September 2001, a further six political organizations had registered for the elections (Bradbury 2008:134). Having finally been forced to buy into the democratization process in order not to be left on the political offside, «Gaal» belatedly formed a political organization referred to as the Alliance for Salvation and Democracy (ASAD). As his deputy chairman, «Gaal» accommodated former vice-president Abdulrahman Aw Ali – who had been the only Gadabursi officer in the SNM, which brought him great respect – in order to counter Egal’s selection of the Gadabursi Mohamed Riyale Kahin as vice-president. As ASAD was closely associated with the radical Calan Cas (Jhazbhay 2010:4) and featured numerous political heavyweights, this party posed a formidable challenge to Egal’s UDUB organization, particularly as the latter included numerous members of the detested former Barre administration. To realize his envisioned electoral victory, Egal needed to further weaken the opposition.

After having appointed his former political adversary «Silanyo» as Minister of Finance in 1997, the President exasperated him by transferring the Habar Jalo politician to the Ministry of National Planning and Coordination in 1999. Disappointed by this demotion, «Silanyo» resigned from his position in 2001 and left for the United Kingdom to undergo medical treatment. Deeming «Silanyo’s» attitude unacceptable, Egal made a political issue out of his resignation and threatened to also leave office, if his minister did not return to his post. Fearing a power vacuum, the guurti pressured «Silanyo» into returning (Interview 108), which pleased Egal as he needed him to appease and divide the Calan Cas, whose political strength increased in the framework of the newly formed political organization ASAD (Interview 142; ION 1997:792). Upon his homecoming, Egal asked «Silanyo» to mediate between him and the SNM hardliners – such as Mohamed Kahin, Muse Behi, and «Degaweyne» (Interview 142). Whether intended to or not by the President, «Silanyo» used his new appointment to distinguish himself politically and gain popularity, ultimately

546 UCID (Justice and Welfare Party), SAHAN (Somaliland Alliance for Islamic Democracy), BIRSOL (Salvation and Protection of Somaliland’s Aspirations), HORMOOD (Champions for Peace and Prosperity), UMAD (Unification of Somaliland’s Viewpoints), and ILAYSKA (Somaliland Beacon Light Party). KULMIYE (Unity Party) was registered later, and HORMOOD and BIRSOL ultimately merged (Jama 2009:18f).

547 Riyale had been an NSS officer under Barre and gone into the khat trade in the early 1990s. He had been selected by Egal in order to appease the Gadabursi clan, whose diaspora had pushed for an independent state of Awdal, issuing the “Awdal Declaration of Independence” in 1995 (Interview 88). Even though this declaration was not taken very seriously on the ground, as most Gadabursi were not in favour of an independent state (Interviews 95, 135, 151), Egal still needed to politically accommodate the non-Isaaq communities. Surprised by his nomination, Riyale was wholly loyal to Egal. Upon leaving for surgery in South Africa, however, Egal was allegedly worried about leaving Somaliland in Riyale’s hands in case of his death, because he considered the Gadabursi wholly unqualified for the position (Interview 142).
gaining so much confidence that he founded his own political organization, Kulmiye (Unity Party). This inevitably played into the hands of Egal and impaired «Gaal’s» chances of winning the elections, as «Silanyo’s» decision to stand for the presidency himself enticed other politicians and their supporters away from ASAD – particularly as «Silanyo» hailed from the same clan as «Gaal» (Interview 108).

Having been postponed by about one year, local council elections finally took place in December 2002. Egal, however, did not live to see these, as he died unexpectedly on March 3rd, 2002 while undergoing surgery in South Africa. In line with the constitution, both houses of parliament confirmed Vice-President Riyale as his successor. In the subsequent elections, UDUB emerged as winner, receiving some 40.76 per cent of all votes. Amongst the five other political organizations that contested the elections it were Kulmiye (18.19 per cent) and UCID (11.24 per cent) that also qualified as accredited national parties (Mesfin 2009:6, referring to ICG 2003:18). That UCID came in third was surprising, given that it was unable to hold a candle to ASAD, both in clan and political terms (Interview 150). Thereby, the latter party was not only outrun by UDUB, Kulmiye and UCID, but in fact came in last among all the six political organizations, although it was headed by charismatic leaders such as «Gaal», «Degaweyne», Abdirahman Aw Ali, and Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, all of whom originated from populous and powerful clans (Interview 142). This surprising outcome was commonly attributed to voting irregularities and the fact that the National Election Commission and Political Party Commission had not only been appointed by the President (Jama 2009:18), but acted to his will (Interview 142).

The democratization process had hardly been democratic itself (Hashi 2005:19), and the older generation in particular remained sceptical of it, as they remembered the troubles and problems that had come with democratization in the 1960s (Interview 150). The fear of premature democratization and its associated problems was supposedly such that even «Gaal», who had long been chasing after the presidential post, asked President Riyale to postpone the presidential elections. «Gaal» even offered to support the prolongation of Riyale’s term in office, if he held back the electoral process, a demand he rejected.

Yet, the members of the committee were also confirmed by the House of Representatives in February 2001 (Jama 2009:18).
The public’s scepticism regarding the democratization process and outright fear of a revival of violence (Interview 150) thereby flies in the face of the assertion that “[m]uch of the process of democratisation has been enabled by an overwhelming public desire to avoid a return to conflict” (Kibble/Walls 2010a:1).

Democratic Legacies

The political thriller that had accompanied Somaliland’s state trajectory in the 1990s continued throughout the second decade of the polity’s existence, albeit at a less pulsating level. At the time the three political parties were established in late 2002, political contestation started losing momentum, undoubtedly influenced by Egal’s death (Bradbury 2008:136). Having seen UDUB emerge from the district elections with a comfortable winning margin, Riyale led Somaliland confidentially towards the next elections. On April 14th, 2003, Riyale championed the presidential election, beating his closest rival «Silanyo» by a margin of only 214 votes (Abokor et al. 2006), and won a five-year mandate to guide the country. Given the peaceful nature of both the transfer of power after Egal’s demise and the subsequent elections, international observers not only lauded Somaliland’s maturity (Bradbury 2008:136), but also interpreted the fact that a member of a minority clan was elected president as evidence of Somaliland’s democratic character (e.g. Abokor et al. 2006:8; Bennet/Woldemariam 2011:7f.).

Yet, Somaliland’s democracy stayed restricted: its geographical reach remained limited (Höhne 2011:327), as exemplified by the parliamentary elections of September 29th, 2005. Although the two opposition parties – Kulmiye and UCID – together received 49 out of a total of 82 seats and, thus, an almost 60 per cent majority (Mesfin 2009:6), they lamented that the electoral process had not reached the ‘hinterland’. Most of the population of

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549 It can be suspected the Riyale, just as Egal before him, pursued the democratic road in part because he probably rightly believed that he stood a greater chance of politically defeating «Gaal» in an electoral campaign than in a clan conference.

550 However, according to some Riyale’s election had less to do with the desire of the Somaliland population to show the international community their democratic nature in making a Gadabursi president of a polity otherwise largely controlled by the Isaaq, but more with the fact that Riyale and his UDUB party were considered the lesser evil. As Kulmiye had developed into a collecting pond of former Calan Cas bigwigs, the party had become unelectable by the Garhajis. Thus, the presidential election, which pitted the Calan Cas (Kulmiye) against the faqash (a prerogative term referring to the former henchmen of Barre; UDUB) was decided in favour of the latter – despite a feeble presidential candidate (Interview 116).

551 While UDUB had gained 33 seats in parliament, Kulmiye and UCID received 28 and 21 seats respectively. The fact that UDUB did not command an overall majority “makes Somaliland the only place in Africa where parliament is not controlled by the government” (Abokor et al. 2006). However, this changed in 2010, when Kulmiye secured the presidential seat.
eastern Sool and Sanaag did not fully participate in the elections – which was largely due to insufficient infrastructure, prevailing insecurity, and the population’s partial objection to the Somaliland state-making project – thus skewing the results. Democracy also remained limited with regard to its character, as was not only illustrated by the way UDUB consistently attempted to stifle the media and incessantly harassed opposition sympathisers (Mesfin 2009:6f.), but as also exposed during the 2007/10 presidential elections.

Originally envisaged for 2007, the presidential elections were repeatedly postponed until June 2010. While these elections were also praised as having largely been free and fair and for having brought about not only a change in personal leadership but also in political parties (e.g. Walls/Kibble 2011:13), the election was at least as much decided by ‘private deals’ as by ‘public polls’. It is widely acknowledged that the country’s largest money transmittance company, Dahabshiil, for example, provided an estimated 40 per cent of the funds for Kulmiye’s presidential campaign in 2009/10 (Interview 106). Upon winning the presidency, «Silanyo» appointed Hirsi, a cousin of Dahabshiil owner Mohamed Said Duale, as Chief of Cabinet/Minister of Presidency, and made the former Dahabshiil representative in London, Saad Ali Shire, Minister of National Planning and Development (Interviews 96, 100, 102). Also Telesom, the polity’s biggest telecommunication company and second most profitable enterprise in Somaliland, strongly supported «Silanyo’s» campaign financially. While Telesom is also said to have representatives in the government, such as Mohamed Abdi Gabose and Abdi Aw Dahir, who both hail from the Habar Yonis clan, the company was biased towards «Silanyo» because the owner of Telesom originates from the same clan as «Silanyo» – the Habar Jalo (Interview 106; see also Interview 96).

As regards the democratic trajectory of Somaliland, disturbing parallels emerge with the early democratic period of the Somali state in the 1960s. While the 1960s proliferation of parties was avoided during the post-1991 period, Somaliland’s political parties were just as much about personalities and as little about political programmes as had been the case then (Interview 36). While this is little unique to Somaliland, the fact that ideological orientation and political agendas took a backseat meant that the three political parties differed primarily

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552 This post constitutes the second most important position of the «Silanyo» administration. Prior to his appointment, Hirsi was chief executive officer of SomTel, the telecommunication branch of Dahabshiil (Interview 106).

553 Yet, it should be acknowledged that, in 2010/11, civil society groups pressured the «Silanyo» government into opening up the political party space as they perceived the established parties to be too long-established (Interview 94).
with regards to clan and economic interests (Interview 95). Political identification with a particular party was so meagre that it could be observed that UDUB members who had held ministerial posts in the Riyale government abrogated their party membership only a few days before the 2010 presidential elections – hoping to obtain a position in the new Kulmiye government (Interview 156). Moreover, some Somalilanders have acknowledged that their democracy was not only fragile, but that their presidents have had clear dictatorial traits (Interviews 5, 75, 112, 142, 151). In a similar vein, others argue that Somaliland was not a democracy, but a clanocracy (Interview 153) – thus exhibiting a further parallel to Somalia’s earlier democratic experience.

**Costs of Democratization**

Although international observers declared the elections of 2002, 2003 and 2005 as “largely free and fair” (Kibble 2007),\(^{554}\) other policy analysts conceded that, while far from ‘free and fair’, the elections had at least been peaceful (Interview 142). Also regarding the impact of democratization on state-making, it appears having been less triumphant as frequently claimed – at least if viewed through the prism of regime standardization. While the move towards elections was “intended to mark a progression from clan-based politics to party politics” (Abokor et al. 2006), this switch from the clan regime to state-issued ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ was increasingly derailed during the course of Somaliland’s decade-long democratic experience. Whereas, in principle, multi-party democracy can facilitate such a change in regimes, it could not deliver this result in Somaliland, where politicians were unable to rise above clan politics.

In Somaliland, democratization took place in an environment in which the clans’ ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ provided the only set of institutions and patterns of identity that politicians could readily appeal and revert to, in order to mobilise mass support. Generally speaking, the political landscape was characterized by the “absence of ideological differences between the three parties” (Höhne 2011:327; Interview 156), which effected a mobilization of party supporters along kinship lines (IRI 2005:4). In other words, democratization was largely inapt to bring about an alteration of the society’s overarching rules, as the political actors relied on precisely those rules in order to mobilise support.

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\(^{554}\) See also fn. 515.
Under these conditions, processes of democratization generally hinder rather than facilitate regime standardization, cum state-making.

This fall-back on the clan regime was reinforced by the system chosen for the parliamentary election of 2005, whereby the population voted for a candidate, rather than a party. As the process of nominating parliamentarians was “less about choosing candidates who would be loyal to their parties” than about selecting ones “who could command the largest ethnic numbers and strongest financial support from their clans” (IRI 2005:13) the parties ultimately ceded much of their control over the nomination process to clan leaders. This system perpetuated the importance of the clan, as it was the clan leadership – rather than the respective political party – that selected candidates and financed their campaigns. This absence of party support for local campaigns “removed a major incentive for candidates to take direction or advice from party officials” (IRI 2005:16). Consequently “voting patterns highlighted the continuing influence of clan politics, with marked regional variations in support for the political parties” (Abokor et al. 2006; Ciabarri 2008:65).

The notion of a situation in which a clan-selected parliament was exchanged for a popularly elected one obviously “caused much anxiety among the clans” (IRI 2005:13). While the previous system had guaranteed each clan a certain level of representation in the legislature, the new system implied that clans would have to compete with one another for scarce positions – thus further boosting clan rules at the expense of the state regime. Under these conditions, the non-Isaaq clans’ reservations about a popularly elected parliament came true. While the Isaaq increased their parliamentary representation by nine seats to 57, some minority and the Harti clans lost out, the latter’s representation falling from 14 to a mere 10 members, which increased their sense of marginalization within Somaliland (Abokor et al. 2006). Although some members of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli participated in the elections, many more rejected them, effectively shrinking the size of the polity (Abokor et al. 2006) and rendering the state’s politics more exclusionary (Hansen/Bradbury 2007:470f.; Ibrahim 2007:229).

These developments led to the observation that democratization barely occurred in southern Togdheer, Sool and eastern Sanaag (Höhne 2011:327), thus forfeiting a certain degree of regime standardization across the territory claimed by the self-styled republic. Over a decade later, the Harti still feel largely unincorporated into the Somaliland state. While the Dhulbahante have frequently perceived it a mockery that they have generally been allocated ‘soft’ ministerial posts, the Warsangeli have often considered their
representatives in the Somaliland cabinets meaningless, as their respective ministers generally do not enjoy high standing within their clans or are even considered traitors (Interview 103). More generally, the democratization process is seen as one in which “the traditional structures have been absorbed into top-down socio-political and administrative systems that are a bottleneck to local governance and development” (Hashi 2005:4). Thus, democratization revalued the clan regime at the expense of the state’s institutions and socio-cognitive system.

6.3 Defying Decentralization, Facing Fragmentation

At the turn of the millennium, Egal’s rule had clearly stood on shaky grounds, which not only put brakes on his reign, but also the overall state-making project. The fragile political consensus in the years following the Hargeysa conference and the democratization route Somaliland embarked upon hampered Egal’s early policies of politico-administrative centralization. Although the President managed to largely delay and partly annul processes of decentralization as stipulated by the Boroma conference and the constitution, the polity was increasingly marked by political fragmentation in the decade following the 1996/97 summit. While this process was catalysed by the imminent democratization that effectively split the territory into clan constituencies, fragmentation was aided by the fact that the political elite was largely unable to rise above clan politics. As, by the mid-2000s, developments towards regime standardization seemingly stalled, some political analysts and practitioners came to regard Somaliland as little more than a polity characterized by the “peaceful coexistence of clans” (Interview 142; see also Interviews 144, 156).

Defying Administrative Decentralization

Having experienced a highly centralized state under Barre, many Somalis were in favour of a greater diffusion of political authority and control in the post-1991 era (APD 2002b:45). Consequently, the Transitional National Charter (TNC) agreed upon in Boroma in 1993 “mandated the Somaliland leadership to decentralize the system of government” (APD 2002b:45). Nonetheless, Egal’s early rule (1993-1996/97) was clearly characterized by a centralization of the political system, which was most blatantly evidenced by his ‘war
projects’ of the mid-1990s. His objection to decentralization also showed in the continued central appointment of regional government officials, and the fact that the latter remained solely accountable to the central government. In November 1993, a few months after the Boroma conference, which had agreed on the formation of regional and local councils to decentralise the appointment of regional government officials, the Ministry of Interior issued a decree, which ruled that

“If a region/district could not agree in nominating a governor/mayor and deputy governor/mayor in 45 days time after a notice to do so, the central government will take the decision to nominate officers for the region/district, at request to parliament for approval by the ministry” (quoted in APD 2002b:46).

Subsequently, the executive passed the responsibility to advance decentralization on to parliament, which could neither agree on the form nor the nature of decentralization. Hence, after progress had significantly stalled, parliament returned this responsibility to the executive, authorizing the government in May 1995 to nominate local officials until local structures were up and running. This clearly played into the hands of Egal, his interest in centralization, and the process of regime standardization, particularly as, ultimately, not one single district or regional administration was nominated by local people between 1993 and 2001 (APD 2002b:49). Yet, the process of democratization that unfolded from the late-1990s onward loosened the central government’s grip over the regions, which showed, for example, in the fact that the appointment of town mayors eluded the president’s purview with the local council elections of 2002 (Interview 156).

Prior to the local elections of 2002, however, President Egal continued his quest for centralization, which he justified by arguing that “Somalilanders were not yet ready to select their own leaders because of internal clan divisions and the inability of existing local government institutions to collect and manage taxes” (Interpeace 2006:5).

