Euroscepticism and the Radical Right:
domestic strategies and party system dynamics

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Abstract

The thesis analyses the phenomenon of party-based Euroscepticism with specific reference to radical right parties. It provides a bridge between the literatures on party behaviour, radical right parties and the study of Euroscepticism. Challenging the notion that parties belonging to the same party family display similar positions on European integration, it argues that radical right parties do not adopt a uniform EU stance. By putting forward a typology of radical right Euroscepticism, the thesis establishes that radical right European positions differ in terms of content, strength and motivation.

In explaining this divergence, the thesis adopts a framework of party strategic behaviour and argues that party positions on Europe are related to the endogeneity of the party system and the dynamics of inter party competition. In particular, the thesis shows that a radical right party’s position on European integration as well as the way in which it accommodates the European issue in its discourse is a function of the party’s wider agenda in the national party system. The latter is developed with reference to (1) party type and (2) its predominant aims and objectives at the domestic level. The thesis demonstrates that the European issue is integral to the radical right’s discursive toolkit but the ways in which the party chooses to debate the issue and/or politicise it largely depend on the national context.

This thesis employs a nested research design as a mixed methods strategy joining the study of the wider universe of European radical right parties with intensive case study qualitative analysis. It commences with an overview of the general patterns and dynamics of radical right Euroscepticism both across Europe and within the political arenas where the three party case studies operate. It proceeds by providing an in depth study of three radical right parties during the period 1999-2009, including the French National Front, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally and the Italian National Alliance.
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<tr>
<td>AKEL</td>
<td>Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού (Progressive Party of Working People, Cyprus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance, Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>British National Party (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CdL</td>
<td>Casa delle Libertà (House of Freedoms, Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>Comparative Manifesto Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>ChristenUnie (Christian Union, The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party, Denmark)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDE</td>
<td>Εθνική Δημοκρατική Ένωση (National Democratic Union, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EK</td>
<td>Εθνικό Κόμμα (National Party, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELEN</td>
<td>Ελληνική Ενότητα (Greek Union, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>Ελληνικό Μέτωπο (Hellenic Front, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENEK</td>
<td>Ενιαίο Εθνικιστικό Κίνημα (United Nationalist Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>Εθνική Παράταξης (National Alignment, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPEN</td>
<td>Εθνική Πολιτική Ένωσις (National Political Union, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National (National Front, France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPO</td>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party, Austria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>Χρυσή Αυγή (Golden Dawn, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IdV</td>
<td>Italia dei Valori – Lista Di Pietro (Italy of Values – Di Pietro List, Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KE</td>
<td>Κόμμα Ελληνισμού (Hellenism Party, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEME</td>
<td>Κίνημα Ελλήνων Μεταρρυθμιστών (Movement of Greek Reformers, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας (Communist Party of Greece, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>Κόμμα Προοδευτικών (Progressive Party, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td>Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός (Popular Orthodox Rally, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>Lega Nord (Northern League, Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families, Poland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoDem</td>
<td>Mouvement démocrate (Democratic Movement, France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la France (Movement for France, France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSI</td>
<td>Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement, Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Нέα Δημοκρατία (New Democracy, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOA</td>
<td>Национален съюз Атака (Attack Party, Bulgaria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα (Panhellenic Social Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Parti Communiste Français (Communist Party of France, France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PdL</td>
<td>People of Freedom (Il Popolo della Libertà, Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PG</td>
<td>Πρώτη Γραμμή (Front Line, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Parti Socialiste (French Socialist Party, France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Πολιτική Άνοιξη (Political Spring, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Rifondazione Comunista (Communist Refoundation Party, Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYN</td>
<td>Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς (Coalition of the Radical Left, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB-LNNK</td>
<td>For Fatherland and Freedom (Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK, Latvia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty establishing the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro (Union of Christian and Centre Democrats, Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>Union pour la Démocratie Française (Union for French Democracy, France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Independent Party (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMP</td>
<td>Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (Union for a Popular Movement, France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest, Belgium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verts</td>
<td>Green Party (France)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Political developments in Europe during the past twenty years have led to an increased academic interest in radical right parties as well as the study of Euroscepticism. This thesis aims to provide a bridge between the literature on party behaviour, radical right parties and the study of Euroscepticism. It argues that radical right parties do not adopt a uniform stance on European integration and establishes that their Euroscepticism differs in terms of content, strength and motivation. In order to demonstrate this varying response to European integration, the thesis employs a mixed-methods approach. It begins with an analysis of the general patterns and dynamics of radical right Euroscepticism across Europe and proceeds by providing a detailed analysis of three radical right parties during the period 1999-2009.

In explaining this divergence in terms of European Union (EU) attitudes, the thesis adopts a framework of party strategic behaviour and argues that the manner in which parties respond to the EU is conditional upon the dynamics of party competition and the parties’ wider agenda in their national party system. The main findings of the thesis are (1) radical right parties do not oppose European integration to the same extent and (2) the issue of Europe is integral to the party type to which they belong and their political strategies at the domestic level.

1.1 The research agenda and puzzle

Since the 1950s the process of political and economic integration at the European level has required ceding a high degree of national sovereignty to supranational institutions. Despite the ‘permissive consensus’ thesis whereby political elites would freely set European policies (Inglehart 1970; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970), this political drive towards supranationalism has never been straightforward. Political reaction to the European project has in fact been initially elite-based and has been observed as early as
1965 with the so-called empty chair crisis triggered by General De Gaulle in France. Later, Margaret Thatcher’s tough negotiation policy during the run up to the signing of the Single European Act in the mid-late 1980s revealed a high degree of scepticism towards the European project. In these two cases maintaining a hard stance on Europe served the purpose of preserving and accommodating French and British national interests at the time. Elite and party-based opposition has significantly increased since the early 1990s in the wake of the process of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. With the Treaty establishing the EU (TEU), the European political elites openly demonstrated for the first time their desire to transfer competences from the national to the European level in not only market-related policies, but also policies traditionally considered to belong to the realm of national politics, including among others foreign policy and the currency. This process of integrating Europe, accelerated at Maastricht and continuing ever since, has produced growing opposition, which has taken various forms and at times halted or delayed the project of a united Europe.

Given that this opposition has been an ever increasing phenomenon during the last twenty years culminating in the recent political controversies over the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, trying to understand contemporary European politics without understanding the dynamics of the process of opposition to integration is a futile exercise. The French and Dutch voter rejection of the project for a European Constitution in 2005, the negative outcome of the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 and the increasing presence of parties with a Eurosceptic agenda in both national Parliaments and the European Parliament (EP) reveal that Euroscepticism, far from being an ephemeral and marginal phenomenon, it has become an integral and structural part of the European integration process.

Consequently, the study of negative party positions on European integration has gained great prevalence in academic research informing an expanding literature since the late 1990s. Euroscepticism is understood as being a form of opposition to European integration, currently epitomised by the political system of the EU\(^1\), which is not confined to particular value and belief systems, but on the contrary has been expressed

\(^1\) Note that the terms EU and European integration are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.
by parties belonging to various party families. Opposition has been diverse in its origin since a variety of political parties have strongly expressed their dissent coming from a range of ideological backgrounds and national contexts. Parties from both Western and Eastern Europe have expressed their disagreement with aspects of European integration. In the 1980s, reservation about the European project was mostly articulated by Socialist parties (Featherstone 1988) whereas from the end of the 1990s onwards opposition is expressed by communist, radical left and radical right parties as well as some conservative, and at times green parties. Single issue anti-EU parties and movements have also been observed. Although empirically most parties expressing strong anti-European feelings tend to be of small size and situated in the periphery of their party system, including among others the Greek Communist party or the French National Front; some of them are larger and mainstream parties having participated in their national coalitions/governments, such as the British Conservatives. Given this diverse expression of Euroscepticism, the question of how political parties position themselves on the issue of European integration and why this differs among parties, is central to the discipline of political science and the field of European Studies.

In explaining party divergent positions on European integration the debate in the literature has been predominately structured in terms of party level and national level explanations. In particular, parties oppose Europe because of party-specific characteristics, which constitute their ideological profile and are antithetical to what Europe stands for. At the same time, parties operate in their national political system, which also influences their standpoints on particular policies, including their policy on Europe. These nation-specific elements include among others the electoral system, the configuration of the party system, probabilities to access office, and positions of major potential allies or competitors. These explanations are not posited to be necessarily antithetical as many cases have demonstrated that the two arguments can be at best complementary or at worst difficult to disentangle.

The argument runs as follows: on the one hand, party families whose aggregate ideological values are closer to the centre of the left-right axis of political contestation, for instance the mainstream Socialist and Conservative/Christian Democrat party families, are less likely to be Eurosceptic because of their centrist ideological character
also reflected in the current political balance within the EU. Moreover, parties belonging to the above party families are usually mainstream with increased interest in gaining office. Thus increasing their likelihood to be part of a government motivates them to avoid contestation over European integration and consequently renders them less likely to adopt a strong Eurosceptic stance and rhetoric. On the other hand, when it comes to extremist (left or right) party families the literature has identified similar explanations of their Euroscepticism. These parties are Eurosceptic because they are situated at the ideological extremes of the left-right axis of political competition. Their value systems are antithetical to what the political system of the EU represents, the latter being a careful compromise between the centrist Socialist and Christian Democratic parties. Additionally, these parties are located in the periphery of their domestic party systems and are much more likely to increase their vote intake from emphasising strong oppositional positions. This provides them with increased incentives to politicise the issue of European integration and are thus more likely to be Eurosceptic. This is what Sitter has called the ‘politics of opposition’ (2001).

Although the literature has not been conclusive on the question of why parties oppose integration to differing extents, empirical studies have pointed to the fact that the strongest Eurosceptic feelings are located mainly within the radical right and radical left (Taggart 1998; Hix 1999; Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks and Steenbergen 2004). However, the main focus of the literature has been thus far to analyse different positions among party families largely disregarding the analysis of different European positions within party families. This is true with the considerable exception of a volume on variation among socialist parties (Featherstone 1988), two journal articles on agrarian and communist parties (Batory and Sitter 2004; Benedetto and Quaglia 2007) and a Conference paper on the conservatives (Flood, Soborski et al. 2007) which display the beginning of an academic interest.

In particular, the positions of parties belonging to the radical right party family have been considerably under-researched. This is partly because radical right parties are viewed as strong advocates of negative positions on European integration. The underlying assumption in the literature would suggest that, by virtue of belonging to the same party family, these parties display similar levels of Euroscepticism and in most
cases project a ‘principled’ Euroscepticism utterly rejecting the process of European integration. Indeed, Hainsworth argues that ‘[these parties] are well placed to act as the voice of popular opposition and protest against developments declared to be anti-national’ (Hainsworth 2008: 85). Radical right parties either because of their extremist ideology (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe, Marks et al. 2004) or because of their marginal position in their domestic party system (Taggart 1998; Sitter 2001) have increased incentives to oppose Europe.

Frieschi suggested as early as 2000 that ‘the strident anti-Europeanism of the French National Front […] contrasts sharply with the pro-European stance of the Italian National Alliance’ in the EP (2000: 518). However, it is only very recently that scholars have identified that behind this seemingly uniform stance hides a vast array of party response to Europe which has also varied over time (Mudde 2007; Hainsworth 2008). This can also be verified by the latest 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey on party positions (Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010) where radical right parties exhibit varying scores on the question of their overall EU position. In a scale structured from one to seven, where one indicates a strongly opposing position and seven a strongly favourable position, radical right parties range from a strongly opposing ‘one’ for the French National Front to a comparatively favourable approach of the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom, which scores 4.75. Indeed, an in-depth research of radical right parties’ EU positions indicates that they do not display a homogenous stance on European integration. Indicatively, the French National Front utterly rejects the EU project whereas the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally accepts the need for European cooperation at a higher multilateral level. The Italian National Alliance is contrasted with the above two cases as it largely accepts the process of European integration and seeks to maintain and promote Italian national interest within the EU institutional framework.

Although the above indicate that parties belonging to the radical right party family display dissimilar positions on European integration, the issue of radical right EU attitudes remains under researched in terms of content as well as underlying argumentation. Seeking to build on the above-mentioned literature and to contribute towards an improved understanding of radical right stance towards European integration, this research is informed by three interrelated questions.
1 How can we conceptualise the nature of radical right positions on the EU?
2 How do radical right parties respond to the issue of European integration?
3 Why do radical right parties oppose Europe to differing extents?

In answering the above research questions, the thesis aims to explore the wider preoccupation of why political parties belonging to the same party family display dissimilar positions on European integration and under which conditions is a party more or less likely to adopt a Eurosceptic position. In this type of research framework, different European positions constitute the dependent variable of the thesis.

1.2 The Argument and theoretical approach

In answering the first and second research questions, the thesis argues that the nature of radical right Euroscepticism can be conceptualised based on four indicators, including the definition of Europe, the principle, the practice and the future of European integration. Based on these indicators, derived from the current literature on Euroscepticism, Mair’s (2007) distinction between the policy and polity aspect of the EU and an attentive reading of the Treaties establishing the EU, the thesis suggests that radical right parties may be broadly categorised into three patterns of opposition to European integration. These include the ‘rejectionist’, the ‘conditional’ and the ‘compromising’ patterns (for a detailed analysis, see Chapter 3).

The thesis answers the third research question, namely ‘why do radical right parties oppose Europe to differing extents?’ taking a party strategic behaviour approach. It argues that the way in which radical right parties respond to the issue of European integration is conditional upon the dynamics of party competition and the parties’ wider agenda in their national party system. Different levels of Euroscepticism as well as the dissimilar ways in which parties accommodate the issue of European integration into domestic party politics across Europe is a function of their primary aims and objectives in the national arena. Party type constitutes the main independent variable of the thesis as it explains different radical right party positions on European integration.
Hooghe, Marks & Wilson (2004: 125) suggest that ‘the Euroscepticism of extreme parties arise […] not only from their opposition to the EU’s policies, but also because they reject the ideology of the EU’s construction’. Radical right Euroscepticism is strongly linked to opposition to immigration, the defence of the national community and culture against foreigners (Hooghe, Marks et al. 2004: 134). These parties ‘tend to see European integration as an encroaching, bureaucratic and elitist phenomenon. Accordingly, it serves to undermine constructs and values, such as the nation-state, national identity, state sovereignty, deeply embedded roots and national belonging.’ (Hainsworth 2008: 82). Radical right parties express a sovereignty-focused discourse and as such relinquishing sovereignty to a supra-national institution denies the very premise of their ideology. According to this school of thought, ideology becomes the prime determinant shaping a party’s position on Europe.

While agreeing with this proposition, the thesis argues that party programmatic factors have significant explanatory value only when analysing broader trends of party positions on European integration. When examining qualitative differences within party families, the explanatory value of this approach diminishes not least because in theory this approach does not expect to find dissimilar European positions within party families. Also, Euroscepticism being a quite versatile and multi-faceted phenomenon, may be expressed in a different manner across European countries. This is especially pertinent to radical right parties as their nationalist ideology draws its resources from the national context more than any other party family. The importance of the national political setting and how a party chooses to behave within its confines becomes important in analysing this party family’s European position. In this sense, the thesis builds on previous work by scholars including Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008a; 2008b) who point to the importance of the national context as well as Sitter (2001; 2003) who suggests that party strategies should be given credit when analysing how the phenomenon of Euroscepticism is expressed across Europe. The novelty of the thesis’ approach lies in systematising the relation between party behaviour and a party’s EU stance. Additionally, it introduces ‘party type’, thus far absent from the literature, as an independent variable in the analysis. The classification of a party into a ‘type’ depends on the latter’s relationship with civil society and the state (Katz and Mair 1995) and includes the mass party, the anti-system party, the catch-all party and the cartel party. It
differs from the notion of party family which refers to a party’s origins and sociology, transnational links, policy and ideology (Mair and Mudde 1998).

In particular, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008d: 255) have argued that ‘the question of how a party determines its underlying position on the European issue is often different from how that issue has been accommodated into […] party politics’. The authors suggest that in fact there has been a conflation of ‘Euroscepticism as (a) a broad, underlying position and (b) whether or not (and how) parties use the European issue […] as an element of inter-party competition’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008d: 255).

Building on this, and considering the importance of the ‘party type’ variable in the analysis, the thesis argues that

1. Party type and aims/objectives resulting from this determine specific party positions on Europe.

2. The national context becomes influential with regards to how the party chooses to debate and/or politicise the European issue at the domestic level.

Based on the above propositions, the thesis contends that the dynamics of party competition in national party systems have significant explanatory value in understanding the phenomenon of Euroscepticism within the radical right party family. A radical right party’s position on European integration as well as the way the party will accommodate the European issue in its discourse is a function of the party’s wider agenda in the national party system. The latter is developed with reference to (1) party type and, resulting from this, (2) its predominant aim and objectives in the party system. As such radical right Euroscepticism is not only conditional upon a party’s deeply-entrenched ideological premises but on a number of other factors (see figure 1.1 below).
The thesis argues that parties belonging to the radical right party family display characteristics of different party types, including protest/anti-system, catch-all and cartel. This in turn leads them to put forward different aims and objectives within their respective party system as well as develop dissimilar strategies. Parties have in their toolkit a series of different strategies and tactics. According to models of competitive party behaviour, parties have at their disposal three main strategies. They pursue policy, votes and office (Strom 1990). However, at given points in time they may prioritise one strategy over the other. Which strategy they will prioritise largely depends on which predominant party type characteristics they may feature. This impacts upon any decision they make at the domestic level, including their discursive strategy towards the European issue as well as their overall EU stance. A party’s position on European integration may be strategically employed at the domestic level for party political purposes.

In particular, the thesis argues that protest anti-system radical right parties are associated with the ‘rejectionist’ Eurosceptic pattern. Rejecting European integration and adopting an adversarial strategy towards the European issue become a tool for differentiation from the other parties in the national political context towards the ultimate goal of polarising the debate and attracting a significant segment of the society sympathising with this type of non-conformist views.
The adoption of a ‘conditional’ European position is associated with catch-all radical right parties. Although they oppose Europe, these parties avoid radicalising their discourse and seek to accommodate the European issue within debates that they perceive to be close to the median voter. The European issue becomes a vote-maximisation tool.

Cartel radical right parties adopt a ‘compromising’ position on Europe. Although they are sceptical towards a number of EU initiatives and practices, they downplay their criticisms with a view to decreasing the salience of, and avoiding contestation on, the European issue. They dismiss the importance of contesting the European issue at the domestic level using Europe as a tool for the party’s governmental entrenchment and a potential leading role within it (see table 1.1. and figure 1.2 below). Note that the word ‘dismissive’ is employed here in the sense used by Meguid (2008), namely avoiding taking an open and clear position on the European issue with a view to reducing its salience (for a detailed analysis see Chapter 2).

**Table 1.1 The Argument in detail**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radical right party type</th>
<th>Predominant party goal</th>
<th>Discursive strategy towards the European issue</th>
<th>Position on the EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-system Catch-all</td>
<td>Policy / Issue Votes</td>
<td>Adversarial Accommodative Dismissive</td>
<td>Rejectionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartel</td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Dismissive</td>
<td>Compromising</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The word ‘dismissive’ is employed here in the sense used by Meguid (2008), namely avoiding taking an open and clear position on the European issue with a view to reducing its salience.
In accordance with proposition two above, the importance of the national context becomes significant with regards to how a party chooses to debate and/or politicise the European issue at the domestic level. Radical right parties tend to associate the issue of Europe with other issues that they find are of domestic relevance. The three case studies of the thesis (discussed below) show that this argument becomes thus nation-specific and differs from one case to another.

In particular, the French National Front associates the European issue with that of globalisation as it views European integration as a project of regional globalisation and largely as an accomplice to the negative effects of globalisation on the nation-state. The Greek Popular Orthodox Rally connects the issue of Europe to broader themes of Greek security policy criticising the EU and the other Greek national parties for not ‘uploading’ the Greek national interest with regards to foreign and security policies onto the European level. The Italian National Alliance associates the European project to a potential greater role for Italy on the international arena arguing that Italy should play a dynamic role in international relations through the EU.
1.3 Research design

1.3.1 Methodology and case selection

This thesis adopts a mixed-methods approach drawing on literature from the radical right, political behaviour and Euroscepticism. It employs a nested research design as a mixed methods strategy joining intensive case study analysis with large-N analysis (Lieberman 2005). The thesis combines the study of the wider universe of European radical right parties with a rigorous case study qualitative analysis in order to attain maximum analytical leverage. It employs the comparative method, and more specifically the method of difference as the cases under investigation exhibit variation in the dependent variable, namely dissimilar positions on European integration.

In order to explain different levels of Euroscepticism within the European radical right party family, the thesis is divided into two sections. This is an integrated study with a view to having a holistic approach to answering the puzzle and improving the prospect of making valid inferences in both cross-national and case-study research. The first section of the thesis observes the general patterns of Euroscepticism within the radical right party family both across Europe and within the political arenas where the three case studies operate. It provides a broader analysis of radical right Euroscepticism studying twelve parties from ten EU member states. The study approximates the wider universe of cases and comprises nearly the totality of radical right parties included in both the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys and comparative party manifesto studies. The second section proceeds with an investigation of three case studies of radical right Euroscepticism. Qualitative case study analysis is used in order to gain theoretical insights from particular cases, explore the dynamics of radical right Euroscepticism and capture the relationship between theory and facts in a largely narrative form (Lieberman 2005: 436).

In particular, the first section displays the ‘big picture’ of Euroscepticism in the European radical right. Based on a novel conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, it maps radical right party positions on European integration using national and European party
manifestos as the main primary source. This analysis provides the general framework of
the thesis and guides the case selection for in-depth comparative research. Given that the
number of cases is low, the thesis is unable to draw conclusions with any statistical
relevance. It proceeds instead by providing a spatial representation of radical right
Euroscepticism across Europe using data from both expert surveys on party positions
and coded party manifesto data from the Euromanifesto’s project. The thesis also
employs computerised content analysis (Laver, Benoit et al. 2003) in order to acquire
systematic information on the forms of political competition and the policies of key
parties in France, Greece and Italy locating the thesis’ case studies in their national
political space. These findings are subsequently used in order to further analyse how the
European issue is played out in each political system.

The second section of the thesis provides an in-depth analysis of three radical right
parties where there is a difference of degree in the dependent variable, namely levels of
Euroscepticism. As a result, the thesis adopts the method of difference (Hancké 2009:
73). That is, ‘by “controlling” for certain common features, […] the analyst can thereby
exclude these factors from the analysis and focus upon those conditions that do vary
systematically within the selected universe […]’ (Norris 2005: 36). The thesis contends
that radical right parties draw upon broadly similar themes and ideas. The parties
analysed here share a common origin, rooted in the defence of national interests and
identity drawing mostly upon the nationalist political doctrine ‘that strives for the
congruence of the cultural and the political unit, i.e. the nation and the state’ (Mudde
2007:16). Although they cannot be considered identical in every respect, their ideology
can be neatly summarized by three epithets: nationalism, authoritarianism and populism
(Mudde 2007). Ideological differences among the parties are thought to be too small to
account for different levels of Euroscepticism within this party family. As a result,
levels of nationalism, authoritarianism and a degree of populist rhetoric are held largely
constant throughout the thesis (for a detailed analysis see Chapter 2).

The French National Front, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally and the Italian National
Alliance constitute the case studies of the thesis. These are three cases of radical right
parties broadly sharing the above ideological characteristics but displaying strong
variation in the dependent variable, i.e. levels of Euroscepticism (see Chapter 3). The
French National Front belongs to the ‘rejectionist’ Eurosceptic pattern, the Popular Orthodox Rally displays a ‘conditional’ type of Euroscepticism and the Italian National Alliance has adopted a ‘compromising’ stance on Europe.

It is worth mentioning that the National Alliance was disbanded in 2008 during the writing of the PhD thesis following a Berlusconi-Fini agreement to join under the banner People of Freedom. In 2010, Fini left the joint party with Berlusconi but a significant part of the National Alliance has remained inside the People of Freedom. During the past few years, the Italian party moved towards a more conservative outlook. While agreeing with the conclusions in the literature, the thesis adopts Mair and Mudde’s (1998) argument that party identity and goals are contingent upon their origin and ideology. In this respect, it is indubitable that the National Alliance had its origins in right-wing radicalism since it was the offspring of the fascist Italian Social Movement. The value of this case lies in understanding whether and how a party’s move away from the party family may impact upon its European position providing an interesting contrast to the French and Greek cases.

These three parties operate in political systems that are largely similar in terms of type of democracy they have adopted (Lijphart 1999). Although only France employs a clearly majoritarian electoral system in the form of a two-round system in both presidential and parliamentary elections, there is a majoritarian as opposed to consensual logic underlying the workings of all three political systems. In all three political systems, the dynamics of party competition are mostly bi-polar (either two-party or two-block) rather than multi-polar. In particular, France is divided into two competing party blocs, although each bloc in turn is sub-divided into further fragments. The left and right are the main competitors within the political system although the National Front has become an important force during the 2000s (Grunberga and Schweisguth 2003; Bornschier and Lachat 2009). In Greece, the system has been characterised as polarised pluralism, either ‘limited’ (Mavrogordatos 1984) or ‘extreme’ (Seferiades 1986). It has evolved into a two-and-a-half party system where two major parties have been associated with the left and right respectively and an additional third small party has been associated with the radical left (Legg and Roberts 1997: 132). From mid-1990s onwards, Italy experienced a shift from consensual politics ‘towards strong political
leadership that has marked the evolution of the new bipolar party system’ (Fella 2006: 13-14). Party polarisation into two main blocks is prominent in all three EU member states, namely polarised multi-partyism in France and Italy whereas polarised two-partyism in Greece. Table 1.2 below summarises the similarities amongst the three case studies.

**Table 1.2 Comparability of the case selection**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Front</th>
<th>Popular Orthodox Rally</th>
<th>National Alliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology (nationalism)</strong></td>
<td>National preference</td>
<td>Ethnic homogeneity</td>
<td>Imperial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology (authoritarianism)</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology (populism)</strong></td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Contained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National political system</strong></td>
<td>polarised multi-partyism</td>
<td>polarised multi-partyism</td>
<td>polarised two-partyism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The thesis employs the most similar systems research design according to which similar cases display variation in the dependent variable. As shown above, the cases under investigation share common elements in terms of their ideology (detailed explanation provided in Chapter sections 5.1.1, 6.1.1 and 7.1.1 ‘What the party stands for’) as well as the political system within which they operate. As a result, party ideology and national political system are ‘controlled for’. The thesis adopts a party type-specific argument and independent variable, which varies across the cases (see table 1.1 above).

**1.3.2 Sources**

The thesis makes use of a variety of primary sources throughout. The first section is based upon the usage of party manifestos for both national and European elections. Manifestos are uniquely authoritative statements of narratives that express the collective beliefs of the party as a whole and exemplify the way in which the party chooses to portray itself externally. These documents are presented in official party platforms and
represent the official party line and the party united as a whole. They ‘are a product of the party in central office; therefore the positions that are stated here should primarily be attributed to this face of party organisation’ (Conti 2010: 97). The study of party manifestos has great potential for estimating party policy positions. Although manifestos do not detect internal party dissent, they provide objective data (Marks, Hooghe et al. 2007: 27) as they ‘chart the party’s position at each election on the basis of its own authoritative policy pronouncement’ (Budge 2002). They are the result of ‘complex debates and negotiations over the normative essence of a party, its strategies at any point in time and its definitions of friends and foes’ (Fella and Ruzza 2006: 183). Moreover, the first section employs data from both expert surveys and codified analysis of political text. In particular, the thesis employs data from the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey on the Positioning of Political Parties (Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010) as well as data from the European Parliament Election Study (EES 2009). It has been a purposeful choice to combine data sources from both expert surveys and manifesto analysis given that ‘Expert and manifesto data approach party positioning differently, and they have contrasting strengths and weaknesses’ (Marks, Hooghe et al. 2007: 26).

The second section of the thesis uses election programmes, papers, declarations, internal press, leader writings and speeches as its primary sources. In addition to these sources and for triangulation purposes (Davies 2001; Hancké 2009), the author has conducted semi-structured elite interviews with politicians from the three party case studies between February 2009 and March 2010 (see Appendix X). Interviews have been selected as a tool in qualitative research in order to ‘assist the political scientist in understanding the theoretical position of the interviewee; his/her perceptions, beliefs and ideologies’ (Richards 1996: 199). They have increased the depth of information and provided valuable insights from ‘key’ politicians involved in each party. Very importantly, they have contributed towards a greater understanding of the underlying logic of each party’s choice on how to position itself on European integration. Following the semi-structured method, there was a clear list of issues to be discussed while at the same time the interviewer was flexible in terms of the sequence of questions asked as well as the topics considered in order to allow the interviewees to develop their own ideas and elaborate their points of interest.
In order to provide an additional cross-reference between interviews and party literature, the author has conducted qualitative content analysis of 1642 Member of European Parliament (MEP) speeches in Plenary during the 5th and 6th EP legislative terms. This analysis quantified the recurrent issues within each party’s MEP speeches. In particular, the author coded 1080 speeches of the French National Front MEPs (302 speeches during the 5th term and 778 speeches during the 6th term), 123 speeches of the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally’s MEPs (they only acquired EP representation during the 6th EP term), and a total of 439 speeches of the Italian National Alliance’s MEPs (196 during the 5th term and 297 during the 6th). The main method of content analysis used here is ‘conventional’ whose ultimate aim lies in describing a phenomenon lacking a pre-defined theory or expectation about the results (see Appendix III). This method does not impose pre-conceived categories and is rather directed towards ‘gaining direct information’ (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1279). The aim was to use this method in order to observe the salient issues for each party as they are developed in their EP speeches and ultimately to assess the level of congruence between the attitudes of two faces of party organisation. That is whether the party in central office producing the party literature and the party in public office providing the speeches are united on the European issue both in terms of their overall position and their precise argumentation.

1.3.3 Time frame

The thesis has a largely contemporary focus. The 1999-2009 period has been chosen since during these years there has been extensive discussion over the ratification of the European Constitution which has aroused strong nationalist sentiments across Europe. The failed 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands are seen as ‘epitomizing a growing mood of scepticism about Europe that could be sensed more or less throughout the enlarged Union’ (Mair 2007: 1). The protracted ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty not only entails further restrictions on national autonomy over policy-making but is also considered to pose an increasing threat to national sovereignty.
1.4 Originality and contribution of the thesis

This thesis aims to provide a bridge between the literatures on party behaviour, radical right parties and the study of Euroscepticism and contribute to the academic understanding of small party behaviour. It provides an input on the definition, measurement and causality of Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a; 2008b). This is achieved through creating a novel typology of the phenomenon of Euroscepticism, through the in-depth analysis of the dynamics influencing party Eurosceptic attitudes in different party systems and through the novel empirical research of parties whose Euroscepticism has been largely under-researched.

In particular, the contribution of the thesis is conceptual, theoretical, empirical and methodological. In answering the first research question, namely ‘how can we conceptualise the nature of radical right positions on the EU?’, the thesis critically evaluates the current definitions of Euroscepticism and adds to the academic understanding of the phenomenon by developing a new framework of Euroscepticism. This new typology intends to (1) improve the academic conceptualisation of the term, (2) contribute towards ‘measuring the dependent variable’ debate, and (3) identify divergent patterns of European positions within the context of radical right parties.

In tackling the second research question, namely ‘how do radical right parties respond to the issue of European integration?’, the thesis makes a significant empirical contribution. This thesis is, to the knowledge of the author, the first study qualitatively analysing radical right party positions on European integration in a sample that approximates to the wider universe of cases in Europe. It constitutes the first case study research systematising the analysis of the European positions of the French National Front, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally and the Italian National Alliance. In fact, this thesis represents the only account [written in English] of the Greek party’s profile, values, ideas and behaviour.

In explaining ‘Why do radical right parties oppose Europe to differing extents?’ the thesis makes a significant theoretical contribution. It feeds into the wider literature on
contemporary comparative European politics and adopts an approach explicitly linking
the literature on party behaviour, radical right parties and the study of Euroscepticism. This represents a novel synthesis of the literature associating party type to radical right party positions on European integration. The thesis challenges assumptions made in the literature regarding the positions of ideologically similar political parties and argues that being ‘anti-system’, ‘catch-all’ or ‘cartel’ impacts upon a party’s discursive strategy toward the European issue as well as its overall EU stance.

Lastly, the thesis makes a methodological contribution being a study of party positions on the EU adopting a mixed-methods approach. The thesis has combined qualitative with quantitative research; spatial analysis of party competition based on computerised content analysis with spatial analysis relying on expert surveys and party manifesto data; elite interviews and content analysis of MEP speeches.

1.5 Outline of the thesis

The thesis is divided into two sections. The first section discusses issues of theory, conceptualisation and measurement of Euroscepticism. It also provides a spatial representation of radical right EU positions across Europe, but also within the political systems where the thesis’ case studies operate. The second section examines in detail the three patterns of radical right Euroscepticism employing the case studies of the French National Front, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally and the Italian National Alliance for each pattern respectively.

In particular, Chapter 2 discusses the core similarities of the parties under investigation demonstrating the comparability of the cases with regards to radical right deeply-held values and beliefs. It argues that the cases are comparable because they share broad ideological characteristics pertaining to this party family. It sets out the wider theoretical framework within which this thesis operates. Based on the literature on party types and party behaviour, the chapter identifies the relevant hypotheses which guide the thesis. The theoretical proposition of this chapter maintains that radical right parties may employ a number of strategies in their domestic party system. Their position on
European integration is a function of which party type they belong to and on their wider agenda in the national party system.

Chapter 3 puts forward a novel conceptualisation of Euroscepticism suggesting that radical right parties may be categorised into three patterns of opposition towards European integration. These comprise the ‘rejectionist’, ‘conditional’ and ‘compromising’ patterns of Euroscepticism and are identified through the careful examination of party attitudes on four different aspects related to European integration and the EU. These include a cultural definition of Europe, the principle of cooperation at a European multilateral level, the EU policy practice and the desire for building a future European polity. It proceeds by conducting qualitative analysis of party literature of twelve radical right parties from ten European countries adding empirical substance to the theoretical reasoning of the chapter.

Chapter 4 analyses the general patterns and dynamics of radical right Euroscepticism in Europe. It employs data from two sources, namely the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey (Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010) and the 2009 European Election Study (EES 2009). This is done in an exploratory manner in order to demonstrate how the phenomenon of radical right Euroscepticism manifests itself across Europe. The objective is to confirm that policy and ideology can be broadly kept similar among radical right parties but that their positions on European integration significantly diverge. It proceeds by using the tools of spatial analysis in order to provide a visual and spatial overview of the structure of electoral competition in France, Greece and Italy where the thesis’ case studies operate. Using computerised content analysis of party manifestos during the 1999-2009 decade, the chapter presents the case studies’ positions in comparison to the rest of the party system. This helps generate expectations regarding the cases’ behaviour in the political system as well as the potential electorate they may appeal to.

Chapter 5 analyses in detail the ‘rejectionist’ pattern of radical right Euroscepticism. Using the French National Front as its case study, it argues that the party’s extremist policy on European integration is integral to its overall political strategy in its national party system. The National Front is intrinsically an anti-system party whose main
political strategy is adversarial, its logic of competition is issue-based drawing its electoral base from clearly-defined voters and its predominant goal is to claim ownership of specific policies or issues. The National Front uses its policy on European integration as a differentiation tool from the rest of the party system in order to polarise the political debate and appeal to a specific segment of the French electorate.

Chapter 6 explores the ‘compromising’ pattern of radical right Euroscepticism. The case study of the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally reveals that this Eurosceptic pattern is associated with vote-maximising party strategy. The party’s anti-European discourse is portrayed in a way that de-emphasises its radicalism. It focuses on issues which the party perceives as important to the general public so that it can portray itself as being close to the median voter. The Greek Popular Orthodox Rally has linked its European position to the issue of Greek security concerns portraying itself as occupying a unique niche in the Greek party system.

Chapter 7 constitutes the final substantive chapter of the thesis. It examines the final pattern of radical right Euroscepticism, namely the ‘compromising’ type. The chapter employs the Italian National Alliance as its case study arguing that this is a case of a Eurosceptic party changing its European position over time for instrumental and tactical purposes as part of its wider modernisation process. In its quest for power, the party downplays the issue with a view to decreasing its salience and avoiding contestation on the matter. Since the party’s primary goal lies in becoming part of the governing cartel and a major player within it, it has increased incentives to adopt a conciliatory position on European integration. ‘Compromising’ Euroscepticism becomes a political tool for its leader in his effort to appear as a statesman on an equal footing with other centre-right leaders abroad.

The concluding chapter 8 reviews the thesis’ main findings and places them in the larger context of the literature on party-based Euroscepticism. It explores the wider relevance of the thesis as well as the generalisability of the argument in examining different levels of Euroscepticism within other party families. It discusses the broader contribution of this research and points to directions for future research.
Part 1 Theory, Conceptualisation and Measurement
Chapter 2 Theorising Radical Right Euroscepticism

Introduction

The main research question posed in this thesis, namely ‘why do parties that belong to the same party family adopt dissimilar positions on European integration?’ feeds into the wider literature on the relationship between the dimensions of political contestation and party positions on European integration as well as the most specific literature on party-based Euroscepticism. Although the literature has mainly focused on ‘party family’ rather than ‘within party family’ different levels of Euroscepticism, it is informative and provides the researcher with important guidelines as to how to approach this research question. However, before embarking in answering the question and laying out the guiding hypotheses of the thesis, one needs to substantiate the extent to which the parties under investigation are comparable. This is important given that the radical right party family classification is contested in the literature and does not provide clear and comprehensive indicators on the exact characteristics that constitute a radical right party.

Having this in mind, this chapter is divided in three sections. It starts with explaining the core similarities of the parties under investigation demonstrating the comparability of the case studies. It continues by setting out the wider theoretical framework within which this thesis operates. Based on the literature, the chapter identifies the relevant hypotheses that guide the remainder of the thesis. It is argued that the cases under investigation are comparable because they share ideological characteristics pertaining to this party family. Since deeply entrenched ideological values and beliefs are set to be broadly similar among the case studies, the chapter turns to examine the explanatory value of other variables, including party type, party behaviour and short and long term political opportunities within the domestic party system.

In a nutshell, this chapter argues that radical right parties may employ a number of strategies in their domestic party system. Their position on European integration is a function of which party ‘type’ they belong to, that is their relationship between civil
society and the state, and on their wider agenda in the national party system. This agenda depends on whether the party attaches more importance to policy, office or votes. Protest anti-system parties seek to differentiate themselves from the rest of the party system by showing distrust for the latter. As part of this wider agenda, they reject European integration aiming to appeal to a particular niche of the society. Radical right parties with catch-all elements adopt a conditional position on Europe. The selection of their anti-EU criticisms depends on what they perceive to be close to the median voter’s position. Their overall party strategy is geared towards vote-maximisation. Cartel radical right parties adopt a compromising position on Europe. They try to decrease the salience of the issue and avoid open contestation on the matter in order to increase their chances to participate in government.

2.1 The Radical right party family

In answering the research question, the thesis adopts the method of difference. Due to this research design choice, it is vital for the analysis to indicate the characteristics these parties share. This discussion is particularly relevant given that radical right parties largely draw characteristics from their national contexts, which naturally vary from one European country to another. This section of the chapter discusses the extent to which the parties under investigation are members of the same party family. Based on this analysis, radical right parties are classified as sharing broadly similar ideological features, including nationalism, authoritarianism and populism. This analysis has a two-fold purpose. The identified characteristics define the group of parties under investigation and form the key similarities, which are held constant among the parties throughout the thesis. It is hence argued that these similarities cannot explain the degree of variation observed in the dependent variable, namely the different levels of Euroscepticism (to be discussed in detail in Chapter 3). Therefore other variables, which are dissimilar among the parties under investigation, must be treated as possible explanations, which will be discussed in sections two and three of the chapter.
2.1.1 The Issue of Terminology

From the outset, it is important to note that there is a plethora of terms used for these parties. Authors have preferred using many epithets to differentiate groups within the political 'right'. The most frequently employed are ‘extreme’ (Hainsworth 1992; Hainsworth 2000a; Hainsworth 2008; Mudde 2000; Carter 2005) and ‘radical’ (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Norris 2005). Other scholars add the element of populism and talk about ‘neo populist’ parties (Taggart 1995; Betz and Immerfall 1998) or about ‘radical right-wing populism’ (Betz 1994; Mudde 2007). Other labels observed in the literature include ‘far right’, ‘national populist’, ‘neo-fascist’, ‘authoritarian’, not to mention but a few. Although these labels are generally defined in rather similar terms (Mudde 2000: 180), the thesis favours the term ‘radical right’. Radical right is seen to be anti-democratic and to share the nationalism of the extreme right, ‘without being totally hostile to liberal democracy’ (Hainsworth 2008: 8-9). Radical right parties –similarly to extreme right parties– espouse a narrow and largely ethnically based exclusionary representation of the nation, which is combined with an authoritarian political perspective. Unlike extreme right parties, however, they have ‘accepted’ to operate within a democratic political system. They are radical not in terms of being outside the existing political order but in terms of being radical within that order (Minkenberg 1997). They do not openly oppose the values and practices of liberal democratic regimes, do not favour a totalitarian form of government nor embrace violence in their discourse.

2.1.2 Classifying the radical right

The literature has been highly inconclusive on which features constitute a radical right party, mainly providing shopping lists of attributes that can be as many as ten depending on the scholar (Ignazi 1997a; Hainsworth 2000a; Mudde 2000). Carter (2005: 15) suggests that whereas there are defining necessary features that constitute this party family, there are also some secondary characteristics, which may vary from one party to
another. This is partly due to the fact that the ideological legacies of radicalism and fascism differ from a country to another. Mair and Mudde (1998) have identified a number of approaches for the classification of political parties into party families. These include transnational federations, party name, origins and sociology and policy and ideology. For classifying radical right parties, Ignazi (2003) has also included the element of their spatial location on the left-right axis of political competition.

Parties establish trans-national federations and international links in order to promote their interests at the European, global or even regional level. This approach, however, can hardly apply to radical right parties. Due to nationalism being a constituent component of their ideological make-up, the establishment of permanent links with parties from other countries becomes practically unfeasible. Indicative is the 2007 dissolution of the Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty EP political group after barely six months of existence. The break-up of the political group occurred following a dispute between the Romanian and the Italian party on the issue of Romanian immigration to Italy.

Using a party’s name (Beyme 1985) as an indicator of its identity can also become slightly misleading in the case of radical right parties. This is because these parties avoid the use of words such as extreme, radical or right in their name. They may choose words such as freedom or popular to be components of their name to avoid the ‘extremist’ label. Some parties may opt to include the word ‘national’ in their appellation, including the French National Front or the British National Party. This, however, is not consistent and does not imply that parties such as the Austrian Freedom Party or the Polish Peasants’ Party do not belong in the radical right party family.

The origins and sociology approach based on the notion of societal cleavages mobilising parties in similar historical circumstances (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) is relatively straightforward and widely acknowledged in the literature. However, with regards to extreme right parties it must be treated with caution. This approach implies that these parties have the intention to mobilise similar interests, which has not been empirically substantiated. Based on this idea, Ignazi (1997a) made a distinction between ‘old’
traditional extreme right-wing parties and ‘new’ post-industrial extreme right parties. The first group constitutes remnants of the two World Wars in the first part of the 20th century and is openly tied to the fascist tradition. The second group does not have any links with the fascist ideology. ‘These parties are the by-product of the conflicts of post-industrial society where material interests are no longer so central’ (Ignazi 1997a: 53). Ignazi views the later group as being the offspring of the silent revolution representing the response to the new values of post-industrial European societies. Despite the merits of his work, the categories of Ignazi’s typology are prone to overlap as the demarcation line is not clear cut. This typology does not take into account the temporal factor disregarding that these parties tend to evolve and change over time, which clearly indicates the difficulty in classifying the parties under investigation. Not all ‘new’ radical right parties have emerged during the same historical period. Taking the example of the French National Front and the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally, which according to Ignazi may be classified as ‘new’, we observe that they were founded approximately thirty years apart. The French party was founded in 1972 whereas the Greek in 2000.

The party’s spatial location in its domestic party system has also been seen as an indicator of belonging to the radical right party family. Ignazi (1997b: 301) suggests that in order to be a member of this family, a party should ‘be located at the right-wing pole of the political spectrum such that no other party is further to the right’. However, it is possible that more than one radical right parties operate in one country. Italy is a prominent example of this. According to Ignazi’s proposition, however, only one party may be characterised as radical right. It is also unclear how far to the right should the parties be in order to be included in the party family in question and whether there is a precise ‘position marking the border between extreme right and moderate right’ (Ignazi 2003: 31). This points to the fact that location in itself may become an imprecise criterion for classification.

Lastly, policy and ideology have been rightly identified as important indicators of party similarity. Analysis of party policy has been based upon methods such as expert surveys (Benoit and Laver 2006) and party manifesto analyses (Budge 2001; Klingemann 2006). This approach has significant analytical leverage as parties belonging to a family are likely to broadly share a similar and coherent system of beliefs as a basis for political
action. The later is defined as ‘a party’s body of normative(-related) ideas about the nature of man and society as well as the organisation and purposes of society’ (Mudde 2000: 19). Mudde (2007) identifies a minimum and a maximum definition of radical right parties. The minimum definition includes one core concept central to and constitutive of radical right ideology, namely the centrality of the nation. Nationalist ideology is understood as ‘an ideology which builds on the idea of the nation and makes it the basis for action’ usually translated in demands for self-determination (Kellas 1991: 21). Nationalism is rooted in the defence of national interests and identity drawing mostly upon the nationalist political doctrine ‘that strives for the congruence of the cultural and the political unit, i.e. the nation and the state’ (Mudde 2007: 16). In this sense, radical right parties ‘seek to provide a sense of solidarity and belonging that binds supporters to their vision of the nation and society’ (Hainsworth 2008: 67). Mudde’s maximum definition also includes the features of authoritarianism and populism. Authoritarianism is defined as the ‘belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely’ (Mudde 2007: 23). Whereas the idea of strict law and order is included in this definition, it does not necessarily imply an anti-democratic sentiment, which is linked with the fact that the party family is entitled ‘radical’ instead of ‘extreme’. Radical right parties may not necessarily advocate anti-democratic policies and institutions but may express distrust for the existing political system. This is directly connected to the key concept of populism as a rhetorical style. Radical right parties tend to see the society as separated into two groups, i.e. the corrupt elite versus the people (Mudde 2007).

This section has pointed to the difficulties in identifying the constitutive elements of the radical right party family. It has shown the inadequacy of approaches, including transnational federations, party name, origins and sociology and spatial location. The main conclusion is that, for the purposes of this study, the policy and ideology approach can be thought as instructive in terms of classifying radical right parties. It must be acknowledged, however, that the researcher should not ‘become too hooked on adopting an essentialist, fit-all interpretation of right-wing extremism but rather to be alert to recognising the style, the discourse, the themes and the issues’ (Hainsworth 2008: 68) integral to this party family. These parties draw upon broadly similar themes and ideas and their ideology can be neatly summarized by three epithets: nationalism,
authoritarianism and populism. Levels of nationalism, authoritarianism and a degree of populist rhetoric are held constant throughout the thesis. Ideological differences among the parties are thought to be too small to account for different levels of Euroscepticism within this party family (see hypotheses later in this chapter and Chapter 4).

2.2 The academic debate

2.2.1 Dimensions of political conflict

The research question of the thesis feeds into the wider debate in the literature on political conflict and European integration. Scholars have sought to explain party positions on European integration with reference to the notion of dimensions of political conflict. They have analysed whether contestation over European integration resolves itself into a single dimension or whether it involves two or more separate dimensions (Steenbergen and Marks 2004: 1). These dimensions are the left/right divide that refers to socioeconomic issues and the more/less integration dimension indicating willingness to give up one’s sovereignty by promoting supranational governance. The fundamental basis for this research is Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) work presenting political mobilisation and cleavages as deeply entrenched structures with the power to polarise the political system and political parties as agents of these societal conflicts. Although there is academic debate on whether these cleavages are frozen as Lipset and Rokkan argued, the literature recognises that they still carry theoretical and explanatory value and that ‘the ideological continuum from left to right is a central organising dimension in Western Europe’ (Steenbergen and Marks 2004: 4).

Based on the above, scholars have put forward four models regarding political contestation over Europe. First, the international relations model suggests that contestation over European integration takes place on a single anti-integration versus pro-integration dimension and that contestation is utterly independent of the left/right divide (Hoffmann 1966; Haas 1968; Moravcsik 1998). Second, the regulation model proposes that European integration is absorbed into the left/right dimension and that the two dimensions are fused in the left/right divide (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). Third, the
Hix-Lord model (1997: 26) puts forward that the left/right dimension remains orthogonal to the more/less integration dimension. The authors argue that major political parties are incentivised to maintain the existing left/right pattern of contestation and when new issues or parties arise on the political agenda, they try to force them on the existing left/right dimension. They thus prefer to ‘compete on the left/right dimension while bottling up competition on issues of European integration’ (Steenbergen and Marks 2004: 6). Finally, the Hooge-Marks model (2001) hypothesises that the politics of European contestation can be explained using a two dimensional approach where the dimensions are not necessarily fused or orthogonal to each other. More precisely, the centre-left prefers ‘regulated capitalism’ and as a result it is likely to become more pro-European as the debate over integration focuses on market regulation rather than market-making. The centre-right, on the other hand, prefers a neoliberal model. It favours combining European-wide markets with minimal European regulation. Once economic and monetary integration is achieved it resists further integration (Steenbergen and Marks 2004: 10).

The above approaches are somewhat dissimilar and generate different expectations about the connection between the issue of Europe and the left/right divide. For the purposes of the thesis’ research question, two issues need to be pinpointed at this point. First, it is clear that all scholars that have sought to address the question of what drives party positions on European integration assume that this puzzle may be explored by using the tools of spatial analysis and representation. This method will thus be employed in order to analyse how the dynamics of party competition in a given domestic context may impact on party positions on European integration (see Chapter 4). Second, the left/right dimension may be thought as a useful predictor of party positions on European integration among party families since the positions or alignments of actors within the left/right space may serve as cognitive and ideological constraints on their general political interaction, including their views on the issue of Europe (Hix 1999). However, the left/right dimension has low explanatory value in analysing within party family differences since ideological variation is not great enough to predict their different positions on Europe. Going back to the first section of this chapter, the thesis has argued that radical right parties are broadly similar in terms of their ideological orientation. This leads to a number of other factors that should be taken into account in explaining
different levels of radical right Euroscepticism, including party type and short and long term political opportunities within the domestic party system.

2.2.2 Party-based Euroscepticism

Since the late 1990s, the literature focusing solely on negative positions on integration has largely expanded. The main debate has been structured in terms of explanations that refer to party specific characteristics and national level characteristics. On the one hand, parties oppose Europe because the latter is antithetical to their deeply entrenched ideological values and beliefs. On the other hand, the dynamics of the wider domestic party system may also impact on a party’s attitude on Europe. In this respect, institutional issues including the electoral system, the configuration of the party system, coalition dynamics and the positions of major potential allies or competitors operating in the same political system may act as catalysts in the formulation of a party’s anti-European position.

Marks and Wilson (2000) have been strong proponents of the party specific explanation of Euroscepticism. The authors focus on the importance of political conflicts that have historically shaped political life in Western Europe. They argue that traditional cleavage theory accounts for a party’s position on European integration and that it is a better guide than using national variations. ‘The new issue of European integration is assimilated into pre-existing ideologies of party leaders, activists and constituents that reflect long-standing commitments on fundamental domestic issues’ (Marks and Wilson 2000: 433). Their argument follows that by paying close attention to a party’s historically embedded predisposition, one can predict or simply ‘read’ how it will respond to a new issue such as European integration. The authors observe that the radical right is ‘distinguished by intense Euro-phobia’, which is linked to their strong nationalism (2000: 457). Radical right parties are ideologically and sociologically predisposed to strongly oppose European integration. Traditional cleavage theory works well to account for a party’s position on European integration and, according to Marks and Wilson, it is a better guide than using national variations.
Along similar lines, Aspinwall (2002) argues that party ideology appears to be a useful indicator of position on European integration. The radical right ‘oppose supranationalism because of the erosion of national power and the threat to national identity this entails, as well as the danger to economic well-being’ (Aspinwall 2002: 87). In examining Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe, Kopecky and Mudde also support this argument. They argue that ‘ideology is the crucial factor in explaining the positions that political parties adopt on issues surrounding the current process of European integration’ (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 321). They suggest that parties do not change their views and positions on the key ideas of the European project. Rather, change of opinion may occur with regards to party positions on the precise functioning of the EU framework. In other words, parties are committed to their general opinions about the European project due to their basic ideological predispositions. They may change their views over time regarding the practice of European integration. The authors argue further that ‘if party ideology plays an important role in determining party positions on the dimension “support for European integration”, we would expect all parties belonging to one party family to have the same position on that dimension.’ (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 320).

