The London School of Economics and Political Science

Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s Policy towards the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union

Anna Wielopolska

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the PhD degree, London March 2013
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Abstract

Germany’s support for the Eastern enlargement of the European Union was a key factor in the successful completion of this idea in 2004. Germany’s policy towards the enlargement was, however, ambivalent and for this reason perceived as controversial. This thesis examines and explains the reasons of this paradox.

German policy makers endorsed the idea of the Eastern enlargement of the EU for the reasons deriving from the national identity, based on a history-related narrative, and from the fact of the successful unification of Germany. As Chancellor Helmut Kohl captured it — the unification of Germany and the unification of Europe were two sides of the same coin.

Eastern enlargement was, however, a novel idea and was changing the existing European order and concepts of the European integration. It faced therefore powerful constraints both in the shape of still existing, though declining, Cold War structural grip, as well as of the conflicting with the enlargement interests of other member state of the EU and domestic economic preferences and interests. It caught German policy makers between powerful and mutually conflicting challenges and faced them with a need to choose strategic priorities for the foreign policy.

The choice was continuity of multilateralism, the principle of the foreign policy of the West Germany. This choice turned the enlargement policy into one of the premises of the grand strategy of the German Europapolitik. Examining the ambivalence in the enlargement policy allows not only to explain its causes but also to observe a process of changing the concept of the European integration.

This doctoral thesis is a result of the research conducted at the London School of Economics and Political Science under the supervision of Prof. William Wallace and Dr. Ulrich Sedelmeier.

The author is thankful for the advice and help of both Supervisors.
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INTRODUCTION

Germany’s support for the Eastern enlargement of the European Union was a key factor in the successful completion of this idea in 2004. Yet Germany’s policy towards the enlargement used to be perceived as ambivalent and for this reason controversial. Advocacy for widening the Union, so strongly voiced by German government politicians on the European stage, used to be accompanied by strong contradictions: the rhetoric of the commitment was in conflict with the lack of specific agenda, delays in setting it, and frequently uncompromising stance of German negotiators over the enlargement’s terms and conditions. Germany was seen as a leading force that placed the enlargement on the EU agenda, but at the same time its policy was perceived as half-hearted, and German policy makers as delaying the process by postponing the pledged actions or insisting on the terms of the accession, which the East Europeans found hard to accept.

This represents a paradox that so far has not been analysed and explained in a satisfactory way. Germany has been recognised in the IR scholarship as the main supporter of the enlargement, and majority of the professional literature on this subject depicts driving factors of the German enlargement policy, thus the reasons behind Germany’s endorsement of the enlargement, while the ambivalence in this policy received comparatively little attention. This leaves the picture of this policy incomplete.

Ambivalence in the foreign policy raises mistrust among state’s partners. Foreign policy when ambivalent translates into perception of a state as unpredictable, uncertain and unreliable. It is useful and important therefore to uncover reasons of such ambivalence in regards to any state, but it is of a very special meaning in regards to Germany, for three reasons. First — because Germany is recognised as a power, the most powerful European nation-state thus a regional power. Secondly — because Germany is perceived as the leading state in the European Union. Thirdly — because the main thrust
of Germany’s post-war foreign policy had been reliability of a predictable, responsible and cooperative partner, and maintaining this feature was desired by majority of German political elites after the unification of their country.

Rarely in a democratic system such as in Germany, a process of policymaking, be it a domestic or foreign, is free of internal differences, conflicts and contradictions. Hammering out an ultimate outcome is the essence of the policymaking in democracy. If however the outcome of this process, the policy, when implemented, causes an impression and perception of ambivalence, it suggests this policy contains elements of ambivalence. Such ambivalence has been recognised and acknowledged in the German enlargement policy by analysts, and in the German EU policy more generally too\(^1\), yet there has been no sufficiently clear and comprehensive explanation of this phenomenon.

The existing analyses of Germany’s enlargement policy that touch upon the issue of the ambivalence indicate that it stems from two conflicting sets of factors. The support was based on historical obligations German elites felt towards Eastern Europe and calculation of material and security gains that would result from stabilization of the region. As indicated it was conflicted with a set of economic interests of domestic provenience that were adverse to the enlargement\(^2\). First set of such interests related to the costs of the enlargement, which German government, due to the strained by the unification financial capacity, wanted to spread out on other member states. The other interests were those advocated by specific interest groups such as German farmers or workers’ unions, who were trying to preserve their economic status quo in the EU, while the enlargement was expected to alter the established arrangements\(^3\). One notable


\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Collins, *German Policy-Making….*, op.cit; there is also a vast literature on the economic conditions of the Eastern enlargement of the EU, e.g. Michael Dauderstädt, *Can the Democracies of East-Central Europe Cope with the Double Impact of Transformation and*
analysis explored the issue of the ambivalence in the German enlargement policy deeper, indicating that it resulted from the specificity of the German policymaking that relies on the dispersion of the process\textsuperscript{4} and opening participation to a wide range of domestic actors. These actors promote various preferences and interests, making it difficult for the government to establish and run a clearly stated and unwavering policy, which creates an impression of indecisiveness and ambiguity.

As much as those lines of reasoning point to valid phenomena, neither provides a sufficient explanation of the ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement. These accounts, despite pointing to very important constraints to the enlargement, are too narrow to explain ambivalence in such a complex policy like on the admission of new members into the political-economic framework of the EU. First occurrence of the ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy is observable at the moment of the introducing this idea, during the negotiations over Germany’s unification. The unification was a political process, during which practically the only domestic interest of Germany was a goal of unifying two countries. That suggests that the constraints that created first manifestation of ambivalence in the German enlargement policy were not of domestic provenience or economic character.

The process of the enlargement lasted for 14 years and so did the German enlargement policy. This policy had its own dynamic and the ambivalence in this policy reflects this dynamic, raising the question of what interests at what stage influenced Germany’s stance on the enlargement, what factors hampered the support for the enlargement and how the process unfolded during these 14 years? How did it happen that the official stance of the German governments remained throughout the whole period consistently supportive for the enlargement, despite diverse and conflicting interests that created the ambivalence in the enlargement policy?


\textsuperscript{4} Collins, \textit{German Policy-Making}…, op.cit.
These questions point to a great complexity of this policy and the strength of the concept, while the basic matter, the causes of the ambivalence and origins of the conflicting interests, remain unexplained because answered only partially. The Eastern enlargement policy was a fully-fledged, coherent part of Germany’s European policy, its grand strategy of Europapolitik. The position of Germany in the European Union and the process of the EU enlargement are too meaningful to leave such questions unanswered. They concern fundamentally important issues of the German position in the EU and Germany’s relations with its European partners.

This thesis is therefore going to examine ambivalence in the German policy towards the EU Eastern enlargement and answer the question what caused this ambivalence, what were the reasons for the ambiguities. The argument follows.

THE ARGUMENT

The argument of this thesis is that the constraints to the EU enlargement that created ambivalence in the German policy were not confined to the domestic interests, and these of the domestic provenience were not only of economic character. Ambivalence was created by tension between supportive and opposing interests, embraced simultaneously. Germany’s endorsement of the enlargement is consistent with a number of German identities based on various narratives, e.g. of Civilian Power identity, or European identity of its foreign policy, and they generate various constraining and conflicting factors.

Therefore the claim of this thesis is that while economic interests of domestic origins were certainly important and impacted Germany’s enlargement policy creating ambivalence, but in the late phase of the process, when the terms of the enlargement were already discussed — specifically during the negotiations of the Agenda 2000. But the ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement is observable not only during the final phase of the enlargement process. This policy lasted for 14 years and different stages of the process were shaped by different factors both supportive and conflicting ones, and the clash between the two created ambivalence in Germany’s policy.

The first major constraints to the enlargement that created such ambivalence occurred in the external realm, were of political character, and active already at the
beginning of the preparation for the enlargement, in the early 1990s. They stemmed from the conditions of Germany’s unification and problems in bilateral relations of Germany and its Eastern partners, then occurred as a part of the creation of a new security system in Europe, or as the necessity to maintain old political loyalties or to chose between alternative concepts of the European Union’s development. They all are of political character and unfolded in the first phase of the enlargement process, when the idea of the enlargement was debated by the EU member states. Economic constraints to the enlargement emerged only in the later phase of the process and therefore they represent the second set of factors that created ambivalence in Germany’s policy.

The order this thesis presents manifestations of ambivalence and their causes is not a comparison of their importance; it reflects chronological developments in Germany’s enlargement policy as the research follows the occurrences of ambivalence. Ambivalence in Germany’s policy manifested in different ways at different stages of the enlargement process, and the factors creating those occurrences in some cases overlapped each other. Some of them like Russian implicit opposition declined with the disappearance of the Cold War order, while the French explicit opposition had a much firmer grip over Germany’s enlargement policy. The impact of each of these constraints was different. Political constraints that occurred chronologically first, at the early stage of introducing the enlargement idea, caused ambivalence which is observable in a gap between supportive for the enlargement rhetoric of German actors and lack of follow-up with concrete political actions. Alternative concepts of the European Union development for example resulted in consideration a contradictory to the enlargement direction, while economic constraints resulted in a political bargaining of the enlargement process, both creating ambivalence in Germany’s stance.

As manifestations and causes of the ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy vary, identification and systematization of conflicting factors and concepts, then preferences and interests, is the first step toward untangling the reasons of the ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy.

Ambivalence manifested in three ways:

1. As a gap between supportive rhetoric and lack of corresponding/following actions
2. As actions contradicting the support to the enlargement and/or hindering its progress
3. As a contradictory rhetoric

A perception of the ambivalence was caused by a gap between expectations and lack of delivery of expected results.

Identifying the causes of ambivalence in Germany’s policy is possible by looking at the chronological development of the enlargement policy. It leads to distinguishing two sets of constraining factors and conflicting interests. They organise structure of the thesis.

In the external realm the support for the enlargement was hindered by six main factors:

1. Conditions of Germany’s unification
2. Historical legacy in bilateral relations
3. Bilateral relations with France
4. Deepening the European integration
5. Creation of the new European security system
6. Economic and financial costs of enlargement

In the domestic area the support for the enlargement was hindered by two factors:

7. Exhaustion with costs of the unification
8. Interests of domestic actors interest groups

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| 7. Exhaustion with costs of unification |
| 8. Interests of domestic interest groups |
An underpinning factor of the constraints is supranational characteristic of the European Union. The role of the EU in enlargement policies of the member states, thus Germany’s policy too, is changeable. Its presence impacts these policies because it allows broadening or narrowing a manoeuvre margin, thus allowing a bigger flexibility in changing the course when needed, without the necessity of withdrawing from the prior declarations or pledges.

Both ambivalence and perception of ambivalence are at the core of the paradox of the German enlargement policy. Some of the external factors listed above as hampering the support for the enlargement, generated a supportive reasoning for this project. An example of that is the creation of a new European security order or historical legacy in bilateral relations of Germany and its Eastern neighbours.

The contradictions in these areas could be seen as pro and contra factors, which often occur in foreign policies. In such a case a policy is usually marked by a struggle (or at least a conflict) between the contradictory factors (external or domestic), and policy makers of both sides, pro and contra, are trying to prevail with their own goal (to succeed with an original goal of the policy in case of its proponents, or contrary, to bring this goal down and reverse the policy in case of the opposite party).

In regards to the German enlargement policy, however, applying the pro and contra distinction would not be an accurate supposition. The contra factors not always represented or created the obstacles German policy makers were ‘dealing with’, trying to overcome and eliminate them in order to realise the vision of supporting the enlargement (or giving up and changing the goal under the pressure of the contra factors). There were no struggling parties either. The conflicting with the enlargement factors listed above as the causes of ambivalence represented alternative to the enlargement reasoning, concepts, and options that were adopted, and in some cases actively pursued, and presented as a goal by German policy makers, within the same foreign policy apparatus that simultaneously was lending support to the enlargement.

This constitutes a difference between obstacles on the way to achieving a certain goal of a certain policy, and ambivalence in conducting such a policy. And similarly — between ambivalence and a changing dynamics of the policy, e.g. exhaustion of the
support. In other words ambivalence in this policy shadows the support for the enlargement, it occurs only when there is such a support.

**THE APPROACH**

The claim of this thesis is that ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy was caused by eight listed above factors. Examination of the process, how the ambivalence was created and manifested, represents a dependent variable in this thesis. The analysis will be completed with an explanation how this ambivalence impacted Germany’s ability to influence the EU enlargement process.

The key notion in this research is ambivalence in a conducted policy. It suggests lack of clarity and coherence of such policy. It also comes from the external perception — it was observed that this policy was ambivalent, it was not stated by the authors of this policy that it would be ambivalent. The first question it implies therefore is whether this ambivalence was present in the rhetoric and actions that constituted this policy, thus was this policy conducted in an ambivalent way, or was this ambivalence only a perceived image?

Looking for causes of ambivalence in the German policy leads to uncovering the reasons for the support, and for the simultaneous opposition to the enlargement. Examining the interplay between the two streaks allows first discerning actual ambivalence from perceived one, second — unravelling explicit as well as implicit factors that impacted Germany’s enlargement policy. An example of the latter is an impact of an emerging new European security order. It was never explicitly stated that European politicians should (or could) proceed with the EU enlargement when the concerns over international security had been settled. Yet that is what happened and German policy makers were at the centre of the interplay between these two powerful streams.

The research is primarily empirical and for explaining the findings it employs the two-level game theory of Robert Putnam\(^5\) and draws on the insights from two accounts

social constructivism mainly in the version of Alexander Wendt\textsuperscript{6} and the rationalist approach of liberal intergovernmentalism as designed by Andrew Moravcsik\textsuperscript{7}. Both approaches remain in conceptual opposition as constructivism focuses on normative side of the creation of national interests and preferences, while liberal intergovernmentalism usually emphasises rational, cost-benefits calculation and bargaining of such interests. Both however have been used in the existing analyses of the German European policy and of the European integration and are highly applicable for this analysis.

Finding the causes of ambivalence requires examining interests of Germany, how Germany understands its interests in relation to the enlargement. The explanatory strategy relies thus first and foremost on constructivism. Constructivist perspective is employed in majority analyses of the German European and enlargement policies. They ascribe Germany’s endorsement of the enlargement to normative reasoning of historically motivated obligations. They also explain the fact of sustaining the commitment to deepening the European integration as a result of the ‘European identity’ of the German foreign policy\textsuperscript{8}. A widening-deepening of the European integration tension created in Germany’s enlargement policy, however, one of the manifestations of ambivalence. Both directions were seen as opposing each other. An explanation of this tension needs a further examination of preferences and interest that derive from the concept of Europeanization of the national identity, thus employing the constructivist perspective. Similarly, narratives pertaining to the historical experience that created ambivalence and perception of ambivalence can be analysed as a constructivist inquiry.

Liberal intergovernmentalism in this thesis serves as a complementary perspective. It is successful in explaining European integration, of which enlargement is a part. It is useful for application in this segment of the research, which examines ambivalence created by material interests, motivated by benefits/costs calculation, most often economic and financial. Such interests were at the bottom of national and group


\textsuperscript{7} Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”, \textit{Journal of Common Market Studies}, vol. 31, NO 4, December 1993

\textsuperscript{8} See for example: Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, \textit{Germany’s European Diplomacy}, …op.cit.; Dyson and Goetz (eds), \textit{Germany, Europe}, …op.cit.
policies, and generated both support and opposition to the enlargement. Intergovernmentalism also opens a possibility to examine a bargaining process over such interests, which is intrinsic to the process of European integration. Both economic and financial costs of enlargement, as well as economic and political costs of the German unification were powerful reasons constraining the support for the enlargement. How the tension was created and developed needs to be examined from this perspective.

Despite the fact that ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy manifested in various configurations of conflicting interests that constitute the complexity of the process, this ambivalence represents a constant variable that highlights the change of the concept of the European integration. Therefore an underlying theoretical explanatory variable for this research is a constructivist concept of the changing normative, based on values and ideas, social construct of the international system in Europe.

CONTRIBUTION

The value and contribution of this research lies in empirical explanation of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy, thus in answering the question that had received little attention in the IR scholarship so far. This thesis seeks therefore to address shortcomings in the German enlargement policy’s analyses. Why such an examination is important?

Although the subject of this research is the policy towards the Eastern enlargement of the EU, the meaning of ambivalence of this policy cannot be confined to the relations with the Eastern countries or to the enlargement process. Ambivalence in Germany’s European policies has been observed also on the issue of the Eastern border at the Two Plus Four conference, or in its policy towards NATO expansion, or on the issue of deepening the European integration too9. The research offers therefore a possibility

that its findings will add more generalizable insights into the way German foreign policy is conceptualised, constructed and conducted.

The Eastern enlargement of the European Union was completed to a very high degree thanks to the support of Germany. Germany is seen in the professional studies as one, if not the main ‘driver’ of this policy. There were strong reasons for Germany to endorse the enlargement that translated into the policy of support, but there were also countervailing forces. And while the main thread of this thesis is an examination of the causes of ambivalence in the enlargement policy, the narrative of this thesis is the interaction between two clusters of the driving forces and of constraints. The aim here is to present a difficult path of switching the idea of reunification of Europe through the EU enlargement into political actions and outcomes, i.e. to present it from its beginnings — picking up the idea, through introducing it into the political realm to designing the means necessary for turning it into political actions and to managing the chosen course.

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CHAPTER 1

RESEARCH FOCUS

METHODOLOGY

THEORY

THE ARGUMENT

This chapter presents an organization of the thesis as well as explanatory factors of the argument. The first section defines the focus of this research in the context of the existing literature. The second one presents methodology employed in this research. The third section outlines a theoretical framework and the fourth — the argument and its structure.

The following chapters of the thesis elaborate the argument outlined in this chapter, and correspond overall with the chronological development of the German enlargement policy.

I. RESEARCH FOCUS

The focus of the research is the causes of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. It is thus the enlargement policy that will be investigated with an aim to answer the question about the reasons of ambivalence that occurred in this policy.

This subject received little attention in the IR literature, which while examining Germany’s foreign policy since 1990 concentrated predominantly on the question of how the unification would and did affect the new Germany’s foreign policy — would this policy become more assertive than practised by the Federal Republic, reflecting the
increase of Germany’s power? This question was explored in relation mainly to the European integration and the new concept of the European security. Literature concerning the policy of the new Germany towards the Eastern partners is much more modest, with three works on Germany’s policy towards the EU and NATO enlargement of key importance for this thesis. These are analyses by:

- Adrian Hyde-Price,
- Henning Tewes and
- Stephen D. Collins

The first two authors place Germany’s post-unification Eastern policy within Germany’s grand European strategy. Adrian Hyde-Price points out that the inclusion of the Eastern policy into the Europapolitik was the main alteration in the quality of the relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours. Henning Tewes analysed Germany’s policy towards NATO and EU expansion, testing it against the premises of the Civilian Power. Both authors admit the presence of challenging difficulties in the new Eastern policy but concentrate on its premises and driving factors. Only the third author Stephen D. Collins focuses explicitly on contradictions in Germany’s policy towards the Eastern enlargement. His examination of this policy during the Kohl’s era, through the prism of ‘management of the agenda’, indicated that the contradictions in this policy were caused by the specificity of the German policy-making, which is characterised as a typical bureaucratic system empowered with far reaching prerogatives.

These accounts do not provide sufficient explanation of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy. In order to find such an explanation analysis of the German enlargement policy has to be refocused from the driving forces as a dependent variable, to inquiry about constraints to the driving forces. For this reason the examination will follow a framework of five steps:

1. Finding out what area ambivalence, or perception of ambivalence, occurred in
2. Determining supportive factors relevant to the circumstances of a particular ambivalence — be it national identity, material preferences, expectations of other states or external partners,
3. Identifying opposing/constraining factors causing ambivalence that occurred either in the international or domestic realm — what external partners or
domestic actors demanded of the German government, what interests, potential and perceived opportunities and strategies of those actors were

4. Examining how decision-makers perceived their foreign policy agenda, choices, options and the room of manoeuvre

5. Analyzing the interplay between the supportive factors and constraints and determining the results of the ambivalence, i.e. impact on the enlargement process, its agenda and decision making on the EU level

A foundation of this inquiry is that there was no single reason of Germany’s support for the enlargement. There were several factors constituting this support, and some of them can be identified in terms of normative/ideational values that derive from the German national identity, while others can be approached in terms of rationalist/material preferences based on benefits/costs calculation. These factors were geopolitical, economic and ideological, and differentiation in their origins and character indicates that similarly the constraints hindering the support to the enlargement were also of various origins and character (a detailed argument is presented in the next section of this chapter).

Germany’s policy towards the Eastern enlargement of the European Union considered mainly three countries — Poland, Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic) and Hungary11, which according to German politicians should be in the first round of the enlargement. Some of the constraints that created ambivalence in Germany’s policy concern complex relations with Poland and the Czech Republic (e.g. those in bilateral relations). Germany’s enlargement policy lasted for 14 years. It started at the time of the negotiations over Germany’s unification in 1990, and lasted till the successful completion of the enlargement in 2004. It spanned tenures of two German Chancellors — Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder. Their terms, Helmut Kohl’s from 1989 to 1998, and Gerhard Schröder’s from 1998 to 2005, correspond with two main phases of the enlargement process — of the preparations that lasted till the agreement on the Agenda 2000 that was reached in 1997, and of the negotiations over the entry terms that started afterwards and ended in 2002.

11 Germany was widely perceived as an advocate of inclusion into the EC/EU framework those three countries. See for example: Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order..., op.cit.; Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap..., op.cit.
It is the argument of this thesis that, unlike suggested so far, the major and most powerful factors that caused the ambivalence in the German enlargement policy occurred during the first phase of the process, during Helmut Kohl’s tenure. The focus of this thesis is therefore predominantly on these factors and this phase of the enlargement process.

II. METHODOLOGY

This section demonstrates methodology of the research. It consists of two subsections — the first explains how the research identifies ambivalence and specific factors that were causally relevant as constraints, and the second one presents criteria for the selection of empirical material.

1. Identification of Ambivalence and its Causes

Identification of ambivalence and its causes in the German enlargement policy is possible when following the five-steps framework provided in the first part of this chapter — Research Focus. It needs first finding out how the ambivalence manifested, thus identifying a tension. That leads to determining supportive for the enlargement factors that were relevant to the manifestation of ambivalence — be it national identity, material rationalist preferences, expectations of other states. Accomplishing those two points will allow to discern what constraints countered supportive factors, creating ambivalence, or perception of ambivalence, in the enlargement policy.

Manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy is observable at three junctures — in a gap between supportive rhetoric and lack of following actions; in a gap or mismatch between political declarations and stalling tactics or actions contradicting the support and hindering enlargement’s progress; in a rhetoric of the actors conducting the enlargement policy that is internally contradictory — either contradicting each other’s statements, or a contradictory rhetoric of a single actor. A gap between rhetoric and lack of actions is apparent for example during the period of over three years since Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher declared the support for the enlargement in the years 1989-1990. An example of ambivalence that manifested as a gap between rhetoric and stalling tactics is a tension between two
conflicting concepts of widening and deepening of the European integration. And an example of contradictory rhetoric is noticeable in the rhetoric of Chancellor Schröder, when he declares support for the enlargement and at the same time emphasises the need for Germany to secure economic and financial interests, which are in conflict with the enlargement. These are only examples; the ambivalences in Germany’s enlargement policy this thesis identified and examines are listed in detail in a part presenting the Argument.

2. Material Selection Criteria

The research is based on an investigation of the foreign policy rhetoric and actions and the domestic elites discourse. The former concerns German foreign policy makers, the latter — both policy makers and political experts and commentators. The thesis does not aim at including all public statements of the key actors, but a representative sample. For selection of the material the research employs the following criteria:

1) Who delivers a statement or conducts an action — position and competences of an actor and authority they are invested with,

2) Where, when and to whom a statement is addressed and delivered, or action presented — a forum, time and addressee, e.g. speeches delivered at the Bundestag during sessions on the foreign policy premises, statements made at the EU intergovernmental conferences, signing agreements, treaties or passing resolutions relevant to the subject of the enlargement, expert opinions and views expressed in an elite discourse;

3) Merits, novelty and results of a statement/speech and action, i.e. whether it is denoting of a direction in the foreign policy, and the novelty — whether it represents originality, what response and attention it received.

The repetitive statements and speeches are mentioned, or sometimes quoted, only for the purpose of demonstrating they are not accidental, but signify a direction of the policy, or represent a voice of a wider group. This combination helps to reduce the risk of bias in selecting samples.
The basic is the first set of criteria — for selection of the actors examined in this research. They derive from an organization of the German foreign policymaking system. This system is based on dispersion of power, which results in openness the participation in this process to various actors. This could pose a problem for the material selection. Despite this openness, however, the decision-making in the German foreign policy apparatus belongs mainly to the government executives, i.e. ‘central decision makers’. These central executives, quoting Robert Putnam, whose two-level game theory is employed in this research, ‘have a special role in mediating domestic and international pressures because they are directly exposed to both spheres not because they are united on all issues nor because they are insulated from domestic politics’\(^{12}\). And the structure of the German system with the precise allocating powers to specific actors provides the necessary for the material selection rigor, and naturally eliminates a bias in selection of actors.

(I) Government Actors

German political system has been termed a ‘cooperative federalism’\(^{13}\), in which executive and administrative responsibilities are shared between different levels of government. The basic division is between the federal and Länder. In regards to the representation of the German state in the external realm, scholars usually list five actors:

- Chancellor
- Chancellor’s Office
- Foreign Ministry
- Federal Ministries — usually three more apart the Foreign Ministry — (i) the Finance, (ii) the Economics and (iii) the Food and Agriculture Ministry
- Länder

These actors are usually listed together, but only two of them represent the German state on the international stage in practice. The first is the Chancellor of

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Germany as the ‘government’s chief executive’ (the Bundespräsident has only representative and symbolic competences). The second one is the chief-operator of the Foreign Ministry. Both these actors speak in the name of the German state, representing the Federal Government. All other listed above actors represent the German state in their particular domains. That makes the representation of the German state on the international stage differentiated; none of these actors, however, conducts an independent foreign policy. They all are actively involved in hammering out the foreign policy through coordination of procedures, based on the Rules of Procedure of the Federal Government and the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries\textsuperscript{14}. This process constitutes a ‘cooperative federalism’, which works according to three rules\textsuperscript{15}:

- Policy sectorisation — with ministries preparing policies that are coordinated only at a late stage;
- Incrementalism — when some ministries amend existing domestic policies;
- Consensual relations within policy communities, which is built up between relevant officials and interest groups.

To have a full picture of the system it is useful to quote Peter Katzenstein\textsuperscript{16} who observed that the system works a threefold policy network based on:

- Party system’s preference,
- The need for consensual relation between Bund and Länder,
- Prevalence of quasi-public institutions through which policy-making can be influenced.

The Basic Law provides a legal framework for the system. A condition of ‘consensus building and rationality’ is a requirement for the system to work\textsuperscript{17}, and this is the reason why German democracy is sometimes called a ‘co-ordination democracy’.

\textsuperscript{14} Geschäftsrung der Bundesregierung, GOBReg and Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der BundesMinisterien, GGO. See: BundesMinisterium des Innern, (ed.), loose leaf collection, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer


\textsuperscript{16} Katzenstein, \textit{Policy and Politics in West Germany}…., op.cit.

\textsuperscript{17} Collins, \textit{German Policy-Making}…., op.cit.
Nonetheless it is the Chancellor of Germany as the ‘government’s chief executive’, and the chief-operator of the Foreign Ministry, who are the main actors representing the state on the international stage. They are also responsible, on the basis of the constitutional competences, for creation and conducting the European policy, and policies in the relation to the European Union. The Chancellor is responsible for the formulation of general guidelines on the foreign policy, and the Foreign Minister bears political responsibility for the European integration policy, thus for setting agenda for the European policy of Germany.

Both these actors played a leading role in creation and conducting the enlargement policy. Other government actors, whose voice impacted this policy, are the heads of the Defence Ministry (in relation to the NATO enlargement), of the Finance and Economics Ministries and of the Bundesbank (in relation to the economic and financial aspects of the enlargement). These are the government executives who constitute the state’s foreign policy-making apparatus this research focuses on.

The second group is of non-government actors.

(ii) Non-government Actors

There are three groups of non-government actors, whose contribution to the enlargement policy is examined in this research. The first group is of state non-government actors, and the next two groups are private actors.

Actors of the first group belong to the political system of the state, but unlike the government executives, they do not represent the state externally. They are:

- Political parties,
- Bundestag,
- Bundesrat.

Position and views of political parties are fundamental for the government executives in formulating and conducting foreign policy, including the enlargement policy. Bundestag and Bundesrat represent the legislative branch of the state system.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^\text{18}\) The Bundestag has the right to give opinions on foreign policy towards the basis of the Law on the Ratification of the EEC Treaty of 1957; the Länder governments have the same right in the Bundesrat on the basis of the Art. 23 of the Basic Law which introduced a possibility for Länder for active participation in the formulation of the European policies. See for example: Jürgen Kühn, *Die
and are referred to in the context of passing resolution, ratification of agreements and as platforms for presenting and discussing state policies.

The second group of non-government actors, whose voice is of the key meaning for this research, are German political analysts and experts outside the centres of power, in media, at universities and think tanks. They create a domestic elite discourse on the German national identity, which is a milieu for political choices, actions and strategies. The key for the selection of the elite discourse material — analyses, opinions, comments — is domestic and international reputation of an author, a think-tank, academic centre or media outlet, and the second deciding factor is how representative and influential is a given hypothesis, proposal or analysis.

The third group of non-government actors consists of organised interest groups. Out of numerous organizations in Germany only a few were engaged, or interested in the enlargement policies. Nonetheless they were powerful and their stance impacted the state policy, especially in the second phase, of negotiating the entry conditions of the enlargement. The German Farmers’ Union (Deutscher Bauerverband — DBV) is the first such interest group, the Federation of German Industry (BDI), German Chambers of Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag), German employers associations (BDA) and Trade Union Federation are the other ones. A separate category of interest groups represents organizations of the WWII expellees, such as the Sudeten Germans or the Expellees Federation (Bund der Vertriebenen, shorthand BdV). They are more private than political organization, although their origins and goals are strictly of political character. They had a powerful impact on the German enlargement policy.

III. THEORY

This section consists of two parts: the first explains the meaning and application of the key notion of this thesis — ‘ambivalence’, and the second presents the choice of theoretical approaches employed in this research and the reasoning behind this choice.
1. Notion of Ambivalence

The operational term of this research is the notion of ambivalence. A concept of ‘logic of ambivalence’ as a framework for understanding, analysis and explanation of choices in politics is known in the field of sociology and political behaviour\(^\text{19}\). It is not in common use in foreign policy analysis, and has not been conceptualised theoretically. The basic question is therefore how ambivalence can be approached in order to make it a methodologically appropriate variable?

First — ambivalence can be detected through examination of rhetoric of a given foreign policy as the first step, and of a nexus between rhetoric and actions as the second one. Coherence, or lack thereof either in rhetoric or in a rhetoric-actions nexus, is a strong indicator whether a given policy contains ambivalence or not. Rhetoric is a vital part of the foreign policy as a form of communication and dialogue. While foreign policy consists of strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests and to achieve its goals in the international relations milieu, rhetoric allows to carry out these strategies, and to express ideas, values, norms, ethics and intentions. It might, and sometimes is used instrumentally, serving as a means of disguise, to hide true intentions or interests. That stresses its importance even more. While the perceptions and philosophy of key policy makers are the most important variables in foreign policy decision-making, their rhetoric as a means of communication, is a tool in the foreign policy. Most often the tool policy makers reach for first.

Yet rhetoric is usually only the first part of policy. The second part is action. Rhetoric expresses a goal, which, if supposed to be achieved, in most cases requires actions.

Majority of foreign policy analyses implicitly or explicitly assume that a given policy has a goal and may face obstacles — both in the external and domestic realms. If

the domestic level is analyzed, then mechanisms and dynamics of hammering out such policy are uncovered, including the clashes between the conflicting factors and preferences. This is detection in the ‘pro and contra’ terms, driving forces versus obstacles. Obstacles in such configuration need to be overcome or ignored, or influenced by contra factors, and changed. These analyses correspond with a definition of the foreign policy given for example by Christopher Hill, that foreign policy is ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’\textsuperscript{20}, or the one, more discerning, provided by Michael Smith, who emphasised its ‘making’ part, the unfolding of the components of the foreign policy, stating that the foreign policy is ‘the embodiment of national aims and interests, pursued through the mobilization and application of national resources’\textsuperscript{21}. In the sense of both these definitions, foreign policy is the final outcome of a clash of various domestic ideas, interests, preferences and ways the national identity is expressed. Foreign policy conducted by state agencies may or may not reflect all these elements, but it does not reveal them.

What however if the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor, usually a state, the final outcome of a clash of various domestic ideas, is not clear-cut and suggests, or reveals internal ambivalence? It then says that the makers of such a policy simultaneously hold conflicting attitudes about the object of their policy and its goal. That may represent a concept of ambivalence in such a policy. And in the absence of definition, conceptualization, politico-theoretical models of ambivalence in the foreign policy theories, as well as of reference in commonly used in IR scholarship definitions of the foreign policy, a proposal of this thesis is to adopt the above description as a determinant in this analysis. The empirical material of this research requires an interpretation of the conditions, under which there are opposing factors, present simultaneously in the foreign policy, and which policy makers conducting this policy, simultaneously embrace.


As mentioned in the introductory part of this thesis, the concept of ambivalence in the German enlargement policy does not represent (or reflect) a process of eliminating factors that are contradictory to the driving ones, i.e. obstacles. It reflects a complexity of the analyzed policy, which is characterised by fluctuation of preferences and development of new interests. The contra factors to the support for the enlargement are the reasoning, concepts, and/or options that are alternative to the enlargement and were adopted, and in some cases actively pursued as a goal, by German policy makers within the same foreign policy apparatus that simultaneously lent support to the enlargement.

Ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy is accompanied by perceived ambivalence. In order to discern the two one has to detect whether what is observable reflects an adoption of the reasoning, concepts, and/or options, which oppose the enlargement, and has an impact on this policy, or not. The former represents ambivalence, but if there are no consequences in terms of political actions determined in statements and speeches, the ambivalence if possible to observe, is probably a perceived one.

2. Choice of Theoretical Approaches

The examination follows the logic and is organised according to the Robert Putnam’s\(^\text{22}\) two-level game theory. It divides the policymaking into two parts — (i) at the national level domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups; (ii) at the international level national governments seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments\(^\text{23}\).

This research will adopt this division though in a reverse order, identifying first actions in the external and following then with uncovering what led to such actions. In other words the first level is an analysis on the international stage: identification of occurrences of ambivalence, then identification of external reasons for Germany’s support to the enlargement and external constraints to this support. It is then followed by

\(^{22}\)Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics...,” op.cit.
\(^{23}\)Ibid., p. 434.
an examination of such factors on the domestic level — of domestic preferences and interests at the basis of the choices in the external policy.

Analysis of these factors will be possible with the tools borrowed from social constructivism and the rationalist framework of liberal intergovernmentalism. Empirical findings of this research indicate that both pro and contra enlargement factors that shaped Germany’s enlargement policy are rooted both in normative, ideational factors of national identity, as well as in strict costs-benefits calculations. For explanation of the former the tools are provided by constructivism, while the latter is possible to explain with the rationalist approach. Application of either is not, however, identical with the division between the external and domestic areas; the use of either rationalist or constructivist framework in this research is a function of the specificity of a given factor in analysis, or in other words it is subordinated to the characteristic of the occurrence of ambivalence and its causes. And while the rationalist approach explains the political preferences based on calculation of costs and benefits, constructivism in contrast applies sociological and normative explanations for the pursued interests.

Both accounts — rationalist intergovernmentalism and constructivism — remain in conceptual opposition; the contemporary question is however to what extent they complement each other\textsuperscript{24}. It is therefore necessary to follow Robert Jervis’ observation that ‘\textit{no one approach consistently maintains a leading position: each of them catches important elements of international politics}\textsuperscript{25}, and the one of John G. Ruggie, who pointed out that ‘the ‘great debates’ that have swept through the field of international relations (…) typically have been posed in terms of the alleged superiority on one approach over another, but the fact that these debates recur so regularly offers proof that no approach can sustain claims to monopoly on truth — or even on useful insights\textsuperscript{26}. This research does not aim at synthesis of two approaches, but at grappling with the dynamics created by ambivalence in the German policy towards the EU enlargement.


Applying both approaches will help to determine causes of various occurrences of ambivalence. The ambivalence, its occurrences as a variable, demonstrates the changing concept of the European integration in Germany’s milieu, and reveals origins of this change — the interplay between changing interests and preferences of Germany. It is a constructivist variable, pertaining to a normative, based on values and ideas, concept of social organization of the international community. A transformation of social and ideological constructs lies at the heart of the constructivist stream offered by Alexander Wendt.

A. Constructivism

Majority of the literature on Germany’s foreign policy after the unification depicts consistently a constructivist interpretation of this policy. Thomas Banchoff, Gunther Hellmann, Peter Katzenstein, Thomas Risse, Adrian Hyde-Price apply broadly the constructivist method arguing that it is crucial to examine historical, ideational and cultural sources of actors’ identities, in order to understand the behaviour of states, because states’ grand strategies are the result not only of political conditions in the domestic and international environments but also of a broader cultural determinants. It is especially important in the case of Germany’s foreign policy. This research follows this direction.

Although constructivist approach is diverse and as ontology does not offer a unified theory or framework, most of the premises laid out by constructivists provide insights that are useful for this research. Starting from the constructivist concern with the

27 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it…, op.cit
28 Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order…, op.cit
human consciousness of individual actors, to the premises that the ‘building blocks’ of international reality are ideational as well as material, and that ideational factors have both normative and instrumental dimensions, to the claim that they express not only individual but collective intentionality as well\(^{30}\).

The central assumption of this thesis is that ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy was created by simultaneous pursuit of various, conflicting interests, both by the German state and German domestic actors. These interests and preferences represent different streaks of the German national identity. They are not structurally determined, on the contrary. Majority of scholars within the constructivist school identified that the unified Germany continues cultivating the culture of reticence in its foreign policy, which is characterised by Europeanization and multilateralism. Europeanization is also a part of an ideational ‘building block’ of international reality of the European Union. The identity of the German nation has been called in the recent years as highly ‘Europeanized’ and having Europeanization in the genetic code\(^{31}\). Using the constructive perspective will allow to understand how this feature influenced the choices over the enlargement policy. For example at the moment of Germany’s unification, when Chancellor Helmut Kohl started referring to the German and European unification as the two sides of the same coin, or at the moment of tension between two concepts, of deepening and of widening the European integration, when Germany chose to support both.

Philosophy, preferences and choices of individual actors such as Chancellor Helmut Kohl or his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher were crucial for shaping the German enlargement policy. Numerous analyses proved that German foreign policy demonstrated a constructivist assumption that interests are not objectively and exogenously given either by the domestic structures of states or by the nature of the international system, but they are defined by the actors involved, according to their identity, values and self-perception\(^{32}\). The rhetoric created by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, that was supportive of the enlargement, or a shift of accents in the enlargement rhetoric of

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\(^{32}\) Hyde-Price, *Interests, Institutions and Identity…*, op.cit.
Kohl’s successor’s Gerhard Schröder, are the facets of the German foreign policy possible to explain by application of the constructivist concern with the human consciousness of individual actors.

Individual preferences of both Chancellors also reflect collective intentionality\textsuperscript{33} of their generations. A generational change of 1998 in German politics is observable in different attitude towards history and its role in contemporary politics. It concerns the fundamentals of the national identity, formed on interpretations of historical experience. As those interpretations differ, either between generations or between interest groups, it may lead to clash of interests, like it did in the case of the past legacy problems in bilateral relations, which created one of the manifestations of ambivalence.

Lastly, constructivism is concerned with rhetoric and the conviction that political, elite discourse co-shapes foreign policy. Such a discourse illuminates, as Thomas Banchoff stresses, the content of state identity\textsuperscript{34}. Elite discourse is fundamental for understanding ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy created for example by deepening-widening tension, or choice of priority in bilateral relations, or consideration of various concepts of a new security system in Europe.

Although central variable of constructivism are interests and constructivist perspective offers a possibility to look into the normative, ideational factors, shared ideas, beliefs and social facts behind the choices over the EU enlargement, it does not provide tools for explanation of rational pursuit of material interests, which were also at play at the choices over the enlargement policy. For this part normative narrative of national identity is not central. But as the context for the pursuit of material interests is another major juncture in the European integration, the Eastern enlargement, liberal intergovernmentalism will be the most useful for explaining the benefits/costs calculation-based choices.

**B. Rationalist Approach**

Rationalist perspective of intergovernmentalism draws on both realist and institutionalist approaches, successfully explaining European integration as the bargain

\textsuperscript{33} Searle, *The Construction of Social…*, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{34} Banchoff, “*German Identity and European…*, op.cit.
between states pursuing self-interested goals\textsuperscript{35}. Given the time framework for this analysis such a bargain is apparent for example at the negotiations over Maastricht Treaty, or in a more direct connection with the Eastern enlargement — in negotiations over Amsterdam Treaty, or when German policy makers worked with their French counterparts on the agreement over the EU expansion.

Intergovernmentalism, originally designed by Stanley Hoffmann as a theory of regional integration\textsuperscript{36} rightly stresses that member states can have shared interests and may pick up collective action for a better outcome, but it is still a state a primary factor for integration and the increase in power at the supranational level results from decisions of governments of single states as they have the legal sovereignty. As this research focuses on a specific aspect of the European integration and relies mostly on constructivist interpretation, the most suitable is the version of intergovernmentalism modified by Andrew Moravcsik\textsuperscript{37}.

First, because contrary to realism it assumes that states are configurations of individual and groups interests, who project their interests into the international system through governments. Secondly because it emphasises economic interests as necessary to take into account for explaining decisions of states’ governments in the negotiations over integration\textsuperscript{38}. Thirdly it also operates on two levels of analysis — of domestic preference formation and the EU intergovernmental bargaining, which corresponds with the two-level game employed in this research.

All these facets are reflected in the late phase of the German enlargement policy when German policy makers take up actions aimed at the EU reforms or when they bargain economic interests and preferences of specific group interests of the German industry or farmers, what are the causes of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement.

Intergovernmentalism offers also an important for this research insight into the power of the German state. The empirical findings of this research confirm that at the

\textsuperscript{35} Robert Keohane, \textit{After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy}, Princeton 1984, p. 122-123
\textsuperscript{36} Stanley Hoffmann, \textit{The State of War: Essays on Theory and Practice of International Politics}, Preager 1965
\textsuperscript{37} Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community…”, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{38} While analysing the evolution of monetary union in Europe Moravcsik observed that economic interests drove the negotiations as congruent with national interests of the states participating in the process and were superior sometimes to the political interests.
basis of the German multilateralism is the culture of political reticence, of restraining the power of the state. As pointed out by Adrian Hyde-Price domestic factors decide about the power capabilities nowadays — demographics, territorial size, resource endowment, wealth and economic structure, industrial financial and technological capabilities, but also non-material factor such as societal cohesion and the stability of the political system. All these factors constitute Germany’s place of the most powerful state in Europe. Germany’s foreign policy however never had features of power politics. On the contrary, it gained an opinion of ‘ostentatiously modest’, and provoked application of numerous new notions of state power — starting from the ‘soft power’, through the ‘trade power’, to the most developed conceptually notion of the ‘civilian power’ elaborated after Germany’s unification.

At the same time German government’s actions follow specific interests of the state, and policy makers in order to realise these interests use the power of their state. This is not the power-exercise that can be explained with the traditional realist approach, as the essence of the power of a state has changed in the European environment. A flag example is the evolution of the German power into a normative, ‘civilian power’ and so-called Franco-German engine of the European integration as the soft Lockean power epitomise the change. Yet as Kenneth Dyson and Klaus Goetz elaborated — German foreign policy spans power and constraints and uses the ‘state power’ to influence the behaviour of others in order to obtain desired outcomes. This facet of exercising state power in the environment of the EU is described also as the ‘institutional power’ of the German state. While it is not possible to explain this sort of power with the realist

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39 Hyde-Price, Interests, Institutions and Identity…, op.cit.
41 A summary can be found in Charlie Jeffery, William Paterson, “Germany’s Power in Europe”, ESRC- IGS Discussion Paper 2000/10
42 The notion of the institutional power is related to the Germany’s power in S. Bulmer, C. Jeffery and W.E. Paterson, Germany’s European Diplomacy: Shaping the regional milieu. Manchester, Manchester University Press 2000. Also the notion is elaborated in the field of sociology; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall offer a fourfold taxonomy of power in International Politics: (i) Compulsory Power — the direct control of one actor over another, (ii) Institutional Power — the control exercised indirectly over others through diffuse relations of interaction, (iii) Structural Power — the constitution of subjects” capacities in direct structural relation to one another, determines what kind of social beings actors are and (iii) Productive Power — the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification (overlapping often with the previous one),in: Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, International Organization 59, Winter 2000
approach, it eludes constructivist tools too, evoking the intergovernmentalist framework as more comfortable for explanation.

Rational calculation and bargaining of material interests created other manifestations of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy than those possible to explain with constructivist tools — at the negotiations over the budgetary and institutional reform and over the entry terms of the enlargement.

IV. THE ARGUMENT

The outlined below factors that were conflicting with the enlargement created various manifestations of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy. They have a common denominator in the shape of the response of German policy makers that is grounded in the domestic setting of the national identity and material and normative interests. Uncovering the reasons why German policy makers responded to these constraints in the way that created ambivalence in their enlargement policy is possible while looking both at the external and domestic levels of determinants of the foreign policy.

A foundation of the German policy makers’ response is the national political identity formed in the WWII aftermath and based on the premises of restraining the state’s power, culture of antimilitarism and commitment to multilateral international cooperation. The organization of the domestic policy-making system did not have a decisive impact on the enlargement policy and creating ambivalence in this policy. The decision making in the German foreign policy can be and often is very clear-cut, definite and unambiguous. The locus of political power in this system, the power decision-making in the foreign policy, remains still in the hands of the government executives. It does not contradict the fact that Germany is a state, in which borders between the domestic and the external are sometimes blurred.

According to the definition of such a state given by Georg Sørensen⁴³, it is a state with a high degree of international interdependencies, and a particular policy-making

⁴³ Georg Sørensen, “An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood: Consequences for Conflict and Cooperation”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 23 1997. He suggested that the contemporary international system contains three main types of state: the standard “Westphalian” sovereign state; the “post-colonial” state; and the “postmodern” state.
structure, with some aspects of sovereignty delegated to the supranational level. Such a state includes highly organised interest groups operating on all levels of state activity, along with a highly developed civil society, both of which influence external relations of the state. Multilevel interdependencies of economy and business complete this picture. Germany has all these features and the multilevel policy-making system is their consequence.

As some scholars observed, this system brings Germany benefits against its partners on the European stage. Negotiations with German representatives are perceived as tough because as noticed by Collins ‘German negotiators and policy-makers are able to negotiate with the fellow EU member states’ representatives on the assumption — whether true or not — that the initial German position is more or less final, as the complex domestic policy-making structure makes re-negotiation among the many policy-makers back in Bonn extremely difficult and time consuming’. Collins stresses that a German representative is able to utilise an apparent weakness of the need to satisfy a large number of heterogenic actors with a variety of interests in Germany. By referring to it they can hold an intransigent position, which would otherwise be untenable, or at least open to criticism from EU colleagues. This example reflects often, although not always, how the agenda of the foreign policy is ‘managed’.

This feature of the German policymaking system however is relevant primarily to the policymaking within the EU, especially a day-to-day policymaking, when particular EU policies are discussed and designed, and particular interests of particular domestic actors are discussed as the subject of a particular policy. Germany’s policy towards the Eastern enlargement of the EU concerns particular policies of the EU only in its late phase, of the negotiations of entry terms and conditions. For the most of the time of the enlargement preparations, Germany’s enlargement policy was a ‘high politics’ deciding on directions of the development of the EU, and only when the budgetary negotiations started, it involved internal EU policies.

A detailed argument of the thesis unfolds as follows:

44 For example Collins, German Policy-Making and Eastern Enlargement…, op.cit.
I. External Challenges

1. Conditions of Germany’s Unification

First manifestation of ambivalence in the German policy towards the Eastern enlargement of the EC occurred during the process of Germany’s unification. The idea was proposed by the Eastern European new democratic governments, and backed by the U.S. administration. Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared support for this idea, developing a persuasive rhetoric that conveyed a normative reasoning of two sides of the same process — Germany’s unification as identical with the unification of the whole continent, which was epitomised by the idea of embracing Eastern European countries into the framework of the European Community.

Declarations of support were confronted, however, with the structural constraints of the crumbling Cold War order. The chief goal of German policy makers at the time was the unification of the country; it required consent of Germany’s Western partners and of the Soviet Union. Western partners, France first of all, fearful of the increasing power of the German state, imposed on Germany a condition of engaging into the deepening the EC integration. It became Germany’s priority in the context of the EC politics and limited drastically a possibility of introducing the enlargement on the EC agenda. Winning the Soviet acceptance required in turn highly cautious proceeding of diplomacy. The Soviet Union was losing its influence in Eastern Europe. As the U.S. administration put forward a condition of including East Germany after unification into NATO, obtaining Russian consent on the unification was a challenge. Introducing the enlargement idea at the same time represented a hazard of jeopardising the Soviet acceptance for the unification.

These contradictions caused ambivalence in Germany’s early policy towards the EC enlargement. It represents a tension between two streams. First — an emerging new concept of the political organization of Europe based on community of values and ideas, thus a case for constructivist approach. Second — the realist grip of the old Cold War structure that induced a bargaining of the security and material interests, which can be explained by rationalist perspective.
2. Bilateral Relations

Unresolved legacy of the past between Germany and its Eastern neighbours created perception and another occurrence of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy. This policy related first of all to Germany’s Eastern neighbours. Poland and Czechoslovakia, later the Czech Republic, were considered as the first countries that would be admitted to the EU.

The difficult history between Germany and its neighbours was the main reason for Germany to support their application for the EU membership. German elites felt obligation to help these countries in overcoming the division that resulted from WWII and hindered their post-war development. Enlargement also represented an opportunity to overcome a difficult legacy of the past, and the German support was received as a strong expression of the will to build new quality relations with the Eastern neighbours. The past legacy represented two main problems — the issue of Germany’s Eastern border in relations with Poland and the claims of German expellees groups against the Czech government over the lost after WWII territories. The former was solved relatively quickly. It caused though a perception of ambivalence, which manifested as a gap between the pledges by German policy makers to support Poland’s application for the EU membership and reluctance to solve the border problem. The expellees’ claims were not solved and affected the Czech application when German deputies launched an initiative to block the Czech membership in the EU creating appearance of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy.

The case represents a tension between two different narratives constituting German national identity and built upon the interpretation of the historical experience; it requires application of constructivist perspective.

3. Relations with France

While German policy makers declared strong support for the enlargement of the EC/EU, they also declared, and worked, on maintaining good relations with the main European partner of Germany — France. Fierce opposition of France to the enlargement curbed the support of German policy makers for this idea. Despite the emergence of the new interests of Germany in the East, that were highly congruent with the enlargement,
German policy makers did not take up political actions that would put the enlargement on the EU agenda. It represents another cause of ambivalence in Germany’s policy.

This factor appeared first time during the negotiations over Germany’s unification and persisted, curbing Germany’s support for the enlargement until the agreement on Agenda 2000 in 1997.

The EU enlargement was to change a political balance in Europe and in the European Union. The prospect of alteration was sensitive for France. French politicians viewed the expansion of the EU as shifting the centre of the political power in Europe to a new, unified Germany. It jeopardised the main provision of France’s post-WWII policy, which was to contain Germany’s power. It was therefore an initiative of French policy makers to commit Germany to a single European currency as the prerequisite for Germany’s unification. The means aimed at constraining economic power of the unified, thus stronger, Germany. The enlargement idea induced fears that it would dilute the efforts to bind Germany with the Maastricht Treaty and that it would deprive France of its position at a hub of the European Union.

German policy makers considered France a primary partner. They felt a historically motivated obligation toward France that resulted from the fact that France offered Germany a partnership after WWII, which elevated Germany out of the post-war international isolation. Preserving good relations with France was assigned therefore a top priority. A choice made between two sets of interests in Germany’s bilateral relations, despite that partially those interests were economic, represents a case for constructivist interpretation.

4. Deepening the European Integration

Deepening the European integration was perceived and presented by majority of EU policy makers and commentators as alternative to the enlargement option. German leaders chose to endorse both directions and that created a manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy. This is a clash of normative visions of the social construction of the international system and for this reason is possible to explain with the constructivist perspective.
Regaining with the unification a full sovereignty prompted among German elites a debate over the future foreign policy, its premises and direction. A part of German elites were considering a closer Western integration, thus strengthening the core of the EU as the main provision for the new foreign policy. This option was perceived as conflicting with the enlargement because it was to precede the widening of the EU and as expected — would absorb political energy and means at the expense of the enlargement. Taking into consideration this alternative hindered the consensus on the enlargement and deepened the ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy.

Yet, the debate on the European integration broadened this notion. In its old pre-1990 version the European integration epitomised Western European integration; the new understanding was about the integration of the whole continent. This represented another paradox — the old concept of the European integration was a constraint to the support for the enlargement, but at the same time the outcome of the debate in Germany established its new concept. This is a case of constructivist inquiry into the process of expanding of the European community of nations, based on shared sovereignty and multilateralism, thus of adjusting the old concept to the new challenges.

5. New European Security Order

The concept of the post-Cold War organization of Europe, as presented by Eastern Europeans was two-dimensional: Eastward expansion of the European Union and of NATO. Eastern Europeans declared their desire to join both structures simultaneously. The hesitation of German policy makers on the issue of NATO expansion was received as hesitation over the concept of the future European order. And the inclination of German policy makers to creating a pan-European, exclusively of the U.S., security system was contradicting the EU-NATO umbrella concept directly. It caused a perception of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement (for it did not contradict directly the idea of the EU enlargement).

The imperative of building a new security system in Europe absorbed attention of the political leaders in the EU throughout the first half of the 1990s decade. The presence of the Soviet troops in the post-communist countries, extended well into the 1990s, and the fact that Russian leaders were positioning Russia as a counter-power to the West on
the one hand, the aspirations of the East European states to join NATO on the other hand, and the intention of the U.S. to maintain its dominant position in the European security system, made the task of redesigning the system challenging and sensitive. Under such circumstances the American administration expected German politicians, who had good relations with Russian leaders, to play a role of a broker and win Russian acceptance for the Eastern enlargement of NATO.

This task was a constraint to the project of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. Not only did it absorb political energy of German policy makers, but also because of the importance of the security issue, it preceded and conditioned implicitly the EU enlargement. The ultimate support the NATO expansion idea received from German policy makers fundamentally contributed to the support for the EU enlargement as the successful introducing this fundamental political change in Europe brought down psychological grip of the Cold War order.

NATO expansion can be approached both with the realist and constructivist assumptions; in this case the constructivist claim about values and norms at the basis of creation of national interests, has a stronger explanatory power for the Germany’s policy towards this issue, than realist calculation.

6. Costs of the Enlargement

Although the factor was strictly economic — financial costs of the enlargement, the issue was political. It was a requirement of reforming the EU budget and its redistribution system in order to spread those costs among all the member states. It represents a textbook case for liberal intergovernmentalism.

The issue reached its culminating point with the prospect of negotiations over the entry terms of enlargement. The preparations of the Agenda 2000, set up ultimately in 1997, was a direct reason for calculations of the costs of the enlargement and a debate on this issue across the EU.

Enlargement in terms of costs presented for German politicians two major problems: (i) the necessity of sharing financial benefits with the new, poor members of the club of which the most challenging for the old members was (ii) the defence of the CAP. It meant that the Union’s budget would have to be increased and the main burden
of new additional costs would fall on Germany, because its position in the Union was of
the main net payer to the common budget. The unification strained however financial
capacity of Germany and German policy makers were trying to spread out the costs of the
enlargement on other member states.

Kohl’s government formulated in November 1994 a call for reform of the EU
budget and reduction of Germany's net contributions. The insistence of the German
government on linking the enlargement to the financial reform of the EU was justified,
but hard to achieve. It caused delays in setting up a schedule for the enlargement. Waiting
for the compromise and cooperation of other member states on the financial burden of the
enlargement created a manifestation of ambivalence in the German enlargement policy
— a gap between the supportive rhetoric and delaying the process. Ultimately German
policy makers broke the impasse and put the enlargement before the EU reform, which
already eludes the liberal intergovernmentalism implying a constructivist approach to the
changing concept of the European integration.

II. Domestic Challenges

7. Exhaustion with the Costs of Unification

The unification exhausted German society both in economic and political terms. It
created constraints to the support for the enlargement and in result — ambivalence in
Germany’s policy. It is a factor combing political and economic aspects and represents a
set of social facts. As such it can be approached with constructivist tools.

Financial costs of the unification as presented by the Kohl’s government were
supposed to be insignificant. It turned out that the net public financial transfers to Eastern
Germany only in 1991 exceeded the original predictions 14 times. Since then, the
transfers in fiscal resources and subsidies were increasing, and throughout the whole
decade on average reached annually 5 per cent of the cash resources of the West
Germany, and increasing public debt at the end of 1994 to more than 60 per cent of the
united Germany’s GDP.

The exhaustion of the German society with the rapid political and economic
changes influenced the attitudes towards the ‘Europeanization’ and European integration.
As the Maastricht Treaty resulted in what most of the German society resented —
abandonment of the Deutsche Mark, the endorsement of the European integration projects, first of all costly enlargement, significantly declined.

While the German government was trying to secure participation of other EU member states in the costs of the enlargement (for the strained by the unification finances), it also had to take into account domestic public opinion. The supportive to the enlargement rhetoric of government executives started to decline, and with the new government formed by the left-wing coalition, this rhetoric was already changed into a decisively opposing paying singlehandedly for the enlargement.

That created another occurrence of ambivalence in the German enlargement policy, though the perception of the ambivalence in this case exceeded the actual phenomenon.

8. Economic Interests of Domestic Actors

German interests groups were the main actors at the negotiations of the entry terms of the enlargement, extending these negotiations and delaying the final date of the enlargement completion. Their position created a perception of the ambivalence in German policy towards the enlargement. It did not create ambivalence itself. It represents a case for the rationalist approach of liberal intergovernmentalism, which emphasises economic interests bargaining at the base of furthering development of the European integration.

There were two most important areas of interests associated with particular groups such as industry or farmers unions: labor market and agriculture. The negotiations over the transition periods for opening the labour market, the agricultural production quotas and the extension of the system of direct payments lasted for 4,5 years, postponing the final date of the enlargement. Much of this time was taken by a ‘ping-pong’ exchange of proposals between the Commission, candidate countries and the two main players — France and Germany. The position of the German negotiators created a perception of an ambivalent attitude towards the enlargement. It was the final act in the process of preparations for the enlargement and it was a far cry from the support declared by the German representatives for the enlargement initially. The Copenhagen Summit
eventually confirmed that the first wave of enlargement would take place in 2004, but the ‘enlargement package’ agreed upon then, was disappointing to the Eastern countries.
CHAPTER 2

Germany’s Unification As the Cause of Ambivalence
In Germany’s Policy Towards the EC Enlargement

1989—1992

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses causes of the first occurrence of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the idea of the EC Eastern enlargement. It transpired in the context and at the time of Germany’s unification, when leading actors on the stage at the time, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, developed a supportive of the enlargement rhetoric, but did not turn it into political agenda.

The enlargement idea was put forward during the process of negotiations of Germany’s unification. The origins of the German policy towards the Eastern enlargement of the EC/EU are closely connected with the unification though not only because of the time concurrence, but primarily because of the political reasoning behind two projects that changed the geopolitics of Europe. The ambivalence in the German stance on the enlargement at this time was caused by the conditions of the unification —
the need to win support for unification from the Soviet Union and to meet expectations of the Western partners.

Germany’s unification is a time of opening of a new era for Europe, and this has a special meaning for the relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours. The novelty is that the East European countries are coming out of 40-year period of remaining ‘behind the Iron Curtain’. The events in Central Europe in the years 1990-1991, Germany’s unification and the idea of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union, set the direction for the political developments in this region for the next decade.

The focus of this chapter is on Chancellor Helmut Kohl, because he made the first official pronouncements regarding the enlargement of the European Community, and because he is the main representative of Germany on the international stage during the unification negotiations. The statements of his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher are also considered, as he is the second most powerful actor in the German policymaking system. The supportive for the enlargement rhetoric reflects a normative reasoning based upon social constructivism. This reasoning was confronted by the conditions imposed on Germany and which German policy makers had to meet. These conditions were generated by the structural constraints of the Cold War division of the continent. Application of the two-level game theory indicates that the reasons for German policy makers not to follow their own rhetoric that was supportive of the enlargement at the time of the unification can be explained by the domestic factor. It was an imperative at the core of the national identity, of achieving the goal of the unification of the divided country. It was a goal of securing ‘autonomy’, which consists according to Alexander Wendt of ‘the ability of a state-society complex to exercise control over its allocation of resources and choice of government’45.

I. AMBIVALENCE

The first appearance of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the Eastern enlargement of the EC manifested as a gap in the rhetoric-actions nexus, specifically between a highly positive and supportive language for the enlargement rhetoric, and the lack of corresponding actions. This is the rhetoric of the two main actors representing

Germany at the time on the international stage—Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The occurrence of the first ambivalence, as the later developments of the German enlargement policy will demonstrate, was symptomatic for its future. On the one hand Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher set a direction for this policy and its tone, indicating the reasoning and building rhetoric for the German government’s support for the enlargement idea. On the other hand, the factors that turned out to be contradictory to the declared support were also indicative for the future impediments to this policy.

The very first signal from the German policy makers about an idea of the Eastern enlargement of the European Community came from Hans-Dietrich Genscher. His statement came early, at the time when Poland had already a new democratic government, and the dismantling of the socialist order was about to start in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Genscher pointed to a possibility of a rapid Eastward enlargement of the European Community as early as during the EPC meeting of 14-15 October 1989 at Esclimont⁴⁶. Although his comment did not have any tangible implications at the time, but many observers and European politicians already understood it as the direction FRG’s government would favour. The sheer perception of the political power of Genscher’s position, as the second representative of the German government after the Chancellor, made his statement authoritative. The fall of the Berlin Wall three weeks later switched the focus to a possibility of Germany’s unification. The idea of embracing East European countries into the common political and economic structure was already floating.

What established the perception that Germany was supportive of the EC Eastward expansion, however, was a subtle shift of accents in the Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s unification rhetoric. The shift of two words, Western to European, appeared during the process of the unification and in relation to it, and ascertained that German politicians saw both challenges, of the German unification and unification of the continent, as bound to each other. This perception was established for two reasons: the position of the Chancellor as the main representative of Germany on the international stage and the fact

⁴⁶ Financial Times, 16 October 1989
that despite the dispersion of power throughout the German policymaking system, the unification policy was conducted almost single-handedly by the Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

Rhetoric was the main tool of German politics at the time. Chancellor Kohl conducted the unification process using persuasive rhetoric appealing to the normative ideals of the European unity that started with the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957. He based the reasoning for Germany’s unification on the assertion that ‘Reunification and West-integration, Deutschlandpolitik and European politics, are the two sides of the same coin. They presuppose each other’\(^47\). The statement was made first during the speech on the state of the nation in a divided Germany delivered to the Bundestag a day before the fall of the Berlin Wall, on 8 November 1989. The phrase of this statement about ‘two sides of the coin’ of Germany’s and West-integration will be appearing later throughout the whole period of the unification and its long-term aftermath, though with a subtle shift of accents. This shift, however, denoted a supportive attitude towards the Eastern enlargement of the EC and became the basis for the supportive rhetoric.