“To prove its point, the government flirted with the idea of introducing nominated clan based local councils. The plan was to implement the experiment in Hargeysa, and then expand the scheme to other major towns. But, in the event, the idea never got off the ground, largely because the dominant clans in Hargeysa could not agree upon a formula for sharing council seats” (ibid.)

This disunity amongst the different clans residing in Hargeysa allowed Egal to posit that the state-making project could not rely on decentralized clan structures – a telling argument.

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555 See Chapter 5.
even though the disunity prevalent in Hargeysa was hardly representative of the situation in other parts of Somaliland.\footnote{In fact, reality diverged from this argument in that local administrations, generally spearheaded by traditional authorities, had formed in different urban and rural areas during «Tuur’s» reign.} In any case, Egal took centralization so far that, by the late-1990s, many Somalilanders perceived the governance arrangements to be a “reproduction of Siyaad Barre’s rigid, pyramidal hierarchy” (APD 2002b:45, 53).

Although Egal was pressured to decentralise the political, economic, and administrative system, he appears to have done little. And while the constitution of 2001 re-emphasized the goal of a decentralised state apparatus (APD 2002b:46), its wording regarding the distribution of power and responsibilities between different levels of government was so ambiguous that its implementation was severely hampered (APD 2002b:47). Regional and district authorities largely continued to function in dependence on the central government, not least because the latter maintained its control over economic resources. The financial windfall local councils had expected to accompany the 2002 local elections did not materialize, compelling them to mobilise their own resources. Yet, the meagre taxes they collected hardly sufficed to finance their activities, let alone provide services to their constituencies (APD 2002b:45). The resulting notorious underperformance of local and national-level administrations led the population to increasingly retreat to their respective clan and rely on its services (Interviews 63, 66, 151).

**Facing Regime Fragmentation**

Thus, while Egal had successfully arrested *de jure* decentralization, he could not preclude it *de facto* in the form of regime fragmentation. The less the government’s ability to enforce institutional and socio-cognitive standardization got – whether due to the absence of infrastructure, a lack of political acceptance in the regions, or insufficient capacity to implement particular rules, for example – the more likely the respective population’s relapse was into its clan regime. The subsequent re-valourisation of the traditional authorities was, however, not only driven by the population, but also the central state government. In the absence of a functioning, effective and efficient administrative apparatus to sustain a relationship between the state and the population, and to potentially carry through regime standardization, the elders provided the only connection between government and population. Hence, the government came to rely increasingly on traditional authorities in the first decade of the
21st century, officially employing some 937 traditional leaders – at a monthly salary of USD 50-100 – throughout the country (MoI 2011; Interviews 14, 16, 95).

The fact that local and regional constituencies became more self-referential in formulating and realizing their (political) interests, and, thus, turned more towards their clan regime, was enhanced by the democratization process. The 2005 voter registration in particular, escalated clan consciousness, not least because prominent politicians announced in the national media that the provision of future state services depended on demographic parameters (Interview 117). As, in the absence of a census, the voter registration provided the polity’s only demographic record that could inform government policies, the (sub-)clans mobilised their members to register for elections in their home town (Interview 151). Simultaneously, clan representatives established their own committees to guide their members through the electoral process (Interview 140). Supported by the government, these committees often financed the transport of clan members to their home towns for voter registration and, a few months later, election (Interview 117). This process reinforced the peoples’ identification with their kin (Interview 156), thus abetting regime fragmentation rather than standardization.

The re-valourisation of the clan regime in the political framework also shows in the fact that regional administrations largely reflect clan politics – e.g. with regard to staffing policies (Interviews 63, 138, 156) – leaving sub-national administrations largely independent of the central state administration (Interview 135). Although President Egal had started to shuffle civil servants, such as police and tax officers, and transfer them between the different regions, this practice largely ended at the turn of the millennium, as first political developments required Egal to shift his focus from state-making to political survival and second, his successor, Riyale reverted to appointing regional governors locally and avoiding overly reshuffling civil servants between different regions (Interview 118). Thus, the

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557 While the inclusion of traditional authorities does not constitute an obstacle to state-making under the condition that they follow and broadcast the state’s ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, it is debatable in how far the traditional leaders employed by the Somaliland government bolstered or undermined the state regime. However, it is very plausible that the traditional elders only partly complied with and perpetuated the state’s rules.

558 As the governors of Somaliland’s six regions always originated from the region of which they were in charge, Egal started to reshuffle the governors from 1997 onwards. In that year, for example, he transferred the governor of Awdal to Sanaag, and Sahil to Awdal region – an action that not only weakened the governors, but was also conducive to counter regime fragmentation along clan lines.
clannisation of regional administrative structures – the root of which lay in the fact that the non-Isaaq clans had not been defeated and subjugated in 1991 (Interview 142) – wore on.

A Brief Case Study of Erigavo

The processes of decentralization and fragmentation and their effects on state-making as sketched out above are exemplified by the developments in Erigavo, whose turn away from Hargeysa partly resulted from errors of omission and commission on the part of the central government. Regime standardization in the Sanaag region, of which Erigavo is the regional capital, was impeded by the fact that “[a]fter the birth of Somaliland in 1991, the government didn’t come to Erigavo in a long period of time”, as a local government official of Erigavo remembers (Interview 66; see also Interview 65). Due to the complex post-war political situation in Erigavo, which is home to four different clans,\(^559\) and the fact that the transitional government that was established in Hargeysa in 1991 did not reach that far into the periphery, the local populace agreed on their own Erigavo Peace Charter and regional government (APD 2008). Erigavo’s political seclusion was reinforced by the civil wars of the mid-1990s, which inhibited central government access to this region.

With the political rapprochement between Egal and the Garhajis during the 1996/97 Hargeysa conference, the central government started to establish some administrative control over Erigavo and the Sanaag region. This showed, amongst others, in the fact that the regional governor was no longer appointed by the regional, but by the national government (Interview 63). “As a result of the top-down efforts of the central government, an administration was established and the militia, especially of the Issaq, were finally integrated under the umbrella of the national army” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:740, referring to Actionaid Somaliland 1998:6). However, the regional administration was largely left to its own devices, not least because the governor whom Egal had appointed in 1997 nominated local candidates for various administrative positions, rather than having them selected by the respective ministries in Hargeysa, as official rules stipulated (Interview 63).

Until 1998 there was only informal administration in Erigavo (Interviews 64, 69). Although the first police forces were sent to and stationed in Erigavo in 1997 (Interview 35),\(^560\) in

\(^559\) Namely the Isaaq/Habar Jalo, Isaaq/Habar Yonis, Harti/Dhulbahante and Harti/Warsangeli.

\(^560\) However, the police force did not become effective until 1998/99 (Interview 66), a branch of the Bank of Somaliland only opened in 1999 (Interview 64), and it was not until 1998 that the informal administration
2003 people still carried firearms for their personal protection within the city (Interview 35). And also when taking other indicators for state presence into account, a picture emerges that leads to the conclusion that the region was more dependent on itself than on the central government in Hargeysa. For example, the 2005 inaugurated Civil Service Institute (CSI) has only ever conducted one single training course in Erigavo (Interview 131). Moreover, Erigavo’s main budget derives from local government taxation, which means that the most potent official financially in the regional capital is the locally elected mayor – not the centrally appointed regional governor. Hence, despite the district council’s ineffectiveness, politics are made much more by local than national actors (Interview 156).

Overall, the regional government remained very strong, making it difficult for Egal to (significantly) influence the situation in Sanaag (Interview 156). Despite the fact that the political opposition of residents in Sanaag towards the Egal government died down in the mid to late 1990s, and even though the majority of the Sanaag population staunchly supported President Riyale in the 2000s, the region did not receive significant (financial) attention (Interview 156). This has, in part, been attributed to the fact that the central government has barely had any resources to incorporate Sanaag – and for that matter, Sool – into Somaliland (Interview 156). By way of example, not even a gravel road connects Erigavo to any other bigger town in Somaliland. This paucity of infrastructure has contributed to the fact that “[e]ven the system of administration existent in Somaliland is based on the clan system” (Interview 38).

The truth of this statement was shown in particular in the formation of the Makhir State of Somalia, proclaimed on July 1st, 2007. The Makhir state constituted a Warsangeli project and was a response to the fact that this Harti sub-clan felt politically sidelined not only in Somaliland, but also Puntland, which came to be increasingly dominated by the Majerteen, another Harti sub-clan. Even though the self-declared government had already dissolved on April 8th, 2008, and a real administration had never formed, the project was proof of the degree of decentralization and lack of regime standardization in Somaliland.

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of Erigavo was replaced with a more formal one (Interview 69). The Somaliland government did not find acceptance in Erigavo until 2003 (Interview 65).
6.4 Interim Conclusion

The literature on Somaliland frequently puts forth the argument that “[t]he inclusion of the traditional authority in the central government of Somaliland undoubtedly has been a vital component of state formation in the territory” (Richards 2009:201; Bryden 1996; Interview 16), and that it was the elders who were “responsible for the success of Somaliland today” (Leonard 2009:13; Interview 2). This ‘benevolent elders’ thesis can be challenged on numerous grounds, leading some to point out that the role of traditional leaders in reconciliation, peace-building and state-making “has often been analysed with exaggerative and romantic views” (Hashi 2005:22). As this chapter implied, the role of traditional authorities in Somaliland’s state-making project was definitely not unambiguous.

More directly, the chapter showed that the processes of democratization and decentralization seemed to have been more problematic than beneficial to Somaliland’s state trajectory. Rather than advancing its state-making endeavour, both processes posed numerous and serious challenges to it. Viewed through the regime prism, democratization and decentralization hampered processes of regime standardization, as they facilitated the re-emergence and re-valourisation of clan regimes at the expense of the state’s sets of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. This was problematic in the sense that the political competition induced by democratization started to challenge the state regime before it could be consolidated. Under these considerations, the processes of democratization and decentralization were introduced prematurely, namely in a situation in which political power could be most easily mobilized and contested along lines of kinship rather than political

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561 Bradbury 1997; Hofman 2002; Bradbury 2008; Jhazbhay 2008; Kaplan 2008b; Walls 2009a; Interview 16.
563 Building on other prominent narratives such as the ‘colonial difference’ thesis (see Samatar 1987:59; Prunier 1998:225; Fox 1999; Brons 2001:129; Lewis 2002:169; Hofmann 2002; Huliaras 2002:158; Osman 2007:101; Interviews 135, 156), the ‘benevolent elders’ thesis has numerous flaws. First, it overlooks the fact that also elders in the south took a pro-active role in peace-making (Gundel 2006:26ff.; Adam 1995:79ff., 2008:26; Brons 2001:261; see also I.M. Samatar 1997:36ff.). Second, this proposition inherently assumes that ‘traditional’ structures were static, thereby ignoring the fact that they had been changed by the (post-) colonial regimes over the previous decades (Osman-Shuke 2004:149). Third, the ‘benevolent elders’ thesis generally restricts the ‘traditional authorities’ involvement to their peace-making character in the 1990s, excluding the more bellicose role played in the 1980s. Fourth, the argument also conceals the fact that Somaliland, too, experienced conflict and power struggles and that its ‘elders’ have not always been successful in their peace-making and state-building efforts (Drysdale 1992b:8). This is particularly obvious when considering e.g. the region of Sanaag, which “illustrates the weakness of the traditional system of governance in building wider administrative structures” (Bryden/Faray 1996:8). Fifth, the argument cannot account for the case of Puntland, i.e. for divergent state-making trajectories within south-central Somalia. For a critical assessment of the role of the elders in state-making in Somaliland, see also Interviews 12, 55, 99, 128.
identity,\textsuperscript{564} which meant that both processes compromised rather than bolstered the young polity’s state-making endeavour.

Coming to a similar assessment, Omaar (2004:91) proposes that “clan solidarity is a major impediment to the emergence of strong political parties based on a shared political vision and programme.” While I disagree with his proposition insofar as I suggest that it was not the clan that was too powerful to see the emergence of political parties, but rather it was that the political parties that were too weak to overcome the strong clan regime, I agree with his appraisal that, after all, “[in] an impoverished country where life is a struggle for basic survival, and there is no public service ethos, dependence on family and clan is a necessity, not a choice.” This is supported by Battera’s (2005:281) argument that “[t]he country still remains in a situation of transition, and transition favours the role of tradition”, an argument that neatly leads over to Ibrahim’s (2007:222) proposition that Somaliland’s transition to constitutional democracy was a “transition without transformation, because it did not entail significant societal change or political, legal and institutional reform.”

Although the political developments highlighted in this chapter provide a sense of the degree of ‘stateness’ Somaliland has achieved over the course of its two decade-long existence, a more in-depth assessment of the nature of its state is needed. Thus, the next chapter turns towards a more in-depth assessment of levels of regime (de-)standardization.

\textsuperscript{564} A SNM veteran and former Minister of Defense under Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, for example, states that an individual’s loyalty lay much more with its respective clan than with the Somaliland state (Interview 24).
Somaliland is frequently considered an exceptional case of state-making (Pham 2012). Having allegedly engaged in “[c]onstructing a state from scratch” (Bradbury 2008:4), the Somali Republic’s offspring is generally judged “a good example of how a fragile society can become an effective state” (Othieno 2008).\footnote{See also comments by Alison Evans, director of the Overseas Development Institute, who states that “[t]he performance of Somaliland is a reason to be optimistic about its future” (Somaliland Press 2011).} According to existing literature, the polity established a functional administration (World Bank 2005:13), brought forth visible signs of sovereign and democratic statehood (Bradbury 2008:4), and, despite or possibly because of the absence of significant international aid, developed accountable political institutions (Eubank 2010).\footnote{Eubank (2010:1f.) goes so far as to claim that “political actors within Somaliland have never received development assistance” and that there was a “lack of external financial assistance to Somaliland.”} Given these and other achievements, numerous policymakers and academics suggest that international recognition should be extended to this ‘little country that could’ (Shinn 2002; Bryden 2003; Jhazbhay 2003).\footnote{Hoyle 2000; Evans 2007; Farley 2010; Guebourg 2002; Henwood 2007; Economist 1999:35.} Yet, although few and far between, there are also more critical voices judging that, overall, “[t]he Somaliland construct is weak” (Battera 2003:239) and that “[i]t is not a state” (Interviews 12, 66).

The previous chapters scrutinized Somaliland’s state-making endeavour and pointed towards some of the numerous challenges it faced during its first two decades. Thereby, it became clear that the advancement of Somaliland’s state-making project cannot be explained solely by ‘benevolent elders’ and ‘liberal democracy’. However, the question of how much progress Somaliland made in terms of state-making since having gained de facto independence in 1991 remains. Although the polity could boast significant achievements not only in comparison to south-central Somalia, but also in its own right, there was still much to be done. The application of the rule of law lacked conformity throughout the
territory, the state’s currency was restricted in its use, and inland revenue enforcement and compliance remained minimal. While numerous challenges persisted, most of these were far from unique to the self-styled republic, but resembled those of other ‘fragile states’.

Analysing a number of aspects that lie at the heart of regime standardization, this chapter assesses the state of affairs of Somaliland’s state-making project two decades into its existence. Questioning overly optimistic views on Somaliland’s progress I argue that its degree of state-making remained limited. While appreciating that levels of regime standardization generally increased between 1991 and 2011, I propose that this development was neither linear nor evenly spread across regions or sectors. Rather, I argue that processes of regime standardization not only slowed down during the 2000s, but that this incremental retreat from state-making was institutionalized. In other words, processes indicative of destandardization were consolidated, making it difficult to overcome state fragility. Moreover, I suggest that the standardization of authoritative sets of rules had largely been confined to the ‘heartland’ that stretches diamond-like from Hargeysa to Berbera and from Boroma to Burco, remaining conspicuously absent from the ‘hinterland’.

In order to investigate the extent of the polity’s progress in state-making the chapter is organized as follows. Section one casts a closer look at the trajectories of institutional (de-)standardization that were characteristic of the administrative architecture, security apparatus, and judicial system. It also includes an assessment of the state’s system of revenue mobilization and its implications for its ability to enhance regime standardization. Section two largely examines processes of socio-cognitive (de-)standardization by focusing on the introduction of the Somaliland Shilling, the evolution of the polity’s media landscape, and the development of the education system and their respective impacts on nation-building. An interim conclusion sums up the chapter’s key findings.

### 7.1 Making or Breaking the State?

Although Somaliland had taken preliminary but significant steps towards institutional and socio-cognitive standardization under Egal during the 1990s, the polity increasingly struggled to maintain this process during the first decade of the 21st century. In central state administration, for example, although “government authority and bureaucracy was expanded” (Bradbury 2008:109) in the decade following the conclusion of the Hargeysa
conference in 1996/97, the impact the administrative apparatus had on processes of regime standardization was more ambiguous – an ambiguity that was mirrored in other sectors that lie at the heart of state-making.

**The State’s Administrative Reach**

In the run-up to the 1996/97 Hargeysa symposium, Somaliland’s administrative apparatus was significantly overstaffed, a trend that continued post-summit due to Egal’s continuing policy of using civil service employment as a tool for demobilization and to provide political spoils to his opponents (Interviews 104, 131, 138). Consequently, «Tuur’s» 1993 transitional administration of around 800 civil servants had swollen to some 6,000 by 1996/97, even though the Civil Service Commission (CSC) that Egal created shortly after having taken power in 1993 estimated that no more than 3,750 individuals were needed to run the state’s administration (Huliaras 2002:162; Seek 2007; Interview 40). While the quantitative and qualitative enhancement of the civil service in the 1990s earned Egal the reputation of having built a functioning state (Interview 17), the unsustainability of his inflationary staffing politics led him to initiate a civil service reform once the civil wars were concluded (Interviews 40, 138).

