The London School of Economics and Political Science

Hegemony, Transformism and Anti-Politics: Community-Driven Development Programmes at the World Bank

Emmanuelle Poncin

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 99,559 words.

Statement of use of third party for editorial help

I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Patrick Murphy and Madeleine Poncin.
Abstract

This thesis scrutinises the emergence, expansion, operations and effects of community-driven development (CDD) programmes, referring to the most popular and ambitious form of local, participatory development promoted by the World Bank. On the one hand, this thesis draws on the writings of Antonio Gramsci to explore new ways of contextualising and understanding CDD programmes along the lines of hegemony and transformism, as promoting social stability and demobilising counter-hegemonic challenges under conditions of democratisation and decentralisation, in support of economic liberalisation. On the other hand, it scrutinises the performative operations of CDD discourse in producing, legitimising and reproducing interventions, along the lines of "anti-politics," inspired by the Foucauldian approaches of James Ferguson and Tania Li. It also examines the performances elicited by CDD discourse, which "hails" politicians as "progressive" leaders, and "interpellates" the population as an "empowered" and "civil" society.

Focusing on "Kalahi," the "flagship" CDD programme of the World Bank in the Philippines, in the "showcase" Province of Bohol, this research also reveals that CDD interventions, ostensibly designed to promote popular participation in local governance, have in practice worked to shore up the position of entrenched local machine politicians, and to undermine local peasant and fishermen's organisations mobilised to demand implementation of agrarian reform and legislation restricting large-scale fishing. Kalahi, the thesis further shows, was from the outset also intertwined with the expansion of agro-business and tourism ventures in the province, and with counterinsurgency operations. In parallel, Kalahi discourse has promoted new discursive styles of leadership, which have enabled local politicians to enhance their political clout and to reinforce their popular support base, whilst practices and institutions have remained essentially unchanged. Overall, this thesis thus shows that CDD programmes have worked to shore up hegemony in rural localities throughout the Philippines, and elsewhere across the developing world.
Contents

List of Figures and Tables .............................................................................................................. 7
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... 8
List of Acronyms .......................................................................................................................... 9

Chapter 1 – Introduction ............................................................................................................. 11
A New Paradigm in Local Development ....................................................................................... 11
CDD as Instrument of “Good Governance”?: The Liberal Communitarian View ...................... 14
Empirical Record .......................................................................................................................... 17
“Social Capital” and “Empowerment,” Revisited ......................................................................... 21
Anti-Politics Machine ................................................................................................................... 27
Hegemony and Transformism ...................................................................................................... 33
A Material-Discursive Analytical Framework of CDD Programmes ........................................... 39
Methodology and Data Sources .................................................................................................. 45
  Research Design and Methodology .......................................................................................... 45
  Scope and Limitations .............................................................................................................. 49
  Sources ..................................................................................................................................... 52
Thesis Overview ............................................................................................................................ 54

Chapter 2 – The Emergence and Rise of CDD Programmes Worldwide .............................. 56
Free Market and Oligarchical Democracies in the 1980s .......................................................... 59
Bringing the State back in: “Good Governance” in the early 1990s ............................................. 65
The Emergence of CDD Programmes: The Cases of Brazil and Mexico ................................. 72
  Mexico ....................................................................................................................................... 72
  Brazil ......................................................................................................................................... 78
Bringing Society Back in: “Civil Society” and “Empowerment” at the Bank ............................. 84
The Evolution and Expansion of CDD Programmes: Indonesia’s KDP and Beyond ............ 92
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 103

Chapter 3 – Kalahi in Philippine Oligarchical Democracy ..................................................... 108
Oligarchical Democracy ................................................................................................................. 117
Crisis and Transformist Responses ............................................................................................. 120
People Power II ............................................................................................................................. 127
The Emergence of Kalahi and the 2004 Elections .................................................................... 131
The Kalahi Vision .......................................................................................................................... 136
Expansion ..................................................................................................................................... 141
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 143

Chapter 4 – Bohol as Arena for Kalahi Intervention .................................................................. 148
Spanish Colonial Rule (1521-1898) ................................................................. 153
American Colonial Era (1898-1946) ............................................................... 156
Post-Independence Commercialisation of the Economy .................................. 161
Going Global .................................................................................................. 166
   Tourism ...................................................................................................... 168
   Agriculture ............................................................................................... 171
Local Growth Coalition .................................................................................. 174
Contestation, Containment and Counterinsurgency ......................................... 178
Conclusion ................................................................................................... 184

Chapter 5 – The “Enabled” Environment ......................................................... 188
   Kalahi Operations in Bohol: An Overview .................................................. 194
   The Rise of “Progressive” Leaders in the 1990s .......................................... 203
   The Aumentado Provincial Administration, 2001-2010 ............................. 206
   Electoral Domination and Development ................................................... 213
   Performing Kalahi in Bohol’s Municipalities ............................................. 216
   Counterinsurgency-led Development ......................................................... 224
   Conclusion ................................................................................................ 230

Chapter 6 – Institutional Interests, Priorities and Pressures at the World Bank and the Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development ........................................... 235
   The Lending Race ...................................................................................... 239
   “Organizational Need for Ignorance” at the Social Development Department .................................................. 242
   The Knowledge Bank ............................................................................... 250
   The Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development ............... 256
   Conclusion ................................................................................................ 265

Chapter 7 – Performing CDD at the World Bank: CDD Practitioners’ (Self-) Representations of CDD Programmes .......................................................... 269
   The Two Spheres of CDD Programmes ...................................................... 271
   Paradoxical Positions ............................................................................... 279
   Performed Representations ................................................................. 283
   Tailoring and Improving ........................................................................ 287
   A Fragile Edifice? ................................................................................... 291
   Conclusion ................................................................................................ 295

Chapter 8 – Conclusion .................................................................................. 298
   CDD Programmes as Instruments of Hegemony, Transformism and Anti-Politics ........................................... 298
   Revisiting the Argument ........................................................................... 302
   Hegemony and Development .................................................................. 315
   Contributions to Literature ...................................................................... 317
List of Figures and Tables

Table 1 – Top 12 CDD Programmes Financed by the World Bank Worldwide..........................99
Figure 1 – Provinces that Experienced Kalahi in 2003-2009..................................................109
Figure 2 – Illustration of the Kalahi “Story of Radical Change” Entitled “Peace Means
Walking the Same Road,” Province of Lanao del Norte, Northern Mindanao.........................140
Figure 3 – Illustration of the Kalahi “Story of Radical Change” Entitled “Our Town Folk
Pull off an Electrifying Victory,” Province of Siquijor, Central Visayas..............................140
Figure 4 – Municipalities that Experienced Kalahi in Bohol between 2003 and 2009........189
Table 2 – Poverty Incidence amongst Population (%) in Kalahi Municipalities, Bohol,
2003-2005..........................................................................................................................193
Figure 5 – “CDD Modalities in Local Institutional Environments”.................................289
Acknowledgements

To John Sidel, my supervisor, who has been incredibly patient and supportive throughout the past four years, and who has enabled me to turn my often unruly ideas into a PhD thesis through his many comments and suggestions, I am truly indebted and very grateful. Thanks also to Mathias Koenig-Archipugi, my advisor, for patiently reading my chapters, discussing them with me, and encouraging me to question and consolidate my arguments.

I am very grateful to all the people who have shared their experiences of development in Bohol with me, and to my Boholano friends, who made me feel at home during my stay there. Thanks also to the many people I met in Manila and in Cebu, in development organisations, government departments, universities, NGOs, and research institutes, for their insights on community-driven development in the Philippines, which have encouraged and inspired me during this research.

I am grateful to the people from World Bank offices in Manila and in Washington, D.C., for taking the time to answer my many questions on CDD programmes; their insights into the world of community-driven development in the Philippines and beyond have been crucial for this thesis.

Although in the past two years, I spent most of my time working from my kitchen table, I have not felt lonely, thanks to the many phone conversations with my grandmothers, Huguette and Jeanne, my aunts, Brigitte and Pascale, and my parents, which have helped me to keep abreast of all the latest family gossips. Patricia, my mother-in-law, and Neil, my brother-in-law, have also always been nearby to share a cup of coffee or redbush during a break.

I owe some of my best breaks to my brother, Nicolas, whose great movie advice has helped me to completely switch off, and remember that there is a world outside of my PhD. Throughout these four years, my father, Philippe, has been particularly good at letting me complain about my work, whilst my mother, Madeleine, has been my main reader and supporter.

Finally, to Nick, for sharing all the highs and lows of this PhD, for putting up with my dragonish moods, for coming almost half-way across the globe to share six months in the Philippines with me, and for making everything so much better: merci bb! And to Stella, for changing everything.
List of Acronyms

ADB  Asian Development Bank
AFP  Armed Forces of the Philippines
APCR  *Apoio às Pequenas Comunidades Rurais* (Support to Small Rural Communities)
BAMDECOR  Bohol Agro-Marine Development Corporation
BAYAN  *Bagong Alyansang Makabayan* (New Patriotic Alliance)
CBD  Community-based Development
CDD  Community-driven Development
CIDA  Canadian International Development Agency
COMELEC  Commission on Elections
CPP  Communist Party of the Philippines
DENR  Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DFID  Department for International Development
DRD  Decentralization and Regional Development
DSWD  Department of Social Welfare and Development
EDSA  *Epifanio de los Santos Avenue*
FARDEC  Farmers Development Center
FCB  First Consolidated Bank
FDN  *Frente Democrático Nacional* (National Democratic Front)
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GNP  Gross National Product
GOLD  Governance and Local Democracy
HUMABOL  *Hugpong sa mga Mag-uumang Bolanon* (Bohol Farmers’ Association)
IBDR  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA  International Development Association
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IPAG  Investment Promotion Advisory Group
JBIC  Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JICA  Japan International Cooperation Agency
KALAHI-CIDSS  *Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan* (Linking Hands in the Fight against Poverty)-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services
Kalahi OBAMA  KALAHI Operation for Barangay and Municipality Assistance
KCAF  KALAHI-CIDSS Additional Financing
KDP  Kecamatan Development Project
KMP  *Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas* (Peasant Movement of the Philippines)
KOICA  Korea International Cooperation Agency
Lakas-Kampi-CMD  Lakas (Strength)-Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (Partner of the Free Filipino)-Christian Muslim Democrats
Lakas-NUCD  Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats
LDP  Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (Fight of Democratic Filipinos)
MAKAMASA Bohol  Makusganong Kapunungan sa mga Gagmayung Mananagat sa Bohol (Federation of Small Fishermen in Bohol)
MCC  Millennium Challenge Corporation
MILF  Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MPDC  Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator
NEDA  National Economic Development Authority
NGO  Non-governmental Organisation
NPA  New People’s Army
NSCB  National Statistical Coordination Board
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OED  Operations Evaluation Department
OPLAN Bantay Laya  Operational Plan Bantay Laya (Freedom Watch)
PALM  Philippine Agricultural Land Development and Mill
PDI-P  Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
PDMS  Poverty Database and Monitoring System
PFL  Partido da Frente Liberal (Liberal Front Party)
PMDB  Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)
PO  People’s Organisation
PRI  Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party)
PRONASOL  Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (National Solidarity Program)
PT  Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)
R-NRDP  Reformulated Northeast Rural Development Program
SEARICE  Southeast Asia Regional Initiatives for Community Empowerment
UNICEF  UN Children’s Fund
USAFFE  United States Armed Forces Far East
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WTO  World Trade Organisation
Chapter 1 – Introduction

A New Paradigm in Local Development

Community-driven development (CDD) refers to the most popular and ambitious form of local, participatory development advanced by the World Bank (alongside other major development organisations) in the past two decades. CDD programmes allegedly promote four overarching, interrelated aims, namely (i) establishing “good governance,” broadly understood as the efficient delivery of public goods and services supported by a capable bureaucracy; (ii) “empowering” communities, referring to “the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives” (Narayan 2002, 14; emphasis in original); (iii) building “social capital” understood as “the norms and networks that enable collective action” (World Bank 2011f); and (iv) alleviating poverty. In theory, CDD programmes directly provide communities with resources, in the form of training, facilitation and information for them to prepare their own development project proposals in a participatory manner. Communities are then asked to compete over block grants to finance their proposals, and, if successful, to become responsible for implementing, managing, operating, monitoring and maintaining their projects, for which they receive further training and supervision, and must provide local contributions towards projects’ costs in cash and/or in kind.

The experience of CDD programmes is expected to increase community members’ skills, knowledge and access to information, and habituate them to collectively and consensually exercise control over resources and decision-making, following norms of participation, transparency, accountability and competition (Wong and Guggenheim 2005). These new assets and norms are expected to trigger individuals’ “capacity to aspire” (i.e. to envision that they can be active participants in local governance), enhance their “agency” and
“voice,” and “empower” them to actively participate in public affairs and hold their
government accountable (Alsop et al. 2006, 11-12; Appadurai 2004). CDD programmes
supposedly enhance the supply-side of governance, moreover, by building local government
officials’ policy-making and service-delivery capacities, fostering their “innovative” and
“progressive” potential and encouraging “synergistic” relationships between communities
and the state. In short, CDD programmes appear to have adopted a holistic approach to local
development, which promises to deliver “good governance” and “community empowerment”
in support of democratisation and decentralisation reforms throughout the developing world
(Wong and Guggenheim 2005; Chase and Woolcock 2005; Narayan 2002; World Bank 2003;
Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009b). In view of their exceptionally promising premises, CDD
programmes have been promoted as the alternative to top-down development (McCalla and
Ayres 1997), and have quickly been elevated to the status of a new paradigm in local,
participatory development at the World Bank (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009b).

Since their emergence at the World Bank in the 1990s, CDD programmes have
evolved and expanded at exceptional speed within and outside the World Bank. The approach
has rapidly gained the support of most major development organisations, including
multilateral banks such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), UN agencies such as the
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and bilateral development agencies
including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA), amongst many others. Most remarkable is the
speed at which the World Bank has scaled up CDD programmes, which emerged in the early
to mid-1990s in the form of a handful of programmes mostly implemented in Latin America,
before booming in the first decade of the new millennium, when the Bank channelled over
US$16 billion or nearly 10% of its total lending towards more than 600 CDD programmes in
over a hundred countries across the developing world (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010, 51).
The Bank has presented the rapid expansion of CDD programme across the developing world as a relatively straightforward enterprise, likened to that of a McDonalds’ franchise: it starts with small-scale field testing of a simple institutional model, follows with diagnostic and pilot phases for scaling up, to refine procedures, logistics and tools, and goes for “mass replication,” whilst reportedly still adapting the model to specific socio-economic contexts “just as McDonalds adapts burgers for different countries (in Japan it sells a teriyaki burger, in India a potato burger)” (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009a, 5). The rationale for such an expansion was formulated in terms of extending the benefits of CDD programmes as widely as possible, as CDD proponents at the World Bank have asserted that:

“We all are familiar with islands of success in community-driven development. These empower a few villages, urban neighborhoods, or producer organizations in a country. How wonderful if they could be scaled up to cover all communities in a province or nation!” (Binswanger-Mkhize and Aiyar 2009b, 47)

Despite such enthusiastic claims, it is striking that the rapid and far-reaching expansion of CDD programmes has taken place in the absence of conclusive empirical evidence on the operations and effects of these programmes on local governance, empowerment and social capital, as revealed by the close examination of CDD’s empirical record. This great paradox raises an important set of questions about CDD programmes: how and why did these programmes emerge at the World Bank in the early 1990s? How can we explain their exceptionally rapid and far-reaching expansion in the first decade of the twenty-first century? How do these programmes operate? What effects do they have on the communities and societies in which they unfold? Overall, how should we understand CDD programmes? These are the questions that this thesis addresses.
CDD as Instrument of “Good Governance”: The Liberal Communitarian View

The World Bank’s representation of CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance” – empowering communities and building social capital whilst also alleviating poverty – is strongly anchored in the intellectual tradition of Tocquevillean communitarianism, integrated within a mainstream liberal economic framework based on assumptions of methodological individualism and free market principles. As such, this representation finds a strong resonance with a large body of mainstream academic literature concerned with the role of civil society in democratic societies. This work has contended that civic engagement is the key to make democracy work, following the influential writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, the nineteenth century French aristocrat disillusioned by what he saw as the failure of the French democratic revolution to significantly shape the “laws, ideas, customs, and manners, [...] necessary to render such a revolution beneficial” (1848, 6). In his study of American democracy, Tocqueville celebrated civil society, the realm of voluntary citizen association, as the key to truly democratic societies. He depicted voluntary associations as governed by the rule of law, reason, and free will, and as promoting any aim that “the human will, seconded by the collective exertions of individuals,” hopes of attaining, in particular “public order, commerce, industry, morality, and religion” (ibid., 205). Tocqueville further proposed that through associational life, free and equal citizens learn democratic values and become “empowered,” by “learn[ing] voluntarily to help each other” (ibid., 115). Thus he viewed a vibrant civil society as a necessary condition for democratic societies to thrive, protected from both the “tyranny of the majority” and the tyranny of government, concluding that “in the end political institutions never fail to become the image and expression of civil society” (ibid., 203).

Over a century later, in the context of the “third wave” of democratisation (Huntingdon 1991) and the fall of the communist Eastern Bloc, the Tocquevillean proposition
that the quality and performance of democratic institutions mirror the “civicness” of the societies in which they operate inspired a large body of literature which identified a dense, vibrant, plural civil society as a prerequisite to (re)democratisation and democracy consolidation. For instance, American sociologist and political scientist Larry Diamond (1999) proposed that the likelihood of (re)democratisation and democratic consolidation is proportional to the vibrancy of civil society, which he presented as a pluralistic, market-oriented actor concerned with the promotion of democracy and of the public interest, and serving the dual role of restricting and legitimising state power by holding the state accountable to the rule of law. In turn, in their comparative study of democratic transition in South America and Southern, Eastern and Central Europe, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, professors of political science at Yale and Oxford University respectively, identified a “lively and independent civil society” as the first necessary condition for democratic consolidation, proposing that a “robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state can help [democratic] transitions get started, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and help deepen democracy” (1996, 9).

Taking a different approach in their study of civil society, high-profile social and political scientists in leading American universities have sought to determine and quantify features of social organisation that could enhance the effectiveness of societies, such as social norms (Coleman 1990) and social trust (Fukuyama 1996). One of the most influential articulations of the (quantifiable) link between the quality of democratic governance and the features of social organisation has been offered by Harvard professor Robert Putnam’s theory of social capital, of which CDD programmes have reportedly been the “largest operational manifestation” (Chase and Woolcock 2005, 2). Heavily influenced by Tocqueville’s ideas, Putnam proposed that the operation and performance of governance institutions reflect the
degree of “civicness” of societies, understood as citizens’ participation in public affairs, political equality, solidarity, trust, tolerance, and associational life (Putnam 1993, 87–90). For Putnam, civicness itself stems from social capital, defined as the “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (1993, 167). In Putnam’s view, membership in voluntary associations imparts their members with shared social norms and trust, as well as civic virtues of collaboration, collective action, and self-discipline, which are in turn expected to give rise to compelling, collective citizens’ demands for “good governance.” Hence the conclusion that “building social capital [...] is the key to making democracy work” (ibid., 185).

Building on Putnam’s work, others have sought to incorporate the state into theories of social capital. For instance, development scholars and practitioners have proposed that social capital that “spans the public-private divide” encourages government and civil society organisations to mutually support each other, as they become enmeshed through social networks, which reportedly produces “state-society synergy” and promotes “good governance” (Evans 1996a and 1996b; Woolcock and Narayan 2006; Tsai 2007). A large body of mainstream literature on participatory democracy has advanced similar arguments, proposing that to be effective as an agent of democratisation or democratic deepening, civil society must be supported by “reformist” and “progressive” government officials, who are both willing and able to open up participatory avenues in government and to meet societal demands for “good governance” (Herzer and Pirez 1991; Fox 1994; Fung 2002).

Viewed in the light of mainstream literature on civil society and participatory democracy, CDD programmes appear as sophisticated instruments of “good governance.” Indeed, the Bank has proposed that CDD interventions build social capital by (i) encouraging the formation of “community groups” and their participation in processes of resource allocation and decision-making; (ii) setting clear rules for collective and consensual decision-
making, promoting principles of transparency, accountability and broad-based participation inclusive of “vulnerable” groups, in particular “the poor;” and (iii) stimulating interactions and trust between the state and communities to foster “synergy” between the state and society, thus “creating the conditions that produce, recognize, and reward good governance” (Woolcock and Narayan 2006, 43). To further “empower” community members and stimulate their civicness, social capital accumulation is complemented by activities seeking to enhance their access to information and skills, and to habituate them to norms of participation, transparency, accountability and competition. Considered against the backdrop of liberal communitarian theories, CDD programmes must thus be understood as very promising instruments of “good governance,” which, in the words of a leading architect and supporter of the CDD approach at the World Bank, represent platforms where communities “learn about democracy by practicing it” (Guggenheim 2006, 138).

**Empirical Record**

Examining the evidence on CDD programmes’ operations and effects highlights the limitations of the approach. The scrutiny of CDD programmes’ empirical record of “good governance,” including “community empowerment” and social capital, reveals that evidence is scarce, largely anecdotal and decidedly inconclusive. Successive reviews of CDD programmes’ operations and impacts, conducted by World Bank staff and consultants, have pointed towards a conspicuous lack of evidence to back up claims that CDD programmes empower communities and improve local governance. For instance, in their review of programmes adopting a CDD approach or the closely-related community-based development (CBD) approach,¹ World Bank economists Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao highlighted that “not a single study establishes a causal relationship between any outcome and

---
¹ CBD is similar to the CDD approach, yet “gives communities less responsibility and emphasizes collaboration, consultation, or sharing information with them on project activities” (OED 2005, ix).
participatory elements of a CBD [or CDD] project,” further stressing the “dearth of well-designed evaluations of such project” (2004, 1; emphasis in original). In response to Mansuri and Rao’s alarming findings, World Bank staff attempted to conduct a meta-analysis of CDD impact evaluations, which was deterred by the low quality of existing evaluations (Wassenich and Whiteside 2004). This lack of solid evidence on the operations and effects of CDD programmes led the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (OED) to remark that the Bank “has lacked a comprehensive understanding of the evolution and scope of its work” in the area of CDD (2005, 49; emphasis in original). Two years later, Mansuri and Rao (2007) published an update on the state of evidence on the operations and impacts of CDD programmes, which pointed out that very little evidence had emerged since their first review, in 2004.

Moreover, the little evidence available on the operations and effects of CDD programmes in terms of governance, empowerment and social capital has proven largely inconclusive. For instance, empirical studies have suggested that “elite capture” of CDD processes and benefits has been frequent, and that CDD programmes have occasionally triggered violent struggles for control over development resources (Woodhouse 2002; Ponzzoni and Kumar 2005; Dasgupta and Beard 2007; Crost and Johnston 2010; Arcand et al. 2010). Evidence on the effects of CDD projects on collective action and social cohesion has also been contradictory and inconclusive. Research has indicated that whilst CDD programmes have appeared to stimulate social capital in some cases, they have disrupted existing social networks and have weakened local “capacities for collective action” in others (Wassenich and Whiteside 2004; Ponzzoni and Kumar 2005; Vajja and White 2008). In a similar vein, professionals at the World Bank and the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) have noted, drawing on research by professor of social anthropology David Mosse, that:
“Empowerment efforts from the bottom up, such as community driven development (CDD), can address real needs and are more inclusive than elite-dominated local governments. However, these interventions may limit poor people’s potential to enhance political capabilities by de-mobilizing them” (Alsop and Norton 2004, 8).

In their third and most recent review of the Bank’s participatory interventions, including CDD programmes, Mansuri and Rao thus concluded that:

“The evidence we do have, shows that participation has little effect on the exercise of voice or on community organized collective action outside the participatory project. Instead, some evidence points to a decline in collective activities outside the needs of the project” (2011, 68; emphasis in original).

In view of such a poor empirical record, professionals at the World Bank (and beyond) have largely held the view that “CDD rests on a commitment among local leaders to empowerment” (Poteete in World Bank 2003, 2). Illustrating this trend, several studies have proposed that CDD interventions have a positive effect as instruments of “good governance” only in better-off, “enabled” environments, where they can supposedly “support nascent or existing practices of good governance or community empowerment” (McLaughlin et al. 2007, xi; see also OED 2005a; McLean et al. 2005; World Bank 2009a). As remarked in the case of the Philippines, the adoption and institutionalisation of CDD principles to guide processes of decision-making and resource allocation in local governance is most likely to happen in places “where the mayor recognizes the value of community empowerment” (World Bank 2004a, paragraph 67), since “the expansion of opportunity spaces to incorporate participation, accountability and transparency can only be led by an LCE [local chief

2 More generally, since the late 1990s, the image of “progressive” leaders as key to development success has become a central element of the Bank’s discourse, as illustrated by the following remark by World Bank President James Wolfensohn: “A new generation of leaders is taking responsibility in developing countries. Many of these leaders are tackling corruption, putting in place good governance, giving priority to investing in their people, and establishing an investment climate to attract private capital. They are doing it in the private sector, in civil society, in government and in communities. They are doing it not because they have been told to. But because they know it is right” (Wolfensohn in Cornwall and Brock 2005, 3; emphasis in original).

3 As more crudely expressed by a senior urban specialist at the World Bank Institute in Washington, D.C.: “At the end of the day, some places operate better because they are better, there is a better context here. Some places operate worse because their contexts are not conducive to “good governance” and empowerment” (IV43).
executive] who is willing to “share power”” (DSWD-DILG 2009, 23). The influence of this argument within the Bank has been increasingly reflected in the deployment of CDD programmes, whose expansion in localities across the developing world has often become conditional upon local leaders’ performances. Thus CDD programmes have been used as rewards for “progressive” politicians who appear to be “genuinely committed to shifting power to the grassroots” (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009a, 9), by offering them the opportunity to “not only get bigger budgets but also build reputations and advance their political careers” (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009b, 155).

The causal link between local leaders’ “progressiveness” and the quality of governance is strongly supported by a branch of mainstream literature on decentralisation and democratisation, which has explained local governments’ performances in terms of the character or agency of local government officials (Rodrik 1996; Grindle 2007; von Luebke 2009). For instance, Harvard professor of international development Merilee Grindle found that the main determinant of local governments’ performance was the individual leadership of local government officials, understood as their “[i]deas, leadership skills and the strategic choices made to promote a reform agenda” (2007, 11), as well as their “commitments, personality, persistence, and political networks” (ibid., 171). However, the conclusion that local leaders’ “vision” or “reform-mindedness” is the main determinant of CDD programmes’ operations and effects in communities across the developing world has been formulated intuitively, rather than on the basis of solid empirical evidence.

Taking a different approach to explain the poor empirical record of CDD programmes, others at the World Bank have highlighted that since villages or communities are not egalitarian and socially-homogenous entities,

---

4 For a critical discussion of the representation of local politicians as “heroes of reform” in development discourse, see, for example, Buehler (2012).
“it cannot be assumed that community-driven approaches to development will *per se* increase the possibilities for broader-based participation in political, social and economic processes [...] in certain instances, they may exacerbate the exclusion of locally disempowered groups from access to public decision-making processes and public resources” (Bebbington, Dharmawan et al. 2004, 201).

In a similar vein, the OED evaluation of the World Bank’s portfolio of CDD programmes concluded that:

“In the end, the Bank should be aware that it is largely trying to use a single financial channel— project financing—to bring about changes in empowerment and social capital, which are affected by a long history of social, cultural, and political forces embedded in the societies in which the Bank is trying to support development. [...] when the Bank tries to initiate empowerment and enhance social capital through CBD/CDD projects, it is often not enough—or can even be counterproductive if the better-off sections of the community gain more than the less-well-off” (OED 2005a, xiv).

These remarks point towards more fundamental shortcomings of CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance,” whose roots can be traced back to Tocqueville’s view of civil society as the egalitarian terrain where participatory democracy is produced and guaranteed.

**“Social Capital” and “Empowerment,” Revisited**

According to some very visible proponents of CDD programmes at the World Bank, the CDD approach has marked the reintroduction of a long-absent awareness of social structures, politics, power, and culture in local development interventions. It supposedly reflects the Bank’s recognition that issues of community development cannot be regarded as “*technical* problems,” and allegedly represents a move “away from a construct that sees projects as something that delivers a particular product and towards a model that sees projects as a way to trigger and support a process that helps villagers solve self-identified development problems” (Guggenheim 2006, 126; emphasis in original). These claims have
been challenged by a large body of critical literature that has carefully analysed the key CDD concepts of empowerment, civil society and social capital, highlighting their underlying apolitical, decontextualised and sanitised quality (Jenkins 2001, Cornwall and Eade 2010), which has been inherited from Tocqueville’s treatment of civil society in the early nineteenth century.

In his study of the nineteenth-century United States, Tocqueville sought and reportedly saw the “image of democracy itself” (1848, 13), identifying the “general equality of conditions” as the most striking and fundamental characteristic of American society (ibid., 1). Tocqueville’s assumption of egalitarian, classless society has largely persisted, often unacknowledged, in mainstream academic writings on civil society and social capital at the turn of the twenty-first century. Thus, armed with horizontal modelling of the social world, divided into communities endowed with greater or lesser stocks of social capital and greater or lesser levels of empowerment, mainstream development scholars have identified the root causes of “underdevelopment” as “incorrect” social organisation and “deficient” individual agency. They have depicted civil society as a unified terrain representing the shared interests of “the people,” where social capital is used to counterbalance the power of the state, and, if necessary, to rise in defence of democracy.

Assumptions of horizontally-structured societies peopled by utility-maximising agents have led Putnam to postulate that “poor governance” largely results from “dilemmas of collective action” – when imperfect information or externalities lead rational individuals, who would be better off if they resorted to collective action, to act alone and selfishly. As  

---

5 In this context, an externality is understood as an “uncompensated interdependency,” which arises “whenever the behavior of a person affects the situation of other persons without the explicit agreement of that person or persons” (Buchanan in Kollock 1998, 188).

6 This postulate is based on the logic of a handful of classic parables in game theory, such as the classic tragedy of the commons, where herders who are granted unlimited access to an open, communal pasture are all compelled by their individual rationality to increase their herds and to allow unlimited grazing for their animals to maximise their profit, which eventually leads to over-grazing, depletes the common resource and affects the livelihood of all (in Putnam 1993, 163-165).
social capital allegedly stimulates flows of information, as well as social trust and norms of cooperation, it supposedly allows individuals to overcome these dilemmas and to become part of a vibrant civil society, which is, according to Putnam and others, key to “good governance” and democracy. However, this set of propositions is only theoretically valid if it is built upon an assumption of classless, egalitarian societies ruled by market laws.

When dimensions of power, politics, inequality and contestation are reintroduced in the analysis, the chain of causation outlined above crumbles, as heterodox analysts have shown. Most notably, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1980) showed that when adopting a vertically-structured model of analysis, where individuals are solidly anchored to their respective social positions, and where practices are influenced by social milieux, social capital reinforces existing social structures by reaffirming relations of domination between members of different social classes. He proposed that individuals use their social capital, understood as social relationships and networks, to serve their own, private interests and to obtain benefits, within the boundaries delimited by their social positions (ibid.). In other words, social capital reaffirms individual’s social positions, reinforcing both the dominance of the more powerful and the low status of the subaltern classes.

In turn, John Harriss warned us that in the World Bank’s discourse, “social capital” has taken the quality of “buzz-word,” often deployed alongside “civil society,” “participation,” and “empowerment” to create an “attractive” yet “deceptive” discourse, which has been “used to veil the nature and the effects of power, and [...] hold out the prospects of democracy (in ‘civil society’) without the inconveniences of contestational politics and of the conflicts of ideas and interests that are an essential part of democracy” (2002, 118). Such ideas are dangerous, Harriss further argued, as they essentially justify the shift of burden for welfare provision from the state to society, and thus rationalise cuts in social public expenditures aligned with free market theories advocating a minimal state and
market expansion (ibid.; see also Cornwall 2010). In turn, Ben Fine (1999, 2001, and 2003) has explored theories of social capital inspired by Putnam’s writings, which have gained prominence at the World Bank and in mainstream development studies. Fine has shown that adopting an all-encompassing, ill-defined notion of social capital has enabled the Bank to treat societies and governments as imperfect markets to correct, remarking that:

“Social capital is truly analytically barbaric, not least because it is parasitic. It takes existing literature and its corresponding concepts. It strips them of their complexities, diversities and traditions. It reconstructs them in its own bland image” (2003, 598).

As both Fine and Harriss concluded, social capital has no demonstrable link with the quality of governance, or with civicness and democracy.

These insights help us to make sense of the wealth of evidence challenging the causal link between social capital and the quality of governance. For instance, empirical studies have found that strong ties between communities and state representatives form a fertile ground for corruption, clientelism and rent-seeking (Matin and Hulme 2003; Putzel 2000; Dasgupta and Beard 2007). They have identified trust and reciprocity as the basis of political patronage, enabling politicians to tightly control their constituencies, directly or through brokers, and encouraging “elite capture” and corruption (Matin and Hulme 2003; Auyero 2000). Empirical research has also highlighted that citizens’ capacity for collective action is often used to advance personalistic rather than civic interests. For instance, in her recent study of local governments in Mexico, Grindle concluded that whilst citizens have a great capacity to organise and petition their governments, they mostly use it to extract resources for their private gain, rather than to demand “good governance” (2007, 124–143).

In turn, the conception of empowerment as agency-building, equipping individuals with new assets in the form of enhanced skills, experience, information and civic values, is

---

7 For Fine (2001), the rise of the concept of social capital in its liberal communitarian form is symptomatic of the colonisation of social science by economics, marking the heyday of “economic imperialism.”
based on the assumption that issues of “non-participation,” “voicelessness” and “powerlessness” stem mainly, if not solely, from a deficit of agency. However, analyses of the interplay between social structures and individuals’ political practices and cognition have highlighted that “non-participation” is rooted in the pervasive influence of unequal social structures. Bourdieu (1984) captured the rootedness and resilience of social inequalities, and the constitutive effect of power relations on individuals’ practices and representations, through the concept of *habitus*, which refers to the matrix of accumulated predispositions, understandings and judgements shaped by individuals’ social milieu, through which individuals encounter the social world. In a similar vein, Stephen Lukes (2005) attempted to go beyond Robert Dahl and the pluralists’ view of power as exercised in situations of open decision making, and beyond the more critical view of power as exercised in “creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process” (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 948). Lukes proposed that power is fundamentally exercised in shaping individuals’ “perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial” (2005, 28). These analyses have concurred in highlighting that individuals’ choices and preferences, and their level of political engagement, are not simply function of their asset endowments, but instead are strongly anchored in hierarchical and resilient social structures. Thus, as Saba Mahmood remarked, agency cannot be simply understood as “capacity for action,” but must be qualified as “a capacity for action that specific relations of *subordination* create and enable” (2001, 210; emphasis in original).

---

8 Lukes’ conception of power was developed by John Gaventa (1980), through his empirical study of quiescence and rebellion in the Central Appalachians.
The disregard for the strength, resilience and stickiness of social inequalities by CDD promoters and by theorists of empowerment has led one observer to note that “[f]or the new conception of empowerment emerging in development thought, the idea of power has proven remarkably difficult to digest” (Drydyk 2008, 5). When reintroducing the notion of power as inhering not only in individuals’ agency, but also in resilient, hierarchical, vertical social structures that are not easily amenable to intervention without a restructuring of social and economic relations, empowerment becomes a “radical project of social transformation” (Luttrell et al. 2007, 3). It must be understood as a challenge to existing power structures through political struggles, rather than a smooth programmatic exercise orchestrated by international development organisations and governments themselves. Against this backdrop, one observer echoed Harriss’ remark on social capital, noting that empowerment has been “skilfully co-opted by conservative and even reactionary political ideologies in pursuit of their agenda of divesting ‘big government’ (for which read: the welfare state) of its purported power and control by ‘empowering’ communities to look after their own affairs” (Batliwala 2007, 558).

In short, the representation of CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance” does not only suffer from empirical weaknesses, but also from important theoretical shortcomings and problems, insofar as it overlooks dimensions of power, politics, inequality and contestation. As such, CDD discourse’s constative dimension, the passive communication of meanings and presentation of facts that can be true or false (Yurchak 2006, 19), is flawed. Yet discourse is not only a passive instrument of communication. It is understood, following Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, as a structured system of meanings, representations, positions, and relations, which inevitably modifies the identity of its objects, as their meaning is not given a priori (2001, 107–108). This definition signals that
discourse is performative: it actively produces meaning and, in so doing, affects the social world (Yurchak 2006, 19) in ways that this thesis sets out to explore.

**Anti-Politics Machine**

Another way to understand the World Bank’s CDD programmes is to situate them within the context of what scholars have described as “development discourse.” Drawing upon the writings of Michel Foucault, a growing body of literature has scrutinised and deconstructed development discourse, to uncover the effects of power in the particular set of representations conveyed by this discourse (Ferguson 1990; Escobar 1995; Parpart et al. 2002; Li 2007; Cornwall and Eade 2010). Here, the writings of anthropologists James Ferguson (1990) and Tania Li (2007) offer particularly valuable insights into the performative dimension of development discourse and its characteristic obliviousness to elements of power, inequality and contentious politics. Li and Ferguson have proposed that development discourse must be understood as a practice deployed to order arenas for intervention, so as to render interventions “intelligible” and possible. Ferguson analysed the specific operations of development discourse in reshaping countries selected for development intervention to fit a standardised model of “less developed country.” He showed how countries came to be represented as traditional and predominantly agricultural economies, endowed with a geography (determining local resources) but no history or politics, with a state as “an apolitical tool for delivering social services and agricultural inputs and engineering economic growth,” and with a people with backwards attitudes and values (1990,

---

9 See also della Faille (2011) for a review of discourse analysis in development studies.
10 Recognising and scrutinising the performativity of discourse enables us to address an important criticism of development discourse analyses, which is that such analyses might misrepresent the practices and knowledge of development practitioners, by preying on easy examples of rhetorical exaggerations or mistaking political discourse produced to attract donors for the discourse of all development practitioners (Olivier de Sardan 2001, 733–734). Although official development discourse might not necessarily reflect the private views and practices of “development experts,” such criticism misses the crucial point that this discourse performs operations that directly affect the social world, independently from the intentions of the speaker and from the veracity of the discourse’s constative dimension.
In the words of Ferguson, development discourse is deployed to represent the field to be developed (whether a country, a region, a province or a village) as “an enormously promising candidate for the only sort of intervention a “development” agency is capable of launching: the apolitical, technical “development” intervention” (ibid., 69). In so doing, discourse “orders the “conceptual apparatus” within which interventions become intelligible (ibid., 275).

Building on Ferguson’s study, Li referred to this process as “rendering technical,” which she defined, following Nikolas Rose, as representing the development arena as:

“an intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics...defining boundaries, rendering that within them visible, assembling information about that which is included and devising techniques to mobilize the forces and entities thus revealed” (Rose in Li 2007, 7).

Arenas for intervention have thus been represented as bounded social entities characterised by variables that can supposedly be quantified, rationalised, remodelled, corrected, and optimised, in the context of development interventions, so as to render interventions “intelligible” and possible (Li 2007, 7). In identifying barriers to development and rendering them technical, development discourse has enabled the World Bank and other development agencies to treat complex social issues as technical, quantifiable variables to be built when absent, reshuffled when misplaced, and freed when constrained.

A crucial insight stemming from Ferguson’s study is that development discourse has the effect of “depoliticizing both poverty and the state,” discharging objects of intervention from any tension that might arise from considerations of social structures or material bases of

---

11 Ferguson aptly remarked that “[i]n its extreme forms, “development” discourse sometimes speaks as if the problem of poverty is all in the head – as if impoverished villagers could escape their condition by a simple change of attitude or intellectual conversion” (1990, 58).
12 Ferguson further noted that: “An analysis that suggests that the causes of poverty [...] are political and structural (not technical and geographical), that the national government is part of the problem (not a neutral instrument for its solution), and that meaningful change can only come through revolutionary social transformation [...] has no place in “development” discourse simply because “development” agencies are not in the business of promoting political realignments or supporting revolutionary struggles” (1990, 69).
power (Ferguson 1990, 256). In the case of CDD programmes, such a process has enabled the Bank to widen dramatically the realm of its interventions, in the name of “good governance,” empowerment and civil society, laying claims on communities as new, “depoliticised” arenas to “correct” and “improve” through CDD interventions, as chapters to come will attempt to show. A further effect of development discourse identified by Ferguson, arising from representations of technical, a-political development projects and arenas for intervention, is that “a “development” project can end up performing extremely sensitive political operations involving the entrenchment or expansion of institutional state power almost invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one can object” (ibid.). These effects are what Ferguson termed “the anti-politics machine.”

Ferguson and Li’s Foucauldian analyses thus offer a particularly promising avenue to analyse CDD discourse, which has been deployed to represent arenas for intervention, and to examine the indirect effects of such representations on power relations outside the development apparatus. Yet, Ferguson and Li’s accounts provide no explanation for the emergence of development discourse, in terms of the specific institutional context in which it emerged, or for shifts in such discourse. Moreover, Ferguson’s analysis offers little insight that would help us to make sense of the political operations and effects of CDD programmes as material resources, and as discourse directly deployed in localities, notably to habituate its recipients to particular norms, values, positions, and relations (rather than ordering arenas for intervention), both of which affect social practices and social relations, as this thesis will attempt to show. Ferguson further suggested that the political effects of development discourse simply “turn out in the end to have a kind of political intelligibility” (Ferguson

---

13 Richard Rottenburg further noted that the representations conveyed through development discourse are “implemented and thus institutionalized as valid versions of the world,” and as such “play a constitutive role in defining the world and the practices thereby legitimated” (2009, xxx).

14 In contrast, Li acknowledges such operations and effects in her analysis of CDD programmes. She proposes that these are best understood along the lines of Foucauldian governmentality, as “conducting the conduct” of the residents of localities which experienced CDD programmes (2007, 267), as further explored in Chapter 2.
1990, 20), a proposition which does not fully account for the dynamics behind the production of specific political effects, and of the narratives that they become wrapped in.

Anthropologists of development have pointed towards these weaknesses of Foucauldian analyses of development discourse. In particular, they have highlighted that such analyses:

“overlook[...] the collaboration and complicity (or duplicity) of marginal actors/institutions in development such as the “consumer practices” (de Certeau 1984) of “beneficiaries who understand and manipulate the rhetorics, rules, and rewards of aid delivery; or the “recipient strategies” of locally powerful state actors who entrench their authority behind subservience to neoliberal donor paradigms” (Lewis and Mosse 2006b, 4).

In other words, Foucauldian analyses have not paid sufficient attention to the ways in which discourse is enacted of performed locally. To overcome these limitations, anthropologists of development have proposed to develop a “methodological deconstructivist” approach which seeks to better understand the relationship between policy models and the practices and material outcomes they give rise to; and to uncover how policy ideas (or discourse) work to enrol supporters and to negotiate and produce common development meanings (Lewis and Mosse 2006a).15

The methodological deconstructivist approach is largely informed by the actor-oriented theory, whose aim is to build “an ethnographic understanding of the “social life” of development projects—from conception to realization—as well as the responses and lived experiences of the variously located and affected social actors” (Long in Lewis and Mosse 2006b, 9). As such, methodological deconstructivists seek to uncover processes of producing and negotiating development meanings, placing a particular emphasis on the role of “brokers” or actors “operating at the “interfaces” of different world views and knowledge systems” (Lewis and Mosse 2006b, 10); and on the process of “translation,” understood as

15 See also Olivier de Sardan (2004), who refers to this approach as “methodological interactionism.”
“an act of performative omission and addition” which “establisizes a relation and mediates between multiple elements and makes them compatible and comparable” (Rottenburg 2009, xxxi).

The methodological deconstructivist approach also focuses on the social processes of production and reproduction of development discourse, whose stability and authoritative nature depend on the ability to enrol a wide range of supporters – by tying their interests to specific representations – who will confirm the validity of such discourse (Mosse 2004, 646). In turn, these social processes of production and reproduction of development discourse are identified as the main determinant of the relative “success” of development policies and projects such as CDD (Latour in ibid.), insofar as “power lies in the narratives that maintain an organization’s definition of the problem [...] —that is, success in development depends upon the stabilization of a particular interpretation” (ibid.). Thus methodological deconstructivists conclude that in practice, development unfolds not in line with development discourse but in "a messy free-for-all in which processes are often uncontrollable and results uncertain" (Lewis and Mosse 2006b, 9).

This thesis, by contrast, focuses attention on those recurring patterns and regularities of development discourse and practice which are observable, and which suggest more structurally determined dynamics in the workings of CDD programmes. Departing from both an exclusively Foucauldian and discourse-centred approach and the methodological deconstructivist approach outlined above, this thesis seeks to identify the causal links that can account for the operations and effects of CDD programmes on the power dynamics of the local contexts in which they are deployed. This is not to suggest that these operations and effects are conscious or intentional, but rather that they follow a certain structural logic that must be brought to light. To understand the structural logic underlying the deployment of CDD programmes, and their effects in drawing “local” people outside the development
industry into their orbit, this thesis turns to theories developed by Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci’s writings are particularly useful to understand CDD programmes’ Tocquevillean claims to stimulate the rise of civic, empowered and well-governed communities in a new light, as they place dimensions of power, politics, inequality and contestation at the centre of the analysis of civil society.

Before turning to examine Gramsci’s key concepts of hegemony and transformism, which are central to this thesis, it is important to note that Foucault and Gramsci belong to the very different intellectual traditions of post-structuralism and Marxism. As such, their respective conceptions of power, practice, human agency and consent offer much contrast, and may, at times, be viewed as conflicting (and rightly so). Yet, many have pointed out that when combined in a common frame of analysis, elements of Gramsci and Foucault’s respective theories may be combined to offer a rich and sophisticated analytical perspective (Cocks 1989; Laclau and Mouffe 2001). For instance, whilst Foucault’s writings offer rich insights on the effects of power at play in sets of representations conveyed by discourse – as captured in his concept of “power/knowledge” – his notion of power “pays little attention to the structural conditions under which power effects are produced in people” (Layder in Olssen 1999, 91). In contrast, Gramscian analyses focus on the structural sources of power, which opens up avenues to analyse the operations and effects of non-discursive practices and material resources, alongside discursive practices. A related point is that whilst Foucault proposed that “power is everywhere” and “comes from everywhere” (1998, 63), Gramsci offered a clearer articulation of the relation between agency and structure, i.e. of how social contexts shape the practices and representations of diverse social groups, as elaborated throughout this thesis.

Another particularly salient divergence between Foucault and Gramsci relates to their respective conceptualisation of consent. Whilst consent is central to Gramsci’s notion of
hegemony, the distinction between consent and coercion is not decisive for Foucault, who (much like Bourdieu) saw the constitution of subjects as an effect of power – which, whether exercised through coercion or consensus, he viewed as essentially a “set of actions upon other actions” (Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 789). By adopting an understanding of consent, the basis of hegemony, as an effect of power itself, this thesis proposes that Foucauldian insights on the workings of discourse can be deployed alongside a Gramscian understanding of the structural logic guiding the deployment of CDD programmes (as discourse and as resources), to yield a rich, multi-layered understanding of CDD programmes. Overall, although bringing together Foucault and Gramsci remains a highly contentious enterprise, this thesis hopes to show that both analyses offer particularly useful and often complementary understandings which help to shed light on CDD programmes in the Philippines and elsewhere.

**Hegemony and Transformism**

In stark contrast to Tocqueville, who depicted civil society as counterbalancing the power of the state and representing the general interest, Gramsci depicted civil society as the sphere of struggle for hegemony, understood as “the “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group,” enabling the dominant bloc to exercise “political, moral, and intellectual leadership” (Gramsci 1971, 12). In Gramsci’s writings, whilst the state is the realm of “direct domination” enforced through coercive means, civil society is the realm of “hegemony.” of domination over meaning, the articulation of interests, and modes of social reproduction (ibid.). In other words, civil society complements (if it is not even part of of\textsuperscript{16}) the state as the domain which “operates without “sanctions” or compulsory “obligations”, but nevertheless

\textsuperscript{16} Although Gramsci established a clear distinction between civil society and the state, in terms of their respective roles and organisation, he occasionally presented civil society as part and parcel of the “State,” as the kernel of hegemony “protected by the armour of coercion” of political society (Gramsci 1971, 263).
exerts a collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality, etc” (ibid., 142).

Gramsci’s writings have served to contextualise the World Bank, alongside other actors, from states and political parties to associations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as embedded within a broad “transnational dominant bloc” of social forces and interests (e.g. Cox 1987; Robinson 1996 and 2003). William I. Robinson, for example, highlighted that from the 1970s onwards, the “accelerated concentration of capital and economic power around the transnational capitalist class” gave rise to new transnational elites, whose interests have been tied to the global (rather than national) economy, and who “became hegemonic within the vast majority of countries in the world and began to transform their countries” (2003, 40–42). As a result, Robinson noted, “[n]ational states, once captured by these transnational groups, internalize the authority structures of global capitalism; the global is incarnated in local social structures and processes” (ibid., 41). In this context, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), amongst others, have been understood as the “institutional agents” of transnational capital, whose operations have indirectly enabled transnational elites to “penetrate and restructure national states” (ibid., 45–46) and localities throughout the developing world.

Against this backdrop, scholars of the “Italian school” of international relations and international political economy have proposed that the operations of international organisations such as the World Bank must be understood along the lines of hegemony promotion (Krasner 1985; Augelli and Murphy 1988; Cox 1993; Wade 2002; Peet 2003; Goldman 2005). For instance, Robert W. Cox identified five hegemonic functions of international organisations:

“(1) they embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they
ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries and (5) they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas” (1993, 62).

Examining the IMF and the World Bank, Robert Wade has shown that these international organisations clearly meet the first two hegemonic characteristics identified by Cox. In particular, Wade (1996, 2001 and 2002) represented the World Bank as an instrument and product of U.S. hegemony, whose role has largely been to promote U.S. free market ideology and foreign policy interests throughout the developing world.

In turn, Michael Goldman’s analysis of the World Bank’s “green neoliberal” policies and interventions focuses on the last three hegemonic functions that Cox listed. Goldman examined the extent and ways in which the World Bank itself exercised hegemony, understanding the organisation as:

“a productive agent maintained through its interactions in multiple sites (from MIT’s economics department to Wall street investment firms and Cargill’s agro-industrial goods division in the United States, to rural research institutes, fertile fields, and the agro-industry sector in India), enabling a diverse set of elite projects, with deeply exploitative effects” (2005, 12).

He showed that the World Bank has relied on its knowledge production activities to mobilise consent and create “global consensus” on policy areas such as water privatisation, which have been discursively promoted as “pro-poor,” yet have been deeply rooted in the political and economic interests of “the world’s largest firms and dispersed comprador classes eager to be part of this new wave of development capital investment” (2007, 796). As a result, Goldman concluded, “the shocking tragedy that much of the world lacks access to affordable and clean water is an image that may create new opportunities in the business of development but may have little to do with ultimately quenching those basic needs” (ibid., 797). Goldman’s analysis thus highlighted that the World Bank’s discourse and knowledge production activities have been rooted in “very real political-economic interests” (ibid., 795), reminding
us that although hegemony has been frequently (mis)interpreted as referring solely to the domain of culture, ideas and beliefs (Crehan 2002), it is rooted in both the discursive and material realms.

Gramsci’s writings signal that “consent,” which is understood in this thesis as an effect of power (as noted above), may be engineered through direct domination over social, economic and political processes, as well as through domination over meaning, preferences and perceptions. Such an insight is particularly useful to analyse the operations and effects of CDD programmes in at least three ways. First of all, an understanding of hegemony as rooted in both the discursive and material realms enables us to analyse the deployment of CDD programmes’ material resources through clientelistic channels in terms of hegemony promotion. Indeed, the clientelistic incorporation of the broad mass of the population has been shown to participate in producing and reproducing elites’ hegemonic positions (Fox 1994; Auyero 2000; Sives 2002). For example, Amanda Sives’ study of political clientelism in Jamaica showed that elites use clientelism to maintain their hegemonic position, through the distribution of economic incentives to elicit consent, and through “political inclusion through clientelist ties,” which “can alleviate some of the negative consequences of economic and social exclusion by providing a sense of belonging, identity, and hope” (2002, 70; see also Güneş-Ayata 1994).

Secondly, viewed in the light of Gramscian theory, CDD programmes’ endeavour to strengthen civil society and to promote social capital, “good governance” and empowerment, without modifying existing patterns of economic and political power distribution, can be seen as an attempt to strengthen the hegemonic position of the transnational dominant bloc. In particular, by deploying material resources in villages that are often characterised by highly unequal power structures, without altering these structures (concentrating instead on forming “community groups” and fostering social ties and collective action), CDD resources are
likely to be channelled towards the interests and priorities of local elites, rather than those of the broad mass of the population. Furthermore, Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke highlighted that by overlooking the element of power, and by representing “‘the local’ as a harmonious community” from which a consensual view of local problems and solutions could and should be extracted, participatory development strategies risk reproducing social inequalities and empowering “powerful vested interests” that dominate development procedures and operations (2000, 253).

Thirdly, CDD programmes’ endeavour to diffuse and promote market norms of participation, transparency, accountability and competition, which are amongst the core values of the dominant bloc, in localities throughout the developing world, appears as an attempt to “create and maintain a social consensus around the interests of the dominant power structures, which in the twenty-first century are encased in and are functional to the neo-liberal world order” (Leal 2010, 94). Furthermore, the diffusion of these norms in the name of “community empowerment” has a particularly strong resonance with the concept of transformismo or “transformism,” a process identified by Gramsci as the “gradual but continuous absorption” of radical pressures by dominant social forces, to prevent, defuse, or demobilise counter-hegemonic challenges (Gramsci 1971, 58–59).

Indeed, CDD discourse has been characterised by the absorption of a lexicon of participation and empowerment, which has been traditionally associated with radical, Marxist-inspired discourse, into the dominant discourse of the World Bank. By appropriating these notions – whilst modifying their “chains of equivalence,” meanings and goals – the Bank has borrowed a popular discourse endowed with an aura of morality and righteousness that “place[s] the sanctity of its goals beyond reproach” (Cornwall 2010, 2). Viewed through Gramscian analytical lenses, this appropriation of the language of radical critics appears as an
attempt to domesticate, channel and absorb counter-hegemonic challenges within the ambit of the dominant bloc, and to promote transformism and hegemony through a process:

“whereby the values of the ruling culture – in this case, the captains of the Development Industry – capture the ideology, self-understanding, and organisations of the working class – in this case, those whose lives are most significantly affected by international development policies and by the ministrations of development assistance” (Eade 2010, viii).

In this regard, it is important to note that to fulfil its potential as instrument of hegemony and transformism, CDD discourse must be “enacted” by its subjects, so as to act upon their perceptions and preferences and thus elicit their “consent,” the basis of hegemony. To do so, CDD discourse “hails” the broad mass of the population as “empowered” individuals who are part of a thriving civil society, and “interpellates” local politicians as “progressive” and “reformist” leaders. In so doing, CDD discourse succeeds or not in triggering “recognition by the interpellated subject” (Purvis and Hunt 1993, 482). Such recognition is expressed in the interpellated subject’s performance, which is understood, following Judith Butler, as a “ritualized production, and ritual reiteration” (1993, 95). In this sense, performance does not imply an insincere or disingenuous act involving dissimulation, but rather refers to “what enables a subject and constitutes the temporal conditions for the subject” (ibid.). Bourdieu further proposed that the performative strength of discourse, its “efficacy” in triggering recognition and desired performances, resides in the “institutional conditions of [its] production and reception” (1991, 111). The chapters to come will thus scrutinise the institutional conditions of production and reception of CDD discourse, seeking

17 Echoing this argument, Harriss remarked that through its discourse of participation and empowerment, the World Bank promotes participation without contestation, rather than democracy (2002, 118).
18 On the discursive level, transformism can thus be understood as the process of discursive absorption of the language of radical critics in the dominant discourse, deployed to rearticulate the interests of diverse social groups in order to promote demobilisation and shore up hegemony.
19 The process of interpellation was described by Louis Althusser (e.g. Althusser 1994), building on the work of Jacques Lacan, and was extended and refined by Judith Butler, Slavoj Žižek and Ernesto Laclau, amongst others.
to identify what, in these contexts, can account for the operations and effects of CDD discourse.

A last, crucial point to highlight here is that a Gramscian analysis of civil society directs attention towards specific conjunctures of “contested hegemony” or “crises of hegemony.”²⁰ These crises occur at times when “long-term changes in socioeconomic structures surface in immediate political realignments” (Hedman 2006, 7), and call for reasserting the hegemonic position of the dominant bloc by carrying the process of transformism “into the zone of civil society” (ibid., 18). Eva-Lotta Hedman (2006) developed a Gramscian framework to explore such conjunctures, from which this thesis draws important insights and inspiration, in particular to analyse the contexts in which CDD programmes emerged and expanded. Overall, a Gramscian understanding of CDD programmes, along the lines of transformism and hegemony, provides us with a promising perspective from which to make sense of the emergence, evolution, expansion, operations, and effects of CDD programmes throughout the developing world.

A Material-Discursive Analytical Framework of CDD Programmes

Drawing on the scholarly traditions of Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault, this thesis seeks to make sense of the emergence, evolution, expansion, operations and effects of CDD programmes on two intertwined yet distinct levels. On the one hand, the thesis scrutinises the performativity of CDD discourse deployed to order and represent arenas for intervention in producing, legitimising and reproducing interventions along the lines of “anti-politics,” inspired by the Foucauldian approaches of James Ferguson and Tania Li. On the other hand, drawing on Gramsci’s writings, this thesis explores ways of contextualising and understanding CDD programmes along the lines of hegemony and transformism, as

²⁰ The occurrence of episodic crises of hegemony highlights the relative fragility of hegemony, which cannot be imposed but instead has to be worked out, as Tania Li (1999) remarked.
promoting social stability and demobilisation of challenges from below – rather than empowering people to take control over their lives and promoting “good governance.”

To do so, it examines CDD programmes as (i) material resources, whose deployment from central governments to (predominantly rural) localities influences social relations and practices in these localities, by affecting the material base of existing social structures;\(^{21}\) (ii) discourse deployed in localities, notably to habituate its recipients to particular norms, values, positions and relations, which influences social relations and practices by affecting the immaterial base of existing power structures (operating at the levels of meaning, perceptions and preferences); and (iii) discourse deployed to represent arenas for intervention, whose performative operations and effects are located both within and outside the development apparatus. To capture the various, often simultaneous effects of CDD programmes as part of an “anti-politics machine” and as instruments of hegemony and transformism, this thesis develops a “material-discursive” analytical framework\(^{22}\) consisting of two sets of three propositions inspired by Foucauldian and Gramscian approaches respectively. On the one hand, this thesis identifies three main effects of CDD discourse (deployed to represent arenas for intervention) as part of an “anti-politics machine,” whose performative operations are located both within and outside the development apparatus:

(1) *CDD discourse opens up politics and societies across the developing world to development interventions by “colonising” and “depoliticising” political and social arenas.*

The absence of dimensions of power, politics, inequality and contestation from the concepts of “good governance,” social capital and empowerment adopted in CDD discourse has

\(^{21}\) It must be noted that the deployment of these resources is still embedded in discourse or discourses – as CDD discourse is often enmeshed with a clientelistic discourse, as chapters to come will show – which echoes Lachau and Mouffe’s remark that “every object is constituted as an object of discourse” (2001, 108). Yet, distinguishing between CDD as material resource and CDD as discourse enables us to further distinguish between the discursive operations and effects of CDD programmes, which affect meanings, preferences and perceptions, and the material operations and effects of CDD programmes, which affect the material base of social structures.

\(^{22}\) Material-discursive analyses have been developed in feminist scholarship to capture the “inseparability of the material and the discursive” (Barad 1999, 8) and to emphasise that subjects and objects are simultaneously socially-constructed and materially-grounded (e.g. Ussher 1997; Barad 1999).
enabled the World Bank to incorporate the realm of politics and society in general as new, “depoliticised” arenas to “correct” and “improve” through development interventions. In other words, CDD discourse has enabled the Bank to dramatically widen its realm of intervention, from the economy to all things social and political (including individual citizens, civil society and the state), by presenting them as quantifiable, malleable, technical elements that could be engineered, improved and managed through CDD interventions.

(2) **CDD discourse enables interventions by forming intelligible arenas for intervention.** As Ferguson and Li have shown, development discourse represents the domain to be developed in terms of a set of deficits and deficiencies that interventions propose to address, constituting it as an “enormously promising candidate for [...] intervention” (Ferguson 1990, 69). In so doing, this discourse proceeds to identify and delimit arenas where interventions become intelligible and thus possible. This process is both one of exposing technical deficits and deficiencies to be corrected – or “rendering technical,” to borrow Li’s expression – and excluding that which lies beyond the scope of intervention, most notably issues of power, inequality and contentious politics.

(3) **CDD discourse legitimises interventions and enables their reproduction, regardless of their actual operations and effects, by forming “enabled” and “constrained” arenas of intervention.** In “constrained” environments, local officials and community members are presented as suffering from deficits of agency, which supposedly result in unaccountable and inefficient governance. In contrast, “enabled” environments are allegedly characterised by relatively high levels of social capital and empowerment, and by “reformist” and “progressive” local leaders. It is further proposed that interventions can only be fully effective and deliver “good governance” and empowerment in “enabled” environments. Thus CDD discourse shifts the responsibility for potential “failure” from interventions themselves onto their recipients – in terms of pre-existing local contexts in general, and of local leaders’
agency in particular. In so doing, CDD discourse preserves the image of “effective” and “successful” interventions, regardless of their actual operations and effects, which legitimates interventions and enables their reproduction.

On the other hand, to analyse CDD programmes along Gramscian lines, as instruments of hegemony and transformism which operate and impact on power relations outside the development apparatus, this thesis outlines three main effects of CDD programmes, understood as CDD discourse (directly deployed in localities, notably to habituate its recipients to particular norms, values, positions and relations) and as material resources, both of which impact on social practices and social relations:

1. **CDD programmes represent avenues to reinforce the control of local bosses and machine politicians, and to strengthen incumbent presidents and ruling parties’ support bases locally, by restyling and strengthening clientelistic channels between national governments and “local communities.”** In particular, CDD programmes are based around the deployment of material resources from national governments directly to (predominantly rural) localities, alongside a discourse which proposes to reorder local social relations through detailed rules and procedures. Thus CDD programmes provide avenues to reinforce and restyle clientelistic channels through which CDD funds can be deployed as patronage resources, in exchange for support, in particular in the form of votes, for ruling parties and incumbent presidents. In so doing, these programmes strengthen, whilst avowedly “reform,” existing power structures, reinforcing the control of local bosses and machine politicians, and building up ruling parties and incumbent presidents’ support bases locally.23

---

23 Although the workings of “traditional” patron-client dynamics must be distinguished from those of hegemony and transformism, clientelism can work towards reinforcing hegemony and promoting transformism, as shown by the dynamics characterising the deployment of CDD programmes, which are discussed in the chapters to come. In short, through CDD’s clientelistic networks, in which “progressive” politicians are prime actors, methods of political control such as electoral fraud cohabit with indirect assertions of power, acting on preferences, interests and perceptions, notably by using the promise of (continued) development—which is largely deployed along clientelistic lines—to obtain people’s support. In this sense, clientelism works to strengthen elites’ hegemonic positions; it helps to elicit popular consent, insofar as consent is viewed as an effect of indirect assertions of power.
(2) CDD programmes provide means to strengthen the power of local elites by promoting “good governance,” “empowerment” and poverty reduction without modifying existing patterns of economic and political power distribution. In particular, by deploying material resources in villages that are often characterised by highly unequal power structures without modifying these structures, CDD resources risk to be channelled towards the interests and priorities of local elites, rather than those of the broad mass of the population. Moreover, by focusing on fostering collective and consensual practices and representations (particularly around local development problems and solutions), CDD programmes’ procedures and operations risk being dominated by local elites, and ultimately risk empowering “powerful vested interests” (Mohan and Stokke 2000, 253) rather than the broad mass of the population.

(3) CDD programmes represent avenues to promote transformist absorption of counter-hegemonic challenges. By appropriating the language of radical critics (whilst distorting its meaning), in particular by advancing a vision of government officials as “progressive” leaders and communities as “empowered,” CDD discourse promotes demobilisation and absorption of counter-hegemonic challenges by dominant social forces. Moreover, CDD programmes introduce an expanded mode of conditionality directly aimed at localities, as the delivery of material resources is conditional upon the performances of local government officials, who are hailed as “progressive” leaders, and of the residents of rural localities, who are interpellated as part of an “empowered” and “civil” society. In so doing, CDD programmes further promote demobilisation and domestication of movements of contestation and reinforce local officials’ power as “progressive” leaders, thus strengthening existing social structures and shoring up hegemony.

The analytical framework outlined above will be deployed to analyse CDD programmes in general, and one CDD programme in particular, the Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan (Linking Hands in the Fight against Poverty) - Comprehensive and Integrated
Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS), or Kalahi, a large, “flagship” CDD programme of the World Bank in the Philippines. Kalahi was selected as a case study of CDD programmes for three main reasons. First of all, it has been considered as “one of the most promising CDD operations in the East Asia region, and in the Bank portfolio” (World Bank 2005a, ii), and thus illustrates what a “successful” CDD programme of the World Bank might look like. Secondly, Kalahi represents the latest World Bank’s thinking on the CDD approach. It adopts empowerment and “good governance” as explicit aims, and directly operates within local government’s structures, which has been regarded by the World Bank as an example of “best practice” to be replicated elsewhere. It is also representative of the trend to use CDD programmes as rewards for “progressive” politicians, which was discussed above and will be further explored throughout the thesis. Thirdly, Kalahi is among the 12 largest CDD programmes worldwide (which are listed in Chapter 2, Table 1), financially and in terms of duration and coverage. It also exemplifies trends in scaling up CDD programmes, as it has been extended through two additional Kalahi programmes financed by the World Bank and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a U.S. foreign aid agency which dispenses bilateral aid to countries that reportedly promote good governance and economic liberalisation (MCC 2012). Furthermore, Kalahi has been considered by the Bank and the Government of the Philippines for further expansion, to reach national coverage (IV44, IV45). In short, Kalahi’s representation as a success story, its explicit focus on “community empowerment” and “good governance,” its wide scale, and its expansion all make it an excellent case in which to explore the effects of “anti-politics” and hegemony and transformism of CDD programmes.