Although the work of the above scholars is highly informative regarding different positions on European integration among party families, it is less instructive when seeking to account within party family differences. This approach suggests that European-wide ideological similarities lead parties belonging to the same party family to adopt similar positions on Europe. It disregards, however, the important qualitative differences in levels of Euroscepticism among radical right parties in both Western and Eastern Europe. As the literature has also suggested, this also holds for agrarian and communist parties, some of which have adopted utterly dissimilar policies on Europe compared to their fellow communist or agrarian parties in other European countries (Batory and Sitter 2004; Benedetto and Quaglia 2007). Having said that, it must be recognised that a party’s general values and beliefs is a very useful way of looking at the ‘big picture’ of party positions on European integration. As Aspinwall (2000: 105) suggests ideology serves ‘as a means to reduce transaction costs in determining political support’.
However, this literature tends to treat parties as isolated organisations. On the contrary, parties operate within a political system the dynamics of which can lead them to amend and adjust their values, beliefs and policies. A party’s position in its national party system may also affect its policy orientation towards Europe. Having this in mind, Taggart (1998: 368) has classified political parties as to ‘how they relate to the Euroscepticism they manifest’. He views party positions on Europe through a different prism and argues that the European issue provides a touchstone of domestic dissent. He suggests that ‘Euroscepticism is manifest in political parties in different forms and can be used in different ways’ (Taggart 1998: 368). He identifies that Euroscepticism is mainly demonstrated in single-issue and protest-based parties. For the first group of parties, opposition to European integration constitutes their sole political reason for existence. The second group stands outside the established group of parties and its anti-EU position is an appendage of their general opposition to the functioning of political systems. In a subsequent paper, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000: 7-8) have suggested that protest parties adopt a Eurosceptic stance ‘as a deliberate means of differentiating themselves from the political mainstream’. This analysis suggests that ideology although a significant component in explaining opposition to European integration is not enough to predict it alone. The ‘degree to which ideology serves as a constraint depends partly on the party’s position in the party system and so it is necessary to also consider the relative positions of parties within their respective party system’ (Taggart 1998: 379).

Parties peripheral to their domestic party systems are more inclined to using the issue of Europe as a mobilising issue compared to parties that occupy a central position.

Following a similar logic, Sitter (2001) argues that Euroscepticism is a government-opposition dynamic. Patterns of competition at the domestic level shape the translation of the European question into party politics. Examining party politics in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, highly Eurosceptic countries and where opposition is expressed across the party system, Sitter finds that principled Euroscepticism is not expected to characterise catch-all or cartel parties. When this occurs, it is mainly the consequence of electoral purposes. In interest or value-based parties, such as the Green parties, Euroscepticism is driven by the extent to which these parties perceive the state as an ally or a threat. The old hard left and new politics parties form an ideological and protest-oriented Euroscepticism because they oppose integration as a part of Western
capitalism. The radical right and new populism parties are ‘driven largely by their opposition or protest strategy’ (Sitter 2001: 27). Their stance is a result of their peripheral (almost excluded) position in the party system. Sitter also suggests that in the case when Eurosceptic parties aspire to participate in a governing coalition, they are expected to modify or avoid Euroscepticism because of its potential electoral cost. This literature has been complemented by Batory and Sitter (2004) who explain variation of Euroscepticism within the agrarian party family on the basis of long and short-term policy goals. In their analysis of Communist Euroscepticism, Benedetto and Quaglia (2007) suggest that although there are three sets of factors influencing their EU position, including international, national and party-specific, communist parties have responded primarily to vote and coalition-seeking opportunities. Johansson and Raunio’s (2001) work demonstrates that in Finland party competition and leadership are strong explanatory factors of party responses to European integration while in Sweden public opinion and factionalism provide more explanatory leverage.

It is noteworthy that the explanations in the literature focusing mainly on national level factors, including short and long term opportunities, do not utterly discard the explanatory value of a party’s ideology. This is because ideology and strategy are closely intertwined and it is hard and sometimes counter-intuitive to try to disentangle one from the other. Ideology and strategy are both integral to party behaviour thus sometimes the reasoning works in a step by step process. Indicatively, Batory and Sitter (2004: 525) argue that ‘If a party assesses European integration as a threat to both its (voters’) economic interests and its values or ideology, it is expected to adopt a hard Eurosceptic stance […]. However, if these two conditions do not hold, electoral strategy and coalition tactics shape a party’s incentives regarding Euroscepticism’. The authors demonstrate that there are other important considerations, and not only a party’s identity, which play a significant role in adopting a policy position. Incentives produced by the general political context within which parties operate are important and need to be taken into account when explaining different positions on Europe within a party family. In his analysis of socialist party positions on European integration, Featherstone (1988) argues that the parties have been influenced by the wider domestic political system, including the impact of other political parties, the parties’ perceptions of the impact of European integration on the national economy and some country-specific
historical experiences. He concludes that ‘variation suggests the importance of the national dimensions in policy making’ (Featherstone 1988: 302) and proposes that there is no indication of correlation between left/right attitudes and EU policy across Europe.

This section of the chapter concludes that party deeply-entrenched ideological values and beliefs have important analytical value demonstrating in a European-wide scale how belonging to a party family is associated to a party’s position to European integration. However, this approach can mainly explain among rather than within party family different positions on Europe. While not discrediting these arguments, scholars have also portrayed Euroscepticism as a government-opposition dynamic or a manifestation of domestic dissent among protest based parties peripheral to their national party system. Although the ideological position of a party may provide the researcher with a useful starting point, it does not give enough information to deduce a party’s EU position. Simply put, we cannot ‘read’ a party’s position on European integration by knowing the party family it belongs to. Thus the researcher is pointed towards explanations that refer to a party’s goals and relative position in its national political environment, to which the chapter turns.

2.3 Answering the research question

Parties do not operate as isolated units but on the contrary as units within the wider political context of their domestic party system. Within each national party system, different types of party operate (Katz and Mair 1995) each having different political goals and objectives (Strom 1990). Electoral competition and coalition games shape the opportunity structures and incentives that parties face (Kitschelt 1999), which may have an effect on party policies, including their position on European integration (Batory and Sitter 2004; Benedetto and Quaglia 2007). This section discusses the literature on party types and party behaviour from which it derives the principal hypotheses and argument guiding this research project.
2.3.1 Party types and party behaviour

According to the literature on party politics, parties may be classified and understood with reference to their relationship with civil society and the state as well as their organisational structures (Katz and Mair 1995). Based on the latter, four ‘ideal’ party types have been identified, including the mass, anti-system, catch-all and cartel parties. The mass party type has usually been associated with left wing ideologies as they –at least historically– have mobilised well-defined social groups which have also been the members of these parties. This is the archetypal party model, the relevance of which has waned given the declining levels of party membership and popular involvement (Scarrow 2000). The success of the anti-system party lies in amplifying popular discontent for (Scarrow 1996) and undermining the legitimacy of the system within which it operates. It does not share the values of the regime and its ‘opposition is not an “opposition on issues” […] but and “opposition of principle” (Sartori and Mair 2005: 118). It expresses distrust vis-à-vis politics and its opposition indicates a wish for an ultimate political goal incompatible with the constitutional structures of a given polity. This type of party ‘is marked by its adherence to an imagined community obliging it, and the entire system, to a standard of perfection’ (Keren 2000: 109). Anti-system parties imagine an impossible reality and their reason for existence lies in trying to realise it. The catch-all party variant actively seeks to reduce its ideological differences from its main competitors (Kirchheimer 1966). The political charisma of the party leader is pivotal for the party’s success since the public is not expected to cast its vote on the basis of embedded social divisions and predispositions but rather on trust on the party’s ability to contribute to the efficiency of the political system (Krouwel 2003: 26). The cartel party has been the most recently identified party type. This type is ‘characterized by the interpenetration of party and state, and also by a pattern of inter-party collusion’ (Katz and Mair 1995: 17). The cartel party becomes part of the state and it continues to have access to state subventions and the media both in government and in opposition. This model implies that the most relevant parties in the system cooperate or ‘collude’ in order to gain privileged access to state regulated channels of communication (Katz and Mair 1995: 18). Competition becomes contained and the links of the party with society decrease as the latter becomes agent of the state.
Rational choice theory suggests that there are three models of competitive party behaviour, including the vote, office and policy-seeking party. The vote-seeking party model derives from Downs’ (1957) work on electoral competition, which argues that parties are not only vote seekers but also vote maximisers. The office-seeking party model assumes that parties seek to maximise control over office rather than votes. For office-seekers, votes are valued instrumentally to the extent that they can increase the number of government portfolios in their control (Riker 1962). Policy-seekers try to maximise their effect on policy. This model ‘was developed in response to the “policy-blind” axioms of the first generation of game theoretic studies of government formation’ (Strom 1990: 567). Thus policy-based theories assume that coalitions will occur by policy connected parties (Axelrod 1970). However, the idea of a policy-seeking party may also be employed outside the literature of coalition-making.

It is important to note that ‘Pure vote seekers, office seekers or policy seekers are unlikely to exist’ (Strom 1990: 570). Rather each party may attach higher significance in one of these strategies depending on a variety of factors and most importantly its long and short term objectives within the institutional and partisan constraints, which ‘structure political opportunities’ in any given political environment (Strom 1990: 579). Thus, ‘maximising one goal may entail merely satisfying another, or even fully-blown trade-offs’ (Bakke and Sitter 2005: 244). For the purposes of the thesis, it is assumed that at a given point in time parties will tend to prioritise one of these goals over the others in order to engage with domestic party competition.

2.3.2 Radical right party behaviour

Synthesizing the two literatures on (1) party types and (2) party behaviour may generate expectations on how radical right parties may behave in a given political system conditional upon the type of party they belong to. This synthesis assumes that parties
belonging to the same party family may (1) display characteristics of different party types and (2) may have different objectives within their respective party system.\(^2\)

An anti-system party, given its intrinsic aim to strive to delegitimize the system within which it operates, is more likely to adopt a policy or issue-based approach to party competition.\(^3\) ‘The theory of issue-ownership finds a campaign effect when a candidate successfully frames the vote choice as a decision to be made in terms of problems facing the country that he is better able to handle than his opponent’ (Petrocik 1996: 826). In the context of an anti-system radical right party behaviour, this can be thought as portraying that the party has the only solution to the problems of the society. The party is likely to take a diametrically different position compared to all other parties in a few issues that it considers to be at the heart of its political agenda. The ultimate goal here is to differentiate itself from the other parties and delegitimize the system. For issue-owners, ‘the goal is to achieve a strategic advantage by making problems which reflect owned issues the programmatic meaning of the election and the criteria by which voters make their choice’ (Petrocik 1996: 828). Thus the party will tend to focus its efforts on issues integral to its discursive toolkit, which are intrinsically linked to its political profile and attract a specific niche segment of the electorate. These may include among others immigration, Euroscepticism and corruption.

A radical right party with catch-all elements is more likely to present itself as a political entrepreneur in an effort to make broader appeals and attract electoral support from all segments of the society (Katz and Mair 1995: 12). The catch-all radical right party has abandoned appealing solely to core constituencies, such as small shopkeepers, craftsmen and low level employees. It has been incentivised to drastically reduce its stress on the issues that divide it from the mainstream political forces of the party system. Within the context of the party’s active pursuit of votes from across the political system, a relative de-emphasization of radicalism in the party’s discourse has occurred. Ultimately, this is geared towards attracting the median voter for vote maximisation purposes.

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\(^2\) Note that the mass party type has waned over time and as such it is not discussed further.

\(^3\) Note that the policy-seeking model derives from coalition theories. The idea of ‘policy-seeking’ has been adapted here as issue-based competition in order to apply to small radical right parties.
Radical right parties that actively pursue to become part of the governing cartel have fundamentally different incentives. A cartel party sees politics as a profession in itself and seeks to mitigate the consequences of party competition. Politics become a game ‘in which the limited inter-party competition that does ensue takes place on the basis of competing claims to efficient and effective management’ (Katz and Mair 1995: 19). To the extent that a radical right party actively pursues government participation, its main motivation is to adopt policies that may not directly target the median voter but are close to its major potential governmental allies. The party seeks to prove that it is capable of holding a governmental portfolio and as such the adoption of controversial policies or the pursuit for drastic changes is carefully avoided.

The above can be summarised as follows (also see table 2.1):

- anti-system radical right parties are likely to emphasize ownership of a number of issues in order to differentiate themselves from the rest of the party system

- catch-all radical right parties are incentivised to de-emphasize their radicalism and stress issues that have the potential to tie them to the median voter

- cartel radical right parties are likely to avoid controversial statements or policies

This is directly linked with Meguid’s (2008) refined theory of party competition. Meguid seeks to explain niche party electoral success or failure by suggesting the latter depends on the strategies that mainstream parties adopt on the niche party’s central issue. These include the ‘adversarial’, ‘accommodative’ and ‘dismissive’ strategies. The ‘adversarial’ strategy consists of taking ‘a position on the new issue dimension opposite to the niche party’s’ (Meguid 2008: 29). This behaviour indicates open hostility to the niche party’s stance, stresses the importance of this issue dimension and calls voters to cast their ballot on the basis of this issue. In the ‘accommodative’ strategy, ‘the mainstream party adopts a position similar to the niche party’s’ (Meguid 2008: 28). This (apparent) policy convergence is geared towards undermining the distinctiveness of the
niche party’s issue position in the hope that niche party voters will desert this party in favour of the mainstream. The ‘dismissive’ strategy includes avoiding taking a position on the niche party’s position indicating the low salience of this issue dimension. The ‘mainstream party signals to voters that these issues lack merit’ (Meguid 2008: 28) and effectively ignores it.

The thesis suggests that these strategies can also be employed by niche parties themselves. Transposing Meguid’s theory of party competition to radical right party behaviour and discursive strategy over a particular issue, we can conclude that:

- anti-system radical right parties → adopt an adversarial strategy → emphasize issue ownership → strong policy divergence
- catch-all radical right → adopt an accommodative strategy → de-emphasize their radicalism → apparent policy convergence with mainstream parties
- cartel radical right parties → adopt a dismissive strategy → signal (relatively) low issue salience → avoid controversial statements or policies

Table 2.1 The logic of radical right party competition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party predominant goal</th>
<th>Radical right party type</th>
<th>Target electorate</th>
<th>Party discursive strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy / Issue Votes</td>
<td>Anti-system</td>
<td>Niche</td>
<td>Adversarial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catch-all</td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>Accommodative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cartel</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Dismissive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.3 The hypotheses

Based on this framework, it is argued that the manner in which parties respond to the European issue is conditional upon their wider agenda in their national party system. As discussed above, this wider agenda depends on the party type and whether the party
gives primacy to access to office and a leading role within it, increasing its electoral appeal by appealing to the median voter, or being persistent on pushing a specific policy/issue (Müller and Strøm 1999). These points can also be found in the literature on party-based Euroscepticism that focuses on party competition as the explanatory variable of different levels of Euroscepticism among parties. Sitter’s (2003) and Batory and Sitter’s (2004) framework of party strategic behaviour may be instructive here. The authors suggest that party European attitudes are conditioned upon four party goals, including party organisation and identity, policy, quest for votes and quest for office. However, party identity is not considered as relevant for the purposes of the thesis since, as argued above, the parties under investigation share common broad ideological features. Similarly party organisation is excluded from the analysis as radical right parties enjoy poor levels of organisation and membership and party leaders are relatively unconstrained by the rest of the party (Pedahzur and Brichta 2002).

Anti-system parties seek to increase their votes through anti-mainstream protest. Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000: 7-8) have suggested that protest parties adopt a Eurosceptic stance ‘as a deliberate means of differentiating themselves from the political mainstream’. They seek to appeal to a particular niche of the society that agrees with their vision of a utopian imagined community. In this respect Europe becomes a tool in their long term goals. The situation is different with catch-all or cartel radical right parties. Sitter (2001) finds that principled Euroscepticism is not expected to characterise catch-all or cartel parties, but when it does, it is mainly the consequence of electoral purposes. He also suggests that in the case when Eurosceptic parties aspire to participate in a governing coalition, they are expected to modify or avoid Euroscepticism because of its potential electoral cost (Sitter 2001). Parties adopt moderate positions in order to become part of the governing cartel.
Based on the above, it is hypothesised that:

1. If a radical right party has anti-system elements, it is likely to emphasise ownership of the European issue and adopt a European discourse antagonistic of European integration (adversarial strategy).

   - The party’s anti-European argumentation is likely to be articulated in a manner that will try to be unique to its own worldview and dissimilar from all other parties in the national political system.

2. If a radical right party strives to have a catch-all appeal, it is likely to support the EU ‘under conditions’ (accommodative strategy).

   - These conditions may be set on issues which the party perceives to be considered important by the general public so that it can portray itself as being close to the voters in general and the median voter in particular.

3. If the party’s primary goal is to become part of the governing cartel and a major player within it, it is likely during its quest for power to downplay the issue of Europe and adopt a conciliatory position on European integration (dismissive strategy).

   - Given that it would have participated in decision-making at the EU level, its criticism towards aspects of European integration is likely to have a constructive character. Its European discourse may be connected with another issue associated with ‘high politics’ with which governmental parties are primarily concerned.

It must be clarified that with reference to hypothesis 3, the thesis does not make a deterministic statement regarding the effects of government participation on party policy. There have been many examples of radical right party government participation,
which did not result in dramatic party policy change (for instance the Italian Northern
League or the Austrian Freedom Party). Rather, it is the party’s active willingness to
acquire office and become central in the governmental cartel in it that is likely to be
associated with a ‘compromising’ position on Europe.

2.3.4 The argument

The main argument of the thesis is that the way in which radical right parties respond to
the EU is conditional upon their wider agenda in their national party system. This wider
agenda depends on (1) party type and (2) party predominant goal in the party system.

Protest anti-system parties utterly reject European integration. The adoption of this
policy becomes an opportunity to undermine the legitimacy of both their national
political system as well as the EU. In this manner, they differentiate themselves from the
rest of the party system and signify strong policy divergence. They increase the
European issue’s salience by adopting an adversarial strategy.

Catch-all radical right parties adopt a conditional position on Europe. They avoid radical
statements and select their anti-European discourse on the basis of what they perceive is
close to the median voter’s potential criticisms. This is an accommodative strategy that
signifies a degree of policy convergence with the mainstream parties geared towards
vote-maximisation.

Cartel radical right parties adopt a compromising position on Europe. They downplay
the issue of Europe in order to decrease its salience and avoid contestation on the matter.
This is seen as a dismissive strategy that may increase their chances to participate in
government and occupy a leading role within it (also see table 2.2).
Additionally, the national context becomes significant with regards to how the party chooses to debate and/or politicise the European issue at the domestic level. Parties tend to associate Europe with other issues that they find are of domestic relevance and may help their cause. This becomes increasingly relevant to radical right parties as their discursive toolkit largely draws from the national context.

In short, radical right EU position is explained by long and short term party objectives in the national system. The precise argumentation on the European issue, however, is influenced by the national context and may be linked to another issue of domestic relevance considered to be core to the party’s political agenda. More widely, radical right parties use the issue of Europe for political purposes relevant to their domestic agenda.

2.3.5 Falsifiability

The thesis employs a standard research design whereby an independent variable is identified as explaining a dependent variable. In particular, radical right positions on European integration (dependent variable) are contingent upon party type and party behaviour at the domestic level (independent variable). In Political Science, one ‘should construct theories so that they can be shown to be wrong as easily and quickly as possible’ (King, Keohane et al. 1994: 100). Complying with the concept of falsifiability (Popper 1968), if future research identifies a case exhibiting that a systematic association between party type and position on Europe does not exist, the argument of the thesis could be falsified.
Examples that could lead to the argument’s falsifiability could include a protest party adopting a pro-European position albeit its generic aim to delegitimize the system within which it operates. Another example would be a radical right party striving to generate a catch-all appeal but nonetheless espousing a hard ‘rejectionist’ EU stance or a party seeking to assume a leading role within the governing cartel but opposing Europe. Until such evidence is produced, however, this research project will treat party type and party behaviour as the main independent variable.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has laid out the core similarities among radical right parties. It has argued that they share broad similar ideological characteristics in terms of nationalism, authoritarianism and a degree of populist rhetoric. These features substantiate the comparability of the cases. By reviewing the literature on political conflict and party-based Euroscepticism, the chapter has argued that in answering the research question one should look at the short and long term political opportunities of each party within the domestic party system. Three hypotheses are derived from the literature on party type and party behaviour. It is argued that anti-system parties’ rejectionist European position serves as a tool for differentiation from the rest of the party system. Radical right parties seeking to have a catch-all appeal use the European issue as a vote-maximisation tool. Radical right parties with a strong motivation to enter government and become central within it avoid contestation on the European issue.

The hypotheses and argument are tested in a two-step approach. First, Chapter 4 shows the relative positions of the parties under investigation within their respective party system. This is done through the computerised content analysis of party manifestos during the 1999-2009 decade, which results in a spatial analysis of party positions. It is necessary to consider the ‘relative positions of parties within their respective party system’ (Taggart 1998: 379). This allows the researcher to observe how far or close the radical right party’s policies are from the other parties and generate expectations regarding the party’s behaviour and potential electorate in its national political system. Second, the thesis proceeds with an in-depth analysis of each case study in order to
empirically substantiate the hypotheses of the thesis. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 conduct a qualitative analysis of party stance on Europe and assess how this plays out with party long and short term objectives in the system.

Before embarking on the analysis of what explains different levels of Euroscepticism within the radical right party family, the thesis analyses the nature of Euroscepticism. The following chapter discusses issues of definition and measurement. It provides a novel conceptualisation of the phenomenon and discerns three patterns of radical right opposition to European integration.
Chapter 3 Defining and measuring radical right Euroscepticism

Introduction

Euroscepticism is a social and political phenomenon whose manifestation has become ever increasing since the early 1990s. Used as a term, Euroscepticism has been very popular coined in various contexts. Although its use dates back to the mid 1980s first used in the British press, it has been subsequently employed in different national political, historical and cultural contexts. The ‘transplanted’ usages of the term from one European state to another have ascribed to it various meanings. In common usage, Euroscepticism has come to be a blanket term for any kind of opposition to, doubt about or reservation about the European project.

Scholars interested in the domestic politics of European integration both from a public opinion and political parties’ perspective have sought to describe and define the phenomenon of Euroscepticism. However, they have not directly touched upon the nature and conceptualisation of radical right Euroscepticism. Aiming to fill this gap in the literature; improve the academic understanding of the phenomenon; and establish and reinforce the thesis’ puzzle, this chapter critically evaluates the current definitions of Euroscepticism and suggests an improved conceptualisation of the term directly applicable to the study of radical right opposition to European integration.

Based on the current literature on Euroscepticism, Mair’s (2007) distinction between the policy and polity aspect of the EU and an attentive reading of the Treaties establishing the EU, this chapter argues that radical right parties may be categorised into three patterns of opposition towards European integration. These include the rejectionist, conditional and compromising patterns of Euroscepticism and are identified through the careful examination of party attitudes on four different aspects related to European integration and the EU. These include a cultural definition of Europe, the principle of cooperation at a European multilateral level, the EU policy practice and the desire for building a future European polity.
The chapter is divided into three sections. It first discusses the prominent works in the literature on Euroscepticism assessing the extent to which they apply to the European positions of radical right parties. Second, it proposes the conceptualisation of radical right attitudes to European integration in terms of three patterns of opposition. Third, it conducts qualitative analysis of party literature of twelve radical right parties from ten European countries adding empirical substance to the theoretical reasoning of the chapter. The analysis demonstrates significant qualitative differences within the radical right party family, which has otherwise been understood as similar in terms of its position on European integration.

3.1 Defining negative attitudes towards European integration

3.1.1 A short history of Euroscepticism: the contextual use of the term

Euroscepticism is a widely accepted term describing negative attitudes towards European integration. Conceptualising and defining Euroscepticism has presented researchers with various problems. It is an elusive term emerging from journalistic discourse having assumed different meanings across time and space. Its early uses can be understood as being ‘embedded within the specific British political and historical context’ (Harmsen and Spiering 2004: 16). Indeed, the term was first traced in journalistic articles written for the British press during the mid-1980s when there was a tendency to use the term ‘Euro-sceptic’ interchangeably with that of ‘anti-Marketeer’ (Spiering 2004: 128). This comes as no surprise due to the political climate of the mid and late 1980s where there were great tensions between the then UK Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and the European Commission. The Thatcherite discourse gave the term a connotation of extremism (Spiering 2004: 128) and in the British context the term has come to refer to a position of hostility to and outright rejection of British EU participation (George 2000: 15).

Although Euroscepticism has its historical roots in the United Kingdom, it has progressively become established elsewhere, especially since the process of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Mudde also identifies 1992 as the ‘turning point’ for radical
right parties both in terms of their position on European integration as well as the salience of the issue in their agenda (Mudde 2007: 159). However, ‘where the term “Euroscepticism” is adopted in the context of distinctively articulated national political debates, it assumes a meaning which must be understood relative to the different national political traditions and experiences of European integration which frame those debates’ (Harmsen and Spiering 2004: 17). In this sense, the term may be employed as a portmanteau of any type of opposition to or reservation about the European project. This vagueness of the term is partly reflected in the literature on party-based Euroscepticism, which has yet to suggest a precise definition of this phenomenon.

3.1.2 Definitions in the literature: theoretical contributions and shortcomings

Taggart, being the first scholar to define Euroscepticism, suggested that it is ‘the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’ (Taggart 1998: 366) and argued that Eurosceptic parties are more likely to stand outside the status quo. Over the years, Taggart and Szczerbiak have further developed this definition by suggesting the distinction between hard (principled) and soft (contingent) Euroscepticism. On the one hand, hard Euroscepticism indicates a party’s ‘outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001: 10). Thus hard Eurosceptics advocate withdrawal of their country from the EU due to disagreement with the current conception of the project. This objection ‘comes from the belief that the EU is counter to deeply held values or, more likely, is the embodiment of negative values’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001: 10). On the other hand, soft Euroscepticism is ‘NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008c: 2).

Szczerbiak and Taggart’s definition of Euroscepticism is the most widely accepted in the literature for a number of reasons and not least because it successfully identifies Eurosceptic trends and tendencies within countries and party systems. By applying this
typology on radical right parties, however, one may present a less clear picture of their attitudes and underlying argumentation. As far as the first type is concerned, Taggart and Szczerbiak argue that parties may adopt a hard Eurosceptic position as the EU epitomizes negative values. This assertion holds true in the case of radical right parties. Due to the nationalistic elements of their ideology, these parties consider supranationalism as an enemy of the nation-state. This however presents a conceptual problem as not all radical right parties are hard Eurosceptics. Whereas some seek their country’s EU withdrawal and reject European integration ‘on principle’, others are content to criticise the system from within. Thus, this hard – soft distinction becomes less sensitive to the fact that some radical right parties may not oppose their country’s EU membership and may rather disagree with the way in which the EU project is run. Additionally, the authors rightly argue that soft Eurosceptic parties present concerns over a number of policy areas. Radical right parties, however, are not solely concerned over EU policies but also over the type of EU decision-making and may present conditions under which they would support cooperation at a higher level. The definition of soft Euroscepticism does not capture the further distinction made between opposition to the polity and policy aspects of European integration\(^4\). This distinction is particularly prominent in radical right discourse and will be explained below.

Kopecky and Mudde (2002) have suggested an alternative categorisation of party-based Euroscepticism differentiating between diffuse and specific support for European integration. Drawing from Easton’s (Easton 1965) seminal work on political regimes, they define diffuse as ‘support for the general ideas of European integration’ while specific is defined as ‘support for the general practice of European integration’ (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 300). This framework leads to a two by two matrix of possible party positions structured along the Europhobe/Europhile and EU-optimist/pessimist axes. These include first, the Euroenthusiasts who support both the ideas of European integration and the general practice of integration. Second, the Eurorejects who do not accept either. Third, the Eurosceptics who support the idea of a united Europe but disagree with the general practice of integration. Fourth, the Europragmatists who are against the idea of the EU but support the practice of integration.

\(^4\) This idea is largely based on P. Mair, ‘Political Opposition and the European Union’, Government and Opposition, 2007, 42, 1, pp. 1-17.
European integration. These categories being ideal types, they argue, are serviceable for the qualitative analysis of party positions.

Mudde (2007: 161-165) has used this typology to discuss the European attitudes of populist radical right parties in Europe currently as well as over time. This typology is successful at describing radical right positions on European integration to the extent that it has somewhat (albeit indirectly) incorporated the policy and polity aspect of the EU in the dimensions of diffuse and specific support. However, the four types that are distinguished on the basis of these two dimensions are not entirely relevant to the party family under investigation. The ‘Euroreject’ category can be both theoretically and empirically applicable to this party family. The ‘Eurosceptic’ category is also highly relevant as it is empirically possible for radical right parties to support the idea of cooperation at EU level but not in the shape of the EU. However, the ‘Euroenthusiast’ category is not empirically observable, especially after the process of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty during the early 1990s. Simply put, there are no radical right parties that enthusiastically support the process of European integration. The ‘Europragmatist’ type is also problematic in this regard as principled opposition to the idea of European integration is highly unlikely to lead to favourable positions on the project of the current EU. Mudde (2007: 162) himself accepts this arguing that ‘very few European political parties fall into this category’.

Flood (2002) has suggested a six-point continuum along which he categorises party positions. It starts from the rejectionist position at the one end of the spectrum and ends with the maximalist position at the other end. In between there are four intermediate positions: revisionist, minimalist, gradualist, and reformist. This is an ordinal categorisation of an opposition/support continuum. However, Flood’s categories are rather broad and ‘are not intended to convey any suggestion of a specific content to the positions which they describe, beyond basic stances towards the EU’s development’ (Flood 2002: 5). This, once again, points to the complexity of categorising party positions on European integration given the lack of specific criteria of categorisation.
Drawing upon Taggart and Szczerbiak’s hard and soft Euroscepticism, Rovny (2004) has offered a conceptualisation of Euroscepticism in terms of two scales including the magnitude and motivation. While the combination of degree (magnitude) and the drive (motivation) of Euroscepticism are the typology’s assets, the latter has not made a substantive addition to the literature. Conti (2003: 19) has suggested a typology of party attitudes to integration along a five point continuum: hard Euroscepticism, soft Euroscepticism, no commitment, functional Europeanism and identity Europeanism. Conti argues that the final goal of a hard Eurosceptic party is the radical change of the EU trajectory or country withdrawal shifting power back to member states. Hard Eurosceptics mainly use protest-based language. A soft Eurosceptic party seeks to reform the EU trajectory, prefers integration through intergovernmental institutions and adopts goal-oriented discourse (Conti 2003: 19). The theoretical contribution of this typology remains significant as it puts forward the main components of party attitudes to European integration. Conti suggests the final goal and the mode of integration preferred by each party as well as the language they use. Regarding radical right Euroscepticism, however, this typology fails to capture qualitative differences that range beyond the simple distinction between the hard and soft types.

Sørensen (2008) has defined the nature of public Euroscepticism identifying four broad ideal types including the economic, sovereignty, democracy and social types. Although the aim of her research has been to discuss public EU attitudes, the ‘sovereignty type’ can be instructive in discussing radical right positions on European integration. Radical right ideology is rooted in the defence of national interests and identity drawing mostly upon the nationalist political doctrine ‘that strives for the congruence of the cultural and the political unit, i.e. the nation and the state’ (Mudde 2007: 16). As such, the issue of sovereignty is particularly salient in radical right discourse and differentiates the attitudes of these parties from those of other party families. We can thus group radical right attitudes as mostly belonging to the ‘sovereignty type’. However, Sørensen’s work does not help analyse different European positions of the radical right party family that fall within the sovereignty type to which the chapter turns.
3.2 Conceptualising radical right attitudes on European integration: three patterns of opposition

Aiming to improve the conceptualisation of radical right attitudes towards the EU, this section proposes the categorisation of their positions on European integration into the rejectionist, conditional and compromising patterns. The three categories of radical right party attitudes advanced here are deduced from party positions on four aspects of European integration, which derive from the current literature on Euroscepticism, Mair’s (2007) distinction between the policy and polity aspect of the EU and an attentive reading of the Treaties establishing the EU. These include a cultural definition of Europe, the principle for cooperation at a European multilateral level, the current EU policy practice and the future of the EU polity. They represent four fundamental aspects of the debate on European integration and provide the indicators on the basis of which the three patterns of radical right Euroscepticism are identified.

3.2.1 Four aspects of European integration

The first aspect of European integration is a cultural definition of Europe. The common identity of European peoples is defined as the feeling of cultural, religious and historical bonds among the European nation states. Mudde identifies this definition of Europe based on the Christian, Hellenistic and Roman traditions as present in radical right party discourse. Europe is seen as a civilisation ‘shared by the various different and independent European nations’ (Mudde 2007: 169-170). This definition does not imply that Europe is considered to be above the nation. Rather, Europe as a continent encapsulates the common elements that bind European peoples together and serves to distinguish ‘us’ from ‘others’. This cultural definition of Europe is closely related to a spatial/border definition and becomes the prime justification for the exclusion of Turkey from Europe and, by extension, the EU. Since Christianity is one of the constitutive elements of Europe, its borders must stop to the Urals and the Mediterranean excluding any non-Christian country to the east and south. If Europe accepted a religiously dissimilar country such as Turkey, then the European
construction would lose one of its essential characteristics and would ultimately collapse.

The second aspect discussed here is the ‘principle’ of European integration. This is anchored on the preamble of the Treaty Establishing the European Union stating that the member states are ‘RESOLVED to mark a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the establishment of the European Communities’ (European Union 2002: 9). The ‘principle’ of European integration indicates a party’s wish and willingness for cooperation at a higher multilateral level. This type of cooperation refers only to cooperation within the EU framework even if the structures of the latter are criticised and reform is actively pursued. It does not signify bilateral or trilateral cooperation between selected European states on particular ad hoc policies, including for instance some aspects of trade. In this respect, cooperation under the European Free Trade Area does not imply the support of the principle of European integration. The latter is an agreement providing only for trade, requiring no political commitment and taking place outside the EU framework. On the contrary, the principle of European integration refers to a multi-faceted multilateral agreement with a political character within the EU structures even if the reform of the latter is actively pursued. Thus opposing the principle of European integration entails opposition against ‘not only the government and its policies but also the whole system of governance’ (Mair 2007: 5). The principle of integration also features in Szczerbiak and Taggart’s abovementioned ‘hard/principled’ opposition to European integration as well as Kopecky and Mudde’s ‘Euroreject’ category.

The third and fourth aspects of European integration derive from Mair’s discussion of political opposition in the EU context. They are deduced from the distinction between opposition to the policy and opposition to the polity aspects of the EU and are respectively labelled as the ‘practice’ and ‘future’ of European integration (Mair 2007: 5). The ‘practice’ indicator is also inferred from the TEU’s stipulation according to which ‘The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain

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5 Capitals in the original. The TEU has been selected as the major Treaty establishing the European Union with which all member states are obliged to comply.
its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire’ (European Union 2002: 11). The ‘practice’ of European integration comprises the overall body of EU law and institutional framework, which include the policies administered at the European level as well as the nature of decision-making. Opposition to the practice of European integration becomes opposition to the policy aspect of the EU.

The ‘future’ indicator of the EU refers to the member states’ strong desire to promote European cooperation within the EU political framework with the general aim of creating an ever closer union. This aspect of integration features in the TEU, which specifies that ‘This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (European Union 2002: 10). According to the Treaty, member states recall ‘the historic importance of the ending of the division of the European continent and the need to create firm bases for the construction of the future Europe’ (European Union 2002: 9). Opposition to the future of European integration develops into opposition to the polity aspect of the EU. Note that this implies Euroscepticism because this is ‘at odds with what is the dominant mode of ongoing integration’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a: 8). Table 3.1 below summarises these four aspects.

**Table 3.1 Conceptualising European integration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>The feeling of cultural, religious and historical bonds among the European peoples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle</td>
<td>The wish and willingness for cooperation at a European multilateral level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice</td>
<td>The EU institutional and policy status quo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>The making of a European polity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.2 The three patterns of radical right opposition

In defining the EU in terms of four fundamental features including the definition, principle, practice and future of integration, our understanding of the range of positions available for parties to adopt increases and the analysis becomes more specified. These
four aspects of integration represent the principal point of reference of this study. They provide the researcher with the analytical toolkit integral to the process of identification of potential radical right EU positions. This section argues that radical right Euroscepticism can be categorised into the rejectionist, conditional and compromising patterns.

‘Rejectionist Euroscepticism’ is a position implying acceptance of common cultural, historical and religious European characteristics. However, there is strong opposition to the remaining three aspects of European integration. This includes rejection of the principle of cooperation within the EU framework, disagreement with the European institutional and policy status quo and resistance to the future building of a European polity. It is necessary to manage all policies solely at the national level and to withdraw from the EU at any cost. This position is generally associated with ardent anti-supranationalism and national self-determination discourse. The general aim is to shift power back to the nation state and restore sovereignty of the nation state’s institutions denying the legitimacy of the EU system of governance as a whole. This pattern largely overlaps with Szczerbiak and Taggart’s hard Euroscepticism as well as Kopecky and Mudde’s ‘Eurorejects’.

‘Conditional Euroscepticism’ entails acceptance of the common heritage of European peoples, approval of the principle of European cooperation but hostility to the current policy practice as well as the future building of a European polity. Although the significance of nation state cooperation at a European level is acknowledged, the current institutional balance as well as the policy status quo are unacceptable because they compromise nation state sovereignty. Consequently, closer unification of the European polity is not an appealing option. ‘Conditional’ Eurosceptics accept by and large the system but have objections to the policies and institutions of EU governance. This pattern is usually connected to a conditional wish for European cooperation to the extent that state sovereignty is not compromised by supranational decisions. A ‘conditional’ position on Europe implies the rejection of decisions taken by supranational institutions and the endorsement of reform so that nation state interests are guaranteed. Cooperation has already gone too far and opposition to an ever closer union is strong. Whereas both the practice of integration and the institutional balance of
powers are dismissed, intergovernmental cooperation within the EU structures and in policies deemed beneficial to the nation state is largely supported. To be sure, there is a great variation of the policies each ‘Conditional’ Eurosceptic wishes to be governed intergovernmentally. ‘Conditional’ Eurosceptics tend to favour the creation of a Europe administered by an institutional framework resembling a confederation, namely intergovernmental cooperation without the presence or with limited power of supranational institutions. Legitimacy of the EU project is denied to the extent that a majority of decisions have been taken by supranational institutions and not by the member states.

‘Compromising Euroscepticism’ comprises acceptance of a common European culture, support for the principle and the practice of integration but opposition to the future building of a European polity. ‘Compromising’ Eurosceptics admit that European integration is not necessarily a good thing but that some of its aspects are beneficial to the state. Transferring decision-making power to European institutions is particularly unattractive. However, a degree of integration is necessary for the general prosperity of the state and particularly in the economic domain. Partaking in the EU structures and institutions provides the possibility to (re)negotiate change and reform from within the EU institutional structures in order to promote one’s national interest. This implies a willingness to ‘play by the rules of the game’ aiming to reinforce the EU’s intergovernmental aspect as well as the member states’ decision-making power typically (but not necessarily) to the detriment of supranational institutions. An ever closer union is not acceptable, however, because that would entail reinforcing federalism. Although this pattern of opposition to the EU project has a negative character, it may not necessarily be considered as Eurosceptic; Szczerbiak and Taggart prefer to use the term ‘Euro-criticism’ or ‘Euro-contestation’ when discussing similar types of attitude (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008d: 252).

As seen in table 3.2 below, a cultural definition of Europe is a point of agreement among the three patterns of radical right Euroscepticism. Europe is seen as standing on a tripod composed by ancient Greek democracy, Roman legal tradition, and
Christianity. These three necessary constituent elements provide the basis for a cultural as well as a spatial definition of Europe. They also generate the justification of the almost unanimous position of radical right parties against Turkish EU accession. Furthermore, opposing the future building of a European polity under the auspices of the EU represents the lowest common denominator of radical right negative attitudes on European integration.

Table 3.2 Patterns of radical right opposition to European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects of European Integration</th>
<th>Patterns of opposition</th>
<th>Cultural Definition</th>
<th>Principle of cooperation</th>
<th>Policy practice</th>
<th>Future EU polity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rejectionist</td>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional</td>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromising</td>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>In favour</td>
<td></td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given that, as mentioned above, radical right attitudes on European integration is a case of ‘sovereignty-based’ Euroscepticism (Sørensen 2008), the issue of sovereignty in their discourse needs to be addressed. The transfer of decision-making power to European institutions is prominent within all three types but is viewed in a different manner. Both the ‘rejectionist’ and ‘conditional’ patterns entail strong opposition to supranationalism and ceding one’s sovereignty to the benefit of European institutions. Any type of transfer of sovereignty to European institutions on any type of issue is unacceptable. However, ‘conditional’ Eurosceptics differ to ‘rejectionist’ Eurosceptics on three grounds. First, they recognize that particular issues cannot be resolved exclusively at the domestic level. Second and as a result of the first, they are willing to accept that European countries must actively cooperate at a multilateral level. Third, they agree that cooperation can take place within the EU framework only if the latter is reformed. This entails taking power away from supranational institutions to the benefit

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6 Note that this definition of European identity directly applies to the radical right’s world view and may not necessarily be shared by other parties or the European public. For a detailed discussion of European identity from the citizens’ perspective, see Bruter, M. *Citizens of Europe?: the emergence of a mass European identity*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

7 To clarify, the patterns suggested here are devised in order to provide useful information regarding party discourse. They have indeed an ordinal character, namely ranging from more to less opposition against the EU. However, measuring the exact distance between them is outside the scope of this chapter.
of member states. This sometimes is articulated in a ‘Europe of Nations’ discourse or supporting the prospect of a European confederation.

‘Compromising’ Eurosceptics do not support the transfer of sovereignty either. Nevertheless, they accept –albeit not without criticisms– the current structures of European integration. A degree of European integration is desirable because it brings important economic advantages and prosperity to the member states. The main difference between the ‘conditional’ and the ‘compromising’ patterns in terms of the issue of sovereignty lies in how the current EU framework is treated. Whereas the first push for intergovernmental cooperation in all policy spheres advocating a framework lacking supranational institutions, the latter are willing to act within the existing EU structures, in other words to ‘play by the rules of the game’.

To clarify, the issue of sovereignty to European institutions is prominent within all radical right Eurosceptic patterns. As mentioned above, these parties’ EU position can be broadly grouped as belonging to Sorensen’s (2008) ‘sovereignty type’. However, the act of ceding national sovereignty to European institutions is viewed in a different manner across these patterns. Both the ‘rejectionist’ and ‘conditional’ patterns are fervent opponents of supranationalism and oppose transferring absolute sovereignty to European institutions on any type of policy. However, the ‘conditional’ Eurosceptics are willing to accept that European countries must cooperate at a multilateral level on particular issues, which they believe cannot be resolved exclusively at the domestic level. ‘Conditional’ Eurosceptics usually suggest the creation of a confederation whereby important issues would be dealt with at a higher level while at the same time member states would retain national sovereignty. ‘Rejectionist’ Eurosceptics only accept bilateral nation state cooperation on a case-by-case basis and are against their country’s EU membership.

‘Compromising’ Eurosceptics also adopt a national interest rhetoric criticising the extent to which EU member states have ceded sovereignty towards European institutions. Nevertheless, they accept –albeit not without criticisms– the current structures of European integration. To a degree European integration is desirable as it brings
advantages to the member states. The main difference between the ‘conditional’ and the ‘compromising’ Eurosceptics lies in how they view the current EU framework for European cooperation. Whereas the first do not accept that the EU is the desirable platform for cooperation suggesting alternative frameworks (i.e. a confederal structure), the later are willing to act within the existing structures of the EU. In other words, ‘compromising’ Eurosceptics are willing to play by the rules of the game.

In sum, the demarcation line between the ‘rejectionist’ and the ‘conditional’ Eurosceptics lies in their view on the issue of withdrawal from the EU. The ‘conditional’ Eurosceptics significantly differ from the ‘compromising’ Eurosceptics because they do not accept that the EU is the desirable framework for European cooperation.

3.3 Radical right attitudes on European integration: an empirical overview

This section, which is largely empirical, tests the validity and relevance of the above patterns through a qualitative analysis of party literature of twelve radical right parties from ten European countries (see table 3.3). Radical right parties are defined here on the basis of Mudde’s (2007: 26) suggestion that their ‘core ideology is a combination of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism’. The parties included in this study feature in Mudde’s appendix of populist radical right parties (2007: 305-308). The thesis also studies the Italian National Alliance which only features in Mudde’s 2000 appendix (Mudde 2000: 185). Recent academic discussions have pointed towards the party’s steady evolution towards a conservative party under Gianfranco Fini’s leadership (Ignazi 2005). While agreeing with the conclusions in the literature, it is indisputable that the party has its origins in right-wing radicalism given that it is the offspring of the fascist Italian Social Movement and as such it is included in the current study.

Party programmes have been selected as they are carefully crafted compromises representing the party as a whole and directed both externally to potential voters as well

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8 The chapter does not consider the Greater Romanian Party due to the lack of linguistic skills on the part of the author.
as internally to the party members. The chapter examines party stances as signalled by official party programmes and statements but recognises that the European position may be nuanced within the parties, especially privately. The analysis is based on party manifests during the period 1999-2009 and some secondary sources on the parties. To the extent that this has been possible, both national and European elections manifests have been selected. A qualitative methodological approach is preferred here because it has the potential to unfold the different argumentation of the parties. This will enrich and add qualitative substance to expert surveys’ numerical assessments, which will be discussed both at the end of this chapter and in Chapter 4 of the thesis.

3.3.1 The ‘Rejectionist’ pattern

The parties belonging to this pattern are the French National Front, the League of Polish Families, the British National Party and the Italian Tricolour Flame. These parties display among others similar positions on the issues of sovereignty transfer, European legislation, immigration, enlargement, and foreign policy. Although they accept that European peoples share cultural, historical and religious characteristics, they are against the principle of ceding national sovereignty to non-national institutions and oppose any European legislation or Treaty. They also blame the EU suggesting that it has been one of the sources of their domestic immigration and economic problems. These parties do not accept the principle that nations should cooperate at a higher European level. They advocate that policies must remain strictly national and wish for their country’s EU withdrawal. They clearly reject the EU policy practice and the future building of an EU polity openly questioning the latter’s political legitimacy.

The National Front is a staunch critic of European integration. In the beginning of the 1990s, the party’s EU stance was clear. France should ‘exit the European Union’ (National Front 2002a: 26)\(^9\). Over the years, its position on French EU withdrawal has become slightly indirect but nevertheless existent. The party expresses its wish for the overhauling of the European Treaties. It suggests a tour of European capitals in order to renegotiate the Treaties. In case of failure of agreement with the EU member states, the

\(^9\) Original text: ‘Sortir la France de l’Union européenne’
National Front advocates the organisation of a popular referendum on the question ‘Should France regain its independence vis-à-vis the Europe of Brussels?’ (National Front 2007: 61). This rhetoric indicates that the party advances French EU withdrawal. This should take place in a hassle-free manner, just like a velvet divorce. Indeed, the literature suggests that the party ‘calls for a restoration of French sovereignty and independence and for the exit of France from the EU’ (Hainsworth, O’Brien et al. 2004: 47). The party supports the restoration of the French currency as well as the reestablishment of French internal border controls. In 2004, Jean Marie Le Pen argued ‘Let’s liberate France’ (National Front 2004) while in 2009 that ‘Their Europe is not our Europe’ (National Front 2009).

The League of Polish Families argues along similar lines in favour of Polish withdrawal. The 2008 manifesto maintains the party’s opposition to Polish EU membership and argues that ‘We oppose the incorporation of Poland into the European Union and we will strive so that Polish people reject integration within the European Union in the national referendum’. Thus, in the case of a national referendum, the party would reject European integration (League of Polish Families 2008). The party argues that the EU ‘being a supranational quasi State structure whose interests conflict with those of the individual nation states’ ‘seeks to overshadow national cultures’ and ‘abolishes the independence of individual countries’ (League of Polish Families 2004: 29).

Along similar lines, the British National Party argues ‘Back to British independence’ (British National Party 2001: 1) and ‘Leaving the European Union – The sine qua non’ viewing the EU as an aspiring super state against British interests (British National Party 2005: 5). In the 2009 EP elections the party argued that ‘By voting for the BNP you will be voting to put the interests of Britain and British People FIRST. Our policy

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10 Original text: ‘La France doit-elle reprendre son indépendance vis-à-vis de l’Europe de Bruxelles?’

11 Original text: ‘Liberons la France’

12 Original text: ‘Leur Europe n’est pas la notre’

13 Original in English.

14 Original text: ‘The EU is a - Unia Europejska jest taką poza- i ponadnarodową strukturą quasi-państwową. Posiada interesy często rozbieżne z interesami poszczególnych narodów.’

15 Original text: ‘Unia Europejska dąży do wygaszenia narodowych kultur’

16 Original text: ‘Unia Europejska znosi niepodległość poszczególnych państw’
on the European Union is clear, straightforward and unambiguous: Britain would be better off out of the EU’ (British National Party 2009: 2). The Italian Tricolour Flame indirectly advocates withdrawal arguing that Italy and the European states should restore political sovereignty and that the EU has been artificially created in Maastricht from the elites and without the will of the people (Tricolour Flame 2006: 2).

3.3.2 The ‘Conditional’ pattern

The radical right parties adopting a ‘conditional’ Eurosceptic position strongly differentiate themselves from the ‘rejectionist’ pattern in that they do not maintain that their countries should exit the EU. These are the Austrian Freedom Party, the Belgian Flemish Interest, the Italian Northern League (Lega Nord), the Danish People’s Party, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) and the Bulgarian Attack. For these parties, the EU framework as currently conceived is clearly not the right platform for European multilateral cooperation. In contrast to the previous category, they crucially accept the principle that European peoples need and should cooperate. They refrain from supporting the current policy and institutional practice as well as the future building of a European polity.

As far as the Austrian Freedom Party is concerned, we learn from the literature that it has ‘used the campaign before the general elections to underline its scepticism regarding EU enlargement’ (Pelinka 2004: 216). The party has been sceptical with respect to the lifting of any kind of borders within the Union and has promoted a general rethinking of Austria’s membership (Pelinka 2004: 222). The party has called the European Constitution a ‘madness’. Andreas Mölzer, the party’s only MEP during the legislative period 2004-2009, argues that ‘Europe of the Brussels syndicate has nothing in common with the conception of a Europe of free and sovereign states’ (Mölzer 2007)\(^{17}\). The party has a cultural conception of Europe stating that Europe ‘is grounded in the Western Christian community of values’ (Austrian Freedom Party 2005: 8)\(^{18}\). The party argues that the future of Europe lies in the close cooperation of its peoples. It mentions that the EU is only one part of the European reality and should not

\(^{17}\) Original in English.
\(^{18}\) Original text: Es gründet in der christlich-abendländischen Wertegemeinschaft.
develop to a European federal state. The Freedom Party ‘is committed to a Europe of free and independent homelands as part of a confederation of sovereign Nation states’ (Austrian Freedom Party 2008: 5) calling for ‘the maintenance of Austria's sovereignty in a Europe of nations’ (Austrian Freedom Party 2006)\(^\text{19}\). It supports the radical reduction of EU bureaucracy (Austrian Freedom Party 2009: 1) and rejects enlargement to Turkey (Austrian Freedom Party 2004: 1; 2009: 2). The party puts forward an alternative framework for European cooperation thus accepting the principle of integration. It nevertheless disagrees both with the EU policy practice and the building of a future European polity.

Similarly, the Flemish Interest criticises the EU for being bureaucratic and intruding the sovereignty of the nation state and its people. The party argues that the EU should neither evolve into a political union nor a federation (Flemish Interest 2004: 27). It is critical towards the EU as it is currently conceived arguing that the nation state should take precedence. ‘The Flemish Interest supports a confederal Europe that respects national and self-determination. Not a European superstate, but an intergovernmental or confederal alliance of sovereign nations’ (Flemish Interest 2009a)\(^\text{21}\). The party says ‘Yes to Europe, No to EU Super State’ being ‘against an EU super state that gains more and more control over the internal affairs of the different member states; the nation states have to remain the most important pillars of European cooperation’ (Flemish Interest 2009b)\(^\text{22}\). It does not, however, advocate withdrawal giving preference to intergovernmental cooperation within the framework of a European confederation. It argues that ‘The creation of a federal Europe is impossible and undesirable because Europe is a mosaic of peoples, all having an ancient history, their own language and culture, tradition of law with specific collective goals. There does not exist a European

\(^{19}\) Original text: ‘Die FPÖ bekennt sich zu einem Europäer freien und unabhängigen Vaterländer im Rahmen eines Staatenbundes souveräner Nationalstaaten.’