Delayed by a couple of years due to political struggles, Egal started implementing the reform in 1999. The President announced the execution of competitive examination in order to separate the wheat from the chaff (Interview 40), which met with fierce resistance from civil servants, who feared for their positions, as those who would fail the exam were to be sacked (Interview 17). Although the administrative reform led to a decrease in the number of civil servants to the allegedly adequate size of 3,750 officials in 2000 (Oumar 2011:15), this was but a transitory diminution (see Table 1). The continuing political struggles that partly evolved around processes of democratization led Egal to drop administrative reform as a policy priority in the early 2000s (Interview 138). Consequently, the afternoon working hours that he had introduced for all government employees in the framework of the civil service reform were also let slide (Interview 131) and, ultimately, officially abolished by President Riyale in 2002 (Interview 36). As this resulted in civil

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568 It was particularly the Garhajis clan that profited from this policy (Interview 138). See previous chapters.

569 The general judgement that, in contrast to Egal, «Tuur» had failed to build an appropriate administration is contested by some, who argue that Egal simply benefited from «Tuur’s» groundwork in creating a functioning civil service (Interview 153).
servants in government ministries, agencies and district councils working only about 24 hours per week by the late 2000s (PFM 2008:26; UNCDF 2009:16), brakes were put on the administrative apparatus’ ability to contribute to regime standardization within and beyond its own ranks.

Table 1: Trajectory of Civil Service Employment (2000-2011)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of civil servants</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>4,649</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>5,559</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>9,843</td>
<td>9,183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: CSC undated:8; Bicker 2004:7; Scek 2007:3; PFM 2008:4; Askar 2009:12; Oumar 2011:15, 18; MF 2011:8; Interviews 18, 40.

However, the standardization of common rules that was not accomplished through dedicated working hours was seemingly compensated for by the numerical expansion of the public administration machinery that could be observed throughout the 2000s (see Table 1). This increase can partly be explained by the fact that the Somaliland government geographically expanded its administration and increased health and education provision in the eastern regions (Oumar 2011:18; MF 2011:8; Interview 40). Viewed in combination with the fact that about two-thirds of all civil servants were frontline service providers who worked in the central government’s regional offices (MF 2011:8), Somaliland’s administration appeared to be an apt tool to carry through processes of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. Yet, closer investigations reveal that central state administration was ill-placed to act as a proper catalyst for regime standardization.

First, the degree to which standardization occurred within the administrative apparatus itself was restricted. First, civil service came to be a “purely Isaaq” business (Interview 138), largely rooted in the fact that its members were mainly demobilized SNM veterans and

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570 Personal observation, Somaliland, 2008, 2009, 2011. In line with this circumstance, UNCDF (2009:41) observes that work ethics amongst public administrators was “extremely low.”

571 Given that “there are no clear records of who is or [is] not a civil servant” (Scek 2007:13; Interview 138), the figures compiled in this table should be treated cautiously.

572 Yet, this explanation is insufficient to account for the abrupt rise in civil servants in 2010, for which patronialism seems to be a better explanation. During the one-month transition period between the announcement of the outcome of the presidential elections on June 26th, 2010 and the handover of power, the outgoing government allegedly recruited an additional 1,000 individuals to the civil service. In the absence of laws and regulations that facilitated the dismissal of government employees and due to the fact that suspension of staff was an explosive political issue, Riyale and his lieutenants secured long-term access to state resources for their supporters despite the change in presidents and ruling parties the 2010 elections brought about (Interview 138). Yet, the bloated nature of Somaliland’s public administration is also due to the fact that in 2011, for example, the state provided civil service salaries to some 863 individuals who were not eligible, as they were either already retired (363), permanently sick (144) or absent (90), deceased (101), had resigned (73) or could be classified as ‘ghost workers’ (92) (Oumar 2011:18).
members of the Garhajis opposition whom Egal had accommodated in the administration throughout the 1990s. The imbalance was further aided by geographical factors, as the location of the administration’s headquarters in the Isaaq stronghold of Hargeysa put other clans at a disadvantage with regard to employment opportunities. Although non-Isaaq clans were incorporated into the administration at ministerial, director generals (DGs) and other high-ranking management levels in order to accommodate them politically, the lower echelons of the state apparatus predominantly featured members of different Isaaq clans (Interview 138) — a position of dominance they were to maintain in subsequent years.

Second, the fact that some 80 per cent of all civil servants still lacked adequate skills to perform their duties by the late 2000s (CSC 2009:17; Interview 61) also impeded standardization. This was due to several factors: civil service recruitment had frequently been driven by politics rather than meritocracy, about ten per cent of the civil servants were far above pension age (UNCDF 2009:17), and there was a lack of adequate training. In order to remedy this shortcoming, in October 2005, Riyale established the Civil Service Institute (CSI) mandating it with training government employees (Interviews 18, 138). Yet, the impact of the CSI remained largely restricted to Hargeysa, as the institute’s trainers only held one or two training sessions per year outside the capital (Interview 131). The state’s ability to enhance regime standardization also failed to live up to its potential in other respects; for example only ministers, DGs and other high-ranking state officials had to take an oath of loyalty to the state when sworn into office (Civil Service Law, Art. 12; Interview 140), thus failing to officially commit lower-ranking civil servants.

The extent to which the state’s administration could propel regime standardization beyond its own ranks was also restricted. First, despite its incremental expansion, state administration

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573 The only Isaaq clan that was under-represented was the Habar Jalo, not only because of their geographical distance from the capital, but also their antagonistic stance towards the Egal government (Interview 138). While this Isaaq domination in the central state administration challenges the frequent proposition that Somaliland was a multi-clan project (Walls/Kibble 2011:13), it is to be noted that such imbalances are anything but abnormal in international comparison. When e.g. Czechoslovakia was formed after World War One, the formation of that state centred around the interests of the Czechs and Slovaks, rather than those of minorities, such as the Hungarians and Germans.

574 It is estimated that, by the late 2000s, about half of all civil servants originated from Hargeysa, and that most of these were from the Isaaq/Habar Awal/Saad Muse clan, followed by members of the Isaaq/Habar Yonis (Interview 138).

575 The regional government of Berbera, for example, estimated that about 35 per cent of its payroll staff was above 60 years of age (UNCDF 2009:17).

576 According to the informant, the CSI held one single training session in Erigavo and none in Las Anood between 2005 and 2011.
remained limited in its geographical spread, leading the Ministry of Finance to observe that “there is excessive concentration of staff in Hargeysa, where more than two-thirds of civil servants are located, and correspondingly relatively low staffing levels in the regions and especially in rural areas” (MF 2011:9). Thus, little had changed since 1997, when ministerial staff was largely confined to Somaliland’s central and western regions,577 with hardly any representatives in Sool and Sanaag (CSC 1997:2, 12, 15).578 By the late 2000s, only 8 of the 26 government ministries were said to have decentralised to regions and districts (UNCDF 2009:5f.).579 The skewed distribution of the administration also showed in the spatial distribution of local government officials: out of a total of 3,500, about 900 worked for the municipality of Hargeysa, while a further 305 were employed in Berbera alone (UN/WB 2006a:18; MF 2011:8).

Second, the ability of the state’s administration to propel regime standardization across the territory was hampered by the fact that the administrative apparatus was fragmented into clan-based regional entities, leading some to characterize Somaliland as a ‘confederation of different clan administrations’ (Interviews 142, 144, 156). Moreover, regional councils and district committees cooperated only on a most informal basis, being dependent on personal relationships between governors and mayors (UNCDF 2009:7). The absence of a more formal relationship was largely rooted in the fact that the Ministry of Interior, which was tasked with the formation of district councils, did not have the capacity to fulfill its mandate (UNCDF 2009:18) – thus failing to broadcast the same ‘rules of the game’ throughout the regions. Furthermore, the implementation and standardization of common rules was inhibited by other factors, not least the fact that the office of the governor of Sanaag was equipped with neither a telephone nor a (web-enabled) computer by the late 2000s.580

577 The Ministry of Finance, for example, employed 42 staff in Hargeysa, 55 in the Sahil region (home to the port of Berbera), 41 in Awdal (passing zone for khat coming from Ethiopia), and 14 in Togdheer.
578 The same applied to other government bodies such as the Bank of Somaliland, which had branches in Hargeysa, Berbera, Boroma, Zeila and Gabiley by the mid-1990s (CSC 1997:83), but only opened an office in Erigavo in 1999 (Interview 69; see also MNPC 1999:7).
579 Namely the Ministries of Water & Mineral Resources; Agriculture; Environment & Rural Development; Public Works; Housing & Transport; Health; Family Affairs & Social Development; Livestock; and Education.
580 Personal observation, Erigavo, 08.04.2009.
Security Providing Capacity\textsuperscript{581}

From 1991 onwards, Somaliland governments struggled to gain and maintain control over the means of violence. In the beginning, this was hampered by the fragmentation of the SNM and a situation in which some 32 heavily armed clan militias competed for military, political and economic shares (Interview 7).\textsuperscript{582} While «Tuur» had formed a nascent police force of 320 individuals in Hargeysa (Interview 45), the means of large-scale violence came under government control only once Egal decreed the formation of the SLPF on November 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 1993 (Somaliland Law 2007; GoSL 2002d:3) and after he succeeded in his DDR and war projects of the mid-1990s. At that time, the government incrementally removed road blocks (Farah/Lewis 1997a:371; Interview 105), replaced clan militias as security providers at ports and airports, and – with the exception of three militias in eastern Somaliland – gradually integrated all militias into the state’s security apparatus (Interview 7).

By 2004, the number of police officers had increased to some 4,340 (Interview 5) and reached about 7,200 by the late 2000s (Interview 42).\textsuperscript{583} Although it is questionable whether, by the turn of the millennium, “small but sufficient security forces have been deployed in all regions: most are uniformed, draw token salaries and have received basic police training” (APD 1999:38),\textsuperscript{584} the increase in personnel was accompanied by a steady boost in territorial reach. Yet, although Erigavo witnessed the creation of a police force in 1997,\textsuperscript{585} it took the government another decade to establish one in Las Anood (Interview 35). But, by the late 2000s, there were some 63 major police stations throughout the country (DDG 2009), suggesting that the security sector had undergone and could relay regime standardization.

However, similar to the trajectory of the administrative apparatus, this potential was also only harnessed to a limited extent. The degree to which standardization occurred within the security apparatus itself was constrained. First, analogous to the state’s administration, the

\textsuperscript{581} The subsequent analysis of Somaliland’s security architecture is limited to a preliminary picture on the trajectory of the Somaliland Police Forces (SLPF); my attempt to conduct in-depth research within the SLPF as well as Somaliland Armed Forces was restricted by Somaliland authorities.

\textsuperscript{582} See Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{583} Other informants speak of approximately 6,000 (Interview 20) to 9,000 (Interview 15) police officers for the late 2000s. According to the SLPF’s own (electronic) records, there were a total of 5,777 police officers in 2009 (Interview 45). Yet, as always, all of these figures should be treated with caution.

\textsuperscript{584} First, Forberg and Terlinden (1999) note that even in the capital of Hargeysa most police officers do not wear uniforms. Second, control of Sool and its capital, Las Anood, was not established before 2007. Third, even two decades into Somaliland’s existence security is mostly provided by non-state actors rather than a functioning police force (see DDG 2009; Balthasar/Grzybowski 2012).

\textsuperscript{585} Yet, according to one informant this police force did not become functional until 1998/99 (Interview 66).
SLPF also came to be strongly dominated by SNM veterans of the Isaaq (WSP 1999:70; GoSL 2002d:12; Interviews 35, 42), largely because Egal had used the security apparatus as a collection device for demobilized militias. Moreover, he had entrusted the SNM War Veteran’s Association Sooyaal with the task of supporting the establishment of the SLPF (GoSL 2002d:3). Although some argue that the SLPF was free of any clan bias (Interview 38), empirical evidence suggests that, by the late 2000s, the majority of police officers still originated predominantly from the Isaaq (Interviews 35, 45; see Table 2). Partly, this was because communities in eastern Somaliland did not have access to education, which formally disqualified them from entering police service (Interviews 15, 141).

Table 2: Origin of Somaliland Police Officers per Region (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. of officers</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Population distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marodi Jeeh (Hargeysa)</td>
<td>1,692</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awdal</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahil</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togdheer</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanaag</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sool</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,257</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interview 45; the data on population distribution are WHO/UNICEF working estimates that were agreed upon with the Government of Somaliland, 2009. For similar, yet slightly older estimates, see UK Border Agency (2012:19) and Ambroso (2002:9).

Second, regime standardization within the ranks of the SLPF was hampered by the 1993 Peace Charter, which laid out decentralized security provisions. Although the initially highly decentralized manner in which police forces were formed (Interviews 35, 128) was increasingly centralized by Egal – for example by sending aspiring police units to the

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586 That the new police forces were dominated by the Isaaq and meant to primarily secure Somaliland’s ‘heartland’ is also reflected in the fact that the trained police troops were mainly stationed in Hargeysa, Boroma, Burco and Berbera (Interview 35). Furthermore, it should be noted that it was not until 2007/08 that the first 370 militias from Buuhodle and Las Anood in Sool region were sent to Mandheera training camp (Interview 35).

587 However, it also needs to be acknowledged that Isaaq represent about 66 per cent of Somaliland’s population, while the Harti and Dir communities represent some 19 and 15 per cent respectively (Mesfin 2009:1).

588 Despite this supposed entry barrier, it is estimated that 30-40 per cent of all police officers are illiterate (Interview 20), which constitutes a further impediment to rule standardization.

589 The statistics show the regional origin of SLPF officers – a reasonable proxy for clan affiliation due to the clans’ settlement patterns – for the year of 2009. While it is obvious that the Isaaq clan holds a dominant position within the SLPF, it is claimed that, over time, other minority clans – such as the Gabooye – have also taken their share in the police force (Interview 35).
Mandheera training camp that had been established in 1994 (Interview 45) – the police forces’ chain of command remained ambiguous even in the late 2000s. As was the case in the mid-1990s, a dozen years later traditional authorities still maintained significant control over the local police units, particularly in smaller settlements (Interviews 20, 35). While a positive side-effect of this control probably lay in the fact that the police did generally not prey on the population, the outcome of the local rootedness of the police forces is indecisive, as it clearly impeded the implementation of the same ‘rules of the game’.

Third, institutional standardization within the police forces was handicapped by restricted routine transfers of police officers from one duty station to another. Although Egal aimed to create a true national force by having police officers rotate between duty stations (Interviews 35, 15), it is unclear to what extent this procedure was ultimately implemented. While it was allegedly applied to police commanders (Interview 35), the rank and file seem not to have been subjected to this procedure. Due to financial constraints on the part of the state as well as individual police officers, the latter depended on their families and clans in their home territories to top up their official salaries (Interviews 42, 23). This attachment of police officers to their home communities also aggravated regime standardization in other ways such as weakening the ‘esprit de corps’ to such an extent that police officers were believed to desert their units for their clan in case they had to pick sides (Interviews 6, 24, 35). This questions the proposition that those combatants who fought on opposing sides during the 1988-91 civil war “today identify with Somaliland and are united in its defense of its independence and sovereignty” (Bulhan 2004:23).

The degree to which the security apparatus could serve as an accelerator of regime standardization beyond its own ranks was also restricted. The lack of respect on the part of the population, lack of enforcement capacity (DDG 2009; UNDP 2010), and insufficient penetration of the country (Interview 38) resulted in the population engaging in their own policing (Interviews 9, 35). Far from being barely tolerated by the government, it was actively encouraged, as evidenced in a speech of one of Burco’s governors who announced at a local meeting that “[w]e [i.e. the state] have the responsibility of protecting you, but we cannot do it without you – it is you [who have to] protect yourselves” (Interviews 9, 35). Although it is argued that “[r]esidents in the west rely on the government for their security

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590 Between 1994 and 2010, about 1,800 police officers graduated from the police academy (UNDP 2011).
591 According to UNDP (2010), the SLPF is “[l]ampered by old and dysfunctional infrastructure, equipment and poor training and deployment.”
while those in the east depend on self-defense” (Bulhan 2004:29), it appears that no community relied for their security on the SLPF alone. The urban population particularly drew significantly on security provided by clan-based neighbourhood watch groups (Balthasar/Grzybowski 2012), opening the security sector to capture by traditional authorities and the clan regime, and leaving the Somaliland government to still grapple for the monopoly over the means of violence two decades after independence (Interview 5).

**Enforcing Which Rule of Law?**

Considered a key condition for building a viable state by the political leadership, the first steps to reinstall a formal judicial system were undertaken at the 1993 Boroma conference (Interviews 12, 19). This was backed with the adoption of a provisional constitution at the 1996/97 Hargeysa summit, which revived previous laws passed by the Somali democratic governments in the 1960s. In the following dozen years the number of district courts increased, Somaliland’s system of law enforcement allegedly grew stronger, and the polity’s population was said to have progressively swapped traditional for positive law (Interview 60). Yet, the trajectory of Somaliland’s judicial sector was not quite so unambiguous and, two decades after its formation, the country still featured a multiplicity of rules for dispute resolution: ‘modern’, ‘traditional’, and religious laws.