24 This approach, which allegedly focuses on both communities and local governments’ empowerment, has been increasingly referred to as “Local and Community Driven Development” (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009b).
Methodology and Data Sources

Research Design and Methodology

The empirical findings and theoretical insights presented in this thesis result from nearly four years of research and analysis conducted in the U.K., the Philippines, and the U.S. In particular, the exploration of Kalahi, the World Bank’s flagship CDD programme in the Philippines, is informed by a nine-month period of fieldwork in the Philippines, undertaken between September 2009 and April 2010, and in June 2010. It was mainly conducted in Manila and in the Province of Bohol, which was selected on the basis of (i) its representation, in CDD discourse, as a Kalahi “success story” and as an “enabled” environment for local governance, forming an optimal context in which to examine a reportedly “successful” Kalahi experience; (ii) the availability of a wide range of social, political and economic data on the province and its municipalities, produced by the provincial government, local universities and NGOs active in the province; (iii) the large coverage of the CDD programme in the province, which was implemented in 12 municipalities, and would enable me to examine the operations and effects of Kalahi in diverse contexts; and (iv) minimal concerns in terms of security and accessibility.

Before describing the period of fieldwork in the Philippines, two important points must be noted. First of all, this thesis initially proposed to make sense of varying political empowerment\textsuperscript{25} trajectories in CDD locations, namely two or three municipalities in Bohol. The initial focus of the thesis was largely based on the hypothesis that since some evidence suggested that CDD programmes such as Kalahi had unfolded following strikingly dissimilar patterns in their different implementation sites (as noted above), the comparison of contrasting political empowerment trajectories across CDD-recipient municipalities would shed some light on the operations and effects of CDD programmes in Bohol and beyond.

\textsuperscript{25} Drawing on Lawrence Bobo and Frank Gilliam (1990), political empowerment was defined as individuals’ or groups’ enhanced capacity or opportunity to achieve representation and influence in political processes.
Fieldwork was thus initially designed to address the puzzle of contrasting political empowerment trajectories in two to three Bohol municipalities that had experienced Kalahi. How and why this focused changed are questions that will be addressed in the pages below.

Secondly, fieldwork was undertaken between autumn 2009 and spring 2010. As such, the implementation of Kalahi in Bohol and elsewhere in the Philippines was largely completed by the time fieldwork took place, as the CDD programme initially ran between 2003 and 2009. Whilst this timeframe prevented direct observation of Kalahi processes as they unfolded on the ground, it was hypothesised that it would enable me to more fully observe and understand the effects of the programme in Bohol municipalities. Indeed, Kalahi’s impacts on local empowerment levels and on the quality of local governance – which are long-term goals of the programme – were assumed to be more visible after six years of Kalahi experience than during implementation. Moreover, this timeline was particularly suited to examine evidence of political empowerment in Bohol’s municipalities, as it covered the period of electoral campaigning leading to the May 2010 elections, the first post-Kalahi synchronised elections in the Philippines – including presidential, legislative and local elections. In addition, although Kalahi processes and procedures would not be directly observed, the assumption was that interviews and informal discussions with Kalahi “actors” and “beneficiaries” would yield sufficient information to understand how Kalahi unfolded in Bohol’s municipalities.

Fieldwork in the Philippines started with an initial period of two weeks in Manila, where I conducted interviews with key informants at the World Bank, university research centres, and national and international NGOs. It was followed by a three-month stay in the Province of Bohol between October and December 2009. During this period, I was offered a desk at the Provincial Planning and Development Organisation (PPDO), in the Provincial Capitol, the seat of the provincial government in Bohol, to conduct desk-based research. This
offered me great access to all official material pertaining to the development initiatives that had been undertaken in the province, including project documents and reports, provincial and municipal-level development plans, and socio-economic data collected in each of the province’s municipalities. It also enabled me to observe bureaucratic politics at play in the PPDO and the provincial government, and to understand how institutional, political and individual interests, priorities and pressures shaped development practices in the province.

My position at the PPDO greatly eased contacts with other provincial agencies, notably the provincial offices of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and of the Department of Agrarian Reform, as well as with municipal mayors and municipal employees. It also enabled me to attend some of the monthly meetings of the provincial governor and the municipal mayors, and of the province’s municipal planning and development coordinators, and to observe visits from prospective donors and from presidential candidates. These events proved to be very rich sources of information on development interventions in general, and on Kalahi in particular. Moreover, contacts with the research institute of a local university, Holy Name University, and with NGOs active in the province, provided me with further insights into the rationales guiding the practice of development in the province, as well with relevant socio-economic and political data on Bohol.

On the basis of the information I gathered and analysed during the first two months of my stay in Bohol, I identified three municipalities which had experienced Kalahi, and which seemed to offer particularly contrasting political and socio-economic features. As such, I inferred that these would constitute promising locations in which to examine and make sense of varying Kalahi experiences within the province. I thus undertook further fieldwork in these municipalities, interviewing mayors, vice-mayors, municipal COMELEC officers, municipal planning and development coordinators, and, when possible, Kalahi staff still present in the municipalities. I also analysed and compared electoral data of the 1998 and 2004
synchronised elections, and of the 2001 and 2007 general elections – i.e. legislative and local elections.

Yet, as my work at the municipal level progressed, my initial assumptions proved incorrect: instead of offering contrasting experiences of Kalahi, in terms of empowerment and governance, the municipalities I examined presented striking similarities, which could be observed throughout the province. In broad terms, these similar features can be described as the combination of (i) discursive performance, especially by local officials, who reiterated CDD discourse of “good governance” and empowerment; and (ii) a clear disregard for CDD principles of participation, transparency, accountability and competitions throughout the province, where local officials described CDD processes as cumbersome and even irrelevant, and seemed to have bent Kalahi procedures at will to fit overall municipal and provincial development plans. As my fieldwork revealed that Kalahi had minimal political empowerment effects in Bohol’s municipalities and barangays (villages), which were supposedly the main sites of CDD intervention, I turned to examine and compare the dynamics characterising the CDD programme at the provincial and national levels. In so doing, I attempted to uncover previously unacknowledged operations and effects of Kalahi, and to more fully understand the workings of the CDD programme and the dynamics characterising its deployment and expansion. Indeed, as the effects of Kalahi were largely invisible in the “communities” that it supposedly empowered, my new challenge was to locate and examine the impacts of the CDD programme beyond the village and municipal levels.

Against this backdrop, my new agenda for research was two-fold: (i) how to make sense of the operations and effects of CDD programmes such as Kalahi, as discourse and as material resources, at the municipal, provincial and national levels; and (ii) how to make sense of CDD production and reproduction amidst such operations and effects, causally, from
an institutional perspective, and through the self-representations of CDD practitioners. To address these questions, I significantly modified my research design. Instead of spending the remainder of my period of fieldwork in a few of Bohol’s municipalities, I went back to Manila, where interviews with World Bank employees and officials from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Kalahi implementing agency, helped me to shed some light on these questions. I also spent two months in a Manila-based development bank, as an intern. Although the project I worked on was not directly related to CDD programmes, my position within an international development organisation not unlike the World Bank helped me to make valuable contacts with international development practitioners, including CDD practitioners, based in Manila. It also enabled me to gain a deeper understanding of the internal workings of such an organisation, and to develop an in-depth knowledge of development practices in the Philippines and beyond. This thesis thus results from the fieldwork described above, from subsequent interviews with current and former CDD practitioners in London and in Washington, D.C., as well as nearly two years of further desk-based research and analysis.

Scope and Limitations

On the basis of the evidence uncovered during fieldwork in the Philippines and through further research – including desk-based research as well as interviews with former and current CDD practitioners conducted in the U.K. and in the U.S. – this thesis has proposed answers to five central questions, namely:

1. How and why did these programmes emerge at the World Bank in the early 1990s?

2. How can we explain their exceptionally rapid and far-reaching expansion in the first decade of the twenty-first century?

3. How do these programmes operate?
4. What effects do they have on the communities and societies in which they unfold?

5. Overall, how should we understand CDD programmes?

The answers to questions 3 and 4 are heavily informed by the “showcase” study of Kalahi in the Province of Bohol. Whilst my approach allowed for an in-depth investigation of the operations and effects of only one CDD programme (Kalahi), whose workings have been mostly explored in one single province (Bohol), the insights gained through this case study of a “CDD success story” may help us to make sense of the workings of CDD programmes in other “showcase” locations throughout the world. Indeed, this examination has uncovered trends and dynamics that were previously left unacknowledged, and which are likely to have been at play across the many countries that have experienced CDD programmes in the past two decades. Moreover, this case study enables us to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamic interactions between the practices and representations of CDD at the local level (i.e. in the locations in which CDD programmes have unfolded) and at the World Bank, whose scope and significance reach far beyond one Philippine province. Other questions addressed in this thesis, pertaining to the emergence, persistence and expansion of CDD programmes, are also very broad in scope, being informed by materials specific to the Philippines’ Kalahi programme, as well as materials treating a wealth of other CDD programmes implemented by the World Bank throughout the developing world.

To further delimit the scope of this thesis, it is important to identify and discuss two main limitations. A first limitation of this research, produced by the methodological choices detailed in the pages above, is that it does not provide detailed descriptions of Kalahi processes and procedures in Bohol or elsewhere – since fieldwork was conducted after Kalahi had been implemented. As such, the picture of Kalahi processes that it offers is more impressionistic than thick and ethnographic. Nonetheless, it still enables us to understand the broad operations and effects of Kalahi in Bohol’s municipalities, whilst providing further
insights on the workings of CDD programmes at provincial and national levels, which have largely been left unexamined in typical village-level studies. A second limitation is that the thesis focuses on (local) elites' representations and performances, rather than on those of the broad mass of the population, or of the residents of the barangays that directly experienced Kalahi. Yet, this thesis’ findings undermine confidence that “communities,” or the broad mass of the population, are actively expressing voice and participating in CDD programmes. They also cast considerable doubt on the World Bank’s claims to offer unmediated access to ordinary people's sentiments and views of CDD, allegedly uncovered through fieldwork undertaken by its own staff or consultants, as explained in the chapters to come. Focusing on (local) elites’ practices and representations also enables us to uncover previously unacknowledged patterns which crucially shape the ways in which CDD programmes such as Kalahi unfold and impact on local power structures. It thus enables us to gain a greater understanding of the operations and effects of CDD programmes, and of the dynamics behind their production and reproduction.

A last point to consider here, closely related to the question of whose practices and representations are treated in this thesis, concerns the author’s position in the text. Whilst the use of “I” has been necessary to offer the above account of my methodological choices and fieldwork experiences, “I” do not figure in the chapters to come – at the exception of the few instances when it is necessary to acknowledge the presence of “the author” to relate particularly significant encounters or highlight specific practices. This choice was made on the basis of methodological and theoretical considerations, as this account does not constitute “my” personal experience of Kalahi in Bohol. Instead, this thesis attempts to offer an understanding of the World Bank’s CDD programmes in general, and of Kalahi in Bohol in particular, based on the written and oral accounts of CDD practitioners, recipients and
observers. It is thus *their* experiences, representations and practices of CDD programmes that this thesis proposes to make sense of.

**Sources**

To scrutinise discursive and non discursive development practices, this thesis draws on two types of materials: *within* and *outside* CDD discourse. Whilst these two categories are relatively fluid and their boundaries are often hazy – as development discourse in general and CDD discourse in particular are not only produced by the World Bank and other development organisations, but also by governments, universities, think-tanks, research institutes and NGOs, amongst others – it is crucial to identify and delimit a discourse of CDD, i.e. the structured system of meanings, representations, positions, and relations, which is produced through (or in support of) the practice of CDD, as a key object of analysis in this thesis.

The materials *within* CDD discourse consist of a wealth of written accounts of CDD programmes, typically produced or commissioned by the World Bank, including project information and appraisal documents, poverty mapping exercises, loan agreements, implementation field guides, project databases, mission reports, programme evaluations and meta-evaluations, impact assessments, research reports and articles, literature reviews, promotional brochures and project implementation manuals. CDD discourse was also accessed through interviews and conversations with former and present employees of the World Bank in the Manila-based Philippine Country Office and in the Bank’s headquarters in Washington, D.C.; with employees of Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development, the implementing agency of the CDD programme Kalahi, in its national and regional offices; with government officials in the Province of Bohol, including municipal mayors and vice-mayors, and employees of provincial and municipal development offices; and with the employees of Manila-based development organisations involved in CDD
programmes. Overall, 25 semi-structured interviews were conducted with current or former CDD practitioners and recipients for the purpose of this research. Interviewees are listed and coded – to ease cross-referencing with the text – in Annex 1, where they are identified through their organisational affiliations and positions, rather than by their names, so as to protect their anonymity. In-depth observation of the provincial development machinery operating in the Province of Bohol and of international development organisations based in Manila also informed the inquiry in a significant way.

The materials outside CDD discourse include a set of documents treating the Philippines in general and Bohol in particular, such as election results, surveys, municipal socio-economic profiles and newspaper articles. These documents were collected in government offices and libraries in the Philippines, in Manila, Bohol and Cebu City, as well as in libraries in London and at Cornell University, Ithaca. Interviews and conversations with political analysts, activists, academics and employees of COMELEC and of the Department of Agrarian Reform, in Bohol, Cebu City and Manila provided further, crucial insights on the operations and effects of CDD programmes such as Kalahi. 22 such interviews were conducted, as listed and coded in Annex 1. This thesis also draws upon a rich academic literature on Philippine politics. Moreover, it encompasses a wealth of scholarly accounts that have critically analysed the World Bank’s policies and practices, and the key concepts of empowerment, “good governance,” social capital, civil society and participation. Finally, it draws crucial insights and inspiration from academic writings which have explored and refined the notion of discourse performativity, in the case of development discourse and beyond, and which have proposed avenues to deploy Gramscian concepts of hegemony and transformism in the fields of comparative politics, political economy, and international relations.
Thesis Overview

To make sense of the emergence, evolution and expansion of CDD programmes throughout the developing world, Chapter 2 examines the political and economic contexts in which these programmes became possible, intelligible, and desirable. It scrutinises the strategies, operations, challenges and priorities of the World Bank and its stakeholders, particularly the U.S., and their evolution amidst changing global political and economic contexts from the 1980s onwards. In contrast, chapters 3 to 5 focus on Kalahi, the showcase CDD programme of the World Bank in the Philippines. Chapter 3 treats the emergence and evolution of Kalahi, asking why such large, “flagship” CDD programme emerged and expanded in the particular context of the Philippines in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and accounting for the power relations, social inequalities, political and economic imperatives and contention that make up the backdrop against which Kalahi unfolded. Chapter 4 narrows the analytical lens and examines the emergence of Kalahi at the provincial level, in the Central Visayan Province of Bohol. It explores the operations of CDD discourse in shaping Bohol as an ideal “arena for intervention” before describing some of the most important socio-economic dynamics characterising the province, which can help to account for the emergence of Kalahi in Bohol. In turn, Chapter 5 scrutinises the operation and effects of Kalahi in the province, in particular in terms of the performances of local politicians who were hailed by CDD discourse as “progressive” leaders.

Having scrutinised the structural logic guiding the deployment of CDD programmes and their effects in drawing “local” people outside the “development industry” into their orbit in chapters 2 to 5, the thesis turns to examine the conditions of production of CDD programmes in chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 focuses on the institutional context in which CDD programmes have been produced and expanded, attempting to explain the survival and expansion of CDD programmes such as Kalahi from the vantage point of the interests,
priorities and pressures at play at the World Bank and the Philippine DSWD. Chapter 7, by contrast, attempts to understand how CDD practitioners have represented CDD programmes to themselves. It explores the operations and effects of CDD discourse as it is performed by World Bank professionals, and examines the ways in which the representations of these professionals have been conducive to the production, evolution and reproduction of CDD programmes. In the light of the understandings developed throughout successive chapters, the conclusion revisits the thesis’ central questions: how to make sense of the emergence of CDD programmes and of their rapid expansion in the 1990s and 2000s? How do they operate? What effects do they have on the localities and societies in which they unfold? Overall, how should we understand CDD programmes?
Chapter 2 – The Emergence and Rise of CDD Programmes Worldwide

This chapter explores the emergence, evolution and expansion of CDD programmes at the World Bank, and the context for these developments. As noted in the introduction, CDD programmes have evolved and expanded at exceptional speed. They emerged in the early 1990s, in the form of two programmes implemented in Mexico and Brazil respectively, before rapidly expanding across Africa, Latin America and Asia\textsuperscript{26} (OED 2005a, 8), and gaining the status of new paradigm in local development in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Yet, it was further noted that the rapid and far-reaching expansion of CDD programmes took place in the absence of empirical evidence on the operations and effects of these programmes as instruments of “good governance.” In this context, how to make sense of the emergence of CDD programmes in the early 1990s? How to explain their rapid expansion and evolution? How to account for their particular form and representation as instruments of “good governance”?

A first step towards answering these questions consists of examining the Bank’s own explanation of the emergence and rise of CDD programmes. In CDD discourse, the emergence of the CDD approach is traced back to the context of postcolonial India and Bangladesh, where “initiatives and model programs [...] advanced community roles,” and had “deep roots in the era’s independence struggles and [were] influenced by the ideas of Gandhi” (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009a, 18). These programmes allegedly shared “ideals of decentralized and participatory decision making, local planning and coordination, and development of sustainable local and community institutions,” which were reportedly

\textsuperscript{26} The OED estimated that between 1989 and 2003, Africa was the largest recipient of CBD and CDD programmes, (with 266 programmes or a third of the Bank’s CBD/CDD portfolio), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (193 CBD/CDD programmes), East Asia and the Pacific, (118 programmes), South Asia (110 programmes) Europe and Central Asia (94 programmes) and the Middle East and North Africa (66 programmes) (OED 2005a, 67-68).
embraced by the Bank in the 1970s as the pillars of its rural development policy – although they remained largely unapplied in practice (ibid., 20–24). In parallel, the rise of NGOs as major development partners of governments and donors in the 1970s, followed by the publication of Robert Chambers’ *Rural Development: Putting the Last First*, reportedly prompted the rise of “participatory appraisal and planning” and “community-based” development interventions (ibid., 24–25). These innovations were identified in CDD discourse as the triggers of a “paradigm shift” in the 1990s, from “top-down” to “community-driven” development models that reportedly integrated “participatory approaches with decentralization and direct community empowerment” (ibid., 25–26).

Accounts written by CDD practitioners at the Bank further identified the social awareness of World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn (1995–2005) and the “personal orientations and professional and personal backgrounds of the Task Managers” as key factors that allegedly enabled the emergence of CDD programmes at the Bank (Guggenheim 2006, 135; Bebbington, Guggenheim et al. 2004, 52). In these accounts, the emergence and rise of the CDD approach was represented as a heroic fight for the recognition of key political and social concepts at the Bank, where a few professionals allegedly battled to “push forward politically contentious notions of governance reform, participation, and devolved control of financial resources to citizens’ groups” (ibid.). Although socially-aware “reformists” were apparently a minority within the Bank’s “economic fortress,”

27 they allegedly fought hard to raise the visibility and support for CDD and its underlying concepts of empowerment, social capital, “good governance” and participation. They were reportedly rewarded with substantial victories, most notably as empowerment was embraced as a central concept in the Bank’s fight against poverty, and enshrined in the influential World Development Report 2000/2001 *Attacking Poverty: Opportunity, Empowerment, and Security*. Against this backdrop, the

27 This expression was coined by Michael Cernea (1993), the Bank’s first sociologist.
CDD approach itself was presented as one of the greatest victories of the Bank’s “reformists” in their struggle against “top-down technocratic fixes” (ibid., 50), represented as a platform to “learn about democracy by practicing it” (Guggenheim 2006, 138), and as a “democratization initiative masquerading as an anti-poverty project” (Barron et al. in Mosse 2011b, 96).

Although these accounts provide some important insights in the Bank’s internal dynamics and struggles over power and meaning, their representation of the emergence and rise of CDD programmes at the Bank overlooks elements of power, politics, inequality and contestation – which are distinctive features of CDD discourse, as noted in Chapter 1. To make sense of the emergence, evolution and expansion of CDD programmes at the World Bank beyond CDD discourse, this chapter thus proposes to examine the political and economic contexts in which they became possible, intelligible, and desirable – in other words, their “conditions of possibilities.” It scrutinises the interests, priorities, challenges and strategies of the Bank and its stakeholders (particularly the United States), and their evolution in changing global political and economic contexts.

The account provided in this chapter makes a new argument with regard to the context within which CDD programmes emerged. It suggests how, in structural terms, this context might have impelled and enabled the emergence and evolution of CDD programmes when and where they emerged and evolved. This kind of contextualisation leaves open many questions as to how decisions were made by individuals within the World Bank and other such institutions, and within the governments of the countries which promoted or experienced CDD programmes; and how the context emphasised in the thesis was viewed, experienced and consciously considered in the formulation and implementation of policy. Yet it provides important insights which enable us to make sense of the emergence, evolution and expansion of CDD programmes, in structural terms. This is all the more important than to date, no one
has attempted to present an alternative account to that provided by the Bank and outlined above.

To make sense of the emergence and rise of CDD programmes worldwide, this chapter starts by situating the emergence of CDD programmes in the context of the promotion of economic liberalisation in the 1980s, and of the set of problems, challenges and opportunities it created. It then describes the broad strategy adopted by the Bank to meet these challenges, along the lines of “good governance,” decentralisation and participation, before turning to its operational deployment through CDD programmes, in the contexts of Southern Mexico and Northeast Brazil in the early 1990s. In later sections, the discussion focuses on new challenges brought by intensified economic liberalisation in the 1990s, and on the Bank’s response, in the form of renewed expansion of its realm of operations towards civil society, social capital, and empowerment. Against this backdrop, the last section of this chapter seeks to make sense of the evolution and expansion of CDD programmes in the late 1990s and 2000s.

**Free Market and Oligarchical Democracies in the 1980s**

The emergence of CDD programmes must be understood in the context of the promotion of economic liberalisation in the 1980s, and the set of problems, challenges and opportunities it created. In the early 1980s, free market ideology replaced Keynesianism as the main theory guiding economic policies worldwide, in particular as a solution to the deep debt crisis that unfolded across the developing world.\(^{28}\) It was promoted by Ronald Reagan in the U.S. and Margaret Thatcher in the U.K., and across the “Third World” via structural

---

\(^{28}\) The debt crisis was prompted by the combination of (i) accumulated loans in the Third World, as in the wake of the first oil shock of 1973, demand for credit fell in recession-hit OECD countries and increased in developing countries, encouraged by temporary rises in prices of primary commodities (the bulk of developing countries’ exports); (ii) rising interest rates following the second oil shock of 1979, leading to an expansion of the debt; and (iii) subsequently falling prices of developing countries’ exports, triggered by global economic recession in the late 1970s (Cardoso and Helwege 1995, 116–117).
adjustment lending of the IMF and the World Bank, which represented the foreign policy priorities of the Western bloc in general, and the U.S. government in particular.\textsuperscript{29} In the context of the global debt crisis, aid became tied to conditionality, which was outwardly promoted by the Bank as a strategy to “support programs of policy and institutional change necessary to modify the structure of an economy so that it can maintain both its growth rate and the viability of its balance of payments” (Jayarajah and Branson 1995, 1). Continued access to concessional loans and debt rescheduling were thus made conditional upon governments’ adoption of IMF and World Bank-prescribed programmes of structural adjustment reforms, which focused on economic liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation, and on strengthening fiscal discipline – through measures intended to control inflation, squeeze state spending, and reduce balance of payments deficits (Pender 2001, 399).\textsuperscript{30} In this context, developing countries were compelled to adopt the policy prescriptions of the Bank and the IMF, which dramatically constrained their policy autonomy (Singh 2002, 299).

Particular emphasis was put on liberalising trade, as a remedy for developing countries to overcome the foreign exchange squeeze and service their debt through export-oriented industrialisation. Moreover, instead of trying to nurture home-grown infant industries, developing countries were encouraged to abandon protectionist measures and focus on primary commodities and foreign direct investment-driven manufactured goods for export. Whilst these measures would allegedly stimulate quick economic growth in the Third World, they would also open access to new markets, cheap labour, raw materials and agricultural products for the First World (Bello 2009a). Intrinsic to the promotion of

\textsuperscript{29} The U.S. voting power at the Bank has exceeded by far that of other member countries, which has enabled it to choose the Bank’s president (usually a U.S. national), veto key issues, and largely influence the overall direction of the Bank’s policies (Wade 1996). As such, the Bank has served as “an especially useful instrument for projecting American influence in developing countries, and one over which the US maintains discreet but firm institutional control” (Wade 2001, 127).

\textsuperscript{30} This standard policy package is commonly referred to as the “Washington Consensus,” a term initially used by economist John Williamson (1990).
economic liberalisation was also the focus on “rolling back the state,” to confine the role of the government to that of a “provider of a regulatory framework for private-sector exchanges” (Wade 1996, 5). This strategy both met anti-communist ideological imperatives of the Cold War era and served to further liberalise Third World economies (Williams and Young 1994). With structural adjustment lending, the Bank and the IMF thus pushed for a host of “market friendly” policies to fashion “enabling environments” for growth throughout the developing world.

Although some have argued that in the long-run, structural adjustment proved beneficial, as it compelled some countries to increasingly rely on the private sector and on export strategies to stimulate economic growth (e.g. Morley 1995), structural adjustment policies had very visible “social costs.” These were particularly severe in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, which suffered from “severe marginalization from the centers of world power and wealth” (Robinson 1999, 45). There, increasingly unfavourable terms of trade, cuts in social services spending, the closing of public and private industries unable to withstand heightened competition, and high inflation triggered by currencies devaluation, all led to mounting poverty, deepening inequalities and soaring unemployment rates in the 1980s (Ewig 2010, 66; Robinson 1999). In Sub-Saharan African countries, the average gross national product (GNP) declined by about 2.2% per year throughout the 1980s, average per capita income fell dramatically, and health and education systems collapsed (Bello 1994, 18; Hoy 1998, 54). In turn, Latin America experienced receding per capita income, declining living standards, rising unemployment, underemployment and income inequality, and growing poverty, from an estimated 130 million people living below the poverty threshold in 1980 to 180 million in the early 1990s (Bello 2005, 84; Hernández-León 2008, 43–44; Ondetti 2008, 64). The effects of structural adjustment were particularly severe in the
countryside, where land markets were privatised, agricultural prices were liberalised, subsidies were eliminated, and access to credit was curtailed (Yashar 1999, 85).

Against this backdrop of expanded economic liberalisation and rising poverty and inequality, the Bank was increasingly criticised in the U.S. – by a Congress dominated by Democrats, by various UN agencies, and by activist groups and the media – for the destructive effects of its interventions on societies across the developing world. Yet the Bank’s mainstream critics did not fundamentally question the soundness of structural adjustment policies of the Bank and the IMF. For instance, the UNICEF called for “adjustment with a human face” (Cornia et al. 1987), which simply advocated more gradual programmes of reforms and the provision of “safety-nets” for the poor. In contrast, the mid-1970s and 1980s also witnessed the rise of more radical and threatening challenges from below, taking the form of popular protests opposing measures of fiscal austerity and trade liberalisation promoted by the World Bank and the IMF. These “austerity protests” were described by John Walton and David Seddon as “large-scale collective actions including political demonstrations, general strikes, and riots, which are animated by grievances over state policies of economic liberalizations implemented in response to the debt crisis and market reforms urged by international agencies” (1994, 39). “Austerity protests” started in Peru and Egypt in the mid-1970s, and spread to half of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as most North African countries, and parts of Asia and Eastern Europe (Walton 1989, 309).31

The Bank was also criticised in Washington, D.C., and beyond, for its massive support for authoritarian regimes. Indeed, since the 1970s, the Bank had lent its support to

---

right-wing dictators in Latin America, Asia and Africa, from Marcos in the Philippines and Suharto in Indonesia to Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire and Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, who were regarded as the best guarantors of the interests of the Western bloc in the Third World. They were initially able to contain social and political unrest by brutally clamping down on leftist and nationalist political challenges, and to implement the Bank’s demands in terms of economic restructuring, which would open Third World economies to foreign trade and investments (Bello et al. 1982; Pincus and Winters 2002b, 6). Yet, in the 1980s, U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes proved increasingly ill-suited to effectively contain and resolve mounting popular protest in the long term – although they were still able to temporarily and brutally repress them (Robinson 1996).

Against this backdrop, the United States government shifted to an active strategy of “democracy promotion” from the 1980s onwards. This new strategy largely consisted of hijacking autonomous democratisation movements, which carried the threat of social revolution, in support of the “new technocratic sectors tied to the global economy” and favourable to both procedural democracy and economic liberalisation, as William I. Robinson’s study has shown (1996, 334). In this context, Robinson argues that “democracy promotion” must be understood as an active strategy to “relieve pressure from subordinate groups for more fundamental political, social and economic change” (1996, 6), signalling a Gramscian shift from domination through coercion to domination through consensus, namely hegemony. Indeed (re)democratisation across Latin America and elsewhere unfolded only in contexts where it was clear that the political parties and politicians who would dominate elections were broadly supportive of economic liberalisation policies, and that former

---

32 In the late 1970s, five of the eight largest recipients of Bank loans were right-wing authoritarian regimes (Hoy 1998, 48).

33 Although some have presented democracy promotion as an “ideological mission” (e.g. McFaul 2004), there is a broad consensus in the literature that democracy promotion is best regarded as a “pragmatic undertaking that serves U.S. security and economic interests” (Carothers 1995, 13).
authoritarian regimes and their enduring institutions, in particular the military, would enjoy a measure of impunity and continued insulation from democratic scrutiny and accountability.

Thus, instead of eliciting broad popular participation in national politics and prompting social reforms, “democracy promotion” promoted demobilisation (as repressive autocratic regimes were replaced by formal democracies) and enabled the (re)emergence and rise of oligarchical democracies, under which the military still enjoyed considerable power and prerogatives. Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora and Richard Wilson (1993) have proposed that “democracy promotion” is therefore best understood as the promotion of “Low Intensity Democracy,” highlighting that:

“The United States wanted stable viable ‘democratic’ regimes that could pre-empt more radical change by incorporating broad popular forces in electoral participation, yet guarantee continuity with the anti-communist and anti-reformist traditions of their military predecessors” (1993, 8).

Moreover, democratic governments enjoyed greater legitimacy than authoritarian ones, which enabled them to implement largely unpopular and harmful structural adjustment policies (ibid.). In this context, (re)democratisation often remained largely procedural, expressed in the form of regular electoral contests, whilst “repression and abuse of human rights continue[d], usually against the familiar targets of labour, students, the Left and human rights activists,” as in the cases of Argentina, Guatemala, the Philippines, and South Korea for instance (ibid., 21).

Against this backdrop, the World Bank – which, as noted earlier, largely represented the foreign policy priorities of the U.S. government – lent support to an “emergent transnational elite” of local oligarchs and business classes who would promote market expansion and exercise social control via consensual (instead of coercive) means.34 In

34 To justify this shift, the Bank simply remarked that: “[a]uthoritarian regimes have not always been better at imposing economic austerity than democracies” (World Bank 1988, 50).
particular, they would defuse and absorb counter-hegemonic challenges through democratic electoral processes in countries such as the Philippines, Brazil, Nicaragua, Chile, Haiti and Southern Africa (Robinson 1996, 16; Hedman 2006). In this context of (re)democratisation and accelerated economic liberalisation, new strategies were called for to shore up hegemony and further promote demobilisation, particularly as democratic politics brought back the threat of leftist challenges to pro-liberalisation parties, which were especially strong in Latin America. These new strategies crystallised around the concepts of “good governance,” decentralisation and participation, which emerged as the key themes of the Bank’s expanding realm of operations in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

**Bringing the State back in: “Good Governance” in the early 1990s**

The early 1990s were marked by the end of the Cold War and the increasing power of “transnational capital,” which led to a restructuring of economies and politics alongside free market principles in many industrialised and developing countries, as Stephen Gill remarked (1995, 405–406). In particular, Robinson highlighted that ongoing (re)democratisation in Latin America, Asia, Africa and in former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries “afforded transnational elites the opportunity to reorganize state institutions and create a more favorable institutional framework for a deepening of neoliberal adjustment” (1999, 60). At the World Bank, this shift from “rolling back the state” to reorganising state institutions took the form of the nascent “good governance” agenda, which allowed the Bank to expand its

---

35 For instance, in 1992, the 300 largest transnational firms controlled a fourth of the world’s US$20 trillion stock of productive assets, and the top 600 corporations accounted for more than 20% of the world’s total value added in manufacturing and agriculture (Gill 1995, 405).

36 In the aftermath of the Cold War, such restructuring was promoted by the U.S. in particular, and was justified in terms of preventing “instability” and “unpredictability,” which were presented as the hallmarks of the “New World Disorder” (Carpenter 1991).

37 Robinson refers to neoliberalism as “a model that seeks to achieve the conditions for the total mobility of capital” (Robinson 1996, 634).
realm of operation and to gain increasing control over its client states. It also enabled it to assuage its critics, by suggesting that the harmful effects of structural adjustment in the 1980s did not stem from ill-advised prescriptions and interventions, but from the ill-adapted environments of its borrowers, which the Bank now allegedly endeavoured to “correct” through its “good governance” agenda.

“Good governance,” broadly understood as the efficient delivery of public goods and services supported by a capable bureaucracy (as noted in the preceding chapter), was presented as a prerequisite for economic growth and development (Williams and Young 1994). It was promoted via structural adjustment lending, which had reportedly become “an important developmental instrument for supporting social, structural, and sectoral reforms” (World Bank 2001, viii), including public sector management reforms. The emerging “good governance” orthodoxy was initially spelled out in the Bank’s report *Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, which proposed that:

“A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the failure of public institutions. Private sector initiative and market mechanisms are important, but they must go hand-in-hand with good governance - a public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its public” (Conable in World Bank 1989, xii).

By formulating the African crisis as a crisis of “governance” requiring “political renewal” (ibid., 6), the report marked the inclusion of the political sphere into the realm of development interventions. It proposed that “Africa needs not just less government but better government—government that concentrates its efforts less on direct interventions and more on enabling others to be productive” by fostering a competitive and capable public service, delegating responsibilities to local governments, building “local capacities” in the public and

---

38 The expansion of the Bank’s policies and operations towards “good governance” was backed by legal reinterpretations of the Bank’s mandate, proposing that insofar as governance pertained to economic development (i.e. was based on economic rather than political grounds), it was within the legitimate scope of intervention of the Bank (Cahn 1993, 164).
private sectors and civil society, leading a “concerted attack on corruption,” and “empowering women and the poor” (ibid., 5–6). The 1993 World Bank study *The East Asian Miracle* strengthened the move towards “good governance,” arguing that governments could and should play a role in promoting “growth with equity,” through “market-friendly” interventions and adherence to market rules of competition, openness and stability (World Bank 1993; Wade 1996). It further asserted that the state had a role to play in redressing instances of “market failures,” by developing strong institutions and facilitating coordination amongst private firms (ibid.).

From the outset, concerns with the effectiveness of specific institutional arrangements, in terms of economic growth promotion, led to a strong focus on decentralisation, which would allegedly provide an optimal institutional framework for growth and development. According to the Bank, decentralisation was a means to enhance the efficiency of public resources allocation. It would direct spending towards cost-effective goods and services (following a model of competitive allocation of scarce resources), whilst increasing local governments’ revenues collection through the imposition of user charges (World Bank 1988). In so doing, decentralisation reforms would allegedly enhance “the contribution of the public sector to economic growth and development” in an effective and non-distortionary manner (ibid., 8). A series of decentralisation studies undertaken by the Bank in the 1980s and 1990s further found that following the same logic of optimised efficiency, decentralisation could improve governments’ responsiveness to the needs of the population, increase flows of information, transparency and accountability, and enhance the quality and sustainability of development projects (e.g. Rondinelli et al. 1983; Aiyar et al. 1996; Aiyar, Piriou-Sall and Williams 1996).

---

39 See Wade (1996) for a study of the context in which *The East Asian Miracle* study was produced, which was marked by Japan’s attempt to challenge the U.S. model of development, in particularly its focus on “rolling back the state.”
Similarly, decentralisation was praised and promoted in the wider literature as a way to either (i) “bring the government closer to the people” – a view which presupposed the benevolence of the government and thus implied that decentralisation would help the government in better meeting the needs and interests of the population; or to (ii) divide sovereignty between diverse levels of government – a proposition based on a view of the government as largely undesirable, and thus inferring that decentralisation would help to defuse the government’s power (Sharma 2009). The various benefits associated with decentralisation fuelled a veritable “decentralization fever” promoted by the Bank in the 1990s, which materialised in the form of numerous initiatives supporting or pushing for legal and judicial reform and decentralisation of political, administrative and fiscal functions in client countries (Bebbington, Dharmawan et al. 2004, 187).40

Yet Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke highlighted some of the limits of mainstream decentralisation theories, as they remarked that:

“Decentralisation in its neoliberal guise treats the local as a functional, economic space with policies designed to increase the efficiency of service delivery. In this sense the market is seen as a universal principle without any ‘geography’, although the implication is that local political economies have their own coherence within this totaling logic. Decentralisation simply facilitates the efficiency of these nested local economies” (2000, 251).

When reintroducing dimensions of power and politics, decentralisation must be understood as the expression of “particular modes of distribution of power” rooted in political struggles for “control over authority and resources,” as Indonesian scholar Vedi Hadiz noted (2004, 698–709). Hadiz showed that in Indonesia, the national government, which was weakened by the fall of Suharto, became unable to violently suppress mounting demands for autonomy and even secession in the provinces, and thus granted kabupaten (district) and kotamadya (town)

40 Between 1993 and 1997, 12% of World Bank projects involved devolving responsibilities to lower levels of government (Litvack et al. 1998, 1). More generally, between 1996 and 2000, the Bank financed over 600 governance-related programmes in 95 countries (Development Committee in Santiso 2001, 3).
greater autonomy (ibid., 707–709). Moreover, decentralisation was intended to strengthen the power of conservative elites by shifting power away from Jakarta, where pressures and mobilisation for more serious political change were strongest, towards rural areas, which were typically seen to be more conservative, and where entrenched local elites could more easily retain office, even in the context of national-level regime change. In this context, the main effect of decentralisation reforms was to produce new patronage networks at the local level, ruled by businessmen and politicians who formed the “lower layers of the New Order’s formerly vast system of patronage,” and who were able to seize the opportunity of (re)democratisation and decentralisation to promote and protect their interests (ibid., 712).

In short, decentralisation gave rise to “new patterns of highly diffuse and decentralized corruption, rule by predatory local officials, the rise of money politics and the consolidation of political gangsterism” (ibid., 711). Similar patterns have been observed in other countries, such as Thailand, post-Soviet Russia and the Philippines. In the Philippines, decentralisation turned local governments into crucial nodes of power that attracted predatory interests and increased the vulnerability of the broad mass of the population to money, clientelism and coercion in the electoral contest (as discussed in the following chapter). As such, decentralisation represented an avenue to “empower[...] conservative local elites” (International Council on Human Rights Policy 2002, 8), and thus to discourage popular mobilisation and movements of contestation. In the age of globalisation, moreover, decentralisation represented a key complement to economic liberalisation, stimulating inter-regional competition for capital to drive costs down for business (in particular labour costs), reduce “inefficiencies” (including central governments’ corruption), and encourage local initiatives to attract capital (e.g. Qian and Roland 1998; Fisman and Gatti 2002). By undercutting the nation-state as the site of social reproduction and economic regulation,

41 This movement of globalisation and decentralisation, devolution, and localisation corresponds to what some scholars, such as Robertson (1995) and Swyngedouw (2004), have referred to as “glocalisation.”
decentralisation further offered an avenue to promote demobilisation and de-statification, essentially freeing transnational capital from the pressures of popular mobilisation on the nation-state, and curtailing leeway for controlling or mitigating the harmful effects of the free market (Robinson 1999, 44). As social movements and activist organisations themselves became decentralised, they lost much of their coordination, coherence and control over their members, a trend that Sydney Tarrow referred to as “the tyranny of decentralization” (2011, 131–132).

The decentralisation of state institutions was paralleled by a shift in social welfare provision, from the national to the local level. There, development and welfare projects would apparently take the form of “bottom-up” and highly participatory processes, based around local knowledge and local needs, with the aim to enable the poor “better to help themselves” (e.g. Chambers 1983). This representation of development projects lent legitimacy and widespread support to the shift to local development interventions, in particular as the concept of participation strongly echoed radical, counter-hegemonic discourse (Mohan and Stokke 2000, 250). Indeed participation was originally inscribed within a “counter-hegemonic approach to radical social transformation” (Leal 2010, 89); it was promoted by Marxist-influenced educator Paulo Freire and the radical school of Participatory Action Research, and advocated by leftist parties as a way to deepen democracy in Latin America (ibid.; Goldfrank 2002, 51–52). Yet, when absorbed in mainstream development discourse, the meaning and goals attached to participation were significantly distorted.

For the Bank, participation was first and foremost a way to improve the efficiency of public services provision, and to stimulate local integration in markets and market relations (e.g. Cernea 1991). It also offered the opportunity to reduce the cost of development interventions, as participatory development programmes usually required unpaid
contributions from “communities,” thus “engaging communities in sharing the costs, and the burdens, of development” (Cornwall and Brock 2005, 6–7). Moreover, participation represented a means to redirect popular demands and pressures for increased welfare and wealth redistribution within the unthreatening channels of mainstream development. It became a mechanism for “countering grassroots resistance to reforms, providing a palliative that served to neutralize popular resistance to liberalising reforms” (Cornwall 2006, 72), and for “convincing citizens that democracy works” (Goldfrank 2002, 52). In other words, participation as complement to decentralisation and liberalisation reforms reflected the need to promote demobilisation and to support the integration of economies within global economic circuitries, locally.

Overall, in contexts of oligarchical democracy, “good governance,” decentralisation and participation came to represent new means to shore up hegemony and promote demobilisation, in support of economic liberalisation. In this context, a diverse array of World Bank programmes and projects advanced a few specific aspects of the Bank’s expanding agenda. Yet a few programmes adopted a new and holistic approach, promoting “good governance” and decentralisation through “bottom-up” and highly participatory approaches, in various “communities” in Mexico and Brazil in the early 1990s. These programmes, which came to be known as the first, large-scale “community-driven development” programmes of the World Bank, are examined in the pages below.

42 Although this thesis does not refute the proposition that participation may constitute a way to stimulate the “exercise of popular agency in relation to development” (Hickey and Mohan 2004, 3), it still advances that when imposed externally, usually by development organisations, participation can largely be viewed as a form of “tyranny” (e.g. Cooke and Kothari 2001).

43 Although the DRD project, which is now regarded as the World Bank’s first large-scale CDD programme, emerged in Mexico in 1991, the label “community-driven development” only emerged four years later, in 1995 (Binswanger-Mkhize and Alyar 2009a, 26).
The Emergence of CDD Programmes: The Cases of Brazil and Mexico

Mexico

The Bank’s first large-scale CDD programme was the Decentralization and Regional Development (DRD) Project. It emerged in Mexico in 1991, in a context of protracted crisis associated with mounting challenges to economic liberalisation and to the conservative party Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party), which had been the de facto ruling party in the country for the previous 60 years. Economic liberalisation in Mexico was associated with the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988). In the context of global debt crisis, the Harvard graduate technocrat broke away from his predecessors’ protectionism and import-substitution industrialisation strategies to embrace free market policies and export-oriented industrialisation. Thus in the mid-1980s, Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and embarked on a programme of economic reform and stabilisation. Economic policies of the mid- to late 1980s focused on trade and financial deregulation and liberalisation, consisting largely of cutting back export subsidies, import licensing, tariffs, credit quotas, interest rate ceilings and regulation of foreign direct investment (Zabludovsky and Pasquel 2010, 89–91). By the end of de la Madrid’s presidency, Mexico was experiencing hyper-inflation (reaching 159% in 1987), a large fiscal deficit, and a plummeting gross domestic product (GDP) (Peters 2000, 49). In the course of the decade, per capita income levels had severely dropped, real minimum wage had declined by nearly 50% and GDP per capita by 9%, standard of living had fallen to the levels of the 1960s, income inequality had increased dramatically, occupational mobility had followed a downward movement, and about 60% of the population lived in poverty (Massey 1996, 402).

Against this backdrop, popular discontent was particularly widespread, and PRI clientelistic networks, though which the party had long dominated electoral politics, were
weakened by diminished government resources (Fernández and Hogenboom 1998, 266–267). As a result, the 1988 elections saw the tightest race to the presidency ever experienced in the country, as Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, running for the leftist coalition *Frente Democrático Nacional* (FDN or National Democratic Front), emerged as the main opponent of PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Challenges to the PRI largely came from the middle class in urban areas and from several southern rural states, which showed unprecedented support for Cárdenas and seriously challenged PRI cacique strongholds in these areas (Harvey 1993, 210–211). Although the race was officially won by Salinas, who reportedly obtained 50% of the votes (against 31% for Cárdenas), the results were widely contested and led to a wave of popular protests, as only half of the polling stations returns were made public, and publicly available returns indicated Cárdenas’ victory, with 39% of the votes against 32% for Salinas (ibid.).

It was in this context of crisis of legitimacy that President Salinas (1988-1994) launched the *Programa Nacional de Solidaridad* (PRONASOL, National Solidarity Program), a much publicised collection of poverty reduction projects intended to revitalise popular support for the administration and its far-reaching free market policies (Needler 1995, 30; Kurtz 2004, 193). There was little doubt about the political rationale behind PRONASOL, whose roles were to (i) generate support for the administration, particularly in view of upcoming elections; (ii) defuse popular mobilisation, which was to be channelled through the programme’s participatory framework; (iii) support the rise of “new leaders,” whose image would be “free of the bossism, corruption, cynicism, and wastefulness that had attached themselves to the party’s [PRI] image” (Needler 1995, 31); and (iv) reduce public spending on rural development (whose volume declined by 55% in real terms between 1980 and 1988) and restrict access to rural credit, which was privatised and replaced by small subsidies distributed through PRONASOL (Magaloni et al. 2007, 193; Harvey 1993, 209;
Dresser 1991, 1–2; Kurtz 2004, 171). As such, PRONASOL has been described as “partisan,” “neopopulist” “containment strategy” and “new form of clientelism” (ibid.).

It was in support of “partisan” and “neopopulist” PRONASOL that the DRD project emerged at the World Bank. The DRD project, which was the Bank’s first large-scale CDD project, was financed through a US$350 million loan to the Mexican government, and implemented between 1991 and 1994 in the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Hidalgo (World Bank 1996, ii). These four states were not only among the poorest and most unequal places in Mexico. They were also among the states where the PRI was most strongly challenged and fraud was most widespread in the 1988 elections, and where mobilisation against the PRI remained vigorous in 1989 and 1990 (Schatz 2011, 144; Harvey 1993, 211–214). Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca experienced particularly widespread protests and mobilisation against the PRI and against economic liberalisation. Marcus Kurtz (2004) identified two main factors explaining the vigour of popular mobilisation in these states. First of all, all three states had a high proportion of indigenous population and a strong sense of indigenous identity, around which the population was able to mobilise. Secondly, they experienced a comparatively weaker penetration of free market than in the rest of the country, mainly due to the re-regulation of coffee production (the base of the economy in these states) at the state level, 44 which lessened the atomising and demobilising effects of free market penetration in the countryside. 45

In this context, the World Bank’s DRD project provided a means to promote demobilisation through avowed support to popular participation and decentralisation. The project officially aimed to “increase access of poor and indigenous populations [...] to basic

44 On the politics of reregulation of coffee production in South Mexico, see Snyder (2001).
45 More generally, Kurtz has shown that in rural Chile and Mexico, movements of contestation generally gathered momentum in the poorest and most unequal regions, which were not yet fully penetrated by economic liberalisation reforms and where the “atomization, disorganization, fragmentation, and economic dependence” (2004, 17) of the rural sector, which would ensure the political support of the peasantry to liberalisation, were not complete.
infrastructure, social services, markets and technologies” (World Bank 1996, 1). To do so, it set up a *Municipio* Investment Program, which would allegedly allow “rural communities to actively manage their own small scale development investments” (ibid., 15). The “bottom-up,” participatory approach of the DRD project in general and the *Municipio* Investment Program in particular was based on the formation of municipal solidarity councils, including municipal presidents, representatives of state governors and representatives of municipal authorities, who were in turn responsible for setting up municipal solidarity committees to manage the investment budgets of the CDD programme. Instead of acting as “new forum[s] for citizen participation accessible to the rural poor” (ibid., iii), as proposed by the Bank, municipal solidarity councils and committees became dominated by the PRI, a process which was eased by the heavy representation of local government officials on the councils. As such, the councils were used as “highly personalized neo-corporatist channels” (Dietz 2006, 50), which tended to “constitute a serious obstacle for groups organized independently of the PRI” (Harvey 1993, 209). Their main effect was thus to “reproduce the control of the PRI in municipalities contested by opposition parties, rather than fostering productive use of public resources” (ibid.)

Although the CDD programme had little impact in terms of reducing poverty or increasing government accountability (Fox and Aranda 1996), evidence suggests that it proved effective in supporting the enduring domination of the PRI over political life in the indigenous, rural southern states of Mexico, including Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca. There, the 1994 presidential elections were marked by particularly widespread coercion, fraud and intimidation, including violation of ballot secrecy, pressure on voters, disorder and ballot stuffing (Fox 1996). With the help of PRONASOL and DRD structures, the PRI had thus succeeded in marginalising the opposition, whose presence was too limited to ensure ballot secrecy (ibid.). Yet the PRONASOL and the DRD programme soon backfired: in impeding
autonomous popular organising efforts locally and supporting PRI domination over official political channels, these programmes (amongst other factors) also forced tensions and contestation into extra-electoral struggles. In southern Mexico, where indigenous identity emerged as a leading organising force against the free market (Yashar 1999),\textsuperscript{46} armed uprisings surfaced in the mid-1990s. In particular, 1\textsuperscript{st} January 1994 became known as both the day when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force, and the day when the \textit{Ejército Zapatista de Liberación National} (Zapatista Army of National Liberation), widely referred to as the Zapatistas, rose up in arms in the state of Chiapas (Dietz 2006).

The Zapatistas compared NAFTA to a death sentence on Mexico (\textit{Subcomandante Marcos} in Gutierrez 2008, 883). Although NAFTA was presented by its proponents in the U.S. and Mexico as a way to raise standards of living and to increase wages in Mexico, it had devastating social and economic effect in the country. For instance, in preparation to the NAFTA, the Salinas government embarked on a programme of privatisation of the \textit{ejido} system, which referred to communally-own land that was communally or individually tenanted by \textit{ejidatarios}, and represented about half of the country’s arable land (Yetman 2000). In 1992, the ban on renting, selling or mortgaging land under the \textit{ejido} system was eliminated, and \textit{ejido} land could be bought for agricultural, livestock and forestry activities by domestic and foreign companies (ibid.). In parallel, agricultural subsidies and price support measures were removed, avowedly to boost economic efficiency and profitability and to embrace free trade principles. These liberalisation reforms proved particularly harmful for Mexico’s “limited-surplus producers,” which largely referred to the country’s indigenous peasantry (Gutierrez 2008, 887). The estimated 18 million people relying on agriculture, particularly on corn cultivation, for their subsistence and livelihood could not face the

\textsuperscript{46} Yashar (1999) has shown that in Latin America, the incompleteness of “neoliberal citizenship,” based on expanded civil and political rights and curtailed social rights, had the unintended consequence of politicising ethnic cleavages and indigenous identities.
competition of modern, heavily-subsidised U.S. commercial corn producers, which threatened their very ability to feed themselves (ibid.). As the declining profitability of maize production in Mexico led to falling agricultural wages and employment opportunities, moreover, NAFTA forced a movement of “retreat into a subsistence economy” and led to the increasing dependency of ejidatarios and small-scale farmers on migrant remittances and wages from non-agricultural labour (Dyer and Taylor 2002, 24; Sadoulet and de Janvry 2001).

Movements of mobilisation and insurgency that arose in reaction to the harmful effects of liberalisation reforms, exemplified by the Zapatista revolution in Chiapas and followed by uprisings in Guerrero and Oaxaca in the mid-1990s, signalled the need to expand the DRD project to further promote demobilisation and domestication of counter-hegemonic challenges. A US$500 million World Bank loan thus served to finance a second DRD project for 5 years (1995-2000) in eight states, four of which had a particularly high proportion of indigenous population and were the sites of particularly vigorous challenges to economic marketisation and its local supporters. The second DRD project’s participatory approach was also strengthened by adopting the Municipio Investment Program template as its main funding delivery mechanism (World Bank 1996, 14). Moreover, as the Bank found the initial Municipio Investment Program to be “extremely successful,” in particular in terms of creating a “model of community implementation of local small scale projects, providing a viable alternative to the traditional centralized implementation” (ibid., iii), the approach was replicated in Brazil, where the national government experienced its own legitimacy crisis in the early 1990s.

47 These are the four original states of Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Hidalgo, as well as the states of Pueblo, Michoacán, Veracruz, and Zacatecas.

48 For instance, in the states of Oaxaca and Veracruz, the installation of PRI state governors was challenged by the left, whilst Pueblo, Oaxaca, Michoacán, and Guerrero became sites of Zapatista “solidarity” actions such as land takeovers and road blockades (Routledge 1998, 253).
Brazil

In Brazil, as in Mexico, the emergence of a large-scale CDD programme supported by the Bank must be understood against the backdrop of mounting leftist challenges in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Five years of progressive (re)democratisation and economic liberalisation under the presidency of José Sarney (1985-1990), a former supporter of the military dictatorship, resulted in economic and social crisis in Brazil. Nearly half of the population were living in poverty, malnutrition was on the rise, unemployment rates were high, occupational mobility followed a downward trend, and inflation was rampant, rising despite a series of prices and wages freeze plans (Robinson 1999, 49; Myers 1992, 117). In this context, the 1989 presidential elections took the form of a contest between “labour” and “capital” (Lula in Hunter, 114). On the one hand, the conservative and quasi-populist Fernando Collor de Mello ran on a platform of fight against corruption and liberalisation reforms that promised to overcome hyper-inflation and stimulate growth. On the other hand, Luiz Inácio (Lula) da Silva, a former worker turned union leader and head of the main opposition party, the left-wing Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers’ Party), ran on a radical platform based on social transformation, redistribution, economic protectionism and interventionism. Collor won a narrow victory over Lula (42.7% against 37.8% of the votes), who enjoyed particular support in a few states of South and Northeast Brazil (Myers 1992, 118). The following year, parliamentary and gubernatorial elections were marked by particularly strong performances by the machine politicians-dominated Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB, Brazilian Democratic Movement Party), and the conservative Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL, Liberal Front Party) (von Mettenheim 1995, 122–125). Although these performances signalled the vigour of “traditional,” conservative
politicians and their local machines, the PT remained a serious challenger to local bosses and “traditional” politicians (ibid.).

During the first year of his presidency, Collor benefited from strong popular and media support, and managed to quickly build majorities in Congress (ibid., 125). Yet his centralisation of power, his reluctance to develop broad political coalitions and the ambiguous results of his economic reform plan, which succeeded in beating inflation but caused drops in industrial production and GDP contraction, cost him the support of conservative politicians and businessmen (Myers 1992, 118–119). After less than two years in power, Collor was impeached on corruption charges, amidst mass protest by an eclectic combination of businessmen and conservative politicians mobilised alongside leftist parties, trade unions and students, known as the Movement for Ethics in Politics. His successor, former Vice-President Itamar Franco, rose to power in a context of widespread popular discontent towards the political elite, which heightened the need to strengthen his legitimacy and base of support in view of the upcoming 1994 presidential elections.

It was in the context of Collor’s impeachment and broad public dissatisfaction with conservative politicians in general that the new government of Itamar Franco and the Bank carried out the Reformulated Northeast Rural Development Program (R-NRDP) between 1993 and 1995. The CDD programme R-NRDP was organised on the basis of the Mexican DRD project. Its design was also informed by the Brazilian pilot project Apoio às Pequenas Comunidades Rurais (APCR, Support to Small Rural Communities), which officially “encouraged small farmers to organize and participate in development activities; [and] financed small rural investments in production, processing and rural infrastructure” (Coirolo

---

49 On the persistence of “traditional” elites in subnational politics under and after military dictatorship in Brazil, more specifically in the state of Minas Gerais, see Hagopian (1996).
50 The most controversial element of Collor’s Plano Novo Brasil, which was particularly threatening to business interests in the country, was the temporary confiscation of US$100 billion from bank and saving accounts, which suggested that Collor was indeed “fight[ing] inflation with the wallets of the rich,” as he had promised during his election campaign (in Myers 1992, 118).
Like Mexico’s CDD programme, APCR relied on the formation of “community associations,” which were responsible for preparing, implementing and operating “priority community subproject investments” in three areas: (i) small infrastructure; (ii) economic activities, such as agriculture or cottage industry; and (iii) “institution building,” referring to the “mobilization and organization of producers and communities” (ibid., 15). After submitting project proposals for these investments to state-level committees for approval, community associations (or the municipal governments, in cases where associations were not formally registered) directly received the funds to implement their projects. The fully-fledged, large-scale R-NRDP followed the APCR template, whilst further decentralising programme management and counterpart financing towards state governments. “Communities” were also endowed with greater responsibilities, including “the identification, preparation, cost sharing (labor, materials, or cash), and implementation of project activities” (ibid., 24).

R-NRDP was implemented in Northeast Brazil, which was regarded as “a political trouble spot and an economic drag on the rest of the Brazilian nation” by the national government and development agencies alike (Wright and Wolford 2003, 110). Indeed the Northeast had a history of mass mobilisation led by the Ligas Camponesas or Peasant Leagues in the 1960s,\(^{51}\) followed by the emergence of union-led rural labour movements in the 1980s (Pereira 1997), and by land occupations as part of the country-wide Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Movement of Landless Rural Workers), which was particularly vigorous in the region – accounting for a third of all land occupations in the country between 1988 and 1994 (Ondetti 2008, 110–111). The poor, highly unequal and populous Northeast was also a key region from an electoral perspective, being home to nearly 30% of the Brazilian population (Roett 1999, 228). The socio-economic structure of the

\(^{51}\) On the Peasant Leagues in Northeast Brazil in the early 1960s, see, for example, Forman (1975), Huizer (1973) and Julião (1972), who was the leader of the Peasant Leagues.
region, which was centred on labour-intensive production of sugarcane for export,\(^{52}\) had eased the enduring domination of regional politics by local bosses and political machines headed by large landowners relying on violence, coercion and clientelism – a system of political bossism known as *coronelismo*.\(^{53}\) However the dismantling of the government sugar subsidies in the late 1980s and the falling international prices for sugar in the 1990s challenged the capacity of local bosses to secure votes, and resulted in increasing rural mobilisation, demand for land redistribution, and support for Lula and the PT in the late 1980s (Wright and Wolford 2003, 142–143). In short, there was a need to strengthen the power of local, state and regional bosses and machine politicians in the Northeast, who largely belonged to Itamar Franco’s PMDB and its ally, the conservative PFL, in view of the 1994 elections.

Against this backdrop, the Brazilian CDD programme, financed by US$302 million in loans from the World Bank to the Federal Government of Brazil, was not simply deployed to “protect the poorest people from the short-term effects of its [the federal government’s] economic adjustment efforts,” as officially stated (Coirolo and Lammert 2009, 24). As in Mexico, R-NRDP also helped to strengthen the dominant position of conservative politicians at state and local levels, who were in charge of redistributing project resources and could widely influence its implementation. Its effectiveness can be gauged from the success of the conservative coalition of the PMDB and PFL – both of which were described as “catchall alliances of state and regional bosses” (Myers 1992, 120) – in the Northeast in the 1994 elections (Hunter 2010, 119). These dynamics were described in terms of a “virtuous cycle” in a recent World Bank’s report, which highlighted that “by providing essential infrastructure and social services to poor rural communities, the Program enhanced the *perceived* effectiveness of States and municipalities in the Northeast” (Coirolo and Lammert 2009, 28; 28

\(^{52}\) For an ethnographic study of the very difficult conditions of living in Northeast Brazil, most specifically in the state of Pernambuco’s *zona da mata* or sugarcane plantation zone, see Schepfer-Hugues (1992).

\(^{53}\) On Brazil’s *coronelismo*, see Leaf’s (1977) classic study; see also Pang (1973).
emphasis added). The program was also incorporated into the quasi-populist discourse of local politicians, as illustrated by Paraiba Governor Cassio Cunha Lima, who declared that the CDD programme was “bringing something absolutely innovative—I’d say fantastic, extraordinary—the chance for communities to follow their own destinies, to choose their priorities, administer resources, assemble in Councils . . . to earn and assume their civic rights” (in Coirolo and Lammert 2009, 21; emphasis in original).

The adoption of a highly participatory programme also had a particularly strong resonance in Northeast Brazil, where literacy campaigns in the 1960s were based on the pedagogy of then Recife University professor Paulo Freire (Shaull 2000, 31). Freire’s pedagogy sought to awaken people’s critical consciousness, a process referred to as conscientização, namely “learning to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality” (translator’s note in Freire 2000, 35). “Reflective participation” was a critical component of this project of social transformation and liberation of “the oppressed,” as it would enable them to avoid “populist pitfalls” and instead “see themselves as women and men engaged in the ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully human” (ibid., 65–66). In the late 1980s and 1990s, popular participation was also a central component of the PT local policy initiatives, most famously in Porto Alegre’s “participatory budget.”54 There, the executive budget allocation process was based on informal citizen consultation on local issues selected by the government (mainly infrastructure building or improvement and public services), on which city residents could submit proposals, which were voted and selected on the basis of a set of pre-agreed, technical criteria, before being sent to the Legislative Council (Waldman 2008, 185–188). In this regard, the Brazilian CDD programme vividly exemplified the trend for free market proponents, from the Bank to national political parties and local politicians, to

---

54 On participatory democracy in Porto Alegre, see Baiocchi (2005). See also Goldfrank (2011) for a discussion of participatory experiments across Latin America.
appropriate radical counter-hegemonic discourse (and, to some extent, practices) to lend legitimacy and an aura of benevolence and social progressiveness to their interventions – despite the drastic distortion of this discourse’s meaning and ends. Moreover, the R-NRDP was extended for a total of 15 years (1995-2010), through the Rural Poverty Reduction Program, which was financed by World Bank loans amounting to US$905 million (Coirolo and Lammert 2009, 29–33).

Overall, the cases of Brazil and Mexico shed considerable light on the emergence of CDD programmes. They show that these programmes emerged in contexts of protracted crises, in regions and states where leftist threats to economic liberalisation and its national champions were particularly strong. In such contexts, CDD programmes represented promising instruments for reinforcing the power of local bosses and machine politicians, which could be used to strengthen and restyle clientelistic channels for the distribution of development assistance, and to obstruct mobilisation from below at the local level. Moreover, their participatory frameworks enabled CDD programmes and national governments to reduce costs associated with the provision of rural welfare and development, whilst lending legitimacy and an aura of benevolence and social progressiveness to such interventions. In so doing, CDD programmes in Mexico and Brazil also represented avenues to promote transformist absorption of the tensions and contradictions of oligarchical democracy. The opportunity that these programmes offered, in terms of promoting demobilisation, reinforcing the control of local bosses and machine politicians, and building up ruling parties’ support bases locally, explains their rapid expansion, as illustrated in the cases of Mexico and Brazil. As mobilisation and protests against economic liberalisation and its proponents in national governments and international financial institutions spread across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean in the 1990s, CDD programmes were further replicated throughout
the developing world, and evolved to reflect the expansion of the Bank’s realm of intervention towards society at large, which is examined in the pages below.

**Bringing Society Back in: “Civil Society” and “Empowerment” at the Bank**

The 1990s was a decade of dramatic market expansion in developing countries. It was promoted by the World Bank and the IMF through policies focusing on macroeconomic stabilisation, trade liberalisation and privatisation (as in the 1980s), as well as financial deregulation and liberalisation. Economic reforms were centred on liberalising current and capital accounts, setting up and liberalising equity markets, increasing central banks’ independence, privatising state banks and easing reserve requirement and directed credit (World Bank 2005b, 203–206). As in the 1980s, the World Bank aggressively promoted these policies through structural adjustment lending, whose volume rose from US$27 billion or 17% of the Bank’s total lending in the 1980s, to US$72 billion or 29% of total lending in the 1990s (World Bank 2001, vii–viii). As a result, the “lost decade” of the 1980s gave way to a decade of financial instability and crises throughout the developing world, where even the Bank’s celebrated development “success stories” crumbled, as most dramatically illustrated by the Mexican and Asian financial crises of 1994 and 1997-1999 respectively.

Mexico, supposedly the World Bank’s best pupil and biggest success story, and the “miraculous” Southeast Asian economies, embarked on rapid financial liberalisation reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s, promoted by the Bank and the IMF. In both cases, reforms led to a rapid expansion in international lending volumes, largely unregulated, unsupervised and characterised by excessive risk-taking by domestic banks, which, as a result, experienced massive loan losses and deteriorating balance sheets leading towards credit crunches (Mishkin 1999, 13–14). Moreover, declining exports led to large current account deficits in both Mexico and Southeast Asia, which should have been corrected through devaluations, but
were ignored as local currencies remained pegged to the dollar (ibid., 10–13). In these contexts, vulnerable banking sectors and highly illiquid economies in Mexico and Southeast Asia became the targets of speculative attacks on their national currencies, which paved the way to full-blown financial crises, as currency devaluation resulted in mounting debt of domestic firms (denominated in foreign currency), large-scale banking crises, further cutbacks in lending, rising inflation, and economic downturns (ibid., 15–17).

In turn, in Central and Eastern Europe, the so-called “shock therapies” orchestrated by the Bank, the IMF, and Harvard economists Jeffrey Sachs (amongst others) focused on rapid economic liberalisation and privatisation to perform a swift move towards market economies, and to prevent the rise of political opposition. As in Latin America and Africa in the 1980s, the policy package had disastrous results in Central and Eastern European countries, which experienced high unemployment rates, inflation, declining standards of living, increasing poverty and inequality, and declines in social service provision (Sokol 2001). In contrast, China and India, both of which embraced heterodox economic policies that were based on gradual economic liberalisation and state interventionism, were rising as two new major economic players on the international scene, and were enjoying rapid and sustained economic growth and industrialisation (Rodrik 2004).