The shift was from the ‘West’ to the ‘European integration’. Helmut Kohl used this phrase explicitly, and supported it with reasoning, for the first time only a year after the unification — in the Bundestag speech of 13 December 1991\(^48\). It was a direct reference to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who used to say that the unification of Germany would be identical with that of overcoming the division of the whole Europe, and as such the reference was understood as a declaration of the German support for overcoming this division. In this way Chancellor Kohl based the idea of the European Community embracing new Eastern democracies upon a direct connection to the German unification. Kohl’s speech, however, triggered neither a politically meaningful debate, nor political action. The idea of enlarging European Community beyond the unified

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\(^48\) Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Maastricht vor dem Bundestag am 13 Dezember 1991 (statement to the Bundestag by Chancellor Kohl regarding the results of the European Council in Maastricht), Bulletin der Bundesregierung, Nr.142, 17 December 1991, 1153-1158.
Germany was not on the agenda of German politicians at the time, and they did not take up actions that would turn this idea into a political process.

This rhetoric was consistently kept up during the whole unification period; Chancellor Kohl and Minister Genscher referred to the ‘two-sides coin’ of the German/European unification in numerous statements and comments. A part of the explanation for not following declarations with action is that the shift of accents in Chancellor Kohl’s rhetoric did not reflect Chancellor’s own, original vision of the European organization. It was only his response to the idea, which had been put on the table by Eastern Europeans, supported by the U.S. administration, and already expressed, more explicitly in the European debate by other politicians. Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s was the earliest response. The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher formulated similar calls for a quick widening the EC in August 1990⁴⁹; the Dutch EC Commissioner Frans Andriesen asked few months later, in May 1991, whether it was ‘time to design the structure of a Community of 24?’⁵⁰.

Those calls were specific, but German policy makers did not formulate or even refer to any concrete dates or details. Yet their ‘two-sides coin’ rhetoric indicated support for the enlargement idea. Soon they presented the need to support this idea as moral duty of the Germans towards the Eastern countries. Moral reasoning represented a powerful assurance that fuelled Eastern Europeans hopes for a quick integration with the West; Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary pinned their hopes on Germany’s leadership. The reassuring rhetoric soon found a direct expression in the bilateral treaties signed with Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1991 and 1992; they included a pledge by the German government to support the EC/EU’s accession of both Eastern neighbours. This was however only a bilateral dimension, whereas there was no concrete action at the EU level by German policy makers.

The gap between declarations and lack of following actions was in a sharp contrast to another rhetoric-actions nexus in the German foreign policy at the time of unification—the nexus concerning Germany’s commitment to the deeper Western integration. The rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl on this issue was supported with concrete

⁴⁹ Margaret Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, Smithmark Pub, 1995
⁵⁰ “Geschlossene Gesellschaft”, *Der Spiegel*, 6 May 1991
actions, which led to ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by the Bundestag. There were no similarly concrete actions on the German side that would put forward the enlargement idea on the EC agenda. All the required elements were in place — the idea was already presented to the EC by the East European governments; Germany as the country at the forefront of overcoming the post-War division in Europe, was in a position to lead the effort; the ongoing unification of Germany was congruent with the idea of Europe’s unification and presented as such by Chancellor Kohl. The ‘European’ rhetoric of Chancellor not only imprinted the perception among Germany’s partners that the German unification was conducted in accordance with the European integration, but that Germany supported the EC Eastward expansion.

The question is why German policy makers did not follow their own rhetoric? The first step is to uncover whether their rhetoric reflected supportive factors that were significant enough to turn them into a political process.

II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS

Origins of the Enlargement Project

There were two supportive factors for German policy makers to embrace the idea of the Eastern enlargement of the European Community that were connected with Germany’s unification. They were grounded in the normative concept of Europe’s organization based on the values upon which the European Community was built. The unification of Germany was the first factor; the second was the expectations of Germany’s partners, the Eastern European new democracies, and the U.S. administration, that Germany would support this idea. The German policy makers’ response was based on the fundamental part of the national identity: the commitment to overcoming the results of World War II and to conducting foreign policy according to the principle of multilateral cooperation with other countries. Both these premises were also the reasons of starting the European integration.

The end of the Cold War shifted geopolitical balance of power in the world and changed the international political makeup of Europe, adding new democracies in the Eastern part. Looking from the theoretical perspective it altered the macro-level variables of the international structure of Europe. It placed German policy makers at the centre of
these profound changes. The changing structure became for the German foreign policy a generative force, a leading factor in defining interests and determining direction and actions, because it opened up a possibility for unification of the divided country. German policy makers captured this power; the unification became a part of the structural changes and a dominant development in Europe throughout the years 1990 to 1992. As a part of the structural changes the unification was congruent with the process of reunification of the continent.

The division of Europe and the German state was a result of World War II and for West German diplomacy it was clear that reunification of their country, which was the main goal of the post-war foreign policy of the FRG, was possible only with overcoming of the division of Europe. This assumption, formulated by Konrad Adenauer, was according to Helmut Kohl’s assertions at the heart of his politics. Kohl presented himself always as a successor of Adenauer’s political philosophy. The unification rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl and his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, which grew into a supportive for the enlargement concept, reflects the core of the German post-war conceptualization of the national identity.

Germany’s unification was also seen as a natural consequence of the Eastern European revolution, which started at the beginning of 1989 and was nearly completed in Poland and Czechoslovakia, when the Berlin Wall was pulled down. The very sense of the Eastern revolution bringing down the Iron Curtain implied the unification of the continent and as the European Community embodied successful development, its Eastward expansion was the only alternative for filling the post-communist political vacuum. Last, the unification brought East German state a membership in the European Community. It was a rapid integration, unprecedented, justified by the unification of the two states and possible thanks to the power of the FRG’s economy, which was expected to shield the EC from the costs of embracing the GDR. For these reasons the immediate gaining of the EC membership by East Germany was exceptional. Nonetheless, it was a precedent that made it the more difficult to deny Eastern European countries a possibility of joining the European Community.

The second supportive factor for embracing the enlargement idea was the fact that Eastern Europeans put the enlargement idea explicitly on the table. Every newly elected
democratic government in Eastern Europe\(^{51}\) between June 1989 and July 1990 was declaring officially, one after another, the desire and determination for joining the European Community and NATO. It was a coherent, two-pillar concept of their future as a part of the Western political, security and economic system and it was presented as such to the Western partners. This challenge, formulated by Eastern Europeans as the necessity of embracing their democracies into the EC structures, affected primarily German policy makers. For geographical and historical reasons German policy makers could respond to the East European counterparts only in a positive way, without risking the reputation of Germany as a reliable state, committed to multilateral international cooperation. Moreover Eastern Europeans, especially those in the immediate neighbourhood of Germany, turned to German policy makers for support for their integration with the West.

Simultaneously Eastern Europeans’ calls had support from the U.S. administration. The idea of a unified Europe was connected directly with the German unification by the American administration, during the negotiations over unification. According to Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, the authors of a thorough account of the negotiations over Germany’s unification\(^{52}\), the idea of embracing new East European democracies into the Western European structures was advocated by the U.S. diplomacy not only at the time of the unification, but even before. President George H.W. Bush declared as early as April 1989 aid for Polish reforms, then one month later, in a major address during his visit to the FRG, proclaimed that the West’s goal now was to ‘let Europe be whole and free’. He declared it as a new mission of NATO and stressed that the Cold War had begun with the division of Europe and it could only end when Europe was whole again\(^{53}\). Secretary of State James Baker reiterated George Bush’s declarations in December 1989 during his trip to Germany. He sketched then a new architecture of a new Europe: it was to be based on political and economic ties that Western Europe was to

\(^{51}\) Between June 1989 and June 1991 every communist country of Central Europe and in the case of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia every constituent republic held competitive parliamentary elections. The first elections were held in Poland, the last ones of this series in Albania. The newly elected representatives of the SU and Yugoslav republics declared then independence.


\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 31.
build with the East\textsuperscript{54}. For this reason Germany’s unification, in the view of the American representatives, was always inseparable from the necessity to unify the continent. In this way a new direction for the development of Europe was set up\textsuperscript{55}. And it was a new Germany that the Americans, and the Eastern Europeans for that matter too, perceived as a ‘natural’ leader for these changes.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s comment of October 1989 was Germany’s first response to these calls. The change in Chancellor Kohl’s rhetoric in the end of 1991 also has to be seen in the context of the expectations of Germany’s partners. It was a response to the pressure of the external structure: the changing European relations forced German politicians to respond to the emerging challenges. These expectations, as presented by the U.S. administration, pointed to new responsibilities that were coming upon Germany with the unification and reflected a perception of the international position and standing of Germany. The unification of the continent, expanding the EC structures was a novel concept and would need a political power to translate it into a political agenda. The Federal Republic was a leader in the post-war Western Europe and its foreign policy earned Germany a credit of a civilian power. That implied the ability to influence and shape the international milieu, thus a leadership necessary for shaping a post-communist order in Europe.

Answering this challenge however required a new rationale and a new set of policies on the German side. First — reorientation of its foreign policy and including Ostpolitik in the grand strategy of Europapolitik, then winning the EC member states’ support for the idea of the Eastern enlargement. Neither process was trouble-free.

III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE

The factors that stimulated supportive rhetoric of the emerging German policy towards the EC enlargement idea were countered with constraints. At this stage, during

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 143
the German unification process, there were two main constraints: an implicit opposition of the Soviet Union and explicit opposition of France. The former was a disappearing relic of the Cold War confrontation, in which Germany was subordinate to superpowers, and the latter illustrates the intergovernmental bargaining.

1. Russian Factor

The Russian factor was working implicitly as a constraint to the idea of the EC enlargement. Soviet leaders did not openly oppose ambitions of the Eastern European governments for joining the EC. But they opposed explicitly a prospect of East Germany slipping into the NATO structure (with Germany’s unification). The position of the Soviet Union as one the victorious allies that decided the post-WWII order in Europe, and the Soviet troops stationing in East Germany, presented a challenge for German policy makers during the process of Germany’s unification. It overshadowed the project of a rapid expansion of the European Community.

A democratic revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe broke the Soviet grip over Eastern Europe. A prospect of two halves of Europe unifying under Western auspices, in all dimensions, political, economic and of security was depriving the Soviets their influence in the region further. This caught German policy makers between two contradictory streams of interests and ambitions, those of the Soviet Union and of the Eastern European democracies. Germany was expected to lend support to the idea of unifying Europe on the one hand, and on the other, due to its good relations with the Soviet leaders that were built through the Ostpolitik, to smooth the relations with the Soviet Union during the ongoing changes in Europe. These were the expectations mainly of the U.S. administration, who wanted to maintain its political influence in Europe. For German policy makers a priority was, however, to secure an acceptance of the Soviet Union for the German unification. Difficulties with this process delayed a moment of turning the idea of enlarging the EU into a political agenda.

Success in obtaining Moscow’s consent for the unification was achieved only after ten months of hard diplomatic efforts, marked by unexpected swings and extraordinary measures. Despite the fact that ‘Perestroika’ used to be described as a policy constructed and promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader was reluctant
to recognise democratic changes sweeping throughout Eastern Europe in the summer 1989. Neither did the prospect of the unification of two German states receive a warm welcome in Moscow.

The key theme of the negotiations with the Russians was withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the former GDR, and the key for reaching consensus was money\textsuperscript{56}. But a factor complicating the negotiations with Moscow the most was the insistence of the U.S. administration on incorporating the former GDR into the NATO structure. This was the most important condition discussed in the run-up to the Two Plus Four agreement and triggered an international debate over the future of the Alliance.

According to commentators\textsuperscript{57}, the Americans were concerned that Germany would try to maintain its ‘unity’ with Russia by withdrawing from NATO. The U.S. administration, however, formulated the NATO condition in a decisive way and Chancellor Kohl could not hesitate on this issue. He had to assure the American ally that the unified Germany would remain a member of NATO. This pledge was highly problematic, because although the original reasons for the creation of NATO ceased to exist with the end of the Cold War confrontation, a new purpose for the Alliance was not defined yet. Russian leaders therefore still considered NATO a hostile organization\textsuperscript{58}, and strongly opposed the inclusion of East Germany in the structure. According to the observers of the Two Plus Four negotiations, the Russians believed they had been given

\textsuperscript{56} The Soviet side demanded certain level of payment for the maintaining a transitional presence of the Soviet troops and then the withdrawal. Similarly breakdown of the GDR’s economic system endangered all long-term economic agreements with the Soviet Union. Kohl government was ready to fulfil both these conditions and quite early in the unification process Kohl pledged to honour the GDR’s long-term economic obligations toward Moscow, hoping that the costs of maintaining a transitional presence of the Soviet troops would be offset by deliveries of the Soviet commodities and the asymmetrical trade after a couple of years would be possible to base on market terms. “Only later in 1990 as it explored GDR files with the new government would Bonn be able to evaluate fully just what these obligations entailed” — wrote Zelikow and Rice. See: Zelikow, Rice, Germany Unified, … op.cit., p. 349; Consequently after unification Bonn opted for an old financial instrument to support trade between the USSR and the new Länder — “Hermes”, the federal export insurance programme in operation since 1949. The original purpose of this programme was to help German companies to gain a foothold in world markets. It operated on the principle of laissez-faire and subsidiarity, but after unification was subsequently modified to suit the needs of Eastern German firms and their customers in the USSR. It occurred that Hermes had to work for years, but eventually in the face of the deteriorating economy in Russia, Hermes was withdrawn. See also: W.A. Smyser, The German Economy: Colossus at the Crossroads, New York: St Marin’s Press, 1993; David Spence, “The European Community and German Unification”, in: Charlie Jeffery and Roland Sturm (eds.) Federalism, Unification and European Integration, London Frank Cass, 1993

\textsuperscript{57} Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified…, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{58} For an analysis at the time see for example Peter Corterie, “Quo vadis NATO?”, Survival, March/April 1990
informal assurance that including East Germany into NATO would not lead to a further enlargement of NATO, which would take it to the Russian border.59

Chancellor Kohl and Minister Genscher managed to develop particularly good relations with Mikhail Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in the 1980s, when mutual visits on both side were frequent. It helped in the negotiations over the unification, but it did not prevent German politicians from as Zelikow and Rice put it—a ‘hard punch’. Ultimately the German government had to pay the Russian Federation in 1990-1993 a colossal sum of nearly 20 billion Deutsche Mark (then USD 40.25 billion) in return for Moscow’s endorsement of the unification.60 But it was a success for Germany and for the projects of unification of the continent.

Moscow’s ultimate consent to Germany’s unification and acceptance of demilitarization of the former GDR was a psychological breakthrough in the process of dismantling the Cold War order. It made Western policy makers more aware that the Soviet Union was deteriorating, so its implosion the following year was less surprising. It was important for dispelling EU member states’ fears of the Soviet negative and unpredictable reactions to the EC/EU enlargement idea. Only few months earlier the ambitions of the new Eastern democracies to join Western structures, especially NATO, seemed very remote; in December 1989 Mikhail Gorbachev called East Germany a ‘strategic ally and reliable member of the Warsaw Pact’.61 A year later the ambitions of Eastern Europeans became more probable, though Russia’s loss of its status as a great power made the relations with Moscow very sensitive. A project of the Eastward

60 This and other conditions seemingly already agreed, proved to be however unstable and in the very last moment days before the final settlement, the Russian side changed them. The difference was substantial — the Russians presented just a week before the Two Plus Four settlement a demand of a total of DM 36 billion. “These numbers far exceeded the West Germany’s planning assumption in July when experts from the Finance Ministry, Foreign Ministry and Chancellery had expected the package to cost DM 1.25 billion in the first year, and a total of DM 4.25 billion over the four-year withdrawal period (…) now the Soviet demanded a sum eight times this size and the Moscow Two Plus Four Ministerial was only a week away” — as Zelikow and Rice commented. See: Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, …, op.cit. p. 351; see also: Manfred Görtelmaeker, Unifying Germany, 1989-90, New York: St Martin”s Press, 1994; Konrad Jarusch, The Rush to German Unity, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994
61 Speech to the Central Committee of the CPSU after his return from the Soviet-American Summit at Malta; Pravda, 9 December 1989.
expansion of the EC and NATO added to a tension in the relations that were already strained by the secession of the Baltic states in January 1991.

This was a fundamental dimension of the ‘Russian factor’, which worked against an idea of immediate introduction of the EC/EU enlargement concept. Western politicians were careful not to make gestures that would humiliate Russia, and the burden of soothing these relations was placed on Germany. Pinning upon a state a task of balancing relations with another partner, difficult for others, indicates a special position of this state. Such a position may result from various factors and circumstances, e.g. when there is a need to choose a mediating state in a conflict. The accomplishment of the German diplomacy in obtaining Moscow’s consent for Germany’s unification strengthened the perception among Germany’s Western partners that German policy makers were capable of maintaining good relations with their Russian counterparts. This created an expectation among the Western allies that German politicians would also secure Russia’s support for the idea of overcoming the Iron Curtain division of the continent.

2. European Community First

This factor was immediately explicit as a contradiction to the enlargement idea. It engaged German policy makers in a project of deepening Western integration, which was a condition of the unification imposed on Germany by Western partners. As such it blocked a possibility of introducing another direction of the European Community/Union development simultaneously, because Germany’s partners would perceive it as Germany’s ambivalence on deepening the integration.

Germany’s Western European partners saw a prospect of liberation of the German state from the post-War restraints as endangering their interests. The way of containing this danger was to bind new Germany more tightly into the Western integration. It is often quoted that president François Mitterrand was supposed to have said to Minister Genscher: ‘Either German unification will follow European unification or you will find yourself opposing a triad [France, Great Britain and Russia] — and that will lead into a
war. If German unification will take place after European unification we will help you."62

This represented a fear, shared by most of Germany’s Western partners, of the increase of the German power.

According to a structuralist approach material factors decide that Germany is the most powerful state in the European Union and Europe. However, as Adrian Hyde-Price pointed out, it is domestic factors that decide about power capabilities of a state nowadays. They are demographics, territorial size, resource endowment, wealth and economic structure, industrial financial and technological capabilities, but also non-material factors such as societal cohesion and the stability of the political system.63 All these elements contributed to Germany’s position of the most powerful state in Europe. That provoked a question of how the new Germany was going to use its power.

West Germany’s foreign policy was never conducted from a position of power. For this reason Germany gained a reputation of ‘ostentatiously modest power’.64 This transformation of the German power was never possible to explain by the realist approach. The phenomenon provoked application of numerous new notions of a state power — starting from the ‘soft power’, through the ‘trade power’, to the most developed conceptually notion of the ‘civilian power’ elaborated after Germany’s unification.65 All these notions reflected a place of Germany within the multilateral context of the international institutions like the EC or NATO. As Peter Katzenstein explained ‘the legitimate exercise of German power can occur only through Europe’s complex institutional arrangements’.66 The so-called Franco-German engine of the European integration was seen as one of the examples of the ‘soft Lockean’ power. Kenneth Dyson and Klaus Goetz noted nevertheless that German foreign policy spanned between power and constraints, and used the ‘state power’ to influence the behaviour of others, in order to obtain desired outcomes. While pointing to this facet of the exercising power in the environment of the EU this research refers to the ‘institutional power’ of the German

62 See for example: Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung, Siedler, 1991
63 Hyde-Price, Interests, Institutions and Identity…, op.cit.
65 A summary can be found in Charlie Jeffery, William Paterson, “Germany’s Power in Europe”, ESRC- IGS Discussion Paper 2000/10
66 Katzenstein, Tamed Power …, op.cit., p.304
This power, in spite of the positive post-War experience of Germany’s partners with Germany’s power, now was perceived a threat. The fear prompted actions aimed at curbing Germany’s power: Western partners, France first of all demanded Germany’s commitment to deepening the Western integration. A basic tool was at the time a pledge to embrace the EMU.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl fully complied with these demands. He based Germany’s unification rhetoric on the assertion that ‘Reunification and West-integration are the two sides of the same coin’\(^68\). He also confirmed Germany’s commitment to the European Community integration. In a speech delivered a few weeks after Germany’s Western partners initiated the preparation to the Two Plus Four Conference Chancellor explicitly said ‘Our political goal continues to be acceleration of European integration wherever possible (…) we want to advance towards a political European Union above and beyond the significant Single Market, which is to be completed by 31 December 1992 and the Economic and Monetary Union’\(^69\). This was reiterated at every important event.

In the Bundestag on 22 November 1990, in a speech on the next meeting of the European Council in Rome, Kohl declared: ‘For us Germans— and I want to emphasise this — the parallelism of the two intergovernmental conferences is of fundamental importance. Our core goal is, and will remain, the political union of Europe. As important as the Economic and Monetary Union is to us, in my opinion it would remain a piecemeal solution if did not realise a Political Union at the same time: both goal are inseparable’\(^70\). Kohl’s party colleagues echoed his rhetoric\(^71\), but it was his voice that

\(^67\) The notion of the institutional power is related to the Germany’s power in Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and William E. Paterson, Germany’s European Diplomacy: Shaping the regional milieu. Manchester, Manchester University Press 2000. Also the notion is elaborated in the field of sociology; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall offer a fourfold taxonomy of power in International Politics: (i) Compulsory Power — the direct control of one actor over another, (ii) Institutional Power — the control exercised indirectly over others through diffuse relations of interaction, (iii) Structural Power — the constitution of subjects’ capacities in direct structural relation to one another, determines what kind of social beings actors are and (iii) Productive Power — the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification (overlapping often with the previous one), in: Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, International Organization 59, Winter 2006


\(^70\) Bulletin der Bundesregierung, Nr. 136, 23 November 1990, p.1408 (the translation of the author)

\(^71\) The foreign policy spokesman for the CDU/CSU group in Bundestag Karl Hornhues stated “Some countries want political union because they fear the dominance of a unified Germany; we should exploit this fear before it diminishes”, The Economist commented
determined the direction of the German policy and shaped the perception among Germany’s partners.

This rhetoric was backed with concrete political actions. As early as December 1989, Helmut Kohl outlined the link between the EMU and political union in a letter to president François Mitterrand. The proposal was described by observers as a package deal, and would be repeatedly exposed in subsequent speeches of Chancellor Kohl. Moreover, when German policy makers assumed a leadership in formulating the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, it proved Germany’s commitment to deepening the European integration beyond doubts. While the expectations of the Western partners were that Germany would comply with their demands, the congruency of German and European interests was perceived as limited; the commitment of Germany to the integration was supposed to be not on Germany’s, but its partners’ terms. French politicians especially used to oppose ‘excessive German plans’, such as fundamental ideas for a new organization of the EU. Nonetheless, Germany met the imposed conditions through concrete actions that corresponded with the rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl.

The commitment of the new Germany to deepening the European integration is according to majority of observers a chief proof of Germany’s continuity of the pre-unification premises of the foreign policy. Paradoxically at the time, the calls of Eastern Europeans were also based on the concept of European integration on the one hand, although in a new, broader sense than the integration of Western Europe, and on the conviction that the power of the German position within the European Community would secure a leadership necessary for introducing the enlargement idea on the EC/EU agenda. Contrary to Chancellor Kohl’s rhetoric about support for both directions of the European

on it sarcastically: “This is where Germany’s good Europeans start to sound like good blackmailers” (“A German Idea of Europe”, The Economist, 27 July 1991, p.28) indicating the limits of congruency between interests of Germany and other European countries.

72 Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage… op.cit., pp.98-100

73 The challenge of devoting Germany to the European integration pursued by President Mitterrand was at the beginning of the 1990s priority, the French version of the European integration differed from a German one. While German politicians opted for a federal European state, their French counterparts contrary — opposed any loss of national sovereignty in key areas and — as it was observed by some German commentators — only accepted integration if it served as a useful tool to pursue the interest of limitation of German economic and political power. See: Frenkel, “German at Maastricht …, op.cit.

74 See for example Thomas Banchoff, “German Identity and European Identity”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5 No 3, September 1998
integration the expectations of Germany’s partners presented German policy makers with the necessity to make a choice.

IV. OPTIONS

European Imprint

The idea of the European integration in its new emerging broader sense, as epitomising the unification of the continent, captured by Chancellor Kohl in the ‘two-sides coin’ phrase worked in favour of the EC/EU enlargement. It lacked, however, substantiation. In its older, narrower aspect of the Western Europe’s integration, which was summed up in the Maastricht Treaty, it worked against a tangible support for the enlargement by Germany’s policy makers for three reasons.

At the beginning of the 1990s Western integration was both more important and more attractive to German policy makers, but even if they wanted to support more actively both direction, their choices at the time were limited. A projected increase of the German power created impossible to ignore nervousness among Germany’s partners. Germany’s position in the EC/EU was of a leading power. This power was, however, kept in check by Germany’s partners; any major decision of the German government was immediately confronted with the question ‘a German Europe, or a European Germany?’75. This limited possibilities of manoeuvre for German policy makers regarding the EU enlargement. If their support for this idea was too strong, the EU partners could perceive it that Germany was growing more assertive in pursuing its own interests.

Limiting German power had at the basis economic dimension — it kept engaging German resources, especially financial. The insistence on Germany’s commitment to the Western integration conflicted with the idea of engaging German political and economic

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75 Joseph Grieco elaborating on an earlier insight by Hans Morgenthau suggests that European integration may be the result of the attempts of other member states to constrain Germany especially after it has emerged potentially stronger after unification. According to Grieco “if states share a common interest and undertake negotiations on rule constituting a collaborative arrangement, then the weaker but still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules so constructed will provide sufficient opportunities for them to voice their concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least ameliorate their domination by stronger partners”. See: Joseph Grieco, “State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union”, in: Benjamin Frankel, Realism: Restatements and Renewal, London Frank Cass, 1996, p. 34; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. New York: Knopf, 1973, p. 509
power into the project of the EU expansion. Each direction, the deepening and widening, was expected to bring certain financial costs upon the member states, but the widening of the EU, i.e. acceptance of the poor, post-communist East European countries, was anticipated as more expensive.

The supportive for both directions rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl suggested a possibility of endorsing both challenges simultaneously. However, both directions were perceived and presented by the EU member states, and in elite discourse, as contradictory. A discussion over the priorities for the EC was not new and generated ideas of various speeds of integration for various countries. It promoted two close advisers of Helmut Kohl, Michael Mertes and Norbert Prill, to pointing to such a possibility already in July 1989. They published a draft of a European architecture of concentric circles, in which France, Germany and other EC countries would be in the first circle, Britain along with other ‘reluctant’ member states would be in the second and Eastern Europe — in the third one. They also stressed that both directions, deepening and widening of integration, would cause tension for both political and economic dynamics.\footnote{Michael Mertes, Norbert Prill, “Der verhängnisvolle Irrtum eines Entweder-Oder. Eine Vision für Europa”, \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, 19 July 1989}

These arguments presented a complex dilemma for German politicians of an either-or choice. They did not take up actions on promoting the enlargement of the EC at the time of the unification, responding first to a more forceful demand of commitment to the deeper integration of the European Community.\footnote{See e.g. Horst Teltschik, \textit{329 Tage…}, op. cit.; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, \textit{Rebuilding a House Divided}, Broadway, 1998} Yet, although it was a condition of the unification, Germany’s partners also formulated much broader expectations they held towards the new, more powerful Germany. The scope of these expectations is reflected in the key document of the time — the Ten-Point plan for the unification that Chancellor Kohl presented on 28 November 1989, and which was accepted by all three major political parties of Germany: the ruling at the time Kohl’s party CDU/CSU, its partner in the government Free Democrats (FDP) and the opposite Social Democrats (SPD).\footnote{During the session of the Bundestag on this day. See: Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographische Berichte, Sitzung 11/173, 28 November 1989, pp. 13510—14. Also: “Zehn-Punkte-Plan zur Deutschlandpolitik”, \textit{Frankfurter Rundschau}, 29 November 1989} The plan specified three areas for which Chancellor felt that the new Germany would have responsibility:

77 See e.g. Horst Teltschik, \textit{329 Tage…}, op. cit.; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, \textit{Rebuilding a House Divided}, Broadway, 1998  
1. The first was the area of the West European integration and the continuity of the FRG’s foreign policy based on institutionalised multilateral cooperation.

2. Securing sensitive relations with the Soviet Union was the second area. Soviet support for changes in Central and Eastern Europe, including unification of Germany, depended to the high degree on the American policy and the way the U.S. government was treating the Soviet leaders\(^7\). But it was also a challenge for the German politicians. Helmut Kohl had to work personally on wining support of the Soviets. Western partners also expected German politicians to secure smooth relations with Russia vis-à-vis the change of international orientation of the Eastern countries’ towards the West.

3. Successful unification expanded Germany’s European responsibilities into the Eastern Europe. New democracies turned to Germany for support and help with their application for the EC/EU and NATO membership. This role was not imposed on Germany like the deeper commitment to the European integration, but it was expected of Germany because of its powerful position both in the EC and NATO. It was not only the expectation of Germany’s European partners, but of the Americans as well.

After winning the elections of December 1990 Chancellor Kohl reiterated the commitment to the European integration and presented Germany’s position on the EU deepening and widening projects in more detail in the programme of his new government in January 1991\(^8\). It included the following objectives:

- Completion of the Single Market,
- Removal of border controls,
- Subsidiarity and cultural diversity,
- Empowering the European Parliament,
- Creation of a common foreign and security policy, and of economic and monetary union,
- Creation of the social chapter, and linking it up closely intergovernmental conferences on monetary and political union

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\(^7\) Zelikow, Rice, *Germany Unified…*, op. cit.

While presenting the programme Kohl stressed that the EU should be open for other European countries and that the East European states should have a ‘European perspective’. He clarified this statement further two months later, saying ‘this does not mean that we can accept all European countries tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, but it does mean that we do not exclude anyone if the conditions for membership are fulfilled’\(^1\). This reflects accurately a place of the enlargement idea versus the integration project in the political concept of the German European policy in 1991.

2. Enlargement Not Critical

At the time of the unification negotiations while presenting the reasons for the integration commitment Chancellor Kohl stressed that the unified Germany needed to be anchored in a more integrated Europe. This would give political assurance to its neighbours and prevent ‘any recidivist behaviour by future German governments’\(^2\). This concern was the main force behind the German insistence on the Maastricht Treaty. The EMU, projected in the Treaty, was regarded by Kohl as essential in order to give the Union the capability to act as ‘Europe’s anchor of stability that was to be accompanied by efforts to build a political union’\(^3\).

Despite the fact then, that structural determinants of Germany’s power after the unification allowed Germany to ‘go it alone’, Germany chose the consistency in its foreign policy. The fact that Germany, with its new sovereign status, accepted the commitment to the further and increased multilateral interdependence within the European Union, prompted commentators to declaring the continuity of the European and multilateral premises of the German foreign policy\(^4\). This continuity was also congruent

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\(^1\) Solidarität und Bereitschaft zur Verantwortung. Die Rolle Deutschlands in Europa, on 13 March 1991, in Kohl, *Bilanzen und Perspektiven…*, op.cit., p. 818


\(^4\) Thomas Banchoff elaborating on the new identity of the new Germany asked why Germany had not embraced a more assertive and independent foreign policy choosing to make an active Ostpolitik a priority over deeper European integration?; in: Thomas Banchoff, “German Identity… op.cit. A typical is also the observation like the one Christian Deubner evolved his analysis around: “However,
with Germany’s interests; the commitment to the deeper integration was as much a result of conditioning the unification, as the fact that Western integration was in many respects congruent with Germany’s interests.

Germany’s dedication to the European integration was first a consequence of the choices made in the WWII aftermath. After 40 years of multilateral and increasingly closer cooperation within the European project, in which Germany played a fundamental role, at the moment of regaining the state’s unity and sovereignty, German politicians held that national interests lay in the further multilateral cooperation within the European structures. Germany neither could afford, nor wanted to change these cornerstone premises, risking loss of the reputation of a civilian power that was built over decades. These credentials represented a core value of Germany’s position in the international realm and within the structures of the EU.

Germany’s European commitment coalesced with the political culture of reticence and presented opportunities for exercising a soft state power. German policy makers found their involvement in cooperation within the EC/EU structures satisfying, because it provided an opportunity to influence the shape of these structures and this cooperation. This supposition does not have a pejorative connotation. The EC/EU membership was conceptualised in terms of multilayered interactions of interests, institutions and ideas. German politicians exercised institutional power within the European Community through ‘exporting’ German domestic institutional models, policy preferences, and the ‘ways of doing things’. It gave Germany a significant position within the EU.

despite the epochal events of 1989–90, the Federal Republic continued to make the deepening of European integration a priority over its widening. When the twin goals of deepening and widening conflicted, as they did periodically in 1993–4, the Kohl government placed greater emphasis on the former. French concerns about a possible shift of the EU’s centre of gravity eastward were apparently one reason Kohl abandoned plans to make widening a central issue of Germany’s 1994 EU presidency. In: Christian Deubner, Deutsche Europapolitik Von Maastricht nach Kerneuropa?, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 1995


86 As it was put by Jeffrey Anderson “Bonn’s general goal in Europe was to erect institutional and normative frameworks at the supranational level that would nurture its successful domestic economic formula”, in: Jeffrey Anderson, German Unification and the Union of Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 13; see also Dyson and Goetz citing Jeffrey Anderson, “Hard Interests, Soft Power and Germany’s Changing Role in Europe”, in: Katzenstein, ed. Tamed Power…, op.cit.
The fact, that German post-war foreign policy was based on the belief that integration with the Western community would strengthen Germany\textsuperscript{87}, resulted in ‘Europeanization of the German state identity’\textsuperscript{88}. This notion represents a strategy for German national interests seeking to shape the surrounding milieu\textsuperscript{89}. From the German leaders’ point of view a supranational identity did not rule out clashes with other EU members. Hans-Dietrich Genscher in his speech on the Maastricht Treaty during the Bundestag debate of December 1991\textsuperscript{90}, stressed that Germany might not always be able to prevail under the weighted majority voting of the Council of Ministers. He added that Germans should accept such outcomes ‘in a European spirit’ and work upon them.

This represents a facet of a state power in the European context that is explainable with the liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions, which emphasise the bargaining between member states as the driving force of the development of the European Union. In the rationalist spirit Gunther Hellmann also pointed to a concept of ‘self-binding’ of Germany’s power in order to reassure its neighbours about its reliability\textsuperscript{91}. This motive, the assurance of the EC partners that a unified Germany would remain loyal to the Community was according to Joseph Grieco the reason why German leaders accepted the EMU in 1990-1991\textsuperscript{92}. German leaders accepted the EMU however before the unification, already in 1988. During the unification they reiterated and strengthened this commitment. This circumstance points to constructivist perspective as the tool for explaining the origins of the choice of multilateralism but as Peter Katzenstein put it, the context for German foreign policy is Europeanization: ‘\textit{this is not to argue that German policy reflected idealistic motives in the 1980s or 1990s. It did not. It reflected German}'

\textsuperscript{87} Bulmer and Paterson point that “German diplomatic resources were enhanced tangibly through the integration process; e.g. foreign policy cooperation among the EC states served as important multilateral tool for a political dwarf”. In: Bulmer and Paterson, “Germany in the European Union: gentle … , op. cit.

\textsuperscript{88} Goetz, Integration policy in a Europeanised state, … op.cit.; Katzenstein, ed., Tamed Power…, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{89} Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, Germany’s European Diplomacy…, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{90} Verhandlungen, 13 December 1991: 5822


interests. But those interests, pursued through power and bargaining, were fundamentally shaped by the institutional context of Europe and the Europeanization of the identity of the German state that had taken place in the preceding decades.\(^93\)

The chief interest of Germany at the beginning of the 1990s decade was to regain the full sovereignty in the world of national sovereign states. It was the driving force of the German foreign policy at the moment of the structural opening. And the challenges Germany had to meet, to overcome peacefully the Russian obstacle and to commit to the deeper Western integration, became the priority for the German foreign policy. The idea of the Eastward expansion of the European Community/Union was not critical for the main goal of the German foreign policy.

V. RESULTS

Not the Same Coin

The Eastern European governments pushed the European Community for an explicit commitment to the goal of enlargement.\(^94\) That required, however, a leadership on the EC side. Eastern Europeans expected Germany to assume this role, and so did the U.S. administration. Preoccupation of the German government with the unification created a vacuum. It was filled with a highly unsatisfactory for the Eastern Europeans solution.

The calls for widening the European Community forced the EC members to responding in a more tangible way than just rhetorically. To the disappointment of the East Europeans, the EC members did not offer opening the door to the EC, starting negotiations of the terms and conditions of accession, what East European diplomacy

\(^{93}\) Peter J. Katzenstein, “United Germany in an Integrating Europe”, in: Katzenstein, ed., Tamed Power..., op. cit., p.14-15

\(^{94}\) For example the Polish chief negotiator in the association negotiations with the EC, Krzysztof Olechowski, stated “that “the technocratic approach” is not enough in these negotiations, which have a historic goal: give Europe back to Poland, and Poland back to Europe”. See: Europe 5456, 21 March 1991, 4. In 1990, Hungarian Foreign Minister Kodolanyi argued that the Iberian enlargement “had been the result of a political settlement” (pushing economic problems in the background) and “that the Community would do the right thing now to take a similar decision”, see: Europe 5206, 3 March 1990, 5. Not only Poles, Czechs or Hungarians were stressing the historical and moral side of the enlargement challenge. When Italy blocked negotiations with Slovenia because of open property questions, Slovenian officials also brought history and European identity into play. President Kucan argued that “Slovenia would again have the feeling that it is the victim of a historical error if it were refused access to the European Union” and warned that “Italy cannot allow itself to oppose Slovenia”s accession as it would be placing a self-centred position before European interests”. See Europe 6263, 30 June 1994, 6
strived and worked for. The EC members agreed instead to offer merely a packet of economic concessions, and only to three Eastern countries that were known as the Višegrad Group\textsuperscript{95}— Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It was the European Council and the European Commission, supported by the French president François Mitterrand, who first offered an initiative to respond to the developments in Eastern Europe. In the summer of 1989 the Council proposed financial assistance to the new Eastern democracies\textsuperscript{96}, and in December that year the creation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Subsequently, in February and April 1990, the European Commission offered association arrangements that took the shape of the Europe Agreements\textsuperscript{97}.

A proposal of association arrangements presented an occasion for German policy makers to put forward an offer congruent with the direction set in the supportive for the enlargement rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl. Kohl’s government, however, did not present its own proposals, accepting only those of the Western partners.

The packet, called Europe Agreements, was viewed not only by Eastern Europeans, but also by many Western observers as a ‘defence instrument’ of the EC members, designed to keep East European countries outside the EC\textsuperscript{98}. The outcome of the negotiations of the Agreements was even more disappointing than initial design, and it was the German representation, which contributed to this disappointment. Although

\textsuperscript{95} It was created in February 1991, when the leaders of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia established a Višegrad Group as a common front and tool to press for integration with the EC and other Western organisations; the name comes form the Hungarian village, in which the leaders of these countries met for the first time a year before, in April 1990 to discuss a commons strategy versus the Western organisations. For other details see: http://www.Višegradgroup.org/.

\textsuperscript{96} “Conclusions of the Presidency Adopted at the End of the European Council in Madrid, 26 and 27 June 1989”, Bulletin of the European Communities 6, 1989

\textsuperscript{97} It was an initiative of the European Council to response in an organised way to the changes in the East; at the summit of G7 in Paris in July 1989 it was decided that the European Commission should coordinate the financial assistance for Poland and Hungary, what has become the PHARE fund. The proposal of founding the EBRD was presented by François Mitterrand at the European Council meeting in Strasbourg in December 1989. And it was the European Commission that proposed officially in April 1990 opening the negotiations over association agreements. See “Conclusions of the Presidency Adopted at the End of the European Council in Strasbourg, 8 and 9 December 1989”, Bulletin of the European Communities 12, 1989

\textsuperscript{98} Barbara Lippert and Heinrich Schneider claim the proposal of the Europe Agreements was burdened with the “strategic ambivalence”: Barbara Lippert and Heinrich Schneider, “Association and Beyond: the European Union and the Višegrad States”, in: Barbara Lippert and Heinrich Schneider, (eds.), “Monitoring Association and Beyond. The European Union and the Višegrad States”, Europäische Schriften des Instituts für Europäische Politik, Band 74, Europa Union Verlag Bonn, 1995, p.26; Heinz Kramer, “The European Community”s response to the New Eastern Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies, NO 31/2, 1993
initially German policy makers voiced their support for the association agreements with the East and Central European states, it turned out that economic interests of the German agriculture and steel industry were in conflict with the idea of opening market to cheaper competitors from the East.

Of the proposed packet of economic accords, only the liberalization of trade was successfully delivered. The removal of barriers in the areas of agriculture, coal, steel and textiles industries, which was vital for introducing free market economies in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, remained in the sphere of intentions. The negotiations over Europe Agreements conducted in June/July 1991, six months after the unification of Germany, were interrupted when the Polish negotiators walked away from the table, protesting against changes in the EC offer. The incident had bad perception in the Eastern countries; it was a shock for Eastern Europeans that the EC members were so defensive in keeping the status quo, and that the main opposition came from France, which originally had proposed the negotiations, and Germany.99

Both countries’ domestic interests were at stake, but it was France leading the opposition, with Germany following. As Ulrich Sedelmeier noted ‘Although Germany as a whole had the strongest interest among EU members in stability in Eastern Europe, concessions to some sectors of domestic industry led to a highly restrictive stance on market access in the Europe Agreements negotiations. Not only did it contradict a strictly economic logic, if one takes into account the considerable future export opportunities for German industry, but in the broader political context it undermined an otherwise consistent political strategy which combined substantial financial aid with support for eventual membership’100. The barrage of criticism was directed mainly at Germany, although the German position was not as rigid as the French one. German negotiators

99 The European Agreements were eventually signed up in December that year, however in a much narrowed down version, without the vital for the Eastern countries part. The bitter shock was a subject of numerous articles in the press of Poland and Czechoslovakia; how deep was the disappointment shows the opinion of the then Polish Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, who commented in the interview with the author that “we should have first negociated the concrete help from the European Community and the opening of their market for our products, then to run the general elections, which brought Poland democracy and independence”. The same comment Bielecki applied to the case of the Czech Velvet Revolution as the perception of the failure of European Agreements in Czechoslovakia was similar to this in Poland.
100 Ulrich Sedelmeier, “The European Union”s association policy towards Central and Eastern Europe”, Sussex European Institute Discussion Paper, 2001, p. 14
favoured setting up long transitional periods, while the French representatives opposed transitional periods altogether.

The passive stance of the German government was not an exception among the EC members. The Community’s response to the East European calls for enlargement was to stall rather than to act. As Sedelmeier and Wallace put it, they ‘reflected a sense that something had to be done, but not a policy’. The Commission proposed negotiation of the association agreements but sought to avoid any reference to the future accession. In its communication to the Council, the Commission clearly stated that the associations would not represent a sort of membership ‘antichamber’ and the issue of the membership would not be excluded, but for the time being this was a ‘separate question’. It presented a sharp contrast with the rapid inclusion of the former GDR into the EC; the EC institutions showed far-reaching flexibility in arranging coordinating mechanism, which was exceptional and unconventional in the EC practices.

The support for the enlargement idea Chancellor Kohl declared in his rhetoric, the unification of Germany, and the embracement of the GDR into the EC, created expectations that Germany would lead the enlargement process. Those factors raised hopes in Eastern Europe and fears in the Western part. These opposing perceptions marked the room of manoeuvre for German policy makers and presented the reason why Chancellor’s rhetoric was designed carefully, without indicating specific prospects.

In October 1990 Helmut Kohl declared ‘our offer is aimed at the reform states of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, to guide them to the European Community as early and as closely as possible through an association geared at their needs’. As the pressure during the German unification was on securing Russian support and leaving

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102 Sedelmeier and Wallace, Policies Towards…, op.cit.
103 See for example Jose I. Torreblanca, The reuniting of Europe: promises, negotiations and compromise. Ashgate, 2001
104 Europe 5185, 2 February 1990
106 Kohl, Bilanzen und Perspektiven… op.cit, p. 687
no doubts about the Western integration commitment, German policy makers did not push for tighter, earlier arrangements with Eastern Europe. Chancellor Kohl, while presenting the goals of his new government in January 1991, assured that East European states should have a ‘European perspective’. He stressed at the same time, however, that it did not mean that ‘we can accept all European countries tomorrow or the day after tomorrow’, but that ‘we do not exclude anyone if the conditions for membership are fulfilled’107.

SUMMARY

The described inconsistency between Chancellor’s pronouncement of ‘Europe’s unification’ as identical with ‘Germany’s unification’, and the lack of adequate actions that would support this idea on the European Community level, created ambivalence in Germany’s initial policy towards the EC Eastern enlargement, and in Eastern Europe a fear that the Chancellor’s rhetoric was only a lip service. This empirical evidence points to a question: was it possible for the German Chancellor, at the time of Germany’s unification, to back up his own rhetoric with tangible actions and use more resolutely for example the Europe Agreements’ planning and negotiations?

To explain Germany’s enlargement policy at the unification moment one has to look at the structural level of the geopolitical order. The presence of the Soviet troops in East Germany was the first factor. Germany’s partners’ fears of the enhanced German power prompted imposing on Germany a condition of committing to the deeper Western integration, which was the second factor. Both created a grip, which did not leave German policy makers much room for the normative approach during the negotiations of the unification. Despite thus that German policy makers stressed that the unification of their country fulfilled a normative goal of ending bipolar confrontation, at the unifying Germany remained at the time still subordinate to the Cold War order. On the other hand, the normative rhetoric of Helmut Kohl was countered by its Western partners with the rational calculation of the political and economic costs of Germany’s unification. The EC members used the deepening EC integration instrumentally in the context of Germany’s

unification. Although the introduction of the single currency had been planned as the next step of upgrading the integration before 1990s, but Germany’s unification speeded up the process; Germany’s partners used the EC deepening project as a tool for containing Germany’s prospective super-power.

In this way international environment shaped German government’s actions: they were aimed at meeting Western partners’ terms and winning the Soviet acceptance. Rationalist politics of Germany’s partners limited the constructivist narrative, as the German foreign policy became a narrow channel for subordinating all efforts to the unification goal. A challenge of the EC Eastern enlargement prompted response and the response given by Chancellor Helmut Kohl was in the spirit of multilateralism of the German foreign policy. Given the demands of Western partners of Germany he could not though push for an early enlargement. The lack of actions, the absence of a more supportive for the Eastern Europeans stance during the Europe Agrrements negotiations, created ambivalence in Germany’s early policy towards the enlargement. As the supportive rhetoric was built by Chancellor Helmut Koh, the question about this passive stance concerns first his person as the main actor.

During the unification process, Chancellor Kohl fully demonstrated the ability of independent setting a guideline for state policies. Famously, when the Chancellor’s Office drew up the Ten-Point plan for the unification, none of the government ministries or any major partners abroad were consulted. Kohl did it empowered by the constitutional prerogatives for setting a Richtlinie, a guideline for the state policies. This evidence points out that the dispersion of power in the German policy-making apparatus does not affect the power of the Chancellor in formulating the policy either in the internal or external domain. ‘In principle, the fragmentation of foreign policy has not limited the scope or influence of the chancellor as the most important foreign policy actor’ — writes Judith Siwert-Probst.

Chancellor Kohl used to sometimes reserve the right to have the ‘last word’ on some issues, declaring them to be ‘Chefsache’. Chefsache is rather an exception than the rule. The circumstances of the unification were unique by all means and called for

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exceptional measures. The idea of embracing Eastern Europe was novel and unprecedented too, yet it did not become a Chefsache. Nor did Chancellor present it to his European partners as a matter for consideration. Apart from the rhetoric the idea did not receive any support from the German Chancellor at the time. The main explanation is that Chancellor’s top priority was the unification, and that the conditions presented by Western partners required his utmost attention. But it also points to probability that Chancellor Kohl was undecided about the enlargement idea yet.

Henning Tewes who looked into the nexus Germany’s unification-EC enlargement, indicates that the fact that Chancellor Kohl did not present a guideline on the issue of Europe Agreements created chaos in the negotiations. Details of agreements like the Europe Agreements are rarely elaborated on the level of the chief of government; the Chancellor usually sets Richtlinie (guideline), and the others negotiate details. Europe Agreements dealt with a change in two sectors, of agriculture and steel industry. Representatives of both sectors had at the time extensive experience in defending their interests in the EC, especially on the Common Agriculture Policy. Chancellor Kohl left the room for them to negotiate. That was a reflection of the dispersion of power in the German policymaking system, which is most apparent in negotiations of economic/financial arrangement on the EC/EU level.

In sum — the opinion that Chancellor Kohl was an architect of the enlargement could suggest that the enlargement was an initiative launched by German politicians. It was not. German politicians were preoccupied with the unification of their country and were far from embracing the enlargement idea on the policymaking level in the years 1990-1992. But paradoxically with the Helmut Kohl’s persuasive, ideational argument about the unification of Germany as identical with the unification of the whole continent, the Eastern enlargement idea gained crucially important spur of support from one of the main actors on the European stage. The Kohl’s unification rhetoric represents the first dimension of the normative reasoning that will be from this moment onwards behind the German support for the enlargement. It also represents the beginning of the change of the concept of the European integration. German elite discourse and German policy will contribute immensely to this change.

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109 Tewes, Germany, *Civilian Power…*, op.cit.
CHAPTER 3

Past Legacy in Bilateral Relations
As the Cause of Ambivalence
In Germany’s Policy Towards the EC/EU Enlargement
1990 — 2002

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines perception and manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy that were caused by the problems stemming from the past legacy in bilateral relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours. The perception of ambivalence was created by reluctance of the German government executives to solve these problems, because it contradicted the reasoning behind their supportive for the enlargement rhetoric. The manifestation of ambivalence was caused by the actions of non-government actors, who attempted to block the Czech application for the EU membership on the grounds of unresolved claims pertaining to the past legacy, which contradicted the support of the German government for the enlargement.

Historical legacy played double role in the German policy towards the EU enlargement. It provided the main normative reasoning for the support of the enlargement, but it also caused problems that interfered with this support. The year 1989
presented a ‘zero-hour’ in bilateral relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours and it faced German policy makers with a two-fold challenge. First was the necessity to achieve a post-WWII rapprochement with the neighbours, second — to avoid economic and political domination of the region. The EU enlargement idea was perceived as an excellent opportunity for achieving both goals. This reasoning presented the grounds for the German support of the enlargement. Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, whose formative experience was shaped by the WWII aftermath, supported ambitions of the Eastern European countries, particularly of Poland, for joining the EU and NATO structures, because they both considered such a support as a historical imperative for the German nation.

The relations between two sides were burdened with a difficult, unresolved WWII legacy. The issue of the Eastern border of Germany, and the claims of the German expellees against the Czech government, overshadowed both the rapprochement process and the German enlargement policy. While during Helmut Kohl’s tenure these problems did not jeopardise the enlargement, they did after a generational change at the German government in 1998. Different rhetoric, and a costs-calculation oriented approach to the foreign policy of the new politicians at power, encouraged domestic expellees groups to using the EU enlargement instrumentally in attempt to win the claims.

The ‘past legacy’ factor reflects interplay between political calculations on the domestic level and actions on the international board. Expellees groups presented a significant part of the CDU/CSU constituency. Securing their support in elections required accommodating their demands. Government executives, both Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder kept distance to the problem, neither supporting the demands of expellees, nor denying them, which created a perception of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy. The demands of the expellees were used, however, as leverage in elections campaigns, and actions of other politicians aimed at helping the expellees’ cause, created a manifestation of ambivalence.

While both the perception and the manifestation of ambivalence in this case were caused by interplay between two levels of the game, external and internal, at the basis of this interplay was a clash of two different historical narratives that refer to the experience
of World War II and constitute a significant part of the German national identity; it is a constructivist perspective that can explain these narratives.

I. AMBIVALENCE

The support for the enlargement voiced by German policy makers was perceived as contradicted by conflicts in bilateral relations between Germany and Poland, and was contradicted in relations with the Czech Republic. The conflict was caused by unresolved legacy of the past. A problem of this legacy overshadowed mutual relations for the most part of the enlargement process, from the moment of Germany’s unification into the early 2000s. At the initial stage of introducing the enlargement idea, this factor caused a perception of ambivalence; in the later phase of negotiations over the terms of enlargement it caused a manifestation of ambivalence.

A perception of ambivalence occurred as a gap between supportive for the enlargement rhetoric of German policy makers and their reluctance with solving problems of the past legacy. Ambivalence manifested as a contradiction between supportive for the enlargement rhetoric of government actors and actions of non-government ones, who held the power to influence the course of the enlargement. The perception of ambivalence was caused by the dispute over the Oder-Neisse border between Germany and Poland, which occurred during the negotiations of Germany’s unification. The manifestation of ambivalence was a result of actions of the German deputies to the European Parliament, who put forth a demand of the German expellees’ organizations for annulment of the so-called Beneš Decrees, making it a precondition of the Czech membership in the EU. The call jeopardised directly the Czech accession application.

Neither issue was directly related to the EU enlargement process. The question thus is how did it create a perception and manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy?

The past legacy problems belong to the bilateral relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours — Poland, and Czechoslovakia, after 1993 — the Czech Republic. Germany’s policy towards the Eastern enlargement of the EU was a dominant part of these relations, and German officials considered both countries, plus Hungary, as
frotnrunners of the enlargement. This was an indicator of the meaning German politicians attached to the relations with these countries. At the basis of this attitude was the sense of particular historical connection. German elites felt a strong moral obligation towards the Poles and the Czechs in the context of WWII. They also shared awareness of the role both nations played in the 1989 revolution, which opened up for Germany a path to unification.

The narrative referring to the experience of WWII has a special meaning because it is a foundation of the post-war national identity of the German nation. It is built around the imperative of breaking with the negative past experience of the war, and underlies Germany’s European identity and the premises of multilateral cooperation in the post-war German foreign policy. Continuity of this imperative into the post-unification time substantiated support for the EU enlargement, which was expressed in the supportive for enlargement rhetoric of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. He built this rhetoric during the unification time, relating Germany’s unification to the unification of the whole continent.

This support was received by Germany’s neighbours as a very strong confirmation of the will to overcome and solve problems of the past legacy. It was seen as a cornerstone of a new era in the mutual relations. This represents a normative, moral dimension of the German enlargement policy, which distinguishes it from enlargement policies of other EC/EU member states. Reluctance against solving problems of the past legacy undermined thus the image of the German government as willing to build new quality relations with the Eastern partners, and for this reason created a perception of ambivalence in the declared supportive stance on the enlargement. Both images and perceptions play an important role in politics and international relations and in relations between Germany and the Eastern neighbours constitute a significant part of their national identity narratives.

Out of the three countries only relation with Hungary was trouble-free. The relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic were heavily burdened. The most important issue between Germany and Poland was the status of the border. Although determined by the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, the border between two countries was provisional in legal terms and that served the revisionists claims. The German-Czech relations were troubled by the compensation claims for the lost territories
and properties, brought up by the German expellees, the so-called Sudeten Germans. Before 1989, their claims were solved only partially. The issue returned in the midst of Germany’s unification, casting shadow on the initial enthusiasm over the 1989 revolution, which was seen as a chance for break in the difficult history between Germany and the Eastern countries.

At the early stage, during the Germany’s unification process, both issues caused a perception of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement. The reluctance of Chancellor Helmut Kohl to confirm the Eastern border presented a strong contrast to his ‘two-sides coin’ rhetoric about the unification of Germany and of Europe. It caused a perception of ambivalence in the German stance on the enlargement in relation to Poland. A similar perception in relation to the Czech application for the EU membership was caused by a similarly reluctant attitude of Chancellor Kohl in regards to the issue of the Sudeten Germans’ claims, raised by the German expellees organizations against Czechoslovak authorities during the German unification.

The border issue was solved relatively quickly, although causing political tension and freezing for almost a year the German-Polish rapprochement. The Sudeten Germans’ claims against the Czech Republic were solved neither during the German unification nor in bilateral treaties. The reluctant stance of Helmut Kohl’s government, who did not interfere in the argument between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech authorities, caused the perception of ambivalence in the German policy towards the Czech Republic and its application for the EU membership. Despite later efforts to put bilateral relations on a reconciliation track, the problem of the Sudeten Germans kept returning and overshadowed the enlargement policy of the government of Gerhard Schröder.

Gerhard Schröder’s team brought different attitude towards the enlargement. A formative experience of Gerhard Schröder’s generation was not shaped by the WWII aftermath, but by the leftist student movement of 1968, which burst out in opposition to the Bonn Republic and its politics. This formed different attitudes in the area of national identity related to Germany’s past. A distinction brought into the foreign policy was not about its re-orientation, or breaking from its premises; the new Social Democrat–Green coalition government announced that it would pursue a much bolder advocacy of national interests. That encouraged expellees group to taking up more decisive actions: in order to
force the Czech government to meet their demands they attempted to block the Czech application to the EU. The action was carried out by the leading politicians of the CDU party and German deputies to the European Parliament, who both are a part of the German policymaking system. German government did not support these attempts, but the move caused a manifestation of ambivalence in the German policy towards the enlargement and the silence of the German executives over the issue exacerbated the perception of this ambivalence.

II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS

Enlargement — Leverage in Bilateral Relations

The end of the bipolar world created a possibility to break a power politics pattern in the mutual relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours. Elites on both sides understood that the post-war reconciliation between two sides was a precondition for a genuine reunification of Europe. They realised it would require overcoming two deeply rooted sets of resentments connected with WWII: Eastern Europeans’ distrust of Germans, rooted in the grave experience of the war, and German resentments over the post-war lost territories and expulsions.

This represents a background for what most observers and scholars indicate as the main reason of Germany’s support for the Eastern enlargement — the sense of historical responsibility and obligation towards Eastern Europe shared by majority of the German elites. According to the constructivist perspective, historical narratives can establish a link between identity and interests on the level of elite discourse. Such a discourse builds a narrative that interprets the past in the light of the present challenges. 

German historical narrative built the national identity presenting the narrative of departing from the atrocious experience of WWII. It also suggests a responsibility for the WWII consequences and points to the interest of overcoming the past.

In respect to Eastern Europe German elites felt responsibility that stemmed from the WWII atrocities inflicted by Nazis on the region and the 4-decades Soviet rule brought upon Eastern Europe as the result of the war. It is the very same foundation as

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110 Every analysis related to the German policy towards the EU enlargement refers to this factor. It has been elaborated in the most thorough way by Adrian Hyde-Price, Germany and European... op.cit.
the basis of the national identity narrative of discontinuity with the negative experience of
the past. But the moral call for supporting the enlargement had also another dimension.
As early as 1989 a respected German historian and political scientist Peter Bender
reminded, that forty years earlier the USA and the Western European states helped
Germany financially to lay down the foundation for the future wealth of the FRG. Now
Germany had a moral duty to help those in need. The call that ‘Germany cannot afford
the EC ended on the Oder-Neisse border’ exemplified the attitude of the majority of
the German elites at the time. From the constructivist point of view this was a narrative of
an extension of the key positive juncture in Germany’s history.

Historical circumstances made the post WWII rapprochement between two sides
much more challenging, however, than it was for Germany and the Western countries.112
The latter were neither burdened with comparably heavy experience of war atrocities, nor
were they alien to West Germany after WWII, like Eastern Europeans locked out behind
the Iron Curtain. Propaganda employed during the Cold War on both sides of the Curtain,
deepened the mutual hostility between Germany and Eastern countries, as both sides
were indoctrinated with a simplified and confrontational version of history113.

Solving the past legacy problems within a common institutional framework of the
EC/EU presented thus the best prospect for developing relations of new quality. As noted
by Adrian Hyde-Price the belief commonly shared by the German elites, that the
enlargement would provide a multilateral context for German relations with the Eastern
neighbours, coalesced with the strong sense of historical debt and moral responsibility

111 Peter Bender, “Die Grosse Chance für den alten Kontinent”, Die Zeit, 1 July 1989
112 On post-WWII reconciliation of Germany with France, Israel, Poland, the Czech Republic see: Lily Gardner-Feldman, “The
principle and Practice of Reconciliation in German Foreign Policy. Relations with France, Israel and the Czech Republic”,
International Affairs 75, no 2, 1999; Ann Philippps, “The Politics of Reconciliation”, German Politics, no 2, 1998; Michael Zielinski,
Friedensursachen. Genese Und Konstituierende Bedingungen Von Friedensgemeinschaften Am Beispiel Der Bundesrepubli
Deutschland Und Der Entwicklung Ihrer Beziehungen Ze Den USA, Frankreich Und Den Niederlanded, Baden-Baden: Nomos-
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995
113 For attempts of the Polish dissident writers to discuss the official communist propaganda and remembering true facts from the
Polish-German history see for example: Stanislaw Stomma, Czy Fatalizm Wrogosci, Refleksje o Stosunkach Polsko- Niemieckich
Ksenofobii Polakow”, in: Powiedzie sobie wszystko, Eseje o Sniejsztwie Polsko-Niemieckim, Wydawnictwo Polsko-Niemieckie,
Warszawa 1996
toward the Eastern countries\textsuperscript{114}. Membership in the common political structure of the EU, with certain state powers delegated to the common supranational body, would create a platform for creation of common interests, thus a much better environment for solving problems of the past.

There were three problematic areas that needed a change.

The first was the old Ostpolitik. It was originally addressed first and foremost to the Soviet Union. After 1989, the East Europeans’ goal was to break down their status of ‘buffer states’ between the West and Russia. The membership in the EU and NATO was seen as a possibility for obtaining this objective and Eastern Europeans sought German support for their ambitions. It required Germany to put the relations with the Eastern neighbours on equal terms with the relations with Russia, thus to depart from the ‘Moscow first’ premises.

The second challenge was of economic character and concerned the whole region. German policy makers felt obligated to prove that the unified Germany did not intend to assume a hegemonic position in the region and revive the notion of Mitteleuropa, which was historically loaded as a synonym for German tendencies to exercise a dominant power over the other states in the region\textsuperscript{115}. Again the EU framework would provide a more levelled ground for economic and political cooperation.

And the third issue was the WWII legacy. The Oder-Neisse border between Germany and Poland, claims of the expellees on the German side needed a reconciliation and political solution.

1. Challenge of Ostpolitik

This was a challenge to upgrade a conditional peace to a normal peace in mutual relations. These relations at the end of communism were, as Adrian Hyde-Price called it,

\textsuperscript{114} Hyde-Price, Germany and European... op.cit., p.183
\textsuperscript{115} Werner Weidenfeld, a historian and political scientist close to Chancellor Kohl and his informal aide on the European issues, categorically warned against using of the term Mitteleuropa as revisionist and belonging to an arsenal of old nationalist rhetoric; he emphasised that the notion was a key motive of the counter-western political thinking; in: Werner Weidenfeld, Der deutsche Weg, Berlin 1990, p. 175; On the fundamental shift in German foreign policy away form its Euro-Atlantic ties towards Central European locale rationalised on historically motivated grounds see: Bruno Schoch, “Renaissance der Mitte — Ein Fragwürdiger Bestandteil deutscher Ideologie kehrt wieder”, in the same editor, Deutschlands Einheit und Europa Zukunft, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992, pp.120-14
in a state of ‘conditional peace’\textsuperscript{116}. It was preceded by a ‘precarious peace’, based on a military balance of power and nuclear deterrence, which directly reflected the Cold War conditions. ‘Pecarious peace’ evolved into a ‘conditional peace’ under German Ostpolitik\textsuperscript{117}. This policy was launched by the SPD/FDP coalition in the years 1969-1972, under the intellectual leadership of Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD) and was continued throughout the 1980s by the CDU-FDP coalition of Helmut Kohl.

Its aim was rapprochement with the communist countries that would bring both German states closer together, according to the formula ‘change through rapprochement’ coined by Egon Bahr, Chancellor Brandt’s advisor. Therefore the main addressee of Ostpolitik was the Soviet Union. As the dominant power it determined the fate of the German-German relations; the recognition of the political dependence of the GDR on the Soviet Union was thus a precondition for rapprochement with the GDR\textsuperscript{118}. Ostpolitik was conceptualised in the early 1960s, and launched in the wake of the tragic Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. This intervention strengthened the conviction among West German politicians that acceptance of the status quo was the only possible way for a long-term change. In this sense Ostpolitik was subordinated to the relations with the Soviet Union. For this reason dissenters in Eastern Europe perceived Brandt’s Ostpolitik as the policy of appeasement.