Established as a three-tier system, Somaliland’s legal architecture included a Supreme Court, several Courts of Appeal, and Regional and District Courts. By the mid-2000s, there were six District and six Regional Courts, situated in Hargeysa, Gabiley, Boroma, Berbera, Burco, and Erigavo and five Appeal Courts, located in Hargeysa, Boroma, Berbera, Burco and Erigavo (APD 2002a). While the number of judges employed by Somaliland increased significantly over time (see Table 3), their regional distribution remained skewed (see Table

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592 See Bulhan (2004) for an interesting survey on perceptions of security in different regions of Somaliland. The survey reveals, amongst others, that populations in Marodijë (Hargeysa) and Awdal predominantly turn to local authorities, if threatened physically (83.5% and 82.2% respectively), while these numbers decline at the expense of respondents who turn to unspecified ‘other’ in other regions (ibid.:16).

593 A study undertaken by the Danish Demining Group (DDG) reveals that throughout Somaliland, traditional authorities addressed about 70 per cent of all disputes and crimes, which generally fall into the category of domestic violence, whereas the police addressed the remaining 30 per cent, which generally lay in the criminal sphere. Yet, there are stark regional differences (DDG 2009). While the SLPF remains the primary security actor, interviewees admit that its writ across Somaliland is not universal (DDG 2009).

594 While the District Courts deal with claims of up to Sl.Sh. 3 million (ca. USD 600) and offences punishable by sentences of less than three years, the Regional Courts engage in claims that exceed these limits.

595 The Regional Court in Las Anood was only installed in December 2007. It is interesting to note that the director of that court used to work for the administration of Puntland (Interview 114).
4) This could also be observed with regard to the spatial distribution of the 33 practicing lawyers, 19 of which worked in Hargeysa, 9 in Burco, and 2 in Berbera, Boroma and Erigavo respectively (Farah 2009:34).

Table 3: Number of Judges in Somaliland (1994-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of judges</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Regional Distribution of Judges (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Marodijeh (Hargeysa)</th>
<th>Awdal</th>
<th>Togdheer</th>
<th>Sahil</th>
<th>Sanaag</th>
<th>Sool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of judges</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Interview 86; APD 2002a.

One obstacle that prevented the legal system from bringing about significant regime standardization across the territory lay in the incoherent amalgamation of overlapping, and at times contradictory codes, which built on British Common Law, Italian Civil Law, Somali xeer (i.e. traditional laws), and Islamic shari'a (APD 2002a). This plurality of ‘rules of the game’, and the fact that adjudication continued to be ad hoc and highly subjective (APD 2002a), inhibited a standardized application of the rule of law (Interview 60). It also perpetuated confusion with regard to law enforcement, for example in situations in which a culprit was sentenced to imprisonment under civil law, but released on the grounds that traditional authorities from the respective lineages involved settled the case based on customary law outside the formal court system (Interviews 60, 140).

Second, the significant lack of qualified personnel – including judges, lawyers, and clerks (APD 2002a) – was not conducive to broadcasting and enforcing the same rules across Somaliland. Acknowledging this scarcity of judicial manpower in article 1 of the Judiciary Organization Act No. 059/95 of 1995, the government moved to relax the strict recruitment procedures for judges, lawyers and other legal professions. The subsequent dilution of professionalism was enhanced by the fact that appointments were increasingly made on political rather than meritocratic grounds (Farah 2009:11). Thus, by June 2002, only 19 out of the 35 practicing judges possessed a law degree, while the remainder merely

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596 According to UN/WB (2006b:15), there were a total of 93 judges in Somaliland in 2006. According to Ahmed Ismail Ali of the Ministry of Justice, the number of judges in Somaliland developed as follows: 1994: 40, 2006: 56, 2007:84, 2009:97 (Interview 86).
had basic education, complemented by some experience in administering *shari’a* law (APD 2002a). For the mid-2000s it was estimated that “only 10% of sitting judges in Somaliland possess a formal education” and that “there is no standardized judges’ training” (Farah 2007:28, 34). Not unsurprisingly, it was concluded that “Somaliland’s judiciary has spent most of the past decade mired in incompetence, corruption and political indifference” (ICG 2003:27; Bulhan 2004:5).

Third, the challenge for the judicial system to act as a catalyst of regime standardization was compounded by regular interference in court matters both by politicians and other influential (clan) actors, leading to a lack of judicial independence (APD 2002a; Interviews 5, 60). While officially, the two major judicial reforms were undertaken to curb corruption (Interviews 81, 82, 83), it is interesting to note that both reforms took place shortly after the 2002 and 2011 elections (Interview 102). Hence, there is reason to speculate that the respective presidents ‘reformed’ the judicial sector for political reasons (Interview 94), a suspicion that is supported by the proposition that the judiciary was dependent on the executive and, ultimately, accountable to the head of state (Interview 60).

At the very least the latest of these ‘reforms’ undermined the standardization of civic law and the modern court system, given that allegedly some 80 per cent of those appointed as judges were sheikhs and individuals who were much more versed in *shari’a* than civic law (Interview 114; Farah 2009:11). Consequently, and because the population lost confidence in the civic law system (APD 2002a; Farah 2009:11), customary clan justice via *xeer* gained a ubiquitous primacy across Somaliland (Interview 81; Farah 2007:19). Although some suggest that legal heterogeneity was a development asset for Somaliland (Battera 2005:281), I argue that the fact that the rule of law still remained largely in the hands of non-state actors two decades after the Republic of Somaliland was formed demonstrates the weakness of its state-making project.

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597 As the nine Supreme Court judges as well as the Attorney General are nominated by the President, some argue that the constitution gives the President too much power (Interview 114).

598 This was partly due to the long-drawn procedures involved when taking a case to court, as well as the financial costs involved. While traditional law was free of charge, dispute resolution via positive law was costly. One informant estimated that a case of USD 5,000 in value costs about USD 1,000 to settle – some USD 200-400 for the court, some USD 300 for the lawyer, expenses for transport and witnesses, etc. (Interview 81).
Standardization through Resource Mobilization?

The mobilization of resources is key to state-making, not only because it is imperative to finance state-building efforts (e.g. Herbst 2000:113), but also because it serves important functions for nation-building (e.g. Azam/Mesnard 2003:456), not least because “[t]he experience of being taxed engages citizens in the political process” (Moore 2008:35).\(^\text{599}\) The Somaliland case lends itself to the study of the relationship between resource mobilization and state-making, largely because its governments depended on local resources in order to pursue their state-making endeavour, as World Bank loans, grants from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and bilateral budget support did not materialize in the absence of international recognition (WSP 2005:104; APD 2002b:66). «Tuur» had faltered in face of this formidable task, and Egal needed all his statesmanship to mobilize sufficient resources to take the Somaliland state-making project forward.

Crucially, however, Egal not only succeeded in mobilizing resources to pursue state-making, but he also managed to incrementally prevent competing actors from generating revenues, at least along the state’s most important economic routes. While between 1992 and 1997 some 14 militia-controlled checkpoints had existed between Boroma and Hargeysa, and another 26 between Burco and Las Anood (Farah/Lewis 1997a:371), these illegal and mostly kinship-based barriers were removed with the conclusion of the inter-clan conferences in Boroma (1993) and Hargeysa (1996/97). Following the Hargeysa summit, domestic revenues grew significantly, increasing by more than 600 per cent between 1997 and 2008 (Jama/Awad 2010:3). Whereas domestic revenues had stood at about Sl.Sh. 680 million (ca. USD 3.5 million)\(^\text{600}\) in 1995, they reached some Sl.Sh. 194 billion in the fiscal year of 2007 (ca. USD 31 million)\(^\text{601}\) (Scek 2007:5; MNPC 1998, 2004; see Table 5 and Figure 1).\(^\text{602}\)

\(^\text{599}\) See Chapter 2.
\(^\text{600}\) Calculated on the basis of the then average exchange rate of about USD 1 to Sl.Sh. 200.
\(^\text{601}\) Calculated on the basis of the then average exchange rate of about USD 1 to Sl.Sh. 6,300.
\(^\text{602}\) However, caution is needed with regard to the exact numbers, as even government publications differ in their reporting and ‘calculations’. For example, the Government of Somaliland 2004 publication ‘Somaliland in figures’ observes central state revenues in the area of Sl.Sh. 126 billion. At the same time, another Government of Somaliland publication dating from 2003 (MNPC 2003b) brings the amount of revenues to merely Sl.Sh. 88.5 billion for the same year of 2002. Other sources provide different data. When relying on reports of the APD (2002b:64) and the Ministry of Finance (MF 2006), it appears that in 1995 Somaliland’s budget stood at about Sl.Sh. 1.9 billion, growing to Sl.Sh. 56 billion in 1999, and 78 billion in 2001 (MNPC 2004). According to the Government of Somaliland publication of 2004, revenues peaked at Sl.Sh. 167 billion in 2001 (MNPC 2004).
Table 5: Central Government Revenue and Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue (in million Sl.Sh.)</th>
<th>Expenditure (in million Sl.Sh.)</th>
<th>Surplus/Deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>2,028</td>
<td>-1,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>12,069</td>
<td>16,125</td>
<td>-4,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>36,109</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>40,971</td>
<td>42,760</td>
<td>1,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>55,456</td>
<td>54,942</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>67,795</td>
<td>135,602</td>
<td>67,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>76,255</td>
<td>166,820</td>
<td>90,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>106,638</td>
<td>117,967</td>
<td>11,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>120,808</td>
<td>120,808</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>144,849</td>
<td>144,849</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>148,252</td>
<td>148,252</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>164,669</td>
<td>164,669</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>202,760</td>
<td>202,760</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>233,104</td>
<td>247,711</td>
<td>-14,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>261,994</td>
<td>258,496</td>
<td>3,497</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Central Government Revenue and Expenditure

Sources: (1) MNPC 1998, MNPC 2004, MNPC 2007, and MNPC 2010, which refer to figures provided by the Ministry of Finance. Note: Some of the figures differ significantly from government publication to government publication. The MNPC 2004 publication puts the revenue for 2000, 2001, and 2002 at SLS. 127,011,187,343, SLS. 167,614,943,238, and SLS. 125,719,493,400 respectively. The above figures are taken from MNPC 2003, as they appear to be more sensible.

In light of these developments and the fact that “some 95% of the resources that finance the activities of the government are locally mobilised, mostly through taxation” (WSP 2005:104; Bryden/Farah 1996:8), Weinstein (2004) portrays Somaliland as a case of ‘autonomous recovery’, and Eubank (2010:20) postulates that it was due to its financial dependency on tax revenues that the polity established an “accountable government.” Following the broader literature on taxation and state-making (e.g. Tilly 1992; Moore 2004;
Bräutigam 2008a), these authors suggest that Somaliland’s mobilization of resources had positive implications on its state-making. Scrutinizing the role resource mobilization played in Somaliland’s state-making endeavour, the following paragraphs also argue that the ‘accountability’ of the polity’s structures of governance can hardly be traced to its system of taxation, as Eubank (2010, 2011) wants us to believe.

Depending on Custom Duties

Although the significant increase of revenue that occurred during the first two decades of Somaliland’s existence is laudable, and even though the creation of a revenue regime by Egal constitutes a great state-making achievement, the potential of the polity’s tax regime to contribute to state-making was restricted. To start with, the overall revenue remained limited, which reflected in a revenue to GDP ratio of about 6 per cent (Jamal/Awad 2010:2). Not only did Somaliland perform significantly below the average of other developing countries, which raised approximately 18 per cent or more of GDP in total revenue (Di John 2009; MF 2011:14), but it also fell behind in historical comparison. While the Somali state of the 1970s had seen a tax-to-GDP ratio of about 12 per cent (Jama/Awad 2010:2), even the period from 1984 to 1990, which was marked by political upheavals and war, witnessed the collection of 5-7 per cent of GDP in total revenue (UN/WB 2006a:iv).

Yet, not only the quantity of resources collected, but also the quality of Somaliland’s system of resource mobilization raises questions regarding its potential to contribute to state-making. For a number of reasons, broad-based regime standardization is more likely to be brought about by the generation of internal revenue as compared to the collection of custom duties. Yet, Somaliland predominantly depended for the generation of revenues on a narrow set of custom duties – a feature hardly unique in sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1997 and 2008, for example, customs contributed an average mean of over 90 per cent of

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603 Yet, it has to be acknowledged that Somaliland roughly doubled the tax-to-GDP ratio between 2003/04 and 2008/09, as overall revenues (approximately USD 18 million) had equaled about 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2003/04 (Jama/Awad 2010:3).

604 Although one must acknowledge that the historical comparison has its flaws, it helps to put Somaliland’s efforts at revenue mobilization into perspective.

605 Compared with the collection of custom duties, the mobilization of inland revenue requires, first, more administrative and enforcement capacity on the part of the state, which increases forward and backward linkages (Hirshman 1958) within the administrative apparatus. Second, once in place, inland taxation is better placed to create broad-based institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, as it involves more taxing individuals than is the case for custom duties. Third, it is inland revenue rather than custom duties that are likely to lead to greater demands for government accountability.
all tax and non-tax revenues to Somaliland’s budget (Holleman 2002:36; Interview 127), not least because they were comparatively easy to monitor and collect (Jama/Awad 2010:6; Interviews 12, 120). But this dependency on custom duties not only made Somaliland vulnerable to external shocks (Holleman 2002:36), but also limited the government’s potential to effect broad-based regime standardization, particularly as the customs architecture remained underdeveloped.

Once Egal had established custom offices along the most important trade routes during the course of the 1990s – largely in order to generate revenues from the import of khat (Interview 109; see Table 6 and Appendix, Map 5) – the structure of revenue generation remained largely unchanged in subsequent years. As in the early 1990s, in the late 2000s the vast majority of revenue collected originated mainly from two custom posts (Interview 5): whereas the lion’s share of approximately 70 to 80 per cent was generated in Berbera (Seek 2007:3; MF 2006:20; Interview 44), custom duties on khat constituted a (much smaller) second source of revenue, contributing around 5 per cent in the 1990s, rising to about 12 per cent in the 2000s to the government’s budget (Hansen 2009:14; Bradbury 2008:171). While in 1999 the taxation of khat contributed close to USD 3 million to the state budget (APD 2002b: 32), the figure increased to USD 5.5 million for 2005 (Hansen 2009:14), and even more in the years thereafter. When geographically disaggregating the mobilization of

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606 See also EIU (2008:6), which puts the figure at 80 per cent.
607 However, when the Somaliland government attempted to impose closer inspections on imported goods at Berbera in August 2003, this elicited a negative reaction from traders (Bradbury 2008:238).
608 While UNDOS (1998) suggests that the first livestock ban led to a 45 per cent fall in revenues for the Somaliland government, and thus a budgetary shortfall of USD 7.5 million, it was estimated within twenty-eight months of the second ban that the government had lost some USD 22.5 million in foreign-exchange earnings plus an additional USD 6.6 million in exchange-rate earning as a result (Holleman 2002). Moreover, it is worth noting that custom revenues accruing from the port of Berbera are highly dependent on the Ethiopian economy, as only some 10-15 per cent of all wholesale products that are imported through Berbera are destined for the Somaliland market, the majority being destined for Ethiopia (Interview 147).
609 Breaking this figure down further it can be seen that taxes on the profitable livestock export trade provided the government with about 30 per cent of all its revenues, amounting to roughly SLSh. 2.5 billion (ca. USD 10 million) per year (calculated on the basis of the 2000 official exchange rate of USD 1 to SLSh. 2,500). The other estimated 40 per cent of revenues raised at the port of Berbera were generated from import duties (Holleman 2002:36; Bradbury 2008:237).
610 Rather than trying to impose a ban on this narcotic – a policy which had not only proven counterproductive in the past but was also largely impossible to enforce for a state like Somaliland – the political leadership of the young entity legalized khat and taxed the business worth some USD 250 million per year, instead (Gilkes 1995, cf. Bradbury 2008:112).
611 USAID (2003:24) suggests that the revenue reaped from the taxation of khat amounted to roughly USD 10,000 per day, thus providing a higher estimate than the one put forth by APD (2002b).
612 While one informant argues that daily revenues accruing from khat were in the range of USD 15,000-17,000 (Interview 44), my own observations at the customs checkpoint in Kalabeydh suggest that this is
custom duties the spatial concentration in Berbera and Kalabeydh shows prominently over time (see Table 7), and is reflected in staff figures per customs post. While the head office in the capital leads the chart with some 63 employees in 2006, it was followed by Berbera (39), Hargeysa (22), Kalabeydh (20), Erigavo (20), Boroma (16), Burco (13), Seylac (13), Abaarso (11), Caynabo (7), Cahsa Caado (5), TogWajale (4), and Faraweyne (2) (Interview 122; see Appendix, Map 5).