Against this backdrop, challenges from below were rising in the mid- to late 1990s and early 2000s, in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and in parts of Eastern Europe. Austerity measures, economic liberalisation, financial deregulation and privatisation were directly challenged by popular protests and uprisings in the form of labour strikes, rural movements, and urban protests and riots against public service cuts (Johnston and Almeida 2006b, 8–11). In Latin America and the Caribbean, these were exemplified by the Zapatistas in Mexico, the landless movement in Brazil, women workers' movements in Nicaragua and Northern Mexico demanding better labour conditions in the Maquilas (export-processing zones), the
“jobs for all” general strike in Uruguay, anti-debt demonstrations in Haiti, and mobilisation against health care privatisation in El Salvador, amongst others (Johnston and Almeida 2006a; Seddon 2005, 243–252). In turn, popular protest took unprecedented proportions in Africa in the 1990s, jumping from a yearly average of about 20 episodes of popular mobilisation in the 1980s to over 80 major episodes of mobilisation in 1991 alone, with massive strikes in Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe opposing governments’ austerity measures, student demonstrations and labour movements in Benin, widespread labour strikes in Egypt, as well as “bread riots” against rising food prices, and rising militant Islamist movements throughout the continent (Zeilig and Seddon 2009, 46–50; Seddon 2005, 230–243). Moreover, the combination of liberalisation reforms, economic crisis, and crises of political legitimacy led to state “criminalization” and war in places like Sierra Leone and Liberia (Bayart in ibid., 52). Popular protests and leftist insurgencies were also spreading throughout Asia, exemplified by “IMF protests” in Pakistan, mass popular protests in Indonesia and the Philippines, and insurgencies in India Nepal and the Philippines, to mention but a few (Seddon 2005, 252–260).

In parallel, “new” social movements, labelled “anti-neoliberal,” “anti-capitalist,” “anti-globalisation” or “deglobalisation” emerged in the industrialised core (and beyond) in the mid- to late 1990s. They were exemplified by the 1999 “Battle of Seattle,” when thousands of people protested against a World Trade Organisation (WTO) meeting, as well as earlier movements opposing NAFTA and GATT negotiations in Canada and the U.S. (Lang 2011, 64–69), and movements such as the Alliance for Global Justice, a Washington, D.C.- based organisation set up in 1998 with the aim to promote “the development of a unified domestic and international movement of transformational grassroots organizations that promote a socially, ecologically and economically just world” (AFGJ 2012). In this context, the World Bank was directly under attack, turning fifty in the midst of the Fifty Years is
Enough campaign, which called for deep reforms, or in the most extreme cases, closure of the Bank (Danaher 1994). These mounting criticisms and challenges from below signalled the need for the Bank to “reform” its modes of intervention, to appease critics in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere in the industrialised core, and to more effectively manage and regulate the many localities drawn into the world economy in the era of globalisation.

The World Bank adopted a two-pronged strategy to address critics and mounting counter-hegemonic challenges. On the one hand, the Bank strengthened its “good governance” agenda, thanks to the increasing influence of new institutional economics and its focus on “getting institutions right.” On the other hand, the Bank further expanded its scope of intervention to more directly address these challenges, embracing the whole society as a realm to be corrected, reorganised and optimised. In other words, as the harmful effects of unrelenting liberalisation generated mounting opposition, they also created the need (or opportunity) for the Bank to adopt more direct tactics of social control to protect and promote market expansion. Thus, after “bringing the state back in,” the Bank brought society back in, through the adoption of civil society, social capital and empowerment as the new key elements of its policies and operations – in a manner that obliterated dimensions of power, politics, inequality and contestation, as noted in Chapter 1.

In the early 1990s, the rise of new states in Eastern and Central Europe revived interest in civil society amongst academic circles in North America and Europe. This trend was exemplified by Harvard professor Robert Putnam and his celebrated writings on social capital and civic communities (1993 and 2000), American sociologist Amitai Etzioni, who pled for the revival of responsive, responsible and authentic communities in America, and the broad literature on civil society and participatory democracy discussed in Chapter 1. Communitarian (rather than individualistic) strands of liberalism also assumed prominence in

---

55 This influence was both illustrated and reinforced by the appointment of Joseph Stiglitz, one of the main proponents of new institutional economics, as senior vice-president and chief economist at the World Bank (1997-2000).
policy-making circles, as Bill Clinton and Tony Blair championed the “Third Way,” a reworking of social democracy under economic liberalisation that proposed to combine economic liberalism with social inclusion and social welfare, to be provided locally, by the third sector or civil society (Fyfe 2005). In liberal communitarian narratives, civil society was thus presented as “a place where politics can be democratised, active citizenship strengthened, the public sphere reinvigorated and welfare programmes suited to pluralist needs designed and delivered” (Brown et al. 2000, 57).

In the mid-1990s, the Bank established itself as a leading proponent of liberal communitarian approaches to development, particularly emphasising the role of civil society in promoting economic development, “good governance” and social cohesion in the context of economic liberalisation and globalisation. As Chapter 1 discussed, it placed an increasing emphasis on building social capital through its interventions, which ostensibly offered a way to reengineer social relations and increase social efficiency, and to “scientifically” link participation with development outcomes (e.g. Cernea and Adams 1994; Bebbington, Guggenheim et al. 2004). Strong civil societies endowed with large stocks of social capital were presented as the antidotes to the increasing hardships and discontent brought about by structural adjustment. Moreover, strengthening civil society was supposedly the solution to overcome the problems and limitations of the decentralisation reforms of the 1990s, which fell short of delivering “good governance,” and largely failed to curb corruption, clientelism and rent-seeking in governments. Instead, evidence indicated that decentralisation turned local governments into key nodes of power, with greater access to national resources and greater power to generate revenue, thus encouraging corruption, clientelism and rent-seeking at the local level (e.g. Khan 2002; Hadiz 2004; Samuels 2003; Crook and Manor 1998; Johnson 2001). In this context, strengthening civil society and building social capital were presented as crucial endeavours to stimulate demand for “accountable” governments and
redress instances of “governance failure” (Landell-Mills 1992; Grootaert 1998; Woolcock and Narayan 2006).

Moreover, in contexts characterised by oligarchical democracy and accelerated economic liberalisation, civil society – understood in Gramscian terms, as “an arena for exercising domination” (Robinson 1996, 29) by incorporating the popular classes “under the hegemony of the elite” (ibid., 58) – represented an important realm in which hegemony could be promoted and counter-hegemonic challenges could be demobilised. The World Bank’s new focus on society at large thus opened avenues to directly manage and regulate localities drawn into the world economy by globalisation. As such, civil society, alongside the state, came to be regarded as an important “enabling” environment for markets and market relations. The double expansion of the Bank’s scope of intervention in the 1990s, initially towards the state through “good governance,” followed by society through “civil society,” soon merged into a new and “holistic” “empowerment” agenda.

In the 2000/2001 World Development Report, the overarching aim of the World Bank’s empowerment agenda was identified as “improv[ing] the functioning of state and social institutions” in order to “improv[e] both growth and equity by reducing bureaucratic and social constraints to economic action and upward mobility” (World Bank 2000c, 9). The ambitious new agenda allegedly consisted of six main tasks, namely (i) “Laying the political and legal basis for inclusive development,” by promoting “transparent,” “democratic” and “participatory” institutions and “legal systems that foster economic growth;” (ii) “Creating public administrations that foster growth and equity,” by increasing their “accountability” and “responsiveness” and by fighting corruption; (iii) “Promoting inclusive decentralization and community development” by strengthening “local capacity” and boosting “popular participation and citizen monitoring of government agencies;” (iv) “Promoting gender

---

56 “Governance failure” refers to instances when distorted incentives, in particular insufficient information, competition and transparency, lead to the sub-optimal allocation of public resources (Stiglitz 2008).
equity;” (v) “Tackling social barriers” by encouraging the participation of socially-excluded groups and “channelling their energies into political processes instead of open conflict;” and (vi) “Supporting poor people’s social capital,” by “linking them to intermediary organizations, broader markets, and public institutions” (ibid., 9–10; emphasis in original). The empowerment agenda thus emphasised “holistic” and “long-term” development, which was presented as a (World Bank-led) process aiming to reshape state and social structures as well as human agency, particularly that of “the poor.”

In this context, the Bank styled itself as a “knowledge bank,” whose central tasks were allegedly to “teach poor countries how to transform themselves, encourage participation in the process of change through partnerships, and encourage commitment and “ownership”” (Pincus and Winters 2002b, 12; see also World Bank 1998b). It devised new instruments to enforce its empowerment agenda, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which represented a new form of conditionality for “Highly Indebted Poor Countries” to qualify for debt relief and concessional lending, by laying out a clear plan for achieving sustainable growth and poverty reduction. The empowerment agenda was thus constructed around an expanded form of conditionality and control over policy-making, which, as John Pender highlighted, involved “the subordination of society’s resources to meeting the perceived requirements of the poorest in that society” (2001, 409). As a result, Pender further noted, “[t]hose governments which are not deemed by the World Bank to have adequately pursued ‘good policy environments' will face the restriction of aid and lending facilities and the active cultivation of opposition movements” (ibid.). Moreover, with the increasing focus on “communities” as loci of empowerment, social capital and civil society interventions, conditionality was stretched from the national to the local level, and was expanded from governments to society at large, as illustrated in the pages to come in the case of Indonesia.
This expanded control was wrapped in a seductive discourse of empowerment, a concept associated with black power, feminist and popular education movements (Batliwala 2007, 558). In the context of these various movements, empowerment was largely understood as “a radical project of social transformation, to enable otherwise excluded social groups collectively to define and claim their rights” (Luttrell et al. 2007, 3). Although the absorption of empowerment into the Bank’s discourse effected a significant distortion of its meaning, turning it into one more depoliticised, sanitised, market-friendly concept, the term lent legitimacy and an aura of social progressiveness to the new policies and interventions of the World Bank (as had happened with the absorption of “participation” in the early 1990s). Moreover, the Bank presented its new agenda as a direct response to the needs and demand of “the poor,” which were allegedly uncovered by the Voices of the Poor, the Bank’s flagship background studies to the World Development Report 2000/2001, based on consultations with 60,000 individuals in 60 countries (Narayan, Patel et al. 2000; Narayan, Chambers et al. 2000; Narayan and Petesch 2002).

Overall, the 1990s were marked by further expansion of the World Bank’s realm of operations, in the context of mounting challenges from below that threatened the expansion of the free market in developing countries. This expansion followed a double movement, (i) outwards, into society at large, which enabled the Bank to increase its reach and influence in developing countries; and (ii) downwards, towards localities or “communities” drawn into the world economy by globalisation, which opened up avenues for the Bank to manage and regulate these localities more directly and effectively. This double expansion crystallised around the so-called empowerment agenda, of which CDD programmes have become the most far-reaching operational manifestation from the late 1990s onwards.
The Evolution and Expansion of CDD Programmes: Indonesia’s KDP and Beyond

The first CDD programme to carry out the Bank’s new liberal communitarian agenda, alongside decentralisation and participation, was Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Project (KDP), which would become one of the largest and supposedly most “successful” CDD programme worldwide. The World Bank-financed, US$273 million KDP emerged in June 1998 in 20 provinces, 95 kabupaten (districts), 350 kecamatan (sub-districts) and 2,000 villages across Indonesia (World Bank 1998a, 49). The context in which KDP emerged was marked by transition to democracy amidst popular movements of contestation. In the 1990s, these movements took the form of struggles over land and productive resources (mainly plantation, mining and logging) between the population and the state, and of widespread and violent rioting, which participated in prompting the fall of Suharto in May 1998, after thirty years in power (Li 2007, 256; Sidel 2006). As in Latin America and the Philippines a decade earlier, (re)democratisation in Indonesia was hijacked by local oligarchs and business classes who “reassert[ed] their political and economic hegemony within the new political arenas of politics and parliament” (Robinson and Hadiz 2004, 28).

Despite formal transition to democracy, land disputes and violent conflicts continued in the period of reformasi (reformation) that followed Suharto’s resignation. The late 1990s also saw the rise of pogroms and ethnic cleansings in Kalimatan, Maluku and Central Sulawesi, which created fears, internationally, that the country would break apart or descend into communal violence, as in Yugoslavia (Sidel 2006, 2–7). They were followed by jihad in the early 2000s, with attacks in Bali, Jakarta and elsewhere, which turned Indonesia into a high-priority country in the international, U.S.-led “war on terror” (ibid.). In the context of the financial crisis of 1997-1998 and its very harmful effects on the broad mass of the
violent struggles across the archipelago were accompanied by the threat of populist electoral challenges to the oligarchy, which also directly threatened to diminish the World Bank and the IMF’s influence and ability to push for further trade and financial liberalisation reforms in the country (Robinson and Hadiz 2004). This threat was largely embodied by Megawati Soekarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia’s first president and “nationalist hero” Soekarno, and leader of the nationalist Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), who established herself as a leading popular and populist figure in Indonesian politics. In the first post-Suharto election of 1999, Megawati Soekarnoputri led a populist campaign that helped her secure a strong following amongst subaltern classes. For instance, she frequently invoked Marhaenism, a doctrine invented by Soekarno to symbolise the struggle of the working class and of the wong cilik (little people), and pledged to reintroduce currency and foreign exchange controls (Ziv 2001; Robinson and Hadiz 2004). The electoral success of Megawati Soekarnoputri (who was elected vice-president after she lost the presidential elections) and of the PDI-P (which won 33% of the seats in parliament) in 1999 thus represented a clear challenge to Indonesia’s oligarchy, and more generally to transnational elites and their “institutional agents” (Robinson 2003, 46), the IMF and the World Bank.

It was in this context of transition to oligarchical democracy and growing counter-hegemonic challenges, in the form of subaltern movements and mobilisations, and of populist electoral challenges to entrenched elites, that KDP emerged. Although KDP’s implementation started a month after Suharto formally resigned, the celebrated CDD programme was designed under the authoritarian New Order regime, in response to the government’s “need to shore up its base among the masses” (Guggenheim 2006, 118). The design of the CDD programme was based on the findings of the Bank’s social development

---

57 Between 1997 and 1998 alone, poverty rates’ increased by between 50% and 100%, whilst real purchasing power and real wages plummeted (Thomas and Frankenberg 2007).
team in Indonesia, which indicated that the New Order regime’s attempt to restructure Indonesian villages had prompted a “Crisis of Leadership in Indonesian Villages,” and had severely weakened social organisation at the local level (ibid., 121–122; emphasis in original). KDP was specifically based on Local Level Institutions studies that the Bank commissioned in the mid-1990s to test Putnam’s theories of social capital. The studies found that whilst top-down government projects were largely ineffective, “communities” or villages had (i) the “capacity” to organise and undertake their own, participatory development projects; (ii) participatory mechanisms, which “would allow members to challenge leaders and to call for reflective “breaks” should disputes remain unsettled;” (iii) strong local leaders, who “could play a facilitating role to share information, invoke dispute resolution procedures, and help villagers find external assistance when it was needed;” and, in some cases, (iv) linkages with civil society organisations, which “could provide access to technology or engineering skills, and, more importantly, [...] could curb problems of corruption or other abuses of authority” (ibid., 124–125).

These findings reportedly challenged the conception of development interventions as merely delivering resources, giving rise instead to a view of interventions as a “way to trigger and support a process that helps villagers solve self-identified development problems” (ibid., 126). As such, KDP was presented as a process that aimed at stimulating villagers’ capacity for coordinated actions, by stimulating participation in local governance, promoting transparency, and encouraging accountability (McLaughlin et al., 2–3). To do so, it provided block grants between US$60,000 and US$110,000 to kecamatan (sub-district) councils (chaired by camats (kecamatan heads) and composed of the elected heads of “village planning groups”), which selected development project proposals (usually small infrastructure projects) prepared by villagers through a four to six month “participatory
planning process” (Guggenheim 2006, 114). 58 Funds were then allocated to the villagers whose proposals had been selected, whilst villagers were trained, monitored and supervised by facilitators to implement and maintain their projects, which they were expected to do by following very detailed rules and procedures (ibid.). KDP also placed a particular emphasis on managing conflict, which was regarded as an inevitable stage of the development process, but could allegedly remain peaceful insofar as “rational actors would be encouraged to channel collective energies into development activities and eschew violent mobilizations that undermined both security and economic progress” (Li 2007, 258).

Thus KDP’s ambitions went beyond the aims of early CDD programmes in Mexico and Brazil, seeking to set up “participatory institutions” and establish “vital participatory processes” throughout Indonesian villages (Edstrom 2002, 2), and to act as a platform where villagers “learn about democracy by practicing it” (Guggenheim 2006, 138), as noted in Chapter 1. Beyond the discourse of its proponents, KDP sought to systematically reorganise social relations by habituating villagers to norms of transparency, participation, accountability and competition. In other words, it aimed at shaping communities whose practices would follow market rules, in particular in their dealings with their local governments, rather than resort to mobilisation, confrontation or contestation. 59 To establish

---

58 Interestingly, KDP focused on the kecamatan, the one level of government in Indonesia whose head, the camat, was not elected, and thus remained solidly part of the bureaucracy. Scott Guggenheim, anthropologist at the World Bank and KDP’s main architect, justified this focus as follows: “villagers saw the kecamatan as the last level of government that they could approach, because they could travel back and forth to the kecamatan reasonably easily, and also because the sociological distance between villagers and a kecamatan official was a lot less than the distance they experienced when entering the powerful and intimidating district office complexes. [...] Because they [kecamatans] were not a fully autonomous unit of government, they had no budget and contracting powers of their own. This meant that the collection of commercial and political interests that maintained a stranglehold over government in the districts was much weaker in the subdistricts. [...] And last, having villagers compete for KDP funds in kecamatan meetings would, we hoped, encourage the kinds of direct negotiations and cooperation that would provide a basis for rebuilding the supra-village horizontal institutions destroyed or neglected by the New Order” (2006, 128–129).

59 The ideal of community promoted through KDP is exemplified by Guggenheim’s dramatised account of an anecdote collected by a KDP researcher, as follows: “It was a brilliantly clear morning in Central Sulawesi when the villagers first spied the large pile of lumber. One of the delivery truck drivers stood lazily by the wood [...] The golden lettering embroidered on his hat told the villagers that he [...] worked for the Public Works Department there. The villagers were curious. Just last year they had gotten funds from the Kecamatan Development Project to build a stone road from their rice fields to the market route, and now here were the
these norms, KDP resorted to an expanded form of conditionality directly focused on localities, as (in principle) CDD funds were delivered only to villages with technically superior project proposals (Li 2007, 242).

Whilst some proposed that in so doing, KDP acted as a source of “countervailing power” by helping to “build marginalised groups’ “capacity to engage” local level governing elites—and, more generally, to shift power relations—using routines of [...] “deliberative contestation” (Gibson and Woolcock 2007, 1), Tania Li aptly remarked that KDP “focused upon conducting the conduct of villagers, while leaving the conduct of senior officials, investors, and the military unexamined and unimproved” (2007, 267). In this way, KDP represented a particularly promising avenue to strengthen existing social structures, by promoting demobilisation and domestication, and by further reinforcing the power of local elites, who “hijacked” decentralisation processes to entrench themselves in positions of local authority (Hadiz 2004), as noted above.

In short, the new generation of CDD programmes, exemplified by KDP, adopted a far-reaching method of social control based on “conducting the conduct” of residents of rural localities, along the lines of market rules and relations, under the seductive and benevolent materials to repair a bridge. [...] “Friend, what is this wood for?” “It’s to build a bridge” “How much wood is there? What did it cost?” “That’s none of your business. [...]” “But we want to know. This is our new rule here. You have to come to the balai desa [village hall] and tell us about the project. Then you have to post a signboard so that all of us know how much this bridge costs. If KDP does it, we want you to do it too.” “You are mistaken. KDP is KDP and it has KDP rules. This is a government project and we follow our rules. Just be thankful that you are getting a bridge”. The villagers were troubled. [...] This was now the era of reformasi and people had a right to know about projects. Early the next morning, [...] the villagers had heaved the wood back onto a large truck owned by the son of the village council head. Two truckloads of villagers and scores of motorcycles joined the procession to the district parliament. When the first parliamentarians arrived for work that morning, they were met by a quiet delegation of villagers standing atop a large pile of wood wrapped in an enormous white cloth. “What is this?” They asked “This is the cloth we use to wrap our dead,” the village head replied, “and dead is what this project is. We would rather have no bridge and no wood than go back to the corrupt ways of the New Order. From now on we only want projects that involve us in decisions. If KDP can do it, other projects can do it too.” And with those words, the villagers got back on their trucks and went home” (2006, 111–112).

Li’s characterisation of KDP as a programme of “government,” in the Foucauldian sense of “conducting the conduct,” aptly captures the CDD programme’s attempt to modify the perceptions and practices of individuals “by calculated means,” and indeed conduct their conduct, rather than freeing or empowering them (2007, 5) Yet Foucault’s notion of “government” implies an overall intention to achieve “the well-being of populations at large” (ibid.). Instead of identifying such an overall intention guiding the operations of CDD programmes, which would be analytically problematic to determine, this thesis attempts to bring to light the structural logic that can help to explain the emergence, evolution, expansion, operations and effects of CDD programmes.
term of “community empowerment.” Moreover, KDP encouraged local politicians to style themselves as “progressive” leaders, by “providing critical support to progressive village heads,” in the form of KDP grants, and facilitation and procedures to encourage these leaders to adopt more participatory practices (McLaughlin et al. 2007, xi and 67–70). In so doing, KDP helped to enhance the material resources and the political clout of these politicians, and represented a promising avenue to promote transformist absorption of the tensions and contradictions of oligarchical democracy, as the chapters to come elaborate in the case of the Philippines. As in Mexico and Brazil, the original KDP evolved and expanded through an additional US$730 million from the World Bank. In 2008, the CDD programme was rolled out into the nation-wide National Program for Community Empowerment, financed by US$1.85 billion in World Bank loans. Such an expansionary trend was by no means limited to Indonesia.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the World Bank expanded its CDD programmes within and across countries. In preparation for expansion, all of the Bank’s regions of intervention61 were asked to prepare plans for scaling up CDD programmes, whilst a newly formed, Bank-wide working group on CDD was tasked with reviewing, refining and promoting CDD programmes (World Bank 2000b; Binswanger-Mkhize and Aiyar 2009a, 33). As a result, the volume of lending channelled towards CDD programmes quickly increased, from US$325 million in 1996 to an average of US$2 billion a year in the 2000s (Mansuri and Rao 2004, 2). Between 2000 and 2008, the Bank thus channelled over US$16 billion or nearly 10% of its total lending towards more than 600 CDD programmes in over 100 countries (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010, 51), as noted in the preceding chapter.

The massive and rapid expansion of CDD programmes must be understood against the backdrop of heightened counter-hegemonic challenges across Latin America, Africa and

---

61 These regions are South Asia, Middle East and North Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, Africa, and Europe and Central Asia.
Asia in the 2000s. On the one hand, subaltern movements and mobilisations, which were discussed in the pages above, persisted throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century. On the other hand, the 2000s saw mounting populist electoral challenges to entrenched national governments. In Latin America, these challenges were exemplified by major electoral successes of the Left, most notably by the presidencies of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Lula in Brazil, who were all elected with an absolute majority of votes and, apart from Lula’s PT, all won congressional majorities (Ellner 2012). In Asia, the elections of Thaksin Shinawatra as Thai Prime Minister and of Joseph Estrada as Philippine President, for example, also signalled that populism and popularity were supplanting money, fraud and machinery as a basis for mobilising voters and threatened the dominant bloc of social forces (as discussed in Chapter 3 in the case of the Philippines).

The type of conjunctures in which CDD programmes have emerged, evolved and expanded can be better understood by considering the contexts in which the twelve largest CDD programmes of the World Bank were implemented, which are listed in Table 1. 62

---

62 Since the World Bank does not keep a database of all its CDD programmes, this list has been compiled by reviewing the literature on CDD programmes produced by the World Bank (including Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009b; World Bank 2009b; Wong and Guggenheim 2005). CDD programmes have been selected on the basis of their financial size, their duration, and their “multi-sectoral” approach (i.e. they have not focused on a single sector, such as health or environmental conservation, as some programmes adopting a CDD approach have), using the World Bank Projects and Operations database <www.worldbank.org/projects>.
Table 1 – Top 12 CDD Programmes Financed by the World Bank Worldwide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>World Bank Financing*</th>
<th>Implementation Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Reformulated Northeast Rural Development Program &amp; Rural Poverty Reduction Program</td>
<td>1207.5</td>
<td>1993-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Kecamatan Development Project (I-III)</td>
<td>1003</td>
<td>1998-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Decentralization and Regional Development Project (I-II)</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1991-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Poverty Alleviation Fund Project (I-III)</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>1999-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>National Fadama Development Project (II and III)</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>2004-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Andhra Pradesh Rural Poverty Reduction Project</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>2003-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Northern Mountains Poverty Reduction Program (I-II)</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>2002-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Social Fund for Development Project (I-V)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1997-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Local Government Development Program (I-II)</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>2000-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Social Investment Fund Project (I-V)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1991-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>KALAHI-CIDSS &amp; KCAF</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>2003-2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In US$ million
Source: World Bank projects and operations database

In Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and the Philippines, CDD programmes emerged and expanded in contexts of (re)democratisation, economic liberalisation and counter-hegemonic challenges, in the form of subaltern movements and mobilisations and of populist electoral challenges to entrenched national governments. In turn, CDD programmes emerged in India, Uganda and Nigeria at times when the countries experienced far-reaching liberalisation reforms supported by the World Bank and the IMF, as well as growing insurgencies and radical social movements. Vietnam and Honduras also experienced CDD intervention at a time when accelerated economic liberalisation and persistent or rising economic inequalities and poverty generated social tensions and discontent. Moreover, Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen were all countries of great concern in the context of the Global War on Terrorism.
In short, the type of contexts in which CDD programmes emerged, expanded and evolved can be broadly sketched as characterised by accelerated economic liberalisation threatened by mounting counter-hegemonic challenges, generally in the form of subaltern movements and mobilisations at the local level, and populist electoral challenges at the national level. In these contexts, CDD programmes represented particularly promising tools to reinforce the power of local elites and promote demobilisation, as illustrated in the case of Indonesia. Moreover CDD programmes enabled the Bank to intervene in contexts where traditional “top-down” interventions would not be possible, in particular in “failed states,” understood by the Bank as a state that “fails its citizens by not providing them with the most basic services,” including security, leading to violence and conflicts (Alda and Willman 2009, 26). In the words of a senior social development specialist at the World Bank’s headquarters in Washington, D.C.:

“CDD work [was] perceived as an opportunity. This was the first chance of the Bank in a failed state context. You could still get resources, and you could get them down to the lowest levels and address basic services. [...] And for the Bank it was a boon, because otherwise you were not working, you were not working in Zambia, you were not working in Bolivia, because the central government had sort of collapsed” (IV44).

In addition, CDD discourse offered the possibility to assuage radical critics of economic liberalisation reforms, in the context of growing “anti-globalisation” social movements in the 2000s – illustrated by the success of Porto Alegre’s World Social Forum, which gathered hundreds of thousands of anti-globalisation activists under the slogan “another world is possible,” by the rise of anti-globalisation activists networks worldwide, and by the vivacity of the protests that almost invariably greeted WTO, World Bank and IMF summits across the world. In this context, CDD discourse of “empowerment” and “participation” strongly echoed the discourse of anti-globalisation activists. Indeed the CDD approach was promoted as a symbol of the Bank’s empowerment agenda, and was described
by World Bank President Wolfensohn, who personally endorsed and publicised CDD programmes, as a key to sustainable and equitable local development. In Wolfensohn’s words:

“CDD is based on the principle that community organizations should have the authority and control over decision and resources of Bank programs. [...] CDD has the potential to make allocation of resources more responsive to the needs of the poor and to lead to more sustainable and equitable outcomes. CDD will also help poor communities develop their own management skills and improve their negotiating capacity to deal with government, the private sector, other development agencies and civil society” (Wolfensohn in Journal of the Inter-Parliamentary Union 2000).

Moreover, CDD programmes allegedly stemmed from “poor people” themselves, who reportedly “demanded” CDD programmes to “shape their own destinies” (Narayan et al. in Dongier et al. 2002, 304). This representation endowed CDD programmes with a benevolent aura, as noted above, which also served to promote a vision of the Bank itself as a “progressive” institution,63 and was particularly useful to gain the sympathy of radical critics.

Although the CDD approach was criticised by hardcore liberal economists, in particular in the U.S. Treasury Department, for diverting the Bank’s attention from purist forms of growth promotion through economic liberalisation reforms,64 it addressed the concerns and complaints of influential, mainstream critics of “top-down” development interventions exclusively focusing on getting the economy right. Indeed, the new consensus that emerged in development policy and development studies in the late 1990s and early 2000s, exemplified by the rise of the “good governance” and empowerment agendas, proposed that economic growth was conditional upon sound institutional arrangements and

63 For instance, according to senior urban specialist at the World Bank Institute in Washington, D.C., the Bank “has a progressive agenda [...] and the people that work in these agendas of CDD, participation, governance, they are very progressive.” When asked what he meant by progressive, he answered that “they truly believe in the value of the poor voices, their needs, aspirations, decision-making...” When further prompted to explain whether this “progressive” agenda might be close to a leftist political agenda, the senior urban specialist replied: “The problem is that left and right, it becomes a bit meaningless in many parts of the world! [...] Inside the development world we don’t use the terms right, left [...]. It is more about development issues” (IV43).

64 See, for example, Wade (2002) for an account of disputes between hardcore liberal economists and proponents of the empowerment agenda in drafting the World Development Report 2000/2001.
effective societies.\textsuperscript{65} In this context, growth was increasingly equated with participatory democracy,\textsuperscript{66} and corruption in central governments was identified as the main impediment to sustainable development.\textsuperscript{67}

Viewed in the light of the mainstream development literature, the CDD approach seemed to address the main failures of previous development policies and interventions. It was presented as the comprehensive remedy to poverty and underdevelopment in localities throughout the developing world, as (i) an efficient, effective, far-reaching and responsive poverty reduction mechanism, which allegedly achieved “immediate and lasting results at the grassroots level” (Dongier et al. 2002, 303); (ii) a tool to improve the local provision of public goods and services by “promoting demand, competitive pressure, and the flow of information between governors and the governed” (Wong and Guggenheim 2005, 254–255); and, more generally, (iii) a way to “organize economic activity and resource management, empower poor people, improve governance, and enhance security of the poorest” (Dongier et al. 2002, 304). Against this backdrop, the rapid expansion of CDD programmes in the first decade of the twenty-first century was presented as desirable and even necessary, as “taking one or several islands of success that have addressed a national development problem and multiplying them to cover as much territory and population as possible and appropriate” (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009a, 3). In short, the evolution and expansion of CDD programmes in the first decade of the twenty-first century represented a particularly promising avenue to address counter-hegemonic challenges across the developing world,

\textsuperscript{65} For a critical discussion of this new consensus, which has been referred to as the “Post-Washington Consensus,” see, for example, Fine et al. (2001).
\textsuperscript{66} As Hadiz noted, democracy was embraced “only insofar as technocrats (or technopols) can preside over policies unimpeded by the intervention of societal interests that might include that of labour or other sources of social democratic or more radical agendas. Political democracy is, therefore, protected from challenges to the vast inequalities in power and wealth embedded in free markets, while it simultaneously protects the rights of property” (2004, 698).
\textsuperscript{67} See, for example, World Bank (1997) and Stiglitz (2002). For a critical analysis of the World Bank’s governance and anti-corruption strategies, see Khan (2002).
whilst assuaging both radical and mainstream critics of the World Bank’s development policies and interventions.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the contexts in which CDD programmes have become possible, intelligible, and desirable. It has traced the evolution of the concepts and practices that came to form the World Bank’s CDD approach, against the backdrop of the specific political and economic conjunctures in which they emerged and expanded. It has proposed that the emergence of CDD programmes must be understood in the context of the promotion of economic liberalisation in the 1980s, and the set of problems, challenges and opportunities it created. The World Bank and the IMF’s aggressive promotion of fiscal austerity, trade liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation through structural adjustment lending had disastrous social consequences, resulting in rising poverty, inequality, under- and unemployment throughout the developing world. These hardships were met by mounting popular discontent and protests against liberalisation and austerity measures, which were particularly vigorous across Latin America and Africa. As U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes proved increasingly ill-suited to contain mounting challenges from below, “democracy promotion” became the overall strategy underpinning the advance of the free market, better understood along the lines of transformism, as an active strategy to “relieve pressure from subordinate groups for more fundamental political, social and economic change” (Robinson 1996, 6). Against this backdrop, the World Bank, which largely represented the foreign policy priorities of the U.S. government, lent support to an “emergent transnational elite” of local oligarchs and business classes, who would promote market expansion and exercise social control via consensual (instead of coercive) means.

In this context, new tactics were called for to shore up hegemony and further promote demobilisation, as democratic politics brought back the threat of leftist challenges to
pro-economic liberalisation politicians and their parties. To do so, the Bank expanded its realm of operations from the economy to government institutions. It embraced “good governance,” decentralisation and popular participation as key themes guiding its policies and operations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which represented new means to shore up hegemony and promote demobilisation in support of transnational capital mobility, in contexts of oligarchical democracy. In particular, decentralisation offered avenues to strengthen the power of local elites over the population, and to discourage popular mobilisation and movements of contestation. By undercutting the nation-state as a site of social reproduction and economic regulation, decentralisation reforms also represented avenues to free transnational capital from the pressures of popular mobilisation at the national level, and limited efforts to control or mitigate the harmful effects of economic liberalisation policies. In turn, participation represented a means to redirect popular demands, tensions and discontent towards the unthreatening channels of mainstream development operations, and to promote transformism by “convincing citizens that democracy works” (Goldfrank 2002, 52).

It was against this backdrop that CDD programmes emerged in Mexico and Brazil in the early 1990s, outwardly promoting “good governance,” decentralisation and participation in contexts of protracted crises, in regions and states where leftist threats to economic liberalisation and its national champions were particularly strong. In such contexts, CDD programmes represented promising instruments for reinforcing the power of local bosses and machine politicians. They could be used to strengthen and restyle clientelistic channels for the distribution of development assistance, and to obstruct mobilisation from below on the local level. Moreover, their participatory frameworks enabled CDD programmes and national governments to reduce costs associated with the provision of rural welfare and development, whilst lending legitimacy and an aura of benevolence and social progressiveness to such interventions. Thus CDD programmes in Mexico and Brazil
represented avenues to reinforce the control of local bosses and machine politicians, build up ruling parties’ support bases locally, and promote transformist absorption of the tensions and contradictions of oligarchical democracy, all of which can explain the rapid expansion of CDD programmes within and across countries in the 1990s onwards.

In the context of accelerated economic liberalisation and its very harmful social effects, popular protests and uprisings spread across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and in parts of Eastern Europe, and were paralleled by anti-globalisation social movements in industrialised countries (and beyond) in the late 1990s. To appease critics and to more effectively manage and regulate the many localities drawn into the world economy in the era of globalisation, the World Bank further expanded its realm of operations (i) outwards, embracing society as a whole as a realm to be corrected, reorganised and optimised; and (ii) downwards, towards localities or “communities” drawn into the world economy by globalisation. This expansion was marked by the rise of civil society and social capital as new conceptual and operational foci at the Bank, which crystallised around the so-called empowerment agenda. Whilst the discourse of civil society, social capital and empowerment lent legitimacy and an aura of social progressiveness to Bank’s policies and interventions, the new focus on society at large also opened avenues to more directly address counter-hegemonic challenges and promote hegemony.

In the late 1990s and 2000s, CDD programmes became the most far-reaching operational manifestation of the World Bank’s empowerment agenda, operating as complements to the promotion of economic liberalisation under conditions of oligarchical democracy. The new generation of CDD programmes, exemplified by Indonesia’s KDP, went beyond the participatory approach of early CDD programmes in Mexico and Brazil. KDP sought to systematically reorganise social relations by habituating villagers to the norms of transparency, participation, accountability and competition, i.e. shaping communities whose
practices would follow market rules, in particular in their dealings with their local governments, rather than resort to mobilisation, confrontation or contestation. It also adopted particularly far-reaching methods of social control based on an expanded mode of conditionality directly aimed at localities, seeking to “conduct the conduct” of residents of these localities, along the lines of market rules and relations, in the name of “community empowerment.” Moreover, KDP encouraged local politicians to style themselves as “progressive” leaders, which helped to enhance the power of these politicians and represented a promising avenue to promote transformist absorption of the tensions and contradictions of oligarchical democracy.

In Indonesia and beyond, the rapid evolution and expansion of CDD programmes in the first decade of the twenty-first century must thus be understood in the context of accelerated economic liberalisation threatened by mounting counter-hegemonic challenges, generally in the form of subaltern movements and mobilisations at the local level, and of populist electoral challenges to entrenched national governments. In these contexts, CDD programmes represented particularly promising tools to strengthen existing social structures, by promoting demobilisation and domestication of counter-hegemonic challenges, reinforcing the power of local elites, and building support for parties supportive of economic liberalisation policies. Moreover, CDD discourse offered the possibility to assuage radical critics of economic liberalisation by echoing their language (whilst distorting its meanings) and promoting a vision of the Bank itself as a “progressive” institution,” which was particularly useful to gain the sympathy of these critics. It also addressed the concerns and complaints of influential, mainstream critics of “top-down” development interventions, representing the CDD approach as the comprehensive remedy to poverty and underdevelopment in localities throughout the developing world.
In short, the evolution and expansion of CDD programmes in the first decade of the twenty-first century represented a particularly promising avenue to address counter-hegemonic challenges across the developing world, whilst assuaging radical and mainstream critics of the World Bank’s development policies and interventions in industrialised countries and beyond. This recontextualisation of the emergence and evolution of the World Bank’s CDD programmes, under conditions of subaltern movements and mobilisations at the local level, and of populist electoral challenges to entrenched national governments, will help us to make sense of the emergence and evolution of a single, flagship CDD programme of the World Bank in the context of the Philippines at the turn of the twenty-first century.
Chapter 3 – Kalahi in Philippine Oligarchical Democracy

In the preceding chapter, the thesis showed that CDD programmes emerged in contexts where accelerated economic liberalisation was threatened by mounting counter-hegemonic challenges, in the form of subaltern movements and mobilisations on the local level and populist electoral challenges at the national level. In these contexts, it was proposed that CDD programmes represented particularly promising tools to reinforce the power of local bosses and machine politicians, strengthen ruling parties’ support bases locally, and promote transformist absorption of the tensions and contradictions of oligarchical democracy. In contrast to Chapter 2, which treated the broad dynamics that could account for the emergence and rise of CDD programmes worldwide, this chapter focuses on the emergence and evolution of a single CDD programme in the Philippines, the Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS), hereafter Kalahi. More specifically, this chapter asks why a large, “flagship” CDD programme such as Kalahi, which was reportedly “one of the most promising CDD operations in the East Asia region, and in the Bank portfolio” (World Bank 2005a, ii), emerged in the particular context of the Philippines in the early 2000s.

The US$182 million Kalahi was the flagship development programme of the World Bank and the Government of the Philippines. It was implemented between 2003 and 2009, in the poorest quartile municipalities of the 42 provinces whose poverty incidence levels were above the national average of 33.7% of families in 2000, as shown in Figure 1.

---

68 Kalahi was financed by a US$100 million World Bank loan, US$31 million from the Philippine government, and US$51 million from local governments and their constituencies (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004, 7).

69 Whilst provinces were selected on the basis of national poverty statistics, municipalities were selected on the basis of indicators on housing and basic facilities, “quality of human capital,” and “access to markets,” determined through a poverty mapping exercise specifically undertaken for Kalahi (Balicasan et al. 2002, 24).
Figure 1 – Provinces that Experienced Kalahi in 2003-2009

Source: World Bank (2005c, 2), © 2013 World Bank
Kalahi was ostensibly designed to “strengthen[...] local communities’ participation in barangay [village] governance” (World Bank 2002, 2). It outwardly pursued three main “activities,” namely: (i) empowering communities – referring to barangays (villages) through “participatory planning, implementation, and management of local development activities;” (ii) improving local governance, by “strengthening formal and informal institutions to become more inclusive, accountable, and effective;” and (iii) providing grants for “community investment programs,” often small infrastructure projects, which would result in “better local resource mobilization” and would “induce the type of behavioral change required for long-term sustainability of such investments” (ibid.).

More specifically, Kalahi initially followed a 16-step approach organised in four phases, which, in principle, unfolded as follows: the first phase, “social preparation,” started with municipal launches of Kalahi, where municipal governments committed to provide counterpart funding and technical support for barangays to implement the programme. In each municipality, a municipal inter-agency committee was set up to coordinate assistance provided by various local government agencies. In every barangay of the municipality, villagers were informed about Kalahi during a first barangay assembly – a formal meeting of all barangay residents, mandated by law to assemble at least twice a year to discuss the affairs of the barangay (Local Government Code of 1991, sections 397–398). There, volunteers were selected to conduct a participatory situation analysis to identify local

---

70 The barangay was defined by the Philippine Local Government Code of 1991 as “the basic political unit,” which “serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects, and activities in the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled” (section 384). Yet this vision has largely failed to materialise, as shown in this chapter.

71 Projects were selected through a so-called “open menu” from which micro-finance and livelihood activities were excluded, which, in practice, encouraged infrastructure projects.

72 The description of Kalahi procedures is based on Araral and Holmemo (2007, 34–37) and focuses on the so-called “16 steps” approach of Kalahi. Three year after the start of the CDD project, it was replaced by the “Community Empowerment Activity Cycle” approach, a more flexible model of implementation that is reportedly more responsive to the local demand than its predecessor (although its main elements remain the same as those of the “16 steps” approach). See DSWD (2007) for a detailed description of the “Community Empowerment Activity Cycle” approach.
development issues and sum them up in a village action plan. The plan was validated during a second barangay assembly, which also served to elect project preparation teams and village representative teams.

The second phase, “project development,” consisted of a series of workshops for village representatives to agree upon the selection criteria that they would use to allocate funding to particular projects. In parallel, local Kalahi teams, municipal staff and local NGOs outlined project concepts, which were prepared through “stakeholder consultations,” validated during a third barangay assembly, and finalised by project preparation teams. During the third phase, “project selection,” village representatives determined which project would receive Kalahi funding via a municipal inter-barangay forum (chaired by the municipal mayor), before announcing the results to each barangay during a fourth barangay assembly. In barangays whose projects were selected, a village subproject management committee was elected. Barangay teams drafted more detailed proposals, which were validated during a fifth barangay assembly, assessed through a second municipal inter-barangay forum, and normally approved for funding.

Eventually, the fourth phase, “project implementation,” started with a pre-implementation workshop where barangay teams and local government staff received training that would enable them to undertake their project (including construction, procurement, finances, and reporting). Volunteer teams then implemented the project, and were required to supply an operation and maintenance plan, to be implemented by a dedicated barangay team under the supervision of the area coordination team. In addition, barangay residents, area coordination teams, and consultants from NGO or academic backgrounds were supposed to monitor and evaluate Kalahi processes throughout the duration of the programme. Kalahi was implemented for three years in each selected municipality, corresponding to three funding cycles. The first cycle supposedly introduced
Kalahi, and secured the commitment of communities and local governments to support the project (especially by providing counterpart funding). The second cycle was designed to mainstream Kalahi processes with local governments’ planning procedures, while the third cycle actively targeted their institutionalisation. It was thus hoped that “the KALAHI way” would be adopted and enshrined in local legislation as a development planning and resource allocation tool (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004, 4).

The World Bank and the Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Kalahi’s implementing agency, highlighted three main elements to justify the emergence (and persistence) of a programme like Kalahi in the Philippines, in terms of the specific challenges it was designed to tackle, and the opportunities for undertaking such a programme in the country. First of all, growing rural poverty was presented as the main reason for implementing Kalahi, the flagship poverty reduction programme of the Philippine government and the World Bank, in the archipelago. As described in a Kalahi appraisal document:

“Widespread poverty continues to be a challenge in the Philippines. Initial estimates of the national poverty incidence show that the proportion of poor households increased from 31.8% in 1997 to 34.2% in 2000. The aggregate number of households below the poverty line in 2000 reached a high of 5.2 million and absolute poverty is over 40% in 8 of the 16 regions in the country. Poverty is a predominantly rural phenomenon in the Philippines. The rural poor constitute about 44% of the rural population and account for almost three-fourths of the poor in the country. Most of the rural poor are engaged in agriculture (about 63%), with rice, corn, coconut farmers, and fisher folk comprising the majority. The severity of rural poverty is the greatest among the landless workers and small farmers who make up a large part of the rural population” (World Bank 2002, 3).

This account further proposed that against the backdrop of the Philippine’s unfavourable “economic situation” and delayed “economic recovery,” which were worsened by the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the severe droughts caused by El Niño, poverty was “rising again” (ibid.). Moreover, poverty was reportedly fuelling “civil unrest and armed conflict” in
the Philippines, further justifying the emergence of Kalahi in terms of addressing both poverty and conflict:

“Worsening poverty has had serious consequences on the economic, political and social fabric of the Philippines. The present administration perceives a strong linkage between high levels of absolute poverty and the persistence of civil unrest and armed conflict in certain parts of the country. It has declared the fight against poverty to be the long-term solution to its fight against armed conflict” (ibid.).

Secondly, Kalahi as a “good governance” programme was allegedly necessary to address the “structural and bureaucratic requirements for a strong developmental state, based on good governance and driven by economic policies that would bring about broad-based growth and poverty reduction,” which were described as “not yet fully in place” (ibid., 4). This account proposed that because of “historically embedded patterns of asset distribution,” “[c]hanges in the Philippine economy” did not systematically bring about “improvements in the distribution of wealth” (ibid.). It highlighted that overall, the “structural fundamentals of the Philippines economy have impeded previous attempts to fight poverty,” and that it was thus necessary to support the government in “strengthening its institutional foundations with the aim of achieving sustainable poverty reduction outcomes” (ibid.). Although the nature of these “structural and bureaucratic requirements” was not specified, CDD discourse encompassed accounts of Philippine decentralisation reform, which described some of the opportunities and challenges for a local “good governance” programme such as Kalahi in the context of the Philippines.

Kalahi emerged in a decentralised context, described as benefiting from a “state of the art” decentralisation law, the Local Government Code of 1991, which enshrined the Kalahi principles of “bottom-up planning and budgeting,” yet had not been fully implemented (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004, 2). Against this backdrop, Kalahi was presented as a “good governance” instrument deployed to stimulate the implementation of the Local Government
Code’s “progressive” provisions (IV35, IV5). To do so, Kalahi reportedly replicated the Code’s rules, captured its essence by promoting participation, transparency and accountability, and operated through existing institutional structures (IV5). It was reportedly geared towards reforming local governments by “pushing the Local Government Code to its limit” (ibid.), more specifically by “utiliz[ing] institutions of local governments” in order to “revitalize them” (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004, 12).

Thirdly, Kalahi was presented as emerging from decades of “NGO Experience” in the Philippines, which reportedly represented “a wealth of experience in organizing communities” and “pioneered the use of their organizational skills in pursuing political change” (ibid., 9). In particular, it was noted that “NGOs formed the backbone of the peaceful people power revolutions of EDSA in 1986 and 2001,” referring to the two episodes of so-called “People Power,” which led to the peaceful removal of dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, and of populist president Joseph Estrada in 2001 (ibid.). Kalahi was thus styled as a programme for and by civil society, as “the only government project that thinks like NGOs!” (Francisco 2003). The CDD programme, which was allegedly building upon the wisdom of decades of civil society interventions in development and social justice, was depicted as a bridge between NGOs and government’s approaches (ibid.). This image was reinforced by the NGO background of DSWD Secretary Corazon “Dinky” Juliano-Soliman. Before leading Kalahi’s implementation team, Soliman had headed one of the most powerful civil society coalitions, the Caucus of Development of NGO Networks (Code-NGO), during the period of protests in 2000-2001 that led to the forced ouster of President Joseph Estrada, in an episode known as People Power II (as discussed in the pages below). Soliman, who was still presented in CDD discourse as a “community organizer and NGO leader” (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004, 2), apparently championed the idea of a CDD programme at the DSWD,
which she described as an opportunity to “generalise the operation of the CSO [civil society organisations]-derived livelihood strategies” (Soliman in Reid 2004).

Overall, in CDD discourse, the Philippines was presented as an ideal “arena for intervention” for a CDD programme such as Kalahi. The country faced high levels of poverty, particularly in rural areas, which the government was not able to tackle alone as it allegedly lacked the “structural and bureaucratic requirements for a strong developmental state” (World Bank 2002, 4), particularly at the local level. A programme such as Kalahi, it was argued, was “tailored” for this context, aiming to concomitantly alleviate rural poverty and address the deficits and deficiencies that would allegedly enable the government to become a “strong developmental state” by stimulating “good governance” at the local level. The Philippines, moreover, reportedly provided a “fertile ground” for the programme, as it benefited from a “state of the art” decentralisation framework and a thriving civil society (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004, 2).

Yet, as Ferguson has shown (and as noted in Chapter 1), the discursive formation of an arena for intervention such as the Philippines consisted of representations of the domain to be developed in terms of a set of deficits and deficiencies that development interventions were specifically designed to address. As described in the pages above, CDD discourse identified and delimited the Philippines as an arena where Kalahi interventions would become “intelligible” and possible, by exposing “technical” deficits and deficiencies to be corrected, and excluding that which lay beyond the scope of intervention, most notably issues of power, politics, inequality and contestation. As such, the Bank’s representation of the Philippines as an ideal arena for Kalahi intervention failed to acknowledge the kinds of challenges, threats, and opportunities that were identified in the preceding chapter as key features of the contexts within which CDD programmes emerged and expanded throughout the developing world in the late 1990s. Yet, the combination of mounting challenges from
below on the local level and of populist electoral challenges at the national level, under conditions of oligarchical democracy and deepening economic liberalisation, was very much in evidence in the Philippines at the time of Kalahi’s emergence, as this chapter attempts to show. The Bank and the DSWD also remained silent about the dynamics that produced the high levels of poverty and poor governance which Kalahi proposed to address, and about the dynamics that produced the institutional context in which the programme emerged and expanded (which was most notably characterised by a “state of the art” decentralisation law, and by seemingly thriving civil society organisations). In other words, CDD discourse performed the crucial “anti-politics” operation of enabling Kalahi intervention by representing the Philippines as an intelligible arena for intervention. Yet, it provides little insights into the dynamics and contexts that can account for emergence and persistence of Kalahi in the Philippines.

To make sense of the emergence and evolution of Kalahi in the Philippines beyond CDD discourse, this chapter accounts for the power relations, political and economic imperatives and contention that make up the backdrop against which Kalahi unfolded. The conceptual focus of this chapter is the process of transformism, identified by Antonio Gramsci, which refers to the “gradual but continuous absorption” of radical pressures by dominant social forces to prevent, defuse or demolise counter-hegemonic challenges (Gramsci 1971, 58–59; Robinson 2008, 290), as noted in Chapter 1. More specifically, this chapter draws on Eva-Lotta Hedman’s (2006) Gramscian account of mobilisation in support of oligarchical democracy in the Philippines, which shows that under Philippine oligarchical democracy, electoral competition, episodes of mobilisation “in the name of civil society,” “reforms,” and initiatives allegedly undertaken to shore up “democracy” have been driven, in large measure, by the fears generated by mobilisation “from below,” as part of an overall
pattern of transformist absorption of the tensions and contradictions of oligarchical democracy.

To understand the emergence and evolution of Kalahi in the Philippines, this chapter starts by sketching the backdrop of enduring oligarchical democracy in the archipelago. It then focuses on the episodic, recurring crises produced by the tensions and contradictions of oligarchical democracy, and on the transformist responses of the oligarchy, in the form of alleged efforts to promote “reform” and shore up “democracy.” A third section examines the specific crisis that unfolded in the Philippines at the turn of the twenty-first century, against whose background Kalahi’s implementation should be situated. The chapter then turns to describe the emergence of Kalahi in a context of crisis of hegemony, characterised by elusive government legitimacy and abiding popular challenges, before scrutinising the effects of the CDD programme in such a context. A final section considers the expansion of Kalahi against a backdrop of resurfacing legitimacy crisis in the mid-2000s Philippines.

Oligarchical Democracy

The emergence of Kalahi must be understood in the context of enduring oligarchical democracy in the Philippines, whose roots have been traced back to the process of democratisation in the U.S. colonial period (1898-1946) (Anderson 1988). Over the course of the first few decades of the twentieth century, political power was gradually transferred to Filipino nationals through the rapid introduction and scaling up of elections, the establishment of a Philippine Legislature, and the creation of myriad elective positions throughout the administration, which were coupled with tight restrictions on political candidacy and franchise. These measures effectively placed state control in the hands of provincial elites, whose access to national-level politics through Congress enabled them to rise as the new “ruling class,” forming a “solid, visible ‘national oligarchy’” (ibid., 11;
emphasis in original). Whilst the Americans emphasised the rapid creation of representative institutions, they neglected bureaucratic institutions, whose weakness further encouraged the ascendancy of patronage over electoral politics and policy-making.\(^{73}\)

These features of Philippine democracy were entrenched by the time of independence in 1946, which marked the “heyday of cacique democracy” (ibid., 16). In the context of intensifying electoral competition and mass enfranchisement, “caciquism,” “political bossism” and “warlordism” emerged as new methods of political control, alongside patronage and electoral fraud.\(^{74}\) Political machines headed by professional politicians were also rising throughout the archipelago.\(^{75}\) They thrived in areas lacking strong political clans, where access to natural resources or stages of local production could be won through violence and privileged access to state resources, which enabled machine politicians to ensure their domination through coercion, and through the systematic conversion of public resources into private ones (Hedman and Sidel 2000, 69; Sidel 1994).\(^{76}\) In this system, the central state, which retained considerable control over the economy, became the prime supplier of rents – particularly through its licensing powers, which were deployed by successive presidents to gain the support of locally entrenched elites in the provinces (McCoy 1994).

The oligarchy dominated formal electoral contests through the two national parties alternating in power, the Liberals and the Nacionalistas, largely owing to the winner-take-all character of the presidential system set up by the Americans.\(^{77}\) As elites effectively used electoral competition to gain control over the state apparatus, their access to state rents

\(^{73}\) On the dynamics of Philippine democratisation under U.S. colonial rule, in particular in terms of clientelistic relationships between Filipino and American officials, see Paredes (1988).

\(^{74}\) See, for example, Bundgaard (1957) and Ando (1971).

\(^{75}\) See, for example, Machado (1972) and Nowak and Snyder (1974) for early accounts of the rise of political machines in the Philippines.

\(^{76}\) As Nowak and Snyder further showed, “[w]hether or not the change in patron-client structures to a more specialized political machine proceeds smoothly depends in large part on the capacity of the government to extract and distribute resources” (1974, 1148).

\(^{77}\) Election laws further prevented the rise of third parties, notably by providing for the inclusion of representatives of the ruling party and of the dominant opposition political party on boards of election inspectors and canvassers, which were responsible for counting the votes.
enabled them to further advance their own private interests and erect business empires for themselves, whilst remaining in control of provincial politics, where they enjoyed de facto autonomy (McCoy 1994, 7). This combination of local and national power, and of public office and private wealth, formed the basis of the oligarchy’s domination of Philippine politics, and ensured its resilience by “giving succeeding generations the means to compete for office” (ibid., 25). This marked the advent of what Paul Hutchcroft has identified as “booty capitalism,” referring to the plundering of the state by the oligarchy for particularistic resources and advantages (1998, 20–21).

In the late 1980s context of (re)democratisation that followed the fall of Marcos’ authoritarian regime, the two-party system was replaced by a multiparty system. Yet the parties that emerged were described as “ad hoc, if not transient and fluid” (Simbulan 2007, 24), and largely served as vehicles for elite politicians to access “the perks, pork barrel and privileges” associated with elected office (Angara in ibid., 28–29). Thus turncoatism, defections, party-switching, lack of ideological basis, and weak mobilisational power remained defining features of Philippine party politics, which were dominated by “guns, goons, and gold” to secure victory in the polls78 (Rocamora 1998). In short, elections provided little more than the “illusion of democratic choice,” as Walden Bello (1988) remarked.

Overall, Philippine oligarchical democracy has been characterised by a political landscape saturated with large landowners who leveraged their personal wealth and social power into upstream trajectories in business and politics; by “cronies” who proliferated in virtually all areas of the economy; and by a pervasive intrastate clientelism. In this context, electoral politics dominated by businessmen, bosses and machine politicians relying on money, machinery, coercion, clientelism and fraud, have persistently drawn the broad mass

78 For instance, although the 1992 synchronised national, provincial and local elections were considered to be the “first reasonably democratic transfer of political power at all political levels since the mid-1960s,” 104 killings, 105 casualties and several kidnappings were reported during the electoral period (Törnquist 1993, 486).
of the population into factional competition within the oligarchy. Yet, as briefly noted above, oligarchical democracy has produced episodic, recurring crises, whose political dynamics have set the stage for the emergence of a CDD programme like Kalahi in the Philippines.

**Crises and Transformist Responses**

The emergence of Kalahi under Philippine oligarchical democracy must be understood against the backdrop of episodic, recurring crises of oligarchical democracy and their resolution, in the form of efforts to promote “reform” and shore up “democracy,” as Eva-Lotta Hedman (2006) has shown. She highlighted that in Philippine oligarchical democracy, elections have served to channel, defuse and absorb the tensions and contention generated by the structure of oligarchical democracy (in particular between universal suffrage and oligarchical rule) in a manner akin to the process of transformism identified by Gramsci. Yet these tensions and contradictions have produced recurring crises in the post-independence Philippines, as Hedman further noted, which have occasionally interrupted the pattern of continuous oligarchical domination. They have unfolded at times when the integrative capacity of machine politics has been diminished, as a result of which subaltern classes challenged the oligarchy and electoral politics (ibid., 16–20).

One of the most far-reaching examples of such a crisis of hegemony unfolded under Marcos’ repressive Martial Law regime (1972-1986), when deepening societal tensions and contestation were increasingly channelled through extra-electoral mobilisation, which included support for the armed struggle of New People’s Army (NPA), the rural guerrilla arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). To curb movements of contestation and defeat the CPP-NPA, a series of counterinsurgency operations was implemented under Marcos, styled on U.S. counterinsurgency models (Bello 1987). Military and paramilitary

---

79 For an account of the rise of popular support for the NPA under Martial Law and its subsequent decline, in the case of the province of Negros Occidental, see Rutten (1996).
operations led by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and civilian paramilitary groups were coupled with community-based, civil development interventions led by the government, and often funded through foreign development assistance. In the context of this “total approach” to counterinsurgency, the fight against poverty and the fight against insurgency were presented as two inextricably intertwined endeavours, as poverty was represented as a breeding ground for the CPP-NPA, whose activities reportedly further hampered growth and progress (Amnesty International 1992, 17–18). Beyond their outward developmental twist, counterinsurgency operations under Marcos were abusive and violent, in particular as the government widely used militia forces and vigilante groups, which led to unprecedented abuses and killings of rebels and civilians (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1990; Human Rights Watch 1990).

Counterinsurgency operations were complemented by a programme of agrarian reform, which was officially presented as the cornerstone of Marcos’ New Society regime, and benefited from the support of the World Bank and USAID (Putzel 1992). However, under Marcos’ 1972 land reform programme, only those tenants cultivating rice and corn land and whose landowner owned more than 25 hectares were entitled to own land (corresponding to only 16% of all tenants, or about 200,000 individuals), whilst a series of financial and production specification criteria further hindered land acquisition by tenants (Kerkvliet 1974b). Thus, Marcos’ agrarian reform programme was largely a token one, designed to contain rural unrest whilst protecting the interests of rural elites, whom Marcos heavily relied on for political support (Franco 2001, 12). As summarised by Benedict Kerkvliet:

---

80 USAID notably assisted the Government of the Philippines in planning reform regulations, whilst the Bank loaned a total US$66 million to back agrarian reform (Putzel 1992, 127–137).

81 Under Marcos’ land reform legislation, tenants were required to “pay for the land over a 15-year period, join a government-sponsored co-operative and contribute to a fund that will guarantee the amortization payment of any member who defaults, adopt modern farming practices (including high yielding varieties of seed), and pay taxes on the land” (Kerkvliet 1974b, 287).
“agrarian reform efforts in the Philippines were never intended to reduce substantially the huge gap between the peasantry and the elite. Instead, the purpose of land reform and related projects was to avert existing or potential agrarian unrest. [...] Over the years, Filipino politicians and U.S. advisors conceded only enough legislation and funding for agrarian projects to keep rural discontent to a manageable level” (1974b, 288–289).

Various USAID and Bank-sponsored rural development schemes (mostly infrastructures projects, loans and agricultural extension services) were deployed in support of agrarian reform, most of which were also integrated into military counterinsurgency plans as part of the “total approach” to defeat the insurgency (Borras et al. 2009, 5; Kerkvliet 1974b, 288). In such a context, the rationale behind the World Bank’s support to agrarian reform schemes was best described by Robert Ayres, from the Washington, D.C.-based policy research institution Overseas Development Council, who wrote that:

“the underlying political rationale behind the Bank’s poverty focus is the pursuit of political stability through what might be called defensive modernization. This strategy rests on an assumption that reform can forestall or pre-empt the accumulation of social and political pressures if people are given a stake in the system. Reform thus prevents the occurrence of full-fledged revolution” (in Bello et al. 1982, 25; emphasis in original).

Violent counterinsurgency operations, token agrarian reform and rural development programmes did not prove sufficient to channel, defuse and absorb the tensions of the Martial Law regime. Instead, social unrest and mobilisation increased in the early 1980s, in the form of unprecedented CPP-NPA influence throughout the countryside, and the revival of peasants, workers and students’ mobilisation and protests (Hedman 2006, 90). Moreover, the combination of abusive practices with sporadic toleration of political participation under Marcos promoted the burgeoning of moderate activist networks, which formed a “resilient, cumulative and flexible opposition” (Boudreau 2004, 154–156). In parallel, in the context of the global recession and debt crisis of the early 1980s, trade liberalisation measures advocated by the Bank and IMF (and pushed through structural adjustments programmes)
failed to boost Philippine exports, whilst measures of import promotion depressed local industries (Bello 1999). As the national economy plummeted, largely due to Marcos’ unparalleled cronyism and to the Bank and IMF’s policy package – whose unprecedented financial support to the Marcos government\footnote{The amount of loans and other forms of financial support from the Bank to the Philippine government reached US$2.6 billion in 1973-1981 – representing more than 20 times the yearly amount lent by the Bank to the Philippines in the 22 years preceding the Martial Law period (Riviera 1994, 119). Although this figure represents, in part, general upward trends in the volume of World Bank lending in the 1970s, it still shows that the Bank’s support to the Philippines under Marcos’ Martial Law regime was exceptional.} was conditional upon the adoption of a labour-intensive, export-oriented model of growth, accompanied by a host of economic liberalisation and industrialisation measures, which resulted in a US$15 billion debt (Bello et al. 1982) – the oligarchy withdrew their support to Marcos and launched their own attack against the dictator.

The crisis that unfolded under Marcos was resolved by carrying the process of transformism “into the zone of civil society,” which, Hedman (2006) has shown, is representative of the resolution of occasional crises of hegemony experienced in the country in the second half of the twentieth century. After fourteen years of authoritarian rule, Marcos was thus toppled through the People Power or EDSA\footnote{EDSA stands for Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, which was the site of the demonstrations that led to Marcos’ ousting.} revolution of 1986, which mobilised hundreds of thousands of Filipinos under the leadership of “a dominant bloc of social forces in the Philippines, comprising the Philippine business class, the Catholic Church, and the U.S. government” (ibid., 113). The re-equilibration of oligarchical democracy and the demobilisation of subaltern classes were further achieved through restored or reinvigorated electoral competition – which drew people back into elections, instead of more radical forms of politics – complemented by reforms ostensibly designed to shore up democracy, half-hearted agrarian reforms and counterinsurgency measures.

The aftermath of People Power was marked by a climate of triumphant democratic spirit, with reinvigorated elections characterised by remarkably high voter turnout, and
seemingly far-reaching democratisation reforms (Hutchcroft 2008, 143). Moreover, former “NGO leaders” were styled (and styled themselves) as “progressive” politicians and were absorbed into successive post-Marcos governments, to which they would lend greater legitimacy. Exemplifying this trend was Florencio “Butch” Abad, who headed *Kilusang Laban sa Kudeta* (Movement against Coups d’Etat), a coalition of leftist and Liberal Party organisations, before President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) nominated him secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform. However, Abad’s nomination, which was part of Aquino’s attempt to “revive the flagging spirit of ‘People Power’” (Clarke 1998, 75), was vetoed by the Congressional Committee on Appointments, forcing him to leave after only three months in post. Indeed the oligarchy had swiftly resumed its domination over Congress, a position which it used to systematically dodge or truncate any legislation (or any appointment) that threatened to undermine its hegemonic position. As such, whilst the illusion of participatory democracy was sustained, prospects for effective participation from subaltern classes were seriously undermined, as illustrated by the case of Philippine decentralisation reform.

Decentralisation represented the most far-reaching post-Marcos reform, allegedly undertaken to promote democratic representation and popular participation, and to undermine corruption and clientelism in government. It was also promoted by the Bank and the IMF as the centrepiece of public sector reforms in the country (Angeles 2007, 233). Philippine decentralisation reform was fleshed out in the Local Government Code of 1991, which Kalahi reportedly aimed to “revitalise” and push “to its limit,” as noted above (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004, 12; IV5). The Local Government Code gave local governments responsibility for basic services and infrastructures provision, whilst increasing their resources to enable them to carry out their new duties. Local governments were thus granted the right to a share

---

84 Butch Abad was also member of a prominent political family in the province of Batanes. His father, Jorge Abad, was a long-term representative of Batanes in Congress, a seat which Butch’s mother, Aurora Abad, also held for a term (PCIJ n.d.).
of national revenues,\textsuperscript{85} and were given power to generate their own revenues through expanded taxing powers and scope for fees and charges levy. Yet these provisions failed to weaken clientelistic ties between the national and local governments. On the one hand, automatic revenue transfers and revenue generating powers were largely insufficient to meet the devolved responsibilities of local governments, which remained dependent on discretionary transfers from the central government (Eaton 2001). On the other hand, in a political landscape saturated with local bosses, machine politicians and political dynasties, shifting power downwards, towards provincial governors and municipal mayors across the archipelago, carried the threats of (i) consolidating local authoritarian enclaves; (ii) further attracting predatory interests; (iii) marginalising the opposition; and (iv) increasing the pressures and vulnerability of the broad mass of the population to money, clientelism and coercion in the electoral contest (Eaton 2001; Patiño 2003; Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003).