A democratic (but illegal then) opposition to communism in Poland in the 1970s, which generated in 1980 an independent free trade union Solidarity, clashed with the premises of Ostpolitik. While German concept was based on the recognition of the existing political order, the Polish socio-political movement of Solidarity was based on contesting, and challenging this order. German politicians, especially of the SDP, the sponsor of Ostpolitik, openly distanced themselves from the Solidarity movement, even when the Polish military-led government dissolved Solidarity in December 1981, what


\textsuperscript{118} See for example Ash, In Europe’s Name..., op. cit.
was disapproved by most Western governments\textsuperscript{119}. The premises of the \textit{Ostpolitik} were in sharp contrast with the hopes of intellectual leaders of the \textit{Solidarity} movement and Czech dissidents too. Both were supporters of genuine reconciliation between the Poles and the Germans and took over the power in 1989 revolution\textsuperscript{120}.

For these reasons the assessment of \textit{Ostpolitik} is two-fold. \textit{Ostpolitik} is often given credit for making the 1975 Helsinki Security Conference possible, which was a focal point of the relations between the Soviet Union and the West at the time.

On the level of bilateral relations between Germany and the Eastern neighbours achievements were not that impressive. In case of Poland \textit{Ostpolitik} resulted in a conditional peace between two states and opened path for reconciliation\textsuperscript{121}. The famous \textit{Kneefall} of Chancellor Willi Brandt during his visit to the Warsaw Ghetto in December 1970\textsuperscript{122} started the rapprochement process and the transition from a precarious to a conditional peace. It also added a rare in diplomacy element of authenticity and emotions. It helped two nations after 1989 to reach relatively quickly a new level of cooperation.

In relations with the Czechs \textit{Ostpolitik} did not have a chance to make a difference. The rigid communist regime reinstated by the Soviets in Czechoslovakia after the 1968 Prague Spring rejected relations with the Federal Republic, leaving them in limbo for the next two decades. The support for the Czech application for the EU membership was seen therefore as a unique opportunity for the change in relations with this country.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} The preservation of good relations with the Soviet Union was for German policy makers the priority. Another result of the Ostpolitik doctrine was the attitude toward the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While the invasion was strongly disapproved by the U.S., a strategic ally of the FRG, German Chancellor Schmidt only reluctantly joined the U.S. sanctions campaign to boycott the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics. He was also the first Western leader to visit Moscow after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Chancellor Schmidt joined the boycott under strong pressure from the US: Zbigniew Brzeziński, the then security adviser of president Carter referred to Germany”s “self-finelandization” in the early 1980; see for example Zbigniew Brzeziński, “A Divided Europe: The Future of Yalta”, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1984/85
\item \textsuperscript{121} Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order…, op. cit.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Brandt acknowledged in this symbolic gesture Germany”s responsibility for the systematic extermination of the Polish Jews and won enthusiastic comments from Western and Polish observers.
\end{itemize}
2. Overcoming *Mitteleuropa* Syndrome

Enlargement was perceived in Germany also as an opportunity for avoiding a trap of ‘*Mitteleuropa*’ or ‘*Zwischeneuropa*’ syndrome\(^{123}\). Both notions returned in the elite discourse in the context of the post-unification increase of German power. As it was put by Jonathan P.G. Bach, ‘*Germany’s relationship with the East is especially complex, not only because of historical atrocities but because Germany and Eastern Europe constitute each others national imaginaries. They both existed historically on the borders of modernity. Eastern Europe bears the brunt of the mark of being ‘the lands between’ — between Germany and Russia, between East and West, but also between Enlightenment and Absolutism, agriculture and industrialization, ethnos and demos, between planned economies and free markets—*Zwischeneuropa*’\(^{124}\).

These observations pointed to a danger of potential political implications, if Germany was to dominate the region\(^{125}\). It was also a part of an elite discourse on this subject. An exchange between highly respected philosopher Jürgen Habermas, and political scientist Wolf Jobst Siedler is indicative here. Siedler expressed the view that in five to ten years’ time, when all difficulties connected with the unification would be overcome, Germany would achieve what ‘*Hitler was incapable of achieving with his army — the domination over the territories between Vistula, Dniepr and Donn, and the territories of Pommerania, Silesia, Czech and Moravs would join Germany*’\(^{126}\). In response to that Jürgen Habermas warned in the interview for *Le Monde* of September 1993: ‘*some are starting to dream about Germany as a super-power in centre of Europe.*

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\(^{123}\) Tewes, Germany, *Civilian Power*..., op.cit., p.51; And as it has been observed by Adrian Hyde-Price, the “geostrategic vulnerability of Zwischeneuropa” — as the “lands between” Germany and Russia — has been one of the four main sources of conflict in modern Europe. See: Hyde-Price, *Building a Stable Peace*..., op.cit. p.2


\(^{126}\) Arnulf Baring, *Deutschland, was nun?*... op.cit. pp. 15-16
Therefore one has to watch carefully the political mentality of the Germans facing the East. Many Germans have the feeling that in the East they meet their own history.¹²⁷

Zwischeneuropa is connected also with the historical ‘Moscow first’ tradition. After 1989 German elites started formulating opinions that ‘from a historical, moral and political perspective Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary matter for Germany more than Russia’¹²⁸ and that Moscow now, as Josef Joffe put it, ‘had very little to blackmail or to bribe Germany with’.¹²⁹ In the past, West Germany’s exposure to Soviet military might and the Soviet veto over the internal German relations ‘made for a separate détente [Soviet Union] and a good deal of propitiatory behaviour’. But after the unification and the retraction of the Soviet power, which was accompanied by tens of billions in ‘ransom’ money, the ‘Moscow Connection has dwindled into a latent option’.

These were prevailing opinions in the German elite discourse in the beginning of the 1990s, and congruent with political actions of the German representatives. It was Chancellor Kohl who set the direction of the future policy towards East European countries. In his speech at the Aspen Institute on 13 March 1991, Kohl declared that ‘our history and our geographical position in the centre of Europe put on our shoulders huge responsibility’.¹³º His statement was preceded a day before by a statement of one of the CDU leaders Alfred Dregger, who explained in an interview for Die Welt, that ‘our role is as follows: we are a reliable ally of the West and a sought after partner for the East’.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Le Monde, 19 September 1993; Jürgen Habermas expanded his thoughts on the issue of Germany as an ordinary state and suspicions about return of nationalism in an essays published in 1995: Jürgen Habermas, Die Normalität der Berliner Republik, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1995
¹²⁸ Thies, Germany and Eastern Europe…, op.cit., p.73-74. He was also one of not many German commentators who admitted that “the irony of history meant that German unification became reality because Poland was the first country fighting the Soviet status quo. The big earthquake was started by Solidarnosc and the people around Lech Walesa could stand the pressure because they had the Polish pope in Rome who was there like a lighthouse for a new political orientation. Next it was the Hungarians who speeded up developments in 1989”.
¹²⁹ Joffe, German Grand Strategy …, op.cit., p. 87
¹³¹ Die Welt, 12 March 1991
3. War Legacy

Both Germany and its Eastern neighbours shared understanding that the main challenge was to revive the process of historical reconciliation\textsuperscript{132}. A model was the Franco-German post-war reconciliation. There were however differences: the position of France vis-à-vis Germany was not comparable to that of Eastern countries vis-à-vis Germany\textsuperscript{133}, because of the asymmetry of the latter, both in political and economic terms. The way to reduce this asymmetry relatively fast, without waiting for levelling it in economic terms, was membership in a common political structure of the European Union.

Post war rapprochement concerned however the WWII legacy and that proved to be the most difficult and problematic. It caused a perception and manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy.

III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE

Bilateral Gridlocks

Two past-legacy issues caused a perception and manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy: a problem with recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as inviolable border between Germany and Poland caused perception of ambivalence and compensation claims of the German expellees organizations against the Czech Republic caused a manifestation of ambivalence. The border issue reflects the two-level game of Chancellor Helmut Kohl; the expellees’ claims issue stemmed from conflicting two narratives pertaining to the past — a narrative of overcoming the war legacy and a revisionist narrative.

Initial reactions in Eastern Europe to the German unification were similar to those in Western countries — anxiety over the return of the ‘German question’. There were however differences between Poland and Czechoslovakia in approaching the problem. Poland managed to deliver quickly a concept of new relations with Germany. It was

\textsuperscript{132} Friedbert Pflüger, “Polen-Unser Frankreich im Osten”, in: W. Schäuble, R.Seiters (Hrsg.) Außenpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, Die Thesen der Jungen Außenpolitiker, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn 1996

\textsuperscript{133} Ash, In Europe’s Name..., op.cit., pp. 310, 369-370
presented in autumn 1989, three months after the first free parliamentary elections in Poland, it was future oriented with indication of areas of cooperation. The first goal of the Poles was to put mutual relations on the path of reconciliation. Therefore, though not free from concerns, Polish elites were undivided in support for Germany’s unification. It was seen in Poland as a natural and necessary consequence of the Eastern European revolution, and highly congruent with the Polish interests\textsuperscript{134}. Polish side pointed to new responsibilities of the unified Germany as of ‘exporter of security and stability’\textsuperscript{135}. The Czech elites shared support for Germany’s unification, yet their discourse was dominated by the problems of the past, the Munich 1938 agreement and Sudeten Germans issues. Only gradually did Czech publications begin to depict a unified Germany as a key partner for the Czechs\textsuperscript{136}.

The moment of Germany’s unification however revealed how much Germany and its Eastern neighbours had to overcome in bilateral relations. Problems of the past legacy created gridlocks in relations between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia. Germany’s partners expected the new Germany to pass a test as a partner committed to the ‘post-modern’ multilateral cooperation and principles of Civilian Power. While the government of Helmut Kohl complied with the Western partners’ conditions, it nearly failed this test in relation with the Eastern partners. Chancellor Kohl’s hesitation over a clear and firm recognition of Germany’s Eastern border received a very bad reception in Poland and Czechoslovakia. It created a perception of ambivalence in Germany’s support for the EC/EU enlargement.

**A. Poland: Border Issue**

\textsuperscript{134} The Polish side offered a far-reaching idea of building a “community of interests”. The concept was originally articulated and presented by the first non-communist Foreign Minister of Poland, Krzysztof Skubiszewski in a speech at the German Society for Foreign Policy (DGAP) in Bonn on 7 February 1990. in: Krzysztof Malinowski, “Asymetria Partnerstwa. Polityka Zjednoczonych Niemiec wobec Polski”, in: Zbigniew Mazur, ed. Rola Nowych Niemiec na Arenie Międzynarodowej, Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1996, pp.270-302


\textsuperscript{136} Vladimir Handl and Marcin Zaborowski, “Comparative Czech and Polish Perspectives and Policies on the Eastern Enlargement of the EU and the Prominence of the “German Factor”, ESRC-IGS Discussion Paper 2000/13
While Western partners expected to receive reassurance from Germany about its commitment to the West European integration, the expectations of the Eastern partners were that Germany would recognise and confirm the post-war territorial division, drawn up by the victorious allies at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences\(^{137}\). For both Poland and Czechoslovakia such a warrant was of fundamental importance. The post-war territorial division drawn up at Potsdam resulted in losses both for Poland and for Germany in their former territories and in expulsions of millions of people from their homelands, including Sudeten Germans. In the democratic environment of the FRG German expellees formed a political movement, which became a constituency of the CSU branch of the CDU party, which was in power at the time of unification. It was a narrative of continuity of the past, a reverse side of the interpretation that was embraced by the majority of German elites as a foundation on the post-war national identity.

The expellees’ organizations never relinquished their claims to the lost territories in the East and the Federal Republic supported these claims by contesting the Oder-Neisse border, until the launch of Ostpolitik. Signing the Warsaw Treaty in 1970 was the first confirmation that the Federal Republic would not violate the border. The treaty, however, was far from a legally binding pledge. According to the agreement among the victorious allies the war was supposed to have been ended officially with a final conference resulting in a peace treaty. That, however, never happened and lawmakers in the FRG maintained that only a united German state was entitled to sign such a pledge, leaving the issue open until unification\(^{138}\).

Polish authorities expected during Germany’s unification a confirmation from the German government of the Oder-Neisse border between two countries\(^{139}\). Chancellor

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\(^{137}\) Decisions made at the Potsdam conference in 1945, especially as relating to the Oder-Neisse line, rolled back the practical results of the German “Drang nach Osten” lasting for centuries and redesigned German territories within the approximate Germanic borders of the year 1000. Germany has lost its eastern territories: Eastern Preussen, Silesia, Eastern Pomeranian to Poland and Sudeten to Czechoslovakia.

\(^{138}\) The Federal Republic questioned the eastern border on the basis of the article 7.1 of “German Agreement” of 23 October 1954, which stated that “the Signatory States are agreed that an essential aim of their common policy is a peace settlement for the whole of Germany (...) They further agree that the final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such settlement”, in: United States Department of State, Documents on Germany 1944-1985, Department of State Publication 9446, p. 427.

\(^{139}\) The FRG’s Bundestag ratified the Treaty but the proportion of votes shows how unpopular this document was: 248 votes were in favour, 17 against with 231 abstentions — mainly among the members of CDU and CSU. However more important was that the accompanying debate over the continuing existence of the German Reich and the quality of the Oder-Neisse border, which — in the
Kohl did not include the issue of the border into his Ten-Point plan for unification of Germany. This was alarming for the Polish side as the legal interpretations of the Germany’s post-war status were vague\textsuperscript{140}. Polish diplomacy insisted on inclusion of the border issue into the Two Plus Four conference. Britain, France, Soviet Union and first of all the U.S. administration made it clear to the German representatives that Germany’s Eastern border would have to be accepted and would not be a matter for any negotiations.

It took Helmut Kohl several weeks to finally accept these demands\textsuperscript{141}. He admitted later in his memoirs, that the decisive factor in his decision was the pressure from the U.S. Finally in June 1990 all the chambers of the German parliaments (\textit{Bundestag} and still existing East Germany’s parliament) accepted the border\textsuperscript{142}. Poland insisted, however, for inclusion of a confirmation in a bilateral treaty with Germany\textsuperscript{143}, and the U.S. and the European partners supported this demand.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item As it was put by Elbe and Kiessler it “triggered fears in Poland about how binding the settlement of borders in the Warsaw Treaty was for the government in Bonn”, in: Frank Elbe, Richard Kiessler, \textit{A Round Table With Sharp Corners. The Diplomatic Path to German Unity}, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden, 1996, p. 109—110;
\item The basis for this contestation was the judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court on the Basic Treaty of 7 July 1975 and its resolution regarding the treaties with Moscow and Warsaw of 7 July 1975 stated that the German Reich continued to exist and that it continued to enjoy its legal authority although it could not act as a state since it lacked any state organization, in particular functioning constitutional organs; the ruling stressed the responsibility of the Four Powers for Germany as a whole and stated that the Federal Republic of Germany had acted only for itself and moreover, that it could only have acted for itself. “From this judgement of the highest court, the expellee organizations derived that the obligation to achieve German unity had territorial implications, and it included all areas that were a part of Germany on 31 December 1937”. Quoted after: Frank Elbe, Richard Kiessler, \textit{A Round Table With Sharp Corners. The Diplomatic Path to German Unity}, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden, 1996, p. 109—110;
\item The CDU/CSU and the FDP with their parliamentary majority passed a resolution on 8 March 1990 “reaffirming that the inviolability of borders with Poland in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act and with a view to German unity forms the essential basis for peaceful coexistence in Europe. In this sense, the border issue shall be settled in a treaty between a government representing the whole of Germany and the Polish government, which shall seal the reconciliation between both nations. Poland”s renunciation of reparation claims on Germany of 23 August 1953 and the joint declaration of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl of 10 November 1989 shall remain valid for united Germany”. : \textit{Bulletin der Bundesregierung}, No 13, 31 January 1991. And in a joint declaration of 13 April 1990, the Volkskammer of the GDR reaffirmed that the “inviolability of the Oder-Neisse line to the Republic of Poland form the basis for the peaceful co-existence of our nations in a common European house”.
\item Both German parliaments — Bundesrepublik and of GDR — accepted the declaration, but from the Polish point of view it was only a declaration without any binding power apart from the moral dimension. Only afterwards when the Polish government expressed its dissatisfaction, Kohl, under the pressure of the US president George Bush and a vigorous action of the French president Francois
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
B. Czechoslovakia: Sudeten Germans

The Czechs experienced a similarly bumpy start in relations with the unified Germany. Chancellor Kohl did not play a primary role in the conflict with the Czechs, but his stance on the Sudeten Germans demands towards Prague was similarly reluctant like on the border issue.

WWII resulted with the shift of territorial order in Central Europe and expulsion of thousands of civilians — Poles from the territories incorporated by the Soviet Union and Germans from the territories lost to Poland and Czechoslovakia. There was a difference between the Germans’ expulsion from Poland and from Czechoslovakia. The former was decided by the victorious allies at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the Sudeten Germans were expelled on the basis of the decrees issued by the then Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš. According to the Sudeten Germans’ interpretation, Czechoslovakia, and only Czechoslovakia was therefore fully responsible for the expulsions.

Czech President Vaclav Havel made the first reconciliatory move towards Germany in December 1989, shortly after being elected he announced that the Czechs should apologise to the Sudeten Germans for what they suffered while being expelled. Czech public and elites opinion was deeply divided over the Havel’s gesture. Soon afterwards, the then president of Bavaria Max Streibl sent a letter to the Czech government with a demand of apology to the Association of the Sudeten Germans, situated in Bavaria. Havel repeated his commitment to expiation in his letter to the German President Richard von Weizsäcker, before a visit to Germany. Weizsäcker did not respond to Havel until two months after Havel’s visit and the Association of Sudeten Germans did not want to take up a dialog. In April 1990 the Association presented a list of demands\(^{144}\) to the Czech government to meet their ‘right to the fatherland’ and to

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\(^{144}\) The letter was officially signed by the federal assembly of the Associations of Compatriots, which claimed to represent the Sudeten Germans. See: Vladimir Handl, “Czech-German declaration on reconciliation”, German Politics, Vol. 6, NO 2, 1997.

Mitterrand supporting Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mазowiecki, eventually agreed the issue would be clarified in a bilateral treaty. The pledge was fulfilled and the treaty including clarification of the border issue was signed on 14 November 1990.
compensate for the lost properties. The demands were supported with a request to stop the process of privatization of the Czech economy, in order to keep open the possibility of restoring the pre-war ownership.

Czech authorities rejected these demands and excluded Sudeten Germans’ Association from negotiations, stressing that the only partner for the Czech side would be the German government. President Havel presented though a conciliatory attitude: speaking during the ceremony when receiving the Charlemagne Award in Aachen in May 1991, he offered the Sudeten Germans the right to return to their ‘fatherland’ and participation in the process of privatization, if they resign their claims. On the other hand he made it clear that the Sudeten Germans issue was strictly connected with the Munich agreements of 1938, which was the basis for Hitler’s annexation of Czechoslovakia. His outspoken Foreign Minister Jiří Dienstbier strongly supported this stance. The Czechs wanted the German government to acknowledge that the Munich agreement was invalid. That would bring a conclusion that the Czech state existed continuously, making the appropriation of the Sudeten territory by the German Reich illegal.

Meeting this demand was difficult not only because the Munich Agreement was guaranteed by four countries—Britain, France, Italy and Germany, but also because that would bring legal problems for the Sudeten Germans. If the Agreement were deemed illegal, they would have lost their German citizenship. This could further be used by the Czechoslovak authorities, which could bring treason charges against the Sudeten Germans for having served the occupying German army during the war.

**IV. OPTIONS**

**Managing the Past — Endangering the Future**

The question pertaining to this part is what possibilities were available to German government executives for solving the problems of the past legacy and why they acted with apparent reluctance and did not take up more decisive actions?

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145 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 October 1990

146 Dienstbier stated publicly in March 1990 that though the expulsion of 3 millions Germans was an act of revenge, Bonn should not put any demands nor application for compensates; he expressed also willing to pay compensations to the families of murdered Sudeten Germans, but only if the German government accepts claims of the families of the Czechs and Slovaks, who died in concentration or labour camps in the Third Reich.
The stance of German government executives in both disputes reflected two aspects — dispersion of power in the German policymaking system that allows various interest groups to argue their interests, and a political calculation aimed at securing support of the domestic constituency, of which the expellees groups was a significant part.

Kohl’s reluctance to confirm the Eastern border during the unification was a subject of numerous analyses. They point mainly to difficulties on the domestic stage. Chancellor had to cope with the demands of the CSU, which represented the expellees, who refused to recognise the Oder-Neisse line as the border. He could not ignore this pressure because he was facing soon the first parliamentary elections in the unified Germany that was set for 12 December 1990. Securing support of his own political base for the elections was of primary importance for Kohl; the expellee constituency was estimated then to be about 1 million votes.

On the other hand however, Kohl could not jeopardise the unification by potential conflict with Poland. He was forced to play it on two boards and to employ a tactic that would enable to achieve two things: to maintain good relation with Poland, and to maintain his own expellee constituency. According to Henning Tewes he pulled off a bravura performance, a masterstroke: ‘By hesitating for so long and by increasing the stakes, Kohl virtually forced the expellees’ organizations to consent to his policy. In this respect, his line was a political masterstroke that weakened irredentism vis-à-vis Poland on the German political scene.’

In this way Helmut Kohl managed a two-level game safeguarding the foreign policy priority, the unification, without opposing domestic interests of a specific group, the expellees. It is worth stressing however that at the time Kohl’s tactics was not that clear even for his closest co-workers, including Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher. For Genscher, as well as for his party the FDP, the option of reconsidering the border was

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147 As noted by observers — “the combined Franco-Polish pressure (from the French President and the Polish Prime Minister) hit the Christian-Liberal coalition in Bonn at time when it threatened to split over the Oder-Neisse issue”. In: Elbe and Kiessler, A Round Table With Sharp Corners…, op.cit., p. 112

148 Tewes, op.cit., p. 64. Clay Clemens in the introduction to the study on Kohl’s Chancellorship explains that “delaying a decision on the final settlement of a border with Poland (Kohl) gave narrow domestic political interests precedence over the sensitivities of a key partner”. In: Clay Clemens and William E. Paterson, The Kohl Chancellorship, Frank Cass London, 1998, p. 9.
closed\textsuperscript{149}. He stated it clearly to the irritation of Kohl in the speech at the UN on 27 September 1990 and in the address to the\textit{ Bundestag} on 8 November 1990. The liberal conservatives led by Rita Süssmuth, Heiner Geißler and President Richard von Weizsäcker, also continually rejected the word ‘reunification’, as in their view, there never should be a re-unification of Germany because the boundaries of the Third Reich of 1937 could never be re-established\textsuperscript{150}.

German government’s reaction to the Sudeten Germans’ problem was initially mixed and unclear. The official stance was that both countries should build positive relations. Kohl’s government, however, did not intervene to solve the conflict between the Czech government and the Sudeten Germans. Chancellor made a decisive move only at the beginning of 1993 and declared the Czech-German reconciliation his\textit{ Chefsache}, reserving the power to make strategic decisions on this matter for himself. It did not, however, result in anything more than reassurance from Kohl that his decisions would be compatible’ with the domestic interests of the CSU, which sounded dangerous to the Czechs\textsuperscript{151}.

The next move was even more worrying for the Czech side. The disputed issues between the two countries, the Sudeten Germans’ claims and the Munich Agreement annulment were excluded from the negotiations of a bilateral treaty.

Germany signed bilateral treaties with Poland in June 1991 and with Czechoslovakia in February 1992. Both treaties contributed to the EU enlargement project in an important way. They included a pledge of the German government to support the EC/EU’s accession of Poland and of Czechoslovakia. Although the pledge did not formally imply any consequences and the treaties were a standard basis for bilateral relations, but the German pledge had an important meaning for the Eastern countries. In this way they obtained the first official promise of support, and what was especially precious, from the one of the most important players in the EU, German Chancellor. But the treaty with Czechoslovakia received mixed perception in Prague. While Germany and Poland regulated sensitive issues of the Oder-Neisse border and the

\textsuperscript{149} FDP maintained that post-war borders in Europe were to remain not only intact but unquestioned. See for example Heiner Geißler,\textit{ Zugluft. Politik in stürmischer Zeit}, Güterloch,1990 p. 246-8

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{151} Tewes, Germany, Civilian Power…, op.cit. p. 74; Handl, Czech-German Declaration …, op.cit.
rights of the German minority in a smooth and satisfactory for both sides way, the treaty with Czechoslovakia failed to address the most difficult concern for the Czechs, the claims of the Sudeten Germans. It left this issue outside the treaty, thus open. After the split up of Czechoslovakia in January 1993 the Czech Republic inherited the problem, and it overshadowed the relations with Germany for many years.

A Joint Declaration of 1997 between Germany and the Czech Republic was to put the bilateral relations on a reconciliation track, but the process was soon halted again. The claims and demands of the Sudeten Germans for compensations from Prague grew bolder than before. In the run-up to the German 1998 general election, Bavarian CSU and a part of the CDU supported these demands.

V. RESULTS

Czech Accession Contested

While the Sudeten Germans’ claims and the border issues caused a perception of ambivalence in the German stance on the enlargement because they undermined an image of Germany supporting the enlargement, the issue between Germany and the Czech Republic escalated into a conflict that caused manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement regarding the Czech application.

The expellees’ claims were revived and given again a political prominence during the election campaign of 1998. The Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber explored the issue in order to maintain the advocacy of the expellees and expellees’ associates in Bavaria. The events unfolded as follows:

On 28 May 1998 German Bundestag passed a resolution that stated a hope that EU enlargement would facilitate a ‘solution to open, bilateral questions in the context of the forthcoming Polish and Czech membership in the EU’. In the bilateral relations between Germany and its Eastern partners the only ‘open’ questions were those the German side was trying to keep open — concerning the legacy of the past. In the Polish case the resolution was understood as concerning the territories lost by Germany after

WWII to Poland, thus as a demand to return the properties of the German expellees or to offer adequate compensations. In the case of the Czech Republic it was a problem of Sudeten Germans. The Polish sequence developed immediately, the Czech sequence two years later.

The response of the Polish side to the Bundestag’s resolution was sharp, according to some comments even disproportionate. The Bundestag’s counterpart Polish parliament Sejm passed a resolution stating that the ‘territorial order in Central-Eastern Europe must not be questioned’. This answer caused consternation on the German side; the Bundestag did not mention collective territorial claims. Yet the German resolution hit the most sensitive for the Polish national identity cord — the Oder-Neisse border issue.

The German-Czech dispute was elevated on a state-to-state level too. During the Bundestag debate accompanying the resolution of May 1998, the CSU leader Edmund Stoiber demanded that the federal government continue to veto the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU, until the Czech government renounces the Decrees of President Beneš, and returns properties to the former German owners. Although the federal government did not answer this demand, it did not solve the problem. In the wake of the increasing pressure from the expellees, in January 2002 the then Czech Prime Minister Miloš Zeman and other leading Czech politicians reminded publicly that the Sudeten Germans had been Hitler’s ‘fifth column’ in the break-up of Czechoslovakia, and that their subsequent expulsion after WWII therefore was meant to be a ‘source of peace’. It caused a sharp reaction among German politicians locked at the time in the early stages of an election campaign of 2002. Chancellor Schröder cancelled a visit to

154 In the Bundestag debate as covered in: “Streit um Dekrete. Stoiber: EU-Beitritt Prags nur bei Einlenken in Vertriebenenfragen möglich”, Tageszeitung, 30 May, 1998; The appeal was reiterated by Erika Steinbach, the President of the Bund der Vertriebenen, in favour of the “veto-policy”, “Die Präsidentin des Bundes der Vertriebenen beruft sich auf den Kosovo”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 August, 1999
155 Zeman used this notion commenting for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz; see: Tageszeitung, 16 January 2002
156 In an interview for the Austrian news-magazine “Profil” (January 20, 2002), Zeman claimed that the Sudeten Germans were “Hitler’s fifth column” in the break-up of Czechoslovakia and “traitors” which at that time even deserved capital punishment; see also Anne Bazin, Germany and the Enlargement of the European Union to the Czech Republic, EUI Working Papers RSC NO 99/21, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), European University Institute, 1999
Prague, planned for April that year, which was received as a harsh and ultimate means in the diplomatic relations.

A year after the Bundestag resolution, in 1999, representatives of the German expellees managed also to put their demands on the European Union’s agenda: the European Parliament called on the Czech government to annul the Beneš Decrees. The Czech government ignored the call, but the call raised a question whether the Beneš Decrees would be compatible with the acquis communautaire of the EU. It also demonstrated that there were two main streams in the bilateral relations between the Czech Republic and Germany.

The first was grounded in the Joint Declaration that was negotiated between 1995-1996 and signed in January 1997. It was not a binding treaty, but was widely perceived as a fairly well balanced expression of political will and an important step on the way to mutual understanding and political settlement. The text of the Declaration was formulated cautiously and it was not a breakthrough in the conflict: the Czech side declared the Beneš Decrees extinct and the German government withdrew its support for any property claims against the Czech Republic.

The second stream was developed by the expellees’ organizations and politicians who were using the Sudeten Germans’ claims to capitalise politically especially throughout the election campaign of 2002. Traditionally the Bavarian CSU backed the Sudeten Germans. Edmund Stoiber, the CSU-chairman in the late 1990 — early 2000s, used to support position of the Sudeten Germans, but moderately. In the 2002 during the elections campaign, however, Stoiber demonstrated a much harder line than before. He indicated a more decisive approach in the speech delivered at the gathering of the expellees on 1 September 2001\footnote{Ansprache des Bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten Dr. Edmund Stoiber anlässlich der zentralen Aufaktveranstaltung des Tages der Heimat am Samstag, 1. September 2001, in Berlin – „Leitwort: Im Zentrum – Vertreibung ächten“, www.bayern.de/Presse-Info/Reden/2001/09-01.html}. Stoiber contrasted a positive, ‘constructive and peaceful’ factor represented by the expellees engaged in the process of building the European house with a ‘highly unsatisfactory’ issue of the legal acquis in Eastern Europe. He placed this comparison in the context of the EU enlargement saying that ‘the enlargement of the EU is doubtlessly a significant historic event (...) we all, including the
expellees want it to happen (...) we however want shape it on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria (...) and to heal the wounds of the past. The expulsion decrees as they concern deprivation of the rights and collective expulsion of Germans are such a wound and a burden. There is no place in the European Union for such decrees, no matter which country they concern’. Stoiber stressed that the Eastern European countries faced the challenge of ‘categorical and binding decision to cut off the decrees’. In his view the challenge did not concern any material values, but was about the moral and spiritual values of the Europeans.

An important circumstance of this speech was that Stoiber clearly differentiated between the Czech decrees and Polish case of the expellees’ claims. He pointed to a processes unfolding in Poland, regarding the issue of expellees — the trial of the commanding officers of the Łambinowice camp where the expelled Germans suffered from inhuman treatment, the public debate and the broad joint Polish-German academic research conducted on the issue of expulsions. To Stoiber this process had a positive effect of expiation. He stressed the lack of a similar approach on the Czech side. In this way the issue of the Beneš Decrees emerged as a possible obstacle for the Czech Republic association with the EU.

In February 2002 Erika Steinbach, the CDU member of Bundestag and the leader of the Expellees Association together with Berndt Posselt, the chairman of the Sudeten Germans Association and the deputy of the CSU to the European Parliament, put forth a demand for annulment of the Beneš Decrees before the EU enlargement. Markus Feber, the chairman of the CSU group in the EP, reiterated this statement, pointing out that without annulment of the Beneš Decrees, the whole schedule of the enlargement should be understood as impossible to proceed with\(^{158}\). This fueled the criticism of the Czech government in the German press but also among the European Parliamentarians.

The issue of expulsions involved initially the Czech Republic and Germany, but later also Hungary, Slovakia and Austria, all of which were also affected by post the WWII policies of expulsions. It paved the way to a coalition of Germany, Austria and Hungary against the Czech Republic. Edmund Stoiber capitalised on these developments, declaring in his election campaign that his government would deal with this problem in a

\(^{158}\) Europagruppe zweifelt am Zeitplan für Osterweiterung, 25.03.2002, www.csu.de/Aktuelles/Argumente/subpage475905.htm
much more decisive way than the government of Gerhard Schröder\textsuperscript{159}. Schröder’s government was in fact almost absent from this debate\textsuperscript{160}, till the Czech announcement about the ‘fifth column’ in April.

The conflict found a finale at the European Parliament. The pressure of the German representatives aimed at tying the issue of the compatibility of the Beneš Decrees with the Czech’s EU membership and putting it on the EU agenda\textsuperscript{161}. Hartmut Koschyk, political speaker for the expellees of the CDU/CSU coalition and a deputy to the \textit{Bundestag} conveyed to the European Union Commissioner Günter Verheugen a demand to inspect the legal structure of the Czech Republic and its compatibility with the \textit{acquis communautaire} of the European Union. The European Parliament asked for an opinion of experts on the international law. The conclusions concerning the Beneš Decrees of professors Ulf Bernitz, Johen A. Frowein and Lord Kingsland\textsuperscript{162} were presented to the European Parliament in October 2002. They confirmed that the Beneš Decrees had no relation to the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU.

\textbf{SUMMARY}

The impact the past legacy issue had on the enlargement policy of Germany throughout nearly the whole process from 1990 to 2002 indicates that at the basis of the German government’s support for the enlargement was a strong normative reasoning based on the imperative to overcome the results of WWII. It was the premise of the enlargement policy set by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and respected by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.


\textsuperscript{160} Stoiber and expellees did not receive much support from other German actors, like for example Länder; only the parliament of Saxony presented the extreme position, demanding abolishment of all legal acts, which went with the transfer of German population from East European countries countries, it demanded the legal acts to be declared as illegal as a precondition for German consent to accession of the individual countries to the EU; and the interior Minister Otto Schily stressed the necessity of the abolishment of the Beneš Decrees.

\textsuperscript{161} For example Europa kann mit den Beneš-Dekreten leben, \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, 12/13 October 2002.

\textsuperscript{162} http://www.mitteleuropa.de/frowein-e0.htm
Opening a new chapter in history between two sides was inseparable from solving the problems of the past legacy. Lack of action on Chancellor Kohl’s side to solve these problems during the unification negotiations, created a perception of disparity between his supportive for the enlargement rhetoric and his absence in the conflict that had a fundamental meaning for both sides. First question therefore is why did Chancellor Kohl abstain from using his power to solve the problematic issues with the Eastern neighbours that occurred during the unification process? Henning Tewes indicated that Chancellor Kohl’s hesitancy over the border issue and stepping aside on the Sudeten Germans’ problem was caused by the need to safeguard the foreign policy priority, the unification, without opposing domestic interests of a specific group, the expellees. For the very same reason Kohl did not present the guideline on the issue of Europe Agreements, leaving the room for negotiations for the representatives of the relevant ministries.

The escalation of the expellees’ claims after 1998 was caused by a different climate around the enlargement, which was brought with a new zeitgeist of the new government of Gerhard Schröder. The expellees’ representatives’ calculation was that the best course was to bind their cause to the enlargement negotiations. Bavarian Minister-President Edmund Stoiber of CSU employed this tactics in his agenda. Bavarian CSU used to be after WWII a stronghold of old resentments, which fostered the refusal to accept the results of WWII. Sheltered in Stoiber’s agenda the expellees were able to unfold their actions against the Czechs on the European level. Their cause, however, was not the main goal for Stoiber; he aimed at strengthening the position of Länder in the European Union. This agenda was congruent with the politics of other Länder, which wanted to protect their interests from Europeanization. As Jeffrey and Paterson explained — it reflected a change from the old elite consensus on Europe, to one, focusing on ‘cost-benefit calculations and unapologetically prioritizes national and/or regional interests’163.

The subordination of the political agenda to the general elections made it possible for the expellees’ organization to involve the Bundestag in their cause with the 1998

resolution on the Beneš Decrees. The resolution was accepted in order to win the support of expellees’ organizations as constituency.

The next success of the expellees, of engaging the EU institutions, the European Parliament and the Commission into the Beneš Decrees issue, connected the issue to the enlargement. It provoked the rise of resentments on the Eastern side; 85% of Polish farmers were convinced at the time that the EU membership would open a possibility for foreigners to purchase properties and land in Poland, which would lead Germans to ‘buying up land’ in Poland\textsuperscript{164}.

The change from the old elite consensus on Europe to one, focusing on ‘cost-benefit calculations’ was at the basis of the Schröder’s government’s attitude towards the enlargement. The approach of the SPD/Green coalition to the foreign policy was focused on the economic issues and protection of the national interests. This coincided with the last phase of the enlargement process — the negotiations of entry terms, which had been never easy, in any of the previous EC enlargements. The nature of such negotiations is that old member states agree on the concessions to the new members — the process of the European integration is at the moment of calibrating details through intergovernmental bargaining process, in which one wins and one loses.

These factors contributed to the changed atmosphere around the enlargement in the late 1990s and early 2000s. A fundamental factor, which encouraged the expellees’ demands, was lack of the pro-enlargement rhetoric during the Schröder’s time. Before 1998, Helmut Kohl with his political weight of Germany’s Chancellor, and the ‘Chancellor of Unity’, every now and then used to remind his European colleagues the core values at the basis of the enlargement. His mentoring was an enforcing factor for proceeding with the enlargement. Chancellor Schröder’s rhetoric regarding the enlargement did not operate with normative notions but with the pragmatic language of business. The grounds for this difference lay in the generational difference between two Chancellors. Gerhard Schröder lacked the ‘memory of the war’, which to a high degree motivated the interest of Helmut Kohl in building the broad, beyond the Western, European integration.

\textsuperscript{164} According to a poll commissioned by the Institute of Public Affairs, national random sample, June 1999
CHAPTER 4

French Opposition to the Enlargement
As the Cause of Ambivalence
In Germany’s Policy Towards the EU Enlargement
1990 — 1997

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy caused by the French opposition to the project of the EU expansion. French factor was an impediment to Germany’s support because it faced German policy makers with a dilemma how to reconcile two diverse, opposite sets of interests — the long-standing partnership with France and the new, emerging interests in the East.

France since the aftermath of WWII had been the key European partner of Germany. It helped to elevate Bundesrepublik out of the post-war isolation. French policy towards Germany was based on the imperative of containing German power and the main tools for this containment were the institutions and regimes of the European Community. In 1990 Germany’s unification in the view of French policy makers through increasing German power brought a danger of Germany’s dominance in Europe. France insistence
on Germany’s commitment to the deeper West European integration and embracement of the single currency was aimed at containing a new increased German power.

The project of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union exacerbated fears of French policy makers. It had potential to make Germany a regional power in Central/Eastern Europe but also to weaken the Franco-German decision-making hub in the European Union. French politicians opposed therefore the idea of the enlargement. Enlargement, however, was slowly embraced into the rationale of the German foreign policy and its grand strategy of Europapolitik. Apart from the normative reasoning based on the imperative to overcome the WWII legacy, Germany was gaining a new perspective on its interests towards the Eastern countries.

In this way German policy makers found themselves between two contradictory challenges — of maintaining good relation with France and endorsing Eastern European countries as a part of the grand European strategy. The answer was to balance both directions. This, however, interfered with the support of German policy makers for the enlargement creating ambivalence in their policy.

The French factor is connected closely with the issue of deepening the European integration, which constitutes another cause of ambivalence in the German enlargement policy. French opposition to the enlargement is nonetheless an independent constraint and cause of ambivalence. It was explicit, strong and persistent, and given the position of France in the EU critical. It created explicit and clear ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement.

At the same time interplay between two opposite sets of Germany’s interests in its bilateral relations, represents first a process of reshaping of Germany’s preferences, but also the way German policy makers balanced opposite directions in the foreign policy. Insights into this facet of Germany’s European policy are informative for further exploration of causes of ambivalence in this policy, because here German policy makers employ the ‘as-well-as’ strategy. For explanation of constitution of interests and preferences and particularly of interplay between the opposites, it is constructivism that offers more accurate perspective because of its focus on elite discourse that is at the basis of formulation national interests. Out of multiple facets of German identity that overlap
each other, in this case it is Germany’s identity based on the principle of multilateralism in the foreign policy.

The ambivalence caused by the tension in the relations with France is also a part of the changing concept of the European integration; German policy makers in order to balance both challenges of the enlargement and the relations with France attempted to bring their French counterparts ‘on board’ of the enlargement. In this way they were introducing to their French partners a concept of embracing Eastern European countries as a part of European milieu.

I. AMBIVALENCE

Ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy caused by the French opposition to the Eastern enlargement of the EU manifested both in rhetoric and actions of German policy makers. German government executives declared the relations with France a priority in their foreign policy. Chancellor Kohl repeatedly called partnership with France ‘decisive’ and invoked a shared Franco-German vision of a Europe ‘growing together not only economically but also politically’. The rhetoric was followed by actions; German policy makers repeatedly offered concessions to France, often on issues crucial for Germany’s interests. Given French explicit and strong opposition to the enlargement assigning priority to the relations with France by German policy makers, created ambivalence in their enlargement policy.

This is a factor that occurred at early stage, when the idea of the Eastern enlargement was only presented by Eastern Europeans, and persisted until the negotiations over the EU reform in late 1990s/2000s. After the Madrid European Council in December 1995, which moved the enlargement process towards setting a timetable for accession negotiations with the associated countries, the French explicit and direct opposition to the enlargement declined. But it was still strong against the EU reform, on which the German government insisted perceiving it as indispensable in order to proceed with the enlargement. French defensive stance affected German policy causing its ambivalence from the early stage of the enlargement process till the Berlin Summit in 1999 because the project was fundamentally in conflict with the French interests. Together with a closely connected factor of deepening the European integration, French
opposition represents the most powerful reason for Germany’s ‘yes, but’ attitude towards the widening of the European Union.

French politicians declared their opposition to the EC/EU enlargement idea as early as January 1990; French president François Mitterrand put forward then a counterproposal of creating a European Confederation\textsuperscript{165}. His comments that the new Eastern European democracies should feel comfortable remaining in ‘ante-room’ of the Community for ‘tens and tens of years’ reflected a deep-seated reasoning behind the opposition to enlargement.

It stemmed from fears of the post unification growth of German power, which, in the view of French politicians, was to be enhanced further by the EC enlargement. German policy makers did not want to risk their most important external partnership and subordinated the foreign policy to the goal of preserving good relations with France. It was an imperative of maintaining loyalty in partnership, but German policy makers also perceived close cooperation with France as highly congruent with Germany’s interest. This partnership allowed Germany, as a part of the tandem, setting direction and managing the European Union’s development, to play a role of an agenda-setter in the EU, exercising its institutional power. Therefore if a demonstration of the European integration commitment was a priority for Helmut Kohl, then maintaining good relations with France was even more important.

During the process that led to the Maastricht Treaty Chancellor Kohl assigned priority to special relations with France\textsuperscript{166} and in order to overcome France’s concerns over Germany’s unification, he was ready to make far-reaching concessions. When France opposed Germany’s central demand to strengthen a democratic legitimacy of the EU by increasing the power of the European Parliament and to adjust the number of members of the European Parliament to the changing demographics of Europe\textsuperscript{167}, Germany withdrew these proposals at the expense of its own interests.

\textsuperscript{165} The interview of President Mitterrand by the French radio, reported in all mainstream German and Polish press at the time. \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, 27 January 1990

\textsuperscript{166} Mathias Jopp, “The Strategic Implications of European Integration”, \textit{Adelphi Papers}, 290, 1994, London IISS

\textsuperscript{167} Ulf Frenkel points that Germany was rather disappointed in its hope that its forthcoming position regarding the Monetary Union would in turn result in deepened integration of European foreign and security policies, and in expansion of the powers of the European Parliament.
At the same time Germany’s commitment to support the enlargement was gaining a new dimension — the emerging new interests in the East. While the primary reasons of the German support for the EU enlargement stemmed from the sense of historical obligations, there was also an emerging reasoning based in material costs and benefits calculation. Eastern Europe was going under political and economic changes of unprecedented scale and scope. That created a volatile environment at the doorstep of Germany. A need for stabilising the region looked more and more urgent and became the core of the new interests of Germany in Eastern Europe. The EU enlargement was perceived as providing the best, because the most complex solution for this need. From the German point of view it was beneficial because, as indicated in the previous chapter, it would allow Germany to avoid the *Mitteleuropa* trap, becoming a dominant political and economic power in the region.

German policy makers were caught between two conflicting sets of interests — of maintaining good relations with France and building new relations with Eastern Europeans. It resulted in ambivalence in the enlargement policy; German policy makers could not push for enlargement because that would aggravate the relations with France. At the same time French opposition to the enlargement made this project vulnerable — the leading position of France in the EU was powerful enough to block the enlargement. It resulted in delaying the enlargement process. One can detect such delays by taking into account two elements: the calls of the applicant countries and the logic of the process. The application was on the table and needed a response, and if the response was positive — to establish criteria for admission and to set a timetable of the process. Eastern Europeans were pushing for such developments, but the next step considered by the EU members was far from the postulates of the East Europeans.

It was not setting criteria or timetable; it was about organization of an institutional platform for the political dialogue with East European countries on the multilateral level of the EU. And even though it did not present obligations, like setting criteria and timetable would, it was still difficult to organise. It was achieved, nonetheless, in the form of the Structured Dialogue introduced at the Essen Summit of December 1994, at the end of the German presidency in the EU. German diplomacy played a significant role in this achievement, but did not push for anything beyond a platform for dialogue. This
indicates that the German policy was cautious and, like during the unification negotiations, still in disparity with the enlargement rhetoric of the top German leaders.

Achieving acceptance of the EU members for the EU expansion needed a political momentum — a possible one was presented with the unification of Germany, when the former Eastern Germany was absorbed quickly into the EC structure. This possibility was missed and after the experience with absorption of the GDR economy, incorporation of other post-socialist economies was perceived as an insurmountable task for the EC. Only the Structured Dialogue in the end of 1994 created as such a political momentum. It was the first actions of German policy makers on the EU level, in accordance to the supportive for the enlargement rhetoric. But the path to the Structured Dialogue for German policy makers was marked by a challenge to manage a growing tension in relations with France, which peaked in spring 1994.

II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS

New Interests of New Germany

German supporters of the enlargement used to list four reasons in the aftermath of the unification as to why the European Union should embrace Eastern Europe¹⁶⁸:

1) Embedding Eastern states into multilateral cooperation of the EU would bring stability of democracy in the nearest neighbourhood of Germany¹⁶⁹,

2) It would facilitate trade and investments what could bring economic benefits to Germany,

3) It would create a multilateral context for cooperation with the Eastern countries,

4) And the fourth reason, more of moral and normative nature, was the conviction that enlargement would be the consequence of the Berlin Wall fall and the end of the Cold War¹⁷⁰.

¹⁶⁸ Hyde-Price, Germany and European order…, op.cit. p. 182-183
¹⁶⁹ This argument explicitly was formulated much later, in 1999 by Günther Verheugen, Germany”s Commissioner Enlargement; he indicated that the primary argument for the enlargement the need to “create a peace order for the whole of Europe based on democracy, the rule of law and human rights”; Die Zeit 9 December 1999
¹⁷⁰ Hyde-Price, Germany and European …, op.cit., p. 183
These views were presented according to Hyde-Price, at the beginning of the 1990s by German political scientists and supported by the wide part of German society, though with differentiation of perceived significance\(^\text{171}\). While two last points were unquestionable but intangible, the views on the economic benefits were polarized, leaving the first reason, of stabilization of the region, as the strongest argument for the enlargement. It was grounded in ‘certain security needs’, which points to the constructivist interpretation of creation of interests, as offered by Alexander Wendt\(^\text{172}\).

German scholar, Josef Joffe, called for stabilisation of Germany’s immediate hinterland (backyard) by extending Eastward the shelter of Western institutions, at least to Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, which would ‘make sense economically and geographically’\(^\text{173}\). Joffe noted that ‘economically’ Czechoslovakia was ‘Germany’s Mexico, next door and with work forces that offered high productivity rated at about one-tenth of German wage levels’\(^\text{174}\). That made Eastern neighbourhood attractive for investments. But due to the lack of concrete stabilising institutional arrangements with the Eastern countries, the volume of the investments there was still low. According to the data published by the Bundesbank, German investors put DM 1.2 billion in Eastern Europe in 1991, which represented merely 4.3 per cent of the whole sum of DM 27.5 billion Germany made available in 1990 and 1991 for all foreign investments. This amount increased over the years 1992/1993 and by the end of 1993 the investments in the Czech Republic only were worth DM 800 million\(^\text{175}\).

Tyll Necker, the then president of the German Industry Confederation (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie), held that Central and Eastern Europe with its 400 million market presented an excellent opportunity for the economic expansion and that it depended only on the Germans whether they would take advantage of this opportunity\(^\text{176}\). These assessments were countered by many economists, for example from a prestigious foundation Wissenschaft und Politik (funded by the federal government,  

\(^{171}\) Ibid.  
\(^{173}\) Josef Joffe, German Grand Strategy after the Cold War, in Arnulf Baring (ed.), *Germany’s New Position in Europe…*, op.cit.  
\(^{174}\) Ibid.  
\(^{175}\) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 November 1993  
\(^{176}\) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 September 1990
headedquarter in Bavarian Ebenhausen), who indicated that much more attractive opportunities for German investments laid in the Far East.\(^{177}\)

The most concrete benefits of the enlargement, however, were seen in stabilization of the region. With this reasoning the support for the enlargement gained a second pillar.

1. Stabilising Region

Two major factors induced a debate on the necessity to stabilise Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s:

- Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the implosion of the Soviet Union, which left a security vacuum and changed the geopolitical position of Germany and
- Outbreak of the conflicts in the Balkans, which started with the war between Serbia and Croatia in 1991, and in Bosnia a year later, and shocked the liberal-democratic Europeans, who had been celebrating victory over communism.

These developments prompted many commentators to raising warnings about a possible prospect of instability in Central and Eastern Europe. Western observers perceived Eastern democracies as nascent and vulnerable because the economies of these countries were going under a ‘shock’ therapy. The concerns were voiced often in quite an alarming tone. A typical phrase is the one used by a German scholar Jochen Thies, who wrote that a ‘large zone of possible turmoil stretches from Germany’s Eastern border right up to Vladivostock’\(^{178}\). Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Marion von Dönhoff, the then publishers of Die Zeit magazine, used a similar tone in a joint article of May 1990. They emphasised that ‘it is in our own interest to feel responsibility for the fate of our neighbours (...) if your neighbour’s house is on fire, your house is in danger. Therefore we help to fight the fire’\(^{179}\). Not only German observers were worrying; Timothy Garton Ash, Dominique Moïsi and Michael Mertes spelled out identical


concerns in a widely quoted article\textsuperscript{180}, when they asked whether the dominos that ‘had fallen into the direction of democracy, could not fall again the other way?’ And a warning by a prominent American expert, Zbigniew Brzeziński, the former U.S. National Security Advisor who in 1989 pointed to the risk of ‘Balkanization of Eastern Europe and Lebanonization of the Soviet Union’\textsuperscript{181}, found many believers.

These alarming arguments that democratic reforms may be reversible, intended to strengthen the call for revision of the Western attitudes towards the East. The quoted observers, with exception of Jochen Thies, were strong supporters of binding Eastern democracies with the Western institutions. Their voice contributed significantly to the debate that eventually brought positive conclusions for the Easter EUropean pleas. Again it was encapsulated in a catchy phrase — ‘enchanting their security will also enhance ours’. It became the argument the most often referred to in the calls for opening of the West towards the East.

The underlying reason for the calls to stabilise the region was a quickly increasing flow of immigration from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In 1990 only it reached 1.3 million people, then the next year — 1.2 million, with the further 2 millions coming from the Balkans in the wake of the war\textsuperscript{182} (these figures did not include the so-called economic immigration). Germany was attractive for immigration from the Eastern neighbourhood throughout the Cold War period — the decisive factors were its proximity, its relatively liberal asylum policy and the excellence of the German welfare state. Now, with the imploding Soviet Union and an unfolding Balkan war, the influx represented a political hazard; given the projected costs of absorption of the bankrupt GDR economy, Germany did not have surpluses that could support refugees and immigrants in the numbers they were flowing in.

These were immediate reasons for endorsing a project of stabilising the region and they were recognised by majority of the German observers and commentators; the idea of introducing stability through the EU enlargement was seen as the most rational

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Brzezinski} Zbigniew Brzeziński, “Post-communist Nationalism”, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 68, No 5, 1989
\bibitem{Migration} From the former Soviet Bloc it was in 1988 approximately 100,000 applications for asylum, in 1992 the number was 440 thousands. Data from: Penny Henson, Nisha Malhan, “Endeavours to Export a Migration Crisis”, \textit{German Politics}, NO 4/3 1995
\end{thebibliography}
response to the challenge. At this early stage German commentators were calling also for recognition of Germany’s responsibility in aiding Eastern countries. Two standpoints of prominent German scholars are illustrative here.

Karl Kaiser emphasised that the German aid should not be considered a charity because it is entirely congruent with the German interests. Germany therefore should accept the fact that its part of the cost would be much bigger than that of other Western countries and that any possible crisis in the region would affect Germany first and foremost. This rationale found a realist version in Christian Deubner’s elaboration. According to his views, there were two German interests ‘in its direct confrontation with the liberated East’. The first was a possibility of easing the tense relations with Russia and the sensitive ones with the West. The Central and East European governments added impetus to this possibility by voicing confidence in Germany and declaring friendship with the powerful western neighbour. The second was the wish of all Eastern countries that the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Central Europe. That was identical with Germany’s desire regarding the presence of the Russian troops in the former GDR. ‘Doubtlessly nothing could awaken and stabilise such sentiments as much, nothing seemed a better precondition for preventing German hegemonic urges, and nothing finally promised quicker and more maintained financial aid for transformation, as giving them the perspective of entering the European Community, where other smaller countries already enjoyed fruitful equal coexistence and cooperation with the bigger ones’ — wrote Deubner.

These motives for including Eastern new democracies into the EU framework were also in line with the liberal approach formulated by two leading liberal German scholars, Dieter Senghaas and Hanns Maull. Senghaas pointed that a stable peace involves a political order characterised by ‘permanent peaceful coexistence and reliable civilised conflict—resolution’, and Maull that the ‘civilisationization’ of international relations is achieved through strengthening normative prohibitions against violent forms

184 Christian Deubner, “Germany as Architect of European Integration and Eastern Europe”, Working Paper 7.11 of Center for German and European Studies, University of California, Berkley, April 1996
185 Dieter Senghaas, (ed.), Den Frieden Denken, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1995, p.15
of conflict resolution\textsuperscript{186}. This corresponds with another aspect of the international security: after the EU enlargement Germany would be in the middle of a stable zone. It was Wolfgang Schäuble, the then leader of the parliamentary faction CDU/CSU faction, who raised this important argument in the debate on the enlargement in the \textit{Bundestag}\textsuperscript{187}.

The need to establish political and economic security in the immediate neighbourhood of Germany started playing in this way a major role in shaping Germany’s support for the enlargement. But there was also another factor constituting the new interests of the new Germany in relation to the Eastern countries. It was the multilateralism of the German foreign policy, Germany’s commitment to the European integration.

2. \textbf{Multilateralism Principle}

The basis for formulation new interests in the East was the multilateral identity of Germany. The unification presented Germany with a question about its future place on the international stage. A key notion in the debate was ‘normalisation’\textsuperscript{188}, it reflected the fact that the unified Germany were becoming a ‘normal’, i.e. fully sovereign country. Multilateralism of the German foreign policy chosen by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer as the means for overcoming Germany’s post-WWII international isolation, and continued by all post-WWII Chancellors, allowed Germany to build a reputation of a reliable partner, but it resulted also in the fact that the BRD ‘had never conducted a sovereign foreign policy, never a truly national, never even a largely autonomous foreign policy’\textsuperscript{189}. Now the question was what would it mean for Germany to run an autonomous and ‘normal’ foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{186} Hanns W. Maull, “Civilian Power: The Concept and its Relevance for Security Issues”, in Lidija Babic and Bo Huldö (eds), \textit{Mapping the Unknown: Towards a New World Order,} The Yearbook of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1992-93, Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1993, pp.115-31

\textsuperscript{187} The argument was an old predilection of the German policy, although the association is rather unfortunate, as the middle location was advocated by Bismarck. For the Schäuble’s quotation see Wolfgang Schäuble, Grundfragen der europäischen Integration aus der Sicht der CDU/CSU — Fraktion, in: R. Hellwig (Hrgs), \textit{Der Deutsche Bundestag und Europa}, München 1993, p. 155

\textsuperscript{188} Charlie Jeffery and William E. Paterson, Germany’s Power in Europe, One Europe or Several, \textit{Birmingham Discussion Papers,} No. ESRC—IGS Discussion 2000/10, pp.23-46 and Ash, Germany’s Choice…, op.cit., p. 79

The notion of ‘normalisation’ initially was seen as eagerness to shed old limits of the semi-sovereign status and to assume a more assertive policy. With the passage of time it became evident that in the context of the European policy, as Adrian Hyde-Price and Charlie Jeffery put it a decade later, ‘normalisation’ did not mean Germany ‘casting off these normative constraints in order that it can become a rational power-maximising actor, but rather a process of rethinking the normative foundations of German European integration policy, of reformulating norms in a way that has opened up the field for a more nuanced and at times more instrumental — engagement of Germany with the EU’\textsuperscript{190}.

Formulation of the new set of Germany’s interests in the East provides an answer to the question of how Germany initially utilised an opportunity for normalisation: the formulation of these interests was based on the principle of multilateralism. In this way German policy makers entered the process of creation new premises for a new Ostpolitik and for a new grand European strategy. The principle of multilateralism allowed turning the new Ostpolitik into a part of Germany’s Europapolitik. That reflects a Peter Katzenstein’s observation that ‘state interests do not exist to be ‘discovered’ by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are constructed through a process of social interaction’\textsuperscript{191}. The new interests were however in conflict with the old commitments, especially to the relation with France.

III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE

French Disconnection

French politicians offered a response to the changes in Eastern Europe as early as autumn 1989, by putting forward an initiative of organising financial aid for the new Eastern democracies (supported by the President of the European Commission Jacques Delors, responding to the American suggestions\textsuperscript{192}). Soon afterwards, however, when the


\textsuperscript{192} Sedelmeier, Wallace, Eastern Enlargement… op.cit., p. 433.
idea of Eastern enlargement started gaining political strength, French politicians became its fiercest adversaries.

The relationship with France presented for German political elites the highest stake as the cooperation between Bonn and Paris was a structural landmark in the post-war European politics. The French attitude and its policy towards Germany, both in the bilateral relation and in the multilateral context of the European Community, was motivated by mistrust; from the French perspective Germany always presented a mixture of rivalry and sources of insecurity and the primary goal of the French was to prevent Germany’s dominance in Europe. It was the motive behind Charles de Gaulle’s decision on the Franco-German Treaty of 1963 and of François Mitterrand’s decision in 1990 to move the European Community to the level of the European Union.

A growing power of Germany was a concern not only for France — in 1986 one of the then European senior statesmen Giulio Andreotti of Italy said in public that it would be better for peace in Europe to have two German states rather than only one, and the reservations of Margaret Thatcher about Germany’s unification were too well known. But for France the ‘German question’ after the unification was hypersensitive. François Mitterrand, the then French president, called for the December 1989 EC summit meeting in Strasbourg, to address concerns over prospect of Germany’s unification. He presented a demand for a deeper integration of Germany into the EC. The response of Chancellor Kohl was decisive — he co-signed with Mitterrand a joint letter of April 1990 calling for a conference that would link both economic and political union. Understanding of closer political and economic union was however different on both sides. While the Germans wanted to ‘balance’ the creation of the EMU with wider prerogatives for the Commission and the European Parliament, the French opposed the

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193 As Margaret Thatcher put in her memoirs Mitterrand shared with her during a meeting on 29 January 1990 fears that the German leaders might succumb to a renewed Drang Nach Osten and seek a sphere of influence over the central and east Europe. In: Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London HarperCollins 1993, p. 798
194 For the realist perspective on the Franco-German relations, see: Thomas Pedersen, Germany, France and the Integration of Europe. Realist Interpretation, London: Pinter 1998; on the Farce’s position on the enlargement seen from the German perspective see: Christian Deubner, Frankreich in der Ostweiterung der EU, 1989 bis1997, Politische Studien, Vol. 50, NO 1, 1999
strengthening of the EU institutions because that would limit the national influence of France within the EU\textsuperscript{195}.

The prospect of the Eastern European countries joining the EC in the French views would place Germany in a dominant position, both in politics and economy in Europe\textsuperscript{196}. The previous, southern round of the EC enlargement in the 1980s resulted in diluting the parity of votes within the EC/EU, through the increased number of the member states. French policy makers stressed this aspect as presenting a serious threat to France (though in fact it was a symbolic more than a real issue). These were not ‘ad hoc’ fears; they were deeply embedded in the awareness of the French nation. As Dominique Moïsi put it the ‘fragile balance of imbalances between West German economic power and France’s relative political and military strength was bound to corrode’\textsuperscript{197}. These fears were still present three years later when around 50 per cent of the French admitted to it in a survey run by the Prognos-Institute for the German Handelsblatt and American Wall Street Journal\textsuperscript{198}.

The difficulty inherent in the complex relations between Germany and France at the time was characterised adequately by Stanley Hoffmann: ‘For many years the French who dominate the Brussels bureaucracy saw in the EC a vehicle for French influence and for imposing restraints on the power of West Germany. Today and for good reasons the fear of Germany dominating the Community has replaced (as also in Denmark) the old fear of an unshackled Germany outside the Community. For France it is worth staying in the EC as long as Germany is in it, but the French have increasing doubts who is the guard and who is the captive’\textsuperscript{199}. In the French concept of the European integration France provided political leadership while West Germany provided economic resources. From the French perspective the idea of the Eastern enlargement of the EU jeopardised this model; French leaders feared, that after the EU enlargement to the East, Germany would displace France as the dominant agenda-setter.

\textsuperscript{195} Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “Die Kontroverse zwischen Bundeskanzler Kohl und Präsident Mitterrand um die institutionelle Reform der EG 1989-90”, in Marie-Therese Bitsch (ed.), Le Couple Franco-Allemand et les Institutions Europeennes, 2005

\textsuperscript{196} Dominique Moïsi, “Insecurities, Old and New, Plague the Paris-Bonn Axis”, The Wall Street Journal, Europe, 7 February 1995

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{198} Handelsblatt, 3 November 1993

\textsuperscript{199} Stanley Hoffmann, “Goodbye to a United Europe?”, New York Review of Books, 27 May 1993, pp. 27-31
French policy makers were resistant to changes of the status quo within the European Community. Their stance during the negotiations over the Europe Agreements, opposing in fact any agreement was the expression of this deep self-preservation. ‘Mitterrand’s overall attitude towards Central and Eastern Europe revealed a defensive attachment to the strategic status quo ante’ — commented Robert Niblett. In this light, a quick response of the French politicians in the autumn of 1989 organising aid for Eastern Europe seems to be less an expression of support for Eastern Europe, and more of a political calculation. And viewing the East through the prism of the policy towards Germany was not new in the French foreign policy; Horst Teltschik in his memoirs recalls that Kohl had made attempts to create a common Franco-German Ostpolitik as early as 1988, but it was unsuccessful and led to a competition rather than cooperation. The conviction on the French side that Germany could win a leading position in Europe by supporting Eastern Europe was now even stronger. With such an attitude, French politicians presented the most difficult obstacle to the launching the idea of the EC/EU enlargement.