Table 6: Overview of Customs Offices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Date established</th>
<th>Type of tax office</th>
<th>Taxing goods coming from</th>
<th>Main goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kalabaydh</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>95% Khat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berbera</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Overseas</td>
<td>Different goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abarso</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Checkpoint</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Khat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boroma</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Mostly khat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hargeysa Airport</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Ethiopia and other cargo</td>
<td>Different goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceyla</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Different goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceel Gal/ Asha-Ado</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Checkpoint</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Different goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burco</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Bossasso</td>
<td>Different goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Checkpoint</td>
<td>Bossasso</td>
<td>Different goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aynabo</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Customs and Checkpoint</td>
<td>Bossasso and Mogadisho</td>
<td>Different goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erigavo</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Bossasso</td>
<td>Different goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xis (Habr Yallo)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Different goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maydh (Habr yonis)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Different goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faraweyne</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Different goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harriad</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Khat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballygubadle</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Bossasso/Mogadisho</td>
<td>Different goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Anood</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Bossasso/Mogadisho</td>
<td>Different goods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interview 44; see also Interview 122.

an understatement. In 2011, some 70,000 kg of khat were imported daily into Somaliland – more than double the volume than in 2003 (Anderson et al. 2007:41) – leading to tax generation in the range of USD 46,000. On the morning of the interview, the customs post in Kalabydh collected taxes worth Sl.Sh. 283,757.017 (ca. USD 43,650), a figure in line with the suggested USD 1,386,000 that Kalabeydh collected each month from khat traders throughout the year (Interview 126). Thus, the yearly revenue generated from khat imports is believed to amount to about USD 15.5 million.

613 While in 1993 only 10 tax officers were employed in Berbera, this rose to 39 in 2006 (Interview 122).
### Table 7: Revenues per Region 1999-2005 (in million Sl.Sh.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Year 1999</th>
<th>Year 2000</th>
<th>Year 2001</th>
<th>Year 2002</th>
<th>Year 2003</th>
<th>Year 2004</th>
<th>Year 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awdal</td>
<td>Zeyla</td>
<td>Zeyla</td>
<td>2,215</td>
<td>1,457</td>
<td>1,349</td>
<td>2,874</td>
<td>2,279</td>
<td>2,768</td>
<td>4,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ceel Gaal</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asha-Ado</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boroma</td>
<td>Boroma</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>1,343</td>
<td>1,938</td>
<td>2,445</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gabiley</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,676</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kalabeydh</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11,790</td>
<td>16,590</td>
<td>20,162</td>
<td>25,697</td>
<td>26,705</td>
<td>29,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Awdal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,311</td>
<td>13,878</td>
<td>18,781</td>
<td>24,423</td>
<td>29,949</td>
<td>31,942</td>
<td>35,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galbeed</td>
<td>Hargeysa</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,985</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>2,455</td>
<td>2,332</td>
<td>4,754</td>
<td>4,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abaarso</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>322</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Faraweine</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baligubadle</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Galbeed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,985</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>2,182</td>
<td>2,817</td>
<td>2,643</td>
<td>5,411</td>
<td>5,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahil</td>
<td>Berbera</td>
<td></td>
<td>26,005</td>
<td>39,373</td>
<td>54,779</td>
<td>78,549</td>
<td>96,021</td>
<td>130,141</td>
<td>135,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sahil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26,005</td>
<td>39,373</td>
<td>54,779</td>
<td>78,549</td>
<td>96,021</td>
<td>130,141</td>
<td>135,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togd.</td>
<td>Burco</td>
<td></td>
<td>277</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Togdheer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>277</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanaag</td>
<td>Erigavo</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ceelayo</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lasaqsoray</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Xii</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sanaag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sool</td>
<td>Las Anood</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caynabo</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>1,354</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>1,354</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41,578</td>
<td>55,065</td>
<td>77,165</td>
<td>107,685</td>
<td>130,744</td>
<td>169,439</td>
<td>178,140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations based on MF (2005, 2006).

### Depending on Inland Revenues

To some, the incremental growth of revenue generated from the khat trade symbolized the increased formalization and strengthening of the state (Hansen 2009:14), which was also mirrored in attempts to enhance domestic taxation from the mid-1990s onwards (Interview 52). To try to further regulate taxation the Somaliland House of Representatives passed a
number of laws in late 1996, and a number of levies were introduced by presidential decrees. Simultaneously, the accountant general’s office and inland revenue departments were expanded, culminating in a situation in which they had established a presence in almost every region by the year 2000 (APD 2002b:63; see Table 8). Hence, it is suggested that “tax collection is carried out effectively in areas that come under the sway of ‘Igal’s administration” (Bryden/Farah 1996:8; Faray 1995:9), and that “[t]he government system of tax collection is improving and there is a steady growth in the revenue collected by central, local and parastatal government agencies” (WSP 2005:50). Although the effectiveness of tax collection remained questionable, it is indisputable that inland revenue increased. While, for example, the Inland Revenue Department of Hargeysa region collected about Sl.Sh. 6 billion per year prior to 1997, this rose to Sl.Sh. 20 billion two years later (Interview 52).

Table 8: List of Inland Revenue Department Sub-Offices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Sub-Office (Region and City)</th>
<th>Date of Establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inland Revenue Office Hargeysa</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland Revenue Office Berbera</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland Revenue Office Borama</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland Revenue Office Gabiley</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland Revenue Office Burco</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland Revenue Office Erigavo</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland Revenue Office Las Aanod</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interview 44.

Laudable as these developments are, the potential for regime standardization remained limited, not least because the share of direct taxation stayed miniscule, contributing an insignificant 2.6 per cent of all taxes to the state coffers between 1997 and 2008 – an entry that was even outstripped by the 5.5 per cent of total revenue raised through fees and charges (Jama/Awad 2010:4). Income tax, for example, was hardly harnessed, and

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614 See e.g. the Body of Laws on Direct Taxation 1996 (no. 89/’96), and the Law on Customs Duties (no. 91/’96).
615 The most notable and prominent example thereof is the so-called aafada, a tax that served to create a disaster fund for the rehabilitation of Burco after the 1994-1996 war (Renders 2006:337).
616 Similarly, the Government of Somaliland claims that “[w]ith a pinch of salt, the [Customs and Revenue] Department works today apparently better than the former Hargeisa branch of Somalia’s Revenue Department (MNPC 1999:10).
617 The payroll tax conceded a tax free allowance of Sl.Sh. 6,000 per month (ca. USD 1), while payrolls between Sl.Sh. 6,000-9,000 were taxed at 3 per cent, those between Sl.Sh. 9,000-12,000 at 6 per cent.
data from the Inland Revenue Department reveals that one company alone (a prominent import-export enterprise) paid some 20.25 per cent of all income taxation, while most other companies contributed less than 0.9 per cent to the overall income tax take.\textsuperscript{618} Over time, the structure of Somaliland’s revenue remained largely unchanged, as evidenced by data presented in Table 9.

### Table 9: Sources of Revenue per Year (1997-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Actual Revenue (in million Sl.Sh.) and Percentages of Total Revenue per Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indirect taxes</td>
<td>25,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(87.7%)</td>
<td>(83.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct taxes</td>
<td>0.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.01%)</td>
<td>(0.01%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Properties</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees and charges</td>
<td>3,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11.1%)</td>
<td>(15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mohamed (undated).*

The meagre yield from inland revenue and its limited potential to contribute to regime standardization lay largely in the population’s opposition (Interview 24) and the state authorities’ restricted capacity to enforce taxation. This is confirmed by a government official who proposes that “taxpayers voluntarily pay only about 10 percent of the taxes they legally owe” (Mohamed undated:23) and a former Minister of Finance who observes that “nobody is paying taxes” and that “there is no tax enforcement capacity” (Interview 12).\textsuperscript{619} This lack of enforcement capacity and consequently restricted potential of inland revenue to contribute to broad-based regime standardization partly lay in the inland

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\textsuperscript{618} The country’s largest hotel, which also hosts numerous UN staff and offices, paid for its 59 staff a total of USD 720 per month in labour tax to the Somaliland state (at a labour tax rate of six per cent) (Interview 93). Telesom, a telecommunication company that controls about 80 per cent of the telecommunication market (Interview 157), paid only some USD 50,000 per year in taxes (Interview 120). This has partly to do with the fact that the government has insufficient capacity and knowledge to tax the communication companies (Interview 157).

\textsuperscript{619} See also Interview 52; Jama/Awad 2010:5.
revenue department’s limited human resources. While the customs office could boast about 235 staff by the mid to late 2000s (see above), the inland revenue office only had 60-65 employees at its disposal – most of whom were subordinate staff (Interview 127), and the remainder were insufficiently trained and lacking relevant work experience (MNPC 1999:10).

The Taxes’ Meagre Contribution to Standardization

The state’s limited ability to tax the population showed in the country’s considerable tax gap, i.e. the difference between the taxes actually raised and what could have been collected according to existing laws and statutes, which, at 75 per cent was highly significant (Jama/Awad 2010:2). This lack of enforcement capacity was present not only at the central, but also the district level, where “[t]here is significant scope for increased revenue collection and service delivery” (UN/WB 2006a:14). This tax gap can largely be traced to the little interest Somaliland governments showed in expanding the state’s inland revenue department due to its meagre profitability (Interview 52) and the belief that the population should pay as little tax as possible, as expressed by a former Minister of Finance (Interviews 12, 145). Moreover, the competition of different ministries over who was entitled to collect what not only diminished overall tax collection (Interview 151), but also hindered institutional standardization.\(^{620}\)

That the Somaliland state authorities made only limited progress regarding the enforcement of domestic taxation can also be seen in the example of fees and levies. The road levy, for example, at Sl.Sh. 50,000 (ca. USD 8.3) per six months, was paid by less than 40 per cent of registered car owners in 2010 (Interview 152) and only just over 17 per cent paid their yearly car registration fee (Interview 127).\(^{621}\) Property tax collection also suffered from irregularities that hindered regime standardization. Having won the civil war against the Garhajis, Egal exempted the clan from paying property tax in Hargeysa in order to both assist their economic recovery and silence them politically. This exemption remained in place in subsequent years, largely because Egal’s successor, President Riyale, depended politically on their support. Although the latter no longer enjoyed this tax holiday by the

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\(^{620}\) The Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Commerce, and Ministry of Telecommunication, amongst others, were, according to a regulation of the 1960s that was re-enacted by the Somaliland government, delegated to collect taxes (APD 2002b:60).

\(^{621}\) The car registration fee was Sl.Sh. 43,000 (ca. USD 7) for limousines, Sl.Sh. 156,000 (ca. USD 25) for landcruisers, and Sl.Sh. 167,000 (ca. USD 28) for trucks (Interview 52).
late 2000s, they allegedly paid only an estimated third of what residents residing in the city’s northern part paid in property tax (Interview 151).

Rather than mobilising resources through popular inland revenue generation, “[t]he government survives on the business community” (Interview 106). Yet, Somaliland governments largely refrained from obliging the biggest enterprises to play by the state’s rules and pay taxes and rather depended on voluntary donations on the part of tycoons. In fact, the tax income from the major businesses amounted to less revenue than that collected from the country’s civil servants in form of labour tax (Interview 120). The tycoons not only evaded tax payment (MNPC 1999:11; Interviews 52, 100), but were so influential that they could lobby for changes in personnel in the inland revenue department, if one of its employees was too persistent in demanding revenue payments from the respective company (Interview 52). Although the money remittance company Dahabshiil, for example, donated some USD 700,000 to the general public during the course of 2010 (Interview 120), such donations were believed to be equivalent to only about one per cent of the private sector’s profits (Interview 100).

More importantly, however, the decision of how much entrepreneurs paid the state remained with the tycoons rather than the political leadership, thus leaving this relationship uninstitutionalized. As observed by a former Minister of Finance, “the system works for them and there is no tax enforcement capacity” (Interview 12). Consequently, it is the private companies such as Dahabshiil and Telesom who control the state rather than vice versa (Interviews 100, 156). Due to the importance of the business sector for the survival of the Somaliland state, Bradbury (2008:155) labels the relationship between the business community and the government of the mid-1990s as a “relationship of co-dependency.”

### 7.2 Forging or Fragmenting the Nation?

Analogous to the trajectory of institutional standardization, progress with regard to socio-cognitive standardization was also ambiguous in the period between 1991 and 2011. On the one hand, the fact that a national currency was established in 1994, a new flag and national

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622 “With a few exceptions: the dozen or so of really rich people with annual income probably in the hundred thousands of millions of Dollars just refuse to pay up and ignore the Inland Revenue” (MNPC 1999:11). While the state legally has the option to jail tax evaders, it refrains from strict enforcement – either because it lacks the enforcement capability, or because the big businessmen are extremely influential at the political level (MNPC 1999:11).
anthem introduced in 1996, a Somaliland school curriculum developed from 1997 onwards, and national and civil war monuments erected in 2001 (Höhne 2011:321), hint at an increased potential for deepening a common set of ‘rules of the mind’. Moreover, two decades after having declared independence, there barely existed a single newspaper edition that did not call for international recognition of Somaliland (Personal observation, Hargeysa, 2008, 2010, 2011; Interview 57), thus committing its readership to a shared value. Yet, the potential for socio-cognitive standardization inherent to these developments does not seem to have been fully harnessed, restricting the extent to which nation-building occurred.

Did Currency Buy Nationalism?

In face of the depleted treasury he inherited when he took power in 1993, and due to his endeavour to establish greater long-term control over the polity’s economy, President Egal introduced a new currency in November 1994 (ION 1995; cf. Symes 2005). Viewed through the regime standardization prism, the replacement of the Somali Shilling (So.Sh.) with the Somaliland Shilling (Sl.Sh.) and the installation of the latter as the single accepted legal tender within the borders of the country constituted a formidable state-making endeavour. First, the introduction of a new currency indicated an advancement of institutional standardization as it was to provide a common, nation-wide medium for engaging in economic transactions. Second, it also constituted a tool for fostering socio-cognitive standardization as the use of the same legal tender is considered to serve as a constant reminder of an ‘imagined community’ and, thus, contribute to nation-building (Helleiner 1998; Rowlinson 1999:60; Young 2004). Yet, how far did the introduction of the Somaliland Shilling contribute to regime standardization?

Although Egal announced on January 13th, 1995 that the Somali Shilling would cease to be legal tender by the end of that month (Symes 2005; MNPC 1999:7), it did not disappear from Somaliland’s markets, but continued to be preferred over the Somaliland Shilling in

623 The introduction of the new currency constituted a windfall to the Egal administration as it was exchanged at a greatly preferential rate for the Somali Shilling (So.Sh.). The government set the exchange rates at Sl.Sh. 50 to USD 1, and Sl.Sh. 1 to So.Sh. 100, earning itself the accusation of conducting ‘the greatest robbery in Africa’ (Bradbury 1997:24ff., Interview 30). As the government sold the So.Sh. for USD, it was provided with hard currency to support its war-torn economy (cf. Symes 2005). The introduction of the Sl.Sh. was financed by prominent merchants (Bradbury 1997:27), who used the discarded So.Sh. for business in other parts of Somalia and Ethiopia. The losers of this change in currency were marginal businesses and small traders, and the major businesses in the east of the country (Interviews 104, 149). The introduction of the Somaliland Shilling thus fueled the civil war, whose outbreak coincided with the introduction of the new currency (Interview 36). See Chapter 5, and also fn. 466.

624 Unwin/Hewitt 2001; Hymans 2004; Cooper 2009.
places like Burco, Erigavo and Las Anood. First, Egal’s opposition objected to the Somaliland Shilling, partly because it went in tandem with a financial strengthening of his government. Second, the dominant livestock economy was strongly linked with south-central Somalia, which rendered the Somali Shilling much more valuable to the traders involved. The distribution of the Somaliland Shilling remained so confined that even salaries of civil servants stationed in Burco were sent either in Somali Shillings or US Dollars (Bradbury 1997:27). The lack of acceptance of the Somaliland Shilling in the east was partly mirrored in the country’s western part. In Awdal, the Ethiopian Birr and the Djiboutian Franc were frequently preferred as legal tender – partly because the Gadabursi and Issa clans were economically strongly intertwined with their Ethiopian and Djiboutian neighbours, for whom the acceptance of the currency of an unrecognized country was risky and burdensome (Interview 99).

The subordinate role the Somaliland Shilling took in Somaliland’s currency landscape not only had to do with political and economic reasons, but also a shortage in supply of Somaliland Shilling denominations. After two rounds of notes had been printed in 1994 and 1996 respectively, the amount of Somaliland Shillings was estimated at around 16 to 17 billion (approximately USD 4.71 million), and their circulation was, not surprisingly, largely restricted to the Kalabeydh-Hargeysa-Berbera corridor (MNPC 1999:7). While the geographical distribution of the Somaliland Shilling increased over the years, businesses in Erigavo still only accepted Somali Shillings in the late 2000s, even though many of the denominations were known to be forgeries (Interview 25; Personal observation, Erigavo, 09.04.2009). Simultaneously, the Erigavo branch of the Central Bank of Somaliland did not hold any Somaliland, but only Somali Shillings in its vaults (Interview 61).

After «Silanyo» took power in mid-2010 he had additional denominations printed and distributed to Burco and the country’s eastern region (NSP 2011). By means of exchanging Somali Shilling denominations worth USD 4.37 million with Somaliland Shilling notes, the government aimed to suppress the circulation of the Somali Shilling by mid-June 2011

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625 See fn. 466.
626 Calculated on the approximate average exchange rate of USD 1 to SLSh. 3,500 (USAID 2003).
627 Also in this case numerous factors led the local population to prefer the Somali Shilling over the Somaliland Shilling. One reason seems to lie in the fact that the vast majority of goods consumed in Erigavo arrived from the Puntland port of Bossasso – with khat being the only major exception (Interviews 25, 63) – largely due to the appalling infrastructure that ‘connects’ Erigavo with other urban centres in Somaliland (Interview 66) and the fact that custom duties are much lower in Bossasso than in Berbera (Interview 9).
Although these measures significantly enhanced the long neglected potential of the national currency to contribute to socio-cognitive standardization, it remains questionable as to how far the Somaliland Shilling will ultimately be accepted and used by the country’s population. As a former Minister of Finance states, “nobody really believes in the Somaliland Shilling [...]. Everybody – even the poorest person – has a US Dollar account” (Interview 99). That the Somaliland Shilling was only second to other currencies was mirrored by the fact that the total value of local currency in circulation was guessed to be about USD 35 million, while the value of foreign currency in circulation was roughly USD 100-150 million (UN/WB 2006a:9). The Somaliland Shilling’s potential to contribute to regime standardization does not, thus, seem to have been fully harvested.