\(^{20}\) Original text: ‘Die FPÖ fordert die Aufrechterhaltung der Souveränität Österreichs in einem Europa der Vaterländer’

\(^{21}\) Original text: ‘Het Vlaams Belang is voorstander van een confederaal Europa dat de eigenheid en het zelfbeschikkingsrecht van de naties respecteert. Geen Europese superstaat, maar een intergouvernementele of confederaal samenwerkingsverband van soevereine naties.’

\(^{22}\) Original text: ‘Verenigd Europa ja, superstaat EU neen Wij zijn tegen een EU-superstaat die steeds dieper ingrijpt in de interne aangelegenheden van de verschillende lidstaten; de natiestaten zijn en blijven de peilers van verdere Europese samenwerking.’
identity in the same sense as an American identity. No one considers themselves primarily Europeans and then Italian or Swedish.’ (Flemish Interest 2009c: 6)\textsuperscript{23}

Conti (2003: 27) finds that the Northern League’s position has changed from a supportive to a much more radical stance. Quaglia (2003: 18) also indicates this shift arguing that it is consolidating its Euroscepticism. Indeed the party criticises the European institutions for not being close to European citizens and for not respecting the traditions and cultures of European peoples. The party promotes a ‘Europe that is a free association of European peoples’ (Northern League 2004: 1)\textsuperscript{24} but is against the creation of a European federal state arguing that their vision of Europe is not one of ‘a centralised super-state led by technocrats who are politically irresponsible for their actions’ (Northern League 2004: 1)\textsuperscript{25}. It argues that ‘we must construct a Europe that is founded on the respect of national and territorial realities, giving the European Union only a limited degree of sovereignty, delimiting its competences and the fields of its intervention avoiding ambiguities’ (Northern League 2006: 26)\textsuperscript{26}. For the party, ‘integration means pursuing our commonalities but also embracing our specificities’ (Northern League 1999: 2)\textsuperscript{27}. ‘We are in favour of a confederal model in which the various member states maintain their sovereignty and where the regional and territorial specificities are recognised’ (Northern League 2009: 61)\textsuperscript{28}. The party is also against the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty supporting its ratification through the means of a referendum (Northern League 2008). Thus whereas the Northern League

\textsuperscript{23} Original text: ‘Een federaal Europa is onmogelijk en ongewenst omdat Europa een mozaïek is van volkeren, allemaal met een eeuwenoude geschiedenis, met een eigen taal en cultuur, rechtstraditie en met eigen specifieke collectieve doelstellingen. Er bestaat geen Europese identiteit in dezelfde zin als er een Amerikaanse identiteit is. Niemand beschouwt zich in de eerste plaats Europeaan en pas daarna Italiaan of Zweed.’

\textsuperscript{24} Original text: ‘la realizzazione di un’Europa che sia una libera associazione dei popoli europei.’

\textsuperscript{25} Original text: ‘L’Europa dei Popoli non è quindi un Super Stato neo-centralista guidato da tecnocriti politicamente irresponsabili del loro operato’

\textsuperscript{26} Original text: ‘si deve cercare di costruire un’Europa fondata sul rispetto delle realtà nazionali e territoriali, cedendo all’Unione Europea solo una limitata parte di sovranità, delimitando chiaramente le proprie competenze; vanno delimitati con precisione gli ambiti di intervento dell’Unione Europea, evitando norme ambigue ed indefinite

\textsuperscript{27} Original text: ‘Integrare significa ricercare tutto ciò che è comune e valorizzare tutto ciò che è specifico.’

\textsuperscript{28} Original text: ‘Ecco perché vogliamo un’Unione europea retta su un modello confederale, in cui i vari Stati membri mantengano inalterate le proprie sovranità, e dove le Regioni e i territori vedano riconosciuti le proprie specificità e differenze’
accepts the principle of EU cooperation, it discards the current policy arrangements and rejects future EU cooperation.

Whereas the Danish People’s Party is against European unification and suggests that the EU must not gain power over the member states, it sustains that particular policies may be dealt with at a European multilateral level. In its 2002 programme, the party argues ‘The Danish People's Party wishes friendly and dynamic cooperation with all the democratic and freedom-loving peoples of the world, but we will not allow Denmark to surrender its sovereignty. As a consequence, the Danish People's Party opposes the European Union.’ (Danish People's Party 2002)\textsuperscript{29}. Danish sovereignty is very important to the party and as a result, ‘nothing can be put above the Danish Constitution’ (Danish People's Party 2002)\textsuperscript{30}. Whereas the party argues against European unification suggesting that the EU must not gain power over the member states, it promotes particular policies of its interest that should be dealt at a European multilateral level ‘We oppose the development of the EU which is going towards the United states of Europe. The Danish People's Party wants a close and friendly cooperation in Europe (Danish People's Party 2004) but cooperation should be limited to areas such a trade policy, environmental policy and technical cooperation. We oppose the introduction of a European political union’ (Danish People's Party 2002)\textsuperscript{31}. The party believes that the EU’s functions ‘must be limited to: issues that great member-state majorities wish to be addressed through the EU, where cross-border nature of issues calls for common solutions and where economies of scale call for common solutions’ (Danish People's Party 2007)\textsuperscript{32}. Whereas in 1999 the party was adamantly against the EP accusing it for various scandals (Danish People's Party 1999), in the 2000s it agrees to a Parliament with controlled functions (Danish People's Party 2004). The party supports cooperation

\textsuperscript{29} Original text: ‘Dansk Folkeparti ønsker et venskabeligt og dynamisk samarbejde med alle demokratiske og frihedselskende nationer i verden, men vi vil ikke acceptere, at Danmark afgiver suverænitet. Heraf følger, at Dansk Folkeparti er modstander af Den Europeiske Union’

\textsuperscript{30} Original text: ‘Det betyder, at intet må sættes højere end den danske Grundlov’

\textsuperscript{31} Vi er modstandere af udviklingen i EU, som går i retning af Europas Forenede Stater. Dansk Folkeparti ønsker et tæt og venskabeligt samarbejde i Europa, men samarbejdet skal begrænses til områder som handelspolitik, miljøpolitik og teknisk samarbejde. Vi er modstandere af indførelsen af en europæisk politisk union.

\textsuperscript{32} Original text: ‘Dansk Folkeparti mener, at EU’s funktioner skal indskrænkes til at omfatte: * opgaver, som store befolkningsfertal i medlemslandene ønsker at løse gennem EU, ** opgaver, hvis grænseoverskridende karakter nødvendiggør fælles løsninger, *** opgaver, for hvilke der er afgørende stordriffsfordele i fælles løsninger.’
in general but opposes the introduction of a European political union or a federal state (Danish People's Party 2004) and argues that Denmark shall remain a sovereign state especially as far as its borders are concerned.

Similarly, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally sustains that the future of Greece is linked to a great extent to the EU. However, this can only occur within the context of a confederation whereby member states would recognise and protect their historic, cultural and ethnic roots as well as the ethnic characteristics of the European peoples (LAOS 2007: 23). ‘Greek EU integration can only occur within the context of a Confederation and only under the condition that our national specificities would be protected’ (LAOS 2003: 12)\textsuperscript{33}. LAOS ‘does not deny Greece’s European identity’ (LAOS 2003: 8)\textsuperscript{34} accepting ‘a Europe of nations’ (LAOS 2004: 2)\textsuperscript{35} whereby European nation states would cooperate in matters of mutual interest. However, the party expresses strong criticisms against the EU’s current and future trajectory arguing that the European Constitution’s goal is to ‘destroy our national sovereignty and abolish the differences between peoples’ (LAOS 2005: 1)\textsuperscript{36}.

Lastly, the Bulgarian Attack does not dedicate much space in its electoral programme on the EU, indicating the low importance of the issue in the party’s agenda. The EU is briefly discussed in the foreign policy section arguing that Bulgaria’s foreign relations must be expanded to include not only the EU but also other states (Attack 2009). This indicates that although the party is a fervent supporter of the maintenance of national sovereignty, it accepts the existence of the EU as a foreign policy actor. While it seeks to reinforce foreign relations with other states, it does not find Bulgaria’s EU withdrawal as a desirable alternative.

\textsuperscript{33} Original text: ‘Η ενσωμάτωση επομένως της χώρας μας στη Ε.Ε. μπορεί να γίνει μόνο στα πλαίσια μιας Συνομοσπονδίας και υπό τον όρο ότι θα προστατεύεται η ιδιαιτερότητά μας’

\textsuperscript{34} Original text: ‘Ο ΛΑ.Ο.Σ. δεν αρνείται την ευρωπαϊκή ταυτότητα της Ελλάδος,’

\textsuperscript{35} Original text: ‘Εμείς δεχόμαστε μια Ευρώπη των Εθνών’

\textsuperscript{36} Original text: ‘Στοχεύει μάλιστα στην αλλοτρίωση της εθνικής ταυτότητας και την κατάργηση της διαφορετικότητας των λαών.’
3.3.3 The ‘Compromising’ pattern

The parties belonging to this pattern agree with the principle for cooperation and the policy practice of European integration. They also acknowledge that their country’s economic prosperity is largely a result of cooperation within the EU framework. These parties are the Italian National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale) and the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom (Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK). They suggest that the EU should be reformed within its existing structures and refrain from proposing an alternative framework for cooperation, such as the confederation argued by some of the parties belonging to the ‘conditional’ pattern. Nevertheless, they are not active proponents of further integration nor do they promote the uploading of further national policies to the European level.

In his analysis of party positions on integration in Italy, Conti argues that the Italian National Alliance attaches particular importance to the nation. It ‘rejects the idea of a federal Europe and supports one of a looser union where the power of nation states is preserved and the outcomes of European integration are systematically checked’ (Conti 2003: 26). It argues that national specificities constitute Europe’s wealth and the EU should not ‘negate the nation state but rather constitute a Confederation of nation states; in this sense the states and their interests would contribute to rather than obstruct the formulation of the European interests and priorities’ (National Alliance 2002: 6)\(^\text{37}\). In this respect, Italy should not entrust itself to Europe but contribute to remake Europe taking into account Italian specificity (National Alliance 2006a: 13). The party is against abandoning national sovereignty arguing that ‘The Right has always argued in favour of a Europe of nations rich by its identities and cultures that should be respected and cannot be reversed by a Super State’ (National Alliance 2004: 6)\(^\text{38}\). Nonetheless, the party supports a number of EU policies including technology, energy and the Lisbon Agenda as well as the reduction of the transatlantic technology gap with

\(^{37}\) Original text: ‘non annullando gli Stati nazionali bensi costituendo una Confederazione di Statinazione; in questo senso gli Stati e gli interessi nazionali contribuiscono e non sono di ostacolo alla formazione dell’interesse e delle priorità europei.’

\(^{38}\) Original text: ‘Ma la Destra ha anche sempre affermato il valore di un’Europa delle nazioni, ricchezza plurima di identità e culture, che vanno alimentate e rispettate e non possono essere annullate in un super Stato informe’
particular focus on the energy security, the liberalisation of the market, the completion of the Trans-European Energy networks, and the support for renewable energy. Moreover, albeit without explicitly referring to Turkey, the party welcomes 'new countries from Europe, which grows geographically and politically starting with the immediate neighbours where the Italian projection is very important (Southeastern Europe and the Balkans)' (National Alliance 2006a: 9)\(^{39}\). The Italian National Alliance feels that it is a European force and intends to contribute to the process of EU reform. The party views integration through a cost-benefit analysis approach and seeks to reinforce the Italian national interest through participating in the European institutions (Conti 2003). This clearly indicates that the party has accepted that it should promote Italian interests within the existing EU structures.

Likewise, the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom argues that the EU must be strengthened only as an association of member states and that Latvian politicians should work hard to achieve advantageous conditions for their country within the EU (For Fatherland and Freedom 2006). Latvia is seen as part of the western European cultural and historical heritage. The party supports Latvia’s EU integration. The latter is considered as a means to stabilise the independence and democratic statehood of Latvia. As an EU member, however, Latvia should not diminish its national identity and cultural distinction and should always seek to maintain its national interest. ‘We will strengthen member state national sovereignty’ (For Fatherland and Freedom 2004: 1)\(^{40}\) working to achieve advantageous conditions for Latvia and Latvian citizens. ‘We support a Europe where the EU and the member states share accountability and responsibilities, rather than the creation of a federal Europe or a "superpower". The EU should have competence in issues where it can act more efficiently than individual member states’ (For Fatherland and Freedom 2009: 1)\(^{41}\). ‘The European Parliament platform should not contribute to the erosion of Latvian and national sovereignty’ (For

\(^{39}\) Original text: ‘di nuovi paesi in un'Europa che si amplia geograficamente e politicamente, a cominciare dai icini prossimi dove massima è la proiezione italiana (Europa sud - orientale e balcanica).’

\(^{40}\) Original text: ‘Mēs stiprināsim ES valstu nacionālo suverenitāti.’

\(^{41}\) Original text: ‘Mēs atbalstām tādu Eiropu, kur atbildība un pienākumi tiek solidāri dalīti starp ES un dalībvalstīm, nevis federālas Eiropas "supervaras" radišanu. ES kompetencē jābūt tiem jautājumiem, kuros tā var rikoties efektīvāk nekā individuāla dalībvalsts.’
Fatherland and Freedom 2009: 2\textsuperscript{42}. Latvia’s EU aim is not to delegate too much of its sovereignty but to achieve a union of free and equal nation states in favour of the principle that member states can be the decision-makers in important policies, including foreign policy, defence, security and taxation (For Fatherland and Freedom 2004: 1).

Both parties have thus accepted that they should promote and strengthen their country’s position within the existing structures of the EU. In other words, they have accepted to play by the ‘rules of the game’.

**Table 3.3** Radical right party positions on European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patterns of opposition to European integration</th>
<th>Rejectionist</th>
<th>Conditional</th>
<th>Compromising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td>Austrian Freedom Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td>Flemish Interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td>Attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td>Danish People’s Party</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>National Front</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td>Popular Orthodox Rally</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tricolour Flame</td>
<td>Northern League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>For Fatherland and Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>League of Polish Families</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td>British National Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above analysis has resulted in the categorisation of four radical right parties in the ‘rejectionist’ pattern, six parties in the ‘conditional’ pattern and two in the ‘compromising’ pattern. Since one of the aims of this chapter has been to provide qualitative support for quantitative assessments of party positions, it is worth comparing the results of this study to those of the latest 2006 Chapel Hill survey (Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010). As seen in table 3.4 below, they largely overlap. On the question ‘Overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration’, the National Front

\textsuperscript{42} Original text: ‘Eiropas Parlamenta tribīne nedrīkst tikt izmantota Latvijas un citu dalībvalstu suverenitātes graušanai,’

85
and the League of Polish Families score respectively the lowest scores. The opposite is true for the Italian National Alliance and the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom. Six parties rank somewhere in the middle. Note that the Chapel Hill Survey has not measured the EU positions of the British National Party and the Italian Tricolour Flame.

**Table 3.4** 2006 Chapel Hill party scores on the question ‘Overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern</th>
<th>Party name</th>
<th>Chapel Hill Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rejectionist</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>League of Polish Families</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tricolour Flame</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austrian Freedom Party</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Danish People’s Party</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flemish Interest</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern League</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Popular Orthodox Rally</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromising</td>
<td>For Fatherland and Freedom</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Alliance</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (1=strongly opposed; 7=strongly in favour)

**Conclusion**

In an attempt to provide a bridge between the literature on radical right parties and the study of Euroscepticism, this chapter has proposed the conceptualisation of radical right opposition to European integration into the rejectionist, conditional and compromising patterns. It has presented for facets of European integration, including the definition of Europe, the principle, the policy practice and the future building of a European polity. It is on the basis of these four indicators that the three patterns have been identified. This chapter has lastly provided a qualitative analysis of party literature aiming to improve our understanding of the nuanced radical right anti-EU argumentation. By building on our existing knowledge of these parties’ EU positions from expert surveys, it has
systematically mapped and analysed the nature of radical right Euroscepticism during the 1999-2009 decade.

The identification of four fundamental aspects of European integration may become helpful in providing a solution to the wider problem of measuring the dependent variable, i.e. different levels of Euroscepticism. They can add precision and clarity when assessing a party’s position on Europe and may be used to identify similar patterns within different party families. This, however, is true with a caveat. The definition of Europe may need to be refined in order to apply to other party families. The usefulness of this three-fold conceptualisation of radical right Euroscepticism lies in identifying the nuances of the phenomenon in descriptive terms. The three patterns have also an analytical purpose since different patterns of Euroscepticism may be associated with different party behaviour at the domestic level.

The qualitative analysis of party literature demonstrates that, although these parties belong to the same party family, they display three utterly different patterns of opposition to European integration. This is a striking finding for a number of reasons. First, it provides evidence to support that radical right parties do not only differentiate themselves from other party families given that they adopt a ‘sovereignty type’ Euroscepticism. They also seek to differentiate themselves from each other. Second, it demonstrates that radical right parties although highly nationalistic in character, do not present themselves as being anti-European in the wider sense of the term. They willingly accept the common aspects shared by European peoples because these serve to distinguish ‘us’ from the ‘others’. Third, and perhaps contrary to common ‘journalistic’ wisdom, not all radical right parties oppose European integration to the extent of pushing for their country’s EU withdrawal. Instead, some radical right parties are rather pragmatic in their approach to integration.

These findings have important implications in terms of possible explanations of party-based Euroscepticism. Arguably the issue of European integration may be assimilated into pre-existing ideologies that reflect long-standing commitments on fundamental domestic issues. Traditional cleavage theory may account for general party response to
European integration (Marks and Wilson 2000). However, the findings of this chapter demonstrate that traditional cleavage theory is less able to explain the extent of opposition or to predict different types of argumentation within a given party family. Other predictors of party-based Euroscepticism, including the national context and party strategic objectives within the domestic party system may also have explanatory power. This is especially true for radical right parties. Given that nationalism is core to their ideology, their European position may be largely influenced by the national context. A comparison of radical right party policies and preferences across Europe ‘can tell us a great deal about the boundedness of the various party families’ (Treschel and Mair 2009: 2). It can offer great insights into how an issue may be emphasized in different political settings and provide some hints regarding the association between the issue of Europe and the dynamics of party competition in EU member states. To this aim, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 intend to analyse in detail radical right party motivations behind adopting a different type of Euroscepticism by focusing on the French National Front, the Greek LAOS and the Italian National Alliance.

Before doing so, the following chapter uses two datasets in order to make a graphic representation of how the phenomenon of radical right Euroscepticism manifests itself across Europe. Moreover, it uses the tools of spatial analysis in order to provide a visual and spatial overview of the structure of electoral competition in the political systems where the thesis’ case studies operate, namely France, Greece and Italy.
Chapter 4

A spatial representation of radical right Euroscepticism

Introduction

Contrary to what has been argued in the literature, the third chapter of the thesis has substantiated that in fact the radical right party family displays dissimilar positions on European integration. The second chapter outlined the hypotheses deriving from the literature on party types, party behaviour and party-based Euroscepticism, which are used as the theoretical guidelines of this chapter. The hypotheses originate from the perspective of a party’s type and its expected behaviour in the party system. More precisely, it is hypothesised that (1) if a radical right party has anti-system elements, it is likely to adopt a European discourse antagonistic of European integration; (2) if a radical right party strives to have a catch-all appeal, it is likely to support the EU ‘under conditions’ and (3) if the party’s primary goal is to become part of the governing cartel and a major player within it, it is likely to downplay the issue of Europe and adopt a conciliatory position on European integration.

Following from the above, the aim of this chapter is two fold. First, it analyses the general patterns and dynamics of radical right Euroscepticism. It employs data from two sources, namely the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey (Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010) and the 2009 European Election Study (EES 2009). Research is conducted in an exploratory manner in order to demonstrate how the phenomenon of radical right Euroscepticism manifests itself across Europe. The objective is to confirm that policy and ideology can be broadly kept similar among radical right parties, but that their positions on European integration specifically diverge.

Second, it uses the tools of spatial analysis in order to provide a visual and spatial overview of the structure of electoral competition in France, Greece and Italy. Using
computerised content analysis of party manifestos during the 1999-2009 decade, the chapter presents the case studies’ positions in comparison to the rest of the party system. This helps generate expectations regarding the three parties’ behaviour in the political system as well as the potential electorate they may appeal to. It is argued that the French National Front’s position in the French political system is very marginal. In contrast, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally’s position is comparatively closer to other parties and much less isolated from the rest of the party system. The Italian National Alliance occupies the centre-right space in the system although there is no party of political significance situated to its right.

The chapter commences with a discussion of the dimensionality of domestic politics and proceeds with an evaluation of where radical right parties lie on the axes of political contestation across Europe. It continues with a short discussion of the computerised content analysis method. The last part of the chapter presents the results of the content analysis in France, Greece and Italy analysing party location within each political system. The findings are discussed with reference to the main hypotheses of the thesis.

4.1 Dimensions of politics and structure of domestic party competition

This section discusses the dimensionality of European politics and maps radical right parties on the main axes of political contestation. This allows the author to compare radical right parties cross-nationally. By examining the radical right party family across Europe using two datasets, two main points may be discerned. First, the parties under investigation vary very little in terms of their position on the left-right and libertarian-authoritarian dimensions. Second, great variation can be discerned in terms of their position on European integration.

4.1.1 Axes of political contestation

It is widely acknowledged in the literature of comparative politics that ‘Most theories of political behaviour assume that the dimensionality of the political space is exogenously determined by social or value divisions’ (Hix 1999: 72). Political parties respond to
these societal value divisions -or cleavages- and are constrained by the political space, which is consecutively constructed in their domestic party system. According to Kitschelt, the three values captured by the slogan of the French Revolution ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’ are the principal social values endorsed by citizens in every political context and are responsible for creating dichotomies of interests. Each of these values ‘envisions societal end-states associated with different, at times complementary, but more often conflicting modes of social organisation’ (Kitschelt 1994: 9). Consequently ‘the programmatic content of political competition in contemporary democracies constitutes nothing but the perpetual struggle to cope with the trade-offs among the three ultimate values’ (Kitschelt 1994: 9), which are translated into social practice.

The first societal value refers to the liberty in the market, namely to the trade-off between market and planned allocation of resources. Second, the value of equality relates to the principle of collective organisation binding all members of the society. These two values ‘mutually presuppose each other [and] beyond a threshold the two principles are associated with rival forms of organisation’ (Kitschelt 1994: 9). This occurs because proponents of the value of equality over that of liberty tend to prefer formal collective forms of political and economic organisation, usually provided by a strong state, over spontaneous market allocation of resources among groups and individuals. The political decision on this trade-off has been a major source of political polarisation in modern democracies. It clearly epitomises the political answer to the questions on how scarce resources must be allocated and which decision-making procedure must regulate this process. Because these two values presuppose one another, they are depicted in the literature by a single dimension of political contestation, namely the ‘distributive’ axis illustrating the decision on the economic allocation of resources. Here, this axis is referred to as the socialist-capitalist axis, the socialist pole indicating state-planned economy and egalitarian distribution of resources whereas the capitalist end of the axis representing complete market allocation of resources and individual economic freedom.

The third value, fraternity, refers to the communitarian social order. The trade-off here is between exclusive and inclusive structures of the community and social values exemplified by on the one hand independent self-organised communities and
paternalistic societal hierarchy on the other. This trade-off is depicted in the libertarian-authoritarian axis of political contestation and includes primarily positions on several non-economic societal issues. This axis may be thought to be independent from the distributive axis because the choice over the social aspects of the community does not tend to predict the choice on the allocation of resources. There is the theoretical and empirical possibility that a libertarian supports either market allocation of resources or state intervention. Similarly, there can be both economically right-wing and left-wing authoritarianism. Admittedly, economically left-wing socialist parties are much more likely to be libertarian but this does not exclude the possibility of a capitalist libertarian party, such as many liberal parties in Europe. The same applies to authoritarianism: right-wing authoritarianism is much more likely to occur but this must not preclude left-wing authoritarianism, including (post-) fascist and hard-line communist parties.

Based on the above, which are derived from Ktischelt’s work on political parties (1994; 1995) as well as Marks and Steenbergen’s findings on the interaction between European integration and national political conflict (2004), it can be reasonably claimed that the European national party systems are two-dimensional in character. These two dimensions represent the major issues of political division in Europe and cut across each other. The first is contestation over economic redistribution, welfare and regulation of the economy. This is more accurately depicted by the socialist-capitalist axis and expresses the class conflict over resources. The second summarising the contestation over non-economic social issues and the structure of the community is depicted by the libertarian-authoritarian axis. This dimension ‘captures conflict about traditional values rooted in a secular/religious divide’ (Marks, Hooghe et al. 2006: 157). These two dimensions summarise how actors position themselves on major issues and on the basis of the finding that they cut across each other, four quadrants of a party’s ideological identity may be identified. These are clock-wise the libertarian-socialist, libertarian-capitalist, authoritarian-capitalist and authoritarian-socialist.

Given that positions such as left-libertarian and right-authoritarian are comparatively more common than intervention-authoritarian and free market-liberalism, scholars including Hix (1999) and Benoit and Laver (2006) have subsumed the two axes into a single left-right dimension. The left-right axis has been the traditional way to represent
deeply-entrenched views containing both positions on the economy and the structure of the community in a much simpler and parsimonious manner. There are advantages and disadvantages in subsuming party positions on both politics and economics in one axis. One the one hand, including the social and economic dimension into the left-right axis of political contestation tends to increase parsimony. On the other hand, breaking them into two dimensions undeniably increases accuracy and may indicate that there are growing numbers of conflicts that resist assimilation into a single dimension. For the purposes of this chapter and based on data availability, the positions of radical right parties will be spatially represented on all three dimensions. This may allow the researcher to discern whether these two types of representation tell a different or a similar story as far as radical right policy and ideology is concerned.

Since the end of the 1990s with the beginning of party contestation over Europe, scholars increasingly employ a fourth dimension, namely the pro-anti integration dimension. This refers to parties’ overall orientation towards European integration. Actors are positioned on a continuum from ‘more’ to ‘less’ integration. The ‘process of political integration creates a (centre-periphery) division between groups whose identity and interests are threatened by integration and those whose identity and interests are protected’ (Hix 1999: 73) This dimension is somewhat an aggregate of party positions on a number of issues related to the EU, including among others the deepening of European integration, support for a number of EU policies, the transfer of power to EU institutions etc. It will be employed below in order to depict radical right party positions on European integration across Europe.

4.1.2 Method and data

For the spatial analysis, two types of data have been employed in two points in time during the 2000s. The first are the data provided by the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey (Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010), which collected information from expert surveys on party positions on different policy dimensions. This data measure party positions on a number of policies in Europe during the first part of the 2000s and are presented in terms of dimensions. The authors argue that ‘When the object of inquiry is complex, it makes
sense to rely on the evaluations of experts — that is, individuals who can access and process diverse sources of information.’ (Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010: 689). Expert surveys allow the researcher to construct dimensions deductively. This method can also summarize the judgements of experts in a systematic way (Benoit and Laver 2006: 9). It has been argued, however, that the approach may be treated with some caution (Mair 2001). There may be potential pitfalls with the method regarding the expert selection, the question wording (Budge 2006) and the actual reliability of the estimates as some experts may provide information regarding the leadership rather than the party as a whole (Budge 2002).

Given the potential criticisms of expert surveys, this data has been complemented by those from the 2009 European Parliament Election Study (EES 2009; Braun, Mikhaylov et al. 2010). This is a dataset emerging from the quantitative content analysis of party manifestos for the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections. The EES coding relies on the Comparative Manifesto Group’s (CMP) method (Budge 2001; Klingemann 2006) and it is very different to that of the Chapel Hill. It consists of breaking down the text of European party manifestos into ‘quasi-sentences’, which are defined as arguments or basic units of meaning. It proceeds by assigning each of these quasi-sentences into one of a number of pre-defined domains and issue categories (Klingemann 2006). Instead of measuring party positions on a specific dimension, this method is built around the assumption that ‘some policy issues are “important” to specified individuals in a given political context and others are not’ (Laver 2001: 69). It is based around a specific model of party competition, which assumes that parties compete ‘in terms of the salience of particular issues in the policy package that they put to voters’ (Laver 2001: 72). This method measures the salience of an issue in a party’s agenda. It is operationalised not as the party’s substantive position on an issue but as the relative emphasis the party attaches to a given issue. Thus, the results of this coding are presented in terms of percentages, which intend to measure each party’s ‘relative emphasis’ on the predefined issues. By measuring issue salience, the CMP method seeks to 'reflect both strategic considerations of how to shape policy positions in the current election so as to consolidate or attract votes, and the constraints imposed by long-standing ideology' (Klingemann 2006: 108; emphasis in original). The idea behind this
reasoning is that party programmes are not only a reflection of a party’s ideology. Instead it is the effect of a mixture of strategic and ideological calculations.

To be sure, this approach has not been free from scholarly criticism either. Concerns have been raised, among others, regarding the theoretical groundings of the coding scheme and the reliability of the coding procedure (Benoit, Mikhaylov et al. 2008). This is the main reason behind the author’s choice to employ both datasets. If both datasets produce similar calculations of party policy in terms of (1) the pro-anti EU integration dimension and (2) the general left – right dimension, the author can safely argue in favour of reliability of the results.

Before proceeding with the analysis, a few words must also be allocated to the sample. This section conducts a medium-N analysis and focuses on twelve political parties from ten European countries. These are the same radical right parties analysed in Chapter 3 of the thesis. The datasets employed here, however, do not include all these parties. The 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey has estimated the positions of ten parties whereas the EES have coded nine. Fortunately, eight out of twelve parties are included in both datasets. As a result, there is scope for comparison. Table 4.1 below displays the parties considered by each approach.

**Table 4.1 Parties included in each dataset**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey</th>
<th>2009 European Parliament Election Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Alliance</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British National Party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish People’s Party</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French National Front</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian Freedom Party</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Orthodox Rally</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern League</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Polish Families</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Fatherland and Freedom</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tricolour Flame</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flemish Block</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2.3 Radical right party mapping: Results and discussion

Following from the above discussion on the dimensionality of European party systems and concerns over different approaches of estimating party positions, this section of the chapter maps the parties under investigation on the general left-right, pro-anti EU, socialist-capitalist and libertarian-authoritarian axes of political contestation. The importance of the party mapping lies in that it demonstrates whether and how the ideological profile of a party may be associated –if at all– to its position on Europe.

Figure 4.1 below displays party scores on the two main dimensions on political contestation, including the libertarian-authoritarian and socialist-capitalist axes (for data see Appendix I). This visual representation of policy estimates is based on party estimates from the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey. On the socialist-capitalist dimension, value zero represents state-planned economy and egalitarian distribution of resources whereas value ten indicates support for complete market allocation of resources. On the libertarian-authoritarian axis, value ten suggests support for a paternalistic societal hierarchy whereas value zero the complete opposite. Figure 4.1 points to two important findings. First, the radical right economic agenda displays significant variation. No significant conclusion can be drawn from this finding as a party’s position on the socialist-capitalist axis does not seem to be correlated with its EU position. For instance, according to Chapter 3, both the League of Polish Families and the French National Front have been categorised as ‘rejectionist’ Eurosceptics. However, on the axis depicting their position on the economy, they are diametrically opposed. Note that variation in radical right positions on the economy is theoretically expected (Mudde 2007: 119-137). In fact, the issue of the economy is a secondary feature in radical right ideology and receives little attention in their programmes and propaganda (Mudde 2007: 133). This may be the reason why it does not seem to be correlated with radical right positions on European integration. Second, variation in radical right levels of authoritarianism is very small. Party values on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension vary from 7.63 for the Danish People’s Party to 10.00 for the French National Front. If one assumes that 7 can be a sensible cut-off point, then it can be reasonably argued that by and large radical right ideology is a constant variable among the cases.
Figure 4.1 Radical right party positions on the two main axes of political contestation

Source: 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey


For reasons of parsimony, in figure 4.2 the two axes have been subsumed into a general Left-Right dimension (for data see Appendix I). This figure illustrates additional information regarding the parties’ Euroscepticism again based on the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey data. As argued in Chapter 3 of the thesis, the Chapel Hill estimates largely coincide with the author’s typology of radical right Euroscepticism. Value one in the pro-anti EU dimension indicates opposition whereas value ten support. In the left-right axis, value zero indicates extreme left and value ten extreme right. The spatial analysis shows that, with the exception of the Bulgarian Attack (NOA) party, radical right parties are situated to the far right of the left-right dimension. If one excludes the Bulgarian Attack, values on this dimension vary from 7.67 for the Danish People’s Party to ten for the French National Front. In terms of party positions on the pro-anti EU axis
of political contestation, the analysis points to the fact that there exists a great degree of variation. The Italian National Alliance and the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom both score 6.78 whereas the French National Front is the most anti-European radical right party scoring one.

**Figure 4.2** Radical right party positions

Source: 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey
Figure 4.3 employs data from the EES study and depicts the parties on the pro-anti integration and left-right dimensions (for data see Appendix I)\textsuperscript{43}. Given that it is the nature of this approach to measure issue salience, the spatial representation may be read in a different manner. What is important lies in the relative distance or absence of distance between the parties. Here, the same picture can be discerned. Again with the relative exception of the Bulgarian Attack party, on the left-right axis, the parties are situated very close together whereas on the pro-anti EU axis they are relatively further away from each other. The most positive references on the EU are recorded for the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom whereas the most negative references are evident in the French National Front.

\textbf{Figure 4.3} Radical right party positions on the EU

\textsuperscript{43} Note that the EES does not provide computed variables for the libertarian-authoritarian and socialist-capitalist dimensions. As a result, only a general left-right and anti-pro European integration dimensions have been employed in the thesis.
The above figures should clearly point to two observations. First, radical right parties are generally ideologically similar across Europe. Second, their position on European integration varies to a large extent. These two observations corroborate arguments that have been made in Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis. In summary, party ideology has been theoretically identified and empirically substantiated as a significant indicator of similarity among the parties under investigation. Moreover, party positions on European integration greatly diverge. The latter argument has been triangulated through the analysis of (1) expert surveys, (2) quantitative analysis of party manifestos and (3) the author’s own qualitative content analysis (the later in Chapter 3). Having substantiated the above arguments, the chapter proceeds by exploring in detail the thesis’ cases studies and their relative positions within their respective party systems.

4.2 Estimating party positions: the Wordscores method

4.2.1 Theoretical considerations

Systematic information on the policies of key actors and parties enables the in-depth analysis of various forms of political competition. Thus, testing the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 of the thesis requires that the case studies are clearly located in the political space within which they operate. To do so, the thesis departs from expert surveys and quantitative content analyses data. It analyses party manifestos using a novel approach, namely computerised content analysis (Laver, Benoit et al. 2003). This is an automated approach implemented in Benoit, Laver and Garry’s programme entitled ‘Wordscores’, an application in STATA, a statistical software package. This methodological approach extracts policy positions from political texts. It estimates policy positions expressed in a text by treating the individual words ‘in that text as data to be scored rather than as words to be understood’ (Martin and Vanberg 2007: 93). This approach estimates party positions by comparing two sets of texts respectively called
reference and virgin texts. The first are a set of texts for which the researcher has estimated dimensions a priori based on independent sources. Using them as reference, the researcher estimates policy positions of the virgin texts. In particular, ‘we use the relative frequencies we observe for each of the different words in each of the reference texts to calculate the probability that we are reading a particular reference text, given that we are reading a particular word’ (Laver, Benoit et al. 2003: 313). The method treats words purely as data allocating them scores without considering their meanings. Using the word scores generated form the reference texts, it can successfully estimate the positions of virgin texts on a given policy dimension. This method has been successfully employed in a number of publications (see for instance Laver and Benoit 2002; Proksch and Slapin 2006; Klemmensen, Hobolt et al. 2007). One of its main advantages lies in the ability of the researcher to estimate policy positions of texts written in any language, which is very relevant for the thesis as the cases involve the study of French, Greek and Italian.

The method uses the reference texts in order to generate a dictionary of words on the basis of which it produces two important measures for the virgin texts, namely a raw score and a transformed score. The underlying assumption is that ‘the relative frequencies of word usage in the virgin texts are linked to policy positions in the same way as the relative frequencies of word usage in the reference texts’ (Laver, Benoit et al. 2003: 316). The raw score is a numerical score representing the expected position of the virgin text on the dimension under investigation. The transformed score is central in the analysis as it enables the substantive interpretation of the raw score. Laver, Benoit and Garry have recommended their own transformed score method. This, however, has not come without controversy in the literature. The main argument against it comes from Martin and Vanberg (2007) who argue that Laver, Benoit and Garry’s rescaling procedure suffers from a number of shortcomings. They point out that the transformation procedure may be sensitive to the selection of virgin texts and that the transformation of the raw scores distorts the reference metric. The authors have produced their own transformation procedure in order to deal with these problems. They argue that ‘our transformation retains its key advantages over the LBG approach. It produces scores that are not sensitive to the set of virgin texts analysed and that accurately reflect the ideological positions of the texts as indicated by their word usage’
(Martin and Vanberg 2007: 100). Admittedly, both transformation procedures can yield similar results. They are based on different assumptions and as a result none of them is necessarily better than the other. The Martin and Vanberg transformation is not sensitive to the virgin texts. However, ‘if more than two high-quality reference texts are available and transformation is motivated by a desire to compare like-for-like reference and virgin texts on the same metric, use the LBG transformation’ (Benoit and Laver 2008: 110). For the purposes of the analysis, the LBG [Laver, Benoit, Garry] transformation is preferred as many reference texts are available.

The transformed scores must be read with reference to each other and not based on a given metric with set boundaries. Once these scores are spatially represented, the researcher must analyse the results for each party in comparison to the other parties in the party system. For instance, a party may be situated at the right extreme of a dimension. This does not necessarily mean that the party is extremist on this dimension. What it does mean, however, is that it is more to the right compared to the other parties. The qualification of whether the party is extreme or not on this dimension depends on the wider knowledge of the researcher on this party and may be grounded on the wider literature.

4.2.2 The process and design

The selection of reference texts is a crucial aspect of the research design since Wordscores take an a priori approach to estimating policy positions. Very importantly, reference texts should extend over the two polar opposites of the dimension that the researcher is interested in. Ideally, the selection of reference texts ‘will contain texts that occupy extreme positions, as well as positions at the centre, of the dimension under investigation’ (Laver, Benoit et al. 2003: 315). For instance, in the analysis of the Italian party system, Communist Refoundation has been included in the reference category although it does not figure in the virgin category. This is because this party provides a trustworthy estimate for the extreme left position on the Italian spectrum. Moreover, ‘the set of reference texts should contain as many different words as possible’ (Laver, Benoit et al. 2003: 315). Since content analysis of the virgin texts is based on the word universe
of the reference texts, the greater the ‘word match’ between the two sets of texts, the better. This implies that to reduce the uncertainty of policy estimates, the texts used must be relatively long.

The Wordscores method compares the word scoring results with a widely used benchmark. In using reference texts, the method assumes that ‘party manifestos in country c at election t are valid points of the reference for the analysis of party manifestos at election t+1 in the same country’ (Laver, Benoit et al. 2003: 314). The implication of this is two-fold. First, reference and virgin texts must represent two different points in time and preferably two different elections. Second, it is rather important for the analysis that the researcher has access to confident estimates of party positions on the policy dimensions under investigation at a given point in time. As a result of the above, two points in time have been set for this analysis. The first is the 2004 EP elections and the second the 2009 EP elections. Given that longer texts generate more confident estimates, it has been a conscious choice to include –where possible– a number of manifestos for these two points in time (see tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 below for the manifestos employed in this study). The reference scores for this analysis have been taken from the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey on four dimensions, including general left-right, pro-anti European integration, economic left-right and libertarian-authoritarian.

Table 4.2 Total words used for reference and virgin texts in the French Case

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Manifestos</th>
<th>PCF</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>UMP</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>UDF/MoDem</th>
<th>Verts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002 P/L</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>53.800</td>
<td>2.500</td>
<td>99.000</td>
<td>16.550</td>
<td>16.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 reference</td>
<td>9.086</td>
<td>61.600</td>
<td>5.000</td>
<td>109.000</td>
<td>29.500</td>
<td>25.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>text</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 P/L</td>
<td>20.000</td>
<td>2.500</td>
<td>5.900</td>
<td>29.700</td>
<td>7.700</td>
<td>38.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 virgin text</td>
<td>20.000</td>
<td>10.119</td>
<td>13.668</td>
<td>31.600</td>
<td>10.400</td>
<td>52.800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Leg=Legislative elections, EP=European Parliamentary Elections, P/L=Presidential and Legislative elections
Table 4.3 Total words used for reference and virgin texts in the Greek Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manifestos</th>
<th>KKE</th>
<th>SYN</th>
<th>PASOK</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>LAOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000 Leg</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,130</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 Leg</td>
<td>11.700</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>69.100</td>
<td>57.900</td>
<td>5.483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Leg</td>
<td>5.160</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>41.200</td>
<td>40.360</td>
<td>38.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 Leg</td>
<td>4.700</td>
<td>8.000</td>
<td>23.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 virgin text</td>
<td>16.400</td>
<td>21.600</td>
<td>67.922</td>
<td>42.499</td>
<td>42.671</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Leg=Legislative elections, EP=European Parliamentary Elections

Table 4.4 Total words used for reference and virgin texts in the Italian Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manifestos</th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Left-wing parties</th>
<th>UDC</th>
<th>Italia dei Valori¹³</th>
<th>Right-wing parties</th>
<th>LN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001 Leg</td>
<td>64.523</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28.845</td>
<td>14.390</td>
<td>8.733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 EP</td>
<td>41.413</td>
<td>20.503</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5035</td>
<td>2.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 Leg</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>81.721</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28.842</td>
<td>3868</td>
<td>8.733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Leg</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>379 + 2611⁴</td>
<td>3.350</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>3489</td>
<td>8.733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 EP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4713⁶</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>1102</td>
<td>30.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 virgin text</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>91.253</td>
<td>3.792</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>8.459</td>
<td>30.308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note (1): Leg=Legislative elections, EP=European Parliamentary Elections

4.3 A spatial analysis of party competition in France, Greece and Italy

In spatial analysis, ‘political competition takes place in a latent ideological space in which politicians (or political groups) are situated’ (Lin, Chu et al. 1996: 465). The underlying assumption is that parties or actors develop their positions in competition with others aiming to increase their electoral support. Thus ‘the objective of spatial analysis is to recover the dimensions of the ideological space, to construct maps of
politicians’ […] ideal points in the space, and to interpret the dimensions of the space’ (Lin, Chu et al. 1996: 465). Based on this, this section uses the tools of spatial analysis in order to show how radical right party positions compare with the rest of the party system within which they operate. Although, as argued above, radical right parties broadly share common ideological features across Europe, these may play out in a distinct manner in different political systems. Parties with similar principles across Europe may be considered extreme or niche in one party system but closer to the median in another party system. This may depend on the general political culture, which issues are important or salient and how they are debated in each political system. It is thus arguable that a radical right party may occupy a different position in different political systems in comparison to the mainstream or other parties. This is one of the reasons behind the choice for the Wordscores approach. Whereas expert surveys and quantitative content analysis methods provide the researcher with objective dimensions that can be compared across Europe, Wordscores is a useful tool as it provides information regarding how parties relate to each other within a given political system. There are thus three reasons for performing spatial analysis (Rabinowitz 1978). First, spatial analysis is exploratory as it may produce new insights into the nature of competition in each political system. Second, it is a useful method for describing and summarizing party positions. Third, it helps the researcher to assess and evaluate the radical right party’s position within the political system it operates.

4.3.1 France

Figure 4.4 below paints a rather clear picture of French politics. The Union for a Popular Movement and the Democratic Movement44 are located very near the centre of the French political space. The French Socialist party is located slightly left of centre regarding its economic policy and around the centre on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension. Two parties are rather distinct from the rest. The Green party stands out as it scores quite low on the libertarian-authoritarian axis whereas the National Front scores quite high. Note that high values indicate being closer to the authoritarian end of the spectrum. In fact, the Greens and the National Front may be thought as the polar opposite parties in the party system. What is very relevant for the analysis is that the

44 Note that this is a successor party of the Union for French Democracy (UDF).
National Front occupies a distinctively marginal position in comparison to the rest of the parties. The party’s spatial distance from the other parties is large, which indicates its niche position in the party system. The results have face validity as they conform previous findings regarding the French political space which suggest that since the end of the 1990s is essentially comprised by three poles, including the Left, the Right and the Far Right (Grunberg and Schweisguth 2003; Bornschier and Lachat 2009).

**Figure 4.4** The French political space in 2009

![Diagram of the French political space in 2009]

Figure 4.5 below tells a similar story as far as party positions on European integration are concerned. The Green and the Communist parties are located towards the centre of the pro-anti EU dimension. The French Socialist Party, the Democratic Movement and the Union for a Popular Movement are quite pro-European in comparison with the others. Again, the National Front stands out at the extreme bottom right end of the figure. The party’s distance from the other parties is large on both dimensions. This confirms previous research on French politics indicating that there is a clear segment of the French society identifying with the National Front’s positions on all dimensions (Mayer 2002a; Mayer 2002b; Grunberg and Schweisguth 2003; Mayer 2007). Given the Front’s great distance from the rest of the party system, it can be reasonably argued that the party has strong protest and anti-system elements and that it actively seeks to attract a niche segment of the society, which also shares its ‘niche’ views. In this respect, the spatial analysis conforms with the thesis’ hypothesis that if a radical right party has anti-system elements, it is likely to adopt a European discourse antagonistic of European integration signifying strong policy divergence from the party system45.

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45 For detailed information on the parties scores from the computerised content analysis, see Appendix II.
Figure 4.5 The European dimension in France 2009


4.3.2 Greece

The overall picture is somewhat different in Greece (see figure 4.6 below). Contrary to France, Greek parties do not tend to cluster around the centre of the political space denoting a greater degree of polarisation. The comparative distance of the Greek parties is greater to that of the French parties and no party is clearly located in the centre of the political space. The only party that can be thought as comparatively centrist within the system is the Coalition of the Radical Left. The centre-right New Democracy is centrist on the libertarian-authoritarian axis and tilts towards the capitalist end of the socialist-capitalist dimension. The Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) can be thought as a party with libertarian elements and a slightly capitalist economic agenda only.
compared to the Communist Party and the Coalition of the Radical Left. The Greek Communist Party is located at the top left end of the political space, indicating support for state intervention in the economy and strong preference for a paternalistic hierarchical society. The Popular Orthodox Rally is located at the top right of the space which also suggests it prefers a society based on tradition but with support for capitalist economic structures, similar to New Democracy. The distance between centre-right and centre-left parties in Greece is much greater than either France or Italy.

It is important to remind the reader that the Wordscores method does not provide scores based on a given metric with set boundaries. Thus the results for each party must be read with reference to each other. Practically, this means that the end point of the dimension in the figure is not the real end point. In other words, the fact that ND and the Popular Orthodox Rally are located towards the right end of horizontal axis does not mean that they are in favour of complete market allocation of resources. Rather their position on this axis indicates that they are to the right of other parties on this dimension, including the Coalition of the Radical Left, the Greek Communist Party and PASOK.

For the purposes of the thesis, the most important finding of figure 4.6 below lies in that the distance of the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally from the rest of the parties is not as great as that of the National Front. Although, similarly to the National Front, the party is clearly situated at the top right of the space, its relative distance from the centre-right New Democracy is smaller compared to the relative distance of the French radical right party from the Union for a Popular Movement. This denotes that the party can not be thought as being clearly distinct from the rest of the party system. Some of its policies tend to be close to the centre-right New Democracy, and in case of a potential need for coalition formation, the Popular Orthodox Rally shows [at least an apparent] policy convergence with the centre-right.
Figure 4.6 The Greek political space in 2009

Figure 4.7 below is the visual representation of how the European issue is debated in the Greek political system. Clearly, the Communist party is the most anti-European party in Greece whereas PASOK is the most pro-European. Interestingly, the Popular Orthodox Rally is situated towards the middle of the anti-pro EU dimension. If one considers the Communist party as the utmost Eurosceptic party in this political system and PASOK as the utmost EU supportive party, then the Popular Orthodox Rally’s position lies towards the middle of the party system and it is closer to New Democracy.

Figure 4.7 also points to another very interesting finding further corroborating the results from figure 4.6. On the general Left-Right axis, the Popular Orthodox Rally is spatially situated much closer to the mainstream New Democracy compared to the relevant distances in the French political space. These results largely confirm the literature which argues that ‘Despite the populist discourse with which it wraps its stance on these policies, LAOS does not substantively differ from the conservative policies advocated by the large party to its left, i.e. ND’ (Sotiropoulos 2010: 318). From this, it can be reasonably argued that, in contrast to the National Front, the Popular Orthodox Rally does not seek to attract a distinctive niche segment of the society that is socially dissimilar to the rest of the Greek society. Clearly, being radical right, its support may come from a nationalist electorate. However, given its position in the party system, the party can also be seen as expanding its electoral base. It can thus be argued that the party attempts to have a catch-all appeal, which explains its comparatively less strong Eurosceptic position.\(^{46}\)

\(^{46}\) For detailed information on the parties scores from the computerised content analysis, see Appendix II.
**Figure 4.7** The European dimension in Greece 2009

Note: **KKE**: Greek Communist Party, **LAOS**: Popular Orthodox Rally, **ND**: New Democracy, **PASOK**: Panhellenic Socialist Movement, **SYN**: Coalition of the Radical Left.

### 4.3.3 Italy

Figure 4.8 below paints a different picture with regards to the Italian party system. In 2009, it resembles more that of France rather than that of Greece. Mainstream parties tend to cluster close to each other rather than disperse around the political spectrum. However, unlike France these results do not reveal a clear pattern whereby a radical right party is situated in a large distance from other parties. The leftist populist party Italy of Values – Di Pietro List appears to be situated very far from the rest of the party...
The parties of the left and the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats tend to occupy a very similar space.

The People of Freedom, created following a fusion between the National Alliance and Berlusconi’s Forza Italia is situated on the top right end of the political system. The party is clearly situated to the right of all other parties in terms of its position on the economy and tends to be much more authoritarian when compared to all other parties within the Italian party system. The People of Freedom is clearly the utmost right-wing party in the Italian system. In comparison to the centre-right French Union for a Popular Movement and the Greek New Democracy, it also occupies a somewhat more right-wing space. The People of Freedom’s relative distance from the parties of the left is similar to that of the Union for a Popular Movement with the French Socialist Party. It is worth noting however, that given the ‘outlier’ position of the French National Front, the French centre-right and centre-left parties are positioned towards the centre of the political system. In the Italian context, there is no party to the right of the People of Freedom. Following from this, it may be reasonable to argue—and in accordance to the thesis’ propositions— that the National Alliance’s right-wing radicalism is appropriated within the People of Freedom. Merging with Forza Italia has given the party the opportunity to appear as mainstream and centre-right and has significantly contributed in the party’s cartelisation within the Italian party system. Nevertheless, the party (through the People of Freedom) continues to occupy the utmost right-wing end of the Italian spectrum.

47 The 2008 virgin text for this party is rather small—hence the relative large transformed standard errors and 95% confidence intervals—see appendix II. The percentage of the total words scored is relatively high (86.9 per cent). A longer text would be likely to produce results situating the party closer to the other parties in the party system. Thus the results with regards to IdV must be treated with caution.

48 Note that other right-wing parties exist in Italy, including Tricolour Flame, that may be positioned to the right of PhD. These are not included in the spatial analysis for two reasons. First, they are of minor political significance and second, they tend to produce very small manifestos, which do not enable a rigorous computerised content analysis.

49 For detailed information on the parties scores from the computerised content analysis, see Appendix II.
Figure 4.8 The Italian political space in 2009


With regards to the Italian parties’ European positions, figure 4.9 below points to the fact that Italian mainstream parties are generally clustered together in their support for Europe. The clear outliers are Italy of Values and Northern League who are nearer the anti-European end of the spectrum. The People of Freedom seems to have a very similar position on Europe compared to the centrist Christian Democrats. In contrast to the French Union for a Popular Movement and the Greek New Democracy, the People of Freedom seems to be (with the Christian Democrats) the most pro-European party in Italy. The contrast is also clear in comparison with the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally, which occupies a median position on Europe, and the National Front’s anti-Europeanism. On the left-right axis conflating the dimensions on
libertarianism/authoritarianism and socialism/capitalism, there is no Italian party occupying the space to the right of the People of Freedom, reconfirming the analysis above. The National Alliance’s union with Forza Italia has enabled the party’s cartelisation within the domestic party system. Although it occupies the most right-wing political space, the fusion has allowed the party to present itself as part of the governing cartel and the mainstream Italian centre-right as well as attract mainstream conservative voters.