The majority of the German political elites did not want to risk the relation with France. The commitment to deepening of the European integration and embracing the single currency was not popular in Germany but understood as necessary to dissolve the fears of a potential ‘mightier’ Germany. As an immediate concession Chancellor Kohl also supported the French position in the negotiations of the 1993 GATT Uruguay Round, which countered the U.S. expectations that Germany would persuade the French to limit their protectionist tendencies. That did not however avert the deterioration of the Franco-German friendship: the French leading daily newspaper Le Monde observed ‘frictions and fissures’ in the bilateral relations. Foreign Minister Alain Juppé stressed

200 Niblett, France and Europe... op.cit., p. 94
201 Teltschik, 329 Tage..., op.cit., p. 369
202 French policy makers initially hoped that the monetary union would de-base the DM as a leading currency in the EC, when it however came close to realization they feared it would be Germany benefiting from the economic union the most; See: Ingo Kolboom, “Die Vertreibung der Dämonen: Frankreich und das vereinte Deutschland”, Europa-Archiv 15-16, 1991
203 See for example Alles härter, Der Spiegel 26 July 1993; In return this gesture German Chancellor and was invited to speak as the first foreign politicians since 1919 to speak before the French senate. In: Neues Wir-Gefühl, Bonner Rundschau, 14 October 1993
204 Angst vorm Koloss, Der Spiegel, 9 August 1993
in the summer 1993 there were objective difficulties in the Franco-German relationship\textsuperscript{205} and former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt wrote in the Parisian weekly \textit{Globe-Hebedo} that Franco-German cooperation had been dissolving since 1989 with Helmut Kohl having done nothing to prevent this process\textsuperscript{206}. And one of the leading German intellectuals Christoph Bertram observed in \textit{Le Monde} that ‘those in France who are thinking in purely national categories must feel that Germany won first prize in the breakdown of the order of Yalta while France had lost’\textsuperscript{207}.

German policy makers were aware that any elaboration of the enlargement project needed French support. And until this support was secured, supportive actions of German policy makers promoting the enlargement were limited. It created ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement, because the French opposition was not an obstacle to ignore or overcome. German policy makers were determined to preserve good relations with France and that made their commitment to the EU enlargement restricted.

\textbf{IV. OPTIONS}

\textbf{Weimar Triangle}

An idea to bring France on ‘board of the enlargement’ prompted an initiative of creating a Weimar Triangle, a platform for cooperation of three countries — France, Germany and Poland. It was an initiative of Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher\textsuperscript{208}. The Triangle concerned the relations with Poland, but was supposed to elevate all new Eastern democracies and bring them closer to the French policy makers. In this way Genscher hoped to win understanding and support of the French for the anticipated widening of the EU to the East. The Triangle exemplified ‘as-well-as’ strategy that reflected Germany’s exercising of the principle of multilateralism in the foreign policy.

Genscher understood the necessity of bringing the relations with the Eastern neighbours out of the shadows of the Cold War. As the Soviet Union used to be a priority in Germany’s \textit{Ostpolitik}, not many German politicians recognised at first the post-Cold War aspirations of the Eastern European democracies. Genscher was among those who

\textsuperscript{205} Die EG lebt gefährlich, \textit{Der Spiegel} 24 August 1993, also Objektive Schwierigkeiten mit Bonn, \textit{Die Welt} 25 August 1993
\textsuperscript{206} Im Urlaubsort Chamonix antwortet Balladur dem Kanzler, \textit{General Anzeiger}, 12 August 1993
\textsuperscript{207} Der Krach am Rhein, \textit{Die Zeit} 25 March 1994
\textsuperscript{208} See „Deklaration von Weimar,”, \textit{Bulletin der Bundesregierung}, No.92, 3 September 1991, pp. 734-5
did. To a high degree one can attribute this to his East German origins. He understood that Russia could not be the main addressee of the new Eastern policy of Germany. A title of the chapter on the relations with the East in Genscher’s memoirs is ‘The East is More Than Moscow’.\(^{209}\) He also understood that a road to elevating the relations with Eastern countries was not only through bilateral treaties, but through bringing Eastern partners into the Western European circle of politics. A political expression of this reasoning was a proposal of the Weimar Triangle.

Reaching out to France was the first goal. On the other hand as the relations with France used to be the bedrock of post-war relations of the Bundesrepublik with Western partners, bringing Poland to the table emphasised the commitment of German politicians to the goal of elevating the relations with the Eastern countries. That was rooted in the deep conviction about a special position of Poland.

From the German point of view, Poland fell into a special category; paradoxically the point of reference for this reasoning was the relation with France. Many German commentators envisaged that in the context of the European integration, German-Polish relationship should perform a role comparable with that of the Franco-German axis in the Western integration.\(^{210}\) Poland’s large territory, the size of its population (nearly 40 mln), its economic potential and its geographical position bordering Ukraine and Belarus, made Poland a natural leader among the Eastern countries. Stable and prosperous Poland, therefore, presented for Germany a desirable development. Genscher’s logic was therefore that the Franco-German-Polish cooperation could bring to a new Europe an added value. ‘Germany’s relations with France and Poland are a decisive determinant of the future of the whole continent — argued Genscher — When Germans, French and Poles work together as Europeans and stop any manifestation of nationalism, then the

\(^{209}\) Genscher, “Memoirs…, op.cit.

\(^{210}\) See: Friedbert Pflüger, Polen-Unser Frankreich im Osten, in: W. Schäuble/ R.Seiters (Hgg.) Außenpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, Die Thesen der Jungen Außenpolitiker, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn 1996. Arnulf Baring advocated the reconsideration of the strategic Franco-German axis suggesting that Poland could replace France as the Federal Republic’s strategic partner in the EU; Arnulf Baring, Scheitert Deutschland? (Stuttgart: 1997), p. 152. Similarly, the then former already German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, envisaged the intensification of future co-operation with Poland in the EU, however in his view this would rather compliment than replace the Franco-German axis. See the speech of Helmut Kohl during the ceremony of honoring him with the Polish highest State award of the White Eagle, on the 20th October, 1998; The speech has been published on the official website of the Polish President’s Office www.president.pl see the English language part under the “Helmut Kohl”.
prospects for building trust and peaceful co-operation in Europe as a whole will be greatly improved’, choosing a symbolic name of the Weimar Triangle for his vision\textsuperscript{211}.

Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher depicted Eastern enlargement project as a ‘great historical chance in overcoming the old divisions and Germany’s role as bridging West and East’. François Mitterrand in an attempt to recapture the initiative in furthering developments in Europe proposed in January 1990 the idea of a European Confederation\textsuperscript{212}. It was not supported by other EC members, and cost him the trust of the East Europeans, who saw his pan-European, ‘unrealistic’ vision as an attempt to counter the idea of the EC enlargement\textsuperscript{213}. This perception was fortified soon by Mitterrand’s comments that the new democracies should feel comfortable remaining in this ‘ante-room’ of the Community for ‘tens and tens of years’.

In the Genscher’s vision, the Weimar Triangle could help facilitating the relations of the Eastern countries with France, but it also could help in Kohl’s strategy aimed at diluting the burden of the enlargement by making it an obligation of the whole Community/Union. There was, however, a sensitive impediment to the Weimar Triangle — Russia. Elevating relations with Poland contradicted a Kohl government’s stance, which emphasised importance of partnership with the Soviet Union. This disparity was underlined by an outbreak of a ‘Gorbimania’ in Germany at the time; the common belief among the German elites, press commentators and politicians was that the unification of their country was possible thanks to Mikhail Gorbachev’s personal involvement. The gratitude of the Germans made Gorbachev a media-star. Helmut Kohl contributed to this picture, demonstrating cordial relations with Gorbachev. From Kohl’s point of view this served a purpose of securing Russia’s friendship in the long term.

The Weimar Triangle initiative can be seen in this context as a special tactics of the German diplomacy. The fact that it was Kohl’s Minister, not the Chancellor himself, who proposed the Triangle, was very comfortable for Helmut Kohl; he could uphold an

\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{212} The interview of President Mitterrand by the French radio, reported in all mainstream German and Polish press at the time. See for example Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 January 1990
\textsuperscript{213} An assumption of the “European confederation” was that it would encompass all the nations of Europe. It relied upon the Gaullist concept of European order, anticipating Europe from Atlantic to the Ural, which would free itself from its dependence on the two super powers.
unchanged position vis-a-vis Russian leaders, starting at the same time the process of building up new quality relations with the Eastern neighbours.

The first meeting within the Weimar Triangle, between Foreign Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Roland Dumas and Krzysztof Skubiszewski, took place in August 1991. It did not bring any particular results. Two years later in November 1993, however, the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and his French counterpart Alain Juppé declared together that they would support Poland in the process of accession to the European Union. This pledge was strengthened by their appeal to other members of the WEU to confer the status of ‘associated’ to Poland and other Eastern countries applying for it. The meetings of the ‘Triangle’ did not change fundamentally France’s adverse stance on the enlargement, but the appeal of Kinkel and Juppé proved that the aim of bringing France closer was achieved. It was, however, limited to the relation with Poland. The French still remained opposed to wider and deeper cooperation with the East, for example to Germany’s push for association agreements with the Baltic states (from the early 1992).

**V. RESULTS**

French opposition to the enlargement idea limited Germany’s potential for taking up supportive for the enlargement actions. This potential was constrained already by the demand of committing to the deepening of the European integration. It resulted with the lack of a strong leadership on the enlargement issue in the EU level, which could have been filled by Germany. Ambivalence created in this way in Germany’s policy is deductible by contrasting it with an acceleration of the German actions in 1994. Until then, however, although the new emerging interests in the East brought about by the need to stabilise the region pressed for introducing the enlargement idea, German policy makers faced with France’s opposition in the years 1990—1993 remained passive and their stance on the enlargement ambivalent. Acceleration was prompted when German policy makers found partners for leading the process — the Dutch and British.

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214 Gemeinsame Erklärung der AußenMinister von Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen, *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, NO 100, 18 November 1993, pp. 1122-3

Commissioners in the EU. That provided a multilateral platform for action, fulfilling the premises of the German foreign policy.

**1. Slowing Down the EU Dynamics**

Winning acceptance of the EU members for the EU expansion needed a political momentum. It took next two years, since signing up the Europe Agreements and Maastricht Treaty, to create it. The Europe Agreements that were described as a ‘defence instrument’ to keep East European countries outside the EC\(^{216}\), and Eastern Europeans pushed for setting a timetable for the enlargement.

The first step was reached with a declaration of the European Council at the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993, when the EU for the first time agreed on the membership perspective for the associated countries. Then, after next 18 months, the member states signed up the Structured Dialogue at the Essen Summit in November 1994, which institutionalised a framework for political dialogue between the EU and Eastern partners. It was the British and the Dutch in the Commission who, with the support of German diplomats, were pushing for institutionalisation of the ‘dialogue’ with the Eastern countries.

Provisions for such a multilateral political dialogue were included already in the Europe Agreements. The Agreements did not acknowledge that enlargement was a Community’s objective, but included recognition of the necessity to create a closer partnership and multilateral dialogue with the Eastern countries. The question left open was — what sort of partnership beyond Europe Agreements should be developed?

The European Council agreed at Maastricht just days after the European Agreements were signed, to examine at Lisbon in June 1992 general implications of the EU enlargement\(^{217}\). The Commission proposed a new formula of ‘reinforced association’

\(^{216}\) Barbara Lippert and Heinrich Schneider claim the proposal of the Europe Agreements was burdened with the “strategic ambivalence”: Barbara Lippert and Heinrich Schneider, Association and Beyond: the European Union and the Visegrad States, in: Barbara Lippert and Heinrich Schneider, (eds.), “Monitoring Association and Beyond. The European Union and the Visegrad States”, Europäische Schriften des Instituts für Europäische Politik, Band 74, Europa Union Verlag Bonn, 1995, p.26; Heinz Kramer, “The European Community”s response to the New Eastern Europe”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, NO 31/2, 1993

\(^{217}\) The Lisbon report distinguished between the countries of the EFTA as immediately eligible for membership and both the southern applicants (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey) and Central East European Countries; see: Anna Michalski, Helen Wallace, *The Challenge of Enlargement*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992
in communication. The subsequent debate within the EU centred upon a dichotomy between deepening and widening the Union. The British advocated the widening and less cohesive community, the French were pushing for deepening among the twelve members, while the German government remained reserved trying to avoid making a choice\textsuperscript{218}. German stance lacked clarity; it was ambivalent.

Helmut Kohl introduced the concept of developing both directions simultaneously — widening and deepening. It conveyed a message that Germany would support the enlargement. But that it supported deepening too. Chancellor Kohl declared it in a government declaration of 1993 stating that ‘it would be unthinkable for us Germans if the Western border of the Czech Republic and Poland should remain the Eastern border of the political union indefinitely’\textsuperscript{219}. The declaration about embracing both directions was reiterated few months later by the Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel\textsuperscript{220} and strengthened by his predecessor, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who commented that the ‘vitality of Europe depends on two sources: deepening and widening’\textsuperscript{221}. The issue of Eastern Europe in the quoted above government declaration, however, took only two short paragraphs in a six-page text. This, along with the lack of concrete proposals how to reconcile both challenges, contributed to the prevailing among other member states at the time reluctance towards the idea of developing both directions. All the member states were rather interested first and foremost in maintaining the status quo of the EU benefits system.

William Wallace and Anthony Forster noted that for most of other than Germany member states, France, Italy or Spain, the problem with the stability of the Eastern Europe was quite remote\textsuperscript{222}. Eastern revolution did not affect these countries as it did Germany, because it happened at its doorstep. Domestic concerns, established priorities

\textsuperscript{218} See for example Reinhard Meier-Walser, Deutschland, Frankreich und Grossbritannien and der Schwelle zu einem neuen Europa, \textit{Außenpolitik} NO 4, 1992; Gregory F. Treverton, The New Europe, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol 71 No 1, 1991-1992


\textsuperscript{220} Kinkel stated this in a speech before the German Society for Foreign Affairs saying that keeping Europe on integration in both directions would be a priority. See: “Rede des AußenMinisters Klaus Kinkel vor der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik”, \textit{Europa-Archiv} 41, 2 1994 D541-542

\textsuperscript{221} Bedenkliehe Thesen, \textit{Der Spiegel} 12 September 1994, p. 29-32

and the challenge to adjust to Maastricht provisions, overshadowed the problems of the Eastern Europe transformation. Apart from the attempted Moscow putsch there were no other dramatic events that would enforce a decisive and quick political response to the East. The process of preparation of a multilateral dialogue was in fact stalled.

Only arrival in 1993 of two new External Relations Commissioners, Sir Leon Brittan from the UK and Hans van den Broek from the Netherlands, reinvigorated the process and prompted German policy makers to action. Both Commissioners represented more liberal approach than their predecessors and started pressing for liberation of trade and widening the access to the EU market for the Eastern countries. The views of Brittan and van den Broek found support from the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

2. Chancellor’s Chefsache

At the arrival of the new Commissioners the negotiations over the idea of institutionalisation of a dialogue with the Eastern countries were stalled, and the emphasis in the debate over the future development of the EU was shifting towards the deepening the Western integration. There was no political impetus for the progress with the enlargement. Chancellor Kohl’s decision to make the enlargement his Chefsache can be seen as an expression of his commitment, and a move aimed at saving and furthering the enlargement. It was the next moment after the declaration of ‘two sides of the same coin’, which made German Chancellor the advocate of the enlargement.

It is impossible to unravel all the details of the cooperation between the Commission and the German representatives, and identify which side triggered which decision. Important feature is that the cooperation created a common front on the issue of the enlargement. German representation in Brussels is formed by officials mainly from the Foreign and Economic Ministries, and it is the Foreign Ministry, which controls the policy-making by the representation. The representatives follow a guideline, Richtlinie formulated in the Chancellor’s Office.

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223 Their entrance coincided with the split of responsibilities within the Commission for East and Central Europe, between DGI for external commercial affairs and the new DGIA for external political affairs. A newly designed DGIA provided Commission with a wider possibility of manoeuvre and of conducting more freely certain political enterprises See: Ulrich Sedelmeier, The European Union Association Policy, towards Central and Eastern Europe”, Sussex European Institute Discussion Paper, pp. 24-25

224 Collins, German Policy-Making…, op.cit.; Tewes, Germany, Civilian Power …, op.cit.
Evidence that the \textit{Richtlinie} the German representatives were given by their government, was to support the enlargement, can be found in numerous official stances and speeches at the time, mainly by Chancellor Kohl himself and his Foreign Ministers — Hans-Dietrich Genscher and subsequently Klaus Kinkel\textsuperscript{225}. Their supportive rhetoric using appealing notions like ‘bridges’ and ‘doors’ was based on clear arguments. Volker Rühe, a new Defence Minister summed them up in 1992 emphasising the security dimension saying that ‘\textit{without stability in the East of our continent there will be no stability for the continent as the whole, and especially no stability for Germany}’. He argued that Germany ‘\textit{cut many other countries in the EC and in Western Europe off from the problems like asylum seekers or the like and (...) it could not be in the German interest to remain permanently in this position}’, thus Germans should commit themselves to eliminating the rift in the prosperity between the West and East\textsuperscript{226}.

All those arguments and statements were crowned by Helmut Kohl, who in 1993 took active interest in the enlargement policy declaring it his \textit{Chefsache} alongside the EMU and the EU affairs\textsuperscript{227}. From this moment onwards German Chancellor pressed other EU states and the Commission, especially at the Essen and Madrid summits in 1994 and 1995, to agreeing on a concrete timetable for accession. He reiterated in the spring of 1994 that relations with the associated countries would be one of the priorities of the German presidency in the EU\textsuperscript{228}. Eastern countries were also receiving reassurances from German politicians in bilateral relations. At every meeting between Polish and German high-rank officials the German side used to assert that Poland Hungary and


\textsuperscript{226} Protokoll des 3. Parteitages der CDU Deutschlands, 26-28 October 1992, Düsseldorf


\textsuperscript{228} Klaus Kinkel summarised the German goals for the presidency as follows: a contribution to the creation of a lasting order of peace in Europe, a decisive process for bringing the Central and East European states closer to the EU and the securing of an economically healthy EU that was able to act politically, he mentioned deepening as the last point; See: Klaus Kinkel, “Deutschland in Europa: Zu den Zielen der deutschen Präsidentschaft in der Europäische Union”, \textit{Europa-Archiv} 41, 1, 1994. pp. 335-342
Czechoslovakia should be the EU members by the end of the century. Chancellor Kohl for example, while visited by the Polish Prime Minister in April 1994, promised to apply necessary measures to help Poland in achieving a full membership. The rhetoric was thus very supportive, to the point that it prompted the opposite to the government SPD party to criticism; SPD representatives warned the government not to make ‘irresponsible promises’ of the fast EC membership.

The European Council agreed at Maastricht to examine general implications of a further enlargement at Lisbon in June 1992. The Commission in a report to the Lisbon European Council stated general rules for applicants; according to these applicant countries first would have to implement ‘acquis communautaire’. The Commission also set out clearly that ‘widening must not be at the expense of deepening’, and that the enlargement must not be a dilution of the Community's achievements. Such limited response of the Commission was due to the reluctance of the member states to carry the issue further; Italy, Spain, France and Portugal held still the Agreements as the framework for preparing the accession.

Chancellor Kohl did not push for setting criteria. He called in spring 1993 for invitation of the heads of Višegrad states’ governments to the next European Council. The invitation did not have any practical meaning as the East Europeans were not empowered with the right to participate in decisions making, but bringing East Europeans to the same table as the EU decision makers aimed as breaking a psychological barrier. It

229 The source is the numerous interviews with Polish officials conducted by the author of the thesis while reporting on these developments in the years 1992-1994 for Rzeczpospolita, Polish Daily Newspaper (for example Minister Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Bronislaw Geremek, see Rzeczpospolita years 1992-1993; www.rp.pl)


231 The report to the June 1992 Lisbon European Council distinguished between the countries of the EFTA as immediately eligible for membership and both the southern applicants (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey) and Central East European Countries. In a report, the Commission re-stated also that there were three basic conditions for membership: European identity, democratic status and respect of human rights and suggested several additional criteria. Applicants had to accept the entire Community system, the “acquis communautaire”, and be able to implement it. This included the single European market and the Maastricht provisions on Economic and Monetary Union. An applicant state had to have a functioning and competitive market economy; if not, membership would disrupt the working of the Community. See: European Commission, “Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement”, EC Bulletin Supplement 3/92, p. 11

232 Ibid., p. 10; Enlargement could not be permitted to damage the progress made in implementing a single European market, a single currency, or a common foreign and security policy.

233 “Kohl will Osteuropäer als Gäste beim nächsten EG-Gipfel”, General-Anzeiger, 28 May 1993
was a small step, but proposed by Germany.

An ultimate success of this approach came in the shape of the Copenhagen Declaration of June 1993. It agreed on a membership perspective for the associated East European countries and lay down the background conditionality for the future enlargement, a supra-national legal framework of the *acquis communautaire*\(^{234}\). The next step was achieved due to support of the German government during the German presidency in the Union in the second half of 1994.

### 3. Structured Dialogue

Chancellor Kohl’s setting the enlargement as a *Chefsache* translated into more concrete actions. It allowed supporting an idea of creation an institutional platform for a ‘dialogue’ with Eastern European countries. It was a first full-scale action of German policy makers on the EU level, conducted in accordance with the supportive for the enlargement rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl. They approached the challenge in a systematic way allocating resources and setting an agenda. This was the action awaited for nearly four years by Eastern Europeans.

After the Copenhagen Declaration critics indicated that the main obstacle against embracing East European countries was their lack of legislation compatible with the one of the EU. Again it was a joint initiative of Commissioners Brittan and van den Broek along with German representatives working in the Commission’s DGI and DGIA, to turn the Copenhagen achievement into a concrete working political action. The idea was to help the Eastern countries to align with the EU legislation — ‘*acquis communautaire*’. The Council accepted in March 1994 a proposal for reinforcing a political dialogue with

\(^{234}\) The Copenhagen European Council declared that the CEECs that had concluded a Europe agreement were eligible for EU membership, if they could meet three conditions: they must have a functioning market economy with the capability to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU; they must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; and they must be able to take on the obligations of EU membership including adherence to the aims of economic and political union. An additional condition specifies that the EU must be able to absorb new members and maintain the momentum of integration. See: European Council, Copenhagen, 21-23 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, SN/180/93. Also: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement
the six associated countries that were to participate in CFSP meetings. The proposal was never implemented, and the scope of the dialogue was limited to meetings with the ‘troika’. Such cooperation did not allow to address sufficiently increasingly worrying problems of immigration and the EU borders security. The need to mitigate these problems and stabilise the region was the reason for the German government to press for a more specific action by the EU.

German policy makers approached the issue in a systematic way. First they created a special unit, an Arbeitsstab (working team) at the Europaabteilung (desk) at the Foreign Ministry. It was designated to deal specifically with the enlargement policies. Secondly, they designed an agenda, which was to further the momentum reached at Copenhagen. The strategy was based on understanding the need of organising more often joint meetings between the EU Ministers and their counterparts from six associate countries.

A following ‘informal’ cooperation between the Commission and the German government, which while holding the presidency had an upper hand in choosing proposals for elaborating, resulted with the call for the Commission, presented at the Corfu European Council of June 1994, to prepare a strategy that could be followed with a view for accession. Such a strategy was to be an introduction to a more detailed schedule of meetings with policy makers from Eastern Europe. The strategy was called later the Structured Dialogue.

An idea of the Dialogue was presented in a joint article published in Le Monde by Chancellor Kohl and the French Prime Minister Eduard Balladur in May 1994, prepared on the German initiative. Both politicians laid out a suggestion for a regular inter-Ministerial dialogue with the associated states. The proposal was since then pushed by German policy makers during the German presidency in the second half of 1994. In July 1994, at the beginning of this presidency, the Council endorsed the proposal. The informal meeting between the German and French policy makers in Paris on 20

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235 The proposal assumed participation of the heads of state or governments of the associated countries, in annual summits of the European Council president and the Commission president; special joint councils on CSFP matters with the associates” Foreign Ministers, along with the meetings of political directors, experts.

236 Sedelmeier, Wallace, Eastern enlargement…, op. cit. p. 443, quoted from Bulletin of the EU, June 1994

237 Le Monde, 26 May 1994; in translation by DPA, 26 May 1994
September facilitated the further way, and one month later the Council agreed to press ahead with the White Paper on the Structured Dialogue.

The Dialogue was accepted at the Essen Summit in December 1994 as ‘Practical Guidelines for Implementing Copenhagen European Council Decisions’\textsuperscript{238}. It spelled out the idea of political consultations of the Eastern candidate states with the EU institutions and their progressive integration into the single European market through regulatory alignment\textsuperscript{239}. The initial proposal included a wider spectrum of institutionalised cooperation, but due to the reluctance of France, Spain and Belgium, who opposed institutionalization of regular meetings, the scope was restricted\textsuperscript{240}. For an ultimate acceptance of this limited version of the Dialogue German policy makers were forced to employ an incentive: German government pledged to support development of a more active Mediterranean policy (Barcelona Process), bringing on board also the French and Spanish governments.

The declarations accepted at two subsequent EU summits, in Corfu and Essen, made the EU member states accept the Eastern enlargement as a prospective goal (and the EFTA enlargement as an immediate objective).

**SUMMARY**

German policy makers were faced after the unification with a challenge of maintaining old loyalties that served Germany’s interests and building new relations with Eastern Europeans that would serve Germany’s new, emerging interests in the region. As the French opposition to the enlargement made both directions conflicting, German policy makers chose to balance both, employing the ‘as-well’as’ strategy. They did not ignore the stance of France, pushing for the enlargement, which was congruent with a more pressing issue of stabilization of Germany’s Eastern neighbourhood. Instead,


\textsuperscript{239} Rejected proposals to work on were on commercial defence, agricultural subsidies, rules of origins and financial transfer.

\textsuperscript{240} The main amendment was that a schedule of meetings would be decided by each presidency, not designed in advance. And as pointed out by Karen Smith the objecting countries stressed they did not want proliferation of meetings and that the EU’s independence of decision would have to be respected, in: Karen Smith, “Enlargement and European Order”, in: Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, (eds.) *International relations and the European Union*, Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York, 2005; Karen Smith, *The making of EU foreign policy: The Case of Eastern Europe*, Palgrave Macmillain, Basington, Hamphire, New York, 2004.
German leaders, Chancellor Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher applied a politics of small and indirect steps, creating first the Weimar Triangle, and then inviting Visegrád states’ governments to the European Council of 1993.

German policy makers took up a more concrete action on the EU level only when a possibility of doing it in cooperation with others presented itself. The views of two External Relations Commissioners, congruent with the German interests in Eastern Europe, allowed German policy makers to promote and achieve the Structured Dialogue. This approach can be seen an expression of Germany’s identity of multilateralism. Both maintaining good relations with France, not acting on the pressing need for securing new interests in the East, and, although for nearly four years only in a rhetorical sphere, but consistently supporting ambitions of the Eastern European partners was congruent with the principle of multilateral cooperation with all partners.

Practically this was a tactics that was not spelled out as such. But consistency of this approach, which spanned nearly three years, from the moment of the Weimar Triangle proposition to the acceptance of the Structured Dialogue, indicates that it was a tactics. It is also indicated in the fact that it followed the Richtlinie established by the main actor, Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Promoting the enlargement through the Weimar Triangle, and on the European level through preparing the ground for the Structured Dialogue — German policy makers successfully uploaded the enlargement on the European agenda. The Weimar Triangle did not help to change France’s stance on the enlargement, but it helped Germany to save the relation with its primary partner and to further the enlargement project.

There was however a price for this policy. It made Germany’s enlargement policy ambivalent. Small steps are expression of cautiousness and hesitancy; Weimar Triangle was a platform for only three states, France, Germany and Poland; and the Structured Dialogue was only a platform for communication of the EU members with Eastern Europeans.

The Dialogue was agreed nearly five years after the idea of the enlargement was presented to the European Community. These years are marked with the calls of Eastern European countries for actions of the EU that would directly respond to their pleas for a formal recognition of their future membership in the EU as an official objective, and then
for setting admission criteria and a timetable. During those five years, the applicants received only indication at the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993 of a membership perspective under very general conditions. But Germany’s stance on the enlargement was consistently supportive. French opposition was a powerful hindrance to Germany’s policy not only because the position of France in the EU created a potential that with a coalition of several other EU member states, France could have derailed the idea altogether. The impediment for German policy makers was that they did not have a partner to working with on the enlargement, in the EU environment.

The enlargement needed an advocate and a leader at the EU forum. Both Eastern countries and Western partners expected and wanted Germany to be this leader. Chancellor Helmut Kohl decided to make the enlargement along with deepening the European integration his *Chefsache*. He set in this way the direction of the post-unification German foreign policy. It was his political vision of Germany’s multilateralism aimed at the long-term gains that was surpassing the current debates in the EU and in Germany. It provides a proof for two assumptions:

1) The lasting commitment to multilateralism of the German foreign policy

2) A constructivist claim formulated by Peter Katzenstein that ‘*state interests do not exist to be ‘discovered’ by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are constructed through a process of social interaction*’

Choosing balancing both directions demonstrates that interests of the state are defined by the actors involved according to their own identity, values and self-perception. In this sense interests and identities are mutually constitutive, like Peter Katzenstein indicated — neither can be defined in the absence of the other. This determines the use of the constructivist perspective for this part of the German foreign policy analysis, both for the choice of preserving old commitments to the relation with France and for the choice of building new quality relations with Eastern partners. According to the constructivist understanding the identity is generally seen as being neither objectively

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242 Katzenstein, *Tamed Power*, op.cit, p. 117
determined by material structures, nor the product of a free-floating discourse; interests and identities are therefore mutually related and constitutive.

And the comment by John G. Ruggie written after the collapse of communism referring to new American foreign policy is applicable to the emergence of the new interests of Germany after its unification. Ruggie wrote that ‘‘making history’ in the new era is a matter not merely of defending the national interest but of defining it, not merely enacting stable preferences but constructing them. These processes are constrained by forces in the object world, and instrumental rationality is ever present. But they also deeply implicated such ideational factors as identities and aspirations as well as leaders seeking to persuade their publics and one another through reasoned discourse while learning, or not, by trial and error. As a result, nothing makes it clearer than the question of agency at times such as ours why the constructivist approach needs to be part of the theoretical tools of the international relations field.”

CHAPTER 5

Deepening versus Widening the European Integration
As the Cause of Ambivalence
In Germany’s Policy Towards the EU Enlargement
1993 — 1995

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy that was created by the tension between two ideas of the future development of the EU — the deepening and widening of the European integration. Both directions were seen as opposite and conflicting with each other. European policy makers were considering therefore options which direction should be given priority. It was a part of a debate on an emerging new concept for the European political and security ‘order’ and it was a core part of a domestic elite debate in Germany.

A new concept of the European political and security order was based on three pillars: a political and economic organization in the institutional shape of the European Union, a new European security system as the expanded NATO, and the Eastern enlargement of the EU. The project of dual development of the EU, deepening and widening the integration, presented a problem for majority of EU policy makers. Fear of
an unprecedented task, which the Eastern enlargement presented, generated an inclination to preserve the status quo within the EU, or at least within the core of the EU. It resulted in an intense debate over ideas how to proceed with the European integration, varying from creation of a core of the EU, to developing a multi-speed, or variable-geometry integration, with the most popular view that the deepening should precede widening.

In a German debate on the new, post-unification foreign policy a prevailing view was that both directions were necessary to embrace, but the question was whether deepening of the European integration should precede its widening. Despite those opinions, Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared embracing both directions simultaneously. It caused confusion, perception of ambivalence and ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy. The perception of ambivalence intensified when two leading German politicians of the governing CDU party, Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble published a paper advocating the deepening of the integration as a priority for German foreign policy.

The chapter focuses on the elite discourse and that opens the analysis to examining other actors in the German enlargement policy-making along the government executives — representatives of political parties. The issue of the European integration was the core and crux of the German debate over the future foreign policy and national interests of the new Germany. The debate reflects the changing concept of the European integration, which is highlighted by the tension that caused ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement. This is a part of a ‘building block’ of the European identity and the debate, and the changing concept of the European integration demonstrate a constructivist assumption that the premises of the ‘building blocks’ of international reality are ideational as well as material, and that ideational factors have both normative and instrumental dimensions244.

Application of the two-level game theory indicates that the ongoing on the domestic level debate on a preferable direction of the European integration had its reflection in the shape of the pronounced by Chancellor Helmut Kohl a new, changing concept of the European integration, that embraced both directions simultaneously.

I. AMBIVALENCE

Ambivalence caused by the tension between two directions of the European integration manifested as the contradictory rhetoric of the leading German actors on the future developments of the European integration. It reflected ambivalence of political elites over the choice of the priority in the foreign policy, making the German stance on the enlargement ambiguous.

First Chancellor Helmut Kohl introduced ambiguity declaring that Germany would embrace and support both directions simultaneously — of deepening and widening the European integration. His declaration caused ambivalence because both directions were seen as opposite, thus as a choice either-or. Moreover Chancellor Kohl did not support his declaration with further elaboration as how to reconcile endorsement of both directions, which made his stance highly unclear, and given the conflict between two options, ambivalent.

Secondly — two leading politicians of the governing at the time CDU party, Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble, presented in September 1994 a paper with a proposal of strengthening the core of the EU. Authors held prominent positions within the German policymaking apparatus, their opinion was perceived therefore as an expression of the German stance and was a reflection of the process of policy-making, the options German policy makers considered. Assigning priority to the deepening of the EU integration weakened the support for the enlargement; if endorsed by the government it would put the enlargement on the second plan in the EU development, postponing its completion because it would lose the support of Germany, the main player in the European Union.

The government of Helmut Kohl did not endorse the paper, yet the paper was never dismissed either. It created a perception that the government executives were testing the waters, what added to the negative perception of the ambivalence caused by the Chancellor’s stance supporting both directions. The more that the domestic elite debate in Germany indicated that the deepening of the integration had a stronger support as the primary interest of the unified Germany than the enlargement.

The debate on the future foreign policy of the new Germany and a place of the new Germany on the international stage, had been unfolding since the unification. It intensified after 1992 when the U.S. administration put forward an idea of expanding
NATO and embracing Eastern European countries into the structure of the alliance. The idea presented a security pillar of an emerging concept of the future European order, but German policy makers were considering more inclusively European options for the security organization. It reinforced a view that the deepening of the European integration should be the priority.

The ‘deepening first option had a strong reasoning based on three elements. First was the commitment to deeper integration, which the government of Helmut Kohl made in order to fulfil the ‘unification condition’ that Western partners imposed on Germany. Second was the goal of maintaining good relations with France; the deepening of the integration was for France an instrument of containing Germany’s power, hence the insistence of French politicians on closer involvement of Germany in the supranational structures of the EU. German policy makers understood the fears of their partners and were committed to dissolving apprehension. And the third component was a growing awareness of the complex difficulties and prospective costs of the enlargement while the deepening presented a more attractive direction.

This three-fold reasoning constituted the concept of deepening of the European integration as an independent factor, which transcended a function of serving as a tool in relations with France, or as a condition of the unification. German policy makers considered the deepening also as a possibility to further Germany’s future interests in Europe. Deepening of the integration presented for Germany opportunities to shape a growth of the EU.

The German domestic elite debate on the EU developments corresponded with the one run across the EU and considered many concepts of the future integration — creating a core of the EU, developing it at a multi-speed or through a variable-geometry. Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers publishing their paper took the discussion in Germany from the academic level to the heart of the political debate over the choices in the foreign policy. The paradox is that the domestic elite debate in Germany on the European identity and European integration facilitated the enlargement. The paper of Schäuble and Lamers in fact created a road map for both directions. Authors not only did endorse the enlargement project in their paper, presenting it as the other side of the same coin with deepening of the integration, but they also set a possible date for the admission
of the candidate countries — the year 2000, which was reiterated soon by Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In this way the direction indicated in the paper, and the Chancellor Kohl’s follow-up with pointing to a concrete date, created paradoxically ambivalence in the German stance on the enlargement, but it also sanctioned the enlargement as the endorsed political goal.

This paradox epitomises the change of the concept of the European integration in the German European policy. Endorsement of both directions, deepening and widening the EU, by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, exhibits the core of the European and multilateralist identity, which is at the basis of the German foreign policy. The very implication of the notion ‘European’, about integration of the continent, now with the enlargement idea started to gain its fuller shape. However, both concepts of deepening and widening of the EU were perceived by the majority of the German and European political elites still as conflicting with each other. This conflict was seen both in economic and political dimensions — the Eastern European countries were not expected to reach quickly the economic development of those countries that were to adopt the single currency.

Nonetheless Chancellor Helmut Kohl approached the challenge not as the necessity of choosing one direction over another but as the necessity to employ the ‘as-well-as’ strategy, because of the principle of multilateralism embedded in the national identity. Chancellor Kohl’s declaration of support for both directions, and a lack of concept how to reconcile contradictions, created ambivalence Germany’s enlargement policy and the dilemma how to balance both challenges the elite debate considered, caused a perception of ambivalence in Germany’s stance on the EU enlargement.

II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS

Changing Notion of the European Integration

While the first most apparent reason of the support that German elites lent to the enlargement idea was grounded in the historical sense of responsibility towards Eastern countries, and the new interests to introduce political and economic stability in the Eastern neighbourhood presented the second streak of the supportive reasoning, an overarching rationale of this support was the European identity of the German foreign policy, with its focus on building the European integration. During and after the
unification German leaders responded to the concerns of the Western partners unequivocally that a premise of the new foreign policy would be the European integration. It was the main setting of the BRD multilateralism and would remain at the heart of the German post-unification identity. This commitment was the main motive of the post-unification rhetoric by government executives; it was expressed by all political parties in the Bundestag debates and by the majority of German elite in a domestic debate. It was a powerful factor working on behalf of the enlargement.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl encapsulated the future direction of Germany’s foreign policy in his Paris speech of January 1990 stating that for the ‘German question’ there is a ‘European answer’. While presenting his new government programme for the years 1991-1994 Kohl stressed that ‘Germany is our fatherland, Europe is our future’. Hans-Dietrich Genscher supported these statements recalling in his speech to the UN General Assembly on 26 September 1990 the phrase of Thomas Mann: ‘our aim is not a German Europe, but a European Germany’. His successor, Klaus Kinkel reiterated idea declaring in May 1992 that there was ‘no alternative to the European path’. These declarations reflected a prevailing view on the European integration among all political parties on the German domestic stage, which led to enshrining the goal of the European integration in the German constitution.

1. European Integration in the Constitution

During the first half of the 1990s German politicians discussed the commitment to the European integration in four parliamentary debates: after the Maastricht Summit in December 1991, two subsequent ratification debates in October and December 1992, and the May 1994 debate, which preceded the 1994 EU elections and the German assumption of the EU presidency. All these debates indicated that German political elites embraced a supranational European identity.

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246 Kohl indicated also that “on the path to a united Europe, France and Germany have to remain driving forces”. In: Kohl “Deutschlands Einheit vollenden”…, op.cit.
247 Ulrich Wickert (ed), Angst vor Deutschland, Hamburg 1990
248 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 May 1992
The CDU/CSU made the European integration its flag policy. The party was carrying out the political testimony of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the founder of the CDU. The integration had among the CDU/CSU ranks understanding of a much deeper project than it was desirable by other European member states, for example Britain, for which the EC was an economic enterprise. For the German CDU it was a political enterprise with far-reaching goal of creating the ‘United States of Europe’\textsuperscript{249}. The rhetoric of the party representatives was calling for ‘cutting back of sovereignty’, for the reasons rooted in the ‘geopolitical realpolitik’\textsuperscript{250}. Chancellor Kohl used to stress that the European integration was based on and stemmed from what he called the ‘power of facts’\textsuperscript{251} suggesting that the political decisions on the European integration were often only adjustments following the ongoing virtual integration. Only after the Maastricht Summit German conservatives became visibly less federalist than in their previous rhetoric, when the project of a deeper political union was presented in a much narrower than expected and debated before form\textsuperscript{252}.

The position of the liberal FDP, which since the beginning of the 1980s was forming the governing coalition with the conservatives, was similar to the one of its coalition partner. German liberals wanted a United States of Europe too\textsuperscript{253}. They also saw the Franco-German collaboration as a driving force of Western European integration\textsuperscript{254}. It was one of the precepts of the policy of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, a prominent representative of the FDP and a Foreign Minister in Helmut Kohl’s governments. The FDP presented a European federation as a political goal in a party resolution of May 1991; Hans-Dietrich Genscher was proposing a confederation only four months later\textsuperscript{255}.

\textsuperscript{250} Hans Stercken, “Stenographischer Bericht des Deutschen Bundestag”, 21 November 1990, pp.3 and 23
\textsuperscript{251} Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 December 1991
\textsuperscript{252} Erich Hauser, “Das Monster von Maastricht”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 18 February 1992
\textsuperscript{253} FDP Bundeshauptausschüß, Liberale Außenpolitik für das vereinte Deutschland, Beschuß des Bundeshauptausschusses, Hamburg, 25 May, 1991, p.5
\textsuperscript{254} Welt am Sonntag, 2 February 1992 (Also available at the FPD’s Press office)
\textsuperscript{255} “Rede von der 46. Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen, 25 September 1991”, Auswärtiges Amt, Mitteilung für die Presse, Nr. 1205/91, p.4
The FDP differed from the conservatives only by exposing more strongly that a federal European state would need a strong democratic structure as well as a social dimension\textsuperscript{256}.

The main left-wing party, the SPD, before 1980 critical of the European project, changed its outlook in the 1980s into a more aligned with the position of the CDU/CSU and FDP. The SPD too declared then the United States of Europe as its goal, though the emphasis in the reasoning was different than of the CDU/CSU and FDP\textsuperscript{257}; while the latter were concerned with Germany’s competitiveness on world markets, the SPD’s primary focus was on integration, which would guarantee peace in Europe\textsuperscript{258}. In the 1990s the SPD’s view on the European integration was the most radical among German political parties. Oskar Lafontaine, the then premier of Saarland and the SPD’s and a candidate for the post of the Chancellor, during the Bundestag debate of 4 October 1990 described the ‘new state’ (a new, unified Germany) as merely a ‘transitional stage since we intend for it to be absorbed in a United States of Europe’. While the United States of Europe was the long-term goal, in a shorter perspective the EC was to transform into a political union accompanied by a monetary and economic community\textsuperscript{259}. Social Democrats, however, criticised Helmut Kohl fervently for what they saw as tactical errors in his negotiations at Maastricht\textsuperscript{260}. As expressed by the then party leader Björn Engholm, Maastricht would have been a full success if it had included the SPD’s postulates of strengthening democracy and democratic procedures\textsuperscript{261}. As for the Eastern countries — the SPD thought the status of association was to be an interim position ‘appropriate for the countries concerned’\textsuperscript{262}.

The Greens in the 1980s were especially vocal about their scepticism on the European integration, fuelled by their anti-centralist, anti-bureaucratic and anti-statist position. After the unification they opposed the creations of a European super-power and

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{256}{"Das liberale Deutschlandprogramm der FDP zu den Bundestagswahlen am 2. Dezember 1990", FPD’s Press Office, p. 22}
\footnote{257}{At the 1991 party convention in Bremen the SPD voted for a United States of Europe consisting of all willing European states. See: “Außen-, Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik, Beschlüsse des Parteitages in Bremen, 28-31 May, 1991”, SPD’s Press Office}
\footnote{258}{Ibid.}
\footnote{259}{Ibid.: Von der Konfrontation der Blöcke zu einem Europäischen Sicherheits-system. Positionspaper zu den sicherheitspolitischen Aspekten der Einigung Deutschlands im Rahmen der Europäischen Integration, Bonn, 25 April 1990}
\footnote{260}{Hauser, Das Monster… op.cit.}
\footnote{261}{Stuttgarter Zeitung, 16 March 1992}
\footnote{262}{Außen-, Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik, Beschlüsse des Parteitages in Bremen… op.cit.}
\end{footnotes}
demanded that the deepening of existing structures must not hinder the opening to and widening of the EU to the East\(^{263}\). As they prepared for taking power in the mid 1990s most of these concerns ceased to exist. A party programmewritten then by its leader Joschka Fischer, first published in 1994, outlined a full support for integrating Germany into the EU and NATO as a matter of national interests\(^{264}\).

These views of the European integration as the primary Germany’s interests, found an expression in the amendments of the constitution of the new German state. The article 23 of the Basic Law of a unified Germany was amended in December 1992 so that the Federal Republic instead of ‘being open for other parts of Germany to join’, was now committed to the ‘realisation of a united Europe’ through the European Union (as envisaged in Maastricht Treaty of December 1991).

2. Expanding Integration Concept

The reasoning behind this commitment presented in the debate was based on the history-related narrative of the German identity. One of the most often repeated arguments by Helmut Kohl was the claim that the European integration remained the best solution to the nationalist rivalry that plagued Europe before 1945. The drive for political union, he reminded on many occasions, was a ‘question of war and peace’ and the multilateral institutions of the EU, NATO and WEU that provided a normative framework for the FRG’s European policy, beneficiary for Germany in successful overcoming post-war legacy in the western realm. Helmut Kohl pointing to this achievement evoked the legacy of the founders of European integration, Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer and other ‘men and women who drew the consequences’ from Europe’s history of suffering\(^{265}\). The integration, Kohl pointed, helped to overcome centuries-old rivalries and conflicts among the participating nations. Klaus Kinkel, who assumed the position of the Foreign Minister in May 1992, depicted the origins of the integration process as a ‘reaction to centuries-long fratricidal wars’; Rudolf Scharping

\(^{264}\) Fischer’s plea for foreign policy realism however strictly advocates a future for Germany as a civilian power abstaining from any from of hard power projection. See: Joschka Fischer, *Risiko Deutschland, Krise und Zukunft der deutschen Politik*, Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1994
\(^{265}\) Kohl expressed this on numerous occasions, including the Bundestag debates.
the chairman of the SPD from 1993 to 1995, pointed that the EU grew out of ‘devastating experience of two terrible fratricidal wars’\textsuperscript{266}.

These declarations along with the amendments of the Basic Law, gave the reason for a conclusion that multilateralism and Europeanization became a nature of the German foreign policy, an intrinsic part of the German political culture. As Klaus Goetz described it — Europeanization became imprinted into the ‘political DNA of the German foreign policy’\textsuperscript{267}. The mantra of the ‘European interests of Germany’ brought German policy makers to the point, at which it was impossible to turn away from this normative narrative in the face of the 1989 change in the geopolitics in Europe and ignore the calls of the East Europeans to overcome the post-war division of the continent.

A positive course of the postwar integration bound German leaders to support further integration steps amid post-Cold War circumstances. For Kohl it compelled Germans to ‘empathise with the ideas of our partners’ and ‘to reflect on what one can demand of a neighbour’\textsuperscript{268}. Together with Kinkel and others, Kohl argued that this shift toward a more European way of thinking had generated the trust and goodwill, which made rapid reunification possible in 1989–90. It represented a core orientation to be maintained ‘under all circumstances’\textsuperscript{269}. As Wieczorek-Zeul put it, ‘Europe said yes to German unity; we say yes to European unity’.

The reasons of the support for the enlargement were summed up in the early 1993 by an influential intellectual Günther Nonnenmacher, the then co-editor-in-chief of \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, one of the leading broadsheet daily newspapers in Germany. He pointed that ‘Germany owes its prosperity to the integration with the other West European democracies. For the maintenance of security and prosperity this alliance has to be deepened, stretched incrementally towards the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, and kept open for free global trade. These aims do not always compete. It is in German interest to mediate and, as much as possible, to work towards balancing

\textsuperscript{266} Verhandlungen, 2 December 1992: 10824; 2 December 1992: 10837; 27 May 1994: 20126
\textsuperscript{267} Klaus Goetz, “National Governance and European Integration: Intergovernmental relations in Germany”, \textit{Journal of Common Market Studies}, Vol 33 No 1, 1995; Klaus Goetz, “Integration Policy in a Europeised State: Germany and the Intergovernmental Conference”, \textit{Journal of European Public Policy}, Vol 3 No 1, 1996
\textsuperscript{268} Verhandlungen, 2 December 1992: 10823–24; 8 October 1992: 9319
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.
A former chancellor Willy Brandt noticed in 1992 that ‘many people became aware for the first time that Europe didn’t end at the demarcation lines in the East and that we have neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe which are close to us’. He proposed a kind of Marshall Plan and pronounced that Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia would be members of the EC by the turn of the century. His call was one of the strongest at the time, but politicians across the political spectrum presented similar views on the need to open to the East in speeches at the Bundestag.

German elites held that the reunification bound Germans to continue making European unity a priority. The Maastricht Treaty itself was a strong argument for the support of the East Europeans’ application: the integration marked a break with the ‘time of national policy’ as Klaus Kinkel put it, and constituted a necessary ‘self-binding’ of German power within durable European institutions, as noted by Wieczorek-Zeul of the SPD. Comments concerning the Maastricht Treaty indicated also an expanding meaning of the European integration. Helmut Kohl emphasised that support for Maastricht was necessary to prove that Germans remained ‘committed to what we have always said, namely that German unity and European unification are two sides of the same coin’.

The presented in the Bundestag debates views on the European integration reflect the main constructivists point that the international system arises from two fundamental streams — the structures of human associations that are determined by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests are constructed by these shared ideas. The unambiguous commitment to the European integration declared by all German political parties was a strong signal about a prospective progress of the integration. The question was about a direction of this progress.

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274 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1999
III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE

1. Problematic Enlargement

While the commitment to the European integration represents an ideational side of the European integration ‘building block’, its material dimension was much more problematic.

Until the preparations of the Structured Dialogue in 1994, the enlargement idea remained abstractive. German politicians of all parties, and their counterparts in other EU member states, considered Western Europe as a model of the standards, that would be necessary for the new Eastern European democracies to reach, if they wanted to gain the EU membership. The necessary standards and conditions of admission, however, were still vague; it was clear that the Easter European countries would not reach quickly standards of the EU members, and if left outside the EU, the catching-up process would take much longer.

Member states were not interested in defining accession standards. Once, however, a debate on the enlargement agenda started, all the difficulties and problems of disparity between the West and East came to the surface. It was triggered by preparations for the Structured Dialogue, which was accepted at the Essen Summit in November 1994. New setting for the political dialogue which the Eastern partners shifted the debate from the level of ideas, down to the real issues; economic concerns were quickly revealed as the main reason of scepticism and reluctance over the enlargement idea.

While the political implications of the prospective enlargement were still challenging, such as the need to cushion the declining Russian influence in the region the most, the economic disparity between the EU and the Eastern countries rose as the most problematic for the EU member states. A phrase in common use at the time in the German debate was Wohlstandsgefälle — ‘difference in prosperity’ and East European new democracies were called ‘transition states’ (to differentiate them from ‘developing states’). Embracing them into the same redistribution system of the EU threatened the economic status quo of the EU the member states.

A sharp contrast to the extrapolations about the Eastern enlargement was the admission of the EFTA countries, that was carried out at the beginning of the 1990s. Strong economically EFTA countries joining the EU were expected to improve the
Union’s budgetary performance. The Eastern European countries would not contribute to the development of the EU, as needing economic assistance. On the other hand the EFTA enlargement also improved the Union’s capability to counteract unwelcome effects, like those unavoidably connected with the Eastern enlargement. Financial issues were touching the very core of the European integration. As it was put by Smith and Wallace — ‘At the economic core of the integration model is a balance between attaining economic efficiency through competition and free trade on the one hand and mitigating the effects of rapid adjustment to economic change on the other’.

As indicated in the previous part, the issue of stability of Eastern Europe became the core of the new Germany’s interests in the East. Helmut Kohl pointed in the midst of the negotiations on Germany’s unification that ‘with the opening of the Iron Curtain new opportunities would arise, the emerging tensions would also be gaining equal attention’. Two years later, in 1992, German Chancellor was stressing that the security problems of Eastern Europe were not any longer of a military nature and argued: ‘A European answer to these problems can only mean leading the states of Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe into the European Community’.

The SPD, in opposition to the government, was more cautious at the time: the chairman of the SPD Group in Bundestag, Hans-Ulrich Klose called Kinkel’s demands for a rapid widening ‘populist and unrealistic’ and warned about the ‘dangerous illusions of the markets opened to the East’ indicating that the German population would not be able to compete with the low-wage countries, which would result in further loss of jobs in Germany (on top of the enormous losses as a result of the unification). Similarly the SPD chairman Rudolf Sharping during his speech in Prague expressed his understanding of the Czech desire to join to the EU, but also pointed that it would be a

279 Nur noch zweite Wahl, *Der Spiegel*, 4 July 1994
long process with considerable difficulties. Politicians of the SPD also avoided indicating any dates, addressing the issue of the EU widening in vague terms and claiming that candidate states ‘must have an all-European perspective’.

Among the financial and economic factors working against the support for the enlargement, the most powerful was the fear of alteration of the EU status quo. The conviction about the need to maintain progress that was increasing the prosperity of the EU members was shared by most of the EU political elites, including the German elites. An idea of NATO expansion, that arose simultaneously to the deepening-widening debate, exposed the scale of the challenge the Eastern European countries faced in order to fulfil the conditions of the NATO membership. Meeting the EU membership conditions was much more complex. EU policy makers, concerned first of all with the Maastricht provisions, saw now the enlargement in a more incremental mode, instead of a big bang, one-act admission of the Eastern applicants.

The strong normative reasoning of the support for the enlargement presented therefore a problem how to sustain heterogeneity within the EU, with a view to the widening the Union. The post Maastricht debate across the EU indicated that new arrangements the Maastricht Treaty brought upon the EU would require, and generate more of differentiation in the integration process. The Maastricht Treaty introduced a multi-speed mode for the implementation of the EMU, which was based on capability of a member-state, measured against common and unanimously agreed convergence criteria, its willingness to embrace the currency and a precise timetable set for each state accordingly. It opened a multi-speed mode for the integration and the debate on possible variants.

2. Various Models of the EU Integration

There were several such variants, of a multi-speed, two-tier, multi-track, variable-geometry or à la carte mode, with the three latter as referred to the most often. Each was seen as built around a hard core of the most advanced in the integration members or to take a form of concentric circles. In a multi-speed mode common

\[280\text{ Europäische Perspektiven in den neunziger Jahren, Rede Rudolf Sharpings in Prag, Presseservice der SPD, 6 April 1994}\]
\[281\text{ Zehn Forderungen an die deutsche Ratpräsidenschaft der EU, Presseservice der SPD, 30 April 1994}\]
objectives were pursued by a group of member states, both willing and able to deepen their integration in some policy areas, with the underlying assumption that the others would follow later. The concept of variable geometry was about integration differentiated in space; it allowed a lasting separation between the core of countries and less developed ones. A Europe á la carte was the most flexible variant — it would allow each member state to pick and choose the policy area, like from a menu, in which it would like to participate, be it social policy, monetary policy, or defence policy, and opt out from the others, with a minimum number of common objectives.

All these modes were suggested interchangeably at this stage of the discussion, but with the main message that the European integration, including embracing new entrants, could and rather should progress in one of these modes. The British Prime Minister John Major for example was talking about the multi-speed of the European development at the lecture at Leiden on 7 September 1994. The French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur in turn referred to ‘concentric circles’ — in an interview for Le Figaro of the 30th of August 1994. He indicated then in his own article in Le Monde of 30 November 1994 that a core for integration should be a pillar for economic policy and political cooperation along with common borders, while solidarités renforcées in other areas such as UME and defence would create a second circle, with a third circle for applicants and future members.

In Germany Josef Janning, one of the leading German political scientists called for different speeds for the EU indicating that as the only reasonable direction for the EU if it was to develop282. Together with Werner Weidenfeld of the prestigious Zentrum für angewandte Politikforschung proposed a ‘differentiated integration’, a deeper integration in different policy areas283. The idea was later promoted by the CDU foreign policy expert Rudolf Seities284 with the emphasis on the economic reasoning: a limitation of the economic and currency union to the stable core of Europe would fit the preferences of many German policy makers, who feared that the D-Mark would be weakened by the acceptance of economically weak states Bundesbank adhered to the so-called ‘crowning

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283 Ibid.
theory’ according to which economic conditions had to be similar before a common currency could be introduced not the other way round. Hans Tietmeyer president of Bundesbank presented a model of ‘concentric circles’ picturing the future development of the EU in the context of embracing the single currency. Klaus Kinkel explicitly asked whether the ‘convoy should be determined by the slowest also ship, or whether those who wanted to proceed faster, were free to do so’. He added that the German preference was to have all members on the board but that Germany wanted a strong European core.

3. Deepening-Widening Discourse

The question about the future development of Europe and the European Union was the main line of the division among four schools of political thought that emerged after the unification as identified by Gunter Hellmann. The most numerous and influential school was of Europeanists, who while not excluding the EU enlargement, favoured the deepening of the EU integration. Europeanists’ views were congruent with those of pragmatic multilateralists, though the latter did not give preference to the deepening of the European integration.

According to the Hellmann’s taxonomy Europeanists presented two basic arguments why the acceleration of European integration should be at the centre of German foreign policy concerns. It was important (1) for ‘internal’ reasons — to prevent the re-emergence of counterbalancing coalitions vis-à-vis Germany and (2) for ‘external’ reasons — to render the EU a more competitive actor in international affairs more broadly. Europeanists pointed first to the constitutional obligation of German policy makers — to foster European integration. Europeanists viewed acceleration of the European integration was as the only sensible choice for geopolitical reasons, in the context of the changes in Eastern Europe. They indicated that the challenges in this part of Europe were facing Germany with a special burden, as it was the most powerful

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285 “Diskussion um die Konvergenzkriterien zur Teilnahme an der EWWU”, Keesings Archiv der Gegenwart, 27 November 1997, 41601
287 Kinkel vor der Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, D541-2
economically and most exposed geopolitically state in the heart of Europe. However, if Germany was to respond to these challenges by unilaterally expanding its influence, such an action would provoke balancing behaviour on the part of its western European allies.\textsuperscript{289}

For this reason deepening of the European integration should have priority. As put it by Werner Link ‘the active participation of German in the development of federal structures in Europe is in its very own interest: indeed, European federalism can be regarded as the foreign policy ‘raison d’etat’ of Germany because in deepening European integration and in creating a European Union Germany can make best use of its power and increase its security without appearing threatening and without provoking counter-balancing coalitions. As a result, the foreign policy imperative is to do everything possible to foster the development of federal structures [in Europe].’\textsuperscript{290}

Europeanists supported deepening of the European integration also as a means for improving Europe’s role in competing with other centres of power in North America and Asia. None of the key members of the EU, including Germany, was viewed as able to compete effectively on its own with the U.S., Japan or China, and the western European allies were seen as lagging behind the other centres of economic power, in all of the key ‘information age’ industries.\textsuperscript{291} From this assessment Europeanists concluded that Germany’s position as a leading economic power could only be regained and preserved in concert with its most important European allies and with help of an institutional apparatus such as the European Commission.

Eurosceptics, on the opposite side, held that German policy makers should accept Germany as a normal nation-state and stop aiming at federal Europe.\textsuperscript{292} Their primary and ultimate objective was an integration of Germany’s eastern neighbours into western institutions because they saw it as a matter of Germany’s security, depending on stability of its eastern borders. In this respect similar views to those of Eurosceptics were held by

290 Ibid.
normalization-nationalists who were explicitly opposed to the downgrading of the EU to a free trade area arguing that it has always been a classical task of geopolitics to integrate different zones with diverging interests.\(^{293}\)

The most important circumstance is that while Europeanists considered a federal Europe a number one long-term objective, they did not believe that accomplishing it would be easy.\(^{294}\) In fact, they doubted whether it would stand a chance of being realised in the foreseeable future. Therefore, they realised that because the necessary enlargement of the EU would take time, it was ‘paramount to create the hard core of the EU immediately: the Carolingian Europe of the six founding members’ of the European Economic Community.\(^{295}\) In the short and medium term the most practical way to proceed thus was to acknowledge explicitly the notion of ‘variable speeds’ in achieving objectives and to create a ‘hard core’ of the European Union member states, willing and able to move ahead faster than the rest.\(^ {296}\) For any of these scenarios essential would be Franco-German cooperation; therefore it ranked first for Europeanists, before for example the German-American relations.

4. French Catalyst

The debate over the directions of the European integration was conducted with a view on the bilateral relations with France. A tension in this relation, present since the unification, reached the boiling point in spring 1994. The French ambassador to Germany François Sheer criticised German foreign policy at the press conference, pointing to its ‘power play’ that was demonstrated according to the French ambassador in the support for the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Klaus Kinkel in reaction warned that he would summon ambassador Scheer to report, an action without precedence in the Franco-


\(^{295}\) Ibid.

German relations. That prompted politicians on the highest level on both sides to a series of mutual reassurances about the special aspect of the relations between two countries. Roman Herzog, the newly elected president of Germany emphasised that in one of his first speeches, and François Mitterrand invited the German counterparts in the Eurocorps to participate in a parade on the French national holiday of 14 July. Despite those declarations, the balance between two countries in the view of the French politicians was changed, and as it was put by Juppé at the time, ’France needed Germany more than Germany needed France’.

The sense of lack of cooperation was exacerbated by growing problems with supranational integration. A conflict over a Franco-German initiative to make the Belgian prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene a new president of the EU that was stopped by the British veto, and a supranational integration on police matters that was stalled at the time, were the most paramount, though not the only examples of these problems. An initiative of the police integration was particularly important to Germany, which together with Britain was trying to pass a convention on a European police organization EUROPOL; it was however opposed by the French who did not agree on transferring sovereign rights to this organization. Impatience with these issues among German policy makers increased their interest in the idea of ‘Europe of different speeds’.

**IV. OPTIONS**

**Schäuble-Lamers Paper**

The debate reached the peak in Germany when two top-members of the governing CDU party Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers issued a proposal for a deeper integration of the ‘core Europe’. They presented their paper ‘Reflections on European...”

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297 “Bonns AußenMinister werft die Nerven”, Berliner Zeitung 18 March 1994
298 “Herzog betont besondered Verhältnis zu Frankreich, Die Welt, 7 August 1994
301 Mitteilung zu den Ergebnissen der europäischen Rates, Presseservice der SPD, 12 Dezember 1994
‘Policy’ on 1 September 1994. It had a very attentive reception across Europe. First, because it was presented under the auspices of the CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag, being thus an officially endorsed by the governing party voice in the discussion. Secondly — the authors were highly ranked politicians within the German policy-making apparatus: Karl Lamers was the CDU Group spokesman on international policy, and Wolfgang Schäuble, was the chairman of the CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag, seen in political circles as a possible successor of Chancellor Kohl. Their paper was therefore regarded as a highly significant politically statement not only for the position of the authors in German establishment but also because it was presented at the time when Germany held the Council presidency.

It gave the European debate a special spur. By opting for deepening the Western integration it put in question the commitment Chancellor Kohl made to the both directions of the European integration. It broke the perception of Germany championing the Eastern enlargement of the EU.

The paper was prescriptive, designed to reconcile a growing disparity between the deepening and widening, and to establish parameters of the integration debate at the approaching Essen Summit at the end of the year. As explained by the authors it provided a blueprint for the road to the enlargement. In the commonly shared perception their call, however, opposed the idea of the enlargement. The overview of their proposal used to be summarised as a suggestion that in the absence of a broad consensus for further deepening among the existing members, integration should proceed among a smaller, core group of member states, who were willing to pool sovereignty in a number of crucial areas. In fact Schäuble—Lamers proposal epitomised the inclination of German elites to preserve the existing balance of ‘power’ and of economic redistribution system in the


German policy makers were not alone in promoting the idea of strengthening the core of the EU; they voiced the concerns shared across all political spectrum of the EU. The authors pointed first of all to the need of strengthening the Union, which was an adjustment of the old concept to new circumstances. In this aspect the paper was first a response to the concerns of German policy makers how to carry out the Chancellor’s commitment to both directions. Second reason for calling for creation of a core Europe and placing the enlargement on the second plan was a growing tension in the relations with France. The proposal of Schäuble and Lamers was an effort to reconcile both desirable directions of the European integration, but it was also an attempt to balance the challenge of maintaining good relations with France and opening to the East. The key, as the authors presented it, was to design an acceptable for both sides concept of the future political organization of Europe, and, what they did not admit publically, to dissolve the French fears about reliability of Germany.

A response from France was immediate and unfavorable: the government representatives with the prime Minister Édouard Balladur (at power since March 1993) responded with a series of statements and speeches in which they underlined the importance of the state, its individuality, capabilities and their resolve to act and started to promote the idea of the concentric development on Europe.