The Media and the ‘Imagined Community’

As established by Anderson (1983) and other scholars, the media can play a pivotal role in forging national identities, as the near simultaneity of engaging with the same news that is spread through a daily newspaper available throughout the country, for example, enhances the creation of an ‘imagined community’. During the course of Somaliland’s history, a complex media landscape developed that lends itself to closer investigation of its impact on nation-building. Shortly after the end of the civil war in 1991, Somaliland saw the mushrooming of independent A4 duplicated ‘newspapers’, such as Ileys (Light), Codka Hargeysa (The Voice of Hargeysa), Xorriyo (Independence/Freedom), and Jamhuuriya (The Republican). Largely created by influential SNM mujahedeen, these newspapers, which had a print run of a few dozen hand-printed leaflets, provided a platform to articulate the views that had inspired the SNM’s armed struggle (Höhne 2008a:96). However, as no

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628 However, according to the governor of the Central Bank of Somaliland the rate at which the currency will be exchanged has yet to be determined (Bartamaha 2011). It should be noted that the Somali Shillings collected by the government were, allegedly, not resold as had been the case under Egal, but destroyed – largely due to the fact that the old Somali Shilling denominations used in Burco were no longer accepted beyond the city’s confines (Interview 101).

629 This section draws on research conducted in the framework of a joint research project of the Stanhope Centre for Communications Policy Research and the Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy (University of Oxford), which I was involved in during the course of 2009. The research findings presented here accrue from my work as Senior Research Associate, in which capacity I conducted and coordinated the project’s research in Somaliland between January and May 2009.

630 Among them were Faisal Ali Sheikh, Jamhuuriya’s managing editor and co-owner, who later joined Kulmiye’s executive committee; Mahmoud Abdi Shide, entrepreneur and SNM veteran, who enabled Jamhurriya to be the first paper to go to the printing press; Aukuse, founder and editor-in-chief of Sababiyo, who had been head of the clandestine SNM radio during the war (Stanhope 2010:53, 59, 102; see also Höhne 2008a:97).
printing press existed until 1993, and as the production of leaflets was hardly profitable, most of them quickly disappeared again – with the exception of Jamhuuriya, which developed into the only independent, proper, government-critical newspaper by 1995.

Constituting a thorn in the side of Somaliland’s political leadership, the early governments tried to restrict the impact of Jamhuuriya, which strongly represented the voice of the SNM, particularly its more hard-line elements. While under «Tuur» press freedom was seriously impeded by the fact that militias loyal to the government would kidnap journalists that produced government-critical articles or cartoons (Omar 2004, cf. Höhne 2008a:96), Egal used other tactics to contain the challenge posed by the paper: he established Maandeeq, a government-funded newspaper designed to outweigh the views expressed in Jamhuuriya. This way, Egal could not only counter the opinions spread by Jamhuuriya – in which he succeeded particularly because many of Maandeeq’s editors were SNM veterans, thus providing former SNM cadres with an alternative source of information – but was also able to better communicate the government’s policies to the population. Clearly, this increased the potential of establishing an ‘imagined community’.

Throughout the 2000s, numerous more privately owned newspapers evolved (Interview 53), such as Haatuf (2001), Ogaal (2005), Geeska Afrika (2006), Sahansaxo (2007), Malmaha (2008), and Waheen (2008). Their impact on socio-cognitive standardization appears unclear. On the one hand, they seem to have contributed to regime standardization in that they promulgated, despite their political differences, very similar ‘rules of the mind’. This was evident not only in that they all called for an independent Somaliland and emphasized the need for international recognition (Personal observation, Hargeysa, 2008, 631). The national printing press was only established in 1995.

631 The national printing press was only established in 1995.

632 Since 1997, Jamhuuriya has also produced a weekly English sister-publication, The Republican, a paper edition of which is also sold in London (Höhne 2008a:97).

633 The media outlet produces the Somali Haatuf, the English Somaliland Times, and the Arabic Al Haatef al Arabi.

634 Founded by Musa Jambir, who used to work for Haatuf, this newspaper has an enhanced coverage of Togdheer region, as its owner originates from Burco and it is funded by entrepreneurs from Togdheer.

635 Established by Mohamed Hussein «Rambo», an SNM veteran who had worked with Jamhuuriya, and was supported by a businessman close to the political party of UCID.

636 Owned by Abdullahi Ahmed Dahel, the former manager of SNM’s Radio Halgaan, and financially supported by at least two individuals close to the political party of Kulmiye.

637 Owned by Abdirahman Adam Dhameye, a former NSS officer, this newspaper was largely financed by former President Riyale.

638 Chaired and funded by Ahmed Hussein Essa, a Somali-American, who used to be an active member of the Kulmiye party, leaving upon having fallen out with the party’s chairman «Silanyo».
2010, 2011), but also in that they largely reflected the voice of the Isaaq in Somaliland. Thus, the media landscape itself was standardized insofar as the media outlets were largely run by SNM veterans. Moreover, the ability of the newspapers to act as a catalyst for standardization was bolstered when new technologies allowed for an increase in numbers of copies, and when an incremental expansion of the country’s infrastructure facilitated the dispersion of the nearly exclusively Hargeysa-based media outlets.

On the other hand, however, the potential of the print media to contribute to socio-cognitive standardization was hampered by a number of factors. First, the number of newspapers distributed remained relatively low. By the late 2000s, Somaliland’s roughly ten media outlets distributed an estimated 7,000 newspaper copies throughout the country. While it is true that newspapers were generally shared among multiple readers (Stanhope 2010:100f.), the fact that the majority of newspapers remained in the capital itself impeded broader socio-cognitive standardization. By way of example, Ogaal produced around 700 to 800 copies per day, which were distributed in Hargeysa (400 copies), Wajale (70), Gabiley (100), Boroma (50), Buro (60-70), Erigavo (25-30) and Las Anood (50) (Interview 46).

Second, given that the newspapers largely reflected the Isaaq viewpoint, they were not always well received among the non-Isaaq communities, thus limiting the impact the media could have on people’s mental models. While Höhne (2008a:91f.) claims that “the newspapers printed in the capital city Hargeysa clearly contribute to the establishment of a democratic political system”, the media landscape was so dominated by the Isaaq that he acknowledges that “the guerrilla legacy heavily biases the reporting on issues touching upon the position of Somaliland as an independent state”, thus excluding “the perspective of a significant minority that is critical about the secession of Somaliland” (see also Stanhope 2010:41). Although the Isaaq dominance of the print media could enhance socio-cognitive standardization by means of superimposing a particular agenda, it is unclear to what extent this bias was helpful, rather than detrimental to, socio-cognitive standardization. As one respondent told the Somaliland Communication Flows Research Project:

“Since there [i.e. in the east of Somaliland] are no newspapers and they don’t receive any newspapers or radio from the capital Hargeysa, we think that they are isolated from the other regions… they don’t know what is going on there."

639 When undertaking a research trip to the eastern town of Erigavo, the Haatufi emblems on the cars were removed under the presumption that these stickers could provoke unnecessary tensions among the eastern population (Personal observation, Hargeysa, 07.04.2009).
and since they don’t have any information they do not think that they are part of Somaliland.”  

Similarly, another interviewee claimed that:

“Some of the people who live in the capital, they may have a big portion of information from the government while the other regions do not…. So if they could get that information partially, or equally, they will share their sense of Somaliland togetherness.”

Radio also played an important role in Somaliland’s media landscape, not only due to the fact that Somali society is predominantly an oral one (Interview 21), but also due to its illiteracy rate of about 60 per cent (IREX 2009:355). During the SNM struggle, radio had been used to mobilize people, and, once the war was over, it had an important impact on Somaliland’s demobilization campaign (Stanhope 2010:18). Subsequent to the declaration of independence, the premises of Radio Hargeysa in the capital were rehabilitated, and the SNM’s Radio Halgaan renamed itself Radio Hargeysa. Yet, in contrast to the print media, hardly any diversification took place, and Radio Hargeysa remained the country’s only broadcasting station. While much of this monopoly was due to technical limitations throughout the 1990s, Somaliland’s governments were strongly opposed to other radio stations going on air. Thus, the radio landscape remained very limited – both with regard to the number of radio outlets as well as their impact – during Somaliland’s first two decades.

The government prohibited the establishment of private radio stations by ministerial decree in 2002. Furthermore, the Ministry of Information demanded that all transmitting equipment that had entered the country be handed over to the central state authorities and banned any further importation of radio transmitting equipment (Stanhope 2010:18). When, in 2005, individuals close to the Kulmiye party established Radio Horyaal, broadcasting a one-hour programme on shortwave from Belgium, military authorities prohibited soldiers from listening, arresting those who did not comply. Yasin Jama Ali, a stringer for the radio station and editor of the Berbera News website was arrested on August 13th, 2009, and accused of spreading “scandals against the nation” (Stanhope 2010:25). Together with the chief of the radio station’s website, Mohamed Said Abdullahi,

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640 Interview 301966180309, Stanhope 2010.
641 Interview 1400899260409, Stanhope 2010.
642 An attitude that was structurally not that different from the Barre government, which had prohibited all privately owned newspapers (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:85).
who was charged in absentia, the two were found guilty of committing “a crime against the Somaliland nation” on August 23rd, 2009 (Stanhope 2010:24).

The fact that Radio Hargeysa remained the sole radio station in the country could have contributed to enhancing socio-cognitive standardization within Somaliland, had it not been for the fact that its broadcasting range was limited to about 25km. Furthermore, the standardization capacity of Radio Hargeysa would have probably been eclipsed by that provided by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Somali Service, which was the most frequently listened to radio station, followed by Voice of America (VOA). Moreover, due to the limited media coverage the eastern parts of the country experienced over the course of the first two decades, large parts of the population in Sool and Sanaag tuned into broadcasts from Puntland (Interview 21). Despite the fact that Radio Hargeysa’s reach remained limited and even though it was subject to government control, numerous respondents to the questionnaire of the Somaliland Communication Flows Research Project expressed their scepticism towards a diversification of the broadcasting landscape.

“The country is still young. So more radios will only divide the minds and hurt the healing of wounds that have been inherited from civil wars, centuries of war. If there are more radios the country would be chaotic. They would be divided according to clans.”

“I support that there should be one single radio station in the country because radio is good for state control. If the radio comes to be controlled by individuals there may be contradictions… that can create a lack of stability and make harm to the nation.”

“You hardly see a radio which is operating impartially, but it is each and every radio station or newsletter… based on individual and clan interests, which is really contributing to the current problems in south Somalia. So really the Somalia media is in such a chaotic manner, no editing, no ethical journalists are working there and they are contributing to the problem.”

It is interesting to point out the manner in which the arrested journalists were dealt with by the government. According to NUSOJ (undated:6) it was common procedure that, upon arresting a journalist, the government would approach the respective clan elders, asking them to sign for the release of their clan member. This “serves as a guarantee for the government that the journalist will not repeat what he or she did, an act that journalists are unhappy about, since it amounts to blackmail.” While muzzling the journalists potentially contributed to regime standardization, the fact that the government resorted to the clan’s ‘rules of the game’ to implement its will rather points towards regime de-standardization.

Interview 302266180309; see also e.g. Interview 401066070309; Stanhope 2010.

Interview 301266080309; see also e.g. Interview 1400899260409; Stanhope 2010.

Interview 600766260309; Stanhope 2010.
These three interview extracts, which were recorded in response to the survey question of how much plurality should be allowed in Somaliland with regard to radio stations, illustrate the belief of some that the diversification of media, and the potential it carries for socio-cognitive de-standardization, could pose a challenge to the young polity.648

**Education Contributing to Standardization?**

After the end of the civil war in the early 1990s, the educational sector in Somaliland developed considerably. While in 1991 there were no educational facilities in place, a nascent educational system started to evolve from 1992 onwards (Bekalo et al. 2003:465). With the support of central government, local communities, foreign donors and the diaspora the number of educational establishments increased to reach some 627 primary schools, 59 secondary schools649 and ten universities nearly two decades into the polity’s existence (UNESCO 2009:10; MNPC 2010; see Table 10). Accordingly, the school population rose from basically zero to some 170,930 primary and 20,460 secondary pupils in 2009 (MNPC 2010).650 This significant development suggests that the educational sector also had a large potential for socio-cognitive standardization – but in how far was it harnessed?

Considering the geographical distribution of schools, the educational system’s potential for socio-cognitive standardization was seemingly harnessed. While some 28 per cent of primary schools were concentrated in the region that is home to the country’s capital, the same region was also home to about 39 per cent of Somaliland’s population.651 Comparing the percentage figures of primary schools with those of regional populations, it can be seen that educational facilities were actually quite evenly spread across the territory (see Table 11). The reason why there was much less of an ‘urban’ or ‘Isaaq bias’ – as could be observed with regard to the security sector, for example – probably lies in the fact that there was little involvement on the part of the government in the sphere of education. As the re-evolution of the educational system depended largely on local actors, their respective diaspora, and international agencies, a more equitable regional distribution was assured.

648 However, overall about 70 per cent of respondents favoured privatization of radio stations in Somaliland, 30 per cent were opposed. See also Interview 21.
649 About 55 per cent of all secondary schools are public (UNESCO 2009:10).
650 These numbers outstrip the enrolment rates of Somalia in 1961/62, when there were only some 18,000 students enrolled in Somali schools (Abdi 1998:333).
651 See WHO/UNICEF working estimates for the regional distribution of Somaliland’s population. For similar, yet slightly older estimates, see see UK Border Agency (2012:19) and Ambroso (2002:9).
Table 10: Growth of Public and Private Education from 1997/98 to 2008/09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary Schools</th>
<th>Secondary Schools</th>
<th>Vocational</th>
<th>Universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997/98</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/99</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/00</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNPC 2010.

Table 11: Distribution of Primary Education by Region (2008/09)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region (reg. capital)</th>
<th>No. of schools</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Student Enrolment</th>
<th>Population distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awdal (Boroma)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>13.40%</td>
<td>14,010</td>
<td>9,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Jeex (Hargeysa)</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>28.23%</td>
<td>44,136</td>
<td>23,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahil (Berbera)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6.54%</td>
<td>5,131</td>
<td>3,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togdheer (Burco)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>20.73%</td>
<td>18,434</td>
<td>9,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanaag (Erigavo)</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>16.11%</td>
<td>13,149</td>
<td>7,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sool (Las Anood)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>14.99%</td>
<td>13,462</td>
<td>7,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>108,322</td>
<td>62,608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNPC 2010; for the estimates on the regional distribution of the Somaliland population, see WHO/UNICEF working estimates.

However, despite this indication that the educational system developed its potential to foster socio-cognitive standardization, a number of items call this supposition into question. First, while the education sector in its entirety experienced a considerable boost, and while this boost showed an equitable regional distribution, enrolment rates remained relatively low. Whereas primary school enrolment was put at between 20 per cent (UN/WB 2006a:3) and 40 per cent (EC undated:6) in the mid-2000s, only some 15.6 per cent of those went on to secondary school, leading to a secondary school gross enrolment rate of about 8.1 per cent in 2007/08 (UNESCO 2009:10). Thereby, enrolment in urban areas was considerably higher (27 per cent) than in rural areas (16 per cent), not to speak of those of nomadic pastoralist communities (1 per cent) (Bekalo et al. 2003:465, referring to UNICEF...
Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that Somaliland’s achievements in the educational sector are respectable.

Secondly, the education sector’s ability to contribute to socio-cognitive standardization was restricted due to a lack of resources. Whereas, prior to the Somali civil war, education had largely been managed by the central government in Mogadishu and heavily subsidized by foreign aid, the limited resources the Somaliland state had at its disposal in the years subsequent to its declaration of independence resulted in deregulation, privatization and decentralization of all educational services (Bradbury 2008:163f.). For example, of the roughly 5,000 teachers in the country, only 2,300 (i.e. 46 per cent) were on the payroll of the central government by the late 2000s (UNCDF 2009:53). Furthermore, about half of the teachers employed were either not trained at all or undertrained (MNPC 1999; MEDPR 1999/2000; cf. Bekalo et al. 2003:465). And, by leaving the task of reviving schools and employing teachers to a mixture of communities, international aid agencies, Islamic charities, diaspora organizations and Somali businesses, the state relinquished considerable control over the education system in general and school curricula more particularly with implications for the extent to which education contributes to socio-cognitive standardization.

The fact that different school curricula were implemented in Somaliland during the first two decades after independence indicates that chances of socio-cognitive standardization were derogated. While 88.1 per cent of secondary schools utilized the Somalia curriculum, 6.8 per cent used the Saudi Arabian one, 1.7 per cent the Kenyan, and 3.4 per cent made use of other curricula (UNESCO 2009:21). “Most primary schools appear to be opportunistic in their use of available curriculum materials from outside the country, or to devise their own curriculum […]. Notably, curriculum materials from Gulf States and…

652 According to UNESCO (2011:1), the average rate of primary and lower secondary school enrolment across sub-Saharan Africa stood at 77 and 43 per cent respectively.