The Code also institutionalised participation of NGOs, People’s Organisations (POs)\textsuperscript{86} and the private sector in local government, through consultations and representation in local special bodies.\textsuperscript{87} Yet the Code’s provisions largely fell short of increasing NGOs and POs’ influence in local policy-making, which was considerably hampered by the manoeuvres of traditional politicians\textsuperscript{88} to maintain their dominant position, such as registering fake NGOs and POs headed by themselves or a member of their family (George 1998, 229). Initially, the Local Government Code also contained provisions for including elected representatives of

\textsuperscript{85} The revenue-sharing regime established by the Code provided that 40\% of the internal revenue taxes were allotted to local governments (section 284c), at least 20\% of which must be allocated to development projects (section 287).

\textsuperscript{86} POs were defined in the 1987 Constitution as “bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure” (article 13, section 15). In the 1990s, the number of NGOs and POs was estimated between 20,000 and 200,000 (ADB 2005, 131).

\textsuperscript{87} For instance the Local Government Code provided that in Barangay Development Councils, which are representative bodies whose official aim is to “mobilize people’s participation in local development efforts,” NGO representatives “shall constitute not less than one fourth (1/4) of the members of the fully organized council” (sections 107 and 109).

\textsuperscript{88} In the Philippines, the expression “traditional politician” refers to a politician whose practices are characterised by patronage, corruption, cheating and coercion, and who usually belongs to or is linked with a political dynasty (Quimpo 2004, 4).
disadvantaged groups in sub-national legislatures, to increase sectoral representation. However, Congress successfully dodged these measures by blocking the legislation necessary to enforce them (Eaton 2003, 485–486). Furthermore, the barangay itself was described in the Code as “a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered” (section 384). Through the regular holding of barangay assemblies, the Code provided that residents could “hear and discuss the semestral report of the Sangguniang Barangay [the barangay’s legislative body]” and initiate and decide on legislation (sections 397-398). However, in practice, barangay assemblies achieved neither the frequency nor the attendance level required by law, and barangays fell short of representing the participatory forums envisioned in the Code (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004). In short, as noted in an article on decentralisation in the Philippine, written more than a decade after the enactment of the Code: “The code's ability to open up the political system at the local level [...] is a largely unfulfilled promise” (Eaton 2003, 487).

The institutional backdrop in which Kalahi was to be implemented, which was most notably characterised by far-reaching decentralisation and formal avenues for popular representation and NGOs’ participation in politics, was thus created as part of a transformist response to a crisis. In parallel, the context of restored oligarchical domination saw the expansion of free market reforms in the Philippines (and elsewhere), through measures of economic deregulation, privatisation, and capital account and financial liberalisation prescribed by the World Bank and the IMF, ostensibly to make the country more competitive and globally-oriented (Hutchcroft 1998; Bello 2000). These measures significantly accelerated under President Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), as the government’s globalisation strategy was centred on “attracting speculative investment by eliminating barriers to capital
entry and exit,” i.e. liberalising tariffs and capital accounts (Bello 2009b). If economic liberalisation was initially associated with revived economic growth (with an average 4% economic growth under Ramos), it made the Philippines heavily dependent on foreign capital and markets (Bello 2000). As such, free market reforms paved the way for financial crisis in the Philippines, whose effects became highly visible by 1998, when massive capital outflow led to recession, stagnation, and a GDP growth rate below zero on the eve of the new millennium (ibid.). It was against this backdrop that Joseph Estrada rose to the presidency, representing a renewed challenge to oligarchical domination. This set the scene for a political crisis which unfolded in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and which forms the backdrop against which Kalahi emerged.

People Power II

The timing and contemporary context for the emergence of Kalahi corresponded to a specific crisis that unfolded at the turn of the twenty-first century, whose origins lay in the presidency of former movie star turned populist politician Joseph “Erap” Estrada (1998-2001). Estrada represented a serious threat to the oligarchy. On the one hand, his leadership was reminiscent of that of Ferdinand Marcos, in particular as cronyism and corruption became widely known as decisive features of his administration (Doronila 2001; De Dios 2001). On the other hand, Estrada owed his rise to the presidency to his popularity as a movie star, incarnating the persona of “Erap” (reverse spelling of pare, meaning buddy in Tagalog) on the screen and on the political scene (Hedman 2001). The populist aura that Estrada had acquired during his acting career enabled him to bypass the traditional channels of machine politics and to win a landslide victory, largely supported by subaltern classes who answered

89 Testimony to the Ramos government’s commitment to free market, the Philippines was one of the six original members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA), formed in 1992, and joined the World Trade Organization in 1995 (Bello 2009b).
his populist election call “Erap para sa mahirap” or “Erap for the poor” (Bautista 2001). Populist promises also filled Estrada’s inaugural address, where he declared:

“I hope this message will not be taken badly by the rich. [...] But, surely, it is time for the masses to enjoy first priority in the programs of the government. As far as resources permit, to the best of our ability and the limit of our energy, we will put a roof over their heads, food on their tables and clothes on their backs. We will educate their children and foster their health. We will bring peace and security, jobs and dignity to their lives. We will put more infrastructure at their service, to multiply their productivity and raise their incomes. [...] What wealth will be generated will be more equitably shared. What sacrifices are demanded will be more evenly carried. [...] For the past twelve years, the call has been for people power to defend democracy, advanced [sic] economic development and other things. It is time to use that power for the people themselves” (Estrada 1998a).

The threat posed by Estrada to the oligarchy was reinforced by the appointment of high-profile leftist personalities in cabinet, as illustrated by Estrada’s nomination of Horacio “Boy” Morales, former chairman of the National Democratic Front (the united front organisation of the CPP), as secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Whilst the political rise of show-business personalities, exemplified by Estrada’s election, further blocked the advent of party-based politics (David 2007), it also marked something of a break with traditional politics. In this regard, Estrada’s presidency did not only threaten the oligarchy’s economic interests. It also jeopardized their very system of social reproduction and continued domination, based on a well-oiled electoral system through which money, coercion and clientelism would ensure electoral success. In other words, Estrada’s electoral victory – which was largely based on popular vote, rather than machine politics (Bautista 2001, 4) – proved that populist appeal could supplant money and machinery in the electoral contest. Moreover, Estrada’s personal habits, particular his highly visible gambling, drinking, and womanising, signalled an “unprecedented abnegation of official protocol and public propriety,” which symbolised the “greater threat to political stability and social reproduction” posed by the non-elite President (Hedman 2001, 8).
Public denunciations of the president’s corruption, cronyism and “immoral” lifestyle began to crystallise in sustained campaign of protests in Manila in the early 2000s, as Filipinos were prompted to mobilise to demand the president’s resignation. Estrada was subsequently impeached by the House of Representatives and then tried for corruption by the Senate until it became clear that pro-Estrada senators were manipulating the process (Labrador 2002, 142). The failure of the impeachment process propelled mass protests that mobilised a wide range of interests and organisations, from business organisations and the Church to students, workers organisations and party-list groups90 (Reyes 2001). Extra-electoral mobilisation succeeded in overthrowing Estrada in a second episode of People Power, also known as EDSA Dos, in January 2001.91

The replacement of Estrada by Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, an economist and daughter of a former president, marked the return of the oligarchy to the presidency, which would ensure that the interests of both the national oligarchy and foreign investors would prevail. However, the context in which Arroyo assumed power was characterised by contention and instability, which People Power II had failed to absorb for two main reasons. First of all, people power mobilisation under conditions of accelerated economic liberalisation was visibly driven by the need to counter “declines in foreign direct investment and loss of favor in the international capital markets” (Davis and Zald 2005, 342). Although the first episode of People Power was also driven, in large measures, by the economic interests of the oligarchy, the “business” aspect was far less salient in 1986 than in

90 In theory, party-list groups are “real,” independent political parties formed by marginalised and underrepresented sectors, which can compete for 20% of the seats of the House of Representatives. Under the party-list system, electors vote for parties, rather than individuals, and seats are attributed by proportional representation, which offers an alternative to the first-past-the-post, single-member district system (Eaton 2003, 475–476). However, the party-list system was restricted and scaled down by Congress, which notably undermined party-list representatives’ ability to pass legislation by imposing an unconstitutional limit of three seats per party-list (ibid., 478). Traditional politicians also hijacked the system, using it as an alternative electoral vehicle, leading to the production of “the worst of parties and party dynamics” (Rocamora 2007).
91 For an impressionistic depiction of the lived experience of People Power II, see PCIJ (2001). For an overview of the events that led to Estrada’s toppling, see also Landé (2001).
2001, when Estrada still enjoyed the enduring support of subaltern classes.\(^2\) Secondly, People Power II was prompted by the “faults” of the electoral system, which failed to work as an instrument of the oligarchy, as it allowed popularity and populism to supplant money, fraud and machinery as a basis for mobilising voters. In this context, instead of restoring the transformist power of the electoral system and reasserting the sanctity of the ballot, the extra-electoral ouster of Estrada exacerbated insecurity and doubts about the electoral system as a whole.

These doubts worsened three weeks before the May 2001 mid-term elections, as Arroyo ordered the public arrest of Estrada and his son, Jinggoy, in a move that was widely regarded as a poorly-designed attempt to weaken Estrada’s enduring clout (Labrador 2002). Instead of reinforcing Arroyo’s legitimacy and restoring confidence in the electoral system itself, the arrest triggered a wave of anti-Arroyo protests, known as EDSA Tres. The new episode of mobilisation was led by powerful pro-Estrada forces, including two of the most influential Christian organisations in the country, Iglesia ni Kristo (Church of Christ) and El Shaddai (God, in Hebrew), as well as senatorial candidates from the opposition (Bello 2001). It culminated in a march on the Presidential Palace, demanding the removal of Arroyo and the return of Estrada to the presidency. Arroyo silenced the protests through a controversial declaration of “state of rebellion” on 1\(^{st}\) May, which lasted only a week. She further consolidated her position in the May 2001 elections, as the administration claimed the majority in the House of Representatives, and eight of the thirteen Senate seats at stake in the elections (Labrador 2002, 143). Yet the deep division of the Senate confirmed the fragile position of the new administration, whilst the extent of fraud and violence deployed during

\(^2\) The high visibility of the business interests behind People Power II led several commentators to qualify People Power II as a “farce” (Davis and Zald 2005, 341), or as something that “wasn’t, strictly speaking, people power” (Head in Hayllar 2003, 267), as opposed to the first episode of People Power, which was widely depicted as the genuine expression of the will of “the people” or “civil society.” However, these representations overlooked the fact that the first episode People Power was also led by the oligarchy, as Hedman (2006) has shown, and as discussed in the pages above.
the 2001 elections (which was unprecedented in the post-Marcos era) hinted towards its failure to restore the transformist power of the electoral contest.

In short, Arroyo came to power in a context of protracted crisis, as the People Power II attempt to carry out transformism “into the zone of civil society” failed to absorb challenges from below, and instead worsened doubts about the electoral system. It is in this context of unresolved crisis – and in the broader context of the politics of crisis, reequilibration and reconstitution of the oligarchy in the Philippines – that the emergence of Kalahi, the flagship development programme of the Philippine government and of the World Bank in the Philippines, must be understood.

The Emergence of Kalahi and the 2004 Elections

As unresolved crisis in the early 2000s threatened to overthrow Arroyo’s government and to undermine the interests of both the national oligarchy and foreign investors, a most pressing concern was to restore the legitimacy of the new administration to ensure its political survival. To do so, the government styled itself as a “reforming” administration, and as the direct product of People Power II mobilisation by and for “civil society” and “the people” (Reid 2011, 58). Arroyo attempted to replicate Estrada’s populist register, adopting the nickname Ate (Big Sister) Glo, pledging to wage a war against poverty and to promote “good governance” and political reforms, and positioning herself as “the champion of the masa” (Hayllar 2003, 269; Labrador 2002, 144). However, Arroyo clearly lacked the populist aura of Estrada, who still enjoyed strong support among the subaltern classes.

93 Arroyo’s 2001 inaugural speech illustrates the prominence of poverty reduction and “good governance” in the president’s discourse, as she outlined her three first “core beliefs” as follows: “1. We must be bold in our national ambitions, so that our challenge must be that within this decade, we will win the fight against poverty. 2. We must improve moral standards in government and society, in order to provide a strong foundation for good governance. 3. We must change the character of our politics, in order create fertile ground for true reforms. Our politics of personality and patronage must give way to a new politics of party programs and process of dialogue with the people” (Macapagal-Arroyo 2001).

94 For instance, surveys undertaken in June 2001 found that amongst the “lower class,” the majority still supported Estrada (Mangahas in Hayllar 2003, 269).
In this context, the Bank lent US$100 million to the Philippine government, to swiftly design and carry out a flagship poverty reduction programme that would represent its commitment to poverty reduction, “good governance” and “empowerment,” as part of the transformist response to the government’s legitimacy crisis.\(^95\) The Bank had every interest in promoting Arroyo’s political survival, in view of her particularly strong commitment to economic liberalisation reforms, which promised to address foreign investors’ mistrust in the Estrada administration. Kalahi was thus prepared in a “record time” of nine months, as highlighted by the World Bank’s country director for the Philippines (Pulley 2002). According to a former Kalahi project director at DSWD, this reflected the pressing need for a programme that could be swiftly implemented and scaled up to gain support in the provinces, in view of the rapidly approaching 2004 general elections (IV5). The DSWD, which had been headed by Arroyo from 1998 to 2000, was selected as Kalahi’s implementing agency, and was entrusted with the pressing task of designing the programme with the assistance of the Bank, which presented itself as a knowledge broker introducing the novel CDD approach to the Philippines (World Bank 2002, 17).

Kalahi’s preparation phase took place between February and August 2002, during which time the project preparation team reportedly (i) assessed existing community-driven initiatives in the Philippines; (ii) engaged in exchanges with the Government of Indonesia and the World Bank team there to learn from their experience of CDD—which was labelled “South-South Learning” in CDD discourse (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004, 10); (iii) undertook “extensive consultations with local stakeholders” (Fisiy 2002, 1); (iv) identified “the location, profile and needs of the poor” (ibid.); (v) examined community-level decision-making

\(^95\) This contextualisation of Kalahi echoes Ben Reid’s representation of the CDD programme as an example of “attempts to utilise participatory processes to help legitimise the state in the eyes of impoverished populations,” which “have explicitly been implemented to counteract threats to the state from insurgencies and political mobilisation by impoverished populations” (2011, 48).
processes; and (vi) mapped out local institutional contexts (ibid). Despite the above claims, the local dynamics behind disempowerment and poor local governance, which Kalahi allegedly aimed to address, remained absent from Kalahi discourse. Instead, very generic CDD discourse provided overarching, official rationales for Kalahi interventions, highlighting persistent rural poverty and sub-optimal governance structures and practices, as noted above.

The urgent need for Kalahi was underlined by representatives from numerous government agencies and by Arroyo herself, who asked World Bank President Wolfensohn for Kalahi’s preparation to be fast-tracked, as the project represented “the main instrument to implement the anti-poverty strategy of her administration” (World Bank 2002, 17). Kalahi was thus initially presented by the Bank as urgently required to reverse trends of rising poverty and economic decline, which, in the Bank’s words, “had serious consequences on the economic, political and social fabric of the Philippines” especially by feeding “civil unrest and armed conflict” (ibid., 3). Surprisingly, “civil unrest and armed conflict” did not specifically refer to the CPP-NPA or to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a militant group fighting for the creation of an independent Islamic state. Yet both organisations had intensified their struggle against the government in the first decade of the twenty-first century, in reaction to Estrada’s confrontational stance and “Total War” policy against the MILF, and to Arroyo’s U.S.-backed counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns in the Philippines from 2001 onwards – with which Kalahi was closely intertwined, as discussed in the chapters to come. Instead, civil unrest was supposedly illustrated by the so-called “uprising of the poor” on 1st May 2001 (Fisiy 2002, 2), which was in fact a pro-Estrada movement led by senatorial candidates and influential Christian organisations Iglesia ni

---

96 These activities were reportedly undertaken as part of a technical assistance project that took place between February and August 2002, in preparation for Kalahi’s implementation (Fisiy 2002).
97 These include the DSWD, the National Economic Development Authority, the Department of Finance, the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Department of Budget and Management, the Commission on Audits, and the National Anti Poverty Commission (World Bank 2002, 17).
Kristo and El Shaddai, in reaction to the highly publicised arrest of Joseph Estrada and his son, as described above. Thus the perceived urgency in undertaking a flagship CDD programme like Kalahi primarily stemmed from direct challenges to Arroyo, who, as noted above, represented a far better guarantor of the interests of the national oligarchy and foreign investors. Deploying the programme throughout the archipelago would strengthen support for Arroyo across regions and provinces, which was necessary not only to ensure her political survival in the short-term, but also to secure her victory in the upcoming presidential elections.

Between January 2003 and March 2004, Kalahi was deployed across 42 provinces and nearly 100 municipalities and 2,300 barangays, in anticipation of the May 2004 general elections, which represented the opportunity for Arroyo to silence doubts about the legitimacy of her extra-constitutional rise to the presidency, and to extend her term for a further six years (Hutchcroft 2008, 145). Against the backdrop of protracted crisis of legitimacy and abiding populist challenge, the CDD programme represented a particularly promising instrument for Arroyo to strengthen her support base in the provinces, in two major ways. Firstly, Kalahi’s material resources were directly dispensed from the national government to municipalities across the Philippines, where they could be used to secure votes alongside congressional “pork barrel” allocations.98 Thus Kalahi provided resources that could be used in factional politics, and represented a valuable avenue for reinforcing clientelistic channels between national governments and “local communities.” Secondly, Kalahi represented a powerful tool for the administration to wrap its own policies in the pro-poor and populist discourse of the opposition, which, as noted in Chapter 1, offered the opportunity to promote transformist absorption of the tensions and contradictions of oligarchical democracy. In particular, Kalahi was promoted as proof of the administration’s

98 “Pork barrel” allocations refer to funds that Congressmen can freely allocate, and which are often used in exchange for political support. For an account of “pork barrel” politics in the Philippines, see Vidallon-Cariño (1966).
outward commitment to poverty reduction, “good governance” and empowerment, which was especially valuable in view of the reinvigorated populist challenge in the 2004 general elections.

In the 2004 elections, the populist challenge to the oligarchy crystallised around the presidential candidacy of Fernando Poe, Jr., former movie star and close friend of Estrada. Poe, who headed the opposition Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (Coalition of United Filipinos), pursued a campaign built around his popular and populist appeal, in an attempt to emulate Estrada’s campaign and victory in 1998 (Teehankee 2006, 232). In contrast, the campaign of Arroyo’s Koalisyon ng Karanaan at Katapatan sa Kinabukasan (Coalition of Experience and Loyalty to the Future) relied heavily on machine-based mobilisation in the provinces, using government resources as campaign tools (particularly in the form of development projects), and resorting to widespread electoral fraud (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 283–284). In short, the 2004 elections took the form of a contest between “machine politics” and “media populism” (ibid., 282). Arroyo emerged as the winner, with an electoral margin of over a million votes and a six-year extension of her term, as well as a strengthened position in Senate.100

It is striking that eight out of the nine regions that delivered their votes to Arroyo and 60% of pro-Arroyo provinces were Kalahi beneficiaries, whilst the majority of regions and provinces that delivered their votes to Poe were excluded from the programme – corresponding to four out of the seven pro-Poe regions, and 66% of the pro-Poe provinces. Outside of Mindanao, the CDD programme’s allocation almost perfectly matched voting

---

99 For instance, no less than two million voters had their names erased from the official voting lists (NAMFREL in Hutchcroft 2007, 4). Although the elections were generally regarded as “free and fair” by influential election-watch groups, these groups were “more concerned with giving Macapagal-Arroyo legitimacy than with safeguarding the sanctity of the ballot” (Hutchcroft 2008, 145), as Poe was regarded as a threat by the established business community and the Catholic Church (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 282).

100 The most notable change in the composition of the Senate was the decline of one of the main opposition parties, the LDP (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, Fight of Democratic Filipinos), which retained only one out of eight seats in the 2004 elections (Teehankee 2006, 236).
trends for presidential candidates at the regional level, as all pro-Arroyo regions were selected for Kalahi, whilst all but one of the pro-Poe regions were excluded from the CDD programme. Moreover, the three provinces that gave Arroyo her widest vote margin (excluding Arroyo’s home province of Pampanga), namely the Visayan provinces of Cebu (1,004,000 vote margin), Iloilo (500,914 vote margin), and Bohol (242,956 vote margin), were selected as Kalahi beneficiaries101 (Teehankee 2006, 237). Overall, these electoral results suggest that Kalahi was remarkably effective as patronage resource.

In short, Kalahi represented a great asset for the administration, both in clientelistic terms, as a financial resource deployed directly in municipalities and barangays throughout the archipelago, and as part of the transformist pattern prevailing under Philippine oligarchical democracy. In particular, by advancing a vision of government officials as “progressive” leaders and of communities as “empowered,” Kalahi discourse supported the administration’s pro-poor and “good governance” discourse, lending legitimacy and a benevolent, socially-progressive aura to the Philippine government and to its flagship CDD programme. Such a trend, which was highlighted in the preceding chapter in the case of CDD discourse in general, is examined in the pages below in the case of Kalahi discourse in particular.

The Kalahi Vision

As part of the transformist solution to contain the crisis of legitimacy and address counter-hegemonic challenges that persisted under Arroyo’s presidency, Kalahi was presented as a symbol of the “reformist” character of the Philippine government. In particular, with Kalahi, the Arroyo administration had allegedly embraced the ethos of civil society. From the outset, Kalahi was associated with civil society, as “the only government

101 Although Cebu was initially selected as a Kalahi beneficiary, the programme was never implemented in the province.
project that thinks like NGOs!” (Francisco 2003), and as allegedly emerging from decades of “NGO experience” in the Philippines (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004, 12), as noted above. As such, Kalahi was presented as the direct product of civil society, particularly of People Power mobilisation. For instance, Corazon Soliman, DSWD secretary and head of Kalahi, claimed that “the spirit of EDSA people – power is the same as KALAHI-CIDSS, proving that a united and empowered populace can bring about positive changes” (in DSWD 2011c). Yet, Kalahi was not simply styled as a programme for and by civil society as a zone outside government. Instead, it was part and parcel of a reinvigorated trend to incorporate “progressive” leaders associated with civil society into the government. Thus, those individuals who had fought for democracy, “in the name of civil society,” were absorbed into the government, which outwardly signalled that extra-constitutional mobilisation was no longer needed, as “reformists” were now within the state apparatus.

Kalahi was styled as the direct product of these “NGO activists” turned “government reformists.” For the first two years of Kalahi implementation, the programme was led by Corazon Soliman, who, as noted above, had headed one of the most powerful anti-Estrada and pro-Arroyo “civil society” coalitions (the Caucus of Development of NGO networks or Code-NGO) during the episode of People Power II, before Arroyo appointed her DSWD secretary in 2001. Soliman was presented as a Kalahi “champion,” whose “leadership had been critical in establishing the KALAHI as the Government’s flagship antipoverty program and in building civil society partnerships” (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004, 2). In turn, she described Kalahi as “consistent with [her] vision of power to the people,” as a project that “brought to the most marginalized communities the opportunity to use their power to analyze the situation and develop solutions that will be implemented by the community” (Soliman 2005).
The CDD programme was also presented as fostering and supporting “progressive” leadership at the local level. This argument found a particularly strong resonance in the Philippines, where it was generally agreed that although the Local Government Code had failed to systematically reform governance, many local governments adopted some of its innovative provisions. In development discourse, this trend was widely interpreted in terms of a rising “political culture of reformism,” which was ostensibly cohabiting with the “dominant political culture underpinning the patrimonial state,” in the words of Ford Foundation employee Terrence George (1998, 248). Cases of “responsive” or “innovative” local governance were further presented as evidence that a new generation of “development-oriented government officials” was seizing the opportunity offered by the Code to break away from machine politics, as argued by political science professor turned Asia Foundation’s Philippines country representative Stephen Rood (1998), for example. In this context, it was proposed that Kalahi would support “reformist leaders,” by offering them the opportunity to distance themselves from “traditionally-minded” leaders, to instead embrace “good governance” practices and thus enhance their credibility (World Bank 2009a).

Kalahi discourse, moreover, promoted a vision of communities as empowered by their experience of Kalahi, which would allegedly transform “mere “subjects” who are passive beneficiaries of state assistance” into “active citizens with rights and responsibilities who take control of their destinies” (World Bank 2002, 4; emphasis in the original). Kalahi would thus instil and “institutionaliz[e] new ways of thinking about accountability and governance at the local level” (ibid., 17). As Kalahi emerged in municipalities and barangays across the

---

102 One of the most famous cases of “progressive” leader in the Philippines was Jesse Robredo, who was the long-term mayor of Naga City, in the Bicol region, before he became secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government in 2010. As mayor of Naga City, Robredo was praised for his “good governance” practices, especially for setting up the Naga City People’s Council, a federation of local NGOs and POs that was granted the prerogatives to propose policy to the Sangguniang Panlungsod (City Assembly) and enjoyed full membership in local government bodies (Ishii et al. 2007, 365–366). Yet careful analyses have shown that the strong political power enjoyed by Robredo was based on a particularly strong political machine at the local level (Kawanaka 2002).
country, collections of “success stories,” styled as first-person narrations by local leaders and community members who experienced Kalahi, were published by the World Bank and the DSWD (e.g. World Bank 2005c; DSWD 2009b). They mirrored the style of the Bank’s “flagship” studies *Voices of the Poor*, which, as noted in Chapter 2, presented the Bank’s empowerment agenda as a direct response to the demand of “the poor.” The alleged authenticity of these accounts of Kalahi experiences supposedly endowed them with the utmost legitimacy, which partly served to address the lack of solid evidence on Kalahi’s impact, in terms of empowerment and governance. These “success stories” related that in communities that experienced Kalahi, “cynicism [was] giving way to idealism,” and “the residents of the barangay [...] worked hand in hand in taking the initial steps of making their dream of a better life come true” (DSWD 2009b, 9–11). Kalahi projects were further described as the “fruit of the spirit of volunteerism,” which had allegedly transformed, united, and empowered individuals and communities, restored “hope” and brought peace to these communities (ibid., 9–17).

The discourse attributed to those who experienced Kalahi was characteristically measured, assertive and positive. It possessed a quasi-omniscient quality, demonstrating the narrators’ total awareness of Kalahi’s aims of empowerment and “good governance.” It was also uniform in tone, in a manner that did not allow the reader to distinguish individual voices, but instead perfectly echoed the Bank’s own language. These characteristics were in evidence in two short comments, which were supposedly made by a local pastor and villager:

“We realized that the road was not a government project. It was our project. And the real project was not the road but our empowerment” (Pastor Clarito Palalisan in World Bank 2005c, 15).

“Kalahi did not just give us projects, it gave us knowledge and the right process which we should live by” (Lisa Camacho in DSWD 2009b, 29).
These accounts were accompanied by images that typically depicted happy communities, ostensibly signalling their gratitude for the programme, as illustrated in Figure 2, or blissfully working together, as in Figure 3 below.

**Figure 1 – Illustration of the Kalahi “Story of Radical Change” Entitled “Peace Means Walking the Same Road,” Province of Lanao del Norte, Northern Mindanao**

Source: World Bank (2005c, 11), © 2013 World Bank

**Figure 2 – Illustration of the Kalahi “Story of Radical Change” Entitled “Our Town Folk Pull off an Electrifying Victory,” Province of Siquijor, Central Visayas**

Figure 2, which depicted villagers in the province of Lanao del Norte, in war-torn Mindanao, was accompanied by the comment: “People are no longer keen on buying guns. With the new road [built through Kalahi], they would rather invest in motorcycles.” This (astoundingly) suggested that the CDD programme resolved conflicts, locally, by providing villagers with better investment opportunities.

Overall, CDD programmes such as Kalahi promoted a vision of civic, responsible and self-reliant communities, whose skills, awareness and capacity for collective action were reportedly key to address poverty and poor governance, in particular corruption and inefficiencies in government. As summarised by Kalahi’s implementing agency,

“The radical transformation of ordinary individuals into watchdogs of the society was one breakthrough achieved by Kalahi-CIDSS, and it came with their powerful will and desire to be involved in the affairs of local governance” (DSWD 2009b, 31).

Kalahi thus appropriated and promoted a vision of government officials as “progressive” leaders and of communities as “empowered,” which was typically associated with counter-hegemonic challenges, and lent legitimacy and a benevolent, socially-progressive aura to the Philippine government and its CDD programme, as noted above. It was further noted that this vision was deployed as part of the politics of crisis, reequilibration and reconstitution of the oligarchy, as shown by the emergence of Kalahi in a context of legitimacy crisis, and by its expansion in a context of resurfacing crisis.

**Expansion**

The representation of Kalahi as part of a transformist solution to Arroyo’s protracted crisis of legitimacy was confirmed by the timing and contemporary context of Kalahi’s expansion. Doubts about Arroyo’s legitimacy resurfaced soon after the 2004 elections, initially with a formal petition for a recount of the votes in 118,000 precincts across the
country, filed by Poe and his running mate Loren Legarda (Rivera 2005, 128). It was followed, less than a year later, by the explosion of the so-called “Hello Garci” scandal, as tapes of Arroyo discussing the fixing of the 2004 elections and her resulting electoral margin with Commission on Elections (COMELEC) commissioner Virgilio “Garci” Garcillano were leaked, threatening Arroyo’s political survival once again. The scandal triggered a series of calls for Arroyo’s impeachment, from within and outside the oligarchy, including members of her own administration, politicians, businessmen and the broad mass of the population (Hutchcroft 2008, 146). In particular, Corazon Soliman, Butch Abad (then education secretary) and eight other former “NGO personalities” turned “reformist” administration officials in the aftermath of People Power II resigned as a result of the scandal, and demanded that Arroyo follow their example. Although the president managed to remain in power, notably through a revived focus on political reform, the scandal signalled that Arroyo’s legitimacy crisis was still unresolved.

It was against this backdrop of resurfacing crisis that in 2005, the World Bank and the DSWD initiated discussions over Kalahi’s expansion through an “enhanced” version of the programme (IV35). In addition to an initial one-year extension (2010-2011), the programme was thus scaled up through the US$60 million KALAHI-CIDSS Additional Financing (KCAF) programme (2011-2014). KCAF was described as a local government-led version of Kalahi, whose aim was to make CDD “more devolved” and “cost-effective” (World Bank 2010b, 10). KCAF was built around the Makamasang Tugon (Pro-masses Approach), an “incentive-based modality” through which only those municipalities that demonstrated “good performance” under Kalahi would qualify for KCAF funding (DSWD

---

103 These officials were known as the “Hyatt 10,” in reference to the press conference where they announced their resignation and called for Arroyo to step down, which was held in the Hyatt hotel in Manila.
104 Arroyo re-launched a heated debate on “charter change,” centred on a shift towards a parliamentary, federal model of government (Hutchcroft 2008, 146).
105 This initial extension was described by the Kalahi manager at the World Bank as a “fairly standard” procedure undertaken to “finish up ongoing work” in the 184 municipalities and 4,229 barangays that experienced the programme (IV4; DSWD 2010).
2011a). In this context, the Kalahi Manager at the World Bank proposed that the initial Kalahi project acted as a “sort of filter” to identify municipalities where “the mayors […], the municipal staff, the communities, have actually mobilised around the programme” (IV4). In other words, KCAF served as a reward for “well-performing” municipalities.

The extension of Kalahi was also promoted by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), established by U.S. Congress under the government of President George W. Bush to dispense bilateral aid only to those countries found to promote “good governance” and economic liberalisation (MCC 2012). To that end, the MCC provided a US$120 million grant for a parallel extension of Kalahi, through the five-year KALAHI Operation for Barangay and Municipality Assistance, also known as Kalahi OBAMA. Together, the two new Kalahi programmes would cover 367 municipalities in 48 provinces, or about a fourth of all Philippine municipalities and 60% of Philippine provinces (World Bank 2010b, 9). In short, the World Bank, alongside the MCC, expanded both the coverage and coercive power of Kalahi, resorting to an expanded form of conditionality at the local level, through which funding attribution was conditional upon the performances of communities in general and local officials in particular. The recontextualisation of this expansion of Kalahi, against the backdrop of protracted crisis experienced in the Philippines in the mid-2000s, confirms an explanation of the CDD programme as part of a transformist response to the crisis of legitimacy which unfolded in the Philippines in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has attempted to explain why a large, “flagship” CDD programme such as Kalahi emerged (and expanded) in the particular context of the Philippines in the early 2000s. Whilst CDD discourse represented the Philippines as an ideal arena for Kalahi

---

106 The nickname “Kalahi OBAMA” was apparently given to the programme by the DSWD, as an obvious reference to its funding source, whilst the MCC simply refers to the programme as Kalahi CIDSS.
intervention, which rendered Kalahi intervention intelligible and possible, such a representation failed to account for the power relations, social inequalities, political and economic imperatives and contention that made up the backdrop against which Kalahi emerged and expanded. This chapter offered an alternative explanation for the emergence and expansion of Kalahi in the Philippines. It proposed that the emergence of Kalahi must be understood in the context of enduring oligarchical democracy in the Philippines, whose political landscape has been dominated by large landowners and other businessmen, who leveraged their personal wealth and social power into upstream trajectories in business and politics, “cronies” who proliferated in virtually all areas of the economy, and a pervasive use of state powers for patronage and particularistic benefits. In this context, electoral politics dominated by businessmen, bosses and machine politicians relying on money, machinery, coercion, clientelism and fraud, have persistently drawn the broad mass of the population into intra-oligarchical, factional competition, channelling, defusing and absorbing tensions and contention generated by the structure of oligarchical democracy in a manner akin to Gramsci’s process of transformismo (Hedman 2006).

Yet oligarchical democracy has produced episodic, recurring crises, whose political dynamics set the stage for the emergence of a CDD programme like Kalahi in the Philippines. As Hedman (2006) showed, these crises unfolded at times when the integrative capacity of machine politics was diminished, as a result of which subaltern classes increasingly challenged the oligarchy and electoral politics. They were typically contained, if not resolved, by carrying the process of transformism “into the zone of civil society” (ibid., 18). Re-equilibration of oligarchical democracy and demobilisation of subaltern classes were further achieved through restored or reinvigorated electoral competition, drawing people back into elections instead of more radical forms of politics, complemented by reforms ostensibly designed to shore up democracy (ibid.). The institutional context in which Kalahi emerged
and expanded, most notably characterised by far-reaching decentralisation and formal avenues for popular representation and NGOs’ participation in politics, was thus created as part of a transformist response to crises of hegemony.

Against this backdrop, the emergence of Kalahi itself must be understood as part of a transformist response to a crisis which unfolded in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Then, popular and populist President Estrada, who posed a serious threat to the oligarchy – most notably by challenging the well-oiled electoral system through which money, coercion and clientelism would reproduce oligarchical domination – was ousted by extra-constitutional means, through an episode of People Power II. Estrada was replaced by Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, whose rise to the presidency marked the return of the oligarchy to the presidency. Arroyo came to power in a context of protracted crisis, as the People Power II attempt to carry out transformism in the zone of civil society failed to absorb challenges from below, and instead worsened doubts about the electoral system.

It was in this context of unresolved crisis that Kalahi emerged as the government’s flagship development programme. It was deployed as part of the politics of crisis, reequilibration and reconstitution of the oligarchy, to address the combination of subaltern movements and mobilisations on the local level, and of populist electoral challenges at the national level. Kalahi was rapidly prepared and deployed in regions, provinces and municipalities across the archipelago, providing a means for Arroyo to strengthen her support base, which was necessary to ensure her political survival in the short-term, and to secure her victory in the 2004 presidential elections. On the one hand, Kalahi provided resources that could be used in factional politics, and represented a valuable avenue for strengthening clientelistic channels between national governments and “local communities.” On the other hand, Kalahi as discourse supported the administration’s own pro-poor and “good governance” image, largely by appropriating representations typically associated with
counter-hegemonic challenges. Kalahi itself was represented as a symbol of the “reformist” character of the new government, and as a direct product of “NGO activists” turned “reformist” leaders. It was promoted as an instrument fostering and supporting “progressive” leadership and “empowered” communities at the local level.

This understanding of Kalahi, as part and parcel of the transformist absorption of the tensions and contradictions of Philippine oligarchical democracy, was confirmed by the timing and contemporary context for its expansion, amidst resurfacing legitimacy crisis in the aftermath of the “Hello Garci” election scandal. Then, to respond to the challenge of protracted crisis of legitimacy and defuse challenges to oligarchical democracy, the Bank, alongside the MCC, expanded Kalahi’s coverage and coercive power. Most notably, they resorted to an expanded form of conditionality at the local level, by making funding attribution conditional upon the performances of communities in general and local officials in particular.

Overall, the context in which Kalahi emerged and expanded was emblematic of the broader nature of the threats against which CDD programmes have been deployed worldwide. The context of the Philippines in the first decade of the twenty-first century was not only one where governance and decentralisation could be “improved,” as proposed by the Bank. It was also one where economic liberalisation under oligarchical democracy faced sustained threats and episodic crises, in the form of mobilisation of subaltern classes behind populist politicians such as Estrada, and revolutionary socialist movements such as the CPP-NPA – corresponding to the elements which made up the context for the emergence and evolution of CDD programmes throughout the world, as identified in Chapter 2. This recontextualisation of the emergence, evolution and expansion of Kalahi has allowed us to understand the programme as part of the politics of crisis, reequilibration and reconstitution of the oligarchy, geared towards promoting social stability and support for the administration,
and defusing challenges to oligarchical democracy. In other words, this chapter has proposed that Kalahi is best understood as an instrument of hegemony and transformism, rather than an instrument of “good governance.” This understanding of Kalahi will help us to make better of sense of the operations and effects of Kalahi at the local level, as spelled out in the chapters to follow.
Chapter 4 – Bohol as Arena for Kalahi Intervention

In the preceding chapter, the thesis discussed the emergence of Kalahi in the Philippines in the first decade of the twenty-first century, in a context where economic liberalisation under oligarchical democracy faced sustained threats and episodic crises. Against this backdrop, it was noted that Kalahi is best understood as an instrument of hegemony and transformism, rather than “good governance,” deployed as part of the politics of crisis, reequilibration and reconstitution of the oligarchy, under conditions of democracy and decentralisation. Whilst this examination enabled us to make sense of the emergence and evolution of Kalahi in the Philippines, beyond CDD discourse, the analytical lens must be narrowed to further understand the operations and effects of the CDD programme, which have been primarily located at the “local” level, in provinces and municipalities that experienced the programme.

This chapter thus scrutinises the emergences of Kalahi in a single province, the Province of Bohol, in the Central Visayas region. As noted in Chapter 1, Bohol has been presented in CDD discourse as a Kalahi “success story” and as an “enabled” environment for local governance, forming an optimal context in which to examine a reportedly “successful” Kalahi experience. To do so, this chapter starts by examining how CDD discourse has represented Bohol in the late 1990s and early 2000s, before Kalahi was launched in the province, through an exercise that mirrors (albeit in a more succinct manner) Ferguson’s examination of development discourse, of “the peculiar emphases, interpretations, construals, and fabrications which combine to produce a unique “development” perspective” (Ferguson 1990, 28). In Kalahi discourse, the late 1990s-early 2000s Bohol was presented as a poor, unproductive agricultural economy, lacking basic public goods and services, as well as
human and social capital. This particular discursive representation of Bohol was captured in the “Balicasan study” (Balicasan and Edillon 2003), a poverty mapping exercise led by Arsenio Balicasan, professor of economics at the University of the Philippines. The study outlined the selection criteria and methodology which served to identify the municipalities that were to undertake Kalahi, namely the poorest 25% municipalities in the 40 poorest provinces of the Philippines, as noted in Chapter 3.

Scrutinising Bohol, the Balicasan study started by highlighting two “conditioning factors” of poverty in the province, namely “environmental problems,” including deforestation, loss of mangroves, and erosion of watershed areas, and “inadequate infrastructure support facilities,” including “poor road condition” (blamed on a “lack of financial and equipment resources”), “high power rates,” and “inadequate water for domestic, agricultural and industrial use” (ibid., 65). Although these were serious problems in Bohol in the late 1990s-early 2000s, the local government benefited from large resources from development organisations to build modern infrastructure, including multi-billion dollar “mega-projects” supported by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), which were not mentioned in the Balicasan study. Moreover, it is striking that “inadequate” infrastructure and “environmental problems” were identified as the main – even the sole – “conditioning factors” of poverty in Bohol. As this chapter discusses, the strategies deployed to increase the profitability of Bohol’s economy and integrate it into national and international economic circuitries in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have certainly had something to do with “conditioning” poverty in the province. Yet as Tania Li remarked, in the case of Indonesia’s CDD programme KDP: “The screening out of refractory relations—unequal relations of production and appropriation foremost among them—was
intrinsic to the construction of communities as sites of improvement” (2007, 238–239).\(^{107}\) These elements belonged to the category of things “necessarily left unspoken,” to borrow Ferguson’s argument, “simply because “development” agencies are not in the business of promoting political realignments or supporting revolutionary struggles” (1990, 68–69).

The Balicasan study then briefly discussed “[l]abor supply,” noting that:

“Sources of income are more diversified in Bohol than in the other provinces. The ratio of agricultural families to non-agricultural families is 3:4. In the two lower income classes, the ratio is only about 1:1. This implies that the domestic market has sufficient absorptive capacity. Add to this is the steady influx of tourists. What is needed is improved productivity of the agriculture sector both in terms of quantity and quality” (Balicasan and Edillon 2003, 65–66; emphasis added).

Although relatively “diversified” sources of income were mentioned, agriculture was the only economic activity discussed in the study, which overlooked the expansion of tourism and agro-industry, and the large flows of remittances from overseas workers, all of which had been driving Bohol’s economy since the 1980s. The study simply pointed out that these other sources of income, coupled with a “steady influx of tourists,” implied that the domestic market was “absorptive” enough to match a potential increase in agricultural production with adequate demand. Against this backdrop, the study delivered one of its key conclusions, that “[w]hat is needed is improved productivity of the agriculture sector both in terms of quantity and quality.” Yet the study completely obscured the fact that boosting the productivity of the province’s agriculture sector had been identified as a priority for Bohol from the days of American colonisation onwards, and had been the focus of development programmes implemented in the province since the 1970s. It simply went on to remark that “[o]n the average, the adult laborer coming from a poor family has finished only four to five years of

---

\(^{107}\) In a similar vein, Mohan and Stokke noted that “constructions of knowledge privilege certain interpretations of local ‘needs’ and [...] often leave untouched the wider processes which create local underdevelopment” (2000, 252).
schooling” (ibid., 66), implying that a lack of education resulted in poor quality of “human capital,” and formed one more barrier to high agricultural productivity.

The rest of the study highlighted that membership in grassroots organisations and cooperatives was insufficient, and that public service provision and utilisation were “inadequate” (ibid., 66–67). A set of statistics was presented to illustrate the inadequacy of public health facilities and services, the limited coverage of agricultural extension service, the widespread lack of schooling, the underutilisation of public health facilities and the very limited reach of government housing and credit programmes. This image of Bohol as a province lagging behind in terms of public goods and services presented a puzzling contrast with the discourse of other development organisations active in Bohol in the 1990s and 2000s, which usually represented the Provincial Government of Bohol as an example of “good governance,” as this chapter discusses.

The Balicasan study concluded that the main “outcome” of this inadequate infrastructure, unproductive agriculture, limited public goods and services and low stocks of human and social capital was poverty, as:

“Approximately 48.1 percent of all households have incomes below the poverty line, as cited by the 2002 Philippine Human Development Report; hence, Bohol ranks among the country’s twenty poorest provinces” (Balicasan and Edillon, 2003, 67).

It further predicted a bleak future for Bohol, due to high population growth rates and rising life expectancy that would “increas[e] pressures on community resources,” and low educational attainments in the poorest municipalities, which supposedly entailed “a very high likelihood of poverty perpetuation into the next generation” (ibid., 67–68).

Overall, the Balicasan study represented Bohol in terms of a set of local, technical, statistically-informed deficits and deficiencies that Kalahi proposed to address – by improving the delivery of public goods and services, building human and social capital, and
providing infrastructure to stimulate economic growth and “good governance.” Just as the World Bank and the DSWD represented the Philippines as an intelligible arena for Kalahi intervention, as the preceding chapter showed, the Balicasan study constituted Bohol as a seemingly ideal arena for Kalahi interventions, as “an enormously promising candidate for the only sort of intervention a “development” agency is capable of launching: the apolitical, technical “development” intervention” (Ferguson 1990, 69). This discursive operation was identified in Chapter 1 as a key “anti-politics” effect of CDD discourse: to enable interventions by forming intelligible arenas for intervention. To do so, technical deficits and deficiencies that interventions proposed to correct were exposed, whilst that which lay beyond the scope of intervention was excluded, most notably issues of power, inequality and contention, as noted in Chapter 1, and as illustrated in the above description of Bohol. As such, Ferguson noted that the representations formed in development discourse “must inevitably appear badly distorted from the point of view of the scholar” (ibid., 28).

To make sense of the emergence of Kalahi in Bohol beyond CDD discourse, this chapter describes the evolution, transformation, dynamics and trends which have shaped and characterised the province’s political and economic landscape. It explores broad trends in Bohol’s economy in the Spanish and American colonial eras, and discusses their impact on the province’s political landscape. The broad patterns of commercialisation of Bohol’s economy in the second half of the twentieth century are then scrutinised, before turning to the subsequent, accelerated integration of the province into national and international economic circuitries. In later sections, the chapter explores the challenges and opportunities created by these processes for local politicians, businessmen and for the broad mass of the population. In so doing, this chapter attempts to highlight some crucial features that lie beyond the realm of CDD discourse, and are key to understanding the emergence of Kalahi in the Province of Bohol.
Spanish Colonial Rule (1521-1898)

A first step towards making sense of the emergence of Kalahi in Bohol is to understand crucial features of the province’s politics and economy, most notably the limited profitability of the local agricultural sector (which persisted until the late twentieth century), whose roots can be traced back to the Spanish colonial period. For most of the Spanish colonial period in the Philippines, the Spaniards’ presence was largely concentrated in Manila, which served as an entrepôt for Chinese luxury goods en route to Europe via Mexico and American silver en route to China, and in a few regional centres (McCoy 2001, 6). The rest of the archipelago was generally considered as economically unprofitable, as it was “too remote for bulk trade, produced neither pepper nor spices, and was too lightly populated for mines or plantations” (ibid.). Its administration was thus left to missionaries, who “lacked the means of the economic incentives to control most localities effectively,” and faced strong rebellion when trying to apply stricter control (ibid.). The administration of the scarcely populated island of Bohol, like that of the neighbouring islands of the Central and Eastern Visayas, was granted to a handful of Jesuit priests. One of their main endeavours was to relocate Boholanos from their many small, disparate and predominantly inland barangays into compact coastal settlements, following a policy of reducción used across Spanish colonies (Day and Urich, 2008, 119; Putong 1965, 23). The Jesuits also attempted to re-educate the sons of local leaders in Christian faith and practices, counting on the converted ruling class to influence the broader population (Mojares 2002, 90–91; Lach and Van Kley 1993, 205).

108 In 1582, Bohol’s population was estimated at 2,000, a number which was reviewed in 1600, when the island’s population was estimated at 9,500 (Newson 2009, 67).
109 For an account of colonisation through evangelisation, highlighting how the Spaniards’ attempt at refashioning and dominating Philippine society through the introduction of Christianity was translated, appropriated, and gave rise to new possibilities for the “colonised” to demarcate themselves from and confront colonial authority, see Rafael (1988).
The exploitative practices of the Jesuits in the Visayan Islands, from forced relocation to the exaction of tribute and forced labour, triggered a series of uprisings across the region, which proved particularly widespread in Bohol (Lach and Van Kley 1993, 206). The most notable of these was the Dagohoy Rebellion of 1744-1829, the longest Filipino insurgency against Spanish colonial rule. Then, Boholans led by Cabeza de Barangay (Barangay Captain) Francisco Dagohoy succeeded in setting up a local, self-governed settlement of 20,000 individuals in Bohol’s hilly interior. The rebels reclaimed friar lands for subsistence agriculture and developed an informal system of land tenure, under which initiating and maintaining the cultivation of a piece of land entitled farmers to claim and hold land (Urih 2003, 159). Boholans effectively maintained their independence from Spanish colonisers for 85 years, during which they refused to pay the Spanish annual tribute, until a four year military campaign brought them back under Spanish colonial rule (Cummins 2006, 132).

Concomitantly, the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were marked by deep socio-economic transformation throughout the archipelago. Most notable was the shift from subsistence to commercial agriculture for export across Philippine regions, which “developed separate ties to global markets through local branches of Anglo-American merchant houses” (McCoy 2001, 8). Regional economic centres based on export agriculture – sugar in the Western Visayas, tobacco in Northeastern Luzon, and rice and sugar in Central Luzon, for instance – thus developed relatively independently from Manila, turning the Philippines into the “first area in Southeast Asia to develop indigenous commercial elites employing modern production methods and a rural wage labour market” (ibid.). In this context, Chinese mestizos (individuals of mixed Chinese and Philippine heritage) rose as a prominent landowning and commercial class throughout the Philippines in the mid- to late nineteenth century (Wickberg
1964), albeit on a small scale in Bohol. Bohol was largely bypassed by these socio-economic mutations, not only because of episodes of rebellion against the Spanish colonisers, but also because the island’s natural conditions (characterised by a rugged interior, insufficient rainfall and droughty soils) were clearly ill-adapted to large-scale cultivation. As a result, in the mid- to late nineteenth century, Bohol was struggling to produce cash crops, contrasting with the development of export agriculture in other provinces of the Philippines. It was also largely bypassed by Spanish investments in basic infrastructure throughout the archipelago during the same period – mainly roads, bridges and school buildings (Luspo 2003, 35).

The mid- to late nineteenth century was also marked by the rapid set up of political infrastructure and by important political change across the archipelago, including in Bohol. In 1854, Bohol passed from the status of a residencia of the neighbouring Province of Cebu to that of province – which included the Central Visayan island of Siquijor (Luspo in Bohol Province 2010, 1–2). It then became a constituent of the Gobierno de Canton de Visayas (Federal Government of the Visayas) during the Philippine revolution against Spain (1896-1898). In the same period, Bohol’s principalia (notables) proclaimed Bohol an independent republic, the Republika sa Bohol, and swore allegiance to nationalist leader Emilio Aguinaldo, who established a civil government in the Philippines during the revolution, and proclaimed Philippine independence on 12 June 1898 (Tirol 1998; Luspo 2003, 36). However, Philippine (and Bohol’s) independence was quickly overthrown by the

---

110 At the turn of the twentieth century, Bohol was considered as one of the few provinces where the population was “very pure” and where “only 13 out of every 10,000 were other than brown” (United States Bureau of the Census 1905, 44). Only 152 individuals were classified as “mixed” (mostly referring to Chinese and Spanish mestizos), although the U.S. Bureau of Census noted that “there is little doubt that the proportion of mixture of races was much greater” (ibid., 44 and 218–219).

111 Bohol’s apparent lack of economic potential also helps to explain the large scale taken by the Dagohoy Rebellion, which was eased by the very limited Spanish presence on the island, and by the little interest that the Spaniards had in Bohol.

112 Unlike most provinces, which “rose in armed revolution against the Spaniards,” Boholano historian Marianoto Jose Luspo related that in Bohol, “the Spanish regime in Bohol came to an end rather quietly” (2003, 35).
U.S., which bought the archipelago from Spain for US$20 million in December 1898 (Miller 1982, 20–30), and whose 48-year colonial rule would shape the Philippine economic and political landscape in much more decisive ways than nearly four centuries of Spanish control.

American Colonial Era (1898-1946)

The Americans initially envisaged the Philippines as an outlet for U.S. trade and investments. Yet U.S. imperialist ambitions were met by great Philippine resistance and led to the Philippine-American War of 1899-1902, which initially took the form of conventional armed combat before turning into guerrilla warfare. In Bohol, where U.S. troops landed in March 1900, poorly armed local movements of resistance fought the American invaders for just over a year. As in the rest of the archipelago, resistance was tackled by the Americans through campaigns of “pacification,” which combined (i) a policy of “chastisement” or brutal crushing of local guerrilla movements through torture, killings of soldiers and civilians, destruction of economic resources, including productive land and cattle, and the burning of 20 out of 35 municipalities in Bohol (Luspo 2003, 36); and (ii) a policy of “attraction” or “benevolent assimilation” to convince the Filipinos of the benefits of American rule, through the provision of education and health services, infrastructure, and the development of a democratic civil administration, notably through the rapid introduction and scaling up of elections (from municipal elections in 1901 and gubernatorial elections in 1902, to legislative elections in 1907 and presidential elections in 1935). Through their restrictive candidacy and suffrage requirements, elections effectively placed state control, from the local to the national level, in the hands of the emerging Filipino elite, the local landowners and merchants who were seen as the best guarantors of U.S. interests in the country, and who plundered the state for particularistic resources and advantages, as noted in the preceding chapter.

In Bohol, these local elites were exemplified by the Borja and Clarin families, who dominated the province’s politics in the period of U.S. “colonial democracy,” and produced a series of senators, congressmen, mayors and other local officials.\textsuperscript{114} However, Bohol’s political families largely failed to develop beyond their municipal power bases, remaining instead “small-town dynasties” (Van Helvoirt 2009, 166). Local politicians were limited by the relatively small size of the Bohol electorate,\textsuperscript{115} which did not form a large vote bank that could be used to negotiate their rise to national politics, as in populous provinces like Cebu. Moreover, the lack of profitability of Bohol’s local economy meant that local elites lacked a strong basis for capital accumulation that would enable them to develop as national oligarchs. In contrast to other provinces of the Philippines such as Batangas, Pampanga and Negros Occidental, where large landowners had large, profitable sugar plantations to leverage into upstream trajectories in business and politics, Bohol’s landholdings remained small, fragmented, and largely unprofitable – based on the cultivation of corn, coconuts and low-yield varieties of wet rice in the northeast of the province.

Against this backdrop, a few individual Boholano politicians still succeeded in rising to national politics through the “mischief of faction,” as Bohol was positioned as a foil against the powerful Osmeña family, “Cebu’s perennial political dynasty”\textsuperscript{116} (Hedman and Sidel 2000, 66). Most notably, José Arsenio Clarin, son of Bohol’s first Governor Don Aniceto Velez Clarin and himself Senator of the Eleventh Senatorial District\textsuperscript{117} for nearly

\textsuperscript{114} Most notably, Don Aniceto Velez Clarin, who was described as “an American favorite,” became Bohol’s first civil governor under American tutelage in 1902-1904 (Luspo 2003, 38). He was followed by former Vice-Governor Salustiano Borja, a relatively “nationalist” politician who was, nonetheless, close to the Americans, and won the 1904 and 1906 elections, whilst his younger brother, Candelario Borja, was elected provincial delegate to the First Philippine Assembly in 1907, alongside Aniceto Clarin’s son, José Clarin (Cullinane 2003, 166; NHI 2008a).

\textsuperscript{115} Bohol’s population was estimated at 269,000 in 1903, 358,000 in 1918 and 492,000 in 1939 (Bureau of the Census and Statistics 1954).

\textsuperscript{116} The Osmeña’s well-oiled political machine granted them access to political office at all levels of the administration, and enabled them to build an economic empire for themselves in the twentieth century (Sidel 1999, 125–132).

\textsuperscript{117} Under the Philippine Legislature (1916-1935) the country was divided into twelve senatorial districts. The eleventh district included Surigao, Misamis Oriental, Misamis Occidental and Bohol.
twenty years (1916-1935), rose to the powerful position of President pro tempore of the Philippine Senate, thanks to political manoeuvring by then Senate President Manuel L. Quezon. In the early 1930s, Quezon sought to contain the power of Cebu Senator Sergio Osmeña by opposing the adoption of Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act or Independence Bill by the Philippine Legislature, whose provisions had been negotiated by Osmeña in Washington, D.C.\textsuperscript{118} (Abueva 1971, 58). Quezon’s opposition caused a split in the ruling Nacionalista Party and a reorganisation of the Philippine Legislature, wherein pro-Independence Bill senators were ousted by the more powerful opposition, which led to the replacement of Osmeña by Clarin as President Pro Tempore (ibid.). Clarin’s powerful position, which he held from 1934 until his death the following year, enabled him to tap central resources to fund infrastructure and a homestead project in Bohol (Luspo in Bohol Province 2010, 2). Yet he lacked the political machinery that would ensure access to national-level positions and economic privileges for generations to come.

As noted above, Boholano politicians, including Clarin, were hindered by the relatively small size of the province’s vote bank and by the lack of profitability of Bohol’s economy, which had, moreover, suffered important destruction that left it in a state of “depression and decadence” in the early twentieth century (United States Philippine Commission 1904, 762–765). Bohol had been devastated by the Philippine-American War, and had further experienced epidemics of smallpox and cholera in the early 1900s (De Bevoise 1995, 98; United States Philippine Commission 1911).\textsuperscript{119} In addition, 95% of the province’s large cattle population, which had constituted a major asset of Bohol’s economy, had been killed by the war or by rinderpest (United States War Department 1909). Fishing

\textsuperscript{118} Osmeña co-headed the Philippine Independence Mission that negotiated the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act in the U.S. alongside Manuel Roxas, who was to become the first president of the independent Republic of the Philippines (1946-1948).

\textsuperscript{119} Bohol Governor Aniceto Clarin reported a grim situation in the province in the first decade of the twentieth century, where: “Agriculture is prostrated on account of calamities of rinderpest, locusts, and cholera. [...] Not over 30 per cent of the ordinary crops will be harvested” (in United States War Department 1908, 755).
was apparently the only source of livelihood that was relatively spared by the many “calamities” hitting Bohol, and was presented as an activity “of which the Boholanos are fond and which gives them sufficient to live tranquilly and honorably” (Clarín in United States War Department 1908, 247).

Soon after taking control over Bohol, the United States envisioned that the province could develop economically – echoing a nationwide drive to “develop” and “modernise” Philippine economy in the first half of the twentieth century, which was led by the Americans and the emerging Philippine national elite. In the early 1900s, rice, corn and coconuts were cultivated on Bohol by smallholder owner-cultivators, 90% of whom had less than one hectare of land. Only about 30 farms were over 50 hectares, and a minority of farmers (less than 7%) were sharecropping tenants (United States Bureau of the Census 1905). The Americans asserted that Bohol’s economic development was not only hindered by the small size of landholdings, but also by the limited extent of agricultural settlement, as only 40% of provincial land was cultivated (ibid.). The new colonial power professed that Boholanos must abandon their “ancient methods” in agriculture, commerce, and industry, which they identified as the reason why the local economy was “at a standstill or in a state of embryo” (ibid., 525). Instead, Boholanos were encouraged to embrace modern techniques that would allegedly boost agricultural productivity and help Bohol to prosper (ibid.).

Beyond such a discourse, modernisation efforts were only half-hearted in Bohol, which was still regarded as a low-priority province with little economic potential. As a result, the province experienced particularly slow-paced reforms, and failed to emerge as an important beneficiary of state resources during the American colonisation period. Thus by the late 1930s, when provinces such as Cebu and Negros Occidental had already shifted towards large-scale plantation and share tenancy (with respectively 41% and 68% of farmers as tenants), subsistence agriculture was still prevalent in Bohol, where only a sixth of farmers
were reported as tenants (Census of the Philippines 1939 in Kerkvliet 1977, 24). Similarly, the set of legal reforms enacted under the Americans to formalise the “modern” system of land tenure and secure landownership necessitated the conduct of a cadastral survey, which had been completed only in Tagbilaran, the provincial capital, in the pre-World War II period (Urich 2003, 198).

These slow economic mutations were brought to a halt as Japanese forces occupied the Philippines during World War II, between 1942 and 1945. In Bohol, guerrilla warfare against the Japanese was conducted by small resistance groups, which soon united and proceeded to organise men civilians into compulsory “Bolo Battalions,” and women into Women’s Auxiliary Service to support the guerrilla fighters (Fernandos 1981, 85–87). As in most regions of the Philippines, Bohol’s guerrilla movement was supported and then supervised by provincial officials. Most notably, Carlos P. Garcia, the son of a prominent landed political family in the province, who served as Bohol’s Third District representative (1925-1931), governor (1931-1940) and then senator for the Eastern Visayas (1941), was advising on the province’s civil affairs to the commonwealth government from his hiding place in Leyte (Eastern Visayas) (ibid., 11–19). When the Japanese retreated, following the American landing on Leyte in October 1944, the civil government was thus re-established under the control of the same elite political families that had dominated Bohol’s pre-war political landscape.

Garcia’s wartime engagement, and his loyalty to the Nacionalista Party, earned him President Osmeña’s nomination as member of the Philippine Commission sent to the United States to negotiate the terms of the programme of Philippine reconstruction and rehabilitation.

---

120 The term bolo refers to a long knife, which is normally used for weeding but also serves as an arm, and which was distributed to members of Bohol’s Bolo Battalions (Fernandos 1981, 85).
121 See Alfred McCoy (1977) for a detailed study of USAFFE (United States Armed Forces Far East) guerrillas elsewhere in the Philippines, which were formed, led and operated by local politicians during the war, when they were largely used against their local political rivals rather than against the Japanese, and after the war, when they were used as a basis for building patronage networks – in particular given that recognition as USAFFE guerrillas entitled “veterans” to lifetime pensions in US dollars.
with the U.S. Congress (NHI 2008b). The classic “machine politician of the Nacionalista Party,” as one observer described Garcia (Pomeroy 1992, 217), was later nominated as running mate of presidential candidate Raymond Magsaysay in the 1953 elections. Garcia held the vice-presidency until 1957, when Magsaysay’s death propelled him to the presidency. The same year, Garcia won the presidential election with only 41% of the votes, which signalled a need to reinforce his provincial political base, notably by integrating Cebu within his Central Visayas bailiwick and weakening the power of Cebu Governor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. (Sidel 1999, 137). To do so, Garcia allied himself with Congressman Ramon Durano, who delivered him a substantial part of Cebu votes against favours and pork barrel from Japanese reparation funds – which enabled Durano to establish himself as a major industrialist (Cullinane 2009, 174–175). Garcia thus concentrated on building up political support from key provinces such as Cebu, rather than on “developing” Bohol’s economy through pork barrel allocations or the attribution of economic rents, as the province was of little strategic significance for national elections, as noted above.122 As in the case of José Clarin, Carlos Garcia’s political success did not translate into significant economic expansion for Bohol. Nor did it give rise to a powerful dynasty, as the province still lacked the vote bank and economic basis to support such a move, although the shift from subsistence to commercial agriculture, which had slowly started under U.S. colonisation, accelerated in the aftermath of World War II.

Post-Independence Commercialisation of the Economy

Scholarly accounts have highlighted that the commercialisation of Philippine agriculture, which was stimulated by the Americans to feed cash crops to the U.S. market,

122 Boholano historian Marianito Jose Luspo gave a different explanation for Garcia’s lack of interest in Bohol, asserting that: “The assumption of its (Bohol) homegrown son, Carlos P. Garcia, to the Presidency in 1957 hardly helped the cause of Bohol. He was too much of a Boholano to pour development projects into his home island ahead of other provinces. At most, he gave Boholanos a sense of pride so crucial at that time when the very name Boholano had become synonymous with ignorance and gawky unsophistication” (2003, 39).
gathered speed with independence – which was granted to the Philippines on 4 July 1946 (Kerkvliet 1977, 22–23). Then, reform of the tenancy system, expansion of the cash economy, demand for cash crops, and population growth, all led to a commercialised mode of agricultural production characterised by agricultural tenancy – which had risen from a third of Filipino farmers being tenants in 1948, to half of them in the early 1960s (ibid.; Kerkvliet 1974a, 9; Simbulan 2005, 58). By contrast, in the early 1950s, Bohol’s agriculture was still characterised by small-scale owner-operated holdings and low-yielding production of rice and white corn (Bureau of the Census and Statistics 1953, 249–287), which led to a widespread and enduring representation of the province as particularly egalitarian. For instance, in the mid-1960s, Boholano and former Philippine Secretary of Education Cecilio Putong wrote that:

In Bohol, land is well distributed among the people. Every family has its own parcel of land, however small it may be, which it cultivates for its own subsistence. There is, therefore no landed gentry that can lord it over the peasants. The tenancy problem is insignificant compared with that in the provinces of Central Luzon. And so the people deal with one another in a spirit of social equality” (1965, 17).

Yet, Philippine-wide trends of agriculture commercialisation were mirrored in Bohol, albeit in a less marked manner than in most provinces. In the aftermath of World War II, population growth\textsuperscript{123} and high density of population\textsuperscript{124} in the province put considerable pressure on already limited local resources, as shown by the decreasing average farm size – from 2.5 hectares in 1948 to 2.3 hectares in 1971 and 1.6 hectares in 1975 (Bureau of the Census and Statistics 1953, 249–287; NSO 1987, 349–351 and addendum). In this context, many Boholano farmers were compelled to sell their properties – mainly to coastal traders or government and army staff living in Bohol’s urbanised areas – to finance the repair of the

\textsuperscript{123} Bohol’s population was just over half a million inhabitants in 1948 (Bureau of the Census and Statistics 1954) and reached almost 700,000 by 1970 (National Census and statistics Office 1970).
\textsuperscript{124} In Bohol, the density of population was at 144 inhabitants per square kilometre in 1960, against a national average of 90 inhabitants per square kilometre, and rose to 166 inhabitants per square kilometre in 1970, against a national average of 122 inhabitants per square kilometre (NSO 1987, 130–132).
damages incurred under Japanese occupation, or to migrate in search of employment in nearby provinces, usually as domestic helpers, manual labourers or peddlers (Urich 1989, 102; Urich 2003, 167; Adem 1982, 34–36). From the 1950s onwards, Bohol thus experienced particularly large waves of “spontaneous” outmigration to the neighbouring islands of Cebu and Mindanao, triggered by mounting deprivations, under-employment and very high population growth rates.