The Schäuble and Lamers’ proposal while in congruency with these calls elaborated in the most comprehensive way the concerns about reconciling the deepening and widening the EU. It offered a departure from a ‘Europe a la carte’, through

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304 They designated the members they saw fit for the core as Germany, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands.
305 As it was put for example by Hilmar Kopper, chairman of the Deutsche Bank who defended Schäuble’s paper because it “had made explicit what we all feared or knew”. See: “Wer Maastricht zerschlägt, der schafft keinen Kern”, Bonner Rundschau, 13 September 1994
306 The concept first time was advocated by Willy Brandt in 1974, who suggested then introduction of different speeds in integration; ten years later law professor Eberhard Grabitz suggested a concept of different layers of integration; and in 1989 prior to unification, the advisors of Chancellor Kohl — Michael Mertes and Norbert Prill promoted a concept of concentric circles around the central core.
307 Robert Niblett, France and Europe: “Resisting Change”, in: Niblett, Wallace, Rethinking…, op.cit. p. 103
308 The most outer circle was to be formed by the states of the former Soviet Union; the European Union was to form the second circle (composed of 30 states maximum) under the discipline of community acquis and the first circle was to be formed by the states willing to cooperate closely with the Franco-German core (especially in the areas of military cooperation and associated by the monetary union).
introduction of ‘variable geometry’ or ‘multi-speed Europe’ concepts. A concept was to counteract centrifugal tendencies that arose from successive enlargements and prevention of a North-South alignment. A chosen mode was to be defined and enshrined in a quasi-constitutional document. The proposal of Schäuble and Lamers drew also attention to a crucial question on the EU’s essential reforms that would have to take place prior to the enlargement, a necessary rebuilding and redesigning of the rules of governance within the Union to adapt the EU to the enlargement, which were addressed neither at Maastricht, nor in subsequent treaties. Although the paper presented rather a list of conditions to fulfil, than a concrete plan how to achieve them, nevertheless it was the first so thoroughly formulated programme on the issue of the EU reform and the question of efficiency and legitimacy in the future, expanded Union.

Regarding the enlargement, the authors indicated five countries as able to join the European Union around the year 2000: Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Slovenia. The paper extrapolated that the accession would impose serious economic strains on both old and new members. A successful economic adjustment would be possible through application of a ‘variable geometry’ concept. It would result with accession at a later date. The authors stressed the necessity to act swiftly: ‘It must be borne in mind that the later the accession takes place, the higher the costs are likely to be’ — wrote Schäuble and Lamers.

V. RESULTS

Deepening-Widening Politics

The paper of Schäuble and Lamers had mixed perception both inside and outside Germany. Not only French leaders criticised it. The proposal resulted in a discomfort and irritation among the EU member countries. Italy’s furious reaction because it was not included into the core-group was the strongest but not a single outcry; the criticism pointed to the division made between the deepening and widening of the EU. It was also the highest concern of Eastern European elites. In their view assigning priority to the

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309 The paper suggested a package of five proposals: (i) Further institutional development of the Union and implementation of the subsidiarity principle, including transferring powers back (ii) Strengthening the “hard core” of the European Union (iii) Intensification of Franco-German relations (iv) Strengthening of the Union’s ability to act on foreign and security policy (v) EU enlargement towards Eastern Europe with the date of 2000 as possible to complete.
strengthening the core, was identical with postponing the enlargement for a long time.

East European politicians and elites viewed the paper as putting both ideas of the deepening and widening of the Union in conflict, and favouring a creation of a two-tier (or two-speed) Europe. This variant of the European integration ran strongly against ambitions and desires of Eastern Europeans, whose main concern was to end as quickly as possible the period in their history when they remained outside a developing Europe.

The fact that German policy makers considered creation of different speed integration created a perception of ambivalence in Germany’s stance on the enlargement of the EU. For this reason the paper was also criticised by the SPD as an attempt to create ‘an upper and lower class Europe’ that would destroy the EU, undermine the credibility and reliability of German European policy’. SPD demanded Kohl to distance himself from a ‘tactless paper’ (the criticism served also an ongoing at the time election campaign)\(^{310}\). Hans-Dietrich Genscher characterised the paper as ‘attempt by CDU/CSU to gain profile in foreign policy a traditional domain of the FDP’ and warned that distinction between core and periphery would not lead to progress, but to nuclear fissions\(^{311}\).

This perception was strong because the paper was embraced by the governing party CDU/CSU; only in June next year the CDU/CSU group of members of Parliament issued two official papers much more moderate and without any reference to the ‘core Europe’\(^{312}\). It is significant also that the Schäuble—Lamers paper was also perceived as allowing Chancellor Kohl to check the idea of a core Europe. Such scholars as Simon Bulmer and William Paterson wrote explicitly that ‘Kohl floated his idea of a core Europe via a CDU/CSU Foreign Affairs Committee’s discussion paper’\(^{313}\). The German government never endorsed the paper. Neither the German representation at the EU supported any of the proposals about the ‘concentric circle’ development of the Union. Helmut Kohl used to stress the Maastricht Treaty commitment, but pointing at the same

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310 Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, Erklärung zu der CDU/CSU-Fraktion vorgelegten Vorschlägen zu einem Kerneuropa, Presseservice der SPD, 5, 12, 5 September 1994, Hans-Ulrich Klose, Vorbild, nicht Vormacht, Bild, 7 September 1994; Klaus Hänsch SPD the president of the European Parliament remarked that to “destroy Maastricht would not create a core, only a chaos”.
311 “Bedenkliche Thesen”, op.cit. pp. 29-32
313 Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and William E. Paterson, Germany’s European Diplomacy: Shaping the regional milieu. Manchester, Manchester University Press 2000
time that ‘with the aim of Maastricht Treaty the Union takes responsibility for the whole of the European continent’\textsuperscript{314}. The official stance was that both directions were complementary, not conflicting.

However, in the light of this research, the paper rather presented the reasons why the government of Helmut Kohl chose the implementation of the Maastricht provisions as the priority. This choice was confirmed by the Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who summarised it in a key speech given in Sigmaringen on 29 April 1994\textsuperscript{315} and was consistent with all previous government declarations about the foreign policy goals. The first such a declaration, presenting provisions of the foreign policy of the new, unified Germany were announced by the new government of Chancellor Kohl after the December 1991 elections. These provisions were threefold\textsuperscript{316}:

- European integration and opening to the East
- global and regional policy
- policy towards the developing countries

Klaus Kinkel, Foreign Minister and since 1993 Vice-Chancellor of Germany, summarising the overseen policy in a key speech in August 1994, defined four goals\textsuperscript{317}:

1) principal focus on Europe with completing the Maastricht Agenda
2) seeking stability in central and Eastern Europe
3) support to and stabilization of the reform process in Russia
4) redefinition of transatlantic relations

It is clear that despite the supporting rhetoric of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the EU enlargement was not listed explicitly as a goal of the foreign policy, even when Germany held the presidency of the EU in the second half of 1994. The primary concern and interest of the German foreign policy was the European integration, and the Maastricht Treaty agenda.

\textsuperscript{314} Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Maastricht vor dem Bundestag am 13 Dezember 1991 (statement to the Bundestag by Chancellor Kohl regarding the results of the European Council in Maastricht), \textit{Bulletin der Bundesregierung}, Nr.142, 17 December 1991, 1153-1158
\textsuperscript{315} \textit{Bulletin der Bundesregierung}, 40, 5 May 1994
\textsuperscript{316} Karl Kaiser, Hanns W. Maull, (Hrsg.) \textit{Deutsche Außenpolitik. Grundlagen}, Bd. 1, München 1994, Bd. 2 München 1995
\textsuperscript{317} Speech in Sigmaringen on 29 April 1994 \textit{Bulletin des Bundesregierung} NO 40, 5 May 1994 pp. 350-351
It was the interest of Germany to deepen the integration for its own merits; the German political elites, like their French counterparts, preferred a ‘strong union with the Franco-German couple at the political steering wheel’\(^{318}\). The French fears were to be dispelled by the proposal to ‘take the Union together with the German counterparts further’. The relationship — as explained by Bulmer and Paterson — had served both as enabling and constraining role, depending on the circumstances. As much thus as the German dominance was restrained, the relation with France served as a ‘useful umbrella for idea of German origins, for example the EMS (…)) and helped empower the government European diplomacy by making German leadership more palatable\(^{319}\). The indication of favouring a deeper integration, like in the government’s provisions for the foreign policy, was dictated thus mainly by the intention to calm down French fears and improve the relation with France, which sharply deteriorated half a year earlier, in spring 1994.

Nonetheless listing the ‘opening to the East’ and ‘seeking stability in central and Eastern Europe’ on the second place among the goals of the government foreign policy was an expression of assigning a very high significance.

Chancellor Kohl presented the two directions as closely connected. He indicated the need to embrace both directions simultaneously as early as in October 1992. While recommending the Maastricht Treaty provisions to his party as ‘unquestionable achievement’ Kohl pointed out that the Treaty was in fact an opening to the enlargement: ‘The whole of Europe needs a strong European Community. This brings me to one, if not the essential aim of the Maastricht Treaty. This treaty is not just a European answer to the collapse of the dictatorship in Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe. With it we take up our responsibility for the whole of the European continent’\(^{320}\). Chancellor consistently declared later both directions as necessary to support.

The view of Chancellor Kohl was a political vision. As such it went beyond a perception of the enlargement the majority of EU policy makers had at the time. For the

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320 Protokoll des 3. Parteitages der CDU Deutschlands, 26-28 Oktober 1992, Düsseldorf
majority the Maastricht Treaty contained provisions of the future EU organization that were highly problematic. They were far-reaching; the pledge to introduce single currency and common foreign and security policy was to alter substantially political character of the EU organization. It would drastically deepen the EU political integration with the unknown outcome, how it would work, and for this reason raising scepticism. The preparations for fulfilling these arrangements were seen as a long-term and exhausting task. Together with the German unification the Maastricht reforms caused political fatigue with changes and modifications that was felt across the EU. The Danish referendum rejecting the Maastricht Treaty was an evidence of this perception.

Those circumstances discouraged politicians and public opinion from further revisions of the EU premises. They did not create a favourable context for pushing for the EU enlargement either — on the contrary, the enlargement was a challenge with many more unpredictable variables. Even such a drastic matter like introduction of the single currency was much more familiar to the Western European politicians and public opinion, because it had been discussed for years, whereas consideration of an eastward expansion of the European Communities was beyond political imagination and public debate before 1990. In this respect it was similar to the NATO expansion project, which took the political thinking beyond the Cold War limits. But while the NATO expansion had a powerful leader, the project of embracing Eastern Europe into the EU structures lacked a similar driving force; the Chancellor Kohl’s vision did not have a compelling charisma.

**SUMMARY**

The EU enlargement and the deepening of the European integration were seen as ‘either or’ option and the domestic debate in Germany evolved around the question which option should Germany choose. The most numerous school in Germany, of Europeanists, was giving the preference to the deepening of the Western integration. Chancellor Kohl decided to support both directions simultaneously. It was a confusing decision as both directions were seen and presented as contradictory. It made the Chancellor’s stance ambiguous and his support for the enlargement ambivalent as Chancellor’s stance did not receive elaboration how to reconcile both directions. The perception of ambivalence in
German stance on the enlargement was deepened when Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers published their paper on strengthening the core of the EU. The primary source of ambivalence was though Chancellor’s decision to embrace both directions simultaneously and employment of the ‘as-well-as’ strategy.

The reason for the Chancellor’s decision was twofold — the primary one was a deeply normative reasoning rooted in the post-war moral philosophy of the German foreign policy and reflecting the national identity of Germany shaped in the post-war decades. The secondary motive was that both directions served interests of Germany if to see them through the benefits-calculation prism.

First the choice of Helmut Kohl was primarily motivated by a strong conviction that Germany had to continue the post-WWII successful foreign policy based on the European integration and cooperation with the Western partners and the need to answer positively the calls of Eastern Europeans. This was the cornerstone of Helmut Kohl’s post-unification foreign policy. Embracing both directions simultaneously was the political vision of Helmut Kohl, who felt obligated to carry on the political vision of Konrad Adenauer.

The principal idea of Adenauer’s grand vision for Germany was that the Germans needed to overcome the indignity and humiliation of the WWII legacy. German Europeanization did not come from the penchant and predilection to building a community of European nations. It was adopted out of weakness as a strategy for survival in the WWII aftermath by chancellor Konrad Adenauer, whose strategy was to abandon a unilateral sovereignty of Germany and to engage it into multilateral frameworks of international institutions and regimes. It was a pragmatic strategy of a defeated state that was looking for redemption and re-entry into a realm of international cooperation. Western partners, France particularly, helped to achieve this aspiration by fostering reconciliation with Germany. The year 1990, nonetheless, again brought forth the legacy of the past. The Westbindung, the close cooperation with Western partners was the

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antidote to the fear of the everlasting ‘return of the shame’\textsuperscript{322}, now the united Germany had an opportunity to achieve a similar outcome in relations with the East.

Helmut Kohl understood and embraced the Konrad Adenauer’s heritage. He realised how heavily the legacy of World War II burdened the fate of Europe, and particularly the relations of Germany with Eastern Europe. He used to compare the European challenge to the task of overcoming the old alternative ‘peace or war’. This conviction was rooted in Kohl’s personal experience; he was the last Chancellor of Germany who remembered the war. His sense of Germany’s responsibility towards the East was unquestionable. Kohl also liked posing as a moral leader of the nation. In this context, he used to stress that he was fulfilling the mission laid down by Konrad Adenauer; in 1990 Kohl successfully accomplished Adenauer’s long-term goal, the unification of Germany. Sustaining the commitment to deepening the European integration was a continuity of the premises of the post-war foreign policy laid by Konrad Adenauer. And by increasingly frequent advocating the idea of taking the Eastern countries on the EU board Kohl was opening a new course for his nation.

The reasoning based on benefits calculation had two dimensions. Western partners found the commitment of the German government to the enlargement controversial. They saw it as an attempt on the German side to gain a dominant position in the region, but at the same time as an opportunity to engage German resources into the European projects (such as of the EMU and deepening the European integration projects). So while German politicians were seeking to involve other EU member states in the enlargement project to share the financial burden, the other member states saw the enlargement as a possibility to contain Germany (apart from France). They did not, however, want German policy makers to lead the EU to the enlargement. German politicians were aware of these attitudes and applied the principle of multilateralism for engaging in both directions. It helped Germany to diffuse their partner’s fears and at the same time to co-shape developments of the EU, both in the deepening and widening aspects.

\textsuperscript{322} Jonathan P.G. Bach, \textit{Between Sovereignty and Integration, German Foreign Policy and National Identity after 1989}, St Martin’s Press, New York 1999
This double-track approach was illustrated by perturbations with the invitation of the heads of associated states to the Essen Summit. This idea of Chancellor Kohl met resistance from other EU member states, because other EU member states feared that the German government was trying to let the East Europeans into the EU through the backdoor. The German government repeatedly cancelled the invitation, what also led Chancellor to stating officially (while addressing the East Europeans in Essen) that ‘today you are still guests, but within a reasonable time you will be the members’, without suggesting any date for the membership.323

323 “Falsche Hoffnungen”, Der Spiegel 12 Dezember 1994
CHAPTER 6

NATO Enlargement versus EU Enlargement Tension
As the Cause of Ambivalence
In Germany’s Policy Towards the EU Enlargement
1993 — 1995

INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on perception of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy that was caused by the NATO enlargement project. The project interfered with the support of German policy makers for the EU enlargement, deepening the perception of already existing ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy.

NATO expansion was a second of the two-pillar concept of new political, security and economic organization of Eastern Europe. German policy makers did not favour NATO Eastward expansion and considered alternative options of a new international security organization of Europe. These alternative options were contradictory to the premises of the idea of the EU and NATO Eastward expansion. As such the consideration of these alternative options created a perception that the foundation of the support for the EU enlargement is not as firm as declared.

In this respect NATO expansion presents the third major, along the deepening of the EU integration and relations with France, external constraint to the EU enlargement in
the years 1992—1995. Yet, paradoxically, both these constraints ultimately facilitated the Eastern enlargement of the EU. And it was German policy makers who played an important role in this process. First German Chancellor Helmut Kohl set a new direction for Germany’s European foreign policy endorsing both the EU widening and deepening projects simultaneously. Then, German policy makers while dealing with both challenges — of balancing deepening the integration with the enlargement and NATO expansion projects — were able to hammer out a solid permissive consensus at the domestic stage on both issues. That allowed eventually the incorporation of both projects into a grand concept of Germany’s European interests. In this way Germany became a leader of the post-Cold War strategic changes in Europe.

The NATO project brought to the scene new actors — the representatives of the Defence Ministry and of political parties. These actors were a part of an epistemic community that advocated NATO expansion. Their actions in the external (the first board) reflect domestically debated interests (the second board). NATO expansion presents however a puzzle — it can be interpreted both in realist terms for its sheer character of expanding a military organization created as defence alliance against the Soviet Union as well as by applying a liberal perspective that would present the expansion as embracing new democracies in Eastern Europe on the basis of common values with the aim to stabilise the region.

The perception of ambivalence in this case was caused by a clash of alternative concepts of a new European security and political order. The events that ultimately led German policy makers to supporting NATO expansion, which was congruent with the support for the EU enlargement, represent a case for the constructivist ontology: an impact of epistemic communities on creation of the state interests.

I. AMBIVALENCE

The perception of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the EU enlargement caused by the NATO expansion project had two dimensions.

First, German policy makers favoured initially other concepts of a new international security organization in Europe. The hesitation of German executives when faced with the idea of the expanded NATO was in conflict with the premises of the EU
enlargement idea. NATO eastward expansion was the second of the two-pillar concept of a new organization of Eastern Europe, with the Eastern enlargement of the European Union as the other pillar. Hesitation over the concept based on NATO undermined the overall perception of Germany as supportive to this two-pillar concept of the new organization of the European continent. Like other Western Europeans, German policy makers too were divided over the future shape of the European security system, and ambivalent about the NATO expansion. As it became number one political issue debated in Europe in the years 1992—1995, together with the discussed idea of prioritising the deepening of the EU integration, it put the EU enlargement project on the backburner.

The second factor was that the project that German government eventually backed absorbed political energy of German policy makers. They played a key role in the process of preparation the NATO enlargement. The project presented also an explicit constraint to the progress of the EU enlargement, restraining a potentially more active and tangible support of German policy makers. NATO expansion was a pillar of the international security system. This area was of primary concern for European policy makers. Only when the project was put on track, it allowed a more pro-active thinking about the EU enlargement.

The constraints to the NATO project also overlapped those that hindered the EU expansion: the Soviet opposition being the main factor and France’s different views of the European organization as the second one. Both these factors were of critical importance for German European policy; German government executives trod cautiously, especially towards Russia, whose troops were still on the German territory. While NATO expansion did not affect a relation with France, once the NATO expansion was on track the Russian factor declined, both in the area of the European security and the EU expansion.

The concept of the post-1989 new political, security and economic organization of Eastern Europe was based on premises of eliminating Soviet dominance in the region, through including Eastern European countries into the Western structures, first and foremost of the European Community/Union of North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was a concept Eastern Europeans and the U.S. administration presented in the wake of the 1989 revolution. Both pillars were necessary for achieving a goal of a complete
liberation of Eastern Europe: the Soviet Union was able to hold political influence over the region after WWII, because it had a military grip over the region and Soviet troops were stationed in Eastern European countries, including East Germany. The premises of a new order were the values of democracy and free-market economy that Eastern Europeans declared to adopt.

NATO expansion and the EU enlargement would allow spreading the Western multilateral system of governance on the most of the continent. That would meet both the Eastern Europeans’ and Americans’ goal. The support of the German government and political elites was decisive for completion of both projects, but initially German policy makers were ambivalent about the NATO expansion; government executives did not back the initiative and the domestic debate revealed support for an exclusively European option of the security system. The hesitation over the American presence in European security was perceived as similar to the ambivalence over the EU enlargement, and overall as uncertainty about acceptance of the Eastern European countries into the Western structures. In this way the reluctance of German policy makers over the NATO expansion deepened the ambivalence that was created by the debate over the directions of the EU development and choosing the deepening as the priority.

NATO expansion project deepened the perception of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the EU enlargement also because of two other reasons: it absorbed political energy of German politicians leaving the enlargement on the back plane and worked as an explicit constraint for the German support for the EU enlargement because it was of much more fundamental character than the EU expansion; it was an international security pillar, parallel to the EU enlargement in an emerging new European order and as it belonged to a different field, of the security not political organization, it was not in a direct conflict to the EU enlargement. But the international security was primary among the goals for a new European international order and the developments of the early 1990s made the issue urgent.

An unexpected military conflict in Yugoslavia, and unstable situation in Russia and the departing former Soviet republics made the issue of the European security in 1993 pressing. The American stance on this issue was unequivocal; the Bush
administration wanted to maintain its military presence on the continent and the project of the NATO Eastern expansion was a means to realise this goal.

The idea was problematic for Europeans, who after the collapse of the Cold War and bipolar system Western Europeans were discussing other preferences of an international security organization than depending on the U.S. Secondly, the American idea conflicted strongly with the interests of the Soviet Union, which still had its troops in the Eastern European countries, including former East Germany. The negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev over the German unification in June 1990 allowed President George H.W. Bush publicly assert that both sides agreed it would be the German, unified nation choosing its alliances\(^{324}\). It implied that other Eastern European countries should follow the rule. But the domestic position of Gorbachev, given the struggle for reforming the Soviet Union, was delicate and a prevailing view among the Soviet leadership was that NATO Eastern expansion was not only an attempt to limit the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, but it presented a direct threat to the Soviet Union’s own security.

The U.S. administration turned their expectations for working through the tension with the Soviet leaders to German policy makers, the closest partners of the Russian leaders in Europe. German politicians were to play a broker’s role in the NATO expansion project. This task absorbed political energy of the German policy makers, who while expected to lead a diplomatic effort, fundamental for a peaceful transition, could not appear as leading the project; it was a requirement of the restrained civilian power. It curbed potentially more active policy towards the EU enlargement amplifying the perception of ambivalence in the German enlargement policy.

**II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS**

**NATO Expansion Discourse**

NATO expansion was the second pillar of a new organization of Europe that concerned Eastern European countries, and as such is inseparable from the EU enlargement project. Given, however, that the NATO represented a military organization with a mission in the international security area, its expansion represented more

fundamental therefore higher political stakes for the European members than the project of the EU enlargement.

The Bush administration declared openly the will to maintain the American primacy in the area of the European security already in 1989 and early 1990. That met the insistence of the East Europeans on expanding NATO’s umbrella over their region. Both calls decided eventually about the NATO expansion. The new European security system, as eventually emerged, looks as a coherent with concept. In the early 1990s it was seen as such almost only from the East European and American perspective, with exception of some Western experts. Eastern European chose the Western model of democracy. Joining the Western political institutions therefore seemed logical and the dismantling of the Iron Curtain was to lead to the unity of the continent under the security protection provided by the U.S.-led NATO.

Among those who supported this vision were American scholars like Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, who called subsequently for expanding NATO eastward. They indicated that such a development would be a historical coherency and a political necessity, both for the Alliance itself, if it wanted to survive into the post-Cold War era, and for the American position on the international stage as well. Their voices were however at the time countered with the opinions that NATO should be dissolved as its purpose ceased to exist. The ‘historical consistency’ was not that obvious and had in some case diametrically different interpretations.

An international debate over the NATO expansion evolved around two different understandings and interpretations of the idea. From a realist perspective NATO expansion was an effort of extending Western influence beyond the sphere established during the Cold War, and as such it was expected to provoke Russian opposition. From a

325 Ibid.
326 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “NATO — Expand or Die?”, *New York Times*, December 28 1994, A15; Samuel Huntington was one of the first calling for admission Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO arguing that alliances are caused by history and because he saw the need of unification of the western civilization in his famous article on the “clash of civilizations”: Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993
327 The opposition to the NATO expansion existed since the early 1990s, but grew in the face if its completion. On 26 June 1997 a group of 50 American experts — former U.S. senators, retired military officers, diplomats, academics — sent an open letter to President Bill Clinton outlining their opposition to the NATO expansion. See for example http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_06-07/natolet
liberal perspective this expansion was to support the nascent democracies in Eastern Europe, which declared common values with those at the basis of NATO foundation, and the umbrella of the NATO’s conflict management mechanisms would introduce a greater stability in the region. Both these sets of arguments divided the supporters and opponents. While the project looked different from different theoretical points of view, it was less differentiated in the German debate.

1. German Power in the International

The subject of NATO expansion was one of the three main topics of the great domestic debate in Germany over its future interests in the international realm. Like the concepts of the EU integration and enlargement, NATO expansion was a defining issue for various schools of thought\textsuperscript{328}. It was apparent that the supporters of deepening the EU integration, Europeanists did not favour NATO expansion. The arguments in the debate about the international security related directly to the issue of the German new power, increased with the unification and its role in a new foreign policy of Germany.

As Gunther Hellmann describes it, all three main schools — pragmatic multilateralists, Europeanists and Eurosceptics — subscribed to the ideas of Realpolitik, of which he lists three assumptions\textsuperscript{329}:

1) that order in the international system, in the sense of predictable, stable and peaceful relations among major powers, is valuable

2) that the threat and use of force is both necessary and legitimate as an \textit{ultima ratio} to reestablish order, given the conflict-ridden nature of international politics and the repeated occurrence of war and

3) that the major powers have both a special interest and a special obligation to keep that order or reestablish it

According to Hellmann the \textit{pragmatic multilateralists} held that the unified Germany should be regarded as one of the major powers in the world, and for this reason should participate in the task of providing for the international order. A representative of

\textsuperscript{328} Gunther Hellmann, “Goodbye Bismarck? The foreign policy of contemporary Germany”, \textit{Mershon International Studies Review}, 40, 1996

\textsuperscript{329} Ibid., p.6
this school, Helga Haftendorn indicated that it was normal for a great power to be responsible for creating and keeping international order, even if only in a co-leadership role. Yet as another pragmatic multilateralist Josef Joffe suggested — force may be the ultima ratio, but ‘soft power’ instruments are more important in managing the increasing international interdependence because ‘welfare rather than warfare’ defines the new paradigm of international relations. Nonetheless according to Michael Stürmer, also a pragmatic multilateralist, Germany cannot be successful unless it acts in conjunction with other Western powers. And it is in Germany’s interest to have its foreign policy activities legitimised by appropriate international institutions — preferably collective security institutions such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) but, if necessary, also by collective defence institutions made up of the Western democracies, that is, the European Union and NATO.

While these argument were pointing to the necessity of maintaining the premise of Germany’s foreign policy the multilateral cooperation with international partners, there were also voices indicating the awareness how the principle of multilateral cooperation is used by some of Germany’s partners.

Uwe Nerlich for example indicated a structural tension between Germany’s continuing interest in operating within multilateral contexts and the interests of some of its major Western allies, particularly those of France and Britain. In Nerlich’s view both countries were interested in developing such institutional functions of NATO and the European Union that were useful for constraining Germany, like stationing allied forces on German soil, constituting multinational corps primarily of German forces, and the European Monetary Union. Neither of these partners of Germany was interested in pushing ahead with European political integration or by creating supranational military

331 Josef Joffe, Deutsche Außenpolitik — postmodern, Internationale Politik 50, January 1995
structures at the European level. *Pragmatic multilateralists* differed about the nature of German interests. Michael Stürmer and Karl Kaiser\(^{334}\) in turn, argued that although it could appear contradictory ‘to pursue genuine German interests at the same time as one is demonstrating solidarity with the allies’, this contradiction is easily resolved by pointing out that ‘as before, all of the essential German interests can only be realised if, and insofar as, they correspond to the essential interests of its allies’.

### 2. Epistemic Community

The outlined above arguments for cooperation with the partners represented the core of the argument in favour of enlarging NATO; it was *pragmatic multilateralists* who built the rhetoric for the NATO expansion. Hellmann pointed that many of the *pragmatic multilateralists* were security specialists by training and ‘highly Americanised’ ones\(^ {335}\). That resulted in choosing the U.S. as a preferable ally for Germany. While the *pragmatic multilateralists* in Germany were the main supporters of this concept, the idea in fact was shared across the elites, what created an epistemic community, centring on the project of enlarging NATO.

Two other main schools of thought in German foreign policy, of *Europeanists* and *Eurosceptics* shared many assumptions and preferences with the *pragmatic multilateralists*: the main was the conviction that Germany, as a matter of principle, should pursue a multilateral diplomatic strategy. In this sense *Europeanists* as well as *Eurosceptics* represented variations of *pragmatic multilateralism*, with *Europeanists* leaning towards European solutions and *Eurosceptics* more inclined towards the idea of continuing membership in NATO. Out of the two, it was *Eurosceptics* who advocated Germany’s strong commitment to NATO.

NATO stood at the top of the *Eurosceptics’* list of priorities — as Hellmann put it — in spite of internal difference within the alliance that appeared during the Balkan crisis NATO was still seen as the only functioning link between Europe and the U.S.\(^ {336}\). *Eurosceptics* emphasised that Germany could not count on its major European allies,

\(^{334}\) Stürmer, *Deutsche Interessen*… op.cit., p. 7

\(^{335}\) Hellmann, “Goodbye Bismarck? … op.cit., p. 9

\(^{336}\) Ibid., p. 8
France and Britain, to the same extent it could count on the United States, what was revealed during the negotiations of Germany’s unification. It should therefore clearly side with the Americans if there should ever arise a conflict between Germany’s European and Atlanticist interests. American presence in Europe was seen as crucial also for balancing the European relations and as reassurance against the prevailing risks in Eastern Europe, especially in Russia. Eurosceptics pointed also moral arguments for which NATO should remain Germany’s first foreign policy priority for — the alliance was the ‘legitimate heir and extension of the Four Freedoms of President Roosevelt that Atlantic Charter and the UN indeed of the anti-Hitler coalition of the core states of world civilization. But Eurosceptics also linked NATO to a new role they envisioned for Germany — that of a great power.

Like pragmatic multilateralists, Eurosceptics too shared a strong conviction that Germany was not a normal nation-state, but a great power. And given its central position, German’s ‘fate’ was to ‘intelligently balance a complicated system of (interlocking) balances of power’ made up mainly of the European Union, NATO, and a regional balance of power system stretching from ‘the European zone of stability to the earthquake zone in the Balkans and eastern Europe’. Hellmann observes that the Eurosceptics’ assumption of Germany as a great power emphasised traditional instruments of great power politics such as alliances, diplomacy, great power concerts in contrast to the formal institutionalization of international cooperation in supranational structures. ‘In the realist tradition Eurosceptics have long castigated as politically dangerous what they perceive to be a tendency on the part of German decision makers to

337 Ibid. As Hellmann put it: a major historical and structural fact that was brought back to the Germans during the Two-plus-Four negotiations on Germany unification.
340 Jürgen von Alten, Die ganz normale Anarchie: Jetzt beginnt die Nachkriegszeit, Berlin: Siedler, 1994. Also as Christian Hacke put it “Germany’s anchor is in the West, in general and “in the middle of the Atlantic in particular because being a member of the Atlantic community may be the best thing that is worth preserving from the Cold War, what is more — it may even be the best thing that has ever happened to Germany’, See Christian Hacke, Welmacht wider Willen. Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, revisited edition, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein,1993.
341 Christian Hacke, Welmacht wider… op. cit.
342 Schwarz, Außenpolitische Agenda… op.cit.
conduct foreign policy without any regard to traditional considerations of power politics’ — observes Hellmann\(^344\). He stresses however that Eurosceptics did not advocate unilateralism. But in contrast to pragmatic multilateralists and Europeanists, they advocated a more assertive, with ‘greater toughness and vigilance in negotiations’, approach vis-à-vis its western European partners in order to make them more responsive to Germany’s own interests\(^345\).

Europeanists were not excessively vocal about NATO. Their basic assumption was similar to that of pragmatic multilateralists that Germany should pursue a multilateral diplomatic strategy. The focus of Europeanists was however on a closer integration within the European Union, in as many areas as possible, what they saw as a key to achieving a position of a more competitive actor in the international area. The clash between the two views — of pragmatic multilateralists favouring NATO commitment of Germany on the one side and of Europeanists inclined to a European system, that would be independent from, or less dependent on the U.S., on the other side — impacted German policy towards the NATO expansion.

**III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE**

**NATO Expansion Politics**

As the domestic debate among experts demonstrates the project of NATO expansion was seen as congruent with Germany’s interests and Germany’s multilateralism\(^346\). But NATO expansion was Germany’s second choice. It was not a goal German policy makers proposed, and the government policy was therefore responsive. A distance towards this issue of the main actor, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, is indicative here. The success of this project was ultimately a result of mutually reinforcing factors: common interest of the Americans and East Europeans; advocacy by an epistemic community, with the prominent German policy makers as the leaders of this community; and adjustment of priorities in the foreign policy of Germany that allowed German policy makers contribute substantially to the NATO enlargement with its skilful diplomacy that

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\(^344\) Hacke, *Weltmacht wider…* op.cit.

\(^345\) Hellmann, “Goodbye Bismarck? … op.cit., p.12

\(^346\) See for example Hyde-Price, *German and European order…*, op. cit.
allowed to overcome contradictory interests of Russia. First, however, the idea of expanding the NATO clashed with Western European concepts, including the German ones, how to fill in the post Cold War security void in Europe.

Disappearance of the direct threat of nuclear confrontation between West and East opened in the view of some West European politicians a possibility to conceptualise more independent from the U.S. ‘protectorate’ arrangements. As Anthony Forster and Robert Niblett pointed out — the old lines of the division between supporters and opponents of the American military presence in Europe that were muted during the Cold War, now reappeared: ‘the long-running dispute between France and its neighbours over the structure of the transatlantic relationship continued, (...) with successive U.S. administrations determined to ensure both that the economic and financial burdens of assisting political and economic transition were shouldered by Western Europe and that strategic and security leadership was retained by Washington’\(^{347}\).

This reasoning was strengthened in the face of the Soviet reaction to the application of the new East European democracies for the membership in NATO; the nervousness and hostility to this quest on the Soviet side was the second factor influencing thinking of West Europeans about the new security system at the time. Given that President George H.W. Bush promised Mikhail Gorbachev during their meeting in Malta in December 1989 that the U.S. would not use the weakness of the Soviet Union for achieving its own goals\(^{348}\), the idea of NATO eastward expansion was see as contradictory to the Soviet interests not only by the Soviets, but also by many Western politicians. The Soviet sensitivity was well understood by German policy makers and the Bush’s pledge was reiterated in London at the NATO summit on the 6\(^{th}\) of July next year by American and German politicians\(^{349}\).

1. Russian Factor

The Russian factor was the most powerful hindrance to the support for the Eastward expansion of NATO. It appears to be the first reason why German politicians,

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347 Forster and Niblett, Concepts of European Order…, op.cit., p.28
348 Zelikow, Rice, Germany Unified…, op. cit.,
both inside and outside government, initially either directly opposed, or were sceptical about the NATO enlargement, and favoured ideas of developing a system that would either include Russia, or at least was neutral towards Russia, thus excluding the U.S. participation. This was a spirit of the pledge made by German policy makers to the Soviet leaders, during the negotiation of the German unification. The unification itself presented a problem in the international security aspect of the relation with the Soviet Union; the inclusion of Eastern Germany into the Alliance was hedged by the Genscher’s proposal to keep NATO troops temporarily out of the former GDR\(^{350}\).

The key was the alleged obligations of Chancellor Kohl to Gorbachev, which Chancellor allegedly pledged during his visit in Caucasus in July 1990 while soliciting the consent of the Soviet Union to Germany’s unification. The controversies surrounding this issue have been reconciled in the most convincing way by Jonathan Eyal, whose claim is that Kohl had to hint that the West would not seek immediate gains out of the Soviet Union’s losses\(^{351}\). Hans-Dietrich Genscher also took a special care during the Two Plus Four negotiations to avoid sending disturbing signals to Moscow and for this reason opposed an idea of sending German troops to the Gulf, because that would be in conflict with the provisions of the Treaty, accepted by the Soviet Union\(^{352}\).

The Russian opposition to the presence of American troops in Russia’s proximity although for different reasons, but was congruent with the ambitions of Western politicians to strengthen the European role in a new security system. There were two main concepts of such a system competing with the idea of enlarging NATO. Both were based on the European institutions, but they differed fundamentally. German politicians presented the first one and their French counterparts — the second one.

The German concept was in fact the concept of Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. He proposed first at the Paris summit of 1990, a broad pan-European, thus including Russia, cooperation built around the CSCE (evolved later into OSCE). He argued that the


\(^{352}\) Genscher, *Memoirs…*, op.cit., p. 902; Also Rudolf Seiters, one of Kohl’s closest advisers the Minister in the Chancellor’s Office gave at the time an interview in which he emphasised that the deployment of Bundeswehr troops to the Persian Gulf should not become a subject of partisan controversy, see: Mil J. Kirchner, “Genscher and What Lies Behind Genscherism”, *West European Politics*, 13, pp. 159.
post-Cold War system should include the Soviet Union as an equal partner and all NATO and Warsaw Pact members (CSCE was seen at the time as the future form of European Security Council). Genscher’s concept was also advocated by Gerhard Stoltenberg the then German defence Minister\textsuperscript{353}, but not by Chancellor Kohl.

The logic of this concept was grounded in the premises of the old German Ostpolitik. The Helsinki process, the crown achievement of the Ostpolitik, was now to be used for creation of collective security in Europe\textsuperscript{354}. The reasoning indicating that it would not be a ‘European security system’ if it left Russia outside was strengthened with the arguments that exclusion of Russia would block the reform of CSCE and of the UN, the disarmament process and could even provoke Russia to increasing its spending on arms\textsuperscript{355}. The idea was criticised as impossible to be efficient with so many members (all European states)\textsuperscript{356} and was in conflict with the premises of the new concept based on NATO-EU eastward expansion. German enthusiasm for this pan-European idea, however, as noted by Forster and Niblett faded soon after securing the support of the Soviet leaders for the unification and acceptance for incorporation of Eastern Germany into NATO\textsuperscript{357}; with the departure of Hans Dietrich Genscher in 1992 from the post of the German Foreign Minister the concept practically died away.

The debate evolved further around the concept favoured by French politicians — of the strengthened WEU, which would cooperate closely with NATO as the main security guarantor. The argument of the proponents was that with the end of bipolar confrontation, i.e. nuclear threat, Western Europeans could take on more responsibility for the European security. Contrary to the Genscher’s pan-European plan, in the French proposal the stress was on ‘westernization’ of the new security system. There were


\textsuperscript{354} Every European state was to become a member of the OSCE and the OSCE itself was to become a “regionalised UN”.

\textsuperscript{355} The negotiations of the late 1980. on the developments of the CSCE, in which the Soviet Union was a participant, were at the beginning of the 1990s still vivid and as such they were incomparably more digestive for Russia than the idea of installing NATO in Central Europe.


\textsuperscript{357} Niblett, Wallace, Rethinking… op.cit., p. 29
however two fundamental uncertainties about this proposal. The first one was about subordination of the WEU — should it be directly under the authority of the European Council, integrated in this way with the EC/EU, or should it remain institutionally autonomous? The second one was about its competences — should the WEU acquire an operational capability and the right to operate within as well as outside the NATO area, or should it remain only an institutional forum for making decisions by European defence and Foreign Ministers? The questions reflected differences in the views of European policy makers on the relation with the U.S. and NATO.

2. American Factor

The official German stance was that the American guarantees for the European security were indispensable for Europe. Chancellor Kohl stressed it in spring 1991 stating that a ‘substantial presence’ of American troops was still favoured. And as the domestic elite debate demonstrates — American guarantees were favoured by majority of the experts as congruent with the multilateralism of the German foreign policy. But at the same time the American presence was a sensitive issue for German policy makers. It was an attitude of a general public that made it questionable for politicians.

The unification increased the desire in Germany to break away from the semi-sovereign status and to use a new status of the full sovereignty more explicitly. One of the most thorny dimensions of the Germany’s semi-sovereignty during the Cold War was the presence of nearly 400 hundred thousands American troops on the West German soil. While remaining loyal to the U.S., German politicians and most of the society regarded the military presence of the Americans ambivalently. They understood the need of protection against the Soviet threat, but the U.S. decision to install in West Germany

358 At a conference on the Petersberg near Bonn on 19 June 1992 the WEU Ministerial Council resolved to use the WEU as the European Union’s defence arm. In the future the WEU should not only carry out peacekeeping missions on behalf of the UN or the CSCE but also peace-enforcement missions. See: “Petersberg Declaration Adopted by the Western European Union Council of Ministers, in Bonn on 19 June 1992”, Brussels, European Press and Information Service, 1992

359 As presented in a simplified form by the German daily newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung — the difference was that the British closely allied with the U.S. and promoting close cooperation with NATO saw WEU as a sort of a European pillar within NATO; for the Germans and the French it was supposed to be a mediating tool between Atlantic and European organizations. See: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 1991. For the French policy makers the British approach was impossible to accept since France withdrew from NATO structure; for this reason German policy makers were ambivalent about the proposal too.

360 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 April 1991
Pershing II and Cruise missiles in the 1980s, caused a huge opposition among the West Germans and a problem for the governing CDU/CSU/FDP coalition. The installation was perceived as too dangerous and was protested in the streets across Germany. The end of the Cold War opened a question of the further American military presence in Europe. That was of a special meaning for the emerging new identity of the unified German nation, because touching upon a sensitive aspect of the German democracy. The American presence in Europe was initially destined to guarantee the peaceful development of the Federal Republic. After 40 years of practising and promoting multilateral foreign policy by the West German politicians there was a strong conviction in Germany that the lesson had been learned and the exam passed, thus the further American supervision was not needed anymore.

For these reasons some German politicians and intellectuals opted for development of a European-grounded security system, linked up to an American ‘warrant’, but with the decisions on the parity with the U.S. This was the stance preferred by Helmut Kohl and coalition parties CSU/CDU and FDP. The opposition, mainly the SPD representatives did not see the U.S. as acting in the Federal Republic’s best interests; they perceived their country as being drawn into a vortex of armed conflicts around the globe. Their position was not anti-American, but they contested the U.S. hegemony in European affairs. They wanted equal partnership with the U.S. Egon Bahr, one of the leading figures of the SPD gave a clear expression of these views in a pragmatic version: ‘European interests are not identical with the global ones of the U.S.’

The split over ‘how much of the involvement’ for the Americans in Europe ran across the parties. In the CDU the Atlanticist stream was represented first of all by Volker

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361 There is a bulk of German literature on this subject. For the insight on the opinion of the German society it was useful to reach Thomas Enders, “Die deutsche Angst vor der Sonderbedrohung, Zur Rolle der nuklearen Kurzstreckenwaffen in Europa”, *Die Sonde*, Nr 1/2 1988 and Karl Feldmeyer, “Sorgen um das Bündnis”, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 December 1986

362 Henning Tewes writes about the wider across political parties consensus on it. See: Tewes, *Germany. Civilian…*, op.cit.

363 Also in the US, among those politicians who wanted to reduce American engagement in Europe. See for example Uwe Nerlich, “Sicherheitsfunktionen der NATO”, *Europe Archiv* NO 48 (23), 1993

364 “Stellungnahme der Kommission Sicherheitspolitik beim SPD-Parteivorstand zur sicherheitspolitischen Verantwortung des Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, Mitteilung für die Presse, 17 May 1991

Rühe. He voiced such views as early as in 1990 saying that ‘NATO alone can guarantee German and European stability’\textsuperscript{366} and reiterating it two years later announcing ‘no changing of the guards in Europe’\textsuperscript{367}. In the opposing SPD the prominent politician Karsten Voigt was similarly staunch supporter of the American presence in Europe.

**IV. OPTIONS**

1. **East European Perspective**

Neither of the two concepts, of exclusively Western European security or a wider pan-European idea, satisfied Eastern Europeans, as both were contradictory to their interests. The basis of this divergence was the orientation against two poles — the United States and Russia.

The pan-European project was in conflict with the interests of the East European countries. Their goal was to join the NATO and they viewed it as an absolute priority and historical imperative. The end of the Cold War provided an opportunity to liberate the region not only from the Soviet rule and influence. Despite the internal implosion, the Soviet Union still presented a potential threat, and Russian troops were still allocated in these countries and on the German territory. And at the February 1991 Warsaw Pact conference the Soviet leaders insisted on other members to pledge they would not join alliances that the Soviet Union held for hostile to its interests. This initiative failed, but it was a signal of an attempt by the Russians to keep its influence in the region\textsuperscript{368}.

The other reason why Eastern Europeans persisted on firm institutional binding with the Western structures, was the historical memory that lack of such bonds left East Europeans alone twice: at the policy of appeasement to Nazi Germany before WWII, and at giving away the Eastern half of the continent to the Soviet rule afterwards\textsuperscript{369}. Therefore the only plausible mechanism capable to bring guarantees to the region of staying free from the Russian influence was that of a close political and military alliance with the

\textsuperscript{366} Volker Rühe, “The New Germany in Europe”, CPC Party Conference Lecture, Conservative Political Centre, November 1990

\textsuperscript{367} Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 July 1992

\textsuperscript{368} Michael Broer, Ole Diehl, “Die Sicherheit der neuen Demokratien in Europa und die NATO”, Europa-Archiv, NO 12/1990, p. 367-376

\textsuperscript{369} During Havel’s visit at the NATO headquarter in March 1991; in “Präsident Havel in einer Rede vor der NATO am 21. März 1991”, Europa-Archiv, No 10/1991, p. D243; Polish politicians were less explicit at the time, however declarations of the ambition to join Western security structures were clear.
United States. NATO enlargement was the second to the EU enlargement pillar of the East European concept of their new political, security and economic international arrangements. For this reason out of two concepts favoured then by the Western politicians, the strengthening the WEU aligned closer with the interests of the Eastern European states. Genscher’s proposals in their view was to preserve the existing balance of power in Europe, with the position of Russia reduced, but without an actual counter-power against it.

Eastern European diplomacy kept therefore pressing the Western counterparts for the NATO expansion. They pinned their hopes upon the conference on the European security in Prague in April 1991. It did not however bring the expected results. The then NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner advocated only an idea of linking NATO with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on the basis of various agreements and treaties. At the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers of NATO member states, in Copenhagen in June 1991, Wörner talked only about ‘intense cooperation’. NATO member governments were also preoccupied with the new Alliance’s strategy that was discussed in 1990-1991, along with negotiations within the European Union’s intergovernmental conference on a definition of a ‘common foreign and security policy’.

Ambitions of West European policy makers were however soon confronted with the hard reality of the security requirements. The Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Yugoslavia’s disintegration next year and disintegration of the Soviet Union, exposed weakness of European military capabilities (on the technological level in case of the Gulf War) and limits of the political coherence within the WEU. Both practically blocked the WEU from participation in operations outside the NATO area without the U.S. (e.g. Yugoslavia’s war). The Europe-centred concepts were practically buried was a proposal by Jacques Delors, of March 1991, of strengthening the common foreign and security policy through the incorporation of the WEU by the EU. Forster and Niblett
called Delors’ proposal ‘*a wake-up call for the Americans and provoked them eventually to ‘intervene’ actively in the negotiations among IGC of the ‘twelve’*’\(^{373}\).

### 2. Support of the Epistemic Community

It was rhetoric of German politicians advocating NATO enlargement that connected it directly with the EU enlargement in the European debate. While arguing NATO expansion German representatives emphasised the need to stabilise the Eastern European region, referring to the political and economic stability too. In this way they broke barriers in conceptualising political landscape of Europe: what seemed at the beginning of the 1990s unthinkable now was on a political agenda. The main factor here was that the Russian threat proved to be possible to ‘disarm’. It created a new normative environment and resulted in the change in attitudes towards the EU enlargement.

The main advocate of the NATO expansion was the German Defence Minister Volker Rühe. In Seville on 30 September 1994 Rühe began a debate over the eastward opening of NATO\(^{374}\), stressing that creation of a stronger CSCE would weaken NATO. Two years later, in the speech at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies in November 1996, while explaining the congruency of the German interests with the NATO expansion he emphasised that one does not have to be a ‘strategic genius’ and it is ‘enough to look at the map’ to see that in the long term it is impossible to maintain the Eastern border of Germany as a border between stability and destabilised zone. ‘*Either we export stability or we will have to import destabilisation*’ — he pointed\(^{375}\). He also argued at the meeting of the German-Polish society in Bonn in 1995, that close links between Germany and Poland and the admission of Poland to NATO are for him a *Herzsache* (matter of heart), as ‘*it was this country, Poland, where the changes that led to the unification of Germany, had begun*’\(^{376}\). His arguments reflected the evolution of the

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373 Forster and Niblett quote the British daily newspaper *The Independent* of 6 and 9 March 1991. Forster and Niblett, *Concepts of European Order…*, op.cit, p. 29  
374 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 1-2 October 1994; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 1-2 October 1994  
375 *Die neue NATO. Vertrag von BundesMinister Rühe in Washington, Bulletin der Bundesregierung* NO 34, 2 Mai, 1996, p. 341  
reasoning behind the NATO enlargement that embraced the idea firmly into the national interests and recognised other nations’ interests too.

The change of the attitude of the governing coalition parties, the CDU/CSU and FDP towards the NATO enlargement was visible during the federal election campaign of 1994. The federal election programme of the CDU and CSU of 16 October 1994 contained a declaration of the support for the Eastern neighbours (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) in their pursuit of NATO membership. It also stressed that the Partnership for Peace initiative was desirable and Germany would do its best, using its influence, to establish a long-term partnership with Russia, both on the level of the relations NATO-Russia and of the EU-Russia. A similar stance was presented by the FDP. The SPD remained consistent in opposing NATO enlargement, with the significant exception of Karsten Voigt, who was one of the strongest supporters of the project. SPD however maintained its opposition till December 1997. A declaration against the expansion of NATO was included in a resolution taken up during the federal gathering in Wiesbaden in November 1993 and reiterated, and elaborated in more details during a similar gathering in Mannheim two years later.

The main concern of SPD was that the embracing Višegrad states into NATO would cause the isolation of Russia and would weaken the process of democratic changes in this country. The change in the SPD stance occurred just few days before Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary signed up the accession protocols with NATO on 16 December 1997. Two weeks earlier, on 3 December during a federal gathering in Hannover the SPD accepted a resolution supporting NATO expansion. Similarly the Greens 90 and ultra socialist PDS opposed NATO enlargement but eventually, in the run-up to the general elections the Greens avoided any categorical resolutions, and the

377 Regierungspogramm von CDU und CSU, August 1994, p. 53
380 Archiv den Gegenwart (further AdG) , 1991, p. 35612
leader of the party Joschka Fischer suggested a possibility of changing his stance on the issue of NATO expansion\textsuperscript{382}.

The actions of the German pro-NATO expansion lobby led by Volker Rühe and Karsten Voigt made it possible that the Alliance reached consensus on the relation with the Eastern countries in the second half of 1993. Eastern countries were offered a ‘Partnership for Peace’. It was a half way only solution, aiming at creating a forum for cooperation between Eastern countries and NATO, and without promises for the membership\textsuperscript{383}. In Eastern European countries it was immediately labelled as the ‘Partnership for Postponement’, but ultimately it smoothed effectively the way for the NATO enlargement. Karsten Voigt and Volker Rühe presented a proposal for cooperation between NATO and Russia. Their efforts in this respect were vigorous, but at the same time cautious. German politicians for example were using at the time specific language in respect to the NATO expansion. They tended to avoid the word ‘Erweiterung’ — ‘enlargement’, speaking rather about ‘Öffnung’ — ‘opening’\textsuperscript{384}. It was necessary from their point of view to further the enlargement idea but in a non-inflammatory (against Russia) way\textsuperscript{385}.

Karsten Voigt proposed a ‘soft enlargement of NATO’, without deployment of nuclear weapons or NATO troops on the territories of the new members. He also suggested that the negotiations could start in 1998. Volker Rühe supported Voight’s proposal, stressing the argument about the necessity of ‘exporting the stability

\textsuperscript{382}Karl Sager, Grüne Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik, Internationale Politik Vol. 51, NO 8, pp. 43-8

\textsuperscript{383}That served Western politicians as an argument to soothe relations with Russia. All other NATO defence Ministers apart from Volker Rühe used to point that Partnership did not anticipate enlargement of the Alliance. See for example W.Schütze, Sackgasse oder Königsweg? Die Ostweierung des NATO, Blätter für Deutsche und International Politik, No 8, 1995, p. 924-935


\textsuperscript{385}It was reflected for example in a four-point plan of Zbigniew Brzeziński presented in the beginning of 1995 and which assumed 1) setting by NATO political standards to abide by new members, 2) indication the states that already obey these standards and starting negotiations with them, 3) acceptance of new members without the necessity of deployment of NATO troops at their territories and 4) offering Russia a transcontinental collective security system, which would consist of two pillars — the agreement on cooperation between Russia and NATO and a new mechanism within CSCE for consultancy between two entities. This proposal found a reflection in a discussion among the NATO and NACC Foreign Ministers, whose first meeting was held in Budapest in May 1995 (few days before signing with Russia the individual “Partnership for Peace” agreement). See: Zbigniew Brzeziński, “A Plan for Europe,” Foreign Affairs, January-February 1995.
The U.S. administration was however at the time still uncertain about setting dates and road maps. The main problem for the U.S. was connected with the challenge of containing Russia’s nuclear threat, and securing non-proliferation and arms control. All other issues were of second importance to the U.S. These tactics paid off when Boris Yeltsin signed the agreement about the individual partnership with NATO.

V. RESULTS

1. American-German U-Turn

NATO expansion was decided in a double u-turn. First, the idea received finally unequivocal backing of the main player, the U.S. administration. Second, the American stance turned around the position of German policy makers. The project was conducted cautiously because it still faced obstacles from the Russian side but a steady political effort grounded firmly the rationale of this idea.

These efforts and concerns took the political energy away from the EU enlargement, but in overall had strengthening effect for grounding the idea of the EU Eastern enlargement.

American diplomats resumed the initiative and came with three fundamental requirements:

- No European caucus inside NATO
- No marginalization of non-EC members of NATO
- No alternative European military organization

386 AdG, 1995, p. 40039 A.
387 Zbigniew Slomkowski, Realia i mity, Trybuna, Polish Daily Newspaper, 2-3 March 1996.
388 Yeltsin sent out on 30 September 1993 letters to the governments of the US, France, Germany and the UK, expressing a list of objections against the expansion of NATO and Russian diplomats still attempted to strengthen the CSCE succeeding partially as the CSCE was agreed in December 1994 to be turned into the OSCE, while Kremlin was in 1992 enthusiastic about the cooperation with NATO recommending its foreign ministry development of close links, shortly afterwards Russian press revealed leaked reports of the foreign ministry for the Kremlin with warnings that in case NATO’s expansion to the East Russia would find itself isolated. In April 1995 Russia also broke in fact the Vienna treaty of 1990 on the conventional arms reduction and started to fortify its 58 Caucasus Army. It was accompanied by the suggestion of creation with the former SU states (CIS now) of a counterbalance for NATO. Eventually Boris Yeltsin agreed in May 1995 on Visegrad states to be accepted in NATO under three conditions: (i) signing up on a strategic partnership with Russia, (ii) promise of not expanding NATO further East and not admitting for example the Ukraine and Baltic states, (iii) financial, economic and technical aid for “rebuilding and modernization of the Russian economy”. See: Ludger Kühnhardt, “Die NATO im Prozeß der inneren und äußeren Veränderung”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 5/1996
Additionally, in order to water down European ambitions for shedding the American dominance, a European Security and Defence Identity was to ‘Europeanise’ NATO\textsuperscript{389}. These proposals were accompanied by a new NATO strategy, which was announced in May 1991 at the Rome Summit of the Alliance.

NATO Ministers declared a support for developing European multinational forces but with the primacy of NATO as the Europe’s defence organization and with ‘defence cooperation’ as an added dimension to the previous ‘collective defence and dialogue’. The alliance was also to create a new multinational Alliance Rapid Reaction Corps that would be capable of deployment outside the NATO area and commanded by the British, with the Germans in command of the air component\textsuperscript{390}.

Second, NATO decided at the Rome summit in November 1991, to create the NACC, North Atlantic Cooperation Council\textsuperscript{391}. In the words of the then Secretary General Manfred Wörner it was a ‘\textit{wide response to the security needs of the East European region}’\textsuperscript{392}. For the East European states this answer was only half satisfactory because it still avoided binding declarations in respect to a desired membership. In January 1992 Manfred Wörner explained to the German press that ‘\textit{widening will not be considered in the near future}’\textsuperscript{393}. Nevertheless it opened for the first time NATO’s doors to the East European states, it became a foundation for redesigning the purpose of NATO and was an indication of emerging, new concept of the European organization.

It was Hans-Dietrich Genscher who in cooperation with James Baker prepared the premises of the NACC. Genscher’s stance evolved over one year from the staunch opposition, to a strategy aimed at closer involvement of the U.S. in the issues of European security, increasingly jeopardised by arising conflicts\textsuperscript{394}. The Yugoslav crisis

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{389} Forster and Niblett, Concepts of European Order…, op. cit., p. 30
\textsuperscript{391} NACC embraced initially 9 central European states. In spring 1992 after the emergence of independent states in the wake of the disintegration of the SU, NACC consisted already of 36 states. NACC participation of the Germans in it — Ash, In Europe’s Name
\textsuperscript{392} Wörner, \textit{Die Atlantische Allianz}… op.cit., p. 4
\textsuperscript{393} \textit{Die Welt}, 31 January 1992
\end{flushleft}
was the main reason behind this change, but only developments in Russia of 1993, which
undermined Russia’s democratic course (constitutional crisis between Russian President
Boris Yeltsin and Russian parliament resolved by using military force, September-
October 1993), generated thinking of ‘NATO response’ in geopolitical terms to the
danger of instability.

The way for considering NATO as the pillar for the future European security
system was wide opened after the change of the Alliance’s strategy, when the emphasis
was shifted from a military and confrontational dimension to a political and preventive
one. That also served indirectly but strongly as a support for the EU Eastern enlargement,
which now had as a security background a process of peaceful transition.

German politicians played a key role in acceleration of the NATO enlargement,
though the beginnings did not indicate this. Volker Rühe, Germany’s Defence Minister,
in his London speech of March 1993, called for not keeping NATO as a ‘closed shop’.
It met an icy reaction from the Chancellor Kohl and highly reluctant perception among
the senior Bundeswehr officers. German press pronounced that Volker Rühe had lost
credibility as a politician. But in fact he put German European security policy a new
track. Only four years later NATO-enlargement, in the shape proposed by and large by
Minister Rühe, was completed.

The reason why Volker Rühe suddenly made his London announcement is usually
associated with an annual conference on international security held in Munich in
February 1993. Les Aspin, the then newly appointed Secretary of Defence of President
Clinton, discussed with European politicians during this conference the situation in the
post-soviet territories. An underlying question was what whether nationalism in the post-
soviet states would escalate similarly to the escalation in the ex-Yugoslavia? Russia’s
engagement in the Yugoslav conflicts was also indicated as an activity against the
interests of the West. Another factor working along this line was that the UN Security
Council was discouraged to take up any decisions about intervention in Yugoslavia
(through NATO) fearing the Russian veto.

395 In a key-note speech delivered at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, on 12 March 1993
396 Editorial, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 March 1993
Only a month later Volker Rühe, calling for the enlargement of NATO, argued that accepting Eastern European countries to NATO would dismantle the buffer zone in this part of Europe\(^{397}\). Kohl’s silence for the first three months after Rühe’s call indicates Chancellor’s uncertainty about how strong the U.S. supported the Rühe’s proposal and what how Moscow would react. Moscow’s reaction was worrying — a series of contradictory, back and forth declarations that began with Boris Yeltsin’s pledging, while visiting Warsaw in April 1993, and reiterating it in August during his visit to Prague, that the decision about joining NATO would be a sovereign decision of the East European countries\(^{398}\). That was fiercely criticised by other Russian leaders and led soon Yeltsin to changing his mind.

A wavering stance of Russian representatives was a reason for not pushing the idea, especially for German policy makers. The idea, nevertheless, was firmly driven by a small number of officials. Adrian Hyde-Price writes that "the decision to enlarge NATO represented a success for a transnational coalition between Defence Minister Rühe and his US-counterparts\(^{399}\)."

The key elements were a good relation of Volker Rühe with Manfred Wörner, the former German Defence Minister and then NATO Secretary General and a nomination of Klaus Naumann, the general inspector of the Bundeswehr for the post of the NATO Military Committee’s Chairman. Their positions in the NATO structure, the common country of their origins, and the significance of Germany’s official, cautious, but supportive, stance on the NATO enlargement — all three elements formed a powerful pro-factor. The American lobby was formed by Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s national security adviser, Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for European Affairs and Les Aspin, Secretary of Defence. The next ally in this international

\(^{397}\) He proposed also establishing a direct military cooperation between NATO and Poland on the basis of just created multinational German-Dutch-Polish brigade.

\(^{398}\) The Russian prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin stressed soon afterwards it would be much better not to extend/modify the old military blocks, but to create “an integral European space”, by which Russians understood the strengthening of the CSCE. And according to Nowaya Yezdehievaya Gazeta, 20 October 1993, that covered the discussion of academics on this issue: Oleg Bogolomov from the International Institute for the Political Studies claimed that the Eastern Europe sooner or later would be a matter of controversy between Russia and the West; the aide of Yeltsin Andranik Migranian and political scientist Nikolai Kolikov called Warsaw agreement of Yeltsin unfortunate; reported by Polish press at the time

\(^{399}\) Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order…, op.cit., p.137
epistemic community was the Californian think-tank RAND Corporation, which was asked to prepare an expert analysis on the possibilities of the NATO enlargement. On the German side among the key actors were a social democrat Karsten Voigt, the then President of the North Atlantic Assembly, and Günther Verheugen then the expert on international affairs at the SPD along with Rudolf Scharping of SPD, but the key role among the German representatives belonged to Volker Rühe.

This coalition was also projected on the state level, between the U.S. and Germany. When the U.S. administration decided that NATO enlargement would further American interests, Germany was indispensable for three reasons: as the main regional power, as the precursor of the expansion of NATO (into the territory of the former East Germany) and as a broker in the relations with Russia. This was recognised perfectly well by Eastern European who addressed their campaign for NATO expansion mainly at the German government and officials. Nevertheless winning wider support for the project on the domestic stage, and securing the necessary ratification by the Bundestag, needed time. The position of the government started changing into more supportive only after the June 1994 meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers in Istanbul, when the Americans demonstrated their support for the expansion of the Alliance.

The speech of President Clinton of October 1996 was critical for furthering the idea; he indicated that the new members of NATO should be admitted on the 50th anniversary of the Alliance. After the December 1996 NATO Summit in Brussels it was decided that the invitation of the first East European states to join NATO should be presented at NATO Summit at Madrid in the mid-1997. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright were appointed as NATO envoys for finalising the negotiations with Russia. It was achieved by the end of 1997 mainly due

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400 RAND Corporation prepared six-steps plan; the basic assumption was that NATO was to be transformed from the military alliance into a Pact securing political stability in an expanded outside its borders territory. It prescribed maintaining the sense of security for Russia, but at the same time developing close cooperation with Ukraine, perceived by the think-tank as a strategic buffer state between Europe and Russia. See Ronald D. Asmus, Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and International Relations (Rand Notes N-3522-AF), Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation 1992; Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stepohen Larrabee, “NATO expansion: the next steps”, Survival 37/1 1995

401 Tewes, Germany, Civilian…, op.cit. p. 184

402 See both the English as German or Polish press at the time. For example Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 October 1996
to diplomatic skills of Chancellor Kohl who managed to maintain good relations with President Yeltsin. His role was crucial for the success.

In February 1997 the Kremlin still insisted that enlarging NATO would be the biggest mistake of Western leaders in fifty years. The Helsinki summit between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin on 21 March ended without an agreement on this matter but with the promise of Russia it would not block it in return for invitation to join the G7 and a $1 billion aid package. Russia eventually agreed that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary could be invited to join NATO, signing on 27 May 1997 in Paris the ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security’. An agreement established that Russia should be granted an ambassador to NATO and have twice a year meetings with NATO’s foreign and defence Ministers. Yeltsin promised to remove all warheads from Russian nuclear weapons that were pointed at NATO states. In July that year, at the NATO summit in Madrid, NATO officials decided to offer invitation to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join the Alliance.