653 Comparing Somaliland’s education sector with the one that existed under Barre, an interesting picture emerges. While from 1975 to 1979 the total basic recurrent and development expenditure on education had culminated in 19 per cent of the national budget (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988), Somaliland spent only eight per cent on all social services together in the late-2000s. However, it should be noted that in 1984, Somalia’s spending on education had fallen to between 1.5 and 2 per cent of the national budget, or 0.6 per cent of GDP, while some 36 per cent was spent on defense and security (Bekalo et al. 2003:463f., referring to Abdi 1998; Ahmed I. Samatar 1988).

654 Of these, only about ten per cent received regular salaries from the Ministry of Education (Interview 41).

655 Merchants supported the educational sector by sponsoring chairs, tables, and blackboards (Interview 41).

656 More benevolently, other informants suggest that one and the same curriculum was applied to 100 per cent by public schools and to 70 per cent by private schools (Interview 43).
neighbouring Kenya are in use unmodified” (Bekalo et al. 2003:460). Moreover, Somaliland’s history books – if at all available, dedicate only one page to the history of the SNM, thus sweeping apart important aspects of the country’s history (Interview 151).

**The State of the Nation**

As the potential for socio-cognitive standardization was not fully harnessed, Somaliland nationalism remained vague and hardly manifested beyond the national holidays of May 18th and June 26th (Interview 151). The fact that Somaliland nationalism did not truly blossom for the most part of the polity’s first two decades was ascribed to the state’s inability to provide certain socio-economic services to the population (Interview 150). As expressed by another interviewee, “for the past eight years, nothing has been invested in common institutions that allow you to have loyalty to the state” (Interview 116). Moreover, a national sense of identity remained underdeveloped, because this identity hinged more on the future hope of international recognition, rather than past achievements from which common ‘rules of the mind’ could be derived (Interview 156).

Ultimately, however, the development of national sentiments remained impoverished due to the prevalence of clannism, which increased in importance over time (Interviews 150, 142). While President Egal had put much effort into creating a national identity, clan identities gained increasing strength, particularly under the Riyale government and in the run up to the 2005 parliamentary elections (Interviews 106, 112). A sign and a consequence of this development was that political parties increasingly aligned and identified with particular clans during the course of the 2000s (Interview 150), fostering identification with the clan rather than non-kinship-based groups (Interview 156) – a development that clearly detracted from socio-cognitive standardization. Consequently, interviewees argued that “I don’t believe that there is Somaliland nationalism. There is Isaaqism” (Interview 19), and that Somaliland was “an Isaaq project dominated by the Isaaq” (Interviews 95, 142, 114).

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657 According to some, this shortcoming of the Somaliland government was diametrically opposed to Barre’s government, which had managed to replace the clan as the most important service provider, thus effecting the retreat of clan identities and the emergence of nationalism (Interviews 144, 156).

658 This is reflected by the fact that the SNM’s struggle is allocated merely one page in the schools’ history books (Interview 151; see also Interview 27).

659 See Chapter 6.

660 This judgement is, however, challenged by others (Interview 94).
7.3 Interim Conclusion

While south-central Somalia faced a general trajectory of regime de-standardization in the two post-1991 decades, the Republic of Somaliland made certain strides in the direction of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. Despite some laudable progress, however, this chapter elucidated that state-making in Somaliland was not as comprehensive as is frequently claimed. Although levels of regime standardization increased overall between 1991 and 2011, it appears that progress indicative of state-building and nation-building remained unclear. Thus, rather than being turned into an ‘effective state’ as, for example, Othieno (2008) has it, the young polity seems to have consolidated as a fragile state. This is largely due to the fact that a plurality of different sets of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ not only continued to prevail, but was consolidated in the state’s set-up. Whereas the 1990s had largely witnessed processes by which Egal wrested authority over particular sets of rules from the traditional authorities, the 2000s were generally marked by developments that saw the clan regime reconquering their spheres of influence.

Moreover, the chapter suggested that the standardization of authoritative sets of rules had largely been confined to the ‘heartland’ inhabited by the Isaaq clan, while it remained principally absent from the ‘hinterland’. In other words, the polity’s periphery was generally marked by processes of de-standardization, largely due to the state’s lack of enforcement capacity. This was shown most prominently with the formation of the Puntland State of Somalia in 1998, the announcement of the Makhir State of Somalia in 2007 and the proclamation of the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) State of Somalia in 2009, all of which attested to Somaliland’s feeble level of regime standardization in its periphery. While those alternative state-making projects can be interpreted as having been the result of the central state’s inability to broadcast and enforce a particular set of rules, they can also be read as having resulted from the central state’s commission to do exactly this. In fact, the secessionist projects within Somaliland coincided with the state’s increasing administrative

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661 Whereas *de facto* regime de-standardization showed in fragmentation of the country into different polities, *de jure* de-standardization was, for example, propelled by the decision to officially return to a multi-lingual society. During the Mbaghati Peace and Reconciliation Conference in Kenya in 2003, a sizeable majority of Somali politicians voted in favour of having two Somali languages – Maay and Maxaatiri – in addition to Arabic (see the Transitional Federal Charter of 2003, Art. 7; see Mukhtar 2007:129).

662 While the Makhir State of Somalia was a Warsangeli project (Interview 156), the SSC State of Somalia is driven and supported by the Dhulbahante clan.
penetration of the respective regions, causing resistance among the particular non-Isaaq communities involved (Höhne 2011).

Yet, whether brought about by the state’s omission or commission to implement particular institutions and socio-cognitive systems, the formation of these alternative state-making projects attests to the underlying regime plurality and the insufficient level of regime standardization achieved in Somaliland during the first two decades of its existence. Assessing Somaliland’s state of affairs, prominent Somaliland politicians argue that the polity was in a “transition to nowhere” (Interview 36) and, with an eye to the continuously strong force of clannism, express their belief that “we will never form a state” (Interview 12; see also Interviews 19, 94). Hence, the benevolent assessment that “[t]he integration of the clan in the government also created a necessary link between ‘old’ Somali governance and the desired ‘new’ democracy” (Richards 2009:201) needs to be questioned. Viewed through the prism of regime standardization, the institutionalization of an institutional and socio-cognitive plurality was beset with more drawbacks than benefits.
“We were lucky” was the response given independently by two former high-ranking and well-respected Somali politicians when asked why Somaliland’s state trajectory diverged so significantly from that of south-central Somalia (Interviews 12, 36). While one informant sees Somaliland’s ‘luck’ as largely deriving from having had a capable leader in President Egal, the other proposes that Somaliland’s fortune lay in its long-lasting neglect by the international community – a neglect that allowed the polity to develop according to its own pace and patterns. Although both propositions are coherent, this thesis suggests that the reason for the divergence of Somali state trajectories transcends the dichotomy of ‘luck’ and ‘misfortune’. Having scrutinized prevailing theoretical approaches to state-building, state fragility and nationalism, developed an original analytical framework that puts an institutional prism at its centre, and challenged received wisdom regarding the making and breaking of Somalia and Somaliland, this research project aimed to contribute to a better understanding of the nature of state development within and outside of Somali boundaries.

The central empirical puzzle this thesis has addressed is if, why and how Somaliland’s state trajectory diverged from previous Somali state-making endeavours undertaken between 1960 and 1991. Moreover, the research project raised the question under what condition was war beneficial rather than detrimental to state-making, as an answer to this conundrum was hoped to render additional insights into processes of the making and breaking of states. In order to address these and a number of further theoretical and empirical issues, the thesis put forth an analytical prism that draws on well-established insights from the literature on state-building, nation-building and warfare. According to this analytical framework, processes of state-(un)making can valuably be understood in terms of institutional and socio-cognitive (de-)standardization. The thesis also suggested that central administration provides an important tool for advancing the standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’.
With reference to the cases of Somalia and Somaliland the thesis showed that processes of state-(un)making do, indeed, correlate closely with alterations in levels of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. This finding is relevant in numerous ways, not least because it stresses the close relationship between trajectories of states and nations. Moreover, the research presented here suggests that while war was surely no ‘angel of order’, in historical and macro-societal terms it can be much more than a mere ‘daemon of decay’ — under the condition that it contributes to regime standardization. Besides generating further insights regarding the role of institutions in development and the ambivalent effects (premature) democratization can have on nascent state-making projects, this thesis also contributed to the literature on Somalia and Somaliland by providing new empirical observations and alternative insights into their trajectories. Thus, it scrutinized the prevailing interpretation of Somaliland being an unmitigated success story of peaceful, bottom-up and democratic state-making.

By means of reviewing some of the key findings, distilling a number of central implications, and identifying some of the study’s caveats and avenues for further research, the final chapter is divided into three sections. Section one revisits some of the research project’s most central theoretical and empirical findings. This is followed by highlighting a number of implications these insights have for our understanding of, and attitude towards, (violent) processes of state-making and related issues of development in section two. The chapter concludes by reconsidering the study’s main limitations, highlighting remaining questions, and suggesting potential avenues for future research.

8.1 Central Findings

State and Nation – A Pair of Twins

One central contribution this thesis makes to existing scholarship on state-making lies in its elaboration of an analytical prism that theoretically re-establishes the intimate connection between state-building and nation-building. While a number of scholars have emphasized the common bonds between the state and the nation (Weber 1948:78; Gellner 1983:1; Hobsbawm 1990:9f.), and others have rightly argued that state-building cannot succeed in the absence of nation-building (Lemay-Hébert 2009), there is a dearth of theoretical frameworks that integrate both concepts to understand processes of state-making and state-
breaking. Drawing on a number of established insights from the literature on state-building (e.g. Evans et al. 1985; Mann 1988; Tilly 1992) and nationalism (e.g. Anderson 1983; Breuilly 1993; Smith 1998), and deploying ideas of institutional theory (e.g. North 1993; Denzau/North 1994) in order to bridge the analytical gap between the two strands of scholarly work, this thesis has proposed that processes of state-making can valuably be understood in terms of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization.

Apart from laying the theoretical foundations this thesis provided empirical evidence in support of the argument that it is processes of ‘rule-standardization’ that constitute the central underlying current as well as common denominator of both state-building and nation-building. Whereas state-building can, ultimately, be described as a development during the course of which an overarching set of ‘rules of the game’ gains dominance within a given society, the standardization of a common set of ‘rules of the mind’ is a defining characteristic of nation-building. And although state-building and nation-building are (analytically) distinct processes the thesis showed that they are closely intertwined. Thus, it can be observed at different instances in Somali history that changes in the institutional set-up conditioned alterations in concomitant socio-cognitive systems and identity patterns – the dissipation of authoritative ‘rules of the game’ in the late 1960s, for example, entailed a fragmentation of common ‘rules of the mind’ into subsidiary socio-cognitive systems.

Hence, this research project not only made the case for the need for ‘bringing the nation back in’, if we are to better understand the complexities of state trajectories, but also disclosed that, figuratively speaking, there are numerous roads that lead to Rome. Put another way, the regime standardization thesis drives home the point that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to state-making, partly because the sets of authoritative rules that are standardized, as well as the means by which they are standardized, differ from case to case and diverge in face of dissimilar (institutional) pre-dispositions. While, for example, all Somali state-making projects have been marked by an overall increase in levels of regime standardization, Barre’s and Egal’s state-making endeavours diverged not least insofar as they tried to standardize different sets of rules by different means. And while linguistic standardization might have been a condition sine qua non for state-making in France, it has been conspicuously absent from state-making processes in Switzerland.
Apart from providing an exceptional opportunity to investigate processes of state-making and state-breaking, the Somali case studies also lend themselves to important questions about the relationship between state trajectories and war. While Tilly’s (1992:67) dictum that “war makes states, and vice versa” has become a classic proposition to explain state-making in historical Europe, its validity has been questioned for contemporary developing countries (e.g. Kaldor 1999; Herbst 2000; Leander 2004). Pigeon-holed and dismissed as constituting “development in reverse” (World Bank 2003; Collier 2004), war has been denied any productive role in shaping states and/or forging nations. Although it is undeniable that wars are nasty and brutish, and even though I do not advocate “Give War a Chance” (Luttwack 1999), this thesis has scrutinized the proposition that war is a “political retrovirus […] about nothing at all” (Enzensberger 1994, as in Cramer 2006:77).

Following scholars such as Cramer (2006) and Taylor and Botea (2008), this research project aimed to disaggregate the ‘black box’ of war in order to corroborate the proposition that war has, at times, played an important role in state-making in sub-Saharan Africa (Deflem 1999; Ahmed/Green 1999; Niemann 2007). As stipulated by the analytical prism of regime standardization, I found that war can be constitutive of state-making under the condition that it – or, rather, certain of its elements – contributes to an increase in institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. By extension this proposition challenges received wisdom, such as the propositions that civil wars are, principally by definition, detrimental to state-making (Biró 2007), whereas only ‘old’ wars could possibly be constitutive of the state (Kaldor 1999). In line with Clapham’s (2001:8) assertion that wars are as likely to make as to break states, I have argued that the analytically feeble division of wars into binary categories such as ‘intra-state/inter-state’ and ‘old/new’, for example, should be replaced by a more thorough understanding of which elements could add in what ways to state-making and which could detract.

Although this thesis contributed only modestly to this debate, it demonstrated that the relationship between violent conflict and state trajectories is more complex than dichotomous concepts want to make us believe. While the Ogadeen War of 1977/78 had ambiguous effects on Somalia’s regime ecology, it could be observed that the process of state-breaking it resulted in originated less in the war per se, but more in Barre’s subsequent policies. Conversely, primary research revealed that both the civil wars of Somalia and Somaliland carried elements that were constitutive of state-making. Although I argue that
violent conflict constitutes neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for state-making, evidence suggests that wars may catalyse processes of regime standardization, not least because wars and the concomitant formation of armies provide “the most common vehicle for cultural homogenization” (Conversi 2007:388, my italics) and subject the population to a “uniform impulse” (Simmel 1964:92; O’Leary 1998:66).

**From Kalashnikovs to Calculators – The Centrality of Administration**

Apart from emphasizing the role war has played in Somali state trajectories, this thesis also pointed towards the crucial role central administration plays in state-making endeavours. Thereby, this proposition stands in the tradition of those scholars who have highlighted that administration lies at the heart of both state-building (e.g. Tilly 1985:45; Herbst 2000:124) and nation-building (e.g. Anderson 1983:53; Giddens 1985:116). While Röder (2007) has also cunningly argued for the centrality of administration in explaining state-making, the thesis went beyond his proposition that “nation-states have mostly come from administrative upgrade of segment-states” (ibid.11). In light of the regime standardization thesis I make the argument that the reason **why** central administration matters for state-making is to be found in it constituting a key tool for bringing about institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. This theoretical proposition could be observed empirically in the Somali case studies, where the spread of particular rules hinged on the presence of an effective administration.

The realization that central state administration has an overwhelming potential to broadcast and enact regime standardization has important implications for the way international actors think about and conduct administrative reforms in developing countries in general and fragile states more particularly. It emphasises that administration is not solely a technical, but in fact highly political issue that not only plays a central role in determining the ‘rules of the game’, but also has significant influence on the ‘rules of the mind’. It also cautions against policy prescriptions that envision a considerable downsizing of the administrative architecture for the sake of efficiency – as has frequently been demanded in the framework of the (post-)Washington Consensus (e.g. World Bank 1997; Edwards 1997) – as this is likely to restrict a government’s potential to spread common institutions and socio-cognitive systems. Given that the military apparatus is, generally, the second most

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663 Röder (2007) understands ‘segment-states’ to be administrative jurisdictions of the overarching nation-state, such as the union states of the former USSR.
significant tool to broadcast and (violently) enforce regime standardization, the diminution of administration not only carries the danger of contributing to regime de-standardization, but also of directly playing into the hands of heightened militarization.

A New Narrative for Somalia and Somaliland

Another intrinsic contribution of this research lies in the alternative narrative it provides for the state trajectories of Somalia and Somaliland. Countering, for example, the proposition that the disintegration of the Somali state started with the onset of dictatorial rule in 1969 (e.g. Abdullahi 2007a:43), this thesis showed that far from state-breaking, Barre’s reign between 1969 and the mid-1970s was predominantly marked by processes indicative of state-making. Similarly, the thesis put forth a nuanced interpretation of the 1977/78 Ogaden War and its effects on the unmaking of the Somali state. While agreeing with the proposition that the Somali-Ethiopian war constituted the most visible turning point that separated the phase of state-making in the early and mid-1970s from the one of state-breaking during the 1980s, I postulated that the unmaking of the Somali state hinged less on the war itself – as frequently suggested by the respective literature – than on the policies subsequently enacted by the national political leadership and international actors. Moreover, I argued that the fragility of Somali state-making projects did not lie with the fact that the “cultural traditions are not compatible with the constructs of a modern state” (Mansur 1995:115), but that it rather stemmed from the regime plurality that rooted in their parallel existence.