Figure 4.9 The European dimension in Italy 2009

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a spatial analysis of radical right positions on two levels. First, employing data both from a recent expert survey and the EES quantitative content analysis of political texts, it has provided an overview of the general patterns of radical right Euroscepticism in Europe. From this analysis, it is argued that in terms of broad ideological principles, radical right parties across Europe can be thought as similar. Despite these ideological similarities, their position on European integration varies to a large extent. These two observations corroborate arguments that have been made in Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis. Second, the chapter has used the tools of spatial analysis in order to provide a visual and spatial overview of the structure of electoral competition in France, Greece and Italy. It has employed a novel methodology in order to substantiate and cross-tabulate findings from different datasets. Using computerised content analysis of party manifestos during the 1999-2009 decade, the chapter presents the case studies’ positions in comparison to the rest of the party system within which they operate.

The main argument put forward here is that although the National Front clearly occupies a marginal position in the French political space, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally is situated comparatively closer to other Greek parties and especially the centre-right New Democracy. The Italian National Alliance has merged with Forza Italia to create the People of Freedom, which clearly occupies the centre-right space in the Italian party system. This spatial analysis can help generate expectations regarding the cases’ behaviour in the political system as well as the potential electorate they may appeal to. Linking to the thesis’ main hypotheses, it is argued that the National Front appeals to a specific electorate different to the rest of the French society, which explains its rejectionist position on European integration. In contrast, the Popular Orthodox Rally seeks to have a comparatively broader appeal much closer to the median linked to a comparatively milder EU position. The Italian National Alliance occupies a centre-right space in the Italian political system being fairly near the centre-left parties providing an indication towards the party’s attempt for cartelisation.
Having provided the ‘big picture’ of politics in France, Greece and Italy, the following three chapters of the thesis explore in detail how the issue of Europe is played out in each political system. Chapter 5 analyses the French National Front as a case of rejectionist Euroscepticism. Chapter 6 explores the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally as a case of conditional Euroscepticism. Chapter 7 looks at the Italian National Alliance as a case of compromising Euroscepticism. Viewing parties as strategic actors in their respective party systems, the following chapters test the thesis’ hypotheses arguing that party type largely influences its spatial location in the party system, and the structure and content of a party’s domestic agenda. This includes its discursive strategy towards the European issue and its overall position on European integration. A party’s European stance is conditional upon its position within the party system; namely whether a party is anti-system, seeks to have a catch-all appeal or strives to become part of the governing cartel.
Part 2 Three radical right Eurosceptic patterns
Introduction

The previous chapters have identified three variants of radical right positions on European integration. This chapter studies the first pattern of radical right Euroscepticism whereby a party utterly ‘rejects’ the process of integration and seeks the repatriation of all competences from the EU to the nation state and, failing to do so, its country’s withdrawal from the EU. To further analyse this type of radical right Euroscepticism, this chapter uses the French National Front as a case study. As integration deepened during the past decades, the National Front’s vision of Europe clashed with the development of the European project. During the 1999-2009 decade, the party’s position crystallised into a complete ‘rejection’ of the EU and any cooperation within the EU framework.

The chapter tests hypothesis 1 which proposes that if a radical right party has anti-system elements, its primary goal will tend to lie in claiming ownership of specific policies or issues in order to differentiate itself from the rest of the party system. Based on this, the party is likely adopt a discourse antagonistic to European integration in order to portray its policy divergence within the political system (adversarial strategy). The party’s anti-European argumentation is likely to be articulated in a manner that will be
unique to its own worldview and dissimilar from all other parties in the domestic party system.

In order to support this hypothesis, the chapter proceeds with a three-fold argument. It first confirms that the National Front is intrinsically an anti-system party whose main political strategy is adversarial, its logic of competition is issue-based and its predominant goal is to claim ownership of specific policies or issues. Secondly, it argues that the National Front has adopted a clear ‘rejectionist’ position on European integration and contends that the party’s staunch anti-European argumentation is connected to its anti-globalisation agenda. Lastly, it puts forward that the party’s extremist policy on European integration is integral to its overall political strategy in its national party system. ‘Rejecting’ Europe provides the niche for differentiation from the French party system.

The first section of this chapter presents an overview of the main characteristics and beliefs of the National Front confirming the existence of an ideological formula combining nationalist and authoritarian values with a populist rhetoric. It also examines the party’s predominant political strategy. Section two analyses in detail the party’s anti-European discourse with reference to the four indicators set out in Chapter 3, namely the definition of Europe, the principle of European integration, the practice of European policy integration and the future of the European polity. It also identifies the ways in which the party connects its anti-European argumentation to its greater anti-globalisation agenda. The last section explores how the party uses its ‘rejectionist’ EU position as part of its general political strategy. It demonstrates that the party uses its policy on European integration as a differentiation tool from the rest of the party system with a view to polarising the political debate and appealing to a specific and distinct segment of the French electorate.
5.1 The French National Front

5.1.1 What the party stands for

The National Front was officially created in 1972. Then, the movement was a quite
heterogeneous coalition bringing together disparate ideological factions (McCulloch
2006), which were all united under the charismatic leadership of Jean Marie Le Pen. It
first participated in the French Parliamentary elections in 1973 when it gained less than
0.5 per cent of the vote. Its leader first ran for President in 1974 when his electoral
results were equally poor. For approximately ten years the party experienced
marginalisation and internal fragmentation. Its ascendancy in the French electoral arena
commenced in the early 1980s. 1983 marked the Front’s first electoral success when
Jean Pierre Stirbois, the party’s general secretary, gained 16.7 per cent of the votes in a
local by-election in Dreux. Soon after this success in 1984, the National Front gained ten
seats in the EP under Le Pen’s ‘Front of national opposition in favour of a Europe of
nations’ (Mayer 1998: 13)\(^\text{50}\). The National Front’s national electoral breakthrough
occurred in the 1986 legislative elections for which proportional representation replaced
the two-ballot majoritarian electoral system. The change of electoral system resulted in
the party gaining 35 seats in the French National Assembly. From 1988 onwards,
however, the system reverted back to majority preventing the National Front from
holding more than one seat in the National Assembly. Presidential elections, on the
other hand, have been much more promising in terms of electoral gains. The party’s
charismatic leader has been receiving a significant percentage in the national
Presidential elections reaching its highest in 2002 when he managed to participate in the
second round of Presidential elections competing with Jacques Chirac for the French
Presidency\(^\text{51}\).

The National Front has often been thought as the archetypal radical right party. Its
ideological stance is widely referred to as ‘national populism’ (Flood 1997). In the
1970s and 1980s, the party attracted a number of intellectuals from different extreme

\(^{50}\) Original text: ‘Front d’opposition nationale pour l’Europe des patries’

\(^{51}\) For a detailed account of Jean Marie Le Pen’s results in French Presidential elections, see
Appendix IV.
right ideological factions including ‘French Algeria die-hards, revolutionary nationalists, wartime Vichyites, Holocaust revisionists, neo-fascists, neo-Nazis, monarchists, Catholic fundamentalists, […] and so on’ (Hainsworth 2000b: 18). This resulted in a degree of internal division. Since the 1990s its ideology has, however, crystallised into what Mudde calls the populist radical right (Mudde 2007: 23), namely an ideological formula combining nationalist and authoritarian values with a populist rhetoric which are briefly explained below.

Central to the party’s ideological make-up are the themes of the ‘nation’ and ‘identity’. As a result, ‘elements of party discourse relate directly to this nation-centred, identity-conscious starting point’ (Davies 1999: 65). This is inextricably linked to the doctrine of national preference, which advocates the defence of French culture and identity (McCulloch 2006: 167) and can be summarised by the party’s well-known slogan ‘La France d’abord’. The right of the French nation to be different became crucial in the party’s ideological reformulation replacing earlier references to cultural superiority reminiscent of fascism (McCulloch 2006: 176). National preference entails among others hostility to multiculturalism, communism and internationalism. The doctrine of national preference coupled with a fear of French decline explain the party’s dislike of immigrants, calls for a stronger French demographic policy and the promotion of France and Francophonie in the world. It also accounts for the party’s progressive turn towards economic protectionism in the 1990s, the rejection of the ‘New World Order’ and the strong criticism of the US and international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (Bastow 1997). Related to this, the principle of national sovereignty underpins the party’s discourse against globalisation and European integration.

That the party is also highly authoritarian is demonstrated in its policies both on social issues and law and order. The National Front insists on the preservation of traditional lifestyles arguing that France lacks social cohesion. The party sees the family as an institution core to the social and moral values structuring the French society (National Front 2007: 15). As such, it supports the principle of ‘family preference’, which entails a national family policy that would revive the traditional family, boost the French birth rate, reduce French abortion rates and ban same sex marriages (National Front 2004; 2007). Moreover, the party presents itself as a champion of law and order fighting for
the rights of respectable French citizens who are violated by criminals (Flood 1997: 121). It supports a stronger justice system with increased numbers of magistrates, the reestablishment of the death penalty, the deportation of foreign criminals, the generalisation of ‘zero tolerance’ policies in a number of areas and the building of more prisons as well as the improvement of the status of prison guards (National Front 2004; 2007). Calls for the restriction of immigration are also core to the National Front’s authoritarianism viewing immigrants as ‘culturally different [who] should be treated as such’ (Hainsworth 2000b: 25). In an effort to normalise their anti-immigrant discourse, ‘key’ personalities in the party acknowledge that ‘We have the obligation to help the poor countries. But the French should come first’\(^52\) (interview with de Saint-Just 2010) and that ‘We want to help Africa. But we want to do so in their own country. Not in Europe’ (interview with Schénardi 2009)\(^53\).

Populism is integral to the party’s rhetoric. Flood (1997: 108) argues that its discourse ‘operates on the basis of a classic binary scheme of us/them = right/wrong = god/evil’. The National Front claims that French society is undergoing a crisis at all cultural, economic and social levels, which ‘has accelerated the decomposition of the French social tissue and solidarity’ (National Front 2004: 151)\(^54\). Crisis has hit among others the institution of the family, the education system, local areas and French employment and impoverishes the French household, the French economy, and ultimately the French State (National Front 2007 preface by Jean Marie Le Pen). The National Front is calling for the ‘liberation of France’ arguing that the current French regime is totalitarianism with a ‘democratic mask’ (National Front 2004: 1). The support of plebiscitary politics becomes integral to the party’s distrust of the current system. The party supports the extensive use of referenda on issues that relate to the ‘future of our Nation’ as it is only by respecting the wishes of French people that France can become a true democracy (National Front 2004: 78).

\(^{52}\) Wording in French: ‘On a le devoir d’aller aider les pays pauvres. Mais les Français d’abord. Les immigres dans notre pays vivent mal. Aider les pays pauvres chez eux’


\(^{54}\) Original text: ‘accélèrent la décomposition du tissu social et des solidarités naturelles’
5.1.2 Issue ownership as the party’s predominant political strategy

The National Front’s predominant strategy during the 1999-2009 decade has been to focus on particular issues in its political agenda that are not covered in a similar manner by other parties in the domestic political system. By disproportionally concentrating on specific policies or issues, it has the ability to claim ownership for them. This is used in order to undermine the legitimacy of the French political system as part of its effort for differentiation from the other parties in the French party system. The party's rigid Eurosceptic position as well as its insistence on an anti-Globalisation agenda have also become integral to this political strategy whereby the party claims that it is the only political force in France whose main purpose is to 'protect' the French people from external forces both European and global. This is not to say that the National Front does not have an incentive to be in office or gain votes. As will be shown below, the party does not view office as a pragmatic aspiration given the French system and votes can only be gained through a strategy of issue ownership and policy differentiation.

The National Front can be thought of as one of the most politically successful and durable radical right parties in Western Europe (DeClair 1999: 115). Indeed since the mid-1980s, ‘this party has appeared as a powerful new actor on the political space, giving rise to a “tripolar” pattern of party competition’ (Bornschier and Lachat 2009: 360). Its electoral gains have allowed it to consider itself as a major force in French domestic politics and to argue that depending on the elections, 'we are 3rd or 4th force in the system' (interview with de Danne 2010)\textsuperscript{55}. Party officials accept that 'we are a small party only from the point of view that we are not represented in the National Assembly' but 'in reality we are not small, we are important in setting the debate, we have influence on the society and we provide an intellectual challenge' (interview with de Danne 2010).

However, unlike other radical right parties in Europe such as the Austrian Freedom Party, this success has not been translated into either significant numbers of legislative seats or political office through participation in a coalition government. This is partly due to the French institutional regime. The semi-presidential nature of the regime as well as the majoritarian style of politics do not encourage the formation of governmental coalitions. Moreover, the majoritarian two-round electoral system penalises smaller

\textsuperscript{55} Interview largely held in English.
parties. In particular, although single-member district plurality systems disadvantage weak parties, the French two-round electoral system produces even stronger biases against weak parties and as a result small parties are systematically under-represented (Blais and Loewen 2009: 349). Blais and Loewen's analysis of the effects of the French electoral system, which examines the potential electoral pay-offs of pre-electoral coalitions, suggests that ‘being part of a [pre-electoral] coalition does not contribute to winning more seats, at least among small parties’ (Blais and Loewen 2009: 352). As a result, the incentive for small parties to enter into pre-electoral coalitions is very low and the National Front is effectively encouraged to compete as a single force in the political system.

According to Golder ‘Pre-electoral coalitions are less likely to form when the ideological distance between potential coalition members increases’ (Golder 2006: 198), which is also confirmed in the French case (Blais and Loewen 2009: 354). The National Front has long been discredited for its extremist ideas and its protest anti-system character and as a result it has been excluded from running as part of an electoral block for the French legislative elections, which has effectively kept the party out of the National Assembly. This can be seen in sharp contrast to the pre-electoral behaviour of the Movement for France, which is an ultra-conservative but not an extremist or anti-system party. In the 2007 legislative elections, the Movement for France ran as part of the ‘Presidential Majority’ electoral block and secured two seats in the National Assembly with obtaining only 1.2 per cent of the vote. The National Front, on the other hand, ran independently and obtained 4.2 per cent of the vote but did not secure any seats in the National Assembly. Due to its extremist views, the ideological distance between the National Front and other parties in France is great, which renders the potential for pre-electoral coalitions unlikely. For instance, according to the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey, which estimated party positions, the National Front is situated at the extreme right pole of the general left-right dimension where 0 signifies extreme left and 10 extreme right. The National Front scored 10 as opposed to 8.63 of the Movement for France and 7.44 of Nicolas Sarkozy’s Union for a Popular Movement (Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010). This finding is also largely confirmed by the analysis of the French political system in Chapter 4 of the thesis.
As mentioned above, the National Front has been increasingly successful in Presidential elections. However, this type of elections by definition entails a 'winner takes all' outcome. As a result of this institutional characteristic, candidates failing to be elected do not seize any concrete political gains in terms of effective power within the political system. The 2002 elections proved to be a significant victory for Jean-Marie Le Pen and a major shock for the French electorate. The National Front, however, did not manage to gain any ‘real’ power through either office or parliamentary representation. This inability of the party to access power is realistically accepted by party officials who also argue that they are not willing to cooperate with any other French political force either pre- or post- elections (interviews with de Danne 2010; de la Tocnaye 2010; de Saint-Just 2010; Salagnac 2010). The other French political forces are seen as responsible for the French decadence and decay (interview with Martin 2010) and as such coalitions are seen as compromise and treason (interview with de Danne 2010).

The above institutional characteristics of the French political system as well as the National Front's own ideology that does not adhere to conventional politics have led to the party's effective exclusion from the party system. This has meant that competition between the National Front and the other parties has developed into a zero-sum game whereby the National Front is the player experiencing constant losses and is unlikely to receive any substantive gains in terms of actual political power. This exclusion provides an additional incentive to the party to engage in adversarial politics. As a result, the party takes a diametrically opposite view from the rest of the party system on particular issues over which it considers having a comparative advantage. This is in accordance with Mayer's evaluation of the National Front’s political strategy, which suggests that the party seeks ‘to polarise the political debate around their ideas, and replace the traditional left/right cleavage with a new one, which sets the National Front against the “gang of four”, as Front National likes to refer to the established parties, evoking the image of collusion’ (Mayer 1998: 17). This strategy becomes increasingly effective if the party treats the mainstream parties as a single block and 'reduces the differences of values, policies and practice between them to mere gradations’ (Flood 1997: 112). This issue-based logic of competition is confirmed by the party’s preference of the word ‘doctrine’ as opposed to ‘ideology’ (interview with de la Tocnaye 2010). Doctrine refers to a particular policy, position or principle advocated by a party whereas ideology indicates the body of doctrine as a whole. It is only by selectively focusing on particular
policies that the National Front can polarise the debate and present its ideas as polar opposite to the other parties.

As Mayer identified in 1998, this strategy is likely to become more effective if a party chooses to compete on a new political division that mainstream parties do not [yet] engage in. The National Front smartly identified new issues since the 1990s and as a result ‘Le Pen has actively sought to weaken the impact of economic issues by declaring that the socio-economic cleavage has lost any relevance, and had been replaced by the opposition between the proponents of a cosmopolitan and those of national identity’ (Perrineau 1997: 64; Bornschier 2008: 89). The National Front’s overall choice to openly engage in the authoritarianism versus libertarianism dimension of political competition can be seen in its adoption of policies including pushing for a halt to immigration, strong law and order and aversion to European integration and globalisation, which indicate the party’s choice to represent the authoritarian end of the spectrum. In its effort to appear adversarial, the National Front mostly competes on the new cleavage ‘winners and losers from globalisation’ and within this division it seeks to push for particular policies that are exclusive to its own agenda, different from the agendas of other parties and arise controversy, such as the effects of immigration, European integration and globalisation.

The party's main political strategy is adversarial, its logic of competition is issue-based and its predominant goal is to claim ownership of specific policies or issues. The party's outright rejection of European integration fits comfortably within this overall political strategy. Insisting on a particular policy preference may provide the party the niche for differentiation from the party system. Strong criticism of the EU may thus be seen as part of the party’s wider agenda to choose a number of policies that it finds of primary importance to the French society and to try to push for them as hard as it can in order to demonstrate policy divergence. The next section analyses in detail the National Front’s European position.
This section argues that during the 1999-2009 decade the National Front has adopted a ‘rejectionist’ position on European integration. Although as most radical right parties, the National Front views Europe as a cultural entity, it is vehemently opposed to European integration within the current EU framework. In particular, the National Front rejects the ‘principle’ of European cooperation under the EU structures, the ‘practice’ of the current policy status quo at the EU level and the ‘future’ creation of a European polity. The party ultimately links this staunch opposition to European integration to its anti-globalisation argumentation as both are perceived as contravening the party’s fervent support for national preference on all policies.

It is worth noting, however, that the National Front was not anti-European all along. The party’s EU position has undergone radical transformation. It has evolved from an ambiguous stance to European cooperation during the 1980s (Flood 1997: 131-132), opposition to Maastricht and distrust of deeper integration in the 1990s (Fieschi, Shields et al. 1996: 247-248), to an outright hostility to and quest for withdrawal from the EU in the 2000s (Hainsworth, O'Brien et al. 2004: 48). The National Front’s European position and argumentation has not developed in a vacuum. In the 1980s, the party flaunted that ‘we are first and foremost Europeans’ supporting a European project that would include ‘a common European defence and nuclear strategy, a common foreign and security policy, common immigration controls and a “European Preference”’ (Hainsworth, O'Brien et al. 2004: 45). The National Front called for ‘European patriotism’ whereby the fusion between French and European identity could be achieved with a vision to jointly confront a common enemy: ‘What strikes at Europe strikes at France, and what strikes at France strikes at Europe’ (Jean Marie Le Pen 1984: 164). The party hardened its position towards European integration as EU powers increased and particularly since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which according to Mudde represented a ‘turning point’ resulting in a change of ‘[radical right] parties’ positions on the European issue and its salience’ (Mudde 2007: 159). President Mitterand’s decision to put the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty to referendum in 1992 forced the National Front to articulate a clearer position on integration denouncing the Treaty as a ‘conspiracy against the peoples and
nations in Europe’ (quoted in Fieschi, Shields et al. 1996: 248) and to progressively abandon its European Patriotism arguments.

The following section proceeds with a discussion of the National Front’s EU stance during the 1999-2009 period arguing that it has crystallised into an utter rejection of the EU system as a whole. In particular, the party’s European position is analysed with reference to the typology of radical right Euroscepticism identified in Chapter 3 of the thesis. This includes a discussion of the National Front’s ‘conception of Europe’, its position on the ‘principle’ of European integration, the current EU policy ‘practice’ and the ‘future’ creation of a European polity. Through an examination of these four indicators and the qualitative content analysis of the party’s MEP plenary speeches during the 5th and 6th EP terms, this section identifies the main points of the National Front’s EU criticism and in particular, it demonstrates how the issue of Europe is linked to its overall anti-globalisation agenda.

5.2.1 Definition of Europe

The National Front views Europe as a continent with a common cultural heritage and argues that Europeans share common western values and a common European identity (interview with de la Toynaye 2010). The party is a self-proclaimed defender of identities and claims to ‘stand for a European Europe, just as it does for a French France’ (Flood 1997: 131). European tradition is based on four essential elements, namely ‘Greek philosophy, Roman Law, the Judeo-Christian values and the Enlightenment’ (Gollnisch 2007). Europe should remain faithful to its moral and spiritual values, including its cultural and legal traditions emanating from Greece and Rome as well as its Christian origins. Europe is not only a cultural but also a human and geographic reality (National Front 2009: 4). Despite European wars throughout the centuries, a long common history has created strong ties amongst European peoples (interview with Martin 2010). The conception of common religious values essential to European identity is manifested in the party’s criticism of the European Constitution for not including any reference to Christianity (Marine Le Pen 2005).

\[56\text{Original text: ‘notre tradition européenne, parmi lesquels quatre essentiellement: la philosophie grecque, le droit romain, la spiritualité judéo-chrétienne et les lumières’}\]
However, the National Front’s definition of Europe takes an exclusionist and insular form. This common European history ‘has invented the freedom and equality of Nations, self-governing without external interference, which is a unique model unparalleled elsewhere’ (National Front 2009: 4). Thus common cultural heritage serves as a justification for both nation-state self-determination and European independence from external intervention. It is only ‘free, strong and sovereign nations that can make European civilisation shine in the world’ (National Front 2002a: 28; 2004: 72)\(^57\). This idea is put forward with the implicit acceptance that France would serve as a model of the other European nations (National Front 2002a; 2004).

It is precisely this European conception based on common values (National Front 2007: 60) that is reflected in the National Front’s opposition to Turkey’s EU accession. Europe is a ‘club’ of equal and sovereign nation-states and there is clearly no space for a country that is ‘geographically, culturally, historically and demographically’ Asian (Gollnisch 2006b)\(^58\). Instead the National Front is motivated by the ‘hope that Europe as a whole, West and East, would at last discover its strength and forge a new collective role in the world’ (Flood 1997: 131). The party leader explains that Europeans should maintain strong and privileged links to Russia, which contrary to Turkey, ‘is a large European nation’ (Jean Marie Le Pen 2007)\(^59\) that ‘belongs culturally, spiritually, geographically to the European space’ (Gollnisch 2009b)\(^60\). The National Front supports a ‘European Europe, thus without Turkey but linked to Russia’ (National Front 2008)\(^61\).

\(^{57}\) Original text: ‘Seules des nations libres, puissantes et souveraines, rendront à la civilisation européenne son éclat dans le monde.’

\(^{58}\) Original text: ‘Cela nous permettrait pourtant de dire clairement que la Turquie est un grand pays, mais qu’elle est essentiellement, géographiquement, culturellement, historiquement, démographiquement, un pays asiatique’

\(^{59}\) Original text: ‘les Russes sont une grande nation européenne’

\(^{60}\) Original text: ‘Mais la Russie, contrairement à la Turquie, appartiennent culturellement, spirituellement, géographiquement à l’espace européen. C’est avec elle, en priorité, que nous devrions avoir des liens privilégiés’

\(^{61}\) Original text: ‘une Europe « européenne », donc sans la Turquie, mais liée à la Russie’
5.2.2 Principle of European integration

The National Front rejects the ‘principle’ of European integration, namely opposes any type of cooperation at a higher multilateral level. The way in which the EU has evolved during the past 20 years does not bear any resemblance to the party’s ideal model for cooperation. The latter includes bilateral or tri-lateral European nation-state cooperation on issues of mutual interest that is neither administered nor governed by a supra-national authority.

This quest for withdrawal is confirmed in the party’s both 2002 and 2004 manifestos where the National Front urges the French people to choose their independence so that France exits the EU. The party renounces the Treaties that ‘link France to the Europe of Brussels’ (Rome, Single Act, Schengen, Maastricht, Amsterdam) (National Front 2002a: 26; 2004: 70). Being an EU member and adopting policies originating from the EU means among others the end of political sovereignty, the end of economic prosperity, the end of food independence, the end of social protection, and of course the end of France (National Front 2002b; 2004). As a solution to the problems stemming from EU membership, the National Front proposes to re-establish French sovereignty on all spheres (National Front 2002a; 2002b; 2004). In the 2007 national manifesto, the party provides a more informed position whereby it suggests organising a tour of European capitals promoting the radical renegotiation of European Treaties. Only when this fails to bear any fruits, would the party organise a national referendum on French withdrawal asking the question ‘Should France regain its independence vis-à-vis the Europe of Brussels?’ (National Front 2007: 61). Indeed the party argues that it does not envisage a ‘brutal’ exit from the EU (National Front 2008). The party’s policy reformulation does not appear to be a feasible option for France. Although in 2007 the party does not openly advocate withdrawal, this does not represent a substantive change in its European policy. Rather this marks a transformation of discourse in the way the position is put forward (interview with de Danne 2010). The party further substantiates its

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62 Original text (in both manifestos): ‘traités liant la France à l'Union européenne de Bruxelles (Rome, l'Acte Unique, Schengen, Maastricht, Amsterdam).’
63 Original text: ‘La France doit-elle reprendre son indépendance vis-à-vis de l’Europe de Bruxelles ?’
position in favour of withdrawal by supporting popular ratification and the use of plebiscitary politics.

The party mentions that it seeks to construct a ‘Europe of Nations’ (National Front 2008). In the 1990s, this new Europe was envisaged as being ‘French dominated, Catholic and White’ (Benoit 1998: 21) and operating on the basis of the principle of community preference, which would ‘assure the prosperity of our peoples and the international influence of European nations’ (National Front 2008). Since it has been clear that the EU would neither be dominated by France nor pursue a strategy of community preference, what the party means during the 1999-2009 decade is that cooperation should take place outside the EU framework on a case by case basis. ‘Cooperation should be undertaken project by project following a cost-benefit analysis managed by a secretary general without political forces’ (interview with Gollnisch 2009a). In fact, the party argues that projects work much better outside the EU. Examples include the aircraft manufacturer Airbus, the satellites company Ariane and the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (National Front 2009: 2). These three non-EU projects provide a yardstick for comparison since they are thought to work well or even better outside the EU. Within this frame of thought, the National Front would invite European cooperation in the areas of research and technology where cooperation is unlikely to have a political character. Economic or industrial cooperation should only take place at a bilateral or multilateral level (interview with Reveau 2010). Some party cadres have toyed with the idea of a common European Army independent from the North Atlantic Alliance and the United States of America (interviews with Schénardi 2009; and de Saint-Just 2010). However, following the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, this no longer appears to be feasible as accord among 27 member states is thought to be difficult to achieve (interview with de Saint-Just 2010).

5.2.3 Practice of European policy integration

Since the National Front is adamantly opposed to the principle of European integration, it is hardly surprising to note that it does not support policy integration within the European framework. The party seeks to re-establish political authority and sovereignty
in a number of policies including among others, fiscal policy, border control and immigration policy, army deployment and food policy (National Front 2004). This preference for repatriation of competences is justified with reference to the democratic principle of national executive accountability to national parliaments as opposed to the dominance of an unaccountable executive at the EU level (interview with Salagnac 2010). This is also reflected in the party’s opposition to the primacy of EU over national law and its quest for the empowerment of national legislation (National Front 2004).

EU policies particularly prominent in the party’s criticisms include the European Monetary Union and the Single Currency, the Common Agricultural Policy, the Single Market, the Schengen agreement and EU citizenship. The party recommends that the European Central Bank (ECB) should be reformed by limiting the scope of its powers and by removing its authority to administer the Eurozone’s monetary policy (interview with de Danne 2010). In the case that this is not possible, it accepts that France should regain its monetary sovereignty (National Front 2008) in order to be able to vary the parity and interest rates of the currency (interview with de la Tocnaye 2010). The ECB is held responsible for speeding up the effects of the financial crisis in Europe by keeping the euro-currency parity stable and by not varying the interest rate of lending money. The Bank is thought to ‘create economic disparities and promote unfair competition among the European countries’ (interview with de Saint-Just 2010)\(^\text{64}\). Monetary policy is thought to be better managed at the domestic level whereby each country could cater for its financial needs. ‘EU Member states can manage the financial crisis by themselves [provided that] they can set their own exchange rates’ (interview with de la Tocnaye 2010)\(^\text{65}\). Far from strengthening the French economy, the Euro currency ‘accelerates the process of globalisation, namely structural instabilities’ (National Front 2004: 112)\(^\text{66}\). Note that the European issue as a whole and the euro in particular have a strategic importance for the party. Jean Marie Le Pen argues that ‘We have to recover our national currency in order to guarantee the purchasing power of our

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\(^{64}\) Wording in French: ‘L’euro crée les disparités et mène à la catastrophe. C’est la concurrence déloyale parmi les pays.’

\(^{65}\) Wording in French: ‘Les Etas membres de l’UE peuvent faire face à la crise eux-mêmes’

\(^{66}\) Original text: ‘Loin de conforter l’économie européenne et française, il en accélère la mondialisation, c’est-à-dire la fragilité structurelle.’
compatriots’ (Au Front 2008b: 4). It is acknowledged, however, that an outright exit from the Eurozone constitutes a bad marketing move for the party. As a result the party’s policy is to first try to reform the ECB and to exit the Eurozone only in the case its proposed reforms fail (interview with de Danne 2010). This demonstrates that the presentation of the European issue to the voter matters.

The Common Agricultural Policy is also heavily criticised as subjugated to ultra-liberal principles of, among others, the World Trade Organisation, resulting in the isolation of rural areas and unemployment (Martinez 2006a; Martinez 2006d). The European Commission is criticised for gradually decreasing the budget for agriculture thus destroying this important industry to the benefit of third countries such as Brazil (Martinez 2006c). Jean Marie Le Pen (2005b: 3) argues that ‘European agriculture is dead’. The EU’s commercial policy is condemned on a similar basis, namely that it promotes an ultra-liberal agenda failing to protect European industries to the benefit of other countries outside Europe, such as China (Jean Marie Le Pen 2005a), and dismantling traditional European industries such as textile, leather, farming, fishing and home appliances (Martinez 2006a). For these reasons, the EU’s commercial policy is a ‘suicide’ as it does not promote protectionism (Jean Marie Le Pen 2005a: 3).

The National Front is also against the EU’s most prominent policy, namely the Single Market. Although the party accepts that Europe’s internal market can lead to some level of development and prosperity, it maintains that it does not ensure the protection of European workers from worldwide competition (interview with Gollnisch 2009a). This policy is also seen as the cause of the de-industrialisation of France and the de-localisation of French businesses (interview with de Saint-Just 2010). The Single Market is thus considered to be a ‘betrayal’ to the party’s core principles and interests as it entails the complete disappearance of internal borders both physical and economic (interview with Gollnisch 2009a). This rationale also explains the party’s staunch opposition to the Schengen accords. Open borders and the Single Market’s free

67 Original text: ‘Il faut […] retrouver notre monnaie nationale pour garantir le pouvoir d’achat de nos compatriotes’
68 Original text: ‘l’agriculture européenne est morte…’
movement of people are thought to have encouraged increased levels of immigration both from within and outside the EU.

As mentioned in the previous section, one of the main principles of the National Front’s ideology is ‘national preference’ (McCulloch 2006). Immigration and citizenship constitute the party’s prime concerns and should be dealt with only at the national level in order to ensure the defence of French culture and identity. The EU, however, is seen as failing to respect the French values by encouraging immigration (Marine Le Pen 2009: 3). Moreover, citizenship and nationality are inextricably linked and the French state is the one responsible to decide who becomes French citizen. The National Front is against European citizenship arguing that ‘the only possible access to citizenship is nationality’ (Gollnisch 2006a) 69. As a result, the party opposes any European competence on immigration policy, is against Schengen and favours the re-establishment of control over French borders (National Front 2002a; 2004). European citizenship is seen as exogenous to the state and is rejected (National Front 2004: 71).

5.2.4 The Future of the European Polity

The National Front envisages ‘a Europe of Nations founded on state sovereignty, community preference and borders protecting her mostly from immigration and company relocations’ (National Front 2008) 70. However, the values and principles upon which the EU has been built are antithetical to the party’s ideology and general raison d’être. For the party, Europe becomes stronger only when the European nation states remain sovereign, independent, strong, prosperous and respected (National Front 2009: 1); not when they are governed by supranational institutions. The EU is seen as a bureaucratic state spending money on tedious legislation, such as ‘la taille des paquets de café’ (Jean Marie Le Pen 2005a: 1) which cannot be reconciled with the party’s strong anti-étatism credentials (National Front 2004: 115-116). The EU is perceived to be advocating ultra-liberal free-market economics, which contravene the National

69 Original text: ‘Le seul accès possible à la citoyenneté d’un pays est d’avoir la nationalité de ce pays.’
70 Original text: ‘une Europe des patries fondée sur la souveraineté de ses Etats, sur la préférence communautaire et sur des frontières la protégeant notamment de l’immigration et des délocalisations.’
Front’s ideas of economic patriotism. Jean Marie Le Pen accuses the EU for being economically mediocre and socially disastrous and that the Reform Treaty ‘is a crime against democracy’. The European model has assumed power over policies that have traditionally been thought to belong to the realm of the ‘national’ rather than that of the ‘international’. The superiority of EU legislation, EU laws on cultural issues, the common currency, the European defence policy as well as the European citizenship are clear examples of the European impact on all national spheres, including the economic, political and social domains.

The National Front presents Europe in a dichotomous manner, i.e. ‘their’ Europe as opposed to ‘our’ Europe, meaning the EU versus a geographic continent of sovereign and independent nation states (National Front 2009). The version of Europe that the party promotes is, however, utopian given political developments that occurred at EU level since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and especially following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The National Front has admitted this during the mid-2000s by arguing that EU has become the ‘ultimate step before global governance’ (National Front 2004: 62) which plainly contradicts the party’s insistence for ‘national solutions to national issues’ (interview with Gollnisch 2009a). The EU does not promote the principles of Community or National Preference, and for this reason it is demonised for all social, cultural and economic problems that member states are facing. These include increased levels of immigration, the decrease of purchasing power, crime and company relocations outside France. Overall the relationship between France and the EU is seen to have resulted in a ‘negative balance’ for France (interview with de Danne 2010). Consequently, it can be reasonably argued that the National Front opposes the ‘making of a future European polity’ and does not see how France could fit in an organisation that is perceived as contravening all tenets of the party’s ideology and is sometimes compared to the Soviet Union. The National Front thus rejects the EU system as a whole. The party has been a fervent opponent of the Reform Treaty, his leader arguing in EP plenary that it is ‘a crime against democracy’.

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72 Original text: ‘ultime étape avant le gouvernement mondial’
It is interesting to note, however, that interviews with party officials have revealed a degree of internal variation in terms of intensity of opposition to the EU. Although by and large all interviewees agreed on their disagreement with the EU project, there was a variation depending the degree of personal familiarity with the EP. Blunt opposition to European integration came mostly (but not exclusively) from those politicians that have in some capacity worked in the EP. The EP seems to have thus produced a negative socialisation effect to the party’s politicians (Kerr 1973; Hooghe 2001).

5.2.5 The issue of globalisation within the National Front’s European discourse

The above anti-European argumentation is ultimately linked to the party’s anti-globalisation rhetoric, which since the 1990s is core to the party’s political agenda (Hainsworth 2004). For the National Front, globalisation is a threat to the nation state having a detrimental impact on both the social and economic spheres. The world is free from all state, economic and social constraints in favour of a model of free-market economics, which destroys French jobs and industries as well as the French welfare state (National Front 2007: 60). Globalisation also entails the weakening of physical border control and trade barriers contravening the very tenets of the party’s ideology, which is based on national sovereignty. Globalisation is thus ‘seen as a series of outside forces posing direct threats to Frenchness at all levels – cultural, social as well as economic’ (Hanley 2001: 310) and is presented as a danger to French national identity eroding the integrity of nations (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000: 445).

The issue of Europe is inextricably connected to that of globalisation as the EU is seen as a type of regional globalisation. Thus globalisation is perceived as commencing ‘by the standardisation at the European level’ (Lang 2001)73. The EU, instead of protecting the European states from the dire consequences of globalisation, is seen as promoting those forces at regional/European level and it is often argued that the entire project is an American fabrication (interview with de Danne 2010). The National Front euphemistically calls this phenomenon ‘Euro-globalisation’ [in French ‘Euromondialisme’]. The European elites are portrayed as having betrayed the people through

73 Original text: ‘Nous voilà simplement devant une étape supplémentaire de la globalisation à marche forcée, qui commence par l'uniformisation au niveau européen.’
unconditionally surrendering to unrestrained free-market economics and the forces of
globalisation (National Front 2009: 1). This entails increased levels of immigration, the
absence of social and worker protection from the EU, company delocalisations and
outsourcing of production as well as the dismantling of both physical and economic
borders. The party argues that the EU is run by delocalised industries in China (National
Front 2009: 1). The negative effects of the credit crunch on both Europe and France
exemplify that the party was ‘right’ to be against globalisation and European integration
(National Front 2009: 1). Instead of providing protection for its workers, the EU has
only made matters worse. According to the party’s leader, ‘Not only does Europe fail to
constitute a protection for French businesses but also contributes to the acceleration of
the processes of deregulation, liberalisation of services and the opening to global
competition’ (Jean Marie Le Pen 2006: 2).74

Due to the above connection of the two issues in the party’s ideological toolkit, the
party’s Eurosceptic discourse largely focuses on the issue of social and economic
globalisation. All the problems that the National Front believes France is facing are due
to the forces of globalisation and European integration as a form of regional
globalisation. Jean Marie Le Pen (2005a: 2) is arguing that we need to ‘defend the
Europe of Nations against the disastrous globalisation and the migratory waves’75. The
EU is portrayed as a ‘Euro-globalising Super State’ contrary to the traditional
conception of the European nation-state based on national sovereignty and the right to
self-determination. This holistic criticism and rejection of the EU project can be
captured by Gollnisch’s EP speech where he argues:

[The EU is] a state without soul nor identity that denies its Greco-
Christian roots, accepts to integrate Turkey despite popular opposition
and only believes in globalisation, competition and the market forces’
(Gollnisch 2005)76.

74 Original text: ‘L'Europe, non seulement n'est pas une protection pour les entreprises
françaises, mais elle contribue à accélérer la déréglementation, la libéralisation des services et
l'ouverture à la concurrence mondiale.’
75 Original text: ‘défendre l'Europe des Patries face au mondialisme destructeur et à la déferlante
migratoire.’
76 Original text: ‘État sans âme ni identité, enfin, qui renie ses racines helléno-chrétiennes,
accepte d’intégrer la Turquie malgré l’opposition des peuples, ne croit qu’à la mondialisation, à
la concurrence et au marché.’
The party’s definition of globalisation is thus very complex and is linked to various social and economic phenomena.

5.2.6 Analysis of the National Front’s European Parliamentary Speeches during the 5th & 6th Terms

An analysis of the party’s EP speeches also demonstrates the comparative salience of issues relevant to the phenomenon of globalisation and the party’s opposition to it77. During the 5th Parliamentary Term, 1999-2004, the National Front elected five MEPs, including Jean Marie Le Pen, Jean Claude Martinez, Carl Lang, Bruno Gollnisch and Charles de Gaulle. Marie-France Stirbois replaced Jean Marie Le Pen in April 2003 following the suspension of the latter’s EP mandate. In total, they gave 302 speeches. During the 6th Parliamentary Term, 2004-2009, the number of speeches more than doubled. The National Front elected seven MEPs. Whereas Lydia Schenardi, Fernand Le Rachinel and Marine Le Pen were elected for the first time, Jean Marie Le Pen, Bruno Gollnisch, Jean Claude Martinez and Carl Lang renewed their mandate. During this legislative term, party MEPs gave 778 speeches to the EP78.

A qualitative content analysis of the total number of 1080 speeches reveals an interesting pattern in terms of the themes that party MEPs refer to when they address the EP. A number of themes recur in these speeches, which can be broadly grouped into two categories, including (1) comments specific to Europe and the EU and (2) points on general non-EU related themes and much general recommendations79. Table 5.1 below shows the percentage of recurring themes in each category. Interestingly, party MEPs overwhelmingly refer to EU issues in their speeches. In total, 82.5 per cent of themes

77 These have been found on the EP’s online archives at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/archive/alphaOrder.do?language=EN
78 Note that Carl Lang and Jean Claude Martinez left Front National shortly before 2009. They did so for party internal dissent reasons rather than change in ideology. As such their speeches have been included in the analysis as they both have been prominent figures of the party during the 1999-2009 period under investigation.
79 For a detailed analysis of how speeches have been coded, see Appendix III.
refer to the politics and policies of the EU. 16.6 per cent of the themes are non-EU related themes.

**Table 5.1 General categories of themes in EP speeches (National Front) 5th & 6th Parliamentary Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of themes in EP speeches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU related themes and criticisms</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU related themes &amp; general recommendations</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)*

A comparison of these two thematic categories among the two EP Parliamentary Terms reveals a similar pattern. The reference to EU related themes remains overwhelming although it increases by 7.2 per cent from the 5th to the 6th Parliamentary term where it scored 77.2 and 84.4 per cent respectively. This corresponds to a relative decrease of references to non-EU related issues. During the 5th Parliamentary Term, party MEPs have referred to non-EU related issues by 22.6 per cent whereas in the 6th by only 14.8 per cent. This indicates that although EU issues were overwhelmingly salient in both EP legislative terms, this salience increased even more during the latter part of the 2000s (see tables 5.2 & 5.3 below).

**Table 5.2 General categories of themes in EP speeches (National Front) 5th Parliamentary Term**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of themes in EP speeches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU related themes and criticisms</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU related themes &amp; general recommendations</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)*

---

80 This strong salience of the EU is corroborated by the 2006 Chapel Hill survey where Front National scores 3.22 where 1 indicates no importance of European integration in the party’s public stance and 4 indicates great importance.
Table 5.3 General categories of themes in EP speeches (National Front)  
6th Parliamentary Term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of themes in EP speeches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU related themes and criticisms</td>
<td>84.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU related themes &amp; general recommendations</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)

A more detailed account of the recurring themes shows the predominance of issues pertaining to the phenomenon of globalisation (see table 5.4 below). Of the total issues that MEPs raised in their EP speeches, more than a third (34.1%) constitute criticisms against the EU for either promoting globalisation at a regional level or failing to protect EU member states from the effects of globalisation. Within the category of issues specific to the EU which accounts for 82.5 per cent of the references, the EU promotes ‘globalisation’ subcategory comprises 34.1 per cent, just under half of the total references to the EU (see table 5.4 below). Next is the subcategory of criticisms towards ‘EU institutions and Treaties’ which accounts for 8 per cent of the overall occurrence of themes (see table 5.4 below). The party also marginally refers to a common European culture, which includes a common Greco-Roman Christian heritage among the European peoples. Particularly striking is also the fact that party MEPs barely use the EP platform to criticise their domestic opponents. Only 2 per cent of the total occurrence of themes openly express disapproval of the French Presidents Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy (see table 5.4 below). The EP is predominantly employed as a platform to condemn EU-related policies and politics rather than to criticise the French elite. Within their EU criticisms, the consequences of ‘Globalisation’ are given more weight compared to other EU related politics.
Table 5.4 Salience of themes in EP speeches (National Front)  
5th & 6th Parliamentary Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occurrence of themes in EP speeches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU related themes and criticisms</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU promotes Globalisation</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Economic policies</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Employment policies</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Institutions/Treaties</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Enlargement</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Procedures/Parliamentary immunity/ EU does not respect HR</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU does not respect referenda/the people</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against various EU policies/initiatives/reports</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU bureaucracy/legislation</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to common European culture</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favour of Russia (as opposed to the EU)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favour of various EP initiatives/reports</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>82.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-EU related themes &amp; general recommendations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General recommendations</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of Chirac/Sarkozy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU specific issues</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>≈ 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: N=1443 occurrences of themes*

*Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)*
As mentioned above, the National Front defines the phenomenon of globalisation in a rather complex manner. Its consequences for both France and Europe are seen as both social and economic. Table 5.5 below summarises the themes recurring in the EP speeches that relate to the party’s definition of globalisation. This includes criticisms of the EU not only failing to protect the member states from globalising forces but also for being committed to the promotion of globalisation. The EU criticism for promoting economic liberalisation is the most salient and accounts for 11.4 per cent of the total recurring issues. This is followed by the issue of immigration, which is portrayed as the social consequence of globalisation and European integration and represents 8.7 per cent of the total issues. The party’s pleas for national and community preference are also included in this category as are the requests to restore both physical and border controls within the EU.

**Table 5.5** Breakdown of ‘EU promotes Globalisation’ subcategory (National Front) 5th & 6th Parliamentary Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Breakdown of ‘EU promotes Globalisation’ subcategory</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU promotes economic liberalisation</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU promotes immigration: EU immigration policy</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National preference/protectionism</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community preference/EU protectionism</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore physical border control</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore customs border control</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU promotes the liberalisation of farming/fishing</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU promotes the dismantling of physical borders: Schengen</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU promotes Globalisation Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)

A comparison of the two EP legislative terms shows that the pattern is rather similar between the two terms. Criticisms of the EU as promoting economic and social globalisation increase by 3.6 per cent (from 31.2 in the 5th to 34.8 per cent in the 6th EP term), criticisms of EU Treaties and Institutions largely remain constant and EU employment and enlargement polices are marginally more criticised during the 6th EP term (see tables 5.6 and 5.7 below). References to the EP procedures and MEPs parliamentary immunity have dropped from 13.9 to 5.5 per cent (see tables 5.6 and 5.7 below). This is because the issue of Jean Marie Le Pen’s EP suspension was resolved after 2004. However, 5.5 is still not a negligible percentage and largely represents the
party’s disapproval of the EP procedures arguing that they disadvantage small parties. This links to the EP’s anti-socialisation effect on National Front politicians. Criticisms of the EU for not respecting the European peoples features largely as a new issue during the 6th EP term as well as the reference to Russia as a historically European country that should be treated as an equal partner (see tables 5.6 & 5.7 below)\(^8\).

**Table 5.6** Salience of themes in EP speeches (National Front) 5\(^{th}\) Parliamentary Term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU related themes and criticisms</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU promotes Globalisation</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Economic policies</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Employment policies</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Institutions/Treaties</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Enlargement</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Procedures/Parliamentary immunity/EU does not respect HR</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU does not respect referenda/the people</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against various EU policies/initiatives/reports</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU bureaucracy/legislation</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to common European culture</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favour of Russia (as opposed to the EU)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favour of various EP initiatives/reports</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>77.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-EU related themes &amp; general recommendations</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General recommendations</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of Chirac/Sarkozy</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU specific issues</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                                                                  | ≈ 100%     |

\(N=381\) occurrences of themes

*Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)*

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\(^8\) Note that a simple word frequency in total 1080 speeches reveals a similar pattern whereby words such as immigration, liberal, borders, customs, agriculture and Turkey recur comparatively more often. For a frequency of words matrix, see Appendix V.
Table 5.7 Salience of themes in EP speeches (National Front)  
6th Parliamentary Term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occurrence of themes in EP speeches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>6th EP Term</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU related themes and criticisms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU promotes Globalisation</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Economic policies</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Employment policies</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Institutions/Treaties</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Enlargement</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Procedures/Parliamentary immunity/EU does not respect HR</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU does not respect referenda/the people</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against various EU policies/initiatives/reports</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU bureaucracy/legislation</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to common European culture</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favour of Russia (as opposed to the EU)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favour of various EP initiatives/reports</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td>84.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU related themes &amp; general recommendations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General recommendations</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of Chirac/Sarkozy</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU specific issues</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>≈ 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)*

5.3 The European issue as a differentiation tool

The aim of this section is illustrate how the party’s decision to adopt a ‘rejectionist’ position on European integration and to actively focus on the issue of social and economic globalisation relates to its general strategy in the domestic party system. As mentioned above, the party’s strategy is adversarial, its logic of competition is issue-based and its predominant goal is to claim ownership of specific policies or issues. Seen through this prism, this section argues that the party’s anti-EU position is integral to the party’s adversarial strategy. Since the party’s main logic of competition at the domestic level is ‘issue or policy based’, the party has increased incentives to delineate itself from the rest of the party system on specific policies in order to make itself heard in the
political arena and to represent a clear and different option for the electorate. The party's change of policy towards an outright rejection of European integration post-Maastricht and especially during the 1999-2009 decade fits comfortably within this overall political strategy. Strong criticism of the EU and the latter’s connection to the wider issue of globalisation become a strategic tool for the party in an effort to show to the French people that it represents a different, powerful and independent actor in the party system. The following section assesses the party’s strategy with reference to the electorate and the rest of the French parties giving particular attention to the 2005 French referendum on the European Constitution and the National Front’s 2009 EP elections’ campaign.

5.3.1 Attracting a well-defined segment of the society

The National Front attracts a particular segment of the society, which is rather dissimilar to the French society as a whole (Mayer 2002a; 2002b; 2007). The party’s electorate has an ethnocentric and authoritarian vision of the society. It is somewhat anti-Semitic and in favour of the reestablishment of the death penalty (Mayer 2002b). It overwhelmingly believes that there are many immigrants in France, that immigrants from North Africa will never become French and that the French people no longer feel at home in France (Mayer 2002b: 505-506). In fact, there is a strong correlation between the importance one attaches to the issue of immigration and the vote for the National Front (Mayer 2007). The party’s core voters are poorly educated and predominantly male. In terms of professional characteristics, they are mostly unemployed, workers, small shopkeepers, craftsmen and low level employees. These voters come from different backgrounds but self-proclaim to be predominantly ‘right-wing’. Indicatively, only 16 per cent of the workers that intended to vote for Jean Marie Le Pen in the 2007 Presidential elections claimed to belong ‘mostly to the left’ (Mayer 2007: 438).

The voters analysed above form a coherent core and have remained largely faithful to the party since the 1980s (Mayer 2002b: 511). The 2002 Presidential elections marked an electoral breakthrough for the party. The theme of insecurity was at the heart of the pre-electoral debate politicised by Jacques Chirac himself (Mayer 2002b; Cautrès 2003). This issue, integral to the party’s discursive toolkit, gave it the opportunity to enrich its
electoral make-up by attracting not only its core voters but also those from the ‘traditional right’ (Mayer 2002b: 513). In 2002 the party gained votes from rural areas and small French towns mainly among farmers who are traditionally supporters of the centre-right Union for a Popular Movement. The positions of these voters largely resemble those of the core National Front supporters. They equally reject immigration, they have an authoritarian vision of the society and they are in favour of the death penalty (Mayer 2007: 439).

It thus seems that during the 2000s, the National Front managed to mobilise two different segments of the French society, namely its core authoritarian and xenophobic electorate and some traditional right-wing voters. Given its profile, the party’s core electorate is the most affected by the liberalisation of markets and the arrival of immigrants. This segment of the French society is likely to consider itself as the victim of the process of globalisation. Both workers and right-wing traditional voters have become the ‘victims of globalisation’ as their professions are usually not sheltered from the forces of economic and social liberalisation. Company delocalisations and outsourcing of production affects professions such as low levels employees and workers. Economic liberalisation also has an adverse effect on farmers, small shopkeepers and craftsmen as cheaper products are imported from abroad. As a result of this process of economic and social globalisation both types of the electorate are likely to support parties that have succeeded in politicising these issues. For example, the traditional right-wing voters opted for Jean Marie Le Pen because they felt socially and economically insecure (Mayer 2007). Policy vote among those circles became a means to defend their socio-economic status in opposition to what are seen as ‘devastating’ European and global forces.

The party is aware of the socio-economic situation of its voters. ‘Our electorate is poor and a victim of globalisation and European integration. We carry the questions and anxieties of the French’ (interview with de Saint-Just 2010). Voters ‘choose us for the consequences of globalisation, namely unemployment, immigration, low purchasing

82 Wording in French: ‘Notre électorat est pauvre que souffre; victime de la mondialisation et de l’Europe. Nous somme porteurs des angoisses et interrogations des français’
power, lost social gains and insecurity’ (interview with Schénardi 2009).

The party’s anti-European discourse largely focusing on the effects of the markets and the European agriculture is clearly addressed to the two types of the French electorate. ‘Our position is really the position of our electorate’ (interview with Schénardi 2009).

The party criticises the EU for having ‘sacrificed the French agriculture to America’ and the single market ‘responding to its own logic’ (interview with Salagnac 2010). A speech of Jean-Claude Martinez in the EP captures the link the party makes between European integration and globalisation and how this is connected to the party’s core electorate and the swing voters, namely workers and farmers respectively.