The accession protocol with three states — Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary — was signed up in December 1997 in Brussels. The German Bundestag ratified the protocols for accepting Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary as the NATO new members on 26 March 1998 with a majority of 554 votes with 37 against and 30 abstentions. All three countries became full members of the Alliance on 12 March 1999, what completed the process of building the first, international security pillar of a new European order.

**SUMMARY**

German policy makers were initially divided and ambivalent about the NATO expansion project and the support for this initiative was their second choice. That made the German policy towards this project ambivalent what deepened the perception of ambivalence towards the EU enlargement. The hesitancy also bears a resemblance to this
towards the EU enlargement. The reasons for the ambivalence in the NATO expansion policy are also similar to those of ambivalence in the EU enlargement policy — the consideration of alternative, competitive directions for the foreign policy, and acting within limits set by the interests of other partners. It demonstrates a pattern in the German foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the unification. First it reflects the commitment to the multilateralism. On the other hand it also demonstrates the structural limits of the German foreign policy and of the German state’s power.

_Bundesrepublik_ was embedded in a network of multilateral institutions from its earliest days, and these were the roots of the German multilateralism. It meant choosing multilateral solutions over preferable national ones. Support the German government lent ultimately to the NATO enlargement project was a positive response to the expectations of the U.S. at the expense of a preferable model. It demonstrates that the multilateralism practised by the semi-sovereign Federal Republic meant determining and defining national interests through the multilateral lens, from the multilateral perspective and in congruency with interests of other states. But it also reminds about the structural limits of manoeuvre in choices for the German foreign policy — despite regaining the full sovereignty Germany was still embedded in the interdependencies of supranational (e.g. EU) and international (e.g. NATO) institutions. Thus, even though the ideas about an independent from the U.S. security system were discussed, and might have been favoured, German policy makers did not define them as a national interest and did not turn any of these into a political initiative.

Both the actions of the German policy makers and the after unification debate on the future foreign policy demonstrate that multilateralism based on the community of values and ideas was considered and decided as the best direction of the foreign policy, securing German interests most efficiently. In this respect the NATO expansion matched the inclination of the German foreign policy to value-driven multilateral solutions. This inclination was a decisive factor for building the permissive consensus for supporting the American initiative.

As such the support German government lent this project is a crown proof for many scholars, that Germany chose multilateralism contrary to neorealists assumptions. And the assumption most often referred to in this case is the one of Kenneth Waltz, who
predicted that Germany’s improved security environment and its enhanced relative power since unification would lead it to pursuing a policy of ‘autonomy maximization’. The expansion of NATO can be seen in the context of German policy as a projection of the intended institutions, norms, and rules that can be continued, developed, reproduced or transformed by states. It then represents an element that does not exist in the neorealist concept of structure. As such German policy towards the NATO expansion can be explained through the constructivist perspective.

This points to the congruency with the EU enlargement. An argument for this choice is that at the international level, institutions like EEC, the Council of Europe and NATO used to play a key role in shaping Germany’s interests, identity and foreign policy, and after the unification continued doing so. This pattern of continuity according to the majority of scholars reflects ideational factors such as ideas, beliefs, historical memory, and social discourse. This claim usually is supported with an argument that Germany’s specific foreign policy behaviour cannot be explained with the international relation theories based on rational choice assumptions such as neorealism or neoliberalism because the cost-benefit calculation cannot be applied to the German choices.

In the light of this analysis German choice in the case of NATO expansion was as much ideational as it was a political costs calculation. A notion most suitable for interpreting the reasons of Germany’s choice would be a Gunther Hellmann’s phrase of pragmatic multilateralism. Germany’s strong anti-militarism was one of the facets of the civilian power, the notion applied to Germany as reflecting the best the feature of its foreign policy. Germany could exercise this sort of power remaining in the military alliance led by the U.S. In the shape of the American military umbrella Germany was substituting what it lacked, according to the observation by Hedley Bull of the English School made about a lacking aspect of the European Union’s civilian power — self-sufficiency in military power. In this way the civilian power of Germany was conditional upon the military power of the Alliance. In this context remaining in the NATO and working on its transformation was a choice based on pragmatic multilateralism.

A positive impact of the NATO expansion and Germany’s support for this project was that it knocked down old, rigid barriers blocking the thinking about a new, truly post-Cold War Europe. As the project proved to be successful despite the biggest and potentially most dangerous challenge, the hostility of Russia, spreading the political reach up to the Russia’s borders, represented already an easier task. Acceptance of the NATO expansion sanctioned the new concept of the European security and political order.
CHAPTER 7

Economic and Political Costs of Germany’s Unification
As the Cause of Ambivalence
In Germany’s Policy Towards the EU Enlargement
1995—1998

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement that was caused by constraints, which occurred in the domestic area. The powerful external political factors that curbed Germany’s support for the enlargement during the first phase of the process, the French opposition to the enlargement, the Russian threat, the challenge of deepening the European integration, in the mid-1990s were losing their impetus. The enlargement idea was placed in the rationale of the German Europapolitik, and the process on the EU level entered the phase of preparations of terms and conditions.

German policy makers, however, now faced a growing domestic discontent with the European integration projects. That jeopardised the needed domestic consensus on the enlargement. Domestic constraints were a reflection of an internal situation of the post-unification Germany. There were two types of such constraints — economic and social.
Economic constraints restrained the financial capacity of the German state to participate and finance projects of the European integration, including the enlargement. The social factor — the increasing exhaustion of German society with the costs of the unification and resistance to the European integration — played a similarly limiting role for the support the idea of the EU enlargement.

The Structured Dialogue agreed at the Essen Summit in December 1994 was designed as a platform for working out a timetable for the enlargement. The subsequent process of creating a timetable specified concrete conditions necessary to fulfil by the applicant countries and concessions necessary to be made by the EU member states. The latter, however, presented a problem of adjusting the EU redistributive policies. For German policy makers this challenge was tough because German society was increasingly exhausted with the costs of the unification. German enlargement supporters had to win now permissive consensus of a wider than elites public in order to lend the support that would allow the progress of the enlargement. A growing disparity between supportive stance of the German political elites and scepticism and opposition among the wider public contributed first to the perception of ambivalence in German stance on the enlargement. Next it changed the enlargement rhetoric of the German policy makers from the supportive to pragmatic.

The economic constraints are the first type of constraints that occurred on the domestic stage. They are explicit. The second set of constraints is connected with the public perception of Europeanization; these constraints are more often implicit. The ambivalence variable at this stage of the German enlargement policy shifted from the normative, ideational milieu into a material one of economic costs and benefits calculations that shaped interests of Germany. While the previous manifestations of ambivalence demonstrate the process of changing of the European integration notion and concept, the manifestation of the ambivalence at this stage shows how the changing concept shapes domestic attitudes and domestic setting for the enlargement policy. The changes of the domestic setting represent a set of social facts in the constructivist ontology.

I. AMBIVALENCE

The main expression of the German support for the EU enlargement project was since the beginnings the rhetoric of the government executives, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Foreign Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Klaus Kinkel. This supportive rhetoric was also reflected in the domestic elite discourse. It started declining in the mid-1990s. While German policy makers during the first years after the unification were conducting their policy towards the EU enlargement responding to the external political challenges, in the mid-1990s they had to face domestic ones. The exhaustion of the German society with economic and political costs of the unification translated into a declining support for the EU enlargement.

It changed gradually the rhetoric of the German enlargement policy, shifting the accents from the supportive reasoning to calculations of the costs of the enlargement. The ambivalence in the German enlargement policy manifested during the first years after the unification as cautiousness of the German policy makers with pressing for a faster pace of the enlargement process. In the mid-1990s ambivalence appeared, and started growing, in the rhetoric too. The costs of the German unification that turned to be much higher than anticipated made German policy makers aware that it would be difficult for the German state to finance the enlargement project and that found its reflection in the changing rhetoric.

The exhaustion with the unification costs made it also difficult for the German society to embrace the enlargement and politicians were adjusting their rhetoric to the perception of the constituencies. It revealed a weakness of the German enlargement policy: the lack of strategy on the enlargement in relation to public opinion. German leaders failed to present the enlargement case in a way that would make this policy better understood and accepted by the German society.

An example of ambivalence in the attitude and stance on the enlargement was an action of Chancellor Helmut Kohl himself. He declared during his visit to Poland in July 1995 the year 2000 as a date of the completion of the enlargement for three countries — Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. He backtracked on his statement just days later.
saying it was an indication that the three countries would receive by this date assurance of the membership, though not the full membership.

Chancellor’s contradictory rhetoric reflected a growing at the time across the EU concerns with the economic and financial side of the enlargement. The European Council in Essen in December 1994 approved a ‘pre-accession’ strategy for Eastern Europe. The next step was setting a timetable. The prospect of a free access of the Eastern European countries to the agriculture and structural funds of the EU, that are aimed at promoting a development in poor regions within the EU, raised fears that the costs of opening these funds to Eastern European countries would exceed the EU financial capacity.

It posed a difficulty for German policy makers to explain to the German society the need for the enlargement in the context of financial costs, when German society was burdened with the costs of the unification that exceeded financial calculations and impacted not only economy, but social sphere too. As Germany was traditionally perceived as ‘der Zahlmeister Europas’ (Europe’s paymaster), the prospective payments for the enlargement were expected to fall upon Germany. Apart from the financial costs, the enlargement was also seen as bringing to the EU a flow of cheap labour. That directly threatened the most troubled area in the post-unification Germany — the labour market. The support for the enlargement in the rhetoric of German politicians was fading.

Simultaneously to the developments around the enlargement German society was increasingly tired with the European integration project. Acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty provisions resulted in raising the barriers for a full membership of Eastern European countries in the EU. A growing conviction among the EU member states therefore was that the full accession would be only possible after substantial institutional reforms of CAP and CCP. German leaders started voicing such a need more often both in the external and in the domestic debate. The Maastricht Treaty was also to bring a very unpopular in Germany European Monetary Union, with the effect of its completion starting on 1 January 1999. German society perceived the EMU as forced upon Germany as a condition of the unification. The sentiment towards losing the Deutsche Mark, a symbol of the power of the West Germany’s economy was strong and translated into a declining support for the European integration project.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl was consistent with his overall support for the enlargement; he called for starting entry negotiations with the Eastern countries, as soon as six months after the conclusion of the IGC. He favoured early admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. His encouraging statements were however completed with the indication that early admission should be accompanied with long transition periods for the full access to certain EU freedoms (like of the labour market). It was an indication of growing significance of the prospective economic and financial problems with the enlargement. At the same time the issue of the EU reform voiced by German policy makers attracted opposition from other member states. It caused a disparity between the insistence of the German government on the EU reform and Chancellor’s support for speeding up the pace of the enlargement; the desire for a fast completion of the enlargement was contradictory to the calls for the reform of the EU that did not look as possible to conduct fast. The German stance on the EU enlargement was in this way ambivalent.

At the basis of the push for the EU reforms was the fact that German policy makers started losing the support of constituencies for the enlargement. The exhaustion of the German society was caused by the exhaustion of the German economy. Together with the heavily strained financial capability of the German state it created unfavourable atmosphere for the enlargement. Having support of constituencies neither for financing the Eastern enlargement nor for the changes that would disrupt the benefits of the EU funds, German politicians stopped advocating the enlargement. It created another manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement and subsequently changed the characteristic of this policy deepening the ambivalence.

II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS

Promised Completion Date

The most supportive factor for the enlargement at this stage was the support of Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Chancellor Kohl demonstrated his commitment to supporting and furthering the enlargement in July 1995. During a visit to Poland he declared before the Polish parliament Sejm a concrete date when the three countries — Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary would receive the EU membership — the year
2000. The statement received attention across Europe, as no official document of the EU indicated any concrete date and Chancellor was the first EU leader indicating it. Although Germany’s Chancellor backpedalled on his promise, explaining a few days later that he meant only that these countries would be formally assured of the EU entry by 2000, not that they would become full members on this date, but the moment Chancellor Kohl chose for making his statement was ripe for setting a concrete date of the enlargement.

The promise by Chancellor Kohl of the year 2000 was consistent with the success of the Structured Dialogue accomplished only six months earlier. The Dialogue was an important step in the progress with the enlargement idea; it broke the initial impasse over more tangible actions. The European Council in Essen in 1994 with the Structured Dialogue approved a ‘pre-accession’ strategy for Eastern Europe. The strategy included the promise to provide prospective members by spring 1995 with a set of guidelines for aligning their economies and legal systems with the EU’s internal market and the promise of financial aid to assist Eastern European countries in making these adjustments. It declined however setting a timetable for the enlargement. The promised financial aid for Eastern Europe and a white paper with details on the administrative and legal reforms necessary for the EU membership was approved by the Cannes Summit in June 1995.

An ongoing debate over other directions of the EU development indicated, however, that other member states and their leaders were considering options that would dilute the costs of the enlargement. The Essen ‘push’ of the German government also provoked a reaction of France and Mediterranean member states — the French presidency in the first half of 1995 (following the German one) sought to ‘rebalance’ the EU by promoting a new aid-programme for Northern Africa (approved as a Mediterranean aid package at the Cannes European Council in June 1995).

Therefore one can see the statement by Chancellor Kohl in July 1995 as an expression of his personal views on the enlargement process. One can also read this statement as a political move — a declaration that the German government was ready to

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410 Deutschland Nachrichten, 14 of July, 1995; The Economist, 15 of July 1995, pp. 35-36
support setting a timetable for the enlargement that would allow a successful completion of the process in 2000, thus a move aimed at encouraging the progress of the enlargement. One can also see his statement as a reiteration of the support in the context of a growing domestic discontent with the European integration.

In 1995 German representatives started sending contradictory signals about the enlargement. On the one hand there was the comment made by Chancellor Kohl about the date of enlargement. On the other hand other German representatives were voicing a growing concern with the decision-making process in the EU, which was conducted according to the rules designed for the Community of six. The rules were in the view of German policy makers inadequate for the Community of 15, let’s alone for the expanded to twenty-something after the Eastern enlargement. At the same time a factor supportive for the enlargement was, however, that German representatives took up actions aimed at preparing the EU for the enlargement. The German government started pressing for an institutional reform and adjusting a qualified majority voting as a precondition for the enlargement413.

An occasion for introducing these postulates was the Intergovernmental Conference, which was set for March 1996. The issue of budgetary reform was linked to the reform of existing and expensive EU policies, CAP and regional policy which both were consuming about 80 percent of the EU budget. None of these issues were formally a part of IGC while the German government saw them as closely connected. German policy makers proposed thus in September 1995 a 4-year reform, separate to the negotiations but which would address these issues. According to the proposed project, the reform was to be simultaneous with the upcoming IGC and would be concluded in time for the 1999 launching of the EMU — it would include budgetary reform and the restructuring of CAP and regional policy and the main goal of these reforms was to prepare the EU for the EMU and enlargement414.

Before the Madrid Summit a controversy occurred about the strategy for entry negotiations; Chancellor Kohl announced that negotiations with Eastern countries should begin six months after the conclusion of the IGC to coincide with the beginning of

413 Financial Times, 5 June 1995
414 Financial Times, 13 September, 1995
negotiations with Malta and Cyprus. Kohl also indicated that Germany favoured early admission of Poland the Czech Republic and Hungary with long transition periods. He pointed that clear signals for these countries were needed for the EU that would support economic reforms and preventing a political vacuum in Central Europe. The concept of a limited enlargement was dictated by concerns over the financial consequences and over the fact the EU was not prepared institutionally for a bigger expansion.

The December 1995 Madrid European Council marked a key step in the enlargement process; it offered a prospect of beginning entry negotiations with Eastern European countries in early 1998. It was a compromise achieved between the German preference for admitting only a limited group of countries in the first wave and the French and Scandinavian demand that all applicant countries be treated equally. The Council announced that the EU would establish objective criteria for membership and that the Commission would give its opinion on individual candidates after the conclusion of IGC in 1997. This opinion would be the basis for the EU member states to determine which countries the EU should start negotiations with. In this way the Summit that was attended by Eastern European leaders, was a big step towards the completion of the enlargement. Chancellor Helmut Kohl expressed his satisfaction declaring that the EU had ‘set the switches for enlargement’ (die Weichen gestellt).

But the enthusiasm of German policy makers for the enlargement was fading away. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel while trying to assure Eastern European governments in November 1996 that enlargement remained the priority for the EU admitted that even the earliest new entrants would not be able to join until after 2000. As he put it the enlargement proved to be ‘for obvious reasons more complicated than previous enlargement rounds. German representatives also started moving towards the French position on the entry negotiations — also in November 1996 Kinkel announced that he favoured the French idea of the European Conference that would be simultaneous to the beginning of real negotiations.

415 Financial Times, 14 December, 1995
416 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18 December 1995
417 Financial Times, 25 November 1996
419 Ibid.
German policy makers were emphasising that negotiations were only one part of the enlargement challenges the EU must accomplish before the admission of Eastern countries. First was introducing the EMU, which was the key European policy priority for the Kohl government. As the date of final completion of the EMU was 2002, the enlargement did not seem to take place before 420. And the second German precondition was the EU institutional and policy reforms. This included a successful conclusion of the IGC and introduction of new majority voting and greater flexibility 421 — the concept that would allow states to forge ahead with more integration over the objections of others, proposed by the French and German governments in October 1996 with the reasoning that it was necessary for effective decision-making in a larger EU 422.

The support for the enlargement of German leaders had also economic dimension. Germany was the biggest provider of the financial and economic aid for Eastern Europe. Overall German governments were sending to the region more bilateral financial resources than any other nation in absolute terms: about two-thirds of all Western aid 423. During the first two years after the 1989 the assistance was channelled through various ministries and governmental institutions, developing their own policies and programmes. Due to increasing criticism over insufficient control over the budget from the federal Audit Office (Bundesrechnungshof) — as presented mainly during the Bundestag debates — the Federal Cabinet decided in 1992 to create a system that would coordinate activities of the federal ministries by implementing a concept named Transform Programme (full name ‘Transform: advise Central and Eastern Europe for the building of democracy and social market economy — concept and advising programme of the federal government’) 424. The assistance under this programme was the biggest and the longest

420 Ibid.
421 Ibid.
422 Financial Times, 23 October 1996
lasting aid offered to the Eastern countries by Western partners. Between 1993 and 2000, within the Transform Program, more than 1500 projects were implemented in sectors of economics, politics, agriculture, law, environment, and social policies. The main idea of the program was the same as in assistance for third-world countries: ‘help the countries to help themselves’ (Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe) in their transformation.

The financial aid aimed also at helping Eastern countries to prepare for the EU membership. The costs of this aid, once the enlargement was completed, could also be reduced, as the new EU members would become beneficiaries of the EU redistribution system.

III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE

Assessments of the upcoming costs of the enlargement exposed that the biggest part would be consumed by adjusting of the Common Agriculture Policy and of subsidies to certain industries. Studies in the beginning of the 1990s indicated that the so-called then Višegrad enlargement would raise the cost of the CAP by $47 billion annually and the extension of the Structural Funds to Višegrad under the then rules would cost ECU 26 billion. A rough estimation was that admitting the Višegrad in 2000 would increase annual EU spending by 58 billion ECU i.e. by 60 % of the EU’s budget projected for 2000. Financing this extra cost would require a drastic cut in EU spending and/or an increase in incumbent contributions. Raising taxes or deficits to cover this cost, however, would be unpopular with the EU voters.

425 The French programme of Francois Mitterrand MICECO created in 1991 ended in 1993 because of rivalries between national ministries and organizations; Britain developed a more structured programme coordinated and implemented by different sections of its Know-How Fund. The Nordic countries, especially Sweden, were also very active with the assistance to Eastern Europe.
426 “Help for selfhelp” was the leading concept of the American Marshall plan in Europe. The idea has been included in the German development policy, as most of the institutions and organisations created for the implementation of the Marshall plan in Germany then became the leading actors of Germany’s aid for third world or development countries. Since 2000 ten East European countries which were to join the EU were already included in the EU financial assistance; measures for the years 2000-2006 was signed at the EU Berlin summit in April 1999, opening ways to a stronger integration process, especially on the agricultural (SAPARD programme) and environmental/structural questions (ISPA programme), but also on institution-building projects (Twinning programme).
Since EU farmers and poor regions were receiving then 80% of all EU spending, most of the spending cuts would inevitably fall on these two groups, including German farmers and German new Länders. The estimation was also that if the EU average yearly income grows at 2% and Višegraders’ three times this pace, it would take two decades before they would reach the 75% of the EU average (and if twice as fast as the EU average — three decades). It was clear that any substantial Eastern enlargement was likely to bankrupt the CAP.

For Germany, the biggest net contributor to the EU budget, the predicted costs of the enlargement must be seen in the context of the costs of the German unification; German politicians while considering the prospect of the enlargement had to take into account apart from the prospective financial costs, also social ones, of which the most dangerous would be a possible increase of unemployment at the domestic market, as a result of accepting cheap labour from Eastern Europe. The prospect of the free movement of the people within the EU guaranteed by the Schengen Agreement, in the context of the economic fears looked problematic.

1. Financial Costs

A political unification of Germany accepted in the Two Plus Four Treaty and formally introduced on 3 October 1990, was to be fully implemented with the first all-German election, set for the early December that year. The state treaty on economic, monetary and social union, which entered into force on 1 July 1990, incorporated a largely closed, centrally planned and highly monopolised economy into an advanced and free-trading market economy. It happened practically overnight. The evidence how inefficient and obsolete the East Germany’s economy was, came to the West as a shock. The collapse of the economic system of all former socialist states only

429 The treaty specified the adoption of West Germany’s economic constitution (the economic, social and labour legislation and competition laws), the adoption of a monetary system regulated by the Bundesbank and the substitution of the Deutsche Mark for the Ostmark. It specified also the organised break-up of state monopolies by the Treuhandanstalt (state holding trust institution established in March 1990) with a mandate, which gave first priority to privatisation.

aggravated problems — in 1991 economic output per head in the five Eastern Länder was 35 per cent or less of the European average.\footnote{The European Community and German Unification, Bulletin of the European Communities, Luxembourg: office for Official Publications of the European Communities}

Despite emerging signs of a scale of difficulties, Helmut Kohl was spreading optimism, assuring the West Germans that they would not feel the costs of the unification. He refused in 1990 to finance unification through a large redistribution on national income by increasing taxes; the upcoming first all-German elections planned for December were at stake. Helmut Kohl made the unification a vehicle for his campaign\footnote{CDU: Ja zur Deutschland, Ja zur Zukunft, Wahlprogramm der CDU zu den Bundestagewahlen am 2.Dezember 1990, Broschüre, available through the CDU's Press Office} painting it as not costly. In response to Oskar Lafontaine, the then Saar prime Minister in competition for the chancellorship, who challenged optimism of Helmut Kohl, Kohl claimed that after a period of adjustments, the unification would finance itself by generating additional tax receipts. It was partly election rhetoric, partly however a reflection of the optimism about the unification that was at the time still high. Helmut Kohl was not the only politician mistaken about estimations of the costs of the enterprise. Opposition politicians were predicting only slightly higher costs, like Karl Schiller of SPD, the former Social Democrat economics Minister, who calculated a cost of unification between DM80 and DM100 billion a year.\footnote{Wirtschaftswoche, 2 March 1990}

The costs, however, were gradually mounting to unanticipated and enormous proportions. Initially reconstruction costs were predicted as insignificant: estimated for DM 9 billion in 1991, DM 7.9 billion in 1992, DM 10 billion in 1993 and 10.7 billion in 1994. Kohl’s ‘domestic Marshall Plan’ (\textit{Fonds Deutsche Einheit} — Germany Unity Fund) was planned for DM 115 billion. It turned out that the net public financial transfers to East Germany only in the first year, 1991, exceeded the original predictions 14 times, to a sum of DM 140 billion, what was an equivalent of West Germany’s 5.5 GDP.\footnote{C.H. Flockton, “The Federal German Economy in the Early 1990s”, German Politics, No 2, August 1993} Since then, according to the data published by the Bonn government in 1994, annually a sum around DM 150 billion was transferred in fiscal resources and subsidies. This made
around DM 600 billion over the first four years\textsuperscript{(435)} (throughout the whole decade it will be — as proved later — on average a transfer of 5 per cent of the cash resources from the West Germany to the Eastern part). These sums were spent mainly on improvement of infrastructure, cleaning up environmental damages but also on industrial investments. Apart from that additionally around DM20 billion was spent on improving the East German railways between 1991 and 1993 and DM 8.8 billion on improving the road network\textsuperscript{(436)}.

These costs seriously strained Germany’s financial capability: the public sector borrowing requirement, which in 1989 in the FGR was 1 per cent of the GDP, rose to 5 per cent in 1994. At the end of 1994 the overall public sector debt reached nearly DM 2 trillion, which stood for more than 60 per cent of the unified Germany’s GDP, and exceeded Maastricht Treaty guideline of 60 per cent in 1995 (in comparison to 46 per cent of the FRG in 1989)\textsuperscript{(437)}. These strains started to be significantly felt by the German society.

2. Economic Costs

German society was undergoing a huge shock of transformation at an extraordinarily fast pace. In the simplest possible assessment the unification added to West Germany a structurally weak region with 16 million people. Not only did it turn out not to be the second largest economy in the former socialist block (contrary to the official statistics of the GDR), but by the mid 1991 gross domestic product in East Germany declined to one half of its 1989 level, while industrial output decreased by two thirds. This was a basic problem for the East Germans, and it was accompanied by the problems caused by the speed of the transition dictated by the political, not economic reasoning.

One single factor that skyrocketed the costs was the decision of Helmut Kohl about 1 to 1 exchange rate for both German currencies. This decision is the reason why it is commonly known that the unification was driven by political imperatives. Bundesbank insisted on a less favourable exchange rate of 1DM to 2OM, and after Kohl’s decision

\textsuperscript{435} Leistungsbilanz der Bundesregierung für die neue Bundesländer, 1994 Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Aktuelle Beiträge für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik, 13 July 1993, p. 18; Leistungsbilanz der Bundesregierung (…), March 1994

\textsuperscript{436} Leistungsbilanz der Bundesregierung (…) March 1994; Flockton, “The Federal German Economy…, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{437} Ibid.
president of *Bundesbank* Karl-Otto Pöhl resigned. Kohl’s move triggered a series of predicted by economists bad consequences, starting from the ‘demand shock’ for western consumers goods and investment goods the resulted soon with the rise of the inflation peaking at 4.5 per cent in the west in late 1992. Economists warned that to prevent overheating of the economy a real appreciation of the DM would have been the appropriate response\(^{438}\). However the failure to raise taxes in the West once the full budgetary consequences of the eastern collapse had become apparent fuelled inflationary excess demand. Public deficit financed by borrowings was matched for the first time since 1951 by the current account deficit. Consequently the economy plunged into recession in late 1992 causing in 1993 a decline in GDP of 1.7 per cent in West Germany and 1.1 per cent in German as a whole.

In the Eastern part of Germany itself the shock therapy caused an economic havoc. First was the collapse of the Eastern production sector — the loss of the domestic and East European markets slowed down manufacturing, which by July 1993 stood for only 69 percent of the pre-unification level. Second came unemployment: the labour force shrank from 10 million to 7.3 million (in app. 16.5 million population of the GDR). In 1994 the unemployment rate in the former GDR was 15 per cent, but with 1.13 million people involved in special labour market schemes, the true unemployment was according to economists closer to 25 per cent.

The aggregation of the costs of market support, of liquidity credits for the firms that were privatised and restructured by *Treuhand*, of pensions and social security, of regional assistance and infrastructural programmes, exceeded three times the sums foreseen in the unification treaty of 1990. In order to sustain such heavy subsidisation of the East the government cut down public spending in the West and redirected it to the East. The government also sought support for changes of the wage level in the Eastern part, but West German workers’ unions resisted it to protect their interests.

In March 1993 the federal government reached a package agreement with the *Länder*, the SPD, union, and business associations called the Solidarity Pact. It provided a ground for a reform of intergovernmental revenue sharing, and a medium-term strategy

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\(^{438}\) Ghanie A. Ghaussy and Wolf Schäfer, (eds.), *The Economics of German Unification*, London: Routledge, 1993
designed to limit the deficit. The unions accepted the low pay deal that meant real income losses, and the Bundesbank eased its fiscal policy. Kohl’s government was forced also to break no-tax promise, given during the 1990 elections and introduced a single income tax surcharge of 7.5 per cent in 1991/92, with the next one planned for January 1995.

All the economic problems of the unification cast a deep shadow over the political potential in the late phase of the Helmut Kohl’s tenure. In the last twelve months of his Chancellorship Kohl was forced to pursue the ‘correction of budgetary imbalances’; that did not leave much room for advocating the speeding up the enlargement. The more that economic and financial hardships were accompanied by the costs in a social sphere and translated into a change of political mood in the country.

3. Social Costs

The integration of the new German Länder, both into the German economy and into the European structures, was taking higher than expected toll. The Länder, just departing from the socialist economy, were plugged into the reality of EC/EU directives, without a transitional stage. Once the unification of Germany became a political reality, the Bonn government automatically reaffirmed EC membership of the GDR. And it chose not a gradual, but a rapid, and often instantaneous convergence to Community rules and norms.

As a result, an almost immediate institutional transfer created significant social and economic problems for the new Länder and for the whole of Germany. Observers noted that out of the approximately 600 harmonization directives issued, the GDR could adopt only 10 percent. While the trade rules and directives were easier to assimilate, the internal market policy generated disagreements during the negotiations over the terms of the GDR’s incorporation into the EC. The completion of the single market was due to take effect on 1 January 1993; it caused the Commission’s concern with the problems of the GDR’s incorporation into the EC. In the opinion of the Commission, raising

440 Ghaussy and Schäfer, The Economic of German…, op.cit.
441 Anderson, German Unification and the Union of Europe…, op.cit., p. 76; W.A. Smyser, The German Economy: Colossus at the Crossroads, New York: St Marin’s Press, 1993
protective barriers around the GDR might establish an awkward precedent that could in turn slow down the implementation of the SEA and the Schengen Agreement\textsuperscript{442}.

The momentum behind the internal market programme created opportunities for German officials to push through contentious domestic legislation. In 1992, the Kohl government sought to justify an increase in Germany’s base value-added-tax rate from 14 to 15 percent by emphasising EC-level commitments to harmonise VAT. The PSD and labour unions, which bitterly contested the measure, accused the government of using an excuse of European commitments to achieve what it wanted on the domestic stage. The tax increase would generate much needed revenues that could be used to clear a portion of the mounting costs of the unification (as well as Germany’s financial pledges to the Gulf War effort). Similarly Bonn used the European commitment to liberalise the flow of persons, embodied in the Schengen Agreement, and to push through tighter asylum laws in 1993.

Social problems with the unification were exacerbated by the emerging difficulties with unification of two profoundly different German societies. ‘We are one people’ — chanted the East Germans, demanding unification. ‘We are one people too’ — was the reply from their Western compatriots\textsuperscript{443}. The attitude of the Wessies towards Ossies was illustrated by a catch phrase the ‘Wall in the head’. Only one fifth of all Germans, according to the opinion poll by Allensbach in 1993, admitted the sense of ‘togetherness’; 22 per cent of West Germans and 11 per cent of East Germans termed themselves together as Germans; the rest said both sides had ‘conflicting interests’\textsuperscript{444}.

The financial burden of the unification was on the Western Germans. They paid the price for the controversial decision by Helmut Kohl on the currency exchange. Kohl decided to exchange a weak GDR mark at the rate 1:1 for the strong Deutschmark, applicable to savings and incomes like wages, salaries and pension payments, and 2 GDR marks for 1 DM for other purposes. The burden of the social unification, on the other hand, was on the Ossies. Almost all changes and adjustments were carried out in a form of implementation of western models. It was the Ossies who faced the important

\textsuperscript{442} David Spence, “The European Community and German Unification”, in: Charlie Jeffery and Roland Sturm (eds.) Federalism, Unification and European Integration, London Frank Cass, 1993

\textsuperscript{443} See for example Ash, In Europe’s Name…, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{444} Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 May 1993
challenge of coming to terms with the legacy of a communist past, a challenge shared by all ex-communist countries dealing with uncovering true history, ex-communist officials, ‘apparatchics’ and all those involved in the activities of the communist parties and services.

IV. OPTIONS

Enlargement in terms of costs presented two major problems for German politicians: the necessity of sharing financial benefits with the new, poor members and among these benefits the most challenging for the old members was the defence of the CAP. It meant that the Union’s budget would have to be increased and the main burden of new additional costs would fall on Germany, because its position in the Union was of the main net payer to the common budget. The financial, economic and social costs of the unification reduced Germany's capability to act as Europe's paymaster. Commentators observed, that it would affect the ‘pace and direction of Europe's future enlargement’.

As noted by Sperling: ‘the costs of reconstructing eastern Germany have increasingly circumscribed German domestic economic policy options (…) ‘Unification has changed the relationship between the ends and means of German diplomacy’ as Germany had to abandon its ‘cheque book diplomacy’.

While the strained financial capability affected the attitudes towards the enlargement of German policy makers on the one side, the other was the increasing reluctance towards the enlargement of the German society. The experience of financial strains and growing economic hardships shaped a perception of the enlargement in Germany on all levels; from academic analyses to mainstream media, the enlargement was seen through the lens of the problems with the absorption of the post-socialist economy of the former GDR. It turned the initial enthusiastic support of the German public opinion for the enlargement into a much more reserved attitude. After unification 50 percent of the surveyed Germans stated that a united Europe should include Soviet

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445 Peter Katzenstein, “United Germany in an Integrating Europe”, *Current History*, March 1997, pp.116-123
446 Sperling, “Germany Foreign Policy after Unification…, op.cit. p.74
Union and Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{447}, but more specific questions received more conservative responses\textsuperscript{448}. The experience with the costs of the unification was the first reason, but it also translated into an increasingly reluctant attitude of the German public opinion towards the European integration. \textit{Eurobarometer} surveys conducted in October–November 1997, just before the Agenda 2000 programme on accession was approved, indicated that 29 per cent of Germans were in favour of enlargement and 46 per cent were opposed (what should be however seen in the light of very similar outcomes of identical survey run in France). This outcome was likely to have been influenced by the belief of 60 per cent that the enlargement would entail extra, unpredicted costs and 47 per cent thinking that it would cause higher unemployment in Germany\textsuperscript{449}.

These attitudes were part of a wider change affecting German society: the declining support for engaging into the European integration projects. The Maastricht Treaty provisions meant in practice an implementation of the four freedoms in economic relations among the EU member state — the freedom of trade in goods, services, free movement of capital and people across the borders of the EU. The provisions also introduced mutual harmonization of various market standards, norms and regulation among the member states and a tendency towards centralization of economic competences, the Common Agriculture Policy and Common Cohesion Policy. The provisions were planned for the internal market of the European Community and the EFTA enlargement of wealthy countries did not add problems. Maastricht provisions did not take into account the Eastern enlargement and that it would bring into the EU obsolete economies, which would disturb the internal balance of the EU.

The ongoing process of German unification magnified the problems of the EU’s single market and regulations in the social sphere. Neither German government nor the labour organizations were satisfied with the consequences of the internal EU market. The new regulations of the competition policy, which monitors and authorises state aid to


\textsuperscript{448} Der Spiegel and Financial Times survey November 1994 only 24 percent advocated widening (with the 42 per cent of the British). See also Christian Härpfer, “Public opinion on European Union enlargement”, Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 2001

\textsuperscript{449} European Commission, 1998, Eurobarometer, Table 4.4. Figures on approval/opposition are calculated from results for ten eastern candidates. Hungary was most favoured (49–31 per cent), Romania least (17–58 per cent). Poland 29–50 per cent
industries, were a serious obstacle for German politicians in managing the economy of the new Germany. For example the state incentives offered on regular basis in order to attract investments in Eastern Länders (plagued by a high rate unemployment) were at odds with the internal market regulations. The second internal market principle, of freedom to provide services from any place to any place in the EU, limited government’s attempts to lower the unemployment; the principle opened free flow of contractor teams from ‘low wage’ countries for limited labour contracts in ‘high wage’ countries. Germany was on the top of the destination list of contractor teams.

The unions and the labor ministry represented a view that two social policy principles should prevail: (1) the principle of subsidiarity, according to which social systems should be defined mainly by the member states, and (2) the principle guaranteeing member states the right to promulgate standards higher than the EU norm. German firms and labor unions achieved in 1996 a compromise, according to which minimum labor offer prices were to be set in affected industries. The case with contractors however underlined the problem with the enlargement: the Schengen Agreement, that was to abolish all internal boundary control within the EU and come into force on 26 March 1995, would make the German labour market vulnerable to workers and contractors from ‘very low wage’ countries of Eastern Europe.

At the same time Germany’s contribution to the EU budget, despite the burden of the unification was on the increase: between 1990 and 1996 German net payments increased from about 12 billion DM to 22.5 billion. It represented 0.6 per cent of German GDP and 60 per cent of all net payments in the EU. The increasing trend was recorded since 1971 when Germany contributed 2.6 billion DM and in 1995 41 billion DM; in relative terms German transfers to Brussels accounted for 2.8 per cent of the federal budget in 1971 and about 9 per cent in 1994. In the face of the upcoming EU enlargement, the concerns of the German politicians were obvious: as it was put by the then Finance Minister Theo Waigel ‘Eastern enlargement should not cost one pfennig more to the German tax payer’450. The call for reform of the EU budget and reduction in Germany's net contributions has been formulated in the coalition agreement of the Kohl’s

government in November 1994. The main battle for the finances for the enlargement will be fought in years 1995-1997 during the process of preparation of the Agenda 2000.

V. RESULTS

Declining Europeanization

The economic cost of the unification significantly weakened the support of the Germans for European integration. The increasing exhaustion of German society with the rapid political and economic changes influenced their attitudes towards the ‘Europeanization’ and European integration. The impact of the commitment to the Western integration was reflected in the attitude towards the Maastricht Treaty, which resulted in what most of the German society resented — the abandonment of the Deutsche Mark. The Germans did not hold a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, but the opponents of the Treaty brought the case before the constitutional court. The Treaty was ruled as compatible with the Basic Law on 12 October 1993, and the Court set down several conditions necessary to fulfil by the government in order to make the Treaty work.  

It did not improve the perception of the single currency among the German society. The Germans, together with the British and Danes, showed the lowest support among the EC member nations to the common European currency. The net vote started in 1990 at about plus nearly 22 per cent (10 points below the EU average), and in 1994 it went down to minus 20 per cent (nearly 40 points below the EU average)\(^4\). This reflected strong emotions stemming from the fact that Deutschmark had a very special meaning for the Germans. After the trauma of the Holocaust and World War II, ‘D-mark nationalism’ was one of a few available venues for expressing patriotism. The mighty

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\(^4\) The conditions were: • the democratic basis of the union must be developed “keeping step with the process of integration” while at the same time a “living democracy” must be maintained by in all the member states; • the Bundestag must retain functions and competencies of “substantial import”; • and the domestic legislative branch must make clear the extent to which it intended to let the European Union exercise sovereign rights; • the power of the Bundestag to make decisions and exert political control should under no conditions be depleted through any means incompatible with the principles of democracy (the Bundestag fulfilled this stipulation by voting to make the transition to the third stage of the monetary union dependent on a positive vote by parliament). See: “Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts über Verfassungsbeschwerden gegen den Vertrag von Maastricht, verkündet in Karlsruhe, 12 October 1993 (excerpts)”, Europa-Archiv 48, NO 22, 1993  

\(^5\) European Commission 1994, Eurobarometer No 41, Brussels, p. 68.
mark was a symbol of post-war achievement, rebuilding, and stability. Helmut Kohl realised this and made his government devote considerable effort to postponing the EC governmental conference until the end of 1990. The conference was to discuss the single currency and Kohl hoped to keep the ‘currency question’ out of the election campaign.

After signing the Maastricht Treaty, Kohl faced a formidable criticism in the media for surrendering the D-Mark. All the media, from tabloids to popular magazines like Der Spiegel, to the conservative broadsheet daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, traditionally supportive of Kohl, raised questions about the Chancellor’s ambition to trade the stable D-Mark for a new and untested European currency. German commentators were also voicing concerns about paying for other, weaker than German, economies in the EC that were to adopt single currency too. This was one of the Germans’ three major fears regarding the single market, as was indicated in a 1992 Eurobarometer survey. After too much immigration (44 per cent) and criminality because of insufficient border control (43 per cent) the concern about paying for weaker economies was the third indicated problem (42 per cent). In comparison, the average dissatisfaction with the single currency across the EC was only 20 per cent.

The legal actions taken up by the opposition against the Treaty forced German leaders to seeking justification of their policies in terms of costs and benefits and to devoting more attention to the domestic policy issues. The unification took its toll in regards to the attitudes of the Germans towards the overall European developments; a combination of nostalgia for the status quo, economic malaise and critique of the democratic deficit of the EU had a serious impact on the general attitude of the German society towards the European integration, either deepening or widening projects.

The ‘public opinion’ is often defined as the aggregation of individual opinions by opinion surveys. Although it is a narrow definition, far too limiting possibilities to explore the notion of attitude, but it is a good starting point for such a discussion. The survey data by Eurobarometer at the time showed a remarkable gap between the conventional view that Germany promoted integration, and the population’s attitude, which was below the average of the EU members in many respects. The most often indicated reasons for such results were (i) fears of too much immigration, (ii) increasing

453 European Commission 1992, Eurobarometer No 38, Brussels, A 38 –A 39
criminality and (iii) presumed obligation to pay for the other members. This corresponded with the indication in the survey that the Germans were part of the group of nations, that were least interested in European politics and least informed about this politics; the low level of knowledge was accompanied by the low degree of identification.

Only 37 per cent of Germans saw themselves as ‘often or sometimes Europeans’ and 59 per cent as ‘never Europeans’ while the average among other EU nations was at the time 46 to 51 per cent respectively. Asked about their future identity 41 per cent of Germans regarded themselves as Germans only, 43 per cent as Germans and Europeans, 9 per cent as Europeans and Germans and 3 per cent as Europeans. The average in the EU was 38, 48, 7 and 4 per cent respectively. These indicators were not surprising. In 1989/90 asked whether the German unification or the EC single market was more important for them 53 per cent of the West Germans chose unification, 20 the internal market; the same question among the businessmen – 19 per cent chose unification, 63 per cent the single market.

As for the single currency the Germans, together with the British and the Dutch showed the lowest support to a common European currency; the net vote started in 1990 at about plus nearly 22 per cent (10 points below the EU average), in 1994 it went down to minus 20 per cent (nearly 40 points below the EU average).

Enlargement was according to any survey at the time much less popular than the integration. The RAND Corporation examining German attitudes towards foreign and security policy among the 824 representatives of German elites in the years 1990-1993, found out two major features. The first one was that in the mid-1990s German elites tended to be more domestically oriented. The second finding was that 48 per cent preferred deepening the EU than widening it, with only 23 per cent other way round. Eventually that the elites accepted nearly unanimously that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland should be admitted to the EU, but their preferences differed — Hungary was

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454 European Commission 1993, Eurobarometer No 40, Brussels, p.68; No 41, A20
456 European Commission 1994, Eurobarometer No 41, Brussels, p. 68.
given the support by 74 per cent, the Czech Republic by 58 and Poland 54. Eurobarometer survey on the attitude towards the enlargement revealed also a difference between Western and Eastern part of Germany, in relation to the Eastern enlargement. According to its autumn 1992 survey the East Germans were more in favour of the integration of Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Poland than the EU average, while the West Germans were only in favour of EU extension with regard to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic with Hungary as the only country accepted nearly as favourable as in the EU average, while all other countries had approval way below the EU average.\footnote{European Commission 1992, Eurobarometer No 38, Brussels, A46-A47}

Those preferences of the Germans changed in the next years. At any time throughout the second half of the 1990s the popular votes rejected the two most important European projects — enlargement and the EMU. There was also a sharp decline in the support for Germany’s own membership, which fell from the level of 83 per cent in 1991 to 38 per cent in 1998.\footnote{Christian Holst, “Public Attitudes and Elite Attitudes: towards a New Foreign Policy Consensus?”, in: Eberwein W.E. and Kaiser Karl (eds), Germany’s New Foreign Policy, Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, Palgrave 2001} In regards to the support for the enlargement — in the year 2000 only 35 per cent of Germans supported the enlargement with 43 per cent against.\footnote{Commissions of the European Communities (CEC), October 2000} The irony was that these data concerned the nation regarded commonly as the most ‘pro-European’ of all EU members. That however was also a result of the gap between the public and elites preferences: the record support for the EU membership among the German elites was recorded in 1996, when 98 respondents to a survey for the German research agency Infratest Burke described the EU membership as a ‘good thing’.\footnote{Infratest Burke, “Meinungsbild der Elite in Deutschland zur Außen und Sicherheitspolitik”, Dokumentation 1996; see under http://www.infratest-dimap.de}

The changing attitude of the German society towards the European integration impacted the general elections of 1998. While the 1992-1993 economic recession and the then visibly much higher costs of the unification, than Kohl promised, weakened his position among voters, a reviving economy early in 1994 brought Helmut Kohl his fourth straight election victory that year. Four years later, the prospect of the upcoming enlargement of the EU and the prolonging and much heavier than expected costs of the

\footnote{London School of Economics and Political Science 2013}
unification along with the imminent and irreversible adoption of the EMU undermined finally Chancellor Kohl’s popularity to the extend that he lost power. The election of 27 September 1998 brought to an end the sixteen-year chancellorship of Helmut Kohl.

SUMMARY

The support for the enlargement introduced and led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl was based on a strong normative reasoning. It turned out to be also congruent with the new interests of Germany in the East. This reasoning hit in the mid-1990s a powerful rationalist constraint: the exhaustion of the German society with financial, economic, social and political costs of the unification. The prospective costs of the upcoming enlargement made German policy makers cautious not to put forward the enlargement in the elections campaign; the prospective costs of the enlargement were potentially explosive. Avoiding it did not however save the CDU of Helmut Kohl, which lost the power to the coalition of the SPD and Green Party.

The costs of the unification that caused the exhaustion of the German society started weighing on the domestic politics. It conflicted the public consensus on the enlargement. Cautiousness about the enlargement in the domestic debate and shifting accents from the normative values-related reasoning to the financial and economic side of the enlargement made the stance of German policy makers less supportive and increasingly more ambivalent. This development touches upon an issue of democratic deficit in modern democracies. The phenomenon of the differences between the goals and preferences of political elites and those of the wider public is present in all polities across Europe; it creates foreign policies that often lack popular support. A German scholar, Michael Zürn, calls this phenomenon ‘executive multilateralism’\textsuperscript{462} and points out that it is increasingly difficult for governments to maintain foreign and domestic affairs as separate realms and confrontation between endogenous and exogenous forces cause political problems to intensify.

This logic can be applied to Germany’s European policy in the mid-1990s, especially in respect to the EU enlargement. Germany’s political class found itself in between an electorate, which was moving away from ‘pro-Europe’, and even ‘pro-EU’

\textsuperscript{462} Michael Zürn, “Does International Governance Meet Demand?,” \textit{IIS-Arbeitspapier} NO 4-5, Universität Bremen, 1997
positions, and the external pressures of Eastern European countries demanding the entry into the EU. German elites never attempted to manage public’s frustration in this respect. More worrying at the time for the government was the public frustration over the prospect of losing the Deutsche Mark, soon to be replaced by a single European currency.

The election campaign began just at the time of the Amsterdam Summit, during which German government confirmed determination in seeking solutions that would facilitate the enlargement. The Agenda 2000 project challenged German politicians with the first concrete programme of adjustment of the existing EU policies. All further developments in the enlargement process and in the formation of German policy towards this issue would be consequences of the agenda set in 1990-1997. The following epoch of Gerhard Schröder, in respect to the enlargement, was a time of struggling to manage the agenda, to find solutions to the challenges that emerged and that had been defined during the Helmut Kohl’s tenure and to finalise the project. Schröder conducted the enlargement policy however with different attitude than of the Helmut Kohl’s government and the roots of this change are in the depicted change of the domestic socio-economic setting in Germany.

The ambivalence as a variable demonstrates at this stage a shift in the approach to the European integration. While elite discourse was changing the notion of the European integration, widening its scope, the financial and economic costs of the unification changed the perception of the European integration among the German society and subsequently among the German policy makers. The burden of the economic and financial costs of the unification shifted the enlargement and its perception into the sphere of material, economic interests. They will shape the enlargement policy in subsequent years.
CHAPTER 8

Costs of Enlargement As the Cause of Ambivalence
In Germany’s Enlargement Policy Towards the EU Enlargement

1994—2000

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy, which was caused by the costs of the enlargement. This is an economic factor and the phase of the enlargement this chapter depicts is different than the first one. The first phase was about preparation of the ground, implementing the idea into a political rationale of the EU members, and introducing this idea on the EU political agenda. From the mid-1990s it is already a phase of managing the agenda. In the years 1995-1997 the enlargement process entered the phase of negotiations of terms and conditions and faced other challenges than before.

It indicates a different dynamics and different character of the constraints; the progress of the enlargement is confronted now with the prospective economic and financial costs. The assessment of these costs generated a need for reforming the EU finances. The EU members must adjust the EU policies to a new, bigger Union; the most
important is the financial reform and establishing a new budget that would meet the needs of the enlargement project. The second challenge — as it is now in the phase of negotiating terms and conditions it is confronted with conflicting interests mainly of economic but also in some cases political of specific domestic interest groups. As such groups are particularly strong at the German domestic stage it is the German actors who still would play an important role in the process of preparations of the enlargement.

The ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement is a result of the support for the enlargement and insistence on the reforms, on which other member states did not want to agree. It is also a difference between the approach to the enlargement of two governments — of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who built the supportive rhetoric and turned into supportive actions and the government of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, whose approach to the enlargement was through the calculation of costs and benefits.

The mid-1990s represent a culminating moment of the German policy maker’s involvement in the advocacy of the enlargement. It is the time between Kohl’s announcement in July 1995 and the Amsterdam Summit of 1997, when the German government threw its power behind the enlargement idea in order to move the process forward. This engagement proves the seriousness of the Chancellor Kohl’s commitment to support enlargement and epitomises the most positive attitude towards the enlargement among German political elites, maintained despite strong opposite contradictions. Soon afterwards a new government of Gerhard Schröder declared a new attitude towards the European integration projects and the enlargement, emphasising first the need to secure Germany’s interests and reaching agreement on the EU reforms.

The negotiations phase represents a case for the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. While construction and articulation of state interests is always possible to explain with the constructivist approach, through examining state identities that constitute such interests, the liberal intergovernmentalism is better suited for explanation of the German policy in this phase, because it is a phase of the integration process of bargaining material interests. The preferences German policy makers presented at the negotiations at subsequent summits in the mid-1990s reflect the basic
claim of liberal intergovernmentalism that the preferences emerge from distributional conflict and the integration outcomes result form hard bargaining among states\textsuperscript{463}.

\textbf{I. AMBIVALENCE}

Ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy at this stage manifested as a conflict between the support for the enlargement and defense of the economic interests of Germany. It intensified with the change of government in Germany, when a new team at power brought a new attitude towards Germany’s engagement in the European integration projects.

A debate on the reforms of the EU exposed contradictory pressures German policy makers were under. They were coming from three directions. First, the promised advocacy of the enlargement collided with the challenge of reassuring Western partners about preserving the existing balance among the old EU member states and particularly delicate issue of a diminishing status of France in a wider EU. Second, the enlargement in the eyes of politicians from other member states was to bring benefits to Germany (for geographical proximity and the strong political and economic position of Germany in the region). To counter this anticipated advantage of Germany, other member states expected German government to take up the financial burden of the enlargement. That, however, clashed with a strong pressure from the German domestic public, exhausted with the costs of the unification and therefore opposing the idea of Germany financing the enlargement; it presented the third conflicting factor.

The enlargement agenda at this point was expected to initiate preparations of the EU for the upcoming moment: the subsequent Summits in Cannes in June 1995 and in Madrid half a year later presented the steps the associated countries would have to take in order to prepare for the Single Market, and the member states to evaluate effects of the enlargement on the EU’s policies and to assess possibilities of opening negotiations with

candidate countries. The Amsterdam Summit of June 1997 was to bring solutions to the calls for institutional reform of the EU\textsuperscript{464}.

Although according to the Edinburgh decision of the European Council of December 1992 the institutional reform was not to be a precondition of the enlargement\textsuperscript{465}, yet three years later the conviction among many of the EU policy makers was that strengthening the EU was essential if the enlargement was to be successful. German diplomacy was the main force insisting on reforms and the stance of Germany on this issue seemed unwavering.

A so-called Maastricht II conference planned for the Amsterdam Summit was expected to review the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty in order to strengthen the introduced then reforms and German representatives were expected to lead the process\textsuperscript{466}. The Amsterdam Summit and the reform expected to be accepted then represented a further deepening of the European integration. German policy makers faced in this context a double dilemma.

First was a concern about domestic perception of pushing by the German government for the further EU integration. The support of the German public opinion for the integration was already stretched by the unwelcome prospect of losing the Deutsche Mark. German leaders presented the EMU project on the domestic stage as bringing first political gain, which was to compensate the economic dubious from the German point of view benefits. Pushing for the reforms of the EU that were supposed to tighten up integration even further than the introduction of the EMU, was in those circumstances politically risky and unlikely to succeed.

The second dilemma related directly to the enlargement. On the one hand many German policy makers shared the conviction about the need for reforms, but an argument

\textsuperscript{464} One of the main arguments for reforms was that expressed explicitly by the European Commission in 1994, which argued that “it is clear that a Union of 20 or more cannot be run on the same lines as a Community of 12” — see: European Commission. The Enlargement of the European Union. Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1994, p.10


that introducing reforms would take a long time, while the enlargement should not wait, was also persuasive. In the run-up to the Amsterdam Summit German politicians were weighing both options.

The proposals they presented at the Amsterdam Summit were surprisingly modest in comparison to the ambitions and insistence on a proper reform of the Union. And to the surprise of other member states German representatives did not insist on reforms, pushing instead for the enlargement agenda. In this way they played a crucial role in saving the Amsterdam Summit from the impasse and failure. First, they worked out a compromise between the member states on the new parity votes. Second, they did not agree on the French proposal on the reforms of the EU. Both actions allowed avoiding a stalemate with the enlargement process. It was a culminating point of the support for the enlargement initiated and introduced into the rationale of the German *Europapolitik* by Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

Germany chose to facilitate the enlargement without insisting on immediate solving of the EU reforms issue, thus without securing at the time its own economic interests. It demonstrated the support for the enlargement but left the issue of the EU reform unsolved. A conflict between determination to reduce budget contributions, the declared German interest in the enlargement, which according to most of the predictions then was not possible without CAP reform, and the upcoming federal elections created an impossible situation for the German government. To put it in game-analysis terms — the combination implied that Germany’s win-set in the Agenda 2000 negotiations on CAP reform was strongly limited.

For these reasons the Agenda 2000 programme, which was conceived at the Madrid Summit as a roadmap for further proceeding with the enlargement, did not solve the problem either; the package of legislation covering the reform of the agriculture and regional policies along with the pre-accession instruments and a new financial framework did not fulfil expectations of either of sides. The issues of the CAP, regional subsidies and the German net-contribution to the EU budget were to be discussed.

The change of the socio-political domestic setting in Germany brought to power a new, social-democratic team of Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer. The change coincided with relocation of Germany’s capitol and starting a new epoch of the ‘Berlin
Republic’. A new spirit of this time was expressed in a different perception of the past and a different, more assertive attitude towards the foreign policy, including the enlargement. The victorious SPD party during the election campaign pictured the enlargement as a questionable move of the EU. This induced quickly a perception that the government of Gerhard Schröder would be much more reluctant towards completing the enlargement than the governments of Chancellor Kohl. In fact the attitude of the new Chancellor towards the enlargement was supportive, however, it was a ‘conditional support’. The main goal of a new European policy of Chancellor Schröder’s government, were deep reforms of the EU, and as it was announced — the enlargement depended on the success of these reforms.

The declaration of the assertive pursuing national interests on the one hand and of the continuity of the previous premises of the foreign policy sent a mixed message as both options were in conflict with each other. It created ambivalence in the government stance on the European policy and towards the enlargement too.

II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS

A ‘managing agenda’ phase in the enlargement process and Germany’s policy towards the enlargement starts with a decision of the European Council at the Madrid Summit in December 1995, which sets a date for opening accession negotiations. The second milestone is the Amsterdam Treaty of June 1997; the provisions of the Treaty determine a task of setting a timetable for accession. The timetable comes just one month later in the shape of the Agenda 2000. Both these achievements were possible to a high degree thanks to the support and concrete actions of German policy makers. It was a culminating moment of their involvement in promoting the enlargement. After these two decisions the enlargement process is already in motion and the battle for turning the idea into political outcomes after the year 1997 is over. The time now is of implementation of the chosen means for achieving the goal and this is the time already of the SPD/Green coalition.

Two turning points impacted the enlargement dynamics in the mid-1990s: a decision on NATO expansion and a date 2000, which was stated by Chancellor Kohl as a date of the enlargement completion.
The year 2000 was already referred to hypothetically in the elite debates and expert comments in the mid-1990s, but only when German Chancellor Helmut Kohl mentioned it, it gained political meaning. Kohl mentioned the date, in his Warsaw speech of July 1995, as a merely prospective date, explaining soon after his intentions, and the date was never confirmed officially or even discussed on the level of the EU Commission. But it had a powerful impact on the enlargement dynamics, along with the decision on NATO expansion; both furthered thinking about the EU enlargement in more concrete terms.

An exemplification of this impact was a change in the rhetoric of the Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who initially issued very cautious statements, and as soon as the decision about enlarging NATO was made, he called for a rapid widening of the EU. The governing CDU stated also in spring 1995 that negotiations about the membership with Visegrad states should start immediately after the governments’ conference of 1996. ‘The widening will make us a European inland state (...) we remain of the West and our Eastern neighbours also want to be a part of the West’ — was the main thought of the CDU’s reasoning. Wolfgang Schäuble also embraced advocacy of the early enlargement stating in the Bundestag that the date 2000 gave the candidate countries a perspective and that the economic adjustment periods should not be longer than in the case of Portugal and Spain. He stressed that the enlargement should happen before the EU reform, since, as he explained, Eastern countries needed a certain perspective and the enlargement on the other hand would enforce and speed up the reforms.

The statements of Kinkel and Schäuble signalled a position of Germany on the EU-reforms-EU-enlargement nexus. This position became a source of frictions with France; although German policy makers held the EU reforms as necessary, they decided not to tie them to the enlargement as a condition. In Amsterdam they chose widening over the deepening of the European integration, the interests that were based on the normative reasoning, not on the benefits and costs calculation.

467 “Rede des AußenMinisters Klaus Kinkel vor der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik”, Europa-Archiv 41, 2 1994
468 Rudolf Seiters: Deutsche Überlegungen zur Regierungskonferenz 1996” CDU/CSU Pressedienst, 2 March 1995
469 “Die D-Mark ist nicht alles”, Der Spiegel, 27 March 1995
1. Amsterdam Summit: Enlargement First

An upcoming Intergovernmental Conference that led the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997 was the third turning point in the enlargement dynamics. The Conference was supposed to tackle issues of the EU reforms, which German policy maker held as necessary to introduce in order to facilitate the enlargement. A goal for the Maastricht Summit was to complete the project of the economic integration with political adequate arrangements for tightening the Union; the Maastricht II was supposed to be a reinforcement of the Maastricht union. It was to address the remaining disagreements on reforming the EU and its institutions. German policy makers had concrete and detailed proposals.

A constellation of Germany’s preferences was complex and contained a seed of conflict. On the one hand there was a strong, grounded in a normative narrative of the German identity, preference to support the enlargement. On the other hand a changing domestic economic and social setting, due to exhaustion of the society with the costs on the unification, created new preferences, based on calculation of costs and benefits that favoured the enlargement conditionally.

In 1995 Minister Kinkel formulated a set of goals expressing that politicians should subordinate the reform of the EU to ‘proximity to the people, competitiveness, domestic security, qualified majority of voting in foreign policy matters and institutional reform’. A German proposal focused on pragmatic deepening in the form of ‘communitising’ further in the foreign policy and domestic security matters. This included qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, the progress on developing Europol and the incorporation of the Schengen Agreement into the EU policy-making framework. The aim of tightening political union was not mentioned: there was a major reason for such a stance of the German government.

Amid discussions about preparations for the enlargement the most problematic issue turned to be a distributive side of the project. German policy makers faced a growing domestic pressure to cut the costs of financing the EU projects, a demand caused by the exhaustion of the German society with the economic burden of the unification. Other member states, however, saw the enlargement as the most congruent with the

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interest of Germany. An expectation was then that the German government should take up the main burden of the enlargement costs. German policy makers chose in the run-up to the Amsterdam Summit a tactic of portraying the enlargement as a tremendous opportunity for the entire EU. With emphasis on the fact that costs and benefits are unquantifiable for the time being.\footnote{Ibid.}

The enlargement costs, however, were not the only issue German representatives considered before the Amsterdam Summit. The whole plan of an big institutional reform presented a danger of further consuming political energy and economic resources, while if the Eastern enlargement was to be completed, the EU should be a strong anchor for the process. This was the reasoning why the EFTA enlargement was welcomed by German policy makers\footnote{As it was put by Helmut Kohl: “There were voices abroad pointing that the Germans looked after these accessions with particular intensity. I think it corresponds with our common policy that we want the enlargement of the Union. So far it is correct that the Foreign Minister, on the instruction of the federal government and mine, has committed himself to it”, Helmut Kohl, Bundestag declaration “Aktuelle Fragen der Europapolitik”, Bulletin der Bundesregierung NO 51, 31 May 1997, p. 477}, although not by the French ones: while the Germans perceived it as a factor strengthening and stabilising the EU, the French policy makers saw it as a dangerous prospect of changing the established balance in favour of northern countries. The EFTA countries first of all presented a higher per capita GDP than the EU average and were already linked to the EU institutionally through the Free Trade Agreement. The Eastern countries were incomparably poorer, and much more inconsistent as a group for their various domestic political and economic systems and the Eastern enlargement presented incomparably different challenge. Yet the EFTA factor was supposed to be helpful.

For the project of the Eastern enlargement it was important that thanks to the EFTA enlargement the EU had on the board member states like Austria, Sweden, Finland. Because of their geographic position, they were potentially more interested in spreading the EU framework eastwards than the southwest countries like Spain, Portugal, France and Ireland. For Germany it brought potential allies in the campaigning for the enlargement and more wealthy states that could share the financial burden. An underlying goal was: the more stable environment within the EU, the smoother, more successful and quicker Eastern enlargement.
That was another reason why German policy makers did not want to make the EU reform a condition for the enlargement. It caused a friction with France. German politicians rejected the French proposal to tighten integration because in the view of German politicians it presented a risk of postponing the enlargement. The French proposal, in the opinion of the German representatives, would delay the preparations. This was the first major clash in Amsterdam, at which German politicians proved their commitment to the facilitating enlargement.

The second point of friction at the Amsterdam Summit was even tougher, yet German representatives demonstrated their support for the enlargement and the strength of their position in the EU. The issue of the EU reform brought a question about the parity votes in the Council of Ministers after the EFTA enlargement. It caused a bitter dispute between the member-states and the ferocity of the argument indicated that the Summit would end up in a failure. It did not only due to determination of the German officials.

A role of the agreement maker in this bargaining belonged to Minister Klaus Kinkel. His persistence to continue negotiations against a possibility that the talks would break, was supported actively by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who kept calling the leaders of the member states in order to make them understand that the position of the German government was unbreakable. ‘This was the clearest sign throughout the entire 1990. that when it came to the enlargement, Germany diplomacy was prepared to put its neck on the block’ — wrote Henning Tewes. A compromise, called from that point the Ioannina Compromise established that a decision blocked by 23 votes would have to be referred back to the Council for consultation.

The Amsterdam Summit contrary to the expectations postponed vital decisions on the EU reforms. The plan for the institutional reform of the EU was a problematic point in relations between Germany and France. German commitment to a federal Europe reflected understanding on the German side that pressing for national interests explicitly was unacceptable in Europe, whereas working indirectly through integrated institutions

473 The declaration stated that “the Amsterdam treaty did not respond to the necessity for substantial progress on the way to strengthening institutions”. The clash between the German and French representatives stemmed from the different concepts of deepening on both sides. The most common denominator was that both were about deepening and very loosely defined.