Much more distinct, however, this thesis added to the debate on Somaliland’s state trajectory by providing new empirical facts, an alternative interpretation of these, and, thus, a narrative that sets itself apart from most existing accounts. Based on extensive primary research the thesis scrutinized some of the most prominent ideas that surround Somaliland’s trajectory – namely that its state-making project has been a ‘success’ (Jhazbhay 2007; Shinn 2002), which is ‘unique’ (Hoyle 2000:85; Kaplan 2008b:148) in that it has been characterized by ‘peaceful progression’ (Othieno 2008; Sufi 2003:285; Bradbury

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665 On the detrimental effects of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on Somalia’s state-making project, see e.g. A.I. Samatar 1993.
666 Eggers 2007; Othieno 2008; Bradbury 2008; Kaplan 2008b; Walls 2009a; Kibble/Walls 2010b; Harris/Foresti 2011.
667 Jhazbhay 2009:50. For an application of this argument to all of Somalia, see e.g. Adam/Ford 1998:v.
2003:455) based on ‘traditional reconciliation’ (Adam 1995; Terlinden/Debiel 2003; Othieno 2008), ‘home-grown democratic institutions’ (Azam 2011:157; ICG 2003:34), and a ‘vibrant democracy’ (Forti 2011:5; Kaplan 2008b:148). While having refrained from wholly dismissing these accounts, this thesis countered that Somaliland’s state-making process has been much more ambiguous, with numerous parallels with other state-making endeavours within and outside of Somali boundaries, and showed significant traits of violent episodes, top-down policies, and shrewd power politics. Rather than celebrating Somaliland’s achievements, this research project scrutinized its progress, and indicated that even in the case of Somaliland, not all good things have gone together.

As well as providing some additional insights into the economic foundations and some of the most pertinent dynamics of elite bargaining in Somaliland, the thesis also called the assertion that it is the ‘traditional elders’ who are “responsible for the success of Somaliland today” (Leonard 2009:13; Flint 1994:36; Massey 1994:123) into question. While the celebration of the elders has fanned the flames of the proposition that Somaliland’s ‘best kept secret’ (Jhazbhay 2003) is, allegedly, to be found in the hybridity of its political orders (Böge et al. 2008; Moe 2009a; Renders 2010), my research leads me to conclude that, first, the role of the traditional authorities in state-making has been eclipsed by the political, economic and military elite, and, second, the involvement of the elders has been much more ambiguous for Somaliland’s trajectory than commonly acknowledged. Although refraining from overgeneralizing the role played by elders, this thesis suggested that they have tended to impede processes of regime standardization in Somali state trajectories.

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670 Here I borrow from Packenham’s (1973) observation that “American liberalism approached foreign aid policy with the belief that ‘all good things go together’” (Putzel 1997:941).
671 See also Bongartz (1991:61) who goes so far as to suggest that Somalia be reconciled and governed by an inter-clan council of elders.
672 Indirectly, I thus also challenge the underlying narratives of ‘colonial difference’ and ‘cultural difference’, reappraising them as insufficient to account for the differences in state-making that can be observed between Somaliland and south-central Somalia, even though cultural and historical divergences do clearly exist and have influenced the basis of the respective regime ecologies.
8.2 Broader Implications

How State-Making Counters Peace-Making

Although this research only touched upon the controversy surrounding the interrelationship of state-making and peace-building in passing, the thesis speaks to this debate in a generic way. While some analysts have come to argue that the concepts of peace-building and state-building are “largely congruent” (e.g. Grävingholt et al. 2009), the work presented here supports the more critical position that the two are not only different, but can counteract each other (e.g. Call 2008a/b; Cliffe/Manning 2008; Call/Wyeth 2008). Consequently, I agree with scholars such as Menkhaus (2003:407f.), who argue that “state building and peace-building are two separate and, in some respect, mutually antagonistic enterprises in Somalia” (see also Tadesse 2004a:66; Menkhaus 2008c). The same proposition holds for Somaliland, where Egal’s state-making endeavour of the mid-1990s clearly challenged the newly won peace head-on and resulted in a number of civil wars.

Even though the separateness of processes of state-making and peace-building is commonly recognised in the literature on Somaliland, some of its authors were seduced into neatly dividing the polity’s history into consecutive phases of peace-building, state-building, and democratization (e.g. Ali/Walls 2008:18). While much could be said about such simplistic divisions, the operative point here is an analytical one: conceptualizations that understand peace-building and state-making as successive phases of a more or less linear trajectory of a society’s post-war development fail to acknowledge that these processes do not (necessarily) build on one another, but are rather involved in a concomitant competition with each other. Why and how is state-making not at peace with peace-building when viewed through the analytical lens of regime standardization?

In the framework of the regime thesis, state-making is understood as a process during the course of which particular (sets of) ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ are standardized among the members of a territorially delineated population, i.e. a process that creates institutional and socio-cognitive conformity. Given that changes in a society’s set of rules go hand-in-hand with shifts in power, state-making processes are inherently crisis-prone and likely to see antagonistic actors turn violent in order to assert themselves and their particular rules. While the concept of assertion also plays a part in peace-building, the latter process is equally characterized by compromise and mutual acceptance. Viewed through the regime standardization prism, peace-building is ultimately about the termina-
tion of violent processes that are designed to create institutional and socio-cognitive homogeneity, and predominantly geared towards accepting the simultaneity of plural ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. While political organizations and alliances can manage conflicts generated by state-making processes, peace-building and state-building are difficult to reconcile.

**Why Democratization Carries Dangers**

More explicitly, this thesis raised questions about the effect of policies of democratization and decentralization on processes of state-making. Having observed how the Somali state of the 1960s slid into an “artificial democracy” (Adam 1999:262; Mansur 1995:114; Abdullahi 2007a:43) and how Somaliland came to epitomise a clanocracy rather than democracy in the eyes of some analysts (Interviews 153, 112), the question arises as to how far democratic forms of governance have helped or hindered the respective state-making projects. Whereas democracy has been identified as a crucial part of development because it provides “the freedom to lead the kind of lives we have reason to value” (Sen 1999:14), empirical evidence also suggests that democratization is prone to polarizing political identities, resulting in social, political and economic instability or even breakdown (Mamdani 2001:23; Chang 2002:76; van de Walle 1999:22f.).

How do the findings presented in this thesis speak to the broader debate on democratization?

As shown in Chapter 5, the democratic transition in Somaliland has been much less characterized by the ‘grassroots’ and ‘bottom-up’ development than is frequently claimed. In line with Sibanda’s (2000) proposition that “new democracies continue to represent the interests of the elite”, it can be observed that the polity’s democratization has generally been marked by top-down processes designed to maintain the power of the ruling elite, rather than to create a political level playing field. Moreover, I suggested that democratization occurred prematurely in Somaliland, as, in the absence of consolidated sub-national political identities, it evidently promoted a relapse into clannism, which fostered regime de-standardization and state fragmentation. The formation of the Makhir State of Somalia in 2007 and the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) State in the late 2000s support the cogency not

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673 While scholars such as Rai (1996) point out that democratic institutions (in old as well as new democracies) tend to marginalize subordinate groups, other researchers show that new democracies exhibit significantly higher rates of civil war (Hegre et al. 2001; Bates 2008:11).

674 The relapse of Somaliland’s political elite into clannism parallels well with the parliamentary era of the 1960s, when “civilian elites manipulated clanism to win elections” (H.H. Adam 1995:205).
only of this argument, but also of comparative accounts on democratization,\textsuperscript{675} which suggest that transitions into democratic forms of governance frequently result in political instability and the mobilization of ‘illiberal’ political forces (Zakaria 1997).

Although elections contain the potential for strengthening state-making, not least because a voter’s experience of joining all other elective citizens in voting for new political representatives is likely to enhance the creation of an ‘imagined community’, electoral processes can also have the opposite effect – namely in contexts in which political identities remain principally congruent with ethnic or clan identities. Under these auguries it is commendable that Somaliland could advance its state-making project not because of but despite the fact that it embarked on a process of democratization – which was, however, rather shallow. While more research is needed to better understand under what conditions certain policies, events or actions exert either positive or negative influences on the standardization of particular ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, the regime standardization thesis clearly supports past propositions that caution against precipitously introducing liberal democracies in fragile states.

\textbf{What Advocates of HPOs Should Reconsider}

The case of Somaliland has been instrumental in giving rise to and fuelling concepts of ‘twilight institutions’ (Lund 2006), the ‘negotiated state’ (Menkhaus 2006/07), and ‘hybrid political orders’ (HPOs) (Böge et al. 2008). In trying to provide an alternative to Weberian conceptualizations of the state these frameworks principally suggest that Somaliland’s alleged state-making ‘success’ lies in the simultaneity and interaction of different sets of institutions, ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ ones. The analytical prism of regime standardization calls these concepts into question, not least because they remain inconclusive regarding the question under what conditions and what kind of HPOs are supportive of rather than inimical to state-making. Rather than advocating treating HPOs as political orders in their own right (Kraushaar/Lambach 2009), the regime prism suggests that the hybridity of political orders – or, in the terminology of the regime prism, the plurality of institutions and socio-cognitive systems – is inimical to state-making. The underlying rationale is that regime plurality impedes the standardization of authoritative sets of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, thus restricting state-making at its very roots.

\textsuperscript{675} E.g. Mansfield/Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000.
In the Somali context, Elmi (1992:61f.) remarks similarly critically that “[t]he strong advocation [...] that the resolution of the present crisis and conflict in Somalia lies in clan and clan-chiefs rather than the political movements and leaders is a greatly misconceived notion of the realities in Somalia” (see also Interview 12). As demonstrated in this thesis, it has rather been the case that in both Somalia and Somaliland it was ‘shrewd politicians’ rather than ‘benevolent elders’ who advanced the respective state-making projects, and that the latter generally achieved greater progress in situations in which the traditional authorities and the clan regimes they presided over were side-lined. It is not without reason that the democratic leadership of the 1960s as well as the dictatorial government of the 1970s as well as the Somaliland administration of the 1990s all tried to limit the powers of the traditional authorities and relegate them from the political arena.

Although having acknowledged that fragile states are inherently ‘hybrid’ as regards their political order, I have argued that this hybridity should not be taken as an ideal or benchmark for state-making. While a plurality of different rules can be desirable or even necessary to keep states functional in the long-term – partly because it may contribute to a state’s resilience in that it provides alternative institutional frameworks that offer “the possibility of switching strategically from one institutional universe to another” (CSRC 2005:8; North 2005:42) – this thesis has carved out the argument that such plurality is more likely to be inimical in the early stages of the development of (fragile) states. Thus, in a manner analogous to the dictum of Rodrik (2008) on economic development, I propose that ‘what is required to sustain states should not be confused with what is required to initiate them.’

8.3 Caveats, Remaining Questions and Avenues for Future Research

Caveats

A number of caveats that are inherent to this study should be mentioned briefly. One obvious limitation of the research presented here lies in its application of the case study approach in general and the restriction of this project to the Somali case in particular. Although Landman (2008:28) considers a single-country study “comparative if it uses concepts that are applicable to other countries, and/or seeks to make larger inferences that
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stretch beyond the original country used in the study” – conditions this research project was keen to fulfil – and even though I could overcome some of the single case study limitations by dividing the Somali case into ‘subunits’ in order to undertake comparative studies over time and space so as to make “many observations from few” (King et al. 1994:217ff.; Lijphart 1971), this project could not escape the general caveats of a single case study approach. Thus, the study remains limited in reaching generalizable conclusions (see Tellis 1997), and its analytical prism needs to be applied to other empirical cases in order to test its validity and usefulness.

One caveat that is more specific to the analytical framework presented here lies in the fact that its utility hinges on in-depth knowledge of the respective case, as the lens of regime standardization hardly lends itself to a large-N comparative study, not least because the standardization of rules can be achieved by rather different means. The execution of large-N studies with the aid of the regime prism is further impeded by the fact that the theoretical framework of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization is geared towards understanding processes rather than identifying and operationalizing clearly defined variables. And given that the processes under investigation are, in the context of state-(un)making, generally drawn-out ones, the study at hand also faces another limitation: the periods of state-making and state-breaking investigated here may well be too short to authoritatively determine the trajectories of states, which unfold over decades and centuries.

Remaining Questions

While this research project has shed light on a number of questions, it has left some unanswered and raised many more. One set of questions that remains for future research is how far the anti-Barre war in south-central Somalia in the late 1980s – and its subsequent continuation during the 1990s and even 2000s – effected institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, and why the levels of regime standardization in south-central Somalia were seemingly less pronounced than in the territory that came to be Somaliland. Although a number of potential reasons can be hinted at in this regard – amongst others the fact that southern rebel movements had a high leverage, that settlement and production patterns differed from those in northern Somalia, and that many more actors fought over higher-priced stakes – additional work is required to address this more contemporary comparative question, which is beyond the scope of the research presented here.
Similarly, the puzzle of why the SNM but not the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) effected a \textit{de facto} secession from Somalia and why the attempt to build a Rahanweyn State of Somalia did not show more progress remains unaccounted for by this thesis. Constituting the militant movement of the agricultural Sab communities in southern Somalia, the RRA fought for the interests of the Sab clans of the Digil, Rahanweyn and other minority groups, all of whom had been politically neglected for decades (Castagno 1964:532; Cassanelli 1996:17). Given that these groups had apparently been much less incorporated into the Somali state and, thus, much less standardized than the Isaaq of north-western Somalia, for example,\textsuperscript{676} this question is particularly pertinent when viewed through the analytical prism of regime standardization. In institutional and socio-cognitive terms, the Sab had probably about the most uniform and most delineated set of rules that should have facilitated the formation of alternative statehood. However, this did not happen – why?

\textit{Future Research Avenues}

One possible way to expand on the research presented here lies in either addressing the aforementioned ‘remaining questions’ or investigating the previously delineated ‘broader implications’ in greater detail. The former avenue could valuably be pursued in the framework of an in-depth study of regime trajectories in post-Barre south-central Somalia, as this would provide comparative empirical material that could contribute to a better understanding of why the state trajectories of north-west and south-central Somalia diverged so significantly. The latter route could, for example, give rise to a holistic investigation of the relationship between peace-building and state-making. In particular, additional research could focus on the effects historical and contemporary peace processes have exercised on respective projects of state-making. Hypothesizing that internationally negotiated (liberal) peace processes enhance rather than reduce regime plurality and, thus,

\textsuperscript{676} See e.g. the fact that only 12 per cent of the male population of the Bas-Jubba region participated in the courses offered by Barre’s literacy campaign of the mid-1970s, and that the Sab communities not only differed in cultural aspects from the pastoral Somali nomads, but also spoke a dialect (\textit{Af maay maay}) different from the official Somali tongue (Compagnon 1995:370). “The decision in 1972 to adopt a Latin orthography for Somali and to make Somali (that is, the language of the central and northern regions, known as \textit{Af-maxaad}) the official language of government and education further isolated \textit{Af-maay} speakers from the political mainstream” (Cassanelli 1996:17). Moreover, the Digil and Mirkiff party HDMS of the 1960s, had been judged the “only party completely established on a tribal basis” (Ware 1965:176).
handicap the stabilization and consolidation of post-war states, such research would be well-placed to shed additional light on the peace-building versus state-making conundrum.

Moreover, this research could be taken forward by extending the regime standardization prism to other cases in order to test its usefulness to better understand state-making trajectories. One obvious possible case study is Iraqi Kurdistan, which shares numerous features with the Somaliland case study presented here. As an alternative to extending the research to other cases, one could also think about shifting the analytical focus under investigation. In this sense, it could be worth addressing the question of how far, not war, but the presence or absence of industrialization has played a key role for the process of regime standardization in past and present state-making projects. This potential research stream could be guided by the hypothesis that the formation of a productive sector in Europe allowed political identities to form around interest groups, such as labour unions, rather than along ethnic or clan lines, thus facilitating the creation of overarching ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ that could act in a unifying rather than dividing way.677 Rather than arguing that the existence of a civil society is a precondition for democracy (Toernquist 1999:135), it could be proposed that it is rather the existence of political as opposed to clan identities that is a precondition for democratic development.

A final agenda item for future research to be sketched out here lies in refining the analytical framework of regime standardization. Guided by the overarching questions of how to assess degrees of standardization, future research could investigate what levels of institutional and socio-cognitive conformity need to be reached to make state-making a sustainable process. Apart from exploring the role national actors play in bringing about regime standardization, this research stream would also invite a closer analysis of the impact international actors and their past and present policies have had on supporting or impeding the standardization of common ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. Having acknowledged that state-making can valuably be understood as a process during the course of which a particular set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems is standardized across a geographically delineated population, the question arises concerning the conditions under which and how, the so-called ‘international community’ can effectively support processes of state-making in the 21st century.

677 See e.g. Diamond et al. (1995:43) according to whom the presence and even generation of cross-cutting cleavages is one of the means by which democracies “manage, soften, complicate, and contain conflict.”
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<td>02.08.2011</td>
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<td>Local member of staff of the United Nations; former official of the Presidency of the Government of Somaliland</td>
<td>Hargeysa</td>
<td>05.08.2011</td>
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Appendix

Chart 1: Clan Genealogy

Author's illustration, following Lewis 1961 and Hagi/Hagi 1998. Note: This chart of Somali clan genealogy is simplified and cannot portray the much more complex and disputed nature of ‘true’ Somali kinship genealogy.
Map 1: The Reserved Areas and the Ogadeen

Map 2: Colonial Partition and Ethnic Distribution of the Somali People

Map 3: Political Map Somalia

Map 4: Map of Somaliland

Map 5: Map of Customs and Inland Revenue Offices in Somaliland

Source: Base map: Survey Action Centre 2003; modifications by the author.