Such trends contributed to the emergence of a new pattern of rural organisation, based on (i) a populous class of tenants and landless farmers, providing a low-wage agricultural workforce in the post-war context of demographic growth, and rising under-employment and unemployment;\textsuperscript{125} and (ii) a relatively wealthy class of absentee landlords, whose economic bases lay in the rising, profitable urban service sector,\textsuperscript{126} especially government employment,\textsuperscript{127} which was often obtained as a reward for political support (Urich 1989, 102; Adem 1982, 124). Very unequal relations of production between tenants and landowners, wherein tenant-farmers had little control over their production and struggled to make a living, further contributed to the rapid conversion of the rural economy, by feeding a cheap labour force into the agricultural production system. This new socio-economic system, characterised by the rise of agricultural tenancy and absentee landownership, was in place from the mid-1950s, when 300 out of 100,000 families in Bohol were controlling a fifth of the total harvested area and owned relatively large landholdings – over 50 hectares each (Simbulan 2005, 59), which was large by provincial standards yet still small compared to plantations

\textsuperscript{125} The category “unemployed” did not appear in the 1948 census of the population; instead, 18,000 were classified as “new worker,” i.e. “without gainful occupation but seeking work” (Bureau of the Census and Statistics 1954). By contrast, in the 1970, 13,000 were classified as “unemployed,” and 6,000 as “looking for work for the first time” (National Census and Statistics Office 1970).

\textsuperscript{126} In 1948, 9,000 employees were working in “personal services” (mostly “domestic services”), and 3,000 in “professional services” (mostly education), whilst in 1970, 32,000 individuals were working in services in Bohol. Similarly, in 1970, 36,000 individuals were working in an urban environment (including 12,000 in private employment, 8,000 working for the government, and 11,000 self-employed individuals) (Bureau of the Census and Statistics 1954; National Census and Statistics Office 1970).

\textsuperscript{127} Between 1948 and 1970, the number of government employees rose from 4,000 to 17,000 employees (Bureau of the Census and Statistics 1954; National Census and Statistics Office 1970).
elsewhere in the country. In this context, Bohol was officially considered as one of the poorest provinces of the Philippines. In 1971, for instance, the provincial per capita income amounted to 426 pesos, against a Philippine-wide average of 634 pesos (JICA 1979, 19). In this context, development discourse presented accelerated marketisation of the economy as the solution, not the cause of poverty in Bohol. It further identified the backwardness of the provincial agriculture sector as the main cause of poverty (rather than unequal relations of production, for instance), as illustrated by the following description of the province by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA):

“Bohol [...] has agriculture as its most important sector, occupying most of the province’s vast tracts of land. The rest, however, are small scale industries which are supported by a limited number of enterprises. Bohol’s agriculture industry is relatively underdeveloped due to the lack of irrigation facilities, out-moded agricultural technology, inefficient land use, and limited channels for distribution. These factors have contributed to the low per capita income of the province” (ibid., 1).

Agriculture was the main but not the sole economic activity in Bohol, where the second most important source of livelihood was provided by fishing, a sector which also experienced important changes in the second half of the twentieth century. First of all, the early days of the post-war era saw the propagation of new, destructive fishing methods employed by small-scale municipal fishermen and part-time subsistence fishermen (usually farmers from the uplands), especially dynamite, chemicals and pesticides such as cyanide (Green et al. 2002, 123–129). Secondly and most importantly, central government policies encouraged the development of commercial fishing from the mid-1970s onwards. In this context, the government, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, actively

---

128 This echoes Tania Li’s remark, in the case of the Indonesian CDD programme KDP, that: “Capitalist enterprise and the search for profit appeared in their [World Bank social development team members’] narratives only as a solution to poverty, not as a cause” (2007, 267).
promoted “efficient but destructive” technology, introducing trawling, Danish seine nets\(^{129}\) with scaring devices, and deep set gill nets\(^{130}\) in Bohol (ibid., 11). By the mid-1980s, ringnet had become the most popular fishing gear in the region, used with fish aggregating devices, fish finders and sonars (Green et al. 2004, 26–36). As a result of improved fishing devices and fleet, commercial fishers became the leading producers of fish products in the Central Visayas, including Bohol.

Commercial fishers’ large-scale use of destructive methods and overfishing resulted in the degradation and depletion of the marine habitat, which was most felt in the dramatic decline of fish catches in Bohol and throughout the Philippines (Green et al. 2002, 21–35; Santos et al. 2003, 213–214). Small-scale “municipal” fisherfolk in Bohol, whose number was estimated at around 80,000 in the 2000s (Green et al. 2002, 8), were hardest hit by the decline of marine resources, which directly threatened their livelihood. They could barely withstand competition from commercial fishers from Bohol, Negros and Cebu, who all operated in their municipal waters (ibid., 130). The whole population also suffered from the combination of reduced catches and expensive technology, which resulted in sharp increases in fish prices – which went up by 1400% between 1977 and 2002 in Bohol (Green et al. 2004, 42).

In short, the commercialisation of Bohol’s agriculture and fishery sectors in the post-war era threatened the livelihood of many farmers, who had become tenants and had little control over their production, and of small-scale fisherfolk, who struggled in the face of the competition and destructions incurred by commercial fisheries. These processes gained greater speed in the 1980s onwards, as the national government and development organisations presented Boholano businessmen and politicians with opportunities and tools to

---

\(^{129}\) A Danish seine net is a seine operated with a tom weight to haul the net (Green et al. 2004, 115), resembling a trawl but much cheaper to operate and usable on smaller boats.

\(^{130}\) A deep set gill nets is an entangling net fixed to the seabed.
promote economic growth through the integration of the province into the global economy, and into national and international sources of patronage.

**Going Global**

In Bohol, as in the rest of the Philippines, the vanguard of economic integration into international circuitries was the throng of workers encouraged by the government to seek employment overseas. From the mid-1970s, the promotion of overseas contract labour, which offered the prospect of greater profits than inter-provincial migrations, became central to the government’s economic development strategy. Government policies such as Marcos’ Labor Code of 1974 encouraged sustained migration flows, which remained particularly large in the Central Visayas. In response to the national government’s labour export policy, the Provincial Government of Bohol set up local institutional structures to encourage overseas employment and seize the enormous economic potential of overseas migrants for Bohol. For instance, the Bohol Employment and Placement Office sent nearly a thousand domestic helpers and nurses to Hong Kong and the Middle East in 2002 (Aumentado 2003), whilst others found employment as seamen, nurses, care givers, and other blue-collar jobs throughout the globe.

Although large, sustained waves of outmigration contributed to depress the local rural economy – representing the loss of a young and dynamic workforce (Adem 1982, 47) – flows of remittance became a major source of income and investment in the province. In the late 1990s, migrant workers set up successful economic ventures, philanthropic initiatives, and

---

131 With a net migration rate of -2.08 between 1975 and 1980, the Central Visayas was the third most important outmigration region in the Philippines, after the Eastern Visayas (-3.13) and Bicol (-2.25) (NSO 1987, 205).
132 In some of Bohol’s municipalities, remittances were estimated to be the main source of livelihood for one sixth of the population (Gibson-Graham 2006, 170).
social investment projects in Bohol, establishing themselves as important direct investors in the province. In the early and mid-2000s, institutional structures were further developed to target investments from overseas workers, such as Bohol Initiatives on Migration and Community Development, which channelled migrants’ remittances into local enterprises, and the social service sector of Bohol’s Provincial Planning and Development Office, which served as a coordination body to attract migrants’ investments in local “poverty reduction” programmes (Feranil 2009).

Beyond overseas employment, economic policies in Bohol and in the rest of the country focused on the development of export-oriented industries and services to attract foreign investment and integrate global markets, as advocated by the World Bank and the IMF. To do so, Bohol’s provincial government benefited from the support of development organisations. In particular, USAID identified investment promotion as a priority for Bohol’s development, through its Governance and Local Democracy (GOLD) programme. The public-private body Investment Promotion Advisory Group (IPAG) was thus set up in the province. It was tasked to define Bohol’s “development path” through rounds of participatory consultation meetings with municipal government employees, and representatives of NGOs and grassroots organisations, which were facilitated through processes of the GOLD programme (USAID n.d.; Galing Pook n.d.). As a result, the IPAG formulated an overall “Vision” of Bohol as “a prime eco-cultural tourism destination and a strong agro-industrial province in the Visayas with an empowered and self-reliant people who are God-loving, law-abiding, proud of their cultural heritage and committed to the growth and protection of the environment” (Cambangay n.d.). To achieve this vision, the “Mission” of the provincial government was to “continuously transform its [Bohol’s] social, economic, political and cultural life through effective collaboration of people from various sectors of the province”

133 For instance, the Bohol Ubi Center Foundation, an ube (purple yam) processing and confectionary-making enterprise, was regarded as the first overseas workers’ social investment project in the country (Aguilar 2005, 30).
In this context, tourism and agriculture were identified as the two main “economic drivers that will propel Bohol’s development” (Aumentado 2002). They became the foci of a province-wide “convergence strategy,” through which all external development funding was channelled towards the two sectors (Aumentado 2006, 5), whose development is examined in the pages below.

**Tourism**

Developing tourism was presented by the provincial government as a “pro-poor” initiative, which “stimulates economic growth and provides direct cash benefits to the people which can, in turn, be channelled to improve nutrition and food security, housing, health and education thereby increase the standard of living as a whole” (Province of Bohol n.d., 36).

Bohol’s tourism development strategy was twofold. The first part of this strategy focused on developing the island of Panglao, about 20km Southwest of Tagbilaran City, into a luxury beach resort. Panglao had been declared “tourist zone and marine reserve” under Marcos (Proclamation 1801), which enabled Marcos crony Anos Fonacier, who had served as a front for Marcos business operations in Cebu, to establish the first luxury resort in Panglao Island in the early 1980s, and become the “Father of Bohol Tourism” (Van Helvoirt 2009, 169; Sidel 1999, 137–138).

The development of Panglao Island as a “tourism estate” was further promoted by successive post-Marcos presidents,[^134] and fleshed out in plans prepared by the Philippine Department of Tourism and the Commission of the European Union in the early and mid-1990s. They envisioned building a 120-hectare resort, centred on a retirement village and comprising leisure and recreational facilities, including a golf course and a marina. The project also included the construction of the Panglao-Bohol international airport, which

[^134]: Panglao was established as a “tourism estate” under President Corazon Aquino’s 1989 Philippine Tourism Master Plan, and identified as a priority area by the Ramos administration (Cañete 2003, 188).
would replace the run-down domestic airport in Tagbilaran city, accommodate large aircrafts, and enable tourists to directly arrive at their luxury beach resorts, rather than in the unglamorous provincial capital (Province of Bohol n.d., annex 1-XI). Although US$17.5 million were spent on the airport project (on a detailed engineering report, on work to upgrade causeway connections between Bohol and Panglao, and on land buying), it was eventually abandoned, as its cost suddenly soared from US$98 million to US$163 million months before the 2010 elections, and the public funds that were to be invested in the project dried up – although it is not clear whether they were spent or assigned elsewhere (Obedencio and Philippine Public Transparency Reporting Project 2011; Howley 2011).

Other initiatives were undertaken by the provincial government and local businessmen to attract big investors who would establish luxurious and profitable resorts on Panglao. Bohol’s Tourism Council and the Tourism Development and Promotion Unit of Bohol Investment Promotion Centre, which was established in 1999 to plan, promote and ease investments in the province (Galing Pook n.d), concentrated their efforts on creating a “business-friendly environment” in Bohol (PPDO 2010, xviii). In so doing, they hoped to attract major investors such as the Shangri-La chain and the Ayala Corporation, Philippines’ largest conglomerate owned by the Alaya family, considered to be “the oldest and most established of the country’s economic elite” (Salazar 2007, 105). In parallel, local officials and businessmen undertook particularly bold initiatives, most notably the Panglao Oasis Islands, a land reclamation project developed by Bohol Chamber of Commerce and Industry President Norris Oculam through his business venture Oasis Leisure Islands Development, Inc. The project proposed to build a group of five artificial islands styled on Dubai’s Palm Islands on the shores of Panglao, which would provide prospective investors with premium land for luxury costal resorts.
On the whole, the drive to develop Panglao tourism sector had harmful consequences for the local population. Efforts to attract external investors crowded out small-scale local enterprises (Van Helvoirt 2009, 83), whilst relentless development plans threatened to displace local residents, who were under pressure from the government and businessmen to sell their lands (Bersales 2005, 257–259). In the case of the Panglao-Bohol international airport for instance, land was reportedly bought from local owners for less than US$2 per square meter, a low price by local standards, which caused much dissatisfaction among local inhabitants who were forced to relocate (Obedencio and Philippine Public Transparency Reporting Project 2011). Moreover, tourism development presented a threat to local farmers and fisherfolk’s livelihood by reducing land available for cultivation, limiting fisherfolk’s access to the sea, and driving prices up; and whilst it generated new employment, the only positions open to local residents were low-wage and manual (Bersales 2005, 250–253).

The second part of Bohol’s tourism development strategy focused on developing “eco-tourism” attractions throughout the province, which led to a veritable “tourism fever” that extended far beyond Panglao (Cañete 2003, 188). The provincial government encouraged all municipal mayors to identify tourism attractions in their barangays, which resulted in a host of activities, from dolphin and whale-watching to river cruises and zip-lines. Local officials and businessmen also banked on the tourism potential of Bohol’s conical limestone hills, known as the “Chocolate Hills,” and of the tarsier, a small nocturnal prosimian primate found only in the Southern Philippines and in some Indonesian and Malay islands. For instance, in 1996, Anos Fonacier, alongside Rev. Fr. Florante S. Camacho, former president of the Divine Word College in Tagbilaran City, and Zosimo Angan, a retired provincial police commander turned businessman, set up the Philippine Tarsier Foundation, Inc. The Foundation, which was described as a cluster of “elite people with business interests mainly in Bohol and Cebu” (ibid., 190), bought land for the establishment of a “sanctuary” in the
municipality of Corella, threatening farmers with forced eviction if they refused to sell their land. It also lobbied the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to classify adjacent timberland, used by local farmers to collect firewood, as a protected area (ibid., 191). In turn, in the municipality of Loboc, tarsier viewing became integrated into river cruising packages, which disrupted local fisheries activities. It also resulted in the loss of agricultural lands for farmers whose cultivations were alongside the river, as the DENR enforced a ban on farming in the Loboc watershed area, to preserve it as a tourism attraction (ibid., 193–195). In short, the development of tourism in Bohol was promoted by and benefited local government officials, businessmen, and foreign investors, whilst often hindering farming and fishing activities, thus disrupting the livelihood of local farmers and fisherfolk.

**Agriculture**

The development of agriculture as the “key economic driver” of Bohol, alongside tourism, was informed by the broad framework outlined in the 1997 Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act, which promoted “higher-value crops, value-added processing, agribusiness activities, and agro-industrialization” to enhance agriculture’s profitability and meet the challenges of globalization (section 3b). In this context, the Provincial Government of Bohol embarked on an ambitious agenda of agriculture modernisation and industrialisation, which was fleshed out in the 2006-2026 Bohol Agricultural Master Plan, the blueprint of agricultural development in the province, drafted by the provincial government and the Philippine-Australia Human Resource Development Facility. The Master Plan proposed to enhance agricultural productivity by increasing the area of productive land, and

---

135 Overall, between the 1980s and the mid-2000s, 75,766 hectares of lands, most of which were cultivated, legally and otherwise, became “protected areas” to promote tourism or protect the environment, fuelling a spate of land tenure disputes that pitted farmers against local businessmen and the state (Urich et al. 2001).
by facilitating farmers’ access to “cost-effective and appropriate technologies” (Provincial Government of Bohol 2007, 37).

Several large-scale projects focused on expanding Bohol’s cultivated area by converting dry land into irrigated rice-fields, which would reportedly turn the province into the “rice granary” of the Central Visayas. Although the northeast of Bohol benefited from large watersheds, development interventions targeted the irrigation of at least 10,000 additional hectares of agricultural land in the area through a series of irrigation projects, the most important of which was the Japanese government-financed Bohol Irrigation Project. The first phase of the project led to the construction of the US$52 million Malinao Dam in the municipality of Pilar, to provide all year-round irrigation to 5,000 hectares of newly-converted rice fields. However, the dam provided irrigation to only two-fifths of the targeted area, whilst frequently drying out during the dry season (Panagbugkos Kontra K-4 2005, 6; Friends of the Earth Japan 2007, 38). In addition, soil erosion in the upland area of Pilar caused the sedimentation of the dam, which severely affected its water storage capacity and reduced its life expectancy from 80 to 20 years (Newby and Cramb 2009; Anania n.d.). Instead of boosting rice productivity, the project resulted in severe indebtedness of farmers in the target municipalities, who had invested in equipment and land levelling to convert their holdings into rice paddies,¹³⁶ and now had to pay an irrigation service fee of about US$32 or 150 kilos of rice, per hectare and per harvest for accessing water (Friends of the Earth Japan 2007, 38; Bohol Standard, 30 January 2011). In response, the provincial government called for even more official development assistance (ODA) projects to reforest Pilar’s upland, and to raise the dam’s height and increase its capacity – corresponding to the third phase of the costly Bohol Irrigation Project, financed by the Korean government.

¹³⁶ The project’s memorandum of agreement between the beneficiary-landowner and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) stipulated that the former “shall pay development cost per hectare for the converted land which include cost of labor, tools and implements, equipment rental, as the case maybe” (in Bohol Standard, 30 January 2011).
In turn, the second phase of the Bohol Irrigation Project resulted in the construction of the Bayongan Dam in the municipality of San Miguel, which became one of the most expensive irrigation dams in the Philippines, requiring approximately US$78 million after its costs suddenly soared by 52% (Landingin 2008). Although the increase was initially rejected by the chief of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), on the grounds that it was highly irregular and made the project economically unviable by NEDA’s standards, President Arroyo prompted the transfer of the head of NEDA, and had the increase approved by her newly-formed Cabinet Group. To deflate the controversy around the dam’s cost, the new head of NEDA affirmed that the project would not only increase agriculture productivity, but that it would also assist counterinsurgency efforts in the province, declaring that:

“One major consideration was the contribution of the project to resolving the peace and order situation in Bohol. The project will benefit a lot of farmers and their families, and that’s where insurgency starts” (Augusto Santos in ibid.).

Furthermore, to facilitate farmers’ access to “cost-effective and appropriate technologies” (Provincial Government of Bohol 2007, 37), the government and development organisations promoted hybrid crops, mainly rice, in Bohol and elsewhere in the Philippine. In the 2000s, programmes of seeds, fertilisers and pesticides’ distribution and subsidies, and of credit provision, such as the Sustainable Integrated Agribusiness Project of Bohol Agricultural Master Plan and the Rice Accelerated Enhancement Response programme, encouraged Boholano farmers to abandon the high-value, low-yield varieties of red rice that they traditionally cultivated for high-yield, hybrid rice crops (Bautista 2006, 105; Urich 1989, 101). Yet the large amounts of fertilisers and pesticides required for hybrid rice cultivation incurred a cost that many farmers could not meet, and damaged Bohol’s fragile eco-system. Programmes of hybrid crops promotion were particularly criticised by regional and national
NGOs such as SEARICE (Southeast Asia Regional Initiatives for Community Empowerment) for increasing farmers’ dependency on private companies providing seeds and other agricultural input (SEARICE n.d.; MASIPAG 2004; GRAIN 2005; Atienza 2010, 5). Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s, initiatives to convert Bohol to high-yield hybrid rice varieties had created similar problems and were quickly abandoned, as they incurred high costs in fertilisers and seeds on farmers, and proved ill-adapted to Bohol’s alkaline soils, which could not support intensified irrigation or use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides (Urich 1989, 106).

Overall, as illustrated in the cases of large-scale irrigation and hybridisation initiatives, projects and programmes designed to increase agriculture productivity turned out to be rather ineffective, often irregular, and harmful to local farmers, who often became indebted and highly dependent on companies providing agricultural inputs. In Bohol, moreover, development programmes designed to “modernise” Bohol’s agriculture were closely intertwined with local businessmen’s strategies to enhance agricultural profitability, as briefly mentioned above, and explored in greater detail in the pages below.

Local Growth Coalition

From the 1980s onwards, the development of Bohol’s agro-industry was led by two local businesses, the Alturas Group of Companies and Bohol Quality, both of which were headed by Chinese mestizo families. Alturas and Bohol Quality both grew from small sari-sari (convenience) stores into large conglomerates that dominated the local agriculture, aquaculture, and agro-industrial sectors, through their production, processing, wholesale and retail activities (Van Helvoirt 2009, 92–93). In particular, Alturas, which was owned and managed by business tycoon Marlito C. Uy, gained control over whole chains of production for the main agricultural and fishery products of Bohol. To ensure its domination over the
rice trade and remain the largest agricultural buyer in the province, a position it enjoyed since the 1990s, Alturas pursued a strategy of incremental vertical integration. It became the prime lender in the province (distributing hybrid rice seeds, chemical fertilisers and pesticides through Alturas Supermarket Corporation, and lending mechanised equipment to farmers), a position which it used to force farmers to sell exclusively to Alturas, at low prices, to repay their debts (Catarata in *Sun Star Cebu*, 4 March 2008; Van Helvoirt 2009, 122).

Farmers were also indebted to the First Consolidated Bank, a private development bank which was set up in Bohol in 1982, and specialised in rural operations such as agricultural loans. The Bank was chaired by Richard T. Uy, the other tycoon of the family, whilst Marlito sat on the Board of Directors. From 1997, the First Consolidated Bank widened its lending operations through its corporate social responsibility arm, the FCB Foundation, a body registered with and certified by USAID, which provided credit only to farmers in the northeast of the province, in the form of seeds and fertilisers provided by the Ayala Corporation. Farmers had to repay the FCB Foundation in cash at 18% interest, and were required to sell their products exclusively to Alturas (SEARICE 2001). As a result of these strategies, the Alturas conglomerate was estimated to control 70% of Bohol’s rice trade in the first decade of the twenty-first century – whilst the remaining 30% was controlled by Bohol Quality (Van Helvoirt 2009, 167–168).

Alturas also swiftly gained control over the rising aquaculture sector, whose development was promoted by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to offset the effects of declining fish harvests in commercial fishing, and to “transform the country’s fishermen from fish hunters to fish farmers” (DA-BFAR 2008, 2). Marcela Farms, which was set up in 1996 as part of the Alturas conglomerate, and considered as an example of “new industries” flourishing thanks to agricultural diversification (Bautista 2006, 107), controlled
about 80% of the total aquaculture production area in the province.\textsuperscript{137} In turn, Alturas’ subsidiary BAMDECOR (Bohol Agro-Marine Development Corporation) was Bohol’s sole exporter of marine and aquaculture production (DTI-BETP 2012). Through Marcela Farms, moreover, Alturas led the local piggery and poultry businesses, including the production of animal feed. To produce the particularly large corn supplies required by Marcela Farms’ animal feed mills, Bohol Second District Representative Erico Boyles Aumentado (2010-present) endeavoured to turn his district into “the pilot in hybrid corn [...] production investments that could transform vast idle lands into agribusiness generators” (Bohol Times, 02 January 2011).

As illustrated by the case of Marcela Farms’ feed mills, local businessmen and local government officials joined their forces to promote a mutually-beneficial economic growth strategy in the province. To do so, they formed a local coalition that promised to generate increased profits, rents and taxes, and whose features corresponded to the “local growth coalitions” that U.S. social scientists have described in American urban settings.\textsuperscript{138} In Bohol, the provincial government actively encouraged and eased the operations and investments of the private sector in agriculture and aquaculture, as a means to promote a shift “from family subsistence production to agri-base entrepreneurship” (PPDO 2010, xviii). Moreover, local businessmen used their prominent positions in the public-private body Bohol Investment Promotion Centre and in the Bohol Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as well as their personal connections with provincial politicians, to influence the direction of investments in the province (Van Helvoirt 2009, 196). As a result, benefits from interventions geared towards developing Bohol’s agriculture and agro-industry were systematically captured by local business tycoons such as the Uys, who used increased profits from agriculture to build a local agro-industrial empire for themselves.

\textsuperscript{137} Marcela Farms owned four out of the eleven aquaculture farms set up in Bohol, covering 170.5 hectares out of the total 215 hectares dedicated to aquaculture in the province (BFAR 2012).

\textsuperscript{138} See, for instance, Mollenkopf (1983) and Logan and Molotch (1987).
Further illustrating the operations and effects of this local growth coalition between provincial officials and local business tycoons is the case of Bohol’s palm oil industry. A major endeavour of then Bohol Governor Erico Aumentado (2001-2010), prompted by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, was to establish the palm oil industry in the province. To do so, Aumentado joined forces with the Uys, who developed and monopolised the palm oil industry in Bohol through three of their business ventures, the First Consolidated Bank, its USAID-accredited, “charitable” arm FCB Foundation, and the Philippine Agricultural Land Development and Mill (PALM). Together, these ventures controlled the provision of credit, seeds, fertilisers and pesticides, and had exclusive rights on palm fruits’ trading and processing (Catarata 2008b). PALM was also entitled to fix selling prices and to reclaim cultivated land if farmers breached their agreement with the company (ibid.). As a result, some farmers became heavily indebted, whilst others lost their lands, food insecurity increased due to the replacement of rice by palm, and mono-cropping and the intensive use of fertilisers and pesticides led to environmental degradation (ibid.). Yet, the palm oil industry was still presented by local officials and businessmen as a “key to lick poverty” (PALM President Joven Uy in Blanco 2007).

In short, Bohol in the 1990s and early 2000s was far from the unproductive, resourceless province described in the Balicasan study. Instead, its economy was driven by a local growth coalition formed by local businessmen and local officials who spearheaded agricultural modernisation and tourism development in the province. They were supported by the national government and development organisations, whose shared aim was to turn Bohol into a profitable province. Yet the accelerated commercialisation of the province’s economy had harmful effects on the broad mass of the population, as noted in the case of tourism development, and as further showed by evidence of rising inequality and poverty in the province. Official statistics showed that poverty incidence had increased in Bohol, from 43%
of the population in 1997 to 53% in 2000, when Bohol was amongst the poorest provinces of the country (NSCB 2003a). Bohol was also estimated to be one of the most unequal provinces in the Philippines, in terms of income distribution, with the fifth highest Gini coefficient in the archipelago\(^{139}\) (NSCB 2003b). Widespread poverty and inequality created tensions and discontent across the province, which occasionally gave rise to protest and rebellion, as the remaining pages of this chapter shall explore.

**Contestation, Containment and Counterinsurgency**

Against the backdrop of persistent rural insecurity, elements of the local peasantry occasionally mobilised and revolted, often in attempts to “rise against the government so that if successful they would be given land and everything would be equalised” (Bernaldez in Urich 2003, 170). Contestation in Bohol (and elsewhere) was channelled through two main avenues: violent NPA-backed rebellion, and peaceful contestation. The intervention of the NPA, which proceeded to organise rebellious Boholano peasants, turned mobilisation into fully-fledged insurgency in the 1980s, and again in the late 1990s and 2000s. Insurgency took various forms, including occupation and cultivation of public land, raids on private and state properties, imposition of “revolutionary taxes” on landlords, businessmen and development organisations, and of “permits to campaign” on local politicians, as well as ambushes and assassinations (ibid., 170). Although NPA-backed insurgency remained very modest in Bohol, where less than 300 armed NPA members were officially counted at the height of the resurgence of insurgency in the early 2000s, the province was officially dubbed the “Central Visayas headquarters of the CPP-NPA” (Aumentado 2007).

Tensions and discontent amongst local farmers were largely channelled through peaceful contestation. Organised movements of contestation strengthened in the first decade

\(^{139}\) The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality, which ranges from 0, indicating perfect income equality, to 1, indicating perfect income inequality.
of the twenty-first century, notably through the sustained activities of provincial and regional leftist organisations in Bohol. Several movements led by local farmers’ organisations arose from direct experiences with agriculture modernisation initiatives prescribed by the government and development organisations. For instance, the abuses associated with the introduction of palm oil in Bohol were documented by two organisations, the province-wide militant farmers’ organisation HUMABOL (Hugpong sa mga Mag-uumang Bolanon, Bohol Farmers’ Association), and the regional peasant support network FARDEC (Farmers Development Center). HUMABOL recruited local farmers’ organisations throughout the province and formed the province-wide Bohol Network of Farmers’ Rights, which actively campaigned against the palm oil project through public information campaigns. The Network also lobbied municipal and provincial government officials and organised demonstrations at the municipal and provincial levels, against palm oil, for genuine land reform, and for sustainable agriculture practices. As a result, it successfully opposed further cultivation of palm for export, reducing the initial target of 45,000 hectares to 5,000 hectares only (Catarata 2008b).

Moreover, in 2006, FARDEC, HUMABOL and barangay-based farmers’ groups obtained increased purchase prices for rice through sustained campaigning (Catarata 2008a). Farmers organised by HUMABOL also marched in the provincial capital city of Tagbilaran to oppose the extension of the 1988 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (Bohol Standard, 15 June 2008), whilst militant farmers organised by the CPP-affiliated, activist peasant group Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Peasant Movement of the Philippines) campaigned for the implementation of the Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill140 (Bohol Times, 11

---

140 The Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill or House Bill 3059, was filled in November 2007 by party list representatives from Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP, Peasant Movement of the Philippines), Anakpawis (Children of Sweat), Bayan Muna (Nation First) and Gabriela Women’s Party, as a “policy to break up the monopoly of a few landowners and foreign control of our lands and implement genuine agrarian reform in order to finally end the feudal and semifeudal exploitation of our farmers; to render them social and historical justice, unleash their productive powers and set our agriculture on the right path of development” (section 2).
July 2010). These demands were strongly opposed by officials from the provincial office of the Department of Agrarian Reform, who argued that redistribution would result in farmers selling their lands, and would entail costly measures of compensation for landlords, concluding that ongoing reform measures were sufficient to improve land tenure (ibid.).

Similarly, the damages incurred by commercial fisheries on marine resources and their domination of the fishing sector generated tensions and discontent amongst local fisherfolk. Organisations such as MAKAMASA Bohol (Makusganong Kapunungan sa mga Gagmayung Mananagat sa Bohol, Federation of Small Fishermen in Bohol), a provincial federation comprising local subsistence fisherfolk associations, actively campaigned against illegal fishing and against the frequent intrusion of commercial fishers into municipal waters in Bohol (Green et al. 2002, 53). However, commercial fishers led by Bohol Fish Traders Association’s President Elmer Chavez, the largest commercial fishing magnate in Bohol (owner of four trawlers and two ice plants in the province), also lobbied the provincial government to revoke the ban on commercial boats’ access to municipal waters, which they blamed for the soaring fish prices in the province (Bohol Times, 9 January 2011; Bohol Chronicle, 9 January 2011).

Tourism development also prompted mobilisation and contestation, in particular from groups of local farmers and fishermen, and from the Catholic Church, which saw the development of Panglao Island Tourism Estate as the cause of an “erosion of moral values” in the province, mostly marked by the heightened consumption of illegal narcotics (Bersales 2005, 262). For instance, the land-reclamation project Panglao Oasis Islands was strongly opposed by fisherfolk associations such as Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya ng Pilipinas (National Alliance of Small Fisherfolk Organisations), as it threatened the livelihood of local fishermen who used the area for seaweed cultivation and fishing – not only by excluding them from reclaimed areas, but also by harming the local marine life.
(Bohol Chronicle, 1 November 2009; Edep 2011). Environmental NGOs also opposed the project, on the grounds of the damages that it would incur on the rich marine ecosystem of the Bohol Marine Triangle (ibid.).

From the 1980s onwards, these challenges from below were largely addressed through the government’s “total approach” to counterinsurgency, which refers to a combination of military counterinsurgency measures and of development interventions, as noted in Chapter 3. Under this “total approach,” development interventions followed the deployment of military operations and specifically targeted barangays classified as “influenced” by the NPA, where they allegedly served to alleviate poverty and improve local governance (Urlich 2003, 172; Aumentado 2007). In the mid-1990s, for instance, the main counterinsurgency instrument of Bohol’s provincial government was the People’s Enhancement Program, through which teams of community organisers were sent alongside military Special Operations Teams to “empower” communities in barangays suspected of hosting rebels. To do so, the programme attempted to organise residents in cooperatives, which would allegedly build their “trust and confidence” and revive the bayanihan (cooperation) spirit (Chiu 2007b; AFP 2007), in a manner akin to the CDD approach.

Counterinsurgency operations were complemented by series of agrarian reforms, which, in Bohol, were impeded by the lack of formal property titling that resulted from incomplete cadastral surveys – and which also eased land-grabbing, a practice that was particularly frequent in Bohol in the 1960s and 1970s (Urlich 2003, 168; Saz 2007, 62). In addition, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, landlords frequently continued to demand half of their tenants’ harvests as rent in the province, although such practice had been banned since President Diosdado Macapagal’s Land Reform Code of 1963, which provided that share

\[141\] Barangays across the country were classified as (i) “influenced” when the government considered that at least half of the inhabitants supported the NPA, and that local, legal organisations were formed to support the armed group; (ii) “infiltrated” when at least a fourth of the population supported the NPA, and local leaders were recruited; and (iii) “threatened” when armed rebels could be seen but were only using the barangay as a point of access to another area (Bohol Provincial Government 2003).
tenancy be replaced by leasehold tenancy (Urich 1989, 102–103; Saulo-Adriano 1991, 7). The enactment of the 1988 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which entitled tenants to claim land after three years of cultivation, also led some landowners to ban tenants from their lands (Urich 2003). In short, in Bohol as elsewhere in the country, successive agrarian reforms were loosely enforced, easily bypassed and in the end had little redistributive effects. As Chapter 3 highlighted, these token reforms largely aimed to “avert existing or potential agrarian unrest” (Kerkvliet 1974b, 288) whilst protecting the interests of rural elites, on whom successive governments relied for political support.

Agrarian reform programmes were further accompanied by numerous donor-assisted development projects focusing on Agrarian Reform Communities, referring to single barangays or group of barangays where at least half of the population was classified as agrarian reform beneficiary under the 1988 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. These Agrarian Reform Communities acted as convergence areas for implementing agrarian reform and support services provided by the government, NGOs and development organisations (ADB 2008). The system was established by the Department of Agrarian Reform in 1993 to “showcase that agrarian reform works to empower people and bring about sustainable agro-industrial development” (ibid.). In Bohol, in the 1990s and 2000s, development projects funded by the World Bank and other development organisations thus largely shared the official aim of improving the economic and social conditions of agrarian reform beneficiaries in selected Agrarian Reform Communities, through community-based approaches.142 More specifically, they relied on a range of activities and initiatives that included (i) providing rural infrastructure and productive assets; (ii) providing training and agricultural support services, including credit, to boost productivity and entrepreneurship; (iii) improving public welfare

services; (iv) setting up income generation initiatives; (v) improving the land titling and administration system; (vi) promoting the participation of cooperatives and civil society organisations; and (vii) building local government officials’ capacity to manage and foster rural development. Yet these projects had little effect in terms of addressing the hardships experienced in rural Bohol, as shown by evidence of rising poverty and persistently high inequality in the province in the late 1990s.

Similarly, widespread discontent amongst fisherfolk was addressed by the government through reforms. Most significantly, The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 set the first two objectives of the fishery sector as “1. Conservation, protection and sustained management of the country’s fishery and aquatic resources;” and “2. Poverty alleviation and the provision of supplementary livelihood among municipal fisherfolk” (section 2g). However, the coastal resource management regime spelled out in the Fisheries Code proved difficult to implement, and, as a result, largely failed to curb destructive practices. For instance, although the Fisheries Code regulated access to and use of aquatic resources to promote food security and to protect and support municipal fisherfolk, destructive fishing methods such as cyanide and dynamite were still used in Bohol in the 2000s. Moreover, although commercial fishers were banned from municipal waters (15km from municipal coastlines), trawlers frequently intruded on Bohol’s municipal waters, where they illegally used “active” fishing gear143 to collect fish (Provincial Government of Bohol 2007, 19; Green et al. 2004, 53).

In short, the deployment of counterinsurgency interventions, reforms and development programmes from the 1980s onwards failed to pre-empt or curb rising mobilisation and contestation in the first decade of the twenty-first century. It was thus in a context of resurging challenges from below, mainly in the form of local peasant and

---

143 An “active” fishing gear is defined in the Philippine Fisheries Code as “a fishing device characterized by gear movements, and/or the pursuit of the target species by towing, lifting, and pushing the gears, surrounding, covering, dredging, pumping and seating the target species to impoundments” (section 4, paragraph 40a).
fishermen's organisations mobilised to demand implementation of agrarian reform, legislation restricting large-scale fishing and more equal terms of trade, that Kalahi emerged in the Province of Bohol.

Conclusion

This chapter has proposed that the emergence of Kalahi in Bohol in the first decade of the twenty-first century can only be understood against the backdrop of (i) local business-led growth strategies for wealth accumulation and economic integration, promoted by a local growth coalition of businessmen and politicians, and supported by development organisations and the central government, on the one hand; and (ii) mounting challenges from below, in reaction to rising inequality and poverty associated with processes of economic liberalisation and integration in national and international economic circuitries, on the other. This account has thus challenged CDD discourse’s representation of Bohol as an underdeveloped, agricultural economy, suffering from low productivity and in need of modern infrastructure and technology, as well as improved governance, and enhanced human and social capital. Instead, it has highlighted that whilst Bohol was largely bypassed by socio-economic mutations unfolding throughout the country in the Spanish colonial era, the province (as the rest of the Philippines) had been identified as a target of economic modernisation initiatives since the early days of American occupation.

The implementation of U.S.-led modernisation reforms (focusing on the installation of a “modern” system of land tenure and “modern” relations of productions characterised by share tenancy) turned out to be particularly slow and half-hearted in Bohol, which was regarded as ill-suited for large-scale commercial plantations, and thus offered little prospect for economic profit. In this context, Bohol’s local elites, whose domination over the local political landscape was eased by the electoral system set up by the Americans, lacked a
strong basis for capital accumulation. As a result, Bohol’s political families largely failed to develop beyond their municipal power bases; and whilst a handful of individual politicians such as José Clarin and later Carlos P. Garcia succeeded in rising to national politics, thanks to Bohol’s position as a foil against the powerful, Cebu-based Osmeña family, they lacked the political machinery that would ensure access to national-level positions and economic privileges for generations to come.

This situation started to change in the aftermath of World War II, a period which was marked by accelerated economic commercialisation in Bohol (and beyond). In this context, a new pattern of rural organisation emerged in the province, based on a populous class of tenants and landless farmers providing cheap agricultural workforce, on the one hand, and a relatively wealthy class of absentee landlords with economic bases in the profitable urban service sector, on the other. Very unequal relations of production between tenants and landowners, wherein tenant-farmers had little control over their production and struggled to make a living, further contributed to the rapid marketisation of the rural economy, and to the pauperisation of the population. In parallel, the development of commercial fishing threatened small-scale fisherfolk, who struggled in the face of the competition and destruction incurred by commercial fisheries. In this context, official estimates indicated that Bohol was one of the poorest provinces of the Philippine in the second half of the twentieth century.

In spite of their harmful effects on the broad mass of the population, processes of economic marketisation gained speed in the 1980s onwards, as the national government and development organisations presented Boholano businessmen and politicians with opportunities and tools to promote economic growth and to integrate the province into the global economy. In this context, local businessmen and provincial government officials formed a local growth coalition, whose aim of turning Bohol into a profitable province was
supported by the national government and development organisations. Together, they led aggressive strategies to promote investments in the province (from Philippine and foreign companies, and from overseas workers), and to develop export-led agriculture, agro-industry and tourism in Bohol. They also positioned themselves as the main beneficiaries of the profits stemming from the increased profitability of Bohol’s economy.

Accelerated economic marketisation in Bohol was accompanied by rising inequality and poverty, as it often hindered small-scale farming and fishing activities, and made local farmers highly dependent on companies providing agricultural inputs. Widespread poverty and inequality also created tensions and discontent across the province, which were met by the deployment of counterinsurgency interventions, reforms and development programmes from the 1980s onwards. Yet these measures failed to curb mounting protests and rebellion in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which were mostly expressed in the form of local peasant and fishermen’s organisations mobilised to demand implementation of agrarian reform, legislation restricting large-scale fishing, and more equal terms of trade.

The Bohol in which Kalahi emerged was thus marked by local business-led growth strategies for wealth accumulation and economic integration, and by resurging challenges from below. This conjuncture is emblematic of the type of contexts in which CDD programmes in general, and Kalahi in particular, have emerged, evolved and expanded, as the preceding chapters have highlighted. However, these dynamics and trends clearly belong to the category of things “necessarily left unspoken” (Ferguson 1990, 68) in CDD discourse. Instead, this discourse focused on realms and realities where Kalahi intervention appears intelligible and possible, locating underdevelopment and poverty in a set of local, technical deprivations amenable to CDD intervention. In so doing, CDD discourse successfully performed the key “anti-politics” operation of enabling Kalahi intervention, by representing Bohol as an intelligible, seemingly ideal arena for intervention. Beyond CDD discourse, the
revisited backdrop sketched in this chapter will help us to make sense of the operations and effects of Kalahi in Bohol, which are scrutinised in the following chapter.
Chapter 5 – The “Enabled” Environment

The preceding chapter described how CDD discourse successfully turned Bohol into an ideal arena for Kalahi intervention: a poor, unproductive agricultural economy, lacking basic public goods and services, as well as human and social capital. It also highlighted that beyond this representation, the Bohol in which Kalahi was launched was characterised by local business-led growth strategies for wealth accumulation and economic integration, which were promoted by a local growth coalition and supported by a myriad of development interventions, and by re-emerging challenges from below in reaction to rising inequality and poverty associated with these economic development processes. Similar contexts of subaltern movements and mobilisations on the local level characterised the emergence of CDD programmes in the rest of the Philippines (as discussed in Chapter 3), and in countries such as Mexico, Brazil and Indonesia, where the first CDD programmes emerged (as discussed in Chapter 2). Against this backdrop, this chapter examines the operations and effects of Kalahi in the Province of Bohol. To do so, it starts by critically examining the representation of Bohol during Kalahi intervention in CDD discourse.

Kalahi emerged in Bohol in 2003, in the pilot municipality of Danao. A year later, the programme was extended to 5 additional municipalities in Bohol’s Second District, and was launched in the remaining 6 municipalities selected for the programme in 2005, all of which are shown in Figure 4.144

144 According to official Kalahi rules, the poorest quartile municipalities in provinces that had poverty incidence above the national average should receive the CDD programme. In Bohol, these were the municipalities of Buenavista, Getafe, Talibon, Bien Unido, President Garcia (where Kalahi started in 2004), and Pilar, Carmen, Trinidad, Mabini, Ubay and San Miguel (where Kalahi started in 2005).
Six years of Kalahi in Bohol resulted in a total of 338 projects undertaken in the twelve municipalities, which were estimated to directly benefit 80,000 Boholanos or about 20% of the population in these municipalities (DSWD 2009a). These projects were funded by a total of US$5.5 million in Kalahi grants, whose yearly amount represented nearly 20% of the total annual income of these municipalities, and by US$2.5 million delivered by local governments as counterpart funding.
A few years after the start of the CDD programme, Bohol was selected as a case study for a report commissioned by the World Bank, which proposed to scrutinise the interactions between Kalahi operations and local governance environments. The resulting *CDD and Accountable Local Governance* report presented Bohol as an “enabled meso-environment for local governance” (World Bank 2009a, 5), in stark contrast to the image of Bohol depicted in the Balicasan study a few years earlier. Bohol had ostensibly become an “enabled” arena of intervention, depicted as “a province that has made substantial progress in reducing poverty, improving political stability and implementing governance innovations” (ibid.). The unpublished field research report conducted as a background case study for the *CDD and Local Governance* report offered one of the most detailed examples of Bohol’s representation as an “enabled” environment in CDD discourse, as follows:

“The provincial leadership has played a pivotal role in the dramatic turn-around of the poverty situation in the whole province. In 2001, the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) list of the 20 poorest provinces in the country, also known as the “Club of 20”, placed the province in the seventh spot. Incumbent Governor Erico B. Aumentado carried poverty reduction as his flagship development program when he first stepped into office in 2001. [...] Based on the improvements in health, education and income in the province, Bohol fell to the sixteenth place in the Club of 20 in 2004. In 2005, it was removed altogether by the UNDP from the list as it became the 41st poorest province out of a total of 79 in the country. The UNDP Philippines 2005 Human Development Index Report cited the province’s poverty reduction program and peace initiatives as the cornerstone for attaining peace and development in Bohol. The provincial government played a strong role in coordinating development planning in Bohol by linking international donors with local recipients. In October 2006, for example, the province held the Bohol Poverty Fair to facilitate direct contact between municipal government units on one hand, and donor/grant agencies and [...] NGOs on the other. The fair generated about PhP284 million [US$5.5 million] of poverty reduction funding commitments. [...] the influx of foreign-funded projects played a major role in improving its development landscape. Projects implemented by the World Bank, FAO-PATSARRD [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations-Philippine-Australian Technical Support for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development] and BIARSP [Belgian Integrated Agrarian Reform Support Program] focused assistance on community-based resource management, agrarian reform, agricultural development and infrastructure. These activities rejuvenated […] local economy, providing skills and livelihood to the people. These also brought the government
closer to the people, thereby building trust and discouraging insurgency” (Canlas and Almoro 2007, 4–5; emphasis in original).

In CDD discourse, Kalahi, combined with the “progressive” and “innovative” provincial leadership and the series of development programmes implemented in the province, reportedly dragged Bohol out of poverty. Kalahi was thus identified as one of Bohol’s main drivers out of poverty, and as a large success in the province in terms of “good governance” and “empowerment” (World Bank 2009a). In particular, the CDD programme was praised for improving local governance by triggering “innovations in bidding and procurement, in leveraging local resources in the mobilization of central transfers, and in energizing the local bureaucracy to find better ways of governing” (ibid., viii). In short, CDD discourse represented Bohol as the archetypal “enabled” environment, where “progressive” leaders were reportedly the guarantors of “good governance” and of “pro-poor” development. As a reward for these alleged achievements, Bohol was selected as recipient of one of the extended versions of Kalahi, the US$120 million Kalahi OBAMA programme of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which was launched in the province in July 2011 (Catan-Tilos 2011).

The representation of Bohol as a CDD and development “success story” was based, first and foremost, on its “substantial progress in reducing poverty” (World Bank 2009a, 5). Such progress reportedly indicated that Kalahi, alongside development programmes funded by the World Bank, USAID, JBIC, AusAid, Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), amongst others, and initiatives led by the “progressive” provincial leadership, had benefited the broad mass of the population in Bohol, in particular “the poor.” CDD discourse stressed that Bohol started the new millennium as part of the “Club of 20,” referring to the top 20 poorest provinces in the Philippines, before it allegedly leapt out of poverty in a few years (Canlas and Almoro 2007,
5). Bohol’s success was supposedly demonstrated by a set of widely-quoted statistics indicating that in the province, an estimated 590,926 individuals or 57% of the population lived under the poverty threshold in 2000, a number which dramatically dropped to 375,277 individuals or 35% of the population living under the poverty threshold by 2003 (Virola 2006). This seemingly exceptional achievement turned Bohol into the second best performing province in the country, in terms of poverty alleviation (ibid.).

However, the following (and less readily quoted) round of official poverty statistics indicated a new and sharp rise in Bohol’s poverty level in 2006, which was estimated at 47% of the population (NSCB 2008). In 2011, new official statistics using a revised methodology\textsuperscript{145} were released and proved even more unsettling, as they indicated that poverty levels in the province rose from 45% of the population in 2003 to 52% in 2006, and slightly declined to 48% of the population in 2009 (NSCB 2011a). Whilst it is important to note that these fluctuations highlight the limited reliability of statistical estimates, in particular in terms of determining the relative success of a programme like Kalahi, it remains striking that official statistics suggest that after six years of Kalahi intervention in the province, poverty levels had worsened overall. Moreover, as detailed in Table 2, statistics from the World Bank and the Philippine National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) indicated that in Bohol, in the twelve municipalities that experienced Kalahi, the average poverty incidence rose by 15% between 2003 and 2005, from 45% to 60% of the population.

\textsuperscript{145} The new methodology is detailed in Bersales (2011).
Table 1 – Poverty Incidence amongst Population (%) in Kalahi Municipalities, Bohol, 2003-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>Variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President Carlos P. Garcia</td>
<td>50.21</td>
<td>66.28</td>
<td>16.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bien Unido</td>
<td>46.40</td>
<td>56.36</td>
<td>9.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getafe</td>
<td>45.72</td>
<td>67.93</td>
<td>22.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubay</td>
<td>45.91</td>
<td>55.12</td>
<td>9.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenavista</td>
<td>51.68</td>
<td>70.06</td>
<td>18.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabini</td>
<td>45.64</td>
<td>56.39</td>
<td>10.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talibon</td>
<td>34.93</td>
<td>57.18</td>
<td>22.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>35.70</td>
<td>58.34</td>
<td>22.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danao</td>
<td>57.21</td>
<td>65.38</td>
<td>8.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilar</td>
<td>45.60</td>
<td>57.36</td>
<td>11.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carmen</td>
<td>39.84</td>
<td>54.63</td>
<td>14.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>44.62</td>
<td>59.58</td>
<td>14.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td><strong>45.29</strong></td>
<td><strong>60.38</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.09</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: NSCB and World Bank (2005, 88–89; and 2009, 99–100)

Statistics produced by the World Bank and the NSCB indicated that in Bohol, the municipalities that did not receive Kalahi also experienced a 15% increase in their average poverty level between 2003 and 2005, from 25% to 40% of the population (ibid.), which further suggests that Kalahi was ineffective as a poverty reduction instrument. Moreover, income inequality was particularly severe in the province, where the income gap remained consistently amongst the highest in the archipelago between 2003 and 2009, when it was estimated at 31% (meaning that the per capita income of poor Boholanos was 31% short of the poverty threshold) against a national average of 27% (NSCB 2011b). Bohol also experienced the greatest income inequality of the Central Visayas region, with a Gini coefficient of 0.548 in 2000, indicating highly unequal income distribution (Zosa 2004, Table 23).

Evidence of persistently high levels of poverty and inequality in the first decade of the new millennium raises questions as to the validity (and instrumental effects) of the
representation of Bohol as an “enabled” environment, where “progressive” leaders and development organisations such as the World Bank allegedly joined forces to alleviate poverty and instigate “pro-poor” development. It also highlights severe limitations and flaws in the vision of Kalahi as a particularly effective “good governance,” empowerment, and poverty reduction programme. This chapter thus proposes to make sense of the broad operations and effects of Kalahi, as material resources and more particularly as discourse, in the province. To do so, it starts by presenting the main characteristics of Kalahi’s operations in Bohol. It then turns to scrutinise Bohol’s “progressive” provincial leaders, seeking to understand why such a style of leadership emerged in the province in the mid-1990s and persisted throughout the 2000s, and how these “progressive” and “reformist” leaders were influenced by and influenced Kalahi’s operations and effects. The discussion then focuses on the performances of mayors and other municipal officials in Bohol who directly experienced Kalahi, and who were “hailed” by CDD discourse as “progressive” leaders. Finally, this chapter considers the operations and effects of Kalahi on challenges from below, as part of Bohol’s counterinsurgency-led development framework.

Kalahi Operations in Bohol: An Overview

As detailed in Chapter 3, Kalahi ostensibly pursued three main goals, namely empowering communities, improving local governance, and providing grants for “community investment programs” (World Bank 2002, 2). These goals were to be achieved through detailed processes and procedures organised in four phases which, in theory, unfolded as follows: 146 the first phase, “social preparation,” consisted of launches of Kalahi at the municipal level, where municipal governments committed to provide counterpart funding and technical support for barangays to implement the programme. In turn, at the barangay level,

146 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed description of the four phases of Kalahi. See also Araral and Holmemo (2007, 34–37), on which this description is based.
villagers were informed about Kalahi, and teams of volunteers were selected to prepare village action plans and project proposals. In the second, “project development” phase, workshops were held for village representatives to agree upon the selection criteria that they would use to allocate funding to particular projects, and for local Kalahi teams, municipal staff and local NGOs to outline project concepts. During the third, “project selection” phase, village representatives determined which projects would receive Kalahi funding, through the holding of municipal inter-barangay forums. In barangays whose projects were selected, project implementation teams were elected and asked to draft more detailed proposals, which were assessed and normally approved for funding. Eventually, the fourth and last phase, “project implementation,” consisted of training workshops for local government staff and barangay volunteer teams, who then implemented projects, whilst Kalahi staff, volunteers and consultants monitored and evaluated Kalahi processes (Araral and Holmemo 2007, 34–37). These four phases were repeated three times in each selected municipality, corresponding to three funding cycles that lasted one year each. The first cycle was designed to introduce Kalahi and secure commitments from communities and local governments to support the project, whilst the second and third cycles targeted the mainstreaming and institutionalisation of Kalahi as “a planning and resource allocation tool for the local government” (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004, 4).

Kalahi’s actual operations in Bohol (and elsewhere) diverged from this template in at least three major ways. First and foremost, the CDD programme came to represent a source of funding for the expansion of agriculture and, to a lesser extent, tourism ventures in Bohol. The twelve municipalities that were selected to experience Kalahi were all located in the northeast part of the province, where most agricultural production was concentrated. The projects funded through Kalahi in these municipalities were predominantly linked to agricultural development, mostly through so-called farm-to-market road projects, which
represented a third of all Kalahi projects in Bohol, as well as irrigation and post-harvest facilities, such as solar driers and organic fertiliser production facilities. In some municipalities, Kalahi also served to finance eco-tourism facilities, such as the “ride for life” zipline in the municipality of Pilar. Yet the preceding chapter highlighted that in Bohol, interventions targeting tourism and agriculture development largely profited a few local politicians and businessmen, whilst disrupting existing sources of livelihoods of local, small-scale farmers and fishermen, and increasing their vulnerability to large-scale corporate interests. As a result, the accelerated marketisation and increased profitability of Bohol’s economy, which Kalahi supported, was accompanied by increasing poverty and resilient inequality, rather than poverty reduction and other benefits promised in CDD discourse.

On the one hand, Bohol’s tourism industry was growing, experiencing a rapidly increasing number of tourists from about 100,000 in 2000 to over 500,000 in 2009 (PPDO 2010, xxxii). The agriculture and agro-industry sectors were also thriving, as Bohol become the largest producer of rice, rootcrops, commercial seaweeds and inland fishery in the Central Visayas in the late 2000s, and the only producer of palm oil in the region (BIPC 2010b). In particular, rice production increased from an average of 80% rice sufficiency between 2005 and 2007 to around 110% in 2008 and 2009, with surplus production exported to Cebu, Dumaguete and Siquijor (PPDO 2010, xxxi). On the other hand, official statistics indicated increasing levels of poverty and persistent inequality in Bohol, as discussed above, whilst qualitative research also revealed that a majority of farmers were still tenants in the province, and that sharecropping remained widespread, with tenants usually relinquishing one fourth of their gross income in rent (Catarata 2008a). Thus, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, Bohol experienced a pattern of “growth with immizeration,” to borrow the expression used by Walden Bello and his colleagues (1982) to describe simultaneous

---

147 Other common projects that were not directly linked with agriculture or tourism included classroom and day care centre building and electrification.
economic growth and rising poverty experienced in the Philippines in the late 1970s. This mirrored Philippine-wide trends of concomitant GDP growth, around 4% in 2001-2010, and rising poverty, from an estimated 25% of the population or 19,796,954 individuals in 2003, to 26.5% of the population or 23,142,481 individuals in 2009 (NSCB 2011a), which were associated with the Arroyo government’s economic liberalisation strategies.

In short, in Bohol, the material resources deployed in Kalahi were largely channelled towards sectors whose development profited Bohol’s government officials and business communities, and often proved harmful to local farmers and fishermen’s livelihoods. Kalahi discourse, moreover, represented such development strategy as “pro-poor” and beneficial to the broad mass of the population, which helped to legitimise and reproduce it in spite of evidence of rising poverty and persistent inequality in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In this context, Kalahi must be understood as part and parcel of economic strategies that produce and reproduce inequality, concentrating on attracting investment and raising economic profitability without seeking to modify existing power structures.

Moreover, although the most important principle at the core of the CDD approach is that communities are granted control over decision-making and resources to undertake their own development projects, the majority of projects undertaken in Bohol clearly matched the provincial government’s priorities. Indeed, as all development interventions in the province, Kalahi was integrated with Bohol’s “convergence strategy,” which meant that Kalahi grants were pulled together with other development funds to finance the provincial government’s priority areas. Interviews with municipal planning and development coordinators (MPDCs) (IV19; IV25; IV26; IV29; IV30) and a local community organiser (IV22) confirmed that the

---

148 The Philippine government’s trade and financial liberalisation policies increased the vulnerability of Filipino industrial and agricultural sectors, as exemplified by free-trade agreements with Japan and China, whose terms were particularly threatening to Filipino industrial and agricultural sectors (Bello 2010). Moreover, the Philippines’ exceptionally heavy reliance on World Bank and IMF loans created a large public deficit, which was serviced through an expanded value added tax on purchases that mostly hit subaltern and middle classes (ibid.).
selection of Kalahi projects was heavily influenced by local officials, as municipal mayors and barangay captains pressured their constituents to favour certain types of projects – usually those aligned with broader provincial plans and priorities. The scrutiny of national trends in “community projects” financed by Kalahi suggests that Bohol was fairly representative of other Philippine provinces that experienced the programme: nationwide, a third of Kalahi-funded projects were roads, and a quarter of these projects were water systems, which was aligned with the infrastructure needs identified by the national government.

A second striking feature of Kalahi in Bohol was that all barangays of the municipalities that experienced the CDD programme received CDD funding – with the exception of Kalahi’s pilot municipality of Danao. This was particularly surprising insofar as inter-community competition for funding was, in theory, a key characteristic of the CDD approach. Competition in Kalahi was supposed to empower communities by habituating them to competitive market rules, as follows:

“KC [Kalahi] incorporates a prioritization process where all barangays within a municipality come together to determine which subprojects would be financed based on agreed selection criteria. This gives communities a sense of the trade-offs that need to be made in allocating scarce public funds and also promotes a stronger sense of collective accomplishment. The hypothesis is that the experience and lessons they learned will empower communities and this empowerment will help build the confidence to engage local officials, participate actively in local governance, and transact with the market” (Edillon et al. 2007, 1).

According to a Kalahi research, monitoring and evaluation officer at Kalahi’s executing agency, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), in the field office for the Central Visayas, the removal of Kalahi’s competitive element in Bohol was simply a coincidence, which might ultimately reflect the preference of Boholanos for equal distribution of funding (IV34). Yet according to MPDCs and a community organiser, local officials “enforced” this funding distribution pattern (IV25; IV26; IV29; IV30; IV22).
Researchers from the University of the Philippines Center for Policy and Executive Development observed a similar trend in the municipality of Hingyon, in the Province of Ifugao, where “municipal local officials [...] were influential to dictate to the constituents in the 1st cycle [of Kalahi] that in accordance to tribal beliefs, all barangays should benefit from the DSWD funding even though the decision was contrary to KC:KKB [i.e. Kalahi] principles” (CPED 2007, 14). More generally, it was apparently not rare for local government officials throughout the Philippines to tweak CDD processes as they saw fit. For instance, Kalahi’s sixth implementation review report noted that “in some other areas Mayors have sought to subvert KALAHI processes posing a genuine challenge to effective project implementation” (World Bank 2007a, 5). Similarly, one piece of academic research on Kalahi found that in villages that experienced Kalahi, “barangay captains were reportedly able to shape the direction of the debate by informally establishing a consensus in favour of particular works” (Reid 2011, 64), whilst in Kalahi municipal inter-barangay forum, “the influence of elected officials became more overt. Barangay captains remained represented and were again often perceived as being in the ‘‘mayor’s camp.’’ They could act in concert to win certain projects” (Kalahi area coordinator F. Calabazaran in ibid.).

Thirdly, Kalahi reporting in Bohol was unreliable, although members of staff hired by the DSWD were dispatched to every municipality, where they were responsible for leading and monitoring Kalahi processes. To prevent local Kalahi workers from being influenced by local elites as they supervised the programme, they had not been linked to the municipality in any capacity prior to their assignment for Kalahi (at least on paper), and were asked to strictly follow a set of lengthy guidelines in the conduct of their respective tasks (DSWD 2007). Yet problems with members of staff dispatched to villages were not rare, as indicated by the Kalahi mid-term review report, which noted that field staff often had a poor understanding of local situations, lacked skills, and felt they were not rewarded properly (DSWD 2006, 8).
Bohol (and elsewhere), bribery and intimidation were occasionally deployed to facilitate amendments to official reports. Bribery was encouraged by the low pay received by the DSWD employees, and by their fragile position vis-à-vis the local government, as they worked and lived in Kalahi municipalities (IV25; IV26; IV29; IV30; IV22). In some municipalities, DSWD employees were seen as intruding on issues that were traditionally the remit of the local mayor and barangay captains, and were thus very vulnerable to the use of threat and intimidation by local politicians (ibid.). The only way for them to be tolerated in these municipalities was to accept the municipal and provincial governments’ control over development funds and processes. As an MPDC and area coordinator for Kalahi municipal coordination team casually remarked (after spending an entire morning collecting official Kalahi reports for the purpose of the PhD thesis), official Kalahi reports “are not to be trusted” (IV30). The manipulation of official reporting was further facilitated by weaknesses in the nationwide Kalahi project monitoring system, whose computerised version, which was designed to “provide a regular management report summarizing operational performance,” was still not in place by 2007 (World Bank 2007a, 7).

Besides these systematic infringements on Kalahi rules, the CDD programme’s operations in Bohol were also characterised by occasional “irregularities,” most commonly awarding contracts for the implementation of “community projects” to the favourite municipal contractor, which resulted in substandard and relatively costly projects (IV25; IV26; IV30). Similarly, the DSWD mid-term review of Kalahi found that nationwide, the poor quality of projects was an issue, which was explained in terms of (i) “lack of technical assistance, resulting in poor planning and implementation of some subprojects;” (ii) “inability of some contractors to follow technical plans and standards;” and (iii) “bad weather conditions, low community capacity, worker and contractor inefficiencies, poor peace and order situation, etc” (DSWD 2006, v). In Bohol, in a few cases, barangay treasurers even
“failed” to deposit Kalahi funds into the bank accounts opened to that effect, explaining that they preferred to “keep the funds at home, because it is safer” (IV30). Moreover, the scrutiny of Kalahi projects’ financial achievements in Bohol showed some surprising patterns, with reports of sums utilised for “community projects” greater than the sums delivered, or conversely, reports of sums utilised for Kalahi projects far less than the amounts delivered. Researchers from the Center for Policy and Executive Development also observed irregularities in financial reporting in Northern Mindanao and Davao, where financial reports of Kalahi projects were kept confidential, which contravened CDD rules of transparency and accountability (CPED 2007, 31–32).

The DSWD was also directly implicated in “irregular” practices in Bohol. According to the president of provincial NGO Bohol Local Development Foundation, DSWD staff sought to bypass official municipality selection processes and simply implement Kalahi in Bohol’s First District, the least “deprived” yet most accessible and “convenient” of Bohol’s three districts (IV14). Provincial government officials contested the DSWD employees’ selection, as the timing of this selection coincided with the inception of Bohol’s Poverty Database and Monitoring System (PDMS), which ranked municipalities according to twelve poverty indicators, and showed that the poorest municipalities were in the northeast of the province. When economists from the University of the Philippines were called in to resolve the dispute between the DSWD and the provincial government, by undertaking an independent poverty mapping exercise to be incorporated in the Balicasan study, their findings validated the PDMS data, rather than the original choice of the DSWD. Thus in Bohol, Kalahi was eventually implemented in municipalities matching official poverty ranking criteria. However, the comparison of municipalities officially identified for Kalahi

---

149 This was the case for 15 projects in Bohol. In one project for instance, only a quarter of the funds committed by the local government were reported as delivered, 120% of which were reported as utilised (DSWD 2009a).

150 For instance, in two municipalities, less than 30% of local funds delivered were reported as utilised (ibid.).
through the Balicasan study with the municipalities where Kalahi was implemented showed discrepancies in half of the 42 provinces that experienced the programme.\textsuperscript{151}

Overall, these findings suggest that despite the representation of Bohol as an “enabled” environment, the experience of Kalahi in Bohol (and in other Philippine provinces) infringed on the most important CDD principles of participation, transparency, accountability and competition. Even more puzzling was the fact that the Kalahi manager at the World Bank’s office in Manila recognised the overall disregard for these CDD principles in Bohol, which he did not present as a particularly alarming issue, as shown by the following remark:

“We don’t always see Bohol as necessarily a place that has tried to draw on a CDD approach. It [poverty-reduction] is quite strongly [government-]led. [...]. In some of my discussions with the governor, feedbacks from his barangay captains are that “we have already done the work; we’ve got the plan. Why is Kalahi coming to open all of this up again? And some of the priorities that Kalahi is coming up with do not fit with the priorities that we identified.” That is an interesting tension. Was it that we did not get the participatory process there quite right? Or was it that the priorities that the mayors and the captains were articulating were not necessarily aligned with what the people really felt they needed? It is probably a bit of both.

I know that the way they looked at Kalahi in the end is as funds from the national government that need to be programmed [...], as one of a number of national government agency programmes: “we have identified all of the things that we want to do up here. And we want to match them with half a dozen programmes from national government agencies.” So it was the participatory aspect of that did not necessarily come through so strongly” (IV4).

The combination of the recognition of the limitations and flaws in Kalahi’s implementation in Bohol, with the enduring representation of the province as an “enabled” environment and CDD “success story,” appears puzzling. Indeed, it suggests that the disregard for CDD principles in Bohol was inconsequential insofar as the World Bank and

\textsuperscript{151} Most commonly, in these provinces, one or two municipalities that were not amongst the poorest quartile of municipalities obtained funding, instead of those identified by the Balicasan study as qualifying for Kalahi. One of the most blatant examples of funding misattribution included the Province of Lanao Del Norte, where only two out of the six municipalities that experienced Kalahi were identified by the Balicasan study as belonging to the poorest quartile municipalities in the province (with the two poorest municipalities excluded from Kalahi). Moreover, in the Province of Leyte, seven out of the twelve municipalities identified by the Balicasan study were excluded from Kalahi.
the DSWD were concerned, and that the elements of a “successful” experience of Kalahi were not those explicitly stated in CDD discourse. To make sense of the paradox between the actual operations of Kalahi in Bohol, and CDD discourse’s representation of the province as an “enabled” environment characterised by “progressive” leadership, the pages below examine the foundations of this representation by scrutinising Bohol’s acclaimed “progressive” leaders.