474 Tewes, Germany, Civilian Power …, op.cit. p. 124
would allow German influence to be exerted more effectively. The French understood this too and therefore resisted German plans for the institutional reform of the EU.

Yet the Summit opened the way to the enlargement and for this reason it was presented as a success\(^{475}\). The European Council in Amsterdam called for accession negotiations to start with a group of six states — Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia — and the negotiations on the EU *acquis* were launched in March 1998. The EU *acquis* was divided into 31 chapters and the Council adopted a common negotiating position on each chapter, which then was put forth to each individual candidate country during bilateral inter-governmental conferences. For the enlargement this project was a big step forward. But in respect to the awaited decisions on the EU reforms, the Amsterdam Summit was perceived as a failure.

As Klaus Kinkel explained shortly before signing the Treaty of Amsterdam, it represented a ‘considerable progress in revamping the EU to make it more efficient and to prepare for the inclusion of new member state’\(^{476}\). It did not, however, resolve all the issues German policy makers considered central to the success of the EU expansion. Chief among those issues, as Kinkel listed, was the assignment of financial responsibilities among the member states. Germany, which was paying in considerably more to the EU than receiving back from various EU programs, was determined to see a ‘more just division of the fiscal burden’ — as Kinkel put it to the reporters in Bonn after the cabinet reviewed the Amsterdam Treaty\(^{477}\). He pointed that further negotiations would be necessary to work out the details of institutional reform left open by the Amsterdam Treaty. The treaty limited the size of the EU Commission to twenty commissioners, but did not specify how commissioners would be chosen once the EU expands to more than twenty member states. ‘We still have a little bit of institutional touch-up work to do, particularly on the size of the Commission and the weighting of member states’ votes’ — explained Kinkel. He added that he had never expected a super-

\(^{475}\) Presidency Conclusions, Amsterdam European Council, 16-17 June 1997; Gipfeltreffen in Amsterdam, Keesing Archiv der Gegenwart, 17 June 1997, 42116—42117

\(^{476}\) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 June 1997

\(^{477}\) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 June 1997
outcome from Amsterdam. ‘What we have here is fifteen countries settling on the least common denominator’ — he commented478.

From the liberal intergovernmentalism perspective, German policy makers had conflicting with each other sets of state preferences, because these preferences derived from different ontologically categories and premises. The preferences the government of Chancellor Kohl chose on the external board, at the Amsterdam Summit, were these shaped by normative factors; the preferences that were based on costs and benefits calculation were put aside.

2. Setting Accession Criteria

Apart from the EU reform issues left after the Amsterdam Summit, there was also a vital concern untouched at all: the membership criteria for the candidate states. It followed the question about the number of the countries that should be included in the Eastern enlargement. The number many politicians were talking about at the time, was between 3 to 5 or 7 the most, within so-called ‘small enlargement’. Germany’s priority was Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia; all four countries were the closest geographically to the EU and Germany, and apart from Slovakia they were the most advanced in their transformation process. At the Madrid Summit Helmut Kohl advocated for three countries — Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic479.

However a high economic growth of other Eastern countries like Estonia and Slovenia left the EU not much space for pushing for the concept of the small enlargement; they proved to be much more advanced in their reforms than for example Slovakia. Kohl’s personal interest in the matter of which countries were to be admitted in the first round was seen by Germany’s partners as pursuing the enlargement at the expense of the issues other member states were concerned with: the future ‘fit’ between the old and new members and whether the non-community countries would be able to catch up with the Maastricht criteria given the huge economic disparities between the EU and the candidate countries. German Chancellor meanwhile was stressing that the

478 Ibid.
479 Financial Times, 15 December 1995 and 18 December 1995
provisions of Maastricht Treaty could not bring the effect of ‘magnetism for Eastern countries’ and they needed a firm prospect of admission.

The future ‘fit’ between the old and new members rested on economic adaptation; the EC/EU organization was predominantly in the economic area, with the Single Market and the planned single currency. The main concern therefore was criteria of economic integration, as the most difficult segment. On the other hand the scope of the membership criteria established in Copenhagen was extraordinarily wide and not entirely economic — in a broad sense they determined that candidate countries not only would have to fulfil the acquis but also to contribute to the advancement of the integration process.

Candidate countries pressed for more precise conditions fearing that the Copenhagen criteria might occur too flexible for negative selection and for setting a deadline for the enlargement. The Commission presented a White Book on the steps the associated countries would have to undertake in order to prepare for the Single Market at the Cannes Summit in June 1995. It opened the way for Eastern countries to prepare for accession. Nonetheless for further proceeding the enlargement needed a road map. It was against the tactic of Helmut Kohl’s government, which did not want to go into deep details on the economic issues fearing the opposition to enlargement from other member states if a debate on a reform of agriculture and Community finance was unleashed. Again, as it was put by Sedelmeier and Wallace, the German government ‘lobbied discreetly, but actively, among its partners for some key decisions to be taken at Madrid, after a strategic review of policy an Enlargement Task Force, established in the Foreign Office in 1994 had advocated moves from a ‘pre-accession’ to an accession strategy’.

Other member states however asked the Commission for a specification of the proposal on the reform in three main fields: finance, agriculture and the structural funds. It came one month after signing the Amsterdam Treaty, in a form of a document ‘Agenda 2000’. The proposals of Agenda 2000 will be main factors shaping the attitudes towards the enlargement after the year 1997.

480 The phrase was a variation on the theory of Konrad Adenauer about magnetic effect of the integrating group of countries on other; Tewes, Germany, Civilian…, op.cit., p.109
481 Sedelmeier, Wallace, Eastern enlargement… op.cit., p.444
3. Agenda 2000

Agenda 2000 set a course of the enlargement process for the next years, providing a framework for negotiations of entry terms and conditions. It brought to the enlargement project a spell of intrinsic to the internal dynamics of the European Union negotiations about net payments, dairy products, beef and veal, and net gains from the budget, the issues, which some argue the European Union is in fact all about.

German representatives had certain preferences in each of these areas and none of the Agenda 2000 proposals was satisfactory for German politicians. It became a reason for the opposition from the affected interests groups on the domestic stage of Germany for the years to come.

Agenda 2000 was also a first step in solving the financial issues connected with the enlargement. It was designed to show what changes were needed if the enlargement was to be ‘affordable’ in the context of the 2000-2006 Financial Framework. Two main issues were brought with the Agenda 2000 to the debate: the adjustments of CAP and of the Structural Policy. Both were the most important sectoral policies of the EU, absorbing together almost 85% of the total EU budget. Moreover, both were expected to play a decisive role in strengthening economic and social cohesion, which was set as one of the three priority objectives under the Amsterdam Treaty (along with the two established previously — of the Single Market and the EMU). In the run-up to the Agenda there were three competing issues pressing on the budgetary reform:

1. Maintaining budget discipline — the main net contributors were concerned whether the budget would remain within the then brackets, as a percentage of EU GNP; they were also concerned about reducing their contributions or at least not increasing them, like with the UK which was concerned about its rebate.

2. Reassuring the then beneficiaries that they would not be deprived of their aid; net recipients of the structural and cohesion funds were led by Spain and farmers across the EU.

3. Ensuring that the applicant countries would not become after joining the EU the second class members excluded from the central EU’s policies.
The system of financing the budget was to be maintained through the period 2000-2006. The Commission under the pressure from the largest net contributors prepared also a document on the Union's finances, which proposed three routes for changing the income and expenditure patterns of the EU:

- on the financing side a simplification of the financing structure in favour of a system more based on GNP
- on the expenditure side — the introduction of a system of partial reimbursement of CAP
- on the balances — the application of a general correction mechanism to all member state experiencing large imbalances

Negotiations about adjusting the programme lasted over the next two years. Similarly like with the negotiations at Amsterdam Summit the enlargement was not the subject of these negotiations, only the context. Therefore the opposite stance of Germany to some aspects of the Agenda 2000 turned out to be serious constraints working against the enlargement and creating ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement.

III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE

1. EU Budget

The constraints to the enlargement in this phase shifted the creation of national preferences in Germany from the ideational, values-driven narrative to the material interests calculation. As the EU reforms advocated by Germany were not tackled at the Intergovernmental Conference, the problem remained to solve.

First concern of German policy makers was to cut down Germany’s net contributions. A position of Germany as the EU biggest net payer was a subject of domestic debates in Germany on the European policy already in the 1970s and 1980s. The chief argument used by the governments, which defended high contribution, used to be that net benefits from the EU in terms of secure access to the market and economic stability it provided, exceeded the value of net payments. In the 1990s however the

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increasingly strained public finances began to dictate a closer scrutiny of the German financial contribution and the project of the enlargement revived the debate.

A call for the reform of the EU budget and reduction of Germany’s net contributions was formulated in a coalition agreement of the CDU/CSU-FDP government in November 1994. The debate at the time was focused on a dramatic increase of the country's contribution — from about 12 billion DM in 1990 to 22.5 billion in 1996 (what was equal 0.6 per cent of German GDP then and 60 per cent of all net payments in the EU). It constituted around 30 percent of the EU budget but only a small amount flew back in the shape of subsidies: in 1995 Germany’s contribution per capita was eight times higher than of France.\(^{483}\) A question for German policy makers was of how to find a fairer way to calculate the payments; their view was to that it should reflect a proportion between net contributions and income per head.

In summer and autumn of 1997 two ministries, the Foreign and Finance led by Klaus Kinkel and Theo Waigel started a campaign aimed at the reform of the EU contributions system. The basic idea was to introduce into the EU budget a so-called cap net contributions model and a fixed ceiling of acceptable burden, established in relation to the national GDP of the member state. An underpinning rule was that all net contributions exceeding 0.3 or 0.4 per cent of the GDP should be returned to the member states. As Agenda 2000 did not include such propositions, Theo Waigel along with his opposite numbers from the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria, wrote a letter in October 1998 to the then president of the Commission Jacques Santer asking the Commission to present its policy towards the EU budget. Klaus Kinkel also made it a goal to find a just method of burden sharing.

These attempts were backed by the German Länder. At a meeting in Bonn in June 1998 the prime Ministers of the Länder stressed the need to reform the EU budget and to find a more equitable model.\(^{484}\) The Bundesrat stated already in 1995 in its decision on the EU budget package that ‘in view of Germany's disproportional burden compared to the other member states the Bundesrat considers a fundamental reorganization of


\(^{484}\) Conference of the Prime Ministers of the Länder (MPK), 8 June 1998, Bonn.
Community finances for the period after 1999 as absolutely necessary. It was followed by the report of the Länder finance Ministers in September 1995 demanding the negotiations for the budget beginning in 1996.

The finance Ministers of the German Länder presented calculation that the Federal Republic had overpaid by DM 12.7 billion in the first half of the 1990s. The demand to renegotiate the EU budget was repeated by the conference of the Länder in June 1997 in Bad Homburg. The representatives of the Länder declared that neither German contributions to the EU budget nor budget rebates were justified. The Bavarian government was especially vocal calling a Commission’s proposal an affront to the federal government and to the German Länder. On the other hand the Länder Ministers responsible for the European affairs stressed during their Bonn conference in September 1997 that it was mainly CAP and the low returns in agriculture that were responsible for the high German contributions.

The debate about the net payments that was reflected in the German media divided public opinion: some commentators held that Germany, the main exporting country in the EU, benefited from being the member of the EU, especially from the liberalised internal market of the Union. For the German Länder it was not so obvious ‘while in the Community every sixth job is dependent on the single market, in Germany it is only every eighth’ — argued representatives of Länder. The Commission's proposal to keep the 1.27 per cent limit was generally accepted by all German participants but in early 1999 Germany backed up a British proposal for a budgetary stabilization. Eventually the Commission’s proposal to preserve the then budgetary system in terms of contributions for period 2000-2006, which was included in the Agenda 2000, was rejected both by the Länder as well as the federal governments.

485 Bundesratbeschluss zum Eigenmittelsystem vom 12. Mai 1995, Bundesratdrucksache 207/95 (Beschluss)
486 At the annual meeting of the finance Ministers of the German Länder, reported “Größere Ausgewogenheit angestrebt”, Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung, 22 July 1997
488 Conference of European Ministers, 24 September 1997, Bonn.
2. CAP

The most problematic issue in the EU budget was CAP. Farm subsidies under this programme accounted for nearly half of the total EU budget\(^{490}\). Critics of CAP always pointed that liberalisation of agriculture policy would lead to massive savings, but powerful farm lobbies, especially in France and Germany effectively opposed these views. In 1998 German farmers represented only a small share of 2.8 per cent of the employed civilian working population\(^ {491}\). This lobby had a strong support of the CDU/CSU for which farmers used to be an important constituency\(^ {492}\). The issue of reforming CAP became one of the primary factors shaping negative attitudes toward the enlargement and the negotiations over the CAP were the reason for delays of the date of enlargement.

The main German actors engaged in the CAP negotiations were three ministries, the Economics, the Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture and the Länder. Ever since the first negotiations on the European agricultural policy in the late 1950s, German policy towards this issue was characterised by a conflict of opinion between all three ministries. German agricultural policy was divided between ‘a liberal free trade position and that of preserving the economic interests of its farmers’\(^ {493}\). In other words the Ministry of Agriculture successfully resisted pressure from the Ministries of Economics and Finance for a more market-oriented and free trade position. The proposals on the CAP reform in the Agenda 2000 did not bring a change and resulted like the previous attempts of a significant reform\(^ {494}\). A reaction of the German Minister of Agriculture Jochen Borchert to the Agenda 2000 proposals, which were presented at the Agriculture Council on 22-23

\(^{490}\) In 1995 farm subsidies represented 48.9 percent of the total EU budget; see: John Keeler, “Agricultural Power in the European Community– Explaining the Fate of CAP and GATT Negotiations”, Comparative Politics, 28:2, January, 1996
\(^{491}\) European Commission (2000), Table 2.0.1.2.
\(^{492}\) It has been identified that farmers used to deliver nearly 80% of their votes to the CDU/CSU, and they have been a substantial force within the parliamentary delegation of the Christian Democrats. See: John Keeler, “Agricultural … op.cit
July 1997 (shortly after announcement of the Agenda), was not surprising. He said he could see only ‘very few positive things’ about the Commission’s proposals.\(^{495}\)

German representation led an attack on the reform proposals included in the Agenda 2000, already at the first formal discussion at the Agriculture Council, which took place in September 1997 in Luxembourg. German representatives strongly opposed a proposed shift from price support to direct payments, advocating maintenance of quotas as an instrument for containing production.\(^{496}\) They also expressed a fierce criticism of the removal of subsidies, which was against German interests (for silage maize\(^i\)), and agreed on a reduction of intervention prices (beef production), on the condition, however, the farmers would be fully compensated.\(^{497}\) Finally, German agricultural officials also rejected a proposal of integration of structural funds into the CAP; the Agriculture Minister Jochen Borchert argued that such changes would blur a division between funds supporting the market and those providing assistance for under-developed areas. Germany advocated instead a separate policy for rural areas.\(^{499}\) These points became a subject of conflict between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministries of Economics.

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\(^{495}\) According to the data of 1996 on basis of which the Agenda proposals were prepared, the most pressing problems to tackle by the EU were considered to be as follows: • the relatively large size of agricultural land (estimates based on the assumption the enlargement will include 10 Eastern countries, the total agricultural area would increase by 40% after the accession); • the relatively high importance of agriculture to the economies of the accession countries (contributing 7.0% in GDP versus 1.7% in the EU-15); • the high agricultural employment which would make the absolute number of farmers more than double (22% of total employment in Eastern countries versus 5.1% in EU-15); • the low GDP in Eastern countries and the much lower labour productivity in their agriculture in comparison with the EU; • the relatively low administrative capability of the applicants to administer the acquis, but; • the great potential in production capacities (all Eastern countries had undergone a considerable decline in agricultural yields due to various factors like depressed producer prices and backward technologies prior to the transition, the market liberalisation of the transition process; all those factors were expected to be remedied and in effect the production might increase considerably, even in medium term) though much lower when compared with EU, the productivity of agricultural labour (GDP per labour unit) in most of the Eastern countries was relatively higher when it was compared with the other sectors of their economies; this indicated the Eastern agriculture could be able to export their products. See: European Commission, 1998, Agenda 2000, http://europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index_en.htm#3

\(^{496}\) Ibid.

\(^{497}\) One of the few Commission’s proposals the German Minister of Agriculture endorsed was the suggestion of national envelopes for the beef sector as proposed in the regulation proposals in March 1998. Rzeczpospolita, 22 March 1998


\(^{499}\) Ibid.
and Finance\textsuperscript{500}. The traditional arguments of the Economics and Finance Ministries were now strengthened by determination to reduce the Germany’s net payment.

A tough stance on the financing of the EU budget was impossible for German politicians to soften; they faced upcoming national elections. The German payments to the EU generally, and payments for Eastern enlargement particularly, were the first points listed in surveys by all those who opposed the enlargement\textsuperscript{501}. In this way Germany faced a dilemma between pursuing a restrictive policy for the EU budget on the one hand and opposing reforms of the CAP, aimed at eventual reducing agricultural expenditure of the EU on the other. Germany’s support for the enlargement of the EU complicated the choice.

German politicians did not want to agree on far-reaching CAP reform, while most agricultural economists supported the Commission’s view that enlarging the EU to the East was incompatible with leaving the CAP unchanged\textsuperscript{502}. Among them prominent German economists from the Scientific Advisory Group to the Ministry of Agriculture argued that far-reaching reform, in particular price cuts, were necessary in order to prepare the CAP for the enlargement but equally necessary were a gradual phasing out of some quotas (in contrast to ‘phasing in’, which assumed levelling subsidies for the new member states), and the steps towards decentralization. The advisors were critical of individual ceilings on direct payments to individual farms, and of the proposal for cross-compliance.

A division within the German government on the CAP reforms was apparent when the Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel welcomed EU Agriculture Commissioner Fischler’s proposals for reform, while German Agriculture Minister Jochen Borchert


\textsuperscript{501} Eurobarometer, various editions

called them unacceptable. In contrast to the Ministry of Agriculture other ministries argued that the Agenda 2000 proposals constituted a good basis for further negotiations. According to *Agra Europe*, Klaus Kinkel pointed out at the start of the enlargement negotiations in Brussels that ‘farmers only made up a small group of the population and the government must think of the other 98%’, and that eastward enlargement ‘was of fundamental importance to German economic prosperity and must not fail because of farm policy’. Given that the CAP consumed between 40-50 per cent of the EU budget, and the German officials wanted to reduce Germany’s net contributions to the EU budget, the Ministry of Finance also became a strong critic of the CAP thus in a sharp conflict to the Ministry of Agriculture.

A conflict between determination to reduce budget contributions, the declared German interest in the enlargement, which according to most of the predictions then was not possible without CAP reform, and the upcoming federal elections created an impossible situation for the German government. To put it in game-analysis terms — this combination implied that Germany’s win-set in the Agenda 2000 negotiations on CAP reform was strongly limited. It created ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement.

### 3. Structural Funds

Enlargement was also problematic for the German *Länder* in the context of the EU regional policy; enlargement would force *Länder* to sharing the EU structural funding with much poorer than most of the *Länder* new member states.

The regional programs were the second major drain in the EU budget, taking two-thirds of all funds. The main concern, long before Agenda 2000, was that recipients of Structural Funds (*Länder* in the case of Germany) would no longer be eligible for these funds after the enlargement, as the EU average GNP per capita would fall with the entrance of poor Eastern countries. By the sheer mathematics of the basic rule of Structural Funds that had been created for levelling disparities between the regions in the

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505 Kirsty Hughes, “The Intergovernmental Conference and EU Enlargement”, *International Affairs*, 72, 1, January 1996
EU (the then EC), with the enlargement Länder would lose effectively a big part of funding.

The Structural Funds presented a concern for the Eastern Länder mainly; a concern of the Western Länder was protection of their particular interests. These interests differed from Land to Land determining their politics — Bavaria had vital interests in agriculture, Saxony-Anhalt’s in industrial regeneration, Brandenburg in cross-border cooperation with the EU’s applicant states, etc. Territoriality rule was at the base of mobilization of the Eastern Länder, which wanted to maintain existing levels of Structural Funding. For this reason Länder representatives took up an effort of creating a group of the regions at the ‘enlargement border’ that started lobbying for subsidies for the Western side of the border (in German, Austria, Italy) and for introducing long transition periods for participation in the Structural Funds, before the full operation of the Single Market was reached on the Eastern side. A completing demand was to retain border controls until the East operates by the EU internal security standards.

IV. OPTIONS

1. New Dimension of Germany’s Interests

Financial calculations of the German net contribution to the EU budget, the CAP and Structural Funds distribution vis-à-vis the enlargement exposed a risk for economic interests both of the German state and particular interests groups, of farmers and Länder. It changed rhetoric and atmosphere around the enlargement, both in the elite debate and policy makers’ actions, which now reflected a growing domestic opposition against the foreign policy as it was conducted under Helmut Kohl.

A new assertive foreign policy was encouraged mainly by left-wing intellectuals like Gregor Schöllgen or Egon Bahr. The point of reference was the Europeanization of the foreign policy by Helmut Kohl; it was criticised broadly on the left side, but commentators usually supportive of the CDU and Helmut Kohl also called for a different approach to national interests. Kohl’s advisor Werner Weidenfeld asked whether Germany could afford to continue its renunciation of leadership in an increasingly
complex international situation\textsuperscript{506} and a political scientist Karl-Richard Korte called Kohl’s policy a ‘tactic of blending in with other states’\textsuperscript{507}. Christian Hacke, who argued that the term of national interests in Germany had been blurred ‘by a veil of moral but irrational arguments’\textsuperscript{508}. He called for examination of Germany’s integration in Europe and leaving only these elements that would be of advantage to Germany.

The sharpest criticism came from the direct opposition to Helmut Kohl — left intellectuals. Egon Bahr, an influential former advisor of Willi Brandt and a leading thinker of the SPD, encouraged German left-wing politicians to think about foreign policy more in terms of power and influence\textsuperscript{509}. He called for ‘emancipation’ of the Federal Republic, and ending a ‘vassal-like’ fear of the American ally and submitting to its ‘patronising’ over the foreign policy. ‘German foreign and security policy should not be relegated to others’ — argued Bahr\textsuperscript{510}. He also argued that the ‘European identity’ was a chimera to which Germany should say ‘good bye’; cooperation with Europe, however, was in the ‘normal’ German interest.

A focal point in a gradual evolution of the views on the German new foreign policy was deployment of German troops in a combat capability in the Kosovo conflict\textsuperscript{511}. Germany, for the first time since WWII, sent Bundeswehr soldiers into a foreign country, as an equal partner to other European partners. It was perceived in Germany as a breakthrough, although a controversial one\textsuperscript{512}. Adrian Hyde-Price analysing these new circumstances stressed that ‘much of the official discourse surrounding German foreign policy was phrased in terms of its morality and ethics,

\textsuperscript{506} Werner Weidenfeld, Fragen an die Außenpolitik der neuen Regierung, \textit{Internationale Politik} 54, no 1, 1999
\textsuperscript{507} Karl-Rudolf Korte, Unbefangen und gelassen: Über die außenpolitische Normalität der Berliner Republik", \textit{Internationale Politik}, 53, no 12, 1998
\textsuperscript{508} Christian Hacke, Die nationalen Interessen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert, \textit{Außenpolitik} 49, no 2, 1998
\textsuperscript{510} Egon Bahr, Die Normalisierung der deutschen Außenpolitik: Mündige Partnerschaft statt bequemer Vormundschaft, \textit{Internationale Politik} 54, no 1, 1999
\textsuperscript{512} Rudolf Augstein, the editor of Der Spiegel commented for example that the U.S. played a role of sheriff of the world and that the air strikes against Kosovo were almost a “colonial war” for they were prompted by domestic American considerations. See: Rudolf Augstein, “Arroganz der Macht", \textit{Der Spiegel}, 3 May 1999
rather than in the traditional diplomatic language of Realpolitik and international law. That changed with the Bundeswehr deployment.

Gerhard Schröder also evoked the notion of Realpolitik in German foreign policy in regards to the European policy. In his government declaration of November 1998 he stressed that a ‘faulty national self-confidence had created the German catastrophes of the twentieth century’ and therefore his government intended to act with ‘less emotional baggage and possibly become more German in the future’. As he reiterated these assumptions a year later, he used a phrase of ‘substantiated self-interest’ as an exemplification of the new approach.

Chancellor Schröder’s statements went however farther than actual governmental or party declarations of intended changes. The SPD programme was much less ‘innovative’; an SPD convention in 1997 passed a resolution on foreign and security policy, in which NATO was described as indispensable foundation of the European security (which was for example opposite to the views of Egon Bahr calling for dissolving the Pact and greater independence of the German security policy). Similarly, other main points of the German foreign policy like the European integration in fact were declared as not that different from the policies of Chancellor Kohl, and indicated rather continuity than intention of breaking with the old premises. A tone of the speeches by Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was also moderate; he emphasised the continuity of the commitment to the European integration, in its complementary nature of deepening and widening simultaneously. An SPD-Green coalition agreement also promised to ‘further develop the guidelines of previous German foreign policy’.

513 Hyde-Price, Germany and European order,…op. cit., p. 220.
515 Fischer reiterated the support for the enlargement at every occasion, most often in media interviews. For example: Bettina Marx, “Zur EU-Osterweiterung gibt es keine Alternative”. AußenMinister Fischer im Gespräch mit der Deutschen Welle. 8 January 1999, in Dietrich von Kyaw, Prioritäten der deutschen EU-Präsidentschaft unter Berücksichtigung des Europäischen Rates in Wien, ZEI Discussion Papers, No C33, 1999
Both politicians, Chancellor Schröder and Joschka Fischer also reiterated during the first days in the office the commitment of the previous governments to support the EU enlargement, as a goal of the new government. Chancellor Schröder in a speech in November 1998 explained that the fundamental determinants of German foreign policy were its ‘geographical location in the heart of Europe growing together’, its experience of ‘integration in the Western community of states’ and ‘history and the lessons Germany has drawn from it’. He specified six key German national interests that indicated rather continuity than a break up with the assumptions of the Kohl’s policy:

1. Deepening and widening the EU.
2. Work towards a peace order for all of Europe.
3. Preserve and strengthen transatlantic relations.
4. Promote the spread of democracy and respect for human rights in all parts of the world.
5. Strengthen the role of the UN as a mechanism for global order.
6. Secure and build up a system of global free trade.

The novelty, the new assertiveness in the foreign policy was expressed in the spirit of support for the EU reforms and the focus on economic issues. As Schröder announced in his government declaration, national identities of the member states would have to be preserved in the EU with a federal solution as the best for its political organization and with the prior tasks for the EU like fighting unemployment, dealing with ecological challenges across the continent, and developing common social and economic policies.

Werner A. Perger, one of the political commentators watching the new government noted that Schröder did not want to ‘legitimise’ the European Union politically and historically, but through specific economic advantages. In regards to the reform of the EU, he supported the three following developments:

- Reform of the system of financing the EU in a way that would ensure lower German contributions to the EU’s budget and secure a ‘fairer’ allocation of resources.

517 Werner A. Perger, Wir unbefangen, Die Zeit, 12 November 1997
• The development of and further synchronization of employment policies in order to tackle rising unemployment through the creation of state-sponsored jobs and equalization of labour costs across the EU.
• Harmonization of corporate taxes in EU Member States.

Out of these goals the most important at the time was to achieve a ‘budgetary fairness’ as called by Schröder. His announcement of the European priorities had a special meaning in the context of the upcoming German presidency in the EU, which was to start just two months after the new government assumed power. The presidency was expected to reveal the new approach to the most challenging subject at the time — the EU enlargement.

V. RESULTS

1. No Enlargement Without Financial Reform

The intention declared by Chancellor Schröder to cut the German net contribution to the EU budget was a very upfront, decisive and contradictory to the declared support for the enlargement. Such a perception was particularly vivid in East Europeans countries, where observers pointed out that while Schröder’s government was vocal about the support for the enlargement, cuts in the EU budget made it impossible to support practically the proceeding with the enlargement.

The new German approach was clear already during the election campaign in 1998 and the new administration directly linked finance reform with the Eastern expansion, declaring a policy of ‘Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform’ (No

enlargement without financial reform)\textsuperscript{519}. Gerhard Schröder at the beginning of his chancellorship stated that Germany was contributing more than half of the money, which Europe was ‘squandering’ (\textit{verbraten})\textsuperscript{520}.

The same message was reiterated during the 1999 election campaign to the European Parliament, with the picture of German Chancellor on posters saying: ‘\textit{We do not expect gifts from Europe. But the same should also hold vice versa}’\textsuperscript{521}. During the first EU Summit in Austrian Pörtschach in October 1998, which Gerhard Schröder attended already as the Chancellor, he also stressed that the EU should not raise false expectations in the accession countries because enlargement was a much more difficult and long-term process than had been anticipated\textsuperscript{522}. Both these assertions were in a strong contrast to the position of Schröder’s predecessor Helmut Kohl. They expressed a new type of German resentment and caused both among the German and the East European political elites serious concerns\textsuperscript{523}.

\section{2. No Enlargement In 2000}

Eastern Europeans saw the new German foreign policy as a rejection of the pledge made by Chancellor Kohl to support the enlargement\textsuperscript{524}. This impression was so strong that Chancellor Schröder during his first visit to Warsaw in November 1998 felt obliged to say that Germany supported Poland joining the EU ‘without any buts’\textsuperscript{525}. He explained that supporting Poland’s application was the way of strengthening the economic and political stability in the region, what was in the national interest of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item “Bundesregierung: Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform”, \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, 3 December 1998
\item Gerhard Schröder quoted by Eckart Lohse, Ministerpräsidenten wollen Steuerreform zustimmen, \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, 9 December 1998
\item Karl Pries, Das Porzellan bleibt heil. Die rot-grünen Novisen auf europäischem Terrain mildern manchen früheren Eindruck von deutscher Arroganz, \textit{Frankfurter Rundschau}, 21 November 1998; The perception was on tit way straight down as during the visit to Poland at the time Chancellor Schröder also declined to offer financial compensation to those who had been subjected to forced labour during the Nazi era. See: \textit{Rzeczpospolita}, 26 November 1998, \textit{Focus}, 16 December 1998
\item \textit{Rzeczpospolita}, 6 November 1998
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Germany. Nonetheless he contradicted Kohl’s promise of the year 2000 as a date Poland would gain a EU membership, making it clear he could not confirm this date. Chancellor Schröder expressed this approach also in a government speech of November 1998 that his government would pursue ‘all opportunities for the enlargement of the EU’, remaining however very cautious about making any suggestions of a date.

These developments deepened the mistrust on the Eastern side. While Kohl used to emphasise that enlargement was an unequivocal political goal of Germany, and economic issues were subordinated to the political agenda, with the government of Gerhard Schröder it became inverse. It was explicitly clarified much later by Joschka Fischer during his meeting with Polish parliamentarians in October 2000. He pointed to analogy between the costs of the German unification and expected costs of the enlargement, stressing that the costs are the second, after the institutional reform of the EU, problem the enlargement is loaded with. He also expressed an opinion that the focus should be rather on construction of the budget and deciding which expenses should be increased and who should be cut down on benefits.\textsuperscript{526}

On the other hand however a new element appeared in the reasoning of the further support of the enlargement. Joschka Fischer presented it in an article in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung ‘On the new foreign policy of Germany in 21\textsuperscript{st} century’,\textsuperscript{527} pointing out that the enlargement of the EU would have to be proceeded, otherwise there is a ‘danger Eastern Europe would slip into a disarray’. This was a line supported by his party as presented by Elisabeth Schrödter, the European deputy of the Greens.\textsuperscript{528} It set also a tone for a debate to come — the arguments pointed by Fischer and his colleague became a core of the reasoning for proceeding with the enlargement that was presented to the German public opinion. In this way the enlargement rhetoric of the German government changed from a clear and decisive advocacy by the Kohl’s teams to a conditional support by the Schröder’s team.

Four key themes in regards to the enlargement came to light during the Schröder’s time:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[526] Europap, 3 October 2000
  \item[527] Fischer, Joseph, “Die Selbstbeschränkung der Macht muß forbestehen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 August 1998
  \item[528] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 May 1999
\end{itemize}
negotiations over Agenda 2000 and the future budget of the EU
new approach to the enlargement deriving mainly from a different than at the Kohl’s time stage of the development of the enlargement process
economic or economically grounded fear of social character
the issue of the expellees

The first came Agenda 2000. After a public debate all over Europe the EU reforms were finally to be agreed by the heads of state or government of the 15 EU countries at their meeting in Berlin in March 1999. The Union’s ‘forward momentum’ was boosted in June 1999 by the election of a new European Parliament for a five-year term, and in the autumn by the arrival in office of a new European Commission under the presidency of the former Italian Prime Minister, Romano Prodi with two German Commissioners — Günther Verheugen responsible for the EU enlargement, and Michele Schreyer — for the budget.

SUMMARY

Germany’s Europapolitik after the unification was constructed and conducted under Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s leadership and according to his vision of Germany’s place in Europe. The main concern of this policy was to resolve a dilemma over the choice between deepening and widening of the European Union. A stance adopted by Germany’s government indicates that for Chancellor Kohl it was not a dilemma over the choice, but a challenge how to reconcile conflicting priorities.

Under the Kohl’s leadership German politicians embraced both directions, although while Western integration was easier to accept, as a more familiar phenomenon, the integration with the East presented increasingly apparent costs that were exceeding the capacity of the German economy strained by the costs of the unification. The challenge of balancing both directions created ambivalence in the enlargement policy. Nonetheless it was a consistent choice of the Kohl’s government — to pursue and balance both.

The policy of balancing in the first years was aimed at winning support of the EU partners for the enlargement. The Structured Dialogue promoted by the German government and accepted by the EU members in 1994 was a crucial step towards winning this support. Support implicated sharing the costs of the enlargement; German policy makers were determined to spread the costs of the enlargement on the whole European Union and save at the same time a balanced distribution of the EU funds. That required a reform of the EU finances. As such it presented a problem for various interests of various member states. Insistence of German representatives on reforms in the face of difficulties with reaching agreement, created ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement. It lasted until the Amsterdam Summit in 1997.

The needed reforms implicated further deepening of the Western integration. The conditions of the deepening as presented by Germany’s partners were contradictory to German’s interests, and the lack of prospect for a fast agreement created a danger that the enlargement would be postponed. German policy makers chose to support the enlargement. A desirable outcome for the German leaders would be an agreed reform of the EU, but when faced with the opposition from other member states, German leaders focused on saving the enlargement, pushing for furthering its agenda despite the lack of prospect for the EU reforms. They chose interests reflecting values and ideas at the core of the national identity, over those based on an economic calculation of the costs and benefits.

It was a culminating point of the supportive for the enlargement policy under Chancellor Helmut Kohl. It left however the issue of the reform of the EU finances unsettled. The deepening exhaustion of the German society with the costs of the unification turned the course of the German politics and a new team at power of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder brought a different rhetoric about the Germany’s engagement into the European integration, including the enlargement. More assertive approach to securing Germany’s interests meant that the new government was determined to settle a financial reform of the EU before the completion of the enlargement. Given a strong opposition to such reforms not only of other member states, but also of the German interest groups of farmers and the Länder, the prospect for reaching agreement on the reforms looked remote. Although the new government
declared a support for the enlargement too, but as its rhetoric on the European integration and enlargement shifted from the normative reasoning to calculations of the financial and economic costs, together with the insistence on the difficult to reach financial reforms of the EU, it created ambivalence in the policy towards the enlargement.

This manifestation of the ambivalence reflects next stage in the evolution of the concept of the European integration. While the previous manifestations (and perceptions) of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement pointed to the normative side these changes derived from, now the new, values and ideas-based premises of the expanded concept, were gaining a structural shape through the intergovernmental bargaining over the distributional preferences of the member states.
CHAPTER 9

Interests Conflicting with the Enlargement
As the Cause of Ambivalence
In Germany’s Enlargement Policy Towards the EU Enlargement

1998—2002

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the causes of the manifestation, and perception of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement that were caused by the conflicting with the enlargement economic interests of the German state and domestic interest groups.

This is the last phase of the enlargement process, of the intergovernmental bargaining. The EU enlargement now is not about a normative commitment; it is a matter of financial calculations and bargaining over the share of the financial burden of each EU member state, and of the interests of particular interest groups. This is also the phase when the German politics came much closer than before to meeting public demands and expectations. The enlargement is still Germany’s priority, but it is not presented in the normative way, characteristic for Chancellor Helmut Kohl; it is now calculated in financial terms.
Gerhard Schröder’s government inherited a vortex of contradictory external and
domestic challenges in the context of the enlargement: a need to endorse the enlargement
and to reduce German payment to Brussels, a need to maintain high returns from the EU
regional funds and to sustain German farmers’ subsidiaries, thus to reject a
comprehensive reform of the CAP that in fact was required for the enlargement.

The position of a new Chancellor was very decisive — Gerhard Schröder
demonstrated that he was ready to risk even a failure of the Berlin Summit during the
German presidency over the EU if the German interests were not secured. Nonetheless all
the challenges — the negotiations on reforms of CAP, structural policy and the budget
turned out to be impossible to close at the Berlin Summit and the Summit opened the
hardest for the accession countries phase of the enlargement process — the entry
negotiations.

German policy makers were locked in a struggle — to keep the pledges to the
Eastern and Western partners and to the domestic constituency, which perceived now the
enlargement as an immediate threat to the vital economic interests of the majority of the
society. Those contradictory to each other challenges explain the ambiguity in the
German policy towards the enlargement at the time.

For explanation of this phase the best approach is of liberal intergovernmentalism.
Although constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of international reality are
ideational as well as material, thus it would be possible to look at the formulation of the
new economic interests of the new Germany in respect to the European integration from a
constructivist perspective. But the emphasis in this phase is on the bargaining these new
interests. Liberal intergovernmentalism provides a better framework for capturing the
change and the moment of projection of the material interests on the level of the
intergovernmental bargaining.

I. AMBIVALENCE

The ambivalence in the German enlargement policy, in its second phase of
negotiations manifested at four points.

First in a difference between supportive for the enlargement rhetoric of
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and economic-interests oriented enlargement rhetoric of his
successor Gerhard Schröder. Second — as a gap between a continuity to support the enlargement as declared by Chancellor Schröder and the attempts of his government to succeed with the budgetary and institutional reform of the EU that were hard, if not impossible, to achieve. Third manifestation of the ambivalence is observable in the contradictory stances of the government executives on the specific issues of the enlargement and the fourth manifestation was a result of a proposal that the German public should have a say over the enlargement in a referendum, of which the outcome was easily predictable as negative.

According to the tripartite framework of integration decisions provided by liberal intergovernmentalism — the formation of state preferences, the outcomes of interstate bargaining and the choice of international institutions — the manifestation of ambivalence analysed here occurred mainly in the phase of formation of state preferences and partly during the bargaining process.

The new team at power, of the SPD/Green coalition brought to the German politics and foreign policy a different approach and different rhetoric. In contrast to the rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl that was based on the normative premises and referred to the historical narrative, a new approach focused on the material, economic interests of Germany. It allowed the SPD and Green parties win the elections, as it was in congruency with the expectations of the domestic constituency. But it presented a profound change in the enlargement policy. There was no more referring to the ‘two-sides coin’ and to the goal of overcoming the division of Europe. An expression of this change was as much the focus on the economic interests as a criticism of the fact that Germany was financing the European integration projects. The change of the rhetoric of Germany’s enlargement policy created ambivalence in this policy.

As the biggest and most problematic at the time of these projects was the enlargement, an economy/finances oriented approach of the new team generated a rhetoric specifically referring to the enlargement and not in a supportive tone. Gerhard Schröder’s election campaign and his tenure had two leading slogans: ‘No enlargement without financial reform’ and ‘No enlargement in 2000’. Both were in conflict with the declared by Chancellor Schröder support for the enlargement. Contradictory external and domestic challenges the government of Helmut Kohl was dealing with, caused at the end
his tenure, after the Amsterdam Summit, a state of suspension of Germany’s position on
the issues of the EU reforms. Gerhard Schröder assuming Chancellorship declared the
will to cut through the indecision of the Kohl’s government but at the same time asserted
that ‘we neither can nor will solve Europe’s problems with a German cheque-book’. It
was reiterated by Schröder’s Minister for Europe (later the first European Commissioner
for the enlargement) Günter Verheugen, who stressed that ‘the road ahead will require
all partners to make concessions and be prepared to make compromises’. Schröder’s
government also announced that it would use the German presidency to pursue a more
calculated national cost/benefit strategy in seeking to limit the financial burden on
Germany of the EU budget, if necessary by ‘fundamentally’ reforming EU policies — the
CAP in particular — in ways disadvantageous to other member states, especially
France. The insistence on the reforms that were opposed by other member states, and
therefore hard to agree upon, created another manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s
policy towards the enlargement.

The dynamic of the German enlargement policy in the end of the 1990s crossed
the line of the usual division between the policy making by politicians and a public
opinion. The results of the exhaustion of the German society with the unification costs
and the policy conducted by Helmut Kohl, brought to power the SPD/Green coalition.
The enlargement issue was positioned in the center of the European policy of the Gerhard
Schröder’s government and the public debate influenced politicians now much stronger
than before; the stance of the policy makers in this phase of the enlargement process is
much closer to the postulates and expectations of the public. And the prospective costs of
the enlargement became the main subject of the domestic debate on the foreign policy
conducted across media.

The debate reflected a declining support for the enlargement among the Germany
society and influenced heavily state preferences presented by the Schröder’s government
in the external. This change of state preferences marked a difference between the

530 The Guardian, 2 January 1999
531 Die Gemeinsame Außenpolitik der europäischen Union, Rede Staatsminister/AA Günter Verheugen beim Zentrum für
europäische Integrationsforschung, Bonn 21 January 1999, available http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/index.htm ; also later
in Tagesspiegel, 5 October 1999
532 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 November 1998
Schröder’s and Kohl’s policy towards the enlargement creating a manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement. It also triggered another manifestation of ambivalence in this policy — a proposal of a referendum over the enlargement. As the public opinion was increasingly more opposed to the enlargement, Günter Verheugen, Schröder’s Minister for Europe and then EU Commissioner for Enlargement, suggested (in his EU Commissioner’s capacity) a referendum as an appropriate means of legitimization for political projects in the German foreign policy, pointing out that in the face of a widespread ‘fundamental objection’ to ‘the entire Eastern enlargement project as an elite project’ imposed upon people, the mistakes that were made regarding the euro, which was introduced ‘behind the backs of the people’, could not be repeated. Given the diminishing support of the German society the outcome of the referendum was seen as surely negative. That augmented the ambivalence of the German government’s stance on the enlargement.

II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS

1. Conditioned Support

The first supportive for the enlargement factor during the Gerhard Schröder’s tuner was a pledge of his government to continue support for the enlargement. The enlargement was presented as one of the main points in ‘Germany’s objectives and priorities’ for the EU-Presidency in 1999. As it was explained in the official government’s statement — ‘the enlargement of the European Union gives us the chance to use its benefits to increase our prosperity, to enhance our freedom, and to reconcile our interests by peaceful means’. This was a declaration that the new government of Chancellor Schröder was going to continue managing the enlargement agenda.

But Chancellor Schröder inherited a difficult legacy from his predecessor in the shape of the Agenda 2000—enlargement—EU reforms nexus. And the process of formation of the new state preference is concentrated in this area. Chancellor Kohl trying to meet the expectations of East Europeans by supporting the enlargement and of

533 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 September 2000
534 Europe’s Path into the 21st Century, 
Western Europeans by supporting the idea of the EU reforms was forced to manage conflicting challenges. First — the opposition to CAP reform within his coalition, with the CDU politicians pro-reform and CSU ones against. Second — trying to advocate reforms of the EU necessary to facilitate the enlargement but opposed by the French partners and conflicted by the need to reduce German contribution to the EU budget. Caught in between these pressures Kohl pursued an internally conflicted agenda of:

1. Advocating enlargement as a top priority
2. Stressing the need to reduce the German contribution to the EU budget
3. Blocking progress in reform of the CAP, without which restructuring of the EU budget was impossible.\textsuperscript{535}

Kohl also faced a new election campaign on the domestic stage, which with the SPD questioning the enlargement as a priority for the EU, made it difficult for him to push for a progress on setting the enlargement timetable. For this reason the elections made the EU reforms rather debated than worked on. Proceeding with the Agenda 2000 proposals was possible in Germany in practice only after the 1998 elections under the new SPD/Green government.

It started with a question how to implement EU budgetary restructuring and policy reform in the preparations to the Eastern enlargement. An introduction of concrete proposals culminated during the German EU Council Presidency in the first half of 1999. It took the member states next three years to worked out a final version of the future enlargement-related budget of the EU, agreed at the Copenhagen Summit of 2002. The outcome was highly unsatisfactory for the Eastern countries and it was the German stance as the main factor delaying the enlargement proceeding.

The key concern for Germany was to reduce the level of the German net contribution to EU expenditure. That was caused by the domestic pressure, grounded first and foremost in the financial problems Schröder’s government inherited from the government of Chancellor Kohl — the huge budgetary deficit following the costs of unification and Kohl’s resistance to raising taxes to balance the burden. Now the

Schröder’s government was firmly committed to achieving ‘fairness’\textsuperscript{536}. Yet it faced also the necessity to proceed with the Agenda 2000. At the Luxemburg European Council in December 1997 the EU invited five Eastern countries and Cyprus to commence enlargement negotiations in the first half of 1998. Half a year later, at the Cardiff summit in June 1998 the member states agreed that they would reach an agreement on Agenda 2000 by March 1999. Agenda 2000 was to be treated as a package solving the issues of the budget, CAP reforms and Structural Funds reform for discussion and bargaining. The deadline for working out proposals was the Berlin Summit under the German presidency in the first half of 1999.

At the moment of taking over the presidency of the EU in January 1999, the highest priority of the German Europapolitik was the reform of the EU and Agenda 2000\textsuperscript{537}. Both these issues were highly important, but also highly problematic and complex.

\textbf{2. Berlin Summit}

The test for the new German government initiating its Europapolitik was to be the presidency of the EU. It proved quickly that national interests as presented by the government gave way to the reality of the EU policy-making. German representatives faced with the constant French opposition stopped persisting on the radical reform of CAP or new financing arrangements. As it was explained by Günter Verheugen ‘\textit{the overriding national interest of Germany is always to keep the dynamic of the European integration process in motion}’\textsuperscript{538}. And the Schröder’s administration approached the task in a managerial way.

The new German Europapolitik had three main goals: (i) reform of financing the EU; (ii) development and synchronization of employment policies; (iii) harmonization of corporate taxes in the EU. They all were directly linked with the Eastern expansion


\textsuperscript{538}Günter Verheugen, “Europa Wohin? Die Zukunft der Europäischen Union”, \textit{Bayerische Landesvertretung}, Bonn, 4 May 1999
captured in a slogan ‘Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform’ (No enlargement without financial reform)\textsuperscript{539}. German Presidency set therefore four main objectives\textsuperscript{540}:

- agreement on Agenda 2000
- progress in employment policy
- improving the EU’s ability to act in the foreign policy domain and
- progress in the preparation of EU institutional reform

A key to breaking an impasse that lasted practically since the Amsterdam Summit of 1997 was the issue of financing the EU. The main discussion therefore in the run-up to the Berlin Summit concentrated on finding a solution for the budgetary issue. The challenges were to limit or reduce the level of structural fund programmes, to phase out cohesion funds, to reform CAP in addition to stabilize or freeze the EU budget at the real level of payments in 1999 (ceiling of 1.27 per cent of EU GDP limit).

German representatives argued that all the issues must be on the table, including sensitive ones such as the UK rebate and that the member states, if they want to reach a constructive settlement, they cannot just defend their stances but have to work out a compromise. This demand was however extremely difficult for German policy makers, who found themselves in a very delicate position: as a Presidency holder Germany was responsible for a successful agreement and that the summit will not end in stalemate but the more the Germans pushed its own demands for a cut in its net contributions the agreement was further away. It was perceived by other member states that they were to lose some of their budgetary advantages just to help Germany to be a responsible Presidency holder. With so many complex challenges German government was unable to significantly further any of its objectives.

The negotiations of the heads of the states in February 1999 demonstrated the opposition of Germany’s partners to the reforms of CAP, fiscal procedures, regional subsidies and the German net contributor position\textsuperscript{541}. German proposal, presented before the conference by the Minister of Agriculture Karl-Heinz Funke, to lower support prices for most of agricultural products, met a fierce opposition from representatives of France,

\textsuperscript{539} Bundesregierung: Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 December 1998.
\textsuperscript{540} Programmrede des Vorsitzenden des Rates der Europäischen Union. BundesaußenMinister Joschka Fischer vor dem Europäischen Parlament in Straßburg am 12.1.1999, pp.18-23
\textsuperscript{541} “In der EU ehrebliche Meinungsverschiedenheit in fast allen Kernfragen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 February 1999

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Spain, Ireland and Britain, with the French president Jacques Chirac calling the proposal ‘outright attack on French interests’\(^{542}\). Similarly the proposals of Cohesion Funds’ reform met opposition\(^{543}\). The fiscal reform ended in lowering the German contribution only by 300 million euro\(^{544}\), what prompted Minister Joschka Fischer to openly saying at the Bundestag that ‘he had realized for the first time that the member states would run away from each other if the Bundesrepublik did not want to assume a role of a financial leader’\(^{545}\).

In the end a compromise was reached and most of the big players like Britain, France and Spain managed to defend their interests making only minor concessions:

- Britain maintained its rebate
- There was agreement on less radical reform on CAP,
- and on continuation of the cohesion funds

A general orientation of the Berlin European Council was that the budgetary imbalances should be resolved by introducing ‘corrections’ to the expenditure side of the Budget, and especially of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). As a result, the final compromise concentrated on making savings rather than reaching the targets of the reform\(^{546}\).

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543 Bundesregierung rückt von umstrittenen Kofinanzierung ab, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 March 1999
544 European Council, 1999, Conclusions of the Berlin Council
545 Helmut Kohl commented on this statement that he had been preaching for all 16 years of his chancellorship what Minister Fischer now revealed. See: Ernstfall für Schröder, Der Spiegel, 29 March 1999
546 The agreed proposals were launched in 1999 in the form of twenty legislative texts relating to the following priority areas: (i) continuation of the agricultural reform along the lines of the changes made in 1988 and 1992, with the view at stimulating European competitiveness, taking great account of environmental considerations, ensuring fair income for farmers, simplifying legislation and decentralising the application of legislation; (ii) increasing the effectiveness of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund by greater thematic and geographic concentration of projects on specific objectives and geographical areas and thus improving management; (iii) strengthening the pre-accession strategy for applicant countries by setting up two financial mechanisms: a pre-accession structural instrument (ISPA) to support improved transport and environmental protection infrastructures and a pre-accession agricultural instrument (SAPARD) to facilitate the long-term adjustment of agriculture and the rural areas of the applicant countries; (iv) adopting a new financial framework for the period 2000-06 in order to enable the Union meeting the main challenges of the beginning of the 21st century, in particular enlargement, while ensuring budgetary discipline.
Despite a decisive position of Chancellor Schröder, who demonstrated that he was ready to risk even a failure of the Summit\textsuperscript{547}, it was impossible to close the negotiations on CAP, structural policy and the budget at the Berlin Summit. On the contrary — the closing agreement was still just a proposal, thus went under further negotiations. As it was commented by Günter Verheugen ‘a real reform did not take a place in Berlin because of the resistance of the French government’. Verheugen stressed that fast admission of associate countries to the EU would be impossible under these conditions\textsuperscript{548}. That was a correct prediction: a phase opened after the Berlin Summit was the hardest for the accession countries. It was a time of struggle for the share of benefits in the future Union of 25. Demands for long transition periods for the full freedom of movement of labour, and plans by the existing member states and the European Commission to exclude the accession countries from some agricultural subsidies, was the main battlefield. For German policy makers it was a struggle to keep the pledges to the domestic constituency, to the Eastern European countries and to the Western partners, what created ambiguity in the German policy towards the enlargement at the time.

III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE

Problems with the Enlargement

The two concrete policy issues he mentioned in this context were the free movement of labour and agriculture. The prospective problems in these areas that would occur after the enlargement caused negative attitudes towards the enlargement not only of the directly interested groups like farmers and low-skilled workers, but contributed to the overall negative perception of the enlargement in Germany.

1. Labour Market

The fear the domestic labour market could be destroyed by the cheap labour from the East\textsuperscript{549} was indicated in various polls as the first, most important reason for the

\textsuperscript{547} Ernstfall für Schröder, Der Spiegel, 29 March 1999
\textsuperscript{548} EU—Kompromiß hält nicht bis 2006, Die Welt, 3 April 1999
\textsuperscript{549} For a discussion of the enlargement’s impact on the German labour market see for example Hans-Werner Sinn, “EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitskraftemigration: Wege zu einer schrittweisen Annäherung der Arbeitsmärkte. Ifo-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung”, in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Max-Planck-Institut für Ausländisches und Internationales Sozialrecht, Andreas Hanlein. München: Ifo-
negative attitudes towards the enlargement. In *Eurobarometer* survey 53 per cent agreed with the statement ‘The more countries there are, the more unemployment there will be in Germany’. That was a higher share than the average in the EU-15 (41 per cent). Similarly the statement ‘Once new countries have joined the European Union, Germany will receive less financial aid from it’ was supported by 57 per cent of the participating in the survey Germans, while in the EU the number was 49 per cent. These results were backed by another survey carried out by the European Commission in September 2002: 50 per cent of the German population expected more unemployment after enlargement, while the EU-15 average was 40 per cent.

A. Transition Periods for Labour until 2015

That issue also presented a threat to Austria. Both German and Austrian representatives picked up the demands for transition periods that would protect the markets of the old member states. German CDU/CSU demanded restrictions on the free movement of people from Eastern countries until 2015 at the earliest. As it was exemplified by the well-known stance of the CSU politician, the leader of the CSU parliamentary group Peter Ramsauer *free movement of people in the enlarged Union would bring a catastrophe to the labour market*. The CDU pointed during the 2002 election campaign to the need of sufficiently long transitional periods in order to prevent the migration of large quantities of East European workers to Germany. After 1989 migration from Central and Eastern Europe to destinations in Western Europe, including most prominently Germany increased substantially, but was decreased since then. In 1997 a total of 415,823 citizens of Central and East European accession countries lived in Germany, representing 7 percent of Germany's total population. In 1998 Germany took

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551 *Die Welt*, 6 January 2001
552 Ibid.
58.8 percent of all the Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian citizens working in the EU, while Austria accounted for 15.6 percent.\footnote{Data from: EU Accession Monitoring Program. Monitoring the EU accession process: country reports, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2001}

It was however a concern not only of Germany and Austria: other EU member states wanted to reduce a total flow of immigrants too. In April 2000 the European Commission presented an information note to the member states, which stated that enlargement most likely would have only a limited impact on EU labour markets.\footnote{http://www.bmava.gv.at/Außenpolitik/wirtschaft/movement.html.en.}

In response the Austrian government issued its own information note, which suggested that enlargement could have a significant impact on the Austrian labour market and that there were a number of important differences between the EC’s southern expansion and the EU eastern enlargement.

From the German perspective an important point made by the Austrians was that although immigration might be limited by planned transition periods, there was also the issue of border commuters. The huge differences in the level of the average incomes on both sides of the border — between the EU and the candidate countries — presented for the Austrian neighbours a strong economic incentive to work in Austria and earn high wages but to spend this income in the Czech Republic or Hungary where the costs of living were much lower. The Austrians argued that this was not an issue at the time of the southern expansion because income differentiation between southern French and northern Spanish border regions were much narrower than those between Austria and its Central and East European neighbours. Furthermore, simple topographical differences between the mountainous French-Spanish border regions and the much more permeable Austrian borders made border commuting more difficult at the time of the southern expansion. Not only in Austria but in the German debate as well, the issue of border commuters played a significant role.\footnote{See: Roland Freudenstein, and Henning Tewes, \textit{Die EU-Osterweiterung und der deutsche Arbeitsmarkt: Testfall für die deutsch-polnische Interessengemeinschaft}, Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2001; Manfred Husmann, “Ost-Erweiterung der EU und Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit”, \textit{Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Arbeits- und Sozialrecht} 13, 1999; Ulrich Becker, EU-Erweiterung und differenzierte Integration: Zu beitrittsbedingten Übergangsregelungen am Beispiel der Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999; For the Bundestag debate see: EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit: öffentliche Anhörung}
workers, project-tied worker (Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer) and border commuters. After 1989 bilateral agreements (and disagreements\textsuperscript{556}) over the rights of subcontractors were constantly reported in the press on both sides of Germany’s eastern border. The problems stemmed mainly from the differences between interest groups — the workers unions opposing employment of the workers from the East and employers willing to use cheaper labour.

Similar differences were at the base of a discussion over the conditions for the enlargement in respect to the construction industry. German unions were not only concerned about Polish workers undercutting German wages but about subcontractors and workers from other EU member states as well. This resulted in a long-lasting struggle within the European Union over a directive concerning the posting of workers and within Germany over a national law setting minimal standards for workers employed by a foreign subcontractor in Germany. In regards to the enlargement the German Chamber of Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag) presented a totally opposite stance. In a paper of April 2000 it argued that it did not share fears of increased immigration. Linguistic and cultural barriers as well as insufficient flexibility would limit migration in a natural way, and, in any case, the immigration of well-qualified workers could be an advantage.

The Federation of German Industry also argued that the EU should hold on to the principle of not allowing long transition periods. Dieter Hundt, the president of the Federation of German Employers Associations (BDA), argued in a press conference on the 18\textsuperscript{th} of September 2000, that transition periods of seven years, as used during the southern expansion, were too long\textsuperscript{557}. Even within limited transition periods, there was a need for flexibility allowing individual member states or sectors to introduce gradually free movement of labour and services on bilateral basis before the end of the transition period.

German farmers eventually, although having had their own special concerns in regards to agricultural policy, viewed that the free movement of labour from the East

\textsuperscript{556} As reported by the author in Rzeczpospolita, throughout years 1996—1999. www.rp.pl/archiwum

\textsuperscript{557} See www.arbeitgeber.de; also Rzeczpospolita, 20 September 2000
should not be banned totally as German farmers used to employ seasonal workers from Eastern Europe. Their pressure on the German agriculture Minister made him asking in a resolution of the 24th of March 2000, that any transition arrangements for labour had to take into account the needs of the German agricultural sector. Those most concerned with the closing borders against the workers from the East were German unions, particularly construction workers’ union, thus from the area, which used to be most targeted by immigrant workers. The trade union federation postulated transition periods on the free movement of workers for about seven to ten years after the accession of the Eastern countries. This stance was supported by representatives of the business community in border regions.\footnote{Deutscher Bundestag, Europaausschuss, Materialsammlung “EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitnehmer freizügigkeit”, p. 60; Deutscher Bundestag, Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union, Wirtschaftliche Chancen und Herausforderungen der EU-Erweiterung: Öffentliche Anhörung am 14. Februar 2001, p. 52.}

B. Government Divided

The German government was divided. The Labour Ministry wanted to address demands of economic sectors and regions, indicating adaptation of the ‘Swiss model’ as adequate for the transition periods rather than the ‘southern expansion’ model and supported a solution, in which there would be one transition period for all member states (with an open option for those member states that wanted to open their markets earlier). The Finance Ministry in turn was more concerned with coordination of social security systems that was directly tied to the freedom of movement question and which had clear budgetary implications. The foreign office under Minister Joschka Fischer took the most more liberal position.\footnote{An interview with Joschka Fischer, Gespräch mit Josechka Fischer über das Koalitionsklima und die Außen - und Sicherheitpolitik”, Der Spiegel, NO 48/23 November 1998} Wolfgang Ischinger, state secretary in the Foreign Ministry, argued that German border regions in particular should not fear a large influx of labour migrants\footnote{Rzeczpospolita, 2 October 2000} because after establishing the free movement of labour, Polish migrant workers would most likely go to regions with high demand for labour rather than regions with high unemployment.

Chancellor Schröder presented an official position of the German government in December 2000. He noted that, in comparison to the transition arrangements for the
Southern expansion of the EC in the 1980s, transition agreements for the Eastern enlargement should be more flexible; Chancellor proposed a seven-year transition period for the free movement of labour, with an option for shortening it for individual accession countries, and, in case of labour shortages. Schröder proposed also restrictions on the free movement of services for selected areas, including the construction sector and handicrafts.  

It met strong criticism in the accession countries whose representatives opposed such transition periods arguing that these demands were based on mistaken assumptions. In Germany the European affairs committee of the German Bundestag, the Association of German Employers (BDA) and the Federation of German Industry supported the flexible and differentiated handling of transition periods but criticized the government’s defensive approach which neglected Germany’s need for immigrants due to an aging population.

2. Agriculture

The Farmers Association (Bauernverband) representing the voice of the German farmers accepted the budget package for 2000-06 as providing adequate funds for incorporating the accession countries into the CAP. It did not see a need for introducing regressive elements into the direct payments scheme for farmers in the existing member states (i.e. reducing direct payments over time to pay for enlargement). The Association did not make any bilateral demands, like in the case of the free movement of labour. However, distributional issues were critical.

561 Bundespresseamt, Bulletin der Bundesregierung, no. 90-1, 19 December 2000; Rzeczpospolit, 22 December 2000
Accession negotiations on the agricultural chapter were opened in June 2000. As particularly difficult were regarded the issues of fixing the quotas, veterinary and phytosanitary standards and the extension of the system of direct payments to the accession countries. Accession countries asked for relatively high production quotas, which were in line with the predicted future level of production. The European Commission opposed this demand and pushed for transition periods. German Farmers Association’s opinion differed with of the Commission on the milk sector. Bauernverband did not regard milk quotas as particularly problematic in the context of EU enlargement, the German milk industry viewed the EU milk quota system as administratively rather complex and difficult and favoured a phase-out of milk quotas.

A second issue, of veterinary and phytosanitary standards, such as sanitary standards for dairies and slaughterhouses, caused a friction with the German representatives. The accession countries asked for transition periods for introducing the EU standards. The German government opposed it on the basis that it would undermine the operation of the single market. The German Farmers Association was of the same opinion as the government.

The most contentious issue was of direct payments, as it had budgetary implications. This issue brought out the contradictions in German policy between advocacy of the Eastern enlargement, and concern with reducing German disproportionate contribution to the EU budget. The direct payments were first instituted to compensate farmers for price cuts. Since integration into the EU was understood as bringing higher prices for the majority of Central and East European farmers, German farmers argued that there was no reason to extend them to the accession countries. However over time other reason for maintaining the payments emerged: they were to be an income support for the poorest farmers. On this basis Eastern farmers should not be excluded. If the payments were to be treated as a reward for stewardship of the land, all farmers should receive such a reward.

566 Ibid.
The EU Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler in a speech on 10 July 2000 stressed a distinction between equal and fair treatment and stated that he was ‘committed to fair treatment of all members, old and new’\textsuperscript{567}. He also repeated other arguments against the extension of direct payments, such as direct payments would not facilitate the necessary restructuring of the agricultural sector in the accession countries and could lead to social tensions between subsidized farmers and industrial workers. German proposals for national co-financing failed in the run-up to the Berlin Summit of 1999 due to French resistance. In the Bundestag debate on the results of the Berlin Summit members of the governing parties claimed that the government had succeeded in defending the interests of eastern farmers preventing the introduction of differentiating elements into the administration of direct payments\textsuperscript{568}. The Bauernverband stated that in principle it supported the extension of direct payments to farmers in the accession countries. This did not end acrimonious negotiations, however they had broader scope than of bilateral German-Polish relations.

3. Border

Another ‘enlargement threat’ was the future border of the EU: over 1,000 km of the borders shared with Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, after enlargement would become a strategic border of the EU. The demand from the EU, to raise the security of this border up to the EU standards, was one of the most forcefully presented to Poland. In order to meet these requirements Poland needed aid (it is worth however mentioning that claims of some scholars that before 1989, there had no been Polish border guards on the Eastern border, only Soviet border guards\textsuperscript{569}, are untrue).