‘The French people’s will expressed by the 2005 referendum broke the wild wave of ultra-liberalism and unrestrained free-trade that for the past 20 years swept and destroyed our coal, steel, textile, leather, spare parts, home appliances and automobile industries. This wave sowed the desertification of our fishing ports, our Languedoc-Roussillon vineyards, our sheep, cattle and poultry breeding, our Caribbean bananas, our Reunion plantations, our farms and plunged the women, the men, the workers and labourers of our country into social insecurity’ (Martinez 2006a).

Globalisation is a rather vague phenomenon that is difficult to capture or measure. The EU, however, is a concrete project whose institutions can be seen and policies can be felt at the national level. In this manner, European integration becomes an easy and tangible scapegoat for the perceived negative consequences of globalisation. Instead of blaming a rather abstract phenomenon for fears of insecurity and unemployment, it becomes rather more effective to put the blame on a concrete project. Besides, the party argues that the EU is a type of regional globalisation. This link between globalisation

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83 Wording in French: ‘‘Ils nous votent pour les conséquences de la globalisation, c’est-à-dire chômage, immigration, bas pouvoir d’achat, acquis sociaux perdus et insécurité.’

84 Wording in French: ‘notre position est vraiment la position de notre électorat’

85 Wording in French: ‘L’UE a sacrifié l’agriculture française à l’Amérique [et] le marché répond à sa propre logique.’

86 Original text: ‘La vague sauvage de l’ultralibéralisme et du libre-échange débridé qui, depuis 20 ans, déferlait et cassait nos charbonnages, nos aciéries, nos industries du textile, du cuir, de la machine-outil, de l’électroménager ou de l’automobile et semait la désertification dans nos ports de pêche, nos vignobles du Languedoc-Roussillon, nos élevages ovins, bovins, aviaires, nos bananeraies des Antilles, nos plantations de la Réunion, nos fermes, plongeant les femmes, les hommes, les ouvrières et les travailleurs de nos pays dans l'insécurité sociale, s'est cassée elle-même sur la volonté du peuple français exprimée par le référendum du 29 mai 2005.’
and European integration appeals to both the party’s core electorate and the traditional right-wing voters, and has the power to mobilise them to go to the ballot box. Presenting this opposition in a very adversarial manner is also directed towards the voters that would potentially abstain. It can be said that in some ways the National Front actively formulates a latent anti-Europeaness linked to the electorate’s anti-globalisation instincts. For instance, in its monthly bulletin it is argued ‘Victims of globalisation, the French farmers pay the consequences of a disastrous European agricultural policy’ (Au Front 2008b: 6)\(^\text{87}\).

The party’s adversarial political strategy demonstrated by, among others, its position on European integration is also facilitated by the features of the French electoral system. Research has shown that the two-round electoral system creates incentives for strategic voting and may encourage voters to support candidates with little chance of victory in the first round. This is because voters may choose to signal their preferences on a particular policy in the first round and ‘alter the policy position of the preferred candidate’ (Blais and Loewen 2009: 355). In this context, the National Front is more likely to attract strategic voting in the first round if it focuses its agenda on selected policies that differentiate it from the rest of the party system and/or on which the other parties have not formulated a clear position.

The positions of the party’s electorate on immigration and on insecurity do not coincide with the positions of the general French electorate. Mayer (2007) finds that the distance of opinion between the National Front and the general electorate has increased during the last twenty years. Far from becoming more right-wing, the French society continues to evolve towards more ‘tolerance and openness’ (Mayer 2007: 431). As such, the employment of issue-based adversarial politics as part of its strategy for differentiation entails that the party does not seek to attract the median voter. The National Front aims to maintain its core voters and attract the disillusioned traditional right-wing voters by first, focusing on particular policies; second, actively seeking to polarise the debate; and third, treating the mainstream parties as a single block.

\(^{87}\)Original text : ‘Victimes de la mondialisation, les agriculteurs français payent les conséquences d’une politique agricole européenne désastreuse.’
5.3.2 Providing a unique yet extremist niche

The active pursuit to polarise the debate by using a strong anti-European rhetoric and by connecting the latter to an anti-globalisation agenda was largely facilitated by the 2005 French referendum campaign on the European Constitution. Although highly divided, the Socialist Party and the Greens supported the Constitution as did the Union for a Popular Movement. The ‘no’ campaign focused its criticisms mostly on socio-economic issues, which were linked to the wider global and domestic context. Supporters of the ‘no’ campaign were diverse ranging from the left wing Workers’ Struggle, French Communist Party and Revolutionary Communist League to Philippe de Villiers’ right-wing Movement for France and Debout la République, a break-away party from the Union for a Popular Movement led by Nicolas Dupont-Aignan.

What united this rather disparate and cross-party campaign against the European Constitution was the discussion of ‘the negative socio-economic impact and cultural consequences of globalisation for France’s economic and political future’ (Startin 2008: 94). The radical left condemned the European Constitution because they saw the EU as a capitalist project that runs counter to their vision of the ‘Socialist United States of Europe’ (Workers' Struggle 2004; Revolutionary Communist League 2006: 18) and that perpetuates the ultra-liberal logic of the Maastricht Treaty (French Communist Party 2004). The right-wing opponents of the Constitution put forward a ‘variable geometry’ or ‘à la carte’ Europe whereby member states would be able to cooperate in an intergovernmental manner in large projects. Neither, however, advocated the repatriation of all competences, the renegotiation of all European Treaties or the organisation of a referendum on French EU membership as did the National Front. Additionally, although the right-wing Eurosceptics share the Front’s views on nation-state sovereignty, they do not adopt its vision of Europe. The latter is based on the absolute supremacy of the European nation state over any other institution which entails that the nation state should not be bound by any international laws. Although the party’s campaign against the Constitution shared the concerns of all the above mentioned parties, it strove to present its positions as representing a unique but nevertheless extremist niche in the political system. This was achieved by engaging in an adversarial
political strategy whereby the National Front was the only party against the totality of EU policies and indirectly advocating EU withdrawal.

The National Front sees both the radical left and ultra-conservative parties as its immediate competitors since sometimes the policies that they put forward and their electorate overlap. In this context, the National Front has an additional incentive to increase its differentiation and to be seen as providing a unique (albeit rather extremist) alternative. By claiming that ‘it was the first Eurosceptic party in France’ (interview with Salagnac 2010), the party presents itself as being the ‘owner’ of Euroscepticism in France. It is self-proclaimed as different from the radical left because it does not only condemn the EU for being ultra-liberal. Rather it also criticises the EU for allegedly being conducive to increased levels of immigration (interview with Schénardi 2009). The party justifies its disapproval of the EU on the basis of its ‘economic patriotism’ doctrine (interview with de la Tocnaye 2010) and its ‘willingness to retain the nation’s prominence’ (interview with de Saint-Just 2010). The party also contends that it is different from the ultra-conservative parties. ‘Philippe de Villers and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan have been elected to the National Assembly thanks to the Union for a Popular Movement’ (interview with de Danne 2010) and as a result they are tied to the mainstream. Regarding de Villiers, it is argued that ‘he has been sold to the Union for a Popular Movement’ (interview with Schénardi 2009). Thus the party’s ‘rejectionist’ position on European integration has a two-fold effect. It first serves to delineate the party from its immediate competitors both on the right and the left sides of the political spectrum. Second its discourse aids the party to present itself as providing a clear anti-party and anti-mainstream alternative.

This strategy becomes all the more pertinent given the zero-sum character of French politics. In a zero-sum environment, it makes sense that a party would not only aim to be as strong as possible, but also to be stronger than its opponents (Meguid 2008). The

88 Wording in French: ‘nous ont été les premiers eurosceptiques en France.’
89 Wording in French: ‘on a la même position sur l’UE avec l’extrême gauche. Mais la justification est différente. A savoir, le patriotisme économique’
90 Wording in French: ‘la volonté de garder la préméance de la nation’
91 Wording in French: ‘Philippe de Villiers et Nicolas Dupont-Aignan sont élus aux législatives grâce à l’UMP’
92 Wording in French: ‘De Villiers est vendu à l’UMP’
National Front has more to win, and very importantly increased media coverage, by being controversial than by being accommodating. The feeling of effective exclusion from the party system accentuates this need for the adoption of contentious policies. ‘They do not let us speak. This has sharpened our claims’ (interview with Schénardi 2009). In its effort for differentiation, the party discourse includes strong anti-EU words and phrases, including ‘We are imprisoned within the EU. It is a prison’, ‘We do not need a villain’, and ‘The European Parliament is a masquerade’ (interview with Salagnac 2010).

This link between the party's effort for differentiation and the issue of Europe became even more prominent in the mid and later part of the 2000s. Nicolas Sarkozy, leader of the centre-right Union for a Popular Movement, openly politicised the issue of immigration and national identity in his 2007 Presidential campaign effectively hollowing out a large part of the National Front’s political agenda (Mayer 2007: 441). Indeed a number of party officials argue that Sarkozy won precisely because he borrowed the National Front’s ideas (interviews with Schénardi 2009; Gollnisch 2009a; de Danne 2010; de Saint-Just 2010). The leader of the Union for a Popular Movement adopted an ‘accommodative’ strategy whereby he increased the salience of the immigration issue and challenged the National Front’s issue-ownership of immigration.

Sarkozy’s strategy proved to be rather effective. The traditional right-wing voters returned to his party in 2007. The National Front received 10.44 per cent of the vote in the first round of the Presidential elections and approximately 1.600.000 less votes compared to the second round of the 2002 elections. This further motivated the National Front to use the issues of European integration and globalisation as part of its exclusive policy toolkit. The National Front mobilises voters on the authoritarian/libertarian dimension of political competition clearly focusing on the ‘identity and the national’

93 Wording in French: ‘On ne nous donne pas la parole. Ça a aiguisé notre revendication.’
94 Wording in French: ‘Nous sommes emprisonnés à l’intérieur de l’UE. C’est une prison’, ‘Nous n’avons pas besoin d’un méchant’; and ‘Le PE, c’est une mascarade’.
95 For a detailed analysis of mainstream parties’ strategies towards niche parties, see Meguid (2008).
96 Another reason for this is that they saw Sarkozy as a more credible candidate compared to Le Pen (Mayer 2007: 441).
rather than the ‘community and the international’ (interviews with Schênardi 2009; Gollnisch 2009a). ‘We defend the “New Paradigm”. We are patriotic and social: we believe in the preservation of national identity and we stand out of the social rights of the people’ (interview with de Danne 2010). In this respect, the National Front is the only party in France ‘entitled’ to oppose European integration and globalisation. The party can claim ownership of these highly related issues as other parties and in particular the Union for a Popular Movement and Sarkozy being part of the 'cartel' cannot realistically adopt similar positions.

The connection between Europe and globalisation became striking in the party’s campaign for the 2009 EP elections. The phrase ‘Euro-mondialisme’ figured prominently on the party’s electoral manifesto. The party argues that the ‘European Super State is not even truly European. It is instead a Euro-global space open to all winds, to all flows of people, products and capital’ (National Front 2009: 4). Bruno Gollnisch gave an interview to the party’s pre-electoral magazine where he argued that ‘The World is sick. Europe is sick. France is sick’ (Au Front 2008b: 7) clearly indicating that Europe is an intermediate level conveying the consequences of globalisation to the nation state. One of the party’s pre-electoral slogans was ‘Against the Europe of Banksters’ alluding that the EU is composed by bankers and gangsters who are only interested in their profits (Au Front 2008b: 5). In 2009, the party supported the radical rupture with what it calls Euro-globalisation arguing that ‘The National Front embodies more than ever the only credible and coherent popular force which defends the independence, the sovereignty, the identity of France and which aims to preserve the security and prosperity of the French in Europe’ (Au Front 2009d: 3).

97 Original text (slightly paraphrased): ‘Mais ils sont résolument contre l’escroquerie qui consiste, sous le couvert de cette coopération, à édifier un Super-État destructeur de leurs identités particulières, de leurs souverainetés, de leurs libertés, sans même pour autant édifier un ensemble véritablement européen, mais un espace euro-mondialiste ouvert à tous les vents, à tous les flux de personnes, de marchandises et de capitaux’
98 Original text: ‘Le Monde est malade, L’Europe est malade. La France est malade’
99 Original text: ‘Contre l’Europe des Banksters’
100 Original text: ‘le Front national incarne plus que jamais la seule force populaire crédible et cohérente qui défende l’indépendance, la souveraineté, l’identité de la France, qui entend préserver la sécurité et la prospérité des Français en Europe.’
It is interesting to note that there was a degree of internal disagreement in the party regarding the official party EP election slogan. The choice was between the slogan ‘Europe hurts’ and ‘Their Europe hurts’ with the first slogan being adopted at the insistence of Jean Marie le Pen (interview with Gollnisch 2009a). The approved slogan is rather more adversarial as it portrays Europe in a monolithic manner and argues that it has dramatic consequences on the member states. The party’s pamphlet below shows a statue representing France with a black eye having suffered a punch from Europe. The dismissed slogan can be thought as comparatively less adversarial because the word ‘their’ shows that the party accepts the existence of two types of Europe: ‘their’ and ‘ours’. It is significant that this vision of ‘two Europes’ was expressed in the European elections manifesto the headline of which was ‘Their Europe is not our Europe’ (National Front 2009: 1)\(^{101}\). The manifesto argued that ‘The National Front has a different idea of Europe. It confirms that the road to follow is not that of Euro-globalisation at the hands of a small co-opting caste, namely the Eurocracy [...] The good way ahead excludes neither the European dialogue nor the industrial, cultural or other types of cooperation. But it entails a radical break from the globalising system’ (National Front 2009: 1)\(^{102}\).

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\(^{101}\) Original text: ‘Leur Europe n’est pas la notre’

\(^{102}\) Original text: ‘Le Front National a une autre idée de l’Europe. Il affirme que la voie à suivre n’est pas celle de l’Euromondialisme, aux mains d’une petite caste qui se recrute par cooptation : l’Eurocratie [...] La bonne voie n’exclut ni la concertation européenne ni la coopération industrielle, culturelle, ou autre. Mais elle implique une rupture radicale avec le système mondialiste.’
Conclusion

The aim of the chapter has been to examine in detail the first type of party-based Euroscepticism, namely the ‘rejectionist’ pattern. It has also sought to explain the ways in which this variant of Euroscepticism may become integral to a radical right party’s political strategy at the domestic level. To illustrate this argument, the chapter has analysed the ideas, positions and strategic considerations of the French National Front during a ten-year period (1999-2009).

Three main components constitute the chapter’s argument. Following a brief discussion of the party’s history and main ideological characteristics, the chapter suggests that the National Front is an intrinsically anti-system party whose predominant strategy is adversarial, its logic of competition issue-based and policy is its prime goal. Rather than having a full approach to the society, the party’s agenda is biased towards specific issues confirming its anti-system and anti-politics character. The chapter continues by arguing that the National Front has adopted a ‘rejectionist’ position on European integration. Although the party accepts Europe as a cultural and geographical entity, it rejects the
principle of integration at the EU level, is utterly against the EU policy status quo and the future building of a European federal state. The EU is rejected as a form of regional globalisation, which promotes ultra-liberal economic policies and encourages immigration. The party argues that European cooperation may only take place outside the EU framework on a bilateral or trilateral basis. Projects work much better outside the EU framework and nation-state cooperation should only take a case-by-case approach. The chapter concludes by illustrating the ways in which this staunch anti-European discourse has become a strategic tool in the party’s policy-based logic of competition. The party’s anti-EU and anti-globalisation positions enhance the party’s differentiation from the mainstream and facilitate its attempt to portray itself as the only party in France that provides a solution to new issues and problems that French people face.

The empirical results of this chapter demonstrate that the National Front has used the European issue for party political gains. In its ultimate quest for political differentiation, the party opted for a strong anti-EU rhetoric advocating –albeit increasingly indirectly– French EU withdrawal. A ‘rejectionist’ EU stance as well as the latter’s connection to the wider issue of globalisation become a strategic tool for the party in an effort to demonstrate to the French people that it represents a different, powerful and independent actor in the party system. Europe is presented as some kind of intermediate political level, which mediates the allegedly dramatic consequences of globalisation to the nation state. This chapter confirms the thesis’ wider argument whereby radical right parties use the issue of Europe in their discursive toolkit for political purposes relevant to their domestic agenda. To shed further light on the thesis’ argument, the following chapter examines the second type of party-based Euroscepticism, namely the ‘conditional’ pattern.
Chapter 6

The pattern of Conditional Euroscepticism: the case of the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally

‘Εμείς νιοθετούμε την Αριστοτέλεια λογική της μεσότητας’

‘We apply Aristotle’s logic of the median’,

Interview with Asterios Rontoulis, LAOS MP, 2009.

Introduction

The previous chapter has explored in detail the first variant of radical right Euroscepticism identified in the thesis, i.e. the ‘rejecting’ position on European integration. This chapter proceeds by examining the second pattern of Euroscepticism. According to this pattern, a party is not against the principle of cooperation at a European multilateral level but it is against the current policy practice as well as the future building of a European polity. To shed more light on this type of radical right Euroscepticism, this chapter analyses the case of the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)\(^\text{103}\). This party does not support Greek EU withdrawal and criticises any such argumentation. European nation states should cooperate in the context of a confederation whereby they would recognise and protect their historic, cultural and ethnic roots. LAOS supports European integration under conditions. These include the use of referenda for every grand EU decision or Treaty change, the predominance of intergovernmental decision-making and the maintenance of Europe’s cultural and religious homogeneity.

\(^{103}\) This chapter refers to the Popular Orthodox Rally by its acronym, LAOS, for reasons of space. The full name of the party is otherwise used throughout the thesis.
The chapter tests hypothesis 2 of the thesis which suggests that if a radical right party seeks to have a catch-all appeal in order to increase its electoral percentages; it is likely to adopt a ‘conditional’ EU position. The party’s anti-European discourse will be portrayed in a way that de-emphasises its radicalism and is likely to focus on issues which the party perceives to be considered important by the general public so that it can portray itself as being close to the median voter (accommodative strategy).

In order to test this hypothesis, the chapter proceeds with a three-fold argument. It first suggests that LAOS’ main political strategy is accommodative, its logic of competition of the ‘catch-all’ variant, and its predominant party goal is to increase its vote intake in order to ensure its survival in the Greek political system. Secondly, it puts forward that LAOS has adopted a ‘conditional’ position on European integration and maintains that in its European discourse the party overwhelmingly stresses issues of Greek security concerns. Third, it argues that the party’s stance on Europe is being used as a vote-maximising tool in its effort to entrench its presence in the Greek party system.

The main body of the chapter provides a detailed examination of LAOS’ position on European integration and its significance within the context of Greek domestic politics. It is divided into three sections. It starts with an overview of the party’s core ideology confirming that the latter is characterised by a combination of nationalist and authoritarian values with a populist rhetoric. It also places the party’s predominant strategy within the cultural, institutional, and historical constraints of the Greek party system. It proceeds by discussing the party’s position on European integration as well as the significance of Greek security concerns in the party’s European discourse. The third section shows how the party’s choice to adopt a ‘conditional’ position on European integration conforms with its general strategy within the Greek party system. It demonstrates that LAOS has adopted a ‘conditional’ EU position depicting Greek public opinion on the matter. LAOS has linked its European position to the issue of Greek security concerns portraying itself as occupying a unique niche in the Greek party system.
6.1 The Popular Orthodox Rally

6.1.1 What the party stands for

Georgios Karatzaferis established LAOS on September 14th 2000, after being expelled from the centre-right New Democracy on April 9th 2000 for openly criticising its members including the then leader, Costas Karamanlis. The establishment of LAOS marked Karatzaferis’ opposition to New Democracy’s ideological turn towards the centre of Greek politics as he represented the ultra-nationalist branch of the party (Georgiadou 2008; 2009). Since its establishment LAOS has enjoyed a piecemeal but constant rise in all types of elections, including local, national and European. LAOS’ electoral debut occurred in the 2002 local elections. The 2004 EP elections marked the party’s electoral breakthrough as with a 4.12 per cent of the Greek vote, the party leader became an MEP. The EP offered him political ‘office’ from which he could exert political power, develop a pan European political network, and increase his political status both domestically and abroad. In the 2007 national elections, the party gained ten seats in the national parliament and became the first radical right party to be represented nationally since 1977. This relative electoral success continued in both the 2009 EP and national elections when the party gained two and fifteen representatives respectively.

The party leader has consistently refused to be associated with the Greek 1967-1974 dictatorship, neo-Nazi or neo-fascist movements arguing that the party belongs to the ‘European right’ and that ‘Le Pen has a fascist mentality which I consider an enemy of society and democracy’. Despite several similar statements, the party can be characterised as belonging to the radical right party family (Mudde 2007: 306). LAOS articulates a ‘xenophobic, anti-immigrant, law and order and Eurosceptic discourse’ and shares the main defining ideological features of the radical

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104 www.in.gr news accessed on April 22nd 2010.
106 For a detailed account of the party’s national and EP electoral results, see Appendix VI.
right which combine nationalist and authoritarian values with a populist rhetoric (Mudde 2007: 20-23) outlined below.

Nationalism and national identity feature prominently in the party’s ideology. The idea of the ‘nation’ constitutes the founding element of the party and all its subsequent ideas and policies derive from this core aspect. For instance, the party’s 2003 manifesto read:

‘[LAOS] is a Greek centric party that advocates the long-term interests of the Greek people and the Greek nation. The Greek civilisation, the Greek spirit and the Greek values inspire the formulation and implementation of its policies’ (LAOS 2003: 7)\textsuperscript{108}

The party assesses all issues affecting Greek society through the patriotic prism, including among others the economy, the environment and foreign affairs (interview with Rontoulis 8 April 2009). It seeks to provide an answer or what it calls the ‘middle ground’ between neo-liberalism and socialism arguing that its policy positions represent the logic of ‘patriotic interference’, namely the party puts the ‘nation’ first in every policy decision (Karatzafis 2009).

That LAOS is also highly authoritarian is illustrated in its policies and attitudes on law and order as well as immigration. Policing and defence are both particularly salient policies within the party. LAOS argues in favour of a strong Greek army and a raised morale of the armed forces (LAOS 2003: 13) as well as for the effective action of Greek security forces (LAOS 2003: 27). Furthermore, LAOS views Greece as having a serious demographic problem but argues that the latter should not be managed by increasing the number of immigrants since ‘Greece has a small number of inhabitants and the proportion of the population has already been altered [by high levels of immigration]’ (LAOS 2007).\textsuperscript{109} Immigration should be strictly controlled and immigrants must be

\textsuperscript{108} Original text: Είναι ένα κόμμα ελληνοκεντρικό, που προτάσσει τα μακροπρόθεσμα συμφέροντα του ελληνικού λαού, και του εθνούς, διαπνέεται από τον ελληνικό πολιτισμό, το ελληνικό πνεύμα και τις ελληνικές αξίες στην χάραξη και εφαρμογή της πολιτικής του.

\textsuperscript{109} Original text: ‘Λόγω του μικρού αριθμού των κατοίκων της, έχει ήδη αλλοιωθεί σημαντικά η αναλογία του πληθυσμού της.’
assimilated in order to be ‘Greeks both in the soul and the spirit’ (LAOS 2007: 44).\textsuperscript{110} The party is against illegal immigration claiming that ‘it plagues Greek society and is catastrophic in many areas’ (LAOS 2003: 23)\textsuperscript{111}. Indicatively, LAOS scores 9.63 on the GAL/TAN axis of the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey where 1 marks a stance fully supportive of expanded personal freedoms and 10 marks ‘traditional’ or ‘authoritarian’ parties that reject these ideas and value order, tradition and stability (Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010). Analysis of the Greek political system in Chapter 4 also points to a similar finding.

LAOS adopts a populist rhetoric. The party tends to see society as divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, i.e. the people and the corrupt elite (Taggart 1998; Mudde 2007: 23). LAOS claims that democracy should lie in the hands of the people rather than what it sees as the corrupted elite. Politics should be the expression of the general will through plebiscitary politics. This explains its consistent attempt to promote the use of referendums for issues that it describes ‘of high national importance’. The party seeks to institutionalise in the Greek Constitution the government’s obligation to carry out a referendum through MP requests and signed petitions from the public (LAOS 2003: 9; 2007: 16). Examples where LAOS advocates a referendum include Turkish and FYROM’s EU entry (LAOS 2007: 22), Greek immigration policy (LAOS 2007: 44), the euro (LAOS 2007: 45), Greek labour policy (LAOS 2007: 60) and FYROM’s official name (LAOS 2007: 84)

Taggart (2000: 2) has defined populism as ‘a chameleon, adopting the colours of its environment’. This entails adapting one’s discourse depending on the context in order to suit one’s political needs. This characteristic of populism is particularly prominent in LAOS which consistently avoids defining itself along the left – right spectrum of political ideology. One of the party’s slogans is ‘Greece is what unites us all’ (LAOS 2003: 1)\textsuperscript{112}. LAOS MPs and party officials discard the characterisation ‘right’ arguing that they do not consider LAOS as belonging to the ‘patriotic right’ (interviews with Aivaliotis 2009; Chrisanthakopoulos 2009; Polatides 2009; Rontoulis 2009). Rather,

\textsuperscript{110} Original text: ‘να είναι Έλληνες στη ψυχή και στο πνεύμα’

\textsuperscript{111} Original text: ‘Αποτελούν τη σοβαρότερη πληγή που ταλανίζει αυτήν τη στιγμή την ελληνική κοινωνία με πολλαπλές καταστροφικές συνέπειες σε διάφορους τομείς.’

\textsuperscript{112} Original text: ‘Όλους εμάς ενώνει η Ελλάς’
they characterise LAOS as the party of ‘patriotic rebirth’ in Greece further arguing that
the left-right division is obsolete especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. This
is true with the considerable exception of two LAOS MPs, Voridis and Georgiadis, who
self-identify as right-wing politicians. In particular, on a scale from one to ten where one
signifies extreme left and ten extreme right, Voridis places himself between 7 and 7.5
(interview with Voridis 2009). Georgiadis admits that there are two types of political
division. He argues that according to the traditional left-right political division, LAOS
belongs to the right. On the other hand, according to the modern political division,
namely the division between the ‘nationalists’ and the ‘internationalists’, LAOS is
clearly a party against the New World Order (interview with Georgiadis 2009).
However, even if these two politicians are comparatively more explicit regarding where
they think the party or themselves may belong, their underlying concept is that the
significance of patriotism in politics should be a continuous and uniting factor regardless
of ideological background. In this respect, ideology becomes blurred and core
ideological values are difficult to identify.

6.1.2 Vote maximisation as the party’s predominant political strategy

The party’s predominant strategy since its establishment in 2000 has been to increase its
votes by portraying itself not as an extreme but rather as a ‘median’ party. The radical
right in Greece has been discredited over the past decades largely but not exclusively
due to the country’s dictatorial past. As a result the radical right has been constrained to
small youth movements and minor parties that have been receiving much less than one
per cent of the national vote since the beginning of the 1980s (see table 6.1 below). In
this context, the first priority of a new and small radical right party is to become
established in the Greek political landscape by aiming to consistently receive relatively
high electoral results. This can only be achieved by appearing to be mainstream. This is
not to say that a radical right party in Greece would not be concerned with gaining office
or pushing particular policies of its interest. As will be shown below, LAOS’ political
strategy is constrained by the country’s political culture, institutions and history. The
party can be either policy or office seeking only after electoral support has entrenched it
in the Greek party system.
Greek politics since the establishment of democracy in the mid-1970s and in particular since PASOK’s political success in the 1980s are characterised by the ‘polarisation of political conflict and rhetoric’ (Legg and Roberts 1997: 142). Political culture is typified by an adversarial style which encourages sharp division of opinion between the two main competitors, namely the conservative and the socialist party. The 1981 elections have been seen as an ‘earthquake’ in Greek politics because they signified the ‘passage from party fragmentation to the high concentration of political forces’ (Pappas 2003: 98) and led to ‘crystallisation of a new political system’ (Diamandouros 1998: 193). Following these elections, the Greek party system has been characterised as polarised pluralism, either ‘limited’ (Mavrogordatos 1984) or ‘extreme’ (Seferiades 1986). It has evolved especially until the end of the 1990s into a two-and-a-half party system where two major parties had been associated with the left and right respectively and an additional third small party had been associated with the radical left (Legg and Roberts 1997: 132). Based on Sartori’s classification of party systems (Sartori and Mair 2005: 164-170), Pappas (2003) concludes that post 1981 Greece is a classic two-party system. This is because no third party can prevent any of the two major parties from governing alone. Small parties do not have a blackmailing potential and government coalitions are unnecessary. Whether we classify the Greek party system as two-and-a-half or classic two party system, political culture remains adversarial and politics are largely focused on the two major political forces thus undermining the role and survival of small political parties.

The electoral system is a form of reinforced proportional representation favouring the ability of the winner to achieve an absolute majority and discouraging electoral or governmental coalitions (Legg and Roberts 1997). This, coupled with a three per cent electoral threshold, produces a largely disproportional effect in terms of the translation of votes into seats by penalising small parties. This electoral system produces both a psychological and a mechanical effect on voting behaviour and the number of effective parties in the Greek party system (Duverger 1954). Greece scores 7.4 in the index of disproportionality (Gallagher and Mitchell 2004), has 2.2 effective number of parties at the legislative level and 2.7 effective number of parties at elective level (Gallagher,
Laver et al. 2006: 364). As a result, ‘No splinter party has gained much support across the country or elected more than a handful of deputies; they tend to last one or two elections at the most’ (Legg and Roberts 1997: 147) and the radical right has been recording low electoral scores (Carter 2002: 134).

Partly as a result of the two above-mentioned reasons, radical right parties have been unsuccessful in Greece since the restoration of the democratic regime in the mid-1970s. As seen in table 6.1 below, the radical right has failed electorally during the twenty year period 1985-2004. Prior to 1985, three radical right parties, including the National Alignment, the Progressive Party and the National Political Union, won seats in three elections, namely the 1977 Parliamentary, 1981 and 1984 European respectively. The success of these three parties is explained by particular events occurring during these years. The National Alignment’s success in 1977 was largely due to reasons specific to the post-1974 transition period, namely the legalisation of the Communist party and the purge of the public sector of people collaborating with the 1967-1974 military regime by the then Greek Prime Minister, Kostantinos Karamanlis (Clogg 1987: 184; Dimitras 1992: 260). The relative success of the Progressive Party and the National Political Union in the EP elections at the beginning of the 1980s was mostly a consequence of the demand ‘for the release of the junta leaders’ from prison (Clogg 1987: 185; Dimitras 1992: 266). In 1984 the National Political Union invited Jean Marie Le Pen, the leader of the French radical right National Front, to Athens, which provoked violent demonstrations. Clogg (1987: 185) argues that ‘this highly polarised climate in which the 1985 [national] elections took place made it predictable that the EPEN [National Political Union] vote, at 0.6%, was substantially less than the 2.3% it had achieved in the 1984 Euroelections’. Moreover, as Davis argues, ‘perhaps the greatest impediment to the rise of neo-populist parties has been the tremendous growth of the Greek welfare state and the populist actions of the PASOK party during the 1980s’ (Davis 1998: 168).

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113 Disproportionality refers to vote-seat disproportionality as measured the least squares index (Gallagher and Mitchell 2004: Appendix B). This is a 0 to 100 scale, 0 being full proportionality and 100 full disproportionality. The Greek 7.4 score runs somewhere in between in Europe with the United Kingdom scoring 17.7 and Austria scoring 1.3 (Gallagher, Laver et al. 2006: 364).

114 Examples during the 1990s of splinter parties that did not last very long in the Greek political landscape include Political Spring and the Democratic Social Movement (splinter parties from ND and PASOK respectively).
This led a number of scholars to predict that unless there were dramatic developments the radical right in Greece was unlikely to rise (Dimitras 1996; Davis 1998).

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Election</th>
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<td>Hellenism Party</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Popular Orthodox Rally</td>
<td>2.17</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Golden Dawn</td>
<td>0.29</td>
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*Source: Dimitras 1992 up to 1990 elections; 1993 to 2009 updated by the author*
The Greek political culture, institutions and history are not conducive to the creation or the survival of a radical right party. Politics are mostly centred around the two major parties, the electoral system does not advantage small parties and radical right ideas are not welcome in the public. As a result, the radical right has not been successful in Greece since the early 1980s and in this respect the emergence of LAOS is rather puzzling. Given these constraints, the major challenge a new, small and radical right party would face lies in ensuring its survival in the party system. This can only be attained by the consistent gaining of seats in the National Parliament. Given that Greece is a polarised society where debate takes mostly place between the two major parties, a party’s inability to enter the National Parliament automatically signifies its political demise. Unlike other European countries, parties that remain outside the Greek Parliament usually cease to operate or become exceptionally weak.

As a result, since its establishment in 2000, the major challenge for LAOS has been to find a way to embed itself in the Greek party system. Although the ideological premise of the party lies in radical right populism, the party has increased incentives to downplay its radical elements in order to appear as representing the ‘mainstream’ of Greek politics. This can be facilitated by the adoption of a populist rhetoric. In this context, adopting an ‘accommodative’ political rhetoric entails that the party portrays itself as espousing ‘median’ (rather than extreme) positions. Appearing to be mainstream may have an effect on its electoral results. If LAOS increases its votes over successive elections, it avoids becoming a ‘flash party’. Consistently high electoral results may provide LAOS the opportunity to ‘break’ the two-party system. In this case, one of the two main parties may need to cooperate with LAOS in order to pass legislation. If this occurs, LAOS has successfully overcome the political, institutional and historic constraints of the Greek political system and is very likely to become a legitimised and established Greek political force.

Party officials have confirmed this strategy. For instance, they have argued that ‘we apply Aristotle’s logic of the median’ indicating that the positions LAOS adopts are not

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115 Note that it is outside the scope of the chapter to discuss the initial rise of LAOS. Taking this relative success for granted and the constraints provided by the Greek party system, it seeks to explain how the issue of European integration sits within the party’s wider strategy. For a short discussion on LAOS’ success, see Gemenis, K. and E. Dinas (2010).
extremist (interview with Rontoulis 2009). Moreover, ‘LAOS represents the average Greek person’, which entails a feeling that the party’s policies somewhat cut across party lines (interview with Georgiou 2009). LAOS is portrayed as a serious ‘government party’ that could participate in a coalition with either major parties. In fact, participation in a governmental coalition would mark the party’s entrance to the Greek mainstream. ‘We may not be mainstream, just because we have not governed. We have, however, mainstream ideas.’ (interview with Polatides 2009). The two party system is seen as an impediment to the ‘mainstreamisation’ of LAOS and the predominance of two Greek families in power is seen as insanity (interview with Georgiou 2009). The party is in favour of a coalition government and has expressed an interest in cooperating not only with the most ideologically proximate New Democracy but also with PASOK (interview with Rontoulis 2009). Although it is accepted that cooperation with ND is a much more feasible scenario given the two parties’ ideological proximity (interview with Georgiadis 2009; also see Chapter 4 findings), it is argued that ‘we can cooperate with New Democracy but only under conditions. We say no to a privileged partnership with New Democracy. We can cooperate with other parties’ (interview with Polatides 2009). LAOS views its participation in a governmental coalition as a likely development only if the party manages to transcend the bi-polar political culture. The party’s leader has argued:

‘Greece is no longer a bi-polar society. This has already been tried. Our political discourse is positively received all the way from the Communist left to the radical right. Everyone listens to us because we are saying what is obvious […] We do not have restrictions. We accept what is good. All parties have patriots’ (Karatzafis 2006).

116 Wording in Greek: ‘Εμείς υιοθετούμε την Αριστοτέλεια λογική της μεσότητας’
117 Wording in Greek: ‘Το ΛΑΟΣ αντιπροσωπεύει το μέσο Ελληνα’.
118 Wording in Greek: ‘Μπορεί να μην είμαστε mainstream, λόγω του ότι δεν έχουμε κυβερνήσει. Έχουμε όμως mainstream ιδέες.’
119 Wording in Greek: ‘Συνεργασία με τη ΝΔ θα μπορέσει να υπάρξει με όρους. Όχι στην προνομιακή συνεργασία με τη ΝΔ. Μπορούμε να συνεργαστούμε και με άλλους.’
120 Original text: ‘Δεν υπάρχει λοιπόν διπλωματίας. Τους δοκίμασαν. Ο δικός μας ο λόγος έχει ενήκουσε ότα από την κομμουνιστική Αριστερά και αριστερότερα αυτής, μέχρι την άκρα Δεξιά. Μας ακούνε όλοι γιατί λέμε τα αυτονόητα.[…] Εμείς δεν έχουμε αγκυλώσεις, ήτι καλό το παίρνουμε. Πατριώτες υπάρχουν σε όλα τα κόμματα.’
LAOS’ official newspaper has also confirmed the party’s willingness to become entrenched in Greek politics as well as the political uncertainty small Greek parties face. Shortly after the 2009 EP elections, the party leader argued that LAOS’ victory should not be confused with Political Spring’s short-term electoral success in the 1990s. ‘We are here to stay, and we will stay’ (Karatzaferis quoted in A1 2009b: 5)\textsuperscript{121}.

Note that the predominant type of party competition in Greece is that of the catch-all variant. Although the left-right is the main division in Greek politics (Lyrintzis 2005: 244) this polarisation is not necessarily based on cleavages as these are understood in the Western European context, namely historical divisions between clearly defined societal groups that are in opposition with one another (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This is because Greece experienced limited industrialisation (Featherstone 1990) and ‘civil society is not composed of independent groups or cohesive classes’; rather the political world has historically been based on clientage structures (Legg and Roberts 1997: 144). Notwithstanding, the Greek parties have manipulated this left-right divide 'according to the exigencies of the political conjuncture’ in order to appeal to every Greek voter (Lyrintzis 2005: 244). In this respect, although New Democracy and PASOK clearly place themselves in the centre-right and centre-left ideological space respectively, they are essentially ‘catch-all’ parties (Legg and Roberts 1997: 144), namely they seek to ‘make broader appeals, trying to catch support from all classes’ (Katz and Mair 1995: 12).

Since the party seeks to appear to be mainstream, it is incentivised to adopt the prevalent type of party competition and endeavour to become ‘catch-all’ in its appeal. This can be observed in LAOS’ leader attempt to recruit politicians from both the left and the right of the political spectrum as well as non-experienced politicians either from the civil service or famous celebrities. For instance, Chrysanthakopoulos (party official and from October 2009 MP) was elected as a PASOK MP in the 1996 and 2000 elections. Voridis (MP) was the President of the radical right party Greek Front. Polatides (MP) was a President of the Prefectural Committee of New Democracy’s youth club. Georgiou (MEP) was a high ranking civil servant and Anatolakis (post October 2009 MP) was a famous footballer. ‘Regardless of political beliefs, i.e. New Democracy, PASOK, etc,

\textsuperscript{121} Original text: ‘Ήρθαμε για να μείνουμε και θα μείνουμε!’
we accept whoever agrees with our patriotic analysis of Greek politics’ (interview with Rontoulis 2009).\footnote{Wording in Greek: ‘Όποιος αποδέχεται αυτή την ανάλυση είναι ενταγμένοι στον πατριωτικό χώρο ανεξαρτήτως πολιτικής πεποίθησης πχ. ΝΔ, ΠΑΣΟΚ κτλ. Ανεξαρτήτως πολιτικού χώρου, αν αποδέχεται τη μήτρα της γέννησης, εμείς τον δεχόμαστε. Είναι αποδεκτός.’}

This catch-all agenda is largely confirmed by the party leader himself, who following the 2009 EP elections argued that ‘LAOS’ voters come from all political streams. The analysis we have is that 45 per cent are from New Democracy, 25 per cent from PASOK and 15 per cent from KKE.\footnote{Original text: ‘Οι ψηφοφόροι του ΛΑΟΣ προέρχονται απ’όλα τα πολιτικά ρεύματα. Η ανάλυση που έχουμε είναι ότι είναι 45% ΝΔ, 25% ΠΑΣΟΚ και 15% ΚΚΕ.’} (A1 2009b: 5). The political make-up of LAOS’ voters is indeed quite diverse. The 2009 EP election survey by Public Issue found that apart from 24 per cent of LAOS voters claiming to be nationalists, 13 per cent positioned themselves as ideologically conservatives, 10 per cent as socialists and a surprising 16 per cent claimed to be ecologists (see figure 6.1 below).\footnote{For further information on the sociology of LAOS’ voters, see Appendix VII.}

**Figure 6.1 Ideological self-placement of LAOS voters**

![Self placement of LAOS voters 2009](image)

Source: Public issue survey for the 2009 EP elections
The party’s main strategy is accommodative, its logic of competition is catch-all and its predominant goal is to increase its electoral potential. The adoption of a ‘conditional’ position on European integration can be situated within this overall strategy. The European issue and the EU as a whole have become a strategic tool serving as a means to present itself as a trustworthy partner at both the domestic and European levels. Adopting a ‘conditional’ position on Europe may thus be seen as integral to the party’s political agenda at the domestic level. The party endeavours to appear mainstream in the eyes of the Greek people in order to increase its electoral appeal and ultimately entrench its presence in the Greek party system. The next section documents LAOS’ European argumentation and explains the ways in which the latter is linked to the party’s preoccupation over Greek security concerns.

6.2 Conditional Eurosepticism and the issue of Greek Security 1999-2009

This section provides an account of LAOS’ position on European integration. It argues that LAOS sees Europe as an entity sharing common cultural, historical and religious characteristics and for this reason the party supports European solidarity and cooperation at a higher multilateral level. Although LAOS presents strong criticisms against the current form of European integration, it accepts the existence of issues that can be better managed at a European rather than national level. The party acknowledges that Greece has benefited highly from EU membership and stands categorically against Greek EU withdrawal. While it is against the creation of a federal union, it accepts that a confederation is the ideal framework for European cooperation. In particular, the party supports the ‘principle’ of European cooperation but disapproves of the current ‘practice’ of policy cooperation at the EU level and the ‘future’ creation of a European polity.

In mapping LAOS’ European argumentation, this section argues that the party has adopted a ‘conditional’ position on European integration. While it supports continuing Greek participation in the EU project, it sets a number of conditions under which it would encourage European integration. These are the supremacy of intergovernmental decision-making whereby member states maintain their status quo at all times, the wider
use of referenda and the EU’s active effort to maintain and protect Europe’s cultural and religious homogeneity. LAOS’ Euroscepticism is analysed through the prism of the typology of radical right Euroscepticism presented in Chapter 3 of the thesis. This consists of a discussion of LAOS’ ‘definition of Europe’, its stance on the ‘principle’ of European integration, the policy ‘practice’ of the EU and the ‘future’ construction of a European polity. Through a detailed investigation of these four indicators of Euroscepticism and the qualitative analysis of LAOS’s MEP plenary speeches during the 6th EP term, this section identifies LAOS’ main points of anti-European rhetoric and in particular, it shows how the issue of Europe is connected to the party’s concern over Greek security.

6.2.1 Definition of Europe

LAOS sees Europe as a cultural entity largely based on Greek civilisation. In particular, it views Europe as standing on a tripod composed by ancient Greek democracy, Roman legal tradition and Christianity, which are the necessary constituent elements of Europe. If one of these ‘legs’ is somehow broken, the European construction is very likely to collapse (interview with Rontoulis 2009). LAOS openly accepts Greece’s European identity. ‘The West belongs to Greece because it has been established on the virtues born by our civilisation, including democracy, humanism, research, lack of excess and harmony’ (LAOS 2003: 8). Since Europe has been built on Greek values, European identity is also thought to have been built on Greek values, which makes Greece an integral part of the European past, present and future. In this respect, LAOS views Greece’s relationship with the EU as a necessary coexistence. Since the EU is the major political and economic organisation of the continent, Greece has no choice but to cooperate in this framework. Otherwise, it would be denying its European identity.

This cultural definition of Europe is closely related to a spatial/border definition. Since Christianity is one of the constitutive elements of Europe, its borders must stop at the

125 Original text: ‘Η Δύση άλλωστε ανήκει στην Ελλάδα, αφού θεμελιώθηκε πάνω στις αρετές που γέννησε ο δικός μας πολιτισμός, όπως η Δημοκρατία, ο ανθρωπισμός, η έρευνα, το μέτρο και η αρμονία.’
Urals and the Mediterranean thus excluding any non-Christian country to the east and
the south, including Turkey. If the EU accepted a religiously dissimilar country such as
Turkey, then the European construction would lose one of its essential characteristics
and would ultimately collapse. ‘Turkey does not belong to the EU for geographic,
cultural, religious and political reasons’ (LAOS 2007: 22). This definition of Europe
provides one of the explanations behind LAOS’ opposition to Turkey’s EU accession.
LAOS suggests that European cooperation should occur only after the European nation
states have clearly defined Europe both spatially and culturally (interview with
Rontoulis 2009). This entails delineating what unites them internally meaning their
culture and what defines them externally meaning the borders of the organisation.

6.2.2 Principle of European integration

LAOS is in favour of the ‘principle’ of European integration and it supports Greek
cooperation at a European multilateral level. The party openly supports Greek EU
membership and criticises any political argumentation in favour of withdrawal. Its 2007
manifesto confirms the party’s belief that:

[Greece is] a country that recognises the tendency for a Union of
Europe and understands that it does not make sense to change the
current European map’ (LAOS 2007: 25).

Having substantiated its European vocation, the party is in favour of a ‘united Europe of
Nations’ (LAOS 2003: 8) because it is only ‘the nation that can produce civilisation’
(interview with Rontoulis 2009). The party supports a type of multilateral European
collaboration where all decision-making would be held in an intergovernmental fashion
among free and sovereign nations. LAOS argues that it is not ‘dogmatically anti-
European but at the same time it does not accept that “we have to surrender to the European Union powers that erode our national sovereignty” (LAOS 2007: 4)\(^{130}\).

Although LAOS is clearly against the loss of national sovereignty, it recognises that the future of Greece is to a great extent linked to the EU. ‘Greek EU integration can only occur within the context of a Confederation and only under the condition that our national specificities would be protected’ (LAOS 2003: 12)\(^{131}\) and ‘where there would be recognition and protection of the historic, cultural and ethnic roots as well as the ethnic characteristics of the European peoples’ (LAOS 2007: 23)\(^{132}\). ‘We accept a system promoting the cooperation of European peoples in the economic, social policy and cultural policies’ (LAOS 2004: 2)\(^{133}\). LAOS ‘does not deny Greece’s European identity’\(^{134}\) (LAOS 2003: 8). It argues that a European confederation would be the only viable framework for cooperation whereby member states can preserve their distinct roles (interview with Polatides 2009). Only within this framework, Greece and the other member states would be able to preserve ‘the veto power for issues considered to be of national importance’ (LAOS 2003: 12)\(^{135}\). Issues of national importance are not necessarily only the ones that have traditionally been in the realm of the nation state, including currency or foreign policy. They could also differ from one member state to the other suggesting that different states attach different priority on different issues. Note that the word ‘confederation’ is used to contrast with the word ‘federation’ used by some political elites as a synonym of supranationalism. The EU must not become a federal super state (interview with Georgiadis 2009). Unaccountable supranational institutions such as the Commission must be devoid of their powers. The member states should have distinct roles and decision making should be intergovernmental based on the principle of unanimity (interview with Polatides 2009).

\(^{130}\) Original text: ‘Δεν είναι ένα δογματικά αντί-ευρωπαϊκό κόμμα, χωρίς ωστόσο να αποδέχεται ότι «θα πρέπει να εκχωρήσουμε στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση ακόμα και εξουσίες που ακυρώνουν την εθνική μας κυριαρχία». ’

\(^{131}\) Original text: ‘Η ενσωμάτωση επομένως της χώρας μας στη Ε.Ε. μπορεί να γίνει μόνο στα πλαίσια μιας Συνομοσπονδίας και υπό τον όρο ότι θα προστατεύεται η ιδιαιτερότητά μας.’

\(^{132}\) Original text: ‘όπου θα αναγνωρίζονται και θα προστατεύονται οι ιστορικές τόσο οι πολιτισμικές και οι εθνικές ρίζες όσο και τα ιδιαίτερα εθνικά χαρακτηριστικά των Ευρωπαϊκών λαών.’

\(^{133}\) Original text: ‘Δεχόμαστε δηλαδή ένα σύστημα που θα προάγει την συνεργασία των Ευρωπαϊκών Λαών στον τομέα της οικονομίας, της κοινονικής πολιτικής και του πολιτισμού’

\(^{134}\) Original text: ‘Ο Α.Α.Ο.Σ. δεν αρνείται την ευρωπαϊκή ταυτότητα της Ελλάδος.’

\(^{135}\) Original text: ‘το δικαίωμα του βέτο για τα ζωτικά της θέματα’
6.2.3 Practice of European policy integration

Despite the party’s support that a number of policies should be dealt with at the European level, LAOS presents strong criticisms on the EU’s policy ‘practice’. From these criticisms derive the three conditions under which LAOS would be allegedly willing to support the European project. These include intergovernmental decision-making, the wide use of plebiscitary politics for all major EU decisions and Treaty changes and the maintenance of each country’s cultural uniqueness.

LAOS supports policy cooperation within the EU framework, including policies such as immigration, energy, economy, development, defence, security and foreign policy (LAOS 2007). The main issue for the party, however, is which decision-making framework would apply. The party is an adamant supporter of unanimity and the preservation of veto power especially as far as national issues are concerned (interview with Voridis 2009). LAOS is against any additional policy transfer to the EU level unless unanimity is preserved. This argumentation forms the first condition under which LAOS would be supportive of the EU project, namely a change in the decision-making arrangements. Decisions should be taken in an intergovernmental fashion so that each member state can safeguard its national interests.

The party’s position on the European Monetary Union is an indicative example here. Although LAOS is an active supporter of Greek economy convergence towards the economies of the most developed EU countries (LAOS 2007: 40), it is rather ambivalent regarding European monetary policy and the euro. ‘We believe that our country’s accession to the Eurozone did not only bring benefits to Greece but it also resulted in a series of problems’ (LAOS 2007: 45)\textsuperscript{136}. LAOS argues that the euro has negative consequences on Greek development policy, exports and tourism and is responsible for the significant increase of the prices of all consumer products. ‘We suffer the consequences of rapid and misguided acceptance of the euro’ (LAOS 2004: 2)\textsuperscript{137}. However, the party does not overtly advocate Greek exit from the Eurozone. Instead, it

\textsuperscript{136} Original text: ‘Θεωρούμε ότι η ένταξη της χώρας μας στη ζώνη του ΕΥΡΩ δεν προσέφερε μόνον οφέλη για την Ελλάδα αλλά, παράλληλα, επέφερε μια σειρά από προβλήματα’

\textsuperscript{137} Original text: ‘υφιστάμεθα τις συνέπειες της γρήγορης και ασύνετης αποδοχής του ευρώ’
supports a referendum where the Greek people can decide whether ‘they prefer to remain in the Eurozone or whether they favour the restoration of the Drachma’ (LAOS 2007: 45). Again the issue for the party is mostly ‘whether decisions on Greek national economic policy should be taken in Greece rather than in Brussels’ (LAOS 2007: 31).

LAOS sees itself as a political force whose purpose is to promote democracy and safeguard Greek national interests within the EU. Being part of the Independence/Democracy group during the 2004-2009 EP parliamentary period, it subscribes to the promotion of transparency, democracy and accountability within the EU and the respect for national differences and interests (Ind/Dem 2004). In an effort to increase accountability, LAOS seeks to introduce more popular democracy through the frequent use of plebiscitary politics (LAOS 2007). The citizens should be involved in issues that affect their everyday life. Citizen participation is likely to become a positive learning process that would ultimately lead to citizen support of integration. The party is open about its Eurosceptic position and argues that ‘In fact, through Euroscepticism, the EU will be re-established on the basis of popular consent’ (interview with Rontoulis 2009). The introduction of pan European referenda for the ratification of every major decision and Treaty change at the EU level, including the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, would lead to more transparency and accountability at the EU level and would ultimately encourage LAOS’ EU support.

The cultural issue is of outmost importance to LAOS and is inextricably linked to its definition of Europe. Whereas accepting the common culture of European peoples, LAOS believes that the peoples of Europe should be able to maintain their national differences. The EU should not attempt to produce policies that cast a shadow on the cultural and national differences of its member states. The EU should respect the history and traditions of each member state. Being part of the globalisation wave, the EU is seen

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138 Original text: ‘να αποφασίσουν με δημοψήφισμα το εάν επιθυμούν την παραμονή της χώρας μας στην Ευρωζώνη ή την επαναφορά της Δραχμής’
139 Original text: ‘θέλουμε οι αποφάσεις για την ιθαγενή οικονομική μας πολιτική να παίρνονται στην Ελλάδα ή στις Βρυξέλλες’
140 Quote from the interview in Greek: ‘εμείς υποστηρίζουμε ότι μέσω του Ευρωσκεπτικισμού πηγάζουν πολιτικά πολύ που θα κάνουν αισθήμα την ΕΕ στους πολίτες. Ενθεμελίωση της ΕΕ με βάση τους πολίτες’
as attempting to make a cultural ‘mishmash’ of its member states. The party actively says no to a ‘European mishmash’ (Karatzafiris 2005) and is in favour of the preservation of the nation, religion, tradition and national languages (interview with Georgiou 2009). The EU is encouraged to establish policies that seek to maintain the European cultural wealth by promoting the mutual respect of each member state’s histories, traditions and civilisations. LAOS supports the EU only if it ensures that each country is able to preserve its national, religious (meaning Christian) and linguistic particularities.