The Rise of “Progressive” Leaders in the 1990s

The CDD vision of “progressive” leadership as a key causal factor of development and poverty alleviation can be traced back to the 1990s, when development discourse on the Philippines was filled with a familiar modernisation argument used to present the favourable prospects of decentralisation reform in the country. According to Steven Rood, a political science professor turned Asia Foundation’s country representative, the combination of the 1991 Local Government Code and of socio-economic transformations in the early 1990s – including agrarian reforms, urbanisation, the rise of the middle class, the spread of information through media and education, the boom of civil society organisations, and the economic impact of overseas workers – advanced “both democracy and development in the Philippines” (Rood 1998, 133). Rood further proposed that the greatest manifestation of these mutations was the rise of a new generation of “development-oriented government officials,” who would allegedly prevail over traditional politicians (i.e. patrons, bosses, caciques and warlords) in the long run (ibid., 125). Sharing the vision spelled out by Rood, development organisations exploited the avenue opened up by decentralisation to invest in “good

---

152 Such a modernisation argument was popular in a strand of pre-Martial Law literature, which predicted that the socio-economic mutations that characterised the independence period would undermine traditional social ties and pave the way for fully-fledged democracy, where “real” political parties representing divergent socio-economic interests would compete for the “Big Government” (Corpuz 1965, 136).
governance” programmes, in order to stimulate the advent of new, “progressive” leadership in the Philippines and elsewhere in the developing world.

In this context, Bohol received a wave of development programmes geared towards deepening “good governance” practices, and seeking to build local governments’ capacities, “empower” communities and stimulate “synergistic” relationships between local governments and the citizenry. These “good governance” and “community empowerment” programmes implemented in the 1990s adopted community-based approaches similar to that of Kalahi, generally providing small grants and agricultural resources, and focusing on building communities’ capacities. Government officials were also directly targeted as recipients of public sector reform and other “good governance” programmes, which provided capacity-building and training for local officials, including the provision of scholarships for government officials to undertake post-graduate studies in Australia, as part of the Philippines-Australia Human Resource and Organisational Development Facility. The most important local government support intervention on Bohol was probably USAID’s GOLD programme, a pioneer “good governance” programme implemented between 1995 and 2000, whose aim was to “demonstrate, by enabling people to decide and do things for themselves, that democracy works” (USAID 2000, 11). Through GOLD, Bohol was considered as an example of local government’s internalisation and institutionalisation of the “good governance” principles of transparency, accountability and participation (Lippman and Blue 2000, 10).

Experiencing such programmes habituated local officials to “good governance” discourse, which hailed “progressive” leaders and rewarded those who recognised themselves with support and flows of funding. In this way, it demonstrated the importance of adopting a discourse of “reformism” and “progressive” governance to access funding. The success of “good governance” discourse in triggering recognition by local politicians was largely rooted
in the limited profitability of Bohol’s economy, which, as Chapter 4 highlighted, persisted until the 1990s, and meant that local politicians lacked a strong local basis for accumulating capital to leverage into upstream trajectories in business and politics. Local development interventions thus represented opportunities and tools for Boholano businessmen and politicians to promote economic growth, through the integration of the province into the global economy and into national and international sources of patronage. In a context where external resources represented a much more promising avenue than the local economy for capital accumulation, Bohol officials thus proceeded to style themselves as “progressive” leaders by gaining expertise in development and “good governance” discourse, which they did with a mastery that earned them acclaim and awards.153

Illustrating this trend, Bohol Governor Rene Relampagos (1995-2001) and Vice-Governor Edgar Chatto (1995-2001) were both depicted as examples of new generations of political dynasties, breaking with “trapo”154 methods to adopt instead “good governance” practices:

“Governor Rene Relampagos and Vice-Governor Edgar Chatto of Bohol are in their thirties, the younger generation of political families, but they embrace organizational development for the provincial machinery, public–private sector partnerships in investment planning, and public opinion polling to sound out their constituents on such hot-button issues as water diversion for the city of Cebu” (Rood 1998, 125).

Rood’s description overlooked Chatto’s political debut as President of the provincial federation of the Kabataang Barangay (Village Youth), the national youth organisation of the Martial Law regime, which was headed by then President Marcos’ daughter Imee – a position he owed to the influential position of his father, former Assemblyman Eladio Chatto, as

153 This argument finds a strong echo in Amy Bridges’ (1997) analysis of the municipal reform movement in the American Southwest, which shows how a context of insufficient local capital and weak political organisation prompted local elites to embrace the municipal reform discourse, which enabled them to secure external funding and electoral victories.

154 Trapo is the contraction of traditional politician (which refers to a politician using patronage, corruption, cheating and coercion, and usually belonging to or linked with a political dynasty, as noted in Chapter 3), and means “dishrag” in Tagalog.
national treasurer of the influential Philippine Coconut Producers’ Federation under Marcos (Hawes 1987, 77). As part of a USAID coastal resources management project, others also described Bohol’s provincial leadership as exemplifying a “new breed of leaders” carrying out an “innovative yet participatory style of leadership and administration” that had “closed ranks with various nongovernment organizations (NGOs), people’s organizations (POs), the private sector, and the academe” (Green et al. 2000, xiii). Relampagos’ description of his own administration illustrates his command of “good governance” discourse, as the former governor asserted that:

“During the past years, the province has achieved vital goals [...] in governance, whereby the provincial leadership has been consistent in its pursuit of participatory and democratic processes. [...] Inter-sectoral involvement and broad-based participation of business, government and civil society (which balances state intervention and market forces with public participation) are essential to make sustainable development a reality” (Relampagos 2002, 192).

Yet in Bohol, it was not Relampagos, but his successor, Governor Erico Boyles Aumentado, (2001-2010), who truly championed the national government and development organisations’ “good governance” discourse.

The Aumentado Provincial Administration, 2001-2010

Erico Aumentado exemplified the new style of “progressive” leadership that development organisations sought to elicit and sustain. In particular, the governor was praised in Kalahi discourse for embracing “poverty reduction as his flagship development program when he first stepped into office” (Canlas and Almoro 2007, 5). Aumentado, known as Bohol’s “political godfather,”155 has been represented as the archetypal self-made man who rose to power through sheer hard work and natural gift for politics. This representation

overlooked Aumentado’s privileged background – as the grandson of Eustaquio Boyles, provincial delegate to the First Philippine Assembly in 1907, and the scion of Bernabe Reyes, President of the short-lived Republic of Bohol – to break with the unpopular image of self-serving and socially-privileged traditional politician.

Aumentado outperformed his predecessor in his mastery of “good governance” discourse, as illustrated by his answer to the rhetorical question “Why Bohol [should receive ODA programmes]?”:

“1. We deliver. Bohol is one of the most improved in terms of poverty reduction. […]
2. We try very hard to attract donor funding […]
3. We think about sustainability of initiatives. […] new offices were created to optimize the provision of direct services to the Boholano constituents. Their mission is to pursue a poverty reduction program and address the insurgency situation, in close coordination and collaboration with other agencies and the military.
4. We think about counterpartnersing – not just of money, but of personnel, equipment and other resources.
5. With the now-pervasive “paradigm of collaboration” between the private and public sectors, the donor agency concerned can trust that each sector will do its part for the success of the project.
6. There is cross-sectoral acceptance of the VMG [Bohol Provincial Vision, Mission and Goals] and the BPFR [Bohol’s Program Framework for Poverty Reduction], making for easier integration of cross-sectoral efforts.

Through it all, one underlying philosophy has served the Provincial Government well: consistent development priorities and master planning for Bohol, even through various administrations, has enhanced over time, with each administration building on the accomplishments of previous ones.

But, the gains we attain for Bohol in fighting poverty and insurgency must be sustained. For indeed, our 2.9 percent population growth rate could double Bohol’s population of 1.2 million this year in the next 20 years, which could set back our gains to where Bohol was before my time. This needs the continued support of ODA funders and institutions” (Aumentado 2006, 5–6).

Aumentado’s discourse closely matched the World Bank and other development organisations’ vision of “good governance” and “sustainable” development. The governor presented Bohol’s provincial government as proactive, efficient, effective, and committed to “optimize the provision of direct services to the Boholano constituents” to fight poverty and insurgency. Aumentado further stressed the ability of the provincial government to “deliver”
development, through “consistent development priorities and master planning for Bohol,” which was to be matched with “continued support of ODA funders and institutions” to sustain these fragile “gains.” He even supported “direct access to ODA concessional loans without sovereign guarantee” for local governments like Bohol, “with good financial housekeeping and governance,” to “sustain the momentum of its efforts to free the province from the bondage of poverty and insurgency” (ibid., 6).

This “good governance” discourse was further supported by three major provincial government initiatives undertaken under Aumentado’s leadership. First of all, the provincial government replicated development organisations’ style of poverty analysis by adding an “evidence-based” element to its discourse, in the form of statistical data on local deprivation. This was captured through the Poverty Database and Monitoring System (PDMS), a unique provincial poverty mapping tool designed to inform local development planning. In theory, the results of the poverty mapping exercise served to guide the development plans of each of Bohol’s municipalities, where municipal officials were asked to use PDMS data to assess the “asset base” of the poor (their natural, human, social, physical, and financing resources), and to formulate municipal poverty profiles. This process was to be complemented by rounds of consultation, to ensure the “broad-based participation of the people” (Provincial Government of Bohol 2007, 27). Municipal development plans were then fed back to the provincial government, where they supposedly served as a basis to help plan and coordinate interventions in municipalities. Thus development planning in the province seemed to follow key CDD principles, supposedly taking the form of a bottom-up process that was both evidence-based and participatory.

Secondly, Bohol’s “convergence strategy” purportedly served to ensure that development projects were “demand-driven” instead of “donor-driven” (Aumentado 2006, 5). The convergence strategy was fleshed out in Bohol Program Framework for Poverty
Reduction, the blueprint for Bohol’s development, which was particularly well-attuned with CDD principles in terms of targeting, aims, and processes. It stipulated that development projects should (i) target the poorest municipalities and barangays, and specifically benefit the poor; (ii) address the most pressing development needs that local communities and local governments jointly identified; (iii) contribute to local institution-building and to “community empowerment;” and (iv) mobilise communities and local governments’ participation (Provincial Government of Bohol 2007). In CDD discourse, the Bohol Program Framework for Poverty Reduction was identified as key to the province’s success in accessing and managing development funds, allegedly enabling the provincial government to “tailor its projects and programs to match resources from various agencies with priority municipalities, barangays and puroks” (Canlas and Almoro 2007, 5).

Thirdly, throughout the first decade of the new millennium, the provincial government pursued a vigorous institution-building strategy to attract investments in the province. A series of events was organised by the provincial government to recruit donors, including investment promotion campaigns in the U.S., Canada, and Japan, which were financed by local businessmen, and so-called “Poverty Fairs” (renamed “Prosperity Fair” in 2010), described as “A Market Place of Poverty Reduction Initiatives” (PPDO 2007). There, municipal government officials presented development project proposals to prospective donors, including development organisations, the private sector, and NGOs, to secure funding for their projects. In 2009, the provincial government also set up Bohol Business One-Stop Shop as part of its investment promotion strategy, to ease the implantation of business in the province by regrouping all agencies responsible for business registration, permit and licensing (BIPC 2010a). The provincial government thus strived to extend its presence and influence, encouraging and controlling increasing flows of investments in the province. In short, with the help of various development organisations, the provincial government
developed a sophisticated and expanding provincial development machinery to promote and manage institutional and private donors’ investments in the province. It also successfully styled itself as a business-minded, hands-on, dynamic and capable provincial government, which further instilled confidence in both donors and investors.

Development organisations responded with praise for the Aumentado provincial government’s “progressive” style of leadership, and its “good governance” performance – performance being understood as “ritualized production, and ritual reiteration” that “enables a subject and constitutes the temporal conditions for the subject” (Butler 1993, 95), rather than implying an insincere or disingenuous act involving dissimulation, as noted in Chapter 1. Governor Aumentado received awards for his “exceptional” local government management and for his “visionary” leadership, whilst the Province of Bohol itself won awards and recognitions, such as the internationally-recognised certification ISO-14001 for its Environment Management System, a first for a provincial government in Southeast Asia (Aumentado 2006). Most significantly, Bohol became the fifth largest recipient of ODA-funded programmes amongst the 80 provinces of the Philippines, obtaining 33 programmes between 1998 and 2008 (Brillantes et al., 2010, 23), largely as a result of provincial officials’ “good governance” performances.

Governor Aumentado’s performance as a “pro-poor” and “progressive” leader, which attracted much development funding in the province, also earned him strong popular support, as shown by the results of the Bohol Poll, a yearly survey of Boholanos’ perceptions of political, social and economic issues, set up by USAID in the mid-1990s, and conducted by Bohol’s Holy Name University. Successive surveys showed that between 2002 and 2009, an average of 79% of those surveyed declared being satisfied with Aumentado (Holy Name University Research Center 2002, 2003, 2004a, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2008 and 2009). This level of satisfaction far exceeded that of other government officials, such as President Arroyo.
and Vice-Governor Herrera, whose respective levels of satisfaction were 53% and 65% of those surveyed for the same period (ibid.). Pre-election surveys also indicated that support for Aumentado dramatically increased in the first decade of the twenty-first century, from about 50% of those surveyed stating their preference for Aumentado as governor in the 2001 and 2004 elections, to 87% in 2007 (Divine Word College of Tagbilaran Research Center 2001; Holy Name University Research Center 2004b and 2007b). This strong support helped Aumentado to push for particularly ambitious projects in Bohol and to occasionally bypass legal procedures. For instance, Aumentado encouraged the implantation of 23 bioethanol farms in the province, which started to operate in 2009, without prior public hearings or presentation of the project to provincial lawmakers, as provided under the Local Government Code of 1991 (Bohol Standard, 24 October 2010). Yet such irregular practices were not acknowledged in CDD discourse (or in broader development discourse), which continued to represent Aumentado as a model of “progressive” government official and as a champion of “good governance.”

Local officials’ “good governance” performances were further promoted by Kalahi, both as (i) financial resources, whose access was sustained as a reward for such performances, through Kalahi OBAMA; and (ii) discourse, which represented provincial officials’ “progressive” character, capability and experience of development interventions as the key elements that had turned the province into an example of “enabled” environment (World Bank 2009a; Yilmaz and Venugopal 2010). In particular, the Kalahi manager at the World Bank’s office in Manila presented Aumentado as one of the few governors who could bring development to their provinces, and who could aptly oversee the implementation of Kalahi (IV4). The Kalahi manager was apparently convinced that Kalahi had been particularly well managed by Aumentado, who, in turn, presented the CDD programme as

---

156 The project was also operated by two Korean-owned companies, although only one of them had signed an official memorandum of understanding (Bohol Standard, 24 October 2010). These irregular procedures led to the suspension of the project by Aumentado’s successor, Governor Edgar Chatto (Silverio 2011).
“one of the major factors that plucked Bohol out from Club 20,” referring to the 20 poorest Philippine provinces (Aumentado in Action for Economic Reforms 2006). Interestingly, the Kalahi manager further insisted that his judgement of Aumentado was based on the governor’s *discursive* performance, declaring that:

> “Of course some people say that because he [Aumentado] has good relations to the top, he was able to do some of the things that he wanted to do. I don’t know about that, but when I have spoken to him... I guess you judge people by the extent to which they are able to articulate what it is that they are trying to do, and I think that he can very well do that. If only there were a few more governors who could do the same!” (IV4).

On the basis of Aumentado’s “progressive” leadership, the Kalahi manager presented Bohol as a “really good case” of provincial government-led implementation of Kalahi, to be emulated across the Philippines:

> “we would be interested in taking the Bohol experience and seeing if we can use that to guide a more provincial model for Kalahi, where you devolve much more responsibilities to a provincial-level. Provincial-level responsibilities for coordinating poverty reduction, I think that’s probably about right. Provinces know their municipalities much better than the national government does. Capacity could be an issue, in some provinces, but in other provinces they could have the capacity. Bohol is a really good case” (ibid.).

Paradoxically, although Bohol was not regarded by the Bank as a “place that has tried to draw on a CDD approach” (ibid.), it was represented as an “enabled environment” and Kalahi “success story” in CDD discourse. Such a representation was largely based on the overall “good governance” performances of Bohol’s “progressive” leaders, whose development machinery and development agenda were regarded by the Bank as having “played a pivotal role in the dramatic turn-around of the poverty situation in the whole province” (Canlas and Almoro 2007, 5). Local government officials’ disregard for participation, transparency, accountability and competition in Kalahi was thus not considered as a major issue, as “good governance,” the main aim of Kalahi (insofar as empowerment
was largely understood as demand for “good governance” in CDD discourse), was supposedly already achieved in Bohol. Not only did “good governance” performances assure local government officials’ access to development resources and enhance their clout as “progressive” leaders, they also represented formidable avenues for these officials to strengthen their political power and dominate electoral contests, as discussed in the pages below in the case of former governor Aumentado.

**Electoral Domination and Development**

Governor Erico Aumentado represented a strong local figurehead for the administration party under Arroyo’s presidency. Although Aumentado was heading an opposition-dominated government when he was first elected governor in 2001, he successfully reversed allegiances and transformed Bohol into an administration bailiwick. By the time of the 2004 elections, Aumentado’s former political opponents had joined him in the administration party, and elected positions were dominated by administration candidates in the province. Bohol was also one of the few provinces where Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo won by a landslide in the fraudulent 2004 presidential elections, which were further characterised by three unusual occurrences in the province: (i) the actual number of registrants far exceeded COMELEC’s projections (619,139 registered voters against 556,579 projected, representing an 11% difference); (ii) increases in the number of registered voters were unusually high; and (iii) Arroyo obtained more votes than the top winning senators in 30 out of Bohol’s 47 municipalities – whereas votes for a presidential candidate extremely rarely exceed that of a winning senatorial candidate (Dejaresco 2010). These all suggested that the Bohol vote was delivered to Arroyo through intensive rigging (ibid.; Coronel 2005). Moreover, Aumentado rose as one of Arroyo’s most vocal defenders throughout the “Hello Garci” scandal that threatened the President with impeachment, and was one of the key instigators behind
Arroyo’s flagship effort to revise the 1987 Constitution – proposing to restructure the Philippine State into a federal, parliamentary regime – in an effort to divert attention from the scandal (Hedman 2006, 189).

As a reward for his (and Bohol’s) strong support to the ruling party and to President Arroyo, and for his performance as a “pro-poor” and “progressive” leader, which earned him strong popular support in the province, Aumentado was handed positions of increasing power. Under Arroyo’s request, Aumentado sought the presidency of the League of Provinces and of the Union of Local Authorities in the Philippines, which he won, unopposed, benefiting from the President’s campaigning and public endorsement (Van Helvoirt 2009, 178). The positions granted Aumentado ex-officio membership in Arroyo’s cabinet, and positions in various corporations owned or controlled by the government, which reinforced the governor’s power and access to resources. Aumentado also became regional chairman for the administration party Lakas (Strength)-Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (Partner of the Free Filipino)-Christian Muslim Democrats, known as Lakas-Kampi-CMD, in the late 2000s. As such, Aumentado was one of the few privileged governors powerful enough to negotiate directly with the President, when others had to bargain through district congressional seats to gain access to resources from the national government.

Aumentado was also rewarded by flows of funding to Bohol, especially in the form of development projects. These did not only increase the financial resources of the provincial government, but also reinforced the image of “progressive” and “pro-poor” politicians in Bohol. Ironically, against the backdrop of the World Bank and other development organisations’ “good governance” agenda, these projects were the openly-admitted result of Aumentado’s tight links with the ruling party, as illustrated by an anecdote recounted by the former governor himself. In 1992, when Aumentado won as Bohol’s Second District representative, the implementation of three “mega-projects” in the province – the first phase
of the Bohol Circumferential Road Improvement Project, the Bohol Irrigation Project, and the Leyte-Bohol Interconnection Project – was held back by then President Fidel V. Ramos, pending Aumentado’s swearing of allegiance to the ruling party Lakas-NUCD (National Union of Christian Democrats) (Bohol Chronicle, 30 June 2010). Just an hour after Aumentado took his oath, Ramos approved the projects, marking the start of an impressive series of large-scale projects allocated to Bohol by the national government (ibid.).

The dependence of development funding allocation on political allegiance was also used to strengthen support for Arroyo, whom Aumentado openly referred to as “Bohol’s greatest patron” (in Manila Bulletin, 12 June 2010). In the words of the former governor, there was no reason to desert the administration party given the number of projects poured by the administration into Bohol, which was “unprecedented in the annals of local governance” (Aumentado in Bohol Sunday Post, 22 November 2009). Similarly, municipalities had a strong incentive to deliver their vote for the administration party, as those which performed particularly well in the 2007 elections (i.e. gave the administration party a 12-0 or 11-1 victory in the senatorial elections) were rewarded with cash for infrastructure projects (Dejaresco 2010). In the 2010 general elections, Aumentado also centred his campaign for Second District representative around the promise of comprehensive rural development, through his Barangay Master Planning project, which promised to deliver “simultaneous growth and development [to] all the barangays in the second district” (Bohol Chronicle, 21 February 2010). Aumentado won with 57% of the votes (against 35% for his main opponent Judith Cajes, former mayor of Trinidad and wife of former Second District representative Roberto Cajes), illustrating once more the central role and effectiveness of development as political bargaining chip.

Against this backdrop, Kalahi itself represented a precious bargaining chip that seemed to have helped Arroyo to secure votes in regions and provinces, as Chapter 3 has
shown. In Bohol, Kalahi, which Aumentado presented as “a flagship program of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and her gift to us, Boholanos” (Aumentado in Blanco 2005), served the administration party particularly well, insofar as one can judge by the electoral results in the municipalities that received Arroyo’s “gift” to Bohol. In the 2004 and 2007 elections, which followed the launch of Kalahi in the province, elective positions were massively won by candidates of the administration party in eleven of the twelve Kalahi municipalities.\(^{157}\) This is particularly striking when considering that in the 2007 elections, nine municipalities that had not received Kalahi funding joined the opposition, whereas only one Kalahi municipality did. In other words, the municipalities that received Kalahi funding were exceptionally effective in delivering votes to the administration, even by the standards of an administration stronghold like Bohol, as over 80% of Kalahi municipalities supported the administration in 2004 and 2007, against less than 60% of non-Kalahi municipalities. Thus Kalahi offered a valuable avenue to strengthen clientelistic channels between national governments and “local communities,” providing patronage resources used in factional politics. As noted throughout the thesis, Kalahi was not simply used in support of clientelistic relationships. It was also deployed to stimulate and reward local leaders who styled themselves as “progressive,” “participatory” and “pro-poor” in response to CDD discourse, as noted above in the case of provincial government officials, and as examined in the pages below in the case of mayors and other municipal officials who experienced Kalahi in Bohol.

**Performing Kalahi in Bohol’s Municipalities**

Kalahi directly sought to elicit “good governance” performances at the municipal and *barangay* levels. As explained by the Kalahi manager at the World Bank’s office in Manila:

\(^{157}\) The only exceptions were Bien Unido, which became an opposition municipality after the 2007 elections, and Trinidad, which was dominated by the opposition party LDP in 2004, before Kalahi started there. In contrast, in the 2007 elections, all of Trinidad’s elective positions went to candidates of the administration party.
“when Kalahi mayors are able to articulate what Kalahi has meant for them, that’s the venue in which the practice of Kalahi shows up: “when we have our planning now, our planning meetings are more open. The planning decisions are based on consultative inputs from the community. We provide feedback to communities about which projects are going to go ahead and where resources are being allocated.” That is the end game” (IV4).

Yet during interviews and discussions with municipal government employees in Bohol, Kalahi procedures and processes were portrayed as very demanding, cumbersome and even irrelevant (IV19; IV25; IV26; IV29; IV30). This view was apparently widespread across the Philippines, as shown by Kalahi mid-term review report’s finding that one of the main weaknesses of the Kalahi process was its “burdensome, tedious and tiring” character (DSWD 2006, 7). Moreover, in Bohol, several municipal government employees described Kalahi’s discursive aims of “empowering communities” and improving local governance practices as highly unrealistic (IV25; IV26; IV30). This was exacerbated by some of the technical limitations of the programme, whose implementation timeframe of three years was regarded by municipal employees as far too short to affect local government practices, and which did not provide these employees with adequate means to supervise the programme’s implementation – as Kalahi supervision responsibilities were simply heaped onto their full-time positions, and rewarded only by a small stipend from the municipality, rather than benefiting from specific budgetary allocations (ibid.).

Despite such drawbacks and limitations, Kalahi represented a large amount of money in a province such as Bohol, which was highly dependent on external resources. On average, Kalahi grants corresponded to 19% of the total annual income of the twelve municipalities that experienced the CDD programme in Bohol.158 Kalahi was thus regarded by government officials in Bohol as a prized resource to be channelled according to their needs and interests,

158 This percentage was calculated using the average annual municipal income of the municipalities that experienced Kalahi for the period 2000-2003 (Provincial Government of Bohol 2007) and for the year 2009 (using the Local Governance Performance Management System of Philippine Department of the Interior and Local Government). It is consistent with Crost et al.’s estimate that the average Kalahi grant represents about 15% of the average municipality's annual budget (2010, 3).
in particular towards the development of agriculture and tourism, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Owing to their past experience of development interventions and to guidance by the provincial leadership, many local officials understood that the key to gain and sustain access to development funding was to perform adequately. Thus, despite widespread cynicism about the CDD programme amongst municipal government employees, local officials at the municipal and barangay levels delivered performances in three main forms.

First of all, Kalahi involved a set of rituals, from barangay assemblies to Kalahi workshops and municipal inter-barangay forums, which local leaders and “community members” were required to “enact” to qualify for the attribution of Kalahi funding. Instead of following “the KALAHI way” and fostering an ethos of participation amongst barangay members, barangay captains were often tasked to “convince” their constituency to attend a few, crucial barangay assemblies at the start of the CDD process (IV25; IV26; IV30). As a result, temporary surges in barangay assemblies’ attendance levels rapidly subsided in Bohol. Such a trend, Kalahi final impact evaluation report shows, was representative of the experience of Kalahi in municipalities throughout the Philippines, where increasing barangay assemblies’ attendance levels observed in 2006 had fallen by 2010, and where households’ participation in “barangay planning activities” had decreased between the start of the project in 2003 and its completion in 2010 (Edillon et al. 2011, 29–30).

Secondly, Kalahi discourse was reiterated by local officials, who never missed an opportunity to highlight their achievements, real or otherwise, in implementing the CDD programme – knowing that difficulties would certainly disqualify them for further rounds of funding. This trend was evident to the author during fieldwork, when municipal mayors and employees invariably started interviews and discussions by reiterating how well Kalahi had been implemented in their municipality, before stressing the reasons why they could and should qualify for more Kalahi funding (often due to the initial assumption that the researcher
was affiliated with the World Bank). These performances were also in evidence in official Kalahi documents, which almost systematically indicated good implementation of the programme in the province, and overlooked the irregularities in implementation mentioned in the pages above. In one of the municipalities where Kalahi was implemented, the MPDC and area coordinator for Kalahi municipal coordination team related that the first year of Kalahi implementation had been marked by serious clashes between Kalahi staff and the “autocratic” mayor, who saw Kalahi processes as undermining his authority and control over the municipality’s barangays (IV30). Kalahi was thus withdrawn from the municipality for a short period of time, before its implementation could be resumed on less confrontational terms. Yet there was no official record of the incident.

Thirdly, local officials understood the importance of providing sufficient and timely counterpart funding, as Kalahi rules required that municipalities match CDD grants by at least a third of the amount that they received, to sustain the image of “capable” local governments. On average, the municipalities that underwent the first phase of Kalahi in Bohol (starting in 2004) succeeded in providing the amount required by the DSWD and the World Bank, whilst those experiencing the second phase (starting in 2005) matched CDD grants by nearly two thirds of their amounts. To raise sufficient funds, congressmen and provincial government officials joined forces with municipal mayors, whilst some municipalities even institutionalised the provision of counterpart funding for Kalahi, which resulted in the provision of US$2.5 million or 45% of the amount released by the Bank in the province (DSWD 2009a).

In Bohol, the most far-reaching and celebrated counterpart funding practices for Kalahi were those of the municipality of Pilar, whose mayor, Wilson Pajo (2004-present), was a typical example of “progressive” leader, as described in the World Bank’s CDD and

---

159 The name of the municipality is not mentioned here, so as to preserve the anonymity of the MPDC and area coordinator for Kalahi municipal coordination team.
Local Governance report and its background case study. Pajo descended from the perennial local political dynasty, as the nephew of Marcos Auguis, who remained Mayor of Pilar for about 40 years – from the creation of the municipality in 1961 until 1998, and for a last term in 2001-2004 (Canlas and Almoro 2007, 3). Pajo was described as a favoured beneficiary of pork barrel politics, as his “political alignment with the provincial and national government proved crucial in obtaining resources for the municipality” (World Bank 2009a, 16). Yet Pajo’s leadership was further described in CDD discourse as “fair and just” (ibid., 55), and his support to Kalahi reportedly proved key to the success of the programme (ibid., 17). Pilar’s Mayor’s “exceptional” leadership in Kalahi was officially recognised with awards, as the municipality was declared “Best in LGU [local government unit] Engagement” in Kalahi in the Central Visayas, and as Pajo himself received the Kalahi Salamat Po (thank you) award in 2009 (Pareja 2009). To a large extent, such praise was based on the municipality’s provision of counterpart funding for Kalahi, which was institutionalised through a covenant whereby each barangay was required to contribute about US$1,500 per year during Kalahi’s implementation period (World Bank 2009a, 28). The funds were pooled together in a municipal trust fund and used as counterpart funding for Kalahi projects. This initiative yielded exceptional results, leveraging about US$365,000 over the three years of Kalahi’s implementation, and thus matching the amount of Kalahi grants in the municipality. As a result, Pilar was presented as a “learning laborator[y] of KALAHI-CIDSS,” and became one of the regular stops on CDD “study tours” for development practitioners in the archipelago, for World Bank representatives from Washington, D.C. and Indonesia and groups interested in implementing similar CDD programmes in Nepal and Vietnam, amongst others (Anania 2009).

Although in Bohol, the “materialisation” of CDD discourse in local officials’ practices and rituals clearly varied from one municipality to the other, the performances
triggered by Kalahi retained a very limited character in comparison to the vision promoted in CDD discourse. Indeed Kalahi practices and rituals were enacted almost exclusively for the gaze of the World Bank and the DSWD, on the occasion of rare and short field visits by high ranking officials from DSWD national office and by professionals from the World Bank’s office in Manila, with the instrumental aim of obtaining funding. In other words, CDD discourse was not fully “materialised” in practices and rituals. Whilst its form (or performative dimension) was reproduced, its meaning (or constative dimension) was distorted, as illustrated by the above-mentioned practices deployed to temporarily increase barangay assemblies’ attendance levels, for instance.

Similar trends of reproduction of discourse’s performative dimension and distortion of its constative dimension were described by Alexei Yurchak (2006), in the case of Soviet late socialism. Yurchak noted that whilst such practices or performances have been widely interpreted as “acting as if” (Wedeen 1998), this type of analysis presumes a highly problematic dichotomy between a “real,” “authentic,” “private” self, on the one hand, and a “disingenuous,” “public” “actor in mask,” on the other, as though the self or the subject was a fixed and fully determined totality (Yurchak 2006, 16–18) – whereas as philosopher Aldo Tassi remarked, “[t]here is no role that stands ‘behind’ all our other roles and defines what we ’really’ are” (in ibid., 22). To overcome issues of binary distinction between practices stimulated by deep belief and practices as simple simulacra, Yurchak drew on Judith Butler’s writings, to highlight that performance is “what enables a subject and constitutes the temporal conditions for the subject” (Butler 1993, 95), as noted earlier in this thesis. This conception allows us to abandon problematic dimensions of intentionality or belief, to focus instead on the effects of performances that enable specific subjects to emerge in the web of pre-existing social relations – beyond these performances’ effects of contributing to shape Bohol’s status
of “enabled” environment, and thus securing continuing flows of development funding, as discussed above.

By performing Kalahi discourse and particularly by enacting its performative dimension, municipal and barangay government officials in Bohol recognised themselves as the “progressive” leaders “hailed” by CDD discourse. To borrow Butler’s formulation, they were “enabled” as “progressive” leaders – regardless of the actual disregard for foundational CDD principles of participation, transparency, accountability and competition that was in evidence in their practices. These performances have had considerable effects on local power relations, in terms of “empowering” local politicians, rather than communities. Even the Kalahi manager at the World Bank remarked that:

“I am sure that they [municipal mayors] all have political agendas. One of the mayor said: “You know, this is the best platform for my re-election that I can think of. This is a programme that delivers benefits directly, across all of the barangays in my municipality and it provides exactly the kinds of services that people are missing, so it is very easy to campaign on that platform”” (IV4).

Kalahi was successfully used as a source of power by local politicians in Bohol, in particular by municipal mayors, whose clout as “progressive” leaders was largely based on their success in accessing development funding. Bohol’s access to external resources was generally perceived as dependent on these leaders, and, to a large extent, rightly so. This led the broad mass of the population to tolerate the domination of these local officials over development projects in general, and Kalahi processes in particular. For instance, the perceived volatility and instability of development funding acted as a powerful deterrent to “oversight” from Kalahi volunteers and members of local NGOs and grassroots organisations, who were supposed to act as watchdogs to ensure that CDD practices were transparent, participatory and accountable, yet tended to go along with municipal mayors’ practices so as not to jeopardise future access to development funds (IV25; IV26; IV30).
Similarly, the background case study for the CDD and Local Governance report mentioned, in the case of the municipality of Pilar, in Bohol, that “benevolent leadership” generated a “strong tendency “not to rock the boat” and leave the decision-making processes to the Mayor [...] among the lower levels of government and among community members” (Canlas and Almoro 2007, 16). Yet it continued by remarking that “[t]he widely held perception of the Mayor's strong and capable leadership has engendered trust-building between the LGU [local government unit] and the barangays—in return facilitating their participation and belief in the credibility of CDD processes” (ibid., 17). CDD discourse thus celebrated so-called “progressive” leaders for easing Kalahi’s implementation and, more generally, for leading development processes and poverty reduction initiatives, despite their domination over CDD and government processes.

In short, by “enabling” local officials at the provincial, municipal and barangay levels as “progressive” leaders, CDD discourse (i) increased local officials’ access to development funding; (ii) legitimised their systematic domination over Kalahi processes and benefits; and (iii) increased their leverage vis-à-vis the population, which discouraged autonomous popular mobilisation, and participated in the reproduction of very unequal power structures. Alongside Kalahi’s usefulness in terms of enhancing the power of provincial and municipal politicians (mainly in the form of political clout and patronage resources), and promoting certain business interests in the province (by providing funding for the agricultural and tourism sectors), Kalahi was deployed in a context of tensions, discontent and contestation produced by severe poverty and inequality, as highlighted in the preceding chapter. How it operated in such context, and what effects it had on movements of contestation in the province, are the questions treated in the remaining pages of this chapter.
Counterinsurgency-led Development

In Bohol, as elsewhere in the Philippines, widespread poverty and resilient social inequality created tensions and discontent, which, as noted in the preceding chapter, occasionally fuelled violent insurgency, as well as peaceful movements of contestation. These challenges from below were mainly addressed through Arroyo’s “holistic” counterinsurgency programme Operational Plan (OPLAN) Bantay Laya (Freedom Watch), which was implemented between 2002 and 2010 with the official aim to “decisively defeat the NPA” (Devesa 2005, 42). Kalahi was implemented in six of the seven “priority areas” of the counterinsurgency programme.\(^\text{160}\) According to the director of the Philippine Institute For Political and Electoral Reform, the programme was part and parcel of OPLAN Bantay Laya (IV10). The CDD programme complemented brutal military and paramilitary operations by helping to re-establish government control in barangays and to “win the hearts and minds” of communities, allegedly by supporting basic service delivery, initiating governance “reforms” and rebuilding people’s “trust” in the government – alongside other civilian “development” interventions led by the government, NGOs and POs (Suerte 2010; Devesa 2005; Peña 2007).

In the context of resurging challenges from below in the first decade of the twenty-first century, Bohol was identified as one of the priority areas of OPLAN Bantay Laya. In response, Governor Aumentado pledged to wage a “‘war’ versus the evils of communism” (Aumentado 2007), adopting “poverty reduction for peace and development” as his official priority (Aumentado 2006, 2). It was operationalised through the Bohol Program Framework for Poverty Reduction, which was crafted and implemented by the newly formed Team Bohol, a group led by provincial government agencies, in partnership with the Philippine Army, paramilitary groups, and the Philippine National Police. As part of the Bohol Program Framework for Poverty Reduction, all development projects in Bohol, including Kalahi, were

\(^{160}\) These areas were Bohol, Ilocos-Cordillera, Southern Tagalog, Bicol, Caraga region and Compostela Valley (Southern Mindanao). Only Central Luzon, which was identified as a priority area under OPLAN Bantay Laya, did not experience Kalahi.
integrated into the model of counterinsurgency-driven poverty reduction, on the ground that “poverty breeds unrest, and to address insurgency, one must first address poverty and deprivation” (ibid., 5).

Yet this focus on insurgency in Bohol appears misplaced, insofar as at the peak of insurgency in 2001, there were less than 300 NPA members in the province, which were to be “neutralised” by about 2,000 troops (Aumentado 2007; Cal 2006). The estimated number of insurgents had fallen to under 50 by 2005 (Aumentado 2007), and less than 20 insurgents were seen in the province between October and December 2007 (Chiu 2007a). Still, Arroyo urged the provincial government to strengthen its counterinsurgency efforts, declaring in 2008, in Administrative Order 201, that “[t]he relevant agencies shall accelerate-expand development programs in support of local peace efforts, especially the Bohol local peace efforts.” A first explanation for this focus is that counterinsurgency operations in Bohol gave credibility to Arroyo’s challenge to defeat the NPA before the end of her term, as the province was the first in the country to be declared entirely free from insurgency, only eight months before the 2010 general elections (Cal 2009). As such, Bohol’s counterinsurgency-driven poverty reduction approach was presented as a model of peace and development promotion in the country (BBC Monitoring International Reports, 17 May 2010; Bohol Standard, 4 July 2010; Torres 2011). In turn, CDD discourse asserted that development projects implemented in Bohol “brought the government closer to the people, thereby building trust and discouraging insurgency,” and noted that Bohol’s poverty reduction and peace promotion initiatives were regarded as “the cornerstone for attaining peace and development in Bohol” (Canlas and Almoro 2007, 5).

161 The very limited extent of insurgency in Bohol is further shown by the results of the Bohol Poll, which indicated that between 1997 and 2008, “insurgency” was mentioned as an important problem in the province in 2003 only, by 1% of those surveyed – in contrast to livelihood concerns, for instance, which were expressed by an average of 24% of those surveyed during the period 1997-2008 (Divine Word College of Tagbilaran and Social Weather Stations 1997 and 1998; Divine Word College of Tagbilaran Research Center 1999 and 2000; Holy Name University Research Center 2002, 2003, 2004a, 2005, 2006, 2007a and 2008).
A second explanation for the focus of counterinsurgency efforts in Bohol lies in the intensification of non-violent challenges from below in the first decade of the twenty-first century, as discussed in the preceding chapter. It was noted that in Bohol, organised movements of contestation strengthened in the 2000s, notably through the sustained activities of provincial and regional leftist organisations, which worked to mobilise Boholanos in calling for the improvement of conditions of production, and the enhancement of the welfare and rights of the broad mass of the population. These challenges from below were largely represented as CPP-NPA insurgency in the discourse of provincial government officials and in the local media (Aumentado 2007; Bohol Chronicle, 31 January 2010). In the context of re-militarisation of Bohol’s barangays and re-arming of local vigilante groups, this representation helped to legitimise abuses perpetrated by the military and paramilitary, most notably in the form of leftist activists’ harassment, anti-communist propaganda, arbitrary arrests, violence, and extra-judicial killings.

First of all, in Bohol (as in other provinces of the Philippines), the military closely monitored party-list members and campaigned against them, implying (rightly or not) their connections with the NPA or other underground armed movements. The military widely referred to party-list groups as “reds’ mainstream network,” and included the leftist party-list organisations Anakpawis (Children of Sweat), Bayan Muna (Nation First), Gabriela and Kabataan (Youth) Party-list, amongst the so-called “Communist Terrorist Movements” (Bohol Chronicle, 31 January 2010). During the 2004 election, members of the army and the police reportedly removed campaigning materials of party-list groups, whilst they actively campaigned against Anakpawis, Bayan Muna, Gabriela and Anak ng Bayan (Children of the Nation), and warned members of local farmers’ organisations against voting for these groups.

162 Campaigning was part of the army’s Psychological Operations Program in Bohol, which was “designed to address the enemy [the CPP-NPA] through pro-active measures and counter-propaganda,” from distributing leaflets, showing films and broadcasting radio programmes, to “show[ing] force” and establishing checkpoints (PPDO 2010, 73–74).
(PCPR 2004). They even labelled Anakpawis leaders the “enemies of Governor Aumentado,” after Aumentado was reportedly ambushed by the NPA in February 2004 (Karapatang Pantao 2004). In 2010, the election-related activities of these party-lists were presented by members of the army and the local media as insurgents’ attempts to revive the armed struggle, regain mass support for the local elections, and intimidate local candidates to strengthen their own political machineries in the province (Bohol Chronicle, 31 January 2010). Voters’ education campaigns on the automated elections undertaken by local NGOs were also monitored by the military, and presented as attempts by the CPP-NPA to gain support for their movement (KARAPATAN 2010).

Secondly, militant farmers’ organisations were also victims of repression and arbitrary arrests by the police and the military, as best illustrated by the case of the “Buenavista 5.” Five farmers, who were members of the Buenavista Farmers Association, an affiliate of HUMABOL, were accused of the double murder of a barangay captain and a barangay tanod (village security guard)163 in the municipality of Buenavista, in 2003. Although the murder was claimed by the NPA, the five men were arrested and imprisoned for seven years, until the local court ruled in 2010 that the accusation brought forward by the military was unfounded. The “Buenavista 5” case was regarded by peasant activists such as HUMABOL Secretary General Danilo Olayvar as an attempt to “weaken the continuing struggle of the farmers for genuine land reform and national change” (Olayvar in Bohol Times, 10 October 2010).

Thirdly, seven cases of political killings were reported in the province between 2004 and 2008.164 They targeted members of farmers organisations, including the provincial

163 Barangay Tanod refers to a “brigade or body composed of civilian volunteers, created at the barangay level to assist the barangay officials in the effective exercise of law enforcement – for the maintenance of peace and order, and the promotion of public safety” (Moreno 1988, 95). The term is used to refer to both the brigade and its members.

164 In 2004, Olimpio Crame, campaigner for the party-list group Anakpawis, and Eugenio Furog, public relation officer for HUMABOL-KMP and Anakpawis municipal coordinator, were killed (KARAPATAN in
farmers’ organisation HUMABOL-KMP (Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, Peasant Movement of the Philippines); leftist organisations such as the militant BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, New Patriotic Alliance) organisation and the Association of Concerned Inabangnons, an alliance opposing the provincial government’s Cebu-Bohol Water project (proposing to bring water from Bohol’s Wahig-Inabanga river to Cebu via an underwater pipeline); and leftist party-list groups, including Anakpawis, Gabriela Women’s Party and Bayan Muna. Three of the victims had been harassed by the police and the military, whilst three of the perpetrators were identified as members of the military or allied counterinsurgency groups. Similar types of abuses were reported nationwide, as Arroyo’s OPLAN Bantay Laya did not only target insurgent forces of the CPP-NPA, but also major party-list groups, religious organisations and media groups, including the Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism, which were represented as CPP-NA “front organisations” (Holden 2009, 383–385; Gorospe-Jamon and Mirandilla 2007, 116). Overall, more than one thousand extra-judicial killings were reported during Arroyo’s presidency, largely targeting members of leftist organisations, and often attributed to members of the military or paramilitary groups (Holden 2009, 832; Amnesty International 2006).

HKMHRPP 2006, 54–55). Two years later, Liezelda Estorba-Cunado, coordinator for Gabriela Women’s Party, was killed by an active member of the Philippine Army’s Barangay Intelligence Network (Asian Human Rights Commission 2006). Nestor Arinque, the Chairman of a municipal branch of HUMABOL, was also harassed by members of the military for his political activities, and shot dead by three unidentified motorcyclists (KARAPATAN 2006). Similarly, HUMABOL Secretary-General and BAYAN-Bohol Chairman Victor Olayvar was shot dead by unidentified motorcyclists, after receiving death threats and reportedly being on a military “hit list” (Amnesty International 2006, 4). The Mata ng Bol-anon (Eyes of the Boholanos) movement, a counterinsurgency group reportedly allied with the military, was blamed for the murder, although no case was filed (Bohol Chronicle, 01 August 2010). On 15 June 2007, Bayan Muna Secretary General Mario Auxilio was shot dead by a gunman identified as Hilario Mandahao Diola, a member of the anti-communist vigilante group Alimaong (tribal warriors) Holy Warriors, which is under the command of the Philippines Army’s 15th Infantry Battalion (AIPTPN 2007). Lastly, Ronald Cempron Sendrijas, who was presented by the local media and as a “prominent New People’s Army leader,” was killed in 2008 (Bohol Standard, 20 January 2008). The Asian Human Rights Commission reported that Sendrijas was a “political detainee” between 2004 and 2006, and that after his release, he was harassed by members of the military and the police, who notably tried to implicate him in the murder of Victor Olayvar. Sendrijas was a member of Samahan ng mga Ex-detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (Society of Ex-detainees for Liberation, against Detention and for Amnesty), and the spokesperson of the Association of Concerned Inabangnons (Asian Human Rights Commission 2008).
Against this backdrop, academic research further found that Kalahi exacerbated violent conflict between the Philippine Army and the NPA and the MILF throughout the Philippines (Crost and Johnston 2010). Although Kalahi did not directly serve to perpetrate abuses against leftist activists in Bohol and elsewhere, it was fed into the institutional set-up of the so-called Poverty Reduction Program for Peace and Development in Bohol, and was, in practice, part and parcel of Arroyo’s OPLAN Bantay Laya, both of which engendered leftist activists’ harassment, anti-communist propaganda, arbitrary arrests, violence, and extra-judicial killings, as discussed above. As such, Kalahi helped to contain and defeat challenges from below, rather than to awaken passive poor people from their apathetic slumber. It promoted transformist absorption of social tensions and contestation, as noted above, and also provided “cover” for counterinsurgency, insofar as the benign picture of a developmentalist and “pro-poor” local government, and of Bohol’s counterinsurgency-led development as a strategy conducted in the name of “peace” and “poverty alleviation,” would mute criticisms of counterinsurgency, and potentially diminish sympathy for left-wing activists on the ground.

In CDD discourse, moreover, insurgency in Bohol was presented as rooted in the lack of trust between the government and “insurgents,” and could allegedly be addressed through programmes such as Kalahi, that purportedly brought the “government closer to the communities” (Canlas and Almoro 2007, 16) – rather than by implementing redistributive agrarian reform and legislation restricting large-scale fishing and promoting more equal terms of trade, as demanded by local peasant and fishermen’s organisations. In so doing, CDD discourse “rendered technical” (Li 2007) “conflict” and “contestation,” in a manner that is best illustrated by the work of the World Bank’s social development team in Indonesia, which examined the links between the Bank’s celebrated Kecamatan Development Project and conflict. Conflict was presented as a “necessary catalyst and an inevitable by-product of
development,” which “may be necessary in the short run for progressive change to occur once violence has abated” (Barron et al. 2011, 42). The challenge for CDD practitioners was allegedly simply to manage such conflicts, resorting to conflict resolution mechanisms embedded in CDD programmes and habituating communities to utilise “legitimate, inclusive and accountable processes of contested deliberation” (Barron et al. 2007, 32). In so doing, it was proposed that communities would overcome their “problem of quiescence, so that tacit domination prevents their voice from ever emerging to question hegemonic power structures” (Barron et al. 2011, 77). This proposition was clearly challenged by the findings presented in this chapter, which has shown that in practice, Kalahi helped to reinforce existing power structures, rather than enabling communities to “question hegemonic power structures.” However, it vividly illustrates the extent to which CDD discourse has appropriated and adapted the language of radical critics, lending a socially-progressive aura as well as legitimacy and widespread support to CDD interventions (as noted throughout the thesis), whilst turning “conflict” into one more depoliticised element to be absorbed in the ever-growing realm of CDD.

Conclusion

This chapter has scrutinised the operations and effects of Kalahi in Bohol. It has highlighted that whilst Bohol was represented as a CDD “success story” and an “enabled” environment in CDD discourse, evidence indicated that after six years of Kalahi implementation in Bohol, poverty had risen and inequality remained particularly high. It has also shown that the experience of Kalahi in Bohol infringed upon the most important CDD principles of participation, transparency, accountability and competition – which was fairly representative of the CDD experience throughout the Philippines. In Bohol, moreover, the material resources deployed in Kalahi were largely channelled towards sectors whose
development profited provincial government officials and businessmen, and often proved harmful to local farmers and fishermen’s livelihoods. Kalahi discourse, in turn, represented such development strategy as “pro-poor” and beneficial to the broad mass of the population, which helped legitimising and reproducing it, in spite of evidence of rising poverty and persistent inequality in the province in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In this context, Kalahi must be understood as part and parcel of economic strategies that produce and reproduce inequality, concentrating on raising economic profitability without altering existing patterns of economic and political power distribution.

Yet the representation of Bohol as an “enabled” environment helped to legitimise and reproduce Kalahi intervention in the province, regardless of its actual operations and effects. Instead, this representation was based on the performances of local government officials who, in Bohol’s context of dependency on external funds, proceeded to style themselves as the “progressive” leaders hailed by development discourse. Through their mastery of “good governance” discourse and their veritable development machinery, provincial politicians became expert in accessing and managing development funding. Politicians such as former Bohol Governor Erico Aumentado, who successfully combined “good governance” discourse with clientelistic practices, were rewarded with positions of incremental power and flows of funding to their provinces, especially in the form of development projects. These projects did not only increase the financial resources of provincial government officials, but also reinforced their image of “progressive” and “pro-poor” leaders, enabling them to enhance their political clout and reinforce their popular support base.

Against this backdrop, Kalahi itself was regarded as a precious bargaining chip, which was awarded to provinces and municipalities in exchange for “good governance” performances, and for support and votes for Arroyo and for candidates of the administration party. In Bohol and elsewhere, the CDD programme served the administration party well,
insofar as elective positions were massively won by candidates of the administration party in municipalities which experienced Kalahi. Thus Kalahi offered a valuable avenue to reinforce the control of local politicians over their constituents, and to build support for Arroyo and her party in the province, by strengthening clientelistic channels between the national government and “local communities” in Bohol and across the Philippines. Moreover, although Bohol’s provincial government officials were already regarded as “progressive” leaders, the CDD programme more directly sought to elicit “good governance” performances at the municipal and barangay levels, and to support the rise of “progressive” leaders locally, rewarding those who styled themselves as “participatory” and “pro-poor.”

Kalahi, which represented nearly 20% of the total annual income of the twelve municipalities that experienced the programme in Bohol, was regarded by municipal officials as a prized resource, to be channelled according to their needs and interests, and sustained through adequate performances. Thus local politicians “enacted” CDD discourse through a set of practices and ritual reiterations, which reproduced CDD discourse’s performative dimension whilst distorting its constative dimension, and which were largely intended for the distant gaze of the Bank and the DSWD. Although CDD discourse was not fully “materialised,” it “enabled” local officials at the provincial, municipal, and barangay levels as “progressive” leaders. In so doing, its main effects were to: (i) increase local officials’ access to development funding; (ii) legitimise their systematic domination over Kalahi activities and benefits; and (iii) increase the leverage of provincial officials vis-à-vis the population, which discouraged autonomous popular mobilisation and participated in the reproduction of very unequal power structures. Thus by making the delivery of CDD funds conditional upon the performances of local government officials (and, to a lesser extent, of villagers), Kalahi promoted the transformist absorption of movements of contestation.
Kalahi was also fed into an institutional set-up of counterinsurgency-led development that engendered gross abuses, in the form of harassment, anti-communist propaganda, arbitrary arrests, violence, and extra-judicial killings of leftist activists and members of peasant organisations in the province. By overlooking these abuses and presenting Bohol’s counterinsurgency-led development as a great success, conducted in the name of “peace” and “poverty alleviation,” CDD discourse further legitimised these practices. Moreover, it rendered “conflict” and “contestation” technical, presenting them as issues of trust between the government and the population, and as “necessary in the short run for progressive change to occur once violence has abated” (Barron et al. 2011, 42). In so doing, CDD discourse turned “conflict” into one more depoliticised element that could allegedly be addressed through CDD programmes.

Against this backdrop, the remark of a World Bank consultant, formulated in the 1970s, vividly captures the dynamics that have characterised Kalahi’s operations and effects, concluding that in the Philippines,

“rural development strategies to date have failed to provide meaningful benefits to those rural Filipinos most in need of them. Underlying all the rhetoric, concerns for production, control of rural discontent, and maintaining the support for elites are still paramount, as circumstances of most rural Filipinos continue to erode rapidly, perhaps already in an irreversible direction” (Anderson in Bello et al. 1982, 99).

Indeed in Bohol, Kalahi, which was ostensibly designed to promote popular participation in local governance, worked to shore up the position of local machine politicians and businessmen, and to undermine local organisations mobilised to demand improvement of conditions of production and redistribution of resources and benefits. More specifically, the CDD programme helped Bohol’s local growth coalition to attract investment, provided patronage resources used in factional politics, and provided “cover” for counterinsurgency as a strategy conducted in the name of “peace” and “poverty alleviation,” which would mute
criticisms of counterinsurgency and potentially diminish sympathy for left-wing activists on the ground. In other words, the deployment of Kalahi in Bohol, which helped to address mounting challenges from below and to reinforce the power of local elites, to the detriment of the broad mass of the population, must be understood as part of the transformist resolution of the crisis of hegemony experienced in the Philippines in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and as part of factional politics under Philippine oligarchical democracy. This alternative understanding of CDD programmes like Kalahi as instruments of hegemony and transformism (and as patronage resources), and of CDD discourse as “anti-politics machine,” has helped us to make sense of the emergence, expansion, operations and effects of CDD programmes. It also raises questions about the persistence and expansion of CDD programmes such as Kalahi, in spite of their severe flaws and limitations as instruments of “good governance,” from the vantage point of the World Bank and of government agencies such as the DSWD, which are examined in the following chapter.
Chapter 6 – Institutional Interests, Priorities and Pressures at the World Bank and the Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development

The preceding chapters explored the emergence, evolution, operations and effects of CDD programmes, more particularly of Kalahi in the Philippines. They highlighted that CDD programmes have acted as patronage resources and as instruments of hegemony and transformism, deployed as part of the politics of crisis, reequilibration and reconstitution of the oligarchy, to address the combination of subaltern movements and mobilisations on the local level, and of populist electoral challenges at the national level. The scrutiny of Kalahi in Bohol also showed that the CDD programme, which was ostensibly designed to promote popular participation in local governance, worked to shore up the position of local machine politicians and businessmen, and to undermine local organisations mobilised to demand improvement of conditions of production and redistribution of resources and benefits. Against such a backdrop, the expansion of CDD programmes was explained in causal terms, as necessary to complement economic liberalisation reforms by addressing the tensions and discontent created by mounting poverty and inequalities throughout the developing world. In so doing, the preceding chapters highlighted the structural logic guiding the deployment of CDD programmes, whilst lending political intelligibility to processes of production and reproduction of these programmes.

This chapter, in contrast, examines the institutional context in which CDD programmes have been produced and reproduced. It attempts to explain the survival and expansion of CDD programmes such as Kalahi from the vantage point of the interests and priorities of the World Bank, and of Kalahi’s implementing agency, the Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). To account for the organisational
contexts in which CDD programmes have been produced and reproduced, this chapter adopts a focus on bureaucratic politics, on the set of institutional interests, priorities, pressures, failings and limitations that can explain the persistence, survival, and expansion of CDD programmes. This echoes the approach adopted by Judith Tendler, in her study of USAID, which proposed to portray “the organizational environment as playing a central role in determining the content of development assistance programs,” and to “find the organizational rationality that lurks behind much of the behavior of development assistance organizations” (1975, 2–3). In addition, this account draws important insights from the work of Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey Winters (2001, 2002 and 2002b), who have examined the World Bank’s institutional structures and dynamics to explain the evolution of its operations, and to make sense of the apparent gap between its discourse and practice. Particularly valuable insights are also drawn from David Mosse’s (2011b) examination of the interplay between the form and formulation of social development concepts, and the interests of non-economist professionals at the Bank. Mosse’s study exposes some of the institutional pressures and interests which are faced by these professionals, and which can help to account for the survival and expansion of programmes such as Kalahi.

As noted throughout the thesis, reproducing and expanding CDD programmes has been a central focus at the Bank and at the government agencies of various countries in which CDD programmes have emerged and evolved, despite evidence suggesting that these programmes have had little impact in terms of “good governance” and empowerment. For instance, in their most recent review of evidence on local, participatory development programmes, including CDD programmes, Mansuri and Rao concluded that “there is little evidence that they [participatory projects] reduce poverty significantly” (2011, 67), and that despite the lack of solid evidence on social capital and empowerment:

“The evidence we do have, shows that participation has little effect on the exercise of voice or on community organized collective action outside the participatory project.
Instead, some evidence points to a decline in collective activities outside the needs of the project’ (ibid., 68).

Echoing these general remarks, the final impact evaluation report for Kalahi was largely inconclusive in terms of the programme’s effects on the quality of local governance and on levels of community empowerment, which, puzzlingly, the report did not directly discuss or assess. It proposed that whilst Kalahi “led to improvements in household welfare, accessibility [of households’ houses all year long], and social capital,” it had “mixed results with regard to participation in governance” (Edillon et al. 2011, 37). More specifically, the report found that in the barangays that experienced Kalahi, trust towards other barangay residents had increased between 2003 and 2009, whilst trust towards local and national government officials had decreased (ibid., 29). It also found that although participation levels in barangay assemblies had initially improved, they had decreased by 2010; and that Kalahi had a generally negative impact on households’ participation in “collective action activities” and in “barangay planning activities” (ibid., 30).

Moreover, official poverty statistics indicated that in the 42 provinces in which Kalahi was implemented, the average poverty level increased from 40.3% of the population in 2003, the year Kalahi started, to 41.7% of the population in 2009, when the programme ended (NSCB 2011a), pointing towards Kalahi’s ineffectiveness as a poverty reduction instrument. In contrast, election results suggested that Kalahi still represented a particularly effective avenue for securing votes in the provinces, as in the 2007 mid-term elections, the majority of provincial level positions (including the positions of governor, vice-governor, and provincial board members) were won by administration candidates in nearly 85% of the provinces that experienced Kalahi.165

165 More generally, in 2007, the administration coalition Team Unity was successful in winning local elected positions and a majority of seats at the House of Representatives, largely owing to “the president’s control over patronage resources” (Hutchcroft 2008, 149). In contrast, it failed to secure a majority at the Senate, signalling the lack of popularity of the administration (ibid.).
As noted throughout this thesis and highlighted above, CDD programmes have thus been characterised by a persistent contradiction between their expansion and reproduction, on the one hand, and a growing body of evidence suggesting their ineffectiveness as instruments of “good governance,” on the other. Against this backdrop, this chapter asks what, in the institutional conditions of production and reproduction of CDD programmes, can account for the systematic expansion of these programmes, amidst increasing evidence of their “failure” to deliver “good governance” and empowerment. To answer this puzzle, this chapter proposes to examine the institutional contexts for the production and reproduction of CDD programmes. In particular, it considers how institutional interests, priorities and pressures at play at the Bank and the DSWD have been conducive to the survival and expansion of CDD programmes such as Kalahi.

This chapter starts by scrutinising the broad institutional priorities of the World Bank, in particular the “pressure to lend” that has been identified as a key characteristic of the institution. It then turns to examine the specific interests and priorities of the Social Development Department, a “marginal” department within the Bank’s “economic fortress” (Cernea in Mosse 2011b, 82), with which CDD programmes have largely been associated. Trends of CDD programmes’ survival and expansion are further scrutinised against the backdrop of the Bank’s new identity as a “knowledge bank,” a crucial characteristic of the context in which CDD programmes have emerged and thrived. Finally, this chapter explores the DSWD’s institutional interests, priorities and pressures, which, alongside the interests, priorities and pressures of the Bank, have made up the institutional context for the survival and expansion of Kalahi. In examining these contexts and their dynamics, this chapter also investigates the effects of CDD discourse, in terms of supporting the institutional interests and priorities of the Bank and the DSWD, and in promoting the survival and expansion of CDD programmes.
The Lending Race

To understand what, in the World Bank’s institutional priorities, can account for the survival and expansion of CDD programmes like Kalahi, it is necessary to consider briefly the basic workings of the Bank. The Bank’s core operation, through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA), is to “provide low or no interest loans (credits) and grants to countries that have unfavorable or no access to international credit markets” (World Bank 2011a). To do so, the Bank generates funds by selling bonds in financial markets (through the IBRD) and lending its own capital, consisting of reserves and member country shareholders’ contributions, and loan repayments. The Bank operates on the basis of lending commitments or targets, which are set for each country in a Country Assistance Strategy, an “indicative business plan for the delivery of Bank services over a particular period of time (most frequently four years), to support the achievement of specific development results by the country’s authorities” (World Bank 2011e). These targets have followed a general upward trend from one year to the next, as shown, for instance, by the World Bank’s US$73 billion commitment in fiscal year 2010 (including loans, grants, equity investments, and guarantees), which represents a 24% increase over fiscal year 2009 (World Bank President Robert Zoellick in World Bank 2010c, 2).

Although the Bank officially framed this systematic increase in lending in terms of a “response to the global crisis” in the late 2000s (World Bank 2011b), it has been widely recognised that the Bank’s operations have been characterised by a pervasive “pressure to lend,”166 which has been particularly acute since the presidency of McNamara in the 1960s. This pressure has largely stemmed from the Bank’s need to reinvest earnings from its portfolio in projects and programmes to avoid the issue of a net negative transfer (which

166 This expression was first used in the report of a Bank’s task force, which was set up to investigate the deteriorating performances of the Bank’s portfolio in the early 1990s (Wapenhans 1992).
would contradict its status of “international development institution”), combined with a lack of “bankable” projects to invest in, as scholars have noted since the early 1970s.¹⁶⁷ The “pressure to lend” has been heightened by the need to meet aggressive annual lending targets set by the Bank’s management, and, as American environmental lawyer and writer Bruce Rich remarked, by the fact that “the World Bank never has to answer directly for the disastrous financial consequences of emphasizing quantity over quality in lending” (1994, 184). The Bank has thus been described as an environment where “the incentive structure [...] has emphasized new lending and lending volumes over project quality and supervision” (Pincus and Winters 2002b, 22), and where “[t]he primary gauge of operational success became the volume of new lending, and career advancement of operations staff became closely tied to the amount of money that they could move” (Pincus 2001, 186). This idea was expressed in a more direct form by a former employee of the World Bank Social Development Department, who declared that:

“In the end if a country wants to do a project, the Bank will lend the money. [...] To be very cynical, yes, the Bank’s priority is to disburse funds quickly. In any case, for any of the Bank’s projects, as long as the front page of the Financial Times doesn’t say “big corruption in a World Bank’s project” people [at the Bank] are happy [...] You [a World Bank employee] can say “our dream is a world free of poverty” but if you want a career, what counts is the amount of lending you do” (IV41).

As a result of this pervasive “pressure to lend,” the Bank’s institutional environment has been characterised by a strong inter-departmental competition for lending (i.e. managing projects and programmes), as the amount of lending carried out by a department determines its place in the Bank’s hierarchy. Inter-departmental competition for funds has been amplified by the confusion around departmental responsibilities for programmes and projects, which are organised along two main dimensions: regions and themes. Each region and each theme

¹⁶⁷ See, for example, Mason and Asher (1973). See also Rich (1994, 183–186) and Weaver (2008, 83–91) on the Bank’s “disbursement imperative.”
correspond to a vice-presidency, the main unit of organisation at the Bank, which comprises six regional vice-presidencies and five “network” or thematic vice-presidencies. Network vice-presidencies are administratively divided into thematic units, corresponding to one or several sectors of the Bank. In turn, each sector has a dedicated board, including representatives from both regions and networks; it operates according to a specific sector strategy or action plan, and is further subdivided into specific themes. Regional vice-presidencies, in contrast, are administratively divided into country management units, usually country offices (based in the country in which they operate), which are in charge of the Bank’s operations in one or several countries. In practice, sectoral and regional dimensions overlap, as staff from specific network vice-presidencies are usually dispatched across the six regions of the Bank, where they form regional technical units that act as consultants for the country management units’ staff, usually on specific projects (World Bank 2011c).

Although in theory, CDD is a theme of the social development thematic unit, which is part of the sustainable development vice-presidency, the Bank describes CDD as “an approach that can be applied to a range of sectors [...] such as microfinance, youth inclusion, natural resource management, and urban development” (World Bank 2011d). Urban development and natural resource management are themes of the sustainable development vice-presidency, whilst microfinance and youth inclusion fall under the remit of the human development vice-presidency. As a result of unclear and variable responsibility for CDD programmes, some programmes have been implemented by social development teams (as in the case of Kalahi and most CDD programmes in Asia), whilst others have been managed directly by country management offices, or by agriculture and rural development teams (particularly in Africa).

To make matters worse, there is a great lack of clarity, in practice, as to which programmes qualify as CDD. Van Domelen (2008) noted the difficulty of delimiting the
portfolio of CDD programmes at the Bank, as programmes labelled CDD correspond to a wide spectrum of participatory approaches, and different labels might be applicable to similar practices. For instance, in Latin America, it has been more common to refer to CDD programmes as social funds, which are associated with the Bank’s Human Development Department. New terminologies have also been formulated and used in more or less consensual ways by development practitioners to refer to rapidly evolving wisdom and practices. Within the Bank, CDD has thus often been called an “umbrella term,” grouping “pure” CDD programmes with projects simply comprising a few elements of the CDD approach (Abakerli et al. 2006, 3; Kumar 2003, 5). In short, it is against a backdrop of “pressure to lend,” strong inter-departmental competition for lending, unclear responsibilities for CDD programmes, and confusion around the scope of the CDD portfolio, that the specific interests and priorities of the Social Development Department, with which CDD programmes are officially associated, must be understood.