It was Germany that provided a major financial and training aid aimed at increasing the efficiency of the border policing. The first legal regulations according to the EU standards came in the shape of the bilateral Readmission Agreement of 1993 with Germany; it introduced a possibility to gain asylum in Germany once migrants have arrived in Poland. Poland was encouraged to sign this agreement with Germany in

\textsuperscript{567} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{568} Deutscher Bundestag, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Protokolle, 14. Wahlperiode, p. 3690
\textsuperscript{569} Jörg Monar, Justice and Home Affairs, in H. Wallace and A. Mayhew (eds), Poland: A Partnership Profile. OEOS Policy Paper, April. University of Sussex, Brighton: 44, 2001
exchange for funding of 120 million DM to improve its asylum systems and border controls. The further legal adjustment aimed at creating asylum and refugees policies.

Neither of the Eastern countries had any experience in dealing with asylum seekers; they used to produce asylum seekers for decades of communism, but not to host them, except for Hungary, which took on some refugees from neighbouring Romania in the late 80s. The Aliens Act introduced in 1997 constituted the first attempt to regulate comprehensively the situation of asylum seekers and refugees in Poland. It did not however conform to international refugee law standards and the provision was amended in 2001. In order to implement the ‘safe country of origin’ and ‘safe third country’ rules, the Polish government was required to adopt lists of safe countries under former Article 95 (it failed however to agree on similar lists in regards to the citizens of Ukraine).

Initially candidate countries adopted relatively generous policies towards asylum seekers perceiving the influx of asylum seekers as rather temporary. With the EU accession, these states were bound to become more attractive as a destination for refugees and economic immigrants.

The Langdon Report released in 1995 emphasized the need to adopt measures against illegal immigration and build efficient asylum systems in candidate countries. The EU immigration and asylum laws under the new Title IV introduced at Amsterdam Summit in 1998. In particular, the Schengen acquis became part of the EU acquis and, as such, it also had to be adopted by candidate countries. These policies brought the requirement to introduce visas for non-EU citizens. It was particularly sensitive for Poland in the context of Poland’s policy towards Ukraine and Belarus, of which the main goal was to strengthen democratic processes there and one of the instruments was the open-border for the citizens of these countries. That was inducing a special fear among

German society. During the Cold War the borders of the Bundesrepublik had been tightly controlled (the internal German border and the border with Czechoslovakia). Opening borders now raised fears of spilling Russia organized criminal networks, Chinese illegal immigrants trafficked across the border and the like. Those fears were confirmed as justified in the following years, so the quality of control on Poland’s eastern border was of special meaning for the Germans.

4. Living Standards

Apart from the fears of immigration, for a substantial part of the German society the problem was still the German-Polish border, although in a different than historical legacy dimension; it was referred to by German media as a ‘poverty border’.

A national survey of January 2002 showed that nearly two thirds, 61 per cent of the Germans expected a diminution of their individual living standards after the enlargement, whereas only 18 per cent held an opposite view. At the same time, a decrease of the standards of social welfare was expected, with 51 per cent being the highest figure among all current member states (the EU-15 average amounts to 39 per cent). Overall, in the first place it was fears related to the financial implications that explain German reservation against enlargement. The size of the future Union caused serious concerns (mainly connected with the EU functioning, and the lack of adequate reforms, for example on the seize of the Commission) and together with the awareness how much financial help the newcomers would need in order to catch up with at least the lowest level of GDP in the old EU, produced obvious conclusions.

Despite some opinions that the enlargement would be a way of stabilising the new members’ economies and keeping the working population in place, the common perception in Germany was opposite.

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573 Tageszeitung for example used often the notion of the “European border of poverty” (Armutsgrenze Europa)
574 For example Michael Bohmer, Migrationseffekte der Osterweiterung auf die EU-Arbeitsmarkte. Berlin: VWF, Verl. fur Wiss. und Forschung, 2001
IV. OPTIONS

1. Democratic Deficit

The fears connected with the prospect of the enlargement were exacerbated by the introduction of the single currency on 1 January 1999. It came as an expected, yet hugely uncomfortable development for the German society. The abandonment of the powerful Deutsche Mark that epitomized the post-war success of Germany was the first reason for this lack of enthusiasm.

*Euro* never had a solid support in German. The polls of 1994\(^{577}\) indicated 59 percent of the Germans questioned were against the euro, in 1997 52 percent and in April 1999, three months after the introduction still 43 per cent\(^{578}\) were against, and in autumn 2000, according to the German *Fors’ Institute* survey, 56 percent of the questioned wanted to withdraw from the *euro*\(^{579}\). Helmut Kohl justified the abandonment of the D-Mark (and other big political decisions) stressing the higher good, in this case that it was taken in the name of Europe. This reasoning was exploited by the opposite to Kohl politicians, who made an election pledge to abandon the top-down fashion of building Europe, as it was under Helmut Kohl.

As the *euro* was already sealed as a currency in Germany, the enlargement became a new point of reference in the foreign policy debate. The fact that the way of introducing *euro* diminished hugely Germans’ support for anything connected with Brussels, was used now as an argument against ‘concealing the truth’ about the costs of enlargement. The prime Minister of Bavaria Edmund Stoiber announcing his intention to make the issue of the enlargement a central point of his election campaign of 2002, attacked Chancellor Schröder and his Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer on this ground, pointing that their government was exercising 19\(^{th}\) century diplomacy with Brussels and hiding the inconvenient facts about the enlargement from German public opinion\(^{580}\). ‘*The German government wants to push through this issue exactly as it did with the euro with discussing it with the German society*’ — wrote Stoiber. His accusations were reiterated

\(^{577}\) European Commission 1994, Eurobarometer No 41, Brussels

\(^{578}\) Europap 3 November 2000

\(^{579}\) Ibid

by Gerd Müller the spokesman of the CDU parliamentary foreign affairs group. He stressed that the ‘German government should start at last treating seriously national interests’\textsuperscript{581}.

The atmosphere exacerbated by the following media coverage. The respected weekly magazine \textit{Der Spiegel} published in September 2000 the survey carried out by the \textit{Emnid Institute} on the attitudes toward the 13 countries considered for the future rounds of the enlargements (thus including Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey) asking which country a respondent would favour as the first admitted to the EU\textsuperscript{582}. The general support for the enlargement was conditional and the most characteristic outcome of this survey was that over 68 per cent of the questioned did not hold enlargement as a priority for the EU. The most important information in the article covering the \textit{Emnid} survey, was however not about the \textit{Emnid} survey, but about a survey allegedly carried out by the German government’s press office (\textit{Bundespresseamt}) in the border regions of Germany. The aim of this survey was to assess the social mood in regards to the upcoming enlargement. According to the article the results of the survey were so horrifying that the government preferred to keep it secret. The \textit{Bundespresseamt} however denied having carried out any survey like that\textsuperscript{583}.

Other survey worth quoting was the one on the attitudes of the elites carried out in 1998 for the Polish International Relations Centre by two poll-institutions — \textit{Demoskop} on the Polish side and \textit{Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin} on the German side — showed that over 73 per cent of the German elites felt and respected historical responsibility for the atrocities done to the Poles in the past and held that the supporting Poland on its way to NATO and the EU was a moral duty of the German elites. Enlargement had extremely high support among the elites — 85 per cent of the questioned did not have doubts over the admission of Poland to the EU. This rate was similarly high across backers of all political parties — with a record rate of 94 per cent of the FDP voters (Free Democrats Party), 86,5 per cent of SPD voters, 82 of the Green party, 89 of CDU and only 66 per cent of the CSU voters. These results did not however have any impact on the perception

\textsuperscript{581} \textit{The Wall Street Journal Europe}, 7 November 2000
\textsuperscript{582} \textit{Der Spiegel}, 11 September 2000
\textsuperscript{583} Author’s own research in the Autumn 2000.
of the negative sides of the enlargement — here the opinion of the elites was not much different from the perception of the wide public.

For the German public opinion most of the ‘enlargement fears’ were connected with Poland as the nearest and most populous country among the candidates\textsuperscript{584}, and the country burdened with most difficult and most threatening in the view of the German public problems. The last phase of the enlargement process, of the finalising it through the implementation of the means centred the perception of the enlargement in Germany often to bilateral German-Polish dimension of it.

Looking into the German press presenting the developments over the time of five years 1998 — 2003\textsuperscript{585} one can list the main reasons for the fears of the enlargement as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Cheap labour threatening stability of the German labour market
  \item Obsolete Polish agriculture and costs of its modernization
  \item The threat to the internal security given high rate of crimes in Poland and not sufficient security of the Eastern border
  \item The threat to the Eastern border \textit{Länder} due to disparities in wages and social welfare that would attract migration from the East
\end{itemize}

Although the issue of agriculture or cheap labour concerned rather particular interest groups like food producers or specific sectors like of a construction industry, their arguments became a common opinion of the German public. It is important however to outline two other sets of factors completing the public perception of and the discussion over the enlargement. Potential advantages, that the enlargement was to bring, used to be formulated as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item New markets promising the growth of already dynamic trade
  \item New jobs based on the assumed growth in trade and investments in the East
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{584} Poland was the largest candidate country both in terms of area (313,000 sq km) and population (38.6 million inhabitants in 2000)

\textsuperscript{585} Much of this research by author is based on the monitoring the developments on a daily basis, while working as a journalist for "Rzeczpospolita" Daily, the leading daily newspaper with the biggest broadsheet issue in Poland.
• Increased security on the Eastern front thanks to both economic and political stabilisation of the region and the increase of the security standards at the Eastern border of Poland
• Gaining more central position of Germany in the EU

The explanations of the low support for the enlargement pointed to the potential results of the enlargement that should be perceived through the lens of two specific German experiences — economic and social costs of the German unification and the way of introducing the single currency. These areas represent the ground of the debate and reasons why the attitudes of the German public towards the enlargement exacerbated at the time of the Agenda 2000 negotiations over the years 1998-2002.

A new approach of the government to the European policy based on the more assertive voicing of criticism over the burden share and the insistence on the decrease of net payments of Germany escalated the negative perception of the enlargement. The new Red/Green coalition changed the atmosphere around the enlargement — with the questioning of some aspects of the enlargement, what replaced advocacy exercised by the previous government. It took its toll on the public attitude towards the enlargement. In autumn 2000 the Eurobarometer survey revealed the lowest support for the European integration among the German public: 36 per cent of the questioned supported enlargement with 43 per cent against. Two most important issues the German society was concerned with were the labour market and agriculture. Poll questions on consequences of the enlargement for Germany specifically resulted in 20 per cent saying the enlargement would create more jobs and 55 per cent that it would not; 24 per cent that it would improve quality of life and 50 per cent that it would not; and 20 per cent that it would not cost Germany more and 64 per cent that it would. The decreasing trend in the support was to follow in the next years.

German politicians recognized importance of these attitudes for the success of the enlargement. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in his speech on ‘multilateralism as a task of German foreign policy’ argued that the ‘multilateral imperative’ in German foreign

586 For example Klaus-Dieter Frankenberg, “Die Leute mitnehmen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 September 2000
587 European Commission 2000, Eurobarometer No 41, Brussels
policy presented Germany with a number of challenges, including most prominently EU enlargement\textsuperscript{588}.

2. Referendum

The media debate culminated in a surprising development. In September 2000, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen suggested in a newspaper interview\textsuperscript{589} that a referendum could be an appropriate means of legitimization for political projects involving Germany. He pointed out that for ‘treaties which change the character of the state, there should be referendums \textit{(Volksentscheide)}’. In response to the question about a widespread ‘fundamental objection’, namely that ‘the entire Eastern enlargement project is an elite project’ imposed upon people in the West and East, Verheugen replied that the mistakes that were made regarding the \textit{euro}, which was introduced behind the people’s back, could not be repeated. He stressed that in the case of \textit{euro} there should have been a referendum. ‘\textit{It would have compelled the elites to come out of their ivory tower and promote the Euro in dialogue with the people. Now, with the EU-enlargement, we are not permitted to again decide over the heads of the citizens}’ — stated Verheugen. Although his suggestion to put the enlargement at a test of a referendum were entirely in line with the gist of the debate, it caused enormous irritation among other German politicians.

It conflicted with the views of the coalition leadership on how enlargement and the German public’s attitudes towards it should be handled and even with the views of the opposite CDU party, except for Bavarian CSU and Edmund Stoiber, whose rhetoric indicated he would welcome referendum and its doubtlessly negative outcome. The day after Verheugen’s statements, Elmar Brok, the Chairman of the European Parliament’s External Affairs Committee, and a CDU politician, said that Eastern enlargement was a decided matter. If one could ‘\textit{state the basic reasons for eastern enlargement and not just let populism ensue, then one has a good chance to convince the public}’. Brok claimed that the problematic accession candidates was not ‘\textit{taboo because of the political correctness}’ and that ‘\textit{individual countries must be discussed, but not in the manner of an}’

\textsuperscript{588} Bundespresseamt, \textit{Bulletin der Bundesregierung}, no. 53-4, 4 September 2000, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{589} Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 September 2000
election campaign or a referendum. His views were representative for the political elite’s position across the main parties. Yet the public was fed with different views and opinions by the German media.

Verheugen’s proposal met approval of many German commentators and observers. A characteristic comment was that of Tagesspiegel that the time of Kohl’s pathos had passed and now there was time for solving problems in a pragmatic way. But it was rejected by the German government as contradictory with the federal constitution (Basic Law), which for the historical reasons does not provide for this opportunity at the national, federal level.

V. RESULTS

Copenhagen Summit

German government of Gerhard Schröder was not especially successful with the bargaining of the presented German preferences in the financing system of the European Union. The European Commission proposed in January 2002 a financial framework that was a result of the negotiations over Agenda 2000. It was not accepted first of all by the German government; it did not present a detailed reaction but a general criticism of which the main claim was that Germany was not prepared to accept expensive package deals in return for agreement on common EU positions.

The principal argument of the German government was that Germany as the biggest net-contributor to the EU budget and the country that still had to bear costs of German unification should not be ‘overburdened’. The position of the Germans was based on the Agenda 2000 agreement, which was achieved under the German Presidency in March 1999. Therefore, both Chancellor Schröder and his Foreign Minister Fischer insisted on not extending direct payments to the new members from Central and Eastern Europe up to the elections in September 2002 and that a slower gradual phasing-in of

590 Der Spiegel, 4 September 2000.
591 Tagesspiegel, 28 October 2000
candidate countries was envisaged in the Agenda 2000 because of the absorption capacities of the new members.

Chancellor Schröder explicitly presented the view of his government in an article published by the national *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*[^593]. He pointed that Germany alone would have to bear costs of about 2 billion annually for direct payments in the EU of 25, which would be equivalent to a quarter of the total cost. He argued that given the Maastricht criteria for sustaining a balanced budget by the year 2004, these costs could not be taken over by Germany. Schröder also pointed out that proposals by the CDU/CSU to extend direct payments to the new members would have them co-financed from national budgets what would be ‘totally unrealistic’. First, because it would lead to a conflict with the French government, and secondly because the candidate countries could hardly finance the payments from their national budgets[^594].

Chancellor Schröder reminded that his government had supported the proposal of co-financing during the Agenda 2000 negotiations in 1999, but this option was fundamentally rejected by France and other member states[^595]. The German government co-initiated the statement, in the conclusions to the Seville European Council that an agreement on the Common position should be passed to the candidates. According to the statement there was room for a compromise which could be based on the principle of ‘no phasing-in without phasing-out’ which meant that the gradual granting of direct payments to new member states should go hand-in-hand with a phasing-out of direct payments for all member states and CAP reforms[^596]. A solution along these lines could also tune down concerns about a two-class EU, which were strongly voiced by Eastern countries, especially Poland[^597].

On the CAP reform the key coalition remained of France and Germany.

[^594]: The ongoing at the time negotiations over the EU budget were much more complex, with the German, British and other net contributors trying to use the new demands regarding Eastern enlargement to reduce the flow of funds to the Southern EU members and the Southern members trying to put the cost of the enlargement exclusively on the Germans, British and other net contributors.
Schröder’s conflict with the French over the costs and benefits of integration ended up with Schröder’s withdrawal from his position over the German net contribution and the CAP in order — as it was said by Verheugen — to keep the dynamic of the integration\(^{598}\). Joschka Fischer also kept assuring that the Franco-German motor for the European integration remained undaunted\(^{599}\). The two countries agreed at the ‘head of government level’, before the first Agriculture Council in June 2003, that the degree of price cuts and the proportion of production should be lower than proposed by the Commission. Then ahead of the Brussels European Council of October 2002 they agreed that the agricultural budget should be frozen until 2013. This was duly agreed by at Brussels\(^{600}\).

The initial position of Schröder’s government supporting reform of CAP was in principle widely supported in academic literature which pointed that this overly costly policy led to poor quality food and disadvantages for the third world countries\(^{601}\). This critical position was shared by large parts of the Federal Confederation of German Industry (\textit{Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI}) and other interest groups. The farmers’ lobbies were however in favour of the extension of the \textit{acquis} including direct payments to the new members from Eastern Europe\(^{602}\). On the other hand, they refused spending more money on development of rural areas and the limitation in direct payments to large farms\(^{603}\) wanting to postpone any reforms after 2006\(^{604}\).

The negotiations over the entry conditions continued and the final date of enlargement was being postponed. That was the reason why the commitment of the West,


\(^{599}\)Ibid.

\(^{600}\) On prices the proposed cut in cereals prices of 5% was rescinded, the cut in butter prices proposed in Agenda 2000 for the year 2000 was reduced from 35.8% to 25% and frozen until 2005. The milk production quota increase also proposed in Agenda 2000 for the year 2000 was delayed another year to 2006 and additional increases of 2% in quota were dropped.


\(^{603}\) “German Criticism of CAP proposal may delay enlargement”, \textit{EU Observer}, 10 July 2002

\(^{604}\) Ibid.; see also CDU/CSU, Positionspapier zur Agrarpolitik, 1st August 2002, download: http://www.cdu.de/politik-a-z/landwirtschaft/positionspapier_agrarpolitik2.pdf.
and especially of the German government, to the goal of embracing Eastern countries into the EU was ambivalent and perceived as such.

It took four and a half years, from July 1998 to the Copenhagen European Summit in December 2002, to negotiate the conditions of the Agenda 2000. Much of this time was taken by a ‘ping-pong’ exchange of the proposals on certain quotas and transition periods between the Commission, candidate countries and the two main players — France and Germany. Although the Copenhagen Summit eventually confirmed that the first wave of enlargement would take place in 2004, the ‘enlargement package’ agreed upon then was again disappointing to the Eastern countries.

The financial proposals not only did not match those initially envisaged in the Agenda 2000 and agreed on by the Commission in 1998; they provided for even less, than had been agreed upon at the Berlin Council in March 1999, when the budget for six new members was designed. The Copenhagen package, both in agriculture and Structural Funds, offered to the newcomers the conditions less favourable than to the incumbents. The total EU budget was established at barely more than 1% of GDP. That allowed saving the EU funds, since the four extra countries were small, and the time period of membership was reduced by more than half, from 4 years to 18 months, but the budget fell to a lower level, than proposed in Agenda 2000 and at the Berlin Summit.

In the Agenda 2000 negotiations on CAP reform\textsuperscript{605} the German Ministry of Agriculture succeeded in imposing its policy objectives, that were nearly identical with those of the farm lobby, and in opposition to the stance of the Foreign, Economics and Finance Ministries. The increasing skepticism of the German public toward European policies encouraged the farm lobby\textsuperscript{606} to fight the CAP reform more strongly than during the 1992 negotiations. At Copenhagen the Council accepted the Commission’s proposal for the ten-year phase-in to full reimbursement of agricultural direct aids, starting at the 25 percent level, as recommended by the Commission. Under the enormous pressure

\textsuperscript{605} European Commission, 2003d Cap Reform Summary
http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/capreform/agreement-summary.htm

\textsuperscript{606} The core of the powerful farm lobby is concentrated in Bayern, traditional constituency of the CSU. For an assessment of the problems Bayern faced with the prospect of the enlargement see see Bjorn Alecke, Auswirkungen der EU-Osterweiterung auf Wirtschaft und Arbeitsmarkt in Bayern: Studie im Auftrag des Bayerischen Staatsministeriums für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Technologie. Ifo-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Forschungsbereich Sozialpolitik und Arbeitsmarkte. 2001
from the accession candidates, mainly Poland, the Council modified the scheme to allow the new members to ‘top up’ the EU’s reimbursement of direct payments to farmers by 30 percent, bringing the rate of reimbursement up to 55 percent in 2005, 60 percent in 2006, 65 percent in 2007, etc. It also agreed that in 2005-2007, up to 40 percent of the ‘top-up’ payments could be paid out of the EU funds received for rural development.

As a result, while the ten states that were to enter the EU in 2004, would be by aggregation in the first three years of the membership net beneficiaries of the EU, rather than net contributors to the common budget, the financial terms of accession were much less generous than those granted to previous accession candidates. East Europeans perceived these outcomes as the result of the German negotiators’ stance.

SUMMARY

Simon Bulmer studying different facets of German power observed that ‘Germany’s power in Europe during the Kohl period was better seen in pushing for long-term strategic goals rather than the nitty-gritty bargaining over individual policy areas’. This found its reflection in the difference of approaches between Chancellor Kohl and Schröder to the enlargement. The ambivalence in the enlargement policy of the Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s government was created by the gap between the support for the enlargement Chancellor felt obligated to continue, by the commitment of his predecessor Helmut Kohl and the desire to secure Germany’s financial and economic interests, that would be met if the EU members had agreed on the budgetary and institutional reforms. This was an attempt brought about by the changed terms of the ‘contract’ with the German society on the issue of the European integration projects.

A combination of the new sovereign status of Germany and resulting from it an elite debate on the ‘normalisation’ of the foreign policy, with an underlying suggestion to embrace more assertive approach to the national interests on the one hand, and the prospective costs of the enlargement on the other hand, triggered and exposed all threats

and fears, real and perceived of the European integration, epitomised now by the enlargement project. It brought into the policy making process the public opinion in a manner not noted before. And the public opinion at this stage expressed through the media in Germany conjured up fears of social threats. Once opened up during the election campaign, they were difficult to contain later and to a high degree determined the enlargement policy of Chancellor Schröder’s government.

That touches upon the issue of democratic deficit in modern democracies. The phenomenon of differences between the goals and preferences of political elites and the wider public is present in all polities across Europe and the conducting of foreign policy that lacks popular support is rather common. In case of German polity Karl Kaiser observed in 1992, that ‘intermeshing of decision making across national frontiers and the growing multinationalization of formerly domestic issues are inherently incompatible with the traditional framework of democratic control’ 608. Kaiser pointed to the problems that politicians can refer to the collective character of the decision taken and high costs for the country if a parliament rejected the agreement that was negotiated by the governments. This led him to the conclusion that the executive can use the complexity and the lack of transparency of international negotiations to prevent unwelcome intrusions by the parliament or by public opinion before an agreement is concluded. Thirty years later the phenomenon matured into a sharp contradiction between declarations of ‘bringing Europe to the citizens’ and introducing more democracy on the one hand, and institutionalised avoidance of it in practice and keeping citizens consistently at bay.

According to the liberal conception of international relations the state is not an actor but a representative institution, constantly subjected to ‘capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors’609. However liberal

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609 Andrew Moravcsik offers for example a rich theoretical framework for studying collusive delegation based on three general theoretical propositions: 1. international cooperation can have the effect of redistributing (with (i) international cooperation can shift agenda-setting power, (ii) redistribute opportunities for participation in domestic decision-making procedures, (iii) amplify informational asymmetries, (iiii) change ideological justification for policies; 2. the second proposition is that the redistribution of domestic political resources favours those directly in charge of international cooperation, which generally are national executives; 3. the third proposition is that this redistributive effect feeds back into intergovernmental bargaining, generally increasing the
approach assuming that domestic politics determines the possibility and form of international cooperation, departs from liberalism in that that the state is not conceptualized as a ‘problem-solver’ aiming at satisfying societal demands, but as a ‘self-interested’ actor aiming at maximising its own room for manoeuvre.

As Klaus Goetz and Kenneth Dyson\(^6\) pointed the congruency of the Germany’s and the European Union’s interests is based on the consistent pro-European consensus of the German elite, ‘permissive’ public consensus and the basic accommodation between EU and German institutions and policies, which rests on the ‘institutional similarities’.\(^6\) These features Peter Katzenstein described as the key to the ‘softness of German power in Europe’\(^6\).

Lack of permissive consensus on the European policy as led by Chancellor Kohl change this policy during the Chancellor Schröder’s tenure. The new state preferences also shook the pro-European consensus of the German elite. Germany’s political class found itself under a tension between an electorate moving away from ‘pro-Europe’, and even ‘pro-EU’ positions, and the external pressures of Eastern European countries demanding the entry into the EU (after fulfilling a set of difficult conditions). There was no organized attempt on behalf of the German elites to manage public frustration in this respect, as it was no in respect to embracing the EMU.

The analysis of the ‘ambivalence’ variable as indicating the changing concept of the European integration in this case, points out that the normative side of the new concept was gaining in this phase, through the intergovernmental bargaining over the EU reforms and post-enlargement arrangements of the redistributive system, a new economic and financial framework.

\(^6\) Dyson, Goetz, Germany, Europe…, op.cit.

\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^6\) Katzenstein, Tamed Power…, op.cit.
CHAPTER 10

Conclusions

This thesis aimed to find and explain the causes and the reasons of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. There are seven major conclusions that have been drawn from the presented material and they unfold as follows:

1. A Geopolitical and Historically Conditioned Choice. The endorsement of the Eastern enlargement of the EU was an obvious choice for German policy makers as pertaining to geopolitics. The idea introduced by Eastern Europeans was congruent with the most fundamental interests of the German nation, which reflected the core of the national identity — an imperative to overcome the results of WWII and to conduct the policy towards the enlargement on the premises of multilateral cooperation.

2. Two Sets of Constraints. The constraints to the support for the EU enlargement that caused ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy were primarily of political character and occurred first in the external realm. They appeared on the level of concepts and at the stage of conceptualising a new political and security order in Europe, and only afterwards in the economic area. The first constraints belonged both to bilateral relations of Germany with its Western and Eastern partners, as well as to the areas of international security, and interdependencies within the European Union. The second set of constraints was primarily of domestic origins — these were economic interests created by a new domestic setting shaped by the process of Germany’s unification and also interests of domestic groups represented at the negotiations of the accession terms and conditions.
3. Balancing ‘As-Well-As’ Strategy. All the constraints and contradictory interests and expectations of the partners forced German policy makers to adopting a strategy of balancing challenges. This strategy created a background for occurrence of ambivalence in the German policy towards the enlargement, but ultimately decided about the enlargement’s success.

4. Changing Concept of the European Integration. The enlargement policy of the German governments became a part of Germany’s grand European strategy, its Europapolitik. The East European states were included in the European integration policy. It represented a new, expanded concept of the European integration. The analysis of the causes of ambivalence in the enlargement policy of Germany helps to see the process of this change — how the new concept of the European integration was emerging and how German elites shaped this concept.

5. Helmut Kohl’s Leadership. Chancellor Helmut Kohl was called an architect of the enlargement. Given the role of the European Commission in the enlargement process, this opinion may be debatable. But the analysis of the causes of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy provides evidence for this claim; the constantly supportive stance of Chancellor Kohl for the enlargement is visible especially when confronted with constraints and conflicting with the enlargement factors. It is visible in the balancing contradictions tactics. Although the tactics led to manifestations and perception of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement, but at the same time it exposes the consistency of Chancellor’s commitment. It exposes how this commitment was carried out despite contradictions to the moment of the EU decision about admission of the Eastern European countries.

6. New Quality of Ostpolitik. Germany’s policy towards the enlargement, despite its apparent contradictions, introduced a change in German Ostpolitik. The Eastern neighbours gained equal footing with the former main addressee of this policy — Russia. And Germany’s advocacy of the enlargement supported the process of overcoming the difficult legacy of WWII.

7. Theory: Constructivism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism. This thesis demonstrates that Germany’s enlargement policy is possible to understand with the
application of two accounts that are usually considered mutually exclusive, of constructivism and liberal intergovernmentalism.

1. A Geopolitical and Historically Conditioned Choice. For German policy makers the endorsement of the Eastern enlargement of the EU was an obvious choice for historical reasons, both related to the World War II consequences and to the end of the Cold War — it was harmonious with the need for a post-WWII reconciliation with the Eastern neighbours and elevating the relations with these countries. The idea was also congruent with the most fundamental interests of the German nation that were conveyed in the post-war European integration policy through the principle of multilateral cooperation with partners, a feature that allowed Germany to change its international position and standing after WWII.

From a geopolitical point of view the end of the Cold War once more put Germany back in the centre of Europe, as its strongest and largest economy, thus potentially its dominant power. At the same time, German policy makers found themselves forced to operate under a wide range of external constraints, many of them exerting pressures that directly countered the preferences Germany’s partners were pushing for. Eastern European pressed Germany for leading post-1989 changes in European order across a wide agenda; they expected Germany to lead first a process of embracing Eastern Europe into the structures of the European Union and NATO. German policy makers were, however, constrained in their freedom of action. These constrains were shaped by a decades-long semi-sovereign status of Germany and they did not disappear after the unification. On the contrary — fears of the emerging, largest power in Europe, prompted Germany’s partners, France mainly, to imposing on the new Germany conditions that would contain this power. A commitment to the deepening of the Western integration was a tool for this containment.

The choice of multilateral cooperation by the unified Germany can be seen from two points of view. A rationalist perspective points that German policy makers had no alternative but to accept the requests of the Western partners in order to win the unification and save a reputation of a reliable partner. From a constructivist point of view German policy makers did not want to dismiss the requests of their Western partners
because the principle of multilateral cooperation was embedded into the German national identity and Germany’s political rationale and it served Germany’s interests in the world of growing international interdependencies.

Germany’s support for the Eastern enlargement was a strategic choice. And again— it can be seen that for German policy makers and elites this support was hardly a choice. Political circumstances of 1990-1991, the break-down of communism in Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany, forced upon German political elites, and in fact on all Western European political elites, the support for the ambitions formulated by Eastern Europeans to join the Western structures. In this context, the calls of Eastern Europeans for the Western Community to expand were impossible to ignore; for Western policy makers because of the collapse of communism, and for German policy makers because of the successful unification of the German states.

German elites, however, as this research confirms, did not see themselves as having a choice over the EU enlargement, for the reasons entrenched much deeper, in the national identity and deriving from the history of the relations with their Eastern neighbours. The strongest proof is the choice German leaders made endorsing the Eastern Europeans’ goals, despite the opposition to the enlargement first of all France, the main partner of Germany, then of other member states, for whom the enlargement presented a risk of losing economic benefits provided by the EU subsidiary system. They declared and consistently sustained the support for the enlargement also despite the fact that it was in conflict with the commitment to participate in the process of deepening the Western integration.

A strong sense of historical imperative to support the process of overcoming the division of Europe was a primary motive behind Germany’s support for the EU enlargement. It was the main facet of historical reasoning, but it had also a bilateral dimension. The end of communism created a possibility for developing a new quality in the bilateral relations with Eastern Europe, which thus far had been burdened by the unresolved legacy of WWII. Support for the EU enlargement, for political ambitions and goals of the new East European democracies, provided an excellent platform for solving problems and building relations of a new quality.
The support for the enlargement has to be also seen as a logical continuation of the post-war pattern of the FRG’s foreign policy, of which the premise was the European integration. Now, as this principle was strengthened by the successful unification of Germany, it would be historically consistent to follow and spread the unification trend on the whole continent. The success of Germany’s unification also generated expectations that the German political elites should lead the process of the unification of Western and Eastern parts of Europe.

Geopolitical and historical circumstances made thus German policy makers choose to meet the expectations of both Western and Eastern partners, and pursue both deepening and widening of the European Union. It was a choice of the ‘as-well-as’ strategy, which for some scholars represents one of the basic traces of the FRG’s post-war foreign policy. For the same reasons, geopolitical and historical, Germany engaged into a task of securing NATO expansion by smoothing relations with the Soviet Union, employing the same tactics.

Under these circumstances, the ambiguities and inconsistencies of German enlargement policy are explicable. First the enlargement was only a part of Germany’s European policy, its grand strategy of Europapolitik. Second — any explicit strategy for reshaping post-Cold War Europe, if it had been pushed through against the interests of the major partners, would have aroused suspicions and hostility. German policy makers refrained from such a strategy, but it did not protect them from criticism: all of Germany’s partners were frustrated by Germany’s policy anyway. The Western partners were anxious about Germany’s support for the East Europeans’ ambitions, Eastern Europeans feared that Germany would defend the EU internal balance against the enlargement. German policy makers, first of all Chancellor Helmut Kohl, decided that a chief goal of the new foreign policy of the unified Germany would be to dispel fears of Germany’s partners and to balance contradictory expectations.

This set of circumstances constitutes a background for emerging of ambivalence in the policy towards the enlargement. The ambivalence was caused and created by a

613 The two leading authors presenting this much closer to the assumptions expressed in the tradition of the German foreign policy are Timothy Garton Ash and Adrian Hyde-Price; see Ash, In Europe’s Name…, op.cit., Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order…, op.cit.
tension between opposite factors, which first occurred at the time of Germany’s unification and then unfolded along the enlargement project, for the most part on the external board, and only in the last phase of the process, on the domestic level. Yet the German governments, both of Helmut Kohl and his successor Gerhard Schröder maintained support for the enlargement throughout the whole enlargement process, although the policy under Chancellor Schröder differed from the policy of Chancellor Kohl.

History-based and geopolitical factors, and a decision to maintain the principle of multilateralism in the foreign policy, were not the only reasons for supporting the Eastern enlargement. The enlargement also proved to be congruent with Germany’s material interests, which emerged after the collapse of communism. German elites were well aware of a need to stabilize the region and the idea of anchoring Eastern European nascent democracies in the Western institutional framework was a logical and indispensable step. That, together with understanding that the enlargement provided an opportunity to liberate Europe from the remaining WWII legacy limitations, represented a permissive public consensus among German elites. This consensus, however, faced strong conflicting factors not only in the external but on the domestic stage too.

2. Two Sets of Constraints. The research allowed systematising challenges, constraints, and contradictions German policy makers faced while conceptualising and conducting a policy towards the Easter enlargement of the EU. The analysis of the empirical material in this thesis shows that the ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement was not a result of a lack of political will to support this idea. On the contrary — the policy of subsequent German governments, that spanned 14 years, proved to be consistently supportive of the enlargement. Yet this policy was not immune to contradictory factors that were in conflict with the enlargement. The examination of the causes of this ambivalence depicts Germany’s policy as unfolding in two main phases:

1) The first phase corresponds roughly with Helmut Kohl’s tenure; it began at the moment when Chancellor Kohl picked up the idea of enlargement in response to the demands of the Eastern European countries. It was a phase of ‘setting agenda’ — conceptualising and building the enlargement policy both on the EU and of German
foreign policy level. On the EU level it was a phase of designing a roadmap and setting a
timetable for the enlargement as the culminating point. On the German foreign policy
level it was a phase of a strategic reorientation of the Ostpolitik, and including it into a
broad Europapolitik framework. Enlargement’s supporters during this phase faced
political constraints in the external realm: German policy makers were required to
maintain the balance with the United States and Russia in the context of creating a new
security system in Europe and with the Western EU partners in the context of the
enlargement project itself.

2) The second phase started in the mid-1990s and lasted till the completion of the
enlargement in 2004. It began when the timetable was set in the Agenda 2000 programme
and it was a phase of ‘managing the agenda’. German policy makers were faced in this
phase with new pressures and constraints to the enlargement, this time economic and of
domestic origins. The costs of Germany’s unification strained financial capability of the
German states and impacted the attitudes of the German society towards the European
integration, and the project of the EU Eastern enlargement, shifting the enlargement
rhetoric from the normative narrative of values and ideas of the new concepts of the
European organization, to the financial and economic benefits/costs calculation of this
organization.

The research demonstrates that German policy makers while considering the EU
Eastern enlargement faced the necessity to balance first strategic external political
constraints and only then domestic interests and preferences that were in conflict with
enlargement. The former reflect a phase of conceptualising a new European order, the
latter — a phase of implementing the adopted policy.

The first set of constraints, the political and external ones German policy makers
faced in the context of the EU enlargement, were a result of a combination of a specific,
geo-political position of Germany in the heart of Europe on the one hand and the post—
Cold War political circumstances of the European environment on the other. This
combination confronted German politicians with a challenge of making strategic choices
for the new, post-unification German foreign policy, be it in the international security
area or in the European integration area. The elements of this combination were mutually
constitutive: Germany’s geo-political position allowed German policy makers and elites
to co-shape the post-Cold War changes in the security and political order in Europe, for example through supporting the NATO expansion project, or through a domestic debate on a new concept of the European integration.

Economic interests of German actors that were in conflict with the enlargement, and that are so often recalled as the cause of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy, impacted this policy towardsly in its last phase, of negotiations over the admission terms. They impacted the phase of ‘managing the agenda’, slowing down the process of the enlargement, while in the light of this analysis, the main constraints that impacted Germany’s enlargement policy causing the ambivalence in this policy occurred at the first stage, during the process of ‘turning idea into political agenda’. This represents a point of departure of this thesis with other accounts of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy.

The analysis proves that the ambivalence appeared and manifested mainly during the first half of the 14-year long policy. It was Helmut Kohl’s tenure, and the enlargement in the first years was only a concept. Chancellor Kohl picked up this concept as highly congruent with the most fundamental interests of the German nation, that represent the core of the national identity. The subsequent constraints to this concept, and to the Chancellor’s support, occurred on the level of conceptualising a new political and security order in Europe. This is the main reason why ambivalence at this stage manifested as a gap between the supportive rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl and lack of following tangible actions. Only after the concept was uploaded on the EU political agenda (after setting the Copenhagen criteria in 1993), the process of the enlargement gained a tangible dimension of more concrete political actions, but the primary battleground for the enlargement was still a ground of ideas and concepts, and remained as such, until the process entered the phase of negotiations over the entry terms and conditions, that were outlined in the Agenda 2000 programme and started after 1998. The tension that was caused by the domestic debate over a choice between two directions of widening and deepening of the European integration and over the NATO expansion project versus an exclusive European security system, are paramount evidence here.

The second phase, after the Agenda 2000, was a phase of highly tangible and visible actions around the enlargement, because negotiations of quotas, limits and
transition periods are actions by definition. And the scale of engagement of German actors in these negotiations (highly organized and strong interest groups and highly vocal of their interests Germany’s representatives to the EU) made this phase widely reported in media and therefore known. A focus on those negotiations would suggest that this was the phase when the enlargement idea faced the most serious opposing factors, decisive for its success or failure. Yet this research demonstrates that the decisive for a success or failure phase was the initial one, between the years 1990 and 1995, when the enlargement project was in the process of turning it from an idea into a policy.

Domestic interests reflected the exhaustion of the German society with the costs of the unification that were much higher than anticipated. This exhaustion triggered fears about the costs of the EU enlargement. It was not only a strong domestic constraint to the support for enlargement; it also brought about a national debate on the new interests and the new foreign policy of the unified Germany. This debate reflected a generational difference in perception of the past between two government teams — of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. For Helmut Kohl, a promoter of the enlargement, the war was a personal memory and a formative factor of his political philosophy of support for the European integration and for the enlargement; Kohl was perceived as an advocate of the enlargement. Kohl’s successor Gerhard Schröder, who lacked war experience, operated with a different, more material-interests oriented rhetoric and was perceived as less committed to the enlargement and to the European integration too. Yet Chancellor Schröder did not have much choice over the enlargement policy; when he assumed power the enlargement process, set in motion by Helmut Kohl, was already irreversible.

3. Balancing ‘As-Well-As’ Strategy. The constraints and factors that were opposing the enlargement idea forced German policy makers to conducting a policy of balancing challenges. It was ‘as-well-as’ strategy and was carried out consistently over the years in regards to the major external challenges: the European integration, the NATO enlargement and the EU enlargement. For Chancellor Kohl it was a matter of reconciling these directions, not of choosing one over another. This decision to carry out the support for the enlargement, and simultaneously to embrace other, conflicting directions and
challenges made the German enlargement policy often ambivalent, causing both manifestations and perception of ambivalence. But the ‘as-well-as’ strategy employed for balancing contradictory challenges proved highly effective; it was decisive for the success of the enlargement.

It was critical for Germany to save old loyalties to its Western partners, whose support for the Federal Republic was fundamental for its international success after WWII, while at the same time to meet the expectations of Eastern Europeans and support their goal of joining the NATO and European Union structures. It was also fundamental to maintain balance with the U.S. and with Russia in the context of creation of a new European security system. These imperatives were shaping Germany’s foreign policy throughout the 1990s decade. And, as they conflicted with each other, they inhibited the progress of the EU enlargement.

The balancing strategy was apparent the most in three cases — of a challenge to maintain good relations with France which opposed the enlargement, in the case of maintaining engagement into the Western integration project which was in conflict with the enlargement, and in the case of the NATO expansion, which was congruent with the enlargement but delayed its progress.

The first two challenges — the French opposition to the enlargement and the idea of deepening the Western integration first, constrained the enlargement explicitly. The support for NATO expansion constrained the enlargement implicitly, but a final result of this project was highly supportive for the EU enlargement.

French opposition to the enlargement blocked initially a possibility for German policy makers to take up tangible actions that would project the enlargement idea onto the level of decision-making in the EU, and given the position of Germany in the EU such actions are possible to imagine. Instead of taking up actions that would support the enlargement directly, German policy maker responded with an idea of the Weimar Triangle. The Triangle was designed as a diplomatic vehicle for getting the French on board; German policy makers did not push their French counterparts to accept the enlargement, they wanted to convince them to the enlargement, first by creating a potentially favourable platform. It was dictated by a concern to avoid any impression of wavering about the pledges and commitments made to the French partners. German
policy makers were faced therefore with the necessity to balance the relations with France against the emerging new interests in the relations with Eastern partners. The challenge in this phase was of choosing priorities, and an explicit choice of Germany was the Maastricht Treaty. At the same time, the Weimar Triangle was to serve a task of building up a momentum for the enlargement and upgrading the Europe Agreements.

A challenge of maintaining balance between two opposite directions of the European integration was equally complicated. It arose when German leading policy makers put the idea of ‘deepening of Western integration first’ on the table. The commitment to deepening the Western integration, made during the unification negotiations, faced German policy makers with a dilemma how to reconcile two directions, of deepening and widening of the EU. It was a dilemma of a choice, because it was seen as such, both in political and economic terms, by majority of German and Western elites. The initial choice made by Chancellor Kohl of deepening the integration as priority seemed to subordinate the enlargement commitment to the European ‘ever closer Union’. The endorsement of the Maastricht Treaty and the pledge to embrace the European Monetary Union were strengthened then with a proposal of Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble to create the ‘core of the Union’. It presented a risk of suppressing the enlargement idea. But in fact it demonstrated a process of hammering out a consensus over the goals of the German foreign policy, that were set by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and that were about keeping a balance between conflicting challenges and saving the Franco-German relationship intact, building new relations with the Eastern European countries, and supporting both widening and deepening of the EU. As those directions were seen as opposite and conflicting with each other, the German policy towards the enlargement was by default ambivalent.

Nonetheless the ‘as-well-as’ strategy was decisive for the success of the enlargement. Considering the difficulties the members of the Union had at the beginning of the 1990s with working out a coherent framework for institutionalisation of a political dialogue with Eastern partners, it was the Germany’s stance, consistently supportive for the ambitions of Eastern Europeans, and a simultaneous emphasis on the commitment to the Western integration, that led the EU members states to the endorsement of the enlargement. The declaration of the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993 set
the criteria for the EU membership. It opened the way for German policy makers for more decisive politics towards the enlargement and the Structured Dialogue, which was promoted by Germany and provided an institutional platform for a dialogue with Eastern European applicants, was a direct result of this opening. A culminating point of the supportive policy towards the enlargement was at the Amsterdam Summit of 1997, when Germany chose facilitating the enlargement over insisting on agreement on the EU reforms.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl made the enlargement policy an integral part of Germany’s grand European policy, including Eastern Europe into the project of the European integration. His strategy ‘as-well-as’ introduced the relations with Eastern Europe into the EU politics. This change was supported also by the second major factor analysed in this thesis: the process of building a new security system in Europe, for which participation of German policy makers was crucial. They employed a strategy of balancing opposite challenges in this case too.

The initial hesitation of German politicians about the NATO expansion project created ambivalence in the German stance on the new European order, of which the EU enlargement was one of the three pillars. After making a decision to support the expansion of NATO, German policy makers were positioned as a broker for addressing Russian concerns. Although the project absorbed political energy postponing the progress of the EU enlargement but ultimately it helped to facilitate it. The velvet revolution of 1989 that ended communist rule in Eastern Europe was unfinished without new security arrangements that would end the Soviet/Russian influence in the region. The agreement that included Eastern Europe in the NATO pact sealed the post Cold War order in Europe. The success affected the thinking about the EU enlargement in two ways. First, once the new security order was decided, the road to the political new order was open. Secondly, the fact that Russian leaders did not take up any major action against the expansion of NATO, which was moving Western military power right up to the Russian borders, eased the fear about the Russia’s reaction to the plan of moving the political power of the EU right up to its borders.

Given that German policy makers were expected to play a role of a broker between the U.S. and Russia and that it was the German Defence Minister Volker Rühe...
who put the idea of expanding NATO on the table as early as in March 1993, the progress in this area helped to ground the new way of thinking about European order among German and Western elites. The most visible proof of this was the position of Chancellor Kohl himself, who at first was caught off guard by his Defence Minister’s bold proposal, but eventually supported the idea. The balancing strategy ‘as-well-as’, although in the case of NATO enlargement not as pro-active as it was in case of the European integration, also proved to be a winner for Germany. The NATO expansion was to a high degree a success of the German diplomacy.

This strategy was successful in balancing the external constraints outlined above. Addressing domestic challenges required a different strategy — not of diplomacy, but of defending domestic interests. While the multilevel policy-making system of Germany made it possible for specific interest groups to defend their economic interests directly at the European Union stage, like in the case of German Länder, which created their own representation to the EU within the framework of the regional policies, the economic interests of the state, like the issue of Germany’s net contribution to the EU budget, had to be, and was, handled by the federal government.

The federal government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl chose at the Amsterdam Summit the enlargement over the insistence on the impossible at the time to agree upon reform of the EU. The centre in the balancing strategy shifted here in favor of the enlargement but cost Chancellor Kohl and his party the elections in 1998. His balancing strategy was absent from one, vital though area — the relation with public opinion. German governments failed to present the enlargement case in a way that would make this policy better understood and accepted by German society. The result was that the prospective costs of the enlargement, in the context of the much higher than anticipated costs of the German unification, made it difficult for the constituencies to embrace the enlargement. And the Amsterdam Summit contributed to the perception that Chancellor Kohl subordinated national interests to the interest of the European integration.

4. Changing European Integration Policy. The enlargement policy of the German governments became a part of Germany’s grand European strategy. The East European states, through the enlargement policy, were included into Germany’s
European integration policy. The analysis of causes of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement exposes how German elite debate contributed to the change of the concept of the European integration.

In the light of this analysis it was the German debate over endorsing two directions of widening and deepening of the European integration that started this change and contributed extensively to the new shape of this concept. There are two reasons here — the European integration concept originated as a preventive political mechanism against a repetition of war, and West Germany was at the centre of creation of this mechanism. The second reason is that West German elites developed the concept of the European integration as a foundation of the rationale of their foreign policy.

The sense of historical responsibility for WWII shared by German elites, which was at the basis of Germany’s promotion of the Eastern enlargement, had shaped the premises of Germany’s post-war foreign policy. It set a principle of cooperation with other countries and resulted in developing a unique phenomenon of ‘Europeanization’, which with time became imprinted in a ‘genetic code’ of German political elites. The concept of implanting Europeanization into the Germany’s ‘genetic code’ implies that it allowed German policy makers to embrace international interests, making them national interests.

This element, as the analysis of ambivalence that was created by the widening-deepening tension indicates, was at play when Germany chose to champion the enlargement in the name of Europe’s best interests, while at the same time German political elites preferred to prioritize the deepening the integration within the EU. The course was set by Chancellor Kohl; his endorsement of both directions gained a broad understanding among German elites, who saw it as highly congruent with the national interests. And although the domestic debate was elaborating the ‘pros and cons’ of both directions, confronting them in this way, the dilemma for German government executives was not to choose one direction or the other. It was how to balance both directions in order to preserve national interests, how to conduct ‘as-well-as’ politics, thus how to

614 See: Adrian Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order. Enlarging NATO and the EU, Manchester University Press 2000
prioritize choices in a practical way. German politicians’ support for the deepening the EU was a response to the expectations of the Western partners but it was also in the interest of Germany to co-shape the future of the European Union. The support for the enlargement was a consequence of recognising the momentum created by the Eastern countries and a response to their application.

The analysis of the ambivalence variable demonstrates that the ‘as-well-as’ strategy of balancing contradictory challenges initiated the change of the concept of the European integration. A seemingly small shift of accents in the rhetoric of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, from the ‘Western’ to ‘European’ integration was a harbinger of the change.

A phenomenon of the European integration continued to evolve since it was applied in the aftermath of WWII, when the Federal Republic sought a way to rebuild its international credibility. Until 1989 the notion meant the West European integration, by default. After 1990 the term became highly ambiguous. The French, Belgians and Dutch still held it as the West European integration fearing, that the concept of pan-European unity would reduce their influence in the EU and leave Germany as the central power. However, for the reasons indicated above, which made German politicians and elite lend support to the enlargement, German policy makers became much more deeply engaged in the process of the enlargement, than the policy makers of other member states. Therefore the notion of the European integration was evolving much faster in the German elite debate and for German policy makers, than for their French, Dutch or Belgian counterparts.

The analysis of the identified constraints and how they created ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy demonstrates that German policy makers chose the enlargement as one of the prerequisites of Germany’s European policy. The policy of balancing the subsequent tensions created by the French opposition to the enlargement, by the revisionist narrative of the expellees’ groups, by the debate over widening and deepening and by consideration of other than NATO security systems for Europe, led to identifying new dimensions of the European integration. In this way German elites and policy makers expanded the scope of the concept of the European integration, still
maintaining it as a fundamental thrust of their Europapolitk. This is how the concept of the European integration was changed.

5. Helmut Kohl’s Leadership. The view of Chancellor Kohl as the architect of enlargement, which is evoked sometimes in media, can be debatable given the fact that the European Commission played the main role in the decision making process regarding the enlargement. But the analysis of the causes of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement demonstrates that Chancellor’s position on the enlargement was the main factor in smoothing contradictions on the European stage, for example the opposition of French policy makers or a threat of the Russian reaction. And the domestic permissive consensus on the enlargement was brought about under Chancellor Kohl’s leadership.

The decision of choosing the ‘as-well-as’ strategy by Chancellor Helmut Kohl set the course for Germany’s post-unification European policy. But Chancellor Kohl’s commitment to the support for the enlargement was tested at the domestic stage. The German political system, often characterised as a mixed system of parliamentary structures and negotiating procedures, is susceptible to such circumstances. It was however Chancellor as a CEO of the government who had to secure a balance between the national and the international\textsuperscript{616}. This role was clearly illustrated by his work on most of the aspects of the EU enlargement agenda: from voicing the idea, to upgrading bilateral and trilateral relations engaging France, to upgrading the relations of the EU with Eastern countries (Essen Summit), to clearing the way for the enlargement, by completing the Ioannina Compromise. The whole enlargement policy as carried out by Helmut Kohl is the evidence that the decisive voice in directing foreign policy belongs in German political system to the Chancellor. It derives from the Chancellor’s constitutional power to establish Richtlinie.

The most effective tool that Chancellor Kohl used to carry out this policy with was his rhetoric about the unity of Germany and unity of Europe as ‘two sides of the same coin’. It was this unwavering repeating and emphasising the necessity to embrace

Eastern countries into the common European framework that embedded this idea in the Germany’s political rationale, and to a high degree in the rationale of other member states. This is the strongest evidence for Helmut Kohl’s advocacy of the enlargement. It was confirmed in the next sequences when the Chancellor’s rhetoric served introducing the idea into the German and the EU political agendas. The value of Chancellor’s consistent rhetoric should not be underestimated — further developments of he enlargement process show that, in fact, no other German actor but the Foreign Ministry supported the enlargement without doubts or hesitations. The latter was the only actor solidly espousing the idea. First because the role of this Ministry is that of an executive arm of Chancellor, its position on the enlargement was thus the consequence of executing the Chancellor’s Richtlinie. Secondly because both Foreign Ministers in Kohl’s governments in the 1990s, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Klaus Kinkel, were supporters of the enlargement by conviction. German elite, as the domestic debate indicates, was more divided over the choices for the foreign policy.

It also proves that Chancellor Kohl set the course of the EU enlargement policy so firmly that the next Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, although having a different attitude towards the enlargement, had to follow this course. Helmut Kohl set the course firmly, because he derived the support from, and grounded it in, the most fundamental characteristic of the German national identity — of multilateral cooperation in order to overcome shadows of the past. Gerhard Schröder had a different attitude towards the enlargement because both Chancellors represented two opposite political parties, and more importantly different generations that invoked different attitudes towards the historically motivated policy.

The CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s sense of historical responsibility stemmed from the prerequisites of the policy of the old Bonn Republic. German political elites, especially those of Helmut Kohl’s and Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s generation were committed to a goal of addressing and solving the legacy of the past and the end of the Cold War provided such a possibility — for the unification of the German states and for solving the legacy of the past. The last shadows of the past were still present in the relations with the Eastern countries. Not to respond positively to the expectations of the East Europeans, who were applying for European Union membership, would have held
back the process of reconciliation with those nations. It was a moral obligation, but embraced fully into the identity of Kohl and Genscher’s generation.

A generational change at power of 1998, however, brought an element of reluctance to embracing a challenge of reconciliation. In the view of the ‘68’ generation of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, this reconciliation was already achieved. The difference in attitudes towards the ‘moral obligation’ between the two generations contributed to the perception of ambiguity in the enlargement policy under Chancellor Schröder. Schröder used to refer less to the history and more to assertiveness in the new Berlin Republic’s foreign policy. In this context the fact Schröder’s government maintained by and large the supportive stance on the enlargement would imply either a firm, decisively and irreversibly set agenda by Schröder’s predecessor Chancellor Kohl, or that despite profound differences between two Chancellors they had similar understanding and definition of Germany’s interests versus the Eastern countries. Eastern partners found Germany’s enlargement policy more ambiguous under Gerhard Schröder’s government than during the Helmut Kohl’s years.

Some authors like Frank Shimmelfennig consider that the decision about enlarging the European Union was a moral imperative, which exploited a ‘rhetorical entrapment’ to silence the opposition. This rhetorical entrapment prevented EU member states from backing down on their initial declarations of support for the enlargement, and forced them to continuing on the initiated path, whether they still wanted or not. The presented in this thesis analysis can be interpret in favour of the ‘rhetorical entrapment’ claim — the supportive for the enlargement rhetoric of Chancellor Helmut Kohl exploited this entrapment especially effectively. But the empirical material in this research points out that in the case of the German debate and policy towards the enlargement, it was not an entrapment; it was a reasoning grounded deeply in the national identity, especially the narrative pertaining to the experience of war.

6. New Quality of Ostpolitik. Germany’s policy towards the enlargement, despite its inner contradictions, introduced a new quality in the German Ostpolitik: the Eastern neighbours not only gained equal position, but because of and during the enlargement became more important than the former main addressee of this policy — Russia. And Germany’s advocacy of the enlargement supported the process of overcoming the difficult legacy of the past.

Germany’s policy towards the enlargement in an overall evaluation can be seen as a breakthrough in the bilateral relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours. Gunther Hellmann commented that Germany was one of the biggest winners of the radical transformation in Europe during the decade of 1990s. The unification was the first benefit, but Germany subsequently also realized many other of its ambitious goals, like the reshaping of its immediate environment according to its own design by opening up NATO and the EU to its Eastern neighbours.

For the Eastern countries the realization of the aspiration for joining both NATO and the EU was a fulfilment of their strategic national priorities. The German role in both processes allows a conclusion that the idea of the EU enlargement enabled and enforced the change in bilateral relations from the grip of the Cold War and merely on diplomatic contacts, to a full-scale and extraordinarily rich bilateral cooperation. This cooperation was asymmetrical: it was Germany who carried out the costs of the growing scope of cooperation. Germany, throughout the 1990s, made an extraordinary effort to provide a huge financial and institutional aid especially for Poland (but for the Czech Republic too), that resulted in an unprecedented close relationship between the two sides. Never before had the Germans and the Poles worked together so close in so many and various areas as they had during the preparations for the enlargement.

The EU enlargement also proved to be the only concept that was applicable to the relations with the Eastern countries after 1989. According to some authors, like for example the long-serving European diplomat Robert Cooper, the year 1989 marks a breakthrough in European history in a sense that this was not just the end of the Cold

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War, but the end of the balance-of-power system in Europe. The goal behind the Eastern enlargement is an evident illustration of this. The embracing of Eastern Europe was not just a rearrangement of the old system. It was an arranging of a new system, of which the main characteristic was the decline of the *Westphalian* model of the state. Despite the constraints to the enlargement identified and described in this thesis, the decision of German leaders to support the enlargement was driven by the pragmatic motives to achieve a long-term goal of political and economic stability of the neighborhood. The wisdom of the German politicians was expressed by Karsten Voigt, who observed that one can be “encircled by friends only when one takes their interests into consideration”.

7. Theory: Constructivism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism. This research is primarily a constructivist inquiry, as an underlying theoretical explanatory variable for this research is a constructivist concept of the changing of a normative, based on values and ideas, social construct of the international system in Europe. With the exception of the last phase of the enlargement process — of the negotiations motivated by economic interests over the terms and conditions of admission, for explanation of which it is liberal intergovernmentalism most suitable — for understanding and explaining the origins of interests and concepts behind the choices made by German policy makers that created ambivalence in their enlargement policy, constructivism has the most adequate explanatory power.

Uncovering the causes and reasons of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement demonstrated that motives behind Germany’s choices that contradicted the support for the enlargement are possible to understand with the application of constructivist approach, first because the manifestations and perceptions of ambivalence occurred mainly during the first phase of the enlargement process, when the idea was discussed and uploaded on the EU political agenda. The constraints that caused the manifestations of ambivalence at this stage occurred on the level of conceptualising a new political and security order in Europe and making strategic choices of directions in the foreign policy. This is how ‘ambivalence’ variable allows observing the process of

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620 Karsten Voigt Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, 2001
the changing of the European integration concept, and how it became a cornerstone of the new order.

The two level game\textsuperscript{621} is a prime tool employed in this thesis. It allowed capturing the interplay between international and domestic realms i.e. between the enlargement related rhetoric and actions of German policy makers on the external board, and the reasons motivating this rhetoric and these actions on the domestic level. To capture this interplay the two-level game allowed first focusing on the external board and detecting manifestations and perceptions of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy. It then allowed identifying, on the same board, supportive and contradictory to the enlargement factors, concepts and circumstances that were at play at the moment of manifestation of ambivalence (or occurrence of its perception). The second step the two-level game opened was identification of supportive and contradictory to the enlargement factors, concepts and circumstances at the domestic level. This examination started from looking into the process of creation of the policy, thus focusing on the actors, whose rhetoric or actions were detected on the external board.

Only with those points identified, an analysis of the causes of the occurred ambivalence was possible. In the majority of the cases of ambivalence’s manifestations detected in the German enlargement policy, an approach suitable for their explanation is constructivism. The ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy was caused primarily by the fact that German policy makers endorsed simultaneously contradictory interests, e.g. supporting both projects of widening the EU and of its deepening, which were for political and economic reasons in conflict with each other, or balancing conflicting interests of its partners, e.g. of France and of Eastern Europeans. The endorsement of conflicting directions in the foreign policy points to the fact that these directions presented for Germany vital interests. Germany chose therefore a strategy ‘as-well-as’ instead of ‘either-or’. The resulting for the research question was why those interests were important, i.e. what made German policy makers embrace conflicting directions.

Constructivist approach with its focus on ideas, values and social constructs allowed to observe that the interests at the basis of Germany’s choices that led to ambivalence in their enlargement policy were a projection of the ideas and values that are

\textsuperscript{621} Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic…, op.cir
at the core of the post-war German national identity — the historically motivated imperative to overcome the WWII results and of multilateral cooperation with partners. It forced German policy makers to employing the ‘as-well-as’ strategy and balance relations with France against the relations with Eastern Europeans, the challenge of deepening the European integration against its widening, or the U.S. interests against the desire to maintain good relations with Russia. The interests deriving from the premises of overcoming the WWII legacy and of multilateralism, were confronted with both realist structural grip of the Cold War order, as well as revisionist narrative of the historical experience, that was contrary to the narrative embraced by majority of the German elites. But other contradictions were based, like the support for the enlargement on the same premises of multilateral cooperation, or like in the case of a changed domestic setting, caused by the exhaustion of the German society with the costs of the unification, which presented an emerging new set of social constructs in the domestic arena.

Employment of constructivist perspective in this research is congruent with the methodologies of other scholars examining Germany’s foreign policy, and leads to conclusions that too are congruent with the conclusions of the other scholars.

Thomas Banchoff, Gunther Hellmann, Peter Katzenstein, Thomas Risse for example applied broadly a constructivist approach for their analyse of Germany’s European policy, arguing that it is critical to examine the historical, ideational and cultural sources of actors’ identities in order to understand the behaviour of states. States’ grand strategies are considered a result not only of material geopolitical conditions in the domestic and international environments but also of broader cultural determinants. Such an account was appropriate for this research in order to examine how enlargement policy became a part of Germany’s grand European strategy.

The endorsement of the enlargement was primarily a result of championing the European integration. It is however a new (and very challenging in its novelty) dimension of the European integration. In this respect another broad constructivist interpretation applied by Adrian Hyde-Price and Charlie Jeffery is congruent with the findings of this research. Hyde-Price and Jeffery pointed out that Germany’s political elites were engaged after unification in a project of redesigning Germany as a ‘normal’ country, which first and foremost affected the future of the European integration. They integrated Eastern enlargement of the EU into their European grand strategy, redesigning this policy and — as this research proves — the concept of the European integration too. It supports an agreement that exists among the IR scholars and political scientists that Germany was able to take a leading position in the process of shaping an institutional arena in Europe and as this research adds — Germany was able to take the lead through changing, modernising the concept of the European integration. This provides evidence that although a state is not ‘programmed’ to constantly seek a new thrust for its national interests, but Germany, due to its history, has been forced to reinvent its interests.

The implementation of the new Eastern policy into the main thrust of the German European policy makes the case also for fulfilling the concept of the ‘civilian power’ that has been applied to Germany by numerous scholars. After unification, contrary to the predictions of neorealists, Germany did not seek autonomy maximization strategies in the regional context through for example the Mitteleuropa concept, or unilateral freedom of action at the expense of multilateralism and the integration. As elaborated in this thesis, constraints to the enlargement indicate that actions of German politicians were conditioned by the circumstances of cooperation with their European partners. Yet the established position of Germany — through its consistent multilateral cooperation with other states and Europeanized identity — allowed German governments to push its

624 Hans Maull, “Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, Europa-Archiv, 10, 1992
weight around in the EU arena, establishing new rules and modifying or abandoning others, like with the new concept of the European integration.

German scholar Gunther Hellman pointed out that the Federal Republic of Germany had become a Civilian Power in its own self-image, because it had learnt from the world, and its own history, but “more than anything else because the allies wanted it to be that way”626. German policy makers supporting the Eastern enlargement of the European Union proved that the Germany has become a Civilian Power in its own fully-fledged self-image. During 14 years after the unification and regaining full sovereignty, despite powerful constraints and contradictory factors, interests and concepts pertaining to the new, post-Cold War organization of Europe, German policy makers supported consistently the project of the Eastern enlargement of the EU till its’ successful completion. They did it not only without inflaming any relations in Europe, but with maintaining vital partnerships, building new ones and strengthening Germany’s position as the Civilian Power.

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