6.2.4 The Future of the European Polity

LAOS is opposed to the policy ‘practice’ of European integration and ‘sets’ the EU conditions under which it would support integration. These conditions reveal a vision of Europe, which according to the party, is different to that promoted by the European Treaties and institutions. This opposition to the ‘future’ construction of a European polity can be seen through LAOS’ rejection of both the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty. Both European projects go in the opposite direction to that which the party aspires. The Lisbon Treaty includes ninety per cent of the text and stipulations of the European Constitution (Chrisanthakopoulos 2008). As such, both projects are rejected for similar reasons, which are closely linked to the ‘conditions’ the party sets to the EU.

Both the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty promote supranational institutions, including a European President and a Foreign Minister, which are thought to be above member state law (LAOS 2005). The Lisbon Treaty is thought to give birth to a super state as it transfers judiciary, executive and legislative powers to the EU. The Treaty confers a high legal status on the EU which entails the weakening of national parliaments in favour of the ‘Brussels Directorate’ (Karatzafiris 2008a: 3). Since veto power is not maintained in a number of areas, the Treaty is seen as compromising the principle of unanimity. ‘It is uncertain whether after the ratification of the treaty we will still be able to maintain our veto power regarding Skopje’s EU accession’ (Karatzafiris
The European public has not been given the chance to ratify either project through national referenda because national governments, including the Greek, fear that people are likely to reject them. LAOS supports that the Greek government refuses a public referendum on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, although the public supports it (Karatzaferis 2008b: 1). Both projects are seen as rendering Europe into a cultural ‘melting pot’ where all different cultures will not be distinguished and member states will be downgraded into the ‘provinces’ of a European federation governed only by strong states (LAOS 2005: 5). The party leader argues that ‘Peoples are not animals and it is a crime to treat them as minced meat’ (Karatzaferis 2005) insinuating that these European projects treat them as such. The European Constitution is thought to promote the weakening of national identities and the differences of the peoples in favour of an ‘American style cultural melting pot’ (LAOS 2005: 6). Given that the Constitution does not include a reference to Christianity, the EU is also seen as ‘promoting the de-christianisation of Europe’ (interview with Rontoulis 2009), which runs counter to the party’s basic values and principles. For these reasons, the leader of LAOS argued in front of the Greek Parliament that the Lisbon Treaty is the ‘greatest fraud against the peoples of Europe’ (Karatzaferis 2008a).

The EU is seen as becoming a Commonwealth of sovereign regions. This entails the disempowerment of the nation state to the benefit of Brussels. The fading away of the nation state is likely to lead to the development of multi-cultural consciousness whereby the Greek people would forget concepts such as the nation, motherland, national heroes and Greek literature (Chrisanthakopoulos 2008). The party’s position on European integration can be summarized as follows: ‘We do not want a federation. We want a confederation of nation states. We are not against the EU. Neither do we believe in Greek withdrawal. Greece has benefited from the EU. We do not want to abolish nation state independence in issues of national importance, e.g. Skopje and Turkey’ (interview

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141 Original text: ‘Και ποιος εγγυάται, κύριε Υφυπουργέ, ότι αν αύριο το πρωί με τη Συνθήκη επικυρωμένη θα έχετε ξανά το δικαίωμα του βέτο απέναντι στα Σκόπια.’
142 Original text: ‘Μα οι Λαοί δεν είναι ζώα και είναι Έγκλημα η αντιμετώπισή τους ως Κιμά’.
143 Original text: ‘όχι η κατάργησή τους μέσα σε ένα Αμερικανικό τύπου χωνευτήρι των λαών’
144 Quote from the interview in Greek: ‘Η ΕΕ θέλει τον αποχριστιανισμό της Ευρώπης’.
145 Original text: ‘Η μεγαλύτερη απάτη σε βάρος των λαών της Ευρώπης’
with Georgiadis 2009). Given that, following Lisbon Treaty ratification the EU requires deeper European state cooperation and greater use of qualified majority voting, it can be reasonably argued that LAOS is against the making of a ‘future’ European polity.

6.2.5 The issue of Greek Security within LAOS’ European discourse

The above ‘conditional’ position on European integration is ultimately linked to issues of Greek security, which are core to LAOS’ agenda. These include the name of the Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the perceived constant threat from Turkey, Greek borders, the situation in Northern Cyprus as well as Greece’s relations with Albania and Kosovo (LAOS 2009). For LAOS, all Greek problems stem from the fact that Greek security concerns, which are thought to be of high national importance, remain unresolved. Greece should be independent from other international organisations in dealing with those issues (LAOS 2007: 21). Foreign policy should have a national and long-term character independent from domestic party politics (LAOS 2003: 11).

‘We believe that our country should have a supra-partisan national foreign policy with continuation, dynamism, consistency and mainly an enduring strategy. This would be formulated on the basis of the sole criterion of the interest of the country and the Greek nation.’ (LAOS 2007: 21)

146 Wording in Greek: ‘Εμείς δεν θέλουμε ομοσπονδία. Θέλουμε συνομοσπονδία εθνών κρατών. Δεν είμαστε κατά της ΕΕ. Ούτε πιστεύουμε στην αποχώρηση της Ελλάδας. Η Ελλάδα έχει οφεληθεί από την ΕΕ. Δεν θέλουμε την κατάργηση της ανεξαρτησίας για θέματα εθνικά πχ. Σκόπια και Τουρκία.’

147 Note that when the party refers to Turkey as a security, it refers to the perceived problem of Turkey as a whole. This includes among others EU enlargement given the problem of cultural and territorial differences with Greece, EU funds to the Turkish part of Cyprus, the Armenian genocide, Turkish occupation army in Cyprus and the status of the Grey Wolves organisation.

148 Original text: ‘Πιστεύουμε ότι η χώρα μας πρέπει να έχει μία υπερκομματική εθνική Εξωτερική πολιτική, με συνέχεια, με δυναμική, με συνέπεια και, κυρίως, με διαχρονική στρατηγική που θα διαμορφώνεται με αποκλειστικό κριτήριο το Συμφέρον της χώρας μας και του Ελληνικού Έθνους.’
For LAOS, security issues strongly affect any other problem pertaining to the Greek society. If these remain unresolved, the country cannot proceed in dealing with economic and social concerns. This is especially true since the Greek government spends a great share of the budget for defence against potential threats to Greece from its neighbours. If Greece resolves its security issues, the defence budget could be allocated to different projects including education, welfare, road construction and school building (interview with Rontoulis 2009).

Issues of security have been increasingly salient in LAOS’ both national and European agenda. One of the reasons why LAOS has a ‘conditional’ Eurosceptic agenda is the fear that if Greece loses its veto power in the EU, it will no longer be able to decide on these vital issues of national importance (interview with Georgiadis 2009). A 2008 seventeen page party document entitled ‘The documentation of shame’ and addressed to the national public outlined in detail how Greek MEPs voted in the EP on issues predominantly related to Greek security concerns (LAOS 2008). The purpose of this pamphlet was to inform Greek citizens on ‘Which MEPs have openly and without shame or inhibitions supported Turkish or Skopje’s interests’ (LAOS 2008: 2)149.

The 2009 EP election manifesto was equally devoted to issues relating to Greek security concerns. Nineteen out of the twenty four pages of the 2009 EP election manifesto criticise the other Greek parties in the EP for not promoting Greek security interests at the European level (LAOS 2009). The front cover depicts a Greek man dressed up in the traditional uniform reminiscent of the Greek War of Independence from Turkey (see figure 6.2 below). Sitting on a locked ballot box, he looks depressed and disheartened and his attire is crinkled and soiled. The slogan on the front page reads ‘Fellow compatriot, some people humiliated you in Europe..! Learn the truth and forget the fairy tales!’ (LAOS 2009)150. This was used as a strong communication tactic to convey that Greeks have been internationally humiliated without being able to react. The underlying message is to criticise the two main Greek parties for having supported Turkey’s EU

149 Original text: ‘Ποιοί Ευρωβουλευτές χωρίς αιδώ απροκάλυπτα και χωρίς αναστολές προασπίζοντα τα συμφέροντα των Τούρκων και Σκοπιανών!’

150 Original text: ‘Φίλε Πατριώτη, κάποιοι σε ταπείνωσαν στην Ευρώπη..! Μάθε την αλήθεια, ξέχασε τα παραμύθια!’
accession insinuating that LAOS is the only Greek party that takes these matters seriously.

**Figure 6.2** LAOS 2009 EP elections manifesto

Note: ‘Euro elections 2009: Fellow compatriot, some people humiliated you in Europe..! Learn the truth and forget the fairy tales! LAOS The strong voice in Europe’
Source: www.laos.gr

6.2.6 Analysis of LAOS European Parliamentary Speeches during the 6th Term

An analysis of the party’s EP speeches is a further manifestation of the comparative salience of Greek security concerns in LAOS’ European agenda as well as the fact that LAOS seeks to promote those issues to the European level. During the 6th parliamentary period 2004-2009, LAOS elected one MEP. Karatzasferis, in his capacity as the party’s
first MEP gave 101 plenary speeches from October 2004 until July 2007\textsuperscript{151}. After the September 2007 Greek national elections, he was elected as in the National Parliament and handed over his EP seat to Georgiou, a former Greek ambassador who gave 22 speeches from October 2007 to April 2009\textsuperscript{152}.

A qualitative content analysis of a total of 123 speeches reveals a very interesting result. A number of themes recur, which can be broadly grouped into two categories, including (1) references specific to the EU and Europe and (2) various issues that refer to either domestic politics or some more general matters. References that belong to these categories are approximately equally distributed with 50.2 per cent and 49.8 per cent respectively (see table 6.2)\textsuperscript{153}. This indicates that although references to themes related to Europe and the EU are very frequent, they do not constitute the overwhelming majority of issues. LAOS has employed the EP platform not only to present and promote its positions on European integration, EU policies and Treaties. It has also used the time allocated in Plenary in order to discuss and raise awareness of a variety of non-EU related issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of themes in EP speeches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU related themes and criticisms</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various issues</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)

A detailed analysis of the above two categories reveals that the issue of Europe is salient within the party but it is equally as important as other issues\textsuperscript{154}. Although a number of EU policies are severely criticised, including economic policies and enlargement, a

\textsuperscript{151} Note that the party did not run for the 1999 EP elections and was not represented during the 5\textsuperscript{th} EP term.

\textsuperscript{152} These have been found on the EP’s online archives at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/archive/alphaOrder.do?language=EN

\textsuperscript{153} For a detailed analysis of how speeches have been coded, see Appendix III.

\textsuperscript{154} This relative salience of the EU is corroborated by the 2006 Chapel Hill survey where LAOS scores 2.86 where 1 indicates no importance of European integration in the party’s public stance and 4 indicates great importance.
significant 9 per cent of the overall occurrences of themes present requests to the EU to assist Greece in a number of internal matters (see table 6.3 below). This indicates that albeit a number of criticisms, the EU is seen as a potential source of positive influence on Greece and is associated with the party’s acceptance of the ‘principle’ of European integration discussed in section 6.2.2. A considerable 14.6 per cent of references concern the issue of Turkey and in particular the prospect of Turkish EU accession (see table 6.3 below). Note that those references are not only directed against the EU for discussing enlargement to Turkey. They are also directed against Turkey for not being ‘eligible’ for EU membership as it occupies the Northern part of Cyprus and fails to respect the European borders. Particularly surprising is the fact that the party, although having an anti-immigration and anti-globalisation agenda did not give much weight on these two topics with 1.6 and 2 per cent respectively (see table 6.3 below)\textsuperscript{155}.

MEP speeches refer to the relationship between the EU and the US with a proportion of 14.6 per cent. In addition to this, LAOS MEPs mention the US independently of its relations with the EU a further 10.2 per cent (see table 6.3). Adding these two subcategories results in a total reference to the US of 24.8, which accounts for approximately one quarter of the entire occurrence of themes. References to the US are inextricably linked to LAOS’ anti-Americanism and can by extension be linked to the general issue of Greek security concerns. For instance, Stavridis argues that ‘Anti-Americanism is also very common, even among elites […], and among most Greeks because of the support that the Americans gave the Greek junta (1967-1974), their role in the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and generally speaking their pro-Turkish stance over the years.’ (Stavridis 2003: 12-13)\textsuperscript{156}.

\textsuperscript{155} Note that, unlike Front National, LAOS refers to the phenomenon of globalisation in a rather vague and abstract manner and does not explicitly link it to the process of European integration. Indicatively, the party refers to the global consequences of cheap imports from China, and the financial impact on small and medium enterprises of the opening of international home products retailer IKEA in Greece and calls for the ‘reversal of the new world order’.

\textsuperscript{156} Note that both radical and mainstream right-wing parties in Greece have traditionally been pro-American. LAOS’ anti-Americanism can be thought of as an adaptation of PASOK’s strong anti-Western message in the 1980s and its ‘spirited national chauvinism’ (Legg and Roberts 1997: 141).
Table 6.3 Salience of themes in EP speeches (LAOS) 6th Parliamentary Term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occurrence of themes in EP speeches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>6th EP Term</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU related themes and criticisms</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Economic Policies</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Referenda</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Enlargement</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Borders</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Constitution</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU should help Greece</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to common European culture</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM &amp; the EU</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania &amp; the EU</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey &amp; the EU</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favour of Russia</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Preference</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Preference</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US &amp; EU relations</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various EU criticisms</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-EU related themes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Security Concerns</td>
<td><strong>20.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic criticisms</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic issues</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>49.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>≈ 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N=245 occurrences of themes
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)

Within the category of non-EU related themes, the issue of Greek security concerns occupies an important 20.8 per cent of the total issues (see table 6.3). This indicates that LAOS MEPs employed the time allocated to them in EP Plenary with a view to promoting Greek security interests. Within this sub-category, 9.3 per cent of the total occurrence of themes refers to Turkey, 5.3 per cent refers to Cyprus, 3.5 per cent refers to FYROM’s name and 1.2 to Greek borders. The issue of Albania and Kosovo jointly
receive 1.5 per cent of the references (see table 6.4 below). Note that the qualitative analysis of the speeches reveals that when the two MEPs have referred to Greek security concerns, they have avoided blaming or criticising the EU. As in the pamphlet ‘The documentation of shame’ analysed above, they have mostly focused their criticisms on the Greek elite for failing to manage these issues in an appropriate manner.

Table 6.4 Breakdown of ‘Greek Security Concerns’ subcategory (LAOS)
6th Parliamentary Term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Breakdown of ‘Greek Security Concerns’ subcategory</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th EP Team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek borders</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greek Security Concerns Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)

It is evident from the analysis that LAOS has sought to ‘upload’ Greek security concerns to the EU level. The EU-related themes category contains sub-categories that are very relevant to Greek security interests. These include the issue of the EU borders, which directly relates to Greece’s dispute with Turkey over the Aegean. They also refer to the relationship between the EU and Greece’s neighbours FYROM, Albania and Turkey discussed within the context of European enlargement policy. Adding all these categories results in a total of 50.1 per cent of occurrences of themes. This indicates a strong salience of this theme in the party’s rhetoric discussed both independently and in relation to the EU (see table 6.5 below)\textsuperscript{157}.

\textsuperscript{157} Note that a simple word frequency in the two MEPs total 123 speeches reveals a similar pattern whereby words such as Turkey, Cyprus, FYROM, Borders, Russia and USA recur comparatively more often. For a frequency of words matrix, see Appendix VIII.
Table 6.5 References to ‘Greek Security Concerns’ subcategory (LAOS) 6th Parliamentary Term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Greek Security Concerns’</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th EP Team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek borders</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Borders</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM &amp; the EU</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania &amp; the EU</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey &amp; the EU</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greek Security Concerns Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)*

6.3 The European issue as a vote-maximising tool

The aim of this section is to demonstrate how the party’s choice to adopt a ‘conditional’ position on European integration conforms with its general strategy within the Greek party system. As analysed in section 6.1.2, LAOS’ main political strategy is accommodative, its logic of competition of the ‘catch-all’ variant, and its predominant party goal lies in increasing its vote intake in order to ensure its survival in the Greek political system. This has also been largely confirmed by the analysis of the Greek party system in Chapter 4 of the thesis. Section 4.3.2 demonstrated that LAOS occupies a spatial position not distinctively separate from the rest of the Greek party system further corroborating the party’s willingness to portray relative policy convergence with the mainstream.

In its quest for respectability, the party has adopted a flexible communication strategy by rejecting extremism in order to construct an image that appears to be near the ‘median voter’. In the context of a largely pro-European public opinion, a vote-maximising party, such as LAOS, is provided with fewer incentives to present a strongly
anti-European rhetoric. Instead the party presents a much more accommodative stance to the European issue aiming at portraying a ‘mainstream’ image to the Greek public. In an effort to increase its electoral potential, the party has sought to capitalise on the issue of Greek security concerns, which resonate well with the Greek public. The party’s ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism becomes a strategic tool serving to differentiate LAOS from every other party in the Greek party system including the radical right, splinters from the conservative New Democracy, the radical left or the mainstream and to demonstrate that it occupies the middle ground in Greek politics.

6.3.1 Seeking to attract the median voter

LAOS endeavours to draw votes from across the Greek party system rather than a clearly predefined segment of the society. In its quest for political entrenchment, the party seeks to be seen as offering an agenda that has the potential to attract Greek voters irrespective of ideology, social background and economic status. Its ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism can be seen as an attempt to depict Greek public opinion on the matter. Greeks have been increasingly pro EU members since the mid-1980s but from 2003 onwards they have become somewhat reluctant towards the European project. Although feelings of indifference towards the project are rising, the public continues to view EU membership as a major source of benefit, especially with regards to issues arising security concerns. LAOS’ EU position clearly reflects this trend of Greek public opinion. The EU project is not rejected but becomes questioned and somehow distrusted. At the same time, membership is still considered necessary and the EU is thought as a source of positive impact on Greece.

Greek public opinion was sceptical about European Community (EC) membership until the mid-1980s when it underwent a major shift and witnessed a strong rising trend. This decisive shift occurred in 1985 and coincided with the securing of EC loans and the change of the governing PASOK’s rhetoric on membership (Featherstone 1994a: 155). Although the initial elite drive for accession was political, Greek public Europhilia has been utilitarian and linked to expectations of economic development and modernisation (Vernardakis 2007: 153). Greek European support emanated from a general preference
for ‘EC-level action to overcome the shortcoming of their own conditions’ including a strong monetary regime (Featherstone 1994a: 156). The Greek voter has seen the European project as a solution to the problems pertaining to the Greek society, including a higher quality of life and the elimination of the perceived social backwardness of the country. There is a wider feeling that, being an EU member, Greece has both Westernised and modernised (for an example on Greek foreign policy see Economides 2005).

A small but steady decline in public EU support has been observed from 2004 onwards. Eurobarometer surveys show that support for EU membership has been declining to the point that in four surveys (Spring 2006, Spring 2007, Spring 2008, Autumn 2008 and Spring 2009) the Greek score is lower than the EU average (see figure 6.3 below). This can also be verified by the 2009 European elections exit poll whereby only 23 per cent of the respondents viewed the European project with feelings of hope. Indifference levels reached 27 per cent whereas reservation and fear attained 28 and 14 per cent respectively (see figure 6.4 below). Despite this rising reluctance towards the EU, Greeks overwhelmingly believe that the country has benefited and continues to benefit from membership largely confirming that the Greeks view the EU from a utilitarian perspective (see figure 6.5 below).
Question: Generally speaking, do you think that Greek membership of the European Community (Common Market) is ...?
Source: Eurobarometer survey (2002-2009)

Source: Public issue, European elections 2009 exit poll\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{158} All Public issue opinion polls have been found at http://www.publicissue.gr/category/pi/analysis/polls/
Figure 6.5 Benefit from EU membership (2002-2008)

Question: Taking everything into account, would you say that Greece has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?

This tendency of Greek public opinion whereby support for membership is dropping whereas at the same time the perception of benefit from EU membership remains high is reflected in LAOS’ ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism. Karatzaferis has argued in the party’s newspaper that ‘At a political level, LAOS’ agenda coincides with the real agenda of Greek society’ (A1 2009b: 4). Appreciating the benefits Greece has derived from the EU and supporting the project under conditions seems to better capture the Greek public opinion, and by extension the Greek ‘median’ voter. Given that Greek positions on European integration are largely utilitarian, LAOS seeks to portray itself as the only Greek party that promotes Greek national interests at the EU level. For instance, the

159 Original text: ‘σε πολιτικό επίπεδο, έχει κατορθώσει η ατζέντα του να συμπίπτει με την πραγματική ατζέντα της κοινωνίας’
party leader has argued that ‘We go to Europe with specific goals and objectives!’ (A1 2009a: 4).160

6.3.2 Capitalising on Greek security concerns

Security constitutes a major concern of the Greek citizens and public opinion on this issue cuts across party lines. Turkey and to a lesser extent FYROM are perceived as constantly threatening the Greek territory. For instance, according to a survey carried out by VPRC in June 2006, 60 per cent of Greeks are against Turkish EU entry.161 In 2008, this opposition has reached an overwhelming 78.1 per cent of the population (see table 6.6 below). As stated by another survey carried out by VPRC in December 2006, 66 per cent of the Greeks are in favour of vetoing FYROM’s EU membership unless the name issue is resolved.162

Table 6.6 Support for Turkish EU membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for Turkish EU membership</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1009</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 69.2, National and European identity, European elections, European values and climate change, March-May 2008

The European issue is not salient in Greek politics (Vernardakis 2007). Party elites are aware of this and do not expect the electorate to cast its vote on the basis of European politics (interview with Georgiadis 2009). This provides LAOS with an additional incentive to link its European position to domestic issues. As seen in section 6.2.6 the party has used the EP platform in order to promote issues relevant to Greek security concerns including FRYOM’s name, Cyprus and Turkey. The party views these issues as remaining unresolved, which largely coincides with the views of the Greek electorate.

---

160 Original text: ‘Και στην Ευρώπη πηγαίνουμε με στόχους’
Especially since the two mainstream parties are strong supporters of Turkish EU entry (Ker-Lindsay 2007: 74), LAOS sees its role as the essential guardian of Greek national interests at the European level.

LAOS’ choice to focus on Greek security issues in its European discourse has been a conscious communication tactic within the context of its vote-seeking party strategy. Issues pertaining to Greek security concerns are closely linked to feelings of national identity, cut across party lines and can be easily stirred up by politicians. A vivid example of this has been the public demonstrations on FYROM’s name in the mid-1990s (Featherstone 1994b: 288). Territory, the country and the homeland are very important in the hearts and minds of Greeks as demonstrated by the October 2007 Public issue survey, which indicates that an overwhelming 82 per cent of Greeks would give their life for their borders and homeland (see figure 6.6 below). As indicated by another Public issue survey in 2008, a significant 84 per cent of Greeks believe that the Greek government should veto FYROM’s EU and NATO accession in the case of no agreement on the country’s name (see table 6.7).
Figure 6.6 For which of the following reasons would you give your life for?

![Bar chart showing reasons for giving life for](chart.png)

Source: Public issue, October 2007, on the national celebration of 28th October

Table 6.7 If there is no agreement on the name, what do you think that Greece should do? Do you think that the Greek government should or should not veto FYROM's EU and NATO accession?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for vetoing FYROM's EU and NATO accession</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Public issue, February 2008

Greek support for European integration is partly due to the citizen insecurity regarding the Greco-Turkish relations and the feeling of external threat from Turkey (Vernardakis 2007: 153-154). This can be seen by the fact that 50 per cent of the Greek electorate feels that the EU is an important power on which Greece can rely in order to resolve its security issues (see table 6.8). Overall, 59 per cent of Greeks trust the EU institutions, which is 9 percentage points higher compared to the 50 per cent EU average (Eurobarometer 2008).
Table 6.8 Which power should Greece rely on regarding its foreign policy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which power should Greece rely on regarding its foreign policy?</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All three</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Public issue, February 2008

Without rejecting Europe, LAOS has linked its Euroscepticism to a mainstream issue in Greece that can be thought of as cutting across party lines. This is consistent with LAOS’ adoption of a catch-all type of party competition. By linking its ‘conditional’ Eurosceptic position to Greek security concerns, LAOS can make its policy relevant to the average Greek person independent of party identification and can appear to represent public opinion. In a speech during the 2009 EP electoral campaign, the party leader mentioned:

‘They ask me, why do you insist on Turkey not becoming an EU member? Because I listen to the Greek heart, soul and consciousness, which has been reported in a survey as being 78 per cent against Turkish EU accession’ (Karatzafiris quoted in A1 2009a: 5)163.

The party increases its potential to attract voters across the party system and eventually become entrenched in the Greek political landscape. The above surveys have shown that the issue of security remains largely uncontested in the Greek society. Greeks irrespective of ideological background tend to relate to the issue of Turkey and FYROM. The insistence on these issues is not only core to LAOS’ agenda but also is likely to mobilise voters in its favour, especially given that the mainstream governing

163 Original text: ‘Μου λένε, γιατί επιμένεις και λες να μην μπει η Τουρκία στην Ευρώπη; Γιατί ακούω, αφουγκράζομαι την καρδιά, την ψυχή και τη συνείδησή του ‘Ελληνα, που σε δημοσκόπηση σε μεγάλη εφημερίδα είπε, το 78%, δεν θέλουμε την Τουρκία στην Ευρώπη’.
parties in Greece have increasingly adopted a much more conciliatory agenda on these issues (Ker-Lindsay 2007). ‘We express the people’s ideas as seen in public opinion surveys in issues such as FYROM’s name’ (interview with Polatides 2009). LAOS sells its Euro sceptic agenda as being the only means to sustain the Greek veto power in security policy issues. ‘We are neither against the EU nor do we believe in Greek withdrawal. Greece has benefited from the EU. Rather, we are against giving away our sovereignty on national issues, for instance Skopje and Turkey’ (interview with Georgiadis 2009).

These issues also bring LAOS to the unique position to criticise the other parties in Greece for failing to protect Greek national interests at the European level. The party portrays itself as the only Greek ‘voice’ not intending to surrender the national interest at the European level:

‘Our voice in the European Parliament will shake other Europeans […] a voice against injustice and defeat, a voice addressed not only to Europeans but also to Greeks who with their compliance have risked writing the bleakest page of Greek history yet. Generations of Greeks have kept Greece upright with sacrifice. They have given her dignity, recognition, respect and prestige. These properties are unfortunately sacrificed on the altar of selfish goals. We should neither settle nor become compliant. Both here and in Europe! Greece first! With this slogan we will give our battle in Europe.’ (LAOS 2004: 5).

164 Original text: ‘Εκφράζουμε τις ιδέες του λαού στις δημοσκοπήσεις, σε θέματα Σκόπια κ.τ.λ.’
165 Original text: ‘Δεν είμαστε κατά της ΕΕ. Ούτε πιστεύουμε στην αποχώρηση της Ελλάδας. Η Ελλάδα έχει οφελήθει από την ΕΕ. Δεν θέλουμε την κατάργηση της ανεξαρτησίας για θέματα εθνικά πχ. Σκόπια και Τουρκία.’
166 Original text: ‘Αυτή η φωνή θα υψωθεί και θα συγκλονίσει τους Ευρωπαίους μέσα στο Ευρωκοινοβούλιο από τους βουλευτές του Λαϊκού Ορθόδοξου Συναγερμού που εσείς με την ψήφο σας θα στέλνετε στις Βρυξέλλες και το Στρασβούργο. Μια φωνή που θα ξαναφωνάζει όχι στην αδικία, όχι στον ενδοτισμό. Μια φωνή που θα ακούσουν όχι μόνο οι Ευρωπαίοι αλλά και οι Έλληνες υπεύθυνοι που με την υποχρητικότητα και τον ενδοτισμό τους κινδυνεύουν να γράψουν την πιο μαύρη σελίδα της Ελληνικής ιστορίας. Γενιές Ελλήνων με θυσίες μεγάλωσαν και κράτησαν όρθια την Ελλάδα. Της χάρισαν αξιοπρέπεια, αναγνώριση, σέβεσμο και γόητρο. Ιδιότητες που δυστυχώς σήμερα θυσιάζονται στο βομβιστικόν σκοπό της Ευρώπης. Στόχος όλων μας πρέπει να είναι να απομόνωσον τους συμβιβασμούς και υποχρητικούς συνεργάτες. Εδώ και στην Ευρώπη! Πρώτη η Ελλάδα. Μ’ αυτό το σύνθημα εμείς θα δώσουμε την μάχη μας στην Ευρώπη.’
Towards the end of the 2000s, these criticisms transformed into outright condemnation against the other Greek parties for neither being committed to nor supporting the Greek national interest at the European level, and more specifically, in the EP.

‘The vote of a large majority of our national partisan representatives in the European Parliament is evidence of surrender and national degradation. […] Greek MEP votes have become arrows against our homeland. We do not blame them for their foolishness. But we do call on them to explain under whose orders and with the promise of what in return they carried out their blasphemy against Macedonia’ (LAOS 2008: 6)\(^{167}\).

It is noteworthy that the underlying impression one gets after reading the party’s manifestos and general literature is that LAOS has accepted a potential resolution of Greek national issues within the EU framework. The party does not use the EU as a scapegoat for the absence of resolution of the Greek national issues. LAOS views the EU as a potential friend of Greece, accepts that Greek domestic problems may be resolved at the European level and indeed in some cases it actively asks EU’s help (see table 6.3 above). This once again demonstrates that the party reads and follows public opinion surveys (see for example figure 6.4 on Greek perceptions of benefit from the EU). Instead of mostly placing the blame on the EU for the lack of solution on various security issues, LAOS criticises Greek parties for not being able to rightly promote Greek interests at the EU level (LAOS 2008). ‘We are the only party that gives a battle in the EU’ (interview with Aivaliotis 2009)\(^{168}\). LAOS’ criticism of PASOK and New Democracy lies in having failed to strengthen Greek bargaining power within the EU and by extension acting against Greek national interest. This is how LAOS portrays itself as the only ‘guardian’ of Greek national interests both at the domestic and at the

\(^{167}\) Original text: ‘Μνημείο υποχωρητικότητας, όμως εις την ποδολειχία και έπαινο εις την εθνική μειοδοσία, αποτελεί η ψήφος μεγάλου μέρους των εθνικών κομματικών αντιπροσώπων μας στο Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο. […] Ψήφοι Ελλήνων Ευρωβουλευτών μεταβλήθηκαν σε βέλη κατά της πατρίδας. Δεν τους κατηγορούμε για αργυροφρενίτιδα. Δεν τους κατηγορούμε για εγγενή ολιγοφρενεία. Τους καλούμε όμως να εξηγήσουν με ποιον την εντολή και έναντι ποιού ανταλλάξαμες με την ψήφο τους ελάκτισαν ή εσύλησαν το ιερό σώμα της Μακεδονίας.’

\(^{168}\) Original text: ‘Είμαστε το μόνο κόμμα που δίνει μάχη στην ΕΕ’
European level. ‘LAOS today convincingly expresses the policies that satisfy the common sentiment’ (Papadopoulos 2009: 18)\(^{169}\).

6.3.3 Appearing to provide a unique yet ‘median’ niche

This active pursuit to show to the electorate that its positions have an accommodative rather than an extremist character is also seen in the party’s attempt to show that its EU position is largely different to that of any other political party in the Greek party system, including radical right, mainstream and left wing.

LAOS argues that Greek party policies on the EU are distinctively three. On the one hand, there is the Greek Communist Party’s ‘rejecting policy’, according to which Greece should not partake to any type of cooperation as it is seen as a product of capitalism and imperialism. On the other hand, there are the Europhile parties, namely PASOK and New Democracy. Being pro-European they both accept Treaties, laws and regulation deriving from the EU (interview with Rontoulis 2009). These positions are both seen as the two ends of the spectrum because according to LAOS parties in Greece would either unconditionally accept and welcome European integration in all domains or blindly reject any type of cooperation. Since these two positions are seen as lying in the extremes of a pro/anti-European dimension, LAOS promotes its position as being centrist. There are ‘two opposing poles in Greece, eurejection versus Europhilia, LAOS reconciles these two and stands in the middle’ (interview with Voridis 2009). By adopting this kind of ‘conditional’ argumentation on the EU, LAOS portrays its European stance as a unique median position compared to the two polar opposite positions represented by the Greek Communist Party on the one hand and PASOK and New Democracy on the other. By showing that it is neither an unconditional EU supporter nor a fervent Eurosceptic, it depicts itself as a centrist party occupying the middle ground in Greek politics.

\(^{169}\) Original text: ‘Ο «Λ.Α.Ο.Σ.» σήμερα εκφράζει πειστικά τις πολιτικές εκείνες θέσεις που ικανοποιούν το κοινό αίσθημα.’
Party officials argue that LAOS’ position is not a ‘sterile rejection of the EU but a constructive criticism’ (interview with Chrisanthakopoulos 2009) or that they prefer the term ‘Eurosensitive’ over the term ‘Eurosceptic’ (interview with Aivaliotis 2009). The term ‘Eurosensitive’ has a positive connotation and insinuates that the party does not reject the EU project as a whole but is sensitive towards Treaties and decisions surrendering member state sovereignty. The party’s European orientation is actively confirmed (interview with Georgiadis 2009) but in this process ‘Eurorealism’ needs to be pursued (interview with Georgiou 2009).

Note that although the party aspires to give the impression that it is a centrist party appealing to the ‘median’ Greek voter, this is not necessarily true. LAOS is a Eurosceptic party opposing a number of EU initiatives. Moreover, it has a radical right ideology demonstrated by its extremist positions on other policy dimensions including immigration and law and order (see for example party scores in the Chapel Hill survey Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010).

This type of differentiation that LAOS actively pursues is beneficial to the party and integral to its vote-seeking strategy. It conveys to the electorate the message that the party does not hold extreme views and that it can be trusted as a centrist political actor. In doing so, it also serves as an indirect criticism against the Communist Party, a significant political opponent in the margins of the Greek party system. Moreover, adopting a ‘conditional’ stance on European integration also becomes a strong criticism against both the Europhile PASOK and New Democracy that are seen as having failed to promote Greek interests at the EU level. In this respect, LAOS’ ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism serves as a tool of differentiation from the rest of the party system.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter has been to analyse the second type of radical right Euroscepticism identified in Chapter 3 of the thesis, namely the ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism. To evaluate the different components of this Eurosceptic pattern and examine how this position is couched within a party’s overall strategy in the domestic
party system, the chapter has analysed the case of LAOS, a Greek radical right party during the 1999-2009 period.

The chapter has presented a three-fold argument. It has first assessed LAOS’ predominant strategy in the Greek party system arguing that the party’s strategy is accommodative, its logic of competition ‘catch-all’, and its predominant party goal vote-maximisation. Second, it has analysed in detail LAOS’ Euroscepticism. It has illustrated that LAOS is against Greek EU withdrawal and accepts the principle of European integration at a higher multilateral level. It is however against the current practice of EU policy cooperation since intergovernmental decision-making is not prevalent. The party is also against the future making of a European polity. LAOS supports European integration under the condition that member states can keep their veto power in issues of national importance, Europe retains its cultural homogeneity and the people have more stake in the decision-making process through plebiscitary politics. The chapter has contended that the issue of Greek security concerns figures prominently within LAOS’ European agenda. Finally, the chapter has argued that LAOS’ ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism is an active attempt to depict Greek public opinion on the matter. Given that issues related to Greek security concerns can provoke political sentiments that cut across party lines, the selection of security policy as a prime discussion issue serves as a tool in its effort to increase its appeal. LAOS ‘conditional’ EU position represents a new and different policy on Europe sharply differentiating itself from other parties in Greek politics. In this respect, adopting a ‘conditional’ EU position and linking it with the issue of Greek security concerns, LAOS portrays itself as occupying a unique niche in the Greek party system. By doing so, it seeks to give the impression of being a ‘median’ centrist party having a broader appeal, which adds to LAOS’ overall vote-maximising catch-all style of competition.

In its quest for vote-maximisation, ultimately leading to respectability and political entrenchment, the party has adopted a flexible communication strategy presenting a moderate language. LAOS has rejected verbal extremism in order to construct an image of apparent policy convergence towards the ‘median voter’ thus enhancing its probability to increase its vote intake. Its ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism can be thought as a marketing decision serving to differentiate LAOS from both the margins and the
mainstream, and to demonstrate that it occupies the middle ground in Greek politics. The party has made a discursive choice to focus on the issue of Greek security concerns in order to appear as the sole ‘guardian’ of Greek national interests at the European level. These issues resonate well within Greek public opinion and are likely to produce high electoral results. This is especially true given that the mainstream Greek parties have left a political gap choosing not to address and openly debate issues pertaining to Greek security, which appear to be important within the electorate. In sum, this chapter confirms once again that Euroscepticism may be employed as part of a party’s agenda in the wider domestic party system. To further illustrate the thesis’s argument, which views Euroscepticism as part of a party’s strategic toolkit, the following chapter proceeds with an analysis of ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism, the third and last type identified in Chapter 3 of the thesis.
Chapter 7 The pattern of Compromising Euroscepticism: the case of the Italian National Alliance

‘Sarebbe eccessivo dire che è la destra che ha contribuito a scrivere la Costituzione europea. Diciamo che il governo italiano, un governo di centrodestra, è stato impegnato in questo obiettivo’.

‘It would be excessive to say that the Right contributed to the writing of the European Constitution. Let us say that the centre-right Italian Government was politically committed to this goal.’

Gianfranco Fini, leader of the National Alliance, 2003.170

Introduction

The previous chapters have examined the first two patterns of radical right Euroscepticism by conducting a detailed analysis of the French National Front and the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally. This constitutes the last empirical chapter of the thesis. It explores the final variant of radical right Euroscepticism, namely the ‘compromising’ position on European integration. This variant expects a radical right party to adopt a position which entails acceptance of a common European culture, support for the principle and the practice of European integration but qualified opposition to the future building of a European polity. To further explore this Eurosceptic variant, this chapter examines the Italian National Alliance.

This party is the offspring of the neo-fascist MSI. It was disbanded in 2008 during the writing of the PhD thesis following a Berlusconi-Fini agreement to join under the banner People of Freedom. In 2010, Fini left the joint party with Berlusconi but a significant part of the National Alliance has remained inside the People of Freedom. The inclusion of this case study in this research design has been purposeful as it provides the

opportunity to explore the various dynamics behind a radical right party’s decision to change and soften its stance on European integration over time.

The chapter tests the third hypothesis of the thesis which purports that if a party’s primary goal is to become part of the governing cartel and a major player within it, it is likely to downplay the issue of Europe and adopt a conciliatory position on European integration. In its quest for power, it is likely to avoid controversial statements or policies. It downplays the issue with a view to decreasing its salience and avoiding contestation on the matter (dismissive strategy). Given that –being part of the cartel– it would have participated in decision-making at the EU level, its criticisms towards aspects of European integration are likely to have a constructive and practical character. Its European discourse may be connected with another issue associated with ‘high politics’ with which governmental parties are primarily concerned.

In order to provide evidence for the above hypothesis, the chapter proceeds with a three-fold argument. It first suggests that the party’s primary political strategy was ‘dismissive’ in the sense used by Meguid (2008; see discussion in Chapter 2), namely avoiding taking an open and clear position on the European issue. The party was predominantly office-seeking and its main goal in the national party system was to lead the Italian centre-right. The chapter proceeds by arguing that the National Alliance adopted a ‘compromising’ position on European integration which was largely connected to the party’s vision for a strong EU presence in the world. Third, it puts forward that the party’s modest support for European integration was integral to its leader’s overall political strategy of becoming the head of the Italian centre-right political cartel. Adopting a ‘compromising’ position on Europe provided the National Alliance the opportunity to portray an image of pro-Europeanness similar to that of its centre-right counterparts in other European capitals boosting the party’s standing not only nationally but also internationally. ‘Compromising’ Euroscepticism became a political tool for its leader in his effort to appear as a statesman on an equal footing with other centre-right leaders abroad. During the process of the party’s transition from a radical right party towards a mainstream conservative party, Europe was used as a ‘litmus test’ to prove this shift.
Following the above argument, this chapter is divided into three constituent sections. It first explores in detail the party’s transformation from the MSI to National Alliance during the 1990s and how this impacted upon the party’s ideological makeup. In doing so, it provides an account of the party’s predominant political strategy within the context of Italian competitive politics. It proceeds by analysing the party’s European discourse with reference to the four European indicators set out in chapter 3, namely the definition of Europe, the principle of European integration, the practice of European policy integration and the future of the European polity. It also discusses EU foreign policy and Italy’s international relations role as a salient issue in the National Alliance’s EU agenda. The last section demonstrates that once the party’s reputation was rehabilitated towards the end of the 1990s, the European issue became a tool for national and international entrenchment in the wider quest for a central role within the Italian centre-right cartel and ultimately leadership of the latter.

7.1 The Italian National Alliance

7.1.1 What the party stands for

The National Alliance was the offspring of the neo-fascist MSI. The latter had been founded in 1946 by a group of supporters of Mussolini’s Italian Social Republic. The party had been essentially anti-system. It opposed liberal democracy and its institutions ‘which had put a seal on Fascism’s destruction’ (Newell 2000: 469). During the post-war decades, the MSI had oscillated between a strategy of insertion (inserimento) and one of re-radicalisation as a result of the diverging factions within the party. The first was anti-bourgeois, anti-capitalist, non-conformist and revolutionary while the second was authoritarian, clerical and corporatist (Ignazi 1994). Essentially there was a division between a radical, violent, hard-line MSI and a moderate faction inclined to cooperate with conservative forces in order to re-insert itself into ‘normal’ Italian politics (Ignazi 2003: 36-37). These differences aside, both factions’ ideological and cultural references as well as the party’s personnel had been characterised by a nostalgia for fascism. As a result, under the post-war democratic anti-fascist regime, the party’s legitimacy was heavily questioned. Despite being viewed as outside the constitutional arc, however, the
MSI had been one of the most electorally successful radical right parties in Europe. From the 1950s onwards, its electoral results had spanned from 4.8 to 8.7 per cent of the Italian vote in national and European elections, indicating that its strategy of insertion had been to an extent successful.

Until the early 1990s the dominant culture in Italy was one of political compromise and lack of alteration of power (Fabbrini 2006: 146). This resulted in the predominance in office of a single party (Christian Democracy) (Bull 2004: 550) with the strongest communist party of the Western world in opposition (Roux and Verzichelli 2010: 12). The MSI had been the only party in post-war Italy overtly claiming a right-wing position. For fear of being associated with fascism, no other party wished to be confused with the term ‘the right’. However, a number of changes in the party’s external environment during the beginning of the 1990s were conducive to the re-branding of the MSI into the National Alliance (Ignazi 1994: 65; Bianchi 2007: 84; Morini 2007: 150).

The reconsideration of fascism in Italian society, the collapse of the post-war regime, the break-up of the centrist Christian Democracy, the MSI’s non-involvement in the ‘Clean Hands’ investigations and the change of the electoral law in 1993 from proportional to a partially compensatory mixed-member system (Renwick, Hanretty et al. 2009) introduced a somewhat majoritarian logic in the Italian party system. From consensual politics ‘there was a shift in emphasis towards strong political leadership that has marked the evolution of the new bipolar party system’ (Fella 2006: 13-14). This divided the political landscape into two camps broadly associated with the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ ending the ostracism of the ‘right’ and by extension that of the MSI (Ignazi 2005: 334). The presence of Berlusconi’s newly established Forza Italia was pivotal in the party’s legitimation. Having no links with the old regime, Berlusconi offered political back-up to the MSI during the 1993 local elections endorsing its leader, Gianfranco Fini, for the Rome mayoralty. The MSI’s resounding success during these elections increased the party’s coalition potential. Berlusconi recognised that ‘if the left was to be beaten’ (Fella 2006: 12), the MSI was to be considered as a legitimate electoral partner. Such a belief led him to coalesce with the MSI for the 1994 elections when the MSI scored an unprecedented 13.5 per cent of the Italian vote.
The impressive electoral result was not due to the MSI providing a radically new message to the electorate. Fini openly supported his belief that Mussolini was Italy’s greatest statesman as late as 1994 provoking strong international criticism (Locatelli and Martini 1994: 143). At the 1995 Fiuggi Congress, the party officially changed its name into the National Alliance. But this was no more than a change in the name rather than political personnel, organisation and ideology (Ignazi 2003; Tarchi 2003). The Theses of the Congress ‘failed to acquire the status of a historic, path-breaking “manifesto” of the new party’ (Ignazi 2005: 337). An overwhelming majority of the 1995 Congress participants continued to positively evaluate fascism (Baldini and Vignati 1996; Ignazi 2003: 46). The new party also presented elements of continuity with regards to its organisational structure (Morini 2007: 160; Ignazi, Bardi et al. 2010: 200).

Since the mid-1990s, its leader was in a constant quest for the ‘winning ideological formula’ (Fella and Ruzza 2006). The party’s ideology constantly changed conditional upon its electoral fortunes and whether it would participate in government or would remain in opposition\(^\text{171}\). Incrementally during the 2000s, the party showed a dramatic drive to distance itself from the past with a view to becoming a considerable force of the Italian centre-right. This reached its apogee with the party’s fusion with Forza Italia to create the People of Freedom launched in 2007 and officially established in 2009 in the run-up to the 2009 European elections. This, however, did not imply that the role of the nation would cease to be instrumental in its ideology. History, tradition, customs, collective memory and common religious sentiment are the ‘founding elements of the Nation’ (National Alliance 2000: 2). The party argues that ‘a people without national

\(^{171}\) During the period of the rise and fall of the first Berlusconi government (1994-1995), MSI-Alleanza Nazionale sought to consolidate its newly-found legitimacy and centrality to the new centre-right ground. In doing so, the party adopted positions generally associated with the conservative right, maintained traditional themes of law and order and declared its fidelity to the tenets of liberal democracy. While in opposition (1996-1999), the party’s policies underwent a radical change. With a view to challenging Berlusconi and as part of its modernisation strategy, the National Alliance put forward neo-liberal policies and supported limited state intervention (National Alliance 1998). These were alien to its fascist past and very similar to the rhetoric of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. Poor performance in the 1999 European elections proved that the adoption of these policies was not electorally fruitful as it failed to draw voters away from Forza Italia. As a result, the National Alliance shifted back to more traditional positions presenting itself as the ‘socially advanced wing of the centre-right’ (National Alliance 2001; Tarchi 2003: 163). At the beginning of the 2000s, the party cadres showed ‘an evolution towards conservative-democratic positions rather than right-extremist ones’ but were also prone to nostalgia for the fascist regime (Ignazi 2003: 51), which indicates the perpetuation of ambivalence within the party.
conscience not only forgets its past but also lacks cohesiveness in the present and is deprived from a future’ (National Alliance 2000: 2-3)\textsuperscript{172}.

The party’s nationalism in the 2000s was not one that focused on race and ethnicity. Rather, it was ‘based on a belief in the nation-as-empire’ (Spruce 2007: 101). The party argued that it felt a ‘healthy national sentiment that should not be confused with nationalism’\textsuperscript{173} (National Alliance 2002: 11) meaning nationalism associated with violence and aggression (interview with Fini in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 17; Campi 2006: 95). The party viewed Italy not as a state created during the 19\textsuperscript{th} century Risorgimento but as a nation or ‘fatherland’ (\textit{patria}) dating back to the era of Ancient Rome and Ancient Greece (National Alliance 2002: 11). In fact, the party claimed ownership of the nationalist term ‘patria’ (Spruce 2007: 106) and presented a strong sense of pride in Italy’s long past:

‘Italy is the place that has best emulated Greek philosophy, mediated by Christianity, the Roman political and legal tradition, the medieval social expression and the best insights of humanism into an organic whole not prejudiced by language nor religion’ (National Alliance 2001: 2)\textsuperscript{174}

This imperial vision of Italy could also be seen through a portrayal of its civilising mission in the world. ‘Italian wit has helped diffuse European intelligence in the world, shaping the politics and culture of other territories’ (National Alliance 2001: 2-3)\textsuperscript{175}. Empire carries within the notion of diversity. The party’s insistence on the principle of subsidiarity was related to its imperial vision of the nation. The wealth of the latter is conditional upon respecting its internal specificities. This, however, does not imply

\textsuperscript{172} Original text: ‘Un popolo senza coscienza nazionale non solo è dimentico del proprio passato, ma è disgregato nel presente e privo di avvenire.’

\textsuperscript{173} Original text: ‘un sano sentimento di nazionalità non va confuso con il nazionalismo’

\textsuperscript{174} Original text: ‘L’Italia è il luogo che ha sintetizzato meglio di altri la filosofia greca, inverte dal cristianesimo, la tradizione giuridica e politica romana, l’articolazione sociale medievale, le migliori intuizioni dell’Umanesimo, in un insieme organico e non confuso di lingua e di religione’

\textsuperscript{175} Original text: ‘il genio italiano ha contribuito a diffondere il genio europeo nel mondo, dando forma politica e sostanza culturale ad altri territori.’

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federalism as it is thought to disintegrate the nation-state. The state should always intervene in emergency situations (National Alliance 2000: 3).

The imperial –rather than ethnic– vision of the nation explains why although the party was tough on immigration, it avoided ‘ethno-populist frames’ such as that immigrants steal jobs from Italians (Fella and Ruzza 2006: 195). The 2002 Bossi-Fini law was a pertinent example here. The law set out rules for immigrants’ entering the country and clandestine immigration. It reduced regular entrance into the country and made the granting of resident permits conditional upon a contract of employment on the part of the immigrant. The party’s primary focus was on rules governing immigrants rather than their perceived threat to the nation (Fella 2006: 16). The law helped cement the National Alliance’s tough stance on immigration but also dissociated it from the hard-line inflammatory rhetoric of the Northern League. Having said that, some National Alliance politicians associated immigration with criminality and lack of citizen safety (La Russa 2005). The party maintained traditional authoritarian positions on issues relating to security and law and order; and attached importance to traditional family and catholic values (Fella 2006: 13; Ruzza and Fella 2009: 155 & 164). Security remained a prime electoral theme during the party’s 2008 electoral campaign (National Alliance 2008b) when the party hardened its positions with Fini declaring that if elected he would make the Bossi-Fini law even stricter (Fini 2007a).

In its quest to carve out a political identity distinct from the populism of its centre-right competitors, the National Alliance avoided populist appeals post-1998 (Ruzza and Fella 2009: 166). This would mark a clear break from the party’s past but would also provide an alternative to the Northern League and Forza Italia. Fini’s calm and measured presence in Italian politics was antithetical to that of Berlusconi and Bossi. To further develop the party’s electoral appeal, ‘Fini sought to distinguish the AN from the populism and neo-liberalism of the LN and FI […] presenting the party as the social conscience of the right’ (Fella 2006: 15). Ignazi has argued that the party was on the fringe of the contemporary radical right (Ignazi 2003: 52) especially after merging with Forza Italia towards the end of the 2000s. However, ‘elements of anti-political and exclusionist discourse remain important […] despite the apparent adoption of a quite conventional conservative and state welfare interventionist programme’ (Ruzza and
Fella 2009: 142). The party’s policies lacked coherence, the MSI symbol continued to feature in party literature, the party’s visual propaganda covertly celebrated elements of fascism (Cheles 2010) and the party ‘struggled to define exactly what it stands for and what holds it together’ (Fella 2006: 22).

7.1.2 Institutional entrenchment as the party’s predominant political strategy

Since the collapse of the old regime at the beginning of the 1990s, the National Alliance went through two distinct phases. The first commenced roughly in 1993 when it enjoyed unprecedented electoral success in the local elections and spanned until the beginning of the second Berlusconi coalition government in 2001. During these years, the party pursued a ‘rehabilitation’ strategy in order to partake in ‘normal’ Italian politics as a respectable and legitimate partner of the right. As mentioned in the previous section, this entailed re-naming the party and re-branding it from neo-fascist into post-fascist/conservative. This strategy was not new and paralleled that of inserimento during the 1950s and 1960s (Bianchi 2007: 75) when the MSI had portrayed itself as ‘a “national” force striving to defend the common national interest, Christian civilisation and the struggle against communism’ (Ignazi 1994: 21)\textsuperscript{176}. The underlying goal of this moderation during the first Italian Republic had been a potential coalition with Christian Democracy and ultimately insertion in the Italian political system. This was only successful during the Second Republic as was demonstrated in the re-election of the party’s electoral coalition and access to government for the second time. Once the party was rehabilitated in the political system, its predominant goal changed. From 2001 onwards, not only was the party no longer marginalised but it also enjoyed governmental status. This marked a decisive break from the past and stimulated a motivation for cartelisation, institutional entrenchment and a drive for a leading position within the electoral coalition (confirming the findings from Chapter 4).