“Organizational Need for Ignorance” at the Social Development Department

The Social Development Department is the only World Bank department filled with anthropologists and sociologists, who have often been regarded as outsiders within the Bank’s “economic fortress,” as noted above. It has thus been confronted with the pressure of overcoming its “marginal” status at the Bank. The marginalisation of the department has gone far, as a former employee of the World Bank Social Development Department relates that “some people [at the Bank] would not want to work for social development; that would not be a good step for their career” (IV41). A survey conducted by the Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department further revealed that over 40% of task managers at the Bank felt that

\[168\] Still, Mosse remarked that the position and responsibilities of non-economist professionals at the Bank have considerably evolved, from “a concern for safeguarding vernacular social and cultural realms and local livelihoods against the threat of growth-driven development and its technical interventions,” to become a task of “norm-setting both in relation to investment loans – through the social and environmental ‘safeguard policies’ - and in relation to policy-based lending through various tools of social analysis” (2011b, 82).
social development staff needed to “change their way(s) of thinking” – by “integrat[ing] better with their Bank colleagues and be more readily available when their help is sought,” for instance – or to “take a more practical approach” – with, for example, a greater focus on project monitoring and evaluation (OED 2005b, 32–33). As the OED study remarked,

“One consequence of the Bank having moved into social development incrementally (and at least partially as a response to outside criticism) has been the creation of internal divisions, which some in the Bank refer to disparagingly as “silos.”[...] Dealing with each topic as it came up led inevitably to a bureaucratic separation of some social science practitioners from others, when it might have made sense to work together [...] Staff opinions on the advisability of changing the organizational structure to bring practitioners closer together are negative [...] , in part because they have change fatigue, but also because they do not believe that the organization will get the structure right no matter how many times it tries” (ibid., 34).

In this context, the Social Development Department has largely counted on the “acceptability” and performances of its programmes to raise its profile within the Bank, for which CDD programmes have proven particularly well-suited. Indeed, CDD programmes have largely owed their survival and expansion to the speedy disbursement of funds that they have allowed. As a senior social development specialist at the Bank’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., clarified about CDD programmes,

“it is a quick way to move money [...] after the first year of getting things sorted out, disbursement levels were huge, probably because they unblocked a channel. So suddenly you had all this very very small scale procurement that wasn’t hindered by the types of processes that were otherwise in place. So in that sense it is also a boon to the Bank, any regional bank, because you can move money” (IV44).

This view was corroborated by a former employee of the Social Development Department, who explained that:

“If you are doing a project at the Bank, what really counts is the speed with which you disburse funds; the old story of the governance specialist so happy that the government wants to disburse within the year, ignoring the upcoming elections the year after. In any case, CDD is great for this. It takes a little time at the beginning, you
build the pipes, then you open them and it flows fast, and that is what people will like” (IV41).

CDD programmes have thus turned out to be particularly well suited to the interests of the World Bank in general, as a way to disburse funds particularly quickly and to increase volumes of lending, and to the interests of the Social Development Department in particular, representing the opportunity to raise its profile within the Bank. In this context, the survival and expansion of CDD programmes can be understood as driven by the need to promote these interests, more specifically by social development professionals’ need to “manage their structural vulnerability in an ‘economic fortress’” (Mosse 2011b, 96).

If the “effectiveness” of CDD programmes in meeting the institutional priorities of the Bank has thus helped the Social Development Department to build its own “acceptability” within the Bank, a great challenge for the department has been to protect its CDD programmes against criticisms and attacks from other departments. As the Bank’s senior social development specialist explained, “there’s been some pushback or argument against it [CDD] from specific sectors, because in some degree, they see it as a threat for resources that are available for health, or for education, or for water” (IV44). Such a context has clearly deterred any openly critical view of CDD programmes at the Social Development Department, as this might result in funding cuts for the department – particularly since “the guy next door will try to get your funds for his project,” in the words of a former employee of the World Bank Social Development Department (IV41). In addition, project managers often develop very personal and possessive relationships to “their” projects, creating a context in which “if you criticise the project, you criticise them. As long as there is this almost paternalist relation between the project manager and the project, it’s very difficult to listen to criticisms” (ibid.). In short, social development teams have become particularly protective of the reputation of their programmes, which they have had every incentive to present as highly
successful, replicable, and worthy of serious investment, regardless of their actual operations and effects.

As David Mosse noted, in his examination of the interplay between the form and formulation of social development concepts and the interests of non-economist professionals at the Bank, whom he generically referred to as the “anthropologists”:

“One might suggest that ‘anthropologists’ at the Bank were subject to what Quarles van Ufford (1993) refers to as the organizational need for ignorance about what is going on locally, in order to save, protect and promote politically important notions, including their own product – whether participation, empowerment, social capital, CDD or ‘social analysis’. Arguably, the more marginal a professional group, the more carefully its products have to be protected against attack” (2011b, 97).

In this context, CDD discourse has served to represent CDD interventions as desirable, effective, improvable and replicable, by freely interpreting or simply ignoring the operations and effects of unfolding interventions. CDD discourse can thus be understood as an expression of the “organizational need for ignorance,” serving to protect and promote CDD programmes rather than to describe, assess and evaluate them,\(^{169}\) as illustrated by the case of Kalahi.

Documentation on Kalahi has provided crucial insights into the operation performed by CDD discourse to meet institutional priorities, in particular through two sets of documents produced for internal usage by the Bank and the DSWD, and whose tone was uncharacteristically pessimistic. In a letter addressed to DSWD Secretary Corazon “Dinky” Soliman, the acting senior director of the Bank’s environment and social development unit listed a series of serious challenges in the implementation of Kalahi, which Bank staff had uncovered during a formal three-week supervision mission undertaken in February 2004. These challenges included: (i) insufficient national government funding; (ii) shortages in

---

\(^{169}\) Pincus also noted that as a result of the “pressure to lend” at the Bank, “once projects have been designed, operations staff do not so much appraise them as promote them within their departments and ultimately to the executive board” (2001, 186-188; emphasis in original).
staffing and training; (iii) difficulties of the programme in reaching “the poorest of the poor;” (iv) limited use of independent monitoring and grievance mechanisms, resulting in reduced public accountability; and (v) lack of sustainability of infrastructure built through the programme (Broadfield 2004). To conclude, the letter further noted that “not all local governments are ready to adopt the KALAHI-CIDSS way” (ibid.). Four months later, another supervision mission conducted by the Bank found that new issues were emerging, as: (i) participation rates in barangay assemblies were falling; (ii) local leaders freely bent Kalahi’s rules; (iii) communities experienced difficulties in following key Kalahi processes, such as participatory situation analyses, municipal inter-barangay forums, and grievance mechanisms; (iv) local government staff were often unsupportive of the programme; and (v) in some cases, local leaders attempted to capture Kalahi (World Bank 2004b).

Against this backdrop, a new letter was written to Secretary Soliman, urging the DSWD to secure additional funding for Kalahi (Fisiy 2004). Yet the letter’s unusually alarmist tone owed less to the project’s poor performance than to worries that Kalahi’s budget would undergo cuts. Indeed, the Congress of the Philippines had failed to approve the government’s budget for 2004, which meant that the more limited 2003 budget would be replicated in 2004, and that the budget of all of the government’s line agencies would be reduced by 15%, as proposed by the government (World Bank 2004a, paragraphs 12–13). These measures were likely to block further scaling up of Kalahi, which was regarded by the Bank as a major setback:

“Given the tight overall fiscal situation in the country, the [World Bank Supervision] Mission is very concerned about the KALAHI-CIDSS budget in 2004 and beyond. Lack of adequate national government funding is the biggest risk to scaling up the project” (ibid., paragraph 11).

The Bank thus recommended that the DSWD should pass the cut to other, less important programmes, and should further tap development assistance funds of senators and
congressmen to get sufficient funding (ibid., paragraph 13). Furthermore, despite the long list of difficulties reported in Kalahi’s implementation, the Bank encouraged the DSWD to keep on outwardly praising the programme in order to obtain funding to scale it up:

“Externally, the DSWD will be best positioned to secure resources through continued demonstration of the KALAHI’s track record as a “program of excellence” worthy of continued support”” (World Bank 2004b, paragraph 75).

As suggested in the pages above, the main concern of the Bank was not the actual operations and effects of the programme, but its size (financial and otherwise), which was considered as a major achievement in and of itself – substantiating Pincus and Winters’s remark that “the incentive structure within the Bank has emphasized new lending and lending volumes over project quality and supervision” (2002b, 22). Thus, to ensure the continuation and expansion of Kalahi, the DSWD and the Bank played down the serious issues that they encountered in implementing the programme, and focused instead on maintaining its image of effective instrument of “good governance.” To do so, the Bank advised the DSWD that a “short narrative section to address qualitative aspects (e.g., social processes)” would be sufficient for Kalahi’s evaluations (World Bank 2004b, paragraph 68) – and would somehow mask the lack of evidence on these “qualitative aspects.” As it became clear that Kalahi did not produce the expected “good governance” and empowerment effects, the Bank and the DSWD endeavoured to shift the blame for failure from the programme itself, whose soundness was not openly questioned, onto the local environments in which it was implemented. They did so by establishing binary distinctions between “progressive” and “traditional” leaders – particularly in terms of leaders’ “mistaken mindset […] that KC [Kalahi] is merely a source of funds” (DSWD 2006, 16) – and between “enabled” and “constrained” environment, as noted throughout the thesis.
Moreover, studies commissioned by the Bank have often been left unpublished, when their findings were found likely to compromise the reputation of the Bank and of its projects and programmes. Illustrating this point, a small study on Kalahi, which revealed that in the 2007 elections, 29 out of 30 “CDD mayors” were re-elected, was quickly buried by the Bank. Indeed, a former employee of the World Bank Social Development Department explained that “if you start talking about politics, about mayors who are re-elected because they received money from the Bank, it won’t go well with the Bank” (IV41). This tendency to conceal potentially compromising findings was also remarked upon by the OED, which noted that social assessments at the Bank are “often done superficially, leading to “comfortable” findings, rather than high-quality assessments, or they overlook key and interrelated issues” (OED 2005b, 36–37).

Indeed, in the context of the Bank’s drive to promote, protect, replicate and scale up CDD programmes, research and evaluations on CDD programmes have become characterised by a subtle process of self-censorship, wherein some questions are not asked and some data is not collected, for fear of “rocking the boat” by challenging the image of effective CDD interventions (IV41). As a result, in countries where governments have been reluctant to evaluate social capital and local governance, evaluations have simply not covered these points (ibid.). In other countries, where governments have been seen by the Bank as “having no weight” and being “desperate for money,” it has apparently not been uncommon for consultants in charge of the impact evaluation to arrange questions that would yield findings in which they simply had a personal interest. For instance, consultants who were simultaneously conducting PhD research designed evaluations that would answer the questions at the core of their theses (ibid.). More generally, in these “weak” countries, the

---

170 For instance, a former employee of the Bank’s Social Development Department explained that in the case of Morocco’s CDD programme National Initiative of Human Development, “what was interesting them [the government] was access to school and to health stations. Social capital, local governments... the king [of Morocco] doesn’t want to hear about it” (IV41).
Bank has often been the sole architect of project evaluations, which have typically been confined to safe grounds, insofar as the World Bank professionals in charge of designing and conducting these evaluations have feared that bringing to light CDD programmes’ flaws and failures would jeopardise their career:

“if they [World Bank employees] are preoccupied by their career, they don’t want to hear about it [criticisms and “negative” findings]. That’s really the issue: as soon as you want to do studies [on local politics, for example] people are... they don’t want to take any risk. Especially in relation to the Bank’s bureaucracy, they don’t want to rock the boat” (ibid.).

This great caution or fear to “rock the boat” has also been directly observed by the author, as several development practitioners and researchers at the World Bank and other development organisations, whom she interviewed, expressed great worries that their identity might be revealed in this thesis. For instance, an employee of the World Bank’s Philippine country office set the following conditions to be interviewed, on the phone: (i) two other persons, who had put him in touch with the author, would be present during the interview; (ii) the author would not know his name; and (iii) the author would not quote him, even anonymously. Even as these conditions were met, the employee refused to directly talk about Kalahi’s effects; instead, he suggested leads that the author could follow, pointing towards increasing poverty levels in the Philippines after six years of Kalahi implementation, for instance. Similarly, a former academic researcher refused to divulge the name of the journal in which one of his articles on CDD programmes was published, fearing that simply mentioning the journal’s name in this thesis might make him identifiable. He further asked the author to “ensure that the reference is anonymised and my name is not revealed in the write-up” (IV47), despite earlier assurance of anonymity.

Overall, CDD programmes have turned out to be particularly well suited to the interests of the Bank, as a way to disburse funds particularly quickly and to increase lending
volumes. They have also served the interests of the Social Development Department, as they have represented the opportunity to raise its profile and increase its acceptability within the Bank. The survival and expansion of CDD programmes have thus helped ensure that these interests would continue to prevail. In this context, CDD discourse has become an expression of a strong “organizational need for ignorance” at the Bank’s Social Development Department, serving to protect and promote CDD programmes as particularly effective and “worthy of continued support,” rather than to describe, assess and evaluate them. Such trends and dynamics must be further scrutinised against the backdrop of the Bank’s new identity as a “knowledge bank,” a crucial characteristic of the context in which CDD programmes have emerged and thrived.

**The Knowledge Bank**

In the mid- to late 1990s, the Bank embraced a new identity as a “knowledge bank,” in a very public effort to reinvent itself in order to assuage mounting criticisms, in particular in the context of emerging “anti-globalisation” movements in North America and Europe, and of rising popular protests and uprisings in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and in parts of Eastern Europe, as discussed in Chapter 2.\(^{171}\) In this context, the Bank has been represented, and has represented itself, as “rather like an Oxbridge college, or a private American university, which uses endowment income to subsidize its research and teaching” (Gilbert, Powell and Vines 1999 in Pincus and Winters 2002b, 10). The Bank has further represented itself as the ultimate source of expertise and knowledge in the area of international development:

“The Bank’s knowledge and cumulated experience of the development process provides the justification for a continuing role for the World Bank in an era where international capital markets appear overliquid rather than underliquid. The Bank is in

\(^{171}\) On the Bank’s “reinvention” efforts, see Pincus and Winters (2002a).
a position to give advice which is more disinterested than that provided by professional consultants, more professional than that provided by academics and more comprehensive than that provided by NGOs” (Gilbert and Vines 2000, 29).

This self-representation as “knowledge bank” reflects and reinforces an important characteristic of the Bank, which Robert Wade vividly captured when he remarked that “the Bank’s legitimacy depends upon the authority of its views; like the Vatican, and for similar reasons, it cannot admit fallibility” (1996, 34–35).

With CDD programmes, the “knowledge bank” has dramatically broadened the scope of its claims to authoritative knowledge, encompassing the sphere of politics, attended to through its “good governance” agenda, and society in general, whose reengineering was addressed through its empowerment agenda. For the Bank to protect and maintain its new identity as the definitive source of expertise on “good governance” and empowerment, it has thus been imperative that CDD programmes be represented as particularly effective instruments of “good governance.” However, although the Bank’s employees have promptly “aligned themselves” with the new empowerment and “good governance” agendas (IV41), the great majority of the staff have lacked expertise and understanding of these concepts, and have benefited from very limited training, guidance and support for implementing CDD programmes.172 This lack of understanding has been particularly acute in instances where CDD programmes have been managed by country management offices or by agriculture and rural development teams. In such instances, the staff responsible for CDD programmes have often had purely economic backgrounds, and have not benefited from training in the basic concepts of CDD, having to rely instead on the assistance of social development staff for their expertise (ibid.).

172 A World Bank staff survey indicated that less than 20% of the 152 employees surveyed were satisfied with the amount and quality of training they received on CDD/CBD, and that only about 25% of the World Bank staff were satisfied of the guidance and support that they received to conduct CDD/CBD operations (OED 2005a, 100).
Whilst such a widespread lack of understanding has sat awkwardly with claims to authoritative knowledge on virtually all aspects of development, concepts of “good governance,” empowerment, and social capital have proved easy to lay claim to, and hard to disprove. As such, these concepts have represented excellent “selling points” for CDD programmes, which have been easy to integrate into programmes’ design, and have endowed them with a valuable moral appeal, restyling them as quests for empowerment, and “good governance” (ibid.). Although surfacing evidence on the lack of impact of CDD programmes on local governance and empowerment has highlighted the unsubstantiated character of such a representation, the moral appeal and righteousness bestowed upon CDD’s core concepts has covered these exaggerations, and has tended to place CDD programmes above criticism. As Andrea Cornwall suggested, concepts like empowerment, social capital and participation have taken a peculiar quality of “buzzwords”, which “gain their purchase and power through their vague and euphemistic qualities, their capacity to embrace a multitude of possible meanings, and their normative resonance,” whilst they “place the sanctity of its [development] goals beyond reproach” (Cornwall 2010, 2). In this context, it has become increasingly difficult to confront the validity of CDD discourse. For instance, the author of an academic article treating the effectiveness of a World Bank’s CDD programme, whose findings were that CDD programmes did not result in empowerment or in greater accountability from local government, was asked to revise his article before publication in a leading social policy journal, on the ground that his overall argument was “too negative” (email communication with article’s author, 8 December 2010). The reviewer argued that the author “fail[ed] to see the positive contribution of CDD,” which was supposedly “all about step by step, incremental change that follows positive experiences” (ibid.).

173See also Cornwall and Brock (2005) and Rist (2007). Fine also pointed out that paradoxically, it is the very “chaotic” and “analytically selective” character of the concept of social capital, as used in development studies and by the Bank, that propelled its rise, whilst “creating a web of eclecticism in which the notion of social capital floats freely from one meaning to another” (1999, 10).
Moreover, although claims of CDD’s positive effects on “good governance,” empowerment and social capital have been made without much evidence to back them up, the fuzziness, lack of common definition and of agreed measurement for these concepts have made such claims very difficult to disprove. As an ex-employee of the World Bank’s Social Development Department explained, “people [Bank’s employees] will tell you “we didn’t find an impact here, but it’s because we didn’t have the right measure”” (IV41). This was illustrated by a CDD coordinator at the Bank’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., who explained that:

“On measurement, I think partly it is an issue of we don’t know how to measure these things [i.e. empowerment and “good governance”]. Hence, even though they are stated in the rhetoric, the attention given to these elements in design are... sometimes falls down simply because you are not tracking it” (IV45).

To address this awkward lack of evidence, diverse methods of measurement have been designed and tested in the hope to find positive impacts of CDD programmes on governance and empowerment, which would serve to further protect CDD programmes against attacks. Indeed in the context of the Bank’s inter-departmental competition for funds, poor or insufficient evidence has served to fuel attacks on CDD programmes from competing departments, as was the case in the mid-2000s, when a series of internal reviews of CDD programmes highlighted the lack of solid evidence of their impact, as noted in Chapter 1 (IV44). Different types of measurement have thus been devised to uncover evidence on the impact of CDD programmes, as summarised by the CDD coordinator at the Bank’s headquarters:

There are three types of approaches to do it [measure the qualitative impact of CDD programmes]:

---

174 See, for example, OED (2005), Mansuri and Rao (2004), and Wassenich and Whiteside (2004).
One is continuing with survey type of work, with perceptions questions. But increasingly, people are feeling that there is a problem of comparability, as well of reliability, when you’re dealing with that type of data.
The new set of evaluation work is around these games that you can do, social capital games and social cohesion games, and you do it in a treatment and a control area, and match the evidence.
And the third, [...] for big programmes like PNPM [Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, or National Program for Community Empowerment, the successor of KDP in Indonesia], like Kalahi, [...] [is] to actually set up a social observatory which [...] does a sort of mixed-methods research to track, visually, sit there for three months of a year and see what is observed, what is happening in terms of decision making [...] of excluded groups. [...] that hasn’t been tried yet, but that might be a new way in which we will get a better handle of how the dynamics change on the ground” (IV45).

In addition to these ongoing efforts to find positive impacts through new measurement methods, CDD programmes’ goals of “good governance” and empowerment have been set with long-term horizons, which has further justified programmes’ continuation. For instance, the Kalahi manager at the World Bank’s office in Manila explained the Bank’s decision to expand Kalahi for an additional three years, through the Kalahi CIDSS Additional Financing (KCAF) programme, as follows:

“why the extra three years? [...] [it] is, I think, a couple of things: one is that we realise in implementation that a CDD programme starts from nothing very much, especially as this [Kalahi] was the first programme of its type here [in the Philippines] that the Bank has supported. So it takes you a while to get all the operational systems in place, test the manuals, make sure that everything works on the grounds. And then, as all good CDD programmes are, they are very much learning by doing, so it is a process of revelations as you [the World Bank and the DSWD] go along, you sort of learn more and more about how the programme is working” (IV4).

According to the Kalahi manager, the KCAF programme would “open up space for civil society engagement, for more transparency, and accountability in decision making, in the use of public funds,” all of which the programme “can demonstrate in three years” (ibid.). Yet, two years after the interview with the Kalahi manager, the Bank was preparing a new extension of the programme (IV45), still pursuing the elusive targets of “good governance” and empowerment. In this context, Kalahi was still presented as a success, as the Bank
“wouldn’t be able to propose an additional financing project without finding that the performance to date is satisfactory,” as highlighted by the Kalahi manager at the World Bank (IV4). More generally, a former employee of the World Bank’s Philippines Country Office remarked that despite the lack of evidence on Kalahi’s effects, in terms of “good governance” and empowerment, the Bank will continue to promote the programme as long as there is no proof of overwhelming failure (IV42).

Overall, the survival and expansion of CDD programmes such as Kalahi can be understood as necessary to protect and promote the Bank’s new identity as an infallible “knowledge bank,” which has further fuelled the Bank’s “organizational need for ignorance.” Indeed, although the great majority of the staff has lacked “expertise” in and understanding of CDD’s core concepts of “good governance,” empowerment, and social capital, these concepts have proved easy to lay claim to, and hard to disprove, due to their fuzziness, lack of common definition and of agreed measurement. Furthermore, they have represented excellent “selling points” for CDD programme, endowing the latter with great normative appeal and moral righteousness. As long-term goals, these concepts have further encouraged the continuation and expansion of CDD programmes, allegedly to more effectively promote “community empowerment” and “good governance” throughout the developing world. whilst the pages above have focused on the World Bank, the remaining pages of this chapter examine the survival and expansion of CDD programmes in the context of the government agencies that have been responsible for their implementation. Focusing on the case of Kalahi, they scrutinise the DSWD’s institutional interests, priorities and pressures, which, alongside the interests, priorities and pressures of the Bank, have made up the institutional context for the survival and expansion of Kalahi.
The Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development

Operating under the World Bank’s supervision,\textsuperscript{175} the DSWD has been in charge of the day-to-day running of Kalahi and of its extension, KCAF, through a devolved project structure specifically set up for the CDD programme. At the top is an inter-agency steering committee chaired by the DSWD secretary, which is in charge of providing Kalahi’s overall policy and implementation framework.\textsuperscript{176} In turn, a national project management office, also headed by the DSWD secretary, is responsible for managing the programme, in particular planning and coordinating its implementation in different regions and monitoring its performances (World Bank 2002, 20–21). In each of the regions in which Kalahi has been implemented, a regional project management office, headed by a DSWD regional director, is responsible for coordinating the local deployment of Kalahi, and for running the programme locally, with duties ranging from local Kalahi staff training and supervision to reporting and grievances resolution (ibid.). Project management teams are also responsible for supervising municipal area coordinating teams, which are, in turn, in charge of monitoring, supervising and facilitating the implementation of the programme in municipalities and barangays (World Bank 2004c, 6).

Like the World Bank’s Social Development Department, the DSWD has been in a marginal position amidst the various department and agencies of the Government of the Philippines. It has been widely regarded as a “weak department with little previous role in development policy” (Reid 2011, 60). Kalahi was by far the largest programme that the DSWD had ever implemented, and marked a stark departure from the typical projects of the department, which usually focused on disaster relief, rehabilitation, and social welfare, rather

\textsuperscript{175}This supervision has been mainly performed through monthly meetings between the Bank and the DSWD. The DSWD has also been required to obtain the Bank’s approval before undertaking any modification of Kalahi procedures (IV35).

\textsuperscript{176}Members of the committee include the DSWD, the National Economic Development Authority, the National Anti Poverty Commission, the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Department of Finance, the Department of Interior and Local Government, and four NGO representatives (World Bank 2002, 12).
than development. The DSWD was reportedly selected as implementing agency for Kalahi on the basis of its experience of implementing the flagship community development programme Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (CIDSS, 1994-2004), which has served as a template for Kalahi, 177 alongside Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Project (World Bank 2002, 13). It was thus proposed that such experience had turned the DSWD into the best candidate for implementing Kalahi, as a “decade of learning-by-doing CDD [referring to CIDSS] means that the DSWD, and its staff, is well equipped to be the KALAHI’s executing agency” (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004, 2). Kalahi national project manager at DSWD further presented the CDD programme as perfectly capturing the mandate of the department (IV35), which is, as per President Joseph Estrada’s Executive Order 15:

> “to provide assistance to local government units (LGUs), non-government organizations (NGOs), other national government agencies (NGAs), people’s organizations (POs) and other members of civil society in effectively implementing programs, projects, and services that will alleviate poverty and empower disadvantaged individuals, families and communities for an improved quality of life” (Estrada 1998b, section 1).

However, although some features of CIDSS informed Kalahi’s design, the former was not a CDD programme, and was significantly smaller than Kalahi, in particular in financial terms. Whereas CIDSS was financed through a US$13 million loan from the World Bank, Kalahi was supported by a US$100 million World Bank loan. And whereas local projects funded via CIDSS were, on paper, attributed to the three poorest barangays in selected municipalities, and supported by a grant of a maximum value of US$250, municipalities that experienced Kalahi were granted US$6,000 for each of their barangay. 178 Moreover, Kalahi reportedly adopted an “enhanced” poverty targeting mechanism in comparison to CIDSS

---

177 A notable feature that Kalahi has borrowed from CIDSS is the so-called “convergence approach to local service delivery,” referring to the joint work of diverse government agencies to deliver a specific programme at the local level (Bhatnagar and Burkley 2004, 10).
178 Crost et al. estimated that the average Kalahi grant amounted to about US$150,000 (or 15% of the average municipality’s annual budget) per municipality and per project cycle, corresponding to a total of US$450,000 for three cycles of implementation (2010, 3).
it was also more “inclusive” than its predecessor, had a
more open menu, stronger technical assistance, better evaluation mechanisms, and a better
exit strategy (ibid.). It was thus 
despite
the lack of prior experience of the DSWD in implementing such a large and complex programme that the department was put in charge of Kalahi, and despite its lack of experience in managing and auditing large funds flows that the DSWD Finance Service Division was put in charge of the programme’s financial management (World Bank 2002, 57). The Bank acknowledged the relative inexperience of the DSWD, noting, in a Kalahi project appraisal document, that:

“The main operational focus of DSWD, the implementing agency, has been on social welfare activities. This project will provide a unique opportunity for DSWD to shift its focus to hard core developmental activities and become fully the department of social welfare and development, as the name implies. To accomplish this goal, DSWD is being restructured to include more task-oriented managers with project implementation skills” (ibid., 20).

The Bank further noted that although the DSWD procurement rules generally “adhere to the principle of competition,” some procedures and regulation “may not fully support economy, efficiency and transparency in procurement” (ibid., 49). The Bank apparently identified these flaws and assisted the DSWD in correcting them, demanding, for example, that the department hire additional employees at the national and regional levels, who would be qualified to manage the procurement process (ibid., 50) – although the DSWD already had qualified procurement staff.

More importantly, perhaps, the Bank went on to note that:

“The risk that the funds will not be efficiently and effectively used for the attainment of project objectives is Substantial. [...] The control risks on the project FM [Financial Management] are: the risk of inadequate FM staffing at the Central, Regional and community project levels; the risk of misuse of funds at the community level where funds flow directly to community bank accounts; the risk of inadequate funding due to the lack of budget cover especially for the years with significant increases in funding requirements especially 2004 to 2006 and the high percentage of counterpart funds required; the risk of delayed FMR [Financial Monitoring Reports] reporting due
to delayed consolidation of financials for the large number of sub projects; and the risk of inadequate audit of the Project due to the large numbers of sub projects situated in far poverty stricken areas and inclusion of counterpart fund contribution in the audit” (ibid., 57; emphasis in original).

In view of the findings related in Chapter 5, that Kalahi funds were relatively easily redirected to serve the interests and priorities of local politicians in Bohol, the Bank appears to have been correct in its risk assessment. The unsuitability of the DSWD’s financial procedures for a large-scale programme such as Kalahi can explain the ease with which Kalahi funds (and processes) have been captured by local politicians. It can further explain how, on occasion, funds have even failed to reach the bank account where they were supposed to be deposited, as Chapter 5 further noted, without being reported by the DSWD.

Such inexperience does not only account for various financial (and other) irregularities in Kalahi; it also explains the heightened “organizational need for ignorance” that the DSWD has been subjected to.179 This “organizational need for ignorance” has proven particularly salient in the DSWD employees’ bureaucratic understanding of Kalahi’s operations and effects. In interviews, employees of the regional office of the DSWD in the Central Visayas expressed seemingly naive views of Kalahi, which did not go beyond Kalahi manuals, and did not allow for understanding the ways in which the programme unfolded in local contexts. For instance, a Kalahi research, monitoring and evaluation officer asserted that the allocation of Kalahi funding to all barangays of the municipalities that experienced Kalahi in Bohol was not something that had been planned or decided by local politicians (IV21). Instead, she proposed that it simply resulted from a choice made in municipal inter-barangay forums by the majority of barangay representatives, in every Kalahi municipality in Bohol, to direct funding at least once to every barangay (ibid.). This was the only satisfactory official explanation that the officer could provide to an outside researcher, since

179 As noted earlier, in the case of the Social Development Department, “[t]he more marginal a professional group, the more carefully its products have to be protected against attack” (Mosse 2011b, 97).
no one at the municipal level or above could intervene in Kalahi decision-making processes, according to Kalahi rules and procedures. Similarly, when asked “what happens if barangays or municipalities do not comply with Kalahi processes?” the Kalahi research, monitoring and evaluation officer’s answer was unequivocal: “this cannot happen, because Kalahi monitoring staff are there to prevent this” (IV34). Through such a narrow, bureaucratic version of the Kalahi discourse, DSWD employees in the Central Visayas have thus brushed away highly visible “irregularities” in Kalahi’s implementation in Bohol, and have represented the CDD process as particularly smooth and successful in the province.

Further interviews have shown that Kalahi management staff at the national office of the DSWD in Manila expressed a similar, highly bureaucratic understanding of Kalahi, which was combined with an in-depth knowledge of the ways in which the programme unfolded at the local level. For instance, Kalahi national project manager at the DSWD explained that issues of elite capture had been anticipated as part of the programme’s risk analysis, and had happened as foreseen (IV35). He went on to explain that these issues were successfully addressed thanks to a grievance redress system embedded in Kalahi, which enabled barangay residents to anonymously report issues to the DSWD, which then investigated and addressed them. Yet, according to a former Kalahi project director at DSWD, the system was never taken very seriously in Kalahi, and, in most instances, was considered to be too confrontational for villagers to use it (IV5). Moreover, in 2004, a World Bank supervision mission found that the grievance redress system was not “fully realized” (without explaining further what, in the system or its implementation, seemingly went wrong), and that many villagers were unaware of the existence of a grievance system (World Bank 2004b, paragraph 12). On Bohol’s allocation of funding to every barangay, the DSWD manager simply commented that this should be flagged up, and that the process would need to be re-evaluated – although no action was taken.
These bureaucratic understandings of Kalahi largely resulted from the marginal position of the DSWD, which needed to protect its reputation as a competent department by protecting its flagship programme Kalahi against attacks from other departments, in particular from the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA). Initially, NEDA strongly opposed Kalahi, doubting the soundness and sustainability of the CDD approach and of its aims of “good governance” and empowerment, which would be particularly difficult to quantify (IV4). In particular, NEDA disapproved of the huge facilitation cost that Kalahi involved, which amounted to US$46.2 million or 25% of Kalahi’s total cost (ibid; World Bank 2002, 40). Yet, in the words of a former employee of the Bank’s Social Development Department, DSWD Secretary Soliman “stepped on NEDA” – whose influence has been limited by its lack of resources and political clout – by using her close links with President Arroyo to get Kalahi approved (IV41). NEDA remained largely disapproving of the project, and it took over nine months for the agency to approve KCAF, the new and allegedly “enhanced” version of Kalahi, which was also headed by Soliman, who was reappointed DSWD secretary by President Benigno Simeon “Noynoy” Aquino III (2010-present). In this context, the DSWD was, like the Bank’s Social Development Department, under considerable pressure to demonstrate the success of the programme, which was largely synonymous of expansion – as a programme’s success was often conflated with its ability to last and grow, being “worthy of continued support.”

Beyond these institutional pressures and interests, the DSWD has also been influenced by the political interests of the Philippine government. As an executive department of the Government of the Philippines, the DSWD operates under the direct control of the president. Its head, the DSWD secretary, is directly nominated by the president, and is part of the Cabinet of the Philippines, a key advisory body of the president. As such, the DSWD has been subjected to the priorities and pressures of the Philippine Government,
as described by Corazon "Dinky" Soliman, in a letter explaining her resignation from the position of DSWD secretary in 2005, following the “Hello Garci” scandal that implicated Arroyo’s direct participation in election fraud. Soliman (2005) explained that the period following the scandal was dominated by “political accommodation” at the DSWD (and elsewhere in government), and by a strategy of “political survival at all costs.” More particularly, Soliman described how some of the DSWD’s projects and initiatives were used as part of “domesticating tactics” that promoted demobilisation of challenges from below, mainly by distributing “packages of goodies for the urban poor communities as either part of raffle draws, food for work and family day activities to keep them from joining the rallies” (ibid.).

At a hearing of a “people’s court” held at the University of the Philippines following the “Hello Garci” scandal, Soliman also testified that “the entire GMA [Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo] cabinet and state resources were mobilized to boost Mrs. Arroyo’s election chance” (Manila Times, 16 September 2011). In this regard, Kalahi seems to have been particularly effective in terms of helping Arroyo and her party to secure votes in regions and provinces in the 2004 and 2007 elections, as this thesis has shown. It was further noted that as the “flagship” programme that embodied the Arroyo government’s outward commitment to poverty reduction, “good governance,” and empowerment, Kalahi represented a powerful tool to increase the legitimacy, popularity, and longevity of the administration. As such, the DSWD was under particular pressure to present the CDD programme as an unmitigated success and as “worthy of continued support.”

DSWD’s reputation as a “clean” and “uncorrupted” department\(^{180}\) helped to lend credibility to the representation of Kalahi as a successful instrument of “good governance.” However, the strong personal linkages between members of the DSWD, the World Bank’s

\(^{180}\) For instance, a survey conducted by Pulse Asia showed that the DSWD was considered to be the “least corrupt” government agency in the Philippines—although only 10.5% of the 1,200 respondents stated that there was almost no graft and corruption in the DSWD (DSWD 2011b).
office in Manila, and the Philippine Department of Budget and Management suggest that personal ties might have influenced Kalahi’s survival and expansion – a crucial issue which cannot be fully investigated in this thesis, for lack of sufficient evidence, but which, nonetheless, must be raised. Illustrating these linkages, Clifford Burkley, who served as DSWD undersecretary and as the first project director of Kalahi, is married to Camilla Holmemo, who worked at the World Bank’s Social Development Department and participated in evaluating Kalahi, until they both joined the Asian Development Bank in Manila. In turn, Andrew Parker, who worked as a senior economist at the World Bank’s office in Manila and was in charge of Kalahi’s implementation, married Julia Abad, whom he met whilst she served as executive assistant to Dinky Soliman at the DSWD, in 2008 (Cabacungan 2010b). Julia Abad subsequently became chief of staff to Noynoy Aquino at the Senate, and then presidential management staff secretary as Aquino won the presidency in 2010. This position enabled her to manage the deployment of the President’s pork barrel, amounting to about US$22 million (Cabacungan 2010a). Julia’s father is “NGO personality” turned “progressive” politician Florencio “Butch” Abad (as mentioned in Chapter 3), whom Aquino appointed secretary of budget and management. Her mother, Henedina “Dina” Abad, was elected Batanes representative in Congress in 2004 and again in 2010 (taking the seat that her husband held between 1995 and 2004), when she also became vice-chair of the appropriations committee of the House of Representatives, which has discretion over budgetary appropriations in the first instance. In addition, Julia’s brother, Luis Andres Abad, is chief of staff of Finance Secretary Purisima (Cabacungan 2010b).

The Abad’s privileged access and control over the national government’s finances, combined with Andrew Parker’s high-ranking position at the World Bank, a major lender of the Government of the Philippines, has been heavily criticised, notably by party-list representatives in Congress, as these personal linkages might compromise monitoring of
administration of the funds (Baldo 2010; Cabacungan 2010a and 2010b). In this context, Andrew Parker took a leave from the World Bank in October 2010, as the Bank insists that its employees “must strive at all times to be seen as politically impartial in the country where [they] work” (World Bank 2009c, 11), and joined AusAID’s office in Manila as social development adviser (Horario and Pilapil 2012). Although personal links between members of the World Bank, the DSWD and the Philippine Department of Budget and Management have been less in evidence since Parker, Burkley and Holmemo have left the World Bank, it is striking that the implementation and expansion of Kalahi (and other programmes) in the first decade of the twenty-first century have been led by a group of influential and close-knit individuals, raising important questions as to the extent to which personal interests influenced these processes.

In short, the survival and expansion of Kalahi must be understood against the backdrop of the institutional interests and priorities of the DSWD (alongside that of the Bank), whose inexperience and efforts to overcome its marginal position have heightened its drive to protect its flagship programme Kalahi against attacks, and to promote it as particularly effective and “worthy of continued support.” This drive has been further reinforced by the political pressures experienced by the department, as Kalahi represented a promising tool to help increase the legitimacy, popularity, and longevity of the Philippine government. Strong personal linkages between members of the DSWD, the World Bank’s office in Manila, and the Philippine Department of Budget and Management have also suggested that personal ties might also have influenced Kalahi’s survival and expansion in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to make sense of the inertia, survival, persistence, and expansion of CDD programmes in general and of Kalahi in particular, in the institutional contexts of their production and reproduction. It has depicted the institutional context of the World Bank as an environment characterised by a pervasive “pressure to lend,” prioritising lending volume and quick funds disbursement whilst deterring self-questioning and critical positions, and by strong inter-departmental competition for lending, which was heightened, in the case of CDD programmes, by unclear responsibilities and confusion around the scope of the CDD portfolio. Moreover, it has highlighted that the Social Development Department, which has generally been in charge of CDD programmes, has been confronted with the further challenge of overcoming its marginal status within the Bank, as the only department mainly staffed by non-economist professionals.

Against this backdrop, CDD programmes have turned out to be particularly well suited to the interests of (i) the Bank in general, as a way to disburse funds particularly quickly and to increase volumes of lending; and (ii) the Social Development Department in particular, representing the opportunity to raise its profile and increase its acceptability within the Bank, or, as Mosse put it, to “manage [its] structural vulnerability in an ‘economic fortress’” (2011b, 96). The survival and expansion of CDD programmes has thus helped ensure that these interests would continue to prevail. In this context, CDD discourse has become an expression of a strong “organizational need for ignorance” at the Bank’s Social Development Department, serving to protect and promote CDD programmes as particularly effective and “worthy of continued support,” rather than to describe, assess and evaluate them.

Furthermore, the survival and expansion of CDD programmes has been necessary to protect and promote the Bank’s new identity as an infallible “knowledge bank” committed to
“good governance” and empowerment, and to support its claim to authoritative knowledge in the realms of governance and social development. Although the great majority of World Banks staff have lacked “expertise” in and understanding of the core CDD concepts of “good governance,” empowerment, social capital, and participation, these concepts have proved easy to lay claim to. Whilst the righteousness bestowed upon these concepts has tended to place them above criticism, their fuzziness and their lack of common definition and of agreed measurement have made them even harder to disprove. They have also represented excellent “selling points” for CDD programmes, endowing them with great moral appeal, and restyling them as quests for empowerment and “good governance.” As long-term goals, these notions have further encouraged the continuation and expansion of CDD programmes, allegedly to continue promoting “community empowerment” and “good governance” throughout the developing world.

Scrutinising the DSWD’s own institutional interests, priorities and pressures, this chapter has further shown that Kalahi has been the first large-scale programme implemented by the DSWD, whose procedures and processes proved ill-suited to manage the programme, in particular in terms of financial flows. Yet, the DSWD has needed to maintain its image of competent department capable of implementing large programmes such as Kalahi, by protecting its flagship CDD programme against attacks from other agencies such as NEDA, and by promoting it as particularly effective and “worthy of continued support.” Kalahi’s survival and expansion has also resulted from the political pressures experienced by the DSWD, which operates under the direct control of the president, and has thus been pressurised to present Kalahi as an unmitigated success to help increase the legitimacy, popularity, and longevity of the Philippine government.

Overall, this chapter has shown that the inertia, persistence, survival, and expansion of CDD programmes such as Kalahi has been both fuelled by, and necessary to support, (i) the
World Bank’s overall institutional priorities of increasing lending volume and disbursing funds quickly, which CDD programmes have served particularly well; (ii) the Bank’s identity as a “knowledge bank,” and the appearance of its infallibility in matters of social development and governance; (iii) the Bank’s Social Development Department’s reputation and acceptability within the Bank; (iv) the need of government departments such as the DSWD to overcome their marginal position and inexperience, by styling themselves as competent departments capable of implementing large programmes; and (v) the priorities of governments of countries like the Philippines, which have enjoyed easy and sustained access to development funding to implement flagship development programmes – largely serving to increase their legitimacy, popularity, and longevity. In this context, CDD discourse has helped to ensure the persistence, survival, and expansion of CDD programmes, and has served the “organizational need for ignorance” of the Bank and government agencies like the DSWD. It has thus helped to protect and promote CDD programmes as particularly effective and “worthy of continued support,” rather than describing, assessing, and evaluating them. It has further presented CDD programmes’ survival and expansion as proofs of the success of these programmes, regardless of their operations and effects.

This chapter has also raised the issue of strong personal ties between members of the DSWD, the World Bank’s office in Manila, and the Philippine Department of Budget and Management, which might have influenced Kalahi’s survival and expansion in the first decade of the twenty-first century. This highlights that beyond the institutional interests, priorities, and pressures outlined in this chapter, other important logics are at play, and can further account for the persistence, survival, and expansion of CDD programmes such as Kalahi. Although the specific issue of personal linkages at the core of Kalahi’s implementation and expansion cannot be fully investigated in this thesis, for lack of sufficient evidence (as noted above), the next chapter focuses on a wider, crucial dimension that must
be accounted for to understand more fully the dynamics underlying the survival and expansion of CDD programmes.
Chapter 7 – Performing CDD at the World Bank: CDD Practitioners’
(Self-) Representations of CDD Programmes

Chapter 6 has explored the institutional processes behind the inertia, persistence, survival, and expansion of CDD programmes. It has shown that the persistence and expansion of CDD programmes has largely resulted from the combination of (i) the World Bank’s institutional priorities of disbursing funds quickly, increasing lending volume, and protecting its image of infallible “knowledge bank;” (ii) the pressures experienced by the Bank’s Social Development Department and by government agencies like the Philippines Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to overcome their respective marginal positions, by protecting and promoting their programmes as particularly effective and worthy of continued support; and (iii) the pressures experienced by government agencies like the DSWD to meet the priorities of governments of countries like the Philippines – which were, in the case of the Philippines, to easily access and quickly disburse development funding to enhance the government’s legitimacy, popularity and longevity. Together, these institutional interests, priorities, and pressures have helped to create momentum behind the persistence and expansion of CDD programmes.

By focusing on institutional priorities and bureaucratic politics, the preceding chapter has thus explained, in causal terms, the survival and expansion of CDD programmes, whilst leaving the (self-)perceptions and (self-)representations of the professionals responsible for running CDD programmes at the World Bank largely unaccounted for. Yet the paradox of the persistence and expansion of CDD programmes amidst increasing evidence of “failure” of these programmes to deliver “good governance” and empowerment raises the question of how the “agents” involved in conducting CDD programmes have represented their practices
to themselves. This chapter thus attempts to understand how CDD practitioners have represented CDD programmes. In so doing, it explores the operations and effects of CDD discourse as it is performed by World Bank professionals. It also examines the ways in which the representations of these professionals have been conducive to the production, evolution and reproduction of CDD programmes.

The conceptual focus of this chapter is the notion of performance, understood as “ritualized production, and ritual reiteration,” which “enables a subject and constitutes the temporal conditions for the subject” (Butler 1993, 95), as noted in Chapter 1. It was further noted, following Alexei Yurchak (2006), that this conception of performance enables us to overcome issues of binary distinction between an “authentic,” “private” self and a “disingenuous,” “public” self who “acts as if” (to borrow Lisa Wedeen’s (1998) expression), to focus instead on the effects of performances, regardless of problematic dimensions of intentionality or belief. Whilst Chapter 5 has drawn on Butler’s conception of performance to understand the operations and effects of CDD discourse in places like the Province of Bohol, this chapter uses this notion to make sense of the ways in which CDD discourse has elicited a set of practices and representations from professionals at the World Bank.

To understand how CDD practitioners have represented their practice to themselves, this chapter starts by accounting for the ways in which these professionals have experienced CDD programmes. It scrutinises the experience of CDD programmes in the local contexts in which they have been implemented, and in the world of international institutions and government agencies, focusing on the “ritual reiteration” of CDD discourse by CDD practitioners. It then turns to consider how paradoxical experiences, representations, and positions of CDD practitioners vis-à-vis CDD programmes have been mediated through performances of CDD discourse, and how empirical evidence challenging the validity of CDD discourse has been interpreted as proof that programmes needed to be “tailored” and
“improved.” Finally, this chapter examines how solid the CDD discursive edifice really is, and what this might mean for the future of CDD programmes. Although this chapter draws on examples from Kalahi, it proposes to broaden the scope of analysis to CDD programmes in general. It thus focuses on the practices and representations of CDD practitioners at the World Bank – mainly in the Philippine country office in Manila, and in the headquarters in Washington, D.C. – rather than on the practices and representations of professionals in government departments and agencies of various countries in which CDD programmes have been implemented.

The Two Spheres of CDD Programmes

CDD programmes have co-existed in two spheres: (i) in the local contexts in which these programmes have been implemented, which are characterised by specific power relations, political and economic interests, imperatives and contention, as described in chapters 4 and 5 in the case of Bohol; and (ii) in the world of international institutions and government agencies, with their institutional and political priorities, their routine operations and procedures, and their dynamic sets of social relations, where power and meanings are constantly negotiated. The experience of CDD programmes “in the field” has been very limited for CDD practitioners at the Bank, who have spent only a limited amount of time in episodic visits to localities where CDD programmes have been implemented. In the case of Kalahi, the experience of “field visits” to places carefully selected by DSWD was described by a former employee of the Bank’s Social Development Department as follows:

“you go on field visit for three days, to visit three municipalities chosen by DSWD, you’ll spend half a day meeting the mayor, who will tell you: “we are happy, all is well and quiet.” You’ll spend 20 minutes in the end in the barangay, people will talk to you, they will employ the words “empowerment,” “participation,” “good governance”... Who told them to say this? You’re a little bit in your bubble” (IV41).
As noted in Chapter 5, local government officials in provinces like Bohol understand that the key to gain and sustain access to Kalahi funding is to perform adequately. Although the Bank’s employees have recognised that these performances fall short of the norms of participation, accountability, transparency, and competition promoted in CDD discourse (in other words, that their constative dimension or meaning is distorted), they have still presented them as evidence that CDD programmes have helped to support the rise of “progressive” leaders who have reportedly embraced “good governance” practices.

Field visits have also occasionally yielded negative findings, in particular in municipalities where local officials have failed to perform as expected. In the case of Kalahi, for instance, the preceding chapter noted that Kalahi supervision missions conducted by Bank staff throughout the Philippines found that (i) participation rates in barangay assemblies were falling; (ii) local leaders frequently bent Kalahi rules and, at times, attempted to capture the programme’s benefits; (iii) communities had difficulties following Kalahi procedures; (iv) funding and staffing were insufficient; (v) the “poorest of the poor” were not reached adequately; (vi) independent monitoring and grievance mechanisms were not widely used; and (vii) infrastructure built in the context of Kalahi was not sustainable (Broadfield 2004; World Bank 2004b). Moreover, CDD practitioners at the Bank encountered the operations and effects of CDD programmes through impact evaluations, implementation reviews and other forms of assessment, which often revealed unsettling trends in the ways in which programmes unravelled on the ground. This literature, which was reviewed in Chapter 1, has suggested that evidence on CDD programmes’ effects on “good governance” and “community empowerment” was scarce, largely anecdotal and decidedly inconclusive, indicating that activities officially aimed at fostering participation and building social capital have often been ineffectual, and have even proved counterproductive at times.
The bulk of practitioners’ experience and practice of CDD programmes has taken place in the realm of international institutions and government departments of borrowing countries, rather than in the local contexts in which these programmes have been implemented, yielding a very different set of meanings attached to CDD programmes. In these environments, discourse has tended to praise CDD programmes and to reaffirm their character as effective instruments of “good governance,” to promote and protect them both within and outside the Bank, as noted in the preceding chapter. Throughout the life of a CDD programme, CDD practitioners encounter donors and government officials, to whom they need to sell CDD programmes; government employees, with whom they jointly implement CDD programmes; other development practitioners, usually “like-minded” individuals, with whom they share CDD discourse; and more sceptical colleagues, against whose attacks they have to protect themselves and their programmes. Much of the everyday experience of CDD thus involves “ritual reiteration” of CDD discourse for audiences of government officials and development practitioners, which reaffirms and legitimises this discourse, as Desmond McNeill and Asunción St. Clair have observed:

“Bank experts need audiences that legitimize their knowledge. In many cases, these audiences are other bureaucrats or actors that are dependent on funds provided by the Bank to carry out activities that have been defined and promoted by the Bank’s experts, thereby generating a circular dynamic between the expertise, the audience, and the legitimacy of that expertise” (2011, 104).

The ritual reiteration of CDD discourse can be observed throughout the Bank’s literature on CDD, as well as in speech acts produced in conferences and workshops, for instance, all of which have been filled with recurring themes such as “success stories,” “lessons learnt,” and “how to” improve, monitor, evaluate, and scale up CDD programmes. The official depiction of CDD programmes has been characterised by three major features, which form the main elements of this ritual reiteration. Firstly, the CDD approach has been
described as a cure for all local economic, social and political ills, as illustrated in the following descriptions of CDD as “a way to provide social and infrastructure services, organize economic activity and resource management, empower poor people, improve governance, and enhance security of the poorest” (Dongier et al. 2002, 303–304); as “an approach that supports collective action, community empowerment, and demand-driven local service delivery” (McLean et al. 2005, 7); and as “a “very powerful manifestation” of social capital and empowerment” (Ian Johnson, vice-president for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development at the World Bank, in Grootaert 2003, 4). Similarly, at the 2004 Workshop on Community Driven Development (co-organised by the Bank and Vietnam’s Ministry of Planning and Investment), CDD was described by World Bank Country Director for Vietnam Klaus Rohland as “the new way of doing business in development, whereby people are responsible for their own future” (in World Bank and Partnership to Assist the Poorest Communes 2004, 5).

Secondly, CDD programmes have been presented as particularly effective and high-achieving programmes, in terms of “good governance,” empowerment, and poverty reduction, regardless of the lack of empirical evidence to back such claim, as discussed throughout the thesis. For instance, the Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook described CDD as follows:

“CDD is an effective mechanism for poverty reduction, complementing market- and state-run activities by achieving immediate and lasting results at the grassroots level. [...] well-designed CDD programs are inclusive of poor and vulnerable groups, build positive social capital, and give them greater voice both in their community and with government entities” (Dongier et al. 2002, 304).

The properties ascribed to CDD programmes have thus often been substituted for empirical achievements, and have simply been asserted as valid and as automatically resulting from the processes at the core of the CDD approach. Thus the literature on CDD has been filled with
assertions that CDD “empowers the poor and vulnerable by placing them in the driver’s seat with respect to decisions on a range of development interventions intended to improve their economic and social conditions” (McLean et al. 2005, 7); and that “CDD initiatives have contributed to more empowered citizenry, more responsive government (particularly local government), improved delivery of public goods and services, and more sustainable community assets” (World Bank 2009b, 2).

Thirdly, CDD programmes have been styled as a direct response to the demands of “the poor,” as formulated in the Bank’s Voices of the Poor, an exercise undertaken in the context of the World Development Report 2000/2001, which reportedly consisted of “[p]ersonal accounts from over 60,000 men and women in 60 countries of the realities of living with poverty, and what they need to improve their lives” (Wong and Guggenheim 2005, 255). The exercise reportedly uncovered that:

“When the poor were asked to indicate what might make the greatest difference in their lives, they responded: (a) organizations of their own so they can negotiate with government, traders, and NGOs; (b) direct assistance through community-driven programs so they can shape their own destinies; and (c) local ownership of funds, so they can end corruption. They want NGOs and governments to be accountable to them” (Dongier et al. 2002, 304).

Furthermore, CDD practitioners have proposed that “CDD treats poor people as assets and partners in the development process,” which reportedly “has the potential to make poverty reduction efforts more responsive to demands, more inclusive, more sustainable, and more cost-effective than traditional centrally led programs” (Chase and Anjum 2008, 24).

More personal accounts of practitioners’ own experience of CDD programmes have also served as an avenue for ritual reiteration of CDD discourse, in the form of “heroic” depictions of the emergence and rise of the CDD approach, as discussed in Chapter 2. In

---

181 In this context, the qualification of “personal” is not intended to denote a binary opposition between “official” and “personal” or between “false” and “true.” It is simply used to qualify a particular kind of account that populates CDD discourse, which consists of quasi-autobiographical narratives of the “lived experience” of “CDD practitioners” at the Bank.
these accounts, CDD programmes have been presented as a remarkable departure from and improvement upon the “traditional” development practices of the World Bank. These accounts have typically represented the CDD approach as stemming from a sophisticated critique of the Bank's earlier practices, as the cutting edge of reform and innovation within the Bank, and overall as better than the average top-down intervention focusing solely on the economy. They have further depicted in heroic terms the personal struggles of social development professionals, who have reportedly had to shape their products, including CDD programmes, in economic-friendly, quantifiable terms to gain acceptance within a conservative Bank staffed with economists.

A very good illustration of this type of literature can be found in a 2004 article co-written by anthropologist Scott Guggenheim, one of the founders of the CDD approach through his work on Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program, Michael Woolcock, lead social development specialist at the Bank, and academics and regular Bank consultants Anthony Bebbington and Elizabeth Olson. In their exploration of the rise of social capital debates at the Bank, Bebbington and his colleagues presented themselves as the first and foremost critics of the Bank’s policies, working from within to reform the institution, and placing themselves above “external” critics who supposedly lack the knowledge and legitimacy to conduct informed analyses of the Bank’s work. Their account approached the Bank as a “battlefield of knowledge,” where “those more sceptical” about the Bank’s top-down development practices have battled for the acceptance of political economy concepts, against the majority of economists working at the Bank (Bebbington, Guggenheim et al. 2004, 52).

In this account, the “sceptics” have had to bargain with the dominant group of economists, and made concessions to “smuggle” politically-loaded concepts into the Bank. In particular, they have had to frame social and political concepts, such as social capital and
empowerment, in terms that would be accepted and meet the criteria of the economists within the Bank. In other words, these concepts had to be quantitatively measurable, calculable, devoid of any tension stemming from considerations of power, inequality, contention and class, and promising economic growth. In this way, the “sceptics” succeeded in “getting social capital into the regressions and thus into the conversations among those minding more dominant paradigms, budgets, and projects” (ibid., 46). They further battled to raise the profile of concepts of social capital and empowerment within the Bank, through “networking and exploiting informal spaces” (ibid., 48); and they won victories, in particular by getting the concepts into the influential World Development Report 2000/2001, where they faced much opposition and had to compromise, but “[e]ven if the shift had been less than hoped, at least the issue of empowerment was forced onto the agenda” (ibid., 50). They reportedly fought the “top-down technocratic fixes,” and undertook “serious strategic attempts to generate internal debates on political issues as much as possible within real constitutional and organisational constraints” (ibid., 51; emphasis in original). Thus, this account of the emergence of the notions of social capital and empowerment at the Bank emphasises the role of “reform-minded” individuals within the Bank, who have allegedly introduced “innovation” through the force of their will and their “personal orientations” (ibid., 52).

In this literature, moreover, CDD programmes have often been described in terms of “democratisation” instruments. For instance, the CDD approach has been represented as a “democratization initiative masquerading as an anti-poverty project” (Barron et al. in Mosse 2011b, 96), as noted in Chapter 2; as an “inherently political reform process[..]” (Wong and Guggenheim, 253); and as contributing to “a reordering of local political relationships” (Guggenheim 2006, 138). Through a language of struggles, battles and other martial terms, CDD practitioners who have identified themselves as “sceptics” and “reform-minded” have
thus depicted their experience of CDD in terms of “awakening” the Bank to the realities of societies and politics across the developing world.

CDD practitioners have recognised that they have had to make concessions to gain acceptance within the Bank. In the words of a senior urban specialist at the World Bank Institute, they have had to “talk the language of the economist” (IV43). However, they have not raised the question as to whether framing politically-loaded concepts in quantifiable, apolitical, and a-contextual terms would risk turning these into sanitised concepts. As discussed in Chapter 1, these concepts have lost their critical edge, as they have been integrated in the Bank’s CDD discourse. Whilst they have retained a benevolent and “progressive” aura (as a vision of power to the people, strong civil society, and participatory democracy), their theoretical grounding has been characterised by a dry, mechanistic understanding of the social world, which has overlooked dimensions of politics, inequality and contestation, and which has thus dramatically curtailed their promises of social change when instrumentally deployed. Such a trend has been captured by David Mosse, who noted that:

“Tactical concessions push the analytical work of Bank non-economists towards instrumental and economistic formulations that not only remove the possibility of ethnographic insights into the nature of the contradictions of development itself, but also contribute to the knowledge system that perpetuates separation of the corporate world of policy rationality from the contingencies of practice” (2011b, 96).

In short, whilst the experience of CDD programmes in the “field” has suggested that these programmes suffer from deep limitations and flaws as instruments of “good governance,” the experience of CDD programmes in the realm of international institutions and various government departments and agencies has suggested that CDD programmes are

---

182 As noted in Chapter 1, the vision of the social world encapsulated in CDD discourse is that of a fluid environment characterised by malleable, adaptive social structures, where individuals are empowered by asset gains and can effectively demand democratic and effective governance through civic, collective action, and through “synergistic” relationships with the state.
effective cures to all social and political ills, and have the potential to advance democracy locally, in communities throughout the developing world. The effects of these conflicting experiences of CDD programmes on the representations of CDD practitioners have surfaced through interviews conducted in the context of this research, in ways that have not been visible in the ritual reiteration of CDD discourse described above.

**Paradoxical Positions**

The puzzle that has emerged from the above account of the experience of CDD practitioners, and that has surfaced, time and again, throughout this thesis, is that of the simultaneous representation of CDD programmes as particularly effective instruments of “good governance,” and the lack of evidence on CDD programmes’ effects on local governance and empowerment. The expression of this paradox in the discourse of CDD practitioners, and its effects on practitioners’ representations, are best illustrated by an encounter with the Kalahi manager at the World Bank’s office in Manila. As noted in Chapter 5, during a first interview, the manager of Kalahi presented the CDD programme as strongly “led” by local officials in Bohol, where “the participatory aspect [of Kalahi] did not necessarily come through so strongly” (IV4). Such remarks on the operations of Kalahi in Bohol, which challenge the representation of the province as an “enabled” environment and a CDD “success story,” were made in a casual way, as a result of general questioning on Kalahi processes, and were intended as helpful “insider tips” to a PhD researcher about to embark on fieldwork.

A few months later, a second interview in which the main characteristics of Kalahi’s operations in the province (which were highlighted in Chapter 5) were the direct focus of the discussion yielded very different results. The Kalahi manager responded with apparent surprise and understandable concern to the exposition of this research’s preliminary findings,
which indicated that in Bohol, the implementation of the CDD programme was largely controlled by local government officials, and infringed on the most important CDD principles of participation, transparency, accountability, and competition, as discussed in Chapter 5. The Kalahi manager found the interviewer’s account “very worrying” and apparently surprising (IV37). However, most of the characteristics that were discussed during that second interview, from the domination of CDD processes by local officials to the removal of Kalahi’s competitive element (noted in Chapter 5), were already known to the Kalahi manager. For instance, although the Kalahi manager claimed to be unaware that in eleven of the twelve municipalities that experienced Kalahi in Bohol, all barangays received funding through the programme, it was mentioned in the World Bank-commissioned *CDD and Local Governance* report, and was a known fact to employees of the regional office of the DSWD in the Central Visayas (IV34). Moreover, as Chapter 5 highlighted, the experience of Kalahi in Bohol has been fairly representative of the Kalahi experience of other provinces in the Philippines, insofar as similar violations of the CDD principles of participation, transparency, accountability, and competition have been reported throughout the archipelago. Yet, whilst most reports commissioned by the Bank have balanced such “negative” findings with more “positive” trends, highlighting specific objectives that Kalahi met, at least temporarily – from good attendance levels in barangay assemblies to timely disbursement of funds, for instance – this thesis has explored underlying dynamics that could account for the broad operations of Kalahi, rather than seeking to match the specific aims of the programme to a specific outcome or performance.

On concluding the interview, the Kalahi manager said that he needed to think about these findings, and perhaps discuss them with his colleagues. A few hours after this encounter, he sent the interviewer one of the reports that the Bank had commissioned on Kalahi, commenting that “[i]t does not feature any in-depth case studies from Bohol but does
suggest the general experience may not be quite as dire as your research appears to be suggesting in Bohol” (email communication, 26 January 2010; emphasis added). Attempts to contact him again to discuss further were met by a very simple answer: “If you have specific information you would like in relation to the project you are welcome to write formally and we will do our best to provide the necessary information” (email communication, 8 February 2010).

This encounter suggests that although CDD practitioners recognise some of the “limitations” and “weaknesses” of CDD programmes, they represent these “limitations” and “weaknesses” as relatively superficial and rectifiable. Thus, they accept criticisms only so long as they are amenable to improving interventions, and fall within the realm of technical deficiencies that can be acted upon.\(^{183}\) The initial reaction of the Kalahi manager to the interviewer’s account was to question her on several specific, “technical” aims of the project (from women’s participation in project activities to barangay assembly participation rates), i.e. elements amenable to improvement through “technical” solutions. However, what was less palatable was the suggestion that the “limitations” or “flaws” observed in Kalahi might indicate that the programme has not been acting as an instrument of “good governance,” regardless of the intentions of the planners.

In a similar vein, a senior social development specialist interviewed at the Bank’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., highlighted the limited effects of CDD programmes in terms of “good governance,” stating that:

> “there is a greater recognition that on trust and governance issues, or on empowerment and governance issues, the evidence is quite mixed. Part of it is difficulties in measuring, part of it is, this is just a much bigger political economy

\(^{183}\) In the epilogue of The Anti-Politics Machine, James Ferguson reflected on a similar encounter, recounting that: “One “developer” asked my advice on what his country could do “to help these people.” When I suggested that his government might contemplate sanctions against apartheid, he replied, with predictable irritation, “No, no! I mean development!” The only “advice” that is in question here is advice about how to “do development” better. There is a ready ear for criticisms of “bad development projects,” so long as these are followed up with calls for “good development projects” (1990, 284–285; emphasis in original).
issue than we can possibly imagine trying to fix through this type of an effort [i.e. a CDD programme]” (IV44).

Yet, he immediately tempered his statement, adding that “CDD is often put in a position [of] claiming to solve several different problems at the same time, so invariably it falls down on one or two of them [...] What you should do is compare: is it relatively better than in the other cases?” (ibid.). One of his colleagues, a CDD coordinator at the Bank, went on to note that:

“The problem is that you are comparing CDD in an absolute sense, in the sense that “did it do well or not,” and not in the relative sense, against a counterfactual of normal mode of delivery. And usually, if the logic of starting a CDD programme was that everything was failing before, then the real comparison of whether things are better should not be in an absolute sense, they should be on the relative sense” (IV45).

In other words, the recognition of the limitations of CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance” has been tempered by a view of these programmes as “comparatively” better than the alternatives (whether it is the presence or absence of other development programmes). As an ex-employee of the Bank’s Social Development Department explained, in the case of Kalahi:

“In a country like the Philippines, there is the issue of the alternative. In CDD, there are issues locally, municipal mayors take advantage of the project, but at least the money arrives, it doesn’t disappear in the DSWD office [...] That is also a big factor, in the fact that we [the Bank] will continue to do CDD programmes, at least you know that you build something [...] People working in CDD are aware that it is not a solution to all problems, but it is better than the alternative” (IV41).

Even problems encountered in CDD programmes have allegedly been “comparatively” better than issues encountered in “top-down” programmes. For instance, elite capture has been characterised as occasionally “benevolent,” and has had the alleged “benefit” of remaining local, as the CDD coordinator at the World Bank declared that “even with all the caveats of it being captured by local elite and all, it’s still local” (IV45). To make sense of CDD practitioners’ persistent representation of CDD programmes as instruments of “good
governance,” despite the tensions and contradictions generated by the lack of empirical evidence on the effects of these programmes, the pages below turn to the operations and effects of CDD practitioners’ performances.

**Performed Representations**

Despite great contradictions between the experience and understandings of CDD programmes within the world of international institutions and government agencies, on the one hand, and in the local contexts in which these programme have been implemented, on the other, CDD programmes have been invariably represented as instruments of “good governance” – which might not (yet) work very well as such, but *can* work to deliver “good governance” and “community empowerment.” The key to understanding the persistence of this representation lies in the practices of CDD practitioners, most notably in their performance of CDD discourse, which has been centred on the ritual reiterations outlined in the pages above. As noted in Chapter 5, in the case of local politicians, performance should not be understood as simply executed by a fixed and pre-determined subject, but rather as something which “enables a subject” (Butler 1993, 95). Thus, just as CDD discourse has “hailed” (and enabled) local politicians as “progressive” leaders, it has also “interpellated” (and enabled) the Bank’s employees as “CDD practitioners.”