Fini’s role in guiding the party’s ideological evolution was crucial as he was able to respond to opportunities provided by changing political circumstances (Campi 2006: VI; Fella and Ruzza 2006: 183). Ideological change did not occur without internal

\textsuperscript{176} Original text: ‘Il Msi si presenta alla Democrazia cristiana come una forza “nazionale” che si batte per la difesa dei comuni interessi, la civiltà cristiana e la lotta al materialismo comunista’
opposition (Ruzza and Fella 2009: 144 & 153) but was facilitated by the centralised organisation of the party whereby the President enjoyed ample powers and incrementally made ‘any real control over him by collective bodies a highly remote possibility’ (Ignazi, Bardi et al. 2010: 207). Fini was playing a game in Italian politics both at party and individual levels. On the one hand, he wished to retain leadership of the party, which led him to occasionally adopt hard-line positions. On the other hand, Fini competed as a potential heir to Berlusconi and aspired to become President of the Republic, which explained his expressed moderation (Ruzza and Fella 2009: 158) and general ‘dismissive’ strategy avoiding taking clear positions. As a result of this dual political agenda, the party seemed to put forward two different types of right-wing political culture (Campi 2006: 62-63).

Circumstantial evidence points to the fact that the party and its leader sought to become an entrenched force in Italy by leading Italian centre-right politics. The party’s electoral coalition with Forza Italia and the Northern League did not consistently enjoy amicable relations. As early as the 1998 Verona Congress, the National Alliance evoked neo-liberal policies overtly borrowing from Forza Italia (National Alliance 1998). In the 1999 European elections, the party stood on a joint list with the Christian democratic Patto Segni party against Berlusconi, which did not succeed electorally. This led the party to shift its focus from the economy to more traditional security and law and order positions and to re-join the Forza Italia – Northern League ‘House of Freedoms’ coalition for the 2001 elections. Following the coalition’s electoral victory in 2001, the opportunity appeared for Fini to ‘position himself as a possible future leader of the post-Berlusconi centre-right’ (Fella 2006: 15). A rift between Fini and Tremonti, the Italian Treasury Minister, over the economic policy of the governmental coalition became a dispute between Forza Italia and the Northern League on the one side and the National Alliance and Christian Democracy on the other (Fella 2006: 18). The National Alliance expressed a feeling of resentment as it appeared that the political priorities of the coalition were dominated by ‘the personal interests of Berlusconi and the political priorities of LN’ (Ruzza and Fella 2009: 154). Choosing to run alone in the 1996 elections, the Northern League had proven to be indispensable to Forza Italia (Pasquino 2008: 346) and gave the impression that it was more important in the coalition than the National Alliance.
Berlusconi’s decreased popularity towards the end of the 2001-2006 government and a sceptical climate within the coalition (De Sio 2007: 98) brought about a discussion of leadership change as well as the probability of moving towards a European-style centre-right that would not ally with extremist parties. Prior to the 2006 elections there was open discussion regarding Berlusconi’s replacement given the expected defeat. ‘The leadership change was expected to lead the coalition to assume a more centrist orientation, making it more similar to moderate centre-right blocks in other European countries’ (De Sio 2007: 107). This provided the perfect opportunity for Fini to portray himself as the future leader of the centre-right. His choice was backed-up by a series of positive public evaluations of Fini as a politician (Ruzza and Fella 2009: 147) and a future leader of the coalition (Campi 2006: 29). Adopting policies that would differentiate the party from both the Northern League and Forza Italia, the National Alliance depicted the image of a respectable right-wing force resembling parties of the European right lacking the populist rhetoric observed in both Bossi and Berlusconi. The rift with Tremonti revealed that the National Alliance was not a hard neo-liberal party; and the various disputes with Bossi served as a reminder that the party had an engaging approach towards immigration. Indeed, the party’s policies on immigration, economics and welfare reform resembled those of the Unione di Centro, a party with strong roots in the old centrist Christian Democracy (Fella 2006: 18).

The discussion over the post-Berlusconi leadership of the centre-right, however, did not last very long. Despite losing the 2006 elections, Berlusconi was thought to have won the electoral campaign which contributed to his re-empowerment within the coalition (De Sio 2007). Berlusconi’s strong charismatic personality came in the way of Fini’s leadership aspirations. However, despite various disputes the two parties officially merged in 2009 to create the People of Freedom. This clearly indicated that various policy differences and past disagreements were not considered strong enough to deter a future right-wing governmental alliance. Particularly within the context of Italian politics where two layers of party system can be detected, the first at electoral and the second at parliamentary levels (Bardi 2007), office-seeking alliances are encouraged especially at the electoral level.
From an anti-system party during the first Italian republic, the National Alliance progressed into a rehabilitated mainstream party in the Second Republic. Its political survival and success, however, were conditional upon the party’s institutional entrenchment in the Italian political landscape. Being part of the centre-right coalition cartel was not enough in this respect. The party viewed its role as creating a right-wing alliance over and above the current parties that would be pivotal to the future development of the country.

‘We want to create a grand Alliance for Italy which would act in the present but also would look to the future in order to restore hope for those who think that Italy has no prospects and has been relegated to the margins of history’ (National Alliance 2008a: 1)177.

This Grand Alliance would only survive if right-wing political values became its reference culture. This project was not only political but also cultural and would ‘re-affirm the Italian model that derives from our history, our culture and out identity’ (National Alliance 2008a: 2)178. The party’s insistence on creating this Alliance to rule the ‘Nuova Italia’ (National Alliance 2008a: 3) also implied a wish for radical change in Italian politics. As the collapse of the First Republic led to the party’s rehabilitation and insertion in Italian politics, the creation of a Grand Alliance under the aegis of the National Alliance would have been likely to result in the party’s entrenchment in the Italian political establishment. Again, the use of the idea of a great Alliance that would bring the Italian right-wing forces together based on cultural references paralleled the previous MSI project of the ‘Grande Destra’ (Ignazi 1994: 7) according to which right-wing parties should coalesce in order to combat communism.

The party’s main strategy was dismissive avoiding controversial statements or policies, its logic of competition is cartelisation/institutional entrenchment and its predominant goal is pursuit of office. The above discussion demonstrated that the centre-right

177 Original text: ‘Vogliamo creare una grande Alleanza per l’Italia che agisca nell’immediato ma guardi al futuro, per ridare speranza, per uscire dalla sindrome di chi pensa ad una Italia priva di prospettive e relegata ai margini della Storia.’
178 Original text: ‘Un progetto politico culturale che passa attraverso la riaffermazione del Modello Italiano che deriva dalla nostra storia, dalla nostra cultura e dalla nostra identità’
coalition was based on a shaky agreement over policies and broad ideas with which the National Alliance was not always in agreement. Political developments suggest that Forza Italia and the Northern League were on better terms with each other than with the National Alliance repeatedly questioning the importance of the latter in the centre-right Italian political landscape. The National Alliance was likely to increase its significance in the party system only through the means of institutionalising its presence through assuming leadership of the centre-right cartel. Failing to do so, the National Alliance and its leader were likely to be continuously overshadowed by Berlusconi’s charismatic personality. Additionally, during the post-Berlusconi era, the probability for the Northern League to lead the centre-right coalition was perceived as low given the party’s extremist, anti-European and regional character. This may be seen as opening a window of opportunity for Gianfranco Fini in his quest for absolute power and institutionalisation within the Italian political system. Adopting a ‘compromising’ position on Europe may thus be seen as integral to the party’s political agenda at the domestic level. The next section analyses the party’s European position explaining how it was related to the party’s vision of a strong Italy.

7.2 Compromising Eurosepticism and the issue of Italy’s international role 1999-2009

This section provides an analysis of the National Alliance’s European position. It argues that during the 1999-2009 period the party’s stance on European integration has crystallised into a ‘compromising’ position. It must be noted, however, that the party’s position on Europe has changed during the years. The party’s transformation from the neo-fascist MSI into the post-fascist National Alliance in January 1995 entailed a dramatic shift in its European rhetoric. From a relatively hard Eurosceptic position in the 1980s and early 1990s (Conti 2009: 206), the party moved towards a more conciliatory view of European integration entailing modest support for the project. Earlier expert surveys have indicated that during the 1980s the party was very close to the hard/‘rejectionist’ Eurosceptic end of the spectrum. On a seven point scale where one indicates strong opposition to European integration and seven strong support, Ray’s expert survey positioned the party at 1.63 in 1984 and 1988 expert surveys. During the following decade, the party modestly moved to 1.88 and 2.55 in the 1992 and 1996
expert surveys respectively (Ray 1999: 300). The MSI had recognised the importance of co-operation but ‘never enthusiastically supported integration because of its fear of loss of national autonomy and independent decision-making’ (Kritzinger, Cavatorta et al. 2004: 958). The dramatic change in its position occurred from the mid-1990s onwards when the party started expressing a moderate stance towards integration in line with De Gaulle’s notion of ‘Europe of fatherlands’ (Fella and Ruzza 2006: 190). The 1995 Fiuggi document stated ‘The idea of “Europe of Fatherlands”, integral to the 1960s Gaullism, can guarantee through intelligent adjustment the historic unity of the national states characterising the civilisation of the continent’ (National Alliance 1995: 61)\textsuperscript{179}. The EU was envisaged as a confederation of equal member states respecting cultural particularities and identities against a ‘federal, centralizing superstate’ (Tarchi 2003: 166).

The subsequent section examines the party’s European position on the basis of the typology of radical right Euroscepticism identified in Chapter 3 of the thesis. The main findings are that the National Alliance views Europe as a cultural and –in particular– Christian entity. It supports the principle of European cooperation at a higher multilateral level and within the context of the EU project. The party accepted by and large the EU policy practice and recognised the importance of European institutions. The nation was instrumental in the construction of the European project. Thus, the EU was seen as beneficial only to the extent that it promoted and safeguarded national interest. The party expressed modest support for the European project and its criticisms remained technical for their most part. It was argued, however, that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit and that, to the party’s disillusionment, it is solely an economic rather than a political project. The party’s ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism can be thought as a positive commitment to the European project coupled with feelings of disenchantment regarding the EU’s current and future trajectory.

\textsuperscript{179} Original text: ‘L’idea dell’ “Europa delle Patrie”, propria del gollismo degli anni ‘60, può garantire, attraverso un intelligente adeguamento, quell’unità storica degli Stati Nazionali che è peculiare caratteristica della civiltà del continente.’
7.2.1 Definition of Europe

The National Alliance viewed Europe as ‘a spiritual and cultural reference product of the history and characteristics of its peoples, from ancient Greece to Rome and Christianity’ (National Alliance 2002: 6)\(^{180}\). Europe is not only a geographical area but also ‘something deeper, a type of civilisation layered over centuries of history’ (National Alliance 2004: 5)\(^{181}\), a ‘European fatherland’ (National Alliance 2000: 4)\(^{182}\). The European way of life filtered through history distinguishes Europeans from other cultures. ‘When we speak of values such as personal dignity, the rule of law, solidarity, the family, respect for life, we inadvertently refer to principles that the Judeo-Christian roots have given to Europe’ (National Alliance 2004: 6)\(^{183}\).

The issue of religion featured prominently in the party’s political discourse as it was thought to be a uniting element of Europe and its peoples. The National Alliance lobbied for a reference to Christianity in the preamble of the European Constitution and regretted that Europe’s Christian roots ultimately were not mentioned (Angelilli 2007). The party argued that ‘a reference to Europe’s Judaeo-Christian roots becomes the necessary recognition of the continent’s secular unity’ (National Alliance 2004: 6)\(^{184}\).

Cristiana Muscardini, one of the party’s MEPs, argued:

‘It is our hope that, with regard to the preamble, the Intergovernmental Conference will come to an agreement on the acknowledgement of the roots from which the Union has sprung to life. The ancient history of Greece and Rome, the Judaeo-Christian traditions and the secular, liberal values which came gradually to be established cannot be

\(^{180}\) Original text: ‘L’Europa costituisce, per Alleanza Nazionale, un riferimento culturale e spirituale frutto della storia e delle specificità di suoi popoli, dall’antica Grecia alla romanità, alla Cristianità’

\(^{181}\) Original text: ‘qualcosa di più profondo, una certa forma di civiltà quale si è stratificata in secoli di storia’

\(^{182}\) Original text: ‘La Patria europea’

\(^{183}\) Original text: ‘Quando parliamo di valori, quali la dignità della persona umana, lo Stato di diritto, la solidarietà, il valore della famiglia, il rispetto della vita, senza accorgercene facciamo un riferimento ai quei principi che le radici giudaico-cristiane hanno donato all’Europa.’

\(^{184}\) Original text: ‘l’inserimento di un riferimento alle radici giudaico-cristiane diventa un riconoscimento dell’unità secolare’
disregarded because it is from them that the future of Europe is
drawing cultural and moral strength.’ (Muscardini 2003)\textsuperscript{185}

The party perceived national and European identities as two distinct identities, which
can nevertheless be reconciled. The two identities were not posited as necessarily
antithetical or competing but were mostly seen in terms of concentric circles whereby
feelings of national identity are strong in the people but feelings of European identity are
also present. The National Alliance argued that only by finding the similarities as well
as the differences of European peoples, it would be possible to acquire the
consciousness of being European citizens (National Alliance 2002: 6). European
citizenship however still implies ‘the need to safeguard our own identities and our own
traditions too’ (Muscardini 2007a)\textsuperscript{186}.

7.2.2 Principle of European integration

The National Alliance was in favour of the ‘principle’ of European cooperation at a
higher multilateral level. The party believed that it is in the European States’ best
interest to pool their resources in order to better manage issues that have an international
and transnational character. It accepted the existence of changing geopolitical conditions
and that the nation state has been undergoing deep and radical changes as a result of
European integration (National Alliance 2001: 9-10). The party’s proposed framework
for cooperation is a ‘Confederation in which the states have their autonomy but decide
to delegate part of their sovereignty to the central institutions for the management of
specific sectors’ (interview with Muscardini 2009)\textsuperscript{187}. This ideal model would ensure the
primacy of the nation state at all times. National specificities constitute Europe’s wealth
and the EU should not ‘negate the nation state but rather constitute a Confederation of

\textsuperscript{185} Original text: ‘Auspichiamo che la Conferenza intergovernativa, per quanto riguarda il
preambolo, trovi un accordo per il riconoscimento delle radici dalle quali ha preso vita l’Unione. La storia greco-romana, la tradizione giudaico-cristiana, i valori laici e liberali che si sono via
via definiti, non possono essere ignorati perché da essi il futuro dell’Europa trae forza culturale e
morale.’

\textsuperscript{186} Original text: ‘bisogno però di difendere anche le nostre identità e le nostre tradizioni.’

\textsuperscript{187} Wording in Italian: ‘Il modello ideale è quello della Confederazione, nella quale gli Stati
hanno un loro spazio di autonomia, ma decidono di delegare parte della loro sovranità alle
istituzioni centrali per la gestione di determinati settori.’
nation states; in this sense the states and their interests would contribute to rather than obstruct the formulation of the European interests and priorities’ (National Alliance 2002: 6). ‘Europe cannot be formed against the Member States and against national interests’ (Tatarella 2008). Key party politicians accepted that Italy benefited more from the European Community and much less from the European Union (interview with Muscardini 2009). It nevertheless opposed a ‘single Europe’ that adopted the same policies for all member states without being sensitive to national and regional specificities.

The nation state is both central to the creation of a united Europe but is also empowered by it. ‘It is through the states and the national governments […] that the Confederation of States could acquire a “political personality” […] and the States would find their centrality’ (National Alliance 2002: 6). This vision of Europe resembles the Gaullist belief of integration based on the strength and integrity of the nation state. ‘Our documents and political positions have been inspired by the Gaullist model’ (National Alliance 2006b: 16). The party leader specified that ‘we are in favour of delegating some powers of the State; but we are against abandoning national sovereignty. “The Europe of nations” should prevail where every member state can maintain its identity in a non-centralised structure’ (interview of Fini in Fini and Staglieno 1999: 29). This was contrasted to the creation of Europe as a Super State ‘The Right has always argued in favour of a Europe of nations rich by its identities and cultures that should be respected and cannot be reversed by a Super State’ (National Alliance 2004: 6).

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188 Original text: ‘non annullando gli Stati nazionali bensì costituendo una Confederazione di Statinazione; in questo senso gli Stati e gli interessi nazionali contribuiscono e non sono di ostacolo alla formazione dell’interesse e delle priorità europei.’
189 Original text: ‘l’Europa non può nascere contro gli Stati e contro gli interessi nazionali’
190 Original text: ‘È attraverso gli Stati e i governi nazionali, quindi, in quanto espressione della volontà di cittadini e della rappresentatività, che la Confederazione di Stati può acquisire “personalità politica”; ancor più al compimento delle grandi transizioni, come detto, gli Stati ritrovano la loro centralità.’
191 Original text: ‘Ci siamo ispirati in tanti nostri documenti e prese di posizioni al modello gollista’
192 Original text: ‘Preciso subito che siamo favorevoli a delegare alcune competenze dello Stato, ma non ad abbandonare la sovranità nazionale, perché l’Europa unita dovrà essere l’”Europa delle Nazioni”, dove ogni membro dovrà mantenere la propria identità in un assetto non centralistico’
193 Original text: ‘Ma la Destra ha anche sempre affermato il valore di un’Europa delle nazioni, ricchezza plurima di identità e culture, che vanno alimentate e rispettate e non possono essere annullate in un super Stato informe’
party was clearly against the creation of a European federal structure. ‘We oppose a type of European integration that would represent the creation of a single model. We are in favour of a Europe that respects the diversities and cultures which enrich it’ (interview with Muscardini 2009)\(^ {194}\). The nation state must be central in EU decision-making where the ‘pluralism of national sovereignties’ must be preserved (National Alliance 2004: 8). The party leader argued that ‘The best way to participate in the European club would be not to give up one’s national prerogatives, history, culture and identity. Being good Europeans presupposes being good Italians’ (interview with Fini in Campi 2006: 108)\(^ {195}\). The strength of European integration stems from the notion of unity in diversity. ‘We must establish European political unity while safeguarding national identities and diversities’ (Angelilli 2001)\(^ {196}\). European cooperation should not be an unconditional surrender of power to the European institutions, ‘Integration should take place when necessary, decentralisation where possible’ (National Alliance 2002: 6)\(^ {197}\).

It is worth noting that the National Alliance portrayed itself as the only party in Italy seeking not only to preserve but also to promote Italian national interests to the European level. ‘Italy […] should find the possibility to develop and assert its characteristics in a united Europe’ (National Alliance 2004: 12)\(^ {198}\). Fini criticised the other parties for being unconditional Europeans without succeeding in uploading Italian interests at the EU level. ‘Europeanists in words, we have never taken the European institutions seriously, we did not strive to insert our officials in the bureaucratic structure of the Communities’ (interview with Fini in Campi 2006: 108)\(^ {199}\). Italy had assumed a deterministic ‘agree and get along’ position towards the EU in order to create an EU ‘at all costs but without any values’ (National Alliance 2002: 5). The party pointed to the

\(^{194}\) Wording in Italian: ‘Ci opponiamo ad una integrazione europea che rappresenti l’omologazione ad un modello unico. Siamo per un’Europa che rispetti le diversità e le culture che la arricchiscono.’

\(^{195}\) Original text: ‘il modo migliore per far parte a pieno titolo del club europeo è quello di non rinunciare alle proprie prerogative nazionale, alla propria identità storico-culturale. Essere buoni europei presuppone essere e sentirsi buoni italiani’

\(^{196}\) Original text: ‘dobbiamo costruire l’unità politica europea, salvaguardando le identità e le specificità nazionali’

\(^{197}\) Original text: ‘Integrazione ove necessario, decentramento ove possibile’

\(^{198}\) Original text: ‘L’Italia Paese […] deve poter trovare nell’Europa unita la possibilità di sviluppare e affermare le sue caratteristiche’

\(^{199}\) Original text: ‘Europeisti a parole, non abbiamo mai preso troppo sul serio le istituzioni europee, non ci siamo battuti […] per inserire nostri tecnici e funzionari all’interno della struttura burocratica della Comunità’
fact that ‘Only in recent years, thanks to the Right, we can speak of the “rediscovery of the national interest” (National Alliance 2004: 12)\textsuperscript{200}. Using the European issue as a tool for domestic criticism, the National Alliance criticised the Italian left for supporting the creation of a European Super State ‘against the culture and traditions of the European peoples’ (National Alliance 2004: 8)\textsuperscript{201}.

7.2.3 Practice of European policy integration

The party largely supported the policy practice of European integration. It espoused EU cooperation on a number of policies including the economy, energy, the environment, immigration and borders, security and justice. Policies of particular interest to the party related to technology and foreign policy. It saw a benefit from European integration to the extent that national interests were preserved and that the EU did not seek to establish uniform policies for all member states irrespective of geography, climate and financial considerations. ‘We are against regulations in some sectors that extend from the North Cape to the island of Lampedusa’ (interview with Muscardini 2009)\textsuperscript{202}. The ‘practice’ of European integration was thus filtered through a systematic cost-benefit analysis conferred upon Italian national interests (Conti 2003: 26).

The National Alliance criticised the EU for being distant from citizens’ interests and needs. The party argued that the EU is a bureaucratic creation suffering from a democratic deficit. Citizens do not participate in the process of integration. The EU has become a technocratic government without popular legitimacy. Its decision-making procedures are opaque and distant from the European peoples. The role of the only European Institution representing the people, i.e. the EP, is limited.

\textsuperscript{200} Original text: ‘Solo in anni molto recenti, grazie all’azione culturale della Destra, si è tornato a parlare di “riscoperta dell’interesse nazionale”’
\textsuperscript{201} Original text: ‘È stata la retorica del progressismo di sinistra a inventare, senza che vi fosse alcuna traccia nei trattati, il superStato europeo, all’interno del quale si voleva annegare la cultura e la tradizione dei popoli.’
\textsuperscript{202} Wording in Italian: ‘Siamo contrari a regolamentazioni di alcuni settori che valgano da Capo Nord all’isola di Lampedusa.’
‘EU decisions far from being taken in the Parliament arise from Council meetings and are implemented by the Commission. The first decide in secrecy whereas the latter implement them in a politically “non-responsible” manner. These paradoxes clearly contradict the democratic spirit inherent in Europe’ (National Alliance 2002: 6)\textsuperscript{203}

The party criticised the European Commission for being a ‘hyper-bureaucracy incapable of designing and implementing a common policy’ (National Alliance 2004: 7)\textsuperscript{204}. The technocratic EU is averse to the process of democratic participation. The people instead of active decision-makers have become passive consumers of European legislation (National Alliance 2002: 5). European bureaucrats have created an over-regulated soulless Europe ‘incapable to assert the roots of its own identity’ (National Alliance 2006a: 12)\textsuperscript{205}. The main challenge for the party was to create a Europe ‘in which the institutional structures […] can be directly accountable to the citizens’ (National Alliance 2004: 8)\textsuperscript{206}. EU regulations were seen as excessive, too hard and complex to understand. ‘Establishing the curvature of bananas or the diameter of peas or the length of contraceptives and believing that this means you are regulating the market is a sign that you are a thousand miles away from the daily life of the citizens’ (Muscardini 2007b)\textsuperscript{207}.

Europe struggles between two antithetical conceptions. The first is a technocratic European Super State alien to democratic participation and legitimacy. The second is a political union of sovereign nation states collaborating in areas of mutual interest. The party’s view of the EU as it stands during the 2000s is rather pessimistic. It deplored that a technocratic and elitist EU reins, product of social democratic policies (National

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Original text: ‘ad oggi ancora troppe decisioni dell’Unione, lungi dall’essere prese in sede parlamentare scaturiscono dalle riunioni del Consiglio e sono attuate dagli organi della Commissione. Il primo decide in segreto, la seconda attua in maniera politicamente “non responsabile”. Questi due evidenti paradossi, in chiara contraddizione con lo spirito democratico di cui l’Europa è stata nei secoli portatrice,’
\item Original text: ‘iperburocraticizzata ma incapace di disegnare e realizzare una strategia politica comune’
\item Original text: ‘incapace di affermare finanche le radice della propria identità.’
\item Original text: ‘E soprattutto un’Unione le cui strutture istituzionali […] possano rispondere direttamente ai cittadini.’
\item Original text: ‘Fissare la curvatura delle banane o il diametro dei piselli o la lunghezza dei contraccettivi e crede di regolare, in questo modo, il mercato, significa essere lontani mille miglia dalla realtà quotidiana dei cittadini.’
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Alliance 2002: 5). ‘There is a clash between a spiritual Europe deriving from history and enriching its peoples through their cultural diversity and a Euro-cracy, a bleak technocratic entity […] distant from the citizens resting upon super-commissions resembling to a “supranational socialist entity” (National Alliance 2004: 7)208. Because the prevailing EU model is technocratic, the EU is perceived as disoriented and fragmented having protectionist and introverted tendencies.

Europe would succeed only if it developed ‘with the people’ in a project of concentric circles of sovereignty primarily regulated by the principle of subsidiarity whereby decentralisation should take place where possible (interview with Muscardini 2009). Careful not to over-criticise the European Commission, the National Alliance recommended a Europe governed by national institutions as well as the EP, the only European Institution legitimated by popular vote (National Alliance 2002: 5). This, coupled with the wider use of public referenda, would be the only way through which the citizens could be involved and the EU could be more accountable and democratised. This is increasingly important given that more than half of national legislation derives from the EU.

7.2.4 The Future of the European Polity

The European vision of the National Alliance was that of a political union (National Alliance 2000: 4). ‘The European Union, following the creation of the single currency, should make another important step forward and start, as soon as possible, the procedure towards the realisation of a political union’ (National Alliance 1999: 1)209. As mentioned above, this political union refers to a confederation of European nation states where all members would contribute without compromising their sovereignty.

208 Original text: ‘Uno scontro tra un’Europa spirituale, fatta dalla storia, che voleva arricchire i suoi popoli attraverso la pluralità delle culture; e l’Eurocrazia, un’entità arcigna, configurata come struttura eminentemente tecnocratica.[…] […]Un’Europa distante dai cittadini, arroccata in supercommissioni, quella di “un’entità socialista sopranazionale”’

209 Original text: ‘L’Unione europea, dopo la creazione della moneta unica, deve compiere un altro passo avanti altrettanto importante ed avviare, il più rapidamente possibile, le procedure per la realizzazione dell’Unione politica.’
The ‘future’ of European integration would be successful only by respecting and preserving member state specificities, which is precisely what unites and enriches the EU. The maintenance of diversity was an important principle of the party which argued that ‘the future of Europe cannot be marked by centralised uniformity but by unity in diversity’ (National Alliance 2002: 5)\textsuperscript{210}. In this political system, the states would ensure that national interests contribute to and do not become an obstacle to the formation of European interests and priorities (National Alliance 2002: 6). Practically this entails that EU member states should try to promote their national interests through the European structures. But it is only through member states and national governments that the EU can attain a political personality. Indeed, the major challenge each EU member state faces is to find a balance between national interests and the European common interest. It is only through the member states that the EU could be empowered. A notable example of this was the party’s attitude towards the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty. Although it largely supported both, it was against the reduction of the composition of the Commission (Muscardini 2007e). Regarding the Constitution, it argued that it should not be

‘exploited for party-political purposes against governments that have been duly elected by their own citizens. The European Union must not run the risk of becoming a place where political groups join in the battle to attack freely made national decisions on ideological grounds.’ (Muscardini 2005)\textsuperscript{211}.

As a result of the party’s aspiration for a political union, the EU was criticised for prematurely enlarging in 2004 to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (National Alliance 2006a: 12-13). The EU should ‘deepen in order to enlarge, resulting in reinforced cooperation on strategic issue for the Union’ (National Alliance 2002: 5)\textsuperscript{212}. Fini expressed disillusionment towards the EU as ‘The future of Europe, at this point, is being nothing more than a vast marketplace’ (interview with Fini in Campi 2006:)

\textsuperscript{210} Original text: ‘il futuro d’Europa non può essere segnato dall’uniformità nel centralismo ma dall’unità nella diversità’

\textsuperscript{211} Original text: ‘la Costituzione non venga strumentalizzata a fini partitici contro governi regolarmente eletti dai propri cittadini. L’Unione europea non deve rischiare di divenire il luogo in cui maggioranze ideologiche si scontrano per contrastare libere scelte nazionali.’

\textsuperscript{212} Original text: ‘approfondire per allargare, dando vita a cooperazioni rafforzate su temi strategici per l’Unione’
EU enlargement was seen as an impediment to the EU becoming a strong political power. ‘EU accession does not preoccupy me since the Europe we are talking about is increasingly [...] a marketplace ruled by a purely economic logic. Lets welcome the Turks with their companies, their workforce and their money’ (interview with Fini in Campi 2006: 106).

The party portrayed itself as a ‘Eurorealist’ option as opposed to supporting a position of unconditional pro-Europeaness or hard Euroscepticism. This Eurorealism derived from what the party perceived as close to the people. ‘It is time to say that Euroscepticism, like Euroenthusiasm, are the two sides of a coin that the citizens are rejecting, because they are calling strongly for Eurorealist policies and for proper application of the subsidiarity concept. In other words, let Europe do what the nation states cannot do by themselves.’ (Muscardini 2004).

7.2.5.1 The issue of Italy’s international role within the National Alliance’s European discourse

The above European argumentation was related to the party’s foreign policy aspirations. The National Alliance saw the EU as a potential strong force in international affairs (National Alliance 2000: 4) that should produce security in the world by conducting crisis management operations (National Alliance 2002: 5). Within a Europe that is increasingly important on the international landscape, Italy should be a driving force in international relations. The EU was seen as a vehicle to reconstruct the Italian image abroad (National Alliance 1995: 61). Whereas the parties of the left have been unconditional EU supporters without promoting the Italian national interest (National Alliance 2004: 11), the National Alliance portrayed a vision of an Italy leading the way.

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213 Original text: ‘Il futuro dell’Europa, a questo punto, è quello di essere niente più che un vasto mercato’

214 Original text: ‘Adesione che non mi preoccupa, dal momento che l’Europa di cui stiamo parlando è sempre più, come ho appena detto, un mercato retto da una logica meramente economistica. Ben vengano i turchi con le loro imprese, con la loro forza-lavoro e con i loro soldi’

215 Original text: ‘E il momento di dire che l’euroscetticismo, come l’euroentusiasmo, sono le facce di un’identica medaglia che i cittadini rifiutano, perché chiedono con forza che ci sia una politica eurorealista e una vera applicazione del concetto di sussidiarietà. Faccia cioè l’Europa ciò che gli Stati nazionali non possono fare da soli.’
in a dynamic Europe assuming international responsibilities and inserting itself within
the Franco-German axis (National Alliance 2009: 9).

The party argued that ‘Italy and Europe should play a dynamic role in international
relations since there are important areas in the world where systematic violation of
human rights takes place’ (National Alliance 2000: 4)\textsuperscript{216}. This global vision of the EU
was linked to a belief of Europe’s civilising mission abroad ‘We want a political Europe
able to inspire the desire for democracy in places in the world where millions of women
and men still suffer a lack of freedom and the rule of law.’ (Muscadini 2007d)\textsuperscript{217}. Europe was seen as a founding pillar of the West not antagonistic to that of the United
States. However, its role would lie in ‘bringing its wisdom to the Alliance, its ability to
filter cultures, to have a dialogue with the South’ (National Alliance 2004: 9)\textsuperscript{218}. Without a common foreign and security policy, Europe ‘will remain weakened’
(Muscadini 2007c) and ‘will not be able to play a role in the world that is analogous to
its economic and commercial weight and could be forced to accept choices make by
others’ (National Alliance 1999: 1)\textsuperscript{219}.

Europe should become a strong player in international politics making a concerted effort
to tackle international crises, which thus far are managed by individual states, the United
States or the United Nations. ‘We have to anticipate future scenarios and cannot, as we
were in the case of Kosovo, be unprepared and divided in the face of such a sensitive
scenario.’ (Muscadini 2008)\textsuperscript{220}. This vision of Europe was portrayed as that of ‘Euro-
realism’ whereby ‘a Union of sovereign states is capable of acting effectively through

\textsuperscript{216} Original text: ‘Ritiene che l'Italia e l'Europa debbano svolgere un ruolo propulsivo nelle
relazioni internazionali; poiché esistono ancora aree importanti del globo nelle quali si realizza
la quotidiana e sistematica violazione delle dignità della persona’

\textsuperscript{217} Original text: ‘Vogliamo un’Europa politica capace di ispirare la voglia di democrazia
laddove nel mondo milioni di donne e uomini ancora subiscono la mancanza di libertà e di
legalità.’

\textsuperscript{218} Original text: ‘Il compito dell’Europa è quello di portare nell’alleanza la sua saggezza, la sua
millenaria capacità di filtrare culture, di dialogare con il Sud del mondo.’

\textsuperscript{219} Original text: ‘l’Europa non potrà svolgere nel mondo un ruolo corrispondente al suo peso
economico e commerciale e potrebbe essere costretto ad accettare scelte fatte da altri’

\textsuperscript{220} Original text: ‘Dobbiamo immaginare gli scenari futuri e non, come nel caso del Kosovo,
trouvârsi impreparati e divisi di fronte a uno scenario quanto mai delicato.’
the expression of a common will.’ (Moscadini 2007f)\(^{221}\). It is, however, noteworthy that the party made an implicit assumption that the European nation states have converging interests all seeking to create a strong European power.

7.2.5.2 Analysis of the National Alliance’s European Parliamentary Speeches during the 5\(^{th}\) and 6\(^{th}\) Terms

The analysis of MEP plenary speeches during the 1999-2009 decade demonstrates that there are a number of issues salient in their discourse. These include their preoccupation with the EU’s international role and its democratic deficit as well as their expression of support for a number of EU initiatives\(^{222}\). During the 5\(^{th}\) Parliamentary Term, 1999-2004, the National Alliance elected 5 MEPs who they gave 196 speeches in total\(^{223}\). During the 6\(^{th}\) 2004-2009 term the number of speeches increased to 297\(^{224}\).

The author’s qualitative content analysis of a total number of 493 speeches offers an interesting insight. The recurring issues can be broadly classified into two categories, including (1) comments specific to the EU and Europe and (2) non-EU related themes\(^{225}\). Table 7.1 below shows that, contrary to LAOS MEPs, National Alliance MEPs overwhelmingly used the EP as a platform to discuss EU rather than domestic or other non-EU specific issues. The party referred to EU issues with a total averaged percentage of 93.6, which surpasses the French National Front’s very high 82.5 per cent (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.5.2). Only a minor 5.75 per cent of the speeches did not refer

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\(^{221}\) Original text: ‘un’Unione di Stati sovrani è capace d’agire efficacemente attraverso l’espressione di una volontà comune.’

\(^{222}\) These have been found on the EP’s online archives at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/archive/alphaOrder.do?language=EN](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/archive/alphaOrder.do?language=EN)

\(^{223}\) During the 5\(^{th}\) EP term, the party elected Roberta Angelilli, Cristiana Moscardini, Antonio Mussa, Adriana Poli Bortone and Sergio Berlato

\(^{224}\) During the 6\(^{th}\) term, the party elected 8 MEPs in total. Roberta Angelilli, Cristiana Moscardini, Adriana Poli Bortone and Sergio Berlato renewed their mandate. Umberto Pirilli, Salvatore Tatarella, Romano Maria La Russa and Alessandro Foglietta joined afresh Alleanza Nazionale’s 6\(^{th}\) EP team. Antonio Mussa replaced Romano Maria La Russa and Domenico Antonio Basile replaced Adriana Poli Bortone in 2008. Thus ten different MEPs gave plenary speeches during the 6\(^{th}\) Parliamentary term.

\(^{225}\) For a detailed analysis of how speeches have been coded, see Appendix III.
to the EU. This finding confirms that the party was preoccupied with the European issue
(interview with Muscardini 2009).  

Table 7.1 General categories of themes in EP speeches (National Alliance)
5th & 6th Parliamentary Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of themes in EP speeches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU related themes</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU related themes</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)

A comparison of these two thematic categories among the two EP Parliamentary Terms reveals a similar pattern. References to EU-related themes remain very high in both EP terms (see tables 7.2 & 7.3 below).

Table 7.2 General categories of themes in EP speeches (National Alliance)
5th Parliamentary Term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of themes in EP speeches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU related themes</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU related themes</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)

Table 7.3 General categories of themes in EP speeches (National Alliance)
6th Parliamentary Term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of themes in EP speeches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU related themes</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU related themes</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)

A detailed analysis of the EU-related themes category demonstrates that the National Alliance used the EP platform to address a number of issues pertaining to the EU (see table 7.4 below). This is similar to the French National Front whose percentage references to EU related themes remain high during the 1999-2009 decade. However, the two parties have significantly different approaches. The French party overwhelming refers to the EU in a negative manner criticising its policies and institutions. The Italian party chose to discuss rather than criticise by default any European initiative and had a much more positive approach on the issue.

226 Note that although Europe was important within the party, the issue was not portrayed as publically salient.
Interestingly, and in concurrence with findings in the above sections of the chapter, the National Alliance criticised the EU on a number of issues (8.9 per cent). However, MEP negative evaluations referred to technical issues and can be thought as constructive as they recommended ways of improving the EU’s policies and practices. Moreover, unlike the other two parties where references to the EU tended to be largely negative, EU criticisms are solely a sub-category of the overall category ‘EU related themes’. It is also noteworthy that the party directly referred to the phenomenon of globalisation only by a rather small 1.7 per cent and that when it did so, it did not connect globalisation to European integration.

Additionally, there is not one single issue prevailing in their speeches. Rather, the qualitative content analysis reveals that the party’s MEPs were concerned with (1) the EU’s role in the world, particularly but not exclusively in the context of terrorism (16.9 per cent); (2) the issue of the EU’s democracy or lack thereof (7.15 per cent) and (3) their active support for a number of EU initiatives (13.95 per cent). This also provides an interesting contrast with the French National Front which employs a large part of its allocated time in plenary to hold the EU responsible for the negative consequences of globalisation in France; and the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally, which mostly uses the EP platform to ‘upload’ issues of domestic relevance.

The comparison of the qualitative content analysis findings strongly points to the fact that the National Alliance became distinctive with regards to its European approach compared to the other two parties under investigation.
Table 7.4 Salience of themes in EP speeches (National Alliance)
5th and 6th Parliamentary Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occurrence of themes in EP speeches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>5th &amp; 6th EP Terms</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU related themes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to common European culture</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Rules and Procedures</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Transparency</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Border Controls</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Budget</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Bureaucracy</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Enlargement</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Health</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro and Stability pact</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Trade/Competition</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment policies</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights and the EU</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European social model</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various European issues</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various EU recommendations</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various Criticisms</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU in the world/Terrorism</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy/Citizens/Institutions</td>
<td>7.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for EU cooperation</td>
<td>13.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of Prodi</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-EU related themes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic issues</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>≈ 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*N* = 707 occurrences of themes

*Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)*

A comparison of the two EP legislative terms shows that the pattern is broadly similar between the two terms (see tables 7.5 and 7.6 below). The party’s preoccupation with the EU’s international role remained the same (16.9 per cent). The issue of democracy slightly dropped from 8.1 per cent to 6.2 per cent in the 5th and 6th terms respectively. Support for EU initiatives increased from 12.7 per cent during the 5th term to 15.2 per cent during the 6th. EU criticisms dropped from 10.4 to 7.4 per cent. The issue of EU
trade and competition increased dramatically between the two terms from 2.6 to 9.9 per cent\(^{227}\).

**Table 7.5** Salience of themes in EP speeches (National Alliance)  
5\(^{th}\) Parliamentary Term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occurrence of themes in EP speeches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>5(^{th}) EP Term</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU related themes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to common European culture</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Rules and Procedures</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Transparency</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Border Controls</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Budget</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Bureaucracy</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Enlargement</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Health</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro and Stability pact</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Trade/Competition</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment policies</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights and the EU</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European social model</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various European issues</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various EU recommendations</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various Criticisms</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU in the world/Terrorism</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy/Citizens/Institutions</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for EU cooperation</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of Prodi</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-EU related themes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic issues</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>(\approx 100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(N=306\) occurrences of themes  
*Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)*

\(^{227}\) Note that a simple word frequency MEPs total 493 speeches reveals a similar pattern, see Appendix IV.
Table 7.6 Salience of themes in EP speeches (National Alliance)
6th Parliamentary Term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occurrence of themes in EP speeches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>6th EP Term</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU related themes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to common European culture</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Rules and Procedures</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Transparency</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Border Controls</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Budget</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Bureaucracy</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Enlargement</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Health</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro and Stability pact</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Trade/Competition</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment policies</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights and the EU</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European social model</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various European issues</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various EU recommendations</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various Criticisms</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU in the world/Terrorism</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy/Citizens/Institutions</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for EU cooperation</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of Prodi</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>93.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-EU related themes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic issues</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-EU related themes sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>≈ 100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*N=401 occurrences of themes*

*Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)*
7.3 The European issue as a tool for institutional entrenchment

This section aims to analyse the ways in which the party’s choice to change its European policy from a relatively hard and critical position to one of ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism link to the party’s overall political strategy in its domestic party system. It argues that the party’s motivation for cartelisation stimulated its ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism and its leader used the latter as a tool for institutional entrenchment. A relatively positive EU stance provided the party and its leader with long-sought national and international legitimacy. ‘Compromising’ Euroscepticism became a political tool for its leader in his effort to appear as a statesman on an equal footing with other centre-right leaders abroad. The following section assesses the party’s strategy with reference to Fini’s role in the European Convention and a discussion of how the issue of Europe was associated with the party’s and its leader’s aim to be a central force in Italian politics.

7.3.1 Fini’s role in the Convention on the Future of Europe

The party’s second re-election in 2001 as part of the House of Freedoms electoral coalition revealed that the party’s reputation had to a large extent been rehabilitated. Fini’s appointment as the deputy Prime Minster in the 2001-2006 centre-right government signified the system’s acceptance of the party as a legitimate force in the Second Republic. However, although the party had strived to prove its move from the past and had become part of Italy’s mainstream politics by the beginning of 2000s, there was still a fear of ‘being chased back into the ghetto to which it had been confined for almost half a century prior to the early 1990s’ (Newell and Bull 2002: 635). Within this context, participation in the Convention for the Future of Europe provided the perfect opportunity for the party to establish its international standing and became a vehicle for the party’s institutional entrenchment in Italian politics.

Fini accepted that participation in the European Convention as the ‘Representative of the Head of State of Italy’ was his own idea and that no one in the party or in the coalition convinced him to do so. ‘I said to Berlusconi: I am available to do this’ (interview with
Fini in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 43) 228. His argument behind this choice was that Giuliano Amato, a left-wing Italian politician, was appointed as the Vice-Chairman of the European Convention that would draft the new architecture of the Union. Fini felt that there was a need for the centre-right government to appoint its own Governmental Representative since this Convention ‘as it actually happened in the end - could have a historical role’ (interview with Fini in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 42) 229. Fini attached importance to the Convention as he thought that it would have a great historical significance as it was ‘unique in its kind’ dealing with a vast range of issues (interview with Fini in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 43-44). There was, however, a personal aspect behind his choice to run for Italian Head of State Representative, namely ‘The desire to occupy myself with Community politics, which increasingly determine the choices of national politics’ (interview with Fini in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 44) 230.

Participating in the high profile Convention for the Future of Europe provided Fini with the perfect opportunity to improve his status both within Italy and abroad. He presented himself not only as the representative of the National Alliance but also, and most importantly, as the main representative of Italy’s executive branch, thus assigning himself decision-making powers (interview with Fini in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 46) 231. He marketed himself as ‘a leading actor of the Convention’s success’ (interview with Fini in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 46) 232.

The Convention was a high profile political arena where Fini could introduce himself to other European leaders and political elites. To liaise with them, Fini sought to portray himself, his party and the Italian government as like-minded as far as the future of Europe was concerned. This was a challenge in itself as the main party in the Italian governmental coalition and its President, have not been considered staunch pro-Europeans (Conti 2009) and his own party has been divided on the European issue (Quaglia 2005: 285). Although Fini provided overall support for the EU’s Constitutional

228 Original text: ‘Dissi al presidente Berlusconi: “Io sono disponibile a farlo”.’
229 Original text: ‘come poi in effetti è accaduto, avere un ruolo di portata storica’
230 Original text: ‘desiderio di cimentarmi con un tema come quello della politica comunitaria che sempre di più determina anche le scelte della politica nazionale’
231 Original text: ‘non rappresentavo la destra ma l’esecutivo del mio paese’
232 Original text: ‘Fatto sta che alla fine il rappresentante del governo italiano è stato considerato uno dei protagonisti del buon esito della Convenzione’
Charter, he put forward a number of amendments whose aim was safeguarding national sovereignty, avoiding the use of the word ‘federal’ and limiting EU institutions’ powers on the member states. He supported the inclusion of a reference on Europe’s Christian roots in the Constitution’s preamble and advocated the creation of a common defence policy (Di Quirico 2003: 32). His recommendations, however, were contradictory since a common European defence would run counter to the principle of safeguarding member states’ national institutions. Additionally, a reference to Christianity would fail to encourage Turkish EU accession.

Notwithstanding the inherent contradiction between Fini’s enthusiastic contribution to the European Convention on the one hand (Angelilli 2007) and his argument against a federal Europe on the other, representing Italy in the European Convention gave Fini status, prestige and credibility both domestically and abroad. Fini established international legitimacy for both himself and his party, which would be essential if he were to realise his desire to lead the centre-right in Italy. He boosted his standing in an international arena and managed to appear as a ‘statesman’ on the same footing with his European counterparts.

Fini’s behaviour as Italian Representative in the European Convention confirms his drive towards cartelisation. The theory of party cartelisation expects parties to broadly alter their behaviour in terms of their internal organisation and to project ‘an “ideology” of managerial competence’ (Blyth and Katz 2005: 45-46). In the Convention, Fini evidently achieved both. Notwithstanding internal criticisms, he put forward his ‘Eurorealist’ views decreasing his dependence on the party on the ground and the party in central office. He also portrayed himself as a professional politician with strong experience in international relations, unlike other politicians from the ruling coalition and Berlusconi himself who had repeatedly made errors on the international stage (Di Quirico 2003: 23). In a cartel party, politics become de-politicised and party positions or leader comments are tailored towards avoiding controversy. Within the coalition Fini’s position on the maintenance of national sovereignty, his opposition to federalism, his Christian-centric stance and his insistence on a strong defence policy were appreciated. In this respect, Fini’s moves on the European arena can be seen as tactical in order to enhance the party’s weight within the government by appearing as the only force within
the coalition of strong international standing. His ‘modest commitment’ (Conti 2006: 222) to the issue of European integration became a strategic tool geared to ultimately pay off at the domestic level.

7.3.2 A leader central to the system

Fini’s behaviour explained above may not be seen in isolation. It is a function of his own goals and the party’s interaction with the other parties domestically. The literature on the party acknowledges that Fini responds to opportunities offered by external circumstances (Fella 2006; Fella and Ruzza 2006). He has been called ‘A man of all seasons’ (Marsiglia 2005)233. In the 1990s, Fini utilised the opportunities provided by the break-up of the political system in order to reformulate his party and distance it from its discredited fascist past. In the 2000s, active pursuit of a leading role in Italian politics have motivated him to portray himself and the party as similar and close to other European conservative/centre-right parties, which reached its apogee with the Alliance’s inclusion in the European People’s Party following the 2009 European elections.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the party saw itself as a strong political force of the right central to the political system. ‘A party of the right that manages to ensure consensus also at the centre of the political spectrum by virtue of its ability of being central to major issues of political and social interest. The party is central but not centrist’ (National Alliance 2002: 13-14)234. Thus it projected an image of a party clearly drawing from a right-wing electorate which, by virtue of being central to Italian politics, can also find common ground with moderate Italian forces.

The party’s European position and its leader’s role in the European convention became an important tool for the party’s institutional entrenchment in Italian politics. The European convention opened a window of opportunity for Fini’s political aspirations in the context of international disenchantment with Berlusconi. The President of the

233 Original text: ‘Un uomo per tutte le stagioni’
234 Original text: ‘Un partito di destra che riesce ad attrarre consensi anche al centro dello schieramento politico, in virtù della sua capacità di essere centrale rispetto ai grandi temi di interesse politico e sociale. Per usare una formula ad effetto: centrali ma non centristi.’
governmental coalition was discredited abroad (Newell and Bull 2002: 629) being under investigation for charges including tax evasion and bribery. Especially during the run up to the Italian 2001 elections the international press led by The Economist argued that ‘Mr Berlusconi is not fit to lead the government of any country, least of all one of the world’s richest democracies.’ (Economist 2001a). A few days following the 2001 Italian elections, the same periodical pointed out that ‘to all but the wilfully uncritical, he stands for sleaze, if not outright criminality’ and that ‘the election of Mr Berlusconi as prime minister would mark a dark day for Italian democracy and the rule of law.’ (Economist 2001b).

Although participation in the European Convention did not satisfy Fini’s ultimate quest for leadership, it did result in his appointment as Foreign Minister in 2004 and President of the Lower House in 2008. These roles attached to the party international political credibility and ultimately facilitated the party’s entry to the European People’s Party. ‘The two years I spent working on the European Constitution and my mandate as Foreign Minister have demonstrated that the National Alliance has similar values to those of the European People’s Party’ (Fini 2008). Within this European family, the party could market itself as having a noteworthy role as it has played a significant part in the process of devising Europe’s architecture, a cause to which the European right has been devoted for decades.

This great importance of the party was transposed to the national level where the party argued that it is fundamental to the Italian political system and democracy:

‘The National Alliance has become a fundamental force not only in Italian politics but also of Italian democracy. This force is neither marginal nor can be marginalised. It was in fact decisive for the accomplishment of democracy, for the consolidation of bipolarity and the alternation of government. The National Alliance should now free itself from both the syndrome of and the temptation for isolation’ (National Alliance 2006a: 1).

235 Original text: ‘I due anni in cui mi sono occupato della Costituzione europea e il mandato alla Farnesina hanno dimostrato con i fatti che An ha valori affini a quelli del Ppe’

236 Original text: ‘Alleanza Nazionale è diventata una forza fondamentale non solo della politica italiana, ma della democrazia italiana. Una forza non marginale né emarginabile. E’ stata infatti determinante per la realizzazione della democrazia compiuta, per il consolidamento del
Fini managed to depoliticise the EU issue, show professionalism and use Europe as a platform to promote himself not only internationally but also nationally. His political credibility on the international stage ultimately paid off at the domestic level. He marketed his party as ‘belonging to one of the greatest families of European political tradition which has largely contributed to the European cause and will continue to do so’ (National Alliance 2004: 6)\(^\text{237}\).

The National Alliance utilised the issue of Europe as a tool for political strengthening and institutional entrenchment at the domestic level. In 2006, post-European Convention and Fini’s appointment as Italian Foreign Minister, the party saw itself as the central force in the coalition ‘thinking, organising and operating as “party-pole”’ in the system (National Alliance 2006a: 2)\(^\text{238}\) having the ‘right and obligation to aspire to permanently become the central force of the coalition through […] its political and cultural project […] from the point of view of a large national and popular party with European inspiration and credentials ’ (National Alliance 2006a: 2)\(^\text{239}\). In the run-up to the 2008 national elections, Fini ‘did not exclude the possibility of running for Prime Minister’\(^\text{240}\) (Fini 2007a), argued that an alternative system to that of the left is possible ‘with or without Berlusconi’ and that ‘I can reconstruct the centre-right. Even if I have to do this on my own’ (Fini 2007b)\(^\text{241}\). The reason for the two parties joining together into the People of Freedom in 2009 was to ‘establish a unitary party of the centre-right, the

\(^{237}\) Original text: ‘La Destra italiana appartiene ad una delle grandi famiglie della tradizione politica europea, che ha già dato un forte contributo alla causa europeista e che continuerà a darlo.’

\(^{238}\) Original text: ‘Alleanza Nazionale deve pensarsi, strutturarsi ed operare come "partito-polo",".

\(^{239}\) Original text: ‘Alleanza Nazionale ha il diritto - dovere di coltivare l'ambizione di diventare, stabilmente, la forza centrale dell'alleanza attraverso […] il suo progetto politico - culturale […]nell'ottica di un grande partito nazionale e popolare di ispirazione e respiro europeo’

\(^{240}\) Original text: ‘Non escludo di candidarmi premier’

\(^{241}\) Original text: ‘Ma un sistema di alleanza alternative di Pd è possibile, con o senza il demolitore’ and ‘Rifaccio io il centrodestra. Anche da solo’
largest party in national history, the largest European party’ (National Alliance 2009: 1).\textsuperscript{242}

7.3.3 Fini: Il Futuro della Libertà

The party leader’s quest for institutional entrenchment extends over the decade under investigation with the publication of his book in 2009 entitled ‘The Future of Freedom: Unsolicited advice to those born in 1989’. The book is inspired by the twenty year anniversary since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 as an event marking modern European history. It provided an opportunity for Fini to summarise his world vision and his ideas on the challenges Italy faces in an era of globalisation and European integration. In the book, Fini carefully avoids discussing his own political trajectory but nevertheless explains his ideas and vision. This is done in order to avoid contradicting his past. It is notable that the book is addressed to young people born in 1989 that have neither experienced Communism nor lived during the First Italian Republic and are presumably not aware of National Alliance’s and Fini’s fascist past.

As the title implies, the book makes a projection into the future showing Fini’s political ambitions and objectives portraying himself as the ‘future of freedom’ and clearly demonstrating that he seeks to assume a guiding role in Italian politics. In this respect, the party’s ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism seems to have been a reaction to the prevailing political atmosphere of both mainstream political elites in Italy. It also contributed to Fini’s vision of becoming the leader of a strong right-wing force comparable to other European centre-right parties and himself appearing as a ‘Statesman’ (see figure 7.1 below).

\textsuperscript{242} Original text: ‘fondare il partito unitario di centrodestra, il più grande partito della storia nazionale, il più grande partito europeo’
Fini discusses the process of European integration within the context of rising levels of immigration in Europe. The general tone is one of educating the young Italians with regards to the challenges confronted in both Italy and Europe calling them to become protagonists in their resolution. He argues that ‘Away from Europe, Italy would increasingly become an outsider with regards to the processes of modernisation and globalisation’ (Fini 2009: 136). His justification of popular opposition to the EU project lies in the gap between a bureaucratic Europe on the one hand and the Europe of the peoples on the other. He recommends the resumption of the discussion on the Continent’s identity and religious credentials. Consistent with the thesis’ findings above, he views the future of Europe as inextricably linked to the latter’s leading role in foreign policy and international relations (Fini 2009: 145).

Fini’s initiative to author this monograph analysing his viewpoints can be seen as an attempt to resemble other successful Italian leaders. Left-wing Romano Prodi and  

243 Original text: ‘Lontana dall’Europa, l’Italia diventerebbe sempre più eccentrica rispetto ai processi della modernizzazione e della globalizzazione’
Walter Veltone have published a number of books. In particular, Romano Prodi, published the book ‘An Idea of Europe’ [Un'idea dell'Europa] in 1999 before he became Commission President in 1999 in order to set out his European credentials and in 2008 ‘My vision of facts: Five years of government in Europe’ [La mia visione dei fatti: Cinque anni di governo in Europa] where he provided an account of his experience as Commission President. Silvio Berlusconi has also engaged in this type of political advertisement by authoring a number of books including ‘Towards the party of freedom: the identity, values and the project’ [Verso il partito della libertà: l'identità, i valori, il progetto] in 2006. Centre-right politicians abroad have also been an inspiration for Fini. Particularly, Nicolas Sarkozy who published in 2007 the monographs ‘Together’ [Ensemble] and ‘Testimony’ setting out his political views to the public regarding contemporary French politics as part of his electoral campaign.

**Conclusion**

The main objective of this chapter has been to examine in detail the third type of radical right Euroscepticism and explain the way in which it is associated with a party’s domestic agenda. To shed light on this Eurosceptic variant, the chapter has analysed the ideas, positions and political trajectory of the Italian National Alliance during the 1999-2009 decade. The chapter has also closely examined the role of the party leader, Gianfranco Fini, in shaping the party’s strategic objectives and European policy.

The argument presented in this chapter consists of three components. Following a discussion of the party’s transformation and re-branding from the neo-fascist MSI to the post-fascist conservative National Alliance, the chapter has argued that since the late 1990s the latter pursued a strategy of institutional entrenchment within the domestic political and party system. The party’s strategy was ‘dismissive’ avoiding controversial statements or policies, its logic of competition was cartelisation/institutional entrenchment and its predominant goal was pursuit of office. It has proceeded with a detailed analysis of the party’s European position through the in-depth analysis of party programmatic literature and the qualitative content analysis of MEP plenary speeches during the 5th and 6th EP legislative terms. It is argued that the party had a cultural
understanding of Europe based on the latter’s Christian, ancient Roman and ancient Greek roots. the National Alliance supported the ‘principle’ of EU cooperation. Its vision of Europe resembled De Gaulle’s notion of a ‘Europe of fatherlands’ whereby integration would proceed in areas of mutual interest and European institutions would not have great powers over national institutions. Maintaining the national interest was of vital importance for the construction of the European architecture. One of the main criticisms against the EU was for suffering from a democratic deficit whereby decision-making is distant from the people rendering European rules illegitimate. The party was in favour of a strong Europe in international affairs with Italy leading the way in a dynamic Europe assuming international responsibilities and inserting itself within the Franco-German axis. Finally, the chapter has argued that the party’s ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism must be seen through the prism of the party’s predominant strategy in the domestic party system. Modest support for Europe as well as its leader’s active participation in the European Convention for the Future of Europe became a vehicle for the party’s and the leader’s further institutional entrenchment in the national political system.

The party’s EU rhetoric has experienced a two-stage transformation. As part of its modernisation process, the party used the European issue as a means of showing that it has shifted towards more consensual positions. In the 1990s, the party’s re-branding from the neo-fascist MSI to the post-fascist/conservative National Alliance resulted in the party softening its EU rhetoric. This, as argued elsewhere, can be seen as part of the party’s wider rehabilitation strategy during the Italian second republic. From 1999 onwards, the party’s EU position crystallised into ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism tailored as a type of positive ‘Euro-realism’. The party’s strategic logic was rooted in the dynamics of the domestic party system and inter-party competition.

In its ultimate quest for office and international respectability, the party adopted a ‘compromising’ position on Europe. It downplayed the European issue with a view to decreasing its salience and avoiding contestation on the matter. A shaky commitment towards the European project allowed the party to project an image of support similar to other centre-right/conservative parties in Europe ultimately boosting the party’s reputation both at the national and European levels. ‘Compromising’ Euroscepticism
became a political tool for its leader in his effort to appear as a statesman on an equal footing with other centre-right leaders abroad, which was seen as potentially increasing the probability of occupying a leading role within the Italian centre-right. The analysis of the Italian National Alliance has revealed that parties can ‘move boxes’ or ‘categories’ in the typology of radical right Euroscepticism depending on what they perceive better at a given point in time for their national strategy. This is the last case study of the thesis giving further weight to the thesis’ overall argument that a party’s position on European integration may be strategically employed at the domestic level for party political purposes. The extent to which a party’s strategy is successful remains, however, outside the scope of this chapter.
Chapter 8 Conclusion: Radical right opposition to European integration

Introduction

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome in 2007, the President of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering, the President of the Council of the European Union, Angela Merkel, and the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, signed the Berlin Declaration. This two page document originally written in German reaffirmed European common ideals and principles. The document started with the pronouncement of European unity:

‘For centuries Europe has been an idea, holding out hope of peace and understanding. That hope has been fulfilled. European unification has made peace and prosperity possible. It has brought about a sense of community and overcome differences. Each Member State has helped to unite Europe and to strengthen democracy and the rule of law. Thanks to the yearning for freedom of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe the unnatural division of Europe is now consigned to the past. European integration shows that we have learnt the painful lessons of a history marked by bloody conflict. Today we live together as was never possible before.

We, the citizens of the European Union, have united for the better.’ (European Union 2007: 1).

The 2007 Berlin Declaration pronounced Europe’s common goals publicly confirming the EU’s focus on the citizens, the workings of democracy, supportive cooperation, its wider influence in the world promoting freedom and development abroad. The notion of ‘togetherness’ was prominent in the text, in particular, in the process of constructing a European model combining economic success and social responsibility for the wider prosperity of the region. The document honoured the progress of the European project emphasizing that it is not only an economic area but also a community of shared values. After a few paragraphs on these broader EU commitments, the document concluded:
‘we are united in our aim of placing the European Union on a renewed common basis before the European Parliament elections in 2009. For we know, Europe is our common future.’ (European Union 2007: 2)

This was an important document sponsored by the then German EU presidency and was issued following the failure of the ratification of the European Constitutional Treaty in a general environment of political uncertainty regarding the future of European integration. The declaration proclaimed the general premises of the EU project and reassured the European Institutions’ willingness to preserve the diversity of European identities, traditions, languages and cultures.

Although the document’s main goal was to lend new momentum in Europe after a period of doubt and soul-searching, it did not avoid tension. The declaration was only signed by the presidents of the three major European institutions. Its explicit (written) endorsement by the leaders of EU member states was carefully avoided for fear of creating further acrimony. Additionally, there was widespread nervousness regarding the translation of the German word ‘Glück’, which means fortune or happiness in other language versions of the declaration. In particular, the German phrase ‘Wir Bürgerinnen und Bürger der Europäischen Union sind zu unserem Glück vereint’ was translated into English as ‘We, the citizens of the European Union, have united for the better’ rather than ‘for our happiness’ clearly avoiding the strong connotation of the selection of the German word ‘Glück’. This was referred to this as a ‘political’ translation in particular with regards to the Danish and English translations (EUobserver 2007).

The above is solely an example demonstrating that there is no longer a clear and unconditional impetus for deepening European integration and promoting federalism. The 2000s have witnessed an increasing influence of critical discourse in the European public sphere indicating that Euroscepticism has not only ceased to be a marginal and ephemeral phenomenon, but has become fundamental to the process of European integration. Evidence for the above statement can be found in an analysis of the society (public opinion), its intermediaries (political parties) and its representatives (EU member state leaders).
The last decade has been characterised by popular antagonism towards European integration. The Irish rejection of the Nice Treaty in June 2001 was taken with surprise by both politicians and the media and did not result in any serious analysis of the reasons behind the Irish negative vote. In contrast, the French and Dutch voter rejection of the project for a European Constitution in 2005 had a profound effect on the process of European integration. Not only was the European Constitution sidelined and ultimately shelved, but also these two referenda marked a clear change in how the EU was portrayed in the hearts and minds of Europeans. The latter clearly passed a negative judgement on the European project. In the run-up to the EU's 50th Anniversary, a Financial Times opinion poll surveying adults in Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain found that 44 per cent of Europeans thought life has got worse since their country joined. A striking 22 per cent argued in favour of their country’s EU withdrawal (BBC 2007). This clearly indicates that the ‘permissive consensus’ thesis has been refuted in the 2000s culminating in the negative outcome of the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008.

In addition to an increasingly negative public opinion, a growing presence of parties with a Eurosceptic agenda can be observed in both national Parliaments and the EP. Radical left and radical right parties constitute the main anti-European political forces that have persisted across time and space. The 2000s have also witnessed the perseverance of single-issue anti-EU parties such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the creation of new parties including Libertas. UKIP is a strong Eurosceptic party consistently supporting Britain’s EU withdrawal since its establishment. In the 2009 EP elections, UKIP reached an impressive second position beating the ruling Labour party. Libertas was the first truly pan-European single-issue Eurosceptic political party officially ‘launched to fight “anti-democratic” Brussels’ (EUobserver 2008). Lastly, following the 2009 EP elections, the European Conservatives and Reformists were established, a new European Political Group with a clearly Eurosceptic and anti-federalist agenda comprising mainstream political forces with governmental status including the Polish Law and Justice Party and the British Conservatives.
Some EU member state political leaders have a clearly Eurosceptic agenda such as Václav Klaus, the President of the Czech Republic, who actively supported Declan Ganley, the head of Libertas, in his campaign for a No vote in the run-up to the Irish Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. The Czech President actively delayed its ratification by refusing to sign the Lisbon Treaty as the Head of State of an EU member state. Following the Irish negative referendum he declared that ‘The Lisbon Treaty is dead’ (The Independent 2009). Other examples include Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, asserting German interests during the European financial crisis and Nicolas Sarkozy, the President of the French Republic, adopting a unilateral and somewhat assertive approach towards the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia whilst holding the six-month EU rotating presidency.

Member state disagreements with regards to the future of the EU and its influence in the world also became apparent during the appointment process of the first EU President and the selection of the EU’s ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’. The selection of Herman van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton reiterated member state tensions over the EU’s governance and its international role. Particularly in the face of the financial crisis and domestic problems such as creating jobs and increasing national growth, the notion of a strong Europe has been sidelined revealing that widespread opposition to, doubt or reservation about the European project has become a structural factor of the latter.

8.1 Domestic strategies and party system dynamics

Against the background of a growing Eurosceptic influence in EU politics, this thesis has tackled one aspect of this phenomenon, in particular that of radical right opposition to European integration. Challenging the notion that parties belonging to the same party family take similar positions on European integration, it is argued that there are instances of different radical right political agendas to European integration. Given party family associations and ideological proximity, the expectation would be that radical right parties adopt similar positions on European integration. However, this study has revealed the variations in anti-European argumentation within the radical right and has
explained the latter with reference to party strategic behaviour within the context of domestic party competition. In brief, this thesis argues that the European issue is not a matter of ideology but, rather, of party interests at the domestic level.

In particular, this study is informed by three inter-related questions, (1) how can we conceptualise the nature of radical right positions on the EU? (2) how do radical right parties respond to the issue of European integration? and (3) why do radical right parties oppose Europe to differing extents? Based on this research design, different European positions have constituted the dependent variable of the thesis.

In answering these questions, this research project has provided a bridge between the literature on party behaviour, radical right parties and the study of Euroscepticism. At a conceptual level and building on the literature of party-based Euroscepticism, it is argued that radical right parties display three patterns of opposition to European integration. These are the ‘rejectionist’, the ‘conditional’ and the ‘compromising’ patterns. These three types have been constructed based on the identification of four facets of European integration, including the definition of Europe, the principle, the policy practice and the future building of a European polity.

The aim of this framework has been to improve the academic understanding of radical right anti-EU argumentation and to systematise the analysis of its nuanced nature. In addition to this, the main finding, that radical right Euroscepticism can be conceptualised in terms of three patterns, points to the fact that the European issue is not assimilated into historical party ideological frameworks and long-standing party commitments on political agendas. The broader findings of the thesis point to the fact that traditional cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Marks and Wilson 2000) is unable to account for, or predict, different types of European argumentation within a specific party family.

A party’s ideological background can be a broad predictor of general party trends in terms of their European argumentation. It can predict that radical right and radical left parties tend to oppose European integration whereas Socialist and Christian Democrat
parties are likely to support the EU project. When examining intra-party family differences, however, the value of this variable is rather weak. Other predictors of party-based Euroscepticism, including the national context and party strategic objectives within the domestic party system may have stronger explanatory power. This is especially true for radical right parties. Given that nationalism is core to their ideology, their European position may be largely influenced by the national context. Based on this, the wider argument of the thesis is that party positions on Europe are related to the endogeneity of the party system and the dynamics of inter party competition. Party type and a party’s wider aims and objectives in the domestic party system determine its position on European integration. The particularities of the national context affect how a party will choose to discuss the European issue at home and to what extent it will choose to politicise it. Like others, radical right parties use the issue of Europe in their discursive toolkit for political purposes relevant to their domestic agenda.

In particular, one of the main findings of this project is that radical right party response to Europe varies as a function of party type, which constitutes the main independent variable of this project. Parties belonging to the same family do not necessarily behave in the same manner. They have a number of tactics in their strategic toolkit, which they use depending on their aims and objectives within their domestic party system. The main three goals parties tend to pursue include policy, votes and office (Strom 1990). Without side-lining any of these goals, parties may prioritise one of them at a given point in time depending on which party type characteristics they predominantly feature.

The thesis has put forward a framework for analysis of radical right Euroscepticism that views parties as strategic actors in their respective party systems. Party type largely influences the structure and content of a party’s domestic agenda, including its discursive strategy towards the European issue and its overall position on European integration. The three main hypotheses, largely confirmed throughout the thesis, differentiate party political behaviour and its influence on a party’s European stance based on whether a party is anti-system, seeks to have a catch-all appeal or strives to become part of the governing cartel.
8.1.1 Anti-system radical right parties and ‘rejectionist’ Euroscepticism

Anti-system parties seek to undermine the legitimacy of the system within which they operate. This is because the core principles of such parties tend to be antithetical with the values of the regime. Thus opposition to the system becomes ‘opposition of principle’ rather than of issues (Sartori and Mair 2005: 118). The ultimate goal for these parties is to be noticed in the party system for their ‘difference’ from the totality of their systemic competitors.

Radical right parties featuring strong anti-system elements adopt a European discourse antagonistic of European integration. Employing the French National Front as its case study, the thesis has shown that radical right anti-system parties criticise the EU in a holistic manner and use the issue of Europe in order to distinguish themselves politically from their competitors. This party type adheres to the idea of an imagined community (Keren 2000: 109) supporting policies unlikely to be implemented. It imagines an impossible reality and their reason for existence lies in trying to realise this ‘utopia’.

Anti-system parties tend to adopt an adversarial strategy towards European integration, which is a position opposite to other parties in the domestic system. The empirical findings of the thesis reveal that adopting an adversarial strategy towards the European issue increases policy divergence and becomes a tool for differentiation in the national political context. A ‘rejectionist’ European position contributes towards the ultimate goal of polarising the debate and attracting the particular segment of the society sympathising with this type of non-conformist views. It becomes a strategic tool for the party in an effort to demonstrate to the electorate that it represents a different, powerful and independent actor in the party system. Such a hard anti-European position lends the party the ability to claim ownership of the European ‘issue’ portraying itself as the only solution to the problems that the society faces.

An anti-system radical right party articulates its anti-European argumentation in a manner unique to its own worldview and dissimilar from all other parties. In the case of the French National Front, the EU has been connected to the wider issue of
globalisation. The EU is blamed for mediating the allegedly dramatic consequences of
globalisation to the nation state.

8.1.2 Catch-all radical right parties and ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism

The catch-all party variant actively seeks to reduce its ideological differences from its
main competitors (Kirchheimer 1966). In this party type, top leadership is strengthened
de-emphasizing ‘specific social-class or denominational clientele’ (Müller 1992: 183).
The party’s ultimate goal is to maximise its votes from among the population at large
without targeting one particular segment of society. Its ideological make-up is rather
versatile adapting to what is perceived to be close to the median voter. In this quest for
vote-maximisation, the political charisma of its leader may be rather important. This is
because the public is not expected to cast its vote on the basis of embedded social
divisions and ideologies, but rather on trust on the party’s ability to contribute to the
efficiency of the political system.

Radical right parties attaching importance to these catch-all characteristics (as opposed
to their anti-system elements) support European integration ‘under conditions’. The
precise formulation of these conditions depends on the issues parties perceive to be
close to the median voter in their respective party systems. Their position on European
integration becomes yet another tool in their quest for vote-maximisation, which has the
potential to ultimately lead to respectability and political entrenchment. To this aim,
these parties avoid radicalising their discourse and seek to accommodate the European
issue within debates that they perceive as being close to the citizens as a whole. They
adopt an ‘accommodative’ discursive strategy towards European integration, which
includes moderating their language on Europe enabling them to construct an image of
closeness to and policy convergence with their mainstream competitors.

The case study of the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally suggested that its ‘conditional’
Euroscepticism was akin to a marketing decision serving to differentiate the party from
both the margins and the mainstream, and to demonstrate that it occupies the middle
ground in Greek politics. The party has made a discursive choice to link the European
issue to that of Greek security concerns in order to appear as the sole ‘guardian’ of Greek national interests at the European level. These issues resonate well within Greek public opinion and are likely to produce higher electoral returns.

8.1.3 Cartel radical right parties and ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism

The cartel party type is ‘characterized by the interpenetration of party and state, and also by a pattern of inter-party collusion’ (Katz and Mair 1995: 17). According to this model, the relevant parties in the system tend to cooperate or ‘collude’ in order to gain privileged access to state regulated channels of communication. As such, this type of party becomes part of the state having access to state subventions both in government and in opposition. These parties engage in ‘limited’ inter-party competition, which ‘takes place on the basis of competing claims to efficient and effective management’ (Katz and Mair 1995: 19).

Radical right parties that actively seek to become part of the governing cartel have different incentives to the above two types. Seeing politics as a profession in itself, they seek to mitigate the consequences of party competition. In this respect, they are incentivised not to adopt controversial or strongly opposing positions. This type of radical right parties put forward a ‘compromising’ position on Europe. They adopt a dismissive strategy towards the EU whereby they tend to downplay the importance of the European issue at the domestic level and avoid openly debating or politicising it. Their criticisms focus on aspects of European integration rather than the European polity as a whole and are usually of a constructive character. A shaky commitment towards the European project allows a cartel radical right party to project an image of support similar to other mainstream centrist conservative parties in Europe ultimately boosting the party’s reputation both at the national and European levels.

The case study of the Italian National Alliance revealed that the party’s conciliatory position on European integration is being used as part of its modernisation process. ‘Compromising’ Euroscepticism became a political device for the party’s leader in his effort to appear as a statesman on an equal footing with other centre-right leaders
abroad, which is seen as potentially increasing the probability of occupying a leading role within the Italian centre-right. In its ultimate quest for office and international respectability, the party has employed the European issue as a tool for its institutional entrenchment and a potential leading role within the government.

8.1.4 The importance of the national context in the parties’ discourse

One of the main findings of this research project is that the national context becomes influential with regards to how a party chooses to debate and/or politicise the European issue at the domestic level. Parties do not discuss the European issue independently. Rather they tend to associate it with other issues that are of domestic relevance and previously integral to their discursive toolkit. Naturally these issues vary from one national context to another, and may be used in association with the European issue in order to enhance aspects of party domestic agenda. What this also tells us about the European issue as a whole is that unless it can be connected with an issue of domestic relevance, it bears limited significance in and by itself.

Within the French National Front, the issue of Europe is inextricably connected to that of globalisation. The EU is seen as a type of regional globalisation. European integration, instead of protecting the European states from the dire consequences of globalisation, is seen as promoting those forces at regional/European level. It is often argued that the entire project is an American fabrication. The party’s anti-EU and anti-globalisation positions enhance its differentiation from the mainstream and facilitate its attempt to portray itself as the only party in France providing a ‘unique’ solution to new issues and problems.

The Popular Orthodox Rally’s position on European integration is linked to issues of Greek security, which are core to its national and European agenda. The party fears that a potential loss of Greek veto power at the EU level may result in a Greek inability to be the decision-maker at the European level on issues of great importance, including Cyprus and Turkey. The party’s ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism provides it with the
opportunity to criticise the other Greek national parties for not ‘uploading’ the Greek national interest with regards to foreign and security policies onto the European level.

The Italian National Alliance associates the European project with a potential greater role for Italy on the international arena arguing that Italy should play a dynamic role in international relations through the EU. The party’s ‘compromising’ European argumentation is related to its foreign policy aspirations. The EU is seen as a vehicle to reconstruct the Italian image abroad. The National Alliance is in favour of a strong Europe in international affairs, with Italy leading the way in a dynamic Europe, assuming international responsibilities and inserting itself into the Franco-German axis. Italy should be the driving force within an increasingly important Europe at the world stage by conducting crisis management operations.

8.2 The theme of time in the thesis

In explaining radical right party divergent positions on European integration, this research project has adopted a party-centric strategic approach. The principal argument is that the manner in which parties respond to the EU is related to the dynamics of inter party competition and the parties’ wider agenda in the system. In this argument, the theme of time is very important, as party behaviour involves a dynamic element. Party strategies change over time as a function of party system dynamics. Parties change agendas and shift their positions over time. This depends on whether at a given point in time they prioritise a particular policy, vote-maximisation or entering the governing cartel as well as how they perceive their competitors in the domestic party system.

The case study of the Italian National Alliance has revealed that parties can ‘move boxes’ or ‘categories’ in the typology of radical right Euroscepticism put forward in the thesis depending on what they perceive to be better at a given point in time for their national strategy. This is a case of a Eurosceptic changing its European position over time for instrumental and tactical purposes as part of its wider modernisation process from the neo-fascist MSI into the post-fascist National Alliance. From a relatively hard Eurosceptic position in the 1980s and early 1990s (Conti 2009: 206), the party moved
towards a more conciliatory view of European integration entailing modest support for the project. The MSI recognised the importance of co-operation at the European level but ‘never enthusiastically supported integration because of its fear of loss of national autonomy and independent decision-making’ (Kritzinger, Cavatorta et al. 2004: 958). From mid-1990s onwards, the party changed its European position in a dramatic way expressing a moderate –yet still sceptic– stance towards integration in line with De Gaulle’s notion of ‘Europe of fatherlands’ (Fella and Ruzza 2006: 190). The National Alliance has henceforth put forward a vision of a ‘confederal’ Europe of equal member states against a federal super state (see Chapter 7).

The party has changed its European position as part of its transition from a neo-fascist anti-system party and within the context of the changing dynamics of the Italian party system following the collapse of Christian Democracy at the beginning of the 1990s. In this respect the argument works over time. Rather than providing a static picture, it explains the dynamism of party positions within a framework of domestic constraints and illustrates how these shifting interests impact on parties’ EU position.

8.3 Wider relevance of the thesis

8.3.1 Broader contribution

This thesis has provided a bridge between the literature on party behaviour, radical right parties and the study of Euroscepticism. It has sought to build on the literature on small party political behaviour as well as improve the academic understanding of the wider phenomenon of Euroscepticism through the examination of radical right party opposition to European integration. The identification of four fundamental aspects of European integration is geared towards providing a solution to the wider problem of measuring the dependent variable, i.e. different levels of Euroscepticism. Consistent with previous arguments according to which ‘the issue of European integration provides us with a powerful lens for illuminating new aspects of party competition’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a: 2), the thesis has shown the ways in which party positions on European integration and changes thereof are integral to party system dynamics and
inter-party competition. According to Szczérbia and Taggart ‘those interested in European integration need to understand party competition in member and candidate states and those interested in political parties need to understand the nature of the European issue’ (Szczérbia and Taggart 2008a: 2). This project has provided insights into how different structures of party competition across European countries impact on the European issue dimension.

The thesis has also conducted a systematic comparison of radical right party policies and preferences across the European space. This has contributed to a more rigorous understanding of the radical right, provided insights into ‘the boundedness’ of this party family as well as ‘how some issues are emphasised in some settings but not in others, or some others are prioritised by some types of parties but not others’ (Treschel and Mair 2009: 2). It has contributed to the development of an explanatory framework of different levels of Euroscepticism within party families by linking a party’s position on European integration to its principle aims and objectives within its domestic party system. In an age of wider popular de-alignment and post-materialist tendencies, party stances are more likely to be associated with their wider interests at the national level rather than entrenched and somewhat ‘outdated’ political ideologies. This is especially true with regards to right-wing radical parties as their ideology is often influenced by the national context.

8.3.2 Generalisability of the model

This thesis has put forward a framework of analysing party-based Euroscepticism in terms of three patterns and an explanation of parties belonging to each pattern as a function of party competition. Although the proposed model is by no means universal, a further analysis of other party families’ European positions could be instrumental in illustrating its wider applicability.

This model of analysis can also be extended to other party families including, among others, the conservatives and the communists. This however, is true with a caveat. The definition of Europe may need to be refined in order to apply to other party families. For
instance, whereas the European conservatives have—similarly to the radical right—a cultural definition of Europe, parties with a communist ideology tend mostly to define Europe as a geographical space employing a particular type of economic model, that of Western capitalism.

A short study of parties belonging to the above party families reveals that the framework of Euroscepticism has the potential to be widely applicable and is relevant to our understanding of other party families’ European positions (see table 8.1 below).

**Table 8.1** Wider applicability of the framework of Euroscepticism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Position</th>
<th>Conservatives</th>
<th>Communists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rejectionist</td>
<td>UK Independence party</td>
<td>Greek Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional</td>
<td>Movement for France</td>
<td>French Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromising</td>
<td>Dutch Christian Union</td>
<td>Progressive Party of Working People</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regards to the Conservatives, the three parties above share broad conservative ideological features including support for law and order, social stability, family values and the preservation of national culture. They stress the significance of an organic society, preferring continuity rather than change, attach importance to private property and are highly nationalistic. Certainly, the importance of religion features much more prominently in the agenda of the Dutch Christian Union. These three parties are also small in terms of size and broadly share the same levels of electoral success. Although the above parties share broad ideological characteristics, they have adopted dissimilar positions on European integration. More precisely, UKIP supports British withdrawal arguing that the EU holds Britain back in the world and is alien to the British political system. The French Movement for France only supports a ‘multiple-speed’ Europe of the nations contending that European integration impacts on member states’ sovereignty. Decision-making must be intergovernmental among European states cooperating freely. The Dutch Christian Union adopts a milder attitude compared to the other two parties. It opposes a federal Europe maintaining that more policies should be dealt with at the national level creating a power balance between the EU and its member
states. It nevertheless accepts the current EU framework and is willing to reform the system from within.

As far as the communist party family is concerned, the Greek, French and Cypriot parties broadly share the principles of communist ideology. They all adhere to a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the society and the economy. Class is rather important in their ideological toolkit arguing that workers should be given more rights and that capitalism must be contained. Whereas both the French and Greek Communist Parties are rather small in size and electoral success, the Cypriot Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) has progressively become rather large and electorally successful. Its General Secretary, Dimitris Christofias, was elected as President of the Republic of Cyprus in 2008 and was the President of the House of Representatives from 2001 to 2008. These three Communist Parties have adopted rather dissimilar European positions. The Greek Communist Party openly advocates Greek withdrawal from the EU equating the latter to capitalist forces exploiting the working class. The French Communist Party does not support French EU withdrawal. It accepts that European states should cooperate but the EU is associated with a neo-liberal free market economic model alien to the French ‘socialist’ tradition. It would support the EU under the ‘condition’ that the latter would adopt a more socialist outlook. Lastly, AKEL has come to terms with the fact that Cyprus’ future is inextricably linked to European integration and as a result has supported the country’s EU entry. The party has accepted to play by the ‘rules of the game’ viewing participation in the EU structures as an opportunity to assert the communist view of a social Europe against neo-liberalism.

The ‘rejectionist’ approach to European integration of both UKIP and the Greek Communist Party is integral to both parties’ anti-systemic elements. They both advocate a political system largely dissimilar to the current British and Greek systems; their discourse seems to draw resources from an idealist perspective of their respective polities. The French Communist Party, in sharp contrast to the above two parties, has discarded its anti-system credentials adhering to the principles of the workings of the French ‘system’ especially following its participation in Mitterand’s government at the beginning of the 1980s. The Movement for France is a conservative splinter party founded by Philippe de Villiers who defected from the French centre-right on the issue
of the Maastricht Treaty. The party has often co-operated with and openly supported the policies of the centre-right Union for a Popular Movement and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy. These two parties appear unable to adopt a hard position on Europe as a result of their position in the party system. In this respect, a ‘conditional’ Eurosceptic stance becomes a function of their wider aim of integrating in the political system. The ‘compromising’ position on European integration of both the Dutch Christian Union and the Cypriot AKEL can be seen as related to their office-seeking/cartel aspirations. Both parties have participated in government with a high-status role. The Dutch Christian Union occupied the prestigious position of Defence Minister in the Cabinet Balkenende IV. Following the 2009 elections, the party left the smallish Independence and Democracy Group in order to join the new European Conservative and Reformists EP group led by large and successful parties including the British Conservatives and the Polish Law and Justice Party.

8.4 Directions for future research

Building on the above suggestions regarding the wider applicability of this study’s analytical model and theoretical argument, future research may be directed towards conducting a systematic analysis of European positions of other party families and the ways in which these relate to party strategies within the context of party system dynamics. Therefore, a rigorous analysis of other party families’ European positions has the potential of being highly informative with regards to both among and within party family differences. The above section has solely given a rough indication of how the thesis’ argument may apply to communist and conservative parties. Further research is needed, however, to answer the question for instance of ‘why have some communist parties retained their Marxist-Leninist rhetoric whereby the EU is rejected as an ‘accomplice’ to global capitalism whereas others have decided to participate in the project and try to ‘change it from within’?

It would be interesting to examine what issues parties connect to the European issue and whether a pattern exists either among or within party families. Are some issues emphasised more in some contexts or by some types of parties rather than others? For
instance, two out of the three case studies of the thesis have linked the European issue to an aspect of their national foreign and security policy. It would be elucidating to assess whether this connection is mostly predominant in the parties of the right or whether in some shape or form it exists within the parties of the left. Europe, being outside of the domestic arena, by definition belongs to the realm of a nation-state’s foreign policy. In this respect, since radical right parties focus on the nation’s territorial integrity, it is not very surprising to note that the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally and the Italian National Alliance view Europe within this wider foreign policy agenda. However, it may be the case that national foreign policy is also of increasing importance within other party families. Building on this, it would also be useful to see whether this connection only exists in parties that do not have an anti-system character. The author’s expectation is that anti-system parties, either on the left or on the right-wing side of the political spectrum, are likely to connect the European issue with globalisation and its dire consequences with regards to openness of either social or economic borders. On the other hand, during an age of increasing European influence on domestic politics and policy-making, parties prioritising office or votes at the domestic level are likely to connect Europe to a criticism of a mostly practical character rather than one concerning the ‘polity’.

Furthermore, the model for analysing Euroscepticism based on four indicators, including definition, principle, practice and future may also be extended to measure other novel issue dimensions such as the environment. Conceptually, a party’s position on environmental change may be measured as a function of whether the party supports/rejects the principle of cooperation on environmental issues; whether it supports the current legal ‘practice’ of various treaties and conventions regulating the interaction of humans and their natural environment; and the ‘future’ governing of environmental practice.

Future research may also be directed towards collecting further primary source material. Although there is no evidence to suggest that the thesis’ interpretation of radical right Euroscepticism is distorted because of lack of material, it would be highly useful to conduct more interviews, especially in the case of the National Alliance. Additionally, evidence provided in this study is inevitably limited with regards to ‘key’ politicians’
motives and preferences. Collecting evidence from party rank-and-file members could allow the researcher to compare and contrast whether there exists a difference of opinion on Europe between the party in central office and the party in public office on the one hand and the party on the ground on the other. Research has thus far shown that party elite positions tend to be less rigid compared to those of the party members and that there may be a divergence between party members and their elected representatives (Bochel and Denver 1983; Panebianco 1988). It would be thus interesting to see whether party members tend to adopt a more negative position on European integration compared to elected politicians. Thus far research has hinted that the leader of the Italian National Alliance tends to proceed in decision-making without fully consulting the party as a whole (Fella 2006; Ruzza and Fella 2009). It would thus be rather informative to see whether Fini’s participation in the Convention for the Future of Europe was an act endorsed by party members. Or whether, by contrast, Fini went beyond the wishes of party members in order to increase his party’s and his own personal status abroad. An analysis of the National Front members’ positions on Europe has the potential to show whether Jean Marie Le Pen’s inflexibility towards the EU project is matched by the rank-and-file elements of the party. Particularly during an age of international and European interconnectedness, what the National Front is proposing seems to be an unlikely scenario that may or may not be shared by party members.

Lastly, it would be instructive to assess the extent to which domestic mainstream parties influence radical right positions on European integration; in particular whether the direct party competition with their main party rivals on the right has some bearing on their Euroscepticism. In the three case studies of this research project, the European positions of the national mainstream centre-right political forces vary to some extent. The National Front may be responding to a somewhat Eurosceptic Gaullist strategy whereas the ‘accommodating’ stance of the Popular Orthodox Rally may be couched with reference to a historically pro-European New Democracy. This was broadly the conclusion of the spatial analysis conducted in Chapter 4, which showed that the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally is situated comparatively closer to the centre-right New Democracy. Lastly, Fini’s consensual but constantly shifting ‘compromising’ position may be a function of Berlusconi’s inconsistent approach to Europe. In an age of waning
ideologies, it becomes increasingly important to study party system interactions and how these impact on wider party positioning.

**Conclusion**

In theory, right-wing radicalism and European integration are incompatible. Radical right ideology consists of interconnected ideas professing a commitment to the nation, authoritarian values and anti-elitism. The EU’s supranational institutions serve ‘to undermine constructs and values, such as the nation-state, national identity, state sovereignty, deeply embedded roots and national belonging’ (Hainsworth 2008: 82). In addition, the EU as a system also defined by its policies has a liberal –as opposed to authoritarian– character having taken a concrete stance on issues including European citizenship and access to rights, pluralistic decision-making structures, cultural tolerance and social inclusiveness demonstrated for instance by the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights. However, rather interestingly, radical right parties do not oppose European integration to the same extent. In fact, their strategies towards Europe are dissimilar and have been ‘governed by different national considerations’ (Featherstone 1988: 339).

This thesis has shown that radical right parties politicise the European issue in a different manner despite their broad similarities and commitment to cross-national radical right ideological features. Parties put forward a different argumentation with regards to the European issue conditional upon party type and the national context within which they operate. Moreover, radical right parties oppose Europe to differing extents and for reasons constitutive of their political environment. This research project views these parties’ dissimilar stance on the European project through the prism of different party competition dynamics within each political system.

These findings suggest that, in understanding both the process of European integration and the driving forces of party-based Euroscepticism, one needs to consider the national context. Radical right parties contest Europe differently based on the dynamics of their domestic environment. It becomes increasingly problematic ‘to talk in universal terms
about a single contest over European integration’ (Taggart 2006: 20). The way in which each party utilises the European issue in its discourse seems to increasingly become ‘independent’ from the EU system itself. It is couched instead within its overall strategy in the domestic party system. This disparate response seems to be formulated as part of each party’s response to the electoral competition dilemma (Kitschelt 1999) that winning office, gaining votes or pushing for a particular policy may involve altering their European position. This finding has important implications for the EU. In the presence of parties using the European issue for party political purposes integral to their national context, various EU strategies to involve Europeans, including the European Citizens’ Initiative introducing a new form of public participation, may prove to be largely ineffective.

More generally, and with regards to the study of European Politics, this thesis points to the fact that it is rather hard to understand the process of European integration and the various occurrences of support for, or opposition to, the project without unpacking the domestic politics of each member state and the patterns of party competition within the different European political systems. Concurrently, students of Comparative Politics increasingly need to consider the process of European integration in their analysis. Given that the EU’s capacity has reached 27 members to date and the EU institutions are increasingly growing, this exercise is becoming ever more challenging for the student of both European and Comparative politics. This research project can thus be seen as a step towards the greater analysis of the interaction between the EU and the national level.
List of appendices

Appendix 1: Raw data for each party

European Election Study estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>LR Gen (-100 to +100)</th>
<th>Pro-Anti EU (-100 to +100)</th>
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<tr>
<td>For Fatherland and Freedom</td>
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<td>11.90</td>
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<tr>
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Chapel Hill estimates

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<th>Pro-Anti EU (1 to 10)</th>
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Appendix II: Results from the computerised content analysis

FRANCE

France: Pro – Anti European integration dimension

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<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Raw Score</th>
<th>Transformed score</th>
<th>Transformed SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence interval</th>
<th>% of Total Words Scored</th>
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France: Libertarian – Authoritarian dimension

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<th>Transformed SE</th>
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France: Socialist – Capitalist dimension

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<td>4.5566 - 5.5441</td>
<td>94.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF/MoDem</td>
<td>4.0751</td>
<td>5.0453</td>
<td>0.2840</td>
<td>4.4772 - 5.6134</td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>4.0181</td>
<td>3.3645</td>
<td>0.2762</td>
<td>2.8121 - 3.9168</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERTS</td>
<td>3.9536</td>
<td>1.4609</td>
<td>0.1199</td>
<td>1.2210 - 1.7007</td>
<td>94.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>3.9439</td>
<td>1.1748</td>
<td>0.2084</td>
<td>0.7580 - 1.5917</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

France: General Left – Right dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Raw Score</th>
<th>Transformed score</th>
<th>Transformed SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence interval</th>
<th>% of Total Words Scored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>4.9924</td>
<td>11.0744</td>
<td>0.2243</td>
<td>10.6258 - 11.5231</td>
<td>95.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMP</td>
<td>4.7524</td>
<td>5.0657</td>
<td>0.2919</td>
<td>4.4509 - 5.6385</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF/MoDem</td>
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<td>4.9676</td>
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<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
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<td>3.6389</td>
<td>0.3250</td>
<td>2.9889 - 4.2889</td>
<td>96.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>VERTS</td>
<td>4.6181</td>
<td>1.6872</td>
<td>0.1477</td>
<td>1.3919 - 1.9826</td>
<td>94.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>4.6312</td>
<td>2.0159</td>
<td>0.2451</td>
<td>1.5257 - 2.5060</td>
<td>96.7</td>
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</table>

Note that confidence interval includes the value of zero. This however, is not a problem for this statistical analysis as the confidence interval does not convey the results of a t-test. In the example above, we know that the transformed score is close to the value of zero.
### Greece: Pro – Anti European integration dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Raw Score</th>
<th>Transformed score</th>
<th>Transformed SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence interval</th>
<th>% of Total Words Scored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td>3.9805</td>
<td>4.1363</td>
<td>0.0800</td>
<td>3.9762 – 4.2963</td>
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<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>3.9813</td>
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<td>0.0807</td>
<td>4.2414 – 4.5641</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>3.9910</td>
<td>7.7182</td>
<td>0.2145</td>
<td>7.2892 – 8.1473</td>
<td>99.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYN</td>
<td>3.9778</td>
<td>3.1990</td>
<td>0.1104</td>
<td>2.9782 – 3.4199</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>3.9697</td>
<td>0.4440</td>
<td>0.1980</td>
<td>0.0480 – 0.8400</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Greece: Libertarian – Authoritarian dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
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<th>Transformed score</th>
<th>Transformed SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence interval</th>
<th>% of Total Words Scored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td>4.9419</td>
<td>7.1781</td>
<td>0.0684</td>
<td>7.0413 – 7.3150</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>4.6842</td>
<td>4.2048</td>
<td>0.0651</td>
<td>4.0745 – 4.3351</td>
<td>92.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>4.3038</td>
<td>-0.1829</td>
<td>0.0585</td>
<td>-0.2999 – -0.0659</td>
<td>85.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SYN</td>
<td>4.7433</td>
<td>4.8865</td>
<td>0.0974</td>
<td>4.6917 – 5.0814</td>
<td>92.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>4.9752</td>
<td>7.5618</td>
<td>0.0970</td>
<td>7.3678 – 7.7557</td>
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</table>

### Greece: Socialist – Capitalist dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
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<th>Transformed score</th>
<th>Transformed SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence interval</th>
<th>% of Total Words Scored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td>3.4263</td>
<td>5.5406</td>
<td>0.0521</td>
<td>5.4364 – 5.6448</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>3.4915</td>
<td>6.2011</td>
<td>0.0514</td>
<td>6.0984 – 6.3038</td>
<td>92.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>3.1951</td>
<td>3.1978</td>
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<tr>
<td>SYN</td>
<td>3.0644</td>
<td>1.8735</td>
<td>0.0822</td>
<td>1.7091 – 2.0380</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>2.7967</td>
<td>-0.8390</td>
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<td>-1.0552 – -0.6229</td>
<td>93.0</td>
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</table>

### Greece: General Left – Right dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Raw Score</th>
<th>Transformed score</th>
<th>Transformed SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence interval</th>
<th>% of Total Words Scored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td>4.1481</td>
<td>7.8198</td>
<td>0.0769</td>
<td>7.6660 – 7.9736</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>4.0569</td>
<td>6.7411</td>
<td>0.0683</td>
<td>6.6045 – 6.8777</td>
<td>92.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>3.7245</td>
<td>2.8087</td>
<td>0.0600</td>
<td>2.6888 – 2.9287</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYN</td>
<td>3.7143</td>
<td>2.6888</td>
<td>0.1145</td>
<td>2.4599 – 2.9177</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>3.4014</td>
<td>-1.0131</td>
<td>0.1523</td>
<td>-1.3178 – -0.7084</td>
<td>93.0</td>
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</table>
ITALY

Italy: Pro – Anti European integration dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Raw Score</th>
<th>Transformed score</th>
<th>Transformed SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence interval</th>
<th>% of Total Words Scored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left Coalition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IdV</td>
<td>3.7945</td>
<td>0.6420</td>
<td>0.3760</td>
<td>-0.1100 1.3941</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>4.1709</td>
<td>5.5910</td>
<td>0.1525</td>
<td>5.2860 5.8959</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right Coalition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IdV</td>
<td>3.7945</td>
<td>0.6420</td>
<td>0.3760</td>
<td>-0.1100 1.3941</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>4.1709</td>
<td>5.5910</td>
<td>0.1525</td>
<td>5.2860 5.8959</td>
<td>95.3</td>
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</table>

Italy: Libertarian – Authoritarian dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Raw Score</th>
<th>Transformed score</th>
<th>Transformed SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence interval</th>
<th>% of Total Words Scored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left Coalition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IdV</td>
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<td>0.7560</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
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<td>5.9632</td>
<td>0.3288</td>
<td>5.3056 6.6208</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right Coalition</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IdV</td>
<td>4.5940</td>
<td>-0.3838</td>
<td>0.7560</td>
<td>-1.8958 1.1281</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>4.9340</td>
<td>5.9632</td>
<td>0.3288</td>
<td>5.3056 6.6208</td>
<td>95.3</td>
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Italy: Socialist – Capitalist dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Raw Score</th>
<th>Transformed score</th>
<th>Transformed SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence interval</th>
<th>% of Total Words Scored</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left Coalition</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Right Coalition</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IdV</td>
<td>4.3111</td>
<td>-0.8309</td>
<td>0.9099</td>
<td>-2.6506 0.9889</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>4.6082</td>
<td>5.6597</td>
<td>0.3992</td>
<td>4.8614 6.4580</td>
<td>95.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Italy: General Left – Right dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Raw Score</th>
<th>Transformed score</th>
<th>Transformed SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence interval</th>
<th>% of Total Words Scored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left Coalition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IdV</td>
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<tr>
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<td>95.3</td>
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<td><strong>Right Coalition</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IdV</td>
<td>4.4037</td>
<td>-0.4016</td>
<td>0.7365</td>
<td>-1.8745 1.0713</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>4.7211</td>
<td>5.6093</td>
<td>0.3155</td>
<td>4.9783 6.2404</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix III: Content analysis of MEP speeches

In order to compare MEP speeches across the three case studies, the thesis has employed the research tradition of content analysis. This is a technique for compressing large amounts of text into categories in a systematic manner. It is a way to provide a quantitative description of an otherwise long text. Content analysis is an ‘empirically grounded method, exploratory in process, and predictive or inferential in intent’ (Krippendorff 2004: xvii) used to make valid and replicable inferences from texts. It provides an indication of the salience or the absence of specific key issues/characteristics in a text but the inferences drawn from the analysis are context-dependent. This method is inherently quantitative. Its purpose is to ‘identify and count the occurrence of specific characteristics of dimensions of texts, and through this, to be able to say something about the messages, images, representations of such texts and their wider significance’ (Anders 1998). Since this type of analysis is ‘useful for examining trends and patterns in documents’ (Stemler 2001), it has been adopted for the purpose of processing MEP speeches.

The two main approaches to content analysis are emergent versus a priori coding (Stemler 2001) or inductive versus deductive (Elo and Kyngs 2008) or conventional versus directed (Hsieh and Shannon 2005) coding. On the one hand, inductive or emergent or conventional content analysis is used when the main aim of the study is to describe a phenomenon (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1279), particularly in cases where literature is scarce. On the other hand, a priori or deductive or directed content analysis is preferred when ‘existing theory or prior research exists about a phenomenon’ (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1281) and is rather useful when testing an existing theory (Elo and Kyngs 2008). Practically, one of the main differences between the two approaches to content analysis lies in the identification of key concepts or variables relevant to the analysis. Key themes are identified during the analysis in the first approach whereas before the analysis in the latter approach.

The choice of the specific type of approach depends on ‘the theoretical and substantive interests of the researcher’ (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1277). Given that (1) the purpose of the analysis of MEP speeches is largely exploratory and descriptive; and that (2) to the knowledge of the researcher this type of analysis has not been previously conducted, the thesis follows the conventional approach to content analysis in the study of MEP
speeches. As a result of this methodological choice, the categories of themes vary across cases. This enables the researcher to compare and contrast the occurrence of themes as well as the relative salience or absence of themes across cases.

In this research, the main unit of analysis is MEP speeches. These have been found in a text from on the EP’s online archives at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/. The analysis produced words and phrases into semantic categories, namely groups of content sharing a commonality, which are both internally homogenous and externally heterogeneous (Graneheim and Lundman 2004: 107). In defining and creating descriptive constructs/categories, the author has identified the recurring themes within each speech by order of appearance. More than one themes may occur within one speech. The analysis has focused on the manifest content of each speech, i.e. the visible and obvious components of the speech. It has, additionally, concentrated on the latent content of each speech, which involves ‘an interpretation of the underlying meaning of the text’ (Graneheim and Lundman 2004: 106). Thus in interpreting the content of the speeches, the analysis has sought to establish whether the references were of a positive or of a negative character aiming to describe how each party’s MEPs approach the wider phenomenon of European integration in their speeches.

This method produced a set of proportions which constitute the primary findings in terms of the centrality of issues in MEP speeches. The findings are represented in the form of percentages, with the latter representing the ratio of occurrences of a particular category. The data have been organised and coded manually by the researcher using NVIVO, a data analysis software.

This analysis has been complemented by a simple word frequency count in order to test whether the author’s findings in terms of occurrence of themes paint a similar picture to the occurrence of words within the speeches. It must be pointed out, however, that some words carry multiple meanings and thus the results from the word frequency count must be treated with caution.
Appendix IV: National Front Presidential Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Presidential Elections</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>190,921</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>4,376,742</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4,570,838</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 (1st round)</td>
<td>4,804,772</td>
<td>16.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 (2nd round)</td>
<td>5,525,034</td>
<td>17.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3,834,530</td>
<td>10.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*In 1981, the National Front’s leader did not attain the 500 signatures of elected representatives required to run for the Presidency

Appendix V: Frequency of words matrix (French National Front)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borders</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs (douane &amp; tariff)</td>
<td>105 &amp; 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolkestein Directive</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schengen</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlargement</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Constitution</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chirac</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarkozy</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)
Appendix VI: LAOS Electoral Results

LAOS’ National Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Elections</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>162,103</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>271,809</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>386,152</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Greek Home Affairs Ministry (www.ypes.gr)*

LAOS’ European Parliament Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Elections</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>252,429</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>366,637</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Greek Home Affairs Ministry (www.ypes.gr)*

Appendix VII: The sociology of LAOS’ voters


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status of LAOS voters</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employer/Business person</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed/Farmer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-employed/Free professional</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed/Craftsman</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector employee</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector employee</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector pensioner</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector pensioner</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private landlord</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: VPRC 2009 EP elections Exit Poll*

Education level of LAOS voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>9</td>
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*Source: VPRC 2009 EP elections Exit Poll*
Age of LAOS voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Bracket</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 +</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: VPRC 2009 EP elections Exit Poll

Appendix VIII: Frequency of words matrix (Greek Popular Orthodox Rally)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Constitution</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolkestein Directive</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schengen</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlargement</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM (Skopje &amp; Macedonia)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borders</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EP online archives (author's calculations)
Appendix IX: Frequency of words matrix (Italian National Alliance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borders</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schengen</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlargement</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prodi</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy &amp; global</td>
<td>33 &amp; 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)*
Appendix X: List of interviewees

French National Front

1. Bruno Gollnisch – February 18th 2009 (executive vice-President and MEP)
2. Lydia Schenardi – October 29th 2009 ((Member of the political office and former MEP)
3. Thibaut de la Toconaye – February 3rd 2010 (Member of the political office)
4. Wallerand de Saint Just – February 4th 2010 (Treasurer)
5. Jean Pierre Reveau – February 5th 2010 (Member of the political office)
6. Catherine Salagnac – February 5th 2010 (Member of the political office)
7. Dominique Martin – February 18th 2010 (Member of the political office)
8. Ludovic de Danne – March 5th 2010 (National Front consultant and Paris regional elections candidate)

Greek Popular Orthodox Rally

1. Asterios Rontoulis, April 8th 2009 (MP)
2. Alexandros Chrisanthakopoulos – April 8th 2009 (MP post-2009 Legislative elections)
3. Elias Polatidis, April 8th 2009 (MP)
4. Makis Voridis – April 10th 2009 (General Secretary of LAOS’ Parliamentary Team, MP)
5. Georgios Georgiou, April 13th 2009 (MEP 2007-2009)
6. Spyridon-Adonis Georgiadis, June 12th 2009 (MP)
7. Costantinos Aivaliotis, April 13th 2009 (MP)

Italian National Alliance

1. Christiana Muscardini – November 18th 2009 (MEP)
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Voridis, M. (2009). "[General Secretary of LAOS's Parliamentary Team and LAOS MP] Interview (10 April)."