The identity of “CDD practitioner” has materialised through sustained practice and reiteration of CDD discourse, which has led or enabled professionals at the World Bank to identify themselves as subjects *acting in the name of* “good governance” and “community empowerment.” As such, contradicting the representation of CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance” would not only challenge the everyday work of World Bank professionals, it would also challenge their very identity as “CDD practitioners.” In this

---

184 This corresponds to the process of “symbolic identification” or “ego-ideal”, the “identification with the very place from where we look at ourselves,” as discussed by Slavoj Žižek (1989, 105; emphasis in original).
way, performing CDD discourse has also very effectively “materialised” CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance,” despite tensions arising from conflicting experiences of CDD programmes, and despite the lack of evidence on these programmes’ operations and effects (although these have generated a good dose of cynicism and disillusionment amongst some practitioners). In other words, the discursive canons of CDD have been enacted to the point that they have become generally accepted as valid and true, regardless of their lack of sufficient evidential basis.\(^\text{185}\)

CDD practitioners have become increasingly assertive in their claims on CDD’s effects in terms of “good governance” and empowerment. For instance, it was noted in the introduction of the World Bank’s publication *Scaling-Up CDD for Dummies*, that the report would “not question the usefulness of CDD itself, question or evaluate its possible impacts, or present evidence on the usefulness of specific recommended approaches or design tools,” since it “assumes that the reader is well-versed with the principles and application of CDD” (Binswanger and Nguyen 2004, 5). For those not “well-versed” and “those not convinced about the merits of CDD,” the report suggested four readings, none of which presented solid evidence on the effects of CDD programmes.\(^\text{186}\) Five years after the publication of *Scaling-Up CDD for Dummies*, the vice-president of the Bank’s Sustainable Development Department asserted, in the foreword to *Scaling Up Local and Community Driven Development*, that CDD “improves not just incomes but people’s empowerment and

\(^{185}\)This proposition echoes Blaise Pascal’s “[a]ct as if you believe, pray, kneel down, and you shall believe, faith will arrive by itself” (in Žižek 1994b, 12).

\(^{186}\)The first paper promoted, rather than assessed, CDD programmes in Africa, which were presented as a “vision of prosperity through the empowerment of local communities” (World Bank 2000a), whilst the second simply laid out a “conceptual framework for a more integrated approach to local development” (World Bank 2004d). However, neither of these papers presented evidence of CDD programmes’ effects. More puzzling was the mention of Mansuri and Rao’s “Community-Based and Driven Development: A Critical Review” (2004), which specifically highlighted the lack of evidence on CDD programmes, as discussed in Chapter 1. Finally, although no copy of Wassenich and Whiteside’s unpublished “CDD Evaluation Study” (2003), which was mentioned by Binswanger and Nguyen, could be found, the *CDD Impact Assessment Study*, which was also authored by Wassenich and Whiteside and published by the World Bank the following year, specifically pointed to the low quality of existing evaluations. It thus proposed to review existing impact assessments of CDD programmes to identify knowledge gaps and to formulate recommendations for sound impact evaluation, as noted in Chapter 1, rather than providing evidence on the “merits of CDD.”
governance capacity,” and that CDD operations “have demonstrated effectiveness at delivering results” (Katherine Sierra in Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009b, iii). Despite the brief mention, in the same report, that “impact evaluation literature and studies, which rigorously prove impacts are still far too scarce” (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009a, 7), it was further asserted that “[t]he Underpinnings that make up the LCDD framework and design principles are no longer theoretical; they have been proven through direct experience over the last 15 years, and by analysis of recent program reviews and impact studies” (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009b, v; emphasis in original).

Following this trend, the overall tone of the 2009 International Conference on Community-Driven Development and Rural Poverty Alleviation in Beijing was bold and assertive. Thus, in his “Welcoming Remarks,” the Bank’s regional vice-president for East Asia and Pacific asserted that:

“The CDD approach constitutes one of the most effective poverty reduction measures available. I hope that the [Chinese] government will scale up these CDD programs considerably in the next ten years, and we at the World Bank stand ready to partner with you. Why do I believe CDD is a worthwhile strategy in China’s efforts to tackle its remaining poverty? Let me give you some concrete examples from other parts of the world. In South Asia, over the last ten years, some 20 CDD programs have reached 12 million households from over 90,000 villages and helped form over 1 million grassroots community groups. The social capital of these groups has been leveraged into real financial capital [...] What I have seen worldwide is that such programs result in communities being empowered, and holding each other and government, especially local government, accountable for results” (James Adams in World Bank 2010a, 69; emphasis added).

In turn, the Canadian Ambassador to China David Mulroney straightforwardly declared that “Canada has sponsored this conference for one very simple reason: CDD works” (in ibid., 73; emphasis added). Thus, CDD discourse has acquired a “material existence,” expressed in CDD practitioners’ performances. As such, the properties ascribed to CDD programmes, and their achievements “in the field,” have not required any more proof than the tangibility of their enactment.
Similarly, CDD programmes have expanded on the basis of bold yet generally groundless assertions, which have served as a substitute for solid empirical evidence on their operations and effects. For instance, although the expansion of Kalahi was supposedly based on the programme’s “strong performance,” and would allegedly serve to “maintain the momentum of implementation” (World Bank 2010b, 6–9), expansion plans were initiated amidst mixed results of Kalahi.\(^{187}\) Four “[k]ey results” were further cited to demonstrate Kalahi’s “strong performance,” three of which were purely technical achievements, pertaining to the programme’s coverage, the number of local projects that were implemented through Kalahi, and their sustainability and functionality (ibid., 8–9). Only the fourth result, “positive changes in villages’ social and institutional dynamics” (ibid., 9), was directly related to Kalahi’s central aims of “good governance” and empowerment. It was based on a so-called “independent impact evaluation” (ibid.), in fact a study undertaken by two professionals working at the World Bank, which found that the experience of Kalahi had positive effects on attendance levels at barangay assemblies, on the frequency of meetings between government officials and the population, and that it improved barangay residents’ trust towards strangers (Labonne and Chase 2008). Yet, the study further found that experiencing Kalahi led to lower levels of group membership and collective action in barangays, to declines in the volume of local development projects, and to decreasing trust towards neighbours (ibid.), which contradicted the Bank’s claim of “positive changes in villages’ social and institutional dynamics.”

This process of turning assertions into foundational facts has been eased by the widespread lack of understanding, among World Bank staff, about how CDD programmes supposedly work in theory, as noted in Chapter 6. As a result, World Bank professionals have

\(^{187}\) In 2005, when the extension of Kalahi was first planned, Kalahi was rated “Moderately Satisfactory,” both in terms of “Progress towards achieving Project Development Objective” and of “Overall Implementation Progress” (World Bank 2010b, 23) – the Bank’s project rating system ranges from Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, to Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, and Highly Unsatisfactory.
often been unable to articulate clearly the core concepts of the CDD approach, despite frequently referring to them to justify their practice. For instance, when asked about what he meant by social capital, the Kalahi manager at the World Bank’s office in Manila replied: “I certainly wouldn’t want to get too caught up in all of that. I guess for us it’s…What is it? Bridging and bonding?” (IV4). Albeit ill-understood, the deeper theoretical roots and mechanisms of the CDD approach have been represented by professionals at the Bank as “scientific” and “true.” This limited grasp of the theoretical mechanisms underpinning CDD programmes has somewhat shielded CDD practitioners from the internal contradictions at the heart of these programmes, and from the impossibility of the society promoted in CDD discourse. Even as reality has kicked back, in the form of empirical evidence challenging the validity of CDD discourse, such evidence has almost systematically been turned into one more proof that CDD programmes could work, but needed some “tailoring” and “improvement.”188

Tailoring and Improving

Evidence suggesting that CDD programmes have not delivered “good governance” and empowerment has been widely interpreted as a signal that programmes needed “improvement.” Although some of the CDD practitioners interviewed for this research expressed cynicism and disillusionment vis-à-vis CDD programmes, all have expressed the view that through a series of technical “improvements” and better “tailoring” to local contexts, CDD programmes could and would eventually help to improve governance and empower communities. As noted throughout the thesis, instances of failures of CDD programmes to reach their goals have usually been regarded as issues of contextual

188 Such mechanism echoes Slavoj Žižek’s description of a “successful” ideology, as follows: “An ideology is really ‘holding us’ only when we do not feel any opposition between it and reality – that is, when the ideology succeeds in determining the mode of our everyday experience of reality itself. […] An ideology really succeeds when even the facts which at first sight contradict it start to function as arguments in its favour” (1994a, 327).
inadequacy, from a lack of capacity or social capital in communities to the wrong attitudes of local leaders and community members, such as apathy and non-participation. Against this backdrop, the challenge for CDD practitioners has been presented as finding the right dosage of ingredients, the correctly tailored approach for each specific type of environment, classified as “enabled” versus “constrained,” “high capacity” versus “low capacity,” “conflict area,” or “Indigenous Peoples’ area,” for instance.

The golden rule of CDD practitioners has thus been that “[g]iven the varying governance structures, capacities, and social, economic, political and historical specificities of each country, scaling up and program design must be tailor-made” (Binswanger and Nguyen 2004, 6). This tailoring supposedly takes into consideration the whole range of local environments’ specificities, from “climatic, ecological, and social contexts” to “historical, social and economic circumstances” (Binswanger-Mkhize and Aiyar 2009b, 74). To do so, the Bank has proposed that CDD programmes’ modalities should be adapted to local governments’ “capacity” and “responsiveness,” as illustrated in Figure 5.
Thus, every issue that has emerged in CDD programmes has been regarded as a further challenge that could be tackled by adapting or tweaking familiar procedures and processes. This tailoring has been widely represented as a relatively straightforward process, as illustrated in Figure 5 above, which could allegedly address every issue encountered in CDD programmes. Yet interviews have shown that in practice, CDD practitioners have faced many difficulties whilst trying to tailor and improve CDD programmes. For instance, although the CDD coordinator at the Bank’s headquarters asserted, with regard to elite capture, that “there are ways to circumvent it,” he immediately added that “what is now very clear is [that] it is an issue where the average level of knowledge on the average CDD project is perhaps lacking and should be improved” (IV45). As summed up by the CDD coordinator:

“As a philosophical idea, everyone [at the Bank] would agree [with CDD]. [...] the debate now is gone much more on the instrumental side [of CDD]. What is the correct
way of doing things? Are we doing things the right way? [...] are we designing it [CDD] right, and taking context into account?” (ibid.).

Instead of leading to question the representation of CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance,” doubts and tensions have been systematically transferred on the social world. Implementation manuals have been re-written, rules have been altered, procedures have been re-formulated,\(^{189}\) and programmes have been tailored to local situations, to find the right formula through which reality would eventually adapt to CDD discourse (rather than the contrary). As the Kalahi manager explained, “all good CDD programmes are [...] very much learning by doing, so it’s a process of revelations as you go along, you sort of learn more and more about how the programme is working.” (IV4). In this way, the unsettled positions, ambiguous perceptions, unfixed meanings, tensions and contradictions that have, at times, surfaced in the discourse of the Bank’s CDD practitioners, have generally not led to questioning of the representation of CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance.” Instead, programmes have evolved in the search for the right formula that would enable them to correct the social world. Evidence of programmes’ “shortcomings” or “failure” has thus been almost invariably interpreted in ways conducive to the continuation of these programmes, generating momentum for the persistence, survival, expansion and reproduction of CDD programmes.\(^{190}\)

\(^{189}\) For instance, Kalahi’s procedures were modified after three years of implementation, as the CDD programme’s initial “16 steps” approach was found to be overly “mechanical,” “bureaucratic,” and “tedious” by local Kalahi recipients (DSWD 2007, 17). It was replaced by an “enhanced community empowerment activity cycle,” which was described as a “five-stage, multi-step process where focus is placed on the stages that the project goes through within a given cycle as opposed to the old formulation that puts focus on the specific steps or activities” (ibid., 21).

\(^{190}\) Tania Li (2007) has proposed that this momentum can be explained in terms of the resilient “will to improve” of development “experts,” which has led these “experts” to misinterpret or mishandle signals that development interventions might not produce desired effects, and has compelled them to reproduce “failing” interventions, following the procedures and processes that they know, in attempts to improve them (Li 2007, 1). In contrast to Li’s analysis, this thesis focuses on the notion of performance, rather than “will,” to understand the practices of World Bank professionals and others, in order to overcome the difficult analytical issue of determining where and when intentionality should be ascribed.
Overall, the tensions and contradictions generated by the discrepancy between CDD discourse and the experience of CDD programmes in the social world, where dimensions of power, inequality and contention have resurfaced, have been mediated through the persistent enactment of CDD discourse, which has turned bold assertions into foundational facts. Moreover, the necessary questioning that has arisen from paradoxical experiences of CDD, has been shifted from CDD programmes to the social world, which has reportedly failed to adapt and to react as planned in CDD discourse – supposedly due to some technical lack or deficiency that must be addressed by further tailoring and improving CDD programmes. The pages above have thus suggested that the production and reproduction of CDD programmes such as Kalahi have been enabled by CDD discourse, whose sustained enactment has “materialised” these programmes as instruments of “good governance,” regardless of their actual operations and effects. How solid the CDD discursive edifice really is, and what this might mean for the future of CDD programmes, are the questions treated in the remaining pages of this chapter.

A Fragile Edifice?

It has proven particularly difficult to represent CDD programmes outside of CDD discourse, whose assertions have been enacted and reiterated to the point that they have mutated into foundational evidence, as shown in the pages above. Indeed, the performative dimension of CDD discourse has been strong enough to elicit performances from local government officials, who have experienced CDD programmes in places like the Province of Bohol, and from professionals at the World Bank, as this chapter has shown. In so doing, CDD discourse has “enabled” local officials as “progressive” leaders, and professionals at the World Bank as “CDD practitioners.” In this regard, CDD discourse has acquired a material existence. Yet, it was also noted that in contrast to the performative dimension of CDD
discourse, which was particularly successfully materialised, its constative dimension was distanced, particularly through enactments in villages and provinces such as Bohol, where CDD programmes were implemented. The gap between the meanings or vision conveyed in CDD discourse and the practices of “progressive” local officials who experienced CDD programmes has often been glossed over, or interpreted in ways that have indicated that CDD programmes can and/or do deliver “good governance” and empowerment, yet might need improving or tailoring.

This gap has also led some professionals at the World Bank Social Development Department, which has positioned itself as the champion and protector of CDD programmes since their emergence at the Bank (as explained in the preceding chapter), to more fundamentally question the foundational proposition that CDD programmes, in their current form, are instruments of “good governance.” Although there has always been some opposition to such claims within the Bank, as noted in the preceding chapters, criticisms have long been ignored or dodged by CDD practitioners, mainly through reiteration of the alleged properties of CDD programmes. Yet, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, doubts have been increasingly expressed by CDD practitioners themselves. For instance, as more evidence on the effects of CDD programmes has come to light since the mid-2000s, a CDD coordinator at the World Bank’s headquarters remarked that “when it comes to spillover, which is again the hope that it [CDD] creates a culture, a norm of participation, sort of community-driven work, that is very weak, there is almost no evidence that it is impacting the outside social order” (IV45).

Further interviews with social development professionals at the World Bank in Manila and in Washington, D.C., have revealed that the representation of CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance” has occasionally been accompanied by the recognition that CDD interventions have, on the whole, delivered neither “community empowerment”
nor “good governance.” In the words of a senior social development specialist at the Bank’s headquarters, social development staff now largely recognise that CDD programmes have been, at times, represented “as a silver bullet to solve a lot of problems, particularly where the state is not particularly strong or capable” (IV44). When asked whether evidence stemming from recent research and evaluations on CDD programmes has been changing the perception of CDD programmes within the Bank, the social development specialist explained that:

“there is a lot more modesty around the question of governance [...] It [the community] is a very very complex environment that is not going to be fixed simply by a programme that is basically addressing... focusing on local level capacities and local level infrastructures. Not alone, it won’t be able to. I am getting a sense that it is the feeling of many people working on CDD. We’ve got good evidence on services, good evidence on poverty, consumption. Governance is still a slightly more challenging question” (ibid.).

Despite the performative strength of CDD discourse, which has been enacted and reiterated for over a decade through a wealth of speech acts and a particularly voluminous and varied literature, such a statement suggests that the lack of evidential base renders CDD’s discursive edifice fragile. In other words, although CDD discourse has survived many attacks, and has effectively supported the production and reproduction of CDD programmes in the 1990s and 2000s, the absence of evidence substantiating bold assertions appears untenable in the long term. This is not to say that CDD programmes are likely to fall out of grace any time soon.

Although the lack of solid empirical evidence has gradually led a few CDD practitioners to recognise some of the limitations of these programmes, in their current form, it has not led them to challenge or question “good governance” or empowerment as aims of CDD programmes. Instead, the durable failure to produce solid evidence on the effects of CDD programmes as “good governance” instruments has led professionals at the World Bank’s Social Development Department to extensively revisit the design of these programmes. As a result, the Bank’s latest vision for CDD programmes in the second decade
of the twenty-first century is that of dramatically extended programmes, reaching national coverage and integrated within government structures, for the “CDD way” to guide processes of both public and private resource allocation at the local level (IV44). As briefly noted in the preceding chapter, this new generation of CDD programme would be accompanied by new modes of assessment, in particular “anthropological studies” conducted through “social observatories,” which would be set up “on the ground” and staffed by professional researchers to track “dynamic changes” elicited by CDD programmes (ibid.; IV45).

Overall, the acceptance of some of the limitations and flaws of CDD programmes is leading to an evolution of these programmes, in order to overcome these limitations and flaws, which are in evidence in empirical studies, and which are difficult to deny or ignore in the long run. This indicates that the potential demise of the present generation of CDD programmes as the solution to overcome the social, political and economic barriers to local development is only possible in the context of the emergence of a new and “improved” version of CDD programmes – which would enable the Bank to maintain its representation of the CDD approach as the alternative to top down development, and as the paradigm in local, participatory development. By embracing the “failures” and learning the “lessons” of the previous generation of CDD programmes, it is thus likely that the new generation of CDD programmes will continue to hold the promises of “good governance” and “community empowerment.” Yet as these programmes are also likely to continue overlooking dimensions of power, politics, inequality, and contestation in their representations, calculations, and practices, they risk ending up “empowering” local machine politicians and businessmen to the detriment of the broad mass of the population, as this thesis has attempted to show in the case of Kalahi in Bohol.

191 According to a senior social development specialist at the Bank’s headquarters in Washington, D.C, the new generation of CDD programmes will strongly focus on “private goods,” through grants for “livelihood assistance” and “individual household transfers,” for instance (IV44).
Conclusion

This chapter has asked how CDD practitioners have represented CDD programmes. It has highlighted that these professionals have experienced CDD programmes in two spheres. In the local contexts in which CDD interventions have been implemented, the experience of CDD practitioners has suggested that CDD programmes have suffered great limitations, as instruments of “good governance.” In contrast, in the realm of international institutions and government agencies, CDD programmes have been represented as effective cures to all social and political ills, and as needed and demanded by “communities” and “the poor.” They have also been presented by their proponents as dramatically improving upon “traditional,” top-down development programmes, in particular by reintroducing the social and political dimensions of development, and by promising to advance participatory democracy locally, in communities throughout the developing world.

The experience of CDD practitioners has thus been marked by a striking paradox, between a growing recognition of CDD programmes’ limitations in terms of their impact on local governance and power relations, and the enduring representation of CDD programmes as effective instruments of “good governance.” Yet the unsettled positions, ambiguous perceptions, unfixed meanings, tensions, and contradictions that have emerged, at times, from such paradoxical experiences, have been mediated through performances of CDD discourse. These performances have “materialised” CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance,” and have enabled professionals at the World Bank to identify themselves as “CDD practitioners,” as subjects acting in the name of “good governance” and “community empowerment.” The discursive canons of CDD have thus been enacted to the point that they have become generally accepted as valid and true, and that bold assertions have been turned into foundational facts, regardless of their lack of evidential basis.
Moreover, the necessary questioning that has arisen from paradoxical experiences of CDD has been shifted from CDD programmes to the social world, which has allegedly failed to react as planned, due to some lack of social capital, progressive leaders or capacity, for instance, which could allegedly be addressed by “tailoring” and “improving” CDD programmes. In this way, the tensions and contradictions that have, at times, surfaced in the discourse of the Bank’s CDD practitioners, have generally not led to questioning of the validity and legitimacy of the representation of CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance.” Instead, evidence of programmes’ “shortcomings” or “failure” has been almost invariably interpreted in ways conducive to the continuation of these programmes. It has generated momentum for the persistence, survival, expansion, and reproduction of CDD programmes, which have constantly evolved in the search for the right formula that would enable them to correct the social world.

Although CDD programmes such as Kalahi have been successfully produced, legitimised, and reproduced through a discourse that has presented them as instruments of “good governance,” the CDD discursive edifice has been weakened by its lack of evidential base. In particular, the gap between the vision conveyed in CDD discourse and the practices of allegedly “progressive” local officials and supposedly “empowered” communities who have experienced CDD programmes has led some professionals at the Bank’s Social Development Department to more fundamentally question the foundational proposition that CDD programmes, in their current form, are instruments of “good governance.” Yet the lack of solid empirical evidence has not led CDD practitioners to challenge or question “good governance” and empowerment as the aims of CDD programmes. Instead, the durable failure to produce solid evidence on the effects of CDD programmes as “good governance” instruments has led professionals at the World Bank’s Social Development Department to extensively revisit the design of CDD programmes, paving the way for the emergence and
expansion of a new and “improved” generation of CDD programmes. Thus CDD programmes are likely to continue to evolve and expand, in the name of “good governance” and “community empowerment.” Yet as these programmes are also likely to continue overlooking dimensions of power, politics, inequality, and contestation in their representations, calculations, and practices, they risk ending up “empowering” local machine politicians and businessmen to the detriment of the broad mass of the population, as this thesis has attempted to show in the case of Kalahi in Bohol.
Chapter 8 – Conclusion

CDD Programmes as Instruments of Hegemony, Transformism and Anti-Politics

This thesis has attempted to make sense of the emergence, evolution, expansion, operations, and effects of CDD programmes. Drawing on the scholarly traditions of Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault, it has explored ways to contextualise and understand CDD programmes along the lines of hegemony and transformism, whilst also scrutinising the performativity of CDD discourse deployed to order and represent arenas for intervention, along the lines of “anti-politics” (Ferguson 1990). This thesis has identified a particular kind of conjuncture in which CDD programmes have emerged, evolved and expanded, characterised by a combination of subaltern mobilisation and populist electoral challenges under conditions of democracy, or democratisation, and decentralisation, which have threatened transnational dominant blocs of social forces and interests in a variety of settings across the developing world. It has further highlighted that against the backdrop of these specific conjunctures, which have been observed in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Mexico, and Brazil, CDD programmes have represented promising tools to shore up hegemony and promote transformist absorption of counter-hegemonic challenges, in three main ways.

Firstly, CDD programmes have represented avenues to reinforce the control of local bosses and machine politicians, and to strengthen incumbent presidents and ruling parties’ support bases locally, by reinforcing (and restyling) clientelistic channels between national governments and “local communities,” as in the cases of Mexico, Brazil, and the Philippines. By deploying material resources from national governments directly to rural localities, alongside a discourse that has proposed to reorder local social relations through detailed rules and procedures, CDD programmes have provided avenues to set up clientelistic channels
through which CDD funds have been deployed as patronage resources, in exchange for support, in particular in the form of votes, for ruling parties and incumbent presidents. In so doing, they have helped to strengthen – whilst avowedly “reform” – existing power structures, reinforcing the control of local bosses and machine politicians, and building up ruling parties and incumbent presidents’ support bases locally.

Secondly, CDD programmes have provided means to strengthen the power of local elites, by promoting “good governance,” empowerment, and poverty reduction without altering existing patterns of economic and political power distribution. In particular, by deploying material resources in villages characterised by highly unequal power structures without modifying these structures, CDD resources have been channelled towards the interests and priorities of local elites, rather than those of the broad mass of the population, as shown in the case of Kalahi in Bohol. Moreover, CDD programmes’ procedures and operations, which have focused on fostering collective and consensual practices and representations, have been easily dominated by local elites, in countries such as Mexico, Brazil and the Philippines, and have ultimately empowered local politicians, rather than the broad mass of the population.

Thirdly, CDD programmes have represented avenues to promote transformist absorption of counter-hegemonic challenges, and of the tensions and contradictions of oligarchical democracy. By appropriating the language of radical critics (whilst distorting its meaning), in particular by advancing a vision of government officials as “progressive” leaders and communities as “empowered,” CDD discourse has promoted demobilisation and absorption of counter-hegemonic challenges by dominant social forces. Moreover, CDD programmes such as Indonesia’s KDP and the Philippines’ KCAF have introduced an expanded mode of conditionality directly aimed at local government units, making the delivery of CDD material resources conditional upon the performances of local government
officials, who have been hailed as “progressive” leaders, and of villagers, who have been interpellated as part of an “empowered” and “civil” society, under the Bank’s distant gaze. In so doing, CDD programmes have further promoted demobilisation and domestication of movements of contestation, and have reinforced local officials’ power as “progressive” leaders, thus strengthening existing social structures and shoring up hegemony. As shown in the case of Bohol, by “enabling” local officials as “progressive” leaders, CDD discourse has increased the leverage of provincial officials vis-à-vis the population, which has discouraged autonomous popular mobilisation, whilst the representation of developmentalist, “progressive” and “pro-poor” local officials potentially diminished sympathy for left-wing activists on the ground.

In parallel, this thesis has identified three main effects of CDD discourse, deployed to represent arenas for intervention, as part of an “anti-politics machine.” First of all, CDD discourse has opened up politics and societies across the developing world to CDD interventions, by “colonising” and “depoliticising” political and social arenas. In particular, the absence of dimensions of power, politics, inequality, and contestation from CDD’s core concepts of “good governance,” social capital, and empowerment has enabled the World Bank to incorporate the realms of politics and society as new, “depoliticised” arenas to “correct” and “improve” through development interventions. It has thus enabled the Bank to dramatically widen the realm of its interventions, from the economy to all things social and political, including individual citizens, civil society, and the state, by presenting them as quantifiable, malleable and technical elements that could be engineered, improved and managed through CDD interventions.

Secondly, CDD discourse has enabled CDD interventions by forming intelligible arenas for these interventions. Following Ferguson (1990) and Li (2007), this thesis has shown that CDD discourse has represented the Philippines in general and Bohol in particular
in terms of deficits and deficiencies that Kalahi has proposed to address, whilst that which lay beyond the scope of Kalahi intervention, most notably issues of power, inequality, and contentious politics, has been excluded. In so doing, CDD discourse has constituted the Philippines and Bohol as ideal arenas for Kalahi intervention, where the CDD programme has become “intelligible,” imaginable and possible.

Thirdly, CDD discourse has legitimised CDD interventions and has enabled their reproduction, regardless of their actual operations and effects, by forming “enabled” or “constrained” arenas of intervention. For instance, this thesis has shown that although the experience of Kalahi in Bohol infringed upon the most important CDD principles of participation, transparency, accountability, and competition, the representation of Bohol as an “enabled” environment, which was largely based on the good performances of local politicians as “progressive” officials, helped to legitimise and reproduce Kalahi intervention in the province. By proposing that CDD interventions could only be fully effective in “enabled” environments – which have been allegedly characterised by relatively high levels of social capital and empowerment, and by “reformist” and “progressive” local leaders – CDD discourse has shifted the responsibility for potential “failure” from interventions themselves onto their recipients, in terms of pre-existing local contexts in general and of local leaders’ agency in particular. In so doing, CDD discourse has preserved the image of “effective” and “successful” interventions, regardless of their actual operations and effects, which has further helped to legitimise interventions, and which has enabled their reproduction. These Foucauldian and Gramscian effects of CDD programmes have been explored and elaborated throughout the thesis.
Revisiting the Argument

As detailed in this thesis, Chapter 2 has proposed that the emergence of CDD programmes must be understood in the context of mounting popular discontent and protests against economic liberalisation and austerity measures promoted by the World Bank (alongside the IMF) in the 1980s and early 1990s. As “democracy promotion” replaced support to authoritarian governments as the main strategy deployed in support of economic liberalisation in the developing world, to “relieve pressure from subordinate groups for more fundamental political, social and economic change” (Robinson 1996, 6), the World Bank lent support to an “emergent transnational elite” of local oligarchs and business classes who would promote market expansion and exercise social control via consensual (instead of coercive) means. In this context, new tactics were called for to shore up hegemony and further promote demobilisation, in particular as democratic politics brought back the threat of leftist challenges to pro-economic liberalisation parties, which was especially strong in Latin America.

It was against this backdrop that CDD programmes emerged in Mexico and Brazil in the early 1990s, outwardly promoting “good governance,” decentralisation and participation in contexts of protracted crises, in regions and states where leftist threats to economic liberalisation and its national champions were particularly strong. In such contexts, CDD programmes represented promising instruments for reinforcing the power of local bosses and machine politicians, which could be used to strengthen clientelistic channels for the distribution of development assistance, and to obstruct mobilisation from below on the local level. Moreover, their participatory frameworks enabled CDD programmes and national governments to reduce costs associated with the provision of rural welfare and development, whilst lending legitimacy and an aura of benevolence and social progressiveness to such interventions. Thus CDD programmes in Mexico and Brazil represented avenues to reinforce
the control of local bosses and machine politicians, strengthen ruling parties’ support bases locally, and promote transformist absorption of the tensions and contradictions of oligarchical democracy.

The opportunity that these programmes offered helps to explain their rapid expansion, against the backdrop of rising popular protests against economic liberalisation reforms and their harmful effects, in the form of labour strikes, rural movements, urban protests, and riots in the mid- to late 1990s and early 2000s, in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and in parts of Eastern Europe. In parallel, the late 1990s saw the emergence of “anti-globalisation” or “anti-neoliberal” social movements, in the industrialised core and beyond. In response to mounting criticisms and challenges from below, the Bank adopted “civil society” and “social capital” as the new conceptual and operational foci of its emerging “empowerment” agenda. This marked the expansion of the Bank’s realm of operations (i) outwards, embracing society as a whole as a realm to be corrected, reorganised and optimised; and (ii) downwards, towards localities or “communities” drawn into the world economy by globalisation, and needing to be managed and regulated more effectively.

CDD programmes became the most far-reaching operational manifestation of the World Bank’s empowerment agenda, operating as complements to market expansion under conditions of oligarchical democracy. The new generation of CDD programmes, exemplified by Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Project (KDP), sought to systematically reorganise social relations by habituating villagers to the norms of transparency, participation, accountability and competition. These programmes also adopted particularly far-reaching methods of social control based on an expanded mode of conditionality directly aimed at localities, seeking to “conduct the conduct” of residents of these localities along the lines of market rules and relations, in the name of “community empowerment,” and encouraging local politicians to style themselves as “progressive” leaders. In so doing, they helped to enhance
the political clout and resources of these politicians, and represented a promising avenue to promote transformist absorption of the tensions and contradictions of oligarchical democracy. Moreover, CDD discourse promised to help assuage radical critics of economic liberalisation, by echoing their language (whilst distorting its meanings) and by promoting a vision of the Bank itself as a “progressive institution.” It also addressed the concerns and complaints of influential, mainstream critics of “top-down” development interventions, and came to be represented as the comprehensive remedy to poverty and underdevelopment in localities throughout the developing world.

This alternative understanding of the emergence and evolution of the World Bank’s CDD programmes has helped us to make sense of the emergence and evolution of Kalahi, a flagship CDD programme of the World Bank, in the particular context of the Philippines in the early 2000s. The context of the Philippines in the first decade of the twenty-first century, which was sketched in Chapter 3, was not only one where “governance” and decentralisation could be “improved,” as proposed by the Bank. It was also one where economic liberalisation under oligarchical democracy faced sustained threats and episodic crises, in the form of mobilisation of subaltern classes behind populist politicians and revolutionary socialist movements such as the New People’s Army of the Communist Party of the Philippines. As Hedman (2006) has shown, these crises were typically contained, if not resolved, by carrying the process of transformism “into the zone of civil society,” to defuse and absorb counter-hegemonic challenges. Re-equilibration of oligarchical democracy and demobilisation of subaltern classes were further achieved through restored or reinvigorated electoral competition – drawing people back into elections instead of more radical forms of politics – complemented by reforms ostensibly designed to shore up democracy (ibid.). The institutional context in which Kalahi emerged and expanded, most notably characterised by
far-reaching decentralisation and formal avenues for popular representation and NGOs’ participation in politics, was thus created as part of a transformist response to a crisis.

Against this backdrop, Chapter 3 has further highlighted that the emergence of Kalahi itself must be understood as part of a transformist response to a crisis which unfolded in the first decade of the twenty-first century. At that time, popular and populist President Estrada was ousted through People Power II and replaced by Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, marking the return of the oligarchy to the presidency. Arroyo came to power in a context of protracted crisis, as the attempt to carry out transformism in the zone of civil society failed to absorb challenges from below, and instead worsened doubts about the electoral system. It was in this context of unresolved crisis that Kalahi emerged as the government’s flagship development programme, deployed amidst the politics of crisis, reequilibration and reconstitution of the oligarchy to address the combination of subaltern movements and mobilisations on the local level, and of populist electoral challenges at the national level.

Kalahi proved to be a valuable instrument for the administration to strengthen its support base. On the one hand, Kalahi’s resources were deployed directly in municipalities and barangays throughout the archipelago, which had the effect of strengthening clientelistic channels between national governments and “local communities,” and provided patronage resources which could be used in factional politics. On the other hand, Kalahi discourse supported the administration’s self-representation as pro-poor and committed to “good governance.” The CDD programme was represented as a symbol of the “reformist” character of the new government, and as a direct product of “NGO activists” turned “reformist” leaders. It was also promoted as an instrument fostering and supporting “progressive” leadership and “empowered” communities at the local level. Furthermore, in the context of resurfacing legitimacy crisis in the aftermath of the “Hello Garci” election scandal, the World Bank, alongside the Millennium Challenge Corporation, further expanded Kalahi’s coverage
and coercive power, resorting to an expanded form of conditionality at the local level by making funding allocations conditional upon the performances of communities in general and local officials in particular. In short, the timing and contemporary context for the emergence and expansion of Kalahi suggest that the CDD programme was part and parcel of the transformist solution to Arroyo’s protracted crisis of legitimacy.

Narrowing the analytical lens, Chapter 4 has scrutinised the emergence of Kalahi in the Province of Bohol in the first decade of the new millennium, proposing that it could only be understood against the backdrop of mounting challenges from below, in reaction to rising inequality and poverty associated with processes of economic liberalisation and integration in national and international economic circuitries. Chapter 4 has related that Bohol was largely bypassed by socio-economic mutations unfolding throughout the country in the late days of the Spanish colonial era, and again by economic “modernisation” initiatives in the American colonial period, as it was generally considered as an economically unprofitable province. As a result, provincial elites lacked a strong local basis for capital accumulation, until the national government and development organisations presented Boholano businessmen and politicians with opportunities and tools to promote economic growth, through the integration of the province into the global economy, and into national and international sources of patronage.

In the mid-1990s, overseas employment, export-oriented agriculture, agro-industry and tourism became identified as the pillars of Bohol’s economic growth, which would enable the province to attract foreign investment and to deepen integration into global markets. In this context, local businessmen and provincial government officials formed a local growth coalition, leading aggressive strategies to promote investments in the province and increase the profits of Bohol’s agriculture and tourism sectors, of which they positioned themselves as the main beneficiaries. They were supported by the national government and
development organisations, whose shared aim was to turn Bohol into a profitable province. Accelerated economic marketisation in Bohol was accompanied by rising inequality and poverty, as tourism and agro-business development often hindered small-scale farming and fishing activities, and made local farmers highly dependent on companies providing agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilisers. In this context, widespread poverty and inequality created tensions and discontent across the province, which gave rise to mounting protests and rebellion in the late 1990s and early 2000s, mostly in the form of local peasant and fishermen's organisations mobilised to demand implementation of agrarian reform, legislation restricting large-scale fishing, and more equal terms of trade.

The Bohol in which Kalahi was launched was thus marked by local business-led growth strategies for wealth accumulation and economic integration, which were supported by a myriad of development interventions led by the government and development organisations, and by contestation over the distribution of land and other resources. Yet the dynamics and trends discussed in Chapter 4 clearly belong to the category of things “necessarily left unspoken” (Ferguson 1990, 68) in CDD discourse. Instead, Kalahi discourse focused on realms and realities where Kalahi intervention appeared intelligible and possible. It identified a set of deficiencies to be addressed through CDD interventions, and systematically excluded all elements which lay beyond the scope of intervention and would challenge the representation of Bohol as a poor, unproductive agricultural economy, where poverty was allegedly rooted in a set of local, technical deficiencies and deficits. In so doing, CDD discourse rendered CDD interventions “intelligible,” possible, and desirable, forming Bohol as a seemingly ideal arena for CDD interventions, and thus enabling Kalahi intervention in the province.

Against the revised backdrop sketched in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 has scrutinised the operations and effects of Kalahi in Bohol. It has highlighted that beyond the representation of
Bohol as a CDD “success story” and as an “enabled” environment in CDD discourse, evidence indicated that after six years of Kalahi implementation in Bohol, poverty had risen and income inequality had remained particularly severe. Moreover, Chapter 5 has shown that the experience of Kalahi in Bohol violated the most important CDD principles of participation, transparency, accountability, and competition – which was apparently fairly representative of the CDD experience throughout the Philippines. In Bohol, the material resources deployed in Kalahi were largely channelled towards sectors whose development profited local politicians and businessmen, and often proved harmful to local, small-scale farmers and fishermen, in particular as it threatened their livelihood. Yet Kalahi discourse represented such development as “pro-poor” and beneficial to the broad mass of the population, which helped to legitimise and reproduce these practices. In parallel, the overall representation of Bohol as an “enabled” environment helped to legitimise and reproduce Kalahi intervention in the province, regardless of its actual operations and effects.

The representation of Bohol as an “enabled” environment was based on the performances of government officials in the province, who, in Bohol’s context of dependency on external funds, proceeded to style themselves as the “progressive” leaders hailed by development discourse. Through their mastery of “good governance” discourse and of the development machinery that was set up in the province with the help of development organisations, provincial politicians became expert in accessing and managing development projects. These projects helped increase the financial resources of provincial government officials, and reinforced their image of “progressive” and “pro-poor” leaders, enabling them to enhance their political clout and reinforce their popular support base. Against this backdrop, Kalahi itself was regarded as a precious bargaining chip, awarded to provinces and municipalities in exchange for support, votes and good performance as “progressive” leaders. In Bohol (and elsewhere), the CDD programme served the administration party well, insofar
as elective positions were overwhelmingly won by candidates of the administration party in municipalities which experienced Kalahi. Thus Kalahi offered a valuable avenue to strengthen clientelistic channels between the national government and “local communities,” providing patronage resources used in factional politics.

Moreover, the case of Bohol has shown that Kalahi helped to elicit “good governance” performance at the municipal and barangay levels, and to trigger the rise of “progressive” leaders locally, by rewarding those who styled themselves as “participatory” and “pro-poor.” The CDD programme was regarded by municipal officials in Bohol as a prized resource, which was to be channelled according to their needs and interests, in particular towards the development of agriculture, and sustained through adequate performances. Thus local politicians “enacted” CDD discourse through a set of practices and ritual reiterations, which reproduced CDD discourse’s performative dimension whilst distorting its constative dimension, and which were largely intended for the Bank and DSWD’s distant gaze. By “enabling” Boholano politicians at the provincial, municipal and barangay levels as “progressive” leaders, CDD discourse (i) increased local officials’ access to development funding; (ii) legitimised their systematic domination over Kalahi activities and benefits; and (iii) increased the leverage of provincial officials vis-à-vis the population, which discouraged autonomous popular mobilisation and participated in the reproduction of very unequal local power structures. Thus by making the delivery of CDD funds conditional upon the performances of villagers and local government officials, Kalahi promoted transformist absorption of mobilisation and contestation. Kalahi was also fed into an institutional set-up of counterinsurgency-led development that engendered gross abuses in the province, in the form of harassment, anti-communist propaganda, arbitrary arrests, violence, and extra-judicial killings of leftist activists and members of peasant organisations. By overlooking these abuses and presenting Bohol’s counterinsurgency-led development as a
great success, conducted in the name of “peace” and “poverty alleviation,” CDD discourse further legitimised such abusive practices.

In short, the case of Bohol has suggested that Kalahi, which was ostensibly designed to promote popular participation in local governance, worked to shore up the position of local machine politicians and businessmen, and to undermine local organisations mobilised to demand improvement of conditions of production and redistribution of resources and benefits. The CDD programme helped Bohol’s local growth coalition to attract investment, provided patronage resources used in factional politics, and provided “cover” for counterinsurgency as a strategy conducted in the name of “peace” and “poverty alleviation,” which would mute criticisms of counterinsurgency and potentially diminish sympathy for left-wing activists on the ground. In this context, the CDD programme must be understood as (i) part and parcel of economic strategies that produce and reproduce inequality, concentrating on raising economic profitability without altering existing patterns of economic and political power distribution; (ii) part and parcel of the transformist resolution of the crisis of hegemony experienced in the Philippines in the first decade of the twenty-first century, serving to address mounting challenges from below and reinforce the power of local elites, to the detriment of the broad mass of the population; and (iii) part of factional politics under Philippines’ oligarchical democracy.

In contrast to chapters 2 to 5, which have explained the evolution and expansion of CDD programmes instrumentally, highlighting the structural logic guiding the deployment of CDD programmes and lending political intelligibility to the reproduction of these programmes, Chapter 6 has attempted to make sense of the inertia, persistence, survival, and expansion of CDD programmes such as Kalahi from the vantage point of the World Bank and government agencies such as the DSWD. It has depicted the World Bank as an environment characterised by a pervasive “pressure to lend” (Wapenhans 1992), prioritising lending
volume and quick funds disbursement whilst deterring self-questioning and critical positions, and by strong inter-departmental competition for lending. Moreover, it has highlighted that the World Bank’s Social Development Department, which has generally been in charge of CDD programmes, has been confronted with the challenge of overcoming its marginal status within the Bank, as the only department mainly staffed by non-economist professionals. Against this backdrop, CDD programmes have turned out to be particularly well suited to the interests of (i) the Bank in general, as a way to disburse funds particularly quickly and to increase volumes of lending; and (ii) the Social Development Department in particular, representing the opportunity to raise its profile and increase its acceptability within the Bank. The survival and expansion of CDD programmes has thus helped ensure that these interests would continue to prevail. In this context, CDD discourse has become an expression of the strong “organizational need for ignorance” at the Bank; it has served to protect and promote CDD programmes as particularly effective and “worthy of continued support” (World Bank 2004b, paragraph 75), rather than to describe, assess and evaluate them.

Furthermore, the survival and expansion of CDD programmes has been necessary to protect and promote the Bank’s new identity as an infallible “knowledge bank” committed to “good governance” and empowerment, and to support its claim to authoritative knowledge in the realm of governance and social development. Although the great majority of staff have lacked understanding of CDD’s core concepts of “good governance,” empowerment, social capital and participation, these concepts have proved easy to lay claim to. They have also represented excellent “selling points” for CDD programmes, endowing them with great moral appeal, and restyling them as quests for empowerment and “good governance.” As long-term goals, these notions have further encouraged the continuation and expansion of CDD programmes, allegedly to continue enhancing and expanding empowerment and “good governance” in communities throughout the developing world.
Additionally, Chapter 6 has scrutinised the DSWD’s own institutional interests, priorities, and pressures, showing that the DSWD’s procedures and processes proved ill-suited to manage Kalahi (in particular in terms of financial flows), which has been the first large-scale programme implemented by the department. Yet, the DSWD has needed to maintain its image of competent department capable of implementing large programmes. As such, it has needed to overcome its marginal position and inexperience, protect its flagship programme Kalahi against attacks from other agencies such as NEDA, and promote it as particularly effective and “worthy of continued support.” The survival and expansion of CDD programmes has also resulted from the political pressure experienced by the DSWD, which operates under the direct control of the President, and has thus been pressurised to present Kalahi as an unmitigated success to help increase the legitimacy, popularity and longevity of the Philippine government. Moreover, Chapter 6 has raised the issue of strong personal ties between members of the DSWD, the World Bank’s office in Manila, and the Philippine Department of Budget and Management, which might have influenced Kalahi’s survival and expansion in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Overall, Chapter 6 has thus shown that the inertia, persistence, survival, and expansion of CDD programmes such as Kalahi has been both fuelled by, and necessary to support, (i) the Bank’s overall institutional priorities of increasing lending volumes and disbursing funds quickly, which CDD programmes have served particularly well; (ii) the Bank’s new identity as a “knowledge bank,” and the appearance of its infallibility in matters of social development and governance; (iii) the World Bank’s Social Development Department’s reputation and acceptability within the Bank; (iv) the need of government departments such as the DSWD, to style themselves as competent departments capable of implementing large programmes; and (v) the priorities of governments of countries like the Philippines, which have enjoyed easy and sustained access to development funding to
implement flagship development programmes – largely serving to increase their legitimacy, popularity and longevity. In this context, CDD discourse has played a key role in ensuring the persistence, survival, and expansion of CDD programmes, and in serving the “organizational need for ignorance” of the Bank and government agencies like the DSWD, by protecting and promoting these programmes, and by presenting their survival and expansion as proofs of their success, regardless of their operations and effects.

Finally, Chapter 7 has asked how CDD practitioners have represented CDD programmes to themselves. It has highlighted that these professionals have experienced CDD programmes in two spheres: in the local contexts in which these programmes have been implemented, and in the world of international institutions and government agencies. Whilst experiences of CDD programmes “in the field” have suggested that these programmes suffer great limitations as instruments of “good governance,” experiences of CDD programmes in the realm of international institutions and government agencies have suggested that CDD programmes are effective cures to all social and political ills. In the realm of international institutions and government agencies, CDD programmes have further been represented as needed and demanded by “communities” in general and “the poor” in particular, and as dramatically improving upon “traditional” top-down development programmes, in particular by reintroducing the social and political dimensions of development, and by promising to advance democracy locally, in communities throughout the developing world.

Chapter 7 has thus shown that the experience of CDD practitioners has been marked by a stark contradiction between a growing recognition of CDD programmes’ limitations and flaws, in terms of their effects on governance and empowerment, and the enduring representation of these programmes as effective instruments of “good governance.” Yet the unsettled positions, ambiguous perceptions, unfixed meanings, tensions, and contradictions that have emerged, at times, from such paradoxical experiences, have been mediated by
performances of CDD discourse. These performances have “materialised” CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance” and have enabled professionals at the World Bank to identify themselves as “CDD practitioners,” as subjects acting in the name of “good governance” and “community empowerment.” The discursive canons of CDD have thus been enacted to the point that they have become generally accepted by CDD practitioners as valid and true, regardless of their lack of evidential basis, by turning bold assertions into foundational facts.

Moreover, the inevitable questioning that has arisen from tensions and contradictions between diverse and at time paradoxical experiences of CDD has been shifted from CDD programmes to the social world and its “constrained environments,” where CDD programmes allegedly needed to be further “tailored” and “improved” to be effective. Thus the unsettled positions, ambiguous perceptions, unfixed meanings, tensions and contradictions that have, at times, surfaced in the discourse of the Bank’s CDD practitioners have generally not led to questioning of the validity and legitimacy of the representation of CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance.” Instead, evidence of programmes’ shortcomings or failure has been almost invariably interpreted in ways conducive to the continuation of these programmes. It has generated momentum for the persistence, survival, expansion and reproduction of CDD programmes, which have constantly evolved in the search for the right formula that would enable them to correct the social world.

Yet Chapter 7 has also noted that although CDD programmes such as Kalahi have been successfully produced, legitimised, and reproduced through a discourse that has presented them as instruments of “good governance,” the lack of evidential base has rendered CDD discursive edifice fragile. In particular, the gap between the meanings or vision conveyed in CDD discourse and the practices of “progressive” local officials who experienced CDD programmes has led some professionals at the World Bank Social
Development Department to more fundamentally question the foundational proposition that CDD programmes, in their current form, are instruments of “good governance.” However, instead of challenging CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance,” these professionals have endeavoured to extensively revisit the design of CDD programmes, paving the way for the emergence of a new and “improved” generation of CDD programmes. Thus Chapter 7 has highlighted that CDD programmes are likely to continue to evolve and expand, in the name of “good governance” and “community empowerment.” Yet as these programmes are also likely to continue overlooking dimensions of power, politics, inequality, and contestation in their representations, calculations, and practices, they risk ending up “empowering” local machine politicians and businessmen to the detriment of the broad mass of the population, as this thesis has attempted to show in the case of Kalahi in Bohol.

**Hegemony and Development**

The alternative account offered in this thesis has deeply challenged the mainstream, liberal communitarian representation of CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance,” which allegedly build social capital, empower communities, stimulate the rise of “progressive” leaders, and, ultimately, represent platforms where communities “learn about democracy by practicing it” (Guggenheim 2006, 138). This type of critique of CDD programme has largely been obscured and excluded by the World Bank and its broader orbit of influence. This exclusion has been explained in Chapter 6 in terms of the Bank’s “organizational need for ignorance” (van Ufford in Mosse 2011b, 97), in particular as a way for social development professionals at the Bank to “deal with their structural vulnerability” (Mosse 2011a, 12), whilst Chapter 7 has further proposed that the discursive canons of CDD have been enacted to the point that they have become generally accepted as valid and true, regardless of their lack of evidential basis. Chapter 7 has also highlighted that the
simultaneous lack of evidence of CDD programmes’ effects on local governance and empowerment, and the enduring representation of CDD programmes as particularly effective instruments of “good governance,” has generated tensions and contradictions amongst CDD practitioners.

Although CDD practitioners have recognised some of the limitations and weaknesses of CDD programmes, they have represented these limitations and weaknesses as relatively superficial and rectifiable, as noted in Chapter 7. Thus they have accepted criticisms only so long as these have been amenable to improving interventions, highlighting technical deficiencies that could be acted upon in a relatively straightforward manner. As showed by the encounter with the Kalahi manager at the World Bank’s office in Manila, which was related in Chapter 7, the suggestion that the limitations or flaws observed in CDD programmes might indicate that programmes such as Kalahi have not been acting as instruments of “good governance,” regardless of the intention of the planners, has been completely unpalatable for CDD practitioners. The active refusal of CDD practitioners at the World Bank to consider their radical critiques is symptomatic of a wider trend in the development industry, which Michael Goldman has explained, following Gramsci, as the unfolding of real hegemony, a critical moment that reveals itself when the dominant bloc of social forces and interests “also pos[es] the questions around which the struggles rages” (Gramsci, Hoare and Nowell-Smith in Goldman 2005, 7).

This exploration of CDD programmes and of their institutional conditions of production has suggested that hegemony is solidly anchored indeed. The issues that have been considered and debated at the World Bank (and beyond) have revolved around questions such as “how to make CDD programmes more effective?” and “how to scale up and replicate these programmes?” whilst more fundamentally questioning of the foundational proposition that CDD programmes are instruments of “good governance” has been actively
suppressed. Against this backdrop, this account has attempted to contribute to a growing body of critical development literature, which has challenged the broad consensus that has dominated the discipline of development studies on the desirability and appropriateness of local and participatory development programmes such as CDD.

**Contributions to Literature**

This thesis has drawn important insights and inspiration from James Ferguson (1990) and Tania Li (2007)’s Foucauldian accounts of “development discourse,” in particular to analyse CDD discourse deployed to represent arenas for intervention. Yet the argument developed in this thesis has differed from these accounts in three main ways. First of all, Ferguson and Li’s accounts provide no explanation for the emergence of “development discourse” or for shifts in such discourse. In contrast, this thesis has attempted to explain the emergence of CDD discourse at the World Bank in the early 1990s, in the context of (re)democratisation and accelerated economic liberalisation, as the threat of leftist challenges to pro-liberalisation parties brought back by democratic politics called for new strategies to shore up hegemony and promote demobilisation. It has further attempted to make sense of the evolution of CDD discourse under conditions of subaltern movements and mobilisations at the local level, and of populist electoral challenges to entrenched national governments, in countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines in the late 1990s and 2000s. It has highlighted that in these contexts, CDD discourse has offered the possibility to promote transformist absorption of counter-hegemonic challenges, to reinforce the power of local elites by “hailing” them as “progressive” leaders, and to assuage radical critics of economic liberalisation by echoing their language and promoting a vision of the Bank itself as a “progressive” institution.
Secondly, Ferguson’s account offers little insight that would help us to make sense of the political operations and effects of CDD programmes as material resources, and as discourse directly deployed in localities, notably to habituate its recipients to particular norms, values, positions and relations (rather than ordering arenas for intervention), both of which affect social practices and social relations, as this thesis has attempted to show. In contrast, this thesis has identified three main Gramscian effects of CDD programmes as instruments of hegemony and transformism, as outlined above. It has proposed that CDD programmes such as Kalahi have helped to strengthen – whilst avowedly “reform” – existing power structures, reinforcing the control of local bosses and machine politicians, building up ruling parties and incumbent presidents’ support bases locally, and promoting demobilisation of counter-hegemonic challenges. This understanding has enabled us to go beyond Ferguson’s proposition that the political effects of development interventions simply “turn out in the end to have a kind of political intelligibility” (Ferguson 1990, 20), by highlighting a structural logic which has helped us to make sense of the operations and effects of Kalahi in the Province of Bohol.

Thirdly, this thesis has attempted to go beyond the notion of intentionality underlying Tania Li’s (2007) account of “the will to improve” in Indonesia. Li has proposed that the practices and representations of development “experts” are based on a resilient “will to improve,” which entertains a “parasitic relationship to its own shortcomings and failures,” leading “experts” to misinterpret or mishandle signals that development interventions might not produce desired effects, and compelling them to reproduce “failing” interventions, following the procedures and processes that they know (2007, 1). In contrast, this thesis has focused on the notion of performance developed by Judith Butler – as something which “enables a subject and constitutes the temporal conditions for the subject” (Butler 1993, 95) – rather than “will,” to understand the practices of World Bank professionals and others. In so
doing, it has attempted to explain the practices and representations of CDD practitioners without referring to dimensions of intentionality or belief, which would be particularly difficult to determine. Instead, it has examined how practitioners have enacted or performed CDD discourse, and how these performances have, in turn, “materialised” CDD programmes as instruments of “good governance,” as well as the very identity of “CDD practitioner” acting in the name of empowerment and “good governance.”

Moreover, Li (2007) has referred to CDD programmes as programmes of “government,” in the Foucauldian sense of “conducting the conduct.” This characterisation aptly captures a crucial dimension of CDD programmes, which propose to modify the perceptions and practices of individuals “by calculated means,” and indeed to “conduct their conduct” by habituating them to norms of participation, transparency, accountability and competition —rather than to free or empower them. However, Foucault’s notion of “government” implies an overall intention to achieve “the well-being of populations at large” (ibid., 5), which would, according to Li, guide programmes such as Indonesia’s KDP. Instead of identifying such an overall intention guiding the operations of CDD programmes, which would be analytically problematic to determine, this thesis has attempted to bring to light the structural logic underlying the emergence, evolution, expansion, operations, and effects of CDD programmes — without suggesting that the trends it has uncovered are necessarily conscious or intentional. In so doing, it has suggested ways to avoid the difficult analytical issue of determining where and when intentionality should be ascribed.

By developing a framework drawing on the scholarly traditions of Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci, this thesis has suggested that local, participatory development programmes such as CDD programmes could and should be examined on three interrelated levels, to capture the various, often simultaneous operations and effects of these programmes, as (i) material resources, whose deployment from central governments to (predominantly
rural) localities has influenced social relations and practices in these localities, by affecting the material base of existing social structures; (ii) discourse deployed in localities, notably to habituate its recipients to particular norms, values, positions and relations, whose deployment has influenced social relations and practices by affecting the immaterial base of existing power structures (operating at the levels of meaning, perceptions and preferences); and (iii) discourse deployed to represent arenas for (and of) intervention, whose main performative effects have been to enable the production and reproduction of CDD interventions, as detailed in the pages above in the case of the Philippines’ Kalahi. By deploying this framework to explore the institutional conditions of production and reproduction of these programmes, and their conditions of reception and enactment, this thesis has also proposed a way to capture the various and often simultaneous effects of CDD programmes like Kalahi, both as part of an “anti-politics machines” and as instruments of hegemony and transformism.

This thesis is also inscribed within a rich body of critical literature on the development industry, which has notably analysed the key CDD concepts of empowerment, civil society and social capital, highlighting their underlying apolitical, decontextualised and sanitised quality. This exploration of CDD programmes at the World Bank has drawn particularly valuable insights from the writings of Pierre Bourdieu, Stephen Lukes, Ben Fine, John Harris and Saba Mahmood, to cite but a few, on social capital, power and empowerment. Building upon the work of these scholars, the findings discussed in this thesis have suggested that the “disempowerment” of the broad mass of the population is not based on deficits of agency, but on deeply entrenched inequalities. This thesis has also highlighted, in the case of Bohol, that the pursuit of particularistic interests by local government officials and businessmen is not caused by insufficient social capital “bridging” their interests and those of the population, but is enabled by the comparatively huge power that they enjoy, in particular in accessing and controlling resources, which they can leverage to obtain relative
quiescence from a large part of the population. Further drawing on the examination of Bohol and its allegedly exemplary governance, the thesis has also suggested that contrarily to CDD theories, undemocratic governance is not an issue of insufficient “demand” emanating from the population, but is rooted in deep social inequalities and institutional structures that ease the capture of resources by predatory interests.

By overlooking dimensions of power, politics, inequality and contestation, CDD discourse has thus proved incorrect in its constative dimension. It has also proved harmful in its performative dimension, as illustrated by the operations of Kalahi discourse in Bohol. There, Kalahi discourse has misrepresented the operations and effects of Kalahi interventions, which have helped to address mounting challenges from below, and to reinforce the power of local elites, rather than empowering communities and promoting “good governance” and democracy. In so doing, Kalahi discourse has enabled the production and reproduction of Kalahi interventions, regardless of their actual operations and effects. Moreover, Kalahi discourse has provided “cover” for counterinsurgency, insofar as the benign picture of a developmentalist and “pro-poor” local government, and of Bohol’s counterinsurgency-led development as a strategy conducted in the name of “peace” and “poverty alleviation,” would mute criticisms of counterinsurgency, and potentially diminish sympathy for left-wing activists on the ground. By “enabling” local politicians as “progressive” leaders, Kalahi discourse has also increased these politicians’ access to development funding, legitimised their systematic domination over Kalahi processes and benefits, and increased their leverage vis-à-vis the population, which has further discouraged autonomous popular mobilisation and has participated in the reproduction of very unequal power structures.

Overall, this thesis has attempted to highlight and challenge the hegemonic operations and effects of CDD programmes, as well as the hegemonic position that they have enjoyed in
the past decade. This position of real hegemony has been particularly vividly captured by Michael Goldman, in the case of broader mainstream development discourse and interventions, as he remarked that:

“Because so many people—including promoters, interpreters, and even critics—now accept as fact that there is no alternative to development and that the only question is how to make it more sustainable, the Gramscian moment may have arrived” (2005, 7).

By proposing an alternative understanding of CDD programmes in terms of hegemony, transformism and anti-politics, and by highlighting the harmful effects that such programmes have on the broad mass of the population in provinces such as Bohol and countries such as the Philippines, this thesis has suggested that those who “accept as fact that there is no alternative to development” (Goldman 2005, 7) might need to think again.
### Annex 1 – Coded List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interviewee Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Interview location</th>
<th>Interview date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV1</td>
<td>Former consultant</td>
<td>Philippines Country Office, World Bank</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>4 March 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV2</td>
<td>Research associate</td>
<td>Center for Research and Local Governance, Holy Name University</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>19 June 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV3</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>La Salle Institute for Governance, De La Salle University</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>21 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV4</td>
<td>Kalahi manager</td>
<td>Philippines Country Office, World Bank</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>22 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV5</td>
<td>Former Kalahi project director</td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>23 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV6</td>
<td>Former employee</td>
<td>Social Development Department, World Bank</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>23 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV7</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Institute for Popular Democracy</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>24 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV8</td>
<td>Deputy director</td>
<td>Third World Study Centre, University of the Philippines</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>25 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV9</td>
<td>Country representative for the Philippines and regional advisor for local governance</td>
<td>Asia Foundation</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>28 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV10</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Institute For Political and Electoral Reform</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>29 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV11</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Holy Name University</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City, Bohol</td>
<td>7 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV12</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Research Centre, Holy Name University</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City, Bohol</td>
<td>7 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV13</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Centre for Local Governance, Holy Name University</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City, Bohol</td>
<td>7 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV14</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Bohol Local Development Foundation</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City, Bohol</td>
<td>7 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV15</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Participatory Research, Organization of Communities and Education towards Struggle for Self-reliance (PROCESS) Bohol</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City, Bohol</td>
<td>10 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV16</td>
<td>Election commissioner</td>
<td>Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Provincial Office, Bohol</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City, Bohol</td>
<td>15 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV17</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Research Centre, Holy Name University</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City, Bohol</td>
<td>19 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV18</td>
<td>Municipal mayors</td>
<td>12 Kalahi municipalities in Bohol</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City, Bohol</td>
<td>20 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV19</td>
<td>Municipal planning and development coordinators (MPDCs)</td>
<td>12 Kalahi municipalities in Bohol</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City, Bohol</td>
<td>21 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV20</td>
<td>Election commissioner</td>
<td>COMELEC Provincial Office, Bohol</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City, Bohol</td>
<td>23 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV21</td>
<td>Kalahi research, monitoring and evaluation officer</td>
<td>DSWD Field Office for Region 7, Central Visayas</td>
<td>Cebu City, Cebu</td>
<td>28 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV22</td>
<td>Community organiser</td>
<td>Project Seahorse Foundation</td>
<td>Cebu City, Cebu</td>
<td>28 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV23</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Bohol Local Development Foundation</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City, Bohol</td>
<td>29 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV24</td>
<td>Provincial agrarian reform officer</td>
<td>Department of Agrarian Reform</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City, Bohol</td>
<td>10 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV25</td>
<td>MPDCs</td>
<td>11 Kalahi municipalities in Bohol</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City, Bohol</td>
<td>18 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV26</td>
<td>MPDC</td>
<td>Kalahi Municipality A&lt;sup&gt;192&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Bohol</td>
<td>25 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV27</td>
<td>Municipal mayor</td>
<td>Kalahi Municipality A</td>
<td>Bohol</td>
<td>25 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV28</td>
<td>COMELEC municipal officer</td>
<td>Kalahi Municipality A</td>
<td>Bohol</td>
<td>25 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV29</td>
<td>MPDC</td>
<td>Kalahi Municipality B</td>
<td>Bohol</td>
<td>25 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV30</td>
<td>MPDC and area coordinator for Kalahi municipal coordination team</td>
<td>Kalahi Municipality C</td>
<td>Bohol</td>
<td>26 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV31</td>
<td>Vice-mayor</td>
<td>Kalahi Municipality C</td>
<td>Bohol</td>
<td>26 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV32</td>
<td>COMELEC municipal officer</td>
<td>Kalahi Municipality C</td>
<td>Bohol</td>
<td>26 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV33</td>
<td>Kalahi community facilitator</td>
<td>Kalahi Municipality C</td>
<td>Bohol</td>
<td>26 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV34</td>
<td>Kalahi research, monitoring and evaluation officer</td>
<td>DSWD Field Office for Region 7, Central Visayas</td>
<td>Cebu City</td>
<td>2 December 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV35</td>
<td>Kalahi national project manager</td>
<td>DSWD national office</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>20 January 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>192</sup> The names of the municipalities are not revealed in this list, so as to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV36</th>
<th>Employee</th>
<th>Institute for Popular Democracy</th>
<th>Manila</th>
<th>21 January 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV37</td>
<td>Kalahi Manager</td>
<td>Philippines Country Office, World Bank</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>26 January 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV38</td>
<td>Project manager</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Account Philippines</td>
<td>Email interview</td>
<td>26-28 January 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV39</td>
<td>Former consultant</td>
<td>Philippines Country Office, World Bank</td>
<td>Email interview</td>
<td>14 January - 8 February 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV40</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Bohol Provincial Agriculture Office</td>
<td>Email interview</td>
<td>22-24 July 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV41</td>
<td>Former employee</td>
<td>Social Development Department, World Bank</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>16 January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV42</td>
<td>Former employee</td>
<td>Philippines Country Office, World Bank</td>
<td>Phone interview</td>
<td>31 May 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV43</td>
<td>Senior urban specialist</td>
<td>World Bank Institute</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>15 November 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV44</td>
<td>Senior social development specialist</td>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific Region Sustainable Development Department, World Bank</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>15 November 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV45</td>
<td>CDD coordinator</td>
<td>Social Development Department, World Bank</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>15 November 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV46</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Institute For Political and Electoral Reform</td>
<td>Email interview</td>
<td>1 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV47</td>
<td>Former researcher</td>
<td>UK University&lt;sup&gt;193&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Email interview</td>
<td>21 May 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Within” CDD discourse

“Outside” CDD discourse

---

<sup>193</sup> The name of the university is not revealed in this list, so as to preserve the anonymity of the interviewee.
References


Atienza, Maria Ela L. 2010. “Globalization and Responses of Agricultural Communities: Limits and Opportunities for Empowerment in Bilar, Bohol.” Presented at the Ninth International Conference of the International Society for Third-Sector Research, Kadir Has University, Istanbul.


Cambangay, Juanito G. N.d. “Bohol’s Development Path.”


DSWD. 2009b. *Trials and Triumphs: Communities Fighting Poverty through KALAHICIDSS*. Quezon City: DSWD.


Hedman, Eva-Lotta. 2006. *In the Name of Civil Society.* Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press.


343


Marcos, Ferdinand E. 1978. “Declaring Certain Islands, Coves and Peninsulas in the Philippines as Tourist Zones and Marine Reserve under the Administration and Control of the Philippine Tourism Authority.” Proclamation 1801.


Olssen, Mark. 1999. Michel Foucault: Materialism and Education. Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey.


